DIOSDADO JOSE ALLADO and ROBERTO L.

MENDOZA
vs.
HON. ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge, Br. 62, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Metro Manila, and
PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-CRIME COMMISSION

FACTS:
Petitioners, Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, were both implicated as the masterminds of
the kidnapping and murder of Eugen Alexander Van Twist.
An information for the said crime was filed against the petitioners primarily on the strength of a sworn
statement by Escolastico Umbal, who admitted that he was among those who kidnapped and killed the
victim upon the orders of the petitioners. Thereafter, respondent judge, Roberto C. Diokno, ordered
the arrest of the petitioners and no bail was recommended.
Petitioners, contending that their arrests was effected whimsically as there is no probable cause,
questioned their arrests.

ISSUE:
Whether or not probable cause is present to warrant the order of arrest against the petitioners.

HELD:
No, probable cause do not exist to merit the order of arrest against the petitioners.

 For sure, the credibility of Umbal is badly battered. Certainly, his bare allegations, even if the State
invokes its inherent right to prosecute, are insufficient to justify sending two lawyers to jail, or
anybody for that matter. More importantly, the PACC operatives who applied for a warrant to search
the dwellings of Santiago never implicated petitioners. In fact they claimed that according to Umbal, it
was Santiago, and not petitioners, who masterminded the whole affair. While there may be bits of
evidence against petitioners' co-accused, i.e., referring to those seized from the dwellings of Santiago,
these do not in the least prove petitioners' complicity in the crime charged. Based on the evidence thus
far submitted there is nothing indeed, much less is there probable cause, to incriminate petitioners.
For them to stand trial and be deprived in the meantime of their liberty, however brief, the law
appropriately exacts much more to sustain a warrant for their arrest — facts and circumstances strong
enough in themselves to support the belief that they are guilty of a crime that in fact happened. Quite
obviously, this has not been met.

G.R. No. 102070

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. DAVID A. ALFECHE, JR.
July 23, 1992

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:

A complaint for Grave Threats and Usurpation of Real Property was filed against Ruperto Dimalata and
Norberto Fuentes, and after the appropriate preliminary investigation, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Juliana C. Azarraga of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Capiz handed down a Resolution, duly
approved by the Provincial Prosecutor, finding prima facie evidence of guilt for the crime charged.
[1] The complainants are co-owners of the parcel of land allegedly usurped.

On 5 July 1991, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Azarraga filed the corresponding Information[2] for
"Usurpation of Real Rights In Property defined and penalized under Article 312 in relation to Article 282
of the Revised Penal Code" with the Regional Trial Court of Capiz. It was docketed as Criminal Case No.
3386 and was raffled to Branch 15 thereof.
On 17 July 1991, respondent Judge, as Presiding Judge of Branch 15 of the court below, dismissed the
case motu proprio on the ground of lack of jurisdiction considering that "the crime committed by the
accused falls under Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code and the violence or intimidation by the
accused is (sic) a means to commit it or a mere incident in its commission, hence, the threat is
absorbed by the crime charged," and considering that "the impossable (sic) fine as penalty is from
P200.00 to P500.00" because the value of the gain cannot be ascertained. 

Assistant Prosecutor Azarraga filed a motion to reconsider the above order[4] alleging therein that it is
true that the crime charged is not a complex crime and if mention is made of Article 282, it is because
"the penalty of the crime defined under Article 312 is dependent on Article 282. Article 312 'borrows'
the pertinent provision on penalty from Article 282, because Article 312 does not provide a penalty" as
"Article 312 expressly provides that the penalty for the violence shall likewise be imposed in addition
to the fine."

ISSUE:

WON the RTC of Capiz has jurisdiction over cases involving a violation of Article 312 of the Revised
Penal Code where the intimidation employed by the accused consists of a threat to kill

HELD:

Yes. Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code is not as simple as it appears to be. What is meant by the
phrase "by means of violence against or intimidation of persons" and the clause "in addition to the
penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him"? What penalty should be made the basis for
determining which court shall acquire jurisdiction over a case involving a violation of the said Article?

Respondent Judge was wrong in his two (2) inconsistent propositions.

This Court cannot agree with the first which postulates that the threat was the means employed to
occupy the land and is therefore absorbed in the crime defined and penalized in Article 312. The
peculiar theory of absorption would result in an absurdity whereby a grave or less grave felony defined
in paragraph 1 of Article 282 and punished by an afflictive correctional penalty consisting of the
deprivation of liberty, would be absorbed by a crime (Article 312) penalized only by a fine. Neither can
this Court accept his second proposition that Article 282 and Article 312 refer to two (2) separate
crimes, both of which "are simple crimes where only one juridical right or interest is violated." As
already stated, the crime of occupation of real right in property is a single, special and indivisible
crime upon which is imposed a two-tiered penalty. Also, such a proposition obfuscates the first
proposition and ignores the distinction between the two Articles. Article 286 is a crime against personal
security while Article 312 is a crime against real property or real rights thereon.

It does not necessarily mean that the petitioner is correct. This Court finds the proposition of
petitioner similarly erroneous and untenable.

The tenant has, at the very least, a real right over the property -- that of possession -- which both
accused were alleged to have usurped through the threat to kill. Tenant is, therefore, the offended
party who was directly threatened by the accused; while the information expressly states this fact, the
tenant is not, most unfortunately, made the offended party. But since both accused have not yet been
arraigned, the information may be accordingly amended to include the tenant as the offended party. 

