PREAMBLE - The phrase “common good” protects the idea of a social order that
I. Deliberations on the Committee Report
The very first Committee Report to come out for deliberation by the
1986 Constitutional Commission was a draft of a preamble. It was a
modification of the Preamble of the 1973 Constitution:
“WE, THE SOVEREIGN FILIPINO PEOPLE, IMPLORING THE GUIDANCE OF
DIVINE PROVIDENCE, TO ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT THAT SHALL EMBODY
OUR IDEALS AND ASPIRATIONS, PROMOTE THE COMMON GOOD, CONSERVE
AND ENHANCE OUR PATRIMONY, SECURE TO OURSELVES AND OUR
POSTERITY THE BLESSINGS OF PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY UNDER A
RULE OF JUSTICE, PEACE, FREEDOM AND EQUALITY, DO ORDAIN AND
PROMULGATE THIS CONSTITUTION.”
*(Phrases and words in bold were modified in the Preamble for the
present Constitution)
June 11, 1986 – approval of the draft upon its second reading.
1. “The guidance of Divine Providence” ! “Almighty God”
- The phrase “Almighty God” was chosen as being more personal
than “Divine Providence” and therefore more consonant with Filipino
religiosity.
2. “To establish a government” ! insertion of phrase “a just and
humane society”
- The phrase added the notion that a constitution not merely sets up
a government but is also an instrument for building the larger society
of which government is merely a part.
3. “Guidance” (from guidance of Divine Providence) ! “aid”
- “aid” is a more all-embracing term.
4. “General welfare” (from 1935/1973 Preambles) ! “Common
good”
enables every citizen to attain his or her fullest development
economically, politically, culturally and spiritually. “General welfare”
was avoided because it could be interpreted as “the greatest good
for the greatest number” even if what the greater number wants does
violence to human dignity.
5. “Conserve and enhance” ! “Conserve and develop”
- The word “enhance” yielded to the 1935’s and 1973’s “conserve
and develop”
6. “Participatory democracy”
- “Participatory” was deleted since it was tautological.
7. “Equality”
- Emphasizes that a major problem in the Philippine society is the
prevalence of gross economic and political inequalities.
8. Insertion of “rule of law” and the litany “truth, justice, freedom,
love, equality and peace.”
- The introduction of the word “love” probably makes the Philippines
the only nation to enshrine the word in its Constitution. It serves as a
monument to the love that prevented bloodshed in the February
Revolution of 1986.
- The insertion of “truth” is a protest against the deception that
characterized the Marcos regime.
- The enumeration captures a stream in Catholic thought which sees
peace as the fruit of the convergence of truth, justice, freedom and
love.
II. Purpose and effect of the Preamble
The Preamble is not a source of power or right for any department
of government.
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Instead:
- It sets down the origin, scope and purpose of the
Constitution.
- Useful as an aid in ascertaining the meaning of ambiguous
provisions in the body of the Constitution.
REMEMBER! Preamble: source of LIGHT, not RIGHT. (Fr. Bernas did
not say this though.)
The Preamble also bears witness to the fact that the
Constitution is the manifestation of the sovereign will of the Filipino
people ! as what can be observed in the present text which uses
the first person as compared to the 1935 counterpart which uses
the third person. The effect of the 1935 text was to suggest that
some third person (United States) was making the announcement
that the Filipino people were finally being allowed to promulgate a
constitution.
Use of first person ! important principle: the document is not just
the work of representatives of the people but of the people
themselves through ratification in a plebiscite.
ARTICLE I. NATIONAL TERRITORY
Section 1. The national territory comprises the Philippine
Archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and
all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains,
including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular
shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between,
and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their
breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines.
Note: The assertion of a territorial claim in a constitution merely
binds the nation promulgating it, given that a constitution is a
municipal law. Hence, a definition of national territory in the
Constitution will bind internationally only if it is supported by proof
under international law.
Purpose of a definition of National Territory:
1. Under 1935: The 1935 Constitution had to be accepted by
the President of the US ! At that time, there was still some fear
that the US govt might dismember Philippine territory hence this
dismemberment could be forestalled by a definition
2. Under 1973: for preservation of national wealth, for national
security, and as a manifestation of our solidarity as a people
3. Under 1987: for educational value + apprehension and
difficulty to explain why the new Constitution would fail to provide
one when the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions had a definition.
Scope of the national territory:
1. The Philippine archipelago ! archipelago: a body of
water studded with islands.
Note: The Philippine archipelago was delineated in the Treaty of
Paris (Dec. 10, 1898), modified by Treaty of Washington (Nov. 7,
1900), and Treaty with Great Britain (Jan. 2, 1930)
The 1973 Constitution omitted the specific mention of these
treaties because the ConCom delegates wanted to erase every
trace of our colonial history from the new organic document.
The 1987 follows this.
2. All other territories over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction
This includes any territory which:
a. Presently belongs to
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 b. Or might in the future belong to the Philippines
through any of the internationally accepted modes of
acquiring territory (reference to the Batanes Islands, which
although indisputable belonging to the Philippines, apparently
lay outside the lines drawn by the Treaty of Paris.)
c. Under the 1973 Consti as territories “belonging to
the Philippines by historic or legal title.” (other territories,
depending on available evidence, might belong to the
Philippines like Sabah, the Marianas, Freedomland)
Note: By dropping the phrase “belonging to the Philippines by
historic right or legal title” (from 1973 Consti), the Constitution did not
drop the Philippine claim to Sabah. It just avoided the use of
language historically offensive to Malaysia. Also, unilateral
assertions in a constitution, which is a municipal law, by themselves
do not establish an international right to a territory.
Note: The US military bases in the Philippines are still part of
Philippine territory. The precise reason why the Phil govt could cede
part of its authority over these bases to the US was the fact that they
were part of the Philippine territory over which the govt exercised
sovereign control. (People v. Gozo)
3. The territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil and insular
shelves and other submarine areas corresponding to (1) and (2)
The Philippines lays claim to them to the extent recognized by
international law (customary + conventional international law:
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Chicago Convention
on International Civil Aviation of 1944)
Territorial sea: (as distinct from a state’s inland and internal waters)
consists of a marginal belt of maritime waters adjacent to the
base lines extending 12 nautical miles outward.
Baseline: the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-
scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State.
Note: ARCHIPELAGIC PRINCIPLE ! assertion that “the waters
around, between and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
irrespective of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal
waters of the Philippines + straight baseline method of delineating
the territorial sea.
Note: The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea did not exactly
accept the entirety of the Philippine position on the archipelagic
principle. The vast areas of water between islands (which the
Philippines considers internal waters ! not subject to right of
innocent passage) ! “archipelagic waters” under the CLOS and
are subject to the right of innocent passage through passages
designated by the archipelago concerned. Hence, the Philippines
ratified the 1982 with reservations.
Two ways of drawing the baseline:
a. “Normal” baseline: one drawn following the “low water line
along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized
by the coastal State ! follows the sinuosities of the coast and would
normally not consist of straight lines.
b. “Straight baseline”: straight lines are drawn connecting
selected points on the coast without appreciable departure from the
general shape ! general direction of the coast. These divide the
internal waters from the territorial waters.
Baseline law: RA 9522 ! provides for one baseline around the
archipelago and separate baselines for the “regime of islands”
outside the archipelago.
Insular shelf: or continental shelf, refers to: the seabed and subsoil
of the submarine areas adjacent to the coastal state but outside the
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territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters, or beyond that limit, to where
the depth allows exploitation AND the seabed and subsoil of areas
adjacent to islands.

4. (1) and (2) consist of terrestrial, fluvial and aerial

domains

Terrestrial domain: all surfaces of land above the sea that belong to
the Philippines.

Fluvial domain: includes the inland waters: bays and rivers,

streams, as well as internal waters or the waters of the sea,
landwards from the baselines.

Aerial domain: air directly above its terrestrial and fluvial domains;
extends up to where outer space begins, directly over our land and
water territories.

(From Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna)

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Case # Case name Facts Held/Ratio
ARTICLE I. THE NATIONAL TERRITORY
1 Magallona v. Exec. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality 1) No. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition
Sec. Ermita (2011) of RA 9522 which mandates the adjustment of the or the loss of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating
country's archipelagic baselines and classifying sea-use rights over maritime zones. Baseline laws such
the baseline regime of nearby territories. as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III only serve to
Historically, RA 3046 is the ruling law which MARK OUT specific basepoints from which baselines
demarcates the maritime baselines of the are drawn either straight or contoured, and to serve
Philippines as an archipelagic state. RA 3046 as geographic starting points to measure the breadth
follows the framing of the Convention on the of maritime zones and continental shelf. This
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous zone of 1958, baseline delimitation done by states serves to give
which codifies the sovereign rights of states over notice to the international community of the scope
their territorial sea. RA 9522 aims to amend RA that the states can exercise treaty based rights (i.e.
3046 by complying with the terms of UNCLOS III sovereignty over territorial waters, jurisdiction to enforce
(United Nations Convention on the Law of the customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitation laws in the
Sea; ratified on Feb 27, 1984). UNCLOS contiguous zone and the right to exploit resources in the
prescribes the waterland ratio, length and contour exclusive areas). The boundaries of the rectangular area
of baselines of archipelagic states and sets a delineated in the treaty of Paris cannot be used as a
deadline for filing the application for the extended basis since UNCLOS is already the internationally agreed
continental shelf. R.A. 9522 shorted one baseline, “ruler” or set of standard for measuring baselines. States
optimized the location of basepoints (some) and acquire or lose territory through occupation, cession,
classified adjacent territories like the Kalayaan accretion and prescription; NOT through multilateral
Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal as treaties that regulate sea-use rights such as UNCLOS III.
regimes of islands, which generate their own
applicable maritime zones. Separate Opinion: Velasco Jr., J: UNCLOS III did not
surrender any territory as it only pertains to sea-use
Issues: rights. This is necessary in order to demarcate water
1) Whether RA 9522 reduces the Philippine territories to ascertain country’s practice of sovereign
maritime territory and, logically, the reach of the rights. Philippines STILL has the power to determine
Philippine State's sovereign power in Violation of what passageways are allowable so that ships may
Art. 1 of the 1987 constitution which embodies the practice the right of passage (Pertaining to Art. I of
terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties. Consti: RE: Waters)

2) Whether RA 9522 opens the country's waters 2) No. The Philippines cannot defy customary

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landward of the baselines to maritime passage by
all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine
sovereignty and national security, contravening
the country's nuclear free policy and damaging
marine resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions
3) Whether there is a loss of a large maritime area
(loss of 15,000 nautical miles), also prejudicing
the livelihood of subsistence fishermen by treating
the KIG as "regime of islands"
4) Whether the Failure of RA 9522 to reference
either Treaty of Paris or Sabah and the use of
UNCLOS framework of regime of islands to
determine the maritime zones of the KIG and
Scarborough Shoal. Thus the statute dismembers
a large portion of the national territory, the pre-
UNCLOS territory under the treaty of Paris and
relative treaties encoded in the definition of
national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987
constitutions. The technical description under the
treaty of Paris is that the Philippine sovereignty
over territorial waters extends hundreds of
nautical miles around the archipelago, embracing
the rectangular area delineated in the treaty.
international law of right to safe passage as identified by
Section 2 of Article II that states that “Philippines adopts
the generally accepted principles of int’l law as part of the
law of the land.” UNCLOS III provides a safeguard, since
it allows states to exercise sovereignty over the body of
water lying landward of the baselines, the airspace over it
and the submarine areas underneath. But in order to be
consistent with the international law principle of freedom
of navigation, the government may pass legislation
designating routes within the archipelagic waters for
innocent and sea lanes passage. The petitioners'
invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in
Article 2 also fail. The provisions that the petitioners cited
(protection of marine wealth, subsistence to fishermen)
are not violated by RA 9522.
3) No. RA 9522 followed the basepoints of RA 3046,
except for at least 9 basepoints that it skipped to optimize
the location of basepoints and adjust the length to comply
with the limitation of UNCLOS III. This resulted in an
increase of the Philippines' total maritime space by
145,216 square nautical miles.
4) No. Although the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal are
outside the baselines drawn around the archipelago
under RA 9522, the determination of KIG as a “Regime of
Islands” under Philippines means that the international
community should respect Philippine’s claim to the
regime of islands as part of its territory of islands.
According to Sen. Miriam Santiago, we are still allowed
by international law to claim them as our own, these are
called contested islands outside our configuration. The
decision to classify them as regimes of islands' under the
Republic of the Philippines manifests the state's
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observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under
UNCLOS III. It is consistent with Art. 121 of UNCLOS III
that states "any naturally formed area of land surrounded
by water which is above water at high tide". Portions of
the KIG falls under the category of regime of islands,
islands that generate their own applicable maritime
zones.
We cannot also enclose the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal in the baseline with the Philippine archipelago for it
would be a breach of the UNCLOS III. UNCLOS III (Art.
47-3) states that the drawing of such baselines shall not
depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago and (Art. 47-2) that the
length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical
miles save for 3% of the total number of baselines
which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.

As for Sabah, Section 2 (EXPLICITLY STATES): the

definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the
Philippine archipelago as provided in this Act is without
prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the
territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in
North Borneo, over which the republic of the Philippines
has acquired dominion and sovereignty.

Separate Opinion: Velasco Jr., J: Archipelagic states are

understood as formed by archipelagos and may include
other islands i.e. not part of the archipelago but part of
state’s territory. This is a recognized rule as other
countries also have territories outside its baselines e.g.
U.S. and Malaysia. UNCLOS is a LAW OF THE SEAS,
not LAW OF TERRITORY.

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 ARTICLE II. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES
Function of Article II: a statement of the basic ideological principles
and policies that underlie the Constitution.
Its provisions:
- shed light on the meaning of the other provisions of
Constitution and
- They are a guide for all departments of the government in
the implementation of the Constitution.
Note: Provisions under this Article are not self-executory. They
need further legislation. However, the right to a healthful environment
asserted in Section 16 was deemed by the Court to be an
enforceable right without need for further legislation. (Oposa v.
Factoran)
The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution was simply
entitled “Declaration of Principles”. The 1987 provisions were written
in the same spirit as their counterparts in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions but there was an attempt to distinguish principles from
policies.
Note: The distinction though is of little significance because not all of
the six “principles” are self-executory and some of the “policies”
already anchor justiciable rights.
I. PRINCIPLES (Sections 1-6): binding rules which must
be observed in the conduct of government.
Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican state.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.
STATE: a community of persons more or less numerous,
permanently occupying a definite portion of territory, independent of
external control, and possessing an organized government to which
the great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience.
Elements of a state: (Montevideo Convention of 1933)
a. People: a community of persons who are:
- Sufficient in number,
- Capable of maintaining the continued existence of the
community and;
- Held together by a common bond of law.
b. Territory: consists of land and waters and the air space
above them and the submarine areas below them
Note: An entity may satisfy the territorial requirement for statehood
even if its boundaries have not been finally settled, if one or more of
its boundaries are disputed, or if some of its territory is claimed by
another state. (Restatement on the Foreign Relations Law of the US)
c. Sovereignty
- Legal sovereignty: supreme power to affect legal interests
either by legislative, executive or judicial action; lodged in the people
but is normally exercised by state agencies. Stated in terms of auto-
limitation, sovereignty is “the property of a state-force due to which it
has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-
restriction.” (Jellinek)
- Political sovereignty: sum total of all the influences in a
state, legal and non-legal, which determine the course of law.
d. Government: institution or aggregate of institutions by which
an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action
which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which
are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who
possess the power or authority of prescribing them.
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Note: Government must be distinguished from administration.
• Government: institution through which the state exercises
power
• Administration: consists of the set of people currently
running the institution.
FUNCTIONS of the Government: (Bacani v. NACOCO)
1. Constituent functions: compulsory functions which
constitute the very bonds of society such as:
- The keeping of order and providing for the protection of
persons and property from violence and robbery
- Fixing of legal relations between man and wife and between
parents and children
- Regulation of the holding, transmission and interchange of
property, and the determination of its liabilities for debt or for
crime
- Determination of contract rights between individuals
- Definition and punishment of crime
- Administration of justice in civil cases
- Determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations
of citizens
- Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of
the state from external danger or encroachment and the
advancement of its international interest.
2. Ministrant functions: optional functions of government
intended for achieving a better life for the community.
Principles for determining w/n a government shall exercise these
optional functions are:
- That a government should do for the public welfare those
things which private capital would not naturally undertake;
- That a government should do those things which by its very
nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare
than is any private individual or group of individuals.
Note: When, however, government chooses to operate not through a
GOCC but through an unincorporated agency, the distinction
between constituent and ministrant functions can be useful. The
concepts however, seem to belong more to the field of political
science than to law. Law prefers to use the term governmental and
proprietary.
Note: From ACCFA v. CUGCO case: Whether one, uses the terms
constituent and ministrant or governmental and proprietary, what is
important to remember is that the enumeration of specific
government functions under these headings cannot be static. The
growing complexities of modern society have rendered this
traditional classification quite unrealistic, if not obsolete. (Justice
Makalintal)
De jure v. De facto government:
1. De jure: one established by authority of the legitimate
sovereign
2. De facto: one established in defiance o the legitimate
sovereign
Kinds of de facto government:
a. The government that gets possession and control of, or
usurps, by force or by voice of the majority;
b. One that is established and maintained by invading military
forces;
c. One that is established as an independent government by
the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against he
parent state, such as the government of the Southern
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 Confederacy in revolt against the Union during the war of
secession. (Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh)
Note: The government under Cory Aquino and the Freedom
Constitution was a de jure government since it was established by
authority of the legitimate sovereign, the people. It was a
revolutionary government established in defiance of the 1973
Constitution.
Treaty obligations governed the government under Aquino since
the resulting government was bound by no constitution or legal
limitations. During the interregnum from February 25 to March 24,
1986 (before the Freedom Constitution took effect by presidential
proclamation), the Bill of Rights was not operative. Protection was
accorded to individuals through the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (CCPR) and Universal Declaration on Human Rights
(UDHR) under international law. (Republic v. Sandiganbayan)
The government under Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo established after
the ouster of President Estrada was likewise a de jure government.
Presidential v. Parliamentary form of government:
1. Presidential: principal identifying feature is the “separation
of powers” (Legislative members who hold office for a fixed term,
Executive members who also hold office for a fixed term and an
independent Judiciary); President is the Chief Executive
2. Parliamentary: (features)
- Members of the government or cabinet or the executive arm
are, as a rule, simultaneously members of the legislature
- Government or cabinet, consisting of the political leaders of
the majority party, or of a coalition who are also members of
the legislature, is in effect a committee of the legislature
- Government or cabinet has a pyramidal structure at the apex
of which is the Prime Minister or his equivalent
- Government or cabinet remains in power only for as long as
it enjoys the support of the majority of the legislature
- Both government and legislature are possessed of control
devices with which each can demand of the other immediate
political responsibility.
Legislature ! may oust government ! government has power to
dissolve legislature + elections
Note: The Philippines has only experienced a presidential form of
government since 1935 despite the government under President
Marcos under the 1973 constitution. It still had the distinguishing
marks of a presidential form of government: separation of powers +
pre-eminence of the president.
Note: There are two theories in international law advising on the
issue whether or not recognition by other states is a constitutive
element of a state even if it has all four elements of the Montevideo
Convention:
1. Constitutive Theory: Recognition “Constitutes” a state; it is
what makes a state and confers legal personality on the entity.
2. Declaratory Theory: Recognition is merely “declaratory” of
the existence of the state and that is being a state depends upon
its possession of the required elements and not upon
recognition.
“Democratic and Republican state”
Republican state: a state wherein all government emanates from
the people and is exercised by representatives chosen by the
people.
The Philippines is called a democratic state in the new Constitution
as it is not only a representative or republican state but also shares
some aspects of direct democracy such as “initiative and
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referendum” (Art. VI, §32 and Art. XVII, §2). This is also a monument
to the February Revolution which re-won freedom through direct
action of the people.

Constitutional authoritarianism: (under the Marcos regime / 1973

Constitution) assumption of extraordinary powers by the President,
including legislative and judicial and even constituent powers
- compatible with a republican state if the Constitution upon which
the Executive bases his assumption of power is:
- a legitimate expression of the people’s will
- if Executive assumes power through valid election.

ARTICLE II. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Section 1. Philippines as a Democratic and Republican State
2 Tondo Medical President Estrada issued EO No. 102, entitled No, the CA did not err in ruling that any question on the
v. CA (2007) “Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the wisdom and efficacy of the HSRA is not a justiciable
Department of Health (DOH),” which provided for the controversy and that the constitutional provisions protecting
changes in the roles, functions, and organizational the health of the Filipino people are not judicially enforceable.
processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive
order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being the As a General rule: the Constitution is considered self-
sole provider of health services to being a provider of executing since if it still requires future legislation for their
specific health services and technical assistance and enforcement the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily
the LGUs (local government units) are responsible nullified by the inaction of Congress. HOWEVER, some
for providing medical assistance to their territories as provisions were declared by the Court as non self-executing.
part of the devolution of gov’t. In line with this, the As stated in Tanada v. Angara, the Sections under Article II
DOH launched the HSRA (Health Sector Reform are non self-executing because Article II of the Constitution
Agenda) by the HSRA Technical Working Group. It is a declaration of principles and state policies are not
provided 5 general areas of reform: (1) to provide intended to be self-executing principles ready for
fiscal autonomy to government hospitals; (2) Secure enforcement through the courts. They are used by the
funding for priority public health programs; (3) judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power
Promote the development of local health systems of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment
and ensure its effective performance; (4) strengthen of laws. Thus Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 invoked are
the capacities of health regulatory agencies; and (5) provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non-self-
Expand the coverage of NHIP (National Health executing in the aforecited case.

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 Insurance Program). Petitioners questioned the
following for violation of Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15,
18 of Article II. When the case reached the CA (Court
of Appeals), it ruled that HSRA cannot be declared
void because the aforementioned provisions of the
Constitution are not self-executing; they are not
judicially enforceable constitutional rights and they
only provide guidelines for legislation.

Issue: Whether CA erred in ruling that any question

on the wisdom and efficacy of the HSRA is not a
justiciable controversy and that the constitutional
provisions protecting the health of the Filipino people
are not judicially enforceable.
3 BCDA v. COA Congress approved Republic Act (RA) No. 7227
(2009) creating the Bases Conversion and Development
Authority (BCDA). Under Section 10, the functions of
the Board include the determination of the
organizational structure and the adoption of a
compensation and benefit scheme at least equivalent
to that of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). In
line with its power to compensate in 1996, BCDA
released a Year-End Benefit (YEB) worth P10, 000
and granted it to each contractual employee, regular
permanent employee, and Board member. In 1999,
the BSP gave a P30,000 YEB to its officials and
employees. In 2000, the BSP increased the YEB
from P30,000 to P35,000. Pursuant to Section 10 of
RA No. 7227 which states that the compensation and
benefit scheme of the BCDA shall be at least
equivalent to that of the BSP, the Board increased
the YEB of BCDA officials and employees from
P10,000 to P30,000. Thus in 2000 and 2001, BCDA
officials and employees received a P30,000 year-end
No, Article II is a statement of general ideological principles
and policies. It is not a source of enforceable rights.
Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the Constitution are not self-
executing provisions.
Additionally, the Board members and full time consultants
cannot be granted YEB because of said functions of the Board
under Section 10 of RA No. 7227. Since under Section 9 of RA
No. 7227 (BCDA law) it specifies that the Board members shall
receive a per diem for every board meeting. IT IS LIMTED
ONLY to not more than P5, 000. This is limited to the total
amount of per diem for one month to not more than four
meetings. Thus the Board is limited by the law in terms of
compensation.
Additionally, Under DBM Circular Letter No. 2002-2, it states
that, "Members of the Board of Directors of agencies are not
salaried officials of the government. As non-salaried officials
they are not entitled to... YEB and retirement benefits unless
expressly provided by law" to which RA 7227 does not state.

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 benefit, and, on 1 October 2002, the Board passed As to full-time consultants, BCDA shall pay consultants a
Resolution No. 2002-10-193 approving the release of contract price because they are not paid basic salary due
a P30,000 year-end benefit for 2002. because there is no employer-employee relationship between
them and BCDA
On 20 February 2003, State Auditor IV Corazon V.
Españo of the COA issued Audit Observation
Memorandum (AOM) No. 2003-0047 stating that the
grant of year-end benefit to Board members was
contrary to Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) Circular Letter No. 2002-2. They served a
notice of disallowance of YEB thereafter (Decision
No. 2004-013). BCDA President and Chief Executive
Officer Rufo Colayco requested the reconsideration
of Decision No. 2004-013 by appealing to COA. COA
affirmed the disallowance of the YEB.

Issue: Whether the Board can grant YEB to its

members and full time consultants on the grounds
that such action is consistent with Sections 5 and 18,
Article II of the Constitution.
4 Bacani v. Bacani and Matoto are court stenographers both
NACOCO assigned in the CFI of Manila. During the pendency
(1956) of another civil case (Civil Case No. 2293, entitled
'Francisco Sycip v. NACOCO'), Alikpala, counsel for
NACOCO, requested the said stenographers for
copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes
taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied
with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the
needed transcript containing 714 pages and
thereafter submitted to him their bills for the payment
of their fees. The NACOCO paid the amount of P564
to Bacani and P150 to Matoto for said transcript at
the rate of P1 per page.
Our Constitution has established three great departments: the
legislative, executive, and the judicial, through which the
powers and functions of government are exercised. These
functions are twofold: constitute and ministrant. The former are
those which constitute the very bonds of society and are
compulsory in nature; latter are those that are undertaken only
by way of advancing the general interests of society, and are
merely optional. The CONSTITUENT functions as follows:
“‘(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of
persons and property from violence and robbery.
‘(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and
between parents and children.
‘(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and

13!
On 19 January 1953, Auditor General requested the
plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts on the fact that
NACOCO, being a government entity, was exempt
from the payment of the fees in question. Petitioners
countered that NACOCO is not a government entity
within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether the National Coconut Corporation
may be considered as included in the term
“Government of the Republic of the Philippines” for
the purposes of the exemption of the legal fees
provided for in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
interchange of property, and the determination of its liabilities
for debt or for crime.
‘(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.
‘(5) The definition and punishment of crime.
‘(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.
‘(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and
relations of citizens.
‘(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers the preservation
of the state from external danger or encroachment and the
advancement of its international interests.’”
The most important of the MINISTRANT functions are: public
works, public education, public charity, health and safety
regulations, and regulations of trade and industry.
The former (Constituent) are functions which our government
is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed
in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute
of sovereignty. The latter (Ministrant) are those functions
which it may exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress
and prosperity of the people. These include corporations
owned or controlled by the government to promote certain
aspects of the economic life of our people such as the
NACOCO. However, they do not acquire that status for the
simple reason that they do not come under the classification of
municipal or public corporation. NACOCO was given a
corporate power separate and distinct from our government,
for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation
Law.
NACOCO was given a corporate power separate and distinct
from our government, for it was made subject to the provisions
of our Corporation Law. Thus, it is true that under Section 8,
Rule 130, stenographers may only charge as fees P0.30 for
each page of transcript of not less than 200 words before the
14!
 appeal is taken and P0.15 for each page after the filing of the
appeal, but in this case the National Coconut Corporation
has agreed and in fact has paid P1.00 per page for the
services rendered by the Plaintiffs and has not raised any
objection to the amount paid until its propriety was disputed
by the Auditor General. The payment of the fees in question
became therefore contractual and as such is VALID even if
it goes beyond the limit prescribed in section 8, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.
5 Bacani v. (See above, Case # 4) “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” does not
NACOCO include government entities which are given a corporate
(1956) personality separate and distinct from the government and
which are governed by the Corporation Law. These include
public corporations or those formed or organized for the
government of a portion of the State. On the other hand, the
phrase ‘municipal corporation’ would only include organized
cities and towns, and like organizations, with political and
legislative powers for the local, civil government and police
regulations of the inhabitants of the particular district. We may,
therefore, define a municipal corporation in its historical and
strict sense to be the incorporation, by the authority of the
government, of the inhabitants of a particular place or district,
and authorizing them in their corporate capacity to exercise
subordinate specified powers of legislation and regulation with
respect to their local and internal concerns.

15!
6 ACCFA (ACA) The Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing
v. CUGCO Administration (ACCFA) was a government agency
(1969) created under Republic Act No. 821. Its
administrative machinery was reorganized and its
name changed to Agricultural Credit Administration
(ACA) under the Land Reform Code (Republic Act
No. 3844). On the other hand, the ACCFA
Supervisors’ Association (ASA) and the ACCFA
Workers' Association (AWA), hereinafter referred to
as the Unions, are labor organizations composed of
the supervisors and the rank-and-file employees,
respectively, in the ACCFA (now ACA).
On September 4, 1961 a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA), which was to be effective for a
period of one (1) year from July 1, 1961, was entered
into by and between the Unions and the ACA. A few
months thereafter, the Unions started protesting
against alleged violations and non-implementation of
said agreement. Finally, on October 25, 1962 the
Unions declared a strike, which was ended when the
strikers voluntarily returned to work on November 26,
1962. On October 30, 1962 the Unions, together with
its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in
Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO),
filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations
(CIR) against the ACCFA for having allegedly
committed acts of unfair labor practice, namely:
violation of the CBA, the right to self-organization,
discrimination against said members in the matter of
promotions, and refusal to bargain.
The CIR rendered its decision and asked ACA to
desist from committing any acts of violation to the
No. Unions have no right to the certification election sought by
them nor, consequently, to bargain collectively (or CBA) with
the petitioner, no further fringe benefits may be demanded on
the basis of any collective bargaining agreement.
The power to audit the operations of farmers' cooperatives and
otherwise inquire into their affairs, as given by Section 113, is
in the nature of the visitorial power of the sovereign, which only
a government agency specially delegated to do so by the
Congress may legally exercise. The implementation of the land
reform program of the government is most certainly a
governmental, not a proprietary, function.
Although the ACA is a government office or agency engaged
in governmental, not proprietary functions, these functions may
not be strictly what is described as "constituent" (as
distinguished from "ministrant"). The growing complexities of
modern society, however, have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government quite
unrealistic, not to say obsolete.
The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and
initiative and which the government was called upon to enter
optionally, and only because it was better equipped to
administer for the public welfare than is any private individual
or group of individuals, continue to lose their well-defined
boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the
government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to
meet the increasing social challenges of the times.
Moreover, the ACA was delegated under the Land Reform
Project Administration, a government agency tasked to
implement land reform. There can be no dispute as to the fact
that the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is
16!
 CBA, right to self-organization, etc. ACA appealed
the decision by challenging the jurisdiction of the CIR
to entertain the petition of the Unions for certification
election on the ground that it (ACA) is engaged in
governmental functions.
Issue: Whether the CIR has jurisdiction to entertain
the petition of the Unions for certification election
given that the mother company (ACA) is engaged in
governmental functions
7 PVTA v. CIR Private respondents (employees of PVTA) filed with
(1975) the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) a petition
wherein they alleged the pay of overtime services in
excess of 8 hours a day rendered by them was not
given to them in accordance with Commonwealth Act
No. 444. The employer, Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration (PVTA) denied the allegations.
Presiding Judge Arsenio T. Martinez of the CIR
rendered a decision in favor of the private
respondent. PVTA then petitioned for a motion for
reconsideration but was denied and so this they
petitioned for certiorari. PVTA contented that CIR is
beyond jurisdiction because PVTA is exercising
governmental, not proprietary functions and that it is
exempt from Commonwealth Act no. 444.
Issue: Whether PVTA discharges governmental and
not proprietary functions.
beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate
into reality. It is a purely governmental function.
Given these, the respondent Unions are not entitled to the
certification election sought in the Court below. Such
certification is admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf
of the employees with respect to terms and conditions of
employment, including the right to strike as a coercive
economic weapon, as in fact the said unions did strike in 1962
against the ACCFA. Given that ACA has a governmental
character, the strike was contrary to Section 11 of RA No. 875
which prohibits strikes against in the government.
Yes. Under RA 2655 as amended by RA 4155, PVTA's nature
as a governmental agency is apparent. Its first section on the
declaration of policy reads: "It is declared to be the national
policy, with respect to the local Virginia tobacco industry, to
encourage the production of local Virginia tobacco of the
qualities needed and in quantities marketable in both domestic
and foreign markets, to establish this industry on an efficient
and economic basis, and, to create a climate conducive to
local cigarette manufacture of the qualities desired by the
consuming public, blending imported and native Virginia leaf
tobacco to improve the quality of locally manufactured
cigarettes." It is thus readily apparent from a cursory perusal of
such statutory provisions why petitioner can rightfully invoke
the doctrine announced in the leading Agricultural Credit and
Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) decision.
However, the characterization of PVTA as governmental is
quite futile. In Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation, the
Chief Justice referred to the ACCFA case when he stated that
the constituent and ministrant functions are not strictly defined
as such anymore. Nonetheless, as he explained so
17!

8 Republic v. Respondent Sison filed a complaint against the Rice
Judge of CFI of and Corn Administration (RCA) for a sum of money
Rizal (1980) with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (CFI). RCA
filed a motion to dismiss on ground of non-suability of
RCA as a mere governmental agency of Republic of
Philippines. The judge rendered a decision in favor of
persuasively: "The growing complexities of modern
society, however, have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government quite
unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be
left to private enterprise and initiative and which the
government was called upon to enter optionally, and only
"because it was better equipped to administer for the public
welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals",
continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be
absorbed within activities that the government must undertake
in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social
challenges of the times.”
Although the petitioner put effort to be adjudged as performing
governmental rather than proprietary functions, such
characteristic cannot militate against respondent Court
assuming jurisdiction over this labor dispute. The contention of
petitioner that the Eight-Hour Labor Law does not apply to it
hardly deserves any extended consideration. The overtime pay
applies equally to private and public industries. If as a result of
the appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne
by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not have
required private respondents to render overtime service. It can
hardly be surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of
personnel. That would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It
would appear, therefore, that such an objection based on this
ground certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat,
respondent Court (CIR) must be sustained.
Yes, RCA is exempted from legal fees and from posting
appeal bonds. RCA’s legal character had already been passed
upon in the case of Ramos vs CIR. RCA was created by RA
3452 pursuant to declared policy: to “stabilize the price of
palay, rice and corn, it shall engage in the 'purchase of these
basic foods' directly from those tenants, farmers, growers,
18!
Sison and ordering RCA to pay the corn grains it
purchased from respondent Sison in the amount of
P1,628,451.54, with interest of P250,000.00. RCA
now represented by the Solicitor General appealed to
dismiss the case given that RCA is a mere
instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines.
When the decision was again denied, RCA filed a
certiorari.
Issue: Whether the RCA is exempt from paying the
legal fees and from posting an appeal bond.
producers and landowners in the Philippines who wish to
dispose of their produce at a price that will afford them a fair
and just return for their labor and capital investment and
whenever circumstances brought about by any cause, natural
or artificial, should so require, shall sell and dispose of these
commodities to the consumers at areas of consumption at a
price that is within their reach” This government character is
showed by Appropriations yearly set aside by General
Appropriations Act according to Section 14 of RA 3452. It is
also an office directly under the Office of the President of the
Philippines.
Mercantile activity of RCA in the buying and selling of palay,
rice, and corn is only incident to its primary governmental
function which is to carry out its declared policy of subsidizing
and stabilizing the price of palay, rice, and corn in order to
make it well within the reach of average consumers, an object
obviously Identified with the primary function of government to
serve the well-being of the people
19!
9 VFP v. Reyes Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP) is an
(2006) organization created under R.A. 2640 in 1960. Over
the course of 2002-2003, VFP received multiple
letters from the Secretary of National Defense (DND
Secretary)
First was a letter asking for a clarification between
the relationship of the VFP and the Philippine
Veterans Bank to the DND. The letter stated these
Sections of R.A. 2640:
Sec. 1 – VFP shall be under the control and
supervision of DND Secretary
Sec. 12 – VFP shall make an audit to the President
or to DND Secretary.
The Second came a circular (DND Department
Circular 04) clarifying the relationship between VFP
and the DND, specifically:
Sec. 3 of Circular- Clarifies that the VFP indeed is
underneath the control and supervision of DND and
is required to make audits. Like a government
agency.
Lastly is a letter (Department Order No.129)
mandating the VFP to conduct a Management Audit.
VFP filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Civil Rules of Procedure, claiming that the DND
unfairly expanded the scope of “control and
supervision” in R.A. 2640. Petitioner claims that it is
not a public nor a governmental entity but a private
organization, and advances this claim to prove that
the issuance of DND Department Circular No. 04 is
an invalid exercise of respondent Secretary’s control
and supervision. They pray that the court issue an
injunction of the DND Circular and may it be declared
Yes. The VFP is a public corporation. This is evident in the
definition of the power to control. “The power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate has
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former to that of the latter.” The definition of
supervision on the other hand is “overseeing, or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former
may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make
them perform their duties.” Thus the department circular are
mere consequences of control and supervision. As such, the
VFP is underneath the DND Secretary, a public officer.
It is crystal clear that our Constitution explicitly prohibit the
regulation by special laws of private corporations, with the
exception of government-owned or controlled corporations
(GOCCs). Hence, it would be impermissible for the law to
grant control of the VFP to a public official if it were neither a
public corporation, an unincorporated governmental entity, nor
a GOCC.
Additionally, a public character can be understood as that of
exercising a sovereign function. In several cases, we have
dealt with the issue of whether certain specific activities can be
classified as sovereign functions. These cases, which deal
with activities not immediately apparent to be sovereign
functions, upheld the public sovereign nature of operations
needed either to promote social justice or to stimulate patriotic
sentiments and love of country. “..The areas which used to
be left to private enterprise and initiative... continue to
lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed
within activities that the government must undertake in its
sovereign capacity...” In the case at bar, the functions of
petitioner corporation enshrined in Section 4 of RA No. 2640
20!
 as null and void.
Issue: Whether veterans federation created by law is
a public office, considering that it does not possess a
portion of the sovereign functions of the government
and considering further that, it has no budgetary
appropriation from DBM and that its funds come from
membership dues.
10 Ramiscal v. In 1998, a scheme was uncovered regarding the
Sandiganbayan unlawful acquisition of territories by the Armed
(2006) Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation
Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). The modus operandi
was that the AFP-RSBS would create two deeds of
sale. One would be signed unilaterally at a much
lower price and registered to the Register of Deeds,
while the other was a bilaterally agreement with a
much higher stated price that would be registered in
the System of the RSBS. The RSBS would then pay
the amount registered in the System using taxpayer
money. The lots would be paid in accordance to the
unilateral deeds of sale, while the excess money
would be kept. The discrepancies would amount to a
total of 703 Million Pesos.
The Ombudsman investigated into this scheme, and
should most certainly fall within the category of sovereign
functions. The protection of the interests of war veterans is not
only meant to promote social justice, but is also intended to
reward patriotism. All of the functions in Section 4 concern the
well-being of war veterans, our countrymen who risked their
lives and lost their limbs in fighting for and defending our
nation. It would be injustice of catastrophic proportions to say
that it is beyond sovereignty’s power to reward the people who
defended her.
The source of funds does not matter. R.A. 2640 itself states
that these are public funds. (Exclusive benefit of Veterans,
sole purpose of benefits and not profit of members, etc.)
Petitioner says that DND did not exercise control because it
historically has never done so, letting the members control for
themselves voluntarily. As we all know, laws are not repealed
by disuse, custom, or practice to the contrary.
No. Petitioner’s contention that the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of
jurisdiction in filing the charges against him were untenable.
The anti-graft court correctly ruled that it has jurisdiction
over the crimes charged. This Court ruled that the AFP-
RSBS is a government-owned and controlled corporation, and
that its funds are in the nature of public funds. Under Section
4(a)(1)(g) of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive
jurisdiction over offenses committed by presidents, directors,
trustees or managers of government owned or controlled
corporations. 42 Under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 8249, the
Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses
committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
office, whether simple or complexed with other crimes.
Petitioner’s culpability on the other hand was proven by the
21!
 initially charged the petitioner with 148 (the number
of transactions of lot acquisition) counts of estafa
through falsification of documents and 1 count of
violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft
Act. After talks with the Panel of Prosecutors and the
Special Prosecutors, the Ombudsman reduced the
charges to 5 Information of estafa and 5 Information
of violation of Sec. 3 (e) in order to streamline the
judicial process.
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction in finding probable cause against
petitioner for the issuance of warrants for petitioner’s
arrest without first conducting a hearing.
11 Alzaga v. Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and
Sandiganbayan Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) was
(2006) established under the virtue of PD No. 361 (1973) to
guarantee continuous financial support to the AFP
military retirement system, as provided for in RA No.
340. On October 7, 1999, four separate information
for violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA No. 3019 were filed
against petitioners Julian Alzaga, Meinrado Enrique
Bello, and Manuel Satuito relative to alleged
irregularities, which attended the purchase of four
lots in Tanauan, Batangas, by the AFP-RSBS.
Alzaga was Head of the Legal Department of AFP-
RSBS when one of the lots was purchased while
Bello was the Police Superintendent and was during
in his tenure that the other three lots were purchased.
Both were vice-presidents of AFP-RSBS. Petitioners
filed their respective motion to quash and/or dismiss
the information alleging that Sandiganbayan has no
fact that he was well aware of the anomalies as he was
member of the Investment Committee (aka the one making the
deeds) as well as the one who signed the deeds. The
petitioners also prepared 2 sets of deeds of sales with the
monetary value of the two sets being different. Additionally, the
ones with the correct amount (the unilateral deeds) was given
to the Register of Deeds while the false ones (the bilateral
deeds) were kept. Petitioner’s fraudulent intent is further
proven by the fact that the Status of Transaction Form (STF),
where the subject lots were endorsed for payment, bore his
signature. The unilateral deeds of sale resulted in the issuance
of the titles, which were also the supporting documents
enumerated in the STF.
Yes. AFP-RSBS is a government-owned or –controlled
corporation. Petitioners’ claim that AFP-RSBS is a private
property is unmeritorious. AFP-RSBS was established to
guarantee continuous financial support to the AFP military
retirement system, similar to the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System
(SSS). The court ruled that the character and operations of the
AFP-RSBS are imbued with public interest thus the same is a
government entity and its funds are in the nature of public
funds.
Given that it is a GOCC then the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over its officials. According to Section 4 of PD No.
1606, Presidents, directors, or truestees, or managers of
government-owned or –controlled corporation, state
universities or educational institutions are under the jurisdiction
of Sandiganbayan. Thus Alzaga and Bello, who were both
vice-presidents and Satuito, who was an assistant vice-
president, are covered and embraced by the position
22!
 jurisdiction over them since AFP-RSBS is a private
entity pursuant to Sec 4 of PD No. 1606, as amended
by RA No. 8249. However, on April 25, 2005, the
Sandiganbayan reversed its earlier resolution saying
that AFP-RSBS is a government-owned or –
controlled corporation thus subject to its jurisdiction.
Petitioners filed for a motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Retirement and Separation Benefit System (AFP-
RSBS) is a government-owned or –controlled
corporation.
12 Javier v. R.A. 8047 “Book Publishing Industry Development
Sandiganbayan Act” was enacted into law. Foremost in its policy is
(2009) the state’s goal in promoting the continuing
development of the book publishing industry through
the active participation of the private sector. To
achieve this purpose, the law provided for the
creation of the National Book Development Board
(NBDB or the Governing Board, for brevity), which
shall be under the administration and supervision of
the Office of the President. The President then
appoints its members which 5 of whom will come
from the gov’t and 6 from the nominees of
organizations of private book publishers, printers,
writers, book industry related activities, students and
the private education sector
Petitioner was appointed to the Governing Board as
a private sector representative for a term of 1 year.
During this time she was also the President of the
Book Suppliers Association of the Philippines
(BSAP). Petitioner was issued by the Office of the
President a travel authority to attend the Madrid
“managers” mentioned under section 4(a)(1)(g) of PD No.
1606. While the first part of section 4 covers only officials of
the executive branch with the salary of grade 27 and higher,
the second part “specifically includes” other officials whose
positions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are by
express provision of law placed under jurisdiction of the said
court.
Yes. The National Book Development Board is a statutory
government agency and the persons who participated therein,
even if they are from the private sector, are public officers to
the extent that they are performing their duty for the benefit of
the public. While indeed under ordinary circumstances a
member of the board remains a private individual, still when
that individual is performing her functions as a member of
the board or when the person is supposed to travel
abroad and is given government money to effect that
travel, to that extent the private sector representative is a
public official performing public functions; if only for that
reason, and not even considering situation of her being in
possession of public funds even as a private individual for
which she would also be covered by provisons of the Revised
Penal Code, she is properly charged before this court.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving. All other national and local
officials classified as ‘Grade 27’ and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 –
Petitioner does not receive any salary but for purposes of
determining the rank equivalence of said positions, the same
23!
 International Book Fair in Spain on October 8-12,
1997 to establish linkages with international book
publishing bodies. She was paid P139, 199.00 as
her travelling expenses. Unfortunately, petitioner
was NOT ABLE to attend the scheduled
international book fair. Resident Auditor Rosario T.
Martin advised petitioner to immediately return/refund
her cash advance. Petitoner, however failed to do so.
A case was then filed against Petitioner for
Malversation of Public funds docketed at the
Sandiganbayan.
Issue: Whether the petitioner is a public officer thus
allowing Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over her
13 MIAA v. CA Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA)
(2006) operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) Complex in Paranaque City under Executive
Order No. 903 (amended into EO 909 and 298
subsequently). MIAA administers land, improvements
and equipment within the NAIA complex. On March
21, 1997. The Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061 which
withdrew the real estate tax exemption under section
21 of the Local Government Code of 1991 granted to
MIAA. MIAA then had to pay the tax imposed by the
City. On 2001, MIAA received Final Notices of Real
Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque
for the taxable years 1992 to 2001 which amounted
to P624,506,725.42. The City of Parañaque
threatened to levy the land and sell it at a public
auction. MIAA thus sought a clarification of Office of
the Government Corporate Council (OGCC) Opinion
No. 061.
may be equated to Board Member II, SG-28. Petitioner’s
offense is office-related because the money for her travel
abroad was given to her because of her Directorship in the
NBDB.
Yes, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from
real estate tax imposed by Parañaque City. MIAA is a
government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to
perform efficiently government functions, not a government
owned or controlled corporation (GOCC). It is not organized as
a stock or non-stock corporation; no capital stock dividends.
Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are owned by the
Republic of the Philippines. MIAA is a property of public
dominion.
Property of public dominion are the following: “(1) Those
intended for public use such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State…” (Art. 420, Civil
Code)
Thus, a real property owned by the Republic is not taxable
except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person (Sec. 234,
LGC). MIAA granted the beneficial use of state property but
not a taxable person and is still therefore exempt from the tax.
24!
 After failing to win the case at the Commission on
Audit on January 2003, Paranaque announced public
auction sale of Airport Lands and Buildings on
barangay halls and the Philippine Daily Inquirer. On 7
February 2003 the Court granted a TRO but
Paranaque received the TRO 3 hours after
conclusion of sale. When the case was brought to the
court, the respondents claim that Section 193 of the
Local Government Code expressly withdrew the tax
exemption privileges of "government-owned and-
controlled corporations" upon the effectivity of the
Local Government Code (LGC) but there was no
mention of exceptions as to international airports.
Issue: Whether Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA
are exempt from real estate tax under existing laws.
14 Boy Scouts of The Commission on Audit issued a Resolution no.
the Philippines 99-011. The said resolution stated that the Boy
v. COA (2011) Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) was created as a
public corporation under the Commonwealth Act. No.
111 amended by P.D. no. 460 and R.A. No. 7278.
With this BSP is said to be put under the jurisdiction
of the COA to be financially audited as it is classified
among government corporations belonging to the
Educational, Social, Scientific, Civic and Research
Sector. BSP claims that it is not subject to audit as
(1) it does not have funds invested in BSP; (2) its
assets are acquired from charity (mostly America);
and (3) it finances its operation from membership
dues.
COA commented that BSP is a public corporation (1)
under Commonwealth Act; (2) it’s a government
agency whose funds are subjected to audit; and (3)
The portions of the properties leased to private entities
(taxable person), however, are not exempt from real estate
tax.
Although MIAA is a juridical person (and thus also subject to
the withdrawal of tax exemptions under Sec 193 of the LGC),
Sec. 133 of LGC expressly provides otherwise and is therefore
still exempted from real property tax. Taxing powers of local
governments do not extend to the national government, its
agencies and instrumentalities.
No. The government still has control over BSP. Not all non
government-controlled corporations are ipso facto private
corporations. Some may become instrumentalities (agency
under special charter) or chartered institutions (has some
corporate power, operational autonomy, and can administer
special fund). A government instrumentality is one that has a
public purpose/interest, that is not integrated within the
department framework and endowed with some if not all
corporate powers administering.
In the case at bar, BSP is a public corporation with a public
purpose whereby the purpose is for the wellbeing of the youth,
the future leaders of the country. It is also under the
Administrative Code of 1987 and includes the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports pursuant to its charter. Thus, it
does not mean that if a corporation is not government owned
or controlled then it automatically means it is a private
corporation. Under Art. XII of Sec. 16, there are public
25!
 RA 7273 did not change in character of BSP. Under
the BSP charter (Commonwealth Act of 111) created
BSP as a public corporation for public interest and
purpose. Under Administrative Code, BSP is
classified as an attached agency whereby there shall
be at least one representative of the government in
its governing board, another provision to be taken
into account is article XVII which bans the creation of
"private corporations” by special law.
Issue: Whether BSP is no longer a Government
controlled corporation thus Philippine government no
longer has control over it and has no power to be
audited under COA.
15 Phil. Society v. The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity
COA (2007) over hundred years ago by Act No. 1285 through the
National Commission. The members are composed
primarily of animal aficionados and animal
propagandists. Its charter is to enforce laws relating
to cruelty inflicted upon animals or the protection of
animals in the Philippine Islands and generally to
alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their
welfare. The petitioner was imbued with the power of
policing in order to enforce the protection of animals.
It was also given the share of ½ of the fines and
imposed and collected through its efforts for
violations of the laws. Although the said police power
and shares in collecting were rescinded by CA No.
148 by mandating them to work with the local police
(later was completely given to the police) and give
the share of money collected to the municipal office.
On December 1, 2003, COA officer attempted to
conduct an audit survey. However, the petitioner
corporations that are not judged base on ownership or
economic viability.
Additionally, according to The Veterans Federation of the
Philippines v. Reyes, despite the VFP being not granted
government funds by DBM it is not proof that it is considered
then a private corporation. This will not also prevent/preclude
the government from extending financial support to BSP. The
erroneous application as cited in VFP does not bar the
government from correct application of the law. Not being
audited by COA in the past does not also prevent COA from
conducting it in the present.
No.
Charter test – The test to determine whether a corporation is
a government owned or controlled, or private in nature is
simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a
public function, or by incorporation under the general
corporation law? Those with special charters are government
corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are
under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and
compulsory members of GSIS (Government Service Insurance
System).
The Constitution of 1935 and 1987 both provide the charter
test which states in Section 7 that the government may only
provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private
corporations, unless corporations are owned or controlled by
government or any of its subdivisions or instrumentality. The
court agrees to petitioner that the Charter test cannot be
applied. Since the petitioner was created on January 19, 1905,
the charter test cannot be applied to the petitioner. Laws also
do not have retroactive effect. Thus, based on its charter, it
26!
 claimed that it was a private entity not under the
jurisdiction of COA. The petitioner claims that even
though it was created by special legislation in 1905,
as there was no general law then existing under
which it may be organized or incorporated, it
exercises no governmental functions because these
have been revoked. Also, nowhere in the Charter of
PhilSoc that it is indicated that it is a government
institution, unlike the BSP. The employees are
covered by SSS, by the initiative of the company, and
not the GSIS. It has no government representative
also that sits on its board. Lastly, the charter does not
mandate that the decisions made should be
consulted by ay government agency.
Issue: Whether the petitioner qualifies as a
government agency that may be subject to audit by
respondent COA?
16 Serana v. Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior
Sandiganbayan student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. She
(2008) is a government scholar. She was appointed by
President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as
a student regent of UP to serve a one-year term.
President Estrada gave the Office of the Student
Regent Foundation Inc. 15 million pesos to renovate
the Vinzons Hall Annex, sourced from the Office of
the President. The renovation failed to materialize
and the succeeding student regent Kristine Clare
Bugayong together with other students and alliance
of student councils within the state university
shows that it is not subject to control or supervision by any
agency of the State. No government representative sits on the
board of trustees of the petitioners. It has powers to voluntarily
determine its by-laws, sue and be sued, own private property,
etc. Also, the employees of the petitioner are registered under
SSS.
The fact that a corporation is created for the public good does
not render its privacy. It might be considered a quasi-public
corporation that render public services and supply public
wants. Examples: corporations that engage in railroad,
warehouse, telephone, water supply, etc. A quasi-public
corporation is a private corporation. Also, just because the
corporation renders public service, it cannot be automatically
recognized as a government instrumentality. Banks, private
schools render public service since this is the trend nowadays
in businesses.
True criteria is the corporation’s relation to the State. If the
corporation is created by the state as an agency or
instrumentality to help in its governmental function then it is
public, if not then private. Ex. Barangays, municipalities, etc.
No. Sandiganbayan was created by President Ferdinand
Marcos so that the public officials may attain the highest norm
of official conduct and at all times accountable to the people.
The jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan is towards public officials
interim or permanent at the time of the commission of the
offense. This include among others officials classified as
Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification. Those of not within the grade 27 or higher
salary are within the jurisdiction of their proper regional,
metropolitan or municipal courts.
In the case at bar, the petitioner is not a Salary Grade 27.
27!
 consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of
Public Funds and Property with the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Ombudsman found a probable cause to indict
petitioner for estafa. The petitioner move to quash
the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan
does not have jurisdiction over the offense charged
or over her person in her capacity as UP student
regent. She claims that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over estafa. She claims that the Philippine
government is not the one that was duped but it was
president Estrada and from his coffers did the money
that was assumed to have been given to her, which
is 15 million pesos. The petitioner said that as a
student regent, she is regent, she was not a public
officer since she merely represented her peers, in
contrast to the other regents who held their positions
in an ex officio capacity. She is just a student and did
not receive salary for being a regent. She did not also
receive money from the Board of Regents (BOR).
Issue: Whether the respondent court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or
excess of jurisdiction in not quashing the information
and dismissing the case notwithstanding that it has
no jurisdiction over the offense charged in the
information
17 Co Kim Cham Petitioner files for mandamus for the lower court to
v. Valdez Tan continue proceedings for Civil Case No.3012 (A
Keh (1945) Property Rights dispute). The court refused to take
cognizance of the petitioner's appeal since the courts
are following Gen. Douglas McArthur's proclamation
that invalidates and nullifies laws, regulations, and
Although PD 1606 covers those who are below Salary Grade
27 like those in Section 4(A)(1) like Presidents, directors,
trustees, or managers, or controlled corporations, state
universities, or educational institutions or foundations; the
petitioner falls under one of them as the BOR performs a
function like a Board of Trustee. Moreover, the compensation
is not an essential element of public office, at most incidental
to public office. It is the investment of sovereign power to one
individual makes one a public officer. Administration of UP is a
sovereign function since UP is performing legitimate
governmental function by providing advanced instructions in
different educational fields. It is also maintained by
government.
The petitioner was not sanctioned by the BOR to act in behalf
of them and contact President Estrada. Resultantly, the act
done was in a private capacity and not in relation to office.
Petitioner took advantage of her position with her brother to
defraud the government.
Additionally, the information shows that the money came from
the Office of the President contrary to what the petitioner
claims.
(1) YES. Usually, the courts and laws of the usurped state
remains intact, and that the courts esp. local maintain their
public office as long as the said laws and public officer did not
act against the usurper. Therefore, the character of the courts
did not change. Also, the internationally recognized rule of
postliminity ensures that the proceedings of the court are
28!
process of any government in the Philippines of that
of the said Commonwealth and without legal effect in
areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation.
The courts refuse to take cognizance of the case
under the defunct state of the Republic of the
Philippines since there is an absence of law granting
such authority. The respondent believes that the
former government is not de facto.
Issues: (1) Whether the judicial acts and proceedings
of the court existing under the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were
good and valid and remained so even after the
liberation or reoccupation of the Islands by US and
Filipino forces.
(2) Whether the proclamation of Gen. Douglas
McArthur that all laws, regulations, and processes of
any other government in the Phil than that of the
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal
effect in the areas of the Phil free of enemy
occupation and control has invalidated all judgment
and judicial acts and proceedings.
(3) Whether the said judicial acts and proceedings
were not invalidated, the present court of
Commonwealth may continue proceeding the
pending at the time of reoccupation. (reiterated by
dissenting Hilado)
indeed good and valid in quality and in legality under de facto
governments. Postliminity believes that the return of occupied
territory to its rightful owner does not means give the former
owner the right to wipe out effects done by the former invader
as long as there is no political complexion in the decisions and
administrative acts.
It would mean that if without the rule, the whole social life of
the community will be paralyzed. It would also be problematic
if everything becomes null and void since some evidence were
already burned because of war and that litigants will not try to
go to court anyway believing it will be null after the war so
inconvenience. Statutory construction also says that any
inconvenience, or endanger a statute will do to public interest
will be avoided and the court will presume that the statute does
not intend to do so either. It would also be assumed that the
acts of the invader are done for public order & safety.
(2) NO. Therefore the declaration of McArthur does not
invalidate the judicial acts and proceedings. It could be added
that the proclamation is an acknowledgment of the Gen.
Incapacity to do so and that the proclamation is simply an
attempt to invalidate all judicial proceedings therefore acting in
accordance to international law. Hague Convention article 43
states that the usurper not to suspend the assertion of civil life
of the usurped, which in this case is being thwarted by the
nullity of judicial cases. In Ochoa v. Hernandez, the US
acknowledges the international rules. The fact that there was a
proclamation of Gen. shows that it is an abrogation and not
fact ab initio.
(3) YES. Usually, the courts and laws of the usurped state
remains intact, and that the courts esp. local maintain their
public office and that the cases in existence continued to be
29!

18 Letter of Petitioner took office as Associate Justice of the
Associate Court of Appeals on June 1980 but took his oath on
Justice Puno November 1982. On January 1983, the Court of
(1992) Appeals was reorganized that became the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Petitioner was
appointed Appellate Justice in the First Special
Cases Division of the Appellate Court. On 1984, he
accepted a position to become the Deputy Minister of
Justice in the Ministry of Justice and thus ceased to
become a member of Judiciary.
After the People Power Revolution of 1986, there
was a reorganization of the Judiciary including the
Intermediate Appellate Court and other lower courts,
and a Screening Committee was created. The
Screening Committee recommended that the
petitioner return as an Associate Justice of the new
Court of Appeals with a rank of (11). But when the
President signed the appointments his seniority
ranking became (26). The petitioner thinks that the
tried. Even though the cases were alien to the usurped courts,
it could be said that through adoption policy of Japan, continue
their duty. Law is established and continued until by some
competent legislative power replaces it. Present courts have
jurisdiction to continue final judgment. As seen that the
Audencia (Spanish period Supreme Court) still take
cognizance of cases despite changing to American occupation
and same with CFI. Even though there was no declaration of
continuation the Executive Proclamation No. 37 also shows
there is recognition of the cases as the cases pending to the
to-be-abolished Court of Appeals were being given to the
Supreme Court, acknowledging its continuity. Therefore,
mandamus is granted ordering to take cognizance of the case
and final judgment shall be continued.
No. The present Court of Appeals is a new court and distinct
and different from the Court of Appeals or the Intermediate
Appellate Court prior to E.O. No. 33. created after the massive
reorganization of the revolutionary government of 1986. The
People Power is a complete overthrow of the established
government of the country or state by those who were
previously subject to it. There is a right for people to abolish,
reform or alter their state since the locus of power resides
within them even though it is done without regard to the
existing Constitution. This power was also recognized by Pres.
Corazon Aquino by saying that “powers vested in me by the
sovereign mandate of the people”.
The Aquino government is revolutionary since it came into
existence in defiance of the existing legal processes. So does
that mean the legal order was overthrown by the Aquino
government?
A legal order is the authoritative code of the polity. Such code
consists of all the rules found in the enactments of the organs
30!
change was due to inadvertence.
It is stated in Sec. 2 of EO No. 33 that the Court of
Appeals Justices shall be appointed by the President.
The cause of his worry is that Associate Justices
have precedence according to the dates of their
appointment. Any member that rendered their
services to other positions in the government and
was reappointed again will retain the precedence and
his service in the Court as if he served continuous
and uninterrupted. The Court granted the request of
Justice Puno.
A motion for reconsideration was written by Justices
Jose C. Campos Jr. and Luis A. Javellana as they
contend that the present Court of Appeals is a new
court and that the petitioner could not contend
reappointment to a prior court. He cannot claim that
he was returning to his former court since it ceased
to exist. Also, although the power of the Executive
cannot be usurped by other branches of gov’t, it shall
be regulated by the Constitution and other laws, in
this case, E.O. 33. The respondents claim that if
there was an inadvertent error, it should be filed to
the Executive and not in the court. They said that he
did file his case to the Executive but was rejected;
therefore, the decision of the Executive should be
respected by the Supreme Court. This is not based
on separation of powers alone but also respect in the
entrusted expertise of the branch that deliberately
rejected the petitioner’s plea.
Issue: Whether there was an inadvertent error in
fixing the judge’s seniority ranking
of the polity. When a state acts under a Constitution, its organs
may be determined from its provisions. The said organs also
have their enactments. Such enactments with the Constitution
comprise the legal order of that constitutional state. It is said
that both create the culture system of the polity. Though it
ceases to be operative as a whole when the legal system is no
longer obeyed by the population nor enforced by officials.
The government of Aquino was met by little resistance as
evidenced by the appointment of officials and reorganization of
Judiciary and Military. This signaled the point where the legal
system in then in effect had ceased to be obeyed by the
Filipinos. Thus the existing court is an entirely new court with
appointment thereto having no relation to the earlier
appointments. Even assuming that the E.O. No. 33 did not
abolish the precedence or seniority rankings of the previous
appointment to the Court of Appeals, existing before 1986, it is
believed that Pres. Corazon Aquino could still disregard the
appointment of seniority rankings when she made the
appointments. It is to be noted that the issuance of the E.O.
No. 33 was during the time of revolutionary government of
Aquino. She was exercising then the powers of the executive
and legislative hence she could modify, repeal, or amend the
E.O. 33 and the appointments to the Court of Appeals.
Thus, the Court does not question at this time the power
exercised by the Executive. The motion for reconsideration is
GRANTED and the appointments made by the President in
1986 are RECOGNIZED.
31!
19 Republic v. Presidential Commission on Good Government
Sandiganbayan (PCGG), filed before the Sandiganbayan against
(2003) Ramas (Major General during the Marcos regime)
and Elizabeth Dimaano. PCGG pursued the case
despite no prima facie evidence against Ramas. The
latter responded by claiming that the PCGG has no
authority to prosecute the case since it does not fall
under EO No.1 (PCGG's task to recover the ill-gotten
wealth) & EO No. 2 (PCGG can only investigate
people taken to be Pres. Marcos' immediate family,
relative, subordinate, or close associate that took
advantage of their public office using their powers,
authority, influence, connections, and relationship.
The PCGG may also cover graft and corruption
cases that the President assigns them.)
PCGG claims that Elizabeth Dimaano's wealth will
not be possible w/o the connection to the
Commanding Gen given that it is out of proportion of
her income. The military confiscated from her
communication equipment; cash amounting to P2.87
million; and $50,000. Dimaano is the claimed
mistress of the respondent (Ramas) living formerly in
Brgy. Tengga, Itaas, Batangas. Sworn statement
shows that she has no means of income and was
formerly a mere secretary/typist of Ramas at Phil
Army. Additionally, her assets amount to
P104,134.60.
During the search at her home, the PCGG personnel
found - Military equipment - 5 baby armalite, one M-
16, one pistol .45 caliber, and 40 ammunitions. In
attache cases they took 700k (modest estimate).
During the investigation they found that Ramas on
Yes. Even during the interregnum the Filipino people
continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration,
almost the same rights were found in the Bill of Rights of the
1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de
jure government, assumed responsibility for the State’s good
faith compliance with the ICCPR to which the Philippines is a
signatory. Under Article 17(1) of the ICCPR, the revolutionary
government had the duty to insure that “[n]o one shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence.”
The UN Declaration of Human Rights, to which the Philippines
is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that “[n]o one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” Although the
signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally
binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has
interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted
principles of international law and binding on the State. Thus,
the revolutionary government was also obligated under
international law to observe the rights of individuals under
the Declaration.
The Court considers the Declaration as part of customary
international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are
proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down
in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government
did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the
same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de
jure government, the revolutionary government could not
escape responsibility for the State’s good faith
compliance with its treaty obligations under international
law.
32!
 the other hand has a house in 15 Yakan St. La Vista
QC (That are not out of proportion to his income as
Ramas defense claims)
The PCGG, amended as the Republic, tried to defer
trial for lack of evidence, then they filed to amend the
complaint to only include Dimaano. Thereafter, the
court did not get the amended complaint and
believed that the case is 1 year overdue and thus the
petitioner presented only 3 witnesses and asked to
be postponed. The petitioner was unable to present
witnesses or further evidence and reiterated its plea
for Dimaano only. The petitioner failed to bring
evidences. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss
the case based on Republic v. Migrino saying that
PCGG has no jurisdiction on people w/o first showing
they are "subordinates" of Pres. Marcos. The court
then decided to dismiss the case and to return the
money, land, equipment jewelry confiscated from
Dimaano. They also remand and referred the records
accumulated to the Ombudsman for trial and
Commisioner of Bureau of Internal Revenue for any
tax liability. PCGG filed for a motion for
reconsideration but was denied by Sandiganbayan.
Issue: Whether the protection accorded to individuals
under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“Covenant”) and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (“Declaration”)
remained in effect during the interregnum.
20 People v. Gozo The accused bought a house and lot located inside
(1973) the US Naval Reservation within the territorial
jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She demolished the
house and built another one in its place without a
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights
existed. Thus the directives and orders issued by government
officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed
the authority granted them by the revolutionary
government. Therefore the directives and orders should
not have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration.
In this case, the warrant, issued by a judge upon proper
application, specified the items to be searched and seized.
The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically
described in the warrant. Nevertheless, the warrant did not
include the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and
land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The raiding team
had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that
these items could be the subject of warrantless search and
seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when
it seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless
these items are contraband per se, and they are not, they must
be returned to the person from whom the raiding team seized
them. The Court held that these items should be returned
immediately to Dimaano.
Yes. The Philippines merely consents that the US government
could exercise its jurisdictions in certain places. The Philippine
Government does not abdicate its sovereignty over the bases
or divest itself completely over offenses committed therein. US
33!
 building permit from the City of the Mayor of
Olongapo City. She claims that she was told by
Ernesto Evalle, an assistant of the Mayor’s City
Office, as well as her neighbors that a building permit
was unnecessary for the construction of the house
(given that it was inside a US Naval territory). Juan
Malones, building inspector, apprehended the four
carpenters working on the house of the accused and
brought them to the headquarters for investigation.
Loreta Gozo was charged and found guilty of
violating the Municipal Ordinance No. 14 (requiring a
permit from the municipal mayor for the construction
or erection of a building, as well as any modification,
alteration, repair or demolition).
has preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses.
President Reagan also reiterated this when he said that the
independence of Philippines and its sovereignty is absolute in
its entire domain. It necessarily has to be exclusive since if it
were not, it will be a derogation of its sovereignty. The
principle of auto-limitation says that through the consent
of the state, expressed or implied, it can restrict sovereign
rights. There could be a diminution of jurisdictional rights but
not a disappearance. The state may also invite others in the
exercise of its sovereignty but the place is still considered
native soil. So the bases mentioned are not and cannot be
foreign territory.

Issue: Whether petitioner needs to secure a building

permit to work on her house located inside a US
Naval territory.

Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of 2. The right of a country to establish military commissions to
national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of try war criminals. (Kuroda v. Jalandoni)
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the 3. Those incorporated in treaties. [E.g. The Vienna
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity Convention on Road Signs and Signals (Agustin v. Edu), the duty to
with all nations. protect the premises of embassies and legations (JBL Reyes v.
Bagatsing)]
Note: The Philippines renounces aggressive and not defensive
war. Doctrines of Transformation and Incorporation:

Among the generally accepted principles in international law
acknowledged by the Court as part of the law of the land are:
1. The right of an alien to be released on bail while awaiting
deportation when his failure to leave the country is due to the fact
that no country will accept him. (Mejoff v. Director of Prisons)
Note: Since dualism holds that international law and municipal law
belong to different spheres, international law becomes part of
municipal law only if it is incorporated into municipal law.

34!
1. Doctrine of Transformation: International law can become Note: The affirmation of amity with all nations does not mean
part of municipal law only if it is transformed into domestic law automatic diplomatic recognition of all nations. Amity with all nations
through appropriate constitutional machinery (such as an act of is an ideal to be aimed at. Diplomatic recognition remains a matter of
Parliament) executive discretion.

2. Doctrine of Incorporation (second part of Section 2

accepts this doctrine): International law has the force of domestic
law; however since treaties become part of Philippine law only by
ratification, the principle of incorporation applies only to customary
law and to treaties which have become part of customary law.

Section 2. International Law and Philippine Municipal Law

21 Tañada v. World Trade Organization is one of the international (1) NO. Article II of the Constitution is not self-executing
Angara (1997) institutions that was created out of a multilateral treaty. After meaning that Congress has to pass a clearly defined
the ravages of World War II, WTO (then was proposed in the law for it to be a cause of action. This is for two
name of International Trade Organization) was envisioned to reasons: (1) The operational terms provided in specific
play a big in the worldwide economic recovery by fostering laws guarantees that the accused can defend his/her
international trade and preventing unilateral protectionist self intelligently and effectively. This guarantees then
policy. Unfortunately, ITO was not ratified thus only the World due process. (2) It violates separation of powers by
Bank (tasked of rehabilitation and reconstruction) and propelling courts into “uncharted ocean of social and
International Monetary Fund (to stabilize currency among economic policy making.” By interpreting words such as
states) took effect. GATT or The General Agreement on right to health in Article II, Judiciary in a way legislates
Tariffs and Trade for the meantime was used by different how it should be construed or legislated.
states to determine the trading of goods. The problem with
GATT though is that it is simply a collection of different Additionally, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an
treaties with no institutionalized body of agreements and no isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
system of dispute settlement. WTO was ratified after a investments, goods and services in the development of
century later after the Uruguay Round (one of the round of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not
talks held by different representatives of states) through the encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods,
signing of the Final Act (A one page paper enumerating the services, and investments into the country, it does not
agreements of the countries regarding the WTO). prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on
the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only
In the Philippines, Respondent Rizalina Navarro, then on foreign competition that is unfair. Additionally,
secretary of the DTI, representing the Philippines, signed in law encourages for businesses to be competitive

35!
 Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round Of Multilateral Negotiations. Under
the Final Act, the Philippines agrees to submit, as
appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of
their respective competent authorities, with a view to seeking
approval of the Agreement in accordance with their
procedures. Fidel V. Ramos ratified the Agreement. The
Senate received two letter from the President for their
concurrence of the Agreement pursuant to Section 21, Article
VII of the Constitution (No treaty or international agreement
shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.)
Issues: (1) Do the provisions of the WTO agreement and its
three annexes contravene Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10
and 12, Article XII, of the Philippine constitution? Meaning
that it violates "economic nationalism"(Filipino First Policy)
by the so-called "parity provisions (state or condition of
being equal)" and "national treatment" clauses by placing
foreign goods on equal footing with local goods.
(2) Do the provisions of said agreement and its annexes limit,
restrict, or impair the exercise of legislative power by
congress? (Given that the WTO Agreement provides that
"(e)ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations
as provided in the annexed Agreements”).
22 Bayan v. On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and United States
Zamora Forged a Military Bases Agreement which allowed the use of
(2000) installations in the Philippine territory by United States
personnel. On August 30, 1951, the Mutual Defense Treaty
was signed where US and Phil. agreed to respond to any
domestic and foreign markets.
In fact, WTO is more lenient to developing States (eg.
tariffs should be reduced to 36% for 6 years for
developed states but for developing states, only 24% is
asked and its deadline is 10 years).
(2) No, the concept of sovereignty employed here is
auto-limitation. In the foregoing treaties, the
Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of
its sovereign powers of taxation, eminent domain and
police power. The underlying consideration in this
partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal
commitment of the other contracting states in granting
the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines
under WTO-GATT.
Also, the Constitution provides that international law
should be adopted as part of the law of the land. Pacta
sunt servanda is followed by Philippines (“Agreements
must be kept” or international agreements must be
performed in good faith). Philippines also follows the
doctrine of incorporation wherein as long as the
international provisions are consistent with domestic
laws, the former will be enforceable within our
jurisdiction. Also, treaties inherently restrict sovereignty.
By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some
aspects of their state power in exchange for greater
benefits granted by or derived from a convention or
pact.
(1) Article 21: “No treaty or international agreement
shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.”
Article 25: “After the expiration of the 1991 treaty of
RP-US concerning Military, the Phil except under treaty
36!
external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public
vessel, and aircraft.
In 1991, the Philippines and US negotiated in the possible
extension of the military bases agreement since it was
expiring. On August of that year, the Senate rejected the RP-
US Treaty of Friendship, which is the treaty that would have
extended the duration of military bases in Phil. The expiration
of the treaty held in abeyance the joint military exercise
between the two countries though the 1951 defense treaty
was still active.
In 1997, US Defense Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt
Campbell and Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo
Severino, Jr. exchanged notes regarding the possible
elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). In 1998,
President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA together with
the US Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. President Joseph
Estrada also ratified the treaty during the same year through
the Sec of Foreign Affairs Exec. Secretary Ronaldo Zamora.
Sec. Zamora sent the treaty to the Senate for concurrence
pursuant to Article 21 of the Constitution (No treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate). The Committee on Foreign Relations headed by
Rodolfo Biazon held joint public hearings and consider it for
recommendation. The treaty was numbered as Resolution
number 443. In May 27, 1999, the Resolution number 443
was approved by the Senate by a two-thirds (2/3) vote. It
entered into force on June 1.
Issues:
(1) Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21,
Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?
duly concurred by the Senate and when the Congress
so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by
the people in a national referendum held for that
purpose and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.”
Article 21 deals with (1) treaties or international
agreements in general and (2) applies to variety of
treaty or international agreements. On the other hand,
Article 25 deals with treaties which involve the presence
of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the
Philippines. In this case, Article 25 is applied since it is
a treaty concerning the military. Article 21 will determine
the number of votes required, which is two-thirds or not
less than 16 (Senate is composed of 24 members). The
16 number will not be reduced despite absence of other
senators since it refers to the Senate as a whole. Lex
specialis derogant generali means that where there is a
statute of a particular enactment and also a general one
which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include
what is embraced in the former, the particular
enactment must be operative, and the general
enactment must be taken to affect only such cases
within its general language which are not within the
provision of the particular enactment.
(2) Ratification is an executive act undertaken by the
head of state or the government through which formal
acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. The State may
provide other means as when the State may provide in
its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a
treaty. The consent of the State to be bound by a treaty
is expressed by ratification when (a) the treaty provides
for such ratification, (b) it is otherwise established that
37!

(2) Does the US Senate need to ratify the treaty with the
Philippines or mere signature of the executive/President is
enough?
the negotiating States agreed that ratification should be
required, (c) the representative of the State has signed
the treaty subject to ratification or (d) the intention of the
State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears
from the full powers of its representative or was
expressed during the negotiation. In our jurisdiction, the
power to ratify is in the President and NOT the
legislature. The Senate is there only to give or withhold
its consent or concurrence to the ratification.
Executive agreements in international law are
binding as a treaty. A treaty under the Vienna
Convention is a written agreement between two or more
states and governed by international law. Whether
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
related instruments, and whatever its particular
designation. Also, the names given in a treaty are
inconsequential as well. The name of the treaty whether
it is a protocol, agreement, pact, cordat, convention,
declaration, etc. are of no prejudice to the meanings
given to them by the internal law of the State.
Thus in the Philippines, we recognize the binding
effects of executive agreements. It is stated in the
Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading that
the courts have long never questioned the validity of
executive agreements. Confirmed by long usage, the
subject has covered vast amounts of subject that the
Congress never did question as well. In the case of US,
as well expressly recognize the validity and
constitutionality of executive agreements. The
Philippines in the Constitutional Commission stated that
it will act on good faith to judge that the country that is
contracting with has done everything if they said they
38!

23 Bayan v. Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established
Romulo to represent the marginalized sectors of society. The
(2011) Secretary of Foreign Affairs Blas Ople is now deceased and
respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity
as Executive Secretary. The issue started when the
Philippines (RP) attempted to bind itself under the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC has
the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the
most serious crimes of international concern and shall be
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.
Examples of serious crimes under international law are:
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes
of aggression. On December 28, 2000, Enrique Manalo
signed the Rome Statute and is STILL PENDING to
ratification.
On the other hand, on May 9, 2003 the Ambassador
Ricciardone of the US Embassy in Note No. 0470 proposed
terms with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) of a non-
surrender bilateral agreement called RP-US Non-Surrender
have done everything for the said agreement to be
recognized.
Thus, the Philippines is bound now to the treaty and is
bound by Article II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution. It cannot
plead that the Constitution as an excuse for non-
compliance with our obligations duties and
responsibilities under the international law and part of
the community of nations. Pacta sunt servanda (Every
State has the duty to carry out in good faith its
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of
international law, and it may not invoke the provisions in
its constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to
perform this duty).
(1) No, the Court believes that the Agreement does not
undermine or contravene the Rome Statute. In fact,
both complement each other. The purpose of ICC is to
be complementary of the signatory states as stated in
Article 1 that it “shall be complementary to national
criminal jurisdiction.” The ICC recognizes that the State
has primary jurisdiction to the first instance of the so-
called crime that was committed. The ICC does not put
a person into trial without undergoing first a trial in
domestic courts. Thus, the jurisdiction of ICC will come
into play only when the states are unwilling or unable to
prosecute. The petition then has to be rejected outright
for nothing in the provisions of the ICC lessens its
efficacy.
The ICC also states that it cannot request a surrender
of a person if it would request the State in turn to act
inconsistently with its obligations under international
agreements. This could be changed if the Court could
get an approval of surrender from the sending State.
39!
Agreement (hereinafter called Agreement). Via an
exchange of notes, DFA Sec. Ople agreed with and
accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy
note and put in effect the Agreement with the US
government.
The Agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines
as “persons” (defined as Government Officials, employees
[including contractors], or military personnel or nationals of
one Party) of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment
suits that might be brought against them in international
tribunals. Under the Agreement, US or RP shall not, absent
the express consent of the first Party, shall surrender or
transfer any of the people of the other Party to: (1)
International tribunal for any purpose, unless such tribunal
has been established by the UN Security Council; or (2)
Other entity or third country, or expelled to a third country, for
the purpose of surrender to or transfer to any international
tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN
Security Council.
Issues: (1) Whether the RP President and the DFA Secretary
committed grave abuse of discretion for concluding the RP-
US non surrender agreement by means of a letter dated 13
May 2013, when the RP gov’t has already signed the Rome
Statute of the ICC although still pending ratification by the
Phil senate
(2) Whether the Agreement made RP abdicate its
sovereignty by bargaining away the jurisdiction of the ICC to
prosecute US nationals, government/employees or military
personnel who commit crimes of international concern.
(3) Whether the non-surrender agreement was executed by
Diff. of Signatory v. State-Party – the signatory state is
only precluded from acts that would defeat the object
and purpose of the Rome Statute. A State-Party is
legally obliged to follow all the provisions of treaty in
good faith. RP is only a signatory state since the
Senate did not ratify yet the treaty. Though it is
understood that agreement to treaties limits or waive
some aspect of their state power; it should be clarified
that the Constitution does not prohibit immunity from
jurisdiction or some aspect of jurisdiction.
Additionally, the Court believes that an exchange of
notes falls into the category of inter-governmental
agreements, which is an internationally accepted form
of international agreement. The UN Treaty Collections
supports the claim by accepting the exchange of notes
as valid avenues of treaty agreement. The rationale is
that as long as it was done by government ministers,
diplomats, or dep’t heads and repeats the text offering
the record of its assent then it is a speedy procedure
that is more efficient since it avoids legislative approval.
(2) No, the Agreement is but an affirmation of the
Philippines’ national criminal jurisdiction. Thus, RP has
a choice to try “persons” of the US, as it is understood
in the Agreement. It may refuse to prosecute, and the
country would, in effect, accord discretion to the US to
exercise either its national criminal jurisdiction over the
“person” concerned or to give its consent to the referral
of the matter to the ICC for trial. This may only be
exercised in cases where “another court or international
tribunal is already conducting the investigation or
undertaking the prosecution of such crime” otherwise,
40!
the President thru DFA in grave abuse of discretion.
(4) Whether the Rome Statute is a declaratory of customary
international law thus the ICC embodies principles of
international law that are treated as part of the law of the land
[Art. II Sec. 2]. Therefore any derogation from the Rome
Statute principles cannot be undertaken via a mere executive
agreement since executive agreements cannot amend or
repeal law. The Agreement thereby frustrates the objects of
the principles of law or alters the customary rules in Rome
Statute.
the Philippines must prosecute the crime before its own
courts. This shows that RP specifically under RA 9851
(Philippines Act on Crimes Against International
Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes
Against Humanity) does not depend on US consent to
put into trial a suspect. The agreement though prevents
the RP (without the consent of US) from surrendering to
any international tribunal US nationals accused of
crimes of RA 9851.
(3) The power to ratify a treaty is within the President
with the Senate only there for concurring or withholding
its ratification. The President also has the power to
refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or if it has
secured the consent he may still refuse or ratify it. This
is the power a President alone has and cannot be
encroached.
(4) First, the court believes that the Agreement does
not amend or is repugnant to RA 9851. Second, the
petitioners did not state what principle of law the
Agreement alters. Third, the petitioners did not
demonstrate how the Agreement frustrates the
objectives of the principles of law in the Rome Statute. It
was shown that the Agreement does not contravene
the sovereignty of jurisdiction of the RP.
RA 9851 (1) defines and establishes crimes against
humanity, (2) provides penal sanctions and criminal
liability, (3) establishes special courts. Nowhere then
could the Agreement attempt to contravene the said
law. The RP also has a prior RP-US Extradition Treaty
signed last 1994, thus the Agreement in conjunction
with the said treaty would not run counter to RA 9851.
41!
 The justification for jus cogen is that the crime that was
committed is so grave and a widely condemned offense
that it is considered done to the international
community, granting everyone its jurisdiction.

When one is talking about the status of customary

international law it refers to three things that makes it a
custom: (1) generality, (2) uniformity and consistency,
(3) duration. This means that the opinion juris that the
psychological element that the state practice or norm be
“carried out in such a way as to be evidence of a belief
that this practice is rendered obligatory.” This is not the
case for the Rome Statute that is perceived to be a
declaratory international law.

The Rome Statute was only ratified by 114 States out of

194 by the time of its force. Since around 58.76% only
ratified it, then it is doubtful how could it asserts its
customary character. To add, Fr. Bernas mentions two
factors to make a customary law it consists of (1)
material factor or the way states behave and (2)
psychological factor the rationale why they behave.
Duration is not important.
There is no general agreement among states that
crimes should be handled by a particular international
criminal court.

Lastly, the Rome Statute rejects universal jurisdiction,

referring again to the claim of declaratory customary
law, as it subjects itself to ratification of the State.
24 Deutsche In accordance with the National Internal Revenue Code No, the Court believes that the country is bound by our
Bank v. CIR (NIRC) of 1997, the petitioner withheld and remitted to adherence to the general principle that international law
(2013) respondent the amount of 67,688,553.51 which is 15% as part of the law of the land. We also follow pacta sunt

42!
branch profit remittance tax (BPRT) on its regular banking
unit (BRU) net income remitted to Deutsche Bank Germany
(DB Germany) for 2002 and prior taxable years. Meaning that
in this case, the NIRC 15% tax was invoked out of par. 6 of
Art. 10 of RP-Germany Tax Treaty where a resident of the
Federal Republic of Germany has a branch in Philippines,
this branch may be subject to branch profits remittance tax
withheld at source in accordance with Philippine law but shall
not exceed 10% of the gross amount of profits remitted.
Thus, the petitioner believes that there was an overpayment
of the BPRT and filed with the BIR Large Taxpayers
Assessment and Investigation Division an administrative
claim for refund or issuance of its tax credit certificate in the
amount of PHP 22,562,851.17. The petitioner requested the
International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) a confirmation of its
entitlement to the preferential tax rate of 10% under the
RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
The CTA denied the claim of refund on the ground that the
application for a tax treaty relief was not filed with ITAD prior
to the payment by the petitioner of its BPRT and actual
remittance of its branch profits to DB Germany, or prior to its
availment of the preferential rate of ten percent (10%) under
the RP-Germany Tax Treaty provision. The petitioner violated
the 15-day period mandated in Revenue Memorandum Order
(RMO) 1-2000. In the decision also of CTA on Mirant
(Philippines) Operations Corporation v. CIR, the CTA ruled
that before the benefits of the tax treaty may be extended to
a foreign corporation wishing to avail itself thereof, the latter
should first invoke the provisions of the tax treaty and prove
that they indeed apply to the corporation (prove that it is true
before apply therefore no automatic application).
servanda or that treaties must be followed in good faith.
Tax treaties are entered into by countries in order to
reconcile the national fiscal legislations of the
contracting parties and in turn help the taxpayer avoid
simultaneous taxations like double taxation in different
jurisdictions. Double taxation is the imposition of
comparable taxes in two or more states on the same
taxpayer in respect of the same subject matter for
identical periods. The use of tax treaty is to encourage
the free flow of goods and services and movement of
capital that would create robust and dynamic
economies.
The contracting parties are expected to create
modifications that may be necessary to ensure the
fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. The BIR then
must not impose additional requirements that would
negate the availment of reliefs provided by international
agreements given that the RP-Germany Tax Treaty
does not provide prerequisites. There is also NOTHING
in RMO No. 1-2000 that would deprive the entitlement
for availment if someone does not comply with the 15-
day rule. The denial of availment by RMO No. 1-2000
would violate the compliance of RP in good faith and
would impair the value of the treaty. This could lead in
negative implications in international relations and
foreign investors.
The objectives of RMO No. 1-2000 is superseded by
the treaty. And since it only involves administrative
issues, it could be remedied by imposing instead
penalties or fines but not the denial of the entitlement.
Also, the Court ruled that the decision in Mirant cannot
43!
 Issue: Whether the failure to strictly comply with RMO no. 1-
2000 will deprive the persons or corporations of the benefit of
a tax treaty
25 Lim v. Exec. The last “Balikatan” was held in 1995. This was due to the
Secretary paucity of any formal agreement relative to the treatment of
(2002) US personnel visiting the PH. In the meantime, the two
countries agreed to hold joint exercises on a reduced scale.
PH and US concluded the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
in 1999. Beginning January 2002, personnel from the Armed
Forces of US started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in
conjunction with the PH military, in “Balikatan 02-1”. The said
training was a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant
to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement
entered into by the PH and US in 1951.
On February 7, 2002 the Senate conducted a hearing on the
“Balikatan” exercise wherein VP Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.,
who is concurrently Secretary of Foreign Affairs, presented
the Draft Terms of Reference (TOR). Five days later, he
approved the TOR (it contained the matters of policy level
and exercise level including the training, administration &
logistics, and public affairs). Under the TOR, the Exercise is
said to be a mutual counter-terrorism advising, assisting and
training Exercise relative to Philippine efforts against the ASG
(Abu Sayyaf Group), and will be conducted on the Island of
Basilan. Further advising, assisting and training exercises
shall be conducted in Malagutay and the Zamboanga area.
Related activities in Cebu will be for support of the Exercise.
Issues:
(1) Whether the PH and US signed the Mutual Defense
Treaty (MDT) in 1951 to provide mutual military assistance
only in the case of an armed attack by an external
bind the court since it is of a case of similar nature.
There are differences in parties, taxes, taxable periods
and treaties involved
(1) The holding of “Balikatan 02-1” must be studied in
the framework of MDT. It is this treaty to which the VFA
adverts and the obligations thereunder which it seeks to
reaffirm. The VFA provided the “regulatory mechanism”
which permits US personnel to engage, on an
impermanent basis, in “activities” approved by the PH
Government.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties signed is
used to determine how treaties should be interpreted
and in this case it says: (1) Interpreted in good faith and
use ordinary meaning, (2) Take into account the context
(context means: any past interpretation and application
of treaties between parties and the use of international
law, if it is applicable)
Thus “activities” is interpreted to give leeway for US and
PH to engage in purposes other than military (combat-
related) practices e.g. training, giving legitimacy for the
Balikatan exercises.
Also; both the history and intent of the MDT and VFA
support the conclusion that combat-related activities (as
opposed to combat itself), such as the one subject of
the instant petition, are indeed authorized.
(2) It must be established that neither the MDT nor VFA
allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on
PH territory. The MDT provides that the US may use
force “for self-defense.”
44!
 aggressor, meaning a third country against one of them.
(2) Whether the Abu Sayyaf bandits in Basilan constitute an
external armed force that has subject the Philippines to an
armed external attack to warrant U.S. military assistance
under the MDT of 1951.
26 Shangri-La v. The main issue concerns the controversy of the “Shangri-La”
Developers mark and the “S” logo. Respondent Developers Group of
(2006) Companies, Inc. (DGCI) claims to own the logo and mark by
the fact that it filed a patent on it on October 18, 1982 with
The fear of petitioners is that the self-defense clause is
hard to justify given that the exercise is held near the
Abu Sayyaf territory. The Court believes that Abu
Sayyaf cannot sit idly when battle is placed at their
doorstep and that they cannot be expected to pick their
targets so as not to harm US troops and not invoke the
self-defense clause. It is then: Nemo potest facere per
alium quod non potest facere per directum (No one is
allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do
directly). However, the Court believes that neither MDT
nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an
offensive war on Philippine territory. It believes that both
countries will follow its treaty obligation according to
pacta sunt servanda.
As a rule, the Court cannot use newspaper, or
electronic reports per se for the reason that facts must
be established according to the rules of evidence. The
alleged “double speak” by Arroyo – claiming that
exercise is not for an offensive effort cannot be
adjudicated given that it is mere speculation.
Thus, absence of any fact that would prove that
Balikatan is an offensive act, we find that the holding of
“Balikatan 02-1” joint military exercise has not intruded
into that penumbra of error that would otherwise call for
correction on our part. In other words, respondents in
the case at bar have not committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
(1) The Court said that the root of ownership is based
on its actual use in commerce and it must be used for
not less than two months in the Philippines prior to the
filing of an application for its registration. Registration,
45!
the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer
(BPTTT). The BPTTT ruled in favor of DGCI and since then,
the DGCI started using the “Shangri-La” mark and “S” logo in
its restaurant business.
The Kuok family on the other hand owns and operates a
chain of hotels and hotel-related transactions since 1969. As
far back as 1962, it adopted the name “Shangri-La” as part of
the corporate names of all companies organized under the
Kuok Group of Companies (the Kuok Group). The Kuok
Group tried to centralize all ownership of the “Shangri-La”
mark and “S” logo and incorporated the companies in Hong
Kong and Singapore the several companies that form part of
the Shangri-La International Hotel Management Ltd. Group of
Companies. The EDSA and Makati Shangri-La Hotel and
Resort Inc. were incorporated in the Philippines beginning
1987 to own and operate the two hotels put by the Kuok
Group in Mandaluyong and Makati. The design was created
by William Lee, a design artist, on February 1975. Thus since
1975, up to the present, the Shangri-La mark and “S” logo
have been used consistently and continuously by all Shangri-
La hotels and companies in their paraphernalia. The Kuok
Group registered the mark and logo in different countries of
the world.
In 1988, the petitioners filed with the BPTTT a petition to
cancel the registration of the “Shangri-La” mark and “S” logo
issued to DGCI on the ground the same were illegally and
fraudulently obtained and appropriated for the latter’s
restaurant business. Until 1987 or 1988 the petitioners did
not operate in the Philippines though they advertise their
hotels and business outside the Philippines through travel
brochures, news, and magazines. They too maintained
reservations and booking agents in airline, hotel
on the other hand, does not grant absolute registration
mark since it is only prima facie proof that the registrant
is the owner of the registered mark or trade name.
However, evidence of prior and continuous use of
another can overcome the registered business and the
latter could be declared as the appropriate owner. The
ownership of a mark or trade name may be acquired not
necessarily by registration but by adoption and use in
trade or commerce. As between actual use of a mark
without registration, and registration of the mark without
actual use thereof, the former prevails over the latter.
Though the rule of actual use is outdated, the rule to
follow is the time of registration. Thus, the use of
trademark in Philippines is required. Trademark is a
creation of use and therefore actual use is a pre-
requisite and registration to the Patent Office is a mere
administrative confirmation of the existence of the right.
The official date of registration by DGCI was
October 18, 1982 and since the actual use was not
till December 1982, the claim base on registration
cannot hold. Additionally, The CA noted that the
respondent’s President had been to the petitioner’s
hotel before and he must have copied the idea there. It
then is absurd not to believe that in a millions of terms
and combination the respondent chose the exact font,
lettering, and word of the petitioner leading then to claim
by the petitioner that the logo was used in bad faith.
One cannot then come to court to ask for
infringement of logo and trademark against the true
owner since it is pointing fingers with unclean
hands.
(2) RA 166 reflects the decision of CA on Section 2 (2
46!
organizations, hotel organizations, tours, and in other allied
fields in the Phil.
The issue in the RTC was that for 8 years, the DGCI has
prior and exclusive use of the logo and mark in question for
its restaurants. The DGCI sought to prohibit Shangri-La from
using the marks and logo in their hotels in the Philippines. In
defense the respondent claimed that DGCI illegally used and
appropriated their mark and logo that they have been using
for their corporate names and affairs since 1962.
During the trials for infringement, the witness for DGCI was
Syhunliong, President and Chairman of DGCI’s Board of
Directors. During the witness procedure, he admitted he had
travelled around Asia and knew of the Shangri-La Hotel in
Hong Kong as early as August 1982. He also said that the
design was made by a jeepney signboard artist and was
written into a piece of paper after he gave his idea to the
artist. He then incorporated the mark and the logo. Following
the incorporation is the reflection of the name in the
restaurant and design. The case went in favor of DGCI and
the logo of Shangri-La constitutes an infringement and
therefrom the petitioners went on appeal to the CA. The CA
affirmed the lower court believing that the use of logo was
abroad, not in the Philippines. It said that although the Paris
Convention regulates the use of trademarks, it still must yield
to the conventions of municipal law. The petitioners tried to
file for a reconsideration that was denied by the CA.
Issues: (1) Whether the petitioner has no right to file the
application for registration of the Shangri-La and the “S” logo
because it did not have prior actual commercial use.
(2) Whether the CA erred in overlooking petitioner’s
month use rule in Phil). This is easy to miss on the part
of the CA. There is a crucial difference between 2 and
2-A.
Since ownership through actual use is required for the
registration of a trademark, Section 2-A defines how
one goes about acquiring ownership thereof. Under
Sec. 2-A, it is clear that actual use is the test AND that
it must not have been appropriated by another. 2-A
does not require actual use in the Philippines. Given
that Respondent was AWARE that the use of “S” logo
beforehand and combined with Sec. 2-A that requires a
logo, before registration, must not be in use EVEN NOT
in the Phil., then respondent’s action fails.
The Philippines is shown in the Intellectual
Property Code (IPC) of RA 8293 to observe and
follow the Paris Convention by incorporating the
relevant portions of the Convention such that the
question of mark may include internationally well-
known mark, whether or not registered, is sought
to be registered or is actually registered.
The notable thing is that even though the Philippines
has signed into the Paris Convention, it still
implemented IPC which has no retroactive clause. RA
166 runs afoul to the Paris Convention by stating that
actual use in commerce is judged within the Philippine
territory. The conflict is that Paris Convention
mandates the recognition of internationally known
marks or devises.
The SC then ruled that following the universal
acquiescence and comity, municipal law on trademarks
47!
 widespread prior use of the “Shangri-La” mark and “S” logo in
their operations.
27 Philip Morris, The petitioner Philip Morris, Inc., is a corporation organized
Inc. v. Fortune under the laws of the State of Virginia issued on April 26,
Tobacco 1973 by the Philippine Patents Office (PPO), the registered
Corporation owner of the trademark of MARK VII FOR CIGARETTES.
(2006) Similarly, petitioner Bensen & Hedges (Canada), Inc., is the
registered owner of the trademark MARK TEN for the
cigarettes as evidenced by PPO Certificate. Another
Certificate of a subsidiary company of Philip Morris, Inc., the
Swiss company Fabrique de Tabac Corporation, S.A., is the
assignee of the trademark LARK which was originally
registered in 1964 by Ligeet and Myers Tobacco Company.
Respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation in the Philippines
manufactures and sells cigarettes using the trademark
MARK.
The legal dispute started when the petitioner manifested that
being registered owners of the trademark MARK VII and
MARK TEN for cigarettes as evidenced by the corresponding
certificates of registration and an applicant for the registration
of the trademark LARK MILDS. Petitioners claimed that they
have registered the aforementioned trademarks in their
respective countries of origin and that, by virtue of the long
and extensive usage of the same, these trademarks have
already gained international fame and acceptance. Petitioner
states that respondent manufactured and sold cigarettes
bearing the identical and/or confusingly similar trademark
MARK. Accordingly, they argued that respondents use of the
trademark MARK in its cigarette products have caused and is
regarding the requirement of actual use in the
Philippines must be subordinate to an international
agreement. The Court believes that given the infirmity of
the two-month rule and the bad faith in the registration
of the mark, it would do injustice to adjudge the
petitioners as infringing their own created mark.
Corporate nationals of member-countries of the Paris
Union can sue before Philippine courts for infringement
of trademarks, or for unfair competition, without need
of obtaining registration or a license to do business
in the Philippines, and without necessity of actually
doing business in the Philippines. To petitioners,
these grievance right and mechanism are accorded not
only by Section 21-A of RA No. 166, as amended, or
the Trademark Law, but also by Article 2 of the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,
otherwise known as the Paris Convention.
However, the fact that their respective home countries,
namely, the United States, Switzerland and Canada,
are, together with the Philippines, members of the Paris
Union does not automatically entitle petitioners to the
protection of their trademarks in this country absent
actual use of the marks in local commerce and
trade. Additionally, R.A. No. 166, as amended,
specifically Sections 2 and 2-A also mandates actual
use of the marks and/or emblems in local
commerce and trade before they may be registered
and ownership thereof acquired.
True, the Philippines adherence to the Paris Convention
effectively obligates the country to honor and enforce its
provisions as regards the protection of industrial
property of foreign nationals in this country. However,
48!
likely to cause confusion or mistake, or would deceive
purchasers and the public in general into buying these
products. Thus the words MARK, TEN, LARK and the Roman
Numerals VII cannot help in pointing out the ownership of the
products.
Invoking the provisions of the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property (Paris
Convention, for brevity), to which the Philippines is a
signatory. Petitioners pointed out that upon the request of an
interested party, a country of the Union may prohibit the use
of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, imitation, or
translation of a mark already belonging to a person entitled to
the benefits of the said Convention.
Issue: Whether there was infringement of the petitioners
trademarks by the respondent
*Note: petitioners have already registered the
trademarks MARK VII, MARK TEN and LARK for cigarettes
in the Philippines BUT their prior actual commercial use
thereof had not been proven. In fact, petitioner’s judicial
admission of not doing business in this country effectively
belies any pretension to the contrary.
any protection accorded has to be made subject to
the limitations of Philippine laws.
In many cases the court ruled the clash between the
1965 Paris Convention to the Trademark Law of
Philippines. The court ruled that following universal
acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on
trademarks regarding the requirements of actual
use in the Philippines must subordinate an
international agreement inasmuch as the apparent
clash is being decided by a municipal tribunal.
Withal, the fact that international law has been made
part of the law of the land does not by any means imply
the primacy of international law over national law in the
municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as
applied in most countries, rules of International Law are
given a standing equal, not superior, to national
legislative enactments.
However as stated by the CA, the petitioner failed to
prove actual use of the trademark. The court also stated
that petitioner’s registration does not confer upon the
registrant an absolute right to the registered mark. The
certificate of registration merely constitutes prima facie
evidence that the registrant is the owner of the
registered mark.
On the other hand, in determining similarity and
likelihood of confusion, jurisprudence has
developed two tests: the dominancy test and the
holistic test. The dominancy test sets sight on the
similarity of the prevalent features of the competing
trademarks that might cause confusion and deception,
thus constitutes infringement. Under this norm, the
49!

28 Mijares v. On May 9, 1991 a complaint was filed by 10 Filipino citizens
Ranada alleged to have suffered human rights abuses in the hands of
(2005) police or military forces under the Marcos regime with the US
District Court, District of Hawaii, against the Estate of
Marcos. Plaintiffs brought action on their own behalf and on
behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals (current
civilian citizens of the Philippines, their heirs and
beneficiaries, who between 1972-1987 where also subject to
human rights abuses by the Military forces) consisted of
approximately 10,000 members. The Alien Tort Act was
invoked as basis for the US District Court’s jurisdiction over
the complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens for tortious
violations of international law. Under the Alien. Under the
Alien Tort Act, U.S. treats human rights abuses as abuses
against "the law of nations" and thus jurisdiction can be
attained even if you’re an alien (Filartega v. Pena-Irala)
The US District Court rendered a FINAL JUDGEMENT
awarding plaintiff class $1,964,005,859.90 (approx. $2B).
Final judgment was eventually affirmed by the US Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Petitioners submit that their
action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the subject
matter of the suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgment,
and not an action for the collection of a sum of money or
recovery of damages. They also point out that to require the
question at issue turns on whether the use of the marks
involved would be likely to cause confusion or mistake
in the mind of the public or deceive purchasers. In
contrast, the holistic test entails a consideration of the
entirety of the marks as applied to the products,
including the labels and packaging, in determining
confusing similarity. However, the petitioner also fails
this category since they fail to demonstrate confusing
similarity between said trademarks.
Yes, the international decision is enforceable here in the
Philippines. The enforcement of foreign judgment in the
Philippines is valid because foreign judgments fall under
GAPOIL (Generally Accepted Principles of International
Law). GAPOIL, by virtue of incorporation, are part of the
law of the land, even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. The preclusion of an action for
enforcement of a foreign judgment in this country
merely due to incorrect filing fees is counter to GAPOIL.
Thus, relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments
in the Philippines, it emerges that there is a general
right recognized within our body of laws, and affirmed
by the Constitution, to seek recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments, as well as a right to
defend against such enforcement on the grounds of
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
50!
 class plaintiffs to pay Four Hundred Seventy Two Million
Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in filing fees would negate and
render inutile the liberal construction ordained by the Rules of
Court, as required by Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, particularly the inexpensive disposition of every
action.

Judge Ranada ruling held that the subject matter of the

complaint was indeed capable of pecuniary estimation, as it
involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the
payment of definite sums of money, allowing for easy
determination of the value of the foreign judgment.

Issue: Whether the U.S. Judgement is enforceable here in

the Philippines?
29 Pharmaceutic On October 28, 1986, President Corazon Aquino, by virtue of
al v. DOH the legislative powers granted to the president under the
(2007) Freedom Constitution, issued Executive Order No. 51 (Milk
Code). One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code
states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes
(ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly
(WHA) in 1981. From 1982-2006, the WHA adopted several
Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be
supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be
ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for
breastmilk substitutes. The Philippines ratified the
International Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990.
Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties
should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child
mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially
parents and children, are informed of the advantages of
breastfeeding.
The international instruments that do have specific
provisions regarding breastmilk substitutes are the
ICMBS and various WHA resolutions. Only the
ICMBS became part of the law of the land because
of TRANSFORMATION by local legislation in the
Milk Code E.O. 51. On the other hand, it is
propounded that WHA resolutions may constitute
"soft law" or non-binding norms, principles and
practices that influence state behavior. Treaties
become part of the law of the land through
transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of
the Constitution. Thus, treaties or conventional
international law must go through a process prescribed
by the Constitution for it to be transformed into
municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.
The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as
they have not been concurred in by at least two-thirds of
all members of the Senate as required under Section

51!
 On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed
Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 or the Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Executive Order
No. 51 (RIRR), which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. On
June 28, 2006, petitioner, representing its members that are
manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes, filed the present
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.
Issue: Whether the international instruments (ICBMS and
WHA resolutions) adverted to by respondents are part of the
law of the land.
21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. However, the
ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had
been TRANSFORMED into domestic law through local
legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk
Code that has the force and effect of law in this
jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se.
On the other hand, WHA, being “soft law”, include
recommendations which are generally not binding,
but they "carry moral and political weight, as they
constitute the judgment on a health issue of the
collective membership of the highest international body
in the field of health."

Thus, unlike what has been done with the ICMBS

whereby the legislature enacted most of the provisions
into law which is the Milk Code, the subsequent WHA
Resolutions, specifically providing for exclusive
breastfeeding from 0-6 months, continued breastfeeding
up to 24 months, and absolutely prohibiting
advertisements and promotions of breastmilk
substitutes, have not been adopted as a domestic law.

Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the officials are superior to military officials only when a law makes them
military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the so.
people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the
State and the Integrity of the National Territory. Armed Forces – to secure the sovereignty of State and preserve the
integrity of the National Territory; may be called upon to protect the
Note: The principle of civilian supremacy is institutionalized by the people when ordinary law and order forces need assistance.
provision which makes the President, a civilian and precisely as
civilian, commander-in-chief of the armed forces. But this does
not mean that civilian officials are superior to military officials. Civilian

52!
 Section 3. Civilian Supremacy
30 IBP v. Zamora Because of the growing number of criminal incidents We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not
(2000) around Metro Manila, then President Estrada gave a constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
verbal directive to the PNP and Marines to conduct a calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible
joint visibility patrols to prevent and suppress crimes. use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The
The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility
the AFP, the Chief of Staff of the PNP and the Secretary patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited
of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of
execute and implement the said order. A Letter of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and
Instruction 02/2000 (“LOI”) which detailed the manner bounds of the Marines’ authority. It is noteworthy that the
of the “TASK FORCE TULUNGAN” was released by local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility
PNP. patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP.
The IBP questioned the necessity of calling for the
Marines and filed petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of
declare the deployment of the Marines, unconstitutional the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. Under the
on the ground that: (a) There was no emergency LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the
situation obtains in Metro Manila as would justify such soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility
deployment (violates Art 2, Sec. 3 of the constitution), to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. Chief
(b) Deployment constitutes an insidious incursion by the of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged involvement in civilian law
military in a civilian function of government (violates Art. enforcement, has been virtually appointed to a civilian post
16, Sec. 5) (c) Deployment creates a dangerous in derogation of the aforecited provision. The real authority
tendency to rely on the military to perform civilian in these operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with the
functions of the government. Unwittingly making the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the
military more powerful than hat it should be under the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or
constitution enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no
Prescinding from its argument that no emergency appointment to civilian position to speak of. Additionally,
situation exists to justify the calling of the Marines, the the Philippine experience reveals that it is not averse to
IBP asserts that by the deployment of the Marines, the requesting the assistance of the military in the
civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in implementation and execution of certain traditionally “civil”
violation of Section 3, Article II. functions (e.g. elections, Red Cross, disaster response,
etc.)
Issue: Whether the deployment of the Marines does not
violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe
the civilian character of the police force.

53!
31 Kulayan v. Three members of the International Committee of the
Tan (2012) Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped by three armed men
who were confirmed as members of the Abu Sayaf
Group (ASG). Due to the said kidnapping of Andres
Notter, Eugenio Vagni and Marie Jean Lacaba, who
were all members of the ICRC, the Sulu Crisis
Management, headed by Governor Abdusakur Mahail
Tan, subsequently created the Civilian Emergency
Forces. Embodied in the “Memorandum of
Understanding” are the intents and purposes of the said
creation which was for the main purpose of the
prevailing situation in Sulu as well as the willingness of
the civilian supporters to offer their services to “rescue
the hostages”.
Ronaldo Puno, then Secretary of the Department of
Interior and Local Government, confirmed that the
government troops have already cornered the said
military group but was forced to pull back due to the
threat of the ASG of beheading one of its hostages. This
instance triggered Gov. Tan to issue Proclamation No.
1, Series of 2009 declaring a state of emergency in the
province, due to the terrorist act of kidnapping of the
ASG and the need of the ‘carrying out’ of emergency
measures. The Proclamation included the setting up of
checkpoints and chokepoints, general searches and
seizures and other public safety measures.
Due to the implementation of the said Proclamation,
several alleged ASG supporters were held under the
custody of the local government; hence this petition filed
by respondents Jamar Kulayan, Temogen Tulawie,
Hadji Mohammand Yusop Ismi, Ahajan Awadi and
SPO1 Sattal H. Jadjuli.
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners primarily due
to the constitutional grant to the President who is the
ONLY authority to exercise emergency powers. The
Court said, citing Villena v. Secretary of Interior, that there is
only one executive and commander-in-chief that the
executive powers shall be vested upon. The Court
considered the President as the nation’s supreme military
leader. Indeed, while the President is still a civilian, Article II,
Sec. 3 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is,
at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian
president the nation’s supreme military leader.
Considering the claims of the respondents, the Court
answered the issues in reference to the provisions of the
Local Government Code. The Provincial Governor,
according to the Court, does not have the same powers of
the President, resulting to an excess of his authority as a
Governor. Also, the Court contended that Article 465 of the
Local Government Code (emergency powers of LGC) could
not be applied since the kidnapping incident is NOT in the
ambit of the definition of ‘calamities and disasters’
which was provided in the above-mentioned provision.
Moreover, the intent behind the powers granted under 465
of LGC is fiscal, economical, and administrative in nature.
To clarify, a local chief executive, or at the case at bar the
Governor, may, however, exercise his supervision only over
the local police. This authority, however, shall be limited to
those undertakings operational in nature.
54!
 Issue: Whether there was a grave abuse of discretion
resulting to excess in jurisdiction on the part of the
Governor in enacting the Proclamation to declare a state
of emergency in his territory.

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect
the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the
State and, in the fulfilment thereof, all citizens may be required,
under conditions provided by law, to render personal military or civil
service.
1987 version v. 1935/1973 counterpart:
1935/1973 counterparts: spoke of “defense” of the State ! prime
duty of the government hence it easily lent itself to interpretations
which justified a national security state offensive to the people.
1987: places emphasis on service to and protection to and
protection of the people.
2. Protecting their rights even when there is a need to defend
the State.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of
life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare
are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.
Note: This section has a similar emphasis with that of Section 4,
which is on the primacy of serving the interest of the people and
protecting their rights.

Note: The phrase “under conditions provided by law” emphasizes

the primacy of:
1. Serving the interest of the people and;

Section 5. Maintenance of Peace and Order

32 Kilosbayan v. This case is a result of the court’s prior decision of (1) No. These are not, however, self-executing
Morato MR invalidating a prior Contract of Lease for certain equipment provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a
(1995) between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) cause of action in the courts. They do not embody
and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC) on judicially enforceable constitutional rights but
the ground that it had been made in violation of the charter of guidelines for legislation.
the PCSO, the parties signed into a new agreement that
would be consistent of the charter and would be conformable Thus, while constitutional policies are invoked, this
to the court’s decision. case involves basically questions of contract law.
More specifically, the question is whether petitioners

55!
The case started when on January 25, 1995, the parties
signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) concerning
rental equivalents and computations, the term of the lease
being eight (8) years allowing with the employment of
personnel, and in any cases of loss, damages, or costs for
maintenance and repair. Upon the expiration of the lease, the
PCSO has the option to purchase the equipment for a sum of
P25 million. On February 21, 1995, this case was filed
seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is
substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in
the first case. The PCSO and PGMC then filed separate
comments in questioning the petitioners’ standing to bring
this suit and maintained that:
The ELA is a different lease contract with none of the
vestiges of a joint venture. The ELA did not have to be
submitted to a public bidding because it fell within the
exception provided in EO No. 301. The power to determine
whether the ELA is advantageous to the government is
vested in the Board of Directors of the PCSO. Petitioners
invoke the following Principles and State Policies set forth in
Art. II of the Constitution:
The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general
welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of
the blessings of democracy. (§5).
The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development
of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. (§12)
The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-
have a legal right which has been violated.
(2) E.O. No. 301, §1 applies only to contracts for the
purchase of supplies, materials and equipment. It
does not refer to contracts of lease of equipment like
the ELA. The provisions on lease are found in §§ 6
and 7 but they refer to the lease of privately-owned
buildings or spaces for government use or of
government-owned buildings or spaces for private
use, and these provisions do not require public
bidding. It is thus difficult to see how E.O. No. 301 can
be applied to the ELA when the only feature of the
ELA that may be thought of as close to a contract of
purchase and sale is the option to buy given to the
PCSO. An option to buy is not of course a contract of
purchase and sale.
Indeed the question is not whether compared with the
former joint venture agreement the present lease
contract is “[more] advantageous to the government.”
The question is whether under the circumstances, the
ELA is the most advantageous contract that could be
obtained compared with similar lease agreements
which the PCSO could have made with other parties.
Petitioners have not shown that more favorable terms
could have been obtained by the PCSO or that at any
rate the ELA, which the PCSO concluded with the
PGMC, is disadvantageous to the government.
56!
 building and shall promote their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the
youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs. (§13)
The State shall give priority to education, science and
technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and
nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total
human liberation and development. (§17).

Issues: (1) Whether the petitioner could invoke the said

Articles in the Constitution.
(2) Whether the ELA did not have to undergo public bidding
33 Kulayan v. Tan (Same facts as above, Case # 32) No. It has already been established that there is one
(2012) repository of executive powers, and that is the
Petitioners claim that the Provincial Governor is not President of the Republic. This means that when
authorized by any law to create civilian armed forces under Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of
his command, nor regulate and limit the issuances of executive power, it is granted to the President and no
PTCFORs to his own private army. one else. Corollarily, it is only the President, as
Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency
Issue: Whether a governor can exercise the calling-out powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of
powers of a President the Constitution, as well as what became known as
the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII
thereof.

Additionally, Section 24 of Article XVIII of the

Constitution prohibits private armies and other armed
groups. Section 21 of Article XI states that, “The
preservation of peace and order within the regions
shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies
which shall be organized, maintained, supervised,
and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The
defense and security of the regions shall be the
responsibility of the National Government.”

57!
 Taken in conjunction with each other, it becomes
clear that the Constitution does not authorize the
organization of private armed groups similar to the
CEF (Civilian Emergency Force) convened by the
respondent Governor. Governor Tan is not endowed
with the power to call upon the armed forces at his
own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation,
Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he
declared a state of emergency and called upon the
Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian
Emergency Force.

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

*This provision is discussed under the non-establishment clause of
the Bill of Rights (Article III, Section 5)

Section 6. Separation of Church and State

34 United Church Petitioner United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. No. The Court stated that: “Basic is the rule that a
of Christ in the (UCCP) is a religious corporation duly organized and existing party cannot be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of a
Philippines, Inc. under the laws of the Philippines. It is the ecclesiastical court to secure affirmative relief and later on renounce
v. Bradford successor of the Evangelical Church of the Philippines, the or repudiate the same after it fails to obtain such
United Church Philippine Methodist Church and the United Evangelical relief. After voluntarily submitting a cause and
of Christ, Inc. Church of the Philippines. encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is
(2012) too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or
Respondent Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. (BUCCI), power of the court. The Court frowns upon the
formerly known as Bradford Memorial Church (Named from undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for
the donor: Matilda Bradford), is likewise a religious decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
corporation with a personality separate and distinct from favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when
UCCP. It was organized at the turn of the 20th century but it adverse.”
was incorporated only on 14 December 1979. For so long a
time, the evangelical churches have been dreaming of uniting In short, it was as if UCCP is forum shopping until it
under the same banner church until they were given the gains the approval of the court, changing its theory
opportunity, thus the birth of UCCP. On a later canonical from time to time in its appeal and petition.

58!
synod, Bradford joined the UCCP becoming one of its
constituent church.
Through the years the UCCP underwent major changes. On
December 14, 1979, Bradford United Church of Christ,
Inc. (BUCCI) was incorporated as a personality separate
and distinct from UCCP (though by ecclesiastical relations,
it is still under UCCP) registered under Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).
UCCP has three (3) governing bodies namely: the General
Assembly, the Conference and the Local Church, each
having distinct and separate duties and powers. As a UCCP
local church located in Cebu, BUCCI belonged to the
Cebu Conference Inc. (CCI) with whom it enjoyed
peaceful co-existence until late 1989 when BUCCI started
construction of a fence that encroached upon the right-
of way allocated by UCCP for CCI and Visayas
jurisdiction.
UCCP General Assembly attempted to settle the dispute. On
7 April 1990, the Cebu Conference Judicial Commission of
UCCP rendered a decision in favor of BUCCI. This
unfavorable decision triggered a series of events which
further increased the enmity between the parties and led to
the formal break-up of BUCCI from UCCP.
Thereafter, UCCP filed a complaint against Bradford the
former seeking the latter’s discontinuance of the name UCCP
attached to its name as Bradford United Church of Christ
Incorporated (BUCCI). This move is to disassociate Bradford
and to enjoin them not to use the “United Church of Christ”
signature it adopted when it joined UCCP.
“An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns
doctrine, creed or form of worship of the church,
or the adoption and enforcement within a
religious association of needful laws and
regulations for the government of the
membership, and the power of excluding from
such associations those deemed unworthy of
membership. Based on this definition, an
ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship
between the church and its members and relate to
matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and
governance of the congregation. To be concrete,
examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affairs to
which the State cannot meddle are proceedings
for excommunication, ordinations of religious
ministers, administration of sacraments and other
activities attached with religious significance.”
Even with their religious nature, SEC may exercise
jurisdiction over them in matters that are legal and
corporate. UCCp and BUCCI, being corporate entities
and grantees of primary franchise, are subject to the
jurisdiction of SEC which shall have absolute
jurisdiction, supervision and control over all
corporations. BUCCI as juridical entity is distinct from
UCCP and has freedom to take action.
If in the case at bar, even with its highest executive
official’s pronouncement that BUCCI is still
recognized as its member-church, UCCP could not
compel BUCCI to go back to its fold, then the alleged
absolute ecclesiastical authority must not be there to
begin with.
59!
 UCCP later on filed an Amended Complaint/Protest
abandoning the original Complaint/Protest. The Amended In the case at bar, the issue being not a purely
Complaint/Protest added BUCCI as one of the respondents; ecclesiastical affair, UCCP and BUCCI, are corporate
alleged that the separate incorporation and registration of entities and grantees of primary franchises subject to
BUCCI is not allowed under the UCCP Constitution and By- the jurisdiction of SEC. DENIED.
laws; and sought to enjoin BUCCI and the respondents from
using the name BUCCI, both in its Amended Articles of
Incorporation and its dealings with the public, and from using
its properties. In short, they now wanted to enjoin BUCCI
to retain its name.

SEC favored BUCCI and defended the right of BUCCI to

disassociate itself from UCCP in recognition of its
constitutional freedom to associate and disassociate. SEC
also pointed out that since UCCP had used the fact of
BUCCI’s disaffiliation to consolidate its claim over the
property subject of the unlawful detainer case against BUCCI
before the RTC, UCCP cannot now deny the validity of said
disaffiliation.

UCCP filed an appeal in which it argued that SEC had no

jurisdiction over them since it their affair with BUCCI is purely
ecclesiastical.

Issue: Whether BUCCI’s disaffiliation is a purely

ecclesiastical affair

II. STATE POLICIES (Sections 7-27): guidelines for the

orientation of the State.

60!
Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In Principles to guide the government in the conduct of the nation’s
its relations with other states, the paramount consideration shall be foreign relations:
national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the 1. Maintain an independent foreign policy
right to self-determination. 2. Give paramount consideration to national sovereignty,
territorial integrity, national interest and self-determination
Note: Generally, the provisions protecting rights in Article II are not
self-executing provisions ! in need of implementing acts of
Congress. Thus:
When some provisions of the Health Sector Reform Agenda
were challenged on the ground that they violated Sections 15, 18 of
Article II (among other non-executing provisions of the 1987
Constitution), the Court clarified that these provisions are not self-
executing. (Tondo Medical Center Employees v. CA)

Section 7. Independent Foreign Policy

35 Lim v. Executive (See above, Case # 25) No, both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all other
Secretary (2002) treaties and international agreements to which the Philippines is a party, must be read
Issue: Whether there is a in the context of the 1987 Constitution. In particular, the Mutual Defense Treaty was
question of Constitutionality concluded way before the present Charter, though it nevertheless remains in effect as a
in the Balikatan 02-1 valid source of international obligation. The present Constitution contains key provisions
useful in determining the extent to which foreign military troops are allowed in Philippine
territory. Thus, in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is provided that:

SEC. 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other
states the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity,
national interest, and the right to self- determination.

The Constitution also regulates the foreign relations powers of the Chief Executive
when it provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Even more
pointedly, the Transitory Provisions state:

Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military

61!
 bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty
duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose,
and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

The aforequoted provisions betray a marked antipathy towards foreign military

presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general. Hence, foreign troops are
allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of direct exception. On the query
on the possible conflict that arises then between the fundamental law and our
obligations arising from international agreements. The Court is of the opinion that
the Philippines is bound by the principle of pacta sunt servanda however when such
treaty violates the fundamental law of the land, it was stated in Gonzales v. Hechanova
that the Constitution authorizes the nullification of the treaty.

Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest,
adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its
territory.
Note: This policy of freedom from nuclear weapons includes the
prohibition not only of possession, control and manufacture of
nuclear weapons but also nuclear arms tests; exception: if
national interest demands or peaceful uses of nuclear energy
Note: Implication of this policy for the presence of American
troops/any American military base that might be established in the
Philippines: any new agreement ! must embody basic policy of
freedom from nuclear weapons. *It is well within government
power to demand ocular inspection + removal of nuclear arms.

Section 8. Freedom from Nuclear Weapons

36 Bayan v. (See above). No, since as stated in the WHEAREAS clauses of the VFA:
Zamora
(2000) Issue: Whether the VFA violates the WHEREAS, by virtue of Article II of the VFA, the United States commits to
prohibition against nuclear weapons respect the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, including the Constitution,
under Article II, Section 8 which declares in Article II, Section 8 thereof, a policy of freedom from nuclear
weapons consistent with the national interest;

62!
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order
that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and
free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate
social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living,
and an improved quality of life for all.
Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of
national development.
Underlying premises of Sections 9 and 10: poverty and gross
inequality are major problems ! these assault the dignity of the
human person.
SOCIAL JUSTICE: the equalization of economic, political, and social
opportunities with special emphasis on the duty of the State to tilt the
balance of social forces by favouring the disadvantaged in life;
justice for the common tao (1935 Convention); “those who have
less in life should have more in law.” (1973 Convention)
Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution discusses how the promotion of
social justice is to be carried out in all phases of national
development.
Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.
Note: See Bill of Rights and human rights provisions on Article
XIII.
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of the family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty
of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the
government.

Special impact of the social justice provision: instrumental in the

socialization of the State’s attitude to property rights ! gradually
eradicating the vestiges of laissez faire in Philippine society. (Check
People v. Pomar)

Section 12. Family Life; Mother; Unborn

37 Roe v. Petitioner Roe, a pregnant single woman, brought a class The word ‘person’, as used in the Fourteenth
Wade action suit challenging the constitutionality of the Texas Amendment, does not include the “unborn.” The right of
(1973) abortion laws. These laws made it a crime to obtain or a woman to choose to have an abortion fell within this
attempt an abortion except on medical advice to save the fundamental right to privacy, and was protected by the
life of the mother. Constitution. A woman’s right to choose to have an
abortion was NOT considered an absolute right.
Her issue is that being unmarried and pregnant, she wished to Government restrictions on a woman’s right to choose
terminate her pregnancy by an abortion "performed by a were subject to the highest standard of review, that of
competent, licensed physician, under safe, clinical conditions"; strict scrutiny. This level of review requires that in order

63!
that she was unable to get a "legal" abortion in Texas because
her life did not appear to be threatened by the continuation of
her pregnancy; and that she could not afford to travel to
another jurisdiction in order to secure a legal abortion under
safe conditions. Roe purported to sue "on behalf of herself and
all other women" similarly situated.
Other plaintiffs in the lawsuit included Hallford, a doctor who
faced criminal prosecution for violating the state abortion laws.
His issue was for many cases he, as a physician, he was
unable to determine whether the women who came to him for
abortion fell within or outside the exception recognized by the
Texas Statute.
Another plaintiff are the Does, a married couple with no
children, their issue was that Mrs. Doe was suffering from a
"neuralchemical" disorder; that her physician had "advised her
to avoid pregnancy until such time as her condition has
materially improved" (although a pregnancy at the present time
would not present "a serious risk" to her life); that, pursuant to
medical advice, she had discontinued use of birth control pills;
and that if she should become pregnant, she would want to
terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a
competent, licensed physician under safe, clinical conditions.
She is suing on behalf of themselves and all couples similarly
situated
The defendant (respondent) in this case was county District
Attorney Wade. A three-judge District Court panel tried the
cases together and held that Roe and Hallford are the only
ones that have standing to sue since there was no actual
controversy on the part of the Does. Roe and Hallford won their
lawsuits at trial. The district court held that the Texas abortion
statutes were void as vague and for overbroadly infringing the
to be enforceable, a government regulation of this right
must be shown to be narrowly tailored to a meet a
compelling state interest. States did have some
legitimate interests in regulating or prohibiting abortions.
The first interest was the protection of the health of the
mother from the dangers of abortion procedures; the
second was the protection of the life of the fetus. While
these interests were not very strong in the early stages of
pregnancy, they became stronger (more compelling) in
the later stages of the pregnancy. Striking a balance
between a women’s right to privacy and a state’s
interests, the Court set up a framework laying out when
states could regulate and even prohibit abortions.
A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas
type, that excepts from criminality only a lifesaving
procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to
pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other
interests involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment which protects against
state action the right to privacy, including a
Woman’s qualified right to terminate her pregnancy.
Though the State cannot override that right, it has
legitimate interests in protecting both the pregnant
woman's health and the potentiality of human life,
each of which interests grows and reaches a
"compelling" point at various stages of the woman's
approach to term.
The following are the rules stated by the court:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the
first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation
must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant
64!
 Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the plaintiffs.
The Does appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United
States and Wade cross-appealed the district court’s judgment
in favor of Roe and Hallford.
Issue: Whether the Texas statutes improperly invade a right
(said to be possessed by the pregnant woman) to choose to
terminate her pregnancy in the concept of personal "liberty"
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause; or in personal, marital, familial, and sexual privacy said
to be protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, or among
those rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment.
38 Imbong v. RH Law – Reproductive Health and Responsible Parenthood
Ochoa (RA 10354) which took effect on March 15, 2014 aims to
(2014) provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized,
access and information to the full range of modern family
planning methods.
Petitioners assail (among other things) that the right to life of
the unborn is violated by the RH law. They claim that the RH
law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, and injectable, which are abortive. These
are violating Section 12 of Article II of the Constitution that
guarantees the protection of both life of the mother and the
unborn.
Issue: Whether the life of the unborn was violated.
woman's attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the
end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its
interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses,
regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are
reasonably related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in
promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life
may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion
except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother.
No, the petitioners believe that contraceptives that
prevent the fertilization of the ovum as abortifacient. Then
it is believe that the sanctioning of fertilization before and
after implantation are contrary to the intention of the
framers of the Constitution as it is against the protection
of the LIFE of the OVUM (considered has life). The
contraceptives opposes the initiation of life which is
considered by the plaintiffs as a fundamental human
good. The state sanction act also violates natural law and
is affront of human dignity. The use of FDA (Food and
Drug Administration) to clarify the use of abortifacient is
not advisable since the FDA will not be the one to
supervise the distribution then it cannot make a truthful
certification. The Respondents claim that the Congress,
in passing the law, considered it as non-abortifacient and
had help from studies and consultations from the World
Health Organization. Additionally, WHO shows that life
begins at implantation of the fertilized ovum.
The decision of the Court is that no person should be
deprived of his life, liberty, and property in Article III Sec.
65!
1 of the Constitution. Contraceptive and family planning
in the Philippines is not a new legislation since there was
already RA. No.4729 (An Act To Regulate The Sale,
Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs)
that led to other family planning method.

When Life Begins – The Court must seek assistance to

scientific and medical issues on this matter and cannot
be ascertained at this stage. The ponente however
believes that life begins at fertilization. The Constitution in
Section 12 clarifies that the State protects the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and literal
ordinary meaning. Conception then means in all
reputable sources is the life that begins at fertilization. It
is the fecundation (could be read as union) of the female
ovum by the spermatozoon resulting in human life
capable of surviving and maturation under normal
conditions.

The Court is clear that there is no need for civil

personality for the courts to even recognize the life of the
unborn as seen in the case of Steel Manufacturing
Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan
S. Montaño and also in the Gonzales v. Carhart the court
reiterated that the State respect human life at all
stages of pregnancy. The legal framers also said that
conception is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm
making it alive and human. Thus the use of devices that
deter the fertilized egg from reaching the uterus is under
the provision an abortifacient such as intrauterine
devices. Science also supports that life begins when the
spermatozoon fertilizes the ovum creating the zygote or
the beginning of the human being (supported by the

66!

39 Meyer v. Act. Neb Laws 1919, c. 249 prohibits the teaching of any
Nebraska subject in any language other than the English language in any
(1922) school, or the teaching of languages other than the English
language below the eighth grade. Robert T. Meyer, an
instructor in Zion Parochial School, was tried and convicted in
the district court for Hamilton county, Nebraska, under an
information which charged that on May 25, 1920, he unlawfully
taught the subject of reading in the German language to
Raymond Parpart, a child of 10 years, who had not attained
and successfully passed the eighth grade.
Petitioners contend that Act. Neb Laws 1919 is arbitrary and
without reasonable relation to any end within the competency
of the state, and as depriving teachers and parents of liberty
without due process of law, in violation of USCA Const. Amen
14. USCA Const. Amen 14 provides that , that no state shall
deprive any person of liberty without due process of law,
Philippine Medical Association also).
Abortion in RH? – The RH law is replete with provisions
that protect the fertilized ovum and allow it safe travel for
implantation. It also recognizes abortion as crime in
Sec.4 and acknowledges that the RPC punishes the
destruction or expulsion of a fertilized ovum as a crime. It
also prohibits the use of any drug or device that prevent
the reaching of the ovum to the womb in the definition of
abortifacient. Though the court believes that the framers
of the RH Law abused their power when they defined
abortion as…devices that primarily destroy a fertilized
ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in
the mother’s womb. Thus the word must be struck down
for being ultra vires. This is so because an abortifacient is
considered as such if its function’s sole known purpose is
such.
No. The statute, was intended not only to require that the
education of all children be conducted in the English
language, but that, until they had grown into that
language and until it had become a part of them, they
should not in the schools be taught any other language.
The obvious purpose of this statute was that the English
language should be and become the mother tongue of all
children reared in this state.
Petitioners suggest that there was an unwarranted
restriction of freedom. However the court disagrees. The
hours which a child is able to devote to study in the
confinement of school are limited. Thus the effect of the
law is limited only to the time that a child spends in
school. The law did not completely stifle the mental
growth of the child. Additionally, the law also affects few
citizens, except those of foreign lineage. The most
67!
 “liberty” denotes, not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but
also the right of the individual to contract to engage in any
of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home,and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men.
Issue: Whether Act. Neb Laws 1919, c. 249 deprives liberty
without due process to teachers/parents in doing their duty for
the enrichment (teaching in/of other languages) of the children.
40 Pierce v. In order to promote a common American culture and compel
Society of general attendance at public schools by normal children,
Sisters between 8 and 16 years old, who have not completed the
(1925) eighth grade, The state of Oregon, through its governor, Walter
M. Pierce, adopt the Compulsory Education Act 1922. The Act
requires every parent, guardian, or other person having control
or charge or custody of a child between 8 and 16 years to
send him ‘to a public school for the period of time a public
damage it could do is to delay the learning of modern
language by imposing first the native language.
The GENERAL RULE is that freedom may not be
abridged by the Legislature if the rule or law they impose
is arbitrary or does not have some kind of relationship to
the purpose of their intended interest. Such GENERAL
RULE will apply even if the legislature insist if it’s for
public interest. In this case, the right of control is the
natural duty of the parent to give his children. This duty
includes the parent’s right to find education for their
children that is suitable to their station in life. Such duty
applies to every parent in the State of Nebraska.
Mere knowledge of the German language cannot
reasonably be regarded as harmful. The law helps the
State by promoting civic duty to the children. This also
helps foreign born citizens considering that their
population is very large. Thus as a consequence then
these children in such certain communities commonly
use foreign words, follow foreign leaders, move in a
foreign atmosphere, and that the children are thereby
hindered from becoming citizens of the most useful type
and the public safety is in peril. Thus it is within the power
of the State to impose such laws in order to create a
common Commonwealth of people that are united.
Yes. Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, we think it
entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children. As stated in the
case, the rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not
be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable
relation to some purpose within the competency of the
State. The act imposed by the State standardize its
68!
 school shall be held during the current year’ in the district children by forcing them to accept instruction from public
where the child resides; and failure so to do is declared a teachers only.
misdemeanor with the exceptions of those children who are not
normal, or who have completed the eighth grade, or whose The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it
parents or private teachers reside at considerable distances interferes with protected liberty interests and has no
from any public school, or who hold special permits from the reasonable relationship to any purpose within the
county superintendent. competency of the state. The Appellees have standing
because the result of enforcing the Act would be
Before the implementation of the Compulsory Education Act, destruction of the appellees’ schools. The state has the
Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians
Mary, a corporation which conducts interdependent primary have the right and duty to choose the appropriate
and high schools and junior colleges, and maintains preparation for their children.
orphanages for the custody and control of children between 8
and 16 years, and Hill Military Academy, also a corporation
engaged in owning, operating, and conducting for profit on
elementary, college preparatory, and military training school for
boys between the ages of 5 and 21 years, filed suit to enjoin
the enforcement of Compulsory Education Act. The former
(Society of Sisters) filed since they believe that the Act
deprives the parents their right to send their children to
parochial or religiously operated schools. The latter (Hill
Academy) filed due to loss of income as parents were afraid to
enroll their children in the private school as it would run
contrary to the law.

Issue: Does the Act interfere with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control?
41 Wisconsin Respondents, members of the Old Order Amish religion and Yes. The State's interest in universal education is not
v. Yoder the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were convicted of totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on
(1972) violating Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law (which other fundamental rights, such as the traditional interest
requires a child's school attendance until age 16) by declining of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their
to send their children to public or private school after they had children.
graduated from the eighth grade. The evidence showed that

69!
 the Amish provide continuing informal vocational education to
their children designed to prepare them for life in the rural
Amish community.
The evidence also showed that respondents sincerely
believed that high school attendance was contrary to the
Amish religion and way of life, and that they would
endanger their own salvation and that of their children by
complying with the law. These men appealed for exemption
from compulsory education under the basis of these religious
convictions. They sincerely held to the belief that the values
their children would learn at home would surpass the worldly
knowledge taught in school.
Issue: Whether the compulsory school attendance law violated
the Amish community’s rights under the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment?
42 Ginsberg v. Under New York Law (§484-h), it is illegal to willfully sell to a
New York minor under 17, (a) any picture which depicts nudity and
(1968) harmful to minors and (b) any magazine which contains such
pictures and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors.
Appellant (Sam Ginsberg) and his wife operate "Sam's
Stationery and Luncheonette" in Bellmore, Long Island. They
have a lunch counter, and, among other things, also sell
magazines including some so-called "girlie" magazines.
Appellant was prosecuted under two informants, each in two
counts, which charged that he personally sold a 16-year-old
boy two "girlie" magazines on two dates, in violation of 484-h of
the New York Penal Law.
Issue: Whether prohibiting the selling of obscene materials to
minors by the state is an unconstitutional deprivation of their
liberty
The Amish have presented that if the State would impose
such compulsory education the consequences are: (1)
destruction and harm of the Amish community; (2)
destroy the Amish way of succeeding their HS aged to
the productive members of their community; (3) destroy
their way of life.
Faced with such argument, it was incumbent on the State
to show with more particularity how its admittedly strong
interest in compulsory education would be adversely
affected by granting an exemption to the Amish. The
State's claim that it is empowered, as parens patriae, to
extend the benefit of secondary education to children,
regardless of the wishes of their parents cannot be
sustained against a free exercise claim of this nature.
No, while the supervision of children's reading may best
be left to their parents, the knowledge that parental
control or guidance cannot always be provided and
society's transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of
children justify reasonable regulation of the sale of
material to them. The Statute making it illegal to sell
obscene material harmful to minors, under 17 years of
age, did not invade the area of freedom of expression
constitutionally secured to minors because it is
constitutionally permissible for the state to accord minors
a more restricted right, than that assured to adults, to
judge and determine for themselves what sex material
they might read or see. The State has an independent
interest in protecting the welfare of children and
safeguarding them from abuses. (Note: parens patriae)
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43 Orceo v. Under Section 1 of Resolution No. 8714 it prohibits an
COMELEC unauthorized person from bearing, carrying or transporting
(2010) firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including all
public buildings, streets, parks, and private vehicles or public
conveyances, even if licensed to possess or carry the same,
during the election period.
Under Section 2 (b) of Resolution No. 8714, the term firearm
includes airgun, airsoft guns, and their replica/imitation in
whatever form that can cause an ordinary person to believe
that they are real. Hence, airsoft guns and their
replicas/imitations are included in the gun ban during the
election period. Petitioner claims that he is a real party-in-
interest, because he has been playing airsoft since the
year 2000. The continuing implementation of Resolution
No. 8714 will put him in danger of sustaining direct injury
or make him liable for an election offense.
Issue: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
including airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations in the term
firearm in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 8714.
No, the COMELEC was mandated to provide the details
of who may bear, carry or transport firearms or other
deadly weapons, as well as the definition of firearms,
among others. These details are left to the discretion of
the COMELEC, which is a constitutional body that
possesses special knowledge and expertise on election
matters, with the objective of ensuring the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
COMELEC’s intent in the inclusion of airsoft guns in the
term firearm and their resultant coverage by the election
gun ban is to avoid the possible use of recreational guns
in sowing fear, intimidation or terror during the election
period. An ordinary citizen may not be able to distinguish
between a real gun and an airsoft gun. It is fear
subverting the will of a voter.
Additionally, Petitioner asserts that playing airsoft
provides bonding moments among family members.
Families are entitled to protection by the society and the
State under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and are free to choose and enjoy recreational activities.
These liberties, petitioner contends, cannot be abridged
by the COMELEC.
However, the Court believes that even constitutional
freedoms are not absolute, and they may be abridged
to some extent to serve appropriate and important
interests.
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Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-
building, and shall promote and protect their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the
youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in
public and civic affairs.
“Family” (under Section 12): a stable heterosexual relationship
Declaration of family autonomy: the family is anterior to the State
and not a creature of the State ! protects the family from
instrumentalization by the State.
Legal meaning and purpose of the protection guaranteed for the
unborn:
1. Not an assertion that the unborn is a legal person
2. Not an assertion that the life of the unborn is placed exactly
at the level of the life of the mother.
Note: When necessary to save the life of the mother, the life of the
unborn may be sacrificed, but not when the purpose is merely to
save the mother from emotional suffering, for which other
remedies must be sought, or to spare the life of poverty, which
can be attended to by welfare institutions.
Note: Protection is made to begin from the time of conception to
prevent the State from adopting the doctrine in Roe v. Wade (a
US SC decision which liberalized abortion laws up to the sixth month
of pregnancy by allowing abortion any time during the first six
months of pregnancy provided that it can be done without danger to
the mother)
Respect for life under this provision ! harmonizes with abolition of
death penalty and ban on nuclear arms.
Note: In the matter of education, the primary and natural right
belongs to the parents, with the secondary and supportive role of
the State.
Note: The State cannot prohibit the teaching of foreign languages to
children before they reach a certain age because such restriction
does violence in both the letter and spirit of the Constitution. (Meyer
v. Nebraska)
Likewise, the State cannot require children to attend only public
schools before they reach a certain age since the child is not the
mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right coupled with the high duty to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations. (Pierce v. Society of Sisters)
The State also cannot require children to continue schooling beyond
a certain age (given that it is against the honest and sincere claim of
parents that such schooling would be harmful to their religious
upbringing) because only those interests of the state “of the highest
order and not those otherwise served can overbalance” the
primary interest of parents in the religious upbringing of their
children. (Wisconsin v. Yoder)
Parens patriae: a concept which allows the State to intervene in the
relation of parent and child ! authority and duty of the State to step
in where parents fail to or are unable to cope with their duties to
their children.
72!
 Section 13. Vital Role of Youth
44 Boy Scouts of (See above, Yes. It is undisputed that the BSP performs functions that are impressed with public interest. In fact,
the Philippines Case # 11). during the consideration of RA No. 7278, which amended the BSP Charter, one of the bill’s sponsors,
v. Commission Senator Joey Lina, commented that: The Boy Scouts of the Philippines has a long history of providing
on Audit Issue: value formation to our young… [they] inculcate moral uprightness among the young people, and further
(2011) Whether the considering that the development of these young people at that tender age of seven to sixteen is vital in
Boy Scouts of the development of the country producing good citizens.
the
Philippines is The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it was created in order to
a government implement a State policy declared in Art. II, §13 of the Constitution, which reads: The State recognizes
corporation. the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

Furthermore, this Court cannot agree with the dissenting opinion which equates the changes introduced
by RA No. 7278 to the BSP Charter as clear manifestation of the intent of Congress to return the BSP to
the private sector. It was not the intent of Congress in enacting RA No. 7278 to give up all interests in
this basic youth organization, which has been its partner in forming responsible citizens for decades.

Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation- General idea: ignore sex where sex is not a relevant factor in
building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of determining rights and duties.
women and men.

Note: This provision does not automatically dislocate the Civil Code
and the civil law jurisprudence on the subject. What it does is to give
impetus to the removal, through statutes, of existing inequalities.

Section 14. Role of Women and Equality of Men and Women

45 Garcia v. Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of In the Senate delibiration of the R.A. 9262 the issue of
Drilon (2013) Bacolod a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, equality was already discussed. The Senate believes if we
Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they
Violence Against Women and Their Children (VAWC), can at all be abused by the women or their spouses, then it
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing would not equalize the already difficult situation for

73!
Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” Petitioner
(Jesus Garcia) and respondent (Rosalie Jaye-Garcia) were
married in 2002 when she was 34 years old and Jesus was
11 years her senior. They have three children. During their
marriage, respondent claims that petitioner forbid her to pray
and isolated her from her friends. Petitioner also took up an
affair with a bank manager of Robinson’s Bank, Bacolod
City, and admitted about it to respondent in 2004. It
spawned a series of fights that left private respondent
physically and emotionally wounded. He also hit Jo-Anne
(oldest of the child) on the chest and slapped her many
times. Respondent attempted suicide and was found by her
son. Petitioner did not bring her to the hospital.
Petitioner warned the private respondent that if she goes on
a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo.
Petitioner controls the family business involving mostly
construction of deep wells. After private respondent
confronted him about the affair, petitioner forbade her to
hold office, depriving her of access to full information about
their business.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with
prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the
constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process
and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified
TPO for being an unwanted product of an invalid law.
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but
however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of
constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the
petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by
the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
Jesus C, Garcia now assails the constitutionality of the
said law as being violative of the equal protection.
women... Whether we like it or not, no matter how
empowered the women are, we are not given equal
opportunities especially in the domestic environment where
the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is
stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.
Given with such deliberation the court dare not venture
into the real motivations and wisdom of the members
of Congress in limiting the protection against violence
and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children
only. Congress has made its choice and it is not our
prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may
be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy
against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the
legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it
is the legislative that determines the necessity,
adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law. We only
step in when there is a violation of the Constitution.
However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.
Plus the court believes that the guaranty of equal
protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in
the application of the laws upon all citizens of the
state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to
avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality,
that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. The Constitution does not require
that things which are different in fact be treated in law
as though they were the same.
The court also notes that base from various research from
United Nations and Philippine Commission on Women,
there is historical evidence of a “gender-based violence”
where societal norms and traditions dictate people to think
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 Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent
and criminalize spousal and child abuse, which could very
well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender
alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of
the remedies under the law.
Issue: Whether the court of appeals committed serious error
in failing to conclude that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory, unjust,
and violative of the equal protection clause.
men are to take dominant roles while women are only
subordinates.
Additionally, women are the usual victims of violence.
During the deliberation of the bill, the authors presented
that DSWD found that female violence comprised more
than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than
90% of these reported cases were committed by the
women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-
in partners.

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of
the people and instill health consciousness.

Section 15. Right to Health

46 Imbong v. RH Law – Reproductive Health and Responsible The Court said that the provision is self-executory as seen
Ochoa (2014) Parenthood (RA 10354) which took effect on March 15, in Article II §15, Article XIII 11, 12, 13, and Article XVI §9.
2014 aims to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the In fact the Court citing the Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
marginalized, access and information to the full range of claim that the constitution is always assumed as self-
modern family planning methods. executing since if not, the Congress may just not legislate
executing departments of laws that may violate the
Petitioners assail (among other things) that the right to fundamental laws of human.
health and the right to protection against hazardous
products by providing universal access to contraceptives It should be noted what the petitioners are assailing is the
that are hazardous for one’s health. The petitioners cite improper proliferation and use of contraceptives and not
studies that the use of contraceptives, intrauterine devices, contraceptives per se. However the court believes that the
and injectable will increase the risk of the user to breast and existence of RA 4729 (Act to Regulate the Sale,
cervical cancer. Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs
and Devices) and 5921 (Regulating the Practice of
Oral contraceptives on the other hand are cited for the Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical
threefold risk of venous thromboembolism (blood clot), Education in the Philippines) will also ensure that there will
schematic stroke (blood clot in brain), and myocardial be no unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives whether
infarction (heart attack). The respondents argue that the harmful or not. Thus procurement of DOH of contraceptives

75!
 Sec.15 Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory and will be in compliance of 4729. The attack also is premature
a statement of the administration’s principle and policy. seeing that the Food and Drug Administration has not yet
Even if it is self-executory, medical authorities refute the given contraceptives.
dangers said posed.

Issue: Whether the right to health was violated.

Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the On this same basis, the SC upheld the empowerment of the Laguna
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm Lake Development Authority to protect inhabitants of Laguna Lake
and harmony of nature. Area from the deleterious effects of pollutants from garbage
dumping and discharge of wastes in the area. (LLDA v. CA)
Note: This provision recognizes an enforceable right. Hence, appeal
to it has been recognized as conferring “standing” on minors
challenge logging policies of the government. (Oposa v. Factoran)

Section 16. Right to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology

47 Oposa v. The principal petitioners are all minors duly represented and Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
Factoran joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no
(1993) additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of
(PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a
organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
concerted action geared for the protection of our succeeding generations can only be based on the concept
environment and natural resources. The original defendant of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to
was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). Every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of
The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
the country's virgin tropical forests." This instant petition was generations to come. Thus the minors are given their locus
filed to seek for the cancelation of all existing timber license standi.

76!
 agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.
Minor petitioners contend that continued granting of timber
license constitutes a misappropriation or impairment of the
natural resource property and violates their constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology (Art. II, Sec. 16,
1987 Constitution). Petitioners likewise rely on the
respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No.
192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful
environment.
48 LLDA v. CA This case stems from the clash between the City Gov’t. of
(1994) Caloocan and the Laguna Lake Development Authority
(“LLDA”). The LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency,
Looking at the merits of the case. The complaint focuses
on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in
our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated
in the fundamental law (Article II, §16).
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be
found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is
less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less
than self-preservation and self-perpetuation.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. EO 192 (conservation, management,
development and proper use of the country's environment
and natural resources) and Admin Code of 1987 (necessity
of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
the environment) define the powers and functions of
DENR, under whose authority and office the complaint
falls.
The petitioners’ right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
as clear as DENR’s duty to protect and advance the said
right. The petitioners’ personality to sue in behalf of their
own as well as the future generations’ behalf can only be
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the said right is concerned.
Yes, they have authority. The cease and desist order
issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of
Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open
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is specifically mandated under RA No. 4850 and its
amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the
declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area
and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the
cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan
with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation of the quality of
human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of
undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.
After investigation of a complaint made by the Task Force
Camarin Dumpsite, the LLDA issued a cease and desist
order to the City Government of Caloocan to stop the
operation of the 8.6 hectare open garbage site in Tala
Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City. Operation
resumed after sometime, which prompted yet another cease
and desist order. Eventually the LLDA with the assistance of
the PNP prohibited entry of garbage trucks into the
dumpsite.
This led to the City Government of Caloocan to file an action
to nullify the Cease and Desist order with a prayer for an
issuance of a writ of injunction.
The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its
power, as a local government unit, pursuant to the general
welfare provision of the Local Government Code, to
determine the effects of the operation of the dumpsite on the
ecological balance and to see that such balance is
maintained.
dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been done in violation
of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant
environment laws, cannot be stamped as an unauthorized
exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers.
By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended
by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order
requiring the discontinuance or pollution.” Section 4, par.
(d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order
may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
The LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue
and ex-parte cease and desist order" in a language, as
suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, However,
it would be a mistake to draw the conclusion that there is a
denial of the power to issue the order in question when the
power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly
bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927,
series of 1983.

The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of

Caloocan on the theory that Section 7 of Presidential
Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control

78!
 law, authorizing the defunct National Pollution Control
Commission to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order
was not incorporated in Presidential Decree No. 813 nor in
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. The Court of
Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act
No. 4850, as amended, the LLDA is instead required "to
institute the necessary legal proceeding against any person
who shall commence to implement or continue
implementation of any project, plan or program within the
Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the
Authority."

Issue: Whether the LLDA has the authority to issue a “cease

and desist” order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this
case, enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
49 LLDA v. CA The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was
(1995) created through RA No. 4850 in order to execute the policy
towards environmental protection and sustainable
development so as to accelerate the development and
balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces and towns.
PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since
water quality studies have shown that the lake will
deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same.
EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and
powers of the LLDA and enumerated the towns, cities and
provinces encompassed by the term “Laguna de Bay
Region”.
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code
of 1991), the municipalities assumed exclusive jurisdiction &
authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal
The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to
erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or
bangus fry area within a definite zone of the municipal
waters. The provisions of RA7160 do not necessarily
repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter
water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake
region. The Local Government Code of 1991 does not
contain any express provision which categorically expressly
repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded
that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to
repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. RA
7160 is a general law. It is basic statutory construction
that the enactment of a later legislation which is a
general law cannot be construed to have repealed a
special law.
The special law is to then to be taken as an exception to

79!
waters since Sec. 149 thereof provides: “Municipal
corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery
privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or
charges therefore…”
Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to
establish fishpens & fish cages to the consternation of the
LLDA.
the general law in the absence of special circumstances
forcing a contrary conclusion. Implied repeals are not
favored and, as much as possible, effect must be given to
all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be
repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law
by mere implication.

The implementation of separate independent policies in fish

cages & fish pen operation and the indiscriminate grant of
fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have
saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the
current environmental problems and ecological stress of
Laguna Lake.

The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1)
fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture structures unregistered
with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2)
those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the
Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal
Fishing; and (3) owners of those declared illegal shall be
criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as
amended by PD 813.

A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of

the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-
culture structures advising them to dismantle their
respective structures otherwise demolition shall be effected.

Issue: Which agency of the government – the LLDA or the

towns and municipalities comprising the region – should
exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its environs
insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is
concerned?

80!
50 Boracay Petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. (petitioner) is a
Foundation, corporation whose primary purpose is to develop the
Inc. vs. The Boracay Island and preserve its beauty. It counts among its
Province of members at least sixty (60) owners and representatives of
Aklan (2012) resorts, hotels, restaurants, and similar institutions; at least
five community organizations; and several environmentally-
conscious residents and advocates.
Respondents on the other hand are the Province of Aklan
(respondent Province), Philippine Reclamation Authority
(respondent PRA) (formerly called the Public Estates
Authority [PEA] that is a government entity created to
reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas),
and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Environmental Management Bureau (DENR-EMB), Regional
Office VI (respondent DENR-EMB RVI), (authorized to issue
environmental compliance certificates regarding projects
that require the environments protection and management in
the region.)
Respondent Province originally built the Caticlan Jetty Port
and Passenger Terminal at Barangay Caticlan to be the
main gateway to Boracay. It also built the corresponding
Cagban Jetty Port and Passenger Terminal to be the
receiving end for tourists in Boracay. Respondent Province
operates both ports to provide structural facilities suited for
locals, tourists and guests and to provide safety and security
measures. However when the Local Government Units and
the private sector met at the Boracay 2010 Summit last
2005, they noted how the current infrastructure and gov’t
supports are lacking.
On November 20, 2008, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
respondent Province approved Resolution No. 2008-369,
Yes. The Local Government Code establishes the duties of
national government agencies in the maintenance of
ecological balance, and requires them to secure prior
public consultation and approval of local government units
for the projects described therein.
In the case before us, the national agency involved is
respondent PRA. Even if the project proponent is the local
government of Aklan, it is respondent PRA which
authorized the reclamation, being the exclusive agency of
the government to undertake reclamation nationwide.
Hence, it was necessary for respondent Province to go
through respondent PRA and to execute a MOA, wherein
respondent PRAs authority to reclaim was delegated to
respondent Province. Respondent DENR-EMB RVI,
regional office of the DENR, is also a national government
institution which is tasked with the issuance of the ECC that
is a prerequisite to projects covered by environmental laws
such as the one at bar.
This project can be classified as a national project that
affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities, and is covered by the requirements found in
the Local Government Code provisions: (1) Section 26.
Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance
of Ecological Balance and (2) Section 27. Prior
Consultations Required.
Based on the above, therefore, prior consultations and
prior approval are required by law to have been conducted
and secured by the respondent Province. Accordingly, the
information dissemination conducted months after the ECC
had already been issued was insufficient to comply with
this requirement under the Local Government Code. Had
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formally authorizing Governor Marquez to enter into
negotiations towards the possibility of effecting self-
liquidating and income-producing development and
livelihood projects to be financed through bonds,
debentures, securities, collaterals, notes or other obligations
as provided under Section 299 of the Local Government
Code.
The said negotiation will encourage investors to fund the (1)
renovation/rehabilitation of the Caticlan/Cagban Passenger
Terminal Buildings and Jetty Ports; and (2) attempt to
reclaim a 2.64 hectares of land along the foreshores of
Barangay Caticlan, Municipality of Malay, Province of Aklan
in order to use for commercial purposes. In accordance with
DENR-EMB RVI Gov. Marquez submitted an
Environmental Performance Report and Monitoring
Program (EPRMP) so that he could secure an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC).
On 2009, the Province deliberated on the possible
expansion of the original 2.64 hectares land to 40 hectares.
This was due to a Geohazard Assessment study that
revealed that the shoreline is eroding and that it is
vulnerable to sea level rising due to climate change. Thus it
will create social, economic, and environmental problems if
not amended. On November 19, 2009, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan approved the 40 hectares expansion.
Petitioners and the Municipality of Malay, Caticlan, and
Boracay however were not aware of the changes. They said
that only last June 17, 2010 (when the Province of Aklan
made an information dissemination drive) that they were
made aware of the changes esp. the expansion of the
project to 40 hectares. By the time they were informed, the
they been conducted properly, the prior public consultation
should have considered the ecological or environmental
concerns of the stakeholders and studied measures
alternative to the project, to avoid or minimize adverse
environmental impact or damage. In fact, respondent
Province once tried to obtain the favorable endorsement of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Malay, but this was denied by
the latter.
The lack of prior public consultation and approval is not
corrected by the subsequent endorsement of the
reclamation project by the Sangguniang Barangay of
Caticlan on February 13, 2012, and the Sangguniang
Bayan of the Municipality of Malay on February 28, 2012,
which were both undoubtedly achieved at the urging and
insistence of respondent Province. As we have established
above, the respective resolutions issued by the LGUs
concerned did not render this petition moot and academic.
The parties are evidently in accord in seeking to uphold the
mandate found in Article II, Declaration of Principles and
State Policies, of the 1987 Constitution, which we quote
below:
SECTION 16. The State shall protect and advance the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
SECTION 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role
of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and
provides incentives to needed investments.
The protection of the environment in accordance with the
aforesaid constitutional mandate is the aim, among others,
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 developments are being undergone already. The
Municipality of Malay then denied the endorsement of the
project and requested PRA to not grant the right to reclaim
the lands in their municipality. Additionally, the Municipality
of Malay cited as their argument to PRA that they had
apprehensions towards the project since they believe it has
detrimental environmental effects.
of Presidential Decree No. 1586, Establishing an
Environmental Impact Statement System, Including Other
Environmental Management Related Measures and For
Other Purposes, which declared in its first Section that it is
the policy of the State to attain and maintain a rational
and orderly balance between socio-economic growth
and environmental protection.

Issue: Whether there should be prior consultation and
approval of the LGU concerned.
Thus the primordial role of local government units under
the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 in
the subject matter of this case is also unquestionable. The
Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160).
This is without a doubt why there should be prior
consultation and prior approval of the LGU concerned.

Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and
technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and
nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total liberation
and development.
Note: This does not mean that the government is not free to balance
the demands of education against other competing and urgent
demands.
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic
force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
“Labor as a primary social economic force” ! HUMAN FACTOR
has primacy over non-human factors in production.
Rights of labor discussed under Article XIII.

Section 18. Labor Protection

51 Philippine Dan Padao started working as a clerk for PNB at its Dipolog Yes. In the 1987 Constitution, provisions on social justice
National Bank City on August 21, 1981. After years of employment in the and the protection of labor underscore the importance and
v. Dan Padao said company, he was appointed regular Credit Investigator economic significance of labor. Article II, Section 18
(2011) III, and was ultimately promoted to the position of Loan and characterizes labor as a primary social economic force, and
Credit Officer IV. Sometime in 1994, PNB became as such, the State is bound to protect the rights of workers
embroiled in a scandal involving “behest” loans. A man by and promote their welfare. Moreover, workers are entitled
the name of Sih Wat Kat complained to the Commission on to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a
Audit that its officers were granting anomalous loans. living wage.

83!
Questionable loans were reportedly being extended to
select bank clients. COA and PNB’s Internal Audit
Department conducted separate investigations. The
questionable loans were eventually cased PNB to suffer
millions in loses.
On June 14, 1998, Dan Padao was administratively charged
with dishonesty, grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty,
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and
violation of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
On January 10, 1997, after due investigation, PNB found
Padao guilty of gross habitual neglect of duty and ordered
dismissed from the bank.
Padao instituted a complaint against PNB with the Labor
Arbitration Branch of NLRC for Reinstatement, Backwages,
Illegal Dismissal, and Palpable Discrimination in treatment of
Employees with Administrative cases. However, the
Executive Labor Arbiter (ELA) found Padao’s dismissal
valid. Padao again appealed to the NLRC, which reversed
and set aside the ELA decision. NLRC declared Padao’s
dismissal illegal. PNB was ordered to pay him full
backwages and attorney’s fees. PNB.
Issue: Whether Dan Padao’s termination of employment in
PNB is valid.
The Labor Code (this is the law re: Article 18) declares
as policy that the State shall afford protection to labor,
promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations
between workers and employers. The State shall assure
the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane
conditions of work.
Thus, in cases of regular employment, the employer is
prohibited from terminating the services of an employee
except for a just or authorized cause. In this case, Padao
was dismissed by PNB for gross and habitual neglect of
duties under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code. Gross
negligence connotes want of care in the performance of
ones duties, while habitual neglect implies repeated failure
to perform ones duties for a period of time, depending on
the circumstances.
In the case at bench, Padao was accused of having
presented a fraudulently positive evaluation of the
business, credit standing/rating and financial capability of
Reynaldo and Luzvilla Baluma and eleven other loan
applicants. Some businesses were eventually found not to
exist at all, while in other transactions, the financial status
of the borrowers simply could not support the grant of loans
in the approved amounts. Moreover, Padao over-appraised
the collateral of spouses Gardito and Alma Ajero, and that
of spouses Ihaba and Rolly Pango. He not only failed to
perform what he was employed to do, but also did so
repetitively and habitually, causing millions of pesos in
damage to PNB.
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Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent favour of self-reliance and independence and in favour of
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. Filipinos.

Note: This provision is a guide for interpreting provisions on the

national economy and patrimony. Any doubt must be resolved in

Section 19. Self-Reliant and Independent National Economy

52 Garcia v. BOI Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Yes. The Court, therefore, holds and finds that the BOI
(1990) Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and applied with committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving the
Board of Investments (BOI) for registration as a new transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to
domestic producer of petrochemicals. Its application Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from
specified Bataan as the plant site. One of the terms and naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason
conditions for registration of the project was the use of that the final say is in the investor all other circumstances
"naphtha cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel for its to the contrary notwithstanding.
petrochemical plant. The petrochemical plant was to be a
joint venture with Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC). No cogent advantage to the government has been shown
by this transfer. This is a repudiation of the independent
However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong, chairman of USI policy of the government expressed in numerous laws
Far East Corporation, the major investor in BPC, personally and the Constitution to run its own affairs the way it
delivered to Trade Secretary Jose Concepcion a letter dated deems best for the national interest.
January 25, 1989 advising him of BPC's desire to amend the
original registration certification of its project by changing the
job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. The reason
adduced for the transfer was the insurgency and unstable
labor situation, and the presence in Batangas of a huge
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) depot owned by the
Philippine Shell Corporation. They also requested a shift of
feedstock for that plant from naphtha to only naphtha/LPG.

Congressman Enrique T. Garcia (Petitioner) vigorously

opposed the proposal since there would be a better
distribution of industries around the Metro Manila area if it
remains in Bataan. Eventually the BOI/DTI approved the

85!
 proposal.
Upon petition, the respondent claims that they have the
foreign investor's claim of right of final choice of plant site
and that P.D. Nos. 949 and 1803 mandate that Limay site
should be the only petrochemical zone in the country, nor
prohibit the establishment of a petrochemical plant
elsewhere in the country. Issue: Whether the BOI/DTI
committed a grave abuse of discretion in allowing in the
transfer of the plant site.
53 Tañada v. (See above, Case # 21).
Angara (1997)
Issue: Whether the Constitution promotes an isolationist
policy?
No. The Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and
services in the development of the Philippine economy.
While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited
entry of foreign goods, services, and investments into the
country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows
an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity,
frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
Additionally, law encourages for businesses to be
competitive domestic and foreign markets.
In fact, WTO is more lenient to developing States Ex.
Tariffs should be reduced to 36% for 6 years for developed
states but for developing states only 24% is asked and its
deadline is 10 years.

Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the

private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural
incentives to needed investments. development and agrarian reform.

Section 20. Role of the Private Sector Comprehensive rural development: agrarian reform + broad
54 Boracay Foundation, (See above, Case (See above, Case spectrum of social, economic, human, cultural, political and even
Inc. v. The Province # 50) # 50) industrial development.
of Aklan (2012) Agrarian reform discussed under Article XIII.

86!
 Section 21. Promotion of Comprehensive Rural and Agrarian Policy
55 Wilson P. Gamboa In 1969, General Telephone and Electronics Corporation Yes. Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and
v. Finance (GTE), an American company and a major PLDT Patrimony) of the 1987 Constitution mandates the
Secretary stockholder, sold 26 percent of the outstanding Filipinization of public utilities: The provision is [an
Margarito Teves, common shares of PLDT to Philippine express] recognition of the sensitive and vital position of
et al. (2011) Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC). public utilities both in the national economy and for
In 1977, Prime Holdings, Inc. (PHI) was incorporated by national security. The evident purpose of the citizenship
several persons. PHI became the owner of shares of requirement is to prevent aliens from assuming control
stock of PTIC by virtue of three Deeds of Assignment of public utilities, which may be inimical to the national
executed by PTIC stockholders. (GTE sold its stocks of interest.
PLDT to PTIC whose stock in turn is majorly owned by
PHI) Any citizen or juridical entity desiring to operate a public
utility must therefore meet the minimum nationality
In 1986, the 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC held by PHI requirement prescribed in Section 11, Article XII of the
were sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Constitution. Hence, for a corporation to be granted
Good Government (PCGG). The PTIC shares, which authority to operate a public utility, at least 60
represent about 46.125 percent of the outstanding percent of its “capital” must be owned by Filipino
capital stock of PTIC, were later declared by this citizens.
Court to be owned by the Republic of the Philippines.
(PHI’s shares of PTIC went to Philippines) Naturally, one of the undisputable right of EVERY
shareholder is a right to vote. However, in the
In 1999, First Pacific, a Bermuda-registered, Hong Kong- absence of provisions in the articles of incorporation
based investment firm, acquired the remaining 54 denying voting rights to preferred shares, preferred
percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC. shares have the same voting rights as common shares.
(MAKING THEM FOREIGN-OWNED) (Majority of PTIC However, preferred shareholders are often excluded
went to Pacific) from any control that is, deprived of the right to
vote in the election of directors and on other
Originally, First Pacific tried to bid for PTIC but failed to matters, on the theory that the preferred
do so by deadline set by IPC. It then yielded its right to shareholders are merely investors in the
PTIC which was then given by IPC until 2 March 2007 to corporation for income in the same manner as
buy the PTIC shares. Through its subsidiary, Metro bondholders. In fact, under the Corporation Code only
Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), Pacific entered into preferred or redeemable shares can be deprived of the
a sale of PTIC which was completed on 28 February right to vote.
2007.

87!

Since PTIC is a stockholder of PLDT, the sale by the
Philippine Government of 46.125 percent of PTIC
shares is actually an indirect sale of 12 million
shares or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding
common shares of PLDT. With the sale, First
Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT increased
from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing
the common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to
about 81.47 percent. This violates Section 11, Article XII
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits foreign
ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than
40 percent.
Respondent (Only look at the last paragraph for
relevant facts since this is a reiteration of above) on
the other hand claims that PTIC was an investment
holder from the beginning. PLDT common shares, or
13.847 percent of the total PLDT outstanding common
shares. PHI became the owner of 111,415 PTIC shares
or 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of
PTIC. PTIC shares held by PHI were sequestered by the
PCGG, and subsequently declared by this Court as part
of the ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand
Marcos. The sequestered PTIC shares were reconveyed
to the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with this
Court’s decision.
Philippine Gov't decided to sell the PTIC shares, which
represent 6.4 percent of the outstanding common shares
of stock of PLDT, and designated the Inter-Agency
Privatization Council (IPC), composed of the Department
of Finance and the PCGG. Upon sale, First Pacific’s
intended acquisition of the government’s 111,415 PTIC
Considering that common shares have voting rights
which translate to control, as opposed to preferred
shares which usually have no voting rights, the term
“capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to common shares.
However, if the preferred shares also have the right
to vote in the election of directors, then the term
“capital” shall include such preferred shares
because the right to participate in the control or
management of the corporation is exercised through the
right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the
term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can
vote in the election of directors.
As revealed in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, “capital” refers to the voting stock or
controlling interest of a corporation. For stocks to be
deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or
Philippine nationals, mere legal title is not enough
to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial
ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate
voting rights is essential. Thus, stocks, the voting
rights of which have been assigned or transferred
to aliens cannot be considered held by Philippine
citizens or Philippine nationals. (They need to be
voters not just holders of stock).
In the present case holders of PLDT preferred shares
are explicitly denied of the right to vote in the election of
directors. PLDT’s Articles of Incorporation expressly
state that “the holders of Serial Preferred Stock shall
not be entitled to vote at any meeting of the
88!
 shares resulting in First Pacific’s 100% ownership of
PTIC will not violate the 40 percent constitutional limit on
foreign ownership of a public utility since PTIC holds only
13.847 percent of the total outstanding common shares
of PLDT.
On 28 February 2007, petitioner filed the instant petition
for prohibition, injunction, declaratory relief, and
declaration of nullity of sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares.
Petitioner claims, among others, that the sale of the
111,415 PTIC shares would result in an increase in First
Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT from 30.7
percent to 37 percent, and this, combined with Japanese
NTT DoCoMo’s common shareholdings in PLDT,
would result to a total foreign common
shareholdings in PLDT of 51.56 percent which is over
the 40 percent constitutional limit. Issue: Whether the
sale of common shares to foreigners in excess of 40
percent of the entire subscribed common capital stock
violates the constitutional limit on foreign ownership of a
public utility.
stockholders for the election of directors or for any
other purpose or otherwise participate in any action
taken by the corporation or its stockholders, or to
receive notice of any meeting of stockholders. On the
other hand, the holders of Common Capital Stock
shall have the exclusive right to vote for the
election of directors and for all other purposes.
Based on PLDT’s 2010 General Information Sheet
(GIS), which is a document required to be submitted
annually to the Securities and Exchange Commission,
foreigners hold 64.27% of the total number of
PLDT’s common shares, while Filipinos hold only
35.73%. Since holding a majority of the common
shares equates to control, it is clear that foreigners
exercise control over PLDT. Such amount of control
unmistakably exceeds the allowable 40 percent limit
on foreign ownership of public utilities expressly
mandated in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution.

Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of
indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national
unity and development.
Indigenous cultural communities are discussed under the National
Economy and Patrimony and under Local Governments.
Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental,
community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare
of the nation.
Note: This provision recognizes the principle that volunteerism and
participation of NGOs in national development should be
encouraged.
Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication
and information in nation-building.
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments.
See Article X.

89!
 Section 25. Local Autonomy
56 Rodolfo G. RA 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) was
Navarro, et established on October 2, 2006. After holding a plebiscite,
al. v. granting of approval of its mother province of Surigao del Norte,
Executive and establishing interim officials, on May 14, 2007, Province of
Sercretary Dinagat elected their new set of provincial officials. Petitioners
Eduardo Navarro et al. filed a motion to declare the creation of province
Ermita, et al of Dinagat as invalid.
(2011)
On February 10, 2010, the petitioners succeeded in having RA
9355 declared unconstitutional. The court reasoned that R.A.
9355 failed to comply with the requirements of land area since it
is only has 802.12 square kilometer big (requirement is 2,000
square kilometer) and population since it only has 106, 951
inhabitants (requirement of 250,000). The decision also declared
Article 9 (2) of the Local Government Code Implementing
Rules and Regulations (LGC-IRR) as null and void. The court
decided to declare also the LGC-IRR Article 9 (2) because it
states that “the land area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.” It
held that the said provision is beyond the ambit of Article 461 of
the LGC inasmuch as such exemption is not expressly stated in
the law.
Thus in Navarro v. Ermita the petitioners as politicians and other
interveners such as COMELEC aimed to resolve the matter as
their position will be very much affected considering that the
decision, if final on time of elections, will revert Dinagat back to a
district in Surigao del Norte and if not, then they will consider
Dinagat then as a separate province with an electable governor,
House of Representatives, etc. However if the decision is
reversed after elections, the elections will become null and void.
Issue: Whether LGC-IRR Article 9(2) is valid therefore R.A. 9355
in turn is constitutional?
Yes. Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR is valid and R.A. 9355
is then constitutional. The court reiterates that the
creation of local government units is propelled by three
factors (1) economic viability (2) efficient administration
(3) capability to deliver basic services to its constituents.
Though the primordial consideration is economic
viability as the court reveals that economic viability will
help produce other factors such as population growth.
Administration on the other hand is sometimes
negligible since some areas are big and that it cannot be
achieved all the time. The delivery of basic service is
supplemental only to the role of national government
thus same with administration in terms of its importance.
A close look at the requirements set by LGC compared
to LGC-IRR the barangays land area is not a requisite
while municipality, cities, and provinces are required.
The municipality and cities are exempted from the
rule if when the said local government unit is to be
created consists of one (1) or more islands as
provided in Section 442 and Section 450,
respectively. This exemption is absent in the
enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a
province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it
is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-
IRR.”
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this
exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but
not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical
configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is
a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands
would form part of the land area of a newly-created
90!
province than in most cities or municipalities. It is,
therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative
policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for
municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of
the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461
(for provinces).

Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in

Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended
to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of
the LGC – and to reflect the true legislative intent. It
would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the
validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.”

This interpretation finds merit when we consider the

basic policy considerations underpinning the
principle of local autonomy. Such liberal
interpretation of what should be a local unit are in
accordance to Section 25, Article II of the
Constitution which mandates that the State shall
ensure the autonomy of local governments;

Consistent with the declared policy to provide local

government units genuine and meaningful local
autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area
requirements for prospective local government units
should be liberally construed in order to achieve the
desired results. The strict interpretation adopted by the
February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counter-
productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and
impractical.

Picture an intended province that consists of several

municipalities and component cities which, in

91!
 themselves, also consist of islands. The component
cities and municipalities which consist of islands
are exempt from the minimum land area
requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442,
respectively, of the LGC. Yet, the province would be
made to comply with the minimum land area
criterion of 2,000 square kilometers, even if it
consists of several islands. This would mean that
Congress has opted to assign a distinctive
preference to create a province with contiguous
land area over one composed of islands since this
preferential option would prove more difficult and
burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer territory of a
province is scattered because the islands are separated
by bodies of water, as compared to one with a
contiguous land mass.”

What is more, the land area, while considered as an

indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not
conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a
province, taking into account its average annual income
of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified
by the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is
four times more than the minimum requirement of
P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The
delivery of basic services to its constituents has been
proven possible and sustainable

Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities This provision’s purpose is to give substance to the desire for the
for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined equality of political opportunities. The definition of “political
by law. dynasties” is however left to the legislature.

92!
Provision not self-executory ! merely gives a guideline for
legislative or executive action.

It is within the power of the state to limit the number of qualified

candidates only to those who can afford or wage a nationwide
campaign and/or are nominated by political parties (Pamatong v.
Comelec)

Section 26. Equal Access to Political Opportunities and Political Dynasties

57 Pamatong v. Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of No. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither
COMELEC Candidacy for President on December 17, 2003. Respondent bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the
(2004) Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due level of an enforceable right. The "equal access"
course to petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy in its Resolution provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the
No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and
State Policies." Like the rest of the policies
Additionally, along with petitioner, the COMELEC also declared enumerated in Article II, the provision does not
other thirty-five (35) as nuisance candidates who could not wage contain any judicially enforceable constitutional
a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative
party or are not supported by a registered political party with a or executive action.
national constituency.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the
Petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly State to enact positive measures that would
rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities accommodate as many people as possible into public
for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 office. That is why the words used are “ENSURE
Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only EQUAL ACCESS TO.” The court also believes that
to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or words and phrases such as "equal access,"
are nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to
that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional countless interpretations owing to their inherent
provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the
sovereign people to choose their leaders. framers to inflict on the people an operative but
amorphous foundation from which innately
Issue: Whether the refusal of the respondent COMELEC to unenforceable rights may be sourced.
accept petitioner Pamatong’s certificate of candidacy is against
his right to equal access to opportunities for public service? The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance

93!
 candidates and the disqualification of candidates who
have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is
easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to
ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective,
and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into
account the practical considerations in conducting
elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of
candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical
confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of
time and resources in preparation for the election.
Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook
example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our
democratic institutions.
58 Rodolfo G. (See above, Case # 56) (See above, Case # 56)
Navarro, et
al. v.
Executive
Sercretary
Eduardo
Ermita, et al
(2011)

Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in public
service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption.
See Article XI.

Section 27. Honesty and Integrity in Public Service

59 Dimapilis- Labrador was the former Chief of the POEA’s Employment No. Dimapilis-Baldoz tries to exculpate herself from the
Baldoz v. Services Regulation Division (ESRD). On May 2, 1997, then foregoing by arguing that she and her office were not
COA (2013) Labor Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Quisumbing) ordered officially notified of the orders, resolutions, and decisions
his dismissal from service as he was found to have bribed a of the SB or that of the Court, affirming Labrador’s
certain Madoline Villapando, an overseas Filipino worker, in the conviction of the crime of direct bribery, and even the

94!
amount of P6,200.00 in order to expedite the issuance of her
overseas employment certificate. Labrador’s dismissal was
affirmed on appeal by the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
dated March 12, 2003, and his subsequent motion for
reconsideration was denied through CSC Resolution No.
040547 dated May 17, 2004.
Thereafter, a criminal case for direct bribery was instituted
against Labrador in view of the same infraction. Consequently,
on August 31, 1999, the Sandiganbayan (SB) promulgated a
Decision, convicting him of the aforementioned crime.
On February 26, 2001, Labrador applied for probation in
accordance with Presidential Decree No. (PD) 968, as amended
by PD 1990 (Probation Law). Upon favorable recommendation
of the Parole and Probation Office, the SB granted Labrador’s
application for probation and likewise cancelled the bail bond he
posted for his provisional liberty.
Thereafter, at the end of Labrador’s probation period, a
Probation Officer’s Final Report dated November 4, 2003 was
issued, recommending that his probation be terminated and that
he be discharged from its legal effects. The SB, however,
withheld its approval and, instead, issued a Resolution (March 2,
2004 Resolution), stating that Labrador’s application for
probation was, in fact, erroneously granted due to his previous
appeal from his judgment of conviction, in violation of Section 4
of the Probation Law.
Further, owing to the probation officer’s finding that Labrador
continued to hold the position of POEA ESRD Chief despite him
having been sentenced to suffer the penalty of temporary
special disqualification from office, the SB directed that copies of
the March 2, 2004 Resolution be furnished to Dimapilis-Baldoz,
as POEA Administrator, as well as to the CSC Chairman for
their information.
notices on the subsequent actions and proceedings
undertaken by the SB. In fact, in her letter for
reconsideration addressed to the COA’s Legal and
Adjudication Office, Dimapilis-Baldoz alleged that
Labrador’s 201 file is bereft of any records regarding the
SB case. While admitting that Labrador did indeed
continue to report for work despite the SB’s August 31,
1999 Decision convicting him of direct bribery, these
antecedents show that she merely acted in good faith
and lawfully exercised her duties when she approved
the payment of Labrador’s salaries, wages, and other
personnel benefits for the period beginning August 31,
1999 to March 2, 2004. It is a standing rule that every
public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith
in the discharge of official duties, such that, in the
absence of any proof that a public officer has acted with
malice or bad faith, he should not be charged with
personal liability for damages that may result from the
performance of an official duty. Good faith is always
presumed and he who alleges the contrary bears the
burden to convincingly show that malice or bad faith
attended the public officer’s performance of his duties.
To elucidate, while the COA correctly affirmed the
disallowance of the salaries and benefits which
Labrador unduly received when he continued to hold
office despite his conviction, the liability for refund
cannot be imposed upon Dimapilis-Baldoz because she
had no knowledge or any reasonable indication that the
payment of salaries to Labrador was actually improper.
Two important incidents impel this conclusion: first,
Labrador’s 201 File with the POEA was without any
record of the SB case; and second, Dimapilis-Baldoz
was only apprised of his conviction when her office was
95!

On March 9, 2004, Dimapilis-Baldoz received a copy of the said
resolution and thereupon issued a Notice/Order of Separation
24 dated March 11, 2004 (Separation Order), relieving Labrador
of his duties. On February 7, 2005, COA State Auditor IV,
Crescencia L. Escurel, issued COA Audit Memo which
contained her audit observations on the various expenditures of
the POEA pertaining to the payment of salaries and benefits
to Labrador for the period covering August 31, 1999 to
March 15, 2004.
On this basis, the COA issued a Notice of Disallowance on
January 18, 2006, finding Dimapilis-Baldoz, among other POEA
employees, personally liable for the salaries and other benefits
unduly received by Labrador in the amount of P1,740,124.08,
paid through various checks issued from August 1999 to March
15, 2004.
On October 29, 2009, the COA issued Decision No. 2009-12130
(COA Decision) which affirmed the Notice of Disallowance and
reiterated that the amount covering the salaries and benefits of
Labrador should not have been paid to him from August 1999 to
March 31, 2004 pending final resolution of the criminal case
against him. The COA pointed out that Labrador should not
have reported for work while he was under probation since his
probation did not obliterate the crime for which he was
convicted, more so his penalty of dismissal from the service.
Issue: Whether Administrator Dimapilis-Baldoz shall be held
liable personally for the salaries and other benefits unduly
received by Labrador.
furnished a copy of the SB’s March 2, 2004 Resolution
which ordered the revocation of Labrador’s probation.
As to how the matter of Labrador’s administrative
penalty of dismissal from the service escaped notice –
not to mention, implementation – is not revealed in the
records before the Court; but it can be easily surmised
that the POEA’s incapability to deal with a twice-
dismissed employee was largely attributable to
bureaucratic incompetence.
It bears emphasizing that it is the policy of the State
to maintain honesty and integrity in the public
service and take positive and effective measures
against graft and corruption. It should, therefore, be
the responsibility of each government agency, such
as the POEA, to know matters pertaining to the
conduct of its own employees in the performance of
their duties and to readily take action against those
undeserving of the public’s trust. To be an effective
agent at exacting accountability from those under
its direct authority, government agencies would do
well to devise a coordinative system to ensure that
records of personnel actions concerning its
individual employees are properly updated and
secured on file, especially all administrative and
criminal cases decided against them.
96!
Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the Not self-executory, but this provision recognizes the duty of
State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.
its transactions involving public interest.

Section 28 complements the right of access to information (which

guarantees the right of the people to demand information) on matters
of public concern found in the Bill of Rights.

Section 28. Full Public Disclosure

60 Neri v. Senate On April 2007, Department of Transportation and No. The President’s claim of executive privilege is not
(2008) Communication ( DOTC) entered into a contract with merely based on a generalized interest; and in
Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the balancing respondent Committees’ and the President’s
supply of equipment and services for National Broadband clashing interests, the Court did not disregard the 1987
Network (NBN) project amounting to 329,481, 290 USD or Constitutional provisions on government transparency,
16 Billion Pesos. In response to the alleged anomalies accountability and disclosure of information. The Letter
in the project, various resolutions which invoke the dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita
power to conduct investigation in aid of legislation specified presidential communications privilege in
were introduced in the Senate. During the relation to diplomatic and economic relations with
investigation, Jose de Venecia III testified that the another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim.
NBN-ZTE broadband deal had been pushed by high
ranking executive officials and instead of Build- The NBN Project involves a foreign country as a party to
Operate-Transfer (BOT) that was converted to the agreement. It is a product of the meeting of minds
government-to-government project. between officials of the Philippines and China. Whatever
the President says about the agreement - particularly
Neri was summoned to appear and testify on Sept. 18, 20, while official negotiations are ongoing - are matters
26 and Oct. 25. Only Sept. 26 he testified before the which China will surely view with particular interest.
Committees for 11 hours. He revealed that Benjamin There is danger in such kind of exposure. It could
Abalos (COMELEC) bribed him 200 million pesos to push adversely affect our diplomatic as well as economic
the project. When Neri was asked about the project itself, relations with the People’s Republic of China.
he invoked “EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE” in which he refused
to answer the questions: 1.) whether or not Pres. Arroyo Considering that the information sought through the
followed up the project 2.) whether or not she directed him three (3) questions subject of this Petition involves the
to prioritize it 3.) whether or not she directed him to President’s dealings with a foreign nation, with more
approve. reason, this Court is wary of approving that Congress

97!

The respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad
Testifacandum requiring him to appear Nov. 20, 2007. On
Nov 20, Neri did not appear before the Committee, thus a
show cause letter to explain why Neri should not be cited
for contempt was issued. Antonio Bautista (counsel of
Neri) replied that he did not want to disrespect and
snob them, that he said everything during the 11 hour
interrogation that did not involve the topics which
exercise executive privilege. Stated in the letter also
was 1.) his non-appearance was upon the order of the
president 2.) his conversations with the pres. Dealt
with delicate, sensitive materials concerning national
security and diplomatic relations 3.) that questions be
furnished in advance so that he may adequately
prepare for the hearing.
The committees found the explanations unsatisfactory,
without responding to his request for advance notices on
matters that still need clarifying, they issued an order
citing him of contempt. On the same day the petitioner
moved for the reconsideration.
Issue: Whether there was a violation of right to information
under the Constitution?
61 Wilson P. Gamboa (See above, Case # 55)
vs. Finance
Secretary Margarito Issue: Whether the petitioner has standing.
Teves, et al. (2011)
may peremptorily inquire into not only official,
documented acts of the President but even her
confidential and informal discussions.
The court agrees with the constitutional right of the
people to publc information. In the case at bar, this
Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to
three (3) specific questions, did not in any way curb the
public’s right to information or diminish the importance of
public accountability and transparency. The pertinent
constitutional provisions are Article II, Sec. 28.
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,
the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest. Together with its twin provision in
Article III, Sec. 7 (right of people to public
information on matters of public concern). However
such rights are not absolute.
In Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, it enumerated the recognized restrictions
to such rights, among them are: (1) national security
matters, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions,
(3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential
information. National security matters include state
secrets regarding military and diplomatic matters,
as well as information on inter-government
exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and
executive agreements.
Yes. Petitioner is a stockholder of PLDT. As such, he
has the right to question the subject sale, which he
claims to violate the nationality requirement prescribed
in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. If the sale
indeed violates the Constitution, then there is a
98!

62 Briccio “Ricky” A. Petitioner Pollo, Chief of the “Mamamayan muna, hindi
Pollo v. mamaya na” division of the Civil Service Comission
Chairperson Karina Regional Office No. IV, was accused of lawyering for
Constantino-David, public officials with pending cases in the CSC. The case
et al. (2011) against him started when an anonymous letter was sent to
the respondent that led to the initiation to investigate the
petitioner. A raiding team then proceeded at once to the
CSC-Regional Office to back up all the files found in the
hard disk of computers at the Public Assistance and
Liason Division, including petitioner’s office computer.
During the raid, petitioner was on leave and was not
present in the office.
That is why co-respondents Director IV Lydia Castillo
(Director Castillo) and Director III Engelbert Unite (Director
Unite) of Chairperson David’s closely monitored the
situation and left the legal matters to them. The following
day, all files collected from the raid were turned over to
Chairperson David. It was found that most files numbering
about to 40 – 42 documents were draft pleadings or letters
in connection with the administrative cases in the CSC
and other tribunals. Chairperson David issued a Show
Cause order, requiring petitioner to submit his explanation
possibility that PLDTs franchise could be revoked, a dire
consequence directly affecting petitioner’s interest as a
stockholder.
The court believes that even if the petitioner is a citizen,
in previous cases such as Albano v. Reyes, the court
believes that matters of public interest would not be
stifled by lack of locus standi. Thus in this case, the
court ruled that when petitioner invoked the public
disclosure clause of the Constitution, the case became a
matter of transcendental public importance.
No. The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition
of all searches and seizures but only of
“unreasonable” searches and seizures. Citing Justice
Harlan, the existence of privacy right involved 2
requirements: one, that the person exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and two, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable (objective).
Applying American Jurisprudence (cited in O’Connor
and Simmons), SC addresses the questions: (1)
whether the petitioner exhibited reasonable expectation
of privacy in his office and computer files, and (2)
whether the search authorized by CSC Chair was
reasonable in its inception and scope. In O’Connor v.
Ortega the court ruled that because Dr. Ortega did not
share his desk or file cabinets with any other
employees, kept personal correspondence and other
private items in his own office while those work-related
files (on physicians in residency training) were stored
outside his office, and there being no evidence that the
hospital had established any reasonable regulation or
policy discouraging employees from storing personal
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 or counter-affidavit.
Petitioner denied said allegations praying that he is not the
person referred to in the anonymous letter. He accused
them of conducting a "fishing" expedition. He asserted that
he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done
while he was on leave. Petitioner pointed out that
although his computer was technically government
property, the temporary use and ownership of the
computer issued under a Memorandum of Receipt is
ceded to the employee who may exercise all attributes of
ownership, including its use for personal purposes. In
view of the illegal search, the files/documents copied from
his computer without his consent are thus inadmissible as
evidence, being “fruits of a poisonous tree.”
CSC found prima facie case against the petitioner and
charged him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and violation
of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct of Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees.). On July 24, 2007, the
CSC issued a Resolution finding petitioner GUILTY of
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service and Violation of Republic Act
6713. He is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE
SERVICE with all its accessory penalties.
Issue: Whether the petitioner’s privacy rights were
violated?
63 Philippine Savings Petitioners Philippine Savings Bank (PSBank) and
Bank v. Senate Pascual M. Garcia III, as President of PSBank, filed a
Impeachment Court Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to nullity and
(2012- February 9 set aside the Resolution of respondent Senate of the
version) Republic of the Philippines, sitting as an Impeachment
papers and effects in their desks or file cabinets
(although the absence of such a policy does not create
any expectation of privacy where it would not otherwise
exist), then Dr. Ortega has a reasonable expectation of
privacy at least in his desk and file cabinets.
In this case, petitioner has no actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy. He did not allege that he had a
separate enclosed office which he did not share with
anyone, or that his office was always locked and not
open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he
allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to
prevent other employees from accessing his computer
files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the
public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally
would have visitors in his office like friends, associates
and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to
use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request.
The office of CSC also prevents any subjective
expectation of privacy since CSC in this case had
implemented a policy that put its employees on notice
that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they
create, store, send or receive on the office computers,
and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer
resources using both automated or human means.
No. The court held that a clear right to maintain the
confidentiality of the foreign currency deposits of the
Chief Justice is provided under Section 8 of Republic
Act No. 6426, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency
Deposit Act of the Philippines (RA 6426). The applicable
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 Court, which granted the prosecution's requests for
subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum to PSBank
and/or its representatives requiring them to testify and
produce before the Impeachment Court documents
relative to the foreign currency accounts that were alleged
to belong to then Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona.
Issue: Whether the TRO shall be issued to prevent the
senate impeachment court from implementing the
subpoena against the authorized representatives of PS
Bank to testify and produce documents relative to the
foreign currency deposits allegedly owned by Chief
Justice Renato Corona.
64 In Re: Production The Supreme Court (SC) received various letters
of Court Records requesting for permissions to examine rollos of the
and Documents different cases. Further, requests for production of
and the Attendance documents per the subpoena ad testificandum et duces
of Court officials tecum (writ to testify in court and writ to provide
and employees as documents requested). The SC then examines whether
witnesses under the said requests shall be granted.
the subpoenas of
law establishes the absolute confidentiality of foreign
currency deposits.
Under Section 8 (Secrecy of foreign currency deposits).
All foreign currency deposits authorized under this Act,
as amended by PD No. 1035, as well as foreign
currency deposits authorized under PD No. 1034, are
hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely
confidential nature and, except upon the written
permission of the depositor, in no instance shall foreign
currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into
by any person, government official, bureau or office
whether judicial or administrative or legislative, or any
other entity whether public or private.
Thus under R.A. No. 6426 there is only a single
exception to the secrecy of foreign currency
deposits, that is, disclosure is allowed only upon
the written permission of the depositor.
Neither the prosecution nor the Impeachment Court
has presented any such written waiver by the
alleged depositor, CJ Corona. Also, while
impeachment may be an exception to the secrecy of
bank deposits under RA 1405, it is not an exemption
to the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency
deposits under RA 6426.
The court believes that not all the request should be
granted. The right to information is NOT ABSOLUTE.
The right to privacy, similarly inviolable, exists. Further,
institutions also enjoy their own right to confidentiality if
needed to protect the integrity of their mandated tasks
under the Constitution and the laws.
The Internal Rules of the SC (IRSC) prohibits
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February 10, 2012 The following are letters sent to the SC: (1) request to see
and the various the rollo of Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of
letters for the the Philippine (FASAP) v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), et
Impeachment al; (2) Certified true copies of the Ahenda and Minutes of
Prosecution Panel the deliberations of, among others, the case of FASAP v.
dated January 19 PAL; (3) see the the rollo of Navarro v. Ermita; (4) see the
and 25, 2012. rollo of Ma. Meceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of
(2012) Representatives Committee on Justice, et. al; (5) see the
rollo of League if Cities v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 176951,
177499 and 178056; (6) the production of documents,
logbooks, and letters to Atty. Estelto Mendoza in the case
of FASAP v. PAL on different dates.
Last, there were also request for Writs, TRO, Minutes,
Logbook, Special Power of Attorney, Opinions of Judges,
and Receipts for the case of former President GMA (G.R.
No. 199034) and First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo
(G.R. No. 188046)
During the impeachment proceedings against Chief
Justice Corona, the Prosecution Panel manifested a
compliance dated Jan. 27, 2012 that it would present 100
witnesses and almost a thousand documents from both
public and private offices. Proposed witnesses included
Justices of the SC, and Court officials and employees who
will testify on matters that are internal to the Court.
The letters asking for examination of records and issuance
of Certified True Copies of rollos and the Agenda and
Minutes of Deliberations were sent about the time of the
above-said events.
Per its manifestation in open court in the impeachment
trial of Feb. 7 and 8, 2012, the House Impeachment Panel
disclosures of the following: (1) Results of raffle of
cases if they are cases involving bar matters,
administrative cases and criminal cases involving
penalty of life imprisonment; (2) Actions taken by the
Court including the agenda of the Court’s session (only
after the official release of the resolution embodying the
Court action may that action be made available to the
public); and (3) Deliberations of the Members in court
sessions on PENDING cases and matters of
deliberative process privilege.
Deliberative Process Privilege is intended to prevent
the ‘chilling’ (or the fear) of deliberative communications
by Senators, Justices, etc. that may invoke the privilege
when asked about information related to exercising their
public functions; To qualify for protection under the
deliberative process privilege, the agency must
show that the document is both:
(1) Predecisional- communications are predecisional if
they were made in the attempt to reach a final decision
and;
(2) Deliberative - disclosure of the information would
discourage candid discussion within the agency.
Public officials and employees then are not required
to present the documents provided for subpoena duces
tecum because (1) appearing in court may interrupt,
hamper or delay public business, and because (2) the
law presumes a particular confidence in public
officers/employees that they will discharge their several
trusts with accuracy and fidelity.
On the other hand, Justices, Judges and Court
102!
 requested the Impeachment Court for the issuance of the
subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum for the
prosecution of records of cases and attendances of
Justices, officials and employees of the SC to testify on
the said records. Hon. Presiding Senate-Judge Juan
Ponce Enrile on Feb. 8, 2012 issued an Order denying the
request for subpoena ad testificandum to JJ. Villarama,
Sereno, Reyes and Velasco (Impeachment Trial of Hon.
Chief Justice Corona). Thus, the attendance of SC
Justices under compulsory process now appears to be
moot and academic.
Further, on Feb. 10, 2012 (10:00 a.m.), Clerk Court Atty.
Vidal brought to attention the subpoena she received
commanding her to appear on Feb. 13, 2012 with the
original and certified true copies of the documents listed
above and to appear and testify on the same day at 2:00
p.m. and everyday thereafter.
officials and employees may not be compelled to
testify on matters that are part of the internal
deliberations and actions of the Court in exercise of their
adjudicatory functions and duties.
For Records of cases that are still pending for
decisions, they are privileged materials that cannot be
disclosed EXCEPT for pleadings, orders and resolutions
that have been made available by the court to the
general public.
The principle of comity or inter-departmental courtesy
demands that the highest officials of each department
be exempt from the compulsory processes of the other
departments. Thus the privileges belong to the SC as an
institution, not to any justice/judge in his/her individual
capacity.

Issue: Whether the court should be mandated to produce

the court records of the cases?

ARTICLE VI. THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT Bicameralism

Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of
the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.
1. Allows for a body with national perspective to check the parochial
tendency of representatives elected by district.
2. Allows for a more careful study of legislation
3. Legislature is less susceptible to control by the Executive
4. Serves as training ground for national leaders

Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal Unicameralism
them. 1. Simplicity of organization resulting in economy and efficiency
2. Facility in pinpointing responsibility for legislation
3. Avoidance of duplication

103!
Kinds of Legislative Power:
1. Original Legislative Power – possessed by sovereign people
2. Derivative Legislative Power – delegated by the sovereign people
to legislative bodies
3. Constituent – power to amend or revise the Constitution
4. Ordinary – power to pass ordinary laws
Limits on Legislative Power
1. Substantive – limits / curtails the contents of a law
2. Procedural – limits / curtails the manner of passing laws
Legislative power of Congress is plenary
Congress may legislate on any subject matter, subject only to
Constitutional limitations. The power of present and future
legislations must remain plenary. Congress may not pass
irrepealable laws as this would curtail the plenary power of future
Congress.
Examples of Constitutional limitations are:
- A law passed by Congress cannot violate the Constitution.
- Congress cannot pass a law that amounts to a usurpation of
executive or judicial prerogatives.
- Congress cannot pass a law that allows it to appoint officials in the
executive department.
- The Senate cannot initiate appropriation and tariff bills.
Non-delegability of Legislative Power
Legislative power is generally non-delegable under the principle of
delegata potestas non potest delegari. Legislative power must
remain where the people have lodged it. Congress, therefore,
cannot abdicate itself of this mandate by further delegating this
power to another body.
This principle however admits several exceptions in our jurisdiction:
1. Delegation of legislative power to local governments
2. Delegation of rule-making power (not legislative / law-making
power) to administrative bodies
3. Constitutionally recognized exceptions
• Congress may, by law, grant the President necessary
powers during times of war and national emergencies for a limited
period and subject to restrictions as it may prescribe. This grant of
power may include legislative power. [Art. VI, Sec. 23(2)]
• The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions
as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government. [Art. VI, Sec.
28(2)]
Grant of Quasi-Legislative Power to LGUs and Administrative
Bodies
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (1919)
Valid vs. Invalid delegation
“The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it
shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to
be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be
done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.”
Discretion may be committed by the legislature to an executive
department or official. The legislature may make decisions of
executive departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it
has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of
fact. The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to
the “necessity” of the case.
104!
Legislative delegation to local authorities
An exception to the general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice,
permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to
local authorities.
Valid Delegation of Legislative Power
Necessity of delegating subordinate legislation
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the
constitutional landscape. In the face of the increasing complexity of
the task of the government and the increasing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its
attention, resort to delegation of power, or entrusting to
administrative agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has
become imperative, as here. (SJS v. DDB, 2008)
Requisites of a valid delegation of legislative power to
administrative agencies:
It must be made clear that legislative power cannot be delegated to
administrative agencies. What is delegated is only rule-making
power or law execution.
They are allowed to:
• “Fill up the details” of an already complete statute through
implementing rules and regulations; or
• Ascertain facts necessary to bring a contingent law into actual
operation
Tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power:
1. Completeness test – the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test – there must be adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
! Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of
legislative authority to delegate, who is not allowed to step into the
shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative
(Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA)
Elements of a Valid Delegation
1. Completeness:
• The law must be complete in itself
• It must set forth therein the policy to be carried out or implemented
by the delegate
What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law
may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the
latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative
cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the
delegate. (Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA)
2. The law must fix a sufficient standard
• Limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable
• Will guide the delegate in the performance of his functions
• The standards formulated need not be in precise language
rather it can be drawn from the declared policy of the law and from
the totality of the delegating statute
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Sufficient standards of delegation of legislative power
Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as
sufficient standards ”public interest” in People v. Rosenthal,
“justice and equity” in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR, “public
convenience and welfare” in Calalang v. Williams, and “simplicity,
economy and efficiency” in Cervantes v. Auditor General, to
mention only a few cases. In the United States, the “sense and
experience of men” was accepted in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial
Commission, and “national security” in Hirabayashi v. United
States. (Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA)
“Public Interest” as a standard
[T]he term “public interest” is not without a settled meaning.
“Appellant insists that the delegation of authority to the Commission
is invalid because the stated criterion is uncertain. That criterion is
the public interest. It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere
general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide
determinations, The purpose of the Act, the requirement it imposes,
and the context of the provision in question show the contrary.
(People v. Rosenthal, 1939)
A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be
gathered or implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged
because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject
as that of the challenged legislation. (Chiongbian v. Orbos, 1995)
Contingent Legislation
While the power to tax cannot be delegated to executive agencies,
details as to the enforcement and administration of an exercise of
such power may be left to them, including the power to determine the
existence of facts on which its operation depends, the rationale being
that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the enactment
of legislation is not of itself a legislative function but is simply
anciliary to legislation. (ABAKADA v. Ermita, 2005)
Laws may be made effective on certain contingencies. The
legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself
rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a power
which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in
ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the
taking into effect of a law. (People v. Vera)
Where the effectivity of the law is made dependent on the verification
by the executive of the existence of certain condition, it is not a
delegation of legislative power. This is called contingent legislation.
Congress provides the conditions required before a law takes effect;
the executive factually determines when those conditions exist.
(ABAKADA v. Ermita, 2005)
Filling in details
There is no undue delegation of legislative power when there is only
a grant of the power to “fill up” or provide the details of legislation
because Congress did not have the facility to provide them.
To a certain extent, matters of detail may be left to be filled in by
rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive
officers and administrative boards. As a rule, an act of the legislature
is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or
definite standard by which the administrative board may be guided in
the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. (People v.
Vera, 1937)
Undue Delegation
The legislature does seemingly on its own authority extend the
benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the
entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. If a
106!
provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province,
all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for
the salary of a probation officer. This is a virtual surrender of
legislative power to the provincial boards. (People v. Vera)
Legislative Veto of Implementing Rules and Regulations
After the enactment of a law, congressional oversight is limited to
scrutiny and investigation. Any action or step beyond that will
undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules
and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a
committee formed by it, retains a “right” or “power” to approve or
disapprove such regulations before they take effect. It is
unconstitutional. Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an
overseer, may not pass upon the legality of IRRs by subjecting them
to its stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of
powers established by the Constitution. The discretion to approve or
disapprove Rules and Regulations is a judicial power. (Abakada v.
Purisima)
Rules and Regulations by Administrative Agencies may have
the force of penal laws if:
1. The delegating statute itself must specifically authorize the
promulgation of penal regulations
2. The penalty must not be left to the administrative agency but
provided by the statute itself
3. The regulation must be published in the Official Gazette or a
newspaper of general circulation
- There should be designated limits of the penalty and it should not
be left to the discretion of the judge (penalty of “imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court” is invalid because it is not for the court to fix
the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been
provided by the legislature (People v. Dacuycuy).

ARTICLE VI. THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1. Legislative Power
65 Chavez v. Judicial The issue came about during the selection process after CJ No. Based on Latin principle of verbal egis non est
and Bar Council Corona was impeached. The petitioner is the Solicitor recedendum or that words should not depart from
(2012) General Chavez as he was among the individuals being their meaning that the Constitution,it is clear that the
considered by Judicial Bar Council (JBC). The case number of the composition of JBC is limited to 7 and
historically narrated that the JBC is an institution established the use of “a” before the “representative of Congress”
in 1986 in order to mitigate political influences that may speaks a lot of the raison d’ etre of the framers of the
breach or politicize the Judicial appointment process as Constitution.
seen in the time of Marcos. Under Sec. 8 Art. VIII of the
Constitution the JBC will have seven members namely During the analysis of the Constitutional Commission
the CJ as ex-officio Chairman, the Justice Secretary, also, it cannot be excused that just because the
and a representative of the Congress as ex officio framers of the Constitution did not pre-empt the
Members, private businessman, ex-member of Supreme bicameral creation of Congress it is a complete

107!
 Court, IBP member, professor of law. The issue started oversight since it would be safer to assume that the 7
when the Congress questions whether the said article allows is an ideal odd number to prevent a deadlock.
the double representation for Congress seeing that starting
the year 2000 each one from the House Of Representatives The single representation of each branch is also a
(HOR) and Senate were sent to JBC, each with their own recognition of the co-equal nature of each branch of
voting power. The petitioner questions the double government through a single ex-officio members in
representation that Congress has given it is unfair to the the JBC.
equal power given to branches of government.
The reference of Congress to a bicameral character
Issue: Whether Congress is given 2 seats in the JBC which is only during limited moments in its exercise of its
is one for the HOR and another for the Senate. power like legislation (suggestion of tax increases or
debt ceilings), impeachment, canvassing of electoral
return for Pres and Vice-Pres. Since these functions
have clearly specified different mandates for the
houses in the Congress while in the case there is no
mention of a specific role of either house as they are
taken as one together.
I. General Rule: Non-delegability of legislative power; Exceptions
A. Delegation to local governments and administrative bodies; Grant to Quasi-legislative Power; In General; LGU and
Administrative Bodies
66 Rubi v. Provincial Rubi and her companions were forced to move into the new No. Normally the power to legislate is conferred in
Board of Mindoro settlement— with a deadline of not more than 60 days— to the legislature but it can permit local administers to
(1918-1919) Lake Naujan provided by the government. One of them, pass administrative legislation in their area esp. for
Dabalos, was imprisoned by the Sheriff of Calapan for trying the purpose of maintaining law and order that will
to get out of the reservation. The order was based on protect the citizens in their area.
Administrative Code of 1917 Sec. 2145 that was adopted
in resolution 25. The court cited Judge Ranney saying that the
delegation of law is constitutional in the case at hand
Issue: Whether Rubi, et. al. were maltreated by being since it is a conferring of power rather than the
deprived of their right of habeas corpus and there was an capacity of determining “what is shall be” (Difference
undue delegation of power to the Provincial Board of of executive on the former with legislative on the
Mindoro in assigning reservation areas for the Mangyanes. latter). The executive branch in the guise of LGU is
not determining a law but enforcing it.

108!

67 Antipolo Realty Mr. Yuson acquired a land from Mr. Hernando that was
Corp v. NHA (1987) sanctioned by the Antipolo Realty Corp. (ARC) Antipolo
Realty failed to develop the subdivision project in
accordance with the original Contract to Sell therefore Mr.
Yuson only paid arrearages up to the period of August 1972
and stopped all monthly installments given that the projects
were halted during those time.
Under the Contract to Sell, the corporation promised to
beautify the subdivision by creating amphitheaters, parks,
etc. In October 14, 1976, the corporation sent a letter to Mr.
Yuson telling him that the improvements were done and that
he now owns the company the amount the money he did not
pay starting from August of 1972 till October of 1976. Mr.
Yuson refused to pay the amount from August but paid the
October 1976 of what he owned, which resulted in a threat
of his lot being rescinded.
Aggrieved, Mr. Yuson filed a motion of complaint to NHA
which resulted in ARC to file a motion to dismiss that was
denied. After a failed motion for reconsideration, ARC filed a
In the case of Rubi et al, such delegation is allowed
given that the local government acted in good faith
when they mentioned in the records that the LGU
previously attempted to help Rubi et al. but all efforts
were futile. Given that there is a need for the local
government to implement the laws that would help
the backward people in Mindoro, they are then
compelled by law to implement Admin Code Sec.
2145. Additionally, the LGU was compelled to
enforce the law given that they wanted to prevent
harmful activity of the Mindoro people when they
cited cases of environmental destruction done
through kaingin.
Yes. Many administrative agencies exercise
adjudicatory powers in order to perform their
functions of upholding law and order such as
regulating contracts.
The court recognizes the need of assistance from
administrative agencies since the courts are clogged
and crowded. This is especially the case when we
are talking about agencies with special competence
and experience that is recognized as essential in the
resolution of questions of complex.
Also in this case, the court recognizes that a statute
may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an
administrative agency over certain disputes and
controversies falling within the agency’s special
expertise. This is the case of NHA that under the PD
957 has been given exclusive jurisdiction to regulate
the real estate trade and business inclusive of
contracts, business practice, and etc.
109!
 motion certiorari and prohibition with writ of Preliminary
injunction assailing the jurisdiction of National Housing
Authority (NHA).
Issue: Whether NHA has the jurisdiction to decide the case
between Mr. Yuson and ARC.
68 PITC v. Angeles The case is about the Administrative Order SOCPEC 89-
(1996) 08-01 wherein it mandates trade partnership with the
People Republic of China (PROC) necessitates a one-to-
one ratio of exchange of products and materials whenever
importation with the said country would be done.
The companies Remington Industrials and Firestone
Ceramics procured materials from PROC. The former
acquired tools and machineries while Firestone imported a
Calcine Vauxite (for brick-making). It was found out that the
said companies failed to submit export credit equivalent
to the value of their importation (one-to-one exchange)
thus the import applications were withheld by Philippine
International Trading Corporation (PITC) and were also
barred from importing goods from PROC.
Remington filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus
against PITC to the RTC of Makati. The RTC issued a TRO
ordering PITC to cease from exercising any power to
process the applications of goods from PROC. The court
ruled that the AO had no authority since EO 133 repealed
that said trade protocols and that the lower court mentions
the said AO trade protocols were not concurred by Senate in
a 2/3 votes. EO 133 is the order issued by Aquino to
empower the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) by
being the primary coordinative, promotive, facilitative and
regulatory arm of the government for the country’s trade.
This made PITC under DTI.
No. The PITC is a government owned or
controlled corporation created by Pres. Marcos
(PD no. 1071). After which, a letter of instruction (LOI
444) directed that trade between the Philippines and
any of the Socialist and other Centrally Planned
Economy Countries (SOCPEC) shall be undertaken
through PITC, including the process and approval of
all application for export and import from the
SOCPEC.
The court does not believe that E.O. 133 repeals the
PD since the E.O merely makes the PITC a line
agency of DTI that is regulated by its supervisory
provisions that helps in streamlined bureaucracy.
The exercise of specialized agencies such as PITC
in accordance with trading with PROC is
constitutional because of the growing complexities of
modern society, it is necessary to create
administrative bodies for efficient regulation of
activities within the government. Thus, by having
specialized administrative bodies, they can deal with
problems with more expertise and knowledge than
the legislative or the courts of justice. These quasi-
legislative bodies are now called as the fourth
department of the government aimed to resolve
activities of foreign governments or entities that may
have interest.
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 When Ramos was the President, he issued the 1993 new
trade agreement between the RP-PROC encouraging trade
liberalization. The problem was that it is not in sync with the
AO-SOCPEC. DTI was instructed to cease implementing of
said AO. Although the issue could be moot, PTIC argues
that Remington still has 0.5% counter export
development service, which remain outstanding.
Issue: Whether the AO is constitutional.
69 Atitiw v. Zamora During the time of President Corazon Aquino, she initiated
(2005) talks with the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army and the
Cordillera Bodong Administration (CBA) due to the growing
insurgency in the area since Marcos time. The talks yielded
into the recognition of Cordillera as an autonomous region,
together with the Muslim Mindanao.
The President in accordance with 1987 Constitution,
PITC though is not empowered by the AO
because the Trade Protocols of 1989, 1990, 1991
has not granted them such. Although it could be
said that the trade protocol does not bestow
regulatory powers because they are not a source
of executive power.
PITC was empowered by the said EO as a valid
exercise of legislation. But it does not imply that the
granting of Administrative order is a valid exercise of
quasi-legislative power since it could be seen that
the EO is not published in the Official Gazette
thus The Administrative Order under
consideration is one of those issuances which
should be published for its effectivity, since its
purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in
relation to LOI 444 and EO 133. Thus, even before
the trade balancing measures issued by the
petitioner were lifted by President Fidel V.
Ramos, the same were never legally effective,
and private respondents, therefore, cannot be
made subject to them, because Administrative
Order 89-08-01 embodying the same was never
published, as mandated by law, for its effectivity.
No. First of all, the Congress is not precluded from
amending or repealing laws as there is no such thing
as an irrepealable law since E.O. 220 is like any
other law.
However, it is not correct to say that the Congress
can repeal a law through the GAA. Contents of the
GAA should only pertain to appropriations of budget
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 enacted E.O. 220 that created the CAR. The Congress on
the other hand enacted RA No. 6766 entitled An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous
Region. A plebiscite was held wherein the people of
Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao, Mountain
Province, and Baguio City cast their votes on the
ratification of the Organic Act. Results showed that the
creation of an autonomous region was approved by a
majority of votes in the Ifugao province ONLY and
overwhelmingly rejected in the rest of the region.
Although the plebiscite did not pass, it was ruled that E.O.
220 is still in effect. During the presidency of Estrada, the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) 2000 was assailed as it
reduced the budget for certain departments of CAR and that
the reduction is feared to prevent CAR from reaching its
autonomy. The said provision in the GAA stated that there
should be funds for the “winding up of activities done in CAR
and the giving out of retirement benefits to the employees
and others affected.” They claim that said removal of gov’t
funds to the creation of CAR destroys the autonomy of CAR.
Issue: Did the Philippine Government, through Congress,
amend/repeal E.O. No. 220.
70 SEC v. Interport The board of directors of Interport Resources Corporation
(2008) (IRC) approved an agreement between Ganda Holdings
Berhad (GHB) to acquire their Ganda Energy Holdings
Inc. (GEHI), which was 97% complete at that time. IRC
on the other hand will issue 55% of its expanded capital
stock. Additionally, GHB will help IRC to acquire 67% of
the capital stock of Philippine Racing Club (PCRI) by
arranging a loan from an international source.
On 1994 of August, IRC alleged that it issued a press
or pertain directly to the said appropriations. Thus the
said assailed provision is germane to the purpose of
the bill as it mentions the means of appropriation.
Plus an appropriations bill covers a broader range of
subject matter and therefore includes more details
compared to an ordinary bill. The title of an
appropriations bill cannot be any broader as it is
since it is not feasible to come out with a title that
embraces all the details included in an appropriations
bill. The assailed paragraph 1 of the RA8760 does
not constitute a rider.
The reduction in funding does not remove CAR
as an autonomous region. E.O. 220 is an
executive act and the GAA is a legislative act. Under
the separation of powers of gov’t both acts are done
in accordance to their roles. Thus absent any grave
abuse of discretion, there is no cause to say that the
legislature wants to usurp the authority of the
executive by repealing an E.O. through a GAA.
Yes. This Court rules that no implementing rules
were needed to render effective Sections 8, 30 and
36 of the Revised Securities Act; nor was the PED
Rules of Practice and Procedure invalid, prior to the
enactment of the Securities Regulations Code, for
failure to provide parties with the right to cross-
examine the witnesses presented against them.
Thus, the respondents may be investigated by the
appropriate authority under the proper rules of
procedure of the Securities Regulations Code for
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release of the approval of its agreements but the SEC
claims that it did not receive any of it. The SEC claims that
IRC failed to report its business developments and its
directors heavily traded IRC stocks given the material of its
information. SEC afterwards conducted a hearing and found
out that IRC and its directors violated the Rules of Material
Facts and Sections 30 and 36 of Revised Securities Act.
There is also an allegation that GHB and that some of its
directors, respondents herein, heavily traded IRC
shares utilizing this material insider information. The
respondents filed an Omnibus Motion that the SEC had not
authority to investigate since the power is within the
Prosecution and Enforcement Department of SEC. The
SEC continued to create special panel to investigate the
case despite the issuance of respondent of injunction. The
injunction was soon granted by the Court of Appeals. The
SEC filed a motion for leave to quash SEC Omnibus to
continue investigation.
The court stated that there were no implementing rules and
regulations regarding disclosure, insider trading and the
provisions of the Revised Securities Acts which the
respondents violated.
There is also no statutory authority for SEC to file a suit for it
will be a violation of the respondents’ right to due process
and equal protection. While pending, RA 8799 (Securities
Regulation Code) took effect on Aug. 8, 2000 which
repealed Sec 8 of PD no. 902-A which created the PED.
This took the place of the Revised Securities Act.
Issue: Whether the CA erred when it ruled that there is no
Statutory Authority for petitioner to file any suit against
respondent with respect to Sections 30 and 36 of the
violations of Sections 8, 30, and 36 of the Revised
Securities Act.
The court upholds these provisions as legal and
binding even without constitutional or statutory
infirmity. Unless a specific provision of the law is
declared invalid and unconstitutional, the same is
valid and binding. The presumption of the validity
of laws is based on the doctrine of separation of
powers, to respect the acts of each department. It
is impracticable for lawmakers to provide general
regulations for various details of management.
The court does not discern any vagueness or
ambiguity in Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised
Securities Act. The broadness of the anti-fraud
provisions is to embrace the infinite variety of
deceptive conduct.
Section 30:
Explains in simple terms the insider’s misuse of non-
public and undisclosed information is the gravamen
of illegal conduct. To protect investors from fraud
when an insider takes advantage of an uninformed
investor using secret information. Insiders are
obligated to disclose information or abstain from
trading shares of his corporation.
INSIDERS – persons whose relationship or former
relationship to the issuer gives them access to a fact
of special significance about the issuer or security
generally not available or one who learns such a fact
from an insider.
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Revised Securities Act FACT OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE
Material fact – affect the market price of a security
which the insider would be required to disclose
Reasonable person – “average man on the street”;
a reasonable person would consider important in
determining his course of action with regard to
shares of stock
Nature and reliability – reliability in light of the
nature and source and circumstances of the
information
Materiality concept – balancing bot the indicated
probability that the event will occur and the
anticipated magnitude of the even in light of the
totality of the company activity; determined on a
case—by –case basis
Generally available – found in a newspaper,
magazine, social media widely used
Section 36
Directors, officers and principal stockholders–
Every person who is directly or indirectly the
beneficial owner of more than ten per centum of any
[class] of any equity security which is registered
pursuant to this Act, or who is [a] director or an
officer of the issuer of such security.

Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act

were enacted to promote full disclosure in the
securities market and prevent unscrupulous
individuals, who by their positions obtain non-public
information, from taking advantage of an uninformed
public. No individual would invest in a market which
can be manipulated by a limited number of corporate
insiders. Such reaction would stifle, if not stunt, the
growth of the securities market. To avert the

114!
 occurrence of such an event, Section 30 of the
Revised Securities Act prevented the unfair use of
non-public information in securities transactions,
while Section 36 allowed the SEC to monitor the
transactions entered into by corporate officers and
directors as regards the securities of their
companies.
B. In Instances allowed by the Constitution, e.g., Article VI, Sections 23 (2) and 28 (2)
II. Issues on Delegation of Legislative Power
A. Requisites of a Valid Delegation
71 Agustin v. Edu Leovillo Agustin is an owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car No since the use of police power in this instance is
(1979) and he is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction (LOI) justifiable given that police power’s purpose anyway
No. 229, activated by Administrative Order 1 of LTO that is to prevent hurtful to the comfort, safety, and
was issued by President Marcos. The LOI 229 mandates welfare of society. It is there for public safety and
that all vehicles should acquire early warning devices so that welfare in order to protect the constitutional rights of
if ever their vehicles are stalled or unable to move they citizens.
could place it somewhere conspicuous to warn other
motorists. The said LOI was brought by Philippines’ The LOI is also a compliance to the Vienna
membership to Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Convention on Road Signs and Signals of 1968 as
Signals and that there is an increasing number of vehicular international law becomes part of the law of the land.
accidents in highway caused by the said stalled vehicles. A standard defines legislative policy and it marks,
The petitioner assails the validity of the LOI as it transgress limits, and maps out its boundaries and specifies the
due process and that there is undue delegation of power of public agency (e.g. LTC) to apply it.
police power and they will patently make EWD vendors
millionaires. The said administrative order of LTO was also done
in compliance of a fundamental policy laid by the
Issue: whether there is a transgressing of the fundamental legislature that the executive then promulgates and if
principle of non-delegation of legislative power. necessary, they also lay down supplemental rules
and regulations.
72 Free Telephone The petitioners are asking to review the amendment caused No. The court first recognizes that the authority
Workers v. Min of by BP Blg. 130 to Art. 264 of the Labor Code regarding exercised by the minister is executive and that the
Labor (1981) strikes. The provision grants the Minister of Labor and question is whether or not this is an encroaching of
Employment the power and/or discretion to assume the power of legislation.
jurisdiction regarding strikes and compulsory

115!
arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission.
The petitioners are concerned how the amendment may be
contrary to the assurance of the State to worker’s right to
self-organization and collective bargaining.
On September 14, 1981, there was a notice of strike filed
with the Ministry of Labor for unfair labor practices stating
the grounds 1) Unilateral and arbitrary implementation of
Code of Conduct 2) Illegal terminations and
suspensions of the employee’s officers and members
as a result of the Code of Conduct 3) Unconfirmation
(sic) of sick leaves treating the said leave as Absence
Without Official Leave of Absence (AWOL).
The petitioners want to revise the Code of Conduct so that it
will be fair to the ones concerned and that said Code should
be suspended for the meantime. On September 25, 1981,
the NLRC certified the strike and the said issue is pursued
under the said agency for compulsory arbitration. The
workers are also enjoined from strike in any private
establishment. Petitioners assail that BP Blg. 130 amends
Article 264 of the Labor Code which delegates to the
Honorable Minister of Labor and Employment the power and
discretion to assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for
compulsory arbitration to the National Labor Relations
Commission, and in effect make or unmake the law on free
collective bargaining. They believe that there is an undue
delegation of legislative powers. There is likewise the
assertion that such conferment of authority "may also ran
contrary to the assurance of the State to the workers' right to
self-organization and collective bargaining.
Issue: Whether BP Blg. 130 unduly delegates legislative
power.
The court said that there was no undue delegation of
legislative power. In Edu v. Ericta, it is said that
“What cannot be delegated is the power to make
laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the
completeness of the statute in all its terms and
provisions when it leaves the hands of the
legislature.”
The legislature designates who does a certain
task and what should be done. It also entails the
scope of power of the person as well as the
discretion to its execution in accordance with the
law. The executive also in pursuance of the
guidelines provided by the law may promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations. The case at
hand shows that BP Blg. 130 is constitutional as it
empowers the Minister of Labor to assume
jurisdiction over labor disputes causing or likely to
cause adverse effects to national interests and
thereafter decide it or certify the same the National
Labor Relations Commission is not on its face value
unconstitutional and contravenes self-organization
and free collective bargaining.
Principle of non-delegation has been made to
adopt to the complexities of government, the
multiplication of subjects, and difficulty of
administering them. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law and should not contradict
the standards of the law prescribes.
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73 Guingona v. The issue started when during the time of Marcos, the
Carague (1991) president abused the use of R.A. 4860 (An Act Authorizing
the President to incur foreign loans) and incurred huge
amount of debts.
Fast forward to the time of Corazon Aquino, the issue was
then centered on the payment of the said debts incurred by
Marcos. In the 1990 Fiscal Budget, the automatic
appropriation of 98.4 billion was majorly dominated by debt
service amounting to 86.8 billion while education
appropriated to DECS only stands at around 27 billion. This
was due to PD 81, 1177, and 1967 ordering the payment of
the said debts to maintain at least a good international credit
standing. The payment of debts are made certain by the
legislative department where they ensure that all types of
credit, principal, interest, and other forms of indebtness sold
in international markets that are lawfully incurred are paid
when they are due. The petitioner wants to suspend the PDs
mentioned and restrain the release of fund for debt services.
He also claims that the budget for debt is higher than the
education which is a violation of Sec. 5 Art. XIV.
Issue: Whether the PDs are an undue delegation of power
to assign the national budget by the Congress?
74 Trade and The issue started when On August 30, Mr. De Guzman was
Investment appointed as Financial Management Specialist IV of Trade
Development and Investment Development Corporation (TIDCORP), a
Corporation v. Civil government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC)
Service created under PD 1080. The appointment of Mr. De
Commission (2013) Guzman was recorded and submitted to CSC department of
Budget and Management. On September 28, 2001—within
the same year—Ms. Bugtong disallowed the appointment of
Mr. De Guzman as the rank of Management Specialist IV
since it is not included in the index of DMB’s occupational
No. The court believes that the Constitution assigns
the highest budget priority to education but this does
not preclude the legislative to act in behalf of national
interest that may be contrary to the said
Constitutional clause.
According to the petitioner, the PDs assigns to the
president undue delegation of legislative power given
that under Sec. 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution,
the amount required to pay the debts are not
specified. There must be exactness, definiteness,
and certainty in appropriation. Though the court
contends that the Constitution does not mandate
exact appropriation on budgets and the amounts
nevertheless are made certain by the legislative
parameters provided in the decrees. The only
requirement is that the said appropriation is made by
law.
Yes. According to the court, although CSC has a
constitutional mandate of regulating compensation
and position it is still limited only to implementing the
laws it is tasked to enact meaning that CSC must
endeavor to harmonize itself with other laws such as
TIDCORP’s R.A. 8494.
Thus in the same way, the court advises TIDCORP
that even though it has its own charter is different
from CSC, it should also endeavor to hew its
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 service (a list of job position with a corresponding pay
assigned to them).
The Executive Vice President Ms. Tambanillo assert that
under its charter, it was stated in RA 8494 Section 7 that
TIDCORP is exempt from occupation, compensation,
position, classification, and classification standard and
thus not bound by DBM’s Index of Occupational
Service. Plus Ms. Tambanillo said that the position was
formerly held by another person that thus is inconsistent
with the approval to prior one. The case was sent to CSC-
NCR which the assertion of CSC won as the case was seen
that TIDCORP did not follow Rule 3 of Circular Order No. 40
of CSC that mandates that positions title of appointments
must conform to the Occupational list of CSC. The same
ruling was upheld by CA when appealed.
Issue: Whether the appointment of Mr. De Guzman is valid.
1. Complete in itself
75 Araneta v. The San Miguel Bay (SMB) is located between the
Gatmaitan (1957) provinces of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, and
considered an important water area in Bicol. In 1950 fishing
operators from Navotas and other areas settled in the said
region to fish that caused the depletion of marine resources
of the area and the destruction of shrimp specie in the area.
This prompted the League of Mayors, together with other
respondents to file a motion to (1) ban trawl fishing at certain
period of years and (2) ban trawl operations.
The President as response issued (1) E.O. No. 22, which
prohibits the use of trawls in SMB, (2) E.O. No. 66 which
amended E.O. No. 22 as answer to the resolution by the
Provincial Board of Camarines Sur which recommended
the allowance of operation of trawls during the typhoon
mandate and practices with harmony in other rules
and regulations since the legislative department did
not mention explicitly that TIDCORP should only
comply with its own charter.
De Guzman’s appointment as Financial Management
Specialist IV in TIDCORP is valid, since Section 1(c),
Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s.
1998 is the only requirement that De Guzman failed
to follow, his appointment actually complied with all
the requisites for a valid appointment.
Yes. There is due delegation when the statue
making the delegation is complete by itself. This
is to ensure that the power being passed by the
legislative department is just for law-execution. In this
case, the Fisheries Act provided the details for
implementation to the Secretaries of Agriculture and
Natural Resources in regulating the marine
resources, specifically imposing restrictions on the
usage of fishing devices for the protection of fish fry
or fish eggs. The President issued three executive
orders in line with this power.
The issuance of the E.O. was complete in itself since
the Congress has passed already a Fisheries act that
(1) prohibits the catching of fish eggs in the waters of
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 season, and (3) E.O. 80, a revived E.O. No. 22. In
response, a group of otter trawl operators filed an injunction
to prevent the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Director of Fisheries from enforcing said
E.O.’s and consider it null and void.
Issue: Whether the E.O.’s were valid, for the issuance
thereof, was not in the exercise of legislative powers duly
delegated to the President.
76 Marcos v. CA The case started when in 1983, the Central Bank (now BSP)
(1997) issued Circular No. 960 which contains Sec. 4 that states
that residents are prohibited from maintaining foreign bank
accounts without prior authorization from CB. It also
mandates residents to report foreign income and earnings
and income to CB. Failure to comply warrants a criminal
offense under Sec. 34 of R.A. No.265, as amended (the
Central Bank Act). The petitioner is alleged to maintain
foreign bank account under former President Marcos who
hid his name under the name of JOHN LEWIS in foreign
Swiss accounts. The said account contain SF 16,195,258.00
with a certain administrator Jean Louis Sunier to maintain
the said accounts. The said couple also maintained
accounts in Paris Banks worth 15 million dollars. Marcos
motioned to quash the said cases given that circulars 1318
and 1353 were issued. 1318 repeals the inconsistent
parts of Circular 960, while 1353 repeals the
inconsistent parts of 1318. Importantly, both circulars
contain a saving clause excepting from the circular
pending criminal actions involving violations of CB
Circular No. 960 and CB Circular No. 1318. Meaning that
pending criminal cases are subject to the old law. The
motion was dismissed by CA.
the Phil and (2) authorizes Sec. of Agriculture and
Nat. Resources to provide regulations/ restrictions as
may be deemed necessary (3) assign sanctuaries
and prevent fishing in those areas and deem
violators as unlawful. Thus it leaves the power to the
Secretary to implement orders to fulfill its mandate.
The president, in exercising the E.O. was acting
through the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. The issuance of the said executive
orders was upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Yes. The Court held that the saving clauses were
valid delegation of power. As respondent Court of
Appeals points out, administrative bodies have
the authority to issue administrative regulations
which are penal in nature where the law itself
makes the violation of the administrative
regulation punishable and provides for its
penalty. This is still the rule on the matter and, in the
instant case, the Central Bank Act defined the
offense and its penalty while the questioned circular
merely spelled out the details of the offense.
Ironically, petitioner concedes the greater power
of the Board to repeal CB Circular No. 960
through CB Circular No. 1318, yet she
inexplicably questions the lesser and incidental
power to provide for saving clauses therein.
Object of the Monetary Board is to stabilize the
monetary system. The punishing of violations are
then needed to reach said goal. These saving
clauses were dictated by the need to continue the
prosecution of those who had already committed acts
of monetary destabilization.
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 Issue: Whether the saving clause is valid delegation of
legislative power.
77 Gerochi v. DOE The case started when DOE implemented the Electric
(2007) Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (2001) which sought
to improve electric services and imposing a universal
charge on the end user per monthly basis on a
Php0.0373 per kilowatt-hour. This is so that the EPIRA
could pay off stranded costs and debts accumulated by
National Power Corporation (NPC). Meaning that NPC
seeks to impose charges to customers for the creation of
investments in the form of utility centers or expanding its
coverage and in the same way, recoup its lost costs. That is
why in Sec 34 of the EPIRA it seeks not only to recover its
assets in a stranded cost but also in Missionary
Electrification (refers to the provision of basic electricity
service in unviable areas with the aim of bringing the
operations in these areas to viability levels).
The petitioners question the power of ERC to impose
through EPIRA additional cost that are reminiscent of
legislative power of taxation.
78 Social Justice The case started when in 2002 RA 9165 or Comprehensive
Society v. Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. The law
Dangerous Drugs mandates that the following be placed in mandatory drug
Board (2008) test: (1) candidates to public office; (2) students in the
secondary, tertiary, public; and (3) private employees and
officers to undergo drug testing when they are charged with
an offense by the prosecutor. Social Justice Society (SJS), a
political party, seeks to prohibit the enactment of RA 9165
In the face of the increasing complexity of modern
life, the delegation of legislative power, or in this case
the implementation of the EPIRA Law to the Energy
Regulation Commission (ERC), is allowed as an
exception to the principle of separation of
powers, since it is doubtful if the legislators can
promulgate laws that would respond promptly to
the minutiae of everyday life. Given this, the
exercise must be adhering to the tests of
COMPLETENESS and SUFFICIENT STANDARD.
Additionally , the Court finds that the prices imposed
are adequate and the standard of complete
electrification that warrant the additional cost are
justifiable.
Completeness – “the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing
he will have to do is to enforce it.”
Sufficiency – “adequate guidelines and limitations
must be mandated in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent
the delegation from running riot.”
No. For students and employees - Sec. 36
expressly provides (complete in itself) how drug
testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools
and officers/employees of public/private offices
should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who
shall undergo drug testing.
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 as it is against unreasonable searches and seizures and
may be used to harass people. In line with this, COMELEC’s
issued Resolution 6468 which required candidates to
undergo drug testing before they could be qualified for the
May 10 2004 elections, which Senator Pimentel deeming as
unconsititutional.
Issue: Whether RA 9165 unconstitutional as they constitute
undue delegation of legislative power when they give
unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine
the manner of drug testing?
79 Pacific Steam v. The case is about Pacific Steam Laundry, a laundry service
LLDA (2009) company. In 2001, the Environment management of DENR
conducted an inspection together with Laguna Lake
Development and Authority (LLDA) on the allege report of
black smoke coming from its plants in Roosevelt
Avenue QC. The LLDA conducted an investigation and
thereafter found out that the untreated waste water of the
petitioner is being leaked in the San Francisco Del Monte
River. Together with the said report, LLDA found out that it
was operating without a permit from LLDA.
The Environment management of LLDA then conducted
water sampling of its effluence (liquid waste material) of
Pacific Steam and found out that the effluence does not
In the case of students, the testing shall be in
accordance with the school rules as contained in the
student handbook and with notice to parents. On the
part of officers/employees, the testing shall take into
account the companys work rules. In either case, the
random procedure shall be observed, meaning that
the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be
picked by chance or in an unplanned way. And in all
cases, safeguards against misusing and
compromising the confidentiality of the test results
are established.
Additionally, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to
issue, in consultation with the DOH, Department of
the Interior and Local Government, Department of
Education, and DDOLE, among other agencies, the
IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then,
the participation of schools and offices in the drug
testing scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of
RA 9165.
No. The court held the comparison of the powers as
functions of the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB)
and the LLDA reveals substantial similarities. The
only difference is that the scope of authority of
the LLDA is limited only to the Laguna Lake
region. Thus, the court held that the adjudication of
pollution cases pertains to the Pollution
Adjudication Board, except where a special law,
such as the LLDA Charter, provides for another
forum. Thus LLDA is the exception to the general
rule within PAB’s jurisdiction. That is why even
though Executive Order No. 192 (EO 192) mandates
the power to PAB, it is still LLDA to rule.
121!
 conform to the effluence standards set by LLDA. The
investigation also yielded that the wastewater treatment of
the petitioner is under construction and further test failed to
show positive results. When the petitioner again requested
for another test the results showed positive result that
complied with the standards and prayed that the notice of
violation should be dismissed. They also pray that the
imposed penalties should be counted on the time of the
hearing not on the on September 5, 2001 (date of initial
sampling) however the court see that Decree No. 984
prohibits the discharge of pollutive wastewater and any
person found in violation thereof shall pay a fine not
exceeding five thousand pesos (PhP5,000.00) [sic] for
every day during which such violation continues. The
mere discharge of wastewater not conforming with the
effluent standard is the violation referred to in PD No.
984. The case was raised to CA and affirmed that LLDA has
the power to impose fines in accord to PD 984 since it is the
power of Pollution Adjudication Board.
Issue: Does the grant of implied power to LLDA to impose
penalties violate the rule on non-delegation of legislative
powers?
2. Fixes a standard
80 People v. The case is about Rosenthal and Osmena who are owners
Rosenthal (1939) of ORO Oil Company, which is built to mine, refine, market,
buy and sell petroleum, petroleum, natural gas and other oil
products. Rosenthal and Osmeña were found to be guilty
of selling their assets based on non-tangible assets.
The assets they sold were merely speculative and base
on future gains. This is in violation of Sec. 2 and 5 of
Act No. 2581 that states that any person, partnership
and business that plans to sell speculative securities
are required to file to the Insular Treasurer various
Under Section 4(h) of EO 927, LLDA may "exercise
such powers and perform such other functions
as may be necessary to carry out its duties and
responsibilities." In Laguna Lake Development
Authority v. Court of Appeals, the Court upheld the
power of LLDA to issue an ex-parte cease and desist
order even if such power is not expressly conferred
by law holding that an administrative agency has also
such powers as are necessarily implied in the
exercise of its express powers. Thus in the said case
the LLDA exercised quasi-judicial powers and
regulation in accordance with its mandate.
The LLDA did not act beyond its mandate when it
taxed the violators since it was done after the act
was violated.
No. The court held that the standards set by Sec 2
and 5 are sufficient to determine the mandate of the
Insular Treasurer. Looking at Act No. 2581, the law is
clear and lawful as it narrates a clear decision
process.
For the power to rescind or the issuance of
cancellation. The court believes that the term
“public interest” construed at the face of
mandate of Insular Treasurer is clear as it
122!
 documents and a fine of 20 pesos. Under Sec. 5 it simply
states that if the Insular Treasurer is satisfied with the
showing of documents of the mentioned agents he will issue
a certificate that will allow its business, and its agents to sell
the speculative securities. The Insular Treasurer may
rescind such certificate for public interest and that the said
rescinded business may file a motion to appeal within 30
days to the Secretary of Finance.
Rosenthal argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional
because no standard or rule is fixed in the Act which
can guide said officials in determining the cases in
which a certificate or permit ought to be issued, thereby
making his opinion the sole criterion in the matter of its
issuance, with the result that, legislative powers being
unduly delegated to the Insular Treasurer, Act No. 2581
is unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether there is undue delegation of power to the
Internal Treasurer.
81 Eastern Shipping The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
Lines v. POEA (POEA) was created under E.O. 797 where it is vested with
(1988) original and exclusive jurisdiction to cases pertaining to
pertains to actions against fly-by-night securities
seller, fraudulent exploiters and etc. Thus there is
no ambiguity and that the discretion is already
clear.
The act anyway allows a checks and balance
through an appeal to the Secretary of Finance in
case of cancellation.
The theory of the separation of powers (between
executive and legislative) is designed by its
originators to secure action and at the same time to
forestall over action which necessarily results from
undue concentration of powers, and thereby obtain
efficiency and prevent despotism. Thereby, the
“rule of law” (referring to Act No. 2851) was
established which narrows the range of
governmental action and makes it subject to
control by certain legal devices. The maxim
“delegatus non potest delegare or delegata
potestas non potest delegare” has been made to
adapt itself to the complexities of modern
governments, giving rise to the adoption, within
certain limits, of the principle of “subordinate
legislation”, in practically all modern governments.
Difficulty lies in fixing the limit and extent of the
authority. While courts have undertaken to laydown
general principles, the safest is to decide each case
according to its peculiar environment, having in mind
the wholesome legislative purpose intended to be
achieved.
Yes. The national legislature has the need to permit
administrative agencies to implement general rules of
provisions by “filling in” the details which the
123!
overseas workers even though the issue is about money,
contracts, benefits, death, etc. Vitaliano Saco is a Chief
Officer of M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an
accident in Tokyo Japan. The widow then filed a case
using E.O. 797 to claim benefits though the petitioner, as
owner of the vessel. Petitioner however argued that the
complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the
Social Security System and should have been filed
against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA
nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the
position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the
complainant. The award consisted of P180, 000.00 as death
benefits and P12, 000.00 for burial expenses.
Issue: Whether the POEA has jurisdiction over the case.
Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide.
It is true that legislative DISCRETION as to the
substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated.
What can be delegated is the discretion to determine
how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall
be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot
be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the
delegate.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether
or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power.
The (1) completeness test and (2) the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there
must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot.
Thus memorandum circular order no. 2: The
award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and
P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the
POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2,
which became effective on February 1, 1984. This
circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted
by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in
the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas
employment.
124!
82 Tablarin v. The petitioners sought to be enrolled for school year 1987-
Guitierrez (1987) 1988 in a medical school but unfortunately, they did not
pass the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) which
was required for them to take as mandated by the Board of
Medical Education as a requisite for their admission. The
petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 2382 (as
amended is Medical Act of 1959).
The said RA is an act which created the Board of Medical
Education for purposes of providing for the standardization
and regulation of medical education by, among others, (a)
determining and prescribing requirements for admission into
a recognized college of medicine and (f) accepting
applications for certification for admission and collecting P25
from each applicant.
MECS Order No. 52 is an order by the Minister of
Education, Culture and Sports establishing a uniform
admission test called the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a
certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical schools
of the Philippines. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of
the abovementioned acts and orders. Nonetheless, pursuant
to the MECS Order, the respondents conducted the NMAT
for the school year 1987-1988. Hence, petitioners instituted
this present petition.
Issue: Whether R.A. 2382 is constitutional.
Yes. The Court ruled that the principle of non-
delegation of legislative power must be applied in
respect of statutes, which like the Medical Act of
1959, deal with complex and technical subjects.
Accordingly, with the growing complexities of modern
life and the increased difficulty of administering the
laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward
the delegation of greater power by the legislature. As
explained by Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta,
that in the Reflector law, the main objective only was
public safety. The standard, as he said, need not be
spelled out specifically as they may be implied from
the POLICY AND PURPOSE OF THE ACT AS A
WHOLE.
In this case, it was stated in the Medical Act as Sec.
1 that the objective of the act is to “provide for and to
govern (a) the standardization and regulation of
medical education.” Additionally, Sec. 5 (a) and (f)
are sufficient standards that set the payment needed
by the applicant (P25.00), and the objective of the
law.
As for Sec. 7, it too has set a clear standard when it
requires that: “The medical college may admit any
student who has not been convicted by any court of
competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral
turpitude and who presents (a) a record of
completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts;
(b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical
school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a
certificate of good moral character issued by two
former professors in the college of liberal arts; and
(d) birth certificate.”
125!
83 Conference v. Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. is an
POEA (1995) incorporated association licensed manning agency together
with other co-petitioners who similarly engage in hiring and
recruiting Filipino seafarers for their foreign-ship-owner
principals. They contest the implementation of Memorandum
Circular No. 5 by the POEA Governing Board that aims to
amend and increase the compensation of Filipino
seafarers as specified in Part II Section C paragraph 1 and
Section L paragraph 1 and 2 of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract for Seafarers.
Governing Board Resolution No. 1 talks about how there is
an adjustment of compensation and other benefits of Filipino
seafarers manning agencies and related businesses. The
POEA Circular No. 5 on the other hand mandate that
manning agencies that want to procure the renewal of their
license to acquire a certificate, need to show that they
adopted the Resolution.
The said order will affect seafarers upon implementation
whether they are on board or not. The Conference questions
the authority of POEA in implementing such order as they
contend that POEA does not have the power to fix and
promulgate rates affecting the death workmen’s
compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going
vessels since Congress can only do so.
Issue: Whether POEA can promulgate rules by virtue of
delegation of powers.
Yes. While the power of legislation is non-delegable,
the Congress may still allow administrative
agencies to promulgate its rules and regulations
in implementing a certain legislation in order to
effectuate its policies. Reason is that it is
impracticable for the Congress to anticipate every
kind of application and effect. All that is necessary is
that the regulation to be germane to the object and
purpose of the law and not in contradiction but in
conformity to the law.
The constitutional challenge of the rule-making
power of the POEA-based on impermissible
delegation of legislative power had been, as correctly
contented by the public respondents, brushed aside
by this Court in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs.
POEA when it held constitutional the death benefits
of seamen in Memorandum No. 2.
Additionally, E.O. 797 states that: “The governing
Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder
provided, shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory
functions of the Administration (POEA).” Thus it is
within the power of POEA to promulgate rules such
as the in this case.
The POEA mandate referred to as providing the
reasonable standard for the exercise of the POEA's
rule-making authority is found in the statement of
powers and functions of the said office in paragraph
(a), Section 4 of E.O. 797 which states: "It shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases,
including money claims, involving employer-
126!

84 Osmena v. Orbos On October 10, 1984 President Marcos issued PD 1956
(1993) that created a special account in the General Fund
known as oil price stabilization fund (OPSF). The said
fund will reimburse oil companies for the increase in prices
brought by the exchange rate or fluctuating prices of oil
crude price in the international market. EO 1024 reclassified
PD1956 as a trust liability account that was released from
the hands of National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy.
Additionally, the EO allowed the investment of the fund in
securities and with the earning accruing then to the funds.
Under Corazon Aquino, EO 1024 was expanded by the
implementation of EO 137 so that it would also cover cost
under recovery. This meant that the account will reimburse
companies that incurred losses because of the price
changes in the domestic market. Under the EO 127 aside
from the ones mentioned, the account may also fund
increases in prices of oil due to taxes in accordance
with the Ministry of Finance with consultation to the
Ministry of Energy. In March 1991, the OPSF was found out
to have incurred 12.877 billion deficits and thus the Ministry
employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any
law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas employment, including seamen. This
adjudicatory function shall be, undertaken in
appropriate circumstances in consultation with the
Construction Industry Authority of the Philippines."
The challenged resolution and memorandum circular,
which merely further amended the previous
Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly conform to the
sufficient and valid standard of "fair and equitable
employment practices" prescribed in E.O. No. 797
can no longer be disputed.
No. The court held that it does not assume the
taxation power of legislation since the trust
liability account was specifically segregated from
the General Fund and has a specific purpose.
Any fund that was levied from the collection of
additional taxes from OPSF is designated as a
special fund that has its purpose and use limited
for the said specific purpose, which is the OPSF.
The purpose also of levying taxes is to regulate the
industry by collecting and reimbursing money for oil.
The funds are segregated from the ministry of
finance to ministry of energy that keeps it at PNB.
The fund is also under scrutiny of COA.
The test to determine if there was proper delegation
is to show that the law is: (1) complete in itself, that is
it must set forth the policy to be executed by the
delegate and (2) it must fix a standard — limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or determinable —
to which the delegate must conform.
127!
 of Energy imposed an increase in pump prices in order to
recoup the losses in around 6 months.
The petitioner contend the taxing that was imposed through
OPSF that was done by the President under the supervision
of the legislative. They claimed that taxing is unconstitutional
under OPSF as it violates Article VI, § 28 (2).
Issue: Whether EO 127 violates Article VI, §28 (2).
85 Viola v. Alunan Mr. Viola filed a case against the then DILG Secretary
(1997) Rafael Alunan for the implementation and promulgation of
Articles 3 Sec. 1-2 of the revised implementing rules and
regulations of general elections of the liga ng mga barangay
or (League of Barangay or Barangay Captains of Phil.)
st nd rd
which allows the election of 1 , 2 , and 3 Vice Presidents
in the liga ng mga barangay.
Under Sec. 1. Local Liga Chapters: The Municipal, City,
Metropolitan and Provincial Chapters shall directly elect the
following officers and directors to constitute their respective
Board of Directors, namely: President, Executive Vice-
President, First Vice-President, Second Vice-President,
Third Vice-President, Auditor, and Five (5) Directors. Sec. 2.
National Liga. The National Liga shall directly elect the
following officers and directors to constitute the National
Liga Board of Directors namely, President, Executive Vice-
President, First Vice-President, Second Vice-President,
Third Vice-President, Secretary General, Auditor, and Five
(5) Directors.
The said Article 3, Sec. 1-2 violate the LGC Sec 493 that
In this case, the provision conferring authority
upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on
petroleum products provides a sufficient
standard by which the authority must be
exercised. Section 8(c) of P.D. 1956 expressly
authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to
augment the resources of the fund. Leaving the
determination of additional amounts to be paid to the
discretion of ERB is more favorable than setting a
specific limit on "how much to tax" because it allows
for the ERB to adjust better to economic conditions
affecting the price of oil.
YES, it is valid given that the President with his
power of executive, can create, abolish, and merge
offices in the executive department for the fulfillment
of his executory duty. In the same way, the court also
recognizes the power of LGC in fixing their own
administrative offices in the barangay. Additionally,
the creation of additional offices is sanctioned by the
LGC as it states: under Sec. 493 of the LGC that it in
fact requires – and not merely authorizes – the board
of directors to “create such other positions as it may
deem necessary for the management of the chapter
The LGC sufficiently fixes the standard since the
purpose is the delivery of government services to the
local districts and the said service will not be possible
if there are missing positions that would make the
liga not as efficient and as effective as expected. It is
seen as sufficient a standard to allow the legislature
to delegate power to such local government unit in
order for it to choose well its officers as well as to
make positions it knows best more than anyone else
that would make the purpose of liga met.
128!
 limits the elective positions only to those of the president,
vice president, and five members of the board of directors.
The said additional position was actually an effect of a
decision made in Barangay National Assembly and placed
in the Constitution and By-Laws on 1994.
Issue: Whether Sec 1-2 of the Revised Implementing Rules
and Guidelines are valid.
86 Abakada v. Ermita RA 9337 or the VAT Reform Act is a law that came about
(2005) because of the amounting budget deficits that is coupled by
the realization of shortages in allocation in key areas of
government like health and education. RA 9337 is sourced
from consolidating 3 bills and upon passing as a law, was
immediately issued a TRO by the court because of the
confusion in its implementation.
The confusion came when sectors are claiming that the said
RA gives 10% additional expense to their products when in
fact it was clarified that there were exceptions and that
implementation varies from industry to industry as the RA
interacts in different ways to other existing laws and that the
exceptions to some laws should suffice enough not to
exceed or even reach the said 10% increase in prices.
However, upon looking at the provisions of the law, the
petitioners contend that Section 4, 5, and 6 of the RA 9337
amend section 106, 107, and 108 of the National Internal
Revenue Code. Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of
goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on
importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on
sale of services and use or lease of properties.
The Baranggay National Assembly that is
participated by the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga
Baranggay is authorized by the Congress to create
by-laws and the Constitution of said barangay rules
and regulations and thus also passes a sufficient
standard to promulgate rules and regulations about
the creation of additional positions. (Though in
dissenting it is the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga
Baranggay who has the power to create by-laws
since there is no mention of Barangay National
Assembly).
No. The court recognizes that the legislative under
Section 28(2) of Article VI has clear mandate to
authorize the President to fix, within specified limits,
or impose tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage, and wharfage dues and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the govt.
The petitioners argue since VAT is a tax on sale,
barter, or exchange of goods and properties as well,
the said VAT is in no way come into the purview of
those mentioned. They also mention since the
Secretary of Finance is a mere alter ego, the
President in total determines the tax.
Under the general rule, the exception in delegation of
legislative powers is subject to the following
recognized limitations:
- delegation of tariff powers to President under
Constitution
- delegation of emergency powers to President
under Constitution
129!

The said provision also grants the President, upon the
recommendation of Secretary of Finance, to increase the tax
to 12% effective on 2006 as long as certain set of condition
are set which are: 1) if the national deficit as a
percentage of GDP from last year exceeds by 1 and ½
and 2) that the VAT as percentage of GDP increases
beyond 2 and 4/5% from the previous year. They contend
that the Secretary of Finance does not have clear
prerogatives on how he could determine the increase of tax
also.
Issue: Whether RA 9337’s granting of stand-by authority in
abeyance of Secretary of Finance’s decision is an undue
delegation of power of taxation that the legislative has and
the President is bereft.
87 Beltran v. Sec. of Republic Act No. 1517 is the original bill that seek to enable
Health (2005) physicians of blood banks and blood laboratories in the
Philippines to conduct operations under the supervision of
Bureau of Research and Laboratories (BRL). However, due
to the 1980s financial crisis, the BRL’s regulatory powers
were crippled.
Meanwhile in the international scene, in 1994, the New
Tropical Medicine Foundation, with the assistance of the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
- delegation to the people at large
- delegation to local governments
- delegation to administrative bodies
The case at hand is not a delegation of legislative
power but more of an ascertainment of facts. The
power to impose the 12% VAT is contingent of
set of specified facts or conditions that are
outside the control of the executive. The use of
the word shall also should be noted as the word is a
legislative order that binds the president to enact the
said increase of 12% VAT in accordance to the order
of legislative if certain conditions are met. The said
shall removes the doubt in power of the President to
impose taxes at his own discretion. There is no
persuasive argument also of Pimentel when he says
that may is the actual implication of shall. In the
present case also, the Secretary of Finance is not
acting for the President but as an agent of the
legislative department as he anticipates the
conditions set for him to recommend the increase of
tax. The Sec. of Finance acts as an agent of
legislative that has the mandate to confirm the facts
by the use of data and analysis.
No. The test to determine undue delegation of
legislative power is to inquire in the use of terms and
that if the law sets a standard. Republic Act No. 7719
or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is
complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of
the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to
safeguard the health of the people and has
mandated several measures to attain this objective.
One of these is the phase out of commercial blood
banks in the country. The law has sufficiently
130!
released its final report of a study on the Philippine blood
banking system entitled “Project to Evaluate the Safety of
the Philippine Blood Banking System.” It was revealed that
of the blood units collected in 1992, 64.4 % were supplied
by commercial blood banks, 14.5% by the PNRC
(Philippine National Red Cross), 13.7% by government
hospital-based blood banks, and 7.4% by private hospital-
based blood banks ; showing that the Philippines heavily
relied on commercial sources of blood. It was further
found, among other things, that blood sold by persons
to blood commercial banks are three times more likely
to have any of the four (4) tested infections or blood
transfusion transmissible diseases, namely: malaria,
syphilis, Hepatitis B, and Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) than those donated to PNRC.
Furthermore, the study revealed that the blood bank donors
are paid donors around P50 to P150.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of
1994 was then enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act
seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by
promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood
banks in the country. One of the provisions of the said act
was the phasing out of commercial blood banks within 2
years from its effectivity. This is to safeguard the public
interest since these blood banks operate on profit and may
not need to impose strict rules on acquiring donors and
entices the poor. The same scheme worked in national use
of Kidney. The petitioners assail that the said phasing out of
blood banks are undue delegation of police power.
Issue: Whether R.A. 7719 is an undue delegation of power.
provided a definite standard for the guidance of the
Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that
is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe
and adequate supply of blood through voluntary
blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred
the power and authority to the Secretary of
Health as to its execution, to be exercised under
and in pursuance of the law.
The Secretary of Health has been given, under RA
No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions
of said Act. Specifically, Section 23 of
Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the
phase-out period for commercial blood banks
shall be extended for another two years until May
28, 1998 “based on the result of a careful study and
review of the blood supply and demand and public
safety.”
Thus, the court reiterates that even though there is
discretion in the extension of the date, one has to be
mindful that the unlawful delegation of legislative
power is within the capability of the agency to
determine the law and not in the said provision,
which is only to execute a clearly set standard of
phasing out blood banks.
131!
88 Bayan v. Ermita The petitioners assail the constitutionality of BP 880 with its
(2005) “no permit, no rally policy and the Calibrated Preemptive
Response (CPR). KMU (Kilusang Mayo Uno) et al. cites the
2005 case of a rally co-sponsored by KMU conducted at the
Mendiola Bridge but blocked by the police along C.M. Recto
and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed ending up with
injured members on the side of the rallyists. Another case
cited is when a rally co-sponsored by KMU and it’s a multi-
sectoral rally that was also dispersed ending into injuries
again on the side of the rally members with 3 of them being
arrested.
The petitioners assail that BP 880 as it gives undue
delegation of legislative power to the mayor by allowing
them to have the power to issue permit rallies.
No. Under the law, there is a clear and present
danger test stated in Sec. 6 (a) with reference to
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil. It is
stated that: it shall be the duty of the mayor or any
official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit
unless there is clear and convincing evidence that
the public assembly will create a clear and present
danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health.
Further, under Sec 6 (c): if the mayor is of the view
that there is imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil warranting the denial or modification
of the permit, he shall immediately inform the
applicant who must be heard on the matter.
Thus, under the BP 880, the power given to the
mayor is determined by a standard of imminent and
grave danger test that would ensure that the rejection
of applicants for rally is not arbitrarily done. If the rally
is violent therefore it should not be granted. It is
important to not that the only valid ones are peaceful
rallies.
Additionally, in cases of mayor’s inaction to an
application of rally, the court believes that as long as
there is an application and that it is not denied, the
police practicing CPR or maximum tolerance shall
allow the rally to ensue. BP 880 merely regulates the
time and place of rallies and even applications do not
need contents but rather only the time, place, and
manner.
132!
89 Abakada v. RA 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005) is an act that aims to
Purisima (2008) optimize revenue generation of BIR (Bureau of Internal
Revenue) and BOC (Bureau of Custom) by providing an
incentive fund system to the officials and members who are
employed 6 months and beyond. Petitioners assert that the
law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the
President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter.
While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and
BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their
revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%,
the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be
achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been
delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will
therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and
unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC
personnel.
Issue: Whether RA 9335 is constitutional.
3. Filling in the details
90 Fernandez v. Sto. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Resolution No. 94-
Tomas (1995) 3710 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The petitioners
are Mr. Fernandez—the director of OPIA (Office of
Personnel Inspection and Audit)—and Ms. De Lima—who is
the Director of Office of Personnel Relations (OPR).
Under the resolution, CSC has the power to (1) Re-arrange
some of the administrative units (or Offices) within the
Commission; (2) Merge the 3 Offices namely: OCSS (Office
Yes. A law sets out sufficient standards when it
provides adequate boundaries to map out the
delegate’s authority and prevent them from running
riot. The said RA does not unduly delegate power as
contained in it provisions are clearly set out
guidelines of enforcing the RA 9335. Sec. 2 contains
that purpose of the said RA, which is to increase
revenue generation. Sec. 4 gives the source of the
fund which comes from the excess of BIR and
BOC’s revenue target determined by the
Development Budget and Coordinating
Committee. The revenue estimates are the expected
revenue collection for a given fiscal year determined
by the Budget Expenditure Sources of Financing
(BESF). Sec.7 clearly maps out how an official may
be remove from civil service by falling short of target
collection and only achieves 7.5%. This is also
subject to civil service law and has to undergo due
process.
The reason for this standard is because the lack of
collection is similar to incompetency and grounds for
disciplinary action. Thus, even in the dismissal, there
is also a sufficient standard set.
Yes. An examination of Administrative Code of 1987
shows that OPIA and OPR are under the CSC. The
Resolution then allowed CSC to merge the OPIA,
OPR, and another office the OCSS into the Research
and Development Office (RDO).The Administrative
Code also provides that changes can be done if the
necessity rises. Thus, in the case there is necessity
to streamline services that compelled the
rearrangement of offices. Furthermore, Mr.
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 of Career Standards and Systems), OPIA (Office of
Personal Inspection, and Audit), and OPR or (Office of
Personal Relations) to form the RDO (Research and
Development Office); (3) Re-allocate certain functions and
carrying with it the transfer of the budget earmarked for such
function. This also meant transferring the personnel,
records, fixtures, and equipment accordingly. The petitioner
questions the undue delegation of power that the CSC
purportedly has in reassigning personnel as they claim that
the legislative only has the power to dissolve public offices.
Issue: Whether the Civil Service Commission had legal
authority to issue Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent it
merged the OCSS, OPIA, and OPR to form the RDO.
91 Chongbian v. RA 6734 is the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Orbos (1995) Muslim Mindanao that calls for a plebiscite to create the
autonomous region. The province of Lanao del Sur, Sulu,
Tawi-Tawi, and Maguindanao voted in favor of the
autonomous region out of other provinces. The said
provinces then created the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM). Those who did not vote in favor of the
autonomous region will remain in their existing
administrative region. The issue then came up when
President Aquino issued EO 429 “Providing for the
Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao”
that was amended by EO 439 that seeks to reorganize the
administrative regions in Muslim Mindanao.
Fernandez was transferred to Region V to replace
the director as he is not only expert in regional
matters but also the director will abscond the position
as he is under investigation. Same with Ms. De Lima
as she is transferred to No. 3 as her services in
public sector union is necessary.
The Court even points out that the Commission has
the power to re-arrange the offices similar to the
powers exercised by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and Office of the president. Again the
requirement is that it follows Sec. 17 which states:
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. — Each office of
the Commission shall be headed by a Director with at
least one (1) Assistant Director, and may have such
divisions as are necessary to carry out their
respective functions. As an independent
constitutional body, the Commission may effect
chances in the organization as the need arises.
No, the President has the power to merge. By virtue
of RA No. 5435, it authorizes the president with the
help of Commission on Reorganization to reorganize
the different executive departments, bureaus, offices,
agencies, and instrumentalities of government
including financial institutions and corporations
owned and controlled by it. The purpose was to
promote simplicity, economy, and efficiency in
the Government. Thus the power of
reorganization has been and still is vested within
the President and that the ARMM merely followed
the pattern set in previous legislation.
The choice of president is also logical since the
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 Issue: Whether the power to "merge" administrative regions
is legislative in character, as petitioners contend, or whether
it is executive in character, as respondents claim it is, and,
in any event, whether Art. XIX, §13 is invalid because it
contains no standard to guide the President's discretion;
92 Rodrigo v. The petitioner is a mayor who is classified as under Salary
Sandiganbayan Grade 27 and is charged with corruption under the
(1999) jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan. He contends that
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to his case as there is no
Municipal Mayor (Salary Grade of 24) in RA 6758 or the
Compensation and Position Classification. However as
mandated by Section 9 of the aforementioned law, the DBM
shall prepare INDEX OF OCCUPATIONAL SERVICES,
POSITION TITLES AND SALARY GRADES where the
position of municipal mayor is included. Thus the petitioner
questions the undue delegation of legislative power within
the exercised power by DBM in issuing the said index.
Issue: Whether a mayor is under the jurisdiction of
Sandiganbayan.
creation of administrative regions are for the purpose
of administration and direction of executive
department which the law requires to have regional
offices. The power also of reorganization of regional
offices has been traditionally lodged in the President
despite absence of any Constitutional mentions.
For the other question on whether the Congress has
established sufficient standard for the President to be
guided the court believes that aside from the
mentioned purposes above, RA 5435 is there as a
guide in reorganizing the departments. As mentioned
in the law, RA 5435 is there “to promote simplicity,
economy and efficiency in the government to
enable it to pursue programs consistent with
national goals for accelerated social and
economic development and to improve the
service in the transaction of the public business."
Yes. The LGC Section 444 mentions that the
municipal mayor shall receive monthly
compensation in accordance to RA 6758 and the
implementing guidelines issued in pursuant
thereto. Thus it shows how the mentioned statement
already qualifies the index by DBM. Furthermore, it is
absurd that the Congress needs to pass another
legislation to approve DBM’s index. Since every time
that DBM chooses to assign a grade in its index
Congress needs to pass another law regarding its
implementation. That is why there is a DBM so that
Congress will relive itself with cumbersome task and
to help fill in the details of law.
The concept of “filing in” the details bore from
the fact that the legislature may not always solve
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93 Tondo Medical v. President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled
CA (2007) “Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the
Department of Health,” which provided for the changes in
the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the
DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the DOH
refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health
services to being a provider of specific health services and
technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic
services to local government units.
In line with this, the DOH (Department of Health) launched
the HSRA (Health Sector Reform Agenda) by the HSRA
Technical Working Group. It provided 5 general areas of
reform: (1) to provide fiscal autonomy to government
the present-day problems with its direct legislative
powers. That is why the solution is expected from the
delegates who are expert in such field. Thus the
administrative agencies may implement broad
policies laid down and fill the details which the
Congress may not have the opportunity of doing so.
Congress delegated the power to determine the
assignment of salary grades and determination of
compensation and position and not the jurisdiction of
Sandiganbayan.
RA 6758 is complete in itself as it is within the Sec. 2
statement of policy on how its purpose is to
determine the equal pay for equal work and duties
and responsibilities for each position.
Finally it also fixes a standard as it fixes standards in
the salary grade of officials and how it is guided in
preparing the Index of Occupational Services.
Yes. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
clearly states: “[T]he president shall have control of
all executive departments, bureaus and offices.”
Also Executive Order No. 292, also known as the
Administrative Code of 1987 provides in SEC. 31
that:
“The President, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have
continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the
President. For this purpose, he may take any of the
following actions:
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 hospitals (2) Secure funding for priority public health
programs (3) Promote the development of local health
systems and ensure its effective performance ; (4)
Strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies (5)
Expand the coverage of NHIP (National health insurance
program). Petitioners claim that Executive Order No. 102 is
void on the ground that it was issued by the President in
excess of his authority. They maintain that the structural
and functional reorganization of the DOH is an exercise of
legislative functions, which the President usurped when he
issued Executive Order No. 102.
Issue: Whether the President has the power to reorganize
the DOH.
94 Malaria Employees Then President Estrada issued EO 102 pursuant to EO 292
and Workers and RA 8522 (also known as the General Appropriations
Association v. Act [GAA] of 1998) that provided for structural changes and
Romulo (2007) redirected the functions and operations of DOH. Estrada
later issued EO 165 that created the Presidential Committee
on Executive Governance (PCEG) composed of the
Restructure the internal organization of the Office of
the President Proper, including the immediate
offices… by abolishing consolidating or merging units
thereof or transferring functions from one unit to
another… and Transfer any agency under the Office
of the President to any other department or agency
as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the
President from other Departments or agencies.”
President is provided such power since reorganizing
his or her office can help “achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency.” To remain effective and
efficient, the offices must be capable of being shaped
and reshaped by the President in the manner the
Chief Executive deems fit to carry out presidential
directives and policies. Indubitably, the DOH is an
agency which is under the supervision and control of
the President and, thus, part of the Office of the
President.
The President did not usurp any legislative
prerogative in issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is
an exercise of the President’s constitutional power of
control over the executive department, supported by
the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized
by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this
Court.
Yes. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
clearly states: “[T]he president shall have control of
all executive departments, bureaus and offices.”
Additionally, Presidential Decree No. 1772 which
amended Presidential Decree No. 1416 expressly
137!
Executive Secretary as chair and the Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) as co-chair.
The assigned DBM secretary then issued a Notice on
Organization, Staffing and Compensation Action and PCEG
issued Memorandum 62 (entitled: Implementing Executive
Order No. 102) which would provide for a rationalization and
streamlining plan for DOH. Pursuant to Memorandum 62,
DOH then issued department and administrative orders that
(1) reorganize the personnel and plantilla (permanent
members/staff) items (2) restructuring of staff and fixing of
retirement and/or voluntary resignation of personnel (3)
system of redeployment and reorganization of members
who appealed. Thus the members of Malaria Control
Service of the DOH filed a case against EO 102 for being an
abuse of discretion.
Issue: Whether Sections 78 and 80 of the General Provision
of Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the General
Appropriation[s] Act of 1998[,] empower former President
Joseph E. Estrada to reorganize structurally and functionally
the Department of Health.
grant the President of the Philippines the
continuing authority to reorganize the national
government, which includes the power to group,
consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices,
to transfer functions, to create and classify functions,
services and activities and to standardize salaries
and materials. The validity of these two decrees [is]
unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly
provides that "all laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed or revoked." So far, there is
yet no law amending or repealing said decrees.
In fact, as pointed out by respondents, the
President’s power to reorganize the executive
department even finds further basis under Sections
78 and 80 of R.A. No. 8522.
Section 78 states: Unless otherwise provided by
law or directed by the President of the
Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in
key positions in any department or agency shall
be authorized in their respective organizational
structure and funded from appropriations provided
by this Act.
Section 80 states: The heads of departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies are hereby
directed to identify their respective activities
which are no longer essential in the delivery of
public services and which may be scaled down,
phased-out or abolished subject to Civil Service
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95 Anak v. Executive President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued EO No. 364. This
Secretary (2007) transformed the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) into
the Department of Land Reform, and placed the Presidential
Commission for Urban Poor (PCUP) and National
Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) under the
supervision and control of the Department of Land Reform.
Thereafter EO No. 379 was issued that amended EO No.
364.
It amended Section 3 of the latter, stating that the NCIP then
shall be an attached agency of the Department of Land
Reform. Petitioner AMIN contends that NCIP and PCUP are
created by statutes and therefore they cannot be affected by
executive orders.
Issue: Whether placing the Presidential Commission for the
Urban Poor (PCUP) under the supervision and control of the
DAR, and the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP) under the DAR as an attached agency is
constitutional.
rules and regulations… Actual scaling down,
phase-out or abolition of the activities shall be
effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for
the purpose by the Office of the President.
The said provisions should not be construed so
narrowly and restrictively since the reorganization
anyway is to help in making the government more
efficient.
Yes it is within the power of the executive. The
Constitution confers the power of control over
executive departments, bureaus, and offices in the
President alone. Such power conferred to the
President also places limitations on the power of the
legislative department in terms of control over
departments. “Any power, deemed to be legislative
by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by
Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere.” Furthermore the executive has the
power of carrying the laws into practical operation.
Thus, the above-mentioned delineation shows that
being passed as a law, the PCUP and NCIP are
under the power of president as he has the power to
carry out laws into practical operation. In carrying out
the statute it is assumed that the legislative had full
knowledge of existing rules and thus placing the
agencies mentioned under the president also gives
the president power over them. Thus it also justifies
the executive action to carry out reorganization
measures. The creation of an office necessarily
ordains an executive in the scheme of administrative
structure.
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4. Undue delegation
96 People v. Vera The case started when Cu Unjieng was convicted a criminal
case in the CFI of Manila under Judge Vera. Unjieng filed
the case to the Supreme Court and was remanded to a
lower court for re-trial. During the pendency of the case, he
filed for probation (suspension of jail time) under Act No.
4221 claiming that he was innocent.
After being directed to different offices, Judge Vera upon
another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set
for hearing and thereafter granted him probation. The Fiscal
of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of
probation to the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The
private prosecution (HSBC) also filed an opposition,
alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, violate the
guarantee of equal protection of the laws for the reason that
its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and
because section of the said Act endows the provincial
boards with the power to make said law effective in their
respective provinces.
Thus with the power over them, the President may
choose also to deactivate the certain office since the
President is the one best equipped to assess
whether an executive agency ought to continue
operating in accordance with its charter or the
law creating it.
Both PCUP and NCIP were formed under the Office
of the President. It then follows that the President
may transfer any agency under the Office of the
President to any other department or agency, in
order to achieve simplicity, economy, and
efficiency.
Yes. Act No. 4221, Sec. 11 reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in
which the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at
rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall
be subject to the direction of the Probation Office
In order to test whether a statute constitute an undue
delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to
see whether the statute was complete in all its terms
and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of
any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.
For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial
boards may be regarded as administrative bodies
endowed with power to determine when the Act
should take effect in their respective provinces.
140!
 Issue: Whether Act. No 4221 constitute an undue delegation
of legislative power.
97 United States v. In the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, the
Barrias (1908) defendant was charged within a violation of paragraphs 70
(prohibits the movement of a move in the Pasig River
without being towed by steam or moved by other adequate
power.) and 83 (imposing fines for violators of par. 70) of
Circular No. 397 PROMULGATED by Insular Collector of
Customs.
Petitioner, Aniceto Barrias, was caught navigating the Pasig
River using a lighter (called Maude) which is manually
powered by bamboo poles (sagwan) in violation of the
Circular No. 397. Barrias now challenged the validity of such
An examination of the probation Act shows that it
does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix
and impose upon the provincial boards any
standard or guide in the exercise of their
discretionary power, which enables the
provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion.
As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and
hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or
definite standard by which the administrative officer
or board may be guided in the exercise of the
discretionary powers delegated to it.
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to
determine for themselves, whether the Probation
Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The
applicability and application of the Probation Act
are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial
boards. If the provincial board does not wish to
have the Act applied in its province, all that it has
to do is to decline to appropriate the needed
amount for the salary of a probation officer.
No. Pursuant to Section 8 of Act No. 1136 (Act that
gives authority to Collector of Customs to license
lighterage and give punishment), there is already a
penalty provided for violators of the Act stating:
“Any person who shall violate the provisions of this
Act, or of any rule or regulation made and issued by
the Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands,
under and by authority of this Act, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall
be punished by imprisonment for not more than six
months, or by a fine of not more than one hundred
141!
 provision of the Circular as it is entirely different from the
penal provision of Act. No. 1136 which only provided a
penalty of not exceeding $100.00 (Note at that time the
peso-dollar exchange was more or less equal).
Petitioner then contends that if the acts of the Philippine
Commission bear the interpretation of authorizing the
Collector to promulgate such a law, they are void, as
constituting an illegal delegation of legislative power.
Issue: Whether the Insular Collector of Customs has the
power to promulgate penalties different from the ones
imposed by Congress.
98 United States v. On February 22, 1913, Panlilio (defendant) was notified in
Panlilio (1914) writing by a duly authorized agent of the Director of
Agriculture, that all of his carabaos in the barrio of Masamat,
municipality of Mexico, Pampanga Province, had been
exposed to the disease commonly known as rinderpest, and
that said carabaos were accordingly declared under
quarantine, and were ordered kept in a corral designated by
dollars, United States currency, or by both such fine
and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court”
Although the Congress delegated the Collector of
Customs to license lighterage, it did not authorize it
to change the penalties imposed by it. This case is
similar to The Board of Harbor Commissioners of the
Port of Eureka vs. Excelsior Redwood Company. It
was ruled that harbor commissioners cannot impose
a penalty under statues authorizing them to do so,
the court saying: "[although the] legislature could
delegate to the plaintiff the authority to make rules
and regulation...the penalty for the violation of such
rules and regulations is a matter purely in the hands
of the legislature."
Thus such a delegated power by the legislative
constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed
by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own
judgment acting immediately upon the matter of
legislation and not through the intervening mind of
another. The Collector cannot exercise a power
exclusively lodged in Congress. Hence, Barrias
should be penalized in accordance to the penalty
being imposed by Act No. 1136. In this case, the
Supreme Court determined that the proper fine is
$25.00.
No. RA 1760 provides in Article 3, 4, and 5 that:
Section 3: It would be unlawful for a person to ship
or bring animal suffering from infected into
Philippines
Section 4: Unlawful to transport suffering animals
142!
an agent of the Bureau of Agriculture and were to remain
there until released by further order of the Director of
Agriculture.
Despite this, defendant illegally and voluntarily ordered his
servants and agents to take the carabaos from the corral in
which they were then quarantined and to drive them from
one place to another in his hacienda for the purpose of
working them as if they are not quarantined. The CFI
convicted defendant of a violation of Act No. 1760 or an act
relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from
dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and
sentencing him to pay a fine of P40, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of
the trial. The accused however does not think that the
violation he committed fall under Act No. 1760 therefore he
cannot be punished.
Issue: Whether RA 1760 has been contravened
from one island, province, municipality, township or
settlement to another or expose them to highway.
Section 5: Unlawful to take an animal from the
locality that the Secretary of the Interior declares.
Except when there is a certificate procured from the
Dept of Agriculture.
Petitioner did not violate any as the animals are in
hacienda and being worked with.
Par 7: A quarantined set of animals shall be provided
by the owner and if he fails, the Dept of Agriculture
shall furnish the supplies needed and charge them
from the owner.
The act done by petitioner is not punishable and not
a penal law since:
Section 6: (c) to require that animals which are
suffering from dangerous communicable diseases or
have and for such time as may be deemed to be
placed in quarantine at such place and for such time
as may be deemed by him necessary to prevent the
spread of disease.
Section 8: Anyone who violates the provisions of this
Act shall be convicted of not more than one thousand
pesos or by imprisonment of six months.
Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of
the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made
unlawful, nor is there punishment for the violation
thereof. Respondent Panlilio's action still constitutes
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99 People v. Maceren Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes,
(1977) Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a
Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta.
Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative
Order No. 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the five
accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro
fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by
"using a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or other
end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which
was attached to the dynamo direct and with the use of these
devices or equipment catch fish thru electric current, which
destroy any aquatic animals within its cuffed reach, to the
detriment and prejudice of the populace"
The trial court dismissed the case as under Sec 11 the law
punishes: "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous
substance" in fishing. It is noteworthy since the Fisheries
Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing."
Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the
recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries,
promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G.
1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters.
a violation of the Penal Code. The Bureau of
Agriculture had ordered quarantine for respondent's
carabaos, which had been executed and completed.
Respondent's orders broke quarantine. This is
considered a plain violation of Article 581 of the
Penal Code: “Any person who shall violate the
regulations, ordinances or proclamations issued with
reference to epidemic disease among animals are
penalized.”
No. We are of the opinion that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority
in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84
and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted
under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No.
3512.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not
expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is
not banned under that law, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize
it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84
and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid
of any legal basis.
An examination of the rule-making power of
executive officials and administrative agencies and,
in particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources (now Secretary of Natural
Resources) under the Fisheries Law sustains the
view that he exceeded his authority in penalizing
electro fishing by means of an administrative order.
Although administrative officials are given such rule-
144!
 Issue: Whether electro fishing in fresh water is punished by
Admin Order No. 84-1 and Administrative Order No. 84.
100 People v. Private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A.
Dacuycuy (1989) Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school officials of Leyte,
were charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte
for violation of RA No. 4670. After their motion to dismiss
was quashed by the municipal court, they filed for a
reconsideration alleging that Section 32 of RA No. 4670 is
null and void for being unconstitutional. RA No. 4670
Section 32 provides:
Sec. 32. Penal Provision. — A person who shall wilfully
interfere with, restrain or coerce any teacher in the exercise
of his rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall in any other
manner commit any act to defeat any of the provisions of
this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not
less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand
pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
(Emphasis supplied).
They claim that Section constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power, the duration of the penalty of
imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court
as if the latter were the legislative department of the
Government.
Respondent judge Dacuycuy in his decision ruled that RA
No. 4670 is valid and constitutional. He claims that: "the
principle of separation of powers is not violated by vesting in
courts discretion as to the length of sentence or amount of
fine between designated limits in sentencing persons
making power, their power is limited only to those
that are germane to the defects and purposes of the
law and that it should conform to the standards that
the law prescribes. By such regulations, of course,
the law itself cannot be extended.
Yes. Two alternative and distinct penalties are
consequently imposed under Section 32 of RA 4670
to wit: (a) a fine ranging from P100.00 to P1,000.00;
or (b) imprisonment. It is apparent that the law has
no prescribed period or term for the imposable
penalty of imprisonment. While a minimum and
maximum amount for the penalty of fine is specified,
there is no equivalent provision for the penalty of
imprisonment, although both appear to be qualified
by the phrase "in the discretion of the court.
In the case under consideration, the respondent
judge erronneously assumed that since the penalty
of imprisonment has been provided for by the
legislature, the court is endowed with the discretion
to ascertain the term or period of imprisonment. We
cannot agree with this postulate. It is not for the
courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no
points of reference have been provided by the
legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and
sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the length
of service of a term of imprisonment which must be
encompassed within specific or designated limits
provided by law, the absence of which designated
limits well constitute such exercise as an undue
delegation, if not-an outright intrusion into or
assumption, of legislative power.
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an
145!
 convicted of crime. In such instance, the exercise of judicial
discretion by the courts is not an attempt to use legislative
power or to prescribe and create a law”
Issue: Whether Section 32 of said Republic Act No. 4670 is
constitutional.
101 Cebu Oxygen v. Petitioner and the union of its rank and file employees, Cebu
Drilon (1989) Oxygen, Acetylene and Central Visayas Employees
Association (COAVEA) entered into a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) covering the years 1986 to 1988.
Pursuant thereto, the management gave salary increases
wherein it was agreed that: on the first year of the
AGREEMENT, each employee will get a P200 increase. On
the second year, each employee will get P200. On the third
year, each employee will get P300. It was also stated that
if the wage adjustment of allowance increases decreed
by law, legislation or presidential edict in any particular
year shall be higher than the foregoing increases in that
particular year, then the company shall pay the
difference.
RA No. 6640 was passed increasing the minimum wage.
The Secretary of Labor then issued the pertinent rules
implementing the provisions of RA No. 6640. Under Section
8 (Wage Increase Under Individual/Collective Agreements)
of the implementing rule, it prohibits the employer from
crediting anniversary wage increases negotiated under
a collective bargaining agreement against such wage
increases mandated by RA No. 6640.
Accordingly, petitioner credited the first year increase of
P200.00 under the CBA and added the difference of P61.66
(rounded to P62.00) and P31.00 to the monthly salary and
the 13th month pay, respectively, of its employees from the
indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither a
minimum nor a maximum duration having been set
by the legislative authority. The courts are thus
given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term
of imprisonment, without even the benefit of any
sufficient standard.
No. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6640, do not
prohibit the crediting of CBA anniversary wage
increases for purposes of compliance with Republic
Act No. 6640. The implementing rules cannot provide
for such a prohibition not contemplated by the law.
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law, and should
be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general provisions. The law itself cannot be
expanded by such regulations. An administrative
agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
Thus petitioner's contention that the salary increases
granted by it pursuant to the existing CBA including
anniversary wage increases should be considered in
determining compliance with the wage increase
mandated by Republic Act No. 6640, is correct.
Petitioner therefor correctly credited its employees
P62.00 for the differential of two (2) months increase
and P31.00 each for the differential in 13th month
pay, after deducting the P200.00 anniversary wage
increase for 1987 under the CBA. Indeed, it is
stipulated in the CBA that in case any wage
adjustment or allowance increase decreed by law,
legislation or presidential edict in any particular year
shall be higher than the foregoing increase in that
146!
effectivity of RA No. 6640 on December 14, 1987 to particular year, then the company (petitioner) shall
February 15, 1988. pay the difference.

A Labor and Employment Development Officer, pursuant to

his Inspection Authority, commenced a routine inspection of
petitioner's establishment. He found out that based on
payrolls and other records petitioner committed violations of
the law by under paying his employees under RA No. 6640
covering the period of two (2) months representing 208
employees who are not receiving wages above P100/day
prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6640 and under payment
of 13th month pay for the year 1987, representing 208
employees who are not receiving wages above P 100/day
prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6640.

Petitioner contends that the anniversary wage increases

under the CBA can be credited against the wage increase
mandated by Republic Act No. 6640. Hence, petitioner
contended that inasmuch as it had credited the first year
increase negotiated under the CBA, it was liable only for a
salary differential of P 62.00 and a 13th month pay
differential of P31.00. Petitioner argued that the payment of
the differentials constitutes full compliance with Republic Act
No. 6640. Petitioner also believes that Section 8 of the
rules implementing the provisions of Republic Act No.
6640 particularly the provision excluding anniversary
wage increases from being credited to the wage
increase provided by said law is null and void on the
ground that the same unduly expands the provisions of
the said law.

Issue: Whether the Implementing Order of the Secretary of

Labor and Employment (DOLE) can provide for a prohibition
not contemplated by the law it seeks to implement.

