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Patterns of Prejudice
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Jews and Arabs in Latin America

a b
Aby Kaufman
a
Lecturer at the department of International Relations , Hebrew University , Jerusalem
b
Lecturer at the department of Spanish and Latin American Studies , Hebrew University ,
Jerusalem
Published online: 28 May 2010.

To cite this article: Aby Kaufman (1976) Jews and Arabs in Latin America, Patterns of Prejudice, 10:1, 15-26, DOI:
10.1080/0031322X.1976.9969289

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 Aby Kaufman and Yoram Shapira
Jews and Arabs
in Latin America
E Middle East problem has been a major
issue of debate in Latin American coun-
tries: in all likelihood, it is the one extra-
continental issue that has attracted the larg-
Downloaded by [Northwestern University] at 05:57 12 January 2015
est attention. An important explanatory ele-
ment is the presence of local Jewish and
Arab communities throughout Latin America,
in significant numbers and in similar pro-
portions; a fact which might encourage com-
petitive political involvement. This is cer-
tainly an unusual phenomenon for a con-
tinent that has become identified as a part
of the developing world, and the aim of this
study is to analyse the relationship of both
the local communities towards the Middle
East issue and evaluate their impact within
the national societies.
By and large, during the period from 1948
until the Yom Kippur war in 1973 the inter-
nal bias of Latin America was outstandingly
favourable to Israel. Latin American countries
were instrumental in assuring the adoption
of the Partition Plan in 1947 and in securing
Israel's membership in the U.N. in 1949, as
well as staunchly supporting Israel in most
votes taken at the international level. Fur-
thermore, on the bilateral level, all 20 Latin
American countries maintained full diplomatic
relations with Israel, most had Embassies in
Jerusalem, reciprocating almost symmetric-
ally the networks of Israeli representation in
the continent.
Since the 1973 October war, Israel's posi-
tion in the international arena has deteriora-
ted. This process has also affected Latin
American states. Nevertheless, all Latin Ame-
rican nations continue to maintain a friendly
attitude (except Cuba which severed relations
in September 1973).
When attempting to provide a explanation
for this assessment one should certainly con-
sider the influence of external factors such
* Footnotes will be found at the end of the
article.
as the bipolar international system, the Great
Powers, "neutralist" countries and the activ-
ities of both parties to the conflict.
In general terms Israeli diplomatic repre-
sentatives over the 25-year period under study,
have been more active and consistent in
seeking Jewish support, while the efforts of
Arab diplomats were more sporadic. Israel's
greater success is also perhaps due to its
wide diplomatic presence on the continent.
While the possibilities of a much larger Arab
network always existed, till 1972 the Arabs
increased the number of their missions only
to twice those of Israel.
TOTAL NUMBERS OF ISRAELI AND ARAB
MISSIONS IN LATIN AMERICAN
COUNTRIES (1948-1972)1
Year 1948/9 1955 1959 1965/6 1971/2
Number of missions
Arab
States 5 7 9 30 33
Israel 1 3 7 13 17
However, numerical and efficiency argu-
ments on foreign activity cannot count as
the major element for assessing the import-
ance of the local communities' attitude to-
wards their countries of origin, and in this
sense, the attachment of Latin American
Jewry towards Israel is fundamental in ex-
plaining the more successful interaction.
Jewish-Arab relations, at the personal level,
have been traditionally cordial, especially as
many members of both communities are in
the same fields of economic activity (i.e. trade
and industry). Before 1948, reasonable inter-
communal relations also existed at the in-
stitutional level; many Jews, for example,
were members, even board members, of Leb-
anese and Syrian social clubs and banks.
Even by 1956 it was still considered "that in
general, there is no animosity on the part
15
 of the Arabs, taken as individuals, against
their Jewish neighbours, that among the Arab
masses there is no deep-rooted anti-Jewish
feeling, though the division makes itself felt
among the leading groups, among institu-
tions an/3 those who play a representative
role and who avoid being seen publicly in
friendly relations with Jews"2.
Ever since its creation, Israel's relations with
the Jewish communities in Latin America have
been strong. The continuous interaction in
various fields showed a deep feeling of in-
terdependence. Israel required from the local
Jews not only persistence in mobilising poli-
tical support from their governments but also
material help in financial and human resour-
ces. The communities, on the other hand,
had their educational and cultural network
reinforced and practically organized by Israel,
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Israel, became active on behalf of the Jewish
State, while at the individual level the great
majority of Jews suddenly became concerned
about Israel's destiny. In the Arab community,
many elements began to be disturbed by the
defeat of the Arab armies. Their organizations
came under increasing pressure by Arab dip-
lomats to enrol in active support for the
Arab cause. Many small social, sports and
cultural organizations, especially those of
the Arab Christian community attempted to
avoid the issue, while major representative
bodies supported the Arab League. Although
tension increased, there was, however, no
direct conflict between the two communities4.
A more systematic analysis of both com-
munities as a source of political support,
must consider the following elements: (a)
numerical strength and degree of involve-

as well as youth and communal activities,
providing them with a raison d'itre and a
unique object for identification for a com-
munity in which 3Judaism had largely taken
on a secular form . On the other hand until
the late sixties the majority of Arab des-
cendants kept aloof from activities of solid-
arity with the Arab countries.
The breach between the two communities
widened with the 1967 war. The Jewish
community became even more strongly iden-
tified with Israel; anti-Zionist Jewish groups
split, some members joining the "Zionist"
establishment. Jewish social and cultural or-
ganizations, with only tenuous links with
ment; (b) organization; (c) legitimacy; (d)
social power; (e) economic 5 power and (f)
influence over mass media.
(a) Numerical Strength and Degree of
Involvement
An accurate estimate of the Jewish and
Arab population in Latin America is not
easily arrived at. Each community and its
counterpart—for virtually opposite purposes
—will generally tend to exaggerate their own
numbers and probably that of their "advers-
ary".6 No single source is available, and a
compilation from diverse sources presents
the following picture for 1970.T

Total Population
Country in thousands Jews Arabs
Argentina 23,364 450,000 500,000
Bolivia 4,931 1,700 several thousands
Brazil 92,238 140,000 400,000-700,000
Colombia 21,117 11,000 20,000
Costa Rica 1,649 1,000 ?
