Editor’s Introduction
This 2019 edition of The Military Balance is published 60
years after it first appeared as an 11-page pamphlet in late
1959. The international security environment is again as
uncertain today as it was then. Great-power competition still
dominates contemporary Western policy discussions, but
now it is not only Moscow’s actions that generate attention.
China perhaps represents even more of a challenge, as
it introduces yet more advanced military systems and
is engaged in a strategy to improve its forces’ ability to
operate at distance from the homeland. At the same time,
while Western armed forces – particularly after Russia
seized Crimea in 2014 – are refocusing on more traditional
security challenges, though characterised by disruptive new
elements, they are having to do this alongside, not instead
of, the range of post-9/11 tasks.
The threat from terrorists persists, as does the impact of
conflict and instability in Africa. And while the war in the
Middle East against the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or
ISIL, might have succeeded in eradicating its territorial base,
ISIS could revert to insurgent tactics. Meanwhile, the civil war
in Syria grinds on, with the regime in the ascendant. Tentative
diplomatic progress at the end of 2018 raised hopes that the
effects of the conflict in Yemen might be alleviated, if not an
immediate end brought to the war. In Asia, the unexpected
North Korean moratorium on missile testing led to renewed
diplomatic contact on the peninsula, and between Pyongyang
and Washington. However, although summits continued,
there remained no progress on the issue of North Korea’s
denuclearisation. In Europe, NATO’s eastern members worry
about Russia, while simmering conflict continues in eastern
Ukraine. In late 2018, Russia began flexing its muscles once
more, this time in the Sea of Azov.
Defence spending
In early April 2019, NATO foreign ministers are due to
convene to mark the Alliance’s 70th anniversary, just days
after the United Kingdom’s scheduled departure from the
European Union. They will celebrate the Alliance’s accom-
plishments, though likely be aware that while external actors
may be bent on undermining Euro-Atlantic cohesion, uncer-
tainty also comes from within.
US President Donald Trump returned to a familiar theme
at the July 2018 NATO summit. The US, he said, ‘might do
its own thing’ unless European allies started spending more
on defence. Although defence spending in NATO’s European
members grew by 4.2% in 2018, it is likely that Trump will, at
the Alliance’s anniversary gathering, again press Europe to
spend more. In mid-2018 he said that European states should
increase defence spending to 2% of GDP ‘immediately’. As
of late 2018, doing this would mean that NATO European
states would have to find an extra US$102 billion, on top of
the amount they currently spend.
Global defence spending in 2018 amounted to over
US$1.67 trillion. This was an increase of more than US$80bn
over the previous year and reflected higher spending in
Western states, notably the United States. Indeed, the US
has driven the global rise in spending, with a 5% real-terms
budget increase between 2017 and 2018; in 2018, the US
accounted for 45% of the global increase in defence spending,
in constant 2010 dollars.
China sets the pace
China’s military modernisation has been striking for the speed
of development and breadth of its ambition to modernise the
People’s Liberation Army by 2035 and create ‘world-class
forces’ by 2049. This ambition is supported by defence spending
that has been on a relentlessly upward trajectory. Between 1998
and 2018, China’s official defence budget grew, on average,
annually by 10% in real terms. Between 2017 and 2018, there
was a slight deceleration caused by slower economic growth,
but the defence budget still grew year-on-year by nearly 6%.
Naval shipbuilding is focusing more than before on large,
high-capability surface combatants. Indeed, Chinese naval
capability is entering a new phase, designed to facilitate
long-distance operations and heighten operational tempo.
The simultaneous launch of two Type-055 cruisers in June
2018 meant that four had been launched in just over a year,
and at least four more are under construction. China’s first
indigenous aircraft carrier began sea trials in 2018, as did the
first Type-055. The carrier is based on the Liaoning, formerly a
Soviet vessel: China’s next carrier looks set to be its first truly
domestic design, with improved capability to undertake
more conventional carrier operations.
China’s air force, meanwhile, continues to improve its
capacity for tactical air combat. Testing of the Chengdu J-20
heavy fighter continued in 2018 and entry into front-line
service seems closer. It appears that the PL-15 extended range
active-radar-guided air-to-air missile (AAM) has started
entering service. Likely fitted with an active electronically
scanned array seeker, it marks a considerable improvement
in the air force’s AAM inventory. Furthermore, China’s long-
rumoured next-generation bomber moved closer to public
recognition, when the H-20 designation was mentioned in
state-controlled media in 2018.
China is making these moves during a time Beijing terms
a ‘strategic opportunity’. It has decided that any risk involved
in implementing these changes is worth bearing now, because
the danger of major conflict with a large power is relatively
low. As a result, Beijing hopes that when this period of stra-
tegic opportunity ends, its armed forces will be able to match
or even outmatch those of peer competitors. For the moment,
though, China’s military power remains latent and there are
still areas of weakness, such as in anti-submarine warfare and
amphibious operations. However, China continues to take
6 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
strides towards addressing these deficiencies and is engaged
on an improved training and exercise regime enabling it to
test operational capability, as well as assess progress towards
its modernisation goals.
Russia matters
Russia too remains a focus of Western security concern, not
only because of its own military-modernisation programme
but also because of its use of military power in seizing Crimea;
its continued and sometimes provocative military behaviour
in the Euro-Atlantic area; and continuing support for the
Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad. New airborne-
forces formations were activated in Crimea, a key air base was
modernised and S-400 (SA-21 Growler) air-defence system
replaced the previous S-300 (SA-10 Grumble/SA-20 Gargoyle)
on the peninsula. The S-400 system has increased Moscow’s
potential reach in the Black Sea region.
There has been renewed interest from Moscow in nuclear-
and dual-capable weapons systems. The Avangard hyper-
sonic glide vehicle reportedly entered series production in
2018, while Russia also revealed the Burevestnik (SSC-X-9
Skyfall) nuclear-powered cruise missile. So far, two batches of
the SSC-X-9 have been manufactured and tested, with only
limited results. More successfully, and less publicly, Moscow
is assessed to have continued to deploy the 9M729 (SSC-8
Screwdriver) ground-launched cruise missile. The SSC-8 is
the cruise missile that, Washington said, led it at the end of
2018 to initiate the 60-day formal withdrawal process from
the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. But
economic challenges mean that Russia’s defence acquisitions
have slowed in recent years. In contrast, because of more
consistent increases in its defence spending, China does not
face the same restrictions.
Ways of war
Advanced military systems and technical knowledge
continue to spread. Some of these systems, such as hyper-
sonic weapons, might hold at risk distant targets previously
deemed safe; they might also compress the decision space
for the defending force. Armed forces are looking to develop
capabilities in other areas like cyber, space, robotics, directed
energy and quantum technologies. China, for instance, has a
national plan to develop artificial intelligence technology and
is accelerating moves to improve civil–military integration.
Western states are reassessing previously held assump-
tions of advantage; for instance, that access to the global
commons and freedom to operate in the electromagnetic
spectrum are uncontested. They still retain an edge over
adversaries, but the gap is narrowing. The pace of change
may mean that in future, advantages – if they exist at all –
may be held only fleetingly, before the other side catches up.
Western states can try to stay ahead by investing signifi-
cantly in research and development and by boosting ties with
the commercial high-technology sector. But in the West this
is not always a smooth process. Faster acquisitions processes
and improved coordination between armed services over
military procurements might improve the speed with which
systems are fielded. Innovation could be improved so that the
urgency of operational innovation is maintained in peace-
time, and that risk-taking in innovation is encouraged. In
addition, more highly qualified people need to be recruited
and retained by armed forces, which also need more flexible
career structures.
Another approach is to accept this situation: not just
that contestation is normal but that there is an increasingly
level playing field. Western states could look to adapt plans
and capabilities to this reality. One way would be to create
‘moments of advantage’, where rapidly focused military
power across all domains could create operational overmatch
even in an environment that is routinely contested. This idea
is associated in the US with the multi-domain-battle concept.
Whatever strategies may be pursued, armed forces need
also to plan on the assumption that their networks will be
targeted by adversaries and that jamming and, more insidi-
ously, spoofing, may become routine. They also need to
become used to operating in a consistently contested informa-
tion environment. Indeed, this may be more apparent as inno-
vative adversaries seek to achieve strategic effect by operating
below the threshold of war; attacks may happen as much in
peacetime as in war. More resilient weapons and networks
may help, enabling troops to fight in a degraded electromag-
netic environment, but so too will better training and ensuring
that the lessons of recent wars are not lost: the next fight might
be at range and over the horizon, but it might also be urban.
Russia is a worry for Washington, but perhaps not so
much in the long term. For the US, the ‘pacing threat’ in the
2025–30 time frame remains China. Signs of Washington’s
concern were again evident in 2018. US Air Force chiefs began
publicly advocating that squadron numbers increase to 386
by 2025–30; this came just a couple of years after US Navy
leaders advocated that the fleet increase to 355 ships. One
reason for this is that, in the Asia-Pacific, the US is aware it
faces the ‘tyranny of distance’.
It is clear that China’s military modernisation is leading
others to reassess their own plans. Some states in the Asia-
Pacific, such as Australia and Japan, are reshaping their
procurements to include more advanced weapons systems,
including next-generation combat aircraft, advanced air-
defence weapons and better submarines. China fields – and is
developing – a range of weapons that would complicate the
planning of armed forces trying to enter the South China Sea,
particularly under combat conditions. While China may have
halted its land-reclamation and island-building programme
in the South China Sea, it has instead concentrated on
building up facilities and weapons on features there, implic-
itly exerting pressure on both its near neighbours and other
regional states looking to exercise freedom of navigation.
China’s modernising armed forces are being seen more
often in more places. But while they may be engaged on a
wider range of missions, they are still developing and remain
operationally untested. China may have arrived strategically,
but it has yet to arrive militarily. However, the progress it is
making towards fielding better-equipped and -trained armed
forces means that day continues to grow closer.
Domain trends
Defence economics
„„ Global defence spending picked up by 1.8% in real terms
between 2017 and 2018. The rise in 2018 was driven by the
United States, which increased its defence budget by 5% in
real terms between 2017 and 2018. The US thereby accounted
for 45% of global defence-spending increases in 2018.
„„ As a result of this increase, global military expenditure has
bounced back from its low point in 2014, when lower energy
prices led oil and gas exporters in particular to curb their
defence outlays.
„„ There is still a serious lack of transparency over military expen-
ditures in the Middle East and North Africa. There is no assess-
ment available for conflict-afflicted countries (Libya, Syria,
Yemen) or particularly opaque states (Qatar, UAE), while data
is unreliable for other countries in the region (Bahrain, Oman,
Saudi Arabia) because of lack of detailed publicly released
information and likely off-budget funding.
Land
„„ Armoured fighting vehicle inventories are being modernised
rather than simply replaced. The high cost of producing new
designs, in light of the quantities required, has resulted in
many new vehicle programmes being delayed or cancelled.
This has led many countries to instead upgrade and extend
the life of existing platforms rather than replacing them.
„„ Armoured utility vehicles, cheaper and less complex than tra-
ditional land platforms, are continuing to prove popular with
armies engaged in operations against asymmetric adversaries
and with nascent armoured-vehicle manufacturers, as they
offer a cheaper entry point into the market.
„„ The proliferation of surface-to-surface conventional ballis-
tic- and cruise-missile capabilities continues, albeit slowly, as
states see them as usefully cost-effective ways to hold at risk
the military and civilian targets of stronger potential adver-
Maritime
„„ There is an increasing emphasis on blue-water capabilities.
Power-projection capabilities, such as amphibious and land-
attack capabilities, remain in demand and will continue to
spread, but there is a renewed focus on the ability to engage
at sea as well as from the sea. In turn, the growing complexity
of the maritime domain is leading to a general rise in capa-
bility requirements for naval vessels, particularly for principal
surface combatants like frigates, but also for smaller surface
combatants and patrol vessels.
„„ Navies, particularly long-established forces, are emphasis-
ing the need to boost ship numbers, following years of fleet
„„ According to available data, Middle Eastern states continued
to dedicate the largest share of GDP to defence and security by
a wide margin. Among the world’s top ten defence spenders
by share of GDP, eight were from the Middle East (Algeria, Iran,
Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia), ranging
from more than 4% to 11% of GDP. This reflects security
concerns in a conflict-torn region but also over-prioritisation
of defence compared to other policy sectors. The rest of the
top-ten list comprises other states facing security challenges
– Afghanistan and Mali.
„„ Defence-related revenue for eight out of the ten defence-
focused Chinese state-owned enterprises indicates that,
in 2016, seven of these were in the top 20 of the world’s
largest defence firms. Three of these – China South Industries
Group Corporation (CSGC), Aviation Industry Corporation of
China (AVIC) and China North Industries Group Corporation
(NORINCO) – appeared in the top ten.
saries. In turn, this trend is helping to drive rising interest in
missile-defence systems.
„„ Development work continues on advanced unmanned
ground vehicles. However, initial military interest seems more
directed towards unmanned or optionally manned logistics
and support vehicles, rather than in the development of
combat platforms.
„„ The renewed possibility of high-intensity conflict with peer
competitors continues to preoccupy Western armies, though
the operations on which they are currently engaged largely
consist of training, logistics and fires support to local actors. At
the same time, they are increasingly aware that the growing
trend of urbanisation may make future combat increasingly
challenging. Adequately addressing this will require more
investment in bespoke, including urban, training facilities.
reductions. This is driven by a more complex and competitive
maritime domain and is leading states to examine ways not
just of increasing new procurements but also sustaining exist-
ing capabilities in service for longer.
„„ The proliferation of submarine capabilities is driving a new or
renewed focus on anti-submarine capabilities. This is shifting
the emphasis not only of procurements but also of training
and deployments compared to recent experience.
„„ The proliferation and renewal of conventional offensive capa-
bilities continues, particularly of anti-ship missiles. This will
drive requirements for new means of distributing offensive
8 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
capabilities ever more widely among fleets. At the same time,
the increased missile threat is driving greater interest in mari-
time missile defences, and investment in this area will likely
increase.
Aerospace
„„ Very high-speed glide vehicles and cruise missiles are being
pursued by China, Russia and the United States as a means of
countering missile defences. Russia could field a hypersonic
glide vehicle, the Avangard, as early as 2019. Several other
countries, including France, India and Japan, are also explor-
ing the possible development of weapons capable of hyper-
sonic (Mach 5+) speed.
„„ Russia and the US are looking to break a speed barrier that
has limited the maximum speed of helicopters for almost 50
years. Both countries have high-speed designs in flight-test,
both exploring different means of raising significantly the top
speed of new designs.
„„ Although the US and partner nations are introducing into
their inventories the F-35 fighter/ground-attack aircraft,
several are also extending the lives of the previous aircraft
‘generation’. This is in part due to F-35 programme delays
and, in the US in particular, the annual rate of acquisition.
Lower funding for this than originally planned has led the air
Cyber
„„ The past year witnessed significant changes in national poli-
cies and military doctrines regarding cyberspace. EU and
NATO states have taken a firmer stance in publicly attributing
cyber attacks, and they have also declared their intentions
to engage adversaries in cyberspace and through concerted
diplomatic and economic sanctions.
„„ Multinational companies are improving their own cyber
defences, as well as influencing internet-governance policy
and adapting to regulatory measures at the global level.
„„ Governments and regional blocs are beginning to impose
incentives and disincentives at the level of individual persons
or companies – perhaps because extraterritorial pressures
have so far proven largely ineffective vis-à-vis other sovereign
states. There were four major examples in 2018 of the public
attribution of cyber operations: the attribution by seven
nations of the NotPetya malware attack to the Russian armed
forces; US indictments of Russian military-intelligence organ-
isations for interference in the 2016 US presidential election;
German, UK and US alerts that Russia was targeting their criti-
cal-infrastructure networks; and the Dutch-led response to an
attempted Russian cyber operation against the Organisation
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. These indicate col-
lective Western resolve to publicly confront perceived Russian
cyber activities.
„„ There is increased interest in introducing innovative capa-
bilities in the maritime domain, such as uninhabited and
directed-energy systems; a number of these systems have
started to be fielded and this will likely increase in pace. This
will inevitably influence judgements over fleet composition
and employment.
force to extend the life of some of its fighter fleet, including
the F-16C/D.
„„ Several air forces are in the process of revamping their air-to-
air missile (AAM) inventories. The United Kingdom is introduc-
ing the Meteor rocket-ramjet-powered beyond-visual-range
radar-guided AAM; the US is exploring what might follow the
AIM-120 AMRAAM; and China now looks to be introducing
into service the PL-15 radar-guided AAM. Meanwhile, Russia
has introduced into service the R-77-1 (AA-12B Adder) and
continues upgrade work, while testing of the Indian Astra
radar-guided AAM is nearing completion.
„„ China, Russia and the US all now have next-generation
bombers in various stages of design and development. The
US B-21 Raider will enter service during the second half of the
2020s and could be joined by a Chinese design before the end
of that decade. Russia, while working on a low-observable
design to meet its PAK-DA future-bomber requirement, also
plans to put an upgraded Tu-160 Blackjack into production.
„„ In order to improve deterrence, moves are under way to
change the perceived utility of cyber operations for foreign
actors. To this end, the US is increasingly producing criminal
indictments, identifying individuals from China, Iran, North
Korea and Russia. They may never face extradition and pros-
ecution, but the professional disadvantages associated with
being publicly revealed in such a way may in the future alter
the personal decision calculus of foreign hackers. The EU and
the US are seeking to use economic sanctions against individ-
ual hackers and corporate entities in a similar way.
„„ Several nations, including Australia, France, Germany, the UK
and the US, have all publicised both their offensive cyber capa-
bilities and their willingness to use them for national defence.
US military doctrine, in particular, has adopted a more con-
frontational tone, asserting in the Department of Defense
2018 Cyber Strategy that the US will ‘defend forward to
disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source, including
activity that falls below the level of armed conflict’. Coupled
with commitments from Denmark, Estonia, the Netherlands,
the UK and US to use their cyber capabilities for NATO’s collec-
tive defence, such doctrines may presage a more conflictual
online environment. While nation-states are drawing lines in
the sand regarding foreign cyber operations, they are break-
ing down the silos among their own military units to capitalise
on, and boost, functional cooperation.
66 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Chapter Four

Europe
 While NATO continued to implement a demanding 
transformation agenda but struggled to shake off the
discomfort of internal divisions, the EU progressed a
large number of defence-cooperation initiatives. This
demonstrated political convergence on the issue, but
these had yet to yield any significant improvement to
military capability.
 At its Brussels Summit, NATO said it would create a 
Cyber Operations Centre and two new commands: a
Joint Force Command dealing with transatlantic lines
of communication, and a Joint Support and Enabling
Command to strengthen logistics capacity and 
military mobility.
 Exercise Trident Juncture, which took place in and
offshore Norway in October, was NATO’s largest
exercise in decades. It saw the deployment of the 
VJTF, and some 50,000 troops in total, plus partner
countries Finland and Sweden.
The EU’s PESCO initiative released two batches
of projects, and while the second list (released in
November) contains more projects related to specific
military requirements, it still does not fully address
strategic-capability gaps, including in strategic airlift,
that were identified in the EU’s June 2018 Capability
Development Plan.
Industrial and military logic supports a single
European combat-aircraft development, but politics
has seen two rival projects emerge, one from France
and Germany and another from the UK.
There is renewed emphasis in NATO on the maritime
domain, intended to add credibility to the Enhanced
Forward Presence and particularly NATO’s ability to
sustain this through transatlantic reinforcement.
NATO European member states increased their total
defence spending by 4.2% between 2017 and 2018.

Active military personnel – top 10 Europe defence spending, 2018 – top 5

(15,000 per unit)
Turkey
355,200 United States
France 203,900 US$643.3bn

Germany 179,400

Italy 171,050

United Kingdom 148,350 Total European

spending
US$284.6bn
Greece 142,350

Spain 120,350

Poland 117,800 United Kingdom France Germany Italy Spain

Romania 69,300

Netherlands 35,400
56.1 53.4 45.7 24.9 15.1
 Europe 67

Regional defence policy and economics 68 ►

Armed forces data section 87 ►

Arms procurements and deliveries 163 ►

Europe: selected deployments, November 2018

Europe
Top 5 operational
deployments
NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence
Estonia
Denmark – 186: 1 armd inf coy
United Kingdom – 900: 1 armd inf bn
HQ; 1 armd inf coy(+); 1 engr sqn

Latvia Germany
Albania – 21: 1 EOD pl Afghanistan – (Operation
Canada – 350: 1 mech inf bn HQ; Resolute Support) – 1,300
1 mech inf coy(+)
Czech Republic – 60: 1 mortar pl
Italy – 160: 1 mech inf coy
Poland – 160: 1 tk coy
Slovakia – 150: 1 mech inf coy
Slovenia – 50: 1 recce pl
Spain – 300: 1 armd inf coy(+)

Lithuania
Belgium – 100: 1 tpt coy Italy
Croatia – 230: 1 mech inf coy Iraq/Kuwait (Operation
Germany – 580: 1 mech inf bn HQ; 1 Prima Parthica) – 1,100
mech inf coy(+)
Netherlands – 250: 1 armd inf coy
Norway – 13: 1 int unit

Poland
Croatia – 69: 1 MRL bty
Romania – 120: 1 ADA bty; 1 MP coy Turkey
United Kingdom – 115: 1 recce sqn Iraq – est 2,000
United States – 774: 1 armd bn
France
Does not include US deployments Chad, Mali, Niger (Operation
under Operation Atlantic Resolve Barkhane) – 3,750 Turkey
Syria – est 5,000

Main battle tank fleets, 2018 Tactical combat aircraft fleets, 2018
(250 per unit) (25 per unit)
Turkey
Turkey 308
2,379
Greece 1,328 Greece 231

Poland 637 France 208

Romania 418 Italy 200
Spain 329 Germany 197
Germany 236 United Kingdom 191
United Kingdom 227 Spain 167
Serbia 212 Poland 98
France 200 Sweden 96
Italy 200 Switzerland 85
(fighter / fighter ground-attack / attack)
68 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Europe
Defence establishments in Europe have continued to
adapt in the face of a complex threat environment.
There are sustained efforts to increase defence
spending, adjust military forces and equipment
capabilities, and introduce additional multinational
defence initiatives. Concern about Russia’s military
modernisation and its application of force in Syria
and Ukraine was matched in 2018 by a growing sense
among policymakers that Moscow was acting within
European societies, seeking to undermine societal
coherence and exert political coercion. For example,
in March 2018, former Russian military-intelligence
officer Sergei Skripal was poisoned by a weapons-
grade nerve agent, believed to be of Russian origin.
Skripal had been convicted in Russia of spying for the
United Kingdom, and after his release in a spy swap
had been living in the UK. In April, Russian military-
intelligence officers were caught by the Dutch security
services as they attempted to mount a surveillance
and cyber operation against the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), based
in The Hague. The OPCW had earlier identified the
agent used against Skripal. These events added to
a growing list of Russian meddling conducted on
European soil.
Meanwhile, amid fears that external actors were
bent on undermining cohesion in Europe, uncertainty
also came from within. During the July 2018 NATO
summit in Brussels, US President Donald Trump,
ignoring recent and planned future increases in
defence spending among European NATO allies,
suggested that the US ‘might do its own thing’
unless European allies started to spend more on
defence. While several European governments found
reassurance in the commitment to NATO expressed
by Secretary of Defense James Mattis, others argued
that it was not sustainable to expect US policy to
proceed against the expressed position of the US
president. Mattis, visiting Paris in October 2018, had
urged European observers to ignore some of the
divisive headlines, suggesting that ‘actions speak
loudest’. Indeed, the US government had reinforced
its military presence in Europe and, notwithstanding
Trump’s rhetoric, funds for the Pentagon’s European
Deterrence Initiative continued to grow. Nonetheless,
recurring rumours that Mattis might either resign or
be fired added to the unease in European capitals.
Strategic autonomy and European ambition
German Chancellor Angela Merkel concluded in
2017 that the US was no longer necessarily a reliable
partner. In a series of speeches and opinion-editorial
pieces in July and August 2018, Heiko Maas, foreign
minister in the Merkel cabinet, began ‘making plans
for a new world order’ in which Europe would
form a counterweight for situations in which the US
‘crosses the line’. Maas suggested that an alliance
of multilateralists, including Canada, Japan and
South Korea, as well as like-minded Europeans, was
needed to protect the international order, based on
multilateralism, cooperation and the rule of law.
In contrast, the UK took a more measured
approach. Still consumed by domestic political
divisions over its exit from the European Union
(Brexit) and negotiations over the terms of withdrawal,
on 16 July Prime Minister Theresa May referred to
the crisis created by Trump’s suggestion merely as
an ‘additional session’ of the NATO summit. Indeed,
May suggested that Trump ‘has made a difference’
primarily by focusing ‘the eyes of those around
the table on the question of the 2% commitment’.
Earlier, May explained at February’s Munich Security
Conference that the UK was ‘unconditionally
committed’ to European security and that a new
security partnership should govern this policy area
between the EU and the UK after Brexit. While many
of her counterparts across the continent welcomed
the sentiment, a final agreement on Brexit – at least
one that was agreed in the UK – proved elusive well
into the autumn. The possibility that an acrimonious
withdrawal from the EU would make security and
defence cooperation more difficult was as real as it
was unintended.
In contrast, France was pursuing ideas for a more
autonomous posture, first outlined in September
2017 in a speech by President Emmanuel Macron.
This is perhaps unsurprising given the long-standing
desire in Paris for a significant degree of European
independence in security and defence matters.
Macron’s major idea was for a European Intervention

Initiative. Though details remained sketchy, this
would see a group of European nations use existing
military assets and units to provide rapid-response
capabilities for crisis management. In June 2018,
nine countries (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the
UK) signed a letter of intent (LOI) to pursue this
initiative. The LOI makes clear that the initiative is not
about creating formations for operations, but rather is
meant to establish a ‘non-binding forum of European
participating states’ with the ‘ultimate objective …
to develop a shared strategic culture’. Participating
governments have discussed some associated
measures, including enhanced cooperation on
strategic foresight and intelligence sharing; scenario
development and planning; support to operations;
and an exchange on lessons learned and doctrine.
Paris was keen to maintain some distance between
its initiative and formal EU security and defence
structures but some partners, including Berlin,
wanted a closer link, and the LOI suggests that the
NATO summit propels transformation
At its 11–12 July 2018 summit in Brussels, NATO added yet
more layers to its post-2014 adaptation process. Based on
US suggestions, and according to US diplomats closely
associated with Secretary of Defense James Mattis, a
new readiness initiative was agreed committing NATO
member states collectively to have 30 battalions, 30 air
squadrons and 30 naval combat vessels ready to use in 30
days. In the run-up to the summit, several European NATO
members expressed concern about the lack of detail
related to the readiness initiative and what precisely was
expected of them. Known as the ‘four thirties’, this goal is
meant to be achieved by 2020. In October 2018, General
Curtis Scaparrotti, NATO Supreme Allied Commander
Europe (SACEUR), was reported as saying that ‘perhaps
the most important thing that has changed [in NATO] is
the mindset that we have to get up every day now and
be ready to deal with a real threat. That is a fundamental
change.’ Although progress on delivering the readiness
initiative will be closely watched in Washington, NATO
commanders point to the underlying shift in approach
indicated by the initiative. Collective defence and hard-
security concerns are once again at the heart of Alliance
thinking, and the organisation is focused on recovering
high-readiness capability, as well as the capacity to move
and deploy large formations.
At the Brussels Summit, NATO also agreed measures
to improve military mobility and defined a new plan for
SACEUR to examine the administrative challenges of
Europe 69
European Intervention Initiative should contribute
to ongoing defence-collaboration efforts within the
EU. Nonetheless, the fact that Denmark, which has
an opt-out from EU military cooperation, and Brexit-
focused Britain joined France’s initiative showed the
benefits of not directly associating it with Brussels.
Among European governments, there seem to
be at least three different schools of thought over
Europe
what European strategic autonomy might ultimately
mean. For the UK , strategic autonomy – to the extent
that it was seen as desirable at all – seems to mean the
ability to provide a stronger European contribution
to transatlantic burden sharing. For Germany,
strategic autonomy referred to the ability to provide
a counterweight to the US in face of existing policy
differences, while for France it implied the ability to
take military action independent of the US. On the
multinational level, an interesting paradox emerged
in 2018. Whereas NATO continued to implement
a demanding transformation agenda started at its
Wales Summit in 2014, but struggled to shake off
moving military personnel and assets across countries.
The NATO Command Structure (NCS) was adjusted
following an internal review, which had revealed
shortcomings when measured against the declared
political–military level of ambition. NATO will create a
Cyber Operations Centre as well as two new commands:
a Joint Force Command dealing with transatlantic lines
of communication to be based in Norfolk, Virginia, and
a Joint Support and Enabling Command to be based in
Germany. Both commands should strengthen logistics
capacity and support military mobility, and mean that
the NCS will grow again in terms of personnel (by about
1,200) after severe post-Cold War cuts that saw staff levels
reduced from about 22,000 posts at the end of the Cold
War to some 6,800 at the start of 2018.
On 25 October, NATO launched its biggest exercise
in decades, with the two-week-long Trident Juncture
2018 bringing together some 50,000 troops from NATO
member states, plus partner countries Finland and
Sweden, to exercise in Norway, the Baltic Sea and the
North Atlantic. In early October, it was announced that
the US aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman and its strike
group would join the exercise.
NATO also launched a training and capacity-building
mission in Iraq, to be led by Canada and set to begin
before the end of 2018, and agreed to conduct more
exercises focused on southern-flank scenarios and
contingencies.
70 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Table 7 NATO transformation, 2014–19

Faced with multiple external security challenges on its eastern and southern flanks and internal challenges to Alliance coherence,
NATO in 2014 embarked on a significant transformation process, seeking to strengthen its ability to conduct its core tasks of
collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. In its public pronouncements, NATO stresses that it has adopted
a 360-degree approach to threats, but the initiatives launched in successive meetings of NATO heads of state and government
demonstrate a clear focus on modernising NATO’s approach to and capabilities for collective defence, which is mostly seen as
being under threat on its eastern flank.

Policy initiative Content Intended effect Assessment and status

Wales Summit (2014)
Readiness Action „„ Rotational continuous presence
Plan of land, sea and air forces and
military activity in the eastern part
of the Alliance
„„ Enlarge the NATO Response Force
(NRF)
„„ Establish Very High Readiness
Joint Task Force (VJTF)
„„ Establish permanent command-
and-control presence and force
enablers on the territories of
eastern allies
„„ Increase readiness and
capabilities of Headquarters
Multinational Corps Northeast
„„ An enhanced exercise programme
Addressing hybrid- „„Enhance strategic „„ Improve ability to deter
warfare threats communications
„„ Develop hybrid exercise scenarios
„„ Strengthen coordination with
other organisations
Defence Investment „„Maintain 2% of GDP defence- „„ Close capability gaps
Pledge spending levels or aim to reach
this level by 2024
„„ Maintain 20% of defence-spending
share on major equipment and „„ Achieve more balanced
R&D or aim to reach this level by
2024
Framework Nations „„Create groupings of allies, each
Concept (FNC) led by one framework nation, to
develop and deploy capabilities
Enhanced Cyber „„ Establish cyber defence as a part
Defence Policy of collective defence
Defence and „„ Support, advise and assist third
Related Security countries with DCB
Capacity Building „„ Complementary approach to EU,
Initiative (DCB) OSCE and United Nations
Warsaw Summit (2016)
Enhanced Forward „„ Deploy one multinational battalion- „„ Boost deterrence
Presence (EFP) sized battlegroup each to EST,
LVA, LTU and POL
„„ Tailored forward presence for the
Southeast/Black Sea region
„„ Strengthen collective- „„ Intensified air policing, AWACS flights
defence and crisis- and maritime-patrol activities
management capability „„ NRF expansion from 13,000 to 40,000
through improved troops
readiness
„„ VJTF established as multinational
„„ Reassure eastern allies brigade with up to five manoeuvre
through on-the-ground battalions; most ready to deploy in 2–7
presence and military days
activity
„„ NATO Force Integration Units
established in BLG, EST, HUN, LVA,
LTU, POL, ROM and SVK
„„ Expanded frequency, size and scope of
NATO exercises
„„ NATO Strategic Communications
and respond to hybrid Centre of Excellence established
attacks „„ Hybrid scenarios included in exercise
programme
„„ Higher degree of coordination with EU
on hybrid threats
„„ 13% real-terms increase in NATO–
through higher spending European defence spending between
and focus on defence 2014 and 2018, but still below 2008
investment levels
„„ Number of NATO member states
burden-sharing among meeting the 2% and/or the 20% target
allies is growing
„„ Encourage multinational „„ GER, ITA and UK set up FNC groupings
pursuit of agreed NATO „„ GER focus is on capability development
defence-planning goals and provision of formed units; ITA
and provide formed units focus on capability development; and
for operations UK focus on operations
„„ Strengthen deterrence in „„ Clarification that a cyber attack could
cyberspace lead to an Article 5 response
„„ Increased cooperation with the private
sector
„„ Strengthen links to „„ DCB activities launched, including in
partner nations GEO, IRQ, JOR, MDA and TUN
„„ Enable NATO’s ability to „„ Attempt to build on NATO experience
project stability without with advise and assist, training and
deploying large combat mentoring activities
forces
„„ Fully deployed as of June 2017, with
by establishing a CAN, GER, the UK and the US serving
multinational tripwire as framework EFP nations
force, triggering an allied „„Strength as of August 2018 was 4,743
response in the case of troops
aggression

Table 7 NATO transformation, 2014–19
Reinforcement „„ Call on member states to deliver
strategy heavy and high-end forces in
line with NATO defence-planning
priorities
Cyber Defence „„ Cyberspace recognised as an
Pledge operational domain in its own right
„„ Prioritise enhanced cyber
defences for national networks
and infrastructure
NATO Baseline „„ NATO support to civil
Requirements for preparedness in areas such as
National Resilience continuity of government and
essential services or the security
of critical national infrastructure
Intelligence and „„ Establish Joint Intelligence and
Security Division Security Division (JISD)
„„ Appoint assistant secretary-
general (ASG) for Intelligence and „„Make efficient use of
Security
Joint Declaration „„ Define priority areas for
EU–NATO substantial cooperation:
countering hybrid threats,
operational cooperation, cyber
security and defence; capability
development; defence industrial
and R&D cooperation, increased
coordination of exercises; defence
and security capacity building
Brussels Meeting of Heads of State and Government (2017)
Action Plan for „„ NATO membership in the Global
the Fight Against Coalition to Defeat ISIS
Terrorism „„ Establish a terrorism intelligence
cell and appoint a coordinator to
oversee NATO’s efforts in the fight „„Increase activity on
against terrorism
Brussels Summit (2018)
NATO Readiness „„ Allies will offer an additional 30„„ Ensure NATO has access „„ Readiness initiative to be implemented
Initiative major naval combatants, 30 heavy
or medium manoeuvre battalions,
30 combat air squadrons and „„ Strengthen NATO’s
enabling forces at 30 days
readiness or less (the ’four 30s’
concept)
Military Mobility „„ Improve military mobility by:
shortening border-crossing times;
diplomatic clearance for military
movements; identifying main and „„Achieve better
alternative supply routes; and
exercising military-mobility tasks
NATO Command „„ Create a Cyberspace Operations
Structure (NCS) Centre
„„ Establish a Joint Force Command
and a Joint Support and Enabling
Command
Europe 71
„„ Provide a credible „„ Some evidence that European NATO
solution to address ‘anti- members are adjusting procurement
access/area-denial’ activity and force structures to focus
threats from Russia on collective-defence tasks
„„ Implementation likely to stretch
through the 2020s
„„ Improved ability to „„ Does not alter NATO’s defensive
respond to cyber attacks approach to cyber, but recognition of
cyber as an operational domain is likely
Europe
„„ Improved national
resilience in the face of to drive policies, plans and information
cyber attacks exchange in this area
„„ Strengthened capacity to „„ Reminder that NATO allies, according
deal with hybrid threats to Article 3 of the North Atlantic
„„ Agreed resilience Treaty, need to contribute to collective
guidelines defence by being able to resist attack
„„ Improve NATO’s ability to „„ ASG appointed in December 2016 and
draw on a wide range of JISD stood up in 2017
intelligence resources „„ Increased production of joint
intelligence, but beyond the JISD
intelligence provided by intelligence work in NATO remains
allies fragmented
„„ Revive EU–NATO „„ List of 74 specific actions agreed,
strategic partnership across the identified priority areas
„„ Strengthen the case „„ Regular progress reports presented
for complementary to EU and NATO; some evidence of
capabilities increased exercise coordination
„„ Task staffs with „„ Joint declaration in July 2018 focused
implementation on military mobility, CBRN, and the
women, peace and security agenda
„„ Demonstrate NATO „„ NATO AWACS flights now conduct
contributions to the air-surveillance and airspace-
international fight against management tasks for the coalition;
terrorism NATO nations to provide air-to-air
refuelling capability
NATO’s southern flank „„ Training mission in Iraq launched
by NATO in 2018 to strengthen the
capacity of Iraqi forces
to combat-ready forces at by 2020
high readiness „„ Initiative will not lead to new forces
being stood up, but focus on the
capacity for rapid readiness of existing forces
response and „„ Driven by the US; European buy-in
reinforcement of forward- unclear at end of 2018
deployed forces
„„ Strengthen NATO „„ NATO aims to cooperate with the EU,
capacity to rapidly deploy which has regulatory responsibility
and sustain forces in key areas. The EU also can make
money available to support the
coordination in development of mobility-relevant
peacetime, crisis and defence infrastructure
conflict
„„ Enhance situational „„ A review of NATO’s command structure
awareness of operational said the NCS was not fit for purpose
activity in cyberspace after significant post-Cold War cuts
„„ Rebuild NATO capacity „„ New elements in the NCS reflect
to conduct large-scale new threats, as well as a return to
collective-defence supporting large troop movements and
operations complex logistics for collective defence
72 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
the discomfort created by internal divisions, the EU
progressed a large number of defence-cooperation
initiatives, demonstrating political convergence on
the issue, but these had yet to yield any significant
improvement to military capability.
EU defence cooperation takes shape
The EU focused on implementing plans drawn
up in 2017 to strengthen defence cooperation. In
December 2017, member states formally launched
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), a
concept that foresees far-reaching defence collabo-
ration among EU member states to develop their
military capability. When originally conceived,
access to PESCO was supposed to be governed by
demanding criteria regarding military capability and
political will. In contrast, PESCO as adopted in 2017
is a much more inclusive undertaking, with softer
criteria for those wishing to join. As a result, all EU
member states except for Denmark, Malta and the
UK are taking part. A first batch of 17 projects was
launched in March 2018. European governments,
perhaps surprised themselves by the rapid progress
during 2017 towards agreement on PESCO, largely
committed to projects that were already under way.
It was hardly a surprise, therefore, when initial state-
ments from participating governments suggested
that more ambitious ventures would be put forward
for the second batch of PESCO projects. This second
list, released in November, contains more projects
directly focused on specific military requirements,
but still does not address strategic capability gaps
including in the areas of heavy transport and stra-
tegic airlift.
During summer 2018, it became apparent that
the EU felt it had succeeded, for the first time, in
putting in place all elements necessary to generate
military capabilities to support EU security and
defence aspirations. The Capability Development
Plan (CDP) sets common capability-development
priorities for EU members. The CDP was revised in
2018 to take account of the suggestion, in the 2016
EU Global Strategy, that the Union should be able
to protect its citizens. It singled out as priority items
ground-combat capabilities, enhanced logistics and
medical capabilities, air mobility, air superiority,
the integration of military air capabilities, naval
manoeuvrability, underwater control, space-
based information and communications services,
information superiority and cyber operations. This
revised set of priorities points to more high-end
military capabilities than the EU’s recent operational
activity would imply. Coordination with the NATO
Defence Planning Process is also foreseen.
The priorities set in the CDP would feed into the
Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD),
which would see member states report on their
capability plans, with EU institutions monitoring
alignment with CDP priorities and identifying
opportunities for cooperation among member states.
A CARD pilot phase was under way in 2018. Then,
PESCO would draw on CARD results to plan and
implement projects in support of the CDP. PESCO
projects in turn would at least partially draw on the
European Defence Fund (EDF) that would make
EU funds available to support defence research and
development, and ultimately capability development.
PESCO projects would be eligible for a higher rate of
EDF funding than other projects (30% instead of 20%),
and some governments have already indicated their
preference to restrict EDF funding to PESCO projects
altogether. The plan is that enhanced European
military capabilities result from this process of
priority setting, de facto harmonisation of capability-
development processes and planning of projects
co-financed with EU funding. These capabilities
would be directly related to the EU’s level of ambition
and compatible with NATO. At the end of 2018, this
theory of EU capability development had crystallised
into the EU’s main defence effort, though it remained
essentially untested.
DEFENCE ECONOMICS
Ten years after the financial crash, European
economies have broadly recovered. In 2017, the euro
area boasted its fastest growth rate in the past decade,
at 2.4%, but the rate of economic output slowed
down in 2018 to 2.0%. Central and Eastern European
states, such as Slovakia (3.9% GDP growth in 2018),
Latvia (3.7%) and Slovenia (4.5%), were particularly
dynamic. Outside the eurozone, Romania and Poland
also achieved strong economic output in 2018, at 4.0%
and 4.4% respectively.
European Union Structural and Investment Funds
contributed to the recovery in Central and Eastern
Europe. For example, in 2017, the IMF calculated that
EU funds made up half of the public investment in
Romania and Hungary. According to the World Bank,
EU funding was equivalent to more than 4% of GDP
for some Central European countries, often in the
form of Cohesion Funds for infrastructure projects.
 Europe 73

Iceland

Finland

Norway

Sweden

Europe
Estonia

Latvia
Denmark
Lithuania
Netherlands
United Kingdom
Belgium

Ireland Poland
Germany

Luxembourg Czech Rep.

Slovakia
Austria
France Hungary
Switzerland
Slovenia Romania
Croatia

BiH Serbia
Italy Bulgaria
Montenegro FYROM

Albania
Spain
Turkey
Portugal Greece

2018 Defence Spending (US$ bn)

56.10 Malta
53.36 Cyprus
45.69

Real % Change (2017–18)

24.87
More than 20% increase
Between 10% and 20% increase
Between 3% and 10% increase
10 Between 0% and 3% increase
Between 0% and 3% decrease [1] Map illustrating 2018 planned defence-spending levels (in US$ at
market exchange rates) as well as the annual real percentage change
5 Between 3% and 10% decrease in planned defence spending between 2017 and 2018 (at constant 2010
prices and exchange rates). Percentage changes in defence spending
2 Between 10% and 20% decrease can vary considerably from year to year, as states revise the level of
1 funding allocated to defence. Changes indicated here highlight the
More than 20% decrease short-term trend in planned defence spending between 2017 and 2018.
.25
.05 Insufficient data © IISS
Actual spending changes prior to 2017, and projected spending levels
post-2018, are not reflected.

▲ Map 1 Europe regional defence spending1

Sub-regional groupings referred to in defence economics text: Central Europe (Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Switzerland), Northern Europe
(Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden), Southern Europe (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain), Southeastern Europe (Bulgaria, Romania
and Turkey), the Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, FYROM, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) and Western Europe (Belgium, France, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).
74 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
2.0
1.39
1.5 1.34 1.36 1.33 1.35 1.37
% of GDP
1.0
0.5
0.0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
▲ Figure 5 Europe regional defence expenditure as %
of GDP
Low interest rates since the 2008 crisis also
contributed to Europe’s economic growth, by
stimulating credit and investment. Governments’
expenditure on interest payments fell, in turn reducing
debt-to-GDP ratios in 2018. There are, however, some
early signs of tightening monetary policy, which will
raise the costs of debt servicing. In August 2018, the
Bank of England increased its interest rate by a quarter
of a percentage point to 0.75% – the highest level since
2009. By August 2018, the Czech National Bank had
raised its interest rate five times in the year. Although
the European Central Bank will keep its interest rate at
its present level until mid-2019, by the end of 2018 it is
set to normalise its monetary policy by looking to end
quantitative easing.
This overall positive picture does not mask the
difficulties experienced in some countries. Italy’s
right–left coalition proposed a public-spending
increase in its first budget, combining tax cuts with
the introduction of a minimum basic income. The
budget plan proved unpopular with Europe’s
financial authorities and risks aggravating Italy’s
debt, which already stands at 130% of GDP. In the
United Kingdom, although unemployment continues
to fall, down to 4.1% in 2018, growth has slowed in
comparison to its continental neighbours. The UK’s
GDP grew by 2.3% in 2015, but then slowed to 1.7%
in 2017 and 1.4% in 2018. The IMF explained this
deceleration by pointing to the effect of the fall in
the pound in slowing real-term income growth, as
well as reduced investment in the country because
of uncertainty surrounding the UK’s decision to
withdraw from the EU. Further south, while Turkey
experienced a growth rate of 3.5% in 2018, its currency
Other Northern
Norway, 2.4% Sweden, 2.3% Europe, 3.4%
Other Southeastern The Balkans
Europe, 1.8% 0.8%
Turkey, 3.1%
United Kingdom
Other Southern 19.7%
Europe, 2.8%
Spain, 5.3%
Italy, 8.7%
France
Other Central 18.8%
Europe, 4.9%
Poland Netherlands, 4.0%
3.8%
Germany Other Western
16.1% Europe, 2.3%
Other Western Europe – Belgium, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg
Other Central Europe – Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia,
Switzerland
Other Northern Europe – Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania
Other Southern Europe – Cyprus, Malta, Portugal
The Balkans – Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, FYROM,
Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia
Other Southeastern Europe – Bulgaria, Romania
© IISS
▲ Figure 6 Europe defence spending by country and
sub-region, 2017
weakened considerably in the summer due to tariffs
imposed by the United States over a detained US
citizen. This in turn helped propel inflation in Turkey
to an estimated annual 15% in 2018.
Defence spending and procurement
Within this context, Europe’s military spending
continued to grow at a steady pace, rising by 4.0% in
real terms in 2018, slightly down from 4.4% in 2017.
Nominal increases between 2017 and 2018 for the
region’s biggest spenders were 4.3% in France, 4.1%
in Germany and 3.2% in the UK.
This overall trend of rising defence spending is set
to continue. The French parliament voted in 2018 for
a seven-year forward plan for defence spending. The
Loi de Programmation Militaire forecasts that the budget
will rise to €44.0 billion (US$53.2bn) by 2023, excluding
pensions, from a figure of €34.2bn (US$40.6bn) in
2018. The increase will fund a recruitment drive for
6,000 civilian and military staff, the bulk of which will
bolster the cyber-defence and intelligence services.
The extra funding will also enable new equipment
purchases, including the modernisation of France’s
nuclear deterrent. (This is expected to cost €25.0bn
(US$29.3bn) between 2019 and 2023.) In 2019, the
 Europe 75

priority focus is on expeditionary capabilities and

Table 8 Denmark: planned increases in defence
sustainability, with the expected delivery of six
spending, 2018–23
Reaper uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs), one more
Currency 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
A400M transport aircraft, two KC-130J tankers, the
modernisation of one KC-130H tanker/transport, and Yearly increases 0.8 0.8 1.7 1.9 2.8 4.8
(DKKbn)
one A330 MRTT for resupply and strategic airlift.
Yearly increases 0.127 0.125 0.268 0.302 0.450 0.779
Unsurprisingly, these reflect the requirements and (US$bn)
lessons from France’s continuing overseas military Defence budget 26.7 27.5 29.2 31.1 33.9 38.7

Europe
operations. (DKKbn)
While the increase in defence spending in France Defence budget 4.2 4.3 4.6 4.9 5.5 6.3
benefits from a political consensus, there was less (US$bn)
unanimity in Germany after the new coalition Source: Danish Defence Agreement 2018–2023

government was formed in March 2018. However,

the budget for 2019 was eventually settled at €42.9bn
(US$50.2bn), including pensions, which at 11.4% is
a significant increase in nominal terms compared to
2018 (€38.5bn, or US$45.7bn).
In the UK, the National Audit Office reported
potential shortfalls in the Ministry of Defence’s
(MoD’s) 2018-28 Equipment Plan, at a minimum of
£7.0bn (US$9.4bn), including £5.9bn (US$7.9bn) in the
next four years. Despite these, treasury documents
indicate a continued increase in the core defence
budget (excluding pensions and other non-MoD
funding sources) from £37.0bn (US$49.5bn) in 2018 to
£37.9bn (US$49.2bn) in 2019. The MoD also benefited
from £800 million in extra funding in the course of the
year, including £600m (US$803m) for the Dreadnought
programme. There is greater political consensus in
Baltic and Nordic countries, where governments
have announced spending increases. In Denmark,
for instance, government and opposition parties
agreed to increase defence spending, with significant
annual steps taking the Danish defence budget over
DKK38.7bn (US$6.3bn) by 2023.
In Sweden, a report initiated by the previous
government and published in early 2018 called for
spending increases totalling SEK168bn (US$19bn)
between 2021 and 2030. The increase was justified,
according to the report’s authors, by the rising costs
of replacing and maintaining military equipment.
In Finland, the defence budget increased to €3.1bn
(US$3.7bn) in 2019, up from €2.9bn (US$3.4bn)
in 2018, largely due to the Squadron 2020 naval
recapitalisation programme. Budgets are also rising
in Estonia, to more than €600m (US$770m) by 2022,
and Latvia, where the government expected to spend
€182m (US$216m) in defence investments in 2018.
Defence-spending increases in European Union
member states will, in a few years, be supplemented
by money spent by the EU on defence objectives.
The European Commission’s proposals for the
multi-annual financial framework 2021–27 include
€13bn (US$15bn) over the course of the seven-year
period dedicated to defence research and capability
development. Another €6.5bn (US$7.7bn) will be
dedicated to military mobility. Nonetheless, and
despite the increase in member states’ defence budgets,
cooperation in defence programmes is still seen as
the best way to rationalise spending and generate
economies of scale. That said, joint projects have in the
past not always proven to be cheaper than domestic
ones. In 2018, France and Germany committed to
work jointly on a future tank programme (the Main
Ground Combat System) and combat aircraft (the
Future Combat Air Systems). Other areas of potential
cooperation include cruise missiles, swarming UAVs,
satellites and maritime-patrol aircraft. EU-level
initiatives such as the Permanent Structured
Cooperation (PESCO) framework may also in future
make a difference. PESCO is specifically designed
to foster defence cooperation among member states,
including on arms procurement.
Defence industry
As well as PESCO, the European Defence Fund (EDF)
allocates EU funding to support cooperative defence
research and capability-development projects. Paving
the way for the full introduction of the EDF, the EU
has introduced two mechanisms. The Preparatory
Action for Defence Research (PADR) will disburse
€90m (US$107m) and the European Defence
Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) €500m
(US$593m) until 2020. Then, between 2021 and 2027,
these mechanisms will be taken over by the EDF. The
EU proposes to support all or part of the research
and capability-development projects, with the key
pre-condition that they are undertaken by three
companies from three countries.
76 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Table 9 EU PADR projects: companies involved per EU member involved respectively across three
Pythia Ocean GOSSRA Vestlife AcamsII Total per
project areas.
2020 country With the EDF, the EU is
Austria 0 introducing a mechanism to
support innovation in defence
Belgium • 1
research: 5% of the fund will be
Bulgaria • 1
dedicated to disruptive technology
Croatia 0
and innovative equipment. This
Cyprus 0 comes in the wake of a broader
Czech Republic 0 push across large European
Denmark • 1 arms-producing states to foster
Estonia • 1 innovation in light of defence-
technology advances elsewhere,
Finland • • 2
particularly those led by China
France • •••• • 6
and the US.
Germany ••••• • • 7
This motivation could also
Greece •••• 4 be seen in France, where the
Hungary 0 2018 budget allocated €4.7bn
Ireland 0 (US$5.6bn) for defence research
Italy ••• ••••• •• • 15 and development (R&D). There
•••• have also been a range of new
Latvia 0 institutional frameworks in recent
Lithuania •• • 3 years. To rationalise these various
Luxembourg 0 mechanisms, in early 2018 the
French defence ministry created
Malta 0
an agency dedicated to defence
Netherlands • • • • 4
innovation, linked to the DGA,
Poland • •• • 4 the defence-procurement and
Portugal • • • •• 5 technology agency, with a €1bn
Romania • 1 (US$1.2bn) budget. Within this,
Slovakia 0 an Innovation Defence Lab will
Slovenia 0 be tasked to identify civilian
innovations that can be used for
Spain •••• •• •• 8
military purposes.
Sweden •• • • 4
The UK has also set up new
United Kingdom • ••• 4 mechanisms to facilitate defence
Total per project 8 41* 9 6 7 innovation. The 2017 Defence R&D
*Total excludes NATO participation. Source: EDA budget came to £3.1bn (US$4.0bn).
Pythia: strategic technology foresight; Ocean 2020: demonstrator for uninhabited systems
to support maritime-security missions; GOSSRA: Generic Open Soldier System Reference
A UK Defence Solutions Centre
Architecture; Vestlife: ballistic and CBRN protection of military personnel; AcamsII: adaptive (UKDSC), established in 2017,
camouflage system
runs an innovation competition to
generate new technologies relevant
The PADR currently supports five projects, for defence. The UKDSC also hosts an Innovation and
which reveal interesting patterns (see Table 9). Collaborative Engagement Lab that brings together
Italy is the most involved state, with 15 firms experts from innovative technology sectors. In 2016,
and research organisations committed to four the UK launched the Defence Innovation Initiative,
out of the five projects. Leonardo leads the most which includes a Defence and Security Accelerator
significant, Ocean 2020, which received a €35m and a Defence Innovation Fund, which was allocated
grant (US$41.5m) and aims to integrate uninhabited £800m (US$1.1bn) over ten years.
platforms for naval surveillance. Spain and Germany Germany is looking to establish similar
come behind Italy, with eight and seven bodies institutional frameworks. Berlin allocated €1.1bn

(US$1.3bn) for defence R&D in 2018. The Bundeswehr
created a Cyber Innovation Hub in 2017, funded
with €15m (US$17m) over three years. Germany’s
new defence-innovation agency, the Agentur für
Disruptive Innovationen in der Cybersicherheit und
Schlüsseltechnologien, was due to be established
before the end of 2018.
Turkey’s defence-industrial base is also strongly
backed by the government. The lira’s fall in mid-2018
could complicate Turkish procurement of foreign
platforms, in particular F-35 combat aircraft, but
also foreign-supplied parts for Turkish programmes,
such as the indigenous combat aircraft (the TF-X)
and the Altay main battle tank. However, indigenous
procurements are relatively sheltered from the
currency crisis.
Turkey has an ambitious goal to become self-
sufficient in defence procurement by 2023. According
to NATO, Turkey allocates more than 30% of its
defence expenditure to weapons procurement and
defence R&D. In 2018, 28.5% of all the country’s R&D
spending was dedicated to defence, amounting to
TL3.26bn (US$636m). This has allowed Turkey to
develop its defence industry and become a significant
exporter. In 2017, according to the Defence and
Aerospace Industry Manufacturers Association,
aerospace and other defence exports reached
US$1.8bn. Turkey’s total aerospace (including civil
aviation) and defence-industry revenue grew by 7.2%
between 2013 (US$5.1bn) and 2018 (US$6.7bn).
NORTH ATLANTIC AND THE HIGH NORTH
There is now renewed emphasis in NATO on the
maritime domain, centred on the North Atlantic and
the ‘High North’. This is intended to add credibility
to the Alliance’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP)
strategy, and particularly NATO’s ability to sustain
this through transatlantic reinforcement, within the
context of a perceived growth in the potential Russian
threat in this arena, notably in submarine activity.
NATO’s response has included the agreement to
create a new joint-force command based in Norfolk,
Virginia. This command will be focused on maritime
security and sustaining transatlantic reinforcement.
Meanwhile, in July 2018, the US Navy re-established
its 2nd Fleet in order to refocus its activities in the
North Atlantic area. In addition, 2018 saw an extended
US Navy aircraft-carrier deployment in European
waters, including a first foray by a US Navy carrier
into the Arctic Circle in more than two decades.
Europe 77
Nonetheless, Russian force levels – including
submarines – remain substantially lower than
those of Soviet forces at the end of the Cold War. It
is also difficult to assess the numbers of submarine
sorties. These may remain relatively low by historical
standards, but the potency of individual Russian
platforms, together with the reduction in NATO
anti-submarine-warfare (ASW) and blue-water naval
Europe
capabilities since the end of the Cold War, suggest
that Russian capabilities would pose a significant
challenge to Alliance forces.
NATO navies have been interested in the arrival of
the Yasen (Severodvinsk)-class cruise-missile submarine
(SSGN) Severodvinsk. Although the design has its
origins in the Cold War, it only became operational
in 2016, is notably quiet, and carries a significant
inventory of both land-attack and anti-ship missiles.
A number of improved versions of this submarine
are under construction or planned. Modernisation of
Russia’s Antey (Oscar-II)-class SSGNs is also under
way.
There is also a renewed emphasis on traditional
maritime strategic focal points, such as the transit
routes of the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom
(GIUK) Gap, but the character of the potential threat
to these is less certain. It may be less a general threat
to sea lines of communication and more one of
individual platforms putting specific high-level NATO
assets at risk. The UK, for example, has highlighted
increased Russian activity associated with the Royal
Navy’s ballistic-missile-submarine base at Faslane,
in Scotland. However, there might also be a threat
to specific high-value naval formations: for example,
targeting just one vessel carrying transatlantic
reinforcements could have significant strategic effect.
Among other responses, the US has been
refurbishing its base facilities in Keflavik, Iceland, in
order to station P-8A Poseidon maritime-patrol aircraft
there, in part to cover the GIUK Gap. Norway and the
UK are also buying P-8s, and cooperation between all
three is planned. A critical US capability in the Cold
War was its underwater sound-surveillance system
(SOSUS), placed in the vicinity of the GIUK Gap to
track submarines. There have been reports of recent
upgrade work, and further development of NATO
and US acoustic-surveillance capabilities may be
under consideration.
Meanwhile, Russia has continued to invest
in precision long-range weapons, ranging from
air-defence to land-attack cruise missiles. All of
these pose a potential challenge to NATO’s ability
78 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
to manoeuvre and add to Russia’s ability to defend
in depth – including protecting Russia’s ballistic-
missile-submarine force through a revived ‘bastion’
concept in the Arctic Circle.
In late 2017, the then-chief of the UK Defence Staff
highlighted concerns about the potential Russian
threat to the undersea-cable infrastructure. Threats to
such infrastructure are not new, but modern societies
are more reliant on these cables than previously. There
are particular concerns about Russia’s development
of surface ‘mother ships’ and submarines that can
host a variety of deep-ocean mini-submarines.
There is also concern that the ‘High North’ could
become an arena of strategic competition. Reducing
sea ice will potentially increase significantly the utility
of polar shipping routes, particularly the Northern Sea
Route, and increase access to and the value of energy
and other natural resources. Russia has a direct stake
in this and has been taking steps to strengthen its
capabilities in the High North. However, other states
are also being prompted to refocus on and revive
their ability to operate in this region (hence the return
in 2018, after more than a decade, of a Royal Navy
submarine to an under-ice exercise) and also drawing
in other major actors, notably China.
SWEDEN
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its
support of separatists in eastern Ukraine were a
clear indication to the Swedish security and defence
community that Russia’s increased involvement in the
affairs of neighbouring states now posed a challenge
to the hitherto-benign security environment in the
Baltic. This situation was reflected in a May 2014
report by the Swedish Defence Commission. This
document, which set out objectives for security policy
and defence developments over the next five years,
noted that the territorial defence of Sweden was
once again the primary task for the Swedish Armed
Forces (SAF). At the same time, having been subject
to repeated reductions in the 1990s and early 2000s,
no further cuts were announced in defence spending
or organisation.
The subsequent defence bill, agreed by parliament
in 2015, said that the war-fighting capability of the
SAF needed to be strengthened along with defence
cooperation with other countries and organisations,
within the restrictions of a non-aligned policy. In
addition, initial steps were taken to reactivate the
Cold War-era ‘total defence’ concept, in terms of
planning and preparatory actions involving national
and local government agencies, as well as private
enterprises and civil society. Another outcome was
that the trend of falling defence expenditure levelled
out and started to rise in absolute terms, although not
as a percentage of GDP.
Defence priorities
These new priorities are notable in part because of
the limited interest that hitherto had been paid to
defence-related issues across the political spectrum.
During the Cold War, defence issues were prominent
in Swedish society and in government policy.
Sweden’s priorities changed during the 1980s, and
particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991, in light of the development of a more favourable
security situation in the Baltic region and the desire by
politicians to release defence funds for other areas of
government spending. Swedish defence policy in the
1990s and early 2000s was largely focused on peace-
support operations, first in the western Balkans and
later in Afghanistan. Other areas of importance were
procurement and defence-industry issues, such as the
recurrent upgrades to the JAS-39C/D Gripen combat
aircraft and related export drives.
In the wake of the deep force reductions that took
place between 1990 and 2005 and the suspension
of peacetime conscription in 2010, the armed forces
and security issues had become less ‘visible’ to the
population. About two-thirds of defence-related
infrastructure was closed in the years after the Cold
War, with this process accelerating in the late 1990s
and early 2000s. Before 1990, almost every county in
Sweden hosted either an army garrison, an air-force
wing or a naval base, and the vast majority of men
had military experience from their time as conscripts.
(Until it was suspended in 2010, only Swedish men
were conscripted.) In recent years, administrations
have therefore tried to revive awareness of defence
issues among the population. An example of this
was the distribution in June 2018 of a civil-defence
brochure called ‘If crisis or war comes’. Sent to
all Swedish households, this pamphlet contained
information on emergency preparedness, total
defence and the warning systems used to alert citizens
in various contingencies.
The renewed interest in security and defence has
spurred debate on the merits of Swedish military
non-alignment versus NATO membership. Sweden’s
political parties are divided on this issue. The Social
Democrats, the Green Party, the Left Party and

the Swedish Democrats are in favour of continued
non-alignment. The Social Democrats say that a shift
in Swedish policy would be destabilising for the
Baltic Sea region. Others say that NATO membership
would force Sweden to raise its defence spending,
and this money would be better spent on areas
including foreign aid and domestic welfare. Concerns
about Alliance membership also include the politics
of some members, and the possession of nuclear
weapons by three allies.
At the other end of the spectrum are parties that
formed the government between 2006 and 2014.
The Moderate Party, the Liberal Party, the Center
Party and the Christian Democratic Party are all
publicly in favour of Swedish NATO membership,
though it is not high on their agenda. Proponents
of membership say that this should have the
support of a majority of the population and that
any application should be made in tandem with
Finland. However, opinion polls show that Swedish
opinion is divided. A poll in Sweden’s biggest
daily newspaper in January 2018 showed that the
public was 43% in favour of NATO membership,
37% against and 25% undecided. A previous poll
from July 2017 published by the public television
company showed 32% in favour, 43% against and
25% undecided. Historically, the percentage of the
Swedish population against NATO membership
has been higher than that in favour.
Defence cooperation
Despite its non-aligned status, Sweden has continued
a policy of close cooperation with NATO in several
areas, in addition to long-standing membership
of the Partnership for Peace programme and
contributions to Alliance-led operations. Cooperation
has been deepened by membership of the enhanced-
opportunities programme for partner countries,
along with Finland, and implementation of the
2014 host-nation support agreement with NATO.
Sweden has also taken part, as a partner country,
in several NATO exercises, such as CMX 2016 and
Trident Juncture 2018. Aside from cooperation with
NATO, as a member of the European Union Sweden
has supported the development of the Permanent
Structured Cooperation (PESCO), launched in
late 2017. In terms of peace-support operations,
Sweden’s major troop contribution has since 2015
been an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
unit deployed to the UN-led operation in Mali,
MINUSMA.
Europe 79
Sweden is a firm supporter of Nordic Defence
Cooperation (NORDEFCO), and is due to chair the
mechanism in 2019. However, the most significant
recent developments in defence cooperation are
several agreements on peacetime cooperation with
countries such as the United Kingdom and the
United States in order to, among other things, boost
interoperability. Bilateral cooperation with Finland
Europe
is particularly important and includes operational
planning for joint action in various contingencies
including war, if activated by the political authorities
in the two countries.
The armed forces
The present-day Swedish Armed Forces is largely a
product of the 2004 defence bill. This was the third in a
succession of defence decisions (1995/1996, 1999/2001
and 2004) that reduced the size of the armed forces
and defence funding. Parliament stated in 2004 that
the basis for the SAF’s posture should be that there
were no military threats of any significance and that
this would be the case for the foreseeable future. An
additional assumption was that any changes would
come with at least ten years’ notice (the ten-year
rule was dropped in 2010, two years after the war in
Georgia). This move meant that operational planning
for territorial defence was discontinued; consequently,
there was no need for wartime organisation or a
mobilisation system. The armed forces were mainly
tasked with taking part in international operations
and maintaining existing military skills. Readiness
requirements differed between units, ranging from
days to years, in order to economise because of scarce
resources. With the exception of coastal artillery,
most military units were maintained to some degree,
although numbers were in many cases small, with
correspondingly limited operational capability. In
2010, the government suspended conscription, as part
of a move towards an all-volunteer force. However, the
end of conscription was not matched by the number
of volunteers needed to fill posts. According to the
ministry, ‘all-volunteer recruitment hasn’t provided
the Armed Forces with enough trained personnel’
and readiness was suffering. The armed forces were
short of ‘1,000 active squad leaders, soldiers and
sailors as well as 7,000 reservists’ in 2016. Announcing
the return of conscript service from the beginning of
2018, defence authorities said that recruitment would
be both voluntary and conscript-based and would
be gender-neutral, with both men and women now
subject to the draft.
80 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

1 Boden Skaraborg Regiment (2 armoured

Regional Command North battalions)
Norrbotten Regiment (2 armoured  Logistics Regiment (2 logistics
battalions; 1 light infantry battalion) battalions)
Artillery Regiment (2 artillery
11 Karlsborg
battalions)
Life Hussars Regiment (1 airborne
NORRBOTTEN 2 Luleå battalion; 1 reconnaissance
Norrbotten Wing (2 FGA battalion)
squadrons with Gripen; 12 Linköping
Army 1 1 helicopter squadron)
2 Helicopter Wing (1 helicopter
Navy 3 Umeå squadron; 1 electronic-
Air Force National CBRN Defence Centre intelligence/airborne
4 Uppsala
early-warning and control unit)
Regional Command VÄSTERBOTTEN
Air Combat Training School 13 Göteborg
Training centre
Armed Forces Intelligence and Centre for Defence Medicine
Specialist centre 3 Security Centre
14 Eksjö
VÄSTERNORRLAND 5 Enköping 2nd Engineer Regiment (2
Command and Control Regiment engineer battalions)
SWEDEN FINLAND Swedish EOD, Demining and
6 Berga
Engineering Centre
4th Naval Warfare Flotilla
JÄMTLAND
1st Marine Regiment 15 Visby
Gotland Regiment (1 armoured
GÄVLEBORG
7 Stockholm
battalion)
Swedish Armed Forces HQ
NORWAY Armed Forces Logistics 16 Halmstad
DALARNA Management Air Defence Regiment
UPPSALA Regional Command (2 air-defence battalions)
Life Guards Regiment (1 military Armed Forces Technical School
VÄSTMANLAND 4 police battalion; 1 motorised Military Academy Halmstad
VÄRMLAND ÖREBRO 5 STOCKHOLM
infantry battalion; 1 security
6 7 ESTONIA 17 Ronneby (Kallinge)
8 battalion) (including SWEDINT)
Blekinge Wing (2 FGA squadrons
SÖDERMANLAND National Guard Combat School
with Gripen; 1 helicopter
Military Academy Karlberg
9 10 11 12 ÖSTERGÖTLAND squadron)
8 Örebro 18 Karlskrona
VÄSTRA GÖTALAND
Armed Forces Network and
15 Naval base
13 14 KALMAR Telecommunications Unit
JÖNKÖPING GOTLAND 1st Submarine Flotilla
9 Lidköping (Såtenäs) 3rd Naval Warfare Flotilla
HALLAND
KRONOBERG Skaraborg Wing (2 FGA Naval warfare School
16 squadrons with Gripen; 1
19 Lund (Revingehed)
DENMARK 17 18 BLEKINGE transport squadron with C-130H)
SKÅNE Regional Command South
10 Skövde South Skåne Regiment (1
19 Regional Command West armoured battalion; 1 mechanised
Land Combat School battalion)
© IISS
BELARUS

▲ Map 2 Sweden: principal military bases

Army An important outcome of the 2015 defence bill

The Swedish Army comprises two mechanised
brigades with units including armour (with Leopard 2
main battle tanks), mechanised infantry (with CV9040
infantry fighting vehicles), artillery, engineering,
air-defence and auxiliary units. The southern brigade
is headquartered in Skövde, while the northern
brigade is headquartered in Boden. As well as these
two brigades, there are more specialised units, such
as ranger and intelligence battalions, and a chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear company. The
army has experienced difficulty in filling personnel-
intensive units with volunteers and will benefit from
the decision to reintroduce conscription.
was to once again garrison the island of Gotland.
As a result, a mechanised battlegroup has been
permanently based there since 2017. New barracks
and maintenance facilities have been built outside
Visby, near training facilities that were not dismantled
when the armoured regiment stationed there was
disbanded in 2005. Indeed this unit, the Gotland
Regiment, was itself revived in 2018, at least in name.
Gotland was also central to Sweden’s large Aurora
military exercise in 2017.
Ongoing army procurements include self-
propelled mortars, Archer self-propelled artillery
pieces, and short-range anti-aircraft missiles. Elements

of the CV90 and Leopard 2 MBT fleets, delivered in the
1990s, are being refurbished and upgraded. In August
2018, in order to boost the capability of its air-defence
network, the government decided to acquire the
US-made Patriot surface-to-air missile system. This
will replace the 1960s-vintage Hawk and is one of
Sweden’s major defence procurements in the near
term.
Navy
Sweden’s main naval base is at Karlskrona, with a
supplementary base located outside Stockholm.
There is also a harbour and replenishment
facilities in Gothenburg on the west coast. The
main operational components of the navy are two
naval-warfare flotillas, a submarine flotilla and an
amphibious battalion equipped with fast assault
craft. The navy was the principal beneficiary of
the change to voluntary recruitment in 2010, as it
was able to recruit specialists more directly, and
its units operate modern vessels such as the Visby-
class corvettes and the Gotland-class submarines. The
level of interoperability with other countries is high,
especially so in the case of Finland; the navy plays
an important role in bilateral operational defence
cooperation.
The navy frequently takes part in multilateral
exercises, such as BALTOPS. Like the army, its
main limitation is its small size (five corvettes, five
submarines, four missile boats, as well as smaller
vessels for counter-mine operations, logistics support
and surveillance), though it has responsibility for one
of the longest coastlines in Europe.
Current naval procurements include a new signals-
intelligence ship, the new A26 submarine class (with
two on order) and new anti-ship missiles (RBS-15
Mk4) for the Visby corvettes. In addition, two Gotland-
class submarines, two Göteborg-class corvettes and the
amphibious battalion’s fleet of fast assault craft are
being refurbished and upgraded.
Air force
The air force’s main task of monitoring Swedish
airspace and securing the territorial integrity has
proven more demanding over the last few years due
to the assertive behaviour of Russian forces in the
Baltic Sea area. Its inventory includes Saab JAS-39
C/D Gripen multi-role fighters organised into six
squadrons based at Luleå, Ronneby and Såtenäs.
The last C/D version was delivered to the Swedish
Air Force in 2015. The Gripen’s operational capability
Europe 81
was significantly boosted by the integration in 2016 of
the Meteor long-range air-to-air missile; its armament
till then included AIM-120 AMRAAM and IRIS-T
air-to-air missiles, RBS-15 air-to-surface missiles
and GBU-49 laser-guided bombs. Alternative bases
for fighter wings exist at Uppsala and at Gotland.
However, the deteriorating security environment
has highlighted the need to disperse the fighter
Europe
squadrons to wartime locations during periods of
heightened readiness. This concept was developed
by the air force during the Cold War but only limited
infrastructure, materiel and dedicated personnel
remain after the reductions of the 1990s and early
2000s.
For airlift, a transport squadron of six C-130Hs is
based at Såtenäs. Sweden is also a member of the SAC
Heavy Airlift Wing in Hungary, which operates three
C-17s. The SAF’s fleet of AW 109, UH-60M Black Hawk
and NH90 helicopters is organised in a combined
helicopter wing, with three squadrons for ground-
based and naval operations. The naval version of
NH90 is capable of conducting anti-submarine
operations.
The air force is the dominant service in terms of
research and development and procurement. Indeed,
the largest proportion of the defence-materiel budget
is taken up by development and production of the
new JAS-39 Gripen E. The Swedish government has
ordered 60 in total. The ‘E’ variant’s first flight took
place in mid-2017. The aircraft are expected to be
delivered between 2020 and 2026.
Home Guard
The volunteer-based Home Guard serves as
Sweden’s territorial force. It includes nearly 22,000
troops in 40 battalions and can be mobilised in hours,
according to the armed forces. This was tested in a
large mobilisation exercise in mid-2018. Its main
tasks include the protection of military installations
and navy and air-force bases, as well as surveillance
and intelligence gathering. The Home Guard also
supports the emergency services in disasters, such as
the forest fires in summer 2018.
Some elements of the Home Guard are tactically
mobile and the coastal units are equipped with
fast boats. Mortars, radio equipment and transport
vehicles have recently been either procured or
transferred from the army. The Home Guard’s
personnel establishment has in recent years been
stable. However, the reintroduction of conscription
and basic military training will also be important for
82 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
future recruitment to the Home Guard. In many parts
of Sweden, it represents the sole military presence,
which makes the Home Guard an important link
between the public and the armed forces.
Defence economics
The Swedish economy is growing and is expected
to continue to do so in the near future. According to
the IMF, GDP growth for 2018 will be 2.4%, which is
above the forecast for the euro area (2.0%). The labour
market is strong but unemployment is not expected
to fall much further from the current level of 6.3%,
due to a slowdown in job creation and the labour
force growing as a result of immigration.
The Swedish defence budget has risen from
US$5.99 billion in 2013 to US$6.54bn in 2018, when
measured in constant (2010) US dollars. Defence
spending in Sweden in 2018 amounts to 1.12% of
GDP compared to 1.54% in Norway, 1.23% in Finland
and 1.20% in Denmark. According to an agreement
reached in 2017 between the Social Democrats, the
Green Party, the Moderate Party and the Center
Party, the defence budget should rise by US$300
million each year from 2018–20. In spite of this, the
SAF reported in spring 2018 that it needs even more
funding in order to fulfil the aims of the 2015 defence
bill. This was supported by a government-appointed
public inquiry, which in February 2018 said that the
acquisition of new equipment, in-service support
and equipment maintenance for the SAF were
underfunded by at least US$700m between 2018 to
2025.
The next long-term defence bill is planned for
2020. The Swedish Defence Commission (with
representatives from all parties in parliament) is
expected to report back to government in May 2019
their recommendations for defence policy for the
years 2021–25. One of the major issues for political
negotiations will be generating a sustainable level
of defence spending beyond 2020. Several parties in
parliament have argued in favour of a substantial
increase during the 2020s, aimed at reaching 2% of
GDP in the latter half of the decade.
As late as 2000 Sweden spent 2% of GDP on
defence, according to Military Balance figures. Any
government would need significant political will to
today pursue similar funding aspirations. And were
such a funding boost to transpire, the challenge for
the Swedish Armed Forces would then be to absorb
the effective doubling of its budget at the same time
as transforming its defence posture.
UNITED KINGDOM
The United Kingdom’s armed forces retain significant
deployable combat power, but under-staffing and
a forward equipment programme that has been
labelled ‘unaffordable’ limit their current and future
military capabilities. While UK Defence Secretary
Gavin Williamson has announced a ‘Modernising
Defence Programme’, the likelihood of acquiring the
funds necessary to deliver this appears low, raising
the possibility of further reductions.
The 2010 UK Strategic Defence and Security
Review (SDSR) reduced the UK armed forces’
conventional military capability by about one-third,
and the judgement that the country’s defence-policy
goals and equipment programmes were unaffordable
led to a reduction in military ambition. However,
the 2015 SDSR resulted in the decision to invest in
equipment modernisation in order to deliver the
more capable ‘Joint Force 2025’. Orders were placed
for F-35B Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters, AH-64E
Apache helicopters, MQ-9B Sky Guardian (dubbed
Protector in UK service) uninhabited aerial vehicles
(UAVs) and P-8A Poseidon maritime-patrol aircraft.
The financial strategy to achieve this was based
on 0.5% real-terms growth to the defence budget
each year, more effective control of equipment-
programme-cost growth and ambitious targets for
internal efficiency savings.
Modernising defence
By late 2017, a year after the UK National Security
Council concluded that threats from domestic
terrorism, cyberspace, and Russia’s military and
‘hybrid’ challenges were materialising more rapidly
than envisaged, it was clear that the defence
programme was again running into financial trouble.
One reason was that the 2016 referendum vote to
leave the European Union devalued the pound and
increased the cost of buying foreign equipment.
Another was that the costs of some future equipment
programmes, particularly submarine and nuclear
capabilities, were growing faster than anticipated,
while many of the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD’s)
efficiency savings had not materialised.
In January 2018, Williamson announced that he
would lead a ‘Modernising Defence Programme’
scrutinising the MoD and its business and equipment-
procurement processes, in order to identify savings
and ways to increase efficiency. Another strand
of this review is to decide on the UK’s current and
 Europe 83

future capabilities. Williamson has said he would
press for more funds, while he and the service chiefs
have made explicit statements about the increasing
Russian threat to the UK and its forces. At the time
of writing, it was unclear when this plan would be
published.
However, in November 2018 the UK’s National
Audit Office assessed the equipment plan as
the MoD, with a high probability of further cuts to
the armed forces’ conventional capability. These
circumstances also increase the considerable
challenge of funding any capability enhancements
that might be proposed by the Modernising Defence
Programme.
Equipment and operations

‘unaffordable’, pointing towards a major shortfall in
the forward equipment programme’s funding. The
£186.4-billion (US$249bn) plan had an affordability
gap of at least £7.0bn (US$9.4bn), of which £5.9bn
(US$7.9bn) will occur in the next four years. The MoD
is looking for efficiency and costs-saving measures
as a result of these funding challenges. During 2018,
leaks indicated three operational-capability-reduction
packages under consideration. The combination of an
unaffordable equipment plan, a high proportion of
new equipment projects being at risk and increasing
levels of under-staffing raise difficult choices for
Europe
Amid this challenging financial environment, the UK
nonetheless continued to order and introduce new
equipment into service. In 2018, fixed-wing trials
began for HMS Queen Elizabeth. The carrier transited
to the US east coast where the UK’s newly acquired
F-35B aircraft landed on the vessel for the first time.
The MoD also announced it would procure the E-7
airborne early-warning aircraft and rejoin the Boxer
armoured-vehicle programme for its Mechanised
Infantry Vehicle requirement. Together with Ajax
tracked vehicles, the wheeled Boxer is envisaged as
being a key component of the army’s future Strike

▼ Figure 7 UK: selected equipment reductions, 1989 and 2018

Personnel Army Royal Navy

1989 2018 1989 2018
Army (incl. Gurkhas) Main battle tanks (excl. stored) Royal Marines commando 3 2
(battalion-sized)

155,500 83,500 1989 2018 Aircraft carriers - 1

870 227 Light aircraft carriers 3 -

(incl. 1 in reserve)
Royal Navy
Nuclear-powered ballistic- 4 4
64,650 32,350 missile submarines (Polaris) (Trident)
1989 2018
Nuclear-powered attack 16 6
Tank regiments 13 3
Royal Air Force submarines
Armoured infantry 3 6
91,450 32,500 battalions Conventionally powered 11 -
submarines
Mechanised infantry 20 3
battalions Landing platform docks 2 2

Royal Air Force Infantry battalions (excl. 29 17 Landing ship docks 5 3

1989 2018 specialised infantry)

Combat aircraft Air-defence destroyers 13 6

Self-propelled artillery 8 3
regiments
Anti-submarine/general- 34 13
Field artillery regiments 9 4 purpose frigates
489 191 (incl. heavy artillery)
Mine countermeasures 38 13
Surface-to-surface 1 - vessels
missile regiments
Patrol and coastal 44 22
Air-defence regiments 3 2 combatants
Combat squadrons
25 8 Airborne battalions 3 3
Logistics and support 38 16
(incl. air-mobile)
© IISS
 84

HMS Queen Elizabeth and its sister ship Prince of Wales will, in full carrier-strike
configuration, offer a power-projection capability far greater than that of their immediate
predecessors, and probably second only to US Navy strike carriers. Studies to replace the
Invincible-class light aircraft carriers began in the mid-1990s. The 1998 Strategic Defence
Review announced plans for two new larger vessels, able to carry up to 50 aircraft. The
project was controversial from the start and suffered multiple delays and cost increases.
The two ships themselves are unique for their size (of 65,000 tonnes) in being configured for
short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) without catapults or arrestor gear. Some critics
regard this as sub-optimal, because of the relatively short range and payload limitations of
the F-35B STOVL variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, as well as the ships’ inability to
accommodate conventional fixed-wing airborne early-warning aircraft. Furthermore, there
are doubts as to whether they will regularly deploy their full complement (at least 36) of
F-35s. The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review announced that the ships would be
given enhanced amphibious assault carrier (LPH) features likely to include improved
accommodation and equipment facilities for an embarked force. There is some concern over
using such high-value platforms in the LPH role, and that adding such a requirement could
have a detrimental effect on the development of a full carrier-strike capability. Nevertheless,
it seems likely that they will be employed as more flexible platforms for joint operations than
traditional carriers. Notwithstanding an abortive plan in 2010 to fit them with catapults and
arrestor gear, this remains an option during their expected 50-year service lives – not least to
accommodate new uninhabited air systems – and they possess features to enable such
adaption.
THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Twin-island design
 Allows separation of main
propulsion units for increased
survivability
▼ Figure 8 Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers

 Enables better location of flying

control in aft island for
improved flight-deck operations

Briefing rooms
 Integrated and
comprehensive complex
 Optimised aviation-
mission planning

Crewing Weapons Integrated electric propulsion

 Lean crewing with extensive use of remote systems to  Magazines  Two gas turbines
reduce full-life costs  Highly automated  Four diesel generators
 Original complement of 679 likely to rise to nearer 900, weapons-handling system  112MW power
Ski-jump
with an air group of 900  Significant reduction in  Maximum speed of 27+ knots
 Built at 12.5 degrees
 Reduced crewing an area of innovation and potential crew requirement
 Improves F-35B short-  Capacity for future systems,
operational risk including electromagnetic
take-off performance
 New USS Gerald R. Ford (at 100,000 tonnes) will likely catapult and directed-energy
have a crew of about 2,600 and an air group of 2,400 weapons

© IISS © IISS
Flight deck and flying operations Notional carrier air groups
Crowsnest Merlin HM2 F-35B Lightning II
 In full carrier-strike configuration, Carrier strike
 Airborne surveillance and
Merlin HM2 this will be the only class of carriers  24-36 F-35B Lightning II
control system, employing
 Anti-submarine-warfare Searchwater radar helicopter with a complete complement of  5 Crowsnest Merlin HM2
helicopter for force protection for force protection fifth-generation fixed-wing aircraft  9 Merlin HM2

Littoral manoeuvre–amphibious assault carrier (LPH)

 8 AH-64D Apache  5 Crowsnest Merlin HM2
 3 CH-47 Chinook  9 Merlin HM2
 12 Merlin HM3/4  2 company embarked
 6 Wildcat AH1 force (250 personnel)

Hybrid combined operation

 6-12 F-35B Lightning II  3 CH-47 Chinook
 Capable of V-22  5 Crowsnest Merlin HM2  6 Wildcat AH1
Osprey operation  9 Merlin HM2/3/4  Embarked special
 8 AH-64D Apache forces
▼ Figure 8 Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers

Thermal metal spray coating ‘Bedford array’ flight deck Shipborne rolling vertical landing (SRVL) Hangar and lifts Notional carrier strike groups
 To protect flight deck lighting system  Developed for the F-35B  Hangar capacity for
Carrier task group: UK sovereign
from F-35B jet efflux  For stabilised glide  Employs combined downward jet thrust at least 20 F-35Bs
 Applied to three landing path alignment for and wing lift for rolling landing at reduced  Large lifts can take
spots and section of F-35B SRVL approach speeds without the need for arrestor gear two F-35Bs each or
runway for take-offs  Improves recovery capability for aircraft one CH-47 Chinook
weapons and fuel without folded rotors
 1 carrier
 2 Type-45 destroyers
UK aircraft-carrier capability-regeneration timeline, 2016–26  2 Type-23/-26 frigates
 1 Astute-class submarine
Crowsnest Queen Crowsnest Crowsnest full  2 auxiliaries
Airborne Elizabeth initial operating Prince of Wales
Surveillance commissioned operating capability full operating
and Control Coalition task group: possible additional units
Prince of capability capability in LPH
contract Queen
role Carrier-Enabled
Wales Elizabeth
signed Carrier Queen Elizabeth Power Projection
officially F-35B flying strike initial first operational Carrier strike full full operating
named trials begin  2 US Arleigh Burke-class destroyers
Royal Navy operating deployment with operating capability (full
Queen accepts capability UK and possibly capability (24 range of  2 European frigates
Elizabeth Prince of US Marine Corps F-35Bs available capabilities and full The Royal Navy has postulated a sovereign carrier
begins sea Wales from F-35Bs for carrier task group with new group as above for a high-threat environment. The
trials builders embarked operations) support shipping) more contested the environment, the more support,
including from allies, that would be required. Two
carriers will allow a continuous availability of one
ship, but operating both together would likely
Europe

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 overstretch RN resources for the foreseeable future,
except in an extreme emergency.
85

© IISS

Europe
86 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Brigades. Although the defence secretary said
that there were no plans to decommission the two
landing-platform-dock (LPD) amphibious ships, the
landing-platform-helicopter (LPH) HMS Ocean was
decommissioned and sold to Brazil.
While the UK’s global deployments persist,
personnel strength has continued to fall across the
services. Under-staffing increased by 1.3% in 2018,
an overall deficit of 6.2%, compared with 3.3% in
2016. There are particular deficiencies in numbers
of pilots, intelligence specialists and engineers,
especially nuclear engineers. These shortages result,
in part, from pay being below comparable civilian
levels. The MoD claims it has sufficient personnel
to meet its operational requirements, and while the
army could probably draw on its reserve, the navy
and air force reserves are smaller and lack many key
capabilities.
Uncertain prospects
It is unlikely that efficiency savings alone will release
funds of the order required to tackle the current
financial difficulties. The July 2018 Major Projects
Review said that there is considerable risk in many
future equipment projects, with almost half being
graded amber (‘successful delivery is in doubt’) or
red (‘successful delivery appears to be unachievable’),
the latter including future nuclear reactors, Astute
submarines, Protector UAVs and the upgraded Warrior
infantry fighting vehicle. Many of the programmes at
risk are crucial to delivering the capabilities required
by Joint Force 2025. Furthermore, without significant
improvements in pay, allowances, accommodation
and training, the chances of the services approaching
full strength are likely to be remote.
Financial commitments to other areas by the
government, and uncertainty over the near-term
trajectory of the economy after the UK withdraws
from the EU, make it unlikely that there will be
a significant increase in the defence budget. This
reduces the MoD’s room for manoeuvre in balancing
existing and future capability requirements, and
means that further reductions to the conventional
capabilities of the UK’s armed forces may be likely.
 Europe 87

MANOEUVRE
Albania ALB Light
3 lt inf bn
Albanian Lek 2017 2018 2019
COMBAT SUPPORT
GDP lek 1.55tr 1.65tr 1 mor bty
US$ 13.1bn 15.1bn 1 NBC coy
per capita US$ 4,545 5,261 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Growth % 3.8 4.0 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Inflation % 2.0 2.3 APC • PPV 3 Maxxpro Plus
ARTILLERY • MOR 93: 82mm 81; 120mm 12

Europe
Def exp [a] lek 17.2bn 19.5bn
US$ 145m 178m
Def bdgt [b] lek 13.0bn 14.3bn 15.7bn
Naval Force 650
US$ 110m 131m
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBF 5
FMA (US) US$ 2.4m 0m
Archangel
US$1=lek 118.80 109.35
[a] NATO definition Coast Guard
[b] Excludes military pensions EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 22
Population 3,057,220
PB 9: 4 Iluria (Damen Stan Patrol 4207); 3 Mk3 Sea
Ethnic groups: Albanian 82.6%; Greek 0.9%; Romani 0.3%; Spectre; 2 (other)
Macedonian 0.2%; other or unspecified 15.7%
PBR 13: 4 Type-227; 1 Type-246; 1 Type-303; 7 Type-2010
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 9.5% 4.2% 4.9% 4.8% 20.5% 5.6%
Air Force 550
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Female 8.5% 3.8% 4.6% 4.6% 22.5% 6.3%
HELICOPTERS
TPT 27: Medium 4 AS532AL Cougar; Light 22: 1 AW109; 5
Capabilities Bell 205 (AB-205); 7 Bell 206C (AB-206C); 8 Bo-105; 2 H145
Principal missions for Albania’s armed forces include territo-
rial defence, internal security, disaster-relief tasks, and small- Regional Support Brigade 700
scale peacekeeping or training deployments. Tirana is looking
to improve the operational readiness of its mechanised infantry
FORCES BY ROLE
battalion in order to fulfil obligations to NATO, which it joined in COMBAT SUPPORT
2009. Other priorities include improving border management and 1 cbt spt bde (1 engr bn, 1 (rescue) engr bn, 1 CIMIC det)
information sharing to prevent transnational crime and terrorism.
Greece and Italy police Albania’s airspace. Albania contributes to Military Police
EU missions but does not possess an independent expedition- FORCES BY ROLE
ary capability. Most Soviet-era equipment has been sold. Limited
COMBAT SUPPORT
defence modernisation under the Long-term Development Plan
1 MP bn
2016–25 is proceeding, but progress has so far been restricted
to small numbers of helicopters. However, the contract for the EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
purchase of the Integrated Surveillance System for Albanian Air- ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
space was approved in November 2017. The navy is expected to AUV IVECO LMV
receive upgrades to vessels that have been or still are deployed in
the Aegean Sea. In late 2018, the prime minister announced that Logistics Brigade 1,200
NATO will invest in modernising the Kucove air base. Albania has
little in the way of domestic defence industry, with no ability to FORCES BY ROLE
design and manufacture modern military platforms. Nevertheless, COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
the country has some publicly owned defence companies that are 1 log bde (1 tpt bn, 2 log bn)
capable of producing small arms, explosives and ammunition.

ACTIVE 8,000 (Land Force 3,000 Naval Force 650 Air DEPLOYMENT
Force 550 Other 3,800) Paramilitary 500 AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 136
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 1
LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 21; 1 EOD pl
Land Force 3,000 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 4
FORCES BY ROLE
MEDITERRANEAN SEA: NATO • SNMG 2: 1 PB
SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF bn SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 28; OSCE • Kosovo 3
1 cdo bn UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 9
88 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

some 100 companies with significant niche capabilities and inter-

FOREIGN FORCES national ties in the areas of weapons and ammunitions, communi-
Armenia OSCE 1 cations equipment and vehicles.
Austria OSCE 1
ACTIVE 21,200 (Land Forces 11,550 Air 2,700
Bosnia-Herzegovina OSCE 1
Support 6,950)
Bulgaria OSCE 1 Conscript liability 6 months recruit trg, 30 days reservist refresher
Canada OSCE 1 trg for volunteers; 120–150 days additional for officers, NCOs and
Georgia OSCE 1 specialists. Authorised maximum wartime strength of 55,000
Germany OSCE 3
RESERVE 157,900 (Joint structured 27,700; Joint
Italy OSCE 1
unstructured 130,200)
Macedonia (FYROM) OSCE 2
Some 12,000 reservists a year undergo refresher trg in tranches
Moldova OSCE 1
Serbia OSCE 1
United Kingdom OSCE 2
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Land Forces 11,550

Austria AUT FORCES BY ROLE
Euro € 2017 2018 2019 MANOEUVRE
GDP € 370bn 387bn Armoured
1 (4th) armd inf bde (1 recce/SP arty bn, 1 tk bn, 2 armd
US$ 417bn 459bn
inf bn, 1 spt bn)
per capita US$ 47,347 51,708
Mechanised
Growth % 3.0 2.8 1 (3rd) mech inf bde (1 recce/SP arty bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1
Inflation % 2.2 2.0 mot inf bn; 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn)
Def bdgt [a] € 2.80bn 2.85bn 2.89bn Light
US$ 3.16bn 3.38bn 1 (7th) lt inf bde (1 recce bn, 3 inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn)
US$1=€ 0.89 0.84 1 (6th) mtn inf bde (3 mtn inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn)
[a] Includes military pensions EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Population 8,793,370
MBT 56 Leopard 2A4
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus AIFV 112 Ulan
APC • APC (W) 78 Pandur
Male 7.2% 2.6% 3.1% 3.3% 24.4% 8.4%
AUV 157: 29 Dingo 2; 128 IVECO LMV
Female 6.8% 2.5% 3.0% 3.3% 24.6% 10.9%
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
ARV 30: 20 4KH7FA-SB; 10 M88A1
Capabilities NBC VEHICLES 12 Dingo 2 AC NBC
Austria remains constitutionally non-aligned, but is an EU member ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
and actively engaged in the Common Security and Defence Policy. MSL • MANPATS Bill 2 (PAL 2000)
Defence-policy objectives are based on the 2013 National Security ARTILLERY 114
Strategy, the 2014 Defence Strategy and the 2015 Military Strat-
SP 155mm 24 M109A5ÖE
egy, including providing military capabilities to maintain sover-
MOR 120mm 90 sGrW 86 (10 more in store)
eignty and territorial integrity, to enable military assistance to the
civil authorities and to participate in crisis-management missions
abroad. A 2017 defence plan included structural changes at the Air Force 2,700
operational and tactical command-and-control level; Vienna is The Air Force is part of Joint Forces Comd and consists of
also planning to boost its rapid-response capability and to stand 2 bde; Air Support Comd and Airspace Surveillance Comd
up new Jäger battalions. In addition, army brigades will specialise
FORCES BY ROLE
according to roles, such as rapid response, mechanised (heavy),
air-mobile (light) and mountain warfare. Initial steps were taken in FIGHTER
2017 but implementation appears incomplete. While not a NATO 2 sqn with Typhoon
member, Austria joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace framework ISR
in 1995 and has since participated in NATO-led crisis-management 1 sqn with PC-6B Turbo Porter
operations. In April 2018, the government announced modest TRANSPORT
budget increases to support training and exercises. The level of 1 sqn with C-130K Hercules
ambition for crisis response is to be able to deploy and sustain a TRAINING
minimum (on average) of 1,100 troops. In August 2018, several
1 trg sqn with Saab 105Oe*
options were discussed to replace Austria’s Typhoon aircraft,
including upgrades to the existing fleet as well as replacement of 1 trg sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer
the existing airframes. Protected mobility is a modernisation prior- TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
ity for 2018 and 2019, and a range of armoured vehicles are due 2 sqn with Bell 212 (AB-212)
to enter service. Austria’s defence-industrial base is comprised of 1 sqn with OH-58B Kiowa
 Europe 89

1 sqn with S-70A Black Hawk BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea

2 sqn with SA316/SA319 Alouette III 344; 1 inf bn HQ; 2 inf coy; 1 hel unit
AIR DEFENCE CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 5
2 bn
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 182; 1 log coy
1 radar bn
MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 12; UN • MINUSMA 3
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 33 combat capable MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 4 obs
FTR 15 Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 1 MOLDOVA: OSCE • Moldova 1
TPT 11: Medium 3 C-130K Hercules; Light 8 PC-6B
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 508; 1 recce coy; 2 mech inf coy;

Europe
Turbo Porter
1 log coy; OSCE • Kosovo 1
TRG 32: 12 PC-7 Turbo Trainer; 18 Saab 105Oe*; 2
DA40NG UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 14
HELICOPTERS WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 7 obs
MRH 24 SA316/SA319 Alouette III
ISR 10 OH-58B Kiowa
TPT 32: Medium 9 S-70A-42 Black Hawk; Light 23 Bell
Belgium BEL
212 (AB-212) Euro € 2017 2018 2019
AIR DEFENCE GDP € 437bn 452bn
SAM • Point-defence Mistral
US$ 494bn 536bn
GUNS 35mm 24 Z-FIAK system (6 more in store)
per capita US$ 43,488 46,979
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IIR IRIS-T
Growth % 1.7 1.5
Special Operations Forces Inflation % 2.2 2.2

FORCES BY ROLE Def exp [a] € 4.00bn 4.20bn

SPECIAL FORCES US$ 4.51bn 4.98bn
2 SF gp Def bdgt [b] € 4.00bn 4.20bn 4.19bn
1 SF gp (reserve) US$ 4.51bn 4.98bn
US$1=€ 0.89 0.84
Support 6,950 [a] NATO definition
Support forces comprise Joint Services Support Command [b] Includes military pensions
and several agencies, academies and schools
Population 11,570,762
Cyber Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
The implementation plan for the 2013 National Cyber Male 8.8% 2.8% 3.0% 3.3% 23.3% 8.1%
Security Strategy is nearly complete; the strategy will be
Female 8.4% 2.7% 2.9% 3.2% 23.1% 10.5%
reviewed in the near term. An Austrian cyber-security
law, based on the EU Network and Information Systems Capabilities
(NIS) Directive, took effect in late 2018, and a national NIS
authority is to be created. A national Cyber Security Steer- In July 2016, the government published its strategic vision for
defence up to 2030. Brussels intends to stabilise Belgium’s defence
ing Group coordinates cyber-security-related matters on
effort and then provide for growth after 2020. It also envisages
the strategic-operational level on a whole-of-government a reduced personnel component of around 25,000. However, a
approach. The defence ministry is responsible for strate- large number of impending service retirements means that a
gic planning and direction. The ministry’s Cyber Defence gradual increase in recruitment is planned. Belgium also continues
Board (led by the cyber coordinator) provides strategic to pursue high readiness levels and deployable niche capabili-
planning and direction. The defence structures/organisa- ties. NATO membership is central to defence policy, as are the EU
tion within the Cyber Defence Centre reached full operat- and the UN. Due to its limited force size, Belgium often collabo-
ing capability at the end of 2017. A CIS and Cyber Security rates with neighbours and has committed with Denmark and the
Netherlands to form a composite combined special-operations
Centre will be subordinated to the Joint Support and Ena-
command. Belgium can deploy forces for a small-scale overseas
bling Command and will assume overall responsibility for operation and maintains overseas deployments on EU and UN
cyber defence at the operational level. There is an opera- missions. The government is investing in short-term requirements
tional centralised Computer Security Incident Response related to aircraft readiness, personal equipment and land-forces
Capability, based on the armed forces’ milCERT. vehicles. As part of the defence plan, the government envisages
launching five investment projects for fighter aircraft, frigates,
mine-countermeasures vessels, UAVs and land-combat vehicles.
DEPLOYMENT The air force has selected the F-35 Lightning II to replace its F-16s.
Belgium has an advanced, export-focused defence industry, focus-
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 17
ing on components and subcontracting, though in FN Herstal it
ALBANIA: OSCE • Albania 1 has one of the world’s largest manufacturers of small arms.
90 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

ACTIVE 26,550 (Army 9,750 Navy 1,450 Air 5,700 Air Component 5,700
Medical Service 1,250 Joint Service 8,400) FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR
RESERVE 5,100
4 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon
SEARCH & RESCUE
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 1 sqn with Sea King Mk48
TRANSPORT
Land Component 9,750 1 sqn with A321; ERJ-135 LR; ERJ-145 LR; Falcon 900B
FORCES BY ROLE 1 sqn with C-130H Hercules
SPECIAL FORCES TRAINING
1 spec ops regt (1 SF gp, 1 cdo bn, 1 para bn) 1 OCU sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon
MANOEUVRE 1 sqn with SF-260D/M
Mechanised 1 BEL/FRA unit with Alpha Jet*
1 mech bde (1 ISR bn; 3 mech bn; 2 lt inf bn; 1 arty bn; 2 1 OCU unit with AW109
engr bn; 2 sigs gp; 2 log bn) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
COMBAT SUPPORT 2 sqn with AW109 (ISR)
1 EOD unit ISR UAV
1 MP coy 1 sqn with RQ-5A Hunter (B-Hunter)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 log bn AIRCRAFT 76 combat capable
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FTR 58: 48 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 10 F-16BM Fighting
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Falcon
ASLT 18 Piranha III-C DF90 TPT 16: Medium 10 C-130H Hercules; Light 4: 2 ERJ-135
RECCE 36 Pandur Recce LR; 2 ERJ-145 LR; PAX 2: 1 A321; 1 Falcon 900B
IFV 19 Piranha III-C DF30 TRG 50: 18 Alpha Jet*; 9 SF-260D; 23 SF-260M
APC • APC (W) 78: 64 Piranha III-C; 14 Piranha III-PC (CP) HELICOPTERS
AUV 656: 220 Dingo 2 (inc 52 CP); 436 IVECO LMV ASW 4 NH90 NFH opcon Navy
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES MRH 3 SA316B Alouette III opcon Navy
AEV 8 Piranha III-C SAR 3 Sea King Mk48 (to be replaced by NH90 NFH)
ARV 13: 4 Pandur; 9 Piranha III-C TPT 17: Medium 4 NH90 TTH; Light 13 AW109 (ISR) (7
VLB 4 Leguan more in store)
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
MSL • MANPATS Spike-MR ISR • Heavy 12 RQ-5A Hunter (B-Hunter) (1 more in store)
ARTILLERY 60 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
TOWED 105mm 14 LG1 MkII AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; IRR AIM-9X Sidewinder
MOR 46: 81mm 14; 120mm 32 II; ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM
BOMBS
Naval Component 1,450 Laser-guided: GBU-10/GBU-12 Paveway II; GBU-24
Paveway III
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
INS/GPS guided: GBU-31 JDAM; GBU-38 JDAM; GBU-
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 2
54 Laser JDAM (dual-mode)
FRIGATES • FFGHM 2 Leopold I (ex-NLD Karel Doorman)
with 2 quad lnchr with Harpoon AShM, 1 16-cell Mk48
VLS with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 4 single Mk32
Medical Service 1,250
324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 FORCES BY ROLE
76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4 med unit
PCC 2 Castor 1 fd hospital
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MHC 5 Flower (Tripartite) ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3 APC • APC (W) 10: 4 Pandur (amb); 6 Piranha III-C (amb)
AGFH 1 Godetia (log spt/comd) (capacity 1 Alouette III) AUV 10 Dingo 2 (amb)
AGOR 1 Belgica
AXS 1 Zenobe Gramme Cyber
The defence ministry released the Belgian Defence Cyber
Naval Aviation Security Strategy in 2014, outlining three pillars of its cyber-
(part of the Air Component) security capability: Cyber Defence, Cyber Intelligence and
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Cyber Counter-Offensive, with ‘full operational capacity’
HELICOPTERS by 2020. A ‘Strategic Vision for Defence’ covering the
ASW 4 NH90 NFH period 2016–30 was published in June 2016. In this, the
MRH 3 SA316B Alouette III cyber mandate was updated, including not only cyber
 Europe 91

defence and intelligence but also offensive capabilities. Capabilities

According to the defence ministry, this capability must, on
the one hand, ensure an appropriate level of cyber security
for Belgian weapons and communication systems, while
on the other it must also be able to identify, manipulate
or distort an opponent’s networks and systems. A cyber-
intelligence pillar guarantees the necessary situational
understanding to guarantee freedom of action. The defence
ministry is developing its Cyber Security Operations
Centre, which provides a second layer of cyber defence.
The armed forces’ primary goals are to defend territorial integrity
and contribute to peacekeeping missions and civilian-support
operations. Bosnia-Herzegovina joined NATO’s Partnership for
Peace in 2006 and a Membership Action Plan was presented in
2010. Its aspiration to join NATO has been delayed due to unre-
solved defence-property issues. The country is reforming its
armed forces and modernising its equipment in accordance with
its Defence Review, Development and Modernisation Plan for
2017–27 and its NATO aspirations. The armed forces are profes-

Europe
sional and represent all three ethnic groups. However, low salaries
All other types of cyber operations (response, exploitation, likely negatively affect recruitment and retention. Bosnia-Herze-
influence, offensive) are the responsibility of the centralised govina contributes to NATO missions and has deployed personnel
cyber capability. to Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan, but the armed forces
have no capacity to independently deploy and self-sustain beyond
national borders. The inventory comprises mainly ageing Soviet-
DEPLOYMENT era equipment. There is an aspiration to procure new Western
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 78 armoured vehicles and helicopters, but financial constraints have
limited progress. Bosnia-Herzegovina has little in the way of a
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • domestic defence industry, with only the capability to produce
MONUSCO 1; 1 obs small arms, ammunition and explosives.
FRANCE: NATO • Air Component 28 Alpha Jet located at ACTIVE 10,500 (Armed Forces 10,500)
Cazaux/Tours
IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 30 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
JORDAN: Operation Inherent Resolve (Desert Falcon) 30
LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 100; Armed Forces 10,500
1 tpt coy; NATO • Baltic Air Policing 4 F-16AM Fighting 1 ops comd; 1 spt comd
Falcon FORCES BY ROLE
MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 20; UN • MINUSMA 130; 1 recce MANOEUVRE
unit; 1 tpt flt with 1 C-130H Hercules Light
3 inf bde (1 recce coy, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn)
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 1 obs
COMBAT SUPPORT
NORTH SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 1: 1 MHC 1 cbt spt bde (1 tk bn, 1 engr bn, 1 EOD bn, 1 int bn, 1
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 1 MP bn, 1 CBRN coy, 1 sigs bn)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 log comd (5 log bn)
FOREIGN FORCES
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
United States US European Command: 900 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 45 M60A3
Bosnia-Herzegovina BIH APC • APC (T) 20 M113A2
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Convertible Mark 2017 2018 2019 VLB MTU
GDP mark 31.5bn 33.0bn MW Bozena
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL
US$ 18.2bn 20.0bn
SP 60: 8 9P122 Malyutka; 9 9P133 Malyutka; 32 BOV-1;
per capita US$ 5,181 5,704
11 M-92
Growth % 3.0 3.2 MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot
Inflation % 1.2 1.4 (AT-4 Spigot); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); HJ-8; Milan
Def bdgt mark 286m 284m ARTILLERY 224
US$ 165m 172m TOWED 122mm 100 D-30
FMA (US) US$ 4m 0m MRL 122mm 24 APRA-40
MOR 120mm 100 M-75
US$1=mark 1.74 1.65
Population 3,849,891 Air Force and Air Defence Brigade 800
Ethnic groups: Bosniac 50.1% Serb 30.7% Croat 15.4% Other or FORCES BY ROLE
unspecified 3.7% HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Bell 205; Mi-8MTV Hip; Mi-17 Hip H
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; SA-342H/L Gazelle (HN-42/45M)
Male 6.9% 2.8% 3.1% 3.7% 26.5% 5.7% AIR DEFENCE
Female 6.4% 2.7% 2.9% 3.5% 27.0% 8.8% 1 AD bn
92 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Poland 39

AIRCRAFT Romania 48
FGA (7 J-22 Orao in store) Russia OSCE 2
ATK (6 J-1 (J-21) Jastreb; 3 TJ-1(NJ-21) Jastreb all in Serbia OSCE 1
store) Slovakia 41
ISR (2 RJ-1 (IJ-21) Jastreb* in store)
Slovenia 14
TRG (1 G-4 Super Galeb (N-62)* in store)
Spain 2 • OSCE 3
HELICOPTERS
MRH 13: 4 Mi-8MTV Hip; 1 Mi-17 Hip H; 1 SA-341H Switzerland 21
Gazelle (HN-42); 7 SA-342L Gazelle (HN-45M) Turkey 249; 1 inf coy
TPT 21: Medium 8 Mi-8 Hip Light 13 Bell 205 (UH-1H United Kingdom 2; • OSCE 3
Iroquois) United States OSCE 6
TRG 1 Mi-34 Hermit
AIR DEFENCE
SAM
Bulgaria BLG
Short-range 20 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful) Bulgarian Lev L 2017 2018 2019
Point-defence 7+: 6 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin); 9K34
GDP L 98.6bn 105bn
Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 1 9K35M3 Strela-10M3 (SA-
US$ 56.9bn 63.7bn
13 Gopher); 9K310 (SA-16 Gimlet)
GUNS 764 per capita US$ 8,077 9,080
SP 169: 20mm 9 BOV-3 SPAAG; 30mm 154: 38 M53; Growth % 3.6 3.6
116 M-53/59; 57mm 6 ZSU-57-2 Inflation % 1.2 2.6
TOWED 586: 20mm 468: 32 M55A2, 4 M38, 1 M55 Def exp [a] L 1.26bn 1.64bn
A2B1, 293 M55A3/A4, 138 M75; 23mm 29 ZU- US$ 724m 991m
23,30mm 33 M-53; 37mm 7 Type-55; 40mm 49: 31
Def bdgt [b] L 1.17bn 1.19bn
L60, 16 L70, 2 M-12
US$ 677m 724m
FMA (US) US$ 5m 0m
DEPLOYMENT US$1=L 1.73 1.65
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 63 [a] NATO definition
ALBANIA: OSCE • Albania 1 [b] Excludes military pensions
ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN: OSCE • Minsk Conference 1 Population 7,057,504
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 2
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
Male 7.5% 2.6% 2.6% 3.3% 25.2% 7.8%
MONUSCO 3 obs
Female 7.1% 2.2% 2.4% 3.1% 25.0% 11.5%
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 2
SERBIA: OSCE • Kosovo 10 Capabilities
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 50 The armed forces’ main priority is defending state sovereignty
and territorial integrity. Bulgaria is in the process of implementing
FOREIGN FORCES the Programme for the Development of the Defence Capabilities
of the Bulgarian Armed Forces 2020. In March 2018, the National
Part of EUFOR – Operation Althea unless otherwise stated Assembly adopted a new National Security Strategy that includes
Albania 1 cyber and transportation security for the first time, while attention
Austria 344; 1 inf bn HQ; 2 inf coy was also paid to hybrid threats. A NATO member, Bulgaria enjoys
close ties with the US. With only limited numbers of combat air-
Azerbaijan OSCE 1
craft itself, Bulgaria’s airspace is protected by NATO’s Air Policing
Bulgaria 11 Mission. It has reached several bilateral defence-cooperation
Canada OSCE 2 agreements with regional states. Sofia has increased the military
Chile 15 retirement age and reduced the maximum age for recruitment
Czech Republic 2 • OSCE 1 in an attempt to cope with personnel shortages. Training is pri-
oritised for those units intended for international operations and
Germany OSCE 1
those with certain readiness levels declared to NATO and the EU.
Greece 2 Bulgaria regularly trains and exercises with NATO partners and
Hungary 164; 1 inf coy • OSCE 1 regional allies. The country contributes to NATO and EU missions
Ireland 5 • OSCE 1 but has little logistics-support capability. Despite long-term plans
Italy 5 • OSCE 6 for reform, the armed forces still rely heavily on ageing Soviet-era
equipment. In May 2018, Bulgaria approved the purchase of new
Macedonia (FYORM) 3 or used fighter aircraft to replace its MiG-29s, as well as the acqui-
Moldova OSCE 1 sition of core combat capabilities to enable the formation of bat-
Netherlands OSCE 1 talion battlegroups within the mechanised brigades. The navy is
 Europe 93

prioritising the procurement of a multi-purpose patrol vessel and Navy 3,450

the modernisation of its frigates to boost its presence in the Black
Sea. Bulgaria’s defence industry exports small arms but has limited
capacity to design and manufacture platforms.
ACTIVE 31,300 (Army 15,300 Navy 3,450 Air 6,700
Central Staff 5,850)
RESERVE 3,000 (Joint 3,000)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES • 4
FFM 3 Drazki (ex-BEL Wielingen) with 1 octuple Mk29
GMLS with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 single 533mm
ASTT with L5 HWT, 1 sextuple 375mm MLE 54
Creusot-Loire A/S mor, 1 100mm gun (Fitted for but
not with 2 twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM)
FF 1 Smeli (ex-FSU Koni) with 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S

Europe
mor, 2 twin 76mm guns
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 3
Army 16,300 PCFG 1 Mulnaya† (ex-FSU Tarantul II) with 2 twin lnchr
with P-15M Termit-M (SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 2 AK630M
FORCES BY ROLE
CIWS, 1 76mm gun
MANOEUVRE
PCT 2 Reshitelni (ex-FSU Pauk I) with 4 single 406mm TT,
Reconnaissance
2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 76mm gun
1 recce bn
MINE COUNTERMEASURES 6
Mechanised
MHC 1 Tsibar (Tripartite – ex-BEL Flower)
2 mech bde (4 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1
MSC 3 Briz (ex-FSU Sonya)
log bn, 1 SAM bn)
MSI 2 Olya (ex-FSU)
Light
AMPHIBIOUS 1
1 mtn inf regt LCM 1 Vydra (capacity either 3 MBT or 200 troops)
COMBAT SUPPORT LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8: 2 AGS; 2 AOL; 1 ARS; 2
1 arty regt (1 fd arty bn, 1 MRL bn) ATF; 1 AX
1 engr regt (1 cbt engr bn, 1 ptn br bn, 1 engr spt bn)
1 NBC bn Naval Aviation
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 log regt HELICOPTERS • ASW 2 AS565MB Panther
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Air Force 6,700
MBT 90 T-72M1/M2 FORCES BY ROLE
IFV 160: 90 BMP-1; 70 BMP-23 FIGHTER/ISR
APC 120 1 sqn with MiG-29A/UB Fulcrum
APC (T) 100 MT-LB TRANSPORT
APC (W) 20 BTR-60 1 sqn with An-30 Clank; C-27J Spartan; L-410UVP-E;
AUV 17 M1117 ASV PC-12M
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES TRAINING
AEV MT-LB 1 sqn with L-39ZA Albatros*
ARV T-54/T-55; MTP-1; MT-LB 1 sqn with PC-9M
VLB BLG67; TMM ATTACK HELICOPTER
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE 1 sqn with Mi-24D/V Hind D/E
MSL TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
SP 24 9P148 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel) 1 sqn with AS532AL Cougar; Bell 206 Jet Ranger; Mi-17
MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs Hip H
(AT-5 Spandrel); (9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) in store) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
GUNS 126: 85mm (150 D-44 in store); 100mm 126 MT-12 AIRCRAFT 21 combat capable
ARTILLERY 311 FTR 15: 12 MiG-29A Fulcrum†; 3 MiG-29UB Fulcrum†
SP 122mm 48 2S1 FGA (Some MiG-21bis Fishbed/MiG-21UM Mongol B in
TOWED 152mm 24 D-20 store)
MRL 122mm 24 BM-21 ISR 1 An-30 Clank
MOR 120mm 215 2S11 SP Tundzha TPT 7: Medium 3 C-27J Spartan; Light 4: 1 An-2T Colt; 2
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS L-410UVP-E; 1 PC-12M
SRBM • Conventional 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab) TRG 12: 6 L-39ZA Albatros*; 6 PC-9M (basic)
AIR DEFENCE HELICOPTERS
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela (SA-7 Grail)‡; 24 9K33 ATK 6 Mi-24D/V Hind D/E
Osa (SA-8 Gecko) MRH 5 Mi-17 Hip H
GUNS 400 TPT 18: Medium 12 AS532AL Cougar; Light 6 Bell 206
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 Jet Ranger
TOWED 23mm ZU-23; 57mm S-60; 100mm KS-19 UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • EW Yastreb-2S
94 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

AIR DEFENCE Capabilities

SAM
Principal tasks for the armed forces include defending national
Long-range S-200 (SA-5 Gammon); S-300 (SA-10
sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as tackling terror-
Grumble) ism and contributing to international missions. Croatia joined
Medium-range S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline) NATO in 2009, having reformed its armed forces to create a small
Short-range S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); 2K12 Kub (SA-6 professional force, with a focus on international peacekeep-
Gainful) ing duties. Economic challenges have delayed further defence
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES modernisation. The Act on Service in the Croatian Armed Forces
AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡ R-73 (AA-11 Archer) SARH was amended in 2018, aiming to improve conditions of service.
Zagreb has defence-cooperation agreements with Bosnia-Her-
R-27R (AA-10 Alamo A)
zegovina, Hungary and Romania, and personnel frequently train
ASM Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge); Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen) with regional and international allies. Croatia participates in NATO
and EU missions, including in Afghanistan. The inventory is almost
Special Forces entirely composed of ageing Soviet-era equipment. Modernisation
FORCES BY ROLE objectives include the acquisition of helicopters, while Zagreb has
selected second-hand Israeli F-16Ds to replace its MiG-21 aircraft
SPECIAL FORCES fleet. Croatia has a small defence industry, focused on small arms,
1 spec ops bde (1 SF bn, 1 para bn) ammunition, explosives and naval systems.

ACTIVE 15,200 (Army 10,750 Navy 1,300 Air 1,300

DEPLOYMENT Joint 1,850) Paramilitary 3,000
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 158 Conscript liability Voluntary conscription, 8 weeks
ALBANIA: OSCE • Albania 1 RESERVE 18,350 (Army 18,350)
BLACK SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 2: 1 MHC
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
11
MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 5 Joint 1,850 (General Staff )
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 23; OSCE • Kosovo 2 FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 43 1 SF bn

FOREIGN FORCES Army 10,750

United States US European Command: 150; 1 armd inf FORCES BY ROLE
coy; M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams; M2A3 Bradley MANOEUVRE

Armoured
1 armd bde (1 tk bn, 1 armd bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty
Croatia CRO bn, 1 ADA bn, 1 cbt engr bn)
Light
Croatian Kuna k 2017 2018 2019
1 mot inf bde (2 mech inf bn, 2 mot inf bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1
GDP k 365bn 381bn ADA bn, 1 cbt engr bn)
US$ 54.8bn 60.0bn Other
per capita US$ 13,271 14,637 1 inf trg regt
Growth % 2.8 2.8 COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty/MRL regt
Inflation % 1.1 1.6
1 AT regt
Def exp [a] k 4.55bn 4.96bn
1 engr regt
US$ 694m 781m 1 int bn
Def bdgt k 4.39bn 4.82bn 5.08bn 1 MP regt
US$ 658m 758m 1 NBC bn
FMA (US) US$ 1m 0m 1 sigs regt
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
US$1=k 6.67 6.35
1 log regt
[a] NATO definition
AIR DEFENCE
Population 4,270,480 1 ADA regt
Ethnic groups: Croatian 90.4% Serbian 4.3% Bosniac 0.7% Italian EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
0.4% Hungarian 0.3% Other or unspecified 3.9 % ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 75 M-84
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
IFV 101 M-80
Male 7.3% 2.7% 3.0% 3.1% 24.3% 7.7% APC 198
Female 6.9% 2.6% 2.9% 3.0% 24.8% 11.6% APC (T) 14 BTR-50
 Europe 95

APC (W) 132: 6 BOV-VP; 126 Patria AMV (incl LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT
variants) AKL 1 PT-71
PPV 52: 32 Maxxpro Plus; 20 RG-33 HAGA (amb) AX 2
AUV 172: 10 IVECO LMV; 162 M-ATV
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES Air Force and Air Defence 1,300
ARV M84AI; WZT-3; 6 Maxxpro Recovery
FORCES BY ROLE
VLB 5 MT-55A
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
MW 2: 1 Bozena; 1 Rhino
1 (mixed) sqn with MiG-21bis/UMD Fishbed
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL
TRANSPORT
SP 41 POLO BOV 83

Europe
1 sqn with An-32 Cline
MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot
(AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 TRAINING
Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn) 1 sqn with PC-9M; Z-242L
ARTILLERY 259 1 hel sqn with Bell 206B Jet Ranger II
SP 20: 122mm 8 2S1; 155mm 12 PzH 2000 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
TOWED 107: 122mm 53 D-30; 130mm 36 M-46H1; 2 sqn with Mi-8MTV Hip H; Mi-8T Hip C; Mi-171Sh
155mm 18 M1H1 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MRL 28: 122mm 27: 6 M91 Vulkan; 21 BM-21 Grad; AIRCRAFT 11 combat capable
128mm 1 LOV RAK M91 R24 FGA 11: 8 MiG-21bis Fishbed; 3 MiG-21UMD Fishbed
MOR 104: 82mm 29 LMB M96; 120mm 75: 70 M-75; 5 TPT • Light 2 An-32 Cline
UBM 52 TRG 22: 17 PC-9M; 5 Z-242L
AIR DEFENCE HELICOPTERS
SAM • Point-defence 8 Strela-10; 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 MRH 27: 11 Mi-8MTV Hip H; 16 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior
Gimlet) TPT 21: Medium 13: 3 Mi-8T Hip C; 10 Mi-171Sh; Light
GUNS 96 8 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II
SP 20mm 39 BOV-3 SP
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
TOWED 20mm 65 M55A4
ISR • Medium Hermes 450
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
Navy 1,300
Point-defence 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin); 9K34 Strela-3
Navy HQ at Split
(SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 AAM • IR R-3S (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60; R-60MK
PCFG 1 Končar with 2 twin lnchr with RBS15B Mk I
(AA-8 Aphid)
AShM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 57mm gun
ASM AGM-114 Hellfire
PCG 4:
2 Kralj with 4 single lnchr with RBS15B Mk I AShM,
1 AK630 CIWS, 1 57mm gun (with minelaying
Special Forces Command
capability) FORCES BY ROLE
2 Vukovar (ex-FIN Helsinki) with 4 single lnchr with SPECIAL FORCES
RBS15B Mk I AShM, 1 57mm gun 2 SF gp
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES •
MHI 1 Korcula Paramilitary 3,000
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 5:
LCT 2 Cetina (with minelaying capability) Police 3,000 armed
LCVP 3: 2 Type-21; 1 Type-22
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AKL 1 DEPLOYMENT
COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 3 RBS15K
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 123
Marines INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 9 obs
FORCES BY ROLE
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1
MANOEUVRE
Amphibious LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 230; 1
1 indep mne coy mech inf coy with Patria AMV; M-ATV
POLAND: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 69; 1
Coast Guard MRL bty with M91 Vulkan
FORCES BY ROLE
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 35; 1 hel unit with Mi-8 Hip
Two divisions, headquartered in Split (1st div) and Pula
OSCE • Kosovo 1
(2nd div)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 11
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 4 Mirna WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 6 obs
96 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Light
Cyprus CYP 1 (4th) lt inf bde
2 (2nd & 8th) lt inf regt
Euro € 2017 2018 2019
COMBAT SUPPORT
GDP € 19.2bn 20.2bn 1 arty comd (8 arty bn)
US$ 21.7bn 24.0bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
per capita US$ 25,380 27,865 1 (3rd) spt bde
Growth % 3.9 4.0 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Inflation % 0.7 0.8 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Def bdgt € 352m 352m 357m MBT 134: 82 T-80U; 52 AMX-30B2
US$ 397m 417m RECCE 69 EE-9 Cascavel
IFV 43 BMP-3
US$1=€ 0.89 0.84
APC 294
Population 1,237,088 APC (T) 168 Leonidas
APC (W) 126 VAB (incl variants)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Male 8.0% 3.1% 4.4% 4.8% 25.5% 5.2% ARV 3: 2 AMX-30D; 1 BREM-1
Female 7.6% 2.7% 3.6% 4.0% 24.2% 6.9% ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL
Capabilities SP 33: 15 EE-3 Jararaca with Milan; 18 VAB with HOT
The National Guard is focused on protecting the island’s territo- MANPATS Milan
rial integrity and sovereignty, and safeguarding Cyprus’s EEZ. Its RCL 106mm 144 M40A1
main objective is to deter any Turkish incursion, and to provide GUNS • TOWED 100mm 20 M-1944
enough opposition until military support can be provided by ARTILLERY 432
Greece, its primary ally. Cyprus has been enhancing its defence SP 155mm 24: 12 Mk F3; 12 Zuzana
cooperation with Greece, including on cyber defence. Nicosia TOWED 84: 105mm 72 M-56; 155mm 12 TR-F-1
has also pledged deeper military ties with Israel, while France has MRL 22: 122mm 4 BM-21; 128mm 18 M-63 Plamen
renewed and enhanced its defence-cooperation agreement with
MOR 302: 81mm 170 E-44 (70+ M1/M9 in store); 107mm
Cyprus, with plans to develop facilities for French vessels on the
island. Having reduced conscript liability in 2016, Nicosia began 20 M2/M30; 120mm 112 RT61
recruiting additional contract-service personnel, as part of the AIR DEFENCE
effort to modernise and professionalise its forces. Cyprus exer- SAM
cises with several international partners, most notably France, Medium-range 4 9K37M1 Buk M1-2 (SA-11 Gadfly)
Greece and Israel. External deployments have been limited to Short-range 18: 12 Aspide; 6 9K331 Tor-M1 (SA-15
some officers joining EU and UN missions. Cyprus has little logis- Gauntlet)
tics capability to support operations abroad. Equipment com- Point-defence Mistral
prises a mix of Soviet-era and modern European systems. Cyprus
GUNS • TOWED 60: 20mm 36 M-55; 35mm 24 GDF-003
has little in the way of a domestic defence industry, with no
(with Skyguard)
ability to design and manufacture modern equipment. The gov-
ernment is looking for opportunities to cooperate with the Greek
defence industry.
Maritime Wing
FORCES BY ROLE
ACTIVE 15,000 (National Guard 15,000) COMBAT SUPPORT
Paramilitary 750 1 (coastal defence) AShM bty with MM40 Exocet
Conscript liability 14 months AShM
RESERVE 50,000 (National Guard 50,000) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Reserve service to age 50 (officers dependent on rank; PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6
military doctors to age 60) PCC 2: 1 Alasia (ex-OMN Al Mabrukha) with 1 hel
landing platform; 1 OPV 62 (ISR Sa’ar 4.5 derivative)
PBF 4: 2 Rodman 55; 2 Vittoria
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 3 MM40 Exocet

National Guard 15,000 (incl conscripts) Air Wing

FORCES BY ROLE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SPECIAL FORCES AIRCRAFT
1 comd (regt) (1 SF bn) TPT • Light 1 BN-2B Islander 
TRG 1 PC-9
MANOEUVRE HELICOPTERS
Armoured ATK 11 Mi-35P Hind E
1 lt armd bde (2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn) MRH 7: 3 AW139 (SAR); 4 SA342L1 Gazelle (with
Mechanised HOT for anti-armour role)
4 (1st, 2nd, 6th & 7th) lt mech bde TPT • Light 2 Bell 206L3 Long Ranger
 Europe 97

Paramilitary 750+ ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Armed Police 500+
FORCES BY ROLE Army ε3,000
MANOEUVRE FORCES BY ROLE
Other MANOEUVRE
1 (rapid-reaction) paramilitary unit Light
5 inf bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
7 inf bn (reserve)
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

Europe
APC • APC (W) 2 VAB VTT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
HELICOPTERS • MRH 4: 2 AW139; 2 Bell 412SP
MSL • MANPATS Milan
Maritime Police 250 RCL • 106mm 36
ARTILLERY • MOR • 120mm 73
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10
PBF 5: 2 Poseidon; 1 Shaldag; 2 Vittoria
Paramilitary
PB 5 SAB-12 Armed Police ε150

FORCES BY ROLE
DEPLOYMENT SPECIAL FORCES
1 (police) SF unit
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 2
Coast Guard
FOREIGN FORCES PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6
PCC 5: 2 SG45/SG46; 1 Rauf Denktash; 2 US Mk 5
Argentina UNFICYP 244; 2 inf coy; 1 hel flt
PB 1
Austria UNFICYP 5
Bangladesh UNFICYP 2
Brazil UNFICYP 2
FOREIGN FORCES
Canada UNFICYP 1 TURKEY
Chile UNFICYP 12 Army ε33,800
Greece Army: 950; ε200 (officers/NCO seconded to Greek- FORCES BY ROLE
Cypriot National Guard) 1 corps HQ; 1 SF regt; 1 armd bde; 2 mech inf div; 1
mech inf regt; 1 arty regt; 1 avn comd
Hungary UNFICYP 11
Pakistan UNFICYP 1 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Paraguay UNFICYP 12
MBT 287 M48A5T2
Serbia UNFICYP 2 IFV 147 ACV AIFV
Slovakia UNFICYP 242; 1 inf coy; 1 engr pl APC • APC (T) 492: 106 ACV AAPC (incl variants);
United Kingdom 2,260; 2 inf bn; 1 hel sqn with 4 Bell 412 386 M113 (incl variants)
Twin Huey • Operation Inherent Resolve (Shader) 500: 1 FGA ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
sqn with 8 Tornado GR4; 6 Typhoon FGR4; 2 Sentinel R1; 1 MSL
A330 MRTT Voyager KC3; 2 C-130J Hercules • UNFICYP SP 60 ACV TOW
(Operation Tosca) 278: 1 recce coy MANPATS Milan
RCL 106mm 219 M40A1
ARTILLERY 643
TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT SP 155mm 174: 30 M44T; 144 M52T1
DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE TOWED 84: 105mm 36 M101A1; 155mm 36 M114A2;
CONTROL 203mm 12 M115
Data here represents the de facto situation on the northern MRL 122mm 9 T-122
section of the island. This does not imply international MOR 376: 81mm 171; 107mm 70 M30; 120mm 135
recognition as a sovereign state. HY-12
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 1 PB
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3 Cessna 185 (U-17)
Capabilities HELICOPTERS • TPT 3 Medium 2 AS532UL Cougar
ACTIVE 3,000 (Army 3,000) Paramilitary 150 Light 1 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)
Conscript liability 15 months AIR DEFENCE
SAM Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger
RESERVE 15,000 GUNS • TOWED 150: 20mm 122: 44 Rh 202; 78
Reserve liability to age 50 GAI-D01; 35mm 28 GDF-003
98 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Armoured
Czech Republic CZE 1 (7th) mech bde (1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 mot inf bn)
Mechanised
Czech Koruna Kc 2017 2018 2019
1 (4th) rapid reaction bde (2 mech inf bn, 1 mot inf bn,
GDP Kc 5.05tr 5.24tr 1 AB bn)
US$ 216bn 245bn COMBAT SUPPORT
per capita US$ 20,402 23,085 1 (13th) arty regt (2 arty bn)
Growth % 4.3 3.1 1 engr regt (3 engr bn, 1 EOD bn)
Inflation % 2.4 2.3 1 CBRN regt (2 CBRN bn)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Def exp [a] Kc 52.7bn 58.8bn
1 log regt (2 log bn, 1 maint bn)
US$ 2.26bn 2.74bn
Def bdgt [b] Kc 52.5bn 58.9bn 66.7bn Active Reserve
US$ 2.25bn 2.75bn FORCES BY ROLE
US$1=Kc 23.38 21.43 COMMAND
[a] NATO definition 14 (territorial defence) comd
[b] Includes military pensions MANOEUVRE
Armoured
Population 10,686,269 1 armd coy
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Light
14 inf coy (1 per territorial comd) (3 inf pl, 1 cbt spt pl,
Male 7.8% 2.3% 2.7% 3.4% 25.2% 7.9%
1 log pl)
Female 7.4% 2.1% 2.5% 3.2% 24.5% 11.1%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Capabilities MBT 30 T-72M4CZ (89 T-72 in store)
The 2015 national-security strategy states that NATO is central to RECCE (34 BPzV Svatava in store)
Czech security, while the 2017 defence strategy points to Russian IFV 227: 120 BMP-2; 107 Pandur II (incl variants); (98
assertiveness, an arc of instability to the south and southeast of
BMP-1; 65 BMP-2 all in store)
Europe and information warfare, including cyber attacks, as core
security challenges. In February 2017, the Czech Republic signed APC
a letter of intent with Germany to affiliate the 4th Czech Rapid APC (T) (17 OT-90 in store)
Deployment Brigade with the 10th German Armoured Division AUV 21 Dingo 2; IVECO LMV
under NATO’s Framework Nations Concept. In the same year, a ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
bilateral agreement with Slovakia addressed mutual air-defence ARV 10 VPV-ARV (12 more in store); VT-55A; VT-72M4
issues. It was announced in 2018 that the two countries will coop- VLB 6 MT-55A (3 more in store)
erate on procurement tenders. The government plans to increase
MW Bozena 5; UOS-155 Belarty
personnel numbers and adopted an Active Reserve Law in 2016,
which aims to incentivise engagement in the reserves. However, ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
recruitment and retention remains a challenge. The armed forces MSL • MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel);
are able to deploy on a variety of international crisis-management FGM-148 Javelin; Spike-LR
operations, including NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in the RCL 84mm Carl Gustaf
Baltic states. The defence ministry announced plans at the end of ARTILLERY 96
2017 to upgrade existing military training and simulation facilities SP 152mm 48 M-77 Dana (38 more in store)
by 2025. The government is trying to replace legacy equipment
MOR 48: 120mm 40 M-1982; (45 more in store); SP
in order to both modernise the armed forces and reduce depen-
dence on Russia for spare parts and services. Modernisation pri-
120mm 8 SPM-85
orities include infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled howitzers,
multi-role helicopters, transport aircraft, short-range air-defence Air Force 5,850
systems and UAVs. The defence-industrial base includes develop- Principal task is to secure Czech airspace. This mission is
ment and manufacturing capability, in particular relating to small fulfilled within NATO Integrated Extended Air Defence
arms, vehicles, and training and light attack aircraft. The holding System (NATINADS) and, if necessary, by means of the
company Czechoslovak Group brings together several companies
Czech national reinforced air-defence system. The air force
across the munitions, vehicles and aerospace sectors.
also provides CAS for army SAR, and performs a tpt role
ACTIVE 23,200 (Army 12,250 Air 5,850 Other 3,650) FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 1 sqn with Gripen C/D
1 sqn with L-159 ALCA; L-159T
Army 12,250 TRANSPORT
FORCES BY ROLE 2 sqn with A319CJ; C295M; CL-601 Challenger; L-410
MANOEUVRE Turbolet; Yak-40 Codling
Reconnaissance TRAINING
1 ISR/EW regt (1 recce bn, 1 EW bn) 1 sqn with L-39ZA Albatros*; L-159 ALCA; L-159T
 Europe 99

ATTACK HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-35 Hind
DEPLOYMENT
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 281
1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171Sh BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea
1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; PZL W-3A Sokol 2; OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 1
AIR DEFENCE
1 (25th) SAM regt (2 AD gp) CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 3 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
AIRCRAFT 44 combat capable MONUSCO 1; 1 obs
FGA 14: 12 Gripen C; 2 Gripen D EGYPT: MFO 18; 1 C295M

Europe
ATK 21: 16 L-159 ALCA; 5 L-159T
IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 30
TPT 15: Light 12: 4 C295M; 6 L-410 Turbolet; 2 Yak-40
Codling; PAX 3: 2 A319CJ; 1 CL-601 Challenger LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 60; 1 mor pl
TRG 9 L-39ZA Albatros* MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 41; UN • MINUSMA 3; 2 obs
HELICOPTERS SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 10; OSCE • Kosovo 1; UN •
ATK 17: 7 Mi-24 Hind D; 10 Mi-35 Hind E UNMIK 2 obs
MRH 5 Mi-17 Hip H
SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 3
TPT • Medium 30: 4 Mi-8 Hip; 16 Mi-171Sh; 10 PZL W3A
Sokol UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 14
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
Point-defence 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 9K32
Strela-2‡ (SA-7 Grail) (available for trg RBS-70 gunners);
Denmark DNK
RBS-70 Danish Krone kr 2017 2018 2019
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES GDP kr 2.15tr 2.23tr
AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120C-5
US$ 326bn 355bn
AMRAAM
per capita US$ 56,631 61,227
BOMBS
Laser-guided: GBU Paveway Growth % 2.3 2.0
Inflation % 1.1 1.4
Other Forces Def exp [a] kr 25.0bn 26.7bn
FORCES BY ROLE US$ 3.78bn 4.25bn
SPECIAL FORCES Def bdgt [b] kr 25.0bn 26.7bn 27.5bn
1 SF gp US$ 3.78bn 4.25bn
MANOEUVRE
US$1=kr 6.60 6.29
Other
[a] NATO definition
1 (presidential) gd bde (2 bn)
1 (honour guard) gd bn (2 coy) [b] Includes military pensions
COMBAT SUPPORT Population 5,809,502
1 int gp
1 (central) MP comd Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
3 (regional) MP comd Male 8.4% 3.3% 3.4% 3.2% 22.3% 8.6%
1 (protection service) MP comd Female 8.0% 3.1% 3.3% 3.1% 22.6% 10.6%

Cyber
A Cyber Security Act entered into force in January 2015
and a new National Cyber Security Strategy and an Action
Plan for 2015–20 were published. The former states that
the country will look ‘to increase national capacities for
active cyber defence and cyber attack countermeasures’.
The National Cyber and Information Security Agency was
established on 1 August 2017 as the central body of state
administration for cyber security, including the protection
of classified information in the area of information and
communications systems and cryptographic protection,
which was previously the responsibility of the National
Security Agency. The defence ministry is developing its
own cyber-defence capabilities according to specific tasks
based on EU or NATO documents and the requirements
of the National Action Plan. The defence ministry security
director also leads on cyber security.
Capabilities
Danish military capabilities remain compact but effective despite
pressures on spending and deployments. In January 2018, the gov-
ernment issued a new defence agreement for 2018–23, envisaging
increased defence spending to deal with a deteriorating security
environment. In particular, it is intended to strengthen deterrence,
cyber defence and Denmark’s role in international operations, as
well as the armed forces’ ability to support civilian authorities in
national-security tasks. Denmark plans to set up a heavy brigade
with ground-based air-defence capabilities and a light infantry
battalion to take on patrol and guard missions in support of the
police. Denmark also intends to strengthen naval air defence, as
well as anti-submarine-warfare capabilities. Ties to NATO, NOR-
DEFCO and other regional neighbours have increased. A defence
agreement, aimed at deterring Russia, was signed in April 2015
with other Nordic states. Denmark is an EU member but has opted
out of military cooperation under the Common Security and
Defence Policy. The new defence agreement foresees that national
100 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

service is retained and that the annual conscript intake should rise. ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Procurement of the F-35A to replace the country’s ageing F-16AM/ RCL 84mm 186 Carl Gustav
BM fleet was confirmed in June 2016. However, the strain of tran- ARTILLERY 24
sitioning to the new platform could temporarily reduce Denmark’s SP 155mm 12 M109A3 (being replaced by CAESAR)
ability to contribute to NATO air-policing tasks. Industrial support
MOR • TOWED 120mm 12 Soltam K6B1
from Terma, Denmark’s largest defence company, may have
been important to the F-35 procurement decision, as some key AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger
sub-components and composites are produced by the firm. The
defence-industrial base is focused on exports to Europe and North Navy 2,200
America and is mainly active in defence electronics and the design EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
and manufacture of components and subsystems. PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 3
ACTIVE 14,500 (Army 6,900 Navy 2,200 Air 2,900 DESTROYERS • DDGHM 3 Iver Huitfeldt with 4 quad
Joint 2,500) lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 1 32-cell
Conscript liability 4–12 months, most voluntary Mk41 VLS (to be fitted with SAM), 2 12-cell Mk56 VLS
with RIM-162 SAM, 2 twin 324mm TT with MU90
RESERVES 45,700 (Army 34,300 Navy 5,300 Air LWT, 1 Millennium CIWS, 2 76mm guns (capacity 1
Force 4,750 Service Corps 1,350) med hel)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE PSOH 4 Thetis 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 MH-60R Seahawk)
PSO 3 Knud Rasmussen with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing
platform
Army 6,900 PCC 6 Diana
Div and bde HQ are responsible for trg only; if necessary, MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 6
can be transformed into operational formations MCI 4 MSF MK-I
FORCES BY ROLE MSD 2 Holm
COMMAND LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 11
1 div HQ ABU 2 (primarily used for MARPOL duties)
2 bde HQ AE 1 Sleipner
MANOEUVRE AG 2 Absalon (flexible support ships) with 4 quad lnchr
Reconnaissance with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 3 12-cell Mk
1 recce bn 56 VLS with RIM-162 ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm TT
1 ISR bn with MU90 LWT, 2 Millennium CIWS, 1 127mm gun
Armoured (capacity 2 AW101 Merlin; 2 LCP, 7 MBT or 40 vehicles;
1 tk bn

 130 troops)
Mechanised
AGS 2 Holm
3 mech inf bn
AKL 2 Seatruck
2 mech inf bn(-)
AXS 2 Svanen
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 SP arty bn
1 cbt engr bn
Air Force 2,900
1 CBRN/construction bn Tactical Air Command
1 EOD coy
FORCES BY ROLE
1 int bn
1 MP bn FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
3 sigs bn 2 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
2 log bn 1 sqn with Super Lynx Mk90B
1 maint bn SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 spt bn 1 sqn with AW101 Merlin
1 sqn with AS550 Fennec (ISR)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TRANSPORT
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules; CL-604 Challenger (MP/
MBT 38 Leopard 2A5 (12 more in store)
VIP)
IFV 44 CV9035 MkIII
APC 226 TRAINING
APC (T) 125 M113 (incl variants); (306 more in store 1 unit with MFI-17 Supporter (T-17)
awaiting disposal) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
APC (W) 101: 79 Piranha III (incl variants); 22 Piranha V AIRCRAFT 44 combat capable
AUV 120: 84 Eagle IV; 36 Eagle V FTR 44: 34 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 10 F-16BM Fighting
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES Falcon (30 operational)
ARV 10 Bergepanzer 2 TPT 8: Medium 4 C-130J-30 Hercules; PAX 4 CL-604
VLB 6 Biber Challenger (MP/VIP)
MW 14 910-MCV-2 TRG 27 MFI-17 Supporter (T-17)
 Europe 101

HELICOPTERS IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 190; 1 SF gp; 1 trg team

ASW 9: 6 Super Lynx Mk90B; 3 MH-60R Seahawk KUWAIT: Operation Inherent Resolve 20
MRH 8 AS550 Fennec (ISR) (4 more non-operational)
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1
TPT • Medium 13 AW101 Merlin (8 SAR; 5 Tpt)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES MEDITERRANEAN SEA: NATO • SNMG 1: 1 AG
AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 11 obs
II; ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 35
ASM AGM-65 Maverick
BOMBS SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 11
Laser-guided EGBU-12/GBU-24 Paveway II/III UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 8

Europe
INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: Operation Inherent Resolve 20
Control and Air Defence Group
1 Control and Reporting Centre, 1 Mobile Control and Estonia EST
Reporting Centre. 4 Radar sites
Euro € 2017 2018 2019
Special Operations Command GDP € 23.0bn 24.8bn
FORCES BY ROLE US$ 26.0bn 29.5bn
SPECIAL FORCES per capita US$ 19,735 22,417
1 SF unit Growth % 4.9 3.7
1 diving unit Inflation % 3.7 3.0
Def Exp [a] € 479m 524m
Reserves US$ 541m 624m
Home Guard (Army) 34,300 reservists (to age 50) Def bdgt [b] € 481m 538m 614m
FORCES BY ROLE US$ 544m 641m
MANOEUVRE FMA (US) US$ 10m 0m
Light US$1=€ 0.89 0.84
2 regt cbt gp (3 mot inf bn, 1 arty bn)
[a] NATO definition
5 (local) def region (up to 2 mot inf bn)
[b] Includes military pensions
Home Guard (Navy) 4,500 reservists (to age 50) Population 1,244,288
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Ethnic groups: Estonian 70%; Russian 25%; Ukranian 1.7%;
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 30 Belarusian 1%; other or unspecified 2.3%
PB 30: 17 MHV800; 1 MHV850; 12 MHV900
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Home Guard (Air Force) 4,750 reservists (to age 50)
Male 8.3% 2.2% 2.4% 3.6% 23.4% 6.7%
Home Guard (Service Corps) 1,350 reservists Female 7.9% 2.1% 2.2% 3.3% 24.6% 13.1%

Cyber
A National Strategy for Cyber and Information Security was
released in December 2014. The Centre for Cyber Security
(CFCS) is situated within the Danish Defence Intelligence
Service. The CFCS is Denmark’s national information and
communications technology (ICT) security authority with
three primary responsibilities: contribute to protecting
Denmark against cyber threats; assist in securing a solid
and robust ICT critical infrastructure; and warn of, protect
against and counter cyber attacks. The 2018–23 Defence
Agreement will lead to a significant increase in the
CFCS’s resources. In addition to existing cyber-defence
capabilities, Denmark has developed a capacity to conduct
defensive and offensive military operations in cyberspace
that will become fully operational in 2019.
DEPLOYMENT
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 160
ESTONIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 186; 1
armd inf coy with CV9035
Capabilities
Estonia has small active armed forces and is reliant on NATO mem-
bership as a security guarantor. Security policy is predicated on the
goals of ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity, and there is
concern over Russian security policy and military activity. The gov-
ernment’s 2017–26 National Defence Development Plan (NDDP)
reflects the worsening security environment in the Baltic region.
The active armed forces are supplemented by a reserve compo-
nent. In June 2018 Estonia joined the French-inspired European
Intervention Force. A NATO battlegroup based in Estonia became
operational in mid-2017 as part of the Alliance’s Enhanced Forward
Presence. The country’s Amari air base hosts a NATO Baltic Air
Policing detachment. Estonia is also a member of the UK-led mul-
tinational Joint Expeditionary Force. Cyber security is a strength,
and Tallinn hosts NATO’s Cybersecurity Centre of Excellence. The
NDDP notes a desire to increase the annual conscript intake and
the total number of active personnel. There is very limited organic
capability to deploy beyond borders, though Estonian forces take
part in EU, NATO and UN missions abroad on a small scale. The
NDDP identifies the need for additional armoured mobility and
armoured firepower, anti-armour weapons and increased muni-
tions stocks. The country has a niche defence-industrial capability,
including ship repair and digital systems.
102 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

ACTIVE 6,600 (Army 5,700 Navy 400 Air 500) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Defence League 15,800 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 An-2 Colt
Conscript liability 8 or 11 months (depending on specialisation; HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 4 R-44 Raven II
conscripts cannot be deployed)
Special Operations Forces
RESERVE 12,000 (Joint 12,000)
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 1 spec ops bn

Army 2,500; 3,200 conscript (total 5,700) Paramilitary

4 def region. All units except one inf bn are reserve based
FORCES BY ROLE
Border Guard
MANOEUVRE The Estonian Border Guard is subordinate to the Ministry
Light of the Interior. Air support is provided by the Estonian
1 (1st) bde (1 recce coy, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 cbt Border Guard Aviation Corps
engr bn, 1 spt bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 (2nd) inf bde (1 inf bn, 1 spt bn) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13
COMBAT SUPPORT PCO 2: 1 Kati; 1 Kindral Kurvits
1 sigs bn PCC 1 Kou (FIN Silma)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT PB 10: 1 Pikker; 1 Raju (Baltic 4500WP); 1 Valve; 8 (other)
1 log bn AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 3
LOGISTICS & SUPPORT • AGF 1 Balsam
Defence League 15,800 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 L-410
15 Districts HELICOPTERS • MRH 3 AW139
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Cyber
IFV 28 CV9035EE (incl 2 CP) Estonia adopted a national Cyber Security Strategy in
APC 158 2008 and in 2009 added a Cyber Security Council to the
APC (W) 151: 56 XA-180 Sisu; 80 XA-188 Sisu; 15 BTR- government’s Security Committee, which supports
80 strategic-level, inter-agency cooperation. Tallinn hosts the
PPV 7 Mamba NATO Cooperative Cyber Security Centre of Excellence
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES and the NATO Locked Shields cyber exercise takes place
AEV 2 Pioneerpanzer 2 Dachs
annually in Estonia, as has the Cyber Coalition exercise
ARV 2 BPz-2
since 2013. A Cyber Security Strategy for 2014–17
VLB 2 Biber
advocated greater integration of capability. A Defence
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Cyber Command became operational in August 2018, with
MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; Milan
full operating capability reportedly expected by 2023.
RCL 160+; 106mm: 30 M40A1; 84mm Carl Gustav; 90mm
130 PV-1110
ARTILLERY 376 DEPLOYMENT
TOWED 66: 122mm 42 D-30 (H 63); 155mm 24 FH-70
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 40
MOR 310: 81mm 131: 41 B455; 10 NM 95; 80 M252;
120mm 179: 14 2B11; 165 M/41D IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 7
AIR DEFENCE LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 38
SAM • Point-defence Mistral MALI: Operation Barkhane 50; EU • EUTM Mali 4; UN •
GUNS • TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2
MINUSMA 3

Navy 300; 100 conscript (total 400) MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MOLDOVA: OSCE • Moldova 1
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4 SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 2
MCCS 1 Tasuja (ex-DNK Lindormen)
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 3
MHC 3 Admiral Cowan (ex-UK Sandown) (1 in refit)

Air Force 500 FOREIGN FORCES

FORCES BY ROLE All NATO Enhanced Forward Presence unless stated
TRANSPORT Denmark 186; 1 armd inf coy
1 sqn with An-2 Colt Germany NATO Baltic Air Policing 6 Eurofighter Typhoon
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER United Kingdom 900; 1 armd inf bn HQ; 1 armd inf coy
1 sqn with R-44 Raven II (+); 1 engr sqn
 Europe 103

cycles, each for about 13,500 conscripts, take place each year.
Finland FIN After conscript training, reservist commitment is to the age of
60. Reservists are usually assigned to units within their local
Euro € 2017 2018 2019
geographical area. All service appointments or deployments
GDP € 224bn 233bn outside Finnish borders are voluntary for all members of the
US$ 253bn 277bn armed services. All brigades are reserve based
per capita US$ 45,927 50,068
Growth % 2.8 2.6
Reserve Organisations 170,000
Inflation % 0.8 1.2
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES

Europe
Def bdgt [a] € 2.83bn 2.87bn 3.14bn
1 SF bn
US$ 3.20bn 3.41bn MANOEUVRE
US$1=€ 0.89 0.84 Armoured
[a] Excludes military pensions 2 armd BG (regt)
Mechanised
Population 5,537,364
2 (Karelia & Pori Jaeger) mech bde
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Light
3 (Jaeger) bde
Male 8.4% 2.8% 3.1% 3.2% 22.6% 9.2%
6 lt inf bde
Female 8.0% 2.6% 2.9% 3.1% 22.2% 11.9% COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bde
Capabilities 1 AD regt
Finland’s armed forces are primarily focused on territorial defence. 7 engr regt
The country’s long border with Russia has focused attention on 3 sigs bn
Russia’s military capabilities and plans. The 2017 Defence Report COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
argues that changes in the security environment have increased Some log unit
the demands on the armed forces and stresses that financial con- HELICOPTER
straints are forcing trade-offs between long-term procurement
1 hel bn
plans and operational readiness. An EU member state, Finland’s
principal multilateral defence relationships include NORDEFCO EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
and the Northern Group, as well as strong bilateral cooperation ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
with Sweden and the US; it is building close ties with NATO short MBT 80 Leopard 2A6 (100 Leopard 2A4 in store)
of membership. In 2017, Finland joined a multinational coop- IFV 212: 110 BMP-2/-2MD; 102 CV9030FIN
eration programme for air-to-ground precision-guided munitions APC 613
set up by a group of NATO member states. The country’s largest APC (T) 142: 40 MT-LBu; 102 MT-LBV
deployment is to the UNIFIL mission but it also contributes to
APC (W) 471: 260 XA-180/185 Sisu; 101 XA-202 Sisu
NATO operations and the international counter-ISIS coalition. In
2015, the air force launched the HX Fighter Programme to replace (CP); 48 XA-203 Sisu; 62 AMV (XA-360)
its F/A-18s. A request for quotations was issued in April 2018 and ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
the replacement aircraft is expected to be selected in 2021. Under ARV 27: 15 MTP-LB; 12 VT-55A
Finland’s Squadron 2020 programme, the navy will replace patrol VLB 27: 12 BLG-60M2; 6 Leopard 2S; 9 SISU Leguan
boats and minelayers with corvette-sized vessels capable of oper- MW Aardvark Mk 2; KMT T-55; 6 Leopard 2R CEV; RA-
ating in shallow water and cold weather. Finland’s defence indus- 140 DS
try consists largely of privately owned SMEs, concentrating on ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
niche products for international markets, but it also features some MSL • MANPATS NLAW; Spike-MR; Spike-LR
internationally competitive larger companies producing wheeled
ARTILLERY 681
armoured vehicles and turreted mortar systems.
SP 122mm 40: 4 K9 Thunder; 36 2S1 Gvozdika (PsH 74)
ACTIVE 21,500 (Army 15,300 Navy 3,500 Air 2,700) TOWED 324: 122mm 234 D-30 (H 63); 130mm 36 M-46
Paramilitary 2,700 (K 54); 155mm 54 K 83/GH-52 (K 98)
Conscript liability 165, 255 or 347 days (latter for NCOs, officers or MRL 56: 122mm 34 RM-70; 227mm 22 M270 MLRS
those on ‘especially demanding’ duties) MOR 279+: 81mm Krh/71; 120mm 261 Krh/92; SP 120mm
RESERVE 216,000 (Army 170,000 Navy 20,000 Air 18 XA-361 AMOS
26,000) Paramilitary 11,500 HELICOPTERS
18,000 reservists a year do refresher training: total obligation 80 MRH 7: 5 Hughes 500D; 2 Hughes 500E
days (150 for NCOs, 200 for officers) between conscript service and TPT • Medium 20 NH90 TTH
age 50 (NCOs and officers to age 60) UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR • Medium 11 ADS-95 Ranger
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE AIR DEFENCE
SAM
Army 5,000; 10,300 conscript (total 15,300) Short-range 44: 20 Crotale NG (ITO 90); 24 NASAMS
FORCES BY ROLE II FIN (ITO 12)
Finland’s army maintains a mobilisation strength of about Point-defence 16+: 16 ASRAD (ITO 05); FIM-92 Stinger
285,000. In support of this requirement, two conscription (ITO 15); RBS 70 (ITO 05/05M)
104 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

GUNS 400+: 23mm ItK 95/ZU-23-2 (ItK 61); 35mm ItK 88; EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SP 35mm Leopard 2 ITK Marksman AIRCRAFT 107 combat capable
FGA 62: 55 F/A-18C Hornet; 7 F/A-18D Hornet
Navy 1,600; 1,900 conscript (total 3,500) MP 1 F-27-400M
FORCES BY ROLE ELINT 1 C295M
Naval Command HQ located at Turku; with two TPT • Light 10: 2 C295M; 3 Learjet 35A (survey; ECM
subordinate Naval Commands (Gulf of Finland and trg; tgt-tow); 5 PC-12NG
Archipelago Sea); 1 Naval bde; 3 spt elm (Naval Materiel TRG 74: 1 G-115EA; 29 Hawk Mk50/51A*; 16 Hawk
Cmd, Naval Academy, Naval Research Institute) Mk66*; 28 L-70 Vinka
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20 AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder;
PCGM 4 Hamina with 4 RBS15SF3 (MTO-85M) AShM, ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM
1 octuple VLS with Umkhonto-IR (ITO2004) SAM, 1 LACM Conventional AGM-158 JASSM
57mm gun BOMBS
PBF 12 Jehu (U-700) (capacity 24 troops) INS/GPS-guided GBU-31 JDAM; AGM-154C JSOW
PBG 4 Rauma with 6 RBS15SF3 (MTO-85M) AShM
MINE WARFARE 15 Paramilitary
MINE COUNTERMEASURES 10
MCC 3 Katanpää Border Guard 2,700
MSI 7: 4 Kiiski; 3 Kuha Ministry of Interior. 4 Border Guard Districts and 2 Coast
MINELAYERS • ML 5: Guard Districts
2 Hameenmaa with 1 octuple VLS with Umkhonto-IR FORCES BY ROLE
(ITO2004) SAM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, up to 100–120 MARITIME PATROL
mines, 1 57mm gun 1 sqn with Do-228 (maritime surv); AS332 Super Puma;
3 Pansio with 50 mines Bell 412 (AB-412) Twin Huey; Bell 412EP (AB-412EP)
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 51 Twin Huey;AW119KE Koala
LCM 1 Kampela
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
LCP 50
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 45
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 7
PSO 1 Turva with 1 hel landing platform
AG 3: 1 Louhi; 2 Hylje
PCC 3: 2 Tursas; 1 Merikarhu
AX 4: 3 Fabian Wrede; 1 Lokki
PB 41
Coastal Defence AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 6
FORCES BY ROLE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 Do-228
MANOEUVRE HELICOPTERS
Amphibious MRH 5: 3 Bell 412 (AB-412) Twin Huey; 2 Bell 412EP
1 mne bde (AB-412EP) Twin Huey
COMBAT SUPPORT TPT 9: Medium 5 AS332 Super Puma; Light 4
1 cbt spt bde (1 AShM bty) AW119KE Koala
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Reserve 11,500 reservists on mobilisation
COASTAL DEFENCE
AShM 4 RBS15K
ARTY • 130mm 30 K-53tk (static)
Cyber
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE The 2017–20 Implementation Plan for Finland’s Cyber
MSL • MANPATS Spike (used in AShM role) Security said that the defence ministry would develop and
maintain a comprehensive cyber-defence capability for
Air Force 1,950; 750 conscript (total 2,700) their statutory tasks, including a cyber-attack capability.
3 Air Comds: Satakunta (West), Karelia (East), Lapland The 2013 national cyber strategy and the defence forces
(North) internal concept encompass intelligence as well as
offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. Full operating
FORCES BY ROLE
capability is planned by 2020. The defence forces published
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
a Cyber Defence Concept in 2016 and created an internal
3 sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet
implementation plan to generate the required capabilities.
ISR
1 (survey) sqn with Learjet 35A The cyber division is organised under the defence forces’ C5
TRANSPORT Agency. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering
1 flt with C295M Hybrid Threats was established in Helsinki in April 2017.
4 (liaison) flt with PC-12NG
TRAINING DEPLOYMENT
1 sqn with Hawk Mk50/51A/66* (air-defence and
ground-attack trg) AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 29
1 unit with L-70 Vinka IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 100; 1 trg team
 Europe 105

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 300; elm 1 mech inf bn; 1 maint ACTIVE 203,900 (Army 114,450 Navy 35,300 Air
coy 40,800, Other Staffs 13,350) Paramilitary 103,400
MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 1; UN • MINUSMA 4
RESERVE 36,300 (Army 21,650 Navy 5,400 Air 5,550
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 18 obs Other Staffs 3,700) Paramilitary 40,000
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 20
SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 7 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 23
Strategic Nuclear Forces

Europe
France FRA Navy 2,200
Euro € 2017 2018 2019 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 4
GDP € 2.29tr 2.36tr
1 Le Triomphant with 16 M45 SLBM with 6 TN-75
US$ 2.59tr 2.79tr nuclear warheads, 4 single 533mm TT with F17 Mod
per capita US$ 39,933 42,931 2 HWT/SM39 Exocet AShM (in refit until 2018/19)
Growth % 2.3 1.6 3 Le Triomphant with 16 M51 SLBM with 6 TN-75
Inflation % 1.2 1.9 nuclear warheads, 4 single 533mm TT with F17 Mod
Def exp [a] € 40.9bn 42.7bn 2 HWT/SM39 Exocet AShM
AIRCRAFT • FGA 20 Rafale M F3 with ASMPA msl
US$ 46.1bn 50.7bn
Def bdgt [b] € 43.1bn 45.0bn 46.5bn Air Force 1,800
US$ 48.7bn 53.4bn
US$1=€ 0.89 0.84 Air Strategic Forces Command
[a] NATO definition FORCES BY ROLE
STRIKE
[b] Includes pensions
1 sqn with Rafale B with ASMPA msl
Population 67,364,357 1 sqn with Rafale B with ASMPA msl (forming)
TANKER
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 sqn with C-135FR; KC-135 Stratotanker
Male 9.5% 3.1% 2.9% 3.0% 22.0% 8.4% EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Female 9.1% 2.9% 2.8% 2.9% 22.2% 11.1% AIRCRAFT 20 combat capable
FGA 20 Rafale B
Capabilities TKR/TPT 11 C-135FR
France maintains globally deployed forces that are also engaged TKR 3 KC-135 Stratotanker
on enduring operations in Africa. The 2017 Strategic Review reit-
erated operational commitments in sub-Saharan Africa and the Paramilitary
Middle East, as well as a continued presence in the Asia-Pacific.
The Programme Budget Law for 2019–25 set out defence-budget
Gendarmerie 40
increases to support these goals. France plays a leading military
role in the EU, NATO and the UN. In 2018, Paris launched the Euro- Space
pean Intervention Initiative, joined by nine other European coun- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
tries, intended to foster a common strategic culture and develop SATELLITES 7
the ability to jointly deploy quickly in case of crises. French forces COMMUNICATIONS 3: 2 Syracuse-3 (designed to inte-
are experienced and well trained, taking part in a range of NATO grate with UK Skynet & ITA Sicral); 1 Athena-Fidus (also
and other multinational exercises. Deployments abroad have
used by ITA)
demonstrated the ability to support expeditionary forces inde-
ISR 4: 2 Helios (2A/2B); 2 Pleiades
pendently; however, the more recent focus on domestic security
has reduced training levels and limited the ability to deploy more
troops overseas. Some strategic military air-transport require- Army 114,450
ments are dependent on allies and external contractors. The Regt and BG normally bn size
high operational tempo has increased the stress on equipment. FORCES BY ROLE
The Programme Budget Law seeks to remedy this with a budget COMMAND
increase for maintenance, reform of aerospace maintenance, and 1 corps HQ (CRR-FR)
accelerated modernisation of multi-role tanker transport and
2 div HQ
refuelling aircraft. France has a sophisticated defence industry,
exemplified by companies such as Dassault, MBDA and Nexter,
MANOEUVRE
with most procurements undertaken domestically and strong Reconnaissance
exports. However, President Macron has called for increased Euro- 1 recce regt
pean defence-industrial cooperation. France is also seeking to Armoured
invest in future technologies and supports start-ups and innova- 1 (2nd) armd bde (2 tk regt, 3 armd inf regt, 1 SP arty
tion in the defence domain. regt, 1 engr regt)
106 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

1 (7th) armd bde (1 tk regt, 1 armd BG, 3 armd inf regt, EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 SP arty regt, 1 engr regt)
 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
1 armd BG (UAE) MBT 200 Leclerc
Mechanised ASLT 248 AMX-10RC
1 (6th) lt armd bde (2 armd cav regt, 1 armd inf regt, 1 RECCE 1,516: 70 ERC-90F4 Sagaie; 1,446 VBL/VB2L
mech inf regt, 1 mech inf regt(-), 1 SP arty regt, 1 engr IFV 627: 517 VBCI VCI; 110 VBCI VPC (CP)
regt) APC 2,338
1 (FRA/GER) mech bde (1 armd cav regt, 1 mech inf APC (T) 53 BvS-10
regt) APC (W) 2,285: 2,200 VAB; 85 VAB VOA (OP)
1 mech regt (Djibouti) AUV 16 Aravis
Light ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
1 (27th) mtn bde (1 armd cav regt, 3 mtn inf regt, 1 arty AEV 54 AMX-30EBG
regt, 1 engr regt) ARV 48+: 30 AMX-30D; 18 Leclerc DNG; VAB-EHC
3 inf regt (French Guiana & French West Indies) VLB 67: 39 EFA; 18 PTA; 10 SPRAT
1 inf regt (New Caledonia) MW 24+: AMX-30B/B2; 4 Buffalo; 20 Minotaur
1 inf bn (Côte d’Ivoire) NBC VEHICLES 40 VAB NRBC
1 inf coy (Mayotte) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL
Air Manoeuvre SP 110 VAB Milan
1 (11th) AB bde (1 armd cav regt, 4 para regt, 1 arty regt, MANPATS Eryx; FGM-148 Javelin; Milan; MMP
1 engr regt, 1 spt regt) ARTILLERY 273+
1 AB regt (La Réunion) SP 155mm 109: 32 AU-F-1; 77 CAESAR
1 AB bn (Gabon) TOWED 155mm 12 TR-F-1
Amphibious MRL 227mm 12 M270 MLRS
1 (9th) amph bde (2 armd cav regt, 1 armd inf regt, 2 MOR 140+: 81mm LLR 81mm; 120mm 140 RT-F-1
mech inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 engr regt) AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 13: 5 PC-6B Turbo Porter; 5 TBM-
Other 700; 3 TBM-700B
4 SMA regt (French Guiana, French West Indies & HELICOPTERS
Indian Ocean) ATK 70: 38 Tiger HAP; 32 Tiger HAD
3 SMA coy (French Polynesia, Indian Ocean & New MRH 110: 18 AS555UN Fennec; 92 SA341F/342M Gazelle
Caledonia) (all variants)
COMBAT SUPPORT TPT 157: Heavy 8 H225M Caracal (CSAR); Medium 114:
1 MRL regt 26 AS532UL Cougar; 36 NH90 TTH; 52 SA330 Puma;
2 engr regt Light 35 H120 Colibri (leased)
2 EW regt UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
1 int bn ISR • Medium 23 SDTI (Sperwer)
1 CBRN regt AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Mistral
5 sigs regt
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Navy 35,300
5 tpt regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 log regt SUBMARINES 10
1 med regt STRATEGIC • SSBN 4:
3 trg regt 1 Le Triomphant opcon Strategic Nuclear Forces with 16
HELICOPTER M45 SLBM with 6 TN-75 nuclear warheads, 4 single
1 (4th) hel bde (3 hel regt) 533mm TT with F17 Mod 2 HWT/SM39 Exocet AShM
ISR UAV (currently undergoing modernisation programme to
1 UAV regt install M51 SLBM; expected completion 2018/19)
AIR DEFENCE 3 Le Triomphant opcon Strategic Nuclear Forces with 16
1 SAM regt M51 SLBM with 6 TN-75 nuclear warheads, 4 single
533mm TT with F17 Mod 2 HWT/SM39 Exocet AShM
Special Operation Forces 2,200 TACTICAL • SSN 6:
FORCES BY ROLE 6 Rubis with 4 single 533mm TT with F17 Mod 2 HWT/
SPECIAL FORCES SM39 Exocet AShM
2 SF regt PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 24
HELICOPTER AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 1
1 hel regt CVN 1 Charles de Gaulle with 4 Sylver A43 octuple VLS
with Aster 15 SAM, 2 sextuple Sadral lnchr with
Reserves 21,650 reservists Mistral SAM (capacity 35–40 Rafale M/E-2C Hawkeye/
Reservists form 79 UIR (Reserve Intervention Units) of AS365 Dauphin)
about 75 to 152 troops, for ‘Proterre’ – combined land DESTROYERS • DDGHM 12:
projection forces bn, and 23 USR (Reserve Specialised 2 Cassard with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block
Units) of about 160 troops, in specialised regt 2 AShM, 1 Mk13 GMLS with SM-1MR SAM, 2
 Europe 107

sextuple Sadral lnchr with Mistral SAM, 2 single AGS 3 Lapérouse

533mm ASTT with L5 Mod 4 HWT, 1 100mm gun AORH 3 Durance with 1-3 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral
(capacity 1 AS565SA Panther ASW hel) SAM (capacity 1 SA319 Alouette III/AS365 Dauphin/
2 Forbin with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 Lynx)
AShM, 4 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 30 SAM, ATF 2 Malabar
2 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2 twin ATS 2 Loire (BSAH)
324mm ASTT with MU90, 2 76mm gun (capacity 1 AXL 10: 8 Léopard; 2 Glycine
NH90 TTH hel) AXS 4: 2 La Belle Poule; 2 other
1 Georges Leygues with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet
AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with Crotale SAM, 2 sextuple Naval Aviation 6,500

Europe
Sadral lnchr with Mistral SAM, 2 single 533mm ASTT FORCES BY ROLE
with L5 HWT, 1 100mm gun (capacity 2 Lynx hel) STRIKE/FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
3 Georges Leygues (mod) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 2 sqn with Rafale M F3
Exocet AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with Crotale SAM, 2 1 sqn (forming) with Rafale M F3
twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM, 2 single 324mm ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE
ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 100mm gun (capacity 2 1 sqn with AS565SA Panther
Lynx hel) ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
4 Aquitaine with 2 8-cell Sylver A70 VLS with MdCN 2 sqn (forming) with NH90 NFH
(SCALP Naval) LACM, 2 quad lnchr with MM40 1 sqn with Lynx Mk4
Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 8-cell Sylver A43 VLS with MARITIME PATROL
Aster 15 SAM, 2 twin B515 324mm ASTT with MU90 2 sqn with Atlantique 2
LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 NFH hel) 1 sqn with Falcon 20H Gardian
FRIGATES • FFGHM 11: 1 sqn with Falcon 50MI
6 Floreal with 2 single lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
1 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM, 1 100mm gun
1 sqn with E-2C Hawkeye
(capacity 1 AS565SA Panther hel)
SEARCH & RESCUE
5 La Fayette with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block
1 sqn with AS365N/F Dauphin 2
3 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with Crotale SAM (space for
TRAINING
fitting 2 octuple VLS lnchr for Aster 15/30), 1 100mm
1 sqn with EMB 121 Xingu
gun (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther/SA321 Super Frelon
1 unit with SA319B Alouette III
hel)
1 unit with Falcon 10MER
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20
1 unit with CAP 10M
FSM 7 D’Estienne d’Orves with 1 twin Simbad lnchr with
Mistral SAM, 4 single ASTT, 1 100mm gun EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PSO 3 d’Entrecasteaux with 1 hel landing platform AIRCRAFT 54 combat capable
PCC 5: 2 L’Audacieuse; 3 Flamant FGA 42 Rafale M F3
PCO 5: 2 La Confiance, 1 Lapérouse; 1 Le Malin; 1 Fulmar ASW 12 Atlantique 2 (10 more in store)
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 17 AEW&C 3 E-2C Hawkeye
MCD 4 Vulcain SAR 4 Falcon 50MS
MHC 3 Antarès TPT 26: Light 11 EMB-121 Xingu; PAX 15: 6 Falcon
MHO 10 Éridan 10MER; 5 Falcon 20H Gardian; 4 Falcon 50MI
AMPHIBIOUS TRG 7 CAP 10M
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3 HELICOPTERS
LHD 3 Mistral with 2 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral ASW 38: 16 Lynx Mk4; 22 NH90 NFH
SAM (capacity up to 16 NH90/SA330 Puma/AS532 MRH 45: 9 AS365N/F/SP Dauphin 2; 2 AS365N3; 16
Cougar/Tiger hel; 2 LCAC or 4 LCM; 13 MBTs; 50 AS565SA Panther; 18 SA319B Alouette III
AFVs; 450 troops) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
LANDING CRAFT 38 AAM • IR R-550 Magic 2; IIR Mica IR; ARH Mica RF
LCT 4 EDA-R ASM AASM; AS-30L
LCM 9 CTM AShM AM39 Exocet
LCVP 25
 LACM Nuclear ASMPA
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 34 BOMBS
ABU 1 Telenn Mor Laser-guided: GBU-12 Paveway II
AG 3 Chamois
AGE 2: 1 Corraline; 1 Lapérouse (used as trials ships for Marines 2,000
mines and divers)
AGI 1 Dupuy de Lome Commando Units 550
AGM 1 Monge FORCES BY ROLE
AGOR 2: 1 Pourquoi pas? (used 150 days per year by MANOEUVRE
Ministry of Defence; operated by Ministry of Research Reconnaissance
and Education otherwise); 1 Beautemps-beaupré 1 recce gp
108 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Amphibious 4 sqn with Alpha Jet*

2 aslt gp 3 sqn with Grob G120A-F; TB-30 Epsilon
1 atk swimmer gp 1 sqn with EMB-121
1 raiding gp TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
COMBAT SUPPORT 2 sqn with AS555 Fennec
1 cbt spt gp 2 sqn with AS332C/L Super Puma; SA330 Puma; H225M
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ISR UAV
1 spt gp 1 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper
AIR DEFENCE
Fusiliers-Marin 1,450 3 sqn with Crotale NG; SAMP/T
FORCES BY ROLE 1 sqn with SAMP/T
MANOEUVRE

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Other
SATELLITES see Space
2 sy gp
7 sy coy AIRCRAFT 292 combat capable
FTR 41: 35 Mirage 2000-5/2000C; 6 Mirage 2000B
Reserves 5,400 reservists FGA 167: 67 Mirage 2000D; 52 Rafale B; 48 Rafale C
ELINT 2 C-160G Gabriel (ESM)
Air Force 40,800 AEW&C 4 E-3F Sentry
FORCES BY ROLE TKR 3 KC-135 Stratotanker
STRIKE TKR/TPT 12: 1 A330 MRTT; 11 C-135FR
1 sqn with Rafale B with ASMPA msl TPT 130: Heavy 14 A400M; Medium 34: 5 C-130H
1 sqn with Rafale B with ASMPA msl (forming) Hercules; 9 C-130H-30 Hercules; 2 C-130J-30 Hercules;
SPACE 18 C-160R Transall; Light 70: 19 CN235M-100; 8
1 (satellite obs) sqn CN235M-300; 5 DHC-6-300 Twin Otter; 23 EMB-121
FIGHTER Xingu; 15 TBM-700; PAX 12: 3 A310-300; 1 A330; 2 A340-
1 sqn with Mirage 2000-5 200 (on lease); 2 Falcon 7X; 2 Falcon 900 (VIP); 2 Falcon
1 sqn with Mirage 2000B/C 2000
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK TRG 153: 84 Alpha Jet*; 18 Grob G120A-F (leased); 25
3 sqn with Mirage 2000D TB-30 Epsilon (incl many in storage); 6 PC-21; 13 SR20
1 (composite) sqn with Mirage 2000-5/D (Djibouti) (leased); 7 SR22 (leased)
2 sqn with Rafale B/C HELICOPTERS
1 sqn with Rafale B/C (UAE) MRH 37 AS555 Fennec
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
TPT 36: Heavy 11 H225M Caracal; Medium 25: 1
1 flt with C-160G Gabriel (ESM)
AS332C Super Puma; 4 AS332L Super Puma; 20 SA330B
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
Puma
1 (Surveillance & Control) sqn with E-3F Sentry
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT
CISR • Heavy 6 MQ-9A Reaper (unarmed)
4 sqn with C-160R Transall; CN235M; SA330 Puma;
AS555 Fennec (Djibouti, French Guiana, Gabon, Indian AIR DEFENCE • SAM Long-range 8 SAMP/T; Short-
Ocean & New Caledonia) range 12 Crotale NG
TANKER AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
1 sqn with C-135FR; KC-135 Stratotanker AAM • IR R-550 Magic 2; IIR Mica IR; ARH Mica RF
TANKER/TRANSPORT ASM AASM; AS-30L; Apache
2 sqn with C-160R Transall LACM
TRANSPORT Nuclear ASMPA
1 sqn with A310-300; A330; A340-200 (on lease) Conventional SCALP EG
1 sqn with A400M BOMBS
1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules; C-160R Transall Laser-guided: GBU-12 Paveway II
1 sqn with C-130H/H-30/J-30 Hercules
2 sqn with CN235M Security and Intervention Brigade
1 sqn with Falcon 7X (VIP); Falcon 900 (VIP); Falcon 2000 FORCES BY ROLE
3 flt with TBM-700A SPECIAL FORCES
1 (mixed) gp with C-160 Transall; DHC-6-300 Twin Otter 3 SF gp
TRAINING MANOEUVRE
1 OCU sqn with Mirage 2000D Other
1 OCU sqn with Rafale B/C 24 protection units
1 OCU sqn with SA330 Puma; AS555 Fennec 30 (fire fighting and rescue) unit
1 OCU unit with C-160 Transall
1 (aggressor) sqn with Alpha Jet* Reserves 5,550 reservists

Paramilitary 103,400
Gendarmerie 103,400; 40,000 reservists
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
ASLT 28 VBC-90
APC • APC (W) 153 VXB-170 (VBRG-170)
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm
some
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 38
PB 38: 2 Athos; 4 Géranium; 24 VCSM; 8 VSMP
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 60: 25 AS350BA Ecureuil;
20 H135; 15 H145
Cyber
In mid-December 2016, the French defence ministry
published a new cyber-security doctrine based on a concept
of active defence, whereby a newly formed military-cyber
corps is authorised to pre-emptively identify, trace and
track potential attackers, neutralise such attacks on a pre-
emptive basis and retaliate against attacks on the basis of
an escalation model that also allows for kinetic responses.
Cyber defence is formally designated an art of war and is
to be taught to France’s entire officer corps. The military-
cyber corps, staffed largely by the foreign-intelligence
service, will report directly to the chief of the general staff.
The new doctrine acknowledges the presence of a Tailored
Access Unit, which has been in existence for over 30 years
and is deployed overseas to provide covert coverage of
specific targets. The military-cyber corps personnel level
is scheduled to rise to 2,600, supplemented by a reserve
force, which itself is scheduled to rise to 4,400. The
February 2018 strategic review of cyber defence noted
four operational areas for cyber: protection, intelligence,
judicial investigation and ‘military action’, which can
use ‘active cyber warfare’ and allow ‘national defence
operations’.
DEPLOYMENT
ARABIAN SEA: Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-150: 2
FFGHM
BURKINA FASO: Operation Barkhane 250; 1 SF gp; 1 H225M;
1 SA342 Gazelle
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 40
UN • MINUSCA 10; 1 UAV unit
CHAD: Operation Barkhane 1,500; 1 mech inf BG; 1 FGA
det with 4 Mirage 2000C/D; 1 tpt det with 1 C-130H; 4
CN235M
CÔTE D’IVOIRE: 950; 1 (Marine) inf bn
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
MONUSCO 2
DJIBOUTI: 1,450; 1 (Marine) combined arms regt with (2
recce sqn, 2 inf coy, 1 arty bty, 1 engr coy); 1 hel det with
2 SA330 Puma; 1 SA342 Gazelle; 1 LCM; 1 FGA sqn with
4 Mirage 2000-5; 1 SAR/tpt sqn with 1 C-160 Transall; 2
SA330 Puma
EGYPT: MFO 1
Europe 109
FRENCH GUIANA: 2,100: 1 (Foreign Legion) inf regt; 1
(Marine) inf regt; 1 SMA regt; 2 PCO; 1 tpt sqn with 3
CN235M; 5 SA330 Puma; 4 AS555 Fennec; 3 gendarmerie
coy; 1 AS350BA Ecureuil; 1 H145
FRENCH POLYNESIA: 1,180: 1 SMA coy; 1 naval HQ at
Papeete; 1 FFGHM; 1 PSO; 1 PCO; 1 AFS; 3 Falcon 200
Gardian; 1 SAR/tpt sqn with 2 CN235M
FRENCH WEST INDIES: 1,000; 1 (Marine) inf regt; 2 SMA
regt; 2 FFGHM; 1 AS565SA Panther; 1 SA319 Alouette III; 1
Europe
naval base at Fort de France (Martinique); 4 gendarmerie
coy; 1 PB; 2 AS350BA Ecureuil
GABON: 350; 1 AB bn
GERMANY: 2,000 (incl elm Eurocorps and FRA/GER bde);
1 (FRA/GER) mech bde (1 armd cav regt, 1 mech inf regt)
GULF OF GUINEA: Operation Corymbe 1 LHD; 1 FSM
INDIAN OCEAN: 2,000 (incl La Réunion and TAAF); 1
(Marine) para regt; 1 (Foreign Legion) inf coy; 1 SMA
regt; 1 SMA coy; 2 FFGHM; 1 PCO; 1 LCM; 1 naval HQ at
Port-des-Galets (La Réunion); 1 naval base at Dzaoudzi
(Mayotte); 1 Falcon 50M; 1 SAR/tpt sqn with 2 CN235M; 5
gendarmerie coy; 1 SA319 Alouette III
IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal) 500; 1 SF gp; 1
trg unit; 1 SP arty bty with 4 CAESAR
JORDAN: Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal) 8 Rafale F3;
1 Atlantique 2
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 669; 1 mech inf bn(-); 1 maint
coy; VBL; VBCI; VAB; Mistral
MALI: Operation Barkhane 1,750; 1 mech inf BG; 1 log bn; 1
hel unit with 4 Tiger; 3 NH90 TTH; 6 SA330 Puma; 4 SA342
Gazelle; EU • EUTM Mali 13; UN • MINUSMA 24
NEW CALEDONIA: 1,660; 1 (Marine) mech inf regt; 1
SMA coy; 6 ERC-90F1 Lynx; 1 FFGHM; 1 PSO; 2 PCC;
1 base with 2 Falcon 200 Gardian at Nouméa; 1 tpt unit
with 2 CN235 MPA; 3 SA330 Puma; 4 gendarmerie coy; 2
AS350BA Ecureuil
NIGER: Operation Barkhane 500; 1 FGA det with 2 Mirage
2000C; 2 Mirage 2000D; 1 tkr/tpt det with 1 C-135FR; 1
C-160 Transall; 1 UAV det with 4 MQ-9A Reaper
QATAR: Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal) 1 E-3F Sentry
SENEGAL: 350; 1 Falcon 50MI
SYRIA: Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal) 1 SF unit
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 18
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: 650: 1 armd BG (1 tk coy, 1
arty bty); Leclerc; CAESAR; •: Operation Inherent Resolve
(Chammal); 1 FGA sqn with 6 Rafale F3
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2 obs
FOREIGN FORCES
Belgium 28 Alpha Jet trg ac located at Cazaux/Tours
Germany 400 (GER elm Eurocorps)
Singapore 200; 1 trg sqn with 12 M-346 Master
110 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Germany GER ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Euro € 2017 2018 2019
Space
GDP € 3.28tr 3.40tr EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ 3.70tr 4.03tr SATELLITES 7
per capita US$ 44,769 48,670 COMMUNICATIONS 2 COMSATBw (1 & 2)
Growth % 2.5 1.9 ISR 5 SAR-Lupe
Inflation % 1.7 1.8
Def exp [a] € 40.4bn 41.9bn
Army 61,700
US$ 45.7bn 49.7bn FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
Def bdgt [b] € 37.0bn 38.5bn 42.9bn
elm 2 (1 GNC & MNC NE) corps HQ
US$ 41.8bn 45.7bn
MANOEUVRE
US$1=€ 0.89 0.84 Armoured
[a] NATO definition 1 (1st) armd div (1 (9th) armd bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk
[b] Includes military pensions bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn); 1
(21st) armd bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 1 armd inf
Population 80,457,737
bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 spt bn); 1 (41st) mech
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus inf bde (1 armd recce bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 lt inf bn,
1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn); 1 tk bn (for NLD
Male 6.6% 2.5% 2.7% 3.1% 24.5% 9.7%
43rd Bde); 1 SP arty bn; 1 sigs coy)
Female 6.2% 2.4% 2.6% 3.0% 24.3% 12.4% 1 (10th) armd div (1 (12th) armd bde (1 armd recce bn,
1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt
Capabilities bn); 1 (37th) mech inf bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2
The 2016 defence white paper committed Germany to a leader- armd inf bn, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn); 1 (23rd)
ship role in European defence. It also emphasised the impor- mtn inf bde (1 recce bn, 3 mtn inf bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1
tance of NATO and the need for the armed forces to contribute to
spt bn); 1 SP arty bn; 1 SP arty trg bn; 2 mech inf bn
collective-defence tasks. The 2018 Konzeption der Bundeswehr
underlines that collective- and territorial-defence tasks will drive
(GER/FRA bde); 1 arty bn (GER/FRA bde); 1 cbt engr
current military-modernisation efforts and are of equal standing coy (GER/FRA bde); 1 spt bn (GER/FRA bde))
with international crisis-management operations. The key implica- Air Manoeuvre
tion for defence modernisation is that Germany will need to invest 1 (rapid reaction) AB div (1 SOF bde (2 SOF bn); 1 AB
in readiness and return to fully equipping operational units, after bde (2 recce coy, 2 para regt, 2 cbt engr coy); 1 atk hel
having experimented in recent years with rotating equipment regt; 2 tpt hel regt; 1 sigs coy)
among units depending on their deployment or training demands.
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Germany is aligning its defence-planning process with capabil-
ity goals derived from multinational guidance. Berlin has been a ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
key sponsor of the Framework Nations Concept and in the EU led MBT 236: 217 Leopard 2A5/A6; 19 Leopard 2A7
the drive to implement Permanent Structured Cooperation on RECCE 185: 169 Fennek (incl 14 engr recce, 14 fires spt);
defence. Close military cooperation has been established, includ- 16 Wiesel
ing the affiliation of units, with the Czech Republic, France, the IFV 578: 357 Marder 1A3/A4/A5; 221 Puma
Netherlands and Romania. The defence ministry has announced APC 1,246
the objective of increasing authorised active force numbers but
APC (T) 507: 345 Bv-206D/S; 162 M113 (inc variants)
this will be challenging, given recruitment and retention problems
APC (W) 739: 208 Boxer (inc CP and trg variants); 531
after conscription was suspended in 2011. The armed forces are
also struggling to improve their readiness levels in light of increas- TPz-1 Fuchs (inc variants)
ing demands on NATO’s eastern flank. In 2019, Germany will be the AUV 683: 247 Dingo 2; 363 Eagle IV/V; 73 Wiesel 1 Mk20
framework nation for NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (with 20mm gun)
land component. Shortages of spare parts and maintenance prob- ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
lems are reported in all three services. Germany’s defence-indus- AEV 42 Dachs
trial base is able to design and manufacture equipment to meet ARV 134: 89 BPz-2 1; 45 BPz-3 Büffel
requirements across all military domains, with strengths in land
VLB 53: 22 Biber; 1 Leopard 2 with Leguan; 30 M3
and naval systems. The government is pursuing a policy of closer
MW 24 Keiler
defence-industrial cooperation in Europe.
NBC VEHICLES 8 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC
ACTIVE 179,400 (Army 61,700 Navy 15,900 Air ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL
27,600 Joint Support Service 27,400 Joint Medical SP 102 Wiesel with TOW
Service 19,950 Cyber 12,700; Other 14,150) MANPATS Milan; Spike-LR (MELLS)
Conscript liability Voluntary conscription only. Voluntary conscripts ARTILLERY 223
can serve up to 23 months SP 155mm 113 PzH 2000
RESERVE 28,250 (Army 6,500 Navy 1,200 Air 3,300 MRL 227mm 20 M270 MLRS
Joint Support Service 11,500 Joint Medical Service MOR 90: 120mm 60 Tampella; SP 120mm 30 M113 with
3,300 Other 2,450) Tampella
 Europe 111

