Thayer Consultancy Background Brief:

ABN # 65 648 097 123

Carlyle A. Thayer
ASEAN Between China and
the United States
September 11, 2020

We are working on a report about ASEAN meetings amid U.S.-China. We request your
analytical input into the following issues:
Q1. How will ASEAN countries respond to the U.S. appeal to stand up to China? Will
they take concrete actions in response, for example. by renegotiating deals with
blacklisted companies?
ANSWER: It is extremely unlikely that ASEAN or any of its ten members will take up
Secretary of State’s Mike Pompeo’s call to stand up to China overtly. Media reports
quote Pompeo as telling his Southeast Asian counterparts, "I think keep going, don’t
just speak up but act. Don’t let the Chinese Communist Party walk over us and our
people. You should have confidence and the Americans will be here in friendship to
help you.” The ASEAN Way, the norms that govern ASEAN’s decision-making, call for
dialogue, not confrontation, and inclusivity. These norms mitigate against ASEAN and
its members taking sides.
The Joint Communique of the 53rd ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held on 9
September makes no direct reference to the growing rivalry between China and the
United States and their pressure on ASEAN or ASEAN members to take sides. Rather,
the ASEAN Joint Communique “welcomed the convening of the 22nd ASEAN-China
Summit (3 November 2019)… [and] looked forward to the convening of the ASEAN-
U.S. Special Summit at a time of mutual convenience, with a view to further
strengthening the ASEAN-U.S. Strategic Partnership.”
The new U.S. Department of Commerce sanctions against twenty-four Chinese
entities are aimed at requiring that American-based companies obtain a license before
they can export U.S. intellectual property and technology to a Chinese listed entity.
These sanctions do not restrict Southeast Asian companies from commercial relations
with the listed entities if U.S. technology is not involved.
However, the U.S. Department of Commerce also designated another thirty-six
entities, including companies in Indonesia and Malaysia, from a range of activities
including “representing an unacceptable risk that U.S.-origin items exported,
reexported, or transferred (in-country) to certain listed entities will be used in military
end-use activities in China and/or in support of programs for the People’s Liberation
Army” or are “contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United
States.”
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Philippines’ President Duterte overruled the advice of his Foreign Secretary Teodoro
Locsin and declared he will not blacklist Chinese companies currently operating in the
Philippines. A subsidiary of the blacklisted China Communications Construction
Company is currently involved in constructing an international airport at Stangley
Point, in Cavite province.
Q2. What concessions will China offer to encourage support, specifically in regard to
the South China Sea or the economy?
China responded to Secretary Pompeo’s July call for an anti-Communist Party of China
coalition by reaching out to Southeast Asian claimant states offering cooperation in
combatting COVID-19, recovery from the pandemic, and urging a step up in the pace
of negotiations on a South China Sea Code of Conduct.
On the eve of the ASEAN 53rd meeting of foreign ministers, China’s State Councilor and
Defence Minister Wei Fenghe toured Southeast Asia meeting the heads of
government and defence ministers in Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines and his
counterpart in Indonesia. Wei promoted three themes during his visit: cooperation to
combat COVID-19, strengthening bilateral defence cooperation, and meeting ASEAN
members “halfway” on the South China Sea. Wei’s counterparts all responded
positively.
Q3. Will ASEAN countries want to or be forced to pick sides between China and the
U.S? What kind of strategies will they employ to navigate this relationship?
It is highly unlikely that ASEAN or any of its ten members will pick sides and they will
resist U.S. pressure to do so. China, after all, is their largest trading partner. Vietnam’s
Minister of National Defence Senior LTGEN Nguyen Chi Vinh recently declared that
nobody will force Vietnam to take sides.
ASEAN made its collective view known on its 53rd anniversary, 8 August, when its
foreign ministers issued a Statement on the Importance of Maintaining Peace and
Stability in Southeast Asia. This statement drew attention to disquieting “geo-political
dynamics” in the region. ASEAN foreign ministers committed to maintaining ASEAN
centrality and ASEAN-led mechanisms, and constructive engagement with ASEAN’s
external partners.
Each ASEAN country will adopt vdifferent strategies in its relations with China and the
United States. On one extreme, Cambodia will bandwagon with China. Others will
adopt various forms of hedging and soft-balancing. Vietnam, for example, pursues a
strategy of “cooperation and struggle” with the major powers, China included.
Malaysia and Brunei both pursue a non-offensive stance towards both Beijing and
Washington. Singapore will be more accommodating to defence interests of the
United States.

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “ASEAN Between China and the United States,”
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, September 11, 2020. All background briefs are
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Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.