Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems Roger B. Myerson Econometrica, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Jul., 1981), 883-897. Stable URL: http://links,jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682% 28 198 107% 2949%3A4% 3C883%3AUEATTE%3E2.0,CO%3B2-A Econometrica is currently published by The Beonometrie Society. ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hhup:/www.jstororg/about/terms.huml. JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at hup:/www jstor-org/journalsfeconosoe.htmi Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the sereen or printed page of such transmission, JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support @jstor.org. hupulwww jstor.org/ ‘Tue Sep 6 11:22:47 2005Econometrica, Vol 8, No. 4 Buy, 1981) UTILITARIANISM, EGALITARIANISM, AND THE TIMING EFFECT IN SOCIAL CHOICE PROBLEMS By Roger B. MvERson ‘Two theorems are derived about social choice functions, which are defined on compre hensive conver subsets of utlity allocation space. Theorem 1 asserts that a linearity condition, together with Pareto optimality implies that a soc unction must be ‘tltarian. Theorem 2 asserts that a concavity condition, togeber with Pareto optimality tnd independence of itlevant alternatives, implies that social choice Funetion must be ther utlitavian or egalitarian. These incaity and concavity conditions have natural interpretations in terms of the timing of social welare analysis (before or after the resolution of uncertainties) and its impact on socal choices. 1, rwtropuction ‘Tut utilitarian principle in ethical theory asserts that the best social policy is the ‘one which gives the greatest total welfare to the individual members of society, where “total welfare” is measured by summing utility numbers forall individuals. This principle has been advocated by philosphers going back to Bentham, and more recently by Harsanyi (5, 6] from the point of view of Bayesian decision theory. ‘The egalitarian principle in ethical theory asserts that the best social policy is the one which gives the greatest welfare subject to the constraint that all individual members should enjoy equal benefits from society. As long as there is any positive tradeoff between the utility payoffs to different individuals, this egalitarian principle leads to the same social choices as the maximin principle, which always maximizes the utility of the most unfortunate individuals in society. Rawls [12, 13] has argued for the maximin principe in his theory of justice. The egalitarian principle has been studied in a game-theoretic context by Kalai [7] and Myerson [9]. ‘As Shapley [18] has pointed out, these two ethical principles both use interper- sonal comparisons of utility, but in very different ways. Translated into the practical debates of daily life, the utilitarian principle asserts that “you should do something for me if it will hurt you less than it will help me,” whereas the exaltarian principle asserts that “you should do something for me if you are better off than I am (or if you have gained more from our cooperation than T have)” This paper will investigate some properties of social choice rules related to these two principles, with the goal of helping to explain wity these two principles have been so important both in the development of ethical theories and in practical social decision making. Other approaches to this same question have been studied by Deschamps and Gevers [3, 4], Sen [17], D’Aspremont and Gevers {2}, Maskin [8], and Roberts [14]. Our approach will differ from these others in that we will use the risk properties of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility scales in an essential way. In this respect, we will follow Harsanyi [5, 6], who 8884 ROGER B. MYERSON derives utilitarianism from assumptions about social decision making in the presence of risk. We will analyze utilitarianism and egalitarianism with respect to a phenome- non which we may call the timing effect in social welfare analysis. To understand this timing effect, consider the following simple example. The father of twin sons ‘wants to set them up in their eareers. His