REPORTABLE 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
INHERENT JURISDICTION

SUO MOTU CONTEMPT PETITION (CRL.) NO.1 OF 2020

IN RE: 
PRASHANT BHUSHAN AND ANR.

J U D G M E N T

1. Heard Shri K.K. Venugopal, learned Attorney General for India,  Dr.

Rajeev   Dhavan,   Shri   Dushyant   Dave,   Shri   C.U.   Singh,   learned   senior

counsel, and the contemnor­Shri Prashant Bhushan.

2. After having adjudged Shri Prashant Bhushan, Advocate, guilty of

contempt vide judgment dated 14.08.2020, Dr. Rajeev Dhavan and Shri

Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel appearing for the contemnor­Shri

Prashant Bhushan raised the following arguments: ­

(i)   That   the   copy   of   the   petition   on   the   basis   of   which   the   suo   motu

cognizance was taken by this Court with respect to first tweet, filed by

Shri Mahek Maheshwari, was not furnished, in spite of the application
Signature Not Verified

having been filed by the contemnor.   Thus, it could not be ascertained
Digitally signed by
Charanjeet kaur
Date: 2020.08.31
14:25:21 IST
Reason:

whether   the   complaint   was   mala   fide   or   even   personally   or   politically

motivated.
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(ii) The factors relevant for sentencing are the offender, the offence, the

convicting judgment, statutory or other defences relating to a substantial

interference  with   justice,   truth,   bona   fides,   and   public   interest   in

disclosure.

(iii) The   contemnor   is   a   lawyer   of   35   years   of   standing,   who   has

pursued   public   interest   litigation   successfully   at   some   personal   and

professional cost.  He got appreciation from the Court.  He is a founding

member of Campaign for Judicial Accountability, which includes several

senior counsel of repute.   He has brought certain corruption cases and

causes to the Court such as V. Ramaswamy case, Coal Mining case, Goa

Mining case, Orissa Mining case, an issue relating to the appointment of

CVC, CBI Director’s case, Lok Pal case etc.  In the public interest, he has

filed several petitions like Narmada case, Bofors case, Police Reform case,

Passive Euthanasia case, HPCL Privatization case, Street Vendors case,

Rickshaw   Pullers   case,   Singur   Land   Acquisition   case,   Draught

Management, Gram Nyayalaya, and Electoral Bond cases.

(iv)   The   nature   of   offences   is   another   ingredient   to   be   taken   into

consideration while imposing sentence; (i) Offence must be clear without

ambiguity.   (ii)   The   potential   offender   must   know/understand   whether

he/she is guilty of the offence.  The offence of scandalizing the Court is

notoriously vague.   It has not been defined by the Statute.   It is called

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"vague   and   wandering”   jurisdiction.       Reliance   has   been   placed   on

Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, 2015 (5) SCC 1.   Such an offence

has   to   be   handled   with   care   and   used   sparingly,   as   observed  in

Baradakanta   Mishra   v.   Registrar   of   Orissa   High   Court   &   another,

(1974) 1 SCC 374.  There is inconsistency in various decisions relating to

the conviction and sentence due to vagueness.

(v) The very jurisdiction of contempt is scandalizing and is vague and

colonial.   Several decisions have been relied upon where the Court has

not even initiated contempt in such matters.    In some of the countries,

the contempt law being an archaic law has already been done away with.

There   cannot   be   any   compromise   with   the   Right   to   Free   Speech   and

Opinions.  

(vi) In the convicting judgment, reliance was placed on the decisions in

P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker & Others, (1988) 3 SCC 167),  Brahma

Prakash Sharma and Others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, 1953 SCR

1169, and  In Re: Hira Lal Dixit and two others, (1955) 1 SCR 677.

The   decision   in  E.M.   Sankaran   Namboodripad   v.   T.   Narayanan

Nambiar, (1970) 2 SCC 325, has been superseded by P.N. Duda (supra).

In   so   far   as   the   decision   in  E.M.   Sankaran   Namboodripad   (supra)  is

concerned, the same would not be relevant inasmuch as the same stands

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overruled by P.N. Duda (supra).   Similarly, reliance on the judgment in

C. K. Daphtary & Ors. v. O. P. Gupta & Ors., (1971) 1 SCC 626, is also

not   relevant   inasmuch   as   the   said   judgment   is   delivered   prior   to

amendment of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short ‘the Act’), vide

which Section 13(b) was brought on statute book, so as to allow truth as

a defence.   The Court has to exercise jurisdiction with  great care and

caution and only in cases that are clear beyond reasonable doubt.   In

Re: S. Mulgaokar, (1978) 3 SCC 339, various guidelines have been laid

down by this Court.  They are, free market of ideas, fair criticism in good

faith when it is in the public interest, the surrounding circumstances,

the   person   who   is   making   the   comments,   his   knowledge   in   the   field

regarding   which   the   comments   are   made   and   the   intended   purpose.

After considering all these guidelines, an advocate should be punished by

exercising   extreme   caution   only   in   the   case   where   the   tendency   is   to

create disaffection and disrepute to erode the judicial system.   Though

the   convicting   judgment,   on   the   one   hand   cites   various   decision   on

balance, on the contrary holds the contemnor guilty for the fair criticism

made by him. 

(vii)   There   is   no   conflict   between   the   constitutional   jurisdiction   under

Articles   129,   215   of   the   Constitution   of   India,   and   the   Contempt   of

Courts Act.  In Pallav Sheth v. Custodian & Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 549, it
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was laid down that the powers of punishment for contempt under Article

129 of the Constitution of India have to be exercised in consonance with

the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

(viii) Besides that, provisions in Sections 8 and 9 and newly amended

Section 13(a) of the Act requires that the Court cannot impose a sentence

unless it is satisfied that contempt is of such a nature that substantially

interferes   or   tends   substantially   to   interfere   with   the   due   course   of

justice.  Thus, special responsibility is cast on the Court to examine the

extent of interference.   The provisions of newly amended Section 13(a)

amply make it clear that the Court is required to assess the situation

itself.   However, in the convicting judgment no such inquiry has taken

place and as such an order of sentence cannot be passed.  Truth should

ordinarily be allowed as a defence unless the Court finds, that it is only a

camouflage   to   escape   the   consequences   of   the   deliberate   attempt   of

scandalizing the Court.  Section 13 of the Act enables the Court to permit

justification by truth as a valid defence in any contempt proceedings if it

satisfied that such a defence is in the public interest and the request for

invoking the defence is bona fide.     Reliance is placed on  Subramanian

Swamy   v.  Arun   Shourie,   (2014) 12   SCC  344.    In   so   far   as   the   first

tweet   is   concerned,   the   tweet   is   an   expression   of   opinion   by   Shri

Prashant Bhushan that due to the Courts not functioning physically the

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litigants are deprived of real access to justice.   It is submitted that this

opinion also finds support from the observations made by this court  In

Re: Financial aid for members of Bar affected by a pandemic (In Suo

Moto   Writ   Petition   No.8/2020)   that   due   to   the   suspension   of   physical

functioning of the Courts, the lawyers have been deprived of sources of

earning their livelihood.

(ix)   With   respect   to   the   second   tweet,   this   is   again   an   expression   of

opinion by Shri Prashant Bhushan.   It was submitted that this opinion

has   been   shared   by   many   others   including   the   retired   judges   of   this

Court.     Reference   was   also   made   to   the   Press   Conference   held   on

12.01.2018 by the Sitting Judges of this Court.  The role of the Supreme

Court and the last four Chief Justices is detailed in the reply affidavit.

The reply is backed up by details and materials and how and why Shri

Bhushan  came to  form opinion  reflected  in  the tweet.    The defence of

truth was not examined at all in the convicting judgment and the same

needs   to   be   examined   at   the   stage   of   sentencing   in   compliance   with

Section 13(b) of the Act. 

(x) Article   19(1)(a)   guarantees   Freedom   of   Speech   and   Expression.

Provisions in Articles 129 and 142(2) of the Constitution of India, cannot

override   Article   19(1)(a)   and   19(2)   of   the   Constitution   of   India.     Free

Speech   is   a   highly   valued   right   and   is   essential   for   democracy.     In   a

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democracy, there is a right to dissent.  There is the freedom to build an

opinion.  Publication in good faith is suggested for the Press, as defined

in   General   Clauses   Act   in   Section   3(22),   it   is   a   valid   defence,   if   done

honestly, whether it is done negligently or not.

(xi) It was submitted that while applying the Principle of Proportionality

the balance will have to tilt in favour of the rights as against restrictions,

inasmuch as the rights are fundamental in nature. The opinions of the

contemnor were bona fide and devoid of malice.  Thus, the decision with

respect to the conviction is required to be recalled, and in such an event,

no sentence can be imposed.   It was submitted that the judgments are

open to scrutiny and this Court should welcome outspoken comments

including criticism by ordinary citizen. 

(xii) Debarring an advocate from appearing is to be done only in rare

cases, as a last resort, only after giving requisite notice for the same, as

held in R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106.

(xiii)   There   should   not   be   an   attempt   to   coerce   the   contemnor   into

making an apology on the basis that nothing else would be acceptable.  

3. At the beginning of the proceedings itself, we had called upon Shri

K.K. Venugopal, learned Attorney General for India, to address us.  In the

morning session, we have heard him at great length.   Learned Attorney

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General   stated   that   this   Court,   by   showing   magnanimity,   should   not

impose any sentence on Shri Prashant Bhushan.  He submitted that the

tweets made by Shri Prashant Bhushan could be considered as bona fide

criticism   in   order   to   seek   improvement   in   the   functioning   of   the

institution.  He further stated, that taking into consideration the causes

represented   by   Shri   Prashant   Bhushan   in   various   public   interest

litigation and the service rendered by him to different classes of society

by   bringing   their   issues   to   the   notice   of   this   Court,   the   Court   should

consider not imposing any sentence on him.

4. When controverted with various statements made by the contemnor

in the affidavit in reply, the learned Attorney General fairly conceded that

such statements were not warranted.  

5. He   suggested   that   such   statements   be   either   withdrawn   by   the

contemnor   or   should   be   taken   off   from   the   pleadings.     When   further

confronted   with   the   Contempt   Petition   filed   by   the   learned   Attorney

General in one of the proceedings against the very same contemnor, the

learned Attorney General submitted that since Shri Prashant Bhushan,

on a piece of paper, had expressed his regret, he expressed desire not to

pursue   the   said   contempt   proceedings.     The   learned   Attorney   General

attempted to read out the statement made by Shri Prashant Bhushan in

the contempt proceedings, which was initiated in the year 2009, wherein
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Shri Prashant Bhushan had expressed his regret.  However, when it was

pointed out to the learned Attorney General that the said statement was

not   pertaining   to   the   present   proceedings   but   earlier   proceedings,   the

learned Attorney General stated that when Shri Prashant Bhushan had

expressed regret in the other proceedings, there is no reason as to why

he should not express regret in the present proceedings also.  He stated

that the same could be considered as regret in the present proceedings

also.   We had also pointed out to the learned Attorney General that the

contemnor   was   pressing   the   statement   made   in   the   affidavit   and   was

raising a plea of truth as a defence.   In such circumstances, whether it

would   be   appropriate   on   the   part   of   this   Court   to   take   off   the   said

statements from the pleadings.  The learned Attorney General, faced with

this   situation,   stated   that   unless   the   contemnor   withdraws   the   said

statements,   in   view   of   the   provisions   of   Section   13(b)   of   the   Act,   the

statements cannot be taken off. 

6. After   hearing   the   learned   Attorney   General,   we   heard   Dr.   Rajeev

Dhavan, learned senior counsel appearing for the contemnor, at length.

The submissions made on behalf of Dr. Dhavan, learned senior counsel,

have already been stated hereinabove.  

7. After Dr. Dhavan, learned senior counsel completed his arguments,

we again called upon learned Attorney General, to address us by taking
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into consideration the submissions made on behalf of contemnor by   Dr.

Dhavan,   learned  senior  counsel.         Learned  Attorney  General  was   fair

enough to state that insistence on the part of the contemnor to press into

service various objectionable statements made in the pleading was not

warranted and also not justifiable.  He fairly stated that in the interest of

the   administration   of   justice,   the   contemnor   ought   not   to   have   made

such statements.   He further stated that such statements, which were

also concerning various sitting and retired judges of this Court, including

the   past   and   present   Chief   Justices,   were   totally   unjustifiable,

specifically so when the retired or sitting judges were not in a position to

defend themselves.  He further submitted that no verdict could be passed

without   hearing   such   Judges,   and   as   such,   the   process   would   be

endless.  He submitted that such a defence cannot be looked into.  From

the tenor of the submission made by the learned Attorney General, it was

apparent   that   the   learned   Attorney   General   was   at   pains   due   to   the

statements made by the contemnor in the affidavit.

8. However, learned Attorney General appealed to the magnanimity of

this Court and submitted that instead of sentencing the contemnor with

any sentence this Court should magnanimously warn him, to be careful

while making any statement with regard to the judges or the institution

of   administration   of   justice   and   he   should   be   further   warned   not   to

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repeat any such act hereafter.  He stated that apart from sending a right

message to the contemnor, it will also send an appropriate message to all

the members of the Bar as well as all citizens throughout the country

that   one   should   be   careful   and   cautious   while   making   any   statement

with regard to the judges or the institution of administration of justice.

The   learned   Attorney   General   reiterated   on   several   occasions   that

magnanimity is required to be shown by this Court. He further submitted

that this Court by showing magnanimity, should give a quietus to this

matter by giving warning to him instead of sentencing him.  

9. During   the   course   of   the   arguments,   it   was   also   brought   to   the

notice of Shri Dhavan, learned senior counsel, the fact that prior to the

supplementary statement of the contemnor dated 24.08.2020, before it

being   filed   in   the   Court,   it   was   widely   published   in   media   on

24/25.08.2020.  It was also brought to the notice of Dr. Dhavan, learned

senior counsel, that the contemnor had made various statements with

regard to the present proceedings either in the press interviews or in the

webinars, which have the effect of influencing the present proceedings

and as to whether such an act at the behest of a litigant was permissible

in law.

10. Dr. Dhavan, learned senior counsel, fairly stated that publication of

the supplementary statement of the contemnor in various print as well
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as other media in advance was not proper, and he also stated that no

lawyer   or   litigant   should   either   give   an   interview,   talk   to   the   press   or

make any statement with regard to pending litigation before any Court.

He submitted that though a fair criticism of judgment after the judgment

was pronounced was permissible in law, making any statement or giving

press   interviews   during   the   pendency   of   the   litigation   was   not

permissible.

11. When Dr. Dhavan, learned senior counsel was confronted with the

situation   as   to   how   the   sitting,   as   well   as   retired   judges   who  are   not

supposed   to   speak   to   anyone   or   to   give   interviews   can   defend   the

allegations made against them,  Dr. Dhavan responded that though this

Court should not reprimand the contemnor for the tweets made by him,

this Court should lay down guidelines for the precautions to be observed

by the lawyers and litigants while making any statements with respect to

the judges and the institution of administration of justice.  He submitted

that this, apart from giving a right signal to the contemnor, would also

give a signal to all the members of the Bar in the country.  

12. Dr. Dhavan, learned senior counsel, also submitted that we should

consider the criticism made by the various persons in the media, and in

case   any   punishment   is   inflicted,   the   Court   will   have   to   face   further

criticism.
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In Re: Defence

13. It is urged by Dr. Dhavan, learned senior counsel, that defence of

the  contemnor  had  not been  taken into  consideration  while  convicting

him   for   criminal   contempt.     He   pressed   the   defence   in   service   to   be

examined   before   imposing   any   sentence.     We   propose   to   examine   the

defence.     However,   before   we   do   so,   to   put   the   record   straight,   it   is

necessary to mention that Shri Dave, learned senior counsel appearing

for Shri Prashant Bhushan, while arguing on 05.08.2020, after reading

few lines   from the   affidavit  in  reply upto  paragraph   38  stated   that  he

would   not   go   to   the   defence   taken   as   reading   of   that   would   further

malign the reputation of this Court. Since he did not press the defence

into service, there was no occasion to take the same into consideration,

specifically,   in   view   of   the   aforesaid   statement   made   by   the   learned

senior counsel.  

