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Ankur Barua
One of the reasons why the Christian tradition has historically been
averse to the notion that the world itself is the body of God is that the
crucial term in this context—namely “body”—has usually been under-
stood, almost analytically, in terms of spatial extension. A physical body
is contingent, moveable, and has a specific spatio-temporal location, but
since God is conceived of (at least in classical theism) as impassible,
atemporal, and outside the spatio-temporal matrix God cannot have or be
a body. This understanding of a body emerges early in St Augustine who
understands by the term “body” (corpus) any entity that is characterized
by spatial extendedness, measurability, and divisibility and who, during
his Manichaean phase, thought of God as something corporeal that
was either infused into the world or diffused beyond it through infinite
space (Augustine, Confessions 7.1.1, 3.7.12, 5.10.19; Holscher 1986).
God’s Body at Work: Råmånuja and Panentheism / 3
Significantly, he even refers, in his mature City of God, to the notion that
God is the soul of the world (mundi animus Deus est) and that the world
is the body (corpus) of that soul, so that the whole is one living being
consisting of body and soul (Augustine, De Civitate Dei 4.12). This, St
Augustine claims, leads to the impious consequences that when we
trample on anything we trample on a part (pars) of God and that when
we kill an animal we slaughter a part of God. Such a corporeal under-
standing of the divine nature, with the constituents of the world as
physical segments broken off from it, would seem to be one version of
“pantheism” in which all finite realities are ultimately in all respects
inseparable from, and self-expressions of, an all-inclusive totality or
unity. While it is difficult to reduce to a shorthand formula the different
types of thought that have been regarded as “pantheistic” down the ages,
what is common to “pantheists” such as Plotinus, Lao Tsu, Benedict de
Spinoza, F.W.J. Schelling, G.W.F. Hegel, and others is their denial of a
personal God who is ontologically distinct from the world, influences the
course of its history, and produces but remains independent of it in all
respects (Quiles 1975; Levine 1994). This rejection sets pantheists not
only against classical theists but also panentheists who hold that finite
individuals, who are autonomous agents with libertarian freedom of
choice, are “included” in God who empowers these individuals without
any externality or mediation. That is, God, who is usually conceived as
temporal, is not ultimately reducible to the world or exhausted by it, as
in pantheism, but surpasses it by remaining independent of it in some
respects and not being as utterly distinct from it as the timeless, impas-
sible creator of the classical theists (Nikkel 1995: 1–5). Panentheism,
therefore, affirms that the relationships between God and the world are
characterized by inclusion and distinction, such that, in the words of
J.A.T. Robinson, there is a “co-inherence between God and the universe
which overcomes the duality without denying the diversity” (1967: 84).
Some of the concerns that have been raised in current discussions over
whether the God who is connected to the world as the divine body is too
mired in empirical finitude to be able to exercise directive agential power
over it have resonances in the Vedåntic context of Råmånuja for whom
the phenomenal world literally is the body of Brahman. As we shall note
in greater detail, contemporary philosophers who have formulated con-
ceptions of the embodied God have often built on an analogy between
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human and divine action, and, by utilizing the specific resources of his
own Upani‚adic commentarial tradition, Råmånuja developed a some-
what parallel homology between the relation of the finite self to its
physical body and the relation of Brahman to the self-body complex.
Råmånuja was able, in part through his distinctive use of the term “body”
(çarra), to elaborate a theology according to which Brahman is inti-
mately present in the world not by being spatially extended through it but
by sustaining every finite object over which Brahman retains a causal
asymmetry and independence in certain crucial respects. In the process
of investigating these parallels, we shall also discuss certain criticisms
of panentheism as a conception of God’s relation to the world that is
distinct from both classical theism and pantheism and seek to respond to
these from within the contours of Råmånuja’s understanding of Brahman
as the immanent sustainer of the world. More specifically, our discussion
of Råmånuja’s theology of divine embodiment will revolve around his
distinctive understanding of the world as the “body” of Brahman and
his simultaneous affirmation that Brahman remains untouched by the
empirical negativities of the finite world and that Brahman sustains at
every moment of its existence the substantivally real world as the divine
“body.” As we shall note, Råmånuja develops a distinctive type of
panentheism in which the world depends for its existence on Brahman
and, in a manner we shall investigate, is a “part” of Brahman, but it is
nevertheless ontologically distinct from Brahman who remains sovereign
over it.
