FIRST DIVISION

[GR No. 46892. June 28, 1940.]

ANTAMOK GOLDFIELDS MINING

COMPANY , appellant , against COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, and NATIONAL LABOR UNION,
INC. , appealed .

Messrs. DeWitt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile on behalf of the

appellant.
Messrs. Paguia and Lerum representing the appeal, National
Labor Union.

SYLLABUS

1. COMMONWEALTH LAW No.

103; CONSIDENTIALITY; PURPOSES OF THE LAW; COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; JURISDICTION; EMPLOYED PATTERNS
AND EM. - Commonwealth Law No. 103 which, as its title indicates,
provides for the protection of the worker, creating an Industrial Relations
Court authorized to set a minimum wage for workers and the maximum
rent to be paid by tenants; to enforce the mandatory arbitration between
employers or landlords and employees or tenants, respectively, and
prescribes penalties for the violation of its decrees, it has been
promulgated by the National Assembly under the precepts contained in
article 5, Title II; Article 6, Title XIII; and articles 1 and 2, Title VIII, of the
Constitution of the Philippines.
2. ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; ID. - In compliance with these
constitutional precepts, the National Assembly enacted Commonwealth
Law No. 103 that creates the Industrial Relations Court which is a
special court with judicial powers (Pambusco Employees
Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, GR No. 46727; Ang
Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, GR No. 46496, concurring
opinion of Judge Jose P. Laurel). Article 1 of said law provides that the
Industrial Relations Court shall exercise jurisdiction to consider,
investigate, decide and settle any question, issue, conflict or dispute that
affects or arises between employers and employees or workers, and
between owners and tenants or sharecroppers, and for relations
between them, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the
law. Article 4 provides that the court will be aware, for the purpose of
prevention, arbitration, decision and adjustment, of any agrarian or
industrial conflict that motivates or leads to a strike or strike because of
differences that arise in the question of wages, participation or
compensation, hours of work or conditions of partnership or
employment, between employers and employees or workers, and
between owners and tenants or appear, provided that the number of
employees, workers, tenants or sharecroppers affected exceeds thirty,
and that the agrarian or industrial conflict is submitted to the court by the
Secretary of Labor, or by one or both interested parties, when the
aforementioned Secretary of Labor certifies regarding its existence and
the suitability of the intervention of the court for the public interest. And
Article 20 prescribes that in the hearing, investigation and resolution of
any issue or conflict, and in the exercise of any of its duties and powers,
the court shall act in accordance with justice and fairness and the
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal
formalities, and will not be subject to any technical rules of legal proof,
but will form judgment in the way it believes fair and equitable. Law No.
103 confers on the Industrial Relations Tribunal full discretionary power
to resolve and decide agricultural and industrial disputes in the manner it
creates fair and equitable, regardless of legal technicalities, and the
power thus granted is judicial and non-legislative, by which does not
violate the principle of separation of powers, the prohibition on
delegation of legislative powers or the equal protection before the
law. As stated in the Cincinnati, W. & ZR Co. case 103 confers on the
Industrial Relations Court full discretionary power to resolve and decide
agricultural and industrial disputes in the manner it creates fair and
equitable, regardless of legal technicalities, and the faculty so granted is
judicial and non-legislative, so it does not infringe the principle of
separation of powers, the prohibition on delegation of legislative powers
or the equal protection before the law. As stated in the Cincinnati, W. &
ZR Co. case 103 confers on the Industrial Relations Court full
discretionary power to resolve and decide agricultural and industrial
disputes in the manner it creates fair and equitable, regardless of legal
technicalities, and the faculty so granted is judicial and non-legislative,
so it does not infringe the principle of separation of powers, the
prohibition on delegation of legislative powers or the equal protection
before the law. As stated in the Cincinnati, W. & ZR Co.
casevs . Comm'rs, of Clinton County ([1852], 1 Ohio St., 88), cited in
Rubi's case against The Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Jur. Fil., 675),
"There is a real difference between delegating the power to enact laws,
which necessarily implies discretion as to what they should be, and
confer attribution or discretion to enforce them, discretion that must be
exercised in accordance with the law. The first cannot be done in any
way; against the second, there is no objection. "
3. ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; ID. - A simple reading of Article 20 of
Law No. 103 shows that the law has not empowered the Industrial
Relations Court to investigate and resolve issues and conflicts between
workers and employers, and tenants and landlords, in an arbitrary and
capricious manner without submit to a certain standard of conduct. The
article clearly states that the rules of procedure adopted, to which the
court must conform, should be inspired by justice and fairness, and
prescribes that the criteria formed should be based on the substantial
merits of the case without regard to technicalities or legal
formalities. Law No. 103 that creates a special tribunal called the
Industrial Relations Court with the power to issue its own regulations
and to resolve and decide agrarian and industrial disputes in accordance
with the dictates of justice and equity, cannot be challenged on the basis
that authorizes the deprivation of liberty and property without due
process of law; nor does it conflict with the precept of article 13, Title
VIII, of the Constitution because the Industrial Relations Court is not of
the same category as the municipal courts, peace courts and first
instance courts for which 108 the regulations of the courts have been
issued by the Supreme Court. cannot be challenged on the grounds that
it authorizes the deprivation of liberty and property without due process
of law; nor does it conflict with the precept of article 13, Title VIII, of the
Constitution because the Industrial Relations Court is not of the same
category as the municipal courts, peace courts and first instance courts
for which 108 the regulations of the courts have been issued by the
Supreme Court. cannot be challenged on the grounds that it authorizes
the deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law; nor
does it conflict with the precept of article 13, Title VIII, of the Constitution
because the Industrial Relations Court is not of the same category as
the municipal courts, peace courts and first instance courts for which
 108 the regulations of the courts have been issued by the Supreme
Court.
4. ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; COMMISSIONERS - The
commissioner was appointed by the Industrial Relations Court in the
exercise of his power conferred by Article 10 of Commonwealth Law No.
103 and in the inspection and hearings held by the commissioner and
the court, respectively, the parties were represented duly, they were
heard and presented the evidence they had available and thought it
convenient to offer. Such inspection and hearings had the character of
an impartial and fair judicial hearing and constitute the due process of
law that guarantees the Constitution.
5. ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; CONCLUSIONS OF FACT. - The
factual considerations that the Industrial Relations Court has established
demonstrate that the contested order is sustained by the result of the
investigation carried out by the commissioner and the evidence that the
parties presented directly before the Court. In these conclusions, all the
evidence submitted by the parties has been considered and analyzed by
the Industrial Relations Court and it is inevitable that the order is not
arbitrary and is justified and sustained by 108 proven facts.
6. ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; PAYMENT OF EMPLOYEE
DAYS. - The Industrial Relations Court, as has already been said, is a
special court and as such has the power to order the appellant to pay
the wages of its employees and workers that have been
replaced. Articles 1 and 4 of Commonwealth Law No. 103, as the first
one has been amended by Article 1 of Law No. 254, confer power and
jurisdiction to the Industrial Relations Court to hear, resolve and decide
all issues, controversies and disputes between employers and workers
and owners and landowners, and the wages of 108 replacement
workers, during the time they were separated from service,

