G.R. No. 205298               September 10, 2014
Pedro was wielding a samurai, Lando, Narciso and
EOPOLDO QUINTOS y DELAMOR, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the
Decision2 dated 31 July 2012 and Resolution3 dated 11
January 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
33776, affirming the Joint Decision4 dated 20 October 2010 of
the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan (trial court) in
Criminal Case Nos. L-8340, L-8341 and L-8342.
The Facts
Petitioner Leopoldo Quintos y Del Amor (p~titioner) was
charged, in conspiracy with his brothers Pedro, Rolly and
Lando, all surnamed Quintos, and Narciso Bµni for frustrated
homicide and homicide.
The Information5 in Criminal Case No. L-8341 reads, in part:
That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy.
Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused in conspiracywith
each other, with intent to kill, did then and there, wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo and
samurai Robert M. dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds,
several lacerations and contusions on the different parts of his
body, thus, the accused performedall the acts of execution
which would produce homicide as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of the timely medical
intervention applied on him that prevented his death, to the
prejudice and damage of the said Robert dela Cruz.
CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The Information6 in Criminal Case No. L-8342 reads, in part:
That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy.
Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused in conspiracy with
each other, with intent to kill, did then and there, wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo and
samurai Felomina dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds and
several lacerations on the different parts of her body, thus, the
accused performed all the acts of execution which would
produce homicide as a consequence but which,nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of the timely medical intervention
applied on him that prevented his (sic) death, to the prejudice
and damage of the said Felomina dela Cruz.
CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised
Penal Code.
In Criminal Case No. L-8340, an Amended Information7 was
filed when the victim Freddie dela Cruz died:
That on or about January 15, 2008 in the afternoon at Brgy.
Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused in conspiracy with
each other, with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously accost, maul and hack with bolo and
samurai Freddie dela Cruz who suffered hacking wounds on
the different parts of his body, which caused his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of Freddie dela Cruz.
CONTRARY to Article 249 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Of the five accused, Pedro Quintos, Narciso Buni and
petitioner were arrested. Rolly and Lando evaded arrest and
remainat large. Petitioner, Pedro and Narciso all pled not guilty
to the charges brought against them.
The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Eduardo
Oyando, Felomina dela Cruz, Robert dela Cruz, Police Officer
Bernardo Cerezo, and Dr. Saniata V. Fernandez.
The defense presented two witnesses, namely, petitioner and
Pedro Quintos. Narciso Buni jumped bail before he could
testify. Petitioner’s sister was also scheduled to testify, but
since her testimony would only be corroborative, the
prosecution admitted her testimony.8
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution established that at about 3:30 p.m. of 15
January 2008, Freddie dela Cruz, Robert dela Cruz, Felomina
dela Cruz, and Eduardo Oyando were walking along the
barangay road of Laois, Labrador, Pangasinan. They were on
their way to the town proper when they were accosted by
Pedro Quintos, Rolly Quintos, Lando Quintos,Narciso Buni and
petitioner.
petitioner were carrying bolos, and Rolly was holding a big
stone. Robert, Freddie, Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, and
Eduardo Oyando ran back towards their house, but the five
attackers caught up with them.
Pedro struck Robert dela Cruz withthe samurai, but the latter
parried the attack with his left hand. Robert dela Cruz
attempted to gain control of the samurai, but Rolly hit him in
the face, near the jaw, with the stone Rolly was carrying.
Robert dela Cruz lost his hold of the samurai and fell to the
ground.
Lando struck Freddie dela Cruz at the back of his head, which
caused the latter to fall face up. Petitioner joined Lando in
hacking Freddie dela Cruz, who, while defending himself with
his hands, sustained injuries on his right hand and lost a few
fingers on his left. Rolly then crushed Freddie dela Cruz’s
chest with the same stone he usedto hit Robert dela Cruz in
the face.
Pedro advanced towards Felomina dela Cruz as the latter
moved towards Robert dela Cruz. Pedro pulledFelomina dela
Cruz’s hair, slashed her nape with the samurai, and then
kicked her to the ground.
Eduardo Oyando was forced to stand aside and was prevented
from helping the dela Cruzes because Narciso Buni was
aiming a bolo at him. The attackers left when they were done,
and only then was Eduardo Oyando able to approach the
victims and call for help.
Robert, Freddie and Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, were
brought to the hospital. They were treated for the injuries
sustained from the attack.
After a few days, Freddie dela Cruz diedfrom his injuries.
Before he died, Freddie dela Cruz identified Pedro and Lando
Quintos as his attackers.
Version of the Defense
The defense presented a different version of the events. In the
afternoon of 15 January 2008, Robert, Freddie, Felomina, all
surnamed dela Cruz, and Eduardo Oyando came to the
Quintos’ house looking for trouble. Pedro, who was in the front
portion ofthe house, went out to try and pacify them. Robert
dela Cruz punched Pedro first, hitting him in the face. Robert
dela Cruz then went to Felomina dela Cruz and took a bolo
wrapped in a towel that the latter was holding. Pedro and
Robert dela Cruz grappled for the bolo. Felomina dela Cruz
approached the two and tried to help Robert dela Cruz, and in
the process got slashed with the bolo. The scuffle resulted in
Robert dela Cruz falling to the ground and Pedro gaining
control of the bolo.
Pedro then noticed that Freddie dela Cruz, who was holding a
bolo, was fighting with Lando. Pedro hurried over and hacked
Freddie dela Cruz to defend his brother Lando. According to
Pedro, his senses dimmed and he did not remember how
many times hehacked Freddie dela Cruz. His brothers pacified
him, and Pedro went with them back to the house; while
Robert, Freddie and Felomina, all surnamed dela Cruz, were
brought to the hospital.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the version of the
prosecution. Petitioner was found guilty for the crime of
homicide for the death of Freddie dela Cruz. However, the trial
court held that the uncertainty on the nature of the wounds of
Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz warrants the
appreciation of a lesser gravity of the crime from frustrated
homicide to attempted homicide.9
The dispositive portion ofthe Joint Decision dated 20 October
2010 reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court finds:
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8340
Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and
NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of HOMICIDE as defined in Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code. The prescribed penalty for Homicide is reclusion
temporalwhich is from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty one (1)
degree lower than the imposable penalty which is Prision
Mayorin its full extent, the range of which is from six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Appreciating no
mitigating circumstances in favor of the accused, the accused
is accordingly sentenced from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as maximum.
Accused are further ORDERED to pay the heirs of Freddie
Dela Cruz, the amounts of (a) Php 75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (b) Php 75,000.00 as moral damages; (c) Php
57,286.00 as actual damages; (d) and Php 15,000.00 as
attorney’s fees.
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8341
Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and
NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and are meted with an
indeterminate sentence of Two (2) months and One (1) day of
arresto mayoras minimum to Two (2) years, Four (4) months
and One (1) day of prision correccionalas maximum.
Accused are furthered (sic) ordered to pay Robert dela Cruz
actual damages in the amount of Php 1,650.00and moral
damages in the amount of Php 15,000.00.