Chile 8,553 30,000 70-120,000
Cuba 8,835 1,500 30,000
Dominican Republic 4,018 280 several hundreds
Ecuador 6,093 1,100 several thousands
El Salvador 3,534 300 several thousands
Guatemala 5,111 1,100 several hundreds
Haiti 4,867 50 •>
Honduras 2,588 100 10,000
Mexico 48,377 35,000 30,000
Nicaragua 1,848 130 several thousands
Panama. 1,425 1,500 several thousands
Paraguay 2,386 1,200 4,000
Peru 13,586 5,000 several thousands
Uruguay 2,886 50,000 15-30,000
Venezuela 10,399 12,000 60,000

16
 The total Arab population is estimated at
around 1,500,000 persons, two-thirds of whom
belong to the Various Christian denomina-
tions, the remainder of Moslem and Druse
origins. The largest single group is claimed
to be the Lebanese. A Beirut newspaper in
1967 estimated a total of 1,138,782 Lebanese
throughout the continent (180,000 in Argen-
tina, 879,000 in Brazil, 12,000 in Venezuela,
10,000 in Colombia, 25,800 in Mexico, 20,000
in Cuba, 684 in Peru, 5,630 in Ecuador, 15308
in Bolivia, 1211 in Haiti and 917 in Jamaica).
Though the numerical advantage is with
the Arabs they tend, unlike the Jews, to be
more widely dispersed as between city and
countryside. In Argentina, out of an Arab
population of half a million, only 50,000 live
in Buenos Aires (10 per cent), while nearly
400,000 Jews reside in the same city (90
per cent of the total Jewish population). The
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Jewish concentration in urban areas may
have electoral importance (in those Latin
American countries in which democratic elec-
toral processes are not restricted), and thus
may succeed in preventing the election of
anti-Zionist and antisemitic candidates to Par-
liament.9 Furthermore, the Jewish vote is
usually more unanimous in support of Cen-
trist Democratic parties as opposed to a more
split pattern in the Arab vote. While con-
centration might work to the advantage of
the Jewish vote, the dispersion of the Arab
population over vast territories enables many
of them to be elected and otherwise particip-
ate in political life through local centres of
power or as representatives10 of local inter-
ests in national Parliaments.
Numerical strength alone, however, does
not sufficiently explain the influence of these
communities. An important feature also is
the degree of active involvement of the com-
munity members in defence of their coun-
tries of origin.
Both the Zionist Federations as well as
individual Jews, played important roles in
the early 1940s in forming Committees for
a Hebrew Palestine and, after the establish-
ment of the State of Israel, in the assump-
tion of Consular functions and the nurturing
of diplomatic activities. The South American
Zionist Congress in Montevideo, in 1947, re-
ceived the support of dozens of political lead-
ers of the Continent, and at the Council of
Latin American Foreign Ministers meeting
in Quintandinha, Brazil, in 1947, Jewish re-
presentatives successfully lobbied on behalf
of the Zionist cause. The Six Day War of
1967 also had strong repercussions in Latin
America. At the same time this feeling of
identification amongst the Jewish masses was
not translated or transformed into increased
support of, and participation within, the exis-
ting institutional framework. The 1970-71
membership drive for the World Zionist Orga-
nization11 met with disappointing results; out
of the 794,450 Jews living in Latin America,
only 50,617 registered as members of Zion-
ist Federations (approximately 6.5 per cent).12
The gap between the size of the Jewish
communities and the membership of the Zion-
ist organizations, is described by Peres as-
"a repercussion of the solidarity that was so
strong that it overflowed the routine frame-
works of the existing institutions that were
regarded in the new situation as 13 detached
from reality and even superfluous."
The October 1973 war reinforced this im-
pact on the Jewish communities, but this
time the impact affected the institutional
framework to a greater extent. In Venezuela,
for example, the Jews were described "as
a community willing to do something, but
in competition with the rest of the continent,
as to who can win more medals in loving
Israel".14 Within 24 hours, thousands of Jews
attended pro-Israeli demonstrations and meet-
ings, raised money, and many even volun-
teered for agricultural work within Israel.
In spite of the positive impact of the 1967
war on Latin American Jewry, leading to a
greater involvement and solidarity in regard
to Israel, longer term tendencies contain sev-
ere implications for the involvement in Jew-
ish and Israeli affairs, and for the viability
and even survival of many Latin American
communities. There are indications of a wide
retreat from organized Jewish activity, and
the existence of a generational crisis within
most local communities. This crisis is the
basic weakness in most of the Jewish insti-
tutions; they have failed to attract the youn-
ger generation. Recent elections for Com-
munity leadership in Buenos Aires and in
Sao Paulo, revealed a marked lack of mass
participation in both, especially among the
younger segments.15 Reports emphasizing the
deteriorating situation within these communi-
ties (decreased involvement, lack of consci-
ousness, loss through intermarriage, etc.) are
appearing ever more frequently in the Israeli
press.18
(b) Organization
Latin American societies where Jewish com-
munities exist can be divided into two basic
prototypes. The more pluralistic and formerly
immigration-encouraging societies (the "white"
southern republics of Argentina, Uruguay, and
17
 Chile) favoured greater ethnic and cultural
homogeneity, encouraged the freedom of the
voluntary organization. In the immigration-
restricting and relatively closed societies
(the Mestizo societies), national identi-
fication and the organization of the
Jewish communities, was given an im-
petus and thus enhanced by the societal
attitude that viewed all immigrants and their
descendants as aliens. As a result of the
existing conditions, in the former type of
countries larger Jewish communities became
established, thus providing greater anonym-
ity within the inter-group relationship, facili-
tating speedier assimilation within the general
society and11 the abandonment of the Jewish
framework. In the smaller countries where
social control is greater and more keenly
felt, the Jewish community is stronger and
more viable. Still, in many places Jewish
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cultural and religious institutions are formed
according to the origins of the first genera-
tion (Sephardi for the Jews of Near East-
ern and North African countries, and Ashken-
azi—often the German-speaking community
separately—for the Jews from Eastern Eu-
rope). However, the tendency of a local Jew-
ish congregation to maintain a united com-
munity structure, can be considered as an
important political resource. Generally, the
Jewish communities in Latin America are
well organized supporting educational, wel-
fare, cultural, social and religious activities.18
The most outspoken, active and militant pro-
Israel supporters vis-a-vis the Latin Ameri-
can governments and other political forces,
have been the umbrella representative Jew-
ish institutions. During the last decade, it has
been the Jewish communities at large that
have adopted the task of staying alert to
all anti-Israel attacks. The amount of politi-
cal support so extended to Israel is remark-
able considering that an attack on Israel
might possibly have unfavourable repercus-
sions for the local community.
