G.R. No. 119205. April 15, 1998.

SIME DARBY PILIPINAS, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION (2ND DIVISION) and SIME DARBY SALARIED EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(ALU-TUCP), respondents. Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. vs. NLRC (2nd Division), 289 SCRA
86, G.R. No. 119205 April 15, 1998

Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with
law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage.
They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits as may be provided by law.

The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers
and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall
enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.

The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of
labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns
to investments, and to expansion and growth.

Same; Same; Same; Right to Self-Organization; Where the change effected by management
with regard to working time is made to apply to all factory employees engaged in the same line
of work whether or not they are members of the union, it cannot be said that the new scheme
adopted by management prejudices the right of the union to self-organization.—The case before
us does not pertain to any controversy involving discrimination of employees but only the issue
of whether the change of work schedule, which management deems necessary to increase
production, constitutes unfair labor practice. As shown by the records, the change effected by
management with regard to working time is made to apply to all factory employees engaged in
the same line of work whether or not they are members of private respondent union. Hence, it
cannot be said that the new scheme adopted by management prejudices the right of private
respondent to self-organization. Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. vs. NLRC (2nd Division), 289 SCRA
86, G.R. No. 119205 April 15, 1998
ARTICLE XIII
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect
and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for
the common good.

To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property
and its increments.

Section 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic
opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.

Same; Same; Social Justice; Although the Supreme Court has inclined more often than not
toward the worker and has upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer, such favoritism
has not blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be
dispensed in the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.—While the
Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it
should not be supposed that every dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor.
Management also has rights which, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the
interest of simple fair play. Although this Court has inclined more often than not toward the
worker and has upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer, such favoritism has not
blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in
the light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine. Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc.
vs. NLRC (2nd Division), 289 SCRA 86, G.R. No. 119205 April 15, 1998
Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Workers Union 59 SCRA 54 (1974)
Facts:
Plaintiff is a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers Union who later resigned from his affiliation
to the said union by reason of the prohibition of his religion for its members to become affiliated
with any labor organization. The union has subsisting closed shop agreement in their collective
bargaining agreement with their employer that all permanent employees of the company must
be a member of the union and later was amended by Republic Act No. 3350 with the provision
stating "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".. By his resignation, the union wrote
a letter to the company to separate the plaintiff from the service after which he was informed by
the company that unless he makes a satisfactory arrangement with the union he will be
dismissed from the service. The union contends that RA 3350 impairs obligation of contract
stipulated in their CBA and discriminatorily favors religious sects in providing exemption to be
affiliated with any labor unions.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 3350 impairs the right to form association.
Held:
The court held that what the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee
is the "right" to form or join associations which involves two broad notions, namely: first, liberty
or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself
without being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee may join or refrain
from joining an association. Therefore the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from
joining any union. The exceptions provided by the assailed Republic Act is that members of said
religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have
closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement,
members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on
the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. Thus this
exception does not infringe upon the constitutional provision on freedom of association but
instead reinforces it.
Petitioner Victoriano is a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo and was an employee of Elizalde Rope
Factory and was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union
had with the company a collective bargaining agreement containing a close shop provision
which reads as follows:
"Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent
employees workers covered by this Agreement."
Under Republic Act No. 875 (particularly Section 4(a), paragraph 4), prior to its amendment by
RA 3350, the employer is free to make an agreement with a labor organization to require as a
condition of employment, membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of
the employees.
When, RA 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to — paragraph (4) of section 4(a) of
Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".
Being a member of the INC, a religion that prohibits affiliation with labor organizations, the
Petitioner wrote a letter informing the Union of his resignation to the said union. Thereupon, the
Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Victoriano from the
service because he was resigning from the Union as a member. Company notified Victoriano
and his counsel that unless he could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the union, the
company would have no choice but to dismiss him from the service.
Victoriano, thus file an action to enjoin the company and the union from dismissing him. The CFI
ruled in favor of Petitioner Victoriano and enjoined the company from dismissing him.