14. It will be relevant to refer to the statement made by the contemnor

which was made and read out before this Court by the contemnor on

20.08.2020, which reads as under:­

“I   have   gone   through   the   judgment   of   this   Hon'ble

Court. I am pained that I have been held guilty of committing
contempt of the Court whose majesty I have tried to uphold —
not as a courtier or cheerleader but as a humble guard — for
over three decades, at some personal and professional cost. I
am   pained,   not   because   I   may   be   punished,   but   because   I
have been grossly misunderstood.
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 I   am   shocked   that   the   court   holds   me   guilty   of
"malicious, scurrilous, calculated attack” on the institution of
administration of justice. I am dismayed that the Court has
arrived  at  this conclusion  without  providing  any  evidence  of
my motives to launch such an attack. I must confess that I am
disappointed that the court did not find it necessary to serve
me with a copy of the complaint on the basis of which the suo
motu notice was issued, nor found it necessary to respond to
the specific averments made by me in my reply affidavit or the
many submissions of my counsel.
I find it hard to believe that the Court finds my tweet
"has   the   effect   of   destabilizing   the   very   foundation   of   this
important pillar of Indian democracy". I can only reiterate that
these   two   tweets   represented   my   bonafide   beliefs,   the
expression   of   which   must   be   permissible   in  any   democracy.
Indeed, public scrutiny is desirable for healthy functioning of
judiciary itself. I believe that open criticism of any institution
is necessary in a democracy, to safeguard the constitutional
order. We are living through that moment in our history when
higher principles must trump routine obligations, when saving
the   constitutional   order   must   come   before   personal   and
professional niceties, when considerations of the present must
not come in the way of discharging our responsibility towards
the future. Failing to speak up would have been a dereliction
of duty, especially for an officer of the court like myself.
My tweets were nothing but a small attempt to discharge
what I considered to be my highest duty at this juncture in the
history   of   our   republic.   I   did   not   tweet   in   a   fit   of   absence
mindedness. It would be insincere and contemptuous on my
part to offer an apology for the tweets that expressed what was
and continues to be my bonafide belief. Therefore, I can only
humbly   paraphrase   what   the   father   of   the   nation   Mahatma
Gandhi had said in his trial: I do not ask for mercy. I do not
appeal   to   magnanimity.   I   am   here,   therefore,   to   cheerfully
submit to any penalty that can lawfully be inflicted upon me
for what the Court has determined to be an offence, and what
appears to me to be the highest duty of a citizen.”

15. The   contemnor,   in   the   statement   made   in   this   Court   on

20.08.2020,   stated   that   the   Court   did   not   consider   it   necessary   to

respond to the specific averments made by him in the reply affidavit.  The
14
contemnor was present along with his counsel, and what was urged was

taken into consideration.  When we had heard Shri Dave, learned senior

counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   contemnor,   on   05.08.2020,       the

contemnor   was   very   much   present   there   and   we   had   taken   into

consideration the submissions which were made in the presence of the

contemnor. 

16. After the judgment of conviction, when this Court had granted time

to the contemnor to submit unconditional apology, if he so desired, the

supplementary statement has been made by Shri Prashant Bhushan on

24.08.2020 to the following effect: ­

“It   is   with   deep   regret   that   I   read   the   order   of   this

Hon’ble Court dated 20th  of August.  At the hearing the court
asked me to take 2­3 days to reconsider the statement I made
in   the   court.     However,   the   order   subsequently   states:   “We
have   given   time   to   the   contemnor   to   submit   unconditional
apology, if he so desires.”
I   have   never   stood   on   ceremony   when   it   comes   to
offering an apology for any mistake or wrongdoing on my part.
It has been a privilege for me to have served this institution
and bring several important public interest causes before it. I
live   with   the   realisation   that   I   have   received   from   this
institution much more than I have had the opportunity to give
it.  I cannot but have the highest regard for the institution of
the Supreme Court.
I believe that the Supreme Court is the last bastion of
hope  for   the  protection of fundamental  rights,  the  watchdog
institutions and indeed for constitutional democracy itself. It
has   rightly   been   called   the   most   powerful   court   in   the
democratic world, and often an exemplar for courts across the
globe.  Today in these troubling times, the hopes of the people
of India vest in this Court to ensure the rule of law and the
Constitution and not an untrammelled rule of the executive. 
15
 This casts a duty, especially for an officer of this Court
like myself, to speak up, when I believe there is a deviation
from its sterling record.   Therefore, I express myself in good
faith, not to malign the Supreme Court or any particular Chief
Justice,   but   to   offer   constructive   criticism   so   that   the   court
can   arrest   any   drift   away   from   its   long­standing   role   as   a
guardian of the Constitution and custodian of people’s rights.
My   tweets   represented   this   bonafide   belief   that   I
continue   to   hold.     Public   expression   of   these   beliefs   was   I
believe, in line with my higher obligations as a citizen and a
loyal officer of this court.  Therefore, an apology for expression
of   these   beliefs,   conditional   or   unconditional,   would   be
insincere.     An   apology   cannot   be   mere   incantation   and   any
apology   has   to,   as   the   court   has   itself   put   it,   be   sincerely
made.   This is specially so when I have made the statements
bonafide and pleaded truths with full details, which have not
been dealt with by the Court. If I retract a statement before
this   court   that   I   otherwise   believe   to   be   true   or   offer   an
insincere   apology,   that   in   my   eyes   would   amount   to   the
contempt of my conscience and of an institution that I hold in
highest esteem.”

17. In   both   the   statements   he   has   reiterated   that   “I   have   made

statements bona fide and pleaded truths with full details which have not

been dealt with by the Court”.

18. Without going into the scope of the aspects to be examined while

sentencing, we propose to consider the defence taken by the contemnor

in his reply affidavit.  

19. For appreciating the submission made by the contemnor it will be

relevant to refer to Section 13 of the Amended Act of 1971, as amended

in 2006, which reads thus: ­

16
 “13.  Contempts   not   punishable   in   certain   cases  –
Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time
being in force –
(a)   no court shall impose a sentence under this Act for a
contempt of court unless it is satisfied that the contempt is
of   such   a   nature   that   it   substantially   interferes,   or   tends
substantially to interfere with the due course of justice;
(b) the court may permit, in any proceeding for contempt of
court,   justification   by   truth   as   a   valid   defence   if   it   is
satisfied   that   it   is   in   public   interest   and   the   request   for
invoking the said defence is bona fide.”

20. The aforesaid provision would show that for considering the truth

as valid defence there is a twin requirement. That such a defence is in

public interest and that the request for invoking the said defence is bona

fide. 

21. The sine qua non for considering the truth as a valid defence are

that the Court should be satisfied that defence is in the public interest

and the request for invoking the said defence is bona fide.  Be that as it

may, since the contemnor is insisting that at this stage also the Court is

required   to   take   truth   as   a   defence   into   consideration,   we   would   be

required   to   consider   the   same,   lest   the   contemnor   feels   that   we   have

avoided its consideration. 

22. In Indirect Tax Practitioners’ Association v. R.K. Jain, (2010) 8

SCC 281, it was held thus: ­

17
 “39.  The   matter   deserves   to   be   examined   from   another
angle. The substituted Section 13 represents an important
legislative   recognition   of   one   of   the   fundamentals   of   our
value   system   i.e.   truth.   The   amended   section   enables   the
court to permit justification by truth as a valid defence in
any contempt proceeding if it is satisfied that such defence
is in public interest and the request for invoking the defence
is bona fide. In our view, if a speech or article, editorial, etc.
contains something which appears to be contemptuous and
this   Court   or   the   High   Court   is   called   upon   to   initiate
proceedings under the Act and Articles 129 and 215 of the
Constitution,   the   truth   should   ordinarily   be   allowed   as   a
defence unless the Court finds that it is only a camouflage
to   escape   the   consequences   of   deliberate   or   malicious
attempt to scandalise the court or is an interference with the
administration of justice. Since, the petitioner has not even
suggested that what has been mentioned in the editorial is
incorrect or that the respondent has presented a distorted
version of the facts, there is no warrant for discarding the
respondent’s   assertion   that   whatever   he   has   written   is
based   on   true   facts   and   the   sole   object   of   writing   the
editorial   was   to   enable   the   authorities   concerned   to   take
corrective/remedial measures.

42.  In   our   view,   a   person   like   the   respondent   can

appropriately be described as a whistleblower for the system
who   has   tried   to   highlight   the   malfunctioning   of   an
important   institution   established   for   dealing   with   cases
involving   revenue   of   the   State   and   there   is   no   reason   to
silence such a person by invoking Articles 129 or 215 of the
Constitution or the provisions of the Act.”

23. In Subramanian Swamy (supra), this Court approved the decision

rendered  in  Indirect  Tax  Practitioners’  Association   v.  R.K.  Jain   (supra)

and observed: ­

“13. The legal position with regard to truth as a defence in
contempt proceedings is now statutorily settled by Section
13 of the 1971 Act (as substituted by Act 6 of 2006). The
Statement   of   Objects   and   Reasons   for   the   amendment   of
Section 13 by Act 6 of 2006 read as follows:

18
 “1.   The   existing   provisions   of   the   Contempt   of
Courts   Act,   1971   have   been   interpreted   in   various
judicial   decisions   to   the   effect   that   truth   cannot   be
pleaded as a defence to a charge of contempt of court.
2. The National Commission to Review the Working
of   the   Constitution   [NCRWC]   has   also   in   its   report,
inter alia, recommended that in matters of contempt, it
shall   be   open   to   the   court   to   permit   a   defence   of
justification by truth.
3.   The   Government   has   been   advised   that   the
amendments   to  the  Contempt   of   Courts  Act,  1971   to
provide   for   the   above   provision   would   introduce
fairness   in   procedure   and   meet   the   requirements   of
Article 21 of the Constitution.
4. Section 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
provides certain circumstances under which contempt
is   not   punishable.   It   is,   therefore,   proposed   to
substitute the said section, by an amendment.
5. The Contempt of Courts (Amendment) Bill, 2003
was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 8­5­2003 and the
same   was   referred   to   the   Department­related
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs for
examination.   The   Hon’ble   Committee   considered   the
said Bill in its meeting held on 2­9­2003. However, with
the dissolution of the 13th Lok Sabha, the Contempt of
Courts (Amendment) Bill, 2003 lapsed. It is proposed to
reintroduce   the   said   Bill   with   modifications   of   a
drafting nature.”

15. A two­Judge Bench of this Court in R.K. Jain [(2010)
8 SCC 281] had an occasion to consider Section 13 of the
1971 Act, as substituted by Act 6 of 2006. In para 39 the
Court said: (SCC p. 311)
“39.   …   The   substituted   Section   13   represents   an
important   legislative   recognition   of   one   of   the
fundamentals   of   our   value   system   i.e.   truth.   The
amended   section   enables   the   court   to   permit
justification   by   truth   as   a   valid   defence   in   any
contempt proceeding if it is satisfied that such defence
is  in  public  interest   and  the  request   for   invoking   the
defence is bona fide. In our view, if a speech or article,
editorial, etc. contains something which appears to be
contemptuous   and   this   Court   or   the   High   Court   is
called upon to initiate proceedings under the Act and
Articles   129   and   215   of   the   Constitution,   the   truth
19
 should   ordinarily   be   allowed   as   a   defence   unless   the
Court finds that it is only a camouflage to escape the
consequences   of   deliberate   or   malicious   attempt   to
scandalise   the   court   or   is   an   interference   with   the
administration of justice. Since, the petitioner has not
even  suggested  that  what   has  been  mentioned  in the
editorial   is   incorrect   or   that   the   respondent   has
presented a distorted version of the facts, there is no
warrant for discarding the respondent’s assertion that
whatever he has written is based on true facts and the
sole   object   of   writing   the   editorial   was   to   enable   the
authorities   concerned   to   take   corrective/remedial
measures.”
Thus, the two­Judge Bench has held that the amended
section enables the Court to permit justification by truth as
a valid defence in any contempt proceedings if it is satisfied
that such defence is in public interest and the request for
invoking the defence is bona fide. We approve the view of the
two­Judge Bench in R.K. Jain [(2010) 8 SCC 281]. Nothing
further   needs   to   be   considered   with   regard   to   second
question   since   the   amendment   in   contempt   law   has
effectively rendered this question redundant.”

24. It was submitted by Dr. Dhavan, learned senior counsel, that the

second   tweet   was   an   expression   of   opinion   by   Mr.   Prashant   Bhushan

that the democracy has been substantially destroyed in the country in

the past six years and the Court has also played its role in the same.

However, the Court did not go into the said defence.   It was submitted

that the said opinion was carved out on the basis of material which was

placed   on   record   along   with   the   affidavit   in   reply.     However,   the   said

material was also not taken into consideration by this Court. 

25. Learned   Attorney  General,   after  being  taken   through   the   defence

taken by the contemnor in the reply, fairly stated that contemnor should
20
be   asked   to   withdraw   such   defences   and   it   should   be   taken   off   the

records.  

26. With regard to the averments made in the affidavit in reply of Shri

Prashant   Bhushan,   the   learned   Attorney   General   submitted   that   the

affidavit   contains   various   allegations   against   several   retired   Chief

Justices   as   well   as   the   sitting   and   retired   Judges   of   this   Court.   He

submitted that such a defence cannot be examined without hearing the

Judges against whom such allegations are made and therefore such a

defence   cannot   be   considered   unless   the   persons   against   whom

allegations are made are heard.  He, therefore, stated that the contemnor

should express regret for taking such a defence and withdraw the same.

On the examination of the defence of the contemnor, we concur with the

submission   made   by   the   learned   Attorney   General   that   the   defence

cannot be said to be either in the public interest or a bona fide one.  In

this respect it will also be pertinent to note that when Mr. Dave, learned

senior   counsel,   was   heard   in   the   presence   of   the   contemnor,   on

05.08.2020, he fairly stated that he would not read further averments in

the affidavit in reply of the contemnor because it will further malign the

reputation of this Court.  Thus, we endorse the view of learned Attorney

General   that   the   defence   should   be   taken   off   the   record   and,   in   our

21
opinion, it is neither bona fide nor in the public interest and as such it

fails to clear the twin test, which we are examining. 

27. One of the reasons why we hold so is that though the tweet is of

two lines, the affidavit in reply refers to series of allegations made by the

contemnor with regard to the functioning of a large number of retired as

well as sitting Judges including the Chief Justices as to their role on the

judicial   as   well   as   on   administrative   side.     If   the   averments   are

considered for taking truth as a defence, it would amount nothing else

but the aggravation of the contempt. 

28. We are of the view that, in the circumstances, the defence taken

cannot be said to be either in the public interest or bona fide one.   On

the contrary, it is more derogatory to the reputation of this Court and

would   amount   to   further   scandalizing   and   bringing   administration   of

justice   in   disrepute,   in   which   the   common   citizen   of   this   country   has

faith and approaches this Court as a last resort for getting justice. 

29. He   averred   that   this   Court   had   surrendered   to   the   majoritarian

executive and that when majoritarian executive was acting in tyranny,

the Supreme Court has not been able to stand to correct the executive.  

30. The   averment   in   the   affidavit   also   referred   to   formation   of   the

Benches by the Chief Justice.   There is reference to various cases dealt

22
with by 9­Judges and 5­Judges of this Court and has casted aspersions

on the entire justice delivery system and on a large number of Judges.  

31. He has further averred with respect to the withdrawal of the case

which   was   filed   questioning   the   decision   of   rejection   of   impeachment

motion moved against the then Chief Justice.   He has also referred to

various   matters   pending   adjudication   before   this   Court   and   also

adversely commented on the functioning of this Court.   He has raised

eyebrows on the Ayodhya verdict and blamed this Court. 

32. After going through the various averments made in the affidavit in

reply for supporting truth as defence, we are of the considered view that

the defence taken is neither in the public interest nor bona fide one, but

the contemnor has indulged in making reckless allegations against the

institution   of   administration   of   justice.     As   referred   by   the   learned

Attorney General the averments are based on political consideration, and

therefore  in  our  view cannot be considered  to  support  the  case  of  the

contemnor of truth as a defence.  

33. The allegations made are scandalous and are capable of shaking

the very edifice of the judicial administration and also shaking the faith

of common man in the administration of justice. 