financial resources allow him only two alternatives: he may send both sons to school (for four years each) to become teachers, or he may send one son to school (for eight years) to become a doctor while the other son will have to become a clerk. Each son would prefer to be a doctor over teacher and teacher over clerk; and each son would prefer a .50-.50 gamble between becoming a doctor or a clerk over becoming a teacher for sure. ‘The father is concerned only for the welfare of his two sons, and he wants to be egalitarian. What should he do? ‘The problem is that the egalitarian principle leads to different conclusions depending on when the welfare of the sons is evaluated. If we think about the sons as they will be in their careers a few years from now, there appears to be only one egalitarian option: both sons must be teachers. On the other hand, if we think about the sons as they are today, then this plan of making both sons teachers is not even Pareto optimal. Both sons would prefer today that the father should plan to send one of them to medical school, letting a fair coin toss decide who gels to become a doctor and who must be a clerk. Before the coin toss, this “randomization” plan seems egalitarian and Pareto dominates the “both teach- ers” plan; but after the coin toss the randomization plan will seem unegalitarian (Gince one unfortunate son is a clerk) and the both teachers plan will be ex post Pareto optimal. The moral of this story is that simply specifying a social welfare function may not be enough to fully determine a procedure for collective decision making. One ‘must also specify when the individuals’ preferences or utility levels should be evaluated; before or after the resolution of uncertainties. The timing of social welfare analysis may make a difference. ‘The timing effect is often an issue in moral debates, as when people argue about whether a social system should be judged with respect to its actual income distribution or with respect to its distribution of economic opportunities. Those who judge with respect to income are implicitly evaluating individuals’ welfare at 4 later point in time than do those who judge with respect to opportunities. In this paper, we will show that utilitarian and egalitarian choice rules have some special properties with respect to this timing-effect problem. In Section 2, we will develop some basic definitions relating to social choice problems and the choice functions which may be used to solve them. In Section 3, we will see that the timing effect can be ignored if and only ifthe social choice function is linear, and we will show that linearity and Pareto optimality together imply that a choice function must be of a generalized utilitarian type. This result is closely related to Harsanyi’s Theorem V in [5], with our linearity condition playing the same role as the sure-thing principle in Harsanyi's work In Section 4, we will show that, ifthe linearity condition from Section 3 isSOCIAL CHOICE PROBLEMS Bes replaced by a weaker concavity condition, and if Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives condition {10] is added, then our choice functions must be either utilitarian or egalitarian. This concavity condition has a natural interpretation in terms of the timing effect: it guarantees that the social choices generated by ‘current welfare analysis must ex ante Pareto dominate those choices generated by future welfare analysis. (In our example, we saw that both sons would indeed prefer ex ante the randomization plan, recommended by current egalitarian analysis, over the both teachers plan, recommended by future egalitarian analy- sis) That is, concavity guarantees that all individuals should always want social decisions to be planned using current expected utility as the data for welfare analysis, so that the timing effect should never cause disputes over when to evaluate social welfare. Perles and Maschler [11] have also used this concavity property (which they call syper-additivity) to characterize a new solution concept for two-person bargaining games. 