The Orders of respondent Judge of 17 July 1991 and 24 July 1991 in Criminal Case No. 3386 are hereby
SET ASIDE. The petitioner may amend the information as suggested above; otherwise, it should be
dismissed because it does not charge an offense.
DIMATULAC v VILLON

Facts:
§ In the prosecution of the Yabuts for the murder of Dimatulac, the Office of the Public Prosecutor
(particularly the Asst Prosecutor) and two Judges (who handled the case) committed serious procedural
flaws resulting in the impairment of due process (prejudicial to both the offended party and the
accused).
§ Procedural irregularities in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor:
o Warrants of arrest were issued by the MCTC, with no bail recommended, but the Yabuts were not
arrested or were never brought unto the custody of the law. Yet, Asst Fiscal Alfonso-Reyes conducted a
reinvestigation. Though a prosecutor may disagree with the findings of the judge who conducted the
preliminary investigation (and conduct his own), the circumstance that the accused waived the filing of
their counter-affidavits left Alfonso-Reyes no other choice but to sustain the MCTC findings—which she
did not do. And later on, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the Yabuts to file their counter-affidavits without first
demanding that they surrender by virtue of the standing warrants of arrest.
o Alfonso-Reyes recommended a bond of 20k for the Yabuts despite the fact that they were charged
of homicide and that they were fugitives from justice (having avoided service of warrant of arrest).
o Alfonso-Reyes was aware of the private prosecution’s appeal to the DOJ from her resolution. (The
subsequent resolution of the DOJ Secretary exposed her blatant errors.) And despite the pending
appeal, she filed the Information. It would be more prudent to wait for the DOJ resolution.
o Office of the Prosecutor did not even inform the trial court of the pending appeal to the DOJ
Secretary.
§ Judge Roura’s procedural lapses:
o Deferred resolution on the motion for a hold departure order until “such time that all the accused
who are out on bail are arraigned”
o Denied the motion to defer proceedings for the reason that “private prosecution has not shown any
indication that the appeal was given due course by DOJ”
§ Judge Villon’s procedural lapses:
o Ordered arraignment despite: a motion to defer proceedings; a ten-day period with which the
complainants can file petition with the CA; resolution of the CA ordering the Yabuts to comment on the
complainants’ action; pending appeal with the DOJ.

Issue:
Can the orders of Judge Roura and Judge Villon be sustained despite procedural defects?

Held:
No. The orders of Judge Roura denying Motion to Defer proceedings are void and set aside. The order
of Judge Villon on the arraignment, and the subsequent arraignment of the Yabuts are void and set
aside. Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is ordered to comply with the DOJ Secretary’s resolution.

Prosecutors are the representatives not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win every case but that justice be done. They are
servants of the law whose two-fold aim is that guilt shall not escape and innocence shall not suffer.

The judge “should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his
obligation to promptly and properly administer justice”. The judge’s action must not impair the
substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of the State and offended party.

When the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court, the acquittal of the accused or dismissal of the case is void.
GALVEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS CASE DIGEST -
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
GALVEZ V. CA                                                                                 G.R. No. 114046 October 24, 1994

FACTS:

On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan,
and one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate informations with homicide and two counts of
frustrated homicide for allegedly shooting to death Alvin Calma Vinculado and seriously wounding Levi
Calma Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr.

On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned, respondent prosecutor filed an E x Parte
Motion to Withdraw Informations of the original informations. This motion was granted by Judge
Villajuan also on December 15, 1993 and the cases were considered withdrawn from the docket of the
court. On the same day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new informations against herein petitioners
for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal
possession of firearms.

Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of jurisdiction was filed by petitioners
before Judge Pornillos on January 3, 1994. At the court session set for the arraignment of petitioners on
January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order denying the motion to quash.

In the meantime, prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge Pornillos, petitioners filed
a motion for reconsideration to Judge Villajuan that the reinstatement of the original informations be
granted. Judge Villajuan granted the MR.

On said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and, in the meanwhile, petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari, petition in its questioned resolution of February 18, 1994, hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations is null and void on the ground that
there was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:
No, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of the trial court petitioners had not yet been
placed in jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and granted before they could be
arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice and hearing thereof.

In actuality, the real grievance of herein accused is not the dismissal of the original three
informations but the filing of four new informations, three of which charge graver offenses and the
fourth, an additional offense. Had these new informations not been filed, there would obviously have
been no cause for the instant petition. Accordingly, their complaint about the supposed procedural
lapses involved in the motion to dismiss filed and granted in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-
93 does not impress us as a candid presentation of their real position.

Petitioner’s contention that the dismissal of the original informations and the consequent filing of the
new ones substantially affected their right to bail is too strained and tenuous an argument. They would
want to ignore the fact that had the original informations been amended so as to charge the capital
offense of murder, they still stood to likewise be deprived of their right to bail once it was shown that
the evidence of guilt is strong. Petitioners could not be better off with amended informations than with
the subsequent ones. It really made no difference considering that where a capital offense is charged
and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a matter of discretion under either an amended or a
new information.

Contrary to petitioners’ submission, the absence of notice and hearing does not divest a trial court of
authority to pass on the merits of the motion. It has been held that—“The order of the court granting
the motion to dismiss despite the absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely
an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The
court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in
such cases is either to have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which
dismissed the complaint or to appeal from the dismissal and not certiorari.”