DECISION

IMPERIAL , M p :

This is an appeal by certiorari filed by the appellant againstthe

order issued by the Industrial Relations Court on May 6, 1939 that
forced him to replace in his previous work or in others substantially
equivalent to the 45 workers listed in the petition of March 31, 1939 and
the 10 workers headed by A. Having been excluded indefinitely, within
10 days of receiving a copy of the order; to pay these 55 workers the
wages they should have received from the date of their suspension or
separation until their replacement; and pending resolution of the other
issues that the parties have submitted, the appellant refrains, under
penalty of contempt, of dismissing or excluding, without prior permission
of the court, to any worker or employee who was under his service at the
time when the dispute that is currently working in the mines or that is
replaced in his work in accordance with the order arose; Yagainst the
resolution of the same court of August 17, 1939 that denied the motion
for reconsideration of the appellant filed on May 26, 1939.
On December 12, 1938, the National Labor Union, Inc., in
representation of the workers and employees of the Complainant who
were members of said labor union, addressed a letter to the
Complainant requesting 21 claims in favor of its affiliates. The letter was
received by the appellant's office in Manila in an envelope stamped by
the Baguio post office on the 30th of the same month. The appellant's
officials called a meetingto their employees on January 2, 1939 and in
which they informed all their workers that some of the demands had
been accepted and had already been implemented, others would be
considered and the rest would be rejected because they were
unreasonable, and they were I advise that they not resort to violence
and observe legal methods in the settlement of their differences with the
appellant. On the night of the same day the workers and employees of
the appellant went on strike and abandoned their jobs. The Complainant
immediately reported this strike to the Department of Labor and
requested her intervention in order to resolve it. The Secretary of Labor
appointed Adolfo Umengan, Special Investigator of the Department, and
Eladio C. Leaño, Public Defender of the Montane Province, to intervene
and see how to solve the strike.