2. BASIC DEFINITIONS In this paper, social choice problems are represented by the sets of feasible utility allocations available to the society. We assume that there are n individuals, numbered 1,2,...,n, in the group or society. We also assume that some von Neumann-Morgenstern utility scale (assigning utility values to all imaginable social situations) has been specified for each individual in the society. Thus, any vector x + %,) in. R" can be interpreted as a utility allocation vector, corresponding to some social situation or gamble in which each individual i gets expected utility x,, as measured in his given utility scale. We do not assume here that the given utility scales have any particular significance for interpersonal comparisons. Of course, any increasing affine transformations of the given utility scales would also be valid von Neumann- Morgenstern utility scales for the individuals, with identical decision-theoretic properties, Given any vectors x and y in R', we write x > y (ory < x) iff x, > y; for every i= 1,2,..-,m, Similarly x'> y (or y < x) means that x, > y, for every i. ‘The usual dot product is used for vectors in R", that is: B= De A set SCR" is comprehensive iff: y < x and x © S together imply that y € S. ‘That is, a comprehensive set describes @ choice situation in which free disposal of any individuals utility is always possible. A set SCR" is comex iff: x Sand y € S and 0<) <1 together imply that Ax +(1— Ay ES, where Ax + (1 —A)y is the vector whose ith component is Ax, + (= A)yp. Since we are measuring utilities in von Neumann-Morgenstern scales, if the group can always plan to randomize between any two collective ‘choice options, then the set of feasible expected utility allocations will be convex.886 ROGER B. MYERSON Given any finite collection of vectors {x',...,x*) CR" (so that each x! = (x{,x4,.. xj) isa vector in R"), we define H(x!,..., x*) to be the smallest ‘convex and comprehensive set containing the set (x',...,.x*). That is: ‘y ER") there exist numbers hy, ... Ae such that 1 ‘ every > 0, 5 y= Iand HO oat) 470 BN IS ae fe We call H(x!,..., x*) the comprehensive-convex hull of (x!,...,x*) In this paper, a choice problem is formally defined to be a nonempty, closed, convex, and comprehensive subset of R, representing the set of feasible utility allocations. That is, we shall always assume that randomized strategies and free disposal of utility are possible in every choice problem. Throughout, we let CP denote the set of choice problems to be studied. Also, we define CP° to be the class of all choice problems which can be generated as the comprehensive convex hulls of nonempty finite sets of allocations. That is: CPP m (A(x! x) (x1, 4) isa finite subset of RY) Al the results which we derive will hold for the case of CP = CP®, but we may allow CP to represent more general classes of convex comprehensive sets as well. For any two sets SCR" and TCR" and any number A, we define AS +(1=2T to be the set: AS + (1-A)T = (Ax + (1-Apylx € Sandy ET} If 0R" such that, for every S in CP: F(S) = (F(S)v 0s F(S)) ES.SOCIAL CHOICE PROBLEMS 887 ‘That is, a choice function should select a feasible utility allocation vector for every choice problem. In the rest of this paper, we will study various properties which we might want a choice function to satisfy, and we will characterize the classes of choice functions which can satisfy these properties. 3, LINEAR AND UTILITARIAN CHOICE FUNCTIONS In this section, we consider choice functions satisfying weak Pareto optimality and linearity properties. A function F: CPR" is weakly Pareto optimal (WO) ift: (i) F(S) € S, and (i) x > F(S) implies x ¢ S, for every S in CP and every x in ®. That is, a ‘choice function is weakly Pareto optimal if it always chooses a feasible utility allocation such that there is no other feasible allocation making everyone strictly better off. If a choice function were not weakly Pareto optimal, then it could be criticized as inefficient, in those cases where it chose a strictly dominated point. ‘A function F: CP->R" is linear iff: F(AS + (1-2)T) = AF(S) + (I= )JF(T) for every pair of choice problems $ and T in CP, and for every number A such that 0R is uilitrian iff there exists some vector (Pis--Ps) in BY such that: () Siyp,=1 and every