Criticisms of Panentheism
existence, which we shall explore shortly, the criticisms that have been
raised against contemporary forms of panentheism would seem applica-
ble to Råmånuja’s theology as well. Therefore, examining them will help
us to highlight better in subsequent sections how Råmånuja’s conception
of divine embodiment can be a pointer to an understanding of divine
agential power over the world that is inspirited by the divine reality.
(a) Regarding the view that God has some particular body, we may
start with the objections that the experience of human embodiment is
associated with manifold epistemic and moral defects and that to be
embodied is to be subject to the ravages of death, decay, and disease.
However, as William J. Wainwright (1987: 72–87) points out, such
earthly ills are not necessarily connected with embodiment: some late
Platonists believed in celestial or astral bodies, and as for Augustine
himself, the tribulations of our mortal life are a consequence of the Fall.
(b) Second, on the Augustinian-Cartesian understanding of “body” as a
spatially extended entity, the claim that the world is the body of God
would imply that the universe as a whole is some sort of a physical
object (Wainwright 1987: 81). In response to the criticism by philoso-
phers such as Kai Nielsen (1971) and Antony Flew (1966) that the notion
of incorporeal agency is not intelligible, for if God does not have a
physical body God cannot be said to act in the world, it has sometimes
been proposed that the collection of spatio-temporally identifiable events
be regarded as the divine body (Hudson 1974: 166–76). However, the
aggregate of physical realities such as planets, solar systems, and
galaxies is not usually regarded as constituting one body, and it would
therefore seem that the analogy between the human mind or will govern-
ing the parts of its (physiological) body and the divine Mind controlling
the constituents of the universe as its “body” breaks down because the
universe is not one and does not exist as a totality (Farrer 1967: 148).
Also, Marcel Sarot writes that in the strict biological sense according to
which the term “organism” applies to human beings and other types of
living things the world cannot be called an organism for it is not a
massive animal or plant. Nevertheless, one can take it in an abstract
sense to mean an entity that appears to be a unified whole while being
internally complex, and he believes that the question of whether the
universe is an organism in this sense remains an open one (Sarot 1992:
235–37).
God’s Body at Work: Råmånuja and Panentheism / 9
(c) Third, another point at which the analogy between human and
divine personhood is alleged to break down concerns the issue of
whether or not the human self is to be conceived in substantialist terms
such that it can transcend the body ontologically in the way that God
transcends the world (Peacocke 1995). As we noted in our discussion of
Clayton, the God-world relationship is only somewhat analogous to the
self-body relationship because while consciousness is an emergent
product contingent on evolutionary processes, God is not a contingent
entity in this sense. Philosophers of mind such as Jaegwon Kim (1993)
who have developed the notion of “supervenience,” according to which
emergent mental processes cannot be “reduced” to brain states, do not
nevertheless believe that these processes are properties of a substantial
“soul”; more specifically, rejecting the notion that the mind is an onto-
logically distinct entity that exercises top-down causal powers over the
body, they often hold that the “mind” is a set of higher level macro-
processes which are grounded in basic physio-chemical processes.
Further, several Christian theologians themselves have claimed that
not only a host of Biblical passages but also the crucial doctrines of
the incarnation and the resurrection emphasize a holistic view of the
embodied person and militate against Cartesian-dualist conceptions of a
substantial soul. For instance, Warren S. Brown (1998) argues that the
term “soul” stands not for an ontological entity distinct from the body but
for our emergent cognitive properties, such as language, memory and
future orientation, which make possible personal relatedness with other
human beings and with God. Nevertheless, sophisticated defenses have
been advanced in recent times for substance dualism, and J.P. Moreland
(2002) outlines five broad patterns of such arguments, including ones
based on introspection, indexicality of thought, and libertarian freedom.
