Crim Digests (H-I)

H.
Multiple offenses/crimes
1. Recidivism (Article 14(9), 29, RPC)
2. Reiteracion (Article 14(10), RPC
3. Quasi-Recidivism (Article 160, RPC)
4. Habitual Delinquency (Article 22, 62, 160 RPC)
Cases:
(Yao)People vs. Bernal, GR No. 44988, 31 October 1936
Appellee: People of the Philippines
Appellant: Canuto Bernal
FACTS
1. Accused Canuto Bernal took without consent three game-cocks belonging to Elias Piamonte. It was
established that the accused had been thrice convicted of the crime of theft before the commission of the
present crime.
2. The trial court found accused guilty as charged and sentenced to 4 months and 1 day of arresto
mayor, with an additional penalty of 7 years for being a habitual delinquent.
ISSUES
1. W/N Should the aggravating circumstance of recidivism be taken into account in fixing the
penalty independently from the penalty provided for being a habitual delinquent? (YES.
Recidivism taken into account independently with HD.)
HELD
1. Recidivism is committed by a person who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been
previously convicted by final judgement of another crime embraced in the same title of the code.
2. The SC holds that it is wrong to assume that recidivism is twice taken into account when the
accused is declared a habitual delinquent.
3. Recidivism as an aggravating circumstance modifying the criminal liability is not an inherent or
integral element of habitual delinquency, which the RPC considers as extraordinary and special
aggravating circumstance.
4. Recidivism as viewed as an aggravating circumstance, is not a factor or element which is
necessarily forms an integral part of habitual delinquency. Therefore, recidivism may exist
independently from habitual delinquency in case a person is a habitual delinquent. In the case at
bar, the penalty of recidivism should also be taken into account independently from the fact that
the accused is also penalized for being a habitual delinquent.
DECISION
Judgement is modified. Guilty of Theft and sentenced to 6 months and 1 day of prision
correcional, and to an additional penalty of 3 years.
CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINION

Abad Santos, J.
Concurs that the accused is guilty of theft. Dissents that the penalty for recidivism should be considered
independently from the penalty of habitual delinquency. The aggravating circumstance of recidivism
should not be taken into consideration in the imposition of penalty prescribed by law for the crime of
which the appellant has been found guilty.
(Sungcad)People vs. Masonson, 63 Phil. 92 (1936)

People vs. Masonson
G.R. No. 44527
March 31, 1936
Ponente: Avaceña, C.J.
Facts
1. Respondent stole from Fausto Veloso, a leather wallet containing money worth P117.
2. The information charged him with the crime of theft. The information also alleged respondent to
be a habitual delinquent since it was his fourth conviction of a crime similar to theft. He pleaded guilty in
the arraignment.
3. The previous court sentenced respondent to 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional, and to
indemnify the offended part in the sum of P120 with an additional penalty of 6 years.
Issues
1. W/N respondent is a habitual delinquent?
Disposition
Wherefore, modifying the appealed judgement, sentenced to 2 months and 1 day arresto mayor,
eliminating additional penalty, affirming in all other respects.
Rationale
1. NO. The information alleges that it was respondent’s fourth conviction by final judgement of a
crime SIMILAR to theft. The word similar has no legal definition in the Penal Code and it is too abstract
in its general acceptation. There may be crimes similar in some sense, but were not ones enumerated in
law (Robbery, Theft, Estafa, Falsification, less/more serious Physical injuries). Alleging in the
information that he was already convicted four times of similar crimes is not sufficient to show that the
said crimes were precisely those enumerated by law.
2. Furthermore, the information alleges that his last conviction was on Sept. 9, 1935. The current
crime being charged was committed on Aug 6, 1935, which was prior to the last conviction. In order that
former convictions may constitute an element of habitual delinquency, they must precede the commission
of the crime charged.
3. The SolGen contends that if the allegations in the information relative to the former conviction
were insufficient to warrant the declaration of respondent as a habitual delinquent, they are at least
sufficient to constitute the aggravating circumstance of recidivism of reiteracion. The Court disagrees. In
order that former convictions constitute the circumstance of recidivism, they must arise from crimes prior
to the current one charged now, and there is no such allegation in the information.
4. The Appellants plea of guilty should be consider as a mitigating circumstance, and since there is
no aggravating circumstance present, penalty prescribed by law should be imposed in its minimum
period.
(Dy)People vs. Flores, 63 Phil. 443 (1936)

People v Flores 63 Phil 443
Petitioner: People of the PH
Respondent: Dominador Flores
Ponente: Villa-Real J.
(yo di na siya divided into facts etc kasi its literally 1 page long)
Case was an appeal of the judgment of CFI of Manila finding respondent guilty of frustrated theft and
sentencing him to 11 days of arresto menor + 2 years 4 mo. 1 day of prison correctional for being a
habitual delinquent.
He appealed that the court erred in sentencing him of principal penalty of 11 days for arresto menor. But
court found that in fact, consummated theft warranted arresto mayor, so since he was guilty of frustrated
theft, his penalty will be a degree lower: arresto menor. He had aggravating circumstance of being a
recidivist but was mitigated by circumstance of plea of guilt.
However, facts alleged were not enough to prove existence of habitual delinquency because neither dates
of former convictions nor commission of crimes of which he was convicted of were specified. Additional
penalty for HD cannot be imposed.
Judgment modified, penalty is reduced.
(Domingo)People vs. De Jesus, 63 Phil. 760 (1936)

No. 45198 October 31, 1936
FACTS:
Basilio De Jesus was convicted of theft by the CFI, having stolen an umbrella and a buri hat
amounting to P2.65. He was sentenced to one month and one day of arresto mayor, as well as the
additional penalty of 2 years, four months, and one day for being a habitual delinquent. The records show
that in January 1933, he was convicted of theft and in November 1935, he was convicted of qualified
theft, his date of release being January 10, 1936. The present crime, theft, is committed in the same year.
De Jesus admitted his guilt, and as such he also admitted him being a habitual delinquent. The
SolGen, however, argued that recidivism should also be considered, notwithstanding the fact that De
Jesus is a habitual delinquent. He argues that “recidivism can be and must be taken twice into
consideration against the appellant”.
ISSUES:
- W/N recidivism could be appreciated, notwithstanding the fact that De Jesus is a habitual
delinquent
RULING
- In habitual delinquency, recidivism is implied, because recidivism is one of those that
constitute habitual delinquency and give it existence, the other one being former conviction.
Therefore, inasmuch as recidivism is a qualifying or inherent circumstance in habitual delinquency, it
cannot be considered an aggravating circumstance at the same time.
(Domingo)People vs. Moran, GR No. 17905, 27 January 1923
No. 17905 January 27,1923
FACTS:
Juan Moran, Fructuoso Casino, and Hilario Oda were convicted of a violation of the Election
Law (defined and punished in Sec.2639 of the Administrative Code) on March 31, 1922, in a decision by
the Supreme Court. However, on March 9, 1922, Act No. 3030 was passed, Sec.71 of which provides that
“offenses resulting from the violations of this Act shall prescribe one year after their commission”.
On May 2, 1922, petitioners filed the present petition before the SC, saying that under the new
law, the crime has prescribed. This is because the crime was committed more than one year before Act
No. 3030 was passed.
ISSUES:
- W/N the offenses referred to in Sec. 71 of Act No. 3030 refers only to that Act (NO)
- W/N Art. 22 of the RPC (retroactivity of penal laws) can be applied to Act No. 3030 as a special
law (YES)
- W/N the crime has prescribed (YES)
RULING:
- 1st issue: Act No. 3030 is amendatory to several sections and parts thereof of the Election Law as
defined in the Administrative Code. As such, when Act No. 3030 refers to “This Act”, it
necessarily refers to the Election Law as found in the Administrative Code. The legislative intent
also points out that Act No. 3030, rather than being an integral part of the former election law, is
in conjunction with the latter the only election law in force.
- 2nd issue: This question is settled in US v. Parrone, where Art. 22 was applied. In that case, since
Act No. 2126 (a later law) provides for a more favorable penalty than Act 1189, the punishment
the court applied was that under Act No. 2126. The Court ruled that Art. 22, necessarily, cannot
be applied to the RPC. Hence, it can only be applied to subsequent laws insofar as the laws were
favorable to the accused. Neither can it be maintained that Art. 22 applies only to penalties and
not to procedure (like prescription), because the procedure is linked to the penalty. Furthermore,
Sec. 71 of Act 3030 is both a substantive law insofar as it gives the person a right not to be
prosecuted after one year has passed, and a procedural law, insofar as it sets the time for
prescription.
- 3rd issue: The crime was committed on December 20, 1920. The new law was passed on March
9, 1922. Clearly, more than one year has passed. As such, under Sec. 71 of Act 3030, the crime
has now prescribed. The accused must be RELEASED.
I. Circumstances affecting criminal liability

1. Justifying circumstances (Article 11, RPC)
a. Self-defense
b. Defense of relative
c. Defense of stranger
d. State of necessity
e. Duty or right
f. lawful order
Cases:
(Yao)People vs. Genosa, GR No. 135981, 15 January 2004
Appellant: Marivic Genosa
FACTS
1. The case at bar is an automatic review for the crime of parricide by Marivic Genosa.
2. Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15, 1995, attacked and wounded his husband
which ultimately led to his death.
3. According to the appellant, she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night and it
was her husband who began the provocation.
4. The appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make
sure she would deliver her baby safely.
ISSUES
1. W/N appellant acted in self-defense? NO.
2. W/N there was treachery in the killing? NO.
HELD
1. For the first issue, the SC held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense
arising from battered woman syndrome, to wit:
a. Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least
two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimated partner;
b. The final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced
in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an
honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life, and;
c. At the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable – not necessarily
immediate and actual – grave harm to the accused based on the history of violence
perpetuated by the former against the latter.
2. There was a resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or intent resulting from
her husband's actions. Pursuant to paragraphs 9 and 10 of Art 14 of the RPC, this circumstance
should be taken in favor of the accused as a mitigating circumstance. In addition, the court also
finds that an extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have
naturally produced passion and obfuscation is also present.
3. For the second issue, the SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating circumstance because the
quarrel or argument that preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of the assailant’s
aggression.
DECISION
The two mitigating circumstances must be taken into account which shall reduce the penalty by
one degree. Penalty imposed is prision mayor in its minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Appellant has already served the minimum period, she is entitled to apply and be released from detention
on parole. AFFIRMED.
(Dy)People vs. Santillana, 308 SCRA 104 (1999)
People v Santillana 308 SCRA 104
Respondent: Stephen Santanilla
Ponente: Melo,J.
Facts: Respondent and a certain Mario Bacamante were fixing a sink at the 2nd floor of their rented
house. Teresita Limpiado, wife of deceased, confronted Mario telling him to stop fixing the sink because
they will elevate their house and the sink being fixed will obstruct their house. Mario said they cannot
stop fixing the sink because they had permission from the owner of the house.
Thereafter, respondent went to the 2nd floor of his house and took a knife and some wires then went back
to the ground floor. Meanwhile, Wilfredo, the deceased, inquired what was going on. After Wilfredo
requested that the two stop from fixing the sink, respondent stabbed him with a knife. After this, he went
back to his house.
Police came to the scene of the crime and arrested respondent who gave himself up but said that he threw
away the knife he used to kill Wilfredo.
Respondent’s version states that he killed Wilfredo because he was lunging at him and he thought he had
no choice but to defend himself. TC did not give credence to this version stating that the means implored
to repel an alleged unlawful aggression used by respondent was way too much. Also, the TC found that
treachery was implored by the respondent, rationing that even if victim was stabbed frontally, the attack
was still sudden and unexpected and the victim was not armed.
Respondent appeals.
Issue:
Was there treachery? NO
Did victim voluntarily surrender? NO
Can respondents actions constitute self defense? NO
Held: Treachery was not proved. There was a lack the 2nd element of treachery which was that the means
of execution was deliberately adopted. Also, appellant did not know the Limpiado spouses; he couldn’t
have concocted to kill somebody he encountered for the first time. The court found that the incident
should have been a simple misunderstanding but was blown out of proportion because of the respondent’s
violent temper.
Voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated. His voluntary surrender must come spontaneously before his
arrest. And even if respondent claims that he instructed Mario to call the police, the fact that he threw
away his weapon goes against the voluntariness of his surrender.
And finally, the court did not find sufficient evidence to support the claim of self defense. Respondent
merely made up a version of the story to escape criminal liability.
Requested for self defense are: 1. Unlawful aggression; 2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; 3. Lack of sufficient provocation on part of the person defending himself.
The court found loopholes on the version of respondent’s accounts. There was no sufficient ground for
him to think that his life was in danger when Wilfredo ‘lunged at him.’ Also, the court said that aside
from using his knife to kill the victim, he could have just retreated to his house, or run away. Because of
his temper, he “descended to the beastly level of humanity” and killed the victim.
Decision: TC’s judgment is affirmed with modification. Respondent is GUILTY of crime of homicide.
Prision Mayor.
(Sungcad)People vs. Lara, 48 Phil 153 (1925)

