1AC -- Enlargement

1AC -- Plan
The United States federal government should substantially reduce its alliance
commitments with North Atlantic Treaty Organization member states by at least
substantially limiting the conditions under which its defense pact can be activated in
the East European Plain.
 1AC -- Bucharest
Advantage One is Bucharest:
Continued commitment to the Bucharest Declaration ensures Ukrainian and Georgian
membership -- starts Cold War 2.0.
Menon and Ruger ’20 [Rajan and William; May 11; Chair in Political Science at the City University of
New York, Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia
University and a Global Ethics Fellow at the Carnegie Council on Ethics in International Affairs, Ph.D. at
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Research Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato
Institute, former Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Texas State University;
Nature Public Health Emergency Collection, “NATO enlargement and US grand strategy: a net
assessment,” https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7212247/; RP]
Hazards of continued NATO enlargement

NATO enlargement created a new dividing line between Russia and the West in post-Cold War Europe. It
helped increase the security dilemma between Russia and the USA while contributing to the emergence of what
many commentators refer to as a second Cold War . Both countries have missed the benefits of cooperating to
solve global challenges . They could also have worked together to balance a rising China, with which
Russia has aligned as its relationship with the USA has deteriorated . Further, as NATO has opened its doors
to several states that are hard to defend, the USA has assumed still more obligations even as new challenges
arise. That in turn has revealed or exacerbated some of the problems built into its primacist grand strategy. NATO
enlargement has, in short, been an unforced error . To mitigate the consequences of this error, the USA and
NATO should shut the alliance’s open door . Doing so would be safe and beneficial , especially given

that Russia’s status as a great power competitor has been overblown (Menon 2020).

Yet NATO has repeatedly proclaimed that its door remains open , including to two of the most
controversial would-be members, Georgia and Ukraine . In late 2017, Vice President Mike Pence insisted during a
visit to Georgia: ‘President Trump and the USA stand firmly behind the 2008 NATO Bucharest statement which
made it clear that Georgia will, someday, become a member’ (White House 2017). As one of us noted at the time, ‘Indeed,
Pence practically suggested Georgia is already an ally with security guarantees, pointing out that “the joint
military operations that are taking place today we hope are a visible sign of our commitment to Georgia’s
sovereignty and to her internationally recognized borders”’ (Ruger 2017). Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reiterated
Pence’s promise in June 2019, remarking that ‘Georgia’s efforts give me great confidence to speak for President Trump, and all of the
US Government, when I say that you will continue to have the support of the USA as you seek to become a
NATO member ’ (US Department of State 2019). And despite asking ‘Do you think Americans care about Ukraine?’ just before a January
2020 trip to that country, once in Kyiv Pompeo stated that the USA had ‘ maintained support for Ukraine’s efforts to
join NATO and move closer to the European Union’ (US Embassy in Ukraine 2020).
That causes European war -- it’s a red-line that threatens regime survival.
Mearsheimer ’14 [John; October 2014; Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the
University of Chicago, Ph.D. in Political Science from Cornell University; Foreign Affairs, “Why the
Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-
ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault; RP]
According to the prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ukraine crisis can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression. Russian President
Vladimir Putin, the argument goes, annexed Crimea out of a long-standing desire to resuscitate the Soviet empire, and he may eventually go
after the rest of Ukraine, as well as other countries in eastern Europe. In this view, the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in
February 2014 merely provided a pretext for Putin’s decision to order Russian forces to seize part of Ukraine.

But this account is wrong : the U nited S tates and its European allies share most of the responsibility for
the crisis. The taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement , the central element of a larger strategy
to move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West. At the same time, the EU’s
expansion eastward and the West’s backing of the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine -- beginning with the
Orange Revolution in 2004 -- were critical elements, too. Since the mid-1990s, Russian leaders have adamantly

opposed NATO enlargement, and in recent years, they have made it clear that they would not stand by while
their strategically important neighbor turned into a Western bastion . For Putin, the illegal
overthrow of Ukraine’s democratically elected and pro-Russian president -- which he rightly labeled a “coup” -- was the
final straw . He responded by taking Crimea , a peninsula he feared would host a NATO naval base ,
and working to destabilize Ukraine until it abandoned its efforts to join the West. 

Putin’s pushback should have come as no surprise . After all, the West had been moving into Russia’s
backyard and threatening its core strategic interests , a point Putin made emphatically and repeatedly.
Elites in the United States and Europe have been blindsided by events only because they subscribe to a flawed

view of international politics. They tend to believe that the logic of realism holds little relevance in the twenty-
first century and that Europe can be kept whole and free on the basis of such liberal principles as the rule of law,
economic interdependence, and democracy.

But this grand scheme went awry in Ukraine. The crisis there shows that realpolitik remains relevant—
and states that ignore it do so at their own peril . U.S. and European leaders blundered in
attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia’s border. Now that the consequences
have been laid bare , it would be an even greater mistake to continue this misbegotten policy.
The Western Affront

As the Cold War came to a close, Soviet leaders preferred that U.S. forces remain in Europe and NATO stay intact, an arrangement they thought
would keep a reunified Germany pacified. But they and their Russian successors did not want NATO to grow any
larger and assumed that Western diplomats understood their concerns. The Clinton administration evidently
thought otherwise, and in the mid-1990s, it began pushing for NATO to expand .

The first round of enlargement took place in 1999 and brought in the Czech Republic , Hungary , and
Poland . The second occurred in 2004; it included Bulgaria, Estonia , Latvia , Lithuania , Romania ,
Slovakia , and Slovenia . Moscow complained bitterly from the start . During NATO’s 1995 bombing campaign
against the Bosnian Serbs, for example, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said, “This is the first sign of what could happen
when NATO comes right up to the Russian Federation’s borders . ... The flame of war could burst out
across the whole of Europe .” But the Russians were too weak at the time to derail NATO’s eastward
movement -- which, at any rate, did not look so threatening, since none of the new members shared a
border with Russia, save for the tiny Baltic countries.

Then NATO began looking further east . At its April 2008 summit in Bucharest , the alliance considered
admitting Georgia and Ukraine . The George W. Bush administration supported doing so, but France and Germany opposed the
move for fear that it would unduly antagonize Russia. In the end, NATO’s members reached a compromise: the alliance did

not begin the formal process leading to membership, but it issued a statement endorsing the aspirations of Georgia and
Ukraine and boldly declaring, “These countries will become members of NATO .” 

Moscow, however, did not see the outcome as much of a compromise. Alexander Grushko, then Russia’s deputy foreign
minister, said, “ Georgia’s and Ukraine’s membership in the alliance is a huge strategic mistake which would
have most serious consequences for pan-European security.” Putin maintained that admitting those two
countries to NATO would represent a “ direct threat ” to Russia. One Russian newspaper reported that Putin, while
speaking with Bush, “very transparently hinted that if Ukraine was accepted into NATO, it would cease to
exist .”

Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008 should have dispelled any remaining doubts about Putin’s
determination to prevent Georgia and Ukraine from joining NATO . Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who was
deeply committed to bringing his country into NATO, had decided in the summer of 2008 to reincorporate two separatist regions, Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. ButPutin sought to keep Georgia weak and divided -- and out of NATO . After fighting broke out
between the Georgian government and South Ossetian separatists, Russian forces took control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow had

made its point. Yet despite this clear warning , NATO never publicly abandoned its goal of bringing
Georgia and Ukraine into the alliance. And NATO expansion continued marching forward , with
Albania and Croatia becoming members in 2009.
The EU, too, has been marching eastward. In May 2008, it unveiled its Eastern Partnership initiative, a program to foster prosperity in such

countries as Ukraine and integrate them into the EU economy. Not surprisingly, Russian leaders view the plan as hostile to
their country’s interests . This past February, before Yanukovych was forced from office, Russian Foreign
Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the EU of trying to create a “ sphere of influence ” in eastern Europe. In the
eyes of Russian leaders, EU expansion is a stalking horse for NATO expansion . 

The West’s final tool for peeling Kiev away from Moscow has been its efforts to spread Western values and
promote democracy in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states, a plan that often entails funding pro-Western individuals and
organizations. Victoria Nuland, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, estimated in December 2013 that the
United States had invested more than $5 billion since 1991 to help Ukraine achieve “the future it deserves.” As part of that effort, the U.S.
government has bankrolled the National Endowment for Democracy. The nonprofit foundation has funded more than 60 projects aimed at
promoting civil society in Ukraine, and the NED’s president, Carl Gershman, has called that country “the biggest prize.” After Yanukovych won
Ukraine’s presidential election in February 2010, the NED decided he was undermining its goals, and so it stepped up its efforts to support the
opposition and strengthen the country’s democratic institutions.
When Russian leaders look at Western social engineering in Ukraine , they worry that their country might be
next . And such fears are hardly groundless. In September 2013, Gershman wrote in The Washington Post, “Ukraine’s
choice to join Europe will accelerate the demise of the ideology of Russian imperialism that Putin
represents.” He added: “Russians, too, face a choice, and Putin may find himself on the losing end not just in
the near abroad but within Russia itself.”

Two scenarios for escalation:

First -- brinksmanship -- Russia will gamble with direct nuclear threats to force NATO’s
exit.
Grover ’18 [John; July 11; M.S. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from George Mason University, B.A.
in Government and Legal Studies from Bowdoin College, fellow at Defense Priorities and assistant editor
at the National Interest; The American Conservative, “Admitting Ukraine Into NATO Would Be A Fool’s
Errand,” https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/admitting-ukraine-into-nato-would-be-a-
fools-errand/; RP]

This week, President Trump is meeting with allied heads of state at a summit of the N orth A tlantic T reaty O rganization
(NATO). Among the many items on the agenda is the question of enlarging NATO to include other
countries such as Ukraine . Although Russian aggression in Ukraine has been rightly condemned, those
who urge for NATO to accept Ukraine as a full member are making a grave mistake .

If Ukraine joined NATO, it would become an even more unstable hotspot that America would be
obligated to defend . Why should the U.S.  risk war  with a nuclear-armed Russia in Moscow’s
backyard ? NATO is a military alliance to defend Europe, not a democracy-promotion machine intended to reorder the political
equilibrium in every European country. Though Washington may wish it, NATO cannot solve every problem nor can it smooth over
all local flash points .
It’s easy to understand why some wish to bring Ukraine under the alliance’s security umbrella. After all, NATO has deterred Soviet and Russian
aggression for nearly 70 years, and good Westerners who watched the Maidan protests have had their heart strings pulled. But expanding

NATO means that if Ukraine asks for help in its current war, America’s sons and daughters will be called
upon to die . If Trump and other administration officials asked American voters whether that’s something they want, the answer would
be a firm “no.”

Furthermore, calls for Ukraine to join NATO forget that   deterrence works  because it relies on m utually
a ssured d estruction (MAD) and on some level of respect for each side’s national interests . When one side
communicates that it no longer cares about the other’s security concerns, the likelihood of war
skyrockets . For instance, in 1962, when Moscow put missiles in Cuba , America reacted very forcefully to
get the Soviet Union to remove them —even though doing so brought the world to the brink . Furthermore,
in 1983, when NATO staged its largest-ever exercises under Reagan—known as Able Archer 83—the Soviet Union
thought it was a cover for an attack and nearly launched their own nuclear strikes as a result.
These same dynamics apply to Ukraine and the question of NATO accession . Although obviously the United
States would never deliberately attack Russia, it doesn’t look that way from Moscow. Whether
anyone likes it or not, Putin believes that Russia is reacting defensively and fears the possibility of a
NATO-led overthrow of his government. He saw what happened when the Western-backed Maidan toppled
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and thinks America might be tempted to do the same to him. As a result of
this—and of Putin’s general revisionism— Russia is the spoiler  for any Ukrainian conflict and would likely
escalate  the use of force to keep Ukraine out of NATO.

This is why U.S. deterrence wouldn’t apply as easily to Ukraine if it did start the process of joining NATO. If
Russia was willing to annex Crimea and invade eastern Ukraine as a de facto veto on Ukraine’s
NATO aspirations, it would certainly do far worse if official accession plans were announced. So far, NATO
has pledged that Ukraine will one day join , but no such plans have been implemented. Additionally, it would likely take
several  years of reforms  in accordance with a  m embership a ction p lan before Ukraine could join NATO,
which would give Russia time to react .

If Russia believes Ukraine is worth fighting for, then America and NATO need to deeply consider the implications rather
than just push ahead for membership. To ignore this reality is to be naïve about how the world works.
America cannot be the world’s crusader for democracy in every crisis. Where would that end? The argument that other
countries’ interests do not matter and that the U.S. just needs to bring everyone under its protective umbrella

collapses on itself . Reduced to its absurd logical conclusion, that would mean America should try to protect
literally every state on the planet from aggression and dictatorship while also preparing to fight anyone—even
nuclear powers —who gets in the way. The brutal truth is that the U.S. needs to protect its own democracy and prosperity. We cannot
always save the day and Washington can no more deliver a perfectly happy ending to Ukraine than it could to Iraq .

As former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer wrote, “Until the simmering conflict in the Donbas and frozen
conflict in Crimea are resolved, Ukraine has little prospect of membership. Bringing Ukraine in with the
ongoing disputes would mean that NATO would face an Article 5 contingency against Russia on day
one of Kyiv’s membership.” Moreover, Henry Kissinger himself has urged that Ukraine ought to be considered a
bridge between West and East rather than another potential NATO ally.

Washington needs to realize that NATO’s expansion is not always in America’s interests and that in this case the cost
would be far too high . The United States should focus on holding NATO’s interest-based red lines while
Russia’s interests —challenging them where we must but not in every possible
also recognizing

circumstance. The alternative would be for the Second Cold War to drag on longer than is necessary to the risk of all.

Second -- escalation spirals -- gray zone provocations incent uncontrollable

divergences in escalation ladders -- culminates in use-it-or-lose-it AND electronic
warfare.
Beebe ’19 [George; October 7; Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for the National
Interest, M.A. in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia; Politico, “We’re More at Risk of Nuclear
War With Russia Than We Think,” https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/10/07/were-more-
at-risk-of-nuclear-war-with-russia-than-we-think-229436; RP]

Today, that old dread of disaster has all but disappeared, as have the systems that helped preclude it. But the actual threat of
nuclear catastrophe is much greater than we realize. Diplomacy and a desire for global peace have given
way to complacency and a false sense of security that nuclear escalation is outside the realm of
possibility. That leaves us unprepared for—and highly vulnerable to—a nuclear attack from Russia.

The most recent sign of American complacency was the death , a few weeks ago, of the I ntermediate-Range N uclear
F orces Treaty—a pivotal 1987 agreement that introduced intrusive on-site inspection provisions, destroyed an entire class of dangerous
weaponry, and convinced both Washington and Moscow that the other wanted strategic stability more than strategic advantage. The New

START treaty, put in place during the Obama administration, appears headed for a similar fate in 2021. In fact, nearly all
the key U.S.-Russian arms control and confidence-building provisions of the Cold War era are dead
or on life support , with little effort underway to update or replace them.

Meanwhile, U.S. officials from both parties are focused not on how we might avoid nuclear catastrophe but
on showing how tough they can look against a revanchist Russia and its leader, Vladimir Putin. Summit
meetings between White House and Kremlin leaders, once viewed as opportunities for peace , are now seen as
dangerous temptations to indulge in Munich-style appeasement , the cardinal sin of statecraft. American
policymakers worry more about “going wobbly,” as Margaret Thatcher once put it, than about a march of folly
into inadvertent war . President Donald Trump’s suggestion that the United States and Russia might explore ways to manage their
differences diplomatically has produced mostly head-scratching and condemnation.

In my more than 25 years of government experience working on Russia matters, I’ve seen that three misguided assumptions
underlie how the United States got to this point.

The first is that American policymakers think that because neither side wants nuclear war, then such a war is
very unlikely to occur. Russia would be foolish, we reason, to cross swords with the powerful U.S. military and risk its own self-
destruction, and many Americans find it hard to imagine that modern cyber duels , proxy battles ,
information operations and economic warfare might somehow erupt into direct nuclear attacks . If
the Cold War ended peacefully, the thinking goes, why should America worry that a new shadow war with a much less formidable Russia will
end any differently?

But wars do not always begin by design . Just as they did in 1914, a vicious circle of clashing
geopolitical ambitions , distorted perceptions of each other’s intent, new and poorly
understood technologies, and disappearing rules of the game could combine to produce a disaster that
neither side wants nor expects.

cyber technologies, a rtificial i ntelligence, advanced hypersonic weapons delivery systems and
In fact,

antisatellite weaponry are making the U.S.-Russian shadow war much more complex and
dangerous than the old Cold War competition. They are blurring traditional lines between espionage and
warfare, entangling nuclear and conventional weaponry, and erasing old distinctions between
offensive and defensive operations. Whereas the development of nuclear weaponry in the Cold War produced the concept of
mutually assured destruction and had a restraining effect, in the cyber arena, playing offense is increasingly seen as

the best defense. And in a highly connected world in which financial networks, commercial operations,
media platforms, and nuclear command and control systems are all linked in some way, escalation from the cyber
world into the physical domain is a serious danger.

Cyber technology is also magnifying fears of our adversaries’ strategic intentions while prompting
questions about whether warning systems can detect incoming attacks and whether weapons will
fire when buttons are pushed. This makes containing a crisis that might arise between U.S. and
Russian forces over Ukraine , Iran or anything else much more difficult. It is not hard to imagine a crisis
scenario in which Russia cyber operators gain access to a satellite system that controls both U.S.
conventional and nuclear weapons systems, leaving the American side uncertain about whether
the intrusion is meant to gather information about U.S. war preparations or to disable our ability to conduct
nuclear strikes . This could cause the U.S. president to wonder whether he faces an urgent “ use it or lose it ”
nuclear launch decision. It doesn’t help that the lines of communication between the United States and Russia
necessary for managing such situations are all but severed .

The threat alone is destabilizing AND outweighs alt causes.

Menon and Ruger ’20 [Rajan and William; May 11; Chair in Political Science at the City University of
New York, Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia
University and a Global Ethics Fellow at the Carnegie Council on Ethics in International Affairs, Ph.D. at
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Research Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato
Institute, former Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Texas State University;
Nature Public Health Emergency Collection, “NATO enlargement and US grand strategy: a net
assessment,” https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7212247/; RP]
The argument that the West precipitated the 2014 Ukraine crisis (Mearsheimer 2014; Peng 2017; Sakwa 2016) has been widely rejected as
either an exaggeration or as baseless (Michael McFaul and Chrystia Freeland quoted in Chatham House 2014). The gist of that thesis is that the

West bears the blame because it serially provoked Russia following the end of the Cold War by
expanding NATO without regard to Russian security interests . The USA and its Western allies assured
Ukraine that it would join NATO one day. The EU launched its Eastern Partnership, the plan designed to draw post-
Soviet states toward it, even though Russia perceived a huge overlap in the membership rosters of the EU
and NATO, which was among the reasons for its antipathy to the Eastern Partnership. The USA vocally supported the 2014
Maidan Revolution that ousted the pro-Russian Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych, and as it unfolded a senior US
foreign policy official visiting Kyiv even discussed with the US ambassador to Ukraine the composition of the future Ukrainian cabinet (BBC

News 2014). To the Russian leadership this amounted to interference in Ukraine’s domestic politics that
was aimed at aligning Ukraine with the West. The West also failed to consider how repeated
invasions across Russia’s western frontier had made its leaders acutely sensitive to the strategic
trajectories of states on its western flank. One can disagree in whole or part with the argument that the West is to
blame and still conclude that the shadow of NATO expansion loomed over the 2014 Ukraine crisis and
shaped its course and outcome.

There is no doubt that Russian leaders were deeply perturbed about the consequences of Ukraine
joining NATO. They see Ukraine as culturally , demographically , economically , and
geostrategically the most consequential of the post-Soviet states. Moreover, NATO gave them good
reason to believe that the chances of Ukraine being admitted were substantial . By the time Putin arrived at
NATO’s 2008 Bucharest Summit, the alliance had already decided not to provide Ukraine (or Georgia) a MAP. Even so, given NATO’s
expansion during Yeltsin’s presidency as well as his own, Putin clearly did not discount the possibility that Ukraine
would be part of NATO one day, not least because the summit’s declaration stated explicitly that it
would. According to the insider account of Mikhail Zygar, a respected Russian journalist and former editor of Russia’s sole
independent television network, ‘He [Putin] was furious that NATO was still keeping Ukraine and Georgia hanging
on by approving the prospect of future membership .’ Zygar writes that Putin ‘flew into a rage’ and
warned that ‘if Ukraine joins NATO it will do so without Crimea and the eastern regions . It will simply
fall apart ’ (Zygar 2016, 153–154). As the protests against Yanukovych gained strength in 2014, it was not unreasonable for
Russia’s leaders to fear that his ouster and the advent of a pro-Western leader would substantially increase
the odds of Ukraine eventually entering NATO. In the eyes of Russian leaders the Ukrainian opposition’s rejection of the
EU-brokered deal, which involved major concessions by Yanukovych, including early elections, was proof that the Maidan movement,

with Washington’s fulsome support, was determined to topple him so as to align Ukraine with the West
(Menon and Rumer 2015). Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Ukraine’s sole Russian-majority province, was doubtless unlawful,
but Russia had never attempted to seize Crimea before, even when a Ukrainian government hostile to it
took power following the 2004 Orange Revolution. Its decision to take that provocative step in 2014
cannot be understood apart from the Maidan movement, which, in Russian eyes, had as one of its objectives the integration
of Ukraine with the West, not just economically but militarily as well.

Only U.S.-Russia war causes extinction -- other nuclear wars don’t.

Cotton-Barratt ’17 [Owen; February 3; Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute,
Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford University, Ph.D. in Pure Mathematics from Oxford University; Global
Priorities Project, “Existential Risk,” https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-
2017-01-23.pdf]
1.1.1 Nuclear war

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear
weapons. However, even in an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia, despite horrific casualties,
aftermath
neither country’s population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and radiation.8 The

could be much worse: the burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the
atmosphere , which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling , severe ozone loss ,
and agricultural disruption – a nuclear winter .
According to one model 9, an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons 10 could lead to a drop in global temperatures of
around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and
New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other
sources would be great. An exchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who
have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each,
although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear
weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation,12 though this estimate might be
unlikely to lead to outright human extinction , but this does suggest that
pessimistic.13 Wars on this scale are

conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation . It should be
emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased
academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and
adapt, would have high returns.

