1. G.R. No.

100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT,
and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal
issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect
on the political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners

who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates
for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution
which similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law

as a legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court,
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice
to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages
in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with
opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered
by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies
and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining
or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177)
stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of
legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of
legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-
666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what
he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active
practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this
he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW
312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do
during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit.
Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are
now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that
this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or
involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as
the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their
respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and
we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available
whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar
engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision
on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer
is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of
law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman
and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public
accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with
the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a
fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law
Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services."
(Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are
called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some
firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In
either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are
younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of
law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be
the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d
863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]).
Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental
realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar
role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little
time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case.
(Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role
colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality.
(Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated
on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still
uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the
courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen,
know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law
offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-
litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing
what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer
has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need
not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal
medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions,
clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized
practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within
a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an
administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively
rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the
work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client
counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find
that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source
of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in
very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features
of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in
which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these
roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging
trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate
law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating
in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate

understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need
for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and
"contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of
significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in
situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the
trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and
formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a
cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the
law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the
various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or
doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level
of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of
other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of
an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every
necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de

campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of
the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that
a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will
vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm
out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for
certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-
house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research,
tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both
courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission),
and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining
policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate
lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the
business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational
corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a
relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is
perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases,
however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their
"international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990,
p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the
lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to
spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is
one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No
longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the
Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern
management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate
counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's
management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the
legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking
them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for
the corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic
repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think
about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being
reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-
national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with
each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some
cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on
boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing
legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as
corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that
differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe,
Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and
business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a
distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both
long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements
within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability
and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new
managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to
simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more
accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity
and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement
value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in
managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by
parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide
coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the
point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of
the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for
such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and
made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of
the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's
evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global,
interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate
the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by
decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make
one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system
shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of
the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working
knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel,"
April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p.
4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position
of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod
does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as

Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations
of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license
fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970),
Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which
involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in
1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment
bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved
being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings
before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former
Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked
with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating,
lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban
land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission,
Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions
with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately
constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top
officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the
finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the
contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating
Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the
Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as
the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside
from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed
from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations,"
submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the
Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center
on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies,
demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in
renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business
specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully
drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance
of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine
External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321).
( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both
parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge
an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in
the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of
law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they
are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See
Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended
by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court
said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which
it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted
on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also
has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an
encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis
supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4)
stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a
commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance
e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949;
Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article
IX of the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those
first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years,
and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall
be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the
modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended
by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would
require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and
would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far
from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written
opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the
definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law."
True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the
definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod
is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years.
This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly
doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even
assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the
incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required
by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged
power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only
where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's
corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been
clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme
Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer
is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed?
The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to
confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still
reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah
(who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod
burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the
man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with
anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The
procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?"
The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it
does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged
determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications
and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to
grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with
the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the
petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I
voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the
position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification
for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even
embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent
Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established
jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed
qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to
his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the
constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because,

ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the
constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the
Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art.
IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional
provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63
Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among
these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It
is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge;
it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action.1 To "practice" law, or any
profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively,
habitually, repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a
nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant
who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same
way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as
head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be
said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs-
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of
statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C.
644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it

prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes
"practice of law." It states:

1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out
to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522,
98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office
for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of
office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court
informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102
Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of
documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law"
(Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v.
People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the
proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin,
supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation
is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law;
are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of

lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires
knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law
books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer
(Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not
respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10)
years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT
LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am
persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he
did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly
considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the
rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not
qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there
must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs.
Villanueva:4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not
qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the
same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting
hisviewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent
simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my
view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the
appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that
body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing
authority to choose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required
qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of
the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply
because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate
proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised
citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but
whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.

Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have
been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification
practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the
uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice
of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The
stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they
deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another
business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That
covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under
P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that
is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and
observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a
business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he
rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and
application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his
main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he
must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of
any acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us
absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every
function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be
too global to be workable."

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a
lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with
some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is
derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he
has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is
conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has
distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The
plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his
experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal
attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he
lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the
Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a
member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities
extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless
eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman
of the Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must
regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms.
Unfortunately, this was not the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the
practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not
expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2
voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and
2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no
power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and
arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of
executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in
international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and
competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a
specific requirement written into the Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never
engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he
has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law,
if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see
how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for
appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we
have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in
fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the
law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant
past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated,
occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged"
in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of
one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is
obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the
Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one
year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even
then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A.
and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How
could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?

The professional life of the respondent follows:

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist
of the following:

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin

American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance
Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities

Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated

companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod
has given the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as
would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least
ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving
receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an
executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged
in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as
commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such
knowledge would be helpful.

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman
accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country
who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times
in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator,
mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to
name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in
the practice of law?

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It
is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:

The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also
services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any
services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other
instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully
determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex
rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and
cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the
practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at
law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any
sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of
such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that
definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n
v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d
773, 776)

For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities
peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or
customarily, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked
whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he
was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how
many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his
business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his
answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that he
had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what
was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing
deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where
he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice."
Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties
where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the
books as far as real estate is concerned."

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do
any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate
contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in
these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v.
Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)

xxx xxx xxx

... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act
in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act
for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys
at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is
much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another,
without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law,
says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in
such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the
court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3)
to keep his client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him
as such. ... His rights are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit.
"Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform
frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming,
... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a
profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522,
523; Emphasis supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of
acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):

xxx xxx xxx

... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of
statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as
a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required

component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to
wit:

l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to
the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98
N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for
the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of
office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court
informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102
Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)

xxx xxx xxx

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal
knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities
which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was
not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding
Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been
assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign
corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing
business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and
continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are
not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated,
Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for
such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the
Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be
confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this
Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion
in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissent

2. Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,

vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition)
and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the
exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr.
Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res.
& Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC.1 Tel.
521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community
in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as
hereinbefore quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at
its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal
support services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal
services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we
required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3)
Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women
Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas
(FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their
memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable
services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered
by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in
either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein
complained of.

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved
in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two
terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily
dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that
document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional
services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or
business registration, obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas,
constitutes practice of law?

xxx xxx xxx

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's
foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it
strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to
advertise one's legal services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of
establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper
publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to
perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law
practice as aforedescribed.4

xxx xxx xxx

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The
Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is)
the effect that the advertisements have on the reading public.

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very
name being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully
submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic
connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic"
connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present
case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is
being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the
advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a
lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the
nature of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as
claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice
does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal
support services," as the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no
room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by
lawyers, whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law,
morals, public order and public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only
meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements,
however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the Family
Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . .

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman entered
into accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of
the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being
conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in
accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but
encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be
considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.

Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex
"A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on
its bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret
marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social
institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its
sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages
celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage
license.

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the
above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The
Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest.
Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction
of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not
constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal
services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an
ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good,
thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of
the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted
that respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it
presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of
evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but
instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar
encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by
specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time
and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the
Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of
the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will
be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal
practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more
importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological development in the profession may be
encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but
only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar.
Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the
more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public
in general and which should be made available exclusively to members of the Bar may be
undertaken. This, however, may require further proceedings because of the factual
considerations involved.

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited

outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which
are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be
prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required to
include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain
course of action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of
rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course of
action to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to
possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of

the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or
perform legal services.

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed
to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or
regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law
practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before
allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-
laws must conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
the Rules of Court.5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal
support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd.
Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The
Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within the realm of
a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For
respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity.
Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to
be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal
Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been
held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing
of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then
take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and
Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation
cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously,
this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the
public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception,
especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the
business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly
admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the
members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name,
the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is
not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5
Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the
law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent
are the persons engaged in unethical law practice.6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently
immoral; and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its
corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and
immoral advertising.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders
"legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary
Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment).
But its advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is
indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations
Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence
and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems;
the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal
principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities
call for legal training, knowledge and experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the
practice of law."7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given
to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons
or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top
of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar
examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of
justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify
these paralegals to deal with the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune
time to establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present,
these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make
measures to protect the general public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with
the general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may
be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited
under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant
case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by
"paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to
those who advertise legal services without being qualified to offer such services. 8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the

impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage,
immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which
are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services. The
Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters. It gives the impression
again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression
that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical
clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority
stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of
Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article."9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of
gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of
Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is
illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the
celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly
fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers
authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting
marriage is not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards
allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified
practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such
as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever
merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could become
justifiable.

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and
divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret
marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where
in this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines.
It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be
able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be
done.

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by
an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character
justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services
rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not
unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent
(assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge of the
law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is

familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of
conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law,
and his use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall recommend,
do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men know the law, but it
is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our
knowledge of the law — accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct not only when we are
acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen
generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or
profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire
prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specification
in harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by
the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he
recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my
opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information,
and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him
and the architect in respect to the building code and the like, then an architect who performed
this function would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed
attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom
placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The most
important body of the industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of the
labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has been
the practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a
management group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and without
regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the defendants have the
same service that the larger employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which appropriate
courses are offered by our leading universities. The court should be very cautious about
declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of conducting business is unlawful, or
that the considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to
do so, or that the technical education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in
their business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any particular
client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to
the law defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the
practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts
are along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within which he
must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the
architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does not
transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his
work, he performed services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would
be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the adjustment of
grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the
practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly
skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the
employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an
exception where the business turns on a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated
by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way
and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute and
persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept
the assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his men grows from differing
interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it.
But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the
proofs.

Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal
government, especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency
of the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may
regulate the representation of parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without
power to interfere with such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by one
whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the
right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations,
September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther
representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever
the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d
800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may
involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:

Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with
the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another
capacity.