HELICOPTERS Naval Special Forces Command

ATK 67 Tiger FORCES BY ROLE
TPT 118: Medium 63 NH90; Light 55: 41 Bell 205 (UH- SPECIAL FORCES
1D Iroquois); 14 H135 1 SF coy
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR 128: Medium 44 KZO; Light 84 LUNA Sea Battalion
FORCES BY ROLE
Navy 15,900 MANOEUVRE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Amphibious
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 6: 1 mne bn

Europe
6 Type-212A with 6 single 533mm TT with DM2A4
Seehecht HWT Air Force 27,600
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 14 FORCES BY ROLE
DESTROYERS • DDGHM 7: FIGHTER
4 Brandenburg with 2 twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet 3 wg (2 sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon)
AShM, 1 16-cell Mk41 VLS with RIM-7M/P, 2 Mk49 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 twin 324mm 1 wg (2 sqn with Tornado IDS)
ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Sea 1 wg (2 sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon (multi-role))
Lynx Mk88A hel) ISR
3 Sachsen with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84F 1 wg (1 ISR sqn with Tornado ECR/IDS; 2 UAV sqn with
Harpoon AShM, 1 32-cell Mk41 VLS with SM-2MR/ Heron)
RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 21-cell Mk49 GMLS with TANKER/TRANSPORT
RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm ASTT 1 (special air mission) wg (3 sqn with A310 MRTT;
with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity; 2 Sea Lynx A319; A340; AS532U2 Cougar II; Global 5000)
Mk88A hel) TRANSPORT
FRIGATES 7 1 wg (total: 1 sqn with C-160D Transall)
FFGHM 2 Bremen with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM- 1 wg (3 sqn (forming) with A400M Atlas)
84A/C Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple Mk29 GMLS with TRAINING
RIM-7M/P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk49 GMLS with 1 sqn located at Holloman AFB (US) with Tornado IDS
RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Mk46 1 unit (ENJJPT) located at Sheppard AFB (US) with T-6
LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Sea Lynx Mk88A hel) Texan II; T-38A
FFGM 5 Braunschweig (K130) with 2 twin lnchr with 1 hel unit located at Fassberg
RBS15 AShM, 2 Mk49 GMLS each with RIM-116 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
RAM SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 1 tpt hel wg (3 sqn with CH-53G/GA/GE/GS Stallion; 1
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 24 sqn with H145M)
MHO 10 Frankenthal (2 used as diving support) AIR DEFENCE
MSO 2 Ensdorf 1 wg (3 SAM gp) with MIM-104C/F Patriot PAC-2/3
MSD 12 Seehund 1 AD gp with ASRAD Ozelot; C-RAM Mantis and trg unit
AMPHIBIOUS • LCU 1 Type-520 1 AD trg unit located at Fort Bliss (US) with MIM-
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 22 104C/F Patriot PAC-2/3
AFSH 3 Berlin (Type-702) (capacity 2 Sea King Mk41 hel; 3 (tac air ctrl) radar gp
2 RAMs)
AG 4: 2 Schwedeneck (Type-748); 2 Stollergrund (Type-745) Air Force Regiment
AGI 3 Oste (Type-423) FORCES BY ROLE
AGOR 1 Planet (Type-751) MANOEUVRE
AOR 6 Elbe (Type-404) with 1 hel landing platform Other
(2 specified for PFM support; 1 specified for SSK 1 sy regt
support; 3 specified for MHC/MSC support) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AOT 2 Rhön (Type-704) AIRCRAFT 217 combat capable
APB 2: 1 Knurrhahn; 1 Ohre FTR 129 Eurofighter Typhoon
AXS 1 Gorch Fock ATK 68 Tornado IDS
ATK/EW 20 Tornado ECR*
Naval Aviation 2,000 TKR/TPT 4 A310 MRTT
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TPT 53: Heavy 21 A400M; Medium 23 C-160D Transall;
AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable PAX 9: 1 A310; 2 A340 (VIP); 2 A319; 4 Global 5000
ASW 8 AP-3C Orion TRG 109: 69 T-6A Texan II, 40 T-38A
TPT • Light 2 Do-228 (pollution control) HELICOPTERS
HELICOPTERS MRH 15 H145M
ASW 22 Lynx Mk88A TPT 73: Heavy 70 CH-53G/GA/GS/GE Stallion; Medium
SAR 21 Sea King Mk41 3 AS532U2 Cougar II (VIP)
112 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Heavy 8 advancing technical cyber/IT capabilities and guiding
Heron 1 cyber policies. A Cyber and Information Space Command
AIR DEFENCE (KdoCIR) led by a chief of staff for Cyber and Information
SAM Space (InspCIR) was launched in April 2017. The overall aim
Long-range 30 MIM-104C/F Patriot PAC-2/PAC-3 of these reforms is to assign current capabilities to areas of
Point-defence 10 ASRAD Ozelot (with FIM-92 Stinger) responsibility, protect Bundeswehr and national cyber and
GUNS 35mm 12 C-RAM Mantis IT infrastructure, and improve capabilities in order to better
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES respond to cyber attacks. Germany’s defence minister stated
AAM • IR AIM-9L/Li Sidewinder; IIR IRIS-T; ARH in April 2017 that the armed forces could respond with
AIM-120B AMRAAM offensive cyber operations if networks are attacked.
LACM Taurus KEPD 350
ARM AGM-88B HARM DEPLOYMENT
BOMBS
Laser-guided GBU-24 Paveway III, GBU-54 JDAM AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 1,300;
1 bde HQ; 1 recce bn; 1 hel flt with CH-53; 1 UAV flt with
Joint Support Service 27,400 3 Heron 1 UAV
FORCES BY ROLE
 ALBANIA: OSCE • Albania 3
COMBAT SUPPORT ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN: OSCE • Minsk Conference 1
3 MP regt
BLACK SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 2: 1 AOR
2 NBC bn
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: OSCE • Bosnia & Herzegovina 1
6 log bn DJIBOUTI: EU • Operation Atalanta 1 AP-3C Orion
1 spt regt ESTONIA: NATO • Baltic Air Policing 6 Eurofighter
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Typhoon
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES FRANCE: 400 (incl GER elm Eurocorps)
APC • APC (W) 74 TPz-1 Fuchs (inc variants)
AUV 451: 206 Dingo 2; 245 Eagle IV/V IRAQ: 110 (trg spt)
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES JORDAN: Operation Inherent Resolve 300; 4 Tornado ECR; 1
ARV 59: 29 BPz-2; 30 BPz-3 Büffel A310 MRTT
NBC VEHICLES 35 TPz-1 Fuchs A6/A7/A8 NBC LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 112; 1 FFGM
LIBYA: UN • UNISMIL 2 obs
Joint Medical Services 19,900
LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 580; 1
FORCES BY ROLE
mech inf bn HQ; 1 mech inf coy(+) with Leopard 2A6; Boxer
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
4 med regt MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 147; UN • MINUSMA 430; 1 sy
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE coy; 1 int coy; 1 UAV sqn
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MEDITERRANEAN SEA: EU • EU NAVFOR MED: 1
APC • APC (W) 109: 72 Boxer (amb); 37 TPz-1 Fuchs (amb) FFGHM; NATO • SNMG 2: 1 FFGHM
AUV 42 Eagle IV/V (amb) MOLDOVA: OSCE • Moldova 1
NIGER: Operation Barkhane 2 C-160 Transall
Cyber & Information Command 12,700
NORTH SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 1: 1 MHO
FORCES BY ROLE
COMBAT SUPPORT POLAND: 100 (GER elm MNC-NE)
4 EW bn SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 440; OSCE • Kosovo 7
6 sigs bn
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 3; 11 obs

Cyber SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 7

Germany issued a Cyber Security Strategy in February 2011.
The National Cyber Security Council, an inter-ministerial
body at state-secretary level, analyses cyber-related issues.
A National Cyber Response Centre was set up at the Federal
Office for Information Security in April 2011. In 2016,
Germany boosted its cyber capabilities by implementing
far-reaching reforms. A new Directorate-General Cyber/IT
(CIT) was created within the Federal Ministry of Defence,
with two divisions for Cyber/IT Governance and IT Services/
Information Security. The director-general serves as chief
information officer and point of contact for other federal
ministries and agencies. The director-general’s tasks include
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 28
UNITED STATES: Trg units with 40 T-38 Talon; 69 T-6A
Texan II at Goodyear AFB (AZ)/Sheppard AFB (TX); 1 trg
sqn with 14 Tornado IDS at Holloman AFB (NM); NAS
Pensacola (FL); Fort Rucker (AL); Missile trg at Fort Bliss
(TX)
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 3 obs
FOREIGN FORCES
France 2,000; 1 (FRA/GER) mech bde (1 armd cav regt, 1
mech inf regt)
 Europe 113

United Kingdom 3,750; 1 armd bde(-) (1 tk regt, 1 armd
inf bn); 1 SP arty regt; 1 maint regt; 1 med regt
United States
US Africa Command: Army; 1 HQ at Stuttgart
US European Command: 37,950; 1 combined service HQ
(EUCOM) at Stuttgart-Vaihingen
Army 23,000; 1 HQ (US Army Europe (USAREUR) at
Heidelberg; 1 div HQ (fwd); 1 SF gp; 1 recce bn; 2 armd
bn; 1 mech bde(-); 1 arty bn; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde(-); 1 (cbt
armed forces are conscript based, although Athens is looking to
become fully professional. However, financial difficulties and wide-
spread abuse of the deferment process have slowed plans. Train-
ing levels are reportedly good, with a focus by the armed forces
on joint operational training. Greece’s deployments involve limited
numbers of personnel and focus on the near abroad, although the
country contributes to EU, NATO and UN missions. Greece is mod-
ernising and upgrading its stored P-3B Orion aircraft to strengthen
its maritime-patrol and anti-submarine-warfare capability. Rotary-
wing transport capability is being boosted and most of the F-16
fleet is being upgraded. Procurement priorities include the pro-

Europe
avn) hel bde HQ; 1 int bde; 1 MP bde; 1 sigs bde; 1 spt
curement of multi-purpose frigates and a new combat aircraft.
bde; 1 ARNG SAM bde(-); 1 (APS) armd bde eqpt set; Greece has an extensive defence industry focused on the domestic
M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams; M2A2 Bradley; Stryker Dragoon; market, capable of manufacturing and developing naval vessels,
M109A6; M119A3; M777A2; AH-64D Apache; CH-47F subsystems, ammunition and small arms.
Chinook; UH-60L/M Black Hawk; HH-60M Black Hawk;
M1097 Avenger ACTIVE 142,350 (Army 93,500 Navy 16,250 Air
Navy 500 21,000 Joint 11,600) Paramilitary 4,000
Conscript liability 9 months army; 12 months navy and air force
USAF 13,100; 1 HQ (US Airforce Europe (USAFE)) at
Ramstein AB; 1 HQ (3rd Air Force) at Ramstein AB; 1 RESERVE 220,500 (Army 181,500 Navy 5,000 Air
ftr wg at Spangdahlem AB with 1 ftr sqn with 24 F-16CJ 34,000)
Fighting Falcon; 1 airlift wg at Ramstein AB with 14
C-130J-30 Hercules; 2 Gulfstream V (C-37A); 5 Learjet
35A (C-21A); 1 B-737-700 (C-40B) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
USMC 1,350
Army 48,500; 45,000 conscripts (total 93,500)
Units are manned at 3 different levels – Cat A 85% fully
Greece GRC ready, Cat B 60% ready in 24 hours, Cat C 20% ready in 48
Euro € 2017 2018 2019 hours (requiring reserve mobilisation). 3 military regions
GDP € 178bn 183bn FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
US$ 201bn 218bn
2 corps HQ (incl NRDC-GR)
per capita US$ 18,637 20,311 1 armd div HQ
Growth % 1.4 2.0 3 mech inf div HQ
Inflation % 1.1 0.7 1 inf div HQ
Def exp [a] € 4.21bn 4.11bn SPECIAL FORCES
US$ 4.76bn 4.90bn 1 SF comd
1 cdo/para bde
Def bdgt [b] € 4.19bn 4.11bn 4.23bn
MANOEUVRE
US$ 4.73bn 4.90bn
Reconnaissance
US$1=€ 0.89 0.84 4 recce bn
[a] NATO definition Armoured
[b] Includes military pensions 4 armd bde (2 armd bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn)
Mechanised
Population 10,761,523
10 mech inf bde (1 armd bn, 2 mech bn, 1 SP arty bn)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Light
2 inf regt
Male 7.1% 2.4% 2.5% 2.7% 24.9% 9.2%
Air Manoeuvre
Female 6.7% 2.3% 2.4% 2.7% 25.3% 11.8%
1 air mob bde
1 air aslt bde
Capabilities Amphibious
Greece’s 2014 National Military Strategy identifies the country’s 1 mne bde
principal defence objectives as safeguarding sovereignty and COMBAT SUPPORT
territorial integrity. The armed forces would also be expected 2 MRL bn
to support Cyprus in the event of a conflict. The Force Structure 3 AD bn (2 with I-Hawk, 1 with Tor M1)
2013–27 document set out plans to make the armed forces more 3 engr regt
flexible, rapidly deployable and cost-effective. Greece is a NATO
2 engr bn
member and leads an EU battlegroup. In recent years, defence-
cooperation agreements have been signed with Cyprus, Egypt
1 EW regt
and Israel. In 2018, talks began on an enhanced US presence in 10 sigs bn
the country. The Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement is the COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
cornerstone of US–Greece defence cooperation and provides for 1 log corps HQ
a naval-support facility and an airfield at Souda Bay in Crete. The 1 log div (3 log bde)
114 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

HELICOPTER COMBAT SUPPORT

1 hel bde (1 hel regt with (2 atk hel bn), 2 tpt hel bn, 4 8 arty bn
hel bn) 4 AD bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE COMBAT SUPPORT
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 1 hel bn
MBT 1,328: 170 Leopard 2A6HEL; 183 Leopard 2A4; 500
Leopard 1A4/5; 100 M60A1/A3; 375 M48A5 Navy 14,200; 2,050 conscript (total 16,250)
RECCE 242 VBL EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
IFV 398 BMP-1 SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 11:
APC • APC (T) 2,407: 86 Leonidas Mk1/2; 2,108 M113A1/ 3 Poseidon (GER Type-209/1200) with 8 single 533mm TT
A2; 213 M577 (CP) with SUT HWT
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 1 Poseidon (GER Type-209/1200) (modernised with AIP
ARV 261: 12 Büffel; 43 BPz-2; 94 M88A1; 112 M578 technology) with 8 single 533mm TT with SUT HWT
VLB 12+: 12 Biber; Leguan 3 Glavkos (GER Type-209/1100) with 8 single 533mm TT
MW Giant Viper with UGM-84C Harpoon AShM/SUT HWT
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE 4 Papanikolis (GER Type-214) with 8 single 533mm TT
MSL with UGM-84C Harpoon AShM/SUT HWT
SP 557: 195 HMMWV with 9K135 Kornet-E (AT-14 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 13
Spriggan); 362 M901 FRIGATES • FFGHM 13:
MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); Milan; TOW 4 Elli Batch I (ex-NLD Kortenaer Batch 2) with 2 quad
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav; 90mm EM-67; SP 106mm 581 Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84A/C Harpoon AShM, 1
M40A1 octuple Mk29 GMLS with RIM-7M/P Sea Sparrow
ARTILLERY 3,609 SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1
SP 587: 155mm 442: 418 M109A1B/A2/A3GEA1/A5; 24 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Bell 212 (AB-
PzH 2000; 203mm 145 M110A2 212) hel or 1 S-70B Seahawk hel)
TOWED 557: 105mm 351: 333 M101; 18 M-56; 155mm 2 Elli Batch II (ex-NLD Kortenaer Batch 2) with 2 quad
Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84A/C Harpoon AShM, 1
206 M114
octuple Mk29 GMLS with RIM-7M/P Sea Sparrow
MRL 145: 122mm 109 RM-70; 227mm 36 M270 MLRS
SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 2
MOR 2,320: 81mm 1,700; 107mm 620 M30 (incl 231 SP)
Phalanx CIWS, 2 76mm gun (capacity 2 Bell 212 (AB-
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

212) hel or 1 S-70B Seahawk hel)
SRBM • Conventional MGM-140A ATACMS (launched
3 Elli Batch III (ex-NLD Kortenaer Batch 2) with 2 quad
from M270 MLRS)
Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84A/C Harpoon AShM, 1
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 18: 1 Beech 200 King Air (C-12C)
octuple Mk29 lnchr with RIM-7M/P Sea Sparrow
2 Beech 200 King Air (C-12R/AP Huron); 15 Cessna 185
SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 Phalanx
(U-17A/B)
CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel)
HELICOPTERS
4 Hydra (GER MEKO 200) with 2 quad lnchr with
ATK 28: 19 AH-64A Apache; 9 AH-64D Apache
RGM-84G Harpoon AShM, 1 16-cell Mk48 Mod 5
TPT 140: Heavy 24: 18 CH-47D Chinook; 6 CH-47SD
VLS with RIM-162 ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT
Chinook; Medium 14 NH90 TTH; Light 102: 88 Bell 205
each with Mk46 LWT, 2 Phalanx CIWS, 1 127mm gun
(UH-1H Iroquois); 14 Bell 206 (AB-206) Jet Ranger (capacity 1 S-70B Seahawk ASW hel)
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 33
ISR • Medium 4 Sperwer CORVETTES • FSGM 5 Roussen (Super Vita) with 2
AIR DEFENCE quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 1 21-cell
SAM 155 Mk49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 1 76mm gun
Medium-range 42 MIM-23B I-Hawk PCFG 12:
Short-range 21 9K331 Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet) 2 Kavaloudis (FRA La Combattante IIIB) with 6 single
Point-range 92+: 38 9K33 Osa-M (SA-8B Gecko); 54 lnchr with RB 12 Penguin AShM, 2 single 533mm TT
ASRAD HMMWV; FIM-92 Stinger with SST-4 HWT, 2 76mm gun
GUNS • TOWED 727: 20mm 204 Rh 202; 23mm 523 ZU- 3 Kavaloudis (FRA La Combattante IIIB) with 2 twin lnchr
23-2 with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 2 single 533mm TT
with SST-4 HWT, 2 76mm gun
National Guard 33,000 reservists
 2 Laskos (FRA La Combattante III) with 4 MM38 Exocet
Internal security role AShM, 2 single 533mm TT with SST-4 HWT, 2 76mm
FORCES BY ROLE gun
MANOEUVRE 2 Laskos (FRA La Combattante III) with 2 twin lnchr with
Light RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 2 single 533mm TT with
1 inf div SST-4 HWT, 2 76mm gun
Air Manoeuvre 1 Votsis (ex-GER Tiger) with 2 twin Mk-141 lnchr with
1 para regt RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 76mm gun 

 Europe 115

2 Votsis (ex-GER Tiger) with 2 twin MM38 Exocet EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AShM, 1 76mm gun AIRCRAFT 231 combat capable
PCO 8: FGA 231: 34 F-4E Phantom II; 70 F-16CG/DG Block
2 Armatolos (DNK Osprey) with 1 76mm gun 30/50 Fighting Falcon; 55 F-16CG/DG Block 52+; 30 F-
2 Pirpolitis with 1 76mm gun 16 C/D Block 52+ ADV Fighting Falcon; 19 Mirage 2000-
4 Machitis with 1 76mm gun 5EG Mk2; 5 Mirage 2000-5BG Mk2; 16 Mirage 2000EG;
PB 8: 4 Andromeda (NOR Nasty); 2 Stamou; 2 Tolmi 2 Mirage 2000BG
MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4 AEW 4 EMB-145AEW (EMB-145H) Erieye
MHO 4: 2 Evropi (ex-UK Hunt); 2 Evniki (ex-US Osprey) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AMPHIBIOUS AAM • IR AIM-9L/P Sidewinder; R-550 Magic 2;

Europe
LANDING SHIPS • LST 5: IIR IRIS-T; Mica IR; ARH AIM-120B/C AMRAAM;
5 Chios (capacity 4 LCVP; 300 troops) with 1 76mm Mica RF
gun, 1 hel landing platform ASM AGM-65A/B/G Maverick
LANDING CRAFT 15 LACM SCALP EG
LCU 5 AShM AM39 Exocet
LCA 7 ARM AGM-88 HARM
LCAC 3 Kefallinia (Zubr) with 2 AK630 CIWS (capacity BOMBS
either 3 MBT or 10 APC (T); 230 troops) Electro-optical guided: GBU-8B HOBOS
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 25 Laser-guided: GBU-10/12/16 Paveway II; GBU-24
ABU 2 Paveway III; GBU-50 Enhanced Paveway II
AG 2 Pandora INS/GPS-guided GBU-31 JDAM; AGM-154C JSOW
AGOR 1 Naftilos
AGS 2: 1 Stravon; 1 Pytheas Air Defence
AOR 2 Axios (ex-GER Luneburg) FORCES BY ROLE
AORH 1 Prometheus (ITA Etna) with 1 Phalanx CIWS AIR DEFENCE
AOT 4 Ouranos 6 sqn/bty with MIM-104A/B/D Patriot/Patriot PAC-1
AWT 6 Kerkini SOJC/Patriot PAC-2 GEM
AXS 5 2 sqn/bty with S-300PMU-1 (SA-10C Grumble)
12 bty with Skyguard/RIM-7 Sparrow/guns; Crotale NG/
Coastal Defence GR; Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 2 MM40 Exocet AIR DEFENCE
SAM
Naval Aviation Long-range 48: 36 MIM-104A/B/D Patriot/Patriot
FORCES BY ROLE PAC-1 SOJC/PAC-2 GEM; 12 S-300PMU-1 (SA-10C
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE Grumble)
1 div with S-70B Seahawk; Bell 212 (AB-212) ASW Short-range 13+: 9 Crotale NG/GR; 4 9K331 Tor-M1
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE (SA-15 Gauntlet); some Skyguard/Sparrow
AIRCRAFT • ASW (5 P-3B Orion in store undergoing GUNS • 30mm 35+ Artemis-30
modernisation)
HELICOPTERS Air Support Command
ASW 18: 7 Bell 212 (AB-212) ASW; 11 S-70B Seahawk FORCES BY ROLE
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
ASM AGM-114 Hellfire 1 sqn with AS332C Super Puma (SAR/CSAR)
AShM AGM-119 Penguin 1 sqn with AW109; Bell 205A (AB-205A) (SAR); Bell
212 (AB-212 - VIP, tpt)
Air Force 18,800; 2,200 conscripts (total 21,000) TRANSPORT
1 sqn with C-27J Spartan
Tactical Air Force 1 sqn with C-130B/H Hercules
FORCES BY ROLE 1 sqn with EMB-135BJ Legacy; ERJ-135LR; Gulfstream V
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with F-4E Phantom II AIRCRAFT
3 sqn with F-16CG/DG Block 30/50 Fighting Falcon TPT 26: Medium 23: 8 C-27J Spartan; 5 C-130B Hercules;
3 sqn with F-16CG/DG Block 52+ Fighting Falcon 10 C-130H Hercules; Light 2: 1 EMB-135BJ Legacy; 1
2 sqn with F-16C/D Block 52+ ADV Fighting Falcon ERJ-135LR; PAX 1 Gulfstream V
1 sqn with Mirage 2000-5EG/BG Mk2 HELICOPTERS
1 sqn with Mirage 2000EG/BG TPT 31: Medium 12 AS332C Super Puma; Light 19: 12
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING Bell 205A (AB-205A) (SAR); 4 Bell 212 (AB-212) (VIP,
1 sqn with EMB-145H Erieye Tpt); 3 AW109
116 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Air Training Command

Hungary HUN
FORCES BY ROLE
TRAINING Hungarian Forint f 2017 2018 2019
2 sqn with T-2C/E Buckeye GDP f 38.2tr 40.8tr
2 sqn with T-6A/B Texan II US$ 139bn 156bn
1 sqn with T-41D per capita US$ 14,209 16,016
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Growth % 4.0 4.0
AIRCRAFT • TRG 91: 28 T-2C/E Buckeye; 20 T-6A Texan Inflation % 2.4 2.8
II; 25 T-6B Texan II; 18 T-41D Def exp [a] f 403bn 444bn
US$ 1.47bn 1.70bn
Paramilitary Def bdgt [b] f 354bn 427bn 513bn
US$ 1.29bn 1.64bn
Coast Guard and Customs 4,000 US$1=f 274.27 261.03
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE [a] NATO definition
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 124: [b] Excludes military pensions
PCC 3
Population 9,825,704
PCO 1 Gavdos (Damen 5009)
PBF 54 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
PB 66 Male 7.6% 2.7% 3.0% 3.2% 24.0% 7.2%
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4: 2 Cessna 172RG Cutlass; 2 Female 7.1% 2.5% 2.8% 3.1% 24.9% 11.9%
TB-20 Trinidad
HELICOPTERS Capabilities
SAR: 3 AS365N3 Hungary published a National Security Strategy and National Mili-
tary Strategy in 2012. Territorial defence and the ability to partici-
Cyber pate in NATO and other international operations are central tenets
of the military strategy, including the medium-term aim of having
A new Joint Cyber Command in the Hellenic National
forces capable of taking part in high-intensity operations. Hungary
Defence General Staff was established in 2014, replacing is also implementing the Zrínyi 2026 national defence and
the existing Cyber Defence Directorate. The National armed-forces modernisation plan, announced in December 2016.
Policy on Cyber Defence was published in March 2018. Hungary coordinates policy with the other member states of the
Visegrád Group, including on defence, and hosts the NATO Centre
of Excellence for Military Medicine. At the end of 2017, the ministry
DEPLOYMENT of defence announced that Hungary would resume pilot training
in 2018. In 2017, the defence ministry established the Military Aug-
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 5 mentation Preparation and Training Command to improve recruit-
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea ment, training and military education. The armed forces partici-
pate in international crisis-management missions, notably in the
1 Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq, but have very limited organic capac-
CYPRUS: Army 950 (ELDYK army); ε200 (officers/NCOs ity to deploy forces beyond national borders. Increasing migration
pressure has involved the armed forces in internal border-control
seconded to Greek-Cypriot National Guard) (total 1,150);
operations, assisting national police forces. Announced equip-
1 mech bde (1 armd bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn); 61 ment-modernisation priorities focus on individual soldier equip-
M48A5 MOLF MBT; 80 Leonidas APC; 12 M114 arty; 6 ment and fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. The defence ministry
M110A2 arty focused on the air-force-related elements of Zrínyi 2026 in 2018, in
part to assist with the transport of troops to international missions.
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 148; 1 FFGHM Hungary’s defence-industrial base is limited, though the defence
ministry set up an inter-ministerial working group to boost domes-
MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 2
tic capacity in the small-arms sector.
MEDITERRANEAN SEA: NATO • SNMG 2: 1 FFGHM; 1
ACTIVE 27,800 (Army 10,450 Air 5,750 Joint 11,600)
PCO; 1 MHO
Paramilitary 12,000
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 116; 1 inf coy
RESERVE 20,000
OSCE • Kosovo 1
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 23 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Hungary’s armed forces have reorganised into a joint force
FOREIGN FORCES Land Component 10,450 (incl riverine element)
United States US European Command: 400; 1 naval FORCES BY ROLE
base at Makri; 1 naval base at Soudha Bay; 1 air base at SPECIAL FORCES
Iraklion 1 SF regt
 Europe 117

MANOEUVRE MRH 7 Mi-17 Hip H


Reconnaissance TPT • Medium 3 Mi-8 Hip (10 in store)
1 ISR regt AIR DEFENCE
Mechanised SAM • Point-defence 16 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); Mistral
1 (5th) mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
sigs coy, 1 log bn) AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo
1 (25th) mech inf bde (1 tk bn; 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 A); ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM
AT bn, 1 log bn) ASM AGM-65 Maverick; 3M11 Falanga (AT-2 Swatter);
COMBAT SUPPORT 9K114 Shturm-V (AT-6 Spiral)
1 engr regt BOMBS • Laser-guided Paveway II

Europe
1 EOD/rvn regt
1 CBRN bn Paramilitary 12,000
1 sigs regt
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Border Guards 12,000 (to reduce)
1 log regt Ministry of Interior
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FORCES BY ROLE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MANOEUVRE
MBT 44 T-72M1 Other
IFV 120 BTR-80A 1 (Budapest) paramilitary district (7 rapid reaction coy)
APC 272 11 (regt/district) paramilitary regt
APC (W) 260 BTR-80 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PPV 12 Maxxpro Plus ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES APC • APC (W) 68 BTR-80
AEV BAT-2
ARV VT-55A Cyber
VLB BLG-60; MTU; TMM A National Cyber Security Centre was established in
NBC VEHICLES 24+: 24 K90 CBRN Recce; PSZH-IV CBRN 2015 by uniting the GovCERT-Hungary and the National
Recce Electronic Information Security Authority. The centre is
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE supervised by the interior ministry (MoI). There is also a
MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 National Cybersecurity Coordination Council, a National
Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel) Cybersecurity Forum and a cyber coordinator for cyber
ARTILLERY 31 security at the governmental level. The Information
TOWED 152mm 31 D-20 Security Centre for Critical Systems and Facilities operated
MOR 82mm by the MoI’s National Disaster Management Directorate
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR 2 has responsibility for critical-infrastructure protection,
MINE COUNTERMEASURES • MSR 4 Nestin including of information. The Cyber Defence Centre
(CDC) was established in 2016 within the Military National
Air Component 5,750 Security Service for security management, vulnerability
FORCES BY ROLE assessment and for incident handling in the defence
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK sector. Since the end of 2017, the CDC has operated a 24/7
1 sqn with Gripen C/D computer-incident response capability.
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with An-26 Curl
DEPLOYMENT
TRAINING
1 sqn with Z-143LSi; Z-242L AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 111
ATTACK HELICOPTER BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • Operation Althea 164; 1 inf
1 sqn with Mi-24 Hind coy; OSCE • Bosnia & Herzegovina 1
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 2; 2 obs
1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H
AIR DEFENCE CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 11
1 SAM regt (9 bty with Mistral; 3 bty with 2K12 Kub IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 164
(SA-6 Gainful))
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 10
1 radar regt
MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 7
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 14 combat capable MOLDOVA: OSCE • Moldova 1
FGA 14: 12 Gripen C; 2 Gripen D SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 388; 1 inf coy (KTM)
TPT 6: Light 4 An-26 Curl; PAX 2 A319
SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 4
TRG 4: 2 Z-143LSi; 2 Z-242L
HELICOPTERS UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 28
ATK 11: 3 Mi-24D Hind D; 6 Mi-24V Hind E; 2 Mi-24P Hind F WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2 obs
118 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

FOREIGN FORCES FOREIGN FORCES

United States US European Command: 100; 1 armd recce Iceland Air Policing: Aircraft and personnel from various
tp; M3A3 Bradley NATO members on a rotating basis

Iceland ISL Ireland IRL

Icelandic Krona Kr 2017 2018 2019 Euro € 2017 2018 2019
GDP Kr 2.62tr 2.80tr GDP € 294bn 309bn
US$ 24.5bn 26.7bn US$ 332bn 366bn
per capita US$ 70,248 75,700 per capita US$ 68,711 75,192
Growth % 4.0 3.7 Growth % 7.2 4.7
Inflation % 1.8 2.5 Inflation % 0.3 0.7
Sy Bdgt [a] Kr 5.87bn 4.28bn 6.75bn Def bdgt [a] € 921m 946m 994m
US$ 54.9m 40.8m US$ 1.04bn 1.12bn
US$1=Kr 106.84 104.84 US$1=€ 0.89 0.84
[a] Coast Guard budget [a] Includes military pensions and capital expenditure

Population 343,518 Population 5,068,050

Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 10.4% 3.3% 3.6% 3.7% 22.4% 6.8% Male 11.0% 3.1% 2.9% 3.1% 23.8% 6.0%
Female 10.0% 3.2% 3.4% 3.5% 22.1% 7.7% Female 10.5% 3.0% 2.8% 3.1% 23.6% 7.0%

Capabilities
Iceland is a NATO member but maintains only a coastguard service.
In 2016, the country established a National Security Council to
implement and monitor security policy. The coastguard controls
the NATO Iceland Air Defence System, as well as a NATO Control
and Reporting Centre that feeds into NATO air- and missile-
defence and air-operations centres. Increased Russian air and
naval activities in the Atlantic and close to NATO airspace have led
to complaints from Iceland. Iceland considers its bilateral defence
agreement with the US as an important pillar of its security policy
and participates in the security-policy dialogue of NORDEFCO.
Iceland hosts NATO and regional partners for exercises, transits
and naval task groups, as well as the Icelandic Air Policing mission.
Despite there being no standing armed forces, Iceland makes
financial contributions and on occasion deploys civilian person-
nel to NATO missions. In late 2016, following a June joint declara-
tion between the two countries, the US Navy began operating P-8
Poseidon maritime-patrol aircraft from Keflavik air base, and was
reportedly upgrading hangars and other infrastructure at the site
to enable regular, rotational patrols.
ACTIVE NIL Paramilitary 250
Capabilities
The armed forces’ core mission is defending the state against
armed aggression, although a 2015 white paper broadened the
scope of the national-security risk assessment beyond traditional
military and paramilitary threats. It listed inter- and intra-state con-
flict, cyber attacks, terrorism, emergencies and natural disasters,
among others. The army maintains substantial EOD capabilities.
Ireland is active in EU defence cooperation and continues to con-
tribute to multinational operations. Its forces are well trained for
their roles. Ireland is also working to establish a specialist reserve
with relevant professional qualifications. It has sufficient logistic
capability to sustain its UN deployments but has no strategic-airlift
capacity. After the white paper, Dublin identified a large number of
defence projects to be completed over a ten-year period. Key pri-
orities include a mid-life upgrade for the army’s Piranha armoured
personnel carriers, EOD robots and UAVs. Ireland has a small
defence industry. Specialist firms export drive-train technologies
for land systems while aviation maintenance, repair and overhaul
is principally focused on the civil sector.
ACTIVE 9,500 (Army 7,500 Navy 1,100 Air 900)
RESERVE 4,050 (Army 3,850 Navy 200)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Paramilitary Army 7,500

FORCES BY ROLE
Iceland Coast Guard 250 SPECIAL FORCES
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 ranger coy
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 3 MANOEUVRE
PSOH: 2 Aegir Reconnaissance
PSO 1 Thor 1 armd recce sqn
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGS 1 Baldur Mechanised
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 DHC-8-300 (MP) 1 mech inf coy
HELICOPTERS Light
TPT • Medium 2 AS332L1 Super Puma 1 inf bde (1 cav recce sqn, 4 inf bn, 1 arty regt (3 fd arty
 Europe 119

bty, 1 AD bty), 1 fd engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 MP coy, 1

tpt coy)
DEPLOYMENT
1 inf bde (1 cav recce sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty regt (3 fd arty BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea
bty, 1 AD bty), 1 fd engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 MP coy, l 5; OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 1
tpt coy)
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MONUSCO 4
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 353; elm 1 mech inf bn
RECCE 6 Piranha IIIH 30mm
APC 101 MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 20
APC (W) 74: 56 Piranha III; 18 Piranha IIIH MEDITERRANEAN SEA: EU • EUNAVFOR MED 1 PSO

Europe
PPV 27 RG-32M
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 13 obs
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTURCTURE
MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin MOLDOVA: OSCE • Moldova 1
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 12; OSCE • Kosovo 3
ARTILLERY 299 SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 126; 1 inf coy
TOWED • 105mm 23: 17 L118 Light Gun; 6 L119 Light
Gun UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 11
MOR 275: 81mm 180; 120mm 95 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 3 obs
AIR DEFENCE
SAM • Point-defence RBS-70
GUNS • TOWED 40mm 32 L/70 each with 8 Flycatcher
Italy ITA
Euro € 2017 2018 2019
Reserves 3,850 reservists
GDP € 1.72tr 1.76tr
FORCES BY ROLE
US$ 1.94tr 2.09tr
MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance per capita US$ 31,997 34,349
1 (integrated) armd recce sqn Growth % 1.5 1.2
2 (integrated) cav sqn Inflation % 1.3 1.3
Mechanised Def exp [a] € 21.2bn 21.2bn
1 (integrated) mech inf coy US$ 23.9bn 25.1bn
Light
Def bdgt [b] € 20.3bn 21.0bn 21.0bn
14 (integrated) inf coy
COMBAT SUPPORT US$ 22.9bn 24.9bn
4 (integrated) arty bty US$1=€ 0.89 0.84
2 engr gp [a] NATO definition
2 MP coy [b] Includes military pensions
3 sigs coy
Population 62,246,674
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
2 med det Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
2 tpt coy
Male 7.0% 2.4% 2.5% 2.7% 24.4% 9.3%

Naval Service 1,100 Female 6.7% 2.3% 2.5% 2.8% 25.3% 12.3%

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8
Capabilities
PSOH 1 Eithne with 1 57mm gun Italy is concerned by security challenges in the Euro-Atlantic envi-
PSO 5: 2 Roisin with 1 76mm gun; 3 Samuel Beckett with ronment, as well as from Europe’s southern flank. The 2017–19
1 76mm gun defence plan, building on the 2015 defence white paper, outlined
a goal to reduce personnel numbers and improve joint activity
PCO 2 Orla (ex-UK Peacock) with 1 76mm gun
between the services. NATO member Italy takes part in the Alli-
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AXS 2
ance’s air-policing mission and since early 2017 has deployed to
Latvia as part of the Enhanced Forward Presence. The EUNAVFOR-
Air Corps 880 MED force is headquartered in Rome, while the US Navy 6th Fleet
2 ops wg; 2 spt wg; 1 trg wg; 1 comms and info sqn is based in Naples. Italian forces are well equipped and trained,
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE though the white paper indicated a desire to improve joint train-
ing. The country takes part in and hosts NATO and other multi-
AIRCRAFT
national exercises and continues to support NATO, EU and UN
MP 2 CN235 MPA
operations abroad. However, Italy is planning to gradually reduce
TPT • Light 5: 4 Cessna FR-172H; 1 Learjet 45 (VIP) its presence overseas to focus on Europe’s southern flank. Italy’s
TRG 8 PC-9M logistics capability is enabled by a fleet of medium transport air-
HELICOPTERS: craft and tankers. The white paper detailed capability-enhance-
MRH 6 AW139 ment programmes including upgrades to main battle tanks and
TPT • Light 2 H135 (incl trg/medevac) procurement of armoured fighting vehicles, counter-UAV systems
120 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

and electronic-warfare capabilities. The expected retirement of EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

much of the naval fleet has triggered a long-term replacement ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
plan; funds are still being allocated for the FREMM frigate pro- MBT 200 C1 Ariete
gramme. F-35As have been ordered for the air force (and F-35Bs ASLT 259 B1 Centauro
for naval aviation). Italy has an advanced defence industry, produc-
IFV 428: 200 VCC-80 Dardo; 208 VBM 8×8 Freccia (incl 36
ing equipment across all the domains, with particular strengths
in shipbuilding and aircraft and helicopter manufacturing. The with Spike-LR); 20 VBM 8×8 Freccia (CP)
country hosts Europe’s F-35 final assembly and check-out facility APC 828

at Cameri. Italy takes part in European defence-industrial coopera- APC (T) 361: 245 Bv-206; 116 M113 (incl variants)
tion projects, including PESCO projects. APC (W) 428: 151 Puma 4×4; 277 Puma 6×6
PPV 39 VTMM
ACTIVE 171,050 (Army 99,950 Navy 30,000 Air AUV 10 Cougar; IVECO LMV
41,100) Paramilitary 175,750 AAV 15: 14 AAVP-7; 1 AAVC-7
RESERVES 18,300 (Army 13,400 Navy 4,900) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
AEV 40 Dachs; M113
ARV 138: 137 BPz-2; 1 AAVR-7
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE VLB 64 Biber
MW 9: 6 Buffalo; 3 Miniflail
Space NBC VEHICLES 14: 5 VBR NBC; 9 VBR NBC Plus
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
SATELLITES 9 MSL • MANPATS Spike; Milan
COMMUNICATIONS 4: 1 Athena-Fidus (also used by RCL 80mm Folgore
FRA); 3 Sicral ARTILLERY 1,018
ISR 5: 4 Cosmo (Skymed); 1 OPSAT-3000 SP 155mm 193: 124 M109L; 69 PzH 2000
TOWED 188: 105mm 25 Oto Melara Mod 56; 155mm 163
Army 99,950 FH-70
Regt are bn sized MRL 227mm 21 MLRS
FORCES BY ROLE MOR 616: 81mm 283 Expal; 120mm 325: 183 Brandt; 142
COMMAND RT-61 (RT-F1) SP 120mm 21 VBM 8×8 Freccia
1 (NRDC-ITA) corps HQ (1 spt bde, 1 sigs regt, 1 spt AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6: 3 Do-228 (ACTL-1); 3 P-180
regt) Avanti
MANOEUVRE HELICOPTERS
Mechanised ATK 36 AW129CBT Mangusta
1 (Friuli) div (1 (Ariete) armd bde (1 cav regt, 2 tk regt, MRH 14 Bell 412 (AB-412) Twin Huey
1 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log TPT 143: Heavy 27: 12 CH-47C Chinook; 15 CH-47F
regt); 1 (Pozzuolo del Friuli) cav bde (1 cav regt, 1 amph Chinook; Medium 39 NH90 TTH; Light 77: 6 AW109; 32
regt, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (Folgore) Bell 205 (AB-205); 26 Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206); 13 Bell
AB bde (1 cav regt, 3 para regt, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr 212 (AB-212)
regt, 1 log regt); 1 (Friuli) air mob bde (1 air mob regt, AIR DEFENCE
2 avn regt)) SAM
1 (Acqui) div (1 (Pinerolo) mech bde (1 tk regt, 3 mech Long-range 16 SAMP/T
inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 Short-range 32 Skyguard/Aspide
(Granatieri) mech bde (1 cav regt, 1 mech inf regt); 1 Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger
(Garibaldi Bersaglieri) mech bde (1 cav regt, 1 tk regt, GUNS • SP 25mm 64 SIDAM
2 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
regt); 1 (Aosta) mech bde (1 cav regt, 3 mech inf regt, ASM Spike-ER
1 SP arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt); 1 (Sassari) lt
mech bde (3 mech inf regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt)) Navy 30,000
Mountain EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 (Tridentina) mtn div (2 mtn bde (1 cav regt, 3 mtn inf regt, SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 8:
1 arty regt, 1 mtn cbt engr regt, 1 spt bn, 1 log regt)) 4 Pelosi (imp Sauro, 3rd and 4th series) with 6 single
COMBAT SUPPORT 533mm TT with Type-A-184 HWT
1 arty comd (1 arty regt, 1 MRL regt, 1 NBC regt) 4 Salvatore Todaro (Type-212A) with 6 single 533mm TT
1 AD comd (2 SAM regt, 1 ADA regt) with Type-A-184 Mod 3 HWT/DM2A4 HWT
1 engr comd (2 engr regt, 1 CIMIC regt)
 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 18
1 EW/sigs comd (1 EW/ISR bde (1 EW regt, 1 int regt, 1 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVS 2:
STA regt); 1 sigs bde with (7 sigs regt)) 1 Cavour with 4 octuple VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 76mm guns (capacity mixed air group of 20 AV-8B
1 log comd (2 log regt, 4 med unit) Harrier II; AW101 Merlin; NH90; Bell 212)
HELICOPTER 1 G. Garibaldi with 2 octuple Albatros lnchr with
1 hel bde (3 hel regt) Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT
 Europe 121

(capacity mixed air group of 18 AV-8B Harrier II; ARSH 1 Anteo (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel)
AW101 Merlin; NH90; Bell 212) ATS 6 Ciclope
DESTROYERS • DDGHM 11: AWT 7: 1 Bormida; 2 Simeto; 4 Panarea
2 Andrea Doria with 2 quad lnchr with Otomat Mk2A AXL 3 Aragosta
AShM, 1 48-cell VLS with Aster 15/Aster 30 SAM, 2 AXS 8: 1 Amerigo Vespucci; 1 Palinuro; 1 Italia; 5 Caroly
single 324mm ASTT with MU90 LWT, 3 76mm guns
(capacity 1 AW101 Merlin/NH90 hel) Naval Aviation 2,200
2 Luigi Durand de la Penne (ex-Animoso) with 2 quad FORCES BY ROLE
lnchr with Otomat Mk 2A AShM/Milas A/S, 1 Mk13 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
GMLS with SM-1MR SAM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr 1 sqn with AV-8B Harrier II; TAV-8B Harrier II

Europe
with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE/TRANSPORT
LWT, 1 127mm gun, 3 76mm guns (capacity 1 NH90 5 sqn with AW101 ASW Merlin; Bell 212 ASW (AB-
or 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) 212AS); Bell 212 (AB-212); NH90 NFH
3 Bergamini (GP) with 2 quad lnchr with Otomat Mk2A MARITIME PATROL
AShM, 1 16-cell VLS with Aster 15/Aster 30 SAM, 2 1 flt with P-180
triple 324mm ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 127mm gun, AIRBORNE EARLY WANRING & CONTROL
1 76mm gun (capacity 2 AW101/NH90 hel) 1 flt with AW101 AEW Merlin
4 Bergamini (ASW) with 2 quad lnchr with Otomat EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Mk2A AShM, 1 16-cell VLS with Aster 15/Aster AIRCRAFT 17 combat capable
30 SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with MU90 LWT, 2 FGA 17: 14 AV-8B Harrier II; 2 TAV-8B Harrier II; 1
76mm gun (capacity 2 AW101/NH90 hel) F-35B Lightning II
FRIGATES • FFGHM 5 Maestrale with 4 single lnchr with MP 3 P-180
Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide HELICOPTERS
SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 127mm ASW 47: 10 AW101 ASW Merlin; 9 Bell 212 ASW; 28
gun (capacity 1 NH90 or 2 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) NH90 NFH
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 15 AEW 4 AW101 AEW Merlin
CORVETTES • FSM 1 Minerva 1 8-cell Albatros lnchr TPT 15: Medium 11: 8 AW101 Merlin; 3 NH-90 MITT;
with Aspide SAM, 1 76mm gun
 Light 4 Bell 212 (AB-212)
PSOH 10: AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
4 Cassiopea with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB- AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120
212) hel AMRAAM
4 Comandante Cigala Fuligosi with 1 76mm gun (capacity ASM AGM-65 Maverick
1 Bell 212 (AB-212)/NH90 hel) AShM Marte Mk 2/S
2 Sirio (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) or NH90 hel)
PB 4 Esploratore Marines 3,000
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 10 FORCES BY ROLE
MHO 10: 8 Gaeta; 2 Lerici
MANOEUVRE
AMPHIBIOUS
Amphibious
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3
1 mne regt (1 recce coy, 2 mne bn, 1 log bn)
LHD 3:
1 (boarding) mne regt (2 mne bn)
2 San Giorgio with 1 76mm gun (capacity 3-4 AW101/
1 landing craft gp
NH90/Bell 212; 3 LCM 2 LCVP; 30 trucks; 36 APC
Other
(T); 350 troops)
1 sy regt (3 sy bn)
1 San Giusto with 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 AW101
Merlin/ NH90/Bell 212; 3 LCM 2 LCVP; 30 trucks; EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
36 APC (T); 350 troops) ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
LANDING CRAFT 24: 15 LCVP; 9 LCM APC (T) 27: 24 VCC-1; 3 VCC-2
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 63 AAV 18: 15 AAVP-7; 2 AAVC-7
ABU 5 Ponza ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
AFD 9 ARV 1 AAVR-7
AGE 3: 1 Leonardo (coastal); 1 Raffaele Rosseti; 1 Vincenzo ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Martellota MSL• MANPATS Milan; Spike
AGI 1 Elettra ARTILLERY
AGOR 1 Alliance MOR 32: 81mm 18 Brandt; 120mm 10 Brandt; SP
AGS 3: 1 Ammiraglio Magnaghi with 1 hel landing 120mm 4 M106
platform; 2 Aretusa (coastal) AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger
AKSL 6 Gorgona
AORH 3: 1 Etna with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AW101/ Air Force 41,100
NH90/Bell 212 hel); 2 Stromboli with 1 76mm gun FORCES BY ROLE
(capacity 1 AW101/NH90 hel) FIGHTER
AOT 7 Depoli 4 sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon
122 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Short SPADA

1 sqn with AMX Ghibli AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
1 (SEAD/EW) sqn with Tornado ECR AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; IIR IRIS-T; ARH AIM-
2 sqn with Tornado IDS 120B AMRAAM
1 sqn with F-35A Lightning II ARM AGM-88 HARM
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR LACM SCALP EG/Storm Shadow
1 sqn with AMX Ghibli BOMBS
MARITIME PATROL Laser-guided/GPS: Enhanced Paveway II; Enhanced
1 sqn (opcon Navy) with ATR-72MP (P-72A) Paveway III
TANKER/TRANSPORT
1 sqn with KC-767A Joint Special Forces Command (COFS)
COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE
1 sqn with AB-212 ICO Army
SEARCH & RESCUE FORCES BY ROLE
1 wg with AW139 (HH-139A); Bell 212 (HH-212); HH-3F SPECIAL FORCES
Pelican 1 SF regt (9th Assalto paracadutisti)
TRANSPORT 1 STA regt
2 (VIP) sqn with A319CJ; AW139 (VH-139A); Falcon 50; 1 ranger regt (4th Alpini paracadutisti)
Falcon 900 Easy; Falcon 900EX; SH-3D Sea King COMBAT SUPPORT
2 sqn with C-130J/C-130J-30/KC-130J Hercules 1 psyops regt
1 sqn with C-27J Spartan TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 (calibration) sqn with P-180 Avanti 1 spec ops hel regt
TRAINING
1 OCU sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon Navy (COMSUBIN)
1 sqn with MB-339PAN (aerobatic team) FORCES BY ROLE
1 sqn with MD-500D/E (NH-500D/E) SPECIAL FORCES
1 OCU sqn with Tornado 1 SF gp (GOI)
1 OCU sqn with AMX-T Ghibli 1 diving gp (GOS)
1 sqn with MB-339A
1 sqn with MB-339CD* Air Force
1 sqn with SF-260EA, 3 P2006T (T-2006A) FORCES BY ROLE
ISR UAV SPECIAL FORCES
1 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper; RQ-1B Predator 1 wg (sqn) (17th Stormo Incursori)
AIR DEFENCE
2 bty with Spada Paramilitary
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 211 combat capable
Carabinieri
FTR 86 Eurofighter Typhoon FORCES BY ROLE
FGA 48: 31 AMX Ghibli; 8 AMX-T Ghibli; 9 F-35A SPECIAL FORCES
Lightning II 1 spec ops gp (GIS)
ATK 34 Tornado IDS
ATK/EW 15 Tornado ECR* Paramilitary 175,750
MP 2 ATR-72MP (P-72A)
SIGINT 1 Beech 350 King Air Carabinieri 107,650
AEW&C 2 Gulfstream G550 CAEW The Carabinieri are organisationally under the MoD.
TKR/TPT 6: 4 KC-767A; 2 KC-130J Hercules They are a separate service in the Italian Armed Forces
TPT 74: Medium 31: 9 C-130J Hercules; 10 C-130J-30 as well as a police force with judicial competence
Hercules; 12 C-27J Spartan; Light 35: 15 P-180 Avanti;
20 S-208 (liaison); PAX 8: 3 A319CJ; 2 Falcon 50 (VIP); 2
Mobile and Specialised Branch
Falcon 900 Easy; 1 Falcon 900EX (VIP) FORCES BY ROLE
TRG 109: 18 M-346; 21 MB-339A; 28 MB-339CD*; 16 MB- MANOEUVRE
339PAN (aerobatics); 26 SF-260EA Other
HELICOPTERS 1 (mobile) paramilitary div (1 bde (1st) with (1
MRH 54: 13 AW139 (HH-139A/VH-139A); 2 MD-500D horsed cav regt, 11 mobile bn); 1 bde (2nd) with
(NH-500D); 39 MD-500E (NH-500E) (1 (1st) AB regt, 2 (7th & 13th) mobile regt))
CSAR 7 AW101 (HH-101A) HELICOPTER
SAR 12 HH-3F Pelican 1 hel gp
TPT 31: Medium 2 SH-3D Sea King (liaison/VIP); Light EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
29 Bell 212 (HH-212)/AB-212 ICO ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Heavy 14: 9 APC • APC (T) 3 VCC-2
MQ-9A Reaper; 5 RQ-1B Predator PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 69
 Europe 123

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light: 1 P-180 Avanti SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 538; 1 mtn inf BG HQ; 1
HELICOPTERS Carabinieri unit; OSCE • Kosovo 10
MRH 24 Bell 412 (AB-412) 
 SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 123
TPT • Light 19 AW109

TURKEY: NATO • Operation Active Fence 130; 1 SAM bty
Customs 68,100 with SAMP/T
(Servizio Navale Guardia Di Finanza) UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 26
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: 120; 1 tpt flt with 2 C-130J
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 179 Hercules
PCF 1 Antonio Zara

Europe
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2 obs
PBF 146: 19 Bigliani; 24 Corrubia; 9 Mazzei; 62 V-2000;
32 V-5000/V-6000
PB 32: 24 Buratti; 8 Meatini
FOREIGN FORCES
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AX 1 Giorgio Cini United States US European Command: 12,750
Army 4,200; 1 AB IBCT(-)
Cyber Navy 4,000; 1 HQ (US Navy Europe (USNAVEUR)) at
A Joint Integrated Concept on Computer Network Naples; 1 HQ (6th Fleet) at Gaeta; 1 ASW Sqn with 4
Operations was approved in 2009, as was a Joint Interagency P-8A Poseidon at Sigonella
Concept on Cyberwarfare in 2014. The National Strategic USAF 4,350; 1 ftr wg with 2 ftr sqn with 21 F-16C/D
Framework for Cyberspace Security, released in 2013, says Fighting Falcon at Aviano; 1 CSAR sqn with 8 HH-60G
that the defence ministry ‘plans, executes and sustains Pave Hawk
Computer Network Operations in the cyber domain in USMC 200
order to prevent, localize and defend (actively and in-
depth), oppose and neutralise all threats and/or hostile Latvia LVA
actions in the cyber domain’. Following the 2015 defence
white paper, Italy created a Joint Cyber Command. This Euro € 2017 2018 2019
will achieve full operational capability in 2019. Initial focus GDP € 26.9bn 28.9bn
is on network protection, including of deployed forces. US$ 30.3bn 34.3bn
per capita US$ 15,550 17,634
DEPLOYMENT Growth % 4.5 3.7
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 800; 1 Inflation % 2.9 2.7
mech inf bde HQ; 1 mech inf regt(-); 1 hel regt(-); AW129 Def exp [a] € 454m 576m
Mangusta; NH90; RQ-7 US$ 513m 684m
ALBANIA: OSCE • Albania 1 Def bdgt [b] € 470m 576m 601m

BLACK SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 2: 1 MHO US$ 531m 684m

FMA (US) US$ 10m 0m
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea
US$1= € 0.89 0.84
5; OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 6
[a] NATO definition
DJIBOUTI: 90
[b] Includes military pensions
EGYPT: MFO 78; 3 PB
Population 1,923,559
GULF OF ADEN & INDIAN OCEAN: EU • Operation Atalanta
Ethnic groups: Latvian 62%; Russian 27%; Belarusian 3%; Polish
1 DDGHM
2.2%
INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 2 obs
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve (Prima Parthica) 845; 1 inf
regt; 1 trg unit; 1 hel sqn with 4 NH90 Male 7.8% 2.2% 2.6% 3.7% 23.3% 6.4%
Female 7.4% 2.1% 2.4% 3.5% 25.3% 13.1%
KUWAIT: Operation Inherent Resolve (Prima Parthica) 255; 4
AMX; 2 MQ-9A Reaper; 1 KC-767A
Capabilities
LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 160; 1
Latvia has small armed forces focused on maintaining national
mech inf coy
sovereignty and territorial integrity but the country depends on
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1,043; 1 mech bde HQ; 1 mech NATO membership as a security guarantor. Russia is Latvia’s over-
inf bn; 1 MP coy; 1 hel bn riding security concern, which in general drives security policy. The
2016 State Defence Concept set defence-strategic principles, prior-
LIBYA: MIASIT 375; UN • UNSMIL 2 obs ities and activities. That same year, a National Armed Forces Devel-
MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 12; UN • MINUSMA 2 opment plan 2016–28 illustrated a capabilities-based planning
process. Principal tasks are to develop and increase capabilities
MEDITERRANEAN SEA: EU • EU NAVFOR MED: 1 LHD
that would ensure early warning, detection and situational aware-
NIGER: MISIN 70 ness, to increase combat readiness and to enhance the ability to
124 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

counter hybrid threats. The armed forces are volunteer-based, Navy 480 (incl Coast Guard)
although the option of moving to conscription was discussed, Naval Forces Flotilla separated into an MCM squadron and
and rejected, in 2017. Latvia has no requirement and therefore no
a patrol-boat squadron. LVA, EST and LTU have set up a
capacity to independently deploy and sustain forces beyond its
joint naval unit, BALTRON, with bases at Liepaja, Riga,
national boundaries, although the armed forces have taken part
Ventspils (LVA), Tallinn (EST), Klaipeda (LTU). Each nation
in a range of NATO operations, and EU civilian and military mis-
contributes 1–2 MCMVs

sions. Land capabilities are part of the focus of the armed forces
development plan – particularly for the mechanised land-force EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
brigade and National Guard. Acquisition requirements include self- PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5
propelled howitzers, CVR(T), MANPADS and ATGW systems. The PB 5 Skrunda (GER Swath)
defence ministry also plans to improve combat readiness. Latvia MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 6
has only niche defence-industrial capability, with cyber security a MHO 5 Imanta (ex-NLD Alkmaar/Tripartite)
focus. MCCS 1 Vidar (ex-NOR)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1
ACTIVE 6,210 (Army 1,400 Navy 480 Air 430 Joint AXL 1 Varonis (comd and spt ship, ex-NLD)
Staff 3,300 National Guard 600)
Coast Guard
RESERVE 15,900 (National Guard 7,750; Joint Under command of the Latvian Naval Forces
8,150) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE PB 6: 1 Astra; 5 KBV 236 (ex-SWE)

Air Force 430

Joint 3,300 Main tasks are airspace control and defence, maritime and
FORCES BY ROLE land SAR and air transportation
SPECIAL FORCES FORCES BY ROLE
1 SF unit TRANSPORT
COMBAT SUPPORT 1 (mixed) tpt sqn with An-2 Colt; Mi-17 Hip H; PZL Mi-2
1 MP bn Hoplite
AIR DEFENCE
Army 1,400 1 AD bn
1 radar sqn (radar/air ctrl)
FORCES BY ROLE
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4 An-2 Colt
MANOEUVRE HELICOPTERS
Mechanised MRH 4 Mi-17 Hip H
1 mech inf bde (2 mech inf bn, 1 cbt spt bn HQ, 1 CSS TPT • Light 2 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
bn HQ) AIR DEFENCE
SAM • Point-defence RBS-70
National Guard 600; 7,750 part-time (8,350 GUNS • TOWED 40mm 24 L/70
total)
FORCES BY ROLE Paramilitary
MANOEUVRE State Border Guard
Light
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 (2nd) inf bde (4 inf bn; 1 engr bn) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS
3 (1st, 3rd & 4th) inf bde (3 inf bn; 1 sy bn; 1 spt bn) PB 3: 1 Valpas (ex-FIN); 1 Lokki (ex-FIN); 1 Randa
COMBAT SUPPORT HELICOPTERS
1 cyber unit TPT • Light 4: 2 Bell 206B (AB-206B) Jet Ranger II; 2
1 NBC coy AW109E Power
1 psyops pl
Cyber
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
The Cyber Security Strategy of Latvia was published in 2014.
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Latvia established a military computer emergency-response
MBT 3 T-55 (trg)
team (MilCERT) unit in early 2016. The MilCERT monitors
RECCE 81 FV107 Scimitar (incl variants)
information and communication technologies of the defence
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE ministry and institutions, including the armed forces. It
MANPATS Spike-LR cooperates closely with the national CERT, participates
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav; 90mm 130 Pvpj 1110 in international exercises and increases cyber-defence
ARTILLERY 123 capabilities. A Cyber Defence Unit has been operational
SP 155mm 47 M109A5ÖE in the National Guard since 2014. Its goal is to ensure the
TOWED 100mm 23 K-53 formation of reserve cyber-defence capabilities and its main
MOR 53: 81mm 28 L16; 120mm 25 M120 role is to support the MilCERT and the national CERT.
 Europe 125

Lithuania has a limited medium-airlift capability, for use in sup-

DEPLOYMENT porting its forces on multinational deployed operations, and has
no requirement for solely sovereign missions. It takes an active
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 36
part in NATO and EU operations. The country is purchasing the
IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 6 NASAMS SAM system to improve its ground-based air defences.
Lithuania has a small defence-industrial base, with niche capabili-
MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 3; UN • MINUSMA 17 ties, for instance in helicopter support and maintenance.
NORTH SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 1: 1 MHO
ACTIVE 19,850 (Army 12,400 Navy 750 Air 1,200
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 7 Other 5,500) Paramilitary 14,400
Conscript liability 9 months

Europe
FOREIGN FORCES
RESERVE 6,700 (Army 6,700)
All NATO Enhanced Forward Presence unless stated
Albania 21; 1 EOD pl
Canada 350; 1 mech inf bn HQ; 1 mech inf coy(+)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Czech Republic 60; 1 mor pl
Italy 160; 1 mech inf coy Army 7,350; 5,050 active reserves (total 12,400)
Poland 169; 1 tk coy FORCES BY ROLE
Slovakia 150; 1 mech inf coy MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
Slovenia 50; 1 CBRN pl(+)
1 (1st) mech bde (1 recce coy, 4 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn)
Spain 300; 1 armd inf coy(+)
Light
United States Operation Atlantic Resolve: 1 tpt hel flt; 5 UH- 1 (2nd) mot inf bde (2 mot inf bn, 1 arty bn)
60M Black Hawk COMBAT SUPPORT
1 engr bn
Lithuania LTU COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 trg regt
Euro € 2017 2018 2019 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
GDP € 41.9bn 44.2bn ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
US$ 47.3bn 52.5bn IFV 4 Boxer (Vilkas) (in test)
per capita US$ 16,731 18,857 APC • APC (T) 238: 234 M113A1; 4 M577 (CP)
Growth % 3.9 3.5
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
AEV 8 MT-LB
Inflation % 3.7 2.5
ARV 6: 2 BPz-2; 4 M113
Def exp [a] € 724m 873m ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
US$ 817m 1.04bn MSL
Def bdgt [b] € 724m 891m 952m SP 10 M1025A2 HMMWV with FGM-148 Javelin
US$ 817m 1.06bn MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin
FMA (US) US$ 10m 0m RCL 84mm Carl Gustav
ARTILLERY 64
US$1=€ 0.89 0.84
SP 16 PzH 2000
[a] NATO definition TOWED 105mm 18 M101
[b] Includes military pensions MOR 120mm 30: 5 2B11; 10 M/41D; 15 M113 with
Population 2,793,284 Tampella
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence GROM
Ethnic groups: Lithuanian 84.2%; Polish 6.6%; Russians 5.8%;
Belarusian 1.2%
Reserves
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
National Defence Voluntary Forces 5,050 active
Male 7.7% 2.7% 3.0% 3.4% 22.6% 6.7% reservists
Female 7.3% 2.6% 2.8% 3.2% 25.0% 13.0% FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Capabilities Other
Lithuania’s small armed forces focus on maintaining territorial 6 (territorial) def unit
integrity and national sovereignty but the country relies on NATO
membership for its security. Like the other Baltic states, it is reliant Navy 760
on NATO’s air-policing deployment for a combat-aircraft capac- LVA, EST and LTU established a joint naval unit,
ity. Russia is the country’s predominant security concern, and
BALTRON, with bases at Liepaja, Riga, Ventpils (LVA),
this shapes Lithuanian defence policy. In January 2017, Lithuania
adopted a new National Security Strategy, reflecting the worsen-
Tallinn (EST), Klaipeda (LTU)
ing regional security environment. Better combat readiness is an EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
objective. Compulsory military service was reintroduced in 2015. PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4
126 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

PCC 4 Zemaitis (ex-DNK Flyvefisken) with 1 76mm gun and is now responsible for shaping national cyber-security
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4 policy. A unified National Cyber Security Centre under the
MHC 3: 1 Sūduvis (ex-GER Lindau); 2 Skulvis (ex-UK Hunt) defence ministry operates as the main national computer
MCCS 1 Jotvingis (ex-NOR Vidar) emergency-response unit for management of cyber inci-
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AAR 1 Šakiai dents related to critical information infrastructure and SIR,
public services, ISPs and digital-services providers. The
Air Force 1,200 law on cyber security was amended in mid-2018. The de-
FORCES BY ROLE fence ministry prepared a National Cyber Security Strategy
AIR DEFENCE
in cooperation with other state institutions and the private
1 AD bn
sector; this was adopted in August 2018. Lithuania is estab-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
lishing a Regional Cyber Security Defense Center that will
AIRCRAFT
concentrate on practical aspects of cyber defence, including
TPT 5: Medium 3 C-27J Spartan; Light 2 L-410 Turbolet
for NATO and its partners. Lithuania also in 2018 started
TRG 1 L-39ZA Albatros
HELICOPTERS a Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in
MRH 3 AS365M3 Dauphin (SAR) Cybersecurity project within the PESCO framework.
TPT • Medium 3 Mi-8 Hip (tpt/SAR)
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger; DEPLOYMENT
RBS-70
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 50
Special Operation Force CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 1
FORCES BY ROLE MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 2; UN • MINUSMA 38; 1 obs
SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF gp (1 CT unit; 1 Jaeger bn, 1 cbt diver unit) NORTH SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 1: 1 MHC
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 1
Logistics Support Command 1,350 UKRAINE: JMTG-U 40; OSCE • Ukraine 2
FORCES BY ROLE
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 log bn FOREIGN FORCES
All NATO Enhanced Forward Presence unless stated
Training and Doctrine Command 1,550 Belgium 250; 1 mech inf coy • NATO Baltic Air Policing 4
FORCES BY ROLE F-16AM Fighting Falcon
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Croatia 230; 1 mech inf coy
1 trg regt
Germany 580; 1 armd inf bn HQ; 1 mech inf coy(+)
Other Units 2,600 Netherlands 250; 1 armd inf coy
FORCES BY ROLE Norway 13; 1 int unit
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 MP bn
Luxembourg LUX
Paramilitary 14,400 Euro € 2017 2018 2019

Riflemen Union 11,000 GDP € 55.4bn 58.2bn

US$ 62.5bn 69.0bn
State Border Guard Service 3,400 per capita US$ 105,863 113,954
Ministry of Interior Growth % 2.3 4.0
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Inflation % 2.1 1.5
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 3: 1
Def exp [a] € 288m 321m
Lokki (ex-FIN); 1 KBV 041 (ex-SWE); 1 KBV 101 (ex-SWE)
US$ 326m 381m
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 2
Christina (Griffon 2000) Def bdgt € 248m 341m
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Cessna 172RG US$ 280m 404m
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 5: 1 BK-117 (SAR); 2 US$1=€ 0.89 0.84
H120 Colibri; 2 H135 [a] NATO definition

Cyber Population 605,764

In mid-2017, all cyber responsibilities were consolidated
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
under the defence ministry. From the beginning of 2018,
the ministry took on the role of leadership for Lithuania’s Male 8.6% 3.0% 3.3% 3.6% 25.1% 6.7%
overall cyber and state information resources (SIR) security Female 8.1% 2.9% 3.1% 3.5% 23.9% 8.3%
 Europe 127

Capabilities Macedonia, Former Yugoslav

Luxembourg maintains a limited military capability to participate
in European collective security and crisis management. Defence
Republic FYROM
Guidelines for 2025 and Beyond were published at the end of Macedonian Denar d 2017 2018 2019
2017. They contain strong statements of support for NATO and EU
security policy and contributions to international missions. They GDP d 620bn 642bn
also outline ambitious modernisation plans, including a reorgan- US$ 11.4bn 12.4bn
isation of the army, which will take on joint responsibilities, includ- per capita US$ 5,474 5,953
ing for ISR, a new air component and a military-cyber cell. Luxem-
Growth % 0.0 1.6
bourg has contributed troops to the multinational battlegroup in

Europe
Lithuania as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence. It is part Inflation % 1.4 1.8
of the European Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet programme, Def bdgt d 6.24bn 6.50bn
partially funding one A330 MRTT, but the Belgian and Dutch air
US$ 114m 125m
forces are responsible for policing Luxembourg’s airspace. Sus-
taining the army’s personnel strength depends on better recruit- FMA (US) US$ 3.6m 0m
ing and retention and being able to recruit from other EU states. US$1=d 54.53 51.92
A review is under way, examining a specialised reserve of civilian
experts. The defence guidelines envisage considerable equipment Population 2,118,945
improvements and cooperative development of UAV capabilities Ethnic groups: Macedonian 64.2%; Albanian 25.2%; Turkish 3.9%;
with Belgium and the Netherlands. Ambitions for the new air com- Romani 2.7%; Serbian 1.8%; Bosniac 0.9%
ponent include tactical-airlift and medical-evacuation capabilities.
There is a small but advanced space industry and some foreign Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
defence firms have a presence, but the country is otherwise Male 8.9% 3.3% 3.6% 3.8% 24.5% 5.8%
reliant on imports. A strategy for defence industry, innovation and
research is to be developed as part of the new defence guidelines. Female 8.3% 3.1% 3.4% 3.6% 24.2% 7.7%

ACTIVE 900 (Army 900) Paramilitary 600 Capabilities

The armed forces’ primary goals are safeguarding the state’s territo-
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE rial integrity and sovereignty, as well as contributing to operations
under the EU, NATO and UN umbrellas. A strategic defence review
was released in 2018, which set out aims to optimise, reorganise
Army 900 and modernise the armed forces into a small, modern and flex-
FORCES BY ROLE ible force. The review’s ‘Future armed forces 2028’ concept calls for
MANOEUVRE changes in the armed forces’ structure, the consolidation of com-
Reconnaissance mands and headquarters, and a reorganised defence ministry.
2 recce coy (1 to Eurocorps/BEL div, 1 to NATO pool of Skopje joined NATO’s Membership Action Plan in 1999. NATO acces-
deployable forces) sion is subject to the resolution of the dispute with Greece over the
country’s name. The armed forces are fully professional and the
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE country aims to train all units, particularly those with deployable
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES capability, to NATO standards. A number of units are earmarked
AUV 48 Dingo 2 for participation in NATO-led operations. Skopje contributes to EU
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE and NATO missions, with personnel deployed to Operation Resolute
MSL • MANPATS NLAW; TOW Support in Afghanistan. Participation in international peacekeep-
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 6 ing missions has increased logistics capability. The country has
modest maritime and air wings and relies on Soviet-era equipment.
A 2014–23 modernisation plan is intended to update equipment to
Paramilitary 600 NATO standards, but progress has been limited. Among the priori-
ties identified are the procurement of air-defence missile batteries
Gendarmerie 600 and medium- and long-range anti-armour systems. There is little in
the way of a domestic defence industry, with no ability to design
DEPLOYMENT and manufacture modern equipment.

AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 2 ACTIVE 8,000 (Army 8,000) Paramilitary 7,600
MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 2 RESERVE 4,850
MEDITERRANEAN SEA: EU • EUNAVFOR MED 2 Merlin
IIIC (leased) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Army 8,000
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF regt (1 SF bn, 1 Ranger bn)
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
1 mech inf bde (1 tk bn, 4 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr
bn, 1 NBC coy)
128 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

COMBAT SUPPORT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

1 MP bn ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
1 sigs bn APC • APC (T) M113; APC (W) BTR-80; TM-170
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Heimlin
1 log bde (3 log bn) AUV Ze’ev
HELICOPTERS
Reserves MRH 1 Bell 412EP Twin Huey
TPT • Light 2: 1 Bell 206B (AB-206B) Jet Ranger II; 1
FORCES BY ROLE
Bell 212 (AB-212)
MANOEUVRE
Light
1 inf bde
DEPLOYMENT
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 44
MBT 31 T-72A ALBANIA: OSCE • Albania 2
RECCE 10 BRDM-2 BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea
IFV 11: 10 BMP-2; 1 BMP-2K (CP) 3; OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 1
APC 202
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 2
APC (T) 47: 9 Leonidas; 28 M113; 10 MT-LB
APC (W) 155: 57 BTR-70; 12 BTR-80; 2 Cobra; 84 TM- SERBIA: OSCE • Kosovo 14
170 Hermelin UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 31
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS Milan
RCL 57mm; 82mm M60A
Malta MLT
ARTILLERY 126 Euro € 2017 2018 2019
TOWED 70: 105mm 14 M-56; 122mm 56 M-30 M-1938 GDP € 11.1bn 12.0bn
MRL 17: 122mm 6 BM-21; 128mm 11
US$ 12.6bn 14.3bn
MOR 39: 120mm 39
per capita US$ 27,327 30,555
Marine Wing Growth % 6.7 5.7
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Inflation % 1.3 1.8
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2 Def bdgt [a] € 57m 59m
Botica US$ 64m 70m
US$1= € 0.89 0.84
Aviation Brigade
[a] Excludes military pensions
FORCES BY ROLE
TRAINING Population 449,043
1 flt with Z-242; Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)
ATTACK HELICOPTER Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 sqn with Mi-24K Hind G2; Mi-24V Hind E Male 7.7% 2.7% 3.2% 3.5% 23.9% 8.8%
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Female 7.3% 2.6% 3.0% 3.3% 23.2% 10.7%
1 sqn with Mi-8MTV Hip; Mi-17 Hip H
AIR DEFENCE Capabilities
1 AD bn The principal roles for the armed forces are maintaining external
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE security and support for civil emergencies and to the police. There
AIRCRAFT is also focus on maritime security in the Mediterranean. Malta
TPT • Light 1 An-2 Colt is neutral but is a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace pro-
TRG 5 Z-242 gramme. The country also participates in bilateral and multilateral
exercises. Although deployment capacity is limited, Malta has con-
HELICOPTERS
tributed to European missions. Italy has assisted Malta in meeting
ATK 4 Mi-24V Hind E (10: 2 Mi-24K Hind G2; 8 Mi- some security requirements, including air surveillance, while the
24V Hind E in store) European Internal Security Fund is funding some modernisation.
MRH 6: 4 Mi-8MTV Hip; 2 Mi-17 Hip H Although there is some shipbuilding and ship-repair activity and
TPT • Light 2 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) a small aviation maintenance industry, none are defence-specific
AIR DEFENCE and Malta relies on imports to equip its armed forces.
SAM • Point-defence 8 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); ACTIVE 1,950 (Armed Forces 1,950)
9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)
RESERVE 180 (Emergency Volunteer Reserve Force
GUNS 40mm 36 L20
120 Individual Reserve 60)
Paramilitary
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Police 7,600 (some 5,000 armed)
incl 2 SF units Armed Forces of Malta 1,950
 Europe 129

FORCES BY ROLE Capabilities

SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF unit According to its defence strategy, Montenegro intends to develop
MANOEUVRE
 an integrated defence system, capable of defending and preserv-
Light ing independence, sovereignty and national territory. However,
1 (1st) inf regt (3 inf coy, 1 cbt spt coy) the principal concern of the authorities is integrating Montene-
COMBAT SUPPORT gro into the collective security system of NATO as well as the EU.
1 (3rd) cbt spt regt (1 cbt engr sqn, 1 EOD sqn, 1 maint sqn) Montenegro joined NATO in 2017. Montenegro that year accepted
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT NATO’s capability targets and has also been aligning its defence
1 (4th) CSS regt (1 CIS coy, 1 sy coy) planning process with NATO standards. The country has signed
defence agreements with Croatia, Slovenia and Poland in recent

Europe
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE years. Reform and professionalism of the armed forces has been
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm L16 slow, and developments have been focused on structural issues
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 14.5mm 1 ZPU-4 around improving recruitment, outflow and professional develop-
ment. The armed forces are not designed to have an expedition-
Maritime Squadron ary capability, and as such have little logistics capability to support
Organised into 5 divisions: offshore patrol; inshore patrol; rap- deployments beyond national borders. Nevertheless, personnel
id deployment and training; marine engineering; and logistics have deployed to Afghanistan with NATO, affording them valuable
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE experience. Podgorica intends to replace ageing Soviet-era equip-
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8 ment. Procurement priorities include light and medium helicop-
PCO 1 Emer ters and light armoured vehicles as well as improved communica-
PCC 1 Diciotti tions capacities according to NATO standards. Future plans include
PB 6: 4 Austal 21m; 2 Marine Protector the formation of a SOF unit and intelligence unit in the land forces.
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2 The country’s defence industry is capable of producing small arms
AAR 2 Cantieri Vittoria and ammunition.

Air Wing ACTIVE 1,950 (Army 875 Navy 350 Air Force 225
1 base party. 1 flt ops div; 1 maint div; 1 integrated log div; Other 500) Paramilitary 10,100
1 rescue section
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
AIRCRAFT
TPT • Light 5: 3 Beech 200 King Air (maritime patrol); 2
BN-2B Islander
Army 875
TRG 3 Bulldog T MK1 FORCES BY ROLE
HELICOPTERS MANOEUVRE
MRH 6: 3 AW139 (SAR); 3 SA316B Alouette III Reconnaissance
1 recce coy
Montenegro MNE Light
1 mot inf bn
Euro € 2017 2018 2019 COMBAT SUPPORT
GDP € 4.24bn 4.53bn 1 MP coy
1 sigs coy
US$ 4.78bn 5.39bn
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
per capita US$ 7,678 8,644
1 log bn
Growth % 4.3 3.7
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Inflation % 2.4 2.8
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Def exp [a] € 59m 71m APC • APC (W) 8 BOV-VP M-86
US$ 66m 85m ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Def bdgt [b] € 66m 67m SP 9 BOV-1
US$ 75.0m 79.2m MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1
FMA (US) US$ 1m 0m Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
US$1=€ 0.89 0.84 ARTILLERY 135
TOWED 122mm 12 D-30
[a] NATO definition
MRL 128mm 18 M-63/M-94 Plamen
[b] Includes military pensions MOR 105: 82mm 73; 120mm 32
Population 614,249
Ethnic groups: Montenegrian 45% Serbian 28.7% Bosniac 8.6% Navy 350
Albanian 4.9% Croatian 1% 1 Naval Cmd HQ with 4 operational naval units (patrol
boat; coastal surveillance; maritime detachment; and SAR)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus with additional sigs, log and trg units with a separate
Male 7.5% 2.0% 2.3% 3.5% 28.4% 6.1% coastguard element. Some listed units are in the process of
Female 7.6% 2.6% 2.7% 3.3% 24.9% 9.0% decommissioning
130 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 AIRCRAFT
PSO 1 Kotor with 1 twin 76mm gun (1 further vessel in AEW&C 16 E-3A Sentry (NATO standard)
reserve) TPT • PAX 1 B-757 (trg)
PCFG 2 Rade Končar† (of which 1 in refit) with 2 single
lnchr with P-15 Termit (SS-N-2B Styx) AShM (missiles Strategic Airlift Capability
disarmed) Heavy Airlift Wing based at Papa air base (HUN). 12
PB 2 Mirna (Type-140) (Police units) participating countries (BLG, EST, FIN, HUN, LTU, NLD,
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1 NOR, POL, ROM, SVN, SWE, USA)
AXS 1 Jadran† EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Heavy 3 C-17A Globemaster III
Air Force 225
Golubovci (Podgorica) air base under army command Strategic Airlift Interim Solution
FORCES BY ROLE Intended to provide strategic-airlift capacity pending
TRAINING the delivery of A400M aircraft by leasing An-124s. 14
1 (mixed) sqn with G-4 Super Galeb; Utva-75 (none op- participating countries (BEL, CZE, FIN, FRA, GER, GRC,
erational) HUN, LUX, NOR, POL, SVK, SVN, SWE, UK)
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with SA341/SA342L Gazelle AIRCRAFT • TPT • Heavy 2 An-124-100 (4 more available
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE on 6–9 days’ notice)
AIRCRAFT • TRG (4 G-4 Super Galeb non-operational; 4
Utva-75 non-operational)
HELICOPTERS Netherlands NLD
MRH 13 SA341/SA342L (HN-45M) Gazelle Euro € 2017 2018 2019
TPT • Medium 1 Bell 412EP Twin Huey
GDP € 737bn 767bn
Paramilitary ε10,100 US$ 832bn 910bn
per capita US$ 48,555 52,931
Montenegrin Ministry of Interior Personnel Growth % 2.9 2.8
ε6,000 Inflation % 1.3 1.4
Special Police Units ε4,100 Def exp [a] € 8.69bn 10.7bn
US$ 9.81bn 12.7bn
Def bdgt [b] € 8.96bn 9.53bn 10.5bn
DEPLOYMENT
US$ 10.1bn 11.3bn
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 20 US$1=€ 0.89 0.84
MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 1 [a] NATO definition
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 3 [b] Includes military pensions
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2 obs Population 17,151,228

Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus

Multinational Organisations Male 8.4% 3.1% 3.1% 3.2% 23.2% 8.5%
Female 8.0% 2.9% 3.0% 3.2% 23.2% 10.2%
Capabilities
The following represent shared capabilities held by Capabilities
contributors collectively rather than as part of national The 2018 defence review tasks the armed forces with territo-
inventories. rial defence and supporting national civil authorities with law-
enforcement, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. Dutch
forces have integrated increasingly with NATO allies, particularly
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Germany. The army contains a Dutch–German tank battalion;
there is also cooperation and integration with the German armed
NATO AEW&C Force forces in the air and naval domains. The Netherlands has air-polic-
Based at Geilenkirchen (GER). Original participating ing agreements with France, Belgium and Luxembourg and is a
countries (BEL, CAN, DNK, GER, GRC, ITA, NLD, NOR, member of the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force. The Netherlands,
PRT, TUR, US) have been subsequently joined by 5 more Belgium and Denmark have committed to forming a composite
special-operations command. Dutch forces are fully professional
(CZE, ESP, HUN, POL, ROM).
and well trained and the Netherlands can deploy and sustain a
FORCES BY ROLE medium-scale force for a single operation, or a small-scale joint
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL force for an extended period. The Netherlands makes significant
1 sqn with B-757 (trg); E-3A Sentry (NATO standard) contributions to NATO and EU military operations globally. The
 Europe 131

country has a modern European- and US-sourced equipment EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

inventory. An agreement is in place with Belgium on the joint ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
acquisition of new frigates and minehunters, while the air force RECCE 196 Fennek
is to acquire F-35 Lightning II combat aircraft. The Netherlands is IFV 170 CV9035NL
part of the programme for a multinational NATO unit of A330 APC • APC (W) 200 Boxer (8 driver trg; 52 amb; 60 CP;
transport/tanker aircraft. The country has an advanced domestic 23 log)
defence industry focusing on armoured vehicles, naval ships and
AUV 60 Bushmaster IMV
air-defence systems, but also hosts a range of international aero-
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
space-company subsidiaries. Damen Schelde Naval Shipbuilding
AEV 10: Dachs; 10 Kodiak
exports frigates, corvettes and fast-attack craft, while DutchAero
ARV 25+: BPz-2; 25 BPz-3 Büffel

Europe
manufactures engine components for the F-35. The country also
collaborates with Germany on the Boxer and Fennek armoured VLB 13 Legaun
vehicles. MW Bozena
NBC VEHICLES 6 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC
ACTIVE 35,400 (Army 18,850 Navy 8,500 Air 8,050) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL
Military Constabulary 5,900 SP 40 Fennek MRAT
RESERVE 4,500 (Army 4,000 Navy 80 Air 420) Military Constabulary MANPATS Spike-MR (Gil)
160
Reserve liability to age 35 for soldiers/sailors, 40 for NCOs, 45 ARTILLERY 119:
for officers SP 155mm 18 PzH 2000
MOR 101: 81mm 83 L16/M1; 120mm 18 Brandt
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE AIR DEFENCE • SAM
Long-range 20 MIM-104D/F Patriot PAC-2 GEM/PAC-3
(TMD capable)
Army 18,850 Short-range 6 NASAMS II
FORCES BY ROLE Point-defence 18+: FIM-92 Stinger; 18 Fennek with FIM-
COMMAND 92 Stinger
elm 1 (1 GNC) corps HQ
SPECIAL FORCES Navy 8,500 (incl Marines)
4 SF coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 4 Walrus with 4 single
1 ISR bn (2 armd recce sqn, 1 EW coy, 2 int sqn, 1 UAV 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea Arrow HWT
bty) PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 6
Mechanised DESTROYERS • DDGHM 4:
1 (43rd) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 3 De Zeven Provinciën with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with
engr bn, 1 maint coy, 1 med coy) RGM-84F Harpoon AShM, 1 40-cell Mk41 VLS
1 (13th) mech bde (1 recce sqn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 engr bn, with SM-2MR/ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT
1 maint coy, 1 med coy) with Mk46 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 127mm gun
Air Manoeuvre (capacity 1 NH90 hel)
1 (11th) air mob bde (3 air mob inf bn, 1 engr coy, 1 med 1 Zeven Provinciën with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-
coy, 1 supply coy, 1 maint coy)
 84F Harpoon AShM, 1 40-cell Mk41 VLS with SM-2MR/
COMBAT SUPPORT ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 2
1 SP arty bn (3 SP arty bty) Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 hel)
1 AD comd (1 AD sqn; 1 AD bty) FRIGATES • FFGHM
1 CIMIC bn 2 Karel Doorman with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-
1 engr bn 84A/C Harpoon AShM, 1 16-cell Mk48 VLS with
2 EOD coy
1 (CIS) sigs bn
1 CBRN coy RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT
with Mk46 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 76mm gun
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
(capacity 1 NH90 hel)
1 med bn
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS
5 fd hospital
PSOH 4 Holland with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 hel)
3 maint coy
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES
2 tpt bn
MHO 6 Alkmaar (Tripartite)
Reserves 2,700 reservists
 AMPHIBIOUS
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 2:
National Command 1 Rotterdam with 2 Goalkeeper CIWS (capacity 6 NH90/
Cadre bde and corps tps completed by call-up of
AS532 Cougar hel; either 6 LCVP or 2 LCM and 3
reservists (incl Territorial Comd) LCVP; either 170 APC or 33 MBT; 538 troops) 

FORCES BY ROLE 1 Johan de Witt with 2 Goalkeeper CIWS (capacity 6
MANOEUVRE NH90 hel or 4 AS532 Cougar hel; either 6 LCVP or
Light 2 LCM and 3 LCVP; either 170 APC or 33 MBT; 700
3 inf bn (could be mobilised for territorial def) troops)
132 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

LANDING CRAFT 17 TPT 5: Medium 4: 2 C-130H Hercules; 2 C-130H-30

LCM 5 Mk9 Hercules; PAX 1 Gulfstream IV
LCVP 12 Mk5 TRG 13 PC-7 Turbo Trainer
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8 HELICOPTERS
AFSH 1 Karel Doorman with 2 Goalkeeper CIWS (capacity ATK 28 AH-64D Apache
6 NH90/AS532 Cougar or 2 CH-47F Chinook hel; 2 ASW 12 NH90 NFH
LCVP) TPT 33: Heavy 17: 11 CH-47D Chinook; 6 CH-47F Chinook;
AGS 2 Snellius Medium 16: 8 AS532U2 Cougar II; 8 NH90 TTH
AK 1 Pelikaan AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AOT 1 Patria AAM • IR AIM-9L/M Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X
AS 1 Mercuur Sidewinder II; ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM
AXL 1 Van Kingsbergen ASM AGM-114K Hellfire; AGM-65D/G Maverick
AXS 1 Urania BOMBS
Laser-guided GBU-10/GBU-12 Paveway II; GBU-24
Marines 2,650 Paveway III (all supported by LANTIRN)
FORCES BY ROLE INS/GPS guided GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb
SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF gp (1 SF sqn, 1 CT sqn) Paramilitary
MANOEUVRE
Amphibious Royal Military Constabulary 5,900
2 mne bn Subordinate to the Ministry of Defence, but performs
1 amph aslt gp most of its work under the authority of other ministries
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FORCES BY ROLE

1 spt gp (coy) MANOEUVRE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Other
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 5 paramilitary district (total: 28 paramilitary unit)
APC • APC (T) 160: 87 Bv-206D; 73 BvS-10 Viking EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
ARV 4 BvS-10; 4 BPz-2 APC • APC (W) 24 YPR-KMar
MED 4 BvS-10
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Cyber
MSL • MANPATS Spike-MR (Gil) A Defence Cyber Command (DCC) was launched in
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 12 L16/M1 September 2014 and became operational in early 2017. It
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger provides ‘integrated military operational and offensive
cyber capacity’. The DCC is situated in the army but
Air Force 8,050 comprises personnel from all the armed services. In late
FORCES BY ROLE July 2018, the DCC came under the direct command of
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK the commander of the armed forces in order to help the
3 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon deployability of this capability. According to the defence
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE/SEARCH & RESCUE ministry, ‘the armed forces can attack, manipulate and
1 sqn with NH90 NFH disable the digital systems of opponents. Potential
TANKER/TRANSPORT opponents might be other states, terrorist or other
1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules organisations, or hackers.’ A Joint SIGINT Cyber Unit
1 sqn with KDC-10; Gulfstream IV was stood up in 2014 under the General Intelligence and
TRAINING Security Service and the Dutch Military Intelligence and
1 OEU sqn with F-35A Lightning II Security Service. An updated defence cyber strategy was
1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer published in November 2018.
1 hel sqn with AH-64D Apache; CH-47D Chinook (based
at Fort Hood, TX) DEPLOYMENT
ATTACK HELICOPTER
1 sqn with AH-64D Apache AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 160
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: OSCE • Bosnia and
1 sqn with AS532U2 Cougar II Herzegovina 1
1 sqn with CH-47D/F Chinook CARIBBEAN: 1 AFSH
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 150; 3 trg unit
AIRCRAFT 63 combat capable
FTR 61 F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon JORDAN: Operation Inherent Resolve 150; 6 F-16AM Fighting
FGA 2 F-35A Lightning II (in test) Falcon
TKR 2 KDC-10 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1
 Europe 133

LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 250; 1 ment announced that it would procure four submarines as part
armd inf coy of a strategic partnership with Germany. Large procurements will
stretch budgets, with the F-35 alone reportedly taking up 32% of
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 241; 1 recce coy all procurement spending between 2018 and 2025. In June 2018,
MEDITERRANEAN SEA: NATO • SNMG 1: 1 DDGHM it was announced that a planned upgrade to Norway’s main battle
tank fleet would be abandoned until the mid-2020s. Norway has
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 13 obs
an advanced and diverse defence-industrial base with a high per-
NORTH SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 1: 1 MHO centage of SMEs and a mix of private and state-owned companies.
SERBIA: OSCE • Kosovo 1
ACTIVE 23,250 (Army 8,100 Navy 3,900 Air 3,600
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 6 Central Support 7,000 Home Guard 650)

Europe
SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 2 Conscript liability 19 months maximum. Conscripts first serve 12
months from 19–28, and then up to 4–5 refresher training periods
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 6
until age 35, 44, 55 or 60 depending on rank and function. Con-
UNITED STATES: 1 hel trg sqn with AH-64D Apache; CH- scription was extended to women in 2015
47D Chinook based at Fort Hood (TX)
RESERVE 40,000 (Home Guard 40,000)
Readiness varies from a few hours to several days
FOREIGN FORCES
United States US European Command: 400
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Norway NOR Army 3,700; 4,400 conscript (total 8,100)
Norwegian Kroner kr 2017 2018 2019 The armoured infantry brigade – Brigade North – trains
new personnel of all categories and provides units for
GDP kr 3.30tr 3.57tr
international operations. At any time around one-third of
US$ 399bn 441bn the brigade will be trained and ready to conduct operations.
per capita US$ 75,389 82,372 The brigade includes one high-readiness armoured
Growth % 1.9 2.1 battalion (Telemark Battalion) with combat support and
Inflation % 1.9 1.9 combat service support units on high readiness
Def exp [a] kr 53.5bn 57.5bn FORCES BY ROLE
US$ 6.46bn 7.11bn MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance
Def bdgt [b] kr 51.2bn 54.9bn 59.0
1 (GSV) bn (1 (border) recce coy, 1 ranger coy, 1 spt coy,
US$ 6.20bn 6.80bn
1 trg coy)
US$1=kr 8.27 8.08 Armoured
[a] NATO definition 1 armd inf bde (1 ISR bn, 2 armd bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 arty
[b] Includes military pensions bn, 1 engr bn, 1 MP coy, 1 CIS bn, 1 spt bn, 1 med bn)
Light
Population 5,372,191
1 lt inf bn (His Majesty The King’s Guards)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Male 9.2% 3.1% 3.4% 3.6% 23.4% 7.7% ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 36 Leopard 2A4
Female 8.8% 2.9% 3.2% 3.5% 22.2% 9.0%
RECCE 21 CV9030
IFV 91: 76 CV9030N; 15 CV9030N (CP)
Capabilities APC 390
Norway sustains small but well-equipped and highly trained APC (T) 315 M113 (incl variants)
armed forces. Territorial defence is at the heart of security policy. APC (W) 75 XA-186 Sisu/XA-200 Sisu
The Long Term Defence Plan, published in 2016, said that the
AUV 190: 20 Dingo 2; 170 IVECO LMV
armed forces needed further adjustments to address evolving
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
security challenges at home and abroad. In October 2017, the
defence ministry announced measures to strengthen capability AEV 25: 16 CV90 STING; 8 M113 AEV; 1 Wisent-2
in the High North. A USMC contingent has deployed to Vaernes, ARV 6 BPz-2
on a rotational basis, since January 2017. In August 2018, this VLB 35: 26 Leguan; 9 Leopard 1
was extended for up to five years and a second location at Seter- MW 9 910 MCV-2
monden added. The US will invest, through its European Deter- NBC VEHICLES 6 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC
rence Initiative, in infrastructure upgrades at Rygge Air Station ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
to enable reinforcements in case of conflict. Norway is not an EU MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin
member, but it signed a cooperation agreement with the Euro-
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav
pean Defence Agency in 2006. At any one time, around one-third
of troops are conscripts. Norway maintains a small presence in a ARTILLERY 202
range of international crisis-management missions, including in SP 155mm 24 M109A3GN
Afghanistan, Iraq and in Jordan. Equipment recapitalisation is MOR 202: 81mm 150 L16; SP 81mm 28: 16 CV9030; 12
ongoing. Norway’s first F-35A arrived in late 2017 and the govern- M125A2
134 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Navy 2,100; 1,800 conscripts (total 3,900) AIR DEFENCE

Joint Command – Norwegian National Joint Headquarters. 1 bn with NASAMS II
The Royal Norwegian Navy is organised into four elements EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
under the command of the chief of staff of the Navy: the AIRCRAFT 79 combat capable
naval units (Kysteskadren), the schools (Sjoforsvarets Skoler), FTR 57: 47 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 10 F-16BM
the naval bases and the coastguard (Kystvakten) FGA 16 F-35A Lightning II
FORCES BY ROLE ASW 6: 4 P-3C Orion; 2 P-3N Orion (pilot trg)
MANOEUVRE EW 2 Falcon 20C
Reconnaissance TPT • Medium 4 C-130J-30 Hercules
1 ISR coy (Coastal Rangers) TRG 16 MFI-15 Safari
COMBAT SUPPORT HELICOPTERS
1 EOD pl ASW 8 NH90 NFH
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SAR 17: 5 AW101; 12 Sea King Mk43B
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 6 Ula with 8 single MRH 18: 6 Bell 412HP; 12 Bell 412SP
533mm TT with A3 Seal DM2 HWT AIR DEFENCE
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 4 SAM • Short-range NASAMS II
DESTROYERS • DDGHM 4 Fridtjof Nansen with Aegis C2 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
(mod), 2 quad lnchr with NSM AShM, 1 8-cell Mk41 VLS AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder
with ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Sting Ray II; IRIS-T; ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM; AIM-120C
LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 NH90 hel) (1 other sank AMRAAM
11/2018; may be salvaged and returned to service) BOMBS
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12: Laser-guided EGBU-12 Paveway II
PCFG 6 Skjold with 8 single lnchr with NSM AShM, 1 INS/GPS guided JDAM
76mm gun
PBF 6 CB90N (capacity 20 troops) Special Operations Command (NORSOCOM)
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4: FORCES BY ROLE
MSC 2 Alta with 1 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM SPECIAL FORCES
MHC 2 Oksoy with 1 twin Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM 1 (armed forces) SF comd (2 SF gp)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 5 1 (navy) SF comd (1 SF gp)
AGI 1 Marjata IV
AGS 2: 1 HU Sverdrup II; 1 Eger (Marjata III) with 1 hel Central Support, Administration and
landing platform Command 6,150; 850 conscripts (total 7,000)
AXL 2 Reine Central Support, Administration and Command includes
Coast Guard military personnel in all joint elements and they are
responsible for logistics and CIS in support of all forces in
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Norway and abroad
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13
PSOH 3 Nordkapp with 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 med
tpt hel)
Home Guard 650 (40,000 reserves)
PSO 5: 3 Barentshav; 1 Harstad; 1 Svalbard with 1 57mm The Home Guard is a separate organisation, but closely
gun, 1 hel landing platform cooperates with all services. The Home Guard is organised
PCC 5 Nornen in 11 Districts with mobile Rapid Reaction Forces (3,000
troops in total) as well as reinforcements and follow-on
Air Force 2,600 ; 1,000 conscript (total 3,600) forces (37,000 troops in total)
Joint Command – Norwegian National HQ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FORCES BY ROLE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 11: 4
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Harek; 2 Gyda; 5 Alusafe 1290
2 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon
MARITIME PATROL Cyber
1 sqn with P-3C Orion; P-3N Orion (pilot trg) The defence ministry is responsible for defending military
ELECTRONIC WARFARE networks and national coordination in armed conflict. The
1 sqn with Falcon 20C (EW, Flight Inspection Service) 2012 Cyber Security Strategy for Norway contained cross-
SEARCH & RESCUE governmental guidelines for cyber defence. Norwegian
1 sqn with Sea King Mk43B; AW101 Armed Forces Cyber Defence supports the armed forces
TRANSPORT by establishing, operating and protecting networks. It is
1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules responsible for defending military networks against cyber
TRAINING attack. It also supports the armed forces at home and
1 sqn with MFI-15 Safari abroad with the establishment, operation, development
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER and protection of communications systems, and is
2 sqn with Bell 412SP Twin Huey responsible for defending military networks against cyber
1 sqn with NH90 (forming) attacks, as well as developing network defence.
 Europe 135

DEPLOYMENT 2017–32 defence concept defines an ambition to restore divisions

AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 70
EGYPT: MFO 3
IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 60; 1 trg unit
JORDAN: Operation Inherent Resolve 60
LITHUANIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 13; 1
int unit
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 15
as tactical combat units, rather than administrative units. Recruit-
ment is under way for the Territorial Defence Force, launched in
2017. Poland has some capacity to independently deploy forces
beyond national borders. Defence-acquisition reform is planned
but a national armaments strategy has yet to be released. A new
armaments agency is due to be launched to consolidate respon-
sibilities and establish stronger control over programmes. Poland
intends to build up its own anti-access/area-denial capacity and in
the 2017 Defence Concept expressed an interest in research into
emerging technologies. Warsaw continues plans to strengthen its

Europe
domestic defence-industrial base, much of which is now consoli-
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 14 obs dated in the state-owned holding company PGZ, using technology
NORTH SEA: NATO • SNMG 1: 1 DDGHM; NATO • transfers and international partnering. Beyond PGZ, several inter-
SNMCMG 1: 1 MHC national defence primes have subsidiaries in Poland.
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 2; OSCE • Kosovo 1 ACTIVE 117,800 (Army 61,200 Navy 7,000 Air Force
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 14 18,700 Special Forces 3,400 Territorial 14,000 Joint
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 12 13,500) Paramilitary 73,400

FOREIGN FORCES ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

United States US European Command: 1,000; 1 mne bn;
1 (USMC) MEU eqpt set; 1 (APS) 155mm SP Arty bn eqpt Army 61,200
set FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
Poland POL elm 1 (MNC NE) corps HQ
MANOEUVRE
Polish Zloty z 2017 2018 2019 Reconnaissance
3 recce regt
GDP z 1.98tr 2.11tr
Armoured
US$ 525bn 549bn
1 (11th) armd cav div (2 armd bde, 1 mech bde, 1 arty
per capita US$ 13,821 14,469 regt)
Growth % 4.7 4.4 Mechanised
Inflation % 2.0 2.0 1 (12th) div (2 mech bde, 1 (coastal) mech bde, 1 arty
Def exp [a] z 37.5bn 41.8bn regt)
US$ 9.94bn 10.9bn 1 (16th) div (1 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 arty regt)
1 (18th) div (1 armd bde, 1 mech bde)
Def bdgt [b] z 37.7bn 41.5bn 44.7bn
Air Manoeuvre
US$ 9.98bn 10.8bn
1 (6th) air aslt bde (3 air aslt bn)
FMA (US) US$ 6.3m 0m 1 (25th) air cav bde (3 air cav bn, 2 tpt hel bn, 1 (casevac)
US$1=z 3.78 3.84 med unit)
[a] NATO definition COMBAT SUPPORT
[b] Includes military pensions 2 engr regt
1 ptn br regt
Population 38,420,687 2 chem def regt
COMBAT SUPPORT
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
2 log bde
Male 7.6% 2.5% 3.0% 3.5% 25.2% 6.7% HELICOPTER
Female 7.2% 2.4% 2.8% 3.4% 25.7% 10.2% 1 (1st) hel bde (2 atk hel sqn with Mi-24D/V Hind D/E, 1
CSAR sqn with Mi-24V Hind E; PZL W-3PL Gluszec; 2
Capabilities ISR hel sqn with Mi-2URP; 2 hel sqn with Mi-2)
Territorial defence and NATO membership are central pillars of AIR DEFENCE
Poland’s defence policy. The primary focus of the 2017–32 defence 3 AD regt
concept is to prepare the armed forces to provide a deterrent EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
against Russian aggression. Russia is characterised as a direct ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
threat to Poland and to a stable international order. The govern-
MBT 637: 142 Leopard 2A4; 105 Leopard 2A5; 232 PT-91
ment continues to pursue a goal of permanently stationing US
Twardy; 158 T-72A/T-72M1 (221 more in store)
troops in the country. Security and defence cooperation also
takes place through the Visegrád Group. There are also defence RECCE 407: 282 BRDM-2; 38 BWR; 87 BRDM-2 R5
ties through the Bucharest Nine, which brings together NATO’s IFV 1,636: 1,277 BMP-1; 359 Rosomak IFV
eastern-flank countries. Warsaw has also established a fund to APC 257
bolster its neighbours’ defence-modernisation ambitions. The APC (T) WDSz (OP)
136 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

APC (W) 227: 211 Rosomak APC; 16 AWD RAK (CP) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 21
PPV 30 Maxxpro MCCS 1 Kontradmirał Xawery Czernicki
AUV 85: 40 Cougar (on loan from US); 45 M-ATV MHO 3 Krogulec
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES MSI 17: 1 Gopło; 12 Gardno; 4 Mamry
AEV 25+: IWT; MT-LB; 17 Rosomak WRT; 8 MID Bizon AMPHIBIOUS 8
ARV 69: 28 BPz-2; 15 MT-LB; 26 WZT-3M LANDING SHIPS • LSM 5 Lublin (capacity 9 tanks; 135
VLB 62: 4 Biber; 48 BLG67M2; 10 MS-20 Daglezja troops)
MW 18: 14 Bozena 4; ISM Kroton; 4 Kalina SUM LANDING CRAFT • LCU 3 Deba (capacity 50 troops)
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 20
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 AGI 2 Moma
Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); Spike-LR AGS 8: 2 Heweliusz; 4 Wildcat 40; 2 (coastal)
ARTILLERY 815 AORL 1 Baltyk
SP 427: 122mm 292 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 111 M-77 Dana; AOL 1 Moskit
155mm 24 Krab ARS 4: 2 Piast; 2 Zbyszko
MRL 122mm 180: 75 BM-21; 30 RM-70; 75 WR-40 ATF 2
Langusta AX 1 Wodnik with 1 twin AK230 CIWS
MOR 216: 98mm 89 M-98; 120mm 95 M120; SP 120mm AXS 1 Iskra
32 SMK120 RAK COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 12+: 12 NSM; MM40 Exocet
HELICOPTERS AIR DEFENCE • SAM
ATK 28 Mi-24D/V Hind D/E Short-range Crotale NG/GR
MRH 64: 7 Mi-8MT Hip; 3 Mi-17 Hip H; 1 Mi-17AE Hip
(aeromedical); 5 Mi-17-1V Hip; 16 PZL Mi-2URP Hoplite; Naval Aviation 1,300
24 PZL W-3W/WA Sokol; 8 PZL W-3PL Gluszec (CSAR) FORCES BY ROLE
TPT 34: Medium 9: 7 Mi-8T Hip; 2 PZL W-3AE Sokol ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE/SEARCH & RESCUE
(aeromedical); Light 25 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite 1 sqn with Mi-14PL Haze A; Mi-14PL/R Haze C
AIR DEFENCE 1 sqn with PZL W-3RM Anakonda; SH-2G Super Sea-
SAM sprite
Short-range 20 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful) MARITIME PATROL
Point-defence 84+: 9K32 Strela-2‡ (SA-7 Grail); 64 9K33 1 sqn with An-28RM; An-28E
Osa-AK (SA-8 Gecko); 20 ZSU-23-4MP Biala; GROM; TRANSPORT
Poprad 1 sqn with An-28TD; M-28B TD Bryza
GUNS 332 1 sqn with An-28TD; M-28B; Mi-17 Hip H; PZL Mi-2
SP 23mm 8 ZSU-23-4 Hoplite; PZL W-3T; 1 PZL W-3A
TOWED 23mm 324; 252 ZU-23-2; 72 ZUR-23-2KG/PG EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT
Navy 7,000 MP 10: 8 An-28RM Bryza; 2 An-28E Bryza
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TPT • Light 4: 2 An-28TD Bryza; 2 M-28B TD Bryza
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 3 HELICOPTERS ASW 11: 7 Mi-14PL Haze; 4 SH-2G Super
SSK 3: Seasprite
2 Sokol (ex-NOR Type-207) with 8 single 533mm TT MRH 1 Mi-17 Hip H
1 Orzel (ex-FSU Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT each with SAR 8: 2 Mi-14PL/R Haze C; 4 PZL W-3RM Anakonda; 2
53-65 HWT (currently non-operational; has been in PZL W-3WA RM Anakonda
refit since 2014; damaged by fire in 2017) TPT • Light 7: 4 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; 1 PZL W-3A; 2 PZL-
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 2 W-3T
FRIGATES • FFGHM 2 Pulaski (ex-US Oliver Hazard
Perry) with 1 Mk13 GMLS with RGM-84D/F Harpoon Air Force 18,700
AShM/SM-1MR SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with FORCES BY ROLE
MU90 LWT, 1 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun FIGHTER
(capacity 2 SH-2G Super Seasprite ASW hel) (1 vessel 2 sqn with MiG-29A/UB Fulcrum
used as training ship) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4 3 sqn with F-16C/D Block 52+ Fighting Falcon
CORVETTES • FSM 1 Kaszub with 2 quad lnchr with FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR
9K32 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT 2 sqn with Su-22M-4 Fitter
with SET-53 HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 SEARCH AND RESCUE
76mm gun 1 sqn with Mi-2; PZL W-3 Sokol
PCFGM 3: TRANSPORT
3 Orkan (ex-GDR Sassnitz) with 1 quad lnchr with 1 sqn with C-130E; PZL M-28 Bryza
RBS15 Mk3 AShM, 1 quad lnchr (manual aiming) 1 sqn with C295M; PZL M-28 Bryza
with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 TRAINING
76mm gun 1 sqn with PZL-130 Orlik
 Europe 137

1 sqn with TS-11 Iskra AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 2

1 hel sqn with SW-4 Puszczyk Griffon 2000TDX
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 (Spec Ops) sqn with Mi-17 Hip H Prevention Units (Police) 59,100
1 (VIP) sqn with Mi-8; W-3WA Sokol Anti-terrorist Operations Bureau n.k.
AIR DEFENCE Ministry of Interior
1 bde with S-125 Neva SC (SA-3 Goa); S-200C Vega (SA-5
Gammon) Cyber
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE The National Security Bureau issued a cyber-security
AIRCRAFT 98 combat capable doctrine in January 2015. The doctrine specifies significant

Europe
FTR 32: 25 MiG-29A Fulcrum; 7 MiG-29UB Fulcrum tasks needed in order to build a national cyber-security
FGA 66: 36 F-16C Block 52+ Fighting Falcon; 12 F-16D capability. It was reported that the document noted
Block 52+ Fighting Falcon; 12 Su-22M4 Fitter; 6 Su- the need to pursue ‘active cyber defence, including
22UM3K Fitter offensive actions in cyberspace’ and maintain ‘readiness
TPT 46: Medium 5 C-130E Hercules; Light 39: 16 C295M; for cyberwar’. In November 2018, the defence ministry
23 M-28 Bryza TD; PAX 2: 1 Gulfstream G550; 1 737-800 announced that the classified 2017–26 armed forces
TRG 68: 8 M-346; 28 PZL-130 Orlik; 32 TS-11 Iskra development plan had been agreed, noting references to
HELICOPTERS the creation of cyber-defence forces.
MRH 8 Mi-17 Hip H
TPT 69: Medium 29: 9 Mi-8 Hip; 10 PZL W-3 Sokol; 10 DEPLOYMENT
PZL W-3WA Sokol (VIP); Light 40: 16 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite;
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 315;
24 SW-4 Puszczyk (trg)
UN • UNAMA 1 obs
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
Long-range 1 S-200C Vega (SA-5 Gammon) ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN: OSCE • Minsk Conference 1
Short-range 17 S-125 Neva SC (SA-3 Goa) BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 39
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 1
AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer);
AIM-9 Sidewinder; R-27T (AA-10B Alamo); IIR AIM-9X DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
Sidwinder II; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM MONUSCO 1 obs
ASM AGM-65J/G Maverick; Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 130
(AS-14 Kedge) LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 160; 1 tk coy
LACM Conventional AGM-158 JASSM
ROMANIA: NATO • MNB-SE 225; 1 mech inf coy;
Rosomak
Special Forces 3,400
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 252; 1 inf coy; OSCE • Kosovo 1;
FORCES BY ROLE
UN • UNMIK 1 obs
SPECIAL FORCES
3 SF units (GROM, FORMOZA & cdo) SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1 obs
COMBAT SUPPORT/ UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 41
1 cbt spt unit (AGAT)
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2 obs
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 spt unit (NIL)
FOREIGN FORCES
Territorial Defence Forces 14,000 All NATO Enhanced Forward Presence unless stated
FORCES BY ROLE Croatia 69; 1 MRL bty with M91 Vulkan
MANOEUVRE Germany MNC-NE corps HQ: 100
Other Romania 120; 1 ADA bty; 1 MP coy
3 sy bde United Kingdom 115; 1 recce sqn
10 sy bde (forming) United States: 774; 1 ARNG armd bn with M1A1 AIM
Abrams; M2A2 ODS Bradley; M109A6 • Operation Atlantic
Paramilitary 73,400 Resolve 2,100; 1 armd bde HQ; 1 armd cav sqn(-); 1 SP arty
bn; M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams; M3A3 Bradley; M109A6; 1 atk hel
Border Guards 14,300 flt with AH-64D Apache; 1 tpt hel flt with 8 UH-60 Black
Ministry of Interior Hawk
Maritime Border Guard 3,700
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 18
PCC 2 Kaper
PBF 6: 2 Straznik; 4 IC16M
PB 10: 2 Wisloka; 2 Baltic 24; 1 Project MI-6
138 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

FORCES BY ROLE
Portugal PRT SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF bn
Euro € 2017 2018 2019
MANOEUVRE
GDP € 193bn 201bn Reconnaissance
US$ 218bn 238bn 1 ISR bn
per capita US$ 21,159 23,176 Mechanised
Growth % 2.7 2.3 1 mech bde (1 cav tp, 1 tk regt, 1 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn,
Inflation % 1.6 1.7
1 AD bty, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn)
1 (intervention) bde (1 cav tp, 1 recce regt, 2 mech inf bn,
Def exp [a] € 2.40bn 2.73bn
1 arty bn, 1 AD bty, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn)
US$ 2.71bn 3.24bn Air Manoeuvre
Def bdgt € 2.24bn 2.18bn 1 (rapid reaction) bde (1 cav tp, 1 cdo bn, 2 para bn, 1
US$ 2.53bn 2.58bn arty bn, 1 AD bty, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 spt bn)
US$1=€ 0.89 0.84 Other
[a] NATO definition
1 (Azores) inf gp (2 inf bn, 1 AD bty)
1 (Madeira) inf gp (1 inf bn, 1 AD bty)
Population 10,355,493 COMBAT SUPPORT
1 STA bty
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 engr bn (1 construction coy; 1 EOD unit; 1 ptn br coy;
Male 8.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.2% 23.8% 7.9% 1 CBRN coy)
Female 7.4% 2.7% 2.6% 2.8% 24.2% 11.5% 1 EW coy
1 MP bn
Capabilities 1 psyops unit
Principal tasks for Portugal’s all-volunteer armed forces are home-
1 CIMIC coy (joint)
land defence, maritime security, multinational operations and 1 sigs bn
responding to humanitarian disasters. The 2013 strategic review COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
set out key defence tasks and envisaged a reduction in army 1 maint coy
strength and organisational change dividing the services into 1 log coy
immediate reaction forces, permanent defence forces and modular 1 tpt coy
forces. Investment plans support Portugal’s ambition to field 1 med unit
rapid-reaction and maritime-surveillance capabilities for territorial AIR DEFENCE
defence and multinational operations. The government in Decem- 1 AD bn
ber 2018 approved a new military programme law for 2019–30;
this has to be approved by parliament. The proposal is expected to Reserves 210,000
boost local defence industry, leading to the acquisition of up to six
KC-390 aircraft; six offshore patrol vessels; a replenishment tanker; FORCES BY ROLE
and a multi-purpose logistics ship. There will be new investments MANOEUVRE
in cyber security and in dual-use technologies. Portugal is an Light
active member of NATO, and NATO’s new cyber-security academy 3 (territorial) def bde (on mobilisation)
is being built there. It also contributes to EU military structures. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
There is a close relationship with former dependencies and with
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
the US, which operates out of Lajes air base. The army plans to
MBT 37 Leopard 2A6
enhance electronic-warfare capacity, light armour and upgrade its
Leopard 2A6s. The navy intends to upgrade its frigates and subma- RECCE 30: 14 V-150 Chaimite; 16 VBL
rines and acquire patrol vessels and a logistic-support ship, while IFV 30 Pandur II MK 30mm
the air force plans to modernise its remaining F-16s and its P-3C APC 397
Orion maritime-patrol aircraft. There is an active defence industry, APC (T) 239: 176 M113A1; 14 M113A2; 49 M577A2 (CP)
though principally in relation to shipbuilding, broader mainte- APC (W) 158: 12 V-200 Chaimite; 146 Pandur II (incl
nance tasks and the manufacture of components and small arms variants)
and light weapons. ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
ACTIVE 27,200 (Army 13,700 Navy 7,600 Air 5,900) AEV M728
ARV 13: 6 M88A1, 7 Pandur II ARV
Paramilitary 24,700
VLB M48
RESERVE 211,950 (Army 210,000 Navy 1,250, Air ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Force 700) MSL
Reserve obligation to age 35 SP 26: 17 M113 with TOW; 4 M901 with TOW; 5 Pandur
II with TOW
MANPATS Milan; TOW
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE RCL • 84mm Carl Gustav; 90mm M67; 106mm 45
M40A1
Army 13,700 ARTILLERY 321
5 territorial comd (2 mil region, 1 mil district, 2 mil zone) SP 155mm 24: 6 M109A2; 18 M109A5
 Europe 139

TOWED 63: 105mm 39: 17 L119 Light Gun; 21 M101A1; 1 Air Force 5,900
Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 24 M114A1 FORCES BY ROLE
MOR 234: 81mm 143; SP 81mm 12: 2 M125A1; 10 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
M125A2; 107mm 11 M30; SP 107mm 18: 3 M106A1; 15 2 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon
M106A2; 120mm 50 Tampella MARITIME PATROL
AIR DEFENCE 1 sqn with P-3C Orion
SAM • Point-defence 20+: 1 M48A2 Chaparral; 19 M48A3 ISR/TRANSPORT
Chaparral; FIM-92 Stinger 1 sqn with C295M
GUNS • TOWED 20mm 20 Rh 202 COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE

Europe
1 sqn with with AW101 Merlin
Navy 7,600 (incl 1,250 Marines) TRANSPORT
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with C-130H/C-130H-30 Hercules
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 2 Tridente (GER 1 sqn with Falcon 50
Type-214) with 8 533mm TT with UGM-84L Harpoon TRAINING
Block II AShM/Black Shark HWT 1 sqn with SA316 Alouette III
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 5 1 sqn with TB-30 Epsilon
FRIGATES • FFGHM 5: EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 Bartolomeu Dias (ex-NLD Karel Doorman) with 2 quad AIRCRAFT 35 combat capable
Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 16-cell FTR 30: 26 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16BM Fighting
Mk48 VLS with RIM-7M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk32 Falcon
twin 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper ASW 5 P-3C Orion
CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity: 1 Lynx Mk95 (Super ISR: 7: 5 C295M (maritime surveillance), 2 C295M (photo
Lynx) hel) recce)
3 Vasco Da Gama with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM- TPT 13: Medium 5: 2 C-130H Hercules; 3 C-130H-30
84C Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple Mk 29 GMLS with Hercules (tpt/SAR); Light 5 C295M; PAX 3 Falcon 50 (tpt/
RIM-7M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk32 triple 324mm VIP)
ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 TRG 16 TB-30 Epsilon
100mm gun (capacity 2 Lynx Mk95 (Super Lynx) hel) HELICOPTERS
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20 MRH 6 SA316 Alouette III (trg, utl)
CORVETTES • FS 2: TPT • Medium 12 AW101 Merlin (6 SAR, 4 CSAR, 2
1 Baptista de Andrade with 1 100mm gun, 1 hel landing fishery protection)
platform AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
1 Joao Coutinho with 1 twin 76mm gun, 1 hel landing AAM • IR AIM-9L/I Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120C
platform AMRAAM
PSO 3 Viana do Castelo with 1 hel landing platform ASM AGM-65A Maverick
PCC 4: 2 Cacine; 2 Tejo (ex-DNK Flyvisken) AShM AGM-84A Harpoon
PBR 11: 1 Albatroz; 5 Argos; 4 Centauro; 1 Rio Minho BOMBS
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 11 Laser-guided/GPS GBU-49 Enhanced Paveway II
AGS 4: 2 D Carlos I (ex-US Stalwart); 2 Andromeda INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM
AORL 1 Bérrio (ex-UK Rover) with 1 hel landing platform
(for medium hel) Paramilitary 24,700
AXS 6: 1 Sagres; 1 Creoula; 1 Polar; 2 Belatrix; 1 Zarco
National Republican Guard 24,700
Marines 1,250 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FORCES BY ROLE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32
SPECIAL FORCES PBF 12
1 SF det PB 20
MANOEUVRE HELICOPTERS • MRH 7 SA315 Lama
Light
2 lt inf bn Cyber
COMBAT SUPPORT The 2013 Cyber Defence Policy Guidance established
1 mor coy
 a national cyber-defence structure. Portugal released
1 MP det a National Cyberspace Security Strategy in 2015. The
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE strategic-military aspects of cyber defence are the
ARTILLERY • MOR 120mm 30 responsibility of the Council of the Chiefs of Staff. A Cyber
Defence Centre, under the chief of defence, reached full
Naval Aviation operating capability in 2017. Cyber-defence units within
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE the three branches of the armed forces are responsible for
HELICOPTERS • ASW 5 Lynx Mk95 (Super Lynx) responding to cyber attacks.
140 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

is seen as a factor limiting capability. Acquisition plans include

DEPLOYMENT armoured vehicles, air-defence radars, surface-to-air missiles and
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 195 corvettes. Acquisition of second-hand F-16s has enhanced Roma-
nia’s air capabilities. Romania was once a significant weapons
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 45; UN exporter, yet since 1989 the country’s defence industry has strug-
• MINUSCA 165; 1 AB coy gled. Current production focuses on small arms and ammunition.
IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 34 However, Bucharest is looking to boost the industry through offset
agreements and technology transfers.
MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 12; UN • MINUSMA 2
NORTH SEA: NATO • SNMG 1: 1 FFGHM
ACTIVE 69,300 (Army 36,000 Navy 6,500 Air 10,300
Joint 16,500) Paramilitary 57,000
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 3; OSCE • Kosovo 1
SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 4 RESERVE 50,000 (Joint 50,000)
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 2
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 1 obs
Army 36,000
FOREIGN FORCES Readiness is reported as 70–90% for NATO-designated
United States US European Command: 250; 1 spt facility forces (1 div HQ, 1 mech bde, 1 inf bde & 1 mtn inf bde)
at Lajes and 40–70% for other forces
FORCES BY ROLE
Romania ROM COMMAND
2 div HQ (2nd & 4th)
New Lei 2017 2018 2019 elm 1 div HQ (MND-SE)
GDP lei 859bn 939bn SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF bde (2 SF bn, 1 para bn, 1 log bn)
US$ 212bn 239bn
MANOEUVRE
per capita US$ 10,786 12,189 Reconnaissance

Growth % 6.9 4.0 1 recce bde
Inflation % 1.3 4.7 2 recce regt
Def exp [a] lei 14.8bn 18.2bn Mechanised
5 mech bde (1 tk bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn,
US$ 3.64bn 4.63bn
1 log bn)
Def bdgt [b] lei 14.8bn 18.2bn 19.5bn
Light
US$ 3.64bn 4.63bn 1 (MNB-SE) inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 log bn)
FMA (US) US$ 4.4m 0m 2 mtn inf bde (3 mtn inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 log bn)
US$1=lei 4.05 3.92 COMBAT SUPPORT
[a] NATO definition 1 MRL bde (3 MRL bn, 1 STA bn, 1 log bn)
2 arty regt

[b] Includes military pensions
1 engr bde (4 engr bn, 1 ptn br bn, 1 log bn)
Population 21,457,116 2 engr bn
3 sigs bn
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 CIMIC bn
Male 7.4% 2.7% 2.8% 3.6% 25.6% 6.6% 1 MP bn
Female 7.0% 2.5% 2.6% 3.5% 26.0% 9.8% 3 CBRN bn
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Capabilities 3 spt bn
AIR DEFENCE
Romania’s armed forces are structured around territorial defence,
3 AD regt
support to NATO and EU missions and contributing to regional
and global stability and security. Principal security threats include, EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
according to the National Defence Strategy 2015–19 and the 2016 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Military Strategy, Russia’s increased presence in the Black Sea, MBT 418: 260 T-55AM; 104 TR-85; 54 TR-85 M1
hybrid warfare, cyber attacks and terrorism. The government has IFV 139: 38 MLI-84 (incl CP); 101 MLI-84M Jderul
stated the intention to strengthen operational capabilities and APC 851
develop its partnerships and cooperation with other NATO and EU APC (T) 76 MLVM
members, and there is an ongoing programme to modernise and APC (W) 715: 69 B33 TAB Zimbru; 31 Piranha III; 2 Piranha
upgrade the armed forces to meet NATO standards. Bucharest has
V; 410 TAB-71 (incl variants); 203 TAB-77 (incl variants)
signed defence-cooperation agreements with regional allies. Nev-
ertheless, it places a great value on its strategic partnership with PPV 60 Maxxpro
the US. Romania hosts the Aegis Ashore ballistic-missile-defence AUV 427 TABC-79 (incl variants)
system at Deveselu. Romania trains widely with its NATO and ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
regional allies and contributes to EU and NATO missions. The inven- ARV 51: 3 BPz-2; 3 MLI-84M TEHEVAC; 5 TERA-71L;
tory is mainly composed of ageing Soviet-era equipment, which 40 TERA-77L
 Europe 141

VLB 40 BLG-67 AOL 1 Tulcea

NBC VEHICLES 80 RCH-84 ATF 1 Grozavu
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE AXS 1 Mircea
MSL • SP 134: 12 9P122 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 74
9P133 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 48 9P148 Konkurs (AT-5 Naval Infantry
Spandrel) FORCES BY ROLE
GUNS MANOEUVRE
SP 100mm (23 SU-100 in store) Light
TOWED 100mm 222 M-1977 1 naval inf regt
ARTILLERY 1,087 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

Europe
SP 122mm 24: 6 2S1; 18 Model 89 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
TOWED 449: 122mm 98 (M-30) M-1938 (A-19); 152mm AUV 14: 11 ABC-79M; 3 TABC-79M
351: 247 M-1981; 104 M-1985
MRL 122mm 188: 134 APR-40; 54 LAROM Air Force 10,300
MOR 426: SP 82mm 160: 80 TAB-71AR; 80 TABC-79AR;
FORCES BY ROLE
120mm 266 M-1982
FIGHTER
AIR DEFENCE 2 sqn with MiG-21 Lancer C
SAM • Short-range 32 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful) FIGHTER GROUND ATTACK
GUNS 60 1 sqn (forming) with with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon
SP 35mm 36 Gepard GROUND ATTACK
TOWED 35mm 24 GDF-003 1 sqn with IAR-99 Soim
TRANSPORT
Navy 6,500 1 sqn with An-30 Clank; C-27J Spartan
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with C-130B/H Hercules
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 3 TRAINING
DESTROYERS 3 1 sqn with IAR-99 Soim*
DDGH 1 Marasesti with 4 twin lnchr with P-15M 1 sqn with SA316B Alouette III (IAR-316B); Yak-52 (Iak-52)
Termit-M (SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 2 triple 533mm TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
ASTT with 53–65 HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S 2 (multi-role) sqn with IAR-330 SOCAT Puma
mor, 2 twin 76mm guns (capacity 2 SA-316 (IAR-316) 3 sqn with SA330 Puma (IAR-330)
Alouette III hel) AIR DEFENCE
DDH 2 Regele Ferdinand (ex-UK Type-22), with 2 triple 1 AD bde
324mm TT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 SA330 (IAR-330) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Puma) 1 engr spt regt
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
CORVETTES 4 AIRCRAFT 56 combat capable
FSH 2 Tetal II with 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 FTR 12: 8 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16BM Fighting Falcon
Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun FGA 24: 6 MiG-21 Lancer B; 18 MiG-21 Lancer C
(capacity 1 SA316 (IAR-316) Alouette III hel) ISR 2 An-30 Clank
FS 2 Tetal I with 2 twin 533mm ASTT with 53-65E TPT • Medium 12: 7 C-27J Spartan; 4 C-130B Hercules; 1
HWT, 2 RBU 2500 Smerch 1 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm C-130H Hercules
guns TRG 32: 10 IAR-99*; 10 IAR-99C Soim*; 12 Yak-52 (Iak-52)
PCFG 3 Zborul with 2 twin lnchr with P-15M Termit-M HELICOPTERS
(SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun MRH 30: 22 IAR-330 SOCAT Puma; 8 SA316B Alouette III
PCFT 3 Naluca with 4 single 533mm ASTT (IAR-316B)
PCR 8: TPT • Medium 36: 21 SA330L Puma (IAR-330L); 15
5 Brutar II with 2 BM-21 MRL, 1 100mm gun SA330M Puma (IAR-330M)
3 Kogalniceanu with 2 BM-21 MRL, 2 100mm guns AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Medium-range 14: 6 S-75M3
PBR 6 VD141 (ex-MSR now used for river patrol) Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline); 8 MIM-23 Hawk PIP III
MINE WARFARE 11 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
MINE COUNTERMEASURES 10 AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; R-73 (AA-11 Archer);
MSO 4 Musca with 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 AK230 R-550 Magic 2; Python 3 ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM
CIWS ASM Spike-ER
MSR 6 VD141 BOMBS
MINELAYERS • ML 1 Corsar with up to 120 mines, 2 Laser-guided GBU-12 Paveway
RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 57mm gun INS/GPS guided GBU-38 JDAM
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8
AE 2 Constanta with 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm Paramilitary ε57,000
guns
AGOR 1 Corsar Gendarmerie ε57,000
AGS 2: 1 Emil Racovita;1 Catuneanu Ministry of Interior
142 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Cyber
Romania’s 2013 and 2015 cyber-security strategies define
the conceptual framework, aim, objectives, priorities
and courses of action for providing cyber security at the
national level. Romania’s 2016 Military Strategy said the
country needed to develop the legal framework to conduct
operations in cyberspace. The defence ministry contains a
military CERT. Romania is in 2019 due to join the NATO
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence.
DEPLOYMENT
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 742;
1 inf bn
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 48
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 14
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
MONUSCO 4; 7 obs
INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 2 obs
IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 50
MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 3; UN • MINUSMA 3
POLAND: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 120; 1
ADA bty; 1 MP coy
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 71; UN • UNMIK 1 obs
SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 3
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2; 5 obs
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 36
Capabilities
Serbia’s armed forces focus on territorial defence, internal secu-
rity and limited support to peacekeeping missions. According to
the 2018 draft security strategy, key threats include separatism,
religious and political extremism, and further international rec-
ognition of Kosovo. The armed forces are modernising to address
long-term capability shortfalls and personnel shortages. Priorities
include procurements; improving availability, maintenance and
readiness levels; and bolstering air-defence systems. Serbia has
agreed to deepen cooperation with NATO through an Individual
Partnership Action Plan, though Belgrade does not aspire to join
the Alliance. Serbia also maintains a close relationship with Russia,
which in recent years has transferred military equipment to Serbia.
The armed forces have reduced in size over the last decade, though
annual recruitment goals are not being met. The armed forces also
lack skilled technicians to operate and maintain advanced systems
and suffer from a shortage of pilots. Serbia mostly trains with its
Balkan neighbours, as well as Belarus, Russia and NATO countries.
Serbia contributes to EU, OSCE and UN peacekeeping missions.
Serbia’s defence industry focuses on missile and artillery systems,
and small arms and ammunition, but the country is reliant on
external suppliers for major platforms. Serbia continues to develop
its defence industry with a focus on the aerospace industry.
ACTIVE 28,150 (Army 13,250 Air Force and Air
Defence 5,100 Training Command 3,000 Guards
1,600 Other MoD 5,200) Paramilitary 3,700
Conscript liability 6 months (voluntary)
RESERVE 50,150
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

FOREIGN FORCES Army 13,250

FORCES BY ROLE
Canada NATO Air Policing: 135; 4 F/A-18A Hornet (CF-18)
SPECIAL FORCES
Poland NATO MNB-SE 225; 1 mech inf coy; Rosomak 1 SF bde (1 CT bn, 1 cdo bn, 1 para bn)

United States US European Command: 1,150; 1 armd inf MANOEUVRE
bn HQ; 2 armd/armd inf coy; M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams; M2A3 Mechanised
Bradley; 1 tpt hel flt with 5 UH-60L Black Hawk 1 (1st) bde (1 tk bn, 2 mech inf bn, 1 inf bn, 1 SP arty bn,
1 MRL bn, 1 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 log bn)
Serbia SER 3 (2nd, 3rd & 4th) bde (1 tk bn, 2 mech inf bn, 2 inf bn, 1
SP arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 log bn)
Serbian Dinar d 2017 2018 2019 COMBAT SUPPORT
GDP d 4.46tr 4.75tr 1 (mixed) arty bde (4 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 spt bn)
US$ 41.4bn 47.7bn 2 ptn bridging bn
1 NBC bn
per capita US$ 5,901 6,815
1 sigs bn
Growth % 1.9 4.0 2 MP bn
Inflation % 3.1 2.1
Def bdgt d 58.9bn 70.5bn Reserve Organisations
US$ 546m 707m FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
FMA (US) US$ 1.8m 0m
Light
US$1=d 107.76 99.74 8 (territorial) inf bde
Population 7,078,110 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Ethnic groups: Serbian 83.3%; Hungarian 3.35%; Romani 2.05%; ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Bosniac 2.02%; Croatian 0.8% MBT 212: 199 M-84; 13 T-72
RECCE 46 BRDM-2
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
IFV 335: 323 M-80; 12 Lazar-3
Male 7.5% 2.7% 3.1% 3.3% 24.6% 7.6% APC 83 • APC(T) 44: 12 BTR-50 (CP); 32 MT-LB (CP)
Female 7.0% 2.6% 2.9% 3.1% 24.9% 10.8% APC (W) 39 BOV-VP M-86; some Lazar-3
 Europe 143

AUV BOV M-16 AIR DEFENCE

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 1 bde (5 bn (2 msl, 3 SP msl) with S-125 Neva (SA-3 Goa);
AEV IWT 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail);
ARV M84A1; T-54/T-55 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet))
VLB MT-55; TMM 2 radar bn (for early warning and reporting)
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE COMBAT SUPPORT
MSL 1 sigs bn
SP 48 BOV-1 (M-83) with 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot 1 maint bn
(AT-4 Spigot) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

Europe
RCL 90mm 6 M-79 AIRCRAFT 63 combat capable
ARTILLERY 443 FTR 13+ : 2+ MiG-21bis Fishbed; 2+ MiG-21UM Mongol
SP 67+: 122mm 67 2S1 Gvozdika; 155mm B-52 NORA B; 5 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 4 MiG-29UB Fulcrum
TOWED 132: 122mm 78 D-30; 130mm 18 M-46; 152mm FGA 17 J-22 Orao 1
36 M-84 NORA-A ISR 12: 10 IJ-22R Orao 1*; 2 MiG-21R Fishbed H*
MRL 81: 128mm 78: 18 M-63 Plamen; 60 M-77 Organj; TPT • Light 10: 1 An-2 Colt; 4 An-26 Curl; 2 Do-28
262mm 3 M-87 Orkan Skyservant; 2 Yak-40 (Jak-40); 1 PA-34 Seneca V
MOR 163: 82mm 106 M-69; 120mm 57 M-74/M-75 TRG 42: 21 G-4 Super Galeb*; 11 Utva-75; 10 Lasta 95
AIR DEFENCE HELICOPTERS
SAM ATK 2 Mi-24 Hind
Short-range 77 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); MRH 52: 1 Mi-17 Hip H; 2 Mi-17V-5 Hip; 2 SA341H
Point-defence 17+: 12 9K31M Strela-1M (SA-9 Gaskin); Gazelle (HI-42); 34 SA341H Gazelle (HN-42)/SA342L
5 9K35M Strela-10M; 9K32M Strela-2M (SA-7 Grail)‡; Gazelle (HN-45); 13 SA341H Gazelle (HO-42)/SA342L1
Šilo (SA-16 Gimlet) Gazelle (HO-45)
GUNS • TOWED 40mm 36 Bofors L/70 TPT • Medium 8 Mi-8T Hip (HT-40)
AIR DEFENCE
River Flotilla SAM
The Serbian–Montenegrin navy was transferred to Short-range 15: 6 S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); 9 2K12 Kub
Montenegro upon independence in 2006, but the (SA-6 Gainful)
Danube flotilla remained in Serbian control. The flotilla Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K310 Igla-
1 (SA-16 Gimlet)
is subordinate to the Land Forces
GUNS • TOWED 40mm 24 Bofors
L/70
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid)
PBR 5: 3 Type-20; 2 others ASM AGM-65 Maverick; A-77 Thunder
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4
MSI 4 Nestin with 1 quad lnchr with Strela 2M (SA-N- Guards 1,600
5 Grail) SAM
FORCES BY ROLE
AMPHIBOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCVP 5 Type-22
MANOEUVRE
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2
Other
AGF 1 Kozara
1 (ceremonial) gd bde (1 gd bn, 1 MP bn, 1 spt bn)
AOL 1
Paramilitary 3,700
Air Force and Air Defence 5,100
FORCES BY ROLE Gendarmerie 3,700
FIGHTER EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with MiG-21bis Fishbed; MiG-29 Fulcrum ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK APC • APC (W) 12+: some Lazar-3; 12 BOV-VP M-86
1 sqn with G-4 Super Galeb*; J-22 Orao AUV BOV M-16 Milos
ISR
2 flt with IJ-22 Orao 1*; MiG-21R Fishbed H*
DEPLOYMENT
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with An-2; An-26; Do-28; Yak-40 (Jak-40); 1 PA-34 ALBANIA: OSCE • Albania 1
Seneca V BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: OSCE • Bosnia and
TRAINING Herzegovina 1
1 sqn with G-4 Super Galeb* (adv trg/light atk);
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 7; UN •
SA341/342 Gazelle; Utva-75 (basic trg)

MINUSCA 73; 2 obs; 1 med coy
ATTACK HELICOPTER
1 sqn with SA341H/342L Gazelle; (HN-42/45); Mi-24 Hind CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 2
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
2 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-17V-5 Hip MONUSCO 1
144 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 177; 1 mech inf coy Sweden 2 • OSCE 3

MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 3 Switzerland 190; 1 inf coy; 1 engr pl; 1 hel flt with AS332
Tajikistan OSCE 1
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 1 obs
Turkey 299; 1 inf coy • UNMIK 1 obs
SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 6 Ukraine 40 • OSCE 1 • UNMIK 3 obs
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 16 United Kingdom 24 • OSCE 5
United States 655; elm 1 ARNG inf bde HQ; 1 recce bn; 1
hel flt with UH-60 • OSCE 8
TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT
DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL
Data here represents the de facto situation in Kosovo. This
Slovakia SVK
does not imply international recognition as a sovereign Euro € 2017 2018 2019
state. In February 2008, Kosovo declared itself independent.
GDP € 85.0bn 90.2bn
Serbia remains opposed to this, and while Kosovo has not
been admitted to the United Nations, a number of states US$ 96.0bn 107bn
have recognised Kosovo’s self-declared status. per capita US$ 17,655 19,642
Growth % 3.4 3.9
Kosovo Security Force 2,500; reserves 800 Inflation % 1.3 2.6
The Kosovo Security Force (KSF) was formed in January Def exp [a] € 935m 1.09bn
2009 as a non-military organisation with responsibility for US$ 1.06bn 1.29bn
crisis response, civil protection and EOD. In 2017, a pro-
Def bdgt € 990m 1.08bn 1.15bn
posal by Pristina to establish an army was opposed by Rus-
US$ 1.12bn 1.28bn
sia, Serbia, the US and NATO. Legislation to this effect was
passed by Pristina in October 2018. In December, NATO US$1=€ 0.89 0.84
said that should the KSF’s mandate evolve, it would have [a] NATO definition
to examine its level of engagement with the force. The KSF Population 5,445,040
is armed with small arms and light vehicles only.
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
FOREIGN FORCES Male 7.8% 2.6% 3.0% 3.6% 25.5% 6.0%
All under Kosovo Force (KFOR) command unless Female 7.4% 2.5% 2.8% 3.5% 25.8% 9.4%
otherwise specified
Albania 28 • OSCE 3 Capabilities
Armenia 40 Slovakia is trying to modernise its armed forces and replace obso-
Austria 508; 1 recce coy; 2 mech inf coy; 1 log coy • OSCE 1 lete equipment while contributing to international crisis-manage-
Bosnia-Herzegovina OSCE 10 ment missions. A defence white paper in September 2016 set out
Bulgaria 23 • OSCE 2 security priorities and a plan to increase defence capabilities. In
Canada 5 • OSCE 2 2017, the government approved a new defence strategy, a new
Croatia 35; 1 hel flt with Mi-8 • OSCE 1 military strategy and a Long-Term Defence Development Plan. A
Czech Republic 10 • OSCE 1 • UNMIK 2 obs NATO and EU member state, Slovakia cooperates closely with the
Denmark 35 Visegrád Group framework. Bratislava has signed an agreement
Estonia 2 to enable air policing and closer integration of air-defence capa-
bilities. After amending the law on conscription in 2017, Slovakia
Finland 20
began to implement its Active Reserves pilot project in order to
Georgia OSCE 1
help address shortfalls in specialist capacities, including in engi-
Germany 198 • OSCE 4 neering. Results of the pilot project fell short of expectations, and
Greece 116; 1 inf coy • OSCE 1 Slovakia passed legislation in early 2018 to improve the training
Hungary 388; 1 inf coy (KTM) conditions for active reservists from mid-2018 onwards. Slova-
Ireland 12 • OSCE 3 kia has committed to deploying a company-sized unit to NATO’s
Italy 538; 1 mtn inf BG HQ; 1 Carabinieri unit • OSCE 11 Enhanced Forward Presence and has also contributed to EU opera-
Kyrgyzstan OSCE 2 tions and UN peacekeeping missions. Bratislava is planning to
Lithuania 1 replace its small fighter and rotary-wing-transport fleets. Coincid-
Macedonia (FYROM) OSCE 14 ing with the July 2018 NATO summit, the government announced
Moldova 41 • OSCE 2 • UNMIK 1 obs it had selected the F-16. There are also ambitions to replace land
Netherlands OSCE 1 equipment and improve the level of technology in the armed
forces. Part of Slovakia’s defence-industrial base is organised within
Norway 2 • OSCE 1
the state-controlled holding company DMD Group, including KON-
Poland 260; 1 inf coy • OSCE 1 • UNMIK 1 obs
STRUKTA Defence, which produces land systems. Other companies
Portugal 3 • OSCE 1 focus on maintenance, repair and overhaul services.
Romania 71 • UNMIK 1 obs
Russia OSCE 1 ACTIVE 15,850 (Army 6,250 Air 3,950 Central Staff
Slovenia 241; 1 mot inf coy; 1 MP unit; 1 hel unit 2,550 Support and Training 3,100)
Spain OSCE 1 Conscript liability 6 months
 Europe 145

AIR DEFENCE
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 1 bde with 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7
Grail); S-300 (SA-10 Grumble)
Central Staff 2,550
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FORCES BY ROLE
AIRCRAFT 24 combat capable
SPECIAL FORCES
FTR 12: 10 MiG-29AS Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UBS Fulcrum;
1 (5th) spec ops bn
TPT 10: Medium 2 C-27J Spartan; Light 8: 2 L-410FG
Army 6,250 Turbolet; 2 L-410T Turbolet; 4 L-410UVP Turbolet
TRG 12: 6 L-39CM Albatros*; 5 L-39ZA Albatros*; 1
FORCES BY ROLE L-39ZAM Albatros*

Europe
MANOEUVRE HELICOPTERS
Armoured ATK (15: 5 Mi-24D Hind D; 10 Mi-24V Hind E all in store)
1 (2nd) armd bde (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 MRH 13 Mi-17 Hip H

mot inf bn, 1 mixed SP arty bn) TPT 9: Medium 3: 1 Mi-8 Hip; 2 UH-60M Black Hawk
Mechanised Light 6 PZL MI-2 Hoplite
1 (1st) mech bde (3 armd inf bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 engr bn, 1 AIR DEFENCE • SAM
NBC bn) Long-range S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble)
COMBAT SUPPORT Short-range 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)
1 MP bn Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
1 spt bde (2 log bn, 1 maint bn, 1 spt bn) AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
 SARH R-27R (AA-10A Alamo)
ARMOURED FIGHITING VEHICLES ASM S5K/S5KO (57mm rockets); S8KP/S8KOM (80mm
MBT 30 T-72M rockets)
RECCE 18 BPsVI
IFV 249: 148 BMP-1; 91 BMP-2; 10 BVP-M
APC 101+
APC (T) 72 OT-90 DEPLOYMENT
APC (W) 22: 7 OT-64; 15 Tatrapan (6×6) AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 36
PPV 7+ RG-32M
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 41
AUV IVECO LMV
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 242; 1 inf coy; 1 engr pl
ARV MT-55; VT-55A; VT-72B; WPT-TOPAS LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 150; 1
VLB AM-50; MT-55A mech inf coy
MW Bozena; UOS-155 Belarty
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 2 obs
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
SP 9S428 with Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) on BMP-1; 9P135 UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 12
Fagot (AT-4 Spigot) on BMP-2; 9P148 Konkurs (AT-5
Spandrel) on BRDM-2 Slovenia SVN
MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111-1
Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel) Euro € 2017 2018 2019
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav GDP € 43.3bn 46.3bn
ARTILLERY 68
US$ 48.9bn 55.0bn
SP 19: 152mm 3 M-77 Dana; 155mm 16 M-2000 Zuzana
TOWED 122mm 19 D-30 per capita US$ 23,654 26,586
MRL 30: 122mm 4 RM-70; 122/227mm 26 RM-70/85 Growth % 5.0 4.5
MODULAR Inflation % 1.4 2.1
AIR DEFENCE • SAM Def exp [a] € 422m 466m
Point-defence 48+: 48 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher);
US$ 477m 553m
9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)
Def bdgt [b] € 420m 449m
Air Force 3,950 US$ 474m 532m
FORCES BY ROLE US$1=€ 0.89 0.84
FIGHTER [a] NATO definition
1 sqn with MiG-29AS/UBS Fulcrum [b] Includes military pensions
TRANSPORT
1 flt with C-27J Spartan Population 2,102,126
1 flt with L-410FG/T/UVP Turbolet Ethnic groups: Slovenian 83%; Serbian 2%; Croatian 1.8%;
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Bosniac 1%; other or unspecified 12.2%
1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 sqn with PZL MI-2 Hoplite
TRAINING Male 6.9% 2.3% 2.5% 3.0% 26.0% 8.0%
1 sqn with L-39CM/ZA/ZAM Albatros Female 6.5% 2.2% 2.4% 2.9% 25.9% 11.5%
146 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Capabilities ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV VT-55A
Since joining NATO and the EU in 2004, territorial defence and the VLB MT-55A
ability to take part in peace-support operations have been central
NBC VEHICLES 10 Cobra CBRN
to Slovenia’s defence strategy. The defence ministry completed a
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Strategic Defence Review in December 2016. Its core conclusion
was that the goals of the previous 2009 review had been missed MSL • MANPATS Spike MR/LR
and that capability development had stalled at a time when ARTILLERY 68
Europe’s security environment had deteriorated. Underfunding TOWED • 155mm 18 TN-90
and bureaucratic failure to implement the policy guidelines were MOR 50+: 82mm M-69; 120mm 50 MN-9/M-74
singled out as key reasons. The main development goal to 2023 AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 9K338 Igla-S (SA-
has been defined as the formation and equipping of two battalion- 24 Grinch)
sized battlegroups. Doctrine will also be reviewed. Slovenia acts as
the framework nation for the NATO Mountain Warfare Centre of Army Maritime Element 130
Excellence. Because its small air wing is not equipped to provide
FORCES BY ROLE
air policing, Italy and Hungary currently provide this capability
under NATO arrangements. The country contributes to EU, NATO SPECIAL FORCES
and UN operations and exercises with other member states. 1 SF unit
Recruitment and retention continues to be a challenge. Slovenia EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
started its third rotation to NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 2
July 2018 where it contributes to the Canadian-led battlegroup. PCC 1 Triglav III (RUS Svetlyak)
Continuing resource challenges mean that significant modernisa- PBF 1 Super Dvora MkII
tion steps seem unlikely during the current Medium-Term Defence
Programme to 2020. Slovenia’s defence industry relies heavily on Air Element 610
exports for its revenue and focuses on individual solider equip-
ment, small arms and ammunition, and CBRN protection and FORCES BY ROLE
detection. TRANSPORT
1 sqn with Falcon 2000EX; L-410 Turbolet; PC-6B Turbo
ACTIVE 7,250 (Army 7,250) Porter;
TRAINING
RESERVE 1,500 (Army 1,500)
1 unit with Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206); PC-9M*;
Z-143L; Z-242L
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with AS532AL Cougar; Bell 412 Twin Huey
Army 7,250 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
FORCES BY ROLE 1 maint sqn
Regt are bn sized EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SPECIAL FORCES AIRCRAFT 9 combat capable
1 SF unit (1 spec ops coy, 1 CSS coy) TPT 4: Light 3: 1 L-410 Turbolet; 2 PC-6B Turbo Porter
MANOEUVRE PAX 1 Falcon 2000EX
Mechanised TRG 19: 9 PC-9M*; 2 Z-143L; 8 Z-242L
1 (1st) mech inf bde (1 mech inf regt, 1 mtn inf regt, 1 HELICOPTERS
cbt spt bn (1 ISR coy, 1 arty bty, 1 engr coy, 1 MP coy, 1 MRH 8: 5 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 2 Bell 412HP Twin
CBRN coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 SAM bty)) Huey; 1 Bell 412SP Twin Huey (some armed)
1 (72nd) mech inf bde (2 mech inf regt, 1 cbt spt bn (1 TPT 8: Medium 4 AS532AL Cougar; Light 4 Bell 206 Jet
ISR coy, 1 arty bty, 1 engr coy, 1 MP coy, 1 CBRN coy, 1 Ranger (AB-206)
sigs coy, 1 SAM bty))
COMBAT SUPPORT DEPLOYMENT
1 EW coy
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 8
1 log bde (1 log regt, 1 maint regt (1 tk coy), 1 med regt) BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea
14
Reserves
IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 6
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 50; 1 recce
Mountain pl
2 inf regt (territorial – 1 allocated to each inf bde) LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 18
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 4
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3 obs
MBT 14 M-84 (trg role) (32 more in store)
APC 115+: SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 241; 1 mot inf coy; 1 MP unit; 1
APC (W) 115: 85 Pandur 6×6 (Valuk); 30 Patria 8×8 (Svarun) hel unit
PPV Cougar 6×6 JERRV UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 1
 Europe 147

Spain ESP ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Euro € 2017 2018 2019 Space
GDP € 1.16tr 1.21tr EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ 1.31tr 1.44tr SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 2: 1 Spainsat; 1
per capita US$ 28,359 31,060 Xtar-Eur
Growth % 3.0 2.7
Inflation % 2.0 1.8
Army 69,250
The Land Forces High Readiness HQ Spain provides one

Europe
Def exp [a] € 10.5bn 11.4bn
NATO Rapid Deployment Corps HQ (NRDC-ESP)
US$ 11.9bn 13.5bn
FORCES BY ROLE
Def bdgt [b] € 11.8bn 12.7bn
COMMAND
US$ 13.4bn 15.1bn
1 corps HQ (CGTAD/NRDC-ESP) (1 int regt, 1 MP bn)
US$1=€ 0.89 0.84 2 div HQ
[a] NATO definition SPECIAL FORCES
[b] Includes military pensions 1 comd (4 spec ops bn, 1 int coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
MANOEUVRE
Population 49,331,076
Reconnaissance
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 armd cav regt (2 armd recce bn)
Mechanised
Male 7.9% 2.5% 2.5% 2.9% 26.0% 7.7%
3 (10th, 11th & 12th) mech bde (1 armd regt (1 armd recce
Female 7.5% 2.3% 2.3% 2.6% 25.6% 10.3%
bn, 1 tk bn), 1 mech inf regt (1 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf
bn), 1 lt inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr
Capabilities bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
The 2017 National Security Strategy indicated that Spain’s 1 (1st) mech bde (1 armd regt (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn),
defence policy was global in scope, though concerned by 1 mech inf regt (1 armd inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn), 1 mtn inf
threats emanating from the Middle East and sub-Saharan bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int
Africa. The army began a force-structure review in 2015, which coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
resulted in a reorganisation into multipurpose brigades with 2 (2nd/La Legion & 7th) lt mech bde (1 armd recce bn, 1
heavy, medium and light capabilities, optimised for deployable mech inf regt (2 mech inf bn), 1 lt inf bn, 1 fd arty bn,
operations and with a greater emphasis on mechanised forma- 1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1
tions and special-operations forces. Spain is a member of NATO sigs coy, 1 log bn)
and continues to support NATO, EU and UN operations abroad. Air Manoeuvre
The country hosts one of NATO’s two Combined Air Operations 1 (6th) bde (1 recce bn, 2 para bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 fd arty bn,
Centres, and the country’s Joint Special Operations Command 1 AT coy, 1 AD coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1
will provide the Special Operations Component Command for sigs coy, 1 log bn)
the NATO Response Force in 2018. The armed forces are well Other
trained and there is a routine exercise programme for both 1 (Canary Islands) comd (1 lt inf bde (2 mech inf regt (1
domestic and multinational exercises. The country’s equipment mech inf bn), 1 lt inf regt (1 lt inf bn), 1 fd arty regt, 1
and logistic-support capability appears to be sufficient to meet AT coy, 1 engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log
its national commitments and contribution to NATO operations bn); 1 spt hel bn; 1 AD regt)
and exercises. In early 2018, Spain launched an equipment- 1 (Balearic Islands) comd (1 inf regt)
modernisation plan, with funding for the modernisation of army 2 (Ceuta and Melilla) comd (1 recce regt, 1 mech inf bn, 1
Chinook helicopters, for the S-80 submarine programme and inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
for military-communications satellites. Spain has reportedly COMBAT SUPPORT
expressed interest in acquiring the F-35 to replace its AV-8Bs. 1 arty comd (1 arty regt; 1 MRL regt; 1 coastal arty regt)
Madrid has also expressed willingness to join European combat 1 engr comd (2 engr regt, 1 bridging regt)
aircraft replacement projects such as the Franco-German FCAS 1 EW/sigs bde (2 EW regt, 3 sigs regt)
and announced that it will participate in funding the European
1 NBC regt
MALE UAV project. Spain’s defence industry manufactures across
1 CIMIC bn
all domains and exports globally. Navantia is the principal, state-
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
owned, shipbuilding firm. The industry is largely integrated
1 log bde (5 log regt; 1 tpt regt)
within the European defence-industrial manufacturing base.
1 med bde (1 log unit, 2 med regt, 1 fd hospital unit)
ACTIVE 120,350 (Army 69,250 Navy 20,100 Air HELICOPTER
19,350 Joint 11,650) Paramilitary 75,800 1 hel comd (1 atk hel bn, 2 spt hel bn, 1 tpt hel bn, 1 sigs
bn, 1 log unit (1 spt coy, 1 supply coy))
RESERVE 15,150 (Army 9,200 Navy 2,900 Air 2,350 AIR DEFENCE
Other 700) 1 AD comd (3 SAM regt, 1 sigs unit)
148 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AMPHIBIOUS

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3:
MBT 327: 108 Leopard 2A4; 219 Leopard 2E LHD 1 Juan Carlos I (capacity 18 hel or 10 AV-8B FGA
RECCE 271: 84 B1 Centauro; 187 VEC-M1 ac; 4 LCM-1E; 42 APC; 46 MBT; 900 troops)
IFV 227: 206 Pizarro; 21 Pizarro (CP) LPD 2 Galicia (capacity 6 Bell 212 or 4 SH-3D Sea King
APC 895 hel; 4 LCM or 2 LCM & 8 AAV; 130 APC or 33 MBT;
APC (T) 473: 20 Bv-206S; 453 M113 (incl variants) 540 troops)
APC (W) 312 BMR-600/BMR-600M1 LANDING CRAFT 12
PPV 110 RG-31 LCM 12 LCM 1E
AUV 260 IVECO LMV LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AORH 2: 1 Patino (capacity 3 Bell 212 or 2 SH-3D Sea King
AEV 34 CZ-10/25E hel); 1 Cantabria (capacity 3 Bell 212 or 2 SH-3D Sea King hel)
ARV 72: 16 Leopard REC; 1 AMX-30; 3 BMR REC; 4
Maritime Action Force
Centauro REC; 14 Maxxpro MRV; 12 M113; 22 M47
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
VLB 16: 1 M47; 15 M60
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 22
MW 6 Husky 2G
PSOH 5 Meteoro (Buques de Accion Maritima) with 1
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
76mm gun
MSL • MANPATS Spike-LR; TOW
PSO 5:
ARTILLERY 1,560 3 Alboran each with 1 hel landing platform
SP 155mm 96 M109A5 2 Descubierta with 1 76mm gun
TOWED 281: 105mm 217: 56 L118 Light Gun; 161 Model PCO 4 Serviola with 1 76mm gun
56 pack howitzer; 155mm 64 SBT 155/52 SIAC PCC 3 Anaga with 1 76mm gun
MOR 1,183: 81mm 777; SP 81mm 4 VAMTAC with PB 4: 2 P-101; 2 Toralla
Cardom 81mm; 120mm 402 PBR 1 Cabo Fradera
COASTAL DEFENCE • ARTY 155mm 19 SBT 155/52 APU MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 6
SBT V07 MHO 6 Segura
HELICOPTERS LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 29
ATK 21: 6 Tiger HAP-E; 15 Tiger HAD-E AGI 1 Alerta
TPT 84: Heavy 17 CH-47D Chinook (HT-17D); Medium AGOR 2 (with ice-strengthened hull, for polar research
40: 16 AS332B Super Puma (HU-21); 12 AS532UL Cougar; 6 duties in Antarctica)
AS532AL Cougar; 6 NH90 TTH; Light 27: 6 Bell 205 (HU- AGS 3: 2 Malaspina; 1 Castor
10B Iroquois); 5 Bell 212 (HU.18); 16 H135 (HE.26/HU.26) AK 2: 1 Martin Posadillo with 1 hel landing platform; 1
UAV • ISR • Medium 6: 2 Searcher MkII-J (PASI); 4 El Camino Español
Searcher MkIII (PASI) AP 1 Contramaestre Casado with 1 hel landing platform
AIR DEFENCE ASR 1 Neptuno
SAM ATF 3: 1 Mar Caribe; 1 Mahon; 1 La Grana
Long-range 18 MIM-104C Patriot PAC-2 AXL 8: 4 Contramaestre; 4 Guardiamarina
AXS 8
Medium-range 38 MIM-23B I-Hawk Phase III
Short-range 21: 8 NASAMS; 13 Skyguard/Aspide Naval Aviation 850
Point-defence Mistral
FORCES BY ROLE
GUNS • TOWED 35mm 67: 19 GDF-005; 48 GDF-007
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with AV-8B Harrier II Plus

Navy 20,100 (incl Naval Aviation and Marines) ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with SH-60B/F Seahawk
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 3: TRANSPORT
3 Galerna with 4 single 533mm TT with F17 Mod 2/L5 1 (liaison) sqn with Cessna 550 Citation II; Cessna 650
HWT Citation VII
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 11 TRAINING
DESTROYERS • DDGHM 5: 1 sqn with Hughes 500MD8
5 Alvaro de Bazan with Aegis Baseline 5 C2, 2 quad Mk141 1 flt with TAV-8B Harrier
lnchr with RGM-84F Harpoon AShM, 1 48-cell Mk41 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
VLS with SM-2MR/RIM-162B Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 1 sqn with Bell 212 (HU-18)
Mk32 Mod 9 SVTT twin 324mm ASTT with Mk46 1 sqn with SH-3D Sea King
LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60B Seahawk ASW EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
hel) AIRCRAFT 13 combat capable
FRIGATES • FFGHM 6: FGA 13: 8 AV-8B Harrier II Plus; 4 AV-8B Harrier II
6 Santa Maria with 1 Mk13 GMLS with RGM-84C (upgraded to II Plus standard); 1 TAV-8B Harrier (on
Harpoon AShM/SM-1MR SAM, 2 Mk32 triple 324mm lease from USMC)
ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 Meroka mod 2 CIWS, 1 76mm TPT • Light 4: 3 Cessna 550 Citation II; 1 Cessna 650
gun (capacity 2 SH-60B Seahawk ASW hel) Citation VII
 Europe 149

HELICOPTERS 1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules; A400M

ASW 21: 7 SH-3D Sea King (tpt); 12 SH-60B Seahawk; 2 1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar
SH-60F Seahawk 2 sqn with C295
MRH 9 Hughes 500MD 1 sqn with CN235
TPT • Light 7 Bell 212 (HA-18) TRAINING
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES 1 OCU sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon
AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; ARH AIM-120 1 OCU sqn with F/A-18A/B (EF-18A/B MLU) Hornet
AMRAAM 1 sqn with Beech F33C Bonanza
ASM AGM-65G Maverick 2 sqn with C-101 Aviojet
AShM AGM-119 Penguin 1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar

Europe
Marines 5,350 1 sqn with T-35 Pillan (E-26)
2 (LIFT) sqn with F-5B Freedom Fighter
FORCES BY ROLE
1 hel sqn with H120 Colibri
SPECIAL FORCES
1 hel sqn with S-76C
1 spec ops bn
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
MANOEUVRE
Amphibious 1 sqn with AS332M1 Super Puma; AS532UL Cougar (VIP)
1 mne bde (1 recce unit, 1 mech inf bn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
bn, 1 log bn) AIRCRAFT 170 combat capable
Other FTR 83: 64 Eurofighter Typhoon; 19 F-5B Freedom Fighter
1 sy bde (5 mne garrison gp) FGA 84: 20 F/A-18A Hornet (EF-18A); 52 EF-18A MLU;
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 12 EF-18B MLU
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES ASW 3 P-3M Orion
MBT 2 M60A3TTS MP 8 CN235 VIGMA
APC • APC (W) 34: 32 Piranha IIIC; 1 Piranha IIIC ISR 2 CN235 (TR-19A)
(amb); 1 Piranha IIIC EW (EW) EW 3: 1 C-212 Aviocar (TM.12D); 2 Falcon 20D
AAV 18: 16 AAV-7A1/AAVP-7A1; 2 AAVC-7A1 (CP) TKR 5 KC-130H Hercules
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES TPT 77: Heavy 3 A400M; Medium 7: 6 C-130H Hercules;
AEV 4 Piranha IIIC 1 C-130H-30 Hercules; Light 59: 3 Beech C90 King Air;
ARV 2: 1 AAVR-7A1; 1 M88; 1 Piranha IIIC 22 Beech F33C Bonanza; 10 C-212 Aviocar (incl 9 trg); 13
ARTILLERY 30 C295; 8 CN235; 3 Cessna 550 Citation V (ISR); PAX 8: 2
SP 155mm 6 M109A2 A310; 1 B-707; 5 Falcon 900 (VIP)
TOWED 105mm 24 Model 56 pack howitzer TRG 98: 61 C-101 Aviojet; 37 T-35 Pillan (E-26)
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE HELICOPTERS
MSL • MANPATS Spike-LR; TOW-2 TPT 40: Medium 18: 9 AS332B/B1 Super Puma; 4 AS332M1
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Mistral Super Puma; 3 AS332C1 Super Puma; 2 AS532UL Cougar
(VIP); Light 22: 14 H120 Colibri; 8 S-76C
Air Force 19,350 AIR DEFENCE • SAM
The Spanish Air Force is organised in 3 commands – Short-range Skyguard/Aspide
General Air Command, Combat Air Command and Canary
Point-defence Mistral
Islands Air Command
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
FORCES BY ROLE AAM • IR AIM-9L/JULI Sidewinder; IIR IRIS-T; SARH
FIGHTER AIM-7P Sparrow; ARH AIM-120B/C AMRAAM
2 sqn with Eurofighter Typhoon ARM AGM-88B HARM
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK ASM AGM-65G Maverick
5 sqn with F/A-18A/B MLU Hornet (EF-18A/B MLU)
AShM AGM-84D Harpoon
MARITIME PATROL
LACM Taurus KEPD 350
1 sqn with P-3A/M Orion
BOMBS
ISR
Laser-guided: GBU-10/12/16 Paveway II; GBU-24
1 sqn with Beech C90 King Air
Paveway III; EGBU-16 Paveway II; BPG-2000
1 sqn with Cessna 550 Citation V; CN235 (TR-19A)
ELECTRONIC WARFARE INS/GPS guided: GBU-38 JDAM
1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar; Falcon 20D
SEARCH & RESCUE
Emergencies Military Unit (UME) 3,500
1 sqn with AS332B/B1 Super Puma; CN235 VIGMA FORCES BY ROLE
1 sqn with AS332B Super Puma; CN235 VIGMA COMMAND
1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar; CN235 VIGMA 1 div HQ
TANKER/TRANSPORT MANOEUVRE
1 sqn with KC-130H Hercules Other
TRANSPORT 5 Emergency Intervention bn
1 VIP sqn with A310; Falcon 900 1 Emergency Support and Intervention regt
150 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

COMBAT SUPPORT TURKEY: NATO • Operation Active Fence 149; 1 SAM bty
1 sigs bn with MIM-104C Patriot PAC-2
HELICOPTER
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 16
1 hel bn opcon Army

Paramilitary 75,800 FOREIGN FORCES

United States US European Command: 3,200; 1 air base at
Guardia Civil 75,800 Morón; 1 naval base at Rota
17 regions, 54 Rural Comds
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
Sweden SWE
8 (rural) gp Swedish Krona Skr 2017 2018 2019
MANOEUVRE
GDP Skr 4.58tr 4.80tr
Other
US$ 536bn 555bn
15 (traffic) sy gp
1 (Special) sy bn per capita US$ 52,925 53,867
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Growth % 2.1 2.4
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 64 Inflation % 1.9 1.9
PSO 1 with 1 hel landing platform Def bdgt Skr 50.7bn 53.8bn
PCC 2 US$ 5.94bn 6.22bn
PBF 34 US$1=Skr 8.55 8.65
PB 27
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 CN235-300 Population 10,040,995
HELICOPTERS
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
MRH 20: 2 AS653N3 Dauphin; 18 Bo-105ATH
TPT • Light 21: 8 BK-117; 13 H135 Male 9.0% 2.7% 3.2% 3.6% 22.2% 9.4%
Female 8.5% 2.5% 3.0% 3.5% 21.7% 10.9%
Cyber
A Joint Cyber Defense Command was set up in 2013, Capabilities
subordinate to Spain’s chief of defence. In 2014, short-/ Sweden’s armed forces remain configured for territorial defence
medium-term goals included achieving full operating and there has been growing concern at Russian military activity
capability on ‘CNDefense, CNExploitation, and CNAttack’. in the Baltic area. There has also been a focus on increasing coop-
Spain’s intelligence CERT coordinates CERT activities. eration with neighbours and NATO in recent years. The 2016–20
defence bill set out the aims of strengthening operational capa-
DEPLOYMENT bilities and deepening multilateral and bilateral defence relation-
ships. Sweden decided to relocate its service staffs from Stock-
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 40 holm to other locations in 2019 in order to provide better pro-
BLACK SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 2: 1 MHO tection. There are plans to increase defence ties with the UK and
the US. Concerns over readiness levels have led to greater coop-
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea eration with NATO and NORDEFCO. In May 2018, Sweden, Finland
2; OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 and the US signed a statement of intent to develop closer coop-
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 8 eration on exercises and interoperability. Readiness, exercises
and training, as well as cyber defence, are spending priorities.
DJIBOUTI: EU • Operation Atalanta 1 P-3M Orion
Amid recruitment challenges, Sweden announced in March 2017
GABON: Operation Barkhane 45; 1 C295M that it would reinstate conscription from January 2018. Sweden
GULF OF ADEN & INDIAN OCEAN: EU • Operation Atalanta has started to re-garrison the island of Gotland. Readiness chal-
1 LPD lenges in the air force triggered a discussion about extending the
service life of the JAS-39C Gripen Cs beyond their intended 2026
IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 350; 2 trg unit retirement date, not least since the air force was slated to receive
LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 300; 1 a lower number of JAS-39Es than requested. In August 2018,
armd inf coy(+) Sweden proceeded with the acquisition of the Patriot medium-
range air-defence system. The country’s export-oriented defence
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 630; 1 mech bde HQ; 1 mech inf
industry is privately owned and capable of meeting most of the
bn(-); 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy
armed forces’ equipment needs, including for advanced combat
MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 292; UN • MINUSMA 1 aircraft and conventional submarines.
MEDITERRANEAN SEA: NATO • SNMG 2: 1 DDGHM;1
ACTIVE 29,750 (Army 6,850 Navy 2,100 Air 2,700
AORH; EU • EU NAVFOR MED: 1 FFGHM; 1 CN235
Other 18,100) Voluntary Auxiliary Organisations
SENEGAL: Operation Barkhane 57; 1 C-130H Hercules
21,200
SERBIA: OSCE • Kosovo 1 Conscript liability 4–11 months, depending on branch (selec-
SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 13 tive conscription; 4,000 in total, gender neutral)
 Europe 151

MOR 282; 81mm 201 M/86; 120mm 81 M/41D

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE AIR DEFENCE
SAM
Army 6,850 Medium-range MIM-23B Hawk (RBS-97)

The army has been transformed to provide brigade-sized Point-defence RBS-70
task forces depending on the operational requirement GUNS • SP 40mm 30 Strv 90LV
FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND Navy 1,250; 850 Amphibious (total 2,100)
2 bde HQ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MANOEUVRE

Europe
SUBMARINE • TACTICAL • SSK 5:
Reconnaissance 3 Gotland (AIP fitted) with 2 single 400mm TT with Typ
1 recce bn 431 LWT/Typ 451 LWT, 4 single 533mm TT with Typ
Armoured 613 HWT/Typ 62 HWT
5 armd bn 2 Sodermanland (AIP fitted) with 3 single 400mm TT
1 armd BG with Typ 431 LWT/Typ 451LWT, 6 single 533mm TT
Mechanised with Typ 613 HWT/Typ 62 HWT
1 mech bn PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 143
Light CORVETTES • FSG 5 Visby with 8 RBS15 AShM, 4
1 mot inf bn single 400mm ASTT with Tp45 LWT, 1 57mm gun, 1
1 lt inf bn hel landing platform
Air Manoeuvre PCGT 4:
1 AB bn 2 Gälve with 4 twin lnchr with RBS15 Mk2 AShM, 4
Other single 400mm ASTT with Tp431 LWT, 4 Saab 601 A/S
1 sy bn mor, 1 57mm gun
COMBAT SUPPORT 2 Stockholm with 4 twin lnchr with RBS15 Mk2 AShM, 4
2 arty bn Saab 601 mortars, 4 single 400mm ASTT with Tp431
2 engr bn LWT, 1 57mm gun
2 MP coy PBF 129 Combat Boat 90E/H/HS (capacity 18 troops)
1 CBRN coy PB 5 Tapper (Type 80)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 7
1 tpt coy MCC 5 Koster

AIR DEFENCE MCD 2 Spårö (Styrsö mod)
2 AD bn AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 11
LCVP 8 Trossbat
Reserves LCAC 3 Griffon 8100TD
FORCES BY ROLE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 15
MANOEUVRE AG 2: 1 Carlskrona with 2 57mm gun, 1 hel landing
Other platform (former ML); 1 Trosso (spt ship for corvettes
40 Home Guard bn and patrol vessels but can also be used as HQ ship)
AGF 2 Ledningsbåt 2000
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AGI 1 Orion
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
AKL 1 Loke
MBT 120 Leopard 2A5 (Strv 122)
ARS 2: 1 Belos III; 1 Furusund (former ML)
IFV 396: 354 CV9040 (Strf 9040; incl CP); 42 Epbv 90 (OP)
AX 5 Altair
APC 1,083
AXS 2: 1 Falken; 1 Gladan
APC (T) 408: 258 Pbv 302; 150 BvS10 MkII
APC (W) 315: 34 XA-180 Sisu (Patgb 180); 20 XA-202
Amphibious 850
Sisu (Patgb 202); 148 XA-203 Sisu (Patgb 203); 113
FORCES BY ROLE
Patria AMV (XA-360/Patgb 360)
MANOEUVRE
PPV 360 RG-32M
Amphibious
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
1 amph bn
AEV 6 Kodiak
ARV 40: 14 Bgbv 120; 26 Bgbv 90
 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
VLB 3 Brobv 120 ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 12 M/86
MW 33+: Aardvark Mk2; 33 Area Clearing System COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 8 RBS-17 Hellfire
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS NLAW; RBS-55 Air Force 2,700
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav FORCES BY ROLE
ARTILLERY 305 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR
SP 155mm 23 Archer 6 sqn with JAS 39C/D Gripen
152 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

TRANSPORT/ISR/AEW&C Cyber
1 sqn with C-130H Hercules (Tp-84); KC-130H Hercules Sweden has a national CERT, is involved in informal
(Tp-84); Gulfstream IV SRA-4 (S-102B); S-100B/D
CERT communities and is a member of the European
Argus
Government CERTs group. A national cyber-security
TRAINING
1 unit with Sk-60 strategy has also been adopted. Four ministries have a
AIR DEFENCE cyber remit: defence, foreign affairs, justice, and enterprise
1 (fighter control and air surv) bn and industry. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency,
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE which reports to the defence ministry, is in charge
AIRCRAFT 96 combat capable of supporting and coordinating security nationwide.
FGA 96 JAS 39C/D Gripen According to the 2015 defence bill, ‘cyber defence
ELINT 2 Gulfstream IV SRA-4 (S-102B) capabilities are an important part of the Swedish Defence.
AEW&C 3: 1 S-100B Argus; 2 S-100D Argus Vital systems must be protected from attack. This also
TKR 1 KC-130H Hercules (Tp-84) requires the ability to carry out active operations in the
TPT 8: Medium 5 C-130H Hercules (Tp-84); Light 2 Saab cyber domain.’ As well as strengthening capacity as part
340 (OS-100A/Tp-100C); PAX 1 Gulfstream 550 (Tp- of the total-defence concept, Sweden sees international
102D) cooperation in cyber as vital.
TRG 67 Sk-60W
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR • Medium 8 RQ-7 Shadow (AUV 3 Örnen) DEPLOYMENT
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 29
ASM AGM-65 Maverick (RB-75)
AShM RB-15F CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 9
AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder (RB-74); IIR IRIS-T (RB- DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
98); ARH AIM-120B AMRAAM (RB-99); Meteor MONUSCO 1; 1 obs
BOMBS
INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 5 obs
Laser-Guided GBU-12 Paveway II
INS/GPS guided GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 66
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF: NNSC • 5 obs
Armed Forces Hel Wing
FORCES BY ROLE MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 6; UN • MINUSMA 241; 1 int
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER coy
3 sqn with AW109 (Hkp 15A); AW109M (Hkp-15B); MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 6 obs
NH90 (Hkp-14) (SAR/ASW); UH-60M Black Hawk
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 2; OSCE • Kosovo 3
(Hkp-16)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 4
HELICOPTERS SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2 obs
ASW 5 NH90 ASW
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 11
TPT 48: Medium 28: 15 UH-60M Black Hawk (Hkp-
16); 13 NH90 TTH (Hkp-14); Light 20: 12 AW109 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2 obs
(Hkp-15A); 8 AW109M (Hkp-15B)

Special Forces Switzerland CHE

FORCES BY ROLE Swiss Franc fr 2017 2018 2019
SPECIAL FORCES GDP fr 669bn 694bn
1 spec ops gp
US$ 679bn 709bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 cbt spt gp per capita US$ 80,637 83,583
Growth % 1.7 3.0
Other 18,100 Inflation % 0.5 1.1
Includes staff, logisitics and intelligence personnel Def bdgt [a] fr 4.71bn 4.87bn 5.32bn
FORCES BY ROLE US$ 4.79bn 4.97bn
COMBAT SUPPORT US$1=fr 0.98 0.98
1 EW bn [a] Includes military pensions
1 psyops unit
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Population 8,292,809
2 log bn
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 maint bn
4 med coy Male 7.8% 2.7% 2.9% 3.2% 24.7% 8.0%
1 tpt coy Female 7.4% 2.5% 2.8% 3.2% 24.6% 10.2%
 Europe 153

Capabilities COMBAT SUPPORT

4 engr bn
The conscript-based armed forces are postured for territorial 4 MP bn
defence and limited participation in international peace-support
1 NBC bn
operations. The government has begun to reduce its armed forces,
1 int unit
reflecting an assessment that in the militia-based system not all
personnel would realistically be available for active service. With COMBAT SUPPORT
permanent neutrality a core feature of foreign and security policy, 4 engr rescue bn
Switzerland is not a member of any alliances, although it joined EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
NATO’s Partnership for Peace Programme in 1996 and on occasion ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
contributes to NATO- and EU-led operations alongside its engage- MBT 134 Leopard 2 (Pz-87 Leo)

Europe
ment in UN or OSCE missions. Switzerland does not participate
IFV 186: 154 CV9030CH; 32 CV9030 (CP)
in combat operations for peace-enforcement purposes and its
APC 914
deployments are limited in size. The 2016 armed-forces develop-
ment plan emphasises improvements in readiness, training and APC (T) 238 M113A2 (incl variants)
equipment. The approach to readiness is changing to a flexible APC (W) 676: 346 Piranha II; 330 Piranha I/II/IIIC (CP)
model in which different units are called up for active service grad- AUV 441 Eagle II
ually and on different timelines. Plans to replace F-5 Tiger II combat ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
aircraft with the Gripen were scrapped after a national referendum AEV 12 Kodiak
rejected the proposal in May 2014. With Switzerland’s air-policing ARV 25 Büffel
capabilities diminished, in July 2018 the government relaunched MW 46: 26 Area Clearing System; 20 M113A2
its attempt to procure a new combat aircraft. The multi-stage NBC VEHICLES 12 Piranha IIIC CBRN
selection process is expected to be completed by the end of 2020
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
and now includes replacement of the F/A18 Hornet, which will be
life-extended through to 2030. Other priorities include upgrades MSL • SP 106 Piranha I TOW-2
to Switzerland’s air-surveillance systems and transport helicopters. ARTILLERY 433
Switzerland’s defence industry has limited design and manufac- SP 155mm 133 M109 KAWEST
turing capabilities, with recognised capacity in the land-vehicles MOR • 81mm 300 Mw-72
sector, which has links to North American companies. PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR 11
Aquarius
ACTIVE 21,450 (Armed Forces 21,450) AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger
Conscript liability 260-600 compulsory service days depending on
rank. 18 or 23 weeks’ training (depending on branch) generally at Air Force 17,200 on mobilisation
age 20, followed by 6 refresher trg courses (3 weeks each). Alterna-
tive service available. FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER
RESERVE 134,800 3 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II
3 sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet
Civil Defence 73,000 (51,000 Reserve)
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with Beech 350 King Air; DHC-6 Twin Otter;
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE PC-6 Turbo Porter; PC-12
1 VIP Flt with Beech 1900D; Cessna 560XL Citation;
Armed Forces 2,950 active; 18,500 conscript Falcon 900EX
(21,450 total) TRAINING
1 sqn with PC-7CH Turbo Trainer; PC-21
Operations Command 72,600 on 1 sqn with PC-9 (tgt towing)
mobilisation 1 OCU Sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II
4 Territorial Regions. With the exception of military TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
police all units are non-active 6 sqn with AS332M Super Puma; AS532UL Cougar;
FORCES BY ROLE H135M
COMMAND ISR UAV
4 regional comd 1 sqn with ADS 95 Ranger
SPECIAL FORCES EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 SF bn AIRCRAFT 85 combat capable
MANOEUVRE FTR 54: 42 F-5E Tiger II; 12 F-5F Tiger II
Armoured FGA 31: 25 F/A-18C Hornet; 6 F/A-18D Hornet
2 (1st & 11th) bde (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 armd inf bn, 1 TPT 22: Light 21: 1 Beech 350 King Air; 1 Beech 1900D;
SP arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs bn) 1 Cessna 560XL Citation; 1 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 15 PC-6
Mechanised Turbo Porter; 1 PC-6 (owned by armasuisse, civil
1 (4th) bde (2 recce bn, 2 SP arty bn, 1 ptn br bn) registration); 1 PC-12 (owned by armasuisse, civil
Light registration); PAX 1 Falcon 900EX
10 inf bn TRG 44: 28 PC-7CH Turbo Trainer; 8 PC-9; 8 PC-21
7 mtn inf bn HELICOPTERS
1 mtn inf unit MRH 20 H135M
154 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

TPT • Medium 25: 15 AS332M Super Puma; 10

AS532UL Cougar Turkey TUR
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR • Medium 16 ADS 95 Ranger (4 systems) New Turkish Lira L 2017 2018 2019
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR AIM-9P GDP L 3.11tr 3.66tr
Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; ARH AIM- US$ 852bn 714bn
120B/C-7 AMRAAM per capita US$ 10,537 8,716
Growth % 7.4 3.5
Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD)
GBAD assets can be used to form AD clusters to be Inflation % 11.1 15.0
deployed independently as task forces within Swiss Def exp [a] L 47.3bn 60.9bn
territory US$ 13.0bn 11.9bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Def bdgt [b] L 28.8bn 40.5bn
AIR DEFENCE US$ 7.89bn 7.90bn
SAM • Point Rapier; FIM-92 Stinger US$1=L 3.65 5.12
GUNS 35mm Some GDF with Skyguard
[a] NATO definition
Armed Forces Logistic Organisation 9,650 [b] Includes funding for Undersecretariat of Defence Industries
on mobilisation Population 81,257,239
FORCES BY ROLE
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 log bde (6 log bn; 1 tpt bn; 6 med bn) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 12.6% 4.2% 4.0% 4.0% 22.2% 3.4%
Command Support Organisation 11,150 on Female 12.1% 4.0% 3.8% 3.9% 21.8% 4.2%
mobilisation
FORCES BY ROLE Capabilities
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Turkey has large, well-equipped armed forces that are primarily
1 spt bde
structured for national defence. Much recent activity has focused
Training Command 37,350 on mobilisation on internal security and cross-border operations in response to the
continuing war in Syria. The Turkish Armed Forces 2033 Strategic
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Plan aims to modernise military equipment and the force struc-
5 trg unit
ture. According to government officials, terrorism is the main secu-
rity threat. Turkey is a NATO member and has provided access to
Civil Defence 73,000 (51,000 Reserve) its airspace and facilities for operations in Iraq and Syria. Following
(not part of armed forces) the attempted coup in July 2016, Ankara dismissed large numbers
of officers from its armed forces, with the loss of experienced
Cyber personnel affecting both operational effectiveness and training
Five Swiss government organisations have responsibilities levels, especially in the air force. The armed forces train regularly,
for cyber threats and responses: the Federal Intelligence including with NATO allies. Turkish statements have indicated an
Service; the Military Intelligence Service; the Command intention to enhance its presence in Cyprus, possibly including a
Support Organisation; Information Security and Facility naval base in the northern part of the island. Equipment is mostly
Protection; and the Federal Office for Civil Protection. A sourced from national firms. Ankara selected BMC to start series
production for its first national main battle tank, a project that
National Cyber Defence Strategy was published in 2012.
has been delayed for over two decades. Turkey is also developing
A national strategy for protection against cyber risks was
a domestic fighter aircraft, with the delivery of F-35As in question
adopted by the Federal Council in April 2018. as a result of US restrictions. To bolster air defence, Ankara signed
a contract with Russia for S-400 missile systems. Under new laws,
DEPLOYMENT the president has authority over defence procurement and control
over Turkey’s top defence companies. Turkey has signed defence-
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 21 cooperation agreements with a focus on exports and technol-
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • ogy transfer, in an effort to boost its national defence industry
MONUSCO 3 and achieve defence-industrial autonomy. The defence industry
is developing more sophisticated weapons platforms across all
INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 3 obs domains.
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF: NNSC • 5 officers
ACTIVE 355,200 (Army 260,200 Navy 45,000 Air
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 6
50,000) Paramilitary 156,800
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 12 obs Conscript liability 12 months (5.5 months for university graduates;
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 235 (military volunteers); 1 inf 21 days for graduates with exemption)
coy; 1 engr pl; 1 hel flt with AS332M Super Puma
RESERVE 378,700 (Army 258,700 Navy 55,000 Air
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 8 65,000)
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2 obs Reserve service to age 41 for all services
 Europe 155

TOWED 760+: 105mm 75+ M101A1; 155mm 523: 517

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE M114A1/M114A2; 6 Panter; 203mm 162 M115
MRL 146+: 107mm 48; 122mm ε36 T-122; 227mm 12
Space M270 MLRS; 302mm 50+ TR-300 Kasirga (WS-1)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MOR 5,813+
SATELLITES • ISR 2 Gokturk-1/2 SP 1,443+: 81mm; 107mm 1,264 M106; 120mm 179
TOWED 4,370: 81mm 3,792; 120mm 578
Army ε260,200 (including conscripts) SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
FORCES BY ROLE SRBM • Conventional MGM-140A ATACMS (launched
COMMAND from M270 MLRS); J-600T Yildrim (B-611/CH-SS-9 mod 1)

