2NC

AT: PDB -- Extra

Regulatory overlap creates chaos and undermines effectiveness of both branches
Aagaard 11 – Todd Aagaard is a Professor of Law at Villanova University. ("Regulatory overlap,
overlapping legal fields, and statutory discontinuities", HeinOnline, 7-16-11, https://heinonline-
org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/HOL/Page?
handle=hein.journals/velj29&div=14&g_sent=1&casa_token=&collection=journals, accessed 7-17-
20)//kel$

The traditional criticism of regulatory overlap asserts that it leads to duplication that wastes government resources.
In 1922, for example, Francis W. Coker argued for consolidating agency programs on the ground that "[n]o serious exception can be taken" to
"the principle of economy: save money and effort by eliminating duplication and overlapping of activity; save both in
overhead expense and in clerical, inspectional, and other subordinate work, by bringing together into one large department
agencies performing closely similar and closely interrelated functions ." Similar ideas persist today. Even if regulatory
overlap has some benefits and therefore does not entirely waste government resources, it still costs more to administer
overlapping programs than to run a single consolidated program. Conflict In addition to targeting overlap on the
ground that it creates waste, analysts and scholars have noted other problems. Giving multiple agencies jurisdiction to
regulate in the same area creates opportunities for conflicting regulations. Regulations that do not directly conflict-i.e., it is
possible to comply with both sets of regulations-still may regulate inconsistently or work at cross-purposes . Regulations
that conflict or work inconsistently create incoherence, undermine each other's effectiveness, and increase
compliance burdens on the targets of regulation.

Congress will be seen as overriding Court decisions, politicizing the plan

Hasen 18 – Richard L. Hasen is an American legal scholar and expert in legislation, election law and
campaign finance. (“End of the Dialogue: Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress”,
HeinOnline, January 18, https://heinonline-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/HOL/Contents?
handle=hein.journals/scal86&id=1&size=2&index=&collection=journals, accessed 7-23-20)//kel$

Consistent with Eskridge, there is a broad, technical literature in public choice and positive political
theory which generally posits that the Justices seek to interpret federal statutes as close as possible to
their own preferences without being overridden by Congress. 47 The chances of congressional override
depend not only upon the preferences of the median member of Congress but also upon the
preferences of committee chairs and party leaders, who act as the gatekeepers for legislation. Jeb
Barnes's detailed study of one hundred randomly selected overrides in the 1974-1990 period found that
"members of Congress-or, more precisely, members of prestige and re-election committees-tend to
draft more comprehensive and effective overrides, especially when the override issue involves the
collection of tax revenue." 48 Further, "if the override issue split the courts along partisan lines in the
pre-override period, federal judges seemed more likely to resist congressional oversight, especially
when the issue involved the interpretation of the statutory rights of discrete, insular minorities, such as
African Americans or immigrants."4 9 Nancy Staudt, Ren6 Lindstildt, and Jason O'Connor canvassed all
express congressional responses-and not just overrides-to Supreme Court tax decisions from 1954 to
2005. The authors found that the Court-Congress dynamic is not unidimensional but rather nuanced and
varied. The existing literature implies when Congress responds to the Court, it does so in a hostile
manner. To be sure, judicial decisions often spark a negative response in Congress, but nearly as often
the cases lead to supportive and positive responses, like codification legislation.50