It is very difficult to precisely estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear war over the next century, and existing attempts leave
very large confidence intervals. According to many experts, the most likely nuclear war at present is between India and Pakistan.14 However,
given the relatively modest size of their arsenals, the risk of human extinction is plausibly greater from a conflict
between the U nited S tates and Russia . Tensions between these countries have increased in recent years and
it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future.

Independently, enlargement interrupts radiological detection AND recovery efforts --

risks nuclear terror.
De Luce and Standish ’16 [Dan and Reid; March 31; National Security Correspondent, Stanford
University; Alfa Fellow and Special Correspondent covering Russia; Foreign Policy, “U.S.-Russia Tensions
Jeopardize Effort to Lock Down Loose Nukes,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/31/u-s-russia-
tensions-jeopardize-effort-to-lock-down-loose-nukes/]

When President Barack Obama hosts leaders from dozens of countries at a summit in Washington on Thursday to discuss
nuclear security , the nation with the world’s biggest atomic arsenal — Russia — will not be at the
table .

Russia’s boycott of the N uclear S ecurity S ummit reflects a widening rift between Moscow and
Washington that has undermined the U.S.-led effort to lock down radiological material,
effectively destroyed prospects for arms control between the two powers, and even raised the risk of a potential
nuclear confrontation not seen since the Cold War.

Russia has an indispensable role to play in any effort to prevent nuclear terrorism because it has a vast
amount of nuclear material  on its territory — by far the most of any country in the world. And
U.S.-Russian collaboration has formed the cornerstone of groundbreaking efforts over the past two
decades to secure weapons stockpiles across the former Soviet Union and prevent the theft of
material that could be used to make atomic bombs or more crude “ dirty bombs .”

That cooperation has come to an end , much to the alarm of many U.S. officials. The Defense Department is
concerned by the threat posed by w eapons of m ass d estruction and trafficking of radiological material ,
“particularly as we are no longer able to ensure that nuclear material is being controlled at the source in
Russia,” Pentagon spokeswoman Lt. Col. Michelle Baldanza said in an email.

Moscow’s absence at the summit illustrates how the discord caused by its incursion into Ukraine has spilled over into
the arena of nuclear arms and security. Russia’s willingness to work with the West started to decline
in recent years as Moscow’s disagreements with Washington escalated over issues like U.S. plans for a missile defense
pulled out of a 1990s-era U.S. program called the Nunn-Lugar Act that helped track and secure
shield. In 2013, Russia
tons of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium.

Under the former program, the United States had provided detection devices, security equipment , and training
to help the Russians keep tabs on its radiological material. And the effort helped sustain a useful
communication channel for American and Russian scientists. Now that cooperation has been abandoned, even as
the threat of terrorists getting their hands on w eapons of m ass d estruction has grown.

Political upheaval causes wildfire nuclear dispersal -- breaks Russian command and
control.
Rosen ’15 [Armin; March 10; Senior writer, citing a study by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and
Strategic Forecasting, the world’s leading geopolitical intelligence platform; Business Insider, “Stratfor
predicts loose nukes in Russia will be 'the greatest crisis of the next decade',”
https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-nukes-could-be-a-huge-crisis-2015-3]

If that upheaval happened, it could lead to what Stratfor calls "the greatest crisis of the next
decade ": Moscow's loss of control over the world's biggest nuclear weapons stockpile .

Russia is the world's largest country and its 8,000 weapons are fairly spread out over its 6.6 million
square miles . According to a Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists study, Russia has 40 nuclear sites , which is twice as
many as the US uses to house a comparable number of warheads. This policy of dispersal makes it difficult for
an enemy to disable the Russian nuclear arsenal in a single attack, but it also makes the Russian stockpile difficult to control .

The Bulletin report also found that the Russia was uncertain exactly how many short-range " tactical " or city-
busting " strategic " nukes it has, nor what the weapons' state of assembly or alert status may be.

dissolution of the Russian Federation could cause an unprecedented nuclear

Stratfor fears that the

security crisis . Not only could the command-and-control mechanisms for Russia's massive and
highly opaque nuclear arsenal completely break down . Moscow might lose its physical control
over weapons and launch platforms as well .

"Russia is the site of a massive nuclear strike force distributed throughout the hinterlands," the Decade
Forecast explains. "The decline of Moscow's power will open the question of who controls those missiles and how their non-use can be
guaranteed."
In Stratfor's view the US is the only global actor that can formulate a response to this problem, and ever
that might not be enough to prevent launch platforms and weapons from falling into the wrong
hands .

"Washington ... will not be able to seize control of the vast numbers of sites militarily and
guarantee that no missile is fired in the process," the Forecast predicts. "The United States will either have to invent a
military solution that is difficult to conceive of now, accept the threat of rogue launches, or try to create a stable and economically viable
government in the regions involved to neutralize the missiles over time."

The forecast doesn't go into detail about what kind of "military solution" might be appropriate. US Special Forces
could conceivably
transport fissile material out of the country or temporarily secure the most vulnerable sites, but those materials would have to
be evacuated to another country, something that would undoubtedly raise tensions with whatever
authority still rules in Moscow. In fact, the surviving Russian government would probably consider any US or allied
military action to be an act of aggression .

Regardless of the extent of the collapse, Stratfor predicts a major security vacuum in Russia in the next decade.

Nuclear terror is feasible and spreads globally.

Beres ’19 [Louis; July 9; Associate Professor of Political Science at Purdue University, Ph.D. who has
lectured and published extensively on the subject of nuclear terrorism; Routledge, “Terrorism And
Global Security: The Nuclear Threat--Second Edition, Completely Revised And Updated,” no. 2]

Nuc lear terror ism could even spark full-scale nuclear war between states . Such war could involve the
entire spectrum of nuclear conflict possibilities, ranging from a. nuclear attack upon a nonnuclear state to systemwide
nuclear war. How might such far-reaching consequences of nuclear terrorism come about? Perhaps the most likely way would

involve a terrorist nuclear assault against a state by terrorists "hosted" in a nother state . For example,
consider the following scenario:

Early in the 1980s, Israel and her Arab state neighbors finally stand ready to conclude a comprehensive, multilateral peace
settlement. With a bilateral treaty between Israel and Egypt already several years old, only the interests of the Palestinians—as
defined by the PLO— seem to have been left out. On the eve of the proposed signing of the peace agreement, half a dozen crude
nuclear explosives in the one kiloton range detonate in as many Israeli cities. Public grief in Israel over the many thousand dead and
maimed is matched only by the outcry for revenge. In response to the public mood , the government of Israel
initiates selected strikes against terrorist strongholds in Lebanon, whereupon the Lebanese government and
its allies retaliate against Israel. Before long, the entire region is ablaze , conflict has escalate d to

nuclear forms, and all countries in the area have suffered unprecedented destruction .

Of course, such a scenario is fraught with the makings of even wider destruction . How would the U nited
S tates react to the situation in the Middle East ? What would be the Soviet response? It is certainly conceivable that a chain
reaction of interstate nuclear conflict could ensue, one that would ultimately involve the superpowers
or even every nuclear weapon state on the planet .
What, exactly, would this mean? Whether the terms of assessment be statistical or human, the consequences of nuclear war require an entirely
new paradigm of death. Only such a paradigm would allow us a proper framework for absorbing the vision of near-total obliteration and the

outer limits of human destructiveness. Any nuclear war would have effectively permanent and irreversible
consequences . Whatever the actual extent of injuries and fatalities, it would entomb the spirit of the entire species
in a planetary casket strewn with shorn bodies and imbecile imaginations.

This would be as true for a "limited" nuclear war as for an "unlimited" one. Contrary to continuing Pentagon
commitments to the idea of selected "counterforce" strikes that would reduce the chances for escalation and produce fewer civilian casualties,
the strategy of limited nuclear war is inherently unreasonable. There is, in fact, no clear picture of what states might hope to gain from
counterforce attacks. This understanding is reflected by Soviet military strategy, which is founded on the idea that any nuclear conflict would
necessarily be unlimited.

Nuclear War Between the Superpowers

The consequences of a strategic exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union have been the object of widespread attention. One
account of these consequences is offered by Andrei D. Sakharov, the brilliant physicist who played a leading role in the development of Russia's
thermonuclear capacity:

A complete destruction of cities, industry, transport, and systems of education, a poisoning of fields, water, and air by radioactivity, a
physical destruction of the larger part of mankind, poverty, barbarism, a return to savagery, and a genetic degeneracy of the
survivors under the impact of radiation, a destruction of the material and information basis of civilization—this is a measure of the
peril that threatens the world as a result of the estrangement of the world's two superpowers. 13

Presently, U.S. strategic arsenals contain approximately 9,000 strategic weapons and 4,000 megaton equivalents. Soviet strategic forces
number approximately 3,000 weapons and about 5,000 megaton equivalents.14 An exchange involving any substantial fraction of these forces
could promptly destroy more than half of the urban populations in both countries. The subsequent fallout could be expected to kill upwards of
50 percent of the surviving rural inhabitants as well as create worldwide contamination of the atmosphere.15

To better understand the effects of fallout, it is useful to recognize that radiation effects have three basic forms: (1) radiation directly from the
explosion; (2) immediate radioactive fallout (first twenty-four hours); and (3) long-term fallout (months and years). In areas where radioactive
fallout is of particularly high intensity, individuals will be exposed to high doses of radiation regardless of shelter protection. Those who do not
become prompt or short-term fatalities and have suffered radiation exposures above 100 REMs will undergo hemo tological (blood system)
alterations that diminish immunological capabilities. The resultant vulnerability to infection will seriously impair prospects for long-term
recovery.

The effects of a nuclear war between the superpowers, however, cannot be understood solely in terms of projected casualties. Rather, these
effects must also include quantitative effects (i.e., availability of productive capacity, fuel, labor, food, and other resources); qualitative effects
(i.e., political, social, and psychological damage); and interactive effects (i.e., the impact on the relationships between the social and economic
factors of production).17 When these corollary effects are taken into account, it is easy to see that policy makers and public alike have typically
understated the aggregate impact of nuclear war.

This point is supported by a 1975 study of the National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, entitled Long- Term Worldwide Effects
of Multiple Nuclear Weapons Detonations. Going beyond the usual litany of crude physical measures of destruction (e.g., number of human
fatalities, number of cities destroyed), the report portrays the long-term, worldwide effects following a hypothetical exchange of 10,000
megatons of explosive power in the northern hemisphere. These effects are cast in terms of atmosphere and climate, natural terrestrial
ecosystems, agriculture and animal husbandry, the aquatic environment, and both somatic and genetic changes in human populations.

While the report recognizes that the biosphere and the species Homo sapiens would survive the hypothesized nuclear war, it recognizes that
the very idea of survival in such a context is problematic. Building upon this recognition, a more recent study prepared for the Joint Committee
on Defense Production of the Congress—Economic and Social Consequences of Nuclear Attacks on the United States—identifies four discrete
levels of postattack survival. This new taxonomy permits a more subtle look at the interactive effects of nuclear war and allows more precise
judgments about the acceptability or unacceptability of nuclear attack damage. According to the study, there are four levels of survival, in
decreasing order of damage.

1. Biological Survival of Individuals. Individuals or groups of individuals survive but not necessarily within the organized political, social, and
economic structure of a modern society.

2. Regional Survival of Political Structures. Some subnational political units survive as viable entities, but without a functioning central
government.

3. Survival of a Central Government. Some form of viable, central control over all preattack national territory survives, but the effectiveness of
this control may vary over an extremely wide range, depending on the specific nature and pattern of the attack(s).

4. Survival Intact of Basic Societal Structure. Damage to the nation is characterized as relatively limited socially, politically and economically;
nevertheless, the attack is militarily destructive. This is the concept of survival envisioned in the notion of limited or controlled nuclear war.
However, it should be noted that the idea that effective strategic military attacks can be benign in their impacts on society is in dispute. It is
used here as a criterion without any implicit acceptance that it can be achieved. 19

There are, however, levels of strategic exchange at which even the first listed category of survival might not be relevant. At such levels, the
species itself—let alone organized political, social, and economic structures—would disappear. The plausibility of such levels is underscored by
the fact that the magnitude of exchange postulated in the NAS report is really quite low. Were the superpowers to exchange between 50,000
and 100,000 megatons of nuclear explosives, rather than the 10,000 megatons assumed by the report, worldwide climatological changes would
imperil the physical existence of Homo sapiens.

Worldwide Nuclear War

results would represent humankind's last and most

If nuclear terrorism should lead to worldwide nuclear war, the

complete calamity , defying not only our imaginations of disaster, but our customary
measurements as well . As the culmination of what Camus once described as " years of absolutely insane
history ," worldwide nuclear war would represent the final eradication of the very boundaries of
annihilation .

atmospheric effects ; effects on natural

In technical terms, the consequences of systemwide nuclear war would include

terrestrial ecosystems ; effects on managed terrestrial ecosystems; and effects on the aquatic environment .

Atmospheric effects would be highlighted by greatly reduced ozone concentrations producing increased u ltra v iolet
radiation and a drop in average temperature . Even the possibility of irreversible climatic shifts cannot be ruled
out.
Natural Terrestrial Ecosystems would be affected by systemwide nuclear war through three principal stress factors: ionizing radiation; uv-B
cumulative effect of these three factors would render the entire planet a "hot
radiation; and climatic change. The

spot" where even vast forests would show physiological and genetic damage .21
Managed Terrestrial Ecosystems would be affected by systemwide nuclear war by radionuclide contamination of foods, chromosome breakage

and gene mutations in crops, and yield-reducing sterility in seed crops. The cumulative effect of these changes would be the
disappearance of the tech nology base for ag riculture. Even if there were any significant 11 survivors, a return to normal
world food production would be unimaginable.22

Aquatic effects of a systemwide nuclear war would stem from ionizing radiation from radionuclides in marine waters and fresh waters; solar uv

radiation; and changes in water temperatures associated with climate. Irreversible injuries to sensitive aquatic species could be
anticipated during the years of large transient increase in uv-B isolation. And the range of geographic distribution of sensitive populations
of aquatic organisms could be reduced.23

Externally, nuclear dispersal crises cause extinction -- one detonation is enough.

Webber ’19 [Philip; May 18; Chair of Scientists for Global Responsibility, Ph.D. from the Imperial
College; Metro, “We will all end up killing each other and one nuclear blast could do it,”
https://metro.co.uk/2019/05/18/we-will-all-end-up-killing-each-other-and-one-nuclear-blast-could-do-
it-9370115/; RP]

The nuclear armed nations have inadvertently created a global Doomsday machine , built with
15,000 nuclear weapons.

Most (93%) have been built by Russia and in the US, 3,100 of them are ready to fire within hours .
Pre-programmed targets include main cities as well as a range of military and civilian targets across the
world primarily in the UK, Europe, US, Russia and China but also in Japan, Australia and South America.

One nuclear blast , one mistake, one cyber attack could trigger it.
But first a reminder about the incredible destructive power of a nuclear weapon.

Modern nuclear warheads are typically 20 times larger than either of the two bombs that obliterated Hiroshima and
Nagasaki at the end of the Second World War.

What just one nuclear warhead can do is unimaginable . We’ve drawn some of the key features to scale against
cityscapes in the UK for a Russian SS-18 RS 20V (NATO designation ‘Satan’) 500kT warhead. US submarines deploy a similar weapon - the
Trident II Mk5, 475kT warhead.

A deafening, terrifying noise will be created, like an intense thunder that lasts for 10 seconds or longer.

After a blinding flash of light bright destroying the retina of anyone looking, and a violent electromagnetic pulse (EMP) knocking out electrical
equipment several miles away, a bomb of this size quickly forms an incandescent fireball 850 metres across.

This is about the same height as the world’s tallest building, the Burj Khalifa. Drawn against the London Canary Wharf financial district or the
Manchester skyline, the huge fireball dwarfs one Canary Sq. (240m), the South Tower Deansgate (201m) and the Beetham Tower Hilton,
(170m).

The fireball engulfs both city centres completely, melting glass and steel and forms an intensely radioactive 60m deep crater zone of molten
earth and debris.

A devastating supersonic blast wave flattens everything within a radius of two to three km, the entire Manchester centre, an area larger than
the City of London, with lighter damage out to eight km.

Most people in these areas would be killed or very seriously injured.

The fireball quickly rises forming an enormous characteristic mushroom shaped cloud raining highly radioactive particles (fallout). It rises to
60,000 ft (18,000m) - twice the altitude of Everest - and is 15 miles, 24km across.

This is one warhead. There are 10 such warheads on each of Russia’s 46 missiles (460 in total) and 48 on each of eight US Trident submarines
(384 in total). In reality, in a nuclear conflict all of these warheads and a further 956 ready-to-fire are likely to be launched.

Whilst this scale of destruction is horrific and hundreds of millions of people would be killed in a few hours from a combination of blast,

radiation and huge fires, there are also terrible longer-term effects.

city-wide firestorms combined with very the high-altitude debris clouds would
Scientists predict that huge

severely reduce sunlight levels and disrupt the world’s climate for a decade causing drought , a
prolonged winter , global famine and catastrophic impacts for all life on earth and in the seas
due to intense levels of UV with the destruction of the ozone layer .
But even at the level of a few hundred nuclear warheads, the consequences of a nuclear war would be extremely severe across the world far
beyond the areas hit directly.

A nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan with ‘ only ’ 100 small warheads would kill hundreds of
millions and cause climate damage leading to a global famine.
The sheer destructive nature of nuclear explosions combined with long lasting radiation, means that nuclear weapons are of no military use.

‘Enemy’ territory would be unusable for years because of intense radiation -especially when nuclear power stations and reprocessing plants are
hit.

Even if your own country is not hit, radiation and climate damage will spread across the globe. No one escapes the consequences.
But the nuclear nations argue that they build and keep nuclear weapons to make sure that they are never used.

After all no one would be stupid enough to actually launch a nuclear weapon facing such terrible retaliation?

It sounds obvious. If you threaten any attacker with terrible nuclear devastation of course they won’t attack you.

That might be true most of the time. It is very unlikely that any country would launch a nuclear attack deliberately. But there are two very major
problems.

First, a terrorist organisation with a nuclear weapon cannot be deterred in this way.

Secondly, there are several ways in which a nuclear war can start by mistake .

A report by the prestigious Chatham House in 2014 documents 30 instances between 1962 and 2002 when nuclear
weapons came within minutes of being launched due to miscalculation , miscommunication , or
technical errors .
What prevented their use on many of these occasions was the intervention of individuals who, against military orders, either refused to
authorise a nuclear strike or relay information that would have led to launch.

Examples include a weather rocket launch mistaken for an attack on Russia, a US satellite misinterpreting sunlight reflecting off clouds as
multiple missiles firings, a 42c chip fault creating a false warning of 220 missiles launched at the United States.

Such risks are heightened during political crises .

The risk of mistake is very high because, in a hangover from the Cold War, the USA and Russia each keep 900
warheads ready to fire in a few minutes, in a ‘ launch on warning ’ status, should a warning of nuclear attack come
in.
These nuclear weapons form a dangerous nuclear stand-off - rather like two people holding guns to each other’s heads.

With only a few minutes to evaluate a warning of nuclear attack before warheads would strike, one mistake
can trigger disaster . A similar nuclear stand-off exists between India and Pakistan.
 1AC -- Rapprochement
Advantage Two is Rapprochement:
Russia is a declining power with structurally constrained ambitions -- the plan begets a
cooperative spiral that spills over to restore the relationship AND externally separates
Moscow from Beijing.
Bandow ’19 [Doug; August 1; Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, J.D. from Stanford University; Cato
Institute, “Time for Ukraine — and America — to Make a Deal With Russia,”
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-ukraine-america-make-deal-russia; RP]

The United States and Europe can help seal the deal . In particular, the Trump administration should end the burgeoning
cold war between Washington and Moscow. The conflict is unnecessary and is in nether side’s
interest.

Russia’s Vladimir Putin is neither Western liberal nor American friend. He pursues his own agenda , disregarding what
Washington wants. Most controversially, he has followed the U.S. example of intervening in other nations’ elections for political
advantage, tossing a wrench or two into America’s presidential contest.

As bilateral ties began to fray , Moscow took advantage of opportunities to hinder American policy
elsewhere. It helped preserve the Assad regime in Syria against all enemies, sustained Venezuela’s Nicolás
Maduro despite substantial American pressure, diminished Washington’s economic assault on North Korea,
frustrated President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, and manipulated European
governments. Some of these actions, such as the ones in Syria, reflected long‐standing Russian policies; others, such as in Venezuela,
were mostly intended to undermine Washington’s position.

However, Putin is not solely at fault for the collapse of U.S.-Russia relations . Declassified documents
make clear that Washington lied to Moscow about its intention to expand NATO . Unconcerned about
Russian sensitivities , the Clinton administration moved the border of the Western alliance to within
a couple hundred miles of St. Petersburg. The U.S. ignored Russian interests in the Balkans and

attempted to cut out Moscow while dismembering the latter’s traditional Slavic partner Serbia. The Clinton
administration used money and influence to keep Boris Yeltsin in power even as Russia’s economy was being looted in the name, though not
the reality, of a market transition.

The Bush administration continued to promote NATO expansion , even to Georgia , which started
a  shooting war with Russia in apparent expectation of U.S. backing , and Ukraine , long part of the Russian
Empire and Soviet Union. In 2014 came Europe’s attempt to pull Kiev westward economically and subsequent
support from Brussels and Washington for a street putsch against Ukraine’s Moscow‐friendly president, who had
won a fair election. In the aftermath, U.S. officials openly spoke of their favored candidates for Ukrainian office.

None of this justified Moscow essentially waging war on Ukraine and forcibly annexing Crimea. However, Western behavior
undermines the claim that Putin is the latest Hitler, out to dominate the world . Russia couldn’t
conquer Europe even if it wanted to : the continent has 10 times the economic strength and
three times the population of Russia. Despite having rebuilt its military, Moscow is a  declining power ,
focused on ensuring that its security and interests are respected by the West. Switch Mexico for Ukraine
and Washington would be most unhappy with Russian “meddling,” per the Monroe Doctrine. Those
Washingtonians currently outraged at Moscow’s behavior would be demanding that America make an
equivalently aggressive response.
Today, Washington and Moscow appear to be adversaries trending towards enemies. Outrage is particularly abundant in Congress, whose
members seek to punish anyone anywhere who opposes them. Yet sanctions against Moscow have completely failed. The Putin government
has not disgorged Crimea, nor has it abandoned separatists in Ukraine’s Donbass, left Syria, dropped support for Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro,
or otherwise changed its foreign policy. And Moscow is unlikely to do so even if the U.S. turns up the pressure. At the same time, Russia has
closed the Nixon‐promoted gap between Moscow and Beijing, which now cooperate together against America.