1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A"
Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and
making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if
the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the
practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of
marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials
may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer
buys materials on the subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what
courses of action to take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal
Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal
advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text which
purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or
rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does
not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and
the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice
of law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to
the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor
does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and
client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND
ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal
advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the
defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar
to a designated or readily identified person in a particular situation — in their publication and
sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . .
There being no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper
basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to
persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement any printed material
or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of
the judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing his
manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact with any prospective
purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding that for the change of $75 or
$100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning
particular problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's
asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the
preparation of necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct
constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by
the defendant relating to specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce,
separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v.
Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory.
"It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling,"
such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits
that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.

xxx xxx xxx

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate
the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other
requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be
secret.

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which
is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal
services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the
proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the
clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The
courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the
term, some of which we now take into account.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice
or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and
counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal
types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their
rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal
principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals
which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to
law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice
of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law.
16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the
conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to
the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we
laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court,
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice
to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust
Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:

. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations
or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies
and there, in such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining
or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-
177),stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of
legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of
legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-
666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc.
v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and
observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised,
constitute "practice of law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description
of the services it has been offering, to wit:

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to
laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use
of computers and modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage,
transmission and reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized legal
research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or
lawyers; document search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact
finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other countries
that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of
preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve
representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or
software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts and
other entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal services. 20

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical
and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the
efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials,
these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent
than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is
look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the
client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken
as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact
that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight
of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991
issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal
Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the
seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's
problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty.
Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take
care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal
problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing the
problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you,
they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we
operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our
specialists.

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These
The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale
or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or
the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa
hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea,"
explains Atty. Nogales.

Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a
rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of
property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and
arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the
right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal
with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you
would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and
gather evidence to support the case. 21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling.
What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the
services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against
the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this
proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts
sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts
for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. 22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules
of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified
in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from
the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the
disciplinary control of the court. 24

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to
draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to
those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes
or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for
members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules
of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments
previously acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the courts as
possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect,
or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction,
interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of
law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but
in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by
incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little
control.27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this
jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first
be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while
there are none in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant"
evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general
public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar
Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs
(1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also
associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such
as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association.
29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to
practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render
legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional
or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law
for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an
unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be
one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal
assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to
use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory
or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or
give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for,
publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not
resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in
which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-
laudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A
lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of
legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that
the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs.
Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in
the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of
the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25
of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant
advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his
profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with
mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most
worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment
of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced
but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as
the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a
normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer
needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda. 40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to
which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those
which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with
the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data.
"Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and
the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended
with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public
offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in
bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities;
the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with
their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program.
Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or
contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower
the dignity or standing of the profession. 43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his
name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said
respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do
not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked
and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the
case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a
lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a
statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written
schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional
Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in
the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any
state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show
that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be
made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the
prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision
in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was
found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of
lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to
allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to
aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity
has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point
in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times,
to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert
all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action,
to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator,
major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he
is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are
involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for
which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are
constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the
adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is,
of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding
and forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be
organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule
against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals
supposedly rendering the alleged support services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50
after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's
corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar
matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the
circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal
Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any
form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition,
and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by
law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of
the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.

3. B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL

BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the
crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991.
The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in
the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and
his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such
bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This
plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the
fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging
from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with
the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993
issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two
(2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to
supervise him.

Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the
1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his
then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En
Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not,
however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.

On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's
oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had
terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his
probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge
Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three
(3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.

The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone
who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral
character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.2 The
essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following
excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect:

In Re Farmer: 3

xxx xxx xxx

This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's
right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to
other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a
character. It is something more than an absence of bad character. It is the good name which the
applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It means
that he must have conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should,
or does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least
resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not
to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider for a
moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its
ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the
recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his
life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to
aid the administration of justice. . . .

xxx xxx xxx4

In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210
NW 710:

It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the
straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of
profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to
possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar
examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination to be made of the
moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument,
therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to
the moral character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil must,
if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once
been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far more
difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and
for the recalling and annulment of his license.

In Re Keenan:6

The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry
on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those
who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire
to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up
to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who
pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the standards
are allowed to remain in it.

Re Rouss:7

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and
professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to
punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like the examination into learning, is
merely a test of fitness.

Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8

Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect
the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet
what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required to
be of good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which they are, may not
bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible
consequence that both those who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who,
having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the
administration of justice.

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned,
than the possession of legal learning:

. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas.
187):

The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the law
unless he covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more
important, if anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice than legal
learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the threshold
of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are that his character will remain bad, and
that he will become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling — a curse instead of
a benefit to his community — a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a
Ruffin.9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking
admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than
inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:

Re Stepsay: 10

The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to practice
is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.

Re Wells: 11

. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar the
court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been
guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained;
that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may
receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's character as respects honesty,
integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not
establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to
the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members
of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into
the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of
such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their
courts of law and in our legal system as we know it.12

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the
required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or
inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the
unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who
inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty
to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity
involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be
beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and
mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that
moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the
participant was then possessed of good moral character.

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is
prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged
himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good
moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the
time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly,
at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration,
evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter
alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good
reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show
to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the
family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other
words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become
morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.

Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers
and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this
Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.

4. [A.M. No. 1625. February 12, 1990.]

ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, Complainant, v. ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; DISBARMENT OF SUBMISSION OF ATTORNEYS; REFERENCE TO THE

IBP OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST LAWYERS IS NOT MANDATORY; CASES MAY BE
REFERRED TO THE SOLICITOR GENERAL. — Contrary to respondent’s claim, reference to
the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court [Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988].
Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B
of the Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-B, the Supreme
Court may conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP by referring
cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of
a lower court. In such a case, the report and recommendation of the investigating official shall
be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court. The Court shall base its final action on the case on
the report and recommendation submitted by the investigating official and the evidence
presented by the parties during the investigation.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ONLY PENDING CASES, THE INVESTIGATION OF WHICH HAS NOT BEEN
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL SHALL BE TRANSFERRED
TO THE IBP. — There is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the effectivity
of Rule 139-B [June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General
had been substantially completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that only pending cases,
the investigation of which has not been substantially completed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, shall be transferred to the IBP. In this case the investigation by the Solicitor General
was terminated even before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his
motion to dismiss that the Solicitor General terminated the investigation on November 26, 1986,
the date when respondent submitted his reply memorandum [Motion to Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p.
353]

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REFERRAL OF CASE WHERE THE SOLICITOR GENERAL HAS ALREADY
MADE A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION RESULTS IN DUPLICATION OF THE
PROCEEDINGS AND DELAY. — There is no need for further investigation since the Office of
the Solicitor General already made a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the case. To
refer the case to the IBP, as prayed for by the respondent, will result not only in duplication of
the proceedings conducted by the Solicitor General but also to further delay in the disposition of
the present case which has lasted for more than thirteen (13) years.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; NO DENIAL OF, WHERE

RESPONDENT WAS GIVEN AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE. —
Respondent’s assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant the referral
of the case to the IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General
respondent was given ample opportunity to present evidence, his failure to adduce additional
evidence is entirely his own fault. There was therefore no denial of procedural due process. The
record shows that respondent appeared as witness for himself and presented no less than
eleven (11) documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed to cross-examine the
complainant who appeared as a witness against him.

5. CIVIL LAW; SALES; CAPACITY TO BUY; LAWYER IS PROHIBITED FROM ACQUIRING

HIS CLIENT’S PROPERTY OR INTEREST IN LITIGATION WHICH HE MAY TAKE PART. —
The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights" which was
signed by on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to respondent one-half (1/2) of the
properties of the Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. m., and
TCT No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907 sq. m., for and in consideration of his legal services to
the latter. At the time the document was executed, respondent knew that the abovementioned
properties were the subject of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending before the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the Fortunados in said case
[See Annex "B" of Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing the document
transferring one-half (1/2) of the subject properties to himself, respondent violated the law
expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring his client’s property or interest involved in any
litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession [Article 1491, New Civil Code].

6. LEGAL ETHICS; DISBARMENT AND SUSPENSION; PURCHASE BY A LAWYER OF

CLIENT’S PROPERTY OR INTEREST IN LITIGATION IS A BRANCH OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS AND CONSTITUTES MALPRACTICE. — This Court has held that the purchase by a
lawyer of his client’s property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional ethics and
constitutes malpractice [Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go Beltran v. Fernandez,
70 Phil. 248 (1940)].

7. ID.; ID.; TRANSGRESSION OF ANY LAW BY A LAWYER IS A REPULSIVE AND

REPREHENSIBLE ACT. — The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
process." Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to
take an oath to "obey the laws [of the Republic of the Philippines] as well as the legal orders of
the duly constituted authorities therein." And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules of Court]. All
of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. The
transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the
Court will not countenance. In the instant case, respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the Civil
Code, must be held accountable both to his client and to society.

8. ID.; ID.; NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABSENCE OF PROVISION PROHIBITING PURCHASE

OF CLIENT’S PROPERTY AND INTEREST, A DISCIPLINARY ACTION MAY BE BROUGHT
AGAINST LAWYER. — It should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil
Code are prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their existing
trust relationship with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property
and rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well
as with the client. And it cannot be claimed that the new Code of Professional Responsibility has
failed to emphasize the nature and consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him." On the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Hence, notwithstanding
the absence of a specific provision on the matter in the new Code, the Court, considering the
abovequoted provisions of the new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well as the
prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase by a lawyer of his client’s property in litigation
constitutes a breach of professional ethics for which a disciplinary action may be brought
against him.