"FRIENDLY SETTLEMENT
"In order to have the present strike of the contractors
and laborers of the respondent company who staged a walk-
out on January 3, 1939, amicably settled, the parties hereby
mutually agree to end the said strike under the condition that
all laborers will be readmitted upon the execution of this
agreement; provided, that all laborers whose services should
 be dispensed with due to lack of work in those tunnels where
they are no longer needed will be given not less than fifteen
days employment from the date of this settlement or
resumption of work, and provided, further, that as soon as the
stopes in 1360 and 1460 levels are opened and the services
of men are needed,the company will give preference to
efficient laborers when reducing the personnel as above
mentioned in those working places and may transfer them to
other divisions to replace inefficient men. "
"In witness hereof, the laborers represented by a
committee composed of Messrs. Luis Lardizabal, Tomas
Dirige, Victoriano Madayag, Maximo Conaoi, Daniel
Lambinicio, and Juan Cerilo and the Antamok Goldfields
Mining Co. as represented by its President, Mr. Andres
Soriano , have hereunto placed their signatures this 4th day of
January, 1939. "
The agreement was signed by the parties on January 4, 1939, but
the workers did not show up until 9 am on the 6th of the same
month. The management of the appellant did not, however, allow any
worker to enter the underground section known as the "830 level" for the
reason that the air had become vitiated due to the strike and it was
necessary to renew it with pure air with the In order to avoid personal
misfortunes. This precaution was taken by the workers as a refusal of
the appellant to work again, so they went on strike again. The strikers
joined by sympathy the workers who worked in the mine called "680
division," which is another separate mine and located 3 kilometers from
the factory. Again the Department of Labor intervened and through the
mediation of Eladio C.
On January 9, 1939 the Department of Labor endorsed the dispute
to the Industrial Relations Court in accordance with Article 4 of
Commonwealth Law No. 103 and said Court held the first hearing of the
matter on the 13th of the same month in the City of Baguio In this
hearing, the 21 claims of the National Labor Union, Inc. were disputed
one by one, and an agreement was reached by the parties on some of
them, others were submitted to the Court's decision and the others were
left pending for be seen and resolved later.
On March 31, 1939, the majority of the aforementioned claims still
pending, the National Labor Union, Inc. appealed, filed a motion alleging
that foreman A. Haber and 9 other workers of the appellant had been
indefinitely suspended on the 29th of the same month; that these
workers had previously been transferred to outside jobs in order to
provide the appellant with an excuse to later separate them from
service; that another group of about 30 workers were dismissed by the
company for no reason and without authorization from the court; and
that the suspensions and separations that were made were acts of
revenge and discriminatory for the workers, for which reason it was
requested that the appellant's officials responsible for such acts be
punished for contempt and that the appellant be forced to replace the
workers in their primitive jobs within the mines and pay their salaries
corresponding to the period in which they were separated from the
service. The appellant answered the motion denying the imputed facts
and alleges that Haber and his 9 companions were suspended for their
continuous laziness during working hours and for having constantly
refused to work, and that the 45 workers headed by the Victorian
Madayag foreman were dismissed for having refused to point out those
responsible for the mistreatment of foreman Juan Moldero in the
morning of March 30, 1939. The motion was seen on April 3, 1939 and
at the hearing the parties presented their witnesses. The court appointed
one of its special agents to be constituted in the appellant's mines and
will conduct an investigation in order to supplement the facts that took
place during the hearing. After considering the evidence presented to
him and the facts found by the appointed commissioner, the court in its
order of May 6, 1939 declared the following facts proven:
"1. The discharges and indefinite suspensions alleged
in the motion were made by the respondent without first
securing the consent of the Court in violation of the order of
this Court of January 23, 1939."
"2. The discharges and indefinite suspensions were
made by the respondent without just cause."
In the same order, the Industrial Relations Court makes the
following considerations that support the conclusions reached:
"In the order of January 23, 1939, the respondent was
enjoined to refrain from discharging any laborer involved in the
dispute without just cause and without previous authority of
the Court. It appears and no denial of the fact is made by the
respondent that the dismissal in one case and the alleged
suspension for an indefinite time in the other, which has all the
effects of a discharge, were made without seeking the
authority of the Court. "
"The charge that Haber and the group of nine laborers
were indefinitely suspended because of continuous loafing
and refusal to work was not established. The real motive
behind the lay off was the completion of their work
'outside.' Under the circumstances, the provision of the order
of March 21, to the effect that these men should be returned
to their work underground after the completion of their work
'outside' should have been observed. The respondent instead
of complying with the order laid off the men. "
precluded their hearing or seeing clearly what transpired
above them in the place where Moldero was assaulted. An
ocular inspection of the premises made by the investigator
confirmed this view. So far as is known, despite the
investigations conducted by the officials of the company and
the policemen of the camp and by the constabulary authorities
in Baguio, the person or persons responsible for the stoning
has not been determined. The precipitate and unwarranted
dismissal of the forty-five men after the incident seems to
have been spurred by an over anxious desire on the part of
the company to get rid of these men. " despite the
investigations conducted by the officials of the company and
the policemen of the camp and by the constabulary authorities
in Baguio, the person or persons responsible for the stoning
has not been determined. The precipitate and unwarranted
dismissal of the forty-five men after the incident seems to
have been spurred by an over anxious desire on the part of
the company to get rid of these men. " despite the
investigations conducted by the officials of the company and
the policemen of the camp and by the constabulary authorities
in Baguio, the person or persons responsible for the stoning
has not been determined. The precipitate and unwarranted
dismissal of the forty-five men after the incident seems to
have been spurred by an over anxious desire on the part of
the company to get rid of these men. "
work was authorized by the Court in said order on the
strength of the assurance of the respondent that no more work
suited for them inside the mines existed. It was directed,
however, in the aforesaid order that as soon as their work
outside was completed the laborers should be immediately
returned to their respective work inside the
mines. Subsequent events and acts of the officials of the
respondent in charge of the mines have convinced the Court
that work existed and exists for the men inside the tunnels and
their transfers were made to provide an opportunity to the
company to dispense with their services as soon as the work
outside is completed. The unwarranted discharges of Haber
and nine others and those of Victoriano Madayag and his
forty-four companions amply demonstrated this
conclusion. Upon the company's own admission, as shown in
its reports in the records and upon the findings of the
investigator of the Court, more than four hundred (400)
workers of different classes among them, muckers, miners,
timbermen, trammers and foremen coming from different
mines in the region have been employed by the respondent as
fresh laborers. Almost all, if not all, of these men are not
members of the petitioner, the National Labor Union, Inc. "
"At the same time the work in different tunnels and
divisions in the mines are allegedly being completed, the old
workers are being laid off. Although a small number of the
men found transfer to other divisions being operated, the
majority are being left without work Instead of laying hands on
the old men laid off and making them work in the tunnels
needing hands and reinstating in the tunnel work those
laborers transferred to the 'outside' department, the
respondent preferred to take in and hire other workers coming
from different places because evidently they are not members
of the union. "