Zelensky’s election offers an opportunity for Ukraine, Europe, and America to repair relations with Moscow.
During the campaign, Zelensky both called for negotiations with Russia and promised not to sacrifice
Ukrainian territory, and since has responded aggressively to Putin’s pressure. When Moscow offered Russian passports to residents of
the Donbass, Zelensky invited Russians to request Ukrainian passports. Kiev recently seized a Russian tanker, while releasing its crew, in
retaliation for Moscow’s previous detention of three Ukrainian vessels.

The new Ukrainian leader has spoken with Vladimir Putin by phone, proposed a swap of prisoners, indicated
a willingness to end the blockade of rebel regions, and suggested talks that would include Donald Trump and
several European leaders. With a Rada majority, Zelensky should be able to pass any legislation required
for a  peace agreement . Ending the war would allow him to concentrate on the real existential
threats to his country—corruption, poverty, extremism, and despair.

Agreement will require compromise , including from American legislators who seem mostly interested in posturing. But that
should still be possible—so long as everyone accepts the underlying , if unpleasant, realities . A  cool peace
would be far better than today’s lukewarm war .

First, NATO should indicate that expansion of the alliance has concluded . With a  peaceful resolution
to the Ukraine conflict, there would be no further extension of troops, exercises, or bases to
Russia’s borders — most importantly in Georgia or Ukraine . Rather, the alliance would repair
contacts with Moscow that have been damaged in recent years.

Second, the Minsk agreement would be refined and implemented. Kiev would provide autonomy for the affected region
while Russia ended its support for separatists. The Putin government would shift its objective from
destabilization to stabilization , recognizing that a  prosperous friend on its border would improve
Russia’s economy and security.

Third, the West would drop sanctions on Moscow. The two sides would move back toward normal
commercial ties. However, the legal authority for their speedy imposition would remain should
Russia violate the accord.

Fourth, Moscow would eschew future intervention in American and European political affairs . That would
include cyber activities , funding of political groups , and electoral hacking . In turn, Washington would
acknowledge its past political meddling and foreswear future interventions in Russian affairs, including funding private organizations involved in
political activities.
 would be free to form commercial ties and forge economic agreements both east and
Fifth, Ukraine
west. While Moscow might claim an enhanced influence over security issues, it could make no similar claim
over investment and trade. Russia would cease to use its gas monopoly as a weapon; in return, Washington would
drop its opposition to the Nord Stream 2 project.

Sixth, Crimea’s final status would be left for the future . Ukraine and the West would informally
recognize that Russia is highly unlikely to return the territory under the best of circumstances while officially
refusing to acknowledge the transfer. In continuing to press for Crimea’s return, they would propose a referendum. Washington,
Brussels, and Kiev would then offer a formal resolution: a referendum conducted with international oversight to decide final control by Ukraine
or Russia.

The benefits of such a peace to America are obvious . Moscow would end its destabilization of Ukraine
while Americans would no longer be entangled in a conflict irrelevant to their security. Russo‐
American economic ties could be revived as Moscow ended its political meddling . Washington
could build on this success , steering Moscow in a different direction on Cuba and Venezuela and winning
Russian assistance or acquiescence on other controversies , such as Iran and North Korea. Finally, the
U.S. could focus on separating Moscow from China.

Renouncing enlargement triggers Russian rebalancing towards the United States --

that caps hotspot escalation, resolves conflict in Syria, AND effectively contains China.
Mearsheimer ’16 [John; November 27; Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the
University of Chicago, Ph.D. in Political Science from Cornell University; National Interest, “Donald
Trump Should Embrace a Realist Foreign Policy,” https://nationalinterest.org/feature/donald-trump-
should-embrace-realist-foreign-policy-18502; RP]

In Europe, the United States foolishly tried to integrate Georgia and Ukraine into the West, precipitating an
unnecessary crisis with Russia that upset the peace in eastern Europe and made it harder for
Moscow and Washington to cooperate on other matters, like ending the bloodletting in Syria .
Spreading democracy, especially by force, almost always fails. It inevitably involves large-scale social engineering in societies that most
Americans poorly understand. Dismantling and then replacing existing political institutions inevitably creates winners and losers, and the latter
usually take up arms in opposition, which forces the U.S. military to wage costly counterinsurgency campaigns that are extremely difficult to
win. The end result is precisely the sort of quagmire we faced in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Trump administration should abandon liberal hegemony and adopt a realist foreign policy . Realism is chiefly
concerned with America’s position in the global balance of power, and it shuns doing social engineering inside
other countries. Instead, Washington would respect the sovereignty of other states even when it disagrees
with their internal policies. Americans prize their own sovereignty, which is why they recoiled at the idea that Russia might be
interfering in the recent presidential election. The United States should treat other countries according to the same
standard and respect their sovereignty as well.

Instead of trying to garrison the world and spread democracy, the Trump administration should concentrate on maintaining
the balance of power in the three regions that are vital to U.S. security: Europe , East Asia and the
Persian Gulf .
East Asia and Europe are important because they are the key centers of wealth and have long been home to the
world’s other great powers . The Persian Gulf is a core strategic interest, because it produces about 30
percent of the world’s oil , which is a critical resource for the functioning of the global economy .
America’s main goal in each of these regions should be to prevent the rise of a regional hegemon .

no country is strong enough to dominate Europe or the Gulf for the foreseeable future.
The good news is that

Germany’s power will decline over time, mainly because of its shrinking population , while Russia has
similar demographic problems and an economy that is too dependent on gas and oil revenues. Even if

Russia modernizes its economy and its population grows in the years ahead— big ifs —it will still be unable to
project significant military power beyond eastern Europe. And even then, the Europeans themselves can afford to
build the military forces necessary to check Moscow’s ambitions . Thus, the Trump administration should encourage the
Europeans to take responsibility for their own security, while gradually reducing the remaining U.S. troops there.

Trump should also make a concerted effort to improve relations with Russia, which is not a serious
threat to American interests. Indeed, the two countries should be allies , as they have a common interest in
combatting terrorism , ending the Syrian conflict and keeping Iran (and other countries) from acquiring
nuclear weapons . Most importantly, the United States needs Russia to help contain a rising China . Given the
history of competition between Russia and China, and the long border they share, Moscow is likely
to join in this effort once Washington abandons the misguided foreign policy that has driven it closer to
Beijing.
There is also no looming threat to dominate the Gulf, which means the new administration should move most of America’s military forces out
of that region and station them over the horizon. The United States would monitor the regional balance of power from afar, but only
reintroduce troops in the event a potential hegemon appeared on the scene. This policy of offshore balancing, coupled with quitting the
regime-change business, would also ameliorate America’s terrorism problem, which is fueled in part by the U.S. military presence on Arab
territory as well as the endless wars the United States has waged in the greater Middle East.

The Trump administration should let local powers deal with ISIS and limit its efforts to providing intelligence, training and arms. ISIS is a serious
threat to them but a minor problem for America, and the only long-term solution is building better local institutions, something the United

States cannot provide. Regarding Syria , Washington should let Moscow take the lead in shutting down
that conflict , which means helping the Assad government reestablish control over most of the country. A
Syria run by Assad poses no threat to the United States; indeed, both Democratic and Republican presidents have long
experience dealing with the Assad regime. If the civil war continues it will be largely Moscow’s problem .

Syrian conflict escalates to nuclear war.

Mayer ’18 [Tom; April 12; Columnist for the Colorado Daily, Rocky Mountain Peace and Justice Center;
Colorado Daily, “Peace Train: Syria and the chance of nuclear war,”
https://www.coloradodaily.com/2018/04/12/peace-train-syria-and-the-chance-of-nuclear-war/; RP]

No sane person wants a nuclear war. But in a world loaded with nuclear weapons , a nuclear war might happen
anyway. One place where a nuclear war might start is Syria . A military confrontation between Russia
and the United States, the countries with the biggest stockpiles of nuclear weapons, is quite possible in
Syria. Such a confrontation could escalate into a nuclear war if either side believed nuclear weapons were
necessary to avoid a humiliating defeat .
Although the United States is clearly the world’s foremost military power — U.S. military expenses exceed those of the next nine countries
combined — Russian stakes in Syria are greater than those of the United States. Syria is much closer to
Russia than to the USA. Syria is Russia’s only reliable ally in the Arab world. Russia’s alliance with Syria gives it
access to the Mediterranean . Russia supports the Assad government partly to control insurgencies
and terrorist attacks within its own country. Moreover, the Russian people strongly endorse Vladimir Putin’s
foreign policy. These political realities mean that Russia will not back down in a military confrontation with
the United States regarding Syria.

The U.S. concerns in Syria are more peripheral (and also contradictory). In Syria and elsewhere, the United States needs to
maintain the credibility of its armed forces. Israel and Saudi Arabia, both U.S. allies, want the United States to remain in Syria. Israel desires a
weak Syria which cannot challenge its annexation of the Golan Heights or support Palestinian resistance. Both Israel and Saudi Arabia fear the
emergence of a Shiite block including Iran, Iraq, Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The United States, like Israel and Saudi Arabia, wants to
overthrow the Assad government, but this government remains the indispensable force combatting jihadist
terrorism in Syria.
The latest inducement to U.S. military action against the Assad government is the recent chemical weapons attack on the city of Douma.
Washington immediately blamed this attack on Assad and his Russian ally , but there is reason to doubt
this narrative. A chemical weapons attack appears entirely contrary to the interests of the Assad regime.
They are winning the war in Syria, and Trump was considering withdrawing U.S. military forces. On the other hand, a chemical
weapons attack would be welcomed by the people who want the United States to remain in Syria. Incidentally, the Syrian Red Crescent found
no evidence of a chemical weapons attack in Douma.

American armed forces should leave Syria immediately. They cannot accomplish anything useful in that country. Their presence
increases the danger of military confrontation with Russia. Bashar al-Assad is indeed a brutal dictator, but
dictatorship in Arab countries is a consequence of social structure combined with imperialist intervention. The
institution of dictatorship is not eliminated when foreign forces remove a dictator . Unfortunately, the most

feasible ending of the horrendous war in Syria is continuation of the Assad regime. In this imperfect world,
stable dictatorship is far preferable to continual warfare that pulverizes society. And it is infinitely
preferable to nuclear war .

Chinese ascension to regional hegemony risks global transition wars and nuclear
conflict.
Minemura and Mearsheimer '20 [Kenji and John; August 17; Researcher at Hokkaido University
Public Policy School; Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago,
Ph.D. in Political Science from Cornell University; The Asahi Shimbun, "Interview/ John Mearsheimer:
U.S.-China rift runs real risk of escalating into a nuclear war,"
http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/13629071]
Answer: The real Cold War started before the coronavirus, and the coronavirus doesn't matter much. And ideology doesn't matter much.
What matters is the balance of power . And the fact is, China has become so powerful over the past 20 years.
There is a serious chance that (China) could become a regional hegemon in Asia. And the U nited S tates
does not tolerate peer competitors. The idea that China is going to become a regional hegemon is
unacceptable to the United States .

So, it's this clash of interests that are generated by this fundamental change that's taking place in the
balance of power. It is driving the competition . And I would note that you'll hear a lot of talk about the fact that the
United States is a liberal democracy, and that China is a communist state. And, therefore, this is an ideological clash.

Q: In “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,” the book you published in 2001, you said there would never be a peaceful emerging of China and
predicted the U.S.-China conflict. When do you think the critical turning point was for their bilateral relationship?

A: That's a difficult question to answer, because it really started in the early 1990s when China began to grow. That's when it started.

It was China's rise in the unipolar moment that is driving the train in this process. And there were a number of events along the way that
mattered greatly. Most importantly, it was China's admission to the WTO in 2001, which really allowed the Chinese economy to accelerate, to
the extent that you can pinpoint a date where the United States recognized that the rise of China was a problem and that China would have to
be contained.

Q: Some analysts in the United States and Japan have argued that since U.S.-China bilateral economic ties and political relations have grown
over 14 years under the so-called engagement policy, it is not feasible for either country to instigate an open war. Do you agree?

A: Well, there were many experts who said the same thing before World War I. They said there was a tremendous
amount of economic interdependence in Europe. And nobody would dare start a war because you would end up killing the
goose that lays the golden egg. But nevertheless, we had World War I. And what this tells you is that you can have
economic cooperation , and at the same time, you have security competition .

And what sometimes happens is that the security competition becomes so intense that it overwhelms the
economic cooperation and you have a conflict . But I would take this a step further and say that if you look at what's
happening in the world today, that economic cooperation between the U nited S tates and China is slowly

beginning to disappear , and you're getting an economic competition as well as security

competition .
As you well know, the United States has its gun sights on Huawei. The United States would like to destroy Huawei.

U nited S tates would like to remain on the cutting edge of all the
The United States would like to control 5G. The

modern sophisticated technologies of the day and they view the Chinese as a threat in that regard. And that
tells you that not only are you getting military competition , but you are also getting economic competition .

Q: Unlike in the Cold War era, no one knows exactly how many nuclear weapons China possesses. You have said that since Eastern
Asia has no central front like Europe, the possibility that a war between the United States and China
could occur over East Asia is high . Many countries surrounding China, particularly Japan, as well as other countries that do not
possess a nuclear weapon, would be vulnerable to an attack from China. Do you think that we may see a war breaking out in East Asia in the
future?

A: Let me start by talking a little bit about the Cold War and then comparing the situation in East Asia and with the situation in Europe during
the Cold War. During the Cold War, the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was centered on central Europe. We used
to talk about the central front, where you had the Warsaw Pact on one side, and NATO on the other side.

And when we talked about U.S.-Soviet war, it involved the central front. Now, the central front was populated by two giant sets of armies, that
were armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons. That meant if we had World War III in central Europe, you would have two huge sets of armies
crashing into each other, with thousands of nuclear weapons.
Not surprisingly, whenwe ran war games during the Cold War, it was very difficult , if not impossible , to
get a war started in central Europe, because nobody in his or her right mind, would start a war given the
possibility of nuclear Armageddon .

Now, contrast that with the situation in East Asia , which is the central flash point between United States
and China, the three places where you could possibly have a war involve the South China Sea , Taiwan
and the East China Sea .

Those areas are not the equivalent of the central front. And it's possible to imagine a limited conventional war
breaking out in one of those three areas. It's much easier to imagine that happening, than a war on the central front during the
Cold War.

This is not to say that a war in East Asia is axiomatically going to happen. I'm not arguing that, but it is plausible that the United States
and the Chinese and some allies of the United States like Japan may end up in a shooting match with the
Chinese in say, the E ast C hina S ea.

Now, if China is losing, or if the United States is losing that military engagement, there will be a serious
temptation to use nuclear weapons as the United States is committed to use nuclear weapons to
defend Japan if Japan is losing a conventional war. And one might say, it's unimaginable that the United States or China would
use nuclear weapons.

But I don't think that's true, because you would be using those nuclear weapons at sea . You would not be hitting the Chinese
mainland in all likelihood. And, therefore, it's possible to think in terms of a " limited nuclear war ," with limited nuclear use.

So, I worry greatly that not only will we have a war between the United States and China, but also that there's a
serious possibility nuclear weapons would be used. And I think in a very important way, it was much less
likely that would happen during the Cold War.

Cooperation stops nuclear Iran, North Korea, and bioweapons -- resolving

enlargement is key.
Sokolsky and Rumer ’20 [Richard and Eugene; June 15; Nonresident Senior Fellow in Carnegie’s
Russia and Eurasia Program, thirty-six-year veteran of the U.S. State Department, M.A. from the School
of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University; Senior Fellow and the Director of
Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, former national intelligence officer for Russia at the U.S.
National Intelligence Council, Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, “U.S.-Russian Relations in 2030,”
https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/15/u.s.-russian-relations-in-2030-pub-82056; RP]
A Proliferated World

The spread of new , lethal , and potentially destabilizing nuclear and non-nuclear military
technologies —and their availability to a greater number of state and nonstate actors—would put the global
nuclear nonproliferation regime under greater strain . Although the United States and Russia have not always
agreed on approaches and priorities, they share a common interest in preventing the further spread of nuclear
weapons, and they have worked cooperatively together on the North Korean and Iranian nuclear
challenges. Over the next decade, it is possible, though arguably not likely, that several countries—Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and perhaps
South Korea and Japan—could seek to acquire nuclear weapons, while North Korea will continue to increase its nuclear
weapons capabilities, and Iran could resume pursuit of a nuclear weapons program if the Iran nuclear
deal (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) cannot be reconstituted in some form. Other emerging
technologies such as synthetic biology could open the door to a wave of entirely new threats
such as the creation of dangerous pathogens , including by nonstate actors. Such scenarios may present
greater opportunities or imperatives for U.S.-Russian cooperation to halt the further spread of nuclear
weapons and other dangerous technologies.
A More Conflict-Prone World

The number and intensity of interstate and intrastate conflicts in and around the Eurasian continent will
likely grow, and some of these will occur in areas near or bordering Russia . Moscow attaches a high priority
to maintaining its hold on and stability in (as it interprets stability—meaning no Western involvement )
its immediate neighborhood , which it claims as its sphere of privileged interests. The wars with
Georgia and Ukraine , as well as continuing Russian involvement in a handful of post-Soviet regional conflicts, have been
motivated by the Kremlin’s desire to enforce its sphere of influence . But in most if not all conflicts on
Russia’s immediate periphery, U.S. core interests will not be at stake , and a direct military confrontation between
Russia and the United States as a result of those regional conflicts is unlikely. Moreover, the experience of the two militaries

operating side by side in congested Syrian air space and successfully deconflicting their activities there
suggests that Washington and Moscow have the will and the means to manage even the most complex
situations responsibly.

A fully realized Iran causes extinction.

Brewer and Tabatabai ’19 [Eric and Ariane; December 12; Deputy Director and Fellow at the
Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Associate Political
Scientist at the RAND Corporation, Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University; War On The Rocks,
“Understanding Iran’s Nuclear Escalation Strategy,”
https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/understanding-irans-nuclear-escalation-strategy/; RP]

Iran is expected to continue to push the nuclear envelope in 2020. If it sticks to its stated schedule of taking a step
to reduce its compliance with the JCPOA every two months, Iran will have six more opportunities before the November elections
in the United States to increase its nuclear activities. For now, it’s unclear exactly what these steps will entail as the Iranian government has

key lines in the agreement, suggesting that if it wants

kept these measures close to the chest. But Tehran has already crossed

to keep up pressure on the United States and Europe, it might need to go even further in 2020.
The timing is important. America’s response to provocative moves by Iran will have political implications for the 2020 presidential elections.
These nuclear steps may accompany and complement continued military action in the Middle East in
two-pronged approach by Tehran aimed at raising the cost of President Donald Trump’s
what’s become a

maximum pressure campaign and building leverage vis-à-vis America. These activities have included
targeting oil production facilities and shipping in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, and
increased aggression by Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and in the Arabian peninsula . As we await the first of
several potential new steps, it’s important to take stock of what Tehran has done so far to resume nuclear activities restricted or halted by the
JCPOA, why it has done so, and to think through what 2020 may bring along.

Iran’s Decision-Making and Calculations

After Trump withdrew the United States from the JCPOA in May 2018 and proceeded to implement his administration’s “maximum
pressure campaign,” Tehran undertook what it dubbed its “strategic patience” policy. The strategy entailed a continued adherence to
the deal by Iran in the hopes that Europe would take steps to undermine America’s new hardline Iran policy. However, a year after the U.S.
withdrawal from the agreement, it became clear that Europe, while clearly disenchanted by the U.S. approach, was nonetheless unable to

effectively counter it. This led Iran to reconsider its own course of action, shifting from a “wait and see” approach
to a much more assertive one.

would begin disengaging from its nuclear commitments

In announcing its new policy, Rouhani noted that Iran
under the deal for as long as the other parties to the agreement fail to provide it with what it desires: Access to the
global financial system and the ability to export its oil . In short, after each new step, Tehran would grant the
Europeans two months to come through. If Europe responds in a satisfactory manner, Iran would then reverse course and return to fully
implementing the deal. If not, then the country would push through and continue to dial down its own compliance with the agreement in 60-
day increments.

approach hasn’t succeeded. Indeed, it has brought further pressure on Tehran. The United States has
So far, Iran’s
imposed additional sanctions and the Europeans reportedly threatened to trigger the dispute-resolution mechanism if
Iran’s nuclear escalation continues. But the strategy has allowed Iran to resume certain nuclear activities previously
constrained under the JCPOA, while also signaling to Europe and the United States that pressure won’t be met with patience forever. Instead,
Iran, too, has sticks and carrots at its disposal and seems willing to deploy them.

Iran has complemented its gradual nuclear escalation with more aggressive military measures in the
region. In doing so, Iran is deliberately dragging U.S. European allies into the ongoing tensions ,
demonstrating to them that they can’t be passive observers to the new U.S. hard line policy on Iran; they are
involved, like it or not. In particular, Iran has targeted European (and Japanese and Gulf Arab) oil tankers, and regional
oil production. The message from Iran is simple: If Iran can’t sell its oil and gain access to their revenue, neither will
America’s regional partners and European allies.

Independently, U.S.-Russian relations solve a myriad of existential risks.

Stent ’20 [Angela; April 27; Director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies,
Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Ph.D. from Harvard University;
Brookings Institutions, “Why are US-Russia relations so challenging?”
https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/why-are-us-russia-relations-so-challenging/; RP]

The United States’ relationship with Russia is today the worst that it has been since 1985 . Moscow’s interference in
the 2016 U.S. presidential election and what appears to be its continuing attempts to affect the 2020 election campaign have made Russia a
toxic domestic issue in a way that it has not been since the 1950s. Its annexation of Crimea and launch of an ongoing
war in southeastern Ukraine, plus its support for Syria’s Bashar al-Assad in his brutal civil war, and for Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro have
raised tensions with the United States. President Trump came into office determined to improve ties with
Russia. But the rest of the executive branch and the U.S. Congress have pursued tough policies toward Russia,
imposing rafts of sanctions and expelling diplomats. The U.S. National Security Strategy declares Russia and China the
two top threats to U.S. national security. At the best of times, U.S.-Russia ties are a mixture of cooperation and
competition , but today they are largely adversarial .