In Argentina, after the alleged arson at-
tempt at the Israeli exhibition in Buenos
Aires, the DAIA, the representative Jewish
body, reacted with more support for Israel;19
it similarly answered pro-Arab statements by
some of the Trade Unions,20 and a pro-Arab
petition brought the DAIA into a direct con-
frontation with the local Arab League's Of-
fice.21 At the meetings in Montevideo (1968)
and Lima (1972), representatives from Jewish
communities of the Continent expressed un-
restricted support for Israel. Umbrella orga-
nizations, such as the Latin American section
of the World Jewish Congress,, provide sup-
18
port for Israel in the region's diplomatic
gatherings, e.g. at the UNCTAD22 meeting In
Santiago. They have also petitioned their go-
vernments, on matters of importance to Dias-
pora Jewry, e.g. the solidarity campaign with
the Jews of the USSR and of the Arab coun-
tries. At the same time, the general political
instability in the region, the polarization of
political forces, and the guerilla movements,
have caused or intensified feelings of insecur-
ity amongst many Jewish communities, Israel
now being considered23 a potential refuge
should the need arise. Although under the
Socialist regimes in both Chile and Cuba,
the Jews did not suffer from official dis-
crimination, many were affected as a result
of their socio-economic position. As for the
future, there is always the fear that as a
result of radical changes and the resultant
turmoil (if it should ensue), the Jew may
be singled out as a victim and a scapegoat.
The main source and centre of anti-Israeli
activity appear to be the Arab Embassies,
with the local communities preferring a more
passive stance.24 Among the younger and
more politically orientated elements of the
community however, there seems to be a
greater willingness to rise to the banner of
the Arab cause. Little is known about con-
tacts between residents of Arab origin and
Palestinian organizations. Yasser Arafat laun-
ched a special appeal to Latin Americans
to join the El-Fatah as volunteers; but the
general response seemed to have been weak;
only in some isolated cases were local in-
dividuals found to be involved in terrorist
activities. They are probably useful in pro-
viding information about Jewish institutions;
iu one instance it was disclosed that local
Arabs were trained in Chile in the use of
arms, and three were jailed in 1969 after
the desecration of tombs in the Jewish cem-
etery.
The Arab institutions are usually estab-
lished according to the place of origin of
the members e.g. the Horns Club, or Socie-
dad Tripolitana; some according to their coun-
try of origin such as the Lebanese Associa-
tion in Brazil and the Clubs Palestino, Sirio
and Jordano in Chile. The concept of the
"greater Syria" is reflected in joint Syrian-
Lebanese institutions all over the continent;
while other groups base their institutions
according to religious or ethnic differences.25
The Arab Embassies encourage and have
furthered the formation of adhoc organiza-
tions, even though in skeleton form and of
sporadic character, to agitate on behalf of
official Arab policy.20 These members will
 participate in public demonstrations and meet-
ings, draw up public statements, distribute
anonymous leaflets,88 print commemorative
posters, etc. However, demonstrations and
rallies are usually attended by very few.
The tactics actually employed by the Arab
Embassies to mobilize the local communi-
ties, often emulate those of the Isra-
eli Embassies in their relationship with the
Jewish communities. Fund-raising cam-
paigns usually meet with a poor response;
the Syrian Ambassador to Brazil thanked
the local community for its $100,000 relief
to benefit Syrian refugees from the Golan
Heights.29
One project was the establishment of
National, and a Continental, roof Organiz-
ation, to act as the spokesman of the whole
Arab community, similar to the existing
Jewish organization (Congreso Judfo Latino-
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Americano; it was considered that this would
provide a stronger power base for the com-
munity in its relations with the continent's
regimes. On 15 May, 1962 the Uni6n Nacio-
nal Arabe de Chile was formed — "a politi-
cal instrument of the Arab League and of
Egyptian financing and inspiration".30 A
subsequent attempt was made in Argentina
in 1964 and a decade later, in the space of
one year, three National Congresses of Arab
Organizations took place.31 This organizing
campaign received the full cooperation of
the Syrian Ambassador and the Director of
the Arab League Office, though the resolu-
tion adopted by the third Congress, "recom-
mending the intervention of Arab diplomats
for the achievement of institutional unifica-
tion",38 implied that difficulties existed in the
mobilizing of support from all Arab groups
and institutions in the country. At approxi-
mately the same time, similar meetings took
place in Chile and in Brazil, resulting in the
formation in Brazil of the Federation of
Arab institutions (FEARAB) at Sao Paulo in
May 1974,ss with the purpose, according to
official Arab sources, of "creating a regional
League of the Arab immigrant in each of
the Republics of the continent".31
The Second Arab Congress in Argentina, in
November 1972, decided to establish a Feder-
ation of Arab Institutions in Latin America,
and a year later, in Buenos Aires, the First
Pan-American Arab Congress convened, with
participation of delegations from Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.3'
It was decided to establish pro-Arab com-
mittees and information and tourist centres
in each country, as well as cultural and
financial institutions for the promotion of
trade between Latin America and the Arab
world. However, these efforts still showed,
after the Yom Kippur War, a gap between
the planning and the scarce achievements.
(c) Legitimacy
Arab immigrants in Latin America have
assimilated to a greater degree than their
Jewish compatriots. They have been praised
for possessing the following characteristics:
a readiness to settle anywhere in the coun-
try, to engage in hard physical work, to
inter-marry, to devote themselves to national
politics, to maintain a high birthrate, to
have physical and psychological characteris-
tics akin to the native mestizos, and to have
a blood relationship with the Spanish majo-
rity immigrant group.38 General Per6n's
special emissary to Egypt, Dr. Feisal al-
Nefouri (of Syrian descent) explained: "With
regard to the Arab colony (in Argentina),
till now nobody took an interest in this
(Mid-East) affair. This is due to the fact that
Arabs tend to integrate totally in their new
society and regard themselves as loyal citi-
zens . . . Per<5n tends to side with Arabs
and not with other immigrants . . . because
the Arab immigrants have always proved
their loyalty to Argentina"." This statement
explains the dilemma the Arab nations face
in trying to get these communities to sup-
port them. The communities pride them-
selves on their being fully integrated, and
this integration undermines political support
for the Arab cause. In general their attach-
ments to their country of origin is similar
to that of any other immigrant group. Their
descendants seldom visit the relatives "back
home" and, even if they do, this does not
necessarily lead to political involvement.
The Arabs have used this legitimacy as
a propaganda weapon in attacking the rela-
tionship of the Latin American Jewish com-
munities with Israel. An advertisement by
the Arab-Mexican Alliance stated that "in
Mexico, members of the Jewish colony and
their sons publicly collected funds to buy
arms for Israel and volunteered to take an
active part in the armed conflict, in gross
violation of this country's international policy
of non-intervention and of self-determin-
ation for all peoples . . . It is our citizens'
duty to prevent Mexico's clean international
record being sullied by the defamations and
hypocrisy of those unable to 88 appreciate the
honour of Mexico's hospitality".
This argument generally fell on fertile soil.
A group of Latin American journalists visit-
19
 ing Israel were unanimous in their convic-
tion, that the people of Latin America are
more sympathetic to their Arab co-citizens
than to their Jewish ones. They specifically
mentioned that in Mexico, Arabs mixed with
the population while Jews are a closed
society — "when a Jew becomes rich, he
sends his money to Israel or America" . . .