23
34. Though there is a Freedom of  Speech, freedom is never absolute

because the makers of the Constitution have imposed certain restrictions

upon   it.     Particularly   when   such   Freedom   of   Speech   is   sought   to   be

abused and it has the effect of scandalising the institution as a whole

and the persons who are part of the said institution and cannot defend

themselves publicly, the same cannot be permitted in law. Though a fair

criticism of judgment is permissible in law, a person cannot exceed the

right   under   Article   19(1)(a)   of   the   Constitution   to   scandalize   the

institution. 

35. It is apparent that the contemnor is involved in making allegations

against the retired and sitting Judges. On one hand, our attention was

attracted  by Shri Dushyant  Dave,  learned  senior counsel,  towards  the

norms of judicial conduct which also provide that Judges cannot express

an opinion in the public.   The Judges have to express their opinion by

their judgments, and they cannot enter into public debate or go to press.

It   is   very   easy   to   make   any   allegation   against   the   Judges   in   the

newspaper   and   media.     Judges   have   to   be   the   silent   sufferer   of   such

allegations, and they cannot counter such allegations publicly by going

on public platforms, newspapers or media.  Nor can they write anything

about the correctness of the various wild allegations made, except when

they are dealing with the matter.   Retired Judges do have the prestige

24
that   they   have   earned   by   dint   of   hard   work   and   dedication   to   this

institution.  They are also not supposed to be answering each and every

allegation made and enter into public debate.  Thus, it is necessary that

when they cannot speak out, they cannot be made to suffer the loss of

their reputation and prestige, which is essential part of the right to live

with   dignity.     The   Bar   is   supposed   to   be   the   spokesperson   for   the

protection of the judicial system.  They are an integral part of the system.

The Bar and Bench are part of the same system i.e. the judicial system,

and enjoy equal reputation.  If a scathing attack is made on the judges, it

would   become   difficult   for   them   to   work   fearlessly   and   with   the

objectivity  of  approach   to  the  issues.    The  judgment  can   be  criticized.

However, motives to the Judges need not be attributed, as it brings the

administration of justice into disrepute.  In Halsbury’s Laws of England,

Fourth   Edition,   Volume   9,  in   para   27,  it   is   observed   that   the

punishment is inflicted, not for the purpose of protecting either the Court

as a whole or the individual Judges of the Court from repetition of the

attack   but   for   protecting   the   public   and   especially   those   who   either

voluntarily or by compulsion are subject to the jurisdiction of the Court,

from   the   mischief   they   will   incur   if   the   authority   of   the   Tribunal   is

undermined or impaired. Hostile criticism of the judges or judiciary is

25
definitely   an   act   of   scandalizing   the   Court.     Defamatory   publication

concerning the Judge or institution brings impediment to justice.  

36. In  C.   Ravichandran   Iyer   v.   Justice   A.M.   Bhattacharjee   and

Others, (1995) 5 SCC 457, this Court dealt with a matter with respect to

allegation against the conduct of a Judge.   A Resolution was passed by

the Bar Council against Judge/Chief Justice of the High Court alleging

misconduct.   This Court held that Bar Council cannot make scurrilous

criticism of conduct of the Judge/Chief Justice and pressurise or coerce

him to demit the office.  Such action would constitute contempt of court

and  affect independence  of  judiciary  which  is  an  essential attribute  of

rule   of   law   and   also   affect   judicial   individualism.     This   Court   further

observed that, however, where the Bar honestly doubts the conduct of

the   Judge/Chief   Justice   and   such   doubt   is   based   on   authentic   and

acceptable   material,   the   proper   course   for   officer­bearers   of   the   Bar

Association would be to meet the Judge in camera and apprise him or

approach the Chief Justice of that High Court to deal with the matter

appropriately.   When  the  allegation is against the Chief  Justice of the

High Court, Bar Association should directly approach the Chief Justice of

India.   Thereafter, the Chief Justice has to take a decision.   Until such

decision is taken, the Bar should suspend all further action and await

response for a reasonable period.   It was held that independence of the

26
judiciary   is   an   essential   attribute   of   rule   of   law,   which   is   the   basic

feature of the Constitution and that judiciary must be free from not only

executive pressure but also from other pressures.  Individual Judge has

to feel secure in view of social demand for active judicial role which he is

required   to   fulfil.     This   Court   also   considered   that   criticism   of   the

judiciary is not protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.   It

was   also   observed   that   fair   criticism   is   based   on   the   authentic   and

acceptable   material   permissible   but   when   criticism   tends   to   create

apprehension in the minds of the people regarding integrity, ability and

fairness   of   the   Judge,   it   amounts   to   contempt.     Such   criticism   is   not

protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.  It was also observed

that the Judge should maintain high standard of conduct based on high

tradition.   It was held thus :­

“10.  The   diverse   contentions   give   rise   to   the   question

whether any Bar Council or Bar Association has the right to
pass resolution against the conduct of a Judge perceived to
have committed misbehaviour and, if so, what is its effect on
independence of the judiciary. With a view to appreciate the
contentions   in   their   proper   perspective,   it   is   necessary   to
have   at   the   back   of   our   mind   the   importance   of   the
independence of the judiciary. In a democracy governed by
rule of law under a written constitution, judiciary is sentinel
on   the  qui   vive  to   protect   the   fundamental   rights   and   to
poise   even   scales   of   justice   between   the   citizens   and   the
State or the States inter se. Rule of law and judicial review
are   basic   features   of   the   Constitution.   As   its   integral
constitutional structure, independence of the judiciary is an
essential attribute of rule of law. In  S.P. Gupta  v.  Union of
India [1981 Supp SCC 87] (SCC p. 221, para 27) this Court
held that if there is one principle which runs through the
27
entire fabric of the Constitution it is the principle of the rule
of law, and under the Constitution it is the judiciary which
is   entrusted   with   the   task   of   keeping   every   organ   of   the
State within the limits of the law and thereby making the
rule of law meaningful and effective. Judicial review is one of
the   most   potent   weapons   in   the   armoury   of   law.   The
judiciary seeks to protect the citizen against violation of his
constitutional or legal rights or misuse or abuse of power by
the  State   or   its  officers.   The   judiciary   stands   between   the
citizen   and   the   State   as   a   bulwark   against   executive
excesses and misuse or abuse of power by the executive. It
is, therefore, absolutely essential that the judiciary must be
free   from   executive   pressure   or   influence   which   has   been
secured by making elaborate provisions in the Constitution
with   details.   The   independence   of   judiciary   is   not   limited
only   to   the   independence   from   the   executive   pressure   or
influence; it is a wider concept which takes within its sweep
independence   from   any   other   pressure   and   prejudices.   It
has   many   dimensions,   viz.,   fearlessness   of   other   power
centres, economic or political, and freedom from prejudices
acquired   and   nourished   by   the   class   to   which   the   judges
belong.
Judicial individualism — Whether needs protection?

11. Independent judiciary is, therefore, most essential when
liberty of citizen is in danger. It then becomes the duty of
the judiciary to poise the scales of justice unmoved by the
powers (actual or perceived) undisturbed by the clamour of
the multitude. The heart of judicial independence is judicial
individualism.   The   judiciary   is   not   a   disembodied
abstraction.   It   is   composed   of   individual   men   and   women
who work primarily on their own. Judicial individualism, in
the   language   of   Justice   Powell   of   the   Supreme   Court   of
United   States   in   his   address   to   the   American   Bar
Association, Labour Law Section on 11­8­1976, is “perhaps
one of the last citadels of jealously preserved individualism
…”. Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in Stephen S.
Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the United
States [398 US 74] stated:

“No matter how strong an individual judge’s spine,
the   threat   of   punishment   —   the   greatest   peril   to
judicial   independence   —   would   project   as   dark   a
shadow   whether   cast   by   political   strangers   or   by
judicial   colleagues.   A   federal   judge   must   be
28
 independent of every other judge…. Neither one alone
nor any number banded together can act as censor and
place   sanctions   on   him.   It   is   vital   to   preserve   the
opportunities for judicial individualism.”

27.  The   Advocates   Act,   1961   gave   autonomy   to   a   Bar

Council of a State or Bar Council of India and Section 6(1)
empowers them to make such action deemed necessary to
set   their   house   in   order,   to   prevent   fall   in   professional
conduct and to punish the incorrigible as not befitting the
noble profession apart from admission of the advocates on
its   roll.   Section   6(1)(c)   and   rules   made   in   that   behalf,
Sections 9, 35, 36, 36­B and 37 enjoin it to entertain and
determine cases of misconduct against advocates on its roll.
The   members   of   the   judiciary   are   drawn   primarily   and
invariably from the Bar at different levels. The high moral,
ethical and professional standards among  the members of
the Bar are preconditions even for high ethical standards of
the Bench. Degeneration thereof inevitably has its eruption
and   tends   to   reflect   the   other   side   of   the   coin.   The   Bar
Council,   therefore,   is   enjoined   by   the   Advocates   Act   to
maintain   high   moral,   ethical   and   professional   standards
which of late is far from satisfactory. Their power under the
Act ends  thereat  and extends no further. Article 121 of the
Constitution   prohibits   discussion   by   the   members   of
Parliament   of   the   conduct   of   any   Judge   of   the   Supreme
Court or of High Court in the discharge of his duties except
upon a motion for  presenting  an address to the President
praying   for   the   removal   of   the   Judge   as   provided   under
Article 124(4) and (5) and in the manner laid down under
the Act, the Rules and the rules of business of Parliament
consistent   therewith.   By   necessary   implication,   no   other
forum or fora or platform is available for discussion of the
conduct of a Judge in the discharge of his duties as a Judge
of the Supreme Court or the High Court, much less a Bar
Council   or   group   of   practising   advocates.   They   are
prohibited   to   discuss   the   conduct   of   a   Judge   in   the
discharge   of   his   duties   or   to   pass   any   resolution   in   that
behalf.

29.  In  Halsbury’s Laws of England  (4th Edn.) Vol. 9, para

27, at p. 21, it is stated that scandalising the court would
mean any act done or writing published which is calculated
to bring a court or a Judge into contempt, or to lower his
authority, or to interfere with the due course of justice or
the lawful process of the court. Scurrilous abuse of a Judge
29
or court, or attacks on the personal character of a Judge,
are punishable contempts. Punishment is inflicted, not for
the purpose of protecting either the court as a whole or the
individual Judges of the court from repetition of the attack,
but   for   protecting   the   public,   and   especially   those   who
either   voluntarily   or   by   compulsion   are   subject   to   the
jurisdiction of the court, from the mischief they will incur if
the authority of the tribunal is undermined or impaired. In
consequence,   the   court   has   regarded   with   particular
seriousness allegations of partiality or bias on the part of a
Judge or a court. Criticism of a Judge’s conduct or of the
conduct of a court even if strongly worded, is, however, not
contempt, provided that the criticism is fair, temperate and
made   in   good   faith   and   is   not   directed   to   the   personal
character   of   a   Judge   or   to   the   impartiality   of   a   Judge   or
court.

30. In Oswald’s Contempt of Court (3rd Edn.), 1993, at p. 50
it is stated that libel upon courts is made contempt
“to keep a blaze of glory around them, and to deter people
from attempting to render them contemptible in the eyes
of the public…. A libel upon a court is a reflection upon
the King, and telling the people that the administration of
justice is in weak or corrupt hands, that the fountain of
justice itself is tainted, and consequently that judgments
which stream out of that fountain must be impure and
contaminated.”
A libel upon a Judge in his judicial capacity is a contempt,
whether it concerns what he did in court, or what he did
judicially out of it. At p. 91, it is stated that all publications
which   offend   against   the   dignity   of   the   court,   or   are
calculated to prejudice the course of justice, will constitute
contempt. One of the natures of offences is scandalising the
courts. In Contempt of Court (2nd Edn.) by C.J. Miller at p.
366,   Lord   Diplock   is   quoted   from  Chokolingo  v.  Attorney
General of Trinidad and  Tobago [(1981) 1 All ER 244, 248]
who   spoke   for   the   Judicial   Committee   summarising   the
position thus:
“   ‘Scandalising   the   court’   is   a   convenient   way   of
describing   a   publication   which,   although   it   does   not
relate to any specific case either past or pending or any
specific Judge, is a scurrilous attack on the judiciary as
a whole, which is calculated to undermine the authority
of   the   courts   and   public   confidence   in   the
administration of justice.”
30
In Borrie and Lowe’s Law of Contempt (2nd Edn.) at p. 226 it
is stated that the necessity for this branch of contempt lies
in   the   idea   that   without   well­regulated   laws   a   civilised
community cannot survive. It is therefore thought important
to   maintain   the   respect   and   dignity   of   the   court   and   its
officers,   whose   task   it   is   to   uphold   and   enforce   the   law,
because   without   such   respect,   public   faith   in   the
administration of justice would be undermined and the law
itself would fall into disrepute. Even in the latest Report on
Contempt   of   Court   by   Phillimore   Committee   to   revise   the
penal   enforcement   of   contempt,   adverting   to   Lord   Atkin’s
dictum that courts are satisfied to leave to public opinion
attacks or comments derogatory or scandalous to them, in
paragraph 162, the Committee had stated that at one stage
“we   considered   whether   such   conduct   should   be
subject to penal sanctions at all. It was argued that any
Judge who was attacked would have the protection of
the law of defamation, and that no further protection is
necessary.   We   have   concluded,   however,   that   some
restraints are still required, for two reasons. First, this
branch   of   the  law   of   contempt   is   concerned   with  the
protection   of   the   administration   of   justice,   and
especially   the   preservation   of   public   confidence   in   its
honesty and impartiality; it is only incidentally, if at all,
concerned   with   the   personal   reputations   of   Judges.
Moreover, some damaging attacks, for example upon an
unspecified   group   of   Judges,   may   not   be   capable   of
being   made   the   subject   of   libel   proceedings   at   all.
Secondly,   Judges   commonly   feel   constrained   by   their
position   not   to   take   action   in   reply   to   criticism,   and
they have no proper forum in which to do so such as
other   public   figures   may   have.   These   considerations
lead   us   to   the   conclusion   that   there   is   need   for   an
effective remedy … against imputations of improper or
corrupt judicial conduct.”
The   Contempt   of   Courts   Act,   1971   engrafted   suitable
amendments accordingly.

Freedom of expression and duty of Advocate
31.  It   is   true   that   freedom   of   speech   and   expression
guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution is one of
the most precious liberties in any democracy. But equally
important   is   the   maintenance   of   respect   for   judicial
independence which alone would protect the life, liberty and
31
 reputation   of   the   citizen.   So   the   nation’s   interest   requires
that   criticism   of   the   judiciary   must   be   measured,   strictly
rational,   sober   and   proceed   from   the   highest   motives
without being coloured by partisan spirit or pressure tactics
or   intimidatory   attitude.   The   Court   must,   therefore,
harmonise   constitutional   values   of   free   criticism   and   the
need   for   a   fearless   curial   process   and   its   presiding
functionary, the Judge. If freedom of expression subserves
public interest in reasonable measure, public justice cannot
gag it or manacle it; but if the court considered the attack
on the Judge or Judges scurrilous, offensive, intimidatory or
malicious, beyond condonable limits, the strong arm of the
law   must   strike   a   blow   on   him   who   challenges   the
supremacy of the rule of the law by fouling its source and
stream.   The   power   to   punish   the   contemner   is,   therefore,
granted to the court not because Judges need the protection
but   because   the   citizens   need   an   impartial   and   strong
judiciary.

34. The threat of action on vague grounds of dissatisfaction
would create a dragnet that would inevitably sweep into its
grasp   the   maverick,   the   dissenter,   the   innovator,   the
reformer — in one word the unpopular. Insidious attempts
pave way for removing the inconvenient. Therefore, proper
care   should   be   taken   by   the   Bar   Association   concerned.
First,   it   should   gather   specific,   authentic   and   acceptable
material which would show or tend to show that conduct on
the   part   of   a   Judge   creating   a   feeling   in   the   mind   of   a
reasonable   person   doubting   the   honesty,   integrity,
impartiality or act which lowers the dignity of the office but
necessarily, is not impeachable misbehaviour. In all fairness
to the Judge, the responsible office­bearers should meet him
in camera after securing interview and apprise the Judge of
the information they had with them. If there is truth in it,
there   is   every   possibility   that   the   Judge   would   mend
himself. Or to avoid embarrassment to the Judge, the office­
bearers can approach the Chief Justice of that High Court
and apprise him of the situation with material they have in
their possession and impress upon the Chief Justice to deal
with the matter appropriately.”