had worked for months and many for years in the mines
of the respondent and it can not be easily accepted that their
experience gained in their particular lines in the very property
of the respondent would be inferior to that attained by the
other workmen in other mines in the district for an equal
period of time. Their inefficiency as a whole group can not be
successfully sustained now because they were not transferred
to surface work for this reason but because of the alleged lack
of work or completion of their work underground. Had any of
them been inefficient in the past, it can not be explained why
such laborer continued in the service as the records of the
company abound with instances of discharges made in the
past of laborers who were found either inefficient or
incompentent or whose services were unsatisfactory. "
"The company asserts ignorance of the union affiliations
of the men in the mine but the evidence stands uncontradicted
that before the strike was called a petition was presented by
the men to the management carrying the signatures of about
eight hundred (800) workers demanding higher pay and better
working conditions. When the men struck, the operation of the
mine was completely paralyzed and there is a strong
indication that a great majority of the workers joined openly
the strike. It would not have been difficult for the respondent,
with the means at its command, to find for itself the employees
and laborers who remained loyal to the company and to
consider those who struck as either members of the union or
its sympathizers. "
"The respondent's claim as to the motive for the
suspension and discharges lacks substance and support in
the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it. From all
what appears, it is inferred that the respondent desires to
discourage membership in the union and to rout it if possible
The wholesale discharges were the expression of such desire
The acts in the mind of the Court are calculated to have two
effects They will not only immediately affect the discharged
laborers but would also discourage other laborers from joining
or remaining members of the union. "
"The allegation that it has always been the policy to
consider the laborer's connection with the company
terminated upon termination of the working place in which he
is employed is not supported by the facts. It has been shown
that as a general rule when work in a place is completed,
workers are transferred to another working place in one level
or to another level, although in some instances days may
elapse before all the men in a bunch can be absorbed in
different levels. "
 outside 'work are not wanting in experience, efficiency
and other conditions alleged to be found among the fresh
laborers. The special qualifications to do particular work can
not rightly be invoked in favor of the employment of new
laborers most especially in those cases of common or
unskilled labor like muckers, trammers, helpers, etc. "
"Under normal circumstances, the exercise of Judgment
of the employer in selecting men he is to employ should not
be interfered with. But when such judgment is arbitrarily
exercised to the prejudice of members of a labor union whose
rights should be safeguarded in consonance with the policies
of the law, the Court not only feels it justified but rightly its duty
to interfere to afford protection to the laborers affected. "
The appellant filed an extensive motion for reconsideration of the
said order, a motion that was denied by the resolution of August 17,
1939. The order of May 6, 1939 and the resolution of August 17 of the
same year are those that gave rise to the appeal filed by the appellant.
The appellant maintains that Commonwealth Law No. 103, as
amended by laws Nos. 254 and 355, is unconstitutional (1) because it
violates the principle of separation of powers; (2) because the National
Assembly abdicated its legislative power by violating the doctrine on
delegation of powers; (3) because the judicial powers conferred by law
to the Industrial Relations Court, considered separately, are arbitrary
and unreasonable and allow the deprivation of liberty and property
without due process of law; and (4) because assuming that the law is
valid and constitutional in its entirety, the portion, at least, of article 20
that provides that the Industrial Relations Court "adopt its procedural
regulations" it must be declared null and void because it violates article
13 of Title VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines that obliges the
Industrial Relations Tribunal to observe the general rules of procedure
applicable to the courts of justice. The appellant alleges in this regard
that since she has been subjected to an arbitrary procedure and
different from that applied to the other litigants in 105 courts of the
Philippines, she has been denied due process of law and the principle of
equal protection before laws.
Commonwealth Law No. 103 which, as its title indicates, provides
for the protection of the worker, creating an Industrial Relations Court
authorized to set a minimum wage for workers and the maximum rent to
be paid by tenants; to enforce the mandatory arbitration between