People vs. Lara
G.R. No. L-24014
October 16, 1925
Ponente: Street, J.
Facts
1. Respondent, Gregorio Lara is convicted with homicide for the death of Cayetano Querido in the
CFI of Abra
2. On the evening of September 25, 1924, Querido, along with four companions stationed
themselves across the house of the respondent. Querido begins to entertain his companions by shouting
insulting remarks against Lara. These remarks were regarding that Lara’s concubine had found another
person.
3. Lara had a guest, Rufino Roque, from the Bureau of lands staying at his house for the night.
Roque had a revolver. When Roque went to sleep, he hung his revolver and his holster on a beam of the
house. After Lara’s patience wore out, he proceeded to take the revolver, and, as it was unloaded, loaded
2 bullets.
4. Upon Querido and his companions seeing Lara emerging from his home, they all scattered.
Querido and one companion heading eastward, and his other companions heading the other way. Querido
admitted to his companion that he was “going to smash [Lara].”
5. When Lara reached the street, he was surprised to find that the insulters had disappeared. With a
pistol in hand, he fired a warning shot into the air before proceeding eastward to where Querido hid.
When Lara passed the spot where Querido was hiding, the latter jumped out and threw his arms around
Lara in order to take possession of the revolver. Lara was able to free himself for a moment, and turned to
face Querido before the struggle for the revolver continued. In the course of the struggle, the revolver was
fired hitting Querido in the abdomen. Querido however still continued to wrestle for the revolver and
manage to wrap his arms around Lara’s neck, while calling out to Mariano Dolor, who lived nearby.
6. Roque, upon hearing the first warning shot, woke up to find that his revolver was missing. He
immediately proceeded to the scene of the crime where he saw the Querido’s arms wrapped around
Lara’s neck. However, in Roque’s attempt to regain possession of the revolver, Querido saw it as an act
of aggression and managed to wrap his other arm around the neck of Roque as well.
7. With Dolor finally arriving at the scene of the crime, he saw Querido with his arms around the
neck of the two, but he appeared to be leaning on them. Dolor took possession of the revolver, and all of
them went together to the municipal building. Querido died 3 days after.
8. Querrido made 2 statement. The first was made immediately upon arriving at the municipal
building before the justice of peace, which did not necessarily prejudice Lara, aside from the fact that it
stated that Lara did the shooting. And a second statement was made which stated that Lara shot Querrido
because the appellant suspected latter to have induced the concubine to find another man.
Issues
1. W/N Lara acted in self-defense?
Disposition
Decision Reversed, appellant acquitted.
Rationale
1. YES. Nothing in the statements show any light to the immediate circumstances of the shooting. The
failure of the declarant to state any act unfavorable to the accused, strongly confirms that the shot had
occurred while the two were struggling over the pistol. The contention was that upon Lara breaking loose
of the hold Querido had on him, any danger had passed and firing the pistol was not justifiable. The Court
opined that the struggle for the gun was continuous and that Querido was still engaged in gaining
possession of the revolver when he was shot.
2. There was no provocation on the part of the respondent, but there was provocation from the
deceased to induce the wrath of mind of any spirited person. When the deceased sprang upon the
respondent for the possession of the revolver, he had the criminal design to beat the respondent up.
3. There was reasonable necessity for the respondent to employ such means to repel the attack. The
darkness of night, the element of surprise, and the revelation of the intent to beat the respondent up
suggest that if the struggle continued without the firing of any shot, the deceased would have gotten
possession of the revolver and shot the respondent. The only means of preventing it was firing the pistol
for the purpose of defense.
4. The shot was fired in the course of the struggle. There was a contention that if he knew that the
revolver was unloaded, why did he continue to grapple for the weapon. To which the respondent replied
that he knew that if the deceased were to get the pistol, he would have used it as a cudgel to kill the
respondent. In US v Patala and US vs Molina, it was held that in the course of struggle, even though
the appellants were able to take possession of the weapon, the danger had not ceased, and therefor
using the weapon against the assailant is justified.
Opinion
Dissenting Opinion, Romualdes, J.
- The superiority of strength of the deceased was not proven. The evidence shows that the deceased, after
being wounded, was not holding on to Roque and Lara in an aggressive manner, to which Dolor stated in
his testimony that Querido was leaning on the two. It was still proven by evidence that Lara acted in self
defense, but it is incomplete.
(Doctor)US vs. Mojica, 42 Phil 784 (1922)

US v. Mojica
42 Phil. 784 / GR No. 17650 ; 15 February 1922
Ponente: Ostrand, J.
Facts:
Artemio Mojica, a Manila policeman was patrolling Calle Real within Intramuros where Constabulary
soldiers (including the deceased Crispin Macasinag) had gathered and started to provoke the officers.
Prior to this incident, there had already been a feud between the police and the constabulary. As police
reserves arrived to control the situation, Macasinag became more aggressive. After escaping the arrest of
the police, Macasinag charged at Mojica with a knife. Mojica took a few steps back and shot Macasinag,
effectively killing him. Mojica was sentenced to reclusion temporal and indemnity.
Issue:
W/N Mojica practiced self-defense? YES.
Ratio:
Art. 8 which enumerates the factors for an exemption from criminal liability includes self-defense
provided that (1) there is unlawful aggression, (2) there were reasonable means to prevent/repel it, and (3)
there was a lack of sufficient provocation on the defending party.
The unlawful aggression (on Macasinag's end) and the lack of provocation (on Mojica's end) is evident
and uncontested. The means to repel or prevent the attack on Mojica's part however is more hazy. While
it would have been possible for Mojica to just have evaded and escaped from harm (and in effect not
killing Macasinag), it would have been against his duty as a policeman. A policeman is expected to
counter such unlawful elements and not escape from it. Another contention was that Mojica could have
used his club. However, due to the lethality of the blade, it would have been unfair for Mojica to use non-
lethal force against a lethal one. Hence, the gunshot was sufficient and necessary to prevent/repel the
attack.
Ruling:
Trial court judgment REVERSED. Appellant ACQUITTED.
(Dela Rosa)People vs. Nugas, GR No. 172606, 23 November 2011

Ponente: Bersamin, J.
Facts:
Jonie Araneta y Nugas was charged with the murder of one Glen Remigio y Santos. Upon learning of the
identity of the co-conspirator of Araneta, the Prosecutor included Nugas as a co-principal. Both pleaded
not guilty. Trial proceeded against Nugas (Araneta changed his mind and pleaded guilty). Prosecution:
Glen and his family were traveling on board their family vehicle along Marcos Highway. They
accommodated two men, who suddenly brandished knives at them. Upon reaching Kingsville Village,
Glen was suddenly stabbed on the neck. The two men alighted and fled. He drove to the nearest hospital,
but ran over two pedestrians (one died) on the way.
Glen’s wife found the knife left behind by the assailants, which she turned over to the police. Glen died
due to the fatal stab wound on his neck. The wife identified Nugas as the person who had stabbed her
husband. Defense: Albeit admitting having stabbed Glen, he maintained that he did so in self-defense.
The vehicle driven by Glen was a passenger taxi and that when he and Araneta boarded it, about 4 other
passengers were already on board. He argued with Glen about the fare for overcharging, and that Glen
punched him and leaned forward as if to get something from his clutch bag. Thinking that Glen was
reaching for a gun inside the bag, Nugas stabbed Glen to protect himself. When asked why he carried a
knife, he said
that he needed it for protection because he was living in a squatter’s area.
Issue:
W/N Nugas stabbed Glen in self-defense? — NO.
Held:
To escape liability, the accused must show by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that:
1. the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to an actual or imminent threat to the life
and limb of the accused claiming self-defense;
2. there was reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression;
3. there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused claiming self-defense or at
least any provocation executed by the accused claiming self- defense was not the proximate and
immediate cause of the victim’s aggression.
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance of
self- defense. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the
aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the
peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. The three elements of unlawful aggression must be
established: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be
actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent
unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with
a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury.
Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not
consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and
positively strong. Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim.
Nugas did not credibly establish that Glen had first punched him and then reached for his clutch bag on
the dashboard, making Nugas believe that he had a gun there. He had not been subjected to either actual
or imminent threat to his life. He had nothing to prevent or to repel considering that Glen committed no
unlawful aggression towards him
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on March 8, 2006 finding MELANIO NUGAS y
MAPAIT guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
(Domingo)People vs. Mendoza, GR No. 133382, 9 March 2000

GR 133382 March 9, 2000
FACTS:
Anchito Nano, the deceased, approached Efren Mendoza’s wife Emily and asked her for a drink.
While Nano was talking with Emily, Efren hacked Nano with a bolo, which led to his death.
In his defense, Efren said that he hacked Nano because the latter was attempting to break into his
home and in fact wounded Efren’s son, Ernie. Efren argued that he was merely defending his home and
family when he attacked Nano. Efren’s defense was corroborated by his wife Emily and son Ernie.
The RTC rejected Efren’s defense due to material inconsistencies, and found him guilty of
murder. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was offset by the aggravating circumstance
of treachery. It sentenced him to reclusion temporal. Hence, this present appeal.
ISSUES:
- W/N Efren is guilty of murder (YES)
RULING:
- Efren invokes self-defense and defense of relative as justifying circumstances. Hence, he has
the burden to prove that Nano was an unlawful aggressor. This he failed to show. First, because at the
scene of the crime, Nano was not found to be in possession of any weapon whatsoever. Second,
Ernie’s testimony that he was attacked by Nano is inconsistent with Efren’s own. Ernie testified that
he lost consciousness right after he was attacked by Nano, while Efren said that he was alerted by
Nano’s aggression when Ernie ran up to him and said he was hit. Nano was also hit in the nape and in
the back. Such wounds cannot logically be inflicted by one who is defending himself.
- The RTC was correct in ruling that there was treachery. The victim’s lack of awareness of the
attack could be gleaned from the nature and location of the wounds.
- However, the RTC erred when it ruled that voluntary surrender was offset by treachery. This is
because treachery is a qualifying circumstance.
o NOTE: A qualifying circumstance changes the nature of the crime. For example,
treachery changes the crime form homicide to murder. On the other hand, a generic
aggravating circumstance does not affect the designation of the crime, but merely
provides to the imposition of the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. Thus,
while a generic aggravating circumstance may be offset by a mitigating
circumstance, a qualifying one may not.
- The proper penalty, therefore, should be prision mayor in its maximum period to reculsion
temporal in its maximum period. Also, Mendoza should pay P50,000 as indemnity and P30,000 as
moral damages.
(Yao)People vs. Moral, GR No. L-31139, 12 October 1984