"Jews live a 'capitalist* way of life and do
not realize that they lead a luxurious life
compared to the majority of the population"
. . . "the Arabs contribute more than the
Jews for the development of the country,
they are ready to settle in the countryside"
. . . "in the Dominican Republic the Arabs
are preferred to the Spanish immigrants
because they do not leave the country once
they become rich".39 On the other hand,
Jewish communities have maintained, un-
hindered, their affectionate relationship with
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Israel. One can find a self-reinforcing inter-
relationship between their voluntary "sepa-
ratism" and their exclusion from certain
domains of society.
A basic factor shaping attitudes towards
local Jewish communities is the fact that
they constitute a minority group possessing
unique national, ethnic, and religious charac-
teristics. The religious aspect is of prime
importance, especially when one considers
the role of the Catholic Church in the Latin
American cultural heritage. In a society
composed of a Catholic majority, equality
cannot be allowed to all religions; while
constitutional guarantees extend to many
aspects of a secular society, certain coun-
tries, through some such provision as that
the President must be a Catholic, practise,
directly or indirectly, a discrimination which
denies some access to institutions. There-
fore, by adhering to his religion, a Jew
automatically becomes a little less equal.*0
Religious "non-conformity", combined with
strong emotional ties to Israel, is apt, during
a period of rising nationalism and xenopho-
bia, to undermine the legitimacy of pro-
Israeli activities engaged in by local com-
munities.
These Jewish community ties with Israel
are often confronted by the society's hos-
tility towards pluralism in loyalties. A
nationalist could express sympathy for Zion-
ism as the "national liberation movement"
of the Jewish people, but he would reject
it if it attempted to persuade a compatriot
to serve another country. The Argentine
nationalist Arturo Jauretche stated: "I want
to make the Jews born here Argentinians
. . . My opinion of Zionism is based on
20
an Argentinian nationalism that aims to see
the sons of the Jews incorporated into the
Nation, as we absorbed the sons of the
Spaniards, the sons of the Italians, etc."."
AH the same, some Gentiles are extremely
sensitive to Jewish particularism, and accept
the intense relationship of the local Jewish
community to Israel as a natural occur-
rence;42 perhaps they are still influenced by
a sense of world responsibility for the Holo-
caust.
In societies where the forces for assimil-
ation are strong, the reaction of many Jews
has been to reinforce the main symbol of
their Judaism, Israel. When one considers
that most of the older generation lack a
cultural and religious background, it seems
even easier to understand how Israel be-
comes their identifying factor as their main
link to Judaism. In many Latin American
countries, the Jews have come to regard
the Israeli Ambassador as their "spiritual
leader"."
Some non-Zionist groups do everything
possible to distinguish between "Israel" and
"Israelite", terms bearing no basic differ-
ence for most Latin Americans. This failure
to differentiate between the images of the
local Jew and that of the Israeli is preg-
nant in its implications for both. When
the image of Israel is high, the local Jew
will benefit from a higher status, and vice
versa. When local Jews become unpopular
(as sometimes happens), as they are con-
sidered to be part of the exploiting elite,
a corresponding deterioration takes place in
Israel's image. Most interviewed considered
that such a parallelism does exist, but mainly
amongst the uneducated. However, many
experienced people when dealing 4 with this
subject confuse Jewish with Israeli. *
The fact that Jews show concern for their
country of citizenship as well as for Israel
helps to counter accusations of alienation.
They express this duality of national senti-
ment, by the use of both patria (fatherland)
and madre patria (motherland). In spite
of a strong introverted trend, these commu-
nities have also been active in general volun-
tary associations, and contribute to national
social welfare programmes. This behaviour
pattern has been described in a booklet deal-
ing with the45 Jewish contribution to Brazil's
development. The Mexican Jewish Women's
Association, in their publication, listed the
projects which they undertook, and it in-
cluded help to general hospitals, schools,
scholarships for University students, an
audio-visual campaign against illiteracy,
 donations to the Red Cross, etc.46 Usually,
such efforts have been formally acknowl-
edged, for example when the former Presi-
dent General Lanusse, of Argentina, ex-
pressed his thanks in a New Year's address:
"The spiritual, material and cultural contri-
bution of this (Jewish) community over more
than a hundred years of activity for the
enlightenment of the Nation, evokes our
gratitude and is an encouragement to follow
this path."47
(d) Economic Power
Economic power can affect the attitudes
of groups and decision-makers, either by
its actual use towards that end, or by its
assumed existence resulting in a reaction
towards those believed to possess it. "Econo-
mic power" can be both a reality and a
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myth. A survey conducted among Argen-
tinian non-Jews revealed that a substantial
proportion believed that Jewish economic
power was greater than that of Americans,
British or Italians.48 The reaction may be
to try not to antagonize what is perceived
to be an economically powerful community;
on the other hand it may provoke hostility
(particularly among leftist elements and
trade union circles), Jews being identified as
"capitalists" and "exploiters".
The use of economic power in support of
political parties and candidates is an atypical
phenomenon.49 When it does occur, it
usually involves only individual members of
a community, but not the whole Jewish
community. Cases of individuals providing
substantial financial support to political
figures have occurred, as in the Chilean presi-
dential campaign in 1969 and in Venezuela
in 1973.
While second-generation Jews generally
belong to the liberal professions, the immi-
grant generation — which provides the
majority of the adult Jewish institutional
leadership — is mostly involved in com-
merce and industry. In Central America
and the Andean countries, with relatively
small Jewish communities, their economic
importance (mainly manufacturers and mer-
chants) in the capitals far exceed their
numerical strength providing them with con-
siderable influence as a result of their per-
sonal wealth and social contacts.
A related source of power is the inflated
importance ascribed to Latin American
Jewry's relationship with US Jewry, and the
resultant assumption of their ability to in-
fluence US policy through their northern
brethren. (In situations of particular diffi-
culty for local Jewry, delegations of North
American organizations have visited certain
Latin American countries.) Furthermore, the
support extended to Israel by the White
House over the last decade and the identi-
fication of Jews in Latin America with the
land of their ancestors has strengthened this
assumption even more.
The economic position of the majority of
the Arabs in Latin America is largely simi-
lar to that of their Jewish co-citizens, being
mainly middle class with a few very wealthy
individuals. However, some of the recent
Arab immigrants belong to the working-class,
without having established themselves eco-
nomically. On the other hand in Chile, until
the beginning of the Allende regime, in 1970,
the Arabs controlled 85% of the textile
industry (enterprises including Yarur, Said,
Hirmas, Chuaqui, Commandari, Samar,
Anania), had large60 holdings in other indus-
tries, and 5 banks.