9. ID.; ID.; A LAWYER SHOULD OBSERVE HONESTY AND FAIRNESS EVEN IN PRIVATE
DEALINGS. — Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to
complainant, at the time the land development agreement was entered into, that the land
covered by TCT No. T-1929 had already been sold at a public auction. The land development
agreement was executed on August 31, 1977 while the public auction was held on June 30,
1971. Respondent failed to live up to the rigorous standards of ethics of the law profession
which place a premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous conduct. The fact that complainant
was not a former client of respondent does not exempt respondent from his duty to inform
complainant of an important fact pertaining to the land which is subject of their negotiation.
Since he was a party to the land development agreement, respondent should have warned the
complainant of the sale of the land at a public auction so that the latter could make a proper
assessment of the viability of the project they were jointly undertaking. This Court has held that
a lawyer should observe honesty and fairness even in his private dealings and failure to do so is
a ground for disciplinary action against him [Custodio v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February
22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517].

10. ID.; ID.; A LAWYER SHOULD NEVER SEEK TO MISLEAD THE COURT BY AN ARTIFICE
OR FALSE STATEMENT OF FACT. — When respondent submitted the alleged true copy of the
addendum on May 23, 1973 as Annex "A" of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City, he knowingly misled the Court into believing that the original
addendum was signed by Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct constitutes
willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with the
truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of fact or
law [Section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional
Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of Professional Responsibility].

11. ID.; ID.; AN AGREEMENT WHEREBY AN ATTORNEY AGREES TO PAY EXPENSES OF

PROCEEDINGS IS CHAMPERTOUS. — The Court, finds that the agreement between the
respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part that: [the Fortunados] agree on the 50%
contingent fee, provided, [respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit,
including court fees . . . is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which
provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of
litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in
good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement.
The agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide for
reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an
attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client’s rights is champertous
[JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements are against public policy
especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own
expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [See Sampliner v.
Motion Pictures Patents Co., Et Al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution of these contracts
violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must
incur administrative sanctions.

12. ID.; ID.; RULE AGAINST REPRESENTATION OF CONFLICTING INTEREST;

EXCEPTION. — One of the recognized exceptions to the rule against representation of
conflicting interests is where the clients knowingly consent to the dual representation after full
disclosure of the facts by counsel [Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule
15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility].

13. ID.; ID.; FOR FAILING TO LIVE UP TO THE STANDARDS EXPECTED OF A MEMBER OF
THE BAR, LAWYER IS SUSPENDED FROM PRACTICE OF LAW. — The Court finds clearly
established in this case that on four counts the respondent violated the law and the rules
governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to assist in the administration
of justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has "miserably failed to live up to the standards
expected of a member of the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988,
163 SCRA 638, 647]. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that, considering the nature of
the offenses committed by respondent and the facts and circumstances of the case, respondent
lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Ramon A.
Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s
oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges against him, respondent filed on June 19,
1976 a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his
complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution dated June 28, 1976, the Court
granted respondent’s motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint. On July
15, 1976, complainant submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that
respondent committed the following acts:

1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor
Fortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses,
including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of the property in
litigation.

2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-15143, wherein Eusebio Lopez, Jr.
is one of the defendants and, without said case being terminated, acting as counsel for Eusebio
Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490;

3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados, which properties are the
subject of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q-15143, while the case was still pending;

4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him on August
30, 1971 for the development into a residential subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No.
Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest
thereof as attorney’s fees from the Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said property
was already sold at a public auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del
Norte and registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City;

5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified documents purporting to be
true copies of "Addendum to the Land Development Agreement dated August 30, 1971" and
submitting the same document to the Fiscal’s Office of Quezon City, in connection with the
complaint for estafa filed by respondent against complainant designated as I.S. No. 7512936;

6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who was his client;

7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without legal basis before the Court of
First Instance and the Fiscal’s Office of Quezon City;

8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal’s Office by making false
assertion of facts in his pleadings;

9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not intentionally tell a lie, he does
not tell the truth either."cralaw virtua1aw library

Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on November 18,
1976, denying the accusations against him. Complainant filed a reply to respondent’s answer on
December 29, 1976 and on March 24, 1977 respondent filed a rejoinder.chanrobles.com.ph :
virtual law library

In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. In the investigation conducted by the
Solicitor General, complainant presented himself as a witness and submitted Exhibits "A" to
"PP’, while respondent appeared both as witness and counsel and submitted Exhibits "1" to
"11." The parties were required to submit their respective memoranda.

On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming that
the long delay in the resolution of the complaint against him constitutes a violation of his
constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases. Upon order of the Court, the
Solicitor General filed a comment to the motion to dismiss on August 8, 1988, explaining that
the delay in the investigation of the case was due to the "numerous requests for postponement
of scheduled hearings filed by both parties and the motions for extension of time to file their
respective memoranda." [Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2; Record, p. 365]. Respondent
filed a reply to the Solicitor General’s comment on October 26, 1988. In a resolution dated
January 16, 1989 the Court required the Solicitor General to submit his report and
recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice.

On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the recommendation that Atty.
Ramon A. Gonzales be suspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General found that
respondent committed the following acts of misconduct:

a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the pendency of the case
where the properties were involved;

b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their land development
agreement had already been sold at a public auction prior to the execution of said agreement;
and

c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document where two signatories
who had not signed the original (or even the xerox copy) were made to appear as having fixed
their signatures [Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp.
403-404].

Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules
of Court. Respondent manifested that he intends to submit more evidence before the IBP.
Finally, on November 27, 1989, respondent filed a supplemental motion to refer this case to the
IBP, containing additional arguments to bolster his contentions in his previous pleadings.

I.

Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by Respondent. It is
respondent’s contention that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor General
was limited to the determination of whether or not there is sufficient ground to proceed with the
case and that under Rule 139 the Solicitor General still has to file an administrative complaint
against him. Respondent claims that the case should be referred to the IBP since Section 20 of
Rule 139-B provides that:

This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present Rule 139 entitled
"DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS." All cases pending investigation by the
Office of the Solicitor General shall be transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board
of Governors for investigation and disposition as provided in this Rule except those cases where
the investigation has been substantially completed.

The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to respondent’s
claim, reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court
[Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578,
October 7, 1988]. Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under the
terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-
B, the Supreme Court may conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP
by referring cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme
Court or judge of a lower court. In such a case, the report and recommendation of the
investigating official shall be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court. The Court shall base its
final action on the case on the report and recommendation submitted by the investigating official
and the evidence presented by the parties during the investigation.

Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the effectivity of Rule
139-B [June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General had been
substantially completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that only pending cases, the
investigation of which has not been substantially completed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, shall be transferred to the IBP. In this case the investigation by the Solicitor General
was terminated even before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his
motion to dismiss that the Solicitor General terminated the investigation on November 26, 1986,
the date when respondent submitted his reply memorandum [Motion to Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p.
353].

Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor General already
made a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the case. To refer the case to the IBP, as
prayed for by the respondent, will result not only in duplication of the proceedings conducted by
the Solicitor General but also to further delay in the disposition of the present case which has
lasted for more than thirteen (13) years.

Respondent’s assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant the referral
of the case to the IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General
respondent was given ample opportunity to present evidence, his failure to adduce additional
evidence is entirely his own fault. There was therefore no denial of procedural due process. The
record shows that respondent appeared as witness for himself and presented no less than
eleven (11) documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed to cross-examine the
complainant who appeared as a witness against him.

II.

The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent committed the
acts of misconduct alleged by complainant Bautista.

After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the
Solicitor General, the Court finds that respondent committed acts of misconduct which warrant
the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary power.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights" which was
signed by the Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to respondent one-half
(1/2) of the properties of the Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of 239.650
sq. m., and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907 sq. m., for and in consideration of his legal
services to the latter. At the time the document was executed, respondent knew that the
abovementioned properties were the subject of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending
before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the
Fortunados in said case [See Annex "B" of Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing
the document transferring one-half (1/2) of the subject properties to himself, respondent violated
the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring his client’s property or interest involved in
any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession [Article 1491, New Civil
Code]. This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of his client’s property or interest in
litigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice [Hernandez v.
Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248 (1940)].
However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which
states that" [t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation
which he is conducting," does not appear anymore in the new Code of Professional
Responsibility. He therefore concludes that while a purchase by a lawyer of property in litigation
is void under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, such purchase is no longer a ground for disciplinary
action under the new Code of Professional Responsibility.

This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
process" (Emphasis supplied). Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
requires every lawyer to take an oath to "obey the laws [of the Republic of the Philippines] as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein." And for any violation of this
oath, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27,
Revised Rules of Court]. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our
legal system. The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and
reprehensible act which the Court will not countenance. In the instant case, respondent, having
violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be held accountable both to his client and to
society.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are
prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their existing trust
relationship with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and
rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well as
with the client. And it cannot be claimed that the new Code of Professional Responsibility has
failed to emphasize the nature and consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "a
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him." On the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Hence, notwithstanding
the absence of a specific provision on the matter in the new Code, the Court, considering the
abovequoted provisions of the new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well as the
prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase by a lawyer of his client’s property in litigation
constitutes a breach of professional ethics for which a disciplinary action may be brought
against him.

Respondent’s next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really implemented,
because the land development agreement on which the transfer depended was later rescinded,
is untenable. Nowhere is it provided in the Transfer of Rights that the assignment of the
properties of the Fortunados to respondent was subject to the implementation of the land
development agreement. The last paragraph of the Transfer of Rights provides that:

. . . for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, Filipino,
married to Lilia Yusay, and a resident of 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila, Quezon City, rendered to
our entire satisfaction, we hereby, by these presents, do transfer and convey to the said ATTY.
RAMON A. GONZALES, his heirs, successor, and assigns, one-half (1/2) of our rights and
interests in the above-described property, together with all the improvements found therein
[Annex "D" of the Complaint, Record, p. 28; Emphasis supplied].

It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties to
respondent to be absolute and unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the land
development agreement was implemented.
Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to complainant, at the
time the land development agreement was entered into, that the land covered by TCT No. T-
1929 had already been sold at a public auction. The land development agreement was
executed on August 31, 1977 while the public auction was held on June 30, 1971.

Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his appearance for the
complainant in an anti-graft case filed by the latter against a certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon
the request of complainant and was understood to be only provisional. Respondent claims that
since complainant was not his client, he had no duty to warn complainant of the fact that the
land involved in their land development agreement had been sold at a public auction. Moreover,
the sale was duly annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent argues, serves
as constructive notice to complainant so that there was no concealment on his
part.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale was
annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent failed to inform the
complainant of the sale of the land to Samauna during the negotiations for the land
development agreement. In so doing, respondent failed to live up to the rigorous standards of
ethics of the law profession which place a premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous
conduct. The fact that complainant was not a former client of respondent does not exempt
respondent from his duty to inform complainant of an important fact pertaining to the land which
is subject of their negotiation. Since he was a party to the land development agreement,
respondent should have warned the complainant of the sale of the land at a public auction so
that the latter could make a proper assessment of the viability of the project they were jointly
undertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and fairness even in his
private dealings and failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action against him [Custodio v.
Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517].

Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified documents
purporting to be true copies of an addendum to the land development agreement.chanrobles
law library : red

Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the document
filed by respondent with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the signatories to the
addendum to the land development agreement - namely, Ramon A. Gonzales, Alfaro T.
Fortunado, Editha T. Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautista — were made to
appear as having signed the original document on December 9, 1972, as indicated by the
letters" (SGD.)" before each of their names. However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado
and complainant who signed the original and duplicate original (Exh. "2") and the two other
parties, Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado, never did. Even respondent himself admitted
that Edith and Nestor Fortunado only signed the xerox copy (Exh. "2-A") after respondent wrote
them on May 24, 1973, asking them to sign the said xerox copy attached to the letter and to
send it back to him after signing [Rejoinder to Complainant’s Reply, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329].
Moreover, respondent acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado had merely agreed by
phone to sign, but had not actually signed, the alleged true copy of the addendum as of May 23,
1973 [Respondent’s Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, p. 16]. Thus, when respondent submitted the alleged true copy of the addendum on
May 23, 1973 as Annex "A" of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City, he knowingly misled the Court into believing that the original addendum was signed by
Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of his solemn
duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never
seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule
138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01,
Code of Professional Responsibility].

Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety was
committed by respondent in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados [Report
and Recommendation, p. 8; Record, p. 394]. The Court, however, finds that the agreement
between the respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part that:

We [the Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent Ramon
Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees.

Alfaro T. Fortunado [signed]

Editha T. Fortunado [signed]

Nestor T. Fortunado [signed]

CONFORME

Ramon A. Gonzales [signed]

[Annex "A" to the Complaint, Record, p. 4].

is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may
not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04,
Code of Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the
expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between
respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of
litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of
proceedings to enforce the client’s rights is champertous [JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F.
Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this case,
the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in consideration of some
bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [See Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., Et
Al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship
between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.

The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting as counsel
for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel for the Fortunados
against the same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15143. The Court, after considering
the record, agrees with the Solicitor General’s findings on the matter. The evidence presented
by respondent shows that his acceptance of Civil Case No. Q-15490 was with the knowledge
and consent of the Fortunados. The affidavit executed by the Fortunados on June 23, 1976
clearly states that they gave their consent when respondent accepted the case of Eusebio
Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of Fortunados, dated June 23, 1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One of the recognized
exceptions to the rule against representation of conflicting interests is where the clients
knowingly consent to the dual representation after full disclosure of the facts by counsel [Canon
6, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him before the Court
of First Instance and the Fiscal’s Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose of harassing him.

The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General’s investigation of this case, Civil Case
No. Q-18060 was still pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, while the
complaints for libel (I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury (I.S. No. 5913) were already dismissed by the
City Fiscal for insufficiency of evidence and lack of interest, respectively [Report and
Recommendation, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 402-403]. The Solicitor General found no basis for
holding that the complaints for libel and perjury were used by respondent to harass complainant.
As to Civil Case No. Q-18060, considering that it was still pending resolution, the Solicitor
General made no finding on complainant’s claim that it was a mere ploy by respondent to
harass him. The determination of the validity of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-18060 was left
to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City where the case was pending resolution.

The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and accordingly holds that
there is no basis for holding that the respondent’s sole purpose in filing the aforementioned
cases was to harass complainant.

Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since the above
discussion on the other grounds sufficiently cover these remaining grounds.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary

The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent violated the
law and the rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to assist in
the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has "miserably failed to live up to
the standards expected of a member of the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892,
July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647]. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that,
considering the nature of the offenses committed by respondent and the facts and
circumstances of the case, respondent lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed serious

misconduct, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for SIX (6)
months effective from the date of his receipt of this Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution be
circulated to all courts of the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the
personal record of Atty. Gonzales.

SO ORDERED.

5. [April 7, 1922. ]

In re MARCELINO LONTOK.

Ramon Diokno for Respondent.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government.

SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEY-AT-LAW; DISBARMENT; PARDON BY GOVERNOR-GENERAL, EFFECT OF,
ON RIGHT OF COURTS TO DISBAR ATTORNEYS. — L, an attorney-at-law, was convicted of
the crime of bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude, within the meaning of section 21 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Later, L was granted a pardon by the Governor General. Held: That L
may not now be excluded from the practice of law, because of a judgment of conviction for a
crime of which he has been pardoned.

2. ID.; ID. — Where proceedings to strike an attorney’s name from the rolls are founded on, and
depend alone, on a statute making the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it
has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding
for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted.

3. ID.; ID. — Where proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on the professional
misconduct involved in a transaction which has culminated in a conviction of felony, it has been
held that while the effect of the pardon is to relieve him of the penal consequence of his act, it
does not operate as a bar to the disbarment proceeding, inasmuch as the criminal acts may
nevertheless constitute proof that the attorney does not possess a good moral character and is
not a fit or proper person to retain his license to practice law.

4. ID.; ID.; ID. — A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt
of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of
existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and
disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes
the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a
new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. There is only this limitation to its operation;
it does not restore offices forfeited, or property or interests vested in others in consequence of
the conviction and judgment. (Decision of the majority of the United States Supreme Court in Ex
parte Garlan [1866], 4 Wall., 380, accepted and followed.)

DECISION

MALCOLM, J. :

The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the removal of Marcelino Lontok from his
office of lawyer in the Philippines Islands, because of having been convicted of the crime of
bigamy. The respondent lawyer, in answer, prays that the charges be dismissed, and bases his
plea principally on a pardon issued to him by former Governor General Harrison.

Marcelino Lontok was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Zambales of the crime of
bigamy. This judgment was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court, while a further attempt to
get the case before the United States Supreme Court was unsuccessful. On February 9, 1921,
a pardon was issued by the Governor-General of the following tenor:

"By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Philippine Organic Act of August 29, 1916,
the sentence in the case of Marcelino Lontok, convicted by the Court of First Instance of
Zambales of bigamy and sentenced on February 27, 1918, to imprisonment for eight years, to
suffer the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of the proceedings, which
sentence was, on September 8, 1919, confirmed by the Supreme Court, is hereby remitted, on
condition that he shall not again be guilty of any misconduct."

The particular provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, upon which the Attorney-General relies
in asking for the disbarment of Attorney Lontok, provides that a member of lawyer by the
Supreme Court "by reason of his conviction of the crime involving moral turpitude." (Sec. 21.)
That conviction of the crime of bigamy involves moral turpitude, within the meaning of the law,
cannot be doubted. The debatable question relates to the effect of the pardon by the Governor-
General. On the one hand, it is contended by Government that while the pardon removes the
legal infamy of the crime, it cannot wash out the moral stain; on the other hand, it is contended
by the respondent that the pardon reaches and offense for which he was convicted and blots it
out so that he may not be looked upon as guilty of it.

The cases are not altogether clear as to just what effect a pardon has on the right of a court to
disbar an attorney for conviction of a felony. On close examination, however, it will be found that
the apparent conflict in the decisions is more apparent than real and arises from differences in
the nature of the charges on which the proceedings to disbar are based. Where proceedings to
strike an attorney’s name from the rolls are founded on, and depend alone, on a statute making
the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon
operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the
attorney after the pardon has been granted. (In re Emmons [1915], 29 cal. App., 121; Scott v.
State [1894], 6 Tex. Civ. App., 343.) But where proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded
on the professional misconduct involved in a transaction which has culminated in a conviction of
felony, it has been held that while the effect of the pardon is to relieve him of the penal
consequences of his act, it does not operate as a bar to the disbarment proceeding, inasmuch
as the criminal acts may nevertheless constitute proof that the attorney does not possess a
good moral character and is not a fit or proper person to retain his license to practice law.
(People v. Burton [1907], 39 Colo., 164; People v. George [1900], 186 Ill., 122; Nelson v. Com.
[1098], 128 Ky., 779; Case of In re ——— [1881], 86 N.Y., 563.)

The celebrated case of Ex parte Garland [1866], 4 Wall., 380 is directly in point. The petitioner
in this case applied for a license to practice law in the United States courts, without first taking
an oath to the effect that he had never voluntarily given aid to any government hostile to the
United States, as required by statute. The petitioner, it seems, had been a member of the
Confederate Congress, during the secession of the South, but had been pardoned by the
President of the United States. It was held, by a divided court, that to exclude the petitioner from
the practice of law for the offense named would be to enforce a punishment for the offense,
notwithstanding the pardon, which the court had no right to do; and the petition was granted. Mr.
Justice Field, delivering the opinion of the court, in part, said:

"A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender;
and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so
that in the eye of the law the of fender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense.
If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon
conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities,
and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new
credit and capacity.
"There is only this limitation to its operation; it does not restore offices forfeited, or property or
interests vested in others in consequence of the conviction and judgment."cralaw virtua1aw
library

Although much which is contained in the opinion of the four dissenting justices, in the Garland
case, appeals powerfully to the minds of the court, we feel ourselves under obligation to follow
the rule laid down by the majority decision of the higher court. We do this with the more grace
when we recall that according to article 130 of the Penal Code, one of the different ways by
which criminal liability is extinguished is by pardon. We must also remember that the motion for
disbarment is based solely on the judgment of conviction for a crime of which the respondent
has been pardoned, and that the language of the pardon is not such as to amount to a
conditional pardon similar in nature to a parole. It may be mentioned, however, in this
connection, that if Marcelino Lontok should again be guilty of any misconduct, the condition of
his pardon would be violated, and he would then become subject to disbarment.