37. It   was   argued   by   Shri   Dhavan,   learned   senior   counsel,   that

question   of   purging   arises   mainly   in   civil   contempt.     The   question   of

32
purging in criminal contempt was considered by this Court in Pravin C.

Shah   v.   K.A.   Mohd   Ali   and   Another,  (2001)   8   SCC   650.     The   Bar

Council   took   the   view   that   the   purging   of   contempt   can   be   only   by

regretting   or  apologising   in   the   case   of   criminal   contempt   and   in   civil

contempt,   by   subsequent   compliance   with   the   order   or   directions   the

contempt can be purged.  The following question arose:­

“23. Now we have to consider the crucial question — how
can a contemnor purge himself of the contempt? According
to the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India,
purging oneself of contempt can be done by apologising to
the court. The said opinion of the Bar Council of India can
be seen from the following portion of the impugned order:
“Purging   oneself   of   contempt   can   be   only   by
regretting   or   apologising   in   the   case   of   a   completed
action   of   criminal   contempt.   If   it   is   a   case   of   civil
contempt, by subsequent compliance with the orders or
directions the contempt can be purged of. There is no
procedural provision in law to get purged of contempt
by an order of an appropriate court.”

(i) Meaning of purging was considered by this Court thus:­

“24. Purging is a process by which an undesirable element
is expelled either from one’s own self or from a society. It is a
cleaning   process.   Purge   is   a   word   which   acquired
implications first in theological connotations. In the case of a
sin, purging of such sin is made through the expression of
sincere remorse coupled with doing the penance required. In
the case of a guilt, purging means to get himself cleared of
the guilt. The concept of purgatory was evolved from the word
“purge”, which is a state of suffering after this life in which
those souls, who depart this life with their deadly sins, are
purified and rendered fit to enter into heaven where nothing
defiled enters (vide Words and Phrases, Permanent Edn., Vol.
35­A, p.307). In Black’s Law Dictionary the word “purge” is
given the following meaning: “To cleanse; to clear. To clear or
exonerate from some charge or imputation of guilt, or from a

33
 contempt.” It is preposterous to suggest that if the convicted
person   undergoes   punishment   or   if   he   tenders   the   fine
amount imposed on him the purge would be completed.”

(ii)  This Court considered how purging can take place thus:­

“25.   We   are   told   that   a   learned   Single   Judge   of   the

Allahabad   High   Court   has   expressed   a   view   that
purging   process   would   be   completed   when   the
contemnor undergoes the penalty [vide Madan Gopal
Gupta (Dr) v. Agra University [AIR 1974 All. 39]]. This
is what the learned Single Judge said about it: (AIR p.
43, para 13)
“In   my   opinion   a   party   in   contempt   purged   its
contempt by obeying the orders of the court or by
undergoing the penalty imposed by the court.”
26. Obeying the orders of the court would be a mode
by   which   one   can   make   the   purging   process   in   a
substantial manner when it is a civil contempt. Even
for   such  a   civil  contempt   the  purging   process   would
not be treated as completed merely by the contemnor
undergoing the penalty imposed on him unless he has
obeyed   the  order   of  the  court   or   he  has  undone  the
wrong.   If   that   is   the   position   in   regard   to   civil
contempt   the   position   regarding   criminal   contempt
must be stronger. Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts
Act categorises contempt of court into two categories.
The first category is “civil contempt” which is the wilful
disobedience of the order of the court including breach
of   an   undertaking   given   to   the   court.   But   “criminal
contempt”   includes   doing   any   act   whatsoever,   which
tends   to   scandalise   or   lowers   the   authority   of   any
court, or  tends to  interfere  with the due course of  a
judicial proceeding or interferes with, or obstructs the
administration of justice in any other manner.”

38. This   Court   did   not   approve   the   view   that   merely   undergoing  the

penalty imposed on a contemnor is sufficient to complete the process of

purging   himself   for   the   contempt.       In   case   of   sentence   of   fine,   the

contemnor can pay the fine and continue to persist with contemptuous
34
conduct   again   and   again.     Something   more   is   required   to   purge   the

criminal contempt.  Even a statement of apology is not enough to purge

the contempt.  The Court has to be satisfied as to the genuineness of the

apology   to   make   an   order   that   contemnor   has   purged   himself   of   the

contempt.     Before   contempt   is   purged,   the   advocate   could   suffer   the

consequences of Rule 11 of the Rules which postulates that in case the

advocate has been found guilty of contempt of court, his authority to act

or plead in any court stands snapped.  

39. In Pravin C. Shah (supra), this Court held thus:­

“22. We have already pointed out that Rule 11 of the Rules is a
self­operating provision. When the first postulate of it is completed
(that the advocate has been found guilty of contempt of court) his
authority   to   act   or   plead   in   any   court   stands   snapped,   though
perhaps   for   the   time   being.   If   he   does   such   things   without   the
express   permission   of   the   court   he   would   again   be   guilty   of
contempt   of   court   besides   such   act   being   a   misconduct   falling
within the purview of Section 34 of the Advocates Act. The interdict
as   against   him   from   appearing   in   court   as   a   counsel   would
continue until such time as he purges himself of the contempt.

27.   We   cannot   therefore   approve   the   view   that   merely

undergoing   the   penalty   imposed   on   a   contemnor   is   sufficient   to
complete   the   process   of   purging   himself   of   the   contempt,
particularly in a case where the contemnor is convicted of criminal
contempt.   The   danger   in   giving   accord   to   the   said   view   of   the
learned   Single   Judge   in   the   aforecited   decision   is   that   if   a
contemnor is sentenced to a fine he can immediately pay it and
continue to commit contempt in the same court, and then again
pay   the   fine   and   persist   with   his   contemptuous   conduct.   There
must be something more to be done to get oneself purged of the
contempt when it is a case of criminal contempt.

28.   The   Disciplinary   Committee   of   the   Bar   Council   of   India

highlighted the absence of any mode of purging oneself of the guilt
35
in   any   of   the   Rules   as   a   reason   for   not   following   the   interdict
contained in Rule 11. Merely because the Rules did not prescribe
the mode of purging oneself of the guilt it does not mean that one
cannot   purge   the   guilt   at   all.   The   first   thing   to  be   done   in  that
direction when a contemnor is found guilty of a criminal contempt
is   to   implant   or   infuse   in  his   own   mind   real   remorse   about   his
conduct which the court found to have amounted to contempt of
court. Next  step  is to  seek pardon from  the court  concerned for
what he did on the ground that he really and genuinely repented
and that he has resolved not to commit any such act in future. It is
not   enough   that   he   tenders   an   apology.   The   apology   tendered
should impress the court to be genuine and sincere. If the court,
on being impressed of his genuineness, accepts the apology then it
could be said that the contemnor has purged himself of the guilt.

29. This Court has held in M.Y. Shareef v. Hon’ble Judges of the
Nagpur High Court [AIR 1955 SC 19] that

“an apology is not a weapon of defence to purge the guilty of
their   offence;   nor   is   it   intended   to   operate   as   a   universal
panacea, but it is intended to be evidence of real contriteness”.
(AIR p. 23, para 10)

Ahmadi, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) in M.B. Sanghi,
Advocate v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana [(1991) 3 SCC 600]
while   considering   an   apology   tendered   by   an   advocate   in   a
contempt proceeding has stated thus: (SCC p. 603, para 2)
“And here is a member of the profession who has repeated
his performance presumably because he was let off lightly on
the first occasion. Soft justice is not the answer — not that
the High Court has been harsh with him — what I mean is he
cannot be let off on an apology which is far from sincere. His
apology was hollow, there was no remorse — no regret — it
was only a device to escape the rigour of the law. What he
said in his affidavit was that he had not uttered the words
attributed to him by the learned Judge; in other words the
learned Judge was lying — adding insult to injury — and yet
if the court finds him guilty (he contested the matter  tooth
and nail) his unqualified apology may be accepted. This is no
apology, it is merely a device to escape.”

30. A four­Judge Bench of this Court in Mulk Raj v. State of
Punjab [(1972) 3 SCC 839] made the following observations which

36
 would throw considerable light on the question before us: (SCC p.
840, para 9)
“9.   Apology   is   an   act   of   contrition.   Unless   apology   is
offered at the earliest opportunity and in good grace apology
is shorn of penitence. If apology is offered at a time when the
contemnor   finds   that   the   court   is   going   to   impose
punishment it ceases to be an apology and it becomes an act
of a cringing coward. The High Court was right in not taking
any notice of the appellant’s expression of apology ‘without
any   further   word’.   The   High   Court   correctly   said   that
acceptance of apology in the case would amount to allow the
offender   to   go   away   with   impunity   after   having   committed
gross contempt.”

40. This Court further held that till contempt is purged, the advocate

has to suffer the consequences of Rule 11.  This Court held: ­

“34.  The  respondent   Advocate   continued   to  appear  in   all  the
courts   where   he   was   earlier   appearing   even   after   he   was
convicted   by   the   High   Court   for   criminal   contempt   without
being objected by any court. This is obviously on account of the
fact   that   presiding   officers   of   the   court   were   not   informed   of
what happened. We, therefore, direct that in future, whenever
an   advocate   is   convicted   by   the   High   Court   for   contempt   of
court, the Registrar of that High Court shall intimate the fact to
all the courts within the jurisdiction of that High Court so that
presiding officers of all courts would get the information that
the   particular   advocate   is   under   the   spell   of   the   interdict
contained in Rule 11 of the Rules until he purges himself of the
contempt.

35. It is still open to the respondent Advocate to purge himself
of the contempt in the manner indicated above. But until that
process   is   completed   the   respondent   Advocate   cannot   act   or
plead   in   any   court   situated   within   the   domain   of   the   Kerala
High Court, including the subordinate courts thereunder. The
Registrar   of   the   High   Court   of   Kerala   shall   intimate   all   the
courts   about   this   interdict   as   against   the   respondent
Advocate.”

37
41. In  Bar Council of India v. High Court of Kerala,  (2004) 6 SCC

311, the ratio in Pravin C. Shah (supra) was affirmed by this Court.   It

was held that the Court has the power to punish under Article 129 of the

Constitution   of   India   and   can   punish   advocate.     The   Court   relied   the

decision in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4

SCC 409.  It was held thus:­

“34.   Although   in   a   case   of   professional   misconduct,   this

Court cannot punish an advocate in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Article 129 of the Constitution of India which can be
imposed on a finding of professional misconduct recorded in
the manner prescribed under the Advocates Act and the Rules
framed thereunder but as has been noticed in Supreme Court
Bar Assn. [(1998) 4 SCC 409] professional misconduct of the
advocate   concerned   is   not   a   matter   directly   in   issue   in  the
matter of contempt case.”

42. Roshan Lal Ahuja, In Re:, (1993) Supp. 4 SCC 446, it was held

that   pleadings   made   had   the   effect   on   scandalizing   and   lowering   the

authority of the Court in relation to the judicial matters but also had the

effect of substantial interference with obstructing the administration of

justice.     Unfounded   and   unwarranted   aspersions   had   the   tendency   to

undermine the authority of the Court and would create distrust in the

mind of the public and on the capacity to impart fearless justice.

38
43. It will be relevant refer to the following clauses of the ‘Restatement

of Values of Judicial Life’ adopted in the Chief Justices’ Conference

at New Delhi on September 18­19, 1992:­

“..(8) A Judge shall not enter into a public debate or express
his   views   in   public   on   political   matters   or   on   matters   that   are
pending or are likely to arise for judicial determination.
(9)   A   Judge   is   expected   to   let   his   judgment   speak   for
themselves. He shall not give interview to the media.”

44. The contemnor has tried to justify the averments made on the basis

of the Press Conference dated 12.01.2018 of the four senior­most Judges

of this Court.  Concept of equality before law, what is permissible not as

to what is impermissible.   It is settled that negative equality cannot be

claimed as there is no concept of negative equality.  We hope it was the

first and the last occasion that the Judges have gone to press, and God

gives wisdom to protect its dignity by internal mechanism, particularly,

when   allegations   made,   if   any,   publicly   cannot   be   met   by   sufferer

Judges.  It would cause suffering to them till eternity.  Truth can be the

defence to the Judges also, but they are bound by their judicial norms,

ethics, and code of conduct.  Similarly, the code of conduct for advocates

is equally applicable to the lawyers also, being part of the system.   The

Rules of Professional Ethics formed by the Bar Council, though couched

under   statutory   power,   are   themselves   not   enough   to   prescribe   or

39
proscribe the nobility of profession in entirety.  The nobility of profession

encompasses, over and above, the Rules of Ethics.  Lawyers, as a class,

are   looked   by   the   public   as   intelligentsia,   as   observed   in  R.

Muthukrishnan     v.     The   Registrar   General   of   The   High   Court   of

Judicature at Madras, (2019) 16 SCC 407.   The relevant portion of the

judgment is extracted hereunder:­

“25. The role of a lawyer is indispensable in the system of
delivery of justice. He is bound by the professional ethics
and   to   maintain   the   high   standard.   His   duty   is   to   the
court,   to   his   own   client,   to   the   opposite   side,   and   to
maintain the respect of opposite party counsel also. What
may be proper to others in the society, may be improper
for   him   to   do   as   he   belongs   to   a   respected   intellectual
class of the society and a member of the noble profession,
the expectation from him is higher. Advocates are treated
with  respect  in  society.  People repose  immense  faith in
the judiciary and judicial system and the first person who
deals with them is a lawyer. Litigants repose faith in a
lawyer and share with them privileged information. They
put   their   signatures   wherever   asked   by   a   lawyer.   An
advocate is supposed to protect their rights and to ensure
that untainted justice is delivered to his cause.

26. The   high  values   of   the   noble   profession   have   to   be

protected   by   all   concerned   at   all   costs   and   in   all   the
circumstances   cannot   be   forgotten   even   by   the
youngsters in the fight of survival in formative years. The
nobility   of   the   legal   profession   requires   an   advocate   to
remember   that   he   is   not   over   attached   to   any   case   as
advocate   does   not   win   or   lose   a   case,   real   recipient   of
justice is behind the curtain, who is at the receiving end.
As a matter of fact, we do not give to a litigant anything
except recognising his rights. A litigant has a right to be
impartially   advised   by   a   lawyer.   Advocates   are   not
supposed to be money guzzlers or ambulance chasers. A
lawyer should not expect any favour from the Judge and
should not involve by any means in influencing the fair

40
decision­making   process.   It   is   his   duty   to   master   the
facts and the law and submit the same precisely in the
court, his duty is not to waste the courts' time.”

72. The   decision   in Mohit   Chaudhary,   In   re [Mohit

Chaudhary, In re, (2017) 16 SCC 78] has also been relied
upon   in   which   this   Court   considered   Rule   10   and
debarred an advocate to practice as Advocate­on­Record
for a period of one month from the date of order. At the
same   time,   this   Court   has   observed   that   a   lawyer   is
under obligation to do nothing that shall detract from the
dignity   of   the   Court.   Contempt   jurisdiction   is   for   the
purpose of upholding honour or dignity of the court, to
avoid sharp or unfair practices. An advocate shall not to
be immersed in a blind quest of relief for his client. “Law
is   not   trade,   briefs   no   merchandise”.   His   duty   is   to
legitimately present his side of the case to assist in the
administration   of   justice.   The   Judges   are   selected   from
the Bar and purity of the Bench depends on the purity of
the   Bar.   Degraded   Bar   results   in   degraded   Bench.   The
Court   has   referred   to   articles   and   standard   of
processional conduct and etiquettes thus: (SCC pp. 88­
92, paras 20­28, 30 & 32)
“20. Warvelle's Legal Ethics, 2nd Edn. at p. 182 sets
out the obligation of a lawyer as:
‘A  lawyer  is  under  obligation to  do  nothing
that shall detract from the dignity of the court,
of   which   he   is   himself   a   sworn   officer   and
assistant. He should at all times pay deferential
respect to the Judge, and scrupulously observe
the decorum of the courtroom.’
21. The contempt jurisdiction is not only to protect
the   reputation   of   the   Judge   concerned   so   that   he
can administer justice fearlessly and fairly, but also
to   protect   “the   fair   name   of   the   judiciary”.   The
protection in a manner of speaking, extends even to
the Registry in the performance of its task and false
and   unfair   allegations   which   seek   to   impede   the
working of the Registry and thus the administration
of   justice,   made   with   oblique   motives   cannot   be
tolerated. In such a situation in order to uphold the
honour and dignity of the institution, the Court has
to   perform   the   painful   duties   which   we   are   faced
with in the present proceedings. Not to do so in the
words of P.B. Sawant, J. in Ministry of Information &
41
Broadcasting,   In   re [Ministry   of   Information   &
Broadcasting, In re, (1995) 3 SCC 619] would: (SCC
p. 635, para 20)
‘20. …   The   present   trend   unless   checked   is
likely to lead to a stage when the system will be
found wrecked from within before it is wrecked
from   outside.   It   is   for   the   members   of   the
profession to introspect and take the corrective
steps   in   time   and   also   spare   the   courts   the
unpleasant duty. We say no more.’