Paradoxically, the exertion of this econo-
mic influence towards political ends is limi-
ted, in relation to the Middle East conflict,
by the fact that they are usually involved
in the same sectors of industry and com-
merce as the Jews, and furthermore sharing
with them the marketing process (wholesale
and retail). As in the Jewish communities,
second and third-generation Latin American
Arabs have also become attracted to the
liberal professions.
Until a few years ago, the bilateral Cham-
bers of Commerce with the Arab countries
were inactive and nominal, as were those
with Israel. In 1972, it was decided in
Argentina to unite all the Chambers of
Commerce so as to make them more effec-
tive.51 Of greater interest is the possibility
of a rise in the economic position of Arab
citizens in Latin American countries, as a
result of the economic drive of several Arab
countries, who could use local Arab citizens
as agents in their large investments and
financial operations.
(e) Social Power: interaction with
power elites
Until recently Latin America has known
few cases of Jewish parliamentarians, with
the exception of Chile, and Argentina under
the radical President Frondizi. They have
not considered themselves as representatives
of the Jewish communities, and if they
adopted a positive attitude towards Israel,
they only tended to influence their fellow-
parliamentarians indirectly. An outstanding
exception was Senator Guelman in Uruguay,
21
 who defined his role in Parliament as, inter
alia, defending the causes championed52 by
the Jewish community of his country.
During 1973 and 1974 Jews held prominent
cabinet positions in several countries —
Economic Ministers in Argentina and Uru-
guay, two Deputy Ministers in Venezuela,
and the Minister of Health in Costa Rica.
In nearly all the democratically elected
regimes — with the exclusion of Mexico,
where Jews in particular53 and European
immigrants generally, tend not to participate
prominently in political life — the Jews
reached Ministerial positions representing
more moderate and liberal opinion. The late
Allende's administration in Chile also in-
cluded many Jews; the extreme Right-wing
opposition charged that the Popular Unity
government was infiltrated by Jews, including
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Allende himself!"
Even though such Jews in public life
showed no particular loyalty to organized
Jewry, during times of crisis, their Jewish-
ness was stressed and used against them.
The Uruguayan Minister of the Economy,
Moises Cohen, was accused, in antisemitic
terms by the Right-wing in 1972, of selling
part of the nation's gold reserves. Jos5
Bar Gelbard, Minister of the Economy in
Argentina, faced even worse problems. When
Jos6 Lopez Rega, then Minister of Welfare
and former Private Secretary of Peron, re-
turned from a trip to Libya in February,
1974, he denounced the existence of erro-
neous information concerning Argentina's
position vis-a-vis the Arab countries, and he
blamed it on officials of "Jewish origin" —
meaning Gelbard53 A Right-wing campaign,
especially from within the Peronist ranks,
alleged that Gelbard had had illegal trans-
actions with a Swiss-Israeli Bank, and on
walls in the centre of Buenos Aires such
slogans were seen as "Down with Gelbard
the Jew"; "Gelbard, Zionist-Jew" or "Gelbard
Bolche (Communist) Jew".56 In most cases,
Jewish institutions do not look favourably
upon active involvement in politics by their
members, they rather prefer an official
neutral position on national issues, so as to
avoid identification with a particular political
body; especially in countries known for their
political instability.
In Latin America it is unusual for Jews
to belong to the traditional elite groups,
such as the military or the landed oligarchy.57
Few Jews follow diplomatic careers, or hold
high political positions. Sebreli considers
that the oligarchy is a closed circle, which
22
excludes Jews; but in those few cases where
Jews married into traditional families, they
"have become part of the oligarchy, they
have renounced their Judaism, severed all
connections with the community, abandoned
the tradition, and have 58accepted Catholicism,
even if only nominally".
While it is true that economic develop-
ment has helped to forge links between the
new interest groups and the ruling elites,
with a greater acceptance of Jewish entre-
preneurs, technocrats, and mass media pur-
veyors, only a minority of those accepted
have undertaken to overtly defend Israel's
position. Furthermore, those Jews who are
important in trade groups, the liberal pro-
fessions, and University circles, while per-
haps more actively pro-Israel, only exercise
a marginal influence on foreign policy.
In spite of their rapid integration, Arabs
too have not generally become integrated
into the "traditional elite", and there have
not been many intermarriages with families
of the upper-class. However, as in Ecuador,
Argentina, Chile and Brazil, some of Arab
origin follow army careers and have achieved
high ranks, e.g. Major Brigadier Raul Laca-
banne or Deputy-Commander Ricardo J.
Almalli, Chairman of the Mendoza branch
of FEARAB in Argentina. In countries of
an autocratic character — Paraguay and
Honduras — small groups of Arabs as a
result of economic deals with the ruling
inner circle or the President, have achieved
strong personal positions. Generally, it is
true to say that their social power is a func-
tion 59of economic power or political posi-
tion.
However, political participation did not
necessarily translate itself in the past into
support for the Arab cause, as many of the
leading community members preferred to
remain neutral as far as the Israeli-Arab
conflict is concerned. There have also been
cases in Latin America, of Arab politicians
taking a vocally pro-Israeli position. Sena-
tor Abdala of Uruguay, of Lebanese origin,
a former member of the Council of the
State-Colegiado and Vice-President, visited
Israel and proposed his own peace plan.00
Senator Turbai Ayala of Colombia, also of
Lebanese origin, and President of the Liberal
Party, has repeatedly made pro-Israeli state-
ments. With the more active role of Arab
Embassies, the growing support for the
"Palestinian" cause, the number of outspoken
pro-Arab supporters has greatly increased; in
Venezuela Jorge Dager, of Lebanese origin,
 a former Chairman of the Chamber of Depu-
ties and Fuerza Democrdtica Papular (FDP)
candidate for the Presidency in 1973, was
openly anti-Israel and pro-Arab. In Brazil,
members of Parliament of Lebanese01 and
Syrian origin, continually attack Israel. In
Argentina, the Lebanese club, "Honour and
Fatherland", held a reception for legislators
of Arab origin — attended also by the Presi-
dent of the Chamber of Deputies Raul A.