147!
102 Ynot v. Executive Order No. 626-A prohibits the interprovincial
Intermediate movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not
Apellate Court complying with the requirements of Executive Order No.
(1987) 626. It states that: No carabao xxx and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another. xxx subject to
confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit.
Petitioner Ynot still managed to circumvent the prohibition
by transporting carabeef instead. This happened when
petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo. They were confiscated by the police
station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. RTC upheld the
decision to confiscate the carabaos. Intermediate Appellate
Court also upheld the trial court.
The thrust of Petitioner’s petition is that the executive order
is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported
across provincial boundaries. He complains that the
measure should not have been presumed, and so
sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the
improper exercise of the legislative power by the former
President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution
(EXTRAORDINARY power of Marcos to make laws if “in
his judgment” the legislative cannot produce an
immediate action).
Issue: Whether there is an undue delegation of legislative
power as it empowers the Chairman of the National Meant
Inspection Commission to distribute the confiscate property
as “may see fit”
Yes. The issue pertains to the questionable manner
of the disposition of the confiscated property as
prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is
there authorized that the seized property shall "be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar
institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal
as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the
case of carabaos."
The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous
and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden
with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse,
and even corruption. One searches in vain for the
usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or
better still, the limitations that the said officers must
observe when they make their distribution. There is
none.
Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be
the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by
what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers
named can supply the answer, they and they alone
may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their
own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a
"roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority
that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
148!
103 Pharmaceutical v. (Same as Case # 29)
DOH (2007)
On October 28, 1986, President Corazon Aquino, by virtue
of the legislative powers granted to the president under the
Freedom Constitution, issued Executive Order No. 51 (Milk
Code). One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code
states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes
(ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly
(WHA) in 1981. From 1982-2006, the WHA adopted several
Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be
supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be
ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for
breastmilk substitutes. The Philippines ratified the
International Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990.
Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties
should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and
child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society,
specially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding.
Petitioner assails the Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 or
the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Executive Order No. 51 (RIRR). DOH acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in violation
of the provisions of the Constitution in promulgating the
RIRR.
Issue: Whether Section 13 of the RIRR on Total Effect
provides sufficient standards.
Yes. Section 13 of the RIRR states:
"Total Effect" - Promotion of products within the
scope of this Code must be objective and should not
equate or make the product appear to be as good or
equal to breastmilk or breastfeeding in the
advertising concept. It must not in any case
undermine breastmilk or breastfeeding. xxx
Such standards bind the Inter-Agency Committee
(IAC) in formulating its rules and regulations on
advertising, promotion, and marketing. Through that
single provision, the DOH exercises control over the
information content of advertising, promotional and
marketing materials on breastmilk vis-a-vis
breastmilk substitutes, supplements and other
related products. It also sets a viable standard
against which the IAC may screen such materials
before they are made public.
Such policy is already enough of a standard to be a
valid guide for the agency. In In Equi-Asia
Placement, Inc. vs. Department of Foreign Affairs,
the court already ruled that it has accepted in the
past as sufficient standards the following: "public
interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience
and welfare," and "simplicity, economy and welfare."
In this case, correct information as to infant feeding
and nutrition is infused with public interest and
welfare.
149!
104 Abakada v. (See above, Case # 89)
Purisima (2008)
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue
the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335, to be
approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created for such purpose.
Petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight
committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers. While the legislative function is
deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment
and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional
oversight committee permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law. Section 12 of
RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. – There
is hereby created a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate
and seven Members from the House of Representatives.
The Members from the Senate shall be appointed by the
Senate President, with at least two senators representing
the minority. The Members from the House of
Representatives shall be appointed by the Speaker with at
least two members representing the minority. After the
Oversight Committee will have approved the implementing
rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter become
functus officio and therefore cease to exist.
Issue: Whether the Congressional Oversight Committee is
unconstitutional.
Yes. In the case of Macalintal v. Commission on
Elections, Congressional Oversight was explained. It
was stated that: The power of oversight embraces
all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance
its understanding of and influence over the
implementation of legislation it has enacted.
Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment
measures undertaken by Congress to monitor
bureaucratic compliance with program
objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are
properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive
waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive
usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to
assess executive conformity with the
congressional perception of public interest. Along
with such power, Congress exercises supervision
over the executive agencies through its veto power. It
typically utilizes veto provisions when granting the
President or an executive agency the power to
promulgate regulations with the force of law. These
provisions require the President or an agency to
present the proposed regulations to Congress, which
Congress in turn has the "right" to approve or
disapprove any regulation before it takes effect.
However, critics criticize the legislative veto as undue
encroachment upon the executive prerogatives. They
contend that legislative veto is an intrusion into the
powers vested in the executive or judicial branches
of government.
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional
oversight is not unconstitutional per se. Rather, it is
integral to the checks and balances inherent in a
150!
 democratic system of government. It may in fact
even enhance the separation of powers as it
prevents the over-accumulation of power in the
executive branch. However, to forestall the danger of
congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative
sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and
related constraints on Congress. It may not vest
itself, any of its committees or its members with
either executive or judicial power. Thus, any post-
enactment congressional measure such as this
should be limited to scrutiny and investigation.

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative

agencies to implement and interpret the law which
they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law
and are entitled to respect. Such rules and
regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are
just as binding as if they have been written in the
statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect
of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality
and legality until they are set aside with finality in an
appropriate case by a competent court. Congress, in
the guise of assuming the role of an overseer, may
not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its
stamp of approval without disturbing the calculated
balance of powers established by the Constitution. In
exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the
IRR based on a determination of whether or not they
conformed with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress
arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
105 Philippine Coconut In 1971, Republic Act No. (RA) 6260 was enacted creating Yes. It should be recalled that the actual distribution
Producers the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the of the bank shares was admittedly an enormous
Federation, Inc. Coconut Investment Fund (CIF), which, under Section 8 operational problem which resulted in the failure of

151!
(COCOFED) v. thereof, was to be sourced from a PhP 0.55 levy on the sale
Republic (2012) of every 100 kg. of copra. Of the PhP 0.55 levy of which the
copra seller was, or ought to be, issued COCOFUND
receipts, PhP 0.02 was placed at the disposition of
COCOFED, the national association of coconut producers
declared by the Philippine Coconut Administration
(PHILCOA, now PCA) as having the largest membership.
The declaration of martial law in September 1972 saw the
issuance of several presidential decrees (P.Ds.) purportedly
designed to improve the coconut industry through the
collection and use of the coconut levy fund. The following
were some of the issuances on the coco levy, its collection
and utilization, how the proceeds of the levy will be
managed and by whom, and the purpose it was supposed to
serve: (1) P.D. No. 276 (established the Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) and declared the
proceeds of the CCSF levy as trust fund, to be utilized to
subsidize the sale of coconut-based products, thus
stabilizing the price of edible oil.); (2) P.D. No. 582 (created
the Coconut Industry Development Fund [CIDF] to finance
the operation of a hybrid coconut seed farm.); (3) P.D. No.
755 (authorizing the PCA to distribute, for free, the shares of
stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers.); (4)
P.D. No. 961 codified the various laws relating to the
development of coconut/palm oil industries; (5) P.D. No.
1468 (mandated the levies as private fund and not gov’t
trust funds); and (6) Letter of Instructions No. (LOI) 926,
Series of 1979, made reference to the creation, out of
other coco levy funds, of the Coconut Industry
Investment Fund (CIIF) in P.D. No. 1468 and entrusted a
portion of the CIIF levy to UCPB for investment, on
behalf of coconut farmers, in oil mills and other private
corporations. Thus basically, the LOI authorizes the
the intended beneficiaries to receive their shares of
stocks in the bank. Thus under Section 9 of the PCA
Administrative Order No. 1 (Rules & Regulations for
Distribution of Shares), the remaining undistributed
shares will be given to coconut farmers who have
qualified and received equity in the Bank and shall be
apportioned among them.
Thus, when 51,200,806 shares in the bank remained
undistributed, the PCA deemed it proper to give a
bonanza to coconut farmers who already got their
bank shares, by giving them an additional share for
each share owned by them and by converting their
fractional shares into full shares. The rest of the
shares were then transferred to a private
organization, the COCOFED, for distribution to those
determined to be bona fide coconut farmers who had
not received shares of stock of the Bank. .
The PCA thus assumed, due to lack of adequate
guidelines set by P.D. No. 755, that it had complete
authority to define who are the coconut farmers
and to decide as to who among the coconut
farmers shall be given the gift of bank
shares; how many shares shall be given to them,
and what basis it shall use to determine the amount
of shares to be distributed for free to the coconut
farmers. In other words, P.D. No. 755 fails the
completeness test which renders it constitutionally
infirm.
In the instant case, the requisite standards or criteria
are absent in P.D. No. 755. As may be noted, the
decree authorizes the PCA to distribute to coconut
152!
UCPB to invest through CIIF the funds in private
corporations.
Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went
directly or indirectly to various projects and/or was converted
into different assets or investments. In this case, the issue
started when the fund was used to invest to First United
Bank (FUB), later renamed UCPB. FUB was the bank of
choice since Pedro Cojuangco group (collectively, Pedro
Cojuangco) had control of it. The plan, then, was for PCA to
buy all of Pedro Cojuangcos shares in FUB. However, as
later events unfolded, a simple direct sale from the seller
(Pedro) to PCA did not ensue as it was made to appear that
Cojuangco, Jr. had the exclusive option to acquire the
formers FUB controlling interests.
Emerging from this elaborate, circuitous arrangement were
two deeds; the first, simply denominated as Agreement,
entered into by and between Cojuangco, Jr., for and in his
behalf and in behalf of certain other buyers, and Pedro
Cojuangco, purportedly accorded Cojuangco, Jr. the option
to buy 72.2% of FUBs outstanding capital stock, or 137,866
shares (the option shares, for brevity), at PhP 200 per
share. The second but related contract, was denominated
as Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for
the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers of the Philippines. It had
PCA, for itself and for the benefit of the coconut farmers,
purchase from Cojuangco, Jr. the shares of stock subject of
the First Agreement for PhP 200 per share. As additional
consideration for PCAs buy-out of what Cojuangco, Jr.
would later claim to be his exclusive and personal option, it
was stipulated that, from PCA, Cojuangco, Jr. shall receive
equity in FUB amounting to 10%, or 7.22%, of the 72.2%, or
fully paid shares. Apart from the aforementioned 72.2%,
farmers, for free, the shares of stocks of UCPB and
to pay from the CCSF levy the financial commitments
of the coconut farmers under the Agreement for the
acquisition of such bank. Yet, the decree does not
even state who are to be considered as coconut
farmers. Would, say, one who plants a single
coconut tree be already considered a coconut farmer
and, therefore, entitled to own UCPB shares? If so,
how many shares shall be given to him? The
definition of a coconut farmer and the basis as to the
number of shares a farmer is entitled to receive for
free are important variables to be determined by law
and cannot be left to the discretion of the
implementing agency.
Moreover, P.D. No. 755 did not identify or delineate
any clear condition as to how the disposition of the
UCPB shares or their conversion into private
ownership will redound to the advancement of the
national policy declared under it. To recall, P.D. No.
755 seeks to accelerate the growth and development
of the coconut industry and achieve a vertical
integration thereof so that coconut farmers will
become participants in, and beneficiaries of, such
growth and development. The said law gratuitously
gave away public funds to private individuals, and
converted them exclusively into private property
without any restriction as to its use that would reflect
the avowed national policy or public purpose.
Additionally, as stated earlier, Section 9 allowed
51,200,806 shares of the bank that remained
undistributed by PCA to distribute. The problem is
that PCA devised its own rules under PCA AO 1 and
153!
PCA purchased from other FUB shareholders 6,534 shares.
While the 64.98% portion of the option shares (72.2% 7.22%
= 64.98%) stocks were purchased for the farmers, the
corresponding stock certificates were placed in the name of
and delivered to PCA. Additionally, there were ALSO shares
forming part of the aforesaid 64.98% portion, which ended
up in the hands of non-farmers. The remaining 27.8% of the
FUB capital stock were not covered by any of the
agreements.
Under paragraph 8 of the second agreement, PCA agreed
to expeditiously distribute the FUB shares purchased to
such coconut farmers holding registered COCOFUND
receipts on equitable basis. Shortly after the execution of the
PCA Cojuangco, Jr. Agreement, President Marcos issued,
P.D. No. 755 directing, as earlier narrated, PCA to use the
CCSF and CIDF (other areas funded by the COCOFUND) to
acquire a commercial bank to provide coco farmers with
readily available credit facilities at preferential rate, and PCA
to distribute, for free, the bank shares to coconut farmers.
After the 1986 EDSA, President Aquino issued Executive
Order Nos. (E.Os.) 1, 2 and 14, as amended by E.O. 14-A
(creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Governance) to pursue ill-gotten wealth and assets of
Marcos. Thus petitioners here are representing coconut
farmers to assail the ANOMALOUS PURHCASE OF FUB
USING THE FUNDS OF FARMERS.
Resolution No. 078-74 as to how these undistributed
and fractional shares shall be disposed of,
notwithstanding the dearth as to the standards or
parameters in the laws which it sought to implement.
Likewise, the said PCA issuances did not take note
of the national policy or public purpose for which the
coconut levy funds were imposed under P.D. No.
755, i.e. the acceleration of the growth and
development of the entire coconut industry, and the
achievement of a vertical integration thereof that
could make the coconut farmers participants in, and
beneficiaries of, such growth and development.
Instead, the PCA prioritized the coconut farmers
themselves by fully disposing of the bank shares,
totally disregarding the national policy for which the
funds were created. This is clearly an undue
delegation of legislative powers.

Through the help of the PCGG, represented by the

Republic, the case went to the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan ruled that P.D. 755 is unconstitutional.
Additionally, the sequestered UCPB shares belong now to
the Republic.

154!
 Issue: Whether Section 1 of P.D. No. 755, as well as PCA
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1975 (PCA AO 1), and
Resolution No. 074-75, are invalid delegations of legislative
power.
5. Executive Misapplication
106 Tatad v. Sec (DOE) In 1984, President Marcos through Section 8 of Presidential
(1997) Decree No. 1956, created the Oil Price Stabilization Fund
(OPSF) to cushion the effects of frequent changes in the
price of oil caused by exchange rate adjustments or
increase in the world market prices of crude oil and imported
petroleum products. The fund is used (1) to reimburse the oil
companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported
petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustment
and/or increase in world market prices of crude oil, and (2)
to reimburse oil companies for cost underrecovery incurred
as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum
products.
The OPSF is sourced from (1) tax or customs duty imposed
on petroleum products; (2) tax collection as a result of the
lifting of tax exemptions of government corporations; (3) any
additional amount gathered from companies importing,
manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum products; or (4)
any resulting peso costs differentials in case the actual peso
costs paid by oil companies in the importation of crude oil
and petroleum products is less than the peso costs
computed using the reference foreign exchange rate as
fixed by the Board of Energy.
Congress on the other hand enacted RA 8180 that provides
for the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry (Oil
Deregulation Law). The deregulation process has two
phases: the transition phase and the full deregulation phase.
(1) No. It has been held in Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. VS. POEA that there are two accepted tests to
determine whether or not there is a valid delegation
of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and
the sufficient standard test.
Given the groove of the Court's rulings, the attempt
of petitioners to strike down section 15 on the ground
of undue delegation of legislative power cannot
prosper. Section 15 can hurdle both the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It
will be noted that Congress expressly provided in
R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the
end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of
any event. Full deregulation at the end of March
1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no
discretion to postpone it for any purported reason.
Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final
date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the
President is to advance the date of full deregulation
before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays down
the standard to guide the judgment of the President
— he is to time it as far as practicable when the
prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the
world market are declining and when the exchange
rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
Petitioners contend that the words "as far as
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During the transition phase, controls of the non-pricing
aspects of the oil industry were to be lifted. The following
were to be accomplished: (1) liberalization of oil importation,
exportation, manufacturing, marketing and distribution, (2)
implementation of an automatic pricing mechanism, (3)
implementation of an automatic formula to set margins of
dealers and rates of haulers, water transport operators and
pipeline concessionaires, and (4) restructuring of oil taxes.
Upon full deregulation, controls on the price of oil and the
foreign exchange cover were to be lifted and the OPSF was
to be abolished.
Petitioner contend that Section 15 of E.O. 392 constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power to the President
and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a
determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive
Branch in determining when to implement the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Petitioners
contend that the law does not define when it is practicable
for the Secretary of Energy to recommend to the President
the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry or when
the President may consider it practicable to declare full
deregulation. Also, the law does not provide any specific
standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the
world market are considered to be declining nor when the
exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered
stable.
Sec. 15. Implementation of Full Deregulation — Pursuant to
section 5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon
approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of
the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As
far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation
when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the
practicable," "declining" and "stable" should have
been defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set
determinate or determinable standards. The stubborn
submission deserves scant consideration. The
dictionary meanings of these words are well settled
and cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence.
Webster defines "practicable" as meaning possible to
practice or perform, "decline" as meaning to take a
downward direction, and "stable" as meaning firmly
established.
(2) Yes. E.O. 392 sourced its power from RA 8180
but claimed that the President can consider the
depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in fully
deregulating the downstream oil industry last
February 1997.
A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily
reveal that it only enumerated two factors to be
considered by the Department of Energy and the
Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time when the
prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the
world market are declining, and (2) the time when the
exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar
is stable. Section 15 did not mention the depletion of
the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight by the
Executive before ordering full deregulation.
We therefore hold that the Executive department
failed to follow faithfully the standards set by R.A. No.
8180 when it considered the extraneous factor of
depletion of the OPSF fund. The misappreciation of
this extra factor cannot be justified on the ground that
the Executive department considered anyway the
156!
 world market are declining and when the exchange rate of
the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable . . .
On February 8, 1997, the President implemented the full
deregulation of the Downstream Oil Industry through
E.O. No. 372.
Issues: (1) Whether Sec. 15 of RA 8180 is unconstitutional
(2) Whether E.O. 392 is a misapplication of RA 8180
108 Tatad v. Sec (DOE) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that
(1997) (MR) Executive Order No. 392 is not a misapplication of Republic
Act No. 8180. Petitioners insist that there was no
misapplication of Republic Act No. 8180 when the Executive
considered the depletion of the OPSF in advancing the date
of full deregulation of the downstream oil industry. They urge
that the consideration of this factor did not violate the rule
that the exercise of delegated power must be done strictly in
accord with the standard provided in the law. They contend
that the rule prohibits the Executive from subtracting but not
from adding to the standard set by Congress.
stability of the prices of crude oil in the world market
and the stability of the exchange rate of the peso to
the dollar. By considering another factor to hasten
full deregulation, the Executive department
rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. 8180. The
Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by
subtraction or addition the standards set in R.A. No.
8180 for it has no power to make laws.
In the cases at bar, the Executive co-mingled the
factor of depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors
of decline of the price of crude oil in the world market
and the stability of the peso to the US dollar. On the
basis of the text of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to
determine the weight given by the Executive
department to the depletion of the OPSF fund. It
could well be the principal consideration for the early
deregulation. It could have been accorded an equal
significance. Or its importance could be nil. In light of
this uncertainty, we rule that the early deregulation
under E.O. No. 392 constitutes a MISAPPLICATION
of R.A. No. 8180.
Yes. This hair splitting is a sterile attempt to make a
distinction when there is no difference. The choice
and crafting of the standard to guide the exercise of
delegated power is part of the lawmaking process
and lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress.
The standard cannot be altered in any way by the
Executive for the Executive cannot modify the will of
the Legislature. To be sure, public respondents do
not cite any authority to support its strange thesis for
there is none in our jurisprudence.
157!
 Issue: Whether Executive Order No. 392 is a misapplication
of Republic Act No. 8180.
6. Mere Directive
109 Dagan v. PRC The controversy stemmed from the 11 August 2004 directive
(2009) issued by the Philippine Racing Commission (Philracom)
directing the Manila Jockey Club, Inc. (MJCI) and Philippine
Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI) to immediately come up with their
respective Clubs’ House Rule to address Equine Infectious
Anemia (EIA) problem and to rid their facilities of horses
infected with EIA. Said directive was issued pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 5 dated 28 March 1994 by the
Department of Agriculture declaring it unlawful for any
person, firm or corporation to ship, drive, or transport horses
from any locality or place except when accompanied by a
certificate issued by the authority of the Director of the
Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI). In compliance with the
directive, MJCI and PRCI ordered the owners of racehorses
stable in their establishments to submit the horses to blood
sampling and administration of the Coggins Test to
determine whether they are afflicted with the EIA virus.
Petitioners and racehorse owners William Dagan (Dagan) et
al. refused to comply with the directive. First, they alleged
that there had been no prior consultation with horse owners.
Second, they claimed that neither official guidelines nor
regulations had been issued relative to the taking of blood
samples. And third, they asserted that no documented case
of EIA had been presented to justify the undertaking.
Despite resistance from petitioners, the blood testing
proceeded. The horses, whose owners refused to comply
were banned from the races, were removed from the actual
day of race, prohibited from renewing their licenses or
evicted from their stables.
No. The validity of an administrative issuance, such
as the assailed guidelines, hinges on compliance
with the following requisites: (1) Its promulgation
must be authorized by the legislature; (2) It must be
promulgated in accordance with the prescribed
procedure; (3) It must be within the scope of the
authority given by the legislature; (4) It must be
reasonable. All the prescribed requisites are met
with regard to the questioned issuances.
The rule is that what has been delegated cannot be
delegated, or as expressed in the Latin maxim:
potestas delegate non delegare potest. This rule
however admits of recognized exceptions such as
the grant of rule-making power to administrative
agencies. Delegated rule-making has become a
practical necessity in modern governance due to the
increasing complexity and variety of public functions.
However there must be a showing that the delegation
itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete
in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the
delegate; and (b) fixes a standard—the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate and determinable.
In this case, Philracom was created for the purpose
of carrying out the declared policy in Section 1 which
is "to promote and direct the accelerated
development and continued growth of horse racing
not only in pursuance of the sports development
program but also in order to insure the full
158!
When their complaint went unheeded, the racehorse owners
lodged a complaint before the Office of the President (OP).
Petitioners maintain that the assailed guidelines do not
comply with due process requirements. Petitioners insist
that racehorses already in the MJCI stables were allowed to
be so quartered because the individual horse owners had
already complied with the Philracom regulation that horses
should not bear any disease. There was neither a directive
nor a rule that racehorses already lodged in the stables of
the racing clubs should again be subjected to the collection
of blood samples preparatory to the conduct of the EIA
tests. Thus it came to them as a surprise that Philracom
demanded a Coggins Test.
Issue: Whether respondents had acted with whim and
caprice in the implementation of the contested guideline.
exploitation of the sport as a source of revenue and
employment." Furthermore, Philracom was granted
exclusive jurisdiction and control over every aspect of
the conduct of horse racing, including the framing
and scheduling of races, the construction and safety
of race tracks, and the security of racing. P.D. No.
420 is already complete in itself.
Section 9 (Specific Powers) of the law fixes the
standards and limitations to which Philracom must
conform in the performance of its functions. Among
them is the power to enforce and prescribe rules
regarding horse-racing. Clearly, there is a proper
legislative delegation of rule-making power to
Philracom. Clearly too, for its part Philracom has
exercised its rule-making power in a proper and
reasonable manner. More specifically, its discretion
to rid the facilities of MJCI and PRCI of horses
afflicted with EIA is aimed at preserving the security
and integrity of horse races.
There is no delegation of power to speak of between
Philracom, as the delegator and MJCI and PRCI as
delegates. The Philracom DIRECTIVE is merely
instructive in character. Philracom had instructed
PRCI and MJCI to "immediately come up with Club’s
House Rule to address the problem and rid their
facilities of horses infected with EIA." PRCI and MJCI
followed-up when they ordered the racehorse owners
to submit blood samples and subject their race
horses to blood testing.
159!
Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators
who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the
Philippines, as may be provided by law.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a:
1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines
2. At least thirty-five years of age on the day of the election
3. Able to read and write
4. A registered voter
5. A resident of the Philippines for not less than two years
immediately preceding the day of the election
The day of the election is the day that the votes are cast.
Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and
shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term of which he was elected.
A person may serve as a senator for more than 2 terms, provided
they are not consecutive.
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed
by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum
of the total number of representatives including those under the party
list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based
on the standards provided in this section.
Classification of House Representatives
1. District Representatives – Elected on the basis of geographic
divisions called legislative / congressional [Primer] districts (elected
based on geographic location).
2. Party-List Representatives – Elected through the party-list system
(elected at large).
160!
 Qualifications for Party-list Representatives: (RA 7941, Sec. 9)
1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines
2. Registered Voter
3. Resident of the Philippines for at least 1 year immediately
preceding the day of the election
4. Able to read and write
5. Bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least 90 days preceding the day of the election
6. At least 25 years of age on the day of the election
(If he represents the youth sector, he must be at least 25 years old
but not more than 30 on the day of the election)

Can a party nominate a person who is not a member of the

sector that is represented by the party?
Disqualifications for Party-list Groups under RA 7941: (Sec. 6)
1. Religious sect or denomination, organization or association
organized for religious purposes (but a religious person / leader may
be elected, the prohibition is on the religious sector if it will be
represented)
2. Advocates violence or unlawful means
3. Foreign party or organization
4. Receives support from any foreign government, foreign political
party, or organization directly or indirectly
5. Violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to
elections
6. Declares untruthful statements in its petition
7. Ceased to exist for at least 1 year
8. Fails to participate in the last 2 preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least 2% of the votes cast under the party-list system in the
2 preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered

161!
Party-list representation

1. The twenty percent allocation

The combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed
twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party-list.

The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is not mandatory. It

merely provides the ceiling as to the maximum number of party-list
seats in Congress. (Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec, 2000)

2. The two percent threshold

Only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total How do we determine the number of seats for Party-list
valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat representatives and the additional seats?
in the House of Representatives.

Only those garnering an additional two percent are qualified to have

an additional seat. (Veterans)
Banat has removed this additional requirement and declared it as
unconstitutional as it prevents the filling up of all the party-list seats.

3. The three-seat limit each

A qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
“qualifying” and two additional seats.

4. Proportional Representation
The additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed “in proportion to their total number of votes.”
Banat (2009) has abandoned the formula provided for in Veterans
(2000) as it declared the 2% threshold to be unconstitutional since it
makes it impossible to achieve the maximum number of available
party-list seats.

162!
1. Determine the number of seats allocated for party-list Those garnering sufficient number of votes according to the ranking
representatives. Divide the total number of legislative districts by in the first round, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to
80% and multiplying the quotient by 20%. This is the total number of their total number of votes. Then, one party-list seat is given to each
party-list seats. of the parties next in rank until ALL the additional seats are allocated.
FORMULA: (SECOND ROUND)
# of District Reps. = Total # of Reps. x 0.2 - First, multiply the percentage of votes of every qualified
0.8 party (#3) by the number of remaining available seats. The product,
rounded down, is the number of additional seats that party is entitled
(example) to.
234 = 292.5 Representatives Illustration: [in the example, there are 58 maximum seats
0.8 reserved for the party-list system, less the number of guaranteed
seats already distributed (FIRST ROUND). There are 45 available
20% of 292.5 = 58.5 Party-list Representatives seats for distribution].
So, for the Buhay Party-list, the formula would be: 0.0444 x
2. The parties are then ranked on the basis of their percentage of 45 = 1.998 (Part “(C)”)
votes in proportion to the total number of votes cast for party-list - Second, assign one party-list seat to each of the parties
candidates. next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed.

3. All parties that garnered at least 2% of the votes qualify for 1 seat
in Congress. This is the FIRST ROUND
- The total percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate
is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party
by the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. (Part “(A)”
in the table)
4.
FORMULA FOR ADDITIONAL SEATS:
Additional seats = Max. seats reserved for party-list (-) Guaranteed
seats for the 2-percenters
5. Ensure that each party is entitled to no more than 3 party-list
(example) seats.
45 Additional seats = 58.5 (-) 13 Guaranteed seats for the 2-
percenters NOTE:
- In case of fractional seats, they shall be disregarded as the law
does not provide for rounding off.

163!

Apportionment
Apportionment – the determination of the number of
representatives which a State, county [..?] or other subdivision may
send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative
body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district
lines so as to equalize the population.
Reapportionment – the realignment or change in legislative districts
brought about by changes in population and mandated by the
constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
Rules on Apportionment
1. It must be in accordance with the number of respective inhabitants
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio.
2. Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.
3. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand,
or each province, shall have at least one representative.
4. Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based
on the standards provided in this section.

Reapportionment may be done through a special law or through a

city charter.

Congress cannot delegate the power to create a province or city

because this power inherently involves the power to create a
legislative district. A delegate cannot alter the very composition of
the Congress by creating legislative districts (or cities / provinces
which are in turn, entitled to legislative representation). (Sema v.
Comelec, 2008)
The creation of legislative districts does NOT need confirmation by
Gerrymandering – the formation of one legislative district out of plebiscite, IF it does not involve the creation of a local government
separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party. unit.
It is not allowed.

164!
 Section 5. Composition of the House of Representatives; Apportionment and Representation
I. Party-list representation (Par. 2)
110 Ang Bagong During the 2001 elections, COMELEC decided to deny Yes. Under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the
Bayani-OFW some manifestation of some of the political party’s intent to Constitution, political parties that are registered may be
Labor Party join the elections. Through Omnibus Resolution 3785, voted upon. Additionally, under RA 7941, private
v. COMELEC COMELEC wrote that “it must recognize the fact that there respondents cannot be disqualified. The RA provides that
(2001) is a need to keep the number of sectoral parties, members of House of Representative (HOR) may be
organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, elected through a party-list system registered national,
keeping only those who substantially comply with the rules regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. Section 3
and regulations” expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a
sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point,
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed the law defines "political party" as "an organized group of
before the COMELEC a Petition praying that "the names of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
some of herein respondents be deleted from the 'Certified policies for the general conduct of government and which,
List of Political Parties/Sectoral as the most immediate means of securing their adoption,
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party- regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
list System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said members as candidates for public office." Furthermore,
certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an Article IX of the Constitution is fulfilled when that the said
alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not party-list must be registered under the party-list system for
be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees its votes to be counted.
not be proclaimed. Other petitioners also filed to
COMELEC to proclaim the disqualification of other parties. Christian Monsod pointed out the rationale. He said that the
party-list may be in the form of regional, national, or sectoral
The petitioner, dissatisfied with the pace of COMELEC filed since he claims that it gives a chance for parties who often
a case in the Supreme Court. The petitioner objects to the lose in their district elections but nonetheless commands a
inclusion of political parties in the party-list system. nationwide membership of like 1,000,000 that may warrant
Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major it six representatives in the HOR. It is then to give them
political parties" as part of the party-list system and wanted voice in the Assembly.
such parties to be disqualified.
This party could be a political party or a sectoral party or
Issue: Whether political parties may participate in the party- coalition party. Therefore political parties—even major
list elections. ones—are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
111 Veterans Article VI, Sec. 5 provides for the number of members in (1) No it does not have to be mandatory. The formula for the
Federation the House of Representatives, as well as the 20% number of seats given to the party-list representatives is

165!
Party v. allocation for the party-list representatives.
COMELEC
(2001) The determination of winners follow RA 7941 that has its
requirement the following: (1) the twenty percent
allocation of seats for party-list; (2) the two percent
(2%) threshold minumum for a seat; (3) the three-seat
limit per party-list; (4) appropriation of seats are
computed via proportional representation base on the
number it garners vis-a-vis other winners.
On June 26, 1998, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed only
thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12)
parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two
percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list
system. Petitioner APEC on the other hand obtained 5.5
percent of the votes thus entitling them to have (2)
representatives while the rest are given only one.
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People's Progressive
Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards
Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed a
motion to proclaim the full number of representatives under
the Constitution. It claimed that the clause of twenty-
percent allocation is mandatory under the Constitution thus
with only (13) declared as winners, it is therefore a
contravention of the Constitution. PAG-ASA claims that RA
No. 7941 two percent threshold defeats the purpose of the
Constitution.
This was assailed by the original (13) winners who
managed to secure at least the two percent threshold.
They claim that RA 7941 clearly prohibits those who
did not fulfill the threshold to be not declared as
winner and that COMELEC should provide additional
translated here in a formula:
Number of Representatives!!
x.20 = No. of party-list rep.
.80 (# reserved for
local representatives)
*Note: increase in the number of district representatives, as
may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a
corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats.
Example:
208
x .20 = 52
.80
The Court states that the Constitution does not require all
the allocated seats to be occupied. If RA 7941 is read
together with Sec. 5 of Article VI, it clearly shows the intent
of Congress to provide a ceiling for party-lists seats in
Congress.
(2) Yes. The two percent threshold, on the other hand, is
mandatory. The fulfillment of the requirement will show that
the said party-list has a significant number of supporters to
warrant a seat in the house. Mr. Monsod said that in the last
election, around 20 million voted and two percent of that will
produce 400,000 voters. This shows that the party
represents a significant number of Filipinos. It also prevents
nuisance representatives that represent/accountable to little
to no one.
This logic is true even if petitioner contends that it would be
mathematically impossible to fill up the 20% threshold by
166!
seats instead, not exceeding two for each for those
which had garnered the two percent threshold in
proportion to the number of votes cast for the winning
parties.
RA 7941 also limits a party-list to only three (3) seats for
their representatives.
The case was brought to COMELEC and through a
judgment En Banc with a (3) concurring and (2) dissenting,
the court upheld its original decision with no changes
and also without expressly declaring the two percent
threshold as invalid or void. Thus the case was brought
to Supreme Court for review.
Issues: (1) Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other
words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list
solons be filled up completely and all the time?
(2) Are the two percent threshold requirement and the
three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
strictly implementing the two percent rule. The court is also
not interested in finding the fault in the wisdom of the law.
The Court held that the three-seat-per-party limit is there
because it helps in opening up the political system to a
pluralistic society through a multiparty system. The
system will enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional
groups, to earn their seats among the fifty.
To calculate the number of seats per party-list under
proportional representation:
st
1 : Rank all organization from highest to lowest number of
votes. Only those who reached 2% are “qualified.” Qualified
meaning they achieve the 2% threshold.
nd
2 : Determine the number of seats of the party that
achieved the highest number of votes (called: first party).
This is because logically, no other party will have more than
the number of seat than the first party.
rd
3 : Determine the number of seats the other parties are
entitled to.
* Note: The additional seats will be dependent on the
proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose
number of seats has already been predetermined, the
second party should be given less than that to which the
first one is entitled:
Formula:
Proportion of
Number of votes of first party = votes of first party
votes for party-list system relative to total
votes
167!
Formula for additional seats for party-list system:

No. of additional for concerned party x Additional seats

Total no. of votes of first party allocated to first party

Using the formula in this case, APEC garnered the highest

votes with 503,487 votes and thereby is called the first
party. The total of number of voters on the other hand is
9,155,309. The SC said that in computing for the
percentage 6% is the bench mark that the court will only
recognize. Thus if the party-list gets more than or garners
exactly 6% after rounding off the total votes, they will get the
maximum number of 3 seats only. Since 3 seats is the
maximum seat number a party-list could acquire under the
law.

Solution:
Proportion of votes
Number of votes of first party = of first party relative
votes for party-list system to total votes

503,487 = 0.05499 = 5.5%

9,155,309

Given that APEC garnered 5.5% it would only be entitled to

an additional of 1 seat. They will have a total of 2 seats. The
first seat is when it got 2% and the other is when it
exceeded the 2%. Since it did not attain a percentage of at
least 6%, it is not qualified to attain the maximum number of
seats, which is 3.

Additionally, it is also logical to assume that the other party-

list will not exceed 2 seats as the highest ranking party-list

168!
did not attain such.

For computing the additional seat/s of the second highest

party, ABA, which garnered 321,646, we use a DIFFERENT
FORMULA:

No. of additional for concerned party x Additional seats

Total no. of votes of first party allocated to first party

321,646 = 0.6388 = .64 x 1 = 64%

503,487

rd
For the 3 highest ALAGAD with 312,500:

312,500 = 0.62 x 1 = 62%

503,487

*Notes: (1) we use a different formula since if we use the

same formula as the one we used to get the percentage for
the first party, it will be against the principle of proportional
representation. Since if for example the first party garnered
20% of total votes and got 3 seats, it would not be fair for
them if the second party that only got exactly 6% of the total
votes to get also 3 seats.

(2) Using the different formula, wherein we use the first

party as the denominator, we now look at the quotient. The
rule is if the quotient is AT LEAST = 1.0, then the party-list
is entitled to 1 additional seat. If it gets 2.0+ then they are
entitled to 2 additional seats.

Thus, both ABA and ALAGAD did not get additional seats
since they are less than 1.0.

169!
112 Partido ng The petition involves the formula for computing the
Manggagawa additional seats due, if any, for winners in party-list
v. COMELEC elections. Several party-list participants sent queries to the
(2006) respondent COMELEC regarding the formula to be
adopted in computing the additional seats for the party-list
winners in the May 10, 2004 elections. In response, the
respondent Commission issued Resolution No. 6835,
adopting the simplified formula of "one additional seat per
additional two percent of the total party-list votes.
Some political parties however claim base on the Veterans
formula cited in the Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
v. COMELEC (June 25, 2003 decision) that they are
entitled to an additional seat. Particularly, BUTIL, CIBAC,
and Partido Manggagawa (PM), when computed using the
formula in Bagong Bayani case, yield a number greater
than one. This speaks of their entitlement to an additional
seat.
On July 31, 2004, respondent Commission en banc, issued
Resolution No. NBC 04-011 to solve the issue of the
petitioners. They claimed that petitioners are not entitled to
additional seats.
Issues: (1) Whether respondent COMELEC en banc, as the
national board of canvassers for the party-list system, could
be compelled by the honorable court to mechanically apply
the formula stated in its 25 June 2003 resolution reiterated
in the 20 November 2003 resolution in Ang Bagong Bayani
cases in the determination of qualified party-list
organizations and in the proclamation of their respective
nominees.
(2) What is pro hac vice and why is it used to seemingly
abandon the Veterans doctrine.
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW v. COMELEC "reiterated that the
additional seats for qualified party-list organizations shall be
computed in accordance with the formula in Veterans" and
that the November 20, 2003 Resolution of the Court in the
same case "had not departed from its 25 June 2003
Resolution." In the case of Veterans, the court laid down 4
inviolable parameters for the party-list system:
- 20% allocation—all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed 20% of total membership
- 2% threshold—only parties garnering 2% of total
valid votes are qualified
- 3-seat limit—regardless of no. of votes maximum
seat obtained by party-lists are 3.
- Proportional representation—additional seats shall
be computed proportional to their total number of
votes
In order to do such COMELEC must:
- Rank all organization from highest to lowest number
of votes. Only those who reached 2% are included
- Determine the number of seats the party is entitled
to
- The no. of additional seats the other party is entitled
to.
Applying the Veterans formula in petitioner's case, the SC
reached the conclusion that CIBAC is not entitled to an
additional seat. Bayan Muna and CIBAC garnered a total
number of 1,203,305 votes and 495,190 votes respectively.
Hence, giving entitlement of additional seat to Bayan Muna.
(2) Regarding the PRO HAC VICE ruling of the court, the
respondents are mistaken into thinking that the court
abandoned the doctrine of Veterans.
170!
This confusion started on May 14, 2001 when COMELEC
computed the additional seat for BUHAY party-list which
yielded only .51 (not qualified to have another seat). After,
the court decided that the additional seats of APEC,
AKBAYAN!, BUTIL, and CIBAC, if any, should not yet be
determined in their Resolution dated June 25, 2003. This
was due to a separate pending motion filed by BAYAN
MUNA to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC
proclaiming APEC, AKBAYAN!, BUTIL and CIBAC's
respective additional nominees.

Despite everything, BUHAY still insisted that they deserve a

seat. Then, the Court resolved pro hac vice to grant
BUHAY's motion, reasoning that: It is thus established in
the Resolution of 25 June 2003 that, like APEC, BUTIL,
CIBAC and AKBAYAN, BUHAY had obtained more than
four percent (4%) of the total number of votes validly cast
for the party-list system and obtained more than 0.50 for the
additional seats. Accordingly, just like the first four whose
additional nominees are now holding office as member of
the House of Representatives, BUHAY should be declared
entitled to additional seat.

The court in said Resolution did not abandon Veterans’

doctrine since they even cited Veterans in the footnote on
said resolution as basis of their computation. The only Court
gave an additional seat to BUHAY only because it was
similarly situated to APEC, BUTIL, CIBAC and AKBAYAN
which "had obtained more than four percent (4%) of the
total number of votes validly cast for the party-list system
and obtained more than 0.50 for the additional seats." Well
to note, the grant of an additional seat to BUHAY was pro
hac vice.

171!

113 Citizens v. By applying the formula adopted by the Supreme Court in
COMELEC Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, Citizens’ Battle
(2007) Against Corruption (CIBAC) garnered a percentage of
3.9084. In the computation for additional seats for the
parties, the COMELEC adopted a simplified formula of one
additional seat per additional 2%, thereby foreclosing the
chances of CIBAC to gain an additional seat. However,
they still wanted their second nominees to be proclaimed.
They used the Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC applying the Veterans formula which is:
After being denied, CIBAC et al. assailed the COMELEC
Resolution (No. 06-0248), which rejected the Motion for
Proclamation of their Second Nominees under the party-list
system in the May 2004 National and Local Elections.
Supreme Court adopted a simplified formula of one
additional seat per additional 2%. Petitioner contends that
they are entitled for additional seats and by denying the
party-list acted in grave abuse discretion amounting by the
SC. Petitioner stressed that the COMELEC simplified
formula runs counter to the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan
Pro hac vice is a Latin term meaning "for this one particular
occasion." A ruling expressly qualified as pro hac vice
cannot be relied upon as a precedent to govern other
cases. It was therefore erroneous for respondent
Commission to apply the November 20, 2003 Resolution
and rule that the formula in Veterans has been abandoned.
The confusion in the petition at bar must have been created
by the way the Veterans formula was cited in the June 25,
2003 Resolution of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani. Be that
as it may, we reiterate that the prevailing formula for the
computation of additional seats for party-list winners is the
formula stated in the landmark case of Veterans
No. The correct formula in ascertaining the entitlement to
additional seats of the first party and other qualified party-
list groups was clearly explicated in Veterans:
Additional seats = No. of votes of
concerned party x No. of
No. of votes of additional seats
the first party allocated to
first party
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical
representation of the number of additional seats to be
awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat,
an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the
actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and
are not rounded off since rounding off may result in the
awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by
the law (3 seat limit). The law itself has set the limit: only
two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such
extant parameter.
172!
Muna formula which used the "number of allotted seats for
the first party" as multiplier. If the Ang Bagong Bayani and
Bayan Muna formula were applied, CIBAC would be
entitled to one additional seat since in the formula:
Additional seats = 495,193 x 3 = 1.2345
1,203,305
Issue: Whether the COMELEC, in adopting the simplified
formula of one additional seat per additional two percent of
the total party-list votes in the proclamation of the party-list
winners in the May 10, 2004 national and local election,
thus, adjudging the petitioner herein as entitled only to one
(1) seat, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The problem with CIBAC’s pertains to a confusion of
phrases used by the courts in different cases. We see that
the Court merely applied the Veterans formula to Ang
Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna in resolving the additional
seats by the other qualified party-list groups. However, it
appears that there was an inaccurate presentation of the
Veterans formula as the Court used the multiplier “allotted
seats for the first party” in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan
Muna instead of the "[number] of additional seats allocated
to the first party" prescribed in the Veterans formula. It is
apparent that the phrase "[number] of additional" was
omitted, possibly by INADVERTENCE from the phrase
"allotted seats for First Party."
The confusion lies in the difference in pronouncement in
Veterans where it pertains to a multiplier of two (2) seats,
while the multiplier "allotted seats for the first party" was the
phrasing used in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna
formula. Thus the latter formula can mean a multiplier of
maximum three (3) seats, since the first party can garner a
maximum of three (3) seats while in Veterans is only two (2)
since that is the only maximum for additional seats.
Moreover, footnote 37 of Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan
Muna states that "for a discussion of how to compute
additional nominees for parties other than the first, see
Veterans. It clarifies the confusion created by the imprecise
formula expressed in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna.
Applying then in this case:
Additional seats = 495,193 x 2 = 1.2345
1,203,305
Thus, CIBAC is not entitled to an additional seat.
173!
114 AKLAT v. AKLAT (Asosasyon para sa Kaunlaran ng Lipunan at
COMELEC Adhikain para sa Tao) was denied participation in the 2001
(2004) elections as it was found to not have complied with the 8-
point guidelines set forth by the SC in Ang Bagong Bayani
v. COMELEC. After another petition, claiming that they
complied with the 8-point guidelines, their petition was still
rejected. COMELEC claimed that they cannot be
considered to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented group.
Issue: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it rejected AKLAT.
115 Bantay Two consolidated petitions are presented in this case. In
Republic v. G.R. 177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA
Commission 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR)
on Elections assailed various COMELEC resolutions accrediting private
(2007) respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the
party-list elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously
determining if their respective nominees possess the
qualifications defined in R.A. 7941 (Party-List System Act)
and if they belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector to be represented.
The petitioners prayed that the COMELEC (1) disclose or
publish the names of the nominees of the various party-list
groups named in the petitions and (2) 33 private
respondents named therein be "declared as unqualified to
participate in the party-list elections as sectoral
organizations, parties or coalition for failure to comply with
the guidelines prescribed by the Court in Ang Bagong
Bayani v. Comelec, which stated that: ‘not only the
candidate party or organization must represent
marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must
its nominees.’”
No. According to Section 5 of RA 7941 that party-list must
show through its constitution, by laws, history, platform
of government that it represents the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. However in this case, the
document entitled Facts about Aklat only contains general
averments that it represents marginalized groups such as
the youth, indigenous communities, urban poor and the
fisherfolk. These general statements do not measure up to
the first guideline in the Bagong Bayani case. Furthermore,
AKLAT is simply a business interest or economic lobby
group which seeks the promotion and protection of the book
publishing industry
(1) No. First of all, in G.R. 177271, the Court ruled that in
certiorari proceedings, it is not called upon to decide factual
issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed
facts on record. The exercise would require the Court to
make a factual determination, a matter outside the office of
judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari.
This petition was denied.
(2) Yes. Originally, COMELEC based its refusal to disclose
the names of the nominees of subject party-list groups on
Section 7 of R.A. 7941:
COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before
election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or
sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which have
applied or who have manifested their desire to participate
under the party-list system and distribute copies thereof to
all precincts for posting in the polling places on election
day. The names of the party-list nominees shall not be
shown on the certified list.
However based on the right to information enshrined in the
self-executory Section 7 of the Bill of Rights and another
174!

In G.R. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales,
Kilosbayan Foundation, and Bantay Katarungan
Foundation impugn the COMELEC Resolution denying
their request for the release of the names of the nominees
of the 14 accredited participating party-list groups
mentioned in petitioner Rosales' previous letter-request
(Babae Ka, Ang Kasangga, Akbay Pinoy, AKSA, Kakusa,
Ahon Pinoy, OFW Party, Biyaheng Pinoy, ANAD, Aangat
Ang Kabuhayan, AGBIAG, BANAT, Bantay Lipad, Aging
Pinoy). Neither the COMELEC Proper nor its Law
Department officially responded to petitioner Rosales’
requests. The April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin,
however, published the front-page banner headline
"COMELEC WON'T BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES", with
the sub-heading "Abalos says party-list polls not
personality oriented." Counsel of petitioners invoked the
constitutionally guaranteed right to information.
COMELEC en banc issued Resolution 07-0724 on April 3,
2007 declaring nominees’ names confidential and that the
commission will only disclose names of party-list nominees
only after 3:00 p.m. on Election Day.
Issues: (1) Whether this court can scrutinize the
qualification of the nominees of the party-list.
(2) Whether respondent COMELEC, by refusing to reveal
the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups,
has violated the right to information and free access to
documents as guaranteed by the Constitution
116 Philippine The case is about COMELEC Resolution No. 8679 that
Guardians delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national, or
Brotherhood, sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-
Inc. (PGBI) v. list system. PGBI was delisted because it failed to get 2%
constitutional provision enunciating the policy of full
disclosure and transparency in Government, which is found
in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, the petition is
MERITOUS.
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "The
names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the
certified list” does not justify the COMELEC’s denial of the
requested disclosure. The prohibition imposed on the
COMELEC under Section 7 is limited in scope and duration;
it extends only to the certified list which the same provision
requires to be posted in the polling places on election day.
To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is
to read into the law something that is not intended. There is
absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the
COMELEC from disclosing or even publishing through
mediums other than the "Certified List" the names of
the party-list nominees. The COMELEC obviously
misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the
provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before
the May 2007 elections. The contention also of Abalos that
the election is not about personalities is not enough of an
excuse to deny petitioner’s their right to information.
No. PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a party-list group
or organization in the coming May 2010 elections. Yes,
PGBI did not garner 2% vote in 2004 but its non-
participation in 2007 should not count as not garnering 2%
175!
 Commission of the votes cast in 2004 and did not participate in the 2007
on Elections elections.
(2009)
Under RA 7941 Sec. 6 (8):
[a party-list may be removed if] it fails to participate in the
last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.
The COMELEC also applied the MINERO case in ruling
that the act of delisting of PGBI in 2007 was considered as
a failure to get 2% of votes.
Issue: Whether there is legal basis for delisting PGBI
117 BANAT v. Barangay Association for National Advancement and
COMELEC Transparency (BANAT) filed before the National Board of
(April) (2009) Canvassers (NBC) a petition to proclaim the full number of
party-list representatives provided by the Constitution as
20% of the house of representative and that the 2% rule
should be harmonized with the Constitutional mandate of
20%.
votes.
According to Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of
Registration. The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel,
after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition
on any of the following grounds: (8) It fails to participate in
the last two (2) preceding elections OR fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-
list system in the two. The use of the disjunctive “or”
signifies that the requisites cannot be combined thus the
ruling in Minero is erroneous interpretation of law.
COMELEC should not apply the MINERO ruling: It qualified
non-participation as not garnering 2% of the votes! This is
not the interpretation of Sec6 (8). Instead, BANAT ruling
should prevail: BANAT garnered less than 2% of the party-
list votes yet qualified for a seat in the allocation of
additional seats. Thus, less than 2% vote cannot be a sole
reason to delist a party. It should be noted if the party
qualified for a seat even with less than 2%.
Also, the word “or” is a disjunctive term thus the law
provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting:(1) not
garnering 2% votes in the two preceding elections, (2) non-
participation in the last 2 preceding elections
(1) Yes it is unconstitutional. In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan
Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELEC’s
original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for
systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being
filled up. They claim that both formulas do not factor in the
total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List
System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the
176!
They believe that Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes
the 2% threshold votes, should be harmonized with Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the
same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable only to the
first party-list representative seats to be allotted on the
basis of their initial/first ranking.The limit of 3 per party still
will apply.
However, COMELEC ruled it as moot and academic as it
was already resolved in the case of Veterans. During the
time that BANAT is filing their reconsideration, COMELEC
promulgated a resolution proclaiming thirteen (13) parties
as winners in the party-list elections in May 2007.
Issues: (1) Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes
prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional? If unconstitutional, how will the party-list
representatives be allocated?
(2) Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties
from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the
major political parties be barred from participating in the
party-list elections?
three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold.
Looking at RA 7941, the second clause of Section 11(b) of
R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes." This
is where petitioners’ and intervenors’ problem with the
formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in
proportion to their total number of votes" to be in
proportion to the votes of the first party. This
interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A.
No. 7941.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional
seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold
for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the
second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941
is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two
percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible
to achieve the maximum number of available party-list
seats when the number of available party-list seats
exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that
20% of the members of the House of Representatives
shall consist of party-list representatives. We therefore
strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the
distribution of the additional seats.
Thus we believe to arrive now at the number of additional
seats, we divide the number of votes garnered by each
party by 15,950,900 (the total number of votes cast for
party-list candidates). There are TWO STEPS in the second
round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied
177!
by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference
between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-
List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-
percenters. The whole integer of the product of the
percentage and of the remaining available seats
corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available
seats.

Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties

next in rank until all available seats are completely
distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in
the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the
three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each
qualified party-list candidate is entitled.

(2) No but the ruling will remain the same. Neither the
Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political
parties from participating in the party-list system. On the
contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the
major political parties to participate in party-list elections
through their sectoral wings. Also, in defining a "party" that
participates in party-list elections as either "a political party
or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that
major political parties will participate in the party-list
elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list
elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of
the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941.
However, by the vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue
the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly
(but still can organize youth or fisherfolk groups under the
purview of being a sectoral representative).

178!
118 Barangay The case started when speaker Prospero Nograles filed a
Association motion to intervene.
for National
Advancement (1) He questions that there are only 219 legislative districts
Transparency and not 220. Accordingly, the allotted seats for party-list
v. COMELEC representation should only be 54 and not 55. The House of
(July) (2009) Representatives seeks clarification on which of the party-
list representatives shall be admitted to the Roll of
Members considering that the Court declared as winners
55 party-list representatives. He questions if one admits the
32 in the list provided by the COMELEC, is it not then it
violates the Constitutional provision raising the number of
Congress to 270.
(2) Additionally, the Court declared as unconstitutional the
2% threshold only in relation to the distribution of additional
seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of
R.A. No. 7941. Yet, it distributed first seats to party-list
groups which did not attain the minimum number of votes
that will entitle them to one seat. Clarification is, therefore,
sought whether the term "additional seats" refer to 2nd and
3rd seats only or all remaining available seats. Corollary
thereto, the House of Representatives wishes to be
clarified whether there is no more minimum vote
requirement to qualify as a party-list representative.
(1) No, it does not. First of all, 250 is not the maximum
number of the House of Representatives. Section 5(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution allows the expansion of
the House of Representatives as the words “unless
provided by law” qualify. Clearly the legislative has the
power to legislate additional seats.
Additionally, we see that as early as the election year of
1995, the total number of members of the House of
Representatives is already beyond the initial maximum of
250 members as fixed in the 1987 Constitution. It is now
275. That is why any change in the number of legislative
districts brings a corresponding change in the number of
party-list seats. However, the increase in the number of
members of the House of Representatives went unnoticed
as the available seats for party-list representatives have
never been filled up before. However, the number of
legislative districts was subsequently reduced to 219 with
our ruling on 16 July 2008 declaring void the creation of the
Province of Sharif Kabunsuan. Thus, in the 2007 elections,
the number of party-list seats available for distribution
should be correspondingly reduced from 55 to 54.
(2) In the second round allocation of additional seats, there
is no minimum vote requirement to obtain a party-list seat
because the Court has struck down the application of the
2% threshold in the allocation of additional seats.
Specifically, the provision in Section 11(b) of the Party-List
Act stating that "those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in the
proportion to their total number of votes" can no longer be
given any effect. Otherwise, the 20 percent party-list seats
in the total membership of the House of Representatives as
provided in the 1987 Constitution will mathematically be
179!
impossible to fill up.

However, a party-list organization has to obtain a sufficient

number of votes to gain a seat in the second round of seat
allocation. What is deemed a sufficient number of votes is
dependent upon the circumstances of each election, such
as the number of participating parties, the number of
available party-list seats, and the number of parties with
guaranteed seats received in the first round of seat
allocation. Thus if only ten parties participated in the 2007
party-list election and each party received only one
thousand votes, then each of the ten parties would receive
10% of the votes cast. All are guaranteed one seat, and are
further entitled to receive two more seats in the second
round of seat allocation.

Regarding the need for proportionality, we believe that the

1987 Constitution does not require absolute proportionality
in the allocation of party-list seats. The phrase "legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio" in Section 5(1) of Article VI requires
that legislative districts shall be apportioned according to
proportional representation. However, this principle of
proportional representation applies only to legislative
districts, not to the party-list system. The allocation of seats
under the party-list system is governed by the last phrase of
Section 5(1), giving the Legislature wide discretion in
formulating the allocation of party-list seats. Clearly, there is
no constitutional requirement for absolute proportional
representation in the allocation of party-list seats in the
House of Representatives.

180!
119 Abayon v. The HRET (House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal)
COMELEC has jurisdiction over eligibilities of party-list representatives.
(2010) The petition here filed against HRET pertains on its
jurisdiction over the case challenging the qualification of the
party-list reps Abayon and Palparan because they are
alleged to not belong to a “marginalized and
underrepresented sector.” Additionally, it was claimed also
that Palparan have committed gross human rights
violations against the marginalized and underrepresented.
Petitioners on the other hand argue that choosing their
representative is an internal concern of the party-list.
Petitioners claim that HRET has no jurisdiction over them
because it is only concered to the party that were “elected”
in the HoR and not the party-list representatives.
Issue: Whether respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the
question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and
Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-
list organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the
House of Representatives that such organizations won in
the 2007 elections.
120 Ang Ladlad v. Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and
COMELEC women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
(2010) bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). It wanted
to be a party-list that represents the LGBT community that
they claimed to be marginalized and under-represented
sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their
sexual orientation and gender identity. Ang Ladlad
complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this
Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national
membership base consisting of individual members and
Yes. The HRET has jurisdiction over the qualification of
Abayon and Palparan as party-list representatives.
According to Article VI. Section 17. of the Constitution:
The HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to, among other things, the qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives.
Once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has
been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualification ends and the HRET’s
own jurisdiction begins.
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this
particular qualification of a nominee—the need for him
or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of
his party-list organization (RA 7941, Sec. 9 Qualification
of Party-list Nominees)—in the context of the facts that
characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan’s relation to
Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the
marginalized and underrepresented interests that they
presumably embody.
Yes. The court recognizes that the Ang Ladlad complied
with the legal requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941. Religion cannot be a basis for the refusal of party-list
registration. Morals should be given secular meanings,
otherwise, it is against full religious freedom (Estrada v.
Escritor case)
Respondents arguments from public morals cannot be a
ground to deny Ang Ladlad’s petition for registration since
Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual
conduct and it fails to explain what societal ills are sought to
181!
 organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of
governance.
However COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the
Petition on moral grounds stating that: petitioner tolerates
immorality which offends religious beliefs. They cite the
Bible and Koran as basis for their rejection of Ang Ladlad.
They claim that the party advocates sexual immorality of
consensual partnership of gays and lesbians. They further
indicate that they advocate Men Having Sex with in the
Philippines.
The court further cited that since laws are presumed to be
incorporated in every contract, rule, etc. Ang Ladlad’s
immoral advocacy violates the RPC and Civil Code when
both deny actions that are against public morals.
Issue: Whether the party-list Ang Ladlad should be granted
accreditation as a party-list.
121 Layug v. On March 31, 2010, petitioner Rolando D. Layug (Layug),
Commission in his capacity as a taxpayer and concerned citizen, filed
on Elections pro se a Petition to Disqualify Buhay Party-List from
(2012) participating in the May 10, 2010 elections, and Brother
Mike from being its nominee. He argued that Buhay Party-
List is a mere extension of the El Shaddai, which is a
religious sect. As such, it is disqualified from being a party-
list under Section 5, Paragraph 2, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, as well as Section 6, Paragraph 1 of RA No.
79415, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.
Neither does Brother Mike, who is allegedly a billionaire
real estate businessman and the spiritual leader of El
Shaddai, qualify as one who belongs to the marginalized
and underrepresented sect. On June 15, 2010, the
COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution denying
be prevented by the denial of Ang Ladlad as a party. Under
our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its
agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its
position through normal democratic means.
The Court recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it
relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in
the UDHR (Universal Declaration of Human Rights) and
ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights)
Yes. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides
that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of its Members. Section
5 (1) of the same Article identifies who are the "members"
of the House. Clearly, the members of the House of
Representatives are of two kinds: (1) members who shall be
elected from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Brother Mike, being the fifth nominee, did not get a seat and
thus had not become a member of the House of
Representatives. Indubitably, the HRET has no jurisdiction
over the issue of Brother Mike's qualifications.
182!
 the petition for lack of substantial evidence.
On July 30, 2010 Buhay Party-List won two (2) seats in the
House of Representatives. Being the fifth nominee,
however, Brother Mike was not proclaimed as the
representative of Buhay Party-List.
Issue: Whether COMELEC, not the HRET, has jurisdiction
over the determination of party-list qualification.
122 Magdalo v. Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its
COMELEC Petition for Registration with the COMELEC, seeking its
(2012) registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party
based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for
participation in the 10 May 2010 National and Local
Elections. In the Petition, MAGDALO was represented by
its Chairperson, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV, and its
Secretary General, Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo).
The COMELEC Second Division issued its Resolution
denying the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO.
COMELEC claims that it is common knowledge that the
party’s organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F.
Trillanes IV, and some members participated in the take-
over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center,
Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent
civilian personnel were held hostage. This and the fact that
they were in full battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly
show their purpose in employing violence and using
unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process
defying the laws of organized societies.
Issue: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in basing its determination on pure conjectures
instead of on the evidence on record.
Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the
qualifications of Buhay Party-List, as it is vested by law,
specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the COMELEC.
Section 6 of said Act states that the COMELEC may motu
proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition.
No. The COMELEC has a constitutional and statutory
mandate to ascertain the eligibility of parties and
organizations to participate in electoral contests.
On the other hand, RA 7941, otherwise known as the Party-
List System Act defines a party-list system as a mechanism
of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC).
Thus, to join electoral contests, a party or organization must
undergo the two-step process of registration and
accreditation. Registration is the act that bestows juridical
personality for purposes of our election laws; accreditation,
on the other hand, relates to the privileged participation that
our election laws grant to qualified registered parties.
Registration must first take place before accreditation.
Considering the constitutional and statutory authority of the
COMELEC to ascertain the eligibility of parties or
organizations seeking registration and accreditation, the
pertinent question now is whether its exercise of this
discretion was so capricious or whimsical as to amount to
183!

123 Dayao v. The individual petitioners are dealers of different brands of
COMELEC liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) while petitioner Federation
(2013) of Philippine Industries, Inc. (FPII) is an association
comprised of entities engaged in various industries in the
country. Private respondent LPG Marketers Association,
Inc. (LPGMA) is a non-stock, non-profit association of
consumers and small industry players in the LPG and
energy sector who have banded together in order to pursue
their common objective of providing quality, safe and
reasonably priced gas and oil products.
On May 21, 2009, LPGMA sought to advance its cause by
seeking party-list accreditation with the COMELEC for the
purpose of participating in the May 10, 2010. LPGMA
claimed that it has special interest in the LPG industry and
other allied concerns. It averred that one of its programs is
the promotion of fair trade practices and prevention of re-
entry of cartels and monopolies by actively pursuing the
initial gains of oil deregulation, and vigilant advocacy for the
curtailment of bureaucratic and regulatory procedures and
governmental practices detrimental to the entry,
development and well-being of small LPG entrepreneurs.
After being approved by COMELEC, a complaint for the
cancellation of LPGMA’s registration as a party-list
organization was lodged. It stated that LPGMA does not
represent a marginalized sector of the society because its
incorporators, officers and members are not marginalized
or underrepresented citizens since they are actually
marketers and independent re-fillers of LPG that control
lack of jurisdiction. In view of the facts available to the
COMELEC at the time it issued its assailed Resolutions, this
Court rules that respondent did not commit grave abuse of
discretion.
Yes. Sec. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.
The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional
or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association, organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government,
foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
directly or through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan election
purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of
the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered.
Section 6 does not require that an opposition to the petition
for registration be previously interposed so that a complaint
for cancellation can be entertained.
184!
45% of the national LPG retail market. COMELEC
dismissed the petition claiming that the petitioner should
have raised the issue when the LPGMA’s party-list
registration was publicized.
Issue: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion.
Looking also at the title of Section 6, it states "cancellation."
Cancellation takes place after the fact of registration when
an inquiry is done by the COMELEC.
Additionally, the Resolution of approving LPGMA’s
registration did not create a perpetual and indefeasible right
to its accreditation as a party-list organization. Neither did it
grant finality and indefeasibility to the factual findings of the
COMELEC on the qualifications of the group. The
accreditation of COMELEC can be likened to a franchise
that is a privilege that may be revoked.
Under paragraph 5 of Section 6 of RA 7941, a party-list
organization may be disqualified on the ground that its
officers and members do not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector. The allegation then against
LPGMA is within the ambit of the aformentioned law.
All told, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the complaint for cancellation of LPGMA’s
party-list accreditation. In the ordinary course of procedure,
the herein complaint should be remanded to the COMELEC
considering that the poll body did not proceed to make a
proximate determination of the present circumstances of
LPGMA’s qualifications. However, COMELEC en banc
decided the case in a recent decision already. The
COMELEC has already determined and declared that the
present factual circumstances of LPGMA meet the
qualifications imposed by law on party-list groups. It will be
a needless roundabout to still remand the complaint to the
COMELEC for it to determine anew the present state of
LPGMA's qualifications.
185!
124 Atong The issue started when 52 party-list groups and
Paglaum et. organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 to the
al. (2013) Supreme Court (SC) in an effort to reverse various
resolutions by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race.
The COMELEC, in its assailed resolutions issued in
October, November and December of 2012, ruled, among
others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed
to represent a “marginalized and underrepresented sector,”
their nominees do not come from a “marginalized and
underrepresented sector,” and/or some of the organizations
or groups are not truly representative of the sector they
intend to represent in Congress.
In Omnibus Resolution dated 11 October 2012, Atong
Paaglaum Inc. (Atong Paglaum) had its accreditation and
registration cancelled due to the fact that its nominees do
not belong to the sectors which the party represents; and
the party failed to file its Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures for the 2010 Elections.
Issue: Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list
system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency v.
Commission on Elections (BANAT) should be applied by
the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
Note: In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court
officially excluded major political parties from participating
in party-list elections.
No. In the discussion of Mr. Monsod with other framers of
the Constitution, it was clarified that political parties such as
Social Democrats may field a candidate under legislative
districts and the party-list system. They are allowed under
the party-list system “For as long as they field candidates
who come from the different marginalized sectors that
we shall designate in this Constitution.”
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution to include in the party-list system both sectoral
and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1),
Article VI of the Constitution, which states: “a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations.”
The commas after the words "national," and "regional,"
separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties.
Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national
and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they
would have stated "national and regional sectoral parties.”
National and regional parties or organizations are different
from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional
parties or organizations need not be organized along
sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list
structure by the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed:
the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but
also for non-sectoral parties. Additionally, R.A. No. 7941
does not require national and regional parties or
organizations to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors.
It could be seen that sectoral parties in Sec. 5 of RA 7941
186!
include the "sectors [such as] labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."

The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily

"marginalized and underrepresented." However, they may
"lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus
organize themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the
special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.

This Court cannot legislate the exclusion of major political

parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the
Constitution and the law. We cannot, however, fault the
COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in
disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing
jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed
grave abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 2013
party-list elections, we must now impose and mandate the
party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

Thus in this case, parties under the national, regional, and

sectoral groups or organization were disqualified by the
COMELEC because they do not represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector. There were
also those disqualified because their nominees do not
belong to the sectors they represent, although they may
have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. There are
also who have been disqualified because one or more of its
nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one
remaining qualified nominee. This Court believes that all
were DONE IN CONTRARY TO THE 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 7941.

187!
125 Abang ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that
Lingkod v. represents the interests of peasant fanners and fisherfolks.
COMELEC On May 31, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD manifested before
(2013) the COMELEC its intent to participate in the May 2013
elections. On November 7, 2012 COMELEC en Banc
cancelled ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a party-list
group. The COMELEC en Banc pointed out that ABANG
LINGKOD failed to establish its track record in uplifting the
cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that it
merely offered photographs of some alleged activities it
conducted after the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC en
Banc further opined that ABANG LINGKOD failed to show
that its nominees are themselves marginalized and
underrepresented or that they have been involved in
activities aimed at improving the plight of the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors it claims to represent. They
filed another petition.
On April 2, 2013, the Court, in Atong Paglaum Inc. v.
Commission on Elections, laid down new parameters to be
observed by the COMELEC in screening parties,
organizations or associations seeking registration and/or
accreditation under the party-list system, viz:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list
system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines
and do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
Yes. The flaw in the COMELEC's disposition lies in the fact
that it insists on requiring party-list groups to present
evidence showing that they have a track record in
representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register
under the party-list system to submit proof of their track
record as a group. The track record requirement was only
imposed in Ang Bagong Bayani where the Court held that
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations
seeking registration under the party-list system must prove
through their, inter alia track record that they truly represent
the marginalized and underrepresented, thus in this light,
the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following
guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to
assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition
must represent the marginalized and underrepresented
groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it
must show -- through its constitution, articles of
incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and
track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Track record is
not the same as the submission or presentation of
"constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement, and other relevant information
as may be required by the COMELEC," which are but mere
pieces of documentary evidence intended to establish that
the group exists and is a going concern.
There was no mention that sectoral organizations
intending to participate in the party-list elections are
still required to present a track record since Sectoral
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3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections
provided they register under the party-list system and do
not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates
in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
"marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in "well-
defined political constituencies." It is enough that their
principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized
and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack
"well-defined political constituencies" include professionals,
the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of the sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the ''marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations
that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong
to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" or that represent those who lack
"well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to
their respective sectors, or must have a track record or
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of
national and regional parties or organizations must be
parties or organizations may either be marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political
constituencies. It is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns
of their sector. Track record is only relevant if the party is
representing a sector they do not factually belong.
Additionally there is no logic in treating sectoral
organizations differently from national and regional parties
or organizations as regards their bid for registration under
the party-list system. The sectoral parties must only show
they exist and documentary evidence showing that they are
bona fide organizations.
The genuineness of ABANG LINGKOD’s petition is
evidenced by the fact that it had been previously registered
as a party-list group. In fact, it participated in the May 2010
party-list elections, and it was able to obtain a sufficient
number of votes in the May 2013 party-list elections to
obtain a seat in the House of Representatives.
These are circumstances, which clearly indicate that
ABANG LINGKOD is indeed a legitimate party-list group.
ABANG LINGKOD, notwithstanding the cancellation of its
registration three days prior to the May 13, 2013 elections,
was able to obtain a total of 260 215 votes out of the 26 722
131 votes that were cast for the party-list, thus entitling it to
a seat in the House of Representatives. This is indicative of
the fact that a considerable portion of the electorate
considers ABANG LINGKOD as truly representative of
peasant farmers and fisherfolk.
Additionally, three of the five nominees of ABANG
LINGKOD are farmers and, thus, are not required to present
189!
 bona-fide members of such parties or organizations. a track record showing their active participation in activities
aimed to promote the sector which ABANG LINGKOD
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations represents, i.e. peasant farmers and fisherfolk.
shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.

The petition of ABANG LINGKOD was again denied

claiming that they did not show that they represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sector. Plus they claim
that the pictures they sent as evidence looks edited.

Issue: Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its

discretion in cancelling ABANG LINGKOD’s registration
under the party-list system.
II. Rules on Apportionment (Pars. 1, 3, and 4)
A. Reapportionment through special law (Par. 3)
126 Tobias v. Petitioners, as taxpayers and resident of Mandaluyong, No. Article VI, Sec. 5(1), is not violated. The present limit of
Abalos assail the Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675 “An 250 is not absolute. There was a mentioned of “unless
(1994) Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a otherwise provided by law.” That the present composition of
Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of the Congress could be increased if it so mandates via
Mandaluyong. Prior to the enactment of the assailed legislative enactment. Therefore not unconstitutional. RA
statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan 7675 enjoys the presumption of having passed through the
belong to only one legislative district who is represented by regular congressional processes thus it assumes that the
Hon. Ronaldo Zamora. Hon. Zamora sponsored the bill members of Congress have taken into consideration the
which is the R.A. No. 7675 minimum requirement of a creation of a separate legislative
district including the minimum requirement of population of
Pursuant to Local Government Code of 1991, the city of 250,000.
Mandaluyong held a plebiscite on April 10, 1994 and the
people were asked whether they approved the conversion Article VI, Sec. 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the
of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city but there was Congress itself which drafted the bill reapportioning the
only a 14.41% turnout that resulted in 18,621 “yes” and legislative district.
7,911 for “no” that allowed the ratification and taking into
effect of R.A. No. 7675.

190!
 Issue: Whether RA 7675 violated Article VI, Sections 5 (1)
and (4) as to the number of members of the Congress to
250 and reappropriating the legislative districts.
127 Mariano v. Petitioners are assailing Republic Act No. 7854: “An Act
COMELEC Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly
(1995) Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati. The RA
attempts to create another legislative district in Makati.
Petitioners believe that (1) reapportionment cannot be
made by a special law and (2) Makati’s population in the
1990 census stands only 450,000. Petitioner contends that
it is unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether RA 7854 is unconstitutional.
No. These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case
of Tobias v. Abalos. In said case, we ruled that
reapportionment of legislative districts may be made
through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city.
The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be
composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250)
members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded,
the Constitution did not preclude Congress from
increasing its membership by passing a law, other than
a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly
what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and
providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district.
Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made
through a general apportionment law, with a review of all
the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit
nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a
new city or province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate period of
time. Such act woul deprive the sovereignty granted to the
people by depriving them or suspending their creation
pending the determination.
Additionally, the population of Makati stands at only four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Section 5(3), Article VI of
the Constitution provides, inter alia, that a city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
shall have at least one representative. Even granting that
the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may
still be increased since it has met the MINIMUM population
191!

128 Sema v. The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato
COMELEC City is part of the province of Maguindanao but it is not
(2008) part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its
inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has
two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district
comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities. A
law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act
and vesting it with power to create provinces,
municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law,
the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan
(Muslim Mindanao Autonomy [MMA] Act 201) which
comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of
Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially
stated that the 1st district is now only made of Cotabato
City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this
stating that status quo should be retained however just for
the purposes of the elections, the first district should be
called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City due to the fact
that they are still awaiting a decisive declaration from
Congress as to Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or
part of any).
Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative
district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district). Later,
Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a
separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should
requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In
fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution provides that a city whose population has
increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative.
No. RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local
government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units:
province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with
three conditions. First, the creation of a local government
unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government
Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a
plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant
of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to
regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units such as done in the Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act 201.
However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress
can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create
local government units, subject to reasonable standards
and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the
Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial
boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create
barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance
with the criteria established in the Local Government Code,
and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff
192!
 be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Kabunsuan province.
Dilangalen was from there and Dilangalen was winning
[and later on really won the district]). She contended that Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a
under the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. population of at least 250k, and that a province, once
Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative created, should have at least one representative in the
representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative district,
City in effect, Cotabato is being deprived of a there must at least be 250k (population) in said district.
representative in the HOR. COMELEC maintained that the Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so
legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Sema’s contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM
Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without
affected and so is its representation. first creating a legislative district. But this can never be
legally possible because the creation of legislative districts
Issue: Whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can
delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create are barangays not cities and provinces.
create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is
constitutional.
B. Rules on Apportionment
1. In accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio (Pars. 3 and
4)
129 Montejo v. Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first Yes. The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional
Commission district of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of Section 1 of Commission shows that it denied the COMELEC the major
on Elections Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain municipalities in power of legislative apportionment as it is lodged in the
(1995) Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of equality COngress.
of representation.
COMELEC relied on an Ordinance entitled "Apportioning
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and the Seats of the House of Representatives of the Congress
Ormoc is composed of 5 districts. The 3rd district is of the Philippines to the Different Legislative Districts in
composed of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Provinces and Cities and the Metropolitan Manila Area,”
Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San which under Section 2 allowed COMELEC to make minor
Isidro, Tabango and Villaba. Biliran, located in the 3rd adjustment to those under Section 3. Under Section 3, it
district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue of RA gives COMELEC the power to adjust any province that may
2141 Section 1 enacted on 1959. Said section spelled out hereafter be created.
the municipalities comprising the subprovince: Almeria,
Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi This court believes that Section 2 of the Ordinance only

193!
 and Naval and all the territories comprised therein.
Under Local Government Code of 1992 the subprovince of
Biliran became a regular province after a majority of votes
were cast in a plebiscite. As a consequence of the
conversion, it reduced the 3rd district to five municipalities
with a total population of 146,067 as per the 1990 census.
To remedy such the distribution of inhabitants, voters,
municipalities in Leyte, the COMELEC transferred certain
municipalities to different districts. Petitioner are assailing
Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC:
Redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte on the ground
that it violates the principle of equality of representation.
(Section 5, Article 6 of the Constitution).
Issue: Whether Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 is void.
130 Herrera v. The issue started when two new municipalities are being
Commission added to Guimaras. The creation of the new municipalities
on Elections prompted Guimaras to split into two separate provincial
(1999) district. The splitting was done through Resolution 2950 as
it also allotted 8 Sangguniang seats to Province of
Guimaras. Petitioners question the apportionment of the
districts given that there is an unfair division created when
1st district only has a population of 56,218 compared to
2nd district that has 70,252. Consequently, because of the
division, the 2nd district has 5 districts compared to the
first’s 3 seats. The petitioners aver that they want a
complete 1 to 1 ratio split giving both 63,000 thousand
inhabitants and equal 3 seats in Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. Issue: Did COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution that
redistricted Guimaras.
empowered the COMELEC to minor adjustments of the
reapportionment. Consistent with the limits of its power to
make minor adjustments, Section 3 of said ordinance did
not authorize the COMELEC to transfer municipalities from
one legislative district. Power only granted was to adjust the
number of members. Power of reapportionment lies only
to the Congress. Minor adjustments does not involve
change in the allocations per district.
Minor examples include error in the correct name of a
particular municipality or when a municipality in between
which is still in the territory of one assigned district is
forgotten. And consistent with the limits of its power to make
minor adjustments, section 3 of the Ordinance did not also
give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer
municipalities from one legislative district to another district.
The power granted by section 3 to the respondent is to
adjust the number of members (not municipalities.)
No. The asservation are untenable since under law stated in
R.A. 7166 the municipalities belonging to each district must
be compact, contiguous and adjacent. Contiguous and
adjacent means adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a
common border, connected, and/or touching along
boundaries often for considerable distances. Thus it
could be surmised that COMELEC adjusted the districts
in accordance with RA 7166. The map of Guimaras
shows that the municipalities grouped together are
contiguous or adjacent.
194!
 2. Contiguous, Compact, and Adjacent Territory
3. Population Size
131 Samson v. Petitioner assert that certifications of income, poplation and No. The Court establishes that in the case of Victoriano v.
Aguirre land area were not presented to Congress during the Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, it ruled that all presumptions
(1999) deliberations that led to the passage of RA No. 8535 (An are indulged in favor of constitutionality. The person who
Act Creating the City of Novaliches). Additionally, the attacks a statute must prove beyond reasonable doubt the
petitioner assert that there were no certification attesting statute’s invalidity because of its contravention of the
that the creation of Novaliches as a city will not adversely Constitution. The Court is not also to judge the invalidity of a
affect the mother city of Quezon City in terms of income, statute base on the fact that it may be hard to its citizens
populations, and land area. since the Court cannot decide on the wisdom, justice,
policy, or expediency of the statute as it is in the purview of
Issue: Whether RA No. 8535 is unconstitutional. the legislators. Thus in this case, the passing of the RA
8535 enjoys presumption of constitutionality.

Requisites for the creation of Local Government are placed

in Section 7 of the Local Government Code of 1991. This is
interpreted in the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Code in Article 11. The former law is the general rule and
the latter expounds the former by detailing the agencies
involved and the numerical requirements set by LGC. The
rules are as follows:
- Income must be sufficient as stated in Art 7. This is
interpreted in Art 11 as an average income of not
less than 20,000,000 for the immediately preceding
two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant
prices as verified by Department Of Finance (DOF).
- Population determined as the total number of
inhabitants in Art. 7 and as interpreted in Art 11, it
means that it be not less than 150,000 as certified
by National Statistics Office (NSO).
- Land Area must be contiguous and at least 100
kilometers as certified by the Land Management
Bureau (LBM) of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR). The territory need

195!
 not be contiguous if it is comprised by two or more
islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities
which do not contribute to the income of the
province according to Art. 7 & 11. Art 11 further
expounds this by stating that the land area will not
apply if the city is composed of one (1) or more
islands.

***The new city shall not reduce the land area, population,
and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said
creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements.
All expenses incidental to its creation shall be borne by the
ones petitioning for its creation.

In this case, Petitioners did not present any proof but only
allegations that no certificates were submitted to the House
Committee on Local Government. Moreover, during the
public hearings resource persons from NSO, Bureau of
Local Government and Finance, LBM and Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) were present. The said
agencies attested that Novaliches achieved the following
requisites:

Income – earned 26, 952, 128.26 preceding two years

Population – around 347, 310
Land area was not considered since under Article 11 of
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Code the
petitioner need only to comply with income, population or
land area.

Subsequently despite the fact that other agencies like DBM,

DILG, and Finance Officials showed official statistics and
reference material, the Court holds that their official
statements could serve the same purpose contemplated by

196!
law requiring certificates. Their affirmation as well as their
oath as witnesses in open session either in Senate or
House of Representatives give greater solemnity than
certification submitted.

Petitioner alleged that the respondents failed to submit

written certifications. This certifications are required by the
Implementing Rules and Regulations that are attached to
the petition when one attempts to create a new city and are
thus submitted to interested municipalities or barangays to
Congress in a form of a resolution.

The Court though does not take cognizance of this fact

since the petitioner failed to manifest the petition that was
allegedly bereft of written certifications. RA 8535 also failed
to submit the seat of government of the proposed city.
However, the issue cannot be the basis of the law’s
invalidity given that Section 12 of LGC provides that
government centers where offices, agencies, or branches of
the National Government, local government, or GOCCs can
suffice as substitute of seat of government.

The adverse effect also to Quezon City was unlikely as the

public meetings that were held include the executive head
of QC Mel Mathay that did not even raise any negative
concerns of the creation of Novaliches. This bespeaks of its
validity given that even in the plebiscite there were also no
concerns raised. The court also believes that even though
certificates are there to inform the concerned barangays,
the fact that the said creation of Novaliches was heavily
publicized in mass media shows that QC was also informed
of the matter.

197!
132 Herrera v. (See above, Case # 130)
Commission
on Elections Petitioners aver that the apportionment of the Province of
(1999) Guimaras into two districts is not equitable due to
disproportionate representation. It is claimed that the
districting embodied in Resolution No. 2950 results in a
disparity of representation in that, in the first district, there
is a ratio of one board member per 18,739 voters while in
the second district, the ratio is one board member per 14,
050 voters.
Issue: Did COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the assailed Resolution that redistricted
Guimaras.
133 Aldaba v. RA 9591 seeks to create a legislative district for the
Commission Malolos City. In procuring the said declaration, the
on Elections requirement of 250,000 under the Constitution was
(2010) achieved by an undated certification issued by a Regional
Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) projecting
the population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,
030 by the year of 2010 using the population growth rate of
3.78 between 1995-2000. The said data is declared by the
court to be unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative
of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
No. The asservation are untenable since under law stated in
R.A. 7166 the municipalities belonging to each district must
be compact, contiguous and adjacent. Contiguous and
adjacent means adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a
common border, connected, and/or touching along
boundaries often for considerable distances. Thus it
could be surmised that COMELEC adjusted the districts
in accordance with RA 7166. The map of Guimaras
shows that the municipalities grouped together are
contiguous or adjacent.
Regarding the population, Under R.A. 7166 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2313, the basis for division into districts shall
be the number of inhabitants of the province concerned and
not the number of listed or registered voters as theorized
upon by petitioners. Thus, COMELEC did not act with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution
because clearly, the basis for the districting is the number of
inhabitants of the Province of Guimaras by municipality
based on the official 1995 Census of Population.
Yes RA 9591 is unconstitutional. The undated Certification
came from the Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of
Region III of the National Statistics Office (NSO) as
authority that the population of the City of Malolos “will be
254,030 by the year 2010.” The Certification states that the
population of “Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is
175,291. However, the demographic projections is
without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda
has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification.
First, certifications on demographic projections can be
issued only if such projections are declared official by the
National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). The records
of this case do not also show that the Certification of
198!
 Regional Director Miranda is based on demographic
projections declared official by the NSCB.

Second, certifications based on demographic projections

can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his
designated certifying officer. There is no showing that
Regional Director Miranda has been designated by the NSO
Administrator as a certifying officer for demographic
projections in Region III. In the absence of such official
designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator
can be given credence by this Court.

Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the

middle of every year. According to Section 6 of Executive
Order No. 135 paragraph (c) of Ramos, the certification of
population census counts will be made as of the census
reference date, such as May 1, 1990, while those of
intercensal population estimates will be as of middle of
every year. The Certification, which states that the
population of Malolos “will be 254,030 by the year 2010,”
violates the requirement that intercensal demographic
projections shall be “as of the middle of every year.”

The projections also seem unrealistic if one tries to compute

the population size of Malolos. The 2007 Census places the
population of Malolos at 223,069 as of 1 August 2007.
Based on a growth rate of 3.78%, the population of
Malolos will grow to only 248,365 as of 1 August 2010.
Even if the growth rate is compounded yearly, the
population of Malolos of 223,069 as of 1 August 2007
will grow to only 249,333 as of 1 August 2010.
134 Aquino III v. The case is about RA 9716 that seeks to reapportion the No. History shows that Congress decided on the number
Commission province of Camarines Sur. Before RA 9716 Camarines 250,000 because it was based on the 1986 census that
on Elections Sur had 4 districts. The first district of Camarines Sur had a reflected around 55 million in population. The number was

199!
(2010) population of 417,304. Following the enactment of RA
9716, the first district was divided into 2 districts creating
then 5 districts in Camarines Sur. However, the petitioners
st
contend the RA 9716 since the splitting of the 1 district
created districts that are less than 250,000 in population,
which is an apparent contravention of the Constitutional
requirement under Section 5 (3) Article VI of the 1987
Constitution stating that each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative.
Issue: Whether a population of at least 250,000 is required
by the Constitution for such new district.
divided to the number of the then Congress who are 200 in
number that yielded 250,000 per district on average.
Article VI Sec 5 (3) draws a plain and clear distinction
between entitlement of a city and a province for a
representative. The use of the comma before the words “or
each province” shows that cities must first show that they
have the 250,000 requisite compared to the province that
needs no proof of such.
Mariano case – Talks about the conversion of Makati into a
city. The court ruled that Makati can still add an additional
district since the court believes that it has already met the
250,000 population requirement. It does not need to
increase its population to another 250,000 to guarantee an
additional district. Thus in the case at hand, given that
province is already entitled ab initio of a representative,
why is not the case of an additional district precluded
to the province when in fact it is not limited by any
constitutional requirement unlike the city.
Supplementary to this claim is that LGC makes the
population requirement for the creation of a province an
alternative requirement only since even though it does not
achieve the minimum number of 250,000, as long as it
could prove that it has a size of 2,000 square kilometer size
and revenue of 20,000,000, then it is allowed to be created.
Historical precedence also bespeaks of the non-essentiality
of the population requirement as during the appropriation of
the district, the Commission divided Cavite into three based
on compactness like one is for fishing, the other district is
for fruits and vegetation, and another for rice growing.
Similarly, in Maguindanao the division is base on political
stability and the avoidance of chaos and disunity among
200!

135 Navarro v. (Case under #56 reproduced here) RA 9355 (An Act
Ermita (2011) Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) was established
on October 2, 2006. After holding a plebiscite, granting of
approval of its mother province of Surigao del Norte, and
establishing interim officials, on May 14, 2007, Province of
Dinagat elected their new set of provincial officials.
Petitioners Navarro et al. filed a motion to declare the
creation of province of Dinagat as invalid.
On February 10, 2010, the petitioners succeeded in having
RA 9355 declared unconstitutional. The court reasoned
that R.A. 9355 failed to comply with the requirements of
land area since it is only has 802.12 square kilometer big
(requirement is 2,000 square kilometer) and population
since it only has 106, 951 inhabitants (requirement of
250,000). The decision also declared Article 9 (2) of the
Local Government Code Implementing Rules and
Regulations (LGC-IRR) as null and void. The court
decided to declare also the LGC-IRR Article 9 (2) because
it states that “the land area requirement shall not apply
district leaders. In Laguna, the districts was separated from
highlands to the lowlands. Thus the Constitution does not
require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality to a
standard in gauging equality of representation.
It should be understood that in the apportionment of district
the court does not condone population of less than 250,000
as it only proves in this case that there are other factors
needed to be considered as in the case that the division
considered dialects, original groupings of the population,
st nd
natural division between the 1 and 2 district and
balancing of the districts 1 and 2 in the said division. Thus
there was no abuse of grave discretion and that violation of
250,000 was not done sine qua non.
For the dissenting Justice Carpio, it is a NO. The Dinagat
Islands province simply does not meet the criteria for the
creation of a province. Section 461 of the Local Government
Code bars the creation of provinces unless two of three
minimum requirements are fulfilled. The said requirement
are: (1) minimum income requirement and (2) either the
minimum land area OR minimum population
requirement. In short, two of the three minimum
requirements must be satisfied, with the minimum
income requirement one of the two. The Dinagat Islands
province does not meet either the minimum land area
requirement or the minimum population requirement.
Dinagat Islands’ population stood only at 106,951. Thus
given that no exception was ever created by law. Hence,
the exception created in the implementing rule of the Local
Government Code (LGC-IRR), exempting provinces
“composed of one (1) or more islands” from the minimum
land area requirement, is void for being ultra vires. The
implementing rule, being a mere administrative regulation to
201!
where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or
more islands.” It held that the said provision is beyond the
ambit of Article 461 of the LGC inasmuch as such
exemption is not expressly stated in the law.
Thus in Navarro v. Ermita the petitioners as politicians and
other interveners such as COMELEC aimed to resolve the
matter as their position will be very much affected
considering that the decision, if final on time of elections,
will revert Dinagat back to a district in Surigao del Norte
and if not, then they will consider Dinagat then as a
separate province with an electable governor, House of
Representatives, etc. However if the decision is reversed
after elections, the elections will become null and void.
Issue: Whether LGC-IRR Article 9(2) is valid therefore R.A.
9355 in turn is constitutional?
implement the Local Government Code, cannot amend the
Code but must conform to the Code. Only Congress can
pass an amendatory clause to fix the said inconsistency.
Despite a possible legislative oversight, the Court should
extend presumption of the law’s validity. The land area
requirement is important since without it, it would reduce
provinces to the level of a rich municipality unable to
host otherwise qualified new smaller local government
units for sheer lack of space.
Dinagat province also fails to satisfy the requirement
for population. The rationale for this is that because the
creation of a province will interact with the Constitutional law
that “each province [,] shall have at least one representative
since the power to create a province or city inherently
involves the power to create a legislative district.” What it
creates is an unfair system of democracy allowing
those who did not achieve 250,000 minimum
requirement to be equal to those who satisfy the
250,000 requirement. Thus, one vote in Dinagat Islands
has the weight of more than two votes in Metro Manila for
the purpose of representation in the House of
Representatives. This is not what our “one person, one
vote” representative democracy is all about.
The rule will also affect the appropriation of pork barrel
funds. This is an open invitation to ruling political clans
strategically situated in this country’s thousands of islands
to sponsor the creation of more underpopulated provinces
within their political bailiwicks, enabling them to capture
more pork barrel funds, thus tightening their grip on the
levers of power.
202!
 4. Following the return of every census, Congress shall make a reapportionment
136 Bagabuyo v. On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro’s then R.A. 9371 is reapportionment legislation passed in
COMELEC Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed and sponsored accordance with Art. VI, §5(4), and not a creation,
(2008) House Bill No. 5859: An Act Providing for the division, merger, abolition or alteration of a local
Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the government unit which requires a plebiscite under
City of Cagayan De Oro or RA No. 9371. It increased Article X Section 10 and the criteria on income,
Cagayan de Oro’s legislative district from one to two. For population and land area under the LGU Code. In short,
the election of May 2007, CDO’s voters would be reapportionment does not call for a plebiscite. CDO city
classified as belonging to either the first or the second politically remains a single unit and its administration is
district, depending on their place of residence. not divided along territorial lines.

On March 13, 2007, COMELEC promulgated a resolution Legislative apportionment - “It is the allocation of seats
implementing the said act. Bagabuyo filed a petition at in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the
the Supreme Court asking for the nullification of RA drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population
9371 and Resolution No. 7837 (COMELEC Resolution that and voting power among the districts.” Reapportionment is
implements RA 9371) on constitutional grounds. Petitioner the realignment or change in legislative districts
argued that COMELEC cannot implement a law without brought about by changes in population and mandated
the commencement of a plebiscite under Article X by the constitutional requirement of equality of
Section 10 of the Constitution, which is indispensable representation
for the division and conversion of a local govt. unit.
Difference:
Issue: Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the ARTICLE VI, Sec. 5 ARTICLE X, Sec. 10
legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City, or (re)apportionment to create, divide, merge, abolish or
does it involve the division and conversion of a local give a uniform and alter territorial boundaries of
government unit? progressive ratio per LGU = requires plebiscite.
district Termination and commencement
of districts.
political corporate existence and
representation/ territorial coverage
district representation
to equalize viability and capacity to provide
population and voting services according to criteria in
power among LGU
districts

203!
Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is:
1. A natural-born citizen of the Philippines
2. At least twenty-five years of age on the day of the election
3. Able to read and write
4. A registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election (except the party-list
representatives)
Congress CANNOT increase or decrease the qualifications provided
under the Constitution.
For domicile there must be animus manendi (intent to remain)
coupled with animus non revertendi (not to return to previous
domicile).
- The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time.
- The change of residence must be voluntary.
- The residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.
To establish new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place
must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. While with
residence, all that is required is bodily presence in a given place.

Bengson v. HRET and Cruz (2001)
There are three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. If he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.
NOTE: Congress is only precluded from imposing additional
qualifications to elective officials whose qualifications are prescribed
by the Constitution itself. However, for other elective candidates
whose qualifications are only found in law (i.e. Governors, Mayors,
etc.) Congress’ plenary power allows it to modify their qualifications
by law. Thus, Congress was actually within its power to require drug
testing for candidates for other elective positions. This was even
reflected in the Ratio of SJS v. DDB. However, the Supreme Court
categorically declared the provision as unconstitutional without
distinction as to its operation in the dispositive portion of the case.

Section 6. Qualifications of district and party-list Representatives

I. Citizenship
137 Bengzon v. Cruz was a natural born citizen of the Philippines Yes. Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and
Cruz (2001) (San Clemente, Tarlac). The Fundamental law was reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. On the other hand,
then the 1935 Constitution. However, he enlisted in Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
the US marine- corps without the consent of the nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost
Philippines and took an oath of allegiance to the US. his citizenship will be restored to its prior status as a
He lost his citizenship under Commonwealth Act. No. naturalized Filipino. Given that he was a natural-born
63 (CA 63) by rendering service to an armed forces of citizen on the onset, he just reacquired his original

204!
 a foreign country. Cruz then reacquired his status. In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino
citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630. He ran citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of
for and elected as Representative of the 2nd District of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired
Pangasinan in 1998. Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:

Issue is the citizenship of Teodoro Cruz in the view of the Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship
constitutional requirement that “no person shall be a by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the
member of the House of Representatives unless he is a Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from
natural born citizen”: Petitioner contends the the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United
citizenship that was referred as a requisite does not States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
include those who acquired citizenship through other taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
means aside from birth that is contrary to Cruz's Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil
repatriation. Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in
the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain
Issue: Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino a renunciation of any other citizenship.
who became an American citizen, can still be considered
a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the
citizenship. Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry
of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the
aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a
status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. Since Cruz was not required to go through the
process of naturalization--then he is ultimately a natural
born Filipino. Due to this, he is qualified to be a member
of the House of Representatives under the Constitution.
II. Domicile and Residence
138 Aquino v. On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his No. NOT ONLY RESIDENCE BUT DOMICILE (a place
Commission Certificate of Candidacy for the position of where you return) OF CHOICE OF CANDIDATE MUST BE
on Elections Representative for the new Second Legislative District of PROVED. Thus the constitutional provision that requires that
(1995) Makati City. He provided in his certificate that he has a candidate must “reside” in the Philippines for a certain time
resided for 10 months in Makati. pertain to domicile. Also COMELEC found the following
pieces of evidence to prove his residence is not in Makati:
Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo

205!
 Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS--NUCD--UMDP of
Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to
disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on the ground that the
latter lacked the residence qualification as a
candidate for Congressman which, under Section 6,
Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution which requires:
should be for a period not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. On
May 8, 1995, the elections were held and the petitioner,
Agapito Aquino, garnered 38,547 votes against another
candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained 35,910 votes.
However, his victory was suspended by COMELEC due
to the case. On June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc
issued a Resolution reversing the resolution of the
Second Division dated May 6, 1995, and declared
Aquino ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate
for the Office of Representative of the Second Legislative
District of Makati City.
The petitioner claims that COMELEC lost its jurisdiction
on May 8, 1995, election day, and that the original
jurisdiction is in the House of Representative Electoral
Tribunal (HRET), therefore COMELEC committed a
grave abuse of discretion.
Issue: Whether the COMELEC’s finding of non-
compliance with the residency requirement of one year
against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to
applicable laws and jurisprudence.
139 Marcos v. Petitioner Imelda Romualdez filed Certificate of
COMELEC Candidacy (COC) for the Representative of the 1st
(1995) District of Leyte on March 1995 stating she lived in Leyte
for 7 months. Montejo candidate of the same position
contends that Mrs. Marcos lacked the one-year residency
(1) Certificate of Candidacy for the May 11, 1992 elections,
indicated that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion,
Tarlac for 52 years. His certificate indicated that he was also
a registered voter of the same district.
(2) His birth certificate places Concepcion,Tarlac as the
birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and Aurora.
(3) He has a 2 yr. Lease Agreement of a Condominium in
Makati instead of buying one. (shows his lack of intention to
permanent residence)
The COMELEC says that one cannot also claim that he
changed his domicile since changing domicile is hard and
absence of any proof, given the facts does not help the case
of Mr. Aquino. Additionally, the claim that it’s hard to establish
the self in a newly created district is absurd since newly
created districts did not present themselves out of thin air so
residence is still important.
COMELEC says that residence is an aspect required since it
allows the voters to exclude those who are not sensitive to
the needs of the community and prevents those who only
want to take advantage of circumstances in a certain locality.
Yes. Article 50 of the Civil Code states: Domicile means a
permanent home or a place to which one returns to--it
includes the elements of residing in a fixed place. In
Residency, this is the physical presence of a person in a
given area or country.
206!
the Constitution requires the candidates to the House of
Representatives.
In Mrs. Marcos amended CoC, she now claims that she
has always maintained Tacloban as her domicile of
residence. On April 24, 1995 – COMELEC Second
Division by a vote of 2-1 came up with a Resolution that
found Montejo’s petition for disqualification meritorious,
and found Marcos’ corrected certificate of candidacy
void, and her original certificate cancelled. Contending
COMELEC’s decision to disqualify Mrs. Marcos for the
position of Representative of 1st district of Leyte. Stating
that she has failed to meet the constitutional requirement
of one-year residency set by the law to the candidates for
the House of Representatives. When election came,
Marcos found out that she won by a landslide in the said
elections and prayed for her proclamation.
Issue: Whether petitioner was a resident, for election
purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one
year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
Essential distinction between the two is that between
residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the
intent to leave for purposes of pleasure, business or health. If
a person has the intention to remain it become his domicile.
HOWEVER, a person can only have one domicile. But the
usage of both the words in political law is used
interchangeably and residence is synonymous with domicile.
In the question of the petitioner’s domicile, there are various
evidence that disprove her claim of domicile in Leyte. There
was a time that petitioner studied and worked in Tacloban
where she continuously lived in Manila. Also in the instance
when petitioner resided in San Juan Manila where she was a
registered voter and served as a member of the Batasang
Pambansa. HOWEVER this court believes that that what
the places Petitioner mentioned are various places of
residence and NOT domicile. It may be true that during
the past 4 decades she has different residences but the
matter of fact is that she never abandoned Tacloban as
her domicile of origin.
This is proved by when she celebrated different
milestones in Tacloban even if her family was in Manila.
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. Petitioner’s argument
of abandoning domicile requires a voluntary act of
relinquishment with the intent to supplant the former. Even if
she married Pres. Ferdinand Marcos and thus
relinquished her residence to his it does not mean her
domicile is lost. She merely gained a new home but not a
domicile of origin.
It is not a statement in a certificate of candidacy is
decisive in determining whether an individual has
207!

140 Domino v. DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
Commission of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the
on Elections Province of Sarangani indicating that he had resided in
(1999) the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1)
year and two (2) months immediately preceding the
election. Private respondents alleged that Domino was
not a resident, much less a registered voter of the
province of Sarangani contrary to what is in his
Certificate of Candidacy. Domino contends that he
had complied with the 1 year residence requirement
and has been residing in Sarangani since 1997. Juan
Domino disqualified as a candidate for representative of
the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani
in May 1988. The result of the election, per Statement of
Votes certified by the Chairman of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers, shows that DOMINO garnered the highest
number of votes over his opponents for the position of
Congressman of the Province of Sarangani.
Issue: Whether petitioner herein has resided in the
subject congressional district for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections.
satisfied the Constitution’s residency qualification
requirements. It is only material when it appears to be a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform or hide a fact.
Petitioner made an honest mistake when she filed her CoC.
This mistake can be attributed to the fact that the entry for
residence is immediately followed by the entry for the number
of years and months in the residence where the candidate
seeks to hold office immediately after the elections.
No. It is within the competence of COMELEC to ascertain the
qualified/disqualified candidates. The MTC of Quezon City
exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared DOMINO a resident
of Sarangani approved and ordered the transfer of his voter’s
registration from Old Balara, Quezon City to Alabel,
Sarangani. It is not within its competence.
The court finds that Domino’s contention that he is a
resident of Sarangani for at least one year preceding the
elections is with no merit. Records show that petitioner’s
domicile of Origin is Condon, Ilocos Sur and that
sometime in 1991 he acquired a new domicile in Old
Balara Quezon City as shown in his Certificate of
Candidacy of Quezon City. Petitioner is now claiming that
he abandoned his Quezon City residence to Province of
Sarangani. BUT a person’s domicile once established is
considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until
a new one is established. In order to do such, one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile.
There must be a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one and definite
acts which correspond with the purpose. There must be an
animus manendi coupled with animus non reverendi.
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141 Perez v. On March 26, 1998 the respondent filed his certificate of
Commission candidacy for the Representative of the Third District of
on Elections Cagayan. Days later, the petitioner as a voter and citizen,
(1999) filed in the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of
Aguinaldo on the ground that he had not fulfilled the
requirement of being a resident of the district for at least
1 year, violating Art. VI Section 6 of the Constitution.
Petitioner presented evidence of respondent’s
certificate of candidacy for governor in the previous
year in the Municipality of Gattaran (1st district outside
rd
3 district of Cagayan). The CoC states also that he is a
resident of said place. Petitioner prays that if Aguinaldo
wins and the case hasn’t been decided, that his
proclamation be suspended.
Respondent, on the other hand, claims that he has
apartments in the 3rd district in order to hide his mistress
since his former marriage was still subsisting. Affidavits
from lessors were presented, all of which show that he
has been a resident of Tugegarao (3rd district) Cagayan
There must be: (1) The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; (2)
the change of residence must be voluntary; and (3) the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.
Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the
locality does not result in acquisition of domicile nor does the
physical presence without intention. Lease of Contract
entered into in 1997 does not adequately support change of
domicile. It only conveys intention to reside but not to stay.
Also Domino’s lack of intention is strengthened by the fact he
is still a registered voter of Quezon City.
Yes. Moreover, the respondent showed substantial evidence
that he fulfilled the residence requirement. The court finds no
merit in the petition for the fact that a person is a registered
voter in another district does not prove that he is not
domiciled in another district. The residence and not a
certificate of candidacy (that petitioners showed) ought to be
the determining factor whether or not an individual has
fulfilled the Constitution’s residency requirement.
In the case a bar, COMELEC found that private respondent
changed his residence from Gattaran to Tuguegarao, the
capital of Cagayan based on the residential apartment where
respondent lived in Tuguegarao, the contract of lease of the
residential apartment, marriage certificate registered in
Tugegarao, certificate of live birth of their daughter was also
registered in Tugegarao and various letters between the
respondent and his wife dating one year before the elections.
The fact that respondent voted in Gattaran is not proof of his
domicile. Considering the purpose of the residency
requirement, to ensure that the person elected is familiar with
209!
 for at least a year. COMELEC decided the respondent
was qualified to run and won the position on May 10
1998. On May 17, 1998 the respondent had already
sworn into office. Petitioner filed motion for recon arguing
that the proclamation of respondent was not a legal
impediment to continue the hearing but was denied.
Hence, this petition contends that COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion holding that respondent had
been a resident of Tugegarao since 1990.
Issue: Whether respondent has the residency
qualification to run for HOR.
142 Fernandez v. When Fernandez filed for candidacy as Representative of
HRET (2009) the First District of Laguna, he indicated that his
residence was at Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Respondent
Jesus Vicente filed a “Petition to deny due course to
cancel Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for
Disqualification” before the Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Laguna which was then forwarded
to the COMELEC. The petition was denied for lack of
merit. Petitioner Fernandez was proclaimed as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of
Laguna. Then respondent Jesus Vicente filed a petition
for quo warranto before the HRET, praying that petitioner
be declared ineligible to hold office as member of the
House of Representatives representing the First District
of Laguna and that petitioner’s election and proclamation
be annulled and declared null and void.
The respondent’s ground for the petition was that
Fernandez lacked the required one-year residency
requirement provided by Article VI section 6 of the
Constitution for members of the House of
Representatives. The HRET ruled in favor of Vicente.
the needs and problems of his constituency, there can be no
doubt that the respondent is qualified, having been governor
of Cagayan for ten years immediately before his election as
Representative of the Third District.
Three standards to show an actual change of domicile:
- one must prove an actual change of domicile,
- a bonafide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and of establishing a new one,
and;
- unequivocal acts which correspond with the
intention.
(1) Yes. The HRET is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective members. Therefore, HRET has jurisdiction
over the case.
(2) Yes. The interpretation of HRET of the residency
requirement had been too much. It is alright that Fernandez
is not at his home in Sta. Rosa 24/7 because the law does
not require a person to be at home all the time in order to
fulfill the residency requirement. It is also alright that
Fernandez would have other houses/ homes and it is even
alright for the petitioner to conduct business or receive
visitors in his other houses. What is important in matters like
this would be the principle of animus revertendi or the
intention to return.
It was seen that Fernandez has the intention to return to his
residence in Sta. Rosa even though the house was only
leased because he has business interests in Sta. Rosa which
is comprised of restaurants and a residential property for
lease. The children of Fernandez are also studying in schools
located in Sta. Rosa.
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 One of the reasons for their decision was because
Fernandez’s alleged residence in Sta. Rosa was only
leased therefore they said it was not actually a
permanent residence the testimonies earlier procured
were allegedly gotten from coercion.
Issues: (1) Whether HRET has jurisdiction over the case
(2)Whether HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction
143 Tagolino v. Richard Gomez filed his CoC with COMELEC for the
HRET (2013) congressional office as Representative of 4th District of
Leyte under the Liberal Party. Mr. Buenaventura Juntilla
though allege that Mr. Gomez was actually a resident of
San Juan Manila and failed to meet the one year
residency under Section 6 Article VI. He was ultimately
disqualified. Then, wife, Lucy Torres-Gomez filed her
COC with a certificate of Nomination and Acceptance to
be Liberal Party’s substitute candidate. Such substitution
is acceptable since according to the COMELEC, a
cancellation does not cancel the certificate of candidacy
of the party and still has the discretion to change their
composition. COMELEC Resolution approved the
substitution. On May 10, 2010, the name Richard was not
removed from the ballots and soon after Lucy Torres won
and the petitioner was placed third in votes in their
district.
As response to the opposition, she contends that she
continued to maintain residency in Ormoc City where she
was born and raised, despite her marriage to Richard
Gomez. The opposition also assails HRET case no. 10-
031 which declared the validity of respondent Lucy
Torres-Gomez’s substitution as the Liberal Party’s
replacement candidate for the position of Leyte
No. COMELEC was right in interpreting the law since a
Candidate disqualified under Section 68 of Omnibus Election
Code can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 71
because he remains a candidate until disqualified; but a
person whose CoC itself has been denied due course and/or
cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because
he is not considered a candidate. In other words, there would
be no candidate to speak of under a denial of due course to
and/or cancellation of a CoC case, then there would be no
candidate to be substituted.
Article 68 talks about qualifications and disqualification.
Article 78 talks about misrepresentation within a CoC that
renders it void. Thus under 78, the lack of CoC because it is
void ab initio may not be grounds for substitution.
HOWEVER in the case at hand, the confusion stemmed from
the decision of COMELEC that used the word “disqualified”
and that his CoC was not denied. COMELEC first division
had “Disqualified” / technically cancelled Richard Gomez’s
CoC because he doesn’t have a one year residency in 4th
District of Leyte in which he is running for Congressman.
Because of the wording, COMELEC en banc allowed Lucy
Torres-Gomez’s substitution under Ormoc 4th District.
211!
 Representative in lieu of Richard Gomez. Thus the
controversy lies in HRET’s decision to accept the
substitution of Richard Gomez by Lucy Torres-Gomez
even if she fails to meet the one year residency. There
also a controversy whether HRET abused its discretion in
agreeing with COMELEC en banc’s decision where it
states that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is
still technically a candidate.
Issues: Whether the substitution of respondent is valid
144 Reyes v. Respondent Tan filed before the COMELEC a petition to
COMELEC cancel the CoC of petitioner on the ground that it
(2013) contained material misrepresentation. In the CoC, it was
stated: (1) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac,
Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan, Batangas
which is the residence of her husband, and at the same
time, when she is also a resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy.
Milagrosa, Quezon City as admitted in the Directory of
Congressional Spouses of the House of Representatives;
(2) that she is not a permanent resident of another
country when she is a permanent resident or an
immigrant of the United States of America; and (3) that
she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American
citizen.
Her CoC was then cancelled. Petitioner here then is
assailing the resolution of COMELEC ordering the
cancellation of her CoC for the position of
representative of the district of Marinduque.
Therefore COMELEC En Banc committed a grave abuse of
discretion esp. for the fact that they granted the petition of
substitution without qualification.
SC said that HRET has exclusive jurisdiction and can opt or
not opt to make a ruling based on COMELEC’s decision.
However, it also erred when it adopted the ruling of
COMELEC. In this light, HRET cannot be faulted because it
merely adopted COMELEC’s decision.
Thus SC ruled that there can be no substitution on the
grounds that the first division had cancelled Gomez’s CoC
because of failure to meet requirements, thus no substitution
is allowed. HRET also committed an abuse of discretion by
adopting the COMELEC ruling.
No. Regarding petitioner's nationality, petitioner countered
that the evidence presented by Tan does not support the
allegation that she is a permanent resident or a citizen of the
United States. The court believes that since the petitioner is a
holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a
“balikbayan,” the burden of proof shifted to petitioner,
imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or that she
has re-acquired such status. Aside from the bare allegation
that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner
submitted no proof to support such contention. Additionally,
petitioner did not prove that she took an oath of allegiance in
compliance with R.A. No. 9225 which will restore her natural
born status.
As to the issue of residency, proceeding from the finding that
petitioner has lost her natural-born status, we quote with
approval the ruling of the COMELEC First Division that
petitioner cannot be considered a resident of Marinduque:
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 Additionally, she also claim she is a Filipino but of
American descent. During the pendency of her Motion The only proof presented by [petitioner] to show that she has
for Reconsideration, on 18 May 2013, petitioner was met the one-year residency requirement of the law and never
proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections. On the abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque is her
same day (5 June 2013) that the COMELEC made the claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the
cancellation of the CoC inal and executory, petitioner province from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011. But such
took her oath of office. fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year
residency. For, [petitioner] has never regained her
Issue: Whether petitioner fulfills the one-year residency domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an
requirement American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said
locality can substitute the fact that she has not
abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.
III. Additional Qualification
145 Social Justice (See above, Case # 78) Yes, they impose a new requirement which is
Society v. UNCONSTITUTIONAL. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of
Dangerous The case started when in 2002 RA 9165 or enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating
Drugs Board Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose
(2008) implemented. The law mandates that the following be qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what
placed in mandatory drug test: (1) candidates to public the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a
office; (2) students in the secondary, tertiary, public; and candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification,
(3) private employees and officers to undergo drug the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The
testing when they are charged with an offense by the right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should
prosecutor. Social Justice Society (SJS), a political party, not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement
seeks to prohibit the enactment of RA 9165 as it is not otherwise specified in the Constitution. Sec. 36(g) of RA
against unreasonable searches and seizures and may be 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed
used to harass people. In line with this, COMELEC’s COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification
issued Resolution 6468 which required candidates to requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
undergo drug testing before they could be qualified for Constitution.
the May 10 2004 elections, which Senator Pimentel
deeming as unconsititutional. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a
candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean,
Issue: Does Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of
Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua
for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as

213!
 enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution?
senator-elect. Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC
Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987
Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the
Senate.

The Constitution only requires (1) citizenship, (2) voter

registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 effectively enlarges the qualification
requirements enumerated in Sec. 4, Art VI of the
Constitution.

Section 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be
elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise
provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following
their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected.
A member of the House may serve for more than three terms as long
as it is not consecutive / successive.
Term v. Tenure: Term is the period that an official is entitled to hold
office while tenure is the period during which the official actually
holds the office.

Section 7. Term of Representatives

146 Dimaporo v. Mohamad Ali Dimaporo, Second Legislative District Yes. The concept of voluntary renunciation of office under
Mitra (1991) representative of Lanao del Sur, filed with the COMELEC Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution is broad enough to
a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional include the situation envisioned in Section 67, Article IX
Governor of the ARMM. The Speaker and Secretary of of B.P. Blg. 881.
the HoR, in performance of their ministerial duties /
administrative power, then excluded Dimaporo’s name Difference between “term” of office and “tenure” is that the
from the Roll of Members of the HoR pursuant to Section term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be
67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code. Dimaporo extended or shortened by the legislature but the period
lost the election and addressed his intention to resume during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may
his office as an elected Member of the Congress. be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of
Petitioner claims that the said provision is not operative said officer. A term is set by the Constitution to a number of

214!
so he could resume office.
Sec. 67: Any elective official whether national or local
running for any office other than the one which he is
holding in a permanent capacity except for President and
Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
Issue: Is Section 6, Article IX of B.P 881(Omnibus
Election Code) operative under the present constitution?
years while a tenure may be shortened because of death or
other circumstances.
In this case, the court is guided by Monroy vs. Court of
Appeals, a case involving Section 27 of R.A. No. 180
(Revised Election Code). The Court, in said case,
categorically pronounced that "forfeiture (is) automatic and
permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of
candidacy for another office. The officials running for office
other than the ones they are holding will be considered
resigned not because of abuse of facilities of power or
the use of office facilities but primarily because under
our Constitution, we have this …chapter on
accountability of public officers (both in the 1973 and
1987 constitution). Section 1 of Article XI (1987) on
"Accountability of Public Officers" states that:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
Under this commentary on accountability of public officers,
the elective public officers must serve their principal, the
people, not their own personal ambition. Petitioner failed
to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of
elective public officials, this statutory provision (Section
67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) seeks to ensure that such
officials serve out their entire term of office by
discouraging them from running for another public office
and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear
that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go
back to their former position. This is consonant with the
215!
constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the
people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate
which they have received from their constituents.

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official

covered thereby files a CoC for another office, an overt,
concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective
office presently being held, he is deemed to have
voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. Forfeiture
(is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing
of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the
moment and act of filing are considered. Once the
certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and
nothing save a new election or appointment can restore
the ousted official. The law does not make the forfeiture
dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and
unforeseeable.

That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg.

881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode
of shortening the tenure of office of members of
Congress, does not preclude its application to present
members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that
"(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office, on impeachment … All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law,
but not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression
clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI
of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman
may be shortened are not exclusive. The expression in the
constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a
vacancy does not preclude the legislature from prescribing

216!
 other grounds

Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in

favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify
the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded,
does not suffice.

Note: The ground for forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI is

different from Section 7 which talks about VOLUNTARY
RENUNCIATION OF OFFICE

Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of
the Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy
shall be held on the second Monday of May. in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the
Senate HR unexpired term.
Members 24 250, unless
otherwise provided If there is a vacancy, it is NOT MANDATORY to have a special
by law election, the matter is left to the discretion of Congress.
Term Duration 6 years 3 years
Term Begins Noon of June 30 Lucero case: In case of special elections, there is no need to fill in
Term Limit Not more than 2 Not more than 3 unless Congress decides to. However, if there is a FAILURE of
consecutive terms consecutive terms elections, Congress MUST fill in the vacancy.
Election Date Second Monday of May
Constituent Elected at Large Per District / Elected
at Large (Party-list)

Section 9. Filling-in Vacancies

147 Lucero v. Wilmar Lucero was down by 204 votes to Jose Ong Jr. No. Under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, there are
COMELEC however, this tally did not include the results of Precinct two requisites for Special Elections: (1) that there is a
(1994) No. 7, 13, and 16 of the Municipality of Silvino Lobos. failure of election, and (2) that such failure would affect

217!
There were abnormalities within the election particularly
in which precinct 7’s ballots were not canvassed thus
held illegible. On the other hand, the election
officers did not count precinct 16’s ballots due to
missing electoral returns and precinct 13 ballot
boxes were snatched thus no election was held
there. Thereafter COMELEC, after a manifestation
issued by Lucero, ordered a counting of precinct 7 and
16’s ballots and, if necessary, hold a special election on
precinct 13. Lucero contends such decision because he
believes that precinct 7’s ballots were invalid.
Issue: Whether the COMELEC acted with a grave abuse
of discretion in calling for a special election in Precinct
No. 13 after 1 year and 10 months, following the day of
the synchronized elections.
the results of the election. The Court ordered a recount of
the all the ballots in the precincts except precinct 13 of the
Second District of Northern Samar and include a count of
precinct 7 and a recount of precinct 16. If the difference in
the total number of the votes between the two congressmen
is less than the total voters of precinct 13, there would be a
special election because the results of precinct can affect the
winner of the elections.
In this case, the COMELEC held that the ballots in precinct 7
were invalid given that testimony witness confirm that the
ballots were tampered and thus a recount will be
unwarranted. That gives us then the votes from Las Navas
and from precinct 16 which if added together would result in
the reduction Ong’s lead to Lucero by 143.
Based from such recount result, the COMELEC thus deemed
that there could be a special election because: (1) There
was a failure of election in precinct 13 when the ballots
in the precinct were snatched. And (2) there are 213
registered voters in Precinct No. 13.
In the course of the deliberations on these cases, the Court
considered the possible application, by analogy, of Section
10, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution providing that no
special election in the event of a vacancy in the Offices of the
President and Vice President "shall be called if the vacancy
occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next
presidential election," and of the second paragraph of
Section 4 of R. A. No. 7166 which provides:
In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or
House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the
expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a
special election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60)
218!

148 Tolentino v. Because of Arroyo’s appointment of Guingona as
COMELEC vice-president there was a vacant seat left in the
(2004) Senate. In order to fill the seat, COMELEC is to hold a
special election to be held simultaneously with the
regular elections. Thus in the elections, there would be
th
13 Senators that would be voted. The 13 placer will
only a 3 year term as compared to the regular 6 year
term due to him serving only Guingona’s unexpired
days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of
the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the
Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with
the next succeeding regular election.
The purpose of the law is clear when it wants to avoid the
expense to be incurred in the holding of a special election
when a regular election is, after all, less than a year away.
However such will not be applied in this case because:
(1) The special election in the former is to fill permanent
vacancies in the Office of the President, Vice President, and
Members of Congress occurring after the election, while the
special election under the latter is due to or by reason of a
failure of election.
(2) A special election under Section 6 would entail minimal
costs because it is limited to only the precincts involved and
to the candidates who, by the result of the election in a
particular constituency, would be affected by the failure of
election. On the other hand, the special election for the
Offices of the President, Vice President, and Senators would
be nation-wide, and that of a Representative, district-wide.
(3) there will be no representative under the Second
Legislative District of Northern Samar in the HoR.
Yes. R.A. No. 6645 provides:
SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least
eighteen (18) months or in the House of Representatives at
least one (1) year before the next regular election for
Members of Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon
receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the
existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election,
219!
term.
Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica sought to
enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming with finality the
candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest number
of votes as the winner in the special election for a single
three-year term seat. Petitioners contend that
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without
jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate
of the position to be filled in the special election as
required under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6645 (R.A.
No. 6645) and (2) it failed to require senatorial
candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy
whether they seek election under the special or regular
elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
Issue: Whether a special election to fill a vacant three-
year term Senate seat was validly held on 14 May 2001.
shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress
is in recess, an official communication on the existence of the
vacancy and call for a special election by the President of the
Senate or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose. The
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus
elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date
of the special election, which shall not be earlier than forty-
five (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from the date of
such resolution or communication, stating among other
things the office or offices to be voted
Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year
before the expiration of the term, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645,
as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special
election by fixing the date of the special election, which shall
not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90)
after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy
in the Senate, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election;
and (2) to give notice to the voters of, among other things,
the office or offices to be voted for.
A survey of COMELEC's actions before the election showed
that nowhere in its resolutions or press releases did it state
that it will hold a special election or even state that the 13th
placer will be proclaimed a winner. However despite such
lapses, there is no fault on the part of COMELEC. In a
special election to fill a vacancy, the law fixes a date at which
the special election is to be held and operates as the call for
that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus
prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body
220!

149 Ocampo v. Petitioner contends to HRET that his opponent won
HRET (2004) through the 807 precincts in the 6th District of Manila on
the following grounds: (1) misreading of votes
garnered by petitioner; (2) falsification of election
returns; (3) substitution of election returns; (4) use
of marked, spurious, fake and stray ballots; and (5)
presence of ballots written by one person or two
persons. Since it was proven that there was a massive
charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to
do so.
In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides
that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to
fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the special election
to fill the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator
Guingonas appointment as Vice-President in February 2001
could not be held at any other time but must be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections on
14 May 2001. The law charges the voters with knowledge of
this statutory notice and COMELECs failure to give the
additional notice did not negate the calling of such special
election, much less invalidate it.
The rule will be different if the vacancy is under the HoR
since the holding of the special election is subject to a
condition precedent, that is, the vacancy should take place at
least one year before the expiration of the term. The time of
the election is left to the discretion of COMELEC and must
follow Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 that it must be held not
earlier than 60 days or longer than 90 days after giving
notice. This is important because it will be impossible for the
local constitutents to know of the time and place of a special
election unless COMELEC notifies them.
No. Settled jurisprudence states that subsequent
disqualification of a candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes does not entitle the candidate who garnered
the 2nd highest number of votes to be declared the winner.
The second placer is just that, a second placer--he lost in the
election, he was repudiated by either majority or plurality of
voters. He could not be proclaimed a winner as he could not
221!
 vote-buying by then respondent Mark Jimenez, he was be considered the first among the qualified candidates. To
disqualified and not proclaimed. rule otherwise is to misconstrue the nature of the democratic
electoral process and the sociological and psychological
Petitioner invokes Article 6 of Disqualification wherein it underpinning behind voter’s preference
is stated that disqualified candidates will have the votes
casted unto them not counted. Petitioner then contends
that because of such circumstances, he should be
declared the winner of the elections since he garnered
the 2nd highest. HRET denied his petition.

Issue: Whether HRET committed grave abuse of

discretion in issuing the proclamation that “protestant”
(herein petitioner) cannot be the duly elected
representative of the 6th district of Manila since being a
second placer he cannot be proclaimed the first among
the remaining disqualified candidates.

Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase.
Increase in emoluments seem to be permitted since the prohibition is
with regard to the immediate increase of compensation / salaries.
However, if we follow the spirit of Philconsa v. Mathay the prohibition
is an absolute ban on any form of direct or indirect increase of salary.
Congress may increase limit on allowances for travel and office since
such do not form part of the salary or compensation; allowances take
effect immediately.
Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.
The phrase “not more than 6 years” has been interpreted to mean
not more than prision correccional in its maximum period. The
privilege against arrest is available only when Congress is in
session (whether regular or special) and whether or not the legislator
is actually attending a session.

222!
The privilege of speech granted to Congress is limited only to • Privilege extends to agents of assemblymen, provided that
forums other than Congress but does not protect the speaker from their agency consists precisely in assisting the legislator in the
disciplinary authority of the Congress. performance of legislative action.
• It is an absolute protection against suits for libel.
• Speech or debate includes utterances made in the
performance of official functions (speeches delivered, statements
made, votes cast, bills introduced, etc.)
• Not necessary that Congress is in session for privilege of
speech, what is essential is that the utterance constitutes legislative
action.

Section 11. Immunities and Privileges

I. Privilege from Arrest
150 People v. Romeo Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of No. Petitioner avers that the First District of Zamboanga chose
Jalosjos (2000) Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary him as their representative and having been re-elected, he has
while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls
lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused- the duty to perform of a Congressman. He adds that it cannot
appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from
to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, pending criminal cases.
including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the
convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to
offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its
the need for his constituents to be represented. benefits. However, in spite of its importance, the privileges
and rights arising from having been elected may be
Issue: Does membership in Congress exempt an enlarged or restricted by law. All officials are subject to the
accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly majesty of law. Privileges should be granted by law not
incarcerated persons in general? inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the
rank the higher requirement of obedience should be rather
than exemption. The immunity from arrest of Senators and
Congressmen are granted in a restrictive sense and cannot be
extended to mean otherwise as provided by law as follow:

1935 Constitution: Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of

223!
the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason,
felony, and breach of the peace be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to
and returning from the same. In this case, the court believes
that this provision only applies to civil arrest that is
contrary to the present case of a criminal nature.

Neither could he invoked the following:

Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance
at its sessions and in going to and returning from the same.
This is also inapplicable since there was no mention of
immunity for crimes of more than six years, which the
petitioner is currently burdening.

Additionally, petitioner avers that under Section 16 (2), Article

VI of the Constitution which states that A majority of each
House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller
number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the
attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under
such penalties, as such House may provide. This reason
cannot also be countenanced as the petitioner has not
given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The
members of Congress cannot compel absent members to
attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a
legitimate one.

The reason for confining someone is to protect society. It is

also done for the administration of justice. It is also apparent
that when the warrant of arrest was served, he fled and did not
heed to the calls of his colleagues in HoR. The court anyway
has granted him provisional leave to attend hearings in the

224!

151 Trillanes v. On July 27, 2003, a group of 300 heavily armed
Pimentel soldiers led by junior officer of the Armed Forces of
(2008) the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood
Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly
demanded the resignation of the President and key
national officials. Due to the threat posed by the said
officers, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo declared
House Committee on Ethics regarding the case of his
suspension, when he needs to go to the dentist, and was even
chartered unto a plane to register as a voter in Dapitan.
The claim of his constituents not being represented could not
be countenanced. First, when the voters of his district elected
the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did
so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such
legislative results which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters
elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a
terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no
longer serve his full term in office. Second, he still has the
capacity to discharge his duty while confined. He still maintains
an office in Congress that still works and fulfills his mandate
through the help of his hired employees. He receives benefits
and salary and has filed bills and resolutions as well.
RE: PERFORMANCE OF LEGISLATION AS THE HIGHEST
HIERARCHY OF GOVERNMENT: The petitioner is only one
within 250 (House of Representatives) and 24 (Senate)
members of the Congress. His physical absence does not
prevent Congress from functioning properly. The hierarchy also
is based on the exigencies of government. The court cannot
also validate inequality since it believes that there should be
equal treatment for people who are similarly situated.
Yes. A person charged with crime is taken into custody for
purposes of administrating justice. The court finds that there is
no reasonable classification, such as election to Congress,
which would distinguish one from the class of prisoners or
delay allow the delay of justice. The Art III. Sec 13 of the
Constitution defines and limits the extent of this:
225!
a state of rebellion and called the AFP to resolve the
issue. After a series of negotiations, the officers
surrendered. After the incident known as “Oakwood
Incident” petitioner Antonio Trillanes IV and his
comrades are charged with coup d’état under Article
134-A of the Revised Penal Code.
Close to four years after the Oakwood Incident,
petitioner has remained in detention and won a
seat in the Senate with a six-year term. Before he
was officially announced as a Senator, he filed an
Omnibus Motion. (a)To be allowed to go to Senate
and attend all official functions (i.e. Regular &
Plenary sessions, committee hearings, etc.) (b) To be
allowed to set up a working area (a computer with
internet and telephone line) in his detention area at
Marine Barracks Manila, For Bonifacio, Taguig City so
that he could work. The cost of setting up the
equipment could be deducted from his budget
allocation in Senate. (c)To be allowed to receive his
staff at reasonable times of days for meetings or
assistance in his work as Senator. (d)To be allowed to
give interviews and to air his comments, reactions,
and/or opinions to the media/press (e) With the
consent of the Court and his custodians, that he be
allowed to receive on Tuesdays and Fridays
reporters and other members of media.
Issue: Whether the Jalosjos jurisprudence is
applicable in this case
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpusis suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
Therefore there is a reason for the petitioner’s right to be
curtailed. Incarceration however is a confinement or
restraint in the power of locomotion and physical activity
thus in the case of Jalosjos there is still the capacity to
accomplish his legislative duties.
The petitioner invokes the doctrine in administrative law
which says: “a public official cannot be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term since
his re-election to the office operates as a condonation of the
officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the
right to remove him therefor.”
The Court is unconvinced. The court held that doctrine of
condonation does not apply to criminal cases. There is no
prior term to speak or re-election on the part of the petitioner.
“Petitioner’s electoral victory only signifies pertinently that
when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so
with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of
action [and] with the knowledge that he could achieve only
such legislative results which he could accomplish within
the confines of prison”
RE: DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF PEOPLE WHO VOTED HIM
BUT WILL NOT SEE HIM PERFORM HIS DUTY: The mandate
of the people yields to the Constitution which they ordained to
226!
 govern all under the rule of law.

RE: PERFORMANCE OF LEGISLATION AS THE HIGHEST

HIERARCHY OF GOVERNMENT: The petitioner is only one
within 250 (House of Representatives) and 24 (Senate)
members of the Congress. His physical absence does not
prevent Congress from functioning properly.
II. Parliamentary freedom of speech and debate
152 Jimenez v. The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of No. Speech or debate contemplated in this section are
Cabangbang said publication, defendant was a member of the those made in the performance of official function. These
(1966) House of Representatives and Chairman of its includes speeches, statements or votes cast in the Congress.
Committee on National Defense. They are duly authorized to do such in the exercise of their
position as part of the congress and in the performance of
Recovery by way of damages for the publication of an their duties. BUT the publication belonging in this case is
allegedly libelous letter of Defendant Cabangbang NOT of that nature. The open letter to the President was
Being a member of the House of Representative and done when the Congress was not in session and defendant
pursuant to the Constitution members of the HoR shall published the letter in the newspapers and was not in the
have the privilege from arrest during their attendance performance of his duty thus such is not privileged.
at the session of Congress and for any speech or
debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any However as a side note that in the letter, defendant likewise
other place. added that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting
tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no
Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly knowledge". This only means that the very document upon
three operational plans under serious study by some which plaintiffs' action is based, explicitly indicates or
ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian shows that they might be absolutely unaware of the
political strategists. The letter alleged that: (1) That alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely
such strategists have had collusions with communists unwitting tools of the planners. We do not think that this
and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas used statement is derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of
the money of the people under the guise of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are
psychological warfare for political campaign officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law,
influencing the minds of the people through radio talk, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and
newspaper, speaking engagements about the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to
Communism, and other means extolling the suggest that the group therein described as "planners"
administration. (2) The letter also alleged that there include these two (2) high ranking officers.

227!
 was also a plan of a coup d’état to place Jesus
Vargas as the president. (3) Finally, the letter
contained that there was a modification of Plan No. 1,
by trying to assuage the President and the public with
a loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen.
Arellano delivered a speech challenging the authority
and integrity of Congress, in an effort to rally the
officers and men of the AFP behind him, and gain
popular and civilian support. To this end, the
“planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among
others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al. may
or may not be aware that they are being used as a
tool to meet such an end.

The letter was said to have been published in

newspapers of general circulation and among other it
asks that Jimenez to resign, for AFP to divorce from
politics, etc. Jimenez then filed a case against
Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against
Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is
libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be
dismissed because he said that as a member of the
HOR he is immune from suit and that he is covered by
the privileged communication rule and that the said
letter is not even libelous.

Issue: Whether the letter was a privileged

communication.
153 Pobre v. Administrative complaint for disbarment against No. The Court rules that her speech was not actionable
Defensor- Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech that was criminally. Legislative is immune from deterrents to the
Santiago delivered on the senate reflecting a total disrespect unhibited discharge of their duties not for themselves BUT for
(2009) towards Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and other the public good. However, the Court wishes to express its
member of the court. Calling them the “Supreme deep concern with the language that the Senator used and
Court of Idiots” for not having been considered the that she has undoubtedly crossed the limits. In this case,

228!
position of Chief Justice.
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the
mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated,
debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like
throwing up to be living my middle years in a country
of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in
the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the
position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of
idiots x x x.
Senator Santiago attests that the speech was covered
by the constitutional provision on parliamentary
immunity--that the speech she delivered was in the
discharge of her duty as a member of the Congress.
This is rooted in Article VI Section 11:
“A Senator or Member of the House of Representative
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six
years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while
the Congress is in session. No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place
for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.”
Issue: Whether Miriam is administratively liable for her
acts.
the senator violated Canon 8 Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. This deals with the
avoidance of abusive language and the maintenance of respect
to the Courts by a lawyer. Lawyers in public service are
keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher
degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their
brethren in private practice. Senator Santiago should have
known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements
would make on the people’s faith in the integrity of the courts.
Her statements were expressions of PERSONAL (indicated
by the letter “I” in the quote) anger and frustration at not
being considered for the Chief Justice position and in a
sense were outside the official parliamentary function.
Parliamentary immunity is not vested in the individual but rather
a privilege to the benefit of the people and the institution. And
the court does not understand her anger towards them
seeing that the judicial bar council has the function of
screening and nominating the Chief Justice.
Even if, a lawyer holding government office may not be
disciplined as member of the Bar BUT the court is not hesitant
to impose some form of disciplinary sanction to Atty. Santiago.
It is imperative to the court to instill her duty to respect the
Courts of the land and that the parliamentary privilege is not for
the benefit of themselves but rather to the function of her office.
[I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and
integrity of this Court and believe that they cannot expect
justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into
their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would
be the result.
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary
sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would
229!
 have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards
the Court and its members. The factual and legal
circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from
doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. The
factual and legal circumstances of this case, however,
deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of
remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration
dictates this kind of disposition." The lady senator clearly
violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her
peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on
her.

Section 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of A member of Congress may resign in order to accept an
Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full appointment in the government before the expiration of his term.
disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify
the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise Even if a member of Congress resigns his seat, he cannot accept an
from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors. appointment to an office which may have been created, or its
emolument increased, during his term.
- Full Disclosure of financial and business interests
- Notification Only of a potential conflict of interest that may arise
from the filing of proposed legislation authored by them.

Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives

may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries,
during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been created or the
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was
elected.

230!
 Section 13. Disqualifications
154 Dante Liban v. It is being assailed whether Gordon is allowed to hold No. The Republic of the Philippines established the PNRC
Richard Gordon two government offices namely: The Senate office and as a voluntary organization for the purpose contemplated
(2011) be the chair of PNRC (Philippine National Red Cross). in the Geneva Red Cross Convention on July 27, 1929. The
Under Sec. 13, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution it states: PNRC is a member National Society of the International Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement (Movement) guided by
No Senator or Member of the House of its Fundamental Principles (from the whereas clause of the
Representatives may hold any other office or Convention)
employment in the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including Thus PNRC must uphold such principles meaning, it
government-owned or controlled corporations or their should remain autonomous, neutral and independent in
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. relation to the State. Section 11 of the Charters of PNRC
Neither shall he be appointed to any office which states that:
may have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was the Philippine National Red Cross shall be finance
elected. primarily by contributions obtained through solicitation
campaigns throughout the year which shall be organized
Petitioners assailed the case of Camporedondo v by the Board of Governors and conducted by the
NLRC, in which PNRC was a government-owned or Chapters in their respective jurisdiction
controlled corporation.
Additionally, PNRC’s funding is not from the government.
Issue: Whether Richard Gordon’s position as PNRC Regarding the management, Section 6 states:
head violates the Art. VI Sec. 13 of the Constitution.
Section 6: a Board of Governors composed of thirty
members, six of whom shall be appointed by the President
of the Philippines, 18 shall be elected by chapter delegates
in biennial conventions and the remaining six shall be
selected by the twenty-four members of the Board already
chosen.

It could be seen that part of the Board are private sector

individuals. In this case, Gordon was elected by a private
sector-controlled PNRC Board fourth-fifths of whom are
private sector members of the PNRC.

231!

Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or
before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi- judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned
or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office.
He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called
upon to act on account of his office.
Prohibitions under Art. VI, Sec. 14:
1. Personal appearance as counsel before any court, quasi-judicial
body, or tribunal.
2. Direct or indirect financial interest in any government contract,
franchise or special privilege during his term.
The Court rules that the President cannot reverse or modify
the decisions or actions of the PNRC Board. Neither can the
President reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the
PNRC chairman.
What the case of Camporedondo v NLRC failed to consider
is in Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987 in which it required the
GOCC must be owned by the government and in cases
of Stock Corporation at least 51%.
It was shown that of the Board are private sector
individuals, thus it is not a GOCC. Gordon can legally hold
office as Chairman of PNRC and a Senator.
• The contracts referred to here are those involving “financial
interest,” that is, contracts from which the legislator expects to
derive some profit at the expense of the government.
• Provision uses the word “term” and not “tenure”.
3. Intervention in any matter before any office of the Government for
his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office.
NOTE: The prohibition is personal to lawyer-congressmen and does
NOT apply to the law firm of which they may be members.
If the legislator is not trying to indirectly appear as counsel for
another, can he intervene in a case representing himself? It can be
argued that he can.
232!
 Section 14. Prohibitions – Lawyer Legislators / Conflict of Interests
155 Puyat v. De There was an election for the 11 Directors of the International No. On the onset, Fernandez cannot be said to be
Guzman (1982) Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI). After the directors were appearing as a counsel seeing that he has already
voted, the board was divided on whether there was actually a purchased 10 shares of IPI. Thus, he is just merely
proper counting of votes. The group was split into those in joining the cause of the private respondents (Acero).
favor of Eustaquio T.C. Acero's contention that there was no However because of certain circumstances like the
proper voting while the ones who contested such allegation purchasing of a measly 200PHP worth of stock in
sided with Eugenio J. Puyat. Thus, the Acero group and IPI representing only 10 shares of the 262,843
Puyat group. The Acero group filed a case at SEC. outstanding shares and acquiring them after the fact
that he was prohibited to appear as counsel
Estanislao Fernandez, a member of the interim Batasang because of a constitutional violation; we are led to
Pambansa, entered as counsel for respondent Acero in the believe that there was a violation.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Petitioner is
assailing the order of the SEC granting Assemblyman The Court believes that this is a case of an indirect
Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in the SEC case “appearance as counsel before…any administrative
at hand. According to petitioners, this is unconstitutional body” and a clear circumvention of the
given that Estanislao Fernandez is a member of the interim Constitutional prohibition using the small stock as
Batasang Pambansa. They believe that he violated the rationale of being a director for the administrative
Constitution when he entered as a counsel for respondent body. The Intervention would enable him to
Acero group. Petitioner contend that this is a constitutional appear actively in proceedings in some other
violation of Section 11, Article 8. capacity and if upheld would render the
constitutional provision as ineffective. We say
On the other hand, accused Fernandez said he did not this because if all other assemblymen would
violate the Constitution since he had legal interest on the want to influence administrative bodies they
case of Acero group. Fernandez uses the fact that he bought would do so just by acquiring minimal
ten (10) shares of IPI for 200 PHP. Additionally, he was voted participation. The constitution prohibits such
as director of IPI in an election of board members. and may not be rendered ineffective by
indirection.
Issue: Whether Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then
stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC Case without Thus the intervention made by Assemblyman
violating Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution Fernandez, falls under Sec. 11 Art. VIII of the
Constitution.

233!
Section 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the
fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date
is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number
of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its
next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.
Regular Session
Begins Ends
th
Once a year on the 4 Monday Discretionary upon Congress but
of July not later than 30 days before the
opening of its next regular
session
Special Session called by the President is done when legislature is
in recess. No longer any significant distinction for determining what
the legislature may consider.
Section 16. (1). The Senate shall elect its President and the House
of Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members. Each House shall choose such other officers
as it may deem necessary.
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and
may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and
under such penalties, as such House may provide.
(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish
its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of
two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty
of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its
judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any
question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be
entered in the Journal. Each House shall also keep a Record of its
proceedings.
(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without
the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any
other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
A Senator who is abroad was cannot be considered in determining
quorum as this Senator is beyond the jurisdiction of Senate’s
compulsory powers.
Avelino v. Cuenco (Quorum)
When the Constitution states that a majority of each House shall
constitute a quorum, “the House” does not mean all the members.
There is a difference between a majority of “all the members of the
House” and a majority of “the House”; the latter requiring less
number. Thus an absolute majority of 12 members of the Senate is a
constitutional majority of the Senate for purpose of a quorum.
It is the proportion between those physically present and the total
membership of the body. (Bernas Primer)
Enrolled Bill Doctrine
The signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate
President and the certification of the secretaries of both Houses of
Congress that such bill was passed are conclusive of its due
enactment. (Arroyo v. De Venecia)
The respect due to a co-equal department requires the courts to
accept the certification of the presiding officer as conclusive
assurance that the bill so certified is authentic. (Casco)
If the officers withdraw their certification, then the presumption is no
longer conclusive.
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 Section 16. Officers and Internal Business
I. Officers of Congress
156 Defensor-Santiago On July 27, 1998 one of the agenda in the Senate was to (1) The court has no power to dictate the legislative
v. Guingona select who will be the Senate President. There were only two in matters purely legislative such as deciding who
(1998) candidates for the position and they were: Sen. Tatad, as will seat as minority leader.
nominated by Sen. Defensor- Santiago, and Sen. Fernan as
nominated by Sen. Ople. Sen. Fernan won with a resulting (2) No. The Constitution mandates that the Senate
vote of 20-2. The following were likewise elected- Sen. President be elected by a number constituting more
Franklin Drilon as Senate Majority Leader and Sen. Blas Ople than one half of all the member. In no way does it
as pro tempore, and Sen. Teofisto Guingona as the Senate provide that members who will not vote for the
minority leader. On the other hand, Sen. Tatad manifested winning Senate President ipso facto constitute the
that he should be the Senate minority leader on the “minority”--that could thereby elect its minority
following grounds: leader.
- Those who voted for Sen. Fernan as the Senate
president comprise the “majority” History shows that “majority” in either house of
- Those who voted for him are part of the “minority” congress refers to the political party to which the
most number of lawmakers belonged, while minority
During the discussion of the abovementioned, Sen. Flavier referred to the party with lesser number of members.
said that it is rather the power of the senators belonging
to Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party to vote the minority leader. Majority may also refer to the group, party, or faction
He said that the party only had seven members in the with the larger number of votes not necessarily more
whole Senate. Thus as “also a minority”, they had chosen than half while the minority receives the smaller
Sen. Guingona as the Senate minority leader. By virtue number of votes.
thereof, the Senate president recognized Guingona as the
Senate minority leader. In the Philippines having a multi-partisan system
meant having several minority parties one of
Issues: (1) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition? which will be declared by the COMELEC as the
dominant minority party for purpose of general
(2) Was there a violation of the Constitution? elections.