Appellant: Renato Moral, et. al.
FACTS
1. Renato Moral, Alexander Moral are both principals while Leopoldo Pedrigosa and Abraham
Antonio are accomplices in the killing Teodoro Casa.
2. The 4 accused were drinking when fellow tenant Teodoro Casa complained to the owner of the
place about the commotion, after having failed to reason with the drunk accused himself.
3. The two Morals stabbed Casa with knives when the latter went out. After having stabbed Casa,
Leopoldo Pedrigosa hit Casa in different parts of his body while Abraham Antonio threw rocks at
the victim.
4. The trial court ruled that Renato Moral was a principal to the crime while Antonio and Pedrigosa.
Alexander Moral is still at large. The court ruled that death penalty be imposed upon all accused.
Renato died in Bilibid, hence the charge has been dismissed.
5. Abraham Antonio and Leopoldo Pedrigosa asserts that death penalty must not be imposed since
they are just accomplices.
6. Antonio also asserts that he cannot be guilty because he acted in defense of a stranger.
ISSUE
1. W/N defense of stranger is a valid defense for Antonio in the case at bar? NO.
2. W/N death penalty was correctly imposed? NO.
HELD
1. In order to provoke defense of stranger, one must prove unlawful aggression on the part of the
person injured or killed by the accused.; that there was a reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel the aggression, and that the person defending should not be
induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. It is clear from the facts that Antonio
has not satisfied these requisites.
2. The trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation,
nocturnity, abuse of superior strength, and intoxication in the case at bar. There was no evidence
to plan and kill the victim falling within the sufficient time elapsed that should have constituted
the element of premeditation.
3. Nocturnity cannot be present because there is no evidence that the accused purposely sought
darkness to carry out the crime.
4. Abuse of superior strength is not proven because it is already absorbed with treachery (which is
present in the case).
5. Intoxication in this case, contrary to the trial court, must be a mitigating circumstance.
6. The accused being accomplices, penalty lower than the prescribed for consummated felonies
should apply. Therefore, penalties for accomplices should apply.
DECISION
Judgement AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on accomplices Antonio and Pedrigosa.
(Dela Rosa)People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 (1943)

Ponente: Moran, J.
Facts:
Chief of Police Antonio Oanis and Corporal Alberto Galanta were instructed by the Constabulary
Provincial Inspector to arrest the escaped convict, Anselmo Balagtas, with bailarina named Irene, and if
overpowered, to get him dead or alive. Upon arrival at the place where Irene could be found, Oanis
approached and asked Brigada Mallare where Irene's room was. Brigada indicated the room and said that
Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Oanis and Galanta then went to the room and upon seeing a man
sleeping with his back towards the door, they simultaneously fired at him. Shocked by the entire scene,
Irene fainted. It turned out later that the man shot and killed was not Balagtas but an innocent man named
Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Oanis and Galanta can be held responsible for Tecson's death? YES
2. Whether or not Oanis and Galanta incur no criminal liability in the performance of their duty? NO
Held:
1. Yes. No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested
shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention. A peace officer cannot
claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary or unreasonable force in making an arrest.
Through impatience of desire to take chances, Oanis and Galanta have exceeded in the fulfillment of their
duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and
without making any previous inquiry as to his identity.
2. No. Oanis and Galanta are criminally liable. A person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the
fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are 2 requisites to justify this: (1)
the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office, (2) that the
injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the
lawful exercise of such right or office. In this case, only the first requisite is present.
(Dela Rosa)People vs. Retubado, GR No. 124058, 10 December 2003

Appellant: Jesus G. Retubado alias JESSIE
Ponente: Callejo, SR., J.
Facts:
Someone played a joke on Edwin Retubado, the appellant’s younger brother who was mentally ill.
Someone inserted a lighted firecracker in a cigarette pack and gave it to Edwin. While Edwin and his
father were having dinner, it exploded. The suspect was their neighbor Emmanuel Caon, Jr. The matter
was brought to the attention of the barangay captain who conducted an investigation.
It turned out that Emmanuel Caon, Jr. was not the culprit. The appellant, however, was bent on
confronting Emmanuel Caon, Jr. Thereafter, the father of Emmanuel Jr., 50 y.o., Emmanuel Caon, Sr.,
(pedicab driver) was confronted by Jesus when the former was on his way home. Emmanuel Sr. ignored
Jesus so the latter pushed the pedicab which nearly fell into a canal. Jesus followed Emmanuel Sr. to his
house. His wife, Rorberta Caon was in the balcony of their house, above the porch waiting for him to
arrive. Emmanuel, Jr., meanwhile, was already asleep.
Emmanuel Sr. demanded to know why he was being followed. Jesus told Emmanuel that he just wanted
to talk to Emmanuel Jr., but Emmanuel Sr. told the appellant that his son was already asleep. Roberta
went down from the balcony and placed her hand on her husband’s shoulder to pacify him. Jesus
forthwith pulled out a handgun from under his t-shirt and shot Emmanuel on the forehead. The latter fell
to the floor as the appellant walked away from the scene. Emmanuel was brought to the Tuburan District
Hospital, but he died shortly thereafter.
Jesus surrendered to the police but failed to surrender the firearm he used to kill the victim. Jesus
admitted shooting the victim but claimed that he was merely performing a lawful act with due care,
hence, cannot be held criminally liable for the victims death. He testified that when he insisted that
Emmanuel wake up his son, Emmanuel went to his room and emerged therefrom holding a handgun.
Jesus grabbed Emmanuel’s hand, they struggled for the gun but eventually, Emmanuel fell on his knees.
Jesus pulled the gun to the level of Emmanuel’s forehead, and the gun suddenly went off. Jesus then
rushed to his house to change clothes. He placed the gun on the dining table. When he went back to the
dining room his sister told him that their brother Edwin had taken the gun and thrown it into the sea. Trial
court convicted Jesus of murder, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
Issue:
1. W/N Jesus was merely performing a lawful act with due care hence, cannot be held criminally
liable for the victims death> — NO
2. W/N Jesus is liable for murder? No. Homicide only
Ruling:
The defense of a state of necessity is a justifying circumstance under Article 11, paragraph 3 of the RPC.
It is an affirmative defense that must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing evidence. By
admitting causing the injuries and killing the victim, the accused must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution. Whether the accused acted under a
state of necessity is a question of fact, which is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
There is no basis to deviate from the findings of the trial court that the appellant was the provocateur, the
unlawful aggressor and the author of a deliberate and malicious act of shooting the victim at close range
on the forehead. The court came to this conclusion based on:
1. Rorberta Caon’s testimony.
2. There is no evidence that the appellant informed the police authorities that he killed the victim in
a state of necessity and that his brother, Edwin, threw the gun into the sea.
3. The appellant had the motive to shoot and kill the victim.
There is no treachery in the present case to qualify the crime to murder. To appreciate treachery, two (2)
conditions must be present, namely, (a) the employment of the means of execution that give the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) the means of execution were deliberately
or consciously adopted. The prosecution failed to adduce an iota of evidence to support the confluence of
the above-mentioned conditions. The appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The appellant Jesus G.
Retubado alias Jessie is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of homicide defined in and penalized
by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of
ten (10) years of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion
temporal, in its medium period, as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the victim, Emmanuel Caon,
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
(Sungcad)Ty vs. People, GR No. 149275, 27 September 2004
Ty v People
G.R. No. 149275
September 27, 2004
Ponente: Tinga, J.
Facts
1. The mother and sister of petitioner, Vicky Ty, were confined in Manila Doctors Hospital, MDH.
The combined hospital bills racked up to P1M. Petitioner drew 7 post-dated checks in the amount of P30k
each.
2. MPH deposited the checks on their due date, but all were returned to the respondent due to
insufficiency of funds. MDH then sent demand letters to petitioner through registered mail, but the
petitioner ignored the letters. MPH then filed 7 informations charging petitioner for 7 violations of BP 22.
3. Petitioner’s defense is that she issued the checks because of an uncontrollable fear of greater
injury. The petitioner said that her mother was harshly mistreated in the hospital and would not discharge
her unless the bills are paid.
4. The TC ruled in favor of MPH and found her guilty of all 7 counts. The CA affirmed the
decision, but modified the fine to be twice the amount of each check per case (60k/case)
5. Hence, this petition.
Issues
1. W/N petitioner’s contention that the checks were issued under an uncontrollable fear prevents her
from becoming criminally liable under BP No. 22?
Disposition
Petition DENIED
Rationale
1. NO. Ty does not deny issuing the 7 postdated bad checks. Her only argument was that she issued
the checks out of an uncontrollable fear of greater injury. For this exempting circumstance to apply
properly there must be 3 requisites: (a) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (b) the fear must be real
and imminent; (c) the fear of injury is greater than or equal to that committed. The mere threat of a future
fear is not enough. There invoker must show that the compulsion was so great that it reduced him to a
mere instrument acting without/against his will. The fear that Ty is alleging is not imminent, but
speculative. She failed to show that her mother’s illness was so life threatening that her continued stay
would induce her death. She also failed to show the court that she was left with no choice but to commit
the crime.
2. Ty contends that the justifying circumstance of state of necessity (par. 4, Art 11, RPC) can apply
to this case. For this justifying circumstance to apply: (1) the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2)
the injury feared be greater than the one to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less
harmful means of preventing it. In the case at bar, the 1st and 2nd requisite are merely expected, and she
could have availed of other options than committing the crime. Moreover, for state of necessity to be
availed, the greater injury feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence or
the willful inaction of the actor. The bounced checks were brought about by Ty’s failure to pay her
mother’s hospital bills.
3. BP 22 is mala prohibitum. The act of issuing bounced checks is what is being punished. Intent is
immaterial.
(Yao)People vs. Sabandal, GR No. L-31129, 30 September 1971
Appellant: Jose Sabandal
FACTS
1. Jose Sabandal and Rogelio Saluper disembarked from their truck near a house where the victim
Claudio Oliveros was along with some others. The two asked whether there were any prostitutes
in the house to which Loreto Caban answered none.
2. Sabandal did not believe Oliveros and went on to search the house. Finding no prostitutes, he
along with Saluper engaged on a fistfight with the group of Oliveros. Sabandal then shot Oliveros
and the group of the latter dispersed.
3. Sabandal and Saluper also left the scene. Oliveros was still able to provide an ante-mortem
statement and account of what happened before he died of his wounds.
4. The court ruled that Saluper may only be liable for slight physical injuries against Oliveros, since
Sabandal shot the latter and there was no conspiracy. Sabandal invokes having acted in
fulfillment of his duty as a police officer as his defense against the charge of murder.
ISSUES
1. W/N Sabandal is entitled to the justifying circumstance of having acted in fulfillment of a duty or
in the lawful exercise of a right or office? NO.
HELD
1. A public official must act in lawful exercise of the position he holds. It must be evident that
Sabandal is acting in such capacity, otherwise a plea is unavailing. This case is not one of lawful
exercise nor is it in fulfillment of duties.
2. Evidence speaks in no uncertain terms that Sabandal figured in a brawl arising from an incident
in no wise connected with the performance of a function vested in him by law. No other
conclusion is justifiable in the light of the facts disclosed. Such defense was rightfully rejected.
DECISION
Sabandal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder punished by reclusion perpetua.
AFFIRMED.
(Sungcad)Pomoy vs. People, GR No. 150647, 29 September 2004