Lastiri. On this occasion, in the presence
of the Lebanese Ambassador, prominence
was given to the identity of purpose of the
Arab and Argentinian struggles against
"imperialism and for national liberation".62
(f) Information and Influence on
the Mass Media
A growing number of second-generation
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Jews are involved in the mass media of the
continent; characteristic of them is their
integration into the national life and men-
tality while providing little coverage of
Middle Eastern events. The exceptions are
J. Zablodovski, popular commentator of the
Mexican television news programme "24
Hours", and J. Timmerman, editor and owner
of the daily La OpMdn in Buenos Aires,
who has successfully combined a pro-Israeli
line, with wide coverage of other inter-
national issues.63
The Jewish press has always been quick
to react to anti-Zionist policies. Mundo
Israelita (Buenos Aires) severely condemned
the participation of a correspondent from
the newspaper Mundo Arabe in a television
programme where it was alleged that "Zion-
ism manipulates and controls the press, radio,
and T.V."61 In Chile, both Jewish news-
papers — Mundo Judfo and Palabra Israelita
— openly criticised the pro-Arab role of
Allende's government at the U.N., as it devi-
ated from the traditional government line
of impartiality and neutrality with regard to
the Middle East conflict.65 Journals spon-
sored by the Jewish communities have often
been successful in reaching the intellectual
and university public, e.g., Raices and Comen-
tario in Argentina; also Indice in Chile, but
their life-span was short. Finally, an indirect
source of pressure on the mass media, are
the commercial relations of Jews with the
private press. Advertisements are often used
as a leverage to influence newspapers' poli-
cies.68
Journalists of Arab origin are not parti-
cularly prominent in this field, and are
usually connected with provincial news-
papers.67 An exception is the (pro-Junta)
newspaper La Humanidad, Lima, Peru which
receives Arab financial support and has Arab
representatives on its editorial board. In
addition to direct influence, pressure can be
brought to bear by foreign Arab sources.
In Chile and Paraguay, there are commercial
radio stations under Arab ownership, as well
as special transmissions in many countries
in both Spanish and Arabic for "internal"
community consumption. There are also
newspapers that are published in Arabic
(El Nafir, El Arabi, El Arz in Brazil; Al-
Taura in Venezuela; Assalam, El Rafik in
Buenos Aires) as well as in Portuguese or
Spanish, or bilingual (Diario Sirio Liban6s<iS
in Buenos Aires, Mundo Arabe in Chile).
While varying in the degree of their anti-
Israeli and anti-Jewish content, most of the
Spanish-language newspapers repeat the
arguments put forward by the Arab Govern-
ments, and in some cases they even succeed
in having their articles republished in the
general press, especially that of the Left.69
Furthermore channels for pro-Arab publi-
city are statements by the Arab Associations,
which70 are sometimes published as news
items, but mostly as advertisements in
major newspapers.71 On occasions anony-
mous leaflets are distributed within the
cities, containing provocative texts, in the
hope that they will initiate public contro-
versies in the general press, as happened in
Buenos Aires.72
Announcements of meetings of the Arab
community and pro-Arab Associations usually
receive press coverage; antisemitic writings
and wall posters have appeared in main
city streets, i.e. "The year of Argentinian-
Arab fraternity. United for the same cause
we shall fight for liberation and restitution
of our usurped and occupied territories: the
Argentinian Malvinas (the British Falkland
Islands) and Palestine and the Arab Terri-
tories".73
To conclude, organised Jewish communi-
ties in Latin America have been generally
actively canvassing political support for
Israel from their respective governments.
Their effectiveness seems to be greater than
that of the Arab communities. The major
reasons for this are a stronger Jewish
organisational network and the deeper feel-
ings of involvement with Israel. On the
other hand the Arab countries have inten-
sified their interest in Latin American Arab
communities over the last years, often fol-
lowing the same patterns employed by Israel
in the Diaspora.
23
 Footnotes
1. Data on Israel compiled from the Israel
Government's Yearbook (in Hebrew). Jerusalem.
Vols. 1948, 1955/6, 1959/60, 1965/72. Data on
Arab States compiled from The Middle East and
North America, A Survey and Reference Book.
Europa Pub. Ltd., Vols. 1948, 1955, 1959, 1965-66,
1971/72.
2. Actividades Antijudias de los Arabes en la
Argentina. D.A.I.A. Press Office, Buenos Aires.
1958, pp. 2-4.
3. Another side of the same picture is anti-
semitism, considered to be "the largest unifying
element in Jewish community life". . "To
discuss antisemitism in the same context with
Jewish associational life is axiomatic." Horowitz,
Irving Louis, Israeli Extasies and Jewish Agonies,
Oxford University Press, New York, 1974, p. 154.
4. In one instance, following the stoning of
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the Syrian embassy in Caracas, the "Arab Uni-
versity Youth" imputed the act to a "group of
hysterical Jews", but the Confederation of Jew-
ish Associations dissociated itself from the action,
and in communique's to the national press con-
demned the incident, stressing their interest in
maintaining "the peaceful co-existence among
residents of Jewish and Arab origin" (El Naci-
onal, Caracas, 1 June, 1967).
5. These categories are expounded by Robert
C. Fried in Comparative Political Institutions,
New York, MacMillan, 1966, p. 2.
6. An example of over-estimation of the Jewish
population in Latin America is given in Al Akh-
bar, Cairo, 10 May, 1972, stating the figure of
one and a half million instead of the more
realistic one of less than one million.
7. Figures for the Arab communities are com-
piled from various Jewish sources: principally
data from the Anti-Defamation League, of B'nai
Brith, Washington DC, according to reports pro-
vided by the Jewish communities of the countries.
Estimates are also given by the Latin American
Jewish Congress Office in Buenos Aires. The
Jewish population data have been compiled from
various sources by Haim Avni in the chapter
dealing with "Latin America" in World Politics
and. the Jewish Condition. Henkin. Louis (Ed.),
Quadrangle Books Inc., 1975, Chap. 7, pp. 270-
271.
8. El Amal, Beirut, 5 September, 1967. These
figures confirm the high degree of inaccuracy
among the various sources on the size of the
Latin American Arab population. Estimates of
2 million Arabs in Brazil have also been sug-
gested, while the most acceptable is an estimate
of 400,000 (of whom 300,000 are Lebanese). The
small group of Lebanese in Chile was omitted
in the above estimate.
9. In the April 1973 elections in Argentina,
Right-wing Marcelo Sanchez Sorondo, running
on the Peronist ticket, failed to receive a major-
ity of the votes in Buenos Aires, while the
Peronists were sweeping home elsewhere.
10. This is particularly true in the case of
large countries. In Argentina, mayors, governors
of leading provinces and provincial and national
legislators are often of Arab origin. According
to an interview with a leader of the Chilean
Jewish community, "many Arabs are activists
24
in political parties, from Conservative to Com-
munist . . . they have mayors, magistrates, jud-
ges, deputies, and senators in a much larger
quantity than Jews, who can count only one
mayor, three magistrates, one deputy and one
senator". In Brazil, similarly, Arab legislators
have come to form a special "caucus" in Par-
liament.
11. Membership Drive Committee, Report sub-
mitted to the Session of the Zionist General
Council, Jerusalem, June 1971.
12. OJI (Information Bulletin of the Latin
American Jewish Congress), No. 21/71, (38),
September 1971. It should also be mentioned
that the institutional crisis affected all Jewish
institutions in Latin America, their membership
failing to increase substantially.
13. Peres, León, "Zehut Veitnakrut Yehudit
Ba-Amerika Halatinit". Gesher, 3-4 (68-69), Tel
Aviv, December 1971, p. 119.