employers or landlords and employees or tenants, respectively, and
prescribes penalties for the violation of its decrees, it has been
promulgated by the National Assembly under the precepts contained in
article 5, Title II; Article 6, Title XIII; and articles 1 and 2, Title VIII, of the
Constitution of the Philippines that provide:
"ART. 5. The State shall take care to promote social
justice in order to ensure the welfare and economic stability of
all the people."
"ART. 6. The State shall protect all workers, especially
women and minors, and shall regulate the relations between
landlords and tenants, and between labor and capital in
industry and agriculture. The State may establish mandatory
arbitration. "
"ART. 1. The Judiciary shall be vested in a Supreme
Court and in other lower courts established by law."
"ART. 2. The National Assembly shall have the power
to define, prescribe and distribute the jurisdiction of the
various courts,..."
In compliance with the transcribed constitutional precepts, the
National Assembly enacted Commonwealth Law No. 103 that creates
the Industrial Relations Court which is a special court with judicial
powers (Pambusco Employees Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations et
al., GR No 46727; Ang Tibay et al. Vs. Court of Industrial Relations et
al., GR No. 46496, concurrent opinion of Judge Jose P. Laurel). Article 1
of said law provides that the Industrial Relations Court shall exercise
jurisdiction to consider, investigate, decide and settle any issue, issue,
conflict or dispute that affects or arises between employers and
employees or workers, and between owners and tenants or
sharecroppers, and to regulate the relations between them, in
accordance with and subject to the provisions of the law. Article 4
provides that the court will be aware, for the purpose of prevention,
arbitration, decision and adjustment, of any agrarian or industrial conflict
that motivates or leads to a strike or strike because of differences that
arise in the question of wages, participation or compensation, hours of
work or conditions of partnership or employment, between employers
and employees or workers, and between owners and tenants or
sharecroppers, provided that the number of employees, workers,
tenants or sharecroppers affected exceeds thirty, and that the agrarian
or industrial dispute is submitted to the court by the Secretary of Labor,
or by one or both interested parties, when the aforementioned Secretary
of Labor certifies regarding its existence and the suitability of the
intervention of the court for the public interest. And Article 20 prescribes
that in the hearing, investigation and resolution of any issue or conflict,
and in the exercise of any of its duties and powers, the court shall act in
accordance with justice and fairness and the substantial merits of the
case, without regard to technicalities or legal formulations, and will not
be subject to any technical rules of legal proof, but will form judgment in
the way it believes fair and equitable. Law No. 103 confers on the
Industrial Relations Court full discretionary power to resolve and decide
agrarian and industrial disputes in the manner it creates fair and
equitable, regardless of legal technicalities and formulations, and the
power thus granted is judicial and non-legislative , so it does not violate
the principle of separation of powers, the prohibition on delegation of
legislative powers or the equal protection before the law. As stated in the
Cincinnati, W. & ZR Co. case 103 confers on the Industrial Relations
Court full discretionary power to resolve and decide agrarian and
industrial disputes in the manner it creates fair and equitable, regardless
of legal technicalities and formulations, and the power thus granted is
judicial and non-legislative, so does not violate the principle of
separation of powers, the prohibition on delegation of legislative powers
or the equal protection before the law. As stated in the Cincinnati, W. &
ZR Co. case 103 confers on the Industrial Relations Court full
discretionary power to resolve and decide agrarian and industrial
disputes in the manner it creates fair and equitable, regardless of legal
technicalities and formulations, and the power thus granted is judicial
and non-legislative, so does not violate the principle of separation of
powers, the prohibition on delegation of legislative powers or the equal
protection before the law. As stated in the Cincinnati, W. & ZR Co.
case the prohibition on delegation of legislative powers nor the equal
protection before the law. As stated in the Cincinnati, W. & ZR Co.
case the prohibition on delegation of legislative powers nor the equal
protection before the law. As stated in the Cincinnati, W. & ZR Co.
casevs . Comm'rs, of Clinton County '1852), 1 Ohio St., 88, cited in the
Rubi et al. Case against The Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Jur. Fil.,
675, "There is a real difference between delegating faculty to enact
laws, which necessarily implies discretion as to what they should be,
and confer taxation or discretion to enforce them, discretion that must be
enforced under the law. The first cannot be done in any way; against the
second there is no objection. "