Yet, as the world’s two nuclear superpowers , Russia and the United States bear a unique responsibility
to keep the peace and discourage the proliferation of nuclear , biological , and chemical
weapons around the globe. Moreover, there are global challenges such as terrorism , climate
change , governing the Arctic , and dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic that necessitate working
together . The challenge is to find an acceptable balance between cooperation and competition and
to compartmentalize the relationship in a more effective way than at present.
 1AC -- Solvency
Finally, Solvency:
The plan limits enlargement without ceding Ukraine to Russia -- facilitating a
transition to a neutral buffer state restores U.S. credibility by reversing course on
failed policy.
Mearsheimer ’14 [John; October 2014; Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the
University of Chicago, Ph.D. in Political Science from Cornell University; Foreign Affairs, “Why the
Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-
ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault; RP]

Western leaders have also clung to the provocative policies that precipitated the crisis in the first
place. In April, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden met with Ukrainian legislators and told them, “This is a second opportunity to make good on
the original promise made by the Orange Revolution.” John Brennan, the director of the CIA, did not help things when, that same month, he
visited Kiev on a trip the White House said was aimed at improving security cooperation with the Ukrainian government.

The EU, meanwhile, has continued to push its Eastern Partnership. In March, José Manuel Barroso, the president of the
European Commission, summarized EU thinking on Ukraine, saying, “We have a debt, a duty of solidarity with that country, and we will work to
have them as close as possible to us.” And sure enough, on June 27, the EU and Ukraine signed the economic agreement that Yanukovych had
fatefully rejected seven months earlier. Also in June, at a meeting of NATO members’ foreign ministers, it was agreed that the alliance
would remain open to new members, although the foreign ministers refrained from mentioning Ukraine by name. “ No
third country has a veto over NATO enlargement,” announced Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO’s secretary-general. The
foreign ministers also agreed to support various measures to improve Ukraine’s military capabilities in such

areas as command and control, logistics, and cyberdefense. Russian leaders have naturally recoiled at these actions; the

West’s response to the crisis will only make a bad situation worse . 

There is a solution to the crisis in Ukraine, however -- although it would require the West to think about the country in a
fundamentally new way. The United States and its allies should abandon their plan to westernize Ukraine and
instead aim to make it a neutral buffer between NATO and Russia, akin to Austria’s position during the
Cold War. Western leaders should acknowledge that Ukraine matters so much to Putin that they
cannot support an anti-Russian regime there. This would not mean that a future Ukrainian
government would have to be pro-Russian or anti-NATO. On the contrary, the goal should be a sovereign
Ukraine that falls in neither the Russian nor the Western camp.

To achieve this end, the United States and its allies should publicly rule out NATO’s expansion into both Georgia
and Ukraine . The West should also help fashion an economic rescue plan for Ukraine funded jointly by the
EU , the I nternational M onetary F und, Russia , and the U nited S tates -- a proposal that Moscow should
welcome , given its interest in having a prosperous and stable Ukraine on its western flank. And the West
should considerably limit its social-engineering efforts inside Ukraine. It is time to put an end to
Western support for another Orange Revolution . Nevertheless, U.S. and European leaders should encourage Ukraine to
respect minority rights, especially the language rights of its Russian speakers. 
Some may argue that changing policy toward Ukraine at this late date would seriously damage U.S.
credibility around the world. There would undoubtedly be certain costs, but the costs of continuing a misguided
strategy would be much greater . Furthermore, other countries are likely to respect a state that learns
from its mistakes and ultimately devises a policy that deals effectively with the problem at hand. That
option is clearly open to the United States.
One also hears the claim that Ukraine has the right to determine whom it wants to ally with and the Russians have no right to prevent Kiev from

joining the West. This is a dangerous way for Ukraine to think about its foreign policy choices. The sad truth is
that might often makes right when great-power politics are at play. Abstract rights such as self-
determination are largely meaningless when powerful states get into brawls with weaker states. Did Cuba
have the right to form a military alliance with the Soviet Union during the Cold War? The United States certainly did
not think so , and the Russians think the same way about Ukraine joining the West. It is in Ukraine’s
interest to understand these facts of life and tread carefully when dealing with its more powerful neighbor.
Even if one rejects this analysis, however, and believes that Ukraine has the right to petition to join the EU and NATO, the fact remains that
the United States and its European allies have the right to reject these requests. There is no reason that the
West has to accommodate Ukraine if it is bent on pursuing a wrong-headed foreign policy,
especially if its defense is not a vital interest . Indulging the dreams of some Ukrainians is not worth the animosity and strife it
will cause, especially for the Ukrainian people. 

It’s the only possible solution to the Ukrainian crisis.

Schaffner, citing Mearsheimer ’19 [Thomas, citing John; September 26; American University,
quoting John Mearsheimer, Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of
Chicago, Ph.D. in Political Science from Cornell University; Russia Matters, “John Mearsheimer on Russia:
Insights and Recommendations,” https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/john-mearsheimer-russia-
insights-and-recommendations; RP]
Ukraine:

I think it is somewhat dangerous to say that Ukraine has the right to self-determination . I don’t think it makes
sense to speak in those terms, because the Russians do not think that Ukraine has the right to self-determination .
When it comes to foreign policy, the Russians don’t think that Ukraine can just choose any foreign policy it
wants, and when you encourage Ukraine to think that it has the right to pursue a foreign policy that leads to it
becoming a member of NATO or the EU, you’re basically signing a death warrant for Ukraine. (Interview on
“Between The Lines”, 12.06.18)

American policy toward Ukraine, motivated by liberal logic, is principally responsible for the ongoing crisis
between Russia and the West. (“The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities,” 2018) 

The strategy for making Ukraine part of the West consists of three linked components: NATO enlargement ,
EU expansion and the Orange Revolution , which aimed at fostering democracy and Western values in
Ukraine and thus presumably produce pro-Western leaders in Kyiv. From Moscow’s perspective , the most
threatening aspect of that strategy is NATO’s movement eastward . (“The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and
International Realities,” 2018)

[I]t all came to a head with the coup in Kyiv on Feb. 22, 2014. We then had a major crisis that we still face and which shows no signs
of going away. What is the solution to this problem? I think the only possible solution is to go back to the
situation that existed before 2008 . Otherwise, there is no hope of settling this matter. What in particular
has to be done? Ukraine has to be turned into a neutral buffer state . The West has to recognize that there
is no way it can continue to pursue a set of policies that are designed to make Ukraine a Western
bulwark on Russia’s border. (Military Review, 06.01.16)

If you want to end this crisis , and you care greatly about the Ukrainian people, and you don’t want to see their country destroyed,
then it’s imperative that we back off and give up on the idea of making Ukraine part of the West.
Instead, we must work to make Ukraine a neutral buffer state , which it was effectively between 1991
and 2014. (Military Review, 06.01.16)
It is too soon to know how this saga will end, but there is good reason to think that [Russian President Vladimir] Putin will achieve his primary
aim—preventing Ukraine from becoming a Western bulwark. (Foreign Affairs, 11.01.14)

Russia is realist -- don’t poke the bear.

Frix ’16 [Nolie; October 2016; B.A. in Political Science and History at Indiana University, submitted in
fulfillment of the requirements for a M.A. in Political Science at Indiana University, under the guidance
and review of Dr. Scott Pegg; Scholar Works, “NATO, Russia, and the Ukraine Crisis,”
https://scholarworks.iupui.edu/bitstream/handle/1805/11818/NATO%2c Russia and the Ukraine
Crisis.pdf; JM]

The Realist View -- Don’t Poke the Bear

Realists have a much different opinion regarding the Ukraine crisis, the role NATO has and should play, and what the West’s response should

be. Realist thought offers a more prudent approach , one that still values military preparedness but
advises against rash and alienating actions . While it is important for NATO, the EU, and the U.S. to offer Russia a united
front which opposes the latter’s aggressiveness, there are some issues with the West’s reactions .

First and foremost, there is a lack of cultural understanding and an inability or unwillingness to understand
Russia’s reasoning. There is a mainstream alarmist trend that contends Russia’s actions in Crimea were
the beginning of a renewed imperialist dream , and potentially the first step in pan-European conflict
with Russia as the conquering aggressor . For any scholar who understands Russia’s motivations, this is
a questionable claim . As a rational actor, the Kremlin is aware it would not be able to win a war
against NATO, and since an invasion of one member country represents an invasion of all NATO members, it is
extremely unlikely Russia would attack such a nation. Furthermore, if Russia had intended to invade all of
Ukraine, as some believed—“Some observers believe Russia could use widespread violence in eastern Ukraine as a pretext for military
intervention” (Belkin et al. 2014, 294)—it would have already done so . According to “Respected Russian military observer Pavel
Felgenhauer…Putin’s military window of opportunity for an invasion of eastern and southern Ukraine
[was] from [April 2014] to about mid-May” (Belkin et al. 2014, 294). Military experts agree Russia does not
have the capacity to occupy the entire nation state of Ukraine. Other time frames of opportunity have
come and gone without a wide-scale Russian invasion which would extend beyond Crimea. For instance, the Kremlin
failed to seize an opportunity to create chaos “in eastern and southern Ukraine” when it failed to “disrupt Ukraine’s May 25 presidential
election” which could have provided “the pretext for an invasion” (Belkin et al. 2014, 294). Although, as realists often stress, it is
impossible to be certain of countries’ intentions, especially when they are hostile, it appears as though
Russia did not and does not wish to invade or occupy all of Ukraine. Realists, however, would focus more
heavily on the fact that Russia does not possess the military capability and capacity to successfully
occupy Ukraine beyond Crimea’s borders or to invade any NATO member country.

Robust empirical research disproves credibility theory -- particularly in Russia.

Fisher ’16 [Max; April 29; International reporter, citing research by Jonathan Mercer at the University
of Washington, a study by Yale University, and corroborating political science research; Vox, “The
Credibility Trap,” https://www.vox.com/2016/4/29/11431808/credibility-foreign-policy-war]

But there is a problem with this theory of credibility : It does not appear to be real . Political
scientists have investigated this theory  over and over , and have repeatedly disproven it .
Yet the belief in credibility persists, dominating America's foreign policy debate, steering the United States toward military action abroad in
pursuit of a strategic asset — the credibility of America's reputation — that turns out not to exist.

How did this idea become so entrenched in Washington, and why does it persist despite being repeatedly debunked? What does it mean to
have so many of America's foreign policy discussions turn around an idea that is demonstrably false — and what can this tell us about how and
why America intervenes abroad?

The credibility myth

When Americans talk about "credibility" in foreign policy, what they are usually describing is something that political scientists instead
call reputational or reputation-based credibility.

In political science, "credibility" usually refers to specific promises or threats , and in this case the research does
say that credibility is real. For example, if the US pledges to defend South Korea from a North Korean invasion, then it matters that the US
convince both Koreas that this pledge is credible, for example by stationing US troops in South Korea.

That is the formal definition of credibility in foreign policy, it's real, and it matters. But when "credibility" is used colloquially, it typically refers
to a very different kind of credibility, one based entirely in a country's or leader's reputation from its actions in other disputes or conflicts. (This
article uses the colloquial definition of credibility, except where noted otherwise.)

Under this line of thinking, if the US fails to follow through on a threat or stand up to a challenger in
one part of the world, then its allies and enemies globally will be more likely to conclude that all American threats are

empty , and that America can be pushed around. If the US backed down once , it will back down
again .
It's easy to see how people could be attracted to this idea, which puts complicated geo-politics in simple and familiar human terms. It
encourages us to think of states as just like people.

But states are not people , and this theory, for all its appealing simplicity, is not correct . There is  no
evidence  that America's allies or enemies change their behavior based on conclusions about America's
reputation for credibility, or that such a form of reputation even exists in foreign policy.
"Do leaders assume that other leaders who have been irresolute in the past will be irresolute in the future
and that, therefore, their threats are not credible ?" the University of Washington's Jonathan Mercer wrote, in introducing his
research on this question.

"No; broad and deep evidence dispels that notion," Mercer concluded. "As the record shows , reputations
do not matter ."

A 1984 Yale University study, for example, examined dozens of cases from 1900 to 1980 to look for signs that, if a
country stood down in one confrontation, it would face more challengers elsewhere. The answer was no :
"deterrence success is not systematically associated … with the defender's firmness or lack of it in previous crises."

Historians have also looked at specific incidents where the US thought its credibility was on the line and
determined that we were simply mistaken .

Acheson's warning that the US had to invade Korea to reassure its European allies , for example, turned out to
be  wrong : British and French officials in fact worried the Americans were going to pull them into a far-away war.
During the Vietnam War, American officials could see that they were losing, but for years worried that withdrawing would communicate
weakness to the Soviet Union, emboldening Moscow to test American commitments elsewhere. Even if Vietnam was lost, American credibility
had to be defended.

As historian Ted Hopf has shown, the Americans could not have had it more wrong: Soviet leaders never reached any such conclusion, and in
fact were puzzled as to why the US sacrificed so many lives for a war that was clearly lost.

If that's not enough evidence for you, try considering reputational credibility from the opposite point of view ,
and it starts to look more obviously ridiculous . Dartmouth's Daryl Press once pointed out to my colleague Dylan Matthews
that Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev repeatedly threatened to eject the American-led forces occupying West Berlin,

but he backed down. The US didn't consider him one iota less "credible" for this, and during the following year's
Cuban Missile Crisis took his threats very seriously .

The idea of reputational credibility has also been debunked in the most well-known recent case : the
notion that America's failure to bomb Syria in 2013 emboldened Russian President Vladimir Putin .

Proponents of reputational credibility took Putin's 2014 Ukraine invasions as vindication. Surely Putin only
invaded because America had damaged its credibility in Syria, they argued. In their view, it showed why it is so crucial for the
US to maintain its reputational credibility by never backing down from military interventions.

Julia Ioffe recently  investigated

this theory  for the Atlantic, asking foreign policy officials and experts in
Moscow whether there was merit to it. She seemed to reach the same conclusion as have many Russia
analysts: that Putin invaded Ukraine for reasons specific to Ukraine . America's supposed reputation loss in
Syria appeared to play no role . Some of Ioffe's sources seemed to not even understand the argument of how Syria and Ukraine
would connect.

The credibility trap

You will notice something these incidents have in common. In every case, a belief in "credibility" pulls the U nited S tates
toward fighting a war for the wrong reasons, or toward staying in a war longer than is worthwhile.
This mistaken belief has repeatedly helped to drive American military action abroad , Dartmouth's Jennifer Lind
demonstrates in a new article in International Security Studies Forum.

"Indeed, from Korea, to Vietnam, to Bosnia, to Libya, to President Barack Obama’s 'red line’ in Syria, debates about U.S. intervention are thick
with admonitions that ‘Our Credibility Is On The Line,'" Lind writes.

The logic of reputational credibility can only ever lead to the same conclusion : toward the use of American
military force abroad, even in cases where there is no clear reason to intervene and where the
downsides of intervention would seem to outweigh the upsides. It is a compass that only points in one
direction .
In this theory, the use of force is inherently good, regardless of how or where the bombs fall, because it strengthens American leadership
globally. And an absence of American military action is almost always bad, because it is said to invite new problems and greater threats.

"Every time analysts and leaders call for war, they warn that inaction will jeopardize America’s credibility," Lind and Press, her husband, have
previously written in Foreign Policy.

Alarmingly, despite the mounting evidence against reputation theory, it continues to drive US foreign
policy discourse — and has recently even been integrated into the formal legal basis of American foreign policy.
2AC
Bucharest
 2AC -- AT: Expansionism
No broader expansion AND ceasing enlargement sates appetite for aggression --
poking the bear causes war.
Carpenter ’18 [Ted; July 28; Senior Fellow in Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute,
Ph.D. in U.S. Diplomatic History from the University of Texas; National Interest, “Russia Is Not the Soviet
Union,” https://nationalinterest.org/feature/russia-not-soviet-union-27041; RP]

Today's Russia is weak and not an existential threat . The messianic, superpower of the USSR was.

The American public and U.S. policymakers both have an unfortunate tendency to conflate Russia with the
Soviet Union. That habit emerged again with the media and political reaction to the Helsinki summit between President Trump and Russian
President Vladimir Putin. Trump’s critics accused him of appeasing Putin  and even of committing treason for not doing
enough to defend American interests and for being far too solicitous to the Russian leader. They regarded that as an unforgivable

offense because Russia supposedly poses a dire threat to the United States. Hostile pundits and politicians charged
that Moscow’s alleged interference in the 2016 U.S. elections constituted an attack on America akin to Pearl Harbor and 9-11.

Trump’s supplicant behavior, opponents contended, stood in shameful contrast to the behavior of previous presidents toward tyrants,
especially toward the Kremlin’s threats to America and the West. They trotted out Ronald Reagan’s “evil empire” speech and his later demand
that Mikhail Gorbachev to tear down the Berlin Wall as examples of how Trump should have acted.

The problem with citing such examples is that they applied to a different country : the Soviet Union . Too
many Americans act as though there is no meaningful difference between that entity and Russia. Worse
still, U.S. leaders have embraced the same kind of uncompromising ,  hostile policies that Washington
pursued to contain Soviet power . It is a major blunder that has increasingly poisoned relations
with Moscow since the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) at the end of 1991.
One obvious difference between the Soviet Union and Russia is that the Soviet governing elite embraced Marxism-Leninism and its objective of
world revolution. Today’s Russia is not a messianic power. Its economic system is a rather mundane variety of
corrupt crony capitalism , not rigid state socialism. The political system is a conservative autocracy with
aspects of a rigged democracy , not a one-party dictatorship that brooks no dissent whatsoever.

Russia is hardly a Western-style democracy, but neither is it a continuation of the Soviet Union’s horrifically brutal
totalitarianism. Indeed, the country’s political and social philosophy is quite different from that of its predecessor. For example, the
Orthodox Church had no meaningful influence during the Soviet era—something that was unsurprising, given communism’s official policy of
atheism. But today, the Orthodox Church has a considerable influence in Putin’s Russia, especially on social issues.

The bottom line is that Russia is a conventional , somewhat conservative, power, whereas the Soviet Union was a messianic,
totalitarian power. That’s a rather large and significant difference, and U.S. policy needs to reflect that realization.

An equally crucial difference is that the Soviet Union was a global power (and, for a time, arguably a superpower)
with global ambitions and capabilities to match. It controlled an empire in Eastern Europe and
cultivated allies and clients around the world, including in such far-flung places as Cuba , Vietnam , and
Angola . The USSR also intensely contested the United States for influence in all of those areas. Conversely,
Russia is merely a regional power with very limited extra-regional reach. The Kremlin’s ambitions are
focused heavily on the near abroad , aimed at trying to block the eastward creep of the N orth A tlantic
T reaty O rganization (NATO) and the U.S.-led intrusion into Russia’s core security zone . The orientation seems
far more defensive than offensive.

It would be difficult for Russia to execute anything more than a very geographically limited
expansionist agenda, even if it has one. The Soviet Union was the world’s number two economic
power, second only to the United States. Russia has an economy roughly the size of Canada’s and is no longer
ranked even in the global top ten . It also has only three-quarters of the Soviet Union’s territory (much of
barely half the population of the old USSR. If that were not enough, that population is
which is nearly-empty Siberia) and

shrinking and is afflicted with an assortment of public health problems (especially rampant alcoholism).

All of these factors should make it evident that Russia is not a credible rival , much less an existential
threat, to the United States and its democratic system. Russia's power is a pale shadow of the Soviet Union's. The only
undiminished source of clout is the country's sizeable nuclear arsenal. But while nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent, they are
useful for power projection or warfighting , unless the political leadership wants to risk
not very

national suicide . And there is no evidence whatsoever that Putin and his oligarch backers are suicidal.
Quite the contrary, they seem wedded to accumulating ever greater wealth and perks.

Finally, Russia’s security interests actually overlap substantially with America’s—most notably regarding the
desire to combat radical Islamic terrorism. If U.S. leaders did not insist on pursuing  provocative policies ,
such as  expanding NATO  to Russia’s border, undermining longtime Russian clients in the Balkans (Serbia) and the Middle
East (Syria), and excluding Russia from key international economic institutions such as the G-7, there would be relatively few
occasions when vital American and Russian interests collide.

A fundamental shift in U.S. policy is needed, but that requires a major change in America's national psychology. For more
than four decades, Americans saw (and were told to regard) the Soviet Union as a mortal threat to the nation's security and its most cherished
values of freedom and democracy. Unfortunately, a mental reset did not take place when the USSR dissolved, and a quasi-democratic Russia
emerged as one of the successor states. Too many Americans (including political leaders and policymakers) act as though they are
still confronting the Soviet Union. It will be the ultimate tragic irony if, having avoided war with a
totalitarian global adversary , America now stumbles into war because of an out-of-date image of,
and policy toward, a conventional , declining regional power . Yet unless U.S. leaders change both their
mindsets and their policies toward Russia, that outcome is a very real possibility.

The plan eases pressure for Russian expansion by creating a neutral buffer on the
westward flank.
Von Rennenkampff ’19 [Marik; November 14; former analyst for the Bureau of International
Security and Nonproliferation in the U.S. Department of State; The Hill, “The analysts are wrong: Putin's
aggression exposes Russia's decline,” https://thehill.com/opinion/international/470552-the-analysts-
are-wrong-putins-aggression-exposes-russias-decline; RP]

Countless geopolitical analysts attribute increasing Russian aggression to Vladimir

Putin’s desire to reclaim Russian “ greatness .” But a more nuanced assessment holds that, far from
“resurrecting” the “Russian empire,” Putin’s provocations are symptoms of an isolated power
in decline.

In short, recentRussian bellicosity around the globe amounts to (a) propping up the few allies that Moscow
has left or (b) lashing out when Russia loses (yet another) ally. Ultimately, Putin’s increasingly belligerent
behavior – to include Moscow’s sweeping campaign to disrupt the 2016 U.S. elections – is a product of Russia’s increasing
isolation on the international stage.

After centuries of invasions – from Napoleon to Nazi Germany – the Russian strategic psyche remains staunchly
suspicious of the West. While this wariness is largely unfounded in the current geopolitical context, it is a reality .
Policymakers would be wise to acknowledge that Moscow is paranoid about its continued loss of
traditional allies and client states, especially on its western flank .

Indeed, Russia  hemorrhaged  allied

buffer states following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many
Eastern European nations, enticed by massive   investment flows  and the economic benefits that
come with closer relations with Europe, began looking westwards .

In all, 13 countries – virtually all previously in the Soviet sphere of influence – joined the transatlantic NATO
alliance following the end of the Cold War. These losses to the West , coupled
with  declining  military spending, amounted to a series of strategic defeats for Russia.