22. Now   turning   to   the   “Standards   of   Professional

Conduct and Etiquette” of the Bar Council of India
Rules contained in Section I of Chapter II, Part VI,
the   duties   of   an   advocate   towards   the   court   have
been specified. We  extract  the 4th  duty  set  out as
under:
‘4. An   advocate   shall   use   his   best   efforts   to
restrain and prevent his client from resorting to
sharp   or   unfair   practices   or   from   doing
anything   in   relation   to   the   court,   opposing
counsel   or   parties   which   the   advocate   himself
ought   not   to   do.   An   advocate   shall   refuse   to
represent   the   client   who   persists   in   such
improper conduct. He shall not consider himself
a   mere   mouthpiece   of   the   client,   and   shall
exercise   his   own   judgment   in   the   use   of
restrained   language   in   correspondence,
avoiding   scurrilous   attacks   in   pleadings,   and
using   intemperate   language   during   arguments
in court.’
23. In the aforesaid context the aforesaid principle in
different   words   was   set   out   by   Crampton,   J.
in R. v. O'   Connell [R. v. O'   Connell,   (1844)   7   Irish
Law Reports 313] as under:
‘The  advocate  is  a  representative  but  not  a
delegate. He gives to his client the benefit of his
learning, his talents and his judgment; but all
through   he   never   forgets   what   he   owes   to
himself   and   to   others.   He   will   not   knowingly
misstate   the   law,   he   will   not   wilfully   misstate
the facts, though it be to gain the case for his
client. He will ever bear in mind that if he be an
advocate   of   an   individual   and   retained   and
remunerated   often   inadequately,   for   valuable
42
 services,   yet   he   has   a   prior   and   perpetual
retainer on behalf of truth and justice and there
is no Crown or other licence which in any case
or for any party or purpose can discharge him
from that primary and paramount retainer.’

24. The fundamentals of the profession thus require
an advocate not to be immersed in a blind quest of
relief   for   his   client.   The   dignity   of   the   institution
cannot be violated in this quest as “law is no trade,
briefs no merchandise” as per Krishna Iyer, J. in Bar
Council   of   Maharashtra v. M.V.   Dabholkar [Bar
Council   of   Maharashtra v. M.V.   Dabholkar,   (1976)   2
SCC 291] (SCC p. 301, para 23).

25. It   is   also   pertinent   to   note   at   this   point,   the

illuminating words of Vivian Bose, J. in ‘G’, a Senior
Advocate   of   the   Supreme   Court,   In   re [‘G’,   a   Senior
Advocate of the Supreme Court, In re, AIR 1954 SC
557 :  1954  Cri LJ  1410]  ,  who elucidated:  (AIR  p.
558, para 10)
‘10. … To use the language of the army, an
advocate of this Court is expected at all times to
comport   himself   in   a   manner   befitting   his
status as an “officer and a gentleman”.’

26. It is as far back as in 1925 that an article titled
“The Lawyer as an Officer of the Court” [Virginia Law
Review,   Vol.   11,   No.   4   (Feb   1925)   pp.   263­77.]
published   in   the Virginia   Law   Review,   lucidly   set
down what is expected from the lawyer which is best
set out in its own words:
‘The duties of the lawyer to the court spring
directly from the relation that he sustains to the
court   as   an   officer   in   the   administration   of
justice.   The   law   is   not   a   mere   private   calling,
but is a profession which has the distinction of
being   an   integral   part   of   the   State's   judicial
system. As an officer of the court the lawyer is,
therefore,   bound   to   uphold   the   dignity   and
integrity   of   the   court;   to   exercise   at   all   times
respect for the court in both words and actions;
to   present   all   matters   relating   to   his   client's
case openly, being careful to avoid any attempt

43
to exert private influence upon either the Judge
or the jury; and to be frank and candid in all
dealings   with   the   court,   “using   no   deceit,
imposition   or   evasion”,   as   by   misreciting
witnesses   or   misquoting   precedents.   “It   must
always   be   understood”,   says   Mr   Christian
Doerfler,   in   an   address   before   the   Milwaukee
County   Bar   Association,   in   December   1911,
“that the profession of law is instituted among
men   for   the   purpose   of   aiding   the
administration   of   justice.   A   proper
administration of justice does not mean that a
lawyer should succeed in winning a lawsuit. It
means   that   he   should   properly   bring   to   the
attention of the court everything by way of fact
and law that is available and legitimate for the
purpose of properly presenting his client's case.
His duty as far as his client is concerned is
simply   to   legitimately   present   his   side   of   the
case. His duty as far as the public is concerned
and as far as he is an officer of the Court is to
aid and assist in the administration of justice.”’
In   this   connection,   the   timely   words   of   Mr
Warvelle may also well be remembered:
‘But   the   lawyer   is   not   alone   a
gentleman;   he   is   a   sworn   minister   of
justice.   His   office   imposes   high   moral
duties and grave responsibilities, and he is
held to a strict fulfilment of all that these
matters imply. Interests of vast magnitude
are   entrusted   to   him;   confidence   is
imposed  in  him;   life,  liberty   and  property
are   committed   to   his   care.   He   must   be
equal   to   the   responsibilities   which   they
create, and if he betrays his trust, neglects
his duties, practices deceit, or panders to
vice, then the most severe penalty should
be inflicted and his name stricken from the
roll.’
That   the   lawyer   owes   a   high   duty   to   his
profession and to his fellow members of the Bar
is   an   obvious   truth.   His   profession   should   be
his pride, and to preserve its honour pure and
unsullied should be among his chief concerns.
“Nothing should be higher in the estimation of
44
 the   advocate”,   declares   Mr   Alexander   H.
Robbins,   “next   after   those   sacred   relations   of
home   and   country   than   his   profession.   She
should be to him the “fairest of ten thousand”
among   the   institutions   of   the   earth.   He   must
stand for her in all places and resent any attack
on her honour — as he would if the same attack
were to be made against his own fair name and
reputation.   He   should   enthrone   her   in   the
sacred   places   of   his   heart,   and   to   her,   he
should   offer   the   incense   of   constant   devotion.
For she is a jealous mistress.
Again,   it   is   to   be   borne   in   mind   that   the
Judges are selected from the ranks of lawyers.
The   purity   of   the   Bench   depends   upon   the
purity of the Bar.
‘The   very   fact,   then,   that   one   of   the
coordinate departments of the Government
is administered by men selected only from
one   profession   gives   to   that   profession   a
certain pre­eminence which calls for a high
standard  of morals as  well  as  intellectual
attainments. The integrity of the judiciary
is   the   safeguard   of   the   nation,   but   the
character  of  the  Judges  is  practically   but
the   character   of   the   lawyers.   Like   begets
like. A degraded Bar will inevitably produce
a   degraded   Bench,   and   just   as   certainly
may   we   expect   to   find   the   highest
excellence   in   a   judiciary   drawn   from   the
ranks of an enlightened, learned and moral
Bar.’
27. He ends his article in the following words:
‘No   client,   corporate   or   individual,   however
powerful, nor any cause civil or political, however
important, is entitled to receive, nor should any
lawyer   render,   any   service   or   advice   involving
disloyalty to the law whose ministers we are, or
disrespect   of   the   judicial   office,   which   we   are
bound to uphold, or corruption of any person or
persons exercising a public office or private trust,
or   deception   or   betrayal   of   the   public.   When
rendering   any   such   improper   service   or   advice,
the   lawyer   invites   and   merits   stern   and   just
condemnation. Correspondingly, he advances the
45
 honour of his profession and the best interests of
his client when he renders service or gives advice
tending   to   impress   upon   the   client   and   his
undertaking exact compliance with the strictest
principles   of   moral   law.   He   must   also   observe
and advise his client to observe the statute law,
though until a statute shall have been construed
and interpreted by competent adjudication, he is
free and is entitled to advise as to its validity and
as to what he conscientiously believes to be its
just meaning and extent. But, above all, a lawyer
will   find   his   highest   honour   in   a   deserved
reputation   for   fidelity   to   private   trust   and   to
public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic
and loyal citizen.’

28. On   examination   of   the   legal   principles   an

important issue emerges: what should be the end of
what the contemnor had started but has culminated
in   an   impassioned   plea   of   Mr   K.K.   Venugopal,
learned   Senior   Advocate   supported   by   the
representatives of the Bar present in court, marking
their appearance for the contemnor. We are inclined
to   give   due   consideration   to   such   a   plea   but   are
unable to persuade ourselves to let the contemnor go
scot­free,   without   any   consequences.   We   are   thus
not   inclined   to   proceed   further   in   the   contempt
jurisdiction   except   to   caution   the   contemnor   that
this should be the first and the last time of such a
misadventure.   But   the   matter   cannot   rest   only   at
that.
***
30. We are of the view that the privilege of being an
Advocate­on­Record under the rules has clearly been
abused   by   the   contemnor.   The   conduct   was   not
becoming of an advocate much less an Advocate­on­
Record in the Supreme Court.
***
32. The   aforesaid   rule   makes   it   clear   that   whether
on the complaint of any person or otherwise, in case
of   misconduct   or   a   conduct   unbecoming   of   an
Advocate­on­Record,   the   court   may   make   an   order
removing his name from the register of Advocate­on­
Record permanently, or for a specified period. We are
not referring to the right to practice as an advocate,
46
 and the name entered on the rolls of any State Bar
Council, which is a necessary requirement, before a
person   takes   the   examination   of   Advocate­on­
Record.  The  present  case  is clearly  one  where this
Court   is   of   the   opinion   that   the   conduct   of   the
contemnor is unbecoming of an Advocate­on­Record.
The   prerequisites   of   the   proviso   are   met   by   the
reason of the Bench being constituted itself by the
Chief Justice, and the contemnor being aware of the
far   more   serious   consequences,   which   could   have
flowed   to   him.   The   learned   Senior   Counsel
representing   the   petitioner   has   thrown   him   at   the
mercy of the court. We have substantively accepted
the   request   but   lesser   consequences   have   been
imposed on the contemnor.”

45. With   respect   to   test   on   judicial   system   and   what   constitutes

Contempt   of   Court   attributing   political   colours   to   the   judgments,   in

Muthu Krishnan (supra) it was held :­

“82. It   has   been   seen   from   time   to   time   that   various

attacks   have   been   made   on   the   judicial   system.   It   has
become very common to the members of the Bar to go to
the press/media to criticise the Judges in person and to
commit sheer contempt by attributing political colours to
the judgments. It is nothing less than an act of contempt
of gravest form. Whenever any political matter comes to
the   Court   and   is   decided,   either   way,   political
insinuations   are   attributed   by   unscrupulous
persons/advocates. Such acts are nothing, but an act of
denigrating the judiciary itself and destroys the faith of
the   common   man   which   he   reposes   in   the   judicial
system. In case of genuine grievance against any Judge,
the   appropriate   process   is   to   lodge   a   complaint   to   the
higher   authorities   concerned   who   can   take   care   of   the
situation   and   it   is   impermissible   to   malign   the   system
itself by attributing political motives and by making false
allegations   against   the   judicial   system   and   its
functionaries. Judges who are attacked are not supposed
to go to press or media to ventilate their point of view.

47
 83. Contempt of court is a weapon which has to be used
sparingly   as   more   is   power,   same   requires   more
responsibility   but   it   does   not   mean   that   the   court   has
fear of taking action and its repercussions. The hallmark
of the court is to provide equal and even­handed justice
and   to   give   an   opportunity   to   each   of   the   system   to
ensure   that   it   improves   upon.   Unfortunately,   some
advocates feel that they are above the Bar Council due to
its   inaction   and   they   are   the   only   champion   of   the
causes.   The   hunger   for   cheap   publicity   is   increasing
which is not permitted by the noble ideals cherished by
the   great   doyens   of   the   Bar,   they   have   set   by   their
conduct   what   should   be   in   fact   the   professional
etiquettes   and   ethics   which   are   not   capable   of   being
defined in a narrow compass. The statutory rules prohibit
advocates   from   advertising   and   in   fact   to   cater   to   the
press/media, distorted versions of the court proceedings
is   sheer   misconduct   and   contempt   of   court   which   has
become   very   common.   It   is   making   it   more   difficult   to
render   justice   in   a   fair,   impartial   and   fearless   manner
though the situation is demoralising that something has
to be done by all concerned to revamp the image of the
Bar. It is not open to wash dirty linen in public and enter
in   accusation/debates,   which   tactics   are  being   adopted
by   unscrupulous   elements   to   influence   the   judgments
and even to deny justice with ulterior motives. It is for the
Bar Council and the senior members of the Bar who have
never forgotten their responsibility to rise to the occasion
to   maintain   the   independence   of   the   Bar   which   is   so
supreme   and   is   absolutely   necessary   for   the   welfare   of
this country and the vibrant democracy.”

46. In Tehseen Poonawalla v. Union of India & Another, (2018) 6

SCC 72, esteemed brother Dr. Justice Chandrachud, who delivered the

judgment, has noted the misuse of public interest litigation and found

that   it   was   a   serious   matter   of   concern   for   the   judicial   process.     He

further   found   that   the   Court   is   flooded   with   misdirected   petitions

purportedly   filed   in   the   public   interest   which,   upon   due   scrutiny,   are

found to promote a personal, business or political agenda.  It was further
48
observed that such petitions pose a grave danger to the credibility of the

judicial process.  It was further observed that this has the propensity of

endangering the credibility of other institutions and undermining public

faith in democracy and the rule of law.   The Court cautioned that the

agency of the Court is being utilized to settle extra judicial scores.  This

Court held thus:­ 

“96. Public interest litigation has developed as a powerful
tool   to   espouse   the   cause   of   the   marginalised   and
oppressed.   Indeed,   that   was   the   foundation   on   which
public   interest   jurisdiction   was   judicially   recognised   in
situations   such   as   those   in Bandhua   Mukti
Morcha v. Union   of   India [Bandhua   Mukti
Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161 : 1984 SCC
(L&S) 389] . Persons who were unable to seek access to
the judicial process by reason of their poverty, ignorance
or illiteracy are faced with a deprivation of fundamental
human   rights.   Bonded   labour   and   undertrials   (among
others) belong to that category. The hallmark of a public
interest petition is that a citizen may approach the court
to ventilate the grievance of a person or class of persons
who   are   unable   to   pursue   their   rights.   Public   interest
litigation   has   been   entertained   by   relaxing   the   rules   of
standing.   The   essential   aspect   of   the   procedure   is   that
the person who moves the court has no personal interest
in the outcome of the proceedings apart from a general
standing as a citizen before the court. This ensures the
objectivity of those who pursue the grievance before the
court.   Environmental   jurisprudence   has   developed
around   the   rubric   of   public   interest   petitions.
Environmental   concerns   affect   the   present   generation
and the future. Principles such as the polluter pays and
the   public   trust   doctrine   have   evolved   during   the
adjudication of public interest petitions. Over time, public
interest   litigation  has   become  a   powerful  instrument  to
preserve the rule of law and to ensure the accountability
of   and   transparency   within   structures   of   governance.
Public   interest   litigation   is   in   that   sense   a   valuable

49
instrument and jurisdictional tool to promote structural
due process.