p,>0, and Gp “F(S)= maximum, es p= x, for every § © CP. That is, a utilitarian choice function is one which always maximizes some weighted average of the individu- als’ utilities ‘One might argue that perhaps we should call these “weighted utilitarian” choice functions, and that we should call a choice function “properly utilitarian” only in the case of p= p=... = p,. However any choice function which is utilitarian in our above sense could be represented as properly utilitarian if all888 ROGER B. MYERSON individuals with p, = 0 were dropped out of the society and if all other individu- als’ utility scales were multiplied by the p, factors. That is, our utilitarian choice functions are precisely those which could be represented as properly utilitarian for some selection of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility scales for the individue als, possibly after some restriction of membership in the society. We say that CP is a comex collection of choice problems iff AS + (1 —\)T. € CP whenever S € CP, T © CP, and 0< A < 1. With this regularity condition ‘on the set of choice problems considered, we can state our first main result. ‘TaeoREM 1: Suppose CP is a convex collection of choice problems, and suppose F:CP-R° is a linear and weakly Pareto optimal choice function. Then F is utilitarian, Proor: Let A= (p ERS). all p; > 0). For any S in CP, define the set Q(S) = (q ER"| for some x ES, q-x > 4: F(S)} Notice that Q(S) must be an open subset of R", If F is not utilitarian, then we must have & C UsecpQ(S), so the Q(S) sets ‘must form an open cover on . Since A is compact, there must exist some finite collection (S',5%,...,5#) CCP such that ACUS, (5!) Then consider §°=(1/K)S',,S/. By WPO, F(S°) must be on the Pareto frontier of the closed convex set 5. s0 by the Supporting Hyperplane Theorem (see Rockafellar (15, Section 11), there must exist some vector p € A such that p - F(S%) > p- x for all x in S°. However, since the Q(S/) cover A, we may assume (renumbering if, necessary) that p € Q(S'). So for some x! in S', p-x! > p+ F(S'). Then by linearity, we get pms)=-(f > *s) “(3 *) min, £(S)= (5) for every j, which would contradict the Pareto optimality of E(S).) By generalizing the equity constraints which define E, we can introduce the class of egalitarian choice functions. We say that F: CP->R® is egalitarian ift F is weakly Pareto optimal and there exist numbers 1,13, 4 and cy >0, > 0,56, >0 such that, for every S in CP: A(S)=m AS) FS) That is, when u= +4) and c= (¢),..., 6), an egalitarian choice func- tion F always selects the best point in S of the form F(S)=u+ ac, for some number a. Since we consider only closed and comprehensive sets, there will always be @ unique weakly Pareto optimal point in $ on the line (w+ aca ER). So the egalitarian choice function is well-defined once the vectors u and > 0 are specified. ‘As before, one might argue that we should call these “rescaled egalitarian” choice functions, reserving the term “properly egalitarian” for the choice func- tion E above. However, any choice function which is egalitarian in our above sense could also be represented as properly egalitarian if we used the appropriate affine transformations of the individuals’ utility scales (mapping x, to (x, ~ 4)/¢)). That is, our egalitarian choice functions are precisely those which could be represented as properly egalitarian under some selection of von New- ‘mann-Morgenstern utility scales for the individuals. ‘An egalitarian choice function like £ is generally neither linear nor utili tarian. For example, (letting n= 2) suppose that $= 1((4,4),(0, 10) and T H(4,4),(10,0)). Then E(S) = (4,4) and E(T)= (4,4). But }S +} T= H(4,4)s(7,2).,7)(5,5)). So we Bet e(ds+47)= 6.5 «c= 42(s)+ 4200),890 ROGER B, MYERSON Although egalitarian choice functions do not satisfy linearity, they do satisfy a weaker property. A choice function F: CP>R® is concave iff F(AS + (1-A)T) > AF(S) + (1-AJF(T) for every pair of choice problems S and T in CP, and for every number A such that 0 dat (1- VB, and so: FS + (1=2)T) > MF(S) + (1-)F(T). ‘There are concave choice functions which are neither utilitarian nor egalitar- ian, For example, let