To reinforce the arguments in favor of the unconstitutionality of

Law No. 103, the appellant emphasizes what was resolved in the case
of Schechter v . United States (1935), 295 US, 496, 79 Law. ed. 270, in
which the Supreme Court of the United States declared the National
Recovery Act unconstitutional. There is, however, a marked difference
between that matter and that considered because the National Recovery
Act instead of creating a court of justice, I believe together with
legislative powers and I authorize the President of the United States to
promulgate codes prescribing the precedent rules in order to carry out
the purposes of the law.
The last basis that is alleged against the validity of Law No. 103 is
that the judicial powers granted to the Court of Industrial Relations are
so arbitrary and unreasonable that they allow the deprivation of liberty
and property without due process of law; and that its article 20, at least,
suffers from this fundamental defect because it confers on the Industrial
Relations Court the power to dictate its own rules of procedure, which
contravenes article 13, Title VIII, of the Constitution that prescribes that
the Tribunal The Supreme Court will issue rules concerning the writings
of uniform claims, practice and procedure for all courts of the same
category.
Article 20 of Law No. 103 reads as follows:
"ART. 20. Regulations of the Court . - The Industrial
Relations Court shall promulgate its rules of procedure and
shall have the other powers that generally correspond to a
court of justice: Understanding, however , That at the hearing,
investigation and resolution of any issue or conflict, and in the
exercise of any of its duties and powers under this Law, the
Court shall act in accordance with justice and equity and the
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities
or legal formulations, and will not be subject to any rules, legal
proof techniques, but will form judgment in the way it believes
fair and equitable. "
A simple reading of this article demonstrates that the law has not
empowered the Industrial Relations Court to investigate and resolve
issues and conflicts between workers and employers, and tenants and
landlords, in an arbitrary and capricious manner without subjecting to a
particular standard of conduct . The article clearly states that the rules of
procedure that it adopts, to which the court must comply, should be
inspired by justice and fairness, and prescribes that the criteria that is
formed should be based on the substantial merits of the case without
regard to technicalities or legal formulations. Law No. 103 that creates a
special tribunal called the Industrial Relations Court with the power to
issue its own regulations and to resolve and decide agrarian and
industrial disputes in accordance with the dictates of justice and equity,
cannot be challenged on the basis that authorizes the deprivation of
liberty and property without due process of law; nor does it conflict with
the precept of article 13, Title VIII, of the Constitution because the
Industrial Relations Court is not of the same category as the municipal
courts, peace courts and courts of first instance for which the regulations
of the courts by the Supreme Court.
In relation to the validity and constitutionality of Law No. 103 AND
ITS amendments, we then insert the concurrent opinion of Judge Laurel
in the matter of Ang Tibay, supra , whose observations will serve to
refute the proposed proposition that the said law and its Amendments
are valid and do not violate the Constitution.
"It should be observed at the outset that our Constitution
was adopted in the midst of surging unrest and dissatisfaction
resulting from economic and social distress which was
threatening the stability of governments the world over. Alive
to the social and economic forces at work, the framers of our
Constitution boldly met the problems and difficulties which
faced them and endeavored to crystalize, with more or less
fidelity, the political, social and economic propositions of their
age, and this they did, with the consciousness that the political
and philosophical aphorism of their generation will, in the
language of a great jurist, 'be doubted by the next and
perhaps entirely discarded by the third.' (Chief Justice
Winslow in Gorgnis v. Falk Co., 147 WiS., 327; 133 NW, 209.)
Embodying the spirit of the present epoch, general provisions
were inserted in the Constitution which are intended to bring
about the needed social and economic equilibrium between
component elements of society through the application of
what may be termed as the justitia communis advocated by
Grotius and Leibnits many years ago to be secured through
the counterbalancing of economic and social forces and
opportunities which should be regulated, if not controlled, by
the State or placed, as it were, in custodia societatis. 'The
promotion of social justice to in sure the well-being and
economic security of all the people' was thus inserted as vital
principle in our Constitution. (Sec. 5, Art. II, Constitution.) And
in order that this declaration of principle may not just be an
empty medley of words, the Constitution in various sections
thereof has provided the means towards its realization. For
instance, section 6 of Article XIII declares that the State 'shall
afford protection to labor, especially to working women and
minors, and shall regulate the relations between landowner
and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and in
agriculture.' The same section also states that 'the State may