While Moscow’s influence on the world stage (rightly) plummeted after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Russia remains a significant military and nuclear power capable of projecting force around the globe. As
Russia lost traditional buffer-
client states to the West, Putin reacted much like many other large , authoritarian military powers under
similar circumstances: by lashing out .

Moscow launched the first European war  of the 21st century following Georgia’s  westward turn towards Europe.
More recently, Putin responded to Ukraine’s pivot  away from Russia by  annexing Ukraine's Crimea
region and launching a deadly war in Ukraine’s eastern provinces. Both Ukraine and Georgia share a border with Russia,
making their turns toward Europe particularly stinging  strategic losses for Moscow.

A few years later, as the Balkan country of Montenegro finalized the NATO membership process, Russia attempted a
last-minute coup  to halt the tiny nation’s westward turn. Moscow’s desperate (and often deadly)
interventions in Georgia , Ukraine and Montenegro are not the actions of an “ empire ” on the rise;
they are the hallmarks of a fading giant desperately seeking to reverse a series of strategic
defeats .

In an (imperfect) analogy, policymakers might imagine how a future U.S. government would react if Europe ,
Mexico and Canada turned toward China. Or, viewed through a slightly different lens, how many allies would the U.S. lose to
the influence of a nuclear-armed competitor before it responded with force?
To be clear, citizens in all countries should be free to choose their governments and, by extension, their nation’s alliances. But there are
consequences to  actively pushing  (or publicly cheering) key Russian allies and client states away from
Moscow's orbit , as successive U.S. administrations have done. Indeed, considering a litany of  historical
nuances  and Putin’s personality and background, it should come as no surprise that Russia lashes out
as it is increasingly cornered on the international stage.
 2AC -- AT: Buffer States
Enlargement link-turns buffers.
O’Hanlon 17—(senior fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, adjunct professor of IR at
Georgetown and Columbia, former member of the external advisory board at the Central Intelligence
Agency from 2011-12). O’Hanlon, Michael E. 2017. Beyond NATO: A New Security Architecture for
Eastern Europe. Brookings Institution Press.

Most important, as part of the new architecture, NATO’s signals to Ukraine and Georgia in 2008 that they would someday
be invited into the alliance would have to be walked back . They would be superseded by the new East European Security
Architecture (EESA), which would reliably ensure their sovereignty far more quickly than
and might prove negotiable

NATO membership could ever have been achieved, given current strategic conditions . It is important to
underscore that if the new architecture works as I believe it could, and likely will, it will be preferable to NATO membership for the

simple reason that it is a far more credible and attainable arrangement, on a much shorter time horizon .9
Some might argue that Russia’s violation of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, which had guaranteed Ukrainian sovereignty, suggests that Moscow would not uphold its obligations under
any new security arrangement. That is possible, and means of verification as well as measures of possible response to Russian transgressions must be developed, as discussed later. It is also

worth noting that since 1994 NATO has added thirteen new members , mostly former Warsaw Pact members or former Soviet republics. Doing so did not amount to an explicit
violation of any promise ever made to Moscow, but as has been argued here, it did dramatically change the European security

landscape in Russian eyes. By contrast, the new security order would be intended to create a permanent
arrangement that covered the whole continent. This would create a much different situation than what followed the
Budapest Memo randum.
 2AC -- AT: Georgia
Ukraine is sufficient.
Person ’15 [Robert; November 12; Assistant Professor of International Relations and Comparative
Politics at the United States Military Academy at West Point; Washington Post, “6 reasons not to worry
about Russia invading the Baltics,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2015/11/12/6-reasons-not-to-worry-about-russia-invading-the-baltics/; RP]

3. The Baltics don’t have the same symbolic meaning as Ukraine and Crimea

Ukraine has  deep symbolic meaning for Russia. Citizens of both countries consider the ancient empire
of Kievan Rus (and its capital, Kiev) to be the cradle of eastern Slavic civilization . Kiev’s Prince Vladimir the Great brought
Orthodox Christianity to his subjects in 988, during a golden age of Slavic civilization that was the foundation for later achievements by Muscovy
and the Russian empire. In fact, they just installed the cornerstone for a massive new monument to Prince Vladimir near the Kremlin in
Moscow. Parts of modern-day Ukraine had been part of the Russian empire since the 16th century; Crimea became part of Russia in 1783.

This deep historical connection of civilizations has long made Ukrainian independence hard for
Russia to swallow.

Putin once famously remarked to George Bush: “You have to understand, George. Ukraine is not even a
country .” And for most of Russia’s history, he’s right: Ukraine only became a country in 1991 after centuries as
the borderland of the Russian and Soviet empires.

That Ukraine took Crimea with it only made things worse, as the peninsula was only “gifted” to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic by Nikita
Khrushchev in 1954, a transfer that many Russians saw as illegitimate both before and after the Soviet collapse.

Ukraine is special for Russia . The Baltics are a different story . My research has traced the territorial evolution of
Russia in the Baltic region. While the Baltics became part of the Russian empire through the partitions of Poland in the

Tsars were sufficiently “ hands off ” to allow strong national identities to flourish that
18th century, the
opposed Russian domination.

What’s more, the Baltics were independent between the world wars. When the Soviet Union forcibly annexed
them again in 1940, Baltic citizens saw it as an illegitimate foreign occupation  – and continued to resist
for the next 51 years. Even as Gorbachev struggled in the dying days of the USSR to hold together some kind of union, he knew
that it would not include the Baltic Republics, and left them out of his proposed treaty salvaging what was left of the Soviet
Union.

Russia and Russians have long recognized that the Baltics are culturally and historically distinct from Russia,
according to surveys and interviews I’ve conducted across Russia and Latvia. Whether the historical and cultural importance
of Ukraine was a motivation or just a justification for Putin’s actions in Ukraine, comparable symbolism is absent in the
Baltics, making them less likely targets for Russian interference.
 2AC -- AT: Revisionism
Not revisionist.
Carpenter, Ted Galen, PhD, ’19, NATO: The Dangerous Dinosaur. Cato Institute. P 73-79.
Those who contend that Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 proves that the Putin government is pursuing an
aggressive, expansionist foreign policy are misreading the situation . Crimea was a special case for
several reasons. First, the peninsula had been part of Russia between 1783 and 1954, during both the czarist and Soviet eras. Soviet leader
Nikita Khrushchev, for reasons that are not entirely clear, arbitrarily transferred Crimea to Ukraine in
1954. Since Ukraine and Russia were both part of the Soviet Union, that decision didn’t seem to matter
much at the time. When the Soviet Union dissolved at the end of 1991, however, Russia suddenly faced
the reality that its key naval base at Sevastopol now was on the territory of a foreign country. Yet even that
development didn’t seem to alarm Russian officials, since Ukraine’s government remained in the hands of generally pro-Russian political
leaders throughout the 1990s and the early years of the new millennium. Kiev provided further reassurance by granting Russia a 25-year lease
on the facility shortly after gaining independence.

The situation became problematic, though, when Viktor Yushchenko, an anti-Russian, pro-Western figure,
became Ukraine’s president in 2004, leading the so-called Orange Revolution. Russian officials were noticeably nervous when
Yushchenko indicated a renewal was unlikely when Moscow’s lease at Sevastopol expired in 2017. That danger passed, however, once another
pro-Russian politician, Viktor Yanukovych, won Ukraine’s 2010 presidential election. Moscow’s anxiety then receded.

Those worries resurfaced with a vengeance in 2014, though, when antiYanukovych demonstrators, encouraged if not actively aided by
Washington and the European Union, overthrew the Ukrainian president nearly two years before his term expired.28 Extremely nationalist,
anti-Russian factions dominated the regime that emerged from the Maidan Revolution. Not only did the Crimean naval base now seem in
jeopardy, but the new leaders avidly sought NATO membership for Ukraine—something that Washington had pushed for years.

The Kremlin responded quickly and decisively to the Ukraine developments. Barely disguised Russian special forces reinforced the normal
garrison at Sevastopol and set up positions elsewhere on the peninsula. Pro-Russian political figures in Crimea immediately called for a
referendum on secession from Ukraine, which was held days later and produced a predictably affirmative vote. Newly elected Crimean officials
then asked that their territory be allowed to join the Russian Federation—a “request” that Moscow quickly granted.

U.S. anger at such a transparent territorial grab was volcanic. The Obama administration denounced the move, and Washington imposed an
array of economic sanctions on Russia. The administration also induced and pressured its European allies to do the same. Such a response
constituted an overreaction, and a hypocritical one. Much of the blame for the Crimea episode should be put at Washington’s door. The U.S.-EU
meddling in Ukraine’s politics to encourage the ouster of a pro-Russian government—a democratically elected one at that—could hardly be
seen as other than hostile and threatening to both Russian leaders and the Russian public. Indeed, polls indicated that Putin’s approval rating
soared to over 80 percent following the annexation.29

The Crimea issue became the principal grievance that anti-Russia types in the United States cited to justify a confrontational policy—until the
allegations of Russian interference in U.S. elections eclipsed that complaint. But one might ask why so many U.S. political leaders and
policymakers elevated a parochial territorial dispute to such prominence, much less why they insist that the arbitrary edict made back in 1954
by the communist dictator of a defunct country must be treated with reverence.30

It would have been better if the successor republics collectively had addressed and implemented territorial adjustments involving Crimea and
other potential problem areas when the USSR dissolved, but Moscow’s decision to resolve the Crimea question unilaterally was not necessarily
a sign of broader territorial ambitions.

The conquest is not even unprecedented in the post–World War II era. Israel seized the Golan Heights
from Syria in 1967 during the Six-Day War and later annexed that territory. Turkey seized a major portion of Cyprus and

continues to occupy that land, establishing a puppet state as a façade. It is certainly an overstatement to contend, as does
UCLA political science professor Daniel Treisman, that “By annexing a neighboring country’s territory by force, Putin overturned in a single
stroke the assumption on which the post–Cold War European order had rested.”31 One could make a stronger case that the
first major blow to that post–Cold War European order came 15 years earlier when the Western
powers amputated Kosovo from Serbia.
Yet Western opinion leaders routinely cite the Crimea annexation and Moscow’s subsequent assistance to secessionist
factions in eastern Ukraine as proof that Russia has broad, perhaps even unlimited, expansionist goals . In February
2015, Gen. Sir Adrian Bradshaw, the senior British officer in NATO, asserted that Russia’s expansionism threatened to become an “obvious
existential threat to our whole being.”32 The following year, Leon Panetta, the former secretary of defense, expressed similar alarm. “Let’s not
kid anybody,” Panetta stated, “Putin’s main interest is to try to restore the old Soviet Union.”33

When advocates of a confrontational policy toward Moscow were not alleging that Putin wanted to revive the Soviet Union, they accused him
of seeking to restore the pre-Soviet Russian empire. That allegation even predated the seizure of Crimea. Senator McCain made the accusation
in 2008, at the time of the Russo-Georgian war. “I think it’s very clear that Russian ambitions are to restore the old Russian Empire,” McCain
stated. “Not the Soviet Union, but the Russian Empire.”34

That line of argument at least implicitly acknowledged that Putin was not a doctrinaire communist, but it still was misplaced and exaggerated.
As Harvard University professor Andrei Shleifer and his co-author Daniel Treisman observe in Foreign Affairs, “To many in the West,
Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia seemed to prove the Kremlin’s land hung er.” Shleifer and Treisman argue that
such a conclusion reflects poor logic. “Kremlin leaders bent on expansion would surely have ordered troops all the
way to Tbilisi to depose [Georgia President Mikheil] Saakashvili. At the least, Russian forces would have taken
control of the oil and gas pipelines that cross Georgia.” Instead, the Russians “left those pipelines alone
and quickly withdrew to the mountains .”35

Shleifer and Treisman raise a very important point. If

Putin is a rogue leader with massive expansionist objectives , why
would he relinquish territory that Russian forces already occupied? Indeed, with very little additional effort, those
forces could have captured Tbilisi and the rest of Georgia. Yet Moscow did not attempt to do so. Hitler
never willingly gave up any of his conquests. And until the East European satellite empire collapsed in 1989–1991, the USSR disgorged only one
occupied area—the portion of Austria it controlled at the end of World War II. Even that modest retreat took place only after laborious,
multiyear negotiations for a treaty guaranteeing Austria’s strict neutrality. If Putin truly harbors malignant expansionist ambitions comparable
to those of Hitler and Stalin, declining to conquer and absorb all of Georgia when that achievement was easily within reach is a curious step.
His decision merely to maintain and consolidate Abkhazia and South Ossetia as Russian protectorates
suggests much more restrained and limited ambitions.

Allegations that Putin wants to reconstitute the Soviet or the czarist empires are vastly overblown. Former
NATO supreme commander Gen. Philip M. Breedlove is a little closer to the mark when he contends that
“Moscow is determined to reestablish what it considers its rightful sphere of influence , undermine
NATO, andreclaim its great power status .”36 But wanting, indeed insisting upon, a sphere of influence has
long been standard behavior for major powers . Indeed, the United States declared such a sphere when James Monroe’s
administration proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine— and it did so at a time when the country was still far from attaining great power status. As for
wishing to undermine NATO, it is more accurate to say that Moscow is belatedly trying to fend off the alliance’s
seemingly inexorable advance east. Finally, Russian leaders would presumably like to reclaim great power status for their country;
insist on a seat at the table when major decisions about Eastern Europe, the Middle
at the very least, they
East, and Central Asia are made. That position is not unreasonable, and an especially clumsy aspect of Western policy toward
Moscow has been the unwillingness to accord even basic respect to Russia and not trample on its core interests.
Rapprochement
AT: T-Collective
 2AC -- AT: T-Subsets
“And/or” includes subsets.
Oxford 89 – Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition. [and, conj.1, adv., and n.1, Oxford English
Dictionary Online, accessed through the University of Michigan]//BPS

and/or (also and or): a formula denoting that the items joined by it can be taken either together or as
f.

alternatives . Cf. either-or n. and adj..

Collective nouns can be singular OR plural.

Ginger ’14 [Ginger Software; carbon dated to March 26; Grammar guide and programming engine;
Ginger, “Collective Nouns,” https://www.gingersoftware.com/content/grammar-rules/nouns/collective-
nouns/]
What happens if you can’t decide whether a collective noun is singular or plural?

You can use different words to compose your sentence to be sure there is no agreement error. For example, you can insert the word
“ members ” after a collective noun or use a different word such as “players” instead of “team” or “zebras” instead of “herd”
or “students” instead of “class.” Reread what you have written to be sure it sounds natural, and give yourself some time to practice.
Soon enough you’ll be able to use plural verbs without worrying whether you have made mistakes.

How to Use Collective Nouns

People who are new to writing often encounter some trouble with sentence agreement when using collective nouns. This is understandable,

because a collective noun can be singular or plural , depending on a sentence’s context . How do you know if
a collective noun is singular? How can you tell if it’s plural? What pronouns and verbs are best for pairing with the collective noun you’ve
chosen?

In the context of NATO, they include any individual member.

Ginger ’14 [Ginger Software; carbon dated to March 26; Grammar guide and programming engine;
Ginger, “Collective Nouns,” https://www.gingersoftware.com/content/grammar-rules/nouns/collective-
nouns/]

Members of collective nouns can act the same way , as individuals doing their own thing . When
members of a collective noun act as individuals , that collective noun is plural and must be paired with plural
pronouns and plural verbs. As you read the following examples, you’ll notice that members of the collective noun are not functioning in unison.
AT: T-Substantial Limit
 2AC -- AT: T-Substantial
“Substantially limits” suggests “considerable,” excluding “minor.”
O’Connor 2 – Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, a 9-0 at the Supreme Court. [Toyota Motor Mfg.,
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams Supreme Court of the United States, 534 U.S. 184, 1-8-2002, Westlaw]//BPS

Our consideration of this issue is guided first and foremost by the words of the disability definition itself .
“[S]ubstantially” in the phrase “ substantially limits ” suggests “ considerable ” or “to a large
degree .” See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1976) (defining “substantially” as “in a
substantial manner ” and “substantial” as “ considerable in amount , value , or worth ” and “being
that specified to a large degree or in the main ”); see also 17 Oxford English Dictionary 66–67 (2d ed.1989)
( “substantial”: “[r]elating to *197 or proceeding from the essence of a thing; essential”; “ [o]f ample or
considerable amount, quantity, or dimensions”). The word “substantial” thus clearly precludes impairments that
interfere in only a minor way with the performance of manual tasks from qualifying as disabilities. Cf. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,
527 U.S., at 565, 119 S.Ct. 2162 (explaining that a “mere difference” does not amount to a “significant restric[tion]” and therefore does not
satisfy the EEOC's interpretation of “substantially limits”).

Reduce also means prevent.

Mahoning County ‘N.D. [Mahoning County; No date; Legal team for Mahoning County, Ohio;
Mahoning County Communicator, “Reducing Solid Waste for Businesses and Industry,”
https://www.mahoningcountyoh.gov/471/Source-Reduction; RP]

Innovative companies are incorporating waste reduction principles into their daily operations. What exactly is waste reduction?
Waste reduction includes all actions taken to reduce the amount and/or toxicity of waste requiring disposal. It
includes waste prevention , recycling, composting, and the purchase and manufacture of goods that have recycled content or
produce less waste. Businesses are reviewing their entire operation to identify and implement as many opportunities for reducing waste as
possible.
AT: Conditions
 2AC -- AT: Russia QPQ CP
Russia says no- they won’t agree without reciprocal NATO reductions which will never
happen- they won’t even come to the table because they don’t believe offers are
genuine
Meier & Lunn 14 (Olivia, associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs
(Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, or SWP) in Berlin. Simon, former secretary-general of the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly, is a Brussels-based senior fellow with the European Leadership Network and a
consultant to the Nuclear Threat Initiative.. "Trapped: NATO, Russia, and the Problem of Tactical Nuclear
Weapons" https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014-01/trapped-nato-russia-problem-tactical-nuclear-
weapons)

This surge of optimism stands in sharp contrast to the pace of progress on

tackling the problem of tactical nuclear weapons in
Europe. NATO and Russia have entrapped themselves, with each of them linking progress on nuclear
arms control to steps by the other side while lacking the political will to take the process forward . The
December 3-4 meeting of NATO foreign ministers and deliberations in the NATO-Russia Council did not even have nuclear arms control in Europe on its agenda,
although a few member states raised the issue.

NATO does not confirm numbers, but it is believed that the United States deploys 150 to 200 gravity bombs under nuclear sharing arrangements in Europe. The

alliance has declared its intention to engage Russia in a process of confidence building on tactical
nuclear weapons in order to pave the way for future reductions. The allies, however, will contemplate
changes to the nuclear posture only on the basis of Russian reciprocity.
Russia probably deploys around 2,000 operational tactical nuclear weapons and may have many more in reserve. Moscow insists that a dialogue on tactical nuclear
weapons must be part of a broader settlement of differences over NATO’s missile defense plans and the asymmetries in conventional capabilities between Russia
and NATO. Recently, Russia reportedly has raised the stakes by moving short-range Iskander missiles, which could carry nuclear warheads, toward NATO member
countries. On December 19, however, Russian President Vladimir Putin denied press reports that the missiles have been deployed on the territory of the Russian
exclave of Kaliningrad, which is situated between NATO members Lithuania and Poland.[1]

NATO’s conditionality and Russian intransigence have created an impasse over how
In combination,

to deal with the nuclear weapons deployed in Europe . Almost 25 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the contribution of
these weapons to nuclear deterrence and the core function of preventing conventional war in Europe has vanished. Nevertheless, both sides have been
unwilling to take meaningful steps toward the elimination of Europe’s nuclear legacy .
In the long run, NATO’s nuclear posture is not sustainable. The hardware supporting nuclear sharing arrangements is aging. U.S. plans to modernize the B61 gravity
bombs deployed in host countries Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey could potentially trigger public opposition to NATO’s nuclear sharing
arrangements.

The alliance, therefore, must re-evaluate the linkages involved in its nuclear weapons policy toward Russia, clarify its goals in arms control and force posture, and,
more broadly, reassess the usefulness of nuclear forces associated with its deterrence posture.

At the same time, Russia would be well advised to take up NATO’s offer of discussing transparency and confidence-building measures. Russia’s rigid stance has
resulted in a more united alliance. Those allies that have argued for a policy of engagement toward Russia find themselves increasingly isolated and with fewer good
arguments to support their case for dialogue and cooperation. Thus, Moscow’s tough policy on tactical nuclear weapons is pushing NATO into a confrontational
mode that cannot be in Moscow’s interest.

This article focuses on the state of play in NATO’s internal deliberations on the alliance’s future nuclear posture and its current efforts to engage
Russia in a process of transparency and confidence-building measures in that area. Ultimately, a reciprocal agreement on reducing the number
of tactical nuclear weapons and eventually eliminating them is the best way to deal with the Cold War’s dangerous and expensive legacy. In the
meantime, each side can take many steps of intrinsic value to break the current political deadlock.

NATO’s Internal Debate

The promise in 2009 by Germany’s previous government to “advocate within the Alliance and with our American allies the removal of the remaining nuclear
weapons from Germany”[2] triggered a debate within NATO on the role of nuclear weapons and the related issue of arms control.[3] The adoption in November
2010 of a new Strategic Concept and a subsequent May 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review report managed to reconcile but not resolve the alliance’s
deep-seated differences.[4]

As a result, the
question of NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons and their relationship to Russia’s own weapons
remains unresolved. In the 2012 posture review report, the allies confirm that NATO’s nuclear forces currently meet the criteria for an effective
deterrence and defense posture.[5] Yet, the report contains several references to the possibility of further reductions in tactical nuclear weapons. Thus, the allies
seek to ensure the broadest possible participation in nuclear sharing arrangements in case NATO were to decide to reduce its reliance on tactical nuclear weapons
based in Europe.[6] These references not only leave open the door to further reductions, but also are testimony to the continuing pressure from some allies for such
movement. The posture review report also clearly states that the alliance is prepared to reduce “its
requirement” for t actical n uclear w eapon s only “in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia.”[7] As a result of
the review, work is now under way in these areas.

Despite three years of discussions in various settings, the allies have not been able to resolve their
competing views on reciprocity —what the term means or what consequences reciprocal actions by Russia may have for NATO policy.
Some insist that Russia must match NATO moves directly; others say that NATO should take actions that
encourage Russian reciprocity. Simply put, the alliance has not established a road map of where it
wants to go and how it plans to get there .