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. L-8342
Accused PEDRO QUINTOS, POLDO QUINTOS and
NARCISO BUNI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and are meted with an
indeterminate sentence of Two (2) months and One (1) day or
arresto mayoras minimum to Two (2) years, Four (4) months
and One (1) day of prision correccionalas maximum.
Accused are furthered (sic) ordered to pay Felomina dela Cruz
actual damages in the amount of Php 3,750.00 and moral
damages in the amount of Php 15,000.00.
In all cases, considering that Pedro Quintos and Poldo Quintos
have undergone preventive imprisonment,they shall be
credited in the service of their sentences with the time they
have undergone preventive imprisonment subject to the
conditionsprovided for in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.10
Petitioner and Pedro Quintos appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court gravely erred in
convicting them despite the prosecution’s failure to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals found the appeal bereft of merit, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the
assailed Joint Decision dated October 20, 2010of the Regional
Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, inCriminal
Case Nos. L-8340, L-8341 and L-8342 is AFFIRMED IN
TOTO.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for: (1) affirming the
conviction, despite the prosecution’s failure to prove
petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) finding that
conspiracy exists, in particular, that a finding of conspiracy
should not be leftto conjecture, in light of the alleged failure of
the prosecution to present evidence that petitioner took part in
inflicting injuries on the victims in furtherance ofa common
design to kill.12
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
Review of Questionsof Fact Improper
The review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
limited to questions of law. This Court does not weigh all over
again the evidence already consideredin the proceedings
below.13 The narrow ambit of review prescribed under this rule
allows us to swiftly dispose of such appeals. This rule, of
course, admits of exceptions applicable to those rare petitions
whose peculiar factual milieu justifies relaxation of the Rules
such as based on speculation or conjectures, or overlooked
undisputed facts which, if duly considered, lead to a different
conclusion.14
In the present case, petitioner finds fault in the decisions of the
trial and appellate courts, alleging that had the said courts
given weight to the defense evidence, conviction would not
have been justified. This is clearly an invitation for the Court to
review the probative value of the evidence presented in the
proceedings below.
A question of law arises when there isdoubt as to what the law
is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact
when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts.15 For a question to be one of law, the same must not
involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants.16 Once it is clear that the issue
invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed
is one of fact.17
Petitioner attempts to justify the review of facts by alleging that
the courts a quo indulged in conjectures and surmises.
However, a careful reading of the decisions of the trial and
appellate courts shows that such is not the case here. The
discussion of the trial court deals extensively with evidence
from both sides, weighing each accordingly. Similarly, the
appellate court evaluated the evidenceof the prosecution and
the defense alike.
Uniform findings of factof the trial and appellate courts deserve
grave respect, and in the absence of any compelling reason to
deviate therefrom, are final and conclusive upon this Court. We
thus proceed with our review without disturbing the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Petitioner avers that his conviction was not supported by proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. His argumentrevolves mainly
on self-defense, defense of relatives and absence of
conspiracy.
We are not persuaded. The records of this case show that the
prosecution witnesses Eduardo Oyando, Robert dela Cruz and
Felomina dela Cruz positively and consistently identified the
accused and relayed the sequence of events. Their
testimonies are corroborated by the evidence presented by the
doctors who attended the hacking victims, as well as by the
police officer who took the statement ofFreddie dela Cruz
before the latter died.
We must emphasize that the trial court found the prosecution
witnesses credible. The assessment ofthe trial court on this
point is generally binding on this Court, and noneof the
exceptions to this rule are obtaining here. Further, the trial
court found that the prosecution witnesses did not have any
motive to testify falsely against the accused.
Pedro Quintos admitted to hacking Robert dela Cruz and
Freddie dela Cruz, and hitting Felomina dela Cruz, invoking
self-defense. Because of Pedro’s admissions, he and his co-
conspirators assumed the burden to establish such defense by
credible, clear and convincing evidence;
otherwise, the same admissions would lead to their
conviction.18
We held in People v. Nugas:
x x x Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is
uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or
when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, the accused
must discharge the burden of proof by relying on the strength
of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the State’s
evidence, because the existence of self-defense is a separate
issue from the existence ofthe crime, and establishing
selfdefense does not require orinvolve the negation of any of
the elements of the offense itself.
To escape liability, the accused must show by sufficient,
satisfactory and convincing evidence that: (a) the victim
committed unlawful aggression amounting to an actual or
imminent threat to the life and limb of the accused claiming
self-defense; (b) there was reasonable necessity in the means
employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c)
there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
accused claiming self-defense or at least any provocation
executed by the accused claiming self-defense was not the
proximate and immediate cause of the victim’s aggression.19
Both petitioner and Pedro also testified that Pedro hacked
Freddie in defense of their brother Lando.20 The defense of
relatives argument likewise fails in light of the lack of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victims. For the accused to be
entitled to exoneration based on defense of relatives, complete
or incomplete, it is essential that there be unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim, for if there is no unlawful aggression,
there would be nothing to prevent or repel.21
The discussion of the Court of Appeals on this point is well-
taken:
We are hardly persuaded by accused-appellants’ allegations
that they were acting in self-defense because the victims were
committing unlawful aggression. We foundthe following
loopholes:
First, as Pedro claims in his testimony, the dela Cruzes were
shouting for the brothers of Pedro tocome out of the house. No
actual sudden or imminent attack, however, was performed. It
has been ruled that mere intimidating or threatening words,
even if said aloud, do not constitute unlawful aggression. Thus,
in People vs. Cajurao, the Supreme Court held that:
There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete unless
there is clear and convincing proof of unlawful aggression on
the partof the victim. The unlawful aggression, a constitutive
element of self-defense, must be real or at least imminent and
not merely imaginary. A belief that a person is about to be
attacked is not sufficient. Even an intimidating or threatening
attitude is by no means enough. Unlawful
aggressionpresupposes an actual or imminent danger on the
life or limb of a person. Mere shouting, an[d] intimidating or
threatening attitude of the victim does not constitute unlawful
aggression. Unlawful aggression refers to an attack that has
actually broken out or materialized or at the very least is clearly
imminent; it cannot consist in oral threats or merely a
threatening stance or posture.
Furthermore, as Pedro testified, the dela Cruzes were shouting
for his brothers to go out, but then, Pedro was the one who
went out. If, indeed, the dela Cruzes had some anger or
aggression at that time, it was definitely not directed at Pedro.
Then, as Pedro went down to pacify the dela Cruzes, Pedro
and Robert dela Cruz engaged in a fist fight. Robert turned and
ran towards his mother, Felomina to allegedly get a bolo which
was in Felomina’s possession and concealed under a towel.
Ifthis is true, Robert had already retreated and was trying to
arm himself to level the supposed fight with Pedro. Thus, from
Pedro’s narration, itcannot be definitely said that the dela
Cruzes went to the house of the accused-appellants with the
determined intention to inflict serious harm on Pedro.
Second, Pedro claims that he was trying to defend his brother
Lando Quintos who was lying on the ground and being
attacked by the deceased Freddie dela Cruz. According to him,
he hacked Freddie before the latter could stab Lando. Pedro
would like to impress upon the court that Lando was also
involved in the fight against the dela Cruzes. However, in the
same testimony, Pedro said that it was he alone who was
fighting Robert, Freddie and Felomina, and that his brothers,
including Lando, were "just there, sir, pacifying."