(3) Did Guingona commited grave abuse of discretion in No constitutional provision states which of the
usurping the minority position? minority groups/independents/combination has the
right to select the minority leader. Method of
choosing minority leader is in the discretion of the

235!
 Senate not by this court. The Congress already
adopted a set of rules to govern internal affairs for
election of officers.

This Court has no authority therefore to interfere and

unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without
running afoul of constitutional principles that it is
bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty that
justifies the Court’s being. Constitutional respect
and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a
coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into
the internal workings of the Senate.

(3) No. Given also that there is no clear standard

over who will sit as minority, there can be no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of Guingona
II. Meaning of “a quorum to do business” and “compulsion to attend”
157 Avelino v. Cuenco During the Senate session on Feb 18, 1949 Sen. Tañada Yes according to the 4 Justices (Justice Paras,
(1949) requested the right to speak on the next session day to Feria, Pablo and Bengzon). This is because 12
formulate charges against Senate President Avelino. His constitutes a quorum in the said case. Normally, 13
request was approved. The next session, petitioner (Avelino) would be the number of majority in the Senate,
delayed his appearance to the Senate session and read the but since Senator Confesor was out of the
last resolution slowly and carefully. In order to avoid the formal country, there was a change to the number of
charges against petitioner several Senators who are in support majority.
of Avelino formed a conspiracy to delay the Senate session by
requesting a roll call and reading of minutes, to which some The Justices said:
vehemently condemn as procedural that can be skipped. “When the Constitution declares that a majority of
“each House” shall constitute a quorum, “the House”
While petitioner was presiding, Tañada repeatedly stood up does not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of
to claim his right to deliver his speech but was rejected by all the members constitute “the House”. There is a
Avelino—and continually ignored him and even difference between a majority of “all the members of
threatened that he would order arrest of any Senator who the House” and a majority of “the House”, the latter
would speak without being acknowledged by him. Senator requiring less number than the first.
David (who was also in support of Avelino) motioned for

236!
 adjournment but respondent (Sen. Cuenco) stated his
opposition for adjournment and suggested that in order to
decide, they should be voted upon by the members.
Suddenly, Avelino banged his gavel and abandoned the Chair
and walked out along with his supporters. Sen. Arranz who
was the Senate president pro-tempore took the chair and
proceeded in the session. Arranz then suggested that Cuenco
preside over the session and took the chair upon unanimous
support. After which, Arranz, again occupied the chair, and
introduced Resolution 67 declaring the vacant position of
the Senate President and designating Cuenco as Acting
President of Senate. Senator Cuenco took the oath and
the next day was recognized by the President.
Petitioner asks the court to declare him as the rightful Senate
President and oust respondent.
Issue: Whether the court has jurisdiction over the case, was
there a quorum in the second session of the Senate?
158 People v. Jalosjos (See above, Case # 150)
(2000)
Petitioner avers that under Section 16 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution which states that A majority of each House shall
constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of
absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties,
as such House may provide.
Issue: Whether respondent’s confinement is a violation of
Section 16 (2) Article VI of the Constitution.
Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the
members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes
constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose
of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not
constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the
arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one
had been so arrested, there would be no doubt
Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been
elected just the same inasmuch as there would be
eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.”
In fine, the four justices that the practical situation
here is to agree with the newly appointed Senate
President. It is because even though the other 11
members would be present, they still would be at 12-
11 in favor of Cuenco. Also, the election of the
Senate President greatly rest upon the will of the
majority. Therefore, if they wanted to, they could just
change the Senate President again.
No. The petitioner has not given any reason why
he should be exempted from the operation of
Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The
members of Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if the reason for the
absence is a legitimate one.
Moreover, in the same way that preventive
suspension is not removal, confinement pending
appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman
unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise,
disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending
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159 Datu Michael The case started with RA 6734 or the Organic Act of ARMM.
Abas Kida v. This was amended by RA 9054 that mandated the holding of
Senate of the elections on the Second Monday of September. Before the
Philippines (2011) September 2001 elections started however, it was moved to
26 November 2001 through RA 9140.
Four years later, Congress enacted RA 9333 finally fixing the
date of “regular elections” as it will now be held on Second
appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense.
Society must protect itself. It also serves as an
example and warning to others. A person charged
with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice.
In this case, it will be recalled that when a warrant for
accused-appellants arrest was issued, he fled and
evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in
the House of Representatives for him to attend the
sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the
authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose
call he initially spurned which accused-appellant is
invoking to justify his present motion. This cannot be
countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its
being contrary to well-defined Constitutional
restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the
States penal system.
RE: PERFORMANCE OF LEGISLATION AS THE
HIGHEST HIERARCHY OF GOVERNMENT: The
petitioner is only one within 250 (House of
Representatives) and 24 (Senate) members of the
Congress. His physical absence does not prevent
Congress from functioning properly. The hierarchy
also is based on the exigencies of government.
No. RA 9333 is constitutional and RA 10153 is partly
unconstitutional. The synchronization of ARMM’s
date of election is constitutional but the extension of
the office and appointment of officers while the
election is pending is unconstitutional. Though the
appointment of ARMM Governor under the
supervision of the president is allowed under
circumstances present.
238!
Monday of August 2005 making it thus permanent every
three years. House Bill 4146 however moved to change it to
Second Monday of May 2013 and every three years after.
The House Bill aimed to synchronize the date of elections to
go along with the national elections.
The said bill provided interim officials appointed by the
President to act as officer for the meantime. The House bill
was approved by the Congress and the Senate passed its own
version with basically the same provision with some
modifications. Eventually, HoR adopted the version of the
Senate and thus it formed RA 10153 that the president signed
into law.
The issue now of the petitioner is that RA 9140, RA 9333, and
RA 10153 laws that amended RA 9054 all failed to comply with
the twin requirements of Section 1 and 3 of RA 9054 which
are: (1) approval of 2/3 vote of members of the HOR and the
Senate separately, and (2) submission of the voted bill to
ARMM for plebiscite. Thus the petitioner says that there was
no plebiscite that happened and that although HoR passed the
2/3 requirement, the Senate failed by 2 votes to reach the 2/3.
Section 1 and 3 are produced here:
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution,
this Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the
Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of
the Members of the House of Representatives and of the
Senate voting separately.
Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act
shall become effective only when approved by a majority of the
vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be
Petitioners aver that the Congress erred in
complying with the rules of the House by failing to
have the bill read in three separate days and comply
with the distribution of printed copies in final form
under the Section 26, Article VI which states:
”No bill passed by either House shall become law
unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have
been distributed to its members, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity
or emergency…”
Although the president certified the bill as urgent,
nonetheless the Congress failed to follow the
required days and dispensing of copies to the
House. The emergency posed also by the president
claiming that: there is a need to protect ARMM’s
autonomy by institutionalizing mechanisms for
electoral reform does not satisfy the calamity or
emergency requisite.
However the court believes that the argument of
petitioner is does not have merit. This case is similar
to Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance where a similar
issue of noncompliance with the emergency or
calamity requisite was purportedly shown by the
president. The court ruled there that given that both
House of Congress had the opportunity to review it—
this is in pursuant to Art VI 23 (2) that the use of
emergency powers of the President is subject to
judicial review of Congress—shows that if there
239!
held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90)
days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
Issue: Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a
supermajority vote and plebiscite.
was no contention or hazard in the constitutional
right that the Congress saw in the use of
emergency powers, the Court shall not strike
down the use of emergency powers. In the
similar way, Congress managed to review the use
of emergency powers and found no problems as
similar to Tolentino.
Petitioners assail that RA 9333 and RA 10153 did
not follow the twin requirements of 2/3 vote and
plebiscite necessary set by RA 9054 that it
amended.
Section 7 though of RA 9054 only speaks of “The
first regular elections.” This left open the
determination of the next election in ARMM. It is only
in RA 9333 and RA 10153 that the determination of
succeeding regular elections were mentioned.
Thus the court ruled that that RA 9333 and RA
10153 are stand-alone statutes that do not
amend any provision of RA 9054. Both of the
said laws merely filled a void provided by RA
9054.
The requirements of 2/3 is placed in RA 9054 that
requires that in order to amend the Organic Act,
there must be a 2/3 votes to amend such law. The
petitioners question that when the bill was passed,
only a majority of the House were present and thus it
is repugnant to the aim of said Section 16 (2) when it
requires the 2/3 votes and not a majority only for a
quorum.
Section 16 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution
provides that a majority of each House shall
240!
 constitute a quorum to do business. This means
that the House can amend, repeal, and create
bills and resolutions upon the majority vote of a
quorum. It is only in cases where the
Constitution prescribes a qualified or
SUPERMAJORITY in specific cases the
contention could be cognized. Thus given that
only 143 are present, a 72 vote suffices. For senate,
it is 7 for 23 members. Also if there is irreconcilable
difference in RA 9054 and the provision provided by
the Constitution in the majority number for a quorum,
the Constitution prevails.

Section 1 of RA 9054 of Congress runs afoul to

Congress’ power barring it to pass irrepealable laws
is transgressed in this case. The said section has set
a very high threshold for amending it making it
difficult to repeal it that is contrary to the power of
Congress. Thus it could be seen that the rationale
of the law set by framers is based on the idea
that it is difficult to gather all representative
every session and allows the existence of a
majority for a quorum. The court cannot take
cognizance of the argument that a high threshold is
set to protect the rights of ARMM given that it
shackles the autonomy of Congress or national
government.
III. Internal Rules and Discipline
160 Arroyo v. De The case started when RA 8240 is still in the stage of it No. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is
Venecia (1997) becoming a law. During the bicameral conference committee, alleged to have been violated in the enactment of
the HoR and Senate aim to create a compromise between R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure
contested parts of RA 8240, which originally came from the of the House rather than constitutional requirements
HoR. During the Rep. Rogelio Sarmientio’s interpellation, Rep. for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27.
Arroyo moved to adjourn the bicameral conference due to lack Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum

241!
of quorum. This was ensued by the Chair, who was headed by
Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, to do a roll call. After the roll call,
they realize that there is indeed a quorum and the
interpellation proceeded.
************
During the interpellation of Mr. Albano he said that: “I move
that we now approve and ratify the conference committee
report”
This was responded by the Deputy Speaker, Mr. Daza, by
saying: “Any objection to the motion?”
Mr. Arroyo on the other hand, upon hearing the deputy
speaker question the House said: “What is that, Mr.
Speaker?”
The Deputy Speaker then said: “There being none, approved
(knocking of Gavel)”
Mr. Arroyo then said: No, no, no wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I
stood up. I want to know what is the question that the chair
asked the distinguished sponsor.
The session was suspended for one minute, and when it was
resumed, Mr. Albano move to adjourn the meeting to next
week. However, the bill was deemed certified as the bill was
signed by the Speaker of the HoR and the President of the
Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both
Houses of Congress as having been finally passed the HoR
and Senate. The enrolled bill (a bill that was certified by both
houses proving it had undergone proper procedure) was
signed into law by President Ramos.
************
but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in
violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence
of a quorum.
The court ruled that referring to cases here and
abroad showed how the Court is always denied to
interfere in the process of law-making within the
House of Congress in the absence of showing that
there was a violation of a constitutional provision or
the rights of private individuals. In the following
cases: [PICK ONE TO DISCUSS IN RECIT]
Osmena v. Pendatun – ruled that parliamentary
rules are merely procedural and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. The
rules are subject to the whims of the House so
they can change, modify or waive the rules
entirely. Additionally, ‘mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
when the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure.’
United States v. Ballin - As long as the rules of the
House do not violate the fundamental rights, the
House has the discretion to determine the rules.
State ex rel. City Loan & Saings Co. v. Moore –
failure to regard the rules is not subject to
judicial inquiry. A legislative act is not invalid for
noncompliance with rules.
State v. Savings Bank – It would be treated an
unwarranted intrusion if the Courts set aside the
242!
 The petitioner then moves to declare RA 8240 to be null and
void since it violated the rules of the House; that these rules
embody the “constitutional mandate” in Art VI of 16(3) that
“each House may determine the rules of its proceedings” and
that, consequently violation of the House rules is a violation of
the Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of
Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false
and spurious.
Issue: Whether the court has jurisdiction over the matter.
161 Osmeña v. On 23 May 1960, Honorable Sergio Osmeña Jr. and members
Pendatun (1960) of the Second District of Cebu took the floor of the Chamber of
House of Representative (HoR) for an hour of privilege speech
entitled “A Message to Garcia.” During the speech, Osmeña
besmirched the president with allegations of bribery and
corruption in his administration. He claimed:
“hearing of ugly reports that under your (President’s)
unpopular administration the free things they (the people of the
Philippines) used to get from the government are now for
sale at premium prices… pardons are for sale… the culprit
can always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can
come across with a handsome dole… kind of justice that your
administration is dispensing.”
The HoR aimed to resolve the matter as the imputations
are of serious assault upon the “dignity and prestige of the
Office of the President, which is the one visible symbol of
the sovereignty of the Filipino people” by issuing a
subpoena to Osmeña and provide the evidence such as
witness and pertinent papers regarding his allegations and
failure to do so will warrant a punishment.
decision of the Congress due to it thinking that it
may have misconstrued its rules.
In the case at hand, there was no private right that
was violated but only those persons who raise the
issue to the Court instead of clarifying such acts to
the House itself. The court believes that it has no
power to intervene in the House no more than
the House to the Court. This is also in
compliance to the separation of powers of
government.
No. Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity
which is a fundamental privilege. Its purpose is to
allow the representative to discharge his duty with
firmness and success. Such practice originate from
United States. However, it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body itself
whenever his words and conduct are considered by
the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member
thereof. In USA, unparliamentary conduct have
been, or could be censured, or committed to prison.
The Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a
senator for one year. Furthermore, the Rules of
Philippine House of Representatives provide that the
parliamentary practices of the Congress of the
United States shall apply in a supplementary
manner to its proceedings.
Regarding the contention that the House already
moved on to take another business, the court
believes that “The rules adopted by deliberative
bodies are subject to revocation modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural,
243!
Osmeña did not produce the said evidence but nonetheless
claimed that 1) He has parliamentary immunity for speeches in
House 2) His words contain no actionable conduct 3) After his
speech the House moved on with another business which in
Rule XVII Sec. 7 of the Rules of the House provides “that if
other business has intervened after the Member had uttered
obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer
therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.”
During this time, the HoR issued House Resolution 59, which
created a special committee of fifteen Members appointed by
the Speaker in order to investigate the truth of the charges
against the President of the Philippines made by Honorable
Sergio Osmeña, Jr. During the investigation, the HoR
continued to perform its task since the legislative session will
imminently be adjourned. On 18 July 1960, HoR issued House
Resolution No. 175 declaring Hon. Osmeña guilty and
suspending him from office for fifteen months.
Issue: Whether honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr. is liable for his
conduct despite his immunity?
and with their observance, the courts have no
concern. They may be waived or disregarded by
the legislative body." Consequently, "mere
failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative
body) when the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure.” Thus mere
failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body)
when the requisite number of members have agreed
to a particular measure."
Thus in this case, there is also no reason for the
petitioner to deny that his attack on the Executive
constitute disorderly conduct under the rules of the
House. The court believes that the determination of
rules that are punishable within the House depend
on the House itself not only because the Constitution
has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because
the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances
of which the House knows best. Thus, where the
state Senate is given the power to expel a member,
the courts will not review its action or revise even a
most arbitrary or unfair decision. That it is a power
of self-protection, and that the legislative body
must necessarily be the sole judge of the
exigency which may justify and require its
exercise.
The invocation of Alejandrino case as precedent by
petitioner is not warranted. Senator Alejandrino was
suspended by office for 12 months because he had
assaulted another member of that Body for certain
phrases the latter had uttered. In this case, despite
244!

162 Santiago v. Complaints were filed by a group of employees of the
Sandiganbayan Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) against
(2001) Santiago, who was then commissioner, for alleged violation of
the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019).
Sandiganbayan petitioner indicted: (1) On or about October
17, 1988, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in
her exercise as Commissioner of the CID, a public office,
willfully, unlawfully, and criminally accepted the
application for legalization of the stay of over 20 aliens,
who arrived in the country after January 1, 1984, in
violation of E.O. 324, which prohibits the legalization of
said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that said aliens
are disqualified (2) These aliens’ stay in the Philippines
was unlawfully legalized by Santiago.
The case was later assumed by the Ombudsman and
the cognizance of the separation of powers, the
Court nevertheless reinstated him. However the
case at hand is different since Senator Alejandrino
is an appointed member of the Governor General
from the Jones Law and under the Jones Law, the
Governor General is empowered to appoint "without
consent of the Senate and without restriction as to
residence senators who will, in his opinion, best
represent the Twelfth District." Therefore his
removal will contravene the Jones Law.
The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress
is plenary, subject only to such limitations as are
found in the Republic's Constitution. So that any
power deemed to be legislative by usage or
tradition, is necessarily possessed by the
Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution
provides otherwise
Yes. Each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds
of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A
penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
exceed sixty days.
Authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the
preventive suspension of an incumbent public
official charged with violation of the provisions
of RA 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential
support. This authority is seen in Section 13 of RA
3019 on suspension and loss of benefits and the
case of Segovia v. Sandiganbayan.
In Segovia v. Sandiganbayan it was stated that the
245!
 petitioner was found to be guilty of unlawfully legalizing the provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all
stay of Chinese aliens. Petitioner posted a bail without need persons indicted upon a valid information under the
for physical appearance as she claimed that she was Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials;
recuperating from a vehicular accident. Senator filed for or permanent or temporary employees, or pertaining
prohibition of the pending criminal cases brought against her to the career or non-career service
(libel, and violation of PD 46) and to defer her arraignment.
It is the ministerial duty of the court to issue an order
The court took cognizance and issued a TRO. HOWEVER in of suspension upon determination of the validity of
the wake of media reports, the petitioner announced her the information filed before it. In issuing the
intention to accept a fellowship from the Harvard University. preventive suspension of petitioner, the
Knowing that petitioner had pending cases, Sandiganbayan Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an
issued an order to prevent her from leaving the country to unequivocal mandate of the law.
which the court later enjoined the Senator not to go. On
January 25, 1996 the court resolved the case, suspending the The order of suspension prescribed by RA 3019 is
accused from her position as Senator and from any other distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its
Government position she may be holding at present or in the own ranks under the Constitution.
future. Her suspension shall be for ninety (90) days only and
shall take effect immediately upon notice. Hence, this petitionArticle VIII, §1 empowers the Court to act not only in
the settlement of “actual controversies involving
Issue: Does the Sandiganbayan have authority to decree a rights which are legally demandable and
ninety-day preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor- enforceable,” but also in the determination of
Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from “whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
any government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
Senate of the Philippines for the implementation of the on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
suspension order. Government. RA 3019 does not exclude from its
coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus
decreeing the assailed preventive suspension
order
IV. Duty to keep Journals and Records
163 US v. Pons (1916) On 10 April 1915, Juan Pons, Gabino Beliso and Jacinto No. With the case at bar, it seems that the courts
Lasarte are all apprentices in a drug smuggling business. They have two choices in determining the date of the
were smuggling drugs into Manila from Spain by steamer adjournment of the Philippine Legislature:
Lopez y Lopez and placed the drugs inside “wine” barrels

246!
Spain. The said opium are placed in 520 tins containing 125 kg
of opium of the value of Php 62,400. They concealed the said
quantity of opium and aided in the transportation, receipt and
concealment of the same after the said opium had been
imported, knowing that the said drug had be unlawfully
brought, imported and illegally introduces into the Philippines
Islands from a foreign country.
Jacinto Lasarte was not found by the authorities. Juan Pons
and Gabino Beliso were apprehended and convicted for their
crimes. Both appealed. Beliso dropped the case and thus his
verdict was rendered final. Pons is continuing on with his
appeal, the case now at bar.
Pons assails the Act since Act No. 2381, under which he
must be punished if found guilty, was passed on March 1,
1914 BUT the last day of the Special Session of the
Philippine Legislature for 1914 was on February 28, 1914.
Thus, Act No. 2381 is null and void.
Issue: Whether the courts may go behind the legislative
journals for the purpose of determining the date of
adjournment of the Legislature.
- By extraneous evidence
OR
- By taking judicial notice of the legislative
journals
It is stated in the case that the validity of the Act is
not otherwise questioned. The vital question here is
the date of adjournment of the Legislature.
The court ruled that it will not go behind the
legislative journals (it will not take in extraneous
evidence, like the claim of Pons’ counsel saying that
the public knows for a fact that the Assembly’s
clocked was stopped on February 28, 1914
midnight). The court rules that it will take judicial
notice of the legislative journals, which show that
yes, the Philippine Legislature did adjourn at 12
midnight on February 28, 1914. However the court
believes that the validity of the Act is assumed to
have been signed before this date, even though
petitioners assail otherwise. The validity of the
Act is not questioned by the court.
It contended that the said Journals are conclusive on
the Court and to question is truthfulness would be to
violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic
laws by which the Philippine Government was
brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of Government, and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions of the legislature. Pon’s witness cannot
be given due weight against the conclusiveness of
the Journals which is an act of legislature.
Additionally, the SC passed upon the
247!

164 Casco Phil Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the
Commercial Co. v. production of synthetic resin glues used primarily in the
Gimenez (1963) production of plywood. The main components of the said glue
are "urea and formaldehyde" which are both being imported
abroad.
Pursuant to R.A. 2609 Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law,
The Central Bank issued Circulars fixing a uniform margin
fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. The bank
also issued memorandum establishing the procedure for
the applications for exemption from the payment of said
fee as provided by R.A. 2609. Petitioners paid the required
margin fee with their 2 import transactions. In both of their
transactions through R.A. 2609 they wanted to avail the
exemption from the payment of said fee as provided by
RA. 2609.
Petitioners filed a refund request to the Central Bank and the
Central Bank issued the vouchers but was not accepted by the
Auditor of the Bank. The refusal was also affirmed by the
Auditor General. The refusal was based on the fact that the
separate importation of "urea and formaldehyde" is not in
accord with the provisions of R.A. 2609. Because section 2 of
R.A. 2609 clearly provides “Urea formaldehyde” and not “urea
and formaldehyde.”
Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde"
appearing in this provision should be construed as "urea and
formaldehyde". Petitioner contends that the bill approved in
Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between
the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members of
Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde"
conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this
particular case.
No. What is allowed in R.A. 2809 is urea
formaldehyde, not “urea and formaldehyde.” Both
are different from each other.
The National Institute of Science and Technology
defines urea formaldehyde as the synthetic resin
formed as a condensation product from definite
proportions of “urea and formaldehyde” under certain
conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time
of reaction. This produce when applied in water
solution and extended with inexpensive fillers
constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the
manufacture of plywood. Urea formaldehyde is
clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct
and different from “urea and formaldehyde.”
Individual statements by members of Congress on
the floor do not necessarily reflect the intent of the
legislative. What is printed in the enrolled bill would
be conclusive upon the courts. It is well settled that
the enrolled bill — which uses the term “urea
formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde”
— is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor
of the measure passed by Congress and approved
by the President.
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the
bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress
and approved by the Executive — on which we
cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle
of separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democratic system — the
248!
 separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the
synthetic resin glue called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter
as a finished product. Petitioner, citing the statements made
on the floor of the Senate, contends that the bill approved in
Congress provided for urea “and “formaldehyde as separate
elements.
Issue: Whether “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt from
payment of margin fee or only “urea formaldehyde”
165 Morales v. Subido Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police
(1969) department of a city for at least three years but does not
possess a bachelor’s degree. Morales was the Chief of
Detective Bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds
the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He began his career in 1934.
Upon the resignation of the former Chief, Morales was
designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same
time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by
the mayor of Manila. Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil
Service, approved the designation of Morales as acting chief
but rejected his appointment for “failure to meet the minimum
educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said
position.” Instead, Subido certified other persons as qualified
for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of
1966.
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police
Agency. – No person may be appointed chief of a city police
agency unless he holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized
institution of learning and has served as chief of police with
exemplary record or has served in the police department of
any city with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at
least three years; or any high school graduate who has
served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight
years with the rank of captain and/higher.
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not
by judicial decree.
No. It would thus appear that the omission —
whether deliberate or unintended — of the phrase,
"who has served the police department of a city
or was made not at any stage of the legislative
proceedings but only in the course of the
engrossment of the bill, more specifically in the
proofreading thereof; that the change was made
not by Congress but only by an employee
thereof; and that what purportedly was a rewriting to
suit some stylistic preferences was in truth an
alteration of meaning. It is for this reason that the
petitioner would have us look searchingly into the
matter.
We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to
discover what really happened. The respect due
to the other branches of the Government
demands that we act upon the faith and credit of
what the officers of the said branches attest to
as the official acts of their respective
departments. Otherwise we would be cast in the
unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth (detective)
trying to determine what actually did happen in the
labyrinth of law-making with consequent impairment
of the integrity of the legislative process. The
249!

Morales argued that the Committee on Government
Reorganization, to which House Bill No. 6951 (Police Act of
1966) was referred, reported a substitute measure. It is to this
substitute bill that Section 10 of the Act owes its present form
and substance. The provision of the substitute bill reads:
“No person may be appointed chief of the city police agency
unless he holds a bachelor’s degree and has served either in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of
Investigation or police department of any city and has held the
rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years
or any high school graduate who has served the police
department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain
or higher.”
The petitioner asserted that the above provision was the
originally passed provision. He claims that there were various
changes made in House Bill 6951 and according to the
Petitioner the House bill division deleted an entire provision
and substituted what is now Sec. 10 of the Police Act of 1966.
Petitioner even submitted documents that would appear that
the omission of the phrase “who served the police
department of a city” was made not at any stage of the
legislative proceedings but only in the course of engrossment
of the bill, more specifically in the proofreading stage and that
the change was not made by Congress but only by an
employee. It is for this reason that the Petitioner would have
the court look searchingly into the matter.
Issue: Whether the SC must look upon the history of the bill,
thereby inquiring upon the journals, to look searchingly into the
matter.
investigation which the petitioner would like this
Court to make can be better done in Congress.
Additionally, the enrolled Act in the office of the
legislative secretary of the President of the
Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in
the statute as officially published in slip form by the
Bureau of Printing.
Enrolled bill prevails over journal. The court cannot
go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really
happened. (The court reiterated its decision in the
Mabanag v Lopez-Vito and Casco case).
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding
that in all cases the journals must yield to the
enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters
which the Constitution expressly requires must be
entered on the journal of each house. To what extent
the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a
failure to have such matters entered on the journal,
is a question which the SC can decide upon but is
not currently being confronted in the case at bar
hence the SC does not now decide.
Notes: (1) “enrolled bill theory”
(2) Quotable: “This is a matter worthy of the
attention not of an Oliver Wendell Holmes but of a
Sherlock Holmes.”
250!
166 Astorga v. Villegas This controversy revolves around the passing of House Bill No.
(1974) 9266, which became RA 4065, An Act Defining the Powers,
Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila,
Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of
RA No. 409, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila.
On March 1964, House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application,
was filed in the HoR. It was passed on third reading without
amendments on April 1964. The bill was referred to the Senate
Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and
Cities headed by Sen. Gerardo Roxas. Committee
recommended approval w/ minor amendment by Roxas. The
bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on 2nd reading on
May 1964, substantial amendments to Sec 1 were introduced
by Senator Tolentino, which were approved in toto by Senate.
However, the amendment by Roxas does not appear in the
journal of the Senate as having been acted upon. On May
1964, Secretary of Senate sent a letter to the HoR that House
Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate with
amendments. Attached to the letter was a certification of the
amendment, which was the one recommended by Roxas and
not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually
approved by the Senate.
Sen. Tolentino issued a press statement that enrolled copy
signed into law by the President was a wrong version of the bill
actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody his
amendments. The Senate President sent a letter to the
President explaining that he considered his signature on the
enrolled bill as invalid of no effect.
Clarifying further in another letter, the bill on which his
Yes. While the majority of the Court in the case
applied the enrolled bill doctrine, it cannot be truly
said that the question has been laid to rest and that
the decision therein constitutes a binding precedent.
The “enrolled bill” was relied upon merely to bolster
the ruling on the jurisdictional question the reasoning
of which if that “if a political question conclusively
binds the judges out of respect to the political
departments, a duly certified law or resolution also
binds the judges under the enrolled bill born of that
respect.”
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based
mainly on "the respect due to coequal and
independent departments," which requires the
judicial department "to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner
stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases
that if the attestation is absent and the same is not
required for the validity of a statute, the courts may
resort to the journals and other records of Congress
for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical
conclusion reached in a number of
decisions, although they are silent as to whether the
journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of
the presiding officers is present.
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the
presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of
a bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the
respect due to a co-equal department of the
government, is neutralized in this case by the fact
that the Senate President declared his signature on
the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent
251!
signature appeared had never been approved by the Senate
and therefore the fact that he and the Senate Secretary had
signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment. The
President sent a message to the presiding officers of both
Houses that he was officially withdrawing his signature on
House Bill 9266 adding that “it would be untenable and
against public policy to convert into law what was not
actually approved by the two Houses of Congress.” Mayor
Villegas issued circulars to disregard the provision of RA
4065.
Vice-Mayor Astorga filed a petition to compel respondents to
comply with the provisions of RA 4065. Respondent’s position
is that the so-called RA 4065 never became law since it was
not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries
in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should
be decisive in the resolution of the issue.
Issue: Whether the courts can look at the journals of the
Congress.
clarification that the invalidation of his signature
meant that the bill he had signed had never been
approved by the Senate.
Additionally, Signatures of presiding officer in the bill
are merely a mode of authentication to signify that
the bill was approved by the Congress and is ready
to be approved or rejected. The Constitution does
not express that signatures are mandatory such that
their absence would render a bill invalid. In the case
of the Senate President declaring his signature to be
invalid thus ultimately rendering the bill invalid is
inconclusive. As far as congress is concerned there
is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the
presiding officer. It is merely a mode of
authentication. The law making process end when
the bill is approved by both houses and the
certification does not add to the validity of the bill. In
other words it is the approval of the Congress and
not the signatures of the presiding officers that
is essential.
Thus the absence of attestation and will not affect
the validity of statute. Absent such attestation as a
result of the disclaimer, and consequently there
being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is
there to determine whether or not the bill had been
duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the
journal should be consulted.
Under the specific facts and circumstances, this
Court resort to the Senate journal for the purpose
of deciding on the ISSUE. The journal discloses
that substantial and lengthy amendments were
252!

167 Phil Judges Assn. Petitioners are assailing Section 35 of RA 7354 as
v. Prado (1993) implemented by Philippine Postal Corporation through its
circular No. 92-98. This withdraw the franking privilege from
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, Regional Trial
Courts, MTC, MNTC and the Land Registration Commission
along with other government offices.
Petitioner then assails the constitutionality on grounds that:
1. Title embraces more than one subject
2. It did not pass the required readings in both House of
Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form
were not distributed among the members before its
passage
3. It’s discriminatory and encroaches on the independence
of the Judiciary.
Petitioner states that the covering repeal of the franking
privilege from the petitioners and this court under EO 207, PD
1882, PD 26 was not included in the original version of the
Senate Bill 720 or of HB 4200. It violates Article 6 Sec 26 of
the Constitution.
Also they stress that Sec. 35 of the assailed act was not a
subject of any disagreement between the houses and so the
second paragraph could not have been validly added as an
introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate
but were not incorporated in the printed text sent
to the President and signed by him. This Court is
not asked to incorporate such amendments into
the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky
undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not
duly enacted and therefore did not become law.
This we do, as indeed both the President of the
Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they
withdrew their signatures therein.
No. The petitioners maintain that the second
paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the
franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court
under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not
included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720
or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared
only in the Conference Committee Report, its
addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
Constitution.
While it is true that a conference committee is the
mechanism for compromising differences between
the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its
jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is
described thus:
A conference committee may, deal generally with the
subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the
precise differences between the two houses. Even
where the conference committee is not by rule
limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely
limits the freedom with which new subject matter can
be inserted into the conference bill. But
occasionally a conference committee produces
253!
amendment. unexpected results, results beyond its mandate,
these excursions occur even where the rules
Issue: Whether the bill did not pass the required readings in impose strict limitations on conference
both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of
final form were not distributed among the members before its the authoritarian power of conference
passage; committee.

It is a matter of record that the conference

Committee Report on the bill in question was
returned to and duly approved by both the Senate
and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the
bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate
President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon
V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having
been duly passed by both Houses of Congress.

It was then presented to and approved by President

Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Laid down is the rule that the enrolled bill, is
conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that
have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and
nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are
themselves also binding on the Supreme Court.

As held in U.S. vs. Pons:

To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the
Philippine legislature when they are, as we have
said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both
the, letter and spirit of the organic laws by which
the Philippine Government was brought into
existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department of the Government, and to interfere with
the legitimate powers and functions, of the
Legislature.

254!
168 Abakada v. Ermita (See above, Case # 86) No. The Bicameral Conference Committee acted
(2005) within its jurisdiction as created by both houses. The
Issue: Whether RA 9337’s granting of stand-by authority in Court reiterated that the irregularities assailed by
abeyance of Secretary of Finance’s decision is an undue petitioners (i.e. lack of records among others) are
delegation of power of taxation that the legislative has and the mostly involved in the internal rules of Congress and
President is bereft. so the Court is not the proper forum for their
enforcement.

“Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and

with their observance, the courts have no
concern. They may be waived or disregarded by
the legislative body “Mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite
number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.”
On the changes and deleted provisions, the Court
said that Congress is the best judge of how it should
conduct its own business expeditiously and in the
most orderly manner. It formulates its own rules for
its proceedings and the discipline of its members.

The Court already made the pronouncement that “[i]f

a change is desired in the practice [of the Bicameral
Conference Committee] it must be sought in
Congress since this question is not covered by any
constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of
each house.NEVERTHELESS, just to put minds at
ease that no blatant irregularities tainted the
proceedings of the bicameral conference
committees, the Court deems it necessary to dwell
on the issue.

The Court found that there were indeed

255!
disagreements All the changes or modifications
made by the Bicameral Conference Committee
were germane to subjects of the provisions referred
to it for reconciliation. Thus, the Court does not see
any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction committed by the Bicameral
Conference Committee.

BCC really needs to settle the differences between

the disagreeing provisions

“Settle” is synonymous to “reconcile” and

“harmonize” so it can a) adopt specific provision of
either House or Senate bill b) decide that neither
provisions would be carried into the final form c) try
to arrive at a compromise between the disagreeing
provisions
The standy-by authority is a compromise to try to
bridge the difference in the rate of VAT proposed by
the two houses

It explained all the other amendments too, but point

is, all changes were germane to subjects of
provisions referred to it for reconciliation à so no
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction

The Court recognized the long-standing legislative

practice of giving BCC ample latitude for
compromising differences between the Senate and
the House.

256!
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal, which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as
the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
Electoral Tribunal – 9 members
" 3 SC Justices, designated by CJ (Senior Justice is the
Chairman)
" 6 members from the Senate/HoR chosen based on
proportional representation.
Electoral Contest: When a defeated candidate challenges the
qualification and claims the seat of a proclaimed winner, the
respective Electoral Tribunal of each House is the sole judge –
neither the SC nor each House of Congress nor COMELEC can
interfere.
- Each house has the power to defer the oath-taking of
members until the final determination of election contests filed
against them. (Angara v. Electoral Commission)
Jurisdiction: Congress and COMELEC en banc can only determine
the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass.
(Banat v. COMELEC) Once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office as a member of HoR
[Senate, President, or Vice-President], COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, HRET [SET or PET]’s begin. (Aggabao v. Comelec)
Electoral Tribunals:
" HRET decides when a party-list REPRESENTATIVE is
qualified, the COMELEC has the authority to decide WON a party-list
organization is qualified.
" Congress does not possess the powers to regulated EVEN
procedural matters of the Electoral Tribunals. The Tribunals are
INDEPENDENT Constitutional bodies. (Angara v. Electoral
Commission)
" Litigants that appear before HRET are bound to know and
are expected to properly comply with procedural requirements (such
as depositing of bonds) laid down by the tribunal. There is no grave
abuse of discretion if the Electoral Tribunal applies its rules strictly.
(Garcia v. HRET)
" The Electoral Tribunal has the power to make their own rules
meaning they can have different periods then those provided in the
election code.
" Judicial Review is possible only upon a determination that
the tribunal’s decision or resolution was rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion constituting
denial of due process (Robles v. House Electoral Tribunal, etc. p.244
of Bernas Primer).
Definition of Election Contest (Vera v. Avelino)
COMELEC gave a report to the president that there was terrorism
and violence in Nueva Ecija and therefore the elections did not really
reflect the true and free expression of popular will. Senate then made
a resolution because of such declaring that petitioners are not yet
allowed to sit in Congress. Petitioners filed a case with the Electoral
Tribunal to make them sit. The SC said that the Congress itself and
not the Electoral Tribunal of each house which does not have
jurisdiction.
257!

An Electoral Tribunal was given the power to decide “all contests”
(as compared to “all the powers of the House or Senate as the sole
judge of the election”). The definition of relating to CONTESTS is
limited it to when there are protests regarding a return or a
candidate, if it is not given this limitation then they would have the
power to look into even the election members who have not been
protested. If a member of the House inquires into the qualification of
any member it is NOT A CONTEST because there is no ousted to
replace the person and this power is no longer with the Electoral
Tribunal but a House power itself.
The Senate has the power to postpone or suspend their assumption
into office, they may suspend a member and the courts cannot order
that they be reinstated etc., otherwise, it would amount to judicial
predominance.
Jurisdiction over party-list (Abbayon v. HRET)
The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and,
eventually, to choose five from among them after all belongs to the
party or organization that nominates them. But when an allegation is
made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a
disqualified nominee to become the party-list representative, the
resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand. It is for HRET to
interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee –
the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative
of his party-list organization.
Non-partisan (Bondoc v. Pineda)
As a judge, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They
must discharge their functions with complete detachment,
impartiality, and independence including but not limited to the
independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence,
“disloyalty to one’s party” and “breach of the party’s discipline” are
not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal.
Members in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just
cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of
office, death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party
he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political
party, or removal for other valid causes. A member may not be
expelled by the HoR for “party disloyalty” short of proof that he has
formally affiliated with another political group.

Section 17. Senate and House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

I. Jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunal
A. Nature and Power
169 Angara v. In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the Yes. The Supreme court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Electoral respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for Commission and the subject matter of the present
Commission the position of member of the National Assembly for the first controversy for the purpose of determining the character,
(1936) district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the
was proclaimed as member-elect of the National Assembly for Electoral commission as the “sole judge” of all contests

258!
the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of
office. On Dec 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session
assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election
of the members of the National Assembly against whom no
protest had thus far been filed.
On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission
(EC) a “Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On
Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which
fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation
made by the National Assembly. Angara filed a Motion to
dismiss arguing that by virtue of the National Assembly
proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued
back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the
EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the
EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.
Petitioner here then wants to Prohibit the Electoral
Commission (respondent) from taking further cognizance of
the protest filed by a Pedro Ynsua (another respondent)
against the election of the petitioner as member of the
National Assembly for the first assembly district of Tayabas.
The controversy lies on the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
controversy.
Issue: Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon
the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative.
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly.
The Electoral Commission did not exceed its jurisdiction. It
has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality
of the Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction
to decide "all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly".
Thus, entertaining the protest of Ynsua must conform to
their own prescribed rules and the National Assembly
cannot divest them of any such powers.
The Electoral Commission is an independent
constitutional creation with specific powers and functions
to execute and perform, closer for purposes of
classification to the legislative than to any of the other two
departments of the government. The Electoral
Commission is also the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly. BUT as far as the Electoral
Commission is concerned the constitution invests in it the
necessary authority in the performance and execution of
the limited and specific function assigned to it by the
Constitution.
Although it is not included in the tripartite system it is
acting within the limits of its authority, an
independent organ. The power vested in the Electoral
Commission is complete and unimpaired as if
originally in the legislature. The express lodging of
that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied
denial of the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly. Wherefore, petition is DENIED.
259!
170 Locsin v. Petitioner Locsin alleged that the results of the May 10
HRET (2013) election were tainted by election fraud, anomalies and
irregularities. Upon the presentation of the preliminary
conference Lagdameo’s winning margin increase from 242 to
265 votes after the revision and appreciation of ballots in 25%
of the pilot protested precincts. On the allegations of fraud and
election irregularities HRET found no compelling evidence on
the doubt of the credibility of the results generated by the
Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) electronic system. Such
that Petitioner Locsin’s allegations were dismissed.
Petitioner here is assailing the decision of the HRET
resolution 12-209 as 1.) NULL and VOID or SET ASIDE the
issuances for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion of jurisdiction. 2.) prevent HRET from implementing
assailed decision 3.) Nullify proclamation of Lagdameo
(private respondent) 4.) DECLARE and PROCLAIM Locsin as
the duly elected Rep. of the First District of Makati for having
received the highest number of votes.
Issue: If the court has jurisdiction over HRET’s decision and
orders to nullify the petition of Locsin.
171 Tagolino v. (See above, Case #143)
HRET (2013)
Issue: Whether the court has jurisdiction over the case
No. Article 6, Section 17 of the Constitution provides that
the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the elections, returns and qualifications of certain
members. The use of the word “sole” emphasizes the
exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred. In the
1935 Constitution it has been described “as intended to be
complete and unimpaired” and also “full, clear and
complete”. The same may be said with regard to the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987
Constitution. The court shall not interfere with HRET’s
exercise of discretion or jurisdiction but only to review
HRET’s decision if it exercised grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of.
Thus, this Court's jurisdiction to review HRET’s decisions
and orders is exercised IF AND ONLY IF there is a
showing that the HRET acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Otherwise, this Court shall not interfere with the HRET’s
exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction.
The HRET took pains in reviewing the validity or invalidity
of each contested ballot with prudence. This is evident
from the decision's ballot enumeration specifying with
concrete basis and clarity the reason for its denial or
admittance. The results, as well as the objections, claims,
admissions, and rejections of ballots were explained
sufficiently and addressed by the HRET in its Decision.
Yes. While it is well-recognized that the HRET has been
empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the members of the House, the Court maintains
jurisdiction over it to check "whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
260!
 jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. In other words, when
the HRET utterly disregards the law and settled
precedents on the matter before it, it commits a grave
abuse of discretion.

Records clearly show that: (1) Richard was held ineligible

as a congressional candidate for the Fourth District of
Leyte due to his failure to comply with the one year
residency requirement; (2) Juntilla’s petition prayed for the
denial of due course to and/or cancellation of his CoC;
and (3) the COMELEC First Division granted the foregoing
petition without any qualification. By these undisputed and
essential facts alone, the HRET should not have adopted
the COMELEC En Banc’s erroneous finding that the
COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution
speaks only of "disqualification and not of cancellation of
Richard’s CoC" and thereby, sanctioned the substitution of
private respondent.

Lest it be misunderstood, the HRET is not bound by

previous COMELEC pronouncements relative to the
qualifications of the Members of the House. Being the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of its respective members, the HRET cannot
be tied down by COMELEC resolutions, else its
constitutional mandate be circumvented and rendered
nugatory. The Court maintains jurisdiction over it to check
whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the HRET. If HRET disregards the law and the
settled jurisprudence it commits such grave abuse.
172 Reyes v. (See above, Case # 144) Yes. Petitioner's claim that COMELEC has no jurisdiction
COMELEC is without merit. Under the law, only after a candidate has
(2013) Issue: Whether COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitioner become a member of the HoR can the HRET has
jurisdiction. Petitioner cannot be considered a Member of

261!
the HoR yet because she has not yet assumed office. The
constitution provides that a person assumes office “at
noon on the 30th day of June”. The Oath of Office the
petitioner presented is not is not valid. As far as the court
th
is concerned, she took her oath on 5 of June which is not
the one prescribe by the Constitution. Such is the case
even if a valid official oath-taking has taken place before
the Speaker of the HoR and in open session.

Petitioner, therefore, is in error when she posits that at

present it is the HRET which has exclusive jurisdiction
over her qualifications as a Member of the HoR. The
COMELEC never ordered her proclamation as the rightful
winner in the election for such membership.

On and after 14 May 2013, there was nothing left for the
COMELEC to do to decide the case. The decision sealed
the proceedings in the COMELEC regarding petitioner's
ineligibility as a candidate for Representative of
Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to petitioner's
proclamation. The bar remained when no restraining order
was obtained by petitioner from the Supreme Court within
five days from 14 May 2013.

Additionally, when petitioner finally went to the Supreme

Court on 10 June 2013 questioning the COMELEC First
Division ruling and the 14 May 2013 COMELEC En Banc
decision, her baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did
not by that fact of promulgation alone become valid and
legal. A decision favorable to her by the Supreme Court
regarding the decision of the COMELEC En Banc on her
certificate of candidacy was indispensably needed, not to
legalize her proclamation on 18 May 2013 but to authorize
a proclamation with the Supreme Court decision as basis.

262!
 B. Pre-proclamation controversies v. election contests; Scope of inquiry; When proper
1. Election contest
173 Vera v. Because of certain terrorism and violence in the Provinces of (1) Yes. The Alejandro doctrine started when Senator
Avelino Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in Jose Alejandrino assaulted a fellow-member in the
(1946) said regions did not reflect the true and free expression of the Philippine Senate. He was thereafter suspended. He filed
popular will. After which, the Senate convened in 1946 a case to the court asking to nullify the decision. The court
ordering that petitioners Jose Vera, Ramon Diokno, Jose held that it cannot do so since the expulsion of the
Romero –who had been included among the 16 candidates for member of legislative is a performance of a duty purely
Senator receiving the highest number of votes proclaimed by legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their
the COMELEC—shall not be sworn, nor seated as members legislative functions and over which they have exclusive
of the Senate. This was called as the Pendatun Resolution. control. The legislative has the power to set standards and
Petitioners here then are praying to annul the Pendatun rules pertaining to the conduct of their officials. This
resolution submitted by the Senate to postpone their doctrine maintained the separation of powers between
admittance to the Senate and compel the respondents to branches and since the Organic Act, this doctrine was not
permit them to occupy their seats and to exercise senatorial abandoned.
prerogatives.
Under the principles enunciated in the Alejandrino case,
Issues: (1) Whether the Alejandro Doctrine still applicable and the court could not order one branch of the Legislature to
whether the facts disclose any features justifying departure reinstate a member thereof. To do so would be to
therefrom? establish judicial predominance, and to upset the classic
pattern of checks and balances wisely woven into our
(2) Whether the Senate has to power to suspend or postpone institutional setup.
the admittance of candidates?
(2) Yes. Before the organization of the Commonwealth
and the promulgation of the Constitution, each House of
the Philippine Legislature exercised the power to defer
oath-taking of any member against whom a protest had
been lodged, whenever in its discretion such suspension
was necessary, before the final decision of the contest.

The discussions in the Constitutional Convention showed

that instead of transferring to the Electoral Commission all
the powers of the House or Senate as "the sole judge of
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of

263!
the National Assembly," it was given only jurisdiction over
"all contests" relating to the election, etc. This is due to the
concern that the words "The election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly"
seems to give to the Electoral commission the power to
determine also the election of the members who have not
been protested. Thus in the amendment the law now
reads:

"There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of

three Justices of the Supreme court designated by the
Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National
Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party
having the largest number of votes, and three by the party
having the second largest number of votes therein. The
senior Justice in the Commission shall be its
Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole
judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the
Members of the National Assembly."

However, another amendment was passed wherein the

phrase in “all cases CONTESTING the election” was
added to limit the ELECTORAL COMMISSION only to
contests. It now reads:

There shall be an Electoral Commission…The Electoral

Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members
of the National Assembly."

The change was necessary since for example a man

elected to be a Congressman, who previously served 10
years in Bilibid for estafa, he had no opponent thus no
protest was filed. The result then is that the Electoral

264!

174 Roces v. Miles Roces and Former Congressman Harry Ping filed their
HRET (2005) respective certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative for the 3rd Congressional District of Manila. A
registered voter of Manila assailed that Ping misrepresented
himself in his CoC as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
The COMELEC wanted to promulgate their decision regarding
the case but before they completed the process, Ping’s
political party expressed their intent to substitute his wife for
the said position. Ping also withdrew his CoC in the process
and filed a motion to deny due course the promulgation of
COMELEC’s decision.
Tribunal has no jurisdiction over him because there is no
election contest.
Given that not all the powers regarding the election,
returns, and qualifications of members was withdrawn by
the Constitution from the Congress; and if, as admitted by
petitioners themselves at the oral argument, the power to
defer the oath-taking, until the contests is adjudged, does
not belong to the corresponding Electoral Tribunal, then it
must be held that the House or Senate still retains such
authority.
It must be observed that when a member of the House
raises a question as to the qualifications of another, an
"election contest" does not thereby ensue, because the
former does not seek to be substituted for the latter.
Therefore having sworn to uphold the Constitution, we
must enforce the constitutional directive. We must not
question, nor permit respondents to be questioned here in
connection with their votes.
Yes. The HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives. They have the power to
determine the question of their own jurisdiction and to
decide all questions, of a law or fact if they are necessary
to determine the question of it jurisdiction
One essential element of jurisdiction: proper parties
must be present. HRET merely exercised exclusive
jurisdiction when it ruled Mrs. Ang Ping a proper party to
contest election of Roces.
265!
While the case regarding the deferement of the decision of
COMELEC was still ongoing the COMELEC First Division,
declared Mr. Ang Pings Affidavit of Withdrawal as moot and
denying due course to the substitute CoC of Mrs. Ang Ping
and ordering the Regional Election Director to delete Mr. Ang
Pings name from the certified list of candidates.
On the election day itself, the Manila City Board of
Canvassers resolved not to canvass the votes for Mr. or Mrs.
Ang Ping citing COMELEC's decision.
On May 15, 2004, after counting only 6,347 votes out of the
150,387 registered voters in the district, it proclaimed Roces
winner
Ang Ping filed a petition to annul the proclamation but was
dismissed by the COMELEC. He then filed to the HRET.
Roces filed also stating that HRET has no jurisdiction over the
case. He also assails that HRET committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied the petitioner motion to dismiss the
case filed by Mr. Ang Ping against petitioner and declaring it
was a proper party to file the protest against Roces.
Issue: Whether HRET has jurisdiction to review a resolution or
order of the COMELEC and/or declare the same as void and
disregard or set it aside.
Additionally, Roces offered as evidence the COMELEC
resolutions denying due course to Mrs. Ang Pings
COC. In doing so, Roces submitted to the HRET the
admissibility and validity of these resolutions and the
HRET cannot be faulted in reviewing the said resolutions
especially for the purpose of determining whether Roces
was able to discharge his burden of proving that Mrs. Ang
Ping is not the proper party to assail his election. In
passing upon the COMELEC resolutions especially for
that purpose, it cannot be said that the HRET usurped the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
Lastly, HRET did not abuse its discretion holding that
Mrs. Ang Ping is a proper party to contest the election
SECTION 5. Promulgation. — The promulgation of a
decision or resolution of the Commission or a Division
shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which notice
shall be served in advance upon the parties or their
attorneys personally or by registered mail or by telegram
Promulgation determines when reglementary period
begins. Commissioner Garcilliano fixed the promulgation
of its resolution whether to give due course to the
candidacy of Mr. Ang Ping on May 5, 2004. Thus the
mysterious April 30, 2004 resolution tramples the rights of
the Ang Pings since it is not the scheduled promulgation.
COMELEC en banc usurped jurisdiction of COMELEC first
division when it issued Resolution No. 6823. which
ordered the deletion of Mr. Ang Pings name from the
Certified List of Candidates and denied the spouses Ang
Pings motions to withdraw and substitute despite the fact
that: (1) the reglementary period of Mr. Ang Ping to appeal
had not yet expired; and (2) Mr. Ang Ping had filed a
266!

175 Señeres v. BUHAY HAYAAN YUMABONG (BUHAY) filed for its desire to
COMELEC Participate in the Party List System of Representation on May
(2009) 2007 bearing the signature of Melquiades Robles as their
president. A Certificate of Nomination of BUHAY’s nominees
for the 2007 elections followed on March 29, also signed and
filed by Robles. However on March 27, Hans Christian
Señeres has also filed a Certificate of Nomination of a
different set of names of nominee including himself and
people who are not even members of the party.
Señeres alleged that he was the acting president and
secretary-general of BUHAY, having assumed the position
since August 17, 2004. He filed a petition asserting the
expiration of Robles’ presidency making then the certificate
filed by Robles lacking in authority and null and void. BUHAY
then adopted a resolution expelling Señeres in the party due
to a violation of its party constitution and by-laws. On July 9
and 18 the COMELEC issued two resolution proclaiming
BUHAY as a winning party-list organization for the May 2007
elections and entitled to 3 house seats.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the instant petition whether the
COMELEC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
motion for reconsideration of the preceding order
on May 10, 2004 within the five-day reglementary
period.
Additionally, COMELEC en banc may not take cognizance
of cases pending in COMELEC divisions
Given that the April 30, 2004 resolution violates Mrs. Ang
Ping's constitutional right to due process and that
Resolution No. 6823 is deemed premature, Resolution No.
6823 is considered void ab initio and is of complete nullity
and without legal effect
At the time Seneres files this petition (July 23), the right of
the nominees as Party List reps had been recognized and
declared in the July 19 Resolution and the nominees had
taken their oath and assumed office in the HoR.
Thus, the petition for certiorari is not a proper remedy. The
proper recourse would have been to file a petition for quo
warranto before the HRET within 10 days from receipt of
the July 19, 2007 Resolution.
The HRET’s sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests
relative to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the HoR “begins only after a candidate has
become a member of the HoR”.(Article 6 Section 17).
Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,
taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the
House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over
elections relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction
begins.
Thus Señeres should have filed the case to HRET.
However, since Señeres failed to file a petition for quo
warranto before the HRET within 10 days from receipt of
the July 19, 2007 Resolution declaring the validity of
Robles Certificate of Nomination, said Resolution of the
COMELEC has already become final and executory.
267!
 jurisdiction in issuing its challenged Resolution E.M. No. 07-
043 : declaring Melquiades Robles as the President of
BUHAY since no party election was held to replace him, then
he was holding the position in a hold-over capacity
Issue: Whether the COMELEC acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its challenged Resolution
dated June 19, 2007, which declared respondent Robles as
the duly authorized representative of BUHAY, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law except the instant petition.
176 Limkaichong Louis C. Biraogo seeks a reconsideration of the Court’s April
v. 1, 2009 Decision, which granted Jocelyn D. Sy Limkaichong’s
Commission petition for certiorari. The April 1, 2009 decision reversed the
on Elections Joint Resolution of the Commission on Election’s (COMELEC)
(2009) Second Division disqualifying Limkaichong from running
as a congressional candidate in the First District of
Negros Oriental due to lack of citizenship requirement.
The court saw that this reconsideration is a mere rehash of
Biraogo’s previous arguments, which the court have all
considered and found without merit in the Decision dated April
1, 2009. However the court, in order to lay to rest once and for
all Biraogo's misgivings, decided to discuss the relevant
issues and revalidate our Decision by ruling on his motion as
follows.
Again, the court reiterates issue in the past case. The
petitioner like in the past case, questions the qualification of
Limkaichong to run for, be elected to, and assume and
discharge, the position of Representative for the First District
of Negros Oriental. The contention of the parties who
sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-
Thus, this petition has now become moot and can be
dismissed outright. And even if we entertain the instant
special civil action, still, petitioner’s postulations are bereft
of merit.
No. The Court has invariably held that once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction
begins.
The fact that the proclamation of the winning
candidate, as in this case, was alleged to have been
tainted with irregularity does not divest the HRET of
its jurisdiction any allegations anyway as to the
invalidity of the proclamation will not prevent the HRET
from assuming jurisdiction over all matters essential to a
member’s qualification to sit in the House of
Representatives.
The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the
manner of filing either an election protest or a petition for
quo warranto against a Member of the House of
Representatives. In our Decision, we ruled that the ten-
day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules
268!
 born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement
in Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution. The proponents
against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a
natural-born citizen because her parents were Chinese
citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the
proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father,
never attained finality due to procedural and substantial
defects.
In the election that ensued, she was voted for by the
constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest
votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and has
since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of
the House of Representatives. During the contention, the
Court ruled that if there are questions of infirmity on the
naturalization of a candidate, the petitioner should be the one
to prove the infirmity. In this case, Biraogo went to great
lengths to procure such decision and after sometime,
COMELEC granted Biraogo’s petition and declared
Limkaichong DISQUALIFIED. However, Limkaichong filed a
motion for reconsideration that suspended such decision.
Biraogo on the other hand contends that the decision did
not suspend the execution of the injunctive part and,
accordingly, the Provincial Supervisor of the COMELEC
should not have proceeded with Limkaichong's
proclamation as the winning candidate in the elections
giving the jurisdiction then to HRET and such decision
are beyond the COMELEC’s control therein.
Issue: Whether COMELEC has jurisdiction over the issue.
177 Aquino v. (Same as above, Case # 138)
Commission
on Elections
(1995)
does not apply to disqualification based on
citizenship, because qualifications for public office
are continuing requirements and must be possessed
not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost,
his title may be seasonably challenged. Accordingly,
the 1987 Constitution requires that Members of the House
of Representatives must be natural-born citizens not only
at the time of their election but during their entire tenure.
Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a
member's citizenship or lack of it may still question
the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period
notwithstanding.
The court even adds that in the case of Vinzons-Chato v.
Commission on Elections the issues raised by petitioner
Chato that essentially relate to the canvassing of returns
and alleged invalidity of respondent Unico's proclamation
are matters that are best addressed to the sound
judgment and discretion of the HRET given that Unico is
now a declared candidate. Significantly, the allegation that
respondent Unico's proclamation is null and void does not
divest the HRET of its jurisdiction.
(1) No. COMELEC assumes jurisdiction in all contests
relative to the election returns and qualification of the
candidates and the HRET only becomes applicable when
the said candidate becomes a member of Senate or HOR.
269!
 Thus a candidate that was still not proclaimed is still not a
member of HOR in compliance to Section 17 of Article VI
of the Constitution. Also, under Sec 6 of RA 6646,
COMELEC has the power to proclaim a candidate to be
suspended and thus has the capacity to not count the
votes. The basis of this is RA 6646, Section 6: Effect of
Disqualification Case:

Any candidate who has been declared by final

judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and
the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion
of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of
his guilt is strong.

Furthermore, it also shows how the trial will not be

terminated just because the candidate won the election
giving then COMELEC jurisdiction outside election. The
words “evidence of guilt is strong” in Sec. 6 of RA 6646
does not preclude the power of COMELEC to
disqualification cases only but a further reading of
Omnibus Election Code Sec 7 of RA 6646 also involve
cases of ineligibility.
178 Perez v. (Same as Case # 141) No. After respondent’s proclamation, the COMELEC
Commission had no jurisdiction to entertain the motions the petitioner
on Elections Issue: Whether COMELEC has jurisdiction over the case was filing. When this petition was filed, respondent was
(1999) already a member of the House of Representatives, which
COMELEC has no jurisdiction over either. It is the House

270!

179 Aggabao v. Petitioner Georgidi B. Aggabao and private respondent
COMELEC Anthony Miranda were rival congressional candidates for the
(2005) 4th District of Isabela during the May 10, 2004 elections.
During the canvassing of the certificates of canvass of votes
(COCV) for the municipalities of Cordon and San Agustin,
Miranda moved for the exclusion of the 1st copy of the COCV
on grounds that it was tampered with; prepared under duress;
differed from other authentic copies and contained manifest
errors.
Aggabao objected arguing that the grounds raised by Miranda
are proper only for a pre-proclamation controversy which is
not allowed in elections for Members of the House of
Representatives.
On May 22, 2004, the reconstituted Provincial Board of
Canvassers (PBC) did not consider from canvass the
contested COCVs and used instead the 4th and 7th copies of
the COCVs. Based on the results, Miranda garnered the
highest number of votes for the position of Congressman.
Despite an appeal, the COMELEC allowed the declaration of
Miranda as the winner. On June 14, 2004, Miranda was
proclaimed as the duly elected Congressman for the 4th
District of Isabela. Petitioner assails the decision of
COMELEC. He claimed that the COMELEC En Banc acted
without jurisdiction when it ordered Miranda’s proclamation
considering that the Second Division has not yet resolved the
appeal.
Issue: Whether the court can take cognizance of this petition.
180 Barbers v. Robert Z. Barbers (“Barbers”) and Biazon were candidates for
COMELEC re-election to the Senate of the Philippines in the 10 May 2004
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal who has jurisdiction
for the declaration of respondent’s ineligibility.
No. The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relative to the election, returns, and qualifications
of members of the House of Representatives. Thus,
once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken
his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the
House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his election, returns,
and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins
It is undisputed that Miranda has already been
proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office on June
14, 2004. As such, petitioner’s recourse would have been
to file an electoral protest before the HRET. His remedy is
not this petition for certiorari.
The allegation that Miranda’s proclamation is null and void
ab initio does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction. Thus
ruled that in an electoral contest where the validity of the
proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his
oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is
raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The
reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids
duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction
between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the
people’s mandate.
Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No. In making the case the court refers to Sec. 17 of
Article VI of the Constitution that is supplemented by the
271!
(2005) Synchronized National and Local Elections (“elections”). On 2
June 2004, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. NBC
04-005 proclaiming Biazon as “the 12th ranking duly elected
12th Senator of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 10,
2004 national and local elections, to serve for a term of 6
years, beginning on June 30, 2004 in accordance with Article
VI, Section IV of the Constitution of the Philippines.”
The COMELEC stated that after the canvass of the
supplemental Provincial COCs from Maguindanao (Cotabato
City), Lanao del Sur and one barangay in Nueva Vizcaya,
Biazon obtained 10,635,270 votes nationwide. On the other
hand, Barbers obtained 10,624,585 votes. Thus, Biazon
obtained 10,685 more votes than Barbers. The COMELEC
stated that this “difference will not materially be affected by the
remaining votes in certain precincts where there was failure of
elections.” Barbers then filed a petition assailing COMELEC's
proclamation of Biazon.
In his petition, Barbers asserted that the proclamation of
Biazon was “illegal and premature being based on an
incomplete canvass.” Barbers asserted that the remaining
uncanvassed COCs and votes and the results of the special
elections, which were still to be conducted, would undoubtedly
affect the results of the elections. COMELEC dismissed the
first case for a lack of merit. Barbers filed for a motion for
reconsideration wherein COMELEC special division dismissed
the case and showed that the newly collected ballots only
reduced the margin of Biazon by 6,000. COMELEC also ruled
that since the respondent was already proclaimed, the case
should be filed to Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). The case is
not a pre-proclamation case.
Issue: Whether this court has jurisdiction over the case.
Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal provides:
RULE 12. Jurisdiction. – The Senate Electoral Tribunal is
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the Members of the Senate
In Javier v. COMELEC, the court interpreted the phrase
“election, returns and qualifications” as follows: [Note the
words must be defined in totality of the law but in case it
needs to be defined individually]:
Election - refers to the conduct of the polls, including the
listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and
the casting and counting of the votes.
Returns - are return to the canvass of the returns and the
proclamation of the winners, including questions
concerning the composition of the board of canvassers
and the authenticity of the election returns
Qualifications - refers to matters that could be raised in a
quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner,
such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of
his certificate of candidacy.
Thus the word “sole” in the Section 17 refers on the other
hand to the exclusivity of the jurisdiction. Thus the court
has no jurisdiction to entertain this said petition. Barbers
should file an electoral protest to the SET.
Although to clarify certain issues regarding the absence of
abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC the court
believes that the argument of the petitioner that
272!
proclamation as the 12th winning senatorial candidate is a
nullity because it was based on an incomplete canvass
and that after having used Provincial Certificates of
Canvass (“PCOCs”) in the canvass of election results for
Senators up to 2 June 2004, the COMELEC used the
Municipal Certificates of Canvass (“MCOCs”) in the “final
tabulation of the uncanvassed results and that of the
special elections yet to be held in certain parts of the
country.

Under Omnibus Election Code of 233:

When the election returns are delayed, lost or
destroyed. – In case its copy of the election returns is
missing, the board of canvassers shall, by messenger or
otherwise, obtain such missing election returns from the
board of election inspectors concerned, or if said returns
have been lost or destroyed, the board of canvassers,
upon prior authority of the Commission, may use any of
the authentic copies of said election returns or certified
copy of said election returns issued by the Commission,
and forthwith direct its representative to investigate the
case and immediately report the matter to the
Commission.

As mentioned above, The board of canvassers,

notwithstanding the fact that not all the election
returns have been received by it, may terminate the
canvass and proclaim the candidates elected on the
basis of the available election returns if the missing
election returns will not affect the results of the
election.

This is supplemented by COMELEC promulgated

Resolution No. 6749, “General Instructions for the

273!

181 Rasul v. Petitioner argues that the Commission acted with grave abuse
COMELEC of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction
(1999) when, acting as a National Board of Canvassers, it declared
that the remaining uncanvassed certificates would no longer
affect the results and proceeded to proclaim the twelve (12)
winning senatorial candidates. Petitioner contends that due to
the indefinite suspension of special elections in some areas,
the total population of registered voters affected number about
268,282; and that at the time of the proclamation of the ‘twelve
(12) winning candidates’, 150,334 votes were not yet
canvassed.
Thus, the 268,686 registered voters who have yet to cast their
votes where special elections have been suspended,
combined with the uncanvassed votes of 150,334 from other
areas of the country total 419,020. Consequently, petitioner
submits that there is a possibility that 12th ranking senatorial
candidate, Teresa Aquino-Oreta, who had a total number of
votes of 7,269,444 or a lead of 280,012 votes over the 13th
placer, Roberto Pagdanganan, who had a total of 6,989,432,
could be dislodged by the latter, if the aforestated
uncanvassed votes plus the number of registered voters of the
Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Results for
Senators and Party List in the May 10, 2004 National and
Local Elections.” Section 9 of the Resolution provides:
“…. Notwithstanding the fact that not all of the COCs
have been received or canvassed, the NBC may
terminate the canvass if the missing COCs would no
longer affect the results of the elections.” The
COMELEC at the time of the decision knows that the
remaining number of areas not counted only amounted to
2,931 so it will not affect the proclamation. Thus the
COMELEC enjoys the presumption of good faith and
regularity in the performance of official duty.
No. The Court reiterates again the Pangilinan v.
Commission on Elections case where it insists that: where
the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in
the congressional elections, the remedy of petitioner
is to file an electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal
of the House of Representatives.
Section 17 of Article 6 and Section 250 of the Omnibus
Election Code underscore the exclusivity of the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.
Inasmuch as petitioner contests the proclamation of herein
respondent Teresa Aquino-Oreta as the 12th winning
senatorial candidate, it is the Senate Electoral Tribunal
which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the
complaint of petitioner.
Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal provides that an election protest must be filed
by any candidate who has filed a certificate of
candidacy and has been voted upon for the same
office.
274!
 deferred special elections totaling 419,020 were considered.
According to petitioner, the number of votes is sufficient to
affect the final result with respect to the 12th and last winning
position. In other words, petitioner submits that the inclusion of
respondent Teresa Aquino-Oreta who was ranked number 12
among the "winning" candidates was premature and based on
incomplete canvass.
Issue: Whether COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction
when, acting as a National Board of Canvassers, it declared
that the remaining uncanvassed certificates would no longer
affect the results and proceeded to proclaim the twelve (12)
winning senatorial candidates.
182 Guerrero v. The case is about the petition filed by herein respondent
COMELEC Guillermo C. Ruiz to disqualify respondent Rodolfo C. Fariñas
(2000) as a candidate for the elective office of Congressman in the
first district of Ilocos Norte during the May 11, 1998 elections.
In the Second Division of the COMELEC, Ruiz sought to
perpetually disqualify respondent Fariñas as a candidate for
the position of Congressman.
Ruiz alleged that Fariñas had been campaigning as a
candidate for Congressman in the May 11, 1998 polls, despite
his failure to file a Certificate of Candidacy for said office. Ruiz
averred that Fariñas’ failure to file said Certificate violated
Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to
COMELEC Resolution No. 2577, dated January 15, 1998.
Ruiz asked the COMELEC to declare Fariñas as a "nuisance
candidate" pursuant to Section 69 of the Omnibus Election
Code and to disqualify him from running in the May 11, 1998
elections, as well as in all future polls.
On May 8, 1998, Fariñas filed his Certificate of Candidacy with
"RULE 14. Election Protest. — A verified petition
contesting the election of any Member of the Senate shall
be filed by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of
candidacy and been voted for the Office of Senator within
fifteen (15) days after the proclamation of the protestee.
No joint election protest shall be admitted, but the
Tribunal, for good and sufficient reasons, may consolidate
individual protests and hear and decide them jointly.
Therefore the case at hand is now moot and academic
as the respondent is now proclaimed as a Senator.
No. In the present case, we find no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it held
that its jurisdiction had ceased with the assumption of
office of respondent Fariñas as Representative for the
first district of Ilocos Norte. While the COMELEC is
vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a
certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power
following the proclamation and assumption of the position
by Fariñas is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries
separating the COMELEC and the HRET.
Under Art. VI, §17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole
and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a member of the House of
Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
275!
the COMELEC, substituting candidate Chevylle V. Fariñas
who withdrew on April 3, 1998. On May 10, 1998, the Second
Division of the COMELEC decided to DISMISS the case on
Fariñas. In dismissing Ruiz’s petition, the Second Division
of the COMELEC stated, "[T]here is none (sic) in the
records to consider respondent an official candidate to
speak of without the filing of said certificate. Hence, there
is no certificate of candidacy to be cancelled,
consequently, no candidate to be disqualified.
On May 11, 1998, the elections pushed through as scheduled.
The post-election tally of votes in Ilocos Norte showed that
Fariñas got a total of 56,369 votes representing the highest
number of votes received in the first district. Fariñas was duly
proclaimed winner. Ruiz filed a motion for
reconsideration, contending that Fariñas could not validly
substitute for Chevylle V. Fariñas, since the latter was not
the official candidate of the Lakas ng Makabayan Masang
Pilipino (LAMMP), but was an independent candidate.
Another person cannot substitute for an independent
candidate. Thus, Fariñas’ certificate of candidacy claiming to
be the official candidate of LAMMP in lieu of Chevylle V.
Fariñas was fatally defective, according to Ruiz. On June 3,
1998, Fariñas took his oath of office as a member of the
House of Representatives.
Issue: Wheter COMELEC committed a grave abuse of
discretion.
Thus, the COMELEC’s decision to discontinue exercising
jurisdiction over the case is justifiable, in deference to the
HRET’s own jurisdiction and functions.
However the Petitioner believes that when it comes to
matters of constitutional requirement for elections, the
HRET has no power and “qualification” in Art VI Sec. 17 is
limited to those not included in the Constitution.
This contention lacks cogency and is far from persuasive.
Art. VI, §17 of the Constitution cannot be circumscribed
lexically. The word "qualifications" cannot be read as
qualified by the term "constitutional." Ubi lex non distinguit
noc nos distinguire debemos = where the law does not
distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. There should
be no distinction in the application of a law where none is
indicated.
Petitioner also avers that since the candidate did not fulfill
the requirements for elections, his proclamation is not valid
for his election is void ab initio.
In an electoral contest where the validity of the
proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his
oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is
raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The
reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids
duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction
between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the
people’s mandate.
Lastly, if respondent Fariñas can validly substitute by
Chevylle V. Fariñas and whether respondent became a
legitimate candidate. Likewise, the decision should be
referred to the Electoral Tribunal
276!
183 Villarosa v. Quintos filed a case against the wife of JOSE T. VILLAROSA,
Senate who was Representative of the District in question for two
Electoral terms, the last of which ended on June 30, 1998; in his
Tribunal certificate of candidacy for the election of May 8, 1995, JOSE
(2000) T. VILLAROSA wrote as his “nickname or stage name: JOE-
JTV.” In her certificate of candidacy, Petitioner wrote “JTV” as
her “nickname/stage name.” VILLAROSA and QUINTOS
were the only candidates for the office of Representative of
the Lone Legislative District of Occidental Mindoro in the 11
May 1998 synchronized national and local elections. The
Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed VILLAROSA
as the winning candidate with a margin of 3,032 votes.
QUINTOS filed an election protest against VILLAROSA
contesting the results of the election in all the 882
precincts in the eleven municipalities of Occidental Mindoro
because of the use of the petitioner of JTV as nickname.
HRET promulgated a resolution stating that with QUINTOS’
withdrawal of the remaining non-pilot protested precincts,
QUINTOS impliedly limited the issue to WHETHER OR NOT
THE “JTV” VOTES SHOULD BE COUNTED IN FAVOR OF
PROTESTEE AMELITA C. VILLAROSA.
HRET issued Resolution informing the parties that “the
Tribunal ruled, by [a] vote of 5-4 of its members, not to
count ‘JTV’ and its variations as valid votes for Protestee
Amelita C. Villarosa, the same being considered stray
ballots.” (On the ground that in her affidavit, she was
asking for the insertion of “Girlie” between her given
name and surname which is an admission that she was
known as “Girlie” and not “JTV”.
Issue: Whether the votes JTV should be counted in as stray
votes?
Yes. During the revision, ballots bearing JTV, JTB, GTV,
GTB, Jitivi, Gitivi, Jitibi and Gitibi on the line for
Representative were classified as ballots for VILLAROSA,
which the revisors of QUINTOS objected to. Likewise,
ballots bearing Girlie on the line for Representative were
classified as votes for VILLAROSA.
Petitioner argued that “JTV” was her designated nickname
in the official list of candidates submitted by the provincial
election supervisor to the COMELEC in Manila; it was the
nickname she used in her posters, handbills and other
election propaganda throughout the campaign period. In
her speeches during the rallies, she urged the voters who
might have found her full name difficult to write to simply
vote “JTV,” as she had decided to use that nickname as a
shortcut of her name as a married woman under Article
370 of the Civil Code.
JTV and its derivatives do not describe the identity of
the petitioner but of her husband who served as
representative of the same district for two terms
The HRET was thus correct in applying Rule 14 of Section
211 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides: Any
vote containing initials only or which is illegible or which
does not sufficiently identify the candidate for whom it is
intended shall be considered as a stray vote but shall not
invalidate the whole ballot.
Furthermore, since votes for “GIRLIE” written in the space
for Representative were in fact claimed by VILLAROSA
and credited in her favor, then the HRET correctly ruled
that “JTV” votes or variations thereof, under the idem
sonans rule, cannot be counted for VILLAROSA because
277!

184 Abayon v. Petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the
HRET (2010) Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the
House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.
Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz,
and Agustin C. Doroga, all registered voters, filed a petition
for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat
Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon, in HRET Case
07-041.
They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-
list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed
out that petitioner Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the
House as a party-list nominee since she did not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the
wife of an incumbent congressional district representative.
She moreover lost her bid as party-list representative of the
party-list organization called An Waray in the immediately
preceding elections of May 10, 2004.
In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first
only one nickname or stage name is allowed.
From all the foregoing, bad faith or malice on the part of
VILLAROSA was evident when, in her certificate of
candidacy and campaign materials, she appropriated the
initials or nickname of her husband, the incumbent
Representative of the district in question whom she
wanted to succeed in office. She tried to make a mockery
of a process whose credibility is essential in preserving
democracy. Nullus commodum potest de injuria sua
propia. No one should be allowed to take advantage of his
own wrong.
Yes, HRET has jurisdiction. Petitioners Abayon and
Palparan assert that they were not elected into office
but were chosen by their respective organizations
under their internal rules, the HRET has no
jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their
qualifications as nominees. If at all, says petitioner
Abayon, such authority belongs to the COMELEC which
already upheld her qualification as nominee of Aangat
Tayo for the women sector.
The members of the House of Representatives are of
two kinds: "members who shall be elected from
legislative districts" and "those who shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
From the Constitution’s point of view, it is the party-list
representatives who are "elected" into office, not their
parties or organizations. These representatives are
elected, however, through that peculiar party-list system
that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law
established where the voters cast their votes for the
278!
 nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the
2007 elections for the members of the House of
Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina
Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio
Flores, and Joselito Ustarez are members of some other
party-list groups.
Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others
with him filed with respondent HRET a petition for quo
warranto against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner Palparan,
in HRET Case 07-040. Lesaca and the others alleged that
Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives
as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay
represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian
Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels,
and security guards. Lesaca and the others said that Palparan
committed gross human rights violations against marginalized
and underrepresented sectors and organizations.
organizations or parties to which such party-list
representatives belong.
Thus, they come into the purview of Section 17, Article VI
of the Constitution which provides that the HRET shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other
things, the qualifications of the members of the House
of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-
list nominees are "elected members.”
RE: member of marginalized: the COMELEC seems to
believe, when it resolved the challenge to petitioner
Abayon, that it has the power to do so as an incident of its
authority to approve the registration of party-list
organizations. But the Court need not resolve this
question since it is not raised here and has not been
argued by the parties.

Issue: Whether respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the

question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan
as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list
organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House
of Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007
elections.
2. Pre-proclamation Controversy
185 Chavez v. This case was originally an urgent petition ad cautelam (as a No. It is quite obvious that petitioner’s prayer does not call
COMELEC precaution refers to a document not necessary but filed for the correction of “manifest errors” in the certificates of
(1992) anyway) praying, among others, for the issuance of a canvass or election returns before the COMELEC but for
temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Commission the ballots contained therein. Indeed, petitioner has not
on Elections (COMELEC) from proclaiming the 24th highest even pointed to any “manifest error” in the certificates of
senatorial candidate. On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a canvass or election returns he desires to be rectified.
resolution in GR No. 104704. The above mentioned resolution There being none, petitioners proper recourse is to file a

279!
 was received by respondent COMELEC on May 6, 1992 and
on the same day, petitioner filed an urgent motion to
disseminate through the fastest available means and order
said Election Officials to delete the name Melchor Chavez as
printed in the certified list of candidates tally sheets, election
returns and count all votes in favor of Fransisco I. Chavez. But
petitioner assailed that COMELEC failed to perform its
mandatory function thus the name of Melchor Chavez
remained undeleted.
Petitioner prays not only for a restraining order but the
judgment be rendered requiring the COMELEC to reopen the
ballot boxes in 80,348 precincts in 13 provinces including
Metro Manila, scan the ballots for “Chavez” votes which were
invalidated or declared stray and credit said scanned
“Chavez” votes in favor of petitioner.
Issue: Whether Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain the
instant petition.
II. Composition
186 Abbas v. On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the
Senate respondent Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET
Electoral Case No. 002-87 against 22 candidates of the LABAN
Tribunal coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11,
(1988) 1987 congressional elections by the COMELEC. On
November 17, 1987, the petitioners, with the exception of
Senator Estrada but including Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
(who had been designated Member of the Tribunal replacing
Senator Estrada, the latter being affiliated with the Liberal
regular election protest which, under the constitution and
the Omnibus Election code, exclusively pertains to the
Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Thus, Art. Vl, Sec. 17 of the Constitution provides that “the
Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective members…” (Emphasis supplied). The
word sole underscores the exclusivity of the tribunal’s
jurisdiction over election contest relating to their respective
members. It is therefore crystal clear that this Court has
no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. It is the
Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction
to act on the complaint of petitioner relating to the election
of a member of the Senate.
As the authenticity of the certificates of canvass or
election returns are not questioned, they must be prima
facie considered valid for purposes of canvassing the
same and proclamation of the winning candidates.
Premises considered, the Court resolved to dismiss the
instant petition for lack of merit.
Yes.
The Constitution states that a Tribunal to be staffed by
both Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of
the Senate, the Constitution intended that BOTH those
judicial and legislative components commonly share
the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators.
The constitutional provision also clearly mandates the
280!
Party and resigned as the Opposition's representative in the
Tribunal) filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members
thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No.
002-87 on the ground that all of them are interested
parties to said case, as respondents therein.
Soon after, Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag, Vicente Paterno,
and Ponce Enrile inhibited themselves from the case. The
petitioner contend that the case be decided out of public
policy, necessity and due process. The respondent tried to
amend the Tribunal’s Rules of procedure so as to permit
the contest being decided by only three members of
tribunal coming from the Senate. The respondent came up
with a provisio wherein:
The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section
24)—requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the
adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso that
where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the
remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less
than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt
resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions.
The petitioner thus questions the amendment to the Senate
Electoral Tribunal as unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether the provision regarding Senators should be
strictly followed.
participation in the same process of decision of a
representative/s of the Supreme Court. The fact that
the proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed
membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1 – an
unmistakable indication that the "legislative
component" cannot be totally excluded from
participation in the resolution of senatorial election
contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of
the Constitution.
Given that the present case would leave where the duty of
such judgment is only within the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
it would result in the Tribunal having no alternative but to
abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform,
but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
participation of its entire membership of Senators. The
Court believes that the overriding consideration that
the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty
which it alone has the power to perform.
Therefore, the Court dismisses the petition for
certiorari for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of
the Tribunal to not let Senator-Members to inhibit or
disqualify himself, rather, just let them refrain from
participating in the resolution of a case where he
sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would
stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment.
“What we are merely saying is that in the light of the
Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot
legally function as such, absent its entire membership
of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can
confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of
valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.”
281!
187 Pimentel v. On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect and
HRET (2002) on 11 May 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System
Act, national elections were held which included, for the first
time, the election through popular vote of party-list groups and
organizations whose nominees would become members of
the House and constituted its House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and Commission on Appointments
(CA) contingent by electing its representatives to these two
constitutional bodies.
In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the
political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in
the HRET and CA. From available records, it does not
appear that after the May 11, 1998 elections the party-list
groups in the House nominated any of their
representatives to the HRET or the CA. EVEN ON THE
DATE OF FILING OF THE INSTANT PETITIONS, the House
contingents to the HRET and the CA WERE SOLELY
COMPOSED OF DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVES. The
Petitioners cite this as a violation to Sections 17 and Section
18.
Issues: (1) Whether this court has jurisdiction over the case?
(2) Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to
reconstitute themselves to include party-list representatives
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
(1) No. The Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate
and on the House the authority to elect among their
members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators
and 12 seats for House Members in the Commission on
Appointments. Under Art. VI, §17 of the Constitution each
chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose,
within constitutionally defined limits, who among their
members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each
chamber’s respective electoral tribunal. Therefore, their
primary recourse clearly rests with the House of
Representatives and not with this Court.
Under Art. VI, §§17-18 of the Constitution, party-list
representatives must first show to the House that they
possess the required numerical strength to be entitled
to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails
to comply with the directive of the Constitution on
proportional representation of political parties in the HRET
and the CA can the party-list representatives seek
recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to
the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the
instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioners’ direct
recourse to this Court is premature.
The instant petitions are bereft of any allegation that
respondents prevented the party-list groups in the
House from participating in the election of members
of the HRET and the CA. It appears from the available
facts that the party-list groups in the House at that time
simply refrained from participating in the election process.
(2) No. The court finds the petitioners lacking locus standi
in the present case as they have not stated their stake in
282!

III. Independence
188 Bondoc v. In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987,
Pineda Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong
(1991) Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the
Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the
position of Representative for the Fourth District of the
province of Pampanga. On May 19, 1987, Pineda was
proclaimed winner in the election. Bondoc filed a protest to
HRET (House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal).
By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which
Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23)
votes. At that point, the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted
on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some
precincts as there were some not yet counted. This resulted
into showing that Bondoc won by 107 votes in another re-
tally.
Later, Congressman Camasura (A member of HRET and LDP
partymate) revealed to his “Chief,” Congressman Jose S.
Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally
the issue. We likewise find no grave abuse in the action
or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in response
to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Art VI, §§17-
18 of the Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET
and the CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute
themselves. Finally, the issues raised in the petitions
have been rendered academic by subsequent events.
On May 14, 2001, a new set of district and party-list
representatives were elected to the House. The Court
cannot now resolve the issue of proportional
representation in the HRET and the CA based on the
“present composition” of the House of Representatives as
presented by petitioners and the Solicitor General.
Yes. The HRET was created under Art. VI, § 17.
The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan
court although two-thirds of its members are
politicians. The purpose of the constitutional convention
creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an
independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of
contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan
consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature in matters
pertaining to contested elections of its members.
The independence of the HRET would be a farce if the
House of Representatives, or the majority party may
shuffle and manipulate the political component of the
electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in
power. It would diminish the HRET to a mere tool
The resolution of the HoR on removing Congressman
Camasura from the HRET for disloyalty to the LDP,
283!
 in the Bondoc case but also that he voted for Bondoc (a rival because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista
party member). He said that he always honors the voice of the Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the
ballot which angered members of LDP upon hearing such constitutional prerogative of the HRET to be the sole
report. judge of the election contest between Pineda and
Bondoc.
On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, they
had already expelled Cong. Camasura and Cong. Benjamin HRET members must discharge their functions with
Bautista from the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize complete detachment, impartiality, and independence
the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for even independence from the political party to which they
allegedly having invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join belong. Hence, “disloyalty to party” and “breach of party
said political party; and that as those acts are not only inimical discipline,” are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a
uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but also a complete member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman
betrayal to (sic) the cause and objectives, and loyalty to Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience
LDP. vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the
examination and appreciation of the ballots and the
LDP also sent a letter to HoR to rescind the election of recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of
LDP of Congressman Camasura to the HRET. Camasura Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion,
was then removed by HRET’s chairwoman Justice an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its
Herrera. resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura
is, therefore, null and void.
Issue: Whether HRET committed a grave abuse of discretion.
IV. Action / Decision
189 Robles v. Petitioner Virgilio Robles and private respondent Romeo No. The Supreme Court agreed with respondent HRET
HRET (1990) Santos were candidates for the position of Congressman of when it held:
the 1st district of Caloocan City in the last May 11, 1987
congressional elections. Petitioner Robles was proclaimed We cannot agree with Protestee's (Robles) contention that
the winner on December 23, 1987. Protestant’s (Santos) "Motion to Withdraw Protest on
Unrevised Precincts" effectively withdrew the precincts
On January 5, 1988, Santos filed an election protest with referred to therein from the protest even before the
respondent HRET. He alleged, among others, that the Tribunal has acted thereon. Certainly, the Tribunal
elections in the 1st District of Caloocan City held last May retains the authority to grant or deny the Motion, and
11, 1987 were characterized by the commission of the withdrawal becomes effective only when the
electoral frauds and irregularities in various forms, like Motion is granted. To hold otherwise would permit a
the ones during the counting of votes and during the party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already

284!
 canvassing of the election returns. He likewise prayed for
the recounting of the genuine ballots in all the 320 contested
precincts. After a series of filing, Santos filed a Motion for
Withdrawal of Protest. Robles was contending when Santos
filed a Motion for Withdrawal on Protest on the ballots, HRET
already lost jurisdiction over the case. He is assailing that
after the Motion for Withdrawal, the case should be
considered as already dismissed.
Issue: Whether respondent HRET acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the revision of
the unrevised protested ballots, notwithstanding the
withdrawal of the protest.
190 Arroyo v. After the May 11, 1992 elections, Arroyo was declared as
HRET (1995) the duly elected Congressman of the lone district of
Makati. Arroyo won by 13,559 votes over his opponent. His
opponent Syjuco protested the declaration before the HRET.
Syjuco alleged that Arroyo won due to massive fraud
hence he moved for revision and recounting.
HRET gave way but during the process some HRET
employees and personnel conducted some irregularities
to ensure Syjuco’s win. After some paper battles between
the two, Syjuco, realizing that mere revision and recounting
would not suffice to overthrow the more than 12,000 votes
lead of Arroyo over him, revised his complaint by including
and introducing in his memorandum cum addendum that his
complaint is actually based on a broader and more
equitable non-traditional determination of the existence of
the precinct-level document-based anomalies and that the
revision he initially sought is just incidental to such
determination.
(Note: Precinct Level Document Based Evidence: electoral
acquired.
We hold therefore that this Tribunal retains the power
and the authority to grant or deny Protestant's Motion
to Withdraw, if only to insure that the Tribunal retains
sufficient authority to see to it that the will of the
electorate is ascertained.
Yes. From his initial prayer for revision, private
respondent's belated attempt to inject the "precinct level
document based anomalies/evidence" theory, he
intended to completely abandon the process and results of
the revision which goes against Rule 28 of the HRET
internal rules which reads:
“After the expiration of the period for filing of the
protest x x x substantial amendments which broaden
the scope of the action or introduce an additional
cause of action shall not be allowed. . . . .”
Members of the Tribunal in fact had already sensed the
impropriety when it issued its "show-cause" order
requiring the Syjuco to explain why his election protest
should not be dismissed. But the majority violated with
open eyes its own rules when they resolved not to
dismiss the protest — a clear indication of grave
abuse of discretion.
The majority members of public respondent HRET
285!
 documents used not only during the actual balloting/voting
stage, but also those availed of even much earlier, as early
(as) the time of the registration of voters)
The 3 justices members of the HRET ruled that such
amendment is already beyond the tribunal’s jurisdiction and
the 6 representative members ruled otherwise. Consequently,
by a vote of 6-3, the HRET did not dismiss the protest filed by
Syjuco and the HRET later declared Syjuco as the winner.
Issue: Did public respondent HRET commit grave abuse of
discretion in proceeding to decide the election protest based
on private respondent's "precinct level document based
anomalies/evidence" theory;
191 Lerias v. Rosette Yniguez Lerias (Petitioner) filed her certificate of
HRET (1991) candidacy as official candidate of UPP-KBL for the
position of Representative for the district of Southern
Leyte. Roger Mercado (Respondent) was the administration
undisputedly admitted as evidence mere photocopies of
election-related documents when there is not even the
slightest showing that the original or even certified true
copies thereof cannot be reasonably produced before the
Tribunal. These photocopies violate the best evidence
rule.
There 2 mandatory requisites for the annulment of
election returns based on fraud, irregularities or terrorism,
namely (1) that more than fifty percent (50%) of the total
number of votes in the precinct or precincts were involved,
and (2) that the votes must be shown to have been
affected or vitiated by such fraud, irregularities or
terrorism.
In this case Public respondent HRET proceeded to
annul 50,000 votes without a dint of compliance with
these requisites.
Additionally, public respondent HRET disregarded election
results on several precincts on the basis of omissions
committed either through mere oversight or plain
negligence on the part of election officials or employees.
These omissions, mainly administrative in nature, cannot
be used as a ground to nullify election results in the
absence of a clear showing of fraud.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
hereby GRANTED, and public respondent HRET's
majority decision is SET ASIDE.
Yes. In an election contest, the best and most conclusive
evidence are the ballots themselves. But where the ballots
cannot be produced or are not available, the election
returns would be the best evidence.
286!
candidate for the same position. During the canvassing of
votes of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC), not
including the ballots from Libagon which had been questioned
by Mercado on the ground that allegedly it had been tampered
with, petitioner and respondent got the two highest votes:
Mercado – 34,422 and Lerias – 34,128.
However, when it came to including the votes from
Libagon, the results differed with Mercado having 35,793
votes and Lerias with 35,939. However, the PBC ruled that
their copy of the certificate of canvass contained erasures,
alterations and superimpositions and therefore, cannot be
used as basis of the canvass.
The PBC simply rejected the explanation of the members of
the municipal board of canvassers of Libagon that said
corrections were made to correct honest clerical mistakes
which did not affect the integrity of the certificate and said
corrections were made in the presence of the watchers of all
the nine (9) candidates for the position, including those of
Mercado who offered no objection.
Lerias made an appeal to COMELEC asking that the copy of
the certificate of canvass for Libagon be used by PBC
Counsel since both Lerias and Mercado agreed to use the
COMELEC copy of the said certificate as long as it is
authentic. In the end, Lerias only received 1,411 votes
which is less than that stated in the copy of PBC.
Lerias filed for a petition to COMELEC reconsideration at
first, then when it was not heeded, she filed another case
of annulment of proclamation. Respondent tried to reply by
asserting Lerias used fraudulent means in elections but
before the initial hearing, there were unidentified armed
men who went to the municipal building of Libagon who
Case in point, the Comelec and HRET must exercise
extreme caution in rejecting returns and may do so
only upon exhaustive investigation as to the
authenticity of the said document.
In light with this, under the best evidence rule, "there can
be no evidence of a writing, the contents of which are the
subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself"
It would appear that the Court sustained the use of the
COMELEC’s copy of the certificate of canvass instead of
the copy of the provincial board of canvassers only to
establish prima facie (but not actually) the winner, without
prejudice to a more judicious and unhurried determination
in an election protest, and because Lerias' through
counsel had previously agreed conditionally and
qualifiedly to its tentative use for pre-proclamation
proceedings.
The decision of this court was merely an affirmance of
the action of the COMELEC and it cannot be relied
upon as a final adjudication on the merits, on the
issue of the genuiness and authenticity of the said
certificate of canvass. Besides, the use of said
COMELEC copy of the certificate of canvass by the board
of canvassers did not foreclose the right of Lerias to prove
that the votes attributed to have been received by her as
stated, in said certificate of canvass is not correct.
Acceptance of a certificate of canvass as genuine and
authentic for purposes of canvass simply means that said
certificate of canvass is genuine and authentic for the
purpose of determining the prima facie winner in the
election. But the very purpose of an election contest is to
287!
 raided and stole the ballot boxes which contained copies
of the election returns. The remaining boxes were
gathered by an HRET representative. During the case trial
in HRET, Lerias presented the original copies of the certificate
of canvass of the municipal and provincial board.
establish who is the actual winner in the election.
The Court then declares that petitioner Rosette Yniguez
Lerias is the duly elected representative of the Lone
District of the Province of Southern Leyte.

The election returns showed that she got a total of 1,811

votes. Mercado showed a photocopy of the canvass which
was different from the original. HRET rejected the election
returns presented by Lerias. There were doubts on the
authenticity of the election returns given that the original
copies were produced after the raid. However, after
another investigation and presentation of evidence it was
declared that Lerias was the winner.
The HRET majority, however, rejected the election returns
of Lerias and sustained the certificate of canvass.

Issue: Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of

discretion
192 Sandoval v. On 1 June 2001 respondent Oreta filed with HRET an election
HRET (2002) protest against petitioner, docketed as HRET Case No. 01-
027. The protest assailed the alleged electoral frauds and
anomalies in 1,308 precincts of the Malabon-Navotas
District. On 4 June 2001 HRET issued the corresponding
summons for service upon petitioner.
On 7 June 2001 HRET Process Server Pacifico Lim served
the summons by substituted service upon a certain Gene
Maga who signed the process server's copy of the
summons and indicated thereon his position as
“maintenance” along with the date and time of his receipt
thereof as of 7 June 2001 at 1:25 p.m.
For service of summons to be valid, it is necessary first to
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the summon and the
election protest MUST BE SERVED on a competent
person in charge of petitioner’s office.
The Court emphasizes that Maga, the maintenance, who
identified himself a staff of the petitioner does not ipso
facto render him competent to receive the summons.
Maga’s indisputable representation that he was a
maintenance man should have alerted the process server
to the fact that he had no authority to receive the
summons for petitioner Sandoval. By the virtue of the
function of a maintenance man, the process server could
have easily discerned the absence of authority of Maga to
receive documents.

288!
establish the following circumstances, i.e., (IES); (a)
impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time,
(b) efforts exerted to locate the petitioners and, (c) service
upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing therein
or some competent person in charge of his office or regular
place of business. It is also essential that the pertinent facts
proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service
or officer's return itself and only under exceptional terms may
they be proved by evidence. Petitioner is assailing that HRET
should receive his answer to the summon that he was given
despite it was late because he was not informed properly of
the summon. The question lies on who is allowed by law to
receive summons.
Issue: Whether the summons was improperly served
While it is not necessary that the person in charge of a
defendant’s regular place of business be specially
authorized to receive summons, it being enough that he
appears to be in charge, we do not think that anyone,
more so the process server, would be led to believe that
Maga has been entrusted the management of office
records to ensure the smooth flow of important
documents therein.
*Rationale: the person to receive should be competent
enough to receive them.
In the absence of even the barest compliance with the
procedure for substituted service of summons outlined in
the Rules of Court, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of public functions does not apply.
It is unmistakable that the process server hastily served
the summons upon petitioner Sandoval by substituted
service without first attempting to personally serve the
process. This violates the rule granting absolute
preference to personal service of summons and, only
secondarily, when the defendant cannot be promptly
served in person and after compliance with stringent
formal and substantive requirements, permitting resort to
substituted service.
In light of the defective and irregular substituted service of
summons, the HRET did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner and consequently the period
within which to file his answer with counter-protest did not
start to run.
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193 Lokin v. The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one
HRET (2010) of the organized groups duly registered under the party-list
system of representation that manifested their intent to
participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and
local elections. CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel
Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from
which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC
obtain the required number of qualifying votes. The nominees
were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner
Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin
Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang.
The nominees’ certificates of acceptance were attached to the
certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC. The list of nominees
was later published in two newspapers of general circulation,
The Philippine Star News and The Philippine Daily Inquirer.
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through
Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination, substitution
and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007,
whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and
Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the
nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus
included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje.
CIBAC president had changed the line-up and submitted it to
the COMELEC. This was allowed by CIBAC’S By-Laws.
COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition of Lokin that the
By-Laws even without consideration of the Board of CIBAC,
the president can change the nominees for Party-List
Representatives. Thus proclaiming Cruz-Gonzales as the
second nominee.
The COMELEC through Resolution Number 7804 amended
section 8 of RA 7941 to include the withdrawal by the party of
(1) YES, it is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. As a general rule, in
accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers, the
Legislature cannot surrender or abdicate its legislative
power, for doing so will be unconstitutional. Although the
power to make laws cannot be delegated by the
Legislature to any other authority, a power that is not
legislative in character may be delegated.
Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can delegate
to executive officers and administrative boards the
authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To be valid,
therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the
following requisites to be valid:
- Its promulgation must be authorized by the
Legislature;
- It must be within the scope of the authority given
by the Legislature;
- It must be promulgated in accordance with the
prescribed procedure; and
- It must be reasonable.
Whether Sec. 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not
is thus to be tested on the basis of whether the second
and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect that the
challenge of Lokin against Sec. 13 succeeds.
As earlier said, the delegated authority must be properly
exercised. This simply means that the resulting IRRs must
not be ultra vires as to be issued beyond the limits of the
authority conferred. It is basic that an administrative
agency cannot amend an act of Congress, for
administrative IRRs are solely intended to carry out, not to
supplant or to modify, the law. The administrative agency
issuing the IRRs may not enlarge, alter, or restrict the
290!
the nominee.
Issues: (1) Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is
unconstitutional and violates the Party-List System Act
(2) Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and
allowing the amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC
without any basis in fact or law and after the close of the polls,
and in ruling on matters that were intra-corporate in nature.
provisions of the law it administers and enforces, and
cannot engraft additional non-contradictory requirements
not contemplated by the Legislature.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only
persons who have given their consent in writing may be
named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate
of any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for
an elective office in the immediately preceding election.
No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees
shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted
to the COMELEC except where (a) the nominee dies, (b)
withdraws in writing his nomination, or (c) becomes
incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute
nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral
representatives in the House of Representatives who are
nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered
resigned.
(2) YES, they committed grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the amendment of nominees of CIBAC
without any basis in fact/law. RA 7941 (Party List Act)
deprives the party lists of the right to change its nominees
or alter the order of nominees once it is submitted to the
COMELEC EXCEPT WHEN: (1) nominee dies; (2)
nominee withdraws nomination in writing; or (3) nominee
becomes incapacitated.
Note that this enumeration is exclusive. Resolution No.
7804 (COMELEC) Sec. 13 provided a 4th instance when
order/names of nominees can be altered and that is “when
the nomination is withdrawn by the party.” Thus,
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
expanding to 4 the 3 grounds for substituting a nominee.
291!
194 Sema v. The Provincial Board of Canvassers of Shariff Kabunsuan
HRET (2010) proclaimed protestee Didagen P. Dilangalen as
Representative of the Lone District of Shariff Kabunsuan
with Cotabato City. Protestant Bai Sandra S.A. Sema, a
congressional candidate of the Lakas-CMD only obtained
87,237 votes thereby having an 18,345-vote difference from
protestee Dilangalen, who obtained 105,582 votes. Protestant
Sema is protesting a total of 195 precincts of the Municipality
of Datu Odin Sinsuat of the Lone District of Shariff Kabunsuan
with Cotabato City.
On September 10, 2009, the HRET issued the assailed
decision. The HRET found that majority of the ballots in the
195 protested precincts of Datu Odin Sinsuat were rejected as
fake or spurious ballots since they did not contain security
features described by Commissioner Resurreccion Borra of
the Commission on Elections. It was also pointed out that
“reports on Revision Results, duly signed by both parties’
revisors, showed that during the revision, all the ballot boxes
in the 195 protested precincts of Datu Odin Sinsuat had no-
locking metal seals, thus it cannot be conclusively stated, that
the ballot boxes at the time that they were opened for revision
purposes were in the same condition as they were when
closed by the Chairman and Members of the Board of Election
Inspectors (BEI) after the completion of the canvassing
proceedings.”
The Tribunal conducted a revision of ballots in all the
contested precincts and eventually discovered that only one
out of the 248 allot boxes of the counter-protested precincts
contained ballots. The rest were empty. HRET relied on
election returns and other election documents rather than the
ballots themselves in determining who really won in the May
14, 2007 congressional elections for the Lone District of
(1) NO, majority of the ballots in the 195 precincts of Datu
Odin Sinsuat were rejected as fake ballots because it did
not contain any security features described by the
COMELEC. It was also pointed out that "Reports on
Revision Results, duly signed by both parties' revisors,
showed that during the revision, all the ballot boxes in the
195 protested precincts of Datu Odin Sinsuat had no self-
locking metal seals, thus, it cannot be conclusively stated,
that the ballot boxes at the time that they were opened for
revision purposes were in the same condition as they
were when closed by the Chairman and Members of the
Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) after the completion of
the canvassing proceedings.
HRET also ruled that petitioner failed to prove by
convincing evidence that the election itself, conducted on
May 14, 2007, was tainted by fraud and irregularities that
frustrated the will of the electorate. The HRET concluded
that the ballots and/or ballot boxes must have been
tampered with after the elections and the counting and
canvassing of votes. Thus, the HRET relied on the
election returns and other election documents to arrive at
the number of votes validly cast for petitioner and
respondent Dilangalen.
(2) NO, as a general rule is, if what is being questioned is
the correctness of the number of votes for each candidate,
the best and most conclusive evidence is the ballots
themselves. However, this rule applies only if the
ballots are available and their integrity has been
preserved from the day of elections until revision. When
the ballots are unavailable or cannot be produced, then
recourse can be made to untampered and unaltered
election returns or other election documents as evidence.
292!
 Shariff Kabunsuan w/ Cotabato City. Petitioner questions the
decision of HRET in using the electoral returns if the ballots
are present.
Issues: (1) Whether the respondent HRET committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in ruling that petitioner had not successfully proven by
convincing evidence that the contested election was attended
by frauds and irregularities when the petitioner presented
overwhelming evidence of fraud exemplified by the discovery
during revision of the numerous spurious ballots for
respondent Dilangalen inside the ballot boxes.
(2) Whether the respondent HRET gravely abused its
discretion in a manner amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it ruled that the spurious ballots containing
votes for respondent Dilangalen that were found inside the
ballot boxes during revision proceedings were introduced into
said ballot boxes after, and not during the elections, when
such deduction was not supported by any of respondent
Dilangalen's evidence, thereby deviating from the basic rule
that when what is involved is the correctness of the number of
votes of each candidate, the best and most conclusive
evidence are the ballots themselves.
195 Duenas v. Petitioner Henry "Jun" Dueñas, Jr. and private respondent
HRET (2010) Angelito "Jett" P. Reyes were rival candidates for the position
of congressman in the 2nd legislative district of Taguig City in
the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections.
After the canvass of the votes, petitioner was proclaimed the
winner, having garnered 28,564 votes as opposed to private
respondent’s 27,107 votes.
Not conceding defeat, private respondent filed an election
protest ad cautelam. He prayed for a recount in 170 of the 732
Thus, as concluded by the HRET, when said ballot boxes
were opened for revision purposes, they could not be said
to be in the same condition as they were when closed by
the Chairman and Members of the BEI after the
completion of the canvassing proceedings. Nothing on
record shows that the election returns, tally sheets and
other election documents that the HRET had on hand had
been tampered or altered. Since it is undisputed that there
are hardly any valid or authentic ballots upon which the
HRET could base its determination of the number of votes
cast for each of the parties, the HRET merely acted in
accordance with settled jurisprudence when it resorted to
untampered and/or unaltered election returns and other
election documents as evidence of such votes. In sum,
there is no showing whatsoever that the HRET
committed grave abuse of discretion.
No. Under the rule used by HRET:
RULE 88. Pilot Precincts; Initial Revision. — Any
provision of these Rules to the contrary notwithstanding,
as soon as the issues in any contest before the Tribunal
have been joined, it may direct and require the protestant
and counter-protestant, in case the protest or counter-
protest involves more than 50% of the total number of
precincts in the district, to state and designate in writing
within a fixed period at most twentyfive (25%) percent of
the total number of precincts involved in the protest or
293!
precincts in the 2nd legislative district of Taguig City. He
alleged that he was cheated in the protested precincts through
insidious and well-orchestrated electoral frauds and anomalies
which resulted in the systematic reduction of his votes and the
corresponding increase in petitioner’s votes. Evidences from
the contending parties were submitted to the HRET after the
revision of 100% of the protested ballots (private
respondent’s) and 25% of the counter-protested ballots
(petitioner’s). The case was then submitted for resolution upon
submission by the parties of their memoranda.
In order dated September 25, 2008, HRET wanted the
continuation of the revision because it cannot yet determine
the true will of the electorate. HRET submitted to augment his
cash deposit in the amount of P320,000 (320k) to cover the
expenses of the revision of ballots in the remaining 75%
counter-protested precincts within a non-extendible period of
ten days from notice.
Instead of complying with the cash deposit amount, 320k, to
cover the expenses of the revision of the ballots, petitioner
filed an urgent motion to withdraw/abandon the remaining
75% counter-protested precincts. HRET wanted and order the
continuation of the revision of ballots and ordered the use of
its own funds instead for the revision of the remaining 75%
counter-protested precincts.
It issued Resolution No. 08-353 dated November 27, 2008,
the HRET invoked Rule 88 of the HRET Rules and settled
jurisprudence, ruling that it had the discretion either to dismiss
the protest or counter-protest, or to continue with the revision
if necessitated by reasonable and sufficient grounds affecting
the validity of the election. This was with the end in view of
ascertaining the true choice of the electorate.
counter-protest, as the case may be, which said party
deems as best exemplifying or demonstrating the electoral
irregularities or frauds pleaded by him; and the revision of
the ballots and/or reception of evidence shall begin with
such pilot precincts designated. Upon the termination of
such initial revision and/or reception of evidence, which
presentation of evidence should not exceed ten (10) days,
and based upon what reasonably appears therefrom as
affecting or not the officially-proclaimed results of the
contested election, the Tribunal may direct motu propio (of
its own accord) the continuation of the revision of ballots in
the remaining contested precincts, or dismiss the protest,
or the counter-protest, without further proceedings
The Supreme Court ruled that based on the HRET Rules,
HRET reserved itself the discretion to continue or
discontinue the process. As provided in the Constitution,
HRET has the power to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the House of Representatives, any final
action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction
shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court.
When jurisdiction is conferred by law on a court or
tribunal, that court or tribunal, unless otherwise provided
by law, is deemed to have the authority to employ all writs,
processes and other means to make its power effective.
Where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined,
every particular power necessary for the exercise of one
or the performance of the other is also conferred. Since
the HRET possessed the authority to motu propio (of his
own accord) continue a revision of ballots, it also had the
authority to carry it out. It thus ordered the disbursement
of its own funds for the revision of the ballots in the
remaining counter-protested precincts. In Rule 7 of the
294!

The petitioner is assailing HRET committed a grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the continuation of the revision of the
ballots despite the petitioner’s withdrawal/abandonment of the
ballots and the use of its funds for the expenses of the
revision of the ballots.
Issues: (1) Whether the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) committed grave abuse of discretion when it
denied petitioner Henry Jun Dueas, Jr.s motion to withdraw or
abandon his remaining 75% counter-protested precincts and;
(2) Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion
when it ordered that its own funds be used for the revision of
the ballots from said 75% counter-protested precincts.
HRET Rules provides that the HRET has exclusive
control, direction and supervision of its functions. The
HRET’s order was but one aspect of its power. The
petitioner’s contention then would in turn deprive HRET’s
constitutional guaranteed of control and jurisdiction.
(2) No. Certainly, the HRETs order that its own funds be
used for the revision of the ballots from the 75% counter-
protested precincts was an exercise of a power necessary
or incidental to the accomplishment of its primary function
as sole judge of election protest cases involving its
members.

Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman,
twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie.
The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within
thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The
Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
Political Alignments (Daza v. Singson)
The House of Representatives may change its representation in the
Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that
may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is
understood that such changes must be permanent and do not
include temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving
severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent
shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
Proportional Representation (Coseteng v. Mitra)
The appointment of the House’s membership in the Commission on
Appointments is done on the basis of proportional representation of
the political parties therein. Even if KAIBA (a political party) were to
be considered as an opposition party, its lone member represents
only .4% or less than 1% of the House membership, hence, she is
not entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the Commission on
Appointments. To be able to claim proportional membership in the
Commission on Appointments, a political party should represent at
least 8.4% of the House membership.

295!
Undue reduction of representation of another party (Guingona v. may perform its functions and transact its business even if only 10
Gonzales) senators are elected thereto as long as quorum exists.

LDP was entitled to 7.5 members to sit on COA and was rounded to
8 giving Romulo of LDP a seat. LP was entitled to 0.5 seats so they
were given 1 seat. The SC said such rounding off is violative of the
Constitution because it should be based on proportional
representation. And if t it uses this method to increase their share by
decreasing other party’s representation. Furthermore, the
Constitution does not mandate that all 12 seats in COA should
be filled. They may perform their functions as long as there is the
required quorum, usually a majority of its membership. The COA

Section 18. Commission on Appointments – Composition, Nature, Functions

196 Daza v. Singson After the elections, the HoR proportionally apportioned its twelve (1) No. In Tanada v. Cuenco, it was held: …the term
(1989) seats in the Commission on Appointments (CoA) among several "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what
political parties represented in that chamber, in accordance to it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
Article VI, Section 18. policy. In other words ... it refers "to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
One of the appointed members is Raul A. Daza, representative the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
of the Liberal Party (LP). On September 16, 1988, there came a which full discretionary authority has been delegated
political realignment where 24 members of the Liberal Party to the Legislature or executive branch of the
joined Laban Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), it left Liberal Party Government." It is concerned with issues dependent
with only 17 members. The HoR revised its representation and upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
removed Hon. Daza and placed Hon. Luis Singson in measure.
accordance to the proportional representation of the political
parties. The Court has the competence to act on the matter
at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not a
The petitioner then contends that he cannot be removed from discretionary act of the House of Representatives
CoA because his appointment is permanent under the that may not be reviewed by us because it is political
announced doctrine in Cunanan v. Tan. In that case, the in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not
petitioner claims that the appointment is political in nature and is the wisdom. This power is under Art. VIII, §1 of the
not within the power of the HOR. Similarly, the petitioner avers Constituton.
that the case is not within the jurisdiction of the Court as it is

296!
political in nature.
Issues: (1) Whether the issue is a political question.
(2) Whether there is a valid reorganization of the CoA.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Given then the case is a legal question on whether
there is a proper appointment in CoA of officials
base on the Constitution’s requirement of
proportional representation, then the Court has
jurisdiction.
(2) Yes. Although not specifically discussed, the
same disposition was made in Cunanan v. Tan as it
likewise involved the manner or legality of the
organization of the Commission on Appointments,
not the wisdom or discretion of the House in the
choice of its representatives.
In said case, 25 members of the Nacionalista party
members defected from their party and formed the
“Allied Majority” because of their discontent over the
leadership of the House. The court held in said case
that there is no need to readjust the CoA
representation of Nacionalista since it viewed the
Allied Majority as merely temporary combination of
the Nacionalista defectors. The court also claims that
the defectors had not disaffiliated from their party
and permanently joined the new political group.
Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista
Party. The reorganization of the Commission on
Appointments was invalid because it was not based
297!
on the proportional representation of the political
parties in the House of Representatives as required
by the Constitution.

In the present case, the petitioner used the Cunanan

case to say that changes in CoA that resulted from
political realignments are acceptable as long as they
are permanent. Thus, the petitioner contends that
the Court should not take cognizance of the LDP as
it as yet to achieve a permanent status. He said that
the change in heart of Congressmen of are not
permanent in nature as it may drastically change as
much as it was born in the first place.

That is why it is still justified for him to hold the

position in CoA unless that LDP has proven that
there is permanence in their political party by
showing that there is stability. He avers that even if
LDP has managed to register themselves as a
political party, there if there is no showing of it
“aging”, then it is not qualified.

The Court resolves that the issue is in favor of the

authority of the House of Representatives to change
its representation in the Commission on
Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that
may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership. It is understood that such changes
must be permanent and do not include the
temporary alliances or factional divisions not
involving severance of political loyalties or formal
disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from
one political party to another.

298!
197 Coseteng v. The congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in the
Mitra, Jr. (1990) election to the House of Representatives of the candidates of
diverse political parties such as the PDP-Laban, Lakas ng Bansa
(LB), Liberal Party (LP), NP-Unido, Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan
(KBL), Panaghiusa, Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan (KAIBA),
and some independents.
Petitioner Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng was the only
candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA. After the elections
for the Majority Floor Leader, the house elected their members
for the Commission on Appointments (CoA). After electing the 11
members, the House elected Minority Floor Leader, Honorable
Roque Ablan, Jr., KBL, as the twelfth member of the CoA,
representing the Coalesced Minority in the House.
A year later, on September 16, 1988, the "Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino" (LDP, for brevity) was organized as a
political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of
Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP hence the need
also to change the CoA to reflect the proportional representation.
Petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra
requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as
a member of the CoA and House Electoral Tribunal. Her petition
was supported by 9 congressman that vouched for her.
However, when the CoA was changed to conform to political
alignments, Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th
member representing the House minority.
Issue: Whether the members of the House in the Commission on
Appointments were chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties therein as provided in
Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Yes. First of all, there is no political question and
even if there is, the Court could rule upon it if it’s a
matter of grave abuse of discretion.
Petition was dismissed for lack of merit because the
revision in House representation in CoA was based
on proportional representation.
The composition of the House membership shows
that there are 160 LDP members in the House,
comprising 79% of the House membership. This
granted them a rounded-up 10 seats in the CA and
left the remaining two to LP and KBL as the next
largest parties.
KAIBA, being an apparent member of the
Coalesced Majority, is bound by the majority
choices. Even if KAIBA were an opposition party,
its lone member Coseteng represents .4% or less
than 1% of the House membership and, hence,
does not entitle her a seat in the 12 House seats in
CA.
Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are
inconsequential because they are not members of
her party and they signed identical endorsements
for her rival, Cong. Verano-Yap.
299!
198 Guingona, Jr. v. The elections yielded the following ratios for political parties that
Gonzales (1992) managed to have their candidates win the elections: LDP- 15
senators; NPC- 5 senators; LAKAS-NUCD- 3 senators; LP-PDP-
LABAN- 1 senator.
According to the rules agreed by the parties, the CoA
proportional representation should be decided by this
mathematical formula:
No. of senators of a political party x 12 seats
––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total no. of senators elected
Resulted in the following percentage - LDP-7.5 members; NPC-
2.5 members; LAKAS-NUCD-1.5 members; LP-PDP-LABAN-.5
members. Seeing the percentages, Senator Romulo in his
capacity as Majority Floor Leader nominated, for and in his
behalf of the LDP, eight (8) senators for membership in the
Commission on Appointments.
However the election of 8 members of LDP was questioned. To
resolve the impasse, a temporary compromise was made
wherein LDP still got 8 members and the rest were rounded
down thus resulting in NPC having 2 and LP-PDP-LABAN
and LAKAS-NUCD Party both with 1 each. These temporary
assignment of numbers will be changed once the Supreme
Court resolves the issue.
Thus as strongly opposed to such matters, Teofisto Guingona.
Jr., in his behalf and in behalf of Lakas-National Union of
Christian Democrats (LAKAS-NUCD), filed a petition recognizing
the invalid the membership of Senators Alberto Romulo as
the eight senator elected by the LDP, and Wigberto E.
Tañada, as the lone member representing the LP-PDP-
No. Given that the mathematical formula was
already agreed upon, the problem is what to do with
the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is
entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a
fractional half membership into a whole membership
of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be
able to elect Senator Romulo. In so doing one other
party's fractional membership was correspondingly
reduced leaving the latter's representation in the
Commission on Appointments to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate.
This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is
no longer in compliance with its mandate that
membership in the Commission be based on the
proportional representation of the political parties.
The election of Senator Romulo gave more
representation to the LDP and reduced the
representation of one political party – either the
LAKAS-NUCD or the NPC.
For LP-PDP-LABAN that garnered only .5
percentage, the Court rules that their representative,
Senator Tañada, is entitled to a seat. He has a right
to be elected as a member of the Commission on
Appointments because of: (a) the physical
impossibility of dividing a person, so that the
fractional membership must be rounded up into one
senator; (b) being the sole elected senator of his
party, his party is entitled to be represented in
the Commission on Appointments; (c) having
been elected senator, rounding up into one full
senator his fractional membership is consistent
with the provision and spirit of the Constitution
300!
LABAN, in the Commission on Appointments, on the ground
that the proposed compromise of Senator Tolentino was
violative of the rule of proportional representation, and that it
is the right of the minority political parties in the Senate,
consistent with the Constitution, to combine their fractional
representation in the Commission on Appointments to complete
one seat therein, and to decide who, among the senators in their
ranks, shall be additionally nominated and elected thereto.
Issue: Whether the election of Senators Alberto Romulo and
Wigberto E. Tañada as members of the Commission on
Appointments is in accordance with the provision of Section 18
of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
and would be in full accord with the principle of
republicanism that emphasizes democracy.
th
We find the respondent’s action of electing an 8
senator for their party violative of the Section 18 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. No party can
claim more than what it is entitled to under such rule.
To allow it to elect more than its proportional share
of members is to confer upon such a party a greater
share in the membership in the Commission on
Appointments and more power to impose its will on
the minority, who by the same token, suffers a
diminution of its rightful membership in the
Commission.
However despite what is stated above Wigberto E.
Tañada cannot sit in the CoA. The court believes
that it is mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the
Commission on Appointments. The Constitution
does not contemplate that the Commission on
Appointments must necessarily include 12
senators and 12 members of the House of
Representatives.
What the Constitution requires is that there be at
least a majority of the entire membership. Under
Section 18, the Commission shall rule by majority
vote of all the members. Even Section 10 Chapter 3
of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments,
provides as follows: The presence of at least thirteen
(13) members is necessary to constitute a quorum.
Provided, however, that at least four (4) of the
members constituting the quorum should come from
either house. This is a common practice that even
301!

199 Guingona, Jr. v. Senator Wigberto E. Tañada et al. files for a reconsideration of
Gonzales (1992) our decision dated October 20, 1992. He claims that the the
(MR) decision ignored the reality of the multi-party system recognized
both by the letter and spirit of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions
Issue: Whether the decision was erroneous.
Constitutionally given committees do in fact follow
and these instances may be mentioned of
Constitutional collegial bodies which perform their
composition is expressly specified by the
Constitution. Among these are the Supreme Court,
CSC, COMELEC, COA. They perform their function
so long and there is the required quorum, usually a
majority of its membership.
Even if Senator Tañada would not be able sit in the
Commission on Appointments, the LP-LDP-LABAN
would still be represented in the Commission by
congressman Ponce Enrile who has become a
member of the LP. On the other hand, there is
nothing to stop any of the political party in order to fill
up the two vacancies resulting from this decision.
No. Although on the basis of the rule on proportional
representation, each of the political parties should be
represented. The problem is what to do with the
fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is
entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a
fractional half membership into a whole membership
of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be
able to elect Senator Romulo.
This is violative of the Constitution as it gave more
representation to LDP. The proportional
representation allows a check to the majority party.
Thus giving more shares will defeat this purpose.
We have declared that the Constitution does not
require that the full complement of 12 Senators be
elected to the membership in the Commission on
Appointments before it can discharge its functions
302!
and that it is not mandatory to elect 12 Senators to
the Commission. The overriding directive of Article
VI, Section 18 is that there must be a proportional
representation is just the maximum complement
allowable under the Constitution.

This is evidenced by Article VI, Section 18 which

deals with the Commission on Appointments,
provides that "the Commission shall rule by majority
vote of all the members", and in Section 19 of the
same Article, it is provided that the Commission
"shall meet only while Congress is in session, at the
call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members,
to discharge such powers and functions as are
herein conferred upon it". In implementing these
provisions, the Rules of the Commission on
Appointments provide that the presence of at least
thirteen (13) members is necessary to constitute a
quorum, "Provided however, that at least four (4) of
the members constituting the quorum should come
from either house". Thus even if the composition of
the Commission is fixed by the Constitution, it can
perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so
long as it has the required quorum, which is less
than the full complement fixed by the Constitution.

Even if respondent Senator Tañada is excluded, the

Commission will still function in accordance to the
Constitution.

303!
Section 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on
Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the Senate
and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with
the election of the President and the Speaker. The Commission on
Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at
the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge
such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it.
" The Commission must act on all appointments submitted to
it within 30 session days from submission.
" The commission shall decide by a majority vote
" The commission can meet and act ONLY when Congress is
in session.
Section 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress
shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law,
and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which
shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and
expenses incurred for each Member.
Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of
its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
The inherent power to contempt along belongs to Congress
(Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative v. Sangguniang
Panglungsod)
The power is recognized as inherent in Congress as a matter of self-
preservation of one of the three independent and coordinate
branches of government. It is sui generis and may not be claimed by
local legislative bodies.
Who may be summoned (Senate Blue Ribbon v. Judge Majaducon)
Anyone except the President and Justices of the Supreme Court
may be summoned. The courts can neither prevent a witness from
appearing in such hearings.
Senate v. Ermita
" Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still
recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall
under the rubric of “executive privilege.”
" When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way
for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is a by a valid
claim of privilege. They are not exempted by mere fact that they are
department heads.
" Section 1 of E.O. 46 in view of its specific reference to
Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any
reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as
limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the
question hour contemplated in said Section 22, but could not be
applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. The requirement to secure presidential consent under
Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is
valid on its face
" When an official is being summoned by Congress on a
matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive
privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the
President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for
invoking the privilege.
Executive Privilege
It has been defined as “the power of Government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the Congress,” as well as
“the right of the President and high-level executive branch offices to
withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the
public.”
304!
Nature of the Information
Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the Courts,
or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of
information of a sensitive character. The extraordinary character of
the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily
against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
Privilege as to a class of persons
Privilege is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of
information and not to categories of persons.
Claims of privilege
Due respect for a co-equal branch of government demands no less
than a claim of privilege clearly stating the grounds therefor.
Attendance of military officers (Guidani v. Senga)
The President has constitutional authority to prevent a member of
the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry, by virtue
of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a
military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military
justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the
appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the
President has adequate remedies under law to compel such
attendance. The President may be commanded by judicial order to
compel the attendance of the military officer.
Requisites of Inquiry under Sec. 21 (Bengzon v. Senate Blue
Ribbon)
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquires in aid of
legislation is not absolute or unlimited. The investigation must be:
1. In aid legislation
2. In accordance with its duly published rules of procedure
3. The rights of persons appearing or affected by such inquires
shall be respected. (The right to due process and the right against
self-incrimination).
Inquiry must be in aid of legislation (De la Paz v. Senate)
De la Paz went with a delegation representing the government in
Moscow. On their way back he was found in the airport with $45k
Euros, he was allowed to return to the Philippines but the money was
confiscated. Upon his return he was subpoenaed by the Senate
Committee for investigation. He claimed lack of jurisdiction because
it did not involve foreign relations and so they could not pass upon it.
The SC ruled however it did involve foreign relations since under
Senate rules all matters relating to relations of the Philippines with
other nations will be under the jurisdiction on the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations. The Moscow incident could create other
consequences toward the Philippines and its relation to other
countries and our obligation with the international community to
comply with our international obligations. Furthermore, the Senate
has decided that legislative inquiry will be jointly conducted with the
Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations). The Senate Rules mandate the Blue
Ribbon to conduct investigation on all matters relating to
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance in office by officers of
the government. The petitioner as a retired PNP General and a
member of the delegation had with him millions of public funds.
Romero v. Estrada (2009)
A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings
have different purposes. On-going judicial proceedings do not
preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation.
Court has NO authority to PROHIBIT a Senate Committee from
requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an
305!
inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure.
Neri v. Senate
" The right of Congress or any of its committees to obtain
information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people’s
right to public information.
" The right to information must be balanced with and should
give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional percepts.
" Congress must no require the executive to state the reasons
for the claim of privilege with such particularity as to compel
disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect
" The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is broad. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in
accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of
procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected
by such inquires must be respected.
Elements of presidential communications privilege (citing U.S.
v. Nixon)
1. The protected communication must relate to a
“quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”
2. The communication must be authored or “solicited and
received” by a close advisor of the President or the President
himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational
proximity” with the President.
3. The presidential communications privilege remains a
qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate
need such that the information sought “likely contains important
evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.
# The Senate cannot immediately cite a witness in contempt
when that witness is not unwilling to testify, but refuses to answer a
question upon orders of the president to invoke executive privilege.
The Senate must first rule on the validity of the claim of privilege.
# To cite him in contempt without determining the validity of
the claim is arbitrary and violative of his rights.
Power to Punish a Person under Investigation (Arnault v.
Nazareno)
Since the Court has no power to determine what legislation to
approve or not to approve, it cannot say that the information sought
from a witness which is material to the subject of the legislative
inquire is immaterial to any proposed or possible legislation. It is not
within the province of the Court to determine or imagine what
legislative measures Congress may take after the completion of the
legislative investigation.
Limit to imprisonment for contempt (Arnault v. Nazareno)
There is no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body
(Senate) to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not
to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body.
While the existence of the House of Representatives is limited to four
years, the Senate is not so limited,
The Senate a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon
the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of
Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to
punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally
be exerted. The detention should not be too long as to violate the
witness’ right to due process of law.
The Court, however, notes had resolution of contempt been adopted
by the House of Representatives, it could be enforced until the final
adjournment of the last session coinciding with Lopez v. De los
Reyes.
306!
Why does Congress have the power to cite witnesses in
contempt? Rules for investigation must be published (Garcillano v. House of
The power of inquiry with process to enforce it -- is an essential and Representatives)
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body The requisite for publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information basic requirements of due process. Public is indeed imperative, for it
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the for the transgression of a law or rule which he had no notice
requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
be afforded to others who possess it Experience has shown that
mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also The absence of any amendment to the rules published some years
that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or ago cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and
complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what unambiguous language of Article VI, Section 21. The organic law
is needed. (Arnault v. Nazareno) instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly
Sabio v. Gordon published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction
An inquiry in aid of legislation was conducted due to losses incurred whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision.
by the PHILCOMSAT because of improprieties in the operation of The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over
their Board of Directors. Sabio of the PCGG was asked to attend but any custom, practice, or tradition followed by the Senate.
he declined due to prior commitment and invoke Sec. 4 of EO 1 that
said that no member of the Commission will be required to testify in
any proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance. The
SC held that Section 4 (b) is repugnant with Article VI, Section 21,
and thus cannot be upheld. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG
member and staff from the Congress’ power of inquiry. This cannot
be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision
granting such exemption. The Congress’ power of inquiry, being
broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It
even extends “to government agencies created by Congress and
officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate
or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class.

Congress may keep a contumacious witness in detention until the

legislative body ceases to exist upon its final adjournment.

307!
 Section 21. Legislative Investigations
I. Power of Inquiry
200 Senate v. Ermita In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Section 1 is VALID but Section 2 and 3 of E.O 464 are
(2006) Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, unconstitutional. The Congress power of inquiry is
conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation expressly recognized in Article VI, Section 21 of the
which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and Constitution.
employees of the executive department, bureaus, and
offices including those employed in Government Owned In Arnault v. Nazareno, when the Congress was still
and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the unicameral, the Congress asked for the attendance of
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police Mr. Arnault for some anomalous purchase of the
(PNP). On Sept. 21 to 23, 2005, the Senate called for the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Rural
attendance of various Executive Officials as resource Progress Administration. He refused to go to the
speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of investigation. The Court held that the power of
North Luzon Railways Corporation Group (herein referred inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential
as North Rail Project) in order to help in investigating an and appropriate auxillary to the legislative function.
alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of Often, voluntary information are inaccurate or
the contract covered in the said project. incomplete that is why compulsion is necessary.

Likewise, the Senate also issued invitations, through the
Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, for
some officials of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) to be resource speakers, in aid of legislation,
inquiring on the “Gloriagate Scandal” and the alleged
Wiretapping of the President of the Philippines
(Referring to the Garci tapes).
Gen. Senga sent a letter in September 27 to postpone the
said hearing due to some pressing needs he needs to
attend and likewise Executive Secretary Ermita requested
the same for he believes he needs time to review the
issues in the meeting. ON SEPTEMBER 28, 2005,
PRESIDENT ISSUED EO 464 “Ensuring Observance of
the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the
Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of
The Congress has the power to investigate the
operations of the executive branch so it would be
incongruous to hold that it does not hold the same power
to its executive officials who are tasked to do executive
operations.
The concern about Legislative’s power to abuse such
rights is diminished by the safeguards that it has set
within itself in conducting such investigation. As Section
21 states, rights of the people investigated are to be
respected. The invitation also specifically states who are
the person concerned and the subject matter of the
inquiry. The investigation of the said persons are also
under the rules of conduct made by Congress that was
published beforehand. Finally, they are remediable
before the court and proceedings thereto are accorded

308!
Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other
Purposes”
“It prohibits Department heads, Senior officials of
executive departments who in the judgment of the
department heads are covered by the executive privilege;
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of
the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in
the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the
executive privilege; Senior national security officials who
in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are
covered by the executive privilege; and such other officers
as may be determined by the President, from appearing in
such hearings conducted by Congress without first
securing the president’s approval.”
After the issuance of the said E.O., Gen. Senga refused to
go to the investigation due to their non-acquisition of
consent necessary for such Congressional investigation.
For Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen Gudani who pushed
through with the event, they were severely reprimanded
by President Arroyo for defying the EO 464 by removing
them from their position and were made to face court
martial proceedings. For the North Rail Transport,
investigation, Exec. Sec. Ermita and other members did
not push through with the investigation.
Issue: Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry
of Congress.
judicial sanction.
RE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: Compared to Section 21
however, Section 22 of Article VI is called the “question
hour”. In such cases, Section 22 in comparison to
Section 21 grants the Congress the power to inquire in
pursuit of its oversight functions (Section 22) as
compared to those made in legislation (Section 21).
Usually, the question here is how officials are
implementing certain statutes, which makes them in
the said investigation report to the legislative. This
practice is unusual since supposedly, executive
departments should only report to the Executive for
their functions.
This is called the question hour. In such cases, Section
22 in comparison to Section 21 grants the Congress to
inquire in pursuit of its oversight functions. Usually, the
question here is how officials are implementing
certain statutes, which makes them in the certain
investigation report to the legislative, which is
unusual since they only report to the executive for
their functions. In cases of question hour, the executive
officer may refuse to go and this rationale is based on the
separation of powers given such inquiry is not in aid of
legislation and does not contravene the legislative
powers of Congress. Thus under Section 22, executive
heads are exempt from the question hour by validly
claiming privilege but not because of their position.
Though the only officers exempted by position is the
President (except in impeachment cases) and the
members of Supreme Court, in due respect to their equal
309!
power.

Section 1 of the EO 464 invokes the Article VI, Section

22 of the Constitution that grants them a power to inquire
not for purposes of “in aid of legislation”.

Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22

of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any
reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be
construed as limited in its application to appearances of
department heads in the question hour contemplated in
the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading
is dictated by the basic rule of construction.

Section 3 requires all officials in Section 2 (b) to secure

the consent of the President prior appearing to the
Congress. It claims that various officials who in the
judgment of the heads of offices designated in the same
section are covered by the executive privilege. This
includes the officers that may be determined by the
President.

The determination of this matter is based on the idea of

being covered by the “executive privilege” which means
that it is up to the President to determine who is the
person who has “information” worthy of being covered by
the executive privilege.

However, in the letter given by Exec. Sec. Ermita, he

does not specify under what subject does the executive
privilege is considered that is whether the secret that is
kept is for whether military, diplomatic, etc. purposes.
Thus the Congress needs to know why such invocation
are proper and deprives of the Congress of its processes

310!

201 Gudani v. Senga Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) invited several
(2006) senior officers of the AFP to appear at a public hearing
before the Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security scheduled on 28 Sept. 2005. The hearing was
scheduled after topics concerning the conduct of the 2004
elections emerged in the public eye, particularly
allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of
copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone
conversation between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
and then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano.
(Garci tapes)
At the time of the 2004 elections, Petitioner Gen. Gudani
had been designated as commander, and co-petitioner
Col. Balutan a member, of Joint Task Force Ranao by the
AFP Southern Command. Joint Task Force Ranao was
tasked with the maintenance of peace and order during
the 2004 elections in the provinces of Lanao del Norte and
Lanao del Sur. Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan, and AFP Chief
of Staff Lieutenant General Generoso Senga were among
the several AFP officers who received a letter invitation
to investigate. There must be a formal claims since an
improper claim is like no claim at all. Although there is no
need for the claimant of executive privilege to give such
particularity of the confidential documents since it would
be counterintuitive to its purpose.
Thus, the claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O.
464 in relation to 2 (b) is invalid as it only requires
that there be consent without the necessity of a
rationale on why it must be considered as
confidential. It severely frustrates the power of the
inquiry of the Congress. However, Section 2 (a) as it
simply enumerates the ones covered in Section 2 is valid.
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional
authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-
in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who
defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At
the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks
the appearance before it of a military officer against the
consent of the President has adequate remedies under
law to compel such attendance. Any military official
whom Congress summons to testify before it may be
compelled to do so by the President. If the President is
not so inclined, the President may be commanded by
judicial order to compel the attendance of the military
officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of
the land which the President has the duty to faithfully
execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not
issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive
officials summoned by the legislature to attend a
congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized
the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and
311!
from Sen. Biazon to attend the 28 Sept. 2005 hearing.
On 26 Sept. 2005, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the
AFP issued a Memorandum directing Gudani and Balutan
to attend the 28 Sept. 2005 meeting. Gen. Senga wrote a
letter to Sen. Biazon, requesting the postponement of the
hearing scheduled for the following day. Then, on the
evening of 27 Sept. 2005, a message was transmitted to
the PMA Superintendent from the office of Gen. Senga
PGMA, NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE
ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING
WITHOUT HER APPROVAL.
The next day, before the hearing, Gen. Senga called
Commodore Tolentino on the latter’s cell phone and asked
to talk to Gen. Gudani, but Gen. Gudani refused. In
response, Gen. Senga instructed Commodore Tolentino to
inform Gen. Gudani that it was an order, yet Gen. Gudani
still refused to take Gen. Senga’s call.
A few hours after Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had
concluded their testimony, the office of Gen. Senga issued
a statement which noted that the two had appeared before
the Senate Committee in spite of the fact that a guidance
has been given that a Presidential approval. The two were
held to have disobeyed a legal order, in violation of
A[rticles of] W[ar] 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior
Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court
Martial proceedings.
Issue: Whether the President has the authority to issue an
order to the members of the AFP preventing them from
testifying before a legislative inquiry.
affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on
specified grounds. However, the ability of the President
to prevent military officers from testifying before
Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the
Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to
control the actions and speech of members of the armed
forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-
chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in
executive privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow
members of the military to appear before Congress is still
subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes
as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised
for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as
commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the
President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to
conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come
to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway
despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is
aware that with its pronouncement today that the
President has the right to require prior consent from
members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom
or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as
commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the
military officers before Congress. Even if the President
has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing
before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is
nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the
courts.
312!
 II. Nature and essence
202 Neg. O. II Elec. In 1985, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Dumaguete No. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete
Coop v. sought to conduct an investigation in connection with possess delegated legislative power. So that is why in
Sangguniang pending legislation related to the operations of public the same way, they are treated similar to Congress. Thus
Panlungsod utilities. Invited in the hearing were the heads of NORECO in this case, although the Constitution does not expressly
(1991) II (Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc.) namely vest Congress with the power to punish non-members for
Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac. The inquiry was to legislative contempt, the power has nevertheless been
focus on the alleged installation and use by the petitioner invoked by the legislative body as a means of preserving
NORECO II of inefficient power lines in that city. its authority and dignity in the same way that courts wield
an inherent power to "enforce their authority, preserve
Torres and Umbac refused to appear before the SP and their integrity, maintain their dignity, and ensure the
they alleged the respondent SP of Dumaguete is bereft of effectiveness of the administration of justice.”
the power to compel the attendance and testimony of
witnesses, nor they have the power to order the arrest of In the case of Arnault v. Nazareno, when the witness
witnesses who fail to obey its subpoena. It is further called by the Congress refused to reveal the person he
argued that assuming the power to compel the attendance gave the 440k of money in question. The Senate then
and testimony of witnesses to be lodged in said body, it filed a contempt case against him. The court upheld the
cannot be exercised in the investigation of matters said power of the Senate and said:
affecting the terms and conditions of the franchise granted
to NORECO II which are beyond the jurisdiction of the SP. The power of inquiry is an essential legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in
Petitioners also claim that the SP does not have the power the absence of information respecting the conditions
to order the arrest of witnesses who fail to obey its which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and
subpoena. where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information — which is not infrequently true —
Issue: Whether LGUs can issue contempt. recourse must be had to others who possess it.
Experience has shown that mere requests for such
information are often unavailing, and also that information
which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete;
so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what
is needed.

The power to punish recalcitrant witnesses must be

considered implied or incidental to the exercise of

313!

III. Requisites
203 Bengzon v. On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines,
Senate Blue represented by the Presidential Commission on Good
Ribbon Government (PCGG), filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil
Committee Case No. 0035 (PCGG Case No. 35) entitled "Republic of
(1991) the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, et al.",
for engaging in devices, schemes and stratagems to
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of plaintiff and
the Filipino people. While the case is ongoing, there were
conflicting reports that the Romualdez corporations were
being taken by the PCGG. After the EDSA revolution, the
Romualdez corporations were sold for P5 million, without
PCGG approval, to a holding company controlled by
legislative power. The lack of power to punish its
witnesses is also in line with the Constitution's demand
for its branches of government to hold full and complete
power. How could the authority and power become
complete if for every act of refusal every act of defiance,
every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body
must resort to the judicial department for the appropriate
remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal
therewith.
However, the same cannot be said to local legislative
bodies. To begin with, there is no express provision
either in the 1973 Constitution or in the Local
Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) granting
local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses
and the power to punish non-members for contempt.
Additionally, the power to issue a subpoena is judicial in
character. To allow local legislative bodies or
administrative agencies to exercise these powers without
express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
No. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or
unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the
Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation
must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
be respected." It follows then that the rights of persons
under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the
right to due process and the right not to be compelled to
testify against one's self.
314!
Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the President's
brother-in-law, who effectively taken over the firms.
On 13 September 1988, Senate Minority Floor Leader,
Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech "on a matter
of personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged
"take-over personal privilege" before the Senate on the
alleged "take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flaship of
the First Manila Management of Companies (FMMC) by
Ricardo Lopa" and called upon "the Senate to look into the
possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with
regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act."
On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was
referred by the Senate to the Committee on Accountability
of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). However at
the hearing, Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the
ground that his testimony may "unduly prejudice" the
defendants in Civil Case No. 0035. Petitioner Jose F.S.
Bengzon, Jr. likewise refused to testify since he believes
that respondent Committee's inquiry could adversely
affect his rights as well as those of the other petitioners
who are his co-defendants in Civil Case No. 0035.
On 5 June 1989 rejecting the petitioner's plea to be
excused from testifying, and the Committee voted to
pursue and continue its investigation of the matter.
Issue: Whether the SBRC's inquiry has valid legislative
purpose.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in
specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such
inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-
examination of any law or in connection with any
proposed legislation or the formulation of future
legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters
vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the
Senate alone.
In this case, the speech of Senator Enrile contained
no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely
called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of
Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."
I other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted
by respondent Blue Ribbon commitee was to find out
whether or not the relatives of President Aquino,
particularly Mr. ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in
connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39
corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez
to the Lopaa Group.”
There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation
involved. It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated
inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of
legislation" becuase it is not related to a purpose within
the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
investigation is to find out whether or not the ralatives of
the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5
RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act",
a matter that appears more within the province of the
courts rather than of the legislature. It can not be
315!

