Wassmer vs.

Velez

FACTS:

Francisco Veles and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided
to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954, Velez
left a note for his bride-to-be, which reads:

“Dear Bet, We will have to postpone wedding –– My mother opposes it. I am leaving on
the Convair today. Please do not ask too many people about the reason why –– That
would only create a scandal.”- Pacquing.”

Thereafter, Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. Wassmer sued Velez for
damages. Velez contended that “there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing” an
action for breach of promise to marry. The records reveal, however, that on August 23,
1954 Wassmer and Velez applied for marriage license, which was subsequently issued.
Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to
relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-be’s trousseau, party dresses and
other apparel for the important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor
and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories was bought.
And then, with but two days before the wedding, Velez simply called off the wedding,
went to Mindanao and never returned and was never heard from again.

RULING:

This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. Mere breach of promise to marry
is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-
described preparation and publication, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is
about to be solemnized is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to
good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance
with Article 21 of the Civil Code.
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

Gashem is an Iranian citizen and an exchange student taking a medical course at

Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City. Sometime in 1987, Gashem courted
Marilou Gonzales and proposed to marry her. Marilou accepted his love on the
condition that they would get married and they agreed to get married after the end of the
school semester, which was in October 1987. Gashem then visited Marilou’s parents in
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage. Sometime in
August 1987, Gashem forced Marilou to live with him in the Lozano Apartments. She
was a virgin before she began living with him. Soon, Gashem’s attitude towards Marilou
started to change. He maltreated and threatened to kill her and as a result of such
maltreatment, she sustained injuries. At the confrontation before the representative of
the barangay captain of Guilig, Gashem repudiated their marriage agreement because
he was already married to someone living in Bacolod. Marilou thus filed a complaint for
damages against Gashem.

RULING:

Gashem is liable for damages. The Supreme Court ruled that where a man’s promise
to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and
his representation to fulfil that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the
giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention
of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to
entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could
justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to
marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor
and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should
have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

In the instant case, it was Gashem’s “fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love
for and promise to marry Marilou that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood
to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on Gashem’s part that made
Marilou’s parents agree to their daughter’s living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage.” In short, Marilou surrendered her virginity, the cherished
possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral
seduction.
Pe v. Pe

FACTS:

Alfonso Pe, a married man, was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Becco, a
collateral relative of Lolita Pe’s father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their
family name, Alfonso became close to Lolita’s family who regarded him as a member of
their family. Sometime in 1952, Alfonso frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext
that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love
with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also
in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged love notes with
each other. The rumors about their love affair reached the ears of Lolita’s par- ents
sometime in 1955, and since then Alfonso was forbidden from going to their house and
from further seeing Lolita. The affair continued nonetheless. On day in 1957, Alfonso
wrote Lolita a note asking her to have a date with him. When Lolita went to see him, the
two decided to elope and Lolita never returned home. The parents, brothers and sisters
of Lolita sued Alfonso for damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code.

RULING:

Alfonso is liable for damages. The circumstances under which Alfonso tried to win
Lolita’s affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an
ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love
with him. No other conclusion can be drawn from the chain of events than that
defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the
affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he
has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a
married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new
Civil Code.
Globe Mackay Cable & Radio Corp. vs. CA 176

FACTS:

Restituto Tobias was employed by Globe Mackay as purchasing agent and

administrative assistant the engineering operations manager. Fictitious purchases and
other fraudulent transactions were discovered and the same were attributed to Tobias,
who ironically was the one who actually discovered and reported the anomalies. One
day after Tobias made the report, Herbert Hendry, the EVP and GM of Globe,
confronted him by stating that he was the number one suspect and ordered him to take
a one week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers
open, and to leave the office keys.

When Tobias returned to work after his forced leave, Hendry again went to him and
called him a “crook” and a “swindler.” He was then ordered to take a lie detector test.
He was also instructed to submit specimen signatures of his handwriting, signature and
initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the
anomalies. The Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report clearing
Tobias of participation in the anomalies. Not satisfied with the police report, Hendry
hired a private investigator who submitted a report finding Tobias guilty. This report
however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be conducted.
Nevertheless, Hendry issued a memo suspending Tobias from work preparatory to
the filing of criminal charges against him.