Europe
4 army HQ AIRCRAFT
9 corps HQ ISR 5 Beech 350 King Air
SPECIAL FORCES TPT • Light 8: 5 Beech 200 King Air; 3 Cessna 421
8 cdo bde TRG 49: 45 Cessna T182; 4 T-42A Cochise
1 mtn cdo bde HELICOPTERS
1 cdo regt ATK 77: 18 AH-1P Cobra; 12 AH-1S Cobra; 5 AH-1W
MANOEUVRE Cobra; 4 TAH-1P Cobra; 9 T129A; 29 T129B
Armoured MRH 28 Hughes 300C
1 (52nd) armd div (2 armd bde, 1 mech bde) TPT 225+: Heavy 7 CH-47F Chinook; Medium 77+: 29
7 armd bde AS532UL Cougar; 48+ S-70A Black Hawk; Light 141: 12
Mechanised Bell 204B (AB-204B); ε45 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 64
2 (28th & 29th) mech div Bell 205A (AB-205A); 20 Bell 206 Jet Ranger
14 mech inf bde UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
Light CISR • Medium 33 Bayraktar TB2
1 (23rd) mot inf div (3 mot inf regt) ISR • Heavy Falcon 600/Firebee; Medium CL-89; Gnat;
7 mot inf bde Light Harpy
COMBAT SUPPORT AIR DEFENCE
2 arty bde SAM • Point-defence 148+: 70 Altigan PMADS octuple
1 trg arty bde Stinger lnchr, 78 Zipkin PMADS quad Stinger lnchr; FIM-
6 arty regt 92 Stinger
2 engr regt GUNS 1,664
AVIATION SP 35mm Korkut; 40mm 262 M42A1
4 avn regt TOWED 1,402: 20mm 439 GAI-D01/Rh-202; 35mm 120
4 avn bn GDF-001/GDF-003; 40mm 843: 803 L/60/L/70; 40 T-1
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES ASM Mizrak-U (UMTAS)
MBT 2,379: 316 Leopard 2A4; 170 Leopard 1A4; 227 Leopard BOMBS
1A3; 100 M60A1; 650 M60A3; 166 M60T; 750 M48A5 T2 Laser-guided MAM-L; MAM-C
(2,000 M48A5 T1 in store)
RECCE ε250 Akrep Navy ε45,000 (including conscripts)
IFV 645 ACV AIFV EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
APC 4,336 SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 12:
APC (T) 3,636: 823 ACV AAPC; 2,813 M113/M113A1/ 4 Atilay (GER Type-209/1200) with 8 single 533mm ASTT
M113A2 with SST-4 HWT
PPV 700+: 50+ Edjer Yaclin 4×4; ε650 Kirpi 8 Preveze/Gür (GER Type-209/1400) with 8 single 533mm
AUV 882: 800+ Cobra; 82 Cobra II ASTT with UGM-84 Harpoon AShM/Tigerfish Mk2
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES HWT/DM2A4 HWT
AEV 12+: AZMIM; 12 M48; M113A2T2 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 19
ARV 150: 12 Leopard 1; 105 M48T5; 33 M88A1 FRIGATES • FFGHM 19:
VLB 88: 36 Leguan; 52 Mobile Floating Assault Bridge 4 Barbaros (mod GER MEKO 200 F246 & F247) with 2
MW Husky 2G; Tamkar quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 2
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE 8-cell Mk41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 Mk32
MSL triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 3 Sea Zenith
SP 365 ACV TOW CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel)

MANPATS 9K135 Kornet-E (AT-14 Spriggan); Cobra; 4 Gabya (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry class) with 1 Mk13
Eryx; Milan GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM/SM-1MR
RCL 3,869: 57mm 923 M18; 75mm 617; 106mm 2,329 M40A1 SAM, 1 8-cell Mk41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM
ARTILLERY 7,799+ SAM, 2 Mk32 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT,
SP 1,080: 155mm 825: ε150 M44T1; 365 M52T (mod); ε310 1 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1
T-155 Firtina; 175mm 36 M107; 203mm 219 M110A2 S-70B Seahawk/AB-212 ASW hel)
156 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

4 Gabya (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry class) with 1 Mk13 Naval Aviation
GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM/SM-1MR
FORCES BY ROLE
SAM, 2 Mk32 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT,
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
1 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1
2 sqn with Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW); S-70B Seahawk
S-70B Seahawk/AB-212 ASW hel)
1 sqn with ATR-72-600; CN235M-100; TB-20 Trinidad
4 Yavuz (GER MEKO 200TN) with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr
with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple Mk29 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
GMLS with Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk32 triple 324mm AIRCRAFT
ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 3 Sea Zenith CIWS, 1 127mm MP 6 CN235M-100
gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) TPT • Light 7: 2 ATR-72-600; 5 TB-20 Trinidad
3 Ada with 2 quad lnchr with RCM-84C Harpoon HELICOPTERS
AShM, 1 Mk49 21-cell lnchr with RIM-116 SAM, 2 ASW 29: 11 Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW); 18 S-70B
Mk32 twin 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm Seahawk
gun (capacity 1 S-70B Seahawk hel)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 52:
Air Force ε50,000
2 tac air forces (divided between east and west)
CORVETTES • FSGM 6:
6 Burak (ex-FRA d’Estienne d’Orves) with 2 single lnchr FORCES BY ROLE
with MM38 Exocet AShM, 4 single 324mm ASTT FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
with Mk46 LWT, 1 Mk54 A/S mor, 1 100mm gun 1 sqn with F-4E Phantom 2020
PCFG 19: 8 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
4 Dogan (GER Lurssen-57) with 2 quad lnchr with ISR
RGM-84A/C Harpoon AShM, 1 76mm gun 1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
9 Kilic with 2 quad Mk 141 lnchr with RGM-84C 1 unit with King Air 350
Harpoon AShM, 1 76mm gun AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
4 Rüzgar (GER Lurssen-57) with 2 quad lnchr with 1 sqn (forming) with B-737 AEW&C
RGM-84A/C Harpoon AShM, 1 76mm gun EW
2 Yildiz with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84A/C Harpoon 1 unit with CN235M EW
AShM, 1 76mm gun SEARCH & RESCUE
PCC 16 Tuzla 1 sqn with AS532AL/UL Cougar
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 15: TANKER
MHO 11: 5 Engin (FRA Circe); 6 Aydin 1 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker
MSC 4 Seydi (US Adjutant) TRANSPORT
AMPHIBIOUS 1 sqn with A400M; C-160D Transall
LANDING SHIPS • LST 5: 1 sqn with C-130B/E/H Hercules
2 Bayraktar with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 20 1 (VIP) sqn with Cessna 550 Citation II (UC-35); Cessna
MBT; 250 troops) 650 Citation VII; CN235M; Gulfstream 550
1 Osman Gazi with 1 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 4 LCVP; 3 sqn with CN235M
17 tanks; 980 troops) (with 1 hel landing platform) 10 (liaison) flt with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); CN235M
2 Sarucabey with 1 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 11 tanks; TRAINING
600 troops) (with 1 hel landing platform) 1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
LANDING CRAFT 30 1 sqn with F-5A/B Freedom Fighter; NF-5A/B Freedom
LCT 21: 2 C-120/130; 11 C-140; 8 C-151 Fighter
LCM 9: 1 C-310; 8 LCM 8 1 sqn with SF-260D
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 35 1 sqn with KT-IT
ABU 2: 1 AG5; 1 AG6 with 1 76mm gun 1 sqn with T-38A/M Talon
AGS 2: 1 Cesme (ex-US Silas Bent); 1 Cubuklu 1 sqn with T-41D Mescalero
AOR 2 Akar with 1 twin 76mm gun, 1 Phalanx CIWS, 1 AIR DEFENCE
hel landing platform 4 sqn with MIM-14 Nike Hercules
AOT 2 Burak 2 sqn with Rapier
AOL 1 Gurcan 8 (firing) unit with MIM-23 Hawk
AP 1 Iskenderun MANOEUVRE
ASR 3: 1 Alemdar with 1 hel landing platform; 2 Isin II Air Manoeuvre
ATF 9: 1 Akbas; 1 Degirmendere; 1 Gazal; 1 Inebolu; 5 Onder 1 AB bde
AWT 3 Sogut EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AXL 8 AIRCRAFT 308 combat capable
AX 2 Pasa (ex-GER Rhein) FTR 27: 17 NF-5A Freedom Fighter; 10 NF-5B Freedom
Fighter (48 F-5s being upgraded as LIFT)
Marines 3,000 FGA 281: 20 F-4E Phantom 2020; 27 F-16C Fighting Falcon
FORCES BY ROLE Block 30; 162 F-16C Fighting Falcon Block 50; 14 F-16C
MANOEUVRE Fighting Falcon Block 50+; 8 F-16D Block 30 Fighting
Amphibious Falcon; 33 F-16D Fighting Falcon Block 50; 16 F-16D
1 mne bde (3 mne bn; 1 arty bn) Fighting Falcon Block 50+; 1 F-35A Lightning II
 Europe 157

ISR 5 Beech 350 King Air TPT 35: Medium 12 S-70A Black Hawk; Light 23: 8 Bell
EW 2+ CN235M EW 204B (AB-204B); 6 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 8 Bell 206A
AEW&C 4 B-737 AEW&C (AB-206A) Jet Ranger; 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)
TKR 7 KC-135R Stratotanker UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
TPT 88: Heavy 7 A400M; Medium 31: 6 C-130B Hercules; CISR • Medium 12 Bayraktar TB2
12 C-130E Hercules; 1 C-130H Hercules; 12 C-160D Transall; BOMBS
Light 49: 2 Cessna 550 Citation II (UC-35 - VIP); 2 Cessna Laser-guided MAM-L; MAM-C
650 Citation VII; 45 CN235M; PAX 1 Gulfstream 550
TRG 168: 33 SF-260D; 70 T-38A/M Talon; 25 T-41D Coast Guard 4,700
Mescalero; 40 KT-IT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

Europe
HELICOPTERS PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 104
TPT 35: Medium 20: 6 AS532AL Cougar (CSAR); 14 PSOH 4 Dost with 1 76mm gun
AS532UL Cougar (SAR); Light 15 Bell 205 (UH-1H PBF 60
Iroquois) PB 40
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 29+ AIRCRAFT • MP 3 CN235 MPA
CISR • Heavy 8 ANKA-S HELICOPTERS • MRH 8 Bell 412EP (AB-412EP – SAR)
ISR 27+: Heavy 9+: some ANKA; 9 Heron; Medium 18
Gnat 750 DEPLOYMENT
AIR DEFENCE
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 506; 1
SAM
mot inf bn(-)
Long-range MIM-14 Nike Hercules
Medium-range MIM-23 Hawk ARABIAN SEA & GULF OF ADEN: Combined Maritime
Point-defence Rapier Forces • CTF-151: 1 FFGHM
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES BLACK SEA: NATO • SNMCMG 2: 1 MHO
AAM • IR AIM-9S Sidewinder; Shafrir 2(‡); IIR AIM- BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea
9X Sidewinder II; SARH AIM-7E Sparrow; ARH AIM- 249; 1 inf coy
120A/B AMRAAM
CYPRUS (NORTHERN): ε33,800; 1 army corps HQ; 1 SF
ARM AGM-88A HARM
regt; 1 armd bde; 2 mech inf div; 1 mech inf regt; 1 arty
ASM AGM-65A/G Maverick; Popeye I
regt; 1 avn comd; 287 M48A5T2; 147 ACV AIFV; 106
LACM Coventional AGM-84K SLAM-ER
ACV AAPC (incl variants); 386 M113 (incl variants); 36
BOMBS
M101A1; 36 M114A2; 12 M115; 30 M44T; 144 M52T1; 9
Electro-optical guided GBU-8B HOBOS (GBU-15)
T-122; 171 81mm mor; 70 M30; 135 HY-12; Milan; 60 ACV
INS/GPS guided AGM-154A JSOW; AGM-154C JSOW
TOW; 219 M40A1; FIM-92 Stinger; 44 Rh 202; 78 GAI-D01;
Laser-guided MAM-C; MAM-L; Paveway I; Paveway II
16 GDF-003; 3 Cessna 185 (U-17); 2 AS532UL Cougar; 1
Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 1 PB
Paramilitary 156,800
IRAQ: Army: 2,000; 1 armd BG
Gendarmerie 152,100 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 86; 1 PCFG
Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Defence in war MEDITERRANEAN SEA: NATO • SNMG 2: 1 FFGHM; 1 PCC
FORCES BY ROLE
QATAR: Army: 200 (trg team); 1 mech inf coy; 1 arty unit;
SPECIAL FORCES 12+ ACV AIFV/AAPC; 2 T-155 Firtina
1 cdo bde
MANOEUVRE SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 291; 1 inf coy
Other UN • UNMIK 1 obs
1 (border) paramilitary div SOMALIA: 200 (trg team); UN • UNSOM 1 obs
2 paramilitary bde SYRIA: ε5,000; 1 cdo unit; 2 armd BG; 1 SAM unit; 1
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE gendarmerie unit
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 10
RECCE Akrep
APC 560+
APC (W) 560: 535 BTR-60/BTR-80; 25 Condor
FOREIGN FORCES
PPV Kirpi Italy Active Fence: 130; 1 SAM bty with SAMP/T
AUV Cobra; Cobra II Saudi Arabia Inherent Resolve: 6 F-15S Eagle
AIRCRAFT Spain Active Fence: 149; 1 SAM bty with MIM-104C Patriot
ISR Some O-1E Bird Dog PAC-2
TPT • Light 2 Do-28D United States US European Command: 1,700; 1 tkr sqn
HELICOPTERS with 14 KC-135; 1 ELINT flt with EP-3E Aries II; 1 spt facility
ATK 4 T129B at Izmir; 1 spt facility at Ankara; 1 air base at Incirlik • US
MRH 19 Mi-17 Hip H Strategic Command: 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Kürecik
158 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

United Kingdom UK ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

British Pound £ 2017 2018 2019 Strategic Forces 1,000
GDP £ 2.04tr 2.10tr
Royal Navy
US$ 2.63tr 2.81tr
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
per capita US$ 39,800 42,261
SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 4:
Growth % 1.7 1.4 4 Vanguard with 1 16-cell VLS with UGM-133A Trident
Inflation % 2.7 2.5 II D-5/D-5LE nuclear SLBM, 4 533mm TT with
Def exp [a] £ 43.0bn 44.1bn Spearfish HWT (each boat will not deploy with more
US$ 55.4bn 59.0bn than 40 warheads, but each missile could carry
Def bdgt [b] £ 40.6bn ε41.9bn up to 12 MIRV; some Trident D-5 capable of being
configured for sub-strategic role)
US$ 52.4bn ε56.1bn
MSL • SLBM • Nuclear 48 UGM-133A Trident II D-5
US$1=£ 0.78 0.75 (fewer than 160 declared operational warheads)
[a] NATO definition
[b] Includes total departmental expenditure limits; costs of Royal Air Force
military operations; and external income earned by the MoD EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Population 65,105,246
RADAR • STRATEGIC 1 Ballistic Missile Early Warning
System (BMEWS) at Fylingdales Moor
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 9.0% 2.8% 3.2% 3.5% 23.1% 8.1%
Space
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Female 8.5% 2.7% 3.1% 3.4% 22.5% 9.9%
SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 8: 1 NATO-4B; 3
Capabilities Skynet-4; 4 Skynet-5

The 2018 National Security Capability Review highlighted a range
of security challenges, including from state-based threats and from
terrorists. UK defence policy is based on using the armed forces
to reduce direct threats by projecting stability abroad. Principal
defence priorities are contributing to the counter-ISIS coalition
and NATO tasks, including in Afghanistan and in Eastern Europe.
The ministry of defence oversees all-volunteer armed forces. Joint
Forces Command comprises key joint force elements, such as
special-forces and military-cyber capabilities. The armed forces
are relatively well balanced between combat, combat support and
logistics, but many key capabilities are close to critical mass and
all three services are short of personnel. A Modernising Defence
Programme has been ongoing for most of 2018, but without addi-
tional funding further capability reductions are likely. This puts at
risk the delivery of the ‘Future Force 2025’ intended to conduct
combat against peer opponents. The US is the country’s closest
military ally. There is also a close intelligence relationship with the
‘Five Eyes’ nations and a growing military partnership with France.
The UK has decided to retain military forces in Germany and leads
the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force. A naval base has recently
opened in Bahrain and the UK continues to support the FPDA in
Southeast Asia. Force modernisation continues, but the defence
budget is under pressure because of the fall in the value of the
pound, the cost growth of major equipment programmes and the
difficulty of achieving savings targets. Expeditionary logistic capa-
bility meets policy requirements, but peacetime logistic support
within the UK is dependent on contractors. The country’s sophis-
ticated defence industry is a world leader in defence exports but
cannot meet all of the UK’s requirements.
ACTIVE 148,350 (Army 83,500 Navy 32,350 Air
32,500) 
 1 (geographic) engr regt
RESERVE 80,000 (Regular Reserve 43,600 (Army
29,450, Navy 6,550, Air 7,600); Volunteer Reserve
34,350 (Army 27,450, Navy 3,650, Air 3,250);
Sponsored Reserve 2,050)
Includes both trained and those currently under training within
the Regular Forces, excluding university cadet units
Army 80,400; 3,100 Gurkhas (total 83,500)
Regt normally bn size. Many cbt spt and CSS regt and bn
have reservist sub-units
FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
1 (ARRC) corps HQ
MANOEUVRE
Armoured
1 (3rd) armd div (3 armd inf bde (1 armd recce regt, 1 tk
regt, 2 armd inf bn, 1 mech inf bn); 1 log bde (5 log regt;
3 maint regt; 3 med regt))

Light
1 (1st) lt inf div (1 (4th) inf bde (1 recce regt, 1 lt mech
inf bn; 2 lt inf bn); 1 (7th) inf bde (1 recce regt, 3 lt inf
bn); 2 (11th & 160th) inf bde (2 lt inf bn); 1 (51st) inf
bde (1 recce regt; 1 lt mech inf bn; 1 lt inf bn); 1 (38th)
inf bde (1 lt inf bn); 1 (Spec Inf Gp) inf bde(-) (3 inf
bn(-)); 1 log bde (2 log regt; 2 maint bn; 2 med regt))
2 lt inf bn (London)
1 (Gurkha) lt inf bn (Brunei)
Air Manoeuvre
1 (16th) air aslt bde (1 recce pl, 2 para bn, 1 (Gurkha)
air mob bn, 1 fd arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log regt, 1
med regt)
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bde (3 SP arty regt, 2 fd arty regt)
1 engr bde (5 cbt engr regt, 2 EOD regt, 1 (MWD) EOD
search regt, 1 engr regt, 1 (air spt) engr regt, 1 log regt)
1 ISR bde (1 STA regt, 1 EW regt, 3 int bn, 1 ISR UAV regt)
1 MP bde (3 MP regt)
1 sigs bde (7 sigs regt)
1 sigs bde (2 sigs regt; 1 (ARRC) sigs bn)
1 (77th) info ops bde (3 info ops gp, 1 spt gp, 1 engr spt/
log gp)
 Europe 159

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ARTILLERY 598

1 engr spt gp SP 155mm 89 AS90
1 log bde (3 log regt; 1 maint regt) TOWED 105mm 114 L118 Light Gun
1 med bde (3 fd hospital) MRL 227mm 35 M270B1 MLRS
AIR DEFENCE MOR 81mm 360 L16A1
2 AD regt AMPHIBIOUS • LCM 3 Ramped Craft Logistic
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
Reserves Point-defence 74: 60 FV4333 Stormer with Starstreak; 14
Army Reserve 27,450 reservists Rapier FSC; Starstreak (LML)

Europe
The Army Reserve (AR) generates individuals, sub-units
and some full units. The majority of units are subordin­ Joint Helicopter Command
ate to regular formation headquarters and paired with Tri-service joint organisation including Royal Navy, Army
one or more regular units and RAF units
FORCES BY ROLE Army
MANOEUVRE
FORCES BY ROLE
Reconnaissance
3 recce regt ISR
Armoured 1 regt (1 sqn with BN-2 Defender/Islander; 1 sqn with
1 armd regt SA341B Gazelle AH1)
Light ATTACK HELICOPTER
15 lt inf bn 1 regt (2 sqn with AH-64D Apache; 1 trg sqn with AH-
Air Manoeuvre 64D Apache)
1 para bn 1 regt (2 sqn with AH-64D Apache)
COMBAT SUPPORT HELICOPTER
3 arty regt 1 regt (2 sqn with AW159 Wildcat AH1)
1 STA regt 1 (spec ops) sqn with AS365N3; SA341B Gazelle AH1
1 MRL regt 1 flt with Bell 212 (Brunei)
3 engr regt 1 flt with SA341B Gazelle AH1 (Canada)
4 int bn TRAINING
4 sigs regt 1 hel regt (1 sqn with AH-64D Apache; 1 sqn with
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AS350B Ecureuil; 1 sqn with Bell 212; Lynx AH9A;
11 log regt SA341B Gazelle AH1)
6 maint regt ISR UAV
4 med regt 1 ISR UAV regt
10 fd hospital COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
AIR DEFENCE 1 maint regt
1 AD regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Army Reserve
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES FORCES BY ROLE
MBT 227 Challenger 2 HELICOPTER
RECCE 613: 197 Jackal; 110 Jackal 2; 130 Jackal 2A; 145 1 hel regt (4 sqn personnel only)
FV107 Scimitar; 31 Scimitar Mk2
IFV 623: 466 FV510 Warrior; 88 FV511 Warrior (CP); 51
Royal Navy
FV514 Warrior (OP); 18 FV515 Warrior (CP) FORCES BY ROLE
APC 1,291 ATTACK HELICOPTER
APC (T) 895 Bulldog Mk3 1 lt sqn with AW159 Wildcat AH1
PPV 396 Mastiff (6×6) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
AUV 1,238: 399 Foxhound; 252 FV103 Spartan (incl 2 sqn with AW101 Merlin HC3/3A/3i
variants); 23 Spartan Mk2 (incl variants); 396 Panther
CLV; 168 Ridgback
Royal Air Force
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES FORCES BY ROLE
AEV 92: 60 Terrier; 32 Trojan TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
ARV 259: 80 Challenger ARRV; 28 FV106 Samson; 5 Samson 3 sqn with CH-47D/SD/F Chinook HC3/4/4A/6
Mk2; 105 FV512 Warrior; 41 FV513 Warrior 2 sqn with SA330 Puma HC2
MW 64 Aardvark TRAINING
VLB 70: 37 M3; 33 Titan 1 OCU sqn with CH-47D/SD/F Chinook HC3/4/4A/6;
NBC VEHICLES 8 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC SA330 Puma HC2
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SP Exactor (Spike NLOS) AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 12: 9 BN-2T-4S Defender; 3 BN-2
MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; NLAW Islander AL1
160 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

HELICOPTERS MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 13

ATK 50 AH-64D Apache MCO 6 Hunt (incl 4 mod Hunt)
MRH 66: 5 AS365N3; 34 AW159 Wildcat AH1; 27 MHC 7 Sandown (1 additional decommissioned and used
SA341B Gazelle AH1 in trg role)

TPT 122: Heavy 60: 38 CH-47D Chinook HC4/4A; 7 CH- AMPHIBIOUS
47SD Chinook HC3; 1 CH-47SD Chinook HC5; 14 CH-47F PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 2
Chinook HC6; Medium 48: 25 AW101 Merlin HC3/3A/3i; LPD 2 Albion with 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS
23 SA330 Puma HC2; Light 14: 9 AS350B Ecureuil; 5 Bell (capacity 2 med hel; 4 LCU or 2 LCAC; 4 LCVP; 6
212 MBT; 300 troops) (of which 1 at extended readiness)
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Medium 7 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4
Watchkeeper (37+ more in store) AGB 1 Protector with 1 hel landing platform
AGS 3: 1 Scott; 2 Echo (all with 1 hel landing platform)
Royal Navy 32,350 Royal Fleet Auxiliary
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Support and miscellaneous vessels are mostly manned
SUBMARINES 10 and maintained by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA),
STRATEGIC • SSBN 4: a civilian fleet owned by the UK MoD, which has
4 Vanguard, opcon Strategic Forces with 1 16-cell VLS approximately 1,950 personnel with type comd under
with UGM-133A Trident II D-5/D-5LE nuclear SLBM, Fleet Commander
4 single 533mm TT with Spearfish HWT (each boat AMPHIBIOUS • PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3
will not deploy with more than 40 warheads, but each LSD 3 Bay (capacity 4 LCU; 2 LCVP; 24 CR2 Challenger
missile could carry up to 12 MIRV; some Trident D-5 2 MBT; 350 troops)
capable of being configured for sub-strategic role) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 12
TACTICAL • SSN 6: AORH 5: 2 Wave; 1 Fort Victoria with 2 Mk 15 Phalanx
3 Trafalgar with 5 single 533mm TT with UGM-109E CIWS; 2 Tide (capacity 1 AW159 Wildcat/AW101 Merlin
Tactical Tomahawk Block IV (TACTOM) LACM/ hel)
Spearfish HWT AFSH 2 Fort Rosalie
3 Astute with 6 single 533mm TT with UGM-109E Tactical AG 1 Argus (aviation trg ship with secondary role as
Tomahawk Block IV (TACTOM) LACM/Spearfish HWT primarily casualty-receiving ship)
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 20 AKR 4 Point (not RFA manned)
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 1
1 Queen Elizabeth (to be fitted with 3 Mk 15 Phalanx Naval Aviation (Fleet Air Arm) 4,650
Block 1B CIWS) (future capacity 24 F-35B Lightning FORCES BY ROLE
II, 14 Merlin HM2/Wildcat HMA2/CH-47 Chinook hel) ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
(in trials) 3 sqn with AW101 ASW Merlin HM2
DESTROYERS 6 2 sqn with AW159 Wildcat HMA2
DDGHM 3 Daring (Type-45) with 2 quad lnchr with AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING
RGM-84C Harpoon, 6 8-cell Sylver A50 VLS with Sea 1 sqn with Merlin Mk 2 Crowsnest (forming)
Viper (Aster 15 and Aster 30) SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx TRAINING

Block 1B CIWS, 1 114mm gun (capacity 1 AW159 1 sqn with Beech 350ER King Air
Wildcat/AW101 Merlin hel) 1 sqn with G-115
DDHM 3 Daring (Type-45) with 6 8-cell Sylver A50 1 sqn with Hawk T1
VLS with Sea Viper (Aster 15 and Aster 30) SAM, 2 Mk EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 114mm gun (capacity 1 AIRCRAFT 12 combat capable
AW159 Wildcat/AW101 Merlin hel) TPT • Light 4 Beech 350ER King Air (Avenger)
FRIGATES • FFGHM 13: TRG 17: 5 G-115; 12 Hawk T1*
8 Duke (Type-23) with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM- HELICOPTERS
84C Harpoon AShM, 1 32-cell VLS with Sea Wolf ASW 58: 28 AW159 Wildcat HMA2; 30 AW101 ASW
SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Sting Ray LWT, 1 Merlin HM2
114mm gun (capacity either 2 AW159 Wildcat or 1
AW101 Merlin hel) Royal Marines 6,600
5 Duke (Type-23) with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM- FORCES BY ROLE
84C Harpoon AShM, 1 32-cell VLS with Sea Ceptor MANOEUVRE
SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Sting Ray LWT, 1 Amphibious
114mm gun (capacity either 2 AW159 Wildcat or 1 1 (3rd Cdo) mne bde (2 mne bn; 2 sy bn; 1 amph aslt sqn;
AW101 Merlin hel) 1 (army) arty regt; 1 (army) engr regt; 1 ISR gp (1 EW
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 22 sqn; 1 cbt spt sqn; 1 sigs sqn; 1 log sqn), 1 log regt)
PSO 4: 2 River Batch 1; 1 River Batch 1 (mod) with 1 hel 1 landing craft sqn opcon Royal Navy
landing platform; 1 River Batch 2 with 1 hel landing EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
platform ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
PBI 18: 16 Archer (trg); 2 Scimitar APC (T) 99 BvS-10 Mk2 Viking
 Europe 161

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTUCTURE TRG 208: 5 EMB-500 Phenom 100; 39 EMB-312 Tucano

MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin T1 (39 more in store); 101 G-115E Tutor; 28 Hawk T2*; 31
ARTILLERY 39 Hawk T1/1A/1W* (ε46 more in store); 4 T-6C Texan II
TOWED 105mm 12 L118 Light Gun HELICOPTERS
MOR 81mm 27 L16A1 MRH 5: 1 AW139; 4 Bell 412EP Griffin HAR-2
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2 Island TPT • Light 3: 2 AW109E; 1 AW109SP
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 30 UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
LCU 10 LCU Mk10 (capacity 4 Viking APC or 120 CISR • Heavy 9 MQ-9A Reaper
troops)
LCVP 16 LCVP Mk5B (capacity 35 troops) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
UCAC 4 Griffon 2400TD AAM • IR AIM-9L/L(I) Sidewinder; IIR ASRAAM; ARH

Europe
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Starstreak AIM-120C-5 AMRAAM; Meteor
ASM AGM-114 Hellfire; Brimstone; Dual-Mode Brimstone;
Royal Air Force 32,500 Brimstone II
FORCES BY ROLE ALCM Storm Shadow
FIGHTER BOMBS
2 sqn with Typhoon FGR4/T3 Laser/GPS-guided GBU-10 Paveway II; GBU-24 Paveway
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK III; Enhanced Paveway II/III; Paveway IV
3 sqn with Typhoon FGR4/T3
1 sqn with F-35B Lightning II (forming) Royal Air Force Regiment
GROUND ATTACK FORCES BY ROLE
2 sqn with Tornado GR4/4A MANOEUVRE
ISR Other
1 sqn with Sentinel R1 6 sy sqn
1 sqn with Shadow R1 COMBAT SUPPORT
ELINT 1 CBRN sqn
1 sqn with RC-135W Rivet Joint
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL Tri-Service Defence Helicopter School
1 sqn with E-3D Sentry FORCES BY ROLE
SEARCH & RESCUE TRAINING
1 sqn with Bell 412EP Griffin HAR-2 1 hel sqn with Bell 412EP Griffin HT1
TANKER/TRANSPORT 2 hel sqn with AS350B Ecureuil
2 sqn with A330 MRTT Voyager KC2/3
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TRANSPORT
1 (comms) sqn with AW109E/SP; BAe-146; BN-2A HELICOPTERS
Islander CC2 MRH 11 Bell 412EP Griffin HT1
1 sqn with A400M Atlas TPT • Light 27: 25 AS350B Ecureuil; 2 AW109E
1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster
Volunteer Reserve Air Forces
3 sqn with C-130J/J-30 Hercules
TRAINING (Royal Auxiliary Air Force/RAF Reserve)
1 OCU sqn with Typhoon MANOEUVRE
1 OCU sqn with E-3D Sentry; Sentinel R1 Other
1 sqn with Beech 200 King Air 5 sy sqn
1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano T1 COMBAT SUPPORT
2 sqn with Hawk T1/1A/1W 2 int sqn
1 sqn with Hawk T2 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
3 sqn with Tutor 1 med sqn
COMBAT/ISR UAV 1 (air movements) sqn
2 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper 1 (HQ augmentation) sqn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 (C-130 Reserve Aircrew) flt
AIRCRAFT 250 combat capable
FGA 154: 17 F-35B Lightning II (in test); 137 Typhoon FGR4/ UK Special Forces
T3 Includes Royal Navy, Army and RAF units
ATK 37 Tornado GR4/GR4A FORCES BY ROLE
ISR 9: 4 Sentinel R1; 5 Shadow R1 SPECIAL FORCES
ELINT 3 RC-135W Rivet Joint 1 (SAS) SF regt
AEW&C 6 E-3D Sentry 1 (SBS) SF regt
TKR/TPT 14 A330 MRTT Voyager KC2/3 1 (Special Reconnaissance) SF regt
TPT 61: Heavy 28: 20 A400M Atlas; 8 C-17A Globemaster; 1 SF BG (based on 1 para bn)
Medium 19: 6 C-130J Hercules; 13 C-130J-30 Hercules; Light AVIATION

10: 5 Beech 200 King Air (on lease); 2 Beech 200GT King Air 1 wg (includes assets drawn from 3 Army hel sqn, 1
(on lease); 3 BN-2A Islander CC2; PAX 4 BAe-146 CC2/C3 RAF tpt sqn and 1 RAF hel sqn)
162 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 sigs regt
Reserve
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
2 (SAS) SF regt
Cyber
The National Cyber Security Centre plays a central role
in coordinating the UK’s cyber policy, and works with
ministries and agencies to implement cyber-security pro-
grammes. A Joint Forces Cyber Group was set up in 2013,
including a Joint Cyber Reserve, providing support to two
Joint Cyber Units and other information-assurance units
across the defence establishment. Increased concern about
the potential of information operations in and through the
cyber domain was central to the 2015 creation of 77 Bri-
gade. The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review des-
ignated cyber a tier-one risk and stated that the UK would
respond to a cyber attack in the same way as it would an
equivalent conventional attack. In October 2016, the UK ac-
knowledged publicly the use of offensive cyber capabilities
against ISIS. In April 2016, it was announced that a Cyber
Security Operations Centre would be established under
the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and tasked with protecting
the ministry’s cyberspace. The Defence Cyber School was
opened in March 2018. The UK is developing specialist rap-
id-response teams, trained to isolate, defend and respond
to cyber threats and prepared to deploy around the UK
and to operational theatres overseas. Through the National
Offensive Cyber Programme – a partnership between the
MoD and Government Communications Headquarters
(GCHQ) since 2015 – the UK says it has strengthened its
cyber capabilities and has continued to employ offensive
cyber alongside the conventional capabilities of the armed
forces.
DEPLOYMENT
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 1,100;
1 inf bn(+); 1 hel flt with 3 Puma HC2
ALBANIA: OSCE • Albania 2
ARABIAN SEA: Operation Kipion 1 DDHM; 1 LPD; 1 LSD
ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN: OSCE • Minsk Conference 1
ASCENSION ISLAND: 20
ATLANTIC (NORTH)/CARIBBEAN: 1 LSD
ATLANTIC (SOUTH): 1 PSO
BAHRAIN: 160; 1 naval base
BELIZE: BATSUB 12
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea
2; OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 3
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY: 40; 1 navy/marine
det
BRUNEI: 1,000; 1 (Gurkha) lt inf bn; 1 jungle trg centre; 1
hel flt with 3 Bell 212
CANADA: BATUS 370; 1 trg unit; 1 hel flt with SA341
Gazelle AH1
CYPRUS: 2,260; 2 inf bn; 1 SAR sqn with 4 Bell 412 Griffin
HAR-2; 1 radar (on det); Operation Shader 500: 1 FGA sqn
with 6 Tornado GR4; 6 Typhoon FGR4; 2 Sentinel R1; 1 E-3D
Sentry; 1 A330 MRTT Voyager KC3; 2 C-130J Hercules; UN
• UNFICYP (Operation Tosca) 278; 1 recce coy
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
MONUSCO (Operation Percival) 2
EGYPT: MFO 2
ESTONIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence
(Operation Cabrit) 900; 1 armd inf bn HQ; 1 armd inf
coy(+); 1 engr sqn
FALKLAND ISLANDS: 1,200: 1 inf coy(+); 1 sigs unit; 1 AD
det with Rapier; 1 PSO; 1 ftr flt with 4 Typhoon FGR4; 1 tkr/
tpt flt with 1 A330 MRTT Voyager; 1 A400M; 1 hel flt with 2
Chinook
GERMANY: 3,750; 1 armd inf bde(-) (1 tk regt, 1 armd inf
bn); 1 SP arty regt; 1 maint regt; 1 med regt
GIBRALTAR: 570 (incl Royal Gibraltar regt); 2 PB
IRAQ: Operation Shader 400; 2 inf bn(-); 1 engr sqn(-)
KENYA: BATUK 350; 1 trg unit
KUWAIT: Operation Shader 50; 1 CISR UAV sqn with 8 MQ-
9A Reaper
LIBYA: UN • UNSMIL (Operation Tramal) 1 obs
MALI: Operation Barkhane 90; 1 hel flt with 3 Chinook
HC3; EU • EUTM Mali 8; UN • MINUSMA (Operation
Newcombe) 2
NEPAL: 60 (Gurkha trg org)
NIGERIA: 50 (trg team)
OMAN: 90
PERSIAN GULF: Operation Kipion 2 MCO; 2 MHC; 1 LSD
POLAND: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 115; 1
recce sqn
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 24; OSCE • Kosovo 5
SOMALIA: EU • EUTM Somalia 4; UN • UNSOM
(Operation Praiser) 43; 3 obs; UN • UNSOS (Operation
Catan) 40; 2 obs
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS (Operations Trenton &
Vogul) 333; 1 engr coy
UKRAINE: Operation Orbital 53 (trg team); OSCE • Ukraine
65
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: 200; 1 tpt/tkr flt with C-17A
Globemaster; C-130J Hercules; A330 MRTT Voyager
FOREIGN FORCES
United States
US European Command: 9,250; 1 ftr wg at RAF Lakenheath
(1 ftr sqn with 24 F-15C/D Eagle, 2 ftr sqn with 23 F-15E Strike
Eagle); 1 ISR sqn at RAF Mildenhall with OC-135/RC-135; 1
tkr wg at RAF Mildenhall with 15 KC-135R/T Stratotanker;
1 spec ops gp at RAF Mildenhall (1 sqn with 8 CV-22B
Osprey; 1 sqn with 8 MC-130J Commando II) • US Strategic
Command: 1 AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar
and 1 Spacetrack radar at Fylingdales Moor
 Europe 163

Arms procurements and deliveries – Europe

Selected events in 2018

„„ In April, France and Germany signed an agreement to military equipment. This is simultaneous to a larger
collaborate on a Future Combat Air System (FCAS) that reform of the French procurement agency (DGA) that
aims to replace the Dassault Rafale and the Eurofighter began in 2017 that seeks to speed up the procurement

Typhoon. Dassault will lead on the project with the
aim of producing prototypes for testing in the mid-
2020s. A concept design issued by Airbus showed a
low-observable, twin-engine fighter aircraft acting as
part of a command-and-control network with other
aircraft and unmanned systems. A model displayed
by Dassault in late 2018 was broadly similar but was
tailless, unlike the Airbus design which showed twin
outwardly canted vertical stabilisers.
„„ The United Kingdom launched a Combat Air
Strategy in July and displayed a concept model of a
fighter aircraft that it hopes will begin replacing the
Typhoon in the mid-2030s. The Tempest project is a
collaboration between BAE Systems, Leonardo, MBDA
and Rolls-Royce, although the UK is open to foreign
partners to help share costs. The Tempest is a large,
low-observable, twin-engined design with a flexible
payload configuration. The UK plans to invest £2bn
(US$2.7bn) over ten years in the project.
„„ The French defence ministry created a defence-
innovation agency in September. The agency will focus
on the research and development of key technologies,
as well as the integration of civilian technologies into
Europe
process and improve cooperation between the armed
forces and industry.
„„ At the EURONAVAL trade show in Paris in October,
French defence minister Florence Parly announced
the start of an 18-month study phase to determine
France’s future aircraft-carrier requirements. The
options include operating more than one carrier.
Although only in the early stages of what will be a
decades-long programme, the minister stated that
a new French carrier must be capable of operating
the Franco-German FCAS and that France was in
discussions with the US over the acquisition of the
General Atomics electromagnetic aircraft-launching
system (EMALS) used on the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier.
„„ In October, Fincantieri and Naval Group announced
a 50/50 joint venture (JV) to build ships for Italy and
France, as well as export customers. Although the
JV did not have any contracts at the time of writing,
it is working towards offering a logistic-ship design
to the French Navy based on a vessel being built
for the Italian Navy. The JV will also bid for the mid-
life upgrade of the French and Italian Horizon-class
destroyers.

▼ Figure 9 Europe: selected ongoing or completed procurement priorities in 2018

18
Central Europe
15
Number of Countries

Northern Europe
Southern Europe
12
Purchasing

Southeastern Europe
Balkans
9 Western Europe

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*Data reflects the number of countries with equipment-procurement contracts either ongoing or completed in 2018. Data includes only procurement programmes for which a production contract
has been signed. The data does not include upgrade programmes.
**Armoured fighting vehicles not including main battle tanks ***Includes combat-capable training aircraft IISS
©
Table 10 European frigate programmes and principal weapons systems
Country Class Prime Contract Value Quantity Anti-ship missile Surface-to-air missile Torpedo Naval gun
contractor date (US$)
FRA FREMM (FRA) Naval 2005 8.3bn 6 (anti-submarine MM40 Exocet Aster 15 (EUR) MBDA MU90 Oto Melara 76/62
Group warfare) (EUR) MBDA (FRA/ITA) Super Rapid
EuroTorp (ITA) Leonardo
2 (air defence) Aster 15/30 (EUR) MBDA
Frégates de Taille 2017 4.28bn 5 Aster 30 (EUR) MBDA
Intermédiaire
GER Baden- (GER) TKMS 2007 3.69bn 4 RGM-84 Harpoon (US) RIM-116 RAM - Oto Melara
Württemberg Boeing (will be replaced by (US) Raytheon/(GER) Diehl 127/64mm LW
(F125) NSM (NOR) Kongsberg) BGT (ITA) Leonardo
164 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Köln (K130 Batch (GER) Lürssen 2017 2.25bn 5 RBS15 Oto Melara 76/62
II) Werft (SWE) Saab Super Rapid
(ITA) Leonardo
ITA FREMM (ITA) Orrizonte 2006 6.76bn 4 (anti-submarine Otomat/Teseo Aster 15/30 MU90 Oto Melara 76/62
Sistemi Navali warfare) (EUR) MBDA (EUR) MBDA (FRA/ITA) Super Rapid
6 (multi-role) EuroTorp (ITA) Leonardo
and
Pattugliatori (ITA) Fincantieri, 2015 5.99bn* 2 (full) Aster 15, 30 & 30 Block 1NT Black Shark
Oto Melara
Polivalenti (ITA) Leonardo (EUR) MBDA (ITA) Leonardo
127/64mm LW
d’Altura
3 (light+) - Aster 30 Black Shark (ITA) Leonardo
(EUR) MBDA (ITA) Leonardo
and Black Arrow
(ITA) Leonardo
2 (light) - - Black Arrow
(ITA) Leonardo
TUR Ada (MILGEM) (TUR) Istanbul 2004 n.k. 4 RGM-84 Harpoon RIM-116 RAM Mk 46 Oto Melara 76/62
Naval Shipyard (US) Boeing and/or (US) Raytheon/(GER) Diehl (US) Raytheon Super Rapid
ATMACA BGT (ITA) Leonardo
(TUR) Roketsan
Istanbul 2005 n.k. 4 RIM-116 RAM Mk 46
(G-MILGEM) (US) Raytheon/(GER) Diehl (US) Raytheon
BGT and
RIM-162 ESSM
(US) Raytheon 
UK City (Type-26) (UK) BAE 2017 4.83bn 3 (8 planned) T.B.D. Sea Ceptor (CAMM) Sting Ray BAE 5 inch
Systems (EUR) MBDA (UK) BAE 62-calibre Mk 45
Systems (US) BAE Land
Systems &
Armaments
*Contract includes construction of a support vessel
 Europe 165

▼ Figure 10 Airbus Defence & Space: A400M heavy transport aircraft

The A400M can trace its origins back to the early 1980s when
Aérospatiale, British Aerospace, Lockheed and MBB proposed
cooperating on a replacement for the C-130 Hercules and C-160
Transall.
A decade later, an eight-nation team (Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom) under the
European Future Large Aircraft Group (EUROFLAG) project, together

Europe
with Airbus, submitted its proposal for a four-engine turboprop that
would lie between the Lockheed Martin C-130J and the Boeing C-17A
Globemaster in both size and cost.
Engine selection caused some controversy when, in May 2003,
European consortium EUROPROP International’s TP400-D6 was
selected over Pratt & Whitney Canada’s PW180. A €19.7 billion
(US$22.3bn) fixed-price production contract was signed that month,
with deliveries of 180 aircraft to the (by then) seven-nation group
planned to take place between 2009 and 2021.
The programme has suffered delays and cost overruns. Issues with
the Full Automatic Digital Engine Control (FADEC) and the gearbox Prime contractor
meant that the prototype’s maiden flight did not take place until late Airbus Defence & Space (INTL)
2009, a year behind schedule. Airbus agreed to fund most
Selected subcontractors
development, and to a fixed-price contract, in part because it
anticipated export sales of up to 200 aircraft. However, the Denel Aerostructures (RSA)
cancellation of South Africa’s order, and a 2010 contract renegotiation Diehl Aerosystems (GER)
after Airbus reported cost overruns of €11.2bn (US$15.6bn), have EUROPROP International (INTL)
proven challenging.
GKN Aerospace (UK)
The overall order was cut from 180 to 170 and the seven nations
agreed to pay an additional €3.5bn (US$4.7bn). The first Indra (ESP)
series-production aircraft was not delivered until 2013. Despite this, Safran (FRA)
the aircraft has been used on operations – including in Mali – where Thales (FRA)
its ability to land on soft and short runways was demonstrated with
Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUR)
some success.

A400M deliveries
A400M deliveries
20
France 2003 contract 2010 renegotiation
Germany Approx. share Approx. share
Malaysia Country Quantity of cost* Quantity of cost*
15 Spain Belgium 7 €766.11m 7 €967.65m
Turkey France 50 €5.47bn 50 €6.91bn
UK Germany 60 €6.57bn 53 €7.33bn
Luxembourg 1 €109.44m 1 €138.34m
10
Spain 27 €2.96bn 27 €3.73bn
Turkey 10 €1.09bn 10 €1.38bn
UK 25 €2.74bn 22 €3.04bn
5 €19.7bn €23.5bn
Total 180 (US$22.3bn) 170 (US$31.2bn)
€109.44m €138.24m
Unit cost 1 (US$123.7m) 1 (US$183.4m)
*Based on division of total cost by quantity ordered
0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

© IISS
222 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Chapter Six

Asia
 There is continuing concern in the West and regional 
countries over China’s military modernisation.
 The PLAAF is moving ahead with the recapitalisation
of its combat aircraft fleets, with obsolescent aircraft
replaced with modern combat types. A successor to 
the H-6K medium-bomber is also in development.
China also continues to expand its military presence in
the South China Sea.
 Regional navies (Japan, South Korea, Australia) 
continue to develop or renew their ability to generate
task-group-centred capabilities for enhanced blue-
water operations. Japan’s new defence programme
guidelines were expected to reinforce ‘cross-domain‘
capabilities. Japan is buying Aegis Ashore and looking
into converting its Izumo-class vessels to carry the F-35B. 
Vietnam, meanwhile, continues to modernise its air and
naval capabilities to complicate the deployment options
of potential adversaries in the country’s maritime littoral.
Some of Asia’s top defence spenders drove the
regional increase in military expenditure. However, the
detailed picture showed some contrasts as defence
spending stagnated in Southeast Asia.
Defence-industry modernisation continues across
the region, albeit with varying degrees of success. In
particular, India’s progress remains hampered by slow
and cumbersome bureaucratic processes.
The unexpected North Korean moratorium on
missile testing led to renewed diplomatic contact
on the peninsula, and between Pyongyang and
Washington. However, while summits continued,
there remained no progress on the issue of North
Korea’s denuclearisation.
I ndia reported that its Arihant nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarine completed its first
operational patrol.

Asia defence spending, 2018 – top 5 Active military personnel – top 10

(25,000 per unit)
United States

US$643.3bn China
2,035,000

India
Total Asian 1, 444,500
spending
US$411.0bn North
Korea
1,280,000
Pakistan
China 654,000
India South
Korea 625,000
Vietnam 482,000

Myanmar 406,000
57.9
168.2 Indonesia 395,500
Japan South Korea Australia
Thailand 360,850

Sri Lanka 255,000

47.3 39.2 26.6
 Asia 223

Regional defence policy and economics 224 ►

Armed forces data section 247 ►

Arms procurements and deliveries 317 ►

Asia: top 5 deployments, November 2018

Nepal
South Sudan (UNMISS)
– 1,758
Pakistan India
DRC (MONUSCO) DRC (MONUSCO)
– 2,776 – 2,647

India
South Sudan (UNMISS)
– 2,369 Bangladesh
DRC (MONUSCO)
– 1,715

Asia
Conventionally-powered attack China: principal surface Tanker/tanker-transport fleets,
submarines 2018 combatants, 2014–18 2018

50 48 100 30
27 (est)
87
82
75 76 25
40 80 72
20 18
30 60
15
20 20
20 40 10
16 15
10 8
6 6 5
10 20 4
6 6 5 5
4 4 1
0 0 0
US PACAF*
China
Singapore
Malaysia
India
Japan
Australia
Pakistan
Indonesia

2015 2016 2017 2018

China
Japan
North Korea
South Korea
India
Australia
Vietnam
Pakistan
Indonesia
Singapore

2014

(aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates)

*(deployed only)
224 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Asia
In late 2017 and early 2018, the crisis provoked by
North Korea’s nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile
programmes became the primary focus of attention
in the region and beyond. The Trump administration
increasingly viewed Pyongyang’s capabilities
as posing a direct threat to the United States. Of
particular concern were North Korea’s sixth nuclear
test in September 2017 (which Pyongyang claimed
involved a missile-ready, two-stage thermonuclear
device) and the testing two months later of a
Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM),
thought to be capable of reaching the continental
US. For several months, there seemed a credible
prospect that the US would feel compelled to attack
North Korea with the aim of curtailing or eliminating
the perceived threat. It was widely thought that this
risked the possibility of escalation, to involve not just
the US and the two Koreas, but also China and Japan,
with unpredictable strategic and economic effects on
the wider Asia-Pacific region and globally.
A diplomatic rapprochement between Seoul and
Pyongyang in 2018 led the two countries’ leaders
to meet in April, May and September. As well as
this surprising thaw in inter-Korean relations, the
Singapore Summit in June 2018 between US President
Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-
un, and bilateral negotiations over the following
months, removed the immediate prospect of war.
However, these developments by no means resolved
the protracted and acutely dangerous dispute. In
exchange for unspecified ‘security guarantees’ from
the US, in Singapore Kim promised ‘unwavering
commitment to complete denuclearisation of the
Korean Peninsula’. This phrase reflected North
Korea’s position that it would only agree to its own
denuclearisation if the supposed threat posed by the
United States’ extended nuclear guarantee to South
Korea was withdrawn.
Three weeks before the Singapore Summit,
North Korea demolished tunnels at the Punggye-ri
nuclear-test facility, and in July reportedly began
dismantling facilities used to develop ballistic-missile
engines at the Sohae satellite-launching station.
However, these were apparently confidence-building
measures rather than substantive steps towards
disarmament. Furthermore, analysts questioned
the level of destruction at Punggye-ri, and satellite
imagery showed extensive continuing activity at the
Yongbyon nuclear-research facility. Furthermore,
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in late July
told a Senate committee hearing that North Korea
was continuing to produce enriched uranium for
use in nuclear weapons. That same month, it was
reported that Pyongyang appeared to be building
new liquid-fuelled ICBMs at its Sanum-dong facility.
Nevertheless, both South Korea and the US continued
their intensive diplomacy with North Korea. In late
September, Pompeo said that a second Trump–Kim
summit was likely, and there was speculation that the
US would reciprocate a commitment by Pyongyang
on specific steps towards denuclearisation with a
formal agreement – to which China would be a party
– to end the Korean War.
Concerns over North Korea and the potential
for conflict on the Korean Peninsula have exerted a
significant influence on military developments in
Northeast Asia. In late 2017, the US had deployed
forces to the region on a scale that suggested to analysts
either that it was planning for a preventive war against
North Korea, or at the very least that the Pentagon
was keen to deliver a message that Pyongyang should
take its concerns seriously. B-52 and B-1 bombers and
F-22 and F-35 combat aircraft all flew close to the
peninsula in 2016 and 2017. Displaying as well as
deploying its advanced military capabilities seemed
to be a key element of US strategy. For the first time in
more than a decade, by late October there were three
US Navy carrier strike groups in the 7th Fleet area of
operations in the western Pacific. In mid-November
and early December, these forces engaged in major
exercises with the Japanese and South Korean armed
forces. While the South Korean administration led
by Moon Jae-in, who became president in May 2017,
has played a key role in facilitating the incipient
peace process between the US and North Korea, it
has continued South Korea’s military-modernisation
initiatives. Seoul is developing a conventional
military deterrent based on the pre-emptive ‘Kill
Chain’ capability (aimed at North Korea’s missile
and nuclear infrastructure, mobile launchers, and

command, control and communications system);
the Korean Air and Missile Defence system; and the
Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR)
strike capability targeting North Korea’s political and
military leadership.
Some analysts, however, consider that the
KMPR strategy, at least, may have been somewhat
downgraded by Seoul following the diplomatic
activity in 2018. Although the Moon administration in
September 2017 allowed the ‘temporary’ deployment
to South Korea of four additional US Army Terminal
High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile
launchers, and in early 2018 reportedly ordered
more Taurus KEPD-350 cruise missiles, an inter-
Korean military agreement in September saw the two
countries agree measures intended to lower tensions
around the demilitarised zone, including setting up
buffer zones, dismantling border posts and clearing
landmines. And in October another South Korea–US
military exercise (Vigilant Ace) was suspended, on top
of the suspension of exercises including Ulchi Freedom
Guardian announced shortly after the Singapore
Summit. Nonetheless, South Korea’s defence minister
reportedly said in November that there ‘shouldn’t be
any wavering’ in South Korea’s military-readiness
posture. Japan has also made efforts to strengthen its
defences against the security challenge from North
Korea, notably through the Cabinet decision in
December 2017 to purchase the Aegis Ashore missile-
defence system.
The North Korea crisis unfolded alongside
continuing concern in the West and regional countries
– notably Japan – over China’s growing defence
spending, its efforts to enhance the capabilities of
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and evidence
of its further militarisation of the features that it had
occupied and had physically expanded since 2012
in the South China Sea. While the US still outspends
China, Beijing’s defence budget has continued to
increase and the PLA has directed much of its growing
budget towards efforts to improve its capabilities.
The most obvious evidence of this has been the
new equipment that is being brought into service,
including a second aircraft carrier, more-capable
ballistic missiles, improved submarines and new
combat aircraft. At the same time, the PLA has been
attempting to strengthen its capacity for warfare in
the cyber, space and electronic-warfare arenas, while
boosting the potential of China’s national defence
science, research and development, and industrial
base through closer cooperation with the civilian
Asia 225
high-technology sector. In combination, these efforts
are yielding new capabilities that, alongside other
improvements, will significantly strengthen China’s
maritime power-projection capabilities as well as the
credibility of its nuclear deterrent.
Military capability is a complex phenomenon,
however, and the PLA still suffers from important
deficiencies, not least in vital areas such as anti-
submarine warfare; intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance; air-to-air refuelling; and joint-service
operations. Even more significantly, it lacks recent
direct experience of high-intensity operations, and
the scale of the continuing purge of corrupt PLA
officers may indicate problems with discipline and
morale. The Chinese Communist Party’s expressed
goal of developing the PLA’s capability so that it will
be capable of ‘winning wars’ in three decades’ time
inadvertently highlights its present shortcomings
and may be an ambitious target. The PLA’s growing
military capabilities increasingly complicate the
Asia
United States’ operational planning assumptions
and could almost certainly inflict serious costs on
the US armed forces if they were to have to force
operational access to China’s maritime littoral in the
event of conflict. Nonetheless, the US remains the
most important military power in the region, despite
its need to project that power over considerable
distances.
Some US allies and security partners worried
about China have been unnerved by the Trump
administration’s unpredictability. However,
substantial overall increases in US defence spending
as well as the Department of Defense’s continuing
focus on strengthening US military capability –
including the capacity to operate more closely with
the armed forces of allies and partners in what it now
calls the ‘Indo-Pacific’ region – are both in large part
intended to mitigate China’s military challenge. While
the Trump administration nominally abandoned its
predecessor’s ‘rebalance’ to the Asia-Pacific, the US
National Defense Strategy published in January 2018
gave pre-eminent attention to the Indo-Pacific and
explicitly identified China and Russia as the primary
‘strategic competitors’.
The US has not been alone in strengthening its
military posture in the region in response to China’s
growing power. In Japan, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s
government has continued gradually to increase
defence spending, which has allowed the Japan
Self-Defense Forces to begin developing significant
additional capabilities. While the immediate
226 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
motivation for some capability-related developments,
such as the acquisition of Aegis Ashore, has been the
security challenge from North Korea, others – such as
the incipient strike capability from Japan’s growing
force of F-35A combat aircraft – could potentially be
used to project military power for wider purposes,
against China as well as North Korea.
Under increasing political pressure from Beijing,
and acutely aware that the cross-strait military
balance has been shifting increasingly in China’s
favour, Taiwan’s government has continued its
efforts to strengthen the island’s defence posture.
It has been led since January 2016 by President Tsai
Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party, which
favours a more distinct political identity for Taiwan.
The Trump administration has supported Taipei’s
defence efforts, and in September 2018 announced the
sale of spare parts and logistic support for Taiwanese
military aircraft; this followed the agreement in June
2017 of a major arms package for Taiwan, including
AGM-88 HARM air-to-surface anti-radiation missiles,
torpedoes and technical support for early-warning
radars.
In Southeast Asia, Vietnam has displayed the
greatest resolution of any Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) member in terms of
attempting to deter Chinese interference with its
interests in the South China Sea. To this end, Hanoi
continues to modernise its naval and air arms as part
of an effort to establish capabilities to complicate the
deployment options of potential adversaries in the
country’s maritime littoral. Vietnam’s state-controlled
media reported during 2017 that India had not only
agreed to supply, but had started delivering, BrahMos
anti-ship cruise missiles to Vietnam, though this was
denied by New Delhi in 2017 and 2018.
Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, more varied
influences shape national-defence policies, strategies
and military procurement. Singapore’s defence
spending has remained the largest of any Southeast
Asian country, and the city-state has continued to
invest heavily in major acquisition programmes.
New equipment entering service in 2017–18 included
A330 MRTT in-flight refuelling aircraft, Aster 30
SAMP/T medium-range ground-based air-defence
systems and locally built Independence-class Littoral
Mission Vessels, of which five of eight ships on
order are now in service. A serious challenge for the
country’s armed forces is the impact of a declining
national birth rate on the size of the conscript cohort,
which is projected to decline by a third by 2030. In
response, the acquisition of platforms requiring fewer
personnel to operate is planned, including a new,
locally developed armoured fighting vehicle and a
next-generation howitzer.
DEFENCE ECONOMICS
In 2018, Asia was the main engine of global growth,
according to the IMF, with GDP growth reaching
5.6%, thereby accounting for 60% of the global total.
Within Asia, however, advanced economies slowed
down between 2017 (2.4% GDP growth) and 2018
(2.1%), with the notable exception of Australia,
where growth accelerated from 2.2% to 3.2%. The
economies of Japan, Singapore, South Korea and
Taiwan all decelerated. In contrast, the region’s
emerging markets and developing economies grew
by 6.5%. The fastest-growing countries in 2018 were
Bangladesh and India at 7.3%, followed by Cambodia
(6.9%) and Laos (6.8%), then China and Vietnam both
at 6.6%. India’s economy in particular rebounded
after important currency and tax reforms introduced
since 2016, and after the implementation of policies
regarding access to bank accounts, identity numbers
and mobile phones.
As it is an export-oriented region, Asia largely
benefited from improved global trade. Regional
growth was also helped by infrastructure projects.
Besides the investments linked to China’s Belt
and Road Initiative projects, there are important
developments in India and Indonesia, among others.
▼ Figure 16 Asia defence spending by country and
sub-region, 2017
Thailand, 1.6% Vietnam, 1.2%
Indonesia, 1.8% Other Southeast
Singapore, 2.7% Asia, 2.4%
Other Australasia, 0.6%
Australia, 6.5%
Other South Asia
1.8%
Pakistan, 2.8%
China
India, 14.1% 40.9%
Mongolia, 0.03%
Taiwan, 2.7%
South Korea, 9.5% Japan, 11.5%
Note: analysis excludes North Korea and Laos due to insufficient data.
© IISS
 [1] Map illustrating 2018 planned defence-spending levels (in
Asia 227
US$ at market exchange rates), as well as the annual real
percentage change in planned defence spending between
2017 and 2018 (at constant 2010 prices and exchange rates).
Percentage changes in defence spending can vary
Mongolia considerably from year to year, as states revise the level of
funding allocated to defence. Changes indicated here highlight
the short-term trend in planned defence spending between
2017 and 2018. Actual spending changes prior to 2017, and
projected spending levels post-2018, are not reflected.
Afghanistan Japan
Pakistan
South Real % Change (2017–18)
China Korea Between 10% and 20% increase
Between 3% and 10% increase
Bhutan Between 0% and 3% increase
Nepal Between 0% and 3% decrease
Laos Taiwan Between 3% and 10% decrease
India
Myanmar Between 10% and 20% decrease
Insufficient data
Thailand © IISS
Bangladesh Vietnam
Philippines
Cambodia
Brunei
Sri Lanka Malaysia
Singapore

Indonesia

Papua New Guinea

168.20 Timor-Leste

Asia
2018 Defence Spending (US$ bn)
Estimate
57.87 Fiji
47.26
39.21 Australia
30.00

20

10

5
2
1
.25 New Zealand
.05

▲ Map 6 Asia regional defence spending1

However, countries with growing debt will likely
face future challenges. In 2018, East Asian countries
with high debt levels included China, Laos, Malaysia,
Mongolia and Thailand, while Cambodia, Laos,
Mongolia and Vietnam all had large fiscal deficits.
This has led countries including China, Laos, Malaysia
and Vietnam to renew fiscal-consolidation efforts,
which might limit public spending and investments
in the near term.
The trade showdown between the US and China will
have a wider effect. Simulations run by international
financial institutions show that the hikes in trade
tariffs could influence regional growth. At the time
of writing, it was too early to fully assess the impact
of these measures, but there are potential economic
consequences for Asia. For instance, if the full range of
measures so far mooted are implemented, according to
the IMF the effect would be to lower Chinese GDP by
1.6% over two years. The IMF also assessed that GDP
growth could fall by 0.9% in South Korea, by 0.7% in
India, Indonesia and Japan, and by 0.6% in Australia,
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.
Running counter to protectionist trends, some
regional states are instead looking to new multilateral
trade agreements. The Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership,
or the TPP-11, replaces the Trans-Pacific Partnership;
the US pulled out of the negotiations for this following
Donald Trump’s election as US president. Ratification
by at least six signatories is pending. In Southeast
228 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
2.0
1.40 1.44 1.45 1.46 1.44
1.5
% of GDP
1.0
0.5
0.0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
▲ Figure 17 Asia regional defence expenditure as % of
GDP
Asia, the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA)
will reduce tariffs among its member states, with full
implementation expected in 2018.
Defence spending and procurement
Asian defence spending continues to increase. It
grew by 4.0% in real terms between 2017 and 2018,
picking up speed after a year of slower growth; the
rate had been 2.8% between 2016 and 2017. Some of
the region’s top spenders drove the increase. In real
terms, Australia’s defence budget grew by 8.4%,
China’s by 5.7% and South Korea’s by 4.5%.
In contrast, defence spending stagnated in
Southeast Asia, with a regional decline of 0.6%
between 2017 and 2018, though there was a more
pronounced drop in some states, notably Indonesia
where real-terms spending fell by 9.7%. This complex
picture is a reminder that strong economic growth
does not necessarily translate into strong defence-
budget growth or high levels of defence expenditure.
Governments in this sub-region are managing
competing policy priorities; in Malaysia, for instance,
there is a focus by the new government on healthcare.
Overall, Southeast Asian states’ defence budgets
remain modest when compared to the rest of Asia;
combined, they reach only the level of South Korea’s
defence budget (see Figure 18).
Consequently, procurement and defence research
and development (R&D) spending for these countries
remains constrained, compared to larger spenders in
East Asia. For instance, Indonesia in 2018 dedicated
15.9% of its budget to these defence investments,
which amounted to some US$1.16 billion, while in
Malaysia and Vietnam these expenditures totalled
US$804 million and US$821m respectively.
Taiwan
Australia
1.43
South Korea
Southeast Asia
Japan
India
China
United States
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
2018
US$bn current
Southeast Asia includes Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Vietnam. No data available for Laos
▲ Figure 18 Indo-Pacific defence spending, 2018
(US$bn, current)
Among Southeast Asian countries, Singapore
spends the most on procurement and defence R&D,
with the estimated US$2.18bn spent on these in 2018
comprising just below 20% of its total defence budget.
The city-state is making significant investments
in its sophisticated air force. It is set to enhance its
rotary-wing fleet with additional H225M Caracal and
CH-47F Chinook helicopters, while the first of six A330
MRTT tankers was delivered in August 2018. The
Singaporean government is also expected to decide,
by the end of 2018, on whether to buy F-35 combat
aircraft as the replacement for its F-16s.
Australia’s increased defence budget is also
dedicated largely to improving aerospace capacities.
Indeed, air platforms comprise four of the top five
acquisition projects for the Australian armed forces
in the coming year (see Table 12). The first is the
acquisition of F-35 combat aircraft; 72 will be bought
in total and the first two were due to arrive in Australia
in December 2018.
These procurement choices reflect Australia’s
concerns over regional security developments,
including China’s military progress, and a desire to
acquire capabilities allowing it to act on its own as well
as with like-minded states. For instance, Australia’s
procurement of P-8 maritime-patrol aircraft mirrors
that in India. South Korea, meanwhile, has selected
the P-8 for its future maritime-patrol-aircraft
requirement.
Expenditures for naval programmes, such as the
future submarines and frigates, will soon rise, with
total programme costs projected at over A$50bn
(US$37bn) and A$30bn (US$22bn) respectively. So

Table 12 Australia: top five acquisition programmes in 2018, by approved expenditure
Equipment ordered/procured
F-35 combat aircraft
Hobart-class air-warfare destroyer
P-8A Poseidon maritime-patrol aircraft
E-7A Wedgetail airborne early-warning aircraft
MRH90 multi-role helicopter
Source: Australian Government, Portfolio Budget Statements 2018–19, Defence Portfolio, Table 64: Top 30 Projects by 2018–19 Forecast
Expenditure, p 120
far, total approved expenditure for Australia’s future
submarine design and construction is A$2.24bn
(US$1.66bn) under phase 1B of the Sea 1000 project
and A$395m (US$293m) for the future frigates under
phase 1 of the Sea 5000 project.
Defence industry and markets
Contract negotiations were ongoing in late 2018
between Canberra and Naval Group regarding
Australia’s submarine programme. The French
company was selected in 2016 to design and build
12 submarines based on the Shortfin Barracuda Block
1A design. A series of contracts has been signed since
this announcement, but this situation illustrates the
lengthy processes and challenges associated with
implementing large equipment deals.
Even when it comes to long-established
partnerships, arms transfers can be affected by
disputes. In 2018, Japan and the US discussed Tokyo’s
concerns regarding the costs and processes of US
Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Japan relies heavily
on FMS, and the value of FMS deliveries increased
from US$779m in 2010 to US$1.01bn in 2017. Japan’s
Audit Board has expressed concerns in recent years
regarding the management of FMS, particularly
over the F-35 programme. Japanese authorities, the
watchdog said, had no knowledge on why prices had
risen, that there were delays in the deliveries of parts
and that there was a lack of coordination with Japanese
firms involved in the manufacturing process. In 2018,
defence ministers from both countries discussed
‘improvements’ to the FMS process, relating to delays
in implementing procurement programmes, as well
as reimbursements of Japanese overpayments on
FMS transactions.
Meanwhile, South Korea was reclaiming outlays
from Indonesia, concerning the KF-X joint combat-
aircraft programme. According to press reports,
Indonesia failed to pay approximately US$200m
Asia 229
Project number/phase Approved project Approved project
expenditure, A$bn expenditure, US$bn
AIR6000 Phase 2A/B 15.51 11.51
SEA 4000 Phase 3 9.09 6.74
AIR 7000 Phase 2 5.21 3.87
AIR 5077 Phase 3 3.87 2.87
AIR 9000 Phase 2 3.77 2.80
to South Korea for its share of the expenses, which
amounted to 20% of the development costs. Seoul
maintained that this did not delay the project, and that
it was in discussions with Jakarta to reduce the latter’s
share in the programme. Indonesia was looking to the
KF-X project to boost technology transfer to its own
defence sector.
Developing a domestic defence-industrial base
Asia
would, in theory, avoid such complications. Many
states in the region are looking to do so. Possessing a
defence-industrial sector would help with sovereign
defence policymaking and would also – if they were
to develop an export model – allow states to recoup
through foreign earnings some of the investments
made in the sector.
Vietnam is looking to rationalise its state-owned
defence enterprises, notably through mergers. In
mid-2018, a new regulation was intended to reduce
the number of military-operated businesses from
88 to 17, to focus military-owned enterprises on
defence tasks and to support economic development.
However, this process of rationalisation began a
decade ago, with little visible effect so far, though
Vietnam’s Military Telecommunications General
Corporation changed its name to Viettel Military
Industry and Telecom Group in early 2018.
In 2018, Australia took measures to support its
defence-industrial base. The government launched
a defence-export strategy in 2018, with the aim
of Australia becoming one of the world’s top-ten
defence suppliers by 2028. The strategy created a new
Australian Defence Export Office. The government
also released A$20m (US$15m) of annual funding
to support arms exports and opened an export
credit line of A$3.8bn (US$2.9bn) for customers of
Australian weapons systems. In April 2018, Canberra
also released its Defence Industrial Capability Plan,
following a 2016 Defence Industry Policy Statement.
It identified priority areas for support to the defence
230 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
industry, including on submarine capability, as well
as land-combat vehicles and related technology
upgrades, and included A$17m (US$13m) per year
for grants to support small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) working in these areas. These new
policies are intended to develop and support local
manufacturers. Currently local companies are only
dominant in shipbuilding, such as ASC and Austal.
Other areas of Australia’s defence-industrial base are
dominated by foreign-owned prime contractors such
as Raytheon Australia, BAE Systems Australia and
Thales Australia.
Reform initiatives were also announced in
South Korea in 2018, with a particular focus on
developing SMEs. The Defense Acquisition Program
India: air- and naval-procurement update
Much of India’s tactical combat-aircraft fleet is ageing
and needs replacement, although urgency on this matter
is not always apparent in New Delhi’s procurement
strategies. India first began to identify a multi-role fighter
to fulfil its medium-combat-aircraft requirement some
two decades ago, but it is only now near the beginning of
a combat-aircraft procurement project to meet the bulk
of this need. During the course of 2018, a limited interim
acquisition of the French Dassault Rafale became mired
in political allegations and counter-claims of corruption.
Meanwhile, at least publicly, Indian enthusiasm to
acquire a next-generation fighter from Russia was also on
the wane.
A problem for the air force is that the strength of its
tactical combat-aircraft squadrons remains well below
target, at a time when both external acquisition projects
and notional national development programmes
are faltering. Furthermore, the rivals against which
it baselines its needs – and in a worst-case scenario
would face in a war on two fronts – are re-equipping
their fleets. China and Pakistan are in the throes of
recapitalising their combat-aircraft fleets and associated
weapons inventories. Of the two, China constitutes by
far the more significant challenge, and remains the
main source of Islamabad’s combat inventory. With
the imminent service-entry of China’s Chengdu J-20
fighter, India risks a situation where China has been
able to develop and introduce into service its first low-
observable combat aircraft in roughly the same time
frame as that absorbed by Delhi in its failed attempts
to buy an ‘off-the-shelf’ aircraft for its medium-fighter
requirement.
That said, things seem to move faster in air defence.
By the end of 2020 the air force will begin to receive the
Administration (DAPA) aims to diversify local defence
suppliers, and boosting the role of SMEs is a key plank
of DAPA’s import-substitution policy. By raising
the profile of SMEs and better integrating them into
international defence supply chains, DAPA also hopes
to enhance export results. In 2017, South Korea exported
weapons worth US$3.19bn but intends to raise that
figure to US$5bn by 2022. New offset guidelines are
expected in early 2019 and may include requirements
for foreign arms manufacturers to integrate locally
made components into their weapons systems for
South Korea’s armed forces. The ‘Defense Business
Innovation Plan’ launched in August 2018 focused on
reforming procurement processes, but also contained
initiatives to promote the domestic industrial base and
first of what is reported as a five-regiment order for the
Russian S-400 (SA-21 Growler) long-range surface-to-air
missile system, a deal for which was struck by New Delhi
and Moscow in October 2018.
The Indian Navy has relied in the past on significant
deliveries of platforms and weapons systems from Russia.
However, the shortcomings of Russia’s naval defence-
industrial base are in part responsible for New Delhi’s
problems or delays in achieving its ambitious naval-
expansion plans. Increasing focus on indigenous warship
construction has produced its own problems, with Indian
shipyards having a poor record of delivery. Meanwhile,
government auditing reports have cited problems with
Russian equipment supplies as being a factor in delayed
naval programmes.
As a result, the Indian Navy has diversified its sources
of supply; for example, it turned to Israel for the supply
of its Barak 1 and Barak 8 air-defence systems. This has
led to Indian warships being equipped with a complex
mix of Israeli, Russian and Western systems. A growing
strategic relationship with the United States is being
driven by, and expressed in increasing discussions on,
the naval-procurement front. An example is possible
collaboration with the US on the design and equipping of
India’s planned second indigenous aircraft carrier. The US
has filled a key maritime requirement with the supply of
P-8 maritime-patrol aircraft (the P-8I Neptune), and looks
like a strong contender to fill a navy requirement for new
shipborne multi-role helicopters.
India still needs to overcome a slow and cumbersome
bureaucratic process and a lack of adequate resources
to deliver on its naval-programme ambitions; as in the
air domain, New Delhi is increasingly conscious that it is
being outpaced in this regard by Beijing.
 Asia 231

Table 13 India: procurements from Russia and the United States, 2000–18

Russian systems US systems

2008 Mi-17V-5 Hip H – MRH
2000 Su-30MKI Flanker H – FGA ac Quantity: 80 Value: US$1.35bn
Quantity: 140 Value: US$6.48bn (RUS) Russian Helicopters
(IND) Hindustan Aeronautics (RUS licensed
production) 2009 P-8I Neptune – ASW ac
Quantity: 8 Value: US$2.1bn
2001 T-90S – MBT (US) Boeing
Quantity: 124 Value: US$371.94m
(RUS) UralVagonZavod 2009 BMP-2 – IFV
Quantity: 236 Value: US$172.42m
2001 T-90S – MBT kits (IND) Ordnance Factory Board
Quantity: 186 Value: US$484.74m (RUS licensed production)
(RUS) UralVagonZavod
2010 MiG-29K/KUB Fulcrum – FGA ac
2001 Il-38SD – ASW ac Quantity: 29 Value: US$1.47bn
Quantity: 5 Value: US$150m (RUS) United Aircraft Corporation
(RUS) United Aircraft Corporation
2011 BMP-2 – IFV
2004 Akula II – SSN Quantity: 153 Value: US$117.19m
Quantity: 1 Value: US$900m (IND) Ordnance Factory Board
(RUS) Government surplus lease (RUS licensed production)
2004 Kiev class – CV 2011 C-17A Globemaster III – Hvy tpt hel

Asia
Quantity: 1 Value: US$2.35bn Quantity: 11 Value: US$4.7bn
(RUS) Government surplus (US) Boeing
2004 MiG-29K/KUB Fulcrum – FGA ac 2012 Su-30MKI Flanker H – FGA ac
Quantity: 16 Value: US$794.21m Quantity: 42 Value: US$2.97bn
(RUS) United Aircraft Corporation (RUS) United Aircraft Corporation
2004 T-90S – MBT 2012 Mi-17V-5 Hip H – MRH
Quantity: 300 Value: n.k. Quantity: 71 Value: n.k.
(IND) Ordnance Factory Board (RUS) Russian Helicopters
(RUS licensed production)
2013 T-90S – MBT
2005 9A52 Smerch – MRL Quantity: 236 Value: US$991.7m
Quantity: 28 Value: εUS$396.48m (IND) Ordnance Factory Board
(RUS) NPO Splav (RUS licensed production)
2006 Talwar II class (Pr. 11356) – FFGHM 2013 C-130J-30 Hercules – Med tpt ac
Quantity: 3 Value: US$1.13bn Quantity: 6 Value: US$1.01bn
(RUS) Yantar Shipyard (US) Lockheed Martin
2006 BMP-2K – IFV 2015 AH-64E Apache – Atk hel
Quantity: 123 Value: n.k. Quantity: 22 Combined
(RUS) Kurganmashzavod CH-47F Chinook Hvy tpt hel value:
Quantity: 15 US$3bn
2007 9A52 Smerch – MRL (US) Boeing
Quantity: 14 Value: εUS$217.75m
(RUS) NPO Splav 2016 P-8I Neptune – ASW ac
Quantity: 4 Value: US$1bn
2007 Su-30MKI Flanker H – FGA ac (US) Boeing
Quantity: 40 (of which 25 kits/semi-
assembled) Value: US$1.55bn 2017 M777A2 – 155mm Arty
(RUS) United Aircraft Corporation Quantity: 145 Value: US$542.1m
(US) BAE Land Systems and Armaments
2007 T-90S – MBT
Quantity: 347 (of which 223 semi-assembled) 2018 C-17A Globemaster III – Hvy tpt hel
Value: US$1.22bn Quantity: 1 Value: US$262m
(RUS) UralVagonZavod (US) Boeing
2008 C-130J-30 Hercules – Med tpt ac 2018 S-400 (SA-21 Growler) – SAM
Quantity: 6 Value: US$962.45m Quantity: 80 Value: US$5.4bn
(US) Lockheed Martin (RUS) Almaz-Antey
232 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
strengthen defence R&D. Plans included intellectual-
property reform and the creation of a new agency
called Defense Science and Technology Planning and
Evaluation, to focus on emerging technologies. The
plan also contained measures to support arms exports,
also via a new agency called the Defense Industry
Promotion Association.
CHINA
President Xi Jinping continues to reform Chinese
governance. This includes his ambitious plan to
modernise the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) by
2035 and complete its transformation into ‘world-
class forces’ capable of winning wars by 2049. These
major policy projects have attracted significant
attention in China and internationally, drawing
concern not only for the return of highly centralised
decision-making in Beijing in the hands of Xi, but also
for the expanding government-led military outreach
that has led to an escalation of regional tensions.
Centralised control
The primacy of the Communist Party of China
(CCP), and its leadership role in government, the
armed forces and society, was made clear at the 19th
Party Congress in October 2017. Furthermore, the
president’s theory – ‘Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism
with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’ – was
written into the Party’s constitution, cementing Xi’s
power in the manner of the precedents set by his
predecessors Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.
Furthermore, at the 13th National People’s Congress
(NPC) in March 2018, a constitutional amendment
was approved, abolishing term limits for the
presidency. Under Xi, the distinctions between party
and state have become increasingly blurred, moving
away from Deng’s vision whereby the two were
separate, and each had distinct powers.
The 19th Party Congress visibly illustrated the
Party’s expanding control over the PLA, and the
recentralisation of decision-making power into Xi
and his allies’ hands within a slimmed-down Central
Military Commission (CMC). Before the 19th Party
Congress, the CMC had a chairman (Xi), two vice-
chairmen and seven members. At its close, as well
as Xi as chairman, the CMC comprised two vice-
chairmen and four members. All are close allies of
Xi, with personal ties to him. The signal was that Xi
would continue to strictly control military reform, to
him a personal project.
The PLA has undergone further organisational
change in 2018. A key message has been that the
PLA serves the Party, not the other way round. As
part of this, Xi has extended his anti-graft campaign
– which previously only targeted high-level PLA
officials – to include lower-ranking officials. During
Xi’s first term as president, more than 13,000 PLA
officers, including 100 generals, were targeted in
the anti-corruption campaign by the Party’s Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection and the
State’s National Supervision Commission. This has
earned Xi both respect for ridding branches of the
armed forces of corrupt ‘tigers’ (high-level officials)
and ‘flies’ (rank-and-file cadres), but also criticism
for his use of the campaign to remove political
opponents and promote his allies to positions of
power.
However, control of the PLA by the Party and Xi
has not gone unchallenged. Years of insufficient care
have led to discontent among PLA veterans, and
since 2016 – when there was a large-scale protest in
Beijing in front of the defence ministry – veterans
have periodically staged public protests in Beijing
over unpaid demobilisation benefits, healthcare and
pensions. These protests have spread beyond Beijing
despite the CCP’s creation of the Ministry of Veterans
Affairs in March 2018 to deal with their concerns.
For instance, a group of over 1,000 PLA veterans
staged a protest in Zhenjiang, Jiangsu province,
in June 2018. While the leadership of Xi regarding
the PLA and political leadership may be publicly
projected as strong, these protests nonetheless
raise questions. Indeed, following a speech to PLA
chiefs at the 2018 Party leaders’ summer retreat at
Beidaihe, Hebei province, Xi once again called for
‘absolute loyalty’ and ‘strengthening the party’s
leadership in the army’ in order to make China and
the PLA powerful. At public appearances in 2018,
Xi’s consistent calls for unwavering PLA loyalty to
the Party may in fact betray some concern over the
strength of this.
While Xi tries to strengthen control of the PLA, he
is using what the 2015 defence white paper labelled
as China’s ‘strategic opportunity’ of a favourable
external environment to modernise the PLA and
bolster the armed forces’ power-projection capability.
The PLA Navy and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) in
particular continue to modernise their equipment
inventories, and the armed forces have started to
integrate new technologies, such as uninhabited
aerial vehicles (UAVs), while China continues to

develop its capabilities and innovation in the fields of
cyber, space and electronic warfare.
In 2017 and 2018, China demonstrated a more
assertive posture in relation to Taiwan and in the
East China Sea. In May 2018, the PLAAF flew H-6K
bombers and Su-35 Flanker E combat aircraft around
Taiwan. These ‘training flights’, as the PLA put it,
were an attempt to discourage Taipei from making
any moves towards independence. In September
2018, Japan’s then defence minister Itsunori
Onodera warned of China’s unilateral escalation
of military activities in the sea and airspace around
Japan. In the South China Sea, China’s militarisation
of the islands and features it occupies in the Spratlys
continues.
Further afield, China has expanded the reach of
its international infrastructure-development project,
the Belt and Road Initiative. However, regional
and international fears have yet to be realised over
dual-use ports along the ‘maritime silk route’ that
China has built. In addition to its military-logistics
base in Djibouti, China announced in August 2018
that it is fully funding and building a training camp
in Afghanistan that will be used to improve the
counter-terrorism capabilities of both Afghan troops
and the PLA. Alongside numerous and increasingly
complex training exercises in China, the region and
internationally – and continuing deployment on UN
operations – this Afghanistan mission will provide the
PLA with valuable, albeit non-combat, operational
experience.
Beijing is simultaneously modernising its armed
forces, expanding its global reach and engaging in
domestic reforms. Maintaining this pace and breadth
may prove a challenge, and if the veterans’ protests
are indicative of morale and cohesion issues within
the force and illustrate concerns over the extent of the
Party’s influence over the PLA, they may influence
Xi’s ability to deliver on the two deadlines he has set
for China’s military progress.
South China Sea
In 2015, Xi promised then US president Barack
Obama that China would not militarise its reclaimed
features in the Spratly Islands. Events since that date
would seem to indicate otherwise.
It is true that China’s large-scale dredging and
reclamation of land appears to have halted, at least
for now. However, between 2013 and 2015, China
reclaimed 17 times more land than the combined
amount reclaimed over the past 40 years by the four
Asia 233
other regional Spratly Island claimants (Malaysia,
the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam). By 2016,
China had reclaimed approximately 12.95 square
kilometres of land. Between 2016 and 2018, the PLA
instead intensified its efforts to fortify these features
by building infrastructure and a range of military
facilities.
The three largest of the Spratly Islands (Fiery
Cross Reef, Mischief Reef and Subi Reef) now host
3-km-long runways, hangars for combat aircraft,
ammunition bunkers, barracks, large berthing
facilities, anti-aircraft guns and close-in weapons
systems. The seven Chinese-reclaimed Spratly
Islands today house over 40 varying radar facilities
that represent a significant enhancement of China’s
capabilities in the area relating not just to command
and control but also intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance. In April 2018, reports emerged that
China had deployed jamming equipment to Mischief
Reef in the Spratlys.
Asia
While surface-to-air missiles and anti-ship cruise
missiles (ASCMs) have not yet been installed in the
Spratlys, further north, in the Paracel Islands group,
China has deployed HQ-9 air-defence systems,
probably YJ-62 ASCMs, as well as J-11B combat
aircraft on Woody Island, the latter two possibly
as short-term deployments. In May 2018, an H-6K
bomber landed on Woody Island, the first time that
one of these bombers had landed on one of China’s
South China Sea islands.
While strategic and regional messaging might be
key to Beijing’s rationale, and the capability of the
deployed equipment has yet to be tested in combat,
Beijing has nonetheless changed the power balance
in the South China Sea. The calculus involved in
any decision by the US or its allies on possible
military action in the South China Sea has become
more complex, and potentially with higher risk. So
far, Washington has responded by continuing to
conduct freedom-of-navigation naval operations
and overflights. In May 2018, the US disinvited
China from the 2018 RIMPAC exercise, citing as the
reason China’s militarisation of the South China Sea.
Meanwhile, the resurrected ‘Quad’ regional grouping
(which includes Australia, India, Japan and the US)
has yet to take shape, with New Delhi denying that
the grouping has any military or defence function.
While the US considers its options, China has
succeeded in dividing Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) member states and promoting its
strategy of bilateral multilateralism. Whether or not
234 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

▼ Map 7 Chinese military facilities in the South China Sea

Duncan Island Drummond Island Tree Island Woody Island

x4 large
H x8 H x16 small
x1 large x2 x2
x5 small

Pattle Island
Lincoln Island
x3

x6

CHINA Km 1,000
Paracel Islands
Money Island
Paracel Is.
H x3

x3 Triton Island Bombay Reef

Spratly
x2 large Is.
H x2 small

China’s land reclamation in the Spratlys and Paracels seems
to have stopped in recent years, and the focus has instead
turned to building up permanent infrastructure. All the
Chinese-controlled features in the Spratlys have what
appear to be permanent weapons emplacements but this is
not the case in the Paracels, though weapons have
appeared there occasionally. This might be due to the
proximity of the Paracels to Hainan, making them less
vulnerable. In the Spratlys, a variety of radars and radomes
now seem to be part of the permanent infrastructure,
indicating the extent of Chinese command-and-control and
ISR capabilities in the South China Sea. The ports in the
Spratly Islands, including deep-water berths, could in the
future support a wide range of naval vessels. Lastly, 3 km
runways, aircraft hangars and weapons-storage facilities on
Woody Island in the Paracels and Subi, Fiery Cross and
Mischief reefs in the Spratlys will enable greater reach for
Chinese airpower.

Airstrip Elephant-cage Harbour High-frequency Observation Storage

radar array radar tower
Close-in Large harbour Possible weapons
weapons Hangars HQ-9 hangar/ Radome emplacement
H Helipad emplacement
system

Gaven Reef Hughes Reef

Subi Reef H H
x4 x2 x4 x24
large tactical x2 x5 x2 x6

H x4 x14 x3

Fiery Cross Reef Spratly Islands

x5 x3 x24
large tactical
PHILIPPINES
x13
H x4 x12 x7
small
x3

Cuarteron Reef Johnson South Reef Mischief Reef

x2 x4 x16
x2 H x2 H x4 x9
large tactical
x2 x2 x2 x4 x2 x8 x4

© IISS

the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific can agree on
how to counter China in the near future, it seems that
Beijing will continue to slowly change the strategic
environment of the South China Sea at sea, in the air
and on reclaimed land.
PLA Army (PLAA)
The process of reorganisation and rebasing begun
in 2017 is mostly complete, although some brigade
moves may yet take place, largely in the Northern
and Western Theatre Commands. However, the
distinction between the areas of responsibility of the
Tibet Military Command and the Western Theatre
Command’s 77th Group Army now seems to have
become blurred, with the latter beginning to rebase
part of its manoeuvre force within Tibet itself.
The focus of the PLAA now appears to be on
internal restructuring within the new combined arms
brigades and training. The first reorganised light
combined arms infantry unit, formed in 2014 and
now part of the 78th Group Army in the Northern
Theatre Command, was unveiled publicly in 2018.
Utilising 4×4 vehicles from the Dongfeng Mengshi
family as personnel carriers, and truck- and jeep-
mounted howitzers and mortars for fire support, this
formation – a battalion of the 48th Combined Arms
Brigade – is a template for the rest of the PLAA’s light
combined arms units. The two newly redesignated
air-assault brigades in the Eastern and Southern
theatre commands, the 121st from the 75th Group
Army and the 161st from the 83rd Group Army,
are also now working up their capabilities and have
begun exercising in their new role.
For the heavy and medium combined arms
brigades, progress in modernising the PLAA’s
armoured-fighting-vehicle fleet is still only
incremental; a limiting factor is that the army is a
relatively low priority for re-equipment. The ZTZ-99
main battle tank, although in production for nearly
two decades, continues to equip less than a quarter
of the new heavy combined arms brigades. The
most advanced variant of the ZTZ-99, the ZTZ-99A,
appears to remain restricted to the two formations
already equipped with it prior to the reorganisation
(the 112th Mechanised Division and 62nd Combined
Arms Brigade).
More progress seems to have been made with
the army’s combat-support equipment, including
artillery, engineering and air-defence systems. The
indigenous HQ-16 air-defence system, which analysts
consider to be roughly analogous to Russia’s Buk, is
Asia 235
now in service with nine of the group armies, as well
as with units in Tibet and Shanghai. This gives the
PLAA its first widespread medium-range air-defence
capability.
PLA Rocket Force (PLARF)
The PLARF remains organised in a series of corps-
leader-grade ‘bases’, now numbering nine in total.
Six of them (bases 61–66) command the force’s
operational missile brigades, while the other three
handle warhead storage and transport (67 Base),
specialist engineering (68 Base) and test and training
(69 Base). The multiple new missile brigades formed
during 2017 are now beginning to take shape, with
some resultant relocation of units and changes to
equipment and missions. In 62 Base, a combination
of rebasing of existing units and the formation of
two new brigades is likely to result in an additional
brigade of DF-21D medium-range ballistic missiles
(MRBMs) and a first brigade of DF-26 intermediate-
Asia
range ballistic missiles being formed in southern
China. Both of these missile types have anti-ship
capabilities and when the brigades reach operational
capability will add to the PLARF’s ability to hold at
risk possible targets in the South China Sea and Indian
Ocean. In northern China, the new brigade in 65 Base
will also most probably equip with the DF-21D, since
it is currently co-located in Dalian, Liaoning province,
with an existing DF-21D formation. This would result
in a doubling of the PLARF’s anti-ship ballistic-
missile brigades, when compared to its roster before
the reorganisation began.
The two new brigades formed in 64 and 66 bases are
both likely to work up as road-mobile intercontinental-
ballistic-missile (ICBM) units; one is most probably
charged with bringing the still-developmental DF-41
(CH-SS-X-20) ICBM into service, while the other will
probably equip with either the DF-31A(G) ICBM or
additional DF-41s. Both of these missiles are believed
to be capable of deploying multiple independently
targetable re-entry vehicles. The new brigades would
mark the first expansion of the PLARF’s road-mobile
ICBM fleet in nearly a decade.
In late 2017, media reports described two test
firings of a new developmental short-range ballistic
missile or MRBM, reportedly with a hypersonic
glide-vehicle payload. It is reported that this missile
may have the PLA designation DF-17, but there is
limited further information available on the missile;
its connections, if any, to existing PLARF designs; and
its intended mission.
236 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
PLA Navy (PLAN) and China Coast Guard
(CCG)
In April 2018, China deployed to the South China Sea
its largest assembly of naval power in modern times.
Led by the aircraft carrier Liaoning, what amounted to
a fleet review consisted of nearly 50 vessels and sent
a significant message. It underscored the dramatic
progress in the capabilities of the PLAN, not least in
its potential for blue-water operations.
The PLAN has taken further steps in developing
its aircraft-carrier capability. In June 2018, China
announced that the Liaoning had reached initial
operating capability, and three months later said
that it had carried out night-flying operations. This
provides further evidence that China may be on
the cusp of a real, if still limited, operational carrier
capability.
In addition, a second aircraft carrier has begun sea
trials and could be accepted into service as early as
2019. Built in China, this second ship is a modified
version of the Liaoning. There were also increasing
indicators that work is under way on a third, larger
vessel that may be fitted with some form of catapult
and arrester gear.
Shipyard output seems to be focusing even
more than before on high-capability large surface
combatants, adding to the sense that Chinese naval-
capability development may be entering a new phase.
In July 2018, there were simultaneous launches of
two of the new Type-055 cruisers. This meant that
four had been launched in just over a year, while at
least four more are under construction. The first of the
Type-055s began sea trials in August 2018.
It has been estimated that the Type-055s displace
between 10,000 and 13,000 tonnes and will enhance
the navy’s capabilities in task-group operations and
independent blue-water deployments. They are seen
as most analogous to the United States’ Ticonderoga-
class cruisers, albeit perhaps slightly larger. The
Ticonderogas act as air-defence command ships for
US Navy carrier strike groups; they have a 122-cell
vertical-launch system, compared to 112 cells for
the Type-055s. A stretched version of the Type-
052D destroyer was observed with a modified flight
deck, possibly to accommodate the new Harbin Z-20
helicopter, perhaps in an anti-submarine role.
The PLAN still has areas of relative weakness,
notably in anti-submarine warfare and amphibious
operations, which continue to constrain its blue-water
aspirations. But it also continues to make strides in
addressing these deficiencies.
Shipyards continue to build smaller surface
combatants too, particularly Type-054A frigates and
Type-056A corvettes, and in September the PLAN
commissioned its fifth Type-071 large amphibious
landing ship. A first Type-075 amphibious assault
vessel is under construction in Shanghai.
China is also transforming its marine corps.
From a force a few years ago of two brigades and
approximately 10,000 personnel, the US Department
of Defense estimates that by 2020 it will consist of
some seven brigades and 30,000 personnel, with a
much wider scope of missions.
The PLAN’s four Type-094 Jin-class ballistic-
missile submarines appear now to be operational.
However, it remains unclear whether this means
that China is able to deliver an effective deterrent
capability. Broader submarine-modernisation
efforts continue, and two Type-039B Yuan II-class
conventionally powered submarines may have
commissioned in 2018.
In July, administrative control of China’s
coastguard was transferred from the civilian State
Oceanic Administration to the armed forces under
the People’s Armed Police. The potential impact of
this move remained uncertain, beyond clarifying and
streamlining a chain of command widely assumed to
already exist.
China’s consolidation of its infrastructure on
the disputed features it has developed in the South
China Sea, plus the ongoing enhancement of its
naval capabilities, continued to strengthen its ability
to exert influence and potentially exercise control
there. During 2018, the incremental progress of these
developments reached the point at which the US took
the decision to disinvite the PLAN from the US-led
Rim of the Pacific exercise. This and a number of other
friction points between the two navies during 2018,
including a significantly close encounter between
the two nations’ warships during a US freedom-
of-navigation operation in September, portended
challenges for both nations’ navies in 2019 and
highlighted the limits of existing agreements on
managing incidents at sea.
PLA Air Force (PLAAF)
The capabilities and institutional influence of the
PLAAF have advanced significantly in recent years;
the ground forces were traditionally the dominant
service. General Xu Qiliang, as vice-chairman of the
CMC, is now the most senior member of the PLA
armed services; a career air-force officer, he was

formerly the PLAAF commander. Another PLAAF
officer, General Yi Xiaoguang, is the commander of
the Central Theatre Command, responsible for the
security of Beijing and the surrounding area. These
appointments are emblematic of the air force’s
progress; they would have been nearly unthinkable,
say analysts, just a decade ago. Change has been
under way since the late 1990s, but a major push
came when the PLAAF received its first service-
specific strategy in 2004, instructing it to ‘integrate
air and space and be simultaneously prepared for
offensive and defensive operations’. For China, this
is not simply a matter of improving hardware and
weapons systems. There has been a simultaneous
drive to remake the PLA as an organisation as
well as its people, their mindset, their training and
their roles. This has affected not only the PLAAF,
but also the PLAN and its naval aviation branch
(PLANAF).
The training and exercise regimen of both the
air force and naval aviation have seen considerable
change. The PLAAF now has a series of exercises, the
‘Four Key Brands’, which enable it to test operational
capability as well as assess progress towards its
modernisation goals. These exercises exemplify a
move away from scripted drills toward a focus on
what China terms ‘back to back’ exercises, where
neither side in the exercise has prior knowledge
of the other’s plans. By doing this, the PLA is
attempting to learn from Western armed forces and
focus on preparing its next generation of pilots for
more realistic – i.e., unscripted – combat in a complex
electromagnetic environment.
The PLAAF has also started expanding the scope
and scale of its missions, and there is greater emphasis
on operations over water. Less than 30 years ago,
PLAAF training manuals included the warning that
these operations included challenges such as the
‘weather changes rapidly’ and ‘the horizon is difficult
to detect’. PLAAF aircraft first flew to the centre line
of the Taiwan Strait in 1998 and over the Miyako Strait
for the first time in May 2015. Since then, however,
there have been multiple flights into the Pacific,
some circumnavigating Taiwan, comprising many
aircraft types. As it sorties farther from the mainland
and conducts patrols more frequently, the PLAAF
is improving pilot training and experience, and
increasing its interaction with the PLAN’s surface
and aviation assets. At the same time, the PLANAF
is developing its capabilities in carrier operations.
Overall, the trend for the PLA’s aviation forces is
Asia 237
for new aircraft, better pilots, improved training and
more interoperability.
Nonetheless, significant challenges remain. One
relates to the human side of military capability. More
progress needs to be made in ensuring that senior
and more conservative leaders trust new ideas and
younger troops. Recruiting, training and retaining
high-quality personnel is a challenge for any armed
force, and one that the PLA is facing as it struggles
to build an NCO corps and attract more college
graduates.
Another challenge relates to ‘jointness’. One of
the core objectives of the PLA’s most recent round
of reforms, this relates to the employment of forces
from two or more service branches such that they
can together conduct coordinated operations. This
is a major change for the PLA, which has long been
ground-centric, with organisationally discrete
institutions. Indeed, US analysts say both the
PLAAF and PLANAF have retained a full suite of
Asia
aviation capacities because they have not been able
to draw on the other’s capabilities. This prevents
them from realising economies of scale that would
result from each maintaining a limited number of
distinct capabilities. Interaction among units was
traditionally limited in the absence of a common
higher-echelon command: regiments within the same
corps rarely trained or exercised together because
of strict command-and-control relationships. This is
slowly beginning to change and there is evidence,
albeit limited in comparison to Western experiences,
that the PLAAF and PLANAF are looking to develop
a level of jointness through common training.
The PLA is also engaged in a concerted effort
to produce strategically effective aviation forces.
Longer-duration missions, further from the mainland,
and increased integration among and between
PLAAF and PLAN aviation will in future become
more commonplace. This effort is taking place
during a time Beijing terms a ‘strategic opportunity’.
This means that the Communist Party of China has
decided that the risks required to implement these
changes are worth bearing now, because the risk of
major conflict with a large power is relatively low.
Consequently, Beijing hopes that when this period
of strategic opportunity ends, its future force will be
ready to compete with peer competitors.
Equipment progress
The Chengdu J-20 combat aircraft remains on track to
be introduced into front-line service with the PLAAF
238 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
around 2020. An operational test-and-evaluation unit
is now flying with the type and initial production-
standard J-20A aircraft are being delivered, so far at a
modest rate. The J-20A will be the first Chinese combat
aircraft designed from the outset with low-observable
characteristics to enter the PLAAF inventory.
The PLAAF has also stood up its first unit equipped
with the Sukhoi Su-35 Flanker E. All 24 Su-35s in the
initial order were expected to be delivered by the end
of 2018 or early 2019. The deal included acquisition
of the export version of the Russian R-77-1 (AA-12B
Adder) active-radar-guided medium-range air-to-air
missile, an upgrade of the basic R-77. Delivery of this
missile to the PLAAF has already begun. However, it
is not clear whether the PLAAF will buy additional
Su-35 aircraft, or if its operational experience with the
type will lead it to favour its own defence industry’s
continuing development of a single-seat Flanker, the
J-11D.
Development work on the successor to the H-6
medium bomber, the H-20, continues. State-owned
media noted in October 2018 that the project was
making ‘significant progress’. The H-20 is assumed
to be a low-observable – possibly tailless – design,
which could enter service from the latter half of the
2020s. Xian, a subsidiary of the Aviation Industry
Corporation of China (AVIC), continues to build
upgraded variants of the H-6 and is involved with the
H-20 programme.
The H-20 is a key element of the PLAAF’s
equipment recapitalisation and part of its goal to
become a ‘strategic air force’. This likely includes
a nuclear role – the current bomber, the H-6K, is
assessed as not having a nuclear role – as well as other
tasks. Indeed, the shift emphasises the PLAAF’s ability
to conduct defensive and offensive air operations
beyond the Chinese mainland, as well as to carry out
large-scale air operations in concert with ground or
maritime forces. Restructuring tactical aviation from
a regimental- to a brigade-based organisation is a part
of this ambition.
Production of Xian’s Y-20 heavy transport aircraft
continues, and the first regiment is forming with
this type. The Y-20 will also likely be the basis for a
tanker aircraft that will eventually replace the H-6
in this role. There are also increasing numbers of
special-mission aircraft within the PLAAF inventory.
For example, electronic-warfare versions of the JH-7
fighter/ground-attack aircraft appear to have been
fielded at unit level, while an escort jammer variant of
the J-16, the J-16D, is also in test.
UAVs are increasingly joining the inventory. These
will likely take on electronic-warfare roles alongside
other intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
tasks. The PLAAF continues to acquire UAVs with
the potential to deliver capabilities from the tactical
to theatre level.
DEFENCE ECONOMICS
According to Beijing, China’s 2018 defence budget
was RMB1.11 trillion (US$168 billion) – an increase
of 8.1% on the 2017 figure of RMB1.02trn (US$151bn).
Although this percentage increase was greater than
in 2017, when the budget was 7% higher than that
in 2016, growth is still in single digits. By contrast,
between 2011 and 2016, the defence budget grew
by more than 10% each year. But 2017 and 2018
figures indicate that single-digit growth is the new
normal, placed within the context of China’s overall
slow economic growth. Nonetheless, despite this
slowdown, which it should be remembered is
relative – China’s GDP still grew by 6.6% in 2018,
down from an average of 10% growth annually
between 2000 and 2009 – Chinese authorities have
also engaged in reforms intended to further develop
defence-industrial capabilities.
Improving China’s defence sector is a priority for
Xi for two principal reasons: firstly, so it can develop
advanced weapons systems for the PLA, and secondly,
to help transition China’s economic structure from
low-end processing to high-end manufacturing.
These efforts have been focused in three areas: civil–
military integration (CMI); innovation; and industrial
rationalisation. China’s defence industry has already
made significant strides. IISS assessments indicate
that in 2016, defence-related revenue for eight of the
ten Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved
in defence production would place seven of these
in the top 20 of the world’s most profitable defence
firms. Three of these – China South Industries Group
Corporation (CSGC), China Aviation Industry
Corporation (AVIC) and China North Industries
Group Corporation (NORINCO) – appear in the top
ten.
Civil–military integration
Xi has often stressed the importance of CMI, also
termed civil–military fusion. It was made a national
priority in 2015. On 2 March 2018, Xi chaired the
first plenary meeting (and third overall) of the
Central Commission for Integrated Civilian–Military

Development (CCIMCD), which was set up in January
2017. At the March meeting, Xi emphasised the need
for a national civil–military fusion and development
strategy and to further develop CMI. These support
China’s goals of having by 2049 world-class military
forces and achieving a modern socialist country (‘the
Chinese Dream and the dream of building a powerful
military’, as Xi put it to the 19th Party Congress in
October 2017). The meeting approved measures
including strategic-development guidelines for CMI,
the 2018 plan of action for the CCIMCD, a programme
to develop CMI pilot zones focused on innovation
and a list of the prospective pilot zones.
The whole party–state system has been mobilised
to deliver Xi’s instructions. For instance, the Office
of CCIMCD, which is responsible for routine work,
has organised workshops to promote civil–military
fusion, review progress made so far in these areas
and fix any problems identified. As part of this,
central-government officials have been dispatched
to different locations across China as part of their
investigations. All major state-owned enterprises
are required to select areas to take part in pilot CMI
reform programmes, and some military officials are
supposed to work for periods in their relevant civil-
sector industries.
Innovation
The CMI policy is strongly connected to efforts
in China to boost defence-industrial innovation.
Priorities for 2018 included the continued overhaul
of China’s defence science-and-technology (S&T)
research institutes and academies. Under way since
2017, this programme aims to change the ownership
structure of wholly state-owned defence S&T research
institutes and academies (those manufacturing
sub-systems or even final assembly) so that they can
be listed on the stock market. This effort started in the
early 2000s, though the focus at that time was on those
firms manufacturing spare parts; it is estimated that
at least US$30bn was raised from the stock market.
Now the focus is shifting to research institutes and
academies.
In the plan, 41 defence-research institutes were
identified for ownership reform, covering ordnance,
electronics, aerospace, shipbuilding, aviation and
the nuclear sector. In May 2018, the Southwest
Automation Institute (or 58th Institute) of China South
Industries Group Company Ltd was approved as the
first out of the 41 institutes to complete the change.
Located in Mianyang City, Sichuan province, this
Asia 239
China’s innovation pilot zones
„„ ChengDeMian (Chengdu-Deyang-Mianyang),
Sichuan Province
„„ Chongqiang
„„ Dalian, Liaoning Province
„„ Lanzhou, Gansu Province
„„ Luoyang, Henan Province
„„ Ningbo, Zhoushan, Hangzhou and Shaoxing,
Zhejiang Province
„„ Ningde, Fujian Province
„„ Qingdao West Coast New Area, Shandong
Province
„„ Shenzhen, Guangdong Province
„„ Wuhan, Hubei Province
„„ Xian, Shaanxi Province
„„ Zhongguancun, Beijing
town is well known as a science and manufacturing
Asia
centre. Its achievements include the production of
intelligent munitions, digital manufacturing and
digital machine-tool production, among other areas;
its total assets reportedly amount to RMB1bn (about
US$154 million).
Analysts think that the 58th Institute case is widely
reported so that its transformation can be a model for
others to follow. The goal was to similarly overhaul
the remaining 40 institutes by the end of 2018 and,
by 2020, convert the majority of defence S&T research
institutes into corporations. However, not all defence-
research institutes and academies are going to be
overhauled. Institutes responsible for basic research
will reportedly remain unchanged but those for
technological development and engineering will be
overhauled.
However, converting these organisations is a
challenging task, involving changes to areas ranging
from salaries and employee welfare to tax incentives,
debt arrangement, asset liquidation, the CCP’s role
in management, labour unions, and price policies for
weapons and equipment.
The March 2018 CCIMCD meeting approved the
first batch of 15 CMI innovation pilot zones.
These zones can be classified as one of five types:
areas with traditional heavy defence industries,
though with emerging numbers of private defence
subcontractors – Sichuan and Shaanxi provinces
being typical cases; areas with the potential to develop
disruptive technologies – such as Shenzhen, which is
emerging as a tech city; areas with good infrastructure,
240 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
suitable as incubators for new industries – Ningbo
and Hangzhou are seen as ideal examples; areas with
a heavy military presence that requires social support,
such as Qingdao and Dalian – where military logistics
heavily rely on local support; and areas with dual-use
heavy industries, such as Ningde and Zhoushan,
which are identified as potential military and civilian
ports with expansion potential.
The idea of innovation pilot zones dates back to
2016, when the National Development and Reform
Commission set out a plan to have ten such zones.
In the end, with motivations perhaps including the
chance of gaining central-government funding as well
as Xi’s favour, at least 26 applications and proposals
were reportedly submitted by ministries, provinces
and major cities. Xi was reported to have set out
instructions emphasising ‘institutional innovation’,
creating a new model that could be imitated elsewhere
to help break obstacles to CMI.
In order to develop China’s capabilities in
sophisticated integrated circuits, advanced computing
and biotechnologies, Beijing announced in January
2018 that it would set up national industrial innovation
centres and issued documentation. In April, a
National Information Optoelectronics Innovation
Center (NIOIC) was established at a technology
centre in Wuhan, Hubei province, run by FiberHome
Technologies, a state-owned enterprise under the
supervision of the State-Owned Assets Supervision
and Administration Commission. The NIOIC is also
home to the national laboratory for fibre-optic and
cyber-communications technology and the national
engineering centre for fibre-optic-communications
technology, among others. It has reportedly been
tasked to develop indigenous advanced integrated
circuit chips, amid trade disputes with the US focused
on technological competition, so that defence and
cyber security can be assured and the government’s
‘Made in China 2025’ programme, to improve China’s
domestic high-tech manufacturing capacity, can be
fully supported. Meanwhile, the State Administration
for Science, Technology and Industry (SASTIND)
runs the National Defense Technology Innovation
Centre, designed to implement an innovation-driven
technology-development strategy. In 2018, two new
centres were approved: the Defense S&T Industry
Aviation Engine Innovation Centre, under the Aero
Engine Corporation of China, and the Maritime
Defense Technology Innovation Centre, under the
China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation. It is
reported that 11 centres will eventually be approved.
Industrial rationalisation
Over the past decade, China’s defence industry has
been organised under ten state-owned conglomerates.
This system too is now being challenged and in
January 2018 the government announced that China
Nuclear Engineering and Construction Group
Corporation would be merged with China National
Nuclear Corporation.
Reports indicated in March that approval has also
been given in principle for a merger between China’s
two major shipbuilding companies – the China State
Shipbuilding Corporation and China Shipbuilding
Industries Corporation (CSIC). It is estimated that after
the merger, total sales revenue will reach RMB$508bn
(US$77bn), a figure exceeding the total revenue of
South Korea’s three major shipbuilders: Hyundai
Heavy Industries, Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine
Engineering Co. Ltd, and Samsung Heavy Industry.
There has been no formal announcement, however,
which analysts assess could be related to ongoing inves-
tigations into allegations of corruption. Nonetheless,
reports of the potential merger reflect Xi’s instruction
that China’s state-owned enterprises become bigger
and stronger in order to compete globally.
The Chinese government is also now encouraging
private-sector involvement in defence S&T. There
have been instances of this in the aerospace sector,
though some of the firms are subsidiaries of state-
owned aerospace conglomerates, such as Beijing
OneSpace Technology Co. Ltd. OneSpace, reportedly
with support from SASTIND, launched China’s
first private rocket in May 2018 on a mission to
collect data for the Aviation Industry Corporation of
China. Another example is LandSpace Technology
Corporation, founded in 2015, which announced
in July the completion of its ZQ-2 rocket system.
Ground tests of the ZQ-2 are expected to be
completed in 2019, with a launch following in 2020.
In January 2017, LandSpace obtained the first private
commercial launch contract for a foreign customer,
launching two satellites for Danish firm GOMSpace
aboard a LandSpace-1 rocket in February 2018. A
third example is ExPace Technology Corporation.
This subsidiary of the China Aerospace Science
and Industry Corporation is also known as the
CASIC Rocket Technology Company; it serves as
its commercial rocket division and focuses on small
satellite launches to low-Earth orbit. Established in
February 2016 in Wuhan, ExPace is developing its
Kuaizhou rockets for different payloads and looking
into fast launches of solid-fuel rockets.

JAPAN
Japan’s evolving defence posture remains driven by a
combination of international and domestic pressures.
Japanese concerns over North Korea’s provocations
were exacerbated in 2017 by a series of missile tests,
while China’s military modernisation and growing
maritime activities in the East and South China
seas continue to worry Tokyo. Meanwhile, the US
presidency of Donald Trump has proven unsettling.
On the one hand, the US administration has pledged
with its Japanese ally ‘maximum pressure’ on North
Korea and commitment to the defence of Japan’s
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, but on the other hand
it is rapidly seeking rapprochement with North
Korea and demanding that Japan pay more for its
own defence and for the benefits of the alliance.
Consequently, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF)
have continued to augment their capabilities, mainly
in the service of the US–Japan alliance, but seeking a
degree of autonomy to hedge against abandonment
by the US. At the same time, Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe has faced domestic challenges to his leadership
and security policy, despite in October 2017 winning
for the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) a
fifth consecutive electoral victory since 2012.
Japan’s principal new commitment to the US–
Japan alliance has been the formal decision in
December 2017 to strengthen its ballistic-missile-
defence (BMD) capabilities with the purchase from
the US of two Aegis Ashore units. These should
bolster the JSDF’s ability to intercept ballistic missiles;
may enhance Japan’s defence against cruise missiles
if it procures the SM-6 interceptor; and, just as
importantly, responds to Trump’s calls for Japan to
procure more US equipment as a quid pro quo for
US security pledges. The Aegis Ashore procurement
has provoked some controversy in Japan, with local
authorities voicing opposition. Furthermore, only
one unit will likely deploy by 2023 and the estimated
cost has doubled to around US$3.6 billion.
In the meantime, Japan is deepening cooperation
with the US armed forces. The Japan Maritime Self-
Defense Force (JMSDF) was revealed in April 2018
as having refuelled US destroyers on BMD duties
17 times in 2017. This was accomplished using the
Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement and the
expanded definitions of Japanese support for the
US in contingencies under new security legislation
passed in 2015. Then defence minister Itsunori
Onodera suggested in August 2017 that collective
Asia 241
self-defence legislation could be used by the
JMSDF to intercept North Korean missiles targeted
at Guam, even if Japan was not itself directly
threatened. Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF)
fighter aircraft carried out drills that same month
with US B-1 and B-52 bombers in the vicinity of the
Sea of Japan as an indirect demonstration to North
Korea of US–Japan interoperability and solidarity.
The Abe administration has furthermore proved
resolute in pushing ahead with plans to relocate
the US Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma to
Henoko, within Okinawa Prefecture, continuing
with land-reclamation works at the new site despite
legal action and protests from the prefectural
government.
The Japan Ministry of Defense (JMoD) has in the
past three years secured budget increases that have
enabled the JSDF to expand existing capabilities
and to move into new areas. The JASDF deployed
the first of its F-35A combat aircraft at Misawa in
Asia
northern Japan in January 2018 and was allocated a
budget in March for investigating the procurement
of air-launched cruise missiles. Japan’s apparent
intent is to utilise its Aegis destroyers, Aegis Ashore,
F-35As, cruise missiles and uninhabited aerial
vehicles to create an integrated system with defensive
and potentially offensive aspects to complement US
power projection, but also compensate for any US
reluctance to defend Japan in the future. The budget
also included a sum for research into hypersonic
systems and related propulsion.
The JMSDF launched its seventh Aegis destroyer
in July 2017. Onodera reported in March 2018 that
the JMoD was actively studying the conversion
of the Izumo-class vessels to enable the operation
of F-35Bs, confirming long-held speculation that
these were not only de facto helicopter carriers but
designed to become eventually fully fledged fixed-
wing aircraft carriers. Japan has long called these
vessels ‘helicopter-carrying destroyers’. Though
in the post-war period Japan has denied itself the
procurement of carriers as an offensive capability,
the conversion project was justified by referring to a
‘defensive carrier’ that was focused on the protection
of Japan’s outlying islands.
In March 2018, the Japan Ground Self-Defense
Force (JGSDF) established the Amphibious Rapid
Deployment Brigade (ARDB). This proto-marine
force will focus on the defence of outlying islands
and be equipped with AAV7 amphibious vehicles
and Osprey aircraft. In addition, the JGSDF is
242 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
planning to deploy surface-to-ship guided missiles
in Japan’s southwest islands to ensure that if
necessary the straits between Okinawa Prefecture
and Taiwan can be closed to Chinese warships. As
part of a reorganisation, a single headquarters has
been set up to coordinate inter-regional JGSDF
action, and lighter and more deployable forces
are being created, particularly in the Western and
Central armies.
New National Defence Programme Guidelines
were due by the end of 2018 and were likely to
promote JSDF ‘cross-domain’ capabilities, reinforced
by cyberspace and space capabilities. However,
Tokyo’s moves to strengthen the US–Japan alliance
and its capabilities face some domestic opposition.
Defence-procurement costs are seen to be escalating:
in 2018, these reportedly increased for Japan’s
indigenous C-2 transport programme, along with
F-35A unit costs and the rising cost of Aegis Ashore,
which could constrain Japan’s scope to acquire new
systems such as a successor to the F-2 fighter.
Abe’s leadership and plans for security-policy
reforms have also been questioned due to his
entanglement in personal financial scandals and
internal competition for the LDP presidency election
that took place in September 2018. This election saw
Abe re-elected as LDP leader, allowing him to serve
another term in which he would become Japan’s
longest-serving prime minister. Additionally, public
trust in the JMoD was tarnished by revelations that
the JGSDF concealed operations logs for the South
Sudan peacekeeping operation. This was in order to
cover up the deteriorating local security situation and
risk of combat, but the scandal led to the eventual
resignation of Onodera’s predecessor Tomomi Inada.
Abe survived these challenges and has focused the
next stage of his premiership on formal revision of the
constitution and the so-called ‘peace clause’ of Article
9; this is the final, long-term goal of his political career
and is seen as essential by Abe to free Japan from past
constraints on security policy. Abe has proposed
revisions that leave intact the current clauses of Article
9 but add a further clause that the ‘JSDF is maintained
as an armed organisation to take necessary self-
defence measures’. Abe’s supporters argue this is a
moderate proposal simply acknowledging the reality
of the JSDF’s existence. But critics respond that the
lack of specificity in defining ‘self-defence measures’
could lead to Japan’s exercise of force beyond the
previous interpretation of the minimum necessary
for self-defence.
THAILAND
The Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) have always
exercised important domestic political and internal-
security roles alongside their responsibility for
external defence. The 22 May 2014 coup took place
after Thailand had been wracked for months by
violent political conflict between factions supporting
and opposing the elected civilian government led
by Yingluck Shinawatra, the sister of former prime
minister Thaksin Shinawatra. (Thaksin’s populist
administration had itself been overthrown by an
earlier coup in 2006.) Since May 2014, the armed forces,
acting through the National Council for Peace and
Order, have closely supervised both the government
and law enforcement on a day-to-day basis. The
armed forces – and particularly the Royal Thai Army
(RTA), which remains the dominant service – have
also attempted to plot a course for the country through
a wide-ranging, 20-year National Strategy. This
plan, which focuses on security as well as political,
economic, social and environmental aspects, was
unanimously approved in July 2018 by the military-
dominated National Legislative Assembly. According
to Thailand’s 2017 constitution, the policies of future
elected governments must conform to the National
Strategy. The military government has several times
postponed the general election, which will allow a
return to democratic rule; it was next scheduled to
be held between late February and early May 2019.
Meanwhile, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha has
indicated his interest in continuing ‘political work’
and it is widely rumoured that he may seek to lead a
political party in order to continue in his present role
after the 2019 election.
Internal and external security
Maintaining internal security in Thailand’s three
southernmost provinces (Narrathiwat, Patani and
Yala) remains an important operational task for the
RTARF, particularly for the army and the marine
corps. Forces are deployed there to tackle an insurgent
campaign by ethnic-Malay separatists – largely by
groups affiliated with the Barisan Revolusi Nasional–
Coordinate – which re-ignited in 2004. A tentative
peace process has been under way since 2015 and
achieved an initial result with the announcement in
February 2018 that a pilot violence-free ‘safety zone’
would be established later in the year. Violence in the
region has decreased because of the peace process, the
government’s security measures and a rehabilitation
 Asia 243

1 Chiang Mai 15 Bangkok MYANMAR

Air base – 41st Wing (L-39ZA)
 Royal Thai Army HQ

7th Infantry Division
 1st Division

LAOS
2 Phitsanulok
1st Development Division*
 VIETNAM
2nd Armoured Division

3rd Army HQ

Naval base
 1
4th Infantry Division

Don Muang air base – 6th Wing

3rd Development Division*

(transport aircraft)
Air base – 46th Wing (BT-67)

16 Prachinburi
3 Petchabun
2nd Infantry Division
 4
1st Armoured Division
 5
17 Chachoengsao
4 Udorn, Udon Thani 2
11th Infantry Division
 3
Air base – 23rd Wing (Alpha Jet)

18 U-Tapao 6
5 Nakhon Phanom
Naval air base
 7
Naval base (Mekong riverine

patrols) 19 Sattahip THAILAND
Naval air base
 Naval base
 10 8
12
11 9
6 Khon Kaen 20 Trat
3rd Armoured Division
 Naval base
 13
7 Roi Et 21 Phachuap Khiri Khan 14 16
6th Infantry Division
 Air base – 5th Wing (AU-23A)
 15 17
8 Ubon, Ubon Ratchathani 22 Samui
Bangkok
Air base – 21st Wing (F-5E/F)
 Naval base

18 19 CAMBODIA
9 Korat, Nakhon Ratchasima 23 Surat Thani
2nd Army HQ
 Air base – 7th Wing (JAS-39 Gripen
 20

Asia
3rd Infantry Division
 C/D, Saab 340 Erieye, Saab 340B) 21
2nd Development Division*

24 Phang-nga
Air base – 1st Wing (F-16A/B)
 1st Naval Area
Naval base

Command
10 Takhli, Nakhon Sawon 25 Songkhla
Air base – 4th Wing (L-39,
 Naval base (coastal vessels)

T-50TH, F-16A/B)
26 Nakhon Si Thammarat
11 Khok Ka Thiem, Lopburi
4th Army HQ
 22
Air base – 2nd Wing (Bell 412,

5th Infantry Division

S-92A, Bell 205/UH-1H) 23
4th Development Division*

12 Lopburi
27 Hat Yai, Songkhla 24 25
HQ Army Aviation

Air base – 56th Wing (JAS-39

Kanchanaburi Gripen forward operating base) 26 2nd Naval Area
13 9th Infantry Division Command
28 Phuket
Kamphang Saen, Nakhon Pathom Naval base
 3rd Naval Area 27
Command 28
14 
Air base – training squadrons 29
29 Pattani
15th Infantry Division


Army Navy Air force *Development Division =

construction/support role MALAYSIA
© IISS

▲ Map 8 Thailand: principal military bases

scheme for insurgents. Indeed, the annual death toll
from the conflict of 235 in 2017 was the lowest since
2004.
The RTA’s 4th Army Region is headquartered
further north in the Kra peninsula at Nakhon Si
Thammarat. It includes two infantry divisions and
a ‘development’ division, totalling around 35,000
troops. Along with the navy-controlled Royal Thai
Marine Corps, the 4th Army Region provides forces
for operations in the troubled provinces. However,
many front-line duties are carried out by black-
uniformed army auxiliaries known as Thahan Pran
(‘hunter-soldiers’, often referred to as ‘rangers’),
who operate closely with paramilitary Border Patrol
Police units. The headquarters of the multi-agency
Internal Security Operations Command Area 4 at Fort
Sirindhorn in Yarang District, Patani province, directs
operations by all security forces in the region.
Though the main priority for the RTARF is to
ensure national unity and internal security, the
armed forces are nevertheless well funded, equipped
and trained to deter and defend Thailand against
state adversaries. Over the last 40 years, a series
of threats have arisen from Thailand’s immediate
neighbours. Border security was a priority during
the 1980s, after the Soviet-supported Vietnamese
244 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
invasion of Cambodia forced Khmer Rouge and other
Cambodian forces opposed to Hanoi’s occupation
across the border, as well as the refugee populations
they controlled. Thailand was one of the nations that
supported Cambodian opposition groups and there
were frequent clashes between Thai and Vietnamese
troops, with protracted fighting in early 1987
near Chong Bok, where the borders of Cambodia,
Laos and Thailand intersect. In late 1987 and early
1988, there were border clashes between Thai- and
Vietnamese-supported Laotian forces over disputed
territory. Sporadic security challenges to Thailand’s
borders continued after the end of the Cold War and
the Cambodian peace settlement of 1991. There was
a major border clash with Myanmar in 2001, and in
2010–12 fighting between Myanmar government
forces and ethnic-minority rebels spilled across
the border into Thailand. In 2008–11, there were a
series of confrontations and exchanges of fire with
Cambodian forces over disputed border territory
around the Preah Vihear temple.
Unlike some of its fellow members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
notably Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam,
Thailand is not a territorial claimant in the South
China Sea and does not perceive a direct threat from
China’s growing power and maritime assertiveness.
Indeed, Thailand’s relations with China have
warmed during the current decade, influenced by
historical ties, current economic links and Thailand’s
foreign-policy recalibration following the adverse
Western reaction to the 2014 coup. Nevertheless,
Thailand has substantial maritime interests due
to its long coastline, the economic importance of
marine resources (especially natural gas) within its
exclusive economic zone, its large fishing fleet, its
heavy economic dependence on international trade
and its increasingly important coastal industrial
development. These all provide important reasons
for developing the country’s navy.
Foreign-defence relations
Since the 1950s, defence and security relations with
the United States have strongly influenced Thailand’s
defence policy, doctrine and equipment procurement.
The basis for the relationship lies in Thailand’s
importance as a relatively stable, pro-Western bastion
during the Cold War: at that time, it needed external
support in the face of both external and domestic
communist threats. Thailand was a signatory to
the 1954 Manila Pact, which, among other things,
established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation
(SEATO). SEATO dissolved in 1977, but the Manila
Pact remains in force, as does the so-called Rusk–
Thanat communiqué of 1962, under which the US
promised to assist Thailand if it faced aggression
from neighbouring countries. Together with
Thailand’s post-2003 status as a Major Non-NATO
Ally, these agreements provide the foundation for
US–Thai security relations. Building on support in
earlier decades, Thailand allowed the US to use the
naval air base at U-Tapao as a staging post for flights
supporting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Thailand’s armed forces have benefited from
substantial infusions of US defence equipment,
logistic and infrastructural support, and training,
managed by the Bangkok-based Joint US Military
Advisory Group Thailand. However, the coups of
2006 and 2014 undermined bilateral security relations
as well as political ties. Subsequent US restrictions on
the supply of military equipment notably provided an
important reason for Thailand to diversify its defence
procurement. Nevertheless, US–Thai engagement
through military exercises has endured. Indeed, the
annual Cobra Gold exercise organised in Thailand
by the US Pacific (now Indo-Pacific) Command and
RTARF remains the largest multilateral exercise
in the Asia-Pacific region. Other annual exercises
involving Thai and US forces are the CARAT Thailand
(naval interoperability), Guardian Sea (anti-submarine
warfare), Hanuman Guardian (army) and Cope Tiger
(air force) series.
Thailand also maintains good defence relations
with several other regional US allies or security
partners, including Australia, where exercise
cooperation includes the Chapel Gold (jungle warfare),
AusThai (naval), Pitch Black (multinational air combat)
and Kakadu (multinational naval) exercise. Thailand
cooperates with fellow ASEAN members through
the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)
and ADMM–Plus (also involving eight of ASEAN’s
Dialogue Partners), though its strongest bilateral
defence cooperation in Southeast Asia is with
Singapore. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) have
conducted extensive training activities in Thailand
since the 1970s, and the Republic of Singapore Air
Force organises the Cope Tiger air-force exercise
with its Thai and US counterparts. In November
2017, Singapore’s Ministry of Defence said that
bilateral defence cooperation with Thailand would
be strengthened, with particular emphasis on closer
naval cooperation, counter-terrorism and cyber

security. Thailand’s defence relations with Japan have
intensified since June 2016, when the two nations’
defence ministers agreed on a range of exchanges,
including bilateral army staff talks and the dispatch
of RTA observers to a disaster-relief exercise in Japan.
Thailand’s alliance with the US has not prevented
it from developing defence relations with China,
which have deepened since 2014. In 2015, the navy
selected China to supply submarines as the basis
for re-establishing a sub-surface capability; in May
2017, Thailand ordered one S26T boat (an export
variant of China’s Yuan class), with delivery by
2023 scheduled. The contract is reported to include
some weapons systems, spare parts and technology
transfer (understood to include developing the
Royal Thai Navy’s Sattahip dockyard such that it
can support submarine operations and construction
of a similar facility on the southwest coast to support
submarine operations in the Andaman Sea). Orders
for another two submarines are expected in 2021–
22. Thailand has also purchased Chinese-made
armoured vehicles: 28 VT-4 (MBT-3000) main battle
tanks (MBTs) were delivered by the end of 2017. Plans
to purchase ten more VT-4s along with 34 VN-1 (ZBL-
08) wheeled armoured personnel carriers (APCs)
were approved in April 2017. At this time, Deputy
Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan confirmed that
an order of a further 11 VT-4s was planned, so that
they could equip a full battalion. In January 2018,
Army Commander-in-Chief General Chalermchai
Sitthisart confirmed plans to collaborate with China
in establishing a military-vehicle maintenance, repair
and overhaul facility in Thailand. Since 2015, the two
countries have also organised Falcon Strike, a bilateral
air-force exercise series in Thailand, which was held
for the third time in September 2018.
Defence economics
Thailand’s defence spending is the third largest in
Southeast Asia (after Singapore and Indonesia),
and the armed forces’ political role has helped to
ensure that the defence sector not only continues
to receive substantial funding but that there are
significant annual increases in the military budget.
The defence budget for the 2019 fiscal year (starting
in October 2018) of US$7.06 billion represents a 4.2%
increase over the previous year. It comprises 7.6% of
government spending and approximately 1.4% of
GDP. About half the budget is allocated to the army;
the remainder is more or less evenly divided between
the navy and air force, with a small proportion
Asia 245
supporting the defence ministry and armed-forces
headquarters. It is thought that around two-thirds of
the defence budget is used to meet routine personnel,
maintenance and operational costs, including the
substantial sums associated with internal-security
operations in southern Thailand. The remainder
of the defence budget is used for procurement and
infrastructural projects. The ‘Vision 2026’ defence-
modernisation plan, approved by Thailand’s Defence
Council in October 2017, outlines the armed forces’
capability improvements over the next decade,
recognising that the extent of modernisation will
depend on the country’s overall economic progress
and the allocation of resources to the defence sector.
The plan also states the objective of increasing the
defence budget to 2% of GDP within the next several
years.
Industry and procurement
In its Defence Industry Masterplan, the government
Asia
emphasises the importance of expanding Thailand’s
presently limited defence industry as an important
component of developing the country’s military
capability, while ensuring that defence spending
benefits the national economy. The Masterplan sees
technology transfers from foreign defence-equipment
suppliers – possibly mandated in the future through
a more explicit offset policy – as playing a central
role in defence-industrial development, which the
government intends to concentrate particularly in
Thailand’s Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC). The
naval dockyard at Sattahip in Chonburi province
and the nearby naval air base at U-Tapao are
viewed respectively as future hubs for the naval
and military-aerospace industry. In November 2017,
the government identified the defence industry
as the 11th key industry targeted to expand in the
EEC. Moreover, legislative changes will allow local
defence-industrial enterprises – which are mainly
owned and operated by the armed forces – to more
easily collaborate with foreign defence companies.
Already, the Royal Thai Navy’s Bangkok Dock
company is building modified River-class offshore
patrol vessels (OPVs) with the United Kingdom’s
BAE Systems, and the RTA’s Weapon Production
Centre is assembling ATMOS 2000 self-propelled
howitzers in collaboration with Israel’s Elbit Systems.
In the aerospace sector, the private Thai company
Avia Satcom, in which Saab has a 37% equity stake,
has developed tactical data links for Gripen combat
aircraft.
246 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
In the past, Thailand’s military capability has not
been helped by the diversity of equipment operated
by the RTARF and by its uncoordinated procurement
system, with each service having responsibility
for its own equipment programmes. However, the
present government is making serious efforts to
reform defence procurement, particularly through
an expanded role for the defence ministry’s Defence
Technology Institute. Under legislation that was
expected to come into effect by early 2019, this will
become the Defence Technology Agency (DTA). The
DTA will act as a central procurement agency for the
armed forces, as well as overseeing the development
of Thailand’s defence industry.
Thailand’s armed forces have benefited from
limited re-equipment programmes during the
present decade, but there are still major outstanding
requirements.
Army
Following contracts with Ukraine’s Ukroboronprom,
the army has taken delivery of more than 200 BTR-3E1
APCs and 49 T-84 Oplot MBTs. Delays in fulfilling that
contract probably provide an additional reason for
the RTA’s increased interest in China as a source of
armoured vehicles. Given an overall requirement for
150 new MBTs to replace US-made M48s and M60s,
further orders for Chinese tanks are possible. Since
2015, the army has been bringing into service 12 locally
produced Elbit Systems ATMOS 2000 howitzers, with
the Marine Corps taking another six. Twenty-six more
may be ordered for the army, with possibly ten units
for the Marine Corps. The army has also purchased
Oerlikon Skyguard 3 air-defence fire-control systems,
as part of a package with eight 35 mm Oerlikon
GDF-007 Twin Guns and ammunition. The already
diverse inventory of the army’s aviation component
has received more helicopters from Russia (Mi-17V5s),
the US (UH-60Ms), Italy (AW139s) and the European
Airbus company (EC145s and UH-72As). Reports
suggest that the RTA may buy additional Mi-17V5s.
The army also reportedly has a requirement for
additional fixed-wing transport aircraft.
Air Force
The most important procurement by the Royal Thai
Air Force (RTAF) over the last ten years involved the
acquisition of 12 JAS 39 Gripen multi-role combat
aircraft, two Saab 340 Erieye airborne early-warning
(AEW) aircraft and a national air command-and-
control system (ACCS), based on Saab’s 9AIR C4I
product, together with data links. This effected a
step change in the potential combat-effectiveness of
the RTAF, by providing the basis for an integrated
and potentially highly effective air-defence
capability. According to Saab, the company
provided access to the source codes for the Gripen so
that the RTAF could ‘develop, upgrade, modify or
add equipment, sensors and weapon systems in the
future by themselves’. There is now a requirement
for an additional six Gripen aircraft. In September
2018, Saab announced that it had been contracted
to upgrade Thailand’s ACCS with ‘new hardware
and software enhancements’. The next-most-
important air-force procurement has involved 12
T-50TH Golden Eagle armed lead-in training aircraft
from South Korea, with deliveries under way from
January 2018.
Navy
Much media coverage of Royal Thai Navy (RTN)
procurement has justifiably focused on its submarine
programme, which is significant not just in terms
of Thailand’s prospective acquisition of a new
capability, but also because of its opportunity costs
for the service. Nevertheless, a significant surface-
ship procurement programme is also under way,
involving a DW 3000F frigate modelled on the South
Korean Gwanggaeto class. The ship began sea trials
in December 2017 and was scheduled for delivery
during 2018. However, funding constraints seem at
least temporarily to have stymied plans for a second
DW 3000F frigate. In addition, a second Krabi-class
OPV (one of the modified River-class vessels) is
under construction at Sattahip; the navy is expected
to order more ships in the same class. While the
procurement of new vessels has been limited, during
the present decade the RTN has upgraded important
surface units, notably its two Chinese-built Type-25T
Naresuan-class frigates (commissioned in 1994–95),
which Saab equipped with new combat-management
systems, fire-control radars and data links allowing
direct communication with the RTAF’s Erieye AEW
platforms.
 Asia 247

FORCES BY ROLE
Afghanistan AFG SPECIAL FORCES
1 spec ops div (1 (National Mission) SF bde (1 SF gp; 1
New Afghan Afghani Afs 2017 2018 2019
mech inf bn (2 mech inf coy)); 2 cdo bde (1 mech inf coy,
GDP Afs 1.38tr 1.45tr 4 cdo bn); 1 (1st MSF) mech bde (2 mech inf bn); 1 (2nd
US$ 20.2bn 20.4bn MSF) mech bde (3 mech inf bn))
per capita US$ 570 565 MANOEUVRE
Growth % 2.7 2.3 Light
Inflation % 5.0 3.0 1 (201st) corps (3 inf bde (4 inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn,
1 CSS bn), 1 inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn, 1
Def bdgt [a] Afs 148bn 147bn
CSS bn), 1 engr bn, 1 int bn, 2 MP coy, 1 sigs bn)
US$ 2.17bn 2.06bn
1 (203rd) corps (2 inf bde (5 inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn,
US$1=Afs 68.08 71.27 1 CSS bn), 2 inf bde (4 inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn, 1
[a] Security expenditure. Includes expenditure on Ministry of CSS bn), 1 engr bn, 1 int bn, 2 MP coy, 1 sigs bn)
Defence, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National
Security Council and the General Directorate of National Security.
1 (205th) corps (4 inf bde (4 inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn,
Also includes donor funding. 1 CSS bn), 1 engr bn, 1 int bn, 2 MP coy, 1 sigs bn)
1 (207th) corps (3 inf bde (4 inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn,
Population 34,940,837
1 CSS bn), 1 engr bn, 1 int bn, 2 MP coy, 1 sigs bn)
Ethnic groups: Pashtun 38%; Tajik 25%; Hazara 19%; Uzbek 12%;
1 (209th) corps (1 div HQ; 3 inf bde (4 inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1
Aimaq 4%; Baluchi 0.5%
cbt spt bn, 1 CSS bn), 1 engr bn, 1 int bn, 2 MP coy, 1
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus sigs bn)
Male 20.8% 5.8% 5.3% 4.3% 13.3% 1.2% 1 (215th) corps (3 inf bde (4 inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn,

Asia
Female 20.1% 5.6% 5.2% 4.1% 12.9% 1.4% 1 CSS bn), 1 inf bde (2 inf bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 CSS bn), 1
engr bn, 1 int bn, 2 MP coy, 1 sigs bn)
Capabilities 1 (111st Capital) div (1 inf bde (1 tk bn, 1 mech inf bn, 2
inf bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 CSS bn), 1 inf bde (4 inf
The Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) are
bn, 1 sy coy, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 CSS bn), 1 int bn)
optimised for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations
against the Taliban and other groups. Although ANDSF casualties EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
are no longer reported by the US and NATO, credible media reports ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
suggested that already high losses due to casualties and desertion MBT 20 T-55/T-62 (24 more in store†)
further increased in 2018. These losses have operational effect. APC 996
Overall, the ANDSF had a personnel shortage of 12%, struggling APC (T) 173 M113A2†
to retain key specialists including pilots, aircraft mechanics, techni-
APC (W) 623 MSFV (inc variants)
cal specialists and special-operations forces. Army and police SOF
are well regarded by NATO and bear the brunt of offensive opera- PPV 200 Maxxpro
tions and intelligence-led strike operations against insurgent net- ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
works. NATO advisers remain embedded in the defence and inte- ARV 20 Maxxpro ARV
rior ministries, although the ANDSF are now responsible for the MW Bozena
majority of training, albeit with NATO support. The additional US ARTILLERY 775
forces authorised to support the new US Afghan strategy reached TOWED 109: 122mm 85 D-30†; 155mm 24 M114A1†
full strength in the middle of 2018 and the UK announced a sig-
MOR 82mm 666: 521 2B14†; 105 M-69†; 40 M252†
nificant increase in its troop numbers. Indigenous logistic support
is slowly improving but remains a source of weakness. Efforts are
also under way to improve leadership, intelligence, logistics and Afghan Air Force (AAF) 7,300
coordination between different service arms. The ANDSF Road Including Special Mission Wing
Map contains ambitious plans to improve capability but depends EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
on continued international support. Air-force modernisation con-
AIRCRAFT 19 combat capable
tinues, but maintenance difficulties reduce aircraft availability.
Afghan forces’ logistics are optimised for internal deployments, but TPT 47: Medium 4 C-130H Hercules; Light 42: 24 Cessna
their effectiveness is limited by a shortage of sufficiently educated 208B; 18 PC-12 (Special Mission Wing); PAX 1 B-727 (2
and trained personnel. Afghan forces depend greatly on imported more in store)
military equipment. TRG 19 EMB-314 Super Tucano* (of which 7 in the US
for trg)
ACTIVE 174,300 (Army 167,000 Air Force 7,300)
HELICOPTERS
Paramilitary 148,700
ATK 4 Mi-35 Hind
MRH 101: 3 Cheetal; 25 MD-530F (11 armed); 73 Mi-17
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Hip H (incl 28 Special Mission Wing hel)
TPT • Medium 16 UH-60A+ Black Hawk
Afghan National Army (ANA) 167,00 BOMBS
5 regional comd Laser-guided GBU-58 Paveway II
248 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Paramilitary 148,700 Apache; CH-47F Chinook; UH-60L Black Hawk; 1 FGA

Afghan National Police 148,700
Under control of Interior Ministry. Includes Afghan
Uniformed Police (AUP), Afghan National Civil Order
Police (ANCOP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), Police
Special Forces (GDPSU) and Afghan Anti-Crime Police
(AACP)
sqn with F-16C Fighting Falcon; 1 atk sqn with 12 A-10C
Thunderbolt II; 1 ISR gp with MC-12W Liberty; 1 ISR unit
with RC-12X Guardrail; 1 EW sqn with EC-130H Compass
Call, 1 tpt sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules, 1 CSAR sqn
with HH-60G Pave Hawk; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A
Reaper; 1 ISR UAV unit with RQ-21A Blackjack • Operation
Freedom’s Sentinel 8,000

FOREIGN FORCES Australia AUS

All Operation Resolute Support unless otherwise specified
Australian Dollar A$ 2017 2018 2019
Albania 136
GDP A$ 1.80tr 1.89tr
Armenia 121
US$ 1.38tr 1.43tr
Australia 300; 1 SF unit; 1 sy unit; 1 sigs unit
Austria 17 per capita US$ 55,693 56,698
Azerbaijan 120 Growth % 2.2 3.2
Belgium 78 Inflation % 2.0 2.2
Bosnia-Herzegovina 63 Def bdgt A$ 31.9bn 35.2bn 35.5bn
Bulgaria 158 US$ 24.4bn 26.6bn
Croatia 123 US$1=A$ 1.30 1.32
Czech Republic 281; 1 sy coy; 1 MP unit Population 23,470,145
Denmark 160
Estonia 40 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Finland 29 Male 9.1% 3.1% 3.4% 3.7% 23.3% 7.6%
Georgia 870; 1 lt inf bn Female 8.6% 3.0% 3.2% 3.5% 22.7% 8.8%
Germany 1,300; 1 bde HQ; 1 recce bn; 1 hel flt with CH-
53G Stallion; 1 ISR UAV flt with Heron UAV Capabilities
Greece 5 The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is capable, well trained and
Hungary 111 well equipped, with strong doctrine, logistic support and C4ISR.
India Indo-Tibetan Border Police 335 (facilities protection) It also has considerable recent operational experience. In March
2016, the government published Australia’s third defence white
Italy 800; 1 mech inf bde HQ; 1 mech inf regt(-); 1 hel
paper in seven years. This identified China’s growing regional role,
regt(-) with AW129 Mangusta; NH90; RQ-7
regional military modernisation and inter-state rivalry as among
Latvia 36 the influences shaping defence policy. The defence of Australia,
Lithuania 50 securing maritime Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and contributing
Luxembourg 2 to stability and the ‘rules-based order’ across the wider Indo-Pacific
Macedonia (FYROM) 44 region are the country’s three main ‘defence objectives’. The coun-
try’s primary ally is the US, but it is also forging closer defence ties
Mongolia 120 with India, Japan and South Korea, while remaining committed to
Montenegro 20 the Five Power Defence Arrangements and close defence relations
Netherlands 160 with New Zealand. The armed forces have considerable opera-
New Zealand 13 tional experience and have played an active part in operations
Norway 70 in Afghanistan as well as in the coalition fighting ISIS in Iraq and
Syria. Strategic air and sealift platforms give the ADF considerable
Poland 315 • UNAMA 1 obs capability to move and sustain deployments overseas. Australia is
Portugal 195 significantly modernising its navy and locally building submarines,
Romania 742; 1 inf bn destroyers and frigates based on European designs. Combat-air
Slovakia 36 and maritime-patrol capabilities are also being boosted. Australia
imports most of its significant defence equipment but possesses
Slovenia 8
a growing defence industry. Its largest naval shipbuilders are ASC
Spain 40 Shipbuilding and Austal, whose US subsidiary, Austal USA, builds
Sweden 29 vessels for the US Navy.
Turkey 506; 1 mot inf bn(-)
Ukraine 11
ACTIVE 57,050 (Army 29,000 Navy 13,650 Air
United Kingdom 1,100; 1 inf bn(+); 1 hel flt with 3 SA330
14,400)
Puma HC2 RESERVE 21,050 (Army 13,200 Navy 2,800 Air
United States 8,475; 1 div HQ; 1 ARNG div HQ (fwd); 1 5,050)
spec ops bn; 3 inf bde(-); 1 inf bn; 1 ARNG inf bn; 1 mne Integrated units are formed from a mix of reserve and regular per-
regt(-); 1 arty bty with M777A2; 1 ARNG MRL bty with sonnel. All ADF operations are now controlled by Headquarters
M142 HIMARS; 1 EOD bn; 1 cbt avn bde with AH-64E Joint Operations Command (HQJOC)
 Asia 249

1 (11th) inf bde (1 recce regt, 3 inf bn, 1 engr regt, 1

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE spt bn)
1 (13th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 spt bn)
Space COMBAT SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 arty regt
SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 1 Optus C1 (dual 1 sigs regt
use for civil/mil comms) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 trg bde
Army 29,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Forces Command MBT 59 M1A1 Abrams
FORCES BY ROLE IFV 253 ASLAV-25 (all variants)

COMMAND APC • APC (T) 431 M113AS4
1 (1st) div HQ (1 sigs regt) AUV 1,042: 1,020 Bushmaster IMV; 22 Hawkei
MANOEUVRE ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Mechanised ARV 45: 15 ASLAV-F; 17 ASLAV-R; 19 M88A2
1 (1st) mech inf bde (1 armd cav regt, 1 mech inf bn, VLB 5 Biber
1 lt mech inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 sigs MW 20: 12 Husky; 8 MV-10
regt, 1 CSS bn) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
2 (3rd & 7th) mech inf bde (1 armd cav regt, 2 mech MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin
inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 sigs regt, 1 CSS RCL • 84mm Carl Gustav
bn) ARTILLERY 239
Amphibious TOWED 155mm 54 M777A2
1 (2nd RAR) amph bn MOR 81mm 185

Asia
Aviation AMPHIBIOUS 15 LCM-8 (capacity either 1 MBT or 200
1 (16th) avn bde (1 regt (2 ISR hel sqn), 1 regt (3 tpt troops)
hel sqn), 1 regt (2 spec ops hel sqn, 1 avn sqn)) HELICOPTERS
COMBAT SUPPORT ATK 22 Tiger
1 (6th) cbt spt bde (1 STA regt (1 STA bty, 1 UAV bty, TPT 82: Heavy 10 CH-47F Chinook; Medium 72: 38 NH90
1 CSS bty), 1 AD/FAC regt (integrated), 1 engr regt TTH (MRH90 TTH); 34 S-70A Black Hawk
(2 construction sqn, 1 EOD sqn), 1 EW regt, 1 int UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
bn) ISR • Medium 15 RQ-7B Shadow 200
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence RBS-70
1 (17th) CSS bde (3 log bn, 3 med bn, 1 MP bn)

Special Operations Command Navy 13,660

Fleet Comd HQ located at Sydney. Naval Strategic Comd
FORCES BY ROLE
HQ located at Canberra
SPECIAL FORCES
1 (SAS) SF regt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 (SF Engr) SF regt SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 6 Collins with 6 single
2 cdo regt 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea Arrow ADCAP HWT/UGM-
COMBAT SUPPORT 84C Harpoon AShM
3 sigs sqn (incl 1 reserve sqn) PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 13
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT DESTROYERS • DDGHM
1 CSS sqn 2 Hobart with Aegis Baseline 7.1 C2, 2 quad lnchr with
RGM-84D Harpoon AShM, 6 8-cell Mk41 VLS with
Reserve Organisations 13,200 reservists SM-2 Block IIIB SAM/RIM-162A ESSM SAM, 2 twin
324mm ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 Phalanx CIWS, 1
Force Command 127mm gun (capacity 1 MH-60R Seahawk)
FORCES BY ROLE FRIGATES • FFGHM 11
COMMAND 3 Adelaide (Mod) with 1 Mk13 GMLS with RGM-84L
1 (2nd) div HQ Harpoon Block II AShM/SM-2 Block IIIA SAM, 1
MANOEUVRE 8-cell Mk41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple
Reconnaissance Mk32 324mm ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 Phalanx
3 (regional force) surv unit (integrated) Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 MH-60R
Light Seahawk ASW hel)
1 (4th) inf bde (1 recce regt, 2 inf bn, 1 engr regt, 1 8 Anzac (GER MEKO 200) with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr
spt bn) with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 1 8-cell Mk41
1 (5th) inf bde (1 recce bn, 4 inf bn, 1 engr regt, 2 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm
spt bn) ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 2
1 (9th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 spt bn) MH-60R Seahawk ASW hel)
250 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 15 TANKER/TRANSPORT

PCO 15: 13 Armidale (Bay mod); 2 Cape (leased) 1 sqn with A330 MRTT (KC-30A)
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES • TRANSPORT
MHO 4 Huon (2 Huon in reserve) 1 VIP sqn with B-737BBJ; CL-604 Challenger
AMPHIBIOUS 1 sqn with Beech 350 King Air
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3 1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III
LHD 2 Canberra (capacity 8 hel; 4 LCM; 100 veh; 1,000 1 sqn with C-27J Spartan
troops) 1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules
LSD 1 Choules (ex-UK Bay) (capacity 1 med hel; 2 TRAINING
LCVP; 24 MBT; 350 troops) 1 OCU with F/A-18A/B Hornet
LANDING CRAFT 17 1 sqn with Beech 350 King Air
LCM 12 LCM-1E 2 (LIFT) sqn with Hawk MK127*
LCVP 5 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 14 AIRCRAFT 172 combat capable
AGHS 2 Leeuwin with 1 hel landing platform FGA 105: 55 F/A-18A Hornet; 16 F/A-18B Hornet; 24 F/A-
AGS 4 Paluma 18F Super Hornet; 10 F-35A Lightning II (in test)
AORH 1 Success ASW 22: 15 AP-3C Orion; 7 P-8A Poseidon
AOR 1 Sirius EW 12 EA-18G Growler*
The following vessels are operated by a private company, AEW&C 6 B-737-700 Wedgetail (E-7A)
DMS Maritime: TKR/TPT 5 A330 MRTT (KC-30A)
ASR 2: 1 Besant; 1 Stoker TPT 51: Heavy 8 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium 22: 10
AX 2: 1 Seahorse Horizon; 1 Seahorse Standard C-27J Spartan; 12 C-130J-30 Hercules; Light 16 Beech 350
AXL 1 Seahorse Mercator King Air; PAX 5: 2 B-737BBJ (VIP); 3 CL-604 Challenger
AXS 1 Young Endeavour (VIP)
TRG 107: 33 Hawk Mk127*; 62 PC-9/A (incl 4 PC-9/A(F)
Naval Aviation 1,350 for tgt marking); 12 PC-21
FORCES BY ROLE AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE AAM • IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; ASRAAM; ARH AIM-
1 sqn with NH90 (MRH90) 120B/C-5/C-7 AMRAAM
1 sqn with MH-60R Seahawk AShM AGM-84A Harpoon
TRAINING LACM Conventional AGM-158 JASSM
1 OCU sqn with MH-60R Seahawk BOMBS
1 sqn with Bell 429; H135 Laser-guided Paveway II/IV; Laser JDAM
INS/GPS-guided AGM-154C JSOW; JDAM; JDAM-ER
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
HELICOPTERS
Cyber
ASW 24 MH-60R Seahawk
Australia’s Chief of Defence Force announced in January
TPT 25: Medium 6 NH90 (MRH90); Light 19: 4 Bell
2018 the establishment of a new Defence SIGINT and
429; 15 H135
Cyber Command, marking the latest organisational change
Clearance Diving Branch in Australia’s developing cyber capabilities. Australia’s
Cyber Security Strategy was launched in April 2016.
FORCES BY ROLE
During the launch, the government publicly announced
SPECIAL FORCES
Australia’s offensive cyber capabilities, to respond to cyber
2 diving unit
intrusions against Australian networks. This capability
is housed in the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD).
Air Force 14,400 The Defence SIGINT and Cyber Command will contain
FORCES BY ROLE personnel from the joint SIGINT unit and the Joint Cyber
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Unit alongside civilians from the ASD. Command of the
3 sqn with F/A-18A/B Hornet Defence SIGINT and Cyber Command runs from CDF
1 sqn with F/A-18F Super Hornet through the Joint Capabilities (Information Warfare)
1 sqn (forming) with F-35A Lightning II Division. This division was formed in mid-2017, consisting
ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE of four branches: Information Warfare Capability; C4 and
1 sqn with AP-3C Orion Battle Management Capability; the Capability Support
1 sqn (forming) with P-8A Poseidon Directorate; and the Joint Cyber Unit. It will be responsible
ELECTRONIC WARFARE for offensive and defensive cyber operations. The 2016
1 sqn with EA-18G Growler Defence White Paper acknowledged the growing challenge
ISR from cyber threats and the need to continue developing
1 (FAC) sqn with PC-9/A(F) Australia’s capabilities to protect systems and networks.
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) is Australia’s
1 sqn with B-737-700 Wedgetail (E-7A) lead organisation for cyber security. Opened in November
 Asia 251

2014, the ACSC in July 2018 became part of the ASD, which
became a statutory agency. Australian government cyber-
security expertise from CERT Australia and the Digital
Transformation Agency also moved into the ACSC.
DEPLOYMENT
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • ISAF Operation Resolute Support
(Highroad) 270; 1 SF unit; 1 sy unit; 1 sigs unit
ARABIAN SEA: Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-150
(Operation Manitou) 1 FFGHM
EGYPT: MFO (Operation Mazurka) 27
IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve (Okra) 380; 1 SF gp; 1 trg unit
MALAYSIA: 120; 1 inf coy (on 3-month rotational tours); 2
AP-3C Orion (on rotation)
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO (Operation Paladin) 12 obs
PHILIPPINES: Operation Augury 100 (trg team)
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS (Operation Aslan) 23; 1 obs
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: Operation Accordion 500: 1 tpt det
with 2 C-130J-30 Hercules; Operation Inherent Resolve (Okra)
150; 1 B-737-700 Wedgetail (E-7A); 1 A330 MRTT (KC-30A)
 Army 126,150
tion plan is under way, called Forces 2030. Counter-terrorism oper-
ations increased following a July 2016 attack and it is mounting
coordinated patrols of the Bay of Bengal with India. In the recent
past, Bangladesh has relied on Chinese and Russian aid and credit
to overcome its limited procurement funding. It has increased
defence collaboration with India. The country has a long record
of UN peacekeeping deployments, with UN payments reportedly
providing an important income source. In Autumn 2017, the army
deployed to the country’s eastern border to provide humanitarian
assistance to Rohingya refugees fleeing Myanmar. A major naval-
recapitalisation and -expansion programme is under way to better
protect the country’s large EEZ, including procurement of Chinese
corvettes. A requirement for modern howitzers and light armoured
vehicles for peacekeeping missions has been announced. Substan-
tial efforts have been made to strengthen the nascent shipbuilding
industry and work has begun on a new submarine-support facility.
The armed forces reportedly retain extensive business interests, in
real estate, banks and other businesses.
ACTIVE 157,050 (Army 126,150 Navy 16,900 Air
14,000) Paramilitary 63,900
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Asia
FORCES BY ROLE
FOREIGN FORCES COMMAND
9 inf div HQ
New Zealand 9 (air navigation trg) SPECIAL FORCES
Singapore 230: 1 trg sqn at Pearce with PC-21 trg ac; 1 trg 1 cdo bn
sqn at Oakey with 12 AS332 Super Puma; AS532 Cougar MANOEUVRE
United States US Pacific Command: 1,500; 1 SEWS at Pine Armoured
Gap; 1 comms facility at NW Cape; 1 SIGINT stn at Pine 1 armd bde
Gap • US Strategic Command: 1 detection and tracking 3 indep armd regt
radar at Naval Communication Station Harold E. Holt Light
23 inf bde
1 (composite) bde
Bangladesh BGD COMBAT SUPPORT
9 arty bde
Bangladeshi Taka Tk 2017 2018 2019 1 engr bde
GDP Tk 21.1tr 23.9tr 1 sigs bde
US$ 262bn 286bn AVIATION
per capita US$ 1,603 1,736 1 avn regt (1 avn sqn; 1 hel sqn)
AIR DEFENCE
Growth % 7.4 7.3
1 AD bde
Inflation % 5.6 6.0
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Def bdgt Tk 236bn 264bn 291bn
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
US$ 2.93bn 3.16bn MBT 276: 174 Type-59; 58 Type-69/Type-69G; 44 Type-
FMA (US) US$ 2m 0m 90-II (MBT-2000)
US$1=Tk 80.63 83.62 LT TK 8 Type-62
RECCE 8+ BOV M11
Population 159,453,001
APC 481
Religious groups: Muslim 90%; Hindu 9%; Buddhist 1% APC (T) 134 MT-LB
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus APC (W) 347: 330 BTR-80; 17 Cobra
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Male 13.9% 5.0% 4.7% 4.1% 18.6% 3.0%
AEV MT-LB
Female 13.4% 4.8% 4.7% 4.4% 20.1% 3.4% ARV 3+: T-54/T-55; Type-84; 3 Type-654
VLB MTU
Capabilities ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Bangladesh has limited military capability that is optimised for MSL • MANPATS 9K115-2 Metis M1 (AT-13 Saxhorn-2)
border and domestic security. A wide-ranging defence modernisa- RCL 106mm 238 M40A1
252 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

ARTILLERY 853+ 1 Nirbhoy (ex-PRC Hainan) with 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor;
SP 155mm 12 NORA B-52 2 twin 57mm gun
TOWED 363+: 105mm 170 Model 56 pack howitzer; 5 Padma
122mm 131: 57 Type-54/54-1 (M-30); 20 Type-83; 54 PBFG 5 Durbar (PRC Hegu) with 2 single lnchr with
Type-96 (D-30), 130mm 62 Type-59-1 (M-46) SY-1 AShM
MRL 122mm 6 (PRC) PBFT 4 Huchuan (PRC) with 2 single 533mm TT each
MOR 472: 81mm 11 M29A1; 82mm 366 Type-53/type- with YU-1 Type-53 HWT
87/M-31 (M-1937); 120mm 95 AM-50/UBM 52 PBF 4 Titas (ROK Sea Dolphin)
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 3: 1 LCT; 2 LCVP PB 11: 1 Barkat (ex-PRC Shanghai III); 2 Karnaphuli; 1
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 7: 1 C295; 5 Cessna 152; 1 PA- Salam (ex-PRC Huangfen); 7 Shaheed Daulat (PRC
31T Cheyenne Shanghai II)
HELICOPTERS MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 5
MRH 2 AS365N3 Dauphin MSO 5: 1 Sagar; 4 Shapla (ex-UK River)
TPT 6: Medium 3 Mi-171Sh Light 3 Bell 206L-4 Long AMPHIBIOUS
Ranger LANDING SHIPS • LSL 1
AIR DEFENCE LANDING CRAFT 14
SAM LCT 2
Short-range FM-90 LCU 4 (of which 2†)
Point-defence QW-2; HN-5A (being replaced by QW-2) LCVP 3†
GUNS • TOWED 166: 37mm 132 Type-65/74; 57mm 34 LCM 5 Darshak (Yuchin)
Type-59 (S-60) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9
AG 1
Navy 16,900 AGHS 2: 1 Agradoot; 1 Anushandhan
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AOR 2 (coastal)
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 2 Nabajatra (ex-PRC AOT 1 Khan Jahangir Ali
Ming Type-035G) with 8 single 533mm TT AR 1†
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 4 ATF 1†
FFGHM 1 Bangabandhu (ROK modified Ulsan) with 2 AX 1 Shaheed Ruhul Amin
twin lnchr with Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 octuple HHQ-7
SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with A244 LWT, 1 76mm gun Naval Aviation
(capacity: 1 AW109E hel) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FFG 3: AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 Do-228NG (MP)
2 Abu Bakr (ex-PRC Jianghu III) with 2 twin lnchr with HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 2 AW109E Power
C-802A AShM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm
gun Special Warfare and Diving Command 300
1 Osman (ex-PRC Jianghu I) with 2 quad lnchr with
C-802 (CH-SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S Air Force 14,000
mor, 2 twin 100mm gun
FORCES BY ROLE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 52
FIGHTER
CORVETTES 8
1 sqn with MiG-29B/UB Fulcrum
FSGM 2 Shadhinota (PRC C13B) with 2 twin lnchr with
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
C-802 (CH-SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 1 octuple FL-3000N
1 sqn with F-7MB/FT-7B Airguard
lnchr with HHQ-10 SAM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing
1 sqn with F-7BG/FT-7BG Airguard
platform
1 sqn with F-7BGI/FT-7BGI Airguard
FSG 4:
GROUND ATTACK
2 Durjoy with 2 twin lnchr with C-704 AShM, 1 76mm
gun 1 sqn with Yak-130 Mitten*
2 Bijoy (ex-UK Castle) with 2 twin lnchr with C-704 TRANSPORT
AShM, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform 1 sqn with An-32 Cline
FS 2 Durjoy with 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun 1 sqn with C-130B Hercules
PSOH 2 Somudra Joy (ex-USCG Hero) with 1 76mm gun, 1 sqn with L-410UVP
hel landing platform TRAINING
PCFG 4 Durdarsha (ex-PRC Huangfeng) with 4 single 1 sqn with K-8W Karakorum*; L-39ZA Albatros*
lnchr with HY-2 (CH-SS-N-2 Safflower) AShM 1 sqn with PT-6
PCO 6: 1 Madhumati (Sea Dragon) with 1 57mm gun; 5 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Kapatakhaya (ex-UK Island) 1 sqn with AW139; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-17-1V Hip H; Mi-
PCC 8: 171Sh
2 Meghna with 1 57mm gun (fishery protection) 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-17-1V Hip H; Mi-171Sh
 Asia 253

1 sqn with Bell 212 SOMALIA: UN • UNSOM 1 obs

1 trg sqn with Bell 206L Long Ranger; AW119 Koala
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1,601; 7 obs; 1 inf bn; 2
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE rvn coy; 2 engr coy
AIRCRAFT 81 combat capable
FTR 53: 9 F-7MB Airguard; 11 F-7BG Airguard; 12 F-7BGI SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 356; 3 obs; 2 inf coy
Airguard; 5 FT-7B Airguard; 4 FT-7BG Airguard; 4 FT-7BGI WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 29; 7 obs; 1 fd
Airguard; 6 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum hospital
TPT 11: Medium 4 C-130B Hercules; Light 7: 3 An-32
Cline†; 3 L-410UVP; 1 C295W
TRG 38: 8 K-8W Karakorum*; 7 L-39ZA Albatros*; 10 PT-6; Brunei BRN
13 Yak-130 Mitten*
Brunei Dollar B$ 2017 2018 2019
HELICOPTERS
MRH 16: 2 AW139 (SAR); 12 Mi-17 Hip H; 2 Mi-17-1V GDP B$ 16.7bn 19.7bn
Hip H (VIP) US$ 12.1bn 14.7bn
TPT 15: Medium 7 Mi-171Sh; Light 8: 2 Bell 206L Long per capita US$ 28,278 33,824
Ranger; 4 Bell 212; 2 AW119 Koala
Growth % 1.3 2.3
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
Inflation % -0.2 0.4
AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-73 (AA-11 Archer); PL-5;
PL-7; SARH R-27R (AA-10A Alamo) Def bdgt B$ 452m 493m
US$ 327m 367n
Paramilitary 63,900 US$1=B$ 1.38 1.34

Ansars 20,000+ Population 450,565

Asia
Security Guards Ethnic groups: Malay 65.7%; Chinese 10.3%; indigenous 3.4%;
other or unspecified 23.6%
Rapid Action Battalions 5,000
Ministry of Home Affairs Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus

FORCES BY ROLE Male 11.8% 4.0% 4.4% 4.5% 22.1% 2.5%

MANOEUVRE Female 11.1% 3.9% 4.5% 4.8% 23.8% 2.7%
Other
14 paramilitary bn Capabilities
Border Guard Bangladesh 38,000 The Royal Brunei Armed Forces are professional and well trained.
The 2011 defence white paper set out missions such as ensuring
FORCES BY ROLE
territorial integrity and upholding the constitution. C4ISR capa-
MANOEUVRE
bilities are being improved to offset the forces’ relatively small
Amphibious
size, and the white paper advocates pursuing procurement to
1 rvn coy
strengthen airspace control, hardening C4 systems against cyber
Other
attack and protecting national communications infrastructure.
54 paramilitary bn
Brunei plans to develop a fully mechanised battalion and stated
Coast Guard 900 in the white paper that it would examine potential replacements
for its Scorpion light tanks. There is a long-established relationship
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
with the UK, for whom Brunei has hosted a garrison since 1962 and
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13
a jungle-warfare school since 1972. Brunei is a member of ASEAN
PSO 4 Syed Nazrul (ex-ITA Minerva) with 1 hel
and has a close relationship with Singapore, for whom it hosts a
landing platform
permanent training base. The 2011 white paper advocates par-
PB 4: 1 Ruposhi Bangla; 1 Shaheed Daulat; 2 Shetgang
ticipation in regional exercises, with an emphasis on command
PBR 5 Pabna
and control, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, and
maritime patrol. Brunei does not have the ability to deploy abroad
DEPLOYMENT without assistance, but has maintained a small deployment to
UNIFIL in Lebanon since 2008. Brunei has no domestic defence
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 1,010; 9
industry and imports its military equipment. In 2010, the Centre
obs; 1 cdo coy; 1 inf bn; 1 med coy
of Science and Technology Research and Development was estab-
CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 2 lished to lead on defence-technology research, manage defence
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • procurements, and provide engineering and support services to
MONUSCO 1,710; 5 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 avn coy; 2 the armed forces.
hel coy
ACTIVE 7,200 (Army 4,900 Navy 1,200 Air 1,100)
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 116; 1 FSG
Paramilitary 400-500
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1,415; 3 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy;
2 sigs coy; 1 tpt coy RESERVE 700 (Army 700)
254 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Paramilitary 400–500
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Gurkha Reserve Unit 400–500
Army 4,900 FORCES BY ROLE
FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE
MANOEUVRE Light
Light 2 inf bn(-)
3 inf bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 cbt spt bn (1 armd recce sqn, 1 engr sqn) DEPLOYMENT
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 30
Reserves 700
FORCES BY ROLE PHILIPPINES: IMT 9
MANOEUVRE
Light FOREIGN FORCES
1 inf bn
Singapore 1 trg camp with infantry units on rotation; 1 trg
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE school; 1 hel det with AS332 Super Puma
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES United Kingdom 1,000; 1 Gurkha bn; 1 jungle trg centre; 1
LT TK 20 FV101 Scorpion (incl FV105 Sultan CP) hel flt with 3 Bell 212
APC • APC (W) 45 VAB
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
ARV 2 Samson Cambodia CAM
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 24
Cambodian Riel r 2017 2018 2019

Navy 1,200 GDP r 89.7tr 99.1tr

FORCES BY ROLE US$ 22.1bn 24.1bn
SPECIAL FORCES per capita US$ 1,379 1,485
1 SF sqn Growth % 6.9 7.0
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Inflation % 2.9 3.3
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 9 Def bdgt [a] r ε3.20tr ε3.90tr
CORVETTES • FSG 4 Darussalam with 2 twin lnchr with
US$ ε788m ε951m
MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing
platform US$1=r 4,059.21 4,103.84
PCC 4 Ijtihad [a] Defence and security budget
PBF 1 Mustaed
Population 16,449,519
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 4: 2 Teraban;
Ethnic groups: Khmer 90%; Vietnamese 5%; Chinese 1%
2 Cheverton Loadmaster
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Air Force 1,100 Male 15.5% 4.4% 4.4% 5.1% 17.5% 1.6%
FORCES BY ROLE Female 15.2% 4.4% 4.6% 5.2% 19.2% 2.7%
MARITIME PATROL
1 sqn with CN235M
TRAINING
Capabilities
1 sqn with PC-7; Bell 206B Jet Ranger II Despite their name, which reflects Cambodia’s formal status as
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER a constitutional monarchy, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
1 sqn with Bell 214 (SAR) (RCAF) are essentially the modern manifestation of the armed
forces of the former People’s Republic of Kampuchea, established
1 sqn with Bo-105
in 1979 following Vietnam’s invasion. Cambodia faces no direct
1 sqn with S-70i Black Hawk external military threats, besides border clashes with Thailand.
AIR DEFENCE Security concerns regard mainly transnational threats generating
1 sqn with Rapier instability such as drug trafficking. Cambodia’s most important
1 sqn with Mistral international links are with the Chinese and Vietnamese armed
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE forces. China and Cambodia have developed training ties in recent
AIRCRAFT years, and exercises have grown in scale. Skirmishes on the border
MP 1 CN235M with Thailand since 2008 provided little indication of capacity for
high-intensity combat. Cambodia lacks resources for personnel
TRG 4 PC-7
training, which is partly financed by Chinese military assistance.
HELICOPTERS The RCAF has an excessive number of senior officers, while many
TPT 21: Medium 13: 1 Bell 214 (SAR); 12 S-70i Black formations and units appear to be of only nominal status. Cam-
Hawk; Light 8: 2 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II; 6 Bo-105 (armed, bodia has contributed personnel to UN peacekeeping missions,
81mm rockets) including MINUSCA and MINUSMA. Despite increased defence
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Rapier; Mistral spending in recent years, the armed forces rely largely on equip-
 Asia 255

ment donations and second-hand procurements, including from Navy ε2,800 (incl 1,500 Naval Infantry)
China and South Korea. Cambodia has no domestic defence indus-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
try, with no ability to design and manufacture modern equipment
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14
for its armed forces.
PBF 3 Stenka
ACTIVE 124,300 (Army 75,000 Navy 2,800 Air 1,500 PB 9: 4 (PRC 46m); 3 (PRC 20m); 2 Shershen
Provincial Forces 45,000) Paramilitary 67,000 PBR 2 Kaoh Chhlam
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT
Conscript liability 18 months service authorised but not imple-
LCU 1
mented since 1993
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AFDL 1
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Naval Infantry 1,500
FORCES BY ROLE
Army ε75,000 MANOEUVRE
6 Military Regions (incl 1 special zone for capital) Light
FORCES BY ROLE 1 (31st) nav inf bde
SPECIAL FORCES COMBAT SUPPORT
1 (911th) AB/SF Bde 1 arty bn
MANOEUVRE
Light Air Force 1,500
2 (2nd & 3rd Intervention) inf div (3 inf bde) FORCES BY ROLE
5 (Intervention) indep inf bde ISR/TRAINING
8 indep inf bde 1 sqn with P-92 Echo (L-39 Albatros* in store)
Other TRANSPORT

Asia
1 VIP sqn (reporting to Council of Ministers) with An-
1 (70th) sy bde (4 sy bn)
24RV Coke; AS350 Ecureuil; AS355F2 Ecureuil II
17 (border) sy bn
1 sqn with BN-2 Islander; Y-12 (II)
COMBAT SUPPORT
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
2 arty bn 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-8 Hip; Z-9; (Mi-26 Halo in
4 fd engr regt store)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 (construction) engr regt
AIRCRAFT
2 tpt bde TPT • Light 12: 2 An-24RV Coke; 1 BN-2 Islander; 2 MA60;
AIR DEFENCE 5 P-92 Echo (pilot trg/recce); 2 Y-12 (II)
1 AD bn TRG (5 L-39 Albatros* in store)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
 HELICOPTERS
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MRH 14: 3 Mi-17 Hip H; 11 Z-9
MBT 200+: 50 Type-59; 150+ T-54/T-55 TPT 8: Heavy (2 Mi-26 Halo in store); Medium 4 Mi-8
LT TK 20+: Type-62; 20 Type-63 Hip; Light 4: 2 AS350 Ecureuil; 2 AS355F2 Ecureuil II
RECCE 4+ BRDM-2
IFV 70 BMP-1 Provincial Forces 45,000+
APC 230+ 
 Reports of at least 1 inf regt per province, with varying
APC (T) M113 numbers of inf bn (with lt wpn)
APC (W) 230: 200 BTR-60/BTR-152; 30 OT-64
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES Paramilitary
ARV T-54/T-55 Police 67,000 (including gendarmerie)
MW Bozena; RA-140 DS
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
RCL 82mm B-10; 107mm B-11
DEPLOYMENT
ARTILLERY 433+ CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 221; 6
TOWED 400+: 76mm ZIS-3 (M-1942)/122mm D-30/ obs; 1 engr coy
122mm M-30 (M-1938)/130mm Type-59-I
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 184; 1 engr coy
MRL 33+: 107mm Type-63; 122mm 13: 8 BM-21; 5 RM-
70; 132mm BM-13-16 (BM-13); 140mm 20 BM-14-16 (BM- MALI: UN • MINUSMA 303: 2 engr coy; 1 EOD coy
14) SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 79; 6 obs; 1 MP unit
MOR 82mm M-37; 120mm M-43; 160mm M-160 SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 1 obs
AIR DEFENCE
SAM • Point-defence FN-6; FN-16 (reported)
GUNS • TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4; 37mm
M-1939; 57mm S-60
256 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

ACTIVE 2,035,000 (Ground Forces 975,000 Navy

China, People’s Republic of PRC 250,000 Air Force 395,000 Strategic Missile Forces
Chinese Yuan Renminbi Y 2017 2018 2019 120,000 Strategic Support Force 145,000 Other
150,000) Paramilitary 660,000
GDP Y 81.2tr 88.6tr
Conscript liability Selective conscription; all services 24 months
US$ 12.0tr 13.5tr
per capita US$ 8,643 9,633 RESERVE ε510,000
Growth % 6.9 6.6
Inflation % 1.6 2.2 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Def exp [a] Y 1.41tr n.k
Strategic Missile Forces 120,000+
US$ 209bn n.k
Def bdgt [b] Y 1.02tr 1.11tr People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force
US$ 151bn 168bn The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (formerly the
US$1=Y 6.76 6.58 Second Artillery Force) organises and commands its own
troops to launch nuclear counter-attacks with strategic
[a] official defence budget & other military-related expenditure
missiles and to conduct operations with conventional
[b] official defence budget missiles. Organised as launch bdes subordinate to 6
Population 1,392,508,664 army-level msl bases. Org varies by msl type
Ethnic groups: Han 91.5%; Zhuang 1.3%; Hui 0.8%; Manchu 0.8%; FORCES BY ROLE
Uighur 0.7%; Tibetan 0.5%; other or unspecified 4.4% SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
1 ICBM bde with DF-4
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 2 ICBM bde with DF-5A
Male 9.2% 3.0% 3.6% 4.3% 25.8% 5.4% 1 ICBM bde with DF-5B
Female 7.9% 2.6% 3.2% 4.1% 24.9% 5.9% 1 ICBM bde with DF-31
2 ICBM bde with DF-31A/A(G)
Capabilities 2 IRBM bde with DF-26
2 MRBM bde with DF-16
China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remains the world’s largest
6 MRBM bde with DF-21A/E
armed force, with an increasingly modern, advanced equipment
2 MRBM bde with DF-21C
inventory. Its operational effectiveness, however, remains ham-
pered by training and doctrine issues. China’s most recent, 2015
2 MRBM bde with DF-21D
defence white paper outlined the importance of power-projec- 4 SRBM bde with DF-11A
tion capabilities, emphasising the requirements for offensive 2 SRBM bde with DF-15B
and defensive air operations and ‘open seas protection’. A major 2 GLCM bde with CJ-10/CJ-10A
restructuring process is now mostly in effect and will probably 5+ SSM bde (forming)
be complete by 2020. The establishment of the Strategic Support EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Force underscores the importance placed upon the further devel- SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
opment of China’s cyber, space and information-dominance capa- ICBM • Nuclear 70: ε10 DF-4 (CH-SS-3); ε20 DF-5A/B
bilities. China does not maintain any formal alliances, but it does
(CH-SS-4 Mod 2/3); ε8 DF-31 (CH-SS-10 Mod 1); ε24
have a number of key defence relationships with regional states
DF-31A (CH-SS-10 Mod 2); ε8 DF-31A(G) (CH-SS-10
and through its membership of the SCO. It also boosted defence
Mod 3)
ties in Africa in 2018. Improving readiness for combat operations
is a key objective of the current reforms; the PLA currently lacks IRBM • Dual-capable ε30 DF-26
any significant recent combat experience and its training has MRBM 158: Nuclear ε80 DF-21A/DF-21E (CH-SS-5
traditionally suffered from over-scripted and unrealistic exer- Mod 2/6); Conventional 78: ε24 DF-16 (CH-SS-11 Mod
cises. Though these weaknesses are acknowledged and possibly 1/2); ε24 DF-21C (CH-SS-5 Mod 4); ε30 DF-21D (CH-
being addressed, it is unclear how effective the newly established SS-5 Mod 5 – ASBM)
structures will be at generating and controlling high-intensity SRBM • Conventional 189: ε108 DF-11A (CH-SS-7
combined-arms capabilities. In the short term, changes to roles Mod 2); ε81 DF-15B (CH-SS-6 Mod 3)
and requirements for officers may have had a detrimental effect GLCM • Conventional ε54 CJ-10/CJ-10A
on morale within the PLA, as well as on its overall level of readi-
ness. The requirement for out-of-area operations is relatively new Navy
for the PLA; the navy is the only service to have experience in EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
extended deployments, assisted by its new support base in Dji-
SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 4:
bouti. Major platform inventories in all the services comprise a
4 Jin (Type-094) with up to 12 JL-2 (CH-SS-N-14)
heterogeneous mix of modern, older and obsolescent designs.
The reduction in overall force size as part of the restructuring strategic SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with Yu-6 HWT
process has seen some older equipment designs finally with-
drawn from service. China has an extensive defence-industrial
Defensive
base, capable of indigenously producing advanced equipment EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
across all domains, although questions persist over quality and RADAR • STRATEGIC: 4+ large phased array radars;
reliability. some detection and tracking radars
 Asia 257

Space TRAINING
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 4 hel trg regt
SATELLITES 103 AIR DEFENCE
COMMUNICATIONS 6 Zhongxing (dual-use telecom 15 AD bde
satellites for civ/mil comms)
Reserves
NAVIGATION/POSITIONING/TIMING 33: 3 Beidou-
The People’s Liberation Army Reserve Force is being
2(M); 6 Beidou-2(G); 6 Beidou-2(IGSO); 1 Beidou-3(G); 16
restructured, and the army component reduced. As a
Beidou-3(M); 1 Beidou-3 (ISGO)
result some of the units below may have been re-roled
ISR 49: 2 Haiyang (remote sensing); 46 Yaogan Weixing
or disbanded
(remote sensing); 1 Ziyuan (ZY-2 – remote sensing)
ELINT/SIGINT 15: 8 Shijian 6 (4 pairs – reported ELINT/ FORCES BY ROLE
SIGINT role); 7 Shijian 11 (reported ELINT/SIGINT role) MANOEUVRE
Armoured
Ground Forces ε975,000 2 armd regt
In late 2015, a single, separate headquarters was established Light
for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ground forces, in 18 inf div
place of the four general departments 4 inf bde
3 indep inf regt
FORCES BY ROLE
COMBAT SUPPORT
COMMAND
3 arty div
13 (Group) army HQ
7 arty bde
SPECIAL FORCES
15 engr regt
15 spec ops bde
1 ptn br bde
MANOEUVRE

Asia
3 ptn br regt
Armoured
10 chem regt
27 (cbd arms) armd bde
10 sigs regt
1 hy mech inf div (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 arty
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
regt, 1 AD regt)
9 log bde
Mechanised
1 log regt
1 (high alt) mech inf div (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1
AIR DEFENCE
arty regt, 1 AD regt)
17 AD div
23 (cbd arms) mech inf bde
8 AD bde
Light
8 AD regt
3 (high alt) mot inf div (1 armd regt, 2 mot inf regt, 1 arty
regt, 1 AD regt) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
24 (cbd arms) inf bde ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Air Manoeuvre MBT 5,800: 600 ZTZ-59; 650 ZTZ-59-II; 600 ZTZ-59D; 200
2 air aslt bde ZTZ-79; 300 ZTZ-88A/B; 1,000 ZTZ-96; 1,500 ZTZ-96A;
Amphibious 600 ZTZ-99; 250 ZTZ-99A; 100 ZTQ-15
6 amph aslt bde LT TK 450: 250 ZTD-05; 100 ZTQ-62; 100 ZTS-63A
Other ASLT 600 ZTL-11
1 (OPFOR) mech inf bde IFV 5,000: 400 ZBD-04; 1,000 ZBD-04A; 1,200 ZBL-08; 600
1 mech gd div (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 arty regt, ZBD-86; 650 ZBD-86A; 550 ZSL-92; 600 ZSL-92B
1 AD regt) APC 3,950
1 sy gd div (4 sy regt) APC (T) 2,700: 750 ZSD-63; 200 ZSD-63C; 1,750 ZSD-
16 (border) sy bde 89
15 (border) sy regt APC (W) 1,250: 700 ZSL-92A; 500 ZSL-10; 50 ZSL-93
1 (border) sy gp AAV 300+ ZBD-05
COMBAT SUPPORT AUV Dongfeng Mengshi; Tiger 4×4
15 arty bde ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
13 engr/NBC bde ARV Type-73; Type-84; Type-85; Type-97; Type-654
2 engr regt VLB KMM; MTU; TMM; Type-84A
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT MW Type-74; Type-79; Type-81-II; Type-84
13 spt bde ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
COASTAL DEFENCE MSL
19 coastal arty/AShM bde SP 1,000: 450 HJ-8 (veh mounted); 100 HJ-10; 450 ZSL-
AVIATION 02B
1 mixed avn bde MANPATS HJ-73D; HJ-8A/C/E; HJ-11
HELICOPTER RCL 3,966: 75mm PF-56; 82mm PF-65 (B-10); PF-78;
12 hel bde 105mm PF-75; 120mm PF-98
258 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
GUNS 1,788
SP 480: 100mm 250 PTL-02; 120mm 230 PTZ-89
TOWED • 100mm 1,308 PT-73 (T-12)/PT-86
ARTILLERY 8,954+
SP 2,120: 122mm 1,650: 500 PLZ-89; 350 PLZ-07A; 150
PLZ-07B; 300 PCL-09; 350 PLL-09; 152mm 150 PLZ-
83A/B; 155mm 320 PLZ-05; (400 in store: 122mm 200
PLZ-89; 152mm 200 PLZ-83A)
TOWED 1,234: 122mm 500 PL-96 (D-30); 130mm 234
PL-59 (M-46)/PL-59-I; 152mm 500 PL-66 (D-20); (4,400
in store: 122mm 2,800 PL-54-1 (M-1938)/PL-83/PL-60 (D-
74)/PL-96 (D-30); 152mm 1,600 PL-54 (D-1)/PL-66 (D-20))
GUN/MOR 120mm 1,250: 450 PLL-05; 800 PPZ-10
MRL 1,550+ 107mm PH-63; 122mm 1,375: 550 PHL-81/
PHL-90; 350 PHL-11; 375 PHZ-89; 100 PHZ-11; 300mm
175 PHL-03; (700 in store: 122mm 700 PHL-81)
MOR 2,800: 82mm PP-53 (M-37)/PP-67/PP-82/PP-87; SP
82mm PCP-001; 100mm PP-89
COASTAL DEFENCE
AShM HY-1 (CH-SSC-2 Silkworm); HY-2 (CH-SSC-3
Seersucker); HY-4 (CH-SSC-7 Sadsack); YJ-62
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 25
PB 25: 9 Huzong; 16 Shenyang
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 205: 3+
Yugong; 50+ Yunnan II; 100+ Yupen; 2+ Yutu; 50 Yuwei
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 22
AK 6+ Leizhuang
AKR 1 Yunsong (capacity 1 MBT; 1 med hel)
ARC 1
AOT 11: 1 Fuzhong; 8 Fubing; 2 Fulei
ATF 2 Huntao
AX 1 Haixun III
AIRCRAFT • TPT 9: Medium 5: 4 Y-8; 1 Y-9; Light 4 Y-7
HELICOPTERS
ATK 270+: 150 WZ-10; 120+ WZ-19
MRH 351: 22 Mi-17 Hip H; 3 Mi-17-1V Hip H; 38 Mi-
17V-5 Hip H; 25 Mi-17V-7 Hip H; 8 SA342L Gazelle; 21
Z-9A; 31 Z-9W; 10 Z-9WA; 193 Z-9WZ
TPT 382: Heavy 105: 9 Z-8A; 96 Z-8B; Medium 209: 50
Mi-8T Hip; 140 Mi-171; 19 S-70C2 (S-70C) Black Hawk;
Light 68: 53 AS350 Ecureuil; 15 H120 Colibri
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR • Heavy BZK-005; BZK-009 (reported); Medium
BZK-006 (incl variants); BZK-007; BZK-008; Light Harpy
(anti-radiation)
AIR DEFENCE
SAM
Medium-range 168+: 150+ HQ-16A; 18 HQ-17
Short-range 254: 24 9K331 Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet); 30
HQ-6D; 200 HQ-7A/B
Point-defence HN-5A/-5B; FN-6; QW-1; QW-2
GUNS 7,396+
SP 396: 25mm 270 PGZ-04A; 35mm 120 PGZ-07; 37mm
6 PGZ-88
TOWED 7,000+: 25mm PG-87; 35mm PG-99 (GDF-
002); 37mm PG-55 (M-1939)/PG-65/PG-74; 57mm PG-
59 (S-60); 100mm PG-59 (KS-19)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR TY-90
ASM AKD-8; AKD-9; AKD-10
Navy ε250,000
The PLA Navy is organised into five service arms:
submarine, surface, naval aviation, coastal defence and
marine corps, as well as other specialised units. There are
three fleets, one each in the Northern, Eastern and Southern
theatre commands
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES 59
STRATEGIC • SSBN 4:
4 Jin (Type-094) with up to 12 JL-2 (CH-SS-N-14)
strategic SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with Yu-6 HWT
TACTICAL 55
SSN 6:
2 Shang I (Type-093) with 6 single 533mm TT with
Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT/YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM
or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM
4 Shang II (Type-093A) with 6 single 533mm TT with
Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT/YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM
or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM
(3 Han (Type-091) in reserve with 6 single 533mm TT
with Yu-3 HWT/YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM)
SSK 48:
2 Kilo (Project 877) with 6 single 533mm TT with
TEST-71ME HWT/53-65KE HWT
2 Improved Kilo (Project 636) with 6 single 533mm
TT with TEST-71ME HWT/53-65KE HWT
8 Improved Kilo (Project 636M) with 6 single 533mm
TT with TEST-71ME HWT/53-65KE HWT/3M54E
Klub-S (SS-N-27B Sizzler) AShM
8 Ming (4 Type-035(G), 4 Type-035B) with 8 single
533mm TT with Yu-3 HWT/Yu-4 HWT
12 Song (Type-039(G)) with 6 single 533mm TT with
Yu-3 HWT/Yu-6 HWT/YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM
or YJ-18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM
4 Yuan (Type-039A) with 6 533mm TT with Yu-3
HWT/Yu-6 HWT/YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-
18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM
12 Yuan II (Type-039B) with 6 533mm TT with Yu-3
HWT/Yu-6 HWT/YJ-82 (CH-SS-N-7) AShM or YJ-
18 (CH-SS-N-13) AShM
(8 Ming (Type-035(G)) in reserve with 8 single
533mm TT with Yu-3 HWT/Yu-4 HWT)
SSB 1 Qing (Type-032) (SLBM trials)
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 87
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 1
1 Liaoning (RUS Kuznetsov) with 4 18-cell GMLS with
HHQ-10 SAM, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 3 H/PJ-
11 CIWS (capacity 18–24 J-15 ac; 17 Ka-28/Ka-31/Z-
8S/Z-8JH/Z-8AEW hel)
DESTROYERS 27
DDGHM 25:
2 Hangzhou (RUS Sovremenny I (Project 956E)) with 2
quad lnchr with 3M80/3M82 Moskit (SS-N-22A/B
Sunburn) AShM, 2 3K90 Uragan (SA-N-7 Gadfly)
SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 1000 Smerch
3 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 2 twin 130mm gun
(capacity 1 Z-9C/Ka-28 Helix A hel) (of which 1 in
refit)
2 Hangzhou (RUS Sovremenny II (Project 956EM) with
2 quad lnchr with 3M80/3M82 Moskit (SS-N-22A/B