Third, despite the alleged savagery that transpired,
surprisingly, accused-appellants did not report the incident to
the police. During crossexamination, Pedro admitted that:
Q: After you were threatened and you did not report of the
alleged incident that happened on January 15 as what you are
telling now?
A: No sir.
Q: In fact even after you were allegedly brought to the hospital
and you were treated you did not even rel[a]y to the police or
even to your barangay the alleged incident which you are now
narrating, am I correct?
A: I was not able to report anymore because after I was treated
to the hospital I was brought directly to the jail, sir.
It is doctrinal that, for evidence to be believed, it must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. We find it difficult to believe that accused-
appellants, who vehemently claim to be the aggrieved parties,
did not report the incident tothe police. Pedro’s alleged
treatment or confinement in the hospital did notprevent them
from doing so. Pedro had at least three brothers: Poldo, Rolly
and Lando; not to mention his mother and sister, who could
have easily gone to the police to report the alleged attack upon
them by the delaCruzes. This omission, therefore, casts doubt
on the veracity of the account of the accused-appellants.
Lastly, the nature of the wounds inflicted on the deceased and
the other victims negate[s] the accused-appellants’ claim of
self-defense. According to the medical certificate of Freddie
dela Cruz, he suffered cardio-respiratory arrest, septicemia
and multiple hacking wounds. Then, in the death certificate, it
was further stated that Freddie dela Cruz suffered "amputation
of left and right hand." Meanwhile, with respect to Robert dela
Cruz, the attending physician, Dr. Saniata V. Fernandez,
testified that the victim suffered lacerated wounds on the
forehead, lower lip and left hand. As for Felomina dela Cruz,
she also suffered almost similar lacerated wounds.
It has been ruled that the presence of a large number of
wounds on the part of the victim, their nature and location
disprove self-defense and instead indicate a determined effort
to kill the victim[s]. In the case at bar, as already explained, the
wounds on Freddie, Robert and Felomina, all surnamed dela
Cruz, negate accused-appellant’s claim of self-defense.
We have contrasted the claim of self-defense to the evidence
presented by the prosecution and this Court believes that the
version of the latter is more credible and consistent with the
truth. As a matter of fact, by simply admitting that they attacked
Freddie dela Cruz and the two other victims, the case against
the accused-appellants had become irrefutable. x x x.22
Existence of Conspiracy
Petitioner alleges that the prosecution did not present evidence
of his participation in the attacks on Robert dela Cruz and
Felomina dela Cruz. He also argues that his mere presence
during the said attacks does not by itself show concurrence of
wills and unity of purpose.
Petitioner’s presence during the commission of the crime was
wellestablished as he himself testified to that
fact.1âwphi1 Assuming that he was merely present during the
attack, inaction does not exculpate him. To exempt himself
from criminal liability, a conspirator must have performed an
overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to
commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof.23
Indeed, mere presence does not signify conspiracy. However,
neither does it indicate the lack thereof Conspiracy can be
inferred from and established by the acts of the accused
themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest.24 In fact, the
prosecution established that petitioner was actively involved in
the attack on Freddie dela Cruz.
In People v. De Leon,25 we held:.
x x x To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every
detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act
or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the
others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator
may be assigned separate and different tasks which may
appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole
collective effort to achieve their. common criminal objective.
Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators. The precise extent or mo[r]ality of participation of
each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators
are principals.
The acts of petitioner before, during and after the attacks on
Robert dela Cruz and Felomina dela Cruz disclose his
agreement with the joint purpose and design in the commission
of the felony. The facts, found by the trial and appellate
courts,.establish that petitioner, together with his brothers and
Narciso Buni, all of them armed, accosted the dela Cruzes,
and gave chase even as the latter were retreating towards their
house. During the attacks, each conspirator had a different
task. After the attacks, all the accused left the felled dela
Cruzes for dead, clearly showing their united purpose in the
felonies committed. The act of one is the act of all. With the
conspiracy proved, the conviction of petitioner was in order.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 July 2012 and the
Resolution dated 11 January 2013 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33776.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-32624 February 12, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. PACIANO NIERRA alias Pacing, GAUDENCIA NIERRA,
FELICISIMO DOBLEN alias Simoy and VICENTE
ROJAS, accused-appellants; GASPAR MISA, accused
whose death sentence is under automatic review.
Felicisimo Doblen, Vicente Rojas and the spouses Pagano
Nierra and Gaudencia Nierra appealed from the decision dated
March 4, 1970 of Judge Pedro Samson C. Animas of the Court
of First Instance of South Cotabato, General Santos City
Branch II, convicting them of murder, sentencing each of them
to death and ordering them to pay solidarity an indemnity of
twelve thousand pesos to the heirs of the victim Juliana Nierra
(Criminal Case No. 2081).
Gaspar Misa, who pleaded guilty to the murder charge, was
also sentenced to death and ordered to pay a similar indemnity
(Decision of August 25, 1969, pp. 36-8, Record). His death
sentence is under automatic review.
According to the evidence of the prosecution, Juliana
Gadugdug-Nierra, 52, and Pagano Nierra, 39, her brother-
inlaw, were competitors in the businesses of launch
transportation and the sale of soft drinks in Barrio Tinago,
General Santos City. Juliana sold coca-cola while Pagano sold
pepsi-cola. Juliana was the owner of two motor
launches, Elsa I and II, while Paciano was the owner of two
launches, Sylvania I and II. Juliana was the wife of Aniceto
Nierra, Paciano's elder brother. To mollify Pagano, by
diminishing the competition between their launches, Aniceto
sold Elsa II. Nonetheless, Aniceto and Paciano were not on
speaking terms.
In order to monopolize those businesses in the locality,
Paciano Nierra conceived the Idea of liquidating his competitor,
Juliana. For that purpose, Felicisimo Doblen, a cousin-in-law of
Paciano, accompanied to Paciano's house in the afternoon of
July 4, 1969 Gaspar Misa, 29, a convicted murderer who in
1965 had escaped from the Davao Penal Colony (Exh. E-4 and
E-5, pp. 10-11, Folder of Exhibits). Misa came to Barrio Tinago
in June, 1969. He resided with his cousin, Silvestre Misa. (See
Pareja vs. Gomez and People, 115 Phil. 820.)
Upstairs in the bedroom of Paciano's house, Misa, in the
presence of Gaudencia Garrido-Nierra, the wife of Paciano,
agreed to kill Juliana in consideration of three thousand pesos.
Paciano promised that in the morning after the killing he would
pay Misa four hundred pesos near the municipal hall of Tupi,
South Cotabato which is about forty kilometers away from
General Santos City. The balance would be paid in the same
place on August 12, 1969.
That arrangement was confirmed by Gaudencia. When Misa
scheduled the assassination on July 8, 1969, Pagano said that
it was up to Misa since he was the one who would kill Juliana.