For our purposes, what is especially interesting is Richard Swinburne’s
conception of the soul as the substantival carrier of personal identity
which needs a body, though not necessarily this mortal body, and which
God may sustain in being through a special divine act. Swinburne argues
that the soul, which constitutes the core of the person, is metaphysically
distinct from its body, but he rejects two senses of the term “substance
dualism,” namely, that the soul is intrinsically immortal and that the
body is an entirely adventitious entity which is not necessary for full
personhood (Swinburne’s response to Adrian Thatcher, see 1987: 180–
10 / Ankur Barua
body (corpus) as an entity which has various shapes and sizes and is a
composition of divisible parts. In his commentary on the Brahma S¨tras,
the Çr' Bhå‚ya, Råmånuja considers several definitions of the term çar'ra,
and after rejecting definitions given by various doctrinal opponents
finally comes to his own definition of “body”: any substance which a
conscious being is capable of completely controlling and supporting for
its own purposes (sarvåtmanå svårthe niyantu% dhårayitu% ca çakyam)
and whose essential form (svar¨pa) is to be the accessory of that being is
its “body” (çar'ra) (Çr' Bhå‚ya 2.1.9).1 In other words, for Råmånuja, the
term “body” (çar'ra) refers not simply to the material structure of a
human being (or an animal or an insentient object) but more extensively
to any substantial entity, whether it is physical (such as the human body)
or spiritual (such as the finite self), that is subject to a conscious being
(such as the transcendent Lord). Consequently, the relationships that hold
at the microcosmic level between the finite j'våtman and its pråk®tic
body are homologous (with some significant asymmetries that we shall
shortly discuss) to the ones that hold at the macrocosmic level between
the supreme Self, the Lord, and His Body, the world of conscious and
non-conscious beings.2
Two of these relationships are, first, the relationship that exists between
a thing that is supported and its supporter (ådhårådheyabhåva); and
second, the relationship between a thing that is controlled and its control-
ler (niyant®niyåmyabhåva) (Vedårthasa%graha para. 76). Råmånuja says
that the human body is ontologically dependent on its j'våtman for its
very existence and temporal continuity since it cannot be “realised apart
from it” (p®thak-siddhyånarha) in a way similar to that in which a mode
(prakåra) cannot exist independently of its mode-possessor (prakårin)
(Vedårthasa%graha para. 62). Moreover, to develop the analogy between
human and divine embodiment, not only the human body which cannot
perdure without being supported by the j'våtman but the world itself can
be regarded as the mode of its mode-possessor, the Lord; for in the same
manner that the substantially real human body cannot be realized apart
from its finite self (p®thak-siddhyånarha), the world itself is ontologically
dependent on the Lord and also derives its intelligibility from it (Lipner
1986: 126). Therefore, what the prakåra-prakårin relationship empha-
sizes is that one entity which has an ontological reality of its own remains
in a state of continuing existential dependence on another, and this is
16 / Ankur Barua
Now the notion that the Lord is the world’s substantial cause (upådåna
kåra~a) would seem to mire Him in its finitude and all the imperfections
that beings within it suffer from. Such a possibility is however clearly
rejected through the use of an important relationship which underlies
Råmånuja’s symbolism of human and divine embodiment, that between a
“part,” which is ontologically dependent on its “part-possessor” (aøça-
aøçin) (Çr& Bhå‚ya 2.3.45). The world is not a part of the Lord in the
physical sense of being a spatially extended piece (kha~da) of His
substance (which cannot be divided into segments unlike an object
constituted of pråk®tic stuff) for this would not only absorb its reality
into the Lord but would also entangle the Lord in the defects of the
world. Rather, the whole world is a part of the Lord who is its part-
possessor (aøçin) in the sense that the world, the aøça, cannot exist
without being a part of Him.5 In short, Råmånuja too would reject, in his
own theological context, the view that St Augustine does in his own,
which is that the world is a material fragment broken off as a constituent
piece of the divine substance. Råmånuja’s commentary on some verses