Sunburn) AShM, 2 Yezh (SA-N-12 Grizzly) SAM,
2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 1000 Smerch 3 A/S
mor, 2 Kortik CIWS with 9M311E (SA-N-11 Grison)
SAM, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C/Ka-28
Helix A hel)
1 Luhai (Type-051B) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-12A
AShM, 1 32-cell VLS with HHQ-16 SAM/Yu-8 A/S
msl,2 triple 324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 twin
100mm gun (capacity 2 Z-9C/Ka-28 Helix A hel)
2 Luhu (Type-052) with 4 quad lnchr with YJ-83 AShM,
1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2 triple 324mm
ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 FQF 2500 A/S mor, 2 H/PJ-
12 CIWS, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity 2 Z-9C hel)
2 Luyang (Type-052B) with 4 quad lnchr with YJ-83
AShM, 2 single lnchr with Yezh (SA-N-12 Grizzly)
SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 H/PJ-12
CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 Helix A hel)
6 Luyang II (Type-052C) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-62
AShM, 8 sextuple VLS with HHQ-9 SAM, 2 triple
324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1
100mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-28 Helix A hel)
10 Luyang III (Type-052D) with 8 octuple VLS with
YJ-18A (CH-SS-N-13) AShM/HHQ-9ER SAM/
Yu-8 A/S msl, 1 24-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 SAM,
2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 H/PJ-12 CIWS
(1 with H/PJ-11 CIWS), 1 130mm gun (capacity 2
Ka-28 Helix A hel)
DDGM 2:
2 Luzhou (Type-051C) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83
AShM; 6 sextuple VLS with S-300FM (SA-N-20
Grumble) SAM, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 100mm gun, 1
hel landing platform
FRIGATES 59
FFGHM 40:
2 Jiangkai (Type-054) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-83
AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2 triple
324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor,
4 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28
Helix A/Z-9C hel)
16 Jiangkai II (Type-054A) with 2 quad lnchr with
YJ-83 AShM, 1 32-cell VLS with Yu-8 A/S msl/
HHQ-16 SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT,
2 FQF 2300 A/S mor, 2 H/PJ-12 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
(capacity 1 Ka-28 Helix A/Z-9C hel)
12 Jiangkai II (Type-054A) with 2 quad lnchr with
YJ-83 AShM, 1 32-cell VLS with Yu-8 A/S msl/
HHQ-16 SAM, 2 triple 324mm TT with Yu-7 LWT,
2 FQF 2300 A/S mor, 2 H/PJ-11 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
(capacity 1 Ka-28 Helix A/Z-9C hel)
7 Jiangwei II (Type-053H3) with 2 quad lnchr with
YJ-83 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2
RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity
2 Z-9C hel)
3 Jiangwei II (Type-053H3) with 2 quad lnchr with
YJ-83 AShM, 1 8-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 SAM,
2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun (capacity
2 Z-9C hel)
FFGM 4:
2 Luda IV (Type-051DT) with 4 quad lnchr with YJ-83
AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2 FQF
2500 A/S mor, 2 130mm gun, 3 twin 57mm gun
Asia 259
2 Luda IV (Type-051G) with 4 quad lnchr with YJ-
83 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2
FQF 2500 A/S mor, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 2 twin
100mm gun
FFG 15:
6 Jianghu I (Type-053H1) with 2 twin lnchr with
HY-2 (CH-SS-N-2) AShM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1
twin 100mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C hel)
1 Jianghu III (Type-053H2) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-
83 AShM, 2 RBU 1200, 2 twin 100mm gun
6 Jianghu I Upgrade (Type-053H1G) with 2 quad
lnchr with YJ-83 AShM, 2 RBU 1200, 2 twin 100mm
gun
2 Luda I (Type-051) with 2 triple lnchr with HY-2 (CH-
SS-N-2) AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 2 FQF 2500
A/S mor, 2 twin 130mm gun (minelaying capability)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS ε205
CORVETTES • FSGM 41:
21 Jiangdao I (Type-056) with 2 twin lnchr with YJ-83
AShM, 1 8-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 SAM, 2 triple
324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel
landing platform
20 Jiangdao II (Type-056A) with 2 twin lnchr with YJ-83
Asia
AShM, 1 8-cell GMLS with HHQ-10 SAM, 2 triple
324mm ASTT with Yu-7 LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel
landing platform
PCFG ε60 Houbei (Type-022) with 2 quad lnchr with YJ-
83 AShM, 1 H/PJ-13 CIWS
PCG 26
6 Houjian (Type-037-II) with 2 triple lnchr with YJ-8
(CH-SS-N-4) AShM, 1 76mm gun
20 Houxin (Type-037-IG) with 2 twin lnchr with YJ-8
(CH-SS-N-4) AShM
PCC 48
2 Haijiu (Type-037-I) with 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 twin
57mm gun
30 Hainan (Type-037) with ε4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2
twin 57mm gun
16 Haiqing (Type-037-IS) with 2 FQF-3200 A/S mor
PB ε30 Shanghai III (Type-062-1)
MINE WARFARE 42
MINE COUNTERMEASURES 50
MCO 16: 4 Wochi (Type-081); 6 Wochi mod (Type-
081A); 6 Wozang (Type-082II)
MSC 16: 4 Wosao I (Type-082); 12 Wosao II (Type-082-II)
MSD 18 Wonang (Type-529) (operated by Wozang
MCO)
AMPHIBIOUS
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 5 Yuzhao
(Type-071) with 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity
4 Yuyi LCAC plus supporting vehicles; 800 troops; 60
armoured vehs; 4 hel)
LANDING SHIPS 49
LSM 21:
1 Yudeng (Type-073-II) (capacity 5 tk or 500 troops)
10 Yuhai (Type-074) (capacity 2 tk; 250 troops)
10 Yunshu (Type-073A) (capacity 6 tk)
LST 28:
4 Yukan (Type-072-IIG) (capacity 2 LCVP; 10 tk; 200
troops)
260 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

9 Yuting I (Type-072-II/III) (capacity 10 tk; 250 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

troops; 2 hel) 1 bde with J-10A/S Firebird; Su-30MK2 Flanker G
9 Yuting II (Type-072A) (capacity 4 LCVP; 10 tk; 250 1 bde with J-11B/BS Flanker L
troops) 1 bde with J-11B/BS Flanker L; JH-7A Flounder
6 Yuting II (Type-072B) (capacity 4 LCVP; 10 tk; 250 1 bde with J-8F Finback; JH-7A Flounder
troops) 1 regt with J-15 Flanker
LANDING CRAFT 63 GROUND ATTACK
LCM ε30 Yunnan 1 bde with JH-7 Flounder
LCU 11 Yubei (Type-074A) (capacity 10 tanks or 150 ASW/AEW
troops) 3 regt with Y-8J; KJ-200; KJ-500; KQ-200
LCAC 14: 10 Yuyi; 4 Zubr ELINT/ISR/AEW
1 regt with Y-8JB/X; Y-9JZ
UCAC 12 Payi (Type-724)
TRANSPORT
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 145
1 regt with Y-7H; Y-8C; CRJ-200/700
ABU 1 Type-744A
TRAINING
AFS 3: 2 Dayun (Type-904); 1 Danyao I (Type-904A)
1 regt with CJ-6A
AFSH 2 Danyao II (Type-904B)
1 regt with HY-7
AG 7: 6 Kanhai; 1 Kanwu 2 regt with JL-8
AGB 2 Yanrao (Type-272) with 1 hel landing platform 1 regt with JL-9G
AGE 7: 2 Dahua (Type-909) with 1 hel landing platform 1 regt with JL-9
(weapons test platform); 1 Kantan; 2 Shupang (Type- 1 regt with JL-10
636); 1 Yanqian (Type-904I); 1 Yuting I (naval rail gun 1 regt with Z-9C
test ship) HELICOPTER
AGI 15: 1 Dadie; 1 Dongdiao (Type-815) with 1 hel landing 1 regt with Ka-27PS; Ka-28; Ka-31
platform; 5 Dongdiao (Type-815A) with 1 hel landing 1 regt with SH-5; AS365N; Z-9C/D; Z-8J/JH
platform; 8 FT-14 1 regt with Y-7G; Z-8; Z-8J; Z-8S; Z-9C/D
AGM 4 Yuan Wang (Type-718) (space and missile tracking) AIR DEFENCE
AGOR 2 Dahua 2 SAM bde with HQ-9
AGS 4 Shupang (Type-636A) with 1 hel landing platform EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AH 8: 5 Ankang; 1 Anwei (Type-920); 2 Qiongsha (hospital AIRCRAFT 385 combat capable
conversion) BBR 31: 27 H-6G; 4 H-6J
AOEH 1 Fuyu (Type-901) with 2 H/PJ-13 CIWS FTR 24 J-8F Finback
AOR 1 Fuqing (Type-905) with 1 hel landing platform FGA 139: 16 J-10A Firebird; 7 J-10S Firebird; 72 J-11B/BS
AORH 9: 2 Fuchi (Type-903); 6 Fuchi mod (Type-903A); Flanker L; 20 J-15 Flanker; 24 Su-30MK2 Flanker G
1 Fusu ATK 120: 48 JH-7; 72 JH-7A Flounder
AOT 22: 4 Fubai; 16 Fujian (Type-632); 2 Fuxiao ASW 8+: 3 SH-5; 5+ KQ-200
AP 4: 2 Daguan; 2 Darong ELINT 13: 4 Y-8JB High New 2; 3 Y-8X; 6 Y-9JZ
ARC 2 Youlan AEW&C 16: 6 KJ-200 Moth; 6 KJ-500; 4 Y-8J Mask
ARS 14: 1 Dadao; 1 Dadong; 1 Dalang II (Type-922III); 3 TKR 5 H-6DU
Dalang III (Type-922IIIA); 3 Dasan; 2 Dazhou; 3 Hai Jiu TPT 38: Medium 6 Y-8C; Light 28: 20 Y-5; 2 Y-7G; 6
101 with 1 hel landing platform Y-7H; PAX 4: 2 CRJ-200; 2 CRJ-700
ASR 6: 3 Dalao (Type-926); 3 Dajiang (Type-925) (capacity TRG 118: 38 CJ-6; 12 HY-7; 16 JL-8*; 28 JL-9*; 12 JL-9G*;
2 Z-8) 12 JL-10*
ATF 14: ε11 Hujiu; 3 Tuqiang HELICOPTERS
AWT 8: 4 Fujian; 3 Fushi; 1 Jinyou ASW 28: 14 Ka-28 Helix A; 14 Z-9C

AEW 10+: 9 Ka-31; 1+ Z-18 AEW
AX 4:
MRH 18: 7 AS365N; 11 Z-9D
1 Dashi (Type-0891A) with 2 hel landing platforms
SAR 11: 3 Ka-27PS; 4 Z-8JH; 2 Z-8S; 2 Z-9S
1 Daxin with 2 FQF 1200 A/S mor, 2 Type-69 CIWS, 1
TPT 38: Heavy 30: 8 SA321 Super Frelon; 9 Z-8; 13 Z-8J;
57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
Medium 8 Mi-8 Hip
1 Qi Ji Guang (Type-927) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
landing platform ISR Heavy BZK-005; Medium BZK-007
1 Yudao AIR DEFENCE
ESD 1 Donghaidao SAM • Long-range 32 HQ-9
COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 72 YJ-12/YJ-62 (3 regt) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR PL-5; PL-8; PL-9; R-73 (AA-11 Archer); IR/
Naval Aviation 26,000 SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo); SARH PL-11; ARH R-77
FORCES BY ROLE (AA-12A Adder); PL-12
Naval aviation fighter/ground-attack units adopted ASM KD-88
brigade structure in 2017 AShM Kh-31A (AS-17B Krypton); YJ-12; YJ-61; YJ-8K;
BOMBER YJ-83K; YJ-9
2 regt with H-6DU/G/J ARM Kh-31P (AS-17A Krypton); YJ-91
 Asia 261

BOMBS 1 bde with JZ-8F Finback*

Laser-guided: LS-500J 1 regt with Y-8H1
TV-guided: KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
1 regt with KJ-200 Moth; KJ-500; KJ-2000; Y-8T
Marines ε25,000 COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE
FORCES BY ROLE 4 bde with Y-5; Mi-171E; Z-8
SPECIAL FORCES 1 regt with Y-5; Mi-171E; Z-8
1 spec ops bde TANKER
MANOEUVRE 1 bde with H-6U
Mechanised TRANSPORT
1 mne bde 1 (VIP) regt with B-737; CRJ-200/700
Light 1 (VIP) regt with B-737; Tu-154M; Tu-154M/D
3 mne bde 1 regt with Il-76MD/TD Candid
Amphibious 1 regt with Il-76MD Candid; Il-78 Midas
2 mne bde 1 regt with Mi-17V-5; Y-7
1 regt with Y-5/Y-7/Z-9
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 regt with Y-5/Y-7
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
3 regt with Y-7
MBT some ZTQ-15
1 regt with Y-8
LT TK 73 ZTD-05
1 regt with Y-8; Y-9
ASLT 30 ZTL-11 TRAINING
IFV 60 ZBL-08 5 bde with CJ-6/6A/6B; Y-5
AAV 152 ZBD-05 8 bde with J-7; JJ-7A
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE 13 bde with JL-8; JL-9

Asia
MSL • MANPATS HJ-73; HJ-8 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
RCL 120mm Type-98 1 regt with AS332 Super Puma; H225 (VIP)
ARTILLERY 40+ ISR UAV
SP 122mm 40+: 20+ PLZ-07; 20+ PLZ-89 2 bde with GJ-1
MRL 107mm PH-63 AIR DEFENCE
MOR 82mm 1 SAM div
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence HN-5 21 SAM bde
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Air Force 395,000 AIRCRAFT 2,413 combat capable
FORCES BY ROLE BBR 172: ε12 H-6 (trg role); ε60 H-6H/M; ε100 H-6K
Fighter/ground-attack units adopted bde structure in 2017 FTR 759: 200 J-7 Fishcan; 192 J-7E Fishcan; 120 J-7G
BOMBER Fishcan; 50 J-8F Finback; 50 J-8H Finback; 95 J-11; 20 Su-
1 regt with H-6M 27SK Flanker; 32 Su-27UBK Flanker
2 regt with H-6H FGA 702+: 78 J-10 Firebird; 142 J-10A Firebird; 55+ J-10B
5 regt with H-6K Firebird; 80+ J-10C Firebird; 48 J-10S Firebird; 130 J-11B/
FIGHTER BS Flanker L; 60+ J-16 Flanker; 12+ J-20A (in test); 73 Su-
5 bde with J-7 Fishcan 30MKK Flanker; 24 Su-35 Flanker
5 bde with J-7E Fishcan ATK 140 JH-7A Flounder
3 bde with J-7G Fishcan EW 14: 4 Y-8CB High New 1; 6 Y-8G High New 3; 2 Y-8XZ
4 bde with J-8F/H Finback High New 7; 2 Y-9XZ
2 bde with J-11A/Su-27SK/Su-27UBK Flanker ELINT 4 Tu-154M/D Careless
4 bde with J-11A/J-11B/Su-27UBK Flanker ISR 51: 24 JZ-8 Finback*; 24 JZ-8F Finback*; 3 Y-8H1
3 bde with J-11B/BS Flanker L AEW&C 13: 4 KJ-200 Moth; 5 KJ-500; 4 KJ-2000
C2 5: 2 B-737; 3 Y-8T High New 4
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
TKR 13: 10 H-6U; 3 Il-78 Midas
8 bde with J-10A/J-10S Firebird
TPT 335+ Heavy 27: 20 Il-76MD/TD Candid; 7 Y-20;
2 bde with J-10B/S Firebird
Medium 42+: 30 Y-8C; 12+ Y-9; Light 239: 170 Y-5; 41
1 bde with J-10B/C/S Firebird
Y-7/Y-7H; 20 Y-11; 8 Y-12; PAX 27: 9 B-737 (VIP); 5 CRJ-
2 bde with J-10C/S Firebird 200; 5 CRJ-700; 8 Tu-154M Careless
1 bde with Su-35 Flanker; Su-30MKK Flanker TRG 1,004+: 400 CJ-6/-6A/-6B; 12+ HY-7; 50 JJ-7*; 150 JJ-
3 bde with J-16 Flanker 7A*; 350 JL-8*; 30 JL-9*; 12+ JL-10*
3 bde with Su-30MKK Flanker HELICOPTERS
GROUND ATTACK MRH 22: 20 Z-9; 2 Mi-17V-5 Hip H
6 bde with JH-7A Flounder TPT 31+: Heavy 18+ Z-8; Medium 13+: 6+ AS332 Super
ELECTRONIC WARFARE Puma (VIP); 3 H225 (VIP); 4+ Mi-171
2 regt with Y-8CB/G/XZ UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR CISR • Heavy 12+ GJ-1; GJ-2
1 regt with JZ-8F Finback* ISR • Heavy 7+ EA-03
262 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

AIR DEFENCE exercised by the PLA’s 3rd and 4th departments and
SAM 754+ other central functions. It reports to the Central Military
Long-range 356+: 180+ HQ-9/-9B; 32 S-300PMU Commission and is believed to be responsible for the PLA’s
(SA-10 Grumble); 64 S-300PMU1 (SA-20 Gargoyle); space and cyber capabilities
64 S-300PMU2 (SA-20 Gargoyle); 16 S-400 (SA-21B
Growler) Theatre Commands
Medium-range 320+: 120+ HQ-2/-2A/-2B; 150 HQ-12
In early 2016, the previous seven military regions were
(KS-1A); 50+ HQ-22
consolidated into five new theatre commands
Short-range 78+: 24+ HQ-6A; 24 HQ-6D; ε30 HQ-7
GUNS 16,000 100mm/85mm
Eastern Theatre Command
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR PL-5B/C; PL-8; R-73 (AA-11 Archer); IIR PL- Eastern Theatre Ground Forces
10; IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo); SARH PL-11; ARH 71st Group Army
PL-12; PL-15 (entering service); R-77 (AA-12A Adder);
(1 spec ops bde, 3 armd bde, 2 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde,
R-77-1 (RVV-SD) (AA-12B Adder)
1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde regt, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde,
ASM AKD-9; AKD-10; KD-88; Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge); Kh-
1 AD bde)
59M (AS-18 Kazoo)
AShM Kh-31A (AS-17B Krypton) 72nd Group Army
ARM Kh-31P (AS-17A Krypton); YJ-91 (Domestically (1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde,
produced Kh-31P variant) 2 amph bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1
ALCM • Conventional CJ-20; YJ(KD)-63 hel bde, 1 AD bde)
BOMBS 73rd Group Army
Laser-guided: LS-500J; LT-2 (1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde,
TV-guided: KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR 2 amph bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1
hel bde, 1 AD bde)
Airborne Corps
FORCES BY ROLE Eastern Theatre Navy
SPECIAL FORCES Coastal defence from south of Lianyungang to
1 spec ops bde Dongshan (approx. 35°10´N to 23°30´N), and to
MANOEUVRE seaward; HQ at Ningbo; support bases at Fujian,
Air Manoeuvre
Zhoushan, Ningbo
6 AB bde
17 SSK; 10 DDGHM; 18 FFGHM; 6 FFG; 19 FSGM;
Aviation
ε30 PCFG/PCG; ε22 MCMV; 2 LPD; ε22 LST/M
1 hel regt
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Eastern Theatre Navy Aviation
1 spt bde
1st Naval Aviation Division
TRANSPORT
(1 bbr regt with H-6DU/G; 1 ASW regt with KQ-200; 1
1 bde with Y-7; Y-8
hel regt with Ka-27PS; Ka-28; Ka-31)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Other Forces
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
(1 FGA bde with JH-7; 1 FGA bde with Su-30MK2;
ABCV 180 ZBD-03
J-10A)
APC • APC (T) 4 ZZZ-03 (CP)
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Eastern Theatre Air Force
SP some HJ-9
10th Bomber Division
ARTILLERY 162+
(1 bbr regt with H-6H; 1 bbr regt with H-6K; 1 bbr regt
TOWED 122mm ε54 PL-96 (D-30)
with H-6M)
MRL 107mm ε54 PH-63
26th Special Mission Division
MOR 54+: 82mm some; 100mm 54
(1 AEW&C regt with KJ-200/KJ-500/Y-8T; 1 AEW&C
AIRCRAFT • TPT 20: Medium 6 Y-8; Light 14: 2 Y-7;
12 Y-12D regt with KJ-2000/Y-8T)
HELICOPTERS Fuzhou Base
ATK 8 WZ-10K (1 ftr bde with J-7E; 1 ftr bde with J-11A/B; 1 FGA bde
CSAR 8 Z-8KA with J-16; 1 FGA bde with Su-30MKK; 2 SAM bde)
MRH 12 Z-9WZ Shanghai Base
AIR DEFENCE (1 ftr bde with J-7E; 1 ftr bde with J-8F; 1 ftr bde with
SAM • Point-defence QW-1 J-11B; 1 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1
GUNS • TOWED 25mm 54 PG-87 FGA bde with Su-30MKK; 2 atk bde with JH-7A; 1 trg
bde with J-7/JJ-7A; 2 SAM bde)
Strategic Support Force ε175,000 Other Forces
At the end of 2015, a new Strategic Support Force was (1 ISR bde with JZ-8F; 1 CSAR bde; 1 Flight Instructor
established by drawing upon capabilities previously Training Base with CJ-6; JL-8; JL-9; JL-10)
 Asia 263

Other Forces 77th Group Army

Marines (1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 2 mech inf bde; 3 inf bde,
(2 mne bde) 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD
bde)
Southern Theatre Command Xinjiang Military District
(1 spec ops bde, 1 (high alt) mech div, 3 (high alt) mot
Southern Theatre Ground Forces
div, 1 arty bde, 1 AD bde, 1 engr regt, 1 EW regt, 1 hel
74th Group Army
bde)
(1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 2 inf bde, 2
Xizang Military District
amph bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel
bde, 1 AD bde) (1 spec ops bde; 1 (high alt) mech inf bde; 2 mtn inf
75th Group Army bde; 1 arty bde, 1 AD bde, 1 engr bde, 1 EW regt, 1
(1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, hel bde)
1 air aslt bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1
Western Theatre Air Force
AD bde)
4th Transport Division
Other Forces
(1 tpt regt with Y-8/Y-9; 1 tpt regt with Y-7; 1 tpt regt
(1 (composite) inf bde (Hong Kong); 1 hel sqn (Hong
with Mi-17V-5/Y-7/Y-20)
Kong), 1 AD bn (Hong Kong))
Lanzhou Base
Southern Theatre Navy (1 ftr bde with J-11AB; 1 ftr bde with J-7; 1 ftr bde with
Coastal defence from Dongshan (approx. 23°30´N) to J-7E; 1 FGA bde with J-16; 1 SAM bde)
VNM border, and to seaward (including Paracel and Urumqi Base
Spratly islands); HQ at Zhanjiang; support bases at (1 ftr bde with J-8H; 1 ftr bde with J-11B; 1 atk bde with
Yulin, Guangzhou JH-7A; 2 SAM bde)
4 SSBN; 2 SSN; 16 SSK; 10 DDGHM; 12 FFGHM; Lhasa Base

Asia
2 FFGM; 7 FFG; 14 FSGM; ε38 PCFG/PCG; ε16 (1 SAM bde)
MCMV; 3 LPD; ε21 LST/M Xi’an Flying Academy
(1 trg bde with JJ-7A; 1 trg bde with JL-9; 2 trg bde with
Southern Theatre Navy Aviation JL-8; 1 trg bde with Y-7; Y-8)
3rd Naval Aviation Division Other Forces
(1 ASW/AEW&C regt with KJ-500; KQ-200; 1 bbr regt (1 surv regt with Y-8H1; 1 CSAR regt)
with H-6DU/G/J; 1 tpt/hel regt with Y-7G; Z-8; Z-8J;
Z-8S; Z-9C/D) Northern Theatre Command
Other Forces
(1 FGA bde with J-11B; 1 FGA bde with J-11B; JH-7A; Northern Theatre Ground Forces
1 SAM bde) 78th Group Army
(1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde,
Southern Theatre Air Force 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD
8th Bomber Division bde)
(2 bbr regt with H-6K) 79th Group Army
20th Special Mission Division (1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 3 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde,
(3 EW regt with Y-8CB/G/XZ)

1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD
Kunming Base
bde)
(1 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-10C; 1 trg
80th Group Army
bde with JJ-7A; 1 SAM bde)
(1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde; 1 mech inf bde, 4 inf bde,
Nanning Base
1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD
(2 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with J-10B/C; 1 FGA
bde)
bde with Su-35; 1 FGA bde with J-7; 1 FGA bde with
Su-30MKK; 1 atk bde with JH-7A; 2 trg bde with J-7/ Northern Theatre Navy
JJ-7A; 1 SAM bde) Coastal defence from the DPRK border (Yalu River)
Other Forces to south of Lianyungang (approx 35°10´N), and to
(1 tkr bde with H-6U; 1 CSAR bde)
seaward; HQ at Qingdao; support bases at Lushun,
Other Forces Qingdao.
Marines 4 SSN; 15 SSK; 1 CV; 5 DDGHM; 2 DDGM; 10
(2 mne bde) FFGHM; 2 FFGM; 4 FFG; 8 FSGM; ε18 PCFG/PCG;
ε12 MCMV; ε7 LST/M
Western Theatre Command
Northern Theatre Navy Aviation
Western Theatre Ground Forces 2nd Naval Air Division
76th Group Army (2 EW/ISR/AEW regt with Y-8J/JB/W/X; Y-9JZ; 1 MP/
(1 spec ops bde, 4 armd bde, 2 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 hel regt with SH-5; AS365N; Ka-28; SA321; Z-8J/JH;
engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde) Z-9C/D)
264 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Other Forces Shijiazhuang Flying Academy

(1 ftr regt with J-15; 1 FGA bde with JH-7A; J-8F; 1 tpt (4 trg bde with JL-8)
regt with Y-7H/Y-8C/CRJ-200/CRJ-700; 1 trg regt with Airborne Corps
CJ-6A; 2 trg regt with JL-8; 1 trg regt with HY-7; 1 trg (6 AB bde)
regt with JL-9G; 1 trg regt with JL-9; 1 trg regt with Other Forces
JL-10) (1 CSAR bde)

Northern Theatre Air Force Paramilitary 660,000+ active

16th Special Mission Division
(1 EW regt with Y-8/Y-8CB/Y-8G; 1 ISR regt with JZ-8F;
1 tpt regt with Y-5/Y-7)
Dalian Base
(2 ftr bde with J-7H; 1 ftr bde with J-8F; 2 ftr bde with
J-11B; 2 FGA bde with J-7E; 1 FGA bde with J-10A; 1
FGA bde with J-10B; 1 atk bde with JH-7A; 1 trg bde
with JJ-7A; 3 SAM bde)
Jinan Base
(1 atk bde with JH-7A; 1 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 ftr bde
with J-8F/H; 1 ftr bde with J-7G; 2 SAM bde)
Harbin Flying Academy
(1 trg bde with CJ-6; Y-5; 1 trg bde with H-6; HY-7; 2 trg
bde with JL-8; 1 trg bde with JL-9)
Other Forces
(1 CSAR bde)
People’s Armed Police ε660,000
In 2018 the People’s Armed Police (PAP) divested its
border defence, firefighting, gold, forest, hydropower
and security-guard units. In addition to the forces listed
below, PAP also has 32 regional commands, each with
one or more mobile units
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Other
1 (1st Mobile) paramilitary corps (3 SF regt; 9 (mobile)
paramilitary units; 1 engr/CBRN unit; 1 hel unit)
1 (2nd Mobile) paramilitary corps (2 SF unit; 9
(mobile) paramilitary units; 1 engr/CBRN unit; 1 hel
unit)

Other Forces China Coast Guard (CCG)

Marines In 2018 the CCG was moved from the authority of the
(2 mne bde) SOA to that of the People’s Armed Police
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Central Theatre Command PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 422
PSOH 41:
Central Theatre Ground Forces 2 Zhaotou with 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 med hel)
81st Group Army
6 Zhaoduan (Type-054 mod) with 1 76mm gun
(1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 2 mech inf bde, 1 (OPFOR)
(capacity 1 med hel)
mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1
3 Jiangwei I (Type-053H2G) (capacity 1 med hel)
spt bde, 1 avn bde, 1 AD bde)
(ex-PLAN)
82nd Group Army
4 Shuoshi II (capacity 1 med hel)
(1 spec ops bde, 2 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 2 inf bde, 1 arty
2 Shucha I (capacity 1 med hel)
bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 hel bde, 1 AD bde)
10 Shucha II (capacity 1 med hel)
83rd Group Army
12 Zhaoyu (capacity 1 med hel)
(1 spec ops bde, 1 armd bde, 5 mech inf bde, 1 air aslt
1 Zhoachang (capacity 1 med hel)
bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr/NBC bde, 1 spt bde, 1 AD bde)
1 Zhongyang (capacity 1 med hel)
Other Forces
(1 hy mech inf div, 2 (Beijing) gd div) PSO 45:
9 Zhaojun (Type-718B) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel
Central Theatre Air Force landing platform
13th Transport Division 1 Dalang I (Type-922) (ex-PLAN)
1 Haixun II with 1
(1 tpt regt with Y-8C; 1 tpt regt with Il-76MD/TD; 1 tpt hel landing platform
regt with Il-76MD; Il-78) 1 Hai Yang (Type-625C) (ex-PLAN)
34th VIP Transport Division 1 Jianghu I (Type-053H) (ex-PLAN)
(1 tpt regt with B-737; CRJ200/700; 1 tpt regt with 1 Kanjie (Type-636A) with 1 hel landing platform
B-737; Tu-154M; Tu-154M/D; 1 tpt regt with Y-7; 1 hel (ex-PLAN)
regt with AS332; H225) 6 Shusheng with 1 hel landing platform
36th Bomber Division 3 Shuwu
(2 bbr regt with H-6K; 1 bbr regt with H-6H) 3 Tuzhong (ex-PLAN)

Datong Base 1 Wolei (Type-918) (ex-PLAN)
(1 ftr bde with J-7; 1 ftr bde with J-11A/B; 2 FGA bde 1 Xiang Yang Hong 9 (ex-PLAN)
with J-7E/G; 2 FGA bde with J-10A; 1 FGA bde with 4 Zhaolai with 1 hel landing platform
J-10C; 1 SAM div; 4 SAM bde) 14 Zhaotim
Wuhan Base PCO 33: 4 Zhaogao (Type-056 mod) with 1 hel
(2 ftr bde with J-7; 1 ftr bde with Su-27SK/J-11A; 1 FGA landing platform; 1 Shuke I; 4 Shuke II; 14 Shuke III; 3
bde with J-10B; 1 trg bde with J-7/JJ-7A; 2 SAM bde) Shuyou; 4 Zhaodai; 3 Zhaoming
 Asia 265

PCC 103: 25+ Type-618B-II; 45 Hailin I/II; 1 Shuzao
II; 14 Shuzao III; 9 Zhongeng; 2 Zhongmel; 7 Zhongsui
PB/PBF ε200
AMPHIBIOUS • LST 2 Yuting I (Type-072-II) (Ex-
PLAN; used as hospital vessels and island supply)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 28
AG 7: 5+ Kaobo; 2 Shutu
AGB 1 Yanbing (Type-071) (ex-PLAN)
AGOR 9: 4 Haijian; 3 Shuguang 04 (ex-PLAN); 2
Xiang Yang Hong 9
ATF 11
AIRCRAFT
MP 1+ MA60H
TPT • Light Y-12 (MP role)
HELICOPTERS
TPT • Light Z-9
Maritime Militia
Made up of full- and part-time personnel. Reports to
PLA command and trains to assist PLAN and CCG in
a variety of military roles. These include ISR, maritime
law enforcement, island supply, troop transport and
supporting sovereignty claims. The Maritime Militia
operates a variety of civilian vessels including fishing
of a Central Commission for Integrated Military and
Civilian Development, which seeks to integrate civilian
technologies, including in the fields of information and
communications technologies and artificial intelligence,
into the PLA. China is investing heavily in quantum
technology and announced in September 2017 that it would
build the largest quantum-research facility in the world
to support technology developments that can be used by
the armed forces, including codebreaking capabilities and
covert navigational capacities for submarines.
DEPLOYMENT
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
MONUSCO 223; 9 obs; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital
DJIBOUTI: 240; 1 mne coy(-); 1 med unit; 2 ZTL-11; 8 ZBL-
08; 1 LPD; 1 ESD
GULF OF ADEN: 1 DDGHM; 1 FFGHM; 1 AORH
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 418; 2 engr coy; 1 med coy
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 403; 1 sy coy; 1 engr coy; 1 fd
hospital
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 5 obs

Asia
boats and oil tankers. SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1,040; 5 obs; 1 inf bn; 1
engr coy; 1 fd hospital
Cyber SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 374; 1 engr coy
The PLA has devoted much attention to information warfare
over the past decade, in terms of both battlefield electronic WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 11 obs
warfare (EW) and wider cyber-warfare capabilities. The
main doctrine is the ‘Integrated Network Electronic Fiji FJI
Warfare’ (INEW) document, which guides PLA computer-
network operations. PLA thinking appears to have moved Fijian Dollar F$ 2017 2018 2019
beyond INEW, towards a new concept of ‘information GDP F$ 10.1bn 10.7bn
confrontation’ (xinxi duikang), which aims to integrate
US$ 4.89bn 5.22bn
both electronic and non-electronic aspects of information
per capita US$ 5,528 5,877
warfare within a single command authority. PLA thinking
sees warfare under informationised conditions as Growth % 3.0 3.2
characterised by opposing sides using complete systems of Inflation % 3.4 3.9
ground, naval, air, space and electromagnetic forces. Since Def bdgt F$ 105m 102m
2008, major PLA military exercises have had cyber and US$ 51.0m 49.7m
information-operations components that have been both
US$1=F$ 2.06 2.05
offensive and defensive in nature. The PLA reorganised
in 2015 and established three new support branches Population 926,276
including the Strategic Support Force (SSF). Although Ethnic groups: Fijian 51%; Indian 44%; European/other 5%
precise responsibilities remain unclear, the SSF reportedly
has three sections: the first dealing with intelligence Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
and military operations in cyberspace (defensive and Male 14.0% 4.0% 4.2% 4.0% 21.5% 3.1%
offensive); the second responsible for military space Female 13.4% 3.8% 4.0% 3.8% 20.5% 3.7%
operations (surveillance and satellite); and the third in
charge of defensive and offensive EW and electronic Capabilities
intelligence. In March 2017, China released an International
Strategy for Cooperation in Cyberspace, which stated that The Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) are an infantry-dom-
the PLA will play an ‘important role’ in cyberspace. The inated defence force with a small naval element. The RFMF has
intervened heavily in Fiji’s domestic politics, and between a third
strategy also stated that the country would ‘expedite the
coup in 2006 and 2014, democracy was effectively suspended.
development of a cyber force and enhance capabilities in
The RFMF is constructing a deployable force headquarters, which
terms of situational awareness, cyber defense, supporting will administer all peacekeeping and HADR forces. International
state activities and participating in international peacekeeping operations are an important revenue source for the
cooperation, to prevent major cyber crisis, safeguard government. Fiji’s principal allies are Australia and New Zealand,
cyber security and maintain national security and social with whom the RFMF regularly conducts training and maritime
stability’. In 2017, China also announced the establishment patrols. In 2016, the RFMF announced that it planned to recruit
266 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

more women for peacekeeping missions, while in early 2018

the navy began recruiting its first-ever women sailors. The RFMF India IND
has recently instituted a Regimental Sergeant Major’s course to
improve the quality of senior NCOs and to raise standards across Indian Rupee Rs 2017 2018 2019
the rest of the force. Previously, personnel were sent overseas to GDP Rs 168tr 188tr
receive this level of training. The 2017–18 Defence Budget identi-
fied a requirement to put the navy’s patrol vessels through a life- US$ 2.60tr 2.69tr
extension programme. Fiji has no significant defence industry and per capita US$ 1,976 2,016
is only able to carry out basic equipment maintenance domesti- Growth % 6.7 7.3
cally. Significant upgrade and maintenance work is usually con-
ducted in Australia. Inflation % 3.6 4.7
Def bdgt [a] Rs 3.74tr 4.04tr
ACTIVE 3,500 (Army 3,200 Navy 300)
US$ 58.0bn 57.9bn
RESERVE ε6,000 US$1=Rs 64.45 69.87
(to age 45) [a] Includes defence civil estimates, which include military
pensions
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Population 1,296,834,042
Religious groups: Hindu 80%; Muslim 14%; Christian 2%; Sikh 2%
Army 3,200 (incl 300 recalled reserves)
FORCES BY ROLE Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
SPECIAL FORCES Male 14.3% 4.8% 4.7% 4.3% 20.8% 3.0%
1 spec ops coy Female 12.7% 4.2% 4.1% 3.9% 19.8% 3.4%
MANOEUVRE
Light Capabilities
3 inf bn
COMBAT SUPPORT India continues its military modernisation, though progress in
1 arty bty some areas remains slow. The armed forces are orientated against
1 engr bn both China and Pakistan. Large numbers of paramilitary forces
remain employed in the internal-security role, while the army
COMBAT SUPPORT
has a major role in internal security in Jammu and Kashmir and in
1 log bn
manning front-line positions along the disputed borders with Paki-
Reserves 6,000 stan. An Indian Joint Armed Forces Doctrine was issued in 2017.
Much is consistent with similar US and NATO doctrines. It also sets
FORCES BY ROLE
out joint doctrine for Indian nuclear command and control, and
MANOEUVRE
sees an ‘emerging triad’ of space, cyber and special-operations
Light
capabilities complementing conventional land, sea and air capa-
3 inf bn
bilities. A defence space agency, defence cyber agency and spe-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE cial-operations division are to be formed. Defence cooperation
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES with the US continues to grow, with an increasing level of exercis-
AUV 10 Bushmaster IMV ing and sales of US equipment. It is also showing great interest
ARTILLERY 16 in Russian equipment including an order for the S-400 missile-
TOWED 85mm 4 25-pdr (ceremonial) defence system. Indian personnel participate in numerous bilateral
MOR 81mm 12 and multilateral exercises, and the country is one of the top troop
contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. However, the overall
Navy 300 capability of the conventional forces is limited by inadequate logis-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE tics, maintenance and shortages of ammunition and spare parts.
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 5: 3 Kula India continues to modernise its conventional military capabilities
(AUS Pacific); 2 Levuka and its nuclear forces, particularly its delivery systems, but many
equipment projects have experienced significant delays and cost
overruns, particularly indigenous systems. The government’s ‘Make
DEPLOYMENT in India’ policy aims to strengthen the defence-industrial base.
EGYPT: MFO 170; elm 1 inf bn Apart from nuclear weapons and missiles, its indigenous defence
industry is often slower to field new capabilities than foreign sup-
IRAQ: UN • UNAMI 165; 2 sy unit pliers.
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 136; 1 inf coy
ACTIVE 1,444,500 (Army 1,237,000 Navy 67,700
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 2 obs
Air 127,200 Coast Guard 12,600) Paramilitary
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2 1,585,950
SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 290; 1 inf bn(-); elm 1 log bn
RESERVE 1,155,000 (Army 960,000 Navy 55,000 Air
140,000) Paramilitary 941,000
Army first-line reserves (300,000) within 5 years of full-time service,
further 500,000 have commitment to age 50
 Asia 267

12 mtn div (3-4 mtn inf bde, 3–4 arty regt)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 2 indep mtn bde
Air Manoeuvre
Strategic Forces Command 1 para bde
Strategic Forces Command (SFC) is a tri-service command SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
established in 2003. The commander-in-chief of SFC, a sen- 1 SRBM gp with Agni I
ior three-star military officer, manages and administers all 1 MRBM gp with Agni II
strategic forces through separate army and air-force chains 1 IRBM gp (reported forming) with Agni III
of command 2 SRBM gp with SS-250 Prithvi II
FORCES BY ROLE 3 GLCM regt with PJ-10 Brahmos
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE COMBAT SUPPORT
1 SRBM gp with Agni I 3 arty div (2 arty bde, 1 MRL bde)
1 MRBM gp with Agni II 2 indep arty bde
1 IRBM gp (reported forming) with Agni III 4 engr bde
2 SRBM gp with SS-250 Prithvi II HELICOPTER
14 hel sqn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIR DEFENCE
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS 54
8 AD bde
ICBM • Nuclear Agni V (in test)
IRBM • Nuclear Agni III (entering service); Agni IV (in Reserve Organisations
test)
MRBM • Nuclear ε12 Agni II Reserves 300,000 reservists (first-line reserve
SRBM • Nuclear 42: ε12 Agni I; ε30 SS-250 Prithvi II; within 5 years full-time service); 500,000 reservists
some SS-350 Dhanush (naval testbed) (commitment until age 50) (total 800,000)

Asia
SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 1 Arihant with 4
1-cell VLS with K-15 Sagarika SLBM, 6 533mm TT
Territorial Army 160,000 reservists (only 40,000
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
regular establishment)
ALCM • Nuclear Nirbhay (likely nuclear capable; in FORCES BY ROLE
development) MANOEUVRE
Some Indian Air Force assets (such as Mirage 2000H or Su- Light
30MKI) may be tasked with a strategic role 42 inf bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
Space 6 (Railway) engr regt
2 engr regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sigs regt
SATELLITES 12 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
NAVIGATION, POSITONING, TIMING: 7 IRNSS 6 ecological bn
COMMUNICATIONS: 2 GSAT
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ISR 3: 1 Cartosat 2C; 2 RISAT
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 3,565+: 122 Arjun; 2,418 T-72M1; 1,025+ T-90S
Army 1,237,000 (ε1,100 various models in store)
6 Regional Comd HQ (Northern, Western, Central, South- RECCE Ferret (used for internal-security duties along
ern, Eastern, Southwestern), 1 Training Comd (ARTRAC) with some indigenously built armd cars)
FORCES BY ROLE IFV 3,100: 700 BMP-1; 2,400 BMP-2 Sarath (incl some
COMMAND BMP-2K CP)
4 (strike) corps HQ APC 336+
10 (holding) corps HQ APC (W) 157+ OT-64
SPECIAL FORCES PPV 179: 165 Casspir; 14+ Yukthirath MPV
8 SF bn ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
MANOEUVRE AEV BMP-2; FV180
Armoured ARV 730+: T-54/T-55; 156 VT-72B; 222 WZT-2; 352 WZT-
3 armd div (2–3 armd bde, 1 arty bde (2 arty regt)) 3
8 indep armd bde VLB AM-50; BLG-60; BLG T-72; Kartik; MTU-20; MT-55;
Mechanised Sarvatra
6 (RAPID) mech inf div (1 armd bde, 2 mech inf bde, 1 MW 24 910 MCV-2
arty bde) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
2 indep mech bde MSL
Light SP 110 9P148 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
15 inf div (2–5 inf bde, 1 arty bde) MANPATS 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); Milan 2 

1 inf div (forming) RCL 3,000+: 84mm Carl Gustav; 106mm 3,000+ M40A1
7 indep inf bde (10 per inf bn)
268 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
ARTILLERY 9,719+
SP 155mm 10 K9 Varja
TOWED 2,975+: 105mm 1,350+: 600+ IFG Mk1/Mk2/Mk3
(being replaced); up to 700 LFG; 50 M-56; 122mm 520
D-30; 130mm ε600 M-46 (500 in store) 155mm 505: ε300
FH-77B; ε200 M-46 (mod); 5 M777A2
MRL 214: 122mm ε150 BM-21/LRAR 214mm 36 Pinaka
(non-operational) 300mm 28 9A52 Smerch
MOR 6,520+: 81mm 5,000+ E1; 120mm ε1,500 AM-50/E1;
SP 120mm E1; 160mm 20 M-58 Tampella
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
IRBM • Nuclear some Agni-III (entering service)
MRBM • Nuclear ε12 Agni-II
SRBM • Nuclear 42: ε12 Agni-I; ε30 250 Prithvi II
GLCM • Conventional 15 PJ-10 Brahmos
AMPHIBIOUS 2 LCVP
HELICOPTERS
MRH 275+: 80 Dhruv; 12 Lancer; 3+ Rudra; 120 SA315B
Lama (Cheetah); 60 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak)
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR • Medium 25: 13 Nishant; 12 Searcher Mk I/II
AIR DEFENCE
SAM • Medium-range Akash • Short-range 180 2K12
Kub (SA-6 Gainful) • Point-defence 500+: 50+ 9K33 Osa
(SA-8B Gecko); 200 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin); 250 9K35
Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet);
9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse)
GUNS 2,395+
SP 155+: 23mm 75 ZSU-23-4; ZU-23-2 (truck-mounted);
30mm 20-80 2S6 Tunguska
TOWED 2,240+: 20mm Oerlikon (reported); 23mm 320
ZU-23-2; 40mm 1,920 L40/70
Navy 67,700 (incl 7,000 Naval Avn and 1,200
Marines)
Fleet HQ New Delhi. Commands located at Mumbai,
Vishakhapatnam, Kochi & Port Blair
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES 16
STRATEGIC • SSBN 1 Arihant with 4 1-cell VLS with
K-15 Sagarika SLBM, 6 533mm TT
TACTICAL 15
SSN 1 Chakra (ex-RUS Akula II) with 4 single 533mm
TT with 3M14E Klub-S (SS-N-30) LACM/3M54E
Klub-S (SS-N-27 Sizzler) AShM, 4 single 650mm TT
with T-65 HWT (RUS lease agreement; damaged in
2017, awaiting repair)
SSK 14:
4 Shishumar (GER T-209/1500) with 8 single 533mm
TT with AEG SUT mod 1 HWT
2 Sindhughosh (FSU Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT with
53-65KE HWT/TEST-71ME HWT/SET-65E HWT
7 Sindhughosh (FSU Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT
with 53-65KE HWT/TEST-71ME HWT/SET-65E
HWT/3M54E Klub (SS-N-27 Sizzler) AShM
1 Kalvari (FRA Scorpène) with 6 533mm TT with
5M39 Exocet Block 2 AShM/5UT HWT
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 28
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 1
CV 1 Vikramaditya (ex-FSU Kiev mod) with 3 octuple
VLS with Barak-1 SAM, 4 AK630 CIWS (capacity: 12
MiG-29K/KUB Fulcrum FGA ac; 6 Ka-28 Helix A ASW
hel/Ka-31 Helix B AEW hel)
DESTROYERS 14
DDGHM 9:
3 Delhi with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (SS-
N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 2 single lnchr with 3K90
Uragan (SA-N-7 Gadfly) SAM, 4 octuple VLS with
Barak-1 SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000
A/S mor; 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity
either 2 Dhruv hel/Sea King Mk42A ASW hel)
3 Kolkata with 2 octuple VLS with Brahmos AShM;
4 octuple VLS fitted for Barak-8 SAM; 2 twin
533mm TT with SET-65E HWT, 2 RBU 6000
Smerch 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
(capacity 2 Dhruv/Sea King Mk42B hel)
3 Shivalik with 1 octuple VLS with 3M54E Klub-N
(SS-N-27 Sizzler) AShM/Brahmos AShM, 4 octuple
VLS with Barak-1 SAM, 1 single lnchr with 3K90
Uragan (SA-N-7 Gadfly) SAM, 2 triple 324mm
ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630
CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Sea King Mk42B
ASW hel)
DDGM 5:
2 Rajput (FSU Kashin) with 2 twin lnchr with P-15M
Termit (SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 2 twin lnchr with
M-1 Volna (SA-N-1 Goa) SAM, 5 single 533mm
ASTT with Varanustra HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch
2 A/S mor, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity
Ka-28 Helix A hel)
1 Rajput (FSU Kashin) with 2 twin lnchr with
Brahmos AShM, 2 single lnchr with P-15M Termit
(SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 2 twin lnchr with M-1
Volna (SA-N-1 Goa) SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT
with SET-65E HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S
mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-
28 Helix A hel)
2 Rajput (FSU Kashin) with 1 octuple VLS with
Brahmos AShM, 2 twin lnchr with P-15M Termit
(SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 2 octuple VLS with Barak
SAM. 1 twin lnchr with M-1 Volna (SA-N-1 Goa)
SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT with SET-65E HWT,
2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 4 AK630 CIWS, 1
76mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-28 Helix A hel)
FRIGATES 13
FFGHM 10:
3 Brahmaputra with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E
Uran-E (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 3 octuple
VLS with Barak-1 SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT
with A244 LWT, 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
(capacity 2 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak)/Sea King
Mk42 ASW hel) (of which 1 non-operational)
1 Godavari with 4 single lnchr with P-15M Termit
(SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 1 octuple VLS with Barak-1
SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, 4
AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 SA316B
Alouette III (Chetak)/Sea King Mk42 ASW hel)
3 Talwar I with 1 octuple VLS with 3M54E Klub-N
(SS-N-27 Sizzler) AShM, 1 single lnchr with 3K90
Uragan (SA-N-7 Gadfly) SAM, 2 twin 533mm
ASTT with SET-65E HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2
 Asia 269

A/S mor, 2 Kashtan (CADS-N-1) CIWS, 1 100mm LANDING CRAFT 12

gun (capacity 1 Dhruv/Ka-28 Helix A ASW hel)
3 Talwar II with 1 octuple VLS with Brahmos AShM,
1 single lnchr with 3K90 Uragan (SA-N-7 Gadfly)
SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT with SET-65E HWT,
2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1
100mm gun (capacity 1 Dhruv/Ka-28 Helix A ASW
hel)
FFH 3:
3 Kamorta with 2 twin 533mm TT, 2 RBU 6000
Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
(capacity 1 Dhruv/Ka-28 Helix A ASW hel)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 106
CORVETTES • FSGM 8:
4 Khukri with 2 twin lnchr with P-15M Termit
(SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 2 twin lnchr (manual
aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (SA-N-5 Grail)
SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing
platform (for Dhruv/SA316 Alouette III (Chetak))
4 Kora with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (SS-
N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 quad lnchr (manual
aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (SA-N-5 Grail)
SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing
platform (for Dhruv/SA316 Alouette III (Chetak))
LCM 4 LCM 8 (for use in Jalashwa)
LCT 8: 4 LCU Mk-IV (capacity 1 Arjun MBT/2 T-90
MBT/4 IFV/160 troops); 4 LCU Mk-3 (capacity 2 APC;
120 troops)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 40
AFD 2: 1 FDN-1; 1 FDN-2
AGOR 1 Sagardhwani with 1 hel landing platform
AGHS 8: 1 Makar; 7 Sandhayak
AO 2 GSL 1,000T Fuel Barge
AOL 10: 1 Ambika; 2 Poshak II; 7 Purak
AOR 1 Jyoti with 1 hel landing platform
AORH 3: 1 Aditya (based on Deepak (1967) Bremer
Vulkan design); 2 Deepak with 4 AK630 CIWS
AP 3 Nicobar with 1 hel landing platform
ASR 1
ATF 1
AWT 3 Ambuda II
AX 1 Tir
AXS 4: 2 Mhadei; 2 Tarangini
Naval Aviation 7,000
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

Asia
PSOH 10: 4 Saryu with 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun 2 sqn with MiG-29K/KUB Fulcrum
(capacity 1 Dhruv); 6 Sukanya with 4 RBU 2500 A/S mor ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
(capacity 1 SA316 Alouette III (Chetak)) 1 sqn with Ka-28 Helix A
PCFGM 8 1 sqn with Sea King Mk42B
6 Veer (FSU Tarantul) with 4 single lnchr with MARITIME PATROL
P-15M Termit (SS-N-2D Styx) AShM, 2 quad lnchr 2 sqn with BN-2 Islander; Do-228-101; Il-38SD
(manual aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (SA-N-5 May
Grail), 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
1 sqn with P-8I Neptune
2 Prabal (mod Veer) each with 4 quad lnchr with
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
3M24E Uran-E (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1
1 sqn with Ka-31 Helix B
quad lnchr (manual aiming) with 9K32M Strela-
SEARCH & RESCUE
2M (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm
1 sqn with SA316B Alouette III (Chetak); Sea King
gun
Mk42C
PCMT 3 Abhay (FSU Pauk II) with 1 quad lnchr (manual
1 sqn with Dhruv
aiming) with 9K32M Strela-2M (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2
TRANSPORT
twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 76mm gun
1 sqn with HS-748M (HAL-748M)
PCC 15: 4 Bangaram; 10 Car Nicobar; 1 Trinkat (SDB Mk5)
TRAINING
PCF 4 Tarmugli (Car Nicobar mod)
1 sqn with Do-228
PBF 58: 9 Immediate Support Vessel (Rodman 78);
1 sqn with HJT-16 Kiran MkI/II, Hawk Mk132
13 Immediate Support Vessel (Craftway); 15 Plascoa
1 hel sqn with Sea King Mk42B
1300 (SPB); 5 Super Dvora; 16 Solas Marine Interceptor
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
(additional vessels in build)
1 sqn with UH-3H Sea King
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1
MSO 1 Pondicherry (FSU Natya) with 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor ISR UAV
AMPHIBIOUS 1 sqn with Heron; Searcher MkII

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS 1 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
LPD 1 Jalashwa (ex-US Austin) with 1 Phalanx CIWS AIRCRAFT 75 combat capable
(capacity up to 6 med spt hel; either 9 LCM or 4 FTR 45 MiG-29K/KUB Fulcrum
LCM and 2 LCAC; 4 LCVP; 930 troops) ASW 13: 5 Il-38SD May; 8 P-8I Neptune
LANDING SHIPS 8 MP 13 Do-228-101
LSM 3 Kumbhir (FSU Polnocny C) (capacity 5 MBT or 5 TPT 37:
APC; 160 troops) Light 27: 17 BN-2 Islander; 10 Do-228
LST 5: PAX 10 HS-748M (HAL-748M)
2 Magar (capacity 15 MBT or 8 APC or 10 trucks; TRG 29: 6 HJT-16 Kiran MkI; 6 HJT-16 Kiran MkII; 17
500 troops) Hawk Mk132*
3 Magar mod (capacity 11 MBT or 8 APC or 10 HELICOPTERS
trucks; 500 troops) ASW 30: 12 Ka-28 Helix A; 18 Sea King Mk42B
270 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

MRH 58: 10 Dhruv; 25 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak); 23 Some units with An-32; Do-228; Hawk Mk 132*; HJT-16
SA319 Alouette III Kiran MkI/II; Jaguar IS/IM; MiG-21bis; MiG-21FL;
AEW 11 Ka-31 Helix B MiG-21M/MF; MiG-27ML; PC-7 Turbo Trainer MkII;
TPT • Medium 11: 5 Sea King Mk42C; up to 6 UH-3H SA316B Alouette III (Chetak)
Sea King ATTACK HELICOPTER
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 2 sqn with Mi-25 Hind; Mi-35 Hind
ISR 10: Heavy 4 Heron; Medium 6 Searcher Mk II TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES 5 sqn with Dhruv
AAM • IR R-550 Magic/Magic 2; R-73 (AA-11 Archer) IR/ 7 sqn with Mi-17/Mi-17-1V Hip H
SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo); ARH: R-77 (AA-12A Adder) 12 sqn with Mi-17V-5 Hip H
AShM AGM-84 Harpoon (on P-8I ac); Kh-35 (AS-20 2 sqn with SA316B Alouette III (Chetak)
Kayak; on May ac); Sea Eagle (service status unclear) 1 flt with Mi-26 Halo
2 flt with SA315B Lama (Cheetah)
Marines ε1,200 (Additional 1,000 for SPB 2 flt with SA316B Alouette III (Chetak)
duties) ISR UAV
After the Mumbai attacks, the Sagar Prahari Bal (SPB), 5 sqn with Heron; Searcher MkII
with 80 PBF, was established to protect critical maritime AIR DEFENCE
infrastructure 25 sqn with S-125 Pechora (SA-3B Goa)
FORCES BY ROLE 6 sqn with 9K33 Osa-AK (SA-8B Gecko)
SPECIAL FORCES 2 sqn with Akash
1 (marine) cdo force 10 flt with 9K38 Igla-1 (SA-18 Grouse)
MANOEUVRE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Amphibious AIRCRAFT 814 combat capable
1 amph bde FTR 62: 55 MiG-29 Fulcrum (incl 12+ MiG-29UPG); 7
MiG-29UB Fulcrum
Air Force 127,200 FGA 534: 114 MiG-21 Bison; 39 MiG-21U/UM Mongol;
5 regional air comds: Western (New Delhi), Southwestern 60 MiG-27ML Flogger; 20 MiG-23UB Flogger; 40 Mirage
(Gandhinagar), Eastern (Shillong), Central (Allahabad), 2000E/I (2000H); 10 Mirage 2000ED/IT (2000TH); 242 Su-
Southern (Trivandrum). 2 support comds: Maintenance 30MKI Flanker; 9 Tejas
(Nagpur) and Training (Bangalore) ATK 115: 28 Jaguar IB; 79 Jaguar IS; 8 Jaguar IM
FORCES BY ROLE ISR 3 Gulfstream IV SRA-4
FIGHTER AEW&C 4: 1 EMB-145AEW Netra (2 more in test); 3
3 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum; MiG-29UB Fulcrum Il-76TD Phalcon
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK TKR 6 Il-78 Midas
4 sqn with Jaguar IB/IS TPT 242: Heavy 27: 10 C-17A Globemaster III; 17 Il-76MD
6 sqn with MiG-21 Bison Candid; Medium 10 C-130J-30 Hercules; Light 141: 57
3 sqn with MiG-27ML/MiG-23UB Flogger An-32; 45 An-32RE Cline; 35 Do-228; 4 EMB-135BJ; PAX
3 sqn with Mirage 2000E/ED/I/IT (2000H/TH – 64: 1 B-707; 4 B-737; 3 B-737BBJ; 56 HS-748
secondary ECM role) TRG 311: 103 Hawk Mk132*; 91 HJT-16 Kiran MkI/IA; 42
11 sqn with Su-30MKI Flanker HJT-16 Kiran MkII; 75 PC-7 Turbo Trainer MkII
ANTI SURFACE WARFARE HELICOPTERS
1 sqn with Jaguar IM ATK 19 Mi-25/Mi-35 Hind
ISR MRH 390: 60 Dhruv; 35 Mi-17 Hip H; 45 Mi-17-1V Hip
1 unit with Gulfstream IV SRA-4 H; 149 Mi-17V-5 Hip H; 59 SA315B Lama (Cheetah); 39
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak); 3+ Rudra
1 sqn with Il-76TD Phalcon TPT • Heavy 1+ Mi-26 Halo
TANKER UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
1 sqn with Il-78 Midas ISR • Heavy 9 Heron; Medium some Searcher MkII
TRANSPORT AIR DEFENCE • SAM
1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules Medium-range Akash
1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III Short-range S-125 Pechora (SA-3B Goa)
5 sqn with An-32/An-32RE Cline Point-defence 9K33 Osa-AK (SA-8B Gecko); 9K38 Igla
1 (comms) sqn with B-737; B-737BBJ; EMB-135BJ 
 (SA-18 Grouse)
4 sqn with Do-228; HS-748 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
1 sqn with Il-76MD Candid AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer)
1 flt with HS-748 R-550 Magic; IIR Mica IR; IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo);
TRAINING SARH Super 530D ARH R-77 (AA-12A Adder); Mica RF
1 OCU sqn with Su-30MKI Flanker AShM AGM-84 Harpoon; AM39 Exocet; Kh-31A (AS-17B
1 sqn (forming) with Tejas Krypton); Sea Eagle†
 Asia 271

ASM Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge); Kh-59 (AS-13 Kingbolt); Kh-
59M (AS-18 Kazoo); AS-30; Kh-23 (AS-7 Kerry)‡; Popeye II
(Crystal Maze)
ARM Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler); Kh-31P (AS-17A Krypton)
ALCM • Nuclear Nirbhay (likely nuclear capable; in
development)
BOMBS • Laser-guided Paveway II
Coast Guard 12,600
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 115
PSOH 16: 2 Sankalp (capacity 1 Chetak/Dhruv hel); 4
Samar with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Chetak/Dhruv hel);
6 Samarth; 1 Vikram (capacity 1 Dhruv hel); 3 Vishwast
(capacity 1 Dhruv hel)
PSO 3 Samudra Prahari with 1 hel landing platform
PCO 1 Vikram with 1 hel landing platform
PCC 40: 20 Aadesh; 8 Rajshree; 5 Rani Abbakka; 7 Sarojini
Naidu
PBF 55: 6 C-154; 2 C-141; 11 C-143; 39 C-401
PB 1 Priyadarshini
AMPHIBIOUS
UCAC 18: 6 H-181 (Griffon 8000TD); 12 H-187 (Griffon
8000TD)
Central Industrial Security Force 144,400
(lightly armed security guards)
Ministry of Home Affairs. Guards public-sector locations
Central Reserve Police Force 313,650
Ministry of Home Affairs. Internal-security duties, only
lightly armed, deployable throughout the country
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Other
236 paramilitary bn
10 (rapid action force) paramilitary bn
10 (CoBRA) paramilitary bn
6 (Mahila) paramilitary bn (female)
2 sy gp
COMBAT SUPPORT
5 sigs bn
Defence Security Corps 31,000
Provides security at Defence Ministry sites
Indo-Tibetan Border Police 89,450
Ministry of Home Affairs. Tibetan border security SF/

Asia
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 23 Do-228
guerrilla-warfare and high-altitude-warfare specialists
HELICOPTERS • MRH 21: 4 Dhruv; 17 SA316B Alouette
III (Chetak) FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Paramilitary 1,585,950 Other
56 paramilitary bn
Rashtriya Rifles 65,000
Ministry of Defence. 15 sector HQ National Security Guards 12,000
FORCES BY ROLE Anti-terrorism contingency deployment force, compris-
MANOEUVRE ing elements of the armed forces, CRPF and Border
Other Security Force
65 paramilitary bn
Railway Protection Forces 70,000
Assam Rifles 63,750
Ministry of Home Affairs. Security within northeastern Sashastra Seema Bal 76,350
states, mainly army-officered; better trained than BSF Guards the borders with Nepal and Bhutan
FORCES BY ROLE
Equipped to roughly same standard as an army inf bn Special Frontier Force 10,000
COMMAND Mainly ethnic Tibetans
7 HQ
MANOEUVRE Special Protection Group 3,000
Other Protection of ministers and senior officials
46 paramilitary bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE State Armed Police 450,000
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 252 For duty primarily in home state only, but can be moved
to other states. Some bn with GPMG and army-standard
Border Security Force 257,350 infantry weapons and equipment
Ministry of Home Affairs
FORCES BY ROLE
FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE
MANOEUVRE
Other
Other
144 (India Reserve Police) paramilitary bn
186 paramilitary bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Reserve Organisations
Small arms, lt arty, some anti-tank weapons
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 942+ Civil Defence 500,000 reservists
AIRCRAFT • TPT some (air spt) Operate in 225 categorised towns in 32 states. Some units
HELICOPTERS • MRH 2 Mi-17V-5 Hip for NBC defence
272 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Home Guard 441,000 reservists (547,000

authorised str) Indonesia IDN
In all states except Arunachal Pradesh and Kerala; men
Indonesian Rupiah Rp 2017 2018 2019
on reserve lists, no trg. Not armed in peacetime. Used
for civil defence, rescue and firefighting provision in GDP Rp 13589tr 14778tr
wartime; 6 bn (created to protect tea plantations in US$ 1.02tr 1.01tr
Assam) per capita US$ 3,876 3,789
Growth % 5.1 5.1
Cyber
Inflation % 3.8 3.4
The Defence Information Assurance and Research Agency
(DIARA) is mandated to deal with cyber-security-related Def bdgt Rp 115tr 108tr 107tr
issues for the armed forces. All services have their own US$ 8.60bn 7.32bn
cyber-security policies and CERT teams, and headquarters FMA (US) US$ 14m 0m
maintain information-security policies. The Indian Army US$1=Rp 13382.56 14700.39
raised the Army Cyber Security Establishment in 2005
and set up the Cyber Security Laboratory at the Military Population 262,787,403
College of Telecommunication Engineering (under the Ethnic groups: Jawa 40.2%; Sunda, Priangan 15.5%; Banjar,
Corps of Signals) in April 2010. The Department for Melayu Banjar 4%; other or unspecified 40.5%
Defence Production in 2018 produced a cyber-security
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
framework so that defence organisations can work towards
more common conceptions of their cyber posture, and their Male 12.5% 4.4% 4.2% 3,9% 21.8% 3.2%
cyber-security requirements. The services have their own Female 12.1% 4.2% 4.1% 3.8% 21.7% 4.1%
cyber groups, and further meetings took place in 2018
regarding the long-discussed proposal to establish a tri- Capabilities
service command for cyberspace.
Indonesia’s TNI is the largest armed force in Southeast Asia. It has
traditionally been concerned primarily with internal security and
DEPLOYMENT counter-insurgency. All three services are based on regional com-
AFGHANISTAN: 335 (Indo-Tibetan Border Police mands. The army remains the dominant service and is deployed
paramilitary: facilities protection) operationally in West Papua, central Sulawesi and elsewhere. A
modernisation plan adopted in 2010 called for the establishment
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • by 2024 of a ‘Minimum Essential Force’ including strengthened
MONUSCO 2,625; 22 obs; 3 inf bn; 1 fd hospital naval and air capabilities. The 2015 defence white paper outlined
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 900; 1 inf bn; 1 med coy Indonesia’s ‘Global Maritime Fulcrum’ policy and advocated build-
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 2 obs ing up maritime, satellite and UAV capabilities. In 2018, Indonesia
expanded its forces in the eastern areas of the country and stood
SOMALIA: UN • UNSOM 1 obs up a long-expected third naval fleet command and a third air-force
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2,351; 18 obs; 2 inf bn; 1 command to organise existing units in that area. Indonesia also
engr coy; 2 fd hospital created a new army reserve division and a third marines group,
both to be stationed in the east. An ASEAN member, Indonesia
SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2; 2 obs has no formal defence alliances but there are defence-cooperation
SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 194; 1 log bn(-) agreements with other states. It also maintains good relations with
China, which has supplied some military equipment. The armed
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 3 obs
forces have contributed to UN and other international peace-
keeping operations. Indonesia regularly exercises with Australian
FOREIGN FORCES and US armed forces and those of Southeast Asian states. Indo-
Total numbers for UNMOGIP mission in India and nesia’s inventory comprises equipment from diverse international
Pakistan sources, and the country uses technology-transfer agreements
to develop its national defence industry. The 2015 white paper
Chile 2 obs
advocated the creation of a strong, independent defence industry,
Croatia 9 obs
with emphasis on the maritime sector. Indonesia has a number of
Italy 2 obs public and private defence companies that provide services and
Korea, Republic of 7 obs equipment across the domains.
Philippines 6 obs
Romania 2 obs ACTIVE 395,500 (Army 300,400 Navy 65,000 Air
Sweden 5 obs 30,100) Paramilitary 280,000
Switzerland 3 obs Conscription liability 24 months selective conscription authorised
Thailand 4 obs (not required by law)
Uruguay 3 obs RESERVE 400,000
Army cadre units; numerical str n.k., obligation to age 45 for
officers
 Asia 273

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 79: 42 Leopard 2A4; 37 Leopard 2RI
Army ε300,400 LT TK 350: 275 AMX-13 (partially upgraded); 15 PT-76;
Mil Area Commands (KODAM) 60 Scorpion 90
14 comd (I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, IX, XII, XVI, XVII, XVIII, RECCE 142: 55 Ferret (13 upgraded); 69 Saladin (16
Jaya & Iskandar Muda) upgraded); 18 VBL
FORCES BY ROLE IFV 64: 22 Black Fox; 42 Marder 1A3 

MANOEUVRE APC 634+
Mechanised APC (T) 267: 75 AMX-VCI; 34 BTR-50PK; 15 FV4333
3 armd cav bn Stormer; 143 M113A1-B
5 cav bn APC (W) 367+: ε150 Anoa; some Barracuda; 40 BTR-
Light 40; 45 FV603 Saracen (14 upgraded); 100 LAV-150
1 inf bde (1 cav bn, 3 inf bn) Commando; 32 VAB-VTT
3 inf bde (2 cdo bn, 1 inf bn) PPV some Casspir
1 inf bde (1 cdo bn, 2 inf bn) AUV 39: 14 APR-1; 3 Bushmaster; 22 Commando Ranger;
3 inf bde (3 inf bn) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
32 indep inf bn AEV 4: 3 Leopard 2; 1 M113A1-B-GN
16 cdo bn ARV 15+: 2 AMX-13; 6 AMX-VCI; 3 BREM-2; 4 BPz-3
COMBAT SUPPORT Buffel; Stormer; T-54/T-55
12 fd arty bn
VLB 16: 10 AMX-13; 4 Leguan; 2 Stormer
7 cbt engr bn
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Asia
MSL • MANPATS SS.11; Milan; 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3
4 construction bn
AVIATION Sagger)
1 composite avn sqn RCL 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1
HELICOPTER RL 89mm LRAC
1 hel sqn with Bo-105; Bell 205A; Bell 412; AH-64E ARTILLERY 1,198+
Apache Guardian SP 74: 105mm 20 AMX Mk61; 155mm 54: 36 CAESAR;
1 hel sqn Mi-35P Hind; Mi-17V-5 Hip H 18 M109A4
AIR DEFENCE TOWED 133+: 105mm 110+: some KH-178; 60 M101; 50
1 AD regt (2 ADA bn, 1 SAM unit) M-56; 155mm 23: 5 FH-88; 18 KH-179
6 ADA bn MRL 127mm 36 ASTROS II Mk6
3 SAM unit MOR 955: 81mm 800; 120mm 155: 75 Brandt; 80 UBM 52
AMPHIBIOUS • LCU 17: 1 ADRI XXXII; 4 ADRI XXXIII;
Special Forces Command (KOPASSUS)
1 ADRI XXXIX; 1 ADRI XL; 3 ADRI XLI; 2 ADRI XLIV; 2
FORCES BY ROLE
ADRI XLVI; 2 ADRI XLVIII; 1 ADRI L
SPECIAL FORCES

AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 9: 1 BN-2A Islander; 6 C-212
3 SF gp (total: 2 cdo/para unit, 1 CT unit, 1 int unit)
Aviocar (NC-212); 2 Turbo Commander 680
Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD) HELICOPTERS
FORCES BY ROLE ATK 14: 6 Mi-35P Hind; 8 AH-64E Apache Guardian
COMMAND MRH 40: 6 H125M Fennec; 17 Bell 412 Twin Huey (NB-
3 div HQ 412); 17 Mi-17V-5 Hip H
MANOEUVRE TPT • Light 29: 7 Bell 205A; 20 Bo-105 (NBo-105); 2 H120
Armoured Colibri
2 armd bn TRG 12 Hughes 300C
Mechanised AIR DEFENCE
1 mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn) SAM • Point-defence 95+: 2 Kobra (with 125 GROM-2
Light msl); TD-2000B (Giant Bow II); 51 Rapier; 42 RBS-70; QW-3
1 inf bde (3 cdo bn)
GUNS • TOWED 411: 20mm 121 Rh 202; 23mm Giant
1 inf bde (2 cdo bn)
Bow; 40mm 90 L/70; 57mm 200 S-60
1 inf bde (2 inf bn)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
Air Manoeuvre
ASM AGM-114 Hellfire
3 AB bde (3 AB bn)
COMBAT SUPPORT
2 fd arty regt (1 SP arty bn; 2 arty bn) Navy ε65,000 (including Marines and Aviation)
1 arty bn
2 cbt engr bn Three fleets: East (Sorong), Central (Surabaya) and West
AIR DEFENCE (Jakarta). Two Forward Operating Bases at Kupang (West
2 AD bn Timor) and Tahuna (North Sulawesi)
274 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 4:
2 Cakra (Type-209/1300) with 8 single 533mm TT with
SUT HWT
2 Nagapasa (Type-209/1400) with 8 single 533mm TT with
Black Shark HWT
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 13
FRIGATES 13
FFGHM 5:
1 Ahmad Yani (ex-NLD Van Speijk) with 2 twin-cell
VLS with 3M55E Yakhont (SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM;
2 SIMBAD twin lnchr (manual) with Mistral SAM,
2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm
gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo-105) hel)
2 Ahmad Yani (ex-NLD Van Speijk) with 2 twin
lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 2
SIMBAD twin lnchr (manual) with Mistral SAM,
2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm
gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo-105) hel)
2 R.E. Martadinata (SIGMA 10514) with 2 quad lnchr
with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 6-cell VLS
with VL-MICA SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with
A244/S LWT, 1 Millennium CIWS, 1 76mm gun (1
med hel)
FFGM
4 Diponegoro (SIGMA 9113) with 2 twin lnchr
with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 2 quad Tetral
lnchr with Mistral SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT
with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing
platform
FFG
1 Hajar Dewantara (trg role) with 2 twin lnchr with
MM38 Exocet AShM, 2 single 533mm ASTT with
SUT HWT, 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo-
105) hel)
FFHM 3:
3 Ahmad Yani (ex-NLD Van Speijk) with 2 SIMBAD
twin lnchr (manual) with Mistral SAM, 2 triple
324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm gun
(capacity 1 Bo-105 (NBo-105) hel)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 116
CORVETTES 20
FSGM 3 Bung Tomo with 2 quad lnchr with MM40
Exocet Block 2 AShM, 1 18-cell VLS with Sea Wolf
SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun (capacity:
1 Bo-105 hel)
FSGH 1 Nala with 2 twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet
AShM, 1 twin 375mm A/S mor, 1 120mm gun
(capacity 1 lt hel)
FSG 2 Fatahillah with 2 twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet
AShM, 2 triple B515 ILAS-3/Mk32 324mm ASTT
with A244/Mk46 LWT, 1 twin 375mm A/S mor, 1
120mm gun
FS 14 Kapitan Pattimura (GDR Parchim I) with 4 single
400mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 twin
57mm gun
PCFG 3 Mandau with 4 single lnchr with MM38 Exocet
AShM, 1 57mm gun
PCG 5:
3 Sampari (KCR-60M)with 2 twin lnchr for C-705 AShM
2 Todak with 2 single lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-8
Saccade), 1 57mm gun
PCT 2 Andau with 2 single 533mm TT, 1 57mm gun
PCC 11: 4 Kakap with 1 hel landing platform; 2 Pandrong;
3 Pari with 1 57mm gun; 2 Todak with 1 57mm gun
PBG 8:
2 Clurit with 2 single lnchr with C-705 AShM, 1 AK630
CIWS
6 Clurit with 2 single lnchr with C-705 AShM
PBF 4 Combat Boat AL D-18
PB 63: 2 Badau (ex-BRN Waspada); 9 Boa; 1 Cucut (ex-SGP
Jupiter); 4 Kobra; 1 Krait; 8 Sibarau; 22 Sinabang (KAL 28);
4 Tarihu; 7 Tatihu (PC-40); 5 Viper
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 8
MCO 2 Pulau Rengat
MSC 6 Pulau Rote (ex-GDR Wolgast)
AMPHIBIOUS
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS • LPD 5:
1 Dr Soeharso (ex-Tanjung Dalpele; capacity 2 LCU/
LCVP; 13 tanks; 500 troops; 2 AS332L Super Puma)
(used in AH role)
4 Makassar (capacity 2 LCU or 4 LCVP; 13 tanks; 500
troops; 2 AS332L Super Puma)
LANDING SHIPS • LST 19
1 Teluk Amboina (capacity 16 tanks; 800 troops)
1 Teluk Bintuni (capacity 10 MBT)
10 Teluk Gilimanuk (ex-GDR Frosch)
2 Teluk Langsa (capacity 16 tanks; 200 troops)
5 Teluk Semangka (capacity 17 tanks; 200 troops) 

LANDING CRAFT 55
LCM 20
LCU 5
LCVP 30

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 26
AGF 1 Multatuli with 1 hel landing platform
AGOR 2 Rigel
AGOS 1 Leuser
AGHS 1
AGS 3 Pulau Rote (ex-GDR Wolgast)
AKSL 4
AORLH 1 Arun (ex-UK Rover) (damaged at sea 2018, in
repair)
AOR 1 Tarakan with 1 hel landing platform
AOT 3: 2 Khobi; 1 Sorong
AP 4: 1 Tanjung Kambani (troop transport) with 1 hel
landing platform; 1 Tanjung Nusanive (troop transport);
2 Karang Pilang (troop transport)
ATF 1
AXS 3
Naval Aviation ε1,000
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT
MP 27: 3 C212-200; 4 CN235 MPA; 14 N-22B
Searchmaster B; 6 N-22SL Searchmaster L
TPT • Light 33: 1 Beech 350i King Air (VIP transport);
8 Beech G36 Bonanza; 2 Beech G38 Baron; 17 C-212-200
Aviocar; 3 TB-9 Tampico; 2 TB-10
HELICOPTERS
ASW 4 AS565MBe Panther
MRH 4 Bell 412 (NB-412) Twin Huey
 Asia 275

CSAR 4 H225M Caracal EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

TPT 15: Medium 3 AS332L Super Puma (NAS322L); Only 45% of ac op
Light 12: 3 H120 Colibri; 9 Bo-105 (NBo-105) AIRCRAFT 109 combat capable
FTR 9: 7 F-16A Fighting Falcon; 2 F-16B Fighting Falcon (8
Marines ε20,000 F-5E Tiger II; 4 F-5F Tiger II non-operational)
FORCES BY ROLE FGA 40: 19 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 5 F-16D Fighting Falcon;
SPECIAL FORCES 2 Su-27SK; 3 Su-27SKM; 2 Su-30MK; 9 Su-30MK2
1 SF bn MP 6: 3 B-737-200; 3 CN235M-220 MPA
MANOEUVRE TKR 1 KC-130B Hercules
Amphibious TPT 49: Medium 16: 4 C-130B Hercules; 4 C-130H
2 mne gp (1 cav regt, 3 mne bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt spt Hercules; 6 C-130H-30 Hercules; 2 L-100-30; Light 24: 9
regt, 1 CSS regt) C295; 9 C-212 Aviocar (NC-212); 5 CN235-110; 1 F-27-
1 mne gp (forming) 400M Troopship; PAX 9: 1 B-737-200; 3 B-737-400; 1 B-737-
1 mne bde (3 mne bn) 500; 1 B-737-800BBJ; 1 F-28-1000; 2 F-28-3000
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TRG 121: 15 EMB-314 (A-29) Super Tucano*; 30 Grob
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 120TP; 7 Hawk Mk109*; 23 Hawk Mk209*; 14 KT-1B; 10
LT TK 65: 10 AMX-10 PAC 90; 55 PT-76† SF-260M; 7 SF-260W Warrior; 15 T-50i Golden Eagle*
HELICOPTERS
RECCE 21 BRDM-2
TPT 36: Heavy 6 H225M (CSAR); Medium 18: 9 AS332
IFV 114: 24 AMX-10P; 22 BMP-2; 54 BMP-3F; 2 BTR-4;
Super Puma (NAS332L) (VIP/CSAR); 1 SA330SM Puma
12 BTR-80A
(NAS330SM) (VIP); 4 SA330J Puma (NAS330J); 4 SA330L
APC 103: • APC (T) 100 BTR-50P; APC (W) 3 BTR-4M
Puma (NAS330L); Light 12 H120 Colibri
AAV 10 LVTP-7A1
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
ARTILLERY 71+
AAM • IR AIM-9P Sidewinder; R-73 (AA-11 Archer); IR/

Asia
TOWED 50: 105mm 22 LG1 MK II; 122mm 28 M-38
SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo)
MRL 122mm 21: 4 PHL-90B; 9 RM-70; 8 RM-70 Vampir
ARH R-77 (AA-12A Adder)
MOR 81mm
ASM AGM-65G Maverick
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • 40mm 5 L/60/L/70; 57mm S-60
ARM Kh-31P (AS-17A Krypton)
Air Force 30,100 Special Forces (Paskhasau)
3 operational comd (East, Central and West) plus trg comd FORCES BY ROLE
FORCES BY ROLE SPECIAL FORCES
FIGHTER 3 (PASKHASAU) SF wg (total: 6 spec ops sqn)
1 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II 4 indep SF coy
1 sqn with F-16A/B/C/D Fighting Falcon EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK AIR DEFENCE
1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon SAM • Point QW-3
1 sqn with Su-27SK/SKM Flanker; Su-30MK/MK2 Flanker GUNS • TOWED 35mm 6 Oerlikon Skyshield
2 sqn with Hawk Mk109*/Mk209*
1 sqn with T-50i Golden Eagle* Paramilitary 280,000+
GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with EMB-314 (A-29) Super Tucano* Police ε280,000 (including 14,000 police
MARITIME PATROL ‘mobile bde’ (BRIMOB) org in 56 coy, incl CT
1 sqn with B-737-200; CN235M-220 MPA unit (Gegana))
TANKER/TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with C-130B/KC-130B Hercules ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
TRANSPORT APC (W) 34 Tactica
1 VIP sqn with B-737-200; C-130H/H-30 Hercules; L-100- AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 5: 2 Beech 18; 2 C-212 Aviocar
30; F-27-400M Troopship; F-28-1000/3000; AS332L (NC-212); 1 Turbo Commander 680
Super Puma (NAS332L); SA330SM Puma (NAS300SM) HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 22: 3 Bell 206 Jet Ranger;
1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules; L-100-30 19 Bo-105 (NBo-105)
1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar (NC-212)
1 sqn with CN235M-110; C295M KPLP (Coast and Seaward Defence
TRAINING Command)
1 sqn with Grob 120TP Responsible to Military Sea Communications Agency
1 sqn with KT-1B EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with SF-260M; SF-260W Warrior PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 31
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER PCO 4: 2 Arda Dedali; 2 Trisula
2 sqn with H225M; AS332L Super Puma (NAS332L); PB 27: 4 Golok (SAR); 5 Kujang; 3 Rantos; 15 (various)
SA330J/L Puma (NAS330J/L); H120 Colibri LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ABU 1 Jadayat
276 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Bakamla (Maritime Security Agency) previously organised into five regional commands. An Amphibi-
ous Rapid Deployment Brigade was also created, tasked mainly
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE with the defence of remote islands. Japan’s alliance with the US
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7 remains the cornerstone of its defence policy, reflected by the con-
PSO 1 Tanjung Datu with 1 hel landing platform tinued US basing, the widespread use of US equipment across all
PB 6 Bintang Laut (KCR-40 mod) three services and regular training with US forces. The JSDF trains
regularly, including in US-led international exercises. However,
Reserve Organisations personnel recruitment and retention are an issue in the context
of an ageing population. Due to their defensive mandate, JSDF
Kamra People’s Security ε40,000 deployments are mostly for peacekeeping purposes. The ongoing
Report for 3 weeks’ basic training each year; part-time military-procurement drive has focused for the first time on power
projection, mobility and ISR, with the first domestically produced
police auxiliary.
F-35 combat aircraft rolled out in mid-2017. Japan has expressed a
desire to boost its ballistic-missile-defence capability by purchas-
DEPLOYMENT ing the Aegis Ashore system. Budget documents also note research
on a hypersonic glide body and new anti-ship missiles. Japan has
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 208; 4 an advanced defence-industrial base, which produces modern
obs; 1 engr coy equipment for the JSDF.
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
ACTIVE 247,150 (Ground Self-Defense Force
MONUSCO 180; 9 obs; 1 engr coy
150,850 Maritime Self-Defense Force 45,350 Air
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1,295; 1 inf bn; 1 MP coy; 1 Self-Defense Force 46,950 Central Staff 4,000)
FSGHM
Paramilitary 14,000
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 9; 1 obs
RESERVE 56,000 (General Reserve Army (GSDF)
PHILIPPINES: IMT 9
46,000 Ready Reserve Army (GSDF) 8,100 Navy 1,100
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2; 3 obs Air 800)
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 800; 4 obs; 1 inf bn

UN • UNISFA 2 obs
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 3 obs
Space
Japan JPN EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SATELLITES 11
Japanese Yen ¥ 2017 2018 2019
COMMUNICATIONS 2: 1 Kirameki-1; 1 Kirameki-2
GDP ¥ 547tr 557tr ISR 9 IGS
US$ 4.87tr 5.07tr
per capita US$ 38,449 40,106 Ground Self-Defense Force 150,850
Growth % 1.7 1.1 FORCES BY ROLE
Inflation % 0.5 1.2 COMMAND
5 army HQ (regional comd)
Def bdgt ¥ 5.13tr 5.19tr 5.29tr
SPECIAL FORCES
US$ 45.7bn 47.3bn
1 spec ops unit (bn)
US$1=¥ 112.17 109.85 MANOEUVRE
Population 126,168,156 Armoured
1 (7th) armd div (1 armd recce sqn, 3 tk regt, 1 armd inf
Ethnic groups: Korean <1%
regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SP arty regt, 1 AD regt, 1 cbt engr bn,
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)
Male 6.5% 2.5% 2.6% 2.4% 22.0% 12.4% 1 indep tk bn
Mechanised
Female 6.2% 2.2% 2.3% 2.4% 22.4% 16.0%
1 (2nd) inf div (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk regt, 3 inf regt, 1 hel
sqn, 1 SP arty regt, 1 AT coy, 1 ADA bn, 1 cbt engr bn,
Capabilities 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)
Japan’s concerns over its regional security environment have 1 (4th) inf div (1 armd recce sqn, 3 inf regt, 1 inf coy, 1
heightened, as evidenced in its 2018 defence white paper. These hel sqn, 1 fd arty regt, 1 AT coy, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr
principally relate to an emerging security challenge from China bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)
and an established concern over North Korea. This has stimulated
1 (9th) inf div (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel
defence-budget increases and defence-policy and legislative
reforms to enable Japan to play a more active international secu-
sqn, 1 fd arty regt, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn,
rity role. While the offensive capacity of the Japan Self-Defense 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt)

Force (JSDF) remains weak, the navy has strengths in anti-sub- 2 (5th & 11th) inf bde (1 armd recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf
marine warfare and air defence. In 2018, a Ground Component regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy,
Command was created to oversee the Ground Self-Defense Force, 1 sigs coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 log bn)
 Asia 277

Light ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
2 (1st & 3rd) inf div (1 recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel MSL
sqn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 SP 37 Type-96 MPMS
NBC bn, 1 log regt) MANPATS Type-79 Jyu-MAT; Type-87 Chu-MAT;
2 (6th & 10th) inf div (1 recce sqn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel Type-01 LMAT
sqn, 1 fd arty regt, 1 SAM bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 RCL • 84mm Carl Gustav
NBC bn, 1 log regt)
 ARTILLERY 1,716
1 (8th) inf div (1 recce sqn, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, 1 SAM bn, SP 172: 155mm 105 Type-99; 203mm 67 M110A2
1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 NBC bn, 1 log regt) TOWED 155mm 340 FH-70
1 (13th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 1 tk coy, 3 inf regt, 1 hel sqn, MRL 227mm 99 M270 MLRS
1 fd arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 MOR 1,105: 81mm 652 L16 120mm 429; SP 120mm 24
sigs coy, 1 log bn) Type-96
1 (14th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 1 lt armd coy, 2 inf regt, 1 COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 104: 22 Type-12; 82 Type-
hel sqn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs 88
coy, 1 log bn) AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 7 Beech 350 King Air (LR-2)
1 (15th) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 1 inf regt, 1 avn sqn, 1 AD HELICOPTERS
regt, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) ATK 103: 59 AH-1S Cobra; 11 AH-64D Apache; 33 OH-1
Air Manoeuvre ISR 44 OH-6D
1 (1st) AB bde (3 AB bn, 1 fd arty bn, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs TPT 272: Heavy 69: 24 CH-47D Chinook (CH-47J); 45
coy, 1 log bn) CH-47JA Chinook; Medium 42: 3 H225 Super Puma MkII+
1 (12th) air mob inf bde (1 recce sqn, 3 inf regt, 1 avn sqn, (VIP); 39 UH-60L Black Hawk (UH-60JA); Light 161: 131
1 fd arty bn, 1 SAM coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 NBC coy, 1 Bell 205 (UH-1J); 30 Enstrom 480B (TH-480B)
sigs coy, 1 log bn) AIR DEFENCE
Amphibious SAM

Asia
1 amph bde(-) (1 amph regt) Medium-range 163: 43 Type-03 Chu-SAM; 120 MIM-
COMBAT SUPPORT 23B I-Hawk
1 arty bde (2 SP arty regt; 3 AShM regt) Short-range 5 Type-11 Tan-SAM
1 (Western Army) fd arty regt
Point-defence 159+: 46 Type-81 Tan-SAM; 113 Type-
2 arty unit (1 MRL bn; 1 AShM regt)
93 Kin-SAM; Type-91 Kei-SAM
1 (Central Army) fd arty bn
GUNS • SP 35mm 52 Type-87
4 engr bde
1 engr unit
1 EW bn
Maritime Self-Defense Force 45,350
5 int bn Surface units organised into 4 Escort Flotillas with a mix
1 MP bde of 8 warships each. Bases at Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo,
1 sigs bde Maizuru, Ominato. SSK organised into two flotillas with
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT bases at Kure and Yokosuka
5 log unit (bde) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
5 trg bde SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 20:
HELICOPTER 2 Oyashio (trg role) with 6 single 533mm TT with T-89
1 hel bde (5 tpt hel sqn; 1 VIP tpt hel bn) HWT/UGM-84C Harpoon AShM
5 hel gp (1 atk hel bn, 1 hel bn) 9 Oyashio with 6 single 533mm TT with T-89 HWT/UGM-
AIR DEFENCE 84C Harpoon AShM
2 SAM bde (2 SAM gp) 9 Soryu (AIP fitted) with 6 single 533mm TT with T-89
2 SAM gp HWT/UGM-84C Harpoon AShM
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 49
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVH 4:
MBT 667: 76 Type-10; 250 Type-74; 341 Type-90 2 Hyuga with 1 16-cell Mk41 VLS with ASROC/RIM-
ASLT 36 Type-16 MCV 162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46/
RECCE 111 Type-87 Type-97 LWT, 2 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (normal ac
IFV 68 Type-89 capacity 3 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel; plus additional
APC 795 ac embarkation up to 7 SH-60 Seahawk or 7 MCH-
APC (T) 226 Type-73 101)
APC (W) 569: 204 Type-82; 365 Type-96 2 Izumo with 2 11-cell SeaRAM lnchr with RIM-
AAV 4 AAV-7 116 SAM, 2 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (normal
AUV 8 Bushmaster ac capacity 7 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel; plus
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES additional ac embarkation up to 5 SH-60 Seahawk/
ARV 70: 4 Type-11; 36 Type-78; 30 Type-90 MCH-101 hel)
VLB 22 Type-91 CRUISERS • CGHM 2:
NBC VEHICLES 57: 41 Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle; 1 Atago with Aegis Baseline 7 C2, 2 quad lnchr with
16 NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle SSM-1B AShM, 1 64-cell Mk41 VLS with ASROC A/S
278 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
msl/SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM/SM-3 Block IA SAM, 1
32-cell Mk41 VLS with ASROC A/S msl/SM-2 Block
IIIA/B SAM/SM-3 Block IA SAM, 2 triple 324mm
ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 2 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1
127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel)
1 Atago with Aegis Baseline 9 C2, 2 quad lnchr with
SSM-1B AShM, 1 64-cell Mk41 VLS with ASROC A/S
msl/SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM/SM-3 Block IA/IB SAM,
1 32-cell Mk41 VLS with ASROC A/S msl/SM-2 Block
IIIA/B SAM/SM-3 Block IA/IB SAM, 2 triple 324mm
ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 2 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1
127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel)
DESTROYERS 33
DDGHM 27:
8 Asagiri with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84C
Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple Mk29 lnchr with Sea
Sparrow SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46
LWT, 1 octuple Mk112 lnchr with ASROC, 2
Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60
Seahawk ASW hel)
4 Akizuki with 2 quad lnchr with SSM-1B AShM, 1
32-cell Mk41 VLS with ASROC/RIM-162B ESSM
SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Type-97 LWT,
2 Phalanx CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60
Seahawk ASW hel)
1 Asahi (Akizuki mod) with 2 quad lnchr with SSM-
1B AShM, 8 4-cell Mk41 VLS with RIM-162B ESSM
SAM/Type-07 A/S msl, 2 triple HOS-303 324mm
ASTT with Type-12 LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block
1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk
ASW hel)
9 Murasame with 2 quad lnchr with SSM-1B AShM,
1 16-cell Mk48 VLS with RIM-162C ESSM SAM, 2
triple 324mm TT with Mk46 LWT, 1 16-cell Mk41
VLS with ASROC, 2 Phalanx CIWS, 2 76mm gun
(capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel)
5 Takanami (improved Murasame) with 2 quad lnchr
with SSM-1B AShM, 1 32-cell Mk41 VLS with
ASROC/RIM-7M/RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple
324mm TT with Mk46 LWT, 2 Phalanx CIWS, 1
127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60 Seahawk ASW hel)
DDGM 6:
2 Hatakaze with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-
84C Harpoon AShM, 1 Mk13 GMLS with SM-1
MR SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT,
1 octuple Mk112 lnchr with ASROC, 2 Phalanx
CIWS, 2 127mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
4 Kongou with Aegis Baseline 4/5 C2, 2 quad Mk141
lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 29-cell
Mk41 VLS with SM-2/3 SAM/ASROC, 1 61-cell
Mk41 VLS with SM-2/3 SAM/ASROC, 2 triple
324mm ASTT, 2 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm
gun
FRIGATES 10
FFGHM 4 Hatsuyuki with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with
RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple Mk29 lnchr
with RIM-7F/M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple ASTT with
Mk46 LWT, 1 octuple Mk112 lnchr with ASROC,
2 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 SH-60
Seahawk ASW hel) (of which 2 in trg role)
FFG 6 Abukuma with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-
84C Harpoon AShM, 2 triple ASTT with Mk 46 LWT,
1 octuple Mk112 lnchr with ASROC, 1 Phalanx CIWS,
1 76mm gun
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6
PBFG 6 Hayabusa with 4 SSM-1B AShM, 1 76mm gun
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 27
MCCS 5:
1 Ieshima
1 Uraga with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (for
MCH-101 hel)
1 Uraga with 1 hel landing platform (for MCH-101)
2 Uwajima
MSC 19: 3 Hirashima; 12 Sugashima; 1 Uwajima; 3 Enoshima
MSO 3: 2 Awaji; 1 Yaeyama
AMPHIBIOUS
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LHD 3 Osumi
with 2 Phalanx CIWS (capacity for 2 CH-47 hel) (capacity
10 Type-90 MBT; 2 LCAC(L) ACV; 330 troops)
LANDING CRAFT 8
LCM 2 LCU-2001
LCAC 6 LCAC(L) (capacity either 1 MBT or 60 troops)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 21
AGBH 1 Shirase (capacity 2 AW101 Merlin hel)
AGEH 1 Asuka with 1 8-cell VLS (wpn trials) (capacity 1
SH-60 Seahawk hel)
AGOS 2 Hibiki with 1 hel landing platform
AGS 3: 1 Futami; 1 Nichinan; 1 Shonan
AOE 5: 2 Mashu (capacity 1 med hel); 3 Towada with 1 hel
landing platform
ARC 1 Muroto
ASR 2: 1 Chihaya with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Chiyoda
II with 1 hel landing platform
AX 6:
1 Kashima with 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun, 1
hel landing platform
1 Kurobe with 1 76mm gun (trg spt ship)
3 Shimayuki with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon
AShM, 1 octuple Mk29 lnchr with RIM-7M Sea
Sparrow SAM, 1 octuple Mk112 lnchr with ASROC,
2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 2 Phalanx
CIWS, 1 76mm gun
1 Tenryu (trg spt ship); with 1 76mm gun (capacity: 1
med hel)
Naval Aviation ε9,800
7 Air Groups
FORCES BY ROLE
ANTI SUBMARINE/SURFACE WARFARE
5 sqn with SH-60B (SH-60J)/SH-60K Seahawk
MARITIME PATROL
1 sqn with P-1; P-3C Orion
3 sqn with P-3C Orion
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
1 sqn with EP-3 Orion
MINE COUNTERMEASURES
1 sqn with MCH-101
SEARCH & RESCUE
1 sqn with Shin Meiwa US-1A/US-2
2 sqn with UH-60J Black Hawk
 Asia 279

TRANSPORT EW 3: 1 Kawasaki EC-1; 2 YS-11EA

1 sqn with AW101 Merlin (CH-101); Beech 90 King Air ISR 17: 13 RF-4E Phantom II* (RF-4J); 4 YS-11EB
(LC-90); KC-130R Hercules AEW&C 17: 13 E-2C Hawkeye; 4 E-767
TRAINING SAR 26 U-125A Peace Krypton
1 sqn with Beech 90 King Air (TC-90) TKR 6: 2 KC-130H Hercules; 4 KC-767J
1 sqn with P-3C Orion TPT 59: Medium 19: 13 C-130H Hercules; 6 C-2; PAX 40:
1 sqn with T-5J 2 B-747-400; 1 B-777-300ER (VIP); 13 Beech T-400; 19 C-1;
1 hel sqn with H135 (TH-135); OH-6DA; SH-60B (SH- 5 Gulfstream IV (U-4)
60J) Seahawk TRG 246: 197 T-4*; 49 T-7
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS
AIRCRAFT 78 combat capable SAR 35 UH-60J Black Hawk
TPT • Heavy 15 CH-47JA Chinook
ASW 78: 16 P-1; 62 P-3C Orion
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
ELINT 5 EP-3C Orion
AAM • IR AAM-3 (Type-90); AIM-9 Sidewinder; IIR
SAR 5: 1 Shin Meiwa US-1A; 4 Shin Meiwa US-2
AAM-5 (Type-04); SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; ARH AAM-4
TPT 27: Medium 6 C-130R Hercules; Light 21: 5 Beech
(Type-99); AIM-120C5/C7 AMRAAM (limited numbers)
90 King Air (LC-90); 16 Beech 90 King Air (TC-90)
ASM ASM-1 (Type-80); ASM-2 (Type-93)
TRG 30 T-5J
HELICOPTERS Air Defence
ASW 87: 35 SH-60B Seahawk (SH-60J); 52 SH-60K Ac control and warning. 4 wg; 28 radar sites
Seahawk
FORCES BY ROLE
MCM 10 MCH-101
AIR DEFENCE
SAR 15 UH-60J Black Hawk
6 SAM gp (total: 24 SAM bty with MIM-104D/F Patriot
TPT 18: Medium 3 AW101 Merlin (CH-101); Light 15
PAC-2/3)

Asia
H135 (TH-135)
1 AD gp with Type-81 Tan-SAM; M167 Vulcan
Air Self-Defense Force 46,950 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIR DEFENCE
7 cbt wg
SAM
FORCES BY ROLE Long-range 120 MIM-104D/F Patriot PAC-2 GEM/
FIGHTER PAC-3
7 sqn with F-15J Eagle Point-defence Type-81 Tan-SAM
2 sqn with F-4EJ (F-4E) Phantom II GUNS • TOWED 20mm M167 Vulcan
3 sqn with Mitsubishi F-2
1 sqn (forming) with F-35A Lightning II Paramilitary 14,000
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
2 sqn with Kawasaki EC-1; YS-11E Coast Guard 14,000
ISR Ministry of Land, Transport, Infrastructure and Tourism
1 sqn with RF-4EJ (RF-4E) Phantom II* (no cbt role)
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 sqn with E-2C Hawkeye PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 367
1 sqn with E-767 PSOH 14: 2 Mizuho (capacity 2 hels); 2 Shikishima
SEARCH & RESCUE (capacity 2 hels); 1 Soya (capacity 1 hel) (icebreaking
1 wg with U-125A Peace Krypton; UH-60J Black Hawk capability); 9 Tsugaru (Soya mod) (capacity 1 hel)
TANKER PSO 43:
1 sqn with KC-767J 3 Hida with 1 hel landing platform
TRANSPORT 1 Izu with 1 hel landing platform
1 (VIP) sqn with B-747-400 9 Hateruma with 1 hel landing platform
2 sqn with C-1; C-2 6 Iwami
1 sqn with C-130H Hercules 1 Kojima (trg) with 1 hel landing platform
Some (liaison) sqn with Gulfstream IV (U-4); T-4* 2 Kunigami with 1 hel landing platform
TRAINING 1 Miura with 1 hel landing platform
1 (aggressor) sqn with F-15J Eagle 6 Ojika with 1 hel landing platform
TEST 14 Taketomi with 1 hel landing platform
1 wg with F-15J Eagle; T-4* PCO 16: 3 Aso; 6 Katori; 7 Teshio
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER PCC 26: 4 Amami; 22 Tokara
4 flt with CH-47JA Chinook PBF 47: 20 Hayagumo; 5 Mihashi; 14 Raizan; 2 Takatsuki;
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 6 Tsuruugi
AIRCRAFT 547 combat capable PB 54: 4 Asogiri; 4 Hamagumo; 11 Hayanami; 12 Katonami;
FTR 189: 147 F-15J Eagle; 42 F-15DJ Eagle 1 Matsunami; 4 Murakumo; 2 Natsugiri; 6 Shimoji; 10
FGA 148: 58 F-2A; 30 F-2B; 51 F-4E Phantom II (F-4EJ); 9 Yodo
F-35A Lightning II (in test) PBI 167: 2 Hakubai; 1 Hayagiku; 164 Himegiku
280 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 16
ABU 1 Teshio
AGS 12: 6 Hamashio; 1 Jinbei; 2 Meiyo; 1 Shoyo; 1 Takuyo;
1 Tenyo
AX 3
AIRCRAFT
MP 2 Falcon 900 MPAT
SAR 4 Saab 340B
TPT 25: Light 23: 5 Cessna 172; 9 Beech 350 King Air
(LR-2); 9 DHC Dash-7 (Bombardier 300) (MP); PAX 2
Gulfstream V (MP)
HELICOPTERS
MRH 5 Bell 412 Twin Huey
SAR 11 S-76D
TPT 36: Medium 8: 3 AS332 Super Puma; 5 H225 Super
Puma; Light 28: 18 AW139; 3 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II; 4
Bell 505 Jet Ranger X; 3 S-76C
Cyber
In 2014, an ‘Office of Cyber’ was established in the C4
Systems Planning Division, Joint Staff Office (JSO) of the
Japan Ministry of Defense to consolidate the cyber-plan-
ning functions of the JSO and to create a more systematic
structure for responding to cyber attacks. The National
Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond stated
that ‘Japan will build up persistent ISR [intelligence, sur-
veillance and reconnaissance] capabilities to prevent any
acts that could impede efficient action by the SDF’. The
2014 Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2014–18) said that the
Self-Defense Forces would develop specialist training for
cyber personnel. The document also said that ‘through its
efforts to secure response capabilities in cyberspace where
attackers have an overwhelming advantage, the SDF may
consider the acquisition of capabilities to prevent them
from using cyberspace’. A Cyber Defense Group, which
integrates the cyber-warfare functions of the three armed
services, was launched in March 2014 to respond to cyber
threats. The group monitors defence-ministry and SDF net-
works and provides responses to cyber attacks. A revised
Cybersecurity Strategy was developed in mid-2018.
DEPLOYMENT
ARABIAN SEA & GULF OF ADEN: Combined Maritime
Forces • CTF-151: 2 DDGHM
DJIBOUTI: 170; 2 P-3C Orion
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 4
FOREIGN FORCES
United States
US Pacific Command: 53,900
Army 2,700; 1 corps HQ (fwd); 1 SF gp; 1 avn bn; 1 SAM
bn
Navy 20,250; 1 CVN; 3 CGHM; 2 DDGHM; 8 DDGM (2
non-op); 1 LCC; 4 MCO; 1 LHD; 1 LPD; 2 LSD; 3 FGA sqn
with 10 F/A-18E Super Hornet; 1 FGA sqn with 10 F/A-18F
Super Hornet; 2 ASW aqn with 6 P-8A Poseidon; 1 ASW flt
with 2 P-3C Orion; 2 EW sqn with 5 EA-18G Growler; 1
AEW&C sqn with 5 E-2D Hawkeye; 2 ASW hel sqn with
12 MH-60R Seahawk; 1 tpt hel sqn with MH-60S Knight
Hawk; 1 base at Sasebo; 1 base at Yokosuka
USAF: 12,50; 1 HQ (5th Air Force) at Okinawa–Kadena
AB; 1 ftr wg at Misawa AB (2 ftr sqn with 22 F-16C/D
Fighting Falcon); 1 ftr wg at Okinawa–Kadena AB (2 ftr
sqn with 27 F-15C/D Eagle; 1 FGA sqn with 14 F-22A
Raptor; 1 tkr sqn with 15 KC-135R Stratotanker; 1 AEW
sqn with 2 E-3B Sentry; 1 CSAR sqn with 10 HH-60G Pave
Hawk); 1 tpt wg at Yokota AB with 10 C-130J-30 Hercules;
2 Beech 1900C (C-12J); 1 spec ops gp at Okinawa–Kadena
AB with (1 sqn with 5 MC-130H Combat Talon; 1 sqn with
5 MC-130J Commando II; 1 unit with 5 CV-22A Osprey);
1 ISR sqn with RC-135 Rivet Joint; 1 ISR UAV flt with 5
RQ-4A Global Hawk
USMC 18,800; 1 mne div; 1 mne regt HQ; 1 arty regt HQ;
1 recce bn; 1 mne bn; 1 amph aslt bn; 1 arty bn; 2 FGA sqn
at Iwakuni with 12 F/A-18D Hornet; 1 FGA sqn at Iwakuni
with 12 F-35B Lightning II; 1 tkr sqn at Iwakuni with 15
KC-130J Hercules; 2 tpt sqn at Futenma with 12 MV-22B
Osprey
US Strategic Command: 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at
Shariki; 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Kyogamisaki
Korea, Democratic People’s
Republic of DPRK
North Korean Won 2017 2018 2019
GDP US$
per capita US$
Def exp won
US$
US$1=won
*definitive economic data not available
Population 25,381,085
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 10.5% 3.8% 4.0% 4.1% 23.0% 3.3%
Female 10.1% 3.7% 3.9% 3.9% 23.5% 6.2%
Capabilities
Renewed diplomacy reduced tensions on the Korean Peninsula
in 2018, though the prospect of limiting Pyongyang’s nuclear
ambitions remains uncertain. Aware of the qualitative inferiority
of its conventional forces, North Korea has invested in asymmet-
ric capabilities, particularly the development of nuclear weapons
and ballistic-missile delivery systems. Throughout 2017, several
new nuclear-capable road-mobile ballistic-missile designs were
revealed and successfully tested. North Korea remains diplomati-
cally isolated. While foreign defence cooperation is restricted by
international pressure and sanctions, Pyongyang has nonetheless
often found ways to develop military ties. Official conscription for
both men and women is often extended, sometimes indefinitely.
Training is focused on fighting a short intensive war on the penin-
sula, but the armed forces’ overall effectiveness in a modern con-
flict against technologically superior opposition is unclear. Internal
exercises are conducted regularly, but those shown are staged and
are not necessarily representative of wider operational capability.
North Korea’s conventional forces remain reliant on increasingly
obsolete equipment, with older Soviet-era and Chinese-origin
equipment supplemented by a number of indigenous designs and
 Asia 281

upgrades. Overall effectiveness and serviceability of some equip- Special Purpose Forces Command 88,000
ment remains in doubt but there is local maintenance, repair and
overhaul capacity. Local defence-industrial capacity includes the FORCES BY ROLE
manufacture of light arms, armoured vehicles, artillery and missile SPECIAL FORCES
systems. North Korea has exported arms in the past. It is unclear 8 (Reconnaissance General Bureau) SF bn
whether the country would have had the capability to indig- MANOEUVRE
enously develop some of the technical advances it has demon- Reconnaissance
strated, including in rocket propulsion. 17 recce bn
ACTIVE 1,280,000 (Army 1,100,000 Navy 60,000 Light
9 lt inf bde
Air 110,000 Strategic Forces 10,000) Paramilitary
6 sniper bde
189,000
Air Manoeuvre
Conscript liability Army 5–12 years, Navy 5–10 years, Air Force 3–4
years, followed by compulsory part-time service to age 40. There- 3 AB bde
after service in the Worker/Peasant Red Guard to age 60 1 AB bn
2 sniper bde
RESERVE ε600,000 (Armed Forces ε600,000), Amphibious
Paramilitary 5,700,000 2 sniper bde
Reservists are assigned to units (see also Paramilitary)
Reserves 600,000
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Light
Strategic Forces ε10,000
40 inf div
North Korea’s ballistic missiles and obsolete H-5 (Il-
18 inf bde

Asia
28) bombers could be used to deliver nuclear warheads
or bombs. At present, however, there is no conclusive EQUIPMENT BY TYPE (ε)
evidence to verify that North Korea has successfully ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
produced a warhead or bomb capable of being delivered MBT 3,500+ T-34/T-54/T-55/T-62/Type-59/Chonma/Pokpoong
by these systems LT TK 560+: 560 PT-76; M-1985
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE (ε) IFV 32 BTR-80A
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS APC 2,500+
ICBM 6+: Hwasong-13/Hwasong-13 mod/Hwasong-14 (in APC (T) BTR-50; Type-531 (Type-63); VTT-323
test); Hwasong-15 (in test) APC (W) 2,500 BTR-40/BTR-60/M-1992/1/BTR-152/M-2010
IRBM Hwasong-12 (in test) (6×6)/M-2010 (8×8)
MRBM ε10 Nodong mod 1/mod 2 (ε90+ msl); some Scud- ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
ER; Bukkeukseong-2 (in test); Hwasong-10 (Musudan) (in MSL
test) SP 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); M-2010 ATGM
SBRM 30+ Hwasong-5 (SS-1C Scud-B)/Hwasong-6 (SS-1D MANPATS 2K15 Shmel (AT-1 Snapper); 9K111 Fagot
Scud-C) (ε200+ msl); some Scud (mod) (in test) (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
RCL 82mm 1,700 B-10
Army ε1,100,000 ARTILLERY 21,100+
FORCES BY ROLE SP/TOWED 8,500:
COMMAND SP 122mm M-1977; M-1981; M-1985; M-1991; 130mm
2 mech corps HQ M-1975; M-1981; M-1991; 152mm M-1974; M-1977;
10 inf corps HQ M-2018; 170mm M-1978; M-1989
1 (Capital Defence) corps HQ TOWED 122mm D-30; D-74; M-1931/37; 130mm M-46;
MANOEUVRE 152mm M-1937; M-1938; M-1943
Armoured GUN/MOR 120mm (reported)
1 armd div MRL 5,100: 107mm Type-63; VTT-323 107mm; 122mm
15 armd bde BM-11; M-1977 (BM-21); M-1985; M-1992; M-1993; VTT-
Mechanised 323 122mm; 200mm BMD-20; 240mm BM-24; M-1985;
4 mech div M-1989; M-1991; 300mm some
Light MOR 7,500: 82mm M-37; 120mm M-43; 160mm M-43
27 inf div SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
14 inf bde SBRM 24 FROG-3/5/7; some Toksa (SS-21B Scarab mod)
COMBAT SUPPORT AIR DEFENCE
1 arty div SAM • Point-defence 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher);
21 arty bde 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
9 MRL bde GUNS 11,000
5–8 engr river crossing/amphibious regt SP 14.5mm M-1984; 23mm M-1992; 37mm M-1992;
1 engr river crossing bde 57mm M-1985
282 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
TOWED 11,000: 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4; 23mm
ZU-23; 37mm M-1939; 57mm S-60; 85mm M-1939 KS-
12; 100mm KS-19
Navy ε60,000
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 73
SSB 1 Gorae with 1 Bukkeukseong-1 SLBM (SLBM trials)
SSK 20 PRC Type-033/FSU Romeo† with 8 single 533mm
TT with SAET-60 HWT
SSC 32+:
ε30 Sang-O some with 2 single 533mm TT with 53–65
HWT
2+ Sang-O II with 4 single 533mm TT with 53–65 HWT
SSW ε20† (some Yugo some with 2 single 406mm TT;
some Yeono some with 2 single 533mm TT)
 FORCES BY ROLE
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 2
FRIGATES • FFG 2:
1 Najin with 2 single lnchr with P-15 Termit (SS-N-2
Styx) AShM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 100mm gun, 2
twin 57mm gun
1 Najin with 2 twin lnchr with Kumsong-3 mod (KN-
SS-N-2 Stormpetrel) AShM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2
100mm gun, 2 twin 57mm gun (operational status
unclear)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 383+
CORVETTES • FS 5
4 Sariwon with 2 twin 57mm gun
1 Tral with 1 85mm gun
PCG 10:
10 Soju (FSU Osa I (Project 205) mod) with 4 single
lnchr with P-15 Termit (SS-N-2 Styx) AShM
PCC 18:
6 Hainan with 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm gun
7 Taechong I with 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 85mm gun, 1
twin 57mm gun
5 Taechong II with 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 100mm gun,
1 twin 57mm gun
PBFG 25+:
4 Huangfeng (Type-021) with 4 single lnchr with P-15
Termit (SS-N-2) AShM, 2 twin AK230 CIWS
6 Komar with 2 single lnchr with P-15 Termit (SS-N-2)
AShM
8 Osa I with 4 single lnchr with P-15 Termit (SS-N-2
Styx) AShM, 2 twin AK230 CIWS
6 Sohung (Komard mod) with 2 single lnchr with P-15
Termit (SS-N-2) AShM
1+ Nongo with 2 twin lnchr with Kumsong-3 mod
(KN-SS-N-2 Stormpetrel) AShM, 2 30mm CIWS
(operational status unknown)
PBF 229:
54 Chong-Jin with 1 85mm gun
142 Ku Song/Sin Hung/Sin Hung (mod)
33 Sinpo
PB 96:
59 Chaho
6 Chong-Ju with 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 85mm gun
13 Shanghai II
18 SO-1 with 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm gun
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 24
MSC 24: 19 Yukto I; 5 Yukto II
AMPHIBIOUS
LANDING SHIPS • LSM 10 Hantae (capacity 3 tanks;
350 troops)
LANDING CRAFT 257
LCPL 96 Nampo (capacity 35 troops)
LCM 25
UCAC 136 Kongbang (capacity 50 troops)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 23:
AGI 14 (converted fishing vessels)
AS 8 (converted cargo ships)
ASR 1 Kowan
Coastal Defence
COASTAL DEFENCE
2 AShM regt with HY-1/Kumsong-3 (6 sites, some
mobile launchers)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
COASTAL DEFENCE
ARTY 130mm M-1992; SM-4-1
AShM HY-1; Kumsong-3
ARTILLERY • TOWED 122mm M-1931/37; 152mm
M-1937
Air Force 110,000
4 air divs. 1st, 2nd and 3rd Air Divs (cbt) responsible for N,
E and S air-defence sectors respectively; 8th Air Div (trg)
responsible for NE sector. The AF controls the national
airline
FORCES BY ROLE
BOMBER
3 lt regt with H-5; Il-28 Beagle
FIGHTER
1 regt with MiG-15 Fagot
6 regt with J-5; MiG-17 Fresco
4 regt with J-6; MiG-19 Farmer
5 regt with J-7; MiG-21F-13/PFM Fishbed
1 regt with MiG-21bis Fishbed
1 regt with MiG-23ML/P Flogger
1 regt with MiG-29A/S/UB Fulcrum
GROUND ATTACK
1 regt with Su-25/Su-25UBK Frogfoot
TRANSPORT
Some regt with An-2 Colt/Y-5 (to infiltrate 2 air-force
sniper brigades deep into ROK rear areas); An-24 Coke;
Il-18 Coot; Il-62M Classic; Tu-134 Crusty; Tu-154 Careless
TRAINING
Some regt with CJ-6; FT-2; MiG-21U/UM
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Some regt with Hughes 500D/E; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H;
Mil-26 Halo; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; Z-5
AIR DEFENCE
19 bde with S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); S-75 Dvina (SA-2
Guideline); S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon); 9K36 Strela-3
(SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K32
Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; Pongae-5
 Asia 283

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE which was reportedly established in the mid-1980s.

AIRCRAFT 545 combat capable Specialists assess North Korea as conceiving of cyber
BBR 80 Il-28 Beagle/H-5† capabilities as useful tools for ‘coercive diplomacy’ and
FTR 401+: MiG-15 Fagot; 107 MiG-17 Fresco/J-5; 100 MiG- ‘disruptive actions’ in the South in the case of war. North
19 Farmer/J-6; 120 MiG-21F-13 Fishbed/J-7; MiG-21PFM Korea has launched distributed-denial-of-service attacks
Fishbed; 46 MiG-23ML Flogger; 10 MiG-23P Flogger; 18+ on South Korean institutions and pursues cyber infiltration
MiG-29A/S/UB Fulcrum against military and other government agencies. The attack
FGA 30 MiG-21bis Fishbed (18 Su-7 Fitter in store) on Sony Pictures in 2014 was attributed to North Korea.
ATK 34 Su-25/Su-25UBK Frogfoot North Korea was also publicly identified as the source
TPT 217+: Heavy some Il-76 (operated by state airline); of the 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack whose aim
Light 208: 6 An-24 Coke; 2 Tu-134 Crusty; ε200 An-2 appeared to be to raise money for the state. South Korea
Colt/Y-5; PAX 9: 2 Il-18 Coot; 2 Il-62M Classic; 4 Tu-154 estimates that North Korea has a nearly 7,000-strong unit
Careless; 1 Tu-204-300 of cyber-warfare specialists, some of whom are deployed
TRG 215+: 180 CJ-6; 35 FT-2; some MiG-21U/UM overseas and tasked with raising revenue for the state
HELICOPTERS through various forms of cyber criminality.
MRH 80 Hughes 500D/E†
TPT 206: Heavy 4 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 63: 15 Mi-8 Hip/
Mi-17 Hip H; 48 Mi-4 Hound/Z-5; Light 139 PZL Mi-2 Korea, Republic of ROK
Hoplite
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES South Korean Won 2017 2018 2019
ISR • Medium some (unidentified indigenous type); GDP won 1,741tr 1,822tr
Light Pchela-1 (Shmel) (reported) US$ 1.54tr 1.66tr
AIR DEFENCE • SAM per capita US$ 29,938 32,046
Long-range 38 S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon)

Asia
Growth % 3.1 2.8
Medium-range 179+: some Pongae-5 (status unknown);
179+ S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline) Inflation % 1.9 1.5
Short-range 133 S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa) Def bdgt won 40.6tr 43.2tr 46.7tr
Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K36 US$ 35.9bn 39.2bn
Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet) US$1=won 1,130.42 1,100.67
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 Population 51,418,097
(AA-11 Archer); PL-5; PL-7; SARH R-23/24 (AA-7 Apex);
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
R-27R/ER (AA-10 A/C Alamo)
ASM Kh-23 (AS-7 Kerry)‡; Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen) Male 6.7% 2.8% 3.6% 3.6% 27.1% 6.2%
Female 6.3% 2.6% 3.2% 3.1% 26.3% 8.3%
Paramilitary 189,000 active
Capabilities
Security Troops 189,000 (incl border guards, South Korea’s defence policy remains focused on its difficult rela-
public-safety personnel) tionship with North Korea, notwithstanding recent diplomatic
Ministry of Public Security re-engagement. Seoul has looked to recapitalise conventional
military capabilities to ensure a qualitative edge over Pyongyang.
Worker/Peasant Red Guard ε5,700,000 It also has prioritised acquiring new capabilities for a three-axis
reservists approach of ‘Kill Chain’, ‘Korea Air and Missile Defence’ and ‘Korea
Org on a province/town/village basis; comd structure is Massive Punishment and Retaliation’. The Defence Reform 2.0
bde–bn–coy–pl; small arms with some mor and AD guns project announced in 2018 sets out ambitions to modernise and
(but many units unarmed) restructure the armed forces, placing emphasis on new technolo-
gies. The established alliance with the US is a major element of
defence strategy, though the planned transfer of wartime opera-
Cyber tional control of forces to Seoul is now ‘conditions based’ with no
Since the 1970s, the North Korean military (the Korean firm date set. A large number of US military personnel and equip-
People’s Army, KPA) maintained a modest electronic ment remained stationed in South Korea; the US THAAD missile-
warfare (EW) capability. As a result of strategic reviews defence system was deployed in 2017 in light of concerns over
following Operation Desert Storm, the KPA established North Korea’s missile capabilities. South Korea’s forces remain
an information-warfare capability under the concept of some of the best equipped and trained in the region. South Korea
‘electronic intelligence warfare’. The two key organisations has demonstrated the capacity to support small international
are the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), which deployments, including contributions to UN missions and counter-
piracy operations in the Arabian Sea. The inventory increasingly
conducts covert operations in peacetime, and the General
comprises modern systems. South Korea has developed a broad
Staff Department (GSD), which is responsible for cyber range of domestic defence industries, which are capable of sup-
operations in support of conventional military efforts. The plying the majority of military requirements. However, there is still
General Staff Department is responsible for operational reliance on the US in areas such as front-line combat aircraft. Local
command and oversees cyber, EW and psychological defence industries are finding growing export success, particularly
operations. This includes the Electronic Warfare Bureau, with the T-50 jet trainer and K-9 self-propelled howitzer.
284 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

ACTIVE 625,000 (Army 490,000 Navy 70,000 Air Reserves

65,000) Paramilitary 9,000 FORCES BY ROLE
Conscript liability Service period reducing from Oct 2018, by three COMMAND
months for the army and marines (now 18 months), and the navy 1 army HQ
(now 20 months); and by two months for the air force (now 22 MANOEUVRE
months).
Light
RESERVE 3,100,000 24 inf div
Reserve obligation of three days per year. First Combat Forces EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
(Mobilisation Reserve Forces) or Regional Combat Forces (Home- ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
land Defence Forces) to age 33 MBT 2,514: 1,000 K1; 484 K1A1; 100 K2; 253 M48; 597
Reserve Paramilitary 3,000,000 M48A5; 80 T-80U; (400 M47 in store)
Being reorganised IFV 540: ε500 K21; 40 BMP-3
APC 2,790
APC (T) 2,560: 300 Bv 206; 1,700 KIFV; 420 M113; 140
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE M577 (CP)
APC (W) 220; 20 BTR-80; 200 KM-900/-901 (Fiat 6614)
Army 490,000 PPV 10 MaxxPro
FORCES BY ROLE ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
COMMAND AEV 207 M9
2 army HQ ARV 238+: 200 K1; K21 ARV; K288A1; M47; 38 M88A1
8 corps HQ VLB 56 K1
1 (Capital Defence) comd HQ ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
SPECIAL FORCES MSL
1 (Special Warfare) SF comd SP Hyeongung
6 SF bde MANPATS 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); Hyeongung;
1 indep SF bn TOW-2A
2 cdo bde RCL 57mm; 75mm; 90mm M67; 106mm M40A2
6 cdo regt GUNS 58
2 indep cdo bn SP 90mm 50 M36
MANOEUVRE TOWED 76mm 8 M18 Hellcat (AT gun)
Armoured ARTILLERY 11,067+
5 armd bde SP 1,353+: 155mm 1,340: ε300 K9 Thunder; 1,040 M109A2
3 mech inf div (1 recce bn, 1 armd bde, 2 armd inf bde, 1 (K55/K55A1); 175mm some M107; 203mm 13 M110
fd arty bde, 1 engr bn) TOWED 3,500+: 105mm 1,700 M101/KH-178;
Mechanised 155mm/203mm 1,800+ KH-179/M114/M115
3 mech inf div (1 recce bn, 1 armd bde, 2 mech inf bde, 1 MRL 214+: 130mm 156 K136 Kooryong; 227mm 58: 48
fd arty bde, 1 engr bn) M270 MLRS; 10 M270A1 MLRS; 239mm some Chunmoo
Light MOR 6,000: 81mm KM29 (M29); 107mm M30
16 inf div (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf regt, 1 arty regt (4 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
arty bn), 1 engr bn) SRBM • Conventional 30 Hyonmu IIA/IIB; MGM-140A
2 indep inf bde /B ATACMS (launched from M270/M270A1 MLRS)
Air Manoeuvre GLCM • Conventional Hyonmu III
1 air aslt bde HELICOPTERS
Other ATK 96: 60 AH-1F/J Cobra; 36 AH-64E Apache
5 sy regt MRH 175: 130 Hughes 500D; 45 MD-500
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE TPT 324: Heavy 37: 31 CH-47D Chinook; 6 MH-47E
3 SSM bn Chinook; Medium 175: 88 KUH-1 Surion; 87 UH-60P Black
COMBAT SUPPORT Hawk; Light 112: ε100 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 12 Bo-
6 engr bde 105
5 engr gp AIR DEFENCE
1 CBRN defence bde SAM • Point-defence Chun Ma (Pegasus); FIM-92 Stinger;
8 sigs bde Javelin; Mistral; 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT GUNS 330+
4 log spt comd SP 170: 20mm ε150 KIFV Vulcan SPAAG; 30mm 20
HELICOPTER BIHO Flying Tiger
1 (army avn) comd TOWED 160: 20mm 60 M167 Vulcan; 35mm 20 GDF-
AIR DEFENCE 003; 40mm 80 L/60/L/70; M1
1 ADA bde AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
5 ADA bn ASM AGM-114R1 Hellfire
 Asia 285

Navy 70,000 (incl marines) FFG 7 Ulsan with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84C
Three separate fleet elements: 1st Fleet Donghae (East Sea/ Harpoon AShM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm ASTT with
Sea of Japan); 2nd Fleet Pyeongtaek (West Sea/Yellow Sea); Mk46 LWT, 2 76mm gun
3rd Fleet Busan (South Sea/Korea Strait); independent PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS ε101
CORVETTES • FSG 32:
submarine command; three additional flotillas (incl SF,
18 Gumdoksuri with 2 twin lnchr with Hae Sung I
mine warfare, amphibious and spt elements) and 1 Naval
AShM, 1 76mm gun
Air Wing (3 gp plus spt gp)
8 Po Hang (Flight IV) with 2 twin lnchr with RGM-84
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Harpoon AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 22 LWT, 2 76mm gun
SSK 16: 6 Po Hang (Flight V) with 2 twin lnchr with Hae Sung
6 Chang Bogo I (GER Type-209/1200; KSS-1) with 8 I AShM, 2 KMk. 32 triple 324mm ASTT with K745
single 533mm TT with SUT HWT/K731 White Shark Blue Shark LWT, 2 76mm gun
HWT PCF 1 Chamsuri II with 1 12-cell 130mm MRL, 1 76mm gun
3 Chang Bogo I (GER Type-209/1200; KSS-1) with 8 PBF ε68 Sea Dolphin
single 533mm TT with SUT HWT/K731 White Shark MINE WARFARE 10
HWT/UGM-84 Harpoon AShM MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9
7 Chang Bogo II (GER Type-214; KSS-2; AIP fitted) with MHO 6 Kan Kyeong
8 single 533mm TT with SUT HWT/K731 White Shark MSO 3 Yang Yang
HWT/Hae Sung I AShM/Hae Sung III LACM MINELAYERS • ML 1 Won San with 2 triple Mk32
SSC 6 Cosmos 324mm ASTT, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 26 AMPHIBIOUS
CRUISERS • CGHM 3: PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 5
LHD

Asia
3 Sejong (KDD-III) with Aegis Baseline 7 C2, 6 8-cell K-VLS
with Hae Sung II LACM/Red Shark A/S msl, 4 quad 1 Dokdo with 1 Mk49 GMLS with RIM-116 SAM, 2
lnchr with Hae Sung I AShM, 10 8-cell Mk41 VLS with Goalkeeper CIWS (capacity 2 LCAC; 10 tanks; 700
SM-2 Block IIIA/B SAM (6 fwd, 4 aft), 1 21-cell Mk49 troops; 10 UH-60 hel)
GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm LPD 4:
ASTT with K745 LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 127mm 4 Cheonwangbong (LST-II) (capacity 3 LCM; 2 MBT; 8
gun (capacity 2 Lynx Mk99/AW159 Wildcat hels) AFV; 300 troops; 2 med hel)
DESTROYERS • DDGHM 6: LANDING SHIPS • LST 4 Go Jun Bong with 1 hel
6 Chungmugong Yi Sun-Sin (KDD-II) with 2 8-cell landing platform (capacity 20 tanks; 300 troops)
K-VLS with Hae Sung II LACM/Red Shark A/S msl, LANDING CRAFT 22
2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM/ LCAC 5: 3 Tsaplya (capacity 1 MBT; 130 troops); 2 LSF-II
(capacity 150 troops or 1 MBT & 24 troops)
Hae Sung I AShM, 4 8-cell Mk41 VLS with SM-2 Block
LCM 10 LCM-8
IIIA/B SAM, 1 21-cell Mk49 GMLS with RIM-116
LCT 3 Mulgae II
RAM SAM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm ASTT with Mk46
LCU 4 Mulgae I
LWT, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 7
Lynx Mk99/AW159 Wildcat hel)
AG 1 Sunjin (trials spt)
FRIGATES 17
AORH 3 Chun Jee
FFGHM 10:
ARS 1 Cheong Hae Jin
3 Gwanggaeto Daewang (KDD-I) with 2 quad Mk141
ASR 1 Tongyeong
lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 2 8-cell Mk48 AX 1 MTB
VLS with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple Mk32
324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 2 Goalkeeper CIWS, Naval Aviation
1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Lynx Mk99/AW159 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Wildcat hel) AIRCRAFT 16 combat capable
6 Incheon with 2 quad lnchr with Hae Sung I AShM/ ASW 16: 8 P-3C Orion; 8 P-3CK Orion
TSLM LACM, 1 21-cell Mk49 lnchr with RIM-116 TPT • Light 5 Cessna F406 Caravan II
SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with K745 Blue Shark HELICOPTERS
LWT, 1 Mk15 1B Phalanx CIWS, 1 127 mm gun ASW 31: 11 Lynx Mk99; 12 Lynx Mk99A; 8 AW159 Wildcat
(capacity 1 Lynx Mk99/AW159 Wildcat hel) MRH 3 SA319B Alouette III
1 Daegu (Incheon Batch II) with 2 8-cell K-VLS with TPT 15: Medium 8 UH-60P Black Hawk Light 7 Bell 205
Hae Sung II LACM/TSLM LACM/K-SAAM SAM/ (UH-1H Iroquois)
Red Shark A/S msl, 2 quad lnchr with TSLM LACM/
Hae Sung I AShM, 2 KMk. 32 triple 324mm ASTT Marines 29,000
with K745 Blue Shark LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block FORCES BY ROLE
1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Lynx Mk99/ SPECIAL FORCES
AW159 Wildcat hel) 1 SF regt
286 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

MANOEUVRE AEW&C 4 B-737 AEW

Amphibious ISR 24: 4 Hawker 800RA; 20 KO-1
2 mne div (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 mne regt, 1 amph bn, SIGINT 6: 4 Hawker 800SIG; 2 Falcon 2000 (COMINT/
1 arty regt, 1 engr bn) SIGINT)
1 mne bde TPT 38: Medium 16: 8 C-130H Hercules; 4 C-130H-30
COMBAT SUPPORT Hercules; 4 C-130J-30 Hercules; Light 20: 12 CN235M-100;
Some cbt spt unit 8 CN235M-220 (incl 2 VIP); PAX 2: 1 B-737-300; 1 B-747
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TRG 183: 83 KT-1; 49 T-50 Golden Eagle*; 9 T-50B Black
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Eagle* (aerobatics); 22 TA-50 Golden Eagle*; ε20 KT-100
MBT 100: 50 K1A1; 50 M48 HELICOPTERS
AAV 166 AAV-7A1 SAR 16: 5 HH-47D Chinook; 11 HH-60P Black Hawk
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTUCTURE MRH 3 Bell 412EP
MSL • SP Spike NLOS TPT • Medium 30: 2 AS332L Super Puma; 8 Ka-32 Helix
ARTILLERY • TOWED 105mm; 155mm
C; 3 S-92A Super Hawk; 7 UH-60P Black Hawk; 10 VH-
COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM RGM-84A Harpoon
60P Black Hawk (VIP)
(truck mounted)
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR 103+: Medium
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 1 MUH-1 Surion
3+: some Night Intruder; 3 Searcher Light 100 Harpy (anti-
Naval Special Warfare Flotilla radiation)
AIR DEFENCE • SAM 206
Air Force 65,000 Long-range 48 MIM-104E Patriot PAC-2 GEM-T
4 Comd (Ops, Southern Combat, Logs, Trg) Medium-range Cheongung (KM-SAM); 158 MIM-23B
FORCES BY ROLE I-Hawk
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
2 sqn with F-4E Phantom II AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder
6 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II II; SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; ARH AIM-120B/C-5/7
3 sqn with F-15K Eagle AMRAAM
10 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (KF-16C/D) ASM AGM-65A Maverick; AGM-130
2 sqn with FA-50 Fighting Eagle AShM AGM-84L Harpoon Block II; AGM-142 Popeye
ISR ARM AGM-88 HARM
1 wg with KO-1 ALCM AGM-84H SLAM-ER; KEPD-350 Taurus
SIGINT BOMBS • Laser-guided Paveway II
1 sqn with Hawker 800RA/XP
SEARCH & RESCUE Paramilitary 9,000 active
2 sqn with AS332L Super Puma; Bell 412EP; HH-47D
Chinook; HH-60P Black Hawk; Ka-32 Helix C Civilian Defence Corps 3,000,000 reservists
TRANSPORT (to age 50)
1 VIP sqn with B-737-300; B-747; CN235-220; S-92A
Superhawk; VH-60P Black Hawk (VIP) Coast Guard 9,000
3 sqn (incl 1 Spec Ops) with C-130H/H-30/J-30 Hercules Part of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries.
2 sqn with CN235M-100/220 Five regional headquarters and 17 coastguard stations
TRAINING EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 81
1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
PSOH 15: 1 Lee Cheong-ho with 1 76mm gun; 1
4 sqn with KT-1
Sambongho; 13 Tae Pung Yang with 1 med hel
1 sqn with Il-103
PSO 21: 3 Han Kang with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing
3 sqn with T-50/TA-50 Golden Eagle*
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER platform; 5 Han Kang II with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing
1 sqn with UH-60P Black Hawk (Spec Ops) pllatform; 12 Jaemin with 1 hel landing platform; 1
AIR DEFENCE Sumjinkang
3 AD bde (total: 3 SAM bn with MIM-23B I-Hawk/ PCO 15 Tae Geuk
Cheongung; 2 SAM bn with MIM-104E Patriot PAC-2 PCC 26: 4 Bukhansan; 6 (430 tonne); 14 Hae Uri; 2 Hae
GEM-T) Uri II
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PB ε4 (various)
AIRCRAFT 590 combat capable AMPHIBIOUS
FTR 174: 142 F-5E Tiger II; 32 F-5F Tiger II LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 8: 1 BHT-150; 4 Griffon
FGA 336: 60 F-4E Phantom II; 59 F-15K Eagle; 118 F-16C 470TD; 3 Griffon 8000TD
Fighting Falcon (KF-16C); 45 F-16D Fighting Falcon (KF- AIRCRAFT
16D); 4 F-35A Lightning II (in test); 50 FA-50 Fighting MP 5: 1 C-212-400 MP; 4 CN235-110 MPA
Eagle TPT • PAX 1 CL-604
 Asia 287

HELICOPTERS
MRH 7: 5 AS565MB Panther; 1 AW139; 1 Bell 412SP Laos LAO
SAR 1 S-92
New Lao Kip 2017 2018 2019
TPT • Medium 8 Ka-32 Helix C
GDP kip 140tr 152tr
Cyber US$ 17.0bn 18.2bn
Defense Cyber Command was established in the Ministry per capita US$ 2,541 2,690
of National Defense in February 2015, but reports in 2018 Growth % 6.9 6.8
indicated that it would be renamed as the Cyber Operations
Inflation % 0.8 0.9
Command in light of the mid-2018 Defense Reform 2.0
initiative, and the findings of a Defense Cybersecurity Def exp kip n.k. n.k.
Development Plan. The group will no longer be concerned US$ n.k. n.k.
with ‘cyber psychological operations’, reports said. A US$1=kip 8245.79 8324.69
Korea–US National Cyber Defense Cooperation Working
Group shares information and enhances cooperation Population 7,234,171
including over policy, strategy, doctrine and training. Ethnic groups: Lao 55%; Khmou 11%; Hmong 8%
There are also trilateral meetings with Japan and the US
on cyber issues. In 2015, a unit responsible for overseeing
cyber operations was established within the Joint Chiefs Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
of Staff (JCS). The renamed Cyber Operations Command Male 16.3% 5.5% 4.9% 4.6% 16.5% 1.8%
will reportedly be under the control of the chairman of the Female 15.9% 5.5% 5.0% 4.7% 17.1% 2.2%
JCS, with the JCS in charge of ‘operational plans to cope
with cyberattacks’. The defence ministry is preparing a Capabilities
National Defense Cybersecurity Strategy, and announced

in April 2017 that it would allocate US$218 million for
cyber capabilities in 2018–22.
DEPLOYMENT
ARABIAN SEA & GULF OF ADEN: Combined Maritime
Forces • CTF-151: 1 DDGHM
INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 7 obs
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 335; 1 mech inf coy; 1 engr coy;
1 sigs coy; 1 maint coy
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 273; 2 obs; 1 engr coy
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 2
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: 139 (trg activities at UAE Spec
Ops School)
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 4 obs
FOREIGN FORCES
Sweden NNSC: 5 obs
Switzerland NNSC: 5 obs
United States US Pacific Command: 28,500
Army 19,200; 1 HQ (8th Army) at Yongsan; 1 div HQ
at Ujieongbu; 1 armd bde with M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams;
M2A2/M3A3 Bradley; M109A6; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde with
AH-64 Apache; CH-47 Chinook; UH-60 Black Hawk; 1
MRL bde with M270A1 MLRS; 1 AD bde with MIM-104
Patriot/FIM-92A Avenger; 1 SAM bty with THAAD; 1
(APS) armd bde eqpt set
Navy 250
USAF 8,800; 1 HQ (7th Air Force) at Osan AB; 1 ftr wg at
Kunsan AB (2 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon);
1 ftr wg at Osan AB (1 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D Fighting
Falcon, 1 atk sqn with 24 A-10C Thunderbolt II); 1 ISR sqn
at Osan AB with U-2S
USMC 250
Asia
The Lao People’s Armed Forces (LAPF) have considerable military
experience from the Second Indo-China War and the 1988 border
war with Thailand. They are closely linked to the ruling Communist
Party and their primary role is internal security. A lack of financial
resources has limited defence spending and military procurement
for two decades. Contacts continue with the Chinese and Viet-
namese armed forces, while there is strong defence cooperation
with Russia. Laos also participates in ADMM–Plus military exer-
cises, and in 2014–15 was co-chair with Japan of the ADMM–Plus
expert working group on HADR. Training support is provided by
friendly countries such as Russia and Vietnam. The LAPF have par-
ticipated in regional exercises with neighbouring countries but
have made no international deployments and have little capac-
ity for sustained operations. In 2017, Russia and Laos signed a
military-technical agreement to strengthen existing armaments
cooperation. Laos still operates Soviet-era military equipment, and
relies on Russian technical assistance. The country lacks a tradi-
tional defence industrial base and maintenance capacity is limited,
reflected in a support contract for a Russian firm to maintain the air
force’s Mi-17 helicopters.
ACTIVE 29,100 (Army 25,600 Air 3,500) Paramilitary
100,000
Conscript liability 18 months minimum
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Space
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SATELLITES • ISR 1 LaoSat-1
Army 25,600
FORCES BY ROLE
4 mil regions
MANOEUVRE
Armoured
1 armd bn
288 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Light
5 inf div Malaysia MYS
7 indep inf regt
Malaysian Ringgit RM 2017 2018 2019
65 indep inf coy
COMBAT SUPPORT GDP RM 1.35tr 1.42tr
5 arty bn US$ 312bn 347bn
1 engr regt per capita US$ 9,755 10,704
2 (construction) engr regt
Growth % 5.9 4.7
AIR DEFENCE
9 ADA bn Inflation % 3.8 1.0

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Def bdgt RM 15.1bn 15.9bn

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES US$ 3.48bn 3.87bn
MBT 25: 15 T-54/T-55; 10 T-34/85 US$1=RM 4.33 4.10
LT TK 10 PT-76
Population 31,809,660
APC • APC (W) 50: 30 BTR-40/BTR-60; 20 BTR-152
AUV ZYZ-8002 (CS/VN3) Ethnic groups: Malay 50.1%; Chinese 22.5%; Indian 6.5%; other or
unspecified 20.9%
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
ARV T-54/T-55 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
VLB MTU
Male 14.1% 4.4% 4.1% 3.8% 21.2% 3.0%
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • RCL 57mm
M18/A1; 75mm M20; 106mm M40; 107mm B-11 Female 13.3% 4.2% 4.0% 3.8% 20.6% 3.3%
ARTILLERY 62+
TOWED 62: 105mm 20 M101; 122mm 20 D-30/M-30 Capabilities
M-1938; 130mm 10 M-46; 155mm 12 M114 Substantial modernisation programmes over the past 30 years
MOR 81mm; 82mm; 107mm M-1938/M2A1; 120mm M-43 have developed the Malaysian armed forces’ capacity for exter-
AIR DEFENCE nal defence. However, the 2013 armed intrusion at Lahad Datu
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K310 in Sabah state, the aftermath of the March 2014 disappearance
Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet) of Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 and Chinese naval intrusions
GUNS into Malaysia’s EEZ in 2015–16 revealed capability shortcomings,
particularly in air and maritime surveillance. Addressing these
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4
capability gaps is a high priority, but budgetary constraints have
TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23; 37mm slowed equipment procurement and infrastructural improve-
M-1939; 57mm S-60 ments. Malaysian forces regularly participate in ADMM–Plus, Five
Power Defence Arrangements and other exercises with regional
Army Marine Section ε600 and international partners, including the US. Malaysia has invested
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE in synthetic military training aids. In 2017, Malaysia began trilateral
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR some joint maritime patrols and joint Sulu Sea air patrols with Indone-
AMPHIBIOUS LCM some sia and the Philippines. The majority of Malaysia’s military equip-
ment is ageing and in several cases non-operational. However,
some modest investments in new equipment have been made. For
Air Force 3,500 example, 22 Squadron was established in 2015 to operate Malay-
FORCES BY ROLE sia’s new A400M transport aircraft. In recent decades, Malaysia
TRANSPORT has maintained a small defence industry providing maintenance,
1 regt with MA60; MA600; Mi-17 Hip H repair and overhaul services. Several companies now licence-build
several major equipment types, such as Gowind-class frigates,
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
though they have yet to export these.
AIRCRAFT
TPT • Light 5: 1 An-74TK Coaler; 2 MA60; 2 MA600
 ACTIVE 113,000 (Army 80,000 Navy 18,000 Air
HELICOPTERS 15,000) Paramilitary 22,500
MRH 15: 6 Mi-17 Hip H; 5 Mi-17V-5 Hip; 4 Z-9A
TPT 4: Medium 1 Ka-32T Helix C; Light 3 SA360 RESERVE 51,600 (Army 50,000, Navy 1,000 Air
Dauphin Force 600) Paramilitary 244,700

Paramilitary ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Militia Self-Defence Forces 100,000+ Army 80,000 (to be 60–70,000)
Village ‘home guard’ or local defence
2 mil region, 4 area comd (div)
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF bde (3 SF bn)
MANOEUVRE
Armoured
1 tk regt (5 armd bn)
 Asia 289

Mechanised MOR 254: 81mm 232; SP 81mm 14: 4 K281A1; 10

5 armd regt ACV300-S; SP 120mm 8 ACV-S
1 mech inf bde (4 mech bn, 1 cbt engr sqn) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT
Light LCA 165 Damen Assault Craft 540 (capacity 10 troops)
5 inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 arty regt) HELICOPTERS • TPT 12: Medium 2 S-61A-4 Nuri; Light
2 inf bde (3 inf bn) 10 AW109
1 inf bde (2 inf bn, 1 arty regt) AIR DEFENCE
1 inf bde (2 inf bn) SAM • Point-defence 15+: 15 Jernas (Rapier 2000); Anza;
Air Manoeuvre HY-6 (FN-6); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse); Starstreak; QW-1
1 (Rapid Deployment Force) AB bde (1 lt tk sqn, 4 AB bn, Vanguard;
1 lt arty regt, 1 engr sqn) GUNS 52+
Other SP 20mm K263
1 (border) sy bde (5 bn) TOWED 52: 35mm 16 GDF-005; 40mm 36 L40/70
1 (border) sy bde (forming)
COMBAT SUPPORT Reserves
9 arty regt
1 STA regt Territorial Army
1 MRL regt Some paramilitary forces to be incorporated into a re-
1 cbt engr sqn organised territorial organisation
3 fd engr regt (total: 7 cbt engr sqn, 3 engr spt sqn) FORCES BY ROLE
1 construction regt MANOEUVRE
1 int unit Mechanised
4 MP regt 4 armd sqn
1 sigs regt

Asia
Light
HELICOPTER 16 inf regt (3 inf bn)
1 hel sqn Other
1 tpt sqn with S-61A-4 Nuri (forming) 5 (highway) sy bn
AIR DEFENCE COMBAT SUPPORT
3 ADA regt 5 arty bty
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 2 fd engr regt
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 1 int unit
MBT 48 PT-91M Twardy 3 sigs sqn
LT TK 21 Scorpion-90 COMBAT SUPPORT
RECCE 214: 130 AML-60/90; 74 SIBMAS (some†); 10 VBL 4 med coy
IFV 136: 31 ACV300 Adnan (25mm Bushmaster); 13 5 tpt coy
ACV300 Adnan AGL; 46 AV8 Gempita IFV25; 46 AV8
Gempita IFV30 (incl 10 with Ingwe ATGM) Navy 18,000
APC 832 3 Regional Commands: Kuantan (East Coast), Kinabalu
APC (T) 265: 149 ACV300 Adnan (incl 69 variants); (Borneo) and Langkawi (West Coast)
13 FV4333 Stormer (upgraded); 63 K200A; 40 K200A1
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
APC (W) 538: 32 Anoa; 26 AV8 Gempita APC (incl 13
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 2 Tunku Abdul
CP; 3 sigs); 300 Condor (incl variants); 150 LAV-150
Rahman (FRA Scorpène) with 6 single 533mm TT with
Commando; 30 M3 Panhard
PPV 29: 9 IAG Guardian; 20 Lipanbara WASS Black Shark HWT/SM39 Exocet AShM
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 10
AEV 3 MID-M FRIGATES 10
ARV 47+: Condor; 15 ACV300; 4 K288A1; 22 SIBMAS; 6 FFGHM 2:
WZT-4 2 Lekiu with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block
VLB 5+: Leguan; 5 PMCz-90 2 AShM, 1 16-cell VLS with Sea Wolf SAM, 2 B515
NBC VEHICLES K216A1 ILAS-3 triple 324mm ASTT with A244/S LWT, 1
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
• MSL 57mm gun (capacity 1 Super Lynx hel)
SP 8 ACV300 Baktar Shikan FFG 2:
MANPATS 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K115-2 2 Kasturi with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block
Metis-M (AT-13 Saxhorn 2); Eryx; Baktar Shihan (HJ-8); 2 AShM, 2 B515 ILAS-3 triple 324mm ASTT with
SS.11 A244/S LWT, 1 100mm gun, 1 57mm gun, 1 hel
RCL 260: 84mm 236 Carl Gustav; 106mm 24 M40 landing platform
ARTILLERY 424 FF 6:
TOWED 134: 105mm 100 Model 56 pack howitzer; 6 Kedah (GER MEKO) with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel
155mm 34: 12 FH-70; 22 G-5 landing platform (fitted for MM40 Exocet AShM
MRL 36 ASTROS II (equipped with 127mm SS-30) & RAM CIWS)
290 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 37 TRAINING

CORVETTES • FSGM 4 Laksamana with 3 twin lnchr 1 unit with PC-7; SA316 Alouette III
with Mk 2 Otomat AShM, 1 Albatros quad lnchr with TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Aspide SAM, 1 76mm gun 4 (tpt/SAR) sqn with H225M Super Cougar; S-61A-4 Nuri;
PCFG 4 Perdana (FRA Combattante II) with 2 single lnchr S-61N; S-70A Black Hawk
with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 57mm gun AIR DEFENCE
PBG 4 Handalan (SWE Spica-M) with 2 twin lnchr with 1 sqn with Starburst
MM38 Exocet AShM , 1 57mm gun SPECIAL FORCES
PBF 17 Tempur (SWE CB90) 1 (Air Force Commando) unit (airfield defence/SAR)
PB 8: 6 Jerong (Lurssen 45) with 1 57mm gun; 2 Sri Perlis EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4 AIRCRAFT 66 combat capable
MCO 4 Mahamiru (ITA Lerici)
FTR 21: 8 F-5E Tiger II; 3 F-5F Tiger II; 8 MiG-29 Fulcrum
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 13
(MiG-29N); 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum (MIG-29NUB)
AFS 2: 1 Mahawangsa with 2 57mm guns, 1 hel landing
FGA 26: 8 F/A-18D Hornet; 18 Su-30MKM
platform; 1 Sri Indera Sakti with 1 57mm gun, 1 hel
ISR 5: 3 Beech 200T; 2 RF-5E Tigereye*
landing platform
TKR 4 KC-130H Hercules
AG 2 Bunga Mas Lima with 1 hel landing platform
TKR/TPT 4 A400M Atlas
AGS 1 Perantau
TPT 33: Medium 10: 2 C-130H Hercules; 8 C-130H-30
AP 2 Sri Gaya
Hercules; Light 18: 9 CN235M-220 (incl 1 VIP); 9 Cessna
ASR 1 Mega Bakti
402B (2 modified for aerial survey); PAX 5: 1 A319CT; 1
ATF 1
B-737-700 BBJ; 1 BD700 Global Express; 1 F-28 Fellowship;
AX 3: 1 Hang Tuah with 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing
1 Falcon 900
platform; 2 Gagah Samudera with 1 hel landing platform
AXS 1 TRG 78: 5 Hawk Mk108*; 12 Hawk Mk208*; 7 MB-339C; 7
MD3-160 Aero Tiga; 30 PC-7; 17 PC-7 Mk II Turbo Trainer
Naval Aviation 160 HELICOPTERS
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MRH 17 SA316 Alouette III
HELICOPTERS TPT 42: Heavy 12 H225M Super Cougar; Medium 29: 25
ASW 6 Super Lynx 300 S-61A-4 Nuri; 2 S-61N; 2 S-70A Black Hawk; Light 1 AW109
MRH 6 AS555 Fennec UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM Sea Skua ISR • Medium Aludra
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Starburst
Special Forces AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
FORCES BY ROLE AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; R-73 (AA-11 Archer); IIR
SPECIAL FORCES AIM-9X Sidewinder II; IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo);
1 (mne cdo) SF unit SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM; R-77
(AA-12A Adder)
Air Force 15,000 ASM AGM-65 Maverick; Kh-29T (AS-14B Kedge); Kh-29L
1 air op HQ, 2 air div, 1 trg and log comd, 1 Intergrated (AS-14A Kedge); Kh-31P (AS-17A Krypton); Kh-59M (AS-
Area Def Systems HQ 18 Kazoo)
FORCES BY ROLE ARM Kh-31P (AS-17A Krypton);
FIGHTER AShM AGM-84D Harpoon; Kh-31A (AS-17B Krypton)
2 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum BOMBS
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Electro-optical guided KAB-500KR; KAB-500OD
1 sqn with F/A-18D Hornet Laser-guided Paveway II
1 sqn with Su-30MKM Flanker
2 sqn with Hawk Mk108*/Mk208* Paramilitary ε22,500
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR
1 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II; RF-5E Tigereye* Police–General Ops Force 18,000
MARITIME PATROL FORCES BY ROLE
1 sqn with Beech 200T COMMAND
TANKER/TRANSPORT 5 bde HQ
2 sqn with KC-130H Hercules; C-130H Hercules; SPECIAL FORCES
C-130H-30 Hercules; Cessna 402B 1 spec ops bn
TRANSPORT MANOEUVRE
1 sqn with A400M Atlas Other
1 (VIP) sqn with A319CT; AW109; B-737-700 BBJ; BD700 19 paramilitary bn
Global Express; F-28 Fellowship; Falcon 900 2 (Aboriginal) paramilitary bn
1 sqn with CN235 4 indep paramilitary coy
 Asia 291

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Mongolia MNG
RECCE 192: ε100 S52 Shorland; 92 FV701 Ferret (60 mod)
Mongolian Tugrik t 2017 2018 2019
APC • APC (W) 140 AT105 Saxon
AUV ε30 SB-301 GDP t 27.2tr 31.2tr
US$ 11.1bn 12.7bn
Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency per capita US$ 3,640 4,098
(MMEA) ε4,500 Growth % 5.1 6.2
Controls 5 Maritime Regions (Northern Peninsula; Inflation % 4.6 7.6
Southern Peninsula; Eastern Peninsula; Sarawak;
Def bdgt t 207bn 257bn 261bn
Sabah), subdivided into a further 18 Maritime Districts.
US$ 84.8m 105m
Supported by one provisional MMEA Air Unit
FMA (US) US$ 2.6m 0m
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$1=t 2439.79 2452.15
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 130
PSO 4: 1 Arau (ex-JPN Nojima) with 1 hel landing platform; Population 3,103,428
2 Langkawi with 1 57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform; 1 Ethnic groups: Khalkh 81.9%; Kazakh 3.8%; Dorvod 2.7%; other or
Pekan (ex-JPN Ojika) with 1 hel landing platform unspecified 11.6%
PCC 3 Bagan Datuk
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
PBF 57: 18 Penggalang 17 (TUR MRTP 16); 2 Penggalang
18; 6 Penyelamat 20; 16 Penggalang 16; 15 Tugau Male 13.8% 3.8% 4.1% 4.9% 20.5% 1.8%
PB 66: 15 Gagah; 4 Malawali; 2 Nusa; 3 Nusa 28; 1 Female 13.2% 3.7% 4.0% 5.0% 22.5% 2.6%
Peninjau; 7 Ramunia; 2 Rhu; 4 Semilang; 6 Sipadan (ex-
Capabilities

Asia
Kris/Sabah); 8 Icarus 1650; 10 Pengawal; 4 Penyelamat; 2
Perwira; 1 Sugut Mongolia’s latest defence-policy document, from 2015, stresses
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AX 1 Marlin the importance of peacekeeping and anti-terrorist capabili-
AIRCRAFT • MP 2 Bombardier 415MP ties. The country has no formal military alliances, but pursues
HELICOPTERS defence ties and bilateral training with multiple regional powers
SAR 3 AW139 and others including India, Turkey and the US. Mongolia is also
seeking to develop its security relationship with China. Mongo-
MRH 3 AS365 Dauphin
lia hosts the annual Khaan Quest multinational peacekeeping-
training exercises. The country’s main exercise partners are India
Area Security Units 3,500 reservists
and Russia, with each country running regular bilateral exercises.
(Auxiliary General Ops Force)
Mongolia’s most significant deployments are to the UN peace-
FORCES BY ROLE keeping mission in South Sudan and Afghanistan. The armed
MANOEUVRE forces remain reliant on Soviet-era equipment, although this
Other has been supplemented by deliveries of second-hand Russian
89 paramilitary unit weapons. Barring maintenance facilities, there is no significant
defence-industrial base, and Mongolia relies on imports from
Border Scouts 1,200 reservists Russia to equip its armed forces.
in Sabah, Sarawak ACTIVE 9,700 (Army 8,900 Air 800) Paramilitary
People’s Volunteer Corps 240,000 reservists 7,500
Conscript liability 12 months for males aged 18–25
(some 17,500 armed)
RELA RESERVE 137,000 (Army 137,000)

DEPLOYMENT ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
MONUSCO 2; 4 obs Army 5,600; 3,300 conscript (total 8,900)
FORCES BY ROLE
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 829; 1 mech inf bn
MANOEUVRE
PHILIPPINES: IMT 16 Mechanised
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 3; 1 obs; UN • UNISFA 1 obs 1 MR bde
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 5 obs Light
1 (rapid deployment) lt inf bn (2nd bn to form)
Air Manoeuvre
FOREIGN FORCES 1 AB bn
Australia 130; 1 inf coy (on 3-month rotational tours); 1 AP- COMBAT SUPPORT
3C Orion on occasion 1 arty regt
292 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Myanmar MMR
MBT 420: 370 T-54/T-55; 50 T-72A
Myanmar Kyat K 2017 2018 2019
RECCE 120 BRDM-2
IFV 310 BMP-1 GDP K 91.3tr 97.7tr
APC • APC (W) 210: 150 BTR-60; 40 BTR-70M; 20 BTR- US$ 67.3bn 71.5bn
80 per capita US$ 1,278 1,354
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES Growth % 6.8 6.4
ARV T-54/T-55
Inflation % 4.0 6.0
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Def bdgt K 2.92tr 2.66tr
GUNS • TOWED 200: 85mm D-44/D-48; 100mm
M-1944/MT-12 US$ 2.15bn 1.95bn
ARTILLERY 570 US$1=K 1356.68 1365.23
TOWED ε300: 122mm D-30/M-30 (M-1938); 130mm Population 55,622,506
M-46; 152mm ML-20 (M-1937)
Ethnic groups: Burman 68%; Shan 9%; Karen 7%; Rakhine 4%;
MRL 122mm 130 BM-21 Chinese 3+%; Other Chin, Kachin, Kayan, Lahu, Mon, Palaung, Pao,
MOR 140: 120mm; 160mm; 82mm Wa, 9%
AIR DEFENCE
SAM Medium-range 2+ S-125 Pechora-2M (SA-26) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
GUNS • TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2 Male 13.6% 4.4% 4.4% 4.0% 20.4% 2.5%
Female 13.0% 4.3% 4,4% 4.2% 21.6% 3.2%
Air Force 800
FORCES BY ROLE Capabilities
TRANSPORT Since the country’s independence struggle in the 1940s, Myan-
1 sqn with An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl mar’s large, army-dominated Tatmadaw (armed forces) has been
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER intimately involved in domestic politics. Even though the National
1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-171 League for Democracy (NLD) won the November 2015 election,
AIR DEFENCE the armed forces remain politically powerful. A defence white
paper published in 2016 placed as a key priority ending conflicts
2 regt with S-60/ZPU-4/ZU-23
with domestic armed groups. It also gives a ‘state-building’ role to
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE the Tatmadaw, legitimising continued intervention in the coun-
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3: 2 An-24 Coke; 1 An-26 Curl try’s politics. In its counter-insurgency operations, the Tatmadaw
HELICOPTERS has been accused by international organisations of human-rights
TPT • Medium 12: 10 Mi-8 Hip; 2 Mi-171 abuses, and concerns have increased after military actions against
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 150: 14.5mm ZPU-4; the Rohingya minority in 2017. China and Russia are key defence-
23mm ZU-23; 57mm S-60 cooperation partners, including bilateral military exercises and
the provision of weapons. In 2016, Myanmar and Russia signed a
Paramilitary 7,500 active broad cooperation agreement including military training. Due to
long-running domestic conflicts, the Tatmadaw has experience
Border Guard 1,300; 4,700 conscript (total with counter-insurgency operations and jungle warfare. Although
there have been small deployments to UN missions, the Tatmadaw
6,000)

remains essentially an internally focused force. Since the 1990s, the
Internal Security Troops 400; 800 conscript armed forces have attempted to develop limited conventional-
warfare capabilities, and have brought into service new armoured
(total 1,200) vehicles, air-defence weapons, artillery, combat aircraft and ships
FORCES BY ROLE procured mainly from China and Russia. There is limited defence-
MANOEUVRE industrial capacity. The Aircraft Production and Maintenance Base
Other has assembled Chinese K-8 trainer aircraft and Myanmar allegedly
4 gd unit aims to negotiate license-production for the Chinese JF-17 combat
aircraft. Myanmar also has growing shipbuilding capabilities,
Construction Troops 300 notably through the Naval Dockyard in Yangon, which launched
patrol and utility vessels in 2018.

DEPLOYMENT ACTIVE 406,000 (Army 375,000 Navy 16,000 Air

AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 120
15,000) Paramilitary 107,000
Conscript liability 24–36 months
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
MONUSCO 2 obs
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 867; 7 obs; 1 inf bn
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 2; UN • UNISFA 1; 2 obs Army ε375,000
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 4 obs 14 military regions, 7 regional op comd
 Asia 293

FORCES BY ROLE Navy ε16,000

COMMAND EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
20 div HQ (military op comd) PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 5
10 inf div HQ FFGHM 2 Kyansitthar with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-
34+ bde HQ (tactical op comd) SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 1 sextuple lnchr with MANPAD
MANOEUVRE SAM, 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)
Armoured FFG 3:
10 armd bn 1 Aung Zeya with 2 quad lnchr with DPRK AShM
Light (possibly Kh-35 derivative), 4 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm
100 inf bn (coy) gun, 1 hel landing platform
337 inf bn (coy) (regional comd) 2 Mahar Bandoola (PRC Type-053H1) with 2 quad lnchr
COMBAT SUPPORT with C-802 (CH-SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 2 RBU 1200
7 arty bn A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm gun
37 indep arty coy PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 77
6 cbt engr bn CORVETTES 3
54 fd engr bn FSGHM 1 Tabinshwethi (Anawrahta mod) with 2 twin
40 int coy lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-8 Saccade), 1 sectuple
45 sigs bn lnchr with unknown MANPADs, 2 RBU 1200 A/S
AIR DEFENCE mor, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)
7 AD bn FSG 2 Anawrahta with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-
SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 2 RDC-32 A/S mor, 1 76mm
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE gun, 1 hel landing platform
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES PSOH 1 Inlay with 1 twin 57mm gun
MBT 185+: 10 T-55; 50 T-72S; 25+ Type-59D; 100 Type- PCG 7: 6 Houxin with 2 twin lnchr with C-801 (CH-SS-N-4

Asia
69-II Sardine) AShM; 1 FAC(M) mod with 2 twin lnchr with
LT TK 105 Type-63 (ε60 serviceable) C-802 (CH-SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 1 AK630 CIWS
ASLT 24 PTL-02 mod PCO 2 Indaw
RECCE 87+: 12+ EE-9 Cascavel; 45 Ferret; 30 Mazda; MAV- PCC 11: 2 Admirable (ex-US); 9 Hainan with 4 RBU 1200
1 A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm gun
IFV 10+ BTR-3U PBG 4 Myanmar with 2 single lnchr with C-801 (CH-
APC 431+ SS-N-4 Sardine) AShM
APC (T) 331: 26 MT-LB; 250 Type-85; 55 Type-90 PBF 3: 1 Type-201; 2 Super Dvora Mk III
APC (W) 90+: 20 Hino; 40 Humber Pig; 30+ Type-92 PB 32: 3 PB-90; 6 PGM 401; 6 PGM 412; 14 Myanmar; 3 Swift
PPV 10 MPV PBR 14: 4 Sagu; 9 Y-301†; 1 Y-301 (Imp)
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 15
ARV Type-72 LCU 5; LCM 10
VLB MT-55A LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 13
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE ABU 1
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav; 106mm M40A1 AGHS 2: 1 Innya; 1 (near shore)
GUNS • TOWED 60: 57mm 6-pdr; 76mm 17-pdr AGS 1
AH 2
ARTILLERY 422+
AK 1
SP 155mm 42: 30 NORA B-52; 12 SH-1
AKSL 5
TOWED 264+: 105mm 132: 36 M-56; 96 M101; 122mm
AP 1 Chindwin
100 D-30; 130mm 16 M-46; 140mm; 155mm 16 Soltam
M-845P Naval Infantry 800
MRL 36+: 107mm 30 Type-63; 122mm BM-21 Grad FORCES BY ROLE
(reported); Type-81; 240mm 6+ M-1985 mod MANOEUVRE
MOR 80+: 82mm Type-53 (M-37); 120mm 80+: 80 Soltam; Light
Type-53 (M-1943) 1 inf bn
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
SRBM • Conventional some Hwasong-6 (reported) Air Force ε15,000
AIR DEFENCE FORCES BY ROLE
SAM FIGHTER
Medium-range 4+: 4 KS-1A (HQ-12); S-125 Pechora-2M 4 sqn with F-7 Airguard; FT-7; MiG-29B Fulcrum; MiG-
(SA-26); 2K12 Kvadrat-M (SA-6 Gainful) 29SM Fulcrum; MiG-29UB Fulcrum
Point-defence Some 2K22 Tunguska (SA-19 Grison); GROUND ATTACK
HN-5 Hong Nu/Red Cherry (reported); 9K310 Igla-1 2 sqn with A-5M Fantan
(SA-16 Gimlet) TRANSPORT
GUNS 46 
SP 57mm 12 Type-80 1 sqn with An-12 Cub; F-27 Friendship; FH-227; PC-6A/B
TOWED 34: 37mm 24 Type-74; 40mm 10 M1 Turbo Porter
294 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

TRAINING Capabilities
2 sqn with G-4 Super Galeb*; PC-7 Turbo Trainer*; PC-9*
1 (trg/liaison) sqn with Cessna 550 Citation II; Cessna The principal role of Nepal’s armed forces is maintaining territorial
integrity, but they have also traditionally focused on internal secu-
180 Skywagon; K-8 Karakorum*
rity and humanitarian relief. Nepal has a policy of providing con-
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER tingents to UN peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and
4 sqn with Bell 205; Bell 206 Jet Ranger; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-35P Africa. Training support is provided by several countries, includ-
Hind; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; PZL W-3 Sokol; SA316 Alouette III ing China, India and the US. Following a 2006 peace accord with
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE the Maoist People’s Liberation Army, Maoist personnel underwent
AIRCRAFT 153 combat capable a process of demobilisation or integration into the armed forces.
Gurkhas continue to be recruited by the British and Indian armed
FTR 63: 21 F-7 Airguard; 10 FT-7; 11 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 6
forces and the Singaporean police. The small air wing provides a
MiG-29SE Fulcrum; 10 MiG-29SM Fulcrum; 5 MiG-29UB limited transport and support capacity but mobility remains a
Fulcrum challenge, in part because of the country’s topography. This deficit
FGA 6 JF-17 Thunder (FC-1 Block 2) was highlighted by Nepal’s dependence on foreign-military logisti-
ATK 22 A-5M Fantan cal and medical assistance following the earthquake in April 2015.
TPT 20: Medium 5: 4 Y-8D; 1 Y-8F-200W Light 16: 3 Beech This dependence remains. Nepal’s logistic capability appears to
1900D; 4 Cessna 180 Skywagon; 1 Cessna 550 Citation II; 3 be sufficient for internal-security operations, including counter-
F-27 Friendship; 5 PC-6A/B Turbo Porter; PAX 1+ FH-227 ing IEDs, however its contingents on UN peacekeeping opera-
tions appear to largely depend on contracted logistic support.
TRG 82: 11 G-4 Super Galeb*; 20 Grob G120; 24+ K-8
Modernisation plans include a very limited increase in the size of
Karakorum*; 12 PC-7 Turbo Trainer*; 9 PC-9*; 6 Yak-130 its air force. Barring maintenance capacities there is no defence-
Mitten* industrial base, and Nepal is dependent on foreign suppliers for
HELICOPTERS modern equipment.
ATK 10 Mi-35P Hind
MRH 23: 3 AS365; 11 Mi-17 Hip H; 9 SA316 Alouette III ACTIVE 96,600 (Army 96,600) Paramilitary 15,000
TPT 45: Medium 10 PZL W-3 Sokol; Light 35: 12 Bell 205;
6 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 17 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
CISR • Heavy 4 CH-3 Army 96,600
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR PL-5; R-73 FORCES BY ROLE
(AA-11 Archer); IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo) COMMAND
6 inf div HQ
Paramilitary 107,000 1 (valley) comd
SPECIAL FORCES
People’s Police Force 72,000 1 bde (1 SF bn, 1 AB bn, 1 cdo bn, 1 ranger bn, 1 mech
People’s Militia 35,000 inf bn)
MANOEUVRE
Light
DEPLOYMENT 16 inf bde (total: 62 inf bn; 32 indep inf coy)
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1; 1 obs COMBAT SUPPORT
4 arty regt
5 engr bn
Nepal NPL AIR DEFENCE
2 AD regt
Nepalese Rupee NR 2017 2018 2019
4 indep AD coy
GDP NR 2.64tr 3.01tr
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ 24.9bn 28.8bn ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
per capita US$ 848 971 RECCE 40 Ferret
Growth % 7.9 6.3 APC 253
Inflation % 4.5 4.2
APC (W) 13: 8 OT-64C; 5 WZ-551
PPV 240: 90 Casspir; 150 MPV
Def bdgt NR 35.7bn 45.0bn 44.9bn
ARTILLERY 92+
US$ 336m 431m TOWED 105mm 22: 8 L118 Light Gun; 14 pack howitzer
FMA (US) US$ 1.7m 0m (6 non-operational)
US$1=NR 106.21 104.37 MOR 70+: 81mm; 120mm 70 M-43 (est 12 op)
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 32+: 14.5mm 30 Type-
Population 29,717,587 56 (ZPU-4); 37mm (PRC); 40mm 2 L/60
Religious groups: Hindu 90%; Buddhist 5%; Muslim 3%
Air Wing 320
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
Male 15.4% 5.5% 5.4% 4.2% 15.7% 2.6% AIRCRAFT • TPT 2: Light 2: 1 BN-2T Islander; 1 M-28
Female 14.1% 5.2% 5.4% 4.8% 18.9% 2.7% Skytruck
 Asia 295

HELICOPTERS of challenges likely to affect the country’s security in the period

MRH 12: 2 Dhruv; 2 Lancer; 3 Mi-17-1V Hip H; 2 Mi-
17V-5 Hip; 1 SA315B Lama (Cheetah); 2 SA316B Alouette
III
TPT 3: Medium 1 SA330J Puma; Light 2 AS350B2
Ecureuil
Paramilitary 15,000
Armed Police Force 15,000
Ministry of Home Affairs
DEPLOYMENT
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 340; 4
obs; 1 MP coy
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
MONUSCO 884; 10 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy
IRAQ: UN • UNAMI 77; 1 sy unit
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 871; 1 mech inf bn
LIBYA: UN • UNISMIL 229; 1 obs; 2 sy coy
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 153; 3 obs; 1 EOD coy
to 2040, including rising tension in the South and East China seas.
In response, among other areas, defence policy will emphasise
awareness of and capacity to respond to activity in the maritime
domain. The white paper indicated investment in improved
maritime air-surveillance capability, new cyber-support capability
for deployed operations and additional intelligence personnel,
but said that until 2030 defence spending was expected to remain
pegged at around 1% of GDP. There are also plans to expand
army personnel strength over the next decade. New Zealand’s
closest defence partner is Australia but the country has revived
defence relations with the US. The 2016 Defence Capability Plan
outlined procurements needed to achieve the white paper’s
vision, including deliveries of new frigates in the late 2020s and
P-8A Poseidon maritime-patrol aircraft in the 2020s. However,
the decommissioning of HMNZS Endeavour in 2017 meant New
Zealand lost its at-sea-replenishment capability, which will
not return until HMNZS Aotearoa enters service in 2021. New
Zealand has a small defence industry consisting of numerous
private companies and subsidiaries of larger North American
and European companies. These companies are able to provide
some maintenance, repair and overhaul capability but significant
work, such as the ANZAC frigate upgrade, is contracted to foreign
companies.