In the evening of July 6, 1969, Doblen, in behalf of Pagano
Nierra, delivered to Misa at the beach a package containing a
caliber .38 pistol with five bullets. Misa contacted his friend,
Vicente Rojas, and apprised him that he (Misa) had been hired
to kill Juliana. Misa asked Rojas to act as lookout on the night
of July 8, 1969 when the killing would be perpetrated.
On that night, Rojas posted himself at the Bernadette store
near the creek or canal about twenty-seven steps from the
scene of the crime. Gaudencia was stationed near the house
of Maning Desinorio about eighteen steps from the scene of
the crime. Pagano was near the house of Juanito Desinorio
about twenty-seven steps from the scene of the crime. The
houses of the two Desinorios were separated from the house
of Juliana Nierra by an alley.
Misa secluded himself near a warehouse about five steps from
the scene of the crime in close proximity to the back of
Juliana's house where. as he had previously observed some
nights before, she used to answer the call of nature. The house
was at the back of the Esso Gas Station near the beach of
Sarangani Bay at Barrio Tinago, General Santos City.
Between seven and eight o'clock that night, the unwary Juliana
went to the beach where she was accustomed to void and
when she squatted, Misa unexpectedly appeared behind her,
held her hair, thus tilting her face, and while in that posture, he
inserted into her mouth the muzzle of the pistol and fired it.
Paciano and Gaudencia, who were near the beach, witnessed
the actual killing.
The postmortem examination disclosed that Juliana sustained
a gunshot wound in the tongue. The bullet passed through the
buccal cavity down to the spinal column where the slug was
extracted.
Aniceto Nierra, on hearing the gunshot and the ensuing
commotion, went down from the house and saw his prostrate
wife with blood oozing from her mouth and nose. Her panty
was pulled down, her dress was raised up to her waist, and her
genital organ was exposed. At the hospital, the doctor
pronounced her dead.
After firing the gun, Misa walked slowly on the beach in front of
Paciano and Gaudencia, passed by the alley between the
houses of Tony Desinorio and Francisco Desinorio, emerged
at the back of the Esso Gas Station crossed the creek or canal
on the west, reached the Lagao road, threw the gun into the
dense talahib grass and rode on a bus. He proceeded to the
Saint Elizabeth Hospital. Then, he changed his mind and
returned to the beach near the victim's house.
The Nierra spouses left the scene of the crime by passing
through the alley between the house of the victim and the
Desinorio houses, which alley separated the building of the
Northern Lines and the Matutum Hotel from the Esso Gas
Station, and emerged on A. Morrow Boulevard which intersects
Saguing Street where Paciano and Gaudencia resided. Their
residence was about two hundred meters away from the scene
of the crime.
A witness, residing at Morrow Boulevard, who happened to be
at the Villa Bus Terminal at around eight-thirty in the evening of
July 8, 1969, when the killing was perpetrated, testified that
she saw Pagano Nierra wearing an underwear and striped T-
short running from Saguing Street to Barrio Tinago. About five
minutes later, she saw Pagano the boulevard and running
towards Saguing Street. He was wearing long pants. The
witness made a statement to the police about what she had
seen.
Early in the morning of the next day, Misa took a bus bound for
Tupi and alighted near the municipal building. Paciano Nierra
arrived in that place and gave him four hundred pesos. Misa
returned to General Santos City, gave fifty pesos to Rojas, and
proceeded to the victim's house where he mingled with the
persons playing cards and domino. He kept vigil there, staying
there for four nights.
He resumed his old job of looking for passengers for the ,
buses and the pumpboat of Rojas. He received a commission
of one peso per passenger. Policemen arrested him and Rojas
as for questioning but they were later released. He left the city
and brought his family to Barrio Luan, Maitum South Cotabato.
There, he was arrested again, this time by Constabulary
soldiers.
On August 7, 1969, Misa was interrogated by Patrolman A.B.
Vencer Jr. of the city police department. He signed a
confession admitting the killing of Juliana Nierra and
implicating the other accused therein. The statement was
sworn to before the fiscal. Two days later, he reenacted the
killing. Photographs were taken of the reenactment. A sketch
of the scene of the crime was prepared.
On August 11, 1969, Misa testified at the preliminary in-
vestigation. In his testimony, he admitted again the killing and
confirmed his confession implicating Paciano Nierra, his wife
Gaudencia, Doblen and Rojas. He executed another
confession on August 12, 1969 which was sworn to before the
city judge.
Thirty-seven days after the killing or on August 14, 1969, Misa,
Doblen, Rojas and the Nierra spouses, as co-conspirators,
were charged with murder aggravated by reward, treachery,
evident premeditation, nocturnity, ignominy and abuse of
superiority and, as to Misa, recidivism, since he had been
sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the murder of Antonio
Abad Tormis in Cebu City.
As already stated, Misa pleaded guilty. At the trial of his co
accused, his confessions and testimony were offered by the
prosecution and were the main bases of the judgment of
conviction and the imposition of the death penalty.
As separate briefs were filed for the defendants, their individual
cases will be separately reviewed.
Misa's case. — His counsel de oficio contends that Misa made
an improvident plea because the trial court allegedly failed to
explain thoroughly to him the gravity of the offense and the
consequences of his plea of guilty.
That contention is not well-taken. Misa, as an escaped
prisoner, had acquired some experience in criminal procedure.
Not only that. He executed two extrajudicial confessions. He
reenacted the crime as the triggerman He testified at the
preliminary investigation, and, after he was sentenced to
death, he was the prosecution star witness during the trial of
his co-accused. His testimony against his co-accused,
delineating their roles in the commission of the killing, which he
had perpetrated, fortified his plea of guilty and removed any
scintilla of doubt as to his culpability and as to his
understanding of the consequences of his mea culpa (See
People vs. Duaban, L-31912, August 24, 1979).
Under the circumstances, we cannot grant counsel de
oficio's prayer that the judgment of conviction be set aside and
that the case be remanded to the lower court for new trial To
hold a new trial. wherein Misa himself would again be the star
prosecution witness, would be a repetitious and preposterous
ceremony.
The case of the Nierra spouses. — They denied any complicity
in the killing of Juliana Nierra. Their version is that in the
evening of July 8, 1969, at about eight o'clock in the evening,
Paciano Nierra was inside a room of his house. Gaudencia
Nierras was in her room, writing something. Eduardo Nierra,
the couple's son, was alone in the sala while Encarnacion
Sabihon a housemaid, was somewhere in the house premises.
Paciano heard somebody coming up the house. When he
came out of the room, he met Nolasco Docallos who said that
Juliana Nierra was shot. Paciano Nierra asked who shot her.
Docallos answered that he did not know.
Docallos asked Paciano for permission to use the latter's
motorcycle in going to the hospital. Paciano instructed his son
Eduardo to render assistance. Paciano could not go out
because two years before he had undergone a surgical
operation in Cebu City. Gaudencia could not leave the children
alone in the house. Eduardo phoned from the funeral parlor
that Juliana was already dead.
At about five-thirty in the morning of the following day,
Gaudencia went to the funeral parlor. She talked with Rodelio,
the son of Juliana. Aniceto Nierra, her brother-in-law and
husband of the victim, did not answer when she tried to talk
with him.