Pomoy v People
G.R. No. 150647
September 29, 2004
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
Facts
1. The victim, Tomas Balbao, was a suspect of a previous robbery. He was arrested in the morning
of Jan 4, 1990. He was then brought to the Philippine Constabulary Company headquarters in Camp
Jalandoni, where he was detained.
2. At 2pm the same day, the petitioner went to the cell of Balbao in order to bring him to the
investigation room, which was in another building about 50ft away, to be interrogated. Upon reaching the
door of the building, the petitioner felt someone trying to grab his gun which was holstered around his
waist. He found that it was Balbao who tried to take his gun. The two grappled for the gun. While in the
course of grappling, 2 shots were fired that his Balabao in the abdominal area. He died on the spot.
3. The TC and CA convicted petitioner of homicide. The CA anchored its decision on the facts that
(1) the gun had been in the control of the petitioner when the shots were fired, (2) the gun had been
locked before the grabbing incident (meaning the petitioner released the safety before firing), and (3) that
the location of the wounds did not support that there was a grappling. Moreover, the fact that the gun was
fired twice in two parts of the body and from different angles (1 in the chest-downward, 1 near the
stomach-upward) shows that there was intent to kill the victim.
4. Hence, the current petition
Issues
1. W/N the shooting of Tomas Balbao was the result of an accident?
2. W/N petitioner was able to prove self-defense?
Disposition
Petition GRANTED
Rationale
1. YES. Accident is an exempting circumstance under Art 12(4) of the RPC which states that any
person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault
or intent in causing it. The elements of accident can be derived from the statement: (1) accused was
performing a lawful act; (2) resulting injury was caused by accident; (3) no fault/intent on the part of
the accused. All these elements are present. First, the petitioner is one of the investigators of the PNP. He
was in lawful performance when he went to fetch the deceased as an order from his superior. The
petitioner was also in lawful performance when he tried to defend his possession of the weapon. Second,
the petitioner exercised all necessary precautions from his firearm from causing accidental discharges,
and that he kept it inside his holster at all times. Third, at no instance did the petitioner testify to any
intent to cause injury to the victim, also testimonies did not state any behavior of the petitioner that would
indicate such intent.
2. N/A. Self-defense is inconsistent with Accident because it presumes that there is a premeditated
intent to kill to save oneself from imminent danger. The fatal shots in this case did not occur out of
conscious effort.
3. The eyewitness account of Erna Basa, which stated that she saw the hands of petitioner and Balbao
on the gun, and that they grappled for it, whereby she explicitly stated that the two did not remain still but
their positions kept changing, demonstrates that the petitioner did have control of the gun during the
grappling. Balbao pertinently tried to gain possession of the gun. Therefore there is no firm basis that
the petitioner was in full control of the gun.
4. Regarding the CA’s 2nd basis, as stated in the eye witness account, the grappling took place very
quickly, but with the two men frenzying for the possession of the gun. In the course of event, it is entirely
logical to assume that the safety mechanism may have been accidentally released in the grappling.
Furthermore, the 2 gun shots does not necessarily negate conclusively that the shooting was accidental.
The gun was a .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol that can shoot in succession to some extent. The
petitioner maintained that the shots were fired in the course of the struggle.
5. In the factual context of the present case, the locations of the wounds become inconsequential.
During the struggle the position of the nozzle may continuously change, such that the trajectory of the
bullet becomes unpredictable.
(Doctor)Andal vs. People, 27 SCRA 608 (1969)

Andal v. People
GR No. L-29814 ; 28 March 1969
Ponente: Fernando, J.
Facts*:
Agapito Escaro, Domingo Largo, Teofilo Cal, Primo Arceo, Bartolome Arceo, Martin Arceo, and Santos
Andal were found to be guilty of the crime of offending religious feeling (as defined and penalized under
Art.133 to be acts offending religious feelings/feelings of the faithful) for burying the wife (of one of the
petitioners) in compliance with the Revised Administrative Code which imposes a duty on the widower to
bury the remains of his deceased wife within 48 hours. The wife can be assumed to be buried in a
cemetery or place wherein the religious feelings of some people were presumably offended.
The petitioners filed for a motion for reconsideration citing the RAC.
Issue:
W/N the act in question may fall under the justifying circumstances? Yeaaanoooope. (u will understand
soon)
Ratio:
The court held that the contentions of the petitioners are not entirely devoid of merit for there is a legal
duty cast on the survivor to bury the remains of the deceased within a definite period and there being only
one cemetery, it could be asserted with a degree of plausibility that the performance of such legal duty
cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution. However, the fact that petitioners took the law in their own
hands by employing force cannot be viewed with sympathy as this would make the rule of law
meaningless. If any effort coming from whatever quarter even under stress of provocation, in defiance of
legal norms, by the employment of force (except for legitimate instances such as self-defense) were
treated as irreprehensible, then the laws will have no purpose.
Ruling:
MR DENIED.
*The facts were in Spanish so I cannot identify exactly what unlawful act they did.
2. Exempting circumstances (Article 12, RPC)

a. Insanity
b. Minority (RA 9344)
c. Accident
d. Irresistible force/fear
e. Insuperable cause
Cases:
(Domingo)People vs. Casillar, GR No. L-28132, 25 November 1969
GR No. L-28132 November 25, 1968
FACTS:
Danilo Nicolas testified that Fortunato Casillar, Rogelio Amita, Dominico Armalda, and a John
Doe (who was soon identified as Celso Puzon, a minor and hence was excluded in the SC proceedings)
robbed and subsequently killed Chan Siak, a Chinaman. Casillar, Amita, and Armalda were apprehended,
were they confessed that they received shares of P50, P75 and P50 respectively. They also identified the
corpse of Chan Siak at the funeraria. The CFI soon found the three men guilty of robbery with homicide.
The trial court found that the crime was aggravated by abuse of superior strength, and and sentenced them
to death. Hence, this petition is before the SC for automatic review.
For their defense, they said that Danilo Nicolas is not a trustworthy witness, and that they were
manhandled by police to extricate their confessions. They interposed alibi as their defense. Furthermore,
they claimed that illiteracy should be considered a mitigating circumstance.
ISSUES:
- W/N the CFI is correct in finding them guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide (YES)
- W/N any mitigating circumstance is present (NO)
RULING:
- The minor inconsistencies with Danilo’s testimony (like the date of the incident) does not
discredit the fact that he positively identified the men as the perpetrators, and that he managed to give
a clear and convincing account of what happened. As for the defense of alibi, suffice to say that such
a defense is weak, because they did not show that it was impossible for them to be at the scene of the
crime.
- The CFI correctly ruled that the crime was aggravated by abuse of superior strength, there
being four men who are all armed with knives. As for illiteracy, it cannot be appreciated as a
mitigating circumstance. It is not illiteracy alone, but rather lack of sufficient knowledge and
intelligence, which counts as a mitigating circumstance.
- CFI ruling is UPHELD, the three men are sentenced to DEATH, and ordered to pay civil
indemnity of P12,000.
(Dy)People vs. Pambid, GR No. 124453, 15 March 2000

People v Pambid GRNo. 124453
Respondent: Joseph Pambid
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
Facts: The case involves 2 instances of statutory rape, where respondent Joseph Pambid raped a 6 year
old grade 1 student, Maricon Grifaldia.
On first instance, Joseph brought the minor to his house and at knifepoint, threatened her to remove her
clothes and proceeded to finger her and forcibly have sexual intercourse but was interrupted when his
mom came home and asked why his room was locked. On the second occasion, he took her to his aunt’s
house he proceeded to rape her.
It took some time for Maricon to tell her parents what happened. When she did she underwent medical
examination and found that she was a non-virgin. At the same time, respondent was arrested; he never
testified but was represented by his parents. The defense presented denial, alibi, and plea of insanity.
His parents presented that the was actually at Fairview, QC working as a meat vendor. Also, they
presented medical reports presenting that respondent suffered from “Insanity or Psychosis classified
under Schizophrenia” and “Mental Retardation.”
But based on evidence, the trial court rendered decision that found Pambid guilty of 2 counts of rape and
was sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetual +50K cost for each count of rape.
Respondent appealed saying that 1. Maricon had differing statements in her testimony, 2. That he had an
alibi. 3. That respondent was exempt from criminal liability because he was insane.
Issue:
Were there contention on Maricon’s statements? NO
Was the alibi admissible? NO
Was respondent exempt from criminal liability because he was insane? NO
Held: The alleged discrepancy concerns mere matters of details which can be expected to happen when a
young girl, aged six and inexperienced, is asked to narrate in court how she was violated. The testimony
of rape victims who are young and immature deserves full credence
Alibi was belied by both cross-examination and by the statements of respondent’s father.
The court found the respondent’s plea of insanity unacceptable. Art. 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code
provides that an imbecile or insane person is exempt from criminal liability, unless he has acted during a
lucid interval. However, he has the burden to prove such. On both instances of rape, he was found to be
fully conscious of what he was doing. Psychiatric examinations and the statements of respondent’s
parents stating that he was insane are not enough grounds to prove that he was deprived of reason when
he raped Maricon.
In addition: only one information of rape was filed against the respondent. The Constitution specifically
provides that the accused must "be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.”
Therefore even if there were 2 instances of rape, he can only be convicted for one.
Decision: RTC decision is SET ASIDE. SC finds Joseph Pambid guilty of count of rape.
(Doctor)People vs. Banez, 301 SCRA 248 (1999)

People v. Banez
GR No. 125849 ; 20 January 1999
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
Facts:
Wilfredo Banez stabbed his father to death after years of tension due to the accused's alleged alcoholism.
20 days after the commission of the crime, the defendant consulted a medical officer of the NCMH, Dr.
Gerona. It was shown through the testimony of the defendant's mother that the he had been confined at
the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center for 2 years for his gasoline addiction. He was also diagnosed by Dr.
Gerona to be schizophrenic. They were contending that his insanity should exempt him from criminal
liability.
Issue:
W/N the defendant's case falls under insanity as stated in Art. 12? NO.
Ratio:
Jurisprudence provides that insanity must deprive the person from using his reason and intelligence (test
of cognition) to constitute an absence in responsibility for his acts. There must be a complete absence of
the power to discern or total deprivation of freedom (test of volition). A mere abnormality in mental
capacity does not constitute insanity.
The defense must also prove beyond reasonable doubt the existence of such mental condition. In this
case, Dr. Gerona actually admitted that the defendant was apparently in good mental condition due to his
release from the rehabilitation center. Dr. Gerona couldn't have also testified regarding the existence of
insanity prior/during the crime since he only met and treated/examined the defendant after the incident.
Ruling:
RTC decision (parricide) AFFIRMED.
(Sungcad)Llave vs. People, 438 SCRA 376 (2006)

Llave v People
G.R. No. 166040
April 26, 2006
Ponente: Callejo, SR., J.
Facts
1. Petitioner was 12 years old at the time when he raped Debbielynn Santos, who was 7 years old at
that time.
2. Debbielyn was going walking to her mother’s store, while on her way she was met by the
petitioner who grabbed her and brought her behind a hollow block wall and proceeded to rape her.
Debbielyn cried in pain until Teofisto, a resident nearby heard and saw the petitioner on top of the victim.
Who fled the scene, immediately. Teofisto instructed the 7 year old to tell her parents what had happened.
The parents brought her to get checked up by a doctor.
3. The petitioner was found in his grandmother’s house and was brought to the police station.
4. The TC and CA found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape; however, since he is a
minor, the TC order him a penalty of prision mayor in its minimum, 6 years and 1 day to 8 years.
Subsequently, the CA modified the penalty to be prision coreccional in its medium, 2 years and four
months to 8 years and 1 day.
5. Hence this petition.
Issues
1. W/N the petitioner acted with discernment?
Disposition
Petition DENIED
Rationale
1. YES. Article 12(3) states that a person over nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from
criminal liability unless he acted with Discernment. Discernment is the mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong. In the current case, the petitioner dragged the resisting victim behind
a pile of hollow blocks near a vacant house to ensure that they won’t be discovered, this proves that the
petitioner knew of the nature of his act, and decided to take the necessary steps to conceal it. When they
were discovered, the petitioner hastily fled and hid in his grandmother’s home proves that the petitioner
knew of the gravity of his act, and the consequences thereof. Furthermore, the mere fact that the petitioner
has stated that he is an outstanding student in school strengthens the conclusions.
(Sungcad)Pomoy vs. People, GR No. 150647, 29 September 2004