97. Yet   over   time,   it   has   been   realised   that   this

jurisdiction   is   capable   of   being   and   has   been   brazenly
misutilised   by   persons   with   a   personal   agenda.   At   one
end   of   that   spectrum   are   those   cases   where   public
interest   petitions   are   motivated   by   a   desire   to   seek
publicity. At the other end of the spectrum are petitions
which have been instituted at the behest of business or
political   rivals   to   settle   scores   behind   the   facade   of   a
public   interest   litigation.   The   true   face   of   the   litigant
behind the façade is seldom unravelled. These concerns
are indeed reflected in the judgment of this Court in State
of   Uttaranchal v. Balwant   Singh   Chaufal [State   of
Uttaranchal v. Balwant   Singh   Chaufal,   (2010)   3   SCC
402 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 81 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 807] .
Underlining these concerns, this Court held thus: (SCC
p. 453, para 143)

“143. Unfortunately, of late, it has been noticed that
such   an   important   jurisdiction   which   has   been
carefully   carved   out,   created   and   nurtured   with
great   care   and   caution   by   the   courts,   is   being
blatantly   abused   by   filing   some   petitions   with
oblique   motives.   We   think   time   has   come   when
genuine and bona fide public interest litigation must
be   encouraged   whereas   frivolous   public   interest
litigation should be discouraged. In our considered
opinion,   we   have   to   protect   and   preserve   this
important   jurisdiction   in   the   larger   interest   of   the
people   of   this   country   but   we   must   take   effective
steps to prevent and cure its abuse on the basis of
monetary   and   non­monetary   directions   by   the
courts.”

98. The   misuse   of   public   interest   litigation   is   a   serious

matter   of   concern   for   the   judicial   process.   Both   this
Court   and   the   High   Courts   are   flooded   with   litigations
and   are   burdened   by   arrears.   Frivolous   or   motivated
petitions, ostensibly invoking the public interest detract
from the time and attention which courts must devote to
genuine   causes.   This   Court   has   a   long   list   of   pending
cases  where   the  personal  liberty   of  citizens   is  involved.
Those who await trial or the resolution of appeals against
50
 orders of conviction have a legitimate expectation of early
justice. It is a travesty of justice for the resources of the
legal   system   to   be   consumed   by   an   avalanche   of
misdirected   petitions   purportedly   filed   in   the   public
interest which, upon due scrutiny, are found to promote
a   personal,   business   or   political   agenda.   This   has
spawned   an   industry   of   vested   interests   in   litigation.
There   is   a   grave   danger   that   if   this   state   of   affairs   is
allowed   to   continue,   it   would   seriously   denude   the
efficacy   of   the   judicial   system   by   detracting   from   the
ability   of   the   court   to   devote   its   time   and   resources   to
cases   which   legitimately   require   attention.   Worse   still,
such   petitions  pose   a  grave  danger  to  the  credibility   of
the   judicial   process.   This   has   the   propensity   of
endangering   the   credibility   of   other   institutions   and
undermining   public   faith   in   democracy   and   the   rule   of
law.   This   will   happen   when   the   agency   of   the   court   is
utilised to settle extra­judicial scores. Business rivalries
have to be resolved in a competitive market for goods and
services. Political rivalries have to be resolved in the great
hall   of   democracy   when   the   electorate   votes   its
representatives   in   and   out   of   office.   Courts   resolve
disputes   about   legal   rights   and   entitlements.   Courts
protect the rule of law. There is a danger that the judicial
process will be reduced to a charade, if disputes beyond
the ken of legal parameters occupy the judicial space.”

47. Further   attack   was   made   on   the   formation   of   the   Bench,   and

recusal was sought of the certain Judges who were part of the Bench, as

they were originally from Bombay High Court.  It was observed that the

conduct of the petitioner and the intervenor is scandalizing the process

of   the   Court   and   would   prima   facie   constitute   criminal   contempt.

However, on a dispassionate view of the matter, the Court did not initiate

proceedings   by   way   of   criminal   contempt   as   that   would   amount   to

unequal   battle.     While   considering   the   submissions   made   by   Shri

51
Prashant   Bhushan   seeking   recusal   and   casting   aspersions   upon   the

judicial officers, it was observed thus:­

“101. … If this were to be the test, it is rather  ironical
that the petitioners had instituted proceedings before the
Bombay High Court each of whose Judges were expected
to   be   faced   with   the   same   situation.   We   informed   Mr
Bhushan that a decision as to whether a Judge should
hear a case is a matter of conscience for the Judge. There
is absolutely no ground or basis to recuse. Judges of the
High   Court   hear   intra­court   appeals   against   orders   of
their   own   colleagues.   References   are   made   to   larger
Benches when there are differences of view. Judges of the
Supreme   Court   hear   appeals   arising   from   judgments
rendered   by   Judges   of   the   High   Courts   in   which   they
served,   either   as   Judges   or   on   appointments   as   Chief
Justices.   Maintaining   institutional   civilities   between   or
towards Judges is distinct from the fiercely independent
role of the Judge as adjudicator. We emphatically clarify
that on the well­settled parameters which hold the field,
there is no reason for any member of the present Bench
to recuse from the hearing. While it is simple for a Judge
faced   with   these   kinds   of   wanton   attacks   to   withdraw
from a case, doing so would amount to an abdication of
duty. There are higher values which guide our conduct.
Though Mr Bhushan ultimately made it clear that he is
not filing an application for recusal — and none has been
filed — we have recorded what transpired to express our
sense   of   anguish   at   the   manner   in   which   these
proceedings have been conducted. Serious attacks have
been made on the credibility of two Judges of the Bombay
High   Court.   The   conduct   of   the   petitioners   and   the
intervenors   scandalises   the   process   of   the   court   and
prima facie constitutes criminal contempt. However, on a
dispassionate view of the matter, we have chosen not to
initiate proceedings by way of criminal contempt if only
not   to   give   an   impression   that   the   litigants   and   the
lawyers   appearing   for   them   have   been   subjected   to   an
unequal battle with the authority of law. We rest in the
hope that the Bar of the nation is resilient to withstand
such   attempts   on   the   judiciary.   The   judiciary   must
continue   to   perform   its   duty   even   if   it   is   not   to   be
palatable   to   some.   The   strength   of   the   judicial   process
lies   not   in   the   fear   of   a   coercive   law   of   contempt.   The
52
 credibility   of   the   judicial   process   is   based   on   its   moral
authority.   It   is   with   that   firm   belief   that   we   have   not
invoked the jurisdiction in contempt.”

48. In  Kamini Jaiswal v. Union of India & Anr. (2018) 1 SCC 156,

the   authority   of   the   Chief   Justice   to   constitute   the   Benches,   was

questioned.  Again, in reply, averments have been made with respect to

the constitution of the Benches by the Chief Justice.  The question was

dealt with in Kamini Jaiswal (supra), in which Shri Prashant Bhushan

himself appeared.  Reliance was placed on D.C. Saxena v. Chief Justice

of India, (1996) 5 SCC 216, in which it was observed thus:­

“81. It   is   the   duty   of   the   Chief   Justice   of   a   court   to

assign   judicial   work   to   his   brother   Judges.   It   was,
therefore, the duty of the respondent to assign the second
writ petition to a Bench to hear it. By doing so he did not,
as   is   alleged,   become   a   Judge   in   his   own   cause.   It   is
contempt to imply, as the alleged contemnor does, that
the respondent would assign it to a Bench which would
not pass an order adverse to him. It is also contempt to
imply that Judges would be so amenable. To plead that
the Bench that heard the second writ petition could not
have heard it and, therefore, could not have dismissed it
and that it is deemed to be still pending is to add to the
contempt.   These   allegations   are   also   aimed   at   bringing
the administration of justice into disrepute.”

49. It was also observed in Kamini Jaiswal (supra) thus:­

“30. Though it is true, that none of us is above law; no
person in the higher echelons is above the law but, at the
same time, it is the duty of both the Bar and the Bench,
to   protect   the   dignity   of   the   entire   judicial   system.   We
find that filing of such petitions and the zest, with which
it is pursued, has brought the entire system in the last
few days to unrest. An effort was made to create ripples

53
 in this Court; serious and unwanted shadow of doubt has
been   created   for   no   good   reason   whatsoever   by   way   of
filing   the   petition   which   was   wholly   scandalous   and
ought   not   to   have   been   filed   in   such   a   method   and
manner.   It   is   against   the   settled   proposition   of   law.
Ultimately   after   arguing   at   length,   at   the   end,   it   was
submitted   by   the   petitioner   and   her   counsel   that   they
were   not   aiming   at   any   individual.   If   that   was   not   so,
unfounded   allegations   ought   not   to   have   been   made
against the system and that too against the Hon'ble Chief
Justice   of   this   country.   In   case   majesty   of   our   judicial
system has to survive, such kind of petitions should not
have   been   preferred   that   too   against   the   settled
proposition   of   law   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   the
aforesaid   decisions   of   this   Court   in D.C.   Saxena [D.C.
Saxena v. Chief   Justice   of   India,   (1996)   5   SCC   216]
and K.   Veeraswami [K.   Veeraswami v. Union   of   India,
(1991) 3 SCC 655 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 734].”

50. In view of the settled legal position, as stated hereinabove, we are of

the considered opinion that the defence taken in the affidavit cannot be

said  to  be  either  bona  fide   or in   the  public   interest.    Both  the   tweets

coupled with averments in the reply affidavit are capable of shaking the

confidence of the public in the institution as a whole.  The second tweet

is capable of creating an impression that the entire Supreme Court in the

last six years has played a vital role in the destruction of democracy.  

51. As   already   discussed   hereinabove,   one   of   the   attending

circumstances   which   is   required   to   be   taken   into   consideration   is   the

person who makes the statement.  It is not expected of a person who is a

part of the system of administration of justice and who owes a duty to

the said system, to make such tweets which are capable of shaking the

54
confidence of general public and further making wild allegations in the

affidavit thereby further attempting to malign the said institution.  Such

an   act   by   responsible   person   who   is   part   of   this   system   cannot   be

ignored or overlooked.  

52. We find no justification to make such a remark/tweet, particularly

when it is made by a lawyer with 35 years standing like Shri Prashant

Bhushan,   who   is   an   officer   of   the   Court   and   advocates   enjoy   equal

dignity in the system.   In spite of learned Attorney General’s insistence

that the averments made in the defence should be withdrawn and regret

should be submitted, Dr. Dhavan, learned senior counsel, stated that the

contemnor is not ready to withdraw the defence taken in the reply.  That

further makes it clear that while insisting with the unjustifiable defence

and   insistence   to   go   with   it   makes   the   entire   episode   the   one   which

cannot be ignored.  

53. The tweet has been made by the lawyer who has the standing of 35

years and who is involved in several public interest litigations.  However,

merely because a lawyer is involved in the filing of the public interest

litigation for the public good it does not arm him to harm the very system

of which he is a part.  Though expectation from an ordinary citizen may

be different, the duties and expectations that are expected from a lawyer

of long standing are on higher side.  An advocate cannot forget his ethical
55
duty and responsibility and cannot denigrate the very system of which

he/she is an integral part.   Fair criticism is not to be silenced, but an

advocate has to remind himself/herself, where he/she crosses the zone

of propriety, and the Court cannot continuously ignore it, and the system

cannot be made to suffer.  When the criticism turns into malicious and

scandalous allegations thereby tending to undermine the confidence of

the   public   and   the   institution   as   a   whole,   such   a   criticism   cannot   be

ignored. 

In Ref: Statement in Press/Media

54. Dr.   Dhavan,   learned   senior  counsel,  next  argued  that  we   should

consider   the   various   statements   made   by   some   of   the   retired   Judges,

journalists, and others.  We are not referring to the names as we do not

deem it appropriate to refer those names.   The argument is founded on

the fact that the Court should be influenced by the opinion expressed in

the newspapers and other media, when the Court is hearing a matter.

There are two facets of the argument.  Firstly, whether the Court should

be moved by the statement published in the newspaper and secondly,

whether, in a sub judice matters, such statements are permissible to be

made. We put a question to ourselves, as to whether the Court can be

guided   by   such   opinions   expressed   on   the   public   platform   and   as   to

whether the Court while exercising its judicial duties render its decision
56
on the basis of the trial made by the media and public opinion. Answer to

both the questions are found firmly in the negative.   The Court cannot

abdicate   its   duty   and   has   to   be   uninfluenced   by   the   statements

published   in   various   articles   published   in   the   media   and   opinions

expressed   therein.     It   has   to   decide   the   case   uninfluenced   by   such

opinions.  

55. C.J.   Miller   in   Contempt   of   Court,   Third   Edition,   dealt   with   the

similar   issue   referring   to   the   decision   in  Attorney­General   v.   Times

Newspaper Ltd., (1973) 3 All ER 54, discussed the aspect thus:­

“7.106 This view was followed in the Australian case of Ex
p.  Attorney­General:  Re   Truth  and  Sportsman  Ltd.   [1958  61
SR (NSW) 484]  Here a newspaper described a driver who had
been convicted after his car had knocked over and killed two
young children as a ‘monster’, adding that ‘it was one of the
most inhumane road killings on record in New South Wales’.
The   Supreme   Court   of   New   South   Wales   justified   the
imposition   of   a   fine   for   contempt   on   the   ground,   inter   alia,
that:
If   comment   and   criticism   of   the   nature   dealt   with   in
these   proceedings   were   permitted   while   an   appeal   is
pending,   prejudice   would   undoubtedly   be   likely   to   be
created,   and   in   any   event   the   court   could   be   seriously
embarrassed
The   decision   in   the   Delbert­Evans   case   was   cited   with
evident approval in Attorney­General v. Crisp and ‘Truth’ (NZ)
Ltd.   [1952   NZLR   84   (NZ   Sup.   Ct.).     The   defendants   had
described one Horry as ‘an unspeakable monster’ and a ‘suave
black­hearted   fiend’   when   the   time   for   appealing   against   a
conviction   for   murder   had   not   expired.     In   holding   that   a
contempt had been committed, Fair J said that such comment
tended   ‘seriously   to   embarrass   the   fair   and   impartial
administration of justice’.”

57
56. It was further observed that there is a substantial risk of serious

prejudice through an effect upon the mind of an appellate judge by such

publication.   It was also emphasized that an  act of making comments

which are intended or even likely to influence a judge necessarily amount

to a contempt.  

57. Dr. Dhavan, learned senior counsel, has submitted that this Court

will be criticized, in case it inflicts any punishment upon Shri Prashant

Bhushan.     We are unmoved by this submission.   While exercising our

judicial functions, we cannot take into consideration whether we will be

praised or criticized for the judgment which we render.  We are required

to decide the cases on the basis of the law as it correctly stands, in our

perception and understanding.  We are not expected to decide the matter

on the basis as to whether there will be criticism of the judgment or not.

We have to be always ready for its fair criticism.  

58. C.J.   Miller,   in  Contempt   of   Court,   Third   Edition,   has   referred

Lord Parker CJ thus:­

“7.118     An   alternative   way   of   justifying   the   imposition   of

liability in such cases as Attorney­General v. Tonks [1939 NZLR
533] is to categorize the publication as an attempt to ‘dictate’ a
decision to an appellate court.  As such, it may be viewed as a
contempt on the basis of an argument that a person who acts
with   the   intention   of   interfering   with   the   administration   of
justice will commit the offence, even though there is absolutely
no   likelihood   of   his   achieving   this   objective.     The   point   is
discussed in more detail elsewhere.  Here, it is sufficient to note
that   Lord   Parker   CJ   agreed   in   Duffy,   ex   p.   Nash   that   a
58
 contempt   may   be   committed   where   ‘the   article   in   question
formed part of a deliberate campaign to influence the decision
of   the   appellate   tribunal’.   [1960   2   QB   188]     Hence,   there   is
common   law   authority   suggesting   that   such   a   campaign   is
unlawful in this country.”

59. This Court has also considered the effect on the cases by pressure

created   by   the   media   in  R.K.   Anand   v.   Registrar,   Delhi   High   Court

(2009) 8 SCC 106 and Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Proprietors of

Indian Express News­Papers Bombay Pvt. Ltd., and others, (1988) 4

SCC 592.

60. In   the   case   of  R.K.   Anand   (supra),  the   Court   considered   the

concept   of   trial   by   media   in   a   case   which   was   sub   judice.     While

considering the same, it was held thus:­

“Reporting of pending trial
289. We   are   also   unable   to   agree   with   the   submission
made by Mr P.P. Rao that the TV channel should have
carried out the stings only after obtaining the permission
of the trial court or the Chief Justice of the Delhi High
Court and should have submitted the sting materials to
the court before its telecast. Such a course would not be
an   exercise   in   journalism   but   in   that   case   the   media
would be acting as some sort of special vigilance agency
for the court. On little consideration the idea appears to
be quite repugnant both from  the points of view of the
court and the media.