Paciano woke up at six o'clock that morning. He and his wife
and their Muslim friend Pandita E. Saguil and Fernando Erro,
the uncle of Paciano, boarded a bus and went to Tupi
ostensibly to buy bamboos for the outrigger of a vinta, a trip
which the Nierra spouses had previously agreed upon with
Saguil. They arrived in Tupi at past ten o'clock. They were not
able to buy bamboos. They ate lunch at the Fernandez
Restaurant.
The group returned to General Santos City, arriving there at
two o'clock in the afternoon. They went to the funeral parlor.
They were not able to talk with Aniceto Nierra. In the evening
of that day, Gaudencia led the prayers for the repose of the
soul of Juliana and she performed that task on the second,
third and fourth nights. She did not lead the prayers on the
succeeding nights because she was advised that it was bad for
her to do so. Their child attended the novena Paciano could
not attend the novena because he had kidney trouble. They
gave one hundred pesos to Juliana's family as contribution to
the funeral expenses.
The Nierra spouses attended the funeral. During the burial,
Aniceto lost consciousness and collapsed Paciano revived him
by pressing his abdomen. After the coffin was placed in the
tomb, Paciano closed the niche. The Nierra spouses gave to
Aniceto an additional two hundred pesos (Pars. 5-6 and 9-15,
pp. 6-11, Appellants' Brief).
Appellants Nierra contend that Misa was not a credible witness
because he was a recidivist and his testimony is riddled with
inconsistencies. That contention is devoid of merit.
Misa testified against his own penal interest. The basic point in
his confessions and testimony was that he was hired by the
Nierra spouses, through Doblen to kill Juliana for the price of
three thousand pesos. That is sufficient for the conviction of
the Nierra spouses as the inducers of the assassination of
Juliana. The discrepancies in his testimony refer to minor
details.
And the fact that the Nierra spouses did not comply with their
contractual commitment to pay Misa the balance of two
thousand six hundred pesos must have impelled him to
unmask them and to reveal the truth even if such a revelation
speeled his own destruction.
The contention that there was no proof of conspiracy among
the accused is belied by the facts shown in the record. Misa
had no personal motive for killing Juliana Nierra. He was
induced to do so because of the monetary consideration
promised by the Nierra spouses. Doblen (Simoy), married to
Paciano's cousin, introduced Misa to the Nierra spouses.
Before Juliana's assassination, Gaudencia had contracted
Misa to kill Nene Amador, her former housemaid, who was
allegedly Paciano's mistress. That projected killing did not
materialize.
Appellants Nierra contend that Misa's testimony as to the
alleged conspiracy is inadmissible in view of the rule that "the
act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy
and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the
co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other
than such act or declaration" (Sec. 27, Rule 130, Rules of
Court).
It is argued that before Misa's testimony could be admitted as
evidence against appellants Nierra, the alleged conspiracy
must first be proven by evidence other than such testimony
and that there is no such independent evidence. This argument
is wrong. It is not supported by action 27 of Rule 130
Section 27 "applies only to extrajudicial acts or declarations but
not to testimony given on the stand at the trial where the
defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant"
(People vs. Serrano, 105 Phil. 531, 541).
Appellants Nierra contend that the trial court erred in finding
that the motive for the killing was to stifle business competition.
This argument is refuted by the testimonies of Aniceto Nierra
and his son Rodelio which show that Paciano Nierra was
antagonistic to his sister-in-law, Juliana, the manager or
"brains" of Aniceto's transportation and coca-cola distribution
businesses.
In 1967, Paciano attempted to destroy Aniceto's launch, Elsa
II, while it was under construction. Aniceto had to sell that
launch because of Paciano's threat that somebody would be
hurt if its operation was continued. Pagano told Rodelio that
the latter's mother, Juliana, who was pockmarked was bad and
dominated her husband Aniceto. On two occasions, Paciano
even challenged his brother to a fight.
Another contention of the appellants is that the trial court
convicted them on the basis of the hearsay testimonies of
Guillermo Sanchez and Jose Samoya. This argument is
misleading. The judgment of conviction was anchored
principally on the confessions and testimony of Misa, the tool
used by the Nierra spouses in encompassing Juliana's death.
Misa's evidence cannot be regarded as hearsay.
The testimonies of Sanchez and Samoya merely proved that
Misa, Rojas and Doblen were implicated in the killing of Juliana
Nierra. It was the affidavit of Sanchez, linking Misa to the
killing, that gave the police a breakthrough in the solution of the
case. After the connection of Misa with the crime was
established, the police arrested him and obtained his
confessions which implicated appellants Nierra as the
investigators.
The Nierras in their fifth assignment of error contend that the
trial court erred in admitting as evidence the affidavit of
appellant Vicente Rojas (Exh. J) which was obtained through
an alleged promise of immunity. The record is not clear as to
that promise of immunity. Rojas' statement was taken on
August 1, 1969. On August 12, he testified at the pre
investigation. The record of his testimony before the fiscal was
signed by him. He was assisted by counsel at that pre
investigation. (Exh. K et seq.) No promise of immunity was
shown to have been made by the fiscal to Rojas.
In any event, his affidavit is a minor piece of evidence and is
cumulative in character. As already stated, the crucial and
decisive evidence consists of Misa's testimony and
confessions.
Appellants Nierra complain that lawyer Cornelio Falgui acted
acted the preliminary investigation as counsel of appellant
Doblen, having been allegedly hired by the offended party,
Aniceto Nierra, and then at the trial, he acted as counsel de
oficio of Misa who pleaded guilty. He also appeared for Doblen
(6 and 19 tsn).
The alleged double role of Falgui cannot be regarded as
having unduly prejudiced appellants Nierra who, as already
noted, were convicted on the basis of Misa's confessions and
testimony. The appellants have not successfully overthrown or
rebutted Misa's evidence.
It was Doblen who acted as a double agent. He was a tool of
Paciano Nierra and at the same time he posed as a friend on
Aniceto Nierra by pretending that he had no hand in the
assassination of Aniceto's wife.
We are convinced that the guilt of appellants Nierra was
proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the night of the shooting,
Paciano Nierra and Gaudencia Nierra did not go to the funeral
parlor to view the remains of Juliana.
After Paciano and Gaudencia were charged with murder, there
was a confrontation between the said spouses and Aniceto
Nierra in the house of their brother, Alonso, in the presence of
their other brother, Gerundio. The following dialogue took place
between Paciano and Aniceto:
Paciano: Noy, why did you
suspect us to be the killers of
your wife?
Aniceto: Will you still deny
when Gaspar Misa pointed to
you that you were standing by
the post and Paciano
(Gaudencia) was also
standing in a another post
when he (Misa) killed my wife.
From now on I have no
brother by the name of
Pacing.
Paciano did not comment on his brother's accusation.
Moreover, Misa wrote the following note to Paciano when they
were confined in the city jail (translation):
My companion Pacing (Paciano):
I am directly telling you and you could be sure
that I will do my best that you will be free.
Before the trial of (in) court, I would like that
you give me the sum of P600 even if you give
the cash advance of P 500 before Sunday. OK
and you give the same thru the hole.