Pomoy v People
G.R. No. 150647
September 29, 2004
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
Facts
1. The victim, Tomas Balbao, was a suspect of a previous robbery. He was arrested in the morning
of Jan 4, 1990. He was then brought to the Philippine Constabulary Company headquarters in Camp
Jalandoni, where he was detained.
2. At 2pm the same day, the petitioner went to the cell of Balbao in order to bring him to the
investigation room, which was in another building about 50ft away, to be interrogated. Upon reaching the
door of the building, the petitioner felt someone trying to grab his gun which was holstered around his
waist. He found that it was Balbao who tried to take his gun. The two grappled for the gun. While in the
course of grappling, 2 shots were fired that his Balabao in the abdominal area. He died on the spot.
3. The TC and CA convicted petitioner of homicide. The CA anchored its decision on the facts that
(1) the gun had been in the control of the petitioner when the shots were fired, (2) the gun had been
locked before the grabbing incident (meaning the petitioner released the safety before firing), and (3) that
the location of the wounds did not support that there was a grappling. Moreover, the fact that the gun was
fired twice in two parts of the body and from different angles (1 in the chest-downward, 1 near the
stomach-upward) shows that there was intent to kill the victim.
4. Hence, the current petition
Issues
1. W/N the shooting of Tomas Balbao was the result of an accident?
2. W/N petitioner was able to prove self-defense?
Disposition
Petition GRANTED
Rationale
1. YES. Accident is an exempting circumstance under Art 12(4) of the RPC which states that any
person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault
or intent in causing it. The elements of accident can be derived from the statement: (1) accused was
performing a lawful act; (2) resulting injury was caused by accident; (3) no fault/intent on the part of
the accused. All these elements are present. First, the petitioner is one of the investigators of the PNP. He
was in lawful performance when he went to fetch the deceased as an order from his superior. The
petitioner was also in lawful performance when he tried to defend his possession of the weapon. Second,
the petitioner exercised all necessary precautions from his firearm from causing accidental discharges,
and that he kept it inside his holster at all times. Third, at no instance did the petitioner testify to any
intent to cause injury to the victim, also testimonies did not state any behavior of the petitioner that would
indicate such intent.
2. N/A. Self-defense is inconsistent with Accident because it presumes that there is a premeditated
intent to kill to save oneself from imminent danger. The fatal shots in this case did not occur out of
conscious effort.
3. The eyewitness account of Erna Basa, which stated that she saw the hands of petitioner and Balbao
on the gun, and that they grappled for it, whereby she explicitly stated that the two did not remain still but
their positions kept changing, demonstrates that the petitioner did have control of the gun during the
grappling. Balbao pertinently tried to gain possession of the gun. Therefore there is no firm basis that
the petitioner was in full control of the gun.
4. Regarding the CA’s 2nd basis, as stated in the eye witness account, the grappling took place very
quickly, but with the two men frenzying for the possession of the gun. In the course of event, it is entirely
logical to assume that the safety mechanism may have been accidentally released in the grappling.
Furthermore, the 2 gun shots does not necessarily negate conclusively that the shooting was accidental.
The gun was a .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol that can shoot in succession to some extent. The
petitioner maintained that the shots were fired in the course of the struggle.
5. In the factual context of the present case, the locations of the wounds become inconsequential.
During the struggle the position of the nozzle may continuously change, such that the trajectory of the
bullet becomes unpredictable.
(Yao)People vs. Fernando, GR No. L-24781, 29 May 1970

Appellant: Marivic Genosa
FACTS
1. The case at bar is an automatic review for the crime of parricide by Marivic Genosa.
2. Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15, 1995, attacked and wounded his husband
which ultimately led to his death.
3. According to the appellant, she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night and it
was her husband who began the provocation.
4. The appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make
sure she would deliver her baby safely.
ISSUES
1. W/N appellant acted in self-defense? NO.
2. W/N there was treachery in the killing? NO.
HELD
1. For the first issue, the SC held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense
arising from battered woman syndrome, to wit:
a. Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least
two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimated partner;
b. The final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced
in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an
honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life, and;
c. At the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable – not necessarily
immediate and actual – grave harm to the accused based on the history of violence
perpetuated by the former against the latter.
2. There was a resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or intent resulting from
her husband's actions. Pursuant to paragraphs 9 and 10 of Art 14 of the RPC, this circumstance
should be taken in favor of the accused as a mitigating circumstance. In addition, the court also
finds that an extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have
naturally produced passion and obfuscation is also present.
3. For the second issue, the SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating circumstance because the
quarrel or argument that preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of the assailant’s
aggression.
DECISION
The two mitigating circumstances must be taken into account which shall reduce the penalty by
one degree. Penalty imposed is prision mayor in its minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Appellant has already served the minimum period, she is entitled to apply and be released from detention
on parole. AFFIRMED.
(Dela Rosa)People vs. Borja, GR No. L-22947, 12 July 1979

People v Borja
GR No. L-22947
July 12, 1979
Ponente: Abad Santos, J.
Facts:
On 18 December 1958, the Anderson Fil-American Guerrillas (AFAG) held a general meeting at the
bahay-pulungan of the religious sect known as Watawat Ng Lahi at Barrio Buragwis, Legaspi City. The
locale of the meeting was so chosen because many AFAG members are also Watawat members. One of
the accused, Pedro Borja, presided over the meeting, which was attended by more than a 100 members,
announcing that their backpay was forthcoming at the rate of P36,000 for a ranking officer, and a lesser
amount for those of lower rank. Borja, who has the rank of a full colonel, is the AFAG head for the entire
Bicol region, which is said to have 36,000 members. When the meeting ended, Borja called an exclusive
conference among selected officers and members, including Rufino Pavia, Inocencio Demen, Pedro
Fustigo, Felipe Benavides, Dominador de los Santos, Alejo Balimbing, and Tito Oljina. At the secret
meeting, Balimbing proposed to Borja that they conduct a raid the following morning at the Hacienda San
Miguel, located at San Miguel Island, across the bay from Tabaco, Albay. With the conference over, all 8
men slept in the bahay-pulungan. When they woke up the next day, the 8 men held an early-morning
conference, with Balimbing airing to Borja his grievances against Santiago Gancayco, Jr. the manager of
the hacienda. That same morning, the 8 men left by bus for Tabaco, via Legaspi City. In Tabaco, the
group went to Barrio San Jose. Upon Borja's instruction, Balimbing hired a motorboat operated by
Mariano Burac.
Crossing the bay, the group disembarked at the hacienda, and at a seashore conference, they agreed to
pose as members of the Philippine Constabulary, ostensibly on a mission to inspect the firearms of the
hacienda. Borja herded the men of the hacienda inside the bodega, where they were guarded by Benavides
and Fustigo. Therein, Balimbing accused Gancayco of killing Balimbing's cousin, and demanded that
Gancayco produce the .45 caliber pistol which he claimed was used to perpetrate the death. Gancayco
explained that it was not he but Solon Demetrio who accidentally shot Balimbing's cousin, and that
Gancayco had no such pistol. Pavia, as well as Demen, fired upon Gancayco. Demen aimed rapid fire at
Salustiano Isorena, the hacienda overseer, who fell flat on the balcony floor. Gancayco, bloodied, rushed
out of the bodega. He was pursued by the gunmen. While the pursuers tracked their prey, Emilio Lanon, a
security guard and barrio lieutenant of the hacienda, left the bodega by the back door and went to
Gancayco's house, where Mrs. Gancayco instructed him to close all the windows and take the children
downstairs, to which he complied. Lanon left the house and looked for Gancayco whom he found in the
abaca plantation. Gancayco, his wife, and children, Isorena, and some other personnel of the hacienda,
were able to rendezvous at the seashore. They got into a waiting motorboat and sped away towards
Tabaco, in the hope of taking the wounded men to the hospital there. Gancayco died enroute, in the arms
of his wife.
While events unfolded on Tabaco Bay, the group of 8 men reached the seashore and chanced upon a
motorboat anchored there. When they discovered that the motorboat did not have enough gasoline, they
looked for another and dragooned Bienvenido Taller into transporting them. The men alighted at the
lighthouse at Malinao and immediately afterwards, Taller reported to the police authorities of the town.
However, he was advised to report to the police authorities of Tabaco, who had jurisdiction over the case.
The 8 men reached the poblacion of Malinao. Borja instructed Pavia and Demen to make their separate
way towards Barrio Buragwis. The remainder of the group boarded a passenger bus going to Tiwi. As the
bus stopped near the market at Tiwi, another car overtook it and policemen from Tabaco, headed by Chief
of Police Ceferino Firaza, alighted and surrounded the bus. Firaza in a loud voice called for the surrender
of all those in the bus responsible for the killing at the Hacienda San Miguel. He was suddenly fired upon
by Borja and then by Balimbing. The fusillade hit him on the right cheek, and he ordered his men to
return fire. The encounter resulted in the death of Balimbing and Oljina; the capture of Benavides and de
los Santos; and the escape of Borja and Fustigo. The encounter in Tiwi took place in the afternoon of 19
December 1958.
Subsequently, the rest of the band fell one by one into the hands of the law. Pavia, Demen, Fustigo were
arrested, and Borja, the last one to fall, was captured on 27 February 1959 after a nationwide manhunt.
Pedro Borja, Pedro Fustigo, Inocencio Demen, Rufino Pavia, Felipe Benavides, Dominador de los Santos,
John Doe and Richard Doe (Alejo Balimbing, and Tito Oljina being the last two), were charged for
murder in Criminal case 2578 and for frustrated murder in Criminal Case 2590 before the Court of First
Instance of Albay.
On 8 September 1960, the court, in Criminal case 2590, found Borja, et. al. guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of frustrated murder, as principals, and sentenced each to imprisonment ranging from 6
years, 1 month, and 11 days of prision mayor, as the minimum, to 14 years, 10 months, and 21 days of
reclusion temporal as the maximum; to suffer inherent accessory penalties; to indemnify Salustiano
Isorena in the sum of P5,000.00, as moral and exemplary damages, severally and jointly, and to pay the
costs. The court also, in Criminal Case 2578, founf Borja, et. al. guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of murder, and sentenced each of them to the maximum penalty of death; to suffer inherent
accessory penalties; to indemnify the offended parties, Mercedes Chuidian Vda. de Gancayco and her
children in the sum of P6,000.00 for the death of Santiago Gancayco, Jr., and another amount in the sum
of P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, both severally and jointly, and to pay the costs. In the
decision, the trial court — pursuant to the Revised Penal Code, Article 5 — recommended to the
President, through the Secretary of Justice, with respect to the accused Dominador de los Santos, "that
executive clemency be extended to him, or that at least his death penalty be minimized or commuted to
life imprisonment." The court so recommended because “the testimony of the accused had contributed in
a large measure to the Court in its pursuit of truth and justice in these cases." Borja, et. al. appealed.
Issue:
Whether the penalty imposed by the trial court, in light of the aggraviating circumstances, be reduced
from the penalty from death and its accessory penalties, to reclusion temporal and its accessory penalties.
Held:
Fustigo, Demen, Pavia, Benavides, and de los Santos do not deny their culpability for the offenses
charged, but prayed for the reduction of the penalty from death and its accessory penalties, to reclusion
temporal and its accessory penalties. They admitted with candor: "The finding of facts in the decision of
the trial court having been found to be a faithful narration of the incident as related during the trial of the
case and given in the two ocular inspections of the premises where the shooting happened, it would seem
a useless endeavor to reiterate said findings of facts." The five accused controverted the findings of the
trial court that there were five aggravating circumstances in the case for murder. Instead, they contended
that the trial court should have appreciated only three aggravating circumstances. The trial court correctly
considered that either treachery or evident premeditation qualifies the crime to murder, and hence the
other alternative circumstance
should be considered as aggravating.
The trial court found five aggravating circumstances against Fustigo, Demen, Pavia, Benavides, and de
los Santos, to wit: (1) the crimes of murder and frustrated murder were
committed by a band, or with the aid of armed men; (2) means were employed to weaken the defense,
wherein is included taking advantage of superior strength; (3) craft, fraud and/or disguise were employed;
(4) there was promise of backpay in the commission of the crimes; and (5) there was treachery or evident
premeditation, depending upon whatever is used to qualify the crimes to murder and frustrated murder.
With respect to Pedro Borja in both cases, the trial court considered against him four aggravating
circumstances as above excluding the promise of backpay. It found another aggravating circumstance in
the case of frustrated murder, i.e. dwelling. Hence, in the case of frustrated murder, it found six
aggravating circumstances against Fustigo, Demen, Pavia, Benavides, and de los Santos; and five
aggravating circumstances against Borja.
It msut be noted, however, that the circumstance of band and aid of armed men, cannot be taken
separately from the circumstance of use of means to weaken the defense, and advantage of superior
strength. All these circumstances are absorbed in treachery and may not be considered independently.
Treachery absorbs the circumstance of craft, fraud and disguise. Nonetheless, this leaves the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation, which applies to all the accused; and the aggravating circumstance
of promise of backpay, which applies to all the accused, except Borja. In disposing the case, the Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court in Criminal Case 2590 in toto; while modifying Criminal
Case 2578 in respect of the principal penalty from death to reclusion perpetua for lack of necessary votes,
and in respect of the civil indemnity from P6,000 to P12,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court in Criminal Case No. 2590 is hereby affirmed in toto;
that in Criminal Case No. 2578 is modified in respect of the principal penalty from death to reclusion
perpetua for lack of necessary votes, and in respect of the civil indemnity from P6,000 to P12,000.00.
3. Absolutory circumstances (Articles 6[3], 7, 16, 20, 247,