Several structural hurdles impede agreement on a unified and practical arms control approach by the
alliance and account for the slow progress in completing the tasks that the posture review assigned. NATO has been trying to increase its arms control profile
and be more coherent by agreeing in May 2012 to set up the Special Advisory and Consultation Committee on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
(see box). Developing policy with regard to possible reductions and reciprocal action by Russia on tactical nuclear weapons has been the committee’s main task until
now.

Yet, arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation remain the prerogatives of individual members;
attitudes within NATO vary considerably, depending on the issue at stake. There is a broad consensus among the 28
alliance members on NATO’s role in constraining WMD proliferation, but views on arms control and disarmament are mixed. Some

members are seeking a higher profile for NATO in disarmament policy, while others believe that this is
not an appropriate subject for an alliance committed to collective defense . France is generally
skeptical of strengthening NATO’s role in arms control. Some central and eastern European
nations also are skeptical of the potential benefits of engaging Russia on arms control .[8]

the low level of ambition is the price of sustaining the intra-alliance

NATO and member state officials insist that

consensus on NATO’s nuclear posture. It is unlikely that the necessary consensus to change
NATO’s nuclear posture will be reached any time soon. Thus, maintaining the status quo is
the default option.[ 9]
Confidence-Building Package

Against this difficult background, NATO began developing a package of transparency and confidence-
building measures on tactical nuclear weapons for discussion with Russia , after the mandate of the new arms control
committee had been adopted in February 2013.[10] After many delays, it was hoped that NATO foreign ministers at the North Atlantic Council meeting on
December 3 would adopt a set of measures for subsequent discussion in the NATO-Russia Council, which met on December 4, also at the level of foreign ministers.

The new NATO committee initially considered more than a dozen specific measures. Many of these were the outcome of deliberations in its predecessor committee,
which was charged under the posture review with elaborating NATO’s role in arms control.[11] Member states “scrubbed” these measures to ensure that they took
full account of their concerns and interests. According to diplomatic sources, after last summer, the earlier committee’s list had been narrowed to five measures,
each of which was developed in further detail in national papers from the United States or the Netherlands.

According to several sources, that short list included topics such as joint seminars, joint declarations on nuclear policy, information exchanges, joint visits at former
deployment sites of tactical nuclear weapons, and cooperation to deal with the consequences of nuclear accidents and incidents. This list was far less ambitious
than, for example, the nonpaper that Norway, Poland, Germany, and the Netherlands submitted in April 2011 on increasing transparency and confidence with
regard to tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. That document, which had also the support of Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg, and
Slovenia, suggested information exchanges about U.S. and Russian tactical nuclear weapons, including numbers, locations, operational status, command
arrangements, and level of warhead storage security. The paper also proposed voluntary notifications of movement of tactical nuclear weapons and exchange visits
by military officials.[12]

The focus and purpose of some potential discussion topics on the 2013 list, such as joint seminars and joint declarations on nuclear policy, were vague, and it
remained unclear what they would add to discussions on similar topics already taking place. For example, there already have been four meetings with Russia on
nuclear doctrines and strategies in the NATO-Russia Council. Most recently, Russian Foreign Ministry officials actively participated in a seminar on such issues held
June 26-28 in The Hague.[13] There also have been four rounds of discussion on nuclear policy among the five countries that the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
recognizes as nuclear-weapon states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), resulting in joint statements.[14]

More-specific proposals, such as information exchanges on nuclear holdings or joint visits to former
nuclear sites, proved to be too difficult to implement and controversial among NATO members. As it
turned out, in some cases NATO itself is not ready to exercise the kind of transparency on tactical
nuclear weapons it is demanding from Moscow. Nuclear declassification rules apparently have not been
changed since the Cold War. Thus, everything related to current or past nuclear activities remains
classified. Defense ministries in several NATO member states continue to oppose any changes to such
policies. Even if an individual NATO member were to decide to be more open about its past or
current involvement in nuclear sharing, releasing such information would need the consent of all other
members of the Nuclear Planning Group.[15]
Most experts and officials concede that the United States could easily adopt a more relaxed approach to these rules.[16] Nevertheless, partly because of these
problems with transparency, the proposals on information exchange and joint visits were dropped from the list of topics to be offered to Russia ahead of the
December 3 foreign ministers meeting.

The proposal to offer a tabletop exercise and information exchanges on nuclear safety and security suffered the
same fate, which was somewhat surprising . Relatively recently, both sides were involved in practical cooperation on reducing the risks from
unintended or unauthorized nuclear weapons use, and despite the general cooling of NATO-Russian relations, that cooperation is generally viewed as having been
mutually beneficial. From 2004 to 2007, all NATO-Russia Council members had been invited to observe four exercises, one in each of the council’s nuclear-weapon
states, to practice responses to incidents and accidents involving nuclear weapons.[17]

Offering such openness today appears unacceptable to some NATO members. These critics
argue that the alliance should not endlessly pursue cooperation with Moscow, given Russia’s
consistent lack of willingness to engage in a dialogue on t actical n uclear w eapon s . Their case was
strengthened when, according to several diplomats, Russia , ahead of the December meeting of the NATO-Russia Council, declared that
it was not interested in any discussion of nuclear confidence building. Whether this objection is specific to the
issue of transparency on tactical nuclear weapons or reflects a more general objection to discussing such matters with non-nuclear-weapon states remains unclear.

In any case, the 2014 work plan of the council omits all topics related to nuclear weapons policy. Meetings of nuclear experts under the auspices of the council have
been put on hold.[18] Discussions could be revived, however, should both sides agree to do so, according to diplomatic sources.[19]

As a result, the arms control committee, during a December 6 meeting, endorsed only two potential transparency and confidence-building measures to be pursued
in a possible future dialogue with Moscow on tactical nuclear weapons. These would comprise unilateral and joint statements on nuclear policy and the possibility
of a dialogue and reciprocal briefings on U.S. and Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Once these topics have been adopted by the North Atlantic Council,
allies will begin a discussion on the timing and tactics of how to take these issues forward with Russia. More-ambitious proposals remain under discussion among
NATO allies. Allies also have yet to agree on what role arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation might play at NATO’s 65th anniversary summit, which is to
take place September 4-5 in Newport in the United Kingdom.

What Lies Ahead?

efforts to revive the nuclear arms control dialogue between NATO and Russia
Over the last few years,

have ground to a halt. The combination of Russia’s unwillingness to engage in a dialogue on

t actical n uclear w eapon s and the refusal of some NATO members to decouple changes in the
alliance’s nuclear posture from Russian actions have resulted in complete deadlock . Vested
interests in maintaining the status quo and arcane classification rules on each side further
solidify the situation.
AT: UK CP
 2AC -- AT: Pressure UK CP
UK doesn’t care about US pressure
Kharpal 20 (Arjun, CNBC’s senior technology correspondent. "‘Our special relationship is less special’:
UK-US bond tested by Britain’s Huawei 5G decision" https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/29/uk-us-
relationship-tested-with-britain-huawei-5g-decision.html)

For decades, some within Britain and the U.S. have celebrated a “special relationship” — historically, politically, economically and
culturally. That bond looks set to be challenged after the U.K.’s decision to allow Chinese telecommunications giant
Huawei to take part in its next-generation mobile networks.
Known as 5G, those networks promise super-fast data speeds but also provide the technology to underpin critical infrastructure in the future.

Washington has maintained that Huawei represents a national security threat because its networking gear could
be used by the Chinese government for espionage. The Trump administration has also raised concerns about the link between Huawei and the
Chinese Communist Party. Huawei has denied that its equipment could be compromised and says it has no links with Beijing.

The U.S. piled pressure on the U.K. to block Huawei . Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said Britain had a
“momentous decision ahead on 5G.” But Britain chose to allow Huawei to participate in parts of 5G networks called the Radio
Access Network. This is essentially the part of the network that hooks up your devices with the actual 5G signal. Huawei can participate in the
RAN, but no more than 35% of a single vendor’s equipment in this part of the network can come from the Chinese vendor.

Britain’s decision has “disappointed” the Trump administration and now U.S. lawmakers are warning
about deteriorating relations between the U.K. and U.S.

They’ll say no- they’re pro Ukraine-NATO ties

Dickinson 6/16 (Peter, editor of the UkraineAlert blog at the Eurasia Center and the publisher of
Business Ukraine and Lviv Today magazines. Formerly he served as the British Council’s information
manager in West Ukraine, where he worked to facilitate dialogue between Ukrainian NGOs and
academic sectors and promote UK government outreach in the region.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/nato-upgrades-ukraine/)

NATO moved to upgrade its relationship with Ukraine on June 12 by officially recognizing the country as
an Enhanced Opportunities Partner. Ukraine is the sixth country to receive this status, joining Australia, Finland, Sweden, Georgia
and Jordan. Being an Enhanced Opportunities Partner will bring Ukraine a number of potential benefits including improved access to
interoperability programs and exercises. It also offers the prospect of greater information and experience sharing.

NATO’s decision was widely toasted by Ukraine, where it was welcomed as a timely boost to the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration ambitions.
In a social media post, President Zelenskyy noted the practical implications of the upgrade. “Grateful to the members of the Alliance for
recognizing Ukraine’s significant contribution to joint peacekeeping operations in the world,” Zelenskyy tweeted. “NATO’s Enhanced
Opportunities Partner status is a practical solution that will allow Ukraine and the Alliance to work even closer together.”

Many of Ukraine’s Western partners offered similarly enthusiastic responses. “I welcome NATO’s award
of Enhanced Opportunity Partner status to Ukraine today – reinforcing the close relationship between
NATO and Ukraine. The U nited K ingdom remains firmly committed to Ukraine’s security, sovereignty
and territorial integrity,” tweeted British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab.
AT: China DA
 2AC -- AT: China Expansion DA
Grand bargain solves the link.
Graham '19 [Thomas; November/December 2019; Distinguished Fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations, former Senior Director for Russia on the National Security Council; "Let Russia Be Russia,"
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2019-10-15/let-russia-be-russia]

Beginning in Europe, U.S. policymakers should give up any ambitions of expanding NATO farther
into formerly Soviet spaces. Rather than courting countries that NATO is unwilling to defend militarily
—note the limp responses to Russian attacks on Georgia and Ukraine —the alliance should strengthen
its own internal cohesion and reassure vulnerable members of its commitment to collective defense. Halting NATO expansion

eastward would remove a central reason for Russia’s encroachments on former Soviet states. But
the United States should still cooperate on security matters with those states, a kind of relationship that Russia tolerates.

So far, the U nited S tates has insisted that the possibility of NATO membership remains open to
Ukraine. Washington has categorically rejected Russia’s incorporation of Crimea and insisted that the conflict in the Donbas be brought to an
end on the basis of the agreement signed in Minsk in 2015, which stipulates a special autonomous status for separatist regions inside a reunited

Ukraine. This approach has made little headway . The Donbas conflict continues, and Russia is putting
down deeper roots in Crimea. Distracted from reform by the struggle with Russia, Ukraine is beset by
corruption , political volatility , and economic underperformance .

The recent election in Ukraine of a new president, Volodymyr Zelensky , whose supporters now dominate the parliament, has
created an opening for a comprehensive resolution of the crisis. Two tradeoffs are essential. First, to allay
Russian concerns , the U nited S tates should tell Ukraine that NATO membership is off the table ,
while deepening bilateral security cooperation with Kiev. Second, Kiev should recognize Russia’s incorporation of Crimea in exchange for

Moscow’s acceptance of the full reintegration of the Donbas into Ukraine without any special status. In a comprehensive
agreement , Ukrainians would also receive compensation for lost property in Crimea and Ukraine
would be afforded access to offshore resources and guaranteed passage through the Kerch Strait to ports on the Sea of Azov.
The U nited S tates and the EU would incrementally ease their sanctions on Russia as these arrangements took
effect. At the same time, they would offer Ukraine a substantial assistance package aimed at facilitating reform in the belief that a

strong, prosperous Ukraine is both the best deterrent against future Russian aggression and a
necessary foundation for more constructive Russian-Ukrainian relations.

Such an approach would be met initially with great skepticism in Kiev , Moscow, and elsewhere in Europe. But
Zelensky has staked his presidency on resolving the Donbas conflict, and Putin would welcome the
chance to redirect resources and attention to countering spreading socioeconomic unrest in Russia.
Meanwhile, European leaders are suffering from Ukraine fatigue and want to normalize relations with

Russia while still upholding the principles of European security . The time is ripe for bold
diplomacy that would allow all sides to claim a partial victory and accommodate the hard
realities on the ground: NATO is not prepared to accept Ukraine as a member, Crimea is not going back to
Ukraine, and a separatist movement in the Donbas is nonviable without Moscow’s active involvement .
It’s better for Ukrainian integrity.
Sweeney '20 [Mike; August 2020; fellow at Defense Priorities, contributor to Divergent Options, West
Point’s Modern War Institute, War on the Rocks; "SAYING “NO” TO NATO—OPTIONS FOR UKRAINIAN
NEUTRALITY," https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/saying-no-to-nato-options-for-ukrainian-
neutrality]

From NATO’s perspective, there likewise has never been an official reversal of the Bucharest Declaration .
Despite lukewarm sentiments among some European allies, NATO’s public position remains that Ukraine
and Georgia will eventually be in the alliance . In April 2020, NATO foreign ministers approved a package
of measures to further enhance cooperation between the alliance and both states, including the sharing of radar data.17
NATO’S NEW REALITY

Despite the persistence of U.S. and NATO policy in support of Ukrainian membership, legitimate doubts should be raised about its
wisdom. At least four factors make this so.

LACK OF TRUE CONSENSUS AMONG THE UKRAINIAN PEOPLE ABOUT JOINING NATO

The first of these is the lack of true consensus among the Ukrainian people on the desirability of joining the
alliance. A recent study by academics Gerard Toal, John O’Loughlin, and Kristen M. Bakke provides new light on current attitudes within
Ukraine toward its external relations. Overall, less than half (44 percent) of those surveyed were found to be in favor of
joining NATO and only 25 percent supported permitting the alliance to base forces on their territory.18 Breaking the country down into
four macro-regions—West, Central, South, and East —the survey found a regionally inverted opinion on the
question of NATO membership: As many people in the West and Central (including Kyiv) were supportive of
joining the alliance as were opposed to that proposition in the East and South.19
Ukraine has done a better job maintaining its internal cohesion than many expected—including the U.S. intelligence community—immediately
after it attained independence.20 But incorporation into NATO without much stronger—and geographically
dispersed— domestic backing could place unneeded stress on Ukrainian society. It would also go
against NATO’s own standards requiring high internal support for joining the alliance as a criterion for
membership.

CHANGING STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE IN EUROPE

Second, the strategic setting in Central and Eastern Europe has changed significantly since earlier rounds of NATO enlargement. Russia has
regained its status as a legitimate military player —at least at the regional level. Since the nadir of the 1990s, Russia
has substantially rebuilt its conventional forces ; it further used its shaky performance in the August 2008 war against
Georgia as an impetus to improve its operational concepts while continuing to modernize its force structure .21

When NATO admitted the Baltic states in 2004 and the Visegrad countries (including Poland) in 1999, Russia’s response was limited to the
realm of diplomacy because it couldn’t use military means to object. Today, Russia’s reaction to Ukrainian membership in
NATO could take on a more concrete and hostile form , from an intensification of support for the
Donbas insurgency to additional aggression against Ukrainian territory, through covert or overt
means. The reality is that the window when Ukraine safely could have been admitted into NATO is now closed .
DEFENSIBILITY OF UKRAINE
A third factor relates to the first two. Even assuming Ukraine could be admitted into NATO, it would present
imposing questions of defensibility . In earlier rounds of enlargement, practical questions about
defense often took a backseat to other matters, such as trans-Atlantic integration and the perceived benefits for strengthening
democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. The relatively benign security environment and deep disparity in U.S. and Russian conventional
forces at the time made this possible. But with
Russia’s return as a capable regional military player, avoiding such
questions vis-à-vis Ukraine’s membership is not an option .

It would be negligent of the U.S. to admit Ukraine into NATO without a clear idea for how its 1,200
mile-border with Russia would be defended, short of total reliance on the threat of nuclear war —
a dangerous and outdated strategy. This point can’t be emphasized enough : NATO would need to
defend a frontier that’s roughly equal to the distance between New York City and Miami .

Outside of Russia itself, Ukraine is the largest country in Europe by land area. Defending it against its immediate neighbor
would almost certainly require basing some NATO forces permanently on Ukrainian territory. As the earlier
opinion poll indicates, this is likely to be unacceptable to the majority of Ukrainians (including some who support
alliance membership).

Moreover, the basing of U.S. or other foreign forces on Ukraine’s territory would also be anathema to
Russia . The basic dilemma is this: It would be hard for NATO to adequately defend Ukraine without
committing forces of such size and proximity that Russia itself would have to view them with
intense concern for its own security. Adding Ukraine puts NATO’s main frontier within 300 miles of Moscow.
AN IMBALANCE OF INTERESTS BETWEEN THE WEST AND RUSSIA

This points to the final factor that makes Ukrainian NATO membership next to impossible: the disparity in interests
between the West and Russia that colors all interactions over Ukraine. Ukraine is unlike any other
territory that NATO could add. It is not only intimately tied up with Russian history —with many Russians
regarding parts of the modern Ukrainian state as Russia proper— but it also sits astride the traditional routes invaders
have exploited to attack Russia for centuries. 22

Ukraine in NATO is a policy option for the U nited S tates; for Russia, it seems like an existential threat .
It’s reckless to suggest Russia would accept Ukrainian membership in the alliance without some kind of
dangerous counter-reaction involving covert or overt use of force .

Attempting to put Ukraine in the alliance might be the worst possible thing for it. More than likely, the only
circumstances that would responsibly allow for Ukraine to enter NATO would be the same ones that would
obviate its necessity: if Russia were to undergo a genuine and stable democratic transformation organically ,

leading to a radical reassessment of its relationships with neighboring states. But banking on that is not feasible from a
defense planning perspective.

Russia is an illiberal, authoritarian regime and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. America, NATO,
and Ukraine need to deal with that reality accordingly . If this is the case, serious doubts must be raised
about the U nited S tates continuing to publicly support Ukrainian membership in the alliance. It serves
no effective purpose ; worse, it might close off avenues of strategic thought that could better support
Ukrainian security interests long term.

Recognizing Russia’s special interest in western border states key to encourage

rebalancing against China.
Lukin, Artyom. International Studies @ Far Eastern University (Russia), 6-13-20,"The Russia–China
entente and its future." International Politics (2020): 1-18.

Scenario 2. Russia—US rapprochement Even though Russian–American relations are presently at a very
low point and unlikely to substantially recover any time soon, in the long term their normalization is not
impossible. In fact, the USA will be under increasing structural pressure to make peace with Russia as
China looms as by far the biggest threat to America’s positions in the international system. At some
point, Washington might be forced to seek Moscow’s collaboration in managing the massive challenge
from Beijing. Although Russia is unlikely to participate in any overt containment of China, it might, at
least, agree to become a neutral player. However, Washington will have to make some significant
concessions to Moscow, such as recognizing Russia’s special interests in Eastern Europe and lifting
sanctions. The hypothetical normalization of US–Russia relations would likely have a dual efect on
Russia’s policy toward China. First, Russia would relax its systemic balancing of the USA and thus have
much less incentive to strategically collaborate with China, especially in the political-military domain.
Second, if Russia feels secure on its western borders , it will have more freedom to play its own game
in East Asia, rather than siding with Beijing, which would, to a degree, help balance China’s
ambitions .
AT: Elections
 2AC -- AT: Elections DA
No link AND October surprises inevitable.
Daniel W. Drezner 9-9, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
at Tufts University, 9/9/20, “Will there be an ‘October surprise’ in foreign policy?,”
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/09/09/will-there-be-an-october-surprise-foreign-
policy/

In campaign parlance, the term “Octobersurprise” means a news story that breaks late in an election cycle that
could tip the balance of the election. Hands down, James B. Comey’s 2016 reopening of the FBI investigation into Hillary Clinton’s emails
is the greatest October surprise of the modern presidency.

The origin of the term, however, comes from the title of a 1992 Gary Sick book alleging that in 1980 the Reagan campaign struck a backroom
deal with Iran’s mullahs for them to stand firm with the Carter administration in return for subsequent covert arms shipments. This is mostly
viewed as a conspiracy theory these days, but the idea of a foreign policy October surprise is not unprecedented. There is solid evidence that in
1968 the Nixon campaign urged the South Vietnamese government to scuttle any hopes of a last-minute peace deal ending the Vietnam War.

The point is that the

original October surprises were grounded in foreign policy. Might President Trump attempt
something similar in 2020?

Of course he would if he thought it would help him. This is someone who was tacitly encouraging the Russians to
intervene in 2016 and probably hopes they do again this time around. According to John Bolton, Trump asked China for trade concessions to
help with his reelection. Trump was impeached over accusations that he coerced Ukraine’s government into generating dirt on Joe Biden.

At this point, it would be more surprising if Trump did not try to pull off an October surprise to boost his chances.

The Trump administration’s challenges in pulling off a potent October surprise are daunting , however. One problem
is that Trump’s opportunities for such a surprise are meager . We have already seen two efforts in the past
month to produce foreign policy deliverables: the normalization of ties between Israel and the U nited A rab E mirates
and the recent arrangement involving Serbia, Kosovo and Israel announced last week.

As Trump himself has acknowledged, Israel is a hot-button issue for evangelicals, so it makes sense that he would
stress these deliverables now. The problem is there is not much there. The UAE deal, while a legitimate accomplishment, did not
really move the needle much beyond Trump’s base.

The Serbia-Kosovo announcement is even flimsier, with one signatory not entirely clear on what was agreed. Richard Grenell can act like a
strutting martinet all he wants, but it does not change the assessment of this agreement as not even worthy of being described as a small win.
Writing in Politico, Majda Ruge notes that because this deal runs afoul of the European Union, it “deepened a transatlantic rift that will certainly
be exploited by regional politicians. This is amateur-hour diplomacy, and the damage done dwarfs any gains.”

Slate’s Joshua Keating notes that even if one ignores the costs, “this is another example of Netanyahu doing Trump a favor, allowing him to
claim a diplomatic win and burnish his pro-Israel credibility ahead of the election. But how many U.S. voters are there who see Kosovo-Israel
relations as a front-burner issue?”

there any foreign policy issues that would boost his chances
Keating raises an important problem for Trump: Are
significantly? The hostage crisis and the Vietnam War were in the forefront of voters’ minds in 1980 and
1968. In 2020, the pandemic matters far more than any foreign policy issue .