Asia
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 4 obs ACTIVE 9,000 (Army 4,500 Navy 2,050 Air 2,450) 

SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1,745; 13 obs; 2 inf bn RESERVE 2,300 (Army 1,650 Navy 450 Air Force 200)
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 359; 7 obs; 2 inf coy; UN •
UNISFA 5; 1 obs ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 333; 2 mech inf coy
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 5 obs
Army 4,500
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
FOREIGN FORCES 1 SF regt
United Kingdom 60 (Gurkha trg org) MANOEUVRE
Light
New Zealand NZL 1 inf bde (1 armd recce regt, 2 lt inf bn, 1 arty regt (2 arty
bty), 1 engr regt(-), 1 MP coy, 1 sigs regt, 2 log bn, 1
New Zealand Dollar NZ$ 2017 2018 2019 med bn)
GDP NZ$ 283bn 296bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
US$ 201bn 206bn
IFV 93 NZLAV-25
per capita US$ 41,572 41,616
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Growth % 3.0 3.1 AEV 7 NZLAV
Inflation % 1.9 1.4 ARV 3 LAV-R
Def bdgt NZ$ 3.31bn 3.40bn 3.75bn ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
US$ 2.35bn 2.37bn MSL • MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav
US$1=NZ$ 1.41 1.44
ARTILLERY 60
Population 4,545,627 TOWED 105mm 24 L118 Light Gun
MOR 81mm 36
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 10.1% 3.3% 3.4% 3.4% 22.3% 7.2% Reserves
Female 9.6% 3.2% 3.2% 3.4% 22.5% 8.4% Territorial Force 1,650 reservists
Responsible for providing trained individuals for
Capabilities augmenting deployed forces
New Zealand has a strong military tradition. The New Zealand FORCES BY ROLE
Defence Force (NZDF) is well trained and has operational COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
experience. The June 2016 defence white paper foresaw a range 3 (Territorial Force Regional) trg regt
296 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Navy 2,050
Fleet based in Auckland. Fleet HQ at Wellington
Pakistan PAK
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Pakistani Rupee Rs 2017 2018 2019
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES • GDP Rs 32.0tr 34.4tr
FFHM 2: US$ 305bn 307bn
2 Anzac (GER MEKO 200) with 1 octuple Mk41 VLS per capita US$ 1,546 1,527
with RIM-7M Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm Growth % 5.4 5.8
TT with Mk46 mod 5 LWT, 1 Mk15 Phalanx Block Inflation % 4.1 3.9
1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-2G(I) Super
Def bdgt [a] Rs 1.02tr 1.26tr 1.36tr
Seasprite ASW hel)
US$ 9.75bn 11.2bn
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6
FMA (US) US$ 242m 100m
PSOH 2 Otago (capacity 1 SH-2G(I) Super Seasprite ASW
US$1=Rs 104.81 112.08
hel) (ice-strengthened hull)
[a] Includes defence allocations to the Public Sector
PCC 4 Lake
Development Programme (PSDP), including funding to the
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 2 Defence Division and the Defence Production Division
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • 1 

Population 207,862,518
AKRH 1 Canterbury (capacity 4 NH90 tpt hel; 1 SH-
Religious groups: Hindu less than 3%
2G(I) Super Seasprite ASW hel; 2 LCM; 16 NZLAV; 14
NZLAV; 20 trucks; 250 troops) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 15.8% 5.5% 5.3% 4.9% 17.7% 2.1%
Air Force 2,450 Female 15.0% 5.1% 5.0% 4.6% 16.6% 2.4%
FORCES BY ROLE
MARITIME PATROL Capabilities
1 sqn with P-3K2 Orion The armed forces have considerable domestic political influence,
TRANSPORT including a strong voice on security policy. Pakistan’s nuclear and
1 sqn with B-757-200 (upgraded); C-130H Hercules conventional forces have traditionally been oriented and struc-
(upgraded) tured against a prospective threat from India. Since 2008, however,
counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism have been of increasing
ANTI-SUBMARINE/SURFACE WARFARE importance and are now the forces’ main effort. While an army-
1 (RNZAF/RNZN) sqn with SH-2G(I) Super Seasprite led counter-terrorism operation has improved domestic security,
TRAINING terrorist attacks continue. The armed forces have a major role in
1 sqn with T-6C Texan II disaster relief and are well practised in such operations. China is
Pakistan’s main defence partner, with all three services employing
1 sqn with Beech 200 King Air (leased)
a large amount of Chinese equipment. Military cooperation with
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER the US is limited by sanctions aiming to improve cooperation on
1 sqn with AW109; NH90 counter-terrorism. Recruitment is good, retention is high and the
forces are well trained. The army and air force have considerable
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
operational experience from a decade of counter-insurgency
AIRCRAFT 6 combat capable operations in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Major investment in military
ASW 6 P-3K2 Orion nuclear programmes continue, including the commissioning of a
TPT 11: Medium 5 C-130H Hercules (upgraded); Light 4 VLF submarine-communications facility and the continued devel-
Beech 200 King Air (leased); PAX 2 B-757-200 (upgraded) opment of a submarine-launched cruise missile. The air force is
modernising its inventory while improving its precision-strike
TRG 11 T-6C Texan II
and ISR capabilities. Recent and likely future naval investment in
HELICOPTERS Chinese-supplied frigates, missile craft and submarines would
ASW 8 SH-2G(I) Super Seasprite improve sea-denial capabilities. The indigenous defence industry
TPT 13: Medium 8 NH90; Light 5 AW109 exports defence equipment, weapons and ammunition. There is
considerable defence-industrial collaboration with China, notably
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM AGM-119 Penguin
through the co-development of the JF-17 combat aircraft.
Mk2 mod7
ACTIVE 653,800 (Army 560,000 Navy 23,800 Air
DEPLOYMENT 70,000) Paramilitary 282,000

AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 13 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

EGYPT: MFO 26; 1 trg unit; 1 tpt unit
IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve 143; 1 trg unit
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 7 obs
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2; 3 obs
Strategic Forces
Operational control rests with the National Command
Authority. The Strategic Plans Directorate (SPD) manages
and commands all of Pakistan’s military nuclear capability.
 Asia 297

The SPD also commands a reportedly 25,000-strong APC (W) 120 BTR-70/BTR-80
military security force responsible for guarding military PPV 225 Maxxpro
nuclear infrastructure AUV 10 Dingo 2
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE
VEHICLES
Army Strategic Forces Command 12,000– ARV 117+: 65 Type-653; Al-Hadeed; 52 M88A1; T-54/T-55
15,000 VLB M47M; M48/60
Commands all land-based strategic nuclear forces
MW Aardvark Mk II
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS 60+ MSL
MRBM • Nuclear ε30 Ghauri/Ghauri II (Hatf-5)/ SP M901 TOW
Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6 – in test); Shaheen-3 (in test)
MANPATS HJ-8; TOW
SRBM • Nuclear 30+: ε30 Ghaznavi (Hatf-3 – PRC
RCL 75mm Type-52; 106mm M40A1 
RL 89mm M20
M-11)/Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4); some Abdali (Hatf-2); some
GUNS 85mm 200 Type-56 (D-44)
Nasr (Hatf-9)
GLCM • Nuclear Babur (Hatf-7); Ra’ad (Hatf-8 – in test) ARTILLERY 4,472+
SP 375: 155mm 315: 200 M109A2; ε115 M109A5 203mm
Air Force 60 M110/M110A2
1–2 sqn of F-16A/B or Mirage 5 may be assigned a TOWED 1,659: 105mm 329: 216 M101; 113 M-56; 122mm
nuclear-strike role 570: 80 D-30 (PRC); 490 Type-54 (M-1938); 130mm 410
Type-59-I; 155mm 322: 144 M114; 148 M198; ε30 Panter;
Army 560,000
 203mm 28 M115
FORCES BY ROLE MRL 88+: 107mm Type-81; 122mm 52+: 52 Azar (Type-
COMMAND 83); some KRL-122; 300mm 36 A100
9 corps HQ MOR 2,350+: 81mm; 120mm AM-50

Asia
1 (area) comd SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
SPECIAL FORCES MRBM • Nuclear ε30 Ghauri/Ghauri II (Hatf-5); some
2 SF gp (total: 4 SF bn)
Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6 – in test); Shaheen-3 (in test)
MANOEUVRE
SRBM 135+: Nuclear 30+: ε30 Ghaznavi (Hatf-3 – PRC
Armoured
M-11)/Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4); some Abdali (Hatf-2); some
2 armd div
Nasr (Hatf-9); Conventional 105 Hatf-1
7 indep armd bde
Mechanised GLCM • Nuclear some Babur (Hatf-7)
2 mech inf div AIRCRAFT
1 indep mech bde TPT • Light 14: 1 Beech 200 King Air; 1 Beech 350 King
Light Air; 3 Cessna 208B; 1 Cessna 421; 1 Cessna 550 Citation;
18 inf div 1 Cessna 560 Citation; 2 Turbo Commander 690; 4 Y-12(II)
5 indep inf bde TRG 87 MFI-17B Mushshak
Other HELICOPTERS
1 sy div (1 more div forming) ATK 42: 38 AH-1F/S Cobra with TOW; 4 Mi-35M Hind (1
COMBAT SUPPORT Mi-24 Hind in store)
1 arty div MRH 115+: 10 H125M Fennec; 7 AW139; 26 Bell 412EP
14 arty bde Twin Huey; 38+ Mi-17 Hip H; 2 Mi-171E Hip; 12 SA315B
7 engr bde Lama; 20 SA319 Alouette III
AVIATION TPT 76: Medium 36: 31 SA330 Puma; 4 Mi-171; 1 Mi-
1 VIP avn sqn 172; Light 40: 17 H125 Ecureuil (SAR); 5 Bell 205 (UH-
4 avn sqn
1H Iroquois); 5 Bell 205A-1 (AB-205A-1); 13 Bell 206B Jet
HELICOPTER
Ranger II
3 atk hel sqn
TRG 10 Hughes 300C
2 ISR hel sqn
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
2 SAR hel sqn
2 tpt hel sqn ISR • Light Bravo; Jasoos; Vector
1 spec ops hel sqn AIR DEFENCE
AIR DEFENCE SAM
1 AD comd (3 AD gp (total: 8 AD bn)) Medium-range LY-80
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Short-range FM-90
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Point-defence M113 with RBS-70; Anza Mk1/Mk2;
MBT 2,496+: 300 Al-Khalid (MBT 2000); ε50 Al-Khalid I; FIM-92 Stinger; HN-5A; Mistral; RBS-70
320 T-80UD; 51 T-54/T-55; 1,100 Type-59/Al-Zarrar; 400 GUNS • TOWED 1,933: 14.5mm 981; 35mm 248 GDF-
Type-69; 275+ Type-85 (270 M48A5 in store) 002/GDF-005 (with 134 Skyguard radar units); 37mm 310
APC 1,605 Type-55 (M-1939)/Type-65; 40mm 50 L/60; 57mm 144
APC (T) 1,260: 1,160 M113/Talha; ε100 Type-63 Type-59 (S-60); 85mm 200 Type-72 (M-1939) KS-12
298 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Navy 23,800 (incl ε3,200 Marines and ε2,000 Marines ε3,200

Maritime Security Agency (see Paramilitary)) FORCES BY ROLE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SPECIAL FORCES
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 8 1 cdo gp
SSK 5: MANOEUVRE
2 Hashmat (FRA Agosta 70) with 4 single 533mm ASTT Amphibious
with F17P HWT/UGM-84 Harpoon AShM 3 mne bn
3 Khalid (FRA Agosta 90B – 2 with AIP) with 4 single AIR DEFENCE
533mm ASTT with DM2A4 HWT/SM39 Exocet AShM 1 AD bn
SSI 3 MG110 (SF delivery) each with 2 single 533mm TT
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 9 Naval Aviation

FFGHM 4 Sword (F-22P) with 2 quad lnchr with C-802A EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2 triple 324mm AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable
ASTT with ET-52C LWT, 2 sextuple RDC-32 A/S mor, 1 ASW 8: 7 P-3B/C Orion; 1 ATR-72-500
Type 730B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Z-9C Haitun MP 6 F-27-200 MPA
hel) TPT 3: Light 2 ATR-72-500; PAX 1 Hawker 850XP
FFGH 3: HELICOPTERS
1 Alamgir (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 2 quad lnchr ASW 11: 4 Sea King Mk45; 7 Z-9C Haitun
with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT MRH 6 SA319B Alouette III
with Mk46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM AM39 Exocet
1 Tariq (ex-UK Amazon) with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr
with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT Air Force 70,000
with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 3 regional comds: Northern (Peshawar), Central (Sargodha),
114mm gun (capacity 1 hel) Southern (Masroor). The Composite Air Tpt Wg, Combat
1 Tariq (ex-UK Amazon) with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with Cadres School and PAF Academy are Direct Reporting
RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B Units
CIWS, 1 114mm gun (capacity 1 hel) FORCES BY ROLE
FFHM 2 Tariq (ex-UK Amazon) with 1 sextuple lnchr with FIGHTER
LY-60N SAM, 2 single 400mm TT with Typ 45 LWT, 1 Mk 3 sqn with F-7PG/FT-7PG Airguard
15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 114mm gun (capacity 1 hel) 1 sqn with F-16A/B MLU Fighting Falcon
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17 1 sqn with F-16A/B ADF Fighting Falcon
PCG 3: 1 sqn with Mirage IIID/E (IIIOD/EP)
2 Azmat (FAC(M)) with 2 quad lnchr with C-802A AShM, FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 AK630 CIWS 2 sqn with JF-17 Thunder
1 Azmat (FAC(M)) with 2 triple lnchr with C-602 AShM, 2 sqn with JF-17 Thunder Block II
1 AK630 CIWS 1 sqn with F-16C/D Block 52 Fighting Falcon
PBFG 2 Zarrar (33) with 4 single lnchr each with RGM-84 3 sqn with Mirage 5 (5PA)
Harpoon AShM ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE
PBG 4: 1 sqn with Mirage 5PA2/5PA3 with AM-39 Exocet AShM
2 Jalalat with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-8 ELECTRONIC WARFARE/ELINT
Saccade) AShM 1 sqn with Falcon 20F
2 Jurrat with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-8 AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
Saccade) AShM 1 sqn with Saab 2000; Saab 2000 Erieye
PBF 2 Kaan 15 1 sqn with ZDK-03
PB 6: 1 Larkana; 1 Rajshahi; 4 M16 Fast Assault Boat SEARCH & RESCUE
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1 sqn with Mi-171Sh (SAR/liaison)
MCC 3 Munsif (FRA Eridan) 6 sqn with SA316 Alouette III
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 8 1 sqn with AW139
LCM 2 TANKER
LCAC 2 Griffon 8100TD 1 sqn with Il-78 Midas
UCAC 4 Griffon 2000 TRANSPORT
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8 1 sqn with C-130B/E Hercules; CN235M-220; L-100-20
AGS 1 Behr Paima 1 VIP sqn with B-707; Cessna 560XL Citation Excel;
AOL 2 Madagar CN235M-220; F-27-200 Friendship; Falcon 20E;
AOR 1 Moawin II (Fleet Tanker) with 1 hel landing Gulfstream IVSP
platform 1 (comms) sqn with EMB-500 Phenom 100; Y-12 (II)
AORH 1 Fuqing with 1 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 1 SA319 TRAINING
Alouette III hel) 1 OCU sqn with F-7P/FT-7P Skybolt
AOT 2 Gwadar 1 OCU sqn with Mirage III/Mirage 5
AXS 1 1 OCU sqn with F-16A/B MLU Fighting Falcon
 Asia 299

2 sqn with K-8 Karakorum* Frontier Corps 70,000

2 sqn with MFI-17 Ministry of Interior
2 sqn with T-37C Tweet
FORCES BY ROLE
AIR DEFENCE
MANOEUVRE
1 bty with HQ-2 (SA-2 Guideline); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16
Reconnaissance
Gimlet) 1 armd recce sqn
6 bty with Crotale Other
10 bty with SPADA 2000 11 paramilitary regt (total: 40 paramilitary bn)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 425 combat capable ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
FTR 153: 46 F-7PG Airguard; 20 F-7P Skybolt; 24 F-16A APC (W) 45 UR-416
MLU Fighting Falcon; 21 F-16B MLU Fighting Falcon; 9
F-16A ADF Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16B ADF Fighting Falcon; Maritime Security Agency ε2,000
21 FT-7; 6 FT-7PG; 2 Mirage IIIB FORCES BY ROLE
FGA 224: 12 F-16C Block 52 Fighting Falcon; 6 F-16D MARITIME PATROL
Block 52 Fighting Falcon; 49 JF-17 Thunder (FC-1 Block 1 sqn with BN-2T Defender
1); 36 JF-17 Thunder (FC-1 Block 2); 7 Mirage IIID (Mirage EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
IIIOD); 63 Mirage IIIE (IIIEP); 39 Mirage 5 (5PA)/5PA2; 2 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 19
Mirage 5D (5DPA)/5DPA2; 10 Mirage 5PA3 (ASuW) PSO 1 Kashmir
ISR 10 Mirage IIIR* (Mirage IIIRP) PCC 10: 4 Barkat; 4 Hingol; 2 Sabqat (ex-US Island)
ELINT 2 Falcon 20F PBF 5
AEW&C 7: 3 Saab 2000 Erieye; 4 ZDK-03 PB 3 Guns
TKR 4 Il-78 Midas AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3 BN-2T Defender

Asia
TPT 35: Medium 16: 5 C-130B Hercules; 10 C-130E
Hercules; 1 L-100-20; Light 14: 2 Cessna 208B; 1 Cessna National Guard 185,000
560XL Citation Excel; 4 CN235M-220; 4 EMB-500 Phenom Incl Janbaz Force; Mujahid Force; National Cadet Corps;
100; 1 F-27-200 Friendship; 2 Y-12 (II); PAX 5: 1 B-707; 1 Women Guards
Falcon 20E; 2 Gulfstream IVSP; 1 Saab 2000
TRG 142: 38 K-8 Karakorum*; 80 MFI-17B Mushshak; 24 Pakistan Rangers 25,000
T-37C Tweet Ministry of Interior
HELICOPTERS
MRH 19: 15 SA316 Alouette III; 4 AW139 DEPLOYMENT
TPT • Medium 4 Mi-171Sh
ARABIAN SEA: Combined Maritime Forces • 1 FFGH
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
CISR • Heavy CH-3 (Burraq) CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 1,259; 10
ISR • Medium Falco obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 hel sqn
AIR DEFENCE • SAM 190+ CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 1
Medium-range 6 HQ-2 (SA-2 Guideline) DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
Short-range 184: 144 Crotale; ε40 SPADA 2000 MONUSCO 2,758; 18 obs; 4 inf bn; 1 hel sqn
Point-defence 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES MALI: UN • MINUSMA 3
AAM • IR AIM-9L/P Sidewinder; U-Darter; PL-5; SARH SOMALIA: UN • UNSOM 1 obs; UN • UNSOS 1 obs
Super 530; ARH PL-12; AIM-120C AMRAAM SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 4; 2 obs
ASM AGM-65 Maverick; Raptor II
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 1,170; 6 obs; 1 inf bn, 1 engr pl;
AShM AM39 Exocet
1 med pl
ARM MAR-1
ALCM • Nuclear Ra’ad (in test) WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 14 obs
BOMBS
INS/SAT-guided FT-6 (REK) FOREIGN FORCES
Laser-guided Paveway II Figures represent total numbers for UNMOGIP mission in
India and Pakistan
Paramilitary 282,000 active Chile 2 obs
Pakistan Coast Guards Croatia 9 obs
Ministry of Interior Italy 2 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Korea, Republic of 7 obs
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 Philippines 6 obs
PBF 4 Romania 2 obs
PB 1 Sweden 5 obs
300 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Switzerland 3 obs COMBAT SUPPORT

Thailand 4 obs 1 engr bn
Uruguay 3 obs 1 EOD unit
1 sigs sqn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Papua New Guinea PNG ARTILLERY • MOR 3+: 81mm Some; 120mm 3
Papua New Guinea Kina K 2017 2018 2019
Maritime Element ε200
GDP K 63.8bn 68.5bn
1 HQ located at Port Moresby
US$ 19.8bn 20.8bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
per capita US$ 2,402 2,465 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 4 Rabaul
Growth % 2.5 -1.1 (Pacific)
Inflation % 5.4 4.2 AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING SHIPS • LCT 3 Salamaua
Def bdgt K 229m 209m (ex-AUS Balikpapan) (of which 1 in trg role)
US$ 71.1m 63.2m
Air Force ε100
US$1=K 3.20 3.30
FORCES BY ROLE
Population 7,027,332 TRANSPORT
1 sqn with CN235M-100; IAI-201 Arava
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Male 16.8% 5.3% 4.8% 4.1% 17.8% 2.2% 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)†
Female 16.2% 5.1% 4.7% 4.1% 16.8% 2.2% EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3: 1 CN235M-100 (1 more in
Capabilities store); 2 IAI-201 Arava
Since independence in 1975, the Papua New Guinea Defence Force HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 3: 2 Bell 412 (leased); 1 Bell
(PNGDF) has suffered from underfunding and lack of capacity to 212 (leased) (2 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) non-operational)
perform its core roles. A reform programme reduced personnel
strength from around 4,000 to 2,100 between 2002 and 2007. DEPLOYMENT
However, during the current decade, the government has made
efforts to revive defence capability. A 2013 defence white paper SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 2 obs
identified the PNGDF’s core roles, including defending the state
and civil-emergency assistance, but noted that ‘defence capabili-
ties have deteriorated to the extent that we have alarming gaps Philippines PHL
in our land, air and maritime borders’. The white paper called for Philippine Peso P 2017 2018 2019
strengthening defence capability on an ambitious scale, with
long-term plans calling for a ‘division-sized force’ of 10,000 person- GDP P 15.8tr 17.6tr
nel by 2030. The PNGDF continues to receive substantial external US$ 314bn 332bn
military assistance from Australia but also from China. In late 2018, per capita US$ 2,989 3,099
plans to build a joint US–Australia–Papua New Guinea naval base
Growth % 6.7 6.5
at Lombrum were announced. The PNGDF is not able to deploy
outside of the country without outside assistance and there have Inflation % 2.9 4.9
only been small PNGDF deployments to UN peacekeeping mis- Def bdgt [a] P 137bn 148bn 188bn
sions. The PNGDF will receive four of the 21 Guardian-class patrol US$ 2.73bn 2.79bn
boats that Australia is donating to small Pacific Ocean nations,
which will replace the four Pacific-class boats Australia donated in FMA (US) US$ 40m 0m
the 1980s. Papua New Guinea has no significant defence industry, US$1=P 50.40 53.00
though there is some local maintenance capacity. [a] Excludes military pensions
ACTIVE 3,600 (Army 3,300 Maritime Element 200 Population 105,893,381
Air 100)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 16.9% 5.1% 4.7% 4.2% 17.4% 1.9%
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Female 16.2% 4.9% 4.5% 4.0% 17.5% 2.7%

Army ε3,300 Capabilities

FORCES BY ROLE
Despite modest increases in defence funding in recent years,
SPECIAL FORCES
mainly in response to rising tensions in the South China Sea, the
1 spec ops unit capabilities and procurement plans of the Armed Forces of the
MANOEUVRE Philippines (AFP) remain limited. The Philippines would still strug-
Light gle to provide more than a token national capability to defend its
2 inf bn maritime claims. Organisational changes include the establish-
 Asia 301

ment in 2018 of an AFP Special Operations Command to command ARTILLERY 260+ 
TOWED 220: 105mm 204 M101/
all special-forces units. Military leaders said this resulted from M102/Model 56 pack howitzer; 155mm 16: 10 M114/M-68;
lessons learned in the Zamboanga City attack in 2013 and the 6 Soltam M-71
Marawi siege in 2017. Lessons learned after Marawi will also likely MOR 40+: 81mm M29; 107mm 40 M30
lead to renewed focus on the capabilities and tactics needed for AIRCRAFT
urban operations. Although President Duterte announced in 2016 TPT • Light 4: 1 Beech 80 Queen Air; 1 Cessna 170; 1
a ‘separation’ from the US and the pursuit of closer relations with
Cessna 172; 1 Cessna P206A
China, he described the US as an important security ally, especially
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Medium Blue
in support of counter-terrorism, in September 2017. The Philip-
pines is an ASEAN member. In 2017 it began trilateral joint mari- Horizon
time patrols and joint Sulu Sea patrols with Indonesia and Malaysia
to counter regional terrorist activity. The armed forces continue to Navy 23,750
be deployed on internal-security duties in the south, where Manila EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
faces continuing challenges from insurgent groups. The second PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 69
phase (2018–22) of the ‘second horizon’ AFP modernisation pro- PSOH 3 Gregorio del Pilar (ex-US Hamilton) with 1 76mm
gramme was approved in 2018. Plans include new artillery systems, gun (capacity 1 Bo 105)
multi-role fighters, radars, transport aircraft and frigates. Feasibility PCF 1 General Mariano Alvares (ex-US Cyclone)
studies are under way for the creation of a defence-industry zone
PCO 10:
in Limay, Bataan, to better enable technology transfer. The Philip-
3 Emilio Jacinto (ex-UK Peacock) with 1 76mm gun
pine Aerospace Development Corporation has assembled a variety
of small helicopters and aircraft for the AFP, as well as providing 5 Miguel Malvar (ex-US) with 1 76mm gun
maintenance, repair and overhaul services for military aircraft. 2 Rizal (ex-US Auk) with 2 76mm gun
PBFG 3 MPAC Mk3 with 1 Typhoon MLS-ER quad lnchr
ACTIVE 142,350 (Army 101,000 Navy 23,750 Air with Spike-ER SSM
17,600) Paramilitary 11,100 PBF 16: 2 Conrado Yap (ex-ROK Sea Hawk); 5 Tomas Batilo
(ex-ROK Chamsuri); 6 MPAC Mk1/2

Asia
RESERVE 131,000 (Army 100,000 Navy 15,000 Air PB 30: 22 Jose Andrada; 2 Kagitingan; 2 Point (ex-US); 4
16,000) Paramilitary 50,000 (to age 49) Swift Mk3 (ex-US)
PBR 6 Silver Ships
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE AMPHIBIOUS
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 2
LPD 2 Tarlac (IDN Makassar) (capacity 2 LCU; 2 hels; 13
Army 101,000 tanks; 500 troops)
5 Area Unified Comd (joint service), 1 National Capital LANDING SHIPS • LST 4:
Region Comd 2 Bacolod City (US Besson) with 1 hel landing platform
FORCES BY ROLE (capacity 32 tanks; 150 troops)
SPECIAL FORCES 2 LST-1/542 (ex-US) (capacity 16 tanks; 200 troops)
1 spec ops comd (1 ranger regt, 1 SF regt, 1 CT regt) LANDING CRAFT 11
MANOEUVRE LCM 2: 1 Manobo; 1 Tagbanua (capacity 100 tons; 200
Mechanised troops)
1 mech inf div (2 mech bde (total: 3 lt armd sqn; 7 armd LCT 5 Ivatan (ex-AUS Balikpapan)
cav tp; 4 mech inf bn; 1 cbt engr coy; 1 avn bn; 1 cbt engr LCU 4: 3 LCU Mk 6 (ex-US); 1 Mulgae I (ex-RoK)
coy, 1 sigs coy))
 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 6
Light AGOR 1 Gregorio Velasquez (ex-US Melville)
1 div (4 inf bde; 1 arty bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn) AOL 1
9 div (3 inf bde; 1 arty bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn) AO 1 Lake Caliraya
Other AP 1
1 (Presidential) gd gp AWT 2
COMBAT SUPPORT
Naval Aviation
1 arty regt HQ
5 engr bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 11: 4 BN-2A Defender; 2
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Cessna 177 Cardinal; 5 Beech 90 King Air (TC-90) (leased)
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES HELICOPTERS • TPT 13: Medium 4 Mi-171Sh; Light 9:
LT TK 7 FV101 Scorpion 3 AW109; 2 AW109E; 4 Bo-105
IFV 54: 2 YPR-765; 34 M113A1 FSV; 18 M113A2 FSV
APC 387 Marines 8,300
APC (T) 168: 6 ACV300; 42 M113A1; 120 M113A2 FORCES BY ROLE

APC (W) 219: 73 LAV-150 Commando; 146 Simba SPECIAL FORCES
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 1 (force recon) spec ops bn
ARV ACV-300; Samson; M578; 4 M113 ARV MANOEUVRE
ANTI-TANK-ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • RCL 75mm Amphibious
M20; 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1 4 mne bde (total: 12 mne bn)
302 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

COMBAT SUPPORT N-22B Nomad; 1 Turbo Commander 690A; 2 C-212 Aviocar

1 CSS bde (6 CSS bn) (NC-212i); PAX 1 F-28 Fellowship (VIP)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TRG 39: 12 S-211*; 7 SF-260F; 10 SF-260TP; 10 T-41B/D/K
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Mescalero
APC • APC (W) 42: 19 LAV-150 Commando; 23 LAV- HELICOPTERS
300 MRH 32: 8 W-3 Sokol; 3 AUH-76; 8 Bell 412EP Twin
AAV 59: 4 LVTH-6†; 55 LVTP-7
Huey; 2 Bell 412HP Twin Huey; 11 MD-520MG
ARTILLERY 37+
TOWED 37: 105mm 31: 23 M101; 8 M-26; 155mm 6 TPT 34: Medium 1 S-70A Black Hawk (S-70A-5); Light
Soltam M-71 33: 2 AW109E; 11 Bell 205 (UH-1D); 20 Bell 205 (UH-1H
MOR 107mm M30 Iroquois) (25 more non-operational)
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
Naval Special Operations Group ISR • Medium 2 Blue Horizon II
FORCES BY ROLE AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
SPECIAL FORCES AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder
1 SEAL unit
ASM AGM-65D Maverick
1 diving unit
10 naval spec ops unit
1 special boat unit
Paramilitary 11,100
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 EOD unit
Coast Guard 11,100
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Air Force 17,600 Rodman 38 and Rodman 101 owned by Bureau of
FORCES BY ROLE Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
FIGHTER PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 84
1 sqn with FA-50PH Fighting Eagle* PCO 5: 4 San Juan with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Balsam
GROUND ATTACK PCC 2 Tirad
1 sqn with OV-10A/C Bronco* PB 66: 2 Boracay (FPB 72 Mk II); 3 De Haviland; 4 Ilocos
ISR
Norte; 1 Palawan; 12 PCF 50 (US Swift Mk1/2); 10 PCF
1 sqn with Turbo Commander 690A
46; 10 PCF 65 (US Swift Mk3); 4 Rodman 38; 10 Rodman
SEARCH & RESCUE
4 (SAR/Comms) sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1M Iroquois); 101; 10 Parola (MRRV)
AUH-76 PBR 11
TRANSPORT LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ABU 1 Corregidor
1 sqn with C-130B/H/T Hercules; L-100-20 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2 BN-2 Islander
1 sqn with N-22B Nomad; N-22SL Searchmaster; C-212 HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 2 Bo-105
Aviocar (NC-212i)
1 sqn with F-27-200 MPA; F-27-500 Friendship Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units
1 VIP sqn with F-28 Fellowship 50,000 reservists
TRAINING
FORCES BY ROLE
1 sqn with SF-260F/TP
MANOEUVRE
1 sqn with T-41B/D/K Mescalero
1 sqn with S-211* Other 56 militia bn (part-time units which can be
ATTACK HELICOPTER called up for extended periods)
1 sqn with MD-520MG
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER DEPLOYMENT
1 sqn with AUH-76
1 sqn with W-3 Sokol CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 2 obs
4 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 6 obs
1 (VIP) sqn with Bell 412EP Twin Huey; S-70A Black Hawk
(S-70A-5) SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 34 combat capable FOREIGN FORCES
FGA 12 FA-50PH Fighting Eagle Australia Operation Augury 100
MP 3: 1 C-130T MP mod; 1 F-27-200 MPA; 1 N-22SL
Brunei IMT 9
Searchmaster
Indonesia IMT 9
ISR 12: 2 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; 10 OV-10A/C
Bronco* Malaysia IMT 16
TPT 15: Medium 4: 1 C-130B Hercules; 2 C-130H Hercules; United States US Pacific Command: Operation Pacific Eagle
1 C-130T Hercules Light 8: 3 C295; 1 F-27-500 Friendship; 1 - Philippines 250
 Asia 303

Singapore SGP ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Singapore Dollar S$ 2017 2018 2019 Army 15,000; 35,000 conscript (total 50,000)
GDP S$ 447bn 466bn FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
US$ 324bn 347bn
3 (combined arms) div HQ
per capita US$ 57,713 61,230 1 (rapid reaction) div HQ
Growth % 3.6 2.9 3 armd bde HQ
Inflation % 0.6 1.0 9 inf bde HQ
Def bdgt S$ 14.2bn 14.8bn 1 air mob bde HQ
1 amph bde HQ
US$ 10.3bn 11.0bn
SPECIAL FORCES
US$1=S$ 1.38 1.34 1 cdo bn
Population 5,995,991 MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance
Ethnic groups: Chinese 74.1%; Malay 13.4%; Indian 9.2%; other or
unspecified 3.3% 3 lt armd/recce bn
Armoured
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 armd bn
Mechanised
Male 6.5% 3.2% 4.6% 5.3% 24.6% 4.6%
6 mech inf bn
Female 6.2% 3.2% 5.0% 5.6% 25.6% 5.4%
Light
2 (gds) inf bn
Capabilities Other

Asia
The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) are the best equipped in South- 2 sy bn
east Asia. They are organised essentially along Israeli lines, with the
COMBAT SUPPORT
2 arty bn
air force and navy staffed mainly by professional personnel while,
1 STA bn
apart from a small core of regulars, the much larger army is based
2 engr bn
on conscripts and reservists. Although there are no publicly avail-
1 EOD bn
able defence-policy documents, it is widely presumed that the
1 ptn br bn
SAF’s primary role is to deter attacks on the city state or interfer-
1 int bn
ence with its vital interests – particularly its sea lines of commu-
2 ISR bn
nication – by potential regional adversaries. There is now an addi-
1 CBRN bn
tional focus on counter-terrorist operations. The defence budget
3 sigs bn
has increased to the extent that Singapore outspends all its South-
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
east Asian counterparts. With an ageing population and declin- 3 med bn
ing conscript cohort, there is a significant personnel challenge, 2 tpt bn
which the defence ministry is looking to address by lean staffing 3 spt bn
and increased use of technology. There is routine overseas train-
ing, and plans have been announced to further improve domestic Reserves
training areas. The SAF also engages extensively in bilateral and Activated units form part of divisions and brigades listed
multilateral exercises with regional and international partners. Sin- above; 1 op reserve div with additional inf bde; People’s
gaporean forces have gradually become more involved in multi- Defence Force Comd (homeland defence) with 12 inf bn
national operations, including the US-led air offensive against ISIS. FORCES BY ROLE
While such deployments have provided some operational experi- SPECIAL FORCES
ence, and training standards and operational readiness are high, 1 cdo bn
the army’s reliance on conscripts and reservists limits its capacity MANOEUVRE
for sustained operations abroad. Equipment modernisation con- Reconnaissance
tinues, with Littoral-Mission Vessels commissioned and progress 6 lt armd/recce bn
on the procurement of armoured vehicles and surface-to-air mis- Mechanised
siles. There is a small but sophisticated defence industry. ST Engi- 6 mech inf bn
neering group manufactures several types of armoured vehicles Light
and corvettes for the SAF. ε56 inf bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
ACTIVE 72,500 (Army 50,000 Navy 9,000 Air 13,500) ε12 arty bn
Paramilitary 8,400 ε8 engr bn
Conscription liability 22–24 months EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
RESERVE 312,500 (Army 300,000 Navy 5,000 Air MBT 96 Leopard 2SG (80–100 Tempest (upgraded
7,500) Centurion) reported in store)
Annual trg to age 40 for army other ranks, 50 for officers LT TK 372: 22 AMX-10 PAC 90; ε350 AMX-13 SM1
304 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

IFV 572+: 22 AMX-10P; 250 Bionix IFV-25; 250 Bionix IFV- Naval Diving Unit
40/50; 50+ M113A1/A2 (some with 40mm AGL, some
FORCES BY ROLE
with 25mm gun)
SPECIAL FORCES
APC 1,576+
1 SF gp
APC (T) 1,100+: 700+ M113A1/A2; 400+ ATTC Bronco
1 (diving) SF gp
APC (W) 415: 250 LAV-150 Commando/V-200
COMBAT SUPPORT
Commando; 135 Terrex ICV; 30 V-100 Commando
PPV 61+: 6+ Belrex; 15 MaxxPro Dash; 40 Peacekeeper 1 EOD gp
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Air Force 13,500 (incl 3,000 conscript)
AEV 94: 18 CET; 54 FV180; 14 Kodiak; 8 M728
5 comds
ARV Bionix; Büffel; LAV-150; LAV-300
VLB 72+: Bionix; LAB 30; Leguan; M2; 60 M3; 12 M60 FORCES BY ROLE
MW 910-MCV-2; Trailblazer FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE 2 sqn with F-15SG Eagle
MSL • MANPATS Milan; Spike-SR; Spike-MR 3 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (some used for ISR
RCL 90+: 84mm Carl Gustav; 106mm 90 M40A1 with pods)
ARTILLERY 798+ ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
SP 155mm 54 SSPH-1 Primus 1 sqn with S-70B Seahawk
TOWED 88: 105mm (37 LG1 in store); 155mm 88: 18 MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT
FH-2000; ε18 Pegasus; 52 FH-88 1 sqn with F-50
MRL 227mm 18 M142 HIMARS AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
MOR 638+ 1 sqn with G550-AEW
SP 90+: 81mm; 120mm 90: 40 on Bronco; 50 on M113 TANKER

TOWED 548: 81mm 500 120mm 36 M-65; 160mm 12 1 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker; A330 MRTT
M-58 Tampella TANKER/TRANSPORT
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Light Skylark 1 sqn with KC-130B/H Hercules; C-130H Hercules
TRAINING
Navy 3,000; 1,000 conscript; ε5,000 active 1 (FRA-based) sqn with M-346 Master
reservists (total 9,000) 4 (US-based) units with AH-64D Apache; CH-47D
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Chinook; F-15SG: F-16C/D
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 4: 1 (AUS-based) sqn with PC-21
2 Challenger (ex-SWE Sjoormen) with 2 single 400mm TT, 1 hel sqn with H120 Colibri
4 single 533mm TT ATTACK HELICOPTER
2 Archer (ex-SWE Västergötland) (AIP fitted) with 3 single 1 sqn with AH-64D Apache
400mm TT, 6 single 533mm TT for WASS Black Shark TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
HWT 1 sqn with CH-47SD Super D Chinook
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 6: 2 sqn with AS332M Super Puma; AS532UL Cougar
FRIGATES • FFGHM 6 Formidable with 2 quad lnchr ISR UAV
1 sqn with Hermes 450

with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 4 octuple VLS with Aster 2 sqn with Heron 1
15 SAM, 2 triple B515 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, 1 AIR DEFENCE
76mm gun (capacity 1 S-70B Sea Hawk hel) 1 AD bn with Mistral opcon Army
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 26 3 AD bn with RBS-70; 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse) opcon
CORVETTES 11 Army
FSGM 6 Victory with 2 quad Mk140 lnchr with RGM-84C 1 ADA sqn with Oerlikon
Harpoon AShM, 2 octuple lnchr with Barak SAM, 2 triple
1 AD sqn with MIM-23 Hawk; SAMP/T
B515 324mm ASTT with A244S LWT, 1 76mm gun
1 AD sqn with Spyder
FSM 5 Independence (Littoral Mission Vessel) with 1
1 radar sqn with radar (mobile)
12-cell CLA VLS with VL-MICA, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel
1 radar sqn with LORADS
landing platform
MANOEUVRE
PCO 7 Fearless with 1 76mm gun (can be fitted with 2
Other
sextuple Sadral lnchr with Mistral SAM)
4 (field def) sy sqn
PBF 8: 2 SMC Type 1; 6 SMC Type 2
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MCC 4 Bedok AIRCRAFT 105 combat capable
AMPHIBIOUS FGA 100: 40 F-15SG Eagle; 20 F-16C Block 52 Fighting
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 4 Endurance Falcon; 20 F-16D Block 52 Fighting Falcon; 20 F-16D Block
with 2 twin lnchr with Mistral SAM, 1 76mm gun 52+ Fighting Falcon (incl reserves)
(capacity 2 hel; 4 LCVP; 18 MBT; 350 troops) ATK (4 A-4SU Super Skyhawk; 10 TA-4SU Super Skyhawk
LANDING CRAFT 23 in store)
LCVP 23: ε17 FCEP; 6 FCU MP 5 F-50 Maritime Enforcer*
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2 AEW&C 4 G550-AEW
ASR 1 Swift Rescue TKR 5: 1 KC-130H Hercules; 4 KC-135R Stratotanker
AX 1 TKR/TPT 5: 1 A330 MRTT; 4 KC-130B Hercules
 Asia 305

TPT 9: Medium 5 C-130H Hercules (2 ELINT); PAX 4 F-50 networks. Meanwhile, under the DCO, the Cyber Security
TRG 31: 12 M-346 Master; 19 PC-21 Division is the first responder to cyber attacks; the Plans and
HELICOPTERS Policy Directorate oversees cyber capability development;
ATK 19 AH-64D Apache and the Cyber Security Inspectorate conducts vulnerability
ASW 8 S-70B Seahawk assessment. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) Cyber
TPT 51: Heavy 16: 6 CH-47D Chinook; 10 CH-47SD Super Defence Group (CDG) was created under the SAF C4
D Chinook; Medium 30: 18 AS332M Super Puma (incl 5 Command (itself created in 2017) to provide round-the-clock
SAR); 12 AS532UL Cougar; Light 5 H120 Colibri (leased) cyber defence of SAF networks. According to MINDEF,
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES ‘The CDG consists of dedicated cyber defence units that are
ISR 17+: Heavy 8+ Heron 1; Medium 9+ Hermes 450 responsible for cybersecurity monitoring, incident response
AIR DEFENCE and audits of SAF networks.’ The SAF has created new
SAM cyber-defence positions for national servicemen (NSF) and
Long-range 4+ SAMP/T regular personnel. A Cyber NSF scheme was launched in
Medium-range MIM-23 Hawk February 2018 to help the armed forces benefit from cyber
Short-range Spyder-SR skills in the forces. When fully established, MINDEF says
Point-defence 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse) (some on that the DCO will have about 2,600 personnel, supported by
V-200/M113); Mistral; RBS-70 specialists in the Defence Science and Technology Agency
GUNS 34 and the Defence Science Organisation.
SP 20mm GAI-C01
TOWED 34 20mm GAI-C01; 35mm 34 GDF (with 25
Super-Fledermaus fire control radar) DEPLOYMENT
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES AUSTRALIA: 2 trg schools – 1 with 12 AS332 Super Puma/
AAM • IR AIM-9N/P Sidewinder; Python 4 (reported); AS532 Cougar (flying trg) located at Oakey; 1 with PC-21
IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II; SARH AIM-7P Sparrow; ARH (flying trg) located at Pearce. Army: prepositioned AFVs

Asia
(AIM-120C5/7 AMRAAM in store in US) and heavy equipment at Shoalwater Bay training area
ASM: AGM-65B/G Maverick; AGM-114 Hellfire; AGM-
BRUNEI: 1 trg camp with inf units on rotation; 1 hel det
154A/C JSOW
with AS332 Super Puma
AShM AGM-84 Harpoon; AM39 Exocet
ARM AGM-45 Shrike FRANCE: 200: 1 trg sqn with 12 M-346 Master
BOMBS KUWAIT: Operation Inherent Resolve 11
INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM
TAIWAN: 3 trg camp (incl inf and arty)
Laser-guided Paveway II
THAILAND: 1 trg camp (arty, cbt engr)
Paramilitary 8,400 active UNITED STATES: Trg units with F-16C/D; 12 F-15SG; AH-
64D Apache; 6+ CH-47D Chinook
Civil Defence Force 5,600 (incl conscripts);
500 auxiliaries (total 6,100)
FOREIGN FORCES
Singapore Police Coast Guard 1,000 United States US Pacific Command: 200; 1 naval spt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE facility at Changi naval base; 1 USAF log spt sqn at Paya
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 102 Lebar air base
PBF 81: 25 Angler Ray; 2 Atlantic Ray; 1 Marlin; 11
Sailfish; 10 Shark; 32 other
PB 21: 19 Amberjack; 2 Manta Ray Sri Lanka LKA
Sri Lankan Rupee Rs 2017 2018 2019
Singapore Gurkha Contingent 1,800
Under the Police GDP Rs 13.3tr 14.5tr

FORCES BY ROLE
 US$ 87.3bn 92.5bn

MANOEUVRE per capita US$ 4,073 4,265
Other Growth % 3.3 3.7
6 paramilitary coy Inflation % 6.5 4.8

Cyber
 Def bdgt Rs 284bn 273bn

The Singapore Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) has long US$ 1.86bn 1.74bn
identified the potential damage that could be caused FMA (US) US$ 0.5m 0m
by cyber attacks, with this concern perhaps more acute US$1=Rs 152.46 157.04
following its adoption of the Integrated Knowledge-
based Command-and-Control doctrine, designed to aid Population 22,576,592
the transition of Singapore’s armed forces to a ‘third-
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
generation’ force. Singapore’s Defence Cyber Organisation
(DCO) consists of four formations and is responsible for Male 12.1% 3.8% 3.6% 3.6% 21.5% 4.2%
overseeing cyber policy, training and defending military Female 11.6% 3.7% 3.5% 3.7% 23.0% 5.8%
306 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Capabilities APC 211+

APC (T) 30+: some Type-63; 30 Type-85; some Type-89
Since the defeat of the Tamil Tigers, the armed forces have reori- APC (W) 181: 25 BTR-80/BTR-80A; 31 Buffel; 20 WZ-551;
ented to a peacetime internal-security role. Military support has
105 Unicorn
been provided by China, in an indication of a growing military-
to-military relationship. The US has eased its long-standing mili- ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
tary trade restrictions. Japan has stated an intention to increase ARV 16 VT-55
maritime cooperation with the country. Sri Lanka has little capac- VLB 2 MT-55
ity for force projection beyond its national territory but has sent ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
small numbers of troops on UN missions. Colombo is developing a MANPATS HJ-8
national cyber-security centre. The navy’s littoral capability, based
RCL 40: 105mm ε10 M-65; 106mm ε30 M40
on fast-attack and patrol boats, has been strengthened with the
acquisition of offshore patrol vessels, while the US has gifted a GUNS 85mm 8 Type-56 (D-44)
former US coastguard cutter and China has announced that it is ARTILLERY 908
gifting a frigate. The army is reducing in size and there appears TOWED 96: 122mm 20; 130mm 30 Type-59-I; 152mm 46
to have been little spending on new equipment since the end Type-66 (D-20)
of the civil war, although Sri Lanka is looking to begin a series of MRL 122mm 28: 6 KRL-122; 22 RM-70
procurements to fill key capability gaps. It was reported in 2018 MOR 784: 81mm 520; 82mm 209; 120mm 55 M-43
that some naval units would relocate to a new port at Hamban-
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
tota, leased by China. Beyond maintenance facilities and limited
fabrication, such as at Sri Lanka’s shipyards, there is no defence- ISR • Medium 1 Seeker
industrial base.
Navy ε37,000; ε13,000 active reserves (total
ACTIVE 255,000 (Army 177,000 Navy 50,000 Air 50,000)
28,000) Paramilitary 62,200
Seven naval areas
RESERVE 5,500 (Army 1,100 Navy 2,400 Air Force EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2,000) Paramilitary 30,400 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 128
PSOH 3: 1 Sayura (IND Vigraha); 2 Sayurala (IND Samarth)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE PCG 2 Nandimithra (ISR Sa’ar 4) with 3 single lnchr with
Gabriel II AShM, 1 76mm gun
Army 113,000; 64,00 active reservists (recalled) PCO 2: 1 Samudura (ex-US Reliance); 1 Sagara (IND
(total 177,000) Vikram) with 1 hel landing platform
Regt are bn sized PCC 1 Jayasagara
PBF 74: 26 Colombo; 6 Shaldag; 4 Super Dvora Mk II; 6
FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND Super Dvora Mk III; 5 Trinity Marine; 27 Wave Rider
7 region HQ PB 20: 4 Cheverton; 2 Mihikatha (ex-AUS Bay); 2 Prathapa
21 div HQ (PRC mod Haizhui); 3 Ranajaya (PRC Haizhui); 1 Ranarisi
SPECIAL FORCES (PRC mod Shanghai II); 5 Weeraya (PRC Shanghai II); 3
1 indep SF bde (various)
MANOEUVRE PBR 26
Reconnaissance AMPHIBIOUS
3 armd recce regt LANDING SHIPS • LSM 1 Shakthi (PRC Yuhai)
Armoured (capacity 2 tanks; 250 troops)
1 armd bde(-) LANDING CRAFT 8
Mechanised LCM 2
1 mech inf bde LCP 3 Hansaya
Light LCU 2 Yunnan
60 inf bde UCAC 1 M 10 (capacity 56 troops) 

1 cdo bde LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3: 2 AP; 1 AX
Air Manoeuvre
1 air mob bde Marines ε500
COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES BY ROLE
7 arty regt MANOEUVRE
1 MRL regt Amphibious
8 engr regt 1 mne bn
6 sigs regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Special Boat Service ε100
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 62 T-55A/T-55AM2 Reserve Organisations
RECCE 15 Saladin Sri Lanka Volunteer Naval Force (SLVNF) 13,000
IFV 62+: 13 BMP-1; 49 BMP-2; WZ-551 20mm active reservists
 Asia 307

Air Force 28,000 (incl SLAF Regt) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

FORCES BY ROLE
 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17
FIGHTER PCO 1 Suraksha (ex-IND Vikram) with 1 hel landing
1 sqn with F-7BS/G; FT-7 platform
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK PBF 11: 2 Dvora; 4 Super Dvora Mk I; 3 Killer (ROK); 2
1 sqn with Kfir C-2/C-7/TC-2 (Inshore Patrol Craft)
1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum* PB 4: 2 Simonneau Type-508; 2 Samudra Raksha
TRANSPORT PBR 1
1 sqn with An-32B Cline; C-130K Hercules; Cessna 421C
Golden Eagle DEPLOYMENT
1 sqn with Beech B200 King Air; Y-12 (II)
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 115; 6
TRAINING
obs; 1 hel sqn
1 wg with PT-6, Cessna 150L
ATTACK HELICOPTER LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 150; 1 inf coy
1 sqn with Mi-24V Hind E; Mi-35P Hind MALI: UN • MINUSMA 200; 7 obs; 1 sy coy
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 172; 2 obs; 1 fd hospital;
1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171Sh
1 hel sqn
1 sqn with Bell 206A/B (incl basic trg), Bell 212
1 (VIP) sqn with Bell 212; Bell 412 Twin Huey SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2; 5 obs
ISR UAV WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 4 obs
1 sqn with Blue Horizon II
1 sqn with Searcher MkII
MANOEUVRE
Taiwan (Republic of China) ROC

Asia
Other New Taiwan Dollar NT$ 2017 2018 2019
1 (SLAF) sy regt
GDP NT$ 17.4tr 18.1tr
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ 573bn 603bn
AIRCRAFT 13 combat capable
FTR 5: 3 F-7GS; 2 FT-7 (3 F-7BS; 1 F-7GS non-operational) per capita US$ 24,292 25,534
FGA 1 Kfir C-2 (2 Kfir C-2; 1 Kfir C-7; 2 Kfir TC-2; 6 MiG- Growth % 2.9 2.7
27M Flogger J2; 1 MiG-23UB Flogger C non-operational) Inflation % 1.1 1.5
TPT 21: Medium 2 C-130K Hercules; Light 19: 3 An-32B Def bdgt NT$ 319bn 332bn 346bn
Cline; 6 Cessna 150L; 1 Cessna 421C Golden Eagle; 7 Y-12
US$ 10.5bn 11.0bn
(II); 2 Y-12 (IV)
TRG 14: 7 K-8 Karakoram*; 7 PT-6 US$1=NT$ 30.44 30.05
HELICOPTERS Population 23,545,963
ATK 11: 6 Mi-24P Hind; 3 Mi-24V Hind E; 2 Mi-35V Hind
Ethnic groups: Taiwanese 84%; mainland Chinese 14%
MRH 18: 6 Bell 412 Twin Huey (VIP); 2 Bell 412EP (VIP);
10 Mi-17 Hip H Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
TPT 16: Medium 4 Mi-171Sh; Light 12: 2 Bell 206A Jet
Male 6.5% 2.9% 3.5% 3.5% 26.5% 6.6%
Ranger; 2 Bell 206B Jet Ranger; 8 Bell 212
Female 6.2% 2.8% 3.3% 3.4% 27.1% 7.8%
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR • Medium 2+: some Blue Horizon II; 2 Searcher MkII
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 27: 40mm 24 L/40; Capabilities
94mm 3 (3.7in) Taiwan’s relationship with China and its attempts to sustain a cred-
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES ible military capability dominate its security policy. The latest Qua-
AAM • IR PL-5E drennial Defense Review, published in March 2017, highlighted
the continued challenge from Beijing. Taiwan’s current focus is
therefore on air defence and deterrence in coastal areas, on both
Paramilitary ε62,200 sides of the island. The armed forces are well trained and exercise
regularly. Demographic pressure has influenced plans for force
Home Guard 13,000
reductions and a shift towards an all-volunteer force. Taiwan’s main
National Guard ε15,000 alliance partnership is with the US. The Taiwan Relations Act from
1979 states that ‘the United States shall provide Taiwan with arms
Police Force 30,200; 1,000 (women) (total of a defensive character’. Despite persistent US refusal to sanc-
tion the transfer of new combat aircraft, Taiwan has obtained US
31,200) 30,400 reservists assistance to modernise its current fleet of F-16s to F-16V standard.
Nevertheless, Taipei maintains an interest in the F-35. Due to the
Ministry of Defence Special Task Force 3,000 lack of potential foreign equipment suppliers, Taiwan is modernis-
Anti-guerrilla unit ing its existing holdings and developing its domestic defence-
industry capabilities through increased funding and the develop-
Coast Guard n/k ment of new weapons programmes. Taiwan’s defence-industrial
Ministry of Defence base has strengths in aerospace, shipbuilding and missiles.
308 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

An indigenous-submarine programme was officially launched NBC VEHICLES 48+: BIDS; 48 K216A1; KM453
in 2017, with the aim to locally build eight boats. The National ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology is in charge of MSL
most defence R&D. SP TOW
ACTIVE 163,000 (Army 88,000 Navy 40,000 Air MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; TOW
RCL 500+: 90mm M67; 106mm 500+: 500 M40A1; Type-51
35,000) Paramilitary 11,450
ARTILLERY 2,200
Conscript liability
SP 488: 105mm 100 M108; 155mm 318: 225 M109A2/A5;
(19–40 years) 12 months for those born before 1993; four
48 M44T; 45 T-69; 203mm 70 M110
months for those born after 1994 (alternative service
TOWED 1,060+: 105mm 650 T-64 (M101); 155mm 340+:
available). Conscription officially ended in January 90 M59; 250 T-65 (M114); M44; XT-69; 203mm 70 M115
2018 and it was planned that the last conscripts would MRL 330: 117mm 120 Kung Feng VI; 126mm 210: 60 Kung
demobilise by the end of 2018 Feng III/Kung Feng IV; 150 RT 2000 Thunder (KF towed
RESERVE 1,657,000 (Army 1,500,000 Navy 67,000 and SP)
Air Force 90,000) MOR 322+
SP 162+: 81mm 72+: M29; 72 M125; 107mm 90 M106A2
Some obligation to age 30
TOWED 81mm 160 M29; T-75; 107mm M30; 120mm
K5; XT-86
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE COASTAL DEFENCE
ARTY 54: 127mm ε50 US Mk32 (reported); 240mm 4
Army 88,000 (incl ε5,000 MP) M1
FORCES BY ROLE AShM Ching Feng
COMMAND HELICOPTERS
3 corps HQ ATK 96: 67 AH-1W Cobra; 29 AH-64E Apache
5 defence comd HQ MRH 38 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior
SPECIAL FORCES/HELICOPTER TPT 110: Heavy 8 CH-47SD Super D Chinook; Medium 26
1 SF/hel comd (2 spec ops gp, 2 hel bde) UH-60M Black Hawk; Light 76 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)
MANOEUVRE TRG 29 TH-67 Creek
Armoured UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
4 armd bde ISR • Light Mastiff III
Mechanised AIR DEFENCE
3 mech inf bde SAM • Point-defence 76: 74 M1097 Avenger; 2 M48
Light Chaparral; FIM-92 Stinger
6 inf bde GUNS 400
COMBAT SUPPORT SP 40mm M42
3 arty gp TOWED 20: 35mm 20 GDF-001 (30 systems with 20
3 engr gp guns) 40mm L/70
3 CBRN gp
3 sigs gp Navy 40,000
COASTAL DEFENCE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 AShM bn SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 4:
2 Hai Lung with 6 single 533mm TT with SUT HWT/
Reserves UGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM
FORCES BY ROLE 2 Hai Shih† (ex-US Guppy II – trg role) with 10 single
MANOEUVRE 533mm TT (6 fwd, 4 aft) with SUT HWT
Light PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 26
21 inf bde CRUISERS • CGHM 4 Keelung (ex-US Kidd) with 2
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE quad lnchr with RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 2
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES twin Mk26 GMLS with RIM-66K-2 SM-2MR Block IIIA
MBT 565: 200 M60A3; 100 M48A5; 265 M48H Brave Tiger SAM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 2
LT TK 625 M41/Type-64 (230 M24 Chaffee (90mm gun) Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 2 127mm gun (capacity
in store) 1 S-70 ASW hel)
IFV 225 CM-25 (M113 with 20–30mm cannon) FRIGATES 22
APC 1,220 FFGHM 21:
APC (T) 650 M113 8 Cheng Kung (US Oliver Hazard Perry mod) with 2
APC (W) 570: ε270 CM-32 Yunpao; 300 LAV-150 quad lnchr with Hsiung Feng II/III AShM, 1 Mk13
Commando GMLS with SM-1MR SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS,
AEV 18 M9 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 S-70C ASW hel)
ARV CM-27/A1; 37 M88A1 2 Meng Chuan (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 1
VLB 22 M3; M48A5 Mk13 GMLS with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM/SM-
 Asia 309

1MR SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, Marines 10,000

1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun FORCES BY ROLE
(capacity 2 S-70C ASW hel) MANOEUVRE
5 Chin Yang (ex-US Knox) with 1 octuple Mk16 lnchr Amphibious
with ASROC/RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 2 triple 3 mne bde
lnchr with SM-1MR SAM, 2 twin lnchr with SM- COMBAT SUPPORT
1MR SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, Some cbt spt unit
1 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
(capacity 1 MD-500 hel) ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
6 Kang Ding with 2 quad lnchr with Hsiung Feng II AAV 202: 52 AAV-7A1; 150 LVTP-5A1
AShM, 1 quad lnchr with Sea Chaparral SAM, 2 ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Mk32 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk ARV 2 AAVR-7
15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity ANIT-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
1 S-70C ASW hel) RCL 106mm
FFGH • 1 Chin Yang (ex-US Knox) with 1 octuple ARTILLERY • TOWED 105mm; 155mm
Mk112 lnchr with ASROC/RGM-84C Harpoon AShM,
2 twin 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx Naval Aviation
Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 MD-500 hel) FORCES BY ROLE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 44 ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE
CORVETTES • FSG 1 Tuo Jiang (Hsun Hai) with 4 twin 2 sqn with S-70C Seahawk (S-70C Defender)
lnchr with Hsiung Feng II AShM, 4 twin lnchr with 1 sqn with MD-500 Defender
Hisung Feng III AShM, 2 triple 324mm TT, 1 Mk 15 ISR UAV
Phalanx Block 1B CIWS; 1 76mm gun 1 bn with Chung Shyang II

Asia
PCG 11: EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 Jin Chiang with 1 quad lnchr with Hsiung Feng II HELICOPTERS
AShM ASW 20 S-70C Seahawk (S-70C Defender)
4 Jin Chiang with 2 twin lnchr with Hsiung Feng II MRH 10 MD-500 Defender
AShM, 1 76mm gun UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Medium
6 Jin Chiang with 1 quad lnchr with Hsiung Feng III ε29 Chung Shyang II
AShM, 1 76mm gun
PCC 1 Jin Chiang (test platform)
Air Force 35,000
PBG 31 Kwang Hua with 2 twin lnchr with Hsiung Feng FORCES BY ROLE
II AShM FIGHTER
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9 3 sqn with Mirage 2000-5E/D (2000-5EI/DI)
MHC 6: 4 Yung Feng; 2 Yung Jin (ex-US Osprey) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
MSO 3 Yung Yang (ex-US Aggressive) 3 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II
6 sqn with F-16A/B Fighting Falcon
COMMAND SHIPS • LCC 1 Kao Hsiung
5 sqn with F-CK-1A/B/C/D Ching Kuo
AMPHIBIOUS
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LSD 1 Shiu Hai
1 sqn with P-3C Orion
(ex-US Anchorage) with 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 hel
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
landing platform (capacity either 2 LCU or 18 LCM; 360
1 sqn with C-130HE Tien Gian
troops) ISR
LANDING SHIPS 1 sqn with RF-5E Tigereye
LST 8: AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
6 Chung Hai (capacity 16 tanks; 200 troops) 1 sqn with E-2T Hawkeye
2 Chung Ho (ex-US Newport) with 1 Mk 15 Phalanx SEARCH & RESCUE
CIWS , 1 hel landing platform (capacity 3 LCVP, 23 1 sqn with H225; S-70C Black Hawk
AFVs, 400 troops) TRANSPORT
LANDING CRAFT 47 2 sqn with C-130H Hercules
LCM ε35 (various) 1 (VIP) sqn with B-727-100; B-737-800; Beech 1900; F-50;
LCU 12 LCU 1610 (capacity 2 M60A3 or 400 troops) S-70C Black Hawk
(minelaying capability) TRAINING
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 12 1 sqn with AT-3A/B Tzu-Chung*
AGOR 1 Ta Kuan 1 sqn with Beech 1900
AOEH 1 Panshih with 1 quad lnchr with Sea Chaparral 1 (basic) sqn with T-34C Turbo Mentor
SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 3 med hel) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AOE 1 Wu Yi with 1 quad lnchr with Sea Chaparral SAM, AIRCRAFT 479 combat capable
1 hel landing platform FTR 285: 87 F-5E/F Tiger II (some in store); 143 F-16A/B
ARS 2: 1 Da Hu (ex-US Diver); 1 Da Juen (ex-US Bolster) Fighting Falcon; 9 Mirage 2000-5D (2000-5DI); 46 Mirage
ATF 7 Ta Tung (ex-US Cherokee) 2000-5E (2000-5EI)
310 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

FGA 127 F-CK-1C/D Ching Kuo cyber activity include the National Security Bureau, the
ASW 12 P-3C Orion defence ministry, and the Research, Development and
EW 1 C-130HE Tien Gian Evaluation Commission. In 2015, a Defense Policy Paper
ISR 7 RF-5E Tigereye recommended that an independent fourth service branch
AEW&C 6 E-2T Hawkeye combining cyber and electronic-warfare capabilities
TPT 33: Medium 19 C-130H Hercules; Light 10 Beech should be formed. The Information, Communications and
1900; PAX 4: 1 B-737-800; 3 F-50 Electronic Warfare Command was established in mid-2017
TRG 97: 55 AT-3A/B Tzu-Chung*; 42 T-34C Turbo Mentor and is responsible for coordinating cyber defence and
HELICOPTERS directing R&D efforts in cyber and EW.
TPT • Medium 19: 3 H225; 16 S-70C Black Hawk; 8 UH-
60M Black Hawk
AIR DEFENCE
FOREIGN FORCES
SAM • Point-defence Antelope Singapore 3 trg camp (incl inf and arty)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR AIM-9J/P Sidewinder; R-550 Magic 2; Shafrir;
Sky Sword I; IR/ARH Mica; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM;
Thailand THA
Sky Sword II Thai Baht b 2017 2018 2019
ASM AGM-65A Maverick
GDP b 15.5tr 16.4tr
AShM AGM-84 Harpoon
ARM Sky Sword IIA US$ 455bn 490bn
LACM Conventional Wan Chien per capita US$ 6,591 7,084
BOMBS • Laser-guided Paveway II Growth % 3.9 4.6
Inflation % 0.7 0.9
Air Defence and Missile Command
Def bdgt b 214bn 217bn 224bn
FORCES BY ROLE
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE US$ 6.29bn 6.51bn
3 SSM bty with Hsiung Feng IIE US$1=b 33.93 33.39
AIR DEFENCE
Population 68,615,858
2 AD/SAM gp (total: 13 bty with MIM-23 Hawk; 4 bty
Ethnic and religious groups: Thai 75%; Chinese 14%; Muslim 4%
with MIM-104F Patriot PAC-3; 6 bty with Tien Kung I
Sky Bow/Tien Kung II Sky Bow) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Male 8.6% 3.3% 3.8% 3.7% 24.9% 4.8%
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
Female 8.2% 3.1% 3.7% 3.6% 26.2% 6.2%
GLCM • Conventional ε12 Hsiung Feng IIE
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Medium-range 600+: 100 MIM-
23 Hawk; ε500 Tien Kung I Sky Bow/Tien Kung II Sky Bow Capabilities
MISSILE DEFENCE • Medium-range 24+ MIM-104F Thailand has large, well-funded armed forces and its air force is
Patriot PAC-3 one of the best equipped and trained in Southeast Asia, while
the introduction into service of Gripen combat aircraft and Saab
Paramilitary 11,450 340 airborne early-warning platforms has boosted Thai airpower.
The Vision 2026 defence-modernisation plan, approved by the
Coast Guard 11,450 defence council in October 2017, outlines the armed forces’ capa-
bility improvements over the next decade. Thailand is considered
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
a major non-NATO ally by the US, while the country has devel-
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 161
oped deeper defence ties with China since the military coup in
PSOH 4: 2 Tainan; 2 Yilan 2014. The armed forces regularly take part in international mili-
PSO 6: 4 Miaoli with 1 hel landing platform; 2 Ho Hsing tary exercises. A small number of personnel remain deployed on
PCO 13: 2 Kinmen; 2 Mou Hsing; 3 Shun Hu 7; 4 the UNAMID mission to Darfur, Sudan. The military-modernisation
Taichung; 2 Taipei effort includes the development of submarines, anti-submarine
PBF ε56 (various) warfare capabilities and a surface-ship procurement programme.
PB 82: 1 Shun Hu 6; ε81 (various) The armoured vehicle fleet has been recapitalised with deliveries
from Ukraine and China. The arrival of the Saab 340 AEW aircraft,
Cyber along with the Gripen combat aircraft and a command-and-con-
Although Taiwan has a highly developed civilian IT sector, trol system, has provided a step change in air capability. Under
the government has been relatively slow to exploit this its Defence Industry Masterplan, the government indicates that
expanding Thailand’s presently limited defence sector can be
advantage for national-defence purposes. However, for
an important way of developing military capability. The govern-
the past decade, Taipei has been working on its Po Sheng ment is making efforts to reform defence procurement and offsets
– Broad Victory – C4ISR programme, an all-hazards by expanding the role of its Defence Technology Institute. It is
system with a significant defence component. The main planned that this will change in 2019 to become the Defence Tech-
focus of the military component of this programme is nology Agency, acting as a central procurement agency for the
countering Chinese information-warfare and electronic- armed forces, as well as overseeing the development of Thailand’s
warfare (EW) attacks. The authorities responsible for defence industry.
 Asia 311

ACTIVE 360,850 (Army 245,000 Navy 69,850 Air TOWED 617: 105mm 340: 24 LG1 MkII; 12 M-56; 200
46,000) Paramilitary 93,700 M101/M425; 12 M102; 32 M618A2; 60 L119 Light Gun;
Conscription liability 24 months 155mm 277: 90 GHN-45 A1; 48 M114; 118 M198; 21 M-71
MRL 68: 122mm 4 SR-4; 130mm 60 PHZ-85; 302mm 4: 1
RESERVE 200,000 Paramilitary 45,000 DTI-1 (WS-1B); 3 DTI-1G (WS-32)
MOR 1,926+: SP 81mm 39: 18 BTR-3M1; 21 M125A3; SP
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 107mm M106A3; SP 120mm 20: 8 BTR-3M2; 12 M1064A3;
1,867 81mm/107mm/120mm
AIRCRAFT
Army 130,000; ε115,000 conscript (total 245,000) TPT • Light 19: 2 Beech 200 King Air; 2 Beech 1900C; 1
FORCES BY ROLE C-212 Aviocar; 1 C295W; 9 Cessna A185E (U-17B); 2 ERJ-
COMMAND 135LR; 2 Jetstream 41
4 (regional) army HQ TRG 33: 11 MX-7-235 Star Rocket; 22 T-41B Mescalero
3 corps HQ HELICOPTERS
SPECIAL FORCES ATK 7 AH-1F Cobra
1 SF div MRH 15: 8 AS550 Fennec; 2 AW139; 5 Mi-17V-5 Hip H
1 SF regt TPT 216: Heavy 5 CH-47D Chinook; Medium 12: 9 UH-
MANOEUVRE 60L Black Hawk; 3 UH-60M Black Hawk; Light 199: 93 Bell
Armoured 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 27 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 52 Bell 212
3 cav div (1 recce bn; 3 tk regt (3 tk bn); 1 indep tk bn; 1 (AB-212); 16 Enstrom 480B; 6 H145M (VIP tpt); 5 UH-72A
sigs bn; 1 maint bn; 1 hel sqn) Lakota
Mechanised TRG 53 Hughes 300C
1 mech inf div (1 recce coy; 1 recce sqn; 1 tk bn; 1 inf UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
regt (4 inf bn); 3 inf regt; 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn) ISR • Medium 4 Hermes 450; Searcher; Searcher II
Light

Asia
AIR DEFENCE
8 inf div (1 recce sqn; 3 inf regt (3 inf bn); 1 engr bn; 1 SAM
sigs bn)
Short-range Aspide
COMBAT SUPPORT
Point-defence 8+: 8 Starstreak; 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24
1 arty div
Grinch)
1 engr div
GUNS 184
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
SP 54: 20mm 24 M163 Vulcan; 40mm 30 M1/M42 SP
4 economic development div
TOWED 138: 20mm 24 M167 Vulcan; 35mm 8 GDF-007
HELICOPTER
with Skyguard 3; 37mm 52 Type-74; 40mm 48 L/70;
Some hel flt
57mm ε6 Type-59 (S-60) (18+ more non-operational)
ISR UAV
1 UAV bn with Hermes 450; Searcher II Reserves
AIR DEFENCE
FORCES BY ROLE
1 ADA div (6 bn)
COMMAND
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 inf div HQ
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 360: 53 M60A1; 125 M60A3; 105 M48A5; 49 T-84 Navy 44,000 (incl Naval Aviation, Marines,
Oplot; 28 VT-4; (50 Type-69 in store)
Coastal Defence); 25,850 conscript (total
LT TK 194: 24 M41; 104 Scorpion (50 in store); 66 Stingray
RECCE 32 S52 Shorland
69,850)
IFV 168 BTR-3E1 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
APC 1,140 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 9
APC (T) 880: Bronco; 430 M113A1/A3; 450 Type-85 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVH 1:
APC (W) 160: 9 BTR-3K (CP); 6 BTR-3C (amb); 18 1 Chakri Naruebet with 2 sextuple Sadral lnchr with
Condor; 142 LAV-150 Commando Mistral SAM (capacity 6 S-70B Seahawk ASW hel)
PPV 100 REVA FRIGATES 8
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES FFGHM 2:
ARV 58: 2 BREM-84 Atlet; 13 BTR-3BR; 22 M88A1; 6 2 Naresuan with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84
M88A2; 10 M113; 5 Type-653; WZT-4 Harpoon AShM, 1 8 cell Mk41 Mod 30 VLS with
VLB Type-84 RIM-162B ESSM SAM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm TT
MW Bozena; Giant Viper with Mk46 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Super
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Lynx 300 hel)
MSL FFG 4:
SP 30+: 18+ M901A5 (TOW); 12 BTR-3RK 2 Chao Phraya (trg role) with 4 twin lnchr with C-802A
MANPATS M47 Dragon AShM, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin 100mm gun
RCL 180: 75mm 30 M20; 106mm 150 M40 2 Chao Phraya with 4 twin lnchr with C-802A AShM,
ARTILLERY 2,643 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 twin 100mm gun, 1 hel
SP 155mm 32: 6 ATMOS-2000; 6 CAESAR; 20 M109A5 landing platform
312 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

FF 2: ASW 2 P-3A Orion (P-3T)

1 Makut Rajakumarn with 2 triple 324mm ASTT, 2 ISR 9 Sentry O-2-337
114mm gun MP 1 F-27-200 MPA*
1 Pin Klao (ex-US Cannon) (trg role) with 6 single TPT • Light 15: 7 Do-228-212; 2 ERJ-135LR; 2 F-27-400M
324mm ASTT, 3 76mm gun Troopship; 3 N-24A Searchmaster; 1 UP-3A Orion (UP-3T)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 82 HELICOPTERS
CORVETTES 7 ASW 8: 6 S-70B Seahawk; 2 Super Lynx 300
FSGM 2 Rattanakosin with 2 twin Mk140 lnchr with MRH 2 MH-60S Knight Hawk
RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr TPT 18: Medium 2 Bell 214ST (AB-214ST); Light 16: 6
with Aspide SAM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm ASTT with Bell 212 (AB-212); 5 H145M; 5 S-76B
Stingray LWT, 1 76mm gun AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM AGM-84
FS 5: Harpoon
3 Khamronsin with 2 triple 324mm ASTT with
Stingray LWT, 1 76mm gun Marines 23,000
2 Tapi with 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 FORCES BY ROLE
76mm gun COMMAND
PSO 1 Krabi (UK River mod) with 1 76mm gun 1 mne div HQ
PCFG 6: MANOEUVRE
3 Prabparapak with 2 single lnchr with Gabriel I AShM, 1 Reconnaissance
triple lnchr with Gabriel I AShM, 1 57mm gun 1 recce bn
3 Ratcharit with 2 twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, Light
1 76mm gun 2 inf regt (total: 6 bn)
PCOH 2 Pattani (1 in trg role) with 1 76mm gun Amphibious
PCO 4: 3 Hua Hin with 1 76mm gun; 1 M58 Patrol Gun 1 amph aslt bn
Boat with 1 76mm gun COMBAT SUPPORT
PCC 9: 3 Chon Buri with 2 76mm gun; 6 Sattahip with 1 1 arty regt (3 fd arty bn, 1 ADA bn)
76mm gun
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PBF 4 M18 Fast Assault Craft (capacity 18 troops)
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
PB 49: 1 T-11 (US PGM-71); 3 T-81; 9 T-91; 3 M36 Patrol
IFV 14 BTR-3E1
Boat; 13 T-213; 1 T-227; 13 M21 Patrol Boat; 3 T-991; 3
APC (W) 24 LAV-150 Commando
T-994
AAV 33 LVTP-7
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 17
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
MCCS 1 Thalang
ARV 1 AAVR-7
MCO 2 Lat Ya
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL
MCC 2 Bang Rachan
SP 10 M1045A2 HMMWV with TOW
MSR 12: 7 T1; 5 T6
MANPATS M47 Dragon; TOW
AMPHIBIOUS
ARTILLERY • TOWED 48: 105mm 36 (reported);
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 1
155mm 12 GC-45
LPD 1 Anthong (SGP Endurance) with 1 76mm gun
(capacity 2 hel; 19 MBT; 500 troops) AIR DEFENCE
LANDING SHIPS 2 SAM Point-defence QW-18
LST 2 Sichang with 2 hel landing platform (capacity 14 GUNS 12.7mm 14
MBT; 300 troops)
Naval Special Warfare Command
LANDING CRAFT 14
LCU 9: 3 Man Nok; 2 Mataphun (capacity either 3–4
MBT or 250 troops); 4 Thong Kaeo
Air Force ε46,000
LCM 2 4 air divs, one flying trg school
UCAC 3 Griffon 1000TD FORCES BY ROLE
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 13
 FIGHTER
ABU 1 Suriya 2 sqn with F-5E/5F Tiger II
AGOR 1 Sok 3 sqn with F-16A/B Fighting Falcon
AGS 2 FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
AOL 6: 1 Matra with 1 hel landing platform; 3 Proet; 1 1 sqn with Gripen C/D
Prong; 1 Samui GROUND ATTACK
AOR 1 Chula 1 sqn with Alpha Jet* 

AORH 1 Similan (capacity 1 hel) 1 sqn with AU-23A Peacemaker
AWT 1 1 sqn with L-39ZA Albatros*; T-50TH Golden Eagle*
ELINT/ISR
Naval Aviation 1,200 1 sqn with DA42 MPP Guardian
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable 1 sqn with Saab 340B; Saab 340 Erieye
 Asia 313

TRANSPORT Police Aviation 500

1 (Royal Flight) sqn with A319CJ; A340-500; B-737-800 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with ATR-72; BAe-748 AIRCRAFT 6 combat capable
1 sqn with BT-67 ATK 6 AU-23A Peacemaker
1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules TPT 16: Light 15: 2 CN235; 8 PC-6 Turbo-Porter; 3 SC-7
TRAINING 3M Skyvan; 2 Short 330UTT; PAX 1 F-50
1 sqn with L-39ZA Albatros* HELICOPTERS
1 sqn with CT-4A/B Airtrainer; T-41D Mescalero MRH 12: 6 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 6 Bell 429
1 sqn with CT-4E Airtrainer TPT • Light 61: 27 Bell 205A; 14 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 20
1 sqn with PC-9 Bell 212 (AB-212)
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) Provincial Police 50,000 (incl ε500 Special
1 sqn with Bell 412 Twin Huey; S-92A Action Force)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Thahan Phran (Hunter Soldiers) 21,000
AIRCRAFT 150 combat capable
Volunteer irregular force
FTR 78: 1 F-5B Freedom Fighter; 21 F-5E Tiger II; 3 F-5F
Tiger II (F-5E/F being upgraded); 38 F-16A Fighting FORCES BY ROLE

Falcon; 15 F-16B Fighting Falcon MANOEUVRE
FGA 11: 7 Gripen C; 4 Gripen D Other
ATK 17 AU-23A Peacemaker 22 paramilitary regt (total: 275 paramilitary coy)
ISR 5 DA42 MPP Guardian
AEW&C 2 Saab 340 Erieye DEPLOYMENT
ELINT 2 Saab 340 Erieye (COMINT/ELINT)

Asia
INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 4 obs
TPT 42: Medium 14: 6 C-130H Hercules; 6 C-130H-30
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1; 2 obs
Hercules; 2 Saab 340B; Light 21: 3 ATR-72; 3 Beech 200
King Air; 8 BT-67; 1 Commander 690; 6 DA42M; PAX 7: SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 9; 1 obs
1 A319CJ; 1 A320CJ; 1 A340-500; 1 B-737-800; 3 SSJ-100-
95LR (1 A310-324 in store) FOREIGN FORCES
TRG 111: 16 Alpha Jet*; 13 CT-4A Airtrainer; 6 CT-4B United States US Pacific Command: 300
Airtrainer; 20 CT-4E Airtrainer; 26 L-39ZA Albatros*; 21
PC-9; 7 T-41D Mescalero; 2 T-50TH Golden Eagle*
HELICOPTERS Timor-Leste TLS
MRH 11: 2 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 2 Bell 412SP Twin Huey; 1
US$ 2017 2018 2019
Bell 412HP Twin Huey; 6 Bell 412EP Twin Huey
CSAR 6 H225M Super Cougar GDP US$ 2.78bn 3.16bn
TPT 20: Medium 3 S-92A Super Hawk; Light 17 Bell 205 per capita US$ 2,237 2,486
(UH-1H Iroquois) Growth % -4.6 0.8
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES Inflation % 0.6 1.8
AAM • IR AIM-9P/S Sidewinder; Python 3; IIR IRIS-T; Def bdgt US$ 25.4m 26.5m
ARH AIM-120 AMRAAM
Population 1,321,929
ASM AGM-65 Maverick
AShM RBS15F Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
BOMBS • Laser-guided Paveway II
Male 20.8% 5.8% 4.6% 3.8% 13.2% 1.9%
Female 19.6% 5.6% 4.5% 4.0% 14.2% 2.1%
Paramilitary ε93,700
Border Patrol Police 20,000 Capabilities
The small Timor-Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL) has been afflicted by
Marine Police 2,200 funding, personnel and morale challenges since it was established
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE in 2001. While the F-FDTL is responsible for external defence, its
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 98 parallel internal-security role has sometimes brought it into con-
PCO 1 Srinakrin flict with the national police force. The F-FDTL has been recon-
stituted but is still a long way from meeting the ambitious force-
PCC 2 Hameln
structure goals set out in the Force 2020 plan published in 2007.
PB 49: 2 Chasanyabadee; 3 Cutlass; 2 Ratayapibanbancha The origins of the F-FDTL in the Falintil national resistance force,
(Reef Ranger); 1 Sriyanont; 41 (various) and continuing training and doctrinal emphasis on low-intensity
PBR 46 infantry tactics, mean that the force provides a deterrent to inva-
sion. In 2017, Portugal and Timor-Leste signed a defence coop-
National Security Volunteer Corps 45,000 – eration agreement up to 2022. The F-FDTL sometimes receives
Reserves training from Australian and US personnel. Australia is donating
314 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

two Guardian-class patrol vessels as part of its Pacific Patrol Boat conflicting claims in the South China Sea. Vietnam adopted a
Replacement programme; these are due to arrive in 2023. Main- new Law on National Defence in 2018 that focused, among other
tenance capacity is unclear and the country has no traditional areas, on information warfare. Legislation is also being discussed
defence industry. that seeks to increase the role of the coastguard, including the
use of force to defend sovereignty. Vietnam is looking to diver-
ACTIVE 2,280 (Army 2,200 Naval Element 80) sify its security partnerships. Washington lifted its arms embargo
on Hanoi in 2016, while New Delhi and Seoul are understood to
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE be seeking inroads into Vietnam’s defence market. The forces are
conscript-based, and there is a plan to reduce their numbers in the
armed forces and other institutions, such as military colleges and
Army 2,200 hospitals, by 2022. Recapitalisation efforts have focused on the
Training began in January 2001 with the aim of deploying navy and air force, mainly with a view to disputes in the Spratly
1,500 full-time personnel and 1,500 reservists. Authorities Islands. While Hanoi cannot hope to balance China’s power on its
are engaged in developing security structures with own, the recent development of a submarine capability and the
international assistance procurement of additional Su-30MK2 combat aircraft and new air-
defence capabilities would complicate Beijing’s military options.
FORCES BY ROLE Vietnam may also be looking to procure assets that would increase
MANOEUVRE its surveillance capacities in the South China Sea, such as UAVs.
Light Vietnam has limited but expanding defence-industrial capacities,
2 inf bn dominated by the state-owned Viettel Military Industry and Tele-
COMBAT SUPPORT coms Group.
1 MP pl
ACTIVE 482,000 (Army 412,000 Navy 40,000 Air
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
30,000) Paramilitary 40,000
1 log spt coy
Conscript liability 2 years army and air defence, 3 years air force and
Naval Element 80 navy, specialists 3 years, some ethnic minorities 2 years
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE RESERVES Paramilitary 5,000,000
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7
PB 7: 2 Albatros; 2 Dili (ex-ROK); 2 Shanghai II; 1 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Kamenassa (ex-ROK Chamsuri)

Air Component Space

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Cessna 172 SATELLITES • ISR 1 VNREDSat

Army ε412,000
Vietnam VNM 8 Mil Regions (incl capital)
Vietnamese Dong d 2017 2018 2019 FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
GDP d 5006tr 5506tr
4 corps HQ
US$ 220bn 241bn SPECIAL FORCES
per capita US$ 2,353 2,553 1 SF bde (1 AB bde, 1 demolition engr regt)
Growth % 6.8 6.6 MANOEUVRE
Inflation % 3.5 3.8 Armoured
6 armd bde
Def bdgt d ε9.93tr ε1.10tr ε1.23tr
3 armd regt
US$ ε4.37bn ε4.83bn Mechanised
FMA (US) US$ 12m 0m 2 mech inf div

US$1=d 22715.61 22807.26 Light
23 inf div
Population 97,040,334
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

Ethnic groups: Kinh 85.7%; Tay 1.9%; Thai 1.8%; Khome 1.4%; 1 SRBM bde
Hmong 1.3%; other or unspecified 7.1%
COMBAT SUPPORT

Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
13 arty bde
1 arty regt
Male 12.2% 4.0% 4.2% 4.7% 22.5% 2.5% 10 engr bde
Female 11.0% 3.7% 4.0% 4.5% 22.9% 3.9% 1 engr regt
1 EW unit
Capabilities 3 sigs bde
Vietnam has a stronger military tradition and its armed forces 2 sigs regt
have more operational experience than any of its neighbours. Its COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
defence efforts and armed forces also benefit from broad popular 9 economic construction div
support, particularly in the context of tensions with China over 1 log regt
 Asia 315

1 med unit Switchblade), 1 Palma lnchr with Sosna-R SAM, 2 twin

1 trg regt 533mm TT with SET-53M HWT, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1
AIR DEFENCE 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
11 AD bde PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 68
CORVETTES 6:
Reserve FSGM 1 BPS-500 with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24E
MANOEUVRE Uran-E (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 9K32 Strela-2M
Light (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM (manually operated), 2 twin
9 inf div 533mm TT, 1 RBU-1600 A/S mor, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 76mm gun
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES FS 5:
MBT 1,270: 70 T-62; 350 Type-59; 850 T-54/T-55 (45 T-34† 3 Petya II (FSU) with 1 quintuple 406mm ASTT, 4
in store) RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm gun
LT TK 620: 300 PT-76; 320 Type-62/Type-63 2 Petya III (FSU) with 1 triple 533mm ASTT with SET-
RECCE 100 BRDM-1/BRDM-2 53ME HWT, 4 RBU 2500 Smerch 1 A/S mor, 2 twin
IFV 300 BMP-1/BMP-2 76mm gun
APC 1,380+ PCFGM 12:
APC (T) 280+: Some BTR-50; 200 M113 (to be 4 Tarantul (FSU) with 2 twin lnchr with P-15 Termit (SS-
upgraded); 80 Type-63 
 N-2D Styx) AShM, 1 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2M
APC (W) 1,100 BTR-40/BTR-60/BTR-152
(SA-N-5 Grail) SAM (manually operated), 2 AK630
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
CIWS, 1 76mm gun

MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger)
8 Tarantul V with 4 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E
RCL 75mm Type-56; 82mm Type-65 (B-10); 87mm Type-
(SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM; 1 quad lnchr with 9K32
51

Asia
Strela-2M (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM (manually operated),
GUNS
2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
SP 100mm SU-100; 122mm SU-122
PCO 5: 1 Project FC264; 4 TT-400TP with 2 AK630 CIWS,
TOWED 100mm T-12 (arty); M-1944
1 76mm gun
ARTILLERY 3,040+
PCC 6 Svetlyak with 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
SP 30+: 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 30 2S3 Akatsiya;
175mm M107 PBFG 8 Osa II with 4 single lnchr with P-15 Termit AShM
TOWED 2,300: 105mm M101/M102; 122mm D-30/Type- PBFT 2 Shershen† (FSU) with 4 single 533mm TT
54 (M-1938)/Type-60 (D-74); 130mm M-46; 152mm D-20; PH 2 Turya† with 1 twin 57mm gun
155mm M114 PHT 3 Turya† with 4 single 533mm TT, 1 twin 57mm gun
MRL 710+: 107mm 360 Type-63; 122mm 350 BM-21 Grad; PB 20: 14 Zhuk†; 4 Zhuk (mod); 2 TP-01
140mm BM-14 PBR 4 Stolkraft
MOR 82mm; 120mm M-1943; 160mm M-1943 MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 13
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS MSO 2 Yurka
SRBM • Coventional Scud-B/C MSC 4 Sonya
AIR DEFENCE MHI 2 Korund (Yevgenya) (Project 1258)
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K310 MSR 5 K-8 

Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse) AMPHIBIOUS
GUNS 12,000 LANDING SHIPS 7
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 LSM 5:
TOWED 14.5mm/30mm/37mm/57mm/85mm/100mm 1 Polnochny A (capacity 6 Lt Tk/APC; 200 troops)
2 Polnochny B (capacity 6 Lt Tk/APC; 200 troops)
Navy ε40,000 (incl ε27,000 Naval Infantry) 2 Nau Dinh
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LST 2 Tran Khanh Du (ex-US LST 542) with 1 hel
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 8 landing platform (capacity 16 Lt Tk/APC; 140 troops)
SSK 6 Hanoi (RUS Varshavyanka) with 6 533mm TT with LANDING CRAFT • LCM 12
3M14E Klub-S (SS-N-30) LACM/3M54E Klub-S (SS-N-27 8 LCM 6 (capacity 1 Lt Tk or 80 troops)
Sizzler) AShM/53-65KE HWT/TEST-71ME HWT 4 LCM 8 (capacity 1 MBT or 200 troops)
SSI 2 Yugo (DPRK) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 27
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 4 AFD 2
FRIGATES • FFGM 4 AGS 1 Tran Dai Nia (Damen Research Vessel 6613)
2 Dinh Tien Hoang (RUS Gepard 3.9 (Project 11661E)) AGSH 1
with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (SS-N-25 AKSL 18
Switchblade) AShM, 1 Palma lnchr with Sosna-R SAM, AP 1 Truong Sa
2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform AT 2
2 Tran Huang Dao (RUS Gepard 3.9 (Project 11661E)) AWT 1
with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (SS-N-25 AXS 1 Le Quy Don
316 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Naval Infantry ε27,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 73 combat capable
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FGA 73: 27 Su-22M3/M4/UM Fitter (some ISR); 6 Su-
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
27SK Flanker; 5 Su-27UBK Flanker; 35 Su-30MK2 Flanker
LT TK PT-76; Type-63
TPT • Light 24: 6 An-2 Colt; 12 An-26 Curl; 3 C295M; 1
APC • APC (W) BTR-60
M-28 Bryza; 2 C-212 Aviocar (NC-212i)
Coastal Defence TRG 47: 17 L-39 Albatros; 30 Yak-52
HELICOPTERS
FORCES BY ROLE
MRH 6 Mi-17 Hip H
COASTAL DEFENCE
TPT 28: Medium 17: 14 Mi-8 Hip; 3 Mi-171; Light 11 Bell
3 AShM bde
205 (UH-1H Iroquois)
1 coastal arty bde AIR DEFENCE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SAM 12+:
COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 4K44 Redut (SSC-1B Long-range 12 S-300PMU1 (SA-20 Gargoyle)
Sepal); 4K51 Rubezh (SSC-3 Styx); K-300P Bastion-P (SSC- Medium-range S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125-
5 Stooge) 2TM Pechora (SA-26), Spyder-MR
ARTILLERY • MRL 160mm AccuLAR-160; 306mm Short-range 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful);
EXTRA Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K310 Igla-1
(SA-16 Gimlet)
Navy Air Wing GUNS 37mm; 57mm; 85mm; 100mm; 130mm
FORCES BY ROLE AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
ASW/SAR AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer); IR/
1 regt with H225; Ka-28 (Ka-27PL) Helix A; Ka-32 SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo); ARH R-77 (AA-12A Adder)
Helix C ASM Kh-29L/T (AS-14 Kedge); Kh-59M (AS-18 Kazoo)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AShM Kh-31A (AS-17B Krypton)
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6 DHC-6-400 Twin Otter ARM Kh-28 (AS-9 Kyle); Kh-31P (AS-17A Krypton)
HELICOPTERS
ASW 10 Ka-28 Helix A Paramilitary 40,000+ active
TPT • Medium 4: 2 H225; 2 Ka-32 Helix C
Border Defence Corps ε40,000
Air Force 30,000 Coast Guard
3 air div, 1 tpt bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FORCES BY ROLE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 69+
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK PSO 4 DN2000 (Damen 9014)
3 regt with Su-22M3/M4/UM Fitter (some ISR) PCO 13+: 1 Mazinger (ex-ROK); 9 TT-400; 3+ other
1 regt with Su-27SK/Su-27UBK Flanker PCC 2 Hae Uri (ex-ROK)
1 regt with Su-27SK/Su-27UBK Flanker; Su-30MK2 PBF 24: 22 MS-50S; 2 Shershen
2 regt with Su-30MK2 PB 26: 1 MS-50; 12 TT-200; 13 TT-120
TRANSPORT LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 5
2 regt with An-2 Colt; An-26 Curl; Bell 205 (UH-1H AFS 1
Iroquois); Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; M-28 Bryza ATF 4 Damen Salvage Tug
TRAINING AIRCRAFT • MP 3 C-212-400 MPA
1 regt with L-39 Albatros
1 regt with Yak-52 Local Forces ε5,000,000 reservists
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Incl People’s Self-Defence Force (urban units) and
2 regt with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171; Mi-24 Hind People’s Militia (rural units); comprises static and mobile
AIR DEFENCE cbt units, log spt and village protection pl; some arty,
6 AD div HQ mor and AD guns; acts as reserve
2 SAM regt with S-300PMU1 (SA-20 Gargoyle)
2 SAM regt with Spyder-MR DEPLOYMENT
3 SAM regt with S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline)
4 SAM regt with S-135-2TM Pechora (SA-26) CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 4; 1 obs
5 ADA regt SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1; 2 obs
 Asia 317

Arms procurements and deliveries – Asia

Selected events in 2018

„„ In May, Indonesian state-owned insurance company
PT Askrindo and the National Association of
Private Defense Industries (Pinhantanas) signed an
agreement to allow the former to supply private
Indonesian defence SMEs with credit, guarantees and
insurance. The agreement was backed by the defence
ministry, which is trying to expand the country’s
defence-industrial base.
„„ In June, Australia announced that it had selected
BAE Systems’ Global Combat Ship design for its
Future Frigate programme. Nine Hunter-class
frigates, as they will be known in Australian service,
will replace the Anzac class, starting in the late
2020s. The ships will be fitted with a locally designed
and built CEAFAR2 phased-array radar and will have
the armed forces will only control businesses focused
on security and defence.
„„ China’s first indigenously built aircraft carrier, the
Type-002, began sea trials in May and could enter
service in 2019. The first Type-055 (Renhai) cruiser
began sea trials in August.
„„ As part of the Defense Reform 2.0 plan, announced
in August, South Korea launched a Defense Business
Innovation Plan, which aims to simplify and speed
up the process of meeting equipment requirements,
as well as address the shrinking defence-industrial
workforce.
„„ Indonesia began negotiations with South Korea

Asia
the Aegis combat-management system. Design in October to reduce its share of the KF-X fighter
and construction is expected to cost AU$35bn programme due to economic constraints. Since
(US$27.64bn). joining the programme in 2016, Indonesia has
reportedly struggled to keep up with payments.
„„ Vietnam passed an amendment in June strengthening Indonesia is currently committed to 20% of the
the government’s drive to further reduce the number KF-X development cost, which is expected to be
of army-owned businesses from 88 to 16. The defence approximately US$1.9bn. The first prototype is
ministry hopes that at the end of the reform process, expected to be completed in 2021.

▼ Figure 19 Asia: selected ongoing or completed procurement priorities in 2018

Australasia
14 South Asia
Southeast Asia – Peninsular and Archipelagic
12 Southeast Asia – Continental
Number of Countries

East Asia
10
Purchasing

8
6
4
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*Data reflects the number of countries with equipment-procurement contracts either ongoing or completed in 2018. Data includes only procurement programmes for which a production contract
has been signed. The data does not include upgrade programmes.
**Armoured fighting vehicles not including main battle tanks ***Includes combat-capable training aircraft IISS
©
318 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Table 14 Republic of Korea: naval platform procurement programmes, by contract date

Class Type Quantity Value (US$) Prime contractor Contract date
Incheon (FFG-I) FFGHM 1 127.04m HHI 2008
Chang Bogo II (Type-214) SSK 6 3.5bn DSME & HHI 2009
Incheon (FFG-I) FFGHM 2 n.k. HHI 2010
Incheon (FFG-I) FFGHM 2 294.65m STX Offshore and Shipbuilding 2010
Nampo (MLS-II) ML 1 n.k. HHI c.2012
KSS-III Batch I SSG 1 2.06bn DSME 2012
Incheon (FFG-I) FFGHM 1 n.k. STX Offshore and Shipbuilding 2013
Daegu (FFG-II) FFGHM 1 294.65m DSME 2013
Chamsuri II (PKMR) PCF 1 58.03m HHIC 2014
Marado (Dokdo Mod) LHD 1 396.5m HHIC 2014
Cheonwangbong (LST-II) LPD 1 142.46m HHI 2014
KDD-III Batch II CGHM Design Work 15.9m HHI 2016
Chamsuri II (PKMR) PCF 3 173.33m HHIC 2016
Daegu (FFG-II) FFGHM 1 295.99m DSME 2016
FFG-III FFGHM Design Work n.k. HHI 2016
Daegu (FFG-II) FFGHM 2 609.41m HHI 2016
LSF-II LCAC 2 132.68m HHIC 2016
Chamsuri II (PKMR) PCF 4 234.83m HHIC 2017
LCU LST 3 29.43m HHIC 2017
Cheonwangbong (LST-II) LPD 1 n.k. HHI c.2017
Daegu (FFG-II) FFGHM 2 555.21m DSME 2018
DSME – Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering; HHI – Hyundai Heavy Industries; HHIC – Hanjin Heavy Industries & Construction

Table 15 Japan FY2019 defence-budget request: top ten new equipment acquisition programmes by value
Equipment Type Quantity Value (JPY) Value (US$) Prime contractor(s)
Aegis Ashore BMD SAM system 2 systems 234.3bn 2.13bn Lockheed Martin (US)
30FF FFGHM 2 99.5bn 906m MHI and MES (JPN)
F-35A Lightning II FGA ac 6 91.6bn 834m Lockheed Martin (US)
MHI (JPN)
SM-3 Block IIA; Ship-launched SAM n.k. 81.8bn 745m Raytheon (US)
SM-3 Block IB
Soryu class SSK 1 71.1bn 647m MHI (JPN)

E-2D Hawkeye AEW&C ac 2 54.4bn 495m Northrop Grumman (US)

C-2 Hvy Tpt ac 2 45.7bn 416m KHI (JPN)
Type-16 Wheeled Assault Gun 22 16.4bn 149m MHI (JPN)
Type-03 Medium-Range SAM 1 company 13.8bn 126m MHI (JPN)
system
Type-12 Coastal anti-ship missiles 1 set 13.2bn 120m MHI (JPN)
KHI – Kawasaki Heavy Industries; MES – Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding; MHI – Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
 Asia 319

▼ Figure 20 Rosoboronexport/Heavy Vehicles Factory: T-90S Bhishma

In 2000, India embarked on a plan to both modernise its tank

fleet and develop an indigenous main battle tank (MBT)
production capability. The plans encompassed India’s plan for
an indigenous design, Arjun, that began in the 1970s, as well
as Russia’s T-90S MBT. Contracts were signed with Russia in
2001 for 124 complete tanks and 186 tanks to be supplied in kit
form. After this, a deal was signed with Rosoboronexport for
transfer-of-technology and subsequent license production of
300 T-90S in India, with deliveries to the Indian Army to take
place from 2006 to 2010.
However, deliveries from the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF)
in Tamil Nadu did not begin until 2009. According to a 2014 HVF licensed builds of 300 T-90S:
report by the Indian Comptroller and Auditor General, the planned and actual production
primary cause of delay was a Russian failure in the
technology-transfer process and decision-making delays in 100
the Indian defence ministry about next steps. Many of the
Planned
documents relating to technology transfer were delivered on
80 Actual
time but only in Russian; translation of these documents took
six years to complete. Other documents were not delivered,
such as those pertaining to construction of the main gun
60
barrel. Until HVF used its plans for the similar main gun on the

Asia
T-72, the company was spending significant sums importing
the parts directly from Russia. 40
The comptroller estimated that 62% of the total cost of the
225 T-90S tanks manufactured by March 2013 was spent on
importing parts. The defence ministry made up for the 20
shortfall in local production by ordering a batch of 347
complete and kit-form T-90s in 2007. Deliveries were 0
completed several years later. It is possible that India’s T-90

4*

5*

6*
7

3
production line will run into the 2020s, but production will
–0

–0

–0

–1

–1

–1

–1

–1

–1

–1
06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15
20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20
have to pick up pace, or be supplemented by more imports,
if plans remain to replace the approximately 1,900 T-72M1
*Estimate based on achieved production rate
Ajeya tanks.

Indian T-90S contracts, by date

Prime contractor
(for Indian production) Contract Quantity Value Value Prime Notes
Date (INR Crore) (US$) contractor
Ordnance Factory Board (IND)
Feb 2001 124 1,774 371.94m ROE Complete MBT
Selected subcontractors
Feb 2001 186 2,312 484.74m ROE 86 SCK and 100 CKD
Rosoboronexport (RUS)
Feb 2004 - 96 21.37m OFB Production-line set-up
Bharat Electronics Limited (IND)
Nov 2004 300 5,084* 1.13bn* OFB All indigenous build
Engine Factory Avadi (IND)
Nov 2007 347 4,913 1.22bn ROE 124 complete MBTs
Field Gun Factory (IND) and 223 SCK
Gun Carriage Factory (IND) Sep 2011 - 971 202.62m OFB Production-
line capacity
Heavy Vehicles Factory (IND) augmentation
Opto Electronics Factory (IND) Dec 2013 236 6,000 991.7m OFB Indigenous build
Ordnance Factory Kanpur (IND) Nov 2016 464 13,448 2bn OFB Reportedly T-90MS
(T-90S upgrade)
Ordnance Factory Medak (IND)
Total 1,657 34,598 6.43bn
Ordnance Factory Muradnagar (IND)
*Estimate based on cost of 225 of the 300 built by 2013
Crore = ten million rupees; SCK = semi-completed kits; CKD = complete knock-down kits;
OFB = Ordnance Factory Board; ROE = Rosoboronexport
320 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Chapter Seven

Middle East and North Africa

 The Daesh mini-state has been largely dismantled, apart  Israel has been enforcing a red line around the
from limited territory in Southeast Syria. However, there transfer of advanced military technology from Iran to
are fears that the group is reverting to insurgent tactics. Hizbullah and also conducting a campaign of air and
The US is demanding that Iranian forces withdraw missile strikes against Iranian forces in Syria. However,
from Syria and plans to continue supporting the Syrian following the 17 September shootdown by Syria of a
Democratic Forces with SOF and air power. Russian IL-20 surveillance aircraft, Russia’s supply of
 UK military commitment to the region was S-300 missiles to Syrian forces will complicate Israel’s
demonstrated by Exercise Saif Sareea in Oman and plans and calculations.
the plan to establish a training base there. This is the  Delivery of Russian combat helicopters to Algeria and
second recent enhancement to the UK’s regional MiG-29M2 multi-role fighters to Egypt continued in
presence, coming just after the official opening in 2018, while Israel and Saudi Arabia were the recipients
2018 of a permanent presence in Bahrain. of more F-35s and F-15s respectively.
 Gulf Arab navies are undertaking significant develop-  Regional defence spending is falling, for those
ment programmes to equip themselves for a more chal- countries where data is available. This includes US
lenging and complex regional maritime environment. Foreign Military Financing to Egypt and Israel.

Saudi Arabia, real-terms defence spending, 2009–18 (US$bn, constant 2010)*

80 Projected spending
US$bn, constant 2010

Total after final spending

60 figures released

40

20

0
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
*Note: Saudi authorities in recent years have later revised defence-spending totals upwards when the government releases its
actual spending figures. As such, it is possible that the R311bn announced for 2018 might be an underestimate.

Active military personnel – top 10

(25,000 per unit)
Iran Syria 139,000
523,000

Egypt 438,500 Algeria 130,000

Saudi Arabia 227,000 Jordan 100,500

Morocco 195,800 Iraq 64,000

Israel 169,500 United Arab Emirates 63,000

 Middle East and North Africa 321

Regional defence policy and economics 322 ►

Armed forces data section 332 ►

Arms procurements and deliveries 377 ►

Middle East and North Africa: top 5 deployments, November 2018

Iran
Syria – 3,000

UAE UAE
Eritrea (Operation Yemen (Operation
Restoring Hope) – 1,000 Restoring Hope) – 3,000

and North Africa

Egypt

Middle East
CAR (MINUSCA) – 1,024

Saudi Arabia
Yemen – 1,500

Main battle tanks, 2018 Tactical combat aircraft fleets, 2018

(250 per unit) (25 per unit)
Egypt Egypt
2,480 375
Saudi
Iran 1,513 Arabia 333
Algeria 1,467 Israel 322

Saudi Arabia 900 Iran 312

Morocco 602 Syria 221

Israel 490 UAE 137

UAE 435 Algeria 111

Iraq 393 Morocco 71

Iraq 51
Lebanon 334
Jordan 49
Kuwait 293
(fighter / fighter ground-attack, attack)
322 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Middle East and North Africa
Conflict and regional rivalries continue to shape the
posture of key actors in the Middle East, as well as
motivate interventions and drive defence planning
and acquisition.
Regional security debates remained dominated
by the potential for escalation between the United
States, Israel and Saudi Arabia on the one hand and
Iran and its allies on the other. While the US sought
to organise its Arab allies in a coalition called the
Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA), the venture
faced significant obstacles, notably rifts between
Arab states themselves. Another troubled coalition
was the Saudi-led Islamic Military Counter Terrorism
Coalition. Its official launch in November 2017 was
followed by little activity, reflecting the lack of
political commitment of the member nations to the
initiative.
The US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA) and its imposition of severe
sanctions to curtail Iran’s oil exports – the country’s
main source of foreign currency – complicated
Iran’s defence-modernisation plans. Tehran had
approached China and Russia with a view to
modernising its air force and air defences, and to
acquire naval- and land-weapons systems, but
shrinking revenues threatened these plans. Beijing
and Moscow, themselves facing US pressure on other
issues, seemed willing to accommodate Tehran. Both
denounced the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and
indicated that they would continue to offer to Iran the
economic benefits promised under the deal. They also
continued high-profile engagement with Tehran. Iran
played an increasingly important role in the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation, and Tehran organised a
well-attended meeting on the security of South and
Central Asia. One key question was whether China
and Russia would fulfil Tehran’s ambitious defence-
procurement plans. Meanwhile, an agreement looked
to have ended decades of tension in the Caspian Sea.
The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates on one side and Qatar on the other
has led to scrutiny of these countries’ weapons
procurements, and the broader diplomatic factors
that might underpin some of these. Saudi Arabia has
pursued ambitious defence projects, ranging from
the acquisition of new platforms to setting in motion
its defence-industrialisation plans under the recently
established Saudi Arabian Military Industries.
The place of weapons procurements in Riyadh’s
international strategy was made clear during a visit to
the White House by Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad
bin Salman in May 2018, with US President Donald
Trump holding signs showing Saudi Arabia’s recent
arms deals with the US. Qatar is also seeking to secure
important defence partnerships. In recent years, it has
embarked on ambitious aircraft-acquisition plans,
including contracts for Eurofighter Typhoons (a letter
of intent was signed in September 2017), F-15QAs
(this sale was approved by the US in 2016) and the
2015 deal for Rafales.
Several crises highlighted the close link between
defence sales and politics. Over the past year, Saudi
Arabia faced deteriorating relations with countries
from which it bought weaponry. Some of these
countries had implemented measures restricting
sales based on criteria that included, for Sweden, a
‘democracy’ clause. Spain briefly suspended the sale
of ammunition and bombs over the conduct of the
Yemen war, and Riyadh expressed displeasure after
the German foreign minister spoke of concern about
its regional policies.
Syria’s many wars
In 2018, the Syrian conflict entered a new phase.
International powers and regional players, as well as a
multitude of Syrian, militia and jihadi actors, are now
involved. At the beginning of the year, Iran, Russia,
Turkey and the US all maintained a military presence
in the country, seeking to shape the battlefield,
protect their partners and erode – if only tentatively at
present – the position of adversaries, and ultimately
strengthen their position for a putative endgame.
This made for a volatile landscape, with multiple
military engagements taking place and a risk of
broader escalation. Indeed, three distinct wars and
a mini-intervention are unfolding in the country
simultaneously. Firstly, the last stage of the war
between the now near-victorious regime of Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad and the remnants of the
rebellion threaten to cause yet more suffering for

the Syrian population, with the battle for heavily
populated Idlib in sight. With the last rebel pockets
falling in the south, around Damascus and in Homs,
the regime proceeded in 2018 to consolidate its
authority, forcing former rebels and others who
had fled conscription to join its ranks. Reflecting
the pressure that the regime’s army is under after
seven years of war, it was reported that amnesties
were in place for those avoiding the draft, though
many Syrian youths still attempt to avoid service. A
new framework to bring the various militias under
government control was put in place with Russian
encouragement, and Moscow also undertook to
reorganise elements of the Syrian armed forces,
reportedly including not just the ‘Tiger Force’ but also
some division-level formations.
Idlib became the focus of intense diplomacy in
mid- to late 2018. It was surrounded by regime and
allied militia forces intent on seizing the enclave,
vulnerable to Russian air attacks, and controlled by
a mix of mainstream rebel and jihadi groups. Though
the regime would likely be able to capture Idlib with
assistance from Russia, it would in all probability be
a costly operation. While the US remained principally
concerned by the strength of the al-Qaeda offshoot in
Idlib, the dilemma was most significant for Turkey.
Ankara was aware that its territory would likely
become the destination for new waves of refugees
and be targeted by jihadi groups. Ultimately, cost
calculations in Ankara and Moscow led to an
arrangement to create a buffer zone between rebels
in the province and government forces that was still
being negotiated at the time of writing. But Turkey
was entangled in another conflict in Syria. In early
2018, Ankara launched an intervention to capture
the northwest province of Afrin and expel Kurdish
forces out of concern that they would support an
insurgency inside Turkish territory. Though progress
was slow at first, Operation Olive Branch saw Turkish
forces take over the whole region in just over two
months, although Turkish troops, backed by Syrian
militias, then faced an active Kurdish insurgency
and were criticised for some actions by human-
rights organisations. Meanwhile, in Syria’s northeast,
the coalition against Islamic State, also known as
ISIS or ISIL, proceeded to destroy the remaining
military infrastructure of the jihadi group along the
Euphrates River Valley. However, ISIS reverted to its
previous insurgent behaviour, taking advantage of
the absence of a state presence to harass local forces
and populations.
Middle East and North Africa 323
The US posture has changed over the year,
reflecting the new focus of the Trump administration
on containing and eventually forcing out Iran from
Syria. The Trump administration argued that a US
presence was essential to ensure the enduring defeat
of ISIS and to disrupt Iran’s territorial reach and
operational freedom of action. The US armed forces
have built more than a dozen operating bases across
the large territory from the Iraqi border to northwest
Syria and along the Euphrates River, and solidified
the military partnership with Kurdish armed groups.
The degree of US involvement became clear when US
troops, backed by substantial air assets, confronted
a mix of Syrian militia forces and (it was reported)
Russian private military contractors in Deir ez-Zor in
February 2018; scores of Russians and Syrians were
reported to have died.
Reducing Iran’s footprint is also Israel’s priority.
Israel has resigned itself to the return of Assad regime
forces to southern Syria, but has sought Russian
help to prevent Iranian and allied elements from
deploying close to its borders. Significantly, Israeli
military officials disclosed that Israel had conducted
over 200 attacks across Syria in recent years, revealing
and North Africa
the extent of Israeli intelligence penetration and
Middle East
military activities in Syria. The targets included
weapons-storage facilities, missile-manufacturing
plants and key individuals. The damage to Iran’s
military infrastructure in Syria seemed severe and
costly, though not irreparable given the commitment
that Iran seems to have to developing its presence in
Syria.
Active military operations by so many powers in
such a small space has always meant that there was
a risk of accidents taking place; this is one reason
why Russia and the US established ‘deconfliction’
procedures as far back as 2016, including a command-
level hotline. In September, Syria’s air defences
mistakenly shot down a Russian surveillance aircraft
shortly after an Israeli airstrike. Russia shortly
afterwards transferred to Syria an S-300 air-defence
system, potentially complicating Israel’s operational
freedom in Syria.
Yemen
The humanitarian toll from the war in Yemen means
that not only does the war remain in the headlines,
but there has been mounting criticism in Western
states of their governments’ support for the Saudi-led
coalition. After two years of relatively static front
lines, a series of advances on the southwest coast
324 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
by UAE-backed forces signalled a new phase. UAE
forces and allied Yemeni factions (notably from forces
loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, killed in
December 2017 by his erstwhile Houthi allies) moved
to capture the port city of Hudaydah. Seizing the city
would disrupt Houthi tax revenues and weaken their
hold over Sana’a and central Yemen. UN agencies
and many countries criticised the move, arguing it
would only exacerbate the ongoing humanitarian
crisis. Temporary ceasefires were agreed and ideas
tabled for the management of the port by the UN,
but the lack of political progress inevitably led to a
resumption of the fighting. The security situation
in Aden, Taizz and elsewhere remained troubled,
illustrating the difficulty facing the coalition and its
local Yemeni allies in generating political stability and
in reconstruction tasks.
This occurred as criticism of the Saudi-led coalition
rose in Washington and elsewhere. Several coalition
airstrikes hit civilian targets, including hospitals
and a school bus. While the Saudis eventually
accepted responsibility for this attack, it changed
the tone of the debate over the war, not least in the
US Congress. A non-binding resolution (invoking
the War Powers Act), was passed by the US Senate
in December. If enacted, it would remove US forces
engaged in hostilities in Yemen (bar those on counter-
terror missions), though it was likely to be vetoed by
the White House. In November, the US had ceased
refuelling coalition aircraft.
For Riyadh, the war presents a challenge of
how, and whether, it is possible to declare victory.
Withdrawal, however, is unthinkable, not least
because the Houthis still fire missiles at Saudi Arabia
and anti-ship missiles at Saudi oil tankers in the Bab
el-Mandeb Strait. Riyadh saw the latter as an Iranian
pressure tactic, as Iran faced a cut in oil exports.
In parallel, the US and its allies continued their
fight against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
The number of special-forces operations and UAV
attacks increased, with some operations mounted in
cooperation with UAE forces, as well as local partners.
DEFENCE ECONOMICS
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
growth recovered in 2017–18 in the Middle East and
North Africa, which in the IMF’s definition includes
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Oil-exporting states saw
their GDP rise from 1.2% in 2017 to 1.4% in 2018,
while GDP grew in oil-importing states from 4.1%
to 4.5%. Notably, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia,
which were all in recession in 2017, registered growth
in 2018. However, the Iranian economy contracted
by 1.5% in 2018 and the IMF forecast that recession
would continue in 2019.
In oil-exporting countries, this limited rebound was
explained by the recovery in energy prices. According
to the World Bank, the average price of crude oil rose
from US$50.8 per barrel in 2015 to just over US$80
per barrel in October 2018. This price was above, or
close to, most of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
states’ fiscal break-even prices. Governments in the
region nonetheless continued to implement fiscal-
consolidation measures. For instance, Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) both introduced
a 5% value-added tax (VAT) in 2018, while Bahrain
may introduce VAT in early 2019.
Iran, however, did not benefit from the rebound
in oil prices as much as its neighbours. The US
announcement that it would reinstate sanctions on
Iran weakened the rial against the dollar. As a result,
inflation picked up again; it was estimated by the
IMF to be 29.6% in 2018. US sanctions include an
embargo on Iranian oil that took effect in November
2018, depriving Tehran of a key source of revenue.
Iranian oil income as a share of total government
revenue was estimated by the World Bank in 2016 at
just above 33%. US sanctions will also restrict Iranian
access to financing and investment from abroad. For
instance, despite European Union statements that it
would shield its member states’ companies from US
▼ Figure 21 North Africa defence expenditure 2017:
sub-regional breakdown
Tunisia, 4.9%
Morocco
19.3%
Algeria, 52.7%
Mauritania
0.8%
Egypt, 22.3%
Note: analysis excludes Libya © IISS
 Lebanon Syria Middle East and North Africa 325

Tunisia
Morocco Israel
Jordan Iraq
Iran

Algeria Kuwait
Libya Qatar
Egypt Bahrain

Saudi UAE
Arabia
Oman
Mauritania

Yemen
2018 Defence Spending (US$bn)
82.93
Real % Change (2017–18)
Between 3% and 10% increase
20 Between 0% and 3% increase
15 Between 0% and 3% decrease
10 [1] Map illustrating 2018 planned defence-spending levels (in US$ at market exchange rates)
5 Between 3% and 10% decrease as well as the annual real percentage change in planned defence spending between 2017 and
2018 (at constant 2010 prices and exchange rates). Percentage changes in defence spending
1 Between 10% and 20% decrease can vary considerably from year to year, as states revise the level of funding allocated to
defence. Changes indicated here highlight the short-term trend in planned defence spending
0.5
More than 20% decrease between 2017 and 2018. Actual spending changes prior to 2017, and projected spending levels
Estimate post-2018, are not reflected.
Insufficient data IISS
©

▲ Map 9 Middle East and North Africa regional defence spending1

sanctions, European airlines had by late 2018 already instance, Saudi Arabia’s defence and security budget
withdrawn from Iran, as had Total, one of the world’s was first declared to be R288bn (US$76.8bn) for 2017,

and North Africa

largest oil firms. but then was revised upwards to R334bn (US$89.1bn).

Among oil-importing states, growth was stronger
in North Africa than in the Levant. In Lebanon (which
registered 1.0% real GDP growth in 2018) and Jordan
(2.3% in 2018), the effects of regional conflicts and
political uncertainty negatively affected growth.
However, Egypt’s financial situation has improved
in recent years, with real GDP growth reaching
5.3% in 2018 (4.2% in 2017). Inflation slowed from
23.5% in 2017 to 20.9% in 2018 and is forecast to fall
further to 14% in 2019, according to the IMF. Egypt’s
budget deficit also narrowed in 2018 through the
implementation of austerity measures, including the
increase in VAT and cuts in energy subsidies, and the
country’s foreign reserves are being rebuilt.
Middle East
As such, it is possible that the R311bn (US$82.9bn)
announced for 2018 might be an underestimate,
only temporarily reducing the region’s military-
expenditure totals. Fluctuating exchange rates also
contributed to the overall regional decline. For
instance, Algeria projected a stable defence budget at
D1.12 trillion for both 2017 and 2018, but this in fact
meant a decrease in US-dollar terms, from US$10.1bn
to US$9.9bn. Similarly, the weakened Iranian rial
meant Tehran’s defence spending declined (when
▼ Figure 22 Saudi Arabia defence expenditure as % of
GDP

Defence spending and procurement 15

12.51 12.64 12.97
Defence spending in the Middle East and North
12
Africa is falling, for those countries where data is 10.68 10.77
available, from US$191 billion in 2017 to US$181bn 8.98
9
in 2018, in current terms. This includes US Foreign
% of GDP

Military Financing for Egypt and Israel. This decline

6
was largely driven by the announcement at the start
of 2018 of Saudi Arabia’s defence and security budget.
3
That said, Saudi authorities in recent years have later
revised defence-spending totals upwards when the 0
government releases its actual spending figures. For 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
326 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
converted into dollars), from US$21.0bn in 2017 to
US$19.6bn in 2018.
Meanwhile, other countries are just spending
less on defence. In Iraq, for example, total defence
and security spending declined by 10% in nominal
terms, from D22.8trn (US$19.5bn) in 2017 to D20.4trn
(US$17.3bn) in 2018. This reduction can be explained,
in part, by the end of the military campaign against
the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL.
Regional defence-spending totals are further
distorted by the fact that reliable data is unavailable
for some countries, such as those in conflict (e.g.,
Libya and Syria) or countries with large budgets who
do not publish budget figures (e.g., Qatar and the
UAE). In the latter countries, in particular Qatar, the
list of procurement announcements in recent years
suggests that there has been no reduction in defence
expenditure. Furthermore, Qatar and the UAE have
each extended their conscription requirements (from
three to 12 months and 12 to 16 months respectively),
which will likely increase military outlays.
Qatar’s recent procurements have focused on
combat aircraft. Having signed a deal for 36 Boeing
F-15 Eagles in December 2017 and 24 Eurofighter
Typhoons that same month, Doha exercised an option
for an additional 12 Dassault Rafales in March 2018,
following the 2015 deal with France for a first batch
of 24. Once these contracts are complete, Qatar will
have 96 combat aircraft to replace its current fleet of
12 Mirage 2000s. Qatar is not the only country in the
region looking to modernise its combat-aircraft fleet.
In June 2018, Bahrain signed a contract with Lockheed
Martin for 16 F-16V Block 70 Fighting Falcons, while
Kuwait signed with Boeing for 28 F/A-18E/F Super
Hornets. Kuwait had already signed a contract with
Italy in April 2016 for 28 Typhoons.
Saudi Arabia has embarked on a naval-
modernisation programme. Key contracts signed
in 2018 included Avante 2200 frigates from Spain’s
Navantia, to be delivered by 2022; HSI 32 fast patrol
boats and Combattante FS56 guided-missile patrol
craft from France’s CMN; and Littoral Combat Ships
from the United States’ Lockheed Martin. These
procurements are expected to contribute to the Saudi
Naval Expansion Programme (SNEP II), which aims
to modernise the Kingdom’s Eastern Fleet.
Defence industry and markets
Opposition in Europe to arms sales to state parties
to the Yemen conflict complicated Navantia’s frigate
contract with Saudi Arabia. After halting the sale of
laser-guided bombs to Saudi Arabia, the Spanish
authorities backtracked on this decision to try
and ensure, reports said, that the frigate deal was
not jeopardised. This reflects the complexities for
European governments of selling weapons systems
to Middle Eastern states. Similarly, although Sweden
had introduced export-control regulations banning
arms sales to non-democracies, Saab pursued
follow-on orders for the GlobalEye advanced airborne
early-warning and control aircraft sale to the UAE,
and in late 2017 established a centre in Abu Dhabi to
develop and produce sensor systems. Germany and
Finland faced similar internal contradictions, with
continued arms exports to the region despite political
announcements to the contrary.
Riyadh’s contract for Spanish frigates highlighted
the established trend in the Middle East whereby
weapons procurements are supposed to also help
develop local production capacities. Launched in
May 2017, Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI)
is at the forefront of procurement decisions in the
Kingdom, with a mission to increase technology
transfers. The agreement for Avante 2200 frigates is
expected to generate 6,000 jobs over five years in Saudi
Arabia, while a contract signed by Boeing and SAMI
to develop a joint venture for military-helicopter
maintenance is also expected to create 6,000 jobs.
The new procurement system in Saudi Arabia has,
however, disrupted traditional negotiating channels
for arms suppliers, as exemplified by the demise
of France’s ODAS, an arms-brokering company
established in 1974. Paris and Riyadh agreed to
dismantle it and open up new channels.
Saudi Arabia’s procurement reforms were
modelled after the UAE’s, which has had success
in developing its local defence-industrial base,
including the creation of the Emirates Defence
Industries Company (EDIC) in 2014. EDIC is
headed by Luc Vigneron, former CEO of Thales,
while SAMI’s CEO is Andreas Schwer, former CEO
of Rheinmetall. Qatar launched its own defence-
procurement body, Barzan Holdings, during the
DIMDEX arms fair in March 2018. The organisation
is intended to lead on defence procurement in
Qatar and ensure that contracts include technology
transfers benefiting Qatar’s economy. Barzan
Holdings rapidly signed a series of agreements with
major foreign defence companies, including, among
others, with Raytheon on a new cyber academy; a
joint venture with Kongsberg on defence technology,
digitisation and the maritime industry; a joint venture

with Rheinmetall (Rheinmetall Barzan Advanced
Technologies); a joint venture with Turkey’s Aselsan
to produce reconnaissance and surveillance systems;
and a letter of intent with Fincantieri for cooperation
on coastal-defence surveillance. The vast array of
suppliers and agreements reinforces the view that
Qatar’s defence-procurement and defence-industrial
strategy are motivated by diplomatic factors as well
as military imperatives.
IRAQ: REBUILDING THE ARMED FORCES
Fifteen years after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and
after multiple attempts at their effective reconstitution,
Iraq’s security forces are still struggling to regain the
necessary capabilities to take full responsibility for
national security. The ostensible defeat in Iraq of the
Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, may give
Baghdad a period of comparative stability, allowing
for reflection on the lessons of the counter-ISIS
campaign and time to plan for the development of
its armed forces and defence institutions. At least in
the near term, NATO- and US-led capacity-building
efforts continue, aimed at helping to produce
Iraqi armed forces of enduring and self-sustaining
effectiveness. Nonetheless, the September 2018 report
by the lead inspector-general for Operation Inherent
Resolve contained a stark assessment by the Pentagon:
it would take ‘years, if not decades’ until Iraq is able
to secure ‘enduring defeat’ of ISIS.
In 2011, the Iraqi armed forces were ‘ready,
capable, and proven’, according to the architects of
their reconstruction. Work had been under way for
eight years at that point. However, three years later,
the new forces collapsed catastrophically in the face of
ISIS. In early 2014, operating principally from within
Syria, ISIS had entered western Iraq and taken control
of much of Anbar province. In June, they moved into
northern Iraq and advanced on Mosul. Within a week,
Iraq’s second city had been captured. Four divisions
of Iraqi troops had been routed by, some estimated,
1,500 ISIS fighters, while 500,000 civilians had been
displaced and the insurgents had advanced to within
150 kilometres of Baghdad.
First steps
In May 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) that governed Iraq in the aftermath of the
Second Gulf War issued two orders. The first
removed the top tiers of all ministries of state, in an
act of ‘de-Ba’athification’. The second dissolved the
Middle East and North Africa 327
Iraqi Ministry of Defence and disbanded the Iraqi
armed forces: army, air force, navy, air-defence force,
republican guard, special republican guard, and
various other forces and paramilitaries. The effect
of this was to remove the executive and leadership
of Iraq’s defence and security institutions, and some
500,000 military personnel, from their duties.
By August 2003, a US-led Coalition Military
Assistance Training Team (CMATT) was training a
modest volunteer ‘New Iraqi Army’, consisting of an
initial nine battalions of a prospective three-infantry-
division force, to be formed within two years; a
coastal-defence force; and, later, a military-aviation
arm. In March 2004, CPA order number 67 formed
the Iraqi Armed Forces, including air- and coastal-
defence forces, and established a new ministry of
defence. Almost immediately, these forces faced
developmental challenges that would persist in one
form or another for the next ten years: short-term goals
(shaped if not imposed from outside the country);
concurrent capacity-building and fighting; and a
variable purpose of counter-insurgency operations
and national defence against external threats.
and North Africa
Building a force under fire
Middle East
By April 2004, the evolving Iraqi armed forces
were failing to tackle a rising Sunni insurgency that
was taking hold across the country. The CMATT
timetable for training the whole force – which was
still well under its intended strength – had already
been compressed from two years to one, and the
armed forces found themselves refocused on internal-
security tasks.
During 2004–09, the large-scale creation of new
armed forces took place alongside a nationwide
counter-insurgency campaign. The supposed
advantages of cumulative, experiential improvement
were, however, less evident than continuous, short-
term operational expediency and competing and
often overwhelming demands placed on senior
decision-makers and military leaders.
While the armed forces helped ensure that elections
could be held at the end of January 2005, the force
remained fragile. It had been increased in ambition,
by this time expanding to an authorised strength
of ten divisions, but it was judged that only 40,000
troops were combat ready and that absenteeism ran
at some 40% of declared strength. Even embedding
coalition ‘military transition teams’ across the army
down to brigade level from the spring of that year
failed to generate the necessary rate of improvement.
328 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
In 2008, the further-expanded Iraqi armed forces
enjoyed some notable successes, such as the first
‘independent’ division-level operation to resecure
Basra in March. However, more generally, Iraqi
military achievements, capacity and self-reliance
tended during this period to be exaggerated.
Although levels of violence in Iraq had decreased
significantly by 2010–11, the withdrawal of US
combat troops by the end of 2011 was premature.
Senior Iraqi military leaders were reported at the time
to be expecting US support to remain in place for a
further decade.
The 2014 collapse
The failure of defence executive, institutional,
managerial and support functions to develop
adequately since 2003 came into sharp focus in 2014.
Across the armed forces, combat capabilities had
attracted greater attention and resources than combat
support or service support. While the army had most
of its main battle tanks, less than half of its artillery
and logistical requirements had been met, with
the US covering the shortfall. Priority also tended
to be afforded to operational needs rather than to
the higher management of defence. Imbalanced
capability and the defence ministry’s lack of expertise
or experience meant the forces were less robust
and resilient than their scale suggested. Gradually
escalating insecurity and diminishing morale were
exacerbated by suspicions of corruption and political
and ethnic sectarianism.
But it was their precipitate collapse in northern Iraq
in June 2014 and their powerlessness to prevent ISIS’s
march south towards Baghdad that demonstrated
unequivocally the Iraqi armed forces’ inability to
secure their borders and, once breached, to defend
the country.
Failure has been attributed to a range of factors.
There were evident shortcomings at the tactical level.
In the defence of Mosul, some military commanders
underperformed and low morale saw troops flee in
large numbers rather than fight. While these may be
proximate causes, the extent and magnitude of the
collapse resulted from a lack of requisite fighting
power. Physically, the armed forces were not capable
of conducting autonomous medium- or high-intensity
operations. Even at the point when the US had left
the country two years earlier, so-called independent
Iraqi operations were still reliant on US airpower,
intelligence and sustainment. It has been argued that
the reconstruction of the armed forces and wider
security-sector reform were incomplete and that –
once unsupported – decline was always more likely
than continuing growth. It has also been asserted
that because the Iraqi armed forces were rebuilt to
a Western design (assuming all-arms cooperation,
with systematic logistics and sustainment) and based
upon Western doctrine and concepts (such as mission
command and delegated authority), which were not
integral to Iraqi military culture, such developments
were unlikely to be self-perpetuating.
Fundamental to the armed forces’ decline and
eventual collapse in 2014 was the political malaise
under the regime of then-prime minister Nouri
al-Maliki. Firstly, endemic corruption undermined
significant aspects of military capability: ghost
soldiers, salaried but not recruited, concealed large-
scale undermanning; funds for combat supplies and
equipment sustainment were redirected, so that
the actual capability of units was much less than
it should have been, or appeared to be. Secondly,
command of the armed forces, and their deployment
and employment, became increasingly sectarian. Shia
loyalists replaced Sunni and Kurdish professionals in
positions of authority, and the armed forces became
instrumental in political control. Their legitimacy,
as well as their effectiveness in terms of defence and
security, was duly eroded.
Present day
The rebuilding of Iraq’s armed forces since 2014
has again proceeded with international support.
However, defence capacity-building in Iraq today
has a substantial security-sector reform component,
suggesting that past shortcomings in this area may
now receive the attention they deserve. However,
challenges remain relating to the type of force Iraq
needs for a conventional military role. While the force
needs to consider the transition to performing new
roles, day-to-day internal-security taskings continue:
a 2018 report by the US Department of Defense
assessed that ISIS had transitioned into a ‘clandestine
insurgency’ in Iraq.
Some of the tactics employed by Iraq’s armed
forces in the battle for Mosul in 2017 demonstrated
impressive adaptability under fire, such as when
armoured plant machinery was used in street-to-
street fighting to counter flanking vehicle-borne
improvised-explosive-device (IED) attacks, allowing
the main force to proceed. Yet significant challenges
remain not just in shaping the strategic direction of the
armed forces, but also in terms of their organisation.

For instance, the future of the Shia-dominated
Popular Mobilisation Units, the set of paramilitary
forces that were greatly empowered during the drive
to oust ISIS from Iraq, is unclear. These groups and
their leaders are viewed in the region as proxies for
Iranian influence. Reports persist that the units are
positioning for a more formal political role in Iraq,
which might complicate any move to disarm or
totally integrate them into the Iraqi armed forces.
Questions also continue over the status of Kurdish
forces in Iraq’s north. These troops were integral to
holding back the advance of ISIS in the north and
then, after coalition training and military assistance,
taking part in combat operations in coordination with
the main offensive by coalition troops and the Iraqi
security forces.
The overall aim is to produce non-sectarian,
politically neutral Iraqi armed forces. The army-
linked, elite Counter Terrorism Service (CTS)
reportedly ‘enjoys legal autonomy’ but may
provide a model for some aspects of ‘force health’
that are vital for the future of the armed forces. For
example, their relative success in recruiting and
retention likely results from their combat record
in standing their ground against the ISIS advance
and then being in the vanguard of the campaign to
recapture Mosul in 2017. The stress on developing
unit cohesion within the basic and special-to-arm
training process could be a lesson, as could the
reported practice within the CTS of randomly
assigning personnel to special-operations battalions
across Iraq. A challenge for the CTS and its Western
training partners will be in diffusing such lessons
across the wider force, so that the CTS becomes
a model for other elements and is not alone in
attracting the best recruits.
Overall, the challenges for the Iraqi armed forces
remain stark. New military systems have been
introduced in recent years, ranging from M1A1 main
battle tanks to F-16 combat aircraft, but according to
the US,
systemic weaknesses remain, many of which
are the same deficiencies that enabled the rise
of ISIS in 2014. The ISF continues to suffer from
poor management of intelligence; corruption
and ‘ghost soldiers’; overlapping command
arrangements with conflicting chains of
command; micromanagement; and inefficient
and inadequate systems for planning and
transmitting orders.
Middle East and North Africa 329
Deficiencies in intelligence mean that the
Iraqi forces remain ‘years, if not decades’ away
from ending reliance on coalition support in this
area. Foreign troops remain engaged on military-
assistance tasks, including some 5,000 US personnel.
In mid-2018, NATO committed at its Brussels Summit
to build on its years of assistance to post-Saddam Iraq
by launching a Canadian-led training and capacity-
building mission, which began operations in late
2018. It is likely, given the factors identified by the
Operation Inherent Resolve inspector-general, that
Iraq’s armed forces will continue to require military
and security assistance for some time yet.
GULF REGION: TRAINING AND
SUSTAINABILITY
In March 2015, a Saudi-led coalition intervened in
Yemen under a United Nations mandate to support
President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi. Much of the
coalition’s military activity has been conducted from
the air, but the armed forces of the United Arab
Emirates have conducted conventional and hybrid
operations over complex terrain and with extended
and North Africa
supply lines. The Saudi land forces, meanwhile, are
Middle East
securing their border with Yemen over extended
internal supply lines, while maritime and air-defence
forces have also been engaged. Neither Saudi Arabia
nor the UAE seemed prepared for this type of conflict
in that neither had a defence policy based on a
clearly defined threat – at least one that was publicly
accessible – and certainly not one that discussed a
regional intervention. As a result, the equipment,
training, doctrine and logistics priorities that
might be associated with tasks such as intervention
operations were, analysts understand, not in place.
Equipment inventories and training programmes
were geared more towards conventional war fighting,
while exercises tended to be short and culminate in
a set-piece and heavily rehearsed final ‘serial’. The
composition of some of the region’s armed forces
is also significant: the Saudi armed forces comprise
Saudi nationals, but the armed forces of the UAE
and Qatar, for example, are not only smaller but
in the main also have larger numbers of serving
non-nationals, usually in the ranks, alongside Emirati
or Qatari officers.
United Arab Emirates
While operations in Yemen are overall conducted
by the Saudi-led coalition, some analysts argue that
330 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
the UAE’s armed forces are those that have been
engaged in many of the ground operations, while
also demonstrating maturity in the air environment.
For the UAE, the ability to mount and maintain
these missions derives from its early investment in
developing military experience, and in particular
human capital, through the deployment of Emirati
military units to Afghanistan, Kosovo and Somalia;
long-standing training courses (including training
aimed at improving air–ground integration); and
a number of programmes that engaged foreign
advisers. Notably, these programmes included the
engagement in 2009 of former Australian Special
Forces commander Major-General Mike Hindmarsh
as an adviser and commander of the Presidential
Guard and, more recently, appointing retired US
Army Lieutenant-Colonel Stephen Toumajan as
a UAE major-general to run the Joint Aviation
Command (JAC).
It is understood that there are now substantial
numbers of retired expatriate advisers, instructors
and aviators in both of these Emirati organisations,
whose presence is creating small and growing
pockets of expertise. In addition, the formation of the
Emirates Defence Industries Corporation (EDIC) as
an ‘umbrella’ organisation (both for the manufacture
and support of defence equipment) has the potential
to be a further step towards the generation of a
defence sector able to support modern operational
armed forces. There is a growing capacity for
logistics support and sustainability through defence
firms such as AMMROC, EDIC MRO Land, and
Global Aviation Logistics, but political factors
and a lack of institutional experience can act as a
brake. For instance, it is unclear whether the armed
forces have developed the ability to act as a truly
‘intelligent customer’, such that the organisation
clearly understands the work it may actually require
of the contractor and is able to critically review the
contractor’s performance. Analysts also consider
that there may be inexperience in output-based
contracting, where the focus is on the actual delivery
of a service or capability (such as the number of hours
a maintained aircraft is able to remain operational
before its next service), as opposed to the physical
aspects of a support contract (such as the hours spent
on servicing), as well as inexperience in managing
large fleets, particularly when they are as diverse as
the JAC’s aviation inventory.
A defence-planning reform programme is
under way in the UAE, driven by consultants and
supported by former service personnel from other
countries. Among other things, it is intended to
engender an intelligence-driven and capability-based
culture. Progress is reportedly slow, partly due to
bureaucratic factors but also because the experience to
run a ministry of defence cannot be created overnight.
There is also the regular distraction (or attraction)
of cutting-edge capabilities, which sometimes
overshadows the need to get the best from the people
and equipment already in service. While there may be
a strong case for obtaining the support of individuals
and organisations with current operational skills in
order to improve support functions, this tends to be
less eye-catching.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia has experienced a different set of
challenges. With the exception, analysts assert, of
pockets of good practice in the Royal Saudi Air Force
(RSAF) through extended training and engagement
with the United Kingdom and the United States, the
lack of investment in people and support capabilities
has probably been the main overall lesson from
current operations. Although the Saudi focus on the
air domain in Yemen may indicate confidence that
airpower will lead to the defeat of the Houthis, it may
equally indicate a lack of confidence in land forces.
The land forces had a previous encounter with Houthi
forces in 2009 but it is unclear what, if any, lessons were
learned. On the surface, an investment equivalent to
that made by the UAE in its deployments has been
absent. At the pilot level, there are skilled operators,
reflecting that the RSAF has trained to positive effect
with UK, US and NATO member states’ air forces,
but as far as can be observed there is little depth in
essential supporting capabilities.
However, analysts consider that realisation of
these limitations has led to an ambitious defence-
reform programme that is intended to have training
and sustainability at its core. The programme – led
by a transformation management office (TMO)
comprising hand-picked and experienced Saudi
nationals, alongside consultants – is intended to
ensure that human resources and a strong central
ministry of defence are at the heart of the reform
programme. The initiative to create the post of
Assistant Minister of Defence for Executive Affairs
is intended to bring private-sector experience and
rigour to the development of the defence ministry’s
enabling functions. Khalid al-Bayari, formerly CEO
of Saudi Telecom Company, was appointed to the

post in February 2018. Work has simultaneously been
under way to identify the personnel best suited to this
new structure; more than 500 officers went through
an assessment centre and are expected to move to
new posts in the coming months. In parallel, the TMO
is involved in some 300 initiatives, spread over the
next ten years, including extensive training reform
and improved readiness and cost-effectiveness. Here,
lessons might be derived from the UAE programme,
where analysts considered that the experience of
expatriate military professionals could provide
insights and benefits that complement the work of
consultants.
Other states
Meanwhile, the past three years have seen significant
investment by Qatar in new defence equipment. At
least on the surface, this investment seems to give
little thought to integration or support. At a time
when many other nations are looking to rationalise
equipment and introduce more multi-role platforms
to ease support demands, Qatar is broadening its
inventory. By contrast, observers understand that
Middle East and North Africa 331
expenditure on training amounts to handfuls of
individual and group hires, often of retired expatriate
military personnel. These personnel work in silos
directed by senior officers, few of whom have
experience in front-line units or on operations.
By comparison, the authorities in Oman have
quietly created a solid base from which to grow
their military capability. Working substantially
with a single partner through a government-to-
government arrangement, as Muscat has done
with the UK, may not suit other countries, but the
durability of the Oman–UK relationship should not
be underestimated: it may be possible to buy the time
of advisers and trainers, but commitment to defence
reform is required over the long term. Operations in
Yemen have highlighted the importance of human
capital and logistics: well-trained and experienced
people are central to progress, with the ability to
sustain both forces and equipment close behind.
Improving this may well require carefully selected
advisers sharing their experience, but it also requires
an open-minded client with the patience to listen,
learn, accrue experience and drive change.
and North Africa
Middle East
332 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

3 indep mech bde

Algeria ALG Light
2 indep mot bde
Algerian Dinar D 2017 2018 2019
Air Manoeuvre
GDP D 18.6tr 21.2tr 1 AB div (4 para regt; 1 SF regt)
US$ 168bn 188bn COMBAT SUPPORT
per capita US$ 4,034 4,450 2 arty bn
Growth % 1.4 2.5 1 AT regt
4 engr bn
Inflation % 5.6 6.5
AIR DEFENCE
Def bdgt D 1.12tr 1.12tr
7 AD bn
US$ 10.1bn 9.93bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$1=D 110.97 112.64 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Population 41,657,488 MBT 1,467: 270 T-54/T-55; 300 T-62; 325 T-72M1/M1M;
572 T-90SA
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus RECCE 134: 44 AML-60; 26 BRDM-2; 64 BRDM-2M with
Male 15.1% 3.5% 4.0% 4.4% 20.9% 2.7% 9M133 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan)
IFV 1,089: 285 BMP-1; 304 BMP-2; 400 BMP-2M with
Female 14.4% 3.4% 3.8% 4.2% 20.5% 3.1%
9M133 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan); 100 BMP-3
APC 807+
Capabilities APC (T) VP-6
The armed forces are among the most capable and best equipped APC (W) 805+: 250 BTR-60; 150 BTR-80; 150 OT-64; 55
in North Africa. Territorial integrity, internal security and regional M3 Panhard; 100+ Fuchs 2; 100 Fahd
stability are the primary roles of the armed forces. Algeria is part
PPV 2 Marauder
of the African Union’s North African Regional Capability Standby
Force, hosting the force’s logistics base in Algiers. Algeria discusses
AUV Nimr Ajban
with its neighbours regional security challenges like counter- ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
terrorism, and has particularly close security cooperation with AEV IMR-2
Tunisia. The conscript-based force exercises regularly, with training ARV BREM-1
appearing to be of a relatively good standard. There is an ongoing MW UR-77
attempt to make the armed forces more professional, which was ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
reflected in the reduction of conscription liability from 18 to 12 SP 28 9P163-3 Kornet-EM (AT-14 Spriggan)
months in 2014. The armed forces’ logistics capabilities appear suf-
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111
ficient to support internal deployments. The army’s and air force’s
Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel);
inventories consist of a core of modern, primarily Russian-sourced
equipment, though China has also supplied equipment, including 9K115-2 Metis-M1 (AT-13 Saxhorn-2); 9K135 Kornet-E
self-propelled artillery. Algiers has expressed interest in acquir- (AT-14 Spriggan); Milan
ing more fixed-wing combat aircraft and the navy is investing in RCL 180: 82mm 120 B-10; 107mm 60 B-11
its submarine fleet. Local industry, and the services, are capable of GUNS 250: 57mm 160 ZIS-2 (M-1943); 85mm 80 D-44;
equipment maintenance. However, while Algeria is largely depen- 100mm 10 T-12
dent on foreign suppliers for new equipment, it has in recent years ARTILLERY 1,098
made significant investments towards developing a domestic SP 224: 122mm 140 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 30 2S3 Akatsiya;
defence industry. This has led to a number of joint ventures with
155mm ε54 PLZ-45
foreign partners, such as with Italy’s Leonardo over the licensed
production of helicopters. TOWED 393: 122mm 345: 160 D-30; 25 D-74; 100
M-1931/37; 60 M-30; 130mm 10 M-46; 152mm 20 M-1937
ACTIVE 130,000 (Army 110,000 Navy 6,000 Air (ML-20); 155mm 18 Type-88 (PLL-01)
14,000) Paramilitary 187,200 MRL 151: 122mm 51: 48 BM-21 Grad; 3+ SR5; 140mm 48
Conscript liability 12 months BM-14; 220mm 4 TOS-1A; 240mm 30 BM-24; 300mm 18
9A52 Smerch
RESERVE 150,000 (Army 150,000) to age 50 MOR 330: 82mm 150 M-37; 120mm 120 M-1943; 160mm
60 M-1943
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
SRBM 4 Iskander-E
Army 35,000; 75,000 conscript (total 110,000) AIR DEFENCE
FORCES BY ROLE SAM 106+
6 Mil Regions Short-range 38 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound);
MANOEUVRE Pantsir-SM
Armoured Point-defence 68+: ε48 9K33M Osa (SA-8B Gecko); ε20
2 (1st & 8th) armd div (3 tk regt; 1 mech regt, 1 arty gp) 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7A/B
1 indep armd bde Grail)‡; QW-2
Mechanised GUNS ε830
2 (12th & 40th) mech div (1 tk regt; 3 mech regt, 1 arty gp) SP 23mm ε225 ZSU-23-4
 Middle East and North Africa 333

TOWED ε605: 14.5mm 100: 60 ZPU-2; 40 ZPU-4; 23mm Naval Infantry

100 ZU-23; 37mm ε150 M-1939; 57mm 75 S-60; 85mm FORCES BY ROLE
20 M-1939 (KS-12); 100mm 150 KS-19; 130mm 10 KS-30 MANOEUVRE
Amphibious
Navy ε6,000 1 naval inf bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 4: Naval Aviation
2 Kilo (FSU Paltus) with 6 single 533mm TT with Test- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
71ME HWT/3M54E Klub-S (SS-N-27 Sizzler) AShM HELICOPTERS
2 Improved Kilo (RUS Varshavyanka) with 6 single 533mm MRH 9: 3 AW139 (SAR); 6 Super Lynx 300
SAR 9: 5 AW101 SAR; 4 Super Lynx Mk130
TT with Test-71ME HWT/3M54E Klub-S (SS-N-27
Sizzler) AShM Coastal Defence
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 8
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FFGHM 5:
COASTAL DEFENCE
3 Adhafer (C28A) with 2 quad lnchr with C-802A AShM, AShM 4K51 Rubezh (SSC-3 Styx)
1 FM-90 lnchr with HHQ-7 SAM, 2 triple 324mm
ASTT, 2 Type-730B CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Coast Guard ε500
hel) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 Erradii (MEKO 200AN) with 2 octuple lnchrs with PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 55
RBS15 Mk3 AShM, 4 8-cell VLS with Umkhonto-IR PBF 6 Baglietto 20
SAM, 2 twin 324mm TT with MU90 LWT, 1 127mm PB 49: 6 Baglietto Mangusta; 12 Jebel Antar; 21 Deneb; 4
gun (capacity 1 Super Lynx 300) El Mounkid; 6 Kebir with 1 76mm gun
FF 3 Mourad Rais (FSU Koni) with 2 twin 533mm TT, 2 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9
RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm gun AR 1 El Mourafek
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 25 ARS 3 El Moundjid
CORVETTES 7 AXL 5 El Mouderrib (PRC Chui-E) (2 more in
reserve†)
FSGM 3 Rais Hamidou (FSU Nanuchka II) with up to 4

and North Africa

Middle East
twin lnchr with 3M24E Uran-E (SS-N-25 Switchblade)
AShM, 1 twin lnchr with 9M33 Osa-M (SA-N-4
Air Force 14,000
Gecko) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 twin 57mm gun FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER
FSG 4:
1 sqn with MiG-25PDS/RU Foxbat
3 Djebel Chenoua with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-
4 sqn with MiG-29C/UB Fulcrum
SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 Rais Hassen Barbiar (Djebel Chenoua mod) with 2
3 sqn with Su-30MKA Flanker
twin lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 1 GROUND ATTACK
Type-730 CIWS, 1 76mm gun 2 sqn with Su-24M/MK Fencer D
PBFG 9 Osa II (3†) with 4 single lnchr with P-15 Termit ELINT
(SS-N-2B Styx) AShM 1 sqn with Beech 1900D
PB 9 Kebir with 1 76mm gun MARITIME PATROL
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1 2 sqn with Beech 200T/300 King Air
MCC 1 El-Kasseh (ITA Gaeta mod) ISR
AMPHIBIOUS 7 1 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E*; MiG-25RBSh
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LHD 1 Kalaat Foxbat D*
Beni Abbes with 1 8-cell A50 VLS with Aster-15 SAM, 1 TANKER
76mm gun (capacity 5 med hel; 3 LCVP; 15 MBT; 350 1 sqn with Il-78 Midas
troops) TRANSPORT
LANDING SHIPS 3: 1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules; L-100-30
1 sqn with C-295M
LSM 1 Polnochny B with 1 twin AK230 CIWS (capacity
1 sqn with Gulfstream IV-SP; Gulfstream V
6 MBT; 180 troops)
1 sqn with Il-76MD/TD Candid
LST 2 Kalaat beni Hammad (capacity 7 MBT; 240 troops)
TRAINING
with 1 med hel landing platform 2 sqn with Z-142
LANDING CRAFT • LCVP 3 1 sqn with Yak-130 Mitten*
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3 2 sqn with L-39C/ZA Albatros
AGS 1 El Idrissi 1 hel sqn with PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
AX 1 Daxin with 2 twin AK230 CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel ATTACK HELICOPTER
landing platform 3 sqn with Mi-24 Hind (one re-equipping with Mi-28NE
AXS 1 El Mellah Havoc)
334 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

1 sqn with AS355 Ecureuil ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
5 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H RECCE AML-60
1 sqn with Ka-27PS Helix D; Ka-32T Helix APC • APC (W) 210: 100 TH-390 Fahd; 110 Panhard
ISR UAV M3
1 sqn with Seeker II HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 12+: 12 AW109; Some
AIR DEFENCE PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
3 ADA bde
3 SAM regt with S-125 Neva (SA-3 Goa); 2K12 Kub (SA-6 National Security Forces 16,000
Gainful); S-300PMU2 (SA-20 Gargoyle) Directorate of National Security. Small arms
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Republican Guard 1,200
AIRCRAFT 135 combat capable
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FTR 34: 11 MiG-25PDS/RU Foxbat; 23 MiG-29C/UB ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Fulcrum RECCE AML-60
FGA 44 Su-30MKA APC • APC (T) M3 half-track
ATK 33 Su-24M/MK Fencer D
ISR 8: 4 MiG-25RBSh Foxbat D*; 4 Su-24MR Fencer E* Legitimate Defence Groups ε150,000
TKR 6 Il-78 Midas Self-defence militia, communal guards (60,000)
TPT 65: Heavy 11: 3 Il-76MD Candid B; 8 Il-76TD Candid;
Medium 16: 8 C-130H Hercules; 6 C-130H-30 Hercules; 2
L-100-30; Light 32: 3 Beech C90B King Air; 5 Beech 200T
DEPLOYMENT
King Air; 6 Beech 300 King Air; 12 Beech 1900D (electronic DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
surv); 5 C-295M; 1 F-27 Friendship; PAX 6: 1 A340; 4 MONUSCO 3 obs
Gulfstream IV-SP; 1 Gulfstream V
TRG 99: 36 L-39ZA Albatros; 7 L-39C Albatros; 16 Yak-130
Mitten*; 40 Z-142
Bahrain BHR
HELICOPTERS Bahraini Dinar D 2017 2018 2019
ATK 39: 31 Mi-24 Hind; 6+ Mi-28NE Havoc; 2+ Mi-28UB GDP D 13.3bn 14.8bn
Havoc
US$ 35.3bn 39.3bn
SAR 3 Ka-27PS Helix D
MRH 85: 8 AW139 (SAR); 3 Bell 412EP; 74 Mi-8 Hip (med per capita US$ 24,326 26,532
tpt)/Mi-17 Hip H Growth % 3.8 3.2
TPT 48: Heavy 8 Mi-26T2 Halo; Medium 4 Ka-32T Helix; Inflation % 1.4 3.0
Light 44: 8 AW119KE Koala; 8 AS355 Ecureuil; 28 PZL Def bdgt [a] D 557m 557m
Mi-2 Hoplite US$ 1.48bn 1.48bn
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
US$1=D 0.38 0.38
CISR • Heavy CH-3; CH-4
[a] Excludes funds allocated to the Ministry of the Interior
ISR • Medium Seeker II
AIR DEFENCE Population 1,442,659
Long-range S-300PMU2 (SA-20 Gargoyle) Ethnic groups: Nationals 46%; Asian 45.5%; African 1.5%; other or
Medium-range 9K317 Buk-M2E (SA-17 Grizzly); S-125 unspecified 7%
Pechora-M (SA-3 Goa)
Short-range 2K12 Kvadrat (SA-6 Gainful) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
GUNS 725 100mm/130mm/85mm Male 9.6% 3.7% 5.0% 6.2% 34.4% 1.5%
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES Female 9.3% 3.2% 3.6% 3.9% 18.0% 1.5%
AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (A-11 Archer); IR/
SARH R-40/46 (AA-6 Acrid); R-23/24 (AA-7 Apex); R-27 Capabilities
(AA-10 Alamo); ARH R-77 (AA-12A Adder); Bahrain’s armed forces are capable and well equipped. The country
ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge); occupies a critical and challenging strategic position between
Kh-59ME (AS-18 Kazoo); ZT-35 Ingwe; 9M120 Ataka (AT-9 regional rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia. The principal roles of the
Spiral-2) armed forces are territorial defence and internal-security support.
AShM Kh-31A (AS-17B Krypton) Bahrain is a member of the GCC. Its most critical security relation-
ARM Kh-25MP (AS-12A Kegler); Kh-31P (AS-17A ship is with Saudi Arabia, but it also has a strong defence relation-
ship with the US. The US 5th Fleet is headquartered in Bahrain, as
Krypton)
is the combined maritime forces headquarters. In 2018, the UK
reopened a permanent naval facility in Bahrain. Military service is
Paramilitary ε187,200 voluntary and personnel are relatively well trained. Despite their
small size, the armed forces have carried out a number of limited
Gendarmerie 20,000 expeditionary deployments to support coalition operations,
Ministry of Defence control; 6 regions including in support of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen. For
 Middle East and North Africa 335

a period in 2017–18, Bahrain commanded Combined Task Force SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
151, focused on countering piracy and other armed criminality SRBM • Conventional MGM-140A ATACMS (launched
at sea – the first time a GCC nation had assumed command of a from M270 MLRS)
CTF outside the Arabian Gulf. In a major enhancement to Bahrain’s AIR DEFENCE
air mobility, it has bought ex-UK C-130J transport aircraft. As part SAM
of a major air-force modernisation, Bahrain intends to buy F-16V
Medium-range 6 MIM-23B I-Hawk
fighters and to upgrade its existing F-16C/Ds to that configura-
Short-range 7 Crotale
tion. The armed forces have their own maintenance support, but
Bahrain has little in the way of a defence-industrial base beyond Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger; RBS-70
the limited naval-ship maintenance support provided by the Arab GUNS 24: 35mm 12 Oerlikon; 40mm 12 L/70
Shipbuilding and Repair Yard.
Navy 700
ACTIVE 8,200 (Army 6,000 Navy 700 Air 1,500) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Paramilitary 11,260 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 1
FRIGATES • FFGHM 1 Sabha (ex-US Oliver Hazard
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Perry) with 1 Mk13 GMLS with SM-1MR SAM/RGM-
84C Harpoon AShM, 2 triple 324mm Mk32 ASTT with
Army 6,000 Mk46 LWT, 1 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 76mm gun
(capacity 1 Bo-105 hel)
FORCES BY ROLE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12
SPECIAL FORCES
CORVETTES • FSG 2 Al Manama (GER Lurssen 62m)
1 SF bn
with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 2 76mm
MANOEUVRE
guns, 1 hel landing platform
Armoured
PCFG 4 Ahmed el Fateh (GER Lurssen 45m) with 2 twin
1 armd bde(-) (1 recce bn, 2 armd bn) lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun
Mechanised PB 4: 2 Al Jarim (US Swift FPB-20); 2 Al Riffa (GER Lurssen
1 inf bde (2 mech bn, 1 mot bn) 38m)
Light PBF 2 Mk V SOC
1 (Amiri) gd bn AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 9
COMBAT SUPPORT

and North Africa

LCM 7: 1 Loadmaster; 4 Mashtan; 2 Dinar (ADSB 42m)

Middle East
1 arty bde (1 hvy arty bty, 2 med arty bty, 1 lt arty bty, LCVP 2 Sea Keeper
1 MRL bty)
1 engr coy Naval Aviation
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 log coy HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 2 Bo-105
1 tpt coy
1 med coy Air Force 1,500
AIR DEFENCE
FORCES BY ROLE
1 AD bn (1 ADA bty, 2 SAM bty) FIGHTER
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 2 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
MBT 180 M60A3 1 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II
RECCE 22 AML-90 TRANSPORT
IFV 67: 25 YPR-765 PRI; 42 AIFV-B-C25 1 (Royal) flt with B-727; B-747; BAe-146; Gulfstream
APC 203+ II; Gulfstream IV; Gulfstream 450; Gulfstream 550;
APC (T) 203: 200 M113A2; 3 AIFV-B S-92A
APC (W) Arma 6×6 TRAINING
AUV M-ATV 1 sqn with Hawk Mk129*
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 1 sqn with T-67M Firefly
ARV 53 Fahd 240 ATTACK HELICOPTER
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE 2 sqn with AH-1E/F Cobra; TAH-1P Cobra
MSL TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
SP 5 AIFV-B-Milan; HMMWV with BGM-71A TOW 1 sqn with Bell 212 (AB-212)
MANPATS BGM-71A TOW; Kornet-EM 1 sqn with UH-60M Black Hawk
RCL 31: 106mm 25 M40A1; 120mm 6 MOBAT 1 (VIP) sqn with Bo-105; S-70A Black Hawk; UH-60L
ARTILLERY 161 Black Hawk
SP 82: 155mm 20 M109A5; 203mm 62 M110A2 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TOWED 36: 105mm 8 L118 Light Gun; 155mm 28 M198 AIRCRAFT 38 combat capable
MRL 13: 122mm 4 SR5; 227mm 9 M270 MLRS FTR 12: 8 F-5E Tiger II; 4 F-5F Tiger II
MOR 30: 81mm 18: 12 L16; 6 EIMOS; SP 120mm 12 FGA 20: 16 F-16C Block 40 Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16D Block
M113A2 40 Fighting Falcon
336 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

TPT 11: Medium 1 C-130J Hercules; PAX 10: 1 B-727; 2

B-747; 1 Gulfstream II; 1 Gulfstream IV; 1 Gulfstream Egypt EGY
450; 1 Gulfstream 550; 3 BAe-146 Egyptian Pound E£ 2017 2018 2019
TRG 9: 6 Hawk Mk129*; 3 T-67M Firefly
GDP Ε£ 3.47tr 4.36tr
HELICOPTERS
US$ 237bn 249bn
ATK 28: 16 AH-1E Cobra; 12 AH-1F Cobra
TPT 27: Medium 13: 3 S-70A Black Hawk; 1 S-92A (VIP); per capita US$ 2,495 2572
1 UH-60L Black Hawk; 8 UH-60M Black Hawk; Light 14: 11 Growth % 4.2 5.3
Bell 212 (AB-212); 3 Bo-105 Inflation % 23.5 20.9
TRG 6 TAH-1P Cobra Def bdgt Ε£ 47.1bn 51.6bn 59.0bn
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES US$ 3.21bn 2.90bn
AAM • IR AIM-9P Sidewinder; SARH AIM-7 Sparrow;
FMA (US) US$ 1.23bn 1.3bn 1.3bn
ARH AIM-120B/C AMRAAM
ASM AGM-65D/G Maverick; some TOW US$1=E£ 14.67 17.78
BOMBS Population 99,413,317
Laser-guided GBU-10/12 Paveway II
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Paramilitary ε11,260 Male 17.3% 4.7% 4.9% 4.8% 17.3% 2.1%
Female 16.1% 4.4% 4.6% 4.6% 17.0% 2.2%
Police 9,000
Ministry of Interior Capabilities
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Egypt’s armed forces are the largest in the region and are princi-
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES pally focused on territorial integrity and internal security, includ-
RECCE 8 S52 Shorland ing combating ISIS-affiliated groups in northern Sinai. Egypt and
APC • APC (W) Otokar ISV; Cobra the US maintain a strong strategic partnership, which has seen
HELICOPTERS significant US equipment deliveries and ongoing Foreign Military
Aid payments. Defence relations with Russia have developed,
MRH 2 Bell 412 Twin Huey particularly regarding procurements. Operational experience will
ISR 2 Hughes 500 have been bolstered by counter-insurgency operations in the Sinai
TPT • Light 1 Bo-105 and contributions to several UN deployments. Training is supple-
mented by regular involvement in a number of multinational exer-
National Guard ε2,000 cises. Egypt has a developing capacity to deploy independently
FORCES BY ROLE beyond its borders. It contributes to UN missions, has intervened
militarily in Libya and sent combat aircraft to support the Saudi-
MANOEUVRE
led coalition in Yemen. The navy’s two new Mistral-class amphibi-
Other ous ships will bolster the capacity to deploy regionally. The armed
3 paramilitary bn forces’ inventory primarily comprise obsolete Soviet-era systems
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE and newer Western equipment. However, the armed forces are
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES undertaking an extensive equipment-recapitalisation programme,
which is seeing the delivery of Russian multi-role fighters, attack
APC • APC (W) Arma 6×6; Cobra
helicopters and SAM systems. Combat aircraft have also been
sourced from France and armed UAVs from China. Naval recapi-
Coast Guard ε260 talisation includes German-built submarines and French-designed
Ministry of Interior frigates. Egypt has an established domestic defence industry, sup-
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 52 plying equipment for both the armed forces and export markets,
PBF 23: 2 Ares 18; 4 Jaris; 6 Saham; 6 Fajr; 5 Jarada ranging from small arms to armoured vehicles. There is a history of
PB 29: 6 Haris; 1 Al Muharraq; 10 Deraa (of which 4 licensed and co-production with foreign companies, including the
local assembly of M1A1 main battle tanks from US-supplied kits
Halmatic 20, 2 Souter 20, 4 Rodman 20); 10 Saif (of which
and the production of frigates with French assistance.
4 Fairey Sword, 6 Halmatic 160); 2 Hawar
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 1 Load- ACTIVE 438,500 (Army 310,000 Navy 18,500 Air
master II 30,000 Air Defence Command 80,000) Paramilitary
397,000
Conscription liability 12–36 months (followed by refresher training
DEPLOYMENT over a period of up to 9 years)
SAUDI ARABIA: Operation Restoring Hope 250; 1 SF gp; 1
RESERVE 479,000 (Army 375,000 Navy 14,000 Air
arty gp; 6 F-16C Fighting Falcon
20,000 Air Defence Command 70,000)

FOREIGN FORCES ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

United Kingdom Air Force 160: 1 naval base
United States US Central Command 5,000; 1 HQ (5th Army 90,000–120,000; 190,000–220,000
Fleet); 1 AD bty with MIM-104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3 conscript (total 310,000)
 Middle East and North Africa 337

FORCES BY ROLE MRL 450: 122mm 356: 96 BM-11; 60 BM-21; 50 Sakr-10; 50

SPECIAL FORCES Sakr-18; 100 Sakr-36; 130mm 36 K136 Kooryong; 140mm 32
5 cdo gp BM-14; 227mm 26 M270 MLRS; 240mm (48 BM-24 in store)
1 counter-terrorist unit MOR 2,564: 81mm 50 M125A2; 82mm 500; SP 107mm
MANOEUVRE 100: 65 M106A1; 35 M106A2; 120mm 1,848: 1,800 M-1943;
Armoured 48 Brandt; SP 120mm 36 M1064A3; 160mm 30 M-160
4 armd div (2 armd bde, 1 mech bde, 1 arty bde) SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
4 indep armd bde SRBM • Conventional 42+: 9 FROG-7; 24 Sakr-80; 9 Scud-B
1 Republican Guard bde UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
Mechanised ISR • Medium R4E-50 Skyeye; ASN-209
8 mech div (1 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 arty bde) AIR DEFENCE
4 indep mech bde SAM
Light Point-defence 141+: 50 M1097 Avenger; 26 M48
1 inf div Chaparral; 45 Sinai-23 with Ayn al-Saqr; 20 9K31 Strela-1
2 indep inf bde (SA-9 Gaskin); Ayn al-Saqr; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡;
Air Manoeuvre FIM-92 Stinger; 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse)
2 air mob bde GUNS
1 para bde SP 160: 23mm 120 ZSU-23-4; 57mm 40 ZSU-57-2
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE TOWED 700: 14.5mm 300 ZPU-4; 23mm 200 ZU-23-2;
1 SRBM bde with FROG-7 57mm 200 S-60
1 SRBM bde with Scud-B
COMBAT SUPPORT Navy ε8,500 (incl 2,000 Coast Guard); 10,000
15 arty bde
conscript (total 18,500)
6 engr bde (3 engr bn)
2 spec ops engr bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
6 salvage engr bn SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 6
24 MP bn 4 Romeo† (PRC Type-033) with 8 single 533mm TT with
18 sigs bn UGM-84C Harpoon AShM/Mk37 HWT (being replaced
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT by Type-209/1400)

and North Africa

36 log bn 2 Type-209/1400 with 8 single 533mm TT with UGM-84L

27 med bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 2,480: 1,130 M1A1 Abrams; 300 M60A1; 850 M60A3;
200 T-62 (840 T-54/T-55; 300 T-62 all in store)
RECCE 412: 300 BRDM-2; 112 Commando Scout
IFV 405+: 390 YPR-765 25mm; 15+ BMP-1 (205 BMP-1 in
store)
APC 4,701+
APC (T) 2,700: 2,000 M113A2/YPR-765 (incl variants);
500 BTR-50; 200 OT-62
APC (W) 1,560: 250 BMR-600P; 250 BTR-60; 410 Fahd-
30/TH 390 Fahd; 650 Walid
PPV 441+: 92 Caiman; some REVA III; some REVA V
LWB; 349 RG-33L (incl 89 amb)
AUV 95+: Panthera T6; 95+ Sherpa Light Scout
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
ARV 367+: Fahd 240; BMR 3560.55; 12 Maxxpro ARV; 220
M88A1; 90 M88A2; M113 ARV; 45 M578; T-54/55 ARV
VLB KMM; MTU; MTU-20
MW Aardvark JFSU Mk4
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL
SP 352+: 52 M901, 300 YPR-765 PRAT; HMMWV with
TOW-2
MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) (incl BRDM-2);
HJ-73; Milan; TOW-2
ARTILLERY 4,468
SP 492+: 122mm 124+: 124 SP 122; D-30 mod; 130mm
M-46 mod; 155mm 368: 164 M109A2; 204 M109A5
TOWED 962: 122mm 526: 190 D-30M; 36 M-1931/37; 300
M-30; 130mm 420 M-46; 155mm 16 GH-52
Middle East
Harpoon Block II AShM/DM2A4/SeaHake Mod 4 HWT
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 9
DESTROYERS • DDGHM 1 Tahya Misr (FRA Aquitaine)
with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2
octuple A43 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2 twin B515 324mm
ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)
FRIGATES 9
FFGHM 5:
4 Alexandria (ex-US Oliver Hazard Perry) with 1 Mk13
GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM/SM-1MP
SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk
15 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun (capacity 2 SH-2G
Super Seasprite ASW hel)
1 El Fateh (Gowind 2500) with 2 quad lnchrs with
MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 1 16-cell VLS with
VL-MICA SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with MU90
LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)
FFGH 2 Damyat (ex-US Knox) with 1 octuple Mk16
GMLS with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM/ASROC, 2
twin 324mm Mk 32 TT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15
Phalanx CIWS, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 SH-2G
Super Seasprite ASW hel)
FFG 2 Najim Al Zaffer (PRC Jianghu I) with 2 twin lnchr
with HY-2 (CH-SS-N-2 Safflower) AShM, 4 RBU 1200
A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm guns
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 61
CORVETTES 7
FSGM 6:
2 Abu Qir (ESP Descubierta – 1†) with 2 quad Mk141
lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 octuple
Albatros lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple Mk32
338 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

324mm ASTT with Sting Ray LWT, 1 twin 375mm Coastal Defence
A/S mor, 1 76mm gun Army tps, Navy control
4 Ezzat (US Ambassador IV) with 2 quad lnchr with
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
RGM-84L Harpoon Block II AShM, 1 21-cell Mk49
COASTAL DEFENCE
lnchr with RAM Block 1A SAM, 1 Mk15 Mod 21
Block 1B Phalanx CIWS 1 76mm gun ARTY 100mm; 130mm SM-4-1; 152mm
FS 1 Shabab Misr (ex-RoK Po Hang) with 2 76mm guns AShM 4K87 (SS-C-2B Samlet); Otomat MkII
PCFG 12:
Naval Aviation
1 Molnya (RUS Tarantul IV) with 2 twin lnchr with
All aircraft operated by Air Force
3M80E Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn), 2 AK630 CIWS, 1
76mm gun AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4 Beech 1900C (maritime
6 Ramadan with 4 single lnchr with Otomat MkII AShM, surveillance)
1 76mm gun HELICOPTERS
5 Tiger with 2 twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 ASW 10 SH-2G Super Seasprite with Mk 46 LWT
76mm gun MRH 5 SA342L Gazelle
PCC 5: UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
5 Al-Nour (ex-PRC Hainan – 3 more in reserve†) with 2 ISR • Light 2 S-100 Camcopter
triple 324mm TT, 4 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 2 twin 57mm
guns
Coast Guard 2,000
PBFG 17: EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
4 Hegu (PRC – Komar type) with 2 single lnchr with PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 79
SY-1 AShM (2 additional vessels in reserve) PBF 14: 6 Crestitalia; 5 Swift Protector; 3 Peterson
5 October (FSU Komar – 1†) with 2 single lnchr with PB 65: 5 Nisr; 12 Sea Spectre MkIII; 15 Swiftships; 21
Otomat MkII AShM (1 additional vessel in reserve) Timsah; 3 Type-83; 9 Peterson
8 Osa I (ex-YUG – 3†) with 1 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-N-5
Grail) SAM (manual aiming), 4 single lnchr with Air Force 30,000 (incl 10,000 conscript)
P-15 Termit (SS-N-2A Styx) AShM FORCES BY ROLE
PBFM 4: FIGHTER
4 Shershen (FSU) with 1 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) 1 sqn with F-16A/B Fighting Falcon
SAM (manual aiming), 1 12-tube BM-24 MRL 8 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
PBF 10: 1 sqn with J-7
6 Kaan 20 (TUR MRTP 20) 3 sqn with MiG-21 Fishbed/MiG-21U Mongol A
4 Osa II (ex-FIN) 2 sqn with Mirage 5D/E
PB 6: 1 sqn with Mirage 2000B/C
4 Shanghai II (PRC) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
2 Shershen (FSU – 1†) with 4 single 533mm TT, 1 8-tube
1 sqn with Mirage 5E2
BM-21 MRL
1 sqn (forming) with Rafale DM
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 14
1 sqn (forming) with MiG-29M/M2 Fulcrum
MHC 5: 2 Al Siddiq (ex-US Osprey); 3 Dat Assawari (US
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
Swiftships)
1 sqn with SH-2G Super Seasprite
MSI 2 Safaga (US Swiftships)
MARITIME PATROL
MSO 7: 3 Assiout (FSU T-43 class); 4 Aswan (FSU Yurka)
1 sqn with Beech 1900C
AMPHIBIOUS 20
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LHD 2 Gamal
Abdel Nasser (FRA Mistral) (capacity 16 med hel; 2 LCT 1 sqn with Beech 1900 (ELINT); Commando Mk2E (ECM)
or 4 LCM; 13 MBTs; 50 AFVs; 450 troops) ELECTRONIC WARFARE/TRANSPORT
LANDING SHIPS • LSM 3 Polnochny A (FSU) (capacity 1 sqn with C-130H/VC-130H Hercules
6 MBT; 180 troops) AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING
LANDING CRAFT 15: 1 sqn with E-2C Hawkeye
LCM 13: 4 CTM NG; 9 Vydra (FSU) (capacity either 3 SEARCH & RESCUE
MBT or 200 troops) 1 unit with AW139
LCT 2 EDA-R TRANSPORT
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 24 1 sqn with An-74TK-200A
AOT 7 Ayeda (FSU Toplivo – 1 additional in reserve) 1 sqn with C-130H/C-130H-30 Hercules
AE 1 Halaib (ex-GER Westerwald-class) 1 sqn with C295M
AKR 3 Al Hurreya 1 sqn with DHC-5D Buffalo
AR 1 Shaledin (ex-GER Luneberg-class) 1 sqn with B-707-366C; B-737-100; Beech 200 Super
ARS 2 Al Areesh King Air; Falcon 20; Gulfstream III; Gulfstream IV;
ATF 5 Al Maks† (FSU Okhtensky) Gulfstream IV-SP
AX 5: 1 El Fateh† (ex-UK ‘Z’ class); 1 El Horriya (also used TRAINING
as the presidential yacht); 1 Al Kousser; 1 Intishat; 1 1 sqn with Alpha Jet*
other 1 sqn with DHC-5 Buffalo
 Middle East and North Africa 339

3 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano Air Defence Command 80,000 conscript;

1 sqn with Grob 115EG 70,000 reservists (total 150,000)
ε6 sqn with K-8 Karakorum*
FORCES BY ROLE
1 sqn with L-39 Albatros; L-59E Albatros* AIR DEFENCE
ATTACK HELICOPTER 5 AD div (geographically based) (total: 12 SAM bty with
2 sqn with AH-64D Apache M48 Chaparral, 12 radar bn, 12 ADA bde (total: 100
1 sqn with Ka-52A Hokum B ADA bn), 12 SAM bty with MIM-23B I-Hawk, 14 SAM
2 sqn with SA-342K Gazelle (with HOT) bty with Crotale, 18 AD bn with RIM-7M Sea Sparrow
1 sqn with SA-342L Gazelle with Skyguard/GDF-003 with Skyguard, 110 SAM bn
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER with S-125 Pechora-M (SA-3A Goa); 2K12 Kub (SA-6
1 sqn with CH-47C/D Chinook 
1 sqn with Mi-8 Gainful); S-75M Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline))
1 sqn with Mi-8/Mi-17-V1 Hip
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with S-70 Black Hawk; UH-60A/L Black Hawk
AIR DEFENCE
UAV
SAM 812+
Some sqn with R4E-50 Skyeye; Wing Loong (GJ-1)
Long-range S-300V4 (SA-23)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Medium-range 612+: 40+ Buk-M1-2/M2E (SA-11/SA-
AIRCRAFT 578 combat capable 17); 78+ MIM-23B I-Hawk; 282 S-75M Volkhov (SA-2
FTR 62: 26 F-16A Fighting Falcon; 6 F-16B Fighting Guideline); 212+ S-125 Pechora-M (SA-3A Goa)
Falcon; ε30 J-7 Short-range 150+: 56+ 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); 10
FGA 313: 139 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 37 F-16D Fighting 9K331M Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet); 24+ Crotale; 80 RIM-
Falcon; 3 Mirage 2000B; 15 Mirage 2000C; 36 Mirage 7M Sea Sparrow with Skyguard
5D/E; 12 Mirage 5E2; ε40 MiG-21 Fishbed/MiG-21U Point-defence 50+ M48 Chaparral
Mongol A; ε14 MiG-29M/M2 Fulcrum; 9 Rafale DM; 8 GUNS 1,646+
Rafale EM SP • 23mm 266+: 36+ Sinai-23 with Ayn al-Saqr
ELINT 2 VC-130H Hercules MANPAD; 230 ZSU-23-4 Shilka
ISR 12: ε6 AT-802 Air Tractor*; 6 Mirage 5R (5SDR)* TOWED 1,380: 35mm 80 GDF-003 with Skyguard;
AEW&C 7 E-2C Hawkeye 57mm 600 S-60; 85mm 400 M-1939 (KS-12); 100mm
TPT 80: Medium 24: 21 C-130H Hercules; 3 C-130H-30 300 KS-19

and North Africa

Hercules; Light 45: 3 An-74TK-200A; 1 Beech 200 King

Middle East
Air; 4 Beech 1900 (ELINT); 4 Beech 1900C; 24 C295M; Paramilitary ε397,000 active
9 DHC-5D Buffalo (being withdrawn) PAX 11: 1 B-707-
366C; 3 Falcon 20; 2 Gulfstream III; 1 Gulfstream IV; 4 Central Security Forces ε325,000
Gulfstream IV-SP Ministry of Interior; includes conscripts
TRG 329: 36 Alpha Jet*; 54 EMB-312 Tucano; 74 Grob ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
115EG; 120 K-8 Karakorum*; 10 L-39 Albatros; 35 L-59E* APC • APC (W) Walid
HELICOPTERS AUV Sherpa Light Scout
ATK 57+: 45 AH-64D Apache; 12+ Ka-52A Hokum B
ASW 10 SH-2G Super Seasprite (opcon Navy)
National Guard ε60,000
ELINT 4 Commando Mk2E (ECM) Lt wpns only
MRH 72: 2 AW139 (SAR); 65 SA342K Gazelle (some with FORCES BY ROLE
HOT); 5 SA342L Gazelle (opcon Navy) MANOEUVRE
TPT 96: Heavy 19: 3 CH-47C Chinook; 16 CH-47D Other
Chinook; Medium 77: 2 AS-61; 24 Commando (of which 8 paramilitary bde (cadre) (3 paramilitary bn)
3 VIP); 40 Mi-8T Hip; 3 Mi-17-1V Hip; 4 S-70 Black Hawk EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
(VIP); 4 UH-60L Black Hawk (VIP) ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
APC • APC
TRG 17 UH-12E (W) 250 Walid
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
CISR • Heavy 4+ Wing Loong (GJ-1) Border Guard Forces ε12,000
ISR • Medium R4E-50 Skyeye Ministry of Interior; lt wpns only
AIR LAUNCHED MISSILES FORCES BY ROLE
AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; AIM-9M/P Sidewinder; MANOEUVRE
R-550 Magic; 9M39 Igla-V; IIR Mica IR; ARH Mica RF; Other
SARH AIM-7E/F/M Sparrow; R-530 18 Border Guard regt
ASM AGM-65A/D/F/G Maverick; AGM-114F/K Hellfire;
AS-30L; HOT; AKD-10 (LJ-7); 9M120 Ataka (AT-9 DEPLOYMENT
Spiral-2)
AShM AGM-84L Harpoon Block II; AM39 Exocet; CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 1,015; 9
ARM Armat; Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler) obs; 1 inf bn; 1 tpt coy
BOMBS DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
Laser-guided GBU-10/12 Paveway II MONUSCO 155; 16 obs; 1 SF coy
340 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

LIBERIA: UN • UNMIL 2 obs a network of non-state groups, such as Hizbullah and Houthi
forces. The armed forces are numerous by regional standards and
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 327; 3 obs; 2 sy coy; 1 MP coy
its personnel are reasonably well trained, with some benefiting
SAUDI ARABIA: Operation Restoring Hope 6 F-16C Fighting from operational experience. The IRGC’s Quds Force is a principal
Falcon element of Iran’s military power abroad, while elements of the
Basij militia also play a foreign role. The regular navy has limited
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1; 2 obs
power-projection capabilities, while the IRGC navy is responsible
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 854; 20 obs; 1 inf bn for maritime security close to home. The armed forces struggle
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 18 obs with an ageing inventory of primary combat equipment that inge-
nuity and asymmetric-warfare techniques can only partially offset.
China and Russia are potentially major suppliers. Tehran procured
FOREIGN FORCES from Russia what is believed to be the S-300PMU2 (SA-20 Gargoyle)
Australia MFO (Operation Mazurka) 27 long-range SAM system. In regional terms, Iran has a well-devel-
oped defence-industrial base, which has displayed the capacity to
Canada MFO 68 support and sustain equipment. Key sectors continue to develop,
Colombia MFO 275; 1 inf bn including missiles and guided weapons, but the defence indus-
Czech Republic MFO 18; 1 C295M try is still incapable of meeting the need for modern weapons
Fiji MFO 170; elm 1 inf bn systems.
France MFO 1 ACTIVE 523,000 (Army 350,000 Islamic
Italy MFO 78; 3 PB Revolutionary Guard Corps 125,000 Navy 18,000 Air
New Zealand MFO 26; 1 trg unit; 1 tpt unit 30,000) Paramilitary 40,000
Norway MFO 3 Armed Forces General Staff coordinates two parallel organisations:
United Kingdom MFO 2 the regular armed forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
United States MFO 454; elm 1 ARNG recce bn; 1 ARNG Corps
spt bn (1 EOD coy, 1 medical coy, 1 hel coy) Conscript liability 18–21 months (reported, with variations depend-
Uruguay MFO 41 1 engr/tpt unit ing on location in which service is performed)

RESERVE 350,000 (Army 350,000, ex-service

Iran IRN volunteers)

Iranian Rial r 2017 2018 2019

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
GDP r 14807tr 20218tr
US$ 431bn 430bn Army 130,000; 220,000 conscript (total
per capita US$ 5,290 5,222 350,000)
Growth % 3.7 -1.5 FORCES BY ROLE
Inflation % 9.6 29.6 5 corps-level regional HQ
Def bdgt r 720tr 921tr COMMAND
1 cdo div HQ
US$ 21.0bn 19.6bn
4 armd div HQ
US$1=r 34378.43 47009.15
2 mech div HQ
Population 83,024,745 4 inf div HQ
Ethnic groups: Persian 51%; Azeri 24%; Gilaki/Mazandarani 8%; SPECIAL FORCES
Kurdish 7%; Arab 3%; Lur 2%; Baloch 2%; Turkman 2% 1 cdo div (3 cdo bde)
6 cdo bde
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 SF bde
Male 12.4% 3.5% 3.7% 5.2% 23.4% 2.5% MANOEUVRE
Female 11.8% 3.3% 3.6% 4.9% 22.7% 2.9% Armoured
8 armd bde
Capabilities Mechanised
14 mech bde
Iran is a major regional military power, due to a combination of
asymmetric and other strategies, despite significant handicaps to
Light
its conventional capabilities because of international sanctions 12 inf bde
and restrictions on arms imports. Iran’s armed forces consist of the Air Manoeuvre
regular armed forces, with a mix of ageing combat equipment, 1 AB bde
and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), with a focus on Aviation
asymmetric capabilities. Chiefly through the IRGC, Iran exerts sig- Some avn gp
nificant military influence via a range of regional allies and proxies, COMBAT SUPPORT
in effect a form of expeditionary capability. It has also developed a
5 arty gp
ballistic-missile inventory. Iran has been largely isolated since 1979
though it has a key relationship with Syria and ties with Russia, EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
including for defence sales. It has developed significant influence Totals incl those held by IRGC Ground Forces. Some
in weaker regional states like Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen through equipment serviceability in doubt
 Middle East and North Africa 341

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 125,000+

MBT 1,513+: 480 T-72S; 150 M60A1; 75+ T-62; 100
Chieftain Mk3/Mk5; 540 T-54/T-55/Type-59/Safir-74; 168 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground
M47/M48; Zulfiqar Forces 100,000+
LT TK 80+: 80 Scorpion; Towsan Controls Basij paramilitary forces. Lightly manned in
RECCE 35 EE-9 Cascavel peacetime. Primary role: internal security; secondary role:
IFV 610+: 210 BMP-1; 400 BMP-2 with 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 external defence, in conjunction with regular armed forces
Spigot); BMT-2 Cobra FORCES BY ROLE
APC 640+ COMMAND
APC (T) 340: 140 Boragh with 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 31 provincial corps HQ (2 in Tehran)
Spigot); 200 M113 SPECIAL FORCES
APC (W) 300+: 300 BTR-50/BTR-60; Rakhsh 3 spec ops div
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES MANOEUVRE
ARV 20+: BREM-1 reported; 20 Chieftain ARV; M578;
Armoured
T-54/55 ARV reported
2 armd div
VLB 15: 15 Chieftain AVLB

3 armd bde
MW Taftan 1
Light
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
8+ inf div
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger/I-
5+ inf bde
Raad); 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5
Air Manoeuvre
Spandrel/Towsan-1); Saeqhe 1; Saeqhe 2; Toophan; Toophan 2
1 AB bde
RCL 200+: 75mm M20; 82mm B-10; 106mm ε200 M40;
107mm B-11 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Naval
ARTILLERY 6,798+ Forces 20,000+ (incl 5,000 Marines)
SP 292+: 122mm 60+: 60 2S1 Gvozdika; Raad-1 (Thunder 1);
FORCES BY ROLE
155mm 150+: 150 M109A1; Raad-2 (Thunder 2); 170mm 30
COMBAT SUPPORT
M-1978; 175mm 22 M107; 203mm 30 M110
Some arty bty
TOWED 2,030+; 105mm 150: 130 M101A1; 20 M-56;
Some AShM bty with HY-2 (CH-SSC-3 Seersucker)
122mm 640: 540 D-30; 100 Type-54 (M-30); 130mm 985

and North Africa

AShM

M-46; 152mm 30 D-20; 155mm 205: 120 GHN-45; 70
M114; 15 Type-88 WAC-21; 203mm 20 M115
MRL 1,476+: 107mm 1,300: 700 Type-63; 600 HASEB Fadjr
1; 122mm 157: 7 BM-11; 100 BM-21 Grad; 50 Arash/Hadid/
Noor; 240mm 19+: ε10 Fadjr 3; 9 M-1985; 330mm Fadjr 5
MOR 3,000: 81mm; 82mm; 107mm M30; 120mm M-65
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
SRBM • Conventional ε30 CH-SS-8 (175 msl); Shahin-1/
Shahin-2; Nazeat; Oghab
AIRCRAFT • TPT 17 Light 16: 10 Cessna 185; 2 F-27
Friendship; 4 Turbo Commander 690; PAX 1 Falcon 20
HELICOPTERS
ATK 50 AH-1J Cobra
TPT 167: Heavy ε20 CH-47C Chinook; Medium 69: 49
Bell 214; 20 Mi-171; Light 78: 68 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 10
Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB-206)
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
HELICOPTERS
CISR • Medium Shahed 129
ISR • Medium Mohajer 3/4; Light Mohajer 2; Ababil
AIR DEFENCE
SAM
Short-range FM-80
Point-defence 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K32
Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; Misaq 1 (QW-1 Vanguard); Misaq
2 (QW-18); 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch) (reported);
HN-5A
GUNS 1,122
SP 180: 23mm 100 ZSU-23-4; 57mm 80 ZSU-57-2
TOWED 942+: 14.5mm ZPU-2; ZPU-4; 23mm 300 ZU-
23-2; 35mm 92 GDF-002; 37mm M-1939; 40mm 50 L/70;
57mm 200 S-60; 85mm 300 M-1939
Middle East
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
In addition to the vessels listed, the IRGC operates a
substantial number of patrol boats with a full-load dis-
placement below 10 tonnes, including ε40 Boghammar-
class vessels and small Bavar-class wing-in-ground effect
air vehicles
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 126
PBFG 56:
5 C14 with 2 twin lnchr with C-701 (Kosar)/C-704
(Nasr) AShM
10 Mk13 with 2 single lnchr with C-704 (Nasr) AShM,
2 single 324mm TT
10 Thondor (PRC Houdong) with 2 twin lnchr with
C-802A (Ghader) AShM, 2 twin AK230 CIWS
25 Peykaap II (IPS-16 mod) with 2 single lnchr with
C-701 (Kosar) AShM/C-704 (Nasr), 2 single 324mm
TT
6 Zolfaghar (Peykaap III/IPS-16 mod) with 2 single
lnchr with C-701 (Kosar)/C-704 (Nasr) AShM
PBFT 15 Peykaap I (IPS -16) with 2 single 324mm TT
PBF 35: 15 Kashdom II; 10 Tir (IPS-18); ε10 Pashe
(MIG-G-1900)
PB ε20 Ghaem
AMPHIBIOUS
LANDING SHIPS • LST 3 Hormuz 24 (Hejaz design
for commercial use)
LANDING CRAFT • LCT 2 Hormuz 21 (minelaying
capacity)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AP 3 Naser
COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM C-701 (Kosar); C-704
(Nasr); C-802; HY-2 (CH-SSC-3 Seersucker)
342 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

HELICOPTERS PBG 9:
MRH 5 Mi-171 Hip 3 Hendijan with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 (Noor) (CH-
TPT • Light some Bell 206 (AB-206) Jet Ranger SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM
3 Kayvan with 2 single lnchr with C-704 (Nasr) AShM
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 3 Parvin with 2 single lnchr with C-704 (Nasr) AShM
Marines 5,000+ PBFT 3 Kajami (semi-submersible) with 2 324mm TT
FORCES BY ROLE PBF 1 MIL55
MANOEUVRE PB 34: 9 C14; 9 Hendijan; 6 MkII; 10 MkIII
Amphibious AMPHIBIOUS
1 marine bde LANDING SHIPS 12
LSM 3 Farsi (ROK) (capacity 9 tanks; 140 troops)
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps LST 3 Hengam with 1 hel landing platform (capacity 9
Aerospace Force tanks; 225 troops)
Controls Iran’s strategic-missile force LSL 6 Fouque
FORCES BY ROLE LANDING CRAFT 11
MISSILE LCT 2
ε1 bde with Shahab-1/-2; Qiam-1 LCU 1 Liyan 110
ε1 bn with Shahab-3 UCAC 8: 2 Wellington Mk 4; 4 Wellington Mk 5; 2 Tondar
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE (UK Winchester)
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 18
MRBM • Conventional up to 50: Shahab-3 (mobile AE 2 Delvar
& silo); some Ghadr-1 (in test); some Emad-1 (in test); AFD 2 Dolphin
some Sajjil-2 (in devt); some Khorramshahr (in devt) AG 1 Hamzah with 2 single lnchr with C-802 (Noor) (CH-
SRBM • Conventional up to 100: some Fateh 110; SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM
Some Khalij Fars (Fateh 110 mod ASBM); some Sha- AK 3 Delvar
hab-1/-2; some Qiam-1; some Zelzal AORH 3: 2 Bandar Abbas; 1 Kharg with 1 76mm gun
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AWT 5: 4 Kangan; 1 Delvar
CISR • Medium AX 2 Kialas
Shahed 129 COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM C-701 (Kosar); C-704 (Nasr);
C-802 (Noor); C-802A (Ghader); Ra’ad (reported)
Navy 18,000
HQ at Bandar Abbas Marines 2,600
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FORCES BY ROLE
In addition to the vessels listed, the Iranian Navy operates MANOEUVRE
a substantial number of patrol boats with a full-load dis- Amphibious
placement below 10 tonnes 2 marine bde
SUBMARINES 21
Naval Aviation 2,600
TACTICAL 21
SSK 3 Taregh (RUS Paltus Project-877EKM) with 6 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
single 533mm TT AIRCRAFT
SSC 1 Fateh (in trials) TPT 16: Light 13: 5 Do-228; 4 F-27 Friendship; 4 Turbo
SSW 17: 16 Qadir with 2 single 533mm TT with Valfajar Commander 680; PAX 3 Falcon 20 (ELINT)
HWT (additional vessels in build); 1 Nahang HELICOPTERS
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 67 ASW ε10 SH-3D Sea King
CORVETTES 6 MCM 3 RH-53D Sea Stallion
FSGM 1 Jamaran (UK Vosper Mk 5 derivative – 1 TPT • Light 17: 5 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 2 Bell 206 Jet
more undergoing sea trials) with 2 twin lnchr with Ranger (AB-206); 10 Bell 212 (AB-212)
C-802 (Noor) (CH-SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 2 single
lnchr with SM-1 SAM, 2 triple 324mm Mk32 ASTT, 1 Air Force 30,000 (incl 12,000 Air Defence)
76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform FORCES BY ROLE
FSG 5: Serviceability probably about 60% for US ac types and about
3 Alvand (UK Vosper Mk 5) with 2 twin lnchr with 80% for PRC/Russian ac. Includes IRGC AF equipment
C-802 (CH-SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 2 triple Mk32 FIGHTER
324mm ASTT, 1 114mm gun 1 sqn with F-7M Airguard; JJ-7*
2 Bayandor (US PF-103) with 2 twin lnchr with C-802 2 sqn with F-14 Tomcat
(CH-SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 2 triple 324mm Mk32 2 sqn with MiG-29A/UB Fulcrum
ASTT, 1 76mm gun FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
PCFG 13 Kaman (FRA Combattante II) with 1–2 twin lnchr 1 sqn with Mirage F-1E; F-5E/F Tiger II
with C-802 (Noor) (CH-SS-N-8 Saccade) AShM, 1 76mm 5 sqn with F-4D/E Phantom II
gun 3 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II

1 sqn (forming) with Su-22M4 Fitter K; Su-22UM-3K
Fitter G
GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with Su-24MK Fencer D
MARITIME PATROL
1 sqn with P-3F Orion*
ISR
1 (det) sqn with RF-4E Phantom II*
SEARCH & RESCUE
Some flt with Bell 214C (AB-214C)
TANKER/TRANSPORT
1 sqn with B-707; B-747; B-747F
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with B-707; Falcon 50; L-1329 Jetstar; Bell 412
2 sqn with C-130E/H Hercules
1 sqn with F-27 Friendship; Falcon 20
1 sqn with Il-76 Candid; An-140 (Iran-140 Faraz)
TRAINING
1 sqn with Beech F33A/C Bonanza
1 sqn with F-5B Freedom Fighter
1 sqn with PC-6
1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer
Some units with EMB-312 Tucano; MFI-17 Mushshak; TB-
21 Trinidad; TB-200 Tobago
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with CH-47 Chinook
Some units with Bell 206A Jet Ranger (AB-206A);
Shabaviz 2-75; Shabaviz 2061
AIR DEFENCE
16 bn with MIM-23B I-Hawk/Shahin
4 bn with S-300PMU2 (SA-20 Gargoyle)
5 sqn with FM-80 (Crotale); Rapier; Tigercat; S-75M
Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline); S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon);
FIM-92A Stinger; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K331
Tor-M1 (SA-15 Gauntlet)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 336 combat capable
FTR 184+: 20 F-5B Freedom Fighter; 55+ F-5E/F Tiger II
24 F-7M Airguard; 43 F-14 Tomcat; 36 MiG-29A/U/UB
Fulcrum; up to 6 Azarakhsh (reported)
FGA 89: 64 F-4D/E Phantom II; 10 Mirage F-1E; up to 6
Saegheh (reported); up to 7 Su-22M4 Fitter K; 3+ Su-
22UM-3K Fitter G
ATK 39: 29 Su-24MK Fencer D; 7 Su-25K Frogfoot (status
unknown); 3 Su-25UBK Frogfoot (status unknown)
ASW 3 P-3F Orion
ISR: 6+ RF-4E Phantom II*
TKR/TPT 3: ε1 B-707; ε2 B-747
TPT 117: Heavy 12 Il-76 Candid; Medium ε19 C-130E/H
Hercules; Light 75: 11 An-74TK-200; 5 An-140 (Iran-140
Faraz); 10 F-27 Friendship; 1 L-1329 Jetstar; 10 PC-6B
Turbo Porter; 8 TB-21 Trinidad; 4 TB-200 Tobago; 3 Turbo
Commander 680; 14 Y-7; 9 Y-12; PAX 11: 2 B-707; 1 B-747;
4 B-747F; 1 Falcon 20; 3 Falcon 50
TRG 141: 25 Beech F33A/C Bonanza; 15 EMB-312 Tucano;
14 JJ-7*; 25 MFI-17 Mushshak; 12 Parastu; 15 PC-6; 35 PC-7
Turbo Trainer
HELICOPTERS
MRH 2 Bell 412
TPT 34+: Heavy 2+ CH-47 Chinook; Medium 30 Bell 214C
(AB-214C); Light 2+: 2 Bell 206A Jet Ranger (AB-206A);
Middle East and North Africa 343
some Shabaviz 2-75 (indigenous versions in production);
some Shabaviz 2061
AIR DEFENCE
SAM 514+:
Long-range 10 S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon); 32
S-300PMU2 (SA-20 Gargoyle)
Medium-range 195+: 150+ MIM-23B I-Hawk/Shahin; 45
S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline);
Short-range 279: 250 FM-80 (Crotale); 29 9K331 Tor-M1
(SA-15 Gauntlet)
Point-defence 30+: 30 Rapier; FIM-92 Stinger; 9K32
Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
GUNS • TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 35mm GDF-002
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR PL-2A‡; PL-7; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-
11 Archer); AIM-9J Sidewinder; IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10
Alamo); SARH AIM-7E-2 Sparrow; ARH AIM-54 Phoenix†
ASM AGM-65A Maverick; Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-
25ML (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge)
AShM C-801K
ARM Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter)
BOMBS
Electro-optical guided GBU-87/B Qassed
Air Defence Command
Established to coordinate army, air-force and IRGC air-
defence assets. Precise composition unclear
and North Africa
Paramilitary 40,000–60,000
Middle East
Law-Enforcement Forces 40,000–60,000
(border and security troops); 450,000 on
mobilisation (incl conscripts)
Part of armed forces in wartime