332 of the RPC, Battered Woman Syndrome under RA
9262, Sections 57 and 58, RA 9344, somnambulism,
mistake of fact, repeal of [favorable] penal law)
Case:
(Yao)People vs. Genosa, GR No. 135981, 15 January 2004 (SUPRA)
4. Mitigating circumstances (Article 13, RPC)

a. Kinds
i. Ordinary
ii. Privileged
iii. Specific
b. Specific circumstances
Cases:
(Dy)People vs. Pajenado, GR No. L-26458, 30 January 1976

People v Pajenado
Respondent: Alfonso Pajenado, Osoy Pajenado, Cecilio Pajenado, Carlito Pajenado and Aniceto Toling
Ponente: Concepcion Jr. J.
Facts: In the evening of March 26, 1966, there was a party at the house of Constancio Pajenado in barrio
Dapdap, Samar, to celebrate the engagementof his daughter. Among present were the mayor of the
municipality, the 5 accused and deceased Jorge Tapong.
Jorge Tapong was already drunk so the mayor instructed 2 policemen to take Tapong home. On the was
home, the 5 accused suddenly emerged, armed with pieces of wood. They started beating the victim. A
certain Jorda saw the incedent and stopped the 5 men from beating the victim. Tapong was taken to his
house where police tried to take info from him but he was already in coma. He died consequently while
being rushed to the hospital.
Accused Aniceto Toling admitted responsibility for the beating and exonerated the other accused. He
justified his actions by saying that he was acting in lawful performance of his duty. He said that victim
was taken to his house and when he was told that his actions were shameful, he became mad and took a
bolo and threaten to kill. Toling said that this was when he took a piece of bamboo and struck the
deceased with it.
Issue: Can Toling’s actions be justified as in lawful exercise of his duty? NO
Held: Inasmuch as Aniceto Toling admitted that he was the author of the death of the deceased Jorge
Tapong, it was incumbent upon him, in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying
circumstance.
A person has no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right of office. There are two requisites where it is justified: 1. that the offender acted in the performance
of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2. that the injury committed be the necessary
consequence of the performance of such duty.
In the case at bar, we find no legal basis to justify Toling's action.
First, Court found Toling’s claims that he was an appointed police officer by the mayor to be false. Only
barrio captains can appoint police officers. Also, the barrio captain belied Toling’s claim that he was a
policeman in the barrio.
Second, Court found Toling’s actions not indicative of a person with authority performing his duty. He
ran away from the scene of the crime. He also did not inform the barrio captain of the incident
considering that it was the barrio captain who had allegedly ordered him to disarm Tapong.
As a result, the TC did not err in concluding that the 5 accused were guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
There was treachery because the five accused suddenly intercepted Tapong while he was on his way to
the house of Pelagia. The victim was unarmed and he had no time to defend himself in view of the
suddenness of the assault and the fact that he was drunk at the time.
Decision: Crime committed was murder with treachery. Aggravating circumstance of the offense having
been committed by a band. Reclusion Perpetual.
(Doctor)People vs. Dagatan, GR No. L-10851, 28 August 1959

People v. Dagatan
GR No. L-10851 ; 28 August 1959
Ponente: Endencia, J.
Facts:
Julio, Sergio, and Saturnino Dagatan beat up Victorio Ceniza and threw his body to the river, effectively
killing the latter. The Dagatans claimed to have done this to avenge the reputation of their family after the
incident involving their sister, Lucila and Eleuterio Yara, Ceniza's first cousin. The elopement and
subsequent abandonment of Yara done against Lucila had tarnished not only the family name but has
damaged Lucila to a great extent. They also initially claimed that they were not in the vicinity since they
were taxi drivers and were on duty at the time.
Issues:
W/N the mitigating circumstance of acting int the immediate vindicaiton of a grave offense against their
sister, Lucila may be applied? NO.
W/N the mitigating circumstance of acting upon impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced
passion should be applied? NO.
Ratio:
The elopement and subsequent abandonment happened long before the commission of the crime. Ceniza
(the deceased) was not directly involved in the said elopement as he was only a cousin of Yara.
The subsequent alibi of the Dagatans were not proven and were actually effectively countered by the
discovery of the broken caborrata in the Dagatan residence.
Ruling:
Lower judgment AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS (instead of mitigating circumstances, the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime, superior strength, and treachery) to be imposed.
(Yao)People vs. Genosa, GR No. 135981, 15 January 2004 (SUPRA)
5. Aggravating circumstances (Article 14, RPC; See Rule

110, Section 8 and 9 of Rules of Court)
a. Kinds
i. Generic
ii. Qualifying
iii. Special aggravating/qualifying
circumstances
b. Specific circumstances
Cases:
(Domingo)People vs. Bello, 10 SCRA 298 (1964)
GR No. L-18792 February 28, 1964
FACTS:
Guillermo Bello, who was 54 years old, a widower and an invalid, had a 24 year-old common-
law wife, Alicia Cervantes. Sometime in 1958, they were experiencing financial difficulties, and so Bello
induced Alicia to work as an “entertainer” in Maring’s Place bar and restaurant. Bello used to watch
Cervantes in the bar, but soon warned her to be careful to be more discreet in her work after he found her
with another man in a movie house. One day, Bello went to Maring’s Place to ask Alicia for money, but
Maring, the owner of the bar, told Bello to forget about Alicia as he is old and invalid. A sad Bello soon
bumped into the Marasigan brothers, who told him that Maring was using Alicia to satisfy white
customers. Bello took this quite hard, and so drank tuba. Afterwards, he entered Maring’s Place that night
and killed Alicia using a balisong.
The CFI found Bello guilty of murder, aggravated by (1) treachery, (2) evident premeditation, (3)
nighttime, and (4) abuse of superior strength. Hence this present appeal.
ISSUES:
- W/N there are any attendant aggravating circumstances in the case (NO- as a result, the crime
should be HOMICIDE)
RULING:
- NO Treachery: While Alicia was indeed stabbed in the back, such was the result of an
indiscriminate attack. There is no showing that Bello employed that attack purposely. Furthermore, it
was shown that this wound was inflicted while Alicia was running away.
- NO Evident Premeditation: there was no showing that Bello came up with a plan to kill Alicia
in the manner which he did.
- NO Abuse of Superior Strength: Alicia was young and fit as she is an “entertainer”, while
Bello is old and invalid. Just because Bello had a balisong does not mean he is advantaged, given his
physique.
- NO Nighttime: While the crime was committed at night, there was no showing that Bello
consciously chose to perpetrate the crime at night.
- There are however, mitigating circumstances: (1) voluntary surrender and (2) passion and
obfuscation.
- Given that there are no aggravating circumstances and two mitigating circumstances, then
Bello is guilty of HOMICIDE, and is hereby sentenced to serve prision mayor for a minimum of 6
years and one day to a maximum of 10 years. He should also pay the heirs of Alicia P6,000 as civil
indemnity.
(Doctor)People vs. Mitra, 107 Phil 951 (1960)

People v. Mitra
GR No. L-13030 ; 29 April 1960
Ponente: Reyes, J.B.L.
Facts:
On the evening of Jan.25,1950, the accused Jose Oliva, Francisco Mitra, Juan Malabanan, Adriano
Carpio, and Paulino Mansit were charged for the murder of Dr. Maximino Maloles in Sto. Tomas,
Batangas.
The perpetrators allegedly shot the victim in the latter's house and escaped. After more than a year of
investigation, Malabanan submitted an affidavit admitting the crime and offering to become a state-
witness. He disclosed how the plans were made and how they were subsequently carried out. His recall
of the various pieces of information were very detailed and precise. The co-defendants claimed that the
statements of Mansit were fabricated and forced by the police hence making them inadmissible in court.
Mansit also admitted his participation in the crime and revealed in his confession the identities of the
other perpetrators.
Mrs. Maloles, the widow of the victim, also gave her own recount of what happened that night. She
claimed that she did not know the identitites of the assailants but was able to physically recognize Torres
and Malabanan. The defendants argued that if Mrs. Maloles' statement that there were 'unknown
assailants,' then she wouldn't have physically identified them.
Jose Magcalas, a cashier in the gasoline station of the Maloles family, stated that he was 10 meters away
from the incident and had witnessed the killing. Defendants claimed that this testimony is inconsistent
and contradicted with that of the other witnesses.
Issue:
W/N the testimonies were credible? YES.
W/N there were aggravating circumstances? YES.
Ratio:
The testimonies, albeit containing inconsistencies, cannot be disregarded. The accuracy of the accounts
depend on the perspective of the witness. The defendants' claims that the Mansit and Malabanan
testimonies were falsified and forced by the police is unfounded and unproven. Furthermore, their
contention that Mrs. Maloles had inconsistencies as to her statement that she did not know the assailants
and yet was able to identify them is incorrect. Mrs. Maloles' lack of familiarity as to the identities of the
assailants is not equal to her inability to remember their physical appearance. She may not know their
real and exact identities but may still come to know them as the perpetrators of the crime. The Magcalas
testimony however is highly improbable since if it were true that he was 10 meters away from the scene,
he would've been easily seen by the perpetrators thus effectively changing the outcome. His inability to
report the incident however may be attributed to the fear of becoming a target himself.
The fact that a motor vehicle was used to transport the perpetrators and aid in their extraction, as well as
the consideration of a cash reward can be used as aggravating circumstances. The Malabanan testimony
narrated how down payments and promises of subsequent payments were given to the perpetrators
(presumably from the Huks, who were enemies of Dr. Maloles). The use of the jeep to rendezvous and
travel to the Maloles residence is evident.
Adriano Carpio's participation cannot be proven to be as a part of the conspiracy. Driving the jeep
could've been done out of fear. There was no evidence that he knew of the planned murder.
Ruling:
Adriano Carpio ACQUITTED. Conviction of Mansit and Mitra AFFIRMED.
(Dy)Lumiguis vs. People, 19 SCRA 842 (1967)