It results, therefore, that the petition of the Attorney General cannot be granted, and that the
proceedings must be dismissed. Costs shall be taxed as provided by section 24 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. So ordered.

6. [Resolution. March 18, 1954.]

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of
1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN ET AL., petitioners.

Jose M. Aruego, M. H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton, for
Petitioners.

Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; ADMISSION; RELATION TO COURT AND PUBLIC. — By its

declared objective, Republic Act No. 972 is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094
law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession,
as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest
demands of the legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal
problems evolved by the times become more difficult.

2. ID.; ID.; A JUDICIAL FUNCTION. — In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved,
the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law in the practice of
the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility.
Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial
power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the
most solid of titles."
3. ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO REPEAL, ALTER OR SUPPLEMENT RULES. — The
Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities governing
the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the
Constitution recognizes, continue to reside in this court. Congress may repeal, alter and
supplement the rules promulgated by this court, but the authority and responsibility over the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law and their supervision
remain vested in the Supreme Court.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS AND THAT OF SUPREME COURT MAY BE
HARMONIZED. — Being coordinate and independent branches the power to promulgate and
enforce rules for the admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter
and supplement them may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the
other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each department
requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the
harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the
existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires
of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by
means of repeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and
the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient administration of
justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms
as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these
reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys-at-law is realized. They are powers which,
exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to
each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and
exacting necessities of the administration of justice.

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CLASS LEGISLATION. — Republic Act No. 972 is a class

legislation. There is no actual nor reasonable basis to classify unsuccessful bar candidates by
years nor to exclude those of other years.

6. ID.; TITLE OF LAW MUST EMBRACE ALL ITS PROVISIONS. - Article 2 of Republic Act No.
972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins. Being
inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.

7. ID.; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972, PART OF SECTION 1 DECLARED TO BE IN FORCE. —

There being no unanimity in the eight Justices who constitute the majority of the court in this
case, that part of article 1 Republic Act No. 972 which refers to the examinations of 1953 to
1955 shall continue in force.

DECISION

DIOKNO, J.:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as
Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953." Under the Rules of
Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may
be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general
average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule
127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different
bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the
examination papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates
who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this
court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to
R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than
those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate
Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to
70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill.
Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written
comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not
override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the
provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable
views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his
signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972.

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-
FIVE.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered on hundred

twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of
seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to
the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the nineteen hundred
and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four
bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations
without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to
take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided,
however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be
considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any
bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have
passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the
passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that
he may take.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to
the bar invoking its provisions, while others motions for the revision of their examination papers
were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There
are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however,
invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed
the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act
No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be
admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should
be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of
the petitioners, properly classified, affected by this decision, as well as a more detailed account
of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to
realize more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical data are set forth:

(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No.
972 total 1,168, classified as follows:

1946 (August) 206 121 18

1946 (November) 477 228 43

1947 749 340 0

1948 899 409 11

1949 1,218 532 164

1950 1,316 893 26

1951 2,068 879 1964

1952 2,738 1,033 426

1953 2,555 986 284

Total 12,230 5,421 1,168.

Of the aforesaid 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586
have filed either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere
motions for reconsideration.

(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said
Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but
failed to obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades
in different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to
reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act 972.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of
which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had
individually presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful
candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which ar still pending
because they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, - although as has been
already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades.

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972.

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal
profession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as
to its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole
question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.

We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the
members of the bar who have amply argued, orally and in writing, on the various aspects in
which the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente
J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law,
and of the U.P. Women Lawyers’ Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique
M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor,
Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from memoranda of counsel for
petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and and Antonio Enrile
Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema, themselves, has greatly helped us in
this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine and American
jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for along
time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was
assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of
prejudice or partiality.

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator
Pablo Angeles David stated:

"The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap
which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome
such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students
who took up law soon after the liberation."

Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now
it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because
they suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."

By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law
graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as
was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of
legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem
evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital
requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To
the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To
approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a
delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an
insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials.
Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the public during
those years and private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and annual
digests. The Official Gazette has been published continuously. Books and magazines published
abroad have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised
and enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine
Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition
of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.

Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable
principles, but the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case of
similar background been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any
precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived the
judicial system established where with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and
which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous juridical history
of more than half a century? From the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a
case in which the validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those against its validity
cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State v. Cannon, 240
NW, 441), the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and
which the proponent of the contested law respects.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been
promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our
power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed law.

To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been
cited to us as a favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of
Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the Supreme Court of that State, denying the
petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute
concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was
declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.

It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

"They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of them
for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the
people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any
male citizen of the age of twenty- one years, of good moral character, and who possesses the
requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the
courts of this State." (p. 93)

According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:

"Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously
rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed. The
convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been exercised,
and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon admission to practice before them.
The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and the insertion
of the provision respecting the admission of attorneys, in its particular section of the
Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the object of this prohibitory clause. There
is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any portion of
their power over this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from
the use of the word ’admission’ in the action referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of
must be by the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and that the power of granting
necessarily implies the power of refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the
applicant possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.

"These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act." (p. 93.)

Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that
the possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of
Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of
applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the law,
which we cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the country.

In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the
Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:

"The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution of
established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able professors, the
students in which department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law
committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study before being entitled to a
diploma as graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this
examination together with the preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test
of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and as rendering the latter
examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and
burdensome.

"The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and for
the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for that of
the court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be given to its
provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with the plain
and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate
an intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of
the students before granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act admits
is, that it was intended to make the college diploma competent evidence as to the legal
attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a modification
of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these statutes and with the
Constitution itself in order to determine the present condition of the law on the subject." (p. 89)

x x x

"The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission, that
has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that question."
(p. 93)

From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be
clearly seen. Please note only the following distinctions:

(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in
the bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court
its jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the
admission of any lawyer.

(3) The Constitution of New York at the time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on
the matter of admission to the practice of law.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this
attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have been
demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of
titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law,
to our judgment the proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement
of attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable.
The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether
past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are
governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it
becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the
petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.

We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been
undertaken in the case of State v. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a
legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was
discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs:

"This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the
English speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much
uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate
qualifications of attorneys at law, but in England and in every state of the Union the act of
admitting an attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of
admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute Mr.
Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of legislative
power. (p. 444)

"No greater responsibility rests upon this court than that of preserving in form and substance the
exact form of government set up by the people. (p. 444)

"Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art.
4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in
character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and
prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)

"But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve
the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and
further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
"Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and
coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty,
but each is supreme in that branch of sovereignty which properly belongs to its department.
Neither department should so act as to embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective
functions. That was the scheme and thought of the people setting upon the form of government
under which we exist. State v. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford v.
Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)

"The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state
government, under a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from embarrassment
or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot escape responsibility
for the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to the judicial department are
exercised. (p. 445)

"The relation of the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an
attaché of the courts. The quality of justice dispensed by the courts depends in no small degree
upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the
administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p. 445)

"Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at least
in the English speaking countries." (p. 445)

After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:

"Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the adoption
of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the
Revolution of 1688, had exercised the right of determining who should be admitted to the
practice of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeants at Law, 6 Bingham’s New Cases
235, ’constitutes the most solid of all titles.’ If the courts and the judicial power be regarded as
an entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law is a constituent
element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that it is
either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the judicial power
exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity cannot be denied.
Our people borrowed from England this judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign
institution, but made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the government.
They took this institution along with the power traditionally exercised to determine who should
constitute its attorneys at law. There is no express provision in the Constitution which indicates
an intent that this traditional power of the judicial department should in any manner be subject to
legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make
the three great departments of government separate and independent of one another. The idea
that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate
qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the
judicial independent of the legislative department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in
the absence of express constitutional provision. While the Legislature may legislate with respect
to the qualifications of attorneys, its power in that respect does not rest upon any power
possessed by it to deal exclusively with the subject of the qualifications of attorneys, but is
incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power to protect the public interest. When it
does legislate fixing a standard of qualifications required of attorneys at law in order that public
interests may be protected, such qualifications constitute only a minimum standard and limit the
class from which the court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not
constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in fixing additional
qualifications deemed necessary by the course for the proper administration of judicial
functions. There is no legislative power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed
by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law." (p. 450)

"Furthermore it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely true
that the Legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a
legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit
attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey (In re
Reisch, 83 N. J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their
formal license to practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the court so
admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall.
333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 52, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson v. Grattan, 48 Kan,
843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth v. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N. W. 1021, 130 Am. St.
Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.

"The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts,
it having been so generally held that the act of a court in admitting an attorney to practice is the
judgment for the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right
upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an
attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to
determine the qualifications may reside." (p. 451)

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of
the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:

"It is indispensable to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be
members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This
arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the
knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected from incompetent and
vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C. L.,
in People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 242 N. Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N. E. 487, 489, 60 A. L. R. 851:
’Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions.’ One is admitted to the bar ’for
something more than private gain.’ He becomes ’an officer of the court, and, like the court itself,
an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His cooperation with the court is due
’whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys at law
the judicial department of government would be hampered in the performance of its duties. That
has been the history of attorneys under the common law, both in this country and in England.
Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without exception conceded to be a judicial
function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action.
Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision of the court
entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the judicial department
conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of
government. It is an inherent power of such a department of government ultimately to determine
the qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to
protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not
possessing good moral character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex
parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, ’It has been well settled, by the rules and practice
of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to
become one of its officers, as an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be
removed.’" (p. 727)

In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the
legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:

"In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for
attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney’s office as follows: "They
are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing
sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has always been the general practice in this
country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court the fact of the
admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to which they, respectively, belong,
for three years preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the possession
of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel moving their admission sufficient
evidence that their private and professional character is fair. The order of admission is the
judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and
counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the
parties become officers of the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They
hold their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained
and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex
parte Hoyfron, 7 How. (Miss. 127; Fletcher v. Daingerfield, 20 Cal. 430. Their admission or their
exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and
has been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the
matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81.’Attorneys and
Counsellors,’ said that court, ’are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate
almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their appointment may, with
propriety, be intrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his duty, may very justly
considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650- 651).