Your companion, (Sgd.) Gaspar Misa
Believe me that I will free you and burn this immediately. (Exit
1)
The above note clearly proves that Misa and Paciano were co-
conspirators. The Nierras were co-principals by inducement.
By acting as lookouts during the perpetration of the killing, they
became co-principals by cooperation as well.
Appeal of Doblen and Rojas. — Doblen's alibi was that on the
night of the killing, he was stranded at Margos, Glan, South
Cotabato. He returned to General Santos City at ten o'clock in
the morning of the following day. He denied that he
accompanied Misa to the house of Paciano Nierra on July 4,
1969 and that he delivered to Misa the package containing the
murder weapon.
Rojas' alibi was that on the night of the killing he slept in his
pumpboat at Lion's Beach, General Santos City. However, that
could not have precluded him from having acted as lookout on
that same beach.
These appellants, like the Nierra spouses, contend that Misa's
confessions and testimony have no probative value because
there was no other evidence proving the alleged conspiracy.
As already stated, that rule does not apply to testimony given
on the witness stand where the defendants have the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant (People vs.
Dacanay, 92 Phil. 872).
It is contended that Doblen was not a co-conspirator because
he was not present when Misa and the Nierra spouses
discussed the liquidation of Juliana Nierra and that when
Doblen delivered the package to Misa, he (Doblen) did not
know that it contained the murder weapon. As to Rojas, it is
contended that he was not present at the said conference
between Misa and the Nierra spouses.
These contentions are not well-taken. The activities of Doblen
and Rojas indubitably show that they had community of design
with the Nierra spouses and Misa in the assassination of
Juliana Nierra.
Like appellants Nierra, Rojas' counsel de oficio contends that
the trial court erred in admitting the affidavit of Rojas (Exh. J)
because it was obtained under an alleged promise of immunity.
It should be noted that Rojas' affidavit does not contain
anything connecting him to the murder. In that affidavit, he
denied that he had any participation in the commission of the
crime and that he conspired with Misa. So, the admission in
evidence of that affidavit did not prejudice him at all.
The killing was correctly characterized by the trial court as
murder qualified by treachery and aggravated by premeditation
and price or reward. As to the Nierras, relationship is an
additional aggravating circumstance.
Treachery absorbed nocturnity and abuse of superiority. The
manner in which Misa liquidated Juliana Nierra added shame,
disgrace or obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime.
Hence, ignominy is aggravating (U.S. vs. Abaigar 2 Phil. 417).
In Misa's case, recidivism as an aggravating circumstance
offset his plea of guilty. That did not preclude the imposition of
the death penalty upon him.
Considering the aggravating circumstances, the death penalty
imposed on the Nierra spouses is in accordance- with law.
However, for lack of the requisite ten votes, the death penalty
imposed on Gaudencia Nierra should be commuted
to reclusion perpetua.
Doblen's role was that of having introduced Misa to the Nierra
spouses and delivering the murder weapon to Misa. He was
not present at the scene of the crime. On the other hand, Rojas
acted as lookout and received fifty pesos for his work.
After a conscientious reflection on the complicity of Doblen and
Rojas, we have reached the conclusion that they should be
held guilty as accomplices. It is true, strictly speaking, that as
co-conspirators they should be punished as co-principals.
However, since their participation was not absolutely
indispensable to the consummation of the murder, the rule that
the court should favor the milder form of liability may be
applied to them (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38 and other
cases).
In some exceptional situations, having community of design
with the principal does not prevent a malefactor from being
regarded as an accomplice if his role in the perpetration of the
homicide or murder was, relatively speaking, of a minor
character (See People vs. Ubiña, 97 Phil. 515; U.S. vs.
Doming 1st, 37 Phil. 446; People vs. Daligdig, 89 Phil. 598;
People vs. Largo, 99 Phil. 1061).
WHEREFORE, (1) the lower court's judgment is affirmed with
respect to Gaspar Misa and Paciano Nierra.
(2) The death sentence imposed on Gaudencia Nierra is
communited to reclusion perpetua. The civil liability imposed
upon her by the trial court is affirmed.
(3) Appellants Felicisimo Doblen and Vicente Rojas are
convicted as accomplices. They are each sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of ten years of prision mayor medium as
minimum to seventeen years of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum and to pay solidarily with the principals an indemnity
of six thousand pesos (as their quota) to the heirs of Juliana
Nierra. They are each subsidiarily liable to the extent of six
thousand pesos for the principals' civil liability. Costs against
the accused.
G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LTSG.
DOMINADOR BAYABOS, LTJG. MANNY G. FERRER,
LTJG. RONALD G. MAGSINO, LTJG. GERRY P. DOCTOR,
ENS. DOMINADOR B. OPERIO, JR., AND THE HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 174786]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. RADM
VIRGINIO R. ARIS, LTJG. KRUZALDO G. MABBORANG,
ENS. DENNIS S. VELASCO, AND THE HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
While this Court has recently faced questions on the criminal
liability of fraternity members for hazing, this case presents
novel questions on the extent of liability of schools and school
authorities under Republic Act No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing
Law.
The responsibility given to an academic institution for the
welfare of its students has been characterized by law and
judicial doctrine as a form of special parental authority and
responsibility.1 This responsibility has been amplified by the
enactment of the Anti-Hazing Law, in that the failure by school
authorities to take any action to prevent the offenses as
provided by the law exposes them to criminal liability as
accomplices in the criminal acts. Thus, the institution and its
officers cannot stand idly by in the face of patently criminal acts
committed within their sphere of responsibility. They bear the
commensurate duty to ensure that the crimes covered by the
Anti-Hazing Law are not committed.
It was within this legal framework that the school authorities of
the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA) were
criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan as accomplices
to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law. Before they were
arraigned, the Sandiganbayan quashed2 the Information
against them on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case
against the principal accused and, the failure to include in the
Information the material averments required by the Anti-Hazing
Law.
Consequently, this Petition was filed before this Court
questioning the Sandiganbayan’s quashal of the Information.
The Case Background
Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. (Balidoy) was admitted as a
probationary midshipman at the PMMA.3 In order to reach
active status, all new entrants were required to successfully
complete the mandatory “Indoctrination and Orientation
Period,”4 which was set from 2 May to 1 June 2001. 5 Balidoy
died on 3 May 2001.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) probed the death of
Balidoy. After months of investigation, it forwarded its
findings7 to the provincial prosecutor of Zambales for the
preliminary investigation and possible criminal prosecution of
those involved in the orientation and indoctrination of the
PMMA Class of 2005.8 Subsequently, the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Zambales issued a Resolution9 finding probable
cause to charge the following as principals to the crime of
hazing: Aldwin Alvarez (Alvarez), Leotharius C. Montez
(Montez), Rudence G. Reyes (Reyes), and Jed Nicholas S.
Simpas (Simpas) – collectively, Alvarez et al. A criminal case
against Alvarez et al. was then filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Iba, Zambales (RTC–Zambales).
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor also endorsed to the
Deputy Ombudsman for the Military the finding of probable
cause to charge the following school authorities as
accomplices to hazing: Rear Admiral (RADM) Virginio R. Aris
(Aris), Lieutenant Senior Grade (LTSG.) Dominador D.