provide for compulsory arbitration.' In extraordinary cases
mentioned in section 16, Article VI, of the Constitution, the
President of the Philippines may be authorized by law, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as the National
Assembly may prescribe, to 'promulgate rules and regulations
to carry out a declared national policy.' Albeit, almost at the
same time the Congress of the United States approved the
National Labor Regulations Act (49 Stat., 449) on July 5,
1935, commonly known as the Wagner Act, we were in the
Philippines headway towards the adoption of our fundamental
law, pursuant to congressional authority given in the Tydings-
McDuffie Independence Act, approved March 24, 1934. In our
Bill of Rights we now find the following provision 'The right to
form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged. ' (Par. 6, section 1, art. III, Constitution.
"By and large, these provisions in our Constitution all
evince and express the need of shifting emphasis to
community interest with a view to affirmative enhancement of
human n conformity with the constitutional objective and
cognizant of the historical fact that industrial and agricultural
disputes had given rise to disquietude, bloodshed and
revolution in our country, the National Assembly
enacted Commonwealth Act No. 103, entitled 'An Act to afford
protection of labor by creating a Court of Industrial Relations
empowered to fix minimum wages for laborers and maximum
rental to be paid by tenants , and to enforce compulsory
arbitration between employers or landlords, and employees or
tenants, respectively; and by prescribing penalties for the
violation of the orders' and, later,Commonwealth Act No. 213 ,
entitled, 'An Act to define and regulate legitimate labor
organizations.' (As to this last act, vide 'findings and policy,'
preamble [sec. 1] of the Wagner Act [49 Sta., 449]).
" Commonwealth Act No. 103, .approved October 29,
1936, was originally Bill No. 700 of the National
Assembly. More light is shed by the explanatory statement of
the Bill than by what transpired in the course of the
deliberation of the measure in the legislative chamber. 'The
present bill,' thus begins the explanatory statement of Bill No.
700, 'creates an Industrial Relations Board. . . and provides
mandatory arbitration. . . in accordance with Article 6, Title XIII
of the Constitution, which provides that 'The State may
establish mandatory arbitration. "" Incorporating the
conclusion reached by a committee appointed, a year or so
before it was observed that' under the legislation actual '"-
evidently referring to Act No. 4055 -' there is no adequate
instrument to avoid strikes. The Department of Labor merely
plays the role of peacemaker between the parties to the
dispute and their decisions are not binding on employers or
workers. The people have reached a level of industrial
development, which makes it imperative that government
intervention in these conflicts be more effective. . . ' The
creation of a Court of Industrial Relations was thus proposed,
endowed "not only of the power to arbitrate but also of the
duty to investigate, decide, and make recommendations on
the issues in conflict and the problems affecting Capital and
Work in Industry and Agriculture under the direction of the
President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines or at the
request of the Secretary of Labor. '
xxx xxx xxx
In the United States labor legislation has undergone a
long process of development too long to narrate here,
culminating in the enactments of what were commonly known
as the Clayton Act, the Norris-La Guardia Act, and finally, the
Wagner Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The
 Wagner Act created the National Labor Relations Board as an
instrumentality of the Federal Government in the settlement of
labor disputes, which device is aimed at the avoidance of
unnecessary friction between labor and capital and the
establishment of industrial peace. Scrutiny of legislation in that
country and of pronouncements made by its Supreme Court
reveals a continuous renovation and change made necessary
by the impact of changing needs and economic pressure
brought about by the irrisistible momentum of new social and
economic forces developed there.v. New York, 198, US, 45)
or in 1908 (Adair v. US, 52 Law. Ed. 430, 208 US, 161, and
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 US, 1) - cases which are relied upon
by the petitioner in its printed memorandum - still retain their
virtuality at the present time. In the Philippines, social
legislation has had a similar development, although of course
to a much smaller degree and of different adaptation giving
rise to several attempts at meeting and solving our peculiar
social and economic problems. ( SeeCommonwealth Acts
Nos. 37, 104, 139, 211; Presidential Message to the National
Assembly, September 2, 1936; Executive Order No. 49, S.
1936). The system of voluntary arbitration devised by Act No.
4055 of the defunct Philippine Legislature has apparently
been abandoned by the enactment of the aforementioned
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 103 and 213. In the midst of
changes that have taken place, it may likewise be doubted if
the pronouncement made by esta court in the case of
People v . Pomar (46 Phil., 440) - also relied upon by the
petitioner in its printed memorandum - still retains its virtuality
as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some
extent given way to the assumption by the government of the
right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with
public interests. "