290. It would be a sad day for the court to employ the
media for setting its own house in order; and media too
would certainly not relish the role of being the snoopers
for the court. Moreover, to insist that a report concerning
a   pending   trial   may   be   published   or   a   sting   operation
concerning a trial may be done only subject to the prior
consent and permission of the court would tantamount to
pre­censorship of reporting of court proceedings. And this
59
 would   be   plainly   an   infraction   of   the   media's   right   of
freedom   of   speech   and   expression   guaranteed   under
Article 19(1) of the Constitution.

291. This   is,   however,   not   to   say   that   media   is   free   to

publish   any   kind   of   report   concerning   a   sub   judice
matter   or   to   do   a   sting   on   some   matter   concerning   a
pending   trial   in   any   manner   they   please.   The   legal
parameter  within which a  report  or  comment  on  a sub
judice matter can be made is well defined and any action
in breach of the legal bounds would invite consequences.
Compared   to   normal   reporting,   a   sting   operation   is   an
incalculably   more   risky   and   dangerous   thing   to   do.   A
sting   is   based   on   deception   and,   therefore,   it   would
attract   the   legal   restrictions   with   far   greater   stringency
and   any   infraction   would   invite   more   severe
punishment.”

61. In State of Maharashtra v. Rajendra Jawanmal Gandhi, (1997) 8

SCC   386,   the   concept   of   trial   by   press,   electronic   media   and   public

agitation was considered and the Court held thus:­

“37. We agree with the High Court that a great harm had
been   caused   to   the   girl   by   unnecessary   publicity   and
taking out of morcha by the public. Even the case had to
be transferred from Kolhapur to Satara under the orders
of   this   Court.   There   is   procedure   established   by   law
governing the conduct of trial of a person accused of an
offence.   A   trial   by   press,   electronic   media   or   public
agitation is the very antithesis of rule of law. It can well
lead to miscarriage of justice. …”

62. In   Santosh   Kumar   Satishbhushan   Bariyar   v.   State   of

Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 498, question of public opinion in capital

sentencing was considered.  It was observed that perception of public is

60
extraneous to conviction as also sentencing.  Relevant paragraphs are as

under:­

“2(F) Public opinion in capital sentencing
80. It   is   also   to   be   pointed   out   that   public   opinion   is
difficult   to   fit   in   the rarest   of   rare matrix.   People's
perception of crime is neither an objective circumstance
relating to crime nor to the criminal. Perception of public
is extraneous to conviction as also sentencing, at least in
capital   sentencing   according   to   the   mandate   of Bachan
Singh [(1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580] .
xxx xxx
87. Public opinion may also run counter to the rule of law
and constitutionalism. Bhagalpur Blinding case [Ed.: The
reference   seems   to   be   to Khatri   (II) v. State   of   Bihar,
(1981)   1   SCC   627   :   1981   SCC   (Cri)   228]   or   the   recent
spate   of   attacks   on   right   to   trial   of   the   accused
in Bombay Bomb Blast case [Ed.: The reference seems to
be to Sanjay Dutt v. State (II), (1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994
SCC   (Cri)   1433]   are   recent   examples.   We   are   also   not
oblivious to the danger of capital sentencing becoming a
spectacle   in   media.   If   media   trial   is   a   possibility,
sentencing by media cannot be ruled out.

88. Andrew Ashworth, a leading academic in the field of
sentencing,   who   has   been   at   the   centre   of   sentencing
reforms   in   the   UK,   educates   us   of   the   problems   in
factoring   in   public   opinion   in   the   sentencing.   He   (with
Michael Hough), observes in an article, “Sentencing and
the Climate of Opinion” (1996 Crim. L.Rev.):
“The views of sentencing held by people outside the
criminal   justice   system—‘the   general   public’—will
always   be   important   even   if   they   should   not   be
determinative in court. Unfortunately, the concept of
public opinion in relation to sentencing practices is
often employed in a superficial or simplistic way. In
this   short   article   we   have   identified   two   major
difficulties   with   the   use   of   the   concept.   First,
members of the public have insufficient knowledge of
actual   sentencing   practices.   Second,   there   is   a
significant   but   much   neglected   distinction   between
people's   sweeping   impressions   of   sentencing   and
their views in relation to particular  cases of which
61
they know the facts. When it is proclaimed that the
public  think  the  courts  are  too lenient, both  these
difficulties are usually suppressed.
To   construct   sentencing   policy   on   this   flawed   and
partial   notion   of   public   opinion   is   irresponsible.
Certainly, the argument is hard to resist that public
confidence in the law must be maintained. It is also
hard to resist the proposition that public confidence
in sentencing is low and probably falling. However,
since the causes of this lie not in sentencing practice
but   in   misinformation   and   misunderstanding,   and
(arguably)   in   factors   only   distantly   related   to
criminal justice, ratcheting up the sentencing tariff
is   hardly   a   rational   way   of   regaining   public
confidence.
This is not to deny that there is political capital to be
made,   at   least   in   the   short   term,   by   espousing
sentencing   policies   which   have   the   trappings   of
tough,   decisive   action.   However,   the   underlying
source   of   public   cynicism   will   not   have   been
addressed;   and   once   politicians   embark   on   this
route, they may be committing themselves long term
to a treadmill of toughness, ‘decisiveness’, and high
public   expenditure.   The   political   costs   of
withdrawing from tough policies, once embarked on,
may   be   too   high   for   politicians   of   any   hue   to
contemplate.   The   United   States   serves   as   an
example.
If   the   source   of   falling   public   confidence   in
sentencing   lies   in   lack   of   knowledge   and
understanding,   the   obvious   corrective   policy   is   to
explain   and   to   educate,   rather   than   to   adapt
sentencing policy to fit a flawed conception of public
opinion.   But   who   should   be   the   target   of   such
explanation and education? We have serious doubts
whether   attempts   to   reach   the   ordinary   citizen
directly   will   have   any   impact   at   all.   On   the   other
hand, we think it feasible, within limits, to educate
those   who   shape   public   opinion.   Newspaper   and
television journalists, for example, responded well to
the   initiatives   in   the   1980s   intended   to   curb   the
reporting   of   crime   in   ways   that   needlessly   fuelled
fear   of   crime.   A   similar   initiative   should   now   be
mounted in relation to sentencing.””

62
63. In  Reliance   Petrochemicals   Ltd.  (supra),   it   was   observed   that

process   of   due   course   of   administration   of   justice   must   remain

unimpaired.   Public   interest   demands   that   there   should   be   no

interference   with   the   judicial   process,   and   the   effect   of   the   judicial

decision should not be pre­empted or circumvented by public agitation or

publications. 

64. The   Judges   have   to   be   impartial   towards   the   crime   of   voice,   as

observed in Dharmkosh­43 (Narad 36­4­5) thus:­

65. Meaning thereby, Judges have to be well versed  in the laws and

impartial   towards   friends   and   foes.     It   emphasizes   that   the   Judges

should be impartial towards friends and foes.  In our opinion, the judicial

decision cannot be influenced by the opinions expressed in the media.  

66. The lawyers and litigants going to press or media in a sub judice

matter   is   another   question   that   is   at   the   fore  in   this   matter.     While

hearing   the   matter,   Shri   Prashant   Bhushan   talked   to   the   press   and

media.     The   statement   which   was   made   by   Shri   Prashant   Bhushan,

pursuant   to   the   order   dated   20.08.2020,   was   also   published   well   in

63
advance in extenso, word to word, in the newspaper and media.  In a sub

judice matter, releasing such statement to the press in advance is an act

of impropriety and has the effect of interfering with the judicial process

and   the   fair   decision   making   and   is   clearly   an   attempt   to   coerce   the

decision of the Court by the influence of newspaper and media, which

cannot be said to be conducive for the fair administration of justice and

would   further   tantamount   to   undue   interference   in   the   independent

judicial   making   process   which   is   the   very   foundation   of   institution   of

administration of justice.   If such kind of action is resorted to in a sub

judice matter, that too by an advocate who is facing a criminal contempt,

it   virtually   tantamount   to   using   a   forum   or   platform   which   is   not

supposed to be used ethically and legally.  More so, in a serious case of

criminal   contempt   and   particularly   after   the   conviction   has   been

recorded   by   this   Court,   it   indicates   that   the   tolerance   of   the   Court   is

being tested for no good reasons by resorting to unscrupulous methods.  

67. Dr.   Dhavan,   learned   senior   counsel,   fairly   stated   that   in   a   sub

judice matter, it is not open to the lawyer or litigant to go to press or

media   and   make   the   statement.       However,   it   appears   that   this   good

sense and counsel by a senior lawyer of long standing has not prevailed

upon the contemnor.  Dr. Dhavan, also stated that statement should not

have been released by Shri Prashant Bhushan to press or media.  It was

64
impermissible for him to do so.   We put on record our appreciation for

the fairness of Dr. Dhavan, learned senior counsel.  He has asked us to

lay down guidelines for future guidance to the members of the Bar and

the litigants on such aspects.

In Ref: Factors for Sentencing
68. Dr. Dhavan, learned senior counsel, submitted that relevant factors

required to be taken into consideration for sentencing are the offender,

the offence and statutory or other defences.  He has also referred to the

guidelines issued in the case in Re: S. Mulgaokar (supra).

69. With respect to the offender, as stated by Shri Prashant Bhushan

in his affidavit that he is a lawyer having of 35 years of standing and has

also   pursued   various   public   interest   litigations.     No   doubt   that   this

would be a relevant factor while balancing the decision to be taken by the

Court.  However, at the same time, the uncalled statements made in the

affidavit for pursuing truth as a defence can also not be ignored.  Since,

in 2009 contempt petition various questions have been framed by this

Court which will have to be answered, the pendency of the said contempt

petition cannot be considered to be a factor in reflecting on the question

of sentence in the present matter.   Even the present Attorney General

had filed a contempt case i.e. Contempt Petition (Crl) No.1/2019 (titled

65
The Attorney General of India v. Prashant Bhushan), which is pending

before this Court.

70. Dr. Dhavan, learned senior counsel, argued that offence is also a

factor   that   is   to   be   taken   into   consideration   while   imposing   the

punishment.   He argued that offence must be clear without ambiguity,

and the potential offender must understand where and when he is guilty

of the offence.   He submitted that scandalising the Court is notoriously

vague, as observed in Shreya Singhal (supra) and that the Court has to

be careful in exercising the jurisdiction, as held in Baradakanta Mishra

(supra).  

71. In respect to the submission made by Dr. Dhavan, learned senior

counsel, with regard to the inconsistency between the judgments of this

Court in  E.M. Sankaran Namboodripad (supra)  and  P.N. Duda  (supra)

is concerned, we are not concerned with the final outcome of the decision

in   these   two   cases.     However,   it   could   be   seen   that   the   legal   position

enunciated in both the judgments is one and the same.   May be in one

case by applying the same law the court found the statements made were

contemptuous   and   in   other   case   the   Court   found   that   the   statement

made was not contemptuous.  With regard to the reference made by Dr.

Dhavan, learned senior counsel, regarding the judgment in Re: Times of

66
India and Hindu, (2013) Cr.L.J. 932, to which one of us (Mishra, J.) was

a party is concerned, the reliance on the said judgment, in our view, is

misplaced.  Firstly, applying the test as to who is the person who makes

the statement, it could be seen that in the said case the statement was

made by a politician, however, in the present case, the statement is made

by a lawyer who has a standing of more than 35 years.  Secondly, in the

said  case  the  statement  was  not made  specifically against anyone  but

was   a   general   statement,   in   the   present   case   the   statement   is   made

against the past four Chief Justices and the Judges, who have occupied

the office of this Court for last six years.  

72. Dr.   Dhavan,   learned   senior   counsel,   also   argued   that   contempt

jurisdiction is vague and colonial.   For this, he has relied upon Justice

Wilmot’s   judgment   in  R.   v.   Almon,   (1965)   Wilm   243,   Mcleod   v.   St.

Aubyn, (1899) AC 549 (PC), R. v. Gary, (1900) 2 QB 36 DC,   R. v.

Colsely,   9   May   1931   DC,     Dhoorika   v.   Director   of   Public

Prosecutions   (Commonwealth   Lawyers’   Association   Intervening),

(2015) AC 875.   He urged that in the last century, this jurisdiction has

been used only for 31 years and never after that in England since 1931.

73. He   has   also   referred  R.   v.   Blackburn,   (1968)   1   ALL   ER   763,

wherein Lord Denning refused to convict or sentence for contempt.   He

67
also referred that in the Spycatcher affair, the Daily Mirror had a banner

heading  stating  in  bold  “YOU FOOLS” and  put  the  picture   of  the  Law

Lords upside down, and no contempt was initiated.  Further, in 2019, in

the Parliament suspension case, the English Supreme Court Judges were

called ‘enemies of democracy,' but no action was taken.   

74. The submissions that are sought to be made in effect amount to

reviewing the view taken by us in the convicting judgment. We need not

again   consider   the   submissions   made   by   Dr.   Dhavan,   learned   senior

counsel,   inasmuch   as   all   his   submissions   have   been   elaborately

considered   in   the   convicting   judgment.     Taking   into   consideration   the

view  taken  by  us  in  the  convicting  judgment  we  cannot  accede  to   the

request of Dr. Dhavan,  learned senior counsel that the decision  dated

14.08.2020 should be withdrawn or recalled. 

75. We find no force in the submission raised to recall the judgment,

suo   motu   otherwise.     We   have   exercised   the   jurisdiction   with   full

circumspection,   care,   and   precautions.     We   find   no   merits   in   the

submission.  While sentencing, we have to act with objectivity in relation

to the person and the actual effect, as held  in Murray & Co. v. Ashok

Kumar Newatia and Another, (2000) 2 SCC 367.

68
76. Dr. Dhavan, learned senior counsel, also argued that there is no

conflict   between   the   constitutional   jurisdiction   under   Articles   129   and

215   of   the   Constitution  and   the  provisions   of   the  Contempt  of   Courts

Act, 1971.  For this purpose, he has relied upon Pallav Sheth (supra), in

which it was observed:­

“30. There   can   be   no   doubt   that   both   this   Court   and   High

Courts   are   courts   of   record   and   the   Constitution   has   given
them the powers to punish for contempt. The decisions of this
Court   clearly   show   that   this   power   cannot   be   abrogated   or
stultified. But if the power under Article 129 and Article 215 is
absolute,  can  there by  any  legislation indicating  the manner
and to the extent that the power can be exercised? If there is
any provision of the law which stultifies or abrogates the power
under Article 129 and/or Article 215, there can be little doubt
that  such  law  would not  be regarded  as  having   been validly
enacted.   It,   however,   appears   to   us   that   providing   for   the
quantum of punishment or what may or may not be regarded
as acts of contempt or even providing for a period of limitation
for initiating proceedings for contempt cannot be taken to be a
provision   which   abrogates   or   stultifies   the   contempt
jurisdiction   under   Article   129   or   Article   215   of   the
Constitution.”

77. The   case   of  Maheshwari   Peri   &   others   v.   High   Court   of

Judicature at Allahabad, (2016) 14 SCC 251, was also referred.   The

relevant paragraph is as under:­

“10.  …..  Be  it   an action initiated  for  contempt  under  Article

129   of   the   Constitution   of   India   by   the   Supreme   Court   or
under   Article   215   of   the   Constitution   of   India   by   the   High
Court,   it   is   now   settled   law   that   the   prosecution   procedure
should be in consonance with the Act, as held by this Court in
Pallav Seth.”

69
78. We  find  that  this  question  has  been  dealt  with   in  the  convicting

judgment and what is the procedure under Articles 129 and 215 of the

Constitution   has   been   considered  In  Re:   Vijay   Kurle   and   Ors.,   2020

SCC Online SC 407.  We will not repeat them again as they are referred

to in the convicting judgment. 

79. Dr.   Dhavan,   learned   senior   counsel,   urged   that   a   copy   of   the

complaint/petition   filed   by   Shri   Mahek   Maheshwari,   was   not   made

available   to   the   contemnor.     He   has   submitted   that   said   Shri   Mahek

Maheshwari was associated for some time with some political party. He

further   submitted   that   as   such   the   person   who   filed   a   petition   was   a

relevant question required to be considered by this Court.   He has also

relied upon Rule 6(2) of the Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt

of the Supreme Court, 1975 read with  Article 145 of the Constitution,

which   provided   that   a   copy   of   the   complaint   must   be   supplied   to   the

contemnor.