Bayabos (Bayabos), Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTJG.) Gerry P.
Doctor (Doctor), LTJG. Manny Ferrer (Ferrer), LTJG. Kruzaldo
Mabborang (Mabborang), LTJG. Ronald G. Magsino
(Magsino), Ensign (ENS.) Dennis Velasco (Velasco), and ENS.
Dominador Operio (Operio) – collectively, respondents. The
Ombudsman Investigator agreed with the findings of the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. The matter was thus ordered
re-docketed for the purpose of conducting the proper
administrative proceedings against respondents for grave
misconduct and abuse of authority.10 The Office of the Special
Prosecutor eventually filed with the Sandiganbayan a criminal
case charging respondents as accomplices to the crime of
hazing.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Meanwhile, the RTC–Zambales issued an Order dismissing
the Information against the principal accused, Alvarez et
al.12 The Order was later entered in the Book of Entries of
Judgment.
Bayabos, Ferrer, Magsino, Doctor, and Operio (collectively,
Bayabos et al.) filed a Motion to Quash the Information. 13 They
argued that the Information did not contain all the essential
elements of the offense. They also pointed out that there was
no allegation that the purported act had been made a
prerequisite for admission to the PMMA, especially considering
that the victim had already been accepted in the academy.
Moreover, they stressed that there was no averment in the
Information that the PMMA was a fraternity, a sorority, or an
organization. Also underscored was the absence in the
Information of any assertion that the alleged hazing was not
part of the “physical, mental, and psychological testing and
training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the
physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective
regular members.” Furthermore, they emphasized that there
was no allegation that they were given prior written notice of
the hazing and that they had permitted the activity.
As a final point, Bayabos et al. argued that the case against
the principal accused had already been dismissed with finality
by the RTC. There being no more principals with whom they
could have cooperated in the execution of the offense, they
asserted that the case against them must be dismissed.
The Special Prosecutor opposed14 the motion of Bayabos et
al. He insisted that the Information alleged the material facts
that would sufficiently establish the presence of the essential
ingredients of the crime of accomplice to hazing. He also
stressed that there was nothing in the law requiring that the
principals must be prosecuted first before a case could be filed
against the accomplices. The Comment/Opposition of the
Special Prosecutor was, however, silent on the issue of
whether the Information contained an allegation that the
supposed hazing had been made a prerequisite for admission
to the PMMA, and whether the academy was considered an
“organization” within the meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law.
Six days before Bayabos et al. were set to be arraigned,15 the
Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution (SB Resolution
I) quashing the Information and dismissing the criminal case
against them. According to the court, the fact that the charge
against the principal accused Alvarez et al. was dismissed with
finality favorably carried with it the indictment against those
charged as accomplices, whose criminal responsibility was
subordinate to that of the former. It stressed that before there
can be an accomplice, there must be a principal by direct
participation, the latter being the originator of the criminal
design. In this case, as there were no principal perpetrators to
speak of, necessarily, there was no one else with whom they
could have cooperated in the execution of the crime of hazing.
In view of the dismissal of the case against the principals, the
court ruled that the Information charging Bayabos et al. as
accomplices could no longer stand on its own.
In any event, the Sandiganbayan found that the Information
charged no offense, and that the allegations therein were mere
conclusions of law. It also stressed that there was no averment
that the alleged hazing was not part of the “physical, mental
and psychological testing and training procedure and practices
to determine and enhance the physical, mental and
psychological fitness of prospective regular members” of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP), pursuant to Section 1 of the law.16 It
must be noted, though, that the Sandiganbayan did not make
any categorical determination that the PMMA was considered
an “organization” within the meaning of the Anti-Hazing Law.
Six months after the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution
dismissing the criminal case against Bayabos et al., the
accused Velasco surrendered and then filed his own Motion to
Quash,17 adopting the grounds raised by that court. His
arraignment was set on 14 August 2006. 18 However, on 3
August 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued another Resolution
(SB Resolution II) dismissing the case against him. According
to the court, since Velasco was similarly situated as
Bayabos et al., the Information against him must likewise be
quashed in light of the reasoning laid out in SB Resolution I. In
the same Resolution, the Sandiganbayan ex proprio
motu dismissed the case against Aris and Mabborang
(collectively, Velasco et al.), explaining that they, too, had been
charged under the same Information for the same offense.19 It
is unclear from the records20 whether the accused Aris and
Mabborang surrendered or were arrested, or whether the
Order of Arrest21 was recalled prior to the dismissal of the case.
Aggrieved, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special
Prosecutor, filed with this Court on 13 March 2006 a Petition
assailing SB Resolution I and, on 16 October 2006, another
Petition challenging SB Resolution II.
The Issues
The Special Prosecutor asks this Court to address a number of
legal issues. After a thorough evaluation of the Petitions,
however, we cull the threshold issues needing to be addressed
by this Court as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I. Whether the prosecution of respondents for the crime
of accomplice to hazing can proceed in spite of the
dismissal with finality of the case against the principal
accused
II. Whether the Information filed against respondents
contains all the material averments for the prosecution
of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-
Hazing Law
Our Ruling
With regard to the first issue, we agree with petitioner that the
Sandiganbayan erred when it dismissed outright the case
against respondents, on the sole ground that the case against
the purported principals had already been dismissed. It is a
settled rule that the case against those charged as
accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the absence of trial
of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against
the latter; or even the latter’s acquittal, especially when the
occurrence of the crime has in fact been established. 22  National Defense and the National Police Commission duly
In People v. Rafael,23 the Supreme Court En Banc reasoned
thus: “The corresponding responsibilities of the principal,
accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other. As
long as the commission of the offense can be duly established
in evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice
or accessory can proceed independently of that of the
principal.” Accordingly, so long as the commission of the crime
can be duly proven, the trial of those charged as accomplices
to determine their criminal liability can proceed independently
of that of the alleged principal.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We note in the present case that Bayabos et al. merely
presented the Order of Entry of Judgment25 dismissing the
case against Alvarez et al. Nowhere is it mentioned in the
order that the case was dismissed against the alleged
principals, because no crime had been committed. In fact, it
does not cite the trial court’s reason for dismissing the case.
Hence, the Sandiganbayan committed an error when it simply
relied on the Order of Entry of Judgment without so much as
scrutinizing the reason for the dismissal of the case against the
purported principals.
Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, we affirm the quashal
of the Information against respondents.
Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, recognizes the right of
the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them. As a manifestation of this
constitutional right, the Rules of Court requires that the
information charging persons with an offense be “sufficient.”
One of the key components of a “sufficient information” is the
statement of the acts or omissions constituting the offense
charged, subject of the complaint.26 The information must also
be crafted in a language ordinary and concise enough to
enable persons of common understanding to know the offense
being charged against them.27 This approach is intended to
allow them to suitably prepare for their defense, as they are
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts
constituting the offense they have purportedly committed.28 The
information need not be in the same kind of language used in
the law relied upon.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
At any time before entering a plea, an accused may assail the
information filed with the court based on the grounds
enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, one
of which is the claim that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense. In assessing whether an information must be quashed
on that ground, the basic test30 is to determine if the facts
averred would establish the presence of the essential elements
of the crime as defined in the law. The information is examined
without consideration of the truth or veracity of the claims
therein, as these are more properly proven or controverted
during the trial. In the appraisal of the information,
matters aliunde are not taken into account.