14. JC. 73 (Interview, Jewish Community lea-
der, name withheld), Caracas, November 1973.
15. In 1969, 70 per cent of the Buenos Aires
Jewish community membership were in the over-
50 age group, with approximately half of the
members being so for at least 26 years. When
comparing the figures with those of 20 and 30
years ago, one sees a decrease in membership
in community institutions. See conclusions of
research project of E. Rogovsky, quoted in Report
No. 1: Mivne Yakadut Amerika Halatinit,
published by the D. Horowitz Institute for the
Study of Developing Countries, Tel Aviv Uni-
versity, Tel Aviv, January 1972, p. 48.
16. Pinkhas Sapir (late Chairman of the Jew-
ish Agency), said upon his return from a visit
to Latin America, that the rate of intermarriage
is 40 per cent, and that 75 per cent of Latin
American Jews have no contact with Jewish
affairs. Haaretz, Tel Aviv, 2 September 1974.
17. A survey carried out among both Jewish
and non-Jewish students in Buenos Aires, pre-
sented among its conclusions, the observation of
a greater tendency for Jewish students to involve
themselves in University and national politics,
of stronger leftish tendencies, and lesser attend-
ance in synagogues than that shown by
Catholic students in attending Church. See re-
search project of A. Monk and E. Rogovsky on,
Changes among Jewish and non-Jewish students
of the Buenos Aires University. American Jew-
ish Committee, Dept. of Social Research, Buenos
Aires, 1964.
18. The highly structured and complex net-
works (central and local representative organiza-
tions; cultural, sports, and University Associa-
tions; Zionist and Israel-orientated Associations;
libraries and community centres; publishers and
bookshops; schools and other teaching institu-
tions; publications, and journals; synagogues, phi-
lantropic and mutual aid associations; hospitals,
etc.) can be better visualized by comparing the
number of registered Jewish institutions to the
size of the Jewish populations. In 1972, Argen-
tina had 470 such institutions for a population
of 450,000; Uruguay 113 for 50,000; Colombia
14 for 11,000. (Data compiled from the Direc-
tory of the Comity Judio Americano. Comunida-
 des ludîas de America Latina, 1971/72, Institute)
de Kelaciones Humànas, Buenos Aires, 1974).
19. La Natión, op. cit., 9 September, 1968.
20. Boletin Informativo DAIA, No. 27, 15
September, 1971, p. 10. DAIA rejected the terms
of a resolution passed by the CGT (trade union)
Branch in Bahia Blanca, Argentina.
21. The DAIA statement was published in the
daily Clarin, Buenos Aires, 14 October, 1971, and
the Arab League's in La Natión, 29 October, 1971.
22. United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development.
23. This potential danger has been expressed
repeatedly by both Israeli and local leaders.
See Ma'ariv, Tel Aviv, 12 December, 1972 and
13 February, 1973.
24. Interview with JC 89, Caracas, April 1973:
and Anti-Defamation League report on Uruguay
(unpublished), 1970.
25. Sotiedad Islámica, Asotiación Panislamista,
Unión Alawita, Juventud Alawita, and Asocia-
ción Drusa in Argentina; "They carry out only
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social, sport, and cultural activities and seldom
participate in actions of political character":
Actividades Anti-judîas de los Arabes en la
Argentina, op. cit., p. 27.
26. Juventud de Ascendentia Arabe de Chile,
Unión de Estudiantes Argentino-Arabe, Juventud
Argentino-Arabe por la Liberatión de la Palestina,
Arab Youth of Bolivia, etc. Further fonns of
Arab institutions are bilateral friendship asso-
ciations between country of residence and coun-
try of origin (Alianza Mexicana-Arabe, Asocia-
ción Cultural Siria in Argentina, Arab-Uruguayan
Friendship Association, Chilean-Arab Cultural
Institute); the more radical elements formed left-
wing committees supporting the Arab cause
(Movimiento de Solidaridad con la Liberatión
y el Desarollo, in Argentina; Comité pro-Paz en
el Medio Oriente, in Tucumán (Argentina); Aso-
ciación Amigos de los Pueblos Arabes, in
Mexico; Comisión de Apoyo y Solidaridad con
los Pueblos Arabes (Argentina) and the Pales-
tine Resistance Organization in Sao Paulo.
27. The demonstrations often have a special
character; the one that took place in Buenos
Aires on the 6th anniversary of the 1967 War,
orgainzed by the "Arab-Argentinian Youth for
the Liberation of Palestine" and the "Arab Peron-
ist Youth", burned the Israeli flag: OJI, Buenos
Aires, 24/73, 13 June, 1973.
28. A text distributed in Honduras reads:
"Do you know that the lands of Salvador are
in the hands of 14 families? Do you know that
out of the 14 Salvadorian families, 8 are of
Jewish origin? Do you know that Salvador's
governments are ruled by these families? Do you
know that the agrarian problem that Salvador
is facing is due to the latifundia of these families
that force Salvadorian peasants to continue emig-
ration? Do you know that Salvador's planes were
sold by Israel? Do you know that the interna-
tional news agencies of the world are Jewish
property? Do you know that the Salvador Go-
vernment's international organizations and world
public opinion is similar to Israel's lies in rela-
tion to our Arab brothers?" The leaflet appeared
during the Salvador-Honduras "soccer" war, 1969-
70.
29. Al Anba, Sao Paulo, 15-31 August, 1969.
30. Report of JC 88, Santiago, Chile, 1964.
31. La Luz, Buenos Aires, 19 May, 1972, cov-
ers the first Congress: OJI No. 145 (29 Novem-
ber, 1972); No. 175 (27 June, 1973), and No. 177
11 July, 1973) cover the Second and Third Con-
gresses. In the last Congress inention was re-
peatedly made of the Arab financial commitment
to Argentina's national development. Los Andes,
23 June, 1973.
32. OJI, op. cit., No. 177, 11 July, 1973, Con-
gress of Córdoba.
33. OJI, op. cit., No. 219, 21 May, 1974, Con-
gress of Santa Fé.
34. OJI, op. cit., No. 116, 10 May, 1972, Con-
gress of Mendoza.
35. OJI, op. cit., 30 October, 1972. The Syrian
Minister of Tourism also participated, as well
as the Ambassadors of Lebanon, Egypt, Syria,
Jordan, Algeria, Iraq, and Libya. King Hussein
sent a message which was read out to the Con-
gress together with messages of solidarity from
Members of the Argentinian Parliament. In the
speeches, Israel and the US were accused of
"expansionism" and "imperialism".
36. Dr. Santiago M. Peralta, La accidn del
pueblo arabe en la Argentina. Apuntes sobre
inmigración. Mentioned in Actividades antijudias
de los Arabes en la Argentina, op. cit. 1-2. The
same author, though, expressed reservations about
the Arab League and other "foreign agents",
that are trying to connect the local Arabs to
an external nationalist movement.