of the ninth chapter of the Bhagavad G&tå further rejects any “pantheistic”
identification of the transcendent Lord with the world which He rules
over as the inner Self. He says that the Lord supports finite beings not in
the way in which a jug supports the water that it contains but entirely
through His will (sa#kalpena) which sustains all the modes (prakåra)
which constitute His body (G&tå Bhå‚ya 9.4). Therefore, although the
relationships between the immutably perfect Lord and the phenomenal
world that He is embodied in are analogous to the ones that hold at the
level of every human person between the finite self and its pråk®tic body,
this parallelism must not obscure the fact of crucial importance that the
control that the Lord, the Principal (çe‚&), wields over the world, His
accessory (çe‚a), is of a different order from the self’s control over its
own body. The j&våtman does not have the causal power to originate its
physical body, and, moreover, its association with its pråk®tic body often
leads it to experience suffering because of the unexpended karma that it
has accumulated over past aeons. Especially, its control over its body is
obstructed in those cases when the body suffers from injury, paralysis,
and such debilities (Çr& Bhå‚ya 2.1.9). On the other hand, since the Lord
is not subject to any karma His connection with the entities of which He
is the Support (ådhåra) is consequently a source of delight to Him and
18 / Ankur Barua
(b) Regarding the objection that the world is not usually viewed as an
“object,” Råmånuja’s understanding of the term “body” in terms of an
entity governed by a conscious reality is not associated with the notion
that it is some sort of a system, closed or open, constituted by interlock-
ing parts. Therefore, the “world” is simply a shorthand term for the finite
conscious and non-conscious entities, and Råmånuja can refer to both
these entities as well to the “world” as the body of Brahman (Lipner
1986: 123). Further, there are parallels in Råmånuja’s theology of divine
action to the view that God’s activity in the world can be regarded as
basic, unmediated action, so that we may meaningfully speak of God’s
intentions, purposes, and love in terms of God’s movements through the
world (Hudson 1991). A basic action, in the terminology introduced by
A. Danto (1965), is one that an agent performs directly and not through
some other action, and Råmånuja often refers to the immediate way in
which the Lord acts in the world, His Body. Giving the example of milk
which can turn sour on itself, Råmånuja says that in a similar manner the
Lord, who possesses powers that cannot be fathomed by human thought,
does not stand in need of instruments external to Himself when He
produces the world (Çr" Bhå‚ya 2.1.24, 2.1.34). Unlike embodied selves
who are able to form new things only through their connection with
pråk®tic objects, the Lord produces the entire universe simply through
His wish and sends it forth while remaining essentially disjoint from all
pråk®tic materiality (Çr" Bhå‚ya 1.1.19).
(c) In connection with the objection that if the “soul” is not a substan-
tially real entity, the body-soul analogy breaks down when it is applied
to the God-world relationship, we can see that Swinburne’s version of
“substance dualism” resonates somewhat with Råmånuja’s understanding
of the substantial self (j"våtman) which is ontologically distinct from its
pråk®tic body, and, which though everlasting, possesses its essential
nature not though some form of “natural immortality” but only because it
is dependent (åyatta) on the Lord who is beyond any change (Çr" Bhå‚ya
4.4.20). For Råmånuja, as we have seen, the embodied self is a conscious
subject categorically distinct from its non-conscious pråk®tic body and as
an enduring reality it “holds together” its mutable pråk®tic body and
prevents it from disintegration. Briefly, three arguments that Råmånuja
offers for the substantial reality of the finite self are as follows: first, the
self has characteristics such as those of inwardness (pratyaktvam) and
20 / Ankur Barua
that the world emerges from the Lord’s productive will and is ontologi-
cally dependent on the Lord at every moment of its existence. Råmånuja
would therefore reject the emanationist-pantheist view that the Lord is
substantially reduced in producing the world, as well as the deistic notion
that the world is an autonomous entity in itself to which its supervising
monarch is only externally related.