In its appeal, the Union claimed that RA no. 3350 was unconstitutional on the ground that:
1. It prohibits all the members of a given religious sect from joining any labor union if such
sect prohibits affiliations of their members thereto; and, consequently, deprives said
members of their constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or organizations
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious [to the] Constitution;

2. It impairs the obligation of contracts;

3. It discriminates in favor of certain religious sects and affords no protection to labor

unions;

4. It violates the constitutional provision that no religious test shall be required for the
exercise of a civil right;

5. It violates the equal protection clause; and

6. It violates the constitutional provision regarding the promotion of social justice.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Republic Act No. 3350 prohibits all the members of a given religious sect
from joining any labor union if such sect prohibits affiliations of their members thereto;
and, consequently, deprives said members of their constitutional right to form or join
lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus becomes
obnoxious [to the] Constitution;

2. Whether or not Republic Act No. 3350 impairs the obligation of contracts;

3. Whether or not Republic Act No. 3350 discriminates in favor of certain religious sects
and affords no protection to labor unions;

4. Whether or not Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional provision that no
religious test shall be required for the exercise of a civil right;

5. Whether or not Republic Act No. 3350 violates the equal protection clause; and

6. Whether or not Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional provision regarding the
promotion of social justice.
Held:
1. No. Union’s contention that Republic Act No. 3350 prohibits and bans the members of such
religious sects that forbid affiliation of their members with labor unions from joining labor unions
appears nowhere in the wording of RA 3350. Both the Constitution and RA 875 recognize
freedom of association. Section 1 (6) of Article III of the Constitution of 1935, as well as Section
7 of Article IV of the Constitution of 1973, provide that the right to form associations or societies
for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875
provides that employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join of assist labor
organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection.
What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the “right” to
form or join associations, whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by
law; and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining
an association.

2. Appellant Union also contends that the Act is unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of
its contract, specifically, the “union security clause” embodied in its Collective Bargaining
Agreement with the Company, by virtue of which “membership in the union was required as a
condition for employment for all permanent employees workers”. This agreement was already in
existence at the time RA was enacted on June 18, 1961, and it cannot, therefore, be deemed to
have been incorporated into the agreement. But by reason of this amendment, Appellee, as well
as others similarly situated, could no longer be dismissed from his job even if he should cease
to be a member, or disaffiliate from the Union, and the Company could continue employing him
notwithstanding his disaffiliation from the Union. The Act, therefore, introduced a change into
the express terms of the union security clause; the Company was partly absolved by law from
the contractual obligation it had with the Union of employing only Union members in permanent
positions. It cannot be denied, therefore, that there was indeed an impairment of said union
security clause. Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, 59 SCRA 54, No. L-25246
September 12, 1974
3. No. The constitutional provision into only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious
tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship, but also assures the free
exercise of one’s chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that
the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and
to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common
good.
The purpose of RA 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or religious or holy and
eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the
free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from
work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means
of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements. To help its citizens to find gainful
employment whereby they can make a living to support themselves and their families is a valid
objective of the state.

4. No. The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful association
membership in any particular religion or in any religious sect; neither does the Act require
affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a
condition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor union. Joining or withdrawing from a labor
union requires a positive act. Republic Act No. 3350 only exempts members with such religious
affiliation from the coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector
is not required to do a positive act—to exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is
exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on his part.
5. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification
in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in
speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it
goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This
Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
SC believes that RA 3350 satisfies the aforementioned requirements. The Act classifies
employees and workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop security agreements, into
those who by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up with a labor union,
and those whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions. The classification rests
on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. There is such real
distinction in the beliefs, feelings and sentiments of employees. Employees do not believe in the
same religious faith and different religions differ in their dogmas and cannons.
6. No. Appellant’s further contention that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional
provision on social justice is also baseless. Social justice is intended to promote the welfare of
all the people. RA 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the welfare of those who,
because of their religious belief, cannot join labor unions; the Act prevents their being deprived
of work and of the means of livelihood.