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB ε90
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 2+: 2 An-140; some Cessna
185/Cessna 310
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light ε24 AB-205 (Bell 205)/
AB-206 (Bell 206) Jet Ranger
Basij Resistance Force ε600,000 on
mobilisation
Paramilitary militia with claimed membership of 12.6
million; ε600,000 combat capable
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Other
2,500 militia bn(-) (claimed, limited permanent mem-
bership)
Cyber
Iran has a well-developed capacity for cyber operations.
It has a well-educated and computer-literate young
population. The Stuxnet incident in 2010 is reported to
have been a turning point in Iran’s approach to cyber
capabilities. In 2011–12, Tehran established a Joint Chiefs of
Staff Cyber Command with emphasis on thwarting attacks
against Iranian nuclear facilities and coordinating national
cyber warfare and information security. In September 2015,
344 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appointed members to a Supreme level of attrition among Iraqi forces has caused concern, particu-
Council for Cyberspace, reportedly a policymaking and larly among the well-regarded Counter-Terrorism Service, which
supervisory body. The IRGC has its own Cyber Defence is often used as a spearhead force. The US has been engaged in
Command; IRGC civilian business interests will aid its a training effort, not least in regenerating air-force capabilities.
NATO announced a new training mission, starting in late 2018.
activities in this area. The precise relationship of groups
A key focus is adapting Iraqi forces to address a developing ISIS
such as the ‘Iranian Cyber Army’ to regime and military insurgency beyond the urban areas. Iraqi forces appear to have
organisations is unclear, but the former has launched improved their ability to conduct complex operations, including at
hacking attacks against a number of foreign organisations. range within the country. However, there has been a reliance on
There are continued reports of increasing investment US air support and coalition ISR assistance, suggesting continuing
in cyber capabilities, used not only for propaganda and capability limitations in this area. Significant logistical shortcom-
intelligence exploitation but also as a means for Iran ings remain, including logistics support and intelligence integra-
to attempt to offset its conventional military weakness tion. The inventory comprises Soviet-era and Russian equipment
vis-à-vis its neighbours and the US, and to exfiltrate combined with newer European- and US-sourced platforms. A
major enhancement has been the delivery and integration of F-16
commercial data. On 23 March 2018, the US Department
combat aircraft. The long-standing ambition to purchase attack
of Justice indicted nine Iranian employees of the Tehran- helicopters has been fulfilled. Barring military maintenance facili-
based Mabna Institute for a multi-year cyber-espionage ties, the Iraqi defence industry has only a limited ability to manu-
campaign against US universities, which they allegedly facture light weapons and ammunition.
carried out on behalf of the IRGC.
ACTIVE 64,000 (Army 54,000 Navy 3,000 Air 4,000
Air Defence 3,000) Paramilitary 145,000
DEPLOYMENT
GULF OF ADEN AND SOMALI BASIN: Navy: 1 FSG; 1 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
AORH
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 1; 3 obs Army 54,000
SYRIA: 3,000 Due to ongoing conflict with ISIS insurgents, there have
been significant personnel and equipment losses in the
Iraq IRQ Iraqi Army. Many formations are now under-strength.
Military capability has been bolstered by the activity of
Iraqi Dinar D 2017 2018 2019 Shia militias and Kurdish Peshmerga forces
GDP D 227tr 273tr FORCES BY ROLE
US$ 192bn 231bn
SPECIAL FORCES
3 SF bde
per capita US$ 4,950 5,793
1 ranger bn
Growth % -2.1 1.5 MANOEUVRE
Inflation % 0.1 2.0 Armoured
Def bdgt [a] D 22.8tr 204tr 1 (9th) armd div (2 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1 engr bn, 1
US$ 19.3bn 17.3bn sigs regt, 1 log bde)
Mechanised
FMA (US$) US$ 250m 0m
3 (5th, 8th & 10th) mech div (4 mech inf bde, 1 engr bn,
US$1=D 1182.00 1182.00 1 sigs regt, 1 log bde)
[a] Defence and security budget 1 (7th) mech div (2 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1
Population 40,194,216 sigs regt, 1 log bde)
Light
Ethnic and religious groups: Arab 75–80%, of which Shia Muslim
55%, Sunni Muslim 45%; Kurdish 20–25% 1 (6th) mot div (3 mot inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs
regt, 1 log bde)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 (14th) mot div (2 mot inf bde, 3 inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1
Male 19.9% 5.4% 4.5% 3.9% 15.3% 1.6% sigs regt, 1 log bde)
1 (1st) inf div (2 inf bde)
Female 19.1% 5.2% 4.4% 3.8% 15.1% 2.0%
1 (11th) inf div (3 lt inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1 log
bde)
Capabilities 1 (15th) inf div (5 inf bde)
The armed forces’ capabilities and morale have improved since the 1 (16th) inf div (2 inf bde)
collapse of several divisions in the face of the ISIS advance in the 1 (17th Cdo) inf div (4 inf bde, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs regt, 1
north in 2014. The recapture of Mosul demonstrated incremental log bde)
growth in capability, in terms of combat power and tactics, as the
1 inf bde
Iraqi armed forces adapted to fight ISIS in urban areas. The future
Other
of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces and the Popular Mobilisation
Forces militias, particularly questions over their integration into a 1 (PM SF) sy div (3 inf bde)
national-security framework, remains an issue for Baghdad. The HELICOPTER
government’s most critical security relationship is with the US, and 1 atk hel sqn with Mi-28NE Havoc
other participants in the international counter-ISIS coalition. The 1 atk hel sqn with Mi-35M Hind
 Middle East and North Africa 345

1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II) Air Force ε4,000
3 atk hel sqn with Bell T407; H135M FORCES BY ROLE
3 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171Sh FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 ISR sqn with SA342M Gazelle 1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
2 trg sqn with Bell 206; OH-58C Kiowa GROUND ATTACK
1 trg sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II) 1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25K/Su-25UBK Frogfoot
1 trg sqn with Mi-17 Hip 1 sqn with L-159A; L-159T1
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ISR
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 1 sqn with CH-2000 Sama; SB7L-360 Seeker
MBT 393+: ε100 M1A1 Abrams; 168+ T-72M/M1; ε50 T-55; 1 sqn with Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; Cessna AC-208B
75 T-90S Combat Caravan*
RECCE 453: ε400 Akrep; 18 BRDM 2; 35 EE-9 Cascavel; 1 sqn with Beech 350 King Air
IFV 240+: ε80 BMP-1; some BMP-3; ε60 BTR-4 (inc TRANSPORT
variants); 100 BTR-80A 1 sqn with An-32B Cline
APC 2,092+ 1 sqn with C-130E/J-30 Hercules
APC (T) 900: ε500 M113A2/Talha; ε400 MT-LB TRAINING
PPV 1,192+: 12 Barracuda; 250 Caiman; ε500 Dzik-3; ε400 1 sqn with Cessna 172, Cessna 208B
ILAV Badger; Mamba; 30 Maxxpro 1 sqn with Lasta-95
AUV M-ATV 1 sqn with T-6A
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 1 sqn with T-50IQ Golden Eagle*
ARV 222+: 180 BREM; 35+ M88A1/2; 7 Maxxpro ARV; EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
T-54/55 ARV; Type-653; VT-55A AIRCRAFT 65 combat capable
NBC VEHICLES 20 Fuchs NBC FGA 21: 18 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 3 F-16D Fighting Falcon;
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE ATK 30: 10 L-159A; 1 L-159T1; ε19 Su-25/Su-25K/Su-
MSL • MANPATS 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan) 25UBK Frogfoot
(reported) ISR 10: 2 Cessna AC-208B Combat Caravan*; 2 SB7L-360
ARTILLERY 1,085+ Seeker; 6 Beech 350ER King Air
SP 72+: 152mm 18+ Type-83; 155mm 30: 6 M109A1; 24 TPT 29: Medium 15: 3 C-130E Hercules; 6 C-130J-30

and North Africa

Hercules; 6 An-32B Cline (of which 2 combat capable);

Middle East
M109A5
TOWED 60+: 130mm M-46/Type-59; 152mm D-20; Type- Light 14: 1 Beech 350 King Air; 5 Cessna 208B Grand
83; 155mm ε60 M198 Caravan; 8 Cessna 172
MRL 3+: 122mm some BM-21 Grad; 220mm 3+ TOS-1A TRG 45+: 8 CH-2000 Sama; 10+ Lasta-95; 15 T-6A; 12
MOR 950+: 81mm ε500 M252; 120mm ε450 M120; T-50IQ Golden Eagle*
240mm M-240 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
HELICOPTERS AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; AIM-9M Sidewinder
ATK 28: 11 Mi-28NE Havoc; 4 Mi-28UB Havoc; 13 Mi-35M ASM AGM-114 Hellfire
Hind BOMBS
MRH 63+: 4+ SA342 Gazelle; 17 Bell IA407; 23 H135M; ε19 Laser-Guided GBU-12 Paveway II
INS/GPS-guided FT-9
Mi-17 Hip H/Mi-171Sh
ISR 10 OH-58C Kiowa
TPT • Light 44: 16 Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II); 10 Bell
Air Defence Command ε3,000
206B3 Jet Ranger; ε18 Bell T407 FORCES BY ROLE
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • CISR Heavy CH-4 AIR DEFENCE
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM 9K114 Shturm (AT-6 1 bn with 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
Spiral); AR-1; Ingwe 1 bn with M1097 Avenger
1 bn with 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)
Navy 3,000 1 bn with ZU-23-2; S-60
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIR DEFENCE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32
SAM
PCO 2 Al Basra (US River Hawk)
Short-range 24 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
PCC 4 Fateh (ITA Diciotti)
Point-defence M1097 Avenger; 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24
PB 20: 12 Swiftships 35; 5 Predator (PRC 27m); 3 Al Faw
Grinch)
PBR 6: 2 Type-200; 4 Type-2010
GUNS • TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60
Marines 1,000
FORCES BY ROLE
Paramilitary ε145,000
MANOEUVRE Iraqi Federal Police ε36,000
Amphibious
2 mne bn Border Enforcement ε9,000
346 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Militias ε100,000
Popular Mobilisation Forces include: Kata’ib Sayyid
Israel ISR
al-Shuhada Brigade; Kata’ib Hizbullah; Badr Brigades; New Israeli Shekel NS 2017 2018 2019
Peace Brigades and Imam Ali Battalions
GDP NS 1.26tr 1.31tr
US$ 351bn 366bn
FOREIGN FORCES
per capita US$ 40,273 41,180
Australia Operation Inherent Resolve (Okra) 380
Growth % 3.3 3.6
Belgium Operation Inherent Resolve (Valiant Phoenix) 30
Inflation % 0.2 0.9
Canada Operation Inherent Resolve (Impact) 370; 1 SF gp; 1
Def bdgt NS 68.0bn 66.3bn
med unit; 1 hel flt with 4 Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon)
US$ 18.9bn 18.5bn
Czech Republic Operation Inherent Resolve 30
Denmark Operation Inherent Resolve 190; 1 SF gp; 1 trg FMA (US) US$ 3.2bn 3.1bn 3.3bn
team US$1=NS 3.60 3.58
Estonia Operation Inherent Resolve 7 Population 8,424,904
Fiji UNAMI 165; 2 sy unit
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Finland Operation Inherent Resolve 100; 1 trg unit
France Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal) 500; 1 SF gp; 1 Male 13.9% 4.1% 3.8% 3.6% 19.5% 5.2%
trg unit; 1 SP arty bty with 4 CAESAR Female 13.3% 4.0% 3.6% 3.5% 19.0% 6.4%
Germany Operation Inherent Resolve 110; some trg unit
Hungary Operation Inherent Resolve 164
Capabilities
Italy Operation Inherent Resolve (Prima Parthica) 845; 1 inf The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are organised for territorial defence,
regt; 1 trg unit; 1 hel sqn with 4 NH90 short-term interventions in neighbouring states and limited
regional power projection. Israel is widely believed to possess a
Latvia Operation Inherent Resolve 6 nuclear-weapons capability. The IDF began a five-year defence
Nepal UNAMI 77; 1 sy unit programme (Plan Gideon) in 2015, focusing resources on its
Netherlands Operation Inherent Resolve 150; 3 trg units regular front-line combat formations. Many reserve units have
New Zealand Operation Inherent Resolve 143; 1 trg unit been disbanded and older equipment retired from service. The US
remains Israel’s key defence partner, as well as a significant source
Norway Operation Inherent Resolve 60; 1 trg unit of funding, and is instrumental in several of the IDF’s equipment
Poland Operation Inherent Resolve 130 programmes, particularly in missile defence and combat aviation.
Portugal Operation Inherent Resolve 34 Israel also maintains discreet ties with a number of Arab states.
Personnel quality and training are generally high, despite the IDF’s
Romania Operation Inherent Resolve 50
continuing reliance on national service. Ground-forces training is
Slovenia Operation Inherent Resolve 6 being overhauled, with new training centres under construction.
Spain Operation Inherent Resolve 350; 2 trg units The IDF has no requirement for out-of-area deployments and its
Sweden Operation Inherent Resolve 66 logistics capabilities are limited to sustaining operations within
Israel itself or in immediate neighbouring territories. The largely
Turkey Army 2,000; 1 armd BG
asymmetric nature of the threats faced by the IDF in recent years
United Kingdom Operation Inherent Resolve (Shader) 400; 2 has focused modernisation efforts on force-protection, missile-
inf bn(-); 1 engr sqn(-) defence and precision-strike capabilities. Israel maintains a broad
United States Operation Inherent Resolve 5,000; 1 mtn div defence-industrial base, with world-class capabilities in several
HQ; 1 cav bde(-); 1 EOD pl; 1 atk hel sqn with AH-64D areas, notably armoured vehicles, unmanned systems, guided
weapons and cyber security.
Apache
ACTIVE 169,500 (Army 126,000 Navy 9,500 Air
34,000) Paramilitary 8,000
Conscript liability Officers 48 months, other ranks 32 months,
women 24 months (Jews and Druze only; Christians, Circassians
and Muslims may volunteer)

RESERVE 465,000 (Army 400,000 Navy 10,000 Air

55,000)
Annual trg as cbt reservists to age 40 (some specialists to age 54)
for male other ranks, 38 (or marriage/pregnancy) for women

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Strategic Forces
Israel is widely believed to have a nuclear capability –
delivery means include F-15I and F-16I ac, Jericho 2 IRBM
and, reportedly, Dolphin/Tanin-class SSKs with LACM
 Middle East and North Africa 347

FORCES BY ROLE 1 SIGINT unit

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 2 MP bn
3 IRBM sqn with Jericho 2
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Reserves 400,000+ on mobilisation
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS FORCES BY ROLE
IRBM • Nuclear: ε24 Jericho 2 COMMAND
3 armd div HQ
Strategic Defences 1 AB div HQ
FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE
AIR DEFENCE Armoured
3 bty with Arrow 2 ATBM with Green Pine/Super Green 9 armd bde
Pine radar and Citrus Tree command post Mechanised
10 bty with Iron Dome (incl reserve bty) 8 mech inf bde
6 bty with MIM-104C Patriot PAC-2 Light
2 bty with David’s Sling 16 (territorial/regional) inf bde
Air Manoeuvre
Space 4 para bde
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Mountain
SATELLITES 9 1 mtn inf bn
COMMUNICATIONS 3 Amos COMBAT SUPPORT
ISR 6: 1 EROS; 4 Ofeq (7, 9, 10 & 11); 1 TecSAR-1 (Polaris) 5 arty bde
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Army 26,000; 100,000 conscript (total 126,000) 6 log unit
Organisation and structure of formations may vary EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
according to op situations. Equipment includes that ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
required for reserve forces on mobilisation MBT 490: ε160 Merkava MkIII; ε330 Merkava MkIV (ε370
FORCES BY ROLE Merkava MkII; ε570 Merkava MkIII; ε180 Merkava MkIV
COMMAND all in store)

and North Africa

Middle East
3 (regional comd) corps HQ RECCE ε300 RBY-1 RAMTA
2 armd div HQ APC • APC (T) 1,300: ε200 Namer; ε200 Achzarit
5 (territorial) inf div HQ (modified T-55 chassis); 500 M113A2; ε400 Nagmachon
1 (home defence) comd HQ (Centurion chassis); Nakpadon (5,000 M113A1/A2 in store)
AUV 100 Ze’ev
SPECIAL FORCES
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
3 SF bn
AEV D9R; Namer; Puma
1 spec ops bde (4 spec ops unit)
ARV Centurion Mk2; Eyal; Nemmera; M88A1; M113 ARV
MANOEUVRE
VLB Alligator MAB; M48/60; MTU
Reconnaissance NBC VEHICLES ε8 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC
1 indep recce bn ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL
Armoured SP M113 with Spike; Tamuz (Spike NLOS)
3 armd bde (1 armd recce coy, 3 armd bn, 1 AT coy, 1 cbt MANPATS IMI MAPATS; Spike MR/LR/ER
engr bn) ARTILLERY 530
Mechanised SP 250: 155mm 250 M109A5 (155mm 148 Soltam L-33;
3 mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 sigs coy) 30 M109A1; 50 M-50; 175mm 36 M107; 203mm 36 M110
1 mech inf bde (5 mech inf bn) all in store)
1 indep mech inf bn TOWED (122mm 5 D-30; 130mm 100 M-46; 155mm 171:
Light 40 M-46 mod; 50 M-68/M-71; 81 M-839P/M-845P all in
2 indep inf bn store)
MRL 30: 227mm 30 M270 MLRS; 306mm IMI Lynx
Air Manoeuvre
(122mm 58 BM-21 Grad; 160mm 50 LAR-160; 227mm 18
1 para bde (3 para bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 sigs coy)
M270 MLRS; 240mm 36 BM-24; 290mm 20 LAR-290 all
Other
in store)
1 armd trg bde (3 armd bn)
MOR 250: 81mm 250 (81mm 1,100; 120mm 650; 160mm
COMBAT SUPPORT 18 Soltam M-66 all in store)
3 arty bde SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
3 engr bn IRBM • Nuclear ε24 Jericho 2
1 EOD coy SRBM • Dual-capable (7 Lance in store)
1 CBRN bn AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 20 Machbet; FIM-
1 int bde (3 int bn) 92 Stinger
348 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Navy 7,000; 2,500 conscript (total 9,500)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL
SSK 5:
3 Dolphin (GER HDW design) with 6 single 533mm
TT with UGM-84C Harpoon AShM/DM2A3/4 HWT/
Kaved HWT, 4 single 650mm TT
2 Tanin (GER HDW design with AIP) with 6 single
533mm TT with UGM-84C Harpoon AShM/DM2A3/4
HWT/Kaved HWT, 4 single 650mm TT
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 45
CORVETTES • FSGHM 3:
2 Eilat (Sa’ar 5) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon
AShM/Gabriel AShM, 1 32-cell VLS with Barak-1
SAM (being upgraded to Barak-8), 2 triple 324mm TT
with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 1
AS565SA Panther ASW hel)
1 Eilat (Sa’ar 5) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon
AShM/Gabriel AShM, 1 32-cell VLS with Barak-8 SAM,
2 triple 324mm TT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Mk 15 Phalanx
CIWS (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther ASW hel)
PCGM 8 Hetz (Sa’ar 4.5) with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84
Harpoon AShM (can also be fitted with up to 6 single
lnchr with Gabriel II AShM), 2 8-cell Mk56 VLS with
Barak-1 SAM, (can be fitted with 2 triple 324mm Mk32
TT with Mk46 LWT), 1 Mk 15 Phalanx CWIS, 1 76mm
gun
PBF 34: 5 Shaldag with 1 Typhoon CIWS; 3 Stingray; 9
Super Dvora Mk I (SSM & TT may be fitted); 4 Super
Dvora Mk II (SSM & TT may be fitted); 6 Super Dvora
Mk II-I (SSM & TT may be fitted); 4 Super Dvora Mk III
(SSM & TT may be fitted); 3 Super Dvora Mk III with 1
Typhoon CIWS (SSM may be fitted)
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCVP 2 Manta
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3
AG 2 Bat Yam (ex-GER Type-745)
AX 1 Queshet
Naval Commandos ε300
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
1 cdo unit
Air Force 34,000
Responsible for Air and Space Coordination
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER & FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with F-15A/B/D Eagle
1 sqn with F-15B/C/D Eagle
1 sqn with F-15I Ra’am
6 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
4 sqn with F-16I Sufa
1 sqn with F-35I Adir
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
1 sqn with AS565SA Panther (missions flown by IAF but
with non-rated aircrew)
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
2 sqn with RC-12D Guardrail; Beech A36 Bonanza (Hofit);
Beech 200 King Air; Beech 200T King Air; Beech 200CT
King Air
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
1 sqn with Gulfstream G550 Eitam; Gulfstream G550
Shavit
TANKER/TRANSPORT
1 sqn with C-130E/H Hercules; KC-130H Hercules
1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules
1 sqn with KC-707
TRAINING
1 OPFOR sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
1 sqn with M-346 Master (Lavi)
ATTACK HELICOPTER
1 sqn with AH-64A Apache
1 sqn with AH-64D Apache
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
2 sqn with CH-53D Sea Stallion
2 sqn with S-70A Black Hawk; UH-60A Black Hawk
1 medevac unit with CH-53D Sea Stallion
UAV
1 ISR sqn with Hermes 450
1 ISR sqn with Heron (Shoval); Heron TP (Eitan)
1 ISR sqn with Heron (Shoval) (MP role)
AIR DEFENCE
3 bty with Arrow 2
10 bty with Iron Dome
6 bty with MIM-104C Patriot PAC-2
2 bty with David’s Sling
SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF unit
1 spec ops unit
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 352 combat capable
FTR 58: 16 F-15A Eagle; 6 F-15B Eagle; 17 F-15C Eagle; 19
F-15D Eagle
FGA 264: 25 F-15I Ra’am; 78 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 49
F-16D Fighting Falcon; 98 F-16I Sufa; 14 F-35I Adir
ISR 6 RC-12D Guardrail
ELINT 4: 1 EC-707; 3 Gulfstream G550 Shavit
AEW 4: 2 B-707 Phalcon; 2 Gulfstream G550 Eitam (1 more
on order)
TKR/TPT 11: 4 KC-130H Hercules; 7 KC-707
TPT 62: Medium 15: 5 C-130E Hercules; 6 C-130H
Hercules; 4 C-130J-30 Hercules; Light 47: 3 AT-802 Air
Tractor; 9 Beech 200 King Air; 8 Beech 200T King Air; 5
Beech 200CT King Air; 22 Beech A36 Bonanza (Hofit)
TRG 67: 17 Grob G-120; 30 M-346 Master (Lavi)*; 20 T-6A
HELICOPTERS
ATK 43: 26 AH-64A Apache; 17 AH-64D Apache (Sarat)
ASW 7 AS565SA Panther (missions flown by IAF but
with non-rated aircrew)
ISR 12 OH-58B Kiowa
TPT 81: Heavy 26 CH-53D Sea Stallion; Medium 49: 39
S-70A Black Hawk; 10 UH-60A Black Hawk; Light 6 Bell
206 Jet Ranger
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR 3+: Heavy 3+: Heron (Shoval); 3 Heron TP (Eitan); RQ-
5A Hunter; Medium Hermes 450; Hermes 900 (22+ Searcher
MkII in store); Light Harpy (anti-radiation UAV)
AIR DEFENCE
SAM 54+:
Long-range MIM-104C Patriot PAC-2; Medium-range 24
Arrow 2; some David’s Sling; Short-range ε30 Iron Dome
 Middle East and North Africa 349

GUNS 920 Finland 18 obs

SP 165: 20mm 105 M163 Machbet Vulcan; 23mm 60 Ghana UNDOF 12
ZSU-23-4 India 2 obs • UNDOF 194; 1 log bn(-)
TOWED 755: 23mm 150 ZU-23-2; 20mm/37mm 455 Ireland 13 obs • UNDOF 126; 1 inf coy
M167 Vulcan towed 20mm/M-1939 towed 37mm/TCM- Nepal 4 obs • UNDOF 333; 2 mech inf coy
20 towed 20mm; 40mm 150 L/70
Netherlands 13 obs • UNDOF 2
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
New Zealand 7 obs
AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; Python 4; IIR Python 5;
ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM Norway 14 obs
ASM AGM-114 Hellfire; AGM-62B Walleye; AGM-65 Russia 5 obs
Maverick; Delilah AL; Popeye I/Popeye II; Spike NLOS Serbia 1 obs
BOMBS Slovakia 2 obs
IIR guided Opher Slovenia 3 obs

Laser-guided Griffin; Lizard; Paveway II Sweden 6 obs
INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM; GBU-39 Small Switzerland 12 obs

Diameter Bomb (Barad Had); Spice United States 2 obs • US Strategic Command; 1 AN/TPY-
2 X-band radar at Mount Keren
Airfield Defence 3,000 active (15,000
reservists)
Jordan JOR
Paramilitary ε8,000
Jordanian Dinar D 2017 2018 2019
Border Police ε8,000 GDP D 28.4bn 29.7bn
US$ 40.1bn 41.9bn
Cyber per capita US$ 4,136 4,228
Israel has a substantial capacity for cyber operations. In
Growth % 2.0 2.3
early 2012, the National Cyber Bureau was created in the
prime minister’s office to develop technology, human Inflation % 3.3 4.5
resources and international collaboration. It is reported that Def bdgt [a] D 1.16bn 1.16bn

and North Africa

Middle East
the IDF’s ‘Unit 8200’ is responsible for ELINT and some US$ 1.63bn 1.63bn
cyber operations. In 2012, according to the IDF, the C4I FMA (US) US$ 470m 350m 350m
Directorate and Unit 8200 were combined into a new task
US$1=D 0.71 0.71
force, charged with ‘developing offensive capabilities and
operations’. Specialist training courses exist, including the [a] Excludes expenditure on public order and safety
four-month Cyber Shield activity. In April 2016, the National Population 10,458,413
Cyber Defense Authority was created, consolidating cyber Ethnic groups: Palestinian ε50–60%
defences into one body. Although the IDF’s Gideon plan
called for a Joint Cyber Command, in January 2017 the IDF Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
announced it would not take this step. The cyber-defence Male 17.5% 5.5% 5.2% 4.7% 18.1% 1.7%
unit of the C4I Directorate and Unit 8200 work together
Female 16.6% 4.9% 4.4% 3.9% 15.6% 1.8%
in tackling cyber threats. Civil agencies reportedly have
responsibility for cyber threats against critical national
infrastructure.
Capabilities
The Jordanian armed forces (JAF) are structured to provide border
security and an armoured response to conventional threats. Their
FOREIGN FORCES well-regarded operational capability belies their moderate size
UNTSO unless specified. UNTSO figures represent total and ageing equipment inventory. There is no recent public state-
numbers for mission. ment of defence policy, although the ongoing civil war in Syria
is a clear concern. The armed forces have undergone budget-led
Argentina 3 obs
restructuring, with the disbandment of the joint Special Opera-
Australia 12 obs
 tions Command and the 3rd Armoured Division. Jordan is a major
Austria 4 obs non-NATO ally of the US with whom it maintains a close defence
Belgium 1 obs relationship. The country has developed a bespoke special-forces
Bhutan 4 obs • UNDOF 3 training centre and has hosted training for numerous state and
non-state military forces. Personnel are well trained, particularly
Canada 4 obs
aircrew and special forces, who are highly regarded internationally.
Chile 3 obs Jordanian forces are able to independently deploy regionally and
China 5 obs have participated in ISAF operations in Afghanistan and in coali-
Czech Republic UNDOF 3 tion air operations over Syria and Yemen. In contrast to the GCC
states, the Jordanian inventory largely comprises older systems.
Denmark 11 obs
Although the state-owned King Abdullah II Design and Devel-
Estonia 3 obs
 opment Bureau (KADDB) has demonstrated a vehicle-upgrade
Fiji 2 obs • UNDOF 290; 1 inf bn(-); elm 1 log bn capacity, the army has largely recapitalised its armoured-vehicle
350 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

fleet with second-hand armour from European countries. KADDB
produces some light armoured vehicles for domestic use, but the
company currently has little export profile.
ACTIVE 100,500 (Army 86,000 Navy 500 Air 14,000)
Paramilitary 15,000
RESERVE 65,000 (Army 60,000 Joint 5,000)
AIR DEFENCE
SAM • Point-defence 140+: 92 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13
Gopher); 48 9K33 Osa-M (SA-8 Gecko); 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-
14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (SA-18
Grouse)
GUNS • SP 200: 20mm 100 M163 Vulcan; 23mm 40 ZSU-
23-4; 35mm 60 Cheetah (Gepard)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Navy ε500

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Army 86,000 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7
FORCES BY ROLE PB 7: 3 Al Hussein (UK Vosper 30m); 4 Abdullah (US
SPECIAL FORCES Dauntless)
1 (Royal Guard) SF gp (1 SF regt, 1 SF bn, 1 CT bn)
Marines
1 (AB) SF bde (3 SF bn)
MANOEUVRE FORCES BY ROLE
Armoured MANOEUVRE
3 armd bde Amphibious
Mechanised 1 mne unit
5 mech bde
Light Air Force 14,000
3 lt inf bde FORCES BY ROLE
Air Manoeuvre FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 (QRF) AB bde (1 SF bn, 2 AB bn) 2 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon
COMBAT SUPPORT GROUND ATTACK
3 arty bde 1 sqn with AC-235
3 AD bde ISR
1 MRL bn 1 sqn with AT-802U Air Tractor; Cessna 208B
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TRANSPORT
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 1 sqn with C-130E/H Hercules
MBT 282: ε100 FV4034 Challenger 1 (Al Hussein) (being 1 unit with Il-76MF Candid
withdrawn); 182 M60 Phoenix (274 FV4030/2 Khalid in TRAINING
store) 1 OCU with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon
LT TK (19 FV101 Scorpion in store) 1 OCU with Hawk Mk63
ASLT 141 B1 Centauro 1 sqn with PC-21
RECCE 103 FV107 Scimitar 1 sqn with Grob 120TP
IFV 751: 13 AIFV-B-C25; 31 BMP-2; 50 Marder 1A3; 321 1 hel sqn with R-44 Raven II
Ratel-20; 336 YPR-765 PRI ATTACK HELICOPTER
APC 879+ 2 sqn with AH-1F Cobra (with TOW)
APC (T) 729: 370 M113A1/A2 Mk1J; 269 M577A2 (CP); TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
87 YPR-765 PRCO (CP); 3 AIFV-B 1 sqn with AS332M Super Puma
PPV 150: 25 Marauder; 25 Matador; 100 MaxxPro 1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); UH-60A Black Hawk
AUV 35 Cougar 1 sqn with H135M (Tpt/SAR)
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 1 sqn with MD-530F
ARV 155+: Al Monjed; 55 Chieftain ARV; Centurion Mk2; 1 sqn with UH-60L Black Hawk
20 M47; 32 M88A1; 30 M578; 18 YPR-806 1 sqn with Mi-26T2 Halo (forming)
MW 12 Aardvark Mk2 1 (Royal) flt with S-70A Black Hawk; UH-60L/M Black
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL Hawk; AW139
SP 115: 70 M901; 45 AIFV-B-Milan ISR UAV
MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; TOW/TOW-2A; 9K135 1 sqn with CH-4B; S-100 Camcopter
Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan) AIR DEFENCE
ARTILLERY 1,429+ 2 bde with MIM-104C Patriot PAC-2; MIM-23B Phase III
SP 554: 105mm 48: 30 M52; 18 MOBAT; 155mm 358 I-Hawk
M109A1/A2; 203mm 148 M110A2 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TOWED 82: 105mm 54 M102; 155mm 28: 10 M1/M59; 18 AIRCRAFT 59 combat capable
M114; 203mm (4 M115 in store) FGA 47: 33 F-16AM Fighting Falcon; 14 F-16BM Fighting
MRL 16+: 227mm 12 M142 HIMARS; 273mm 4+ WM-80 Falcon
MOR 777: 81mm 359; SP 81mm 50; 107mm 50 M30; ATK 2 AC235
120mm 300 Brandt SP 120mm 18 Agrab Mk2 ISR 10 AT-802U Air Tractor*
 Middle East and North Africa 351

TPT 12: Heavy 2 Il-76MF Candid; Medium 3 C-130E Germany Operation Inherent Resolve 300; 4 Tornado ECR; 1
Hercules (1 C-130B Hercules; 4 C-130H Hercules in store); A310 MRTT
Light 7: 5 Cessna 208B; 2 M-28 Skytruck (2 C295M in Netherlands Operation Inherent Resolve 150; 6 F-16AM
store, offered for sale) Fighting Falcon
TRG 24: up to 16 Grob 120TP; 8 PC-21 (12 Hawk Mk63* in
Norway Operation Inherent Resolve 60
store, offered for sale)
United States Central Command: Operation Inherent
HELICOPTERS
ATK 12 AH-1F Cobra (17 more in store, offered for sale) Resolve 2,300; 1 FGA sqn with 12 F-15E Strike Eagle; 1 CISR
MRH 14: 3 AW139; 11 H135M (Tpt/SAR) (6 MD-530F in sqn with 12 MQ-9A Reaper
store)
TPT 48: Heavy 1 Mi-26T2 Halo; Medium 35: 10 AS332M
Super Puma (being WFU); 25 S-70A/UH-60A/UH-60L/
Kuwait KWT
VH-60M Black Hawk; Light 12 R-44 Raven II (13 Bell 205 Kuwaiti Dinar D 2017 2018 2019
(UH-1H Iroquois) in store, offered for sale)
GDP D 36.4bn 43.6bn
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
CISR • Heavy some CH-4B US$ 121bn 145bn
ISR • Light up to 10 S-100 Camcopter per capita US$ 27,394 31,916
AIR DEFENCE • SAM 64: Growth % -3.3 2.3
Long-range 40 MIM-104C Patriot PAC-2 Inflation % 1.5 0.8
Medium-range 24 MIM-23B Phase III I-Hawk
Def bdgt D 1.75bn 1.87bn
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR AIM-9J/N/P Sidewinder; SARH AIM-7 US$ 5.79bn 6.18bn
Sparrow; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM US$1=D 0.30 0.30
ASM AGM-65D/G Maverick; BGM-71 TOW Population 2,916,467
BOMBS
Ethnic groups: Nationals 35.5%; other non-Arab Asian countries
Laser-guided GBU-10/12 Paveway II 37.7%; other Arab countries 17.5%; other or unspecified 9.3%

Paramilitary ε15,000 active Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus

and North Africa

Gendarmerie ε15,000 active Male 12.9% 3.2% 5.1% 7.2% 28.7% 1.2%

Middle East
3 regional comd Female 11.9% 3.0% 3.8% 4.3% 17.3% 1.5%
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES Capabilities
2 SF unit Kuwait’s small but capable armed forces have benefited consid-
MANOEUVRE erably from the significant presence on Kuwaiti territory of size-
Other able US forces. The primary responsibility is territorial defence,
10 sy bn through a strategy of sufficient readiness to provide a holding
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE force until the mobilisation of friendly forces. The National Guard,
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES under its Strategic Vision 2020 plan, intends to boost readiness
APC • APC (W) 25+: AT105 Saxon (reported); 25+ and equipment capability. Kuwait is a member of the GCC and has
EE-11 Urutu a bilateral defence-cooperation agreement with the US, which
AUV AB2 Al-Jawad provides for a range of joint activities and mentoring, and the
stationing and pre-positioning of significant numbers of US per-
DEPLOYMENT sonnel and supplies of equipment. Since 2004, Kuwait has been
designated a US major non-NATO ally. Kuwait operates a system
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 7; 3 obs of voluntary military service but suffers from a limited population
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • pool. Contributions of air and ground assets have been made to
MONUSCO 4; 6 obs the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, but otherwise the country has
limited deployment ambitions. There is limited logistic-support
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 61; 1 obs
capacity, although heavy-airlift and airborne-tanking assets grant
SAUDI ARABIA: Operation Restoring Hope 6 F-16C Fighting a limited airborne-expeditionary capability. The equipment inven-
Falcon tory includes a range of modern European- and US-sourced plat-
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 4 forms, including advanced air-defence-missile batteries. Kuwait
is recapitalising its combat-aircraft fleet with the F/A-18E/F Super
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 11; 5 obs Hornet and Eurofighter Typhoon, which together will significantly
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2 obs enhance its air-combat capabilities. There are also indications
that it wants to upgrade its fleet of main battle tanks and seek
additional attack helicopters, and possibly new missile-armed
FOREIGN FORCES multi-mission fast attack craft for the navy. Kuwait lacks a domes-
Belgium Operation Inherent Resolve (Desert Falcon) 30 tic defence-industrial base and is reliant on imports, albeit with
France Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal) 8 Rafale F3; 1 offset requirements to help stimulate the country’s wider indus-
Atlantique 2 trial sector.
352 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

ACTIVE 17,500 (Army 13,000 Navy 2,000 Air 2,500) AIR DEFENCE
Paramilitary 7,100 SAM
Conscript liability 12 months Short-range 12 Aspide
Point-defence Starburst; FIM-92 Stinger
RESERVE 23,700 (Joint 23,700) GUNS • TOWED 35mm 12+ Oerlikon
Reserve obligation to age 40; 1 month annual trg
Navy ε2,000 (incl 500 Coast Guard)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20
PCFG 2:
Army 13,000
1 Al Sanbouk (GER Lurssen TNC-45) with 2 twin lnchr
FORCES BY ROLE with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun
SPECIAL FORCES 1 Istiqlal (GER Lurssen FPB-57) with 2 twin lnchr with
1 SF unit MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun
MANOEUVRE PBF 10 Al Nokatha (US Mk V Pegasus)
Reconnaissance PBG 8 Um Almaradim (FRA P-37 BRL) with 2 twin lnchr
1 mech/recce bde with Sea Skua AShM
Armoured AMPHIBIOUSLANDING CRAFT 6
3 armd bde LCM 1 Abhan (ADSB 42m)
Mechanised LCVP 5 ADSB 16m
2 mech inf bde LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AG 1 Sawahil with 1 hel
Light landing platform
1 cdo bn
Other Air Force 2,500
1 (Amiri) gd bde FORCES BY ROLE
COMBAT SUPPORT FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 arty bde 2 sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet
1 engr bde TRANSPORT
1 MP bn 1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III; KC-130J Hercules;
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT L-100-30
1 log gp TRAINING
1 fd hospital
 1 unit with EMB-312 Tucano*; Hawk Mk64*
ATTACK HELICOPTER
Reserve 1 sqn with AH-64D Apache
FORCES BY ROLE 1 atk/trg sqn with SA342 Gazelle with HOT
MANOEUVRE TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Mechanised 1 sqn with AS532 Cougar; SA330 Puma; S-92
1 bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIRCRAFT 66 combat capable
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES FGA 39: 31 F/A-18C Hornet; 8 F/A-18D Hornet
MBT 293: 218 M1A2 Abrams; 75 M-84 (75 more in store) TKR 3 KC-130J Hercules
IFV 492: 76 BMP-2; 180 BMP-3; 236 Desert Warrior† (incl TPT 5: Heavy 2 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium 3 L-100-30
variants) TRG 27: 11 Hawk Mk64*; 16 EMB-312 Tucano*
APC 260 HELICOPTERS
APC (T) 260: 230 M113A2; 30 M577 (CP) ATK 16 AH-64D Apache
APC (W) (40 TH 390 Fahd in store) MRH 13 SA342 Gazelle with HOT
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES TPT • Medium 13: 3 AS532 Cougar; 7 SA330 Puma; 3
ARV 24+: 24 M88A1/2; Type-653A; Warrior S-92
MW Aardvark Mk2 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
NBC VEHICLES 11 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; SARH
ARTY 211 AIM-7F Sparrow; ARH AIM-120C7 AMRAAM
SP 155mm 106: 37 M109A3; 18 Mk F3; 51 PLZ-45 (18 AU- ASM AGM-65G Maverick; AGM-114K Hellfire; HOT
F-1 in store) AShM AGM-84D Harpoon Block IC
MRL 300mm 27 9A52 Smerch
MOR 78: 81mm 60; 107mm 6 M30; 120mm ε12 RT-F1 Air Defence Command
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE FORCES BY ROLE
MSL AIR DEFENCE
SP 74: 66 HMMWV TOW; 8 M901 1 SAM bde (7 SAM bty with MIM-104D Patriot PAC-2
MANPATS TOW-2; M47 Dragon GEM)
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav 1 SAM bde (6 SAM bty with Skyguard/Aspide)
 Middle East and North Africa 353

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIR DEFENCE • SAM 52: Lebanon LBN
Long-range 40 MIM-104D Patriot PAC-2 GEM
Lebanese Pound LP 2017 2018 2019
Short-range 12 Skyguard/Aspide
GDP LP 81.7tr 85.5tr
Paramilitary ε7,100 active US$ 54.2bn 56.7bn
per capita US$ 12,013 12,454
National Guard ε6,600 active
Growth % 1.5 1.0
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES Inflation % 4.5 6.5
1 SF bn Def bdgt LP 2.81tr 3.20tr
MANOEUVRE US$ 1.87bn 2.12bn
Reconnaissance FMA (US) US$ 80m 0m 50m
1 armd car bn
US$1=LP 1507.51 1507.51
Other
3 security bn Population 6,100,075
COMBAT SUPPORT Ethnic and religious groups: Christian 30%; Druze 6%; Armenian
1 MP bn 4%; excl ε300,000 Syrians and ε350,000 Palestinian refugees
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
RECCE 20 VBL Male 11.9% 4.1% 4.1% 4.3% 22.6% 3.0%
IFV 70 Pandur (incl variants) Female 11.4% 3.9% 3.9% 4.2% 22.5% 4.0%
APC • APC (W) 27+: 5+ Desert Chameleon; 22 S600
(incl variants) Capabilities
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are focused on internal and
ARV Pandur
border security. However, the LAF’s ability to fulfil its missions
remains under strain from Hizbullah’s position in national politics
Coast Guard 500 and from the spillover effects of the Syrian conflict. Publication

and North Africa

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE of a new National Defence Strategy continues to be delayed by

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32
PBF 12 Manta
PB 20: 3 Al Shaheed; 4 Inttisar (Austal 31.5m); 3 Kassir
(Austal 22m); 10 Subahi
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 4: 2 Al
Tahaddy; 1 Saffar; 1 other
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AG 1 Sawahil
DEPLOYMENT
SAUDI ARABIA: Operation Restoring Hope 4 F/A-18A Hornet
Middle East
political divisions. Training and material support are received from
the US, as well as from France, Italy and the UK. Previous material
support from Saudi Arabia was curtailed for political reasons. Per-
sonnel quality and capability is relatively high for the region and
US special-operations personnel continue to provide operational
advice and assistance. LAF operations against ISIS have demon-
strated improved capability. The LAF has no requirement for extra-
territorial deployment and minimal capability to do so. It remains
dependent on foreign support to replace and modernise its ageing
equipment inventory. Barring some light maintenance facilities in
the services, Lebanon has no significant domestic defence indus-
try.

FOREIGN FORCES ACTIVE 60,000 (Army 56,600 Navy 1,800 Air 1,600)
Canada Operation Inherent Resolve (Impact) 1 A310 MRTT Paramilitary 20,000
(C-150T); 2 C-130J-30 Hercules (CC-130J)
Denmark Operation Inherent Resolve 20 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Italy Operation Inherent Resolve (Prima Parthica) 255; 4
AMX; 2 MQ-9A Reaper; 1 KC-767A Army 56,600
Singapore Operation Inherent Resolve 11
FORCES BY ROLE
United Kingdom Operation Inherent Resolve (Shader) 50; 1
5 regional comd (Beirut, Bekaa Valley, Mount Lebanon,
CISR UAV sqn with 8 MQ-9A Reaper
North, South)
United States Central Command: 14,000; 1 ARNG armd
SPECIAL FORCES
bde; 1 ARNG cbt avn bde; 1 spt bde; 2 AD bty with MIM-
1 cdo regt
104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3; 1 FGA sqn with 12 F-16C Fighting
MANOEUVRE
Falcon; 1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper; 1 (APS) armd
bde eqpt set; 1 (APS) inf bde eqpt set Armoured
1 armd regt
Mechanised
11 mech inf bde
Air Manoeuvre
1 AB regt
354 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Amphibious Air Force 1,600

1 mne cdo regt 4 air bases
Other FORCES BY ROLE
1 Presidential Guard bde GROUND ATTACK
6 intervention regt
4 border sy regt 1 sqn with Cessna AC-208 Combat Caravan*
COMBAT SUPPORT 1 sqn with EMB-314 Super Tucano*
2 arty regt ATTACK HELICOPTER
1 cbt spt bde (1 engr regt, 1 AT regt, 1 sigs regt; 1 log 1 sqn with SA342L Gazelle
bn) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 MP gp 4 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 sqn with SA330/IAR330SM Puma
1 log bde 1 trg sqn with R-44 Raven II
1 med gp EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 construction regt AIRCRAFT 9 combat capable
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ISR 3 Cessna AC-208 Combat Caravan*
MBT 334: 92 M48A1/A5; 10 M60A2; 185 T-54; 47 T-55 TRG 9: 3 Bulldog; 6 EMB-314 Super Tucano*
HELICOPTERS
RECCE 55 AML
MRH 9: 1 AW139; 8 SA342L Gazelle (5 SA342L Gazelle;
IFV 48: 16 AIFV-B-C25; 32 M2A2 Bradley
5 SA316 Alouette III; 1 SA318 Alouette II all non-
APC 1,378
operational)
APC (T) 1,274 M113A1/A2 (incl variants) TPT 38: Medium 13: 3 S-61N (fire fighting); 10 SA330/
APC (W) 96: 86 VAB VCT; 10 VBPT-MR Guarani IAR330 Puma; Light 25: 18 Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey); 3 Bell
PPV 8 Maxxpro 205 (UH-1H Huey II); 4 R-44 Raven II (basic trg) (11 Bell
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 205; 7 Bell 212 all non-operational)
ARV M113 ARV; T-54/55 ARV reported
 AIR LAUNCHED MISSILES
VLB MTU-72 reported ASM AGM-114 Hellfire
MW Bozena
ARTILLERY 611 Paramilitary ε20,000 active
SP 155mm 12 M109A2
TOWED 313: 105mm 13 M101A1; 122mm 35: 9 D-30; Internal Security Force ε20,000
26 M-30; 130mm 15 M-46; 155mm 250: 18 M114A1; 218 Ministry of Interior
M198; 14 Model-50 FORCES BY ROLE
MRL 122mm 11 BM-21 Other Combat Forces
MOR 275: 81mm 134; 82mm 112; 120mm 29 Brandt 1 (police) judicial unit
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE 1 regional sy coy
MSL 1 (Beirut Gendarmerie) sy coy
SP 15 VAB with HOT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MANPATS Milan; TOW ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
RCL 106mm 113 M40A1 APC • APC (W) 60 V-200 Chaimite
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES Customs
ISR • Medium 8 Mohajer 4
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIR DEFENCE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2/2M (SA-7A Grail/ PB 7: 5 Aztec; 2 Tracker
SA-7B Grail)‡
GUNS • TOWED 77: 20mm 20; 23mm 57 ZU-23-2
FOREIGN FORCES
Navy 1,800 Unless specified, figures refer to UNTSO and represent
total numbers for the mission
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 13 Argentina 3 obs
PCC 1 Trablous Armenia UNIFIL 33
PB 11: 1 Aamchit (ex-GER Bremen); 1 Al Kalamoun (ex- Australia 12 obs
FRA Avel Gwarlarn); 7 Tripoli (ex-UK Attacker/Tracker Austria 4 obs • UNIFIL 182: 1 log coy
Mk 2); 1 Naquora (ex-GER Bremen); 1 Tabarja (ex-GER Bangladesh UNIFIL 116: 1 FSG
Bergen) Belarus UNIFIL 5
PBF 1 Belgium 1 obs
AMPHIBIOUS Bhutan 4 obs

LANDING CRAFT • LCT 2 Sour (ex-FRA EDIC – Brazil UNIFIL 222: 1 FFGHM
capacity 8 APC; 96 troops) Brunei UNIFIL 30
 Middle East and North Africa 355

Cambodia UNIFIL 184: 1 engr coy

Canada 4 obs (Operation Jade) Libya LBY
Chile 3 obs Libyan Dinar D 2017 2018 2019
China, People’s Republic of 5 obs • UNIFIL 418: 2 engr
GDP D 42.3bn 59.9bn
coy; 1 med coy
Colombia UNIFIL 1 US$ 30.6bn 43.2bn
Croatia UNIFIL 1 per capita US$ 4,740 6,639
Cyprus UNIFIL 2 Growth % 64.0 10.9
Denmark 11 obs Inflation % 28.5 28.1
El Salvador UNIFIL 52: 1 inf pl Def exp D n.k. n.k.
Estonia 3 obs • UNIFIL 38 US$ n.k. n.k.
Fiji 2 obs • UNIFIL 136; 1 inf coy US$1=D 1.39 1.39
Finland 18 obs • UNIFIL 300; elm 1 mech inf bn; 1 maint
coy Population 6,754,507
France UNIFIL 669: 1 mech inf bn(-); VBL; VBCI; VAB; Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Mistral
Male 13.1% 4.3% 4.3% 4.6% 23.2% 2.2%
Germany UNIFIL 112: 1 FFGM
Female 12.5% 4.1% 4.1% 4.2% 21.2% 2.3%
Ghana UNIFIL 870: 1 mech inf bn
Greece UNIFIL 148: 1 FFGHM Capabilities
Guatemala UNIFIL 2 Armed groups in Libya are composed of a mix of semi-regular
Hungary UNIFIL 10 military units, tribal militias and armed civilians based around
India 2 obs • UNIFIL 900: 1 inf bn; 1 med coy General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) in the eastern part
Indonesia UNIFIL 1,295: 1 inf bn; 1 MP coy; 1 FSGHM of the country and Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj’s internationally
recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) in the west.
Ireland 13 obs • UNIFIL 353: elm 1 mech inf bn
Both the GNA’s and LNA’s affiliated forces have relatively low levels
Italy UNIFIL 1,043: 1 mech bde HQ; 1 mech inf bn; 1 engr of training. The presence in these formations of units from the
coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 hel bn former Gadhafi-era army has bolstered their military capability.
Kenya UNIFIL 1

and North Africa

Meanwhile, the GNA-affiliated forces have since 2016 benefited

Middle East
Korea, Republic of UNIFIL 335: 1 mech inf coy; 1 engr from several military advisory and training programmes, includ-
coy; 1 sigs coy; 1 maint coy ing EUNAVFOR–MED maritime-security training for the Libyan
Navy and Coast Guard. LNA troops have combat experience from
Macedonia (FYROM) UNIFIL 2
fighting ISIS in the eastern coastal region and they have alleg-
Malaysia UNIFIL 829: 1 mech inf bn edly received training and combat support from external actors
Nepal 4 obs • UNIFIL 871: 1 mech inf bn in the region. Both organisations’ equipment is mainly of Russian
Netherlands 13 obs • UNIFIL 1 or Soviet origin, including items from the former Libyan armed
New Zealand 7 obs forces, and suffers from varying degrees of obsolescence. However,
the lack of high-technology platforms has allowed both forces
Nigeria UNIFIL 1
 to maintain minimum operational standards. The country has no
Norway 14 obs domestic defence-industrial capability.
Qatar UNIFIL 2
Forces loyal to the Government of National
Russia 5 obs
Accord (Tripoli-based)
Serbia 1 obs • UNIFIL 177; 1 mech inf coy
Sierra Leone UNIFIL 3 ACTIVE n.k.
Slovakia 2 obs
Slovenia 3 obs • UNIFIL 18 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Spain UNIFIL 630: 1 mech bde HQ; 1 mech inf bn(-); 1
engr coy; 1 sigs coy Ground Forces n.k.
Sri Lanka UNIFIL 150: 1 inf coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Sweden 6 obs ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Switzerland 12 obs MBT T-55; T-72
Tanzania UNIFIL 159: 1 MP coy IFV BMP-2
Turkey UNIFIL 86: 1 PCFG APC • APC (T) 4K-7FA Steyr
United States 2 obs AUV Nimr Ajban
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
ARV Centurion 105 AVRE
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • SP 9P157-2 Khrizantema-S (AT-15 Springer)
ARTILLERY
SP 155mm Palmaria
TOWED 122mm D-30
356 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Navy n.k. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

A number of intact naval vessels remain in Tripoli, ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
although serviceability is questionable MBT T-55; T-72
RECCE BRDM-2; EE-9 Cascavel
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
IFV BMP-1; Ratel-20
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 1
APC
FRIGATES • FFGM 1 Al Hani (FSU Koni) (in Italy for APC (T) M113
refit since 2013) with 2 twin lnchr with P-15 Termit-M APC (W) BTR-60PB; Nimr Jais; Puma
(SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 1 twin lnchr with 9K33 Osa-M PPV Al-Wahsh; Caiman; Streit Spartan; Streit Typhoon
(SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 406mm ASTT with USET- AUV Panthera T6; Panthera F9
95 Type-40 LWT, 1 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 twin ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
76mm gun† MSL
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 3+ SP 10 9P157-2 Khryzantema-S (status unknown)
PBFG 1 Sharaba (FRA Combattante II) with 4 single lnchr MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot
with Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 76mm gun† (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); Milan
PB 2+ PV30 RCL some: 106mm M40A1; 84mm Carl Gustav
AMPHIBIOUS ARTILLERY
LANDING SHIPS • LST 1 Ibn Harissa with 3 twin SP 122mm 2S1 Gvodzika
40mm DARDO CIWS† (capacity 1 hel; 11 MBT; 240 TOWED 122mm D-30
troops) MRL 107mm Type-63; 122mm BM-21 Grad
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2 MOR M106
AFD 1 AIR DEFENCE
ARS 1 Al Munjed (YUG Spasilac)† SAM
Short-range 2K12 Kvadrat (SA-6 Gainful)
Air Force n.k. Point-defence 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE GUNS • SP 14.5mm ZPU-2 (on tch); 23mm ZSU-23-4
AIRCRAFT 14+ combat capable Shilka; ZU-23-2 (on tch)
FGA 2 MiG-23BN
ATK 1 J-21 Jastreb† Navy n.k.
TRG 11+: 3 G-2 Galeb*; up to 8 L-39ZO*; some SF-260 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
HELICOPTERS PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7+
ATK Mi-24 Hind PB: 7+: 1 Burdi (Damen Stan 1605) with 1 23mm gun;
TPT • Medium Mi-17 Hip 1 Burdi (Damen Stan 1605) with 1 76mm gun; 1 Burdi
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 (Damen Stan 1605); 2 Ikrimah (FRA RPB20); 1 Hamelin;
Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-24 (AA-7 Apex) 1+ PV30
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1
Paramilitary n.k. AFD 1

Coast Guard n.k. Air Force n.k.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7+ AIRCRAFT 5+ combat capable
FTR MiG-23 Flogger
PCC Damen Stan 2909 (YTB armed with with 14.5mm
FGA 5+: 3+ MiG-21bis/MF Fishbed; 1 Mirage F-1ED; 1
ZSU-2 AD GUNS and 122mm MRL)
Su-22UM-3K Fitter
PBF 4 Bigliani
TRG 1+ MiG-21UM Mongol B
PB 3: 1 Burdi (Damen Stan 1605); 1 Hamelin; 1 Ikrimah
HELICOPTERS
(FRA RPB 20)
ATK Mi-24/35 Hind
TPT Medium Mi-8/Mi-17 Hip
TERRITORY WHERE THE RECOGNISED AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2
AUTHORITY DOES NOT EXERCISE Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid)
EFFECTIVE CONTROL
Data here represents the de facto situation. This does not FOREIGN FORCES
imply international recognition Germany UNSMIL 2 obs
Italy MIASIT 375
ACTIVE n.k. Nepal UNSMIL 230; 1 obs; 2 sy coy
United Arab Emirates 6 AT-802; 2 UH-60M; 2 Wing Loong
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE I (GJ-1) UAV
United Kingdom UNSMIL 1 obs
Libyan National Army n.k. United States UNSMIL 1 obs
 Middle East and North Africa 357

COMBAT SUPPORT
Mauritania MRT 3 arty bn
4 ADA bty
Mauritanian Ouguiya OM 2017 2018 2019
1 engr coy
GDP OM 1.76tr 1.86tr EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ 4.94bn 5.20bn ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
per capita US$ 1,271 1,310 MBT 35 T-54/T-55
Growth % 3.5 2.5 RECCE 70: 20 AML-60; 40 AML-90; 10 Saladin
APC • APC (W) 37: 12 Cobra; 5 FV603 Saracen; ε20
Inflation % 2.3 3.8
Panhard M3
Def bdgt OM 51.6bn 56.8bn ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
US$ 145m 158m ARV T-54/55 ARV reported
US$1=OM 356.57 358.65 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS Milan
Population 3,840,429
RCL • 106mm ε90 M40A1
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus ARTILLERY 180
TOWED 80: 105mm 36 HM-2/M101A1; 122mm 44: 20
Male 19.2% 5.2% 4.5% 3.9% 13.8% 1.6%
D-30; 24 D-74
Female 19.0% 5.3% 4.8% 4.3% 16.3% 2.2% MRL 10: 107mm 4 Type-63; 122mm 6 Type-81
MOR 90: 81mm 60; 120mm 30 Brandt
Capabilities AIR DEFENCE
The country’s small and modestly equipped armed forces are SAM • Point-defence ε4 SA-9 Gaskin (reported); 9K32
tasked with maintaining territorial integrity and internal secu- Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
rity. In light of the regional threat from extremist Islamist groups, GUNS • TOWED 82: 14.5mm 28: 16 ZPU-2; 12 ZPU-
border security is also a key role for the armed forces, which are 4; 23mm 20 ZU-23-2; 37mm 10 M-1939; 57mm 12 S-60;
accustomed to counter-insurgency operations in the desert. The 100mm 12 KS-19
country is a member of the G5 Sahel group. Mauritania’s armed
forces take part in the US-led special-operations Flintlock train-
Navy ε600
ing exercise. The country also benefits from training with French

and North Africa

armed forces. Deployment capabilities are limited to neighbour- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ing countries without external support, but the armed forces
have demonstrated mobility and sustainability in desert regions.
Mauritania has a limited and ageing equipment inventory, which
hampers operational capability. Despite some recent acquisitions,
including small ISR aircraft, aviation resources are insufficient con-
sidering the size of the country. Naval equipment is geared toward
coastal-surveillance missions but there are plans to increase
amphibious capabilities. There is no domestic defence industry.
Middle East
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17
PCO 1 Voum-Legleita
PCC 7: 1 Abourbekr Ben Amer (FRA OPV 54); 1 Arguin; 2
Conejera; 1 Limam El Hidrami (PRC); 2 Timbédra (PRC
Huangpu Mod)
PB 9: 1 El Nasr† (FRA Patra); 4 Mandovi; 2 Saeta-12; 2
Megsem Bakkar (FRA RPB20 – for SAR duties)

ACTIVE 15,850 (Army 15,000 Navy 600 Air 250) Air Force 250
Paramilitary 5,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Conscript liability 24 months AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable
ISR 2 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan
TPT 8: Light 7: 2 BN-2 Defender; 1 C-212; 2 PA-31T
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Cheyenne II; 2 Y-12(II); PAX 1 BT-67 (with sensor turret)
TRG 11: 3 EMB-312 Tucano; 4 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; 4
Army 15,000 SF-260E
FORCES BY ROLE HELICOPTERS • MRH 3: 1 SA313B Alouette II; 2 Z-9
6 mil regions
MANOEUVRE Paramilitary ε5,000 active
Reconnaissance
1 armd recce sqn Gendarmerie ε3,000
Armoured Ministry of Interior
1 armd bn FORCES BY ROLE
Light MANOEUVRE
7 mot inf bn Other
8 (garrison) inf bn 6 regional sy coy
Air Manoeuvre EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 cdo/para bn ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Other APC • APC (W) 12 Cobra
2 (camel corps) bn PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • 2 Rodman
1 gd bn 55M
358 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

National Guard 2,000 for major defence equipment. However, its relative stability has
attracted Western defence companies, such as Airbus, Safran and
Ministry of Interior
Thales, to establish aerospace manufacturing and servicing facili-
ties in the country.
Customs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ACTIVE 195,800 (Army 175,000 Navy 7,800 Air
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2: 1 13,000) Paramilitary 50,000
Dah Ould Bah (FRA Amgram 14); 1 Yaboub Ould Rajel (FRA Conscript liability 12 months for men and women aged 19–25
RPB18) (agreed in late 2018)

RESERVE 150,000 (Army 150,000)

DEPLOYMENT Reserve obligation to age 50
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 744; 9
obs; 1 inf bn ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 8
SOMALIA: UN • UNSOS 1 obs
Space
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SATELLITES 2
Morocco MOR ISR 2 Mohammed VI
Moroccan Dirham D 2017 2018 2019
Army ε75,000; 100,000 conscript (total
GDP D 1.06tr 1.11tr 175,000)
US$ 109bn 118bn
FORCES BY ROLE
per capita US$ 3,137 3,355 2 comd (Northern Zone, Southern Zone)
Growth % 4.1 3.2 MANOEUVRE
Inflation % 0.8 2.4 Armoured
Def bdgt D 33.8bn 34.3bn 1 armd bde
11 armd bn
US$ 3.49bn 3.63bn
Mechanised
FMA (US) US$ 10m 0m 3 mech inf bde
US$1=D 9.70 9.43 Mechanised/Light
Population 34,314,130 8 mech/mot inf regt (2–3 bn)
Light
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 lt sy bde
Male 12.9% 4.2% 4.2% 4.0% 20.6% 3.2% 3 (camel corps) mot inf bn
Female 12.5% 4.2% 4.2% 4.2% 22.0% 3.8%
35 lt inf bn
4 cdo unit
Capabilities Air Manoeuvre
2 para bde
Regional security challenges rank highly for Morocco’s armed 2 AB bn
forces, who have gained experience in operations in Western
Mountain
Sahara. Despite the UN-brokered 1991 ceasefire between Morocco
1 mtn inf bn
and the Polisario Front, the conflict in Western Sahara remains
unresolved. Morocco maintains long-standing defence ties with COMBAT SUPPORT
France and the US, receiving military training and equipment 11 arty bn
from both. There is also close cooperation with NATO, and in 2016 7 engr bn
Morocco was granted access to the Alliance’s Interoperability AIR DEFENCE
Platform in order to strengthen the defence and security sectors 1 AD bn
and bring the armed forces to NATO standards. In 2017, Morocco
rejoined the African Union. The armed forces have also gained Royal Guard 1,500
experience from UN peacekeeping deployments and a number
FORCES BY ROLE
of multinational exercises. It was announced in late 2018 that
conscription would be reintroduced. The armed forces have some MANOEUVRE
capacity to deploy independently within the region, as well as to Other
UN peacekeeping missions in sub-Saharan Africa. Morocco has 1 gd bn
also deployed overseas in a combat role, contributing F-16 aircraft 2 cav sqn
to the Saudi-led coalition intervention in Yemen. The inventory EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
primarily comprises ageing French and US equipment. However,
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
there are plans to re-equip all the services and to invest signifi-
cantly in the navy. Morocco has also launched two Earth-observa- MBT 602: 222 M1A1SA Abrams; 220 M60A1 Patton; 120
tion satellites, aboard European rockets, which can meet some sur- M60A3 Patton; 40 T-72B (ε200 M48A5 Patton in store)
veillance requirements. Morocco does not yet have an established LT TK 116: 5 AMX-13; 111 SK-105 Kuerassier
domestic defence industry and relies on imports and donations ASLT 80 AMX-10RC
 Middle East and North Africa 359

RECCE 284: 38 AML-60-7; 190 AML-90; 40 EBR-75; 16 with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46
Eland LWT, 1 76mm gun
IFV 115: 10 AMX-10P; 30 Ratel Mk3-20; 30 Ratel Mk3-90; PSO 1 Bin an Zaran (OPV 70) with 1 76mm gun
45 VAB VCI PCG 4 Cdt El Khattabi (ESP Lazaga 58m) with 4 single
APC 1,225 lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun
APC (T) 905: 400 M113A1/A2; 419 M113A3; 86 M577A2 PCO 5 Rais Bargach (under control of fisheries dept)
(CP) PCC 12:
APC (W) 320 VAB VTT 4 El Hahiq (DNK Osprey 55, incl 2 with customs)
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 6 LV Rabhi (ESP 58m B-200D)
ARV 48+: 10 Greif; 18 M88A1; M578; 20 VAB-ECH 2 Okba (FRA PR-72) each with 1 76mm gun
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE PB 27: 6 El Wacil (FRA P-32); 10 VCSM (RPB 20); 10
MSL Rodman 101; 1 other (UK Bird)
SP 80 M901 AMPHIBIOUS 5
MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); M47 Dragon; LANDING SHIPS 4:
Milan; TOW LSM 3 Ben Aicha (FRA Champlain BATRAL) (capacity 7
RCL 106mm 350 M40A1 tanks; 140 troops)
GUNS • SP 36: 90mm 28 M56; 100mm 8 SU-100 LST 1 Sidi Mohammed Ben Abdallah (US Newport)
ARTILLERY 2,306 (capacity 3 LCVP; 400 troops)
SP 357: 105mm 5 AMX Mk 61; 155mm 292: 84 M109A1/ LANDING CRAFT 2:
A1B; 43 M109A2; 4 M109A3; 1 M109A4; 70 M109A5; 90
LCM 1 CTM (FRA CTM-5)
Mk F3; 203mm 60 M110
LCT 1 Sidi Ifni
TOWED 118: 105mm 50: 30 L118 Light Gun; 20 M101;
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9
130mm 18 M-46; 155mm 50: 30 FH-70; 20 M114
AG 1 Damen 3011
MRL 122mm 35 BM-21 Grad
AGHS 1 Dar Al Beida (FRA BHO2M)
MOR 1,796: 81mm 1,100 Expal model LN; SP 107mm 36
AGOR 1 Abou Barakat Albarbari† (ex-US Robert D. Conrad)
M106A2; 120mm 550 Brandt; SP 120mm 110: 20 (VAB
AGS 1 Stan 1504
APC); 90 M1064A3
AK 2
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
AX 1 Essaouira
ISR • Medium R4E-50 Skyeye

and North Africa

AIR DEFENCE AXS 2

Middle East
SAM
Marines 1,500
Point-defence 49+: 12 2K22M Tunguska-M (SA-19
Grison); 37 M48 Chaparral; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ FORCES BY ROLE
GUNS 407 MANOEUVRE
SP 20mm 60 M163 Vulcan Amphibious
TOWED 347: 14.5mm 200: 150–180 ZPU-2; 20 ZPU-4; 2 naval inf bn
20mm 40 M167 Vulcan; 23mm 75–90 ZU-23-2; 100mm
17 KS-19
Naval Aviation
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Navy 7,800 (incl 1,500 Marines) HELICOPTERS • ASW/ASUW 3 AS565SA Panther
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 6
Air Force 13,000
DESTROYERS 1 FORCES BY ROLE
DDGHM 1 Mohammed VI-class (FRA FREMM) with FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 sqn with F-5E/F-5F Tiger II
2 octuple A43 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 2 triple 3 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
B515 324mm ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun 1 sqn with Mirage F-1C (F-1CH)
(capacity 1 AS565SA Panther) 1 sqn with Mirage F-1E (F-1EH)
FRIGATES 5 ELECTRONIC WARFARE
FFGHM 3 Tarik ben Ziyad (NLD SIGMA 9813/10513) 1 sqn with EC-130H Hercules; Falcon 20 (ELINT)
with 4 single lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2/3 MARITIME PATROL
AShM, 2 6-cell VLS with VL-MICA SAM, 2 triple 1 flt with Do-28
324mm ASTT with MU90 LWT, 1 76mm gun TANKER/TRANSPORT
(capacity 1 AS565SA Panther) 1 sqn with C-130/KC-130H Hercules
FFGH 2 Mohammed V (FRA Floreal) with 2 single lnchr TRANSPORT
with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun (can be fitted 1 sqn with CN235
with Simbad SAM) (capacity 1 AS565SA Panther) 1 VIP sqn with B-737BBJ; Beech 200/300 King Air; Falcon
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 50 50; Gulfstream II/III/V-SP/G550
CORVETTES • FSGM 1 TRAINING
1 Lt Col Errhamani (ESP Descubierto) with 2 twin lnchr 1 sqn with Alpha Jet*
with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr 1 sqn T-6C
360 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

ATTACK HELICOPTER Force Auxiliaire 30,000 (incl 5,000 Mobile

1 sqn with SA342L Gazelle (some with HOT) Intervention Corps)
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Bell 205A (AB-205A); Bell 206 Jet Ranger (AB- Customs/Coast Guard
206); Bell 212 (AB-212) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with CH-47D Chinook PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 36: 4
1 sqn with SA330 Puma Erraid; 18 Arcor 46; 14 (other SAR craft)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 90 combat capable
DEPLOYMENT
FTR 22: 19 F-5E Tiger II; 3 F-5F Tiger II
FGA 49: 15 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 8 F-16D Fighting Falcon; CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 765; 2
15 Mirage F-1C (F-1CH); 11 Mirage F-1E (F-1EH) obs; 1 inf bn
ELINT 1 EC-130H Hercules DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
TKR/TPT 2 KC-130H Hercules MONUSCO 527; 2 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 fd hospital
TPT 47: Medium 17: 4 C-27J Spartan; 13 C-130H Hercules;
Light 19: 4 Beech 100 King Air; 2 Beech 200 King Air; 1
Beech 200C King Air; 2 Beech 300 King Air; 3 Beech 350 Oman OMN
King Air; 5 CN235; 2 Do-28; PAX 11: 1 B-737BBJ; 2 Falcon
Omani Rial R 2017 2018 2019
20; 2 Falcon 20 (ELINT); 1 Falcon 50 (VIP); 1 Gulfstream II
(VIP); 1 Gulfstream III; 1 Gulfstream V-SP; 2 Gulfstream GDP R 27.2bn 31.4bn
G550 US$ 70.8bn 81.7bn
TRG 80: 12 AS-202 Bravo; 19 Alpha Jet*; 2 CAP-10; 24 T-6C per capita US$ 17,128 19,170
Texan; 9 T-34C Turbo Mentor; 14 T-37B Tweet Growth % -0.9 1.9
HELICOPTERS Inflation % 1.6 1.5
MRH 19 SA342L Gazelle (7 with HOT, 12 with cannon)
Def bdgt R 3.34bn 3.44bn
TPT 77: Heavy 10 CH-47D Chinook; Medium 24 SA330
Puma; Light 43: 25 Bell 205A (AB-205A); 11 Bell 206 Jet US$ 8.69bn 8.95bn
Ranger (AB-206); 3 Bell 212 (AB-212); 4 Bell 429 US$1=R 0.38 0.38
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES Population 3,494,116
AAM • IR AIM-9J Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; Mica IR; IIR
Expatriates: 27%
AIM-9X Sidewinder II; SARH R-530; ARH AIM-120C7
AMRAAM; Mica RF Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
ASM AASM; AGM-65 Maverick; HOT
Male 15.4% 4.4% 5.1% 5.9% 21.6% 1.7%
ARM AGM-88B HARM
Female 14.7% 4.2% 4.5% 4.6% 16.0% 1.8%
BOMBS
Laser-guided Paveway II; GBU-54 Laser JDAM
INS/GPS-guided GBU-31 JDAM
Capabilities
Oman maintains small but capable armed forces, with a particu-
Paramilitary 50,000 active lar emphasis on personnel quality and training. Their principal
task is ensuring territorial integrity. Oman is uniquely placed with
Gendarmerie Royale 20,000 a long coastline outside the Gulf, so it has a particular focus on
FORCES BY ROLE maritime security. With relatively limited resources, it maintains
modern but modest equipment. Oman is a member of the GCC
MANOEUVRE
but has not contributed any forces to the Saudi-led intervention in
Air Manoeuvre Yemen. It has close defence and security ties with the UK and the
1 para sqn US, for whom it hosts forward-deployed forces. There is a particu-
Other lar emphasis on training, especially with the UK. In late 2018, the
1 paramilitary bde two countries announced the establishment of a new joint training
4 (mobile) paramilitary gp base in Oman. Recent deployment experience beyond Oman has
1 coast guard unit been limited, but the country maintains modest logistics assets,
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER particularly in the naval domain. The country is developing the
1 sqn port of Duqm into a major potential logistics hub for partners.
Oman is in the process of recapitalising its core inventory with the
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
procurement of air and naval systems, including combat aircraft
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 15 and patrol and high-speed support vessels. Oman has very limited
Arcor 53 indigenous defence-industrial capacity, but it has begun local pro-
AIRCRAFT • TRG 2 R-235 Guerrier duction of various types of ammunition.
HELICOPTERS
MRH 14: 3 SA315B Lama; 2 SA316 Alouette III; 3 SA318 ACTIVE 42,600 (Army 25,000 Navy 4,200 Air
Alouette II; 6 SA342K Gazelle 5,000 Foreign Forces 2,000 Royal Household 6,400)
TPT 8: Medium 6 SA330 Puma; Light 2 SA360 Dauphin Paramilitary 4,400
 Middle East and North Africa 361

PCFG 3 Dhofar with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE AShM, 1 76mm gun
PCO 4 Al Ofouq with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
Army 25,000 PCC 3 Al Bushra (FRA P-400) with 1 76mm gun
FORCES BY ROLE AMPHIBIOUS 6
(Regt are bn size) LANDING SHIPS • LST 1 Nasr el Bahr† with 1 hel
MANOEUVRE landing platform (capacity 7 tanks; 240 troops) (in refit
Armoured since 2017)
1 armd bde (2 armd regt, 1 recce regt) LANDING CRAFT 5: 1 LCU; 3 LCM; 1 LCT
Light LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8
1 inf bde (5 inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1 fd engr regt, 1 engr AGS 1 Al Makhirah
regt, 1 sigs regt) AK 1 Al Sultana
1 inf bde (3 inf regt, 2 arty regt) AP 2 Shinas (commercial tpt – auxiliary military role
1 indep inf coy (Musandam Security Force) only) (capacity 56 veh; 200 tps)
Air Manoeuvre AX 1 Al-Mabrukah
1 AB regt AXS 1 Shabab Oman II
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT EPF 2 Al Mubshir (High Speed Support Vessel 72) with 1
1 tpt regt hel landing platform (capacity 260 troops)
AIR DEFENCE
1 ADA regt (2 ADA bty) Air Force 5,000
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FORCES BY ROLE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
MBT 117: 38 Challenger 2; 6 M60A1 Patton; 73 M60A3 2 sqn with F-16C/D Block 50 Fighting Falcon
Patton 1 sqn with Hawk Mk103; Hawk Mk203; Hawk Mk166
LT TK 37 FV101 Scorpion 
 1 sqn with Typhoon
RECCE 137: 13 FV105 Sultan (CP); 124 VBL MARITIME PATROL
IFV 2 Pars III 8×8 1 sqn with C295MPA; SC.7 3M Skyvan
APC 200 TRANSPORT

and North Africa

APC (T) 10 FV4333 Stormer 1 sqn with C-130H/J/J-30 Hercules

Middle East
APC (W) 190: 175 Piranha (incl variants); 15 AT-105 1 sqn with C295M
Saxon TRAINING
AUV 6 FV103 Spartan 1 sqn with MFI-17B Mushshak; PC-9*; Bell 206 (AB-206)
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES Jet Ranger
ARV 11: 4 Challenger; 2 M88A1; 2 Piranha; TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
3 Samson 4 (med) sqn; Bell 212 (AB-212); NH-90; Super Lynx
ARTILLERY 233 Mk300 (maritime/SAR)
SP 155mm 24 G-6 AIR DEFENCE
TOWED 108: 105mm 42 L118 Light Gun; 122mm 30 2 sqn with Rapier; Blindfire; S713 Martello
D-30; 130mm 24: 12 M-46; 12 Type-59-I; 155mm 12 FH-70 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MOR 101: 81mm 69; 107mm 20 M30; 120mm 12 Brandt AIRCRAFT 63 combat capable
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL FGA 35: 17 F-16C Block 50 Fighting Falcon; 6 F-16D Block
SP 8 VBL with TOW 50 Fighting Falcon; 12 Typhoon
MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; Milan; TOW/TOW-2A MP 4 C295MPA
AIR DEFENCE TPT 20: Medium 6: 3 C-130H Hercules; 2 C-130J Hercules;
SAM • Point-defence 8 Mistral 2; FGM-148 Javelin; 9K32 1 C-130J-30 Hercules (VIP); Light 12: 5 C295M; 7 SC.7 3M
Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ Skyvan (radar-equipped, for MP); PAX 2 A320-300
GUNS 26: 23mm 4 ZU-23-2; 35mm 10 GDF-005 (with TRG 44: 4 Hawk Mk103*; 8 Hawk Mk166; 12 Hawk
Skyguard); 40mm 12 L/60 (Towed) Mk203*; 8 MFI-17B Mushshak; 12 PC-9*
HELICOPTERS
Navy 4,200 MRH 15 Super Lynx Mk300 (maritime/SAR)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TPT 26+ Medium 20 NH90 TTH; Light 6: 3 Bell 206 (AB-
PRIMARY SURFACE COMBATANTS 3 206) Jet Ranger; 3 Bell 212 (AB-212)
FFGHM 3 Al-Shamikh with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 AIR DEFENCE • SAM
Exocet Block 3 AShM, 2 6-cell VLS with VL-MICA Short-range NASAMS
SAM, 1 76mm gun Point-defence 40 Rapier
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 MSL
CORVETTES • FSGM 2: AAM • IR AIM-9/M/P Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder
2 Qahir Al Amwaj with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet II; ARH AIM-120C7 AMRAAM
AShM, 1 octuple lnchr with Crotale SAM, 1 76mm ASM AGM-65D/G Maverick
gun, 1 hel landing platform AShM AGM-84D Harpoon
362 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

BOMBS
Laser-guided EGBU-10 Paveway II; EGBU-12 Paveway II FOREIGN FORCES
INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM United Kingdom 90

Royal Household 6,400 Palestinian Territories PT

(incl HQ staff)
FORCES BY ROLE
 New Israeli Shekel NS 2017 2018 2019
SPECIAL FORCES GDP US$
2 SF regt per capita US$
Growth %
Royal Guard Brigade 5,000
Inflation %
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE US$1=NS
Other *definitive economic data unavailable
1 gd bde (1 armd sqn, 2 gd regt, 1 cbt spt bn) Population 4,635,207
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
ASLT 9 Centauro MGS (9 VBC-90 in store) Male 20.2% 5.7% 5.1% 4.4% 13.9% 1.5%
IFV 14 VAB VCI Female 19.1% 5.5% 5.0% 4.3% 13.7% 1.7%
APC • APC (W) ε50 Type-92
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Capabilities
MSL • MANPATS Milan
The Palestinian Territories remain effectively divided between the
ARTILLERY • MRL 122mm 6 Type-90A Palestinian Authority-run West Bank and Hamas-run Gaza. Each
AIR DEFENCE organisation controls their own security forces, principally the
SAM • Point-defence 14 Javelin National Security Forces (NSF) in the West Bank and the Izz al-Din
GUNS • SP 9: 20mm 9 VAB VDAA al-Qassam Brigades in Gaza. Both have generally proved effective
at maintaining internal security in their respective territories. The
Royal Yacht Squadron 150 Palestinian Authority has received support from the EU, Jordan
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE and the US. NSF battalions, as well as the Presidential Guard and
Civil Police, conduct US-funded internal-security training at the
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3
Jordanian International Police Training Center. A small number
AP 1 Fulk Al Salamah (also veh tpt) with up to 2 AS332
of Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades personnel are claimed by Israel
Super Puma hel to have received military training in Iran and Syria; the brigades
have substantial experience in conducting asymmetric military
Royal Flight 250 action against Israel. None of the Palestinian security organisations
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE conduct external military deployments, and they lack a formal mil-
AIRCRAFT • TPT • PAX 5: 2 B-747SP; 1 DC-8-73CF; 2 itary-logistics structure. Both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority
Gulfstream IV lack heavy military equipment, although the former have retained
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 6: 3 SA330 (AS330) a substantial arsenal of improvised rocket and mortar capabili-
ties, as well as some man-portable guided weapons. No formal
Puma; 2 AS332F Super Puma; 1 AS332L Super Puma
defence industry exists, although Hamas is able to acquire light or
improvised weapons, either smuggled into Gaza or of local con-
Paramilitary 4,400 active struction.

Tribal Home Guard 4,000 ACTIVE 0 Paramilitary n.k.

org in teams of ε100 Precise personnel-strength figures for the various Palestinian
groups are not known
Police Coast Guard 400
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32
PCO 2 Haras There is little available data on the status of the
organisations mentioned below. Following internal
PBF 3 Haras (US Mk V Pegasus)
fighting in June 2007, Gaza has been under the de facto
PB 27: 3 Rodman 101; 1 Haras (SWE CG27); 3 Haras
control of Hamas, while the West Bank is controlled by the
(SWE CG29); 14 Rodman 58; 1 D59116; 5 Zahra
Palestinian Authority. In October 2017, both sides agreed a
Police Air Wing preliminary reconciliation deal on control of Gaza.
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4: 1 BN-2T Turbine Islander; 2 Paramilitary
CN235M; 1 Do-228 Palestinian Authority n.k.
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 5: 2 Bell 205A; 3 Bell
214ST (AB-214ST) Presidential Security ε3,000
 Middle East and North Africa 363

Special Forces ε1,200

Qatar QTR
Police ε9,000
Qatari Riyal R 2017 2018 2019
National Security Force ε10,000 GDP R 608bn 685bn
FORCES BY ROLE US$ 167bn 188bn
MANOEUVRE
per capita US$ 61,025 67,818
Other
9 paramilitary bn Growth % 1.6 2.7
Inflation % 0.4 3.7
Preventative Security ε4,000 Def exp R n.k. n.k.
Civil Defence ε1,000 US$ n.k. n.k.
US$1=R 3.64 3.64
The al-Aqsa Brigades n.k.
Profess loyalty to the Fatah group that dominates the Population 2,363,569
Palestinian Authority Ethnic groups: Nationals 25%; expatriates 75%, of which Indian
18%; Iranian 10%; Pakistani 18%
Hamas n.k.
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades ε15,000–20,000 Male 6.4% 2.4% 6.3% 11.0% 50.5% 0.7%
FORCES BY ROLE Female 6.3% 1.6% 1.9% 2.7% 9.9% 0.4%
COMMAND
6 bde HQ (regional) Capabilities
MANOEUVRE
Qatar is attempting to transform its military capabilities and
Other regional defence standing based on significant equipment acqui-
1 cdo unit (Nukhba) sitions, with the aim of creating one of the most well-equipped
27 paramilitary bn forces in the region. The diplomatic crisis with several of its GCC
100 paramilitary coy neighbours has brought Qatar and Turkey closer together in their
COMBAT SUPPORT
Some engr units limited but significant defence cooperation, which includes a small

and North Africa

Turkish military presence in-country. The crisis appears not to have

Middle East
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
affected the significant Qatar–US military relationship, including
Some log units
the presence of forces from the US and other Western states at Al-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Udeid air base, and the key US-run coalition air-operations centre.
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL • The pressure on personnel requirements is increasing significantly
MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) (reported) due to Qatar’s acquisition programme. Changes were reported
ARTILLERY to national-service liabilities in 2018, increasing terms of service
and making national service voluntary for women. The speed and
MRL • Qassam rockets (multiple calibres); 122mm
scale of the equipment plan suggests that Qatar will need signifi-
Grad cant foreign help to integrate and operate its new capabilities. The
MOR some (multiple calibres) Italian Navy is supporting training for new Italian-built vessels and
a joint Eurofighter Typhoon squadron is being stood up with the
Martime Police ε600 UK. The Qatari armed forces initially sent air and ground elements
to support the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen. The country is also
acquiring platforms with potentially significant power-projection
capability. Qatar’s ambitious across-the-board re-equipment pro-
gramme includes significant purchases of combat aircraft. These
procurements will, when combined, dramatically increase the
size of the air force, and it is in terms of air capabilities that there
are the most questions about Qatar’s ability to procure the neces-
sary infrastructure, maintenance and personnel. Coastal-defence
missiles are being acquired, while an AN/FPS-132 early-warning
radar is being installed. Qatar currently has a limited indigenous
defence-industrial capability, including in ship repair.

ACTIVE 16,500 (Army 12,000 Navy 2,500 Air 2,000)

Paramilitary up to 5,000
Conscript liability 12 months for all men, regardless of education;
voluntary conscription for women

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Space
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 1 Es’hail-2
364 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Army 12,000 (including Emiri Guard) Coastal Defence

FORCES BY ROLE FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES COASTAL DEFENCE
1 SF coy 1 bty with 3 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM
MANOEUVRE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Armoured COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 12 MM40 Exocet
1 armd bde (1 tk bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 mor sqn, 1 AT bn) AShM
Mechanised
3 mech inf bn Air Force 2,000
Light FORCES BY ROLE
1 (Emiri Guard) bde (3 inf regt) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
COMBAT SUPPORT 1 sqn with Alpha Jet*
1 fd arty bn 1 sqn with Mirage 2000ED; Mirage 2000D
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with Rafale (forming)
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES TRANSPORT
MBT 62 Leopard 2A7+ 1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III; C-130J-30 Hercules
ASLT 48: 12 AMX-10RC; 36 Piranha II 90mm 1 sqn with A340; B-707; B-727; Falcon 900
RECCE 44: 20 EE-9 Cascavel; 25 Fennek; 8 V-150 Chaimite; ATTACK HELICOPTER
16 VBL 1 ASuW sqn with Commando Mk3 with Exocet
IFV 40 AMX-10P 1 sqn with SA341 Gazelle; SA342L Gazelle with HOT
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
APC 190
1 sqn with Commando Mk2A; Commando Mk2C
APC (T) 30 AMX-VCI
1 sqn with AW139
APC (W) 160 VAB
APC 14 Dingo 2 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES AIRCRAFT 18 combat capable
AEV Wisent 2 FGA 12: 9 Mirage 2000ED; 3 Mirage 2000D
TPT 18: Heavy 8 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium 4
ARV 3: 1 AMX-30D; 2 Piranha
C-130J-30 Hercules; PAX 6: 1 A340; 2 B-707; 1 B-727; 2
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Falcon 900
MSL
TRG 27: 6 Alpha Jet*; 21 PC-21
SP 24 VAB VCAC HOT
HELICOPTERS
MANPATS Milan
ASuW 8 Commando Mk3
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav
MRH 34: 21 AW139 (incl 3 for medevac); 2 SA341 Gazelle;
ARTILLERY 115+
11 SA342L Gazelle
SP 155mm 52: 28 Mk F3; 24 PzH 2000 TPT • Medium 4: 3 Commando Mk2A; 1 Commando Mk2C
TOWED 155mm 12 G-5 AIR DEFENCE • SAM
MRL 6+: 122mm 2+ (30-tube); 127mm 4 ASTROS II Mk3 Short-Range 9 Roland II
MOR 45: 81mm 26 L16; SP 81mm 4 VAB VPM 81; Point-defence Mistral; Blowpipe; FIM-92 Stinger; 9K32
120mm 15 Brandt Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
SRBM • Conventional 2 BP-12A (CH-SS-14 mod 2) AAM • IR R-550 Magic 2; ARH Mica RF
ASM Apache; HOT
Navy 2,500 (incl Coast Guard) AShM AM39 Exocet
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11 Paramilitary up to 5,000 active
PCFGM 4 Barzan (UK Vita) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40
Exocet Block 3 AShM, 1 sextuple lnchr with Mistral SAM, Internal Security Force up to 5,000
1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PCFG 3 Damsah (FRA Combattante III) with 2 quad lnchr DEPLOYMENT
with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 2
PBF 3 MRTP 16
PB 1 MRTP 34
FOREIGN FORCES
Coast Guard Turkey 150 (trg team)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE United States US Central Command: 10,000; USAF
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 CAOC; 1 bbr sqn with 6 B-1B Lancer; 1 ISR sqn with 4 RC-
PBF 4 DV 15 135 Rivet Joint; 1 ISR sqn with 4 E-8C JSTARS; 1 tkr sqn
PB 8: 4 Crestitalia MV-45; 3 Halmatic M160; 1 other with 24 KC-135R/T Stratotanker; 1 tpt sqn with 4 C-17A
 Middle East and North Africa 365

Globemaster; 4 C-130H/J-30 Hercules; 2 AD bty with MIM-

104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3 • US Strategic Command: 1 AN/
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
TPY-2 X-band radar
Army 75,000
FORCES BY ROLE
Saudi Arabia SAU MANOEUVRE
Armoured
Saudi Riyal R 2017 2018 2019
4 armd bde (1 recce coy, 3 tk bn, 1 mech bn, 1 fd arty bn,
GDP R 2.58tr 2.89tr 1 AD bn, 1 AT bn, 1 engr coy, 1 log bn, 1 maint coy, 1
US$ 687bn 770bn med coy)
per capita US$ 21,096 23,187 Mechanised
Growth % -0.9 2.2 5 mech bde (1 recce coy, 1 tk bn, 3 mech bn, 1 fd arty bn,
1 AD bn, 1 AT bn, 1 engr coy, 1 log bn, 1 maint coy, 1
Inflation % -0.9 2.6
med coy)
Def exp R 334bn 311bn
Light
US$ 89.1bn 82.9bn 2 lt inf bde
US$1=R 3.75 3.75 1 (Royal Guard) regt (3 lt inf bn)
Air Manoeuvre
Population 33,091,113
1 AB bde (2 AB bn, 3 SF coy)
Ethnic groups: Nationals 73%, of which Bedouin up to 10%, Shia
Aviation
6%; expatriates 27%, of which Asians 20%, Arabs 6%, Africans 1%,
Europeans <1% 1 comd (3 hel gp)
COMBAT SUPPORT
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 3 arty bde
Male 13.1% 4.2% 4.0% 4.8% 28.7% 1.8% EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Female 12.6% 3.9% 3.5% 4.0% 17.9% 1.5% MBT 900: 140 AMX-30; 370 M1A2/A2S Abrams; 390
M60A3 Patton
Capabilities RECCE 300 AML-60/AML-90
IFV 760: 380 AMX-10P; 380 M2A2 Bradley

and North Africa

The armed forces are one of the best equipped in the region, APC 1,340

Middle East
and the kingdom has displayed an increasing willingness to use APC (T) 1,190 M113A4 (incl variants)
them as part of a more assertive foreign policy. Principal roles are APC (W) 150 Panhard M3 (ε40 AF-40-8-1 Al-Fahd in
securing territorial integrity, internal security and regional stabil- store)
ity. Saudi Arabia’s defence posture continues to emphasise the AUV 333: 73 Aravis; 100 Didgori (amb); 160 M-ATV; Al-
deployment of airpower. Saudi Arabia is the leading member of Shibl 2; Terradyne Gurkha;
the GCC. However, its most critical defence relationship is with the
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
US, which is the ultimate external guarantor of its security. In 2017,
AEV 15 M728
the countries agreed to establish a Strategic Joint Consultative
ARV 278+: 8 ACV ARV; AMX-10EHC; 55 AMX-30D;
Group, and furthered existing defence and security cooperation.
Leclerc ARV; 122 M88A1; 90 M578
Riyadh also has significant security relationships with France and
VLB 10 AMX-30
the UK, though recently there has been diversification of defence
MW Aardvark Mk2
relationships, including with China. Significant training support
NBC VEHICLES 10 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC
is supplied by the US and, to a lesser extent, the UK. The armed
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
forces continue to gain combat experience from their involve-
ment in the conflict in Yemen. However, the operation has exposed
MSL
areas of comparative weakness and capability gaps, especially in SP 290+: 90+ AMX-10P (HOT); 200 VCC-1 ITOW;
the application of precision airpower, air–ground coordination M-ATV with Milan
and in logistics support, such as aerial refuelling. The US remains MANPATS Hyeongung; TOW-2A
the country’s main source of advanced weaponry, followed by the RCL 84mm Carl Gustav; 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1
UK, with whom it signed a new Military and Security Cooperation ARTILLERY 761
Agreement in September 2017. Saudi Arabia continues its equip- SP 155mm 224: 60 AU-F-1; 110 M109A1B/A2; 54 PLZ-45
ment recapitalisation, with orders for combat aircraft, corvettes TOWED 110: 105mm (100 M101/M102 in store); 155mm
and multi-mission surface combatants. There is a modest domestic 110: 50 M114; 60 M198; 203mm (8 M115 in store)
defence-industrial base, mainly in the assembly and overhaul of MRL 127mm 60 ASTROS II Mk3
land systems. Riyadh has declared an intention to spend 50% of MOR 367: SP 81mm 70; SP 107mm 150 M30; 120mm 147:
its defence outlays locally as part of its Vision 2030 initiative and 110 Brandt; 37 M12-1535
established the state-owned Saudi Arabian Military Industries to HELICOPTERS
oversee local defence production. ATK 35: 11 AH-64D Apache; 24 AH-64E Apache
MRH 21: 6 AS365N Dauphin 2 (medevac); 15 Bell 406CS
ACTIVE 227,000 (Army 75,000 Navy 13,500 Air Combat Scout
20,000 Air Defence 16,000 Strategic Missile Forces TPT • Medium 58: 12 S-70A1 Desert Hawk; 22 UH-60A
2,500 National Guard 100,000) Paramilitary 24,500 Black Hawk (4 medevac); 24 UH-60L Black Hawk
366 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

AIR DEFENCE • SAM GROUND ATTACK

Short-range Crotale 3 sqn with Tornado IDS; Tornado GR1A
Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
1 sqn with E-3A Sentry
Navy 13,500 1 sqn with Saab 2000 Erieye
Navy HQ at Riyadh; Eastern Fleet HQ at Jubail; Western ELINT
Fleet HQ at Jeddah 1 sqn with RE-3A/B; Beech 350ER King Air
TANKER
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with KE-3A
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 7 TANKER/TRANSPORT
DESTROYERS • DDGHM 3 Al Riyadh (FRA La Fayette 1 sqn with KC-130H/J Hercules
mod) with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 2 1 sqn with A330 MRTT
AShM, 2 8-cell A43 VLS with Aster 15 SAM, 4 single TRANSPORT
533mm TT with F17P HWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 3 sqn with C-130H Hercules; C-130H-30 Hercules; CN-
AS365N Dauphin 2 hel) 235; L-100-30HS (hospital ac)
FRIGATES • FFGHM 4 Madina (FRA F-2000) with 2 2 sqn with Beech 350 King Air (forming)
quad lnchr with Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr TRAINING

with Crotale SAM, 4 single 533mm TT with F17P HWT, 1 OCU sqn with F-15SA Eagle
1 100mm gun (capacity 1 AS365N Dauphin 2 hel) 3 sqn with Hawk Mk65*; Hawk Mk65A*; Hawk Mk165*
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32 1 sqn with Jetstream Mk31
CORVETTES • FSG 4 Badr (US Tacoma) with 2 quad Mk140 1 sqn with MFI-17 Mushshak; SR22T
lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 2 triple 324mm 2 sqn with PC-9; PC-21
ASTT with Mk 46 LWT, 1 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
PCFG 9 Al Siddiq (US 58m) with 2 twin Mk140 lnchr with 4 sqn with AS532 Cougar (CSAR); Bell 212 (AB-212); Bell
RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, 1 Phalanx CIWS, 1 76mm gun 412 (AB-412) Twin Huey (SAR)
PB 19: 17 (US) Halter Marine 24m; 2 Plascoa 2200 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3 AIRCRAFT 407 combat capable
MHC 3 Al Jawf (UK Sandown) FTR 81: 56 F-15C Eagle; 25 F-15D Eagle
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 5
 FGA 185+: up to 67 F-15S Eagle (being upgraded to
LCM 3 LCM 6 (capacity 80 troops) F-15SA configuration); 47+ F-15SA Eagle; 71 Typhoon
LCU ε2 Al Qiaq (US LCU 1610) (capacity 120 troops) ATK 67 Tornado IDS
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2 ISR 14+: 12 Tornado GR1A*; 2+ Beech 350ER King Air
AEW&C 7: 5 E-3A Sentry; 2 Saab 2000 Erieye
AORH 2 Boraida (mod FRA Durance) (capacity either 2
ELINT 2: 1 RE-3A; 1 RE-3B
AS365F Dauphin 2 hel or 1 AS332C Super Puma) 

TKR/TPT 15: 6 A330 MRTT; 7 KC-130H Hercules; 2 KC-
Naval Aviation 130J Hercules
TKR 7 KE-3A
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TPT 47+: Medium 36: 30 C-130H Hercules; 3 C-130H-30
HELICOPTERS Hercules; 3 L-100-30; Light 11+: 10+ Beech 350 King Air; 1
MRH 34: 6 AS365N Dauphin 2; 15 AS565; 13 Bell 406CS Jetstream Mk31
Combat Scout TRG 181: 24 Hawk Mk65* (incl aerobatic team); 16 Hawk
TPT • Medium 12 AS332B/F Super Puma Mk65A*; 22 Hawk Mk165*; 20 MFI-17 Mushshak; 20 PC-9;
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES 55 PC-21; 24 SR22T
AShM AM39 Exocet; AS-15TT HELICOPTERS
MRH 15 Bell 412 (AB-412) Twin Huey (SAR)
Marines 3,000 TPT 30: Medium 10 AS532 Cougar (CSAR); Light 20 Bell
FORCES BY ROLE 212 (AB-212)
SPECIAL FORCES UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
1 spec ops regt with (2 spec ops bn) CISR • Heavy some Wing Loong 1 (GJ-1) (reported);
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE some CH-4
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES ISR • Medium some Falco
RECCE Bastion Patsas AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
APC • APC (W) 135 BMR-600P AAM • IR AIM-9P/L Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder
II; IRIS-T; SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; AIM-7M Sparrow; ARH
AIM-120C AMRAAM
Air Force 20,000 ASM AGM-65 Maverick; AR-1
FORCES BY ROLE AShM Sea Eagle; AGM-48L Harpoon Block II
FIGHTER ARM ALARM
4 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle ALCM Storm Shadow
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK BOMBS
2 sqn with F-15SA Eagle Laser-guided GBU-10/12 Paveway II; Paveway IV
3 sqn with Typhoon INS/GPS-guided GBU-31 JDAM; FT-9
 Middle East and North Africa 367

Royal Flt ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AEV 58 LAV-E
AIRCRAFT • TPT 24: Medium 8: 5 C-130H Hercules; 3 ARV 111 LAV-R; V-150 ARV
L-100-30; Light 3: 1 Cessna 310; 2 Learjet 35; PAX 13: 1 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
A340; 1 B-737-200; 2 B-737BBJ; 2 B-747SP; 4 BAe-125-800; MSL
2 Gulfstream III; 1 Gulfstream IV SP 182 LAV-AT
HELICOPTERS • TPT 3+: Medium 3: 2 AS-61; 1 S-70 MANPATS TOW-2A; M47 Dragon
Black Hawk; Light some Bell 212 (AB-212) RCL • 106mm M40A1
ARTILLERY 359+
Air Defence Forces 16,000 SP 155mm 132 CAESAR
TOWED 108: 105mm 50 M102; 155mm 58 M198
FORCES BY ROLE
MOR 119+: 81mm some; 120mm 119 LAV-M
AIR DEFENCE
HELICOPTERS
6 bn with MIM-104D/F Patriot PAC-2 GEM/PAC-3
ATK 12 AH-64E Apache
17 bty with Shahine/AMX-30SA
MRH 20: 8 AH-6i Little Bird; 12 MD530F (trg role)
16 bty with MIM-23B I-Hawk
TPT • Medium 23 UH-60M Black Hawk
73 units (static defence) with Crotale/Shahine
AIR DEFENCE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE GUNS • TOWED • 20mm 30 M167 Vulcan
AIR DEFENCE AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
SAM ASM AGM-114R Hellfire II
Long-range 108 MIM-104D/F Patriot PAC-2 GEM/
PAC-3
Paramilitary 24,500+ active
Medium-range 128 MIM-23B I-Hawk
Short-range 181: 40 Crotale; 73 Shahine; 68 Crotale/ Border Guard 15,000
Shahine
FORCES BY ROLE
Point-defence 400+: 400 M1097 Avenger; Mistral
Subordinate to Ministry of Interior. HQ in Riyadh. 9
GUNS 1,070
subordinate regional commands
SP 942: 20mm 92 M163 Vulcan; 30mm 850 AMX-30SA
MANOEUVRE

and North Africa

TOWED 128: 35mm 128 GDF Oerlikon; 40mm (150

Middle East
Other
L/70 in store)
Some mobile def (long-range patrol/spt) units
2 border def (patrol) units
Strategic Missile Forces 2,500 12 infrastructure def units
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 18 harbour def units
MSL • TACTICAL Some coastal def units
IRBM 10+ DF-3 (CH-SS-2) (service status unclear) COMBAT SUPPORT
MRBM Some DF-21 (CH-SS-5 – variant unclear) (reported) Some MP units
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
National Guard 73,000 active; 27,000 (tribal ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
levies) (total 100,000) APC • PPV Caprivi Mk3
FORCES BY ROLE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 23+
MANOEUVRE PCC 9 CSB 40
Mechanised PBF 6+: 4 Al Jouf; 2 Sea Guard; some Plascoa FIC 1650
5 mech bde (1 recce coy, 3 mech inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 PB 8: 6 Damen Stan Patrol 2606; 2 Al Jubatel
cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 8: 5 UCAC Griffon
Light 8000; 3 other
5 inf bde (3 combined arms bn, 1 arty bn, 1 log bn) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4: 1 AXL; 3 AO
3 indep lt inf bn
Other Facilities Security Force 9,000+
1 (Special Security) sy bde (3 sy bn) Subordinate to Ministry of Interior
1 (ceremonial) cav sqn
COMBAT SUPPORT General Civil Defence Administration Units
1 MP bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 10 Boeing Vertol 107
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
ASLT 204 LAV-AG (90mm) Special Security Force 500
IFV 640 LAV-25 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
APC • APC (W) 806 117 LAV-A (amb); 30 LAV-AC ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
(ammo carrier); 296 LAV-CC (CP); 73 LAV-PC; 290 V-150 APC • APC (W) UR-416
Commando (810 in store) AUV Gurkha LAPV
368 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

maintenance, a situation that has deteriorated further. Front-line

DEPLOYMENT
TURKEY: Operation Inherent Resolve 6 F-15S Eagle
YEMEN: Operation Restoring Hope 1,500; 1 armd BG;
M60A3; M2A2 Bradley; M113A4; M-ATV; 2+ MIM-104D/F
Patriot PAC-2/3
combat units have been re-equipping with Russian-supplied new
or surplus weapons systems. Before the civil war, Syria did not have
a major domestic defence industry, although it possessed facilities
for the overhaul and maintenance of its existing systems. It did,
however, possess some capacity in focused areas, such as ballistic
missiles and chemical weapons.

ACTIVE 139,000 (Army 100,000 Navy 4,000 Air

FOREIGN FORCES 15,000 Air Defence 20,000) Paramilitary 100,000
Bahrain Operation Restoring Hope 250; 1 SF gp; 1 arty gp; 6 Conscript liability 30 months (there is widespread avoidance of
F-16C Fighting Falcon military service)
Egypt Operation Restoring Hope 6 F-16C Fighting Falcon
Jordan Operation Restoring Hope 6 F-16AM Fighting Falcon ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Kuwait Operation Restoring Hope 4 F/A-18A Hornet
Sudan Operation Restoring Hope 3 Su-24 Fencer Army ε100,000
United Arab Emirates Operation Restoring Hope 12 F-16E FORCES BY ROLE
Fighting Falcon The Syrian Arab Army combines conventional forma-
United States US Central Command: 500 tions, special forces and auxiliary militias. The main fight-
ing units are the 4th Armoured Division, the Republican
Syria SYR Guard, the paratroopers and the Special Forces (including
Tiger Forces); they receive the most attention and training.
Syrian Pound S£ 2017 2018 2019 Much of the remainder performs static functions across
regime-held areas. Many formations are under-strength,
GDP S£
at an estimated 500–1,000 personnel in brigades and regi-
US$ ments.
per capita US$ COMMAND
Growth % 4 corps HQ
Inflation % 1 (5th Assault) corps HQ
SPECIAL FORCES
Def exp S£
2 SF div (total: 11 SF regt; 1 tk regt)
US$ MANOEUVRE
US$1=S£ Armoured
*definitive economic data unavailable 1 (4th) armd div (1 SF regt, 2 armd bde, 2 mech bde, 1
arty regt, 1 SSM bde (3 SSM bn with Scud-B/C))
Population 19,454,263
5 armd div(-)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Mechanised
1 (Republican Guard) mech div (3 mech bde, 2 sy regt,
Male 16.1% 5.2% 4.8% 4.4% 17.9% 2.0%
1 arty regt)
Female 15.3% 5.0% 4.6% 4.4% 18.0% 2.4% 3 mech div(-)
2 indep inf bde(-)
Capabilities Amphibious
The civil war has significantly depleted the combat capabilities of 1 mne unit
the Syrian armed forces and transformed them into an irregularly COMBAT SUPPORT
structured militia-style organisation focused on internal secu- 2 arty bde
rity. There is no published defence doctrine or white paper, the 2 AT bde
ongoing war instead dictating de facto requirements and priori- 1 SSM bde (3 SSM bn with FROG-7)
ties. Most formal pre-war structures and formations exist in name
1 SSM bde (3 SSM bn with SS-21)
only, as resources have been channelled into an irregular network
of military organisations that form the regime’s most effective EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

military capabilities. Russia is the regime’s dominant ally and has Attrition during the civil war has severely reduced equip-
provided essential direct combat support and assistance to Syrian ment numbers for almost all types. It is unclear how much
military activities, as well as significant amounts of replacement remains available for operations
equipment. Iran and Hizbullah also continue to assist in the pro- ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
vision and training of militias and other ground forces. Overall MBT T-55A; T-55AM; T-55AMV; T-62; T-62M; T-72;
levels of training remain poor, but select regular and irregular mili- T-72AV; T-72B; T-72B3; T-72M1; T-90
tary formations have gained a reasonable degree of proficiency
RECCE BRDM-2
through combat experience. The armed forces lack the requisite
capabilities for external deployment, although they remain able
IFV BMP-1; BMP-2; BTR-82A
to redeploy moderate numbers of formations and capabilities APC
within the country. Logistics support for major internal opera- APC (T) BTR-50
tions away from established bases remains a challenge. The large APC (W) BTR-152; BTR-60; BTR-70; BTR-80
pre-war equipment inventory has long suffered from indifferent APC IVECO LMV
 Middle East and North Africa 369

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES MSI 5 Korund (Yevgenya) (Project 1258)

ARV BREM-1 reported; T-54/55 AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING SHIPS • LSM 3 Polnochny B
VLB MTU; MTU-20 (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops)
MW UR-77 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AX 1 Al Assad
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL
SP 9P133 Malyutka-P (BRDM-2 with AT-3C Sagger); Coastal Defence
9P148 Konkurs (BRDM-2 with AT-5 Spandrel) FORCES BY ROLE
MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs COASTAL DEFENCE
(AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K115- 1 AShM bde with P-35 (SSC-1B Sepal); P-15M Termit-R
2 Metis-M (AT-13 Saxhorn 2); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 (SSC-3 Styx); C-802; K-300P Bastion (SSC-5 Stooge)
Spriggan); Milan EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARTILLERY COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM P-35 (SSC-1B Sepal);
SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; D-30 (mounted on T34/85 chassis); P-15M Termit-R (SSC-3 Styx); C-802; K-300P Bastion (SSC-
130mm M-46 (truck–mounted); 152mm 2S3
Akatsiya 5 Stooge)
TOWED 122mm D-30; M-30 (M1938); 130mm M-46;
152mm D-20; ML-20 (M-1937); 180mm S-23 Naval Aviation
GUN/MOR 120mm 2S9 NONA-S All possibly non-operational after vacating base for Rus-
MRL 107mm Type-63; 122mm BM-21 Grad; 140mm BM- sian deployment
14; 220mm 9P140 Uragan; 300mm 9A52 Smerch; 330mm
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
some (also improvised systems of various calibres)
HELICOPTERS • ASW 10: 4 Ka-28 Helix A; 6 Mi-14 Haze
MOR 82mm some; 120mm M-1943; 160mm M-160;
240mm M-240
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS Air Force ε15,000(-)
SRBM • Conventional Scud-B/C/D; Scud look-a-like; FORCES BY ROLE
9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab); Fateh-110/M-600 FIGHTER
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 2 sqn with MiG-23 MF/ML/UM Flogger
ISR • Medium Mohajer 3/4; Light Ababil 2 sqn with MiG-29A/U Fulcrum
AIR DEFENCE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
SAM 4 sqn with MiG-21MF/bis Fishbed; MiG-21U Mongol A

and North Africa

Medium-range 9K37 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly); 9K317 2 sqn with MiG-23BN/UB Flogger

Middle East
Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly) GROUND ATTACK
Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) 4 sqn with Su-22 Fitter D
Point-defence 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin); 9K33 Osa 1 sqn with Su-24 Fencer
(SA-8 Gecko); 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 9K32 1 sqn with L-39 Albatros*
Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse); 9K36 TRANSPORT
Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch) 1 sqn with An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl; Il-76 Candid
GUNS 1 sqn with Falcon 20; Falcon 900
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4; 57mm ZSU-57-2; S-60 (on 2K12 1 sqn with Tu-134B-3
chassis) 1 sqn with Yak-40 Codling
TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 37mm M-1939; 57mm S-60; ATTACK HELICOPTER
100mm KS-19 3 sqn with Mi-25 Hind D
2 sqn with SA342L Gazelle
Navy ε4,000 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Some personnel are likely to have been drafted into other 6 sqn with Mi-8 Hip/Mi-17 Hip H
services EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Heavy use of both fixed- and rotary-wing assets has likely
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 32†: reduced readiness and availability to very low levels. It is
CORVETTES • FS 2 Petya III (1†) with 1 triple 533mm estimated that no more than 30–40% of the inventory is op-
ASTT with SAET-60 HWT, 4 RBU 2500 Smerch 1† A/S erational
mor, 2 twin 76mm gun AIRCRAFT 236 combat capable
PBFG 22: FTR 64: 34 MiG-23MF/ML/UM Flogger; 30 MiG-29A/SM/
16 Osa I/II with 4 single lnchr with P-15M Termit-M UB Fulcrum
(SS-N-2C Styx) AShM FGA 118: 68 MiG-21MF/bis Fishbed; 9 MiG-21U Mongol
6 Tir with 2 single lnchr with C-802 (CH-SS-N-8 A; 41 MiG-23BN/UB Flogger;
Saccade) AShM ATK 39: 28 Su-22 Fitter D; 11 Su-24 Fencer
PB 8 Zhuk† TPT 23: Heavy 3 Il-76 Candid; Light 13: 1 An-24 Coke; 6
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 7 An-26 Curl; 2 PA-31 Navajo; 4 Yak-40 Codling; PAX 7: 2
MHC 1 Sonya with 2 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2 (SA- Falcon 20; 1 Falcon 900; 4 Tu-134B-3
N-5 Grail)‡ SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS TRG 15 L-39 Albatros*
MSO 1 Natya with 2 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2 (SA- HELICOPTERS
N-5 Grail)‡ SAM ATK 24 Mi-25 Hind D
370 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

MRH 54: 26 Mi-17 Hip H; 28 SA342L Gazelle EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

TPT • Medium 27 Mi-8 Hip ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111
AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel);
(AA-11 Archer); IR/SARH; R-23/24 (AA-7 Apex); R-27 9K115-2 Metis-M (AT-13 Saxhorn 2); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14
(AA-10 Alamo); ARH; R-77 (AA-12A Adder) reported Spriggan); BGM-71 TOW; Milan
ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29T/L (AS-14 Kedge); HOT ARTILLERY
ARM Kh-31P (AS-17A Krypton) TOWED 122mm D-30
MRL 107mm Type-63; 122mm BM-21 Grad; Grad (6-tube
Air Defence Command ε20,000(-) tech)
FORCES BY ROLE MOR 82mm some
AIR DEFENCE AIR DEFENCE
4 AD div with S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); 2K12 Kub (SA-6 SAM
Gainful); S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline) Point-defence MANPADS some
3 AD regt with S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon); GUNS
S-300PMU2 (SA-20 Gargoyle) SP 14.5mm ZPU-1; ZPU-2 23mm ZU-23-2; ZSU-23-4
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Shilka
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
Long-range S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon); 24 Syrian Democratic Forces ε50,000
S-300PMU2 (SA-20 Gargoyle) A coalition of predominantly Kurdish rebel groups in
Medium-range S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline) de facto control of much of northeastern Syria. Kurdish
Short-range 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); S-125 Pechora (SA- forces from the YPG/J (People’s Protection Units/Women’s
3 Goa) Protection Units) provide military leadership and main
Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2/2M (SA-7A/B Grail)‡ 
 combat power, supplemented by Arab militias and tribal
groups. The SDF has benefited from considerable US and
Paramilitary ε100,000 coalition air support, embedded special-operations forces
and weaponry.
National Defence Force ε50,000 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
An umbrella of disparate regime militias performing a ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
variety of roles, including territorial control MBT T-55; T-72 (reported)
IFV BMP-1
Other Militias ε50,000 APC • PPV Guardian
Numerous military groups fighting for the Assad
AUV M-ATV
regime, including Afghan, Iraqi, Pakistani and sectarian
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
organisations. Some receive significant Iranian support
MSL • MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs
RCL 73mm SPG-9; 90mm M-79 Osa
FOREIGN FORCES ARTILLERY
Hizbullah 7,000–8,000 MRL 122mm BM-21 Grad; 9K132 Grad-P
Iran 3,000 MOR 82mm 82-BM-37; M-1938; 120mm M-1943;
improvised mortars of varying calibre
Russia 5,000: 1 inf BG; 3 MP bn; 1 engr unit; ε10
T-72B3/T-90; ε20 BTR-82A; 12 2A65; 4 9A52 Smerch; AIR DEFENCE • GUNS
TOS-1A; 9K720 Iskander-M; 10 Su-24M Fencer; 6 Su-34; 4 SP 14.5mm ZPU-4 (tch); ZPU-2 (tch); ZPU-1 (tch); 1
Su-35S; 1 Il-20M; 12 Mi-24P/Mi-35M Hind; 4 Mi-8AMTSh ZPU-2 (tch/on T-55); 23mm ZSU-23-4 Shilka; ZU-23-2
Hip; 1 AShM bty with 3K55 Bastion (SSC-5 Stooge); 1 SAM (tch); 57mm S-60
bty with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 1 SAM bty with S-300V4 TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-2; ZPU-1; 23mm ZU-23-2
(SA-23); 1 SAM bty with Pantsir-S1/S2; air base at Latakia;
naval facility at Tartus Syrian National Army ε20,000
Formed in late 2017 from Syrian Arab and Turkmen
rebel factions operating under Turkish command in the
TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT Aleppo governate and northwestern Syria, including Afrin
DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL province.
Data here represents the de facto situation for selected EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
armed opposition groups and their observed equipment ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT T-54; T-55; T-62
National Front for Liberation ε50,000 IFV BMP-1
A coalition of surviving Islamist and nationalist rebel ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
factions formed in 2018, reportedly backed by Turkey, MSL • MANPATS BGM-71 TOW; 9K115 Metis (AT-7
and operating in northwestern Syria; particularly in and Saxhorn)
around Idlib. RCL 73mm SPG-9; 82mm B-10
 Middle East and North Africa 371

ARTILLERY Capabilities
MRL 107mm Type-63; 122mm 9K132 Grad-P
Ensuring territorial sovereignty and internal security are the main
MOR 82mm 2B9 Vasilek; improvised mortars of varying
tasks of the armed forces, which have limited capacities but are
calibre undergoing a modernisation process. The civil war in Libya and
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS Islamist terrorist groups operating from there continue to pose a
SP 14.5mm ZPU-4 (tch); ZPU-2 (tch); ZPU-1 (tch); security concern. In the light of terrorist attacks, the armed forces
23mm ZU-23-2 (tch); 57mm AZP S-60 are engaged in counter-terrorism operations, and have been
TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1; ZPU-2; ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23-2 tasked with securing sensitive industrial sites. Designated a major
non-NATO ally by the US in 2015, Tunisia also benefits from defence
and security cooperation with US AFRICOM and with France. The
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) ε10,000 country has received training from Algeria and is a member of the
HTS was formed by Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly known Saudi-led Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition. The armed
as Jabhat al-Nusra) in January 2017 by absorbing other forces are involved in multinational exercises, notably those led
hardline groups. It is designated a terrorist organisation by by the US. The country is also strengthening its intelligence capa-
bilities. Overall military capability is limited by the ageing equip-
the US for its links to al-Qaeda.
ment inventory, although Tunisia has been the recipient of surplus
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE US systems, including armed utility helicopters. The country has
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE limited defence-industrial capabilities.
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K113
ACTIVE 35,800 (Army 27,000 Navy 4,800 Air 4,000)
Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115-2 Metis-M (AT-13
Paramilitary 12,000
Saxhorn 2); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan)
Conscript liability 12 months selective
RCL 73mm SPG-9; 106mm M-40
ARTILLERY
MRL 107mm Type-63 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
MOR 120mm some; improvised mortars of varying
calibres Army 5,000; 22,000 conscript (total 27,000)
AIR DEFENCE FORCES BY ROLE
SAM SPECIAL FORCES

and North Africa

Point-defence 9K37M Strela-2M (SA-7B Grail)‡ 1 SF bde

Middle East
GUNS 1 (Sahara) SF bde
SP 14.5mm ZPU-1; ZPU-2; 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60 MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance
1 recce regt
FOREIGN FORCES Mechanised
France Operation Inherent Resolve (Chammal) 1 SF unit 3 mech bde (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 arty regt, 1
Turkey 500+; 1 SF coy; 1 armd coy(+); 1 arty unit AD regt, 1 engr regt, 1 sigs regt, 1 log gp)
COMBAT SUPPORT
United States Operation Inherent Resolve 2,000+; 1 ranger
1 engr regt
unit; 1 mne bn; 1 arty bty with M777A2; 1 MRL bty with
M142 HIMARS EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 84: 30 M60A1; 54 M60A3
Tunisia TUN LT TK 48 SK-105 Kuerassier
RECCE 60: 40 AML-90; 20 FV601 Saladin
Tunisian Dinar D 2017 2018 2019 APC 350
GDP D 96.7bn 106bn APC (T) 140 M113A1/A2
US$ 40.0bn 41.7bn APC (W) 110 Fiat 6614
PPV 114+: 4 Bastion APC: Ejder Yalcin; 100+ Kirpi
per capita US$ 3,465 3,573
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Growth % 2.0 2.4
AEV 2 Greif
Inflation % 5.3 8.1 ARV 9: 3 Greif; 6 M88A1
Def bgt D 2.02bn 2.33bn 2.93bn ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL
US$ 833m 915m SP 35 M901 ITV TOW
FMA (US) US$ 95m 0m 40m MANPATS Milan; TOW
ARTILLERY 276
US$1=D 2.42 2.55
TOWED 115: 105mm 48 M101A1/A2; 155mm 67: 12
Population 11,516,189 M114A1; 55 M198
MOR 161: 81mm 95; SP 107mm 48 M106; 120mm 18
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Brandt
Male 13.0% 3.3% 3.5% 4.0% 22.0% 3.9% AIR DEFENCE
Female 12.2% 3.2% 3.5% 4.0% 23.0% 4.3% SAM • Point-defence 26 M48 Chaparral; RBS-70
372 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

GUNS 127 Paramilitary 12,000

SP 40mm 12 M42
TOWED 115: 20mm 100 M-55; 37mm 15 Type-55 (M- National Guard 12,000
1939)/Type-65 Ministry of Interior
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Navy ε4,800 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ASLT 2 EE-11 Urutu FSV
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 33 APC 26+:
PSO 2 Jugurtha (Damen Stan MSOPV 1400) with 1 hel APC (W) 16 EE-11 Urutu (anti-riot); VAB Mk3
landing platform PPV 10 Streit Typhoon
PCFG 3 La Galite (FRA Combattante III) with 2 quad lnchr AUV IVECO LMV
with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 24
PCG 3 Bizerte (FRA P-48) with 8 SS 12M AShM PCC 6 Rais el Blais (ex-GDR Kondor I)
PCFT 6 Albatros (GER Type-143B) with 2 single 533mm PBF 7: 4 Gabes; 3 Patrouiller
TT, 2 76mm guns PB 11: 5 Breitla (ex-GDR Bremse); 4 Rodman 38; 2
PBF 2 20m Fast Patrol Boat Socomena
PB 17: 3 Istiklal; 3 Utique (mod PRC Haizhui II); 5 HELICOPTERS
Joumhouria; 6 V Series MRH 8 SA318 Alouette II/SA319 Alouette III
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 7: TPT • Light 3 Bell 429
ABU 3: 2 Tabarka (ex-US White Sumac); 1 Sisi Bou Said
AGE 1 Hannibal DEPLOYMENT
AGS 1 Khaireddine (ex-US Wilkes)
AWT 1 Ain Zaghouan (ex-ITA Simeto) DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
AX 1 Salambo (ex-US Conrad, survey) MONUSCO 11; 4 obs
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 4; 1 obs
Air Force 4,000
FORCES BY ROLE United Arab Emirates UAE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with F-5E/F-5F Tiger II Emirati Dirham D 2017 2018 2019
TRANSPORT GDP D 1.41tr 1.59tr
1 sqn with C-130B/H/J-30 Hercules; G.222; L-410 Turbolet
US$ 383bn 433bn
1 liaison unit with S-208A
TRAINING per capita US$ 37,733 41,476
2 sqn with L-59 Albatros*; MB-326B; SF-260 Growth % 0.8 2.9
1 sqn with MB-326K; MB-326L Inflation % 2.0 3.5
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Def exp D n.k n.k
2 sqn with AS350B Ecureuil; AS365 Dauphin 2; AB-205 US$ n.k n.k
(Bell 205); SA313; SA316 Alouette III; UH-1H Iroquois;
US$1=D 3.67 3.67
UH-1N Iroquois
1 sqn with HH-3E Population 9,701,315
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Ethnic groups: Nationals 24%; expatriates 76%, of which Indian
AIRCRAFT 23 combat capable 30%, Pakistani 20%, other Arab 12%, other Asian 10%, UK 2%,
FTR 11: 9 F-5E Tiger II; 2 F-5F Tiger II other European 1%
ATK 3 MB-326K Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
ISR 12 Maule MX-7-180B
Male 7.5% 1.9% 2.3% 4.6% 55.1% 1.1%
TPT 18: Medium 13: 5 C-130B Hercules; 1 C-130H
Hercules; 2 C-130J-30 Hercules; 5 G.222; Light 5: 3 L-410 Female 6.9% 1.6% 1.8% 2.7% 14.1% 0.4%
Turbolet; 2 S-208A
TRG 30: 9 L-59 Albatros*; 4 MB-326B; 3 MB-326L; 14 Capabilities
SF-260 The UAE’s armed forces are arguably the best trained and most
HELICOPTERS capable among the GCC states. In recent years, there has been a
MRH 34: 1 AS365 Dauphin 2; 6 SA313; 3 SA316 Alouette growing willingness to take part in operations, including sending
III; 24 OH-58D Kiowa Warrior an F-16 detachment to Afghanistan, participating in the air cam-
SAR 11 HH-3E paign in Libya and joining the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen.
A new defence agreement was signed with the US in May 2017
TPT 39: Medium 8 UH-60M Black Hawk; Light 31: 6
designed to deepen military cooperation. The UAE hosts a French
AS350B Ecureuil; 15 Bell 205 (AB-205); 8 Bell 205 (UH-
base and is diversifying its security relationships, including with
1H Iroquois); 2 Bell 212 (UH-1N Iroquois) China, India and Japan. A significant part of the UAE approach to
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES regional security, particularly around the Horn of Africa, has been
AAM • IR AIM-9P Sidewinder engaging in capacity building and training. The UAE’s involvement
ASM AGM-114R Hellfire in the Yemen campaign has offered combat lessons, not least of
 Middle East and North Africa 373

all in limited amphibious operations. This operation also dem- MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; Milan; TOW
onstrates the country’s developing approach to the use of force RCL 84mm Carl Gustav
and there are signs of an acceptance of military risk. In the case ARTILLERY 600+
of Yemen, the UAE has committed air and ground forces, particu- SP 155mm 181: 78 G-6; 85 M109A3; 18 Mk F3
larly but not exclusively the presidential guard, deployed armour
TOWED 93: 105mm 73 L118 Light Gun; 130mm 20 Type-
and demonstrated the use of a range of air munitions, includ-
ing precision-guidance kits. The country is developing regional
59-I
staging posts to support the Yemen operation. The UAE has an MRL 88+: 122mm 50+: 48 Firos-25 (est 24 op); 2 Jobaria;
advanced inventory of modern equipment across the domains and Type-90 (reported); 227mm 32 M142 HIMARS; 300mm
is taking steps to upgrade its airborne ISR capabilities. In 2016, the 6 9A52 Smerch
UAE began to receive US-manufactured THAAD ballistic-missile- MOR 251: 81mm 134: 20 Brandt; 114 L16; 120mm 21
defence batteries. The country continues to develop its defence- Brandt; SP 120mm 96 RG-31 MMP Agrab Mk2
industrial base; parent company EDIC oversees a variety of subsid- SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
iaries, including in the UAV, support, munitions, guided-weapons SRBM • Conventional 6 Scud-B (up to 20 msl); MGM-
and defence-electronic sectors. The UAE remains reliant on exter-
140A/B ATACMS (launched from M142 HIMARS)
nal providers for major weapons systems.
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ACTIVE 63,000 (Army 44,000 Navy 2,500 Air 4,500 ISR • Medium Seeker II
Presidential Guard 12,000) AIR DEFENCE
Conscript liability 24 months for those with no secondary-school SAM • Point-defence Blowpipe; Mistral
certificate, 16 months for secondary-school graduates. Women – 9 GUNS 62
months regardless of education SP 20mm 42 M3 VDAA
TOWED 30mm 20 GCF-BM2
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Navy 2,500
Space EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 1
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FRIGATES • FFGH 1
SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 3 Yahsat
1 Abu Dhabi with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet
Block 3 AShM, 1 76mm gun
Army 44,000

and North Africa

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 42

Middle East
FORCES BY ROLE CORVETTES 10
MANOEUVRE FSGHM 6:
Armoured 6 Baynunah with 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet
2 armd bde Block 3 AShM, 1 8-cell Mk56 VLS with RIM-162
Mechanised ESSM SAM, 1 21-cell Mk49 GMLS with RIM-116C
2 mech bde RAM Block 2 SAM, 1 76mm gun
Light FSGM 4:
1 inf bde 2 Muray Jib (GER Lurssen 62m) with 2 quad lnchr
COMBAT SUPPORT with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 1 octuple lnchr
1 arty bde (3 SP arty regt) with Crotale SAM, 1 Goalkeeper CIWS, 1 76mm gun,
1 engr gp 1 hel landing platform
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 2 Ganthoot with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Block 3 AShM, 2 3-cell VLS with VL-MICA SAM, 1
MBT 385: 45 AMX-30; 340 Leclerc 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
LT TK 76 FV101 Scorpion PCFGM 2 Mubarraz (GER Lurssen 45m) with 2 twin
RECCE 73: 49 AML-90; 24 VBL lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 sextuple lnchr with
IFV 405: 15 AMX-10P; 390 BMP-3 Mistral SAM, 1 76mm gun
APC 928 PCFG 6 Ban Yas (GER Lurssen TNC-45) with 2 twin lnchr
APC (T) 136 AAPC (incl 53 engr plus other variants) with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM, 1 76mm gun
APC (W) 185: 45 AMV 8×8 (one with BMP-3 turret); PBFG 12 Butinah (Ghannatha mod) with 4 single lncher
120 EE-11 Urutu; 20 VAB with Marte Mk2/N AShM

PPV 607: 465 Caiman; 115 Maxxpro LWB; 27 Nimr Hafeet PBF 12: 6 Ghannatha with 120mm mor (capacity 42
AUV 650 M-ATV; Nimr Adjban; Nimr Jais troops); 6 Ghannatha (capacity 42 troops)
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 2
AEV 53 ACV-AESV; Wisent-2 MHO 2 Al Murjan (ex-GER Frankenthal-class Type-332)
ARV 143: 8 ACV-AESV Recovery; 4 AMX-30D; 85 AMPHIBIOUS 29
BREM-L; 46 Leclerc ARV; 15 Maxxpro ARV LANDING SHIPS • LST 2 Alquwaisat with 1 hel
NBC VEHICLES 32 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC landing platform
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE LANDING CRAFT 17
MSL LCM 5: 3 Al Feyi (capacity 56 troops); 2 (capacity 40
SP 20 HOT; Nimr Ajban 440A with Kornet-E troops and additional vehicles)
374 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

LCP 4 Fast Supply Vessel (multipurpose) Air Defence

LCT 8: 1 Al Shareeah (LSV 75m) with 1 hel landing
FORCES BY ROLE
platform; 7 (various)
AIR DEFENCE
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3:
2 AD bde (3 bn with MIM-23B I-Hawk; MIM-104F
AFS 2 Rmah with 4 single 533mm TT
Patriot PAC-3)
AX 1 Al Semeih with 1 hel landing platform
3 (short range) AD bn with Crotale; Mistral; Rapier; RB-
70; Javelin; 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse); 96K6 Pantsir-S1
Air Force 4,500 2 SAM bty with THAAD
FORCES BY ROLE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
3 sqn with F-16E/F Block 60 Fighting Falcon
Medium-range MIM-23B I-Hawk; MIM-104F Patriot
3 sqn with Mirage 2000-9DAD/EAD/RAD
PAC-3
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AND CONTROL
Short-range Crotale; 50 96K6 Pantsir-S1
1 flt with Saab 340 Erieye
SEARCH & RESCUE Point-defence RBS-70; Rapier; Javelin; 9K38 Igla (SA-18
2 flt with AW109K2; AW139 Grouse); Mistral
TANKER MISSILE DEFENCE 12 THAAD
1 flt with A330 MRTT
TRANSPORT Presidential Guard Command 12,000
1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster FORCES BY ROLE
1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules; L-100-30 MANOEUVRE
1 sqn with CN235M-100 Reconaissance
TRAINING 1 recce sqn
1 sqn with Grob 115TA Mechanised
1 sqn with Hawk Mk102* 1 mech bde (1 tk bn, 4 mech inf bn, 1 AT coy, 1 cbt engr
1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer coy, 1 CSS bn)
1 sqn with PC-21 Amphibious
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 mne bn

1 sqn with Bell 412 Twin Huey EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
AIRCRAFT 156 combat capable MBT 50 Leclerc
FGA 137: 54 F-16E Block 60 Fighting Falcon (Desert IFV 290: 200 BMP-3; 90 BTR-3U Guardian
Eagle); 24 F-16F Block 60 Fighting Falcon (13 to remain in ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
US for trg); 15 Mirage 2000-9DAD; 44 Mirage 2000-9EAD MSL • SP HMMWV with 9M133 Kornet
ISR 7 Mirage 2000 RAD*
SIGINT 1 Global 6000 Joint Aviation Command
AEW&C 2 Saab 340 Erieye
FORCES BY ROLE
TPT/TKR 3 A330 MRTT
GROUND ATTACK
TPT 23: Heavy 7 C-17 Globemaster III; Medium 6: 3
1 sqn with Archangel; AT802 Air Tractor
C-130H Hercules; 1 C-130H-30 Hercules; 2 L-100-30; Light
ANTI-SURFACE/ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
10: 6 CN235; 4 DHC-8 Dash 8 (MP)
1 sqn with AS332F Super Puma; AS565 Panther
TRG 79: 12 Grob 115TA; 12 Hawk Mk102*; 30 PC-7 Turbo
TRANSPORT
Trainer; 25 PC-21
1 (Spec Ops) gp with AS365F Dauphin 2; H125M Fennec;
HELICOPTERS
AW139; Bell 407MRH; Cessna 208B Grand Caravan;
MRH 21: 12 AW139; 9 Bell 412 Twin Huey
CH-47C/F Chinook; DHC-6-300/400 Twin Otter; UH-
TPT • Light 4: 3 AW109K2; 1 Bell 407
60L/M Black Hawk
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHCILES
ATTACK HELICOPTER
CISR • Heavy Wing Loong I (GJ-1); Wing Loong II
ISR • Heavy RQ-1E Predator XP 1 gp with AH-64D Apache
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; IIR AIM- AIRCRAFT 37 combat capable
9X Sidewinder II; IIR/ARH Mica; ARH AIM-120B/C ATK 23 Archangel
AMRAAM ISR ε6 AT802 Air Tractor*
ASM AGM-65G Maverick; Hakeem 1/2/3 (A/B) TPT • Light 15: 2 Beech 350 King Air; 8 Cessna 208B
ARM AGM-88C HARM Grand Caravan*; 1 DHC-6-300 Twin Otter; 4 DHC-6-400
ALCM Black Shaheen (Storm Shadow/SCALP EG variant) Twin Otter
BOMBS HELICOPTERS
INS/SAT guided Al Tariq ATK 28 AH-64D Apache
Laser-guided GBU-12/58 Paveway II ASW 7 AS332F Super Puma (5 in ASuW role)
 Middle East and North Africa 375

MRH 47: 4 AS365F Dauphin 2 (VIP); 9 H125M Fennec; 7

AS565 Panther; 3 AW139 (VIP); 20 Bell 407MRH; 4 SA316 Yemen, Republic of YEM
Alouette III
Yemeni Rial R 2017 2018 2019
TPT 63+: Heavy 22 CH-47F Chinook; Medium 41+: 11
UH-60L Black Hawk; 29+ UH-60M Black Hawk GDP R 10.0tr 14.7tr
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES US$ 31.3bn 28.5bn
ASM AGM-114 Hellfire; Cirit (reported); Hydra-70; HOT per capita US$ 1,043 926
AShM AS-15TT; AM39 Exocet Growth % -5.9 -2.6
Inflation % 24.7 41.8
Paramilitary
Def bdgt R n.k n.k
Critical Infrastructure and Coastal US$ n.k n.k
Protection Agency (CICPA) US$1=R 320.00 514.05
Ministry of Interior
Population 28,667,230
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Ethnic groups: Majority Arab, some African and South Asian
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 113
PSO 1 Al Wtaid Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
PCM 1 Arialah (Damen Sea Axe 6711) with 1 11-cell
Male 20.3% 5.8% 5.0% 4.4% 14.2% 1.3%
SeaRAM GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM, 1 57mm
Female 19.2% 5.6% 4.9% 4.3% 13.9% 1.5%
gun, 1 hel landing platform
PBF 58: 6 Baglietto GC23; 3 Baglietto 59; 15 DV-15; 34 Capabilities
MRTP 16
Yemen continues to be wracked by a conflict that is, according to
PB 53: 2 Protector; 16 (US Camcraft 65); 5 (US
the UN, the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. There appears to be
Camcraft 77); 6 Watercraft 45; 12 Halmatic Work; 12
little apparent prospect that any of the competing forces will be
Al Saber able to gain a decisive upper hand. The government of President
Hadi appears to exercise limited control over the forces nominally
DEPLOYMENT loyal to it, while the proxy forces supposedly allied to the govern-
ment and supported by the members of the Saudi-led coalition

and North Africa

ERITREA: Operation Restoring Hope 1,000; 1 armd BG;

Leclerc; BMP-3; G-6; Agrab Mk2; 2 FSGHM; 2 LST; 6 LCT; 4
Archangel; 3 AH-64D Apache; 2 CH-47F Chinook; 4 UH-60M
Black Hawk; Wing Loong 1 (GJ-1) UAV; 4 MIM-104F Patriot
PAC-3
LIBYA: 6 AT-802; 2 UH-60M; 2 Wing Loong 1 (GJ-1) UAV
SAUDI ARABIA: Operation Restoring Hope 12 F-16E Fighting
Falcon
YEMEN: Operation Restoring Hope 3,000 1 bde HQ; 2 armd
BG; Leclerc; BMP-3; Patria AMV; M-ATV; G-6; M109A3;
Agrab Mk2; 4 AH-64D Apache; 2 CH-47F Chinook; 4 UH-
60M Black Hawk; 96K6 Pantsir-S1; 4 MIM-104F Patriot
PAC-3
FOREIGN FORCES
Australia 650; 1 tpt det with 1 B-737-700 Wedgetail (E-7A);
1 A330 MRTT (KC-30A); 2 C-130J-30 Hercules
Denmark Operation Inherent Resolve 20
France 650: 1 armd BG (1 tk coy, 1 armd inf coy; 1 aty bty);
Leclerc; VBCI; CAESAR; 6 Rafale
Italy 120; 1 tpt flt with 2 C-130J Hercules
Korea, Republic of: 139 (trg activities at UAE Spec Ops
School)
United Kingdom 200; 1 tkr/tpt flt with C-17A Globemaster;
C-130J Hercules; A330 MRTT Voyager
United States: 5,000; 1 ftr sqn with 6 F-22A Raptor; 1 ISR
sqn with 4 U-2; 1 AEW&C sqn with 4 E-3 Sentry; 1 tkr sqn
with 12 KC-10A; 1 ISR UAV sqn with RQ-4 Global Hawk; 2
AD bty with MIM-104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3
Middle East
answer to those member states rather than Yemeni military author-
ities. The rebel Houthi forces, who are assumed to receive mate-
rial support from Iran, are largely tribal-based militias, along with
some elements of the Yemeni armed forces who were loyal to the
late former president Saleh. Al-Qaeda affiliates also appear active
in the country. Government forces tend to be underequipped
and poorly paid compared to the proxy groups supported by the
Saudi-led coalition. The Houthi rebel forces gained from the train-
ing and capabilities of the former Yemeni armed forces previously
loyal to former president Saleh. The Houthi rebels appear to retain
most of the more capable heavy armour and armoured fighting
vehicles. Opposition forces have maintained their ability to launch
surface-to-surface missiles at Saudi Arabia. The Saudi-led coalition
continues to provide ground and air support for the Hadi govern-
ment. The conflict appears to have been sustained by a combina-
tion of large existing stockpiles of weapons and ammunition and
external supplies, despite UN embargos. There is no domestic
defence industry, barring some limited maintenance and work-
shop facilities.
ACTIVE 40,000 (Goverment forces 40,000)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Government forces ε40,000 (incl militia)
President Hadi’s government is nominally supported by
parts of the Yemeni armed forces, as well as a number of
militia organisations in southern and eastern Yemen. The
government’s ability to exercise direct control over most
of these forces is extremely limited, with local leaders
and state sponsors, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE,
exercising stronger influence.
376 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
up to 20 bde(-)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT Some M60A1; T-34†; T-54/55; T-62; T-72
RECCE some BRDM-2
IFV BMP-2; BTR-80A; Ratel-20
APC
APC (W) BTR-60
PPV Streit Cougar; Streit Spartan
AUV M-ATV
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); M47
Dragon; TOW
GUNS • SP 100mm SU-100†
ARTILLERY • SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika
AIRCRAFT • ISR 6 AT-802 Air Tractor*
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-4;
23mm ZU-23-2
FOREIGN FORCES
All Operation Restoring Hope unless stated
Saudi Arabia 1,500: 1 armd BG; M60A3; M2A2 Bradley;
M113A4; M-ATV; AH-64 Apache; 2+ MIM-104D/F Patriot
PAC-2/3
Sudan 950; 1 mech BG; T-72AV; BTR-70M Kobra 2
United Arab Emirates 3,000; 1 bde HQ; 2 armd BG;
Leclerc; BMP-3; M-ATV; G-6; M109A3; Agrab Mk2; 4 AH-
64D Apache; 2 CH-47F Chinook; 4 UH-60M Black Hawk;
96K6 Pantsir-S1; 4 MIM-104F Patriot PAC-3
TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT
DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL
Insurgent forces 20,000 (incl Houthi and
tribes)
The Houthi-run de facto administration has controlled
northern Yemen since 2015 is supported by a combination
of Houthi tribal militias and elements of the Yemeni
armed forces loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh.
Following a break between the Houthis and Saleh in late
2017 that resulted in the latter’s death, his former forces
have become further split between those that remained
affiliated with the Houthis and those who have joined
Saleh’s son and nephew to fight against them.
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
up to 20 bde(-)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT T-55; T-72
IFV BMP-2; BTR-80A
APC • APC (W) Some BTR-40; BTR-60
AUV M-ATV
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS M47 Dragon; 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5B
Spandrel/Towsan-1); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn)
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
SRBM • Conventional (most fired or destroyed) 9K79
Tochka (SS-21 Scarab); Scud-B/Hwasong-5; Borkan-1
(possible extended-range Scud derivative); Qaher-1
(possible Tondar-69 derivative)
COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM some C-801/C-802
(reported)
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 20mm M167 Vulcan;
23mm ZU-23-2
 Middle East and North Africa 377

Arms procurements and deliveries – Middle East and

North Africa
Significant events in 2018

„„ Qatar launched Barzan Holdings at its DIMDEX trade negotiate the sale of unclassified equipment with
show in March. Barzan Holdings will focus on creating customers without government approval. However,
joint ventures (JVs) with other companies, in order the Defense Export Control Agency must still sign
to create a defence-industrial capability in Qatar. off deals. Under previous rules, companies had to
A number of JVs were announced at the show with acquire a marketing licence from the government
international companies such as BMC, Kongsberg, before negotiating with a customer, which could take
Raytheon, Rheinmetall and Qinetiq. several months.

„„ Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) and Spain’s „„ In September, Alexandria Shipyard launched the first
Navantia formed a JV to work on the design and of three Gowind 2500 frigates that are being built
construction of the five Avante 2200 corvettes that in Egypt. Naval Group was awarded a contract in
Saudi Arabia ordered in mid-2018. The JV will fit out 2014 to design and build the first vessel and provide
the final two corvettes with Navantia’s CATIZ combat- assistance, an integrated mast, and other systems
management system in Saudi Arabia. and weapons for three more frigates. Port Said (976)
is the first major warship that Egypt has built. The first
„„ Qatar continued its recent series of big-ticket of class, El Fateh (971), was commissioned in October
procurements, with contracts for Turkish armed 2017.
uninhabited aerial vehicles, armoured vehicles,
patrol boats, Italian NH90 helicopters and, most „„ In July, China signed cooperation agreements with

and North Africa

Middle East
significantly, a US$6.43bn deal with BAE Systems for Kuwait and then the UAE. These include proposed
24 Typhoon combat aircraft and nine Hawk training bilateral cooperation in defence technology and
aircraft. industry, although the specifics were not made
public. The UAE has acquired armed Chinese UAVs,
„„ The Israeli government loosened arms-export while Kuwait has operated Chinese howitzers since
regulations in October. Israeli companies can now 2000.

▼ Figure 23 Middle East and North Africa: selected ongoing or completed procurement priorities in 2018

14
12
Number of Countries

North Africa
10 Levant
Purchasing

Gulf and Yemen

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*Data reflects the number of countries with equipment-procurement contracts either ongoing or completed in 2018. Data includes only procurement programmes for which a production contract
has been signed. The data does not include upgrade programmes.
**Armoured fighting vehicles not including main battle tanks ***Includes combat-capable training aircraft IISS
©
378 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Table 16 Reported Russian defence exports to Algeria: recently completed and ongoing, by contract date
Equipment Type Quantity Value* Prime contractor Contract Delivery
date
T-90SA MBT 185 US$1bn UralVagonZavod 2006 2006–08
96K6 Pantsir-S1 Short-range SP SAM 38 US$500m KBP Instrument 2006 2011–13
(SA-22 Greyhound) Design Bureau
S-300PMU2 Long-range SP SAM 8 US$300m Almaz-Antey 2006 2008–09
(SA-20 Gargoyle)
S-300PMU2 Long-range SP SAM 8 US$300m Almaz-Antey 2006 2010
(SA-20 Gargoyle)
Varshavyanka SSK 2 US$600m Admiralty Shipyards 2006 2009
(Improved Kilo)
Su-30MKA FGA ac 28 US$1.5bn United Aircraft 2006 2007–09
(Flanker H) Corporation

Yak-130 Mitten Trg ac 16 US$300m United Aircraft 2006 2011

Corporation

S-300PMU2 Long-range SP SAM 8 US$400m Almaz-Antey 2008 2012

(SA-20 Gargoyle)
Su-30MKA FGA ac 16 US$900m United Aircraft 2009 2011–12
(Flanker H) Corporation

T-90SA MBT 120 n.k. UralVagonZavod 2011 2012–13

S-300PMU2 Long-range SP SAM 8 US$400m Almaz-Antey 2011 2013–14
(SA-20 Gargoyle)
9K317E Buk-M2E Medium-range SP 48 n.k. Almaz-Antey 2013 2016–ongoing
(SA-17 Grizzly) SAM

Mi-28NE Havoc Atk Hel 42 US$2.7bn Russian Helicopters 2013 2015–ongoing

Mi-28NE Havoc Atk hel 42 US$2.7bn Russian Helicopters 2013 2015–ongoing

Mi-26T2 Halo Hvy tpt hel 6

Mi-8AMTSh Med tpt hel 39

T-90SA MBT 200 US$1bn UralVagonZavod 2014 2015–ongoing

Tigr with SP AT Msl 28 n.k. KBP Instrument 2014 2016–ongoing
Kornet-EM Design Bureau
Varshavyanka SSK 2 US$1.2bn Admiralty Shipyards 2014 2018–ongoing
(Improved Kilo)
Su-30MKA FGA ac 14 US$800m United Aircraft 2015 2017–ongoing
(Flanker H) Corporation

Mi-26T2 Halo Hvy Tpt Hel 8 US$1bn Russian Helicopters 2015 2017–ongoing

9M720 Iskander-E SRBM 4 n.k. Tekhmash n.k. 2017

TOS-1A 220m MRL n.k. n.k. Omsktransmash n.k. 2017–18

*All contract values are from Russian media reporting and converted into US dollars
 Middle East and North Africa 379

Table 17 Saudi Arabia: top ten arms orders in 2017–18, by order date
Equipment Type Quantity Value (US$) Prime contractor(s) Order date
M1A2S Abrams MBT n.k 880m (US) General Dynamics Land Systems 2017
AH-6i Little Bird MRH Hel 24 25.52m (US) Boeing Apr 2017
UH-60M Black Hawk Med Tpt Hel 115 n.k. (US) Sikorsky Jun 2017
CH-47F Chinook Hvy Tpt Hel 8 533m (US) Boeing Aug 2017
E-3A Sentry AEW&C ac 5 240.2m (US) Boeing Oct 2017
UH-60M Black Hawk Med Tpt Hel 17 193.85m (US) Sikorsky Jan 2018
Combattante FS56 PCGM 3 ε294.1m (FRA) CMN Jan 2018
Multi-Mission Surface FFGHM 4 6bn (US) Lockheed Martin Mar 2018
Combatants (MMSC)
HSI 32 (FRA CMN) PBF 39 480m (SAU) Zamil Offshore Services Apr 2018
Avante 2200 FFGHM 5 2.12bn (ESP) Navantia Jul 2018

Table 18 Gulf Cooperation Council states: new fighter/ground-attack aircraft contracts, 2005–present
Order date Country Aircraft Quantity Value (US$) Prime contractor Deliveries
Dec 2005 Saudi Arabia Eurofighter Typhoon 72 8.87bn (UK) BAE Systems 2009–17
Dec 2011 Oman F-16C Block 50 10 600m (US) Lockheed Martin 2014
F-16D Block 50 2
Mar 2012 Saudi Arabia F-15SA Eagle 84 11.4bn (US) Boeing 2016–ongoing
Dec 2012 Oman Eurofighter Typhoon 12 3.9bn* (UK) BAE Systems 2017–18

and North Africa

May 2015 Qatar Rafale 36 8.72bn (FRA) Dassault n.k.

Middle East
Apr 2016 Kuwait Eurofighter Typhoon 28 8.81bn (ITA) Leonardo 2020–23
Dec 2017 Qatar F-15QA 36 6.17bn (US) Boeing n.k.–2022
Jun 2018 Bahrain F-16V Block 70 16 1.12bn (US) Lockheed Martin n.k.–2023
Jun 2018 Kuwait F/A-18E Super Hornet 22 n.k. (US) Boeing n.k.–2021
F/A-18F Super Hornet 6
Sep 2018 Qatar Eurofighter Typhoon 24 6.43bn* (UK) BAE Systems 2022–n.k.
*Includes supply of Hawk training aircraft

Table 19 Iraq: selected procurement contracts, 2010–18

Order date Equipment Type Quantity Value (US$) Prime contractors Deliveries
Sep 2011 F-16C/D Block 52 FGA ac 18 ε3bn (US) Lockheed Martin 2015–16
Oct 2012 F-16C/D Block 52 FGA ac 18 ε3bn (US) Lockheed Martin 2016–ongoing
2012 Mi-28NE/UB Havoc Atk hel 15 4.2bn package (RUS) Russian Helicopters 2014–16
(reported)
Mi-35M Hind Atk hel 28 (RUS) Russian Helicopters 2013–ongoing
96K6 Pantsir-S1 SAM 24 (RUS) Almaz-Antey 2014–16
(SA-22 Greyhound)
9K338 Igla-S MANPADs n.k. (RUS) KBM 2014–16
(SA-24 Grinch)
Dec 2013 T-50IQ Golden Eagle Trg ac 24 2.65bn (ROK) KAI 2017–ongoing
Aug 2014 L-159 Atk ac 12 36.13m (CZE) Czech Government; 2015–ongoing
Aero Vodochody
2015 BMP-3 IFV 500 n.k. (RUS) Traktornyye Zavody 2018–ongoing
2016 T-90S MBT 73 n.k. (RUS) UralVagonZavod 2018–ongoing
380 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Chapter Eight

Latin America and the Caribbean

 Ageing inventories and a lack of adequate funding for 
replacements are a limiting factor on the capabilities
of many of the region’s armed forces.
 Some regional armed forces remain active on internal 
security duties, with some nations also introducing
legislation to enable these deployments.
 Latin America’s defence industries saw a notable 
development in 2018 with the planned tie-up
between Boeing and Embraer. Both firms have agreed
to create new joint venture dedicated to defence sales,
notably of the KC-390. Meanwhile, Saab has started
building the Gripen facility in Brazil.
Regional navies continue development of littoral
patrol and manoeuvre capabilities, including with
locally-produced patrol craft.
Brazil’s acquisition of the former-HMS Ocean
introduces a large aviation platform with potentially
more useable capability than hitherto into the region.
Regional defence spending has bottomed out in the
wake of stronger economic growth, after two years of
cuts to defence spending.

Latin America and the Caribbean defence Active military personnel – top 10
spending, 2018 – top 5, including US foreign military (15,000 per unit)
financing
Brazil
United States 334,500
US$643.3bn Colombia
293,200
Mexico 277,150

Venezuela 123,000

Peru 81,000
Total
Latin America
and the Chile 77,200
Caribbean
spending Argentina 74,200
US$61.1bn

Brazil Colombia Mexico Chile Argentina

Dominican Republic 56,050

Cuba 49,000
28.0bn 10.6bn 5.23bn 4.25bn 4.23bn
Bolivia 34,100

Tactical combat aircraft fleets, 2018

(10 per unit)
Brazil 106 Cuba 45
Chile 74 Colombia 34
Peru 68 Ecuador 25
Argentina 55 Honduras 17
Venezuela 51 El Salvador 14
 Latin America and the Caribbean 381

Regional defence policy and economics 382 ►

Armed forces data section 393 ►

Arms procurements and deliveries 436 ►

Latin America and the Caribbean: top 5 deployments, November 2018

Argentina
Cyprus (UNFICYP) – 244

Brazil
Lebanon (UNIFIL) – 222
Colombia
Egypt (MFO) – 275

Peru
Uruguay CAR (MINUSCA) – 213
DRC (MONUSCO) – 937

Latin America and

the Caribbean
Medium and heavy transport helicopters, 2018 Patrol and coastal combatants, 2018
(10 per unit) (10 per unit)
Mexico
Brazil 68 127
Colombia 67 Chile 67
Mexico 55 Colombia 62
Peru 38
Brazil 44
Venezuela 20
Venezuela 33
Chile 19
Bahamas 21
Argentina 10
Ecuador 7 Paraguay 20

Bolivia 6 Dominican Republic 17

Cuba 2 Honduras 17
Nicaragua 2 Argentina 16

(not including Coast Guards)

382 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Latin America and the Caribbean
Persistent regional security challenges stemming
from the threat from organised crime and drug
traffickers and the need for humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief (HA/DR) missions are among
the issues driving developments in regional armed
forces. At the same time, the effects on the region
of the continuing economic crisis in Venezuela
are becoming more apparent. This is principally
due to its impact on Venezuela’s population – the
economic crisis has triggered an exodus of nationals
to neighbouring countries. But it is also noticeable in
the responses that it has generated in regional states,
such as Brazil and Colombia, which have deployed
elements of security forces as a result of the influx of
Venezuelan citizens.
Reshaped domestic roles
It is noteworthy that, years after some Latin American
states began to reshape military roles away from
involvement in internal affairs, certain legislatures
have once again focused on the military role in tasks
at home, though these are now of a significantly
different nature. In Brazil, the armed forces have in
recent years mounted security operations, notably in
urban favela areas, to counter organised crime. A Law
and Order Guarantee (Garantia da Lei e da Ordem,
or GLO) can be invoked by presidential decree,
which has to establish a specific geographical area
for the mission, and start and end dates, though these
are flexible. The legislation has been used to enable
military deployments against criminal elements in
urban areas. However, the territorial restrictions
on GLOs have been re-examined. In late May 2018,
to allow the armed forces to intervene after striking
truck drivers blocked several roads, President Michel
Temer said that the GLO was valid across Brazil.
The armed forces can also be deployed through
a ‘federal intervention’, one level below a state of
emergency. This mechanism was included in the 1988
constitution, but first used in February 2018, when
Temer declared a federal intervention in the public
security of Rio de Janeiro State.
The security challenge posed by organised crime
and drug trafficking has prompted other regional
states to re-examine their legislative frameworks.
For example, in late 2017 the Mexican legislature
approved an internal-security law, intended by the
government to regulate the use of the armed forces
on internal-security operations. The Mexican military
has been deployed since 2006 on missions to help
tackle organised crime and drug trafficking. Amid
criticism that more emphasis should be placed on
improving policing, President Enrique Peña Nieto
said that, as well as the new law, local authorities were
also obliged to strengthen institutional capacities.
In November, however, the law was rejected by the
Supreme Court. President-elect Andrés Manuel
López Obrador discussed different approaches to
tackling the country’s security challenges, with a
focus on preventive strategies, as well as the creation
of a national guard.
Other states enacting or discussing legislative
amendments include Argentina, Paraguay and Peru.
In Argentina, the Macri administration announced
in late July wide-ranging plans to reform the defence
establishment, including legislation to modify a decree
from 2006 which restricts the armed forces to tackling
external state-based threats. It is understood that the
plan will enable a broader assessment of threats of
external origin, which would in theory allow greater
latitude to deploy against non-traditional threats such
as organised crime. In Paraguay, changes have been
made to laws in recent years on domestic defence and
security, reportedly allowing a military role in certain
internal tasks without declaring a state of emergency.
And in Peru, Law 30796 of June 2018 authorised the
armed forces to intervene in the valley of the Apurimac,
Ene and Mantaro rivers to tackle drug trafficking.
These legislative changes reflect the changing
security environment in the region. Armed forces are
envisaged as taking on an increasingly broad range
of roles, moving away from traditional territorial-
defence tasks towards tackling non-traditional
challenges such as those from transnational organised
crime and drug trafficking and now also including
cyber threats, deployments overseas on peace-
support tasks and HA/DR missions. Increasingly,
multinational regional exercises also focus on these

tasks. Common challenges continue to lead more
defence ministries to consider the benefits from
greater regional cooperation, not only through
training but also in areas such as information sharing.
In Venezuela, however, the year also saw a
traditional threat to the leadership, if delivered in
a non-traditional way. President Nicolás Maduro
survived an assassination attempt during a military
parade on 4 August. It was claimed that this was
engineered by a group of right-wing dissidents,
who used a pair of small uninhabited aerial vehicles
(UAVs) packed with explosives. Earlier in the year,
arrests had been reported relating to the 2017 attack
on government buildings by a police officer. After
the 2018 attack, Venezuela’s leadership blamed the
governments of Chile, Colombia and Mexico for their
potential roles in supporting what was described as
a right-wing terrorist movement inside Venezuela
and announced the deployment of 100,000 troops
to guarantee the country’s borders from a potential
military intervention by its neighbours.
Regional developments
In Colombia, the commander of the armed forces
said in June 2018 that principal defence concerns
were sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well
as defending against internal threats. He also noted
that other key tasks were environmental protection,
disaster response and exporting security – including
peace-support and international training missions.
Colombia hosted the international Unitas exercise in
late 2018 and has been active in training and skill-
sharing activities with other regional armed forces.
However, the crisis in Venezuela continues to generate
concern in Bogotá. Some reports indicate that up to
one million Venezuelans have in recent years fled to
Colombia. The Venezuelan situation has led to the
re-examination of some of Colombia’s procurement
priorities, although current procurement budgets
remain modest. Reports indicate that aspirations
include the acquisition of air-defence systems. There
are also long-standing plans to procure a replacement
or complement for Colombia’s ageing Kfir fighter-
aircraft fleet (some of which were recently upgraded),
as well as a surface-warship project (Plataforma
Estratégica de Superficie). More broadly, reform
plans continue in order to reshape the Colombian
defence establishment for the post-internal-conflict
environment by boosting morale, capability
and transparency, and producing armed forces
compatible with NATO standards.
Latin America and the Caribbean 383
The Brazilian Army deployed to the border with
Venezuela in August 2018 in an effort to increase
security for the local population, as well as to respond
to the needs of the nearly 60,000 Venezuelans that
had reportedly crossed into Brazil. Meanwhile, the
Brazilian armed forces reached several significant
milestones in 2018. In June, the navy commissioned
the PHM Atlantico, formerly the United Kingdom’s
HMS Ocean. The arrival of this helicopter carrier
marks the return to Brazil of a naval-aviation power-
projection capability for the first time since the
decommissioning of the aircraft carrier Sáo Paulo
(the former French Navy Foch) in 2017. However, the
selection of a supplier for the Tamandaré-class corvette
project, Brazil’s most anticipated procurement
decision, was delayed in mid-2018, causing the
programme to further slip. Meanwhile, the air force
continued to push for the finalisation of the test and
evaluation phase of the much-anticipated KC-390
multi-role tanker transport; the air force is expected
to receive its first three KC-390s in 2019.
The president of Ecuador, Lenín Moreno, has
sought to improve significantly relations with the
United States. Under the direction of Defence Minister
(and retired general) Oswaldo Jarrín, the Ecuadorean
armed forces have launched a reorganisation
programme that includes the creation of a joint
command. Jarrín has been instrumental in increasing
defence and security cooperation with Washington,
Latin America and
including supporting the temporary deployment of US
the Caribbean
air assets, such as US Customs and Border Patrol P-3
Orion maritime-patrol aircraft to help Ecuador monitor
its large exclusive economic zone. He announced in
September that the defence ministry was working on
a new defence white paper. In neighbouring Peru, the
army continues a transformation process that includes
the creation of a new disaster-response brigade. The
navy has launched a long-awaited programme to
modernise the submarine fleet, with the first hull
opened in May 2018 at the navy-run SIMA shipyards,
which have also begun to build the second Makassar-
class landing platform dock (LPD). The first LPD, BAP
Pisco, was commissioned in June 2018.
Economic challenges in Argentina continue to
prevent a major revamp of its armed forces. As a
result, long-awaited procurement projects have
been shelved or rescheduled for 2020 and onwards.
Although President Mauricio Macri announced his
intent to strengthen military and industrial capacity
in a speech in July, the precise sums to be allocated for
this process remained unclear at the time of writing.
384 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
However, capability developments in 2018 included
delivery to the air force of more Beechcraft T-6C+
Texan II trainers; the plan is to acquire 12 airframes.
This has enabled the air force’s Tucano trainers to be
repurposed for interdiction operations in the north
of the country. Their employment against non-state
threats reflects the shift in the country’s defence
policy, which until 2018 confined military activities to
defending against conventional state threats.
Meanwhile, in August 2018, Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Paraguay and Peru announced their
intention to suspend indefinitely participation in
the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), a
regional organisation which was created in 2008 in an
effort to foster regional political, social, defence and
economic cooperation. The move came after Bolivia
assumed the presidency of the organisation and
amid disputes with Venezuela. UNASUR’s South
American Defense Council had launched several
multinational programmes on military education,
equipment research and development, and procure-
ment, including the joint development of a primary
trainer aircraft and a tactical UAV, both of which
failed to materialise.
DEFENCE ECONOMICS
After some difficult years, with a contraction of 0.6%
of GDP in 2016 and only modest growth of 1.3% of
GDP in 2017, Latin America and the Caribbean is
seeing stronger figures, expected to reach 2% in 2018.
According to the IMF, countries such as Chile (3.4%),
Paraguay (4.5%), Peru (3.7%) and Uruguay (3.4%)
were some of the most dynamic economies in South
America in 2018.
This return to growth was enabled by both external
and internal factors. Overall, the region was helped
by growth in the United States, which rose from 2.5%
in 2017 to 3.4% in 2018. Mexico and Central American
and Caribbean countries are particularly dependent
on the economic situation in the US. In 2016, Mexico
exported 74% of its products to the US, with Nicaragua
at 61% and Honduras at 56%. However, according to
the OECD, while Mexico and Central American states
have become more reliant on the US economy, South
American countries have become more dependent on
China’s economy.
Another external factor was the recovery in
commodity prices after the 2014 crash. According
to the World Bank, copper prices recovered from
US$5,510 per metric tonne (mt) in 2015 to over
US$6,000 per mt in summer 2018. This benefited
commodity exporters such as Chile, for whom
copper-related exports came to 21% of its total exports
in 2016, and other minerals-related exports another
20%. Peru, another metal-commodity exporter, also
benefited from these rising prices.
Internally, growth was fuelled by private
consumption, thanks to improved business and
consumer confidence, as well as investments; this was
the case in Chile and Colombia. Meanwhile, tourism
grew in the Caribbean, benefiting countries such as
Barbados, Belize, Jamaica and St Lucia.
However, larger countries in the region acted as a
brake on the overall regional economic acceleration.
Argentina, for example, has experienced difficulties
since mid-2018. In the wake of the rise of interest
rates in the US, Argentina saw its currency weaken
sharply. Between January and September 2018, the
peso lost more than 50% of its value against the US
dollar. Inflation also reached record highs, up to
34.4% year-on-year in August 2018. This led Buenos
Aires to implement an austerity programme, with
hikes in export taxes and a reduction in the number
of government ministries. Around the same time,
Macri announced defence-reform plans, including a
restructuring of the ministry of defence. Nonetheless,
the government had to request a US$50-billion loan
from the IMF. In addition, a severe drought affected
Argentina’s production of soya beans and corn,
which had constituted 24% and 6% of its exports
respectively in 2016.
▼ Figure 24 Latin America and the Caribbean defence
spending by country and sub-region
Other Central America, 2.1%
Trinidad and Tobago, 1.5%
Other Caribbean
Panama, 1.2% 2.2%
Mexico, 8.5%
Other South
America, 2.2%
Ecuador, 2.8%
Peru, 3.7%
Brazil
45.4%
Argentina
6.9%
Chile, 6.9%
Colombia, 17.3%
Note: analysis excludes Cuba, Suriname and Venezuela © IISS
 Latin America and the Caribbean 385

The IMF assessed that Brazil’s GDP would grow
from 1% in 2017 to 2.3% in 2018, rebounding after two
years of recession. However, weaknesses remained,
which could dampen this outlook. The Brazilian real
weakened against the US dollar by 25% between
September 2018 and January 2018. In May 2018, the
truck drivers’ strike hit the economy, hampering
the shipping industry and trade, and leading to
fuel shortages. Political uncertainty also dominated
ahead of the presidential election in October 2018,
in which right-leaning candidate Jair Bolsonaro was
victorious. Most importantly, Brazil’s economy, and
in particular the government’s room for manoeuvre,
is clouded by rising debt and large deficits. These
challenges, however, appear manageable when
compared to Venezuela’s economic crisis. The IMF
has estimated an inflation rate there above 1,000,000%
in 2018, and the authorities had to devaluate the
currency by replacing 100,000 bolívares fuertes with
one bolívar soberano.

▼ Map 10 Latin America and the Caribbean regional defence spending1

Bahamas

Mexico Cuba Haiti

Puerto Rico
Jamaica
Belize Dominican Rep. Antigua and Barbuda
Honduras
Guatemala Nicaragua
Barbados
El Salvador Panama Trinidad and Tobago
Costa Rica
Venezuela
Guyana
Fr. Guiana
Colombia
Suriname

Ecuador

Latin America and

the Caribbean
Peru
Brazil

Real % Change (2017–18)

More than 20% increase
Between 10% and 20% increase Bolivia
Between 3% and 10% increase
Between 0% and 3% increase
Between 0% and 3% decrease Paraguay
Between 3% and 10% decrease
Between 10% and 20% decrease
Insufficient data IISS
© Argentina
2018 Defence Spending (US$ bn) Uruguay
27.95
Chile

10
7 [1] Map illustrating 2018 planned defence-spending levels (in US$ at
market exchange rates), as well as the annual real percentage change
5 in planned defence spending between 2017 and 2018 (at constant 2010
3 prices and exchange rates). Percentage changes in defence spending
can vary considerably from year to year, as states revise the level of
1 funding allocated to defence. Changes indicated here highlight the
short-term trend in planned defence spending between 2017 and 2018.
.25 Actual spending changes prior to 2017, and projected spending levels
.05 post-2018, are not reflected.
386 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
2.0
1.5
1.27 1.26
1.17 1.18
1.14 1.16
% of GDP
1.0
0.5
0.0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
▲ Figure 25 Latin America and the Caribbean regional
defence expenditure as % of GDP
Defence industry
A major development in the Latin American defence
industry in 2018 was the planned tie-up between
Boeing and Brazil’s largest defence company,
Embraer, which is involved in key programmes such
as the delivery of Gripen combat aircraft to the Brazilian
Air Force. It also develops the EMB-314 Super Tucano
light-attack/training aircraft and the KC-390 transport
aircraft. In 2016, Boeing and Embraer had agreed to
jointly market the KC-390. However, the partnership
announced in July 2018 goes beyond this. The firms
have agreed to create a new joint venture dedicated
to the sale of defence products, in particular the
KC-390. But as the partnership deals with commercial
products, it still needs to be authorised by the
Brazilian authorities.
Brazil is not the only Latin American country
attracting foreign interest in its defence sector.
Moreover, it is not just the major Western prime
contractors who see the region as a potential market.
For instance, Peru’s Air Force Maintenance Service
has assembled the Korea Aerospace Industries KT-1P
training aircraft. The final KT-1P of the 20-aircraft
order was delivered in April 2017. Meanwhile,
the South Korean shipbuilding firm STX agreed a
partnership with Peru’s SIMA shipyards to work
together on the delivery of PGCP-50 maritime-patrol
boats for the Peruvian Navy.
In Argentina, the major defence firm Fábrica
Argentina de Aviones (FAdeA) was caught up in
the country’s economic challenges. The government
threatened to reduce its funding if the company did
not ink an export deal for its IA-63 Pampa III training
aircraft, and lack of sales meant that the company had
to lay off 500 employees over two years. However,
FAdeA signed a memorandum of understanding with
South Africa’s Paramount Group in 2018. The opening
of the African market could be an opportunity for
FAdeA and might help mitigate its current difficulties.
Regional procurement
Argentina’s financial problems have prevented
the implementation of a planned modernisation
programme that would have seen the procurement
of new fighter aircraft for the air force, five ocean-
patrol vessels for the navy and up to 20 medium-lift
helicopters for army aviation. Nevertheless, besides
T-6C+ Texan trainers, the air force took delivery of its
first locally upgraded C-130H Hercules and is expected
to receive the first three IA-63 Pampa III lead-in fighter
trainers from FAdeA. The Argentinian government
was also able to process the €14.2 million (US$16.8m)
payment for five Super Etendard Modernisé naval
fighters in May 2018 and expected the aircraft to be
in service before the G20 summit in Buenos Aires in
November–December 2018.
Bolivia received a relatively small military-
assistance package from China in 2018 in the form
of light vehicles and logistics equipment, including
ten Tiger 4x4 armoured vehicles for the army. Other
procurement included a light aircraft obtained from
various civilian second-hand sources. The country’s
main investment programme in recent years has
featured the procurement of a network of dual-use
air-surveillance and air-traffic-control radars ordered
from Thales in 2015.
The Brazilian armed forces took delivery of a
significant number of armoured vehicles and artil-
lery pieces in 2018. The army received eight ASTROS
multiple-rocket launchers from AVIBRAS to complete
the order for three new batteries, as well as 60 M109A5
155 mm self-propelled howitzers, while the marines
received their last AAV7A1 amphibious assault vehi-
cles. Besides the arrival in 2018 of the former UK
helicopter carrier HMS Ocean, the navy evaluated in
2017 its first Exocet-equipped H225M helicopters. The
country’s second upgraded Super Lynx anti-subma-
rine-warfare helicopter made its maiden flight in
mid-2018 in the UK.
Procurement spending in Colombia remains
modest, mainly due to the costs associated with the
ongoing implementation of the peace process with
FARC. In 2018, the armed forces took delivery of a
range of logistical vehicles, including a single landing
craft (ARC Bahia Colombia), the fifth of class; five
Defender 380X patrol boats; and a ninth upgraded

Arpia IV helicopter. Colombia also created a new
multipurpose squadron equipped with Bell 206
Jet Ranger helicopters and a new UAV squadron
equipped with Boeing ScanEagle and NightEagle
systems for the air force, while the army took delivery
of a small number of locally produced TR12 Hunter
mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles. The air
force will likely also acquire a single C-130H Hercules
transport aircraft from surplus US Air Force stocks
and announced its intention to acquire another two.
Although funds remain limited in Ecuador, the
government has been trying to recapitalise some of
its military capabilities, particularly air mobility. A
single M28 Skytruck light cargo plane was delivered,
and it is understood that the ministry wishes to
procure at least six light helicopters for the army.
CHILE
Chile’s armed forces are professional and capable, if
compact. Until recently, missions and planning were
dominated by territorial-defence considerations, but
the armed forces are also now preparing for ‘missions
other than war’, including peacekeeping and
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR).
As part of this process, they are undertaking more
exercises with regional and international partners.
Santiago’s security policy is transforming from a
traditional defence model to one defined by changing
regional relations and new strategic priorities
promoted by civilian governments. As a consequence,
concepts and force structures designed to address
territorial threats coexist with policy initiatives
and procurement programmes associated with
new tasks. At the same time, there has been a slow
reduction in the defence budget and the cancellation
or postponement of some procurement plans for
conventional equipment. This strategic transition
has continued during President Sebastián Piñera’s
second term in office. In his first term, in 2010–14,
he proposed initiatives to modify Chile’s defence
policy, an aspiration to which his successor Michelle
Bachelet was also committed. Chile’s defence minister
was elected president of the Conference of Defense
Ministers of the Americas in October 2018. The
defence ministry said that Chile’s presidency of this
group would be directed at strengthening regional
cooperation in HA/DR, environmental protection,
preparing for new security challenges including
cyber defence, and boosting women’s participation in
the armed forces. In addition, Piñera, who was elected
Latin America and the Caribbean 387
again in December 2017, is introducing substantial
changes to the way Chilean defence is financed.
Security policy in transition
Following the transition to democracy in the early
1990s, Chilean defence was principally shaped by
three considerations: that historical rivalries with
Bolivia and Peru were still potential sources of conflict;
that the armed forces retained considerable autonomy
in defence affairs after political arrangements agreed
during the democratic transition; and that the
military-modernisation programme benefited from
healthy financial resources.
These factors helped to maintain a military
posture focused on external defence in the event of
conventional conflict. The army was organised as
a mechanised force with three motorised infantry
brigades and four armoured brigades equipped
with Leopard 1 and 2 main battle tanks and variants,
the only likely role for which was the defence of the
desert regions in Chile’s north. The air force was
conceived of as an air-superiority and strike force;
it acquired 46 F-16 combat aircraft, mostly second-
hand from the Netherlands but supplemented later
with some new builds. The navy was designed to
guarantee the protection of sea lines of communi-
cation with a surface fleet of eight principal surface
combatants and to carry out interdiction operations
with a submarine fleet of two Type-209/1400 and two
Latin America and
Scorpène-class boats. Each of the three services oper-
the Caribbean
ated relatively autonomously, with only a limited
degree of joint organisation.
However, since the late 2000s, several factors have
combined to change this model. Closer economic ties
and political rapprochement with Chile’s neighbours
have reduced the risk of a border crisis. Chile was one of
the founders of the Pacific Alliance and is an associate
member of the Mercado Común del Sur (Common
Market of the South, or MERCOSUR). Nonetheless,
there have been disputes with neighbours, though
parties have resolved to settle these through recourse
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). A long-
standing maritime dispute between Chile and Peru
was eventually settled only after referral to the ICJ,
which in 2014 granted Lima additional maritime
waters. In 2013, Bolivia took a dispute with Chile to
the ICJ over its claim that it should have access to the
Pacific Ocean via an ‘Atacama corridor’. In October
2018, the court found that Chile ‘did not undertake a
legal obligation to negotiate a sovereign access to the
Pacific Ocean for the Plurinational State of Bolivia’.
388 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

At the same time, successive civilian governments PERU ‘Atacama

corridor’ BOLIVIA
have strengthened their capacity to design and 4th NAVAL ZONE
manage defence policy. A new organisational Iquique Plan Secure Northern
 4th Naval Zone HQ Border (2011–15;
structure for the ministry of defence (Law 20424) was  6th Army Division HQ restarted Aug 2018)
approved in 2010. This gave the civilian leadership  1st Air Brigade HQ ARICA- Coordinated border-
greater influence over security-policy planning and PARINACOTA security operation by
the army, navy and
armed-services administration by creating the offices  1st Army Division HQ
carabineros, covering
 5th Air Brigade HQ Antofagasta
of the under-secretary of defence and the under-  FAMAE the administrative
regions from
secretary for the armed forces. Another outcome of Maintenance Centre
Coquimbo to
the reorganisation process was that control of the CHILE Arica-Parinacota.
paramilitary Carabineros was transferred to the
1st NAVAL ZONE  Special Operations
Ministry of the Interior and Public Security in 2011. Brigade
As well as consolidating political control over the Pacific Ocean
COQUIMBO
 Empresa Nacional
security establishment, recent administrations have
de Aeronautica
promoted new missions for the armed forces, such as 1st Naval Zone HQ Valparaiso Colina (ENAER) HQ
disaster relief, maritime surveillance and border secu- Santiago  Fábricas y
Maestranzas del
rity, as well as contributing to international peace-  2nd Naval Zone HQ Rancagua
Ejército (FAMAE) HQ
keeping missions. Indeed, while the 2010 defence  Astilleros y  2nd Motorised
Maestranzas de la Talcahuano Division HQ
white paper affirmed the need to maintain a credible Armada (ASMAR)  2nd Air Brigade
deterrent capability, it also incorporated into Chile’s main facilities 2nd NAVAL ZONE
security-policy objectives the development of non- Valdivia  Army Aviation
3rd Mountain Division HQ Brigade HQ
combat activities and stronger regional cooperation.
Puerto Montt
Under this framework, the armed forces have a
 5th Naval Zone HQ
key role in delivering humanitarian assistance and  3rd Air Brigade 5th NAVAL ZONE
helping to rebuild infrastructure after natural disas- ARGENTINA
ters. They carried out these tasks after Chile suffered
4th Army Division HQ
severe earthquakes in 2010 and 2015, reflecting not Coihaique
just changing policy priorities but also that the armed
forces have core capabilities vital for responding to
3rd NAVAL ZONE
these crises. Meanwhile, Santiago has maintained  3rd Naval Zone HQ
 5th Army Division HQ
significant participation in UN missions while deep-  4th Air Brigade HQ
ening its involvement in peacekeeping more broadly,
for instance by establishing the Joint Center for
Punta Arenas
Peacekeeping Operations in 2002. It contributed to
Selected exercises, 2018
MINUSTAH (Haiti) with a battalion-size unit, until
Name Date Location
the end of the operation in October 2017. Currently,
RIMPAC 2018 11–24 Jul United States (Hawaii)
Chile keeps small detachments in UNFICYP (Cyprus)
PANAMAX 2018 30 Jul–10 Aug United States
and UNVMC (the mission to verify the peace process Estrella Austral 2018 22–31 Aug Chile
in Colombia). At the same time, it has representatives Kakadu 2018 20 Aug–15 Sep Australia
in UNMOGIP (India and Pakistan), UNTSO (Egypt, Angel de los Andes Sep Colombia
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria) and MINUSCA © IISS

(Central African Republic). Chile also contributes to
EUFOR Althea, the European Union mission respon-
sible for maintaining security in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
An emphasis on regional security cooperation has
been particularly visible in Chile’s growing military
ties with Argentina. Rapprochement with Buenos
Aires began with the signing of a memorandum of
understanding in 1995. A battalion-strength joint
Cruz de Sur (Southern Cross) peacekeeping force
was formed after bilateral talks in 2005 and 2006. Both
▲ Map 11 Chile: key military bases and defence-
industrial facilities
nations’ military units also take part in the Solidaridad
series of biannual disaster-response drills.
The armed forces
The armed forces are highly professional but limited
in size, with just over 77,000 personnel, 46,000 of

whom are in the army. Military service is mandatory,
though there are usually enough volunteers to
forestall compulsory notices. Only the army has
a significant number of conscripts in its ranks (its
non-commissioned officers are professional), while
the navy and the air force are almost all professional.
There has been increased emphasis on strength-
ening ‘jointness’ and reducing the administrative
and operational independence of the three services.
After 2010, and the approval of Law 20424, the Joint
Staff became responsible for the strategic manage-
ment of the armed forces; they had traditionally held
an administrative function. This decision was later
accompanied by the creation of two regional joint
commands (North and South). Based on this structure,
the Joint Staff has acquired a greater role in directing
major operations. Joint Command North, for instance,
supports the police force’s border-security operations
through the Frontera Norte Segura (Safe Northern
Border) Plan. Likewise, the Joint Staff is responsible
for coordinating Chilean participation in international
peacekeeping and observation missions.
Meanwhile, procurement priorities have been
modified, not only in size as a result of budget
reductions, but because of the broadening focus of
Chile’s defence policy. Investment is mainly allocated
to the acquisition of multipurpose equipment capable
of combat and non-combat operations.
Procurement
As a consequence, some of the capabilities required for
tasks such as rapid deployment and maritime patrol
have been afforded greater priority. This change is
most likely to affect the army, as its structure and
equipment holdings have been traditionally geared
towards conventional combat operations. To date,
the last significant land-system procurement by Chile
was of US-origin M109A5+ self-propelled howitzers.
The second batch of 12 arrived in December 2014 by
means of US Foreign Military Sales.
Regular army deployments in support of disaster-
relief activities have helped the development of a
more flexible force, in particular by the involvement
of military-engineering contingents in such tasks (and
on exercises). As a part of this process, Chile has taken
steps to expand its rotary-wing assets, including the
acquisition of a batch of AS532AL and AS532ALe
Cougar helicopters, the last of which was delivered in
2016. These have expanded significantly the capability
of the aviation brigade, which provides air mobility for
the army and plays a critical role in disaster-relief oper-
Latin America and the Caribbean 389
ations. Likewise, the army made significant invest-
ment in 2017 to equip its engineer battalions with new
construction plant and all-terrain vehicles, improving
their capabilities to manage natural disasters.
Meanwhile, the air force will have to consider how
to maintain the level of platform capability that made
it one of the most sophisticated air forces in the region.
A significant number of its F-16 combat aircraft are
approaching the limit of their operational lives, as are
the air force’s 1980s-vintage CASA C-101CC trainer/
light-attack aircraft, and there are believed to be no
immediate plans to renew or extend these capabilities.
Air-force efforts have instead been directed at strength-
ening transport aviation, by taking into service four
ex-US Marine Corps KC-130R Hercules, increasing to
seven Chile’s Hercules fleet. Chile’s aerial-surveillance
capacity is also receiving attention: three Hermes 900
uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) are already oper-
ating as part of the Safe Northern Border Plan. A key
future project will be renewing the SSOT (Sistema
Satelital de la Observacion de la Tierra) intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance satellite operated by
the air force’s Space Operations Group.
The Chilean Navy has bolstered its capacity for
maritime-security and coastguard-related tasks.
Four domestically produced Piloto Pardo-class
offshore-patrol vessels have been acquired, two with
ice-strengthened hulls. Meanwhile, the first steel was
cut for a new icebreaker in 2017. This Ice-class vessel
Latin America and
is due to be completed in 2022 and will provide
the Caribbean
invaluable support to expanding Chilean activities
in the Antarctic. Modernisation of the navy’s fleet of
P-3ACH Orion maritime-patrol aircraft is also under
way. This mid-life upgrade programme will replace,
according to Lockheed Martin, elements including
the ‘outer wings, centre wing, horizontal stabiliser
and horizontal stabiliser leading edges’.
Nonetheless, Chile’s principal combat platforms
are also receiving attention. The navy’s three Type-23
frigates were undergoing modernisation in 2018 that
involved the installation of new combat-management
systems and air-defence missiles. The navy’s two
Scorpène-class submarines have also been completely
overhauled, and one of the two Type-209/1400s is
undergoing a similar process that will extend its
service life by ten years. However, the plan to acquire
a further two Scorpène-class boats to replace the Type-
209/1400s has been postponed, while a replacement
has yet to be identified for the submarine tender
Almirante José Toribio Merino Castro, which had been
taken out of service in 2015.
390 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
The navy is also developing its blue-water
activities, increasing its capability to operate
at distance from its bases and to participate in
multinational coalitions. In 2015, the navy deployed
the oiler Almirante Montt northwards to supply
Canada’s Pacific Fleet, a mission which would have
given the crew valuable lessons in operations with
unfamiliar vessels in distant waters. A milestone was
reached in 2018 when the Chilean Navy assumed the
leadership of the naval component of the RIMPAC
multinational exercise taking place off Hawaii.
Defence economics
Over the past decade, Chile has consistently ranked
highly in the table of Latin American defence budgets.
Military expenses have traditionally been financed
from three sources: firstly, annual budget allocations
to the defence ministry, which have typically been
used to cover salaries, operating expenses and
infrastructure-construction outlays; secondly, the
National Defence Provident Fund (Caja de Previsión
de la Defensa Nacional, or CAPREDENA), which
manages military-pension payments; and, lastly,
the Copper Reserve Law (Ley Reservada del Cobre),
which traditionally allocated 10% of profits from
national copper exports to military procurement.
Given the difficulties in calculating the precise
proportion of armed-forces funding derived from
copper revenues – the government occasionally
diverts some of these funds for other purposes –
most estimates of Chilean defence spending tend to
focus on the first two sources (the ministry’s annual
budget and armed-forces pensions). Together, these
amounted to an average of around 1.67% of GDP
between 2010 and 2014. That said, private-sector
analysis of the economy in August 2018 reportedly
indicated that, between 2012 and 2017, the copper
law generated additional funds averaging more than
US$1 billion annually for equipment acquisitions.
Salaries are the principal component of the defence-
ministry budget; in 2018, these amounted to 64.2% of
the total, while operating expenditure stood at 21.4%,
according to the budget presented to congress in late
2017. Most of the remainder was allocated to cover a
variety of financial expenses, leaving almost no room
for the purchase of new weapons systems. In the past,
the copper law offset this funding shortfall.
However, after attempts by previous governments,
in September 2018 President Piñera announced the
repeal of the copper law and the creation of a new
mechanism to fund equipment acquisition. According
to this new scheme, the armed forces will have two
additional sources of funding apart from standard
allocations to the ministry of defence. There will be
a four-year budget, initially funded with US$2.6bn
from remaining copper-law resources and then by
new annual allocations provided by the government.
A Strategic Contingency Fund will also be created,
with an additional US$1bn to be used in case of a
national-security crisis or natural disaster.
A share of the profits of Chile’s state copper
company will no longer go by law to the armed forces
but will instead be transferred to the treasury in the
same way as other copper revenues; the government
will decide its allocation in the same way as the rest
of the national budget. By repealing the copper law,
Chile’s civilian political leadership will gain full
control over all defence funding and expenditures.
More broadly, the repeal of the copper law reflects
two key changes in the Chilean political landscape.
It demonstrates that the civilian government has
achieved full control of defence policy, while showing
an underlying change in government priorities in
favour of increased investment in areas such as health
and education. Indeed, recent governments sought to
provide alternative uses for the funds generated by the
copper law. To this end, legal changes were made that
allowed copper-law revenues for disaster relief after
the 2010 earthquake, during the fires in the Valparaíso
region in 2014 and in early 2015 in order to finance
reconstruction in flood-hit areas of the north. The bill
establishing a new financing mechanism was going
through the legislative process at the time of writing.
It is possible that military spending might also
come under pressure as a consequence of Chile’s
economic situation: growth fell from 5.8% in 2010 to
just 1.5% in 2017 according to the IMF. Between 2010
and 2018, the percentage of Chile’s GDP devoted to
the armed forces fell from 1.63% to 1.42%. The defence
budget for 2018 represents a moderate increase of 3%
in nominal terms in comparison to the previous year.
In real terms, measured in constant (2010) US dollars,
this meant an increase of 1.9% between 2017 and 2018.
The reduction in available funds for the armed
forces could result in some challenges. Given its level
of technical sophistication, military equipment is
expensive to maintain, not to mention the costs that
would be associated with new systems of similar
or better capability. Consequently, the defence
ministry will have to carefully manage any significant
reduction in defence expenditures, in order to prevent
an adverse effect on conventional defence capabilities.

