CHAPTER 4:

HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY

(HAZOP)
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) is a formal
systematic rigorous examination to the process and
engineering / production facility.

A HAZOP is a qualitative technique based on guide-

words and is carried out by a multi-disciplinary team
(HAZOP team) during a set of meetings.
 Objective

•For identifying cause and the consequences of

perceived mal-operations of equipment and
associated operator interfaces in the context of
the complete system.

•It accommodates the status of recognized design

standards and codes of practice but rightly
questions the relevance of these in specific
circumstances where hazards may remain 3
undetected.
When to perform HAZOP ?

 The HAZOP study should preferably be carried out

as early in the design phase as possible - to have
influence on the design.

 As a compromise, the HAZOP is usually carried out as

a final check when the detailed design has been
completed.

 A HAZOP study may also be conducted on an

existing facility to identify modifications that should
be implemented to reduce risk and operability
problems.
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• HAZOP identifies potential hazards , failures and
operability problems.

• It is most effective as a team effort consists of plant

and prices designers, operating personnel, control and
instrumentation engineer etc.

• It encourages creativity in design concept evaluation.

• Its use results in fewer commissioning and operational

problems and better informed personnel, thus
confirming overall cost effectiveness improvement.
What is required?

1. Selection of team members.

Two types of person needed :
•Detailed technical knowledge of the process.
•Those with knowledge and experience of applying
highly structured, systematic HAZOP approach.

2. Define objectives and scope – define scope of work.

•To new design – applied to a detailed design.
•To existing design – identify hazards not previously
identified To plant modification
HAZOP TEAM MEMBERS

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RESPONSIBLE OF THE HAZOP TEAM
MEMBERS
HAZOP Leader
• Plan sessions and timetable
• Control discussion
• Limit discussion
• Encourage team to draw conclusion
• Ensure secretary has time for taking note
• Keep team in focus
• Encourage imagination of team members
• Motivate members
• Discourage recriminations
• Judge importance issues 8
HAZOP Secretary

• Take adequate notes

• Record documentations
• Inform leader if more time required in taking notes
• If unclear, check wording before writing
• Produce interim lists of recommendations
• Produce draft report of study
• Check progress of chase action
• Produce final report
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Process Engineer

• Provide a simple description

• Provide design intention for each process unit
• Provide information on process conditions and design
conditions
• Provide a simple description
• Provide design intention for each process unit
• Provide information on process conditions and design
conditions
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Mechanical Design Engineer

• Provide specification details

• Provide vendor package details
• Provide equipment and piping layout information

Instrument Engineer

• Provide details of control philosophy

• Provide interlock and alarm details
• Provide info on shutdown, safety features 11
Plant Engineer or Manager
• Provide information on compatibility with any existing
adjacent plant
• Provide details of site utilities and services
• Provide (for study on existing plant) any update on
maintenance access and modifications

Shift Operating Engineer or Supervisor

• Provide guidance on control instrumentation integrity from
an operating experience view point
• Provide (for study on existing plant) information on plant
stability at the specified control parameters
• Provide information on experienced operability deviations
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of hazard potential
Chemist

• Provide details of process chemistry

• Provide details of process hazards (polymerisations,
byproducts, corrosion etc)

Project Engineer

• Provide details of cost and time estimation and also budget

constraints.
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• Ensure rapid approval if required
HAZOP INFORMATION
 Documents needed for HAZOP study
 Process Flow Sheet ( PFS or PFD )
 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram ( P &
ID )
 Process Calculations
 Process Data Sheets
 Instrument Data Sheets
 Interlock Schedules
 Layout Requirements
 Hazardous Area Classification
 Operating instructions
Define Objectives And
Scope

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HAZOP INFORMATION

 Documents needed for HAZOP study

 For Preliminary HAZOP
 Process Flow Sheet ( PFS or PFD )
 Description of the Process