Petitioner: Banagan Lumiguis, Ramon Subano, Sedinan Subano and Kamba Lumiguis
Respondent: People of the Philippines
Ponente: Makalintal J.
Facts: Kamba Lumiguis and Godo Idlay engaged in a fist fight with all the other appellants surrounding
them. Godo knocked down Kamba because he was the superior boxer. Upon seeing this, Dungo-an Abao
struck Godo on the back of his head with a piece of wood, causing him to fall on the ground. Kamba,
Banagan, Ramon and Senidad all proceeded to hit Godo with pieces of wood as well.
Bay-abbu and Codalis tried to stop the appellants but were also hit with wood. When appellants finally
ran away, Laydan helped Godo and brought him to the house of the barrio lieutenant. Godo revealed that
the fight ensued because of a debt Kamba refused to pay. Godo died a day after.
Medical examination showed that Godo died because his skull was fractured.
The CA rendered decision on this case, sentencing the appellants to prison correctional to prison mayor +
indemnity of 6k jointly and severally.
Banagan, Kamba, Senidad and Ramos appealed to SC, Senidad withdrew his appeal and Dungo-an Abao
did not appeal. The 3 posited that they should be convicted at most for physical injuries and that Kamba
should be acquitted.
They also said that the court erred in considering aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength
and not considering mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction/ignorance in favor of accused. And
finally, that all 5 accused should not be jointly and severally liable for the indemnity
Issue:
1. Did CA err in convicting petitioners as accomplices in crime of homicide? NO
2. Was there no aggravating circumstance? NO
3. was there mitigating circumstance? NO
4. Are they all equally liable for the indemnity? NO
Held:
1. On issue of being accomplices to the crime of homicide, the petition lacks merit. While Dungo-an
delivered the fatal blow, the appellants’ actions of attacking the deceased show participation in
the common criminal design; this shows that they are guilty as accomplices to homicide.
2. On issue of aggravating circumstance, the court said that while abuse of superior strength would
be an aggravating circumstance, in the case at bar, since only one person participated as a
principal and the others participated as accomplices, it cannot be said that they took advantage of
superior strength. That said, the aggravating circumstance cannot be considered.
3. On issue of the mitigating circumstance, the appellants invoke Sec. 106 of the Admin Code of the
Department of Mindanao and Sulu.
It states that: “In pronouncing sentence upon a Moro or other non-Christian inhabitants of the
Department convicted of crime or misdemeanor, the judge or justice may ignore any minimum
penalty provided by law for the offense; and may impose such penalty not in excess of the
highest penalty provided by law, as, in his opinion, after taking into consideration all the
circumstances of the case including the state of enlightenment of the accused and the degree of
moral turpitude which attaches to the offense among his own people, will best subserve the
interest of justice. The judge or justice may also, in his discretion at any time before the
expiration of the period allowed for appeal, suspend the execution of any penalty or part
thereof so imposed, subject to such condition as he may prescribe.”
No abuse in discrediting the alleged mitigating circumstance was found since it is within the
discretion of the court to apply the special provision.
4. On the issue of indemnity, accomplices are only liable for the penalty one degree lower for the
consummated crime. Also, principals are primarily responsible, accomplices are jointly and
severally liable in case of insolvency by the principal.
Decision: Judgement of CA is MODIFIED.
(Sungcad)People vs. Rojas, Nos. L-46960–62, 8 January 1987

People v Rojas
G.R. No. L-46960-62
January 8, 1987
Ponente: Per Curiam
Facts
1. 3 women were killed in May 23, 1973 by unknown circumstances. They’re ages are 21, 7, and 5.
2. In January of 1973, Wilfredo Rojas first met the other co-accused, and befriended them. He
brought with him “wordly wares,” and his own, “concept of spirit.” He taught his newfound friends to
pray “Our Father” “Hail Mary” and the apostle’s creed. He also sold them “anting-anting” oil which he
claimed would protect them from injury.
3. On the morning of the massacre, Rojas and his companions all prayed while armed with guns and
knives. After, they all proceeded to their destination. They surrounded the group of girls. There were 5
girls in the “tapahan.” Rojas approached the 21 year old and pretended to ask for a certain “Yoyong.”
Suddenly, one of Rojas’ companions fired at one of the girls, but his gun jammed. Only then did Rojas
deliver a fatal stab to the 21 year old. Rojas then proceeded to stab the 7 year old in the head, before
turning to the smallest in the group, the 5 year old, and stabbed her twice to death. The group then severed
the ears of the 21 and 5 year old. Rojas then ordered the group to run. The other two girls were able to
escape and became witnesses to the case.
4. 2 of the co-accused became state witnesses who testified the events which corroborated with the 2
girls’ testimonies.
5. The trial court ordered the death penalty to be served upon the accused, and hence this mandatory
review by the SC.
Issues
1. W/N there was a conspiracy among the co-accused?
2. W/N there was evident premeditation?
Disposition
Judgement AFFIRMED
Rationale
1. YES. There is a conspiracy when 2 or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and
decide to do it. In this case, the conspiracy is established by the behavior of the accused. The accused
gathered in a church on the morning of the commission of the crime; they referred to Rojas as
“Commander,”; they surrounded the 5 girls to prevent them from leaving; when one of their companions
shot at one of the girls, none of them were surprised; nobody stopped Rojas when he started slaughtering
the girls; and there was no protest when they severed the ears of the girls.. With conspiracy established,
the act of one shall be the act of all
2. Evident premeditation is an aggravating circumstance that will increase the penalty. In a
conspiracy which is directly established with proof of deliberation, evident premeditation may be taken
for granted. But in an implied conspiracy, there must be proof as to how and when the plan was hatched.
There must be a showing of opportunity for reflection. The facts found in the lower court show such
premeditation by the meetings that all the accused would have since they met in January. They all
assembled at the church before going to the scene of the crime. They could have made up their mind,
whilst in prayer, to kill the girls. They knew where they were going. Between the time from the church to
the scene of the crime is a good 30 minute walk. They had sufficient time to reflect.
(Yao)People vs. Oga-Oga, Nos. L-69070-72, 29 November 1984

Appellant: Leonila, Domingo, and Juanito Oga-oga
FACTS
1. Appellants Domingo and Leonila Oga-Oga are spouses while John Oga-Oga alias Junjun, is the
brother of Domingo. On the other hand, the victims in the instant case were spouses Alfredo and
Anita Oga-Oga and their son Antonio.
2. The tenancy of a portion of a land situated at Sitio Bilibol, San Jose, Burauen, Leyte, which was
formerly tenanted by appellant John Oga-Oga was awarded to the victim spouses Alfredo and
Anita Oga-Oga when the former abandoned it and left for Manila. Said award of tenancy was
resented by herein appellants since appellant spouses Domingo and Leonila Oga-Oga wanted and
expected the tenancy thereof, they already being the tenants of the adjacent portion of the subject
land.
3. Appellant Leonila Oga-Oga approached Anita and a heated argument between them ensued.
Thereafter, appellant Leonila Oga-Oga shouted at the other appellants, her husband Domingo and
brother-in- law John, "Come here, they are here, kill them. Then Domingo and John both killed
Anita, Alfredo, and their son.
4. The accused were convicted for triple murder. Leonila was a principal by inducement for having
a moral ascendency over her husband and her brother-in-law. Domingo and Juanito are principals
by direct participation. The appellants appeal to the SC.
ISSUES
1. W/N Leonila was a principal by inducement in the commission of the crime? YES.
2. W/N there was a qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength notwithstanding the
sufficient evidence to establish it?
HELD
1. Leonila Oga-Oga is the wife of Domingo Oga-Oga and John Oga-Oga is the brother of Domingo.
From the evidence adduced it appears that Leonila has ascendancy and moral influence upon her
co- appellants as in fact upon the cue from her directing that her co-appellants kill the victims, her
co- appellants together and armed with boloes assaulted the victims one after the other. The
contention of the appellants that it is unnatural that the wife should give command to the husband
since the rule is the other way, is without basis. It is too well-known that there are many husbands
who submit to the desires and biddings of their wives. Thus, the Court agrees with the following
findings of the trial court.
2. Regarding superior strength, whereas in this case the appellants took advantage of their greater
number and that they were an armed then when they assaulted and killed the victims one after the
other who are then unarmed and defenseless certainly, the aggravating or qualifying circumstance
of abuse of superior strength must be considered.
DECISION
WHEREFORE, the judgment convicting Leonila Oga-Oga of the crime of triple murder is hereby
affirmed and she is sentenced to suffer the penalty of three reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of
the three deceased each in the amount of P30,000.00 and to pay her proportionate share of the costs.
(Dela Rosa)People vs. Tacan, 182 SCRA 601 (1990)
(Dela Rosa)People vs. Montinola, 360 SCRA 631 (2001)
(Dy)People vs. Ventura, 433 SCRA 389 (2004)
(Domingo)People vs. Cachola, 420 SCRA 520 (2004)

GR Nos. 148712-15 January 21, 2004
FACTS:
Jessie Barnachea, the 12 year old witness of the killings, was about to leave his family’s house to
watch television in his uncle’s house when two armed men burst in their house. The men struck Jessie
with a gun. Jessie heard gunshots, and when the attack was over, he saw his mother Carmelita, his brother
Felix Jr., and his cousin Rubenson Abance all slaughtered. Jessie’s older brother Robert, who was in his
uncle’s house at that time, saw two men running away from their house. One pointed a gun at him, which
prompted Robert to scamper away. He saw the armed men get inside a jeep marked “fruit and vegetable
dealer” and “El Shaddai”.
The said jeep was intercepted by police authorities that very night. On board were eight people.
The eight people were taken in custody. At the police station, Jessie identified two of the people-
Dominador Cachola and Ernesto Amay- as the two armed men who were responsible for the slaughter.
Cachola and Amay were found guilty of four counts of murder (principals) and sentenced to death. The
other six people were considered as accomplices to the crime.
Since Cachola and Amay were sentenced to death, the present case is now in the SC for automatic
review.
ISSUES:
- W/N Cachola and Amay were rightfully charged with murder (YES)
- W/N the other six people were rightfully charged as accomplices (NO)
RULING:
- On Cachola and Amay: On the same night when they perpetrated the act, they were positively
identified by Jessie as the armed men who slaughtered his family. Jessie’s testimony remained steady,
even during cross-examination. Furthermore, the defense could not impute any ill-motive on Jessie to
falsely implicate the accused. The TC was also correct in holding that the crime committed was
murder, attended by treachery. This is because the attack was so sudden and unexpected, such that the
victims could not fight back or even flee. However, the TC erred in finding that the killings were
attended by evident premeditation, because it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that the men
prepared for the attack. There is also the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, because Carmelita
and Felix, Jr (Jessie’s mother and brother), were killed inside their own home.
- On the six people charged as accomplices: Neither community of design nor performance of
an overt act prior to/simultaneous to the crime was proven. In fact, the only reason that the six people
were implicated is that they happened to be on the same jeep as Cachola and Amay. Absent any
showing of the two requisites of being an accomplice, the people must be acquitted.
- Cachola and Amay is sentenced to DEATH for 4 counts of murder. The other six people are
ACQUITTED. Cachola and Amay are ordered to pay indemnity to the heirs of the victims.
(Domingo)People vs. Melendrez, 59 Phil. 154 (1933)