Defence industry
Chile’s defence industry is relatively small and
dominated by public enterprises. Although they
are state-owned, these firms have management
independence. This has helped them adopt long-term
business models, such that they are able to maintain
levels of technological sophistication, relative to
the rest of the region. The three key companies
are FAMAE (Fábricas y Maestranzas del Ejército,
manufacturing and repairing land systems), ASMAR
(Astilleros y Maestranzas de la Armada, active in
naval shipbuilding and repair) and ENAER (Empresa
Nacional de Aeronáutica, which manufactures and
maintains aircraft).
FAMAE is one of the oldest defence companies in
Latin America, and has, over time, progressed from
manufacturing licensed small arms to more complex
activities such as the modernisation of Chile’s Leopard
1V main battle tanks. Its defence-production capacity
grew considerably in 1976 after the US imposed an
arms embargo on Chile’s then-military government.
FAMAE’s most ambitious project is the manufacture
of the SLM multiple-rocket launcher, which leverages
the company’s prior experience with the Rayo
programme (cancelled in 2002).
Meanwhile, maritime concern ASMAR has
considerable technological expertise and a number of
orders on its books. Its most important projects are the
construction of the Ice-class icebreaker, the Type-23
modernisation project and the overhaul of the Type-
209/1400 submarines. Its most significant foreign
contract was for the modernisation of Ecuador’s
Type-209/1300 submarines, completed in 2014.
ENAER has a broad manufacturing and
maintenance portfolio, spanning both civil and
military aircraft. A well-known export is the T-35
Pillan basic trainer, which has been exported to the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Spain, among
others, while its most important domestic programme
is to provide technical support to the air force’s F-16
combat-aircraft fleet. The company also maintains
C-130 Hercules transport aircraft – including for foreign
customers such as Colombia. In March 2015, ENAER
signed an agreement with Italy’s Leonardo to provide
support and produce components for C-27J Spartan
transport aircraft and M-345 HET advanced trainers.
In November 2016, ENAER signed an agreement with
Airbus to develop capabilities for the maintenance
and overhaul of C212, CN235 and C295 airlifters, as
well as to cooperate in the production of components
for space systems.
Latin America and the Caribbean 391
In addition to these three major state companies,
Chile’s defence industry includes a network of smaller
private companies that specialise in the production of
high-technology systems and components. Chile’s
defence sector has benefited from the government’s
long-term approach to industrial development, as
well as from sustained procurement-funding levels
enabled by the copper law. However, as the Chilean
defence budget reduces in the face of slowing
economic growth and other spending priorities, and
because of changes to copper law disbursements, the
risk grows that domestic contracts may come under
pressure; as a result, export success will become ever
more important.
MEXICO
In July 2018, Mexicans elected as president Andrés
Manuel López Obrador (popularly known as
AMLO) from the left-wing National Reconstruction
Movement (MORENA) party. AMLO won with
a landslide 53% majority. He ran on a populist
campaign that focused on fighting corruption
and lowering government salaries and benefits.
AMLO’s security proposals included the creation of
a civilian-led National Guard that will blend army
and marine units together with the Federal Police to
create a single internal-security force. The security
forces, meanwhile, remain engaged on internal-
Latin America and
security tasks and in 2018 violence continued to pose
the Caribbean
a challenge.
Before assuming office, AMLO announced that the
Mexican armed forces would remain represented in
his cabinet via two distinct ministries, the Secretariá
de la Defensa Nacional (SEDENA), comprising the
army and air force, and the Secretariá de Marina
(SEMAR), comprising the navy. These are headed by
an active-duty four-star general and an admiral, who
serve as (equally ranked) secretary of defence and
navy respectively. While there have been reports of
potential change in the political-military organisation,
with a likely shift towards a single civilian-staffed
defence ministry and the creation of a joint chief of staff
structure, similar rumours have been heard during
previous transitions. Any significant adjustment to the
political-military structure will require constitutional
changes, as it is currently mandated that active-duty
military officers head these institutions. AMLO also
announced that his administration will recruit 50,000
additional personnel to join SEDENA, SEMAR and
the Federal Police.
392 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
The announcement that the 1,800-strong
presidential guard would disband after AMLO
takes office attracted some attention. Known as the
Estado Mayor Presidencial, the guard had provided
security and logistics for the office of the president
since 1926. AMLO stated that his personal security
would instead be guaranteed by a 20-member civilian
staff. He also announced that the Presidential Air
Transport (CGTAP) flight will be disbanded and sold
off. This includes some 22 aircraft, including a Boeing
787-8 (delivered in 2016), four Gulfstream executive
aircraft, one Beech 350i, one H225M and six AW109s.
Over the past decade, the Mexican armed forces
have expanded and modernised their internal-security
capabilities at the expense of their conventional
capacity. Major investment is required to modernise
their artillery, armour, air defence, fighter-aviation
and surface-warfare capabilities.
Local production of DN-XI armoured vehicles
ceased at around 150 out of a planned 1,000, though
there is potential to restart the production line once
the army-run defence industries finalise their move
to Puebla. Most of the DN-XIs, along with around
250 SandCats, have been re-distributed to the newly
created military police brigades. These brigades have
been created by drawing personnel from infantry,
cavalry and artillery units, in lieu of additional
resources to significantly expand personnel levels;
the Mexican Army had stood up ten of 12 of these
units by 2018. The army expects to procure new 105
mm and 155 mm artillery pieces, as well as a new
generation of 8x8 armoured fighting vehicles, during
the 2018–24 administration.
In November 2018, the Mexican Navy was due
to launch the Reformadora, the first of eight SIGMA
10514-class frigates, which are planned to be built
at Mexican shipyards. The navy has announced
plans to equip Reformadora with RGM-84L Harpoon
Block II anti-ship missiles and RIM-162 ESSM and
RIM-116 Block 2 missiles, as well as MH-60R Seahawk
helicopters armed with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles
and APKWS II guided rockets. The ship is due to
enter service in 2020. Navy shipyards have also been
building the seventh and eighth Oaxaca-class ocean-
patrol vessels, ARM Jalisco and ARM Estado de Mexico,
which are due to be commissioned in 2019. SEMAR
expects to continue its naval construction programme
under AMLO; however, the exact mix of ships to be
built in the 2019–24 period remains unclear. Mexico’s
ongoing requirements for ocean- and coastal-patrol
vessels to monitor its exclusive economic zone are
likely to continue, although SEMAR has made the
construction of the frigates a priority and may push
for funding for at least three more by 2024.
Mexico’s aviation assets were significantly
modernised during the 2012–18 administration,
with UH-60M Black Hawk and AS565MBe Panther
helicopters arriving, as well as more Beechcraft T-6C+
Texan IIs and eight King Air 350 turboprops. Half
of the King Airs are configured for maritime patrol
and the remainder for intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance. The procurement of further
UH-60M Black Hawks, mainly to begin replacement
of the Mi-17 fleet, has been outlined as a priority
for the 2018–24 administration. However, these
requirements may be revised in early 2019, as the new
administration begins to redefine its procurement
priorities. The acquisition of further maritime-patrol
aircraft, including a medium-altitude long-endurance
(MALE) uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV), is part of
SEMAR’s long-term plans.
Mexico’s marines continue to expand and have
now been reorganised around a brigade-level special-
forces unit (UNOPES) – an amphibious marine
infantry brigade, which deploys units on both the
Pacific and Gulf of Mexico coasts – and 30 battalions
that are in various stages of formation. Requirements
for new amphibious and light armoured vehicles
have been reported.
Mexico’s southern radar network, known as SIVA
(Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Aérea) is augmented
by a flight composed of an EMB-145AEW Erieye and
two EMB-145RS maritime-patrol aircraft, all of which
are scheduled for upgrade. Three new S45 tactical
UAVs have been incorporated into the SIVA flight.
An unknown number of the more capable Hermes 900
MALE UAVs remain assigned to the Federal Police and
the National Security Investigations Centre (Centro
de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional, or CISEN), an
organisation that AMLO has pledged to dissolve. The
repair and refurbishment of the air force’s sole fighter
squadron began in late 2017, and the first two F-5Es
to be redelivered were operational in September
2018. The procurement of a new air-surveillance
network for Mexico’s northern border, based on
the Thales GM400 composed of up to five radars
and a command-and-control centre, was suspended
due to lack of funds. Despite a US Army North/US
NORTHCOM cooperation programme that led to
the lease of TPS-70 radar as an emergency interim
solution, SEDENA authorities have announced that
the acquisition of five new radars is a priority.
 Latin America and the Caribbean 393

Antigua and Barbuda ATG Argentina ARG

East Caribbean Dollar EC$ 2017 2018 2019 Argentine Peso P 2017 2018 2019
GDP EC$ 4.12bn 4.35bn GDP P 10.6tr 13.6tr
US$ 1.52bn 1.61bn US$ 638bn 475bn
per capita US$ 16,702 17,477 per capita US$ 14,463 10,667
Growth % 2.8 3.5 Growth % 2.9 -2.6
Inflation % 2.5 1.4 Inflation % 25.7 31.8
Def bdgt [a] EC$ 16.9m 19.2m Def bdgt P 102bn 121bn 151bn
US$ 6.25m 7.10m US$ 6.17bn 4.23bn
US$1=EC$ 2.70 2.70 US$1=P 16.56 28.67
[a] Budget for the Ministry of Legal Affairs, Public Safety, Population 44,694,198
Immigration & Labour
Population 95,882 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 12.6% 4.0% 3.8% 3.8% 20.3% 5.0%
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Female 11.8% 3.8% 3.7% 3.7% 20.7% 6.8%
Male 11.6% 4.1% 4.1% 3.6% 20.2% 3.6%
Female 11.3% 4.1% 4.2% 3.8% 24.6% 4.8% Capabilities
Argentina’s armed forces have sufficient training and equipment to
Capabilities fulfil internal-security tasks, although any power-projection ambi-
The Antigua and Barbuda Defence Force (ABDF) focuses on inter- tion is limited by lack of funding. The armed forces principally focus
nal security and disaster relief, and also contributes to regional on border security, surveillance and counter-narcotics operations,
counter-narcotics efforts. It comprises a light-infantry element, in part due to the increase in drug-trafficking activity in and around
which carries out internal-security duties, and a coastguard, the country, and cooperate with Bolivia and Paraguay. Amid other
which is tasked with fishery protection and counter-narcotics. defence reforms, legislation proposed in 2018 may allow greater
Antigua and Barbuda is a member of the Caribbean Community latitude to deploy the armed forces against non-traditional threats.
and the Caribbean Regional Security System. The country main- Military cooperation with the US centres on enhancing readi-
tains defence ties with the UK and sends personnel to train in the ness, as well as disaster response, border security and peacekeep-
US. The ABDF participates in US SOUTHCOM’s annual Tradewinds ing. The armed forces participate in multinational exercises and
disaster-relief exercise, though it has no independent capacity to bilateral peacekeeping exercises with neighbour Chile. There are
deploy forces other than in its immediate neighbourhood, most limited deployment capabilities, and the equipment inventory is
recently for disaster-relief efforts in Dominica. The equipment increasingly obsolete, with modernisation hampered by limited

Latin America and

inventory is limited to small arms and light weapons (there is a funding. The air force faces significant equipment-availability chal-

range of mainly soft-skinned vehicles), while the coastguard main-
tains ex-US patrol vessels and a number of smaller boats. Aside
from limited maintenance facilities, there is no significant indig-
enous defence industry.
ACTIVE 180 (Army 130 Coast Guard 50)
(all services form combined Antigua and Barbuda Defence Force)
the Caribbean
lenges and the navy has seen its capability decline in areas such as
anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare and airborne early warning.
Argentina possesses an indigenous defence-manufacturing capac-
ity covering land, sea and air systems, although industry fortunes
have dipped in recent years because of lack of investment. State-
owned aviation firm FAdeA has aircraft-maintenance capabilities,
but is reliant on external assistance for some manufacturing tasks.

RESERVE 80 (Joint 80) ACTIVE 74,200 (Army 42,800 Navy 18,500 Air
12,900) Paramilitary 31,250
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Army 130
FORCES BY ROLE Army 42,800
MANOEUVRE Regt and gp are usually bn-sized
Light FORCES BY ROLE
1 inf bn HQ SPECIAL FORCES
1 inf coy 1 SF gp
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT MANOEUVRE
1 spt gp (1 engr unit, 1 med unit) Mechanised
1 (1st) div (1 armd bde (4 tk regt, 1 mech inf regt, 1 SP
Coast Guard 50 arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy),
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 (3rd) jungle bde (2 jungle inf regt, 1 arty gp, 1 engr
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2: 1 bn, 1 int coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy, 1 med coy); 1 (12th)
Dauntless; 1 Swift jungle bde (3 jungle inf regt, 1 arty gp, 1 engr bn, 1 int
394 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy, 1 med coy), 2 engr bn, 1 sigs (to be converted to ISR role); 2 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 1
bn, 1 log coy) Sabreliner 75A (Gaviao 75A)
1 (3rd) div (1 mech bde (1 armd recce regt, 1 tk regt, 2 TRG 5 T-41 Mescalero
mech inf regt, 1 SP arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 int coy, 1 HELICOPTERS
sigs coy, 1 log coy), 1 mech bde (1 armd recce tp, 1 tk MRH 5: 4 SA315B Lama; 1 Z-11
regt, 2 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 int TPT 67: Medium 3 AS332B Super Puma; Light 64: 1 Bell
coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy), 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 log coy) 212; 25 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois – 6 armed); 5 Bell 206B3;
1 (Rapid Deployment) force (1 armd bde (1 recce sqn, 3 13 UH-1H-II Huey II; 20 AB206B1
tk regt, 1 mech inf regt, 1 SP arty gp, 1 cbt engr coy, AIR DEFENCE
1 int coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy), 1 mech bde (1 armd SAM • Point-defence RBS-70
recce regt, 3 mech inf regt, 1 arty gp, 1 cbt engr coy, GUNS • TOWED 229: 20mm 200 GAI-B01; 30mm 21 HS
1 int coy, 1 sigs coy,1 log coy), 1 AB bde (1 recce tp, L81; 35mm 8 GDF Oerlikon (Skyguard fire control)
2 para regt, 1 arty gp, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log
coy), 1 AD gp (2 AD bn))
Navy 18,500
Light
Commands: Surface Fleet, Submarines, Naval Avn,
1 (2nd) mtn inf div (2 mtn inf bde (1 armd recce regt, 3
Marines
mtn inf regt, 2 arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log
coy), 1 mtn inf bde (1 armd recce bn, 2 mtn inf regt, FORCES BY ROLE
1 jungle inf regt, 2 arty gp, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 SPECIAL FORCES
construction coy, 1 log coy), 1 AD gp, 1 sigs bn) 1 (diver) SF gp
1 mot cav regt (presidential escort) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Air Manoeuvre SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 2:
1 air aslt regt 1 Salta (GER T-209/1100) with 8 single 533mm TT with
COMBAT SUPPORT Mk 37/SST-4 HWT
1 arty gp (bn) 1 Santa Cruz (GER TR-1700) with 6 single 533mm TT
1 engr bn with SST-4 HWT (undergoing MLU)
1 sigs gp (1 EW bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 maint bn) PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 11
1 sigs bn DESTROYERS • DDH 1 Hercules (UK Type-42 –
1 sigs coy utilised as a fast troop-transport ship), with 1 114mm
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT gun (capacity 2 SH-3H Sea King hel)
5 maint bn FRIGATES • FFGHM 10:
HELICOPTER 4 Almirante Brown (GER MEKO 360) with 2 quad
1 avn gp (bde) (1 avn bn, 1 hel bn) lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 octuple Albatros
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple B515 ILAS-3 324mm
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES TT with A244 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 AS555
MBT 231: 225 TAM, 6 TAM S21 Fennec hel)
LT TK 117: 107 SK-105A1 Kuerassier; 6 SK-105A2 6 Espora (GER MEKO 140) with 2 twin lnchr with
Kuerassier; 4 Patagón MM38 Exocet AShM, 2 triple B515 ILAS-3 324mm
RECCE 47 AML-90 ASTT with A244 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1
IFV 232: 118 VCTP (incl variants); 114 M113A2 (20mm
AS555 Fennec hel)
cannon)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16
APC 278
CORVETTES • FSG 3 Drummond (FRA A-69) with 2
APC (T) 274: 70 M113A1-ACAV; 204 M113A2
twin lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 2 triple ILAS-3
APC (W) 4 WZ-551B1
324mm ASTT with A244 LWT, 1 100mm gun
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
PSO 3:
ARV Greif
2 Irigoyen (ex-US Cherokee)
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • SP 3 M1025 HMMWV with TOW-2A 1 Teniente Olivieri (ex-US oilfield tug)
RCL 105mm 150 M-1968 PCO 2:
ARTILLERY 1,108 1 Murature (ex-US King – trg/river patrol role) with 3
SP 155mm 42: 23 AMX F3; 19 VCA 155 Palmaria 105mm gun (in refit since 2016)
TOWED 172: 105mm 64 Model 56 pack howitzer; 1 Sobral (ex-US Sotoyomo)
155mm 108: 28 CITEFA M-77/CITEFA M-81; 80 SOFMA PCGT 1 Intrepida (GER Lurssen 45m) with 2 single lnchr
L-33 with MM38 Exocet AShM, 2 single 533mm TT with
MRL 8: 105mm 4 SLAM Pampero; 127mm 4 CP-30 SST-4 HWT, 1 76mm gun
MOR 886: 81mm 492; SP 107mm 25 M106A2; 120mm PCC 1 Intrepida (GER Lurssen 45m) with 1 76mm gun
330 Brandt; SP 120mm 39 TAM-VCTM PB 6: 4 Baradero (Dabur); 2 Punta Mogotes (ex-US Point)
AIRCRAFT AMPHIBIOUS 6 LCVP
TPT • Light 14: 1 Beech 80 Queen Air; 3 C-212-200 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 18
Aviocar; 2 Cessna 208EX Grand Caravan; 1 Cessna 500 ABU 3 Red
Citation (survey); 1 Cessna 550 Citation Bravo; 3 DA42 AFS 4 Puerto Argentina (ex-RUS Neftegaz)
 Latin America and the Caribbean 395

AGB 1 Almirante Irizar (damaged by fire in 2007; 2 (tac air) sqn with IA-58 Pucara; EMB-312 Tucano (on
returned to service in mid-2017) loan for border surv/interdiction)
AGHS 3: 1 Austral; 1 Cormoran; 1 Puerto Deseado (ice- ISR
breaking capability, used for polar research) 1 sqn with Learjet 35A
AGOR 1 Commodoro Rivadavia SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
AK 3 Costa Sur (capacity 4 LCVP) 2 sqn with Bell 212; Bell 212 (UH-1N); Mi-171, SA-
AOR 1 Patagonia (FRA Durance) with 1 hel platform 315B Lama
AORL 1 Ingeniero Julio Krause TANKER/TRANSPORT
AXS 1 Libertad 1 sqn with C-130H Hercules; KC-130H Hercules; L-100-
30
Naval Aviation 2,000 TRANSPORT
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with B-707
AIRCRAFT 20 combat capable 1 sqn with DHC-6 Twin Otter; Saab 340
FGA 2 Super Etendard (9 more in store) 1 sqn with F-27 Friendship
ATK 1 AU-23 Turbo Porter 1 sqn with F-28 Fellowship; Learjet 60
ASW 7: 3 S-2T Tracker†; 4 P-3B Orion 1 (Pres) flt with B-757-23ER; S-70A Black Hawk, S-76B
TPT • Light 7 Beech 200F/M King Air TRAINING
TRG 10 T-34C Turbo Mentor* 1 sqn with AT-63 Pampa
HELICOPTERS 1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano
ASW 2 SH-3H (ASH-3H) Sea King 1 sqn with Grob 120TP
MRH 4 AS555 Fennec 1 hel sqn with Hughes 369; SA-315B Lama
TPT • Medium 4 UH-3H Sea King TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES 1 sqn with Hughes 369; MD-500; MD500D
AAM • IR R-550 Magic EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AShM AM39 Exocet AIRCRAFT 72 combat capable
ATK 52: 20 A-4 (A-4AR) Skyhawk†; 2 OA-4 (OA-4AR)
Marines 2,500 Skyhawk†; 21 IA-58 Pucara; 9 IA-58M Pucara
FORCES BY ROLE ELINT 1 Cessna 210
MANOEUVRE TKR 2 KC-130H Hercules
Amphibious TPT 27: Medium 4: 3 C-130H Hercules; 1 L-100-30;
1 (fleet) force (1 cdo gp, 1 (AAV) amph bn, 1 mne bn, 1 Light 16: 1 Cessna 310; 6 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 4 Learjet
arty bn, 1 ADA bn) 35A (test and calibration); 1 Learjet 60 (VIP); 4 Saab
1 (fleet) force (2 mne bn, 2 navy det) 340; PAX 7: 1 B-737; 1 B-757-23ER; 5 F-28 Fellowship
1 force (1 mne bn) TRG 59: 20 AT-63 Pampa* (LIFT); 19 EMB-312 Tucano; 8

Latin America and

the Caribbean
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Grob 120TP; 6 P2002JF Sierra; 6 T-6C Texan II
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES HELICOPTERS
RECCE 12 ERC-90F Sagaie MRH 27: 4 Bell 412EP; 11 Hughes 369; 3 MD-500; 4
APC • APC (W) 31 VCR MD-500D; 5 SA315B Lama
AAV 11 LVTP-7 TPT 12: Medium 3: 2 Mi-171E; 1 S-70A Black Hawk;
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES Light 9: 7 Bell 212; 2 S-76B (VIP)
ARV AAVR 7 AIR DEFENCE
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE GUNS 88: 20mm: 86 Oerlikon/Rh-202 with 9 Elta
RCL 105mm 30 M-1974 FMK-1 EL/M-2106 radar; 35mm: 2 Oerlikon GDF-001 with
ARTILLERY 89 Skyguard radar
TOWED 19: 105mm 13 Model 56 pack howitzer; AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
155mm 6 M114 AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; R-550 Magic; Shafrir 2‡
MOR 70: 81mm 58; 120mm 12
AIR DEFENCE Paramilitary 31,250
SAM • Point-defence RBS-70
GUNS 40mm 4 Bofors 40L Gendarmerie 18,000
Ministry of Security
Air Force 12,900 FORCES BY ROLE
4 Major Comds – Air Operations, Personnel, Air Regions, COMMAND
Logistics, 8 air bde 7 regional comd
SPECIAL FORCES
Air Operations Command 1 SF unit
FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE
GROUND ATTACK Other
2 sqn with A-4/OA-4 (A-4AR/OA-4AR) Skyhawk 17 paramilitary bn
396 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Aviation
1 (mixed) avn bn Bahamas BHS
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Bahamian Dollar B$ 2017 2018 2019
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
RECCE S52 Shorland GDP B$ 12.2bn 12.9bn
APC (W) 87: 47 Grenadier; 40 UR-416 US$ 12.2bn 12.9bn
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm per capita US$ 32,661 34,333
AIRCRAFT Growth % 1.4 2.3
TPT 13: Light 12: 3 Cessna 152; 3 Cessna 206; 1 Cessna
Inflation % 1.4 2.5
336; 1 PA-28 Cherokee; 2 PC-6B Turbo Porter; 2 PC-12;
PAX 1 Learjet 35 Def bdgt B$ 98.7m 90.6m 92.3m
HELICOPTERS US$ 98.7m 90.6m
MRH 2 MD-500C US$1=B$ 1.00 1.00
TPT • Light 17: 5 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 7 AS350
Ecureuil; 1 H135; 1 H155; 3 R-44 Raven II Population 332,634
TRG 1 S-300C
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Prefectura Naval (Coast Guard) 13,250 Male 11.4% 3.9% 4.2% 4.2% 22.2% 3.1%
Ministry of Security Female 11.0% 3.8% 4.1% 4.1% 23.0% 4.9%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 69 Capabilities
PCO 7: 1 Correa Falcon; 1 Delfin; 5 Mantilla (F30 Halcón
The Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF) is an entirely naval force
– undergoing modernisation)
primarily tasked with disaster relief, maritime security and counter-
PCC 1 Mariano Moreno
ing narcotics trafficking. Its single commando squadron is tasked
PB 58: 1 Dorado; 25 Estrellemar; 2 Lynch (US Cape); 18
with base and internal security. The Bahamas is a member of the
Mar del Plata (Z-28); 1 Surel; 8 Damen Stan 2200; 3 Stan
Caribbean Community, and the RBDF maintains training relation-
Tender 1750
ships with the UK and US. The RBDF participates in US SOUTH-
PBF 2 Shaldag II COM’s multinational annual Tradewinds disaster-response exercise.
PBR 1 Tonina There is very little independent capacity to deploy abroad, aside
LOGISTICS & SUPPORT 11 from recent regional disaster-relief efforts. The second phase of
AAR 1 Tango the Sandy Bottom Project was completed in April 2017; the final
AFS 1 Prefecto Garcia phase will see further infrastructure improvements and an increase
AG 2 in RBDF personnel numbers. A new permanent naval base on
ARS 1 Prefecto Mansilla Grand Bahama is under discussion to bolster the RBDF’s counter-
AX 5: 1 Mandubi; 4 other narcotics work. The maritime wing is focused around patrol vessels
AXS 1 Dr Bernardo Houssay and smaller patrol boats, while the air wing has a small inventory
AIRCRAFT of light aircraft. Apart from limited maintenance facilities, the
MP 1 Beech 350ER King Air Bahamas has no indigenous defence industry.
TPT • Light 6: 5 C-212 Aviocar; 1 Beech 350ER King
Air ACTIVE 1,300
TRG 2 Piper PA-28 Archer III
HELICOPTERS ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
SAR 3 AS565MA Panther
MRH 1 AS365 Dauphin 2
TPT 5: Medium 3: 1 H225 Puma; 2 SA330L (AS330L)
Royal Bahamian Defence Force 1,300
Puma; Light 2 AS355 Ecureuil II FORCES BY ROLE
TRG 4 S-300C MANOEUVRE
Amphibious
DEPLOYMENT 1 mne coy (incl marines with internal- and base-security
duties)
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 2 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 244; 2 inf coy; 1 hel flt; 2 Bell 212 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 21
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3 obs PCC 2 Bahamas
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2 obs PBF 6 Nor-Tech
PB 13: 4 Arthur Dion Hanna; 2 Dauntless; 3 Lignum Vitae
(Damen 3007); 2 Sea Ark 12m; 2 Sea Ark 15m
LOGISTICS & SUPPORT 1
AKR 1 Lawrence Major (Damen 5612)
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3: 1 Beech A350 King Air; 1
Cessna 208 Caravan; 1 P-68 Observer
 Latin America and the Caribbean 397

FOREIGN FORCES
Belize BLZ
Guyana Navy: Base located at New Providence Island
Belize Dollar BZ$ 2017 2018 2019

Barbados BRB GDP BZ$ 3.71bn 3.82bn

US$ 1.85bn 1.91bn
Barbados Dollar B$ 2017 2018 2019 per capita US$ 4,806 4,830
GDP B$ 9.98bn 10.3bn Growth % 0.8 1.8
US$ 4.99bn 5.17bn Inflation % 1.1 1.3
per capita US$ 17,758 18,366 Def bdgt [a] BZ$ 47.6m 45.7m
Growth % -0.2 -0.5 US$ 23.8m 22.8m
Inflation % 4.4 4.2 FMA (US) US$ 1m 0m 0m
Def bdgt [a] B$ 77.m 78.5m US$1=BZ$ 2.00 2.00
US$ 38.5m 39.3m [a] Excludes funds allocated to Coast Guard and Police Service
US$1=B$ 2.00 2.00
Population 385,854
[a] Defence & security expenditure
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Population 293,131
Male 17.2% 5.4% 4.3% 4.4% 16.7% 2.1%
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Female 16.4% 5.0% 4.1% 4.5% 17.7% 2.2%
Male 8.9% 3.1% 3.1% 3.6% 24.6% 5.0%
Female 8.9% 3.1% 3.2% 3.6% 25.5% 7.3%
Capabilities
Belize maintains a small Defence Force (BDF) and coastguard to
Capabilities provide national security, particularly control of the borders with
Guatemala and Mexico. A new National Security and Defence
Maritime security and resource protection are the main tasks of Strategy (2017–20) identifies territorial defence and combating
the Barbados Defence Force (BDF), but it has a secondary public- transnational crime as key objectives. An unresolved territorial
safety role in support of the police force. The BDF has been active dispute with Guatemala over Belize’s southern border remains a
in counter-narcotics work in recent years, and troops have also source of concern. The UK has a long-standing security relationship
been tasked with supporting law-enforcement patrols. The BDF with Belize and maintains a small training unit there, and the BDF
has been taking steps to improve its disaster-relief capacity and is also trains with US SOUTHCOM. Overall training levels are limited
developing a company-size mobile field hospital. The Caribbean but generally sufficient for the BDF’s tasks. Belize is a member of
Regional Security System is headquartered in Barbados, and it the Caribbean Community. The BDF does not deploy internation-
ally and logistics support is adequate for border-security missions.
is also a member of the Caribbean Community. The BDF partici-
The conventional equipment inventory is limited and there is no

Latin America and

pates in US SOUTHCOM’s multinational annual Tradewinds disas-

the Caribbean
domestic defence industry other than limited maintenance facili-
ter-response exercise. There is limited capacity to independently
ties.
deploy within the region, most recently on hurricane-relief duties.
The inventory consists principally of a small number of patrol ACTIVE 1,500 (Army 1,500) Paramilitary 150
vessels. Apart from limited maintenance facilities, Barbados has no
indigenous defence industry. RESERVE 700 (Joint 700)
ACTIVE 610 (Army 500 Coast Guard 110) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
RESERVE 430 (Joint 430)
Army ε1,500
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Light
Army 500 2 inf bn (3 inf coy)
FORCES BY ROLE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
MANOEUVRE 1 spt gp
Light EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 inf bn (cadre) ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • RCL 84mm
Carl Gustav
Coast Guard 110 ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 6
HQ located at HMBS Pelican, Spring Garden Air Wing
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 6: AIRCRAFT
1 Dauntless; 2 Enterprise (Damen Stan 1204); 3 Trident TPT • Light 3: 1 BN-2A Defender; 1 BN-2B Defender; 1
(Damen Stan Patrol 4207) Cessna 182 Skylane
398 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

TRG 1 T-67M-200 Firefly ACTIVE 34,100 (Army 22,800 Navy 4,800 Air 6,500)
HELICOPTERS Paramilitary 37,100
TPT • Light 3: 2 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 1 Bell 407 Conscript liability 12 months voluntary conscription for both males
and females
Reserve
FORCES BY ROLE ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
MANOEUVRE
Light Army 9,800; 13,000 conscript (total 22,800)
1 inf bn (3 inf coy) FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
Paramilitary 150 6 mil region HQ
Coast Guard 150 10 div HQ
SPECIAL FORCES
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
3 SF regt
All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD
MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance
FOREIGN FORCES 1 mot cav gp
United Kingdom BATSUB 12 Armoured
1 armd bn
Mechanised
Bolivia BOL 1 mech cav regt
Bolivian Boliviano B 2017 2018 2019 2 mech inf regt
Light
GDP B 259bn 287bn
1 (aslt) cav gp
US$ 37.8bn 41.8bn 5 (horsed) cav gp
per capita US$ 3,413 3,719 3 mot inf regt
Growth % 4.2 4.3 21 inf regt
Inflation % 2.8 3.2 Air Manoeuvre
2 AB regt (bn)

Def bdgt B 3.73bn 3.45bn
Other
US$ 543m 503m 1 (Presidential Guard) inf regt
US$1=B 6.86 6.86 COMBAT SUPPORT
Population 11,306,341 6 arty regt (bn)
6 engr bn
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 int coy
Male 16.0% 5.1% 4.7% 4.4% 16.9% 2.4% 1 MP bn
1 sigs bn
Female 15.4% 5.0% 4.6% 4.4% 18.2% 3.0%
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
2 log bn
Capabilities AVIATION
The armed forces are constitutionally tasked with maintaining 2 avn coy
sovereignty and territorial defence, but counter-narcotics and AIR DEFENCE
internal and border security are in practical terms the main tasks 1 ADA regt
of the armed forces. Joint task forces have been formed and dis- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
patched to border regions to combat smuggling activities, and a ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
series of border posts are being established. Modest procurement
LT TK 54: 36 SK-105A1 Kuerassier; 18 SK-105A2 Kuerassier
programmes are intended to improve the services’ ability to under-
RECCE 24 EE-9 Cascavel
take these roles. Airspace control is an emerging strategic prior-
APC 148+
ity, and construction continues on 13 civilian and military radars
APC (T) 87+: 50+ M113, 37 M9 half-track
to help address this requirement. There is defence-technology
APC (W) 61: 24 EE-11 Urutu; 22 MOWAG Roland; 15
cooperation with Russia, but China remains a significant supplier
of military materiel, and delivered logistics vehicles in late 2018. V-100 Commando
An agreement was signed in September 2018 on joint operations AUV 19 Tiger 4×4
with Peru on countering illicit trafficking and disaster relief. Amid ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
greater internal deployments to border areas on counter-traffick- ARV 4 Greif; M578 LARV
ing tasks, the armed forces have stressed the need to improve con- ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
ditions for personnel. An Aerospace Research and Development MSL
Centre was created in 2018 in the military engineering school with SP 2 Koyak with HJ-8
the objective of developing munitions and ISR UAVs. There is some MANPATS HJ-8
local maintenance, repair and overhaul capacity for the services. RCL 90mm M67; 106mm M40A1
 Latin America and the Caribbean 399

ARTILLERY 311+ EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

TOWED 61: 105mm 25 M101A1; 122mm 36 M-30 (M-1938) AIRCRAFT 22 combat capable
MOR 250+: 81mm 250 M29; Type-W87; 107mm M30; TPT 88: Heavy 1 MD-10-30F; Medium 4: 1 C-130A
120mm M120 Hercules; 2 C-130B Hercules; 1 C-130H Hercules; Light 72:
AIRCRAFT 1 Aero Commander 690; 3 Beech 90 King Air; 1 Beech 55
TPT • Light 4: 1 Fokker F-27-200; 1 Beech 90 King Air; 1 Baron; 2 Beech 200 King Air; 1 Beech 1900; 3 C-212-100;
C-212 Aviocar; 1 Cessna 210 Centurion 10 Cessna 152; 2 Cessna 172; 19 Cessna 206; 3 Cessna
HELICOPTERS 210 Centurion; 1 Cessna 402; 9 DA40; 3 F-27-400M
MRH 6 H425 Troopship; 4 IAI-201 Arava; 2 Learjet 25B/D; 2 MA60†; 1
TRG 1 Robinson R55 PA-32 Saratoga; 4 PA-34 Seneca; 1 Sabreliner 60; PAX 11:
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 37mm 18 Type-65 1 B-727; 5 B-737-200; 1 B-737-300; 1 BAe-146-100; 2 BAe-
146-200; 1 Falcon 900EX (VIP)
Navy 4,800 TRG 30: 6 K-8WB Karakorum*; 6 T-25; 16 PC-7 Turbo
Organised into six naval districts with HQ located at Trainer*; 2 Z-242L
Puerto Guayaramerín HELICOPTERS
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MRH 1 SA316 Alouette III
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR 3: 1 TPT 35: Medium 6 H215 Super Puma; Light 29: 2 H125
Santa Cruz; 2 others Ecureuil; 19 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 2 H145; 6 R-44
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3 Raven II
AG 1 AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 18+: 20mm Oerlikon; 37mm 18
AH 2 Type-65

Marines 1,700 (incl 1,000 Naval Military Paramilitary 37,100+

Police)
National Police 31,100+
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE FORCES BY ROLE
Mechanised MANOEUVRE
Other
1 mech inf bn
27 frontier sy unit
Amphibious
9 paramilitary bde
6 mne bn (1 in each Naval District)
2 (rapid action) paramilitary regt
COMBAT SUPPORT
4 (naval) MP bn Narcotics Police 6,000+
FOE (700) – Special Operations Forces
Air Force 6,500 (incl conscripts)

Latin America and

FORCES BY ROLE
DEPLOYMENT

the Caribbean
GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with K-8WB Karakorum CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 1; 2 obs
ISR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
1 sqn with Cessna 206; Cessna 402; Learjet 25B/25D MONUSCO 3 obs
(secondary VIP role)
SEARCH & RESCUE SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 3 obs
1 sqn with AS332B Super Puma; H125 Ecureuil; H145 SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 1; 3 obs
TRANSPORT
1 (TAM) sqn with B-727; B-737; BAe-146-100; MA60
1 (TAB) sqn with C-130A Hercules; MD-10-30F
1 sqn with C-130B/H Hercules
1 sqn with F-27-400M Troopship
1 (VIP) sqn with Beech 90 King Air; Beech 200 King Air
Beech 1900; Falcon 900EX; Sabreliner 60
6 sqn with Cessna 152/206; IAI-201 Arava; PA-32
Saratoga; PA-34 Seneca
TRAINING
1 sqn with DA40; T-25
1 sqn with Cessna 152/172
1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer
1 hel sqn with R-44 Raven II
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 (anti-drug) sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)
AIR DEFENCE
1 regt with Oerlikon; Type-65
400 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Army 128,000; 70,000 conscript (total 198,000)

Brazil BRZ FORCES BY ROLE
Brazilian Real R 2017 2018 2019 COMMAND
GDP R 6.56tr 6.88tr
8 mil comd HQ
12 mil region HQ
US$ 2.06tr 1.91tr
7 div HQ (2 with regional HQ)
per capita US$ 9,896 9,127 SPECIAL FORCES
Growth % 1.0 1.4 1 SF bde (1 SF bn, 1 cdo bn)
Inflation % 3.4 3.7 1 SF coy
Def bdgt [a] R 93.3bn 101bn 107bn MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance
US$ 29.2bn 28.0bn
3 mech cav regt
US$1=R 3.19 3.60 Armoured
[a] Includes military pensions 1 (5th) armd bde (1 mech cav sqn, 2 tk regt, 2 armd inf
Population 208,846,892 bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
1 (6th) armd bde (1 mech cav sqn, 2 tk regt, 2 armd inf
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 AD bty, 1 engr bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log
Male 11.2% 4.2% 4.1% 4.0% 22.2% 3.7% bn)
Mechanised
Female 10.7% 4.1% 4.0% 3.9% 23.1% 4.9%
3 (1st, 2nd & 4th) mech cav bde (1 armd cav bn, 3 mech
cav bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
Capabilities 1 (3rd) mech cav bde (1 armd cav bn, 2 mech cav bn, 1
The armed forces are among the most capable in the region. arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
Brazil seeks to enhance its power-projection capabilities, boost 1 (15th) mech inf bde (3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr
surveillance of the Amazon region and coastal waters, and further coy, 1 log bn)
develop its defence industry, though economic difficulties con-
Light
tinue to affect its ability to develop these ambitions. However,
1 (3rd) mot inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 1 mech inf bn, 1
security challenges from organised crime have seen the armed
forces deploy on internal-security operations. Brazil maintains
mot inf bn, 1 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy,
military ties with most of its neighbours including personnel- 1 log bn)
exchange programmes and joint military training with Chile and 1 (4th) mot inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 1 mot inf bn, 1 inf
Colombia. There is also defence cooperation with France, Sweden bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
and the US, centred on procurement, technical advice and person- 1 (7th) mot inf bde (3 mot inf bn, 1 arty bn)
nel training. Brazil’s air-transport fleet enables it to independently 1 (8th) mot inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 3 mot inf bn, 1 arty
deploy forces. It contributes small contingents to several UN mis- bn, 1 log bn)
sions across Europe, the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. 1 (10th) mot inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 4 mot inf bn, 1 inf
Despite substantial budgetary constraints, Brazil is attempting to coy, 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy)
modernise its equipment across all domains. Major platform pro- 1 (13th) mot inf bde (1 mot inf bn, 2 inf bn, 1 inf coy, 1
grammes include PROSUB (one nuclear-powered and four diesel-
arty bn)
electric submarines) and the recent acquisition of a former UK heli-
1 (14th) mot inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn)
copter carrier. Brazil has a well-developed defence-industrial base,
across all domains, with a capability to design and manufacture 1 (11th) lt inf bde (1 mech cav regt, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1
equipment for its armed forces. The aerospace sector is particularly engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 MP coy, 1 log bn)
strong, with some private companies such as Avibras and Embraer 10 inf bn
exporting to international customers. Local companies are also 1 (1st) jungle inf bde (1 mech cav sqn, 2 jungle inf bn, 1
involved in the border-security programme SISFRON. There are arty bn)
industrial partnerships, including technology transfers and R&D 4 (2nd, 16th, 17th & 22nd) jungle inf bde (3 jungle inf
support, with France’s Naval Group (PROSUB) and Sweden’s Saab bn)
(FX-2 fighter). 1 (23rd) jungle inf bde (1 cav sqn, 4 jungle inf bn, 1 arty
ACTIVE 334,500 (Army 198,000 Navy 69,000 Air bn, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
Air Manoeuvre
67,500) Paramilitary 395,000
1 AB bde (1 cav sqn, 3 AB bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr coy, 1
Conscript liability 12 months (can go to 18; often waived)
sigs coy, 1 log bn)
RESERVE 1,340,000 1 (12th) air mob bde (1 cav sqn, 3 air mob bn, 1 arty bn,
1 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log bn)
Other
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 1 (9th) mot trg bde (3 mot inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 log bn)
1 (18th) sy bde (2 sy bn, 2 sy coy)
Space 1 sy bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 7 sy coy
SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 1 SGDC-1 (civil– 3 gd cav regt
military use) 1 gd inf bn
 Latin America and the Caribbean 401

COMBAT SUPPORT AIR DEFENCE

3 SP arty bn SAM • Point-defence RBS-70; 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse);
6 fd arty bn 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)
1 MRL bn GUNS 100:
1 STA bty SP 35mm 34 Gepard 1A2
6 engr bn TOWED 66: 35mm 39 GDF-001 towed (some with
1 engr gp (1 engr bn, 4 construction bn) Super Fledermaus radar); 40mm 27 L/70 (some with
1 engr gp (4 construction bn, 1 construction coy) BOFI)
2 construction bn
1 EW coy Navy 69,000
1 int coy Organised into 9 districts with HQ I Rio de Janeiro, HQ II
6 MP bn Salvador, HQ III Natal, HQ IV Belém, HQ V Rio Grande,
3 MP coy HQ VI Ladario, HQ VII Brasilia, HQ VIII Sao Paulo, HQ
4 sigs bn IX Manaus
2 sigs coy FORCES BY ROLE
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT SPECIAL FORCES
5 log bn 1 (diver) SF gp
1 tpt bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
4 spt bn SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 5:
HELICOPTER 2 Tupi (GER T-209/1400) with 8 single 533mm TT with
1 avn bde (3 hel bn, 1 maint bn) Mk24 HWT (of which 1 in refit until 2019)
1 hel bn 2 Tupi (GER T-209/1400) with 8 single 533mm TT with
AIR DEFENCE Mk48 HWT
1 ADA bde (5 ADA bn) 1 Tikuna (GER T-209/1450) with 8 single 533mm TT with
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Mk24 HWT (in refit until 2019)
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 11
MBT 393: 128 Leopard 1A1BE; 220 Leopard 1A5BR; 45 DESTROYERS • DDGHM 2:
M60A3/TTS 1 Greenhalgh (ex-UK Broadsword) with 4 single lnchr
LT TK 50 M41C with MM38 Exocet AShM, 2 sextuple lnchr with Sea
RECCE 408 EE-9 Cascavel Wolf SAM, 6 single STWS Mk2 324mm ASTT with
IFV 6 VBTP-MR Guarani 30mm Mk 46 LWT (capacity 2 Super Lynx Mk21A hel)
APC 1,153 1 Greenhalgh (ex-UK Broadsword) with 4 single lnchr
with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM, 2 sextuple lnchr
APC (T) 630: 584 M113; 12 M113A2; 34 M577A2
with Sea Wolf SAM, 6 single STWS Mk2 324mm ASTT
APC (W) 523: 223 EE-11 Urutu; 300 VBTP-MR Guarani

Latin America and

with Mk 46 LWT (capacity 2 Super Lynx Mk21A hel)
6×6

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
AEV 6+: Greif; 2 Sabiex HART; 4+ Pioneerpanzer 2 Dachs
ARV 4+: BPz-2; 4 M88A1; M578 LARV
VLB 4+: XLP-10; 4 Leopard 1 with Biber
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS Eryx; Milan; MSS-1.2 AC
RCL 194+: 84mm Carl Gustav; 106mm 194 M40A1
ARTILLERY 1,865
SP 153: 105mm 72 M7/108; 155mm 81: 37 M109A3; 44
M109A5/A5+
TOWED 431
105mm 336: 233 M101/M102; 40 L118 Light Gun; 63
Model 56 pack howitzer
155mm 95 M114
MRL 127mm 36: 18 ASTROS II Mk3M; 18 ASTROS II
Mk6
MOR 1,245: 81mm 1,168: 453 L16, 715 M936 AGR;
120mm 77 M2
HELICOPTERS
MRH 51: 29 AS565 Panther (HM-1); 5 AS565 K2 Panther
(HM-1); 17 AS550U2 Fennec (HA-1 – armed)
TPT 38: Heavy 11 H225M Caracal (HM-4); Medium 12:
8 AS532 Cougar (HM-3); 4 S-70A-36 Black Hawk (HM-2);
Light 15 AS350L1 Ecureuil (HA-1)
the Caribbean
FRIGATES 9
FFGHM 6 Niterói with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet
Block 2 AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with Aspide
SAM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm ASTT with Mk 46 LWT,
1 twin 375mm A/S mor, 2 Sea Trinity Mk3 CIWS, 1
115mm gun (capacity 1 Super Lynx Mk21A hel)
FFGH 3:
2 Inhaúma with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block
2 AShM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm ASTT with Mk 46
LWT, 1 115mm gun (1 Super Lynx Mk21A hel)
1 Barroso with 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block
2 AShM, 2 triple Mk32 324mm ASTT with Mk
46 LWT, 1 Sea Trinity Mk3 CIWS, 1 115mm gun
(capacity 1 Super Lynx Mk21A hel)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 44
PSO 3 Amazonas with 1 hel landing platform
PCO 6: 4 Bracui (ex-UK River); 1 Imperial Marinheiro with
1 76mm gun; 1 Parnaiba with 1 hel landing platform
PCC 2 Macaé
PCR 5: 2 Pedro Teixeira with 1 hel landing platform; 3
Roraima
PB 24: 12 Grajau; 6 Marlim; 6 Piratini (US PGM)
PBR 4 LPR-40
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES •
MSC 4 Aratu (GER Schutze)
402 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

AMPHIBIOUS EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 2 AIRCRAFT 11 combat capable
LPD 1 Bahia (ex-FRA Foudre) (capacity 4 hels; 8 LCM, ATK 11: 6 A-4 (AF-1) Skyhawk; 2 A-4M (AF-1B)
450 troops) Skyhawk; 2 TA-4 (AF-1A) Skyhawk; 1 TA-4M (AF-1C)
LPH 1 Atlantico (ex-UK Ocean) (capacity 18 hels; 4 Skyhawk
LCVP; 40 vehs; 800 troops) HELICOPTERS
LANDING SHIPS 3 ASW 18: 11 Super Lynx Mk21A; 1 Super Lynx Mk21B;
LST 1 Mattoso Maia (ex-US Newport) with 1 Phalanx 6 S-70B Seahawk (MH-16)
CIWS (capacity 3 LCVP; 1 LCPL; 400 troops) CSAR 2 H225M Caracal (UH-15A)
LSLH 2: 1 Garcia D’Avila (ex-UK Sir Galahad) (capacity TPT 53: Heavy 8 H225M Caracal (UH-15); Medium 7:
1 hel; 16 MBT; 340 troops); 1 Almirante Saboia (ex- 5 AS332 Super Puma; 2 AS532 Cougar (UH-14); Light
UK Sir Bedivere) (capacity 1 med hel; 18 MBT; 340 38: 15 AS350 Ecureuil (armed); 8 AS355 Ecureuil II
troops) (armed); 15 Bell 206B3 Jet Ranger III (IH-6B)
LANDING CRAFT 16: AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM: AM39 Exocet;
LCM 12: 10 EDVM-25; 2 Icarai (ex-FRA CTM) Sea Skua; AGM-119 Penguin
LCT 1 Marambaia (ex-FRA CDIC)
LCU 3 Guarapari (LCU 1610) Marines 16,000
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 44 FORCES BY ROLE
ABU 5: 4 Comandante Varella; 1 Faroleiro Mario Seixas SPECIAL FORCES
ABUH 1 Almirante Graca Aranah (lighthouse tender) 1 SF bn
AFS 1 Potengi MANOEUVRE
AGHS 5: 1 Caravelas (riverine); 4 Rio Tocantin Amphibious
AGOS 2: 1 Ary Rongel with 1 hel landing platform; 1 1 amph div (1 lt armd bn, 3 mne bn, 1 arty bn)
Almirante Maximiano (capacity 2 AS350/AS355 Ecureuil 1 amph aslt bn
hel) 7 (regional) mne gp
AGS 8: 1 Aspirante Moura; 1 Cruzeiro do Sul; 1 Antares; 3 1 rvn bn
Amorim do Valle (ex-UK Rover); 1 Rio Branco; 1 Vital de COMBAT SUPPORT
Oliveira 1 engr bn
AGSH 1 Sirius COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
AH 5: 2 Oswaldo Cruz with 1 hel landing platform; 1 Dr 1 log bn
Montenegro; 1 Tenente Maximianol with 1 hel landing EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
platform; 1 Soares de Meirelles ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
AOR 2: 1 Almirante Gastão Motta; 1 Marajó LT TK 18 SK-105 Kuerassier
AP 3: 1 Almirante Leverger; 1 Paraguassu; 1 Pará (all river APC 60
transports) APC (T) 30 M113A1 (incl variants)
ASR 1 Felinto Perry (NOR Wildrake) with 1 hel landing APC (W) 30 Piranha IIIC
platform AAV 47: 13 AAV-7A1; 20 AAVP-7A1 RAM/RS; 2
ATF 5: 3 Triunfo; 2 Almirante Guihem AAVC-7A1 RAM/RS (CP); 12 LVTP-7
AX 1 Brasil (Niterói mod) with 1 hel landing platform ENGINEERING VEHICLES • ARV 2: 1 AAVR-7; 1
AXL 3 Nascimento AAVR-7A1 RAM/RS
AXS 1 Cisne Barco ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL• MANPATS RB-56 Bill; MSS-1.2 AC
Naval Aviation 2,100 ARTILLERY 65
FORCES BY ROLE TOWED 41: 105mm 33: 18 L118 Light Gun; 15 M101;
GROUND ATTACK 155mm 8 M114
1 sqn with A-4/4M (AF-1) Skyhawk; TA-4/4M (AF- MRL 127mm 6 ASTROS II Mk6
1A/1C) Skyhawk MOR 81mm 18 M29
ANTI SURFACE WARFARE AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 40mm 6 L/70 (with BOFI)
1 sqn with Super Lynx Mk21A
ANTI SUBMARINE WARFARE Air Force 67,500
1 sqn with S-70B Seahawk (MH-16) Brazilian airspace is divided into 7 air regions, each of
TRAINING which is responsible for its designated air bases. Air assets
1 sqn with Bell 206B3 Jet Ranger III are divided among 4 designated air forces (I, II, III & V) for
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER operations (IV Air Force temporarily deactivated)
1 sqn with AS332 Super Puma; AS532 Cougar FORCES BY ROLE
1 sqn with AS350 Ecureuil (armed); AS355 Ecureuil II FIGHTER
(armed); H225M Caracal (UH-15A) 4 sqn with F-5EM/FM Tiger II
3 sqn with AS350 Ecureuil (armed); AS355 Ecureuil II FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
(armed) 2 sqn with AMX (A-1A/B)

GROUND ATTACK/ISR
4 sqn with EMB-314 Super Tucano (A-29A/B)*
MARITIME PATROL
1 sqn with P-3AM Orion
2 sqn with EMB-111 (P-95A/B/M)
ISR
1 sqn with AMX-R (RA-1)*
1 sqn with Learjet 35 (R-35A); EMB-110B (R-95)
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
1 sqn with EMB-145RS (R-99); EMB-145SA (E-99)
TANKER/TRANSPORT
1 sqn with C-130H/KC-130H Hercules
TRANSPORT
1 VIP sqn with A319 (VC-1A); EMB-190 (VC-2); AS355
Ecureuil II (VH-55); H135M (VH-35); H225M Caracal
(VH-36)
1 VIP sqn with EMB-135BJ (VC-99B); ERJ-135LR (VC-
99C); ERJ-145LR (VC-99A); Learjet 35A (VU-35);
Learjet 55C (VU-55C)
2 sqn with C-130E/H Hercules
2 sqn with C295M (C-105A)
7 (regional) sqn with Cessna 208/208B (C-98); Cessna
208-G1000 (C-98A); EMB-110 (C-95); EMB-120 (C-97)
1 sqn with ERJ-145 (C-99A)
1 sqn with EMB-120RT (VC-97), EMB-121 (VU-9)
TRAINING
1 sqn with EMB-110 (C-95)
2 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano (T-27) (incl 1 air show sqn)
1 sqn with T-25A/C
ATTACK HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Mi-35M Hind (AH-2)
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with H225M Caracal (H-36)
1 sqn with AS350B Ecureuil (H-50); AS355 Ecureuil II
(H-55)
1 sqn with Bell 205 (H-1H); H225M Caracal (H-36)
2 sqn with UH-60L Black Hawk (H-60L)
ISR UAV
1 sqn with Hermes 450/900
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 210 combat capable
FTR 46: 43 F-5EM Tiger II; 3 F-5FM Tiger II
FGA 49: 38 AMX (A-1); 11 AMX-T (A-1B)
ASW 9 P-3AM Orion
MP 19: 10 EMB-111 (P-95A Bandeirulha)*; 9 EMB-111
(P-95BM Bandeirulha)*
ISR: 8: 4 AMX-R (RA-1)*; 4 EMB-110B (R-95)
ELINT 6: 3 EMB-145RS (R-99); 3 Learjet 35A (R-35A)
AEW&C 5 EMB-145SA (E-99)
SAR 7: 1 C295M Amazonas (SC-105); 4 EMB-110 (SC-95B),
1 SC-130E Hercules
TKR/TPT 2 KC-130H
TPT 198: Medium 20: 4 C-130E Hercules; 16 C-130H
Hercules; Light 170: 11 C295M (C-105A); 7 Cessna 208 (C-
98); 9 Cessna 208B (C-98); 13 Cessna 208-G1000 (C-98A);
52 EMB-110 (C-95A/B/C/M); 16 EMB-120 (C-97); 4 EMB-
120RT (VC-97); 5 EMB-121 (VU-9); 7 EMB-135BJ (VC-
99B); 3 EMB-201R Ipanema (G-19); 2 EMB-202A Ipanema
(G-19A); 2 ERJ-135LR (VC-99C); 7 ERJ-145 (C-99A); 1
ERJ-145LR (VC-99A); 9 Learjet 35A (VU-35); 1 Learjet
55C (VU-55); 9 PA-34 Seneca (U-7); 12 U-42 Regente; PAX
Latin America and the Caribbean 403
8: 1 A319 (VC-1A); 3 EMB-190 (VC-2); 4 Hawker 800XP
(EU-93A – calibration)
TRG 264: 100 EMB-312 Tucano (T-27); 39 EMB-314 Super
Tucano (A-29A)*; 44 EMB-314 Super Tucano (A-29B)*; 81
T-25A/C
HELICOPTERS
ATK 12 Mi-35M Hind (AH-2)
MRH 2 H135M (VH-35)
TPT 60: Heavy 14 H225M Caracal (12 H-36 & 2 VH-36);
Medium 16 UH-60L Black Hawk (H-60L); Light 30: 24
AS350B Ecureuil (H-50); 4 AS355 Ecureuil II (H-55/VH-
55); 2+ Bell 205 (H-1H)
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR • Medium 5: 4 Hermes 450; 1 Hermes 900
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR MAA-1 Piranha; R-550 Magic 2; Python 3; IIR
Python 4; SARH Super 530F; ARH Derby
AShM AM39 Exocet
ARM MAR-1 (in development)
Paramilitary 395,000 opcon Army
Public Security Forces 395,000
State police organisation technically under army control.
However, military control is reducing, with authority
reverting to individual states
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR • Heavy 3 Heron (deployed by Federal Police for
Amazon and border patrols)
Cyber
Cyber was a key component of the 2008 National Defence
Strategy and the July 2012 Defence White Paper. In 2011,
the army inaugurated Brazil’s cyber-defence centre
Latin America and
the Caribbean
(CDCiber) to coordinate existing army, navy and air-force
activities. There is an active training programme, run by
the Institute of Cyber Defence among others, and a Cyber
Operations Simulator (SIMOC) was set up in 2013, within
the Integrated Electronic Warfare Centre. In July 2015,
the army activated two provisional cyber-defence units
under CDCiber, a cyber-defence command and a national
school of cyber defence. Brazil’s cyber-defence command
(ComDCiber), set up in 2016, plans, coordinates and
controls operational, doctrinal, development and training
activities relating to cyberspace. The 2018 Cyber Guardian
exercise utilised the SIMOC and involved military and civil
organisations.
DEPLOYMENT
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 4; 3 obs
CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 2
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
MONUSCO 7; 1 obs
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 222; 1 FFGHM
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 6; 5 obs
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 1 obs; UN • UNISFA 3 obs
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 10 obs
404 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

FORCES BY ROLE
Chile CHL Currently being reorganised into 1 SF bde, 4 armd bde, 1
armd det, 3 mot bde, 2 mot det, 4 mtn det and 1 avn bde
Chilean Peso pCh 2017 2018 2019
COMMAND
GDP pCh 180tr 189tr 6 div HQ
US$ 277bn 300bn SPECIAL FORCES
per capita US$ 15,068 16,143 1 SF bde (1 SF bn, 1 (mtn) SF gp, 1 para bn, 3 cdo coy, 1
log coy)
Growth % 1.5 4.0
MANOEUVRE
Inflation % 2.2 2.4
Reconnaissance
Def bdgt [a] pCh 2.60tr 2.68tr 4 cav sqn
US$ 4.01bn 4.25bn 2 recce sqn
US$1=pCh 648.85 631.07 2 recce pl
Armoured
[a] Includes military pensions
3 (1st, 2nd & 3rd) armd bde (1 armd recce pl, 1 armd
Population 17,925,262 cav gp, 1 mech inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 AT coy, 1 engr coy,
1 sigs coy)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 (4th) armd bde (1 armd recce pl, 1 armd cav gp, 1
Male 10.2% 3.5% 3.9% 4.2% 22.7% 4.7% mech inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 engr coy)
Female 9.8% 3.4% 3.8% 4.0% 23.4% 6.5% 1 (5th) armd det (1 armd cav gp, 1 mech inf coy, 1 arty
gp)
Capabilities Mechanised
1 (1st) mech inf regt
Chile’s 2017 defence white paper noted core roles of assuring
Light
sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also indicated an increas-
1 (1st) mot inf bde (1 recce coy, 1 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 3
ing shift towards non-traditional military roles such as disaster
relief, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping. Chile maintains AT coy, 1 engr bn)
military ties with most of it neighbours. Personnel-exchange pro- 1 (4th) mot inf bde (1 mot inf bn, 1 MRL gp, 2 AT coy, 1
grammes and R&D cooperation are under way with Brazil and engr bn)
Colombia. Defence cooperation with the US is centred on pro- 1 (24th) mot inf bde (1 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 AT coy)
curement, technical advisory and personnel training. Training 1 (6th) reinforced regt (1 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 sigs coy)
takes place regularly on a national basis, and the armed forces 1 (10th) reinforced regt (1 mot inf bn, 2 AT coy, 1 engr
routinely participate in international exercises. Chile has a limited bn)
capacity to deploy independently beyond its borders. Service- 1 (11th) mot inf det (1 inf bn, 1 arty gp)
ability challenges may arise for some equipment in the absence 1 (14th) mot inf det (1 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 sigs coy,
of upgrades. One such case is Chile’s F-16s, several of which are 1 AT coy)
reaching the end of their operational life, though an upgrade plan 7 mot inf regt
was announced in late 2018. However, because of the reduced risk
1 (3rd) mtn det (1 mtn inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 engr coy)
of conventional conflict and border crises, priorities have changed
1 (9th) mtn det (1 mtn inf bn, 1 engr coy, 1 construction
to reflect a new focus on littoral and blue-water surveillance capa-
bn)
bilities and helicopters. Chile has a developed defence-industrial
base, with ENAER conducting aircraft maintenance. ASMAR and 2 (8th & 17th) mtn det (1 mtn inf bn, 1 arty coy)
FAMAE are key maritime and land firms respectively, with the COMBAT SUPPORT
former set to construct a new icebreaker that will enhance Chile’s 1 arty regt
ability to support operations in Antarctica. 1 engr regt
4 sigs bn
ACTIVE 77,200 (Army 46,350 Navy 19,800 Air 1 sigs coy
11,050) Paramilitary 44,700 2 int regt
Conscript liability Army 12 months; Navy 18 months; Air Force 12 1 MP regt
months. Legally, conscription can last for 2 years COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 log div (2 log regt)
RESERVE 40,000 (Army 40,000)
4 log regt
6 log coy
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 1 maint div (1 maint regt)
AVIATION
Space 1 avn bde (1 tpt avn bn, 1 hel bn, 1 spt bn)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SATELLITES ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
ISR 1 SSOT (Sistema Satelital de Observación de la MBT 246: 115 Leopard 1; 131 Leopard 2A4
Tierra) IFV 191: 173 Marder 1A3; 18 YPR-765 PRI
APC 548
Army 46,350 APC (T) 369 M113A1/A2
6 military administrative regions APC (W) 179 Piranha
 Latin America and the Caribbean 405

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 2 Almirante Riveros (ex-NLD Karel Doorman) with
AEV 9 Pioneerpanzer 2 Dachs 2 quad lnchr with MM40 Exocet Block 3 AShM,
ARV 35 BPz-2 1 octuple Mk48 lnchr with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow
VLB 16 Biber SAM, 4 single Mk32 Mod 9 324mm ASTT with
MW 3+: Bozena 5; 3 Leopard 1 Mk46 Mod 5 HWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE AS532SC Cougar)
MSL • MANPATS Spike-LR; Spike-ER FFGM 2:
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav; 106mm 213 M40A1 2 Almirante Lattore (ex-NLD Jacob Van Heemskerck)
ARTILLERY 1,407 with 2 twin Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon
SP 155mm 48: 24 M109A3; 24 M109A5+ AShM, 1 Mk13 GMLS with SM-1MR SAM, 1
TOWED 240: 105mm 192: 88 M101; 104 Model 56 pack octuple Mk48 lnchr with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow
howitzer; 155mm 48 M-68 SAM, 2 twin Mk32 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT,
MRL 160mm 12 LAR-160 1 Goalkeeper CIWS
MOR 1,107: 81mm 743: 303 ECIA L65/81; 175 FAMAE; PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12
265 Soltam; 120mm 293: 173 ECIA L65/120; 17 FAMAE; PSOH 4: 2 Piloto Pardo; 2 Piloto Pardo with 1 76mm gun
93 M-65; SP 120mm 71: 35 FAMAE (on Piranha 6x6); 36 (ice-strengthened hull)
Soltam (on M113A2) PCG 3:
AIRCRAFT 2 Casma (ISR Sa’ar 4) with 4 single lnchr with Gabriel I
TPT • Light 8: 2 C-212-300 Aviocar; 3 Cessna 208 AShM, 2 76mm guns
Caravan; 3 CN235 1 Casma (ISR Sa’ar 4) with 4 single lnchr with Gabriel
HELICOPTERS I AShM, 2 twin lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 2
ISR 9 MD-530F Lifter (armed) 76mm guns
TPT 17: Medium 12: 8 AS532AL Cougar; 2 AS532ALe PCO 5 Micalvi
Cougar; 2 SA330 Puma; Light 5: 4 H125 Ecureuil; 1 AMPHIBIOUS
AS355F Ecureuil II PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS
AIR DEFENCE LPD 1 Sargento Aldea (ex-FRA Foudre) with 3 twin
SAM • Point-defence Mistral Simbad lnchr with Mistral SAM (capacity 4 med hel; 1
GUNS 41: LCT; 2 LCM; 22 tanks; 470 troops)
SP 20mm 17 Piranha/TCM-20 LANDING SHIPS 3
TOWED 20mm 24 TCM-20 LSM 1 Elicura
LST 2 Maipo (FRA Batral) with 1 hel landing platform
Navy 19,800 (capacity 7 tanks; 140 troops)
5 Naval Zones; 1st Naval Zone and main HQ at Valparaiso; LANDING CRAFT 3
2nd Naval Zone at Talcahuano; 3rd Naval Zone at Punta LCT 1 CDIC (for use in Sargento Aldea)
Arenas; 4th Naval Zone at Iquique; 5th Naval Zone at LCM 2 (for use in Sargento Aldea)

Latin America and

the Caribbean
Puerto Montt LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 13
FORCES BY ROLE ABU 1 George Slight Marshall with 1 hel landing platform
SPECIAL FORCES AFD 3
1 (diver) SF comd AGOR 1 Cabo de Hornos
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AGHS 1 Micalvi
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 4: AGS 1 Type-1200 (ice-strengthened hull, ex-CAN) with
2 O’Higgins (Scorpène) with 6 single 533mm TT with 1 hel landing platform
A-184 Black Shark HWT/SUT HWT/SM39 Exocet Block AOR 2: 1 Almirante Montt with 1 hel landing platform;
2 AShM 1 Araucano
2 Thomson (GER T-209/1400) with 8 single 533mm TT AP 1 Aguiles (1 hel landing platform)
A-184 Black Shark HWT/SUT HWT/SM39 Exocet Block ATF 2 Veritas
2 AShM (of which 1 in refit) AXS 1 Esmeralda
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 8
DESTROYERS • DDGHM 1 Almirante Williams (ex-UK Naval Aviation 600
Broadsword Type-22) with 2 quad Mk141 lnchr with EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 2 octuple VLS with Barak AIRCRAFT 14 combat capable
SAM; 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm ASW 4: 2 C295ASW Persuader; 2 P-3ACH Orion
gun (capacity 1 AS532SC Cougar) MP 4: 1 C295MPA Persuader; 3 EMB-111 Bandeirante*

FRIGATES 7: ISR 7 P-68
FFGHM 5: TRG 7 PC-7 Turbo Trainer*
3 Almirante Cochrane (ex-UK Norfolk Type-23) with 2 HELICOPTERS
quad Mk141 lnchr with RGM-84C Harpoon AShM, ASW 5 AS532SC Cougar
1 32-cell VLS with Sea Wolf SAM, 2 twin 324mm MRH 8 AS365 Dauphin
ASTT with Mk46 Mod 2 LWT, 1 114mm gun TPT • Light 7: 3 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 4 Bo-105S
(capacity 1 AS-532SC Cougar) (MLU begun 2018) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AShM AM39 Exocet
406 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Marines 3,600 FGA 10: 6 F-16C Block 50 Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16D Block
50 Fighting Falcon
FORCES BY ROLE
ATK 16 C-101CC Aviojet (A-36 Halcón)
MANOEUVRE
ISR 3 Cessna O-2A
Amphibious
AEW&C 1 B-707 Phalcon
1 amph bde (2 mne bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 log bn)
TKR 5: 2 KC-130R Hercules: 3 KC-135 Stratotanker
2 coastal def unit
TPT 37: Medium 3: 1 C-130B Hercules; 2 C-130H Hercules;
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Light 29: 2 C-212-200 Aviocar; 1 C-212-300 Aviocar; 4 Cessna
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
525 Citation CJ1; 3 DHC-6-100 Twin Otter; 7 DHC-6-300
LT TK 15 FV101 Scorpion
Twin Otter; 2 Learjet 35A; 10 PA-28-236 Dakota; PAX 5: 1
APC • APC (W) 25 MOWAG Roland B-737-300; 1 B-737-500; 1 B-767-300ER; 2 Gulfstream IV
AAV 12 AAV-7 TRG 46: 4 Cirrus SR-22T; 14 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; 28
ARTILLERY 39 T-35A/B Pillan
TOWED 23: 105mm 7 KH-178; 155mm 16 M-71 HELICOPTERS
MOR 81mm 16 MRH 12 Bell 412EP Twin Huey
COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM MM38 Exocet TPT 28: Medium 7: 1 S-70A Black Hawk; 6 S-70i (MH-
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 14: 4 M998 60M) Black Hawk; Light 21: 13 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois);
Avenger; 10 M1097 Avenger 5 Bell 206B (trg); 2 BK-117; 1 Bo-105CBS-4
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
Coast Guard
ISR • Medium 3 Hermes 900
Integral part of the Navy
AIR DEFENCE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SAM
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 55 Short-range 17: 5 Crotale; 12 NASAMS
PBF 26 Archangel Point-defence Mistral (including some Mygale/Aspic)
PB 29: 18 Alacalufe (Protector-class); 4 Grumete Diaz GUNS • TOWED 20mm M163/M167 Vulcan; 35mm
(Dabor-class); 6 Pelluhue; 1 Ona Oerlikon GDF-005
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
Air Force 11,050 AAM • IR AIM-9J/M Sidewinder; Python 3; Shafrir‡; IIR
FORCES BY ROLE Python 4; ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM; Derby
FIGHTER ASM AGM-65G Maverick
1 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger III+ BOMBS
2 sqn with F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon Laser-guided Paveway II
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK INS/GPS guided JDAM
1 sqn with F-16C/D Block 50 Fighting Falcon (Puma)
ISR Paramilitary 44,700
1 (photo) flt with; DHC-6-300 Twin Otter; Learjet 35A
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING Carabineros 44,700
1 flt with B-707 Phalcon Ministry of Interior; 15 zones, 36 districts, 179 comisaria
TANKER/TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with B-737-300; C-130B/H Hercules; KC-130R ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Hercules; KC-135 Stratotanker APC • APC (W) 20 MOWAG Roland 

TRANSPORT ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm
3 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); C-212-200/300 AIRCRAFT
Aviocar; Cessna O-2A; Cessna 525 Citation CJ1; DHC- TPT • Light 4: 1 Beech 200 King Air; 1 Cessna 208; 1
6-100/300 Twin Otter; PA-28-236 Dakota; Bell 205 (UH- Cessna 550 Citation V; 1 PA-31T Cheyenne II
1H Iroquois) HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 16: 5 AW109E Power; 1
1 VIP flt with B-737-500 (VIP); Gulfstream IV AW139; 1 Bell 206 Jet Ranger; 2 BK-117; 5 Bo-105; 2 H135
TRAINING
1 sqn with EMB-314 Super Tucano* Cyber
1 sqn with PA-28-236 Dakota; T-35A/B Pillan The Joint Staff coordinates cyber-security policies for the
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Ministry of National Defence and the armed forces. Each
1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Bell 206B (trg); Bell service has a cyber-security organisation. The Ministry of
412 Twin Huey; Bo-105CBS-4; S-70A Black Hawk Interior and Public Security (Internal Affairs) released a
AIR DEFENCE National Cyber Security Strategy in 2017. There is active
1 AD regt (5 AD sqn) with Crotale; NASAMS; Mistral; discussion with neighbouring states on cyber-security
M163/M167 Vulcan; Oerlikon GDF-005 challenges. Chile and the US signed in 2018 a joint declara-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE tion on cooperation in cyber defence. In late 2017, Chile’s
AIRCRAFT 88 combat capable Official Gazette detailed cyber plans including the crea-
FTR 48: 10 F-5E Tigre III+; 2 F-5F Tigre III+; 29 F-16AM tion of a Joint Cyberdefence Command and defence CERT
Fighting Falcon; 7 F-16BM Fighting Falcon teams, among other measures.
 Latin America and the Caribbean 407

DEPLOYMENT ACTIVE 293,200 (Army 223,150, Navy 56,400 Air

13,650) Paramilitary 187,900
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea
Conscript liability 18-months duration with upper age limit of 24,
15 males only
CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 12
RESERVE 34,950 (Army 25,050 Navy 6,500 Air
INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 2 obs
3,400)
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 3 obs
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Colombia COL
Army 223,150
Colombian Peso pC 2017 2018 2019
FORCES BY ROLE
GDP pC 928tr 989tr SPECIAL FORCES
US$ 314bn 337bn 1 SF div (3 SF regt)
per capita US$ 6,380 6,761 1 (anti-terrorist) SF bn
Growth % 1.8 2.8 MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
Inflation % 4.3 3.2
1 (1st) div (1 (2nd) mech bde (2 mech inf bn, 1 mtn inf
Def bdgt [a] pC 30.0tr 31.3tr 33.5tr
bn, 1 engr bn, 1 MP bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 log bn, 1 Gaula
US$ 10.2bn 10.6bn anti-kidnap gp); 1 (10th) mech bde (1 armd recce bn,
FMA (US) US$ 38.5m 0m 20m 1 mech cav bn, 1 mech inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 2 sy bn, 2
US$1=pC 2951.27 2936.46 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 2 Gaula anti-kidnap
[a] Includes Defence and Security gp); 2 sy bn; 1 log bn)
Light
Population 48,168,996 1 (2nd) div (1 (5th) lt inf bde (2 lt inf bn, 1 jungle inf bn,
1 sy bn, 1 arty bn, 1 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (30th) lt inf bde (1 cav recce
Male 12.2% 4.2% 4.4% 4.3% 21.0% 3.2% bn, 2 lt inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt
Female 11.6% 4.1% 4.2% 4.2% 21.9% 4.5% bn, 1 log bn); 1 rapid reaction force (3 mobile sy bde))
1 (3rd) div (1 (3rd) lt inf bde (2 lt inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 1
Capabilities COIN bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 MP bn,
1 log bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (23rd) lt inf bde
Colombia’s armed forces have over recent decades significantly
improved their level of training and their overall capabilities. Inter-
(1 cav gp, 1 lt inf bn, 1 jungle inf bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 log
nal security remains a priority, and the armed forces are focused bn); 1 (29th) mtn bde (1 mtn inf bn, 1 lt inf bn, 2 COIN

Latin America and

on fulfilling counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics opera- bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 log bn); 2 rapid reaction force (total:

tions, though the armed forces are looking towards new security
roles and organisations for the post-FARC era. In response to the
humanitarian and security challenge from Venezuela, Colombia is
strengthening cooperation with Brazil on border controls, while
also housing a large number of Venezuelan refugees. Colom-
bia maintains good military ties with Argentina, Chile and Peru,
although it withdrew from UNASUR in 2018. The US is Colombia’s
closest international military partner, with cooperation involving
equipment procurement, technical advice and personnel training.
In May 2018, Colombia joined NATO as a global partner and will
participate in Alliance initiatives including in cyber and maritime
security. Conscription was adjusted in 2017 and the government
intends to grow the reserve component. The forces train regu-
larly, including large multilateral exercises such as the US Red Flag
air-combat exercise in 2018. Although the equipment inventory
mainly comprises legacy systems, Colombia has the capability
to independently deploy its forces beyond national borders. The
army is planning to modernise its oldest APCs, while the navy may
look to replace both its submarine and frigate fleets in the medium
term. The air force’s ground-attack capabilities remain limited,
although a substantial number of multi-role and transport heli-
copters have been procured. In 2018, Colombia activated its first
UAV squadron, which is set to carry out ISR missions. Colombia’s
defence industry is active in all domains. CIAC is developing its first
indigenous UAVs, while CODALTEC is developing an air-defence
system for regional export. COTECMAR has supplied patrol boats
and amphibious ships for national and export markets.
the Caribbean
7 mobile sy bde))
1 (4th) div (1 (7th) air mob bde (2 air mob inf bn, 1 lt
inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 log bn, 1
Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (22nd) jungle bde (1 air mob
inf bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 jungle inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 cbt spt
bn, 1 log bn); 1 (31st) jungle bde (1 lt inf bn, 1 jungle
inf bn))
1 (5th) div (1 (6th) lt inf bde (2 lt inf bn,1 mtn inf bn, 2
COIN bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 log bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap
gp); 1 (8th) lt inf bde (1 lt inf bn, 1 mtn inf bn, 1 arty
bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1
(9th) lt inf bde (1 SF bn, 2 lt inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 COIN
bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 sy bn, 1 log bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap
gp); 1 (13th) lt inf bde (2 cav recce bn, 1 airmob inf
bn, 3 lt inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt
spt bn, 2 MP bn, 1 log bn, 2 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1
rapid reaction force (3 mobile sy bde))
1 (6th) div (1 (12th) lt inf bde (2 lt inf bn, 2 jungle inf
bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 Gaula anti-
kidnap gp); 1 (13th) mobile sy bde (4 COIN bn); 1
(26th) jungle bde (1 lt jungle inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 cbt
spt bn); 1 (27th) lt inf bde (2 lt inf bn, 1 jungle inf bn, 1
sy bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 log bn))
1 (7th) div (1 (4th) lt inf bde (1 (urban) spec ops bn; 1
cav recce bn, 3 lt inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn,
408 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

1 MP bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 log bn); 1 (11th) lt inf bde (2 lt Navy 56,400 (incl 12,100 conscript)
inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn); 1 (14th) lt inf HQ located at Puerto Carreño
bde (3 lt inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 log
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
bn); 1 (15th) jungle bde (1 lt inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 1 engr
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 4:
bn, 1 log bn); 1 (17th) lt inf bde (2 lt inf bn, 1 COIN bn, 2 Pijao (GER T-209/1200) each with 8 single 533mm TT
1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn, 1 log bn); 1 rapid reaction force each with HWT
(1 (11th) mobile sy bde (3 COIN bn))) 2 Intrepido (GER T-206A) each with 8 single 533mm TT
1 (8th) div (1 (16th) lt inf bde (1 mech cav recce bn, 1 lt each with HWT
inf bn, 1 log bn, 1 Gaula anti-kidnap gp); 1 (18th) lt inf PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 4
bde (1 air mob gp, 1 sy bn, 1 arty bn, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt FRIGATES • FFGHM 4 Almirante Padilla with 2 quad
spt bn, 1 log bn); 1 (28th) jungle bde (2 inf, 2 COIN, lnchr with Hae Sung I AShM, 2 twin Simbad lnchr
1 cbt spt bn); 1 rapid reaction force (1 (5th) mobile sy with Mistral SAM, 2 triple B515 ILAS-3 324mm ASTT
bde (3 COIN bn); 1 (31st) mobile sy bde (5 COIN bn))) each with A244 LWT, 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105/
3 COIN mobile bde (each: 4 COIN bn, 1 cbt spt bn) AS555SN Fennec hel)
Other PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 62
1 indep rapid reaction force (1 SF bde, 3 mobile sy bde) CORVETTES • FS 1 Narino (ex-ROK Dong Hae) with 2
COMBAT SUPPORT triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm gun
1 cbt engr bde (1 SF engr bn, 1 (emergency response) PSOH 3 20 de Julio
engr bn, 1 EOD bn, 1 construction bn, 1 demining bn, PCO 2: 1 Valle del Cauca Durable (ex-US Reliance) with 1
1 maint bn) hel landing platform; 1 San Andres (ex-US Balsam)
1 int bde (2 SIGINT bn, 1 log bn, 1 maint bn) PCC 3 Punta Espada (CPV-46)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT PCR 10: 2 Arauca with 2 76mm guns; 8 Nodriza (PAF-II)
2 spt/log bde (each: 1 spt bn, 1 maint bn, 1 supply bn, 1 with hel landing platform
tpt bn, 1 medical bn, 1 log bn) PB 12: 1 11 de Noviembre (CPV-40) with 1 Typhoon CIWS;
AVIATION 2 Castillo y Rada (Swiftships 105); 2 Jaime Gomez; 1 José
1 air aslt div (1 counter-narcotics bde (3 counter- Maria Palas (Swiftships 110); 4 Point; 2 Toledo
PBR 31: 6 Diligente; 7 LPR-40; 3 Swiftships; 9 Tenerife; 2
narcotics bn, 1 spt bn); 1 (25th) avn bde (4 hel bn; 5
PAF-L; 4 others
avn bn; 1 avn log bn); 1 (32nd) avn bde (1 avn bn, 2
AMPHIBIOUS 23
maint bn, 1 trg bn, 1 spt bn); 1 SF avn bn)
LCM 3 LCM-8
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE LCU 12: 5 Golfo de Tribuga; 7 Morrosquillo (LCU 1466)
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES UCAC 8 Griffon 2000TD
RECCE 121 EE-9 Cascavel LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8
IFV 60: 28 Commando Advanced; 32 LAV III ABU 1 Quindio
APC 114 AG 2: 1 Inirida; 1 Luneburg (ex-GER, depot ship for
APC (T) 54: 28 M113A1 (TPM-113A1); 26 M113A2 patrol vessels)
(TPM-113A2) AGHS 1 Roncador
APC (W) 56 EE-11 Urutu AGOR 2 Providencia
PPV 4 RG-31 Nyala AGS 1 Gorgona
AUV 38 M1117 Guardian AXS 1 Gloria
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Naval Aviation 150
MSL
SP 77 Nimrod EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MANPATS TOW; Spike-ER AIRCRAFT
MP 3 CN235 MPA Persuader
RCL 106mm 73 M40A1
ISR 1 PA-31 Navajo (upgraded for ISR)
ARTILLERY 1,796
TPT • Light 11: 1 C-212 (Medevac); 4 Cessna 206; 3
TOWED 120: 105mm 107: 22 LG1 MkIII; 85 M101;
Cessna 208 Caravan; 1 PA-31 Navajo; 1 PA-34 Seneca; 1
155mm 13 155/52 APU SBT-1
Beech 350 King Air
MOR 1,676: 81mm 1,507; 120mm 169
HELICOPTERS
AIRCRAFT
MRH 8: 1 AS555SN Fennec; 3 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 4
ELINT 3: 2 Beech B200 King Air; 1 Beech 350 King Air
Bell 412EP Twin Huey
TPT • Light 22: 2 An-32B; 2 Beech B200 King Air; 3 TPT • Light 9: 1 Bell 212; 5 Bell 212 (UH-1N); 1 BK-
Beech 350 King Air; 1 Beech C90 King Air; 2 C-212 Aviocar 117; 2 Bo-105
(Medevac); 7 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; 1 Cessna 208B-
EX Grand Caravan; 4 Turbo Commander 695A Marines 22,250
HELICOPTERS FORCES BY ROLE
MRH 17: 6 Mi-17-1V Hip; 6 Mi-17MD; 5 Mi-17V-5 Hip SPECIAL FORCES
TPT 93: Medium 54: 47 UH-60L Black Hawk; 7 S-70i Black 1 SF bde (4 SF bn)
Hawk; Light 39: 24 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 15 Bell 212 MANOEUVRE
(UH-1N Twin Huey) Amphibious
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 40mm 4 M1A1 1 mne bde (1 SF (Gaula) bn, 5 mne bn, 2 rvn bn, 1 spt bn)

1 mne bde (1 SF bn, 2 mne bn, 2 rvn bn, 1 spt bn)
1 rvn bde (1 SF bn, 1 mne bn, 2 rvn bn, 1 spt bn)
1 rvn bde (4 rvn bn)
1 rvn bde (3 rvn bn)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 log bde (6 spt bn)
1 trg bde (7 trg bn, 1 spt bn)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARTILLERY • MOR 82: 81mm 74; 120mm 8
AIR DEFENCE • SAM Point-defence Mistral
Air Force 13,650
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
2 sqn with Kfir C-10/C-12/TC-12
GROUND ATTACK/ISR
1 sqn with A-37B/OA-37B Dragonfly
1 sqn with AC-47T
1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano*
2 sqn with EMB-314 Super Tucano* (A-29)
EW/ELINT
2 sqn with Beech 350 King Air; Cessna 208; Cessna 560;
C-26B Metroliner; SA 2-37; 1 Turbo Commander 695
TRANSPORT
1 (Presidential) sqn with B-737BBJ; EMB-600 Legacy; Bell
412EP; F-28 Fellowship; UH-60L Black Hawk
1 sqn with B-727; B-737-400; C-130B/H Hercules; C-212;
C295M; CN235M; ; IAI Arava; KC-767
1 sqn with Beech C90 King Air; Beech 350C King Air;
Cessna 208B; Cessna 550; EMB-110P1 (C-95)
TRAINING
1 sqn with Lancair Synergy (T-90 Calima)
1 sqn with T-37B
1 hel sqn with Bell 206B3
1 hel sqn with TH-67
HELICOPTER
1 sqn with AH-60L Arpia III
1 sqn with UH-60L Black Hawk (CSAR)
1 sqn with Hughes 500M
1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H)
1 sqn with Bell 206B3 Jet Ranger III
1 sqn with Bell 212
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 72 combat capable
FGA 22: 10 Kfir C-10; 9 Kfir C-12; 3 Kfir TC-12
ATK 12: 6 A-37B/OA-37B Dragonfly; 6 AC-47T Spooky
(Fantasma)
ISR 13: 1 Beech C90 King Air; 1 C-26B Metroliner; 5
Cessna 560 Citation II; 6 SA 2-37
ELINT 13: 4 Beech 350 King Air; 6 Cessna 208 Grand
Caravan; 2 Cessna 337G; 1 Turbo Commander 695
TKR/TPT 1 KC-767
TPT 64: Medium 7: 3 C-130B Hercules (3 more in store);
3 C-130H Hercules; 1 B-737F; Light 49: 10 ATR-42; 2
Beech 300 King Air; 2 Beech 350C King Air; 1 Beech 350i
King Air (VIP); 4 Beech C90 King Air; 4 C-212; 6 C295M;
1 Cessna 182R; 12 Cessna 208B (medevac); 1 Cessna 550;
2 CN235M; 2 EMB-110P1 (C-95); 1 EMB-170-100LR; 1
IAI-201 Arava; PAX 8: 2 B-727; 1 B-737-400; 1 B-737BBJ;
Latin America and the Caribbean 409
1 EMB-600 Legacy; 1 F-28-1000 Fellowship; 1 F-28-3000
Fellowship; 1 Learjet 60
TRG 78: 14 EMB-312 Tucano*; 24 EMB-314 Super Tucano
(A-29)*; 23 Lancair Synergy (T-90 Calima); 17 T-37B
HELICOPTERS
MRH 18: 6 AH-60L Arpia III; 8 AH-60L Arpia IV; 2 Bell
412EP Twin Huey (VIP); 2 Hughes 500M
TPT 48: Medium 13 UH-60L Black Hawk (incl 1 VIP hel);
Light 35: 12 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 12 Bell 206B3 Jet
Ranger III; 11 Bell 212
TRG 30 TH-67
UNAMMED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Medium 8: 6
Hermes 450; 2 Hermes 900
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR Python 3; IIR Python 4; Python 5; ARH Derby;
I-Derby ER (reported)
ASM Spike-ER; Spike-NLOS
BOMBS
Laser-guided Paveway II
INS/GPS guided Spice
Paramilitary 187,900
National Police Force 187,900
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT
ELINT 5 C-26B Metroliner
TPT • Light 42: 5 ATR-42; 3 Beech 200 King Air; 2
Beech 300 King Air; 2 Beech 1900; 1 Beech C99; 4
BT-67; 2 C-26 Metroliner; 3 Cessna 152; 3 Cessna 172;
9 Cessna 206; 2 Cessna 208 Caravan; 2 DHC-6 Twin
Otter; 1 DHC-8; 3 PA-31 Navajo
HELICOPTERS
MRH 4: 1 Bell 407GXP; 1 Bell 412EP; 2 MD-500D
TPT 75: Medium 17: 5 UH-60A Black Hawk; 9 UH-60L
Latin America and
the Caribbean
Black Hawk; 3 S-70i Black Hawk; Light 58: 34 Bell 205
(UH-1H-II Huey II); 6 Bell 206B; 5 Bell 206L/L3/L4
Long Ranger; 8 Bell 212; 5 Bell 407
Cyber
Colombia’s 2011 policy guidelines for cyber security and
cyber defence set out three main organisations with cyber
responsibilities: the CERT team (colCERT); the Police
Cyber Centre; and the armed forces’ Joint Cybersecurity
and Cyberdefence Command. The defence ministry is the
coordinating body for cyber defence, and Colombia has
an active training and simulation programme in cyber
defence, with the Higher War College also organising
courses in cyber warfare for military (a staff course) and
civil personnel.
DEPLOYMENT
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 2 obs
EGYPT: MFO 275; 1 inf bn
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1
FOREIGN FORCES
United States US Southern Command: 50
410 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Air Surveillance Unit 400

Costa Rica CRI EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Costa Rican Colon C 2017 2018 2019 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 17: 4 Cessna T210 Centurion;
4 Cessna U206G Stationair; 1 DHC-7 Caribou; 2 PA-31
GDP C 32.8tr 34.6tr Navajo; 2 PA-34 Seneca; 1 Piper PA-23 Aztec; 1 Cessna
US$ 58.3bn 60.8bn 182RG; 2 Y-12E
per capita US$ 11,729 12,095 HELICOPTERS • MRH 3: 2 MD-500E; 1 MD-600N
Growth % 3.3 3.3
Inflation % 1.6 2.4 Cuba CUB
Sy Bdgt [a] C 220bn 259bn 259bn
Cuban Peso P 2017 2018 2019
US$ 390m 454m
GDP US$
FMA (US) US$ 5m 0m 0m
per capita US$
US$1=C 562.87 569.25
Growth
[a] Paramilitary budget
Inflation
Population 4,987,142 Def exp P

Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus US$

US$1=P
Male 12.2% 4.2% 4.4% 4.3% 21.0% 3.2%
Female 11.6% 4.1% 4.2% 4.2% 21.9% 4.5% Population 11,116,396
*definitive data not available
Capabilities Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Costa Rica’s armed forces were constitutionally abolished in 1949, Male 8.5% 3.2% 3.1% 3.6% 24.5% 7.0%
and the country relies on paramilitary-type police organisations
Female 8.0% 2.9% 2.9% 3.3% 24.9% 8.3%
for internal-security and counter-narcotics tasks, as well as par-
ticipation in regional peacekeeping operations. A new National
Security Strategy was adopted in 2018 in order to help tackle rising
Capabilities
crime. Colombia and the US have provided assistance and training, Cuba’s armed forces are principally focused on protecting ter-
focused on policing and internal-security tasks rather than con- ritorial integrity, and rely on a mass-mobilisation system. Military
ventional military operations. The Special Intervention Unit (UEI) capability is limited by equipment obsolescence and a largely
has received specialist training from non-regional states, including conscript-based force. Cuba maintains military ties with China
the US. The Public Force, Coast Guard and Air Surveillance Units and Russia, and the latter has stepped in to supply oil and fuel fol-
have little heavy military equipment, and recent modernisation lowing Venezuela’s economic collapse. Defence cooperation with
Russia is largely centred around technical support for the mainte-
has depended on donations from countries such as China and the
nance of Cuba’s ageing Soviet-era equipment. Cooperation with
US. Apart from limited maintenance facilities, Costa Rica has no
China appears to be on a smaller scale and involves training agree-
domestic defence industry. ments and personnel exchanges. Training levels are uncertain and
flying hours are likely to be low due to the limited availability of
PARAMILITARY 9,800 serviceable aircraft. The armed forces are no longer designed for
expeditionary operations, and have little logistical capability to
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE support deployments abroad. The inventory is almost entirely
composed of legacy Soviet-era systems with varying degrees of
obsolescence. Serviceability appears a problem, with much equip-
Paramilitary 9,800 ment at a low level of availability and maintenance demands
growing as fleets age. Much of the aviation fleet is reported to be
Special Intervention Unit in storage. Russian assistance should improve availability, but is
FORCES BY ROLE only a short-term solution given the advanced age of much of the
inventory. It is unlikely that Havana will be in a position to finance
SPECIAL FORCES
significant equipment recapitalisation in the near term. Cuba has
1 spec ops unit little in the way of domestic defence industry, bar some upgrade
and maintenance capacity. Cuba has sent maintainers to South
Public Force 9,000 Africa, highlighting not just revenue-raising requirements for the
11 regional directorates forces but also the potential knock-on effect this might have on
the level of maintenance capacity remaining in Cuba.
Coast Guard Unit 400 ACTIVE 49,000 (Army 38,000 Navy 3,000 Air 8,000)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Paramilitary 26,500
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10: Conscript liability 2 years
PCC 2 Libertador Juan Rafael Mora (ex-US Island) RESERVE 39,000 (Army 39,000) Paramilitary
PB 8: 2 Cabo Blanco (US Swift 65); 1 Isla del Coco (US 1,120,000
Swift 105); 3 Point; 1 Primera Dama (US Swift 42); 1 Ready Reserves (serve 45 days per year) to fill out Active and
Puerto Quebos (US Swift 36) Reserve units; see also Paramilitary
 Latin America and the Caribbean 411

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Navy ε3,000

Western Comd HQ at Cabanas; Eastern Comd HQ at
Holquin
Army ε38,000
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FORCES BY ROLE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8
COMMAND
PSO 1 Rio Damuji with two single P-15M Termit (SS-N-
3 regional comd HQ
2C Styx) AShM, 2 57mm guns, 1 hel landing platform
3 army comd HQ
PCM 1 Pauk II† (FSU) with 1 quad lnchr (manual
COMMAND
aiming) with 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 4
3 SF regt
single ASTT, 2 RBU 1200 A/S mor, 1 76mm gun
MANOEUVRE
Armoured PBF 6 Osa II† (FSU) each with 4 single lnchr (for P-15
1 tk div (3 tk bde) Termit (SS-N-2B Styx) AShM – missiles removed to
Mechanised coastal-defence units)
2 (mixed) mech bde MINE WARFARE AND MINE COUNTERMEASURES 5
Light MHI 3 Korund (Yevgenya) (Project 1258)†
2 (frontier) bde MSC 2 Sonya† (FSU)
Air Manoeuvre LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2
1 AB bde ABU 1
AIR DEFENCE AX 1
1 ADA regt
1 SAM bde Coastal Defence
ARTILLERY • TOWED 122mm M-1931/37; 130mm
Reserves 39,000 M-46; 152mm M-1937
FORCES BY ROLE COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 4+: Bandera IV
MANOEUVRE (reported); 4 4K51 Rubezh (SSC-3 Styx)
Light
14 inf bde Naval Infantry 550+
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† FORCES BY ROLE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MANOEUVRE
MBT ε900 T-34/T-54/T-55/T-62 Amphibious
LT TK PT-76 2 amph aslt bn
ASLT BTR-60 100mm
RECCE BRDM-2; Anti-aircraft Defence and Revolutionary Air
AIFV ε50 BMP-1/1P Force ε8,000 (incl conscripts)

Latin America and

APC ε500 BTR-152/BTR-50/BTR-60 Air assets divided between Western Air Zone and Eastern

the Caribbean
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Air Zone
MSL FORCES BY ROLE

SP 2K16 Shmel (AT-1 Snapper) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) 3 sqn with MiG-21ML Fishbed; MiG-23ML/MF/UM Flog-
GUNS 600+: 57mm 600 ZIS-2 (M-1943); 85mm D-44 ger; MiG-29A/UB Fulcrum
ARTILLERY 1,715+ TRANSPORT
SP 40+: 100mm AAPMP-100; CATAP-100; 122mm 2S1 1 (VIP) tpt sqn with An-24 Coke; Mi-8P Hip; Yak-40
Gvozdika; AAP-T-122; AAP-BMP-122; Jupiter III; Jupiter
ATTACK HELICOPTER
IV; 130mm AAP-T-130; Jupiter V; 152mm 2S3 Akatsiya
2 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-35 Hind
TOWED 500: 122mm D-30; M-30 (M-1938); 130mm
TRAINING
M-46; 152mm D-1; M-1937 (ML-20)
2 (tac trg) sqn with L-39C Albatros (basic); Z-142 (pri-
MRL • SP 175: 122mm BM-21 Grad; 140mm BM-14
mary)
MOR 1,000: 82mm M-41; 82mm M-43; 120mm M-43; M-38
AIR DEFENCE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SAM AIRCRAFT 45 combat capable
Short-range 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful) FTR 33: 16 MiG-23ML Flogger; 4 MiG-23MF Flogger;
Pont-defence 200+: 200 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 4 MiG-23U Flogger; 4 MiG-23UM Flogger; 2 MiG-29A
9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin); Fulcrum; 3 MiG-29UB Fulcrum (6 MiG-15UTI Midget;
9K36 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 4+ MiG-17 Fresco; 4 MiG-23MF Flogger; 6 MiG-23ML
Gimlet); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ Flogger; 2 MiG-23UM Flogger; 2 MiG-29 Fulcrum in store)
GUNS 400 FGA 12: 4 MiG-21ML Fishbed; 8 MiG-21U Mongol A (up
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4; 30mm BTR-60P SP; 57mm ZSU- to 70 MiG-21bis Fishbed; 30 MiG-21F Fishbed; 28 MiG-
57-2 21PFM Fishbed; 7 MiG-21UM Fishbed; 20 MiG-23BN
TOWED 100mm KS-19/M-1939/85mm KS-12/57mm Flogger in store)
S-60/37mm M-1939/30mm M-53/23mm ZU-23 ISR 1 An-30 Clank
412 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

TPT 11: Heavy 2 Il-76 Candid; Light 9: 1 An-2 Colt; 3 An-
24 Coke; 2 An-32 Cline; 3 Yak-40 (8 An-2 Colt; 17 An-26
Curl in store)
TRG 45: 25 L-39 Albatros; 20 Z-326 Trener Master
HELICOPTERS
ATK 4 Mi-35 Hind (8 more in store)
ASW (5 Mi-14 in store)
MRH 8 Mi-17 Hip H (12 more in store)
TPT • Medium 2 Mi-8P Hip
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
Medium-range S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); S-75 Dvina
mod (SA-2 Guideline – on T-55 chassis)
Short-range S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); S-125 Pechora mod
(SA-3 Goa – on T-55 chassis)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR R-3‡ (AA-2 Atoll); R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73
(AA-11 Archer); IR/SARH R-23/24‡ (AA-7 Apex); R-27
(AA-10 Alamo) 
 ACTIVE 56,050 (Army 28,750 Navy 11,200 Air
ASM Kh-23‡ (AS-7 Kerry)
Capabilities
The principal tasks for the Dominican armed forces include inter-
nal- and border-security missions, as well as disaster relief. Train-
ing and operations increasingly focus on counter-narcotics and
include collaboration with the police in an inter-agency task force.
The US sends training teams to the country under the terms of a
2015 military-partnership agreement, and the navy has trained
with French forces. The Dominican Republic is a regular participant
in the US SOUTHCOM’s annual Tradewinds disaster-response exer-
cise. The army has strengthened its presence along the border with
Haiti, establishing new surveillance posts. There is little capacity to
deploy and sustain forces abroad. The army’s equipment inventory
is small and outdated, and the small number of armoured vehicles
are obsolete and likely increasingly difficult to maintain. The Air
Force operates a modest number of light fixed- and rotary-wing
assets, and the Navy a small fleet of mainly ex-US patrol craft of
varying size. Aside from maintenance facilities, the country does
not have a domestic defence industry.
16,100) Paramilitary 15,000

Paramilitary 26,500 active ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

State Security 20,000
Army 28,750
Ministry of Interior
5 Defence Zones
Border Guards 6,500 FORCES BY ROLE
Ministry of Interior SPECIAL FORCES
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20 3 SF bn
PCC 2 Stenka MANOEUVRE
Light
PB 18 Zhuk
4 (1st, 2nd, 3rd & 4th) inf bde (3 inf bn)
Youth Labour Army 70,000 reservists 2 (5th & 6th) inf bde (2 inf bn)
Air Manoeuvre
Civil Defence Force 50,000 reservists 1 air cav bde (1 cdo bn, 1 (6th) mtn bn, 1 hel sqn with Bell
205 (op by Air Force); OH-58 Kiowa; R-22; R-44 Raven II)
Territorial Militia ε1,000,000 reservists Other
1 (Presidential Guard) gd regt
1 (MoD) sy bn
FOREIGN FORCES
COMBAT SUPPORT
United States US Southern Command: 1,000 (JTF-GTMO) 1 cbt spt bde (1 lt armd bn; 1 arty bn; 1 engr bn; 1 sigs bn)
at Guantanamo Bay EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Dominican Republic DOM LT TK 12 M41B (76mm)
APC • APC (W) 8 LAV-150 Commando
Dominican Peso pRD 2017 2018 2019 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
GDP pRD 3.61tr 4.01tr RCL 106mm 20 M40A1
GUNS 37mm 20 M3
US$ 76.1bn 81.1bn
ARTILLERY 104
per capita US$ 7,478 7,891 TOWED 105mm 16: 4 M101; 12 Reinosa 105/26
Growth % 4.6 6.4 MOR 88: 81mm 60 M1; 107mm 4 M30; 120mm 24 Expal
Inflation % 3.3 4.3 Model L
Def bdgt pRD 23.5bn 29.8bn HELICOPTERS
ISR 8: 4 OH-58A Kiowa; 4 OH-58C Kiowa
US$ 496m 603m
TPT • Light 6: 4 R-22; 2 R-44 Raven II
US$1=pRD 47.48 49.45

Population 10,298,756 Navy 11,200

HQ located at Santo Domingo
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
FORCES BY ROLE
Male 14.0% 4.8% 4.6% 4.3% 20.1% 2.8% SPECIAL FORCES
Female 13.6% 4.6% 4.5% 4.2% 19.5% 3.1% 1 (SEAL) SF unit
 Latin America and the Caribbean 413

MANOEUVRE Capabilities
Amphibious
1 mne sy unit Ecuador’s armed forces are able to fulfil internal-security tasks,
although the crisis in Venezuela and resulting refugee flows tran-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE siting Colombia has added to existing security challenges in the
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17 northern border area. In 2018, Ecuador’s defence ministry drafted
PCO 1 Almirante Didiez Burgos (ex-US Balsam) an ambitious all-domain equipment-modernisation and -procure-
PCC 2 Tortuguero (ex-US White Sumac) ment plan, though this is reliant on budgetary approval. Due to
PB 14: 2 Altair (Swiftships 35m); 4 Bellatrix (US Sewart the security conditions along the northern border area, the armed
Seacraft); 2 Canopus (Swiftships 101); 3 Hamal (Damen forces are standing up a new joint task force for counter-insur-
gency and counter-narcotics operations. Greater defence coop-
Stan 1505); 3 Point
eration with Peru is focused on demining efforts on the border.
AMPHIBIOUS • LCU 1 Neyba (ex-US LCU 1675) Military ties with Washington have been revived, representing a
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8 turning point in bilateral relations after defence ties were curtailed
AG 8 in 2009 and US troops left Manta air base. The armed forces train
regularly and have participated in large regional and international
Air Force 16,100 military exercises. There is limited capability to independently
deploy beyond its borders. The equipment inventory is derived
FORCES BY ROLE from a variety of sources and suffers from a general state of obso-
GROUND ATTACK lescence and low availability. Modernisation plans will target the
1 sqn with EMB-314 Super Tucano* small fleet of fighter aircraft, transport and training aircraft, and the
SEARCH & RESCUE army’s personnel carriers. Ecuador’s defence industries are centred
1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II); Bell 205 (UH-1H on the army’s Office of Industries (DINE), which produces military
Iroquois); Bell 430 (VIP); OH-58 Kiowa (CH-136); S-333 equipment through army-run enterprises. The state-owned ship-
TRANSPORT yard ASTINAVE has some construction, maintenance and repair
capabilities; however, the navy’s submarines are being modernised
1 sqn with C-212-400 Aviocar; PA-31 Navajo
in Chile.
TRAINING
1 sqn with T-35B Pillan ACTIVE 40,250 (Army 24,750 Navy 9,100 Air 6,400)
AIR DEFENCE Paramilitary 500
1 ADA bn with 20mm guns Conscript liability Voluntary conscription
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
RESERVE 118,000 (Joint 118,000)
AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable
Ages 18–55
ISR 1 AMT-200 Super Ximango
TPT • Light 13: 3 C-212-400 Aviocar; 1 Cessna 172; 1
Cessna 182; 1 Cessna 206; 1 Cessna 207; 1 Commander ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
690; 3 EA-100; 1 PA-31 Navajo; 1 P2006T
Army 24,750

Latin America and

TRG 12: 8 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; 4 T-35B Pillan

the Caribbean
HELICOPTERS FORCES BY ROLE
ISR 9 OH-58 Kiowa (CH-136) gp are bn sized
TPT • Light 16: 8 Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II); 5 Bell 205 COMMAND
(UH-1H Iroquois); 1 H155 (VIP); 2 S-333 4 div HQ

AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 20mm 4 SPECIAL FORCES
1 (9th) SF bde (3 SF gp, 1 SF sqn, 1 para bn, 1 sigs sqn, 1
Paramilitary 15,000 log comd)
MANOEUVRE
National Police 15,000 Mechanised
1 (11th) armd cav bde (3 armd cav gp, 1 mech inf bn, 1
Ecuador ECU SP arty gp, 1 engr gp)
1 (5th) inf bde (1 SF sqn, 2 mech cav gp, 2 inf bn, 1 cbt
United States Dollar $ 2017 2018 2019 engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy)
GDP US$ 104bn 107bn
Light
1 (1st) inf bde (1 SF sqn, 1 armd cav gp, 1 armd recce
per capita US$ 6,217 6,301
sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 med coy)
Growth % 2.4 1.1 1 (3rd) inf bde (1 SF gp, 1 mech cav gp, 1 inf bn, 1 arty
Inflation % 0.4 -0.2 gp, 1 hvy mor coy, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log
Def bdgt US$ 1.57bn 1.70bn coy)
1 (7th) inf bde (1 SF sqn, 1 armd recce sqn, 1 mech cav
Population 16,498,502
gp, 3 inf bn, 1 jungle bn, 1 arty gp, 1 cbt engr coy, 1
sigs coy, 1 log coy, 1 med coy)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 (13th) inf bde (1 SF sqn, 1 armd recce sqn, 1 mot cav
Male 13.6% 4.7% 4.6% 4.2% 19.0% 3.6% gp, 3 inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 hvy mor coy, 1 cbt engr coy,
Female 13.1% 4.5% 4.4% 4.2% 20.1% 4.0% 1sigs coy, 1 log coy)
414 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

2 (17th & 21st) jungle bde (3 jungle bn, 1 cbt engr coy, 1 2 Shyri (GER T-209/1300) with 8 single 533mm TT each
sigs coy, 1 log coy) with SUT HWT (1 undergoing refit in Chile)
1 (19th) jungle bde (3 jungle bn, 1 jungle trg bn, 1 cbt PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 1
engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy) FFGHM 1 Moran Valverde† (ex-UK Leander batch II) with
COMBAT SUPPORT 4 single lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 3 twin lnchr
1 (27th) arty bde (1 SP arty gp, 1 MRL gp, 1 ADA gp, 1 with Mistral SAM, 1 Phalanx CIWS, 1 twin 114mm gun
cbt engr coy, 1 sigs coy, 1 log coy) (capacity 1 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II hel)
1 (23rd) engr bde (3 engr bn) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 9
2 indep MP coy CORVETTES • FSGM 6 Esmeraldas (3†) with 2 triple
1 indep sigs coy lnchr with MM40 Exocet AShM, 1 quad Albatros lnchr
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT with Aspide SAM, 2 triple B515 ILAS-3 324mm ASTT
1 (25th) log bde with A244 LWT (removed from two vessels), 1 76mm
2 log bn gun, 1 hel landing platform (upgrade programme
2 indep med coy ongoing)
AVIATION PCFG 3 Quito (GER Lurssen TNC-45 45m) with 4 single
1 (15th) avn bde (2 tpt avn gp, 2 hel gp, 1 mixed avn gp) lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun (upgrade
AIR DEFENCE programme ongoing)
1 ADA gp
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AE 1 Calicuchima
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AGOS 1 Orion with 1 hel landing platform
LT TK 24 AMX-13 AGS 1 Sirius
RECCE 67: 25 AML-90; 10 EE-3 Jararaca; 32 EE-9 Cascavel AK 1 Galapagos
APC 123 ATF 1
APC (T) 95: 80 AMX-VCI; 15 M113 AWT 2: 1 Quisquis; 1 Atahualpa
APC (W) 28: 18 EE-11 Urutu; 10 UR-416 AXS 1 Guayas
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
RCL 404: 90mm 380 M67; 106mm 24 M40A1 Naval Aviation 380
ARTILLERY 541+
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SP 155mm 5 Mk F3
AIRCRAFT
TOWED 100: 105mm 78: 30 M101; 24 M2A2; 24 Model 56
MP 1 CN235-300M
pack howitzer; 155mm 22: 12 M114; 10 M198
ISR 3: 2 Beech 200T King Air; 1 Beech 300 Catpass King
MRL 122mm 24: 18 BM-21 Grad; 6 RM-70
Air
MOR 412+: 81mm 400 M29; 107mm M30; 160mm 12
TPT • Light 3: 1 Beech 200 King Air; 1 Beech 300 King
M-66
Air; 1 CN235-100
AIRCRAFT
TRG 6: 2 T-34C Turbo Mentor; 4 T-35B Pillan
TPT • Light 14: 1 Beech 200 King Air; 2 C-212; 1 CN235;
4 Cessna 172; 2 Cessna 206; 1 Cessna 500 Citation I; 3 IAI- HELICOPTERS
201 Arava TPT • Light 9: 3 Bell 206A; 3 Bell 206B; 1 Bell 230; 2
TRG 6: 2 MX-7-235 Star Rocket; 2 T-41D Mescalero; 2 CJ- Bell 430
6A UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
HELICOPTERS ISR 5: Heavy 2 Heron; Medium 3 Searcher Mk.II
MRH 33: 7 H125M (AS550C3) Fennec; 6 Mi-17-1V Hip; 2
SA315B Lama; 18 SA342L Gazelle (13 with HOT for anti-
Marines 2,150
armour role) FORCES BY ROLE
TPT 11: Medium 7: 5 AS332B Super Puma; 2 Mi-171E; (3 SPECIAL FORCES
SA330 Puma in store); Light 4: 2 H125 (AS350B2) Ecureuil; 1 cdo unit
2 H125 (AS350B3) Ecureuil MANOEUVRE
AIR DEFENCE Amphibious
SAM • Point-defence Blowpipe; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 5 mne bn (on garrison duties)
Grail)‡; 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
GUNS 240 ARTILLERY • MOR 32+ 60mm/81mm/120mm
SP 20mm 44 M163 Vulcan AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Mistral; 9K38
TOWED 196: 14.5mm 128 ZPU-1/-2; 20mm 38: 28 Igla (SA-18 Grouse)
M-1935, 10 M167 Vulcan; 40mm 30 L/70/M1A1
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM HOT Air Force 6,400
Navy 9,100 (incl Naval Aviation, Marines and Operational Command
Coast Guard) FORCES BY ROLE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FIGHTER
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 2: 1 sqn with Cheetah C/D
 Latin America and the Caribbean 415

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
2 sqn with EMB-314 Super Tucano* El Salvador SLV
1 sqn with Kfir C-10 (CE); Kfir C-2; Kfir TC-2
United States Dollar $ 2017 2018 2019
Military Air Transport Group GDP US$ 24.8bn 25.9bn
FORCES BY ROLE per capita US$ 3,895 4,041
SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Growth % 2.3 2.5
1 sqn with Bell 206B Jet Ranger II
 Inflation % 1.0 1.2
1 sqn with PA-34 Seneca Def bdgt US$ 146m 141m
TRANSPORT FMA (US) US$ 1.9m 0m 0m
1 sqn with C-130/H Hercules; L-100-30
1 sqn with HS-748 Population 6,187,271
1 sqn with DHC-6-300 Twin Otter Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 sqn with B-727; EMB-135BJ Legacy 600; Sabreliner 40
Male 13.0% 5.0% 5.0% 4.3% 17.3% 3.4%
TRAINING
Female 12.3% 4.9% 5.0% 4.5% 20.9% 4.3%
1 sqn with Cessna 206; DA20-C1; MXP-650; T-34C
Turbo Mentor
Capabilities
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
El Salvador’s armed forces’ primary challenge is tackling organ-
AIRCRAFT 42 combat capable
ised crime and narcotics trafficking in support of the National
FGA 25: 10 Cheetah C; 2 Cheetah D; 4 Kfir C-2; 7 Kfir C-10 Civil Police. The country’s 2015 security strategy focuses on tack-
(CE); 2 Kfir TC-2 ling violent crime. El Salvador switched diplomatic recognition
TPT 31: Medium 4: 2 C-130B Hercules; 1 C-130H Hercules; from Taiwan to China in 2018, a move which has halted planned
1 L-100-30; Light 16: 1 Beech E90 King Air; 3 C295M; 1 equipment donations from Taiwan. El Salvador participates in a
Cessna 206; 3 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 1 EMB-135BJ Legacy tri-national border task force with Guatemala and Honduras. The
600; 2 EMB-170; 2 EMB-190; 1 M-28 Skytruck; 1 MXP-650; armed forces have long-standing training programmes, including
with regional states and with the US, focused on internal security,
1 PA-34 Seneca; PAX 11: 2 A320; 2 B-727; 1 Falcon 7X; 1
disaster relief and support to civilian authorities. El Salvador has
Gulfstream G-1159; 5 HS-748 deployed on UN peacekeeping missions up to company strength
TRG 39: 11 DA20-C1; 17 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; 11 but lacks the logistical support to sustain independent interna-
T-34C Turbo Mentor tional deployments. The armed forces have received little new
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 7 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II heavy military equipment in recent years and are dependent on
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR Python 3; R-550 an inventory of Cold War-era platforms; the majority of these are
operational, indicating adequate support and maintenance. El
Magic; Shafrir‡; IIR Python 4; SARH Super 530
Salvador lacks a substantive defence industry but has successfully
AIR DEFENCE

Latin America and

produced light armoured vehicles domestically based upon com-

the Caribbean
SAM • Point-defence 13+: 6 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 7 mercial vehicle chassis.
M48 Chaparral; Blowpipe; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡;
9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse) ACTIVE 24,500 (Army 20,500 Navy 2,000 Air 2,000)
GUNS Paramilitary 17,000
SP 20mm 28 M35 Conscript liability 12 months (selective); 11 months for officers and
NCOs
TOWED 64: 23mm 34 ZU-23; 35mm 30 GDF-002
(twin) RESERVE 9,900 (Joint 9,900)

Paramilitary 500 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Coast Guard 500
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Army 20,500
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 21 FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
PCC 4: 3 Isla Fernandina (Vigilante); 1 Isla San Cristóbal
1 spec ops gp (1 SF coy, 1 para bn, 1 (naval inf) coy)
(Damen Stan Patrol 5009)
MANOEUVRE
PB 14: 1 10 de Agosto; 2 Espada; 2 Manta (GER Lurssen
Reconnaissance
36m); 1 Point; 4 Rio Coca; 4 Isla Santa Cruz (Damen
1 armd cav regt (2 armd cav bn)
Stan 2606)
Light
PBR 3: 2 Río Esmeraldas; 1 Rio Puyango 6 inf bde (3 inf bn)
Other
DEPLOYMENT 1 (special) sy bde (2 border gd bn, 2 MP bn)
COMBAT SUPPORT
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 1; 1 obs; UN • UNISFA 1 obs
1 arty bde (2 fd arty bn, 1 AD bn)
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MIUNRSO 3 obs 1 engr comd (2 engr bn)
416 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TPT • Light 1 Cessna 310

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES HELICOPTERS
RECCE 5 AML-90 (4 more in store) MRH 2 MD-520N
APC • APC (W) 38: 30 VAL Cashuat (mod); 8 UR-416 TPT • Light 3: 1 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 2 R-44
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Raven II
RCL 399: 106mm 20 M40A1 (incl 16 SP); 90mm 379
M67
ARTILLERY 217+ DEPLOYMENT
TOWED 105mm 54: 36 M102; 18 M-56 (FRY) LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 52; 1 inf pl
MOR 163+: 81mm 151 M29; 120mm 12+: 12 UBM 52;
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 156; 1 hel sqn
(some M-74 in store)
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 35: 20mm 31 M-55; 4 TCM-20 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1; 2 obs
SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 1 obs
Navy 2,000
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 1 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10
PB 10: 3 Camcraft (30m); 1 Point; 1 Swiftships 77; 1 FOREIGN FORCES
Swiftships 65; 4 Type-44 (ex-USCG) United States US Southern Command: 1 Forward
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 4 Operating Location (Military, DEA, USCG and Customs
personnel)
Naval Inf (SF Commandos) 90
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF coy
Guatemala GUA
Guatemalan Quetzal q 2017 2018 2019
Air Force 2,000 GDP q 556bn 592bn
FORCES BY ROLE US$ 75.6bn 79.1bn
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR
per capita US$ 4,469 4,583
1 sqn with A-37B/OA-37B Dragonfly; O-2A/B Skymaster*
TRANSPORT Growth % 2.8 2.8
1 sqn with BT-67; Cessna 210 Centurion; Cessna 337G; Inflation % 4.4 3.7
Commander 114; IAI-202 Arava; SA-226T Merlin IIIB Def bdgt q 1.91bn 1.92bn 2.37bn
TRAINING
US$ 260m 256m
1 sqn with R-235GT Guerrier; T-35 Pillan; T-41D
Mescalero; TH-300 FMA (US) US$ 1.74m 0m 0m
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER US$1=q 7.35 7.49
1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Bell 407; Bell Population 16,581,273
412EP Twin Huey; MD-500E; UH-1M Iroquois
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Age 0–14 15 –19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
AIRCRAFT 25 combat capable Male 17.6% 5.2% 5.0% 4.4% 15.4% 2.0%
ATK 14 A-37B Dragonfly
Female 16.9% 5.1% 4.9% 4.4% 16.5% 2.4%
ISR 11: 6 O-2A/B Skymaster*; 5 OA-37B Dragonfly*
TPT • Light 10: 2 BT-67; 2 Cessna 210 Centurion; 1
Cessna 337G Skymaster; 1 Commander 114; 3 IAI-201 Capabilities
Arava; 1 SA-226T Merlin IIIB The armed forces are refocusing on border security, having drawn
TRG 11: 5 R-235GT Guerrier; 5 T-35 Pillan; 1 T-41D down their decade-long direct support for the National Civil Police
Mescalero in 2018 as part of the inter-agency Plan Fortaleza. Guatemala main-
HELICOPTERS tains an inter-agency task force with neighbouring El Salvador and
MRH 14: 4 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 8 MD-500E; 2 UH-1M Honduras. The army has trained with US SOUTHCOM, as well as
Iroquois with regional partners such as Brazil and Colombia. Training for
TPT• Light 9: 8 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 1 Bell 407 conventional military operations is limited by budget constraints
(VIP tpt, govt owned) and the long focus on providing internal security. Guatemala main-
TRG 5 TH-300 tains a company-sized contingent as part of the UN mission to the
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR Shafrir‡ DRC, but otherwise lacks the capability for significant international
deployments. The equipment inventory is small and ageing. The
Paramilitary 17,000 US has provided several soft-skinned vehicles to the army, while
the air force has undertaken some modest recapitalisation of its
National Civilian Police 17,000 fixed-wing transport and surveillance capacity. Funding is being
Ministry of Public Security sought for additional maritime- and air-patrol capabilities. Aside
AIRCRAFT from limited maintenance facilities, the country has no domestic
ISR 1 O-2A Skymaster defence industry.
 Latin America and the Caribbean 417

ACTIVE 18,050 (Army 15,550 Navy 1,500 Air 1,000) AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCP 2 Machete
Paramilitary 25,000 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AXS 3

RESERVE 63,850 (Navy 650 Air 900 Armed Forces Marines 650 reservists
62,300) FORCES BY ROLE
(National Armed Forces are combined; the army provides log spt MANOEUVRE
for navy and air force) Amphibious
2 mne bn(-)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Air Force 1,000
Army 15,550 2 air comd
15 Military Zones FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR
FORCES BY ROLE
1 sqn with A-37B Dragonfly
SPECIAL FORCES
TRANSPORT
1 SF bde (1 SF bn, 1 trg bn)
1 sqn with BT-67; Beech 90/200 King Air
1 SF bde (1 SF coy, 1 ranger bn) 1 (tactical support) sqn with Cessna 206
1 SF mtn bde TRAINING
MANOEUVRE 1 sqn with T-35B Pillan
Light TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 (strategic reserve) mech bde (1 inf bn, 1 cav regt, 1 log 1 sqn with Bell 212 (armed); Bell 407GX; Bell 412 Twin
coy) Huey (armed); UH-1H Iroquois
6 inf bde (1 inf bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Air Manoeuvre Serviceability of ac is less than 50%
1 AB bde with (2 AB bn) AIRCRAFT 1 combat capable
Amphibious ATK 1 A-37B Dragonfly
1 mne bde TPT • Light 16: 1 Beech 90 King Air; 2 Beech 200 King Air; 4
Other BT-67; 2 Cessna 206; 4 Cessna 208B; 3 Cessna 210 Centurion;
1 (Presidential) gd bde (1 gd bn, 1 MP bn, 1 CSS coy) (4 IAI-201 Arava; 5 Cessna R172K Hawk XP in store)
COMBAT SUPPORT TRG 4 T-35B Pillan† (7 PC-7 Turbo Trainer* in store)
1 engr comd (1 engr bn, 1 construction bn) HELICOPTERS
2 MP bde with (1 MP bn) MRH 4: 2 Bell 412 Twin Huey (armed); 2 Bell 407GX
TPT • Light 13: 2 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 5 Bell 206B
Reserves Jet Ranger; 6 Bell 212 (armed) (2 Bell 206B Jet Ranger; 4 Bell

Latin America and

FORCES BY ROLE 212 (armed) in store)

the Caribbean
MANOEUVRE
Light Tactical Security Group
ε19 inf bn Air Military Police
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Paramilitary 25,000
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
RECCE (7 M8 in store) National Civil Police 25,000
APC 47
FORCES BY ROLE
APC (T) 10 M113 (5 more in store) SPECIAL FORCES
APC (W) 37: 30 Armadillo; 7 V-100 Commando 1 SF bn
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MANOEUVRE
RCL 120+: 75mm M20; 105mm 64 M-1974 FMK-1 Other
(ARG); 106mm 56 M40A1 1 (integrated task force) paramilitary unit (incl mil
ARTILLERY 149 and treasury police)
TOWED 105mm 76: 12 M101; 8 M102; 56 M-56
MOR 73: 81mm 55 M1; 107mm (12 M30 in store);
120mm 18 ECIA
DEPLOYMENT
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 32: 20mm 16 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 2; 1 obs
GAI-D01; 16 M-55 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
MONUSCO 150; 5 obs; 1 SF coy
Navy 1,500 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 2
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 2
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10
PB 10: 6 Cutlass; 1 Dauntless; 1 Kukulkan (US Broadsword SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 4; 3 obs
32m); 2 Utatlan (US Sewart) SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 1; 2 obs
418 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

ARTILLERY 54
Guyana GUY TOWED 130mm 6 M-46†
MOR 48: 81mm 12 L16A1; 82mm 18 M-43; 120mm 18
Guyanese Dollar G$ 2017 2018 2019 M-43
GDP G$ 749bn 780bn
US$ 3.56bn 3.64bn Navy 200
per capita US$ 4,578 4,649 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Growth % 2.1 3.4 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5
PCO 1 Essequibo (ex-UK River)
Inflation % 2.0 1.3
PB 4 Barracuda (ex-US Type-44)
Def bdgt G$ 12.0bn 12.1bn
US$ 57.1m 56.2m Air Force 200
US$1=G$ 210.26 214.52 FORCES BY ROLE
Population 740,685
TRANSPORT
1 unit with Bell 206; Cessna 206; Y-12 (II)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Male 12.9% 5.7% 5.4% 4.4% 19.5% 2.6% AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4: 2 BN-2 Islander; 1 Cessna
Female 12.5% 5.4% 5.1% 4.0% 18.7% 3.8% 206; 1 Y-12 (II)
HELICOPTERS
Capabilities MRH 1 Bell 412 Twin Huey†
TPT • Light 2 Bell 206
The Guyana Defence Force (GDF) has minimal conventional mili-
tary capability, and its activities are focused on border control
and support for law-enforcement operations and assistance to Haiti HTI
the civil power. The government is planning to restructure the
GDF to improve its flexibility. Guyana is part of the Caribbean Haitian Gourde G 2017 2018 2019
Basin Security Initiative. It has close military ties with Brazil, with GDP G 552bn 640bn
whom it cooperates on border security via annual military regional
exchange meetings. The country also has bilateral agreements US$ 8.61bn 9.72bn
with France, China and the US, who provide military training and per capita US$ 784 874
equipment. The GDF trains regularly and takes part in bilateral Growth % 1.2 2.0
and multinational exercises. A training initiative with China helped
two Guyanese pilots to acquire air-combat certification although Inflation % 14.7 13.3
Guyana has no combat aircraft in its inventory. There is no expedi- Def bdgt G 435m 514m
tionary or associated logistics capability. Equipment is mostly com- US$ 6.8m 7.8m
posed of second-hand platforms, mainly of Brazilian and North
American manufacture. The air force has expanded its modest air- FMA (US) US$ 1.2m 0m 0m
transport capabilities with some second-hand utility aircraft. Apart US$1=G 64.12 65.82
from maintenance facilities, there is no defence-industrial sector.
Population 10,788,440
ACTIVE 3,400 (Army 3,000 Navy 200 Air 200)
Active numbers combined Guyana Defence Force Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 16.1% 5.4% 5.2% 4.6% 16.4% 1.9%
RESERVE 670 (Army 500 Navy 170)
Female 16.2% 5.4% 5.2% 4.6% 16.9% 2.4%

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Capabilities

Army 3,000 Haiti possesses almost no military capability. A small coastguard is
tasked with maritime security and law enforcement and, while the
FORCES BY ROLE country’s embryonic army is hoped to eventually number around
SPECIAL FORCES 5,000 personnel, it is still in the very early stages of development.
1 SF coy Plans for military expansion were outlined in the 2015 White Paper
MANOUEVRE on Security and Defence. A road map for the re-establishment
Light of the Haitian armed forces was distributed to ministers in early
1 inf bn 2017 and in March 2018 an army high command was established.
Other The army’s primary missions will reportedly be disaster relief and
1 (Presidential) gd bn border security. Haiti is a member of the Caribbean Community
COMBAT SUPPORT and participates in US Southern Command’s annual Tradewinds
1 arty coy disaster-response exercise. Ecuador and Brazil have both pledged
to assist with training the new army. The plan is to recruit 500
1 (spt wpn) cbt spt coy
troops initially, focusing on engineering and medical capability
1 engr coy
for disaster-relief tasks. However, it is unclear whether the current
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE budgetary provision is sufficient to fund the level of capability
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES required. There is no heavy military equipment, and no defence
RECCE 9: 6 EE-9 Cascavel (reported); 3 S52 Shorland industry.
 Latin America and the Caribbean 419

ACTIVE 150 (Army 150) Paramilitary 50 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Army 7,300
FORCES BY ROLE
Army 150 SPECIAL FORCES
1 (special tac) spec ops gp (2 spec ops bn, 1 inf bn; 1 AB
Paramilitary 50 bn; 1 arty bn)
MANOUEVRE
Coast Guard ε50 Mechanised
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 inf bde (1 mech cav regt, 1 inf bn, 1 arty bn)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 8: 5 Light
Dauntless; 3 3812-VCF 1 inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 arty bn)
3 inf bde (2 inf bn)
1 indep inf bn
Honduras HND Other
Honduran Lempira L 2017 2018 2019 1 (Presidential) gd coy
COMBAT SUPPORT
GDP L 540bn 576bn
1 engr bn
US$ 23.0bn 23.8bn 1 sigs bn
per capita US$ 2,766 2,829 AIR DEFENCE
Growth % 4.8 3.5 1 ADA bn
Inflation % 3.9 4.4 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Def bdgt [a] L 6.28bn 7.96bn ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
US$ 267m 329m LT TK 12 FV101 Scorpion
RECCE 57: 1 FV105 Sultan (CP); 3 FV107 Scimitar; 40
FMA (US) US$ 4.5m 0m 0m
FV601 Saladin; 13 RBY-1
US$1=L 23.49 24.18 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
[a] Defence & national security budget RCL 50+: 84mm Carl Gustav; 106mm 50 M40A1
Population 9,182,766 ARTILLERY 118+
TOWED 28: 105mm: 24 M102; 155mm: 4 M198
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus MOR 90+: 81mm; 120mm 60 FMK-2; 160mm 30 M-66
Male 16.5% 5.5% 5.2% 4.6% 16.7% 1.9% AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 20mm 48: 24 M-55A2; 24 TCM-
Female 15.8% 5.3% 5.0% 4.4% 16.6% 2.5%
20

Latin America and

the Caribbean
Capabilities Navy 1,350
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
The armed forces have been deployed in support of the police to PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17
combat organised crime and narcotics trafficking since 2011; this
PB 17: 2 Lempira (Damen Stan Patrol 4207 – leased);
mission remains their prime focus. Honduras’s 2014–18 strategy
1 Chamelecon (Swiftships 85); 1 Tegucilgalpa (US
document outlines internal security as its primary concern. Hon-
Guardian 32m); 4 Guanaja (ex-US Type-44); 3 Guaymuras
duras maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan, which has sup-
plied surplus military equipment, and also receives US security
(Swiftships 105); 5 Nacaome (Swiftships 65); 1 Rio Coco
assistance, though this has been reduced in recent years. Hon- (US PB Mk III)
duras hosts a US base at the Soto Cano airfield. Honduras is also AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 4
part of a tri-national border-security task force with neighbouring LCU 2: 1 Gracias a Dios (COL Golfo de Tribuga); 1 Punta
El Salvador and Guatemala, and a separate border-security force Caxinas
with Nicaragua. Training remains focused on internal- and bor- LCM 2 LCM 8
der-security requirements, and training for conventional military
action is limited. Honduras does not have the capability to main- Marines 1,000
tain substantial overseas deployments. Most equipment is ageing, FORCES BY ROLE
with serviceability in doubt. The air force and Public Order Military MANOEUVRE
Police are working with Israel to modernise their inventories. Apart Amphibious
from limited maintenance facilities, the country has no domestic 2 mne bn
defence industry.

ACTIVE 14,950 (Army 7,300 Navy 1,350 Air 2,300 Air Force 2,300
Military Police 4,000) Paramilitary 8,000 FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
RESERVE 60,000 (Joint 60,000; Ex-servicemen 1 sqn with A-37B Dragonfly
registered) 1 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II
420 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

GROUND ATTACK/ISR/TRAINING
1 unit with Cessna 182 Skylane; EMB-312 Tucano; MXT- Jamaica JAM
7-180 Star Rocket
Jamaican Dollar J$ 2017 2018 2019
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with Beech 200 King Air; C-130A Hercules; Cessna GDP J$ 1.90tr 1.99tr
185/210; IAI-201 Arava; PA-42 Cheyenne; Turbo US$ 14.8bn 15.4bn
Commander 690 per capita US$ 5,193 5,393
1 VIP flt with PA-31 Navajo; Bell 412EP/SP Twin Huey
Growth % 0.7 1.2
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); Bell 412SP Twin Inflation % 4.4 3.4
Huey Def bdgt J$ 18.2bn 29.4bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE US$ 142m 228m
AIRCRAFT 17 combat capable US$1=J$ 128.44 128.99
FTR 11: 9 F-5E Tiger II†; 2 F-5F Tiger II†
ATK 6 A-37B Dragonfly
Population 2,812,090
TPT 17: Medium 1 C-130A Hercules; Light 16: 1 Beech
200 King Air; 2 Cessna 172 Skyhawk; 2 Cessna 182 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Skylane; 1 Cessna 185; 2 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; 2
Male 13.2% 4.8% 4.5% 3.8% 19.0% 4.1%
Cessna 210; 1 EMB-135 Legacy 600; 1 IAI-201 Arava; 1
Female 12.8% 4.6% 4.5% 3.9% 20.1% 4.6%
L-410 (leased); 1 PA-31 Navajo; 1 PA-42 Cheyenne; 1 Turbo
Commander 690
TRG 16: 9 EMB-312 Tucano; 7 MXT-7-180 Star Rocket
Capabilities
HELICOPTERS The Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) is focused principally on mari-
MRH 8: 1 Bell 412EP Twin Huey (VIP); 5 Bell 412SP Twin time and internal security, including support to police operations.
Huey; 2 Hughes 500 Jamaica maintains military ties, including for training purposes,
TPT • Light 7: 6 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 1 H125 with Canada, the UK and the US and is a member of the Caribbean
Community. The defence force participates in US SOUTHCOM’s
Ecureuil
annual Tradewinds disaster-response exercise. In March 2018,
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR Shafrir‡ financed by Canada, the JDF established the Caribbean Special
Tactics Centre, which will train special-forces units from Jamaica
Military Police 4,000 and other Caribbean nations. The JDF does not have any capac-
FORCES BY ROLE ity to support independent deployment abroad. Funds have been
MANOUEVRE allocated to procure new vehicles and helicopters, and a new King
Other Air maritime-patrol aircraft has arrived. Other than limited mainte-
nance facilities, Jamaica has no domestic defence industry.
8 sy bn
ACTIVE 3,950 (Army 3,400 Coast Guard 300 Air 250)
Paramilitary 8,000 (combined Jamaican Defence Force)

Public Security Forces 8,000 RESERVE 980 (Army 900 Coast Guard 60 Air 20)
Ministry of Public Security and Defence; 11 regional
comd ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Army 3,400
DEPLOYMENT FORCES BY ROLE
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 12 obs MANOUEVRE
Mechanised
1 (PMV) lt mech inf coy
FOREIGN FORCES Light
United States US Southern Command: 380; 1 avn bn with 2 inf bn
CH-47F Chinook; UH-60 Black Hawk COMBAT SUPPORT
1 engr regt (4 engr sqn)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 spt bn (1 MP coy, 1 med coy, 1 log coy, 1 tpt coy)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
AUV 12 Bushmaster
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 12 L16A1
Reserves
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Light
1 inf bn
 Latin America and the Caribbean 421

Coast Guard 300 relationship with the US, which has provided equipment and train-
ing to Mexican forces under the Mérida Initiative, as well as via
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE bilateral programmes via the Pentagon. There has been a train-
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10 ing focus on internal-security tasks and low-intensity warfare. The
PBF 3 armed forces have a moderate capability to deploy independently,
PB 7: 2 County (Damen Stan Patrol 4207); 4 Dauntless; 1 but do not do so in significant numbers. There are plans to recapi-
Paul Bogle (US 31m) talise diverse and ageing conventional combat platforms across all
three services. State-owned shipyards have produced patrol craft
Air Wing 250 for the navy and will produce modules for the frigates currently
under construction. Army factories have produced light armoured
Plus National Reserve
utility vehicles for domestic use. Airbus Helicopters operates a
FORCES BY ROLE manufacturing plant in Querétaro.
MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT
1 flt with Beech 350ER King Air; BN-2A Defender; Cessna ACTIVE 277,150 (Army 208,350 Navy 60,300 Air
210M Centurion 8,500) Paramilitary 58,900
SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Conscript liability 12 months (partial, selection by ballot) from age
1 flt with Bell 407 18, serving on Saturdays; voluntary for women; conscripts allo-
cated to reserves.
1 flt with Bell 412EP
TRAINING RESERVE 81,500 (National Military Service)
1 unit with Bell 206B3; DA40-180FP Diamond Star
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
AIRCRAFT
MP 1 Beech 350ER King Air
TPT • Light 4: 1 BN-2A Defender; 1 Cessna 210M
Space
Centurion; 2 DA40-180FP Diamond Star EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
HELICOPTERS SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 2 Mexsat
MRH 2 Bell 412EP
TPT • Light 7: 2 Bell 206B3 Jet Ranger; 3 Bell 407; 2 Bell Army 208,350
429 12 regions (total: 46 army zones)
FORCES BY ROLE
Mexico MEX SPECIAL FORCES
1 (1st) SF bde (5 SF bn)
Mexican Peso NP 2017 2018 2019 1 (2nd) SF bde (7 SF bn)
1 (3rd) SF bde (4 SF bn)
GDP NP 21.8tr 23.5tr
MANOEUVRE
US$ 1.15tr 1.20tr Reconnaissance

Latin America and

the Caribbean
per capita US$ 9,319 9,614 3 (2nd, 3rd & 4th Armd) mech bde (2 armd recce bn, 2 lt
Growth % 2.0 2.2 mech bn, 1 arty bn, 1 (Canon) AT gp)
Inflation % 6.0 4.8 25 mot recce regt
Light
Def bdgt [a] NP 86.4bn 102bn
1 (1st) inf corps (1 (1st Armd) mech bde (2 armd recce
US$ 4.57bn 5.23bn
bn, 2 lt mech bn, 1 arty bn, 1 (Canon) AT gp), 3 (2nd,
FMA (US) US$ 5m 0m 0m 3rd & 6th) inf bde (each: 3 inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 (Can-
US$1=NP 18.93 19.56 on) AT gp), 1 cbt engr bde (3 engr bn))
[a] National security expenditure 3 (1st, 4th & 5th) indep lt inf bde (2 lt inf bn, 1 (Canon)
AT gp)
Population 125,959,205
92 indep inf bn
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 25 indep inf coy
Air Manoeuvre
Male 13.6% 4.5% 4.3% 4.1% 19.3% 3.2%
1 para bde with (1 (GAFE) SF gp, 3 bn, 1 (Canon) AT gp)
Female 13.0% 4.3% 4.3% 4.1% 21.3% 4.0% Other
1 (Presidential) gd corps (1 SF gp, 1 mech inf bde (2 inf
Capabilities bn, 1 aslt bn), 1 mne bn (Navy), 1 cbt engr bn, 1 MP
Mexico has the most capable armed forces in Central America. bde (3 bn, 1 special ops anti-riot coy))
They have been committed to providing internal-security support COMBAT SUPPORT
within Mexico for nearly a decade. As articulated by the Program 1 indep arty regt
for National Security 2014–18, the armed forces are tasked with 10 MP bde (3 MP bn)
defending state sovereignty and territorial integrity, internal secu-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
rity and extending aid to civilian authorities. They are focused
on tackling drugs cartels and other organised crime; the Military ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Police Corps has been expanded in recent years to allow it to take RECCE 255: 19 DN-5 Toro; 127 ERC-90F1 Lynx (7 trg); 40
on a wider role as part of this tasking. Mexico has a close defence M8; 37 MAC-1; 32 VBL
422 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

IFV 390 DNC-1 (mod AMX-VCI) Naval Aviation 1,250

APC 309
FORCES BY ROLE
APC (T) 73: 40 HWK-11; 33 M5A1 half-track
MARITIME PATROL
APC (W) 236: 95 BDX; 16 DN-4; 2 DN-6; 28 LAV-100
5 sqn with Cessna 404 Titan; MX-7 Star Rocket; Lancair
(Pantera); 26 LAV-150 ST; 25 MOWAG Roland; 44 VCR
IV-P; T-6C+ Texan II
(3 amb; 5 cmd post)
1 sqn with Beech 350ER King Air; C-212PM Aviocar;
AUV 397: 150 DN-XI; 247 Sandcat
CN235-300 MPA Persuader
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
1 sqn with L-90 Redigo
ARV 7: 3 M32 Recovery Sherman; 4 VCR ARV
TRANSPORT
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
1 sqn with An-32B Cline
MSL • SP 8 VBL with Milan
1 (VIP) sqn with DHC-8 Dash 8; Learjet 24; Turbo
RCL • 106mm 1,187+ M40A1 (incl some SP)
Commander 1000
GUNS 37mm 30 M3
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
ARTILLERY 1,390
2 sqn with AS555 Fennec; AS565MB/AS565MBe
TOWED 123: 105mm 123: 40 M101; 40 M-56; 16 M2A1, 14
Panther; MD-902
M3; 13 NORINCO M90
2 sqn with Bo-105 CBS-5
MOR 1,267: 81mm 1,100: 400 M1; 400 Brandt; 300 SB
5 sqn with Mi-17-1V/V-5 Hip
120mm 167: 75 Brandt; 60 M-65; 32 RT-61
TRAINING
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 80: 12.7mm 40 M55;
1 sqn with Z-242L; Z-143Lsi
20mm 40 GAI-B01
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Navy 60,300 AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable
MP 6 CN235-300 MPA Persuader
Two Fleet Commands: Gulf (6 zones), Pacific (11 zones)
ISR 4: 2 C-212PM Aviocar; 2 Z-143Lsi
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TPT 32: Light 30: 5 Beech 350ER King Air (4 used
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 127
for ISR); 3 Beech 350i King Air; 4 C295M; 2 C295W; 1
PSOH 6:
Cessna 404 Titan; 1 DHC-8 Dash 8; 6 Lancair IV-P; 2
4 Oaxaca with 1 76mm gun (capacity 1 AS565MB
Learjet 31A; 1 Learjet 60; 5 Turbo Commander 1000; PAX
Panther hel)
2: 1 CL-605 Challenger; 1 Gulfstream 550
2 Oaxaca (mod) with 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 AS565MB
TRG 47: 3 L-90TP Redigo*; 4 MX-7 Star Rocket; 13 T-6C+
Panther hel)
Texan II; 27 Z-242L
PCOH 16:
HELICOPTERS
4 Durango with 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 Bo-105 hel)
MRH 29: 2 AS555 Fennec; 4 MD-500E; 19 Mi-17-1V Hip;
4 Holzinger (capacity 1 MD-902 Explorer)
4 Mi-17V-5 Hip
3 Sierra with 1 57mm gun (capacity 1 MD-902 Explorer)
SAR 14: 4 AS565MB Panther; 10 AS565MBe Panther
5 Uribe (ESP Halcon) (capacity 1 Bo-105 hel)
TPT 27: Heavy 3 H225M Caracal; Medium 10 UH-
PCO 9: 6 Valle (US Auk MSF) with 1 76mm gun; 3 Valle
60M Black Hawk; Light 14: 1 AW109SP; 5 MD-902 (SAR
(US Auk MSF) with 1 76mm gun
role); 8 S-333
PCGH 1 Huracan (ISR Aliya) with 4 single lnchr with
TRG 4 Schweizer 300C
Gabriel II AShM, 1 Phalanx CIWS
PCC 2 Democrata Marines 21,500 (Expanding to 26,560)
PBF 73: 6 Acuario; 2 Acuario B; 48 Polaris (SWE CB90); 17
FORCES BY ROLE
Polaris II (SWE IC 16M)
SPECIAL FORCES
PB 20: 3 Azteca; 3 Cabo (US Cape Higgon); 2 Lago; 2 Punta
3 SF unit
(US Point); 10 Tenochtitlan (Damen Stan Patrol 4207)
MANOEUVRE
AMPHIBIOUS • LS • LST 4: 2 Monte Azules with 1 hel
Light
landing platform; 2 Papaloapan (ex-US Newport) with 4
32 inf bn(-)
76mm guns, 1 hel landing platform
Air Manoeuvre
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 25
1 AB bn
AGOR 3 Altair (ex-US Robert D. Conrad)
Amphibious
AGS 7: 3 Arrecife; 1 Onjuku; 1 Rio Hondo; 1 Rio Tuxpan
1 amph bde (4 inf bn, 1 amph bn, 1 arty gp)
AK 1 Rio Suchiate
Other
AOTL 2 Aguascalientes
1 (Presidential) gd bn (included in army above)
AP 2: 1 Isla Maria Madre (Damen Fast Crew Supplier
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
5009); 1 Nautla
2 spt bn
ATF 4 Otomi with 1 76mm gun
ATS 4 Kukulkan EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AX 2 Huasteco (also serve as troop transport, supply and ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
hospital ships)
 APC • APC (W) 29: 3 BTR-60 (APC-60); 26 BTR-70
AXS 1 Cuauhtemoc with 2 65mm saluting guns (APC-70)
 Latin America and the Caribbean 423

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE TRG 144: 4 Beech F33C Bonanza; 25 Grob G120TP; 20

RCL 106mm M40A1 PC-7* (30 more possibly in store); 1 PC-9M*; 4 PT-17; 25
ARTILLERY 22+ SF-260EU; 35 T-6C+ Texan II*
TOWED 105mm 16 M-56 HELICOPTERS
MRL 122mm 6 Firos-25 MRH 44: 15 Bell 407GXP; 11 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 18
MOR 81mm some Mi-17 Hip H
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 9K38 Igla (SA- ISR 13: 4 MD-530MF; 9 MD-530MG
18 Grouse) TPT 125: Heavy 11 H225M Caracal; Medium 31: 3
AS332L Super Puma (VIP); 2 H225 (VIP); 2 Mi-8T Hip; 6
Air Force 8,500 S-70A-24 Black Hawk; 18 UH-60M Black Hawk Light 83:
FORCES BY ROLE 5 AW109SP; 45 Bell 206; 13 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II; 7 Bell
GROUND ATTACK/ISR 206L; 13 Bell 212
4 sqn with T-6C+ Texan II UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR 8: Medium 3
1 sqn with PC-7/PC-9M Hermes 450; Light 5 S4 Ehécatl
ISR/AEW AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR AIM-9J
1 sqn with Beech 350ER King Air; EMB-145AEW Erieye; Sidewinder
EMB-145RS; SA-2-37B; SA-227-BC Metro III (C-26B)
TRANSPORT Paramilitary 62,900
1 sqn with C295M; PC-6B
1 sqn with B-737; Beech 90 Federal Police 41,000 (Incl 5,000
1 sqn with C-27J Spartan; C-130E/K-30 Hercules; L-100-30 Gendarmerie)
5 (liaison) sqn with Cessna 182/206 Public Security Secretariat
1 (anti-narcotic spraying) sqn with Bell 206; Cessna EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
T206H; AIRCRAFT
1 (Presidential) gp with AS332L Super Puma; AW109SP; TPT 13: Light 7: 2 CN235M; 2 Cessna 182 Skylane; 1
B-737; B-757; B-787; Gulfstream 150/450/550; H225;
Cessna 500 Citation; 2 Turbo Commander 695; PAX 6: 4
Learjet 35A; Learjet 36; Turbo Commander 680
B-727; 1 Falcon 20; 1 Gulfstream II
1 (VIP) gp with B-737; Beech 200 King Air; Beech 350i
HELICOPTERS
King Air; Cessna 501/680 Citation; CL-605 Challenger;
MRH 3 Mi-17 Hip H
Gulfstream 550; Learjet 35A; Learjet 45; S-70A-24
TPT 27: Medium 13: 1 SA330J Puma; 6 UH-60L Black
TRAINING
Hawk; 6 UH-60M Black Hawk; Light 14: 2 AS350B
1 sqn with Cessna 182
Ecureuil; 1 AS355 Ecureuil II; 6 Bell 206B; 5 H120 Colibri
1 sqn with PC-7; T-6C+ Texan II
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
1 sqn with Beech F33C Bonanza; Grob G120TP; SF-

Latin America and

ISR 12: Medium 2 Hermes 900; Light 10 S4 Ehécatl
260EU

the Caribbean
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Federal Ministerial Police 4,500
4 sqn with Bell 206B; Bell 212; Bell 407GX
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with MD-530MF/MG
1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip HELICOPTERS
1 sqn with H225M Caracal; Bell 412EP Twin Huey; TPT • Light 25: 18 Bell 205 (UH-1H); 7 Bell 212
S-70A-24 Black Hawk UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
1 sqn with UH-60M Black Hawk ISR • Heavy 2 Dominator XP
ISR UAV
1 unit with Hermes 450; S4 Ehécatl
Rural Defense Militia 17,400
FORCES BY ROLE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MANOEUVRE
AIRCRAFT 56 combat capable
ISR 8: 2 Cessna 501 Citation; 2 SA-2-37A; 4 SA-227-BC Light
Metro III (C-26B) 13 inf unit
ELINT 8: 6 Beech 350ER King Air; 2 EMB-145RS 13 (horsed) cav unit
AEW&C 1 EMB-145AEW Erieye
TPT 112: Medium 9: 4 C-27J Spartan; 2 C-130E Hercules; Cyber
2 C-130K-30 Hercules; 1 L-100-30; Light 90: 2 Beech 90 Press reports indicated that the cyberspace operations
King Air; 1 Beech 200 King Air; 1 Beech 350i King Air; 6 centre was completed within Sedena in 2017, the same year
C295M; 59 Cessna 182; 3 Cessna 206; 8 Cessna T206H; that Mexico published a National Cybersecurity Strategy.
1 Cessna 501 Citation; 1 Cessna 680 Citation; 2 Learjet It is understood that another cyberspace operations centre
35A; 1 Learjet 36; 1 Learjet 45XP; 3 PC-6B; 1 Turbo will be created for the navy. Key documentation includes
Commander 680; PAX 13: 6 B-737; 1 B-757; 1 B-787; 1 CL- the 2013–18 National Defence Sector Programme, the 2013–
605 Challenger; 2 Gulfstream 150; 1 Gulfstream 450; 1 18 National Development Programme and the 2014–18
Gulfstream 550 National Security Programme.
424 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Other
DEPLOYMENT 1 comd regt (1 inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 int unit, 1 sigs bn)
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 1 1 (ecological) sy bn
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 3 COMBAT SUPPORT
1 engr bn
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 4 obs COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 med bn
Nicaragua NIC 1 tpt regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Nicaraguan Gold Cordoba Co 2017 2018 2019
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
GDP Co 415bn 422bn MBT 82: 62 T-55 (65 more in store); 20 T-72B1
US$ 13.8bn 13.4bn LT TK (10 PT-76 in store)
per capita US$ 2,221 2,127 RECCE 20 BRDM-2
Growth % 4.9 -4.0 IFV 17+ BMP-1
APC • APC (W) 90+: 41 BTR-152 (61 more in store); 45
Inflation % 3.9 5.9
BTR-60 (15 more in store); 4+ BTR-70M
Def bdgt Co 2.51bn 2.58bn ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
US$ 83.5m 81.7m AEV T-54/T-55 AEV
US$1=Co 30.05 31.55 VLB TMM-3
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Population 6,085,213
MSL
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus SP 12 9P133 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger)
MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger)
Male 13.6% 5.1% 5.3% 4.9% 17.4% 2.4%
RCL 82mm B-10
Female 13.0% 5.0% 5.3% 5.1% 19.8% 3.0%
GUNS 281: 57mm 174 ZIS-2; (90 more in store); 76mm 83
ZIS-3; 100mm 24 M-1944
Capabilities ARTILLERY 766
Nicaragua’s armed forces are primarily a territorial light-infantry TOWED 12: 122mm 12 D-30; (152mm 30 D-20 in store)
force, with a vestigial coastal-patrol capability. They are tasked with MRL 151: 107mm 33 Type-63: 122mm 118: 18 BM-21
border and internal security, as well as with support for disaster- Grad; 100 Grad 1P (BM-21P) (single-tube rocket launcher,
relief efforts and ecological protection. Nicaragua has training rela-
man portable)
tionships with Russia and the US, as well as with neighbouring and
regional states, including Cuba and Venezuela. Training is largely MOR 603: 82mm 579; 120mm 24 M-43; (160mm 4 M-160
focused on key internal- and border-security tasks, although the in store)
mechanised brigade has received Russian training in conven- AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-
tional military operations. The armed forces do not undertake sig- 14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-
nificant international deployments and lack the logistical support 7 Grail)‡
for large-scale military operations, although the strategic-reserve
mechanised brigade can deploy internally. Equipment primar-
ily consists of ageing Cold War-era platforms. Russia has supplied
Navy ε800
some second-hand tanks and armoured vehicles to help re-equip EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
the mechanised brigade and has supported the establishment of a PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 8: 3
repair workshop to maintain the vehicles in-country. Barring main- Dabur; 4 Rodman 101, 1 Zhuk
tenance facilities there is no domestic defence industry.

ACTIVE 12,000 (Army 10,000 Navy 800 Air 1,200) Marines

FORCES BY ROLE
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE MANOEUVRE
Amphibious
Army ε10,000 1 mne bn
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
Air Force 1,200
1 SF bde (2 SF bn) FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE TRANSPORT
Mechanised 1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Beech 90 King Air; Cessna U206;
1 mech inf bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 1 mech inf bn, Cessna 404 Titan (VIP)
1 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 AT coy) TRAINING
Light 1 unit with Cessna 172; PA-18 Super Cub; PA-28 Cherokee
1 regional comd (3 lt inf bn) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 regional comd (2 lt inf bn; 1 arty bn) 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H (armed)
3 regional comd (2 lt inf bn) AIR DEFENCE
2 indep lt inf bn 1 gp with ZU-23
 Latin America and the Caribbean 425

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MANOEUVRE

AIRCRAFT Other
TPT • Light 9: 3 An-26 Curl; 1 Beech 90 King Air; 1 1 sy bde (5 sy bn(-))
Cessna 172; 1 Cessna U206; 1 Cessna 404 Titan (VIP); 2 1 indep sy bn
PA-28 Cherokee
National Police Force 20,000
TRG 2 PA-18 Super Cub
No hvy mil eqpt, small arms only
HELICOPTERS
FORCES BY ROLE
MRH 7 Mi-17 Hip H (armed)†
SPECIAL FORCES
TPT • Medium 2 Mi-171E
1 SF unit
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 23mm 18 ZU-23 MANOEUVRE
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM 9M17 Skorpion (AT- Other
2 Swatter) 1 (presidential) gd bn(-)

National Aeronaval Service 2,000

Panama PAN FORCES BY ROLE
Panamanian Balboa B 2017 2018 2019 TRANSPORT
1 sqn with C-212M Aviocar; Cessna 210; PA-31 Navajo;
GDP B 61.8bn 66.0bn
PA-34 Seneca
US$ 61.8bn 66.0bn 1 (Presidential) flt with ERJ-135BJ; S-76C
per capita US$ 15,089 15,877 TRAINING
Growth % 5.4 4.6 1 unit with Cessna 152; Cessna 172; T-35D Pillan
Inflation % 0.9 2.0 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with AW139; Bell 205; Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois);
Def bdgt [a] B 746m 738m
Bell 212; Bell 407; Bell 412EP; H145; MD-500E
US$ 746m 738m
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FMA (US) US$ 2m 0m 0m PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17
US$1=B 1.00 1.00 PCO 1 Independencia (ex-US Balsam)
[a] Public security expenditure PCC 2 Saettia
PB 14: 1 Cocle; 1 Chiriqui (ex-US PB MkIV); 2 Panquiaco
Population 3,800,644
(UK Vosper 31.5m); 5 3 De Noviembre (ex-US Point), 1
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Taboga; 4 Type-200
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 1 General
Male 13.3% 4.3% 4.3% 4.0% 20.5% 3.9%
Estaban Huertas
Female 12.8% 4.1% 4.1% 3.8% 20.2% 4.6% LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AG 2

Latin America and

AIRCRAFT

Capabilities
Panama abolished its armed forces in 1990, but has a border
service, a police force and an air/maritime service for low-level
security tasks. The primary security focus is on the southern border
with Colombia, and the majority of the border service is deployed
there. Both Colombia and the US have provided training and
support. Training is focused on internal and border security rather
than conventional military operations and there is no capability to
mount significant external deployments. None of Panama’s secu-
rity services maintain heavy military equipment, focusing instead
on light transport, patrol and surveillance capabilities. Aside
from limited maintenance facilities, the country has no domestic
defence industry.
the Caribbean
TPT • Light 11: 1 DHC-6-400 Twin Otter; 3 C-212M
Aviocar; 1 Cessna 152, 1 Cessna 172; 1 Cessna 210; 1
ERJ-135BJ; 1 PA-31 Navajo; 2 PA-34 Seneca
TRG 6 T-35D Pillan
HELICOPTERS
MRH 10: 8 AW139; 1 Bell 412EP; 1 MD-500E
TPT • Light 21: 2 Bell 205; 13 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois);
2 Bell 212; 2 Bell 407; 1 H145; 1 S-76C

Paramilitary 26,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Paramilitary 26,000
National Border Service 4,000
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF gp
426 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Other
Paraguay PRY 1 (Presidential) gd regt (1 SF bn, 1 inf bn, 1 sy bn, 1 log gp)
COMBAT SUPPORT
Paraguayan Guarani Pg 2017 2018 2019
1 arty bde with (2 arty gp, 1 ADA gp)
GDP Pg 219tr 238tr 1 engr bde with (1 engr regt, 3 construction regt)
US$ 38.9bn 41.9bn 1 sigs bn
per capita US$ 5,600 5,934
Reserves
Growth % 4.8 4.4
FORCES BY ROLE
Inflation % 3.6 4.0 MANOEUVRE
Def bdgt Pg 1.53tr 1.78tr 1.77tr Light
US$ 273m 313m 14 inf regt (cadre)
US$1=Pg 5618.94 5690.47 4 cav regt (cadre)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Population 7,025,763
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
RECCE 28 EE-9 Cascavel
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
APC • APC (W) 12 EE-11 Urutu
Male 13.3% 4.3% 4.3% 4.0% 20.5% 3.9% ARTILLERY 99
Female 12.8% 4.1% 4.1% 3.8% 20.2% 4.6% TOWED 105mm 19 M101
MOR 81mm 80
Capabilities AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 22:
The armed forces are small by regional standards and the equip- SP 20mm 3 M9 half track
ment inventory for all services is ageing and largely obsolete. The TOWED 19: 40mm 13 M1A1, 6 L/60
country faces internal challenges from insurgency and transna-
tional organised crime, chiefly drug trafficking. Conscript numbers Navy 2,700
have reduced in recent years, and there are a significant number EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
of higher ranks in the force structure. Key formations have long PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20
been under-strength. There has been some training support by the PCR 1 Itaipú
US, and the MOD reported in 2018 a training cooperation agree- PBR 19: 1 Capitan Cabral; 2 Capitan Ortiz (ROC Hai Ou);
ment with Germany. Paraguay has had a consistent if limited tra-
2 Novatec; 6 Type-701; 3 Croq 15; 5 others
dition of contributing to UN peacekeeping operations since 2001.
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCVP 3
There is only limited ability to self-sustain forces abroad, and no
effective power-projection capacity. There is a small force of river-
patrol craft, though some of the older of these have finally been
Naval Aviation 100
retired. Armoured capability is very limited. While there are plans FORCES BY ROLE
to acquire more modern equipment, including tanks, naval equip- TRANSPORT
ment and aircraft of all types for the air force, recent acquisitions 1 (liaison) sqn with Cessna 150; Cessna 210 Centurion;
of heavier materiel have been confined to small quantities of Cessna 310; Cessna 401
engineering and transport equipment. There is some local main- TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
tenance capacity but the effectiveness of systems is limited by age 1 sqn with AS350 Ecureuil (HB350 Esquilo)
and while there is some R&D and manufacturing cooperation with
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
local research institutes, there is no traditional defence-industrial
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6: 2 Cessna 150; 1 Cessna 210
base.
Centurion; 2 Cessna 310; 1 Cessna 401
ACTIVE 11,900 (Army 7,400 Navy 2,700 Air 1,800) HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 2 AS350 Ecureuil (HB350
Paramilitary 14,800 Esquilo)
Conscript liability 12 months
Marines 700; 200 conscript (total 900)
RESERVE 164,500 (Joint 164,500) FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Amphibious
3 mne bn(-)
ARTILLERY • TOWED 105mm 2 M101
Army 7,400
Much of the Paraguayan army is maintained in a cadre Air Force 1,800
state during peacetime; the nominal inf and cav divs are FORCES BY ROLE
effectively only at coy strength. Active gp/regt are usually GROUND ATTACK/ISR
coy sized 1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano*
FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT
MANOEUVRE 1 gp with C-212-200/400 Aviocar; DHC-6 Twin Otter
Light 1 VIP gp with Beech 58 Baron; Bell 427; Cessna U206
3 inf corps (total: 6 inf div(-), 3 cav div(-), 6 arty bty) Stationair; Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; Cessna 210
 Latin America and the Caribbean 427

Centurion; Cessna 402B; PA-32R Saratoga (EMB-721C armed forces are primarily orientated towards preserving territo-
Sertanejo); PZL-104 Wilga 80 rial integrity and security, focusing on counter-insurgency and
TRAINING counter-narcotics operations, while strengthening their disaster-
1 sqn with T-25 Universal; T-35A/B Pillan relief capabilities. Peru maintains close military ties with Colombia.
The two countries signed a cooperation agreement on air control,
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
humanitarian assistance and counter-narcotics. The armed forces
1 gp with AS350 Ecureuil (HB350 Esquilo); Bell 205 (UH- train regularly and take part in national and multilateral exercises.
1H Iroquois) The armed forces are capable of independently deploying exter-
MANOEUVRE nally and contribute to UN missions abroad. There has been some
Air Manoeuvre modernisation of some air-combat assets, though not across the
1 AB bde whole fleet. The navy is looking to acquire new corvettes and mod-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ernise its ageing submarines. The state-owned shipyard SIMA and
aviation firm SEMAN are key players in Peru’s defence industry,
AIRCRAFT 6 combat capable
both in terms of manufacturing and maintenance. SEMAN com-
TPT • Light 18: 1 Beech 58 Baron; 4 C-212-200 Aviocar; pleted in 2017 final assembly for the last Korean-designed KT-1
1 C-212-400 Aviocar; 2 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan; 1 trainer, and the navy in 2018 commissioned the first locally built
Cessna 210 Centurion; 1 Cessna 310; 2 Cessna 402B; 2 and South Korean-designed multipurpose vessel.
Cessna U206 Stationair; 1 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 1 PA-32R
Saratoga (EMB-721C Sertanejo); 2 PZL-104 Wilga 80 ACTIVE 81,000 (Army 47,500 Navy 24,000 Air 9,500)
TRG 21: 6 EMB-312 Tucano*; 6 T-25 Universal; 6 T-35A Paramilitary 77,000
Pillan; 3 T-35B Pillan Conscript liability 12 months voluntary conscription for
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 9: 3 AS350 Ecureuil (HB350 both males and females
Esquilo); 5 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 1 Bell 427 (VIP) RESERVE 188,000 (Army 188,000)
Paramilitary 14,800
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Special Police Service 10,800; 4,000 conscript
(total 14,800) Space
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
DEPLOYMENT SATELLITES • ISR PERÚSAT-1

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 1; 2 obs Army 47,500

CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP 12 4 mil region
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • FORCES BY ROLE
MONUSCO 1; 6 obs SPECIAL FORCES
1 (1st) SF bde (4 cdo bn, 1 airmob arty gp, 1 MP Coy, 1
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1 obs
cbt spt bn)

Latin America and

the Caribbean
1 (3rd) SF bde (3 cdo bn, 1 airmob arty gp, 1 MP coy)
Peru PER 1 SF gp (regional troops)
MANOEUVRE
Peruvian Nuevo Sol NS 2017 2018 2019 Armoured
GDP NS 699bn 748bn 1 (3rd) armd bde (2 tk bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 AT
coy, 1 AD gp, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn)
US$ 214bn 229bn
1 (9th) armd bde (2 tk bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty gp, 1
per capita US$ 6,732 7,118
ADA gp)
Growth % 2.5 4.1 Mechanised
Inflation % 2.8 1.4 1 (3rd) armd cav bde (3 mech cav bn, 1 mot inf bn, 1
Def bdgt NS 7.06bn 7.51bn 7.47bn arty gp, 1 AD gp, 1 engr bn, 1 cbt spt bn)
US$ 2.17bn 2.30bn
1 (1st) cav bde (4 mech cav bn, 1 MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn)
Light
FMA (US) US$ 1m 0m 0m
2 (2nd & 31st) mot inf bde (3 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1 MP
US$1=NS 3.26 3.27 coy, 1 log bn)
Population 31,331,228 3 (1st, 7th & 32nd) inf bde (3 inf bn, 1 MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn)
1 (4th) mtn bde (1 armd regt, 3 mot inf bn, 1 arty gp, 1
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn)
Male 13.2% 4.4% 4.6% 4.3% 18.9% 3.6% 1 (5th) mtn bde (1 armd regt, 2 mot inf bn, 3 jungle coy,
Female 12.8% 4.3% 4.6% 4.5% 20.7% 4.0%
1 arty gp, 1 MP coy, 1 cbt spt bn)
1 (5th) jungle inf bde (1 SF gp, 3 jungle bn, 3 jungle coy,
Capabilities 1 jungle arty gp, 1 AT coy, 1 AD gp, 1 jungle engr bn)
1 (6th) jungle inf bde (4 jungle bn, 1 engr bn, 1 MP coy,
Peru’s armed forces have sufficient training and capabilities to fulfil 1 cbt spt bn)
domestic-security tasks, although they are limited by an increas- COMBAT SUPPORT
ingly ageing equipment inventory and economic constraints. The
1 (1st) arty bde (4 arty gp, 2 AD gp, 1 sigs gp)
428 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

1 (3rd) arty bde (4 arty gp, 1 AD gp, 1 sigs gp) PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 7
1 (22nd) engr bde (3 engr bn, 1 demining coy) FRIGATES 7
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FFGHM 6:
1 (1st Multipurpose) spt bde 3 Aguirre (ex-ITA Lupo) with 8 single lnchr with Otomat
AVIATION Mk2 AShM, 1 octuple Mk29 lnchr with RIM-7P Sea
1 (1st) avn bde (1 atk hel/recce hel bn, 1 avn bn, 2 aslt Sparrow SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT,
hel/tpt hel bn) 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)/SH-3D
AIR DEFENCE Sea King)
1 AD gp (regional troops) 3 Carvajal (mod ITA Lupo) with 8 single lnchr with
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr with
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with A244 LWT,
MBT 165 T-55; (75† in store) 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)/SH-3D
LT TK 96 AMX-13 Sea King)
RECCE 95: 30 BRDM-2; 15 Fiat 6616; 50 M9A1 FFHM 1:
APC 295 1 Aguirre (ex-ITA Lupo) with 1 octuple Mk29 lnchr with
APC (T) 120 M113A1 RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with
APC (W) 175: 150 UR-416; 25 Fiat 6614 A244 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 212)/SH-3D Sea King) (is being fit with MM40 Exocet
ARV M578 Block 3)
ANTI-TANK-ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12
MSL CORVETTES • FSG 6 Velarde (FRA PR-72 64m) with 4
SP 22 M1165A2 HMMWV with 9K135 Kornet E (AT-14 single lnchr with MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun
Spriggan) PCR 6:
MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); HJ-73C; 2 Amazonas with 1 76mm gun
9K135 Kornet E (AT-14 Spriggan); Spike-ER 2 Manuel Clavero
RCL 106mm M40A1 2 Marañon with 2 76mm guns
ARTILLERY 1,011 AMPHIBIOUS
SP 155mm 12 M109A2 PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD 1 Pisco (IDN
Makassar) (capacity 2 LCM; 3 hels; 24 IFV; 450 troops)
TOWED 290: 105mm 152: 44 M101; 24 M2A1; 60 M-56;
LANDING SHIPS • LST 2 Paita (capacity 395 troops)
24 Model 56 pack howitzer; 122mm; 36 D-30; 130mm 36
(ex-US Terrebonne Parish)
M-46; 155mm 66: 36 M114, 30 Model 50
LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 7 Griffon 2000TD (capacity
MRL 122mm 35: 22 BM-21 Grad; 13 Type-90B
22 troops)
MOR 674+: 81mm/107mm 350; SP 107mm 24 M106A1;
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 25
120mm 300+ Brandt/Expal Model L
AG 4 Rio Napo
AIRCRAFT
AGOR 1 Humboldt
TPT • Light 16: 2 An-28 Cash; 3 An-32B Cline; 1 Beech
AGORH 1 Carrasco
350 King Air; 1 Beech 1900D; 4 Cessna 152; 1 Cessna 208
AGS 5: 1 Carrasco (ex-NLD Dokkum); 2 Van Straelen; 1
Caravan I; 2 Cessna U206 Stationair; 1 PA-31T Cheyenne II;
La Macha, 1 Stiglich (river survey vessel for the upper
1 PA-34 Seneca
Amazon)
TRG 4 IL-103
AH 4 (river hospital craft)
HELICOPTERS
AO 2 Noguera
MRH 7 Mi-17 Hip H
AOR 1 Mollendo
TPT 36: Heavy (3 Mi-26T Halo in store); Medium 23 Mi-
AORH 1 Tacna (ex-NLD Amsterdam)
171Sh; Light 13: 2 AW109K2; 9 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite; 2 R-44
AOT 2 Bayovar
TRG 5 F-28F
ATF 1
AIR DEFENCE
AWT 1 Caloyeras
SAM • Point-defence 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin);
AXS 2: 1 Marte; 1 Union
9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
GUNS 165 Naval Aviation ε800
SP 23mm 35 ZSU-23-4
FORCES BY ROLE
TOWED 23mm 130: 80 ZU-23-2; 50 ZU-23
MARITIME PATROL
1 sqn with Beech 200T; Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW);
Navy 24,000 (incl 1,000 Coast Guard) F-27 Friendship; Fokker 60; SH-2G Super Seasprite; SH-
Commands: Pacific, Lake Titicaca, Amazon River 3D Sea King
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TRANSPORT
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 6: 1 flt with An-32B Cline; Cessna 206; Fokker 50
4 Angamos (GER T-209/1200) with 8 single 533mm TT TRAINING
with AEG SST-4 HWT (of which 1 in refit) 1 sqn with F-28F; T-34C Turbo Mentor
2 Islay (GER T-209/1100) with 8 single 533mm TT with TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
AEG SUT-264 HWT 1 (liaison) sqn with Bell 206B Jet Ranger II; Mi-8 Hip
 Latin America and the Caribbean 429

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with Z-242

AIRCRAFT 1 hel sqn with Schweizer 300C
MP 8: 4 Beech 200T; 4 Fokker 60 ATTACK HELICOPTER
ELINT 1 F-27 Friendship 1 sqn with Mi-25/Mi-35P Hind
TPT • Light 6: 3 An-32B Cline; 1 Cessna 206; 2 Fokker 50 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
TRG 5 T-34C Turbo Mentor 1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H
HELICOPTERS 1 sqn with Bell 206 Jet Ranger; Bell 212 (AB-212); Bell 412
ASW 6: 2 Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW); 1 SH-2G Super Twin Huey
Seasprite; 3 SH-3D Sea King 1 sqn with Bo-105C/LS
MRH 3 Bell 412SP AIR DEFENCE
TPT 11: Medium 8: 2 Mi-8 Hip; 6 UH-3H Sea King; 6 bn with S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
Light 3 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TRG 5 F-28F AIRCRAFT 78 combat capable
MSL • AShM AM39 Exocet FTR 20: 9 MiG-29S Fulcrum C; 3 MiG-29SE Fulcrum C; 6
MiG-29SMP Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UBM Fulcrum B
Marines 4,000 FGA 12: 2 Mirage 2000ED (2000DP); 10 Mirage 2000E
FORCES BY ROLE (2000P) (some†)
SPECIAL FORCES ATK 36: 18 A-37B Dragonfly;1 Su-25A Frogfoot A; 9 Su-
3 cdo gp 25A Frogfoot A†; 8 Su-25UB Frogfoot B†
MANOEUVRE ISR 6: 2 Learjet 36A; 4 SA-227-BC Metro III (C-26B)
Light TPT 37: Medium 6: 4 C-27J Spartan; 2 L-100-20; Light
2 inf bn 27: 4 An-32 Cline; 7 Cessna 172 Skyhawk; 3 DHC-6 Twin
1 inf gp Otter; 12 DHC-6-400 Twin Otter; 1 PC-6 Turbo-Porter; PAX
Amphibious 4 B-737
1 mne bde (1 SF gp, 1 recce bn, 2 inf bn, 1 amph bn, 1 TRG 68: 19 EMB-312 Tucano; 20 KT-1P; 10 MB-339A*; 6
arty gp) T-41A/D Mescalero; 13 Z-242
Jungle HELICOPTERS
1 jungle inf bn ATK 18: 16 Mi-25 Hind D; 2 Mi-35P Hind E
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MRH 20: 2 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 18 Mi-17 Hip H
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES TPT 28: Medium 7 Mi-171Sh; Light 21: 8 Bell 206 Jet
APC • APC (W) 47+: 32 LAV II; V-100 Commando; 15 Ranger; 6 Bell 212 (AB-212); 1 Bo-105C; 6 Bo-105LS
V-200 Chaimite TRG 4 Schweizer 300C
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE AIR DEFENCE • SAM
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav; 106mm M40A1 Short-range S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
ARTILLERY 18+ Point-defence Javelin

Latin America and

the Caribbean
TOWED 122mm D-30 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
MOR 18+: 81mm some; 120mm ε18
 AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid)‡; R-73
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 20mm SP (twin) (AA-11 Archer); R-550 Magic; IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10
Alamo); ARH R-77 (AA-12 Adder)
Air Force 9,500 ASM AS-30; Kh-29L (AS-14A Kedge)
Divided into five regions – North, Lima, South, Central and ARM Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter)
Amazon
FORCES BY ROLE
Paramilitary 77,000
FIGHTER National Police 77,000 (100,000 reported)
1 sqn with MiG-29S/SE Fulcrum C; MiG-29UB Fulcrum B
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
1 sqn with Mirage 2000E/ED (2000P/DP)
APC (W) 120: 20 BMR-600; 100 MOWAG Roland
2 sqn with A-37B Dragonfly
HELICOPTERS
1 sqn with Su-25A Frogfoot A†; Su-25UB Frogfoot B†
MRH 1 Mi-17 Hip H
ISR
1 (photo-survey) sqn with Learjet 36A; SA-227-BC Metro General Police 43,000
III (C-26B)
TRANSPORT Security Police 21,000
1 sqn with B-737; An-32 Cline
1 sqn with DHC-6 Twin Otter; DHC-6-400 Twin Otter; Technical Police 13,000
PC-6 Turbo Porter
1 sqn with L-100-20 Coast Guard 1,000
TRAINING Personnel included as part of Navy
2 (drug interdiction) sqn with EMB-312 Tucano EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with MB-339A* PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 38
430 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

PSOH 1 Carvajal (mod ITA Lupo) with 1 127mm gun to design and manufacture modern military equipment and Suri-
(capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212)/SH-3D Sea King) name has looked to its foreign military cooperation to improve not
PCC 8: 1 Ferré (ex-ROK Po Hang) with 1 76mm gun; 2 just trade training but also military maintenance capacity.
Río Cañete (ROK Tae Geuk); 5 Rio Nepena
PB 10: 6 Chicama (US Dauntless); 1 Río Chira; 3 Río
ACTIVE 1,840 (Army 1,400 Navy 240 Air 200)
Santa (All services form part of the army)
PBR 19: 1 Río Viru; 8 Parachique; 10 Zorritos
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AH 1 Puno ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
AIRCRAFT
TPT • Light 3: 1 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 2 F-27 Friendship
Army 1,400
Rondas Campesinas FORCES BY ROLE
Peasant self-defence force. Perhaps 7,000 rondas ‘gp’, up MANOEUVRE
to pl strength, some with small arms. Deployed mainly Mechanised
in emergency zone 1 mech cav sqn
Light
DEPLOYMENT 1 inf bn (4 coy)
COMBAT SUPPORT
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 209; 4
1 MP bn (coy)
obs; 1 engr coy
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MONUSCO 3; 8 obs
RECCE 6 EE-9 Cascavel
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1; 3 obs APC • APC (W) 15 EE-11 Urutu
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 1; 1 obs; UN • UNISFA 2 obs ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
RCL 106mm M40A1
Suriname SUR ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 6

Suriname Dollar srd 2017 2018 2019 Navy ε240

GDP srd 25.6bn 28.7bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ 3.42bn 3.84bn PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10 
PB 5: 3
per capita US$ 5,870 6,506 Rodman 101†; 2 others
Growth % 1.9 2.0 PBR 5 Rodman 55
Inflation % 22.0 7.8
Air Force ε200
Def exp srd n.k. n.k.
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ n.k. n.k.
AIRCRAFT 2 combat capable
US$1=srd 7.49 7.47
TPT • Light 2: 1 BN-2 Defender*; 1 Cessna 182
Population 597,927 TRG 1 PC-7 Turbo Trainer*
HELICOPTERS • MRH 3 SA316B Alouette III (Chetak)
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 12.3% 4.6% 4.3% 4.2% 22.3% 2.7%
Female 11.8% 4.4% 4.1% 4.0% 21.8% 3.5% Trinidad and Tobago TTO
Trinidad and Tobago
2017 2018 2019
Capabilities Dollar TT$
GDP TT$ 154bn 158bn
The armed forces are principally tasked with preserving territo-
rial integrity. They also assist the national police in internal- and US$ 22.8bn 23,3bn
border-security missions, as well as tackling transnational criminal per capita US$ 16,638 16,931
activity and drug trafficking. They have also been involved in disas- Growth % -2.6 1.0
ter-relief and humanitarian-assistance operations. The country
Inflation % 1.9 2.3
is a member of the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management
Agency and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. Ties with Def bdgt TT$ 7.63bn 6.24bn 6.12bn
Brazil, China, India and the US have been crucial for the supply US$ 1.13bn 920m
of equipment, including a limited number of armoured vehicles
US$1=TT$ 6.78 6.78
and helicopters, as well as training activity. The armed forces take
part in the multilateral Tradewinds disaster-response exercise. The Population 1,215,527
armed forces are not sized or equipped for power projection and
are no longer engaged in any international peacekeeping opera- Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
tions. Resource challenges and limited equipment serviceability
means the armed forces are constrained in providing sufficient Male 9.8% 3.0% 3.0% 3.6% 26.5% 4.8%
border and coastal control and surveillance. There is no capability Female 9.4% 2.8% 2.7% 3.3% 24.8% 6.3%
 Latin America and the Caribbean 431

Capabilities Uruguay URY

The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force (TTDF) focuses on border
protection and maritime security, as well as counter-narcotics Uruguayan Peso pU 2017 2018 2019
tasks. A larger role in law-enforcement support is planned for the GDP pU 1.70tr 1.85tr
army. Trinidad and Tobago is a member of the Caribbean Com-
munity, and cooperates with other countries in the region in US$ 59.2bn 60.9bn
disaster-relief efforts. It also takes part in US SOUTHCOM’s annual per capita US$ 16,942 17,380
Tradewinds disaster-response exercise and sends personnel to the Growth % 2.7 2.0
US and UK for training. Trinidad and Tobago has no capacity to
deploy and maintain troops abroad, and bar limited maintenance Inflation % 6.2 7.6
facilities has no domestic defence industry. Def bdgt pU 14.8bn 14.8bn 14.8bn
US$ 515m 486m
ACTIVE 4,050 (Army 3,000 Coast Guard 1,050)
(All services form the Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force) US$1=pU 28.68 30.36
Population 3,369,299
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 10.1% 3.8% 4.0% 3.8% 20.8% 5.8%
Army ε3,000
Female 9.8% 3.7% 4.0% 3.7% 21.8% 8.6%
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF unit
Capabilities
MANOEUVRE Principal tasks for the armed forces are assuring sovereignty and
Light territorial integrity, restated in the 2018 draft military law. This also
2 inf bn reinforced civilian control over the military. The 2018 draft law
COMBAT SUPPORT contained provisions to reduce the number of senior officers and
address promotion issues across all services. Uruguay and Argen-
1 engr bn
tina have a joint peacekeeping unit and take part in joint exercises.
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT In 2018 a defence cooperation agreement was signed with Russia,
1 log bn including training exchanges. The armed forces participate regu-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE larly in multinational exercises and deployments, notably on UN
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE missions. The air force is focused on the counter-insurgency role,
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav but ambitions to purchase a light fighter aircraft remain ham-
ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 6 L16A1 pered by funding problems. The acquisition of air-defence radars
may have improved the military’s ability to monitor domestic air-
space, but the lack of interdiction capability will continue to limit
Coast Guard 1,050 the capacity to respond to contingencies. Much of the equipment

Latin America and

FORCES BY ROLE inventory is second-hand, and there is little capacity for inde-

the Caribbean
COMMAND pendent power projection. Maintenance work is sometimes out-
1 mne HQ sourced to foreign companies, such as Chile’s ENAER.
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ACTIVE 21,000 (Army 13,500 Navy 4,800 Air 2,700)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 26 Paramilitary 1,400
PCO 1 Nelson II (ex-PRC)
PCC 6: 2 Point Lisas (Damen Fast Crew Supplier 5009); 4
Speyside (Damen Stan Patrol 5009) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
PB 19: 2 Gasper Grande; 1 Matelot; 4 Plymouth; 4 Point; 6
Scarlet Ibis (Austal 30m); 2 Wasp; (1 Cascadura (SWE Army 13,500
Karlskrona 40m) non-operational) Uruguayan units are substandard size, mostly around
30%. Div are at most bde size, while bn are of reinforced
Air Wing 50 coy strength. Regts are also coy size, some bn size, with the
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE largest formation being the 2nd armd cav regt
AIRCRAFT FORCES BY ROLE
TPT • Light 2 SA-227 Metro III (C-26) COMMAND
HELICOPTERS 4 mil region/div HQ
MRH 2 AW139 MANOEUVRE
TPT • Light 1 S-76 Mechanised
2 armd regt
1 armd cav regt
5 mech cav regt
8 mech inf regt
Light
1 mot inf bn
5 inf bn
432 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Air Manoeuvre SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 para bn 1 sqn with AS350B2 Ecureuil (Esquilo); Bell 412SP Twin
COMBAT SUPPORT Huey
1 (strategic reserve) arty regt TRANSPORT/TRAINING
5 fd arty gp 1 flt with T-34C Turbo Mentor
1 (1st) engr bde (2 engr bn) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
4 cbt engr bn AIRCRAFT 2 combat capable
AIR DEFENCE ISR 5: 2 Beech 200T*; 3 Cessna O-2A Skymaster
1 AD gp TRG 2 T-34C Turbo Mentor
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MRH 2 Bell 412SP Twin Huey
MBT 15 Tiran-5 TPT • Light 1 AS350B2 Ecureuil (Esquilo)
LT TK 38: 16 M24 Chaffee; 22 M41A1UR
RECCE 15 EE-9 Cascavel Naval Infantry 700
IFV 18 BMP-1 FORCES BY ROLE
APC 376 MANOEUVRE
APC (T) 27: 24 M113A1UR; 3 MT-LB Amphibious
APC (W) 349: 54 Condor; 48 GAZ-39371 Vodnik; 53 OT- 1 mne bn(-)
64; 47 OT-93; 147 Piranha
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES Air Force 2,700
AEV MT-LB
FORCES BY ROLE
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
MSL • MANPATS Milan
1 sqn with A-37B Dragonfly
RCL 69: 106mm 69 M40A1
ISR
ARTILLERY 185
1 flt with EMB-110 Bandeirante
SP 122mm 6 2S1 Gvozdika
TRANSPORT
TOWED 44: 105mm 36: 28 M101A1; 8 M102; 155mm 8
1 sqn with C-130B Hercules; C-212 Aviocar; EMB–110C
M114A1
Bandeirante; EMB-120 Brasilia
MOR 135: 81mm 91: 35 M1, 56 Expal Model LN; 120mm
1 (liaison) sqn with Cessna 206H; T-41D
44 Model SL
1 (liaison) flt with Cessna 206H
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Light 1 Charrua
TRAINING
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 14: 20mm 14: 6 M167
1 sqn with PC-7U Turbo Trainer
Vulcan; 8 TCM-20 (w/Elta M-2106 radar)
1 sqn with Beech 58 Baron (UB-58); SF-260EU
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Navy 4,800 (incl 1,400 Prefectura Naval Coast
1 sqn with AS365 Dauphin; Bell 205 (UH–1H Iroquois);
Guard)
Bell 212
HQ at Montevideo
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 13 combat capable
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 2
ATK 12 A-37B Dragonfly
FF 2 Uruguay (PRT Joao Belo) with 2 triple Mk32 324mm
ISR 1 EMB-110 Bandeirante*
ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 2 100mm gun
TPT 23: Medium 2 C-130B Hercules; Light 21: 1 BAe-
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 15
125-700A; 2 Beech 58 Baron (UB-58); 6 C-212 Aviocar; 9
PB 15: 2 Colonia (ex-US Cape); 1 Paysandu; 9 Type-44
Cessna 206H; 1 Cessna 210; 2 EMB-110C Bandeirante; 1
(coast guard); 3 PS (coast guard)
EMB-120 Brasilia; PAX 1 C-29 Hawker
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3
TRG 17: 5 PC-7U Turbo Trainer; 12 SF-260EU
MSO 3 Temerario (Kondor II)
HELICOPTERS
AMPHIBIOUS 3: 2 LCVP; 1 LCM
MRH 2 AS365N2 Dauphin II
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9
TPT • Light 9: 5 Bell 205 (UH–1H Iroquois); 4 Bell 212
ABU 2
AG 2: 1 Artigas (GER Freiburg, general spt ship with
replenishment capabilities); 1 Maldonado (also used as Paramilitary 1,400
patrol craft)
Guardia Nacional Republicana 1,400
AGS 2: 1 Helgoland; 1 Trieste
ARS 1 Vanguardia
AXS 2: 1 Capitan Miranda; 1 Bonanza DEPLOYMENT
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 2
Naval Aviation 210
FORCES BY ROLE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
MARITIME PATROL MONUSCO 930; 7 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 mne coy; 1 hel sqn
1 flt with Beech 200T*; Cessna O-2A Skymaster EGYPT: MFO 41; 1 engr/tpt unit
 Latin America and the Caribbean 433

INDIA/PAKISTAN: UN • UNMOGIP 3 obs

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 2
Space
Venezuela VEN EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SATELLITES • COMMUNICATIONS 1 Venesat-1
Venezuelan Bolivar Fuerte Bs 2017 2018 2019
GDP Bs 2.93bn 3.41tr Army ε63,000
US$ 210bn 96bn FORCES BY ROLE
per capita US$ 6,890 3,300
MANOEUVRE
Armoured
Growth % -14 -18
1 (4th) armd div (1 armd bde, 1 lt armd bde, 1 AB bde,
Inflation % 1,088 1,370,000 1 arty bde)
Def bdgt Bs 10.3m n.k Mechanised
US$ [a] 741m n.k 1 (9th) mot cav div (1 mot cav bde, 1 ranger bde, 1 sy bde)
Light
US$1=Bs 0.01 354.40
1 (1st) inf div (1 SF bn, 1 armd bde, 1 mech inf bde, 1
[a] US dollar figures should be treated with caution due to high
ranger bde, 1 inf bde, 1 arty unit, 1 spt unit)
levels of currency volatility as well as wide differentials between
official and parallel exchange rates 1 (2nd) inf div (1 mech inf bde, 1 inf bde, 1 mtn inf bde)
1 (3rd) inf div (1 inf bde, 1 ranger bde, 1 sigs bde, 1 MP
Population 31,689,176 bde)
1 (5th) inf div (1 SF bn, 1 cav sqn, 2 jungle inf bde, 1
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
engr bn)
Male 13.9% 4.3% 4.2% 4.2% 19.9% 3.3% COMBAT SUPPORT
Female 13.2% 4.1% 4.1% 4.1% 20.5% 4.0% 1 cbt engr corps (3 engr regt)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Capabilities 1 log comd (2 log regt)
AVIATION
The armed forces and national guard are tasked with protecting
1 avn comd (1 tpt avn bn, 1 atk hel bn, 1 ISR avn bn)
sovereignty, assuring territorial integrity and assisting with inter-
nal-security and counter-narcotics operations. They have sufficient
Reserve Organisations 8,000
capabilities and funding to fulfil internal-security tasks and fulfil
their regime-protection role, but the economic crisis will impact FORCES BY ROLE
future equipment availability and training levels. Incidents such as MANOEUVRE
the apparent attempted assassination of President Maduro in 2018 Armoured
1 armd bn

Latin America and

and the attack on the supreme court by a police helicopter pilot

the Caribbean
in 2017 point to some internal stresses in the armed forces. Ven- Light
ezuela is almost completely isolated regionally, with frictions relat- 4 inf bn
ing to the humanitarian crisis leading to troop deployments near 1 ranger bn
the Colombia–Venezuela border. There are close ties with China COMBAT SUPPORT
and Russia. Caracas relies on both countries for procurements and 1 arty bn
technical support. The armed forces train regularly, with a recent 2 engr regt
increase in large-scale, civil–military cooperation. Venezuela has
also taken part in joint combined exercises with China, Cuba
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
and Russia. There is little logistics capability that would support ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
deployment abroad. Equipment is relatively modern and mainly MBT 173: 81 AMX-30V; 92 T-72B1
of Chinese and Russian manufacture, with advanced Su-30MKV LT TK 109: 31 AMX-13; 78 Scorpion-90
combat aircraft and S-300VM air-defence systems in the inven- RECCE 121: 42 Dragoon 300 LFV2; 79 V-100/V-150
tory. However, the economic crisis has seriously affected the gov- IFV 237: 123 BMP-3 (incl variants); 114 BTR-80A (incl
ernment’s ability to sustain its military expenditure; maintenance variants)
and further procurement may suffer as a consequence. Venezuela’s APC 81
defence industry is based on a series of small, state-owned com- APC (T) 45: 25 AMX-VCI; 12 AMX-PC (CP); 8 AMX-
panies, mainly focused on the production of small arms, ammuni- VCTB (Amb)
tion and explosives. Venezuela has no capability to design modern APC (W) 36 Dragoon 300
defence equipment, and local platform production is limited to ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
small coastal-patrol boats.
ARV 5: 3 AMX-30D; BREM-1; 2 Dragoon 300RV; Samson
ACTIVE 123,000 (Army 63,000 Navy 25,500 Air VLB Leguan
11,500 National Guard 23,000) Paramilitary 220,000 NBC VEHICLES 10 TPz-1 Fuchs NBC
Conscript liability 30 months selective, varies by region for ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
all services MSL • MANPATS IMI MAPATS
RCL 106mm 175 M40A1
RESERVE 8,000 (Army 8,000) GUNS • SP 76mm 75 M18 Hellcat
434 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

ARTILLERY 515+ TRANSPORT

SP 60: 152mm 48 2S19 Msta-S (replacing Mk F3s); 155mm 1 sqn with Beech 200 King Air; C-212 Aviocar; Turbo
12 Mk F3 Commander 980C
TOWED 92: 105mm 80: 40 M101A1; 40 Model 56 pack TRAINING
howitzer; 155mm 12 M114A1 1 hel sqn with Bell 206B Jet Ranger II; TH-57A Sea Ranger
MRL 56: 122mm 24 BM-21 Grad; 160mm 20 LAR SP TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
(LAR-160); 300mm 12 9A52 Smerch 1 sqn with Bell 412EP Twin Huey; Mi-17V-5 Hip H
GUN/MOR 120mm 13 2S23 NONA-SVK EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MOR 294+: 81mm 165; SP 81mm 21 Dragoon 300PM; AIRCRAFT 2 combat capable
AMX-VTT; 120mm 108: 60 Brandt; 48 2S12 MP 2 C-212-200 MPA*
AIRCRAFT TPT • Light 7: 1 Beech C90 King Air; 1 Beech 200 King
TPT • Light 28: 1 Beech 90 King Air; 1 Beech 200 King Air; Air; 4 C-212 Aviocar; 1 Turbo Commander 980C
1 Beech 300 King Air; 1 Cessna 172; 6 Cessna 182 Skylane; HELICOPTERS
2 Cessna 206; 2 Cessna 207 Stationair; 1 IAI-201 Arava; 2 ASW 4 Bell 212 ASW (AB-212 ASW)
IAI-202 Arava; 11 M-28 Skytruck MRH 12: 6 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 6 Mi-17V-5 Hip
HELICOPTERS TPT • Light 1 Bell 206B Jet Ranger II (trg)
TRG 1 TH-57A Sea Ranger
ATK 10 Mi-35M2 Hind
MRH 32: 10 Bell 412EP; 2 Bell 412SP; 20 Mi-17V-5 Hip H Marines ε15,000
TPT 9: Heavy 3 Mi-26T2 Halo; Medium 2 AS-61D; Light
FORCES BY ROLE
4: 3 Bell 206B Jet Ranger, 1 Bell 206L3 Long Ranger II
COMMAND
1 div HQ
Navy ε22,300; ε3,200 conscript (total ε25,500) SPECIAL FORCES
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 spec ops bde
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 2: MANOEUVRE
2 Sabalo (GER T-209/1300) with 8 single 533mm TT with Amphibious
SST-4 HWT 1 amph aslt bde
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 6 3 mne bde
FFGHM 6 Mariscal Sucre (ITA mod Lupo) with 8 single 3 (rvn) mne bde
lnchr with Otomat Mk2 AShM, 1 octuple Albatros lnchr COMBAT SUPPORT
with Aspide SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with A244 1 cbt engr bn
LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) 1 MP bde
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10 1 sigs bn
PSOH 3 Guaiqueri with 1 Millennium CIWS, 1 76mm gun COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
(1 damaged in explosion in 2016) 1 log bn
PBG 3 Federación (UK Vosper 37m) with 2 single lnchr EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
with Otomat Mk2 AShM ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
PB 4: 3 Constitucion (UK Vosper 37m) with 1 76mm gun; LT TK 10 VN-16
1 Fernando Gomez de Saa (Damen 4207) IFV 21: 11 VN-1; 10 VN-18
AMPHIBIOUS APC • APC (W) 37 EE-11 Urutu
LANDING SHIPS • LST 4 Capana (capacity 12 tanks; AAV 11 LVTP-7
200 troops) (FSU Alligator) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
ARV 1 VN-16 ARV
LANDING CRAFT 3:
AEV 1 AAVR7
LCU 2 Margarita (river comd)
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
UCAC 1 Griffon 2000TD
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav; 106mm M40A1
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 10
ARTILLERY 30
AGOR 1 Punta Brava
TOWED 105mm 18 M-56
AGS 2
MOR 120mm 12 Brandt
AKL 4 Los Frailes PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR 23:
AORH 1 Ciudad Bolivar 18 Constancia; 2 Manaure; 3 Terepaima (Cougar)
ATF 1 AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • 1 LCM; 1 LCU;
AXS 1 Simon Bolivar 12 LCVP

Naval Aviation 500 Coast Guard 1,000

FORCES BY ROLE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 22
1 sqn with Bell 212 (AB-212) PSO 3 Guaicamacuto with 1 Millennium CIWS, 1 76 mm
MARITIME PATROL gun (capacity 1 Bell 212 (AB-212) hel) (1 additional
1 flt with C-212-200 MPA vessel in build)
 Latin America and the Caribbean 435

PB 19: 12 Gavion; 1 Pagalo (Damen Stan 2606); 4 Petrel AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

(US Point); 2 Protector AAM • IR AIM-9L/P Sidewinder; R-73 (AA-11 Archer);
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 5 PL-5E; R-27T/ET (AA-10B/D Alamo); IIR Python 4; SARH
AG 2 Los Tanques (salvage ship) R-27R/ER (AA-10A/C Alamo); ARH R-77 (AA-12 Adder)
AKSL 1 ASM Kh-29L/T (AS-14A/B Kedge); Kh-59M (AS-18 Kazoo)
AP 2 AShM Kh-31A (AS-17B Krypton); AM39 Exocet
ARM Kh-31P (AS-17A Krypton)
Air Force 11,500
FORCES BY ROLE Air Defence Command (CODAI)
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Joint service command with personnel drawn from other
1 sqn with F-5 Freedom Fighter (VF-5) services
2 sqn with F-16A/B Fighting Falcon FORCES BY ROLE
4 sqn with Su-30MKV AIR DEFENCE
2 sqn with K-8W Karakorum* 5 AD bde
GROUND ATTACK/ISR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano*; OV-10A Bronco 1 log bde (5 log gp)
ELECTRONIC WARFARE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sqn with Falcon 20DC; SA-227 Metro III (C-26B) AIR DEFENCE
TRANSPORT SAM
1 sqn with Y-8; C-130H Hercules; KC-137 Long-range S-300VM
1 sqn with A319CJ; B-737 Medium-range 9K317M2 Buk-M2E (SA-17 Grizzly);
4 sqn with Cessna T206H; Cessna 750 S-125 Pechora-2M (SA-26)
1 sqn with Cessna 500/550/551; Falcon 20F; Falcon 900 Point-defence 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch); ADAMS;
1 sqn with G-222; Short 360 Sherpa Mistral; RBS-70
TRAINING GUNS 440+
1 sqn with Cessna 182N; SF-260E SP 40mm 12+: 6+ AMX-13 Rafaga; 6 M42
2 sqn with DA40NG; DA42VI TOWED 428+: 20mm: 114 TCM-20; 23mm ε200 ZU-23-
1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano* 2; 35mm; 40mm 114+: 114+ L/70; Some M1
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 VIP sqn with AS532UL Cougar; Mi-172 National Guard (Fuerzas Armadas de
3 sqn with AS332B Super Puma; AS532 Cougar Cooperacion) 23,000
2 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H (Internal sy, customs) 9 regional comd
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 93 combat capable ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

Latin America and

FTR 21: 17 F-16A Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16B Fighting Falcon APC • APC (W) 44: 24 Fiat 6614; 20 UR-416

FGA 23 Su-30MKV
ATK 7 OV-10A Bronco
EW 4: 2 Falcon 20DC; 2 SA-227 Metro III (C-26B)
TKR 1 KC-137
TPT 75: Medium 14: 5 C-130H Hercules (some in store);
1 G-222; 8 Y-8; Light 56: 6 Beech 200 King Air; 2 Beech
350 King Air; 10 Cessna 182N Skylane; 12 Cessna 206
Stationair; 4 Cessna 208B Caravan; 1 Cessna 500 Citation
I; 3 Cessna 550 Citation II; 1 Cessna 551; 1 Cessna 750
Citation X; 2 Do-228-212; 1 Do-228-212NG; 11 Quad City
Challenger II; 2 Short 360 Sherpa; PAX 5: 1 A319CJ; 1 B-737;
1 Falcon 20F; 2 Falcon 900
TRG 84: 24 DA40NG; 6 DA42VI; 18 EMB-312 Tucano*; 24
K-8W Karakorum*; 12 SF-260E
HELICOPTERS
MRH 8 Mi-17 (Mi-17VS) Hip H
TPT 23: Medium 15: 3 AS332B Super Puma; 8 AS532
Cougar; 2 AS532UL Cougar; 2 Mi-172 (VIP); Light at least
8 Enstrom 480B
the Caribbean
ARTILLERY • MOR 50 81mm
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 34: 12
Protector; 12 Punta; 10 Rio Orinoco II
AIRCRAFT
TPT • Light 34: 1 Beech 55 Baron; 1 Beech 80 Queen Air;
1 Beech 90 King Air; 1 Beech 200C King Air; 3 Cessna
152 Aerobat; 2 Cessna 172; 2 Cessna 402C; 4 Cessna
U206 Stationair; 6 DA42 MPP; 1 IAI-201 Arava; 12 M-28
Skytruck
TRG 3: 1 PZL 106 Kruk; 2 PLZ M2-6 Isquierka
HELICOPTERS
MRH 13: 8 Bell 412EP; 5 Mi-17V-5 Hip H
TPT • Light 19: 9 AS355F Ecureuil II; 4 AW109; 5 Bell
206B/L Jet Ranger/Long Ranger; 1 Bell 212 (AB 212);
TRG 5 F-280C
Paramilitary ε220,000
Bolivarian National Militia ε220,000
436 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Arms procurements and deliveries –

Latin America and the Caribbean
Significant events in 2018

„„ Spanish company Indra and Colombian company „„ Brazil announced the shortlist for its Tamandaré
Codaltec signed in June an agreement to develop an corvette programme in October, which will see four
air-defence system. The two companies will begin vessels acquired for US$1.5bn:
work on a command-and-control system that will zz Saab and Damen Schelde with Consub – SIGMA
integrate data from different sensors. It is unclear 10514 with the Saab 9LV combat-management
if the system will eventually include ground-based system;
air defence or will comprise an air-surveillance zz TKMS with Embraer and Oceana shipyard –
network. MEKO A100;
zz Leonardo and Fincantieri with Vard Promar
„„ In July, Boeing and Brazil’s Embraer agreed a shipyard – a modification of the Barroso-class
deal that will see Boeing acquire through a new design;
US$4.75bn joint venture (JV) a controlling stake in zz Naval Group – Gowind 2500.
Embraer’s commercial-aircraft business. Embraer will
retain control of its defence business but the two „„ The first series-production Embraer KC-390 was
companies are also discussing creating a JV for sales, flown on its maiden flight on 9 October. This allowed
support and manufacturing of Embraer’s KC-390 the aircraft to be awarded its civil certificate of air-
transport aircraft. worthiness. The first KC-390 for the Brazilian Air Force
is expected to be delivered in the first half of 2019 with
full operating capability to be achieved by the end of
the year.