There is also the degree to which polarization has poisoned the well for an October surprise. Even if Trump
were to achieve, say, a North Korean peace deal, the cynicism about any announcement will be
rather high. The White House’s attempt to fluff up the Serbia-Kosovo deal feeds this cynicism even more. Some observers fear he might
launch a war to seek a rally-round-the-flag effect, but for reasons I elaborated a year ago, this seems unlikely.
Trump might want to pull off an October surprise, but the foreign policy larder is barren . He is more
likely to care about a coronavirus vaccine announcement than a Middle East peace deal.

Predictions fail.
Rosenbaum 18 – Eva Galanes-Rosenbaum, Chief of Staff, Director, Media & Opinion Analysis at
Rethink, Comparative Politics Masters, from the London School of Economics & Political Science, citing
Nate Silver of 538 fame. [2018 Midterms: Did the Polls Fail—Again?! 11-12-18,
https://rethinkmedia.org/blog/2018-midterms-did-polls-fail—again]//BPS

2016, THE POLLS DIDN’T FAIL— THE MODELS DID

Many people wrote extensively on this question in the aftermath of the 2016 election (and, in fact, leading up to it). If you’re interested in a
deep dive, I suggest starting with FiveThirtyEight and going on from there. But the important points are these:

National polls aligned with the popular vote.

State polls were not as accurate. And because our presidential elections rest on a wacky, unfair electoral college system in which some states
have massively outsized power, a small inaccuracy in several key states obscured the likelihood of a Trump victory.

It wasn’t polls that failed, it was the models. Polls themselves are tools to measure the present. It’s election models that try to use current
information to predict the future, and that is where we went rather wrong .
Given these three factors, it’s worth distinguishing between polls and models.

OK, BUT THE MODELS ARE BASED ON POLLS, RIGHT?

Polls are good at finding out what big populations think. But polls are not as good at predicting the future.
Remember that polls are trying to find out about a universe of people by taking a small sample of those people. That universe can be all
American adults, or people of color in a state, or people who frequently shop at Target. The idea is the same: take a large enough sample of
that universe and you can tell a lot about it without having to ask every person in that universe.

Election polls—that is, polls asking about voters’ choices in an upcoming election—are trying to survey a group that doesn’t
yet exist : voters. Up to the point when voters literally cast their ballots , everything is probability
and supposition . We are suppos ing that some people will actually vote , and supposing others will not.
As Ariel Edwards-Levy from the Huffington Post put it, “Today [on Election Day], across the nation, we’re seeing that universe be created,
person by person.”

Polling tells you what is true now. Even if a pollster guesses correctly about who is likely to vote, all we know is what the
outcome would (probably) be if the election were held today and those people did vote. We are assuming that
what was true when the poll was taken will be true on November 6.

Polls already have blind spots and error : no sample perfectly represents a population, and many polls do a
poor job of accounting for certain groups of people. When you add in the uncertainty of a population that doesn’t yet exist
(people who will actually vote in the upcoming election), the chances of getting it wrong go up . Pollsters make educated
guesses about who is in that universe of “likely voters” and who isn’t. They base these guesses on a lot of elements—the most important is

whether someone voted in a previous election—but there are a lot of things that pollsters can’t foresee.

For example, a confusing ballot design in Broward County, FL. Or voting machines miscounting ballots in some Florida counties. Or
problems with the design, not of the ballot itself, but of the return envelope for absentee ballots, as we saw in Gwinnett County, GA. Apart

from election administration issues like these, tropical storms and other natural disasters can interfere with
voter registration deadlines ; snow and rain on Election Day can make it hard for voters to wait in
long lines at polling places —and wet ballots can cause malfunctions.

There are a lot of things that pollsters simply can’t account for when drawing and weighting their samples of “likely
voters”—things that go well beyond an October surprise.
BUT THE MODELS ARE COMPLEX, SCIENTIFIC ALGORITHMS—RIGHT?!

It’s true that election prediction models like the one from FiveThirtyEight and The Upshot are complex. They “ingest” a lot of information, from
national and state polls to fundraising levels, historical trends in turnout, and even experts’ ratings. Normally, we endorse the idea behind these
models: rather than relying on a single poll, compare a bunch of polls and use additional relevant information to find the “truthiest” truth.

However, there are some potential problems that these models have a hard time dealing with. “Herding” is one problem Nate Silver has written
about—basically, pollsters aren’t weighting their samples in a vacuum, but may be making their results look similar to their colleagues’ or like
they think they “should” look. When pollsters are listening too closely to “conventional wisdom,” their polls
like their expectations rather than reflecting the current population of voters they’re
may start to look
trying to sample.
Similarly, pollsters and model-builders make assumptions about the future based on the past, but some of those assumptions may be wrong.
For example, Americans of color vote at lower rates, and less consistently, than white Americans. Pollsters will weight their samples
accordingly, and models will also assume that respondents of color are less likely to turn out. But Black voters have voted at nearly the same
rates as white voters in the last few elections, and many advocates are trying to change this trend for all racial groups. If the models do not
account for this—or if they overcompensate—then they may be off.

Also related are systemic problems and diminishing returns . As Silver points out, “it’s better to be ahead in two
polls than ahead in one poll, and in 10 polls than in two polls. Before long, however, you start to encounter diminishing returns. Polls tend
to replicate one another’s mistakes .” In 2016, most polls apparently missed the group of white, male voters without college
degrees who made a big difference to Trump’s win. Across most polling, it’s harder to get people of color to participate in a survey than white

people, so polls systematically “miss” these groups. Adding another 10 or 20 polls to a model won’t make it more
accurate if there is a systemic flaw .

Finally, remember that turnout models—like much of the polling world—are more of an art using scientific
approaches than a true science . Each aspect of a model is a decision made by a person, who has biases
and blind spots like any other person.
BOTTOM LINE: IS POLLING BROKEN?

Elections are hard to call because they’re make-believe until they’re not . Past may be prologue, but it isn’t
prescription.

Polls will never be perfect. They tell us about the present, but they can’t see clearly into the future. They can’t account for poor ballot design,
machine malfunction, weather, or the myriad other factors that may affect who votes and how.

In 2018, the polls seemed to be more accurate than not, as they have been for several years. Late polls showing Gillum and Nelson winning
their contests when they both ended up losing is not a sign that polls are untrustworthy, but may point to other phenomena like herding or
unforeseeable elements.

The extent to which you trust polls should also depend on what you’re using them for. Most of us use polls to read public
opinion , not future behavior. For this purpose, the precision of the win-loss percentage is less crucial. What’s more important is
that we know who thinks what, how that has changed over time, and what we can do about it.
Plan’s under the radar AND no vote switching.
Achen & Bartels 16 – Christopher H. Achen, Politics Professor at Princeton. Larry M. Bartels, Political
Science Professor at Vanderbilt University. [Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce
Responsive Government, Princeton University Press]//BPS
Philip Converse (1964) extended this seminal work, building a new, more formidable case for skepticism regarding the idealized image of
democratic citizens, this time substituting random national samples for the insightful but less systematic observations of Bryce, Lippmann,
Niebuhr, and Schumpeter. Converse’s essay set off a vibrant decades-long critical discussion of his methodology and the inferences he drew
from his findings, but few public opinion scholars disputed the central point he made—that judged by the
standards of the folk theory, the political “belief systems” of ordinary citizens are generally thin ,

disorganized , and ideologically incoherent .

In chapter 2 we will argue that Converse’s argument is, if anything, even better supported a half century later
than it was when he wrote. A vast amount of supporting evidence has been added to his dispiriting
comparison of actual human political cognition with the expectations derived from the folk theory of democracy. Well-informed

citizens, too, have come in for their share of criticism , since their well-organized “ideological”
thinking often turns out to be just a rather mechanical reflection of what their favorite group and
party leaders have instructed them to think . Faced with this evidence, many scholars in the final chapters of their books
continue to express idealistic hope that institutional reform, civic education, improved mass media, more effective mobilization of the poor, or
stronger moral exhortation might bring public opinion into closer correspondence with the standards of the folk theory. But in sober moments
most acknowledge the repeated failures of all those prescriptions.

Thus, scholars, too, persist uneasily in their schizophrenia , recognizing the power of the critical arguments but hoping
can somehow be discredited or evaded, allowing the lackluster reality of
against hope that those arguments
democratic practice to be squared with conventional idealistic democratic thinking . Often, their attempts to
bolster the tattered theoretical status quo bring them back to Winston Churchill’s claim that “democracy is the worst form of government
except all those others that have been tried from time to time.”10 But that is a distinctly un-idealistic defense of democracy—and no defense at
all of the folk theory of democracy.

THE PLAN OF THIS BOOK

Our view is that conventional thinking about democracy has collapsed in the face of modern social-
scientific research . This book first documents the collapse, then points toward more reliable foundations that could support a
vigorous rebuilding.

Our treatise on democracy does not begin with ideal boys. And while it does begin with democratic ideals, we test those ideals, not merely
explicate and affirm them. We hope to contribute both to the improvement of democratic theory and to the improvement of democracy. After
all, as Dahl (1956, 52) recognized, “There is a great variety of empirical facts that one needs to know, or have some hunches about, before one
can rationally decide on the kinds of political rules one wants to follow in the real world.”

Our empirical facts are drawn predominantly from the democratic system we know best, that of the United States. However, we
refer frequently to other democratic systems as well, and we believe that our findings are likely to be of considerable relevance even in
countries that differ from the United States—and from each other—in many important historical, institutional, and cultural respects. While
history, institutions, and culture surely shape specific democratic practices in important ways, they do not, as best we can tell, lead to
fundamentally different conclusions about the central issues we raise in this book.

Our analyses range over the past century of American political history, from the reelection of Woodrow Wilson in 1916 to that of Barack Obama
in 2012. We consider the great New Deal realignment of the 1930s, the political transformation of the South during and after the civil rights
struggles of the 1960s, the ramifications of the Watergate scandal in the 1970s, and the interplay of politics and religion in shaping baby
boomers’ views regarding the fraught issue of abortion over the course of their adult lives. Each of these case studies is intended to assess or
illustrate specific aspects of our general account of democratic politics; but each is also intended to contribute to a broad portrait of the
workings of democracy in America and elsewhere.
In chapter 2 we take up the subject of popular sovereignty. As Donald Kinder has observed, “if ordinary citizens were to reason ideologically, as
political elites presumably do, then the prospects for democratic control would be enhanced.” Thus, “the extraordinary interest in the
possibility of ideological reasoning was and still is an expression of concern for the quality and very possibility of democratic forms of
government” (Kinder 1983, 391). For example, the influential “spatial model” of electoral competition (Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich 1984)
has provided an elegant theoretical account of how ideological reasoning by ordinary citizens could enhance the prospects for democratic
control over political elites.

Unfortunately from this perspective, Converse (1964) found that “the vast majority of Americans” are “ thoroughly
innocent of ideology ” (Kinder 1983, 391)—and that finding has been “largely sustained” by subsequent scholarship (Kinder 1983,
401). The available evidence suggests that citizens of other advanced democracies are similar to Americans in this respect. Thus, Converse’s
work raises a significant challenge not only to the spatial model, but to a great deal of scholarly and popular thinking about how policy decisions
might be justified on democratic grounds.

In chapter 2 we survey a substantial body of scholarly work demonstrating that most democratic citizens are uninterested in
politics , poorly informed , and unwilling or unable to convey coherent policy preferences through
“issue voting.” How, then, are elections supposed to ensure ideological responsiveness to the popular will? In our view, they do not. The
populist ideal of electoral democracy, for all its elegance and attractiveness, is largely irrelevant in practice, leaving elected officials mostly free
to pursue their own notions of the public good or to respond to party and interest group pressures.
1AR
Bucharest
 1AR -- AT: Revisionism
Russia’s defensive.
Götz & Merlen ‘18 (*Elias Götz; Postdoctoral Researcher at the Uppsala Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies (UCRS), Uppsala
University, Sweden; **Camille-Renaud Merlen. PhD Candidate in International Relations; Published online 11/15/18; “Russia and the question
of world order”; European Politics and Society; Volume 20; Issue 2; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23745118.2018.1545181)

To begin with, there are a number of reasons to be sceptical about the ‘ revanchist Russia ’ perspective . First, it
adopts an overly deterministic position , which negates the open-ended character of history by underlining its
predetermined course through certain ‘iron laws’ and the supposedly unchanging ‘essence’ of
Russia . In so doing, this perspective effectively denies the role of individual agency: Whoever the leader
is, or whatever the regime may be, Russians are subordinate to the quest for imperial greatness .
This is a view that incidentally dovetails with that of extreme Russian nationalists , who see Russian
history in similar holistic terms of a ‘single stream’ that connects Ivan IV, Peter the Great, Stalin, and
Putin. However, Russia has experienced tremendous upheavals throughout history that
dramatically changed its society and its relations with the outside world. This happened often at the instigation of one or
a few individuals. Both the beginning and the end of the Soviet Union, for example, serve as powerful

reminders of the role agency plays in affecting Moscow’s internal and external affairs. Furthermore,
essentialist claims about Russian identity do not offer much insight into the dynamics of Moscow’s
approach to the liberal international order, which has significantly fluctuated over time (Tsygankov,
2016Tsygankov, A. P. (2016). Russia’s foreign policy: Change and continuity in national identity. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Second, Russia’s revisionist behaviour
should not be exaggerated . Its intervention in Ukraine has remained relatively limited , as has its military
activity in other post-Soviet states (Götz, 2016Götz, E. (2016). Russia, the West, and the Ukraine crisis: Three contending perspectives. Contemporary Politics,
22(3), 249–266. doi: 10.1080/13569775.2016.1201313, p. 9). In fact, the scope of Russia’s revanchist aims is a matter of debate. It is doubtful whether Moscow has
a blueprint for an alternative international order with different norms and principles than the
current one. Nor does its promotion of conservative authoritarianism seem to constitute a genuine
agenda. As Lewis (2016Lewis, D. (2016, May 24). The “Moscow Consensus”: Constructing autocracy in post-Soviet Eurasia. The Foreign Policy Centre. Retrieved from
https://fpc.org.uk/moscow-consensus-constructing-autocracy-post-soviet-eurasia/ ) writes, ‘ the export of conservative social and political

values (…) has so far not developed into a coherent campaign, but remains a rather ad hoc and
inchoate critique by Russian politicians of “ multiculturalism ”, LGBT rights and “political correctness” in Europe.’ Furthermore, the
‘ revanchist Russia ’ perspective is unable to account for the numerous instances in which
Moscow has adhered to the norms, rules, and institutions that are associated with the existing liberal
order . While it might be a stretch to describe Moscow as a consistent defender of multilateralism (Lo, 2015Lo, B. (2015). Russia and the new world disorder. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press. ), it has supported frameworks such as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal . It also acceded to the

World Trade Organization in 2012 – after 19 years of talks – and continues to be a member of the European Court of
Human Rights. The liberal goals and supranational methods of these institutions hardly fit with a
revisionist imperial agenda. Third, Moscow’s behaviour is much more in line with that of an ordinary
great power than the ‘ revanchist Russia ’ perspective makes it out to be. For one thing, Russia is by no
means unique in its quest to establish a zone of influence in its near neighbourhood . As Carpenter (2017Carpenter, T.
G. (2017, January 19). The simple reason Russia and America keep inching towards crisis. National Interest (online). Retrieved from http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/the-simple-

reason-russia-america-keep-inching-towards-crisis-19117 [Google Scholar] , January 19) points out, Russia is hardly the only country to regard the
[ sphere of influence ] concept as important for its security. Or do U.S. officials believe that Chinese
actions in the South China Sea , Turkey’s policies towards Iraq and Syria, and Saudi Arabia’s
actions in Bahrain and Yemen do not involve such a consideration? For another, interference in the
domestic affairs of other states is something of a habit for great powers. Whether they are democratic or authoritarian
does not seem to make a difference in this regard. The United States, for example, has a long track record of meddling in the

internal affairs and electoral processes of other countries (Levin, 2016Levin, D. H. (2016). When the great power gets a vote: The effects of great
power electoral interventions on election results. International Studies Quarterly, 60(2), 189–202. doi: 10.1093/isq/sqv016 ). It is therefore unlikely that a more democratic Russia will

substantially change its key foreign policy objectives and activities. Furthermore, the discrediting of Russian concerns over NATO
enlargement as an ‘imagined’ threat, rather than a ‘real’ one, misses the mark . Any international relations scholar
worth their salt knows that uncertainty about others’ intentions is central to security dilemma dynamics. Thus, Moscow’s fears should not be brushed

aside as idiosyncratic Russian paranoia . In conclusion, it seems fair to say that the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective faces
an array of explanatory challenges and shortcomings .
 1AR -- Link Turn
Enlargement provokes, not contains.
Mearsheimer ’14 [John; October 2014; Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the
University of Chicago, Ph.D. in Political Science from Cornell University; Foreign Affairs, “Why the
Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-
ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault; RP]
Blame Game

predicted that NATO expansion would provoke a crisis , after which the
In that same 1998 interview, Kennan

proponents of expansion would “say that we always told you that is how the Russians are .” As if on cue,
most Western officials have portrayed Putin as the real culprit in the Ukraine predicament. In March, according to The New York Times, German
Chancellor Angela Merkel implied that Putin was irrational, telling Obama that he was “in another world.” Although Putin no doubt has
autocratic tendencies, no evidence supports the charge that he is mentally unbalanced. On the contrary: he is a
first-class strategist who should be feared and respected by anyone challenging him on foreign policy. 

Other analysts allege, more plausibly, that Putin regrets the demise of the Soviet Union and is determined to
reverse it by expanding Russia’s borders. According to this interpretation, Putin, having taken Crimea, is now testing the
waters to see if the time is right to conquer Ukraine, or at least its eastern part, and he will eventually behave aggressively toward other
countries in Russia’s neighborhood. For some in this camp, Putin represents a modern-day Adolf Hitler, and striking any kind of deal with him

NATO must admit Georgia and Ukraine to contain Russia before it

would repeat the mistake of Munich. Thus,
dominates its neighbors and threatens western Europe. 

This argument falls apart on close inspection . If Putin were committed to creating a greater Russia,
signs of his intentions would almost certainly have arisen before February 22. But there is virtually no
evidence that he was bent on taking Crimea, much less any other territory in Ukraine, before that date.
Even Western leaders who supported NATO expansion were not doing so out of a fear that Russia
was about to use military force. Putin’s actions in Crimea took them by complete surprise and appear to have
been a spontaneous reaction to Yanukovych’s ouster. Right afterward, even Putin said he opposed
Crimean secession, before quickly changing his mind. 

The plan solves expansion by strengthening NATO.

Depetris ’19 [Daniel; November 29; Fellow at Defense Priorities, citing Emmanuel Macron and
Mateusz Morawiecki; Defense One, “NATO Should End its Open-Door Policy,”
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/11/nato-should-end-its-open-door-policy/161595/; RP]

But NATO will be committing a grave error in judgment if the officials decide to continue with business-as-
usual . The alliance may not wish to admit it, but NATO is suffering from a crisis of confidence —and the need
for a reassessment is clear . 

Spurred on by French President Emmanuel Macron’s comments in The Economist about NATO suffering from “ brain-

death ,” Europe has spent the last several weeks debating the relevance of the military organization.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel publicly called out her French colleague for what she regarded as inappropriate remarks and reportedly
pulled Macron aside during an anniversary dinner of the fall of the Berlin Wall to admonish him. Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki told
the Financial Times that NATO was “the most important alliance in the world when it comes to preserving freedom and peace.” Seven decades
after it was created, there is widespread terror at the very thought of questioning NATO’s relevance in the 21st century. 

The status quo may feel comfortable to the vast majority of NATO member states, particularly those who continue to spend a paltry amount of
their own resources on national defense. However, there is one reform NATO should embrace to make the
objective of collective defense more realistic : closing the door to new members once and for all.

undergone seven rounds  of enlargement and gone from 12 original

Since its establishment in 1949, NATO has
members to 29 today. The alliance incorporates most of the European area of operations, from Iceland in the northwest
to Estonia in the east. Expansion continues to be sold as beneficial to the alliance as a whole .

Yet the benefits of NATO enlargement have not matched the advertising . The open-door policy ,
where any country in the North Atlantic can be invited to become a full member, has saddled NATO with a
collection of states that are security consumers rather than true security providers. With the Soviet Union dead
and buried, enlargement has been twisted from a means into an end in and of itself .
Montenegro, a country with a population the size of Louisville, Kentucky, and a GDP one-eighth the size of Delaware, became NATO’s 29th
member state in 2017. Its induction was celebrated in Washington, more so for the sheer act of entering the alliance than the security
contribution the small Adriatic state could provide. No
one can argue with a straight face that Montenegro—which
underwent a near-coup in 2016 and boasts an army of about 2,000 servicemembers—adds any military value. 

The same question applies to North Macedonia. Despite the U.S. Senate’s 91-2 vote to allow its accession, the land-locked nation nestled in

at best a geopolitical irrelevance and at worst another cling-on to a NATO already

the Balkans is

bloated with cheap riders .

The blunt reality is that there are no solid arguments for either’s inclusion. The case for further
enlargement is becoming strained , if there were any case to begin with. Raising the blood
pressure of Russian President Vladimir Putin is hardly a good justification. 
AT: China DA
 1AR -- Link Turn
Russia will coop with the U.S. to rebalance.
Mearsheimer, John J. Professor of IR @ Uchicago, ’19, “Bound to Fail.” International Security, Vol. 43,
No. 4

What about Russia? It is certainly a great power, which is why the emerging world is multipolar, not bipolar. But it will be by far
the weakest of the three great powers for the foreseeable future , unless either the U.S. or Chinese economy
encounters major long-term problems. The key question regarding Russia is: Which side, if any, will it take in the U.S.-China
rivalry? Although Russia is now aligned with China, it is likely to switch sides over time and ally with the United States, simply
because an increasingly powerful China is the greater threat to Russia , given their geographical
proximity. Should Moscow and Washington forge closer relations because of their mutual fear of
China, Russia will be loosely integrated into the U.S.-led bounded order. Should Moscow continue to have
friendly relations with Beijing because it fears the United States more than it does China, Russia will be
loosely integrated into the China-led bounded order. It is possible that Russia will try not to align itself with either side and
remain on the sidelines.96

It solves the DA and disproves revisionism.