GR No. L-39913 December 19, 1933
FACTS:
Ricardo Melendrez and Elias Martinez broke into the house of Tin Bun Boc, which was by then
unoccupied. While inside, the two accused stole various items amounting to P76.68. The trial court found
them guilty of robbery. As for Melendrez, the Information alleged that he was a habitual delinquent,
having been found guilty of theft twice and estafa once, with his date of last conviction being September
3, 1932. Martinez remains at large. Melendrez pleaded guilty for robbery. The trial court sentenced him to
8 years and one day of prision mayor and to serve an additional penalty of six years and one day of
prision mayor for being a habitual delinquent.
Melendrez appealed this judgment to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
- W/N there are mitigating and aggravating circumstances in this case (YES, plea of guilty is
mitigating, habitual delinquency is aggravating)
RULING:
- Melendrez argues that lack of instruction should be considered as a mitigating circumstance.
This court had already ruled that such cannot be taken into account for the crime of robbery.
Furthermore, no evidence was adduced to show that Melendrez did indeed lack instruction.
- On Habitual Delinquency and Recidivism: When an appellant is both a habitual delinquent
and a recidivist, recidivism should be taken to account in imposing the principal penalty in its
corresponding degree, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant is also sentenced to suffer an
additional penalty as a habitual delinquent.
- The penalty is prision correccional. Given that there is one mitigating and aggravating
circumstance, the penalty should be imposed to its medium degree.
6. Extenuating circumstances (Articles 333[3] and 255,

RPC)
Case:
(Dela Rosa)People vs. Borja, GR No. L-22947, 12 July 1979
7. Alternative circumstances
a. Intoxication
b. Relationship
c. Degree of instruction
Cases:
(Yao)People vs. Necesito, GR No. L-13467, 30 September 1960
Appellant: Juan and Justino Necesito
FACTS
1. Filemon de los Santos and Crisanta Marigmen, husband and wife respectively, were living in
their house in the barrio of Bagto, Baler, Quezon. In the evening of that day the spouses, their
daughters, Fely de los Santos, who lived with them, and Maria Donato, who had come for a visit,
and Juanito Rogayan and his wife, Filomena, slept in their house.
2. Just then Crisanta saw appellant Juan Necesito in the act of shooting her husband and at the third
shot her husband, using a long gun. Juan fired three shots at her husband and at the third shot her
husband fell down on the floor. Juan then focused his flashlight on the body of her fallen husband
and stared in anger at her, and walked back and forth in the hall.
3. All of the circumstances prove beyond reasonable of any doubt that the widow identified Juan
Necesito (uncle of Justino Necesito) as the assailant of her husband and that Justino Necesito
accompanied him.
4. The trial court found the accused guilty of murder, where it found a mitigating circumstance of
lack of instruction.
ISSUES
1. W/N the trial court was correct in finding that there was a mitigating circumstance of lack of
instruction? NO.
HELD
1. Alibis presented by both accused were bereft of merit. Two witnesses for the prosecution
testified that it was the deceased who had suggested that the finding of the lost copra be
denounced to the police authorities. As it was shown that the carabaos of Juan Necesito were
found in the place where the copra was hidden, this fact points to Juan Necesito as the author of
the theft. And as the deceased was the one who suggested denouncing the finding of the copra to
the police, this facts was sufficient ground for the Necesitos to take revenge. That the revenge
was the motive is proved by the fact that Justino Necesito informed Santos Feria, witness for the
prosecution, while in a rice mill, that Filemon de los Santos better take care. (Apparently the
victim impliedly snitched on Juan Necesito regarding the copra issue)
2. The court below found the accused guilty of murder, holding that there was between them to
commit the crime. It also found that a mitigating circumstance which is lack of instruction,
attended the commission, and consequently imposed the penalty in its medium degree, i. e.,
reclusion perpetua. We do not agree to this finding of a mitigating circumstance. As a matter
of fact, Justino Necesito knew how to write and both appellants come from Pangasinan, where the
rate of literacy is high. (No ratio on why they disagree with the mitigating circumstance)
3. The commission of the crime was attended with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, and
the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and dwelling.
DECISION
Judgement AFFIRMED.
(Doctor)US vs. Pado, 19 Phil. 111 (1911)

US v. Pado
GR No. L-6061 ; 18 March 1911
Ponente: Trent, J.
Facts:
Evening of Dec. 24, 1909 - Mateo Pado (Bangit), son-in-law Laurencio Indo, and Fausto Garfin went to
the house of Julian Masuelas, his mother Lucia Copertino, and Juliana and murdered them. Fausto is the
brother-in-law of Julian. Indo was shot and killed by the Constabulary during their escape. The
defendants were charged with murder with the qualifying circumstance of known premeditation (due to
the plan and preparations days prior to the night of the crime) and the aggravating circumstances of
having committed the crime in the house of the offended parties and at night.
Issue:
W/N the extenuating circumstances of Art.11 may be applied? YES.
Ratio:
The court upheld the trial court's judgment of the defendants being guilty of the crime of assassination
with the already mentioned qualifying and aggravating circumstances. However, the court also gives the
defendants the benefit of Art. 11 for they truly believed that their targets were witches who feasted on
children at night. Their principal motive was influenced by the firm belief that these people were actually
witches. Fernanda Garfin (wife of the defendant) confirmed this as she found no other motive for Fausto
to commit such a crime. The superstition was so imbedded in the minds of the defendants that they
thought that the massacre of these victims would be a great service to the community. This can be
attributed to their remote and mountainous location wherein there was little to no contact with more
enlightened people to learn the error of their ways.
The court may use and apply Art.11 to offset any number of generic aggravating circumstances.
Ruling:
Judgment appealed is AFFIRMED. Penalty MODIFIED from death penalty to cadena perpetua (life
imprisonment).
(Sungcad)People vs. Ramos, 91 Phil. 678 (1952)

People v Ramos
G.R. No. L-3989
July 30, 1952
Ponente: Paras, C.J.
Facts
1. Respondent-appellant, Consolacion Jaime, lived with the deceased, Isaac Pariñas, as his common-
law wife. However, due to the deceased’s constantly maltreating Jaime, she had a paramour. Because of
the prevailing maltreatment of the deceased, Jaime induced her paramour, Benito Ramos, to kill the now
deceased.
2. Ramos instructed the guards to now allow Isaac Pariñas to perform his guard duties that night.
The deceased in fact did not pursue his guard duties. Ramos went to the deceased’s house looking for the
deceased while Jaime pretended to be asleep. In the conversation between Ramos and the deceased, the
former hit the deceased in the head with his garand rifle. When the deceased fell to the ground, Ramos
continued hitting him in the head.
3. A neighbor heard the crying of Jaime, and learned that the deceased had been “kidnapped.” A
searched was conducted by the police, where they eventually found the bloodied body of the deceased,
who died shortly after.
4. One of the guards who Ramos spoke to regarding the guard duty of the deceased, told the chief of
police about what Ramos had told him, prompting an investigation against him.
5. Ramos confessed to the crime, who revealed the involvement of Consolacion Jamie. Both Ramos
and Jaime were convicted, separately, but only Jaime appealed.
Issues
1. W/N respondent-appellant can be convicted based on the confession of Benito Ramos?
Disposition
Judgement affirmed
Rationale
1. YES. Jaime contended that Ramos’ confession is hearsay. However, the moment she presented
Ramos as a defense witness to question him on his confession, allowed his confession to be admissible
into evidence. The admissibility of Ramos’ confession not only reaffirmed his guilt, but also showed how
they concerted a plan to kill the deceased. Appellant’s guilt as a principal by induction is clear from the
fact that she asked her paramour to kill her husband.
(Dy)People vs. LaoLao, GR No. L-12978, 31 October 1959

Respondent: Cornelio, Francisco, Eulalio, Pedro, Restituto Laolao
Ponente: Barrera J.
Appeal from a judgment of CFI of Iloilo finding defendants guilty of murder sentencing them to reclusion
perpetua and pay indemnity of P3,000 and to undergo indeterminate sentence of 6 months 1 day of prison
correctional to 7 years 1 day of prison mayor.
Judgment is affirmed for Cornelio, Francisco and Eulalio but indemnity is modified to 6k. Pedro Laolao
is acquitted.

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CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINION

(Sungcad)People vs. Masonson, 63 Phil. 92 (1936)

(Dy)People vs. Flores, 63 Phil. 443 (1936)

Judgment modified, penalty is reduced.

(Domingo)People vs. De Jesus, 63 Phil. 760 (1936)

I. Circumstances affecting criminal liability

(Sungcad)People vs. Lara, 48 Phil 153 (1925)

(Doctor)US vs. Mojica, 42 Phil 784 (1922)

(Dela Rosa)People vs. Nugas, GR No. 172606, 23 November 2011

(Domingo)People vs. Mendoza, GR No. 133382, 9 March 2000

(Yao)People vs. Moral, GR No. L-31139, 12 October 1984

(Dela Rosa)People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257 (1943)

(Dela Rosa)People vs. Retubado, GR No. 124058, 10 December 2003

(Sungcad)Pomoy vs. People, GR No. 150647, 29 September 2004

(Doctor)Andal vs. People, 27 SCRA 608 (1969)

2. Exempting circumstances (Article 12, RPC)

(Dy)People vs. Pambid, GR No. 124453, 15 March 2000

(Doctor)People vs. Banez, 301 SCRA 248 (1999)

(Sungcad)Llave vs. People, 438 SCRA 376 (2006)

(Sungcad)Pomoy vs. People, GR No. 150647, 29 September 2004

(Yao)People vs. Fernando, GR No. L-24781, 29 May 1970

(Dela Rosa)People vs. Borja, GR No. L-22947, 12 July 1979

3. Absolutory circumstances (Articles 6[3], 7, 16, 20, 247,

4. Mitigating circumstances (Article 13, RPC)

(Dy)People vs. Pajenado, GR No. L-26458, 30 January 1976

Issue: Can Toling’s actions be justified as in lawful exercise of his duty? NO

In the case at bar, we find no legal basis to justify Toling's action.

(Doctor)People vs. Dagatan, GR No. L-10851, 28 August 1959

(Yao)People vs. Genosa, GR No. 135981, 15 January 2004 (SUPRA)

5. Aggravating circumstances (Article 14, RPC; See Rule

(Doctor)People vs. Mitra, 107 Phil 951 (1960)

(Dy)Lumiguis vs. People, 19 SCRA 842 (1967)

Decision: Judgement of CA is MODIFIED.

(Sungcad)People vs. Rojas, Nos. L-46960–62, 8 January 1987

(Yao)People vs. Oga-Oga, Nos. L-69070-72, 29 November 1984

(Dela Rosa)People vs. Tacan, 182 SCRA 601 (1990)

(Dela Rosa)People vs. Montinola, 360 SCRA 631 (2001)

(Dy)People vs. Ventura, 433 SCRA 389 (2004)

(Domingo)People vs. Cachola, 420 SCRA 520 (2004)

(Domingo)People vs. Melendrez, 59 Phil. 154 (1933)

6. Extenuating circumstances (Articles 333[3] and 255,

(Doctor)US vs. Pado, 19 Phil. 111 (1911)

(Sungcad)People vs. Ramos, 91 Phil. 678 (1952)

(Dy)People vs. LaoLao, GR No. L-12978, 31 October 1959

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