In this context, one may note certain parallels between Råmånuja’s
conception of divine creativity, based on a quasi-spatial symbolism of
divine embodiment, and the panentheism of Hartshorne who distin-
guishes between God’s “abstract essence” consisting of God’s essential
characteristics such as existence, independence, and omniscience and
God’s “concrete states” in which the temporal, relative, and passible God
processually accumulates value from the world through interactions with
it (Hartshorne 1948; Hartshorne and Reese 1953: 15–25). He regards
God as the soul of the world to indicate that God has immediate knowl-
edge and control over the actual things encompassed by the divine body
that is “internal” to God, but God is more than and distinguishable from
all of them (Hartshorne 1941: 174–87). In response to the charge that
his God, who is not actus purus but has unrealized potentialities, is too
contingent and dependent to be transcendent to the world, Hartshorne
holds that God is in fact doubly transcendent with regard to two kinds of
perfections: God is absolutely perfect in some respects (for instance, God
can know everything knowable) and relatively perfect in some other
respects (God cannot foreknow future contingents and God’s knowledge
of the world continues to grow). Now Råmånuja’s theology revolves
around the ontological distinctions between the Lord, the finite self and
material reality conceived of in substantialist terms, and he would be
opposed to process thought’s prioritization of interrelated events over
perduring substances with classificatory fixities, in which “becoming is
reality itself” and human beings are co-creators, with God, of Godself
(Hartshorne 1967b: 113; Rescher 1996). However, there are some
analogues to these Hartshornean distinctions between the divine essence
and the divine actuality in Råmånuja’s theology, for though in one sense
the Lord does not undergo any “essential” change, when he produces the
world He may be said to have changed “contingently” in that He now has
a Body qualified by finite beings (Çr Bhå‚ya 2.3.18; Gupta 1967: 67).
Therefore, while the Lord is eternally perfect as the unchanging ground
God’s Body at Work: Råmånuja and Panentheism / 23
Conclusion
“If Christians presume that God is somehow beyond this world and is
therefore not be identified with it in part or in whole, the theologian in
the interest of Christian coherence adds that this non-identity must not
amount to a simple contrast” (1988: 47). Thus a Christian thinker such as
St Augustine says that God is both more interior to him than his most
inward part and also higher than the highest (tu autem eras interior intimo
meo et superior summo meo), and in this claim we can hear echoes of
Råmånuja’s view that the supreme personal reality which includes and
encompasses all finite entities is yet “above” the world (Augustine,
Confessions 3.6.11).
Therefore, even Christian theologians of a more orthodox inclination
who do not specifically propose panentheistic notions of the divine but
seek to develop theologies in which human persons, God, and the world
are linked together in various types of interrelationships can fruitfully
engage in a dialogue with Råmånuja. For instance, Charles Taliaferro
(1994: 233) writes that an increasing number of Christian theologians
have charged that anthropological “dualism” leads to the denigration of
the physical reality of the body which becomes an external shell where
the spiritual essence is encased as a solitary monad. He argues that though
many forms of dualism associated with Gnosticism and Manicheanism
have indeed been associated with depreciating attitudes towards the
body, environmental degradation and patriarchal hierarchalisms that have
equated masculinity with cognitive processes and feminity with bodily
experiences, one needs to carefully distinguish between various types of
dualism and not lump all of them together. His “integrative dualism,”
which holds that the human person and the body constitute an embodied
unity, seeks to affirm that our manifold experiences in aesthetic, emo-
tional, ethical, and social contexts are firmly rooted in our corporeal
substratum which is therefore not a mere appendage. Taliaferro’s point
that there is no necessary connection between the acceptance of some
form of anthropological dualism and an attitude of hatred or loathing
towards the physical body finds further support from our discussion of
Råmånuja’s conception of the human person as an embodied unity in
which the “health” of the spiritual principle and that of the physical body
are closely interrelated.
In short, Råmånuja’s views on human and divine embodiment are not
simply of specialized Indological interest and can speak to a variety of
26 / Ankur Barua
Notes
1. Lipner (1984) has pointed out that for Råmånuja this is the literal
meaning of the term “body”; consequently, the world is the “body” of the
Lord in this sense.
2. Overzee has noted that “the body-self doctrine provides a theological
structure to hold together a vision in which the divine and the world are
fully integrated, one with the other. It also provides a model for spiritual
practice leading to knowledge of Brahman (brahmajñåna) through
coming to know the true nature of one’s self and the world” (1992: 83).
3. Bhatt says that in Råmånuja’s theology “the reality of the world is
recognised, the supremacy of Brahman is taught, and yet both are brought
together into a unity” (1975: 86).
4. In connection with Råmånuja’s understanding of the ontological
status of the world, Vidyarthi says that “it is not self-sufficient but is,
in all its stages, under the constant care, control and guidance of the
Supreme Person” (1978a: 130).
God’s Body at Work: Råmånuja and Panentheism / 27
References Cited