HELD:

Petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to Tobias
and for which the latter must be indemnified. Even granting that petitioners might have
had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was
exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable.
Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive
manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-
delictual acts committed by petitioners.
St. Louis Realty Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

St. Louis Realty Corporation (SLRC) published an advertisement in the Sunday Times
of December 15, 1968, with a heading “WHERE THE HEART IS,” whereby the
residence of a doctor was erroneously depicted as the residence of a family (different
from that of the doctor’s) that had recently moved into the Brookside Hills community.
Noticing the mistake, the doctor called the attention of the advertiser whose officer
subsequently offered his apologies but without however rectifying the published item.

However, when the lawyer of the doctor demanded actual, moral and exemplary
damages from the advertiser on account of the erroneous publication, the advertiser
published a new advertisement, in the Manila Times of March 18, 1969, wherein the
same family as in the original advertisement was depicted with its real house but no
apology to the doctor or an explanation of the error in the original advertisement was
made. Moreover, after the doctor had filed a complaint for damages, the advertiser
published a “Notice of Rectification” in a space 4 by 3 inches, claiming that its print ad
“Where the Heart Is” which appeared in the Manila Times issue of March 18, 1969 was
a rectification of the same ad that appeared in the Manila Times (Sunday Times) issue
of December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969, wherein a photo of the house of another
Brookside homeowner was mistakenly used as a background for the featured
homeowner. In the lower court, the judge ruled that the advertiser committed a mistake
which violated the complainant’s right to privacy and should have immediately
published a rectification and apology, but because of its mistake and utter lack of
sincerity, defendant had caused complainant to suffer mental anguish in addition to
actual damages resulting from reduced income.

RULING:

When the matter was elevated to the Supreme Court after the appellate court had
affirmed the lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court declared that the St. Louis
Realty’s employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the residences in a widely
circulated publication like the Sunday Times and it never made any written apology and
explanation of the mix-up but just contended itself with a cavalier “rectification.” As a
result of the mix-up, the private life of complainant was mistakenly and
unnecessarily exposed causing him to suffer diminution of income and mental
anguish. According to the Court, the acts and omissions of St. Louis Realty fall under
Article 26.
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 150758 (February 18, 2004)

FACTS:

Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private

complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge
Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and
Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter
part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously
married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed
Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes.
Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he
shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit
with Villareyes.

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one
with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. When Ancajas learned of this third
marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married
to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner,
Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. The trial
court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of bigamy. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused for the crime
of bigamy despite clear proof that the marriage between the accused and
private complainant had been declared null and void ab initio and without
legal force and effect.

HELD: As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage

during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy,
notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void
ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of

petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas
would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s
psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for
bigamy.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10,
1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy
had already been consummated. Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an
Capili vs. People
G.R. No. 183805 (July 3, 2013)

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the RTC.
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1)
there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage
before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event
that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the
charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of
nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant
criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second

marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.

RULING: Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the
crime of bigamy as follows:

Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has
been legally married; (2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.

In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy
were present when the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private
respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a
valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted
on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the
bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private
respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage
for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for
the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be
charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration
of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still
subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.
Montañes v. Cipriano
G.R. No. 181089 (October 22, 2012)

FACTS: On April 8, 1976, Lourdes Cipriano (Lourdes) married Socrates Flores

(Socrates). On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage,
Lourdes married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio). In 2001, Lourdes filed with the
RTC of Muntinlupa a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates
on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The RTC rendered its
decision declaring the marriage of Lourdes with Socrates null and void. Said
decision became final and executory on October 13, 2003.

On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the
first marriage, filed a complaint for bigamy against Lourdes alleging that
Lourdes failed to reveal to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates.
Lourdes moved to quash the information alleging that her first marriage to
Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no
more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24,
1983. She also averred that she had contracted her second marriage before
the effectivity of the Family Code; hence, the existing law at that time did not
require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to
contracting a subsequent marriage. Hence, the RTC granted the motion to
quash.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC is correct in quashing the information for
bigamy.

HELD: The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been
legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his
or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the
second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for
bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage.

In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage

with Silverio in 1983, her first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was
still subsisting as the same had not yet been annulled or declared void by a
competent authority. Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity was declared only in 2003.
In Mercado v. Tan, we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the
nullity of the first marriage was immaterial, because prior to the declaration
of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the
declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied
retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said
"Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to explain, thus: “The fact that
procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive
application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.” GRANTED.