 For Detailed HAZOP

 Piping and Instrumentation Diagram ( P & ID )
 Process Calculations
 Process Data Sheets (energy and material balances)
 Instrument Data Sheets
 Interlock Schedules
 Layout Requirements
 Hazardous Area Classification
 Description of the Process
 Material safety data sheets
 Provisional operating instructions
 Equipment data sheets Start-up and emergency shut-down
procedures
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 P&ID
• A Piping and Instrumentation Diagram - P&ID, is a
schematic illustration of functional relationship of piping,
instrumentation and system equipment components.
• P&ID represents the last step in process design.
• P&ID shows all of piping including the physical sequence of
branches, reducers, valves, equipment, instrumentation and
control interlocks.
• P&ID is normally developed from process flow diagram
(PFD).
• The P&ID are used to operate the process system.
• A process cannot be adequately designed without proper
P&ID. 17
P&ID
A P&ID should include: (Basically every mechanical aspect
of the plant with some exceptions):

-Instrumentation and designations

-Mechanical equipment with names and numbers
-All valves and their identifications
-Process piping, sizes and identification
-Miscellaneous - vents, drains, special fittings, sampling lines,
reducers, increasers etc
-Permanent start-up and flush lines
-Flow directions
-Interconnections references
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-Control inputs and outputs, interlock
-Computer control system input
Block Flow Diagram

The block or rectangles represents unit operations and the

blocks are connected by lines representing the process flow
streams

 Focus on process sequence

Mass balance requirements

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 BLOCK FLOW DIAGRAM
It consists of simple block elements that are connected
with an arrow. It describes following information :

o Each block represents a process function which in

reality may consist of several pieces of equipment.
o Gives a clear overview uncluttered by details.
o Effective for conceptualizing a new process or a PFD.
o Major flow lines shown with arrows giving direction of
flow.
o Flow goes from left to right whenever possible.
o Light streams (gases, vapors) move towards top and
heavy streams (solid, liquid) go towards bottom.
o If lines cross each other then, horizontal line is
continuous and vertical line is broken.
o Provides preliminary material balance. 20
 Ammonia
Urea Prills Bagging
Air Ammonia Urea &
Carbon Dioxide
Unit Unit Shipping

Fuel Gas Utility

Utility
Unit
Unit

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PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM

It is a diagram of fluid flow system showing the

equipment items connected by major process pipes and
containing data on essential process control circuits or
major process requirements. It would include following
details.
 Process piping
 Major equipment names
 Major equipment numbers
 Major equipment identification numbers
 Control valves
 Interconnection with other system
 Major bypass and circulation lines
 System rating and operational values as maximum,
minimum and normal flow
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 CONTINUED…….

 Process parameters i.e. temperature and pressure

 Composition of fluids

A process flow diagram does not following details,

 Pipe class

 Pipe line number

 Maintenance vents and drains

 Relief and safety valves

 Code class information

 Seismic class information

 Instruments
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Distinction Between PFD & PID

PFD P&ID

1. Used During Construction No Yes*

2. Shows all process and service piping No Yes
3. Indicates presence of all controls No Yes
4. Shows all motors No Yes
5. Shows thermal insulations No Yes
6. Shows major equipment Yes Yes
7. Shows flow quantities Yes No
8. Shows stream compositions Yes NO

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STANDARD SYMBOLS FOR INSTRUMENTS

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STANDARD SYMBOLS FOR EQUIPMENT

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27
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STANDARD SYMBOLS FOR FLUID MOTIVE
MACHINERY

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STANDARD SYMBOLS FOR VESSELS

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STANDARD SYMBOLS FOR VALVES

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STANDARD SYMBOLS FOR LINES

Ms. Tan Jully

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Example: ISA Symbols for a Level Indicator

"L" for the process variable "Level", and

"I" for the "Indicator" type of instrument.

the code for level indicator no. eight

Flowmeter - Indicating
FI 001

Temperature - Transmitter
TT 001

Control Valve
FV 001

Position Switch - High Level

ZSH 001
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Preliminary P&IS

EP301 Plant Safety Eng.

1. Format & Sheet Size:
A0 or A1 (ISO)

Ms. Tan Jully

2. Title Block:
Client Name, Unit Name, Section
Name, Project Name

3. Column Note:

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4. Equipment Design Data
Preliminary P&IS

EP301 Plant Safety Eng.