xxx xxx xxx

"In Commonwealth Act No. 103 , and by it, our
Government no longer performs the role of a mere mediator or
intervenor but that of the supreme arbiter."
In its following error statement, the appellant alleges that the
conduct of the investigator, the investigation that he practiced and the
manner in which he learned of the matter, the Industrial Relations Court
deprived him of an impartial and fair view, and constitute deprivation of
his property without due process. Of law. In order to demonstrate the
lack of grounds for error reporting, we believe it is sufficient to reproduce
below the manner in which the investigation was conducted by the
commissioner appointed by the Industrial Relations Court and the
manner in which the hearing was held by said tribunal, as set forth in the
order of May 6, 1939.
"Hearing was held on April 3, 1939, where witnesses for
both the petitioners and the respondent testified. To
supplement the facts brought out at the hearing, the Court
ordered one of its Special Agents to proceed to the premises
of the mines to conduct a further investigation. "
The commissioner was appointed by the Industrial Relations Court
in the exercise of his power conferred by Article 10 of Commonwealth
Law No. 103 and in the inspection and hearings held by the
commissioner and the court, respectively, the parties were duly
represented , were heard and presented the evidence they had available
and thought it convenient to offer. Such inspection and hearings had the
character of an impartial and fair judicial hearing and constitute the due
process of law that guarantees the Constitution.
The appellant also maintains that the order of May 6, 1939 is
arbitrary because there is no substantial or competent evidence to
support it. On this point, the factual conclusions that the Industrial
Relations Court has established demonstrate that the contested order is
sustained by the result of the investigation carried out by the
commissioner and the evidence that the parties presented directly
before the Court. In these conclusions, all the evidence submitted by the
parties has been considered and analyzed by the Industrial Relations
Court and the conclusion that the order is not arbitrary and is justified
and sustained by the proven facts is inevitable.
The last error signaling is related to the part of the order of May 6,
1939, which provides that the appellant pay the 55 workers replaced the
wages they ceased to receive during their separation from service. The
appellant submits that this part of the order amounts to a sentence for
damages that the Industrial Relations Court cannot pronounce because
it lacks jurisdiction. The claim is not meritorious. The Industrial Relations
Court, as has already been said, is a special court and as such has the
power to order the appellant to pay the wages of its employees and
 workers that have been replaced. Articles 1 and 4 of Commonwealth
Law No. 103, as the first one has been amended by Article 1 of Law No.
254,
The appeal for certiorari is denied and the order of May 6, 1939
and the resolution of August 17 of the same year are confirmed, with the
appellant's costs. That's how it is ordered.
Avanceña, Diaz, Laurel, and Moran, MM., Are satisfied.
||| (Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No.
46892, [June 28, 1940], 70 PHIL 340-362)