A. In aid of legislation
204 Standard v. On February 1, 2005, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice
Senate (2007) Chairperson of respondent, delivered a privilege speech
entitled “Arrogance of Wealth” before the Senate based
on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo denouncing
Petitioner Standard Chartered Bank (SCB) for selling
unregistered foreign securities in violation of the
Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and urging
the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid
of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar
fraudulent activity in the future. The speech was
referred to the Senate Committee. Acting on the referral,
respondent set the initial hearing to investigate, in aid of
legislation, the subject matter.
overlooked that when respondent Committee decide to
conduct its investigation of the petitioners, the complaint
in Civil No. 0035 had already been filed with the
Sandiganbayan. Thus to allow the respondent
Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue
already before the Sandiganbayan would not only pose
the possibility of conflicting judgments between a
legislative commitee and a judicial tribunal.
According to dissent of Gutierrez, Jr. the following are the
requisites for Sec. 21 of Article VI as stated in its
provision:
(1) Formal requirement of publishing the rules of
procedure and the investigation thereof must be done in
accordance with them
(2) Investigation must be done for a valid legislation
(3) Congress did not violate the basic rights of the
witness.
No. The citation of Bengzon Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee is misplaced as the investigation would not
pre-emptively encroach on the power of the courts to
have jurisdiction over the case. It is true that in Bengzon,
the Court declared that the issue to be investigated was
one over which jurisdiction had already been acquired by
the Sandiganbayan, and to allow the [Senate Blue
Ribbon] Committee to investigate the matter would create
the possibility of conflicting judgments.
However a closer look at the Bengzon shows the
difference. Central to the Courts ruling in Bengzon was
that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was without any
constitutional mooring to conduct the legislative
316!
The Committee invited petitioners to attend the hearing,
requesting them to submit their written position paper.
Petitioners stressed that there were cases pending in
court allegedly involving the same issues subject of
the legislative inquiry, thereby posing a challenge to
the jurisdiction of respondent to continue with the
inquiry.
On February 28, 2005, respondent commenced the
investigation. Senator Enrile moved that subpoenae be
issued to those who did not attend the hearing and
that the Senate request the Department of Justice,
through the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, to
issue a Hold-Departure Order against them and/or include
them in the Bureau’s Watch List.
Respondent then proceeded with the investigation proper.
Towards the end of the hearing, petitioners made an
Opening Statement that brought to the attention of the
Committee the lack of proper authorization from
affected clients for the bank to make disclosures of
their accounts and the lack of copies of the accusing
documents mentioned in Senator Enrile's privilege
speech, and reiterated that there were pending court
cases regarding the alleged sale in the Philippines by
SCB of unregistered foreign securities.
The February 28, 2005 hearing was adjourned without the
setting of the next hearing date. However, petitioners
were later served by respondent with subpoena ad
testificandum and duces tecum to compel them to
attend and testify at the next hearing. Hence, this petition.
investigation. The Courts found that the intended inquiry
was not in aid of legislation. The Court found that the
speech of Senator Enrile, which sought such
investigation contained no suggestion of any
contemplated legislation; it merely called upon the
Senate to look into possible violations of Section 5,
Republic Act No. 3019. Thus, the Court held that the
requested probe failed to comply with a fundamental
requirement of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
Unfortunately for the petitioners, this distinguishing
factual milieu in Bengzon does not obtain in the instant
case. P.S. Resolution No. 166 contains the purpose of
the investigation which are:
(1) Securities Regulation Code seem to be inadequate in
preventing the sale of unregistered securities and in
effectively enforcing the registration rules intended to
protect the investing public from fraudulent practices;
(2) regulatory intervention by the SEC and BSP likewise
appears inadequate in preventing the conduct of
proscribed activities in a manner that would protect the
investing public;
(3) there is a need for remedial legislation to address the
situation, having in mind the imposition of proportionate
penalties to offending entities and their directors, officers
and representatives among other additional regulatory
measures
Thus the said purposes are the purpose of the
investigation that would help in aiding a new legislation to
solve the aforementioned.
317!
 Issue: Whether the Committee acted without jurisdiction
and/or acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in conducting an investigation,
purportedly in aid of legislation, but in reality probing into
the issue of whether the standard chartered bank had sold
unregistered foreign securities in the Philippines.
205 De la Paz v. In October 2008, Gen. De La Paz, a senior officer of the
Senate (2009) PNP, headed a delegation of 8 to attend an Interpol GA.
De La Paz brought with him his wife and 3 days after the
scheduled GA, de la Paz is also scheduled to retire.
After the GA, De La Paz was apprehended in the
departure area for he was carrying with him €105,000.00
(P6,930,000.00). He was also carrying with him
€45,000.00 (P2,970,000.00). He failed to declare in writing
that he is carrying such an amount and this is in violation
of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and
the United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime. De La Paz and his group were later
released but the €s were confiscated by the Russians.
Upon arrival to the Philippines, De La Paz was issued a
subpoena by the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations for the investigation it was to conduct
involving the Moscow incident. De La Paz averred that
the said committee does not have jurisdiction of the
case. De La Paz argued that the Committee is devoid of
any jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow incident as the
matter does not involve state to state relations as provided
in paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules
of Procedure (Senate Rules). They further claim that
respondent Committee violated the same Senate Rules
when it issued the warrant of arrest without the required
signatures of the majority of the members of respondent
It is thus erroneous to claim that just because a case was
filed in a court, the Congress loses its powers to conduct
an investigation in aid of legislation.
Yes. The Moscow incident could create ripples in the
relations between the Philippines and Russia. Gen. Dela
Paz went to Moscow in an official capacity, as a member
of the Philippine delegation to the INTERPOL
Conference in St. Petersburg, carrying a huge amount of
"public" money ostensibly to cover the expenses to be
incurred by the delegation. For his failure to comply with
immigration and currency laws, the Russian government
confiscated the money in his possession and detained
him and other members of the delegation in Moscow.
Furthermore, the matter affects Philippine international
obligations. We take judicial notice of the fact that the
Philippines is a state-party to the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption and the United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. The
two conventions contain provisions dealing with the
movement of considerable foreign currency across
borders.
The Moscow incident would reflect on our country’s
compliance with the obligations required of state-parties
under these conventions. Thus, the respondent
Committee can properly inquire into this matter,
particularly as to the source and purpose of the funds
discovered in Moscow as this would involve the
Philippines’ commitments under these conventions.
318!
 Committee. They likewise assail the very same Senate
Rules because the same were not published as
required by the Constitution, and thus, cannot be
used as the basis of any investigation involving them
relative to the Moscow incident.
Issue: Whether the investigation was done pursuant to a
legislation.
206 Romero v. On August 15, 2006, petitioner Reghis Romero II, as
Estrada (2009) owner of R-II Builders, Inc., received from the Committee
an invitation, signed by the Legislative Committee
Secretary, which asks him to attend an investigation
entitled: “RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE LABOR
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE, IN AID OF
LEGISLATION, THE LIABILITY FOR PLUNDER OF THE
FORMER PRESIDENT RAMOS AND OTHERS, FOR
THE ILLEGAL INVESTMENT OF OWWA FUNDS IN THE
SMOKEY MOUNTAIN PROJECT, CAUSING A LOSS TO
OWWA OF P550.86 MILLION” and RESOLUTION
DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, IN ITS ONGOING INQUIRY IN AID OF
LEGISLATION, ON THE ALLEGED OWWA LOSS OF
P480 MILLION TO FOCUS ON THE CULPABILITY OF
THEN PRESIDENT FIDEL RAMOS, THEN OWWA
ADMINISTRATOR WILHELM SORIANO, AND R-II
BUILDERS OWNER REGHIS ROMERO II.
The investigator is Jinggoy Estrada. The
inquiry/investigation is specifically intended to aid the
Senate in the review and possible amendments to the
pertinent provisions of R.A. 8042, “the Migrant
Workers Act” and to craft a much needed legislation
relative to the stated subject matter and purpose of the
aforementioned Resolutions. In his reply, petitioner
No. In Chavez v. NHA, assuming for argument that it
involves issues subject of the respondent Committee’s
assailed investigation, is no longer sub judice or
“before a court or judge for consideration” because
the case was decided already. An en banc Resolution
dated July 1, 2008, the Court, in G.R. No. 164527,
denied with finality the motion of Chavez, as the
petitioner in Chavez, for reconsideration of the
Decision of the Court dated August 15, 2007. In fine,
it will not avail petitioners any to invoke the sub
judice effect of Chavez and resist, on that ground,
the assailed congressional invitations and
subpoenas. The sub judice issue has been rendered
moot and academic by the supervening issuance of the
en banc Resolution of July 1, 2008 in G.R. No. 164527.
At any rate, even assuming hypothetically that
Chavez is still pending final adjudication by the
Court, still, such circumstance would not bar the
continuance of the committee investigation as long
as it is carried out for a legislative purpose.
A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and
court proceedings has different purposes. On one
hand, courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative
procedures to settle, through the application of a law,
actual controversies arising between adverse
319!
 requested to be excused from appearing and testifying
before the Committee at its scheduled hearings of the
subject matter and purpose of Philippine Senate (PS)
Resolution Nos. 537 and 543. His request, being
unmeritorious was denied.
Romero II appeared at the September 4, 2006 Committee
investigation.Two days after, petitioner Romero II filed a
Manifestation with Urgent Plea for a TRO alleging, among
others, that:
litigants and involving demandable rights.
On the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are,
inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the
legislative body to gather information and, thus,
legislate wisely and effectively; and to determine
whether there is a need to improve existing laws or
enact new or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry
need not result in any potential legislation. As
succinctly stated in Arnault v. Nazareno:

(1) he answered questions concerning the investments of [T]he power of inquiry––with process to enforce it––is an
OWWA funds in the Smokey Mountain project and how essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
much of OWWA’s original investment had already been function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
paid; effectively in the absence of information respecting
(2) when Senator Estrada called on Atty. Francisco I. the conditions which the legislation is intended to
Chavez, as resource person, the latter spoke of the facts affect or change; and where the legislative body does
and issues he raised with the Court in Chavez v. National not itself possess the requisite information––which is
Housing Authority, none of which were related to the not infrequently true––recourse must be had to others
subject of the inquiry; and who possess it.
(3) When Senator Estrada adjourned the investigation, he
asked petitioners Romero II and Canlas to return at the Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the
resumption of the investigation. constitutional rights of witnesses will be respected by
respondent Senate Committees, it [is] their duty to
Issue: Whether the legislative inquiry when it raised a cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts
question pertaining to a case in Chavez v. National needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting
Housing Authority is sub judice (meaning that: "restricts obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoena, to
comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees,
proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm
court, or obstructing the administration of justice.) of proper investigation.
B. In accordance with duly published rules of procedure
207 Garcillano v. During the 2007 election the conversation of President No. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with
House (2008) Arroyo and the herein petitioner Virgilio Garciliano, the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry
COMELEC regional director, regarding the desire of the without duly published rules of procedure, in clear

320!
President to have a favorable outcome in terms of his
Senatoriables. Such conversation was recorded and was
played during the house of representative investigation.
Because of such turn of events, a petition was filed
before the court praying that such playing of the
illegally seized communication was in violation of RA
4200 or the anti-wiretapping law.
Also such petition for injunction prays that the Senate
committee be prevented from further conducting such
investigation for the basic reason that there was no
proper publication of the senate rules, empowering
them to make such investigation of the unlawfully seized
documents.
Issue: Whether there was proper publication of the rules
as to empower the senate to further proceed with their
investigation?
derogation of the constitutional requirement. (Section
21, Article VI)
The requisite of publication of the rules is intended
to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the
height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he
had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2
of the Civil Code, which provides that
"Laws shall take effect after 15 days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official
Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines."
Respondents justify their non-observance of the
constitutionally mandated publication by arguing
that the rules have never been amended since 1995
and, despite that, they are published in booklet form
available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public
at the Senate’s internet web page.
The Court does not agree. The absence of any
amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s
defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of
Section 21, Article VI. The organic law instructs, without
more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly
published rules of procedure, and does not make any
distinction whether or not these rules have undergone
amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to
publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice
or tradition followed by the Senate.
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 The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of
RA 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce
Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication
through the internet is all the more incorrect. RA 8792
considers an electronic data message or an
electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document only for evidentiary purposes. In
other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility
in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data
messages and/or electronic documents. It does not
make the internet a medium for publishing laws,
rules and regulations. Also, the further assertion of the
senate that they already published such rules through
their web page, in observance of the RA 8792 was only
viewed by the court as matter of evidence and still does
not conforme with what the constitution propounded. In
this regard the high court granted the petition for
injunction preventing the senate to conduct such inquiry
in aid of legislation.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate

Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative
inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct
of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be
deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the
rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure."
C. Respect for the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
208 Neri v. Senate On April 2007, Department of Transportation and Yes. The revocation of EO 464 (an EO issued by
(2008) Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhing President Arroyo that advised executive officials and
Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply employees, when they are invited to legislative inquiries
of equipment and services for National Broadband in aid of legislation, to secure first a president's approval)

322!
Network (NBN) project amounting to 329,481, 290 USD or
16 Billion Pesos. In response to the alleged anomalies
in the project, various resolutions which invoke the
power to conduct investigation in aid of legislation
were introduced in the Senate. During the
investigation, Jose de Venecia III testified that the
NBN-ZTE broadband deal had been pushed by high
ranking executive officials and instead of Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) that was converted to
government-to-government project.
Neri was summoned to appear and testify on Sept. 18, 20,
26 and Oct. 25. Only Sept. 26 he testified before the
Committees for 11 hours. He revealed that Benjamin
Abalos (COMELEC) bribed him 200 million pesos to push
the project. When Neri was asked about the project itself,
he invoked “EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE” in which he refused
to answer the questions: 1.) whether or not Pres. Arroyo
followed up the project 2.) whether or not she directed him
to prioritize it 3.) whether or not she directed him to
approve.
The respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad
Testifacandum requiring him to appear Nov. 20, 2007. On
Nov 20, Neri did not appear before the Committee, thus a
show cause letter to explain why Neri should not be cited
for contempt was issued. Antonio Bautista (counsel of
Neri) replied that he did not want to disrespect and snob
them, that he said everything during the 11 hour
interrogation that did not involve the topics which exercise
executive privilege. Stated in the letter also was 1.) his
non-appearance was upon the order of the president 2.)
his conversations with the pres. Dealt with delicate,
sensitive materials concerning national security and
in the case of Senate v. Ermita, does not in any way
diminish the concept of executive privilege.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in
cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power
textually committed by the Constitution to the
President, such as the area of military and foreign
relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the
repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing,
pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the
doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating
to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than
others.
Several jurisprudence provide the following elements of
presidential communications privilege before its exercise
can be said valid:
(1) The protected communication must relate to a
“quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.”
In this case, the subject matter, which is foreign loans
that the President will acquire for the project is a power
non-delegable that only the President himself can
exercise. The fact that the President has to secure the
prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall
submit to Congress a complete report of its decision
before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does
not diminish the executive nature of the power.
The requirement that the President has to submit a report
to Congress is only a reflection of separation of powers
that allows checks and balances esp. in important
323!
diplomatic relations 3.) that questions be furnished in
advance so that he may adequately prepare for the
hearing.
The committees found the explanations unsatisfactory,
without responding to his request for advance notices on
matters that still need clarifying, they issued an order
citing him of contempt. On the same day the petitioner
moved for the reconsideration.
Issue: (1) Whether there is a recognized presumptive
presidential communications privilege in our legal system.
matters such as President’s power to contract foreign
loans in behalf of the Philippine people. This process is
similar to the checks and balance apparent in creating a
law wherein the President has veto powers. Thus it could
not be said that because the President can veto a law,
the power to create a law is not lodged in the Congress.
(2) The communication is limited only by the
"doctrine of operational proximity"
This doctrine simply limits the power of presidential
communications privilege. This doctrine prevents the
President from simply making every communication done
by his executive a privilege thus preventing people to
scrutinize the communication. The test is that: Only
communications at that level are close enough to the
President to be revelatory of his deliberations or to
pose a risk to the candor of his advisers.
In this case, since the communication is between the
President and his Cabinet adviser, it could be seen that
the communication is within the close proximity of the
President. To determine who is within the operational
proximity we use the organizational test laid down in
Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice. The main
consideration is to limit the availability of executive
privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the
President, not only by reason of their function, but also by
reason of their positions in the Executive’s organizational
structure. Thus, respondent Committees’ fear that the
scope of the privilege would be unnecessarily expanded
with the use of the operational proximity test is
unfounded.
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 (3) The President’s claim of executive privilege is not
merely based on a generalized interest; and
likely contains an important and compelling need
to be kept confidential.

In this case, it is easy to discern the danger that goes

with the disclosure of the President’s communication with
her advisor. The NBN Project involves a foreign country
as a party to the agreement. Whatever the President
says about the agreement - particularly while official
negotiations are ongoing - are matters which China will
surely view with particular interest. There is danger in
such kind of exposure. It could adversely affect our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
People’s Republic of China.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that the

communications elicited by the three questions are
covered by the presidential communications privilege.
First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and
non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to
enter into an executive agreement with other countries.
This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature
has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Second, the communications are
“received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the
“operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered
a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s
cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

325!
 IV. Power to punish a Person Under Investigation
209 Arnault v. This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the Yes. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be
Nazareno acquisition by the Philippine Government of the within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make,
(1950) Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in the investigating committee has the power to require
1949. Among the witnesses called to be examined by a witness to answer any question pertinent to course
the special committee created by a Senate resolution was to his Constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of the The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative
purchase price to a representative of the vendor-- body to make, must be material or necessary to the
Petitioner was the attorney in-fact of Ernest H. Burt in the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such
negotiations for the purchase of the Buenavista (P 4.5 M) as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every
and Tambobong (P 500k) Estates. It turned out that the question which the investigator is empowered to
Government did not have to pay a single centavo for coerce a witness to answer must be material or
the Tambobong Estate as it was already practically pertinent to that inquiry, subject of the subject of the
owned by virtue of a deed of sale from the Philippine inquiry or investigation.
Trust Company and by virtue of the recession of the
contract through which Ernest H. Burt had an interest in So a witness may not be coerced to answer a
the estate. An intriguing question which the committee question that obviously has no relation to the subject
sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent of the inquiry. Note that, the fact that the legislative
irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt the body has jurisdiction or the power to make the
total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only inquiry would not preclude judicial intervention to
P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have correct a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of
forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. that power.
The committee sought to determine who were
responsible for and who benefited from the What is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter
transaction at the expense of the Government. Arnault under inquiry. As to the self-incrimination issue, as
testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a
P1,500,000 were delivered to him; and that on the same constitutional right, is his clear duty as a citizen to give
occasion he draw on said account two checks; one for frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent
P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the authority. The state has the right to exact fulfillment of
Associated Agencies, Inc., with PNB, and another for a citizen's obligation, consistent of course with his
P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed. The right under the Constitution. The not necessary for
Senate adopted Resolution No. 8 creating a Special the legislative body to show that every question
Committee to determine the validity of the purchase and propounded to a witness is material to any proposed
whether the price paid was fair and just. or possible legislation; resolution of commitment here

326!
 During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to
reveal the identity of said representative, at the same
time invoking his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution
committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-
Arms and imprisoned “until he shall have purged the
contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name of
the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as
answer other pertinent questions in connection
therewith.” Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas
Corpus.
Issue: Whether or not either the Senate or HoR has the
power to punish a person not a member of the house with
contempt.
210 Sabio v. Gordon Senate Resolution No. 455 directed an inquiry in aid of
(2006) legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippines Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the
alleged improprieties in their operations by their
respective Board of Directors.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of a prior
commitment, and at the same time invoked Sec. 4(b) of
EO No. 1: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial,
legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.”
Issue: Whether Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 limits the power
of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or
staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or
in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a
continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the
periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of
Representatives.
There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to
punish for contempt in cases where that power may
constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
That power subsists as long as the Senate, which is
a continuing body, persists in performing the
particular legislative function involved.
No. Considering the settled jurisprudence, the Court finds
Section 4(b) directly repugnant with the Constitution.
Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff
from the Congress' power of inquiry. This cannot be
countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any
provision granting such exemption. The Congress'
power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything
that concerns the administration of existing laws as well
as proposed or possibly needed statutes It even extends
"to government agencies created by Congress and
officers whose positions are within the power of
Congress to regulate or even abolish." PCGG belongs to
this class.
"Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a
limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence
of any constitutional basis."
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administrative proceeding in so far as it repeals the 1987
Constitution.
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is
inconsistent with the principle of public
accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff
beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other
administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public
accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes
irresponsibility and non-accountability.
Section 4(b) limits or obstructs the power of
Congress to secure from PCGG members and staff
information and other data in aid of its power to
legislate.
To summarize: A statute may be declared
unconstitutional because it is not within the
legislative power to enact; or it creates or establishes
methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; or its purpose or effect violates the
Constitution or its basic principles. As shown in the above
discussion, Section 4(b) is inconsistent with Article VI,
Section 21 (Congress' power of inquiry), Article XI,
Section 1 (principle of public accountability), Article II,
Section 28 (policy of full disclosure) and Article III,
Section 7 (right to public information).
The clear import of this provision is that all existing laws,
executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions
and other executive issuances inconsistent or repugnant
to the Constitution are repealed. Section 4(b) of E.O. No.
1 is declared REPEALED by the 1987 Constitution.
Respondent Senate Committees' power of inquiry
relative to Senate Resolution 455 is upheld.
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Section 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative,
with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either
House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and
be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of
the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least
three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall
not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related
thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so
requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall
be conducted in executive session.
Is the oversight function under Sec. 22 the same as a Question
Hours?
No. In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the
“question hour” has a definite meaning. It is a period of confrontation
initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other
ministers accountable for their acts and the operation of the
government, corresponding to what is known in Britain as the
question period. It cannot be imposed in a Presidential system of
government because of the separation of powers.
What is the difference between Congressional Inquiries in aid of
legislation under Sec. 21 and inquiries pursuant to its oversight
function under Sec. 22?
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how departmental
heads are implementing the statutes which is has issued, it is right to
such information is not as imperative as that of the President to
whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a
report of their performance as a matter of duty, But when the inquiry
in which Congress requires their appearance is “in aid of legislation,”
the appearance is mandatory. The oversight function of Congress
may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation (Senate v. Ermita)
Under Sec 21, ANYONE, except the President and the SC Justices,
may be summoned. Under Sec. 22 as alter egos of the President,
they may NOT appear without the President’s permission. [This
exemption applies only to heads of Depts. and not to everyone such
as those in the cabinet rank].

Section 22. Congress and Heads of Departments

211 Senate v. (See above, Compared to Section 21, Section 22 of Article VI is called the “question hour”. In such cases, Section 22 in
Ermita Case # 200) comparison to Section 21 grants the Congress the power to inquire in pursuit of its oversight functions
(2006) (Section 22) as compared to those made in legislation (Section 21).
Issue: What is Usually, the question here is how officials are implementing certain statutes, which makes them in the said
the difference investigation report to the legislative. This practice is unusual since supposedly, executive departments
of Sec. 21 and should only report to the Executive for their functions.
22 of Article
VI. This is called the question hour. In such cases, Section 22 in comparison to Section 21 grants the
Congress to inquire in pursuit of its oversight functions. Usually, the question here is how officials are
implementing certain statutes, which makes them in the certain investigation report to the
legislative, which is unusual since they only report to the executive for their functions. In cases of

329!
question hour, the executive officer may refuse to go and this rationale is based on the separation of powers
given such inquiry is not in aid of legislation and does not contravene the legislative powers of Congress.
Thus under Section 22, executive heads are exempt from the question hour by validly claiming privilege but
not because of their position.

Though the only officers exempted by position is the President (except in impeachment cases) and the
members of Supreme Court, in due respect to their equal power. Section 1 of EO 464 invokes Art. VI, § 22
of the Constitution that grants them a power to inquire and not for purposes of “in aid of legislation”.

The absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its
application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision
of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction.

Section 3 requires all officials in Section 2 (b) to secure the consent of the President prior appearing to the
Congress. It claims that various officials who in the judgment of the heads of offices designated in the same
section are covered by the executive privilege. This includes the officers that may be determined by the
President.

The determination of this matter is based on the idea of being covered by the “executive privilege” which
means that it is up to the President to determine who is the person who has “information” worthy of being
covered by the executive privilege.

However, in the letter given by Exec. Sec. Ermita, he does not specify. Executive privilege is considered that
is whether the secret that is kept is for whether military, diplomatic, etc. purposes. Thus, the Congress needs
to know why such invocation is proper and deprives Congress of its processes to investigate. There must be
a formal claim since an improper claim is like no claim at all. Although there is no need for the claimant of
executive privilege to give such particularity of the confidential documents since it would be counterintuitive
to its purpose.

Thus, the claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to 2 (b) is invalid as it only requires that
there be consent without the necessity of a rationale on why it must be considered as confidential. It
severely frustrates the power of the inquiry of the Congress. However, Section 2 (a) as it simply enumerates
the ones covered in Section 2 is valid.

330!
Section 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both
Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the
sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may,
by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to
such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease
upon the next adjournment thereof.
Ampatuan v. DILG Secretary (2011)
The President did no proclaim a national emergency, only a state of
emergency, in the three placed mentioned. The calling out of the
armed forces to prevent or suppresses lawless violence in such
places is a power directly vested by the Constitution to the President.
There is no need for congressional authority to exercise the same.

Existence of a state of war – not declaring war

The power “to declare war” is not lodge with Congress but with the
executive [power which holds the sword of the nation. Congress can
only state facts – the existence of “a state of war.”

Even if Congress doesn’t declare or make a law regarding the

existence of a state of war, the President can exercise commander in
chief powers can act under Art. 7, Sec 18. (David v. Arroyo).

Sec. 23 (2) is an example of constitutionally sanctioned delegation of

Emergency powers by Congress. Congress may even delegate
legislative powers to the president if necessary.

Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary

" Sec. 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President
from declaring a state of rebellion.
" The President, when declaring a state of rebellion and in
calling out the armed forces, is merely exercising her Chief Executive
and Commander-in-Chief powers as vested on the President by
Section 1 and 18 of Article VII as opposed to the delegated
legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.

331!
 Section 23. Declaration of the Existence of a State of War
Delegation of Emergency Powers
212 Sanlakas v. The case has its origins in the Oakwood Incident of Rebellion According to the Constitution, the President is
Executive between 3 junior officers of the AFP--demanded the granted a “sequence of graduated powers”:
Secretary (2004) resignation of the President and other executive officials calling out power, power to suspend and the
because of the worsening corruption. Due to this, President privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and power
issued Proclamation 427 and General Order 4 both of which to declare martial law. The constitution requires
declared a state of rebellion and calling the AFP to suppress the concurrence of two conditions namely 1) an
such rebellion. Petitioners assert that the issuance of the actual invasion or rebellion and that 2) public safety
respective Proclamation order 427 and General order 4 is requires the exercise of such power. The Article not
unconstitutional claimed: only vests to the president the commander-in-chief
- Section 18 Article 8 of the constitution in so far that it power but also with executive powers. The
does not authorize a declaration of a state of rebellion. Commander-in-chief Powers are broad enough
- Also they contend that the presidential issuances cannot when taken together with the provision on executive
be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as power. Thus, the President’s authority to declare
the congress has not delegated any power to the a state of rebellion springs in the main from her
president. powers as chief executive and draws strength
- Also, it was an unwarranted and abuse of power to from the commander-in-chief powers.
exercise martial law.
The Solicitor-general points out Sec. 4 chapter 2
Issue: Whether the proclamation calling the state of rebellion is Book III (Office of the President) of the Revised
proper. Administrative Code of 1987. This provision states
that the president’s proclamation gives notice to the
nation that such state exists and that the AFP may
be called upon to prevent or suppress it. Mere
declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or
violate constitutionally protected rights. These are
purely executive powers vested on the President by
Sec. 1 and 18 Art. 8 as opposed to the delegated
legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2)
of Article 6.

332!
213 Ampatuan v. The day after the infamous Ampatuan massacre happened,
Hon. DILG President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation
Secretary Puno 1946, placing the provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan
(2011) Kudarat, and Cotabato City under a state of emergency. She
then directed the AFP and PNP to undertake measures as may
be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and
suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the said areas.
Three days later, President Arroyo issued Administrative Order
273 which “transfers” the supervision of the ARMM from the
Office of the President to the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG). The word “transfer” was then changed to
“delegate/delegating” because of some issues raised over the
terminology. It was amended by AO 273-A.
Petitioner contend that the President unlawfully exercised
emergency powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP
and PNP personnel in the places mentioned in the proclamation.
But such deployment is NOT by itself an exercise of
emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution. They also claim that the issuance of the
AO273/AO273-A encroached the autonomy of ARMM as a local
government unit. Thus the petition of prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.
Issues: (1) Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and
273-A violate the principle of local autonomy under Section 16,
Article X of the Constitution, and Section 1, Article V of the
Expanded ARMM Organic Act;
(2) Whether President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency
powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent
and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City; and
(1) No. the DILG Secretary did not take over control
of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement
agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into
custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao
massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner
Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post on
December 10, 2009 pursuant to the rule on
succession found in Article VII, Section 12, of RA
9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the
then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly,
petitioner Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-
Governor. In short, the DILG Secretary did not take
over the administration or operations of the ARMM.
(2) No. The President did not proclaim a national
emergency, only a state of emergency in the
three places mentioned. And she did not act
pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that
authorized her to exercise extraordinary
powers. The calling out of the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places
is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the
President a stated in Section 18 of Article 7.
Therefore, she did not need a congressional
authority to exercise the same.
333!
Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills
shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Types of bills
1. Appropriation: Money set aside from public – general
appropriations act, IRA.
2. Tariff/Revenue Bill: Proposal to earn money for government.
3. Increase of Public Debt: Increase ceiling of borrowings to be
able to loan money.
4. Bills of local application: Conversion of city, naming street.
5. Private Bill: Relate to private person (citizenship law, etc).
Purpose of Sec. 24?
The main purpose of the bills emanating from the House of
Representatives is to bring in sizeable revenues for the government
to supplement our country’s serious financial problems, and improve
tax administration and control of the leakages in revenues from
income taxes and value-added taxes, and the Senate, approaching
the measures from the point of national perspective, can introduce
amendments within the purposes of those bills (Abakada v. Ermita)
Only the House can initiate the passage of a revenue bill
(Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance)
It is not the law – but the revenue bill – which is required by the
Constitution to “originate exclusively” from the House of
Representatives. A bill originating in the House may undergo
extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of
the whole bill creating an entirely distinct bill.
To insist that a revenue statute – and not only the bill which initiated
the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law –
must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny
the Senate’s power to 1) “concur with amendments” and 2) propose
amendments.” It would violate the coequality of legislative power of
the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to
the Senate.

Section 24. Origin of Money Bills, Private Bills and Bills Local Application
I. Bills of Local Application – Origin
214 Guingona v. (Same as above, Case # 73) No. The argument of the petitioner is untenable: This
Carague (1991) Under R.A. 4860, the President is authorized to obtain transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely
foreign loans and credit for financing approved economic been adopted by its framers to preserve the social
development purposes or projects or for relending to private order so that legislation by the then President Marcos
purposes. President Marcos issued the following: may be recognized. The automatic appropriation
PD 81 – Sec. 7 provides that "all the revenue realized from provides the flexibility for the effective execution of
the projects financed by such loans," after deducting debt management policies
expenses, is appropriated for servicing the foreign debts.
Absent an automatic appropriation clause, if the
PD 1177 – Sec. 31 provides that “All expenditures for … Philippine Government has to await and depend upon
principal and interest on public debt, … are automatically Congressional action, by the time this comes, it may no

334!
appropriated xxx”
PD 1967 – Sec. 1 provides that “…hereby appropriated, out
of any funds xxx not otherwise appropriated, such amounts
as may be necessary to effect payments on foreign or
domestic loans”
longer be responsive to the intended conditions and
result to delayed payments and arrearages may have
supervened which would worsen our debt service-to-
total expenditure ratio in the budget due to penalties
and/or demand for immediate payment even before due
dates.

All PDs were issued to amend the provisions of the Act
regarding the payment of debt service. The Marcos
administration incurred big amounts of debt which are still
unpaid even after his presidency.
Pres. Corazon Aquino submitted to the Congress the
Budget for the Fiscal Year 1990. It (P233.5 Billion) provided
P86.8 billion for debt service out of the P98.4 billion on
automatic appropriation and P27 billion for the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports. The said automatic
appropriation is authorized by the PDs to make prompt
payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and
maintain the credit standing of the country.
The Court maintains the lawful authorizations or
appropriations constituted in RA 4860, as amended by
PD 81, Sec. 31 of PD 1177 and PD 1967, unless they
are repealed or otherwise amended by Congress.
Whether or not the country should honor its international
debt, more specifically the enormous amount that had
been incurred by the past administration, is more of a
political decision for Congress and the Executive to
determine in the exercise of their wisdom and sound
discretion.

Though the PDs do not state specific amounts to be paid,

the amounts are still made certain by the legislative
parameters provided, that is, to pay the principal, interest,
taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credit
or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures, securities or
other evidences of indebtedness sold in international
markets incurred by the virtue of law, as when they shall
become due.
Petitioner believes the said decrees are inconsistent with
§§24 and 27, Art. VI of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether the decree of automatic debt servicing is

unconstitutional

335!
215 Tolentino v. These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision
Secretary of dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for the
Finance (1994) declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise
known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law.
Petitioners claim that R.A. No. 7716 did not "originate
exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by
Art. VI, §24 of the Constitution.
Petitioners admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in the
House of Representatives where it passed three
readings. They also admit that afterward it was sent to the
Senate where after first reading it was referred to the Senate
Ways and Means Committee.
What they are contending is that the Senate did not pass it
on second and third readings. Instead what the Senate did
was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630) which it
approved on May 24, 1994. Petitioner Tolentino adds that
what the Senate committee should have done was to amend
H. No. 11197 by striking out the text of the bill and
substituting it with the text of S. No. 1630. That way, it is
said, "the bill remains a House bill and the Senate version
just becomes the text (only the text) of the House bill."
Thus they believe that Republic Act No. 7716 did not
"originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, §24 of the Constitution, because it is in
fact the result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No.
11197 and S. No. 1630. It is notable in two respects: the
verb "shall originate" is qualified in the Philippine
Constitution by the word "exclusively" and the phrase "as on
other bills" in the American version is omitted. This means,
according to them, that to be considered as having
originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain
No. To begin with, it is not the law — but the revenue bill
— which is required by the Constitution to "originate
exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is
important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in
the House may undergo such extensive changes in the
Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole.
The possibility of a third version by the conference
committee may even occur. At this point, what is
important to note is that, as a result of the Senate
action, a distinct bill may be produced.
To insist that a revenue statute — and not only the bill
which initiated the legislative process culminating in the
enactment of the law — must substantially be the same
as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power
not only to "concur with amendments" but also to
"propose amendments." It would be to violate the
coequality of legislative power of the two houses of
Congress and in fact make the House superior to the
Senate.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the
initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills
and bills of local application must come from the House
of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they
are from the districts, the members of the House can be
expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and
problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are
elected at large, are expected to approach the same
problems from the national perspective. Both views are
thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.
The Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the
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 the essence of H. No. 11197.
Issue: Whether Section 24 Article VI of the Constitution was
violated.
216 Alvarez v. In April 1993, HB 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality
Guingona of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be
(1998) known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the HoR. In
May 1993, a Senate bill (SB 1243) of similar title and
content with that of HB 8817 was introduced in the Senate.
In January 1994, the HB 8817 was transmitted to the
Senate.
In February 1994, the Senate conducted a public hearing on
SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate Committee on Local
Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of
HB 8817 as it was totally the same with SB 1243.
Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA 7720). Now
Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of
the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate
as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House
bill. Thus, because revenue bills are required to
originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, the Senate cannot enact revenue
measures of its own without such bills. After a
revenue bill is passed and sent over to it by the
House, however, the Senate certainly can pass its
own version on the same subject matter. This
follows from the coequality of the two chambers of
Congress. The Senate can practically re-write a bill
required to come from the House and leave only a
trace of the original bill.
In sum, while Art. VI, §24 provides that all appropriation,
revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills
must "originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives," it also adds, "but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments."
Yes, there was no violation then of the Constitution.
There was no violation of Art. VI, Sec. 24 since it
cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was passed
before SB No. 1243. Petitioners themselves cannot
disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817 was filed
on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May
19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus precursive
not only of the said Act in question but also of SB No.
1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the
legislative process that culminated in the enactment of
Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section 24,
Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under
the circumstances attending the instant controversy.
337!
 Alvarez et al. are assailing the constitutionality of the
said law on the ground that the bill creating the law did
not originate from the lower house.
Issue: Whether considering that the Senate passed SB No.
1243, its own version of HB No. 8817, Republic Act No.
7720 can be said to have originated in the House of
Representatives.
217 Southern Cross Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern
Cement v. Phil Cross) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
Cement (2004) cement manufacturing, production, importation and
exportation. Private respondent Philippine Cement
Manufacturers Corporation (Philcemcor) is an association of
domestic cement manufacturers.
Respondent Department of Trade and Industry (“DTI”)
accepted an application from Philcemcor, alleging that the
importation of gray Portland cement in increased quantities
has caused declines in domestic production, capacity
utilization, market share, sales and employment; as well as
caused depressed local prices.
The Tariff Commission, on 19 November 2001, received a
request from the DTI for a formal investigation to determine
whether to impose a definitive safeguard measure on
The Senate held in abeyance any action on SB No.
1243 until it received HB No. 8817 after its approval
on the Third Reading from the House of
Representatives. The filing in the Senate of a substitute
bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House,
does not contravene the constitutional requirement that
a bill of local application should originate in the House of
Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act
thereupon until it receives the House bill. Such
circumstances was already discussed in Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance and held to be valid.
On the side of every law lies the presumption of
constitutionality. For RA 7720 to be nullified, it must
be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution.
Yes. The required positive final determination of the
Tariff Commission exists as a properly enacted
constitutional limitation imposed on the delegation
of the legislative power to impose tariffs and
imposts to the President under Section 28(2), Article
VI of the Constitution. The authority delegated to the
President may be exercised by his/her alter egos, such
as department secretaries.
For purposes of the President’s exercise of power to
impose tariffs, it is generally the Secretary of
Finance who acts as the alter ego of the President.
However in this case, the SMA empowered the DTI
Secretary, as alter ego of the President to impose
definitive general safeguard measures, which basically
are tariff imposts of the type spoken of in the
Constitution.
338!
imports of gray Portland cement, pursuant to Section 9 of
the Safeguard Measures Act (SMA) and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations.
*Note: The SMA provides the structure and mechanics for
the imposition of emergency measures, including tariffs, to
protect domestic industries and producers from
increased imports which inflict or could inflict serious injury
on them.
Tariff Commission issued its Formal Investigation Report
stating that the industry has not suffered and is not suffering
significant overall impairment in its condition, i.e., serious
injury and that there is no threat of serious injury that is
imminent from imports of gray Portland cement. The DTI
hereby issues the following: "The application for safeguard
measures against the importation of gray Portland cement
filed by PHILCEMCOR is hereby denied”.
Philcemcor filed to CA a petition for certiorari to set aside
DTI’s decision according to CA it held that the DTI Secretary
is not bound by the factual findings of the Tariff Commission
since such findings are merely recommendatory and they
fall within the ambit of the Secretary’s discretionary review.
DTI then issued new decision in June 25 2003 that there
was really a serious injury to the local cement industry
of import surges and imposed a definitive safeguard
measure on importation of gray cement.
Issue: Whether the Safeguard Measures Act’s’ requirement
of first having the Tariff Commission investigate the
purported emergency in order for the DTI to impose market
protection measures are constitutional.
However, the law did not grant him full, uninhibited
discretion to impose such measures. The DTI Secretary
authority is derived from the SMA; it does not flow from
any inherent executive power. Thus, the limitations
imposed by Section 5 are absolute, warranted as they
are by a constitutional fiat.
Additionally, the DTI Secretary does not have the power
to review the findings of the Tariff Commission for it is
not subordinate to the Department of Trade and Industry
(“DTI”). It falls under the supervision, not of the DTI nor
of the Department of Finance (as mistakenly asserted
by Southern Cross, but of the National Economic
Development Authority, an independent planning
agency of the government of co-equal rank as the DTI.
As the supervision and control of a Department
Secretary is limited to the bureaus, offices, and
agencies under him, the DTI Secretary generally cannot
exercise review authority over actions of the Tariff
Commission. Neither does the SMA specifically
authorize the DTI Secretary to alter, amend or modify in
any way the determination made by the Tariff
Commission. The most that the DTI Secretary could do
to express displeasure over the Tariff Commission’s
actions is to ignore its recommendation, but not its
determination. Nothing in the SMA obliges the DTI
Secretary to adopt the recommendation made by the
Tariff Commission. Thus, even if the Tariff Commission
makes a final determination, the DTI Secretary may opt
not to impose a general safeguards measure or choose
a different type of safeguard measure other than that
recommended by the Tariff Commission.
339!
 II. Appropriation of Public Revenue for Public Purpose
218 Pascual v. In 1953, RA 920 was passed. This law appropriated No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without
Secretary of P85,000.00 “for the construction, reconstruction, repair, power to appropriate public revenue for anything but a
Public Works extension and improvement” of “Pasig feeder road public purpose.
(1960-1961) terminals. Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the
validity of the law. He claimed that the appropriation It is the essential character of the direct object of the
was actually going to be used for private use for the expenditure which must determine its validity as
terminals sought to be improved were part of the justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to
Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by be affected nor the degree to which the general
Senator Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate advantage of the community, and thus the public
that passed and approved the same RA. welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion

Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress
the fact that he owns those terminals and that his property
would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the
taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual
then prayed that the Sec of Public Works be restrained from
releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other
hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the said property
to the City of Pasig.
Issue: Whether the appropriation of PhP85, 000 for the
construction of the feeder roads is valid.
Thus, incidental to the public or to the state, which
results from the promotion of private interest and the
prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not
justify their aid by the use public money
the donation to the Government, over five (5) months
after the approval and effectivity of said Act, made,
according to the petition, for the purpose of giving a
"semblance of legality", or legalizing, the appropriation
in question, did not cure its aforementioned basic defect
The SC ruled that said donation violated the provision
of our fundamental law prohibiting members of
Congress from being directly or indirectly
financially interested in any contract with the
Government, and, hence, is unconstitutional, as well
as null and void ab initio, for the construction of the
projected feeder roads in question with public
funds would greatly enhance or increase the value
of the aforementioned subdivision of respondent
Zulueta, "aside from relieving him from the burden
of constructing his subdivision streets or roads at
his own expense"; that the construction of said

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Section 25.
(1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of the Government
as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of
preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular
appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
projected feeder roads was then being undertaken by
the Bureau of Public Highways; and that, unless
restrained by the court, the respondents would
continue to execute, comply with, follow and implement
the aforementioned illegal provision of law, "to the
irreparable damage, detriment and prejudice not only
to the petitioner but to the Filipino nation."
***The donation of the property to the government to
make the property public does not cure the
constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed
when the said property was still a private property
cannot be ignored. “In accordance with the rule that the
taxing power must be exercised for public purposes
only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for
public purposes and not for the advantage of private
individuals.” Inasmuch as the land on which the
projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged
then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation
sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall
strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other
departments and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it
is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as
certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a
corresponding revenue proposed therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
341!
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be
disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate
vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by
law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to
pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the
general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be
deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the
general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
Garcia v. Mata
An Appropriations Act for FY 1956-57 includes a provision which
states that “after the approval of this Act, and when there is no
emergency, no reserve officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
may be called to a tour of active duty for more than two years during
any period of five consecutive years,” is void for being a rider. (It has
no connection with the Appropriations Act)
Transfer of Funds IS VOID (Demetria v. Alba)
P.D. 1177 empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds
from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project or activity of any department,
bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the
funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which
the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the
purpose of augmenting the item to which the transfer is to be made
IS VOID/UNCONSITUTIONAL.
The appropriation must be made for public purpose (Pascual v.
Secretary of Public Works)
The subsequent donation of the road did not validate the law
(construction of feeder roads) because the validity of a statute
depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its approval,
and not upon event occurring or acts performed subsequently. The
land where the feeder road was still a private land when Congress
made the appropriation; thus void.
PDAF is Unconstitutional (2013) – see digest for full discussion
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the
release of funds (power of the purse). Only the executive may
implement the law– including the GAA to which the PDAF is a part
of. Under the pork barrel system, the legislators themselves dictate
as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a
clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the
principle of separation of powers.
The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the
two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual
members. In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual
legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go
to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power.
In the GAA, PDAF is only noted as the funds of the legislators
without specific projects. Only once the GAA is approved, the
legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his
PDAF. Under such system, power of president to check and balance
to veto the appropriation made by the legislator is gone as the GAA
is already approved.
With the PDAF, elected district congressmen can either bypass or
duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. In this
instance, congressmen, who are national officers, meddle with local
342!
government affairs which is contrary to the State policy on local are still considered as non-existent as no funds were appropriated to
autonomy. The Court noted that the PDAF seemed to be more of a them in the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is
personal fund on the part of legislators. unconstitutional and is without legal basis.

DAP is party Unconstitutional (2014) – see digest for full
discussion
DAP did not violate Section 29(1) Art. VI which states that “No
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.” DAP is merely a program by the
Executive prioritizing government spending. No additional funds
were withdrawn from the Treasury. Funds, which were already
appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the
DAP.
DAP is not an executive impoundment of funds. It refers to the
President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or
deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually
prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable
national government budget deficit (which did not happen).
Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because
what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
As provided in the Constitution, “savings” may be augment. Under
the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among
other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain
project once it is completed; finally discontinued; or finally
abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn
from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of
savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all
for the transfers.
Furthermore, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal
year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from
certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as
“savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.

It is true that the President (and even the heads of the other
branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make
realignment of funds, however, such should only be made “within
their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. Under the DAP, funds
appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to
the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.

Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate

realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Despite some
being legitimate projects within the Executive branch, these projects

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 Section 25. Rules on Appropriation
I. Limits on Power to Appropriate
219 Brillantes v. COMELEC On October 29, 2002, the COMELEC, through its Yes. The assailed COMELEC resolution
(2004) Resolution No. 02-0170, adopted a modernization contravenes constitutional provisions under Article
program for the 2004 elections consisting of three VI, §29 which states that “no money shall be paid
phases: out of the treasury except in pursuance of an
Phase I -computerized system of registration and voters appropriation made by law; and Article VI, §25.
validation or “biometrics”
Phase II - Computerized voting and counting of votes; By its very terms, the electronic transmission
Phase III - Electronic transmission of results. On January and tabulation of the election results projected
24, 2003 under Resolution No. 6712 is “unofficial” in
character, meaning “not emanating from or
PGMA issued EO 172 which allocated the sum of sanctioned or acknowledged by the government
P2.5B to exclusively fund the Automated Election or government body. Any disbursement of public
System (AES) in time for the 2004 elections. On funds to implement this project is contrary to the
February 10, 2003, upon the request of COMELEC, provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No.
PGMA issued EO175 authorizing the release of a 9206, which is the 2003 General Appropriations
supplemental P500 million budget for the AES project Act.
of the COMELEC. The COMELEC promulgated
Resolution 6074 which awarded the contract for The use of the COMELEC of its funds appropriated
Phase II of the AES to the Mega Pacific Consortium. for the AES for the “unofficial” quick count project
may even be considered as a felony under Article
In a separate contract, PMSI (Philippine Multi-media 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
System, Inc.) was awarded the bid for the implementation Irrefragably, the implementation of the assailed
of Phase III. The COMELEC bound and obliged itself to resolution would entail, in due course, the hiring of
pay PMSI the sum of P298, 375,808.90 as rentals for the additional manpower, technical services and
leased equipment and for its services. However, the acquisition of equipment, including computers and
Phase II of AES was scrapped based on the Decision software, among others. According to the
of the Court granting the petition of Information COMELEC, it needed P55,000,000 to
Technology Foundation of the Philippines (ITFP) to operationalize the project, including the encoding
nullify the contract of COMELEC with Mega Pacific process. Hence, it would necessarily involve the
Consortium. The COMELEC then would have to disbursement of public funds for which there must
maintain the old manual voting and counting system be the corresponding appropriation.
for the May 10, 2004 elections.

344!
 Despite the scrapping of Phase II, the COMELEC The court reviewed the GAA (RA 9206) and find
nevertheless ventured to implement Phase III of the no appropriation for the project of the
AES through an electronic transmission of advanced COMELEC for electronic transmission of
“unofficial” results of the 2004 elections for national, “unofficial” results.
provincial and municipal positions, also dubbed as
an “unofficial quick count.” On the other hand, Phase I Under the GAA, the allotment for modernization of
apparently encountered problems in its implementation, electoral system shall be used as prescribed under
as evinced by the COMELEC’s pronouncements prior to RA 8436, which provides that the amount should be
the elections that it was reverting to the old listing of used “particularly for the process of voting, counting
voters. of votes and canvassing/consolidation of results of
the national and local elections” --- nothing said on
Senate President Franklin Drilon expressed his the transmission of results such as Phase III.
misgivings and misapprehensions about the
constitutionality of the proposed electronic Thus the use of the money for unofficial results is
transmission of results for the position of President and considered a modification of the intended purpose
VP in his letter to COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos. of the budget that violates Section 25 Article VI.
Besides this letter the COMELEC also had a primal
problem of sourcing the money for the implementation of The power to augment from savings lies dormant
the project since the money allocated for the AES has until authorized by law.In this case, no law has,
already been spent for the acquisition of the equipment. thus, far been enacted authorizing the respondent
Notwithstanding the problems on constitutionality COMELEC to transfer savings from another item in
and budget, the COMELEC was determined to carry its appropriation, if there are any, to fund the
out the Phase III of AES and promulgated Resolution assailed resolution. No less than the Secretary of
6712. The commissioners submit that the budget for the Senate certified that there is no law
Phase III should be taken from the modernization appropriating any amount for an unofficial count
program fund in the GAA. and tabulation of the votes cast during the May 10,
2004 elections.
Issue: Whether Resolution No. 6712 is void
II. Prohibition of increase
III. Prohibition on “riders” in appropriation bills
220 Garcia v. Mata (1975) On 11 July 1956, the date when RA 1600 took effect, the No. While R.A. 1600 appropriated money for the
petitioner had an accumulated active commissioned operation of the Government for the fiscal year
service of 10 yrs, 5 months, and 5 days in the AFP. 1956-1957, the said par. 11 refers to the
Eusebio B Garcia was a reserve officer in active duty with fundamental government policy matters of the

345!
 the Armed Forces of the Philippines until his reversion to
inactive status on 15 Nov 1960, pursuant to the provision
of RA2332.
In 1969, he brought an action to compel the Sec
of Natl Defense and Chief of Staff of the AFP to
reinstate him in the active commissioned service of
the AFP, readjust his rank as of Captain, and to pay all
the emoluments and allowances due to home from the
tome of his reversion to inactive status. He claims that
his reversion to inactive status in 15 Nov 1960 is in
violation of the par. 11 of the special provision which
prohibits the reversion to inactive status of reserve
officers on active duty with at least 10 years of
accumulated active commissioned service.
The respondents contend that the said provision has no
relevance or pertinence whatsoever to the budget in
question or to any appropriation item contained therein,
and is therefore proscribed by Art. VI, Sec. 19, par. 2 of
the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the
general appropriation bill unless it relates specifically to
some particular appropriation therein; and any such
provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to
such appropriation.
Issue: Whether the subject provision contained in an act
is embraced in the subject and is properly connected
therewith, the subject to be considered is the one
expressed in the title of the act.
221 Atitiw v. Zamora (2005) (See above, Case # 69)
During the time of President Corazon Aquino, she
calling to active duty and the reversion to
inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP.
The paragraph in question also violated Art. VI,
Sec. 21, par. 1 of the 1935 Constitution of the
Philippines which provided that "No bill which may
be enacted into law shall embrace more than
one subject which shall be expressed in the title of
the bill." This constitutional requirement nullified and
rendered inoperative any provision contained in the
body of an act that was not fairly included in the
subject expressed in the title or was not germane to
or properly connected with that subject.
The constitutional provision was intended to
preclude the insertion of riders in legislation, a
RIDER being a provision not germane to the
subject-matter of the bill
But, if a provision in the body of the act is not fairly
included in this restricted subject, like the provision
relating to the policy matters of calling to active duty
and reversion to inactive duty of reserve officers of
the AFP, such provision is inoperative and of no
effect.
Par. 11 is unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative.
Instant petition denied. Being unconstitutional, it
confers no right and affords no protection. In legal
contemplation, it is as though it has never been
passed.
No. The assailed paragraph, insofar as it limits the
spending of the appropriation for CAR to the
winding up of its activities, does not constitute a
346!
initiated talks with the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army
and the Cordillera Bodong Administration (CBA) due to
the growing insurgency in the area since Marcos time.
The talks yielded into the recognition of Cordillera as an
autonomous region, together with the Muslim Mindanao.
The President in accordance with 1987 Constitution,
enacted E.O. 220 that created the CAR. The Congress on
the other hand enacted RA No. 6766 entitled An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.
A plebiscite was held wherein the people of Abra,
Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao, Mountain Province,
and Baguio City cast their votes on the ratification of
the Organic Act. Results showed that the creation of
an autonomous region was approved by a majority of
votes in the Ifugao province ONLY and overwhelmingly
rejected in the rest of the region.
Although the plebiscite did not pass, it was ruled that E.O.
220 is still in effect. During the presidency of Estrada, the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) 2000 was assailed as
it reduced the budget for certain departments of CAR and
that the reduction is feared to prevent CAR from reaching
its autonomy. The said provision in the GAA stated that
there should be funds for the “winding up of activities
done in CAR and the giving out of retirement benefits to
the employees and others affected.” They claim that said
removal of gov’t funds to the creation of CAR destroys the
autonomy of CAR.
Issue: Is the assailed paragraph constitute a rider?
rider. It precisely follows a standard that a provision
in an appropriations bill must relate specifically to
some particular appropriation therein. Said
paragraph meets the germaneness standard
because it lays down a limitation or restriction on
the use of a specific appropriation item already
provided in the 2000 GAA. Its operation expressly
confines to the budgetary allocation for the CAR.
Contents of the GAA should only pertain to
appropriations of budget or pertain directly to the
said appropriations. Thus the said assailed
provision is germane to the purpose of the bill as it
mentions the means of appropriation. Plus an
appropriations bill covers a broader range of subject
matter and therefore includes more details
compared to an ordinary bill. The title of an
appropriations bill cannot be any broader as it is
since it is not feasible to come out with a title that
embraces all the details included in an
appropriations bill. The assailed paragraph 1 of the
RA8760 does not constitute a rider.
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222 Farinas v. Executive RA No. 9006, entitled “An Act to Enhance the holding of
Secretary (2003) Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections
through fair election practices,” is a consolidation of the
following bills originating from the House of
Representatives and the Senate, respectively: (1) HB no.
9000 known as the “Omnibus Election Code”; (2) SB no.
1742 with the same title as RA 9006.
Sec. 14 of the RA 9006 repeals Sec. 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC)
“Section 14. Repealing Clause. – Section 67 and 85 of
the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bldg. 881)
and Sections 10 and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are
hereby repealed. xxx”
“SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any
elective official, whether national or local, running for any
office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-
President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.”
With the repeal of Sec. 67, all elective officials are now
placed on equal footing as they are allowed to finish their
respective terms even if they run for any office, whether
the presidency, vice-presidency or other elective
positions, other than the one they are holding in a
permanent capacity.
Petitioners allege that Section 14 of RA 9006, insofar as
it repeals Section 67 of the OEC, is unconstitutional for
being in violation of Sec. 26(1), Art. VI of the Constitution.
Whether Section 14 of RA 9006 is unconstitutional
No. The title is so broad that it encompasses all the
processes involved in an election exercise,
including the filing of certificates of candidacy by
elective officials. They argue that the repeal of
Section 67 is germane to the general subject of
Rep. Act No. 9006 as expressed in its title as it
eliminates the effect of prematurely terminating the
term of an elective official by his filing of a certificate
of candidacy for an office other than the one which
he is permanently holding, such that he is no longer
considered ipso facto resigned therefrom. The
legislature is not required to make the title of the act
a complete index of its contents.
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider.
The court is convinced that the title and the
objectives of RA 9006 are comprehensive enough
to include the repeal of Sec. 67 of the OEC. To
require that the said repeal of Sec. 67 of the Code
be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a
complete index of its content
The legislators considered Sec. 67 of the OEC as a
form of harassment or discrimination that had to be
done away with and repealed. The executive
department found cause with Congress when the
President of the Philippines signed the measure
into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in
government may believe that the repeal of Section
67 is bad policy as it would encourage political
adventurism. But policy matters are not the
concern of the Court. Government policy is within
the exclusive dominion of the political branches of
the government.
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 IV. Transfer of Funds
223 Demetria v. Alba (1987) There is a clear conflict between par. 1 of Section 44
of PD 1177 ("Budget Reform Decree of 1977”) which
states:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any
fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which
are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or
office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment.
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to
another was explicit and categorical under the 1973
Constitution.
The purpose and conditions for which funds may be
transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be
allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and
such transfer may be made only if there are savings
from another item in the appropriation of the
government branch or constitutional body.
Also, it fails to specify the objectives and purposes for
which the proposed transfer of funds are to be
made, allows the president to override the safeguards,
form and procedure prescribed by the Constitution,
amounts to undue delegation of legislative powers to the
executive, and are without or in excess of the authority
and jurisdiction of the president. Petitioners, as
concerned citizens of the country, assailed the
constitutionality of Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD
No. 1177.
Yes. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177
unduly over extends the privilege granted under
said Section 16[5].
Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for the
enactment of unfunded appropriations, results in
uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses
accountability for budgetary performance and
entrenches the pork barrel system as the ruling
party may well expand [sic] public money not on the
basis of development priorities but on political and
personal expediency.
The general principle relied upon cannot therefore
accord them the protection sought as they are not
acting within their "sphere of responsibility" but
without it.
The nation has not recovered from the shock, and
worst, the economic destitution brought about by
the plundering of the Treasury by the deposed
dictator and his cohorts (Marcos). A provision
which allows even the slightest possibility of a
repetition of this sad experience cannot remain
written in our statute books.
Also the claim that the decree was valid under 1973
Constitution cannot be countenanced. The
prohibition to transfer an appropriation from one
item to another was explicit and categorical under
the 1973 Constitution. The leeway granted was thus
limited. The purpose and conditions for which funds
may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may
349!
 Issue: Whether Section 44 (1) of PD 1177 is
unconstitutional
224 Araullo v. President Background: The Disbursement Acceleration Program
Aquino (2014) (DAP) was President Aquino’s, under the leadership of
DBM’s Secretary Florencio Abad, response to the
sluggish economic growth of the Philippines. The DAP
allowed the Executive to allocate public funds pooled
from unreleased appropriations from Personnel Services,
unprogrammed funds, carry-over appropriations from the
previous year, and budget from slow-moving items or
projects that had been realigned to support faster
disbursing projects of its various agencies in the guise of
the President exercising his constitutional authority under
Sec. 5 (5) Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution to transfer
funds out of savings to augment the appropriations made
by offices within the Executive Branch of the Government.
However, the challenges have proven to be more
complicated as allegations on transferring these funds
be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item
and such transfer may be made only if there are
savings from another item in the appropriation of
the government branch or constitutional body.
Sec 44(1) of PD 1177 empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one
department, bureau, office or agency of the
Executive Department to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau or office included
in the General Appropriations Act or approved after
its enactment, without regard as to whether or not
the funds to be transferred are actually savings in
the item from which the same are to be taken, or
whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be
made. These constitutional infirmities render the
provision in question null and void.
Yes. Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution
is used to keep a tight rein on the exercise of the
power to transfer funds appropriated by Congress
by the President and the other high officials of the
Government. Thus it could be seen that the funding
of current activities, projects, and programs, the
GENERAL RULE should still be that the budgetary
amount contained in the appropriations bill is the
extent Congress will determine as sufficient for the
budgetary allocation for the proponent agency. The
ONLY EXCEPTION is found in Section 25 (5),
Article VI of the Constitution. It bears emphasizing
that the exception in favor of the high officials
named in Section 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution are exclusive. Thus the President has
the power to transfer the funds.
350!
outside of the Executive Branch have been made.
Main Issue: The DAP initially surfaced when Sen.
Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered his privilege speech in
the Senate saying that some Senators including himself,
have been allotted an additional budget of P50M as an
incentive to oust Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. As a
response, Sec. Florencio Abad of the DBM released a
public statement stating that PHP50M came from the
DAP and that the said sum was given upon request of the
Senators via a letter. Moreover, he also said that this was
not the first time such disbursements have been made.
He explained that the funds under the DAP were usually
taken from (1) unreleased appropriations under
Personnel Services; (2) unprogrammed funds; (3) carry-
over appropriations unreleased from the previous year;
and (4) budgets for slow-moving items or projects that
had been realigned to support faster-disbursing projects.
The DBM soon came out to claim in its website that the
DAP releases had been sourced from savings generated
by the Government, and from unprogrammed funds; and
that the savings had been derived from:
(1) the pooling of unreleased appropriations, like
unreleased Personnel Services appropriations that would
lapse at the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of
slow-moving projects and discontinued projects per zero-
based budgeting findings; and
(2) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments for slow-
moving programs and projects that had been earlier
released to the agencies of the National Government.
However, the transfer of appropriated funds, to be
valid under Section 25(5), must be made upon a
concurrence of the following REQUISITES, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President,
the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
heads of the Constitutional Commissions to
transfer funds within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings
generated from the appropriations for their
respective offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to
augment an item in the general
appropriations law for their respective
offices.
In this case, the First Requisite–GAAs of 2011 and
2012 lacked valid provisions to authorize transfers
of funds under the DAP; hence, transfers under the
DAP were unconstitutional. To comply with the first
requisite, the GAAs should expressly authorize the
transfer of funds. In the 2011 GAA, the provision
that gave the President and the other high officials
the authority to transfer funds was Section 59, as
follows:
Section 59. Use of Savings. The President of the
Philippines, the Senate President, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
351!
Issue: Whether the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other
executive issuances allegedly implementing the DAP
violate Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution
the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional
Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the
Ombudsman are hereby authorized to augment any
item in this Act from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
This provision was reproduced in 2012 under
Section 53.
A reading shows, however, that the aforequoted
provisions of the GAAs of 2011 and 2012 were
textually unfaithful to the Constitution for not
carrying the phrase "for their respective offices"
contained in Section 25(5), supra. The impact of the
phrase "for their respective offices" was to authorize
only transfers of funds within their offices (i.e., in the
case of the President, the transfer was to an item of
appropriation within the Executive). The provisions
carried a different phrase ("to augment any item in
this Act"), and the effect was that the 2011 and
2012 GAAs thereby literally allowed the transfer of
funds from savings to augment any item in the
GAAs even if the item belonged to an office outside
the Executive. To that extent did the 2011 and 2012
GAAs contravene the Constitution. At the very least,
the aforequoted provisions cannot be used to claim
authority to transfer appropriations from the
Executive to another branch, or to a constitutional
commission. Realizing their error, the Congress
eventually changed the provision in 2013 GAA to be
constitutional.
The court also saw that there was a violation of the
second requisite as well since there were no
352!
savings from which funds could be sourced for the
DAP. The violation was sourced from the
misunderstanding or confusion with the word
“SAVINGS” under the Section 25 (5).

The petitioners posit that there could be savings

only when the Program, Activity or Project (PAP) for
which the funds had been appropriated were
actually implemented and completed, or finally
discontinued or abandoned. They insist that savings
could not be realized with certainty in the middle of
the fiscal year; and that the funds for "slow-moving"
PAPs could not be considered as savings because
such PAPs had not actually been abandoned or
discontinued yet. Belgica argues that "savings"
should be understood to refer to the excess money
after the items that needed to be funded have been
funded, or those that needed to be paid have been
paid pursuant to the budget.

Such definition of the petitioner is meritous since it

believes that the re-allocation of money before the
executive agency uses it is an act that is tantamount
to the President transgressing the power of the
Legislative to determine where the funds should go.
Thus in order to be called a “saving” it should be
either:

(i) still available after the completion or

final discontinuance or abandonment of
the work, activity or purpose for which
the appropriation is authorized;
(ii) from appropriations balances arising
from unpaid compensation and related

353!
 costs pertaining to vacant positions and
leaves of absence without pay; and
(iii) from appropriations balances realized
from the implementation of measures
resulting in improved systems and
efficiencies and thus enabled agencies
to meet and deliver the required or
planned targets, programs and services
approved in this Act at a lesser cost.

In this case, the DBM declares that part of the

savings brought under the DAP came from "pooling
of unreleased appropriations such as unreleased
Personnel Services appropriations which will lapse
at the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of
slow moving projects and discontinued projects per
Zero-Based Budgeting findings." Thus the fact
alone that the appropriations are unreleased or
unalloted is a mere description of the status of the
items as unalloted or unreleased. They have not yet
ripened into categories of items from which savings
can be generated.

Unobligated allotments, on the other hand, were

encompassed by the first part of the definition of
"savings" in the GAA, that is, as "portions or
balances of any programmed appropriation in this
Act free from any obligation or encumbrance."
HOWEVER, NBC No. 541 (Authority of DBM to
withdraw unobligated allotments) did not set in clear
terms the criteria for the withdrawal of unobligated
allotments. It only specified that the withdrawal of
unobligated allotments will be for those "slow-
moving projects" in order "to fund priority and/or

354!
fast-moving programs/projects." The problem is that
such withdrawn money does not satisfy the
category of being a saving since it is not technically
considered as abandoned or discontinued project.

Finally, the third requisite is violated when funds

from savings were transferred under the DAP to
augment deficient items not provided in the GAA.
Under the law, an appropriation for any PAP must
first be determined to be deficient before it could be
augmented from savings. This did not seemed to be
the case. Looking at one of the projects funded by
the DAP which is the Disaster Risk, Exposure,
Assessment and Mitigation (DREAM) project under
the Department of Science and Technology
(DOST), it covered the amount of P1.6 Billion which
was originally to be just P537,910,000. Such
amount exceeded since the President added other
expenses namely the funding of “personnel services
and capital outlays.” Thus it is clear that the
President added other expenses through DAP that
allowed him to substitute and transgress the
decision of the legislative to not fund such project.

Additionally, the third requisite is further violated

when the President initiated cross-border
augmentations from savings. Under the
Constitution, the augmentation of funds should be
limited to the “respective offices.” This means that
each offices head is limited only to his office like the
President to Executive; the Senate, with respect to
the Senate President; the House of
Representatives, with respect to the Speaker; the
Judiciary, with respect to the Chief Justice; the

355!

225 Liga v. COMELEC By early 1994, the Congress itself had made an
(1994) assessment that the P137, 878,000.00 that were
appropriated by Congress for the holding of the 1994
barangay elections in the General Appropriation Act of
1994, would be insufficient to defray the cost of
holding the said elections.
In order to augment the said appropriated amount,
petitioners allege that the respondents have
threatened and are about to effect a transfer or re-
allocation of the following amounts to be sourced
from the executive and legislative branches of
Government to respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). According to the news item entitled
“Barangay Poll Funds Found” in 18 March 1994 issue
of the Manila Bulletin, the following are the figures:
(a) P180,000,000 from the appropriation of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).
(b) P100,000,000 from the Countryside Development
Fund; P70,000,000 from the Senate and
P30,000,000)from the House of Representatives; and
(c) P43,000,000 from the Internal Revenue Allotments
(IRA) of Provinces, Cities and Municipalities.
Constitutional Commissions, with respect to their
respective Chairpersons.
Such violation in this case happened when the
Executive authorized the funding of 43 Million of the
HoR’s e-library in 2010. The second instance is
when the Executive authorized the release of funds
to the Commission on Audit when it requested help
in funding it IT development for good governance
programs.
No. If the public respondents are attempting, or
intending to effect the transfer of funds would be in
direct contravention of Sec. 25(5), Art. VI, of the
Constitution; however the Court, finding the
explanation of respondents to be well taken,
dismissed the petition due to lack of merit.
Undoubtedly, the threat to pursue the scheme, if
ever there was one, existed only in newspaper
reports which could have misled the general public,
including the petitioners, into believing that the
same emanated from unimpeccable sources.
The Court acknowledges that petitioners have
displayed vigilance and acted with the best of
intentions when they filed the present petitions. Yet,
it would have been more prudent for them to
have first obtained an official statement or at
least confirmation from respondents as to the
veracity of the reports contained in the said
news item — which could itself have been quoted
out of context by the reporter concerned or simply
abbreviated to meet the day's deadline.
356!
 Petitioners raise the issue on the ground that to
effect the transfer of funds would be in direct
contravention of Section 25(5), Article 6 of the
Constitution. Respondents argue the said reports were
mere unofficial proposals or suggestions made in the
process of searching for funds for the said elections but
which were later discarded by the proponents
themselves. COMELEC particularly alleges that it
intends to fund the forthcoming barangay elections
(1) from the P137,878,000 appropriated by Congress
for the said elections and (2) from its (COMELEC's)
own savings resulting from unused funds originally
intended for the conduct and supervision of elections and
other political exercises such as funds for the sectoral
elections which did not take place and (3) possibly from
a portion of its (COMELEC's) modernization program
for which the amount of more than five hundred million
pesos (P500,000,000) had been appropriated by
Congress. Also the (4) fund of the local government
may also be used to help defray the cost in accordance
with Section 50 of the Omnibus Election Code which
provides that LGUs are required to appropriate funds for
barangay elections.

Issue: Whether COMELEC is indeed officially initiating

the alleged transfer of funds for the barangay elections.
226 PhilConsa v. Enriquez House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of
(1994) 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both
houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it
imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of
appropriations in the proposed budget previously
submitted by the President.
It also authorized members of Congress to propose and
(1) Yes. Regarding Pork Barrel System or
Countrywide Development Fund / pork barrels
(Article 48). The court believes that it is
constitutional; not encroachment of executive power
The power of appropriation lodged in Congress
carries with it the power to specify the project or
activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It
can be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants

357!
identify projects in the “pork barrels” allotted to them
and to realign their respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment
of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress
presented the said bill to the President for consideration
and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into
law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act
NO. 7663, entitled “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS
FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO
DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” (GAA
of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his
Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of
the bill he vetoed and one of which he vetoed is:
5. Use of Savings. The Chief of Staff, AFP, is authorized,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of National
Defense, to use savings in the appropriations provided
herein to augment the pension fund being managed by
the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System as
provided under Sections 2(a) and 3 of P.D. No. 361 (GAA
of 1994, p. 746).
Instead, Senators Tañada and Romulo sought the
issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus
against the respondents in G.R. No. 113766. In this
petition, petitioners contest the constitutionality of: (1) the
veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA
of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
and the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President
it to be.
The CDF is explicit that it shall be used "for
infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and
computers and other priority projects and activities
and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries…"
It was Congress itself that determined the purposes
for the appropriation. Executive function under the
CDF involves implementation of the priority projects
specified in the law. The authority given to the
members of Congress is only to propose and
identify projects to be implemented by the
President.
Hence, under Article 48 of the GAA of 1994, if the
proposed projects qualify for funding under the
CDF, it is the President who shall implement them.
In short, the proposals and identifications made by
the members of Congress are merely
recommendatory.
(2) Yes. Special Provision on Use of Savings for
AFP Pensions – allows Chief of Staff to augment
pension funds through the use of savings. Accdg. to
the Consti. only the Pres. may exercise such power
pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO
VALID.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of
Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund
for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement
and Separation Benefits System is violative of
Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the
Constitution.
358!
 in the implementation of certain appropriations for the
CAFGU’s, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority
(NHA).
Issues: (1) Whether the Pork Barrel is legal
(2) Whether the veto of Savings for AFP pensions is valid.
227 Belgica et al. v. Hon Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of the Pork
Ochoa et al. (2013) Barrel System. Pork Barrel refers to an appropriation of
government spending meant for localized projects and
secured solely or primarily to bring money to a
representative's district. In the Philippines, the “pork
barrel” has been commonly referred to as lump-sum,
discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature,
although, its usage would evolve in reference to certain
funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund.
The Malampaya Funds was a special fund created under
PD 910 issued by then President Marcos for the
development of indigenous energy resources vital to
economic growth. The Presidential Social Fund is
sourced from the share of the government in the
aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR through which the
President provides direct assistance to priority programs
and projects not funded under the regular budget.
In 1996, an anonymous source later identified as Former
Marikina City Romeo Candazo revealed that huge sums
of government money went into the pockets of legislators
Under Section 25(5), no law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations, and
under Section 29(1), no money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law. While Section 25(5)
allows as an exception the realignment of savings
to augment items in the general appropriations law
for the executive branch, such right must and can
be exercised only by the President pursuant to a
specific law.
(1) Yes. The Pork Barrel involves lump-sum
discretionary funds. Thus the court identifies the
two lump-sum discretionary funds:
[1] Congressional Pork Barrel – from herein is
referred as the lump-sum, discretionary fund
wherein legislators, either individually or collectively
organize into committees are able to effectively
control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization
through various post-enactment measures and/or
practices.
[2] Presidential Pork Barrel from herein the lump-
sum, discretionary fund which allows the President
to determine the manner of its utilization.
Thus the Pork Barrel is unconstitutional on the
following grounds:
1. It violates the separation of powers when it
allows the Congress to intrude in the execution of
the project. The court believes that it is done in the
form of project lists, consultations, program menus,
etc., the legislators are given the power to identify
359!
as kickbacks. In 2004, several concerned citizens sought
the nullification of the PDAF for being unconstitutional.
Unfortunately, for lack of any pertinent evidentiary support
that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has
become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of
Congress, the petition was dismissed.
In July 2013, NBI began its probe into allegations that
“the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion
over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from
the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government
agencies for scores of ghost projects.”
The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six
whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation
(stands for Janet Lim Napoles) had facilitated the
swindling of billions of pesos from the public coffers for
“ghost projects” using no fewer than 20 dummy non-
government organizations for an entire decade. In August
2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released report
revealing substantial irregularities in the disbursement
and utilization of PDAF by the Congressmen during the
Arroyo administration. Under the Arroyo Administration
the Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)
by the DBM the application and implementation of the
projects by the appropriate implementing agencies and
the several government-owned-and-controlled
corporations (GOCCs).
As for the 'Presidential Pork Barrel', whistle-blowers
alleged that "at least P900 Million from royalties in the
operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan
province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has
gone into a dummy NGO.
the project they decided to be funded through 2013
PDAF Articles Special Provision 1-5. The
Congress determines the project by requiring under
Special Provision 1 for agencies to pass a project
menu to which they can pick and choose. Under
Special Provision 2, implementing agencies shall
are required, within 90 days from the GAA is
passed, to submit to Congress a more detailed
priority list, standard or design prepared and
submitted from which the legislator may make his
choice. Under Special Provision 3, the legislator
then fixes the limit of the funding. Also under
Special Provision 4, the implementing agencies
are required to submit a list of modification for
endorsement. Lastly, there is also a post-enactment
authority that is granted to the legislators under
Special Provision 5 that allows them to control
fund release and realignment of funds. Clearly such
acts allow legislators to assume the role of the
executive department.
2. It violates the non-delegability of legislative
power when legislators are given a personal lump-
sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a)
how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific
project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine. This is a violation of non-delegability
since the Constitution under Art. VI, Sec. 29(1)
requires that appropriations are to be done by law.
Additionally, the power to appropriate funds is
solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses
comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the
individual members. Further, nowhere in the
exceptions does it state that the Congress can
360!

Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA
Report and the Napoles controversy, several
petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking
that the Pork Barrel System be declared
unconstitutional
The Office of Ombudsman charged 5 lawmakers for
plunder and 3 for malversation, direct bribery, and
violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act. Also
included are the lawmakers’ chef-of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other officials of three
implementing agencies, and the several presidents of
NGOs set up by Napoles.
Issues: (1) Whether the Pork Barrel is unconstitutional.
(2) Whether the Pork Barrel violates Article VI Section 25
(5) of the Constitution.
delegate the power to the individual member of
Congress.
3. It violates Checks and Balance since the
President cannot veto a lump-sum discretionary
budget whose purpose is still uncertain. For the
President to exercise his item-veto power, it
necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item"
which may be the object of the veto. An item, as
defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to
"the particulars, the details, the distinct and
severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill."
4. It violates Accountability under Section 1,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Congressional
oversight may be performed either through: (a)
scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of
appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of
departments to appear before and be heard by
either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation; or (b)
investigation and monitoring of the implementation
of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
The fact that individual legislators are given post-
enactment roles in the implementation of the budget
makes it difficult for them to become disinterested
"observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or
monitoring the implementation of the appropriation
law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight
would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested
with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be
361!
checking on activities in which they themselves
participate.

(2) Yes. Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987

Constitution requires that the "special
appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for
which it is intended, and shall be supported by
funds actually available as certified by the National
Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding
revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile, with respect
to discretionary funds, Section 25(6), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall
be disbursed only for public purposes to be
supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to
such guidelines as may be prescribed by law."

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79

Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit
since the said amount would be further divided
among individual legislators who would then receive
personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the
GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds
based on their own discretion. As these
intermediate appropriations are made by legislators
only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of
the law, it necessarily means that the actual items
of PDAF appropriation would not have been written
into the General Appropriations Bill

In particular, the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion

would be treated as a mere funding source allotted
for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships,
medical missions, assistance to indigents,
preservation of historical materials, construction of

362!

228 Sanchez v. COA (2008) In 1991, Congress passed RA 7180 otherwise known as
the General Appropriations Act of 1992. This law provided
an appropriation for the DILG under Title XIII and set
aside the amount of P75,000,000.00 for the DILG's
Capability Building Program.
On 11 November 1991, Atty. Hiram C. Mendoza (Atty.
Mendoza), Project Director of the Ad Hoc Task Force for
Inter-Agency Coordination to Implement Local Autonomy,
informed then Deputy Executive Secretary Dionisio de la
Serna of the proposal to constitute and implement a
"shamrock" type task force to implement local autonomy
institutionalized under the Local Government Code of
1991.
The proposal was accepted by the Deputy Executive
Secretary and attested by then DILG Secretary Cesar N.
Sarino, one of the petitioners herein, who consequently
issued a memorandum for the transfer and
remittance to the Office of the President of the sum of
P300,000.00 for the operational expenses of the task
force. An additional cash advance of P300,000.00 was
requested. Upon post-audit conducted by Department
auditor Iluminada M.V. Fabroa, however, the amounts
were disallowed.
Issue: Whether there is legal basis for the transfer of
funds of the Capability Building Program Fund
appropriated in the 1992 General Appropriation Act from
roads, flood control, etc. This setup connotes that
the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts
and purposes of the appropriation for further
determination and, therefore, does not readily
indicate a discernible item
No. Clearly, there are two essential requisites in
order that a transfer of appropriation with the
corresponding funds may legally be
effected. First, there must be savings in the
programmed appropriation of the transferring
agency. Second, there must be an existing item,
project or activity with an appropriation in the
receiving agency to which the savings will be
transferred.
Actual savings is a sine qua non to a valid transfer
of funds from one government agency to
another. The word actual denotes that something is
real or substantial, or exists presently in fact as
opposed to something which is merely theoretical,
possible, potential or hypothetical.
The Court in Philconsa v. Enriquez, categorically
declared that the Senate President and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, shall approve the realignment (of savings).
However, "[B]efore giving their stamp of approval,
these two officials will have to see to it that: (1) The
funds to be realigned or transferred are actually
savings in the items of expenditures from which the
same are to be taken; and (2) The transfer or
realignment is for the purpose of augmenting the
items of expenditure to which said transfer or
realignment is to be made.”
363!
 the Department of Interior and Local Government to the
Office of the President;
Section 26.
(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof
in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
Further, the records of this case unmistakably point
to the reality that there were no savings at the time
of the questioned transfer. Records show that there
were two deposits dated 31 January 1992 and 28
April 1992. The said deposits showed that such
money could not have been deposit because the
1992 GAA took effect only on 1 January 1992 or 30
days before. No savings could have existed in such
short amount of time.
As regards the requirement that there be an item to
be augmented, which is also a sine qua non like the
first requirement on the existence of savings, there
was no item for augmentation in the appropriation
for the Office of the President at the time of the
transfers in question. Augmentation denotes that an
appropriation was determined to be deficient after
the implementation of the project or activity for
which an appropriation was made, or after an
evaluation of the needed resources. To say that the
existing items in the appropriation for the Office of
the President already needed augmentation as
early as 31 January 1992 is putting the cart before
the horse.
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
364!
One subject in title is mandatory (Central Capiz v. Remirez)
It should be interpreted, however, liberally rather than strictly or
technically. As long as it is embraced in the general subject it is
germane to the subject (Sumulong v. Commission on Elections).
1. To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation
2. To prevent surprise or fraud on legislature Notes:
3. Fairly appraise people thru publication (deprivation of rights) Requiring every bill passed to embrace only one subject which shall
be expressed in the title thereof is aimed against the evils of the so-
Process: called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious
st
" 1 Reading: Only title sent to deliberations committee. and/or unconsidered encroaches.
nd
" 2 Reading: debate and deliberations
rd
" 3 Reading: Title and no more amendments and voting. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its
title is not a mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to Congress;
When the President certifies a bill what may be disregarded? ITS IS MANDATORY. The title of the bill, HOWEVER, is NOT
The bill still has to pass three readings, however, the certification required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be
dispenses with the requirement that these be done on separate comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure.
days. The three readings can be done in ONE DAY.
The Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles
of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or
impede the power of legislation.

If the title fairly indicated the general subject, and reasonably covers
all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the
legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement.

Section 26. Subject and title of bills – general prohibition of “riders”

229 Cordero v. Cordero is the trial lawyer of the Tenancy Counsel Unit of No, the sections are constitutional. The SC held that that
Cabantuando the Agricultural Tenancy Commission of the Department the constitutional requirement in question is satisfied
(1962) of Justice. He later appeared as the counsel of indigent if all parts of the law are related, and are germane to
tenant Salazar who filed a case against landlord Sta. the subject matter expressed in the title of the bill. The
Romana in order to reinstate and reliquidate past harvests. constitutional requirement is complied with as long as the
Sta. Romana filed a motion to disqualify Cordero as counsel law, as in the instant case, has a single general subject

365!
for Salazar and he invoked Sec. 54 of R.A. 1199 or The
Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines, which states that:
“Section 54. Representation by Counsel. - In all cases
wherein a tenant cannot afford to the represented by
counsel, it shall be the duty of the Public Defender of the
Department of Labor to represent him, upon proper
notification by the party concerned, or the court of competent
jurisdiction shall assign or appoint counsel de oficio for the
indigent tenant.”
Cordero appealed. During pendency of the appeal, R.A. 2263
or An Act Amending Certain Sections of RA 1199, known as
the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines was
passed. This law amended the previous law and now
allows trial lawyers from the TCU to represent indigent
tenants. Cordero filed a Manifestation averring that by
virtue of the amendment, the issue has now become
moot and academic. Judge Cabatuando countered that
the provision is not embraced in the title.
which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act. The amendatory
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as
they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, will be regarded as valid.
The provisions of sections 19 and 20 of Republic Act No.
2263 are certainly germane to, and are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the one general
subject, agricultural tenancy. To declare sections 19 and
20 of Republic Act No. 2 null and void would in effect
upset the transfer of duty of representing indigent
tenants from the public defenders of the Department
of Labor to the trial attorney in the Mediation Division
of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission of the
Department of Justice. In other words, a declaration of
nullity of these provisions of Republic Act No. 2263 would
do harm to, and would be nugatory of, intention of
Congress to consolidate the function of enforcing our
tenancy laws in the Department of Justice.

The fundamental objection of respondent to the presumed

constitutionality of these sections is that section 19 of
Republic Act No. 226 authorizing the Secretary of Justice
acting through a tenancy mediation division, to carry out
a national enforcement program including the mediation
of tenancy disputes, is not expressed in the title of the
bill as required by section 21, paragraph 1, of Article VI of
the Philippine Constitution.

Issue: Whether Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. Act No. 2263 is

unconstitutional because of the constitutional provision that
“No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more
than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill.”

366!
230 Philconsa v. RA 3836 (Subsection [c], paragraph 2, Section 1) is the law
Gimenez that allows an officer of Congress and an elective officer of
(1965) either House of Congress to retire regardless of age.
However, to be eligible for retirement, the officer must
have served for at least 12 years as such Senator and/or
as Member of the House of Representatives. For an
elective officer, he must have served the government for
at least 12 years, of which not less than four years must
have been rendered as such elective officer.
The gratuity payable by the employer or office concerned is
equivalent to one year's salary for every four years of service
in the government. Said gratuity is exempt from taxation, not
liable to attachment or execution, and not refundable in case
of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree.
PhilConsa assails the constitutionality of RA 3836 that allows
retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick
leave to Senators and Representatives and to elective
officials of the Congress. He asserts that the bill does not
express the gratuities of the Senators and HOR.
Issue: Whether Republic Act 3836 is constitutional
231 Alalayan v. Republic Act No. 3043 is an amendatory act empowering
NPC (1968) National Power Corporation "in any contract for the supply
of electric power to a franchise holder," receiving at least
50% of its electric power and energy from it to require as
a condition that such franchise holder "shall not realize a
net profit of more than twelve percent annually of its
Yes. It is to be observed that under Republic Act 3836,
amending the first paragraph of section 12, subsection (c)
of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Acts
Nos. 660 and 3096, the retirement benefits are granted
to members of the Government Service Insurance
System, who have rendered at least twenty years of
service regardless of age. This paragraph is related and
germane to the subject of Commonwealth Act No. 186.
HOWEVER, par. 8 of Republic Act 3836 refers to
members of Congress and to elective officers thereof who
are not members of the Government Service Insurance
System. To provide retirement benefits, therefore, for
these officials, would relate to subject matter which is not
germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other words,
this portion of the amendment (re: retirement benefits for
Members of Congress and elected officers, such as the
Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for each House) is not
related in any manner to the subject of Commonwealth
Act 186 establishing the Government Service Insurance
System and which provides for both retirement and
insurance benefits to its members.
In short, Republic Act 3836 violates three constitutional
provisions, namely: first, the prohibition regarding increase
in the salaries of Members of Congress; second, the equal
protection clause; and third, the prohibition that the title of
a bill shall not embrace more than one subject.
Yes. Riders are provisions which are not germane to the
purposes a specific bill. They are also known as
inappropriate provisions.
The benefit of having no bill "which may be enacted into
law that embrace more than one subject which shall be
367!
 investments plus two-month operating expenses."
Respondent, under such provision, needs to "renew all
existing contracts with franchise holders for the supply
of electric power and energy," so that the provisions of
the Act could be given effect.
Alalayan and Philippine Power Development Company are
re-suppliers of power produced by NAPOCOR. They assail
the constitutionality of the power vested in National Power
Corporation under RA 3043 and aver that the Section 3 of RA
3043 is a rider in only meant to increase the capital stock of
NAPOCOR.
Issue: Whether Section 3 of RA 3043 is constitutional.
232 Insular The petitioner is a corporation organized and existing under
Lumber the laws of New York. U.S.A., and duly authorized to do
Company v. business in the Philippines as a licensed forest
CTA (1981) concessionaire. It purchases manufactured oil and motor
fuel which it used in the operation of its forest concession on
which specific tax was paid. Insular Lumber Company filed a
expressed in [its] title ...” is aimed against the evils of the
so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well
as surreptitious or unconsidered enactments.
If the law amends a section or part of a statute, it suffices
if reference be made to the legislation to be amended,
there being no need to state the precise nature of the
amendment.
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to
employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the
title should serve the purpose of the constitutional
demand that it inform the legislators, the persons
interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire
into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take
appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or
fraud upon the legislators. In this case, the law is entitled
"An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act Numbered
One Hundred Twenty, as Amended by Republic Act
Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and Forty One."
WHEREFORE, there being no showing that Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 3043 is unconstitutional, the decision of
the lower court, dismissing the petition, is affirmed. With
costs against petitioner Alalayan.
No. In the first assignment of error, the Commissioner
contends that the first proviso in Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 1435 is unconstitutional. In claiming the
unconstitutionality of the aforesaid section, the
Commissioner anchored its argument on Article VI,
Section 21(l) of the 1935 Constitution (now Art. VI, §26)
368!
 claim for refund of P19, 921.37 representing 25% of the
specific tax paid on the manufactured oil and fuel used in its
operations pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Republic
Act No. 1435 “An Act to Provide Means for Increasing The
Highway Special Fund”
Section 5. Provided, however, that whenever any oils
mentioned above are used by miners or forest
concessionaires in their operations, twenty-five per centum of
the specific tax paid thereon shall be refunded by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue upon submission of proof
of actual use of oils and under similar conditions enumerated
in subparagraph one and two of section one hereof,
amending section one hundred forty-two of the National
Internal Revenue Code.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, on the other hand,
contends that privilege of partial tax refund granted by
Section 5 to those using oil in the operation of forest and
mining concessions is limited to a period of five (5) years
from June 14, 1956, the date effectivity of said Act.
Consequently, oil used in such concession after June 14,
1961 are subject to the full tax prescribed in Section 142 of
the National Internal Revenue Code.
Issue: Whether Section 5 of Republic Act No. 1435 is
unconstitutional.
233 Tio v. Petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of
Videogram other videogram operators adversely affected assails the
Regulatory constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An
Board (1987) Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with
We find no merit in the argument. Republic Act No. 1435
deals with only one subject and proclaims just one
policy, namely, the necessity for increasing the
Highway Special Fund through the imposition of an
increased specific tax on manufactured oils.
Section 5 of the law is in effect a partial exemption from
the imposed increased tax. Said proviso, which has
reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, is nor, a deviation
from the general subject of the law. The primary purpose
of the aforequoted constitutional provision is to prohibit
duplicity in legislation the title of which might completely
fail to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature,
scope and consequences of the law or its operation.
This does not seem to this Court to have been ignored
in the passage of Republic Act No. 1435 since, as the
records of its proceedings bear out, a full debate on
precisely the issue of whether its title reflects its
complete subject was held by Congress which passed
it. Furthermore, in deciding the constitutionality of a
statute alleged to be defectively titled, every
presumption favors the validity of the Act. As is true
republic in cases presenting other constitutional issues,
the courts avoid declaring an Act unconstitutional
whenever possible. Where there is any doubt as to the
insufficiency of either the title, or the Art, the legislation
should be sustained. In the incident on hand, this Court
does not even have any doubt.
No. The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and
is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of,
the general object of the DECREE, which is the
regulation of the video industry through the Videogram
369!
 broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram
industry (hereinafter briefly referred to as the BOARD). The
Decree was promulgated on October 5, 1985 and took effect
on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days after completion of its
publication in the Official Gazette. Petitioner assails the
following section as violating the one-subject-one-bill rule.
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of
Videograms. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent
(30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may
be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram
containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual
program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax
collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty
percent (50%) shall acrrue to the municipality where the tax
is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax
shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the
Metropolitan Manila Commission.
Issue: Whether PD 1987 is unconstitutional due to the tax
provision.
234 Phil Judges (Same as above, Case # 167)
Assn. v.
Prado (1993) R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine
Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and
Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and
for Other Purposes Connected Therewith."
Petitioners are assailing Section 35 of RA 7354 as
Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax
provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that
general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is
simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms
scattered throughout the DECREE. The express purpose
of the DECREE to include taxation of the video industry in
order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore
uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from
Preambles 2 (taxation of videogram) and 5 (use of tax
money for regulation of videogram).
Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in
presenting the measure. The title of the DECREE, which
is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is
comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed
in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It
is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title/
An act having a single general subject, indicated in
the title, may contain any number of provisions, no
matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are
not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject,
and may be considered in furtherance of such subject
by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general object." The claim that Section 10 is a
rider has not merit.
No. R.A. No. 7354 is a repealing statute.
The contention is untenable. The title of the bill is not
required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the
measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates
the general subject, and reasonably covers all the
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the
370!
 implemented by Philippine Postal Corporation through its
circular No. 92-98. This withdraw the franking privilege from
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, Regional Trial
Courts, MTC, MNTC and the Land Registration Commission
along with other government offices.
Petitioner then assails the constitutionality on grounds that
title embraces more than one subject
Issue: Whether RA 7354 embraces more than one subject?
235 Tolentino v. (Same as above, Case # 215)
Secretary of
Finance Petitioner maintains that RA 7716 violates Art. VI, §26(1) of
legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance
with the constitutional requirement.
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically
stated in its title, but matter germane to the subject as
expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment
of the object in view, may properly be included in the act.
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former
law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of
the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a
law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its
title. As observed in one case, if the title of an act
embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was never
claimed that every other act which repeals it or alters by
implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act.
Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the
Constitution, nor practicable.
RA 7374 Sec. 3: d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are
generated by and within the industry to finance the overall
cost of providing the varied range of postal delivery and
messengerial services as well as the expansion and
continuous upgrading of service standards by the same.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking
privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No.
7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and
effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue
of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not
have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
No. It is unnecessary to do this in order to comply with the
constitutional requirement, since it is already stated in the
title that the law seeks to amend the pertinent provisions
371!
 (1994) the Constitution. PAL contends that the amendment of its
franchise by the withdrawal of its exemption from the VAT is
not expressed in the title of the law. By stating that R.A. No.
7716 seeks to "[RESTRUCTURE] THE VALUE-ADDED TAX
(VAT) SYSTEM [BY] WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND
ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE
PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES," Congress thereby clearly expresses its
intention to amend any provision of the NIRC which
stands in the way of accomplishing the purpose of the
law.
R.A. No. 7716 seeks to withdraw certain exemptions,
including that granted to PAL, by amending §103, as follows:
§103. Exempt transactions. — The following shall be exempt
from the value-added tax
of the NIRC, among which is §103(q), in order to widen
the base of the VAT.
Actually, it is the bill which becomes a law that is required
to express in its title the subject of legislation. The titles of
H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 in fact specifically referred
to §103 of the NIRC as among the provisions sought to be
amended. We are satisfied that sufficient notice had
been given of the pendency of these bills in Congress
before they were enacted into what is now R.A. No. 7716.
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically
stated in its title, but matter germane to the subject as
expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment
of the object in view, may properly be included in the act.

Issue: Does R.A. No. 7716 violate Art. VI, § 26(2) of the
Constitution?
236 Tobias v. (Same as above, Case # 126) No. Contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, the creation of a
Abalos separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not
(1994) Issue: Whether RA 7675 violated Article VI, Section 26 of the separate and distinct from the subject but is a natural and
Constitution logical consequence of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city. The court has also liberally adjudged “one
title-one subject” in order not to cripple legislation.

It is already sufficient that the title expresses the general

subject and all the provisions are germane to that general
subject. There should be a practical rather than a
technical construction.
237 Tatad v. Sec (Same as above, Case # 106) No. A law having a single general subject indicated in the
(DOE) (1997) title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how

372!
 RA 8180: providing for the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry (Oil Deregulation Law). It provided
for a tariff differential (7% for new players who don’t have
refineries and 4% for current players who already have local
refineries). Petitioners assailed §5(b) and §15 of R.A. No.
8180 or the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of
1996.
§5(b) of the law provided that “tariff duty shall be imposed . . .
on imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and
imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven
percent (7%) . . .” On the other hand, §15 provided that “[t]he
DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than
March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full
deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining and when the
exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is
stable . . .”
Tatad assails Sec 5(b) of RA 8180 providing for tariff
differentials because he alleged that the imposition of
tariff rates is alien to the law’s subject which is Oil
Deregulation.
Issue: Did §5(b) violate the one title-one subject requirement
of the Constitution?
238 De Guzman Petitioner files a preliminary injunction and temporary
v. COMELEC restraining order, assailing the validity of Section 44 of
(2000) Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The
Voter’s Registration Act of 1996". RA 8189 was enacted
on June 10, 1996 and approved by President Fidel V. Ramos
on June 11, 1996. Section 44 thereof provides:
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for
the method and means of carrying out the general
subject.
We hold that section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is
germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the
deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is
supposed to sway prospective investors to put up
refineries in our country and make them rely less on
imported petroleum.
Principle is stated in Section 2: The objective of the
deregulation law is quite simple. As aptly enunciated in
Sec. 2 thereof, it is to "foster a truly competitive market
which can better achieve the social policy objectives of fair
prices and adequate, continuous supply of
environmentally-clean and high quality petroleum
products.
No. Section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is
sufficiently complied with where, as in this case, the title is
comprehensive enough to embrace the general objective
it seeks to achieve, and all the parts of the statute are
related and germane to the subject matter embodied in
the title or so long as the same are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject and title.
373!
 "SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election
Officer shall hold office in a particular city or municipality for
more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at
the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto,
has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or
municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the
Commission to a new station outside the original
congressional district."
By virtue of the said section, COMELEC issued directives
that reassigned the petitioners, who are either City or
Municipal Election Officers, to different stations.
Issue: Whether Section 44 of RA 8189 is unconstitutional
239 Cawaling v. On August 16, 2000, former President Estrada signed into
COMELEC law R.A. No. 8806, an “Act Creating the City of Sorsogon
Sec. 44 of RA 8189 is not isolated considering that it is
related and germane to the subject matter stated in the
title of the law. The title of RA 8189 is "The Voter’s
Registration Act of 1996" with a subject matter enunciated
in the explanatory note as "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A
GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING A
SYSTEM OF CONTINUING REGISTRATION,
PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AND
AUTHORIZING THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS
THEREFOR." Section 44, which provides for the
reassignment of election officers, is relevant to the
subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure the
integrity of the registration process by providing a
guideline for the COMELEC to follow in the
reassignment of election officers. It is not an alien
provision but one which is related to the conduct and
procedure of continuing registration of voters
The objectives of Art. VI, §26(1) of the 1987 Constitution
are:
- To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation;
- To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature
by means of provisions in bills of which the titles
gave no information, and which might therefore be
overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally
adopted; and
- To fairly apprise the people, through such
publication of legislative proceedings as is usually
made, of the subjects of legislation that are being
considered, in order that they may have
opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or
otherwise if they shall so desire.
No. The argument is far from persuasive. Contrary to
petitioner’s assertion, there is only one subject embraced
374!
 (2001) By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon and Sorsogon
in the Province of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds
Therefor.” The COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the
matter for ratification. On December 17, 2000, the Plebiscite
City Board of Canvassers (PCBC) proclaimed the creation of
the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by
the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite. Invoking his
right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of
Sorsorgon, Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. filed petitions
challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806.
One of the issues raised was R.A. No. 8806 actually
embraces two principal subjects which are: (1) the
creation of the City of Sorsogon, and (2) the abolition of
the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. While the title
of the Act sufficiently informs the public about the creation of
Sorsogon City, petitioner claims that no such information has
been provided on the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon
and Sorsogon.
Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8806 violate the "one subject-one
bill" rule enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI of
theConstitution
240 Abakada v. (Same as above, Case # 86 and 168)
Ermita (2005)
House Bill No. 3555 was introduced on first reading on
January 7, 2005. The President certified the bill on January
7, 2005 for immediate enactment. On January 27, 2005, the
in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of
Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate
existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject
separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon
City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical,
natural and inevitable consequence of the
merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary means by
which the City of Sorsogon was created. Hence, the title
of the law, “An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by
Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the
Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds Therefor,”
cannot be said to exclude the incidental effect of
abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be
considered to have deprived the public of fair
information on this consequence.
It is well-settled that the “one title-one subject” rule does
not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully
index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the
persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal
rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to
cripple or impede legislation.”
Petitioners argument that the practice where a bicameral
conference committee is allowed to add or delete
provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill after these
had passed three readings is in effect a circumvention of
the no amendment rule (Sec. 26 (2), Art. VI of the 1987
375!
House of Representatives approved the bill on second and
third reading. House Bill 3705 was also introduced in the
House and its mother bill is House Bill 3555. The President
also certified it as urgent on February 8, 2005. The House of
Representatives approved the bill on second and third
reading on February 28, 2005. Meanwhile in the Senate, they
passed Senate Bill No. 1950. It is a bill that substituted 3
other previous bills introduced in the Senate and took into
consideration the House Bill No. 3555 and House Bill 3705
when it was made. Before long, the Conference
Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill
No. 3555, House Bill No. 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950,
“after having met and discussed in full free and conference,”
recommended the approval of its report, which the Senate
did on May 10, 2005, and with the House of Representatives
agreeing thereto the next day.
The enrolled copy of the consolidated House and Senate
version was transmitted to the President, who signed the
same into law on May 24, 2005. Thus, came R.A. No.
9337. On July 1, 2005, a TRO was issued because there
were confusion on its implementation and that some claim
that all prices went up by 10% when in fact there are some
provision on the law that gave leeway to in terms of tax
increase. The reason the Court implemented a TRO was to
clarify the confusion in its implementation.
Issue: Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates Article VI, Section
26(2) of the Constitution.
Constitution), fails to convince the Court to deviate from its
ruling in the Tolentino case that:
Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committees
Report in these cases must have undergone three
readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case,
there would be no end to negotiation since each house
may seek modification of the compromise bill. . .
Art. VI. § 26 (2) must, therefore, be construed as
referring only to bills introduced for the first time in
either house of Congress, not to the conference
committee report.
The Court reiterates here that the “no-amendment
rule” refers only to the procedure to be followed by
each house of Congress with regard to bills initiated
in each of said respective houses, before said bill is
transmitted to the other house for its concurrence or
amendment.
Verily, to construe said provision in a way as to proscribe
any further changes to a bill after one house has voted on
it would lead to absurdity as this would mean that the
other house of Congress would be deprived of its
constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to
said bill. Thus, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution
cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by the
Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and
modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills that have
been acted upon by both houses of Congress is
prohibited.
376!
241 BANAT v. Petitioner (a duly accredited multi-sectoral organization) is
COMELEC assailing the constitutionality of RA No. 9369 (An Act
(2009) Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled ‘An Act
Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an
Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998 National
or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local
Electoral Exercises, to Encourage Transparency, Credibility,
Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the
Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic
Act No. 7166 and Other Related Election Laws, Providing
Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes’).
Petitioner alleges that the title of RA No. 9369 is
misleading because it is about poll automation but also
contains substantial provisions dealing with manual
canvassing of election returns. Petitioner alleges that specific
sections (34, 37, 38 and 43) are neither embraced in the title
nor is germane to the subject matter of RA 9369.
The COMELEC and the OSG both maintain that the title of
RA 9369 is broad enough to encompass ranging topics that
deal not only with the automation process but with everything
related to its purpose encouraging a transparent, credible,
fair and accurate elections
- Section 34 – Amend Section 26 of RA 7166
regarding Official Watchers
- Section 37 – Amend Section 30 of RA 7166
regarding National Board of Canvassers
- Section 38 – Amend Section 15 of RA 7166 Pre-
proclamation of President, Vice, Senator and HOR
- Section 43– Amend Section 255 of Batasang
Pambansa Blg. 881 regarding Prosecution
Issue: Whether RA 9369 violates §26(1), Art. VI
No. The constitutional requirement that “every bill passed
by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof” has always been
given a practical rather than a technical construction. The
requirement is satisfied if the title is comprehensive
enough to include subjects related to the general purpose,
which the statute seeks to achieve.
The title of a law does not have to be an index of its
contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text
are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the
title. Moreover, a title which declares a statute to be an act
to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise
nature of the amendatory act need not be further stated.
RA 9369 is an amendatory act.
Clearly, the subject matter of RA 9369 covers the
amendments to RA 8436, BP 881, RA 7166, and other
related election laws to achieve its purpose of promoting
transparency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy in the
elections. The provisions of RA 9369 assailed by
petitioner deal with amendments to specific provisions of
RA 7166 and BP 881, specifically: (1) Sections 34, 37 and
38 amend Sections 26, 30 and 15 of RA 7166,
respectively; and (2) Section 43 of RA 9369 amends
Section 265 of BP 881. Therefore, the assailed provisions
are germane to the subject matter of RA 9369 which is to
amend RA 7166 and BP 881, among others.
377!
242 Datu Michael (Same as above, Case # 159)
Abas Kida v.
Senate of the The case started with RA 6734 or the Organic Act of ARMM.
Philippines This was amended by RA 9054 that mandated the holding of
(2011) elections on the Second Monday of September. Before the
September 2001 elections started however, moved the
elections to 26 November 2001 through RA 9140. Four
years later, Congress enacted RA 9333 fixing the date of
“regular elections” as it will now be held on Second Monday
of August 2005 making it thus permanent every three years.
House Bill 4146 however moved to change it to Second
Monday of May 2013 and every three years after. The
House Bill aimed to synchronize the date of elections to go
along with the national elections. The said bill provided
interim officials appointed by the President to act as officer
for the meantime. The House bill was approved by the
Congress and the Senate passed its own version with
basically the same provision with some modification.
Eventually, HOR adopted the version of the Senate and thus
it formed RA 10153 that the president signed into law.
Issue: Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Sec.
26 (2) of article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
243 Giron v. While the constitutionality of Fair Elections Act is questioned,
COMELEC petitioner Henry R. Giron (Giron) asserts that the
(2013) insertion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act or
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9006 which violates Section 26(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically
requires: "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
Petitioner avers that these provisions are unrelated to the
main subject of the Fair Election Act: the lifting of the political
No. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
explained the effect of the President’s certification of
necessity in the following manner:
“The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the
bill on separate days. The phrase “except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc” in Art. VI Sec. 26 (2) qualifies that the two
stated conditions before the bill can become a law: [i] the
bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it
has been printed in its final form and distributed three
days before it is finally approved.”
In the present case, the records show that the President
wrote to the Speaker and the House to certify the
necessity of the immediate enactment of a law
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and
local elections. Following the Tolentino ruling, the
President’s certification exempted both the House and the
Senate from having to comply with the three separate
readings requirement.
The House and the Senate gave full recognition to the
President’s certification and promptly enacted RA No.
10153. There was no grave abuse of discretion.
No. Petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention were unable
to present a compelling reason that would surpass
the strong presumption of validity and
constitutionality in favor of the Fair Election Act. They
have not put forward any gripping justification to reverse
our ruling in Fariñas, in which we have already ruled that
the title and the objectives of R.A. 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include subjects other than the
lifting of the ban on the use of media for election
378!
ad ban. Section 12 refers to the treatment of the votes
cast for substituted candidates after the official ballots
have been printed, while Section 14 pertains to the repeal
of Section 67 (Candidates holding elective office) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code. Section 67 of this law concerns the ipso
facto resignation of elective officials immediately after
they file their respective certificates of candidacy for an
office other than that which they are currently holding in
a permanent capacity. Whether or not the inclusion of
Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section
26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the "one subject-
one title" rule.
Issue: Whether the inclusion of the Fair Election Act violates
Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the “one
subject-one title” rule?
propaganda.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to Enhance
the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices."
Section 2 of the law provides not only the declaration of
principles but also the objectives thereof:
The State shall, during the election period, supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or
permits for the operation of media of communication or
information to guarantee or ensure equal opportunity for
public service, including access to media time and space,
and the equitable right to reply, for public information
campaigns and for among candidates and assure free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on
elective officials who run for an office other than the
one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep.
Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on
the use of media for election propaganda, does not
violate the "one subject-one title" rule. This Court has
held that an act having a single general subject, indicated
in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no
matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are
not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject,
and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by
providing for the method and means of carrying out the
general subject.. As for Section 12 it states:
In case of valid substitutions after the official ballots have
been printed, the votes cast for the substituted candidates
379!

244 Imbong v. The petitioners question the constitutionality of the RH Law,
Ochoa (2014) claiming that it violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title rule.
According to them, being one for reproductive health with
responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the
constitutional standards of due process by concealing
its true intent - to act as a population control measure.
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the
RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, and
that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and
"reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are
inseparable.
Issue: Whether RH bill violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution
shall be considered as stray votes but shall not invalidate
the whole ballot. For this purpose, the official ballots shall
provide spaces where the voters may write the name of
the substitute candidates if they are voting for the latter:
Provided, however, That if the substitute candidate is of
the same family name, this provision shall not apply.
During the making of the law, there was concern that the
said part is a rider said by Chairman Syjuco. The makers
of the law said that the Section 12 is base from experience
and research of the law. Even though Chairman Syjuco
tried to find a term that would fit it and placed in the title,
other commissioners like Loren Legarda said that the term
FAIR ELECTION PRACTICE already covers the term
enough.
No. The rule mandates that the law should not be so
uncertain that an average person reading it would not be
informed of its purpose of enactment or put on inquiry as
to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to
or indicating one subject where another or different one is
really embraced in the act or in its omission it removes the
real subject or scope.
The plaintiff claim that the law conceals its true intent,
which is to act as a population control measure. The
respondents believe that the control measure is inevitably
intertwined or inseparable with responsible parenthood
and reproductive health. The court has a reason to
believe that the RH Law is a control measure since the
corpus of the law is reduction of the country’s
population as it also promotes pregnancy-preventing
products. It also emphasize in its introduction that the
marginalized need to be provided with full range of
modern family planning products and methods. These
380!

Section 27.
(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law,
be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign
it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections
to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at
large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall
agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to
the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall
become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be
determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting
for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated
within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall
become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not
affect the item or items to which he does not object.
family planning methods are clearly geared towards the
prevention of pregnancy. Though the law also provide pre-
natal and post-natal care. Though the large version of the
law contain methods to prevent pregnancy. The Court
believes that the Congress has no reason to
intentionally deceive the public as to the contents of
the assailed legislation by naming it as “reproductive
health” and “responsible parenthood.”
Steps needed before a bill becomes a law
1. Approved by Congress (positive act). No enactment through
legislative inaction Quorom
2. Approved by the President through positive act or inaction
(not signing the bill or invalid veto). It must be returned to the House
within thirty days after the date of receipt to effect veto.
3. IF vetoed by the president, 2/3 of ALL members of Congress
(House then Senate) must agree to pass the bill.
When do the yeas and nays have to be taken?
1. Upon last and third reading of a bill
2. At the request of one-fifth of the Members present.
3. In repassing of a bill over the veto of the President’s veto
2 Types of Veto
1. General Veto -- If you veto a provision in an ordinary bill –
considered as if you vetoed the whole bill.
2. Item Veto -- only for appropriation, revenue and tariff bills –
only the specific provision is vetoed. The whole bill continues to exist
except for the vetoed item.
An “item” in a revenue bill does not refers to an entire section
imposing a particular kind of tax but rather to the subject of the tax
and the tax rate.
381!
" An item is “an individual some of money dedicated to a the law includes the duty to desist from implementing it when
stated purpose, NOT some general provision of law which happens implementation would prejudice public interest.
to be put into an appropriation bill " A condition in an appropriation bill may not be vetoed without
" Riders are provisions that do not relate to a specific vesting the items to which it is attached [i.e., the specific item to
appropriation, but is more in the nature of a general provision of law. which the condition refers to].
It is not for an appropriation bill and is better contained in a separate
law.
" Doctrine of inappropriate provision: a provision that is
constitutionally inappropriate for an appropriation bill may be singled
out for veto even if it is not an appropriation or revenue item (refers
to riders).
" Executive Impoundment – refusal of the President to
spend funds already allocated by Congress for a specific purpose.
The President can do such on the basis of his Commander-in-Chief
powers and on the generous argument that the duty to implement

Section 27. Procedure in Law-Making

I. Passage of bills
245 Arroyo v. De (Same as above, Case # 160) No. No rule of the House of Representatives has been
Venecia (1997) cited which specifically requires that in cases such as
Issue: Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia this involving approval of a conference committee
that the law was properly passed is false and spurious report, the Chair must restate the motion and
conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other
hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the
manner in which the conference committee report on
H. No. 7198 was approved was by no means a unique
one. It has basis in legislative practice.

Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that

some other way would be better, more accurate and
even more just. The advantages or disadvantages,
the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any
matter for judicial consideration.

382!
 Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the
nays of the Members be taken every time a House has
to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the
last and third readings of a bill, at the request of one-
fifth of the Members present, and in repassing a bill
over the veto of the President. Indeed, considering the
fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of
the Members by yeas and nays had already been
taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the
process.

Petitioners claim that they were prevented from

seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result of the
precipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment of
the session. It would appear, however, that the
session was suspended to allow the parties to
settle the problem, because when it resumed that
day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore.
While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for
adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following
week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if there
was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is
that he did not. Instead of submitting the proper
motions for the House to act upon, petitioners
insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo’s question
as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep.
Arroyo’s question was not, in form or substance, a
point of order or a question of privilege entitled to
precedence. Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it
can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill
which became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of
the House acted with grave abuse of his discretion.
246 Abakada v. Ermita (Same as above. Case # 86, 168, and 240) No. Pursuant to this inherent constitutional power to
(2005) promulgate and implement its own rules of procedure,

383!
House Bill No. 3555 was introduced on first reading on
January 7, 2005. The President certified the bill on
January 7, 2005 for immediate enactment. On January
27, 2005, the House of Representatives approved the bill
on second and third reading. House Bill 3705 was also
introduced in the House and its mother bill is House Bill
3555. The President also certified it as urgent on February
8, 2005. The House of Representatives approved the bill
on second and third reading on February 28, 2005.
Meanwhile in the Senate, they passed Senate Bill No.
1950. It is a bill that substituted 3 other previous bills
introduced in the Senate and took into consideration the
House Bill No. 3555 and House Bill 3705 when it was
made.
Before long, the Conference Committee on the
Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 3555, House
Bill No. 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950, “after having
met and discussed in full free and conference,”
recommended the approval of its report, which the Senate
did on May 10, 2005, and with the House of
Representatives agreeing thereto the next day. The
enrolled copy of the consolidated House and Senate
version was transmitted to the President, who signed the
same into law on May 24, 2005. Thus, came R.A. No.
9337.
On July 1, 2005, a TRO was issued because there were
confusion on its implementation and that some claim that
all prices went up by 10% when in fact there are some
provision on the law that gave leeway to in terms of tax
increase. The reason the Court implemented a TRO was
to clarify the confusion in its implementation. The
petitioners assert that the Bicameral Conference
the respective rules of each house of Congress
provided for the creation of a Bicameral Conference
Committee.
In Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, the Court already
made the pronouncement that “[i]f a change is desired
in the practice [of the Bicameral Conference
Committee] it must be sought in Congress since this
question is not covered by any constitutional provision
but is only an internal rule of each house.”
To reconcile or harmonize disagreeing provisions, the
Bicameral Conference Committee may then (a) adopt
the specific provisions of either the House bill or
Senate bill, (b) decide that neither provisions in the
House bill or the provisions in the Senate bill would be
carried into the final form of the bill, and/or (c) try to
arrive at a compromise between the disagreeing
provisions.
#1 - With regard to the disagreement on the rate of
VAT to be imposed, it would appear from the
Conference Committee Report that the Bicameral
Conference Committee tried to bridge the gap in the
difference between the 10% VAT rate proposed by the
Senate, and the various rates with 12% as the highest
VAT rate proposed by the House, by striking a
compromise whereby the present 10% VAT rate
would be retained until certain conditions arise, i.e.
the value-added tax collection as a percentage of gross
domestic product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds
2 4/5%, or National Government deficit as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 1½%.
384!
Committee (BCC) exceeded its authority by :
1) Inserting the stand-by authority in favor of the President
in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A. No. 9337;
2) Deleting entirely the no pass-on (Companies cannot
pass the burden on consumers) provisions found in both
the House and Senate bills;
3) Inserting the provision imposing a 70% limit on the
amount of input tax to be credited against the output tax;
and
4) Including the amendments introduced only by Senate
Bill No. 1950 regarding other kinds of taxes in addition to
the value-added tax.
Issue: Whether the Bicameral Conference Committee
exceeded its authority?
#2 - With regard to the disagreement on whether only
the VAT imposed on electricity generation,
transmission and distribution companies should not be
passed on to consumers or whether both the VAT
imposed on electricity generation, transmission and
distribution companies and the VAT imposed on sale of
petroleum products may be passed on to consumers,
the Bicameral Conference Committee chose to
settle such disagreement by altogether deleting
from its Report any no pass-on provision
#3 - With regard to the amount of input tax to be
credited against output tax, the Bicameral
Conference Committee came to a compromise on
the percentage rate of the limitation or cap on such
input tax credit, but again, the change introduced
by the Bicameral Conference Committee was
totally within the intent of both houses to put a
cap on input tax that may be. If at the end of any
taxable quarter the output tax exceeds the input tax,
the excess shall be paid by the VAT-registered person.
If the input tax exceeds the output tax, the excess shall
be carried over to the succeeding quarter or quarters:
PROVIDED that the input tax inclusive of input VAT
carried over from the previous quarter that may be
credited in every quarter shall not exceed seventy
percent (70%) of the output VAT: PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, THAT any input tax attributable to zero-
rated sales by a VAT-registered person may at his
option be refunded or credited against other internal
revenue taxes.
#4 - As to the amendments to NIRC provisions on
taxes other than the value-added tax proposed in
385!

II. Presidential Veto
247 CIR v. CTA (1999) The Manila and Golf & Country Club Inc. petitioned to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (the petitioner in this
case) that they should be exempted from the 20%
caretaker’s tax which was vetoed by President Marcos.
The contested law is House Bill no. 17839 which became
the RA No. 6110, but Marcos signed the act he noted
down that pursuant to Section 20-3, Article 6 of the
Constitution, he vetoed the following item:
Section 37. A new section is hereby inserted between
sections one hundred and ninety-one and one hundred
ninety-two, to be known as Section one hundred and
ninety-one-A which shall read as follows:
“Sec. 191-A. Caterers. A caterer's tax is hereby imposed
as follows:
"(3) On proprietors or operators of restaurants,
refreshment parlors, bars, cafes and other eating places
which are maintained within the premises or compound of
a [hotel, motel, resthouse] (removed by Marcos) cockpit,
Senate Bill No. 1950, since said provisions were
among those referred to it, the conference committee
had to act on the same and it basically adopted the
version of the Senate.
Thus, all the changes or modifications made by the
Bicameral Conference Committee were germane to
subjects of the provisions referred to it for
reconciliation. Such being the case, the Court
does not see any grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed
by the Bicameral Conference Committee.
We have already ruled that the presidential veto
referred merely to the inclusion of hotels, motels and
resthouses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket but not to
the whole section. But, as mentioned earlier also, the
CTA opined that the President could not veto
words or phrases in a bill but only an entire item.
Obviously, what the CTA meant by "item" was an
entire section. We do not agree.
An ITEM in a revenue bill does no refer to an entire
section imposing a particular kind of tax, but rather to
the subject of the tax and the tax rate.
The SC ruled that if Marcos would be granted the
power to veto the entire section would be giving the
President the power to disapprove items in a revenue
bill would be perpetrated rendering that power (of the
President) inutile of choosing which portions he wants
vetoed. He only has a choice to approve or disapprove
a section and not just a particular ITEM.
386!
race track, jai-alai, cabaret, night or day club or which are
accessible to patrons of such cockpit, race tract, jai-alai,
cabaret night or day club by means of a connecting door
or passage, twenty per cent of their gross receipts.

The burden of petition will be shifted to the consuming

public. The development of hotels, essential to our tourist
industry, may be restrained considering that a big portion
of hotel earnings comes from food sale. Since the Manila
Hotel operates restaurants in its premises, it is liable
to pay the tax provided in paragraph (1), Section 206
of the Tax Code.

RA No. 6110 however took effect on September 1, 1969.

By this virtue, petitioners assessed the club fixed taxes as
operators of golf links and restaurants, and also
percentage tax (caterer's tax) for its sale of foods and
fermented liquors/wines for the period covering
September 1969 to December 1970 in the amount of
P32,504.96. The case was tried and was denied and
brought up to the CTA.

CTA agreed with Manila Gold and Country Club Inc.

because it held that when the President is granted the
right to veto it would be the whole section and not just a
part of it. Thus, CTA ruled that the club need not pay
taxes. Commissioner of Internal Revenue argues that
the veto of President Marcos was only for the words
hotel, motel, and resthouse and not the entire veto.
Manila Gold & Country Club Inc. is not included in the
vetoed item thus should be liable.

Issue: Whether the vetoing powers of the President is for

an item or a whole section of a said act.

387!
248 Gonzales v. On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill
Macaraig (1990) No. 19186, or the General Appropriations Bill for the
Fiscal Year 1989. As passed, it eliminated or decreased
certain items included in the proposed budget submitted
by the President. On 29 December 1988, the President
signed the Bill into law, and declared the same to have
become RA No. 6688. In the process, seven Special
Provisions and Section 55, a "General Provision,"
were vetoed. The Senate expressed its resolve in
Resolution 381 declaring that the veto of Section 55 is
unconstitutional. The contested Section 55 states:
"SEC. 55. Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase
of Recommended Appropriations Disapproved and/or
Reduced by Congress: No item of appropriation
recommended by the President in the Budget
submitted to Congress pursuant to Article VII, Section
22 of the Constitution which has been disapproved or
reduced in this Act shall be restored or increased by
the use of appropriations authorized for other
purposes by augmentation. An item of appropriation for
any purpose recommended by the President in the Budget
shall be deemed to have been disapproved by
Congress if no corresponding appropriation for the
specific purpose is provided in this Act."
The reasons for the veto is: "The provision violates
Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. An
unwanted consequence of this provision is the inability of
the President, the President of the Senate, Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions to augment any item of appropriation of
their respective offices from savings in other items of
No, it is constitutional. Paragraph (2) is what is referred
to as the item-veto power or the line-veto power. It
allows the exercise of the veto over a particular item or
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As
specified, the President may not veto less than all of an
item of an Appropriations Bill. In other words, the power
given to the executive to disapprove any item or items
in an Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to
veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining
portion of the same item.
The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that
the President may not veto a provision without vetoing
the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle
that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the
subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the
Constitutional mandate that any provision in the
general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to
some particular appropriation therein and that any such
provision shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates.
Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the
Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to some
"particular appropriation" therein. The challenged
"provisions" fall short of this requirement.
First, the vetoed "provisions" do not relate to any
particular or distinctive appropriation. They apply
generally to all items disapproved or reduced by
Congress in the Appropriations Bill.
To determine if it is related to the said appropriation,
according to the court: It is not enough that a provision
388!
their respective appropriations even in cases of calamity
or in the event of urgent need to accelerate the
implementation of essential public services and
infrastructure projects.
This is augmented by the fact that a careful review of the
legislative action on the budget as submitted shows that in
almost all cases, the budgets of agencies as
recommended by the President, as well as those of the
Senate, the House of Representatives, and the
Constitutional Commissions, have been reduced!
Issue: Whether the veto by the President of SEC 55 of
GAB for FY 1989 and SEC 16 of GAB for FY 1990 is
unconstitutional.
be related to the institution or agency to which funds
are appropriated. Conditions and limitations properly
included in an appropriation bill must exhibit such a
connexity with money items of appropriation that they
logically belong in a schedule of expenditures… the
ultimate test is one of appropriateness" (Henry v.
Edwards, supra, at 158).
Second, the disapproved or reduced items are
nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. To discover
them, resort will have to be made to the original
recommendations made by the President and to the
source indicated by petitioners themselves.
Third, the vetoed Sections are more of an expression
of Congressional policy in respect of augmentation
from savings rather than a budgetary appropriation.
The legislature cannot by location of a bill give it
immunity from executive veto nor can it circumvent the
veto power over substantive legislation by artfully
drafting general law measures so that they appear to
be true conditions or limitations on an item of
appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature would be
permitted to impair the constitutional responsibilities
and functions of a co-equal branch of government.
According to the Court, the presidential power to veto is
not an invasion of legislative since it is limited by law.
The purpose and conditions for which funds may be
transferred were specified, i.e., transfer may be allowed
for the purpose of augmenting an item and such
transfer may be made only if there are savings from
another item in the appropriation of the government
branch or constitutional body. The exercise of such
389!

249 Bengzon v. Drilon RA 910 was enacted in 1953 to provide retirement
(1992) pensions to Justices of the SC and the CA who have
rendered service at least 20 years either in the judiciary or
in any branch of government, or in, both, or having
attained the age of 70, or who resign by reason of
incapacity to discharge the duties of the office; he shall
authority in respect of disapproved or reduced
items by no means vests in the Executive the
power to rewrite the entire budget, as petitioners
contend, the leeway granted being delimited to
transfers within the department or branch
concerned, the sourcing to come only from
savings.
Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, as
amended (RA 6670, 4 August 1988), otherwise known
as the “Budget Reform Decree of 1977” grants the
authority to augment any appropriation of the Executive
Department in the General Appropriations Act, from
savings in the appropriations of another department,
etc.
Also, the President under Sec. 45 has the Authority to
Use Savings in Appropriations to Cover Deficits.
Section 12 of the General Appropriations Act of 1989
also grants the President similar powers.
If, indeed, by the later enactments of Section 55 (FY
‘89) and Section 16 (FY '90), Congress, as petitioners
argue, intended to amend or repeal Pres. Decree No.
1177, with all the more reason should it have so
provided in a separate enactment, WHEREFORE, the
constitutionality of the assailed Presidential veto is
UPHELD and this Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
No, it is unconstitutional. The Executive must veto
a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she cannot act
like an editor crossing out specific lines, provisions, or
paragraphs in a bill that he or she dislikes. In the
exercise of the veto power, it is generally all or nothing.
However, when it comes to appropriation, revenue
390!
receive until his death the salary which he has received at
the time of his retirement.
After amendment, it became RA 1797 and included AFP
and Constitutional Commission in retirement. Marcos
issued successive decrees which automatically
readjusted the retirement pensions of military officers
and enlisted men. But those in the judiciary and the
Constitutional Commissions were not included in this
automatic readjustment. Realizing this unfairness,
Congress in 1990 sought to reenact the repealed
provisions by approving a bill on the matter. However,
Pres. Aquino vetoed the HB on the ground that it would
erode the very foundation of the Government’s collective
effort to adhere to the policy on standardization of
compensation under the Salary Standardization Law,
RA6758.
As a result of the resolution by the Court, Congress
included in the General Appropriations Bill (G.A.B.)
for the Judiciary intended for the payment of adjusted
pensions rates for the retired justices. In Jan 1992,
President vetoed portions of Section 1, and the entire
Section 4 of the Special Provision for the SC and the
Lower Courts on the ground that the President vetoed
the HB on the matter already, and such appropriation
would erode the policy of salary standardization.
Issue: Whether the veto of the President of certain
provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to the payment
of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is
constitutional or valid.
or tariff bills, the Administration needs the money
to run the machinery of government and it cannot
veto the entire bill even if it may contain
objectionable features.
The President is, therefore, compelled to approve
into law the entire bill, including its undesirable
parts. It is for this reason that the Constitution has
wisely provided the "item veto power" to avoid
inexpedient riders being attached to an
indispensable appropriation or revenue measure.
Thus the President’s veto regarding the assailed
portion of the General Appropriations Bill is invalid
and unconstitutional. As stated, when it comes to
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bills, the Executive
is authorized to exercise item-veto. And it refers to:
Item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details,
the distinct and severable parts; it is a specific
appropriation of money, not some general provision of
law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill
In the present case, the general fund adjustment is an
item which appropriates P500M to enable the
Government to meet certain unavoidable obligations
which may have been inadequately funded by the
specific items for the different branches, departments,
bureaus, agencies, and offices of the government. The
President did not veto this item. What were vetoed
were methods or systems placed by Congress to
insure that permanent and continuing obligations
to certain officials would be paid when they fell
due.
391!
 What she vetoed were provisions – methods and
systems placed by Congress to insure that
obligations would be paid when they fell due. Thus,
augmentation of specific appropriations found
inadequate to pay retirement benefits is a provision
and not an item. More ironic is the fact that
misinformation led the Executive to believe that the
items in the 1992 Appropriations Act were being vetoed
when, in fact, the veto struck something else.

PD No. 644 (repealing decree) of Marcos regarding

taking away the automatic readjustment for the
judiciary never became valid law because it was never
published, pursuant to the Tanada v Tuvera
doctrine

The veto power to set aside the resolution of this court

trenches upon the constitutional grant of fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary. Veto is tantamount to
dictating to the judiciary how its funds should be
utilized. Additionally, Justices of the Court have vested
rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in
accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has
no power to set aside and override the decision of the
Supreme Court neither does the president have the
power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her
predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws.
The veto is unconstitutional since the power of the
president to disapprove any item or items in the
appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto
part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of
said item.
250 PhilConsa v. (Same as above, Case # 226) Yes, the veto is VOID. It is readily apparent that the
Enriquez (1994) Special Provision applicable to the appropriation

392!
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of
1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both
houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it
imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of
appropriations in the proposed budget previously
submitted by the President. It also authorized members of
Congress to propose and identify projects in the “pork
barrels” allotted to them and to realign their respective
operating budgets. Pursuant to the procedure on the
passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the
Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the
President for consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into
law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act
NO. 7663, entitled “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS
FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER
THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-
FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” (GAA of 1994).
On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential
Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he
vetoed.
Among the many provisions that were vetoed, the focus is
the vetoed provision regarding “inappropriate provision is
in the vetoed DEBT CEILING.
Special Provision on Debt Ceiling – Congress provided
for a debt-ceiling; this was vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing
the entire appropriation for debt service which is
P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation for debt.
The rationale is in the Foreign Borrowing Act, P.D. No.
for debt service insofar as it refers to funds in
excess of the amount appropriated in the bill, is an
"inappropriate" provision referring to funds other
than the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriated in the
General Appropriations Act of 1991.
Likewise, the vetoed provision is clearly an attempt
to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign
Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the
debt payment policy. As held by the Court in Gonzales,
the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate
law, not in the appropriations law.
Thus," it follows that any provision which DOES NOT
relate to any particular item, or which extends in its
operation beyond an item of appropriation, is
considered "an inappropriate provision" which can
be vetoed separately from an item. Also the Court held
that "inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional
provisions and provisions which are intended to amend
other laws, because clearly these kind of laws have no
place in an appropriations bill.
Thus just as the President may not use his item-veto to
usurp constitutional powers conferred on the
legislature, neither can the legislature deprive … the
chief executive officer of the state by including in a
general appropriation bill matters more properly
enacted in separate legislation.
[The] power to veto bills of general legislation . . .
cannot be abridged by the careful placement of such
measures in a general appropriation bill, thereby
forcing the [Chief Executive] to choose between
393!
 1177 and E.O. No. 292:
Use of the Fund. The appropriation authorized herein
shall be used for payment of principal and interest of
foreign and domestic indebtedness: PROVIDED, That any
payment in excess of the amount herein appropriated
shall be subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress of the
Philippines: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in no case shall
this fund be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central
Bank Board of Liquidators.
Issue: Whether the veto of the president on special
provisions of Article of the GAA 1994 is unconstitutional
and void?
approving unacceptable substantive legislation or
vetoing "items" of expenditures essential to the
operation of government.
The legislature cannot by location of a bill give it
immunity from executive veto. Otherwise, the
legislature would be permitted to impair the
constitutional responsibilities and functions of a co-
equal branch of government in contravention of the
separation of powers doctrine.
Thus, the vetoed provision on the debt servicing is
clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No.
1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to
reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court
in Gonzales v. Macaraig, the repeal of these laws
should be done in a separate law, not in the
appropriations law.

Section 28.
(1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress (4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used
for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt
from taxation.
The general limitation on the power to tax is that it should be
exercised only for a public purpose.
" Since it affects property rights it is also subject to due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
When is “tax” uniform?
A tax is uniform when it operates with the same forece and effect in
every place where the subject of it is found. Uniformity means that all
property belonging to the same class shall be taxed alike. (CIR v.
Lingayen Gulf)

394!
When is a system of taxation progressive?
It is progressive when the rate increases as the tax base increases
(for equitable distribution of wealth).
" Tax base is the amount where taxes would be derive from
(e.g. gross income, income before taxes)
" E.g. If tax base is 100 the tax rate is 1%. If tax base is 200
the tax rate is 2%
Does Sec. 28 prohibit regressive or indirect taxes?
No. Although the Constitution requires Congress to “evolve a
progressive system of taxation,” this is only a directive, just like the
directive to give priority to the enactment of laws for the
enhancement of human dignity and the reduction of social,
economic, and political inequalities. These provisions are put in the
Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially
enforceable rights. (Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance).
Can Congress delegate the power to tax?
No. But it can delegate the power to determine when the required
conditions for the tax to take effect arise. See contingent legislation.
CIR v. Santos
The Court cannot subscribe to the theory that the tax rates of other
countries should be as yardstick in determining what may be the
proper subjects of taxation in our own country. The State is free to
select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that
“inequalities which results from singling out of one particular class for
taxation, or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.
Abra v. Henando and Roman Catholic Bishop
For the exemption of lands, buildings and improvements, they should
not be exclusively but also actually and directly used for religious
charitable or educational purposes. There must therefore be proof of
the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings and improvement for
religious or charitable (or educational) purpose to be exempt from
taxation.
CIR v. CA
The YNCA is not an educational institution within purview of
Constitution for it to be granted the exemption. Furthermore, the
claim for exemption from income tax has not basis because the
Constitutional exemption applies only to property taxes.
John Hay v. Lim
Under R.A. 7227 only Subic SEZ is exempt from taxes, the extension
of the same by the President to the John Hay SEZ finds no support
therein.
Lung Center v. QC
60% of its beds are used exclusively for charitable purposes. Only
such portion will be exempt from tax, those leased out to private
entities however are not exempt from real property tax.
395!
 Section 28. Taxation
I. Scope and Purpose
251 Planters v. Fertiphil Petitioner PPI and respondent Fertiphil are private It is apparent that the imposition of P10 per fertilizer bag
(2008) corporations incorporated under Philippine laws, both sold in the country by LOI 1465 is purportedly in the
engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, exercise of the power of taxation. It is a settled
pesticides and agricultural chemicals. Marcos issued principle that the power of taxation by the state is
Letter of Instruction (LOI) 1465, imposing a capital plenary. However, there are two kinds of limitations on
recovery component of Php10.00 perbag of fertilizer. the power of taxation: the inherent limitations and the
The levy was to continue until adequate capital was constitutional limitations.
raised to make PPI financially viable.
PPI insists that LOI No. 1465 is a valid exercise either of
Fertiphil remitted to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority the police power or the power of taxation. It claims that
(FPA), which was then remitted the depository bank of the LOI was implemented for the purpose of assuring the
PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from 1985 to fertilizer supply and distribution in the country and for
1986.After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily benefiting a foundation created by law to hold in trust for
stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. Fertiphil millions of farmers their stock ownership in PPI.
demanded from PPI a refund of the amount it remitted,
however PPI refused. Fertiphil filed a complaintfor Police power and the power of taxation are inherent
collection and damages, questioning the powers of the State. Police power is the power of the
constitutionality of LOI 1465, claiming that it was State to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an liberty or property in order to promote the general
unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of welfare, while the power of taxation is the power to levy
due process. taxes to be used for public purpose. The main purpose
of police power is the regulation of a behavior or conduct,
PPI argues that Fertiphil has no locus standi to question while taxation is revenue generation. The “lawful
the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 because it does not subjects” and “lawful means” tests are used to determine
have a "personal and substantial interest in the case or the validity of a law enacted under the police power. The
will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement." It power of taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by
asserts that Fertiphil did not suffer any damage from the inherent and constitutional limitations. HOWEVER tax
imposition because “incidence of the levy fell on the collected is PRIMARILY USED for revenue generation.
ultimate consumer or the farmers themselves, not on the
seller fertilizer company. The power to tax can be resorted to only for a
constitutionally valid public purpose. By the same
Issue: What is the power of taxation? token, taxes may not be levied for purely private

396!
 purposes, for building up of private fortunes, or for the
redress of private wrongs.

They cannot be levied for the improvement of private

property, or for the benefit, and promotion of private
enterprises, except where the aid is incident to the public
benefit.

The reason for this is simple. The power to tax exists for
the general welfare; hence, implicit in its power is the
limitation that it should be used only for a public purpose.
It would be a robbery for the State to tax its citizens and
use the funds generated for a private purpose. As an old
United States case bluntly put it: “To lay with one hand,
the power of the government on the property of the
citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon favored
individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private
fortunes, is nonetheless a robbery because it is done
under the forms of law and is called taxation.

The term “public purpose” is not defined. It is an elastic

concept that can be hammered to fit modern
standards. Jurisprudence states that “public purpose”
should be given a broad interpretation. It does not only
pertain to those purposes which are traditionally viewed
as essentially government functions, such as building
roads and delivery of basic services, but also includes
those purposes designed to promote social
justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the
relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing and urban
or agrarian reform.
II. Limitations on the power: Uniform and equitable
252 CIR v. CA (1996) Fortune Tobacco Corporation is engaged in the No. RMC 37-93 is discriminatory and thus infringes
manufacture of different brands of cigarettes. CIR on uniformity of taxation.

397!
Commissioner Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr. reported to
Deputy Minister Ramon Diaz of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government, "the initial position
of the Commission was to classify 'Champion,'
'Hope,' and 'More' (cigarette brands manufactured
by Fortune) as foreign brands since they were listed
in the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign
companies. Pursuant to this, Fortune Tobacco
changed the names slightly ('Hope' to Hope Luxury'
and 'More' to 'Premium More’) to avail of ad valorem
tax for local products (45% or 20% only). A bill, which
later became Republic Act ("RA") No. 7654, [6] was
enacted, on 10 June 1993, by the legislature and
signed into law, on 14 June 1993, by the President of
the Philippines. The new law became effective on 03
July 1993. It amended Section 142(c) (1) of the
National Internal Revenue Code ("NIRC") to read; as
follows:
"SEC. 142. Cigars and Cigarettes.
"(c) Cigarettes packed by machine. - There shall be
levied, assessed and collected on cigarettes packed by
machine a tax at the rates prescribed below based on
the constructive manufacturer's wholesale price or the
actual manufacturer's wholesale price, whichever is
higher:
"(1) On locally manufactured cigarettes which are
currently classified and taxed at fifty-five percent (55%)
or the exportation of which is not authorized by contract
or otherwise, fifty-five (55%) provided that the minimum
tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack.
"(2) On other locally manufactured cigarettes, forty-five
percent (45%) provided that the minimum tax shall not
be less than Three Pesos (P3.00) per pack.
Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 1, of the 1987
Constitution mandates taxation to be uniform and
equitable. Uniformity requires that all subjects or objects
of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike or
put on equal footing both in privileges and liabilities.
Thus, all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same
class must be taxed at the same rate and the tax must
operate with the same force and effect in every place
where the subject may be found.
RMC 37-93 would only apply to "Hope Luxury," Premium
More" and "Champion" cigarettes
Apparently, RMC 37-93 would only apply to "Hope
Luxury," Premium More" and "Champion" cigarettes and,
unless petitioner would be willing to concede to the
submission of private respondent that the circular should,
as in fact my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Bellosillo
so expresses in his separate opinion, be considered
adjudicatory in nature and thus violative of due process
following the Ang Tibay doctrine, the measure suffers
from lack of uniformity of taxation. In its decision, the
CTA has keenly noted that other cigarettes bearing
foreign brands have not been similarly included within the
scope of the circular. In the interpellation it was
questioned that despite there are other brands they were
not included because: “[They] don't have specific
information on other tobacco manufacturers.”
Subsequently imparing them to classify other brands as
foreign or local.
Thus during the hearing of the Committee on Ways and
Means of the House of Representatives, it was revealed
398!