5 . Layout of Equipment

Ms. Tan Jully

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HAZOP PROCEDURE
1. Divide the system into sections (i.e., reactor, storage)
2. Choose a study node (i.e., line, vessel, pump, operating
instruction)
3. Describe the design objective
4. Select a process parameter
5. Apply a guide-word
6. Determine cause(s)
7. Evaluate consequences/problems
8. Recommend action: What? When? Who?
9. Record information
10. Repeat procedure (from step 2)
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 EP301 Plant Safety Eng. Ms. Tan Jully
37
HAZOP WORKSHEET
FOR YOUR ANALYSIS, USE THIS HAZOP
TABLE:

Guidewords Deviation Possible Consequences Action

Causes Required

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WORKSHEET ENTRIES
 Node
 A node is a specific location in the process in which (the deviations
of) the design/process intent are evaluated. Examples might be:
separators, heat exchangers, scrubbers, pumps, compressors, and
interconnecting pipes with equipment.
 Design Intent
 The design intent is a description of how the process is expected to
behave at the node; this is qualitatively described as an activity
(e.g., feed, reaction, sedimentation) and/or quantitatively in the
process parameters, like temperature, flow rate, pressure,
composition, etc.
 Deviation
 A deviation is a way in which the process conditions may depart
from their design/process intent.
 Parameter
 The relevant parameter for the condition(s) of the process (e.g.
pressure, temperature, composition).
 Examples of process parameters: flow, pressure, composition,
level, reaction, speed, time, pH, temperature…etc 39
 Guideword
 A short word to create the imagination of a deviation of the
design/process intent. The most commonly used set of guide-words
is: no, more, less, as well as, part of, other than, and reverse. In
addition, guidewords like too early, too late, instead of, are used;
the latter mainly for batch-like processes. The guidewords are
applied, in turn, to all the parameters, in order to identify
unexpected and yet credible deviations from the design/process
intent.
 Cause
 The reason(s) why the deviation could occur. Several causes may be
identified for one deviation. It is often recommended to start with
the causes that may result in the worst possible consequence.
 Consequences
 The results of the deviation, in case it occurs. Consequences may
both comprise process hazards and operability problems, like plant
shut-down or reduced quality of the product. Several consequences
may follow from one cause and, in turn, one consequence can have
several causes
 Action Required / Safeguard
 Facilities that help to reduce the occurrence frequency of the
deviation or to mitigate its consequences.
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FIVE TYPES OF ACTION REQUIRED /SAFEGUARDS

1. Identify the deviation (e.g., detectors and alarms, and

human operator detection)
2. Compensate for the deviation (e.g., an automatic
control system that reduces the feed to a vessel in
case of overfilling it. These are usually an integrated
part of the process control)
3. Prevent the deviation from occurring (e.g., an inert
gas blanket in storages of flammable substances)
4. Prevent further escalation of the deviation (e.g., by
(total) trip of the activity. These facilities are often
interlocked with several units in the process, often
controlled by computers)
5. Relieve the process from the hazardous deviation
(e.g., pressure safety valves (PSV) and vent systems) 41
 Select Line

Select deviation
e. g more flow

Move on to Is more flow possible

next deviation

Is it hazardous or does it Consider

prevent efficient other
operation ? causes of
more flow

What change in Will the operator know

plant will tell him that there is more flow ?
?
What changes in plant or Consider other
method will prevent the change(s) or
deviation or make it less agreed to
likely or protect against the accept hazard
consequences ?

Is the cost of the change

justified ?

Agree change (s)

Agree who is responsible for 42
action

Follow up to see action has

been taken
GUIDELINES FOR DIVISION INTO SECTIONS
 Choices of lines – P&ID must be divided logically. Not too many sections. Factors to
be considered :
 Each section should contain active components, which gives rise to deviations.
E.g piping which contains control valves can give rise to flow deviations, heat
exchangers can cause T deviations.
 Materials in section – contain significant amount of hazardous materials.
 Section based on process and states of materials. Only 1 process operation per 1
section.
 General guidelines :
 Define each major process component as a section. Usually anything assigned
equipment number should be considered a major process component.
 Define one line section between each major process component.
 Define additional line sections for each branches off the main process flow.
 Define a process section at each connection to existing equipment.
 Supplementary guidelines
 Define only one process section for equipment in identical service. However,
pumps in different service with a common spare must be treated separately.
 Define only one line at the end of a series of components if there are no other
flow paths.
 Define only one additional line section if there are alternative flow paths,
regardless of how many branches there are.
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 Ms. Tan Jully
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GUIDEWORDS
45
GUIDEWORD + PARAMETER
 Some examples of combinations of guide-words
and parameters:

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 Strength of HAZOP
• HAZOP is a systematic, reasonably comprehensive and flexible.
• It is suitable mainly for team use whereby it is possible to incorporate the
general experience available.
• It gives good identification of cause and excellent identification of critical
deviations.
• The use of keywords is effective and the whole group is able to
participate.
• HAZOP is an excellent well-proven method for studying large plant in a
specific manner.
• HAZOP identifies virtually all significant deviations on the plant, all
major accidents should be identified but not necessarily their causes.