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

"Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the

exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point.
Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of
the court." — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.

"Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power
of the court." — A. C. Brydonjack, v. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on
Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A. L. R. 1512.

On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.

"The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is
the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of
transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights
and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time of
the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or
change either by legislative action or by judicial decrees.
"The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other
departments of the government." — 16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.

"If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them
construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by
settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of
offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry."
— Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 192.

In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a
general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in
mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment
revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates
concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for
justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive
department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a
clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the
rules promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid
argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:

"Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish increase or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes,
and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify
the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines." — Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and
responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress
found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over
which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the
Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit
that Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on
the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar
or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law.
Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according
to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power
does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys
at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.

Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the
admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them
may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful
consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers
have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation
being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission
to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high
virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of repeal, amendment
or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has
the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice and the supervision
of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum standards
for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is
desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating
attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercised within their proper constitutional
limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in attaining the establishment
of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of
justice.

The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took the examination
and failed by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that
one who had been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law
without a previous examination. The Government appointed Guariña and he discharged the
duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This Tribunal refused to give his license without previous
examinations. The court said:

"Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks
admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the
office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes. Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted
February 28, 1907, is as follows:

"SEC. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled
’An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine
Islands,’ is hereby amended to read as follows:

"1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the
sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as members
of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any
person who, prior to the passage of this Act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the
authority of the United States, the position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of
First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine
Islands, or the position of Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General,
assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of
Manila, assistant prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant
city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for
the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippines Islands
without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to
the satisfaction of said court."

"The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to
pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907,
shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning
upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required percentage of 75. We
would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of
this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the required qualifications of
learning in the law at the time when he presented his former application for admission to the
bar, we should grant him a license to practice law in the courts of these Islands, without first
satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now
’possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability.’

"But it is contended that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled
as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination ’upon motion
before the Supreme Court’ accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds
the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the object
which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the
earlier statute, and in view of the context generally and especially of the fact that the
amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which specifically
provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination, the clause may be
licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without any examination.’ It is
contended that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the
apparent intention of the legislator, and to the candidate’s claim de jure to have the power
exercised."cralaw virtua1aw library

And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2,
16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:

"Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed to it
by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under
consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word ’may,’ as used in the above citation from Act
No. 1597, a mandatory rather than a permissive effect. But any act of the commission which has
the effect of setting at naught in whole or in part the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any
Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred upon the commission is to
that extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful limits and authority.

Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions
enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:

"In the various cases wherein applications for admission to the bar under the provisions of this
statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such appointments
had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those
cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to the
date of their appointment.

"In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not
and never had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his
appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the
required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.

"In the light of this affirmative proof of his deficiency on that occasion, we do not think that his
appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof of his possession of the
necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for
license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.

"In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of
the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since
that time he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and
presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office
that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to
retain him in the Government service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think
we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the
ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his
proficiency in a special examination which will be given him by a committee of the court upon
his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at
any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule." — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

The law in question, like those in the Case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer
from the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a
classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.

In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until
December 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began
studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma
issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an
examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies after
the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being,
among others, a class legislation. The Court said:

"This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas
from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899,
under which the application is made, is entitled ’An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An
act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors,’ approved March 28, 1894, in force
July 1, 1874.’ The amendment, as far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists in the
addition to the section of the following: ’And every applicant for a license who shall comply with
the rules of the supreme court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the time such
applicant commend the study of law, either in a law office or a law school or college, shall be
granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules’." — In
re Day et al, 54 N. Y., p. 646.

. . . "After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December
31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma
regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws of this state, whose
regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the student of at least
36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the study of law prior to
November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral character. The other
branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for two years in a law office, or
part of such time in a law office, ’and part in the aforesaid law school,’ and whose course of
study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by
the examining board in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right to
admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial
rights and privileges upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of legislative
creation for their admission to the bar." (p. 647.)

"Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited

by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to
practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the
character of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of the requisite
learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a general law, and not by
granting special and exclusive privileges to certain persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4,
section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the
holder an officer of the court, and confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to argue
causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services
and arrest on civil process while attending court. The law conferring such privileges must be
general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that purpose, may
classify persons so long as the law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable
relation to the end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable basis
for different legislation as to the different classes, and not a purely arbitrary one, having no just
relation to the subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 III. 66, 35 N. E. 62;
Ritchie v. People, 155 III. 98, 40 N. E. 454; Railroad Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.

"The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may furnish
a basis for classification (Williams v. People 121 Ill. 48, II N. E. 881); but the place where such
physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary
discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State v. Pennyeor, 65 N. E. 113, 18
Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the
profession of the law and plainly, any classification must have some reference to learning,
character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons
who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two classes
- First, those presenting diplomas issued by any law school of this state before December 31,
1899; and, second, those who studied law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of
the time in a law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the
subjects specified in the present rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems
to be no limit of time for making application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of
the rules are dispensed with, and as between the two different conditions and limits of time are
fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the
completion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be
anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the
mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those
who began the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as
well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two
years in study, while those who commenced the next day must spend three years, although
they would complete two years before the time limit. The one who commenced on the 3d. If
possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before December 31, 1899, and
without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed course must be
pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any natural
reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for
the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)

In the case of Cannon above cited, State v. Cannon, 240 N. W. 441, where the legislature
attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to
its aspect of being a class legislation:

"But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to
prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and license
those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner here
attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike and
accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of
those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. v. West Virginia,
129 U. S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: ’It is undoubtedly the right of every
citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business or profession he may choose,
subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition.
This right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican
institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All may be pursued
as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for their successful
prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the ’estate’ acquired in them - that is,
the right to continue their prosecution - is often of great value to the possessors and cannot be
arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real or personal property can be thus taken. It is
fundamental under our system of government that all similarly situated and possessing equal
qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of medicine,
requiring examinations to establish the possession on the part of the application of his proper
qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and courts have
seriously considered whether the exemption from such examinations of those practicing in the
state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law unconstitutional because of
infringement upon this general principle. State v. Thomas Call, 121 N. C. 643, 28 S. E. 517; see,
also, The State ex rel. Winkler v. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N. W. 345; State v. Whitcom,
122 Wis. 110, 99 N. W. 468.

"This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law and
to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not
material that he had once established his right to practice law and that one time he possessed
the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no manner
affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great body of the public an individual upon
whom it would confer its favors.

"A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to
admit to the practice of law without examination, all who had ’serve in the military or naval
forces of the United States during the World War and received an honorable discharge
therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress
approved June 7th, 1924, known as ’World War Veteran’s Act, 1924 and whose disability is
rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This Act was held
unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses of the constitution of
that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N. W. 179.

A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-

153 as follows:

"The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid
must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those excluded and,
furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided
the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real differences, as
distinguished from irrelevant and artificial once. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to
one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference between the situation
of that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some reason on
which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a difference between the situation
and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances of all
other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as
presents a just and natural reason for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in
their rights and privileges. A law is not general because it operates on all within a clause unless
there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not generally on
all." (12 Am Jur. pp. 151-153.)

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject,
have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5
per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5
per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75
per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature
indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for this classification? If there is none, and none
has been given, then the classification is fatally defective.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general
average indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful
candidates of those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of
unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the
exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that
this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned
may prove by some other means his right to an equal consideration.

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it
is argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972
intend to cure? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted
admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in
1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more;
in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per
cent, which was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the
Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the
passing averages during those years were all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, is it
desired to undo what had been done — cancel the license that was issued to those who did not
obtain the prescribed 75 per cent? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to
do so. Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented
is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946
to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of
judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the
effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955,
increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates
be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the
law attempts to amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the
Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have
done during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power
exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was
done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has
granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power
corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.

Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals.
The grave defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may
happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this
manner his usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar
examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case,
however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in the title of the Act. While this law
according to its title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2
establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21(1), article
VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is
inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affects the entire law.

Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the
legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second,
because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic
principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is
unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons,
to wit:

1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations
of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was
exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these
candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already
prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary
to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional
responsibility of the Supreme Court.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of
these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and
although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable
reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and after them. In attempting to do it directly
Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.

3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they
ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to
improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum
norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers
to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial
functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and
inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be
admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.

4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is
contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of
law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a
class legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is
void. .
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the
examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in
those years, shall continue in force.

RESOLUTION

Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and
impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of
the debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two
of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to take
part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribe to this decision have voted
and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:

1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946
to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without
force and effect.

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the
examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid
and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the
examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the
examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have
filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted
to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or
dates that the Chief Justice may set. So ordered. .

The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972

As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general
average in the bar examination of August and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per
cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising
to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the introduction in 1951,
in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12,
14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to the
practice of the profession. The amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those
referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately concern us. The proposed amendment is as follows:

"SEC. 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects shall
be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and Mortgages,
5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law, 10 per cent;
International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises,
5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful candidates shall
not be required to take another examination in any subject in which they have obtained a rating
of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into account in determining their general
average in any subsequent examinations: Provided, however, That if the candidate fails to get a
general average of 70 per cent in his third examination, he shall lose the benefit of having
already passed some subjects and shall be required to the examination in all the subjects.

"SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — Any applicant who has obtained a
general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any
examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be entitled
to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the
corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).