n=2, and let F’ and F” be linear utilitarian choice funetions such that F'(S) maximizes }x, +x, over x €S, and F"(S) maxi- mizes 3x, + 4x, over x © S. Then let rs te ie SF(S)+ FCS) (so that F”” is linear but not weakly Pareto optimal), and let F(S)=(F\(S), FS) be the unique point on the weakly Pareto optimal frontier of S such that: F(S)~ F'"(S) = F(S) — P'S). It can be checked that the F:CP—>R? thus defined is a concave and weakly Pareto optimal choice function, but it is not utilitarian or egalitarian. However, this choice function may also seem rather complicated, in that it depends on F°(S) and F*(S), two alternatives which are not actually selected. That is, this ‘choice function violates a principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives Following Nash [10], we say that a choice function is independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) iff, for any two choice problems $ and T in CP: if $C T and F(T)€S then F(S)= F(T). (Sen [16] calls this condition “Property a”, to distinguish it from the condition of the same name used by Arrow [1]) To interpret this condition, suppose that society faces choice problem T and selects, F(T). Now suppose that it is discovered that some points in T really are not feasible, and so the actual feasible set is $C T. Independence of irrelevant alternatives requires that, if the old choice is still feasible (F(T) € S), then it should still be chosen, Any choice function determined by maxmization of a social welfare function, or by a social preference ordering over utility allocations, will satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives. Recall that CP° is the set of all choice problems which can be generated as comprehensive convex hulls of finite sets of points in R". If we impose the regularity condition that CP 2 CP®, then we can state our second main result, ‘characterizing utilitarianism and egalitarianism. TurorrM 2: Suppose that CP > CP°, and suppose that F:CP—>R" is weakly Pareto optimal, concave, and independent of irrelevant alternatives. Then F is either utilitarian or egalitarian. Proor or THEOREM 2: The proof will be broken up into a series of lemmas and definitions.892 ROGER B. MYERSON Derinrmion: For any allocations x and y in R*, let f(x)= F(H(x)) and let fey) = FAG»). Derisrmion: Let M be the set of all allocations in R" which F could possibly select; that is: M = (x|x-= F(S) for some $ € CP}. Lowa 1: M = (xx €R" and x = f(x) PRoor: If x = f(x) = F(H(x)) then x € M, for S = H(x). On the other hand, if x= F(S) for any S, then H1(x) S by WPO, and so x= F(H(x)) by 1A Leva 2: M is convex. PROOF: Suppose x = f(x), y= f(y), 0SA< 1, and 2 =Ax-+ (1 —Ayy. Then H(2)=AA(x) + (= N)H(), 80 S(2) = F(H(2)) > MF(H(x)) + (1 — )F(H(y)) =det(I-dyaz. So f(z) > = by concavity. But f(z) < + by IPO. So f(z) = z, and: © M. DEFINITION: Let CP* be the set of all choice problems generated by utility allocations in M. That is: CP = (A(x ys 05 YEE MY E My. FEM) Lava 3: If S © CP* and T © CP* and 0<2-< 1, then FOS + (1-A)T) =AF(S) + (I= F(T). Proor: Let x= F(S), y= F(T). Choose w € S.-M and z € S01 M so that dw + (I= Aje > FAS + (1-A)T), (This can be done because, by convexity of M, S © CP* must be generated from SM by disposal of utility only. Furthermore, by feasibility, there must be some w* © $ and 2+ © T such that dwt + (1-A)z* = FAS + (1-A)T). Then choose w € $0 M and z € TM so that w > w* and z > z*,) Then by IIA and convexity of M, we must have dw + (I-A) = FAS +(1-A)T).SOCIAL CHOICE PROBLEMS 893 By IA, we have x = f(x,w), since H(x,w) C8. Also: dw + (I= A)e = f(x + (1 —A)z,Aw + (1—A)2) by IA from AS + (1 —A)T. But z € M implies that 2 = f(z). So by concavity doe (= Ale > A(x) + (1 A) f(z) =A # (=). Since A> 0, we get w > x. So x © H(w) and x= f(w) by IIA. But w EM, so ‘A similar argument shows that y = z, Thus det (1-A)y = FAS + (1-27). Lema 4: There exists some vector p © R° such that p, > 0 forall i, S1-p,= 1, ‘and: for all § © CP*, and all x € S, p-x < p+ F(S). Proor: F is linear on CP* by Lemma 3. CP* is a convex collection of sets, because M is convex. So by Theorem 1, F is utilitarian on CP*, Dprintmion: Henceforth let p be the vector constructed in Lemma 4, Lema 5: For any choice problem S © CP, for any x © SM, p> F(S)> p> Proor: Let y= F(S). Then y €M and x © M, so H(x, y) € CP*. By IIA, F(H(x, y)) = J. So py > pox by Lemma 4, LemMa 6: Suppose px > p+ f(y) and x € M. Then x= fx, y). (Notice that, since p > O and y > f(y), the hypothesis of this lemma will hold if px > py and xeM) Proor: Let =x, y). For some \ such that 0 p+ x, which would contradict the hypothesis if z = f()- So we know X Af y) + (LA) (3) = Az + (A. Soz>Az+(I—A)x, and thus z > x, since 1 = A> 0. Sody + (I= A)x > z > x. ‘This implies that either A= 0 or y > x. But y > x is not possible, by Lemma 5 and the hypothesis of this lemma. SoA =0 and z < x. Therefore z = Lea 7: Suppose x M,y © M,NER, and z = Ax + (1 —A)y. Then p- fiz) ape894 ROGER B. MYERSON Proor: If 0 1. Suppose that, contrary to the lemma, for some 6 p-z—p- fiz) > €>0. Let w= f(z) + el, where 1= (1, ..., DER’ It f(z,w) were in H(z) then we would have f(z,w)= f(z) by IIA. But this would violate WPO, since w > f(z). So 2 ¥ f(e,w). By construction, p-z>p-w=p-fiz)+e. (Notice p-1=1.) Then by Lemma 6, edu (Remember \ > | is assumed here.) But by concavity, we must have: Multiplying through by A, we get Ax + (1 —A)y > f(2,w), a contradiction of the ‘conclusion in the last paragraph. Thus our assumption of pz > p f(z) must be impossible, and so p- z= p- f(z) if \> 1 For the case of A <0, the proof is similar to the A > 1 case, reversing the roles of x and y, and of A and (I A). Lesa 8: Suppose that F is not utilitarian. Then there exist allocations u and in R such that u= f(v) and p+ v> p-u. Also, there exists a vector ¢ ER" such that ¢ > 0, p-¢= 1, and u~ cE M. Proor: If F is not utilitarian, then we can find some S € CP such that supe P*¥ > p- F(S). So we can choose some pS such that po >p- F(S). Now fe) < © 50 flv) SM. By Lemma 5, p- F(S)> p-f(v). So po > p-u, when we let u= fle). To construct e, first let d= u— f(u—1). We know u— Also, u=1> flu), sod >1>Oand p-d >p-1=1.Lete pre=1,c>0, and wen(gly)anays (2st is in M (by convexity of M), flu- NEM. (l/p- dd. 80 ASSUMPTION: In Lemmas 9 through 12 we will assume that F is not utilitarian, We will prove that F must be egalitarian. Dermrmion: Henceforth, under the assumption that F is not utilitarian, let up, and ¢ be as in Lemma 8.SOCIAL CHOICE PROBLEMS 895 Limon 9: Suppose x = M and p+ > p-x>p+u. Then x > w PRooF: Let a=(p+0-p-u+D/(p+0~p-x), and let y= + a(x~ 0), Notice that a >I and p-y=p-u-1I. By Lemma 6, f(v,x) = x, so by IIA we get fw, x) = x. But Hew) = Ln(n.y) + SL M0) So by concavity of F: F008) 2 2 fou) + floy= bus # su. Then x > u. Lenowa 10: Suppose x © M and p+ x PRoor: Suppose not. Then, for some i, x, p((I-Oxto)=poute>pru as long as ¢ is small and positive. So (I — ¢)x + ¢y will violate Lemma 9 if x u. So we must have x > u. Lesata 11: For any vector d in RY, if u—d EM then, for every d in Ry utd eM. Proor: Consider first the case of A>0. Let y= f(u-+Ad). Then p+ y= p (ud) by Lemma 7. So 1 Awe Tea? * Tene DEM (by convexity of M) and 1 du d))=p-u (Tey t TE a) or By Lemma 10, we conclude 1 ae Tea? * Tex)?896 ROGER B. MYERSON y(t Au -Mu~d) =u tad. But y = f(u+Ad) implies y < w+Ad. Sou + Ad For the case of A <0, observe that the preceding case showed u ~(—d) = u + dM. So, using our results for positive multipliers, we get u+Ad= w+ (-AX=d) E M since A> 0. Leva 12: Suppose x € M. Then x = w+ Bo, where B= p> x ~ pu Proor: By Lemma 1] and the definition of c,u— le © M. So 4x + $(u— Be) eM. But Po($8 +AU Be) Apex tS pwd Bp Hirst pu Bap So 4x +4(w— fe) > u by Lemma 10, Solving for x, we get x > u+ Be. Now let y = w+ (w~ x). By Lemma I1 we know y € M and also u + Be © M. So fy + (w+ Bc) € M. Observe that Pi(Lyt3(u4 Be)) = Sp um E BH bpou tl B= So 4y+4(w+ fe) > w by Lemma 10. Thus y > u~ fe, and so x= 2u~y < + fe. Together with x > w+ Be from the preceding paragraph, this proves the lemma. Since Lemma 12, stating that F is egalitarian, was proven under the assump- tion that Fis not utilitarian, we have proven the Theorem. OED. Northwestern University Manusript received June, 1979; revision received Api, 1980. REFERENCES In] Angow, K. 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