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 Weakness of HAZOP
• HAZOP is very time consuming and can be laborious with a tendency for
boredom for analysts.
• It tends to be hardware-oriented and process-oriented, although the technique
should be amenable to human error application.
• It tends to generate many failure events with insignificance consequences and
generate many failure events which have the same consequences.
• HAZOP does not identify all causes of deviations and therefore omits many
scenarios.
• It takes little account of the probabilities of events or consequences, although
quantitative assessment are sometime added. The group generally let their
collective experiences decide whether deviations are meaningful.
• HAZOP is poor where multiple-combination events can have severe effects. It
tends to assume defects or deterioration of materials of construction will not arise.

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EXAMPLE : HAZOP

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SCENARIO - EXAMPLE

You and your family are on a road trip by using a car

in the middle of the night. You were replying a text
message while driving at 100 km/h and it was raining
heavily. The car hits a deep hole and one of your tire
blows.

You hit the brake, but due to slippery road and your
car tire thread was thin, the car skidded and was
thrown off the road.

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POINTS TO PONDER

What is the cause of the accident?

What is the consequence of the event?

What can we do to prevent all those things to

happen?

What other possible accidents might happen on

the road trip?

Can we be prepared before the accident occurs?

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IN A SYSTEMATIC WAY

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P & ID

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HAZOP TERMINOLOGY 1 - NODE

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HAZOP TERMINOLOGY 2 –
DESIGN INTENT
 Description of how the process is expected to
behave at the Study Node.
 This is qualitatively described as an activity (e.g.,

feed, reaction, sedimentation) and/or

quantitatively in the process parameters, like
temperature, flow rate, pressure, composition, etc.
 Flash Drum Example:

 To separate light components from the heavies (or to

collect
 light component at the top product stream)
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HAZOP TERMINOLOGY 3 –
HAZOP LOG SHEET

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HAZOP TERMINOLOGY 4 –
DEVIATION
 Deviation is a way in which the process conditions
may depart from their INTENTION/DESIGN
INTENT
 Expressed by combining parameters such as FLOW
with Guideword such as MORE to indicate MORE
FLOW – meaning the flow is more than the design
intent.
 Expresses as other unwanted condition such as
Contamination or corrosion.
 Parameters: any process parameters such as Flow,

temperature, pressure, pH etc

 Guideword: NO, MORE, LESS, AS WELL AS, PART

OF, OTHER THAN, REVERSE, etc. 57

 IN CLASS DISCUSSION -1
 Perform the HAZOP Study on the Flash Drum
and Heat Exchanger (based on the P&ID).

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59
IN CLASS ASSIGNMENT - 2
 List the possible guidewords and parameters for
the following equipment:

1. Reactor
2. Distillation Column
3. Pump

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The Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) for a gas sweetening process is
shown in Figure Q3. Sour gas which contains carbon dioxide (CO2) and
hydrogen sulfide (H2S) will be fed into the Absorber (P1), and it will be
absorbed by the down flow of amine solution, producing the sweet gas. The
output stream consists of rich amine is fed into the Regenerator, whereby acid
gas (CO2 and H2S) will be removed and lean amine will be recycled into the
Absorber (P1) for reuse.

Figure Q3: Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID)

Based on Figure Q3, answer the following questions:

(a) Develop a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study on the Absorber (P1) for
the following process parameters, Pressure and Flow, by using one (1)
suitable HAZOP Guidewords for each process parameter.
(10 marks)

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(b) Develop a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study on the Pump (E1) for
the following HAZOP Guidewords, More and Less, by using one (1)
suitable process parameters for each HAZOP Guidewords.
(10 marks)