We quote the pertinent provision of the Anti-Hazing Law as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1. Hazing, as used in this Act, is an initiation rite or
practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in
a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit,
neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or
humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly,
foolish and other similar tasks or activities
or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological
suffering or injury.
The term “organization” shall include any club or the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine National Police,
Philippine Military Academy, or officer and cadet corp of
the Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's Army Training.
The physical, mental and psychological testing and training
procedure and practices to determine and enhance the
physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective
regular members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Philippine National Police as approved by the Secretary of
recommended by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Director General of the Philippine National
Police shall not be considered as hazing for the purposes of
this Act.
Sec. 4. x x x x.
The school authorities including faculty members who
consent to the hazing or who have actual knowledge
thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same
from occurring shall be punished as accomplices for the
acts of hazing committed by the perpetrators. (Emphasis
supplied)
The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following
essential elements are established: (1) a person is placed in
some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to
physical or psychological suffering or injury; and (2) these acts
were employed as a prerequisite for the person’s admission or
entry into an organization. In the crime of hazing, the crucial
ingredient distinguishing it from the crimes against persons
defined under Title Eight of the Revised Penal Code is the
infliction by a person of physical or psychological suffering on
another in furtherance of the latter’s admission or entry into an
organization.
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who
have had no direct participation in the act, they may
nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1)
hazing, as established by the above elements, occurred; (2)
the accused are school authorities or faculty members; and (3)
they consented to or failed to take preventive action against
hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof. responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as
accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to a
First, we reject the contention of respondents that PMMA technical term37 – in this case, hazing – is insufficient and
should not be considered an organization. Under the Anti- incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the acts allegedly
Hazing Law, the breadth of the term organization includes – committed and thus a mere conclusion of law. Section 6, Rule
but is not limited to – groups, teams, fraternities, sororities, 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that the information
citizen army training corps, educational institutions, clubs, must include, inter alia, both “the designation of the offense
societies, cooperatives, companies, partnerships, corporations, given by the statute” and “the acts or omissions complained of
the PNP, and the AFP.31 Attached to the Department of as constituting the offense.” The Special Prosecutor’s belated
Transportation and Communications,32 the PMMA is a argument38 in his Petition before this Court that the successful
government-owned educational institution33 established for the completion of the indoctrination and orientation program was
primary purpose of producing efficient and well-trained used as a prerequisite for continued admission to the academy
merchant marine officers.34 Clearly, it is included in the – i.e., attainment of active midshipman status – does not cure
term organization within the meaning of the law. this defect in the Information. Thus, the Information must be
quashed, as the ultimate facts it presents do not constitute the
We also disagree with the Sandiganbayan ruling that the crime of accomplice to hazing.
quashal of the Information was warranted for failure to allege
that the purported acts were not covered by the exemption Finally, we reject the Special Prosecutor’s claim that the
relating to the duly recommended and approved “testing and Sandiganbayan should just have ordered the filing of another
training procedure and practices” for prospective regular information or the correction of the defect by amendment,
members of the AFP and the PNP. This exemption is an instead of dismissing the case outright.39 Indeed, Section 4,
affirmative defense in, not an essential element of, the crime Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, provides that if a motion to
of accomplice to hazing. It is an assertion that must be properly quash is based on the ground that the facts charged do not
claimed by the accused, not by the prosecution. The reason for constitute an offense, the court shall give the prosecution a
this rule is that the accused carry the burden of proof in chance to correct the defect by amendment. However, the
establishing by clear and convincing evidence that they have provision also states that if the prosecution fails to make the
satisfied the requirements thereof.35 Thus, the prosecution’s amendment, the motion shall be granted. Here, we point out
failure to point out in the Information that the exception is that the Special Prosecutor insisted in his Comment on the
inapplicable would not justify the quashal of that Information. Motion to Quash40 that there was no defect in the Information.
Neither has he filed a new information after the motion was
Nevertheless, we find – albeit for a different reason – that the sustained, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 117. Thus, the
Motion to Quash must be granted, as the Information does not Sandiganbayan was correct in ordering the quashal of the
include all the material facts constituting the crime Information and the eventual dismissal of the case.
of accomplice to hazing. The Information charging respondents
reads as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary This does not mean, however, that the Special Prosecutor is
The undersigned Assistant Special Prosecutor, Office of the now precluded from filing another information. Section 6, Rule
Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses [RADM] Virginio R. Aris, 117, specifically states that an order sustaining a motion to
[LTSG.] Dominador D. BAYABOS, [LTJG.] Manny G. Ferrer, quash would not bar another prosecution. That is, of course,
[LTJG.] Ronald G. Magsino, [LTJG.] Kruzaldo G. Mabborang, unless respondents are able to prove that the criminal action or
[LTJG.] Gerry P. Doctor, [ENS.] Dominador B. Operio, Jr., and liability has been extinguished, or that double jeopardy has
[ENS.] Dennis S. Velasco, as accomplices for Violation of R.A. already attached.
8049 (Anti-Hazing Law), committed as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Given the foregoing, the Court no longer sees the necessity to
pass upon the other issues raised by petitioner.
That during the period from the 2nd of May 2001 up to the 3rd of
May 2001, inside the campus of the Philippine Merchant WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No.
Marine Academy (PMMA), in the Municipality of San Narciso, 171222 is hereby DENIED and the petition for certiorari in G.R.
Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of No. 174786, DISMISSED. The dismissal of the case in
this Honorable Court accused RADM Virginio R. Aris, Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated 27 January 2006 and 3
President of PMMA with [Salary Grade (SG) 29]; LTSG. August 2006 in Criminal Case No. 28339 are thus AFFIRMED.
Dominador D. BAYABOS, Commandant of the Cadets; (LTJG.)
Manny G. Ferrer, 1st Batallion Officer; LTJG. Ronald G. SO ORDERED.
Magsino, Security Officer; LTJG. Kruzaldo G. Mabborang,
2nd Battalion Officer; LTJG. Gerry P. Doctor, Batl. Mast.; ENS.
Dominador B. Operio, Jr., 1st Battalion Company Officer; and
ENS. Dennis S. Velasco, Mess Officer, all public officers,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
committing the offense in relation to office and while in the
performance of their duties as such public officers being the
school authorities and/or faculty members did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally, consent or have actual
knowledge of the hazing perpetrated by the principal accused,
all First Class Midshipmen, against probationary midshipman
FERNANDO BALIDOy, JR. during the school’s Indoctrination
and Orientation; and, fail to take any action to prevent the
occurrence of the hazing and the infliction of psychological and
physical injuries against said  FERNANDO BALIDOy, JR.
thereby causing the instantaneous death of the latter, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of said FERNANDO
BALIDOy, JR.36
As can be gleaned from the above, the indictment merely
states that psychological pain and physical injuries were
inflicted on the victim. There is no allegation that the purported
acts were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry
into the organization. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient
would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal