[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.

RENATO L. CAYETANO, Petitioner, v. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON.

JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, Respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for

petitioner.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions While

ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court’s decision in this case
would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our
national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX-C: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position
in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." (Emphasis
supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1), Article XII-C of the
1973 Constitution which similarly provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a

Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including
the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for al least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what

constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Black defines "practice of law" as: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It
is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by
maintaining an office where he is held out to be an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and
fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate." (Black’s Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.).

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title
Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person
is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,

firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears
in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or
acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in
the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil.
173, 176-177) stated: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in

court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and
in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work

performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on
a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation.
They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at
law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No
valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance
in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his
office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning
and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy
trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys." (Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.], p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of
the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing

for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in
even broader terms as advocacy, counseling and public service.

"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the

profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual
for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing
attorney at law within the meaning of the statute." (Barr D. Cardell, 155 NW
312).

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23).

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has
adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which
I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on
Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by
Section 1 is that ‘They must be Members of the Philippine Bar’ — I am
quoting from the provision — ‘who have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years.’"

"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of

the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would
like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding
members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of
law outside the COA. We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the
lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal
talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be
considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of
the Commission on Audit.

"This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions

and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the
practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is
equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article
on the Commission on Audit?"

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA although it is
auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And,
therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary
qualifications in accordance with the provision on qualifications under our
provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.

"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is
equivalent to the practice of law.

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. OPLE. Thank you." cralaw virtua1aw library

. . . (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others,
that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA)
should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of
auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways
synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not
engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are
private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as

commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the
business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are
often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm
is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some
firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called
shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced
attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneys called "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law
practice is essentially tautologies, unhelpful defining the practice of law as
that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West
Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as
"the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to
be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass’n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145
Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne,
128 Conn. 325, 22 A. 2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost
every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable. (Wolfram, op. cit.)

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the

most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the
average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large
percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating
lawyer’s role colors much of both the public image and the self-perception of
the legal profession. (Ibid.).
chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects
history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander
Sycip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a
business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before
the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such
as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially
more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know
that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is]
loosely describe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business
lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial
lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine,
surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective."
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will engage in
a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills,
legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even
the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice will usually perform
at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role
such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a
client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one
of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the
exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have
mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers
find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for
many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that
is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove
from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special
roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers’ work the
constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in
which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The
most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government
legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted
are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the
traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary

transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional
groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends
in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an

accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law
research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal
policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and contingency planning,"
has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many
decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the

sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major
trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of
action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute
danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure
must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a
model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test
projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting

and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has
received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy
of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary
approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those

trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to
multi-variable decisional contexts and the various approaches for handling
such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master’s or doctorate
degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal
policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts
and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in
similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would
require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to

as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big
money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not
explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of
attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of
the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their
legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only
for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle
most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the
legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include,
inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate
secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other
adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission),
and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the
legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These
include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. (Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from
the action, or not understanding how one’s work actually fits into the work of
the organization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the
results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes
offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the
business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer’s services may sometimes be engaged by a

multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law
field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived
by many as glamorous, this is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most
cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the
younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business
Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25, 1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of
finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to
wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one
who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts
them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm,"
so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method
of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities
Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management
issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types
of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of
particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skills applicable to a corporate counsel’s management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of
the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a

shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel’s total
learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel’s
role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process,
including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation’s
strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced
as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with
sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with
public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in
other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer’s participation in decision-making within the

corporation is rapidly changing. The modern corporate lawyer has gained a
new role as a stockholder — in some cases participating in the organization
and operations of governance through participation on boards and other
decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing
legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. (Emphasis
supplied).

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies

toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other
countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative
efforts between governmental and business Japan’s MITI is world famous.
(Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate

Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all
kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups
within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in
the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment, coordinating work with outsiders, promoting
team achievements within the organization. In general, such external
activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group
processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer

vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current
research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are
apropos: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an
effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and
pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops,
inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the systems dynamics
principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels.
(Emphasis supplied).

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions

involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it
can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation
settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of
cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be

used directly by parties and mediators in all kinds of negotiations. All
integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation
case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function,
concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that

comprise a major part of the general counsel’s responsibilities. They differ
from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal
entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered
and made. chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken

those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be
directly supportive of this nation’s evolving economic and organizational fabric
as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment.
The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the
relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel’s Office. The general

counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of
the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects
of the firm’s strategic issues, including structuring its global operations,
managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of
employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex
make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not
enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full
sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer’s aim is not the understand all of the law’s effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working
knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the
basic legal "constitution" or make-up of the modern corporation. "Business
Star, The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more
than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work.
Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law
territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the
lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding
and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jar. 11, 1989, p.
4).
chanrobles law library : red

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino

to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the
Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination

of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath
of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the
bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-
73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more
than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo).

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar,
Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the
World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for
about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted
with the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal,
economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in
1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of
an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since
1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and
National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod’s work involved being
knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation
hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his
personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen’s
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged
sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for
and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the
urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a
member of the Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability
of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission,
Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and
the party-list system for the House of Representative." (pp. 128-129 Rollo)
(Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used
to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and

which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise
during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there
are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an
operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts)
who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2,
Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country’s Constitution; it lays

down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of
any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental
parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower’s representation; (3) conditions of
closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13)

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring
program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries’ sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted
by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of
Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the
World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). (Emphasis
supplied).

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely re

negotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation
and agreement drafting and in re negotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer
may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the
formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract
agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished
dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). (Emphasis
supplied).

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the

set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a
failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement
must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state
the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a complete debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreements — an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international
affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
once said: ‘They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are,
men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene
mastery.’ (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4,
Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law",
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration
the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty.
Monsod s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA
327, the Court said: chanrobles.com : virtual law library

"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by

the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition
being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If
he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide." (Emphasis supplied).

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v. Civil Service
Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all
the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative
but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that
another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so
would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing
authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by law." (Emphasis supplied).
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar,
consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment;
and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v.
Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p.
200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the

nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President

with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without re appointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall
hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members
for three years, without re appointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member
be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity." cralaw virtua1aw library

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla’s separate opinion, suffice it to say that his
definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law
practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law,
which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla’s definition would
require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practiced two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that
in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really
means nothing because the definition says that law practice." . . is what
people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of
law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all
situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on
what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but
we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of
the Philippine Bar, who has been practicing law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practicing law, without first becoming
lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected
President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more
qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action
or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is
indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the
incumbent President?
We now proceed: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public

hearings on Monsod’s confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed
the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by
the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission’s judgment. In the
instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the
writs prayed, for has been clearly shown. chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Additionally, consider the following: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President,

may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm
the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S.
Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible
that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth
life."
cralaw virtua1aw library

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of
Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson’s beloved) for help in capturing
Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

"No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins." cralaw virtua1aw library

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator
placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front
of Samson’s eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened
to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with
righteous fury, Accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The
procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow
from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit
of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said
petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements
pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-

quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC,
INC.  Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
1

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are

champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements,
hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in
the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the
services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be
allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of
Arizona,  reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
2

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein,
we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association
(PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle
(WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6)
Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers
on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda.   The said bar associations readily
3

responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court
takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services
offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of
law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper
and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers
adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them
on the issues involved in this bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the
two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would
readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who could
deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic
institutional services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage,
property, or business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or
foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?

xxx xxx xxx

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect
that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of
establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper
publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to
perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of
law practice as aforedescribed. 4

xxx xxx xxx

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services.
The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently
because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to
the very name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is
respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just
like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly,
the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the

present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the
impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal
services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a
person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever
doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services"
as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law
practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal
services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have it. The
advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public
that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary
to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are
only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said
advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to
know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is
recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . .

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman

entered into accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being
conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in
accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very
least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in
Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.

Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in
Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words
"Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if
not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent
union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes
marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular
advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is
suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license.

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that
the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate.
The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements
suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is
committed.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do

not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question
give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it
offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in
the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are
encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good
customs and the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
 xxx xxx xxx

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the

publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto.
It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further performing or
offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such
services to the public in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of
evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be
stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-
members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to
prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by
specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having
devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements
for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession
will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology.
Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter,
even if both are (equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal
practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also,
and more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological development in the
profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of
illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its

services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the
Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which
service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made available
exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require
further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be

prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of
marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While
respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such
matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine
law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should
be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot
recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal
practice of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at

members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to
practice law or perform legal services.

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be
allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly
defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating
his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the
legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be considered, the
corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every
provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving
legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the
use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is
absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the
trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated
services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers
of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work
is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a
certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all
indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal
services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds, incorporation,
rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an
attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such
limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for
it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc."
holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an  odious
vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance
for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to
persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised
Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court.
Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it
are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish
to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal
right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not
only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons
engaged in unethical law practice. 6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are
wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and
patently immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic
and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical,
misleading and immoral advertising.
 xxx xxx xxx

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely
renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as
enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2
to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated above,
clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of
court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family
Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret
marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related
problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other
related laws.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal
principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which
activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as
"the practice of law."
7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be
given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by
unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study
on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the
bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the

administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as such.
While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or
standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the
meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect the general
public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the
guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which
may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are
prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it
appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by
an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the
general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without being
qualified to offer such services. 
8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the

impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of
marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign
investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of its
services. The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters. It
gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought
to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also
gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The
Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and
majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main
purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the
purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against
the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases,
but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work
out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this
country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid
marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are
solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency
for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is
towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from
qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of
advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an
illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be
amended so that such act could become justifiable.

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages
and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly
reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a
secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on
divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely
represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by
our Code of Morals should not be done.

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for
clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of
this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar.  10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services
rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is
not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of
respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves
knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of
law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless

he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a
course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's)
knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what
measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only
presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable
acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law — accurate
or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when
we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather
precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or profession. A good
example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention
codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specification in
harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is
required by the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some
measure that he recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are
they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged for
the legal advice or information, and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a
major non-legal problem.

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to
advise him and the architect in respect to the building code and the like, then an architect
who performed this function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory
reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-
empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel
man. But this is not the case. The most important body of the industrial relations experts
are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers.
Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the practice for some years to
delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen for
their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or
lack of it. More recently, consultants like the defendants have the same service that the
larger employers get from their own specialized staff.

The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which
appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The court should be very
cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of conducting
business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily perform a
certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical education given by our
schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any
particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged
primarily to advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his employees, to
guide his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path charted
by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the
case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and psychological
lines. The law only provides the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning code
limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the architect may plan. The
incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does not transform his
activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work,
he performed services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would
be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the

adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is
not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select
an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person appointed is
free to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however,
there may be an exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most real
estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land
depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess
the probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same
opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy
between an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or of
a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a
definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the proofs.

Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the
federal government, especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations
Board. An agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by
the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before such agency. The State
of New Jersey is without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules of the
National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person, or by
counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S.
203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a
lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board
allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in
Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which
may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:

Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently

with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or
in another capacity.

1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See
Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a
marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute
practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for
Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then
what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal
Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment
of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational
materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where
the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the subject and
determines by himself what courses of action to take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal
Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal
advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text
which purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the
principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution
to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these
two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved and
accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal contact
or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence
and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF
LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR
PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer general
advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's
publication does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person in a particular situation — in their publication and
sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law .
. . . There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no
proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of
selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement any
printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the
memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant having an interest in any
publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any
personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however,
the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice
in the course of personal contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in
the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action
or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary
documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of
law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant
relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce,
separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v.
Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-
advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice
or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this
light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious
disposition of this case.

xxx xxx xxx

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or
perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities,
formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof
(which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that
only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are
available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent
for the proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we
note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction
and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining
the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of
law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge
or skill. 
12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice
and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights
are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court.  13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three
principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform
them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for
clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of
life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law.  14

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the
practice of law.   One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and
15

then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court,
is also practicing law.   Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and
16

rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law.   One
17

who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for
it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 
18

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod,   after citing the doctrines in several cases,
19

we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract
and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered
to be in the practice of law when he:

. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,

associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity, performs
any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs
any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340
Mo. 852).

This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-
177),stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and
all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters or
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer
which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning
and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o
Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N.
E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139,
144).

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court.
Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive
findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of
respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own
description of the services it has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained

paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory,
through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and
communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of
documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence
gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and
assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or non-
government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations;
educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other
countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that
they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that
do not involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer
systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate
legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal
services. 20

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve
mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and
programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research
aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to
laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic
is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on
marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the
respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the
client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called
paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by
said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that
respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the
weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and
so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January

13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled
"Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and
operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices
on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter
what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion
domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are
"specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in
taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These
specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field
toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law
firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing
the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's
bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so
on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's
referred to one of our specialists.

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment.
These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a
simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were
a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you
wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's
just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.

Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If
you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit
millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would
be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is
even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in
taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs
contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how to
arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case.  21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not
controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the
nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory
prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now
assailed in this proceeding.

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported
facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-
shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from
simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these
services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive
functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law.  22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent
which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law. 23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an
individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to
practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 
24

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish
to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is
limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and
various statutes or rules specifically so provide.   The practice of law is not a lawful
25

business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions
required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law
who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study, have
been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science
entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of
their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of
law.   The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar
26

is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the
public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and
unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the
United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be
adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware
that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral
adoption as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent,

there are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal
education, while there are none in the Philippines.   As the concept of the "paralegals" or
28

"legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to
protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by
the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant
Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal
assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own
code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc.
and the American Paralegal Association.  29

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may
be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly
licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of
another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and
extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor.  30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney
cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the
unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of
law.   That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of
31

their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to
practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
facts.   He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
33

deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his

qualifications or legal services.   Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
34

representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract
legal business.   Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the
35

Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in
which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other
like self-laudation.  36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents.
A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill
as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods.   The prescription against
37

advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental

postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of
The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot   an advertisement, similar to
38

those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding,   was held to 39

constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the

respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from
the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and
not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts
the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As
a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but
must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).

We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a
lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which
must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a
client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public
attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and
proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.  40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the
profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define
the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories,
namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from
the restrictions. 
41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical
and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a
statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses,
telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth
and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other
educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships;
legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly represented."  42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be
a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is
published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list
the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or
injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain
only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with,
address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is
not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law. 44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged
by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same
definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned
exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona,   which is repeatedly
45

invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not
applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in
said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation
or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to
be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or
impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of
Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case
contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state
unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state."   This goes to show
46

that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent,
can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception.
Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the
decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television
commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly   with respect to these
47

characteristics of lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial
systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would
only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal
profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the
community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such
negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of
professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary

action, to advertise his services except in allowable instances   or to aid a layman in the
48

unauthorized practice of law.   Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the
49

prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a
member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition
of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more
severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the
purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and
determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since
it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is
merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly
determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of
our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the
practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly
rendering the alleged support services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo
warranto action,   after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the
50

grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-
off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may
be necessary under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes
"A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as
indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur

B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF

SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other
individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul
Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the
infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part
of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into
plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to
the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by
the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused
individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation
with the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June
1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation
was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation
officer assigned to supervise him.

Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to
Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal
conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar
Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.  He passed the
1

Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.

On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the
attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro
T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April
1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from
the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993.
Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for
Admission to the Bar.

The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to

everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens
of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified.  The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is
2

stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as
having persuasive effect:

In Re Farmer:  3

xxx xxx xxx

This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the

applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he
must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary
to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of bad character. It is
the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through
association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a man of
upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character expresses itself,
not in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to
do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is
wrong. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently
proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his
advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are
committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals
with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of
the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
 xxx xxx xxx 4

In Re Application of Kaufman,  citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359,
5

210 NW 710:

It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from
the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the
practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for
admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly
apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a
minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission to
practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that  the
highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a candidate
who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully
met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and
has pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far more difficult
situation is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for
the recalling and annulment of his license.

In Re Keenan: 6

The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to
carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued
only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral
character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it.
Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to
separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the
profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.

Re Rouss: 7

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and
professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not
to punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like the examination into
learning, is merely a test of fitness.

Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8

Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only
protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the
cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such agents give?
They are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the
court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law,
and it is of the highest possible consequence that both those who have not such
qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall
not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice.

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of
greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice
are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:

. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10
Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the
law unless he covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the attorney
is more important, if anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice
than legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant
passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are that his
character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead of an ornament to
his great calling — a curse instead of a benefit to his community — a Quirk, a Gammon
or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin. 9

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those
seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly
broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:

Re Stepsay:  10

The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to
practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.

Re Wells: 11

. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar
the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has
been guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be
sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment
proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's
character as respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse
admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be
causes for disbarment.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek
admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct
expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a
general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with
inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal
system as we know it. 12

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of
the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely
accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the
death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on
the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed
to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had,
by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of
them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless
stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted
upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally
irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then
possessed of good moral character.

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court
is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has
purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress
that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated
not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also,
and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the
attorney's oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration,
evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may
consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community
who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for
a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by
Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the
senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the
community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show
that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the
ancient and learned profession of the law.

Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof,
brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of
Raul Camaligan.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J. is on leave.

A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990

ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with
malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges against
him, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his
complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution dated June 28, 1976, the Court granted respondent's motion
and required complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976, complainant submitted an amended complaint for
disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the following acts:

1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor
Fortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to pay all
expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of
the property in litigation.

2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-15143, wherein Eusebio
Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants and, without said case being terminated, acting as
counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490;

3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados, which properties

are the subject of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q-15143, while the case was still
pending;

4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him on
August 30, 1971 for the development into a residential subdivision of the land involved in
Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty
percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney's fees from the Fortunados, while knowing fully
well that the said property was already sold at a public auction on June 30, 1971, by the
Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan
City;

5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified documents purporting
to be true copies of "Addendum to the Land Development Agreement dated August 30,
1971" and submitting the same document to the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, in
connection with the complaint for estafa filed by respondent against complainant
designated as I.S. No. 7512936;

6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who was his client;

7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without legal basis before the
Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City;

8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office by making
false assertion of facts in his pleadings;

9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not intentionally tell a he, he
does not tell the truth either."

Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on

November 18, 1976, denying the accusations against him. Complainant filed a reply to
respondent's answer on December 29, 1976 and on March 24, 1977 respondent filed a
rejoinder.

In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. In the investigation
conducted by the Solicitor General, complainant presented himself as a witness and
submitted Exhibits "A" to "PP", while respondent appeared both as witness and counsel
and submitted Exhibits "1" to "11". The parties were required to submit their respective
memoranda.
On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him,
claiming that the long delay in the resolution of the complaint against him constitutes a
violation of his constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases. Upon
order of the Court, the Solicitor General filed a comment to the motion to dismiss on
August 8, 1988, explaining that the delay in the investigation of the case was due to the
numerous requests for postponement of scheduled hearings filed by both parties and the
motions for extension of time to file their respective memoranda." [Comment of the
Solicitor General, p. 2; Record, p. 365]. Respondent filed a reply to the Solicitor General's
comment on October 26, 1988. In a resolution dated January 16, 1989 the Court required
the Solicitor General to submit his report and recommendation within thirty (30) days from
notice.

On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the recommendation
that Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales be suspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General
found that respondent committed the following acts of misconduct:

a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the pendency of
the case where the properties were involved;

b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their land
development agreement had already been sold at a public auction prior to the execution
of said agreement; and

c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document where two
signatories who had not signed the original (or even the xerox copy) were made to
appear as having fixed their signatures [Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor
General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404].

Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B of the
Revised Rules of Court. Respondent manifested that he intends to submit more evidence
before the IBP. Finally, on November 27, 1989, respondent filed a supplemental motion
to refer this case to the IBP, containing additional arguments to bolster his contentions in
his previous pleadings.

I.

Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by respondent. It is
respondent's contention that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor
General was limited to the determination of whether or not there is sufficient ground to
proceed with the case and that under Rule 139 the Solicitor General still has to file an
administrative complaint against him. Respondent claims that the case should be
referred to the IBP since Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that:

This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present Rule 139
entitled DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS. All cases pending
investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall be transferred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and disposition as provided in
this Rule except those cases where the investigation has been substantially completed.

The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to

respondent's claim, reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory
upon the Court [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales,
G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988]. Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive
procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under
Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court may conduct disciplinary
proceedings without the intervention of the IBP by referring cases for investigation to the
Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court. In such
a case, the report and recommendation of the investigating official shall be reviewed
directly by the Supreme Court. The Court shall base its final action on the case on the
report and recommendation submitted by the investigating official and the evidence
presented by the parties during the investigation.

Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the effectivity
of Rule 139-B [June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor
General had been substantially completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that only
pending cases, the investigation of which has not been substantially completed by the
Office of the Solicitor General, shall be transferred to the IBP. In this case the
investigation by the Solicitor General was terminated even before the effectivity of Rule
139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his motion to dismiss that the Solicitor General
terminated the investigation on November 26, 1986, the date when respondent submitted
his reply memorandum [Motion to Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p. 353].

Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor General
already made a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the case. To refer the case
to the IBP, as prayed for by the respondent, will result not only in duplication of the
proceedings conducted by the Solicitor General but also to further delay in the disposition
of the present case which has lasted for more than thirteen (13) years.

Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant the
referral of the case to the IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by the
Solicitor General respondent was given ample opportunity to present evidence, his failure
to adduce additional evidence is entirely his own fault. There was therefore no denial of
procedural due process. The record shows that respondent appeared as witness for
himself and presented no less than eleven (11) documents to support his contentions. He
was also allowed to cross-examine the complainant who appeared as a witness against
him.

II.

The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent
committed the acts of misconduct alleged by complainant Bautista.

After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the
Solicitor General, the Court finds that respondent committed acts of misconduct which
warrant the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary power.

The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights"
which was signed by the Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to
respondent one-half (1/2) of the properties of the Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-
1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. mm., and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907 sq.
m., for and in consideration of his legal services to the latter. At the time the document
was executed, respondent knew that the abovementioned properties were the subject of
a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending before the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the Fortunados in said case [See Annex
"B" of Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing the document transferring
one-half (1/2) of the subject properties to himself, respondent violated the law expressly
prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring his client's property or interest involved in any
litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession [Article 1491, New Civil
Code]. This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property or
interest in litigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice
[Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248
(1940)].

However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics,
which states that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of
the litigation which he is conducting," does not appear anymore in the new Code of
Professional Responsibility. He therefore concludes that while a purchase by a lawyer of
property in litigation is void under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, such purchase is no longer
a ground for disciplinary action under the new Code of Professional Responsibility.

This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a
lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal process" (Emphasis supplied), Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an oath to 44 obey the laws [of the Republic
of the Philippines] as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein."
And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the
Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules of Court]. All of these underscore the
role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. The transgression of any
provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will not
countenance. In the instant case, respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code,
must be held accountable both to his client and to society.

Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil
Code are prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their
existing trust relationship with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by
purchase the property and rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with
such property and rights, as well as with the client. And it cannot be claimed that the new
Code of Professional Responsibility has failed to emphasize the nature and
consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him."
On the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession." Hence, notwithstanding the
absence of a specific provision on the matter in the new Code, the Court, considering the
abovequoted provisions of the new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well
as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's
property in litigation constitutes a breach of professional ethics for which a disciplinary
action may be brought against him.

Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really
implemented, because the land development agreement on which the transfer depended
was later rescinded, is untenable. Nowhere is it provided in the Transfer of Rights that
the assignment of the properties of the Fortunados to respondent was subject to the
implementation of the land development agreement. The last paragraph of the Transfer
of Rights provides that:

... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES,
Filipino, married to Lilia Yusay, and a resident of 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila, Quezon
City, rendered to our entire satisfaction, we hereby, by these presents, do transfer and
convey to the said ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, his heirs, successor, and
assigns, one-half (1/2) of our rights and interests in the abovedescribed property,
together with all the improvements found therein [Annex D of the Complaint, Record, p.
28; Emphasis supplied].

It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties to
respondent to be absolute and unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the land
development agreement was implemented.
Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to complainant,
at the time the land development agreement was entered into, that the land covered by
TCT No. T-1929 had already been sold at a public auction. The land development
agreement was executed on August 31, 1977 while the public auction was held on June
30, 1971.

Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his appearance
for the complainant in an anti-graft case filed by the latter against a certain Gilbert
Teodoro was upon the request of complainant and was understood to be only
provisional. Respondent claims that since complainant was not his client, he had no duty
to warn complainant of the fact that the land involved in their land development
agreement had been sold at a public auction. Moreover, the sale was duly annotated at
the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent argues, serves as constructive notice
to complainant so that there was no concealment on his part.

The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale was
annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent failed to
inform the complainant of the sale of the land to Samauna during the negotiations for the
land development agreement. In so doing, respondent failed to live up to the rigorous
standards of ethics of the law profession which place a premium on honesty and
condemn duplicitous conduct. The fact that complainant was not a former client of
respondent does not exempt respondent from his duty to inform complainant of an
important fact pertaining to the land which is subject of their negotiation. Since he was a
party to the land development agreement, respondent should have warned the
complainant of the sale of the land at a public auction so that the latter could make a
proper assessment of the viability of the project they were jointly undertaking. This Court
has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and fairness even in his private dealings
and failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action against him [Custodio v. Esto, Adm.
Case No. 1113, February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517].

Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified documents
purporting to be true copies of an addendum to the land development agreement.

Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the
document filed by respondent with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the
signatories to the addendum to the land development agreement namely, Ramon A.
Gonzales, Alfaro T. Fortunado, Editha T. Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L.
Bautista—were made to appear as having signed the original document on December 9,
1972, as indicated by the letters (SGD.) before each of their names. However, it was only
respondent Alfaro Fortunado and complainant who signed the original and duplicate
original (Exh. 2) and the two other parties, Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado, never
did. Even respondent himself admitted that Edith and Nestor Fortunado only signed the
xerox copy (Exh. 2-A) after respondent wrote them on May 24, 1973, asking them to sign
the said xerox copy attached to the letter and to send it back to him after signing
[Rejoinder to Complainant's Reply, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329]. Moreover, respondent
acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado had merely agreed by phone to sign, but
had not actually signed, the alleged true copy of the addendum as of May 23, 1973
[Respondent's Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, p. 16]. Thus, when respondent submitted the alleged true copy of the
addendum on May 23, 1973 as Annex "A" of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City, he knowingly misled the Court into believing that the original
addendum was signed by Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct
constitutes willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner
consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or
false statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon
22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility].
Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety was
committed by respondent in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados
[Report and Recommendation, p. 8; Record, p. 394]. The Court, however, finds that the
agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part that:

We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent Ramon
Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees.

Alfaro T. Fortunado [signed]

Editha T. Fortunado [signed]
Nestor T. Fortunado [signed]

CONFORME

Ramon A. Gonzales [signed]

[Annex A to the Complaint, Record, p. 4].

is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a

lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See
also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good
faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement.
The agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide for
reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby
an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client's rights is
champertous [JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements are
against public policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry
on the action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the
thing in dispute [See Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242 (1918)].
The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer
and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.

The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting as
counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel for the
Fortunados against the same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15143. The Court,
after considering the record, agrees with the Solicitor General's findings on the matter.
The evidence presented by respondent shows that his acceptance of Civil Case No. Q-
15490 was with the knowledge and consent of the Fortunados. The affidavit executed by
the Fortunados on June 23, 1976 clearly states that they gave their consent when
respondent accepted the case of Eusebio Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of Fortunados, dated June
23, 1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One of the recognized exceptions to the rule against
representation of conflicting interests is where the clients knowingly consent to the dual
representation after full disclosure of the facts by counsel [Canon 6, Canons of
Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility].

Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him before the
Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose of
harassing him.

The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General's investigation of this case,
Civil Case No. Q-18060 was still pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City, while the complaints for libel (I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury (I.S. No. 5913) were
already dismissed by the City Fiscal for insufficiency of evidence and lack of interest,
respectively [Report and Recommendation, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 402-403]. The Solicitor
General found no basis for holding that the complaints for libel and perjury were used by
respondent to harass complainant. As to Civil Case No. Q-18060, considering that it was
still pending resolution, the Solicitor General made no finding on complainants claim that
it was a mere ploy by respondent to harass him. The determination of the validity of the
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-18060 was left to the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City where the case was pending resolution.

The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and accordingly holds
that there is no basis for holding that the respondent's sole purpose in filing the
aforementioned cases was to harass complainant.

Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since the
above discussion on the other grounds sufficiently cover these remaining grounds.

The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent
violated the law and the rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession.
Sworn to assist in the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has
"miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar." [Artiaga v.
Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647]. The Court agrees
with the Solicitor General that, considering the nature of the offenses committed by
respondent and the facts and circumstances of the case, respondent lawyer should be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed serious

misconduct, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for
SIX (6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this Resolution. Let copies of this
Resolution be circulated to all courts of the country for their information and guidance,
and spread in the personal record of Atty. Gonzales.

SO ORDERED.

April 7, 1922

In Re MARCELINO LONTOK

Ramon Diokno for respondent.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government.

MALCOLM, J.:
The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the removal of Marcelino Lontok from
his office of lawyer in the Philippine Islands, because of having been convicted of the
crime of bigamy. The respondent lawyer, in answer, prays that the charges be dismissed,
and bases his plea principally on a pardon issued to him by former Governor-General
Harrison.

Marcelino Lontok was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Zambales of the crime
of bigamy. This judgement was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court, while a further
attempt to get the case before the United States Supreme Court was unsuccessful. On
February 9, 1921, a pardon was issued by the Governor-General of the following tenor:

By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Philippine Organic Act on August 29,
1916, the sentence in the case of Marcelino Lontok convicted by the Court of First
Instance of Zambales of bigamy and sentenced on February 27, 1918, to imprisonment
for eight years, to suffer the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs
of the proceedings, which sentence was, on September 8, 1919, confirmed by the
Supreme Court is hereby remitted, on condition that he shall not again be guilty of any
misconduct.

The particular provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, upon which the Attorney-General
relies in asking for the disbarment of Attorney Lontok, provides that a member of the bar
may be removed or suspended form his office of lawyer by the Supreme Court "by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude." (Sec. 21) That conviction of
the crime of bigamy involves moral turpitude, within the meaning of the law, cannot be
doubted. The debatable question relates to the effect of the pardon by the Governor-
General. On the one hand, it is contended by the Government that while the pardon
removes the legal infamy of the crime, it cannot wash out the moral stain; on the other
hand, it is contended by the respondent that the pardon reaches the offense for which he
was convicted and blots it out so that he may not be looked upon as guilty of it.

The cases are not altogether clear as to just what effect a pardon has on the right of a
court of disbar an attorney for conviction of a felony. On close examination, however, it
will be found that the apparent conflict in the decisions is more apparent than real, and
arises from differences in the nature of the charges on which the proceedings to disbar
are based. Where preceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls are founded
on, and depend alone, on a statute making the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for
disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a
bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been
granted. (In re Emmons [1915], 29 Cal. App., 121; Scott vs. State [1894], 6 Tex. Civ.
App., 343). But where proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on the professional
misconduct involved in a transaction which has culminated in a conviction of felony, it has
been held that while the effect of the pardon is to relieve him of the penal consequences
of his act, it does not operate as a bar to the disbarment proceedings, inasmuch as the
criminal acts may nevertheless constitute proof that the attorney does not possess a
good moral character and is not a fit or proper person to retain his license to practice law.
(People vs. Burton [1907], 39 Colo., 164; People vs. George [1900],186 Ill., 122; Nelson
vs. Com. [1908],128 Ky., 779; Case of In re ———— [1881],86 N.Y., 563.)

The celebrated case of Ex parte Garland [1866], 4 Wall., 380, is directly in point. The
petitioner in this case applied for a license to practice law in the United States courts,
without first taking an oath to the effect that he had never voluntarily given aid to any
government hostile to the United States, as required by statute. The petitioner, it seems,
had been a member of the Conferate Congress, during the secession of the South, but
had been pardons by the President of the United States. It was held, buy a divided court,
that to exclude the petitioner from the practice of law for the offense named would be to
enforce a punishment for the offense, notwithstanding the pardon which the court had no
right to do; and the opinion of the court, in part, said:

A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of
existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is an innocent as if he had
never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties
and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it
removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes
him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.

There is only this limitation to its operation; it does not restore offices forfeited, or
property or interest vested in others in consequence of the conviction and judgement.

Although much which is contained in the opinion of the four dissenting justices, in the
Garland case, appeals powerfully to the minds of the court, we feel ourselves under
obligation to follow the rule laid down by the majority decision of the higher court. We do
this with the more grace when we recall that according to the article 130 of the Penal
Code, one of the different ways by which criminal liability is extinguished is by pardon.
We must also remember that the motion for disbarment is based solely on the judgement
of conviction for a crime of which the respondent has been pardoned, We must also
remember that the motion for disbarment is based solely on the judgment of conviction
for crime of which the respondent has been pardoned, and that the language of the
pardon is not such as to amount to a conditional pardon similar in nature to a parole. It
may be mentioned however, in this connection, that if Marcelino Lontok should again be
guilty of any misconduct, the condition of his pardon would be violated, and he would
then become subject to disbarment.

It results, therefore, that the petition of the Attorney-General cannot be granted, and that
the proceedings must be dismissed. Costs shall be taxed as provided by section 24 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. So ordered.

Resolution             March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates
of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for
petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.

DIOKNO, J.:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and
concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953."
Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for
admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he
must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below
50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless,
considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and
the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this
court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of
only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in
1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed
by this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See
Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a
few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and
secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the
passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The
President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven
members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto,
and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto.
Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the
vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the
matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his
signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as
follows:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FIFTY-FIVE.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one

hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general
average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred
and forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-
one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per
cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade
below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That
for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered
as one and included as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject
in any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed
to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in
computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any
subsequent examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for
admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision
of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an
additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the
reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid
injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration,
irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the
court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it
must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied
equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the
petitioners, properly classified, affected by this decision, as well as a more detailed
account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision as Annexes
I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical data are
set forth:

(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act
No. 972 total 1,168, classified as follows:

1946     (August) 206 121 18

1946     (November) 477 228 43
1947 749 340 0
1948 899 409 11
1949 1,218 532 164
1950 1,316 893 26
1951 2,068 879 196
1952 2,738 1,033 426
1953   2,555     968     284
               TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586
have filed either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere
motions for reconsideration.

(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2

of said Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different
examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating,
however, their highest grades in different subjects in previous examinations, with their
latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing average as provided for by
Republic Act No. 972.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore
1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in
1946 to 1951 had individually presented motions for reconsideration which were denied,
while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar
motions, which are still pending because they could be favorably affected by Republic
Act No. 972, — although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient
reasons to reconsider their grades

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the
legal profession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been
expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for
admission on the sole question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.

We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the
members of the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects
in which the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire
Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of
the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General,
Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios,
Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta
against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego,
M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera,
Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal
researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine and American
jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for
a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority
opinion was assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly as possible above
all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparation. Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author
Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:

The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous
handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation
has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the
preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation.

Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed.
And now it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total
1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of
"inadequacy of preparation."

By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094
law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the
profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The
public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency,
precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An
adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should
be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the
protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those
inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to
create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of
legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials.
Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the public
during those years and private enterprises had also published them in monthly
magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been published continuously.
Books and magazines published abroad have entered without restriction since 1945.
Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been printed locally
during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946,
which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of
public knowledge.

Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable
principles, but the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical
case of similar background been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is
there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly
derived the judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the
United States, and which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our
contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a century? From the citations of those
defending the law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law had been
sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day,
54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the
opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and which the
postponement of the contested law respects.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been
promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not
within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed law.

To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has
been cited to us as a favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where
the Court of Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that
State, denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the
provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on
April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the
Constitution of the state of New York.

It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of
them for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature
or the people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public
office. Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who
possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to
admission to practice in all the courts of this State. (p. 93).

According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:

Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had
previously rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they
possessed. The convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this
power had been exercised, and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon
admission to practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was
aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of the provision" expecting the admission
of attorneys, in this particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its
connection with the object of this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of
confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any portion of their power over
this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from the use of
the word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of
must be by the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and that the power of granting
necessarily implies the power of refusing, and of course the right of determining whether
the applicant possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.

These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)

Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it
provided that the possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College
conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that
the constitution required of applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not
however quote the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or accessible
private library in the country.

In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New
York, the Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:

The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an
institution of established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of
able professors, the students in which department were not only subjected to a formal
examination by the law committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of
study before being entitled to a diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently,
and no doubt justly, considered this examination, together with the preliminary study
required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary
examination by the court; and as rendering the latter examination, to which no definite
period of preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and burdensome.

The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant,
and for the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the
college for that of the court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater
scope should be given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature
designed entirely to dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution;
and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the
college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a
diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was intended to
make the college diploma competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the
applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a modification of pre-
existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these statutes and with the
Constitution itself in order to determine the present condition of the law on the subject.
(p.89)

xxx     xxx     xxx

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of
admission, that has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases
upon that question. (p.93)

From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar
may be clearly seen. Please note only the following distinctions:

(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who
failed in the bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the
court its jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not
decree the admission of any lawyer.

(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely
different on the matter of admission of the practice of law.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and
their supervision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of
this attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power
have been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the
most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution
to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission
to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly
belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established
rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and
principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more
undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of
these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.

We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of
admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this
matter had been undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in
which the validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to
practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the
following paragraphs:

This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the
English speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much
uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate
qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act
of admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to
constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an
assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)

Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section
1, art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are
legislative in character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it
sets up and prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)

But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will
serve the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose
other and further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)

Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent,
and coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of
sovereignty which properly belongs to its department. Neither department should so act
as to embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was the
scheme and thought of the people setting upon the form of government under which we
exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4
Wis., 567. (p. 445)
The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state
government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts
cannot escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus
committed to the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)

The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an
attache of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small
degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and
reproach to the administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute.
(p.445)

Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at
least in the English speaking countries. (p. 445)

After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:

Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the
adoption of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament
since the Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who should be
admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6
Bingham's New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and
judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine who should be admitted
to practice law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that
element and say with assurance that it is either a part of the inherent power of the court,
or an essential element of the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power
belonging to the judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign institution, but made of it
a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the government. They took this
institution along with the power traditionally exercise to determine who should constitute
its attorney at law. There is no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an
intent that this traditional power of the judicial department should in any manner be
subject to legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our
constitution was to make the three great departments of government separate and
independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial
department by prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent
with the dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the legislative
department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence of express
constitutional provisions. While the legislature may legislate with respect to the
qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power
to protect the public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications
required of attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such
qualifications do not constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which
the court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute the
ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications
deemed necessary by the course of the proper administration of judicial functions. There
is no legislative power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them
unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p. 450)

Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite

likely true that the legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in
pursuance of a legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous
that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the
states, except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our
investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to practice law by their
admission as members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex
parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366;
Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P.
646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep.
1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.

The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the
courts, it having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney
to practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the
Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it
seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial
function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a

consultation of the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:

It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that

there be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral
character. This arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and
restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be
protected from incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing
mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y.
456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege
burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for something more than private
gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is due "whenever
justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys at law the
judicial department of government would be hampered in the performance of its duties.
That has been the history of attorneys under the common law, both in this country and
England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without exception
conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as are other
proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open
and notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its records. The establishment by
the Constitution of the judicial department conferred authority necessary to the exercise
of its powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an inherent power of such a
department of government ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be
admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this
respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good
moral character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex
parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the rules and
practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is
qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause
he ought to be removed." (p.727)

In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice
the legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in
part:

In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test
oath for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as
follows: "They are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of
their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has always been the
general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties.
In this court the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to
which they, respectively, belong for, three years preceding their application, is regarded
as sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement
of counsel moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional
character is fair. The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the parties
possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to
appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of
the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office
during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and
declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex
parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial
power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It
was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the matter of the application of
Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that
court, "are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate almost
exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their appointment may, with
propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his duty, may very justly
considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-
651).

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the

exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this
point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent
powers of the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.

Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent
power of the court. — A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See
Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.

On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial
and legislative departments of the government.

The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is
that it is the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in
matters of transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary
determines rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or
conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a
vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial
decree.

The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other
departments of the government. — 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.

If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them
construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly,
by settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the
discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of
a judicial inquiry. — Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.

In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a
general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be
admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a
judgment — a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited
year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke
these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this
Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any attempt on
the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the
case with the law in question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement
the rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is
no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.
Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to
the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have
the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. — Constitution of
the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal
equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power
and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had
Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have
nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and
supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over
the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their
supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the
place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution
does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly
attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is
limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its
judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power
does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate
attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.

Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules
for the admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and
supplement them may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the
other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each
department requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without
diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature
may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the
demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture,
training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or
supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which
has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice and the
supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the
minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these
reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers
which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather
complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond
to the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of justice.

The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took
examination and failed by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted
law provided that one who had been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted
to the practice of law without a previous examination. The Government appointed
Guariña and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This tribunal
refused to give his license without previous examinations. The court said:

Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks
admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he
holds the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.

Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:

Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety,
entitled "An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings
in the Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:

1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under
the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as
members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this act, or at any time
thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of justice
of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of
the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney
General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of
the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila,
assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or
assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of
the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court
and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.

The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed
to pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23,
1907, shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of
legal learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required
percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public
and to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant
in the required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he presented his
former application for admission to the bar, we should grant him license to practice law in
the courts of these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to
pass the examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the necessary qualifications
of learning and ability."

But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is
entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination
"upon motion before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has
held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged
that having in mind the object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting
the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally
and especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of
the original Act which specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates without
examination. It is contented that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in
order to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's
claim de jure to have the power exercised.

And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States,
articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and
confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such
as that under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the
above citation from Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress
prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred upon the commission is to that extent
invalid and void, as transcending its rightful limits and authority.

Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions
enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:

In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the
provisions of this statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact
that such appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of
the applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had
been practicing attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.

In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was
not and never had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the
date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he
was deficient in the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission
to the bar.

In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think
that his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his
possession of the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore
that this application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be
denied.

In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points
short of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the
fact that since that time he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province
of Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of
the duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the
Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service by appointing him
to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the above-cited
provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by
general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special
examination which will be given him by a committee of the court upon his application
therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at any of
the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for
the license.

The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to
suffer from the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make
a classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.

In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court,
until December 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students
who began studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and
presented a diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law
office and would pass an examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they
commenced their studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared
that this law was unconstitutional being, among others, a class legislation. The Court
said:

This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of
diplomas from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly
passed in 1899, under which the application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section
1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors,"
approved March 28, 1884, in force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in
the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the section of the following: "And every
application for a license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard to
admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant commend the study of law, either
in a law or office or a law school or college, shall be granted a license under this act
notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules". — In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p.
646.

. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to
December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder
of every diploma regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws of
this state, whose regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance
by the student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student
began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual
proofs of good moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that any student who
has studied law for two years in a law office, or part of such time in a law office, "and part
in the aforesaid law school," and whose course of study began prior to November 4,
1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by the examining board in the
branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is
by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon
the persons named therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for their
admission to the bar. (p. 647.)

Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation,

prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit
attorneys to practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could
prescribe the character of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive
of the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a
general law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice
law is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court,
and confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees
therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil
process while attending court. The law conferring such privileges must be general in its
operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that purpose, may
classify persons so long as the law establishing classes in general, and has some
reasonable relation to the end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a
reasonable basis for different one, having no just relation to the subject of the legislation.
Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40
N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.

The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may
furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the
place where such physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such
basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void
(State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say
what shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of the law, and plainly, any
classification must have some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in
such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons who began the study of
law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two classes — First, those
presenting diplomas issued by any law school of this state before December 31, 1899;
and, second, those who studied law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of
the time in a law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon
examination in the subjects specified in the present rules of this court, and as to this latter
subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making application for admission. As to
both classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as between the two
different conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the
law school, but a diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of course its managers
may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be anything with relation to the
qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the mere date of
November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who
began the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years
as well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend
only two years in study, while those who commenced the next day must spend three
years, although they would complete two years before the time limit. The one who
commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination
before December 31, 1899, and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the
other the prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such
classification cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject
sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing
privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)

In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the
legislature attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also
held with regards to its aspect of being a class legislation:

But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power
to prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and
license those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the
manner here attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will
apply to all alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the
Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice
Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L.
Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow
any lawful calling, business or profession he may choose, subject only to such
restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition." This right
may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican
institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All may be
pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for
their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate"
acquired in them — that is, the right to continue their prosecution — is often of great
value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their
real or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of
government that all similarly situated and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy
equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of medicine, requiring
medications to establish the possession on the part of the application of his proper
qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and courts
have seriously considered whether the exemption from such examinations of those
practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law
unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas
Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101
Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.

This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice
law and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or
favor. It is not material that he had once established his right to practice law and that one
time he possessed the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that
right. That fact in no matter affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great
body of the public an individual upon whom it would confer its favors.

A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court
to admit to the practice of law without examination, all who had served in the military or
naval forces of the United States during the World War and received a honorable
discharge therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the
Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and
whose disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this
Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality
clauses of the constitution of that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178
Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.

A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur.

151-153 as follows:

The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be
valid must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those
excluded and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has
sometimes avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and
real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law
that is made applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial
difference between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it does not
apply and must rest on some reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there
must be such a difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members of
the class and the situation and circumstances of all other members of the state in relation
to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural cause for
the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law
is not general because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial
reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur.
pp. 151-153.)

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any
subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in
1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per
cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules
require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed
since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the abovementioned
authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has been given, then the
classification is fatally defective.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general
average indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the
unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained
classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954,
1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same
conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946
does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his right to an
equal consideration.

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its
retroactivity, it is argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What
does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which
the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general
average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and
those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in
1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the Court as
equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances
deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during those
years were all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had
been done — cancel the license that was issued to those who did not obtain the
prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do
so. Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress
lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates
who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the
lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the
cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to the years
1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with
the order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said
law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are not the rules
promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its place.
This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done during those years according to
the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power exercised was not to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend
them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress,
because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the
judiciary, to which such duty been confided.

Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite

intervals. The grave defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the
laws and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his
certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different,
seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes
was used in the first bar examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and
other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article is not
expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article
2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21
(1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and
because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.

Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the
legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second,
because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic
principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is
unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following
reasons, to wit:

1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar
examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to
practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the
admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to
determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It
obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner.
This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme
Court.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions
of these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers,
and although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time
for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In
attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.

3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are,
as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should
tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these
rules as minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the
daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of
justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to
render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of
law according to existing rules.

4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law
makes, is contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the
admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification
is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to
what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the
entire law is void.

6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the
examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the
examinations in those years, shall continue in force.

RESOLUTION

Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and
impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and
close of the debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious
observations of two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced
their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who
subscribed to this decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and
under the authority of the same:

1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of
1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void
and without force and effect.

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the
examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive,
is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the
Constitution.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the
examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the
examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without
having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed,
whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become
final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 5170 November 17, 1999

(FORMERLY A.C. CBD-445)

LILIA FERRER TUCAY, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MANUEL R. TUCAY, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:.

Complainant Lilia F. Tucay, feeling deeply aggrieved by the immoral conduct of her
husband Atty. Manuel Tucay, seeks the latter's disbarment in the instant administrative
proceedings.

Complainant and respondent have long been married, the two taking their vows years
back on 14 July 1963 at the St. Ignatius church, Camp Murphy, in Quezon City. For thirty
years, the couple have lived together with their children.

Just a few days before their thirtieth anniversary or on 07 July 1993 to be exact, with the
first marriage still subsisting, respondent lawyer contracted another marriage with one
Myrna C. Tuplano, herself married since 1983 to a certain Florante T. Tabilog.
Respondent left the conjugal dwelling in July 1993 to cohabit with Myrna Tuplano.

Complainant also caused the filing of bigamy charge against respondent lawyer and his
second wife, docketed Criminal Case No. Q-94-54709, before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 45, of Quezon City, which case still pends. In an attempt to defeat the early
prosecution of the criminal case, respondent filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City seeking the judicial declaration of nullity of the second marriage. The
petition was later dismissed due to lack of interest; subsequently, however, respondent
filed a second petition for the same purpose, this time with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City. In both petitions, he averred that neither he nor the other supposed party to
the second marriage was physically present on the date of its alleged celebration thereby
rendering void any such marriage, if at all, under the provisions of Article 3, paragraph 3,
and Article 6 of the Family Code.
The IBP-CBD, through Commissioner Jaime V. Vibar, gave neither credence nor validity
to the explanation of respondent and recommended to the IBP Board of Governors the
disbarment of Atty. Tucay for gross misconduct and failure to maintain the highest degree
of morality expected and required of every member of the Bar. On 13 December 1997,
the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIII-97-164 which "RESOLVED to
ADOPT and APPROVE" the report and recommendation of the investigating
Commissioner after being satisfied that the latter's findings were amply supported by the
evidence on record.

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not respondent did contract a
bigamous marriage, a matter which apparently is still pending with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City. It is enough that the records of this administrative case sufficiently
substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of
Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a
married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low
regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him
regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license
confers upon him.

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard
of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming of an attorney. The grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, including deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to the practice of law, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority to do so, are not preclusive in nature even as they
are broad enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or
commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer at no time must be
wanting in probity and moral fiber which not only are conditions precedent to his entrance
to, but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership in, a great and
noble profession.

The Court concurs with the IBP-CBD and the IBP Board of Governors in their findings
and thus accepts their recommendation that respondent lawyer, having ceased to meet
and possess the qualifications required of every lawyer, must forthwith be disbarred.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to disbar respondent Atty. Manuel Tucay

immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution. Let a copy hereof be made a part of the
records of said respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the
Philippines, and copies to be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon,
Jr., JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 6792             January 25, 2006

ROBERTO SORIANO, Complainant,
vs.
Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit 1 for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by

Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime
involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the conviction,
violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; 2 and constitutes
sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. 3

Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD
issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and that an ex-
parte hearing had been scheduled for June 11, 2004. 4 After that hearing, complainant
manifested that he was submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint and its
attachments.5 Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file his Position Paper, which he did
on July 27, 2004.6 Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and

Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors
in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.

In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for
frustrated homicide,7 which involved moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment.

The facts leading to respondent’s conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the

Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise:

"x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after
gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao
Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of
the car he had overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of
the Baguio community who was under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused
tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino
Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and held him by his
shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door causing the accused to
fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been drinking because he
smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of
his car to help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately and
was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the chest
instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again and was about to box the
taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on
to the accused until he could be pacified and then released him. The accused went back
to his car and got his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a
handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the
eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them up intending to return them to
the accused. But as he was handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel
of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on
the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was
witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the
complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano." 8

It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and
brought the latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on
the left side of his neck, 9 complainant would have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not
received timely medical assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco
Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left
part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver.

The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002,
respondent filed an application for probation, which was granted by the court on several
conditions. These included satisfaction of "the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in
favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano." 10

According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply
with this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of Appeals. 11

In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that

respondent be disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude.

The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but
that the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on the
following facts:

"1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;

"2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter,
driving a taxi, had overtaken him;

"3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went
back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot
Complainant[,] who was unarmed;

"4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;
"5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that
he had shot Complainant;

"6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one
mauled by Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,

"7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet
satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant."12

On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution
adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as

approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is
deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer
possessed of good moral character. 13 In the instant case, respondent has been found
guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his
conviction has already been established and is no longer open to question, the only
issues that remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated
homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment.

Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." 14

The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been
discussed in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC, 15 a labor case
concerning an employee who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide.
Considering the particular circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this
Court rejected the employer’s contention and held that homicide in that case did not
involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been violative of the IRRI’s
Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court explained
that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the employer made a
pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determine
conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to the
courts, as explained thus:

"x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the
crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every
known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves
moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding
circumstances. x x x."16 (Emphasis supplied)

In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court
appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating
circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the circumstances of the
crime are quoted as follows:

"x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating and
had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then
forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to
stop the attack but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he
drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim
who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times.
These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his
person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and
voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate
that Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust." 17

The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly
evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.

Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the
latter least expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated
by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the
circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyer’s
assault.

We also consider the trial court’s finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed
morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend
himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed
complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter
unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his
gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly
intention to escape punishment for his crime.

The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his
conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it
were, he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be
slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his
fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced
vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a
lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of
a person who has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a
false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.

It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm 18 and
his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities. 19 He has thus brazenly violated the law and
disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both in his attorney’s
oath20 and in the Code of Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to "obey the laws
of the land."

All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic
sense of justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his
sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it has been four years 21 since he was
ordered to settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant
in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown
by his violent reaction to a simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning
capacity, good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges
complainant the measly amount that could never even fully restore what the latter has
lost.

Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the
profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character. 22 Where their
misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally
unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their license
and the law, the court may be justified in suspending or removing them from that office. 23
We also adopt the IBP’s finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral
character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of
law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty. 24

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior.
As found by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Fariñas, an
out-of-court settlement with complainant’s family. 25 But when this effort failed, respondent
concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was complainant’s family that had
sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon. 26

The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible
story of having been mauled by complainant and two other persons. 27 The trial court had
this to say:

"The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined
[Atty. Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people including the complainant
helped each other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor
that it is improbable[,] if not downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were
bent on beating him to death could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries
sustain the complainant’s version of the incident particularly when he said that he boxed
the accused on the chest. x x x."28

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more
important than truthfulness.29 The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on
honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior. 30 Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court
or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in
good faith.

The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal
profession. They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. "Law is a
noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who
are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they
are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct
themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach." 31

The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a
basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the
penalty recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate.

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by

requiring that those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and
reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. 32 Thus, whenever
a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we
shall not hesitate to rid our profession of odious members.

We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that
disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end
desired. In the instant case, however, the Court cannot extend that munificence to
respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society and
his profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable
with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a shining exemplar
of truth and justice.

We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high

degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also
as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen
short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.

In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances
– not the mere fact of their conviction – would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the
legal profession. In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen
dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the
bar.

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name

is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-19450             May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.

PAREDES, J.:

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio

Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of
said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on
replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by
City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private
prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his
appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he
would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any
payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor
was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs.
Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed
to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by
operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that
the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a
violation of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining
the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit
Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32,
Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys
from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP
Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that
he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to
the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment
on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the
offended party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the
criminal action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and
be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the
accused.

Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace
a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed
by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule
appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It
does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a
professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or
intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of
Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are
handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo.
There could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as
Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On
the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a right
to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was
impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.

In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may
appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor
in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.

WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos,
Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed,
without costs.

The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.

The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits. 1äwphï1.ñët

Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore
reproduced, and which we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel
lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138,
Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as
a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney
Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We
believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private
practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an
isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts
of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p.
1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute
has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as
customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98
N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as
determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of
the Solicitor General is noteworthy:

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself
to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given
permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the
complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be,
as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant..

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.