Two days before the effectivity of RA 7654, Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 ("RMC 37-93"), was
issued by the BIR which expressed Hope, More, and
Champion are locally manufactured cigarettes
bearing a foreign brand.
Thus pursuant to the Sec. 142 of NIRC is subject to
55% ad valorem tax. They are classified as such
because these brands are listed in the World Tobacco
Registry as also being manufactured in other countries
as well. Fortune Tobacco, requested for a review,
reconsideration and recall of RMC 37-93 in the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA). CTA upheld the position of Fortune
Tobacco and ruled that the 55% ad valorem tax on the
Fortune products is defective, invalid and
unenforceable, such that when R.A. No. 7654 took
effect the brands in question were not CURRENTLY
CLASSIFIED AND TAXED at 55% pursuant to Section
1142(c) (1) of the Tax Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7654 and were therefore still classified as other locally
manufactured cigarettes and taxed at 45% or 20% as
the case may be.
Issue: Whether RMC 37-93 is not discriminatory since it
applies to all locally manufactured cigarettes similarly
situated as 'Hope,' 'More' and 'Champion' cigarettes.
253 CIR v. Lingayen Respondent Lingayen Gulf operates an electric power
Gulf (1988) plant in the municipalities of Lingayen and Binmaley in
Pangasinan, pursuant to the municipal franchise granted
to it by their municipal council under Resolutions 14 and
25. Section 10 of their franchise states that:
“It shall pay quarterly into the Provincial treasury of
by Ms. Chato that the other cigarette brands were not
included because there was not enough time to study all
the possible brands with regard to this matter. The
Commission even said that there will be other
memorandum once they finished studying other brands.
HOWEVER, the Court is convinced that the hastily
promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a valid and
effective administrative issuance. All taken, the Court is
convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has
fallen short of a valid and effective administrative
issuance.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals,
sustaining that of the Court of Tax Appeals, is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
No. RA 3843 is considered constitutional. Uniformity
means that all property belonging in the same class shall
be taxed alike.
Legislature has authority to grant exemptions, which
has never been a breach of the equal protection clause.
Lingayen’s power plant was considered to be under a
different class than those taxed by 5% (under Act 667),
399!
Pangasinan 1% if its gross earnings for the first 20
years, and 2% for the remaining 15 years.”
BIR made an assessment and found out that a total of
P19,293.41 from 1946-1954 the respondent’s
deficiency in paying the said franchise taxes and
surcharges applying the franchise tax of 5% as
prescribed in section 259 of the National Revenue
Code. As opposed to the lower rates for municipal
franchises. Lingayen requested a reinvestigation,
saying that instead of deficiency taxes, they
overpaid the franchise tax. Request was denied by
petitioner. On September 29, 1956, the private
respondent requested for a reinvestigation and was
denied of the private respondent's request for
reinvestigation and reiterated the demand for payment
of the same. WHILE THE CASE IS ON APPEAL, RA
3843 was passed on June 22, 1963, granting Lingayen
a legislative franchise for the operation of electric light,
heat, and power systems in the same municipalities in
Pangasinan.
Lingayen shall pay ONLY a 2% Franchise Tax
quarterly to the Provincial Treasury of Pangasinan in
lieu of any other tax levied. It is expressly exempted
and effective further upon the date the original franchise
was granted, no other tax than the 2% can be
collected the date the original franchise was granted,
no other tax than the 2% can be collected… because
this will be in lieu of any and all taxes and/or licenses of
any kind, nature or description levied, established, or
collected by any authority whatsoever
Respondent court ruled that the provisions of R.A. No.
but under the one taxed by 2%. A Class created by RA
3636.
It is true that the private respondents municipal
franchises were obtained under Act No. 667 (5% rule) of
the Philippine Commission, but these original franchises
have been replaced by a new legislative franchise, i.e.
R.A. No. 3843 (2% rule). As correctly held by the
respondent court, the latter was granted subject to the
terms and conditions established in Act No. 3636, as
amended by C.A. No. 132. These conditions Identify
the private respondent's power plant as falling within
that class of power plants created by Act No. 3636,
as amended. The benefits of the tax reduction
provided by law (Act No. 3636 as amended by C.A.
No. 132 and R.A. No. 3843) apply to the respondent's
power plant and others circumscribed within this
class.
IN SHORT, RA 3843 merely moved Lingayen’s power
plant from its old classification to the new class. It
only effected the transfer of a taxable property from one
class to another.
The 5% tax was never intended to have universal
application, Section 259 of the Tax Code allowed for less
than 5%, more than 5% was the one not allowed.
Given its validity, should the said law be applied
retroactively so as to render uncollectible the taxes in
question which were assessed before its enactment? The
question of whether a statute operates retrospectively or
only prospectively depends on the legislative intent. In
the instant case, Act No. 3843 provides that "effective ...
upon the date the original franchise was granted, no
400!
 3843 should apply and accordingly dismissed the claim
of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The said
ruling is now the subject of the petition at bar.
Issue: Whether Section 4 of R.A. No. 3843 is
unconstitutional for being violative of the "uniformity and
equality of taxation" clause of the Constitution.
254 Tolentino v. (Same as above, Case # 215 and 235)
Secretary of
Finance (1994) Petitioner maintains that R.A. No. 7716 violates Art. VI,
§26 (1) of the Constitution which provides that "Every
bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof." PAL
contends that the amendment of its franchise by the
withdrawal of its exemption from the VAT is not
expressed in the title of the law. By stating that R.A.
No. 7716 seeks to "[RESTRUCTURE] THE VALUE-
ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM [BY] WIDENING ITS TAX
BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION,
AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND
REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS
AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,"
Congress thereby clearly expresses its intention to
amend any provision of the NIRC which stands in
the way of accomplishing the purpose of the law.
Under the said RA, there were allegations of violations
of the due process, equal protection and contract
clauses and the rule on taxation. CREBA asserts that
R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts,
(2) classifies transactions as covered or exempt without
reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes
other tax and/or licenses other than the franchise tax of
two per centum on the gross receipts ... shall be
collected, any provision to the contrary notwithstanding."
Republic Act No. 3843 therefore specifically provided
for the retroactive effect of the law.
Legislative intent was to fix it at 2%, courts cannot
contest. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the
respondent Court of Tax Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
No. Equality and uniformity of taxation means that all
taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class be
taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the
authority to make reasonable and natural classifications
for purposes of taxation. To satisfy this requirement it is
enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all
persons, forms and corporations placed in similar
situation.
Indeed, the VAT was already provided in E.O. No. 273
long before R.A. No. 7716 was enacted. R.A. No. 7716
merely expands the base of the tax.
Thus, in a previous decision involving E.O. No. 273 it was
held: The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is
imposed only on sales of goods or services by persons
engaged in business with an aggregate gross annual
sales exceeding P200,000.00. Small corner sari-sari
stores are consequently exempt from its application.
Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of farm and
marine products, so that the costs of basic food and other
necessities, spared as they are from the incidence of the
VAT, are expected to be relatively lower and within the
reach of the general public.
401!
 should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall
"evolve a progressive system of taxation."
Issue: Does the law violate Art. VI, § 28(1) of the
Constitution?
255 Tan v. Del Rosario These two consolidated special civil actions for
(1994) prohibition challenge, in G.R. No. 109289, the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, also
commonly known as the Simplified Net Income
With regard to the claims that the VAT is regressive, the
Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of
indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive. What it
simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a
progressive system of taxation."
Indeed, the mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but
to evolve, a progressive tax system. Otherwise, sales
taxes, which perhaps are the oldest form of indirect
taxes, would have been prohibited with the proclamation
of Art. VIII, §17(1) of the 1973 Constitution from which
the present Art. VI, §28(1) was taken. Sales taxes are
also regressive.
Resort to indirect taxes should be minimized but not
avoided entirely because it is difficult, if not
impossible, to avoid them by imposing such taxes
according to the taxpayers' ability to pay. In the case of
the VAT, the law minimizes the regressive effects of this
imposition by providing for zero rating of certain
transactions (R.A. No. 7716, §3, amending §102 (b) of
the NIRC), while granting exemptions to other
transactions.
The transactions which are subject to the VAT are
those which involve goods and services which are
used or availed of mainly by higher income groups.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are
denied with finality and the temporary restraining order
previously issued is hereby lifted.
No. Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of
equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or
objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated
alike both in privileges and liabilities. Uniformity does not
402!
Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), amending certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code
and, in G.R. No. 109446, the validity of Section 6,
Revenue Regulations No. 2-93, promulgated by public
respondents pursuant to said law.
Petitioners claim to be taxpayers adversely affected by
the continued implementation of the amendatory
legislation. Among the claims asserted by the petitioner,
they believe that the said RA violated Article VI, Section
28(1) “The rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive
system of taxation.”
Issue: Whether RA violated Article VI, Section 28(1) was
violated.
violate the classification as long as:
(1) the standards that are used therefor are
substantial and not arbitrary,
(2) the categorization is germane to achieve the
legislative purpose,
(3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both
present and future conditions, and
(4) the classification applies equally well to all those
belonging to the same class
What may instead be perceived to be apparent from the
amendatory law is the legislative intent to increasingly
shift the income tax system towards the schedular
approach in the income taxation of individual taxpayers.
The SC does not view this classification to be arbitrary
and inappropriate.
With the legislature primarily lies the discretion to
determine the nature (kind), object (purpose), extent
(rate), coverage (subjects) and situs (place) of taxation.
This court cannot freely delve into those matters which,
by constitutional fiat, rightly rest on legislative judgment.
Of course, where a tax measure becomes so
unconscionable and unjust as to amount to confiscation
of property, courts will not hesitate to strike it down for
the power to tax cannot override constitutional
proscriptions. This stage, however, has not been
demonstrated to have been reached within any
appreciable distance in this controversy before us.
The due process clause may correctly be invoked only
when there is a clear contravention of inherent or
constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax power.
No such transgression is so evident to the Court.
403!
 III. Progressive system
IV. Delegated tax legislation
256 Southern Cross (Same above as # 217) Yes. Section 5 plainly evinces legislative intent to
Cement v. Phil restrict the DTI Secretary’s power to impose a
Cement (2004) Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation general safeguard measure by preconditioning such
(Southern Cross) is a domestic corporation engaged in imposition on a positive determination by the Tariff
the business of cement manufacturing, production, Commission. Such legislative intent should be given full
importation and exportation. Private respondent force and effect, as the executive power to impose
Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation definitive safeguard measures is but a delegated
(Philcemcor) is an association of domestic cement power—the power of taxation, by nature and by
manufacturers. Respondent Department of Trade and command of the fundamental law, being a preserve of
Industry (“DTI”) accepted an application from the legislature. Section 28(2), Article VI of the 1987
Philcemcor, alleging that the importation of gray Constitution confirms the delegation of legislative
Portland cement in increased quantities has caused power, yet ensures that the prerogative of Congress
declines in domestic production, capacity utilization, to impose limitations and restrictions on the
market share, sales and employment; as well as caused executive exercise of this power:
depressed local prices. The Tariff Commission, on 19
November 2001, received a request from the DTI for a The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix
formal investigation to determine whether or not to within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
impose a definitive safeguard measure on imports of restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
gray Portland cement, pursuant to Section 9 of the SMA export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
(Safeguard Measures Act) and its Implementing Rules duties or imposts within the framework of the national
and Regulations. development program of the Government

Tariff Commission issued its Formal Investigation
Report stating that the industry has not suffered and is
not suffering significant overall impairment in its
condition, i.e., serious injury and that there is no threat
of serious injury that is imminent from imports of gray
Portland cement. The DTI hereby issues the following:
"The application for safeguard measures against the
importation of gray Portland cement filed by
PHILCEMCOR is hereby denied”.
This delegation of the taxation power by the legislative to
the executive is authorized by the Constitution itself. At
the same time, the Constitution also grants the
delegating authority (Congress) the right to impose
restrictions and limitations on the taxation power
delegated to the President. The SMA empowered the
DTI Secretary, as alter ego of the President, to
impose definitive general safeguard measures, which
basically are tariff imposts of the type spoken of in the
Constitution. However, the law did not grant him full,

404!
Philcemcor filed to CA a petition for certiorari to set
aside DTI’s decision according to CA it held that the DTI
Secretary is not bound by the factual findings of the
Tariff Commission since such findings are merely
recommendatory and they fall within the ambit of the
Secretary’s discretionary review. DTI then issued new
decision in June 5 2003 that there was really a
serious injury to the local cement industry of import
surges and imposed a definitive safeguard measure
on importation of gray cement. The issue whether the
factual findings of Tariff Commission is binding upon
DTI. Section 5 of SMA contains the power of DTI:
“Conditions for the Application of General Safeguard
Measures. – The Secretary shall apply a general
safeguard measure upon a positive final
determination of the [Tariff] Commission that a
product is being imported into the country in increased
quantities, whether absolute or relative to the domestic
production, as to be a substantial cause of serious injury
or threat thereof to the domestic industry; however, in
the case of non-agricultural products, the Secretary shall
first establish that the application of such safeguard
measures will be in the public interest.
The safeguard measures which the DTI Secretary may
impose under the SMA may take the following
variations, to wit:
(a) an increase in, or imposition of any duty on the
imported product;
(b) a decrease in or the imposition of a tariff-rate
quota on the product;
(c) a modification or imposition of any quantitative
restriction on the importation of the product into
the Philippines;
uninhibited discretion to impose such measures.
To better comprehend Section 13, note must be taken of
the distinction between the investigatory and
recommendatory functions of the Tariff Commission
under the SMA.
The word “determination,” as used in the SMA, pertains
to the factual findings on whether there are increased
imports into the country of the product under
consideration, and on whether such increased imports
are a substantial cause of serious injury or threaten to
substantially cause serious injury to the domestic
industry. The SMA explicitly authorizes the DTI Secretary
to make a preliminary determination, and the Tariff
Commission to make the final determination. The
distinction is fundamental, as these functions are not
interchangeable. The Tariff Commission makes its
determination only after a formal investigation process,
with such investigation initiated only if there is a positive
preliminary determination by the DTI Secretary under
Section 7 of the SMA. On the other hand, the DTI
Secretary may impose definitive safeguard measure only
if there is a positive final determination made by the Tariff
Commission.
In contrast, a “recommendation” is a suggested
remedial measure submitted by the Tariff Commission
under Section 13 after making a positive final
determination in accordance with Section 5. The Tariff
Commission is not empowered to make a
recommendation absent a positive final determination on
its part. Under Section 13, the Tariff Commission is
required to recommend to the [DTI] Secretary an
405!
 (d) one or more appropriate adjustment measures, “appropriate definitive measure.” The Tariff Commission
including the provision of trade adjustment “may also recommend other actions, including the
assistance; and initiation of international negotiations to address the
(e) any combination of the above-described underlying cause of the increase of imports of the
actions. Except for the provision of trade products, to alleviate the injury or threat thereof to the
adjustment assistance, the measures domestic industry and to facilitate positive adjustment to
enumerated by the SMA are essentially import competition.”
imposts, which precisely are the subject of
delegation under Section 28(2), Article VI of the The recommendations of the Tariff Commission, as
1987 Constitution. rendered under Section 13, are not obligatory on the
DTI Secretary. Nothing in the SMA mandates the DTI
Issue: Whether the Safeguard Measures Act’s’ Secretary to adopt the recommendations made by the
requirement of first having the Tariff Commission Tariff Commission. In fact, the SMA requires that the DTI
investigate the purported emergency in order for the DTI Secretary establish that the application of such safeguard
to impose market protection measures are measures is in the public interest, notwithstanding the
constitutional. Tariff Commission’s recommendation on the appropriate
safeguard measure based on its positive final
determination.

The non-binding force of the Tariff Commission’s

recommendations is congruent with the command of
Section 28(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that
only the President may be empowered by the
Congress to impose appropriate tariff rates,
import/export quotas and other similar measures. It is
the DTI Secretary, as alter ego of the President, who
under the SMA may impose such safeguard measures
subject to the limitations imposed therein. A contrary
conclusion would in essence unduly arrogate to the Tariff
Commission the executive power to impose the
appropriate tariff measures. That is why the SMA
empowers the DTI Secretary to adopt safeguard
measures other than those recommended by the Tariff
Commission.

406!

257 Abakada v. Ermita (Same as above, Case #86, 168, 240, and 246)
(2005)
Issues: Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337,
amending Sections 106, 107 and 108 of the NIRC,
violate the following provisions of the Constitution
namely:
(1) Article VI, Section 28(2) by giving the President
undue delegation of power which provides:
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to
fix within specified limits, and may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues,
and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the government.
(2) Article VI, Section 28(1), which reads:
The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The
Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
Unlike the recommendations of the Tariff Commission, its
determination has a different effect on the DTI Secretary.
Only on the basis of a positive final determination made
by the Tariff Commission under Section 5 can the DTI
Secretary impose a general safeguard measure. Clearly,
then the DTI Secretary is bound by the determination
made by the Tariff Commission
(1) No. The powers which Congress is prohibited from
delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently
and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power,
which can never be delegated, has been described as
the authority to make a complete law. Under the
general rule, for a delegation to be unconstitutional, the
delegation must appear that the power involved is purely
legislative in nature – that is, one appertaining exclusively
to the legislative department. The following recognized
limitations or exceptions:
- Delegation of tariff powers to President under
Constitution
- Delegation of emergency powers to President
under Constitution
- Delegation to the people at large
- Delegation to local governments
- Delegation to administrative bodies
While the power to tax cannot be delegated to executive
agencies, details as to the enforcement and
administration of an exercise of such power may be left
to them, including the power to determine the existence
of facts on which its operation depends. The legislature
may delegate to executive officers or bodies the power to
determine certain facts or conditions, or the happening of
407!
contingencies, on which the operation of a statute is, by
its terms, made to depend its authority.

The ascertainment of facts as basis for the enactment of

legislation is not of itself a legislative function. The
legislative can in fact delegate it to its members or others
to perform. This determination of facts is necessary since
some statutes or laws are only needed in certain
conditions. The case before the Court is not a delegation
of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of
ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and
administration of the increase rate under the law is
contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the
12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a
specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation
or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters
outside of the control of the executive.

No discretion would be exercised by the President. As

the executive who executes laws, the President is
mandated to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the
existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress.
This is a duty which cannot be evaded by the President.
Inasmuch as the law specifically uses the word “shall”,
the exercise of discretion by the President does not come
into play.

(2) No, it does not violate also Article VI, Section 28(1).

UNIFORMITY in taxation means that all taxable articles

or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at
the same rate. Different articles may be taxed at different
amounts provided that the rate is uniform on the same
class everywhere with all people at all times. In this

408!
case, the tax law is uniform as it provides a standard
rate of 0% or 10% (or 12%) on all goods and
services. However, it must be stressed that the rule of
uniform taxation does not deprive Congress of the power
to classify subjects of taxation, and only demands
uniformity within the particular class.

R.A. No. 9337 is also EQUITABLE. The law is equipped

with a threshold margin. The VAT rate of 0% or 10% (or
12%) does not apply to sales of goods or services with
gross annual sales or receipts not exceeding P1,
500,000.00. Also, basic marine and agricultural food
products in their original state are still not subject to the
tax, thus ensuring that prices at the grassroots (to the
poor) level will remain accessible. R.A. No. 9337 puts a
premium on businesses with low profit margins, and
unduly favors those with high profit margins. The tax
of the corporations were also increased from 35%
from 32%. It should be noted that under Section 116,
imposed a 3% percentage tax on VAT-exempt persons
i.e., transactions with gross annual sales and/or receipts
not exceeding P1.5 Million. Congress also mitigated
the possible effects of tax to basic goods and
services by cushioning the impact of the imposition of
the tax on those previously exempt. Excise taxes on
petroleum product and natural gas were reduced and
subsequently, percentage tax on domestic carriers was
removed. Power producers are now exempt from paying
franchise tax. The Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) is not exempt from income
taxes anymore. Even the sale by an artist of his
works or services performed for the production of
such works was not spared. Therefore RA 9337 is
EQUITABLE.

409!

258 Spouses The Financing Program was the culmination of efforts
Constantino v. that began during the term of former President Corazon
Cuisia (2005) Aquino to manage the country’s external debt problem
through a negotiation-oriented debt strategy involving
cooperation and negotiation with foreign creditors.
Pursuant to this strategy, the Aquino government
entered into three restructuring agreements with
representatives of foreign creditor governments during
PROGRESSIVE taxation is built on the principle of the
taxpayer’s ability to pay. Admittedly though, the VAT is
regressive. The principle of progressive taxation has no
relation with the VAT system inasmuch as the VAT paid
by the consumer or business for every goods bought
or services enjoyed is the same regardless of income.
At the end of the day, it is really the lower income
group or businesses with low-profit margins that is
always hardest hit. To calculate, the disparity lies in the
income earned by a person or profit margin marked by a
business, such that the higher the income or profit
margin, the smaller the portion of the income or profit that
is eaten by VAT. A converso, the lower the income or
profit margin, the bigger the part that the VAT eats away.
However, the court ruled in Tolentino case that:
The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of
indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive. ‘Direct
taxes are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as possible,
indirect taxes should be minimized.’ Resort to indirect
taxes should be minimized but not avoided entirely
because it is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid them by
imposing such taxes according to the taxpayers' ability to
pay. VAT manages to mitigate the effects by providing
exemptions to certain businesses or persons.
Yes. The Constitution allows the President to contract
and guarantee foreign loans. It makes no prohibition on
the issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to
which kinds of debt instruments are more onerous than
others. Additionally, the power of the Sec. of Finance is
from the evident exigency by the fact that the process of
establish debt is deep within the realm of the
expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it
410!
the period of 1986 to 1991. However, petitioners alleged
that even prior to the execution of the Program
respondents had already implemented its “buyback
component” when on 15 May 1992, the Philippines
bought back P1.26 billion of external debts pursuant to
the Program.
The petition sought to enjoin the ratification of the
Program, but the Court did not issue any injunctive
relief. Hence, it came to pass that the Program was
signed in London as scheduled. Petitioners characterize
the Financing Program as a package offered to the
country’s foreign creditors consisting of two debt-relief
options.
- A cash buyback of portions of the Philippine
foreign debt at a discount
- Allowed creditors to convert existing Philippine
debt instruments into any of three kinds of
bonds/securities:
Respondents believe that the Financing Program would
cover about U.S. $5.3 billion of foreign commercial
debts and it was expected to deal comprehensively with
the commercial bank debt problem of the country and
pave the way for the country’s access to capital
markets. They add that the Program carried three basic
options from which foreign bank lenders could choose,
namely:
- to lend money
- to exchange existing restructured Philippine
debts with an interest reduction bond; or
- to exchange the same Philippine debts with a
principal collateralized interest reduction bond.
is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its
risk and cost objectives, and meet any other
sovereign debt management goals
With constitutional parameters already established, we
may also note, as a source of suppletory guidance, the
provisions of R.A. No. 245. Section 1 thereof empowers
the Secretary of Finance with the approval of the
President and after consultation of the Monetary Board,
“to borrow from time to time on the credit of the Republic
of the Philippines such sum or sums as in his judgment
may be necessary, and to issue therefor evidences of
indebtedness of the Philippine Government.” Ineluctably
then, while the President wields the borrowing power it is
the Secretary of Finance who normally carries out its
thrusts.
Similarly, in the instant case, the Constitution allocates to
the President the exercise of the foreign borrowing power
“subject to such limitations as may be provided under
law.” Following Southern Cross, but in line with the
limitations as defined in Villena, the presidential
prerogative may be exercised by the President’s alter
ego, who in this case is the Secretary of Finance.
It bears emphasis that apart from the Constitution,
there is also a relevant statute, R.A. No. 245 that
establishes the parameters by which the alter ego
may act in behalf of the President with respect to the
borrowing power. This law expressly provides that the
Secretary of Finance may enter into foreign borrowing
contracts. This law neither amends nor goes contrary to
the Constitution but merely implements the subject
provision in a manner consistent with the structure of the
Executive Department and the alter ego doctine. In this
411!
 Petitioners stress that unlike other powers which may be
validly delegated by the President, the power to incur
foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution
in the person of the President. They argue that the
gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the
Filipino nation requires that the President alone must
exercise this power. They submit that the requirement of
prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the
Constitution–the Monetary Board–reinforces the
submission that not respondents but the President
“alone and personally” can validly bind the country.
Issue: Whether only the President may exercise the
power to enter into these contracts and such power may
not be delegated to respondents.
V. Exemptions
259 Abra Valley College Petitioner seeks to annul the Notice of Seizure and the
v. Aquino (1988) Notice of Sale of its lot and building in Bangued, Abra,
for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties
amounting to 5,140.31. These were issued for the
satisfaction of the taxes, putting up the lot and building
for public auction. Dr. Paterno Millare the Mayor gave
the highest bid of 6000. The trial court found out that:
(a) that the school is recognized by the government
and is offering Primary, High School and
College Courses, and has a school population
of more than one thousand students all in all;
(b) that it is located right in the heart of the town of
Bangued, a few meters from the plaza and
about 120 meters from the Court of First
Instance building;
(c) that the elementary pupils are housed in a two-
storey building across the street;
regard, respondents have declared that they have
followed the restrictions provided under R.A. No.
245, which include the requisite presidential
authorization and which, in the absence of proof and
even allegation to the contrary, should be regarded in a
fashion congruent with the presumption of regularity
bestowed on acts done by public officials.
Moreover, in praying that the acts of the respondents,
especially that of the Secretary of Finance, be nullified as
being in violation of a restrictive constitutional
interpretation, petitioners in effect would have this Court
declare R.A. No. 245 unconstitutional. We will not
strike.
No. The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the
property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution.
The exemption in favor of property used exclusively for
charitable or educational purposes is not limited to
property actually indispensable therefor, but also extends
to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of said purposes.
Although this is the proper interpretation, the use of the
school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither
contemplated by law nor by jurisprudence.
There is justification for the use of the second floor as a
residence of the Director, which is complimentary to the
primary purpose which is for education but the use of the
ground floor for commercial purposes cannot be
considered incidental.
412!
 (d) that the high school and college students are
housed in the main building;
(e) that the Director with his family is in the second
floor of the main building; and
(f) that the annual gross income of the school
reaches more than one hundred thousand
pesos.
The court agrees with the trial court that the school
building and lot should be taxed not because of the
residential purpose of the second floor but because of
the commercial purpose of the ground floor but since
only a portion of the school is being used for
commercial purposes, half of the assessed tax must
be returned to the school involved.

The trial court disagreed for the grant of exemption of

taxes because of the residential use of the director of
the second floor, thus this petition. Petitioner contends
that the primary use of the lot and building for
educational purposes and not the incidental use thereof
determines exemption from property taxes under Art 6,
Sec 25 of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act
No. 470 otherwise known as the Assessment Law which
both state that all lands buildings and improvements
used exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific or
educational purposes are exempted from real property
tax. The respondents added that other than the fact that
the second floor is being used for residential purposes,
the ground floor of the building is being used for
commercial purposes, rented out to Northern Marketing
Corporation.

Issue: Whether the lot and building in question are used

exclusively for educational purposes.
260 Bayan v. Zamora The Philippines and the United States of America forged
(2000) a Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among
others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory
by United States military personnel. To further
strengthen their defense and security relationship, the
Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual
Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty,
No. The negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent
ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which
pertain solely to the President. It is thus in the sole
discretion of the President, as being incidental to the
executive and diplomatic powers granted to him by the
constitution, in granting the tax exemption in Article VII of
the VFA. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot

413!
the parties agreed to respond to any external armed
attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels,
and aircraft. When the Military Bases Agreement was
about to expire, US negotiated for a possible extension
via RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Security proposal which the Philippine Senate rejected.
US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific
Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by
Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to
exchange notes on "the complementing strategic
interests of the United States and the Philippines in the
Asia-Pacific region." A final series of conferences and
negotiations culminated in Manila on January 12 and 13,
1998. Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos
approved the VFA, then after ratified by Pres. Estrada.
Estrada, acting through respondent Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of
the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter
of the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant
to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. After
debates in Senate and Legislative Oversight Committee,
on June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force.
In Art. 7 (Importation and Exportation) of the Visiting
Forces Agreement provide:
- United States Government equipment,
materials, supplies, and other property imported
into or acquired in the Philippines
- Title to such property shall remain with the
United States, which may remove such
property from the Philippines at any time,
free from export duties, taxes, and other
similar charges
intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.
Upon final acceptance of the treaty, it shall be binding on
the two states under international law, and as stated in
Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines, the generally accepted principles of
international law shall be part of the law of the land.
Moreover, the court further holds that under the
international principle of pacta sunt servanda, the
State is responsible in making sure that the government,
Constitution and laws will carry out international
obligations.
The Philippines cannot readily use the Constitution as a
convenient excuse for non-compliance with the duties
and responsibilities under international law.
Negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of
the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to
the President. It is thus in the sole discretion of the
President, as being incidental to the executive and
diplomatic powers granted to him by the constitution, in
granting the tax exemption in Article VII of the VFA. Into
the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and
Congress itself is powerless to invade it.
414!
 - Such property may be removed from the
Philippines, or disposed of therein, provided that
disposition of such property in the Philippines to
persons or entities not entitled to exemption
from applicable taxes and duties shall be
subject to payment of such taxes, and duties
and prior approval of the Philippine Government
- Transfers to persons or entities in the
Philippines not entitled to import privileges
may only be made upon prior approval of the
appropriate Philippine authorities including
payment by the recipient of applicable duties
and taxes imposed in accordance with the
laws of the Philippines. The exportation of
such property and of property acquired in the
Philippines by United States personnel shall be
free of all Philippine duties, taxes, and other
similar charges.

Issue: Does the VFA violate: Section 28 (4), Article VI of

the Constitution granting the exemption from taxes and
duties for the equipment, materials supplies and other
properties imported into or acquired in the Philippines
by, or on behalf, of the US Armed Forces?
261 Republic & PD 1442 was issued by President Marcos which allowed No. Section 234 (a) of the Local Government Code
Philippine National the government to enter into service contracts for states that the following are exempted from payment of
Oil Company- financial, technical, management or other forms of the real property tax:
Energy assistance with qualified domestic and foreign entities,
Development for the exploration, development, exploitation, or Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or
Corporation utilization of the country’s geothermal resources. On 20 any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial
(PNOC) v. City of January 1992, Pres. Aquino issued Proclamation 853 use thereof has been granted, for consideration or
Kidapawan (2005) which excluded certain portions of the land embraced in otherwise, to a taxable person
the Mt. Apo National Park and declared the same as
geothermal reservation under the administration of the Petitioner claims: Sec 234(a) of the LGC, MAGRA,

415!
PNOC, known referred to as the MAGRA.
Subsequently, PNOC-EDC built a 104-megawatt power
plant within the MAGRA, utilizing steam as fuel to power
turbines. The City Treasurer of Kidapawan, Cotabato,
notified PNOC-EDC of its real property tax delinquency
for the period of 1993-2002; issuing a warrant of levy for
the 701- hectare MAGRA.
Consequently, the Treasurer sent a notice of sale of
said property through public auction. PNOC-EDC filed
with the RTC a petition enjoining respondents from
issuing a notice of delinquency and from proceeding
with the auction of MAGRA. But the RTC ruled that
PNOC-EDC is not exempt from real estate tax and that
Respondents may auction the improvements of the
property instead of the real property itself since the
MAGRA is part of Public Domain, thus cannot be sold to
any private entity.
Issue: Whether or not PNOC-EDC is an entity exempt
from paying real property tax?
which is a real property owned by the government, can
only be subjected to real property tax if its beneficial use
is transferred to a taxable person. Citing Sections 1 of PD
1442, it argued that PNOC-EDC is not liable to pay the
real property tax since the beneficial use of MAGRA was
retained by the government.
Respondents assert that PNOC-EDC is a taxable entity
because it is not a political subdivision or GOCC which is
exempt from taxes under its charter. They maintain that
under the service contract, the PNOC-EDC retains
absolute control of the operations and is thus the
beneficial user of the property. PNOC-EDC not only
receives 40% of the net share, but the provisions of the
service contract likewise indicated that PNOC-EDC is the
beneficial user. Moreover, PNOC-EDC has control over
the actual conduct of the geothermal operations while the
government through the DOE has supervision only.
The LGC did not withdraw that tax exemption under
the service contract since the power to grant tax
exemptions is solely vested in Congress under
Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution.
The tax exemption that the PNOC-EDC was granted
through its service contract with the DOE cannot be
applied since it was not granted in accordance with the
aforementioned provision of the Constitution;
consequently, there was no exemption to withdraw.
Additionally, the LGC specifically enumerates those who
are exempt from real property tax and the PNOC-EDC is
not one of them
Under its charter, no tax exemptions were granted. Even
416!

262 John Hay People’s This is a petition for prohibition, mandamus and
Alternative declaratory relief with prayer for a temporary
Coalition v. Lim restraining order (TRO) regarding the constitutionality
(2003) of Presidential Proclamation No. 420, "CREATING
AND DESIGNATING a portion of the area covered by
the former Camp John Hay as THE JOHN HAY Special
Economic Zone pursuant to R.A. No. 7227." R.A. No.
7227 granted the Subic SEZ incentives ranging from
tax and duty-free importations, exemption of
if PNOC-EDC was awarded exemptions in its charter, the
same was withdrawn by the LGC. Under the service
contract entered into by the gov’t and PNOC-EDC,
the latter is both the beneficial and actual user of the
MAGRA and thus liable to pay the real property tax
assessments.
Furthermore, in relation to Sec. 28(4), Art. VI of the
Constitution, the exemption provided in the service
contract cannot be given effect because the DOE,
representing the gov’t in the execution of the contract,
has no authority to grant the same. However, the court
agrees with PNOC-EDC that its machineries, equipment,
buildings and other infrastructures found in MAGRA
cannot be levied upon and sold at public auction because
they are not the properties subject to tax. Thus, as
mentioned earlier, PNOC-EDC is not subject to any tax
exemption and thus is liable for the real property tax due
to the City of Kidapawan.
MAGRA is the only delinquent property and thus the levy
must be upon such. But since MAGRA is inalienable, the
City of Kidapawan must avail of judicial action in order to
compel the PNOC-EDC to pay the delinquent real
property tax.
No. Second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation
No. 420 is declared null and void.
The incentives under RA 7227 are exclusive only to the
Subic SEZ, hence, the extension of the same to the John
Hay SEZ finds no support therein, and neither does the
same grant of privileges to the John Hay SEZ find
support in the other laws specified under Section 3 of
Proclamation No. 420.
417!
businesses therein from local and national taxes, to
other hallmarks of a liberalized financial and
business climate. Among other things, RA 7227 also
created BCDA. BCDA entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement and Escrow Agreement with private
respondents Tuntex (B.V.I.) Co., Ltd (TUNTEX) and
Asiaworld Internationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD),
private corporations registered under the laws of the
British Virgin Islands, preparatory to the formation of a
joint venture for the development of Poro Point in La
Union and Camp John Hay as premier tourist
destinations and recreation centers.
Four months later or on December 16, 1993, BCDA,
TUNTEX and ASIAWORD executed a Joint Venture
Agreement whereby they bound themselves to put up a
joint venture company known as the Baguio
International Development and Management
Corporation which would lease areas within Camp John
Hay and Poro Point for the purpose of turning such
places into principal tourist and recreation spots, as
originally envisioned by the parties under their
Memorandum of Agreement. The Baguio City
government meanwhile passed a number of resolutions
in response to the actions taken by BCDA as owner and
administrator of Camp John Hay.
It is the legislature, unless limited by a provision of the
Constitution, that has full power to exempt any person or
corporation or class of property from taxation, its power
to exempt being as broad as its power to tax.
In maintaining the validity of Proclamation No. 420,
respondents contend that by extending to the John Hay
SEZ economic incentives similar to those enjoyed by the
Subic SEZ which was established under R.A. No. 7227,
the proclamation is merely implementing the legislative
intent of said law to turn the US military bases into hubs
of business activity or investment. They underscore the
point that the government’s policy of bases conversion
cannot be achieved without extending the same tax
exemptions granted by R.A. No. 7227 to Subic SEZ to
other SEZs.
Tax Exemption cannot be implied, as it must be
categorically and unmistakably expressed.

On May 11, 1994, the Sanggunian passed a

resolution requesting the Mayor to order the
determination of realty taxes which may otherwise
be collected from real properties of Camp John Hay.
The resolution was intended to intelligently guide
the sanggunian in determining its position on
whether Camp John Hay be declared a SEZ, it (the

418!
 sanggunian) being of the view that such declaration
would exempt the camp’s property and the economic
activity therein from local or national taxation.

More than a month later, however, the sanggunian

passed Resolution No. 255, (Series of 1994), seeking
and supporting, subject to its concurrence, the
issuance by then President Ramos of a presidential
proclamation (Proclamation No. 420) declaring an
area of 288.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in
accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 7227.
The issuance of Proclamation No. 420 spawned the
present petition challenging, in the main, its
constitutionality or validity as well as the legality of the
Memorandum of Agreement and Joint Venture
Agreement between public respondent BCDA and
private respondents TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD.

Petitioners allege as grounds for the allowance of the

petition the following: Presidential Proclamation No. 420,
s. 1990 insofar as it grants tax exemptions is invalid and
illegal as it is an unconstitutional exercise by the
President of a power granted only to the Legislature

Issue: Whether the tax exemptions and other financial

incentives granted to the Subic SEZ under Section 12 of
R.A. No. 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act
of 1992), are applicable to the John Hay SEZ.
263 Lung Center v. QC Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity which owns a
(2004) parcel of land in Quezon City. Erected in the middle of
the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung Center
of the Philippines.
The ground floor is being leased to a canteen, medical
Partly No. The Court held that the petitioner is indeed a
charitable institution based on its charter and articles of
incorporation. As a general principle, a charitable
institution does not lose its character as such and its
exemption from taxes simply because it derives income
from paying patients, whether out-patient or confined in

419!
professionals who use the same as their private clinics,
as well as to other private parties. The right portion of
the lot is being leased for commercial purposes to the
Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center. The petitioner
accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders
medical services to out-patients, both paying and non-
paying. Aside from its income from paying patients, the
petitioner receives annual subsidies from the
government.
Petitioner filed a claim for exemption on its
averment that it is a charitable institution with a
minimum of 60% of its hospital beds exclusively
used for charity patients and that the major thrust of
its hospital operation is to serve charity patients.
The city assessor denied the claim. When appealed to
the QC-Local Board of Assessment, the same was
dismissed. On appeal, the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals affirmed the local board’s decision, finding that
Lung Center of the Philippines is not a charitable
institution and that its properties were not actually,
directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.
Hence, the present petition for review with averments
that the Lung Center of the Philippines is a charitable
institution under Section 28(3), Article VI of the
Constitution.
Issue: Is the Lung Center of the Philippines a charitable
institution within the context of the Constitution, and
therefore, exempt from real property tax?
the hospital, or receives subsidies from the government,
so long as the money received is devoted or used
altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to
achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of the
persons managing or operating the institution it is a
charitable institution.
In this case, the petitioner adduced substantial evidence
that it spent its income, including the subsidies from the
government for 1991 and 1992 for its patients and for the
operation of the hospital. It even incurred a net loss in
1991 and 1992 from its operations.
Despite this, the Court held that the portions of real
property that are leased to private entities are not exempt
from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly
and exclusively used for charitable purposes. While
portions of the hospital are used for treatment of patients
and the dispensation of medical services to them,
whether paying or non-paying, other portions thereof are
being leased to private individuals and enterprises.
Accordingly, the portions occupied by the hospital used
for its patients are exempt from real property taxes while
those leased to private entities are not exempt from such
taxes. Under P.D. No. 1823, the petitioner is entitled to
receive donations. The petitioner does not lose its
character as a charitable institution simply because the
gift or donation is in the form of subsidies granted by the
government.
Section 2 of PD 1823 states that petitioner “shall be
exempt from income and gift taxes, the same further
deductible in full for the purpose of determining the
maximum deductible amount under Section 30,
420!
paragraph (h), of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended. The Lung Center of the Philippines shall be
exempt from the payment of taxes, charges and fees
imposed by the Government or any political subdivision
or instrumentality thereof with respect to equipment
purchases made by, or for the Lung Center.

Given the abovementioned, it is clear that the petitioner is

not exempted from any property tax for its real properties
and buildings.

On the other hand, Section 28(3), Article 6 of the

Constitution covers only property taxes which means that
the institution itself is not exempted rather, only those
lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly, and
exclusively used for charitable purposes

The petitioner failed to discharge its burden to prove that

the entirety of its real property is actually, directly and
exclusively used for charitable purposes. While portions
of the hospital are used for the treatment of patients and
the dispensation of medical services to them, whether
paying or non-paying, other portions thereof are being
leased to private individuals for their clinics and a
canteen. Further, a portion of the land is being leased to
a private individual for her business enterprise under the
business name "Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center."
Indeed, the petitioner’s evidence shows that it collected
P1,136,483.45 as rentals in 1991 and P1,679,999.28 for
1992 from the said lessees.

421!
Section 29.
(1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law.
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid,
or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious
teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher,
minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall
be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If
the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled
or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general
funds of the Government.
Is a law providing automatic debt service appropriation valid
even if actual/exact amounts are not stated in the law?
Yes. The legislative intention [of such a law] is that the amount
needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the
State to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking
charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as
guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the need to
enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises.
Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific
amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very nature of the problem
being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the
legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The executive is not
of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt
servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes,
and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or
indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or other
evidence of indebtedness old in international markets incurred by
virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due. No uncertainty
arises in the executive implementation as the limit will be the exact
amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury.
The appropriation must be made for public purpose (Pascual v.
Secretary of Public Works)
The subsequent donation of the road did not validate the law
(construction of feeder roads) because the validity of a statute
depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its approval,
and not upon event occurring or acts performed subsequently. The
land where the feeder road was still a private land when Congress
made the appropriation; thus void.

Section 29. Restrictions on Use of Public Fund

I. Fiscal Powers of Congress
264 Pascual v. Secretary (Same as above, Case # 218) No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power
of Public Works to appropriate public revenue for anything but a public
(1960-1961) In 1953, RA 920 was passed. This law appropriated purpose.
P85,000.00 “for the construction, reconstruction,
repair, extension and improvement” of “Pasig feeder It is the essential character of the direct object of the

422!
road terminals. Pascual, then governor of Rizal,
assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that
the appropriation was actually going to be used
for private use for the terminals sought to be
improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision.
The said Subdivision is owned by Senator
Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate
that passed and approved the same RA.
Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in
Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and
that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the
expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be
upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Sec of Public
Works be restrained from releasing funds for such
purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an
afterthought, donated the said property to the City of
Pasig.
Issue: Whether the appropriation of PhP85, 000 for
the construction of the feeder roads is valid.
expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a
tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected
nor the degree to which the general advantage of the
community, and thus the public welfare, may be
ultimately benefited by their promotion
Thus, incidental to the public or to the state, which results
from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of
private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by
the use public money. The donation to the Government,
over five (5) months after the approval and effectivity of
said Act, made, according to the petition, for the purpose of
giving a "semblance of legality", or legalizing, the
appropriation in question, did not cure its aforementioned
basic defect
The SC ruled that said donation violated the provision of
our fundamental law prohibiting members of Congress
from being directly or indirectly financially interested
in any contract with the Government, and, hence, is
unconstitutional, as well as null and void ab initio, for the
construction of the projected feeder roads in question
with public funds would greatly enhance or increase
the value of the aforementioned subdivision of
respondent Zulueta, "aside from relieving him from the
burden of constructing his subdivision streets or roads
at his own expense"; that the construction of said
projected feeder roads was then being undertaken by the
Bureau of Public Highways; and that, unless restrained by
the court, the respondents would continue to execute,
comply with, follow and implement the aforementioned
illegal provision of law, "to the irreparable damage,
detriment and prejudice not only to the petitioner but to the
Filipino nation."
423!
265 MIAA v. Mabunay Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) assail
(2000) the decision by the RTC of Manila requiring MIAA to
contract security services through public bidding.
Respondent Lanting Security and Watchman Agency
(bonded security agency) entered into an agreement
with MIAA to render security services on a month-to-
month basis (April 31, 1987) contract was renewed
from 1988-1985.
After which, the privatization of the Aviation Security
Services a subsidiary of the Philippine Aviation
Security Services took place and formed PASSCOR.
MIAA approved the award of security services in
favor of PASSCOR. Lanting then filed complaint to
the court challenging the “highly irregular” awarding
by MIAA of the security services without going
through public bidding not only contrary to the law
but also against public policy.
Issue: Whether the court a quo erred in ruling that
under existing laws and regulations the contract for
security services should be awarded through public
bidding
Quoting Section 68 of RA 7845: Service Contracts.
Departments, bureaus, offices or agencies of the
National Government are hereby authorized to enter
into contracts with other government agencies,
private firms or individuals and non-governmental
organizations for services related or incidental to
their respective functions and operations through
public bidding or negotiated contracts whenever it is
impractical or more expensive for the government to
directly undertake such functions and operations xxx
Yes.
Appropriations definition: An appropriations act is
primarily a special type of legislation whose content is
limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific
purpose or a separate fiscal unit.
Section 31 of the GAA of 1993 merely authorizes the heads
of departments, bureaus, offices or agencies of the national
government to hire, through public bidding or negotiated
contracts, contractual personnel to perform specific
activities or services related or incidental to their functions.
This law specifically authorizes expenditures for the hiring
of these personnel. It is not the governing law on the award
of the service contracts by government agencies nor does
it do away with the general requirement of public bidding.
There is nothing in Section 68 of RA 7845 which does
away with the general requirement of public bidding in
the award of government contract. The quoted section
gives the government agency concerned the sole option to
resort to public bidding or to negotiate contract whenever it
is impractical or more expensive for the government to
directly undertake a certain function or operation is not
tenable. Although the legislature in making appropriations
under its exclusive jurisdiction eaves largely to
administrative discretion the choice of ways and means to
accomplish the object of appropriation that administrative
discretion may not transcend the statute.
424!
266 Guingona v. (Same above, Case # 73 and 214)
Carague (1991) Under R.A. 4860, the President is authorized to
obtain foreign loans and credit for financing
approved economic development purposes or
projects or for relending to private purposes.
President Marcos issued the following:
PD 81 - Section 7 provides that "all the revenue
realized from the projects financed by such loans,"
after deducting the actual and necessary operating
and maintenance expenses, is appropriated for
servicing the foreign debts.
-
PD 1177 Sec. 31. Automatic appropriations. –– All
expenditures for … (b)principal and interest on public
debt, … are automatically appropriated; Provided,
that no obligations shall be incurred or payments
made from funds thus automatically appropriated
except as issued in the form of regular budgetary
allotments
PD 1967 - Section 1. There is hereby appropriated,
out of any funds in the National Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, such amounts as may be
necessary to effect payments on foreign or domestic
loans, or foreign or domestic loans
All PD’s were issued to amend the provisions of the
act regarding the payment of debt service. The
Marcos administration incurred big amounts of
debt which are still unpaid even after his
presidency.
President Corazon Aquino submitted to the Congress
the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of
Financing for the Fiscal Year 1990. The 1990 budget
(P233.5 Billion) provided P86.8 billion for debt
No. The argument of the petitioner is untenable: This
transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been
adopted by its framers to preserve the social order so
that legislation by the then President Marcos may be
recognized. The automatic appropriation provides the
flexibility for the effective execution of debt
management policies.
Absent an automatic appropriation clause, if the Philippine
Government has to await and depend upon Congressional
action, by the time this comes, it may no longer be
responsive to the intended conditions and result to delayed
payments and arrearages may have supervened which
would worsen our debt service-to-total expenditure ratio in
the budget due to penalties and/or demand for immediate
payment even before due dates.
The Court maintains the lawful authorizations or
appropriations constituted in RA4860, as amended by
PD81, Sec. 31 of PD 1177 and PD 1967, unless they are
repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. Whether or
not the country should honor its international debt, more
specifically the enormous amount that had been incurred
by the past administration, is more of a political decision for
Congress and the Executive to determine in the exercise of
their wisdom and sound discretion.
425!
 service out of the P98.4 billion on automatic
appropriation and P27 billion for the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports. The said automatic
appropriation is authorized by presidential decrees
(PD No. 81, PD No. 1177 and PD No. 1967) for the
Republic of the Philippines to make prompt payment
and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain
the credit standing of the country.

Though the presidential decrees do not state specific

amounts to be paid, the amounts nevertheless are
made certain by the legislative parameters provided
in the decrees, that is, to pay the principal, interest,
taxes and other normal banking charges on the
loans, credit or indebtedness, or on the bonds,
debentures, securities or other evidences of
indebtedness sold in international markets incurred
by the virtue of law, as when they shall become due.

Petitioner believes the said decrees are inconsistent

with Article VI, §§24 and 27 of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether the decree of automatic debt

servicing is unconstitutional
267 COMELEC v. Hon Congress passed the Voter’s Registration Act of
Quijano (2002) 1996 (RA 8189) that provided for the modernization
and computerization of the voter’s registration list
and appropriation funds in order to establish a clean
and complete updated list of voters. This is for the
May 2004 elections. Fingerprint would be digitally
entered in the system and upon completion would be
compared and matched in order to avoid double
entries. An identification card would then be issued to
each registrant as a visual record.
No. According to the constitution “no money shall be paid
out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law”. Thus, in the execution of government
contracts, the precise import of this constitutional restriction
is to require the various agencies to limit their expenditures
within the appropriations made by law for each fiscal year.
Complementary to the constitution are provisions of law
and administrative issuances--Administrative code of 1987,
Sec. 46, Sec 47)

426!

COMELEC then issued invitations for the bidding of
supply and installation one of which is the
respondent PHOTOKINA--garnered the highest
total weighted score and was declared the
winning bidder. Respondent was declared the
winning bid. Problem lies in the budget
appropriated by Congress for the COMELEC of
only 1 Billion PHP and actual funds under the
Certificate of Availability Funds (CAF) of the
COMELEC was 1.2 Billion PHP. COMELEC then
changed their management from Chairman
Demetriou to Benipayo. Benipayo announced that
the project has been scrapped and dropped and
stated his intention of coming up with a project of his
own which is the “Triple E Vision” project.
PHOTOKINA filed to the court a case to compel
COMELEC to pay the 1.2 Billion PHP contract as
what has been previously decided. In this petition
COMELEC wants otherwise.
Issue: Whether may a successful bidder compel a
government agency to formalize a contract with it
notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount
appropriated by Congress for the project?
Complementary to the foregoing constitutional injunction
are pertinent provisions of law and administrative
issuances that are designed to effectuate the above
mandate in a detailed manner. Sections 46 and 47,
Chapter 8, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of EO 292, otherwise
known as "Administrative Code of 1987," provide:
"SEC. 46. Appropriation Before Entering into Contract. - (1)
No contract involving the expenditure of public funds shall
be entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor,
the unexpended balance of which, free of other obligations,
is sufficient to cover the proposed expenditure; and
"SEC. 47. Certificate Showing Appropriation to Meet
Contract. - Except in the case of a contract for personal
service, xxx no contract involving the expenditure of public
funds by any government agency shall be entered into or
authorized unless the proper accounting official of the
agency concerned shall have certified to the officer
entering into the obligation that funds have been duly
appropriated for the purpose and that the amount
necessary to cover the proposed contract for the current
calendar year is available for expenditure on account
thereof, subject to verification by the auditor concerned.”
The tenor of the language of the law that the existence
of appropriations and the availability of funds are
indispensable pre-requisites to or conditions for the
execution of government contracts. Using this as the
premise we cannot accede to PHOTOKINA contention that
there is already a perfected contract. Since PHOTOKINA’S
bid is beyond the amount appropriated by the Congress for
the VRIS project the proposed contract is not binding to the
COMELEC.
427!
 Even the draft contract submitted by Commissioner Said in
that provides for a contract price in the amount of P1.2
Billion Pesos is unacceptable. Indeed, we share the
observation of former Chairman Demetriou that it
circumvents the statutory requirements on government
contracts. While the contract price under the draft contract
is only P1.2 Billion and, thus, within the certified available
funds, the same covers only Phase I of the VRIS Project,
i.e., the issuance of identification cards for only 1,000,000
voters in specified areas. In effect, the implementation of
the VRIS Project will be “segmented” or “chopped” into
several phases.

Not only is such arrangement disallowed by our budgetary

laws and practices, it is also disadvantageous to the
COMELEC because of the uncertainty that will loom over
its modernization project for an indefinite period of time.
Should Congress fail to appropriate the amount necessary
for the completion of the entire project, what good will the
accomplished Phase I serve? As expected, the project
failed "to sell" with the Department of Budget and
Management.
II. Special Funds (Par.3)
268 Gaston v. Republic P.D. No. 388, promulgated on February 2,1974, Yes. Section 7 of P.D. No. 388 does provide that the
Planters Bank which created the PHILSUCOM, provided for the stabilization fees collected "shall be administered in trust by
(1988) collection of a Stabilization Fund as follows: the Commission." However, while the element of intent to
SEC. 7. Capitalization, Special Fund of the create a trust is present, a resulting trust in favor of the
Commission, Development and Stabilization sugar producers, millers and planters cannot be said to
Fund. — There is hereby established a fund for the have ensued because the presumptive intention of the
commission for the purpose of financing the growth parties is not reasonably ascertainable from the language
and development of the sugar industry and all its of the statute itself.
components, stabilization of the domestic market
including the foreign market to be administered in No implied trust in favor of the sugar producers either can
trust by the Commission and deposited in the be deduced from the imposition of the levy. It is not clearly

428!
Philippine National Bank derived in the manner
herein below cited from the following sources:
- Stabilization fund shall be collected as
provided for in the various provisions of this
Decree.
- Stabilization fees shall be collected from
planters and millers in the amount of Two
(P2.00) Pesos for every picul produced and
milled for a period of five years from the
approval of this Decree and One (Pl.00)
Peso for every picul produced and milled
every year thereafter.
Provided: That fifty (P0.50) centavos per
picul of the amount levied on planters, millers
and traders under Section 4(c) of this Decree
will be used for the payment of salaries and
wages of personnel, fringe benefits and
allowances of officers and employees for the
purpose of accomplishing and employees for
the purpose of accomplishing the efficient
performance of the duties of the
Commission. Provided, further: That said
amount shall constitute a lien on the sugar
quedan and/or warehouse receipts and shall
be paid immediately by the planters and mill
companies, sugar centrals and refineries to
the Commission.
Petitioners are sugar producers, sugarcane planters
and millers. Respondent Philippine Sugar
Commission (PHILSUCOM) was formerly the
government office tasked with the function of
regulating and supervising the sugar industry until it
shown from the statute itself that the PHILSUCOM imposed
on itself the obligation of holding the stabilization fund for
the benefit of the sugar producers. Neither can petitioners
place reliance on the history of respondents Bank.
The stabilization fees collected are in the nature of a tax,
which is within the power of the State to impose for the
promotion of the sugar industry.
The stabilization fees in question are levied by the State
upon sugar millers, planters and producers for a special
purpose — that of "financing the growth and development
of the sugar industry and all its components, stabilization of
the domestic market including the foreign market the fact
that the State has taken possession of moneys pursuant to
law is sufficient to constitute them state funds, even though
they are held for a special purpose. Having been levied for
a special purpose, the revenues collected are to be treated
as a special fund, to be, in the language of the statute,
"administered in trust' for the purpose intended.
Once the purpose has been fulfilled or abandoned, the
balance, if any, is to be transferred to the general funds
of the Government. That is the essence of the trust
intended [Article VI, Sec. 29(3)].
The character of the Stabilization Fund as a special
fund is emphasized by the fact that the funds are
deposited in the Philippine National Bank and not in
the Philippine Treasury, moneys from which may be
paid out only in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law (1987) Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 29[1],1973
Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 18[l]).
429!
was superseded by its co-respondent Sugar The Stabilization Fund is to be utilized for the benefit of
Regulatory Administration (SRA). Respondent the entire sugar industry, "and all its components,
Republic Planters Bank (briefly, the Bank) is a stabilization of the domestic market," including the
commercial banking corporation. foreign market the industry being of vital importance to
the country's economy and to national interest.
Petitioners and Intervenors have come to this Court
praying for a Writ of mandamus commanding The sugar planters are not beneficial owners. The money is
respondents to implement and accomplish the collected from them only because they it is also they who
privatization of Republic Planters Bank by the are to be benefited from the expenditure of funds derived
transfer and distribution of the shares of stock in the from it. The investing of the funds in RPB is not alien to the
said bank now held by and still carried in the name of purpose since the Bank is a commodity bank for sugar,
the Phil. Sugar Commission, to the sugar producers, conceived for the sugar industry’ growth and development.
planters and millers, who are the true beneficial
owners of the 761,416 common shares, and
53,005,045 preferred shares, the said investment
having been funded by the deduction of P1.00 per
picul from sugar proceeds of the sugar producers
commencing the year 1978-79 until the present as
stabilization fund pursuant to PD 388.

Respondents PHILSUCOM and SRA, for their part,

squarely traverse the petition arguing that no trust
results from Section 7 of P.D. No. 388; that the
stabilization fees collected are considered
government funds under the Government Auditing
Code; that the transfer of shares of stock from
PHILSUCOM to the sugar producers would be
irregular, if not illegal; and that this suit is barred by
laches.

Issue: Whether the stabilization fees collected from

sugar planters and millers pursuant to Section 7 of
P.D. No. 388 are funds in trust for them, or public
funds;

430!
269 Osmena v. Orbos (Same as above, Case # 81)
(1993) President Marcos issued PD 1956 that created a
special account in the General Fund known as oil
price stabilization fund (OPSF). The said fund will
reimburse oil companies for the increase in prices
brought by the exchange rate or fluctuating prices of
oil crude price in the international market. EO 1024
reclassified PD1956 as a trust liability account that
was released from the hands of National Treasury to
the Ministry of Energy. Additionally, the EO allowed
the investment of the fund in securities and with the
earning accruing then to the funds.
Under Corazon Aquino, EO 1024 was expanded by
the implementation of EO 137 so that it would also
cover cost under recovery. This meant that the
account will reimburse companies that incurred
losses because of the price changes in the domestic
market. Under EO 127, aside from the ones
mentioned, the account may also fund increases
in prices of oil due to taxes in accordance with
the Ministry of Finance with consultation to the
Ministry of Energy. In March 1991, the OPSF was
found have incurred 12.877 billion deficits and thus
the Ministry of Energy imposed an increase in pump
prices in order to recoup the losses in around 6
months.
The petitioner contends the taxing that was imposed
through OPSF that was done by the President under
the supervision of the legislative. They claimed that
taxing is unconstitutional under OPSF.
Issue: Whether the EO 127 violates Article VI, 29 (3).
No. The "trust account" in the books of account of the
Ministry of Energy is valid and not contrary to Section
29(3), Article VI of the Constitution.
The Court, citing a similar case in Gaston vs. Republic
Planters Bank, that the stabilization fees collected are in
the nature of a tax, which is in the power of the State to
impose for the promotion of the industry.
The tax collected is not a pure exercise of the power of
taxation. It is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide a
means of stabilization in the industry. The levy is primarily
in the exercise of the power of the state.
Having been levied for a special purpose, the revenues
collected are to be treated as a special fund "to be
administered in trust" for the purpose intended
The character of the Stabilization Fund as a special kind of
fund is clear when we consider that the funds are deposited
in the PNB and not in the Philippine Treasury
The OSPF is a special fund based on the special treatment
given to it by E.O. 137, as it is segregated from the general
fund
Although it is referred to by the law as a "trust liability
account," the fund still falls under the definition of a special
fund and is still subject to the scrutiny and review of the
COA
431!
270 First Lepanto The case questions where and in what manner
Ceramics v. CA appeals from decisions of the Board of Investments
(1994) (BOI) should be filed. A thorough scrutiny of the
conflicting provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,
otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980," Executive Order No. 226, also known
as the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 and
Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 is, thus, called
for Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 (PD 1789)
provided the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
connection with the decisions of Board of
Investments:
Article 78. Judicial Relief. All orders or decisions of
the Board in cases involving the provisions of this
Code shall immediately be executory. No appeal
from the order or decision of the Board by the party
adversely affected shall stay such order or decision:
Provided, That all appeals shall be filed directly
with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the order or decision.
BP Blg. 129 Section 9 granted the decision and final
orders of quasi-judicial agencies (such as BOI)
exclusively to exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the
then Intermediate Appellate Court (Now CA).
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except
those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution,
the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of
Yes. The present Constitution (ratified on February 11,
1987) provided that No law shall be passed increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in
this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
*Thus the section Omnibus Investments Code of 1987
pertaining to the increase of the SC’s jurisdiction should not
be acknowledged unless the Supreme Court allows it to be
so.
The SC rules there is no reason why decision and final
orders of BOI must be directly appealed to this Court. As
already noted in the main decision in this case, the purpose
of BP. Blg. 129 is to provide uniform appeals to the CA
from the decisions and final orders of all quasi-judicial
agencies with the exception only of those issued under the
Labor Code and those rendered by the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals.
EO 226 was also promulgated after the 1987 Constitution
took effect February 2, 1987. Thus, Art 82 of EO 226,
which provides for increasing the appellate jurisdiction of
the SC, is invalid and therefore never became effective for
the concurrence of the Court was no sought in its
enactment. Thus, the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981
as amended still stands. The exclusive jurisdiction on
appeals from decisions of the BOI belongs to the CA.
432!
 the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the
fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948.

The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the

power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive
evidence and perform any and all acts necessary
to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling
within its original and appellate jurisdiction,
including the power to grant and conduct new
trials or further proceedings.
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and
interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of
the Philippines and by the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals.

This is in opposite to Omnibus Investments Code of

1987 (EO No. 226 July 17, 1987) Section 82:
Provided, That all appeals shall be filed directly
with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the order or decision.

Issue: Was the Court correct in sustaining the

appellate jurisdiction of the CA in decisions from the
Board of Investments?
271 Diaz v. CA (1994) January 23, 1991, Davao Light and Proper
Company Inc. (DLPC) filed with the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the
approval of the sound value appraisal of it
property and services. The Asian Appraisal
Company valued the Equipment as P1,141,744,00
on March 12 1990. December 6, 1992. ERB
approved the application of DLPC after deducting
14.8 Million worth of property and equipment which
Yes. On 2 February 1987, the New Constitution took effect
(with Sec. 30.) On 8 May 1987, the President promulgated
E.O. No. 172 creating the Energy Regulatory Board to
replace the Board of Energy. Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172
was enacted without the advice and concurrence of the
Court, this provision never became effective, with the
result that it cannot be deemed to have amended the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Consequently, the
authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases from the

433!
were not used by DLPC in its application.
Afterwards, On July 6, 1992, the petitioner filed a
petition for review on certiorari before this Court
assailing the decision of ERB on the ground of lack
jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court dismissed the case on the grounds that (1)
the filing of the petition for review with the SC
was a wrong mode of appeal, and (2) the petition
did not comply with the provisions of the SC
Circular 1-88 because (A) did not state the date
when the petitioners received the notice of the ERB,
(B) it did not state the date when the petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration, and (C) it
inconsistently alleged different dates when the
petitioners supposedly receive the denial of their
motion by ERB.
The present Constitution (ratified on February 11,
1987) provided that No law shall be passed
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advice and concurrence. May 8, 1987,
the President promulgated E.O. 172 creating the
ERB and in Section 10: (a) party adversely
affected by a decision order or ruling the Board
XXX ay file a petition to be known as petition for
review with the SC.
February 27, 1991, the SC promulgated that the
proper mode of appeal from any quasi-judicial
agency including ERB is by way of petition for
review with the CA.
Board of Energy, now ERB, remains
Contrary to petitioners' stand, the Supreme Court's
Resolution dated September 8, 1992, referring "this case to
the Court of Appeals for further disposition" was not a
directive for this court to disregard the above circulars and
precedents. Rather the said SC resolution could mean
only that this court should dispose of the subject
petition in conformity with, and not in violation of,
those circulars and precedents
If the appeal is brought to either Court (Supreme Court or
Court of Appeals) by the wrong procedure, the only course
of action open to it is to dismiss the appeal. There is no
longer any justification for allowing transfers of erroneous
appeals from one court to another (Quesada v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 93869, 12 November 1990).
SC Circular 2-90
4. Erroneous Appeals. — An appeal taken to either the
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or
inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.
a) Appeal to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal. - No
appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from a
judgment of a regional trial court by notice of appeal under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, regardless of any statement
in the notice that the Supreme Court is the court of choice;
and no judge or clerk of a regional trial court, shall elevate,
or cause to be elevated, to the Supreme Court the records
of a case thus erroneously appealed 3 under pain of
disciplinary action, said officials, no less than the attorney
taking the appeal, being chargeable with knowledge that
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may
434!

Issue: Whether E.O. No. 172 is violative of Section
30, Article VI of the Constitution
272 Fabian v. Desierto January 23, 1991, Davao Light and Proper
(1998) Company Inc. (DLPC) filed with the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the
approval of the sound value appraisal of it
property and services. Teresita G. Fabian was the
major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT)
which was engaged in the construction business w/
Agustin. Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District
Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly
committed the offenses for which he was
administratively charged in the Office in the office of
the Ombudsman.
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents
developed between the parties and when Fabian
properly be invoked only through petitions for review on
certiorari.
d) No transfer of appeals erroneously taken. — no transfers
of appeals erroneously taken to the Supreme Court or to
the Court of Appeals to whichever of these Tribunals has
appropriate appellate jurisdiction will be allowed; 5
continued ignorance or willful disregard of the law on
appeals will not be tolerated.
Both Circulars Nos. 1-88 and 2-90 were duly published in
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
Hence, lawyers are expected to keep themselves abreast
with the decisions of this Court and with its Circulars and
other issuances relating to procedure or affecting their
duties and responsibilities as officers of the court
(Teehankee, Jr. v. Hon. Madayag, G.R. No. 102717, 12
December 1992).
No. Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true
legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this
Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates
the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution
against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of
this Court (First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA).
No countervailing argument has been cogently presented
to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition.
That constitutional provision was intended to give this Court
a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of
legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would
unnecessarily burden the Court.
435!
 tried to terminate their relationship, Agustin refused
and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of Rule 45 of the 1997 Civil Procedures allows ONLY
employing acts of harassment, intimidation and questions of law may be filed straight to the SC on a
threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned verified petition for review on certiorari.
administrative case against him. A case ensued
which eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman – ** Thus in this case where the question of W/N the
who inhibited himself – later the case led to the petitioner is guilty of the administrative is a question of facts
deputy Ombudsman. The deputy ruled in favor of thus cannot be given to the Supreme Court
Agustin and he said the decision is final and
executory. Fabian appealed the case to the SC. She ***In this case, the Supreme Court allowed the transfer of
averred that Sec. 27 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of appellate jurisdiction to the CA because it is pa purely
1989) pertinently provides that -In all administrative procedural and not a substantive power.
disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to
the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari
within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice
of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether Section 27 of RA 6770 which

provides for appeals in administrative disciplinary
cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the SC
in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
valid
273 Villavert v. Desierto Petitioner Douglas R. Villavert is a Sales &
(2000) Promotion Supervisor of PCSO Cebu Branch
responsible for the sale and disposal of PCSO
sweepstakes tickets withdrawn by him, which are
already considered sold. As Villavert is not expected
to sell all withdrawn tickets on his own, he is allowed
by the PCSO to consign tickets to ticket outlets
and/or to engage the help of sales agents, usually
sidewalk peddlers and hawkers.
No. On February 9, 1999, promulgated A.M. No 99-2-02-
SC: In light of the decision in Fabian v. Ombudsman (G.R.
No. 129742, 16 September 1998), any appeal by way of
petition for review from a decision or final resolution or
order of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, or
special civil action relative to such decision, resolution
or order filed with the Court after 15 March 1999 shall
no longer be referred to the Court of Appeals, but must
be forthwith DENIED or DISMISSED, respectively.

436!
From 20 March to 12 June 1994, or for two (2) As the instant petition was filed prior to 15 March 1999 (i.e.
months of weekly draws, petitioner Villavert incurred petition for review in this case was on June 18 1998) thus
a total of P997,373.60 worth of unpaid PCSO tickets. not yet covered by the A.M which allowed it to be
On 13 October 1994 he wrote the Chairman and reviewed and not dismissed. Referral to the CA was
Acting General Manager of PCSO, Manuel L. allowed in the case of Fabian v. Desierto, but in
Morato, proposing to settle his unpaid ticket accordance with AM of the SC. Its referral for final
accounts. His proposal involved the payment of disposition to the Court of Appeals is still in order.
P50,000.00 in cash as down payment; payment of
the remaining amount in equal monthly installments
of P5,000.00; application of all his per diems and
commissions to his account as they became due;
and, sale of fifty (50) booklets or more per draw.

On 4 June 1996 petitioner filed a Manifestation with

respondent Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas informing
the latter of the approval by PCSO Chairman and
Acting General Manager of his amended proposal for
settlement. However, in an Order dated 14 August
1996 respondent Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas
required petitioner to secure further approval from
the PCSO Board of Directors. Petitioner complied
with this requirement.

Graft Investigation Officer II Edgemelo C. Rosales,

after due consideration of the evidence submitted by
petitioner, rendered a resolution recommending the
dismissal of Adm. Case No. OMB-VIS-ADM-95-0088
in view of:

(a)the approval of petitioner’s proposal of settlement

by the PCSO Chairman-Acting General Manager;
(b) the findings that petitioner did not mismanage his
responsibilities in the sale of sweepstakes tickets;

437!
 and,
(c) the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the PCSO
through its authorized representative.

Despite the recommendation, however, the Deputy

Ombudsman-Visayas through Director Virginia
Palanca-Santiago issued a Memorandum dated 17
July 1997 finding petitioner "liable for administrative
sanction for Grave Misconduct and / or Dishonesty."

Consequently, petitioner was recommended for

dismissal from the public service with all the
accessory penalties provided under Memorandum
Circular No. 30, Series of 1989, of the Civil Service
Commission.On 7 November 1997 respondent
Ombudsman approved the Memorandum.On 4
December 1997 petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the Deputy
Ombudsman-Visayas in an Order dated 30 January
1998 and approved by the Ombudsman on 3 April
1998.

Issue: Whether decision and finals orders from the

Ombudsman, a quasi-judicial agency, must be
forwarded to the Supreme Court and not the Court of
Appeals.
274 Tirol v. COA (2000) Petitioner's main allegation is that the Requisition
and Issue Voucher (RIV) and check were previously
reviewed by his subordinates before he approved
and signed them. Said act, therefore, only constitutes
a ministerial act on his part. The Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas rejected petitioner's defense
because had he carefully scrutinized the
documents he would have discovered that the
No. Thus the petition for certiorari in this case is hereby
DENIED, and the Resolution of 20 March 1997 and Order
of 5 March 1998 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-
Visayas-Crim-94-0836 are AFFIRMED.
From the pleadings, it is clear that the questions raised by
the petitioner are questions of fact rather than of law. What
petitioner wants to happen is for the Supreme Court to

438!
purchases were made without competitive public
bidding. Moreover, the magnitude of the amount
involved would prevent a reasonable mind from
accepting the claim that petitioner was merely
careless or negligent in the performance of his
functions.
Accordingly, it was recommended that petitioner and
co-petitioners be indicted for violation of Sec. 3 (g) of
R.A. No. 3019, as amended for entering into a
contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the Government. Information
was subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan,
charging the petitioner and two others with the
aforementioned offense. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Ombudsman's ruling but the
Motion was dismissed, prompting petitioner to file the
instant petition, seeking reversal of the
Ombudsman's assailed Resolution and Order.
Petitioner alleged that (1) his participation was
limited to signing of the RIV and the check as a
matter of routine; (2) that the RIV did not involve the
determination of the price of the supplies and
equipment; (3) that the signing of the check was
authority vested in him as the DECS Regional
Director; and (4) that the presumption of regularity in
the performance of public functions by public officers
should apply in his favor. Petitioner cited the cases of
Arias v. Sandiganbayan and Magsuci v.
Sandiganbayan where the Court held that heads of
office may rely to a reasonable extent on their
subordinates and on the good faith of those who
prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into
review the evidence and determine whether in fact he
acted in good faith and that no conspiracy existed among
the accused.
The rulings in Arias and Magasuci are inapplicable to
petitioner because the petitioners in the said cases were
indicted and submitted themselves to trial before the
Sandiganbayan, which convicted them for the offense
charged. In Arias, the Court set aside the judgment against
the petitioner because there was no evidence that the
Government suffered undue injury. And in Magsuci, the
reversal by the Court of the judgment of conviction was
based on a finding that Magsuci acted in good faith and
that there has been no intimation at all that he had
foreknowledge of any irregularity committed by either or
both Engr. Enriquez and Acia.
In both Arias and Magsuci, there was paucity of evidence
on conspiracy, while in this case, there is only the claim of
petitioner that he acted in good faith and that there was no
conspiracy. The Ombudsman believes otherwise and the
Court does not ordinarily interfere with the discretion of the
said Office.
Moreover, this case is an appeal under Sec. 27 of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 in relation to Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure which has been declared
unconstitutional in Fabian v. Desierto for increasing
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its
advice and consent. Also, there is no right of appeal
available since the Section mentions only appeals from all
administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions of the Ombudsman.
439!
 negotiations.
In his comment, the Solicitor General contends that
there was a conspiracy of silence and inaction
and because of that petitioner was guilty of
negligence. He further asseverates that it is beyond
the ambit of the Court's authority to review the power
of the Ombudsman in prosecuting and dismissing a
complaint filed before it.In his Reply, petitioner states
that the petition does not involve a review of the
factual finding of the Ombudsman but rather its
conclusion based on undisputed facts.
Issue: Whether the issue is a question of law, and
may therefore, be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
275 Cabrera v. Lapid The petitioner, Amelia M. Cabrera, entered into a
(2006) lease agreement with the Municipality of Sasmuan
over a tract of land for the purpose of devoting it to
fishpond operations. According to the petitioner she
had spent approximately P5m for its construction
before the fishpond operations commence in August
1995. A month later, petitioner learned from
newspaper reports of the impending demolition of her
fishpond as it was purportedly illegal and blocked the
flow of the Pasak River (not typo). Thus, petitioner
sent the fishpond administrator to dissuade
respondents from destroying her property
Despite the pleas from petitioner, respondents
ordered the destruction of petitioner's fishpond. The
property was demolished on October 1995 by
dynamite blasting. Petitioner alleged that the
demolition was purposely carried out in the presence
of media representatives and other government
**The Supreme Court also found that the petition was in
fact a modified form of forum shopping as shown in the
other case filed.
No. The petitioner cannot appeal and use Section 27 of RA
No. 6770 because it is an appeal direct to the SC which
ONLY allow such in cases which has for its subject
administrative disciplinary cases. The right to appeal is
granted only in respect to orders or decisions of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases.
The provision does not cover resolutions of the
Ombudsman in criminal cases.
However, an aggrieved party in criminal actions is not
without any recourse. Where grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction taints the
findings of the Ombudsman on the existence of probable
cause, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65. The remedy from resolutions of the
Ombudsman in preliminary investigations of criminal cases
is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule45.
440!
officials to gain media mileage. Petitioner imputed
evident bad faith on respondents Mayor Baltazar and
Vice-Mayor Cabrera in allowing the destruction of the
fishpond despite their prior knowledge of the
existence of the lease agreement. She also charged
respondents Governor Lapid and Senior
Superintendent Ventura with gross inexcusable
negligence for ordering the destruction of the
fishpond without first verifying its legality. Petitioner
sought reconsideration of the Resolution, arguing
that under Sec. 149 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, the exclusive authority to grant fishery
privileges is vested in the municipalities.
Petitioner also questioned the certification by the
Municipal Health Officer, alleging that the same was
issued before the ocular inspection of the property
which took place only on the day of the demolition.
Petitioner also contended that a judicial proceeding
was necessary to determine whether the property
indeed had caused the flooding. On 13 May 1996,
Ombudsman issued the assailed Resolution,
dismissing the petitioner’s complaint. The dismissal
was based on the declaration that the fishpond was a
nuisance per se and, thus, maybe abated by
respondents in the exercise of the police power of
the State.
HOWEVER in this case, petitioner has taken the position
that the Ombudsman has decided questions of substance
contrary to law and the applicable decisions of the
Supreme Court. That is a ground under a Rule 45 petition.
Indeed, from a reading of the assignment of errors, it is
clear that petitioner does not impute grave abuse of
discretion to the Ombudsman in issuing the assailed
Resolution and Order. Rather, she merely questions his
findings and conclusions. As stated earlier, direct appeal to
the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari is
not sanctioned by any rule of procedure. By availing of a
wrong remedy, the petition should be dismissed outright.
**the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of power
because it based its decision on Section 3(e) of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or of Article 324 of the
Revised Penal Code. -- it was for the best interest of the
general public; for the good and the highest good.

Issue: Whether the petitioner can appeal its case to

SC.

441!
Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advice and concurrence.
Section 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be
enacted.
Section 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a
system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom,
whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve
or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or
local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor
signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC
The right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative requires an implementing
law from Congress.
The system of initiative of the Constitution under Section 2 of Article
XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory,
Under Section of R.A. No. 6735, the people are not accorded the
power to “directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in
part, the Constitution” through the system of initiative – they can only
do so with respect to “laws, ordinance, or resolutions.”
Lambino v. COMELEC
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon petition” is that the entre proposal on its face
is a petition by the people.
" First, the people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal;
" Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must
be embodied in a petition.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written of
the face of the petition, or attached to it, and if so attached, the
petition must stat e the fact of such attachment
A signature requirement would be meaningless if the person
supplying the signature has not first seen what it is what he or she is
signing.
An initiative that gathers signatures form the people first showing to
the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a
deception.
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the
Constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the
system of checks-and-balances, and there is also revision if the
change alters the substantial entirety of the Constitution, as when the
change affects substantial provisions of the Constitution.
Amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or
deletes without altering the basic principle involved; Revision
generally affects several provision of the Constitution, while
amendment generally affects only the specific provision being
amended.
442!
 Section 32. Initiative and Referendum
276 SBMA v. COMELEC On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The The process started by private respondents was an
(1996) Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made
created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise preparations for a REFERENDUM only.
created SBMA to implement the declared national policy
of converting the Subic military reservation into In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in
alternative productive uses to govern the aforesaid. On the footnote below, the word "referendum" is repeated
November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all.
Subic military reservation to the Philippines government. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum";
Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum
of its task, particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, Committee"; the documents were called "referendum
airport, buildings, houses and other installations left by returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of
the American navy. Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the
description "referendum". To repeat, not once was the
On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No.
Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an
Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, INITIATIVE.
as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic **RA 6735, Section 3
Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office
of the President. On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia “Initiative” is the power of the people to propose
filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to amendments to the Constitution or to propose and
annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The enact legislations through an election called for the
Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition purpose.
by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye
1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend “Referendum” is the power of the electorate to
certain provisions of RA 7227. Not satisfied, respondents approve or reject a legislation through an election
resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991. called for the purpose.

On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local (1) Yes, COMELEC committed grave abuse of
initiative on the ground that the subject thereof was discretion.
merely a resolution and not an ordinance.
The process started by private respondents was an
On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made
No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the

443!
SSEZ(Subic Special Economic zone) including therein
the portion of the former naval base within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong. On June 18,
1956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845
and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local
referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to
govern the conduct of the referendum. On July 10, 1996,
SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the
validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public
respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative
that proposes an amendment of a national law. The
petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify
Pambayang Kapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the
Subic Special Economic Zone, b) to allow Morong to
join provided conditions are met.
Issues: (1) Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2848 which
governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to
annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10
(2) Whether the questioned local initiative covers a
subject within the powers of the people of Morong to
enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment
of a national law.
body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote
below, the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27
times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The
Comelec labelled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the
counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum
Committee"; the documents were called "referendum
returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of
Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the
description" referendum". To repeat, not once was the
word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No.
2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an
INITIATIVE.
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises
administration and supervision of the process itself,
akin to its powers over the conduct of elections.
These law-making powers belong to the people; hence
the respondent Commission cannot control or change
the substance or the content of legislation.
Beyond one’s legal power/authority
(2) Yes. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because
the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage
and not yet an approved law.
The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It
is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it,
then there would be nothing to contest and to
adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it
and ithas become an approved ordinance or resolution
that rights and obligations can be enforced or
implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely
aproposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon
a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally
speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies,
444!

277 Defensor-Santiago On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with
v. COMELEC (1997) COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift
Term Limits of elective Officials by People’s Initiative”
The COMELEC then, upon its approval,
(a) Set the time and dates for signature gathering all
over the country,
(b) Caused the necessary publication of the said
petition in papers of general circulation, and
(c) Instructed local election registrars to assist
petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing
stations.
On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al. filed a special civil
action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago
argues that:
(1) The constitutional provision on people’s
initiative to amend the constitution can only
be implemented by law to be passed by
not hypothetical questions or cases. In the present
case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to
review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the
commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it
does not have the same authority in regard to the
proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or
approved, or passed upon by any "branch or
instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The
Commission on Elections itself has made no
reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought
by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included
verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No.
2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made
by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court
could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over,
in the exercise of its review powers.
YES. RA6375 intended to include the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, BUT
is, unfortunately, INADEQUATE to cover that
system
The right of the people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution through the system of initiative is
recognized under Art. XVII Sec.2 of the Constitution,
but it cannot be exercised if the Congress does not
provide for its implementation since it is not self-
executory.
The procedures and details on how the right is to be
carried out are left to the legislature. RA6735 was
intended to cover initiative to propose amendments
to the Constitution. But it did not fully complied
with the duty of the Congress to “provide for the
implementation of the right”
445!
 Congress and no such law has yet been
passed by Congress,
(2) RA 6735 indeed provides for three systems of
initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution, on
statues and on local legislation.
The two latter forms of initiative were specifically
provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no
provisions were specifically made for initiatives on
the Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter
of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to
some future law – as pointed out by former Senator
Arturo Tolentino.
Issue: Whether RA 6735 was intended to include
initiative on amendments to the constitution and if so
whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such
initiative.
Sec.2 of RA 6735 does not suggest an initiative on
amendments to the Constitution which provides:
The power of the people under a system of initiative
and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or
reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative
body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act
is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
The word “Constitution” therein was not germane to
said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and
referendum on national laws, local laws, ordinances
and resolutions.
That section is silent as to amendments to the
Constitution. Initiative on the Constitution is confined
only to proposals to amend. Under the Constitution, the
people are not accorded the power to “directly propose,
enact, approve or reject” the Constitution through the
system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to
laws, ordinances and resolutions.
Details on the implementation of the system of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution were also not
provided for.
Also, while the Act provides subtitles for National
Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and
Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution.
The silence simply means that the main thrust of the
446!

278 Lambino v. On 15 February 2006, the group of Raul Lambino and
COMELEC (2006) Erico Aumentado (“Lambino Group”) commenced
gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change
the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino
Group filed a petition with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7
of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and
Referendum Act. The proposed changes under the
petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government. The Lambino Group claims that: (a) their
petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least 12% of all registered voters, with
each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its
registered voters; and (b) COMELEC election registrars
had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The COMELEC, however, denied due course to the
petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative
petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Santiago vs. Commission on
Elections. The Lambino Group elevated the matter to the
Supreme Court, which also threw out the petition.
Act is initiative and referendum on national and local
laws. If Congress intended RA6735 to full provide for
the implementation of the initiative on amendments to
the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle
therefor.
Thus, RA6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned.
NOSection 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the
Yes.
governing provision that allows a people’s initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. While this
provision does not expressly state that the petition
must set forth the full text of the proposed
amendments, the deliberations of the framers of our
Constitution clearly show that:
(a) the framers intended to adopt the relevant
American jurisprudence on peoples initiative; and
(b) in particular, the people must first see the full text of
the proposed amendments before they sign, and that
the people must sign on a petition containing such full
text.
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition” is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people.
This means two essential elements must be present.
First, the people must author and thus sign the
entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign
on their behalf.
447!
In the case of the Lambino Group’s petition, there’s not a
single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the proposed
changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the
signature sheet state that the text of the proposed
changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely
asks a question whether the people approve a shift
from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-
Parliamentary system of government. The signature
sheet does not show to the people the draft of the
proposed changes before they are asked to sign the
signature sheet. This omission is fatal.
Issue: Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition
complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s
initiative.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal
must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full
text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the
people who express their assent by signing such
complete proposal in a petition. The full text of the
proposed amendments may be either written on the
face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the
petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is
an assurance that every one of the several millions
of signatories to the petition had seen the full text
of the proposed amendments before – not after –
signing.
Moreover, “an initiative signer must be informed at the
time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is
proposed” and failure to do so is “deceptive and
misleading” which renders the initiative void.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the
people without first showing to the people the full
text of the proposed amendments is most likely a
deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on
the people. That’s why the Constitution requires that
an initiative must be “directly proposed by the people x
x x in a petition” – meaning that the people must
sign on a petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as
amending the nation’s fundamental law, the writing of
the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden
from the people under a general or special power of
attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected
individuals.
448!
In this case, the petitioners failed to show the court that
the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the
signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is
“deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative
void.

Thus the initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of

the Constitution disallowing revision through
initiatives

Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes

of amending the Constitution. The first mode is
through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its
Members. The second mode is through a constitutional
convention. The third mode is through a people’s
initiative.

Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and

second modes, applies to “any amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution.” In contrast, Section 2 of
Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only
to “amendments to this Constitution.” This
distinction was intentional as shown by the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. A
people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies
only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its
revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional
convention can propose both amendments and
revisions to the Constitution.

Does the Lambino Group’s initiative constitute an

amendment or revision of the Constitution? Yes. By
any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a

449!
Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system, involving the abolition of the Office of the
President and the abolition of one chamber of
Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere
amendment.

Courts have long recognized the distinction between

an amendment and a revision of a constitution.
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a
basic principle in the constitution, like altering the
principle of separation of powers or the system of
checks-and-balances.

There is also revision if the change alters the

substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the
change affects substantial provisions of the
constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly
refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes
without altering the basic principle involved. Revision
generally affects several provisions of the constitution,
while amendment generally affects only the specific
provision being amended.

In this case the proposed changes were from a

bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-
parliamentarism. In this case, the change is so great
that the executive and the legislative branch would be
merged. This is revision of the Constitution. These
changes affect the structure of government or the
system of checks-and-balances among or within the
three branches. Thus it is a revision not an
amendment. Article 6 and 7 would merge/cease to
exist.

450!
 ARTICLE VII. THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Express Powers of the President
1. Power to appoint
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of 2. Power to enter into treaties TAP BIICC
the Philippines. 3. Power to grant pardon
4. Commander-in-Chief powers
I. Executive Power 5. Chief of State power (control over the Executive Department)
- Ceremonial functions: the President remains and will always be the 6. Power to impose customs / tariff duties
ceremonial head of the government and must take part with real or 7. Power to execute / implement laws
apparent enthusiasm in a range of activities [Head of State] 8. Power to submit the budget to Congress
- The Cabinet: an institution that is extra-constitutionally created,
consisting of the heads of departments who through usage have II. Executive Privilege
formed a body of presidential advisers who meet regularly with the - Power of the President to withhold certain types of information from
President. They possess no authority over the President and serve the courts, the Congress, and the public. (Senate v. Ermita, 2006)
at his pleasure and behest.
III. Immunity from Suit
- There is no provision about this in the Constitution. However,
according to Fr. Bernas, it was already understood from
jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his tenure

ARTICLE VII. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1. Executive Power
I. Scope of Power
279 Marcos v. After the People Power Revolution, the presidency of Yes. Before going into other matters, the right to return
Manglapus (1989) Cory Aquino was met with problems that besieged her and right to travel are two separate and distinct
such as the failed Manila Hotel Coup by political things. The right to return is covered by territorial rules
leaders of Mr. Marcos; takeover of Channel 7 by covered by the country’s respective border laws and is
Marcos loyalists; military coup attempt by Honasan; bound to limitations of national security. The right to travel
and the communist insurgency. is one that pertains to freedom of movement. In this case,
Marcos has the right to travel to any country however his
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his right to return to Philippines is prohibited.
wish to return to the Philippines to die. But Mrs. Aquino
has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. The residual powers of the President is in Art. VII, §1.
Marcos and his family. Petitioners believe that the right However, it does not define what is meant by
of Marcos to return is guaranteed by the BILL OF executive power. Although in other Articles it is admitted

451!
RIGHTS
Section 1.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Section 6.
The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law.
The petitioners further assert that under international
law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to
the Philippines is guaranteed. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Article 13.
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of
each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any
country, including his own, and to return to
his country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which had been ratified by the
Philippines, provides:
Article 12
(1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State
shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence.
that there are samples of what the President’s power is, it
seems that the Constitution did not specify what the
powers of the President are. The court believes that we
could not narrowly construed the President to someone
who simply executes laws and neither can we also limit
his power to the ones enumerated within the Constitution.
In other words, executive power is more than the sum of
specific powers so enumerated by the Constitution.
Additionally, it seems that whatever power inherent in
the government that is neither legislative nor judicial
has to be executive. In the case of Springer v.
Government of Philippine Islands, when the issue of
determining members of the legislature who constitute a
majority of the "board" and "committee" but are not doing
their legislative performance it was held that:
…it is clear that they are not legislative in character, and
still more clear that they are not judicial. The fact that they
do not fall within the authority of either of these two
constitutes logical ground for concluding that they do fall
within that of the remaining one among which the powers
of government are divided.
In exercising the said executive power, the President is
guided by the Constitution. In the present case, Article II
Section 4 and 5 seem applicable wherein it collectively
states that:
"[t]he prime duty of the Government is to serve and
protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace
and order,the protection of life, liberty, and property, and
the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the
enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
452!
 (2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country,
including his own.
(3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to
any restrictions except those which are provided by
law, are necessary to protect national security, public
order (order public), public health or morals or the
rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with
the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.
(4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to
enter his own country.
The petitioners finally contend that the President is
without power to impair the liberty of abode of the
Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the
limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair
Sec. 4 - The prime
their right to travel because no law has authorized her
duty of the to do so. They advance the view that before the
government is to
serve and protect
right to travel may be impaired by any authority or
its people. agency of the government, there must be legislation
to that effect.
Sec. 5 - The
maintenance of
peace and order, Respondents on the other hand argue for the primacy
the protection of
life, liberty, and of the right of the State to national security over
property, and the individual rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II,
promotion of the
general welfare are §§4-5 of the Constitution.
essential for the
enjoyment by all the
people of the Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr.
blessings of Marcos and family from returning to the Philippines for
democracy.
reasons of national security and public safety has
international precedents. Other dictators such as
Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Anastacio
Somoza Jr. of Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala,
etc. Finally, the respondents believe that the right to
return to one's country is not among the rights
democracy."
The issue at hand requires that the President balance the
general welfare and the common good against the
exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power
involved is the President's residual power to protect
the general welfare of the people.
It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of
the people. It could also be construed to mean the
President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully
executed. Also, as the Commander-in-Chief, the President
is bestowed with the duty to protect the peace. The power
of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to
exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of
emergency or to leading the State against external and
internal threats to its existence. The President is not only
clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency,
but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day
problems of maintaining peace and order.
The President indeed has the power to bar the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines. This was exemplified
even further by the fact that despite the Congress did not
insist to pass its resolution, which was signed by 103 of its
members, to allow the Marcoses to return to the
Philippines in order to exemplify “Philippines’ collective
adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights
under the Constitution and…laws.” The Resolution does
not question the President's power to bar the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the
President's sense of compassion to allow a man to come
home to die in his country.
453!
 specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which
treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel,
but it is our well-considered view that the right to
return may be considered, as a generally accepted
principle of international law and, under our
Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II,
Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct
and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a
different protection under the International Covenant
of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being
"arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Issue: Does the President have the power to bar the
return of former President Marcos and family to the
Philippines?
280 Marcos v. On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was
Manglapus (1989) filed by petitioners, raising the following major
(MR) argument:
The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his
own country; if she has, she had exercised it arbitrarily.
The power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippine should be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that
office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
President.
No. The President has unstated residual powers which are
implied from the grant of executive power and which are
necessary for her to comply with her duties under the
Constitution. The powers of the President are not
limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article
on the Executive Department and in scattered
provisions of the Constitution.
Neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of
the President's implied or residual powers is tantamount to
setting the stage for another dictatorship. Despite
petitioners' strained analogy, the residual powers of the
President under the Constitution should not be confused
with the power of the President under the 1973
Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6.
Amendment No. 6 refers to a grant to the President of
thespecific power of legislation. Thus it cannot be said that
the residual powers of the President cannot be used to
legislate and as a form of abuse.
454!
 II. Examples of exercise
A. Valid exercise
281 Philconsa v. House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of (1) Special Provision on Debt Ceiling – Congress
Enriquez (1994) 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o
both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As vetoing the entire approp. for debt service. The said
passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain provisions are germane to & have direct relation w/ debt
items of appropriations in the proposed budget service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot be
previously submitted by the President. It also vetoed w/o vetoing the entire item/appropriation.
authorized members of Congress to propose and VETO VOID.
identify projects in the “pork barrels” allotted to them
and to realign their respective operating budgets. It is readily apparent that the Special Provision
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and applicable to the appropriation for debt service
enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, insofar as it refers to funds in excess of the amount
Congress presented the said bill to the President for appropriated in the bill, is an "inappropriate"
consideration and approval. provision referring to funds other than the
P86,323,438,000.00 appropriated in the General
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill Appropriations Act of 1991.
into law, and declared the same to have become
Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled “AN ACT Likewise the vetoed provision is clearly an attempt to
APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment
JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, policy. As held by the Court in Gonzales, the repeal of
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the
FOR OTHER PURPOSES” (GAA of 1994). On the appropriations law.
same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Thus," it follows that any provision which DOES NOT
Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed relate to any particular item, or which extends in its
which are the following: operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered
"an inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed
1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that separately from an item. Also the Court held that
“this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly "inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional
done through the 1994 GAA.” And that provisions and provisions which are intended to amend
“appropriations for payment of public debt, other laws, because clearly these kind of laws have no
whether foreign or domestic, are automatically place in an appropriations bill.
appropriated pursuant to the Foreign

455!
 Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177
as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4,
Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative
Code of 1987.
2. Special provisions which authorize the use of
income and the creation, operation and
maintenance of revolving funds in the
appropriation for State Universities and
Colleges (SUC’s),
3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30%
(contract) ratio for road maintenance.
4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP
of medicines in compliance with the Generics
Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).
5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in
the appropriation for the modernization of the
AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the “Use
of Fund,” which requires the prior approval of
the Congress for the release of the
corresponding modernization funds, as well as
the entire Special Provision No. 3 on the
“Specific Prohibition” which states that the said
Modernization Fund “shall not be used for
payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer
planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150
armored personnel carriers”
6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to
use savings in the AFP to augment pension
and gratuity funds.
(2) Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCU’s –
said provision allows for the use of income & creation of
revolving fund for SCU’s. Provision for Western Visayas
State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other
SCU’s enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres.
merely acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID.
Petitioners claim that the President acted with grave
abuse of discretion when he disallowed by his veto the
"use of income" and the creation of "revolving fund" by the
Western Visayas State University and Leyte State
Colleges when he allowed other government offices, like
the National Stud Farm, to use their income for their
operating expenses (Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 15-16).
There was no undue discrimination when the President
vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar
provisions in other government agencies. If some
government agencies were allowed to use their income
and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is
because these agencies have been enjoying such
privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing
such practices as exceptions to the "one-fund policy" (e.g.,
R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A
for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No.
359 for the Department of Budget and Management's
Procurement Service).
(3) Special Provision on Road Maintenance – Congress
specified 30% ratio fo works for maintenance of roads be
contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH.
Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It
is not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the
subj. of road maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o
vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID.
456!
 7. Conditions on the appropriation for the
Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR,
the Congress.
Issue: Whether the veto of the President of certain
provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 is valid.
The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate
provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien
to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the
other hand, it specified how the said item shall be
expended — 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of
special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure
bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to
which they relate so long as they are "appropriate" in the
budgetary sense (Art. VII, Sec. 25[2]). The veto of the
second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item
for the DPWH is therefore unconstitutional.
AFP medicines - Special Provision on AFP Medicines -
Being directly related to and inseparable from the
appropriation item on purchases of [ALL?] medicines by
the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the
President without also vetoing the said item. VOID.
President vetoed the said provision being non-compliant
to Generics Drugs Law which states: Purchase of
Medicines. The purchase of medicines by all Armed
Forces of the Philippines units, hospitals and clinics shall
strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National
Drug Policy of the Department of Health (GAA of 1994, p.
748).
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of
medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the
formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the
Department of Health is an "appropriate" provision. it is a
mere advertence by Congress to the fact that there is an
existing law, the Generics Act of 1988, that requires "the
extensive use of drugs with generic names through a
rational system of procurement and distribution."
457!
(4) Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. –
AFP modernization, prior approval of Congress required
before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called
legislative veto. Any prov. blocking an admin. action in
implementing a law or requiring legislative approval
must be subj. of a separate law. VETO VALID.

The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use of

Fund" for the AFP modernization program that the
President must submit all purchases of military equipment
to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the
"congressional or legislative veto." By way of definition, a
congressional veto is a means whereby the legislature can
block or modify administrative action taken under a
statute. It is a form of legislative control in the
implementation of particular executive actions. The form
may be either negative that is requiring disapproval of the
executive action, or affirmative, requiring approval of the
executive action. This device represents a significant
attempt by Congress to move from oversight of the
executive to shared administration.
A congressional veto is subject to serious questions
involving the principle of separation of powers.

(5) Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP

Pensions – allows Chief of Staff to augment pension
funds through the use of savings. Accdg. to the Consti.
only the Pres. may exercise such power pursuant to a
specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO VALID.

The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to

use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP
being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation
Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of

458!
the Article VI of the Constitution.

Under Section 25(5), no law shall be passed authorizing

any transfer of appropriations, and under Section 29(1),
no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law. While Section
25(5) allows as an exception the realignment of savings to
augment items in the general appropriations law for the
executive branch, such right must and can be exercised
only by the President pursuant to a specific law.

(6) Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation

of CAFGU’s – use of special fund for the compensation of
the said CAFGU’s. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior
approval. It is also an amendment to existing law (PD No.
1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation
act cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws.
VETO VALID.

This is the first case before this Court where the power of
the President to impound is put in issue. Impoundment
refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason,
to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the
failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type.
In refusing or deferring the implementation of an
appropriation item, the President in effect exercises a veto
power that is not expressly granted by the Constitution. As
a matter of fact, the Constitution does not say anything
about impounding. The source of the Executive authority
must be found elsewhere.

The Solicitor General contends that it is the President, as

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, who should determine when the services of

459!
the CAFGU's are no longer needed.

This is the first issue about impoundment. Proponents of

impoundment have invoked at least three principal
sources of the authority of the President. Foremost is the
authority to impound given to him either expressly or
impliedly by Congress. Second is the executive power
drawn from the President's role as Commander-in-Chief.
Third is the Faithful Execution Clause which ironically is
the same provision invoked by petitioners herein.
The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws
requires that the President desist from implementing the
law if doing so would prejudice public interest. An example
given is when through efficient and prudent management
of a project, substantial savings are made. In such a case,
it is sheer folly to expect the President to spend the entire
amount budgeted in the law

We do not find anything in the language used in the

challenged Special Provision that would imply that
Congress intended to deny to the President the right to
defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate
11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if
such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the
proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be
embodied and manifested in another law. A provision in
an appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or
amend other laws, in this case

(7) Conditions on the appropriation for SC,

Ombudsman, COA, CHR – By setting guidelines or
conditions in his veto, the President is simply exercising
his constitutional duty to implement the laws faithfully.
VALID.

460!

282 Webb v. de Leon Hubert Webb & 8 other persons charged w/ the crime
(1995) of rape w/ homicide of Carmela Vizconde, her mother &
sister. The principal witness was Jessica Alfaro. The
DOJ issued the assailed Resolution finding probable
cause. Information was filed against petitioners through
DOJ Order No. 223; warrants of arrest issued by Judge
Amelita Tolentino. Jessica Alfaro was not included in
the information based on RA No. 6981 (Witness
Protection, Security, & Benefit Program) w/c mandates
non-inclusion of state witness in the criminal complaint
& grants immunity from prosecution. It grants the DOJ
the power to determine who can qualify to said
program & become immune from suit
The conditions objected to by petitioners are mere
reminders that the implementation of the items on which
the said conditions were imposed, should be done in
accordance with existing laws, regulations or policies.
They did not add anything to what was already in place at
the time of the approval of the GAA of 1994.
There is less basis to complain when the President said
that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will
issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be
determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. The
issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public
funds authorized by Congress is simply an exercise by the
President of his constitutional duty to see that the laws are
faithfully executed (1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17;
Planas v. Gil 67 Phil. 62 [1939]). Under the Faithful
Execution Clause, the President has the power to take
"necessary and proper steps" to carry into execution the
law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]).
These steps are the ones to be embodied in the
guidelines.
No. The non-inclusion of Alfaro is anchored on RA 6981,
entitled "An Act Providing For A Witness Protection,
Security And Benefit Program And For Other Purposes"
enacted on April 24, 1991. Alfaro qualified under its
Section 10, which provides:
Sec. 10. State Witness. — Any person who has
participated in the commission of a crime and desires to a
witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as
determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be
admitted into the Program whenever the following
circumstances are present:
(a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a
grave felony as defined under the R.P.C. or its equivalent
461!

Issue: Whether the grant of State Witness to Jessica
Alfaro, which would grant her non-inclusion in the case,
is an intrusion to judicial power?
under special laws; (b) there is absolute necessity for his
testimony; (c) there is no other direct evidence available
for the proper prosecution of the offense committed; (d)
his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its
material points; (e) he does not appear to be most guilty;
and (f) he has not at anytime been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude.
Because Alfaro qualified for Section 10, she is entitled to
Section 12 or the effects of it.
Sec. 12. Effect of Admission of a State Witness into the
Program. — The certification of admission into the
Program by the Department shall be given full faith and
credit by the provincial or city prosecutor who is
required NOT TO INCLUDE THE WITNESS IN THE
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION and if
included therein, to petition the court for his discharge in
order that he can be utilized as a State Witness. The court
shall order the discharge and exclusion of the said
accused from the information.
Admission into the Program shall entitle such State
Witness to immunity from criminal prosecution for the
offense or offenses in which his testimony will be given.
The validity of these provisions is challenged by petitioner
Webb. It is urged that they constitute ". . . an intrusion into
judicial prerogative for it is only the court which has the
power under the Rules on Criminal Procedure to
discharge an accused as a state witness.
In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the
executive department of government whose principal
462!

283 Djumantan v. Bernard Banez is the husband of Marina Cabael,
Dominguez (1995) went to Indonesia as a contract worker and
converted into Islam. On May 17, 1974, he
married Djumantan in accordance with Islamic rites
as his second wife. On January 13, 1979, petitioner
and her two children with Banez, arrived in Manila as
the "guests" of Banez. The latter made it appear that
he was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was
merely repaying the hospitality extended to him during
his stay in Indonesia.
power and responsibility is to see that our laws are
faithfully executed.
A necessary component of this power to execute our laws
is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to
prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of
discretion — the discretion of whether, what and whom to
charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord
of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We
thus hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible
for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in the
Department of Justice the power to determine who
can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall
be granted immunity from prosecution.
Section 9 of Rule 119 (relating it to Art. 7 Sec. 1 1987
Constitution) does not support the proposition that the
power to choose who shall be a state witness is an
inherent judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the
court, is given the power to discharge a state witness
only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the
crime and the accused. The discharge of an accused is
part of the exercise of jurisdiction but not a recognition
of an inherent judicial function.
Yes. Generally, the right of the President to expel or
deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to
the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as
the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the
country. This right is based on the fact that since the
aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into the
territory is a matter of pure permission and simple
tolerance which creates no obligation on the part of the
government to permit them to stay.
463!
 As "guests," petitioner and her two children lived
in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her children
were admitted to the Philippines as temporary
visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act
of 1940. Marina Cabael discovered the true
relationship of her husband and petitioner. Then on
March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner
was changed from temporary visitor to that of
permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the
same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner was issued an
alien certificate of registration. Not accepting the set-
back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter
complaint with the Ombudsman, who subsequently
referred the letter to the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation (CID). On the basis of the said letter,
petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell.
The CID issued an order revoking the status of
permanent resident given to petitioner, the Board
found the 2nd marriage irregular and not in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines. There
was thus no basis for giving her the status of
permanent residence, since she was an Indonesian
citizen and her marriage with a Filipino Citizen was
not valid.
Issue: Whether the executive has the power of
deportation.
284 Chavez v. PCGG Petitioner was impelled to file the case due to
(1998) several news reports that claimed to referr to (1)
the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of
Marcos assets deposited in various coded
accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported
execution of a compromise, between the
The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or
allowed to continue to reside in the country, is protected
only so far as Congress may choose to protect it. There
is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino
citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be
given permanent residency, in the Philippines. It is
not mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies
for a visitor's visa. Once admitted into the country, the
alien has no right to an indefinite stay.
The entry of aliens into the country and their
admission as immigrants is not a matter of right,
even if they are legally married to Filipino citizens.
Alien’s admission is a matter of pure permission, not as a
matter of right. Likewise, an alien does not possess right
to an indefinite stay.
Congress may impose a limitation of time for the
deportation of alien from the country. Immigration Act of
1940 provides that the deportation of an alien has a
prescriptive period of 5 years after the cause for
deportation arises.
No. We believe that criminal immunity under Section 5
cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the
principal defendants in the spate of ill-gotten wealth
cases now pending before the Sandiganbayan. As
stated earlier, the provision is applicable mainly to
witnesses who provide information or testify against a
464!
government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs,
on how to split or share these assets. While invoking
his right to information, he claims that any compromise
on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an
issue of “paramount public interest,” since it has a
“debilitating effect on the country’s economy” that
would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of
the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have
a right to know the transactions or deals being
contrived and effected by the government.
Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny
forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos
heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner’s action is
premature, because there is no showing that he has
asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the
Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet
be compelled to make any disclosure, since the
proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements
have not become effective and binding.
Issue: Whether compromise agreement between the
Marcoses and the PCGG is valid.
respondent, defendant or accused in an ill-gotten wealth
case.
While the General Agreement states that the Marcoses
“shall provide the [government] assistance by way of
testimony or deposition on any information [they] may
have that could shed light on the cases being pursued by
the [government] against other parties,” the clause does
not fully comply with the law. Its inclusion in the
Agreement may have been only an afterthought,
conceived in pro forma compliance with Section 5 of EO
No. 14, as amended. There is no indication whatsoever
that any of the Marcos heirs has indeed provided vital
information against any respondent or defendant as to the
manner in which the latter may have unlawfully acquired
public property.
Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG commits
to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be
retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of
the Constitution. The power to tax and to grant tax
exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to a certain
extent, in the local legislative bodies. §28 (4), Article
VI of the Constitution procides for the rule/s on tax
exemption. The PCGG has absolutely no power to
grant tax exemptions, even under the cover of its
authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth cases.
Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting
the Marcoses from paying taxes on their properties,
such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal
protection clause under the Bill of Rights. Any special
grant of tax exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs
will constitute class legislation. It will also violate the
465!
constitutional rule that “taxation shall be uniform and
equitable.”

Neither can the stipulation be construed to fall within the

power of the commissioner of internal revenue to
compromise taxes. Since the Marcoses are not of the
people who demonstrates a clear inability to pay. This
power can be exercised only when (1) the tax appears to
be unjustly or excessively assessed, or (2) the
administration and collection costs involved do not
justify the collection of the tax due

The government binds itself to cause the dismissal of all

cases against the Marcos heirs, pending before the
Sandiganbayan and other courts. This is a direct
encroachment on judicial powers, particularly in regard to
criminal jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial
court, is not lost despite a resolution, even by the justice
secretary, to withdraw the information or to dismiss the
complaint. Thus, the PCGG, as the government
prosecutor of ill-gotten wealth cases, cannot
guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases
against the Marcoses pending in the courts, for said
dismissal is not within its sole power and discretion.

The government also waives all claims and counterclaims,

“whether past, present, or future, matured or inchoate,”
against the Marcoses. Again, this all-encompassing
stipulation is contrary to law. Under the Civil Code, an
action for future fraud may not be waived. It also sets a
dangerous precedent for public accountability. It is a
virtual warrant for public officials to amass public
funds illegally, since there is an open option to
compromise their liability in exchange for only a

466!

285 Pontejos v. The Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989
Ombudsman have endowed the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)
(2006) with a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutorial powers -- virtually free from
legislative, executive or judicial intervention -- in
order to insulate it from outside pressure and
improper influence. Unless tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, the judgments and orders of
the OMB shall not be reversed, modified or
otherwise interfered with by this Court.
Sometime in 1998, Restituto P. Aquino filed an
affidavit/Complaint before the Ombudsman against
Emmanuel T. Pontejos (arbiter), Wilfredo I. Imperial
(regional director) and Carmencita R. Atos (legal staff),
all of them officials of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB). Aquino accused Pontejos
and Atos of conspiring to exact money in exchange for
a favorable decision of a case against Roderick Ngo
then pending in the HLURB. He further averred that
Pontejos acted as his counsel during the time when the
latter was the hearing officer of the case. Moreover,
Atos allegedly received P10,000 in check, which was
part of the consideration for a favorable decision.
Imperial was implicated as an alleged accomplice.
Preliminary investigation found probable cause
portion of their ill-gotten wealth. Also, it violates due
process by immediately waiving the case without trial.
The Agreements do not provide for a definite or
determinable period within which the parties shall fulfill
their respective prestations. It may take a lifetime before
the Marcoses submit an inventory of their total assets.
No. The decision on whether to prosecute and whom
to indict is executive in character. It is the prosecution
that could essentially determine the strength of pursuing a
case against an accused. The prosecutorial powers
include the discretion of granting immunity to an
accused in exchange for testimony against another.
Constituent - compulsory function
In Mapa v. Sandiganbayan: The decision to grant
immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the
prosecution process. It is essentially a tactical decision to
forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve
a higher objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the
right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty
of having committed a crime. Its justification lies in the
particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of the
more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude
the long arm of the law. The power to prosecute includes
the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the
corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute.
The Court has previously upheld the discretion of the
Department of Justice (DOJ), Commission on Elections
(Comelec), and the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) to grant immunity from prosecution
on the basis of the respective laws that vested them with
such power. The OMB was also vested with the power
to grant immunity from prosecution
467!
 against Pontejos for the crimes of estafa, direct
bribery and illegal practice of profession in
violation of RA 6713.
Consequently, criminal cases of estafa and bribery
against Pontejos were filed before the RTC of Quezon
City. Prior to that, Atos was extended immunity as a
state witness by the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto.
The Overall Deputy Ombudsman ruled that Atos should
be extended immunity from criminal prosecution and
discharged as state witness. According to him, Atos
was merely a subordinate who could have acted only
upon the prodding of Pontejos. Also, her testimony was
necessary to build a case against Pontejos. Pontejos
motioned for reinvestigation to be conducted by the
City Prosecutor without remanding the case to the
Ombudsman. The Asst. City Prosecutor, after
conducting reinvestigation, recommended to
amend the information and include Atos as
accused reasoning that the power to grant
immunity pertains solely to the courts not the
prosecution which can only recommend. The
Overall Deputy Ombudsman disapproves the
prosecutor’s report.
Issue: Whether the Ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of
jurisdiction when it granted an immunity to Ms. Atos to
become a state witness on almost the same date the
Affidavit was executed and submitted;
286 Banda v. Ermita NPO (National Printing Office) was formed on July
(2010) 1987, during the term of Pres. Aquino by Executive
Order 285. Sec 6 of EO 285 provides the exclusive
The power is placed in Sec 17 of Rules of Court:
Discharge of accused to be state witness. –When two or
more persons are jointly charged with the commission of
any offense… the court may direct one or more of the
accused to be discharged with their consent so that
they may be witnesses for the state when after
requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the
sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a
hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied
that: There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the
accused whose discharge is requested;
(a) There is no other direct evidence available for the
proper prosecution of the offense committed,
except the testimony of said accused;
(b) The testimony of said accused can be
substantially corroborated in its material points;
(c) Said accused does not appear to be the most
guilty; and
(d) Said accused has not at any time been convicted
of any offense involving moral turpitude.
The Court has already held that this provision is applicable
only to cases already filed in court. The trial court is given
the power to discharge an accused as a state witness only
because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime
and the accused.
Given that the power to grant immunity is executive, the
fact that an individual had not been previously charged or
included in information does not prevent the prosecution
from utilizing said person as a witness.
Yes. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the
President has the power to reorganize the offices and
agencies in the executive department in line with the
468!
printing jurisdiction over the following:
- Printing, binding and distribution of all standard
and accountable forms of national, provincial,
city and municipal governments, including
government corporations;;
- Printing of officials ballots;;
- Printing of public documents such as the
Official Gazette, General Appropriations Act,
Philippine Reports, and development
information materials of the Philippine
Information Agency.
The Office may also accept other government printing
jobs, including government publications, aside from
those enumerated above, but not in an exclusive basis.
The details of the organization, powers, functions,
authorities, and related management aspects of the
Office shall be provided in the implementing details
which shall be prepared and promulgated in
accordance with Section II of this Executive Order.
On October 25, 2004, Pres Arroyo issued the herein
assailed EO 378, amending Sec 6 of EO 285,
removing the exclusive jurisdiction of PO over
printing services requirements of government
agencies and instrumentalities.
Section 1: states that it shall have to compete with the
private sector, except in printing of election
paraphernalia.
Section 2: Government agencies/instrumentalities may
source printing services outside NPO provided that:
2.1 The printing services to be provided by the private
sector is superior in quality and at a lower cost than
what is offered by the NPO;; and
2.2 The private printing provider is flexible in terms of
President’s constitutionally granted power of control over
executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of
the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under
existing statutes.
Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President
continuing authority to reorganize and redefine the
functions of the Office of the President. Section 31,
Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the said Code, is explicit:
Sec. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to
Reorganize his Office. – The President, subject to the
policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President. For this
purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office
of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices,
the President Special Assistants/Advisers System and the
Common Staff Support System, by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the
President to any other Department or Agency as well
as transfer functions to the Office of the President
from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the
President to any other department or agency as well
as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from
other Departments or agencies. (Emphases ours.)
In Canonizado v. Aguirre we ruled that reorganization
469!
meeting the target completion time of the government
agency.
SECTION 3. In the exercise of its functions, the amount
to be appropriated for the programs, projects and
activities of the NPO in the General Appropriations Act
(GAA) shall be limited to its income without additional
financial support from the government.
Pursuant to EO 378, government agencies and
instrumentalities are allowed to source their printing
services from the private sector through competitive
bidding, subject to the condition that the services
offered by the private supplier be of superior quality
and lower in cost compared to what was offered by the
NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPO’s
appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its
income.
Perceiving EO 378 as a threat to their security of
tenure as employees of the NPO, petitioners now
challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1)
it is beyond the executive powers of President
Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285
issued by former President Aquino when the latter
still exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive
Order No. 378 violates petitioners’ security of
tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual
abolition of the NPO.
Issue: Whether EO 378 is constitutional
“involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of
offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions.” It takes place when there
is an alteration of the existing structure of
government offices or units therein, including the
lines of control, authority and responsibility between
them.
The power of the President to reorganize even executive
offices already funded by the said appropriations act,
including the power to implement structural, functional,
and operational adjustments in the executive
bureaucracy and, in so doing, modify or realign
appropriations of funds as may be necessary under such
reorganization.
In a recent case of Tondo Medical Center Employees
Association v. Court of Appeals it was stated: a structural
and functional reorganization of the Department of
Health under an executive order. The principle that the
power of the President to reorganize agencies under the
executive department by executive or administrative order
is constitutionally and statutorily recognized.
Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 quoted above authorizes the
President (a) to restructure the internal organization of
the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate
Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers System
and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another, and (b) to transfer
functions or offices from the Office of the President to
any other Department or Agency in the Executive
470!
Branch, and vice versa. Concomitant to such power
to abolish, merge or consolidate offices in the Office
of the President Proper and to transfer
functions/offices not only among the offices in the
Office of President Proper but also the rest of the
Office of the President and the Executive Branch

In the case at bar, there was neither an abolition of the

NPO nor a removal of any of its functions to be transferred
to another agency. Under the assailed Executive Order
No. 378, the NPO remains the main printing arm of the
government for all kinds of government forms and
publications but in the interest of greater economy
and encouraging efficiency and profitability, it must
now compete with the private sector for certain
government printing jobs, with the exception of election
paraphernalia which remains the exclusive responsibility
of the NPO, together with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,
as the Commission on Elections may determine. At most,
there was a mere alteration of the main function of the
NPO by limiting the exclusivity of its printing responsibility
to election forms.

To be very clear, this delegated legislative power to

reorganize pertains only to the Office of the President and
the departments, offices and agencies of the executive
branch and does not include the Judiciary, the Legislature
or the constitutionally-created or mandated bodies. In
Dario v. Mizon it is stated that: Reorganizations in this
jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they
are pursued in good faith.

471!
 B. Invalid exercise
287 Laurel v. Garcia The subject property in this case is one of the four (4)
(1990) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
government under the Reparations Agreement
entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956. The properties
and the capital goods and services procured from the
Japanese government for national development
projects are part of the indemnification to the
Filipino people for their losses in life and property
and their suffering during World War II.
The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations
valued at $550 million would be payable in twenty (20)
years in accordance with annual schedules of
procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and
Japanese government. Reparations Law, prescribes
the national policy on procurement and utilization of
reparations and development loans.
The Roppongi property is under the government
sector and is as intended, it became the site of the
Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred
to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976 when the Roppongi
building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our
government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi
property has remained undeveloped since that time. A
proposal was presented to President Corazon C.
Aquino by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan,
Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the subject
of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm - Kajima
Corporation — which shall construct two (2)
buildings in Roppongi and one (1) building in
Nampeidai and renovate the present Philippine
Chancery in Nampeidai.he other building in
(1) Yes. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi
lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be
alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership
for general use and enjoyment, an application to the
satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social
group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a
juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the
common and public welfare and cannot be the object
of appropration.
ART. 420. The following things are property of public
dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks shores roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth.
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under
paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as
property belonging to the State and intended for some
public service. We emphasize, however, that an
abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi
property for public service and to make it patrimonial
property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be
definite Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use
alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the
government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a
lack of financial support to repair and improve the
property.
472!
Roppongi shall then be used as the Philippine
Embassy Chancery. At the end of the lease period, all
the three leased buildings shall be occupied and used
by the Philippine government. No change of ownership
or title shall occur.
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive
branch of the government has been pushing, with great
vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties
starting with the Roppongi lot. This is realized when On
the President issued Executive Order No. 296
entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of
separations' capital goods and services in the
event of sale, lease or disposition. The four
properties in Japan including the Roppongi were
specifically mentioned in the first The property has
twice been set for bidding at a minimum floor price of
$225 million.
The text of EO 296 provides:
Section 1. The provisions of Republic Act No. 1789, as
amended, and of other laws to the contrary
notwithstanding, the above-mentioned properties can
be made available for sale, lease or any other manner
of disposition to non-Filipino citizens or to entities
owned by non-Filipino citizens.
Issues: (1) Whether the Ropongi property is public?
(2) Whether the Chief Executive, her officers and
agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the
Roppongi property?
Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an
"authority to sell", does not have a provision in its text
expressly authorizing the sale of the four properties
procured from Japan for the government sector. The
executive order does not declare that the properties lost
their public character. It merely intends to make the
properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos
alone in case of a sale, lease or other disposition. It
merely eliminates the restriction under Rep. Act No.
1789 that reparations goods may be sold only to
Filipino citizens and one hundred (100%) percent
Filipino-owned entities.
Executive Order No. 296 is based on the wrong
premise or assumption that the Roppongi and the
three other properties were earlier converted into
alienable real properties.
Under Act No. 1789, there is a differentiation on the
procurements for the government sector and the private
sector (Sections 2 and 12, Rep. Act No. 1789). Only the
private sector properties can be sold to end-users who
must be Filipinos or entities owned by Filipinos. It is this
nationality provision which was amended by Executive
Order No. 296.
Also when one looks at the intention of procuring funds for
selling the Roppongi property, Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act
No. 6657 (the CARP Law) provides
…as one of the sources of funds for its implementation,
the proceeds of the disposition of the properties of the
Government in foreign countries. Under the CARP law,
however, it did not withdraw the Roppongi property
from being classified as one of public dominion when
it mentions Philippine properties abroad. Section 63 (c)
473!
refers to properties which are alienable and not to those
reserved for public use or service. Rep Act No. 6657,
therefore, does not authorize the Executive Department to
sell the Roppongi property. It merely enumerates possible
sources of future funding to augment (as and when
needed) the Agrarian Reform Fund created under
Executive Order No. 299. Obviously any property outside
of the commerce of man cannot be tapped as a source of
funds. The respondents try to get around the public
dominion character of the Roppongi property by
insisting that Japanese law and not our Civil Code
should apply.

(2) No. The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988 by

President Aquino of the recommendation by the
investigating committee to sell the Roppongi property was
premature…Moreover, the approval does not have the
force and effect of law since the President already lost
her legislative powers. The Congress had already
convened for more than a year.

Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the

Roppongi property is no longer of public dominion, there is
another obstacle to its sale by the respondents.
Under Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code
of 1917 provides:

Instrument conveying the title to real estate or to any other

property the value of which is in excess of one hundred
thousand pesos, the respective Department Secretary
shall prepare the necessary papers which, together with
the proper recommendations, shall be submitted to the
Congress of the Philippines for approval by the same.

474!
The requirement has been retained in Section 48,
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292).

It is not for the President to convey valuable real

property of the government on his or her own sole
will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and
approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It
requires executive and legislative concurrence.

In an earlier and separate case questioning the property

sale of Roppongi in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, they
clarified that the question is was whether the President
has the power to allocate the proceeds of the Roppongi
property to finance CARP.
Having declared a need for a law or formal declaration to
withdraw the Roppongi property from public domain to
make it alienable and a need for legislative authority to
allow the sale of the property, we see no compelling
reason to tackle the constitutional issues raised by
petitioner Ojeda. Also, the selling of property did not
materialize as it is currently under a TRO.

The court also acknowledges that the Roppongi property

is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices
fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so
because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos —
veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the
Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is
a policy determination where both the President and
Congress must concur. Considering the properties'
importance and value, the laws on conversion and
disposition of property of public dominion must be faithfully
followed.

475!
288 Review Center v. The Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
Ermita (2009) conducted the Nursing Board Examinations
nationwide. In June 2006, licensure applicants wrote
the PRC to report that handwritten copies of two sets of
examinations were circulated during the examination
period among the examinees reviewing at the R.A.
Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center.
George Cordero, Inress Review Center’s President,
was then the incumbent President of the Philippine
Nurses Association. The examinees were provided
with a list of 500 questions and answers in two of
the examinations’ five subjects, particularly Tests
III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-Surgical
Nursing). The PRC later admitted the LEAKAGE
and traced it to two Board of Nursing members. On
19 June 2006, the PRC released the results of the
Nursing Board Examinations. On 18 August 2006, the
Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from proceeding
with the oath-taking of the successful examinees.
President GMA ordered for a re-examination and
issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to
supervise theestablishment and operation of all
review centers and similar entities in the
Philippines. CHED Chairman Punoapproved CHED
Memorandum Order No. 49 series of 2006
(Implementing Rules and Regulations).- Review
Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an
organization of independent review centers, asked the
CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR arguing,
among other things, that giving permits to operate
a reviewcenter to Higher Education Institutions
(HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional
organizations will effectively abolish independent
(1) No. Sec. 3. Creation of Commission on Higher
Education. - In pursuance of the abovementioned policies,
the Commission on Higher Education is hereby created,
hereinafter referred to as the Commission.
The Commission shall be independent and separate from
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS),
and attached to the Office of the President for
administrative purposes only. Its coverage shall be both
public and private institutions of higher education as
well as degree-granting programs in all post-
secondary educational institutions, public and private.
"Higher education," however, is defined as "education
beyond the secondary level" Higher education should be
taken to mean tertiary education or that which grants a
degree after its completion.
Sections 1 and 8, Rule IV of the RIRR define a review
center and similar entities as follows:
Section 1. REVIEW CENTER. - refers to a center
operated and owned by a duly authorized entity pursuant
to these Rules intending to offer to the public and/or to
specialized groups whether for a fee or for free a program
or course of study that is intended to refresh and
enhance the knowledge and competencies and skills
of reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in
preparation for the licensure examinations given by
the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC).
Section 8. SIMILAR ENTITIES – the term refer to other
review centers providing review or tutorial services in
areas not covered by licensure examinations given by
the Professional Regulations Commission including but
476!
review centers. CHED Chairman Puno however
believed that suspending the implementation of the
IRR would be inconsistent with the mandate of EO
566
A dialogue between the petitioner and CHED took
place. Revised IRR was approved. Petitioner filed
before the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend RIRR
praying to exclude independent review center from the
coverage of the CHED. In 2007, then CHED Chairman
Neri responded to the petitioner that: to exclude the
operation of independent review centers from the
coverage of CHED would clearly contradict the
intention of the said Executive Order No.566; As to the
request to clarify what is meant by tie-up/be integrated
with an HEI, tie-up/be integrated simply means, to be in
partner with an HEI.
Issues: (1) Does CHED have jurisdiction over review
centers?
(2) Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by
the Executive of legislative power as it expands the
CHED’s jurisdiction; and whether the RIRR is an invalid
exercise of the Executive’s rule-making power.
not limited to college entrance examinations, Civil Service
examinations, tutorial services in specific fields like
English, Mathematics and the like.
The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the
CHED’s coverage under RA 7722. The CHED’s coverage
under RA 7722 is limited to public and private
institutions of higher education and degree-granting
programs in all public and private post-secondary
educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to
formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers
and similar entities.
The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows that
it refers to one which offers "a program or course of
study that is intended to refresh and enhance the
knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees
obtained in the formal school setting in preparation
for the licensure examinations" given by the PRC. It
also covers the operation or conduct of review classes or
courses provided by individuals whether for a fee or not in
preparation for the licensure examinations given by the
PRC. A review center is not an institution of higher
learning as contemplated by RA 7722. It does not offer
a degree-granting program that would put it under the
jurisdiction of the CHED.
(2) Yes. Under Section 20. Residual Powers. - Unless
Congress provides otherwise, the President shall
exercise such other powers and functions vested in
the President which are provided for under the laws
and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which
are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.
477!
The provision clearly states that the exercise of the
President’s other powers and functions has to be
"provided for under the law." There is no law granting
the President the power to amend the functions of the
CHED. The President may not amend RA 7722 through
an Executive Order without a prior legislation granting her
such power. The President has no inherent or delegated
legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED
under RA 7722.

The President has control over the executive department,

bureaus and offices. Thus, he is granted administrative
power over bureaus and offices under his control to
enable him to discharge his duties effectively.

Administrative power is concerned with the work of

applying policies and enforcing orders as determined
by proper governmental organs.
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President
which relate to particular aspects of governmental
operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative
head shall be promulgated in administrative orders."

Just like AO 308 in Ople v. Torres, EO 566 in this case

is not supported by any enabling law. Since EO 566 is
an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is
also an invalid exercise of the CHED’s quasi-legislative
power. Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-
legislative or rule-making power through the promulgation
of rules and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its
rule-making power within the confines of its jurisdiction
under RA 7722. The RIRR covers review centers and
similar entities which are neither institutions of higher
education nor institutions offering degree-granting

478!

289 Biraogo v. Truth Presidential Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc
Commission (2010) body formed under the Office of the President with the
primary task to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and to
submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
PTC has all the powers of an investigative body.
But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render
awards in disputes between contending parties. All
it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of
programs.
However, there is a chance that the President may still
exercise its power to control PRC. Under Sec. 5 of RA
8981, the PRC is mandated to "establish and maintain
a high standard of admission to the practice of all
professions and at all times ensure and safeguard the
integrity of all licensure examinations." Section 7 of RA
8981 further states that the PRC shall adopt "measures to
preserve the integrity and inviolability of licensure
examinations."
However, the enumeration of PRC’s powers under
Section 7(e) includes among others, the fixing of dates
and places of the examinations and the appointment of
supervisors and watchers. The power to preserve the
integrity and inviolability of licensure examinations should
be read together with these functions. These powers of
the PRC have nothing to do at all with the regulation
of review centers.
(1) No. Section 31 contemplates "reorganization" as
limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1)
restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging
units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to
another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of
the President to any other Department/Agency or vice
versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of
the President to any other Department/Agency or vice
versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by
reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These
point to situations where a body or an office is already
existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be
479!
graft and corruption and make recommendations. It
may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite
people in contempt, much less order their arrest.
Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine
from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant
the filing of information in our courts of law.
“Commission’s members are usually empowered to
conduct research, support victims, and propose policy
recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes.
Through their investigations, the commissions may aim
to discover and learn more about past abuses, or
formally acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare
the way for prosecutions and recommend institutional
reforms." Thus, their main goals range from
retribution to reconciliation.
Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being
violative of the legislative power of Congress under
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the
constitutional authority of the legislature to create a
public office and to appropriate funds therefor.
Issues: (1) Does the creation of the PTC fall within the
ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in
Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code?
(2) Whether the President has transgressed the power
of judiciary since the power vested in the Truth
Commission to “investigate” seems like a judicial
function.
(3) Whether Executive Order No. 1 should be struck
down as violative of the equal protection clause. The
clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and
find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft
effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned,
much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the
answer to the question is in the negative.
To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the
Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced
supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to
the term "restructure"– an "alteration of an existing
structure." Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure
of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of
Executive Order No. 1.
Clearly, the power of control (meaning reorganize gov’t) is
entirely different from the power to create public offices.
The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter
finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress,
or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws. So is
there a valid delegation?
OSG contends that the power of President to create
offices is in P.D. 1416. Though P.D. 1416 as amended by
P.D. No. 1772 should be considered void given that it was
made as a law in transition to a parliamentary gov’t, which
cannot be held true to the current context with the
promulgation of the 1987 Constitution.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring
that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the
powers of the President are not limited to those specific
powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized
powers of the President granted pursuant to this
constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad
480!
and corruption during the previous administration only.
The intent to single out the previous administration is
plain, patent and manifest.
*Note #3 is where you have to distinguish why the
PTC was struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause but E.O. 1 of Corazon Aquino that
established the PCGG to pursue Marcos was
allowed.
hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to
ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully
executed. It should be stressed that the purpose of
allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an
inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know
so that he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.
Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the
Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds.
(2) No. The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially
the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or
observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine
and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by
careful inquisition; examination. In the legal sense,
"adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority; to determine finally.
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to
the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-
judicial agency or office. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered
as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied
by the authority of applying the law to the factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review as
may be provided by law. Contrary to petitioners’
apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the
Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
481!
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the
commission will complement those of the two offices.

At any rate, the Ombudsman’s power to investigate under

R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other
similarly authorized government agencies such as PCGG
and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit
trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary investigation
on charges against public employees and officials is
likewise concurrently shared with the Department of
Justice.

Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be

inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded
conclusiveness.

(3) Yes. Arroyo administration is but just a member of a

class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a
class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission
as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.

EO 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal

protection clause. The clear mandate of truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration only. The intent to
single out the previous administration is plain, patent
and manifest.

482!
 III. Executive Privilege
290 U.S. v. Nixon In 1972, President Richard Nixon, a Republican, was No. Nixon must hand over the tapes. The Court has the
(1974) running for re-election against Senator George authority to interpret claims with respect to powers alleged
McGovern, a Democrat. On June 17, 1972, McCord to derive from enumerated powers. It is the duty of the
and four other men working for the Committee to Court to say what the law is with respect to the claim of
Re-Elect the President (or CREEP) broke into the privilege of the President.
Democratic Party’s headquarters in the Watergate,
a hotel-office building in Washington, D.C Presidential communication is protected, however when
(Watergate Scandal). They got caught going the communication is not of a governmental nature, and
through files and trying to plant listening devices. there is a public interest in those communications, then
Five days later, Nixon denied any knowledge of it or the immunity granted by the Constitution does not
that his administration played any role in it. The exist. This is important to the adversarial system we have
burglars went to trial in 1973 and either pled guilty or in this country. There must be a full disclosure of all of the
were convicted. Before sentencing, McCord wrote a facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. This
th
letter to Judge John Sirica, contending that high is essential to the carrying of justice. Both the 5
th
Republican and White House officials knew about amendment (due process) and the 6 amendment (right to
the break-in and had paid the defendants to keep face adversaries is part of this carrying of justice.
quiet or lie during the trial.
In applying the balance test, Presidential communications
On July 16, 1973, Alexander Butterfield, a former White are indeed protected generally, but in the instance of a
House staff member, testified that there were secret criminal case, the protection cannot remain, for it would
recordings of presidential conversations discussing the “cut deep into the guarantee of due process law and
break-in with its organizers. A subpoena was issued gravely impair the basic function of the courts.”
directing President to produce tape recordings and
documents. The President’s motion to quash Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or
subpoena was denied. Nixon refused to turn the sensitive national security secrets, the Court finds it
tapes over to Congress claiming the tapes were difficult to accept the argument that even the very
covered by “executive privilege”. The subpoena important interest in confidentiality of Presidential
demands confidential conversations between communications is significantly diminished by production
President and his close advisors that it would be of such material for in camera inspection with all the
inconsistent with public interest to produce. The protection that a district court will be obligated to provide.
privilege prevails over the subpoena duces tecum As for separation of powers, they were not meant to stand
(used to compel the production of documents that by themselves, as there are cases in which the powers co-
might be admissible before the court). Moreover, Nixon mingled with one another.

483!
 claims the separation of powers doctrine which
precludes judicial review of a President’s claim of
privilege.
Issue: Whether Nixon’s executive privilege absolute?
291 Almonte v. The function of the ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE
Vasquez (1995) AND INVESTIGATION BUREAU (EIIB) is to gather
and evaluate intelligence reports regarding illegal
activities affecting national economy. Almonte
(Petitioner) was then Commissioner of the EIIB, while
The doctrine of separation of powers was not intended to
operate with absolute independence. To ensure that
justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that
compulsory process be available for the production of
evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the
defense
The President’s executive privilege is not absolute and
must bend to Amendment 4 and Amendment 5
requirements of speedy and fair trials and of the ability of
defendants to face their accusers. Courts are not required
to proceed against the President as if the President was
any other individual.
Citizens have the right under Amendments 4 and 5 of the
constitution to face their accusers and have fair and
speedy trials, even when bringing claims against the
President of the United States. While the President is not
any other citizen, the court must balance the executive
privilege interest with the interest of the individual citizen
under Amendments 4 and 5. In so doing, the court should
review the privileged material – the tapes in this case – in
their private chambers and balance such interests. In the
instant case, interest claimed by the President was not
sufficient to outweigh that of the individual
citizen’s. Therefore, the tapes were subpoenaed.
Note: To review in camera is to review in chambers of the
judge and not inside the court.
No. Governmental privilege against disclosure is
recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on
military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is
based upon public interest of such paramount
importance as in and of itself transcending the
484!
Perez was the Chief of the Budget and Fiscal
Management Division.Ombudsman received an
anonymous letter alleging that funds representing
savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been
illegally disbursed. The letter states that during the
implementation of EO 127, 190 personnel were
dismissed. Before the EO, the EIIB had monthly
savings of 500k from unfilled plantilla positions
plus the implementation of RA 6683, a total amount
of 1.4 million was saved. However it was disbursed.
The EIIB has a syndicate headed by the Chief of
Budget Division who is manipulating funds and
also the brain of “ghost agents”. The
Commissioner has the biggest share.
Graft Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman’s Office,
Jose Saño asked for authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation and issued a subpoena to Petitioners
Almonte and Perez requiring them to submit their
counter-affidavits. Saño also issued a subpoena duces
tecum (ordering the recipient to appear before the court
and produce documents or other tangible evidence for
use at a hearing or trial.) to the Chief of the EIIB’s
Accounting Division ordering him to bring “all
documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the
year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary)
for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988.”
Petitioners claim that to produce these documents
would lead to the knowledge of its operations,
movements and tactics, which would destroy the
EIIB. Petitioners invoke governmental privilege.
individual interests of a private citizen, even though,
as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce
his legal rights. Governmental privilege may be
invoked when there is a reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military
matters which, in the interest of national security,
should not be divulged
Although where the claim of confidentiality does not rest
on the need to protect military, diplomatic or other national
security secrets but on a general public interest in the
confidentiality of his conversations, courts have declined
to find in the Constitution an absolute privilege of the
President against a subpoena considered essential to the
enforcement of criminal laws.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or
diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of
records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed,
EIIB’s function is the gathering and evaluation of
intelligence reports and information regarding “illegal
activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not
limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion,
dollar salting.” Consequently, while in cases which
involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine
from the circumstances of the case that there is
reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence
will expose military matters without compelling
production, no similar excuse can be made for a
privilege resting on other considerations.
Nor has our attention been called to any law or regulation
which considers personnel records of the EIIB as
classified information. To the contrary, COA Circular No.
485!
Issue: Whether or not “all documents relating to
personal services funds for the year 1988 and all
evidences, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole
plantilla of EIIB for 1988” are classified and, therefore,
beyond the reach of public respondent’s subpoena
duces tecum.
88-293, which petitioners invoke to support their
contention that there is adequate safeguard against
misuse of public funds, provides that the “only item of
expenditure which should be treated strictly
confidential” is that which refers to the “purchase of
information and payment of rewards.”
Reasonable records should be maintained and kept for
inspection of the Chairman, Commission on Audit or his
duly authorized representative. All other expenditures are
to be considered unclassified supported by invoices,
receipts and other documents, and, therefore, subject to
reasonable inquiry by the Chairman or his duly authorized
representative.
It should be noted that the regulation requires that
“reasonable records” be kept justifying the
confidential or privileged character of the information
relating to informers. There are no such reasonable
records in this case to substitute for the records
claimed to be confidential. No express statutory grant
of privilege; only purchase of info & rewards are
privileged under COA Circular No. 88-293. EIIB has
duty to account for use of public funds.
On the other hand, the Ombudsman is investigating a
complaint that several items in the EIIB were filled by
fictitious persons and that the allotments for these items in
1988 were used for illegal purposes. The plantilla and
other personnel records are relevant to his investigation.
He and his Deputies are designated by the Constitution
“protectors of the people” and as such they are required
by it “to act promptly on complaints in any form or manner
against public officials or employees of the Government,
486!

292 Senate v. Ermita In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of
(2006) the Philippines, through its various Senate
Sec 2 Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in
- is valid because aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
the scope is based
on jurisprudence attendance of officials and employees of the
executive department, bureaus, and offices including
those employed in Government Owned and
Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police
(PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Senate called for
the attendance of various Executive Officials as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway
project of North Luzon Railways Corporation Group
(herein referred as North Rail Project) in order to
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporation.
His need for the documents thus outweighs the claim
of confidentiality of petitioners.
Above all, even if the subpoenaed documents are treated
as presumptively privileged, this decision would only
justify ordering their inspection in camera but not their
nonproduction. However, as concession to the nature of
the functions of the EIIB and just to be sure no information
of a confidential character is disclosed, the examination of
records in this case should be made in strict confidence by
the Ombudsman himself. Reference may be made to the
documents in any decision or order which the
Ombudsman may render or issue but only to the
extent that it will not reveal covert activities of the
agency. Above all, there must be a scrupulous
protection of the documents delivered.
Yes. Section 1 is VALID but Section 2 and 3 of E.O 464
are unconstitutional. The Congress power of inquiry is
expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution. Compared to Section 21 however, Section
22 of Article VI is called the “question hour”. In such
cases, Section 22 in comparison to Section 21 grants the
Congress the power to inquire in pursuit of its oversight
functions (Section 22) as compared to those made in
legislation (Section 21).
Usually, the question here is how officials are
implementing certain statutes, which makes them in
the said investigation report to the legislative. This
practice is unusual since supposedly, executive
departments should only report to the Executive for
their functions.
487!
help in investigating an alleged overpricing and
other unlawful provisions of the contract covered
in the said project.
Likewise, the Senate also issued invitations, through
the Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security, for some officials of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) to be resource speakers, in
aid of legislation, inquiring on the “Gloriagate
Scandal” and the alleged Wiretapping of the
President of the Philippines (Referring to the Garci
tapes). Gen. Senga sent a letter in September 27 to
postpone the said hearing due to some pressing
needs he needs to attend and likewise Executive
Secretary Ermita requested the same for he believes
he needs time to review the issues in the meeting.
ON SEPTEMBER 28, 2005, PRESIDENT ISSUED
EO 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on
Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of
Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for
Other Purposes:”
“It prohibits Department heads, Senior officials of
executive departments who in the judgment of the
department heads are covered by the executive
privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who
in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by
the executive privilege; Philippine National Police
(PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or
higher and such other officers who in the judgment of
This is called the question hour. In such cases, Section
22 in comparison to Section 21 grants the Congress to
inquire in pursuit of its oversight functions. Usually, the
question here is how officials are implementing
certain statutes, which makes them in the certain
investigation report to the legislative, which is
unusual since they only report to the executive for
their functions. In cases of question hour, the executive
officer may refuse to go and this rationale is based on the
separation of powers given such inquiry is not in aid of
legislation and does not contravene the legislative powers
of Congress. Thus under Section 22, executive heads are
exempt from the question hour by validly claiming privilege
but not because of their position.
Though the only officers exempted by position is the
President (except in impeachment cases) and the
members of Supreme Court, in due respect to their equal
power.
Section 1 of the EO 464 invokes the Article VI, Section 22
of the Constitution that grants them a power to inquire not
for purposes of “in aid of legislation”.
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of
Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any
reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be
construed as limited in its application to appearances
of department heads in the question hour
contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of
Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of
construction.
Section 3 requires all officials in Section 2 (b) to secure
488!
the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive
privilege; Senior national security officials who in the
judgment of the National Security Adviser are
covered by the executive privilege; and such other
officers as may be determined by the President, from
appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress
without first securing the president’s approval.”
After the issuance of the said E.O., Gen. Senga
refused to go to the investigation due to their non-
acquisition of consent necessary for such
Congressional investigation. For Col. Balutan and
Brig. Gen Gudani who pushed through with the
event, they were severely reprimanded by
President Arroyo for defying the EO 464 by
removing them from their position and were
made to face court martial proceedings. For the
North Rail Transport, investigation, Exec. Sec. Ermita
and other members did not push through with the
investigation.
Issue: Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of
inquiry of Congress therefore unconstitutional.
the consent of the President prior appearing to the
Congress. It claims that various officials who in the
judgment of the heads of offices designated in the same
section are covered by the executive privilege. This
includes the officers that may be determined by the
President.
The determination of this matter is based on the idea of
being covered by the “executive privilege” which means
that it is up to the President to determine who is the
person who has “information” worthy of being covered by
the executive privilege.
However, in the letter given by Exec Sec. Ermita, he does
not specify under what subject does the executive
privilege is considered that is whether the secret that is
kept is for whether military, diplomatic, etc. purposes.
Thus the Congress needs to know why such invocation
are proper and deprives of the Congress of its processes
to investigate. There must be a formal claims since an
improper claim is like no claim at all. Although there is no
need for the claimant of executive privilege to give such
particularity of the confidential documents since it would
be counterintuitive to its purpose.
Thus the claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464
in relation to 2 (b) is invalid as it only requires that
there be consent without the necessity of a rationale
on why it must be considered as confidential. It
severely frustrates the power of the inquiry of the
Congress. However Section 2 (a) as it simply enumerates
the ones covered in Section 2 is valid.
489!
293 Neri v. Senate On April 2007, Department of Transportation and
(2008) Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with
Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for
the supply of equipment and services for National
Broadband Network (NBN) project amounting to
329,481, 290 USD or 16 Billion Pesos. In response to
the alleged anomalies in the project, various
resolutions which invoke the power to conduct
investigation in aid of legislation were introduced
in the Senate. During the investigation, Jose de
Venecia III testified that the NBN-ZTE broadband
deal had been pushed by high ranking executive
officials and instead of Build-Operate-Transfer
(BOT) that was converted to government-to-
government project.
Neri was summoned to appear and testify on Sept. 18,
20, 26 and Oct. 25. Only Sept. 26 he testified before
the Committees for 11 hours. He revealed that
Benjamin Abalos (COMELEC) bribed him 200 million
pesos to push the project. When Neri was asked about
the project itself, he invoked “EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE”
in which he refused to answer the questions:
1.) whether or not Pres. Arroyo followed up the project
2.) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it
3.) whether or not she directed him to approve.
The respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad
Testifacandum requiring him to appear Nov. 20, 2007.
On Nov 20, Neri did not appear before the Committee,
thus a show cause letter to explain why Neri should not
be cited for contempt was issued. Antonio Bautista
(counsel of Neri) replied that he did not want to
disrespect and snob them, that he said everything
Yes. The revocation of EO 464 (an EO issued by
President Arroyo that advised executive officials and
employees, when they are invited to legislative inquiries in
aid of legislation, to secure first a president’s approval) in
the case of Senate v. Ermita, does not in any way
diminish the concept of executive privilege. This
concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in
cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power
textually committed by the Constitution to the
President, such as the area of military and foreign
relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the
repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing,
pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the
doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating
to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than
others.
Several jurisprudence provide the following elements of
presidential communications privilege before its exercise
can be said valid:
(4) The protected communication must relate to a
“quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.”
In this case, the subject matter, which is foreign loans that
the President will acquire for the project is a power non-
delegable that only the President himself can exercise.
The fact that the President has to secure the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to
Congress a complete report of its decision before
contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not
490!
during the 11 hour interrogation that did not
involve the topics which exercise executive
privilege. Stated in the letter also was 1.) his non-
appearance was upon the order of the president 2.)
his conversations with the pres. Dealt with delicate,
sensitive materials concerning national security
and diplomatic relations 3.) that questions be
furnished in advance so that he may adequately
prepare for the hearing.
The committees found the explanations
unsatisfactory, without responding to his request for
advance notices on matters that still need clarifying,
they issued an order citing him of contempt. On the
same day the petitioner moved for the
reconsideration. Issue: Whether there was a violation
of right to information under the Constitution?
Issue: Whether there is a recognized presumptive
presidential communications privilege in our legal
system.
diminish the executive nature of the power.
The requirement that the President has to submit a report
to Congress is only a reflection of separation of powers
that allows checks and balances esp. in important matters
such as President’s power to contract foreign loans in
behalf of the Philippine people.
(5) The communication is limited only by the “doctrine
of operational proximity”
This doctrine simply limits the power of presidential
communications privilege. This doctrine prevents the
President from simply making every communication done
by his executive a privilege thus preventing people to
scrutinize the communication. The test is that: Only
communications at that level are close enough to the
President to be revelatory of his deliberations or to
pose a risk to the candor of his advisers.
In this case, since the communication is between the
President and his Cabinet adviser, it could be seen that
the communication is within the close proximity of the
President. To determine who is within the operational
proximity we use the organizational test laid down in
Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice. The main
consideration is to limit the availability of executive
privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the
President, not only by reason of their function, but also by
reason of their positions in the Executive’s organizational
structure. Thus, respondent Committees’ fear that the
scope of the privilege would be unnecessarily expanded
with the use of the operational proximity test is unfounded.
491!
 (6) The President’s claim of executive privilege is not
merely based on a generalized interest; and likely
contains an important and compelling need to be
kept confidential.