With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:

"It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled to
repeat even those subjects which they have previously passed. This is not the case in any other
government examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been amended in this measure to
give a candidate due credit for any subject which he has previously passed with a rating of 75
per cent or higher."cralaw virtua1aw library

Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested
the comments of this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed by seven
Justices while three chose to refrain from making any and one took no part. With regards to the
matter that interests us, the Court said:

"The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that if
a bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the
examination, he need not be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort of
passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a time. The
trouble with this proposed system is that although it makes it easier and more convenient for the
candidate because he may in an examination prepare himself on only one or two subjects so as
to insure passing them, by the time that he has passed the last required subject, which may be
several years away from the time that he reviewed and passed the first subjects, he shall have
forgotten the principles and theories contained in those subjects and remembers only those of
the one or two subjects that he had last reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because
there is nothing in the law which requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations
every year in succession. The only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must
pass the examination in no more than three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time
or number of years intervening between each examination taken. This would defeat the object
and the requirements of the law and the Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When
a person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the
knowledge and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law subjects required in bar
examinations, so as presently to be able to practice the legal profession and adequately render
the legal service required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the candidates
who may have obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago, another three
subjects one year later, and the last two subjects the present year. We believe that the present
system of requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average with no grade in any
subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one to be all around,
and prepared in all required legal subjects at the time of admission to the practice of law.

x x x.
"We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment provides
that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without
failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946,
shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office. In other words, Bar
candidates who obtained not less than 70 per cent in any examination since the year 1946
without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their non-admission to the Bar by the
Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a passing general average in any of those years,
will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only prospective but retroactive in its effects.

"We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not
exactly in favor of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to
govern even in the future. As to the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have
serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that after every bar examinations, the
Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who
have obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting and denying the petitions for
reconsideration of those who have failed. The present amendment would have the effect of
repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court’s resolution denying and rejecting the
petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more but less than the
general passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this question involves legal
implications, and this phase of the amendment if finally enacted into law might have to go thru a
legal test. As one member of the Court remarked during the discussion, when a court renders a
decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the basis of and in accordance with a certain law
or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even repeal of said law or rule may not
affect the final decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, in the sense of revoking or
rendering it void and of no effect.

"Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are officers
of the courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the Bar, the
Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be its officer.
Conversely, when it refused and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who in any year
since 1946 may have obtained a general average of 70 per cent but less than that required for
that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly considered and declared
that he was not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be its officer. The present
amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general average runs counter to
all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and in effect says that a
candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its officer because he was
unprepared, undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of all, must be admitted and
allowed by this Court to serve as its officer. We repeat, that this is another important aspect of
the question to be carefully and seriously considered."cralaw virtua1aw library

The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:

"I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of the
legal profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by admitting to
practice precisely a special class who have failed in the bar examination. Moreover, the bill
contains provisions to which I find serious fundamental objections.

"Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all
subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th
day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This
provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one group of persons,
namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.

"The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court
made in accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar
examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the
Bar those who have obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and denying the
petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The provision under consideration would
have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court’s resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of
those who may have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for that year. Said provision also
sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally obliged to grant a similar
privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to other professions such
as medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy."cralaw virtua1aw library

Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed
by 2/3 vote of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill
No. 371 was presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND
INCLUDING 1953

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

Section 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any bar
candidate who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations after July 4,
1946 up to the August 1951 bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per
cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1964 bar examinations; 74 per cent in
1955 bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject,
shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the
Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing general average shall be restored
in all succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact
one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole
number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July 4, 1946 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and
such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said
candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.

With the following explanatory note:

"This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another
opportunity to those who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to
1951 when those who would otherwise have passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily not
so considered by altering its previous decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme Court has
been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the apparent
arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parties concerned, it is proposed
in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages for passing the bar examinations as
follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar examination, 71 per cent;
for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar
examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be restored with the condition that
the candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade of below 50 per cent. The reason for
relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the tremendous handicap which students
during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the
insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up
law soon after the liberation. It is believed that by 1956 the preparation of our students as well
as the available reading materials will be under normal conditions, if not improved from those
years preceding the last world war.

In this bill we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the
supervision as well as the administration of the study of law which was objected to by the
President in the Bar Bill of 1951.

"The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill would
admit to the practice of law ’a special class who failed in the bar examination’. He considered
the bill a class legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good conscience, correct because
Congress is merely supplementing what the Supreme Court have already established as
precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing mark of those who took the Bar
examination in 1947. These bar candidates for whom this bill should be enacted, considered
themselves as having passed the bar examination on the strength of the established precedent
of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable difficulties and handicaps
which they were unavoidably placed. We believe that such precedent cannot or could not have
been altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without giving due consideration to the
rights already accrued or vested in the bar candidates who took the examination when the
precedent was not yet altered, or in effect, was still enforced and without being inconsistent with
the principles of their previous resolutions.

"If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective statute
which Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a ’valid classification’ as against
class legislation, is very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence:

"‘A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess a
common disability, attribute, or classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial
differentiation between those included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a class
is accepted by the Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and then have the dissevered
factions of the original unit designated with different rules established for each.’" (Fountain Park
Co. v. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).

"Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions which
must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a class. If
so, the correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only a few. If so,
the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The constitution does not prohibit
special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there are special evils with which the
general laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will sustain the special form.
*** The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide margin of discretion
conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be revision by the court.
(In Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 71 L. Ed. 1015, 63 Sup. Ct.
431). (1932).
"This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroact to the extent of the
care or correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated from
the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.

"For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.

(Sgd.) "PABLO ANGELES DAVID

"Senator"

Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The
President again asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:

Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the
information that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking the
same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951, contained
in the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant Executive
Secretary.

(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS.

The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing
it, by virtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered
972 (many times erroneously cited as No. 974).

It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President and
the author of the Bill were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the polls.

Separate Opinions

LABRADOR J., concurring and dissenting:

The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this
Court, because lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to
determine admission thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The
power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in its exercise. This power should
be distinguished from the power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this
power (to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in the Constitution to the
Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the
holding of examination, the qualifications of applicants, the passing grades, etc, are within the
scope of the legislative power. But the power to determine when a candidate has made or has
not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely with this Court.

I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the
scope of the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who
obtain a general average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955
should be considered as having passed the examination, is to mean exercise of the privilege
and discretion judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different
years with grades lower than the passing mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is an
arrogation of the Court’s judicial authority and discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as
discriminatory. Why should those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to
have the privilege of a lower passing grade, while those taking earlier or later are not?

I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the
rule-making power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court
to admit members thereof, and because it is discriminatory.

PARAS, C.J., concurring and dissenting:

Under section 14 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to
have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per
cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." This passing mark has
always been adhered to, with certain exception presently to be specified.

With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful
candidates included only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon
motion for reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73
per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In the examinations of
November, 1946 the list first released containing the names of successful candidates covered
only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion for
reconsideration, 19 candidates with a general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent
by resolution of March 31, 1947. This would indicate that in the original list of successful
candidates those having a general average of 73 per cent or more but below 75 per cent were
included. After the original list of 1947 successful bar candidates had been released, and on
motion for reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of 69 per cent were allowed to
pass by resolution of July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948,
in addition to the original list of successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a general
average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of
whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28,
1949. Thus, for the year 1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing average, and
for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and this amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an
amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.

Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose general averages
mostly ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration, invoking the precedents
set by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were uniformly denied.

In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors,
practicing attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued
lengthily pro or con, approved a bill providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing
general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held after
July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the President mainly in view of an unfavorable comment of
Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress
passed another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by the President, with the important
difference that in the later bill the provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the supervision and
regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation and
Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication of names of the bar examiners before the
holding of the examinations, and (4) the equal division among the examiners of all the
admission fees paid by bar applicants, were eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become
a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the President by merely not signing it within the required period;
and in doing so the President gave due respect to the will of the Congress which, speaking for
the people, chose to repass the bill first vetoed by him.

Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per cent
in any examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar
examinations; 72 per cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations;
and 74 per cent in the 1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in
any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act also provides that any bar candidate who
obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any examination after July 4, 1946, shall be
deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included
in computing the passing in any subsequent examinations.

Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of Republic
Act No. 972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this Court mass or
separate petitions, praying that they be admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of
said Act, upon the allegation that they have obtained the general averages prescribed therein.
In virtue of the resolution of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said
petitions, and members of the bar, especially authorized representatives of bar associations,
were invited to argue or submit memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for said hearing
being that some doubt had "been expressed on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in
so far as it affects past bar examinations and the matter" involved "a new question of public
interest."cralaw virtua1aw library

All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the
practice of law is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the
Constitution which in Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:

"The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law Said rules shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive right. The
existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes and are
declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines."cralaw virtua1aw library

Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter or
supplement said rules. Little intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme
Court and the Congress to regulate the admission to the practice of law is concurrent.

The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar
examinations held prior to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final
resolutions of the Supreme Court refusing to admit to the practice of law the various petitioners,
thereby resulting in a legislative encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion this view
is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the
finality of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain periods
after which they become executory and unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on
motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in any given year, are subject to revision by this
Court at any time, regardless of the period within which the motions were filed, and this has
been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar examinations and admission to the
practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function only because said matters happen to be
entrusted, under the Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no
judicial function involved, in the strict and constitutions sense of the word, because bar
examinations and the admission to the practice of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect
opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other examining boards. In the second
place, retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only when they would be
ex post facto, would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny due process
and equal protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto
enactment, does not impair any obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one
the right to due process and equal protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative
statute intended to correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by this Court of
different passing general averages in certain years.

Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 1, 1946, are being discriminated against,
because we no longer have any record of those who might have failed before the war, apart
from the circumstance that 75 per cent had always been the passing mark during said period. It
may also be that there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as those benefited by
Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter of classification, the reasonableness must be
determined by the legislative body. It is proper to recall that the Congress held public hearings,
and we can fairly suppose that the classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative
judgment derived from the facts and circumstances then brought out.

As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the
Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is one
expressly sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited
by the Constitution is essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants that have already been
vested or acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the empty purpose of creating
appearances of separation and equality among the three branches of the Government. Republic
Act No. 972 has not produced a case involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor of
one and against the other. Needless to say, the statute will not affect the previous resolutions
passing bar candidates who had obtained the general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule
127. A law would be objectionable and unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that
those who have been admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80
per cent, will not be allowed to practice law, because said statute would then destroy a right
already acquired under previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar admission of those
whose general averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.

Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power
conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by
reducing the passing average to 70 per cent, effective several years before the date of the
resolution. Indeed, when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all candidates who
obtained a general average of 69 per cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a
general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of whether they filed petitions for
reconsideration, it in effect amended section 14 of Rule 127 retroactively, because during the
examinations held in August 1947 and August 1948, said section (fixing the general average at
75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. It stands to reason, if we are to admit that the
Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the admission to the
practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general
average.
Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious, since this Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947
bar examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire
into the wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of the
legislators. This Court in many instances had doubted the propriety of legislative enactments,
and yet it has consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on that ground.

To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against
public interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the
general public was not considered by the Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public
hearings, and we are bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the members of this
Court, to their oath of office, had taken all the circumstances into account before passing the
Act. On the question of public interest I may observe that the Congress, representing the people
who elected them, should be more qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept
Republic Act No. 97" as an expression of the will of the people through their duly elected
representatives.

I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its
concurrent power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to
the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court
may not do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to a democracy, where we can and
should only hope that the right men are put in the right places in our Government.

Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given
effect in its entirety.

7. A.C. No. 5170 November 17, 1999

(FORMERLY A.C. CBD-445)

LILIA FERRER TUCAY, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MANUEL R. TUCAY, respondent.

PER CURIAM:.

Complainant Lilia F. Tucay, feeling deeply aggrieved by the immoral conduct of her husband
Atty. Manuel Tucay, seeks the latter's disbarment in the instant administrative proceedings.

Complainant and respondent have long been married, the two taking their vows years back on
14 July 1963 at the St. Ignatius church, Camp Murphy, in Quezon City. For thirty years, the
couple have lived together with their children.

Just a few days before their thirtieth anniversary or on 07 July 1993 to be exact, with the first
marriage still subsisting, respondent lawyer contracted another marriage with one Myrna C.
Tuplano, herself married since 1983 to a certain Florante T. Tabilog. Respondent left the
conjugal dwelling in July 1993 to cohabit with Myrna Tuplano.

Complainant also caused the filing of bigamy charge against respondent lawyer and his second
wife, docketed Criminal Case No. Q-94-54709, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, of
Quezon City, which case still pends. In an attempt to defeat the early prosecution of the criminal
case, respondent filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking the
judicial declaration of nullity of the second marriage. The petition was later dismissed due to
lack of interest; subsequently, however, respondent filed a second petition for the same
purpose, this time with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. In both petitions, he averred that
neither he nor the other supposed party to the second marriage was physically present on the
date of its alleged celebration thereby rendering void any such marriage, if at all, under the
provisions of Article 3, paragraph 3, and Article 6 of the Family Code.

The IBP-CBD, through Commissioner Jaime V. Vibar, gave neither credence nor validity to the
explanation of respondent and recommended to the IBP Board of Governors the disbarment of
Atty. Tucay for gross misconduct and failure to maintain the highest degree of morality expected
and required of every member of the Bar. On 13 December 1997, the IBP Board of Governors
passed Resolution No. XIII-97-164 which "RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE" the report
and recommendation of the investigating Commissioner after being satisfied that the latter's
findings were amply supported by the evidence on record.

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not respondent did contract a
bigamous marriage, a matter which apparently is still pending with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City. It is enough that the records of this administrative case sufficiently substantiate the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that
indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral
conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the
treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him.

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his
duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming of an attorney. The grounds enumerated in
Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, including deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
the practice of law, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so, are
not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically any kind of
impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional career or in his private life. A
lawyer at no time must be wanting in probity and moral fiber which not only are conditions
precedent to his entrance to, but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership
in, a great and noble profession.

The Court concurs with the IBP-CBD and the IBP Board of Governors in their findings and thus
accepts their recommendation that respondent lawyer, having ceased to meet and possess the
qualifications required of every lawyer, must forthwith be disbarred.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to disbar respondent Atty. Manuel Tucay immediately upon
his receipt of this Resolution. Let a copy hereof be made a part of the records of said
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and copies to
be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

8. A.C. No. 6792 January 25, 2006

ROBERTO SORIANO, Complainant,

vs.
Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit1 for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto
Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral
turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;2 and constitutes sufficient ground for his
disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.3

Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a
Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing
had been scheduled for June 11, 2004.4 After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was
submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint and its attachments.5 Accordingly, the CBD
directed him to file his Position Paper, which he did on July 27, 2004.6 Afterwards, the case was
deemed submitted for resolution.

On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and

Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.

In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated
homicide,7 which involved moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment.

The facts leading to respondent’s conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise:

"x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after
gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a
taxi driver overtook the car driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had
overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community
who was under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter
stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car,
berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced
open his door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused
had been drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly,
the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up
immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the
chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi
driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the
accused until he could be pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his car and
got his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was
on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground.
He picked them up intending to return them to the accused. But as he was handing the same to
the accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him
hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and
sped off. The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of
the taxi driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano."8

It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and brought
the latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of
his neck,9 complainant would have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely
medical assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano
sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled
him for his job as a taxi driver.

The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002,
respondent filed an application for probation, which was granted by the court on several
conditions. These included satisfaction of "the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of
the offended party, Roberto Soriano."10

According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply with
this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of Appeals.11

In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that respondent be

disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but that
the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following facts:

"1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;

"2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter, driving a
taxi, had overtaken him;

"3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went back to
his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was
unarmed;

"4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;

"5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that he had
shot Complainant;

"6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one mauled
by Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
"7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his
civil liabilities to Complainant."12

On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution adopting the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and
adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to
have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good
moral character.13 In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands
convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already been
established and is no longer open to question, the only issues that remain to be determined are
as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether
his guilt warrants disbarment.

Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or
good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals."14

The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been discussed in
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,15 a labor case concerning an employee
who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering the particular
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court rejected the employer’s
contention and held that homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime
would have been violative of the IRRI’s Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for
dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the
employer made a pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to
determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to
the courts, as explained thus:

"x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime.
Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and
intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude
may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. x x
x."16 (Emphasis supplied)

In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court
appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating
circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are
quoted as follows:

"x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating and had his
back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly
rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack
but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from
the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on
Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's
intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of
the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of
any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not
inherently vile, immoral or unjust."17

The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly
evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.

Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter
least expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact
that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were
reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyer’s assault.

We also consider the trial court’s finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed
morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself.
In fact, under the impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was
merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make
matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave
fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime.

The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct,
respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted
like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his
inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of
the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an
undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued
complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the
obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.

It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm18 and his
unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.19 He has thus brazenly violated the law and
disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both in his attorney’s oath20 and
in the Code of Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to "obey the laws of the land."

All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic sense of
justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his sentence and
granted him probation. And yet, it has been four years21 since he was ordered to settle his civil
liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that
obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a
simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity, good health, and youthful
vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that could never
even fully restore what the latter has lost.

Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the profession
of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character.22 Where their misconduct outside of their
professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of
the privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court may be justified in
suspending or removing them from that office.23
We also adopt the IBP’s finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral character,
which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.24

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As
found by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Fariñas, an out-of-
court settlement with complainant’s family.25 But when this effort failed, respondent concocted
a complete lie by making it appear that it was complainant’s family that had sought a conference
with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon.26

The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of
having been mauled by complainant and two other persons.27 The trial court had this to say:

"The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty.
Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people including the complainant helped each
other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if
not downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating him to death
could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainant’s version of the
incident particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x."28

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important
than truthfulness.29 The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and
condemns duplicitous behavior.30 Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be
misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.

The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal profession.
They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. "Law is a noble profession,
and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent
intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the
law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their
dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach."31

The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic
moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate.

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by

requiring that those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable --
lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.32 Thus, whenever a clear case of
degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid
our profession of odious members.

We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that
disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end
desired. In the instant case, however, the Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent.
His actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society and his profession. We
are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration
for the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of
good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing
requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.

In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances – not
the mere fact of their conviction – would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal
profession. In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty
of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is

ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his
record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.

SO ORDERED.

9. [G.R. No. L-19450. May 27, 1965.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA,

Defendant-Appellant.

Magno T. Bueser, for Defendant-Appellant.

Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW EMPLOYED IN THE GOVERNMENT; PROHIBITION TO ENGAGE

IN PRIVATE PRACTICE; MEANING. — Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary actions a succession of acts of the same kind. The practice of
law by attorneys employed in the government, to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not
conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The word private
practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

2. ID.; ID.; ASSISTANT CITY ATTORNEY HANDLING CASE FOR RELATIVE WITH
PERMISSION OF SUPERIOR NOT IN PROHIBITED PRIVATE PRACTICE. — The isolated
appearance as a private prosecutor, previously authorized by his superior, of an assistant city
attorney in a criminal case for malicious mischief before a justice of the peace court where the
offended party is his relative, does not violate Section 32, Rule 127, now Sec. 35, Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.
DECISION

PAREDES, J.:

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva
with the crime of Malicious Mischief, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality.
Said accused was represented by counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte.
The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo
City, having entered his appearance as private-prosecutor, after securing the permission of the
Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would
appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he
would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private
prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, Et Al.,
v. Blanco, Et Al., 79 Phil. 647 wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to
the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of
law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in
entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling.
On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City
Attorney Fule.

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal
Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 127,
now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel
claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by
upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually engaged
in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon.
Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of
which read:

"The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended
party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a
legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.

"Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice
of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was
being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant
City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of
crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal
cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the
City Attorney of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City
Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal
case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a
right to be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was
impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.
"In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear
before the Justice of the Peace Court in Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal
case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.

"WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos,
Laguna, allowing the appearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without
costs."cralaw virtua1aw library

The above decision is the subject of the instant proceedings.

The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.

Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and
which We consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused
interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides
that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor
General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to
clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was
engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did
not constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is
more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession
of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p.
1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services (State v. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The
appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in
the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:

"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services."cralaw virtua1aw library

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by
his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar,
who is a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is
hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against Appellant.