37. El Akhbar, Cairo, 10 May, 1973.
38. Alianza Mexicana-Arabe, The Truth about
the Middle East (in Spanish), Advertisement, Mex-
ico D. F. 12 June, 1967. The accusations against
Jewish fund-raising for Israel were also exploited
extensively in Argentina (see declaration by the
Argentinian Arab Union of Students, Causa Arabe,
Buenos Aires, August 1963) where there was
also a request for parliamentary investigation.
39. Ma'ariv, Tel Aviv, 7 March, 1974. Inter-
view with journalists from Mexico, the Domini-
can Republic, Chile and Brazil, who were in
Israel to attend a Symposium of Journalists from
17 Latin American countries.
40. Avni, H., op. cit., p. 266.
41. Interview with Arturo Jauretche, published
in Horizonte, No. 12, Buenos Aires, 25 November,
1964.
42. JC 70, speaking about Uruguay, said that
"government circles do not differentiate between
local Jewry and Israel; while considering local
Jewry as Uruguayan citizens first, they feel that
it is perfectly legitimate to regard them as de-
fenders of the State of Israel".
43. JC 72, Interview with Mexican Jewish lead-
er (name withheld).
44. At the time of the Eichmann Trial, Pre-
sident Frondizi confused the two words in a
statement, when he stressed that, "hundreds of
thousands of 'ISRAELIS' (our italics) live in
Argentine protected by democratic legislation".
The reaction of the Argentinian-Jewish Institute,
was to clarify the difference, and to stress that
only few ISRAELITES living in Argentina are
of Israeli origin. La Nación, Buenos Aires, 10
August, 1960.
45. Samuel Malamud, Contribuicao Judaica ao
Desenvolvimento Brasileiro nos. 150 ANOS da
Independencia. Servicio de Divulgacao da Fede-
racao Israelita do Rio de Janeiro, 1972; Speech
of the President of the Jewish Federation deliv-
ered at the Legislative Assembly of the State
of Guanabara.
25
 46. Conseio Mextcano de Mujeres Israelites,
A.C., 30 Años 1941-71.
47. Bolettn Informativo, DAIA, No. 20, 30
September, 1971.
48. Juan José Sebreli, op. cit., p. 174. The
above mentioned survey shows also that 55 per
cent of military men believe that Jews, have
the greatest economic power and 39 per cent
of them believe that the North Americans do.
49. The overall fact is that Jews have remained
in the economic interstices of those nations (Arg-
entina, Brazil, Mexico) without exercising any
corresponding political role. Horowitz, op. cit.,
p. 124.
50. JC 88, Santiago, Chile, 1964.
51. La Luz, Buenos Aires, 19 May, 1972.
52. JC 28, Jerusalem, 1973.
53. See Haaretz, Tel Aviv, 22 March, 1971.
54. Mentioned in an article on the "Sinarquia
Internacional", in the Right-wing publication
Patria Peronista, Buenos Aires, March, 1974:
OJI, No. 13/74, 9 April, 1974, p. 4.
55. Idem, No. 7/74 (208), 27- February, 1974,
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of a "Study Day" on the Palestinian problem
by the Union National Arabe de Chile and the
Comité Chileno de Solaridad con los Pueblos de
Asia y Africa was reproduced in Ultima Hora,
Santiago, 22 May, 1969, and in other left-wing
papers.
71. Statements by the "Arab and Palestinian
Colony in Venezuela" were published in El Na-
tional, Caracas, 6 February, 1969, and 28 August,
1969, on the burning of the Al Aqsa Mosque in
Jerusalem and the hanging of Jews in Baghdad.
In Chile, they are usually placed in El Mercurio
(Right-wing) and Ultima Hora (Left-wing), e.g.
the "Resurrection of the Arab Palestinian People",
29 May, 1969.
72. A leaflet signed by the "Pro-Liberation of
Palestine" accused Israel of being a fictitious
state, "built by Russia, North America and Eng-
land for colonialist purposes . . . The State of
Israel is an aggression against all nationalities,
including the Argentinian, because the Jew born
in Argentina renounces his duty towards his
country and service to the glorious blue and

p. 1. The implication was that the presence of white flag (Argentina's), to travel to Palestine
a Jew in an Argentinian Government undermined and kill the natives, the real owners of this
possible beneficial relations with Libya. country": Actividades Antijudias de los Arabes
56. Idem, No. 27/74 (228): 16 August, 1974. en Argentina, op. cit., pp. 39-40.
p. 3. 73. Signed by CASPA Committee of Support
57. The case of Brigadier José Berdichewsky, and Solidarity with the Arab Peoples; DAIA,
of the Chilean Air Force, is an exception. As Buenos Aires, Boletîn Informativo, No. 14.
one of the highest-ranking officers in the Air
Force, he served as the principal assistant to
a leading member of the military Junta, Brig.-
General Leigh.
58. Sebreli, op. cit., p. 248.
59. Politicians of Arab origin are largely re-
presented in the "Populist" Peronist movement.
After the 1973 election, Arab sources counted
26 members of Parliament and 5 Provincial
Governors (out of 20): Crónicas, Buenos Aires,
21 June, 1973.
60. The same Alberto Abdala visited Lebanon
where he was decorated by the Government with
the "Grand Cross of the Order of the Cedar".
Al Gurba, Mexico City, May 1968.
61. Ma'ariv, Tel Aviv, 6 October, 1972
62. OJI, No. 222, op. cit., 4 June, 1974.
63. Timmerman's pro-Israeli stand, combined
with support for Cuba, Socialist Chile, Peru and
the Vietcong, made him a target for threats
and accusations by the Right-wing "Nationalist
Motherland" elements, who described him as a
"Zionist-Communist", "Bolche (communist) to be
hanged"; and included the call: "Zionist to the
crematorium", signed: "Catholic anti-Zionist
Commando": La Opinion, Buenos Aires, 23 April,
1974.
64. OJI, op. cit., No. 8/74, 209, 5 March, 1974,
p. 61.
65. Idem, No. 42, 9 December, 1970, p. 2.
66. JC 31, Jerusalem, November 1972.
67. E.g., Youseff writing for Diario Fluminense,
Brazil, in 1969, and Karel Yorde for Panorama,
Maracaibo, Venezuela.
68. Closed down for. lack of funds after 45
years of publication.
69. The newspaper Nueva Jornada, Bolivia,
reproduced material originally published in
La Voz del Mundo Arabe, of La Paz.
70. Political statements opposed to "Interna-
tional Zionism" issued by the Comité de Solari-
dad Arabe Palestino Peruano was reproduced
in OJI, No. 72, 30 June, 1971. The announcement

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