In this case, it is easy to discern the danger that goes with

the disclosure of the President’s communication with her
advisor. The NBN Project involves a foreign country as a
party to the agreement. It was actually a product of the
meeting of minds between officials of the Philippines and
China. Whatever the President says about the agreement
– particularly while official negotiations are ongoing – are
matters which China will surely view with particular
interest. There is danger in such kind of exposure.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed,

the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are
covered by the presidential communications privilege.
First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and
non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power
to enter into an executive agreement with other countries.
This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications
are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under
the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.

492!
294 Akbayan v. Aquino Petitioners, as non-government orgs, congresspersons,
(2008) citizens and taxpayers, filed a petition for mandamus
and prohibition seeking to compel respondents,
Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary
Thomas Aquino, et al., to furnish petitioners the full
text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership
Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and
Japanese offers (parts of the notes of negotiating
parties) submitted during the negotiation process and
all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade
agreement to be entered into by the Philippines with
another country in the event the Senate grants its
consent to it, covers a broad range of topics which
includes trade in goods, rules of origin, customs
procedures, paperless trading, trade in services,
investment, intellectual property rights,
government procurement, movement of natural
persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual
recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement,
improvement of the business environment, and
general and final provisions.
Petitioners emphasize that the refusal of the
government to disclose the said agreement violates
their right to information on matters of public concern
and of public interest. That the non-disclosure of the
same documents undermines their right to effective
and reasonable participation in all levels of social,
political and economic decision making. Respondent
herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on
the ground that the matter sought involves a
diplomatic negotiation then in progress, thus
Yes. To be covered by the right to information, the
information being sought should be of public
concern. “Public concern” and “public interest” both
embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public
must know about BECAUSE it these would be
affecting their lives, or simply because such matters
naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen.
The right to information on the grounds for public
interest/concern is determined by the courts on a case to
case basis depending on the subject matter, of what
interest, and of what importance as it relates to and affects
the public.
The very nature of the JPEPA, as an international trade
agreement, is evident that the Philippines and Japanese
offers submitted during the negotiations towards its
execution are matters of public concern. The
respondents do not dispute this fact. The respondents
only claim that they are covered by executive
privilege.
However, the Court holds that, in determining whether the
information is covered by the right to information, a
specific “showing of need” for such information is not a
relevant consideration, but only whether the same is a
matter of public concern.
When the government has claimed executive privilege,
and it has established that the information is indeed
covered by the same, then the party demanding it, if it is to
overcome the privilege, must show that that the
information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of
its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and
reasonably participate in social, political, and
493!
constituting an exception to the right to
information and the policy of full disclosure of
matters that are of public concern like the JPEPA -
that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the
doctrine of executive privilege.
Issue: Whether the full text/content/negotiation of the
JPEPA is under the executive privileged and thus must
be confidential?
economic decision-making.
For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of
information as privileged does not mean that it will be
considered privileged in ALL INSTANCES. Only after a
consideration of the context in which the claim is
made may it be determined if there is a public interest
that calls for the disclosure of the desired information,
strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged
status.
The Court held that “applying the principles adopted in
PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of
the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential –
since there should be ‘ample opportunity for discussion
before [a treaty] is approved’ – the offers exchanged by
the parties during the negotiations continue to be
privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is
reasonable to conclude that the Japenese
representatives submitted their offers with the
understanding that ‘historic confidentiality’ would
govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the
ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but
with other foreign governments in future negotiations.” The
Court also stressed that “secrecy of negotiations with
foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional
provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the
freedom of access to information.
It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the
Philippine offers in treaty negotiations would
discourage future Philippine representatives from
frankly expressing their views during negotiations
[chilling effect]. The Highest Tribunal recognized that
494!
 treaty negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro
quo, where negotiators would willingly grant concessions
in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more
favorable terms in an area of greater national interest.

In the case at hand, Petitioners have failed to present the

strong and “sufficient showing of need”. The
arguments they proffer to establish their entitlement to the
subject documents fall short of this standard stated in the
decided cases. There is no dispute that the information
subject of this case is a matter of public concern.
IV. Immunity from Suit
295 Soliven v. Makasiar Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the
(1988) together with others was charged for libel by the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
president. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance
against him and others!!! or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive
of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of
Petitioner, Beltran, argues that "the reasons which the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose
a correlative disability to file suit [dugas!]." He But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to
contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President by virtue of the office and may be
the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any
may subsequently have to be a witness for the other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an
prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's accused in a criminal case in which the President is
jurisdiction. complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a
defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such
This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat accused.
her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on
the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would
possible contempt of court or perjury. In this case, prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus,
Beltran argues that Cory, being immune from suits, if so minded the President may shed the protection
cannot be called by the courts to testify because afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's
she may be liable for contempt and/or perjury by jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the
the court which the presidential immunity privilege or to waive it is solely the President's

495!
 safeguards her. Thus Beltran is using this
presidential immunity so that the case would be
dismissed.
Issue: Whether the constitutional rights of Beltran were
violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant
for his arrest without personally examining the
complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine
probable cause
296 Harlow v. Presidential aides’ claiming absolute immunity. Harlow
Fitzgerald (1982) and Butterfield are aides of President Nixon who
conspired to have Fitzgerald removed from his
employment in the White House, allegedly violating his
constitutional rights. Fitzgerald filed a suit for damages.
Presidential aide does not enjoy the same degree of
immunity. He must establish that his office performs
such sensitive functions that would require immunity
and that the act alleged was in the performance of said
functions. The case laid down 2 tests: 1) objective test
– must have reasonable knowledge and respect for
basic rights and 2) subjective test – must not
demonstrate malicious intent. Both must be present.
Case was remanded for further proceedings based on
the standards laid down.
Respondent Ernest Fitzgerald was a member of the
Senior Executive Service of the US Air Force
Headquarters. He later became a whistle-blower on
questionable cost overruns in the Lockheed C-5 aircraft
program. Later, he was dismissed on the orders of
President Nixon.
Fitzgerald avers that petitioners Harlow &
Butterfield participated in a conspiracy for his
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person.
As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case
to proceed would produce a "chilling effect" on press
freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on
the point.
No. They are only entitled to qualified immunity.
Government officials whose special functions or
constitutional status requires complete protection from
suits for damages (including certain officials of the
Executive Branch, such as prosecutors and similar
officials) are entitled to the defense of absolute
immunity. However, executive officials in general are
usually entitled to only qualified or good faith immunity.
The recognition of a qualified immunity defense for high
executives reflects an attempt to balance competing
values: not only the importance of a damage remedy to
protect the rights of citizens, but also the need to protect
officials who are required to exercise discretion and the
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous
exercise of official authority. Federal officials seeking
absolute immunity from personal liability for
unconstitutional conduct must bear the burden of showing
that public policy requires an exemption of that scope.
Absolute Immunity. For officials whose special functions or
constitutional status requires complete protection from
suit. This refers to the President, Legislators, Judges, and
certain officials of the Executive Branch.
Presidential aide does not enjoy the same degree of
496!
dismissal because of his intention to be a whistle-
blower. He further alleges that they entered the
conspiracy in their capacity as SENIOR WHITE
HOUSE AIDES to former President Nixon. RES
Fitzgerald presents as evidence the series of
conversations in which Harlow discussed Fitzgerald’s
dismissal. Also, a recorded conversation that voiced
the President stating that Harlow was “all for canning
Fitzgerald.”
Harlow & Butterfield argued that they are entitled to a
blanket protection of absolute immunity as an incident
of their office as presidential aides. Petitioners rely on
the doctrine held in Gravel v. US, where the US SC
endorsed the view that it is impossible for
Congress to perform their functions without aides,
and such aides should be treated as alter egos.
Petitioners contend that the rationale of Gravel
mandates a similar "derivative" immunity for the chief
aides of the President.
Issue: Whether the aides to a President are privy to the
executive immunity doctrine if sued for actions
undertaken in their official positions.
immunity. He must establish that his office performs such
sensitive functions that would require immunity & that the
act alleged was in the performance of said functions.
While absolute immunity might be justified for aides
entrusted with discretionary authority in such sensitive
areas as national security or foreign policy, a "special
functions" rationale does not warrant a blanket recognition
of absolute immunity for all Presidential aides in the
performance of all their duties. To establish entitlement
to absolute immunity, a Presidential aide first must
show that the responsibilities of his office embraced a
function so sensitive as to require a total shield from
liability. He then must demonstrate that he was
discharging the protected function when performing
the act for which liability is asserted. Under the record
in this case, neither petitioner has made the requisite
showing for absolute immunity. However, the possibility
that petitioners, on remand, can satisfy the proper
standards is not foreclosed.
Objective test: must have reasonable knowledge &
respect for basic rights.
Subjective test: must not demonstrate malicious
intent. Both must be present. Case was remanded for
further proceedings based on the standards laid down.
The previously recognized "subjective" aspect of qualified
or "good faith" immunity -- whereby such immunity is not
available if the official asserting the defense "took the
action with the malicious intention to cause a
deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury,
frequently has proved incompatible with the principle
497!

297 Clinton v. Jones Respondent sued under Arkansas law to recover
(1997) damages from petitioner, the current President of the
United States, alleging, inter alia, that while he was
Governor of Arkansas, petitioner made "abhorrent"
sexual advances to her, and that her rejection of those
advances led to punishment by her supervisors in the
state job she held at the time.
Petitioner promptly advised the Federal District Court
that he would file a motion to dismiss on Presidential
immunity grounds, and requested that all other
pleadings and motions be deferred until the immunity
issue was resolved. After the court granted that
request, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss without
prejudice and to toll any applicable statutes of limitation
during his Presidency. The District Judge denied
dismissal on immunity grounds and ruled that discovery
could go forward, but ordered any trial stayed until
petitioner's Presidency ended.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal denial, but
reversed the trial postponement as the "functional
equivalent" of a grant of temporary immunity to which
petitioner was not constitutionally entitled. The court
that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial.
Henceforth, government officials performing discretionary
functions generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate "clearly
established" statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.
Case remanded (trial the case in lower court for
reconsideration) for further proceedings based on the
standards laid down.
Yes. We have long held that when the President takes
official action, the Court has the authority to determine
whether he has acted within the law. Perhaps the most
dramatic example of such a case is our holding that
President Truman exceeded his constitutional authority
when he issued an order directing the Secretary of
Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the
Nation's steel mills in order to avert a national catastrophe
Petitioner's principal submission--that in all but the most
exceptional cases, the Constitution affords the President
temporary immunity from civil damages litigation arising
out of events that occurred before he took office--cannot
be sustained on the basis of precedent.
The principal rationale for affording Presidents immunity
from damages actions based on their official acts--i.e., to
enable them to perform their designated functions
effectively without fear that a particular decision may give
rise to personal liability, see, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 749,
752, and n. 32--provides no support for an immunity for
unofficial conduct.
Moreover, immunities for acts clearly within official
capacity are grounded in the nature of the function
498!
 explained that the President, like other officials, is
subject to the same laws that apply to all citizens, that
no case had been found in which an official was
granted immunity from suit for his unofficial acts, and
that the rationale for official immunity is inapposite
where only personal, private conduct by a President is
at issue. The court also rejected the argument that,
unless immunity is available, the threat of judicial
interference with the Executive Branch would violate
separation of powers.
Issue: Whether the President can be involved in a
lawsuit during his presidency for actions that occurred
before the tenure of his presidency and that were not
related to official duties of the presidency?
298 Gloria v. CA (2000) Petitioner [private respondent herein *NOTE OF THEIR
POSITIONS] was appointed Schools Division
Superintendent, Division of City Schools, Quezon City,
by the then President Corazon C. Aquino. Respondent
Secretary Gloria recommended to the President of
the Philippines that the petitioner be reassigned as
Superintendent of the MIST [Marikina Institute of
Science and Technology], to fill up the vacuum created
by the retirement of its Superintendent, Mr. Bannaoag
F. Lauro. President approved the recommendation of
Secretary Gloria. Petitioner requested respondent
Secretary Gloria to reconsider the reassignment, but
the latter denied the request.
The petitioner prepared a letter dated October 18, 1994
to the President of the Philippines, asking for a
reconsideration of his reassignment, and furnished a
copy of the same to the DECS. However, he
subsequently changed his mind and refrained from
performed, not the identity of the actor who performed
it Forrester v. White.
We also believe that there was an abuse of discretion for
the District Court to defer the trial until after the President
leaves office. Such a lengthy and categorical stay takes
no account whatever of the respondent's interest in
bringing the case to trial. The complaint was filed within
the statutory limitations period--albeit near the end of that
period--and delaying trial would increase the danger of
prejudice resulting from the loss of evidence,
including the inability of witnesses to recall specific
facts, or the possible death of a party. The decision to
postpone the trial was, furthermore, premature.
No. Petitioners theorize that the present petition for
prohibition is improper because the same attacks an act of
the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential
immunity from suit.
Petitioners’ contention is untenable for the simple reason
that the petition is directed against petitioners and not
against the President. The questioned acts are those of
petitioners and not of the President.
EVEN IF presidential decisions may be questioned before
the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that
the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioners themselves admitted that their questioned act
constituted a ministerial duty, such that they could be
subject to charges of insubordination if they did not
comply with the presidential order. What is more, where
an administrative department acts with grave abuse of
499!
 filing the letter with the Office of President. The
petitioner filed a petition to CA wherein they
adjudged that the reassignment of the petitioner...
is hereby declared to be violative of petitioner’s
right to security of tenure, and the respondents are
hereby prohibited from implementing the same.
Issue: Whether Respondent Court of Appeals has
allowed itself to be instrumental in private respondent’s
circumvention of the presidential immunity from suit by
giving due course and granting reliefs prayed for in a
suit purportedly filed against petitioners but actually
questioning an act of the president.
299 Estrada v. Desierto From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner
(2001) and Estrada was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but
v. Desierto (MR) surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from
(2001) power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur
Governos, Luis “Chavit” Singson, a longtime friend of
the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner,
his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos
from jueteng lords. The exposé immediately ignited
reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000,
Senator Teofisto Guingona Jr, then the Senate Minority
Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege
speech entitled “I Accuse.”
He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220
million in jueteng money from Governor Singson
from November 1998 to August 2000. He also
charged that the petitioner took from Governor
Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes
intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was
referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon,
to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by
discretion, which is equivalent to a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment, or where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner, there is a
justification for the courts to set aside the administrative
determination thus reached.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
35505 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
(1) Yes. The issue brings under the microscope of the
meaning of Section 8, Article VII of the Constitution.
It is a factual question and its elements are beyond
quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the
intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.
Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to
be determined from his acts and omissions before, during
and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance
on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned
as President.
In an article of Philippine Daily Inquirer entitled the
Angara Diary wherein it revealed the “state of mind” of the
President in the last days of his office, he retorted to
Angara that he would “call for snap elections” The
proposal for a snap election for president in May
500!
Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on
Justice (then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano)
for joint investigation.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air.
After several resignations, On December 7, the
impeachment trial started. The dramatic point of the
December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa
Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank.
She testified that she was one foot away from
petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature “Jose
Velarde” on documents involving a P500 million
investment agreement with their bank on February 4,
2000. Then came the fateful day of January 16, when
by a vote of 11-10the senator-judges ruled against
the opening of the second envelop which allegedly
contained evidence showing that petitioner held
P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the
name “Jose Velarde.”
The public and private prosecutors walked out in
protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel
resigned as Senate President. The ruling made at
10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of
anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By
midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA
Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered
against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.
General Reyes declared that “on behalf of your Armed
Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed
Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing
our support to this government.
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide
where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that
petitioner had intended to give up the presidency
even at that time.
Also, when offered a graceful exit, the petitioner
expressed no objection to the suggestion for a
graceful and dignified exit but said he would never
leave the country
The resignation of the petitioner was implied.
There were several negotiations about his terms for
resignation.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner
cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacañang. In the press release containing his final
statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the
respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the
reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of
our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace
due to any kind of inability and that he was going to
re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people
for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was
referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the
people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk
from any future challenge that may come ahead in the
same service of our country. Petitioner’s reference is to a
future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his
supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly,
501!
administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as
President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner
and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace. After
her induction, she placed several members in her
cabinet, elected a new Vice President and the House
secured their support to the newly elected President.
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner’s
legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases
previously filed against him in the Office of the
Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB
Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on
October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption.
On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No.
146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further
proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754,
1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal
complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the
term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally
warranted.” Thru another counsel, petitioner, on
February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He
prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be
the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic
of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge
the duties of his office, and declaring respondent
to have taken her oath as and to be holding the
Office of the President, only in an acting capacity
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”
While in MR he contends that Section 11 of Art 7 was
misinterpreted by the Court and that congress can only
decide the issue of inability when there is a variance of
the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity
could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioner’s
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is
now in the past tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign
but only took a temporary leave of absence due to his
inability to govern. In support of this thesis, the letter
dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate
President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited.
Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:
“Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the
Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that
I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my
office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice
President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada”
Though the letter is a mystery. Under any circumstance,
however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the
resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before
the press release of the petitioner clearly showing his
resignation from the presidency, then the resignation must
prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the
press release, still, it commands scant legal significance.
Petitioner’s resignation from the presidency cannot
be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a
whimsical will especially if the resignation is the
result of his repudiation by the people. There is
another reason why this Court cannot give any legal
502!
opinion between a majority of the Cabinet and the
President. He also argues that declaration of incapacity
is needed and it should not be implied.
Petitioner Estrada makes then two submissions: first,
the cases filed against him before the respondent
Ombudsman should be prohibited because first, he
has not been convicted in the impeachment
proceedings against him; and second, therefore he still
enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether
criminal or civil as President.
Issues: (1) Whether the petitioner resigned as
President
(2) Whether the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.
Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the
immunity
significance to petitioner’s letter and this shall be
discussed in issue number III of this Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he
did not resign, he also argues that he could not resign
as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:
“Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign
or retire pending an investigation, criminal or
administrative, or pending a prosecution against him,
for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code on bribery.”
Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be
obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement
from being used by a public official as a protective shield
to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or
administrative case against him and to prevent his
prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for
bribery under the RPC.
However, the said cases filed against the petitioner cannot
be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked
jurisdiction to act on them. Sec. 12 of RA No. 3019
cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it
contemplates of cases whose investigation or
prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal
obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting
President.
Also, the exact nature of an impeachment proceeding
is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an
administrative proceeding, it cannot be considered
503!
pending at the time petitioner resigned because the
process already broke down when a majority of the
senator-judges voted against the opening of the second
envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out,
the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of
Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were
postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no
impeachment case pending against petitioner when
he resigned.

(2) No. This court believes that since the Impeachment

Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to
demand that he should first be impeached and then
convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if
granted, would put a perpetual bar against his
prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend
itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-
sitting President who has not been subjected to
impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a
criminal prosecution.

The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in

character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these
crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty,
be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a non-
sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of
this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts
and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability.
It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an
inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and
omissions.

In US v. Nixon, US President Richard Nixon, a sitting

504!

300 David v. Arroyo On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the
th
(2006) 20 Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President
Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1017 and
GO No. 6 as to implement it.
The reasons that the President stated for declaring
such General Order to implement the Presidential
Proclamation were that over the past several months,
elements in political opposition have conspired with
President it concluded that “when the ground for
asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for
use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized
interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the
fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of criminal justice.
In the Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the US Supreme Court further
held that the immunity of the President from civil
damages covers only “official acts.”
Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to
reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones
where it held that the US President’s immunity from suits
for money damages arising out of their official acts is
inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to
appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in
our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987
Constitution is that a public office is a public trust.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to
appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in
our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987
Constitution is that a public office is a public trust.
No. It is stated that incidentally, it is not proper to implead
President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine
that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case,
and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or
law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the
President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into
court litigations while serving as such.
505!
extreme left represented by NDF-CCP-NPA and Furthermore, it is important that she be freed from any
military adventurists. This presented a clear danger to form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him
the president as political opposition tried to oust her as to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and
president and take over the government. On March 3, functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only
Presidential Proclamation 1017 was lifted by President one constitutes the executive branch and anything which
Arroyo. The Solicitor General defended the basis of impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great
President Arroyo for declaring PP 1017, was that the and important duties imposed upon him by the
intent of the Constitution was to give the President full Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the
discretionary powers in determining the necessity to Government.
call out the AFP. Notwithstanding the SG’s contentions,
the Magdalo group instigated the Oakwood mutiny and However, this does not mean that the President is not
wearing or read bands on their left arms to show accountable to anyone. Like any other official, she
disgust. remains accountable to the people but she may be
removed from office only in the mode provided by law and
Simultaneously, Oplan Hackle I (plans of bombings that is by impeachment.
and attacks on the PMA alumni homecoming in
Baguio, where the President was invited) was
discovered. The next morning, after the discovery of
the plan, a bomb was discovered in the campus. Also,
information was intercepted by PNP Chief Arturo
Lomibao regarding PNP-SAF members that are
planning to defect from the Arroyo administration,
along with Congressman Peping Cojuanco who
planned out moves to bring down said administration.

A large number of soldiers joined the rallies as critical

mass and armed components to anti-arroyo protests.
Another factual basis after the issuance of the
Presidential Proclamation and General Order was the
bombings of telephone communication towers and cell
sites in Bulacan and Bataan. These events show a
clear and present critical situation, leading the
President to cancel all events related to EDSA People
Power I.

506!
 Executive Secretary Mike Arroyo declared that
warrantless arrest and takeover of facilities can be
implemented. One of these warrantless arrest was
Randy David (Filipino journalist, UP professor) , due to
mistake of fact that he was a participant in the street
rallies. Also, Cong. Crispin Beltran (representative of
Anakpawis party). The following facilities were taken
over: Seizure of Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante
(local news publications). This was done, according to
the PNP. to show a strong presence to tell media
outlets not to connive or help out rebels to take down
the government.

Issue: Whether there is Legal Standing to sue

President as respondent
V. The Cabinet
301 Spouses The Financing Program was the culmination of efforts
Constantino v. that began during the term of former President Corazon
Cuisia (2005) Aquino to manage the country’s external debt problem
through a negotiation-oriented debt strategy involving
cooperation and negotiation with foreign creditors.
Pursuant to this strategy, the Aquino government
entered into three restructuring agreements with
representatives of foreign creditor governments during
the period of 1986 to 1991. However, petitioners
alleged that even prior to the execution of the Program
respondents had already implemented its “buyback
component” when on 15 May 1992, the Philippines
bought back P1.26 billion of external debts pursuant to
the Program.
The petition sought to enjoin the ratification of the
Program, but the Court did not issue any injunctive
relief. Hence, it came to pass that the Program was
Yes. Petitioners stress that unlike other powers which may
be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur
foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in
the person of the President. They argue that the gravity
by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino
nation requires that the President alone must exercise this
power. They submit that the requirement of prior
concurrence of an entity specifically named by the
Constitution–the Monetary Board–reinforces the
submission that not respondents but the President “alone
and personally” can validly bind the country.
We believe that the evident exigency of having the
Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the
President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made
manifest by the fact that the process of establish debt is
deep within the realm of the expertise of the
Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the

507!
signed in London as scheduled. Petitioners
characterize the Financing Program as a package
offered to the country’s foreign creditors consisting of
two debt-relief options.
- A cash buyback of portions of the Philippine
foreign debt at a discount
- Allowed creditors to convert existing Philippine
debt instruments into any of three kinds of
bonds/securities:
Respondents believe that the Financing Program
would cover about U.S. $5.3 billion of foreign
commercial debts and it was expected to deal
comprehensively with the commercial bank debt
problem of the country and pave the way for the
country’s access to capital markets. They add that the
Program carried three basic options from which foreign
bank lenders could choose, namely:
- to lend money
- to exchange existing restructured Philippine
debts with an interest reduction bond; or
- to exchange the same Philippine debts with a
principal collateralized interest reduction bond.
Petitioners stress that unlike other powers which may
be validly delegated by the President, the power to
incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the
Constitution in the person of the President. They argue
that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will
affect the Filipino nation requires that the President
alone must exercise this power. They submit that the
requirement of prior concurrence of an entity
specifically named by the Constitution–the Monetary
Board–reinforces the submission that not respondents
required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost
objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt
management goals
If, as petitioners would have it, the President were to
personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing
power, he/she would have to pause from running the
country long enough to focus on a welter of time-
consuming detailed activities–the propriety of
incurring/guaranteeing loans. This sort of constitutional
interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet
positions and the respective expertise which the holders
thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the
President’s effectivity in running the government.
Inevitably, it fell upon the Secretary of Finance, as the
alter ego of the President regarding “the sound and
efficient management of the financial resources of the
Government to formulate a scheme for the implementation
of the policy publicly expressed by the President herself.
Nevertheless, there are powers vested in the President by
the Constitution which may not be delegated to or
exercised by an agent or alter ego of the President. Thus
while the President wields the borrowing power it is the
Secretary of Finance who normally carries out its thrusts.
Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus and proclaim martial law and the exercise
by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (pardon)
Another important qualification must be made. The
Secretary of Finance or any designated alter ego of the
President is bound to secure the latter’s prior consent to or
508!
 but the President “alone and personally” can validly subsequent ratification of his acts. In the matter of
bind the country. contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, the repudiation
by the President of the very acts performed in this regard
Issue: Whether there was a valid delegation of power by the alter ego will definitely have binding effect.

Given that petitioners do not assert that respondent

pursued the Program without prior authorization of the
President or that the terms of the contract were agreed
upon without the President’s authorization, leads us to
conclude that said acts carried presidential approval.!

Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is:
1. A natural-born citizen of the Philippines
2. A registered voter
3. Able to read and write
4. At least forty years of age on the day of the election
5. A resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election
Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same
qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and in the same
manner, as the President. He may be removed from office in the
same manner as the President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet.
Such appointment requires no confirmation.
- The Vice-President is essentially a President on reserve
- In deference to his office, an appointment as department head
extended to him does not need the consent of the COA
! But the President is not obliged to give the Vice-President
a Cabinet position

Section 3. The Vice-President

302 Funa v. Executive The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, Yes. Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil
Secretary (2013) President Gloria M. Macapagal-Arroyo appointed service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or
a resignation by Agnes VST Devanadera in order to by the primary functions of their positions, members of the
vie for a congressional seat in Quezon Province; Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when
that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other

509!
designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General
in a concurrent capacity; that on April 7, 2010, the
petitioner, is assailing that Agra’s concurrent
appointments or designations, claiming it to be
prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution; that during the pendency of the
suit, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed Atty.
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and
that Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor General and
commenced his duties as such on August 5, 2010.
Despite Agra forwarding a different set of facts, the
Court said that Notwithstanding the conflict in the
versions of the parties, the fact that Agra has
admitted to holding the two offices concurrently
in acting capacities is settled, which is sufficient
for purposes of resolving the constitutional
question that petitioner raises herein.
Issue: Whether the designation of respondent
Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the
position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport to which she had been appointed,
violated the constitutional proscription against dual
or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their
deputies and assistants
words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive
public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article
VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the
President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants. The only two exceptions
against the holding of multiple offices are:
(1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as
Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice- President
to become a member of the Cabinet; and
(2) Posts occupied by Executive officials specified in
Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation
in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of the officials’
offices
It is equally remarkable, therefore, that Agra’s designation as
the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex officio
capacity, by which he would have been validly authorized to
concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding of one
office being the consequence of holding the other. The term
ex officio means “from office; by virtue of office.” It refers to an
“authority derived from official character merely, not expressly
conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to
the official position.
Indeed, the powers and functions of the OSG are neither
required by the primary functions nor included by the
powers of the DOJ, and vice versa. The OSG, while
attached to the DOJ, is not a constituent unit of the latter,
as, in fact, the Administrative Code of 1987 decrees that
the OSG is independent and autonomous
The persons cited in the constitutional provision are the
510!

Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by
direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the
election and shall end at noon of the same date, six years thereafter.
The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who
has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than
four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any
time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the
full term for which he was elected.
"Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants."
Public officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary,
Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary are not covered by the
prohibition, nor is the Solicitor General affected thereby.
Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid
for all purposes as those of de jure officer, in so far as the
public or third persons who are interested therein are
concerned.
ANNULS AND VOIDS the designation of Hon. Alberto C. Agra
as the Acting Secretary of Justice in a concurrent capacity
with his position as the Acting Solicitor General for being
unconstitutional and violative of Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution; and DECLARES that Hon. Alberto C. Agra
was a de facto officer during his tenure as Acting Secretary of
Justice.!
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President
and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly
certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be
transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate.
Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the
Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election,
open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House
of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the
manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed
elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest
511!
number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of
a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.
• Voluntary renunciation for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in his service
• If the Vice President succeeds to the Presidency, if he
serves for less than 4 years, he may run for election as
President (not a case of re-election)
I. Congress as National Board of Canvassers
- Congress is given the authority to make a determination of the
authenticity and due execution of the returns coming from the
provincial and city board of canvassers in accordance with the
manner provided for by law.

- Election of the President and Vice President: elected by direct vote
by the people
- Term of the President and the Vice President
• President: fixed term of 6 years to begin at noon on June 30,
following the year of the election and to end at noon also on
June 30, 6 years after
• The fixing of the exact date and time excludes the right to
“hold-over”
• The President is not eligible for any re-election for that office,
either immediately after his term or even after an interval of 1
or more terms
• Vice President: may not serve for more than 2 successive
terms
Non-legislative Functions of Congress
1. Appropriation
2. Declaration of a State of War
3. Canvassing the returns of the President / Vice President
4. Impeachment
II. Breaking a Presidential or Vice-Presidential Tie
- Congress has the authority to break a tie
- In case 2 or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes,
the tie can be broken by a majority vote of all the Members of both
Houses of Congress, voting separately.

Section 4. Election of the President and VP

I. Term of the President and VP
303 Anson-Roa v. During the 2004 elections, senatorial candidates Elisa No.
Arroyo (2004) Anson-Roa & Amina Rasul-Bernardo assail the PGMA is not running for re-election for SHE WAS NOT
candidacy & allege use of public funds for campaign of ELECTED as President. Neither does she fall under the
then candidate Arroyo. They claim that PGMA should prohibition against a person who SUCEEDED the Pres., for the
immediately resign upon her filing of her Certificate of provision states that for a person to be considered a successor
Candidacy (COC) on 2004 and claim that it is in he/she needs to serve at least 4 years. Thus in the case of

512!
 violation of the Constitution in that it prohibits the Pres.
from seeking re-election and the equal protection
clause.
Issue: Whether Arroyo cannot run as President as it
violates Sec. 4, Article VII of the Constitution
304 Tecson v. Petitioner Victorino X. Fornier, files a case in
COMELEC Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to
(2005) disqualify Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (aka FPJ) and to
deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in
truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners;
his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and
his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the
son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Assuming that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
could nonetheless have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child
of an alien mother. Since Allan F. Poe contracted a
prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his
marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such
prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married
Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
After petitioner was denied by COMELEC and
COMELEC en banc along with other petitions like
those of Maria Jeanette C. Tecson the case is filed in
the Supreme Court.
Issues: (1) Whether the Supreme Court has
Jurisdiction. (Main case under Art VII, Sec. 4 )
PGMA, she has didn't manage to at least serve 4 years after
replacing Erap. Thus PGMA does not have to resign & can run
w/ all the concomitant powers & duties of the Presidency.
(1) No. In the present case, SC has jurisdiction over election
contests (consist of either an election protest or a quo
warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one
objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate from
office). The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the
tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of
the Philippines, and NOT of "candidates" for President or Vice-
President. THUS IT CONTEMPLATES POST-ELECTION
SCENARIO. Hence the petition of Tecson and others, being
done only after the case was tried in the COMELEC, cannot be
countenanced since cases cannot be directly filed in the SC and
Fornier has only standing.
(2) Art. VII, Sec. 2 provides that one must be a natural born
citizen to run for President. The following facts are presented:
- Death Certificate of Lorenzo Pou him to be a Filipino, a
resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at
the time of his death on 11 September 1954.
- An “uncertified” copy of a supposed certificate of the
alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on
05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe
and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to
be on 16 September 1940.
- The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley
- FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939
- Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each
513!
(2) Whether FPJ is a natural born citizen (main case other on 16 September, 1940
under Art VII, Sec. 2)! - The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe

Petitioner believes that Lorenzo Poe was not in the Philippines

during the 1898-1902 (The time where inhabitants are
considered as citizens). HOWEVER he likewise failed to show
that Lorenzo Poe was at any other place during the same
period. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it
should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the
place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also
his residence before death.

Under the 1950s Civil Code, the acknowledgment was required

to establish filiation or paternity. One of the ways is through
voluntary acknowledgment in a record of birth, a will, or a public
document. The document needs to be signed by the father. In
this case, the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by
both parties, nowhere in the document was the signature of
Allan F. Poe found.

However, such omission is not crucial. Section 39, Rule 130, of

the Rules of Court provide: The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of
another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be
received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy,
and the relationship between the two persons is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration. Thus, the duly
notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of
Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the
COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe,
recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living
together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including
respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family.

514!
Another Argument is that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to
respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. Petitioner
presented an evidence that shows FPJ’s parent’s marriage took
around one year after he was born, making him illegitimate. As
an illegitimate child, petitioner claims that FPJ should follow the
citizenship of his mother, an American citizen.

However, legitimate and illegitimate distinctions must rest on

REAL DIFFERENCES. Where jurisprudence regarded an
illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it
did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino
nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with
the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise
parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate
child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate
against him. Additionally, the 1935 Constitution (Constitution at
the time of birth of FPJ) states that among the citizens of the
Philippines are “those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines.” There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe
conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
Therefore, the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his
favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the
Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the
ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position
and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been
material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-
Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also
deliberate and willful. DISMISS

515!
 II. Congress as National Board of Canvassers
305 Brillantes v. The COMELEC, through its Resolution No. 02-0170, Yes. Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered
COMELEC adopted a modernization program for the 2004 by RA 8436, vest upon Congress the sole and exclusive
(2005) elections consisting of three phases: authority to officially canvass the votes for the elections of
Phase I-computerized system of registration and voters President and Vice-President. Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166,
validation or “biometrics” as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18
Phase II - Computerized voting and counting of votes; of Rep. Act No. 8436, solely authorize NAMFREL, the duly-
Phase III - Electronic transmission of results. accredited citizen’s arm to conduct the “unofficial counting of
votes for the national or local elections. The quick count under
PGMA issued EO 172 which allocated the sum of the guise of an “unofficial” tabulation would not only be
P2.5B to exclusively fund the Automated Election preemptive of the authority of congress and NAMFREL, but
System (AES) in time for the 2004 elections. On would also be lacking constitutional and/or statutory basis.
February 10, 2003, upon the request of COMELEC,
PGMA issued EO175 authorizing the release of a Additionally, Senate President Franklin Drilon already expressed
supplemental P500 million budget for the AES his objection to the Resolution as encroaching upon Congress’
project of the COMELEC. The COMELEC power to canvass the votes for the President and VP.
promulgated Resolution 6074 which awarded the COMELEC disregarded this valid objection and still
contract for Phase II of the AES to the Mega Pacific promulgated the assailed Resolution. The Resolution directly
Consortium. infringes the authority of Congress. Even RA 8436 [Authorizing
the COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES)]
In a separate contract, PMSI (Philippine Multi-media confirms the constitutional duty of Congress as the National
System, Inc.) was awarded the bid for the Board of Canvassers for the President and Vice-President
implementation of Phase III. The COMELEC bound
and obliged itself to pay PMSI the sum of P298,
375,808.90 as rentals for the leased equipment and for
its services. However, the Phase II of AES was
scrapped based on the Decision of the Court
granting the petition of Information Technology
Foundation of the Philippines (ITFP) to nullify the
contract of COMELEC with Mega Pacific
Consortium. The COMELEC then would have to
maintain the old manual voting and counting
system for the May 10, 2004 elections.

516!
Despite the scrapping of Phase II, the COMELEC
nevertheless ventured to implement Phase III of the
AES through an electronic transmission of
advanced “unofficial” results of the 2004 elections
for national, provincial and municipal positions,
also dubbed as an “unofficial quick count.” On the
other hand, Phase I apparently encountered problems
in its implementation, as evinced by the COMELEC’s
pronouncements prior to the elections that it was
reverting to the old listing of voters.

Senate President Franklin Drilon expressed his

misgivings and misapprehensions about the
constitutionality of the proposed electronic
transmission of results for the position of President
and VP in his letter to COMELEC Chairman Benjamin
Abalos. Besides this letter the COMELEC also had a
primal problem of sourcing the money for the
implementation of the project since the money
allocated for the AES has already been spent for the
acquisition of the equipment. Notwithstanding the
problems on constitutionality and budget, the
COMELEC was determined to carry out the Phase
III of AES and promulgated Resolution 6712. The
commissioners submit that the budget for Phase III
should be taken from the modernization program
fund in the GAA.

Issue: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of

discretion in issuing Resolution No. 6712 for
preempting the sole and exclusive authority of
Congress under Art. VII, Sec. 4 to canvass the votes
for the election of President and Vice-President

517!
306 Pimentel v. Petitioner Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a
Joint judgment declaring null and void the continued
Committee existence of the Joint Committee of Congress (Joint
(2004) Committee) to determine the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass and
preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential
and Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004
elections following the adjournment of Congress sine
die on June 11, 2004.
Petitioner contends that the adjournment on Jun 11,
th
2004 by the 12 Congress of its last regular session,
th
terminated on the said day and the 12 Congress
passed out of existence, therefore he argues that all
pending matters and proceedings terminate upon the
expiration of the Congress. He relies on Legislative
procedure, precedent and practice from the rules of
both Houses of the Congress to support his argument.
The court takes cognizance of the constitutional issue
regarding the validity of the canvassing of votes for
President and Vice-President in the recently concluded
national elections, whether there was grave abuse of
discretion.
Issue: Whether there has been a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Congress in having the
Joint Committee of Congress handle the canvassing of
votes for the President and the Vice-President in the
recently concluded national elections, despite the
th
termination of the 12 Congress.
No. Petitioner’s claim that his argument is supported by
legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the
rules of both houses of the Congress is contradicted by Sec. 42
of Rule 14 of the Rules of the Senate, that the Senate shall
convene in joint session during any voluntary or compulsory
recess to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President
not later than 30 days after the day of the elections, in
accordance with Art. VII, §4 of the Constitution.
Moreover, the precedents set by 1992 and 1998 Presidential
Elections do not support the move to stop the ongoing
canvassing by the Joint Committee, they citing the observations
of former Senate President Jovito Salonga.
During both the 1992 and 1998 elections, this was also done.
During that time, both Houses of Congress adjourned, but still
after the Joint Committee completed the counting and tallying of
votes for the President and Vice-President, and then the Houses
of Congress convened in joint public session as the National
Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winners as President and
Vice-president.
With regard to his argument that the existence and proceedings
of the Joint Committee is invalid, following the adjournment of
both Houses of Congress of their regular sessions on Jun 11,
2004, he invokes Art. VI, §15.
However, the term of the present Twelfth Congress did not
terminate and expire upon the adjournment the regular session
of both Houses on Jun 11, 2004.
The provision invoked does not pertain to the term of Congress
but to its regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory
30-day recess before the opening of its next regular session.
th
Therefore, until Jun 30, 2004 the 12 Congress cannot be said
518!

307 Lopez v. Petitioner, Cong. Ruy Elias Lopez, Representative of
Senate the 3rd Legislative District of Davao asked the Court to
(2004) declare the Rules of the Joint Public Session of
Congress unconstitutional creating a Joint Committee
which shall preliminary canvass the votes of the
candidates for President and Vice-President during the
May 2004 elections, approved by both Senate and
House of Representatives after much deliberation.
Petitioner claims of being deprived of their
congressional prerogatives and such Canvassing
Rules were adopted by the Congress with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and that he had no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy other that this petition.
Issue: Whether the Congress committed grave abuse
of discretion
to have passed out of legal existence.
th
The legislative functions of the 12 Congress may have
terminated upon the final adjournment of its regular sessions
but this does not affect its non-legislative functions, such
as that of being the National Board of Canvassers. In fact,
the joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened
by express directive of Sec 4 Art 7 of the Constitution to canvass
the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and
Vice-President cannot adjourn until it has accomplished its
constitutionally mandated tasks. Its membership may change,
but it retains its authority as a board until it has accomplished its
purposes.!
No. Sec. 4, Article VII of the Constitution expressly empowers
Congress “to promulgate its rules for the canvassing of
certificates”.
The Court had no power to review the internal proceedings
of Congress, unless there is a clear violation of the Constitution
(Arroyo v. De Venecia).
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court has no
authority to interfere in the “exclusive realm” of a co-equal
branch, absent a showing grave abuse of discretion (Santiago v.
Guingona) and has no authority to restrict or limit the exercise of
congressional prerogatives granted by the Constitution.
The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave
abuse and cannot be said to have deprived petitioner and other
members of the Congress of their congressional prerogatives
provided, that the decision and final report of the said
Committee shall be submitted and therefore shall be
subject to the approval of the joint session of both Houses
of Congress, voting separately.!
519!
308 BANAT v. On 23 January 2007, less than four months before the
COMELEC 14 May 2007 local elections, the President signed RA
(August 9369. RA9369 is actually a law amending RA8436 and
2009) RA7166. RA9369 is regarding the authorization of
COMELEC to use an automated election system in the
May 1998 election as well as other election-related
procedures both local and international that petitioners
deem to be violative of the Constitution. Petitioners
assail several sections of RA9369 (Sections 34, 37, 38,
and 43) and contend that it does not follow the rule on
titles as mandated in Sec. 26(1). Pertinent to our topic
is Sections 37 and 38 of the said RA.
Sec. 37 (of RA 9369):
Congress and the Commission en banc shall
determine the authenticity and due execution of the
certificate of canvass for president and vice president
and senators, respectively, as accomplished and
transmitted to it by the local boards of canvassers
When it appears that a certificate of canvass has been
altered which may cast doubt, the presidential, vice
presidential, or senatorial candidate concerned or his
party, Congress, or Commission en banc, as the case
may be, shall for the sole purpose of verifying the
actual number of votes cast count the votes as they
appear in the copies of election returns.
Sec. 38 reads as follows:
For purposes of elections for President, VP, Senator,
Member of HoR, no pre-proclamation cases shall be
allowed on matters relating to preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody, and appreciation of
election returns or the certificates of canvass as the
No. This is not the case and Court held that:
Congress and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon
the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET because powers of
Congress and the COMELEC en banc, on one hand, and the
PET and the SET, on the other, are exercised on different
occasions and for different purposes.
The jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only be invoked
once the winning presidential, vice presidential or
senatorial candidates have been proclaimed. On the other
hand, under Section 37, Congress and the COMELEC en banc
shall determine only the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass. Congress and the COMELEC en banc
shall exercise this power before the proclamation of the
winning presidential, vice presidential, and senatorial
candidates.
Petition lacks merit. The presumption is that the legislature
intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law. Those who
petition the Court to declare a law unconstitutional must show
that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
Petition dismissed.
520!
 case may be except as provided for in Sec.30.

Petitioners argue that Sec. 37 and 38 violate the

Constitution by impairing the powers of PET and SET.
Petitioners say that Congress as the National Board of
Canvassers for election of President and VP, and the
COMELEC en banc as the National Board of
Canvassers for the election of Senators may now
entertain pre-proclamation cases in the election of
President, VP, and Senators. They say that in
entertaining these, Congress and COMELEC en banc
undermine the independence and encroach upon the
jurisdiction of the PET and SET.

Issue: Whether Sections 37 and 38 of RA9369 violate

Sec. 4(7) Art. 7 of the Constitution.!
III. Breaking Presidential or Vice-Presidential Tie
IV. Presidential or Vice-Presidential Controversies
309 Defensor- During the 1992 presidential election, there were a lot Yes. Miriam Santiago filed her COC for the senate without any
Santiago v. of issues as to who the real winner is. However, the qualification, condition or reservation--in doing so she entered
Ramos Congress sitting as Board of Canvassers proclaimed into a political contract with the electorate that of elected she
(1996) Fidel V. Ramos as duly elected President of the would assume Senator functions and serve constituents.
Republic. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, who also ran for
presidency, filed before the Presidential Electoral In assuming the office of Senator, the Protestant has effectively
Tribunal (PET) for annulment of proclamation on abandoned this protest or at the very least abandoned “the
grounds of massive fraud and electoral sabotage determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved
among others. Protestant prayed that the revision in in the matter who is the real choice of the electorate.
the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed
with and the revision process in the pilot areas be The Court held that an election contest involves a public office in
deemed computed. While the election contest is still which the public has an interest. In the case at bar, when
pending, Miriam Defensor-Santiago was elected protestant entered into a political contract with the electorate as
Senator of the Republic in the mid-term election in Senator, she impliedly waives her vested right to the election
1995. Thus the case at hand. contest. More importantly, by election to a position, it is
assumed that that person would solely focus on the position in

521!
 Issue: Whether the election protest filed by Defensor-
Santiago is moot and academic by her election as a
Senator in the 1995 election and her assumption of
office?
310 Tecson v. Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of COMELEC In
Lim (2005) taking cognizance of the case instead of the Supreme
Court regarding the election protest thrown at Roland
Poe or Fernando Poe Jr., not satisfying the natural
born citizen requirement of presidential candidates for
the 2004 elections. Tecson et al states the governing
provision is Art. 7 Sec. 4 (7) of the constitution which
states that the SC en Banc shall be the sole judge in
election, returns and qualifications of Presidents.
Issue: Whether the court has jurisdiction?
311 Poe v. GMA During the May 10, 2004 Presidential Elections, Arroyo
(2005) was declared as the candidate who garnered the most
number of votes for the presidency while FPJ followed
in the second place. July 23, 2004 FPJ filed an election
protest at the Presidential Electoral Tribunal contesting
the votes of Arroyo. On December 14, 2004, the
Protestant died in the course of his medical treatment
at St. Luke’s Hospital. Mrs. FPJ claims that because of
the untimely demise of her husband and in
representation not only of her deceased husband but
more so because of the paramount interest of the
which he or she is elected. In assuming the office of the Senator
then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn the
protest, or at very least, abandoned her “determination to protect
or pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the
real choice of the electorate.” Such abandonment or withdrawal
operates to render moot and academic the instant case.
Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public
interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the
results of the 1992 presidential elections, thereby enhancing the
all too crucial political stability of the nation during this period of
national recovery. PETITION DISMISSED.!
No. The case at bar is not an election contest and thus not
under the jurisdiction of the courts. CONTEST is in reference to
a post-election scenario. Meaning the contest should be done
within 30 days after the proclamation of the winning president or
vice-president. That the contest is questioned by the candidate
for the same position receiving the SECOND OR THIRD
HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES. Thus the case at bar is not
under the jurisdiction of the court since Fernando Poe is only a
candidate.
No. Rule 14 of the PET Rules states that only two persons, the
2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election. By this express
enumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined the real
parties in interest concerning an on-going election contest. It
envisioned a scenario where, if the declared winner had not
been truly voted upon by the electorate, the candidate who
received that 2nd or the 3rd highest number of votes would be
the legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest.
We have every time ruled that a public office is personal to the
public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon
522!
 Filipino people, there is an urgent need for her to
continue and substitute for her late husband in the
election protest initiated by him to ascertain the true
and genuine will of the electorate in the 2004 elections.
She does not want to be placed in the seat of
Presidency but if ever GMA was proclaimed to lose,
she said that the rightful predecessor replace her.
Issue: May the widow substitute/intervene for the
protestant who died during the pendency of the latter’s
protest case?
312 Macalintal v. Petitioner assails the constitutionality of PET as it is
PET (2010) against Section 4 Article 7 of the Constitution – SC
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of Pres. And VP
and authorized to promulgate its rules.
Petitioner argues that the Rules of PET allows the
“appointment of additional personnel”; with that, it
contravenes with Section 12 Article 8 of the
Constitution which prohibits the designation of
Members of SC and of other courts to perform quasi-
death although this does not necessarily abate the pending
action since an election protest is not purely personal and
exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the
death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue
the protest proceedings.
In such intervention, the interest which allows a person to
intervene in a suit must be in the matter of litigation and of such
direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either
gain or lose by the effect of the judgment. In this protest, Mrs.
FPJ will not immediately and directly benefit from the outcome
should it be determined that the declared president did not truly
get the highest number of votes. We fully appreciate counsel’s
manifestation that movant/intervenor herself claims she has no
interest in assuming the position as she is aware that she
cannot succeed to the presidency, having no legal right to it. Yet
thus far, in this case, no real parties such as the vice-
presidential aspirants in the 2004 elections, have come forward
to intervene, or to be substituted for the deceased protestant. In
our view, if persons not real parties in the action could be
allowed to intervene, proceedings will be unnecessarily
complicated, expensive and interminable – and this is not the
policy of the law.
(1) No. The petitioner does not possess the locus standi in filing
the instant petition. Petitioner was PGMA’s counsel in her
election protest against FPJ in 2004. The court argued that
petitioner should have filed this case then. His failure to raise a
seasonable constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with
his unconditional acceptance of the Tribunal’s authority over the
case he was defending, translates to the clear absence of an
indispensable requisite for the proper invocation of this Court’s
power of judicial review. Judicial inquiry requires that the
constitutional question be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the Tribunal’s
523!
judicial or administrative functions. SolGen filed a
comment arguing that petitioner is unspecified and
without statutory bases and that the constitution of PET
is on firm footing on the basis of the grant of authority
to the SC to be the sole judge of all election contests
for the Pres. Or VP
The History of PET:
1935 -- There was a separate PET that was created to
govern contests in Pres and VP.
1971 -- PET was removed because it became
parliamentary and the Pres was election from the
parliament.
1981 -- PET was restored because the election of Pres
was brought back.
1987 -- Consti it only wrote that SC would be the sole
judge and it shall promulgate rules for this
implementation.
Issues: (1) Whether petitioner has locus standi
(2) Whether the constitution of PET is unconstitutional
and violates Sec 4 Art 7 and Sec 12 Art 8 of the
Constitution
(3) Whether PET exercises quasi-judicial factors
constitution.
(2) No. The establishment of PET simply constitutionalized what
was statutory before the 1987 Constitution thus, the context of
PET cannot be denied. Further, its establishment cannot be
considered an infringement of the separation of powers because
the power being given to the SC is a judicial power. Given that,
PET can establish and promulgate its own rules because it is a
body distinct and independent from the House and the CA just
like the HRET and SET
Furthermore, the additional duty of being in charge of election
protests involving Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates
may be too burdensome for the SC that’s why it is necessary for
PET to exist.
The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional
Commission to a PET, with Fr. Bernas categorically declaring
that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the
Constitution, they “constitutionalized what was statutory.”
Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same
Constitution is plenary and under the doctrine of necessary
implication, the additional jurisdiction provided by the last
paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide
presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the
means necessary to carry it into effect. (referring to the
implementation of its own rules)“The PET is not simply an
agency but it was intended by the framers of the Constitution…
it is to be an independent institution but not separate from the
judiciary.”
(3) No. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a
presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs
what is essentially a judicial power. The traditional grant of
524!
judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution which provides that the power “shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.” The set up embodied in the Constitution
and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as
essentially an exercise of judicial power.

Similar with COMELEC, HRET, and SET, they are empowered

to resolve election contests which involve an exercise of judicial
power as explicitly stated in the Constitution

By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity
from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only
to the Tribunal.

PET , composed of SC justices as chairman and members

of PET, was created to be a “tribunal” solely for the
purpose in dealing with contests of Pres and Vp.

It is obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation

of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully
complies – not unlawfully defies – the constitutional
directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the
change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal,
respectively, was designed simply to highlight the
singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunal’s functions as a
special electoral court. !

525!
Section 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the
President, the Vice- President, or the Acting President shall take the
following oath or affirmation:
"I do solemnly swear [or affirm] that I will faithfully and
conscientiously fulfill my duties as President [or Vice-President or
Acting President] of the Philippines, preserve and defend its
Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and
consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God." [In
case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted]
Section 6. The President shall have an official residence. The
salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be determined by
law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in
said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the
term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved.
They shall not receive during their tenure any other emolument from
the Government or any other source.
Section 7. The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall
assume office at the beginning of their terms.
If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act
as President until the President-elect shall have qualified.
If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect
shall act as President until a President shall have been chosen and
qualified.
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect
shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the Vice
President-elect shall become President.
Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or
shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become
permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act as
President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been
chosen and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who
is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a Vice-
President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability,
or inability of the officials mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.
Section 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from
office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall
become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death,
permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the
President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case
of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall
then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have
been elected and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in
case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting
President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President
shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same
restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President.
526!
 Filing a Vacancy in the Presidency

Totality Test (Estrada v. Desierto)

1. Intent to resign
2. Acts of relinquishment

Sections 7-8. Filling a Vacancy in the Presidency

313 Estrada v. Desierto (See above, Case # 299) Yes. The issue brings under the microscope of the meaning of
(2001) and Estrada Article VII, §8.
v. Desierto (MR) Issue: Whether the petitioner resigned as President
(2001) It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble:
there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment. (Totality test)

Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be

determined from his acts and omissions before, during and
after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using
this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as
President.

In an article of Philippine Daily Inquirer entitled the “Angara

Diary” wherein it revealed the “state of mind” of the President
in the last days of his office, he retorted to Angara that he
would “call for snap elections”. The proposal for a snap
election for president in May where he would not be a
candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to
give up the presidency even at that time.

527!
Also, when offered a graceful exit, the petitioner expressed
no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified
exit but said he would never leave the country.

The resignation of the petitioner was implied.

There were several negotiations about his terms for
resignation.

In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be

doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the
press release containing his final statement, (1) he
acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as
President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its
legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the
seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he
was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and
that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon
as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude
to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without
doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to
serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not
shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the
same service of our country. Petitioner’s reference is to a
future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his
supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be
attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press
release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell.
His presidency is now in the past tense.

It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but

528!
only took a temporary leave of absence due to his
inability to govern. In support of this thesis, the letter dated
January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate President
Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to
the said letter, viz:

“Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the
Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I
am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By
operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall
be the Acting President.

(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada”

Though the letter is a mystery. Under any circumstance,

however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the
resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the
press release of the petitioner clearly showing his resignation
from the presidency, then the resignation must prevail as a
later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press release,
still, it commands scant legal significance. Petitioner’s
resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of
a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the
resignation is the result of his repudiation by the people.
There is another reason why this Court cannot give any legal
significance to petitioner’s letter and this shall be discussed in
issue number III of this Decision.

After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did

not resign, he also argues that he could not resign as a
matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:

529!
“Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or
retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative,
or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense
under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code on bribery.”

Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be obvious. It

is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being
used by a public official as a protective shield to stop the
investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case
against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-
Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal
Code.

However, the said cases filed against the petitioner cannot be

considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked
jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019
cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it
contemplates of cases whose investigation or
prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal
obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.

Also, the exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is

debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an
administrative proceeding, it cannot be considered pending at
the time petitioner resigned because the process already
broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted
against the opening of the second envelope, the public and
private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed
their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the
proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in
effect, no impeachment case pending against petitioner
when he resigned.

530!
Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-
President during the term for which he was elected, the President
shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office
upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the
third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-
President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need
of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling for a special
election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not
earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of
such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed
certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this Constitution
and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the
Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be charged
against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the
requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of this
Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended
nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be
called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date
of the next presidential election.
BOTH offices of the President and VP must be vacant.
Convene = Day 3 after vacancy at 10 am ! after 7 days = call for
Special Elections + 45-60 days = holding of the Special Elections
[except if vacancy occurs within 18 months before the NEXT
presidential elections]
Section 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be
discharged by the Vice- President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to
the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice- President
shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as
Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the
powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all
the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President
of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue.
For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session,
within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need
of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written
declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required
to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting
separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President;
otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and
duties of his office.
531!
Incapacity of the President
- Deals with the thorny issue of whether the President is still able to
perform his functions or not. If the President is able to make the
decision and is willing to declare himself disabled, he certainly has
the power to declare so.
Procedure
1. President is unable to discharge his powers because:
- He declares that he is unable
- By a transmittal by the majority of the Cabinet Members to
the Senate President and House Speaker that the President is
unable
2. In this case, VP temporarily acts as President
3. President may resume office by a written declaration to the Senate
President and House Speaker that no inability exists
4. Within 5 days, the Cabinet may still prevent the President from
resuming office by written declaration that the President remains
unable to discharge his powers
5. In such case Congress shall decide the issue within 10 (12 if not in
session) by a vote of 2/3’s of both Houses voting separately.

Section 11. Incapacity of the President

314 Estrada v. (See above, No. Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is
Desierto Case # 299) incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in Art. VII, §11. This contention is the
(2001) and centerpiece of petitioner’s stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting
Estrada v. Issue:! President.
Desierto Whether the
(MR) (2001) petitioner is However, Congress issued House Resolution No. 176 (expressing support of HoR to VP GMA as new
only President) and No. 178 (confirming GMA as new President). Senate also issued Senate Resolution No. 83
temporarily (Recognizing the impeachment proceedings are functus officio). Both houses of Congress have recognized
unable to respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability
act as of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability.
President.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner
Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as
President of the Philippines. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by
constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing the
principle of separation of powers.

532!
Section 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public
shall be informed of the state of his health. The members of the
Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be
denied access to the President during such illness.
Serious Illness of the President
Sec. 11 deals with illness which results in incapacity, while Sec. 12
presumably deals with serious illness that is not incapacitating
because access to him is kept open for Cabinet members in charge
of national security and foreign relations
- To allow the President to make the important decisions in
those areas of government, which suggests a situation where the
President is still able
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment
during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business,
or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise,
or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth
civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be
appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the
Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
I. Prohibition against holding another office or employment
- Prohibits the President, VP, members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies and assistants from holding any office or employment
during their tenure
- Except for the VP who may be appointed to the cabinet, and the
Secretary of Justice who is made ex-officio member of the Judicial
and Bar Council, the officials enumerated under Sec. 13 may not
hold another office.
- The stricter prohibition is imposed on members of the Cabinet. It
therefore applies not just to department secretaries, but to any one
who is a member.
II. Other Prohibitions
- Prohibited participation in a contract with the government can
include being a member of a family corporation which has dealings
with the government
th
- If 4 degree relatives are already in office when a President
assumes office, the relatives are NOT thereby ousted from their
positions
! What is prohibited is appointment or reappointment and
not uninterrupted continuance in office
533!
 Section 13. Conflict of Interest Limitations
I. Prohibition against Holding Another Office or Employment
315 Rafael v. Petitioner, who was engaged in the manufacture of Yes. Republic Act No. 3137, particularly Section 2
Embroidery & embroidery and apparel products for the purpose of thereof, is declared constitutional, and the permanent
Apparel Control exportation, using imported raw materials and doing injunction issued by the court a quo is set aside. Costs
Board (1967) business under the style "El Barato Alce Company", was against petitioner appellant, thus making it a valid law.
authorized by the Collector of Customs, pursuant to the
provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code (RA 1937), to The arrangement envisioned in section 2 is not violative
operate a manufacturing bonded warehouse located at of the established doctrine that "the appointing power is
Santolan, Tenejeros, Malabon, Rizal, known as the exclusive prerogative of the President, upon which no
Manufacturing Bonded Warehouse No. 88. petitioner limitations maybe imposed by Congress, except those
imported raw materials exempt from duty and proceeed to resulting from the need of securing the concurrence of
manufacture them into finished products for export under the the Commission on Appointments and from the exercise
terms and conditions required and specified in the letter- of the limited power to prescribe the qualifications to a
authority. given appointive office."
In 1961, Republic Act No. 3137 was passed. This law
created the Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection No new appointments were made, as they were merely
Board (EACIB). Section 2 thereof also provided that the designated new duties as ex-officio member in addition to
Board shall be composed of: their original duties. Hence, it does not infringe upon the
appointing power of the President.
(1) a representative from the Bureau of Customs to act
as Chairman, to be designated by the Secretary of It is significant that Congress, took care to specify, that
Finance; the representatives should come from the Bureau of
(2) a representative from the Central Bank to be Customs, Central Bank, Department of Commerce and
designated by its Governor; Industry and the National Economic Council. The obvious
(3) a representative from the Department of Commerce reason must be because these departments and/or
and Industry to be designated by the Secretary of bureaus perform functions which have a direct relation to
Commerce and Industry; the importation of raw materials, the manufacture thereof
(4) a representative from the National Economic into embroidery and apparel products and their
Council to be designated by its Chairman; and subsequent exportation abroad.
(5) a representative from the private sector coming from
the Association of Embroidery and Apparel An examination of section 2 of the questioned statute
Exporters of the Philippines. reveals that for the chairman and members of the Board
to qualify they need only be designated by the respective

534!
 Later, in the performance of its duties, the EACIB made
certain assessments against Cecilio Rafael but the latter
refused to comply. Rafael sued EACIB and he averred that
RA 3137 is unconstitutional for while Congress may create
an office it cannot specify who shall be appointed therein,
and that the members of the EACIB can only be appointed
by the President in accordance with Article 7, Sec. 10 2 of
the Constitution.
The questioning of the petitioner of the mentioned provision
points that the Congress may create an office it cannot
specify who shall be appointed therein; that the members of
the Board can only be appointed by the President in
accordance with Article VII, Sec. 10, sub-section 3 of the
Constitution; that since the Act prescribes that the chairman
and members of the Board should come from specified
offices, it is equivalent to a declaration by Congress as to
who should be appointed, thereby infringing the
constitutional power of the President to make appointments.
Issue: Whether or not RA3137, Sec. 2 is constitutional
316 CLU v. Exec. Petitioner seeks a declaration of the unconstitutionality of
Secretary Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C.
(1991) Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent provisions of the
assailed Executive Order are:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary
functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in
addition to his primary position, hold not more than two
positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding
compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall
department heads, thus making the claims of the
petitioner erroneous. With the exception of the
representative from the private sector, they sit ex-officio.
In order to be designated they must already be holding
positions in the offices mentioned in the law. No new
appointments are necessary. This is as it should be,
because the representatives so designated merely
perform duties in the Board in addition to those they
already perform under their original appointments.
AUTHORIZING THE HOLDING OF OTHER GOVERNMENT
OFFICES OR POSITIONS BY THE MEMBERS OF THE
CABINET, UNDERSECRETARIES, ASSISTANT
SECRETARIES AND OTHER APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS OF
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT UNDER CERTAIN
CONDITIONS
(1) No. INTENT OF THE LAW WHEN IT COMES TO
FAMILY OF PRESIDENT:
The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to
impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his
official family in so far as holding other offices or
employment in the government or elsewhere because
they exercise more powers and, therefore, more cheeks
and restraints on them are called for because there is
more possibility of abuse in their case."
Compared to the prohibition in the legislative Section 13,
Article VI, The prohibition in Sec 13 Article VII is
absolute, not being qualified by the phrase "in the
535!
not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards,
councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.
Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or
assistant secretary or other appointive official of the
Executive Department holds more positions than what is
allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the
excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is
next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than
two positions other than his primary position.
Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the
government in government-owned or controlled
corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the
boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or
undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in
effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their
primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein
imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution
According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution," the only exceptions
against holding any other office or employment in
Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely:
(1) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of
the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and
(2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article
VIII.
Government." The prohibition imposed on the President
and his official family is therefore all-embracing and
covers both public and private office or employment.
IN RELATION TO THE CASE
The qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly
refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7,
Article I-XB of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said
qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do,
would render nugatory and meaningless the manifest
intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution
to impose a stricter prohibition on the President,
Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants with respect to holding other
offices or employment in the government during their
tenure.
Moreover, respondents' reading of the provisions in
question would render certain parts of the
Constitution inoperative. This observation applies
particularly to the Vice-President who, under Section
13 of Article VII is allowed to hold other office or
employment when so authorized by the Constitution, but
who as an elective public official under Sec. 7, par. (1) of
Article I-XB is absolutely ineligible "for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office or position
during his tenure." Surely, to say that the phrase "unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution" found in
Section 13, Article VII has reference to Section 7, par.
(1) of Article I-XB would render meaningless the
specific provisions of the Constitution authorizing
the Vice-President to become a member of the
Cabinet.
536!
Issue: Whether EO 284 is constitutional.! It is a well-established rule in Constitutional
construction that no one provision of the
Constitution is to be separated from all the others.
Laws must also be in harmony.

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or

employment under Art. VII, §13 of the Constitution must
not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied
by the Executive officials specified therein without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions
of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts
do no comprise "any other office" within the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but
are properly an imposition of additional duties and
functions on said officials. To characterize these
posts otherwise would lead to absurd consequences.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment cannot chair the
Board of Trustees of the National Manpower and Youth
Council (NMYC) or the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), both of which are attached to his
department for policy coordination and guidance. Neither
can his Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries chair
these agencies.

EX-OFFICIO: The term "primary" used to describe

"functions" refers to the order of importance and thus
means chief or principal function. The term is not
restricted to the singular but may refer to the plural. The
additional duties must not only be closely related to,
but must be required by the official's primary functions.

Examples of designations to positions by virtue of one's

537!
primary functions are the Secretaries of Finance and
Budget sitting as members of the Monetary Board, and
the Secretary of Transportation and Communications
acting as Chairman of the Maritime Industry Authority
and the Civil Aeronautics Board.

If the functions required to be performed are merely

incidental, remotely related, inconsistent,
incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary
function of a cabinet official, such additional
functions would fall under the purview of "any other
office" prohibited by the Constitution.

As earlier clarified in this decision, ex-officio posts held

by the executive official concerned without additional
compensation.

During their tenure in the questioned positions,

respondents may be considered de facto officers and as
such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.
It has been held that "in cases where there is no de jure,
officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had
possession of the office and has discharged the duties
pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of
the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the
salary, fees and other compensations attached to the
office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on
equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public
should benefit by the services of an officer de facto and
then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such
services. Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments
received by the respondents by virtue of actual services
rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be
retained by them.!

538!
317 De la Cruz v. Petitioners are members of the National Housing
COA (2001) Authority Board as alternates to the NHA Board of
Directors composed of the Secretary of Public Works,
Transportation and Communication, Director-General of the
National Economic Development Authority, Secretary of
Finance, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Industry, the
Executive Secretary, and the General Manager of the
Authority; alternates whose “acts shall be considered the
acts of their principals” (Section 7 of the PD 757 creating the
NHA). Abovementioned Decision rendered by the
Commission on Audit denied petitioners’ appeal from the
Notice of Disallowance issued by NHA Auditor in 1997.
Such notice disallowed payments to petitioners of their
representation allowances and per diems from August 19,
1991 to August 31, 1996 amounting to P276,000. Said
notice by the NHA Auditor disallowed in audit the
payment of representation allowances and per diems of
“Cabinet members who were the ex-officio members of
the NHA Board and/or their respective alternates who
actually received the payments.” This Notice is in line with
a 1997 Memorandum by the COA and with a Supreme
Court decision (Civil Liberties Union) which declared EO 284
unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabinet members, their
deputies and assistants to hold other offices, in addition to
their primary offices, and to receive compensation therefor.
Issue: Whether petitioners are entitled to the representation
allowances and per diems? Are they covered by the Notice
of Disallowance issued by the NHA Auditor in 1997?
No they are not entitled to receive compensation. In the
Civil Liberties Union SC decision it has been held that
“the prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or
employment under Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution is not to be interpreted as covering positions
held without additional compensation in ex-officio
capacities as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of the concerned official’s office. Ex-
officio = “from office; by virtue of office”. Hence, the
employment of the Executive officials into the NHA Board
as stated in Section 7 of PD 757 is primarily a function
attached to the office of said officials and hence, they
need not be compensated independently for such
employment. The reason is that these services are
already paid for and covered by the compensation
attached to his principal office.
Next, in response to the argument of the petitioners that
they’re positions, as alternates, are not covered by such
disallowance notice, since they hold positions lower than
that of the Assistant Secretary, the Court held that:
“... The agent can never be larger than the principal.
If the principal is absolutely barred from holding any
position in and absolutely prohibited from receiving
any remuneration from the NHA or any government
agency for that matter, so must the agent be.”
Provided that the petitioners are alternates to the
Directors of the Board comprised of the Executives
stated above, they are the “agents” the Court talks
about in the ratio and the “principals” are the
Executive officials.
539!
318 Bitonio v. COA RA No. 7916 is the charter of Philippine Economic Zone
(2004) Authority (PEZA) Section 11 RA No. 7916
The Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) Board. –
There is hereby created a body corporate to be known as
the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA)…
The Board shall be composed of the Director General as
ex officio chairman with eight (8) members as follows:
the Secretaries or their representatives of the
Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of
Finance, the Department of Labor and Employment, the
Department of [the] Interior and Local Government, the
National Economic and Development Authority, and the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, one (1) representative from
the labor sector, and one (1) representative from the
investor/business sector in the ECOZONE. Members of
the Board shall receive a per diem of not less than the
amount equivalent to the representation and transportation
allowances of the members of the Board and/or as may be
determined by the Department of Budget and Management:
Provided, however, that the per diem collected per month
does not exceed the equivalent of four (4) meetings.
In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr was
appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations
in the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). In
a Letter dated May 11, 1995, Acting Secretary Jose S.
Brillantes of DOLE designated Bitonio to be the DOLE
representative to the Board of Directors of Philippine
Economic Zone Authority (PEZA). As representative of
the Secretary of Labor, the petitioner was receiving a
per diem for every board meeting he attended during
the years 1995 to 1997.
Yes COA was correct. The Court’s ruling was in
conformity with Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
The court anchored its decision in Dela Cruz v.
Commission on Audit. The ex-officio position being
actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal
office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to
receive additional compensation for his services in the
said position because services are already paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to his principal
office. Whatever prohibitions or restrictions the member
is subjected, the representative is likewise, not
exempted.
The petitioner’s presence in the PEZA Board meetings is
solely by virtue of his capacity as representative of the
Secretary of Labor. As the petitioner himself admitted,
there was no separate or special appointment for such
position. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from
receiving compensation for his additional office or
employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the
petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the
Secretary of Labor.
The Supreme Court cannot allow the petitioner who sat
as representative of the Secretary of Labor in the PEZA
Board to have a better right as his principal. Moreover, it
is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not
be repugnant to the Constitution. No law can render it
nugatory because the Constitution is more superior to a
statute.
The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the flaw
540!
After the post audit of PEZA’s disbursement transactions, in the law which is the reason why the law was later
COA disallowed the per diem of Bitonio and thus issued 3 amended by R.A. No. 8748 to cure such defect. The
Notice of Disallowance for 1995-1997.On November 24, option of designating representative to the Board by the
1998, the petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration to different Cabinet Secretaries was deleted. Also, the
the COA. paragraph as to payment of per diems to the members of
the Board of Directors was also deleted, considering that
He contended that: The Supreme Court modified its earlier it clearly is in conflict with the Constitution. DISMISS.!
ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case which limits the
prohibition to Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries and
their Assistants. Officials given the rank equivalent to a
Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary and other
appointive officials below the rank of Assistant Secretary are
not covered by the prohibition. Section 11 RA No. 7916
(provides for the payment of per diem) was enacted four
years after Civil Liberties Union case become final thus
Congress is presumed to be aware of the parameters. RA
No. 7916 is presumed to be valid. RA No. 7916 is more
superior than COA Memorandum No. 97-038 (authorized
the issuance of the Notices of Disallowances for the per
diems received by the petitioner) *Statute more superior
than an administrative directive.

The COA anchors the disallowance of per diems in the case

of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary. Thus,
Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries, and their Assistant
Secretaries, are prohibited to hold other government offices
or positions in addition to their primary positions and to
receive compensation therefore, except in cases where the
Constitution expressly provides.

Issue: Whether COA correctly disallowed the per diems

received by the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA
Board of Directors’ meetings as representative of the
Secretary of Labor.!

541!
319 Nat’l Amnesty Proclamation No. 347 created the National Amnesty
v. COA (2004) Commission (NAC) to process & review amnesty
applications. It is composed of a Chair & 3 appointed
members by the Pres. and reps. from the DOJ, DND, &
DILG as ex-officio members.
The ex-officio members appointed representatives were
paid honoraria. NAC issued Admin. Order No. 2 allowing
said reps. to receive per diems, allowances, & other
benefits, but the COA issued Memo No. 97-038 disallowing
such grants.
Issue: Whether representatives designated by ex-officio
members are entitled to receive honoraria
320 Funa v. Ermita On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(2010) appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as
Undersecretary of the DOTC.
No. The Court ruled that there is no legal basis to grant
any additional compensation whatsoever to the
representatives of ex officio members. COA's
memorandum on the other hand was based on the Civil
Liberties Union case.
The petitioners are not exempt from the general
prohibition because there is no law or administrative
order creating a new position and authorizing additional
compensation. The petitioners assumed their
responsibilities not by virtue of an appointment but by
mere designation from the ex officio members. Ex-officio
means "from office or by virtue of office" it follows that the
official concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in the said position. The
reason that these services are already paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to his principal
office.
An appointment is the selection by the proper authority of
an individual who is to exercise the powers and functions
of a given office. Designation connotes and imposition of
additional duties upon a person in the public service by
virtue of an earlier appointment. Without appointment, the
designation does not entail any right to receive the salary
of the position.
Moreover, based on jurisprudence the Court has ruled
time and again that representatives of ex officio members
are not entitled to receive any additional compensation
as that would put them in a better right than their
principals who are not allowed to receive.
Yes. The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or
affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall
not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the
542!
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then
MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was
designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the
Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC
Undersecretary.
On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as
taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant
petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s
appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the
prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any
other office or employment.
On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition,
Bautista was appointed Administrator of the MARINA and
she assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on
February 2, 2009.
Petitioner argues that Bautista’s concurrent positions as
DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
On the other hand, the respondents argue that the requisites
of a judicial inquiry are not present in this case. In fact, there
no longer exists an actual controversy that needs to be
resolved in view of the appointment of respondent Bautista
as MARINA Administrator effective February 2, 2009 and
the relinquishment of her post as DOTC Undersecretary for
Maritime Transport, which rendered the present petition
moot and academic. Petitioner’s prayer for a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is likewise
moot and academic since, with this supervening event, there
is nothing left to enjoin.
Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries.
On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B
reads:
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions
of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
Noting that the prohibition imposed on the President and
his official family is all-embracing, the disqualification was
held to be absolute, as the holding of "any other office" is
not qualified by the phrase "in the Government" unlike in
Article VI, § 13 prohibiting Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives from holding "any other office
or employment in the Government"; and when compared
with other officials and employees such as members of
the armed forces and civil service employees, we
concluded thus:
These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on
the President and his official family, which prohibitions
are not similarly imposed on other public officials or
employees such as the Members of Congress, members
of the civil service in general and members of the armed
forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to
treat the President and his official family as a class by
543!

Issue: Whether the designation of respondent Bautista as
OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had
been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription
against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and
their deputies and assistants.
itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service
are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by
law or by the primary functions of their positions,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B
is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all
elective and appointive public officials and employees,
while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987
Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple
offices or employment in the government during their
tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with
equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13,
Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as
intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the
privilege of holding multiple government offices or
employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the
constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as
intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. The
phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution"
must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those
particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit:
the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the
Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as
President in those instances provided under Section 7,
544!

321 Betoy v. The On June 8, 2001, Congress enacted EPIRA with the goal of
Board of restructuring the electric power industry and privatization of
Directors the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC). -
(2011) Pursuant to Section 48 of the EPIRA, a new National Power
Board of Directors (NPB) was created. On February 27,
2002, pursuant to Section 77 of the EPIRA, the Secretary of
the Department of Energy promulgated the IRR.- On the
other hand, Section 63 of the EPIRA provides for separation
benefits to officials and employees who would be affected
by the restructuring of the electric power industry and the
privatization of the assets of the NPC - On November 18,
2002, pursuant to Section 63 of the EPIRA and Rule 33 of
the IRR, the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124
which, among others, resolved that all NPC personnel shall
be legally terminated on January 31, 2003 and shall be
entitled to separation benefits. On the same day, the NPB
passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-125 which created a
transition team to manage and implement the separation
program. - As a result of the foregoing NPB Resolutions,
petitioner Enrique U. Betoy, together with thousands of his
co-employees from the NPC were terminated.
pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice
being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council
by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed
Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the
stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and
consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided
in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding
another office is allowed by law or the primary functions
of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of
MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is the exception
recognized in Civil Liberties Union.
No. In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this
Court explained that the prohibition contained in Section
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to
posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein
without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity
as provided by law and as required by the primary
function of said official's office. The reason is that these
posts do not comprise "any other office" within the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are
properly an imposition of additional duties and functions
on said officials. - This Court agrees with the contention
of the Solicitor General that the constitutional prohibition
was not violated, considering that the concerned Cabinet
secretaries were merely imposed additional duties and
their posts in the NPB do not constitute “any other
office” within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition. - The delegation of the said official to the
respective Board of Directors were designation by
Congress of additional functions and duties to the
officials concerned.
545!

Section 11 - TRANSCO Board of Directors. – All the powers of the
TRANSCO shall be vested in and exercised by a Board of
Directors. The Board shall be composed of a Chairman and six (6)
members. The Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF) shall
be the ex officio Chairman of the Board. The other members of the
TRANSCO Board shall include the Secretary of the Department of
Energy (DOE), the Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), the President of TRANSCO, and
three (3) members to be appointed by the President, each
representing Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.
Section 48 - National Power Board of Directors. –The new Board
shall be composed of the Secretary of Finance as Chairman, with
the following as members: the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary
of Budget and Management, the Secretary of Agriculture, the
Director- General of the National Economic and Development
Authority, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, the Secretary of
the Department of Trade and Industry, and the President of the
National Power Corporation.
Section 52 - The Corporation shall be administered, and its
powers and functions exercised, by a Board of Directors which
shall be composed of the Secretary of Finance as the Chairman,
the Secretary of Budget and Management, the Secretary of the
Department of Energy, the Director-General of the National
Economic and Development Authority, the Secretary of the
Department of Justice, the Secretary of the Department of Trade
and Industry and the President of the PSALM Corp. as ex officio
members thereof.
Issue: NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125
are valid.!
322 Funa v. (Same as above, Case # 302)
Executive
Secretary Issue: Whether the designation of respondent Bautista as
Designation connotes an imposition of additional
duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the
public service by virtue of an earlier appointment. -
Designation does not entail payment of additional
benefits or grant upon the person so designated the
right to claim the salary attached to the position.
Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle
the officer to receive the salary of the position. The legal
basis of an employee's right to claim the salary attached
thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment to the
position, and not a mere designation. - Hence, Congress
specifically intended that the position of member of the
Board of NPB shall be ex officio or automatically attached
to the respective offices of the members composing the
board. It is clear from the wordings of the law that it was
the intention of Congress that the subject posts will be
adjunct to the respective offices of the official designated
to such posts.
The designation of the members of the Cabinet to form
the NPB does not violate the prohibition contained in our
Constitution as the privatization and restructuring of the
electric power industry involves the close coordination
and policy determination of various government
agencies. Section 2 of the EPIRA clearly shows that the
policy toward privatization would involve financial,
budgetary and environmental concerns as well as
coordination with local government units, to wit: !
Yes. Fou nd in Article VII of the Constitution that the
temporariness of the appointment or designation is not
an excuse to disregard the constitutional ban against
546!
(2013) OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had
been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription
against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and
their deputies and assistants
holding of multiple offices by the Members of the Cabinet;
that Agra’s invocation of the principle of hold-over is
misplaced for being predicated upon an erroneous
presentation of a material fact as to the time of his
designation as the Acting Solicitor General and Acting
Secretary of Justice; that Agra’s concurrent designations
further violated the Administrative Code of 1987 which
mandates that the OSG shall be autonomous and
independent.
In this regard, to hold an office means to possess or to
occupy the office, or to be in possession and
administration of the office, which implies nothing less
than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of
the office.
The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice
concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General
was unconstitutional and void for being in violation of the
constitutional prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service
are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by
law or by the primary functions of their positions,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-
B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to
all elective and appointive public officials and
employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to
be the exception applicable only to the President, the
Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their
547!
deputies and assistants.
the only two exceptions against the holding of multiple
offices are:
(1) those provided for under the Constitution, such
as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice-
President to become a member of the Cabinet;
and
(2) Posts occupied by Executive officials specified in
Section 13, Article VII without additional
compensation in ex officio capacities as provided
by law and as required by the primary functions
of the officials’ offices

While all other appointive officials in the civil service are

allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by
law or by the primary functions of their position, members
of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so
only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself.
Art VII, Section 13 however explicitly stated however
exceptions to such rule.

The 1987 Constitution is prohibiting dual or multiple

offices which are incompatible with one another. To
“hold” an office means to “possess” office and not to the
nature of the appointment or designation. It must be
stressed though that while the designation was in the
nature of an acting and temporary capacity, the words
“holding of office” were employed. Such holding or office
pertains to both appointment and designation because
the appointee or designate performs the duties and
functions of the office.

548!
 II. Other Prohibitions
323 Doromal v. In October 1987, Special Prosecution Officer II, Dionisio A. Yes, it is a violation of the Constitution. A new preliminary
Sandiganbayan Caoili, conducted a preliminary investigation of the charge investigation of the charge against the petitioner is in
(1989) against the petitioner, Quintin S. Doromal, a former order not only because the first was a nullity but also
Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good because the accused demands it as his right.
Government (PCGG), for violation of the AntiGraft and
Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in Moreover, the charge against him had been changed, as
connection with his shareholdings and position as directed by the Ombudsman. However, as the absence
president and director of the Doromal International of a preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the
Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to complaint or information.
st
supply P61 million worth of electronic, electrical, 1 Allegation: entered into a business transaction or
automotive, mechanical and air-conditioning equipment contract with the Department of Education, Culture and
to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or Sports and the National Manpower and Youth Council,”
nd
DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council 2 Allegation: unlawfully participate[d] in a business
(or NMYC). through the Doromal International Trading Corporation, a
family corporation of which he is the President, and which
On January 25,1988, with the approval of Special company participated in the biddings conducted by the
Prosecutor Raul Gonzales, Caoili filed in the Sandiganbayan Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the
an information against the petitioner (Criminal Case No. National Manpower & Youth Council, which act or
12766) alleging Doromal as then the Commissioner of participation is prohibited by law and the constitution
PCGG did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have direct
or indirect financial interest in the DITC, which business, Under Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
contracts or transactions he is prohibited by law and the Procedure, it is stated that:
constitution from having any interest The petitioner filed a
petition in this Court questioning the jurisdiction of the SEC. 3. Procedure. ... no complaint or information for an
"Tanodbayan" to file the information without the approval of offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be
the Ombudsman. The Court annulled the information, filed without a preliminary investigation having been first
stating that Tanodbayan has no authority to conduct conducted
preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal
cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the However, before the filing of such complaint or
Ombudsman. Motion to quash was denied. Over the information, the person arrested may ask for a
petitioner's objection (because the President had earlier preliminary investigation by a proper officer in
approved his application for indefinite leave of absence as accordance with this Rules
PCGG commissioner "effective immediately and until final

549!
decision of the courts in your case"), the Sandiganbayan
ordered his suspension pendente lite from his position as
PCGG Commissioner and from any other office he may be
holding. His motion for reconsideration of that order was
also denied by the Court. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether the act of Doromal would constitute a
violation of the Constitution.!
Its denial over his opposition is a "prejudicial error, in that
it subjects the accused to the loss of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law". Since Section 13 of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019)
provides:
SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. – Any public
officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information … is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office.
That admission allegedly belies the averment in the
information that the petitioner “participated” in the
business of the DITC in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by law from having any interest. The
Sandiganbayan in its order of Aug. 19, 1988 correctly
observed that "the presence of a signed document
bearing the signature of accused Doromal as part of the
application to bid…is not a sine qua non", for, the
Ombudsman indicated that the petitioner "can rightfully
be charged...with having participated in a business which
act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII”
because "the DITC remained a family corporation in
which Doromal has at least an indirect interest."
The constitutional ban is similar to the prohibition in the
Civil Service Law that "Pursuit of private business...
without the permission required by Civil Service Rules
and Regulations" shall be a ground for disciplinary action
against any officer or employee in the civil service. He
shall be suspended regardless of his approved leave of
absence. Since his preventive suspension has exceeded
the reasonable maximum period of 90 days provided in
Sec. 42 of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines
(P.D. 807), it should now be lifted.
550!
Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall Midnight Appointments
remain effective, unless revoked by the elected President, within This provision is a limitation on the President’s power of
ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of office. appointment. There is no similar limitation on the power of
appointment of local executives.
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential Prevent appointment of officials who are under the influence of the President.
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Sections 14-15. Appointments by Acting President

324 In re.: On March 30, 1998, The President signed appointments of No. The Court resolved to declare the appointment VOID.
Appointment of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as In the period stated in Section 15, Article VII of the
Valenzuela Judges of RTC-Bago City and Cabanatuan City, Constitution, the President is neither required to make
(1998) respectively. These appointments were deliberated, as it appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so in
seemed to be expressly prohibited by Art 7 Sec 15 of the comparison with Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII.
Constitution:
Sec. 4 (1), Article VIII : The Supreme Court shall be
Two months immediately before the next presidential composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions
Acting President shall not make appointments, except of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be
temporary appointments to executive positions when filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.” Sec. 9, Article VIII : The members of the Supreme Court
and judges in lower courts shall be appointed by the
A meeting was held on March 9, 1998 by the Judicial and President from a list of at least three nominees prepared
Bar Council to discuss the constitutionality of appointments by the Judicial and Bar Council for, every vacancy. Such
to the Court of Appeals (CA) in light of the forthcoming appointments need no confirmation.
1998 Presidential elections. Senior Associate Justice
Florenz Regalado, Consultant of the Council and Member For the lower courts, the President shall issue the
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was in the position appointments within ninety days from the submission of
that “election ban had no application to the CA based on the list.
the Commission’s records”. This hypothesis was then
submitted to the President for consideration together with During the period stated in Section 15, Article VII of the
the Council’s nominations for 8 vacancies in the CA. Constitution — “(t)wo months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end his term” — the
The Chief Justice (CJ) received on April 6, 1998, an official President is neither required to make appointments to the
communication from the Executive Secretary transmitting courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9

551!
the appointments of 8 Associate Justices of CA duly signed
on March 11, 1998 (day immediately before the
commencement of the ban on appointments), which implies
that the President’s Office did not agree with the
hypothesis.
The President, addressed to the JBC, requested on May 4,
1998 the transmission of the “list of final nominees” for the
vacancy in view of the 90 days imposed by the Constitution
(from Feb 13, date present vacancy occurred). In behalf of
the JBC, CJ sent the reply on May 6 that no session has
been scheduled after the May elections for the reason that
they apparently did not share the same view (hypothesis)
proposed by the JBC shown by the uniformly dated March
11, 1998 appointments. However, it appeared that the
Justice Secretary and the other members of the Council
took action without waiting for the CJ reply. This prompted
CJ to call for a meeting on May 7. On this day, CJ received
a letter from the President in reply of the May 6 letter where
the President expressed his view that Article 7 Sec 15 only
applied to executive appointments, the whole article being
entitled “EXECUTIVE DEPT”. He posited that appointments
in the Judiciary have special and specific provisions, as
follows:
Article 8 Sec 4 “The Supreme Court shall be composed of
a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit
en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days from the occurrence thereof.”
Article 8 Sec 9 “The Members of the Supreme Court and
judges in lower courts shall be appointed by the President
from the list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation.
On May 12, CJ received from Malacañang, the
appointments of the 2 Judges of the RTC mentioned.
Considering the pending proceedings and deliberations on
this matter, the Court resolved by refraining the appointees
of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to
fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided
therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII.
Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of
appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2)
those made for partisan considerations. The first refers
to those appointments made within the two months
preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those
which are declared elections offenses in the Omnibus
Election Code, viz.:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty
of an election offense: Vote-buying and vote-selling. — (1)
Any person who gives, offer or promises money or
anything of value gives or promises any office or
employment... in order to induce anyone or the public in
general to vote for or against any candidate or withhold his
vote in the election, or to vote for or against any aspirant
for the nomination or choice of a candidate in a convention
or similar selection process of a political party.
(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new
position, promotion, or giving salary increases. — During
the period of forty-five days before a regular election and
thirty days before a regular
election and thirty days before a special election,
(1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government
office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations, who appoints or hires any new employee,
whether provisional, temporary, or casual, or creates and
fills any new position, except upon prior authority of the
Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority
sought unless, it is satisfied that the position to be filled is
essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency
concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a
manner that may influence the election.
552!
from taking their oaths. However, Judge Valenzuela took
oath in May 14, 1998 claiming he did so without knowledge
on the on-going deliberations. It should be noted that the
originals of the appointments for both judges had been sent
to and received by the CJ on May 12 and is still in the
latter’s office and had not been transmitted yet. According
to Judge Valenzuela, he did so because of the May 7
Malacañang copy of his appointment.
In construing Article 7 and 8: when there are no
presidential elections, Art. 8 shall apply where vacancies in
SC shall be filled within 90 days otherwise prohibition in
Art. 7 must be considered where the President shall not
make any appointments. According to Fr. Bernas, the
reason for prohibition is in order not to tie the hands of the
incoming Pres through midnight appointments. whether,
during the period of the ban on appointments imposed
by Section 15, Article VII of the, Constitution, the
President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in
the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article
VIII; whether he can make appointments to the
judiciary during the period of the ban in the interest of
public service.
Issue: Whether the President can fill vacancies in the
judiciary pursuant to Article 8 Sec 4 and9, during the
appointment ban period stated in Article 7 Sec 15.
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section
15, Article VII consist of the so-called “midnight”
appointments. However the President is allowed to do
appointments to important positions which have to be
made even after the proclamations of a new President.
Such appointments, so long as they are “few and so
spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate
action and careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and the appointee’s qualifications,” can
be made by the outgoing President.
Sec. 15 may not unreasonably be deemed to contemplate
not only “midnight” appointments — those made obviously
for partisan reasons as shown by their number and the
time of their making — but also appointments of the
Presidential election. The exception in the same allows
only the making of temporary appointments
to executive positions when continued vacancies
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The SC’s view is that, as a general proposition, in case of
conflict, the need for officials to be appointed should yield
to the fear of vote-buying. The prevention of vote-buying
and similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding delays in
filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of some
cases. Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can
be filled temporarily by designation. But prohibited
appointments are long-lasting and permanent in their
effects. They may, as earlier pointed out, their making is
considered an election offense.
To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative
need for an appointment, during the period of the ban, not
only in the executive but also in the SC. This may be the
case should the membership of the Court be so reduced
that it will have no quorum, or should the voting on a
particularly important question requiring expeditious
resolution be evenly divided. Such a case, however, is
covered by neither Art. VII, §15 nor Art. VIII, §§4(1) and 9.!
553!
325 De Castro v. The case started with the compulsory retirement of Chief
JBC (2010) Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010, which occurs
just seven days after the coming presidential elections on
May 10, 2010. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9,
Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy. HOWEVER Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution bans the President from appointmenting two
(2) months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term.
On a January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC) passed a resolution that opened the
position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC
automatically considered for the position of Chief Justice
the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court,
namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate
Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco,
Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.
However, the last two declined their nomination through
letters.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may
appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition
under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not
apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that
any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90
days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article
VIII of the Constitution; that in their deliberations on the
mandatory period for the appointment of Supreme Court
Justices, the framers neither mentioned nor referred to the
ban against midnight appointments, or its effects on such
period, or vice versa; that had the framers intended the
prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they
could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution,
which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII
Yes. Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in
conflict. The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive
Department):
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department):
Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a
Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit
en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days from the occurrence thereof.
As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive
Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested
by the Constitution in the President. The presidential
power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and
16 of the Article. Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial
Department and defines the duties and qualifications of
Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section
4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the provisions
specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme
Court Justices.
The court believes then that had the framers of the
Constitution intended to extend the prohibition contained
in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of
the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.
They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of
the provisions. They would have easily and surely written
the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as
being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of
the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in
554!
(Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII
(Judicial Department); and that the framers also
incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations
on the Presidents power to appoint members of the
Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political
vicissitudes and its insulation from political pressures, such
as stringent qualifications for the positions, the
establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which
the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
Issues: Whether the President can appoint a SC Justice?
Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was
not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments
within two months before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the Presidents or
Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members
of the Supreme Court.
Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition
covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed
that the Valenzuela dictum did not consider the intent of
the Constitutional Commission. The exchanges
during deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
on October 8, 1986 further show that the filling of a
vacancy in the Supreme Court within the 90-day period
was a true mandate for the President.
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the
word shall an imperative, operating to impose a duty that
may be enforced should not be disregarded. Thereby,
Sections 4(1) imposes on the President
the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member
of the Supreme Court within 90 days. It did not consider
that Section 4(1) of Art. VIII is independent of other
provision. We thus reverse Valenzuela.
Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to
all other appointments in the Judiciary. There is no
question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption
of Section 15 as part of Article VII was made in order to
eliminate midnight appointments of the outgoing Chief as
a form of vote buying.
Given the rationale, it is proper then to assume that the
framers did not need to extend the prohibition to
appointments in the Judiciary, because their
establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the
nomination and screening of candidates for judicial
positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of
555!

326 Atty. Elias Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition
Omar v. Career assailing Executive Order No. 883, series of 2010 (EO
Executive 883), which granted Career Executive Service Officer
Secretary (CESO) rank to eligible lawyers in the executive branch,
(2011) and a related administrative issuance, Career Executive
Service Board (CESB) Resolution No. 870, for violating
Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution.
On 28 May 2010, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(President Arroyo) issued EO 883 granting the rank of
CESO III or higher to officers and employees “occupying
legal positions in the government executive service who
have obtained graduate degrees in law and successfully
passed the bar examinations” (Section 1). EO 883 invoked
the granting of CESO “rank to government personnel who
successfully complete certain graduate programs, such as
Masters in Public Safety Administration (MPSA) and
Masters in National Security Administration (MNSA)” as
basis for the granting of CESO rank to government lawyers
in the executive service.
The CESB subsequently endorsed to President Arroyo its
recommendation to vest CESO rank to 13 officials from
various departments and agencies, including three
members of the CESB who signed CESB Resolution No.
the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight
appointments to the Judiciary.
Lastly, Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are
obviously of the same character, in that they affect the
power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14
and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the
Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15
also applies only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,
i.e. that every part must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment.
No, since the case is moot. The petition seeks a review of
the constitutionality of EO 883 and CESB Resolution No.
870 for being repugnant to Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution. At the time this petition was filed, however,
President Aquino had already issued EO 3 revoking EO
883 expressly (under Section 1) and CESB Resolution No.
870 impliedly (under Section 2). EO 883 and CESB
Resolution No. 870 having ceased to have any force and
effect, the Court finds no reason to reach the merits of the
petition and pass upon these issuances’ validity. To do so
would transgress the requirement of case and controversy
as precondition for the Court’s exercise of judicial review.
These factors do not obtain here. The question whether
an appointment to a CESO rank of an executive official
amounts to an “appointment” for purposes of the
constitutional ban on midnight appointment, while
potentially recurring, holds no certainty of evading judicial
review as the question can be decided even beyond the
appointments-ban period under Section 15, Article VII of
the Constitution.
Indeed, petitioner does not allege to have suffered any
violation of a right vested in him under EO 883. He was
not among the 13 officials granted CESO ranking by
556!
870.7 On 10 June 2010, President Arroyo appointed the 13
officials to varying CESO ranks.
On 30 July 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III
(President Aquino) issued EO 3 expressly revoking EO 883
(Section 1) and “[a]ll x x x administrative orders,
proclamations, rules and regulations” that conflict with EO 3
(Section 2). As basis for the repeal, the fifth “Whereas”
clause of EO 3 provides that “EO 883 encroaches upon the
power of the CESB to ‘promulgate rules, standards and
procedures on the selection, classification, compensation
and career development of members of the Career
Executive service x x x’ vested by law with the [CESB] x x
x.”
President Arroyo. The CESB itself stated that “no
conferment of CESO rank was ever made by President
[Arroyo] in relation to EO 883.”19 Hence, for the Court to
nevertheless reach the merits of this petition and
determine the constitutionality of EO 883 and CESB
Resolution No. 870 despite their unquestioned repeal and
the absence of any resulting prejudice to petitioner’s rights
is to depart from its constitutional role of settling “actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable. WHEREFORE,
we DISMISS the petition.!

On 4 August 2010, petitioner Atty. Elias Omar A. Sana

(petitioner) filed the present petition, contending that EO
883 and the subsequent appointment of the 13 executive
officials to CESO rank are void for violating the
constitutional ban on midnight appointment under Section
15, Article VII of the Constitution. Petitioner theorizes that
appointments to positions and ranks in the CES are
“executive” in nature and, if made within the period
provided under Section 15, Article VII, fall under its
prohibition.

In its Comment, the CESB prays for the dismissal of the

petition as the issue it raises was rendered moot by EO 3’s
revocation of EO 883.

Issue: Whether EO 883 is unconstitutional for being

violative of Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution.

557!
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of II. Kinds of Presidential Appointments
the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the Section 14 – When the elected President assumes or
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and Acting President reassumes office, he is given 90 days within
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or which to revoke appointments made by the
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in Acting President. If he does not revoke them,
him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the they remain as if made by the elected
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by President.
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Section 15 – Made by a President within 2 months before
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in Midnight the next presidential elections and up to the
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of Appointments end of his term. In order not to tie the hands of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. the incoming President through midnight
EAOCO
appointments, appointments made during that
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the period can only be temporary and therefore
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such revocable by the next President.
appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Section 16 – With or without confirmation by Commission on
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Regular Appointments, and with ad-interim
Congress. Presidential appointments
Appointments
I. Nature of the Appointing Power
This power belongs to the Executive. Ad Interim v. Appointments in an Acting Capacity
- The Legislature may not usurp such function
• It may only create an office and prescribe the qualifications Ad Interim Acting Capacity
of the person who may hold the office, but it may neither Effective upon acceptance
specify the person who shall be appointed to such office nor Extended only during a recess of Extended anytime there is a
actually appoint him Congress vacancy
- The appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the President, Submitted to the Commission of NOT submitted to the
upon which no limitations may be imposed by Congress except Appointments for confirmation / Commission on Appointments
those resulting in the need of securing the concurrence of the rejection
Commission on Appointments This is not a temporary Way of temporarily filling
- The appointing authority, however, should not be confused with the appointment. An ad-interim important offices but, if abused,
authority of the legislature to impose additional duties on existing appointment is permanent they can also be a way of
offices circumventing the need for
confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments

558!
III. Scope of the power of the Commission on Appointments • Chairmen and Commissioners of
st
• 1 sentence: a 3-step process (nomination, consent, the CSC, COMELEC, and COA
appointment) • Regular members of the JBC
nd
o Those that need consent of Commission on • 2 sentence: only of appointment [NO confirmation
Appointments: necessary]
$ Heads of the executive departments
$ Ambassadors, and other public ministers
and consuls Congress
- Create office
$ Officers of the armed forces from the rank of - Qualifications
- Term
Colonel or Naval Captain - Compensation
$ Other officers whose appointments are
vested in him by the Constitution

Section 16. Regular Presidential Appointments

I. Nature of the Appointing Power
327 Government v. National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine No. The court believes that the power of appointment in
Springer (1927) Congress through Act No. 2822. The government eventually the Philippines appertains, with minor exceptions, to the
became the owner of 99% of its stocks. In November 1926, executive department; that membership in the voting
the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 committee in question is an office or executive function;
which divested the voting rights of the Senate President and that the National Coal Company and similar corporations
House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the are instrumentalities of the Government; that the duty to
voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General look after government agencies and government property
who is the head of the government (President at that time belongs to the executive department.
was considered the head of state but does not manage
government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to Thus the placing of members of the Philippine Legislature
the Senate President and the House Speaker. on the voting committee constitutes an invasion by the
Legislative Department of the privileges of the Executive
A meeting was held and there the Government-General Department. The legislative department under the
asserted that he has the sole power to represent the Organic law is only authorized to create office, which in
government. The Senate President and Speaker of the this case is Act No. 2822 or the NCC itself. Although
House however disagreed. Notwithstanding EO No. 37 and there are some instances that the power to appoint by
the objection of the Governor-General they still elected Milton the Legislature in the guise of Secretaries of
Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC that Departments, of officers and employees for the
gave the new directors power to vote. Legislature, and of Resident Commissioners, the rule is

559!

Issue: Whether the Senate President as well as the House
Speaker can validly elect the Board Members of NCC.
328 Bermudez v. The vacancy in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Exec Secretary Tarlac impelled the main contestants in this case namely:
(1999) petitioner Oscar Bermudez and respondent Conrado Quiaoit
to take contrasting views on the proper interpretation of a
provision in the 1987 Revised Administrative Code.
Bermudez was a recommendee of then Justice Secretary
Teofisto Guingona, Jr., for the position of Provincial
Prosecutor. Quiaoit, on the other hand, had the support of
then Representative Jose Yap. On 30 June 1997, President
Ramos appointed Quiaoit to the coveted office. Quiaoit
received a certified xerox copy of his appointment and, on 21
July 1997, took his oath of office before Executive Judge
Angel Parazo of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 65) of
Tarlac, Tarlac. On 23 July 1997, Quiaoit assumed office and
immediately informed the President, as well as the Secretary
of Justice and the Civil Service Commission, of that
assumption.
On 10 October 1997, Bermudez filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Tarlac, a petition for prohibition and/or injunction,
and mandamus, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
injunction/temporary restraining order, against herein
respondents, challenging the appointment of Quiaoit primarily
on the ground that the appointment lacks the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice prescribed under
the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. After hearing, the
trial court considered the petition submitted for resolution
and, in due time, issued its now assailed order dismissing the
that the executive department has the power to appoint
public officials. In this case, given that NCC is a GOCC
under the government, it is appropriate to hold that the
executive has the authority to appoint positions to them
including its directors.
No. An “appointment” to a public office is the unequivocal
act of designating or selecting by one having the
authority therefor of an individual to discharge and
perform the duties and functions of an office or trust. The
appointment is deemed complete once the last act
required of the appointing authority has been complied
with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in
order to render it effective.
Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right of choice is
the heart of the power to appoint. In the exercise of the
power of appointment, discretion is an integral part
thereof.
When the Constitution or the law clothes the President
with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such
conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying
with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. It should
be here pertinent to state that the President is the head
of government whose authority includes the power of
control over all “executive departments, bureaus and
offices.”
It is the considered view of the Court that the phrase
“upon recommendation of the Secretary,” found in
Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the Revised
Administrative Code, should be interpreted to be a mere
advise, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially
persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory
560!
 petition. The subsequent move by petitioners to have the
order reconsidered met with a denial.
Issue: Whether the absence of a recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice to the President can be held fatal to the
appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit.
329 Datu Michael The case started with RA 6734 or the Organic Act of ARMM.
Abas Kida v. This was amended by RA 9054 that mandated the holding of
Senate of the elections on the Second Monday of September. Before the
Philippines September 2001 elections started however, it was moved to
(2012) 26 November 2001 through RA 9140.
Four years later, Congress enacted RA 9333 finally fixing the
date of “regular elections” as it will now be held on Second
Monday of August 2005 making it thus permanent every
three years. House Bill 4146 however moved to change it to
Second Monday of May 2013 and every three years after.
The House Bill aimed to synchronize the date of elections to
go along with the national elections.
The said bill provided interim officials appointed by the
President to act as officer for the meantime under Article 7
Section 16 (RA 10153) which states:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
upon the party to whom it is made. The President, being
the head of the Executive Department, could very well
disregard or do away with the action of the departments,
bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary
authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having
acted beyond the scope of his authority.
Yes. The provision classifies into four groups the officers
that the President can appoint:
First, the heads of the executive departments;
ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of
colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by
law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates
from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of
officials that the President can appoint
On the issue that the appointed officials MUST be
elective and representative of the constituent political
units for the OIC to be truly representative. The court
believes that it is a misreading of RA No. 10153,
mistakenly reading RA 10153 as a law that changes
the elective and representative character of ARMM
positions.
What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint
561!
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The House bill was approved by the Congress and the
Senate passed its own version with basically the same
provision with some modifications. Eventually, HoR adopted
the version of the Senate and thus it formed RA 10153 that
the president signed into law.
Issue:! Whether the appointment by the President of OICs to
govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period
pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law is valid?
officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor,
Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected
in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and
assumed office.” This power is far different from
appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated
term ending on the assumption to office of the officials
elected in the May 2013 elections.
RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization
of elections and for the interim measures that must in the
meanwhile prevail. Aside from its order for
synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim
measure responding to the adjustments that the
synchronization requires.
Regarding the claim that the interim measure is an
unreasonable move for Congress to adopt, given the
legal situation that the synchronization unavoidably
brought with it. In plain terms it means that since the
dates of elections are usually moved, it allows for
lengthening or shortening the term of the elected
ARMM officials. It is up to the choice of the President
to appoint – for a fixed and specific period as an
interim measure.
The said conclusion would not be true under the very
limited circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153
where the period is fixed and, more importantly, the
terms of governance – both under Section 18, Article X of
the Constitution and RA No. 9054–will
not systemically be touched nor affected at all.
!
562!
 II. Kinds of Presidential Appointments
330 Pimentel v. This case is a petition to declare unconstitutional the Yes. The power to appoint is essentially executive in
Ermita (2005) appointments issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the
(“President Arroyo”) through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. exercise of this executive power except in those
Ermita (“Secretary Ermita”) to respondents. The following are instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to
the set of appointments made by Pres. Arroyo: interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint
are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope
of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power
to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the
qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot
appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress
impose on the President the duty to appoint any
particular person to an office.

On August 2004, Arroyo issued appointments to respondents

However, even if the Commission on Appointments is
as acting secretaries of their respective departments.
composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its
powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission
Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23
on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its
September 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim
power to give or withhold consent to presidential
appointments to respondents as secretaries of the
appointments.
departments to which they were previously appointed in an
Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not
acting capacity.
have appointed respondents as acting secretaries
because “in case of a vacancy in the Office of a
Issue: Is President Arroyo’s appointment of respondents as
Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be
acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on
designated as Acting Secretary.”
Appointments while Congress is in session, constitutional?

The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is

its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to
fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a
permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in
an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such
as the office of a department secretary, the President
must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as

563!
acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her
choice could assume office.

Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President

the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary
as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether
temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust
and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the
President who her alter ego should be.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant

while Congress is in session. Since a department
secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting
appointee to the office must necessarily have the
President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the
office of a department secretary, the President must
appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even
while Congress is in session. That person may or may
not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons
may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also
be the permanent appointee.

The law expressly allows the President to make such

acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book
III of EO 292 states that “[t]he President may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government service or
any other competent person to perform the functions of
an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the President
may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet
in the government service, as long as the President
deems that person competent.

Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of

564!
 appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to
abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting
appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly
provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of
EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to
prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a
way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.

Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from

appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are
effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments
are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas
acting appointments may be extended any time there is a
vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are
submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not
submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily filling important
offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of
circumventing the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
III. Scope of the Power of the Commission on Appointments
st
A. Other officers whose appointments are vested in the President (1 Sentence)
331 Sarmiento III v. This case is a petition for prohibition while the petitioners are No. The President does not need approval from the COA
Mison (1987) taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated bar of the to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
Philippines and professors of constitutional law seeking to The court first looked at the history of the Constitution
enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing his as wherein in the 1935 constitution, much of the executive
appointed Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. The power was limited by the legislature and it resulted in
petitioners would likewise enjoin respondent Guillermo horse trading/seats were given to the highest bidder
Carague in his capacity as Secretary of Budget Management while in the 1973 Constitution, Marcos took absolute
from effecting disbursements in payment of petitioner’s salary power in his appointments. The court construed the 1987
and emoluments. Petitioner’s argument is grounded on the constitution as a middle ground wherein there are officers
fact that Mison’s appointment is unconstitutional on the that require no confirmation from the COA. The Supreme

565!
 grounds that it was not approved by the Commission of Court then reviewed the tapes of the of Constitutional
Appointments. Respondents aver that the appointment was Commission and it was revealed that their intent was to
in line with the constitutional powers that are granted to the was to exclude certain positions from confirmation by the
chief executive to appoint officials in government. The court COA as such in the case Bureau Heads that were
in this instance tried to construe the meaning behind Section removed from the first group of individuals that required
16, Article VII of the constitution by grouping them into four approval. This is expressed as well in Sec. 601 of the
groups. The first group is stipulated to require approval from tariff and customs code of the Philippines as amended by
the COA. PD 34 which states that the commissioner and the
deputy commissioner of customs shall be appointed by
- First, the heads of the executive departments; the president of the Philippines.
ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls;
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from
the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the
President in this Constitution;
- Second, all other officers of the government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
- Third, those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint; and
- Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments
the Congress may by law vest in the President alone

Issue: Whether the president needs approval from the

Commission on Appointments to appoint officers who fall in
the 2nd, 3rd and 4th category.
332 Bautista v. On August 27, 1987, President Cory Aquino appointed
Salonga (1989) petitioner Bautista as permanent Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR). Bautista took her oath
of office on December 22, 1988 to Chief Justice Marcelo
Fernan and immediately acted as such.
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments (CoA) wrote a letter to Bautista requesting for
her presence along with several documents at the office of
(1) Yes. The Court held that the it is within the authority
of the President, vested upon her by the Constitution,
that she appoint Executive officials. The second sentence
of the provision Section 16, Article VII provides that the
President is authorized by law to appoint, without
confirmation of CoA, several government officials. The
position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII of the
1987 Constitution, which provides the appointments

566!
 CoA on January 19. Bautista refused to be placed under
CoA's review hence this petition filed with the Supreme
Court.
While waiting for the progress of the case, President Aquino
appointed Hesiquio R. Mallillin as "Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights" but he was not able to sit in
his appointive office because of Bautista's refusal to
surrender her post. Malilin invoked EO 163-A which provides
that the tenure of the Chairman and the Commissioners of
the CHR should be at the pleasure of the President thus
stating that Bautista shall be subsequently removed as well.
Issues: (1) Whether the President's appointment is
considered constitutional.
(2) Whether Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's
confirmation.
333 Quintos-Deles On April 6, 1988, petitioner and three others were appointed
v. CA (1989) Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to Article
VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of
which are to be made with the confirmation of CoA. It
therefore follows that the appointment of the Chairman of
CHR by the President is to be made and finalized even
without the review or participation of CoA. Bautista's
appointment as the Chairman of CHR, therefore, was
already a completed act on the day she took her oath as
the appointment was finalized upon her acceptance,
expressly stated in her oath.
(2) No. As seen, the President appointed petitioner
Bautista on 17 December 1988 to the position of
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights with the
advice to her that by virtue of such appointment—not,
until confirmed by the Commission on Appointments—
she could qualify and enter upon the performance of her
duties after taking her oath of office. The court believes
that even if the case shows that the President submits to
CoA for confirmation, the act itself was done there and
then and thus Bautista can act as Chairman of CHR after
her appointment for reasons stated above. Additionally,
the appointment is not an ad-interim appointment
covered by COA since there was no vacancy during the
time of appointment, which was 14 January 1989, which
would make the appointment only ad-interim for a vacant
position.
Furthermore, the Court held that the provisions of EO
163-A is unconstitutional and thus cannot be invoked by
Mallillin. The Chairman of CHR cannot be removed at the
pleasure of the President for it is constitutionally
guaranteed that they must have a term of office.
Yes. We held in Sarmiento vs. Mison, et al. that under
st
Sec. 16 of Article VII 1 paragraph that such
appointments require the confirmation of CoA. The
567!
the Constitution. The following are the appointed officers:
Teresita Quintos-Deles —-Women
Al Ignatius G. Lopez—Youth
Bartolome Arteche —-Peasant
Rey Magno Teves—-Urban Poor
On April 18, 1988, the above-mentioned sectoral
representatives were scheduled to take their oaths before
Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. at the Session Hall of Congress
after the Order of Business. However, petitioner and the
three other sectoral representatives- appointees were not
able to take their oaths and discharge their duties as
members of Congress due to the opposition of some
congressmen-members of the Commission on Appointments,
who insisted that sectoral representatives must first be
confirmed by the respondent Commission before they could
take their oaths and/or assume office as members of the
House of Representatives. The oath-taking was then
suspended.
Issue: Whether the Constitution requires the appointment of
sectoral representatives to the HoR to be confirmed by the
CoA.
provision reads:
First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;
Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in
paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by
appointment by the President by express provision of
Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is undubitable
that sectoral representatives to the House of
Representatives are among the "other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution," referred to in the first sentence of Section
16, Art. VII whose appointments are subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The
invocation of Art. XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution as
authority for the appointment of petitioner places said
appointment within the ambit of the first sentence of
Section 16, Art. VII
Additionally, the reference to paragraph 2, Section 16 of
Article VII as additional authority for the appointment of
petitioner is of vital significance to the case at bar. The
records show that petitioner's appointment was made on
April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in recess (March 26,
1988 to April 17, 1988); hence, the reference to the said
paragraph 2 of Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment
extended to her. This is because Deles' appointment was
made pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, par.2 which gives
the President”the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
568!
 compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress. Hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2
of Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment extended to her.
nd
B. Officers the President is authorized by law to appoint (2 Sentence)
334 Pobre v. The controversy began on January 2, 1992, when the term of Yes. Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
Mendieta office of Honorable Julio B. Francia as PRC empowers the President to appoint "those whom he may
(1993) Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that time, Mariano A. be authorized by law to appoint." The law that authorizes
Mendieta was the senior Associate Commissioner and him to appoint the PRC Commissioner and Associate
Hermogenes P. Pobre was the second Associate Commissioners, is P.D. 223, Section 2, which provides
Commissioner of the PRC. On February 15, 1992, President that the Commissioner and Associate Commissioners of
Corazon C. Aquino appointed the petitioner, then an the PRC are "all to be appointed by the President for a
Associate Commissioner, as the PRC Commissioner/ term of nine (9) years, without reappointment, to start
Chairman. He took his oath of office on February 17, 1992. from the time they assume office.

Even before Commissioner Pobre's appointment, the private
respondent, Mariano A. Mendieta, as the Senior Associate
Commissioner, filed a petition for declaratory relief against
Commissioner Pobre, Executive Secretary Drilon, and Acting
Secretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro, praying that they
be enjoined from appointing, or recommending the
appointment of Associate Commissioner Pobre as Chairman
of the PRC because under Section 2 of P.D. No. 223, he
(Mendieta), as the senior Associate Commissioner, was
legally entitled to succeed Francia as Chairman of the PRC.
He cites the following provision of Section 2, P.D. No. 223
which provides that:
. . . any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled for the
unexpired term only with the most Senior of the Associate
Commissioners succeeding the Commissioner at the
expiration of his term, resignation or removal.
The Court finds unacceptable the view that every
vacancy in the Commission (except the position of
"junior" Associate Commissioner) shall be filled by
"succession" or by "operation of law" for that would
deprive the President of his power to appoint a new PRC
Commissioner and Associate Commissioners — "all to
be appointed by the President" under P.D. No. 223. The
absurd result would be that the only occasion for the
President to exercise his appointing power would be
when the position of junior (or second) Associate
Commissioner becomes vacant. We may not presume
that when the President issued P.D. No. 223, he
deliberately clipped his prerogative to choose and
appoint the head of the PRC and limited himself to the
selection and appointment of only the associate
commissioner occupying the lowest rung of the ladder in
that agency. Since such an absurdity may not be
presumed, the Court should so construe the law as to

569!
 Issue: Whether the President may appoint as
Commissioner/Chairman of the PRC another Associate
Commissioner or any person other than the Senior Associate
Commissioner!
335 Flores v. Drilon The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227,
(1993) otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor
Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this original petition with
prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order. Petitioner prays that R.A. 7227 be
prohibited in order "to prevent useless and unnecessary
expenditures of public funds by way of salaries and other
operational expenses attached to the office. They mainly
attack Paragraph (d) of the law which reads —
(d) Chairman administrator — The President shall appoint a
professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority
with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject
to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be
the ex oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as
the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided,
however, That for the first year of its operations from the
avoid it.
There is thus no excuse to construe the clause: "at the
expiration of his term, resignation or removal" as
pointing to a moment that the President can exercise his
power only when the Chairman or Commissioner still has
an unexpired term that was not finished due to
resignation or removal. Such interpretation cannot be
possible since the clause does not refer to the
Chairman/Commissioner. Such interpretation would
contradict the first clause providing that he will be
succeeded by the senior Associate Commissioner "for
the unexpired portion of his term only." There can be no
more "unexpired term" to speak of if the Chairman
stepped down "at the expiration of his term."
No. Congress did not contemplate making the subject
SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to the
Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of
appointment. The phrase "shall be appointed"
unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA
posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of
Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it been the legislative intent
to make the subject positions ex officio, Congress would
have, at least, avoided the word "appointed" and,
instead, "ex officio" would have been used.
Petitioners also assail the legislative encroachment on
the appointing authority of the President. Section 13, par.
(d), itself vests in the President the power to appoint the
Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer of
SBMA, although he really has no choice under the law
but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City.
Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of the power to
570!
 effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo
shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive
officer of the Subic Authority
Petitioners claim that the provision violates Sec. 16, Art. VII,
of the Constitution, which provides:
"[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint",
This became an issue since it was the Congress, through the
questioned proviso, and not the President who appointed the
Mayor to the subject posts. It is further argued that the SBMA
posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of
Olongapo City, hence, an excepted circumstance, citing Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary where we stated that
the prohibition against the holding of any other office or
employment by the President, Vice-President, Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants during their
tenure, as provided in Sec. 13, Art. VII, of the Constitution,
does not comprehend additional duties and
functions required by the primary functions of the officials
concerned, who are to perform them in an ex officio capacity
as provided by law, without receiving any additional
compensation therefor.
Issue: Whether said provision of the RA 7227 violates the
constitutional prescription against appointment or designation
of elective officials to other government posts.
336 Rufino v. President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued EO 30 creating the
Endriga (2006) Cultural Center of the Philippines as a trust governed by a
Board of Trustees of seven members to preserve and
appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion
of whom to appoint.Hence, when Congress clothes the
President with the power to appoint an officer, it
(Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of
the President to only one candidate. Once the power of
appointment is conferred on the President, such
conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to
appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the
qualifications of the officer, Congress may not abuse
such power as to divest the appointing authority, directly
or indirectly, of his discretion to pick his own choice.
Consequently, when the qualifications prescribed by
Congress can only be met by one individual, such
enactment effectively eliminates the discretion.
In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject
posts be filled with a presidential appointee for the first
year of its operations from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, the
proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority to
only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo
City. Since only one can qualify for the posts in question,
the President is precluded from exercising his discretion
to choose whom to appoint. Such supposed power of
appointment, sans the essential element of choice, is no
power at all and goes against the very nature itself of
appointment.! While it may be viewed that the proviso
merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first
year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of
Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional
authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and
no other, can qualify.
Yes. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably
inconsistent with Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15
571!
promote Philippine culture.
On 5 October 1972, or soon after the declaration of Martial
Law, President Marcos issued PD 15, the CCP’s charter,
which converted the CCP under EO 30 into a non-municipal
public corporation free from the “pressure or influence of
politics.” PD 15 increased the members of CCP’s Board from
seven to nine trustees. Later, Executive Order No. 1058,
issued on 10 October 1985, increased further the trustees to
11.
After the People Power Revolution in 1986, then President
Corazon C. Aquino asked for the courtesy resignations of the
then incumbent CCP trustees and appointed new trustees to
the Board. Eventually, during the term of President Fidel V.
Ramos, the CCP Board included Endriga, Lagdameo, Sison,
Potenciano, Fernandez, Lenora A. Cabili ("Cabili"), and
Manuel T. Mañosa ("Mañosa").
On 22 December 1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada
appointed seven new trustees to the CCP Board for a term of
four years to replace the Endriga group as well as two other
incumbent trustees. The 7 NEW trustees were:
(1) Armita B. Rufino - President, vice Baltazar N.
Endriga;
(2) Zenaida R. Tantoco - Member, vice Doreen
Fernandez
(3) and 5 more others.
Except for Tantoco, the Rufino group took their respective
oaths of office and assumed the performance of their duties
in early January 1999. On 6 January 1999, the Endriga group
filed a petition for quo warranto before this Court questioning
President Estrada's appointment of seven new members to
empowers the remaining trustees to "elect" and not
"appoint" their fellow trustees for the effect is the same,
which is to fill vacancies in the CCP Board. A statute
cannot circumvent the constitutional limitations on the
power to appoint by filling vacancies in a public office
through election by the co-workers in that office. Such
manner of filling vacancies in a public office has no
constitutional basis.
Further, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP
trustees the independent appointing power of their fellow
trustees. The creation of an independent appointing
power inherently conflicts with the President's power to
appoint. This inherent conflict has spawned recurring
controversies in the appointment of CCP trustees every
time a new President assumes office.
In the present case, the incumbent President appointed
the Endriga group as trustees, while the remaining CCP
trustees elected the same Endriga group to the same
positions. This has been the modus vivendi in filling
vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing the President to
appoint and the CCP Board to elect the trustees. In
effect, there are two appointing powers over the same set
of officers in the Executive branch. Each appointing
power insists on exercising its own power, even if the two
powers are irreconcilable. The Court must put an end to
this recurring anomaly.
There is another constitutional impediment to the
implementation of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15. Under
our system of government, all Executive departments,
bureaus, and offices are under the control of the
President of the Philippines under Section 17, Article VII
572!
the CCP Board. The Endriga group alleged that under
Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board "shall be
filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at
the next regular meeting." In case "only one trustee
survive[s], the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving
trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the
[CCP]." They claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is
entirely vacant may the President fill such vacancies, acting
in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP.
The Endriga group asserted that when former President
Estrada appointed the Rufino group, only one seat was
vacant due to the expiration of Mañosa's term. The CCP
Board then had 10 incumbent trustees because of the
appointment. The Endriga group refused to accept that the
CCP was under the supervision and control of the President
and cited Section 3 of PD 15, which states that the CCP
“shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation”.
! The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a
In their motion for reconsideration, the Rufino group asserted
that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the power
to appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees of the
Board. The law may not validly confer on the CCP trustees
the authority to appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the
latter would be officers of equal rank and not of lower
rank. Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to
elect their fellow trustees should be declared unconstitutional
being repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution allowing the appointment only of “officers lower
in rank” than the appointing power.
Issue: Whether Section 6(b) of PD 15 is unconstitutional
considering that [it] is an invalid delegation of the President's
appointing power under the Constitution.
of the 1987 Constitution.
The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial
branches of government. The CCP is also not one of the
independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a
quasi-judicial body nor a local government unit. Thus, the
CCP must fall under the Executive branch. Under the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency "not
placed by law or order creating them under any specific
department" falls "under the Office of the President.
Since the President exercises control over "all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices," the
President necessarily exercises control over the CCP
which is an office in the Executive branch. In mandating
that the President "shall have control of all executive
offices," Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
does not exempt any executive office such as the CCP.
government office in the Executive branch outside the
control of the President in the guise of insulating that
office from politics or making it independent. If the office
is part of the Executive branch, it must remain subject to
the control of the President.
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the
trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the Board,
runs afoul with the President's power of control under
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
573!
 IV. Appointment of Officers “lower in rank”
A. May Congress require other appointments to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments?
337 Calderon v. Based on Sarmiento III v. Mison; Bautista v. Salonga; and No. There are 4 groups of officers whom the Pres shall
Carale (1992) Quintos Deles, et al. v. The Commission on Constitutional appoint:
Commissions the following doctrines have been set:
1) Heads of exec depts., ambassadors, other public
(1) Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments ministers & consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
(CA) is required only for presidential appointees rank of colonel or naval captain, & other officers whose
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, appointment are vested in him in this Consti.
Article VII, including, those officers whose 2) All other officers of the Govt whose appointments are
appointments are expressly vested by the not otherwise provided for by law
Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral 3) Those whom the Pres may be authorized by law to
representatives to Congress and members of the appoint
constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service 4) Officers lower in rank whose appointments the
and Election). Congress may by law vest in the Pres alone.

(2) Confirmation of CA is required only for presidential
appointees mentioned in the first sentence of
Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers
whose appointments are expressly vested by the
Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral
representatives to Congress and members of the
constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil Service
and Election). In Mison, it was also held that when
Congress creates inferior offices but omits to
provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an
unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the
officers are considered as among those whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law.
Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law),
amending the Labor Code (PD 442) was approved. It
provides in Section 13 thereof as follows:
In the case of Mison, there were two (2) major changes
proposed and approved by the Commission in Section 16
of Article VII. These were (1) the exclusion of the
appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement
of confirmation by the CA; and (2) the exclusion of
appointments made under the second sentence of the
section from the same requirement.
The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all
other officers of the government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law and those whom the
President may be authorized by law to appoint.
Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall
within the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution, more specifically under the "third
groups" of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those
whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.

574!
The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and
other Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President,
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees
of the sector which nominated the predecessor. The
Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters shall also be
appointed by the President, upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, and shall be subject to
the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.
Pursuant to said law (RA 6715), President Aquino appointed
the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC. This petition
then questions the constitutionality of the said appointments
since the Solicitor General (SolGen) contends that RA 6715,
which amended the Labor Code, transgresses Section 16,
Article VII by expanding the confirmation powers of the
Commission on Appointments without constitutional basis.
Mison and Bautista laid the issue to rest since the SolGen
had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the list
of officers whose appointments must be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments, the Constitution would have
said so by adding the phrase "and other officers required by
law" at the end of the first sentence, or the phrase, "with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments" at the end of
the second sentence of the said Article. Evidently, our
Constitution has significantly omitted to provide for such
additions.
Issue: Whether Congress may, by law, require confirmation
by CA of appointments extended by the President to
government officers additional to those expressly mentioned
in the 1st sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII whose appointments
require confirmation by the CA.
Thus it is unconstitutional for RA 6715 to require the
confirmation of the CA for the appointments of
respondents Chairman and Members of the NLRC
because:
1) It amends by legislation, the first sentence of
Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding
thereto appointments requiring confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments; and
2) It amends by legislation the second sentence of
Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing
the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments on appointments which are
otherwise entrusted only with the President.
Sec 16, Art VII was deliberately intended by the framers
to be a departure from the system embodied in the 1935
Constitution where the CA exercised the power of
confirmation over almost all presidentiall appointments,
leading to many cases of abuse of such power of
confirmation.
575!
338 U-Sing v. In June, 1960, Fortunato Naya was employed as a
NLRC (1993) maintenance worker at U-Sing Button and Buckle Industry in
Caloocan City. The establishment, as its name suggests, is
engaged in the manufacture and sale of buttons and buckles.
On May 30, 1986, Naya stopped working on account of
illness and died shortly thereafter. His widow, Cecilia Naya,
filed in the Manila Arbitration Branch of the Department of
Labor & Employment against U-Sing Button and Buckle
Industry for a claim for separation pay and incentive leave
pay due her husband. This case was filed to the NLRC.
Petitioner U-Sing claims that Fortunato Naya was indebted to
them in the amount of 116,500.00. They further claimed that
they gave him P4,247.00 during his confinement at the Lung
Center of the Philippines and donated 123,500.00 to his
family when he died. U-Sing was asked to pay in the end to
Naya’s wife for lack of factual evidence. In the
reconsideration, they claimed that NLRC had no jurisdiction
over the case, because "the appointments of the
commissioners have not been confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments (CA).”
Issue: Whether NLRC needs to have its commissioners
confirmed by the CA to have jurisdiction.
339 Tarrosa v. Respondent Singson was appointed Governor of the Bangko
Singson (1994) Sentral by President Fidel V. Ramos on July 2, 1993.
Petitioner argues that respondent Singson's appointment is
null and void since it was not submitted for confirmation to
the Commission on Appointments. The petition is anchored
on the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which
established the Bangko Sentral as the Central Monetary
Authority of the Philippines. Section 6, Article II of R.A. No.
7653 provides:
No. Non-confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the new NLRC Commissioners who
were appointed under Republic Act 6715 did not make
their appointment null and void.
In Calderon vs. Carale, we held that the Chairman and
members of the National Labor Relations Commission
are not among the officers mentioned in Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution whose appointments
require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Therefore, their acts are valid. In any
case, the petitioners raised this issue only in their present
petition, after their motion for reconsideration was denied
by the Commission. They are estopped from repudiating
the jurisdiction of the NLRC which they had already
recognized.
No. Calderon v. Carale, we ruled that Congress cannot
by law expand the confirmation powers of the
Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of
appointment of other government officials not expressly
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII
of the Constitution.
576!
 Sec. 6. Composition of the Monetary Board. The powers and
functions of the Bangko Sentral shall be exercised by the
Bangko Sentral Monetary Board, hereafter referred to as the
Monetary Board, composed of seven (7) members appointed
by the President of the Philippines for a term of six (6) years.

The seven (7) members are:

(a) The Governor of the Bangko Sentral, who shall be
the Chairman of the Monetary Board. The Governor
of the Bangko Sentral shall be head of a department
and his appointment shall be subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments. Whenever the
Governor is unable to attend a meeting of the Board,
he shall designate a Deputy Governor to act as his
alternate: Provided, That in such event, the Monetary
Board shall designate one of its members as acting
Chairman

Issue: Whether the appointment as Governor of the Bangko

Sentral ng Pilipinas requires the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments
340 Manolo v. Petitioners question the constitutionality and legality of the
Sistoza (1999) permanent appointments issued by former President
Corazon C. Aquino to the respondent senior officers of the
Philippine National Police who were promoted to the ranks of
Chief Superintendent and Director without their appointments
submitted to the Commission on Appointments (CA) for
confirmation under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution and Republic Act 6975 otherwise known as the
Local Government Act of 1990. RA 6975 reads:
Sec. 26. Powers, Functions and Term of Office of the PNP
Chief. - The command and direction of the PNP shall be
vested in the Chief of the PNP who shall have the power to
Yes. It was held in Sarmiento III vs. Mison that Section
16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requiring
confirmation by the CA of certain appointments issued by
the President contemplates a system of checks and
balances between the executive and legislative branches
of government. Experience showed that when almost all
presidential appointments required the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, as was the case under
the 1935 Constitution, the commission became a venue
of horse-trading and similar malpractices.
Additionally, it was held by different cases that Section
16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups

577!
direct and control tactical as well as strategic movements,
deployment, placement, utilization of the PNP or any of its
units and personal, including its equipment, facilities and
other resources. Such command and direction of the Chief of
the PNP may be delegated to subordinate officials with
respect to the units under their respective commands, in
accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the
Commission. The Chief of the PNP shal also have the power
to issue detailed implementing policies and instructions
regarding personnel, funds, properties, records,
correspondence and such other matters as may be necesary
to effectively carry out the functions, powers and duties of the
Bureau. The Chief of the PNP shall be appointed by the
President from among the senior officers down to the rank of
the chief superintendent, subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments: Provided, That the Chief of
the PNP shall serve a term of office not to exceed four (4)
years: Provided, further, That in times of war or other national
emergency declared by Congress, the President may extend
such term of office.
On the other hand, Sec.31. Appointment of PNP Officers and
Members. - The appointment of the officers and members of
the PNP shall be effected in the following manner:
(c) Senior Superintendent to Deputy Director General -
Appointed by the President upon recommendation of the
Chief of the PNP, with the proper endorsement by the
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and
(d) Director General - Appointed by the President from
among the senior officers down to the rank of chief
superintendent in the service, subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments;Provided, That the Chief of the
of officers of the government to be appointed by the
President:
First, the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by
law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments
belonging to the first group require the confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of
respondent officers who are not within the first category,
need not be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.
Additionally, in Tarrosa v. Singson, Congress cannot by
law expand the power of confirmation of the Commission
on Appointments and require confirmation of
appointments of other government officials not mentioned
in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the
1987 Constitution.
Thus Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 is
unconstitutional as it empowers the CA to confirm the
578!
 PNP shall serve a tour of duty not to exceed four (4) years;
Provided, further, That, in times of war or other national
emergency declared by Congress, the President may extend
such tour of duty.
Issue: Whether RA 6975 is a valid law that duly requires
confirmation of the appointments of officers from the rank of
senior superintendent and higher by the Commission on
Appointments.
341 Soriano v. Lista The case is a petition questioning the constitutionality and
(2004) legality of the permanent appointments, made by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, of public respondents to different
positions in the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG). Petitioner
bewails the fact that despite the non-submission of their
names to the Commission on Appointments (CA) for
confirmation, all of the said respondent officers of the PCG
had assumed their duties and functions.
According to petitioner, their respective appointments are
illegal and unconstitutional for failure to undergo the
confirmation process in the CA. Thus, they should be
prohibited from discharging their duties and functions as such
officers of the PCG.
Issue: Whether the appointments to PCG were
unconstitutional?
appointments of public officials whose appointments are
not required by the Constitution to be confirmed.
However it is only unconstitutional only to the parts that
allow the CA to confirm appointments.
No. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
PCG used to be administered and maintained as a
separate unit of the Philippine Navy. It was subsequently
placed under the direct supervision and control of the
Secretary of the Department of National Defense.
Eventually, it was integrated into the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) as a major subordinate unit of the
Philippine Navy. President Ramos reorganized PCG and
placed it under the Office of the President. Currently
though PCG was transferred again to Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
Now that the PCG is under the DOTC and no longer part
of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the promotions and appointments of
respondent officers of the PCG, or any PCG officer from
the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do not
require confirmation by the CA.! It is clear from the
Constitution that only appointed officers from the rank of
colonel or naval captain in the armed forces require
confirmation by the CA. The list is exclusive and the
clause officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain refers to military officers alone.
579!
 B. Recess or Ad-interim Appointments and Temporary Appointments
342 Pimentel v. (Same as above # 330) Yes. The power to appoint is essentially executive in
Ermita (2005) nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the
This case is a petition to declare unconstitutional the exercise of this executive power except in those
appointments issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to
(“President Arroyo”) through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. interfere. Limitations on the executive power to appoint
Ermita (“Secretary Ermita”) to respondents. The following are are construed strictly against the legislature. The scope
the set of appointments made by Pres. Arroyo of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power
to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the
qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot
appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress
impose on the President the duty to appoint any
particular person to an office.

However, even if the Commission on Appointments is

On August 2004, Arroyo issued appointments to respondents
composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its
as acting secretaries of their respective departments.
powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission
on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its
Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23
power to give or withhold consent to presidential
September 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim
appointments.
appointments to respondents as secretaries of the
Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not
departments to which they were previously appointed in an
have appointed respondents as acting secretaries
acting capacity.
because “in case of a vacancy in the Office of a
Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be
Issue: Is President Arroyo’s appointment of respondents as
designated as Acting Secretary.”
acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments while Congress is in session, constitutional?
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is
its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to
fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a
permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in
an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such
as the office of a department secretary, the President
must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as

580!
acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her
choice could assume office.

Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President

the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary
as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether
temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust
and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the
President who her alter ego should be.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant

while Congress is in session. Since a department
secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting
appointee to the office must necessarily have the
President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the
office of a department secretary, the President must
appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even
while Congress is in session. That person may or may
not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons
may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also
be the permanent appointee.

The law expressly allows the President to make such

acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book
III of EO 292 states that “[t]he President may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government service or
any other competent person to perform the functions of
an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the President
may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet
in the government service, as long as the President
deems that person competent.

Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of

581!

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency (Villena v. Secretary of
Interior)
All executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive and,
except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to
abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting
appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly
provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of
EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to
prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a
way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from
appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are
effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments
are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas
acting appointments may be extended any time there is a
vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are
submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not
submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily filling important
offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of
circumventing the need for confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
Constitution or law to act in person or in the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive
and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by
and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
secretaries, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are unless disapprove or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
582!
Definition of “Power of Control” (Mondano v. Silvosa)
Power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or to set aside what a
subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. It is such
power which has been given to the President over all executive
officers, from Cabinet members to the lowliest clerk. The Power of
Control extends over government-owned corporations (NAMARCO
v. Arca).
DISTINGUISH: The Presidents power over “acts” and “persons”
of appointee in classified service. (Ang-Angco v. Castillo)
The President does not have blanket authority to remove any officer
or employee of the government. His power must still be subject of
the law passed by the legislative body, particularly with regard to the
procedure, cause and finality of the removal of persons who may be
the subject of disciplinary action. The power of control merely
applies to the exercise of control over the acts of the
subordinate and not over the act or agent himself of the act.
Note: The inherent disciplinary power of the President has been
made subject to limitation by the legislature through the Civil Service
System. Hence, it may be said that while the executive has power
over the “judgment” or “discretion” of his subordinates, it is the
legislative which has control over their “person.”
Power to discipline local officials (Joson v. Torres)
The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate.
As the President has the power to investigate complaints against
local government officials, A.O. 23 nevertheless delegates the power
to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee as
may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue
delegation as the President remains the Disciplining Authority. What
is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline.
Furthermore, the power of the DILG to investigate administrative
complaints is based on the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of
qualified political agency, which is based on the control power of the
President. Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the
presidency. As head of the Executive, the President may delegate
some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is
required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he acts personally. Each head of the
department is and must be the President’s alter ego in the matter of
that department where the President is required by law to exercise
authority. The power to discipline stems from the power from the
President to APPOINT, and not from his control powers.
Power to Reorganize (Anak Mindanao v. Executive Secretary)
The express grant of the power of control to the President justifies an
executive action to carry out the reorganization of an executive office
under a broad authority of law. Reorganization can involve the
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or even abolition of
positions by reason of economy or redundancy of functions (Malaria
Employees v. Executive Secretary).
Power of Supervision (See Article X, Sec. 4 and 16)
It is the power of a superior officer to “ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed” by inferiors. The power of supervision does not
include the power of control; but the power of control necessarily
includes the power of supervision. (The power of the President over
local governments is only general supervision as LGU’s have local
autonomy).
KMU v. Dir-Gen. of NEDA:
The President’s constitutional power of control is self-executing
and does not need any implementing legislation. The
Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the
laws are faithfully executed. There are several laws mandating
583!
government entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in
general, improve public services. The adoption of a uniform ID date
collection and format under EO 420 is designed to reduce costs,
increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services.
Faithful Execution Clause (Gonzales v. Hechanova)
The reverse side of the power to execute the law is the duty to carry
it out. The President cannot refuse to carry out a law for the simple
reason that in his judgment it will not be beneficial to the people. As
the SC point out, “after all we still live under a rule of law.”