80. No doubt that though initially the said Mr. Mahek Maheshwari had

filed a petition in this Court which was placed on the administrative side

of this Court, this Court had decided to initiate suo motu proceedings.

Only that part of the petition i.e. the first tweet made by the contemnor

was   one   of   the   basis   for   taking   action   against   the   contemnor.     The

relevant   tweet   has   specifically   been   mentioned   in   our   order   dated

70
22.07.2020.   No other part of the petition was taken into consideration

for  proceeding   against   the   contemnor.     Insofar   as   the   second   tweet  is

concerned, which was on the basis of the report published in the Time of

India dated 22.07.2020, we had decided to take suo motu cognizance of

the same.  Thus, it will not be of any relevance as to whether a copy of

the petition filed by Shri Mahek Maheshwari was supplied or not.   The

suo motu cognizance was taken only on the basis of the said two tweets,

which were specifically quoted in our order dated 22.07.2020.  As held in

catena   of   cases,   the   only   requirement   is   that   the   Court   must   follow

principles   of   natural   justice.     The   Court   specifically   made   aware   the

contemnor   about   the   basis   on   which   the   Court   took   suo   motu

cognizance.   Not only that but the contemnor understood the basis on

which the Court was proceedings, as is evident from the bulky affidavit

in reply filed by him.  Contention in this respect, in our view is without

substance. 

81. Argument raised by Dr. Dhavan that Free Speech is part of Article

19(1)(a)   of   the   Constitution   cannot   be   disputed.     However,   we   are   not

convinced   that   while   exercising   power   under   Article   129   of   the

Constitution, we are interfering with the rights under Article 19(1)(a) of

the Constitution.  Supreme Court being a court of record can punish for

contempt.  He also argued about the Freedom of Press, which is beyond

71
doubt  an   important  aspect   of   democracy.     Free   Speech   is   essential  to

democracy can also not be disputed, but it cannot denigrate one of the

institutions of the democracy.  As observed in Maneka Gandhi v. Union

of India and Another,  (1978) 1 SCC 248, democracy is based on free

debate   and   open   discussion,   however,   cannot   go   to   the   extent   of   the

scurrilous   attack   and   shaking   the   faith   of   the   general   public   in   such

institution.     Freedom   of   speech   and   expression   includes   the   right   to

impart   and   receive   information,   which   includes   freedom   to   hold   an

opinion   as   was   held   in  Secretary,   Ministry   of   Information   and

Broadcasting, Government of India & Ors. v. Cricket Association of

Bengal  &  Ors.,  (1995)  2  SCC   161.    No   doubt,   one   is   free   to   form  an

opinion and make fair criticism but if such an opinion is scandalous and

malicious, the public expression of the same would also be at the risk of

the contempt jurisdiction.   No doubt that the contention raised by Dr.

Dhavan,   learned   senior   counsel,   that   free   speech,   as   envisaged   under

Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution is a fundamental right.   However, it

cannot be forgotten that rights under Article 19(1) of the Constitution are

subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2) of the Constitution

and rights of others cannot be infringed in the process.  The same have

to   be  balanced.     While  exercising the  powers   under Article  129  of  the

Constitution, the Court will have to strike a balance between the right

72
under   Article   19(1)(a)   and   the   restrictions   under   Article   19(2)   of   the

Constitution.  No doubt that, as urged by Dr. Dhavan, freedom of press

is   also   an   important   aspect   in   a   democracy.    We   cannot   control   the

thinking process and words operating in the mind of one individual, but

when it comes to expression, it has to be within the constitutional limits.

Lawyers'   noble   profession   will  lose  all   its   significance   and   charm   and

dignity if the lawyers are permitted to make any malicious, scandalous

and scurrilous allegations against the institution of which they are part.

The lawyers are supposed to be fearlessly independent and robust but at

the same time respectful to the institution.  

82. Dr. Dhavan, learned senior counsel, also argued that as per Section

3(22) of the General Clauses Act, things shall be considered to be done in

good faith, in fact, if done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not.

Dr.   Dhavan,   submitted   that   if   defence   of   good   faith,   as   provided   in

Section 3(22) of the General Clauses Act is taken into consideration, it

will have to be held that the act done by the contemnor was done in good

faith if it was done honestly, may be done negligently.     The perusal of

the comments can neither be said to be done honestly or in good faith.

Reliance has been placed on  Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd. and

Others, (1999)4 All ER 609, it has been observed that the true test is

whether the opinion, however exaggerated, obstinate or prejudiced, was

73
honestly   held   by   the   person   expressing   it.     It   cannot   be   said   that   a

person   who   is   the   lawyer   having   35   years   standing,   who   has   made

malicious and scandalous comments in the tweets and amplified them by

the   averments   made   in   the   affidavit   in   reply   which   have   the   effect   of

denigrating   the   very   institution   to   which   he   belongs,   can   be   made

honestly or in good faith.  

83. Dr.  Dhavan,  learned  senior counsel,  submitted   that  applying  the

doctrine of proportionality the balance will have to tilt in favour of the

fundamental   rights   as   against   restrictions.   He   argued   that

reasonableness means substantive and procedural reasonableness and

imports proportionality, and he has placed reliance on  State of Madras

& Ors. v. V.G. Row, (1952) SCR 597, Chintaman Rao & Ors. v. State

of   Madhya   Pradesh,  (1950)   SCR   759,  Papnasam   Labour   Union   v.

Madura   Coats   Ltd.   and   Ors.,  (1995)   1   SCC   501,  State   of   Andhra

Pradesh & Ors. v. McDowell and Co. & Ors., (1996) 3 SCC 709, Union

of India (UOI) & Ors. v. G. Ganayutham (Dead) by Lrs., (1997) 7 SCC

463, Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. U.T. Chandigarh & Ors., (2004) 2 SCC

130,  Om Kumar  & Ors. v. Union  of India  (UOI),  (2001) 2  SCC  386,

Anuj Garg & Ors. v. Hotel Association of India & Ors., (2008) 3 SCC 1

and   Chairman,   All   India   Railway   Rec.   Board   &   Ors.   v.   K.   Shyam

74
Kumar & Ors.,  (2010) 6 SCC 614.     Thus, he has submitted that the

conviction be recalled, and no sentence be imposed.   We have weighed

the   pros   and   cons,   rights,   and   limitations   and   thereafter   rendered   a

considered decision regarding conviction, and as discussed in this order,

on   consideration   of   proportionality   we   find   no   room   to   entertain   this

submission.     The   same   is   repelled.         Shri   Dhavan,   learned   senior

counsel, also relied upon the following statement in Andre Paul Terence

Ambard v. The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago,  (1936) All

ER 704, the following passage has been relied upon:­

“…  no wrong is committed by any member of the public
who exercises the ordinary right of criticizing in good faith
in   private   or   public   the   public   act   done   in   the   seat   of
justice.     The   path   of   criticism   is   a   public   way:   the
wrongheaded are permitted to err therein: provided that
members   of   the   public   abstain   from   imputing   improper
motives   to   those   taking   part   in   the   administration   of
justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism
and   not   acting   in   malice   or   attempting   to   impair   the
administration of justice, they are immune.  Justice is not
a   cloistered   virtue:   she   must   be   allowed   to   suffer   the
scrutiny   and   respectful   even   though   outspoken
comments of ordinary men.”
(Emphasis supplied)

84. There can be no doubt about the principle that any member of the

public has a right to criticize in good faith in private or public, the public

act done in the seat of justice. However, the members of the public are

required to abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part

in   the   administration   of   justice.     Right   to   fair   criticism   is   contrasted

75
against acting in malice or attempting to bring down the reputation of

the   institution   of   administration   of   justice.     We   find   that   even   after

recording the judgment of conviction, no remorse has been expressed by

the   contemnor,   nor   apology   has   been   submitted.     It   was   argued   that

apology is being coerced from the contemnor.       In the supplementary

statement dated 24.08.2020, Shri Prashant Bhushan has stated that “At

the   hearing   the   court   asked   me   to   take   2­3   days   to   reconsider   the

statement I made in the court.”   However, the order specifically states,

“We have given time to the contemnor to submit unconditional apology, if

he so desires.”     We find that by now it is a settled position of law that

the Court speaks through its judgments and orders.   Virtual exchange

during the course of the proceedings is not what is the order of the Court

but it could be a tentative expression of that exchange during the course

of hearing.   However, ultimately what is final is the order of the Court,

which has the seal of it.  It would have been better if the aforesaid part

was not mentioned in the supplementary statement, but we cannot stop

anybody   from   making   any   statement,   but   we   consider   it   not   to   be   a

proper statement as to what should have been the words in the order of

the Court.     We have not coerced the contemnor to submit the apology

and have clearly mentioned that time was given to submit unconditional

apology,   “if   he   so   desires”.     It   was   his   decision   to   submit   it   or   not.

76
However, he has chosen to submit a supplementary statement.   Thus,

the   submission   raised   by   Dr.   Dhavan,   learned   senior   counsel,   as   to

coercion is without substance.   The desire of learned Attorney General

that   he/contemnor   should   withdraw   the   allegation   and   express   regret

has also gone unheeded.

85. Dr. Dhavan, has also referred to the observation of Krishna Iyer, J.,

in  Re:   S.   Mulgaokar  (supra).     We   have   considered   the   same   in   the

convicting judgment and followed the principle laid down therein.     No

doubt   that   while   exercising   the   right   of   freedom   of   speech   the   fair

criticism   of   the   system   is   welcome   and   the   Judges   cannot   be   hyper

sensitive   even   when   distortions   and   criticism   overstep   the   limit.

However, the same cannot be stretched to permit to make malicious and

scandalous statement.   The Court has to act only in the case where the

attack is beyond a permissible limit, the strong arm of the law strikes a

blow on him who challenges the supremacy of the rule of law by fouling

its source and stream.

86. We have applied the aforesaid guidelines and standards.  

87. Learned Attorney General submitted that the Court should exhibit

magnanimity.   Dr.   Dhavan,   learned   senior   counsel,   invoked   the

statesmanship from this Court.  Learned Attorney General stated that if

77
there is an expression of regret and if the affidavit is withdrawn, perhaps

a   quietus   can   be   given   to   the   proceeding.     However,   the   contemnor

declined   to   do   so.   Learned   Attorney   General   also   submitted   that   in

Arundhati Roy’s case, it was held that “our shoulders are broad enough

to shrug off comments against it.”  No doubt about it, our approach has

to be like one stated by the learned Attorney General.  In spite of learned

Attorney General appealing that it was not too late for the contemnor to

express regret as he did in the other case regarding contempt filed by

learned Attorney General and one more chance be given, but that was

virtually   declined   flatly   by   Dr.   Dhavan,   learned   senior   counsel,   in   the

presence of the contemnor.   It is apparent that in both the statements

made by the contemnor, he is sticking to his ground, and he is not at all

realizing that any wrong was done by him to the institution.  At the same

time, he has expressed the faith in the institution and he has submitted

that an apology cannot be a mere incantation and an apology has to be

as the Court itself put be sincerely made.  He has further stated that he

made the statement bona fide and with truthful details which had not

been dealt with by the Court.  He is insistent and has no remorse about

what he has stated in the defence.  He has not gone by the advice of the

learned   Attorney   General   to   withdraw   the   same   and   to   take   if   off   the

record.     Shri   Prashant   Bhushan   being   a   person   well   versed   with   law

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ought to have given due weightage to the advice rendered by the learned

Attorney General who has pleaded not to sentence him, at the same time

maintained that the statements made in the affidavit in reply could not

be   taken   into   consideration   for   considering   the   case   of   Mr.   Prashant

Bhushan  of  truth  as a defence.    When senior­most functionary  in  the

legal profession of the stature of the learned Attorney General was giving

an advice to express regret and withdraw the wild allegations a lawyer of

such a long standing was expected to give due respect to it.   Even our

request made to him has gone in vain.   Thus, we feel that the simple

issuance of warning is not going to suffice in the instant case.

88. It was argued by Dr. Dhavan, learned senior counsel, that in case

the  contemnor  is  sent to  the  imprisonment, he will attain  martyrdom,

and he also should not be debarred from the practice.  He further stated

that the Court could not pass an order debarring the contemnor from

practicing unless a prior notice was issued to him and an opportunity of

hearing was given in that regard.  

89. Pursuant to the conviction in a criminal case, the Bar Council of

India can suspend the enrolment, if it so desires.  It is also open to this

Court to debar from practicing in a Court, as held in Supreme Court Bar

Association   (supra).    We   are   not   afraid   of   sentencing   the   contemnor

either with imprisonment or from debarring him from the practice. His

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conduct reflects adamance and ego, which has no place to exist in the

system   of   administration   of   justice   and   in   noble   profession,   and   no

remorse   is   shown   for   the   harm   done   to   the   institution   to   which   he

belongs.   At   the   same   time,   we   cannot   retaliate   merely   because   the

contemnor   has   made   a   statement   that   he   is   neither   invoking   the

magnanimity or the mercy of this Court and he is ready to submit to the

penalty that can be lawfully be inflicted upon him for what the Court has

determined   to   be   an   offence.     He   has   even   invoked   the   Father   of   the

Nation,   Mahatma   Gandhi’s   statement,   which   was   made   by   Mahatma

Gandhi at the conclusion of the trial against him.

90. The Court, from the very beginning, was desirous of giving quietus

to this matter.   Directly or indirectly, the contemnor was persuaded to

end   this   matter   by   tendering   an   apology   and   save   the   grace   of   the

institution   as   well   as   the   individual,   who   is   an   officer   of   the   Court.

However, for the reasons best known to him he has neither shown regret

in spite of our persuasion or the advice of the learned Attorney General.

Thus, we have to consider imposing an appropriate sentence upon him.

91. Duly balancing the factors urged by Dr. Dhavan as to the offender,

offence, the convicting judgment and the defence taken we have to decide

the question of sentence.  In our considered view, the act committed by

the contemnor is a very serious one.  He has attempted to denigrate the

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reputation   of   the   institution   of   administration   of   justice   of   which   he

himself is a part.  At the cost of repetition, we have to state that the faith

of the citizens of the country in the institution of justice is the foundation

for rule of law which is an essential factor in the democratic set up.

92. We   have   given   deep   thought   as   to   what   sentence   should   be

imposed on the contemnor.  The conduct of the present contemnor also

needs to be taken into consideration.  This Court in Tehseen Poonawala

(supra)   has   observed   that   the   said   matter   was   a   fit   matter   wherein

criminal   contempt   proceedings   were   required   to   be   initiated.   However,

the   court   stopped   at   doing   so   observing   that   it   would   have   been   an

unequal fight.  The learned Attorney General had also initiated contempt

proceedings against the present contemnor, however, on the contemnor

submitting regret, the learned Attorney General sought withdrawal of the

said proceedings.  However, the said proceedings are still pending.  In the

present matter also not on one occasion but on several occasions, we not

only   gave   opportunity   but   also   directly   or   indirectly   pursuaded   the

contemnor to express regret.  Not only that the learned Attorney General

had also suggested that it was in the fitness of things that a contemnor

expresses  regret  and   withdraws  the  allegation  made  in  the  affidavit in

reply,   which   request   was   not   heeded   to   by   the   contemnor.     The

contemnor   not   only   gave   wide   publicity   to   the   second   statement

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submitted   before   this   Court   on   24.08.2020   prior   to   the   same   being

tendered to the Court, but also gave various interviews with regard to

sub   judice   matter,   thereby   further   attempting   to   bring   down   the

reputation of this Court.  If we do not take cognizance of such conduct it

will give a wrong message  to  the lawyers  and litigants  throughout the

country.     However,   by   showing   magnanimity,   instead   of   imposing   any

severe puishment, we are sentencing the contemnor with a nominal fine

of  Re.1/­ (Rupee one).

93. We, therefore, sentence the contemnor with a fine or Re.1/­ (Rupee

one) to be deposited with the Registry of this Court by 15.09.2020, failing

which   he   shall   undergo   a   simple   imprisonment   for   a   period   of   three

months   and   further   be   debarred   from   practising   in   this   Court   for   a

period of three years.

94. Accordingly,   the   present   proceedings   including   all   pending

applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

          ……………………………….J.
   (Arun Mishra)

                  ……………………………….J.
     (B.R. Gavai)

                  ……………………………….J.
           (Krishna Murari)
New Delhi;                      
August 31, 2020.
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