Deborah Welch Larson, Professor of Political Science at the University of California-Los Angeles, 7-3-
20, “Book Review Roundtable: Rising Titans, Falling Giants,” https://tnsr.org/roundtable/book-review-
roundtable-rising-titans-falling-giants/

The question is whether this justification for the continued U.S. presence in Europe still stands, now that China is rising. Based on
predation theory , Wohlforth deduces that the United States might want to bolster or strengthen
Russia to obtain its help against China .

Taliaferro is more cautious about the benefits of predation, pointing out that Russia’s current
interference in Ukraine and its disinformation campaign in Western democracies have their origins in bitter and long-
standing resentments over how the Cold War ended. Taliaferro observes, “while relegation in 1990 succeeded in
pushing the Soviet Union out of the great power ranks, it could never guarantee that post-Soviet Russia would remain ‘down’ indefinitely.”
Refusing to accept the status claims of a declining power evokes strong emotions that can lead to an
offensive reaction . Former great powers may, over time, recover some of their capabilities, and an aggrieved major power
may be able to act as a spoiler, as Russia has done by interfering in Western elections and intervening in
Syria.36

Treating the declining state with respect and offering it a chance to exercise leadership can go a long
way toward diminishing the likelihood that it will adopt a policy of seeking revenge and increase the
chances that it will cooperate with the rising state in preserving world order. Status incentives are also less
costly — and less risky — than efforts to bolster the power of a declining state .

Plan causes a stable Ukraine.

Sweeney 20—(fellow at Defense Priorities). Sweeney, Mike. 2020. “Saying ‘No’ to NATO—Options for
Ukrainian Neutrality.” Defense Priorities. August 2020.
https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/saying-no-to-nato-options-for-ukrainian-neutrality.
This will be a difficult path for Ukraine to walk. That said, removing the option of NATO membership could force a more
constructive internal dialogue within Ukraine on what its status might look like under some concept of
political and military non-alignment .24 So long as membership in the alliance is officially on the
table, this debate is unlikely to occur as deeply and fully as it should . FINLANDIZATION? But what form should
that neutrality take? Within the foreign policy community, two models have been routinely proffered for Ukraine: Austria and Finland. Finland is the one most frequently cited. Following
Russia’s seizure of Crimea, for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger both called for this option to be given serious consideration.25 “Finlandization” has since become shorthand
for Ukrainian neutrality among those advocating alternatives to NATO membership. However, this concept is largely based on a romanticized reading of Finland’s Cold War history. In 1948,
Helsinki signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) with Moscow. It allowed Finland to remain free of Soviet forces (from 1956 onward), unlike the Soviet
Union’s other western neighbors, all of whom were incorporated into the Warsaw Pact military alliance. But Finland was hardly independent. “Neutrality” was a fig leaf for kowtowing to
Moscow politically in exchange for preserving some internal sovereignty and a relatively free hand to conduct its external economic affairs.26 Even this didn’t stop occasional and explicit
interference by the Soviets, such as the 1961 Note Crisis, when Moscow directly influenced the Finnish presidential election.27 The Note Crisis was prompted by the possibility the sitting
president, Urho Kekkonen, might lose the upcoming election to Olavi Honka, a social democrat who had split from the Finnish communist party. Moscow threatened to invoke a clause in the
FCMA allowing for “military cooperation,” i.e. the reintroduction of Red Army forces onto Finnish territory. The Soviets in essence threatened invasion. Honka withdrew, and Kekkonen went
on to win re-election—four more times.28 He served as Finland’s president up until 1981, reigning as a low-grade autocrat who was seen as “Moscow’s man.”29 There’s a ready comparison to
be made between Kekkonen and the ousted Yanukovych. Yanukovych was openly supported by Putin in Ukraine’s 2010 presidential election, winning a close, controversial contest. His victory
was seen as solidifying Russia’s influence in Ukraine, symbolized by Yanukovych’s subsequent abrogation of Ukraine’s association agreement with the EU in deference to an economic pact with
Russia. But that move set off the Euromaidan protests, unleashing not only anarchy in parts of Ukraine, but also precipitating Russia’s seizure of Crimea. This highlights the internal danger of

Prescribing “Finlandization” now for Ukraine is to consign it essentially to

the wrong type of neutrality being foisted on Ukraine.

the status of a vassal state, one which could again carry unwanted implications for its internal cohesion . It would be resisted strongly in many parts of the country,
especially the western regions and the central area around Kyiv. Ukraine’s internal stability should be weighed with external concerns—not out of simple deference to Ukrainian wishes but

because domestic discord can be as destabilizing to the region as external conflict. THE AUSTRIAN MODEL The Austrian model offers a more interesting choice.30
Austria enjoyed more true independence than Finland during the Cold War, aided in part by the lack of a contiguous border with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the approach Austria took—a
multilateral treaty with other powers, including the United States—differed markedly from the bilateral FMCA signed between Helsinki and Moscow. That Austria surrendered territory—the
province of South Tyrol—as part of its neutrality bargain is another reason contemporary writers have latched onto this example; Ukraine sanctioning the loss of Crimea may well be a price it

the Austrian model holds promise, the unique circumstances under which it was
has to pay for a more constructive relationship with Russia.31 But, while on the surface

initiated and signed—as a defeated and occupied combatant after World War II— are far from an exact match to Ukraine’s current situation.
Also, rather than being something imposed on Austria—as a similar treaty would be on Ukraine—neutrality was a solution engineered by the Austrians themselves.32 Indeed, the Eisenhower
administration initially opposed the move at the time, worrying Austrian neutrality would weaken the West and perhaps set an unwanted precedent for Germany.33 In contrast, the actions of
Ukraine’s political establishment—at least since the seizure of Crimea—have been to tack in the opposite direction of non-alignment. In December 2014, the Ukrainian parliament voted to
formally abandon the “non-bloc” status promoted during Yanukovych’s tenure. The then-Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko called the legislation “a bill about our place in Western
civilization.”34 In short, whereas Austrian political elites viewed non-alignment as their path to security from Soviet occupation, many of their contemporary Ukrainian counterparts often view
it as the road to Russian subjugation. There is, admittedly, modest hope greater support might be growing among the Ukrainian polity for non-alignment. The aforementioned survey of
Ukrainian attitudes toward its external relationships found a slim majority (50.4 percent) supporting some form of neutrality.35 That figure is far from decisive, though, and, as yet, is not

widely reflected in Ukrainian political elites, many of whom still pin their hopes on eventual entry into NATO.36 Sweden offers a more appealing
representation for Ukraine. Like Austria, Swedish neutrality was a deliberate , internal choice. In Sweden’s case it
resulted from its catastrophic defeats during the Napoleonic Wars. 37 What’s relevant to the Ukrainian experience is non-
alignment gave Sweden time to recover from its national trauma and redevelop as a viable political
and econ omic power in its own right. While one can debate the morality of it, neutrality also allowed Sweden to avoid the worst of subsequent European
conflagrations, such as both world wars. In a similar light, neutrality could not only serve Ukraine vis-à-vis assuaging Russian

security concerns , but also by giving the still relatively young nation time to consolidate itself internally . The
more successful Ukraine grows as a state, the better it will be able to withstand external pressure and
coercion from its eastern neighbor. Ultimately, what will best protect Ukraine against Russian interference and
manipulation will be its ability to provide its people with effective governance and opportunities to
attain their own prosperity . An analog can be seen in Estonia and Latvia , where the Russophone community has consistently
resisted Moscow’s “soft power,” despite having differences at times with the eponymous nationalities in
their countries. The better econ omic prospects found in these nations (including access to the European Union) has helped inoculate their
Russophone communities against external influence. 38 Ukraine is a nation of over 40 million people which conceivably could become a leading
European state someday—if it can curb its endemic corruption and grow its economy. 39 Since 2014, the governments of Volodymyr Zelensky and his predecessor, Petro Poroshenko, have
attempted to tackle these interlinked challenges with mixed results. On the positive side, Poroshenko is credited with curbing the nation’s debt and average wages have also more than
doubled since 2016. 40 The association agreement with the European Union has been resuscitated, entering into effect in 2017. But Ukraine remains the poorest country in Europe on a per
capita basis having surpassed Moldova for that dubious distinction in 2019. 41 Additional structural reforms are badly needed—especially in the banking sector—while graft and corruption

remain unwelcome facts of life. 42 Formal adoption of non-alignment could gain Ukraine “ geostrategic space ” in which
to gather its own house . While emulation has its limits, proffering a prosperous, independent country like twenty-first-century Sweden is a more appealing goal than
vassal-state Finland during the Cold War.

Ukraine accepts the plan as a safeguard of territorial integrity.

Bandow ’19 [Doug; August 1; Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, J.D. from Stanford University; Cato
Institute, “Time for Ukraine — and America — to Make a Deal With Russia,”
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-ukraine-america-make-deal-russia; RP]
No doubt such a package would elicit strong opposition from some, especially in Kiev. Obviously only Ukraine can decide what its priorities are.
However, the U.S. and Europe should inform Kiev that their security interests require ending any
plans to add Ukraine to NATO. America’s defense, ultimately the raison d’etre of its participation in the transatlantic alliance, is not
served by Washington confronting a nuclear‐armed state, namely Russia, over its relations with a nation essentially irrelevant to American
security. Ukraine should make its decision realizing that it cannot rely on the protection of others.

How Zelensky would view such a proposal is unknown. But he would have good reason to embrace an agreement
that ended Russian military intervention and secured his country’s freedom to choose
economically . Crimea would not be returning, but under no circumstance other than full‐scale war is it ever likely to be. And Ukraine
need not formally accept the territorial loss.
AT: Elections
 1AR -- No Link
Predictions are hopeless.
Bruers 16 – Tom Breur, Senior Director Data & Analytics of Boston Scientific. [US elections: How could
predictions be so wrong? Journal of Marketing Analytics, 4,
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41270-016-0010-2#Sec3]//BPS

Why is Predicting Elections So Hard ?

Presidential elections happen once every four years. What that implies, is that even if you have been gathering data for 20 years,
there are still only five elections you may have covered. And even if you have been gathering data for 20 years, it is
highly unlikely that you will have complete time series for all of the variables that you gathered. What is much
more realistic is that you have gathered some data for parts of that time span.

To summarize this issue: although gathering data for as long as 20 years seems quite impressive (and I would agree it is), you will still only have

five elections that you were able to “predict,” which makes it –from a statistical perspective – a rather sparse
dataset . What makes the problem of data sparsity even worse is that for many of the variables that you would like to use to
predict the upcoming election outcome , you will not have the full 20 years’ worth of history . If
you consider something like “active Facebook usage” an important variable to predict, then obviously that information was not
available 20 years ago, because Facebook didn’t exist, yet.

A universal problem with any sampling method is that we calculate statistical inferences on the
basis of the assumption that the survey responses are a random, non-biased selection of the larger

population . The risk for bias is high , though, when less and less people are willing to participate in research. The election turnout
has been hovering around 60 per cent for the last decade, and even with incentives (which have their own unintended side effects, bias being
one of them) a researcher would be lucky to have a response rate of, say, 10 per cent . A low response rate doesn’t
necessarily mean the results are bad, it merely implies that the risk of bias is greatly elevated .

In many cases, for statistical and technical reasons, you will need to impute (“estimate”) missing values from your time series. No matter
how clever your data fusion algorithms may be, they will still remain only approximations of
reality . As Pyle (1999) has outlined, this is a tricky , and very risky activity. It is unavoidable that time series
imputation casts a doubt on any prediction that is based on such data . Yet after the missing data have been
replaced by best guesses, the risky consequences of doing so can be easily forgotten….

A second factor that makes predicting elections hard is that generalizing – which is the hallmark of any kind of
prediction – is tricky because the longitudinal time span your data cover is easily long enough
for relations between variables to have changed. This type of change in reality happens everywhere,
and always makes predicting hard, as Yogi Berra already pointed out. Once you compound it with the problem
of data sparsity , it becomes clear why so-called “model engineering” (the analyst inputting domain
knowledge to override statistical evidence in a particular data set) is both necessitated as well as extra risky . Let’s look at an example
from another field to illustrate this problem.
They read a new link card, so this link-turn is justified.
Tamkin 19 (Emily Tamkin, Washington Post. “More than 8 in 10 Americans support NATO, study
finds.” April 3, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/04/03/more-than-americans-
support-nato-study-finds/)
NATO is a popular punching bag for President Trump. Days before coming into office, he called it “obsolete.” As president, he’s railed against
European spending on defense and noted time and again that many NATO allies don’t meet the target of 2 percent of gross domestic product
on defense. Other U.S. politicians — in Congress, for example — have rushed to make sure NATO allies know that the United States remains
committed to the alliance. But as NATO approaches its 70th birthday Thursday, it’s worth asking — are Americans still behind
NATO or have they been swayed by Trump’s arguments ?
According to a new study by the Program for Public Consultation of the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland and released by the

nonpartisan organization Voice of the People, the American people remain committed to NATO , too.
Respondents were put in the position of policymakers and presented with arguments for and against remaining in NATO. Just over 8 in 10, or

83 percent , of the roughly 2,400 respondents said that the United States should remain in NATO.
“The idea is that you’re putting the respondent in the shoes of the policymaker so they’ve really heard the essential side of the issue,” said
Steven Kull, director of the survey.

And support bridged the proverbial aisle, with 90 percent of Dem ocratic respondents and 77 percent of
Republicans saying the United States should remain in NATO. (Since at least 2009, according to the Pew Research Center, Democrats
have taken a more favorable view of NATO.)

“Given that there is substantial discussion questioning whether NATO membership is necessary, and given that Russia has become relatively
weak and that it’s been some years since the Cold War, I thought it was striking that support for NATO membership is as robust as it is,” said
Kull, noting that, even in “very red districts ,” 78 percent of respondents thought the United States should
remain in NATO (and that millennials, many who do not remember the Cold War, overwhelmingly supported that option, with 77 percent
opting to remain).

But it isn’t just that Democrats and Republicans alike think the United States should remain in NATO. Respondents were presented with three
choices — press Europeans to spend more on defense and threaten to disengage if they do not; urge Europeans to spend more but do not
threaten to disengage; or remain part of NATO but bring military investments in line with what Europeans spend.

The most popular option was actually to bring U.S. military investments in line with the investments Europeans are making.

“It wasn’t a conclusion we should necessarily spend less — it’s more to bring U.S. military investments in line with the European level,” Kull
clarified, the thinking being that, “ ‘Well if the Europeans are comfortable at the level that they’re at, maybe we should adjust ours.’ ”

most people did not favor threatening NATO allies. For both Democratic
But the significant thing to Kull was that

and Republican respondents, threatening to disengage was the least popular option, with only 4 percent
of Democrats and 21 percent of Republicans saying that they found it to be the most convincing.

It’s “one more indicator of how robust support is for the alliance ,” Kull said. “That the threat to withdraw was so
widely rejected.” A little something for NATO to celebrate, perhaps, on its 70th birthday.
 1AR -- UQ -- Thumpers
Thumpers and predictions fail.
Chris Clizza 9/7 Politics Reporter and Editor-at-Large 9/7/20 “How coronavirus will decide the 2020
race” https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/07/politics/us-election-2020-week-ahead/index.html

(CNN)With just 57 days until the 2020 election , it will be time to vote before you know it. For our special Labor Day edition, I'm
breaking down the five big storylines to watch between now and Election Day -- the narratives that will define the final
stretch of the race between President Donald Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden. Tell your friends to subscribe to The Point
newsletter! 5. Health: When he was elected in 2016, Donald Trump, at 70, was the oldest person ever elected to a first term as president. If Joe
Biden gets elected this fall, he will break that record; Biden will be 78 on Inauguration Day 2021. Trump has worked to make Biden's acuity and
health an issue in the campaign, suggesting, without evidence, that the former vice president is not mentally up to the job. "Something is going
on," Trump told Fox News' Sean Hannity last month. "And I assume we will be able to find out sooner, rather than later, I hope. But something
is going on. It's very strange." Meanwhile, Trump's own health has become a topic of conversation in the race -- specifically an unscheduled trip
he made to Walter Reed hospital in November 2019. The story the White House told about the trip -- routine start to his annual physical, just
some test and labs -- has been contradicted by reporting that Vice President Mike Pence was alerted to the possibility he might need to take
over as president if Trump was anesthetized. Even without these stories, the
health of the two candidates would be
something of an issue, as one is 74 and the other is 77. Voters in the latest CNN poll, released earlier this month, were
closely divided over which of the two men they believed had the "stamina" and "sharpness" to be
president; 48% chose Biden while 46% opted for Trump. 4. The debates : Despite Trump's best efforts, there will be only three
general election debates this fall, with the first one set for three weeks from Tuesday. In a country still dealing with a steadily
spreading pandemic, there will be far less in-person campaigning by the two presidential candidates than in years past.

And likely fewer interviews with state and national reporters. All of which means that the trio of general election
debates are that much more important this time around. Because they will function almost certainly as the best
-- and only -- non-scripted events featuring both candidates between now and November 3. And as such,

represent Trump's biggest chance to change the arc of the race -- and Biden's biggest potential
pitfall to lose it. So, what do we know about the two men as debaters? Biden is, well, so-so. He struggles with bringing key facts out
on the spot and thinking quickly on his feet. He is also a debate rule-follower, often cutting off his answers mid-
sentence when he reaches the approved time limit. Trump is, uh, unorthodox as a debater. He will bully, interrupt, intimidate
and play fast and loose with the facts . He isn't big on preparation in advance of the debates, which occasionally leaves him
without a clue of what he is being asked. (See: "Nuclear Triad.") As a result of Trump's debating style, the moderators -- Chris Wallace of Fox
News for the first, C-SPAN's Steve Scully for the second and NBC's Kristen Welker for the third -- will play an HUGE role in how the proceedings
play out. Do they fact-check Trump in real time? Do they allow him to go far over time? Does he simply ignore their attempts to make him stop

talking? 3. Election interference: Everyone this side of Donald Trump (and Attorney General Bill Barr) seems to acknowledge that
Russia continues to pose a serious threat to the integrity of the 2020 election. "We assess that Russia
is likely to continue
amplifying criticisms of vote-by-mail and shifting voting processes amidst the COVID-19 pandemic to undermine
public trust in the electoral process," read a recent intelligence bulletin from the Department of Homeland Security. And in an interview
with CNN's Dana Bash on Sunday, vice presidential candidate Kamala Harris acknowledged the threat posed by Russia and other foreign actors.
"I do believe that there will be foreign interference in the 2020 election, and that Russia will be at the front of the line," Harris said. The issue is
that Trump (and Barr) don't agree. Instead, the President has spent many tweets insisting that the rise in mail-in balloting -- as states seek to
mitigate the spread of the coronavirus -- is the real threat to election integrity. "For our Country to be sending 80 million UNSOLICITED BALLOTS
is very unfair and a roadmap to disaster," he tweeted late last month. "Even recent small and easier to control elections which did this are a
catastrophic disaster. Fraudulent & missing Ballots like never seen before. 20% and 30% off. STOP!" (NOTE: There is no evidence of widespread
voter fraud by mail-in balloting.) Add
it all up and what you are left with is a recipe for chaos -- with foreign actors
seeking to muck around in the election, a President dead-set on creating the idea of a rigged election
and the very likely possibility that the vote count takes longer with so-many mailed-in ballots. 2. "Law and order" vs. racial
injustice: Anyone who watched the Republican National Convention late last month knows that the Trump campaign is heavily
invested in using the protests -- some violent, most not -- breaking out around the country over racial injustice and policing to
scare suburban voters back into the Republican ranks. "If the left gains power, they will demolish the suburbs, confiscate
your guns, and appoint justices who will wipe away your Second Amendment and other Constitutional freedoms," said Trump at one point
during his convention acceptance speech. And at another: "If the Radical Left takes power, they will apply their disastrous policies to every city,
town, and suburb in America." The question is whether people -- especially white suburban women -- buy what Trump is selling. Or
put more accurately: Will these blatant appeals to fear overcome their personal distaste for Trump? Much depends
on what comes next -- and neither Trump nor Biden have much control over that. In the wake of George Floyd's death in May, the protests
were largely regarded by the public as peaceful, and Trump's tone-deaf response to them was a major factor in his tumbling polling numbers.
(His handling of the coronavirus -- much more on that below -- was the largest factor in his slide.) The more recent protests in Portland and
Kenosha, Wisconsin have produced far more violent images -- buildings burning, a Trump supporter dead -- that have left people more
undecided about their feelings about the unrest. Biden has to walk a fine line here too -- condemning the violence coming out of the protests
while also acknowledging the roots of why people are taking to the streets: A string of Black men killed or wounded in interactions with the
police. "Rioting is not protesting," Biden said in a speech on the subject last Monday. "Looting is not protesting. Setting fires is not protesting.
None of this is protesting. It's lawlessness, plain and simple." So will the next two months make people more open to Trump's "law and order"

message? Or will Biden's attempt to condemn riots while supporting the right to protest be enough? 1. The coronavirus election:
When a global pandemic sickens more than 6 million Americans and kills almost 189,0000 -- and is projected to kill 255,000 by November 1 -- it
is the dominant issue of election . The coronavirus ripples -- economic, educational, environmental --
are everywhere, and there isn't a single person not affected by them . And practically everyone has a

strong opinion about how Trump has handled the virus. At the moment, that is very bad news for the
incumbent. In the latest CNN poll, conducted earlier this month, just 40% approved of how he has dealt with the virus while 55%
disapproved. Asked
which candidate would deal better with the ongoing pandemic, 53% chose Biden while just
41% chose Trump. These numbers are consistent with virtually all the other polling data in the race. And as approval for Trump's handling of
the coronavirus has waned, so too has his standing in general election polling against Biden. (The CNN poll of polls gives the former vice
president a 51% to 43% edge.) The President's numbers -- on coronavirus and in general election matchups --
have been strikingly consistent over the summer. That is, again, bad news for him as it suggests that the public's
mind is largely made up on the matter. How could the incumbent change such a politically problematic dynamic? Trump, if his
public pronouncements are to be believed, thinks that he has a silver bullet: The announcement of a vaccine

before the election. "Starting to get VERY high marks in our handling of the Coronavirus (China Virus), especially when compared to
other countries and areas of the world," Trump tweeted Monday. "Now the Vaccines (Plus) are coming, and fast!" The first part of that tweet is
false. The second part is aspirational. If
a vaccine does emerge pre-election, it's still no guarantee to change
Trump's fate. How widely available will it be? How effective will it be? How soon before the election will an announcement be? And what if
it doesn't come pre-election? Trump is in a worse place right now than he was in 2016. And that's because a majority of

Americans don't trust him to handle the single largest issue -- by a lot -- they believe is facing the country.