Section 17. Power of Control

I. Power of Control
343 Lacson – Jose Magallanes, permittee and actual occupant, ceded Yes. The plaintiff claim that according to the Public Land Act
Magallanes v. his rights and interest to a portion of a 1,103-hectare the decisions of the Director of Lands as to questions of facts
Pano (1967) pasture land (public land) in Tamlangon, Basalan, shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of
Davao to the plaintiff corporation, Lacson-Magallanes Agriculture and Natural Resources. And that it is controlling
Co, Inc. The land ceded to plaintiff was officially upon the courts and the President. However, the President
released from the forest zone as pasture land and naturally controls all of all executive departments.
declared agricultural land. Jose Paño and 19 other Control simply means the power of an officer to alter or
claimants applied for the purchase of 90 hectares of the modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
ceded land by Jose Magallanes. Plaintiff corporation in done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
turn filed its own sales application covering the entire judgment of the former for that of the latter.
released area. Jose Paño protested against the plaintiff
corporation and claims that they are actual occupants of The plaintiff also submits that the decision of the Executive
the parts thereof covered by their own sales application. secretary herein is an undue delegation of power because it
is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally
The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the upon the matter. The court ruled that (1) there are
conflict, rendered a decision in favour of the plaintiff constitutional powers which the President must exercise
corporation. A move to reconsider failed. The Secretary in person such as the following:
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, on appeal by o Power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, to
Jose Pano, affirmed the decision of the Director. The proclaim martial law [Sec.10(2), Art VII, 1935
case was then elevated to the President of the Constitution]
Philippines. o To grant reprieves, commutations and pardons and
Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, by authority of the remit fines and forfeitures [Sec.10(6)]
President decided the controversy, modified the
decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Also, the President is not expected to perform in person all

584!
 Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and :
(1) Declared that “it would be for the public interest
that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers
who depends on the land for their existence, be
allocated that portion on which they have made
improvements”; and
(2) Directed that the controverted land (northern
portion, Block I, LC Map 1749, Project No. 27,
of Bansalan, Davao, with Lantian River as the
dividing line) “ should be subdivided into lots of
convenient sizes and allocated to actual
occupants, without prejudice to the corporation’s
right to reimbursement for the cost of surveying
this portion.”
Issue: May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority
of the President, reverse a decision of the Director of
Lands that had been affirmed by the Executive
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources?
344 Ang-Angco v. Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co., Inc had a
Castillo (1963) problem of withdrawing their commodities consisting of
1,188 units of pepsi-cola concentrates which were not
covered by any Central Bank release certificate and
were imported without any dollar allocation or remittance
of foreign exchange.
After failing thus far in all their attempts, the counsel of
Pepsi-Cola turned to Collector of Customs Isidro Ang-
Angco in an attempt to secure from him the immediate
release of the concentrates. Mr. Ang-Angco, seeing
perhaps that the importation did not carry any release
certificate from the Central Bank, advised the counsel to
try to secure the necessary release certificate from the
No-Dollar Import Office that had jurisdiction over the
the multifarious executive and administrative functions.
Under the constitutional setup, the Executive Secretary,
who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the
President, has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm,
modify or even reverse any order that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the
Director of Lands, may issue.
Lastly, the plaintiff argues that the Executive Secretary is
equal in rank to the other department head as alter egos of
the President. In this case, the Exec Sec cannot intrude into
the zone of action allocated to another department head. The
court ruled that the plaintiff lack appreciation to the fact that
the Executive Secretary acts “by authority of the President” -
his decision is that of the President’s. Thus, the court must
give full faith and credit to the decision. Only the President
may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not
authorized to do so.!
No. Section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code
contains the power of the President
To remove officials from office conformably to law and to
declare vacant the offices held by such removed officials. For
disloyalty to the (United States) Republic of the Philippines,
the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may at
any time remove a person from any position of trust or
authority under the Government of the (Philippine Islands)
Philippines.
"Conformably to law" is significant. It shows that the
President does not have blanket authority move any officer or
employee of the government but his power must still be
subject to the law that passed by the legislative body. Since
585!
case. However, No-Dollar Import Office wrote a letter to
petitioner and said that it did not have the authority to do
what petitioner wanted. Afterwards, Secretary of
Finance Hernandez having been contacted by
telephone, Collector of Customs Ang-Angco read to him
the letter after which the Secretary verbally expressed
his approval of the release on the basis of said
certificate. Collector Ang-Angco, while still in doubt as to
the propriety of the action suggested, finally authorized
the release of the concentrates upon payment of the
corresponding duties, customs charges, fees and taxes.
Customs Manuel P. Manahan learned of the release he
filed an administrative complaint against Collector of
Customs Ang-Angco. During the pendency of
petitioner’s administrative case, Executive Secretary
Natalio P. Castillo, by authority of the President,
rendered a decision on the case on February 12,
1960 finding Ang-Angco "guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service", and
considering him resigned effective from the date of
notice, with prejudice to reinstatement in the Bureau
of Customs. After exhausting all the administrative
remedies available to him to secure his reinstatement to
the office from which he was removed without any valid
cause or in violation of his right to due process of law,
Collector Ang-Angco filed before this Court.
Petitioner contends that there was a violation of due
process and that only the CSC has the power to remove
officers and administer administrative cases.
Respondent contend that, whether the officers or
employees concerned are presidential appointees or
CSC has such law which governs action to be taken against
officers and employees in classified civil service it should be
then stated that the law is binding upon President.
Section (D) of the Revised Administrative Code
Power to appoint and remove. — The Department Head, the
recommendation of the chief of the Bureau or office
concerned, shall appoint all subordinate officers and
employees appointment is not expressly vested by law in the
(Governor-General) President of the Philippines, and may
remove or punish them, except as especially provided
otherwise, in accordance the Civil Service Law.
"In accordance with the Civil Service” is also significant. So
we may say that even granting for administrative purposes,
the President of the Philippines is considered as the
Department Head of the Civil Service Commission, his power
to remove is still subject to the Civil Service Act of 1959.
In Hebron v. Reyes it was stated that "the [President has] the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter…"to distinguish it from the power of general
supervision over municipal government, but the decision
does not go to the extent of including the power to remove an
officer or employee in the executive department. (Power
over the acts and not the person himself).
President's control over the executive department only refers
to matters of general policy. The term "policy" means a
settled or definite course or method adopted and followed by
a government, body, or individual, and it cannot be said that
the removal of an inferior officer comes within the meaning of
586!
 belong to the classified service, if they are all officers
and employees in the executive department, they all
come under the control of the President and, therefore,
his power of removal may be exercised over them
directly without distinction.
Issue: Is the President empowered by any other law to
remove officers and employees in the classified civil
service?!
345 Villaluz v. A letter dated January 28, 1960 addressed to the
Zaldivar (1965) President of the Philippines by Congressman Joaquin R.
Roces as Chairman of the Committee on Good
Government of the House of Representatives, the latter
informed the Acting Assistant Executive Secretary
Sofronio C. Quimson of the findings made by his
Committee concerning alleged gross mismanagement
and inefficiency committed by petitioner in the Motor
Vehicles Office which are summed up in the letter, as
follows: (1) malpractice in office resulting in huge losses
to the government; (2) failure to correct inadequate
controls or intentional toleration of the same, facilitating
thereby the commission of graft and corruption; and (3)
negligence to remedy unsatisfactory accounting; that as
a result of said findings. Congressman Roces
recommended the replacement of petitioner and of his
assistant chief Aurelio de Leon as well as the complete
revamp of the offices coming under the Motor Vehicles
Office
After the investigation said committee submitted its
report to the President of the Philippines who thereafter
issued Administrative Order No. 332 decreeing the
removal from office of petitioner; that as a result of
control over a specific policy of government.
Thus the CSC is given the power over the President primarily
to give stability to the tenure of office of those who belong to
the classified service. To hold that civil service officials hold
their office at the will of the appointing power subject to
removal or forced transfer at any time, would demoralize and
undermine and eventually destroy the whole Civil Service
System and structure. System will devolve Jacksonian Spoils
System under which a victorious Chief Executive.
Yes. There is merit in the claim that petitioner, being a
presidential appointee, belongs to the non-competitive or
unclassified service of the government and is such he can
only be investigated and removed from office after due
hearing the President of the Philippines under the principle
that "the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint"
as can be clearly implied from Section 5 of Republic Act No.
2260.
Reiterating Ang-Angco, the President may extend the power
to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees
who belong to the executive department if they are
presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified
service for such can be justified under the principle that the
power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint (Lacson
v. Romero), but not with regard to those officers or
employees who belong, to the classified service for as to
them that inherent power cannot be exercised.
Consequently, as a corollary to the foregoing ruling, we may
state that the Commissioner of Civil Service is without
jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative charges
filed against petitioner because the authority of said
Commissioner to pass upon questions of suspension,
587!
petitioner's removal. After having been officially notified
of his removal, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration and/or reinstatement, and when this
was denied, he filed the instant petition before this
Court.
Respondent also averred that the President of the
Philippines, contrary to petitioner's claim, has jurisdiction
to investigate and remove him since he is a presidential
appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or
unclassified service under Section 5 of Republic Act No.
2260.
Issue: Whether Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the
President to be removed considering that he is an
appointee of the president.!
separation, or removal can only be exercised with reference
to permanent officials and employees in the classified service
to which classification petitioner does not belong.
There is, therefore, no error of procedure committed by
respondents insofar as the investigation and disciplinary
action taken against petitioner is concerned, even if he is
under the control and supervision of the Department of Public
Works, in view of the reason we have already stated that he
is a presidential appointee who comes exclusively under the
jurisdiction of the President.
With regard to the claim that the administrative proceedings
conducted against petitioner which led to his separation are
illegal simply because the charges preferred against him by
Congressman Roces were not sworn to as required by
Section 72 of Republic Act No. 2260, this much we can say:
said proceedings having been commenced against petitioner
upon the authority of the Chief Executive who was his
immediate administrative head, the same may be
commenced by him motu proprio without previous verified
complaint pursuant to Executive Order No. 370, series of
1941, the pertinent provisions of which are is follows:
(1) Administrative proceedings may be commenced a
government officer or employee by the head or
chief of the bureau or office concerned motu
proprio or upon complaint of any person which
shall be subscribed under oath by the complainant:
Provided, That if a complaint is not or cannot be
sworn to by the complainant, the head or chief of
the bureau or office concerned may in his
discretion, take action thereon if the public interest
or the special circumstances of the case, so
warrant.
588!
346 NAMARCO v. Respondent Arive was the Manager of the Traffic-
ARCA (1969) Storage Department of NAMARCO. Pursuant to General
Manager’s Administrative Order No. 1180, he was
investigated by a committee for violating
Management Memorandum Order directing that the
allocation and deliveries of merchandise imported
under the Trade Assistance Program to its
designated beneficiaries be stopped and for causing
the improper release of shipments intended for
delivery upon full payment by the Federation United
NAMARCO distributors (FUND). The committee found
Arive guilty, and so the General Manager issued Admin
Order No. 137 holding Arive guilty and dismissing him
from the service. The Board of Directors adopted
Resolution No. 584-60 dismissing him from the
service with prejudice to his reinstatement and to all
benefits he would have been entitled to.
Yes. The Court rules that the President can review and
reverse the decision of NAMARCO, and to order his
reinstatement for it falls within the constitutional power of the
President over all executive departments, bureaus and
offices. NAMARCO is administratively supervised by the
Administrator of the Office of Economic Coordination, who
shall be responsible to the President. In invoking the
NAMARCO charter stating that the decision shall be
conclusive, it does not mean that the decision to remove a
subordinate employee is not appealable to the President. The
President can modify or nullify an act of a subordinate officer
done in the performance of his duties. As a Presidential type
of government, all executive and administrative organizations
are adjuncts of the Executive department. In addition to that,
the right to reinstatement of Arive is clear for being unable to
comply with an illegal order by NAMARCO. Wherefore,
petition dismissed.!

Arive then appealed to the President of the

Philippines, resulting to a decision handed down by
Executive Secretary Ramon Diaz setting aside the
Resolution of NAMARCO and reinstating Arive to
his former position. The reason stated was that the
decision of NAMARCO stopping the further delivery of
the commodities had been subsequently declared illegal
by the Supreme Court for violating the contract sale, so
it would be improper to hold Arive liable for his failure to
comply with an illegal order. In addition to that, ,The
Pasig River bodegas being private warehouses could
not be controlled and supervised by Arive, so the
release of the commodities cannot be blocked by him.

NAMARCO filed a motion for reconsideration stating

that the power to remove its subordinate employees

589!
 through RA 1345 (NAMARCO Charter) belongs to the
General Manager with the approval of the Board of
directors, which is not appealable to any governmental
body. The motion was denied, along with a subsequent
motion for reconsideration. NAMARCO failed to comply
with the order to reinstate Arive, despite a complaint
from Arive. The Court in granting the complaint of Arive
ruled that the President has control and supervision over
all GOCCs including NAMARCO, hence he may review
or nullify any act of NAMARCO, and that the right to
reinstatement of Arive appears to be very clear. Thus
the present petition filed by NAMARCO.

Issue: Whether the President has authority to reverse

the decision of the Board of Directors of the NAMARCO
and to order the reinstatement of Arive.!
347 PASEI v. Article 25 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D.
Torres (1993) 442, as amended) encourages private sector
participation in recruitment and placement of workers
under guidelines, rules and regulations to be issued by
the Secretary of Labor.
On 20 January 1982, President Marcos issued LOI 1190
withholding the grant of new licenses to operate
agencies for overseas employment. On 19 March 1991,
President Aquino issued EO 450 lifting the ban on new
applications for licenses to operate recruitment agencies
subject to guidelines and regulations the Secretary of
Labor may promulgate. On 8 April 1991, respondent
Secretary of Labor and Employment promulgated
Department (DO) No. 9, Series of 1991, entitled
"Guidelines Implementing Executive Order No. 450."
Petitioners, all applicants for new licenses, support the
No. As we view it, LOI 1190 simply imposes a presidential
review of the authority of the Minister of Labor and
Employment to grant licenses, hence, directed to him alone.
Since this is undoubtedly an administrative action, LOI 1190
should properly be treated as an administrative issuance.
Unlike Presidential Decrees which by usage have gained
acceptance as laws promulgated by the President, Letters of
Instruction are presumed to be mere administrative
issuances except when the conditions set out in Garcia-
Padilla v. Enrile exist.
Consequently, to be considered part of the law of the land,
petitioners must establish that LOI, 1190 was issued in
response to "a grave emergency or a threat or imminence
thereof, or whenever the interim Batasan Pambansa or the
regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately
on any matter." The conspicuous absence of any of these
conditions fortifies the opinion that LOI 1190 cannot be any

590!
 position of respondent that LOI 1190 was not a law.
Petitioners pray that EO 450 be declared invalid for
being contrary to LOI 1190.
Issue: Whether the respondents acted with grave abuse
of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making
authority in issuing said circulars.!
348 De Leon v. Francisco R. Estavillo (Agent III) and Cesar de Leon
Carpio (1989) (Head Agent) of the NBI were terminated by then
Minister of Justice Neptali Gonzalez. Both appealed to
the Review Committee (EO 17) but the body to decline
to act their petitions--lost control because of ratification
of new constitution. They then moved the case to the
Civil Service Commission wherein the Merit Systems
Protection Board sustained their pleading insofar as
their dismissals were invalid and unconstitutional
having been violated the security of tenure under
the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the Board
ordered their reinstatement. However, respondent
Carpio, as Director of NBI, returned the orders issued by
the Secretary of Justice to CSC “without action,”
claiming that they were null and void for having been
rendered without jurisdiction.
Undersec. Justice Montenegro referred the order
reinstating Estavillo to NBI and also Undersec. Justice
more than a mere administrative issuance.
In arguing that LOI 1190 was issued to cope with "a grave
emergency," petitioners point to the 3rd "Whereas" clause
which speaks of the concern of the state against cut-throat
competition seriously affecting the integrity and viability of the
overseas recruitment industry, and the difficulty in the
regulation and supervision of agencies and the protection of
the welfare of the workers. The petitioner's appraisal that the
3rd "Whereas" clause manifests a grave emergency situation
is as good as anybody else's contrary view. Moreover, even if
we treat as emergency the "situation which has seriously
affected the integrity and viability of the overseas
employment industry," there is no indication that in the
judgment of the President it is grave.
No. It is an elementary principle of our republican
government, enshrined in the Constitution and honored not in
the breach but in the observance, that all executive
departments, bureaus and offices are under the control of the
President of the Philippines.
The President’s power of control is directly exercised by him
over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn and by his
authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their
respective jurisdictions in the executive department. The
constitutional vesture of this power in the President is self-
executing and does not require statutory implementation, nor
may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the
legislature.
The President has full control of all the members of his
Cabinet and may appoint them as he sees fit or shuffle them
at pleasure, subject only to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments and replace them in his discretion. In
591!
 Bello III referred order to reinstate De Leon to the NBI.
Reaction of respondent NBI was to refer to the CSC,
claiming that the said orders were null and void for
having been rendered without jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether the Director of the NBI can disobey an
explicit order issued by the Sec. of Justice.!
349 Joson v. Torres Respondent Torres filed a complaint against Petitioner
(1998) Governor Joson before the Office of the President for
barging violently into the session hall of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan with the company of armed
men. The case was endorsed to the DILG. Petitioner
was declared in default and ordered the petitioner 60-
day preventive suspension for failure to file an answer
after three (3) extensions.
Petitioner later filed a “Motion to Conduct Formal
Investigation”. DILG denied the motion declaring that the
submission of position papers substantially complies
Noblejas v. Salas the court held that the fiscal was bound to
obey the order of the Sec. of Justice who was exercising over
him the President’s constitutional power of control. His acts
should therefore have been respected by the respondent
Director of the NBI.
In the case at bar, there is no question that when he directed
the respondent to reinstate the petitioners, Sec. Ordonez was
acting in the regular discharge of his functions as an alter ego
of the President. His acts should therefore have been
respected by the respondent Director of the NBI, which is in
the Department of Justice under the direct control of its
Secretary. As a subordinate in this department, the
respondent was (and is) bound to obey the Secretary’s
directives, which are presumptively the acts of the President
of the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The respondent
is hereby ORDERED to immediately reinstate the
petitioners as directed by the Secretary of Justice in
implementation of the challenged orders of the Merit Systems
Protection Board of the Civil Service Commission. No costs.!
No. The DILG’s delegation of power is valid. The President
remains the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the
power to investigate, not the power to discipline. The power
to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As
the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power
derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints
against local government officials. A. O. No. 23, however,
delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special
Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the
Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary
to petitioner Joson’s claim.
592!
 with the requirements of procedural due process in
administrative proceedings. Later, the Executive
Secretary, by authority of the President, adopted the
findings and recommendation of the DILG Secretary.
The former imposed on petitioner the penalty of
suspension from office for six (6) months without pay.
Petitioner argues that there is an undue delegation of
power to the DILG and that his motion shouldn’t be
dismissed because of the submission of position papers.
Issue: Whether the resolution of DILG Secretary is
invalid on the ground of undue delegation that it is the
President who is the Disciplining Authority, not the
Secretary of DILG?
350 Hutchinson v. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority advertised in leading
SBMA (2000) national daily newspapers and in one international
publication an invitation offering to the private sector the
opportunity to develop and operate a modern marine
Under the doctrine of qualified political agency “…which
recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by
the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.”
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President
provided in the Constitution. Control is said to be the very
heart of the power of the presidency. As head of the
Executive Department, the President, however, may delegate
some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he
is required by the Constitution to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally.
The members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the
President in certain matters because the President cannot be
expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers
personally all the time. Each head of a department is, and
must be, the President’s alter ego in the matters of that
department where the President is required by law to
exercise authority.!
(1) Yes. The declaration made by the SBMA Board declaring
HPPL as the winning bidder was neither final nor
unassailable. Under LOI No. 620, all projects undertaken by
the SBMA are subject to the approval of the Office of the
593!
container terminal within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone.
One of the qualified bidders was Hutchison Ports
Philippines limited (HPPL). Also, the World Bank was
also hired for their expertise to evaluate the business
plans submitted by each of the bidders. After
assessment HPPL’s business plan was far superior than
the others (World Bank). ICTSI (one of the qualified
bidders) was legally barred from operating a second port
in the Philippines--the first one being the Manila
International Container Port based on EO 212. ICTSI
then appealed to the Office of the President for the
re-evaluation of the bids. President then issued a
memorandum to withhold the signing of the
Contract with HPPL and conduct a rebidding.
Issues: (1) Whether the Office of the President can set
aside the award made by SBMA to HPPL.
(2) Whether the HPPL can sue in the courts
President. Hence, the Board of SBMA is under the control
and supervision of the President of the Philippines.
Therefore, the declaration made by the Board did not vest
any right in favor of HPPL.
(2) No. HPPL cannot sue in the Philippines. It is a foreign
corporation registered under the laws of the British Virgin
Islands. It did not register here in the Philippines.
The maelstrom of this issue is whether participating in the
bidding is a mere isolated transaction, or did it constitute
“engaging in” or “transacting” business in the Philippines
such that petitioner HPPL needed a license to do business in
the Philippines before it could come to court.
HPPL cannot invoke that it was suing only on an isolated
transaction. The conduct of bidding is not an isolated
transaction. It is “doing business” here in the Philippines. The
Supreme Court emphasized that as a general rule, “doing” or
“engaging in” or “transacting” business in the Philippines is a
case to case basis. It has often been held that a single act or
transaction may be considered as “doing business” when a
corporation performs acts for which it was created or
exercises some of the functions for which it was organized.
The amount or volume of the business is of no moment, for
even a singular act cannot be merely incidental or casual if it
indicates the foreign corporation’s intention to do business.
Participating in the bidding process constitutes “doing
business” because it shows the foreign corporation’s
intention to engage in business here. The bidding for the
concession contract is but an exercise of the corporation’s
reason for creation or existence. Therefore, HPPL has done
business here without license. It cannot now sue in the
594!

351 Cruz v. Sec. of Petition assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act
DENR (2000) No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA) in so far as it grants ownership over natural
resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the
petition be granted in part. Petitioners assert that there
is unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over
lands of the public domain as well as the rule infringes
upon the President’s power of control over executive
departments under Section 17, Art. 7 of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether the power of the President over the
NCIP is unconstitutional
Philippines without license because its participation in the
bidding is not merely an isolated transaction.
The primary purpose of the license requirement is to compel
a foreign corporation desiring to do business within the
Philippines to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the courts of
the state and to enable the government to exercise
jurisdiction over them for the regulation of their activities in
this country. Accordingly, petitioner HPPL must be held to be
incapacitated to bring this petition for injunction before this
Court for it is a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines without the requisite license. !
Kapunan (Separate Opinion)
No. The NCIP is the primary agency of government for the
formulation and implementation of policies, plans and
programs to recognize, promote and protect the rights and
well-being of indigenous peoples. It shall be an independent
agency under the Office of the President. As such, the
administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of
the President is characterized as a lateral but
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination. This relationship shall be carried out
through a system of periodic reporting. Matters of day-to-day
administration or all those pertaining to internal operations
shall be left to the discretion of the Chairperson of the
Commission, as the Chief Executive Officer.
Such characterization does not remove said body from the
President’s control and supervision. That Congress did not
intend to place the NCIP under the control of the President in
all instances is evident in the IPRA itself, which provides that
the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals, like
595!

352 Domingo v. Pres. Estrada issued EO 81 transferring sports
Zamora (2003) programs and activities of DECS to the Philippine Sports
Commission (PSC). Pursuant to this, then DECS Sec.
Gen. issued Memo 01592 & Memo 01594 reassigning
Staff of the Bureau of Physical Education and School
Sports (BPESS). Petitioners alleges EO 81 as void and
unconstitutional for undue legislation of Pres. Estrada
and violation of separation of powers & Memoranda for
violation of said personnel's security of tenure. During
the pendency of the case, RA 9155/2001 Governance of
Basic Education Act was enacted with Sec. 9 abolishing
BPESS and transferring programs and activities of
DECS relating to sports competition to PSC.
Issue: Whether EO 81 is valid.
those of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Nevertheless, the NCIP, although independent to a certain
degree, was placed by Congress "under the office of the
President" and, as such, is still subject to the President’s
power of control and supervision granted under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution with respect to its performance
of administrative functions, such as the following:
o must have approval of presidents in loans
o approval in negotiation
o it is still mandated to submit annual reports to
President.
o Direction of president and the President is also given
the power to appoint the Commissioners of the
NCIP as well as to remove them from office for
cause motu proprio or upon the recommendation of
any indigenous community.!
Yes. Although the issue is already academic, its significance
constrains the Court to point out that Executive Order No.
292 (“EO 292” for brevity), otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, expressly grants the President
continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the
President. Section 31 of EO 292 provides:
“SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to
Reorganize his Office. – The President, subject to the policy
in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of
the President.
EO 292 Section 31(1): President can reorganize the office of
the President proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging
units or by transferring functions from one unit to another
596!
EO 292 Section 31 (2) and (3): President power to reorganize
offices outside the office of the President proper but still
within the office of the President is limited to merely
transferring functions or agencies. Transfer of functions does
not result to employee’s cessation in office because his office
continues to exist although in another department, agency or
office

Since EO 81 is based on the President’s continuing authority

under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, EO 81 is a valid
exercise of the President’s delegated power to reorganize the
Office of the President. The law grants the President this
power in recognition of the recurring need of every President
to reorganize his office “to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency.” The Office of the President is the nerve center of
the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the
Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and
reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to
carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of
the President is the command post of the President. This is
the rationale behind the President’s continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President.

Petitioners’ contention that the DECS is not part of the Office

of the President is immaterial. Under EO 292, the DECS is
indisputably a Department of the Executive Branch. Even if
the DECS is not part of the Office of the President, Section
31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 clearly authorizes the President to
transfer any function or agency of the DECS to the Office of
the President. Under its charter, the PSC is attached to the
Office of the President. Therefore, the President has the
authority to transfer the “functions, programs and activities of
DECS related to sports development” to the PSC, making EO

597!

353 DENR v. DENR The Regional Executive Director of DENR for Region 12
Region 12 issued a memorandum directing the immediate transfer
Employees of the DENR 12 Regional Offices from Cotabato City to
(2003) Koronadal Cotabato. The memorandum was issued
pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued by the DENR
secretary. Repondents filed with the RTC a petition for
nullity of the order with preliminary injunction. RTC ruled
in favor of respondents because of procedural matters.
Hence this petition. Petitioner prays for a liberal
application of procedural rules considering the greater
interest of justice. (which was granted in the ruling
obviously)
Issue: Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority
to reorganize the DENR Region 12 Office.
81 a valid presidential issuance.
However, the President’s power to reorganize the Office of
the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should
be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of
the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the
President can reorganize the Office of the
President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or
merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to
another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292,
the President’s power to reorganize offices outside the Office
of the President Proper but still within the Office of the
President is limited to merely transferring functions or
agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or
Agencies, and vice versa.!
Yes. Under the Qualified Political Agency Doctrine: “All
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
the Executive Department; the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by
the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive."
However, as head of the Executive Department, the
President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and
supervisory) powers personally all the time. He may
delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except
598!

354 Chavez v. In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
Romulo (2004) delivered a speech before the members of the PNP
stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public
places to avert the rising crime incidents. In her speech
she: DIRECTING THE PNP CHIEF TO SUSPEND
INDEFINITELY THE ISSUANCE OF PERMIT TO
CARRY FIREARMS IN PUBLIC PLACES. THE
ISSUANCE OF PERMITS WILL NOW BE LIMITED
ONLY TO OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF GUNS
AND NOT TO CARRYING THEM IN PUBLIC
PLACES. FROM NOW ON, ONLY THE UNIFORMED
MEN IN THE MILITARY AND AUTHORIZED LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS CAN CARRY FIREARMS
IN PUBLIC PLACES, AND ONLY PURSUANT TO
EXISTING LAW. CIVILIAN OWNERS MAY NO
LONGER BRING THEIR FIREARMS OUTSIDE THEIR
when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally.
President may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet
members except when he is required by the Constitution to
act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that
he acts personally. Applying the doctrine of qualified political
agency, the power of the president to reorganize the national
government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members
exercising control over a particular executive department.
In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly
reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR
XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South
Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR
Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the
President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the
same.!
No. First, Speech is merely suggestive. Second, President
Arroyo hold the steering wheel that control the course of her
government. She lays down policies in the execution of her
plans and programs. Whatever policy she chooses she has
her subordinate to implement them. In short she has the
power of control. Thus, when President Arroyo directed
respondent Ebdane to suspend the issuance of PTCFOR,
she was just directing a subordinate to perform an assigned
duty. Such act is well within the prerogative of her office.
The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative power,
however, is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of
exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice
permits the legislative body to delegate its licensing power to
certain persons, municipal corporations, towns, boards,
councils, commissions, commissioners, auditors, bureaus
599!
 RESIDENCES. THOSE WHO WANT TO USE THEIR
GUNS FOR TARGET PRACTICE WILL BE GIVEN
SPECIAL AND TEMPORARY PERMITS FROM TIME
TO TIME ONLY FOR THAT PURPOSE. AND THEY
MAY NOT LOAD THEIR GUNS WITH BULLETS
UNTIL THEY ARE IN THE PREMISES OF THE FIRING
RANGE. Acting on President Arroyo’s directive,
respondent Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines
Petition to seek and prevent the implementation of the
“Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the
Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence” issued by
PNP Chief of Police Ebdane. Pres. Relying on the
principle of separation of powers, petitioner argues that
only Congress can withhold his right to bear arms. In
revoking all existing Permits to Carry Firearms Outside
of Residence (PTCFOR), President Arroyo and
respondent Ebdane transgressed the settled principle
and arrogated upon themselves a power they do not
possess – the legislative power.
Issue: The President has no power or authority-much
less by a mere speech-to alter, modify or amend the law
on firearms by imposing a gun bank and cancelling
existing permits for guns to be carried outside
residences?!
355 KMU v. Dir- This case involves two consolidated petitions for
Gen of NEDA certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of
(2006) the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of Executive
Order No. 420 (EO 420) on the ground that it is
unconstitutional. EO 420, issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005, reads: REQUIRING
ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-
OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO
and directors. Such licensing power includes the power to
promulgate necessary rules and regulations. Thus, when
President Arroyo directed respondent Ebdane to suspend the!
issuance of PTCFOR, she was just directing a subordinate to
perform an assigned duty. Such act is well within the
prerogative of her office.
Additionally, in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. we held that:
“Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or
a property right protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution” In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted
broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident
from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
P.D. No. 1866 which state that “the Chief of Constabulary
may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under
such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders
of firearms to carry them outside of residence.” Following the
American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR
does not constitute a property right protected under our
Constitution. Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary
licenses in other regulated fields.!
No. Section 2 of EO 420 provides, “Coverage. – All
government agencies and government-owned and controlled
corporations issuing ID cards to their members or
constituents shall be covered by this executive order.” EO
420 applies only to government entities that issue ID
cards as part of their functions under existing laws.
These government entities have already been issuing ID
cards even prior to EO 420.
600!
STREAMLINE AND HARMONIZE THEIR
IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING
FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
Under EO 420, the President directs all government
agencies and government-owned and controlled
corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and
format for their existing identification (ID) systems.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 167798 allege that EO 420 is
unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of
legislative functions by the executive branch of the
government. Furthermore, they allege that EO 420
infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy. Petitioners in
G.R. No. 167930 allege that EO 420 is void because the
Executive has usurped the legislative power of
Congress as she has no power to issue EO 420.
Furthermore, the implementation of the EO will use
public funds not appropriated by Congress for that
purpose.
Issue:! In issuing EO 420, is unconstitutional as it is
beyond the power of the President?
Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to
“adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system.” Thus, all
government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions
under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data
collection and format for their IDs. In short, the purposes of
the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to reduce
costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, insure compatibility,
and provide convenience to the people served by
government entities.
Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and
recorded under the uniform ID system to only 14 specific
items, namely: (1) Name; (2) Home Address; (3) Sex; (4)
Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of Birth; (7) Place of Birth;
(8) Marital Status; (9) Name of Parents; (10) Height; (11)
Weight; (12) Two index fingers and two thumbmarks; (13)
Any prominent distinguishing features like moles or others;
and (14) Tax Identification Number.
These limited and specific data are the usual data required
for personal identification by government entities, and even
by the private sector. Anyone who applies for or renews a
driver’s license provides to the LTO all these 14 specific
data.
At present, government entities like LTO require considerably
more data from applicants for identification purposes. EO
420 will reduce the data required to be collected and
recorded in the ID databases of the government
entities. Government entities cannot collect or record data,
for identification purposes, other than the 14 specific data.
Making the data collection and recording of government
entities unified, and making their ID formats uniform, will
601!
admittedly achieve substantial benefits. These benefits are
savings in terms of procurement of equipment and supplies,
compatibility in systems as to hardware and software, ease of
verification and thus increased reliability of data, and the
user-friendliness of a single ID format for all government
entities.

There is no dispute that government entities can individually

limit the collection and recording of their data to the 14
specific items in Sec. 3 of EO 420. There is also no dispute
that these government entities can individually adopt the ID
format as specified in Sec. 3 of EO 420. Such an act is
certainly within the authority of the heads or governing
boards of the government entities that are already authorized
under existing laws to issue IDs.

A unified ID system for all these government entities can be

achieved in either of two ways. First, the heads of these
existing government entities can enter into a memorandum of
agreement making their systems uniform. If the government
entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID
pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws, they
can also adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID format,
especially if the uniform format will result in substantial
savings, greater efficiency, and optimum compatibility. This is
purely an administrative matter, and does not involve the
exercise of legislative power.

Second, the President may by executive or administrative

order direct the government entities under the Executive
department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format.

Section 17, Article VII provides for the President’s power of

control. The same Section also mandates the President to

602!
“ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the

President can direct all government entities, in the exercise
of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform
ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings,
efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the
public. The President’s constitutional power of control is
self-executing and does not need any implementing
legislation.

Of course, the President’s power of control is limited to the

Executive branch of government and does not extend to the
Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions.
Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the
COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to
issue voter’s ID cards.This only shows that EO 420 does not
establish a national ID system because legislation is needed
to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all
branches of government.

The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that

the laws are faithfully executed. There are several laws
mandating government entities to reduce costs, increase
efficiency, and in general, improve public services. The
adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under EO
420 is designed to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and
in general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing EO
420, the President is simply performing the
constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed.

Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or

repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the President did not

603!

356 Philips v. BOI Petition to review 2 assailed resolution of the CA.
(2010) Petitioner Phillips Seafood Corporation is a domestic
corporation engaged in the export of processed
crabmeat and other seafood products. Petitioner
registered with respondent Bureau of Investments (BOI)
as an existing and expansion producer of soft shell
crabs and other seafood products. Petitioner’s plant was
situated as Masbate and administrative office in Cebu
and relocated to Bacolod city. Petitioner was granted an
Income Tax Holiday (ITH) for locating to a less-
developed area in accordance with Art. 40 of EO 226
(Omnibus Investment Code of 1987). Then petitioner
filed to respondent BOI an application for registration of
it new plant in Roxas city having an expanded capacity
of 155, 205 kg a year. Petitioner’s registration was
categorized as a new producer on a non-pioneer status
with an ITH for four years beginning January 2000.
Petitioner then elevated it to the Office of the President
but likewise denied petition.
In a letter dated 25 September 2003, respondent BOI
informed petitioner that the ITH previously granted
would be applicable only to the period from 13 August
1999 to 21 October 1999 or before petitioner’s transfer
to a “not less-developed area.” Petitioner wrote
respondent BOI requesting for a reconsideration of its
decision.
make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and
executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as
insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-
friendliness in the implementation of current ID systems of
government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is
simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation.
No. E.O. No. 226 apparently allows two avenues of appeal
from an action or decision of the BOI, depending on the
nature of the controversy. One mode is to elevate an appeal
to the Office of the President when the action or decision
pertains to either of these two instances: first, in the decisions
of the BOI over controversies concerning the implementation
of the relevant provisions of E.O No. 226 that may arise
between registered enterprises or investors and government
agencies under Article 7 (There shall be a board that is
governed by 4 governors that shall exercise their powers in a
quorum); and second, in an action of the BOI over
applications for registration under the investment priorities
plan under Article 36 (Any order or decision of the Board
shall be final and executory after thirty (30) days from its
promulgation. Within the said period of thirty (30) days,
said order or decision may be appealed to the Office of
the President.
Another mode of review is to elevate the matter directly to
judicial tribunals. For instance, under Article 50, E.O. No.
226, a party adversely affected by the issuance of a license
to do business in favor of an alien or a foreign firm may file
with the proper Regional Trial Court an action to cancel said
license. Then, there is Article 82 (all appeals shall be filed
directly with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the order or decision), E.O. No. 226,
which, in its broad phraseology, authorizes the direct appeal
to the Supreme Court from any order or decision of
604!
On 03 May 2004, petitioner received by fax BOI’s letter
denying its motion for reconsideration. Petitioner
elevated the matter to the Office of the President, which
dismissed petitioner’s appeal on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction in a Decision dated 22 September 2004. The
Office of the President likewise denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration in an Order dated 14 March
2005.Petitioner received a copy of the order on 01 April
2005.
On 05 April 2005, petitioner filed a petition for review
before the Court of Appeals, questioning the dismissal
of its appeal before the Office of the President. The
petition argued that the executive power of control over
the acts of officials under the Office of the President is
superior to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals over decisions of quasi-judicial agencies under
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In their petition they
argued that:
(1) The executive power of control over the acts
of officials under the office of the President
is superior to the appellate CA
(2) Also they contend that decision of BOI
appeal to the Office of the President should
be allowed if not it would be contrary to
constitutional power of President to review
acts of department!
!
Issue: Whether the executive power of control over the
acts of department secretaries must prevail.!
respondent BOI “involving the provisions of E.O. No. 226.”
E.O. No. 226 contains no provision specifically governing the
remedy of a party whose application for an ITH has been
denied by the BOI in the same manner that Articles 7 and 36
thereof allow recourse to the Office of the President in certain
instances. Nevertheless, Article 82 of E.O. No. 22 is the
catch-all provision allowing the appeal to the courts from all
other decisions of respondent BOI involving the other
provisions of E.O. No. 226.
In relation to Article 82, E.O. No. 226, Section 1 of Rule 43 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly includes
respondent BOI as one of the quasi-judicial agencies whose
judgments or final orders are appealable to the Court of
Appeals via a verified petition for review. Appeals from
judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now
required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified
petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in
Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to
provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-
judicial agencies.
Petitioner further contends that from the decision of
respondent BOI, appeal to the Office of the President should
be allowed; otherwise, the constitutional power of the
President to review acts of department secretaries will be
rendered illusory by mere rules of procedure.
Such “executive control” is not absolute. The definition of the
structure of the executive branch of government, and the
corresponding degrees of administrative control and
supervision is not the exclusive preserve of the executive. It
may be effectively limited by the Constitution, by law, or by
605!

357 Angeles v. Petitioner (Judge Adoracion Angeles) was the foster
Gaite (2009) mother of her 14-year old grandniece Maria Mercedes
Vistan and she (petitioner) provided the child with love
and care, catered to her needs and sent her to a good
school. Petitioner’s love for the child extended to her
siblings, particularly her half-brother, respondent
Michael Vistan (a former drug addict)
One night Michael Vistan had a falling out with petitioner
for his failure to do a very important errand for which he
was severely reprimanded over the phone and was told
that no assistance of any kind would be extended to him
and no longer welcome at the petitioner’s residence. He
then conspired with his cohorts and induce his half-
sister to leave the petitioner’s custody. Petitioner filed a
complaint of kidnapping (Inducing a Minor to Abandon
His Home) against Vistan. Michael went into hiding
judicial decisions. All the more in the matter of appellate
procedure as in the instant case. Appeals are remedial in
nature; hence, constitutionally subject to this Court’s rule-
making power.
Parenthetically, Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 18 expressly
recognizes an exception to the remedy of appeal to the Office
of the President from the decisions of executive departments
and agencies. Under Section 1 thereof, a decision or order
issued by a department or agency need not be appealed to
the Office of the President when there is a special law that
provides for a different mode of appeal. In the instant case,
the enabling law of respondent BOI, E.O. No. 226, explicitly
allows for immediate judicial relief from the decision of
respondent BOI involving petitioner’s application for an ITH.
E.O. No. 226 is a law of special nature and should prevail
over A.O. No. 18.
No. The President's act of delegating authority to the
Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum Circular
No. 58 is constitutional.
The President himself had set the limits of his power to
review decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of
Justice.: except if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua
or higher.
The President has the right to delegate such power to the
DOJ Secretary for the purpose of achieving proper and
speedy administration of justice.
Qualified Political Agency Doctrine: “All executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department; the heads of the various executive departments
are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except
606!
while he dragged along his half-sister Maria Mercedes.
He eventually brought the girl to ABS-CBN where he
made her recite a concocted tale of child abuse against
petitioner. But prompted by his desire to retaliate against
the petitioner and to get himself off the hook from the
kidnapping charge, Michael caused undue physical,
emotional and psychological sufferings to Maria
Mercedes Vistan.
The petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan
before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Malolos,
Bulacan for five counts of violation of RA 7610 (Child
Abuse Act) and PD 1829(Penalizing obstruction of
Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders)
and libel for the aunt of Michael and Mercedes.
in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive
are performed by and through the executive departments,
and the acts of the secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive."!

The Investigating Prosecutor issued a resolution to

uphold the charge of violation of Ra 7610 and dismissed
that charged of violation of PD 1829(. This was however
denied by the Provincial Prosecutor who also issued a
decision to dismiss the case. Petitioner filed a petition
for review with DOJ USec. Teehankee and with DOJ
Sec. Perez but both were denied

She tried appealing to the Office of the President but

was dismissed by such on the ground of Memorandum
Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for
review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary
of Justice except those involving offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua or death.

Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals which sustained

the dismissal. Memorandum Circular No. 58,
promulgated by the Office of the President on June 30,

607!
 1993 reads:

xxx No appeal from or petition for review of

decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice
on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be
entertained by the Office of the President, except those
involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death |||xxx

Petitioner argues in the main that Memorandum

Circular No. 58 is an invalid regulation, because it
diminishes the power of control of the President and
bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a
subordinate officer, almost unfettered power.

Issue: Whether Memorandum Circular No. 58 is

unconstitutional since it diminishes the power of the
President.!
358 Boy Scouts of The Commission on audit issued a Resolution no. 99-
the Philippines 011. The said resolution stated that the Boy Scouts of
v. COA (2011) the Philippines (BSP) was created as a public
corporation under the Commonwealth Act. No. 111
amended by P.D. no. 460 and R.A. No. 7278. With this
BSP is said to be put under the jurisdiction of the COA
to be financially audited as it is classified among
government corporations belonging to the Educational,
Social, Scientific, Civic and Research Sector. BSP
claims that it is not subject to audit as (1) it does not
have funds invested in BSP; (2) its assets are acquired
from charity (mostly America); and (3) it finances its
operation from membership dues.
COA commented that BSP is a public corporation (1)
under commonwealth act; (2) it’s a government agency
No. GOVERMENT STILL HAS CONTROL OVER BSP. NOT
ALL NON GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED CORPORATION
ARE IPSO FACTO PRIVATE CORPORATION. SOME MAY
BECOME INSTRUMENTALITY (agency under special
charter) OR CHARTERED INSTITUTION (has some
corporate power, operational autonomy, and can administer
special fund). A government instrumentality is one that has
a public purpose/interest, that is not integrated within
the department framework and endowed with some if not
all corporate powers administering.
In the case at bar, BSP is a public corporation with a public
purpose whereby the purpose is for the wellbeing of youth,
future leader of the country. It is also under the administrative
code of 1987 and includes department of education culture
and sports pursuant to its charter. Thus it does not mean that

608!
 whose funds are subjected to audit; and (3) RA 7273 did if a corporation is not a government owned or controlled then
not change in character of BSP. Under the BSP charter it automatically means it is a private corporation since under
(commonwealth act of 111) created BSP as a public the Art XII of Sec. 16 that there exist public corporations that
corporation for public interest and purpose. Under are not judged base on ownership or economic viability.
administrative code 1987 BSP is classified as an Additionally, according to The Veterans Federation of the
attached agency whereby there shall be at least one Philippines v. Reyes, despite the VFP being not granted
representative of the government in its governing board, government funds by DBM it is not proof that it is considered
another provision to be taken into account is article XVII then a private corporation. This will not also prevent/preclude
which bans the creation of "private corporations “by the government from extending financial support to BSP. The
special law. erroneous application as cited in VFP does not bar the
government from correct application of the law. Not being
Issue: Whether BSP is no longer a Government audited by COA in the past does not also prevent COA from
controlled corporation thus Philippine government no conducting it in the present
longer has control over it and has no power to be
audited under COA.
II. Power of Supervision
359 Drilon v. Lim Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Autonomy Act, the Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to
(1994) Secretary of Justice Drilon had, on appeal to him of four review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax
oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both
7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, of these grounds. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila
null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version
procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for of what the Code should be.. All he did in reviewing the said
containing certain provisions contrary to law and public measure was determine if the petitioners were performing
policy. Secretary Drilon declared that: their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the
(1) there were no written notices of public hearings on prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances
the proposed Manila Revenue Code that were sent to and the grant of powers to the city government under the
interested parties Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not
(2) nor were copies of the proposed ordinance published of control but of mere supervision
in three successive issues of a newspaper of general
circulation Control : "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set
(3) No minutes were submitted to show that the aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
obligatory public hearings had been held. of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
(4) Neither were copies of the measure as approved the latter,"
posted in prominent places in the city

609!
(5)Finally, the Manila Revenue Code was not translated
into Pilipino or Tagalog and disseminated among the
people for their information and guidance
RTC of Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution and
sustained the ordinance. More importantly, it declared
Section 187 of the Local Government Code as
unconstitutional because of its vesture in the
Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local
governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy
mandated in the Constitution and of the specific
provision therein conferring on the President of the
Philippines only the power of supervision over local
governments. The Secretary is empowered to review tax
ordinances and inferentially to annul them.
The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187
is constitutional and that the procedural
requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as
specified in the Local Government Code had indeed
not been observed. Parenthetically, this petition was
originally dismissed by the Court for non-compliance
with Circular 1-88, the Solicitor General having failed to
submit a certified true copy of the challenged decision.
However, on motion for reconsideration with the
required certified true copy of the decision attached, the
petition was reinstated.
Section 187: Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of
Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory
Public Hearings. — The procedure for approval of local
tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in
accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided,
That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose
Supervision: “the power of a superior officer to see to it that
lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law."
i.e If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done
or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules
Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on
two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain ultra
vires (beyond powers) provisions and non-compliance with
the prescribed procedure in its enactment.
These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or
reasonableness, of the tax measure. The omission of the
posting of the ordinance does not affect the validity
considering that the publication in newspapers of general
circulation will satisfy due process. Also the translation
requirement is only applicable to local development plans
and public investment programs of the LGU and not to tax
ordinances
Section 187 of the Local Government Code is
constitutional but AFFIRMING its finding that the
procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila
Revenue Code have been observed.
610!
 prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That
any question on the constitutionality or legality of
tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised
on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity
thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a
decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of
the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall
not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the
ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee,
or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within
thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse
of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice
acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file
appropriate proceedings with a court of competent
jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether the lower court has jurisdiction to

consider the constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC
360 PRA v. Bunag This is a petition to review for certiorari involving alleged
(2003) overpay of petitioner of certain benefits and allowances.
The petitioner is PRA or also known as Philippine
Retirement Authority is a government controlled
organization under EO 1038 while the respondents are
Bunag, a former general manager of PRA and Lozada,
a department manager of PRA. The office of the
president approved corporate operating budget of 1992
P25,288,091; however, P9,129,333 was disallowed
representing unjustified/unauthorized allowances, fringe
benefits and others.
PRA reduced the compensation of private respondent
and stopped payment of RATA and other allowances.
Private respondents then elevated the matter to the
Office of the President. The case was docketed as O.P.
Yes. Under P.D. No. 1037, PRA was granted the power
and authority to “establish and fix, review, revise and
adjust the appropriate compensation scheme of the
officers and employees of with reasonable allowances,
bonuses and other incentives as may be recommended by
the Chief Executive Officer/General Manager. Further,
Section 13 of P.D. No. 1037 also exempts officers and
employees of PRA from the rules and regulations of the
Office of Compensation and Position Classification.
Notwithstanding exemptions from the authority of the Office
of Compensation and Position Classification granted to PRA
under its charter, PRA is still required to 1) observe the
policies and guidelines issued by the President with
respect to position classification, salary rates, levels of
allowances, project and other honoraria, overtime rates,

611!
Case No. 95-L-6336.
On December 18, 1995, the Office of the President
reversed the ruling of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) and awarded to the private
respondents the allowances and benefits claimed. It
ruled that “the exemption of PRA from the jurisdiction of
[the DBM], as provided under the PRA charter,
remained effective and legally impervious to the
assertions by [the DBM] of its authority. As no prior
approval or authority is required from the DBM with
respect to the compensation scheme of PRA and the
grant of allowances by it to its employees, the Office of
the President held that disbursements made by PRA
representing compensation and allowances of PRA
officials and employees prior to the effectivity of July 1,
1989 were valid. It applied the principle of “non-
diminution of benefits” embodied in the transitory
provisions of R.A No. 6758 and concluded that private
respondents are entitled to continue receiving the
compensation and benefits previously enjoyed by them.
Thus, the Office of the President directed the
Department of Budget and Management to provide
enough funds to cover the salaries and allowances of
the PRA officials and employees.
Consequently, petitioner PRA filed a Petition for
Review with the Court of Appeals. On December 14,
1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
affirming the ruling of the Office of the President.
Private respondents, on the other hand, argue that PRA
has the requisite power and authority to impose and
implement a compensation scheme for its employees
without need of prior approval or authority from the
and other forms of compensation and fringe benefits and
2) report to the President, through the Budget
Commission, on their position classification and
compensation plans, policies, rates and other related details
following such specifications as may be prescribed by the
President.
Despite the power granted to the Board of Directors of
PRA to establish and fix a compensation and benefits
scheme for its employees, the same is subject to the
review of the DBM. However, in view of the express powers
granted to PRA under its charter, the extent of the review
authority of the Department of Budget and Management
is limited. As stated in Intia, Jr. v. Commission on Audit, the
task of the DBM is simply to review the compensation and
benefits plan of the government agency or entity
concerned and determine if the same complies with the
prescribed policies and guidelines issued in this regard.
The role of the DBM is supervisorial in nature, its main
duty being to ascertain that the proposed compensation,
benefits and other incentives to be given to PRA officials
and employees adhere to the policies and guidelines
issued in accordance with applicable laws.
In sum, this Court rules that prior to R.A. No. 6758, the
compensation and benefits scheme of petitioner PRA is
subject to the review authority of the DBM. Hence,
compensation, allowances and other benefits received
by PRA officials and employees without the requisite
approval or authority of the DBM are unauthorized and
irregular and this defect cannot be cured by the
transitory provisions in R.A No. 6758
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in
612!
 DBM.
Issue: Whether the disbursement made by PRA under
RA 6758 compensation and position classification act of
1989 subject to the review of the DBM? !
361 Romualdez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government
Sandiganbayan (PCGG), filed before the (Sandiganbayan) Anti-Graft
(2004) Court, charging the accused with violation of Sec. 5, RA
3019, that Alfredo Romualdez, brother-in-law of
Ferdinand Marcos, for the purpose of promoting his self-
interested and/or that of others, intervene directly or
indirectly, in a contract between the National Shipyard
and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a GOCC and the
Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO),
a private corporation, the majority stocks of which is
owned by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed
to the BASECO its ownership for P5M.
Petitioner argues that he enjoys derivative immunity,
because he allegedly served as a high-ranking naval
officer (naval aide-de-camp) of former President
Marcos. He relies on Section 17 of Article VII of the
1973 Constitution, as amended, which we quote:
“The President shall be immune from suit during his
tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for
official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his
specific orders during his tenure”
Issue: Whether petitioner enjoys derivative immunity
from suit.
CA-G.R. SP No. 47818 is MODIFIED as follows:
Compensation and allowances granted to private
respondents prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6758 without
the authority or approval of the Department of Budget and
Management are unauthorized and disallowed. The DBM is
directed to effect the necessary adjustments
No. As the Sandiganbayan the claimed provision is not
applicable to petitioner because the immunity amendment
became effective only in 1981 while the alleged crime
happened in 1975.
In Estrada v. Desierto, this Court exhaustively traced the
origin of executive immunity in order to determine the extent
of its applicability. We explained therein that executive
immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President.
It could not be used to shield a non-sitting President from
prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in
office. The reasoning of petitioner must therefore fail, since
he derives his immunity from one who is no longer sitting as
President. Verily, the felonious acts of public officials and
their close relatives “are not acts of the State, and the officer
who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands on the
same footing as any other trespasser.”
In sum, petitioner utterly fails to show that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
assailed Resolutions. On the contrary, it acted prudently, in
accordance with law and jurisprudence.
613!
362 National Artist Petitioners alleged that on January 30, 2007, a joint
for Literature meeting of the NCCA Board of Commissioners and the
Virgilio Almario CCP Board of Trustees was held to discuss, among
(2013) others, the evaluation of the 2009 Order of National
Artists and the convening of the National Artist Award
Secretariat.
In a letter submitted to the President it was stated:
We are respectfully submitting a recommendation of the
NCCA Board of Trustees and CCP Board of Trustees
for the Proclamation of the following as 2009 Order of
National Artists:
Mr. MANUEL CONDE+ (Posthumous) – Film and
Broadcast Arts
Dr. RAMON SANTOS – Music
Mr. LAZARO FRANCISCO+ (Posthumous) – Literature
Mr. FEDERICO AGUILAR-ALCUAZ – Visual Arts
The above persons were identified by experts in the
various fields of arts and culture, including living
National Artists. An intensive selection process was
observed following established practice.
According to respondents, the aforementioned letter
was referred by the Office of the President to the
Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the
President allegedly received nominations from various
sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly
endorsing private respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez,
Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Mañosa and
Jose Moreno.
The Committee on Honors purportedly processed these
nominations and invited resource persons to validate the
qualifications and credentials of the nominees. On July
Yes, the President abused her discretion.
Limits of the President’s Discretion
The respective powers of the CCP Board of Trustees and of
the NCCA Board of Commissioners with respect to the
conferment of the Order of National Artists are clear. They
jointly administer the said award and, upon their
recommendation or advice, the President confers the Order
of National Artists.
To “recommend” and to “advise” are synonymous. In
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Atty. Palma, it is stated that the power to
“recommend” is includes the power to give “advice,
exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive
in character, not binding upon the party to whom it is
made.
Thus, in the matter of the conferment of the Order of National
Artists, the President may or may not adopt the
recommendation or advice of the NCCA and the CCP
Boards. In other words, the advice of the NCCA and the
CCP is subject to the President’s discretion.
Assuming that it is a power of discretion, is it a
transgression of Article 17 then?
Under Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
Thus the power of discretion of President is circumscribed to
faithfully execute the relevant laws such as the NCCA and
CCP boards as NCCA and the CCP Boards in connection
with the conferment of the Order of National Artists by
614!
6, 2009, Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829 were issued
declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz
and private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Mañosa and Moreno, respectively, as National
Artists.
Petitioners instituted this petition for
prohibition, certiorari and injunction and claimed that
former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her
discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous
screening and selection process for the Order of
National Artists and in substituting her own choice
for those of the Deliberation Panels. According to
petitioners, the President’s discretion to name
National Artists is not absolute but limited. In
particular, her discretion on the matter cannot be
exercised in the absence of or against the
recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP.
Issue: Whether President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely
abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the
rigorous screening and selection process for the Order
of National Artists.!
executive issuances were institutionalized by two laws,
namely, Presidential Decree No. 208 dated June 7, 1973 and
Republic Act No. 7356.
The function of the CCP Board of Trustees as National Artists
Awards Committee under RA 7356:
The [NCCA] shall coordinate with the national cultural
agencies including but not limited to the Cultural Center of
the Philippines, the Institute of Philippine Languages, the
National Historical Institute, the National Library, the National
Museum, the Records Management and Archives
Office. However, they shall continue operating under
their respective charters or as provided by law where
provisions therein are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act.
The NCCA has been given the following mandate:
(1) extend recognition of artistic achievement
through awards, grants and services to artists
and cultural groups which contribute significantly to
the Filipino’s cultural legacy;
(2) Under Sec. 13. Powers and Functions - (j) advise
the President on matters pertaining to culture
and the arts, including the creation of a special
decoration or award, for persons who have
significantly contributed to the development and
promotion of Philippine culture and arts
(3) promulgate rules, regulations and undertake any
and all measures as may be necessary to
implement this Act
By virtue of their respective statutory mandates in connection
with the conferment of the National Artist Award, the NCCA
615!
and the CCP decided to work together and jointly administer
the National Artist Award. We have held that an
administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has
the force and effect of law and they are binding upon
executive and administrative agencies, including the
President himself/herself as chief executor of laws.

Given everything, what is then the implication of this to

the Committee of Honors within the Office of the
President?

Section 2.5(A) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of

Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003 provides:

The existing modalities of the NCCA for selecting

recipients for the Order of National Artists, and the
Gawad sa Manlilikha ng Bayan, and of the NAST for
selecting recipients of the Order of National Scientists, shall
remain in force.

In Section 2.4 it is stated under “The Committee on Honors”

that - The Committee on Honors serves as a National Awards
Committee.

The Committee on Honors shall, as a general rule, serve

as a screening committee to ensure that nominations
received from the various awards committees meet two
tests: that there has not been an abuse of discretion in
making the nomination, and that the nominee is in good
standing. Should a nomination meet these criteria, a
recommendation to the President for conferment shall be
made.

Clearly, the authority of the Committee on Honors is limited

616!
to determining whether the nominations submitted by a
particular awards committee, in this case, the joint NCCA
and CCP Boards, have been tainted by abuse of
discretion, and whether the nominees are in good
standing. Should the nominations meet these two criteria,
the Committee on Honors shall make a recommendation to
the President for conferment of the Order of National Artists.

In view of the various stages of deliberation in the selection

process and as a consequence of his/her duty to faithfully
enforce the relevant laws, the discretion of the President in
the matter of the Order of National Artists is confined to
the names submitted to him/her by the NCCA and the
CCP Boards.

Applying this to the instant case, the former President

could not have properly considered respondents
Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno, as their
names were not recommended by the NCCA and the CCP
Boards. Furthermore, with respect to respondent Guidote-
Alvarez who was the Executive Director of the NCCA at that
time, the Guidelines expressly provides:

NCCA and CCP Board members and consultants and NCCA

and CCP officers and staff are automatically disqualified from
being nominated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED in PART.

Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July 6, 2009
proclaiming respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo
Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Mañosa, and Jose Moreno,
respectively, as National Artists are
declared INVALID and SET ASIDE for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion.

617!
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when
the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight
hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative
of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by
the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public
safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance
with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed
by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on
military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able
to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged
within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
Commander-in-Chiefship
" The President is not a member of the armed forces. He
REMAINS as a civilian despite being the commander of such.
Despite being elected as the highest civilian officer, the CIVILIAN
president holds supreme military authority and is the ceremonial,
legal, and administrative head of the armed forces.
" The President DOES NOT NEED to possess military training and
talents, but as commander-in-chief, he has the power to direct
military operations and to determine military strategy. [Planning
and determining of strategy may be delegated, but the ultimate
power is his].
" The President has control and direction of the conduct of war,
whether the war be declared or undeclared “the Executive has
the power of the sword.”
3 Powers of the President”
1. Calling out power
2. Power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
- Applies only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.
3. Power to impose martial law on the Philippines or any part
thereof.
Habeas Corpus reviewable by the SC (Lansang v. Garcia)
Due to the throwing of 2 hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in
1971 causing the death of 8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which
618!
suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged
that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist/communist
groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al. were invited by the Philippine
Constabulary headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation.
Lansang et al. questioned the validity of the suspension of the writ
averring that the suspension does not meet the constitutional
requisites.
TWO conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to
suspend the privilege of the writ (a) there must be an invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, and (b)
public safety must require the suspension of the privilege.
As commander in Chief, the President has 3 course of action: (a) to
call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law. He had already called out the armed forces, but
this prove inadequate. Of the two other alternatives, the suspension
of the privilege is the least harsh.
The court finds that the PP889 is valid because the requisites for that
suspension of writ of habeas corpus are present. Such presidential
determination of the existence of the conditions required by the
Constitution to justify a suspension of the privilege of the writ is no
longer conclusive on the other branches. This Court may
legitimately inquire into its validity.
Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary
During the Oakwood mutiny where members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines occupied the Oakwood apartments in Makati, the
President GMA issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No.
4, both declare a “state of rebellion” and calling out the Armed
Forces to suppress the rebellion. The petitioners claim that the
declaration of state of rebellion is an exercise of emergency powers,
which amounts to a usurpation of the power of Congress. The SC
ruled that the President has the power to declare state of rebellion in
exercise of her Commander in-Chief powers. In calling out the armed
forces, however, a declaration of a state of rebellion is utter
superfluity.
As to the issue of exercising emergency powers without the grant of
such power by Congress, the SC ruled that there is no proof that the
President exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive
or Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of
rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a
wedding of her Commander in Chief powers.
David v. Arroyo
Arroyo enacted PP1017 (declaring a state of national emergency).
The specific portion of PP1017 questioned is the enabling clause: “to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.” The
Court ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants President GMA the authority to promulgate “decrees.”
Legislative power is peculiarity with the province of the Legislature.
To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative
power by issuing decrees.
It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be
enforced. With respect to “laws,” she cannot call the military to
enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs las, laws
governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and
contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under
PP1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless
violence.
619!
Ampatuan v. Puno Call in AFP Suspend Declare
After the massacre in Maguindanao, President Arroyo issued Proc. Privilege of Martial Law
1946 placing the provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and the Writ of
Cotabato under a state of emergency. She further issued AO 273 HC
and 273-A delegating the supervision from OP to DILG. Petitioners Grounds:
assail the said Proc. and AOs for being unconstitutional and that the 1. Invasion 1. Yes 1. Yes 1. Yes
President does not have a basis for calling out those powers. The 2. Rebellion 2. Yes 2. Yes 2. Yes
Court ruled that it is not unconstitutional. 3. Prevent/Suppress 3. Yes 3. ?? 3. ??
lawless violence
3 Types of Marital Law (military jurisdiction in American Period of the According to Generally: 60 Days
jurisprudence) Grounds Dean Except if extended by
1. Jurisdiction under military law- exercised both in peace and Candelaria it Congress or revoked by
war; is indefinite. Congress or the SC
2. Military government- exercised in the time of foreign war Notice ?? Notice must be given to
without the boundaries of the United States, or in time of Congress within 48 hours.
rebellion and civil war within the states or districts occupied Judicial Review No. (Bernas Yes. The test is whether the
by rebels treated as belligerents; and p. 309 citing President did NOT act
3. Martial law proper (The type of Martial Law in the Lansang v. arbitrarily, and the
Philippines)- exercised in times of invasion or Garcia citing sufficiency of the factual
insurrection within the limits of the United States, or Martin v. basis. The SC has 30 days
during rebellion within the limits of stages maintaining Mott) to decide the case.
adhesion to the National Government, when public Who can question? ?? Any citizen
danger requires its existence. Are Courts and Open Open Open
Legislative Assembly
close or open during
such period
Procedure for arrests ?? File in court within 3 days
from arrest for the offense
of rebellion related to
invasion.

620!
Martial Law Proper
" Public Safety is the concern of police power, which is also
the object of the exercise of Martial law.
" The exercise of the police power which resides in the
executive branch to preserve order and insure public safety
in times of emergency when other branches of government
are unable to function, or their functioning would itself
threaten public safety.
" “Calling out powers” simply means calling on the AFP to
assist the police. This doesn’t give the President additional
powers. A president can claim emergency powers only when
these are granted by Congress under Art. VI Sec. 23.
and degrees of emergency could not be identical
under all conditions, they can only be analogous.
$ COMMON DENOMINATOR IN THE
EXERCISE OF MARTIAL LAW POWER: the
exercise by an executive officer of the
discretion and judgment normally exercised
by a legislative or judicial body.
NOTE: Only Time When the Senate and HOR Votes Jointly.

Martial Law and Suspension of the Writ depends on 2 factual

bases:
1. Existence of actual invasion ore rebellion
2. Requirements of public safety
o Necessity creates the conditions for martial law and
at the same time limits the scope. Therefore the
degree and kind of vigorous executive action
needed to meet the varying kinds and degrees of
emergency action needed to meet the varying kinds

Section 18. Emergency Powers

I. Commander-in-Chiefship
363 Lansang v. Garcia In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while There is only presumption but it is not conclusive.
(1971) the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a public Conclusiveness asserted by Respondents:
meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation 1. Relied heavily upon Martin v. Mott involving the
of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for U.S. President's power to call out the militia, which
November 8, 1971, two (2) hand grenades were thrown, — he being the commander-in-chief of all the
one after the other, at the platform where said armed forces — may be exercised to suppress or
candidates and other persons were. As a consequence, prevent any lawless violence, even without
eight (8) persons were killed and many more injured, invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent
including practically all of the aforementioned danger thereof, and is, accordingly, much broader

621!
candidates, some of whom sustained extensive, as well
as serious, injuries which could have been fatal had it
not been for the timely medical assistance given to
them.
Soon after noontime, the President of the Philippines
announced the issuance of Proclamation No. 889, which
suspended the writ of habeas corpus. Petitioners had
been apprehended and detained "on reasonable belief"
that they had "participated in the crime of insurrection or
rebellion;" that "their continued detention is justified due
to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to Proclamation No. 889 of the
President of the Philippines.
"continuing detention of the petitioners as an urgent
bona fide precautionary and preventive measure
demanded by the necessities of public safety, public
welfare and public interest"; that the President of the
Philippines has "undertaken concrete and abundant
steps to insure that the constitutional rights and
privileges of the petitioners as well as of the other
persons in current confinement pursuant to
Proclamation 889 remain unimpaired and unhampered”
if not completely curtailed, by various safeguards
contained in directives issued by proper authority."
These safeguards are set forth in:
(1) No arrest shall be made without warrant
authorized in writing by the Secretary of
National Defense
(2) That authority to cause arrest under the
proclamation will be exercised only by the
Metrocom, CMA, CIS, and "officers occupying
than his authority to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, jeopardizing as the latter
does individual liberty; and
2. The privilege had been suspended by the
American Governor-General, whose act, as
representative of the Sovereign, affecting the
freedom of its subjects, can hardly be equated
with that of the President of the Philippines
dealing with the freedom of the Filipino people, in
whom sovereignty resides, and from whom all
government authority emanates.
Though the Courts find that US courts have been
uncertain also about its conclusiveness.
In our resolution of October 5, 1971, We stated that "a
majority of the Court" had "tentatively arrived at a
consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of
the existence of the factual bases for the issuance of
Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A ... and
thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such
bases.
Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is
neither absolute nor unqualified. The precept in the
Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an
exception thereto.
What is more, it postulates the former in the negative,
evidently to stress its importance, by providing that
"(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended ...." It is only by way
of exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege
"in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" — or,
622!
 position in the provinces down to provincial
commanders"; that there shall be no
indiscriminate or mass arrests
(3) Constabulary to establish appropriate
Complaints and Action Bodies/Groups to
prevent and/or check any abuses
Proclamation No. 889 was further amended by
Proclamation No. 889-D, lifting the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the following
provinces, sub-provinces and cities of the Philippine
Issue: Is the proclamation of President of suspension
base on its facts conclusive upon courts?!
under Art VII of the Constitution, "imminent danger
thereof" — "when the public safety requires it, in any of
which events the same may be suspended wherever
during such period the necessity for such suspension shall
exist. (In simple terms the burden of proof is on the
President thus there is a need to review).
Much less may the assumption be indulged in when we
bear in mind that our political system is essentially
democratic and republican in character and that the
suspension of the privilege affects the most fundamental
element of that system, namely, individual freedom.
The untrammelled enjoyment and exercise of such right —
which, under certain conditions, may be a civic duty of the
highest order — is vital to the democratic system and
essential to its successful operation and wholesome
growth and development.
Although we must be forewarned against mistaking mere
dissent — no matter how emphatic or intemperate it may
be — for dissidence amounting to rebellion or insurrection,
the Court cannot hesitate, much less refuse — when
the existence of such rebellion or insurrection has
been fairly established or cannot reasonably be
denied.
[The Court is called] to uphold the finding of the Executive
thereon, without, in effect, encroaching upon a power
vested in him by the Supreme Law of the land and
depriving him, to this extent, of such power, and,
therefore, without violating the Constitution and
jeopardizing the very Rule of Law the Court is called upon
to epitomize.!
623!
364 Aberca v. Ver This case stems from alleged illegal searches and
(1988) seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of
plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force
Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to
conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-
terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing
reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro
Manila
Said searches are done with defectively issued judicial
search warrants; that during these raids, certain
members of the raiding party confiscated a number of
purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that
plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued
by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they
were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs
were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence
and counsel; that military men who interrogated them
employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence
on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or
confessions
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages. A
motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their
counsel, then Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza,
alleging that: plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry
into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a
damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Issue: Whether the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for
illegal searches conducted by military personnel and
No. At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of
the Civil Code which renders any public officer or
employee or any private individual liable in damages for
violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another,
as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents
from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability
under the said article.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their
duty, as they claim. But this cannot be construed as a
blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any
constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the
rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in
and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution
remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials,
high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and
allegiance at all times.
What we are merely trying to say is that in carrying out this
task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must
be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will
start to unravel.
The linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in the
rule of law. Once that faith is lost or compromised, the
struggle may well be abandoned.
We do not find merit in respondents' suggestion that
plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal
arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right
of the individual to seek release from detention through
624!
other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining
the Constitution. his liberty.

P.D. No. 1755 gives them 1 year to file a case for any
violation of rights during Martial Law

Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming

that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages
for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot
suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries
suffered because of respondents

However, we find it unnecessary to address the

constitutional issue pressed upon us. On March 25, 1986,
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 2,
revoking Proclamation Nos. 2045 and 2045-A and lifting
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. The question therefore has become moot and
academic.

May a superior officer under the notion of respondent

superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally
with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional
rights and liberties have been violated?

The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally

limited in its application to principal and agent or to master
and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No
such relationship exists between superior officers of the
military and their subordinates.

Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this

case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law

625!

365 IBP v. Zamora Because of the growing number of criminal incidents
(2000) around Metro Manila, then President Estrada gave a
verbal directive to the PNP and Marines to conduct a
joint visibility patrols to prevent and suppress crimes.
The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of
the AFP, the Chief of Staff of the PNP and the Secretary
of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to
execute and implement the said order. A Letter of
Instruction 02/2000 (“LOI”) which detailed the manner
of the “TASK FORCE TULUNGAN” was released by
PNP.
The IBP questioned the necessity of calling for the
Marines and filed petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to
declare the deployment of the Marines, unconstitutional
on the ground that: (a) There was no emergency
situation obtains in Metro Manila as would justify such
deployment (violates Art 2, Sec. 3 of the constitution),
speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or
"indirectly" responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not
the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must
answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury
caused to the aggrieved party.
Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's
ruling, dismissing for lack of cause of action the complaint
against all the defendants, except Major Rodolfo
Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba. The
complaint contained allegations against all the defendants
which, if admitted hypothetically, would be sufficient to
establish a cause or causes of action against all of them
under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not
constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible
use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The
participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility
patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited
participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of
the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and
bounds of the Marines’ authority. It is noteworthy that the
local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility
patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the
PNP.
In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader
of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. Under
the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the
soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their
responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the
626!
 (b) Deployment constitutes an insidious incursion by the
military in a civilian function of government (violates Art.
16, Sec. 5) (c)Deployment creates a dangerous
tendency to rely on the military to perform civilian
functions of the government. Unwittingly making the
military more powerful than hat it should be under the
constitution
Prescinding from its argument that no emergency
situation exists to justify the calling of the Marines, the
IBP asserts that by the deployment of the Marines, the
civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in
violation of Section 3, Article II.
Issue: Whether the deployment of the Marines does not
violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe
the civilian character of the police force.
366 Lacson v. Perez On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by
(2001) an "angry and violent mob armed with explosives,
firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other
deadly weapons" assaulting and attempting to break
into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38
declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the
National Capital Region. She likewise issued General
Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police to
suppress the rebellion in the National Capital
Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged
leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" were
thereafter effected. Aggrieved by the warrantless
arrests, and the declaration of a "state of rebellion,"
which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the
arrests, the following four related petitions were filed
before the Court
Marines. Chief of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged
involvement in civilian law enforcement, has been virtually
appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited
provision. The real authority in these operations, as
stated in the LOI, is lodged with the head of a civilian
institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none
of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members
of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian
position to speak of. Additionally, the Philippine
experience reveals that it is not averse to requesting the
assistance of the military in the implementation and
execution of certain traditionally “civil” functions (e.g.
elections, Red Cross, disaster response, etc.)
Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People's Movement
against Poverty (PMAP), for his part, argues that the
declaration of a "state of rebellion" is violative of the
doctrine of separation of powers, being an encroachment
on the domain of the judiciary which has the constitutional
prerogative to "determine or interpret" what took place on
May 1, 2001, and that the declaration of a state of
rebellion cannot be an exception to the general rule on the
allocation of the governmental powers.
The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not
easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established
since matters considered for satisfying the same is a
combination of several factors which are not always
accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual
standards that the court may use to judge necessity,
information necessary to arrive at such judgment might
627!

Issue: Whether the Court can inquire into factual basis
of “state of rebellion”
also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent
information might be difficult to verify, or wholly
unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence
upon which the President might decide that there is a
need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not
constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief
has a vast intelligence network to gather information,
some of which may be classified as highly confidential or
affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the
power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively
necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of
human lives and mass destruction of property
The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the exercise of this power. However,
this is no longer feasible at this time, Proclamation No. 38
having been lifted. DISMISSED.
Other Matters
All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state
of rebellion by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the
warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as
having no basis both in fact and in law. Significantly, on
May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the
lifting of the declaration of a "state of rebellion" in Metro
Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been
rendered moot and academic.
As to petitioners' claim that the proclamation of a "state of
rebellion" is being used by the authorities to justify
warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that it
has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in
connection with the "rebellion." He states that what is
628!

367 Lim v. Executive The last “Balikatan” was held in 1995. This was due to
Secretary (2002) the paucity of any formal agreement relative to the
treatment of United States personnel visiting the
Philippines. In the meantime, the respective
governments of the two countries agreed to hold joint
exercises on a reduced scale. PH and US concluded the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1999. Beginning
extant are general instructions to law enforcement officers
and military agencies to implement Proclamation No. 38.
Indeed, as stated in respondents' Joint Comments: [I]t is
already the declared intention of the Justice
Department and police authorities to obtain regular
warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts
committed prior to and until May 1, 2001 which means
that preliminary investigations will henceforth be
conducted. (In simple terms, the President still ordered to
get Warrants before any arrest happen).
G. R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition), 147781 (Defensor-
Santiago Petition), and 147799 (Lumbao Petition) that
they are under imminent danger of being arrested without
warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary
remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an
individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not without
adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.
Further, a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be
delivered to the proper judicial authorities within the
periods provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
otherwise the arresting officer could be held liable for
delay in the delivery of detained persons.
Should the detention be without legal ground, the person
arrested can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary
detention.
1) The holding of “Balikatan 02-1” must be studied in the
framework of MDT. It is this treaty to which the VFA
adverts and the obligations there under which it seeks to
reaffirm. The VFA provided the “regulatory mechanism”
which permits United States personnel to engage, on an
impermanent basis, in “activities” approved by the
Philippine Government
629!
January 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the
United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to
take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in
“Balikatan 02-1”. The said training was a simulation of
joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense
Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by
the Philippines and the United States in 1951.
On February 7, 2002 the Senate conducted a hearing
on the “Balikatan” exercise wherein Vice-President
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., who is concurrently
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, presented the Draft
Terms of Reference (TOR). Five days later, he
approved the TOR (it contained the matters of policy
level and exercise level including the training,
administration & logistics, and public affairs). Under
the TOR, the Exercise is said to be a mutual counter-
terrorism advising, assisting and training Exercise
relative to Philippine efforts against the ASG(Abu
Sayyaf Group), and will be conducted on the Island of
Basilan. Further advising, assisting and training
exercises shall be conducted in Malagutay and the
Zamboanga area. Related activities in Cebu will be for
support of the Exercise.”
Issues: (1) Whether the Philippines and the United
States signed the mutual defense treaty (MDT) in 1951
to provide mutual military assistance only in the case
of an armed attack by an external aggressor,
meaning a third country against one of them.
(2) Whether the Abu Sayyaf bandits in Basilan
constitute an external armed force that has subject the
Philippines to an armed external attack to warrant U.S.
It stated: “United States personnel must abstain from any
activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement.”
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties signed is
used to determine how treaties should be interpreted and
in this case it says: (1) Interpreted in good faith and use
ordinary meaning. (2) Take into account the context
(context means: any past interpretation and application of
treaties between parties and the use of international law if
it is applicable)
Thus “activities” is interpreted to give leeway for US and
Philippines to engage in purposes other than military
(combat-related) e.g. training. Giving legitimacy for the
Balikatan exercises.
Also, both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense
Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-
related activities — as opposed to combat itself — such as
the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed
authorized.
(2) It must be established that neither the MDT nor the
VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on
Philippine territory. The MDT provides that US may use
force “for self-defense.”
The fear of petitioners is that the self-defense clause is
hard to justify given that the exercise is held near the Abu
Sayyaf territory. The court believes that Abu Sayyaf
cannot sit idly when battle is placed at their doorstep and
that they cannot be expected to pick their targets so as not
to harm US troops and not invoke the self-defense clause.
It is then: Nemo potest facere per alium quod non potest
facere per directum (No one is allowed to do indirectly
630!
military assistance under the MDT of 1951. what he is prohibited to do directly). However the court
believes that neither MDT nor the VFA allow foreign
troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine
territory. It believes that both countries will follow its treaty
obligation according to pacta sunt servanda.

On the matter that the Balikatan 02-1 self-defense clause

is a camouflage to conceal the true nature of the exercise.
The court cannot take cognizance of the alleged use of
force by Americans in south. As a rule, the court cannot
use newspaper, or electronic reports per se for the reason
that facts must be established according to the rules of
evidence. The alleged “double speak” by Arroyo --claiming
that exercise is not for an offensive effort cannot be
adjudicated given that it is mere speculation.

Thus absence of any fact that would prove that Balikatan

is an offensive act we find that the holding of “Balikatan
02-1” joint military exercise has not intruded into that
penumbra of error that would otherwise call for correction
on our part. In other words, respondents in the case at
bar have not committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

It is all too apparent that the determination thereof

involves basically a question of fact. On this point, we
must concur with the Solicitor General that the present
subject matter is not a fit topic for a special civil action for
certiorari. Courts are charged with the duty “to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.”

From the facts obtaining, we find that the holding of

631!

368 Sanlakas v. The case has its origins in the Oakwood Incident of
Executive Rebellion between 3 junior officers of the AFP--
Secretary (2004) demanded the resignation of the President and
other executive officials because of the worsening
corruption. Due to this, President issued Proclamation
427 and General Order 4 both of which declared a state
of rebellion and calling the AFP to suppress such
rebellion. Petitioners assert that the issuance of the
respective Proclamation order 427 and General order 4
is unconstitutional claimed:
- Section 18 Article 8 of the constitution in so far
that it does not authorize a declaration of a state
of rebellion.
- Also they contend that the presidential
issuances cannot be construed as an exercise
of emergency powers as the congress has not
delegated any power to the president.
- Also, it was an unwarranted and abuse of power
to exercise martial law.
Issue: Whether the proclamation calling the state of
rebellion is proper.
369 David v. Arroyo (Same as above, Case # 300)
(2006)
“Balikatan 02-1” joint military exercise has not intruded
into that penumbra of error that would otherwise call for
correction on our part. In other words, respondents in the
case at bar have not committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
According to Article 18 Article 8 of the constitution the
President is granted a “sequence of graduated
powers”: calling out power, power to suspend and the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and power to
declare martial law. The constitution requires the
concurrence of two conditions namely 1) an actual
invasion or rebellion and that 2) public safety requires the
exercise of such power. The Article not only vests to the
president the commander-in-chief power but also with
executive powers. The Commander-in-chief Powers are
broad enough when taken together with the provision on
executive power. Thus, the president’s authority to
declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from
her powers as chief executive and draws strength
from the commander-in-chief powers.
The Solicitor-general points out Sec. 4 chapter 2 Book III
(Office of the President) of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987. This provision states that the president’s
proclamation gives notice to the nation that such state
exists and that the AFP may be called upon to prevent or
suppress it. Mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot
diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. These
are purely executive powers vested on the President by
Sec. 1 and 18 Art. 8 as opposed to the delegated
legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2) of
Article 6.
The provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency
under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is
632!
 th
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20
Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President
Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1017 and
GO No.6 as to implement it.
The reasons that the President stated for declaring such
General Order to implement the Presidential
Proclamation were that over the past several months,
elements in political opposition have conspired with
extreme left represented by NDF-CCP-NPA and military
adventurists. This presented a clear danger to the
president as political opposition tried to oust her as
president and take over the government. On March 3,
Presidential Proclamation 1017 was lifted by President
Arroyo. The Solicitor General defended the basis of
President Arroyo for declaring PP 1017, was that the
intent of the Constitution was to give the President full
discretionary powers in determining the necessity to call
out the AFP. Notwithstanding the SG’s contentions, the
Magdalo group instigated the Oakwood mutiny and
wearing or read bands on their left arms to show
disgust.
Simultaneously, Oplan Hackle I (plans of bombings and
attacks on the PMA alumni homecoming in Baguio,
where the President was invited) was discovered. The
next morning, after the discovery of the plan, a bomb
was discovered in the campus. Also, information was
intercepted by PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao regarding
PNP-SAF members that are planning to defect from the
Arroyo administration, along with Congressman Peping
Cojuanco who planned out moves to bring down said
administration.
CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not
authorize the President to take over privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest
without prior legislation.
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the
above provision refers not only to war but also to “other
national emergency.” If the intention of the Framers of
our Constitution was to withhold from the President the
authority to declare a “state of national emergency”
pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and
grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence
of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided
so.
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking
over of privately owned public utility or business affected
with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a
delegation from Congress.
The said powers of the President is additionally
recognized during the state of national emergency under
PP 1017, can call the military not only to enforce
obedience “to all the laws and to all decrees x x x” but also
to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17 which reads:
In times of national emergency, when the public interest
so requires, the State may, during the emergency and
under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take
over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest.
The president cannot validly order the taking over of
private corporations or institutions such as the Daily
Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the
633!
A large number of soldiers joined the rallies as critical
mass and armed components to anti-arroyo protests.
Another factual basis after the issuance of the
Presidential Proclamation and General Order was the
bombings of telephone communication towers and cell
sites in Bulacan and Bataan. These events show a clear
and present critical situation, leading the President to
cancel all events related to EDSA People Power I.
Executive Secretary Mike Arroyo, declared that
warrantless arrest and takeover of facilities can be
implemented. One of these warrantless arrest was
Randy David (Filipino journalist, UP professor) , due
to mistake of fact that he was a participant in the
street rallies. Also, congresman Crispin Beltran
(representative of Anakpawis party). The following
facilities were taken over: Seizure of Daily Tribune,
Malaya and Abante (local news publications). This
was done, according to the PNP. to show a strong
presence to tell media outlets not to connive or help
out rebels to take down the government.
Issues: (1) Whether Article 6 Section 23 was violated.
(2) Whether PP 1017 is constitutional.
other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the
constitution is not limited to natural calamities but
rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a
distinction; the president can declare the state of national
emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does
not come automatically after it for such exercise needs
authority from Congress. The authority from Congress
must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period
only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such
restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to
carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.
Thus the warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and
Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the
KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
(2) PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes
a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP
to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the
provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce
laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees
promulgated by the President, are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face
because of its “overbreadth.” They claim that its
enforcement encroached on both unprotected and
protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the
634!
Constitution and sent a “chilling effect” to the citizens.

Overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for

testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech cases. A
plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily
directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is
actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence.

The said powers of the President is recognized in Section

18, Article VII of the Constitution wherein it is stated that
the President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. (Calling-out powers)

The Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of
the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes
necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.
In the present case it is stated that, owing to her Office’s
vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to
determine the actual condition of the country.

However, a President must be careful in the exercise of

his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he
wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom
of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are
the limitations.

Thus according to Justice Mendoza, the PP 1017 is

merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out

635!
power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or
suppressing lawless violence. The SC ruled that GMA has
validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of
graduated powers.

The said powers of the President is also recognized in

Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution wherein it is
stated that The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Take Care
powers). As the Executive in whom the executive power is
vested, the primary function of the President is to enforce
the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in
existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by
the officials and employees of his department. In the
exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may
employ the powers attached to his office as the
Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the
country, including the Philippine National Police under the
Department of Interior and Local Government.

President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the

foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to
those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081.
She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce
laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is

unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo
the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative
power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.
Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of

636!

370 Ampatuan v. Hon. The day after the infamous Ampatuan massacre
DILG Secretary happened, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
Puno (2011) issued Proclamation 1946, placing the provinces of
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
under a state of emergency. She then directed the
AFP and PNP to undertake measures as may be
allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and
suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the said
areas. Three days later, President Arroyo issued
Administrative Order 273 which “transfers” the
supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the
President to the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG). The word “transfer” was then
changed to “delegate/delegating” because of some
issues raised over the terminology. It was amended by
AO 273-A.
Petitioner contends that the President unlawfully
exercised emergency powers when she ordered the
deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the places
mentioned in the proclamation. But such deployment is
NOT by itself an exercise of emergency powers as
understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution. They also claim that the issuance of the
AO273/AO273-A encroached the autonomy of ARMM
as a local government unit. Thus the petition of
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Issues: (1) Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs
the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial
Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can
justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by
issuing decrees. !
(1) No. the DILG Secretary did not take over control of the
powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took
respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged
complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice-
Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the
vacated post on December 10, 2009 pursuant to the rule
on succession found in Article VII, Section 12, of RA 9054.
In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker
of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-
Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. In short, the
DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or
operations of the ARMM.
(2) No. The President did not proclaim a national
emergency, only a state of emergency in the three
places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any
law enacted by Congress that authorized her to
exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in
such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests
in the President a stated in Section 18 of Article 7.
Therefore she did not need a congressional authority to
exercise the same.
637!
 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local autonomy
under Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, and
Section 1, Article V of the Expanded ARMM Organic
Act;
(2) Whether President Arroyo invalidly exercised
emergency powers when she called out the AFP and
the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato
City
371 Fortun v. Arroyo This case is concerned the constitutionality of a
(2012) presidential proclamation of martial law and suspension
of the privilege of habeas corpus in 2009 in a province in
Mindanao which were withdrawn after just eight days.
The case started when heavily armed men, believed led
by the ruling Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried
under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a highway in
Maguindanao. In response to this carnage, on
November 24 President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of emergency in
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to
prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in Central
Mindanao. On December 4, 2009 President Arroyo
issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial
law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in that province except for identified areas of the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
Arroyo submitted her report to Congress in accordance
with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
which required her, within 48 hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to submit to that
body a report in person or in writing of her action. On
December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened
Issue is moot. Although the above vests in the President
the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, he shares such power with
the Congress. Thus:
o The President’s proclamation or suspension is
temporary, good for only 60 days;
o He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or
suspension, report his action in person or in
writing to Congress;
o Both houses of Congress, if not in session must
jointly convene within 24 hours of the
proclamation or suspension for the purpose of
reviewing its validity; and
o The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm
the President’s proclamation or suspension, allow
their limited effectivity to lapse, or extend the
same if Congress deems warranted.!
Supreme Court’s Power in Emergency Powers
Although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court
the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is
implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its
own review powers.
638!
pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution to review the validity of the President’s
action. But, two days later or on December 12 before
Congress could act, the President issued Presidential
Proclamation 1963 (PP1963), lifting martial law and
restoring the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus in
Maguindanao. Petitioners Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun and
the other petitioners challenge the constitutionality of
President Arroyo’s Proclamation 1959 affecting
Maguindanao.
Issue:! Did the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law
and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao,
render the issues moot and academic?
The constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation
of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress
before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the
Court. President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959
before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact
convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the
petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court
has nothing to review.
Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been
meaningfully implemented. The military did not take over
the operation and control of local government units in
Maguindanao.
No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported
President did not issue any law or decree affecting
Maguindanao. Those who were arrested during the period
were either released or promptly charged in court.
Stated in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
the Court has only 30 days from the filing of an
appropriate proceeding to review but more than two years
have passed since petitioners filed the present actions to
annul Proclamation 1959.
If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill
its duty respecting the proclamation or suspension within
the short time expected of it, then the Court can step in,
hear the petitions challenging the President’s action, and
ascertain if it has a factual basis. If the Court finds none,
639!

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence
of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
Purpose of Executive Clemency
" Tacit admission that human institutions are imperfect and that
there are infirmities in the administration of justice
o Instrument for correcting this infirmities and for mitigating
whatever harshness might be generated by a too strict
application of the law
" Non-delegable power and must be exercised by the President
personally
then it can annul the proclamation or the suspension.
What if 30 days is inadequate to review? Carpio states
that 30-day period does not operate to divest this Court of
its jurisdiction over the case. The settled rule is that
jurisdiction once acquired is not lost until the case has
been terminated.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated
petitions on the ground that the same have become moot
and academic.!
Constitutional limits on Executive Clemency (Sec. 19)
1. It cannot be exercised over cases of impeachment.
2. Reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remission of
fines and forfeitures can be given only after final conviction
by final judgment.
3. Grant of amnesty must be with the concurrence of a majority
of all the Members of Congress.
a. Art. IX, C, Sec. 5 also states that no pardon,
amnesty, parole or suspension of sentence for
violation of election laws, rules and regulations shall
be granted without the favorable recommendation of
the COMELEC.
Clemency on Administrative penalties (Llamas v. Orbos)
The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases
executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole
exclusion of impeachment cases. There is no valid and convincing
reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in an
administrative case. IF the President can grant reprieves,
commutations and parsons, and remit fines and forfeiture in criminal
cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in
640!
administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal Pardon: Nature and Legal Effects
offenses. " An act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the
execution of laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is
Types of Executive Clemency bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed.
" No legal power can compel the Executive to give such.
" Two types of pardon are: Absolute Pardon and Conditional
Pardon.
" A conditional pardon has no force until accepted by the
condemned because it may be less acceptable to him than the
original punishment and may in fact be more onerous.
" An absolute pardon is complete even without acceptance.
However, one who has been given Absolute Pardon has NO
demandable right to reinstatement, it does not restore legal
offices already forfeited (See Monsanto v. Factoran below).
" Pardon can only be extended to one whose conviction is final,
pardon has no effect until the person withdraws his appeal and
thereby allows his conviction to be final (People v. Salle Jr.)

Violation of Conditional Pardon (Torres v. Gonzales)

Petitioner was convicted of estafa in the CFI and affirmed by the CA.
A conditional pardon was granted by the President on the condition
petitioner would got again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines. Petitioner accepted such pardon.

On the basis of several criminal charges, the Minister of Justice

recommended the cancellation of the conditional pardon. The
conditional pardon was cancelled and petitioner was arrested. The
grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of
a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject
to judicial scrutiny. The acceptance of the conditions of the pardon
imports the acceptances of the condition that the President will also
determine whether the condition has been violated.

641!
Reinstatement of former rights (Monsanto v. Factoran) PARDON AMNESTY
Monsanto, an assistant treasurer, was convicted by the A Private act granted by the A public act by proclamation of
Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public documents. Chief Executive which must be the Chief executive which the
While her MR was pending, Pres. Marcos extended to her absolute pleaded and proved by the concurrence of Congress of
parson which she accepted. She asked to be reinstated to her former person pardoned because the which the courts should take
position which the Office of the President denied, stating that she courts do no take notice thereof judicial notice.
cannot be reinstated as acquittal can only produce such, and not Granted to one after conviction Granted to a class of persons or
absolute pardon. She was also required to indemnify the amount the communities who may be guilty
owed the government. of political offenses, generally
before or after the institution of
Petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office which was the criminal prosecution and
forfeited, but the facts constituting her offense must be and should sometimes after conviction.
be evaluated and takin into account to determine whether she can Looks forward and relieves the Looks backward and abolishes
once again be entrusted with public funds. The pardon granted to offender from the consequences and puts into oblivion the offense
petitioner has resulted in removing from her disqualification from of an offense of which he has itself it so overlooks and
public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her been convicted – abolishes or obliterates the offense with
former post as assistant city treasurer she must re-apply and forgives the punishment and which he is charged that the
undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment. does not work the restoration of person released by amnesty
Finally, she still has to pay civil liability, notwithstanding her the rights to hold public office, or stands before the law as though
absolute pardon. the right of suffrage, unless such he committed no offense.
rights be expressly restored by
Exception to the Doctrine of Monsanto v. Factoran (Garcia v. the terms of the pardon, and in
Commission on Audit) no case exempts the culprit form
If pardon was given because the accused was acquitted on the the payment of civil indemnity
ground that he did not commit the crime, he is entitled to
reinstatement and backwages. Other forms of executive clemency
" Reprieve: postpones the execution of an offense to a day certain
Amnesty " Commutation: remission of a party of the punishment, a
" May be only given with the concurrence of the majority of all the substitution of a less penalty for the one originally imposed
members of Congress " Remission of fines and forfeitures: merely prevents the collection
" The grant of a general pardon to a class of political offenders of fines or the confiscation of property, it cannot have the effect
wither after conviction or even before the charges are filed of returning property which has been vested in third parties or
" To avail of amnesty, it is not necessary for the accused to admit money in the public treasury.
his responsibility for the commission of the criminal act

642!
 Section 19. Executive Clemency
I. Purpose of Executive Clemency
372 Cristobal v. Labrador On March 15, 1930, the Court of First Instance of Rizal No. It should be observed that there are two
(1940-1941) found Teofilo C. Santos, respondent herein, guilty of the limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional
crime of estafa. Accordingly, he was confined in the prerogative of the President: (a) that the power be
provincial jail of Pasig, Rizal and paid the corresponding exercised after conviction and (b) that such power
costs of trial. Teofilo C. Santos continued to be a does not extend to cases of impeachment.
registered elector in the municipality of Malabon, Rizal,
and was, for the period comprised between 1934 and Subject to the limitations imposed by the
1937, seated as the municipal president of that Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be
municipality. Commonwealth Act No. 357, otherwise restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must
known as the Election Code, was approved by the remain where the sovereign authority has placed it
National Assembly, section 94, paragraph (b) of which and must be exercised by the highest authority to
disqualifies the respondent from voting for having whom it is entrusted.
been "declared by final judgment guilty of any crime
against property. An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime
committed but removes all disabilities resulting from
In view of this provision, the respondent forthwith applied the conviction. In this case, the disability is the result
to His Excellency, the President, for an absolute pardon. of the conviction without which there would no basis
On December 24, 1939, granted the said petition, for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not
restoring the respondent to his "full civil and political the only punishment, which the law imposes upon
rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public those who violates its command. There are
office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment accessory and resultant disabilities, and the
only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature pardoning power likewise extends to such left of the
and involving no money or property responsibility. consequences of conviction. While the pardon
Petitioner, Miguel Cristobal, filed a petition for the extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the
exclusion of the name of Teofilo C. Santos from the list of sense that he will be eligible for appointment only to
voters since he was already disqualified by CA 357. He positions which are clerical or manual in nature
contends that because of legislative action of CA 357, said involving no money or property responsibility, it is
person cannot be granted by President pardon in terms of absolute insofar as it restores the respondent to full
political rights. civil and political rights.

Issue: Whether the pardoning power exercised here would The suggestion that the disqualification imposed in
amount to an unlawful exercise of the President of a the Election Code, does not fall within the purview of

643!
 legislative function? the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, would
lead to the impairment of his pardoning power not
contemplated in the Constitution and would lead
furthermore to the result that there would be no way
of restoring the political privilege in a case of this
nature except through legislative action.
II. Constitutional Limits on Executive Clemency
373 Llamas v. Orbos Petitioner maintains that sometime in August, 1988, Yes. Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension.
(1991) respondent governor, in his official capacity as Provincial 1. Preventive suspension may be imposed by
Governor Tarlac, entered into and executed a Loan the Minister of Local Government if the
Agreement with Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc., a non- respondent is a provincial or city official, ...
stock and non-profit organization headed by the governor 2. Preventive suspension may be imposed at
himself as chairman and controlled by his brother-in-law any time after the issues are joined, when
as executive director, trustee, and secretary; that the said there is reasonable ground to believe that the
Loan Agreement was never authorized and approved by respondent has committed the act or acts
the Provincial Board, in direct contravention of the complained of, when the evidence of
provisions of the Local Government Code; that the said culpability is strong, when the gravity of the
Agreement is wholly one-sided in favor of the Foundation offense s warrants, or when the continuance
and grossly inimical to the interest of the Provincial in office of the respondent could influence
Government (because it did not provide for interest or for the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety
any type security and it did not provide for suretyship and and integrity the records and other evidence.
comptrollership or audit to control the safe disbursement In all cases, preventive suspension shall not
of said loan); that a total amount of P20,000,000.00 was extend beyond sixty days after the start of
disbursed to the aforesaid Foundation. said suspension.
3. At the expiration of sixty days, the
The Secretary of the then Department of Local suspended official shall be deemed
Government rendered a decision. Governor Mariano Un reinstated in office without prejudice to the
Ocampo III is, as he hereby found guilty. On February 26, continuation the proceedings against him
1991, herein public respondent Executive Secretary until its termination.
issued a Resolution dismissing respondent governor's
appeal and affirming the September 21, 1990 DLG Let us first deal with the issue on jurisdiction While it
decision. petitioner, on March 1, 1991, took his oath of is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in
office as acting governor. Under the administrative which the President's discretionary powers are
suspension order, petitioner had up to May 31, 1991 as exercised or into the wisdom for its exercise, it is also

644!
acting governor. On the same date (March 1, 1991),
respondent govemor moved for a reconsideration of the
Executive Secretary's Resolution, to which petitioner filed
an opposition.
On May 15, 1991 after serving 60 days of his suspension
and that the public respondent believing that the governor
wanted to accelerate the development and there was no
direct benefit to him the loans that were given out, public
respondent issued Governor Mariano Un Ocampo III is
hereby granted executive clemency in the sense that his
ninety-day suspension is hereby reduced to the period
already served. Petitioner's main argument is that the
President may grant executive clemency only in
criminal cases, based on Article VII, Section 19 of the
Constitution only “after conviction by final judgment.”
Issue: Whether pardon is applicable to administrative
cases.!
a settled rule that when the issue involved concerns
the validity of such discretionary powers or whether
said powers are within the limits prescribed by the
Constitution, We will not decline to exercise our
power of judicial review.
According to the petitioner, the qualifying phrase
"after conviction by final judgment" applies solely to
criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant of
executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has
been "convicted in an administrative case," allegedly
because the word "conviction" refers only to criminal
cases
"Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos,"
if the law does not distinguish, so we must not
distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish
between which cases executive clemency may be
exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of
impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive
clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it
would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the
exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage
of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution.
It is our considered view that if the President can
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with
much more reason can she grant executive
clemency in administrative cases, which are
clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
Other laws also attest to the President’s power of
executive clemency: Under Sec. 43 of P.D. 807, "In
645!

374 People v. Salle Francisco Salle and Ricky Mengote were found guilty of
(1995) the crime of murder and destructive arson. After filing their
Notice of Appeal, Salle suddenly filed an Urgent Motion to
Withdraw Appeal. The Court required Salle's counsel,
Atty. Ida May La'o of the Free Legal Assistance Group
meritorious cases, the President may commute or
remove administrative penalties or disabilities issued
upon officers and employees, in disciplinary cases,
subject to such terms and conditions as he may
impose in the interest of the service."
It is evident from the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, therefore, that the President's executive
clemency powers may not be limited in terms of
coverage, except as already provided in the
Constitution.
In administrative cases, compared to criminal, the
quantum of evidence required is mere substantial
evidence to support a decision, not to mention that
as to the admissibility of evidence, administrative
bodies are not bound by the technical and rigid rules
of admissibility prescribed in criminal cases. It will
therefore be unjust and unfair for those found guilty
administratively of some charge if the same effects of
pardon or executive clemency cannot be extended to
them.
We wish to stress however that when we say the
President can grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, We refer only to all
administrative cases in the Executive branch, not
in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the
government.!
No. It should be observed that there are two
limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional
prerogative on pardon by the Chief Executive,
namely: (a) that the power be exercised after
conviction; and (b) that such power does not
646!
(FLAG) to verify the voluntariness of the motion.
Atty. La'o manifested that Salle signed the motion without
the assistance of counsel on his misimpression that the
motion was necessary for his early release from the New
Bilibid Prison following the grant of a conditional pardon by
the President on. She also stated that Mengote was also
granted conditional pardon and that he immediately left for
his province without consulting her. She prayed that the
Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal.
The Court granted Salle's Motion to Withdraw Appeal
Taking into consideration Section 19, Article VII of the
Constitution which provides that the President may,
except in cases of impeachment or as otherwise provided
in the Constitution, grant pardon after conviction by final
judgment, the Court required (1) the Solicitor General and
the counsel for accused-appellants to submit their
memoranda on the issue of the enforceability of the
conditional pardon and (2) the Presidential Committee for
the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon to inform the Court
why it recommended to the President the grant of the
conditional pardon despite the pendency of the appeal.
In its Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General
maintains that the conditional pardon granted to appellant
Mengote is unenforceable because the judgment of
conviction is not yet final in view of the pendency in
this Court of his appeal.
However, the FLAG, through Atty. La'o, submits that the
conditional pardon extended to Mengote is valid and
enforceable. Citing Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., it
extend to cases of impeachment.
A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no
appeal is seasonably perfected, (b) when the
accused commences to serve the sentence, (c) when
the right to appeal is expressly waived in writing,
except where the death penalty was imposed by the
trial court, and (d) when the accused applies for
probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal.
Where the judgment of conviction is still pending
appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality, as
in the instant case, executive clemency may not yet
be granted to the appellant.
The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under
Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution
prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or
conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his
appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any
application therefor, if one is made, should not be
acted upon or the process toward its grant should not
be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn.
Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the
Government concerned must require proof from the
accused that he has not appealed from his conviction
or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may
be in the form of a certification issued by the trial
court or the appellate court, as the case may be.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate
as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and
the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon,
commutation of sentence, or parole before the
647!
 argues that although Mengote did not file a motion to
withdraw the appeal, he was deemed to have abandoned
the appeal by his acceptance of the conditional pardon
which resulted in the finality of his conviction. Mariano,
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor, contends that per
information given to the Secretariat by Assistant.
Director Villanueva, Mengote's carpeta or prison record
does not show that he has a pending appeal with the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. For that reason,
the Secretariat was not able to advise those concerned to
take appropriate steps for the withdrawal of the appeal
before it recommended to the Committee the grant of
conditional pardon in favor of Mengote. Mariano then
assures the Court that there was no intention on the part
of the Secretariat and the Committee to violate Section 19,
Article VII of the Constitution, and that what happened
was a clear misappreciation of facts due to the incomplete
records of Mengote.
Issue: Whether a pardon granted to an accused during the
pendency of his appeal from a judgment of conviction by
the trial court is enforceable?!
375 People v. Bacang RTC of Negros Oriental ruled on a Criminal case finding
(1996) accused Casido, Alcorin and Francisco Palacios guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing them
to reclusion perpetua and to pay 200k and 25k as actual
damages and funeral expenses respectively. Accused
Casido and Alcorin appealed to the courts. This Court
accepted the appeal on 7 December 1994.
On 11 January 1996, the accused filed a motion before
this Courtan undated Urgent motion to Withdraw Appeal
from accused- appellants William Casido and Franklin
withdrawal of an appeal shall render those
responsible therefor administratively liable.
Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must
not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the
release of the accused from confinement.
Counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y
Cuntado is hereby given thirty (30) days from notice
hereof within which to secure from the latter the
withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to this
Court.!
No. The SC denied the petition for appeal which was
formerly instituted by the petitioners and the Bureau
of Corrections is DIRECTED to effect, with the
support and assistance of the Philippine National
Police, the re-arrest of accused-appellants William
Casido and Franklin Alcorin who shall then, forthwith,
be confined at the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila.
Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution
prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or
648!
 Alcorin which, however, did not state any reason
therefor.
And on January 5, 1996, Venancio J. Tesoro,
Superintendent IV of the Bureau of Corrections provided
that legal effects of pardon was explained to the accused
and it is the accused’s own free will that it chooses to be
pardoned.
Superintendent Venancio J. Tesoro submitted certified
true copies of the conditional pardons separately granted
to accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin
both signed by the President on 19 January 1996 and of
their certificates of discharge from prison showing that the
said accused-appellants were released from confinement
on 25 January 1996 in view of the grant of conditional
pardon.
SC said: “It is then clear that the conditional pardons
separately extended to the accused-appellants were
issued during the pendency of their instant appeal.”
The SC notices that the during the instant appeal, the the
officers of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail,
Release, and Pardon were hearing the case on issuing
pardon to the accused which is a direct contravention to
the Constitution which requires a final conviction.
Issue: Whether the pardon is valid given that it was
granted during the pendency of the instant appeal!
376 Drilon v. CA (1991) Sometime in 1973, the private respondents (Rodolfo
Ganzon and Raul Paredes) were charged with double
murder before Military Commission No. 34. On July 27,
1973, the military promulgated a decision acquitting
conditional, to an accused during the pendency
of his appeal from his conviction by the trial
court.
Any application therefor, if one is made, should not
be acted upon or the process toward its grant should
not be begun unless the appeal is
withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or
instrumentalities of the Government concerned must
require proof from the accused that he has not
appealed from his conviction or that he has
withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in the
form of a certification issued by the trial court or the
appellate court, as the case may be. The
acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an
abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the
release of an accused by virtue of a pardon,
commutation of sentence, or parole before the
withdrawal of an appeal shall render those
responsible therefor administratively liable.
Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must
not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the
release of the accused from confinement.
SC ordered the re-arrest of Casido and Alcorin.!
Yes. The Court as discussed in Tan vs Barrios:
There should be no retroactive nullification of final
judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal,
rendered by military courts against civilians before
649!
Paredes but sentencing Ganzon to life imprisonment with
hard labor.
The records show that the private respondents had been
arraigned by the military court, pleaded not guilty, and,
with respect to Raul Paredes, acquitted, and with respect
to Ganzon, convicted and sentenced. The records also
show that Ganzon had served time until 1978, when he
was placed under "house arrest" by then President
Marcos. He also claims that in 1986, he was pardoned by
the then President, an alleged pardon he is invoking to
deter the reinvestigation by the Department of Justice.
In 1988, administration having changed, then Secretary of
Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez directed State Prosecutor
Aurelio Trampe to conduct a preliminary investigation
against the private respondents for the above
murders. The private respondents moved for
dismissal: in Ganzon's case, on the ground that he,
Ganzon, had been extended an absolute pardon by the
President Ferdinand Marcos, and he, having been
previously convicted, can no longer be tried anew; in
Paredes' case, on the ground that he, Paredes, had been
acquitted
Trampe, however, denied both requests and
reconsideration having been likewise denied, the private
respondents went to the Court of Appeals on
prohibition. (For reinvestigation) and the CA granted the
prohibition.
Issue: Whether the pardon granted to Ganzon is
conclusive.
!
the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. “ … Not
everybody who was convicted by a military
court, much less those were acquitted and
released, desires to undergo the ordeal of a
second trial for the same offense ….”
The Court is of the considered opinion that these twin
developments — six-year service of sentence and
subsequent release — are significant, since if
President Marcos ordered Ganzon's release after
six years of imprisonment, President Marcos,
unavoidably commuted Ganzon's imprisonment to six
years , although as a condition, Ganzon shall remain
under "house arrest." Court is of the opinion that if
Ganzon's sentence had been commuted, Ganzon,
has therefore served his sentence and if he has
served his sentence fully, he can no longer be
reinvestigated, or, be made to "complete the service
of his sentence."
The Court therefore need not consider whether or not
Rodolfo Ganzon had been pardoned, and whatever
"pardon" the former President may have extended to
him did not erase the fact that as early as 1978, he
was a free man. Of course, he was supposed to have
remained under house arrest but as we said, not as a
continuation of his sentence, but pursuant to Marcos'
vast arrest and commitment powers during martial
rule. Dismissed
650!
377 Torres v. Gonzales Sometime before 1979 (no more specific date appears in
(1987) the records before the SC), petitioner was convicted by
the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of estafa
(two counts) and was sentenced to an aggregate prison
term of from 11 years 10 months and 22 days to 38 years
9 months and 1 day, and to pay an indemnity of
P127,728.75 (Criminal Cases Nos. 68810, 91041 and F-
138107).
On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the
petitioner by the President of the Philippines on condition
that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal
laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated,
he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by
law." Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and
was consequently released from confinement.
The evidence before the Board showed that on 22 March
1982 and 24 June 1982, petitioner had been charged with
twenty counts of estafa which were pending trial before
Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Quezon City on May 21
1986).
The record before the Board also showed that on 26 June
1985, petitioner had been convicted by the Regional Trial
Court of Rizal (Quezon City) of the crime of sedition in
Criminal Case No. Q-22926: this conviction was then
pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court.
On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the
conditional pardon of the petitioner.
On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice
issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest
and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was
No. In proceeding against a convict who has been
conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive
Department has two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code, a purely executive act,
not subject to judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article 159 of
the Revised Penal Code, a judicial act consisting of
trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional
pardon.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section
64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is
necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional
pardon.
Under Art. 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is
regarded as having violated the provisions thereof
must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final
judgment before he can be made to suffer the
penalty prescribed.
In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed
against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an
exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and
is not subject to judicial scrutiny. (*note*)
The PRESIDENT. When the person was
conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise by
the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative.
The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner
651!
 accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve
the unexpired portion of his sentence.
Issue: Whether conviction of a crime by final judgment of a
court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly
rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his
conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of
his original sentence.!
378 People v. Casido The case started when the court released a resolution on
(1997) 30 July 1996. The court ruled that the conditional pardons
granted in this case to accused-appellants William Casido
and Franklin Alcorin are void for having been extended on
19 January 1996 during the pendency of their instant
appeal. They were re-arrested and REQUIRE the officers
of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail,
Release, and Pardon to SHOW CAUSE why they should
not be held in contempt for approving the applications for
the pardon of the accused-appellants despite the
pendency of their appeal.
Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or
Pardon (hereinafter Committee) stated that the
applications for conditional pardon of the aforenamed
prisoners were recommended by the Committee to the
President for the grant of Conditional Pardon after the
Secretariat had evaluated the crimes for which they had
been charged in pursuit of their political belief. Such
recommendation was approved by the President.
They also allege that prior to their release, subject
prisoners filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal
which was received by the Supreme Court on January 11,
1996. Unfortunately, the Committee failed to verify first
whether the counsel of the accused had also withdrawn
carries with it the authority or power of the Executive
to determine whether a condition or conditions of the
pardon has or have been violated. To no other
department of the Government has such power been
intrusted.!
Yes. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and
as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and
proved by the person pardoned, because the courts
take no notice thereof; while amnesty by
Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of
which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon
is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is
granted to classes of persons or communities who
may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or
after the institution of the criminal prosecution and
sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from
the consequences of an offense of which he has
been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the
punishment, and for that reason it does nor work the
restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the
right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case
exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (article
36, RPC). While amnesty looks backward and
abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it
so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which
he is charged that the person released by amnesty
652!
 their appeal or that the NGO lawyers had filed in their
behalf a motion to Withdraw their Appeal. There was no
intention on the part of the Secretariat and the Presidential
Committee to violate Section 19, Article VII, of the
Constitution, but that what happened was a clear
misappreciation of fact.
Solicitor General additionally alleged that the accused-
appellants in this case, in an effort to seek their release at
the soonest possible time, applied for pardon before the
Presidential Committee on the Grant of Bail, Release or
Pardon (PCGBRP), as well as for amnesty before the
National Amnesty Commission (NAC). They claim that the
effect then is that since the amnesty, unlike pardon, may
be granted before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes even after conviction, the
amnesty then granted to accused-appellants William
Casido and Franklin Alcorin rendered moot and academic
the question of the premature pardon granted to them.
stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed no offense.
Accordingly, while the pardon in this case was void
for having been extended during the pendency of the
appeal or before conviction by final judgment and,
therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Section
19, Article VII of the Constitution, the grant of the
amnesty, for which accused-appellants William
Casido and Franklin Alcorin voluntarily applied under
Proclamation No. 347, was valid. This Proclamation
was concurred in by both Houses of Congress in
Concurrent Resolution No. 12 adopted on 2 June
1994.
The release then of accused-appellants William
Casido and Franklin Alcorin can only be justified by
the amnesty, but not by the pardon.

Issue: Whether the amnesty rendered the question on

pardon moot.
III. Pardon: Nature and Legal Effects
379 Monsanto v. Factoran In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the No. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace,
(1989) Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. proceeding from the power entrusted with the
Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and execution of the laws, which exempts the individual,
three other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law
falsification of public documents and sentenced them to inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private,
imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) though official act of the executive magistrate,
day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is
and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay intended, and not communicated officially to the
a fine of P3,500. Court.

They were further ordered to jointly and severally A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is

653!
indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50
representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to
pay the costs proportionately.
Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court
which subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a
motion for reconsideration but while said motion was
pending, she was extended on December 17,1984 by then
President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on
December 21, 1984.By reason of said pardon, petitioner
wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be
restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer
since the same was still vacant. Petitioner’s letter-request
was referred to the Ministry of Finance.
th
In its 4 Indorsement dated March 1, 1985, the Finance
Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her
position without the necessity of a new appointment not
earlier than the date she was extended the absolute
pardon. It also directed the city treasurer to see to it that
the amount of P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbayan had
required to be indemnified in favor of the government as
well as the costs of the litigation, be satisfied.
Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner
wrote the Ministry on April 17, 1985 stressing that the full
pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which
implies that her service in the government has never been
interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement
should correspond to the date of her preventive
suspension which is August 1,1982; that she is entitled to
backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that
she should not be required to pay the proportionate share
of the amount of P4,892.50.
essential, and delivery is not complete without
acceptance." Petitioner maintains that when she was
issued absolute pardon, the Chief Executive declared
her not guilty of the crime for which she was
convicted.
The Court wishes to stress one vital point: While we
are prepared to concede that pardon may remit all
the penal consequences of a criminal indictment if
only to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a
presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed
by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the
fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an
individual and that once he is absolved, he should be
treated as if he were innocent. For whatever may
have been the judicial dicta in the past, we cannot
perceive how pardon can produce such "moral
changes" as to equate pardoned convict in character
and conduct with one who has constantly maintained
the mark of a good, law-abiding citizen.
Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual
from all the penalties and legal disabilities and
restores him to all his civil rights. But unless
expressly grounded on the person's innocence
(which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be
constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true
character and purpose of the privilege.
Thus it restores a convicted felon to public office
necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the
conviction although such pardon undoubtedly
restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.
654!

Issue: Whether a public officer, who has been granted an
absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment.
Public offices are intended primarily for the collective
protection, safety and benefit of the common good.
They cannot be compromised to favor private
interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement
because of a mistaken notion that the pardon
virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa
would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and
plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from
refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad
character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by
reason of the pardoned conviction.
For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the
absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public
office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the
RPC for estafa thru falsification of public documents.
It is clear from the authorities referred to that when
her guilt and punishment were expunged by her
pardon, this particular disability was likewise
removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply for
reappointment to the office which was forfeited by
reason of her conviction. And in considering her
qualifications and suitability for the public post, the
facts constituting her offense must be and should be
evaluated and taken into account to determine
ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted
with public funds.
Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner
has resulted in removing her disqualification from
holding public employment but it cannot go beyond
that. To regain her former post as assistant city
treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual
procedure required for a new appointment.
655!
380 Garcia v. COA (1993) Petitioner was a supervising lineman in the Region IV
Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena
City. A criminal case of qualified theft was filed against
him. The president grated him an executive clemency.
The petitioner filed a claim for back payment of salaries.
The petitioner was later recalled to the service on 12
March 1984 but the records do not show whether
petitioner’s reinstatement was to the same position of
Supervising Lineman.
Issue: Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of back
wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the grant
of executive clemency.
The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for
appointment to public office which was forfeited by
reason of the conviction of the offense. But since
pardon does not generally result in automatic
reinstatement because the offender has to apply for
reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages.
If the pardon is based on the innocence of the
individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a
new man and as innocent; as if he had not been
found guilty of the offense charged. 7 When a person
is given pardon because he did not truly commit the
offense, the pardon relieves the party from all
punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby
restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and
unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.
In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the
trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond
reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did
not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from
finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court
commended petitioner for his concern and dedication
as a public servant. Verily, petitioner’s innocence is
the primary reason behind the grant of executive
clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable
recommendations for his reinstatement. This signifies
that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated
to his former employment; he is restored to his office
ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.
Petitioner’s automatic reinstatement to the
government service entitles him to back wages. This
is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent
656!

Section 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans
on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty
days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to
the Congress a complete report of its decision on applications for
loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or
government-owned and controlled corporations which would have
the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters
as may be provided by law.
from the start and to make reparation for what he has
suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the
service. The right to back wages is afforded to those
with have been illegally dismissed and were thus
ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of
the charges against them.
Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from
April 1 1975 (date when he was illegally dismissed)
to March 12 1984 (reinstated) to the petitioner.
Power to contract of guarantee foreign loans
" Having learned from the Marcos regime which enslaved the
Philippines to foreign banks, this provision created a more
effective way of checking the President.
o The President can no longer contract of guarantee
foreign loans without the concurrence of the Monetary
Board
" These rules are applicable to foreign laws, but legislation can
also make it applicable to domestic loans.
657!
 Section 20 Section 21 Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Instrument Loans of the State International
Members of the Senate.
Agreements
Treaties
Senate concurrence in international agreements
Requirements Requires the PRIOR Requires " Treaties of any kind, whether bilateral or multilateral, require
concurrence of the Monetary SUBSEQUENT
Senate concurrence
Board (no ratification ratification of 2/3 of
" Treaties are not only forms of international agreements the
necessary) ALL the members of
President can enter into
SENATE
o The authority to enter into executive agreements without
Legal State can borrow from: concurrence of the legislature has traditionally been
Characteristic 1. Int’l Orgs. (i.e. IMF) recognized in the Philippine jurisprudence
under 2. Other States " Treaty-making involves 2 phases: negotiation and the actual
International " Like an Int’l making of the treaty, in the negotiation phase, the President
Law Agreement excludes the legislature. However, the fruit of the Executive’s
1. Int’l Banking Inst. negotiation cannot bind as law unless it has the concurrence of
" Like a contract Senate.
C’s remedy: seek relief in " Ratification is given by at least 2/3 of ALL the members of
native state (i.e. US) who will Senate.
sue on behalf of the bank.
TREATIES EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
" International agreements " International agreements
No restriction to the type of foreign debt (Spouses Constantino v. involving political issues or embodying the
Cuisia) changes of national policy implementation or
The language of the Constitution allows the President to contract and and those involving adjustments of detail, in
guarantee foreign loans. There is no prohibition on the issuance of international arrangements carrying out well-established
certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt of permanent character. national policies and
instruments are more onerous than others. The plain, clear and " Requires concurrence of at traditions.
unambiguous language of the Constitution should be construed in a least 2/3 of all the members " Agreements involving
sense that will allow the full exercise of the power provided therein). of Senate arrangements of a more or
less temporary nature.
" Does not require
concurrence of at least 2/3 of
all the members of Senate

658!

Gonzales v. Hechanova (nature of executive agreements):
The Executive Secretary authorized the importation of foreign rice to
be purchased from the private sources, and created a rice
procurement committee composed of the other respondents for the
implementation of said proposed importation. The Government
executed contracts with the governments of other countries for the
importation of rice. Petitioner, as a rice planted and president of the
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association file the instant petition,
alleging that the importation violates R.A. 345, which explicitly
prohibits the importation of rice and corn.
The Court stated that it was not sufficiently established by the
respondents that the contracts were executive agreements. In fact,
the respondent even insisted they were contracts.
Even assuming that they were executive agreements, the same were
unlawful. Under the Constitution, the President has the power to
enter into executive agreements without previous legislative
authority. However, he may not enter into transactions through
executive agreements if such transactions are prohibited by statues
enacted prior thereto.
Termination of Treaty
" May be arrived at by formal agreement of the parties or the
treaty itself may contain the manner of terminating its life
o International law recognizes the right of 1 party to
terminate a treaty for breach by the other party or when
the fundamental circumstances for which the treaty was
entered into have changed.
" Since Congress has legislative power and since statutes and
treaties are of the same rank, Congress can pass a law negating
the terms of a treaty.
o Will only affect the domestic force of the treaty under the
theory of dualism.
Foreign Relations Power of the President
1. Power to make treaties (Art. VII, Sec. 21) and enter into
Executive and International Agreements.
2. Power to appoint ambassadors, public ministers and consuls
(Art. VII, Sec. 16)
3. Power to receive ambassadors and other ministers (party of
statutory law)
4. Power to contract and guarantee foreign loans on behalf of
the Republic (Art. VII, Sec. 20)
5. Power to deport (under the Administrative Code) – pursuant
to the residual power of the president to safeguard national
interest and protect the general welfare of the State.
Vinuya v. Romulo
Petitioners are all members of comfort women group, who
approached the Executive Department assistance in filing a claim
against the Japanese officials and military officers. The Executive
Department decline, and took the position that the individual claims
for compensation had already been satisfied by Japan’s compliance
with the Peace Treaty executed between both countries. The Court
ruled there was no grave abuse of discretion by the Executive’s
refusal to assist the petitioners.
From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioner’s claims
against Japan. In this case, the Executive has already decided that it
is the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals
for reparations against Japan in Treaty of Peace of 1951. The Court
cannot question the wisdom of such decision.
659!
May the President be compelled to submit a treaty to the Senate submits a treaty to the Senate there is nothing for the Senate to
for concurrence? (Pimentel v. Office of Executive Secretary) concur.
The Court said that the decision to enter or not to enter into a treaty
is a prerogative solely of the President. Thus, unless the President

Section 21. Treaties and International agreements

I. Senate concurrence in international agreements
381 Gonzales v. Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorized the importation of Yes. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said
Hechanova (1963) foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. tracts as alleged executive agreements has been
Gonzales filed a petition opposing the said sufficiently established. The parties to said contracts do
implementation because RA No. 3542 which allegedly not pear to have regarded the same as executive
repeals or amends RA No. 2207, prohibits the agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts may
importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and Corn properly considered as executive agreements, the same
Administration or any other government agency." are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a
constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos.
2207 is to be authorized by the President of the 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the
Philippines, and by or on behalf of the Government of the American constitutional system enter into executive
Philippines. They add that after enjoining the Rice and agreements without previous legislative authority, he
Corn administration and any other government agency may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction
from importing rice and corn, Section 10 of RA 3542 which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.
indicates that only private parties may import rice under Under the Constitution, the main function of the
its provisions. They contended that the government has Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The
already constitute valid executive agreements with former may not interfere in the performance of the
Vietnam and Burma, that in case of conflict between RA legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of
2207 and 3542, the latter should prevail and the conflict his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments
be resolved under the American jurisprudence. that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly
repealing the same through an executive
Issue: Whether RA 3452 prevails over the executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act
agreements entered into by the President prohibited by said laws.

The American theory to the effect that, in the event of

conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is
latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the

660!

382 USAFFE Veterans The central issue in this litigation concerns the validity of
Association v. the Romulo-Snyder Agreement (1950) whereby the
Treasurer (1959) Philippine Government undertook to return to the United
States Government in ten annual installments, a total of
about 35-million dollars advanced by the United States
to, but unexpanded by, the National Defense Forces of
the Philippines.
In October 1954, the USAFFE Veterans Associations
Inc., hereafter called Usaffe Veterans, for itself and for
many other Filipino veterans of World War II, ex-
members of the United States Armed Forces in the Far
East (USAFFE) prayed in its complaint before the Manila
court of first instance that said Agreement be annulled.
Petitioners pray that instead of being remitted, it should
be turned over to Finance Service of AFP for the
payment of all pending claims of USAFFE Veterans
(United States Armed Forces in the Far East). Petitioners
allege that no funds must be returned as it was actually
owned by the Philippine Government upon delivery by
U.S. and that the officers who entered into agreement
have no authority to do so.
case at bar, for respondents not only admit, but, also
insist that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. Said
theory may be justified upon the ground that treaties to
which the United States is signatory require the advice
and consent of its Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the
legislative department. No such justification can be given
as regards executive agreements not authorized by
previous legislation, without completely upsetting the
principle of separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances which are fundamental in our
constitutional set up and that of the United States.
Yes. There is no doubt that President Quirino approved
the negotiations. The Romulo-Snyder Agreement is NOT
A TREATY, but an EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT. In
international law, there is no difference between treaties
and executive agreements in their binding effect upon
states. The distinction is purely a constitutional one and
has no international legal significance.
An executive agreement is not technically a treaty
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate.
Executive agreements may be entered into with other
states, and are effective even without the concurrence of
the Senate.
Executive Agreements fall into two classes:
(1) Presidential Agreements
(2) Congressional-Executive Agreements (i.e. entered
into in pursuance of acts of Congress)
Romulo-Snyder Agreement may fall under any of these
two classes. The acts of Congress appropriating funds
for the yearly installments necessary to comply with the
Romulo-Snyder Agreement, constitute a ratification
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 They believe that Philippine foreign Secretary Carlos P.
Romulo had no authority to return or promise to return
the aforesaid sums of money through the so-called
Romulo-Snyder Agreement.
Issue: Whether Philippine Foreign Secretary Carlos P.
Romulo have the authority to enter into Romulo-Snyder
Agreement?
383 Tañada v. Angara World Trade Organization is one of the international
(1997) institutions that was created out of a multilateral treaty.
After the ravages of World War II, WTO (then was
proposed in the name of International Trade
Organization) was envisioned to play a big in the
worldwide economic recovery by fostering international
trade and preventing unilateral protectionist policy.
Unfortunately, ITO was not ratified thus only the World
Bank (tasked of rehabilitation and reconstruction) and
International Monetary Fund (stabilize currency among
states) took effect. GATT or The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade for the meantime was used by different
states to determine the trading of goods. Though the
problem with GATT is that it is simply a collection of
different treaties with no institutionalized body of
agreements and no system of dispute settlement. WTO
was ratified after a century later after the Uruguay Round
(one of the round of talks held by different
representatives of states) through the signing of the Final
Act (A one page paper enumerating the agreements of
the countries regarding the WTO).
In the Philippines, Respondent Rizalina Navarro, then
secrretary of the DTI, representing the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh,
Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the
thereof.
(1) No. Article II of the Constitution is not self-executing
meaning that Congress has to pass a clearly defined law
for it to be a cause of action. This is for two reasons (a)
The operational terms provided in specific laws
guarantees that the accused can defend his/her self
intelligently and effectively. This guarantees then due
process. (b) It violates separation of powers by propelling
courts into “uncharted ocean of social and economic
policy making.” By interpreting words such as right to
health in Article II, Judiciary in a way legislates how it
should be construed or legislated. Additionally, The
Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy.
It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and
services in the development of the Philippine economy.
While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited
entry of foreign goods, services, and investments into the
country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows
an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity,
frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
Additionally, law encourages for businesses to be
competitive domestic and foreign markets.
In fact, WTO is more lenient to developing States Ex.
Tariffs should be reduced to 36% for 6 years for
developed states but for developing states only 24% is
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 Uruguay Round Of Multilateral Negotiations. Under
the Final Act, the Philippines agrees to submit, as
appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of
their respective competent authorities, with a view to
seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with
their procedures. Fidel V. Ramos ratified the Agreement.
The Senate received two letter from the President for
their concurrence of the Agreement pursuant to Section
21, Article VII of the Constitution (No treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.)
Issues: (1) Do the provisions of the WTO agreement and
its three annexes contravene Sec. 19, Article II, and
Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, of the Philippine
constitution? Meaning that it violates "economic
nationalism"(Filipino First Policy) by the so-called
"parity provisions (state or condition of being equal)"
and "national treatment" clauses by placing foreign
goods on equal footing with local goods.
(2) Whether the Senate's concurrence in the WTO
agreement valid?
384 Bayan v. Zamora On March 14, 1947 the Philippine and United States
(2000) Forged a Military Bases Agreement which allowed the
use of installations in the Philippine territory by United
States personnel. On August 30, 1951 the Mutual
Defense Treaty was signed where US and Phil agreed to
respond to any external armed attack on their territory,
armed forces, public vessel, and aircraft.
In 1991, the Philippines and US negotiated in the
possible extension of the military bases agreement since
asked and its deadline is 10 years.
(2) Yes. Using the foregoing well-accepted definition of
grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of
regularity in the Senate's processes, this Court cannot
find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of
discretion to the Senate's exercise of its power of
concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21
of Article VII of the Constitution.
"A final act, sometimes called protocol de cloture, is an
instrument which records the winding up of the
proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually
includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties,
conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed
upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the
conference." It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a
summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference
which may have taken place over several years.
(1) Section 21 deals with (a) treaties or international
agreements in general and (b) applies to variety of treaty
or international agreements. On the other hand, Section
25 deals with treaties which involve the presence of
foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the
Philippines. In this case, Section 25 is applied since it is a
treaty concerning the military. Section 21 will determine
the number of votes required, which is two-thirds or not
less than 16 (Senate is composed of 24 members). The
16 number will not be reduced despite absence of other
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it was expiring. On August of that year, the Senate
rejected the RP-US Treaty of Friendship, which is the
treaty that would have extended the duration of military
bases in Phil. The expiration of the treaty held in
abeyance the joint military exercise between the two
countries. Though the 1951 defense treaty was still
active.
In 1997, US Defense Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific
Kurt Campbell and Foreign Affairs Undersecretary
Rodolfo Severino, Jr. to exchange notes regarding the
possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA). In 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos approved the
VFA together with the US Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
President Joseph Estrada also ratified the treaty during
the same year through the Sec of Foreign Affairs Exec
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora. Sec Zamora send the treaty
to the Senate for concurrence pursuant to Article 21 of
the 1987 Constitution (No treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred
in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate). The Committee on Foreign Relations headed by
Rodolfo Biazon held joint public hearings and consider it
for recommendation. The treaty was numbered as
Resolution number 443. In May 27, 1999, the Resolution
number 443 was approved by the Senate by a two-thirds
(2/3) vote. It entered into force on June 1.
Issues:
(1) Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21,
Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution?
(2) Does the US Senate need to ratify the treaty with the
senators since it refers to the Senate as a whole. Lex
specialis derogant generali means that where there is a
statute of a particular enactment and also a general one
which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include
what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment
must be operative, and the general enactment must be
taken to affect only such cases within its general
language which are not within the provision of the
particular enactment.
(2) Ratification –is an executive act undertaken by the
head of state or the government through which formal
acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. The State may
provide other means as when the State may provide in its
domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty.
The consent of the State to be bound by a treaty is
expressed by ratification when (a) the treaty provides for
such ratification, (b) it is otherwise established that the
negotiating States agreed that ratification should be
required, (e) the representative of the State has signed
the treaty subject to ratification or (d) the intention of the
State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears
from the full powers of its representative or was
expressed during the negotiation. In our jurisdiction, the
power to ratify is in the President and NOT the
legislature. The Senate is there only to give or withhold
its consent or concurrence to the ratification.
Executive agreements in international law are binding as
a treaty. A treaty under the Vienna Convention is a
written agreement between two or more states and
governed by international law. Whether embodied in a
single instrument or in two or more related instruments,
and whatever its particular designation. Also, the names
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Philippines or mere signature of the executive/President
is enough?
given in a treaty are inconsequential as well. The name
of the treaty whether it is a protocol, agreement, pact,
cordat, convention, declaration, etc. are of no prejudice to
the meanings given to them by the internal law of the
State.
Thus in the Philippines, we recognize the binding effects
of executive agreements. It is stated in the Commissioner
of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading that the courts have
long never questioned the validity of executive
agreements. Confirmed by long usage, the subject has
covered vast amounts of subject that the Congress never
did question as well. In the case of US, as well expressly
recognize the validity and constitutionality of executive
agreements. The Philippines in the Constitutional
Commission stated that it will act on good faith to judge
that the country that is contracting with has done
everything if they said they have done everything for the
said agreement to be recognized.
Thus the Philippines is bound now to the treaty and is
bound by Article II Sec. 2 of the Constitution. It cannot
plead that the Constitution as an excuse for non-
compliance with our obligations duties and
responsibilities under the international law and part of the
community of nations. Pacta sunt servanda (Every State
has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations
arising from treaties and other sources of international
law, and it may not invoke the provisions in its
constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform
this duty).
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385 Abaya v. Ebdane Based on an Exchange of Notes, Japan and the
(2007) Philippines have reached an understanding that
Japanese loans are to be extended to the country with
the aim of promoting economic stabilization and
development efforts.
In accordance with the established prequalification
criteria, eight contractors were evaluated or considered
eligible to bid as concurred by the JBIC. Prior to the
opening of the respective bid proposals, it was
announced that the Approved Budget for the Contract
(ABC) was in the amount of P738,710,563.67.
Consequently, the bid goes to private respondent in the
amount of P952,564,821.71 (with a variance of 25.98%
from the ABC). Hence this petition on the contention that
it violates Sec. 31 of RA 9184 which provides that :
Sec. 31 – Ceiling for Bid Prices. – The ABC shall be the
upper limit or ceiling for the bid prices. Bid prices that
exceed this ceiling shall be disqualified outright from
further participating in the proceeding. There shall be no
lower limit to the amount of the award.
The petitioners further contends that the Loan Agreement
between Japan and the Philippines is neither an
international nor an executive agreement that would bar
the application of RA9184. They pointed out that to be
considered as such, the parties must be two (2)
sovereigns or states whereas in this loan agreement, the
parties were the Philippine government and the JBIC, a
banking agency of Japan, which has a separate juridical
personality from the Japanese government.
Issue: Whether the assailed resolution violates RA 9184.
No. The Loan Agreement No. PH-204 taken in
conjunction with the Exchange of Notes dated December
27, 1999 between the Japanese Government and the
Philippine Government is an executive agreement.
An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine
agreement that has many similarities with the private law
contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two
documents, each of the parties being in the possession
of the one signed by the representative of the other.
…treaties, agreements, conventions, charters, protocols,
declarations, memoranda of understanding, modus
vivendi and exchange of notes all are refer to
international instruments binding at international law.
Although these instruments differ from each other by title,
they all have common features and international law has
applied basically the same rules to all these instruments.
These rules are the result of long practice among the
States, which have accepted them as binding norms in
their mutual relations. Therefore, they are regarded as
international customary law.
Under the fundamental principle of international law of
pacta sunt servanda, which is in fact, embodied is
Section 4 of RA9184, “any treaty or international or
executive agreement affecting the subject matter of this
Act to which the Philippine government is a signatory,
shall be observed”. The DPWH, as the executing agency
of the project financed by the Loan Agreement rightfully
awarded the contract to private respondent China Road
and Bridge Corporation.
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386 Pharmaceutical v. On October 28, 1986, President Corazon Aquino, by
DOH (2007) virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president
under the Freedom Constitution, issued Executive Order
No. 51 (Milk Code). One of the preambular clauses of the
Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to
Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes (ICBMS), a code adopted by the
World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982-2006,
the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and
protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and
health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
The Philippines ratified the International Convention on
the Rights of the Child in 1990. Article 24 of said
instrument provides that State Parties should take
appropriate measures to diminish infant and child
mortality, and ensure that all segments of society,
specially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding.
On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed
Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 or the Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Executive
Order No. 51 (RIRR), which was to take effect on July 7,
2006. On June 28, 2006, petitioner, representing its
members that are manufacturers of breastmilk
The Loan Agreement was executed and declared that it
was so entered by the parties “in the light of the contents
of the Exchange of Notes between the government of
Japan and the government of the Philippines dated Dec.
27, 1999.” Under the circumstances, the JBIC may well
be considered an adjunct of the Japanese government.
The JBIC procurement guidelines absolutely prohibits the
imposition of ceilings and bids.
The international instruments that do have specific
provisions regarding breastmilk substitutes are the
ICMBS and various WHA resolutions. Only the
ICMBS became part of the law of the land because of
TRANSFORMATION by local legislation in the Milk
Code E.O. 51. On the other hand, it is propounded
that WHA resolutions may constitute "soft law" or
non-binding norms, principles and practices that
influence state behavior. Treaties become part of the
law of the land through transformation pursuant to
Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution. Thus, treaties
or conventional international law must go through a
process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be
transformed into municipal law that can be applied to
domestic conflicts.
The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as
they have not been concurred in by at least two-thirds of
all members of the Senate as required under Section 21,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. However, the ICMBS
which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been
TRANSFORMED into domestic law through local
legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk
Code that has the force and effect of law in this
jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se.
667!
 substitutes, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) or a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. Issue: Whether the international instruments
(ICBMS and WHA resolutions) adverted to by
respondents are part of the law of the land.
On the other hand, WHA, being “soft law”, include
recommendations which are generally not binding, but
they "carry moral and political weight, as they
constitute the judgment on a health issue of the collective
membership of the highest international body in the field
of health."

Thus, unlike what has been done with the ICMBS

whereby the legislature enacted most of the provisions
into law which is the Milk Code, the subsequent WHA
Resolutions, specifically providing for exclusive
breastfeeding from 0-6 months, continued breastfeeding
up to 24 months, and absolutely prohibiting
advertisements and promotions of breastmilk substitutes,
have not been adopted as a domestic law.
II. Termination of Treaty
III. Other Foreign Affairs Power
387 Vinuya v. Romulo Petitioner Isabelita Vinuya, et al. were all members of the No. The issue is political in nature. It is not within SC
(2010) Malaya Lolas Organization, established for the purpose power to order the Executive Department to take up the
of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese petitioner’s cause. SC only power in this regard is to urge
military forces in the Philippines during WWII. and exhort the Executive Department to take up
petitioner’s cause. Jurisdiction over such issues of
Petitioner argue that (1) the general waiver of claims international scope lies with the Executive Department,
made by the Philippine government in the Treaty of particularly the Chief Executive. As a general principle –
Peace with Japan is void. (2) They claim that the comfort and particularly here, where such an extraordinary length
women system established by Japan, and the brutal rape of time has lapsed between the treaty’s conclusion and
and enslavement of petitioners constituted a crime our consideration – the Executive must be given ample
against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture. (3) They discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of
allege that the prohibition against these international espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of
crimes is jus cogens norms from which no derogation is both the interests of the petitioners and those of the
possible; as such, in waiving the claims of Filipina Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are
comfort women and failing to espouse their complaints sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or
against Japan, the Philippine government is in breach of necessary.
its legal obligation not to afford impunity for crimes

668!
against humanity. (4) Finally, petitioner assert that the
Philippine govt’s acceptance of the “apologies” made by
Japan as well as funds from the Asian Women’s Fund
(AWF) were contrary to international law.
Respondent Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo, et al.
maintain that (1) all claims of the Philippines and its
nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San
Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral
Reparations Agreement of 1956. (2) In addition, RES
argue that the apologies made by Japan have been
satisfactory, and (3) that Japan had addressed the
individual claims of the women through the atonement
money paid by the AWF.
Issue: Whether Respondent Romulo is ultra vires in
refusing to espouse the claims of the PET for the crimes
against humanity and war crimes committed against
them; and, can the Court compel respondent Romulo to
espouse petitioner’s claims for official apology and other
forms of reparations against Japan before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international
tribunals
“[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign
relations.” (US v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp)
It is also the President who possesses the most
comprehensive and the most confidential information
about foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular
officials regularly brief him on meaningful events all over
the world. He has also unlimited access to ultra-sensitive
military intelligence data. In fine, the presidential role in
foreign affairs is dominant and the President is
traditionally accorded a wider degree of discretion in the
conduct of foreign affairs (CJ Puno’s Dissent in Secretary
of Justice v. Lantion)
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means
available for individuals to bring a claim within the
international legal system has been when the individual is
able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the
individual’s behalf. Even then, it is not the individual’s
rights that are being asserted, but rather, the state’s own
rights.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in
international law has been used as a legal term
describing obligations owed by States towards the
community of states as a whole. Such obligations derive,
for example, in contemporary international law, from the
outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also
from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights
of the human person, including protection from slavery
and racial discrimination.
In international law, the term “jus cogens” (literally,
669!
 “compelling law”) refers to norms that command
peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and
custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in
the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit
derogation, and can be modified only by general
international norms of equivalent authority.

Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty
days from the opening of every regular session as the basis of the
general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of
financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue
measures.

The Budget
" The budget which becomes the basis of the general
appropriation bill, is prepared by the President and submitted
to Congress within 30 days from the opening of every
regular session
" Congress may no increase the appropriation recommended
by the President for operation of the Government as
specified in the budget (Art. VI, Sec. 25).
" The “source of financing” has reference to other sources
other than taxation i.e. foreign aid.

Section 23. The President shall address the Congress at the

opening of its regular session. He may also appear before it at any
other time.

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