▼ Figure 26 Latin America and the Caribbean: selected ongoing or completed procurement priorities in 2018

8
Number of Countries

The Caribbean
6 Mexico and Central America
Purchasing

Western South America

Southern South America
4 Northern South America

0
s
**

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*Data reflects the number of countries with equipment-procurement contracts either ongoing or completed in 2018. Data includes only procurement programmes for which a production contract
has been signed. The data does not include upgrade programmes.
**Armoured fighting vehicles not including main battle tanks ***Includes combat-capable training aircraft IISS
©
 Latin America and the Caribbean 437

▼ Figure 27 Naval Group: Programa de Desenvolvimento de Submarinos (PROSUB)

The Brazilian Navy has operated conventionally powered

submarines (SSKs) since the 1920s. Patrol requirements in
S-BR
the southern Atlantic and in Brazil’s exclusive economic
zone, including hydrocarbon fields, has led Brasilia to
recently sharpen focus on developing a nuclear-propulsion
capacity. These ambitions are long-standing and pre-date
the 1978 beginning of the Submarino com Propulsão Nuclear
Brasileiro (SN-BR) programme. SN-BR
This project languished until the 2000s. In 2008, France and
Brazil signed a series of defence-cooperation agreements.
This was followed later that year by the establishment of the
Programa de Desenvolvimento de Submarinos (PROSUB)
office in Brazil, with the intention of developing an
indigenous nuclear-propulsion capability, as well as
acquiring new SSKs.
Brazil’s National Defence Strategy was published in 2009, Programme costs
which restated the intent to ‘maintain and develop [Brazil’s] 2009 Senate estimate 2013 audit estimate
ability to design and manufacture both conventional and
nuclear-propelled submarines’. Contracts signed with France
in 2009 formalised many of the 2008 agreements: Naval Group
would transfer technology and support Brazil’s efforts to
build four Scorpéne-class SSKs and a larger
nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) based on that design. The
first of each type was planned to enter service in 2015 and
2021 respectively.
Despite construction starting on the first SSK in 2010, the
programme is now several years behind schedule, largely R$6.79 billion R$27.33 billion
due to budgetary challenges that have affected many
government programmes. PROSUB has also been caught up (US$3.40bn) (US$12.67bn)
in Brazilian anti-corruption investigations. The first SSK is
now expected to be delivered in 2020 and the SSN in 2029.

Latin America and

Contractor(s) and responsibilities
 Naval Group (formerly DCNS): technology transfer, 
construction of some submarine parts, supply of
torpedoes and countermeasures

 Itaguaí Construções Navais (ICN): construction of the
five submarines
 Odebrecht: design and construction of the new ICN
shipyard and naval base
the Caribbean
Nuclebrás Equipamentos Pesados (NUCLEP):
production of the nuclear-propulsion system
Amazônia Azul Tecnologias de Defesa (AMAZUL):
development of nuclear-propulsion and nuclear-
fuelling site in new naval base

Programme Vessel name Pennant number First-steel cut Launched Commissioned

SN-BR Álvaro Alberto SN-10 - - -
S-BR Riachuelo S-40 27 May 2010 - -
S-BR Humaitá S-41 04 Sep 2013 - -
S-BR Tonelero S-42 13 Jan 2015 - -
S-BR Angostura S-43 23 Feb 2016 - -

© IISS
Chapter One
Sixty years of The Military Balance
This 2019 edition of The Military Balance marks 60
years since the publication first appeared, in late 1959,
as a slim pamphlet of just 11 pages. The latest edition
has been compiled by the IISS’s Defence and Military
Analysis Programme, the Institute’s largest research
team with 14 permanent staff. That first volume was
produced single-handedly by Alastair Buchan, the
first Director of what was then called The Institute
for Strategic Studies. The Foreword stated that it was
published ‘as a contribution to the growing concern
that is developing throughout the world about the
arms race’. It is apparent, from these early editions,
that the focus was very much on nuclear capabilities
and missile systems. The rationale behind the first
pamphlet was that there would be considerable value
in collating published information ‘into one simple
comparative analysis […] in order to provide a firmer
basis, not only of the discussion of “the balance of
terror”, but of the problems of disarmament’.
It is also true that the appearance of that first
volume stemmed in part from concerns expressed
to the Director by senior Western defence officials
about a lack of public understanding over the size
and nature of the Soviet military challenge to Europe.
Indeed, the short paper Making Headway, The First
Five Years of the ISS said that ‘the responsible private
citizen ... had little but occasional official statements
and the sensational reports of newspapers to judge
whether, for instance, there was a “missile gap”, how
strong the Russian army was, or what was the state of
India’s defences’.
Today, the problem is of a different character.
There is a torrent of accessible information from
a profusion of sources. But making sense of it all is
another matter. Indeed, for an audience that is reac-
quainting itself with the degree to which information
can be manipulated, there is still a place for sober,
evidence-based and independent sources of informa-
tion and analysis, like The Military Balance.
The book evolves
The amount of data in the book has significantly
increased over the years. The first volume – called
The Soviet Union and The NATO Powers, The Military
Balance – contained information on just 15 states. The
tenth edition in 1968–69, now solely titled The Military
Balance (as it had been since the 1963–64 edition),
contained information on 59 states; in the 2019 book,
the tally is at 171. As Sir Michael Howard has pointed
out, Alastair Buchan and his successors were ‘later to
lament that they had got themselves stuck with the
title The Military Balance, providing as it does so stark
and conceptually misleading an idea of the complex
nature of military power’. But, he continued, ‘stuck
they are, and “MilBal” has become the Institute’s flag-
ship’.
In some respects the increase in the number of
countries assessed in the book has reflected the inter-
nationalisation of the Institute, from the early 1960s
onwards, in terms of the composition of its Council,
the scope of its research activity as well as its staffing.
The word ‘International’ was adopted as a prefix
by the organisation in the early 1970s. Not 20 years
ago, the editorial team for The Military Balance was
mainly composed of former commissioned officers
from the UK armed forces. Today we are an over-
whelmingly civilian and increasingly international
team. The way in which we display our data has
also changed significantly over the years. Today, the
book contains detailed lists of military organisations
subdivided according to role, while military equip-
ment is broken down according to its type. In doing
this, we are mindful of the need to maintain catego-
ries that can be compared between states, as well as
the wish of the Institute’s Council in 1964 that The
Military Balance retain the compression of the original
edition, so making it easier to find information. This
also helps ensure that the book remains portable.
The 2019 edition may be heavier than the first, but it
remains a one-volume publication that can easily be
carried in an attaché case.
This is one of the features that continues to distin-
guish The Military Balance from other publications in
the field. In deciding which information to prioritise
in the book, we are mindful that we cannot accommo-
date the complete range of military systems operated
by states. We display data that we think is essen-
tial to national military power. Naturally, this starts
10 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
with strategic systems, and then progresses through
combat weapons systems and combat support equip-
ment. We are more selective on the latter and partic-
ularly so when it comes to combat service support
(such as logistics and transport) although, of course,
we realise that these capacities are vital to armed
forces. And it means that some readers may disagree
with us on our choices.
A comparable dataset
Another distinguishing feature, enabled by the
book’s concision, is the capacity it provides to
compare data categories between country entries.
Indeed, this quickly became one of its principal
features, exemplified early on by its comparative
tables of strategic nuclear systems. The ability to
compare, over time, the same categories of organisa-
tion and equipment (as well as defence economics)
data was helped by the introduction of formal data
categorisation. This function developed incremen-
tally, though for equipment it was greatly helped
by the public emergence of equipment definitions
as part of the discussions over conventional arms
control in Europe. Importantly, these were then
used by the states that were party to these agree-
ments. The same could be said for the emergence of
counting rules associated with strategic-arms-limi-
tation agreements.
Of course, because of the breadth of our data, even
developments like this did not meet all our needs.
For instance, the equipment lists for arms-control
agreements might only contain definitions for the
equipment within the scope of these agreements – so
excluding a range of national military equipment. The
Institute therefore has its own ways of more formally
categorising military equipment, again to assist in the
process of comparing across countries. We publish
information on these judgements in our ‘Explanatory
Notes’. Sometimes, countries disagree with them and
tell us so. But we have to adopt a system that enables
the comparison of equipment and forces between
states. These comparative approaches remain valu-
able. The Military Balance still publishes its table of
‘international comparisons of defence expenditure
and military personnel’ as well as a range of other
comparative tables and charts. These days, govern-
ments use our data in public forums for reasons
including its reliability and its accessibility; indeed,
because it is unclassified, governments may feel more
comfortable publishing Military Balance data than
releasing their own.
The Military Balance+
The launch, in early 2017, of the Military Balance+
interactive digital database started a new era not
just in the way we present our defence information,
but also in the way that it can be used. We created
a searchable system that allows users to query the
data for themselves and provides the option to down-
load our defence data in spreadsheet form. This is
a significant change for our customers, who now
no longer have to laboriously type our information
into their own database; now they can download
our information and integrate it in a fraction of the
time taken previously. The database also allows us to
diverge from the focus on concision. We do not have
to employ so many abbreviations online and have the
ability to include more data categories without the
restrictions imposed by a bound book. It also allows
us to move away from an annual publication cycle.
We will retain the printed book, but this will in time
provide us with a platform to present perhaps more
discrete datasets, as well as conduct more analysis of
our information.
Assessing military power
In its early years, senior Institute staff were concerned
not just that The Military Balance remain concise, but
that it remain a primarily quantitative publication.
Indeed, one of the reasons for the establishment of
the complementary Strategic Survey in 1967 was that
the Institute needed a publication where matters of
defence policy could be analysed, allowing The Military
Balance to focus on quantitative assessments. But over
recent decades, we have again introduced into the
book analysis of defence plans, and the regional secu-
rity environments within which nations frame their
defence policies. This reflects the view that solely
examining equipment, and examining military capa-
bilities quantitatively, tells only part of the story of
national military power. Understanding more about
national defence policy is important too, as it gives
the analyst information about what a nation might
envisage as tasks for its armed forces. Policies can be
used as guides against which to measure inventories
and procurement plans: are these, for instance, well
matched against the roles intended for armed forces?
A range of other factors are also important in these
more qualitative assessments. Operational experience
is one, as is robust military training, and we track in
our database information on key military exercises
undertaken by states as well as their deployments.
Also noteworthy is an understanding of the legisla-

tive steps that countries need to take before they can
actually deploy their armed forces; it is easier for
some than others. We cover additional areas in our
‘capability summaries’, such as a country’s alliance
relations and its defence-industrial base. But these are
only indicators. Indeed, if The Military Balance was to
engage in more thoroughgoing qualitative studies,
it might have to also compare between states factors
including doctrine, organisation, training, materiel,
leadership and education, personnel, facilities and
interoperability (collectively termed DOTMLPFI by
NATO), with the trade-offs between thoroughness
and concision that this would entail.
Focusing on the future
That said, there are questions now over what areas of
military power we may look to assess, and to quan-
tify, so as to still generate useful comparative assess-
ments in future. Should we sharpen our focus on
aspects of ‘traditional’ post-Second World War mili-
tary power that are once more absorbing the attention
of governments, such as strategic nuclear forces and
manoeuvre warfare capabilities, at the expense of,
say, systems useful in constabulary roles? Of course,
an answer to the question ‘how important are these
weapons’ may depend in large part on the location in
which you happen to be sitting when the question is
posed. And the Institute is mindful of the interests of
its global membership and worldwide readership, as
well as the reality that ‘non-traditional’ security chal-
lenges can fairly rapidly become more traditional.
Whether to include some new weapons systems
may be seen as relatively clear-cut decisions – in time
we can perhaps expect hypersonic systems to begin
featuring in aerospace inventories – though these
would still require clear methodological guidelines.
But these decisions are harder to make for dual-use
systems. For instance, in the 1980s there were sugges-
tions that we should include more on space-based
capabilities – the US Strategic Defense Initiative
was noted in mid-decade by an external analyst as a
possible area of focus. For space, which has relatively
recently emerged as a conflict domain, it is difficult
to determine how relevant some civilian satellites
may be to military power. For example, armed forces
may have access to bandwidth on civilian commu-
nications satellites, but determining which satellites
are subject to these agreements may be problematic.
They may also have access to remote-sensing satel-
lites. However, these judgements are more straight-
forward when it comes to early-warning satellites.
Sixty years of The Military Balance 11
New capabilities are emerging, like cyber power,
autonomous systems, robotics and more technologi-
cally enabled systems, such as command-and-control
networks improved with artificial intelligence and
machine learning. A key challenge for analysts, and
certainly for us working with comparative data, is first
to begin understanding how to assess these. In recent
years we have begun to look at proxies for making
judgements about military cyber power; for instance,
does a country have a military cyber organisation,
or has it declared an offensive cyber capability? We
are now engaged on a more thoroughgoing project
to define metrics to measure cyber power. Of course,
a key problem we will face is that cyber power is not
solely a military phenomenon. It is critical to military
systems, but also vital to economic and energy secu-
rity, and much of the expertise may lie in the private
sector. Nonetheless, our task is to identify categories
that the Institute can begin to assess, and a method-
ology that it can apply in doing so.
As we gather our data, now and in the future,
we adhere to an established formula. The Institute is
independent and owes no allegiance to any govern-
ment. We still, each year, solicit comments from
countries on the data we publish, and to this end we
maintain lines of communication with ministries of
defence and armed forces. These contacts allow us
not just to solicit information, but also to engage in
a dialogue about data points through the year. We
also regularly contact specialists outside govern-
ment and we conduct continual open-source infor-
mation gathering. With the volume of information
in the public domain growing near-exponentially,
this cuts two ways. For instance, increasing print and
online imagery is a valuable aid to the analyst, but
its practical utility depends on judgements we make,
including over veracity. However, the judgements we
make are ours alone.
From its inception, The Military Balance proved its
value. Its data was used as a key source by the media
from the first editions, and over the years it has also
been used by governments and officials compiling
their own defence publications. Examples include
Marshal Vasily Sokolovsky’s 1962 book Military
Strategy, documents, speeches and publications by
ministries of defence including the UK Ministry of
Defence and the US Department of Defense, testi-
mony to the US Congress, reports by other think tanks
and even the 1980s Soviet propaganda pamphlets
entitled Whence the Threat to Peace, issued as a riposte
to the Pentagon’s Soviet Military Power. In some cases,
12 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
of course, organisations will use our information
selectively. Selecting and collating the information
is not straightforward. In 1964, it was said that four
months of intensive work went into the production
of the book. By 1968, this had grown to six to nine
months. Now, production of the book and database is
a year-round activity.
For many of those who work on and use our
data, the book is a mine of information. Equipment
has come and gone during these 60 years, such as
the F-111 and the SR-71, but careful examination of
the information indicates that there are also signif-
icant elements of continuity. For instance, some
defence equipment has been in service throughout
the 60 years. This includes the Centurion, T-34, T-54
and T-55 tanks and the MiG-21, Tu-95 and Tu-16
aircraft (variants of the latter serving as China’s H-6
bomber) and the U-2 and B-52. The current plan is
for the B-52 to still be in service in 2050 (it first flew in
1952, six years before the ISS was founded). Sherman
main battle tanks only disappeared from our data in
the last year, when we assessed that they were no
longer in active Paraguayan service (three remain as
recovery vehicles in Mexico). At the same time, for the
defence specialist the books offer a window on plans
that failed to carry through – the first edition notes
that ‘the supersonic TSR-2 will replace the Canberra
for tactical purposes’. Those who began producing
the book intended it to provide an authoritative basis
of accessible information on which debates around
military affairs could be centred. We still retain that
ambition.
Challenges in nuclear-arms control:
past and present
Nuclear-arms control is back at the centre of interna-
tional-security debates. Although agreements related
to the control of arms and the conduct of warfare
have existed for centuries, the modern concept of
arms control emerged as a result of the scholarly
debate at the dawn of the Cold War about how to
avoid a future conflict, particularly one involving
nuclear weapons. The current group of treaties that
define arms control – conventional, nuclear and other
‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMD) – served the
world well in managing the Cold War and the period
of relative peace that followed.
However, arms-control regimes have come under
increasing pressure since the late 1990s and are
now in a period of unprecedented crisis. Should the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and
New START collapse, the world may be without any
bilateral nuclear-arms-control agreements between
the two states with the largest nuclear arsenals –
Russia and the United States – for the first time since
the 1960s. The risk is that the absence of arms control
between these two powers may lead to an arms race
with unpredictable consequences and instability that
could lead to a new Cold War or potentially even to
conflict.
Defining terms
The US launched the first nuclear-arms-control effort,
the Baruch Plan, in 1946, under which the US would
transfer control of its arsenal to the United Nations
in exchange for a verifiable ban on nuclear weapons,
to be followed by the elimination of the US nuclear
inventory. This proposal failed, not least because the
Soviet Union was quickly developing its own nuclear
arsenal. Early efforts towards disarmament (including
competing proposals throughout the 1950s and 1960s
in the Committee on Disarmament) failed largely
because they focused on eliminating the weapons, as
though they were the cause of international conflicts,
rather than a symptom of them. Scholars therefore
sought a better approach.
The best definition of arms control to emerge
from the early thinking of Cold War theorists is by
Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin in
their seminal 1961 book, Strategy and Arms Control.
This book defined the term to include ‘all the forms
of military cooperation between potential enemies
in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its
scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and
economic costs of being prepared for it’. They also
highlighted how ‘common interest’ between adver-
saries could lead to cooperation to avoid conflict,
as well as asserting that arms control could include
reductions or increases in weapons – as long as it
focused on establishing stability and reducing the
incentive for either side to initiate conflict.
Arms control was seen as a way not just to prevent
nuclear war, but also to manage the arms race and
competition for new weapons systems, as well as a
means to buy time in order to solve underlying polit-
ical conflicts. Setting a clearer context and meaning
for arms control and its adoption within national
strategies helped policymakers and publics alike not
only to embrace arms control but also begin to find
ways of implementing it.
The Cuban Missile Crisis focuses minds
The US, USSR and UK had been discussing a ban
on testing since the late 1950s, but it was the Cuban
Missile Crisis in 1962 that gave the US and Soviet
political and military leadership the political will to
embrace arms control, and particularly nuclear-arms
control, as a way to manage tensions and risks during
the Cold War.
The first tentative steps towards limiting the
nuclear-arms race came days after the end of the
Cuban Missile Crisis, with then Soviet premier Nikita
Khrushchev’s proposals to limit nuclear risks. This led
to an agreement that established a direct communica-
tions link between Moscow and Washington in June
1963 (the ‘hotline’ agreement) and the Partial Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty in August 1963, which limited tests
by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the US
(but not China or France). The goodwill achieved led
to the start of US–USSR talks on stopping the spread
of nuclear weapons, first in space, resulting in the
Outer Space Treaty of January 1967, and then glob-
ally, resulting in a joint draft treaty by the US and
USSR on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) in August 1967. The NPT entered into force
14 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
in 1970, legally limiting the number of countries that
could possess nuclear weapons.
The golden age of Cold War arms control
Early successes in US–USSR talks helped build
support among NATO members for arms control,
as expressed in the December 1967 Report of the
Council on the Future Tasks of the Alliance (known
as the Harmel Report). The Harmel Report defined
the original dual-track approach of deterrence and
dialogue, which led directly to NATO’s so-called
‘Reykjavik signal’ of 1968, which called for multi-
lateral nuclear- and conventional-arms-control talks
with the Warsaw Pact, known as the Mutual and
Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). The Harmel
Report also led NATO to support the launch of the
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
(CSCE), which led to the Helsinki process, resulting
in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 (which included
transparency over large-scale military exercises). In
parallel, bilateral US–USSR negotiations resulted in
three key agreements in May 1972: the Agreement
on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the
High Seas (INCSEA); the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT); and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty. This momentum also led to the negotiation
and signature (but not ratification) of SALT II (1979).
Global efforts to address other WMD resulted in the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
of 1972, which entered into force in 1975.
The SS-20 crisis and the INF Treaty
Despite the progress on arms control, tensions
between the US and USSR increased through the
1970s. A notable escalation occurred with the Soviet
introduction of a new, destabilising nuclear missile in
Europe, the 15Zh45 (SS-20 Saber) in 1977. The SS-20
was a direct threat to stability because of its effective-
ness as a first-strike weapon. Critically, it was road-
mobile and harder to strike than a fixed launcher. It
was also solid-fuelled, and therefore ready to launch
in minutes rather than the hours it took to prepare a
liquid-fuelled rocket. The SS-20 also was highly accu-
rate, with multiple warheads, unlike the 8K63 (SS-4
Sandal) and 8K65 (SS-5 Skean) missiles it replaced,
which required far higher-yield nuclear warheads to
damage their targets reliably. Because of this, the SS-4
and SS-5 missiles were seen as retaliatory rather than
first-strike weapons. However, the introduction of the
SS-20 led NATO allies to worry that the Soviet Union
intended to launch a first strike (including SS-20s and
shorter-range nuclear systems) to knock out NATO
command-and-control systems and key airfields and
seaports in Europe and prevent the US and Canada
from bringing reinforcements from North America.
This scenario would give Washington a stark choice
after a first strike: to retaliate against Soviet targets
and risk strikes on the continental US, or to ‘de-couple’
from Europe and allow the battlefield to be contained
only on the territory of European NATO and Warsaw
Pact states.
NATO reacted to the introduction of the SS-20 by
reaching a second ‘dual-track’ decision in December
1979, declaring that, on the one hand, NATO would
restore deterrence through basing a similar nuclear-
weapon system in Europe – the Pershing II ground-
launched ballistic missile (GLBM) and BGM-109G
Gryphon ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)
– thus eliminating any perceived Soviet first-
strike advantage. On the other hand, NATO would
offer a route to reduce now-mutual risks through
nuclear-arms control: specifically, a ban on ground-
launched missiles with a range between 1,000 kilo-
metres and 5,500 km in the European theatre. NATO
member states met intensively from 1979 onwards
to design and agree to the parameters of a treaty,
which continued through the negotiations. Bilateral
US–USSR talks, augmented by consultation among
NATO member states before and after each round
of talks, began in 1981 but collapsed in 1983 with the
deployment of the Pershing II ballistic-missile and
Gryphon cruise-missile systems in Europe. Like the
SS-20, both of these systems were road-mobile and
solid-fuelled. However, following a pivotal summit
between then US president Ronald Reagan and then
Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik in
1986, both sides agreed to a global ban on Soviet and
US intermediate-range ground-launched missiles
and shorter-range systems. The INF Treaty, signed
in 1987, banned GLBMs and GLCMs with ranges
between 1,000 km and 5,500 km (‘intermediate-range
missiles’, according to the treaty text) and ‘shorter-
range’ GLBMs and GLCMs with ranges between 500
km and 1,000 km.
Helsinki and the end of the Cold War
Meanwhile, through the CSCE process, the Helsinki
Final Act chapter on military transparency became
the Stockholm Document of 1986, which contained
more extensive and mandatory military-transpar-
ency rules, especially over military exercises, known
as Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. The

Stockholm Document was expanded and updated
in 1990, renamed the Vienna Document, further
updated in 1992, 1994 and 1999, and is now known
as the Vienna Document 2011. The MBFR talks ended
in 1989 without producing a treaty, but the wide-
ranging talks, which included discussion of nuclear
weapons and aerial verification, resulted in the
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
in 1990. The aerial-verification regime was turned into
its own treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, which provides
the right to overfly all territory of each party (signed
in 1992, but did not enter into force until 2002). On the
bilateral track, success on the INF Treaty led to agree-
ment on START in 1991, which, along with the CFE
Treaty, provided verifiable, transparent reductions in
the Cold War conventional and nuclear arsenals.
Enthusiasm for arms control and disarmament
continued after the end of the Cold War, with the
US and USSR (later Russia) announcing unilateral
limits on short-range nuclear forces, known as the
Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI) of 1991 and
1992. A year later, Russia and the US subsequently
agreed to ban multiple independently targetable
re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) in START II (which did not
enter into force). Other successful arms-control efforts
included the ban on chemical weapons, known as
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which
was signed in 1993 and entered into force in 1997.
Less successful was the call for a ban on the produc-
tion of fissile material, the proposed Fissile Material
Cut-Off Treaty, which has been on the agenda of the
UN Conference on Disarmament since 1995 without
leading to a treaty, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was signed in 1996, but
is still not in force. The Agreement on the Adaptation
of the CFE Treaty suffered a similar fate in 1999, with
the treaty signed but still not in force. Critics of arms
control began to push back on the underlying concept
and framework (especially regarding the reliance on
bilateral US–Russia treaties), while concerns over
unaddressed non-compliance with existing agree-
ments emerged in the context of a range of agree-
ments, including the BTWC, CFE, CWC, INF, NPT
and PNI.
A new form of arms control
Discussion over the utility of arms control came to
the forefront of security debates with the US deci-
sion to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in 2002.
Russia retaliated by withdrawing its ratification of
the START II Treaty and pursuing MIRV-capable
Challenges in nuclear-arms control: past and present 15
strategic missile systems. Then US president George
W. Bush sought to introduce a new paradigm for
bilateral nuclear-arms control with Russia, submit-
ting a short and simple draft of a politically binding
agreement to limit deployed systems. However,
Russia insisted the treaty be legally binding, and
the result was the Strategic Offensive Reductions
Treaty (SORT). SORT lacked verification, instead
requiring each side to declare that it had reduced
the total number of its operationally deployed stra-
tegic nuclear warheads. SORT was superseded
by the 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, known as New START. Russia and the US
returned to a pattern of more complex agreements
that included verifiable elimination of nuclear
delivery systems and limits on strategic delivery
systems and deployed weapons that would reduce
numbers down to levels not seen since the late 1950s.
In February 2018, both parties announced they had
reached the central limits of New START. However,
the treaty did not limit MIRV-capable systems and,
with the new administration of President Donald
Trump, the US may be returning to the SORT
approach of simple but non-verifiable agreements,
instead of verifiable arms control. (For instance, John
Bolton – now national security advisor to President
Trump – as long ago as 2010 wrote critically of New
START’s ‘myopic focus on Russian arms levels’ and
advocated greater flexibility over launchers.) Russia,
in the meantime, rejected then US president Barack
Obama’s offer of further reductions in strategic
nuclear weapons as proposed in his Berlin speech
of June 2013.
SS-20 crisis redux
Since then, the crisis of arms-control compliance has
worsened. Russia’s willingness to violate the INF
Treaty in pursuit of dual-capable, precision ground-
launched cruise missiles of short and intermediate
range, in the context of its pursuit of a broader set of
strike capabilities, is of particular concern for stability.
Its introduction of the 9M729 (SSC-8 Screwdriver), a
road-mobile, dual-capable GLCM with a range likely
greater than 2,000 km, has reintroduced the spectre of
credible nuclear first strike to Europe for the first time
in a generation. At the very least, Russia’s unwilling-
ness to take decisive and transparent steps to allay
any concerns about the system or, more specifi-
cally, to destroy it in a verifiable way, has unsettled
European states.
Major landmarks in arms control, 1944–2017 16

1960 France first atomic test 1981 Intermediate-range Nuclear

1962 Cuban Missile Crisis
1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty; Hotline Agreement
1964 China first atomic test
1966 US nuclear weapons in
Europe peak (7,000)
1967 Harmel Report; Outer Space
Forces (INF) Treaty
negotiations begin
1983 US Pershing II missiles
deployed; INF negotiations
halt
1986 US–Soviet Reykjavik Summit;
Stockholm Document
1987 INF Treaty signed; global
THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

1944 US first atomic test Treaty nuclear stockpiles peak at

1945 US first atomic use
1946 Baruch Plan
1949 NATO formed
1949 Russia first atomic test
1968 Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) signed; Mutual and
Balanced Force Reduction
(MBFR) talks launched
64,000
1989 MBFR talks replaced by
Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe (CFE) talks
2002 Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty
(SORT) signed
2002 Open Skies entry
into force
▼ Figure 1 Major landmarks in arms control, 1944–2017

1940s 1960s 1980s 2000s

1950s 1970s 1990s 2010s

1954 US nuclear weapons
deployed in Europe
1955 Warsaw Pact formed
1970 NPT entry into force
1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT), Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty; Agreement on the
Prevention of Incidents on and
over the High Seas, Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention
signed
1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty
1975 Helsinki Final Act
1977 Russia deploys SS-20 missiles
1979 NATO dual-track decision;
SALT II
1990 CFE Treaty; Vienna 2010 New START Treaty
Document
2017 Nuclear Weapon
1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Ban Treaty signed
Treaty (START) I signed
1992 Open Skies Treaty signed
1993 START II signed; Chemical
Weapons Convention
signed (1997 entry into
force)
1995 NPT indefinite extension
1999 Adapted CFE Treaty signed;
Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty signed

Instead, Russia has pursued counter-charges that
the US had considered settled in the 1990s, while
denying the existence of the system in bilateral talks
from 2013 to 2017. In response, first the Obama admin-
istration and then the Trump administration sought
to increase political, military and economic pres-
sure on Russia to return to compliance and maintain
allied support (including NATO and Asian allies). In
December 2017, Russia admitted the existence of the
system, but denied it was a treaty violation, though
it gave no further explanation and made no effort
to resolve US concerns during 2018. As a result of
Russia’s action, the US declared Russia in violation
of the INF Treaty in July 2014 and has been seeking
support from allies for additional steps, while Russia
continues to deny it is in violation. On 4 December,
the US said it had found Russia in ‘material breach’
of the treaty and that it would suspend its obligations
‘as a remedy effective in 60 days unless Russia returns
to full and verifiable compliance’.
What’s next?
With little prospect of a positive resolution of the chal-
lenges facing the INF Treaty, nuclear-arms control is
at a critical stage. If Russia continues to violate the INF
Treaty, the extension of New START, which expires in
2021, is hard to envision. Some in the Trump adminis-
tration suggest that they could pursue another SORT-
type agreement, but while that likely is not Russia’s
preference – Moscow arguably would prefer verifi-
cation, plus legal limitations – both sides may find
that they currently have neither the funds nor the
inclination to engage in a strategic nuclear-arms race.
Both Moscow and Washington are already investing
significant sums in nuclear-force modernisation,
as they strive to reach their modernisation targets
within New START limits. However, both countries
have been developing air- and sea-launched inter-
mediate-range missile systems for some time, and
ground-launched systems are more likely to join the
mix should the INF Treaty collapse. In addition, other
states are developing and deploying such missile
systems, in particular China, with the majority of its
nuclear weapons delivered by intermediate-range
ground-launched systems. Indeed, it has been argued
that technology and the proliferation of related know-
how are passing the INF Treaty by. More countries
are seeking precision-guided, dual-capable cruise-
Challenges in nuclear-arms control: past and present 17
missile technology, as other advanced systems suited
to first-strike capabilities pass from drawing board
to deployment, including long-range cruise missiles,
hypersonic missiles and boost-glide systems.
One possible way forward was proposed by the
US and Russia in October 2007 in a joint statement
at the 62nd session of the UN General Assembly.
In the face of the proliferation of intermediate- and
shorter-range missiles, both sides proposed that addi-
tional countries (especially China) could join a call
to renounce ‘ground-launched ballistic and cruise
missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilome-
ters, leading to the destruction of any such missiles,
and the cessation of associated programs’. While this
proposal did not gain traction at the time, the spread
of such systems – both nuclear-capable and conven-
tional – has grown and the potential threat they pose
has become clearer. (In addition, the current impasse
over membership in the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR), with Russia blocking applications
for new membership and China not yet permitted to
join due to concerns over its export-control regime, has
prevented the MTCR from fully achieving its aims.)
The joint 2007 proposal could even be expanded to
include a ban on the development, production and
deployment of such systems, along with verifiable
destruction provisions. It is likely that, to succeed
today, such an agreement would also have to involve
air- and sea-launched systems. It could mean revis-
iting the idea – discussed as part of the original INF
Treaty proposals – of introducing regional limits on
intermediate-range missile systems, rather than an
outright ban.
Other issues will need to be addressed too,
including shorter-range nuclear weapons and new
technical problems. The latter includes long-distance
hypersonic weapons and the challenge they pose in
compressing a defender’s decision space; the related
role of artificial intelligence in military decision-
making loops; lethal autonomous weapons; and
how to (and whether it is possible to) deter cyber
attacks (which could potentially target early-warning
or nuclear-command-and-control facilities). While
arriving at the frameworks capable of managing
even one of these challenges could be problematic,
surviving a new, more complex, less predictable and
more multipolar equivalent of the Cold War could be
even more difficult.
Quantum computing and defence
The integration of quantum technologies currently
represents one of the most anticipated advances
for armed forces, yet their precise impact remains
difficult to predict. Although economical applica-
tions and widespread use are still years away, there
is little doubt that they will have disruptive effect
when they are employed at scale. In May 2018, the
head of quantum computing at technology firm
Intel suggested that ‘if 10 years from now we have a
quantum computer with a few thousand qubits, that
would certainly change the world in the same way the
first microprocessor did’. (A qubit, or quantum bit, is
the basic unit of information in a quantum computer,
analogous to a bit in a standard computer.) But while
quantum technology is expected to eventually have
far-reaching effects for military forces, intelligence
services and law-enforcement agencies, it is unclear
how far it will alter the traditional balance of power
among states, or between states and non-state actors.
Potential military applications
The field of quantum information science is giving
rise to multiple new defence-related applications that
are often grouped together under the single moniker
‘quantum’, but which merit independent consider-
ation. Quantum key distribution (QKD), quantum
cryptanalysis and quantum sensing all promise to
significantly affect strategic security in differing
ways. For example, QKD provides a near-term
advantage for defenders to secure their communica-
tions, while quantum cryptanalysis is an inherently
offensive capability, though one that is maturing at
a slower pace. Generalised quantum computing will
offer many other possibilities, but they are too uncer-
tain at this stage to permit concerted analysis of their
second-order effects.
The most common form of quantum encryption
is the transmission of cryptographic keys (i.e., QKD)
using quantum ‘superpositions’ of photons during
the initiation of secure communications sessions. In
keeping with Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, the
exact states of the photons are indeterminate until
they are isolated and measured – only then do they
exhibit a specific state of polarisation. As the very
process of intercepting (or ‘eavesdropping’ on) a qubit
irreversibly changes it, QKD offers a valuable means
of knowing if communications have been intercepted
and examined (e.g., through a ‘man-in-the-middle’
attack). This is analogous to using tamper-resistant
envelopes for sending letters via the standard postal
network. QKD technology is applicable to existing
systems for encrypted communications, but until the
last few years it had faced implementation challenges
over long distances, thereby rendering it impractical
outside limited environments.
Quantum cryptanalysis refers to the specific
application of quantum computing for decrypting
encoded messages. Current encryption standards
primarily rely upon mathematical algorithms for
encoding data, which are effectively unbreakable in
any reasonable period of time. For example, US mili-
tary-grade, Advanced Encryption Standard 256-bit
encryption would theoretically require billions
of years for modern computers to crack the code
through brute-force methods (i.e., ‘trial-and-error’ of
all possible solutions). Quantum computers, however,
will eventually be able to replace sequential trial-and-
error methods for processing such complex math-
ematical problems with alternate means to consider
many possibilities simultaneously. The promise
of quantum cryptanalysis is so alluring that some
countries are already beginning to collect encrypted
foreign communications with the expectation that
they will be able to extract valuable secrets from that
data in the future. When quantum cryptanalysis does
become available, it will significantly affect interna-
tional relations by making broadcast (or intercepted)
communications open to decryption. For countries
that extensively rely on encryption to secure mili-
tary operations, diplomatic correspondence or other
sensitive data, this could be a watershed event.
In September 2018, the United States published
its National Strategic Overview for Quantum
Information Science, which defined quantum sensing
as ‘leveraging quantum mechanics to enhance the
fundamental accuracy of measurements and/or
enabling new regimes or modalities for sensors and
measurement’. Such new capabilities would afford
clear military advantages. The United Kingdom’s
Defence Science Expert Committee has highlighted

the potential importance of improved gravity
sensors (quantum gravimeters), which could detect
moving masses under water, such as submarines.
Superconducting magnetometers that use quantum
technology to measure miniscule changes in magnetic
fields could also be used to locate enemy submarines,
while quantum radar could be used to detect even
low-observable aircraft. As the UK Defence Science
and Technology Laboratory has said, ‘it is anticipated
that new militarily disruptive technologies (e.g.,
novel communications or radar modalities) will be
enabled’. Quantum technologies already form part of
developments related to the miniaturisation of atomic
clocks, which are useful for position, navigation and
timing purposes.
Quantum computing will likely provide other
disruptive applications, although it is too early in
the research-and-development phase to foresee what
inventions lie ahead or how friendly forces or adver-
saries may leverage them. Quantum computing will
not entirely supplant classical computing methods
based on transistors and silicon microchips. Instead,
quantum computing should best be conceived of as
an alternative, complementary and even synergistic
technology that will be able to solve some prob-
lems that current computers cannot, but which will
most likely also be comparatively ineffective, or
only marginally better, for solving other problems at
which current computers excel.
National programmes
Several nations are heavily investing in quantum
research to gain economic and military advantage.
The dual-use nature of quantum computing means
that private companies and universities will also
play key roles in inventing and adapting these new
technologies. In its March 2018 submission to the
UK House of Commons Science and Technology
Committee, the Institute of Physics asserted that ‘the
UK needs to convert its strong research base into
commercial products, by deepening connections
between academia and industry, and capitalising on
relevant industrial strengths’. The extent to which a
nation-state can marshal resources to prioritise the
development of military applications may prove a
decisive edge in this new technological race.
China was an early leader in quantum research
and development. In 2016, Beijing initiated an effort
to achieve major breakthroughs in quantum tech-
nologies by 2030, and that same year it launched the
world’s first quantum satellite, which teleported a
Quantum computing and defence 19
photon to Earth in 2017. The Micius satellite has now
successfully completed QKD from orbit to ground
stations in Xinglong, China, and Graz, Austria. In
2017, China also established the first long-distance,
terrestrial quantum-communication link between
Beijing and Shanghai. These scientific achievements
represent landmark initiatives that could secure
China’s government communications against foreign
observation – at least until post-quantum crypt-
analysis becomes a functional reality. The planned
US$10-billion National Laboratory for Quantum
Information Sciences in Hefei, Anhui province, will
lead the nation’s drive for quantum computing and
sensing.
The US is another possible leader in the race to
realise quantum applications for defence. Since 2016,
the government has sponsored over US$200 million
in quantum research, and in 2018 the Department
of Energy and the National Science Foundation
committed another US$250m to support quantum
sensing, computing and communications through
two- to five-year grant awards. Among the armed
forces, the US Army Research Office funds extensive
research in quantum computing, while the US Air
Force sees it as transformative technology for infor-
mation and space warfare. But even more relevant
may be private-sector companies such as Google,
IBM, Intel and Microsoft, which have been conducting
quantum research for almost a decade. In the West,
they – along with the Canadian company D-Wave
Systems – are leading the development of quantum
computers that may run the quantum-enabled mili-
tary platforms of the future.
Collectively, European nations are also investing
substantially and making significant advances. The
European Commission’s quantum-technologies flag-
ship programme will be a large-scale research initia-
tive in the order of €1bn (US$1.1bn) over a ten-year
period. It is intended to focus on four main areas
of quantum technology: communication, compu-
tation, simulation and sensing. In 2013, the UK
government announced a five-year investment of
₤270m (US$422m) for its own National Quantum
Technologies Programme, which is intended
to ‘create a coherent government, industry and
academic quantum technology community’, and
quantum technologies were in late 2018 the subject
of a UK Parliamentary inquiry. French President
Emmanuel Macron signed a memorandum of
understanding with Australia’s then-prime minister
Malcolm Turnbull in May 2018 on a joint venture
20 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
between the two countries to develop and commer-
cialise a quantum silicon integrated circuit. This joint
venture will combine the efforts of the Australian
company Silicon Quantum Computing and the
French research institute Commissariat à l’énergie
atomique et aux énergies alternatives. Finally, in
September 2018, Germany announced new funding
for quantum-technologies research worth €650m
(US$771m) for the period 2018–22.
Russia is also investing in quantum computing,
at the Russian Quantum Center, but it has not
committed the same level of resources as other
nations and remains behind China and the US. That
may partially correlate with the overall decline in
Russian scientific-research capacity since the 1990s.
President Vladimir Putin has, however, reportedly
raised national spending on research and devel-
opment (R&D) to 1% of Russia’s gross domestic
product, with R187bn (US$3bn) earmarked for funda-
mental scientific R&D in 2018. Nonetheless, the recent
breakthroughs in quantum information science have
not been driven by Russian researchers, as is evident
from vocal US concerns about a growing ‘quantum
gap’ with China, without similar attention to threats
from Russia in this field.
Quantum supremacy
The term ‘quantum supremacy’ refers to the ability
of a quantum computer to perform tasks beyond
the capability of today’s most powerful conven-
tional supercomputers. Google announced a 72-qubit
processor in 2018 – surpassing IBM’s record the
previous year of 50 qubits – and said that its new chip
might achieve quantum supremacy within a year. But
it is not just the number of qubits that matters; rather,
a combination of factors – including the ‘depth’ of
a quantum circuit, or how many logical operations
it can perform before errors proliferate – affect the
true computational power that IBM researchers have
termed ‘quantum volume’. Intel shares the view that
quantum technologies are incredibly complex and
will require significant time to perfect commercial
applications.
It is also worth considering what quantum tech-
nologies might mean for geopolitics. There are
grounds for concern that the advent of quantum
technologies will only exacerbate the digital divide
among nations and increase security disparities. For
example, quantum cryptanalysis could theoretically
be a great equaliser, but in reality it may only become
available to wealthy, advanced countries who can
afford to operate the required assets. If a select
handful of countries can both force transparency on
their adversaries’ communications and safeguard
their own through QKD or post-quantum-encryp-
tion algorithms, then hegemonic relationships might
persist. The same could hold true for massive data
processing to deliver real-time intelligence and opera-
tional advantages to technically advanced states. This
potential new security dilemma was raised during
the 4th European Cybersecurity Forum in Krakow,
Poland, in October 2018.
Conversely, the development and widespread
diffusion of quantum technologies might over time
reduce the comparative advantage of some powers.
If every government can secure its communications,
process intelligence data with heretofore-unprece-
dented scale and speed, and detect foreign military
assets in the air or under the sea, then a levelling effect
might be observed. All that can be certain at this stage
is that technical quantum supremacy is both inevi-
table and close to hand, and that the disruptive effects
of quantum technologies will likely lead countries to
change their defence postures.
Chapter Two
Comparative defence statistics
Top 15 defence budgets 2018† US$bn
1. United States 2. China US$bn
3. Saudi Arabia 4. Russiaa
700

600

82.9 63.1 500

168.2
5. India 6. United Kingdom 7. France 400

300

57.9 56.1 53.4 200

8. Japan 9. Germany 10. South Korea
643.3
100

47.3 45.7 39.2 0

11. Brazil 12. Australia 13. Italy 14. Israelb 15. Iraq United Other Rest
States top 15 of the
countries world

28.0 26.6 24.9 21.6 19.6

a
Under NATO defence-spending definition; Includes US Foreign Military Assistance
b

Note: US dollar totals are calculated using average market exchange rates for 2018, derived using IMF data. The relative position of countries will vary not only as a result of actual adjustments in defence spending
levels, but also due to exchange-rate fluctuations between domestic currencies and the US dollar. The use of average exchange rates reduces these fluctuations, but the effects of such movements can be significant
in a number of cases. ©IISS

2018 top 15 defence and security budgets as a % of GDP*

Oman Saudi Afghanistan Iraq Israel Algeria Jordan Iran Kuwait Mali Armenia Russia Trinidad Cambodia Bahrain
Arabia and Tobago

11.0% 10.8% 10.1% 7.5% 5.9% 5.3% 4.7% 4.6% 4.3% 4.1% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 3.9% 3.8%
* Analysis only includes countries for which sufficient comparable data is available. Notable exceptions include Cuba, Eritrea, Libya, North Korea, Qatar, Syria and the UAE. ©IISS

Planned global defence expenditure by region 2018† Planned defence expenditure by country 2018†
Latin America
Latin America and
and the Caribbean, 3.6% Other NATO, 7.5%
the Caribbean
3.6% Sub-Saharan Africa Non-NATO Europe, 1.2%
Asia and 1.0%
Australasia
Other Eurasia, 0.5%
24.3%
Other Middle East
North America and North Africa, 5.8% United States
39.2% 38.1%
Other Asia, 5.8%
South Korea, 2.3%
Middle East Germany, 2.7%
and North Africa Japan, 2.8%
10.7% France, 3.2%
Sub-Saharan Africa United Kingdom, 3.3%
1.0% Europe China, 10.0%
Russia and Eurasia 16.9% India, 3.4% Russia Saudi
4.2% 3.7% Arabia
4.9%
Figures do not sum due to rounding effects ©IISS
† At current prices and exchange rates
22 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Real global defence-spending changes by region 2016–18*

8
6
4
2
% 0
-2 * Excludes states for which
insufficient data is available
-4
-6
2016
-8
2017
-10 2018
-12
North Europe Russia and Asia Middle East Latin Sub-Saharan Global
America Eurasia and North America Africa
Africa and the
Caribbean

Defence investments in Asia, 2018

60 Defence investments, US$bn Defence investments, % of defence budget 35
33.3 Defence investments include outlays spent on weapons procurements and defence R&D. Asia has become the
largest arms-importing region in recent years, with most countries in the Indo-Pacific modernising their
inventories and investing in their domestic defence-industrial base. China spends the most on defence
31.2 30
50 investments, with more than US$56.1bn allocated for these expenses in 2018.

26.8 26.6 25
40 25.3

% of defence budget
24.0
US$bn current

20
20.1 20.8
19.8
15 18.3
17.0 16.9 15
15.4 15.9
14.9
10
11.5 10

5 6.9 5

0 2.6
0
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Composition of real defence-spending increases Composition of real defence-spending reductions

2017–18‡ 2017–18‡
Other Sub-Saharan Africa, 3.7% Latin America and the Caribbean, 2.67%
Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, 1.3%
North Africa, 0.1% Angola, 2.1% Europe, 1.1%
Russia and Eurasia, 1.9% Eurasia, 0.6%
Other Latin America, 2.0% Other Asia, 1.7%
Other Europe, 11.0% Indonesia, 3.0%
Canada, 3.1% Saudi Arabia
Other Asia, 2.8% 44.9%
Other Middle East and
Germany, 1.7% North Africa, 2.1%
Brazil, 2.4% Israel, 1.6%
Total increases United Total reductions
South Korea States Kuwait, 1.9%
2.4% 2017–18:‡ 2017–18:‡
45.0%
Pakistan, 2.4% US$59.2bn Oman, 2.8% US$29.8bn
France, 2.8% Algeria, 4.1%

India, 3.6% Iran, 6.9%

Australia
3.8%
Turkey
4.5% China, 12.2% Iraq, 17.9%

©IISS
† At current prices and exchange rates. ‡ At constant 2010 prices and exchange rates.
 Medium 1989 2000 2010 2018
Russia’s Aerospace Forces (VKS) have benefited from a decade of sustained investment
bomber Tu-22M3
allowing the delivery of new and upgraded combat aircraft and air-launched weapons. Tu-22M3M
This, however, has relied on designs already in development or service when the Soviet upgrade
Union collapsed; plans then for successor types of combat aircraft were abandoned in the
Tu-22M Upgraded variant Upgraded variant
early 1990s.
While upgrades of types already in service – such as the Su-27 Flanker – have belatedly Successor: Successor:
entered the inventory, all new designs were shelved. As of late 2018, the VKS is once again Sukhoi T-60S PAK DA
attempting to address those same requirements. Ambitions to introduce the Sukhoi Su-57
heavy fighter into service are yet to be realised, while other military-aircraft plans are

Cancelled programme Future requirement
being revised. A mix of budgetary constraints combined with overly optimistic development
schedules have combined to slow the introduction of the Su-57.
Heavy 1989 2000 2010 2018
Ambitions to acquire a new bomber to meet the PAK DA requirement also appear to have
fighter Su-27M (Su-35)
been revised, with the project delayed and the aircraft re-cast as a complement to the new Su-35S
Tu-160M2 variant of the Soviet-era Tu-160 Blackjack. upgrade

Su-27 Upgraded variant Upgraded variant

Personnel
Successor: Successor: PAK
MiG MFI FA (Su-57)
1989

Cancelled programme Future requirement

Interceptor 1989 2000 2010 2018

2018 MiG-31M MiG-31BM

upgrade

0 200,000 400,000 600,000 800,000 1,000,000 MiG-31 Upgraded variant Upgraded variant

Successor: Successor:
Soviet (VVS and PVO) and Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), 1989–2018

MiG Project 701 PAK DP

Aircraft 
Cancelled programme Future requirement
Attack 1989* 2018

Fighter/ground Transport 1989 2000 2010 2018

attack IL-76 upgrade Il-76MD-M
Fighters

Medium-range Il-76M Upgraded variant Upgraded variant

bombers
Long-range Successor: Successor:
bombers Sukhoi Il-106 PAK VTA
Comparative defence statistics

0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000


Cancelled programme Future requirement
23

© IISS
*1989 figure combines air-force and air-defence-force aircraft
 24

The armies of the United States (from 2003), Russia (from
2008) and China (from 2017) have shifted from division-
based structures to new brigade-centric organisations for
their manoeuvre forces. Combat support and combat
service-support units, previously held separately at
divisional level, have been moved into combat brigades. For
Russia and the US, these changes were originally based on
a judgement that there was a reduced prospect of high-
intensity operations and, in the US case, on the ability to
achieve air dominance. As a result, the US brigade combat
team (BCT) designs are relatively light on fires and combat
support. While subsequent revisions have added a third
manoeuvre battalion and another combat-engineer
company, the latest iteration of the US armored BCT still has
only one battalion allocated to fire support, combat support
and combat service support, and no organic air defence.
The equivalent Russian motor-rifle brigade, by contrast,
allocates more battalions to these roles, reflecting the
importance of ground-based fire support in Russian
doctrine and, perhaps, concerns over the relative weakness
of Russian air capabilities. The new Chinese design appears
to be a compromise between the two, with more support
units than the US approach, but not as many as the Russian
version, though there is possibly a higher headcount than
either. In recent years there has been renewed attention in
Russia and the West on potential high-intensity operations
and both Russia and the US have begun re-emphasising
division-level operations, Moscow going so far as to
re-establish some previously downsized divisions. Whether
the Chinese will eventually follow suit remains to be seen.

US: Armored Brigade Combat Team

THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

7
9
Battalions 15

3,300
Reconnaissance Armoured Armoured Armoured Self-propelled Engineer/ Support 5,000
squadron battalion battalion infantry artillery combat-support battalion
Personnel 4,500
(bn sized) battalion battalion battalion
Fire/combat support Combat
87
China: Combined Arms Brigade (Heavy) service support
Brigade structures: China, Russia and the United States

100
Tanks 41

125
100
IFVs/APCs 129

Reconnaissance Combined- Combined- Combined- Combined- Artillery/anti- Air-defence Engineer/ Support 18

battalion arms battalion arms battalion arms battalion arms battalion tank battalion battalion combat-support battalion 70
battalion Artillery 54
Fire/combat support Combat
service support
Russia: Motor-Rifle Brigade (with BMP infantry fighting vehicle)
In addition to the battalions shown, a motor-rifle brigade includes company-level
electronic-warfare; chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear; and medical units.

Reconnaissance Tank Motor-rifle Motor-rifle Motor-rifle Self-propelled- Self-propelled- Multiple-rocket- Anti-tank Air-defence Air-defence Engineer Signals Maintenance Support
battalion battalion battalion battalion battalion artillery artillery launcher battalion battalion battalion battalion battalion battalion battalion
battalion battalion battalion
Fire/combat support Combat service support
© IISS
 The US Navy brought into service the Aegis combat
management system in the 1980s. Introduced after lengthy
research and development, this was a step change in
surface-ship anti-air-warfare (AAW) capabilities. Aegis
was developed in response to a significant increase in the
aircraft and anti-ship-missile threat, particularly that of
saturation attack. Compared to existing systems, it
comprised fixed phased-array radar and an integrated
combat system, as well as better surface-to-air missiles.
This improved processing, reaction time and channels of
fire, and provided an extended engagement envelope. The
first Aegis-equipped warship, the cruiser USS
Ticonderoga, was commissioned in 1983. A further
significant development took place in 1986 with the
introduction of the multiple-cell vertical launch system
(VLS) in place of trainable twin-arm missile launchers.
Other navies followed suit, either by adopting Aegis or
developing phased-array/active electronically scanned
radar systems and VLS. Japan was an early adopter of
Aegis. A number of medium-sized European navies rapidly
made the step up in capability, either adopting Aegis or
parts of it, whereas France, Italy and the United Kingdom
developed their own systems. From 2005, China joined the
club, and now has Type-052C and Type-052D destroyers,
and will have Type-055 cruisers, though there may be
question marks over the capabilities of some of the
combat systems involved. But while Asia has nearly
caught up with Europe in terms of numbers of these
platforms, and looks set to forge ahead, the United States
still fields more surface combatants with these
capabilities than all other operators combined. US and
Japanese Aegis ships also have a ballistic-missile-
defence capability.

United States Europe Asia Russia

Denmark 3 Australia 1
2018: 87
France 1 2 1998: 5 2008: 4 2018: 5
China 2 15 Russia’s first platform with modern phased
Germany 3 3 array/VLS area-air-defence capability is the new
frigate Admiral Gorshkov, a system that has had
Italy 1 2 significant development delays. However, for some
India 3
time the Russian Navy has deployed a handful of
2008: 74 Netherlands 4 4
very large surface combatants with high-
Norway 5 5* performance SA-N-6 and SA-N-20 missiles, albeit
Japan 4 5 6 with more limited fire-control and combat systems.
Spain 4 5 These vessels are included here.

1998: 51 United Kingdom 1 6 South Korea 3

Totals 1998: 0 2008: 19 2018: 30 Totals 1998: 4 2008: 7 2018: 28

Selected AAW vessels: estimated available firepower
The US Navy’s Ticonderoga-class cruisers are the oldest Aegis-
equipped platforms, though they have been significantly updated. Their
VLS cells associated with advanced
AAW platforms
estimated 10,000–13,000 tonnes with 112 cells. US and Asian
combatants in this class tend to have larger VLS magazines than their
Principal advanced anti-air-warfare surface combatants and operators, 1998–2018

replacement will be critical for the US Navy. South Korea’s KDD III European counterparts (including Australia’s Spanish-designed Hobart US (Ticonderoga/Arleigh Burke class)
Sejong class is the largest Aegis platform so far. China’s Type-052D class). However, the cells cannot be reloaded at sea, although the US
destroyers are about to be joined by the Type-055 cruisers, at an Navy is looking into this.

US: Ticonderoga class South Korea: KDD III China: Type-052D Australia: Hobart class France: Forbin class
10,000 tonnes FLD 11,000 tonnes FLD 7,500 tonnes FLD 6,300 tonnes FLD 7,050 tonnes FLD
122 VLS cells 80 (+48 ASW/LACM) VLS cells 64 VLS cells 48 VLS cells  48 VLS cells 8,720
Comparative defence statistics

864 China
(Type-052C/D)
25

© IISS
*Helge Ingstad, foundered 8 Nov 2018. Salvage doubtful. FLD: full-load displacement. AAW: the capability to engage airborne threats, including aircraft and missiles
26 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Key defence statistics

ICBM (Launchers) (25 per unit) Bomber aircraft (25 per unit)
Cruis
70 193

334 139 23

400 157

19
Ballistic-missile nuclear-powered submarines (10 per unit)

4 4 1 10 4 14

Active personnel (100,000 per unit) Reserve personnel (100,000 per unit)

2,035,000 510,000

203,900 36,300 250

1,444,500 1,155,000

900,000
2,000,000
148,350 80,000
Attack
1,359,450 845,600
70

19
Armoured infantry fighting vehicles Main battle tanks
(1,000 per unit) (1,000 per unit)

5,060 5,800 50

627 200
3,100 3,565
6,221 3,110 Heavy/m
623 227
3,419 2,833

Artillery (1,000 per unit) Attack/guided missile submarines

(25 per unit) 85 4
8,954
54
273
6
9,719
15 Airborne earl
5,325
49
637
6

6,883 53

Aircraft carriers (10 per unit)

29 7
1 1 1 1 11
 Comparative defence statistics 27

China France India Russia UK US

er unit)
Cruisers, destroyers and frigates Principal amphibious ships
193 (25 per unit) (25 per unit)
86
5
139 23
3
27
157 1
33
19 5
101
32

14
Tactical aircraft (500 per unit)
00 per unit)
1,932 1,146

250 191

,155,000
756 3,421

2,000,000
Attack helicopters (250 per unit) Heavy/medium transport helicopters
278 383 (500 per unit)

70 158

19 12

383 374

50 108 2,665
5,800

928
65
10 Heavy/medium transport aircraft Tanker and multi-role tanker/transport aircraft
(100 per unit) (100 per unit)

missile submarines
18 15 6 15 14
per unit) 85 48 37 178 47
530
54 682

Airborne early-warning and control aircraft Heavy unmanned aerial vehicles

(100 per unit) (50 per unit)
49

19 6 13 Some 9
53

29 7 4 18 6 111
11
514

© IISS
28 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Chapter Three

North America
 The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review committed to
nuclear modernisation, including development of low-
yield warheads for SLBMs and, in the longer term, a
modern nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile. 
 Pentagon efforts to partner with Silicon Valley and tech-
nology firms to accelerate innovation have met some
opposition from the sector, including refusal by Google
staff to participate in the Project Maven AI initiative.
 The US army is fielding specially trained Security Force
Assistance Brigades to provide trainers, advisors and 
mentors to partner other nations’ forces. It continues
to balance the requirements of ongoing missions with
the reorientation to traditional tasks, also improving
its combat-training centres and hastening their 
reorientation to high-end combat.
 The US Air Force continues to face the challenge of
an ageing inventory combined with the lower pace
of delivery of replacement types. USAF chiefs are
advocating an expanded number of operational
squadrons: the target mentioned is 386 by 2030.
Any question of whether the Pentagon wanted to
sustain two combat aircraft manufacturers (Lockheed
Martin plus one other) appears to have been resolved
with Boeing picking trainer, tanker UAV, and
helicopter orders that will help sustain its military
business.
The US Navy continues to try to balance rebuilding
readiness with achieving early progress towards
increasing platform numbers to achieve a 355-ship
battle force target.
After delays, Canada announced that a consortium
led by Lockheed Martin (with the UK Type-26 design)
was the preferred bidder for its Canadian Surface
Combatant programme.

Lockheed Martin F-35 fleet numbers Boeing P-8A Poseidon fleet numbers
243
250 80 75
200
200 175 55
60
45
150 131
40 30
100 87
18
20
50

0 0
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

S expeditionary support and transport /

U US principal surface combatants, 2014–18
logistics and supply vessels, 2014–18
100 120 112
108 106
87 85 88 87 88 98 103
100
80
80
60
60
40
40
20 20

0 0
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
(aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates)
 North America 29

Regional defence policy and economics 30 ►

North America
Armed forces data section 44 ►

Arms procurements and deliveries 63 ►

US: top 5 troop deployments, November 2018

Germany
37,950 Japan
53,900

Republic of Korea
28,500

Afghanistan
16,475

Kuwait
14,000

(includes army, navy, air force and USMC)

United States real-terms defence spending, 2009–18 (US$bn, constant 2010)

700 12

600
8
US$bn, constant 2010

Year-on-year % change

500
4
400

300 0

200 -4

100
-8
0
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
30 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
North America
UNITED STATES
Towards the end of its first year in power, the
administration of US President Donald Trump
began to release national-security documents that
elaborated its political priorities. Trump wrote of
his 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) that ‘we
are charting a new and very different course’. His
administration has done so in two important ways:
by prioritising the return of great-power competition;
and by unsettling Washington’s closest allies.
Strategy documents
The strategy of ‘principled realism’ described by
the December 2017 NSS is a narrative arc of military
strength and generous institution building by the
United States that surrendered American advantages
and empowered and emboldened potential rivals.
The contrast with the 2015 NSS is clear. That
document, released by the Obama administration,
affirmed ‘America’s leadership role within a rules-
based international order that works best through
empowered citizens, responsible states, and effective
regional and international organizations’. The 2017
version flips the perspective from an international
order of increasing cooperation to one of increased
competition and of ‘intertwined, long-term challenges
that demand our sustained national attention and
commitment’. It acknowledges that US advantages
long taken for granted are shrinking relative to
challengers and commits to prioritise US efforts to
manage great-power competition from China and
Russia.
Priorities from the NSS carried through into the
2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), and into the
Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) budget requests.
The NDS states that ‘inter-state strategic competition,
not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S.
national security’. Great-power challengers, rogue
states (Iran and North Korea) and transnational
threats shape the NDS and reprioritise spending in
the defence budget. The language is stark. The United
States’ ‘competitive military advantage has been
eroding’. The US armed forces have ‘no preordained
right to victory on the battlefield’, and tough choices
need to be made in order ‘to field a lethal, resilient,
and rapidly adapting Joint Force’. It departs from
the NSS in stressing the primacy of diplomacy
in Washington’s international engagement and
emphasising the essential contributions of allies –
the document contains multiple references to their
importance.
In its February 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the
DoD provided more detail on its long-stated assertion
that Russia was in violation of the 1987 Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and committed
the US to nuclear modernisation, including the
development of low-yield warheads for submarine-
launched ballistic missiles and, in the longer term, a
modern nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile.
The DoD also committed to robust missile defences.
However, as of November it had yet to release its
Missile Defense Review. Formerly the Ballistic Missile
Defense Review, this new version is expected to focus
also on hypersonic threats and advocate an enhanced
detection and tracking architecture, including in
space.
Congress largely complied with the
administration’s defence strategy and spending
priorities, agreeing the US$716-billion top line during
budget negotiations in March and passing the 2018
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) on
schedule for the first time in a decade and with wide
bipartisan support (the vote was 85–10 in the Senate,
351–66 in the House of Representatives). The budget
deal extends only until 2020, however, making
sustained support questionable.
The DoD’s force-sizing construct has likewise
been brought into alignment with the focus on great-
power competition; but it also emphasises that the
ability to defeat aggression by a major power, while
deterring opportunistic aggression and disrupting
imminent threats from terrorism and ‘weapons of
mass destruction’, will require the fully mobilised
joint force in wartime. While that appears to be
an expanded construct, the previous force-sizing
construct had focused on steady-state (rather than
full wartime mobilisation) capacity.
While Congress authorised an increase in end-
strength for the force, the DoD is programming money

first to restore readiness that had eroded under Budget
Control Act (BCA) 2011 spending caps. The US$33bn
shortfall identified in 2017 by Secretary of Defense
James Mattis has been filled, mostly by Congress
ignoring the administration’s reduction of Overseas
Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. A Congress
led by the president’s own party has been activist in
foreign and defence policy to stay the president’s
hand. Examples include continuing State Department
funding despite administration efforts to reduce it
by nearly 30%; supporting NATO in advance of the
Brussels Summit; rejecting Russia’s request to ques-
tion US diplomats (which Trump had agreed with
President Vladimir Putin to allow); and legislating
against the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea
or Europe without the secretary of defense’s approval.
Alliance relations
The authors of the NSS have been commended for
blunting the tone of President Trump’s ‘America
First’ campaign speeches and producing a strategy
document more amenable to sustaining existing rules,
alliances and institutions. However, the president’s
own views were unchanged, as the gap between
his speech presenting the document and the NSS
illustrated: ‘We have made clear that countries that
are immensely wealthy should reimburse the United
States for the cost of defending them. This is a major
departure from the past, but a fair and necessary one.’
While President Trump considers that he is
‘strengthening even our strongest alliances’, other
members of these alliances do not agree. NATO allies
have been left reeling from their interactions with the
president, who refers to their own defence spending
as money owed to the US and seems not to consider
as relevant the legacy of shared sacrifice in war.
Trump derailed the G7 meeting in June 2018, refusing
to sign the communiqué and publicly denigrating
Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. Trump
also seems to consider the European Union as much
of a foe as China, at least in trade terms. Unilateral
US withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal – even
after acknowledgement by the director of national
intelligence and the secretaries of state and defense
that Iran was in compliance with the agreement – and
the subsequent imposition of secondary sanctions on
European firms, led Heiko Maas, the German foreign
minister, to suggest an international payments system
independent of US influence. Trump’s announcement
that the US would withdraw from the INF Treaty also
unsettled Washington’s European allies. And talk of
North America 31
a ‘bloody nose’ attack under consideration by the US
on North Korea alarmed both South Korea and Japan.
North America
Meanwhile, personal diplomacy by the president
with North Korea and Russia left a trail of confusion
about what he had agreed – North Korea maintains
the US agreed to sign a peace treaty as a precursor
to denuclearisation, while the White House maintains
the opposite.
Those insults and alarms have come despite
strenuous efforts by the departments of state and
defense to sustain policy cooperation, and similarly
strenuous restraint by allies in consenting to give
President Trump the policy successes he claims.
The 2018 NATO summit produced policy outcomes
that could have been a significant success for the
administration: renewed commitment by all allies to
increased defence spending; a new Atlantic Command,
headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, to protect
reinforcement routes and data cables in the Atlantic;
and formal agreement on a force of 30 battalions, 30
air squadrons and 30 ships to be deployable within
30 days. (The US had, earlier in May, announced it
would reinstate its 2nd Fleet, focused on the Atlantic;
the fleet had been disestablished in 2011.) President
Trump, however, preferred friction with allies before
his Helsinki summit with President Putin. Indeed,
where the administration has made advances, this
has arguably been down to the work of government
departments. Examples include the DoD’s trilateral
cooperation with Finland and Sweden, intelligence-
sharing arrangements with India and further
rotational deployments of US troops to Poland and
the Baltic states.
Secretary of Defense Mattis, meanwhile, adroitly
worked with both parties in Congress and closely
with allies. That task became more difficult with
the firing of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and
National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster. Their
replacements, Mike Pompeo and John Bolton, are
more closely aligned with the president’s views than
their predecessors and are reshaping their staffs in
similar directions, leaving the DoD less latitude for
independent policies. At the same time, President
Trump appears to be growing in confidence about
his own judgement on national-security issues and,
analysts understand, impatient at the legal, legislative
and bureaucratic processes that make the DoD less
responsive than he expects it to be. Examples include
the Space Force, proposed as the sixth US military
service, and Trump’s desire for a large military
parade.
32 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
The incoherent policy atmosphere of the
Trump administration always held the prospect
for significant DoD changes, such as ending
military exercises on the Korean Peninsula or
banning military service by transgender or non-US
citizens, and corroding civil–military norms by
giving political speeches to military audiences or
associating the DoD with immigration policies. But
administration-personnel appointments in 2018
increase the likelihood of White House activism and
effectiveness in imposing the president’s political
agenda on the Pentagon.
US Army
The 2018 US NDS’s emphasis on inter-state strategic
competition has led the US Army to continue its
refocus from counter-insurgency towards also
preparing for high-intensity combat against peer
competitors. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 NDAA
allocated resources for this task, and the 2019 NDAA
accelerates this trend.
Readiness gains have been significant. Army Chief
of Staff General Mark Milley testified before the Senate
Armed Services Committee on 12 April 2018 that
the readiness of active army brigade combat teams
(BCTs) had increased from 30% a year before to 50%
in May 2018. The army’s goal is to achieve 66% for the
regular army and 33% for the reserve component by
2022. Readiness, in this context, means that the units
are fully staffed and equipped and immediately able
to conduct decisive operations if ordered. This status
is validated by a rotation though one of the Combat
Training Centers (CTCs).
The army continues to improve the CTCs and
hasten their reorientation to high-end combat. In 2018,
Table 1 NDAA 2019 authorisation: equipment acquisitions and upgrades
Equipment Type Source
66 AH-64E Apache Atk Hel New build and upgrade US$1.2bn
55 UH-60M/HH-60M Black Hawk Med Tpt Hel/CSAR Hel New build
8 MH-47G Chinook Hvy Tpt Hel (Spec Ops) Upgrade
135 M1A2C Abrams MBT Upgrade
Mobile Protected Firepower
Tank Development
programme
61 M2A4/M7A4 Bradley IFV Upgrade
45 M109A7 Paladin 155 mm SP Arty Upgrade
197 Armoured Multi-purpose
APC(T) New build
Vehicles (AMPV)
3,390 Joint Light Tactical
AUV New build
Vehicles (JLTV)
there were 20 rotations to these centres, including
four for reserve components. According to General
Milley’s testimony, these rotations are ‘focused on
the high-end fight, replicating near-peer competitor
capabilities, including increased enemy lethality,
degraded communications, persistent observation,
and a contested environment’.
The army is also balancing the demand to produce
ready units with high-end combat skills with the
enduring missions in Afghanistan and elsewhere to
counter irregular adversaries. In February 2018, the
army established and deployed its first Security Force
Assistance Brigade (SFAB) to Afghanistan. SFABs are
designed to provide focused attention and expertise
to the advisory mission. General Milley said that the
SFAB comprises ‘the chain of command of an infantry
brigade combat team from staff sergeant on up’. This
approach means conventional BCTs will no longer
need to be repurposed from their conventional-
warfare focus. SFABs also serve as a hedge for
high-end missions, as they can be rapidly filled with
junior officers and soldiers to become a full infantry
BCT. The army plans to field a total of six SFABs,
including one in the National Guard.
Some 150,000 soldiers remain deployed in support
of US combatant commands. For the European
Deterrence Initiative (EDI), 1,500 additional soldiers
are planned join the 33,000 already in Europe by 2020.
This increase includes a field-artillery brigade head-
quarters, two multiple-rocket-launcher battalions and
a short-range air-defence battalion. The 2019 NDAA
continues to increase authorised army-personnel
levels to support improved readiness and meet new
missions. Active-duty end-strength is expected to
rise by 4,000 in FY2019 to 487,500 (the army’s goal is
Base OCO RDT&E Sum
- - US$1.2bn
US$1.1bn US$21m - US$1.1bn
US$99m US$25m - US$124m
US$1.1bn US$455m - US$1.5bn
- - US$319m US$319m
- US$205m - US$205m
US$462m US$67m - US$569m
US$449m US$231m - US$679m
US$1.3bn - - US$1.3bn

500,000), while the National Guard and army reserve
will remain at 343,500 and 199,500 respectively.
Army equipment programmes are also
accelerating, particularly plans to modernise
Armored BCTs. The 2019 NDAA authorises a range
of equipment for this purpose (see Table 1).
The army is also upgrading two BCT sets of Stryker
vehicles to the latest version and Abrams tanks with the
Trophy active-protection system, a battle-tested Israeli
design. Nevertheless, these modernisation efforts are,
as Milley told the Senate Armed Services Committee,
upgrading ‘technologies and ideas that come out
of the ‘60s and ‘70s’. Congress allocated additional
funds for modernisation programmes during the
committee stages of the NDAA, particularly for
research, development, test and evaluation.
Addressing peer competitors
The army took several important decisions in
2017–18 in a bid to close capability gaps with peer
competitors. In December 2017, it published ‘Multi-
Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for
the 21st Century: 2025–2040’, since renamed ‘Multi-
Domain Operations’. This is the service’s evolving
concept for how it intends to seize the advantage
from potential adversaries and restore a credible
conventional deterrent and war-fighting capability
against peer competitors.
Addressing peer-competitor challenges has
spurred the army to prioritise modernisation efforts.
In October 2017, it created eight cross-functional teams
to address its most important capability challenges:
long-range precision fires; next-generation combat
vehicles; future vertical lift; network command,
control, communication and intelligence; assured
positioning, navigation and timing; air and missile
defence; soldier lethality; and the synthetic training
environment.
In November 2017, the army created an Army
Modernization Task Force, which culminated in June
2018 with the establishment of US Army Futures
Command (AFC), the most significant reorganisation
of the service since the creation of the Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in the 1970s. AFC
began operations on 1 July.
Army Futures Command
AFC is the army’s fourth four-star command, joining
TRADOC, US Army Forces Command and US Army
Materiel Command (AMC). Based in Austin, Texas,
AFC has three subordinate organisations: Futures
North America 33
and Concepts; Combat Development; and Combat
Systems. These are drawn principally from the AMC
North America
and TRADOC and include the Army Capabilities
Integration Center; the Capability Development and
Integration Centers and their battle labs, currently
part of the TRADOC Centers of Excellence (such
as manoeuvre and fires); the TRADOC Analysis
Center; the Research, Development and Engineering
Command; and the Army Materiel Systems Analysis
Activity.
As a result, TRADOC is no longer responsible
for building the future army. Instead, as the order
announcing the creation of the AFC noted, ‘TRADOC
recruits, trains, and educates the Army’s Soldiers;
develops leaders; supports training in units; develops
doctrine; establishes standards; and builds the Army
by developing and integrating operational and
functional concepts and organizational designs for
the fielded force’.
US Navy and US Coast Guard
The US Navy (USN) spent 2018 dealing with issues
including the continuing fallout from the ship
collisions in the western Pacific in 2017; the debate
over how – and how quickly – to achieve the target
of a 355-ship fleet; and the beginnings of a change in
posture arising from the NDS’s reference to the return
of great-power competition.
Multiple senior officers, chiefly based in the western
Pacific, left their posts in the wake of the collisions.
Investigations identified some specific and systemic
failures. A particular problem among forward-
deployed surface forces in the western Pacific was
that training and readiness standards were affected
by the demands of a growing operational tempo.
While the lessons identified have focused particularly
on surface naval forces in the Pacific, many are seen to
apply to other parts of the surface navy.
Some recommendations have proved
contentious – such as consolidating force-generation
responsibilities, including for the Pacific, under Fleet
Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia. The challenge
is that operational demands are, if anything,
increasing, and thereby sharpening the dilemma over
how to restore readiness levels while also seeking to
grow the fleet.
As if to underline the operational tempo, in May
2018 the USN carried out its first two-ship freedom-
of-navigation operation in its recent series of such
missions in the South China Sea, and a two-destroyer
transit of the Taiwan Strait in July. At the same
34 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
time, mechanical problems sidelined two major
amphibious ships that were due to participate in the
2018 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, an indicator
of readiness challenges in the amphibious force.
Meanwhile, the discussion continues over the
target for a 355-ship fleet, including over whether it
is even an appropriate goal. There is also pressure
from the navy, Congress and defence companies over
how best to achieve early results in terms of growing
numbers and capability. Some estimates have
suggested that reaching the 355-ship goal could take
until 2050, unless more urgent approaches are found.
Strategies proposed have included modernising
and extending the lives of current platforms – for
example, keeping Arleigh Burke-class destroyers in
service for at least 45 years – and accelerating aircraft-
carrier and submarine procurement schedules. At the
same time, the navy has been preparing a new force-
structure assessment that could modify the target
fleet size, though this depends on new estimates of
the likely requirement for key platforms, such as
submarines; the likely impact on the capabilities of
new programmes like the FFG(X) next-generation
frigate; as well as, possibly, a new squeeze on funding
in the coming years.
The USN has looked to fill capability gaps in
response to an increasingly contested maritime space.
It chose the Norwegian-designed Naval Strike Missile
to fulfil its requirement for an over-the-horizon anti-
ship weapon for the Littoral Combat Ship, while the
firing of a submarine-launched Harpoon anti-ship
missile by the USS Olympia during RIMPAC – the first
such launch from a US submarine in more than two
decades – signalled the likely return of the weapon
and capability to the US inventory.
In April, there was no fleet carrier in the Middle
East region when USN forces launched Tomahawk
cruise-missile strikes on Syrian targets following
an alleged chemical-weapons attack by the Assad
regime. This highlights a situation that seems set to
become increasingly regular as the navy adopts a
more dynamic deployment model, in part to increase
tactical unpredictability. Indeed, the navy is likely
to rely increasingly on allies and the use of big-deck
amphibious ships to provide limited fixed-wing
naval-aviation capabilities to supplement its carriers.
The carrier USS Harry S. Truman, which might
normally have been expected to deploy to the Middle
East, remained instead in the Mediterranean and
North Atlantic for a shortened period of three months
at sea. This was one of the clearest examples of how
the navy is looking to reshape its posture to move
away from inflexible standing commitments in order
to prepare for more high-end operations. Another
was the re-establishment of the 2nd Fleet to refocus on
delivering naval capability across the North Atlantic.
The 2nd Fleet’s area of operations will extend
into the Arctic, an area of increased significance
also for the US Coast Guard. In March 2016, the
navy and coastguard issued a request for proposals
for the design and construction of up to three new
heavy icebreakers. The coastguard was also due to
commission a seventh new Legend-class national-
security cutter as Congress continued to debate
adding numbers to the inventory. Originally intended
to be a class of eight ships, Congress has approved
funding for 11, and has been considering adding
a twelfth. The coastguard is also trying to balance
requirements for smaller offshore-patrol cutters and
fast-response cutters as it seeks to recapitalise its fleet.
US Air Force
The US Air Force (USAF) has for the better part of this
decade been focused on the challenge from current
and emerging competitors, while at the same time
maintaining a commitment to counter-insurgency
and counter-terrorism operations. Its problem is not
that China is now emerging as a major aerospace
power, which it had anticipated, but that Russia is
attempting to reclaim its great-power status. The
USAF again has to plan for European contingencies
in parallel to the Indo-Pacific. Air Force Secretary
Heather Wilson has said that ‘the Air Force is too
small for what the nation is asking us to do’.
Moreover, the air force does not have time to
draw breath as it moves to address the deteriorating
security environment, nor can it rely solely on over-
matching the technology of a potential peer or near-
peer adversary. The absolute gap between the US and
China and Russia continues to close. Both are close
to introducing fifth-generation combat aircraft, while
China might begin to field a bomber aircraft with
a reduced radar signature in the second half of the
next decade. Beijing and Moscow are also pursuing
advanced guided weapons.
Sustained combat operations are placing stress on
the air force. William Roper, then air-force assistant
secretary, said in March 2018 that ‘cost-effective
modernization is a top Air Force priority, and the
need for it has never been more pressing. Twenty-six
years of continuous combat operations has done more
than just take a toll on Airmen and equipment; it has
The Lockheed Martin F-35 will, if all current plans are met, become the most Radar band
numerous combat aircraft among NATO states. In service currently with the sections on wings
US and Israeli air forces, the aircraft was in 2018 used for the first time in
combat operations. Nonetheless, it has had a troubled development history,
and as the Pentagon’s largest procurement has often been criticised. While Radar-warning receiver antennas
often publicly associated with ‘stealth’, the aircraft’s integrated sensor suite Distributed
– covering radar, electro-optical and electronic-warfare systems – is as aperture
important as the aircraft’s signature management. Indeed, in parts of the system (DAS)
flight envelope the F-35 has only relatively modest performance for a
multi-role combat aircraft. Proponents say that this misses the point, and the
information and domain-awareness superiority provided by the aircraft’s AESA radar Electro-optical targeting
integrated sensor suite will allow it to prevail in combat. But the aircraft’s system (EOTS)/infrared
long development has meant that some of its electro-optical systems already search and track (IRST)
require upgrades to address component obsolescence.

AESA radar Air-to-air AAS-37 distributed

The Northrop Grumman APG-81 active detection track aperture system
electronically scanned array (AESA) The Northrop Grumman
multi-mode radar is the primary sensor used to Cruise missile AAS-37 distributed aperture
Data link
detect surface and air targets beyond visual system provides the pilot with
range. Detailed performance figures are imagery from six electro-
classified. The radar, operating at the X-band,
▼ Figure 2 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II: sensor suite

optical sensors around the

uses a slightly upward canted array to reduce aircraft. The AAS-37 is used
radar reflectivity. The AESA is fixed, which limits its Uninhabited combat for day and night navigation,
scan to plus or minus 60 degrees off bore-sight, but aerial vehicle negating the need for
obviates the need for a mechanical re-positioner. As well as night-vision goggles in the
providing air- and surface-target detection and identification, the case of the latter. It can also
radar can be used for electronic attack and ground moving-target provide warning of missile
Ground moving-
indicator and synthetic aperture radar modes. launches.
target detection

Electro-optical targeting system Features:

The Lockheed Martin electro-optical targeting  Internally mounted
system (EOTS) is a chin-mounted infrared search-  Long-range, high-resolution
and-track and laser designator. It provides passive  Navigation forward-looking
detection of air and surface targets. The system Long-range
air-to-air IRST infrared (NAVFLIR), targeting
housing is intended to maintain a low radar cross forward-looking infrared
section: a pylon-mounted pod would increase the (FLIR), infrared search and
aircraft’s radar signature. The EOTS is now being track (IRST) functions
upgraded. Known as Advanced EOTS, this project is
 Air-to-surface targeting FLIR
intended to improve performance, address
component obsolescence and give better imagery Laser-spot Laser  Air-to-air imaging
tracker designation
North America

and longer-range detection.  Digital continuous zoom

35

© IISS

North America
36 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
allowed the national security environment to change
while our time, talent, and treasure were otherwise
engaged.’ That said, it also provided the USAF with
greater operational experience than China or Russia.
The USAF is operating combat-aircraft types for
longer, and at a higher rate of use, than expected.
This is the cumulative result of funding constraints,
development delays, shifting priorities, and a more
demanding and unpredictable security environment.
Legacy tactical fleets are being retained for longer
than previously planned. The F-15E Strike Eagle is
now expected to remain in the inventory until 2040,
while the last F-16C/D Fighting Falcons might not be
withdrawn until almost 2050. The average age of an
aircraft in the air force’s tactical combat fleet is 25
years. Stresses on people and aircraft, and changing
security challenges, have led the air-force hierarchy
to advocate an expanded number of operational
squadrons. The ‘air force we need’, said Wilson in
September, ‘has 386 operational squadrons by 2030’.
Modernisation priorities
The workhorse of the future fighter fleet, the F-35A
Lightning II, entered operational squadron service in
2017, and the air force plans to buy 258 aircraft between
2019 and 2024. Development concerns appear to have
been for the most part overcome, while the aircraft’s
unit cost is also reducing. The cost for the low-rate
initial production (LRIP) 10 batch was US$94.3
million, and this is expected to be cut further in LRIP
11. That said, the USAF and other F-35 customers
were during the course of 2018 increasingly worried
by support costs. USAF Chief of Staff General David
Goldfein said he was ‘concerned’ about the issue.
The risk is that greater-than-anticipated sustainment
costs over the life of the programme would affect the
planned procurement budget.
As of September 2018, the air force planned to
receive its first 18 Boeing KC-46A Pegasus tanker
aircraft by the end of April 2019, 20 months later
than originally planned. Development problems
with some of the aircraft’s systems continued to be
an issue during 2018. The air force intends to buy 179
KC-46As, with the type being used to first replace the
McDonnell Douglas KC-10A Extender, 59 of which
remain in service.
The air force’s third procurement priority is the
Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider low-observable
bomber. This will replace the B-2 Spirit and the
B-1B Lancer in the nuclear and conventional roles
respectively. A critical design review was due for the
programme at the end of 2018, and the first aircraft are
meant to begin entering the inventory in the second
half of the 2020s. This aggressive schedule continues
to suggest that the still-classified detailed design may
be well progressed. The air force’s bomber road map
sees the B-2 leave the inventory by 2032, with the
B-1B following by 2036. The B-52H Stratofortress will
remain in service until the 2050s, supplementing the
planned 100-plus B-21s.
Critical to the B-52H in the nuclear-deterrent role
is the Long-range Stand-off (LRSO) cruise missile,
which will replace the AGM-86 nuclear-armed
cruise missile. Lockheed Martin and Raytheon
are developing designs for the LRSO – which is
associated with the AGM-180/181 designation – under
technology-maturation and risk-reduction contracts.
Performance characteristics of the LRSO
requirement have not been made public, though
the air force has been more forthcoming about two
high-speed-weapons projects, both being developed
by Lockheed Martin – the AGM-183A Air-launched
Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) and the Hypersonic
Conventional Strike Weapon (HCSW). The USAF’s
renewed and public activity in the hypersonic domain
is in part a response to Chinese and Russian pursuit
of such technology. Meanwhile, the air-launched
Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC)
is also being pursued by the air force. Other notable
announcements in the year included the selection of
a Boeing–SAAB team as the preferred bidder for the
T-X trainer contract – giving Boeing a continuing stake
in the design and manufacture of combat-capable
fixed-wing aircraft – and the firm’s contract-win,
alongside Leonardo, in the programme to replace
the UH-1N with the MH-139 in the liaison role for
intercontinental-ballistic-missile personnel.
The USAF is also having to navigate President
Trump’s demand that an independent Space Force be
set up, and the implications of this for the air force’s
Space Command. The president’s idea to create a
space service has not met with universal approval,
with some opponents arguing it is a distraction.
DEFENCE ECONOMICS
The FY2019 budget for national-defence (discretionary
050 budget authority) spending totalled US$716
billion. This funding breaks down into US$617.1bn in
base spending for the DoD, augmented by US$69bn
in OCO funding. Of the remainder, US$21.9bn is
requested for atomic-energy defence activities,
 North America 37

chiefly managed by the Department of Energy, with 5

the last US$8bn allotted to other defence activities,

North America
3.77
principally counter-terrorism operations conducted 4
3.44 3.28 3.17
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 3.07 3.14
Discretionary 050 budget authority is the most 3

% of GDP
commonly cited measure of US defence spending.
2
It is the value classified as ‘national defense’ for the
purposes of the spending caps instituted by the BCA
1
of 2011, though the OCO account is exempt from
these caps. The discretionary 050 budget authority
0
request excludes US$10.8bn in mandatory defence 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
spending, such as concurrent-receipt military
[1] Figures refer to the National Defense (050) Budget Function (Outlays) as a % of GDP
retirement benefits; US$5.3bn in discretionary Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) programmes managed by ▲ Figure 3 US defence expenditure as % of GDP1
the State Department; US$11.7bn of discretionary
and mandatory spending for the US Coast Guard
(which operates under the Department of Homeland
Security); and US$193bn for discretionary and outlays between 1 October 2018 and 30 September
mandatory veterans’ benefits and services. 2019, if spent according to plan. The IISS uses annual
Budget authority is distinct from annual federal outlays for its defence-budget figures.
outlays in that it authorises some spending for later The DoD component of the 050 spending request
years. The 050 discretionary and mandatory budget breaks down as follows: US$182bn for the US Army,
requests for FY2019 would result in US$688.9bn in US$194.1bn for the US Navy and US Marine Corps,

Table 2 US National Defense Budget Function1 and other selected budgets2 1999, 2009–19
US$ in National Atomic Other Total National Defense Department Department Total Total
billions, Defense Energy Defense of of Federal Federal
current Budget Defense Activities Homeland Veterans Government Budget
year Function Activities Security Affairs Outlays Surplus/
dollars Deficit
Discretionary
FY BA Outlay BA BA BA BA Outlay BA BA
1999 278.4 261.2 12.4 1.4 292.2 288.3 274.8 N/A 44.1 1,701.8 125.6
2009 667.5 636.7 23.0 7.1 697.6 694.8 661.0 46.0 96.9 3,517.7 -1,412.7
2010 695.6 666.7 18.2 7.3 721.2 714.1 693.5 45.4 124.3 3,457.1 -1,294.4
2011 691.5 678.1 18.5 7.0 717.0 710.1 705.6 41.6 122.8 3,603.1 -1,299.6
2012 655.4 650.9 18.3 7.7 681.4 669.6 677.9 45.9 124.0 3,536.9 -1,087.0
2013 585.2 607.8 17.5 7.4 610.2 600.4 633.4 61.9 136.0 3,454.6 -679.5
2014 595.7 577.9 18.4 8.2 622.3 606.2 603.5 44.1 165.7 3,506.1 -484.6
2015 570.9 562.5 19.0 8.5 598.4 585.9 589.7 45.3 160.5 3,688.4 -438.5
2016 595.7 565.4 20.1 8.3 624.1 606.9 593.4 46.0 163.3 3,852.6 -584.7
2017 626.2 568.9 21.4 8.7 656.3 634.1 598.7 62.3 178.8 3,981.6 -665.4
2018* 652.9 612.5 21.9 8.4 683.2 674.6 643.3 73.8 184.2 4,173.0 -832.6
2019* 696.1 656.9 23.1 8.6 726.8 716.0 688.6 51.0 192.7 4,406.7 -984.4
Notes Selective Service System). It does not include 2
Early in each calendar year, the US government
FY = Fiscal Year (1 October–30 September) funding for International Security Assistance presents its defence budget to Congress for
* (request) (under International Affairs), the Veterans the next fiscal year, which begins on 1 October.
Administration, the US Coast Guard (Department The government also presents its Future Years
1
The National Defense Budget Function of Homeland Security), nor for the National Defense Program (FYDP), which covers the next
subsumes funding for the DoD, the Department Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). fiscal year plus the following five. Until approved
of Energy Atomic Energy Defense Activities Funding for civil projects administered by the by Congress, the budget is called the Budget
and some smaller support agencies (including DoD is excluded from the figures cited here. Request; after approval, it becomes the Budget
Federal Emergency Management and Authority (BA).
38 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
US$194.2bn for the air force and US$115.8bn for
defence-wide activities. The army receives nearly half
of all OCO, while the air force is allocated one-quarter,
and the remainder is more or less evenly divided
between the navy and defence-wide activities. The
distributions of both base and OCO spending by
department are typical of recent years.
By functional category, the DoD funding request
for 2019 equates to US$283.5bn for operations and
maintenance, US$152.9bn for military personnel,
US$144.3bn for procurement, US$92.4bn for research,
development, test and evaluation (RDT&E), US$9.8bn
for military construction, US$1.6bn for family housing,
and US$1.6bn for revolving and management funds.
Relative to FY2018-enacted appropriations, this
represents a 2.3% decline in nominal procurement
spending and a 4.8% increase to military personnel.
There are nominal increases to both the operations and
maintenance and RDT&E accounts. Each is less than a
percentage point above inflation, which is estimated
by the Congressional Budget Office at 2.2% in FY2018
and 2.0% in FY2019. Using enacted appropriations as
a baseline better reflects congressional involvement in
the budget process.
Two-year budget deal to amend the BCA
Annual 050 defence-budget growth from 2018 to
2019 was 2.1% in nominal terms, or roughly pacing
inflation, which means that there has been no real
increase in buying power. The 2018 Bipartisan Budget
Act (BBA18) essentially reset the floor of base defence
spending in 2018. This led to 10.6% growth in enacted
appropriations from 2017 to 2018 before allowing the
2019 budget to grow with inflation from that new
spending floor. Taken together, the 2018 and 2019
budgets represent a US$165bn increase above BCA
spending caps for 050 discretionary budget authority
in those two years. In FY2019, combined base and
OCO discretionary 050 budget authority will be the
highest since 2011, when adjusted for inflation.
How did these higher budgets transpire? President
Donald Trump and the DoD leadership requested
US$603bn in base discretionary national-defence
spending in FY2018, far in excess of the US$549bn
spending cap for that year. However, this is typical of
budget requests after passage of the BCA: the Obama
administration similarly submitted requests in excess
of the spending caps for discretionary spending
each year. On 9 February 2018, Congress passed
the BBA18, which raised the base defence-spending
caps to US$629bn and US$647bn in 2018 and 2019,
respectively – an increase of US$165bn. Along with
OCO spending and a series of additional smaller
emergency-spending requests owing to North
Korean provocations and hurricane relief, Congress
appropriated a total of US$700.9bn in discretionary
050 budget authority for 2018. This figure was above
the 2018 budget request, but in line with unofficial
top-line figures advanced by the House and Senate
Armed Services committees in late 2016 and early
2017. As such, Congress was the primary driving
force behind the defence-budget increases.
Unusually, the president’s 2019 defence-budget
request was released before appropriations for
FY2018 were fully known. The final appropriation
for FY2018 did not occur until 23 March 2018, about a
month after the release of the FY2019 request and 175
days into FY2018. White House and Pentagon officials
based their 2019 request on the two-year BBA18 deal
reached earlier in the year by Congress. BBA18 raised
spending caps on defence and non-defence spending
to pave the way for 2018 appropriations and the 2019
request.
Force structure
The final 2018 defence appropriations added 8,500
active-duty military personnel above the FY2018
request: 7,500 for the army and 1,000 for the marine
corps. The 2019 budget requests a further 15,600
active-duty personnel from 2018 levels: 4,000 soldiers,
7,500 sailors, 4,000 airmen and 100 marines. The pay
raise for 2018 was 2.4%, and the requested pay raise
for 2019 is 2.6%, the largest in nine fiscal years.
While the 2019 NDAA resources the 2019
military-personnel request completely, congressional
appropriators, who actually allocate the spending,
only funded about 7,000 of the 15,600 personnel
requested to instead fund modernisation priorities. A
similar approach was adopted by the Senate in their
draft NDAA, but abandoned in the final law (P.L.
115-232, signed by the president on 13 August 2018).
Most of this bolstered end-strength will address
combat-readiness shortfalls by restoring ground
units and naval-vessel crews to optimal strengths,
and by addressing the air force’s shortages in pilots
and maintenance personnel. In FY2019, the army will
continue to stand up its Security Force Assistance
Brigades. The air force is adding a net of one active
fighter squadron to its total force. The Department
of the Navy projects no changes to marine-corps
force structure and the addition of seven new active
warships.

The 2019 defence-budget request also includes
end-strength projections out to 2023. The navy and
army would like to grow by 9,500 personnel each
(active and reserve) above the FY2019 request, while
the air force would like to add 11,400 and the marines
just 300. These levels suggest few major force-
structure changes in the near future. To use the army
as an example, the projected active force of 495,500
in FY2023 would be just over the troop levels in the
last full year of the Obama presidency, but far below
President Trump’s campaign promise of a 540,000-
person active army.
Modernisation and the National Defense
Strategy
The 2019 defence budget is the first to implement the
precepts of the new NDS, released in January 2018.
Pursuant to the strategy’s reorientation of threats, the
character of the budget suggests the DoD is pursuing
a capability-based build-up rather than a capacity-
driven one. Force structure will remain more or
less steady, and modernisation will concentrate on
developing next-generation systems.
Navy shipbuilding is a prime example. Congress
appropriated 14 ships in 2018 and the White House
requested ten more in FY2019 (see Table 3). Congress
ended up adding two Littoral Combat Ships, an
Expeditionary Fast Transport Vessel and a cable ship,
as well as funds for the future procurement of another
destroyer and two amphibious ships. But despite plans
to sustain similar production rates for the next few
years, the overall fleet is projected to peak at 326 vessels
in 2023. It will not attain this size again until 2036, as
the retirement rate of hulls outpaces production.
Naval-aviation procurement is down relative to
2018 appropriations, but tracks closely to the planning
Table 3 US Navy build-up: shipbuilding proposals
Congress ship appropriation, 2018
1 Nuclear-powered aircraft carrier
2 Destroyers with AShMs
2 Nuclear-powered attack submarines
3 Littoral Combat Ships
1 LX(R) landing platform dock
1 Expeditionary Sea Base
1 Expeditionary Fast Transport Vessel
1 Fleet-replenishment oiler
1 Towing, salvage and rescue ship
1 Oceanographic survey ship
North America 39
for 2019 that was included in last year’s budget
request. Programmes with notable decreases include
North America
the request for nine F-35C Joint Strike Fighters (down
from ten in FY2018), 20 F-35Bs (down from 24), four
KC-130J tanker/transport aircraft (down from six) and
seven V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft (down from 14).
Conversely, the procurement picture for the
marines is relatively positive, with notable additions
including US$191m for communications equipment
and an extra US$94m to procure new HIMARS rocket
artillery systems.
The army in late 2017 unveiled its ‘big six’
modernisation priorities: long-range precision fires;
next-generation combat vehicles; future vertical
lift; networks and communications/intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance; air and missile
defence; and soldier lethality. The service has
reallocated over 80% of its science and technology
funding to support these, although this encompasses
just 22% of army RDT&E, or US$2.4bn dollars.
While the army pursues new equipment, it
is slowing procurement of legacy systems. After
expanded helicopter purchases in 2018, aviation-
procurement funding is down by more than 30% in
the 2019 request. Nonetheless, upgrades continue
unabated. More Abrams tanks have been slated for
the Abrams improvement programme, and the 2019
request funds enough commercial off-the-shelf active
protection systems to outfit 261 tanks (enough for three
brigades). And procurement of the new armoured
personnel carrier (AMPV) to replace the M113 is up
by 90 units compared to 2018 appropriations (for a
total request of 197).
In 2019, the air force is due to receive 87% of all
new research and development dollars relative to
2018 appropriations. Importantly, this increase is to
White House FY2019 request
3 Destroyers with AShMs
2 Nuclear-powered attack submarines
1 Littoral Combat Ship
1 Expeditionary Sea Base
2 Fleet-replenishment oilers
1 Towing, salvage and rescue ship
40 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
unclassified air-force accounts: there is no nominal
increase to classified RDT&E. The majority of new
funding is directed into four space programmes:
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles, Evolved
Space-based Infrared Radar System, Navstar GPS
and research into ‘operationally responsive space’.
While space programmes benefited from increased
RDT&E, the procurement picture is less bright, falling
by US$1.2bn relative to 2018 appropriations. This
decline is exaggerated by Congress’s contentious
decision to add two Wideband Global SATCOM
satellites, which the air force did not request, into
2018 appropriations at a cost of US$595m.
Aircraft procurement is also lagging for three
main reasons. The first relates to the cancelled plan to
recapitalise the JSTARS surveillance aircraft, possibly
with a new aircraft, in favour of alternatives still in
development. Secondly, delays in KC-46 tanker
production have resulted in US$151m in further
losses to the procurement programme. Finally, the
NORAD: watching Northern America’s skies and seas
The deteriorating security environment and likely impact
of climate change have reinvigorated interest in replacing
the North Warning System (NWS). Part of the sensor suite
for the US–Canada North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD), this had until recently appeared to
be a Cold War-era relic. At the same time, a sign both of
Canada’s interest in the Arctic and its growing capabilities
there can be seen in the country’s May 2018 decision to
extend its air-defence identification zone to cover the
country’s entire Arctic archipelago.
Following the 9/11 attacks, the NWS became part of the
defence against any further aerial threat from terrorists.
At the same time, its traditional role of providing early
warning of state-orchestrated air attack diminished. An
increase in Russian long-range bomber flights skirting
Canada’s air-defence identification zone has – when
combined with increased accessibility to the Arctic – not
only refocused attention on potential threats from the
north, but also resulted in steps to upgrade early-warning
capabilities. Canada and the United States are engaged
in studies examining options to replace the NWS, and
an analysis will notionally be completed by 2020. Initial
deliveries of a replacement capability might begin in
2026.
Radar coverage
The original US–Canada joint North American Air Defense
Command was established in 1957, with responsibility for
2019 budget requests only 48 F-35As, compared to 56
included in 2018 appropriations.
OCO and emergency spending
The 2019 request for OCO totals US$69bn, a slight
increase from 2018’s appropriated US$65.9bn.
However, the 2018 OCO appropriation was bolstered
by a further US$5.8bn in emergency funding passed
separately in December 2017 and February 2018.
US$1.2bn of that amount was for hurricane relief,
with the rest intended to repair the USS Fitzgerald
and USS John S. McCain, augment ballistic-missile-
defence capabilities and increase troop levels in
Afghanistan. There is no equivalent supplemental
budget request for any type of emergency spending
in 2019.
The significant change to OCO is the US$6.5bn
request for the EDI, significantly more than that
requested in 2018 or enacted in 2017 (US$4.8bn and
US$3.4bn, respectively).
the Distant Early Warning radar network of FPS-19 long-
range and FPS-23 low-level radars, commonly known as
the DEW Line. The former radar could detect a bomber-
size target flying at medium altitude at a range of 160
nautical miles. In the 1980s, the DEW Line was supplanted
by the NWS.
The NWS consists of a chain of medium- and long-
range radars providing air surveillance and early warning.
In Canada, eleven AN/FPS-117 long-range radars are
supported by 36 AN/FPS-124 short-range systems.
The FPS-117 entered service in 1988 and the FPS-124
in 1990. Radar data is collated at the Royal Canadian
Air Force’s 22 Wing, also known as the Canadian Air
Defence Sector. There are also three NWS sites in Alaska.
Following assessment, and if required, radar information
is then forwarded to NORAD at Peterson Air Force Base
in Colorado. The NWS improved the capacity to detect
Soviet-era cruise missiles, though capability in this
area remained only partial. Developments in combat-
aircraft and cruise-missile technology are now driving
requirements for the technologies that will succeed the
present radar system.
For example, Russia has already introduced into
service an air-launched cruise missile with a reduced
radar signature, the Kh-101/102 (AS-23A/B Kodiak).
Depending on the version, this missile has an estimated
maximum range of either 4,000 kilometres or 5,000 km,
and a cruise altitude of around 50 metres. The Russian

More than US$3.2bn of the EDI increase is allocated
to prepositioning equipment, which represents
half of the total EDI request. Of that US$3.2bn,
77% goes toward the army’s goal of establishing
equipment sets to support a division-sized force
based around two Armored Brigade Combat Teams
(one upgraded with active protection systems), two
fires brigades, supporting air defence and ancillary
units. Ten percent of the total is for additional Patriot
PAC-3 MSE air-defence systems and long-range
air-launched cruise missiles (JASSM-ER), with most
of the remainder allocated to Air Force Deployable
Airbase Systems.
Total spending for Central Command train-and-
equip operations remains steady, though with a shift
away from Iraq and Syria toward Afghanistan. The
Afghan Security Forces Fund request is for US$5.2bn,
up from the 2018 appropriation of US$4.7bn.
Conversely, the 2018 appropriation for train-and-
equip activities to counter the Islamic State, also
Navy, meanwhile, is fielding the 3M14 (SS-N-30A Kalibr)
cruise missile on both ships and submarines, which
has an engagement range in excess of 2,000 km. While
these missiles are subsonic, Russia is also developing
hypersonic cruise missiles for its aerospace and naval
forces.
These, however, are far from the only demands that
will be placed upon the NWS replacement architecture.
Low-observable combat-aircraft technology is no longer
limited to the US and a handful of its allies. Russia
continues to develop a design to meet its PAK DA bomber
requirement that is widely held to have signature
management at the heart of its design, though progress
on this design is likely to depend on the trajectory of
the Russian defence budget. NORAD’s new surveillance
network, however, is planned to be in operation well
beyond 2050.
Surveillance requirements
Canada’s All Domain Situational Awareness programme
is attempting to identify the relevant technologies and
approaches for future surveillance needs. As well as
aerospace, maritime surface and sub-surface surveillance
are part of the requirement. The notional timescale is to
identify an approach by 2021, select the contractor(s) by
2023 and award a contract in 2024. The overall upgrade
programme will likely take at least a decade to implement.
Canada already uses its RADARSAT constellation for
North America 41
known as ISIS or ISIL, was US$1.8bn; the 2019 request
totals US$1.4bn. Like FY2018, the 2019 request
North America
supports an end-strength of 11,958 in Afghanistan
and 5,765 in counter-ISIS operations in Iraq and
Syria, but increases personnel assigned to in-theatre
support of both operations from 56,310 to 59,463.
Future Years Defense Program
The 2019 defence-budget request was the first
completed by the Trump administration to include
a Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), which
projects spending from FY2019 through FY2023.
In general, trends in future years are consistent
with the approach of the 2019 budget request.
Annualised growth in discretionary national-defence
spending between FY2018 and FY2023 is 2.1%, nearly
identical with projected annual inflation in the US.
The result is flat or declining defence spending when
measured in constant dollars. Projected expenditures
closely track the spending levels advanced by the last
maritime surveillance, and this is likely to feature further
in the architecture of a replacement NWS. The extent to
which satellites will provide elements of the required
aerospace surveillance has yet to become clear.
Maritime surveillance will also be supported by the
acquisition of a long-range uninhabited aerial vehicle.
Delivery of the yet-to-be-selected system is due in
the mid-2020s. Maritime surveillance is increasing in
prominence with the impact of climate change on the
Northwest Passage, and the waterways across Canada’s
north linking the Pacific and Atlantic oceans on average
becoming navigable for longer periods each year.
Other considerations include the extent to which
resilience is required. During the Cold War, the DEW
and NWS were tripwire systems. Their static radars
were vulnerable to attack but were unlikely to be
particularly high-value targets. It is likely that resilience
considerations will form part of the planning process for
the replacement architecture.
While the exact suite of sensors remains to be
determined, as does the degree to which these are
ground- or space-based, the requirement for them is
enduring. Economic, ecological and security interests in
the Arctic region will only grow, and because of these
factors, the recapitalisation of Canada’s and the United
States’ northern air-, and now maritime-, surveillance
capacity will almost certainly remain a priority for Ottawa
and Washington.
42 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
DoD plans completed before the enactment of the
BCA 2011. In other words, the Pentagon is planning
to restore funding to pre-sequestration levels without
factoring in real growth to undo shortfalls brought
about by the spending caps.
Projections of spending by public law title are
available only for base accounts. They show that
spending on base RDT&E is projected to decline by
6% in nominal terms by 2023. Spending on military
personnel and procurement both outpace inflation
and average overall budget growth. Because these
accounts often have significant OCO components, it
is not possible to project their exact values.
While Pentagon and White House leaders seem
intent on quickly folding OCO back into the base
budget, owing to both real and imagined criticisms of
OCO, they are likely to have as little success as recent
administrations – mostly due to the continuation of
the BCA into 2020 and 2021. Yet FYDP plans beyond
2019 may not come to fruition. The BCA remains
in effect for FY2020 and FY2021, meaning a further
two-year budget agreement is necessary to secure the
requested administration budgets. Without such a
deal, base national-defence spending in FY2020 and
FY2021 would fall by US$171bn, or about 13% of the
total request.
Resourcing the FYDP would require a budget deal
even larger than BBA18, which was over twice as large
as the 2013 and 2015 budget deals combined, making
it unlikely. The decline of OCO spending (which is
exempt from budgets caps), compounding national
debt and potential legislative changes stemming from
the 2018 midterm elections could all prevent such a
large deal from materialising.
Foreign Military Financing programmes
Outside the national-defence account, the State
Department requested US$5.3bn in discretionary
spending for FMF. This amount is in line with last year’s
request for US$5.1bn. Both of these figures reflect the
Trump administration’s objective of reducing State
Department spending. Given congressional pushback
to such proposals, the request should be viewed as a
poor predictor of actual expenditures. Last year, for
example, Congress appropriated US$6.1bn for FMF –
close to the 2017 request (US$6.3bn).
Comparing the 2018 and 2019 requests still
reveals useful information about relative changes
in priorities. Funding for Israel increased from
US$3.1bn to US$3.3bn, reflecting a new bilateral
ten-year agreement for US$34bn in FMF contributions
between 2019 and 2028. One condition of that deal
is a gradual elimination of Israel’s ability to convert
one-quarter of received FMF funds into local currency
to purchase Israeli products. Elsewhere, requested
FMF spending on Pakistan reduced from US$100m
to US$80m. Meanwhile, the 2018 request for a single
‘Global’ account worth US$201m was reduced to
US$75m to improve budgetary oversight. This was
augmented by a series of new, separate requests
for individual countries (Colombia, Lebanon, the
Philippines, Tunisia, Ukraine and Vietnam) totalling
US$172m. However, requests for Egypt (US$1.3bn),
Jordan (US$350m) and general administration remain
unchanged.
CANADA
Delivering on the pledges of the Liberal government’s
2017 defence-policy review remains the focus of
Canadian defence. This report promised adaptation
to a new and more challenging security environment,
with a subtext that Canada would aim to maintain
and strengthen international commitments and
engagement.
Deployments
Canada has been deploying small but significant
capability packages. In some areas, these
commitments have been modestly boosted. At the
July NATO summit in Brussels, Prime Minister Justin
Trudeau announced a four-year extension – to March
2023 – of Canada’s contribution to the Alliance’s
Enhanced Forward Presence in Europe. Canada
leads the multinational battlegroup in Latvia. The
announcement also indicated that the mission would
grow from 455 to 540 personnel.
Canada’s maritime commitment to NATO – a
frigate deployed to the European theatre – was
bolstered from February 2018 by the extended
deployment to European waters of the submarine
HMCS Windsor. While these Victoria-class vessels
have operated before in the North Atlantic, this was
the first-ever deployment of one by Canada to the
Mediterranean. Trudeau also announced in July
that Canada would take command of a new NATO
training and capacity-building mission in Iraq. Up to
250 Canadian personnel will deploy up to late 2019.
A submarine also featured in Canada’s broader
efforts to project power, particularly in the Asia-
Pacific. From September 2017, the Vancouver Island-
homeported HMCS Chicoutimi began a seven-month

deployment to the region, the first by a Royal Canadian
Navy (RCN) submarine since the 1960s. At the end of
July, the frigate HMCS Calgary also deployed to the
region for five months, while Canada deployed 1,000
personnel to the US-led Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC)
exercise, including two frigates, two coastal-defence
vessels and the new interim auxiliary oiler MV
Asterix, which joined the fleet in January, thereby
filling a major capability gap. The Asia-Pacific saw
other capabilities deployed, including to help monitor
compliance with UN sanctions against North Korea.
And, after some delay, in July 2018 Canada began
deploying the first of eight helicopters, plus some 250
personnel, to support the UN stabilisation mission
in Mali. Amid these activities, questions continued
about the Canadian forces’ capabilities, their ability
to sustain operational tempo and the future defence
programme.
Procurement
Canada’s long-running plans to recapitalise its
combat-aircraft fleet, currently based on ageing
CF-18 Hornets, have been further complicated by
a trade dispute between Ottawa and Boeing over a
complaint by the latter against the Canadian firm
Bombardier. Canada abandoned an expected interim
purchase of 18 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets. Instead, it is
purchasing a similar number of second-hand F/A-18s
from Australia.
Also, in December 2017, Canada formally launched
a new competition to find a long-term successor
aircraft to replace the previous administration’s
contentious plan to purchase 65 F-35A Lightning IIs
(although Canada remains an industrial partner in
the programme). The aim of the new plan is to select
a design by early 2022, with the first of 88 new aircraft
to be delivered in 2025. The list of ‘eligible suppliers’
for the procurement comprises Airbus Defence and
Space (with Eurofighter Typhoon), Boeing Defense
(Super Hornet), Dassault Aviation (Rafale), Lockheed
Martin (F-35 Lightning) and Saab (Gripen).
The arrival of the converted merchant ship Asterix
heralded a welcome revival of Canada’s own afloat-
support capacity. Until then, since the retirement
of the Protecteur and Preserver, the RCN had been
relying on help from the Chilean and Spanish navies.
North America 43
Canada’s Joint Support Ship programme is intended
to provide a new long-term afloat-support capability
North America
based on the German Navy’s Berlin class. However,
by 2018 the estimated cost of the project had increased
by more than 40%. Initial construction began in June
2018, although detailed design of the two planned
vessels had yet to be finalised, raising fears about
potential additional cost increases and further delays.
The RCN had been targeting delivery dates of 2022
and 2023 for the two ships, already somewhat later
than originally planned, but these may now stretch
by a further year or two.
In October 2018, after a series of delays, the
Canadian government announced that it had
selected the consortium led by Lockheed Martin,
offering the BAE Systems Type-26 design, as the
preferred bidder for its future Canadian Surface
Combatant (CSC) programme. The other contending
consortiums were offering versions of the Dutch
De Zeven Provinciën and the Spanish F-105 frigate
designs. A fixed-price bid from Italy’s Fincantieri in
November 2017, based on the FREMM design, was
rejected by Canada as being outside the prescribed
procurement process.
Canada still intends for construction of the
CSC to begin in the early 2020s, and that a ‘full
complement’ of 15 vessels will be procured to replace
the current frigates and recently retired destroyers
on a one-for-one basis. This remains an ambitious
target. Meanwhile, the navy aims to modernise the
current Victoria-class submarines in order to keep
them effective until the mid-2030s. By then, however,
their age will make this a challenge (the boats were
launched in the UK between 1986 and 1993), as will
any ambition to replace them.
The first Harry DeWolf-class Arctic offshore-
patrol ship was launched in September 2018, and the
government later said it will buy a sixth. There has
been criticism that these vessels are under-equipped
for their roles in what could become an increasingly
challenging theatre of operations. The Canadian
government has also been negotiating for the
conversion of three modern commercial icebreakers
to Canadian Coast Guard service on the model of the
urgent requirement that led to the conversion of the
MV Asterix.
44 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Canada CAN
Canadian Dollar $ 2017 2018 2019 Space
GDP CS$ 2.15tr 2.24tr EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SATELLITES • SPACE SURVEILLANCE 1 Sapphire
US$ 1.65tr 17.3tr
per capita US$ 45,095 46,733 Army 23,000
Growth % 3.0 2.1 FORCES BY ROLE
Inflation % 1.6 2.6 MANOEUVRE
Def exp [a] CS$ 29.2bn 27.6bn Mechanised
US$ 22.5bn 21.4bn 1 (1st) mech bde gp (1 armd regt, 2 mech inf bn, 1 lt inf
Def bdgt [b] CS$ 24.1bn 23.5bn bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log bn)
2 (2nd & 5th) mech bde gp (1 armd recce regt, 2 mech
US$ 18.6bn 18.9bn
inf bn, 1 lt inf bn, 1 arty regt, 1 cbt engr regt, 1 log bn)
US$1= CS$ 1.298 1.291
COMBAT SUPPORT
[a] NATO definition 1 engr regt
[b] Department of National Defence and Veterans Affairs 3 MP pl
Population 35,881,659 AIR DEFENCE
1 SAM regt
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Male 7.9% 2.8% 3.2% 3.5% 23.7% 8.5% ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Female 7.5% 2.7% 3.0% 3.3% 23.4% 10.6%
MBT 82: 42 Leopard 2A4 (trg role); 20 Leopard 2A4M
(upgraded); 20 Leopard 2A6M (52 Leopard 1C2 in store)
RECCE ε120 LAV-25 Coyote
Capabilities IFV 550: 141 LAV-III Kodiak; 409 LAV 6.0
Canada’s armed forces are focused principally on territorial APC 443
defence, as well as contributing important capabilities to inter- APC (T) 268: 235 M113; 33 M577 (CP)
national missions, principally through NATO. The 2017 defence APC (W) 175 LAV Bison (incl 10 EW, 32 amb, 32 repair,
review reaffirmed commitments to NATO, but also to mod- 64 recovery)
ernising capabilities, including cyber power. Canada operates AUV 455: 7 Cougar; 448 TAPV
a volunteer force with high standards of training. The review ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
promised to increase regular and reserve forces, with particular AEV 23: 5 Buffalo; 18 Wisent 2
enhancements in the areas of cyber and intelligence. Deploy- ARV 12 BPz-3 Büffel
ments, although relatively small scale, underscore a determi- ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
nation to maintain a power-projection capability and interna- MSL • MANPATS TOW-2
tional engagement. Canada’s leadership of a NATO battlegroup RCL 84mm Carl Gustav
in Latvia highlights a continuing capability to deploy medium- ARTILLERY 287
sized land formations. It has also contributed to NATO’s air- TOWED 163 105mm 126: 98 C3 (M101); 28 LG1 MkII;
policing mission. Meanwhile, the deployments of frigates and 155mm 37 M777
submarines to the NATO theatre and the Pacific demonstrate MOR 124: 81mm 100; SP 81mm 24 LAV Bison
continuing blue-water naval capabilities. The 2017 review UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR • Light Skylark
pledged to finally deliver on a range of delayed procurements AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence Starburst
aimed at making the services more suitable to future opera-
tions. It raised the target for a new-generation fighter to 88 Reserve Organisations 17,000
aircraft, but a trade dispute with Boeing saw Canada turn to
Australia to purchase second-hand F/A-18s to supplement its
Canadian Rangers 5,000 Reservists
current fleet. In October 2018, the government selected the
Provide a limited military presence in Canada’s northern,
Lockheed Martin-led consortium and its BAE Systems Type-26
coastal and isolated areas. Sovereignty, public-safety and
frigate design as the preferred bidder for Canada’s future surveillance roles
surface combatant. Canada maintains a well-developed range FORCES BY ROLE
of mainly small and medium-sized defence firms. The strongest MANOEUVRE
sector is in combat vehicles and components, though the naval Other
sector has recently developed. 5 (patrol) ranger gp (187 patrols)

ACTIVE 66,600 (Army 23,000 Navy 8,300 Air Force Army Reserves 12,000 Reservists
12,000 Other 23,300) Paramilitary 4,500 Most units have only coy-sized establishments
FORCES BY ROLE
RESERVE 27,000 (Army 17,000 Navy 4,600 Air 2,100 COMMAND
Other 3,300) 10 bde gp HQ
 North America 45

MANOEUVRE 1 sqn with C-130J-30 (CC-130) Hercules

Reconnaissance 1 (utl) sqn with DHC-6 (CC-138) Twin Otter

North America
18 recce regt (sqn) TRAINING
Light 1 OCU sqn with F/A-18A/B Hornet (CF-18AM/BM)
51 inf regt (coy) 1 OCU sqn with C-130H/H-30/J (CC-130) Hercules
COMBAT SUPPORT 1 OCU sqn with CH-148 Cyclone
16 fd arty regt (bty) 1 OCU sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon)
3 indep fd arty bty 1 sqn with P-3 Orion (CP-140 Aurora)
10 cbt engr regt (coy) TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 EW regt (sqn) 5 sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon)
4 int coy 3 (cbt spt) sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon)
10 sigs regt (coy) 1 (Spec Ops) sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon –
OPCON Canadian Special Operations Command)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 sqn with CH-47F (CH-147F) Chinook
10 log bn (coy)
3 MP coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 95 combat capable
Royal Canadian Navy 8,300 FGA 77: 59 F/A-18A (CF-18AM) Hornet; 18 F/A-18B (CF-
18BM) Hornet
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ASW 18 P-3 Orion (CP-140M Aurora)
SUBMARINES • SSK 4: TKR/TPT 7: 2 A310 MRTT (CC-150T); 5 KC-130H
4 Victoria (ex-UK Upholder) with 6 single 533mm TT with TPT 47: Heavy 5 C-17A (CC-177) Globemaster III; Medium
Mk48 Sea Arrow HWT (2 currently non-operational) 25: 6 C-130H (CC-130) Hercules; 2 C-130H-30 (CC-130)
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES • Hercules; 17 C-130J-30 (CC-130) Hercules; Light 10: 6
FFGHM 12: DHC-5 (CC-115) Buffalo; 4 DHC-6 (CC-138) Twin Otter;
12 Halifax with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Block II PAX 7: 3 A310 (CC-150 Polaris); 4 CL-600 (CC-144B/C)
Harpoon AShM, 2 octuple Mk48 VLS with RIM-7P Sea TRG 4 DHC-8 (CT-142)
Sparrow SAM/RIM-162C ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm HELICOPTERS
ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 Phalanx CIWS, 1 57mm gun ASW 26: 11 SH-3 (CH-124) Sea King (to be withdrawn
(capacity 1 SH-3 (CH-124) Sea King ASW hel) end 2018); 15 CH-148 Cyclone (6 more Block 2 hels
MINE WARFARE delivered but not yet accepted)
MINE COUNTERMEASURES • MCO 12 Kingston (also MRH 68 Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon)
used in patrol role) TPT 29: Heavy 15 CH-47F (CH-147F) Chinook; Medium
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 10 14 AW101 Merlin (CH-149 Cormorant)
AORH 1 Asterix (Resolve) (capacity 2 CH-148 Cyclone RADARS 53
ASW hel) AD RADAR • NORTH WARNING SYSTEM 47: 11 AN/
AX 9: AXL 8 Orca; AXS 1 Oriole FPS-117 (range 200nm); 36 AN/FPS-124 (range 80nm)
STRATEGIC 6: 4 Coastal; 2 Transportable
Reserves 4,600 reservists AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
24 units tasked with crewing 10 of the 12 MCOs, ASM AGM-65 Maverick
harbour defence & naval control of shipping AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder; SARH AIM-7M Sparrow
ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM
BOMBS
Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) 12,000
Laser-guided: GBU-10/GBU-12/GBU-16 Paveway II;
FORCES BY ROLE GBU-24 Paveway III
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK INS/GPS-guided: GBU-31 JDAM; GBU-38 JDAM; GBU-
4 sqn with F/A-18A/B Hornet (CF-18AM/BM) 49 Enhanced Paveway II
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
1 sqn with SH-3 Sea King (CH-124) NATO Flight Training Canada
1 sqn with CH-148 Cyclone EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT
2 sqn with P-3 Orion (CP-140 Aurora) TRG 45: 26 T-6A Texan II (CT-156 Harvard II); 19 Hawk
SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT 115 (CT-155) (advanced wpns/tactics trg)
3 sqn with AW101 Merlin (CH-149 Cormorant);
C-130H/H-30 (CC-130) Hercules Contracted Flying Services – Southport
1 sqn with DHC-5 (CC-115) Buffalo EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TANKER/TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT
1 sqn with A310/A310 MRTT (CC-150/CC-150T) TPT • Light 7 Beech C90B King Air
1 sqn with KC-130H TRG 11 G-120A
TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS
1 sqn with C-17A (CC-177) Globemaster MRH 9 Bell 412 (CH-146)
1 sqn with CL-600 (CC-144B) TPT • Light 7 Bell 206 Jet Ranger (CH-139)
46 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Canadian Special Operations Forces ees were stood up in the new ‘cyber operator’ role; civilian
Command 1,500 recruitment was due to start in 2018 and reservist recruit-
ment in 2019. Canada published a cyber-security strategy
FORCES BY ROLE
in October 2010 and an action plan on implementation in
SPECIAL FORCES
2013. The armed forces’ Information Management Group
1 SF regt (Canadian Special Operations Regiment)
(IMG) is responsible for electronic warfare and network
1 SF unit (JTF 2)
defence. The Canadian Force Information Operations
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Group, under the IMG, commands the Canadian Forces
1 CBRN unit (Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit –
Information Operations Group Headquarters; the
CJIRU)
Canadian Forces Electronic Warfare Centre; the Canadian
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Forces Network Operation Centre, which is the national
1 (spec ops) sqn, with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon – from
operational cyber-defence unit permanently assigned to
the RCAF)
support Canadian Forces operations; and other units.
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
NBC VEHICLES 4 LAV Bison NBC
HELICOPTERS • MRH 10 Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon)
DEPLOYMENT
ALBANIA: OSCE • Albania 1
Canadian Forces Joint Operational Support BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: OSCE • Bosnia and
Group Herzegovina 2
FORCES BY ROLE CARIBBEAN: Operation Caribbe 1 MCO
COMBAT SUPPORT
CYPRUS: UN • UNFICYP (Operation Snowgoose) 1
1 engr spt coy
1 (close protection) MP coy DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
1 (joint) sigs regt MONUSCO (Operation Crocodile) 8
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT EGYPT: MFO (Operation Calumet) 68; 1 MP team
1 (spt) log unit
IRAQ: Operation Inherent Resolve (Impact) 370; 1 SF trg gp; 1
1 (movement) log unit
med unit; 1 hel flt with 4 Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon) hel

Paramilitary 4,500 KUWAIT: Operation Inherent Resolve (Impact) 1 A310 MRTT

(C-150T); 2 C-130J-30 Hercules (CC-130J)
Canadian Coast Guard 4,500 LATVIA: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence (Operation
Incl Department of Fisheries and Oceans; all platforms Reassurance) 350; 1 mech inf bn HQ; 1 mech inf coy(+);
are designated as non-combatant LAV 6.0; M777
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MALI: UN • MINUSMA (Operation Presence) 138: 1 hel
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 69 sqn with 3 CH-47F (CH-147F) Chinook; 5 Bell 412 (CH-145
PSOH 1 Leonard J Cowley Griffon)
PSO 1 Sir Wilfred Grenfell (with hel landing platform) MEDITERRANEAN SEA: NATO • SNMG 2: 1 FFGHM
PCO 13: 2 Cape Roger; 1 Gordon Reid; 9 Hero; 1 Tanu
PCC 1 Harp MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO (Operation Jade) 4 obs
PB 53: 1 Post; 1 Quebecois; 1 Vakta; 10 Type-300A; 36 PACIFIC OCEAN: Operation Caribbe 2 MCO
Type-300B; 1 S. Dudka; 1 Simmonds (on loan from ROMANIA: NATO • Air Policing 135; 5 F/A-18A Hornet
RCMP); 2 Baie de Plaisance (CF-18)
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 4 Type-
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR • Joint Enterprise (Operation
400
Kobold) 5; OSCE • Kosovo 2
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 42
ABU 7 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS (Operation Soprano) 5; 5
AG 4 obs
AGB 15 UKRAINE: Operation Unifier 200; OSCE • Ukraine 35
AGOR 8 (coastal and offshore fishery vessels)
AGOS 8 
 FOREIGN FORCES
HELICOPTERS • MRH 7 Bell 412EP • TPT 19: Medium
1 S-61; Light 18: 3 Bell 206L Long Ranger; 15 Bell 429 United Kingdom BATUS 400; 1 trg unit; 1 hel flt with
SA341 Gazelle AH1
Cyber United States 150

In June 2017, Canada’s defence-policy review said that

Canada ‘will develop the capability to conduct active
cyber operations focused on external threats to Canada in
the context of government-authorized military missions’.
This was because a ‘purely defensive’ cyber posture was
‘no longer sufficient’. In November 2017, the first transfer-
 North America 47

United States US ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

North America
United States Dollar $ 2017 2018 2019 US Strategic Command
GDP US$ 19.5tr 20.5tr HQ at Offutt AFB (NE). Five missions: US nuclear deterrent;
per capita US$ 59,792 62,518 missile defence; global strike; info ops; ISR
Growth % 2.2 2.9
US Navy
Inflation % 2.1 2.4
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Def exp [a] US$ 686bn 706bn SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 14 Ohio with
Def bdgt [b] US$ 599bn 643bn 689bn up to 24 UGM-133A Trident D-5/D-5LE nuclear SLBM, 4
[a] NATO definition single 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea Arrow HWT
[b] National Defense Budget Function (50) outlays. Includes DoD
funding, as well as funds for nuclear-weapons-related activities US Air Force • Global Strike Command
undertaken by the Department of Energy. Excludes some military FORCES BY ROLE
retirement and healthcare costs. MISSILE
Population 329,256,465 9 sqn with LGM-30G Minuteman III
BOMBER
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 5 sqn with B-52H Stratofortress
2 sqn with B-2A Spirit (+1 ANG sqn personnel only)
Male 9.5% 3.3% 3.4% 3.7% 22.3% 7.1%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Female 9.1% 3.1% 3.3% 3.5% 22.8% 8.9%
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
ICBM • Nuclear 400 LGM-30G Minuteman III (1
Capabilities Mk12A or Mk21 re-entry veh per missile)
The United States remains the world’s most capable military AIRCRAFT
power, with a unique ability to project power on a global basis. BBR 66: 20 B-2A Spirit; 46 B-52H Stratofortress
The Pentagon’s 2018 National Defense Strategy refocused AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
priorities on the return of renewed ‘great-power competition’ ALCM • Nuclear AGM-86B
and called for a reversal in reductions in the size of the joint
force. A new Nuclear Posture Review backed the development Strategic Defenses – Early Warning
of low-yield warheads and a nuclear-capable sea-launched North American Aerospace Defense Command
cruise missile. A missile-defence review is pending, and the (NORAD) – a combined US–CAN org
direction to create a space force has fuelled debate over the EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
best way to integrate space into national-security policy. The RADAR
US is NATO’s most capable member, and has defence-treaty NORTH WARNING SYSTEM 50: 14 AN/FPS-117
obligations to, among others, Australia, the Philippines, Japan, (range 200nm); 36 AN/FPS-124 (range 80nm)
South Korea and Thailand. The US maintains an all-volunteer SOLID STATE PHASED ARRAY RADAR SYSTEM
force, including significant reserves, with high levels of training (SSPARS) 5: 2 AN/FPS-123 Early Warning Radar
throughout all command and service levels. However, readiness located at Cape Cod AFS (MA) and Clear AFS (AK); 3
remains a major concern. Modernisation priorities include a AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar located
renewal of strategic nuclear capabilities, including a new class at Beale AFB (CA), Thule (GL) and Fylingdales Moor
of ballistic-missile submarine and a new long-range bomber, (UK)
and a major recapitalisation of air assets across the services. A SPACETRACK SYSTEM 10: 1 AN/FPS-85 Spacetrack
major declared priority for the current administration is a long- Radar at Eglin AFB (FL); 6 contributing radars at
term naval build-up to a 355-ship combat fleet. The US also Cavalier AFS (ND), Clear (AK), Thule (GL), Fylingdales
continues to actively develop its defensive and offensive cyber Moor (UK), Beale AFB (CA) and Cape Cod (MA); 3
capabilities. The country has the strongest defence industry Spacetrack Optical Trackers located at Socorro (NM),
globally, with a dominant position in the international defence Maui (HI), Diego Garcia (BIOT)
market, although a report initiated by President Trump warned PERIMETER ACQUISITION RADAR ATTACK
that key areas of the defence-industrial base were eroding, CHARACTERISATION SYSTEM (PARCS) 1 AN/
which could have consequences for the defence supply chain. FPQ-16 at Cavalier AFS (ND)
DETECTION AND TRACKING RADARS 5 located
at Kwajalein Atoll, Ascension Island, Australia, Kaena
ACTIVE 1,359,450 (Army 476,200 Navy 329,850 Point (HI), MIT Lincoln Laboratory (MA)
Air Force 325,900 US Marine Corps 185,400 US Coast GROUND BASED ELECTRO OPTICAL DEEP
Guard 42,100) SPACE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (GEODSS)
Socorro (NM), Maui (HI), Diego Garcia (BIOT)
RESERVE 845,600 (Army 524,000 Navy 100,950 Air STRATEGIC DEFENCES – MISSILE DEFENCES
Force 176,150 Marine Corps Reserve 38,350 US Coast SEA-BASED: Aegis engagement cruisers and
Guard 6,150) destroyers
48 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

LAND-BASED: 40 ground-based interceptors at 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 MRL bde HQ; 1 log bde; 1
Fort Greely (AK); 4 ground-based interceptors at (hy cbt avn) hel bde)
Vandenburg AFB (CA) 1 (7th) inf div (2 (1st & 2nd SBCT, 2nd ID) mech bde (1
armd recce sqn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr
Space bn, 1 CSS bn))
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 (1st SBCT, 25th ID) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3
SATELLITES 137 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn)
COMMUNICATIONS 43: 4 AEHF; 6 DSCS-III; 2 2 (2nd & 3rd CR) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3 mech
Milstar-I; 3 Milstar-II; 5 MUOS; 1 PAN-1 (P360); 5 SDS-III; sqn, 1 arty sqn, 1 cbt engr sqn, 1 CSS sqn)
2 SDS-IV; 6 UFO; 9 WGS SV2 Light
NAVIGATION/POSITIONING/TIMING 31: 12 1 (10th Mtn) inf div (3 (1st–3rd IBCT) lt inf bde (1 recce
sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 log
NAVSTAR Block IIF; 19 NAVSTAR Block IIR/IIRM
bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde)
METEOROLOGY/OCEANOGRAPHY 6 DMSP-5
1 (25th) inf div (2 (2 & 3rd IBCT) inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2
ISR 16: 5 FIA Radar; 5 Evolved Enhanced/Improved Crystal
inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 log bde; 1
(visible and infrared imagery); 2 Lacrosse (Onyx radar
(cbt avn) hel bde)
imaging satellite); 1 NRO L-76; 1 ORS-1; 1 TacSat-4; 1
2 (Sy Force Assist) inf bde(-)
TacSat-6

Air Manoeuvre
ELINT/SIGINT 27: 2 Mentor (advanced Orion); 3
1 (82nd) AB div (1 (1st AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce bn, 1
Advanced Mentor; 4 Mercury; 1 NRO L-67; 1 Trumpet;
mech coy; 3 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS
4 Improved Trumpet; 12 SBWASS (Space Based Wide
bn); 2 (2nd & 3rd AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce bn, 3 para
Area Surveillance System; Naval Ocean Surveillance
bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 (cbt avn) hel
System)
bde; 1 log bde)
SPACE SURVEILLANCE 6: 4 GSSAP; 1 SBSS (Space
1 (101st) air aslt div (3 (1st–3rd AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce
Based Surveillance System); 1 ORS-5

bn, 3 para bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1
EARLY WARNING 8: 4 DSP; 4 SBIRS Geo-1 (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 log bde)
1 (173rd AB BCT) AB bde (1 recce bn, 2 para bn, 1 arty
US Army 476,200 bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn)
FORCES BY ROLE 1 (4th AB BCT, 25th ID) AB bde (1 recce bn, 2 para bn, 1
Sqn are generally bn sized and tp are generally coy sized arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn)
COMMAND Other
3 (I, III & XVIII AB) corps HQ 1 (11th ACR) trg armd cav regt (OPFOR) (2 armd cav
1 (2nd) inf div HQ sqn, 1 CSS bn)
SPECIAL FORCES COMBAT SUPPORT
(see USSOCOM) 3 MRL bde (2 MRL bn)
MANOEUVRE 1 MRL bde (4 MRL bn)
Armoured 4 engr bde
1 (1st) armd div (2 (2nd & 3rd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd 2 EOD gp (2 EOD bn)
recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 10 int bde
cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 (1st SBCT) mech bde (1 armd 2 int gp
recce sqn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 4 MP bde
CSS bn); 1 MRL bde HQ; 1 log bde; 1 (hy cbt avn) hel 1 NBC bde
bde) 3 (strat) sigs bde
1 (1st) cav div (3 (1st–3rd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd 4 (tac) sigs bde
recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 MRL bde (1 MRL bn); 1 log bde; 2 log bde
1 (hy cbt avn) hel bde) 3 med bde
1 (1st) inf div (2 (1st & 2nd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd 1 tpt bde
recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt HELICOPTER
engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 log bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde) 2 (cbt avn) hel bde
1 (3rd) inf div (2 (1st & 2nd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd 1 (cbt avn) hel bde HQ
recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt AIR DEFENCE
engr bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 lt inf bn; 1 MRL bde HQ; 1 log 5 SAM bde
bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde)
Reserve Organisations
Mechanised
1 (4th) inf div (1 (3rd ABCT) armd bde (1 armd recce Army National Guard 335,200 reservists
sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr Normally dual-funded by DoD and states. Civil-
bn, 1 CSS bn); 1 (1st SBCT) mech bde (1 armd recce emergency responses can be mobilised by state
sqn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn); governors. Federal government can mobilise ARNG for
1 (2nd IBCT) lt inf bde (1 recce sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, major domestic emergencies and for overseas operations
 North America 49

FORCES BY ROLE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

COMMAND ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES

North America
8 div HQ MBT 2,386: 775 M1A1 SA Abrams; 1,611 M1A2 SEPv2
SPECIAL FORCES Abrams (ε3,500 more M1A1/A2 Abrams in store)
(see USSOCOM) ASLT 134 M1128 Stryker MGS
MANOEUVRE RECCE 1,745: ε1,200 M3A2/A3 Bradley; 545 M1127
Reconnaissance Stryker RV (ε800 more M3 Bradley in store)
1 armd recce sqn IFV 2,931: ε14 LAV-25; ε2,500 M2A2/A3 Bradley; 334
Armoured M7A3/SA BFIST (OP); 83 M1296 Styker Dragoon; (ε2,000
5 (ABCT) armd bde (1 armd recce sqn, 2 armd bn, 1 more M2 Bradley in store)
armd inf bn, 1 SP arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn) APC 10,547
Mechanised APC (T) ε5,000 M113A2/A3 (ε8,000 more in store)
2 (SBCT) mech bde (1 armd recce sqn, 3 mech inf bn, 1 APC (W) 2,613: 1,773 M1126 Stryker ICV; 348 M1130
arty bn, 1 cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn) Stryker CV (CP); 188 M1131 Stryker FSV (OP); 304
Light M1133 Stryker MEV (Amb)
14 (IBCT) lt inf bde (1 recce sqn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 PPV 2,934: 2,633 MaxxPro Dash; 301 MaxxPro LWB (Amb)
cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn) AUV 9,016: 2,900 M1117 ASV; 465 M1200 Armored Knight
6 (IBCT) lt inf bde (1 recce sqn, 2 inf bn, 1 arty bn, 1 (OP); 5,651 M-ATV
cbt engr bn, 1 CSS bn) ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
4 lt inf bn AEV 531: 113 M1 ABV; 250 M9 ACE; 168 M1132 Stryker
Air Manoeuvre ESV
1 AB bn ARV 1,177+: 360 M88A1; 817 M88A2 (ε1,000 more
COMBAT SUPPORT M88A1 in store); some M578
8 arty bde VLB 60: 20 REBS; 40 Wolverine HAB
1 SP arty bn MW 3+: Aardvark JSFU Mk4; some Husky 2G; 3+ Hydrema
8 engr bde 910 MCV-2; M58/M59 MICLIC; M139; Rhino
1 EOD regt NBC VEHICLES 234 M1135 Stryker NBCRV
3 int bde ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
3 MP bde MSL
1 NBC bde SP 1,133: 133 M1134 Stryker ATGM; ε1,000 M1167
2 (tac) sigs bde HMMWV TOW
18 (Mnv Enh) cbt spt bde MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT RCL 84mm Carl Gustav
9 log bde ARTILLERY 5,411
17 (regional) log spt gp SP 155mm 965: 900 M109A6; 65 M109A7 (ε500 more
HELICOPTER M109A6 in store)
8 (cbt avn) hel bde TOWED 1,339: 105mm 821 M119A2/3; 155mm 518
5 (theatre avn) hel bde M777A2
AIR DEFENCE MRL 227mm 600: 375 M142 HIMARS; 225 M270A1
3 SAM bde MLRS
MOR 2,507: 81mm 990 M252; 120mm 1,076 M120/
Army Reserve 188,800 reservists M1064A3; SP 120mm 441 M1129 Stryker MC
Reserve under full command of US Army. Does not have SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
state-emergency liability of Army National Guard SRBM • Conventional MGM-140A/B ATACMS; MGM-
FORCES BY ROLE 168 ATACMS (All launched from M270A1 MLRS or
SPECIAL FORCES M142 HIMARS MRLs)
(see USSOCOM) AMPHIBIOUS 116
COMBAT SUPPORT PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 8
4 engr bde LSL 8 Frank Besson (capacity 24 Abrams MBT)
4 MP bde LANDING CRAFT 70
2 NBC bde LCU 34 LCU-2000
2 sigs bde LCM 36 LCM 8 (capacity either 1 MBT or 200 troops)
3 (Mnv Enh) cbt spt bde AIRCRAFT
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ISR 19: 14 RC-12X Guardrail; 5 RC-12 Guardrail (trg)
9 log bde ELINT 8: 5 EO-5C ARL-M (COMINT/ELINT); 2 EO-5B
11 med bde ARL-C (COMINT); 1 TO-5C (trg)
HELICOPTER TPT 156: Light 152: 113 Beech A200 King Air (C-12
1 (theatre avn) hel bde Huron); 28 Cessna 560 Citation (UC-35A/B); 11 SA-227
Metro (C-26B/E); PAX 4: 1 Gulfstream IV (C-20F); 2
Army Stand-by Reserve 700 reservists Gulfstream V (C-37A); 1 Gulfstream G550 (C-37B)
Trained individuals for mobilisation TRG 4 T-6D Texan II
50 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
HELICOPTERS
ATK 714: 464 AH-64D Apache; 250 AH-64E Apache
SAR 249: 19 HH-60L Black Hawk; 230 HH-60M Black
Hawk (medevac)
TPT 2,822: Heavy 450 CH-47F Chinook; Medium 1,884:
250 UH-60A Black Hawk; 914 UH-60L Black Hawk; 720
UH-60M Black Hawk; Light 488: 423 UH-72A Lakota; 65
UH-1H/V Iroquois
TRG ε50 TH-67 Creek
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 388
CISR • Heavy 152 MQ-1C Gray Eagle
ISR • Medium 236 RQ-7B Shadow
AIR DEFENCE • SAM 1,183+
Long-range 480 MIM-104D/E/F Patriot PAC-2 GEM/
PAC-2 GEM-T/PAC-3/PAC-3 MSE
Short-range NASAMS
Point-defence 703+: FIM-92 Stinger; 703 M1097 Avenger
MISSILE DEFENCE • Long-range 42 THAAD
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
ASM AGM-114 Hellfire
US Navy 329,850
Comprises 2 Fleet Areas, Atlantic and Pacific. 6 Fleets:
2nd – Atlantic; 3rd – Pacific; 4th – Caribbean, Central and
South America; 5th – Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, Red Sea;
6th – Mediterranean; 7th – W. Pacific; plus Military Sealift
Command (MSC); Naval Reserve Force (NRF). For Naval
Special Warfare Command, see US Special Operations
Command
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES 67
STRATEGIC • SSBN 14 Ohio opcon US STRATCOM
with up to 24 UGM-133A Trident D-5/D-5LE nuclear
SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea Arrow HWT
TACTICAL 53
SSGN 49:
4 Ohio (mod) with total of 154 Tomahawk LACM , 4
single 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea Arrow HWT
7 Los Angeles with 1 12-cell VLS with Tomahawk
LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea Arrow
HWT
22 Los Angeles (Imp) with 1 12-cell VLS with
Tomahawk LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48
Sea Arrow HWT
10 Virginia Flight I/II with 1 12-cell VLS with
Tomahawk LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48
ADCAP mod 6 HWT
6 Virginia Flight III with 2 6-cell VLS with Tomahawk
LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48 ADCAP
mod 6 HWT
SSN 4:
1 Los Angeles with 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea
Arrow HWT
3 Seawolf with 8 single 660mm TT with up to 45
Tomahawk LACM/Mk48 Sea Arrow HWT
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 112
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVN 11
1 Gerald R. Ford with 2 octuple Mk29 mod 5 GMLS with
RIM-162D ESSM SAM, 2 Mk49 mod 3 GMLS with
RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (typical
capacity 75+ F/A-18E/F Super Hornet FGA ac; F-35C
Lightning II FGA ac (IOC planned 02/2019); E-2D
Hawkeye AEW&C ac; EA-18G Growler EW ac; MH-
60R Seahawk ASW hel; MH-60S Knighthawk MRH
hel)
10 Nimitz with 2 8-cell Mk29 GMLS with RIM-162
ESSM SAM, 2 Mk49 GMLS with RIM-116 SAM,
2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (typical capacity 55 F/A-
18 Hornet FGA ac; F-35C Lightning II FGA ac (IOC
planned 02/2019); 4 EA-18G Growler EW ac; 4 E-2C/D
Hawkeye AEW ac; 6 H-60 Seahawk hel)
CRUISERS • CGHM 23:
22 Ticonderoga with Aegis Baseline 5/6/8/9 C2, 2 quad
lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 2 61-cell Mk41
VLS with SM-2ER SAM/SM-3 SAM/SM-6 SAM/
Tomahawk LACM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk54
LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 2 127mm guns
(capacity 2 MH-60R Seahawk/MH-60S Knight Hawk hels)
1 Zumwalt with 20 4-cell Mk57 VLS with RIM-162
ESSM SAM/SM-2ER SAM/ASROC ASW/Tomahawk
LACM, 2 155mm guns (capacity 2 MH-60R Seahawk
ASW hel or 1 MH-60R Seahawk ASW hel and 3 Fire
Scout UAV)
DESTROYERS 65

DDGHM 37 Arleigh Burke Flight IIA with Aegis
Baseline 5/6/7/9 C2, 1 29-cell Mk41 VLS with
ASROC ASW/SM-2ER SAM/SM-3 SAM/SM-6
SAM/Tomahawk LACM, 1 61-cell Mk41 VLS with
ASROC ASW/SM-2ER SAM/SM-3 SAM/SM-6 SAM/
Tomahawk LACM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk54
LWT, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B CIWS, 1 127mm gun
(capacity 2 MH-60R Seahawk/MH-60S Knight Hawk hels)
DDGM 28 Arleigh Burke Flight I/II with Aegis Baseline
5/9 C2, 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM,
1 32-cell Mk41 VLS with ASROC ASW/SM-2ER
SAM/SM-3 SAM/SM-6 SAM/Tomahawk LACM, 1
64-cell Mk41 VLS with ASROC ASW/SM-2 ER SAM/
Tomahawk LACM, 2 Mk49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM
SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk54 LWT, 2 Mk 15
Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (4 with 2 SeaRAM instead of
Phalanx), 1 127mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (of
which two suffered major damage in collisions)

FRIGATES • FFHM 13:
6 Freedom with 1 21-cell Mk49 lnchr with RIM-116
RAM Block 2 SAM, 1 57mm gun (capacity 2 MH-
60R/S Seahawk hel or 1 MH-60 with 3 MQ-8 Fire
Scout UAV)
7 Independence with 1 11-cell SeaRAM lnchr with
RIM-116 SAM, 1 57mm gun (capacity 2 MH-60R/S
Seahawk hel and 3 MQ-8 Fire Scout UAV)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 61
PCFG 10 Cyclone with 1 quad Mk 208 lnchr with BGM-
176B Griffin B SSM
PCF 3 Cyclone
PBF 6 Mk VI
PBR 42
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 11
MCO 11 Avenger with 1 SLQ-48 MCM system, 1 SQQ-
32(V)3 Sonar (mine hunting)
COMMAND SHIPS • LCC 2 Blue Ridge with 2 Mk 15
Phalanx Block 1B CIWS (capacity 3 LCPL; 2 LCVP; 700
 North America 51

troops; 1 med hel) (of which 1 vessel partially crewed by Military Sealift Command (MSC)
Military Sealift Command personnel)

North America
AMPHIBIOUS Fleet Oiler (PM1)
PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 32 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
LHA 1 America with 2 octuple Mk29 GMLS with RIM- LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 15
162D ESSM SAM; 2 Mk49 GMLS with RIM-116 AOR 15 Henry J. Kaiser with 1 hel landing
RAM SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS (capacity 6 F-35B platform
Lightning II FGA ac; 12 MV-22B Osprey tpt ac; 4 CH-
53E Sea Stallion hel; 7 AH-1Z Viper/UH-1Y Iroquois Special Mission (PM2)
hel; 2 MH-60 hel) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
LHD 8 Wasp with 2 octuple Mk29 GMLS with RIM- LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 22
7M/RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk49 GMLS with AGM 3: 1 Howard O. Lorenzen; 1 Invincible
RIM-116 RAM SAM, 2 Mk 15 Phalanx Block 1B (commercial operator); 1 Sea-based X-band Radar
CIWS (capacity: 6 AV-8B Harrier II FGA or F-35B AGOR 6 Pathfinder
Lightning II FGA ac; 4 CH-53E Sea Stallion hel; 6 MV- AGOS 5: 1 Impeccable (commercial operator); 4
22B Osprey tpt ac; 4 AH-1W/Z hel; 3 UH-1Y hel; 3 Victorious
LCAC(L); 60 tanks; 1,687 troops) AGS 1 Waters
LPD 11 San Antonio with 2 21-cell Mk49 GMLS with AS 7 (long-term chartered, of which 1 C-Champion, 1
RIM-116 SAM (capacity 2 CH-53E Sea Stallion hel or Malama, 1 Dominator, 4 Arrowhead)
2 MV-22 Osprey; 2 LCAC(L); 14 AAAV; 720 troops)
LSD 12:
Prepositioning (PM3)
4 Harpers Ferry with 2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
116 SAM, 2 Phalanx Mk15 CIWS, 1 hel landing LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 27
platform (capacity 2 LCAC(L); 40 tanks; 500 AG 2: 1 V Adm K.R. Wheeler; 1 Fast Tempo
troops) AK 4: 2 LTC John U.D. Page; 1 Maj. Bernard F. Fisher;
8 Whidbey Island with 2 Mk49 GMLS with RIM- 1 CPT David I. Lyon
116 SAM, 2 Phalanx Mk15 CIWS, 1 hel landing AKEH 2 Lewis and Clark
platform (capacity 4 LCAC(L); 40 tanks; 500 AKR 10: 2 Bob Hope; 1 Stockham; 7 Watson
troops) AKRH 5 2nd Lt John P. Bobo
LANDING CRAFT 245 AP 2: 1 Guam; 1 Westpac Express
LCU 32 LCU-1600 (capacity either 2 M1 Abrams MBT ESD 2 Montford Point
or 350 troops)
Service Support (PM4)
LCP 108: 75 LCPL; 33 Utility Boat
LCM 25: 10 LCM-6; 15 LCM-8 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
LCAC 80 LCAC(L) (capacity either 1 MBT or 60 troops LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9
(undergoing upgrade programme)) AH 2 Mercy with 1 hel landing platform
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 14 ARS 2 Safeguard
AFDL 1 Dynamic AS 2 Emory S Land
AGOR 5 (all leased out): 1 Ocean; 3 Thomas G. ATF 3 Powhatan
Thompson; 1 Kilo Moana Sealift (PM5)
ARD 2 (At a minimum of 4 days’ readiness)
AX 1 Prevail
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ESB 1 Lewis B. Puller (capacity 4 MH-53/MH-60 hel)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 23
SSA 2 (for testing)
AOT 6 (long-term chartered, of which 1 Empire State;
SSAN 1 (for propulsion plant training)
1 Galveston; 1 Lawrence H. Gianella; 1 Maersk Peary; 1
UUV 1 Cutthroat (for testing)
SLNC Pax; 1 SLNC Goodwill)
Naval Reserve Forces 100,950 AK 7: 1 Ocean Crescent; 3 Sgt Matej Kocak; 1 1st Lt
Harry L. Martin; 1 LCpl Roy M. Wheat; 1 Sea Eagle
Selected Reserve 58,200 (long-term chartered)
AKR 10: 5 Bob Hope; 2 Gordon; 2 Shughart; 1 Watson
Individual Ready Reserve 42,750
Fleet Ordnance and Dry Cargo (PM6)
Naval Inactive Fleet EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Notice for reactivation: LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 14
60–90 days minimum (still on naval vessel register) AOE 2 Supply
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AKEH 12 Lewis and Clark
AMPHIBIOUS 7
LHA 3 Tarawa • LPD 4 Austin Afloat Staging Command Support (PM7)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 4 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AOE 2 Supply LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2
ARS 2 Safeguard ARC 1 Zeus
52 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

ESB 1 Lewis B. Puller (capacity 4 MH-53 hel/4 MV-22 COMMAND & CONTROL
tiltrotor; 250 troops) 2 sqn with E-6B Mercury
MINE COUNTERMEASURES
Expeditionary Fast Transport (PM8) 2 sqn with MH-53E Sea Dragon
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TRANSPORT
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 9 2 sqn with C-2A Greyhound
EPF 9 Spearhead TRAINING
1 (FRS) sqn with EA-18G Growler
US Maritime Administration (MARAD) 1 (FRS) sqn with C-2A Greyhound; E-2C/D Hawkeye; TE-
National Defense Reserve Fleet 2C Hawkeye
1 sqn with E-6B Mercury
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 (FRS) sqn with F/A-18A/A+/B/C/D Hornet; F/A-18E/F
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 19
Super Hornet
AGOS 2 General Rudder
2 (FRS) sqn with F-35C Lightning II
AGM 2: 1 Pacific Collector; 1 Pacific Tracker
1 (FRS) sqn with MH-53 Sea Dragon
AK 6: 1 Cape Ann (breakbulk); 1 Cape Chalmers
2 (FRS) sqn with MH-60S Knight Hawk; HH-60H
(breakbulk); 2 Cape Farewell; 1 Cape Nome (breakbulk);
Seahawk
1 Del Monte (breakbulk)
2 (FRS) sqn with MH-60R Seahawk
AOT 3 Paul Buck
1 sqn with P-3C Orion
AP 4: 1 Empire State VI; 1 Golden Bear; 1 Kennedy; 1
State of Maine 1 (FRS) sqn with P-3C Orion; P-8A Poseidon
AX 2: 1 Freedom Star; 1 Kings Pointer 6 sqn with T-6A/B Texan II
2 sqn with T-44C Pegasus
Ready Reserve Force 5 sqn with T-45C Goshawk
Ships at readiness up to a maximum of 30 days 3 hel sqn with TH-57B/C Sea Ranger
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 (FRS) UAV sqn with MQ-8B Fire Scout; MQ-8C Fire
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 43 Scout
ACS 6: 2 Flickertail State; 1 Gopher State; 3 Keystone State TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
AK 4: 2 Wright (breakbulk); 2 Cape May (heavy lift) 14 sqn with MH-60S Knight Hawk
AKR 33: 1 Adm W.M. Callaghan; 4 Algol; 4 Cape 1 tpt hel/ISR sqn with MH-60S Knight Hawk; MQ-8B
Capella; 1 Cape Decision; 4 Cape Ducato; 1 Cape Edmont; Fire Scout
1 Cape Henry; 2 Cape Hudson; 2 Cape Knox; 4 Cape ISR UAV
Island; 1 Cape Orlando; 1 Cape Race; 1 Cape Trinity; 2 1 sqn with MQ-4C Triton
Cape Trinity; 2 Cape Victory; 2 Cape Washington EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 1,007 combat capable
Naval Aviation 98,600 FGA 736: 23 F-35C Lightning II; 10 F-16A Fighting
10 air wg. Average air wing comprises 8 sqns: 4 with F/A- Falcon; 4 F-16B Fighting Falcon; 10 F/A-18A/A+ Hornet;
18; 1 with MH-60R; 1 with EA-18G; 1 with E-2C/D; 1 with 9 F/A-18B Hornet; 90 F/A-18C Hornet; 30 F/A-18D
MH-60S Hornet; 290 F/A-18E Super Hornet; 270 F/A-18F Super
FORCES BY ROLE Hornet
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK ASW 140: 65 P-3C Orion; 75 P-8A Poseidon
2 sqn with F/A-18C Hornet EW 131 EA-18G Growler*
19 sqn with F/A-18E Super Hornet ELINT 9 EP-3E Aries II
11 sqn with F/A-18F Super Hornet AEW&C 80: 50 E-2C Hawkeye; 30 E-2D Hawkeye
2 sqn with F-35C Lightning II C2 16 E-6B Mercury
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE TKR 3: 1 KC-130R Hercules; 1 KC-130T Hercules; 1 KC-
11 sqn with MH-60R Seahawk 130J Hercules
1 ASW/CSAR sqn with HH-60H Seahawk TPT • Light 60: 4 Beech A200 King Air (C-12C Huron);
3 ASW/ISR sqn with MH-60R Seahawk; MQ-8B Fire 6 Beech A200 King Air (UC-12F Huron); 8 Beech A200
Scout King Air (UC-12M Huron); 33 C-2A Greyhound; 2 DHC-
ELINT 2 Beaver (U-6A); 7 SA-227-BC Metro III (C-26D)
1 sqn with EP-3E Aries II TRG 582: 44 T-6A Texan II; 232 T-6B Texan II; 7 T-38C
ELINT/ELECTRONIC WARFARE Talon; 55 T-44C Pegasus; 242 T-45C Goshawk; 2 TE-2C
13 sqn with EA-18G Growler Hawkeye
MARITIME PATROL HELICOPTERS
3 sqn with P-3C Orion ASW 225 MH-60R Seahawk
8 sqn with P-8A Poseidon MRH 271 MH-60S Knight Hawk (Multi Mission
1 sqn (forming) with P-8A Poseidon Support)
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL MCM 28 MH-53E Sea Dragon
6 sqn with E-2C Hawkeye ISR 3 OH-58C Kiowa
3 sqn with E-2D Hawkeye CSAR 11 HH-60H Seahawk
 North America 53

TPT 13: Heavy 2 CH-53E Sea Stallion; Medium 3 UH- MCM 7 MH-53E Sea Dragon
60L Black Hawk; Light 8: 5 UH-72A Lakota; 2 UH-1N CSAR 16 HH-60H Seahawk

North America
Iroquois; 1 UH-1Y Venom
TRG 119: 43 TH-57B Sea Ranger; 76 TH-57C Sea US Marine Corps 185,400
Ranger 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF), 3 Marine
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • ISR 91 Expeditionary Brigades (MEB), 7 Marine Expeditionary
Heavy 41: 1 MQ-4C Triton; 20 MQ-8B Fire Scout; 16 MQ- Units (MEU) drawn from 3 div. An MEU usually consists
8C Fire Scout; 4 RQ-4A Global Hawk (under evaluation of a battalion landing team (1 SF coy, 1 lt armd recce
and trials); Medium 35 RQ-2B Pioneer; Light 15 RQ- coy, 1 recce pl, 1 armd pl, 1 amph aslt pl, 1 inf bn, 1
21A Blackjack arty bty, 1 cbt engr pl), an aviation combat element (1
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
medium-lift sqn with attached atk hel, FGA ac and AD
AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder
assets) and a composite log bn, with a combined total of
II; SARH AIM-7 Sparrow; ARH AIM-120C-5/C-7/D
about 2,200 personnel. Composition varies with mission
AMRAAM
requirements
ASM AGM-65F Maverick; AGM-114B/K/M Hellfire;
APKWS FORCES BY ROLE
AShM AGM-84D Harpoon; AGM-119A Penguin 3 SPECIAL FORCES
ARM AGM-88B/C/E HARM/AARGM (see USSOCOM)
ALCM • Conventional AGM-84E/H/K SLAM/SLAM- MANOEUVRE
ER Reconnaissance
BOMBS 3 (MEF) recce coy
Laser-guided: GBU-10/12/16 Paveway II; GBU-24 Amphibious
Paveway III 1 (1st) mne div (2 armd recce bn, 1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2
INS/GPS guided: GBU-31/32/38 JDAM; Enhanced mne regt (4 mne bn), 1 mne regt (3 mne bn), 1 amph
Paveway II; GBU-54 Laser JDAM; AGM-154A/C/C-1 aslt bn, 1 arty regt (3 arty bn, 1 MRL bn), 1 cbt engr
JSOW bn, 1 EW bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn)
1 (2nd) mne div (1 armd recce bn, 1 recce bn, 1 tk bn,
Naval Aviation Reserve 3 mne regt (3 mne bn), 1 amph aslt bn, 1 arty regt (2
FORCES BY ROLE arty bn), 1 cbt engr bn, 1 EW bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn)
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 (3rd) mne div (1 recce bn, 1 inf regt (3 inf bn), 1 arty
1 sqn with F/A-18A+ Hornet regt (2 arty bn), 1 cbt spt bn (1 armd recce coy, 1 amph
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE aslt coy, 1 cbt engr coy), 1 EW bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn)
1 sqn with MH-60R Seahawk COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
ELECTRONIC WARFARE 3 log gp
1 sqn with EA-18G Growler
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MARITIME PATROL
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
2 sqn with P-3C Orion
MBT 447 M1A1 Abrams
TRANSPORT
IFV 488 LAV-25
5 log spt sqn with B-737-700 (C-40A Clipper)
2 log spt sqn with Gulfstream III/IV (C-20D/G); APC • APC (W) 207 LAV variants (66 CP; 127 log; 14
Gulfstream V/G550 (C-37A/B) EW)
4 sqn with C-130T Hercules AAV 1,200 AAV-7A1 (all roles)
1 sqn with KC-130T Hercules AUV 2,429: 1,725 Cougar; 704 M-ATV
TRAINING ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
2 (aggressor) sqn with F-5F/N Tiger II AEV 42 M1 ABV
1 (aggressor) sqn with F/A-18A+ Hornet ARV 185: 60 AAVRA1; 45 LAV-R; 80 M88A1/2
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER MW 38 Buffalo; some Husky 2G
2 sqn with HH-60H Seahawk VLB 6 Joint Aslt Bridge
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE •
AIRCRAFT 77 combat capable MSL
FTR 31: 2 F-5F Tiger II; 29 F-5N Tiger II SP 106 LAV-AT
FGA 29 F/A-18A+ Hornet MANPATS FGM-148 Javelin; FGM-172B SRAW-MPV;
ASW 12 P-3C Orion TOW
EW 5 EA-18G Growler* ARTILLERY 1,452
TKR 5 KC-130T Hercules TOWED 812: 105mm: 331 M101A1; 155mm 481 M777A2
TPT 41: Medium 18 C-130T Hercules; PAX 23: 15 MRL 227mm 40 M142 HIMARS
B-737-700 (C-40A Clipper); 1 Gulfstream III (C-20D); MOR 600: 81mm 535 M252; SP 81mm 65 LAV-M; 120mm
3 Gulfstream IV (C-20G); 1 Gulfstream V (C-37A); 3 (49 EFSS in store for trg)
Gulfstream G550 (C-37B) UNMANNED AERIAL VEHCILES
HELICOPTERS ISR • Light 100 BQM-147 Exdrone
ASW 7 MH-60R Seahawk AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger
54 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Marine Corps Aviation 34,700 SAR 4 HH-1N Iroquois

3 active Marine Aircraft Wings (MAW) and 1 MCR MAW TPT 286: Heavy 139: 138 CH-53E Sea Stallion; 1 CH-
53K King Stallion; Medium 19: 8 VH-60N Presidential
FORCES BY ROLE
Hawk (VIP tpt); 11 VH-3D Sea King (VIP tpt); Light 128
FIGHTER
UH-1Y Venom
1 sqn with F/A-18A++ Hornet
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
5 sqn with F/A-18C Hornet
ISR • Light 80 RQ-21A Blackjack
4 sqn with F/A-18D Hornet
AIR DEFENCE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
5 sqn with AV-8B Harrier II SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger; M1097 Avenger
3 sqn with F-35B Lightning II AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
ELECTRONIC WARFARE AAM • IR AIM-9M Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X
1 sqn with EA-6B Prowler Sidewinder II; SARH AIM-7P Sparrow; ARH AIM-
COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT 120C AMRAAM
1 sqn with Beech A200/B200 King Air (UC-12F/M ASM AGM-65E/F IR Maverick; AGM-114 Hellfire;
Huron); Beech 350 King Air (UC-12W Huron); AGM-176 Griffin; APKWS
Cessna 560 Citation Ultra/Encore (UC-35C/D); DC-9 AShM AGM-84D Harpoon
Skytrain (C-9B Nightingale); Gulfstream IV (C-20G); ARM AGM-88 HARM
HH-1N Iroquois LACM AGM-84E/H/K SLAM/SLAM-ER
TANKER BOMBS
3 sqn with KC-130J Hercules Laser-guided GBU-10/12/16 Paveway II
TRANSPORT INS/GPS guided GBU-31 JDAM; AGM-154A/C/C-1
14 sqn with MV-22B Osprey JSOW
2 sqn (forming) with MV-22B Osprey
TRAINING Reserve Organisations
1 sqn with AV-8B Harrier II; TAV-8B Harrier Marine Corps Reserve 38,350
1 sqn with F/A-18B/C/D Hornet
FORCES BY ROLE
1 sqn with F-35B Lightning II
MANOEUVRE
1 sqn with MV-22B Osprey
Reconnaissance
1 hel sqn with AH-1W Cobra; AH-1Z Viper; HH-1N
2 MEF recce coy
Iroquois; UH-1Y Venom
1 hel sqn with CH-53E Sea Stallion Amphibious
ATTACK HELICOPTER 1 (4th) mne div (1 armd recce bn, 1 recce bn, 2 mne
2 sqn with AH-1W Cobra; UH-1Y Venom regt (3 mne bn), 1 amph aslt bn, 1 arty regt (2 arty bn,
5 sqn with AH-1Z Viper; UH-1Y Venom 1 MRL bn), 1 cbt engr bn, 1 int bn, 1 sigs bn)
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
8 sqn with CH-53E Sea Stallion 1 log gp
1 (VIP) sqn with MV-22B Osprey; VH-3D Sea King; Marine Corps Aviation Reserve 12,000 reservists
VH-60N Presidential Hawk
FORCES BY ROLE
ISR UAV
3 sqn with RQ-21A Blackjack FIGHTER
AIR DEFENCE 1 sqn with F/A-18A++ Hornet
2 bn with M1097 Avenger; FIM-92 Stinger (can provide TANKER
additional heavy-calibre support weapons) 2 sqn with KC-130J/T Hercules
TRANSPORT
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 sqn with MV-22B Osprey
AIRCRAFT 452 combat capable
TRAINING
FGA 443: 61 F-35B Lightning II; 5 F-35C Lightning II;
1 sqn with F-5F/N Tiger II
45 F/A-18A++ Hornet; 7 F/A-18B Hornet; 107 F/A-18C
ATTACK HELICOPTER
Hornet; 92 F/A-18D Hornet; 110 AV-8B Harrier II; 16
2 sqn with AH-1W Cobra; UH-1Y Venom
TAV-8B Harrier
EW 9 EA-6B Prowler* TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
TKR 45 KC-130J Hercules 1 sqn with CH-53E Sea Stallion
TPT 20: Light 17: 5 Beech A200/B200 King Air (UC- ISR UAV
12F/M Huron); 5 Beech 350 King Air (C-12W Huron); 1 sqn with RQ-21A Blackjack
7 Cessna 560 Citation Ultra/Encore (UC-35C/D); PAX EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
3: 2 DC-9 Skytrain (C-9B Nightingale); 1 Gulfstream IV AIRCRAFT 23 combat capable
(C-20G) FTR 12: 1 F-5F Tiger II; 11 F-5N Tiger II
TRG 3 T-34C Turbo Mentor FGA 11 F/A-18A++ Hornet
TILTROTOR • TPT 306 MV-22B Osprey TKR 20: 7 KC-130J Hercules; 13 KC-130T Hercules
HELICOPTERS TPT • Light 7: 2 Beech 350 King Air (UC-12W Huron); 5
ATK 177: 77 AH-1W Cobra; 100 AH-1Z Viper Cessna 560 Citation Ultra/Encore (UC-35C/D)
 North America 55

TILTROTOR • TPT 12 MV-22B Osprey Air Combat Command (ACC)

HELICOPTERS 2 active air forces (9th & 12th); 12 wg. ACC numbered

North America
ATK 37 AH-1W Cobra air forces provide the air component to CENTCOM,
TPT 32: Heavy 6 CH-53E Sea Stallion; Light 26 UH-1Y SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM
Venom FORCES BY ROLE
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES FIGHTER
ISR • Light 20 RQ-21A Blackjack 3 sqn with F-22A Raptor
Marine Stand-by Reserve 700 reservists FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
Trained individuals available for mobilisation 4 sqn with F-15E Strike Eagle
4 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (+6 sqn personnel
only)
US Coast Guard 42,100 (military); 8,500
1 sqn with F-35A Lightning II
(civilian) 1 sqn with F-35A Lightning II (forming)
9 districts (4 Pacific, 5 Atlantic)
 GROUND ATTACK
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 3 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II (+1 sqn personnel
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 160 only)
PSOH 23: 1 Alex Haley; 13 Famous; 3 Hamilton; 6 Legend ELECTRONIC WARFARE
PCO 42: 14 Reliance (with 1 hel landing platform); 28 1 sqn with EA-18G Growler (personnel only – USN
Sentinel (Damen 4708) aircraft)
PCC 22 Island 2 sqn with EC-130H Compass Call
PBI 73 Marine Protector ISR
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 78 2 sqn with E-8C J-STARS (personnel only)
ABU 52: 16 Juniper; 4 WLI; 14 Keeper; 18 WLR 5 sqn with OC-135/RC-135/WC-135
AG 13: 1 Cosmos; 4 Pamlico; 8 Anvil 2 sqn with U-2S
AGB 12: 9 Bay; 1 Mackinaw; 1 Healy; 1 Polar (1 Polar in AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
reserve) 5 sqn with E-3B/C/G Sentry
AXS 1 Eagle COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE
2 sqn with HC-130J Combat King II
US Coast Guard Aviation 2 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TRAINING
AIRCRAFT 1 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II
SAR 20: 11 HC-130H Hercules; 9 HC-130J Hercules 1 sqn with E-3B/C Sentry
TPT 34: Medium 14 C-27J Spartan; Light 18 CN235-200 2 sqn with F-15E Strike Eagle
(HC-144A – MP role); PAX 2 Gulfstream V (C-37A) 1 sqn with F-22A Raptor
HELICOPTERS 1 sqn with RQ-4A Global Hawk; TU-2S
5 UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper
SAR 146: 44 MH-60T Jayhawk; 102 AS366G1 (MH-
COMBAT/ISR UAV
65C/D) Dauphin II
7 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper
2 sqn with RQ-170 Sentinel
US Air Force (USAF) 325,900 ISR UAV
Almost the entire USAF (plus active force ANG and AFR)
2 sqn with EQ-4B/RQ-4B Global Hawk
is divided into 10 Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEF),
each on call for 120 days every 20 months. At least 2 of the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF)
10 AEFs are on call at any one time, each with 10,000–15,000 Provides the air component of PACOM, and commands
personnel, 90 multi-role ftr and bbr ac, 31 intra-theatre air units based in Alaska, Hawaii, Japan and South
refuelling aircraft and 13 aircraft for ISR and EW missions Korea. 3 active air forces (5th, 7th, & 11th); 8 wg
Global Strike Command (GSC) FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER
2 active air forces (8th & 20th); 8 wg
2 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle
FORCES BY ROLE 2 sqn with F-22A Raptor (+1 sqn personnel only)
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
9 ICBM sqn with LGM-30G Minuteman III 5 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
BOMBER GROUND ATTACK
4 sqn with B-1B Lancer 1 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II
2 sqn with B-2A Spirit AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
5 sqn (incl 1 trg) with B-52H Stratofortress 2 sqn with E-3B/C Sentry
COMMAND & CONTROL COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE
1 sqn with E-4B 1 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER TANKER
3 sqn with UH-1N Iroquois 1 sqn with KC-135R (+1 sqn personnel only)
56 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

1 sqn with B-737-200 (C-40B); Gulfstream V (C-37A) SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
2 sqn with C-17A Globemaster ICBM • Nuclear 400 LGM-30G Minuteman III (1 Mk12A
1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules or Mk21 re-entry veh per missile)
1 sqn with Beech 1900C (C-12J); UH-1N Huey AIRCRAFT 1,466 combat capable
TRAINING BBR 139: 61 B-1B Lancer; 20 B-2A Spirit; 58 B-52H
1 (aggressor) sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon Stratofortress (46 nuclear capable)
FTR 264: 95 F-15C Eagle; 10 F-15D Eagle; 159 F-22A Raptor
United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE) FGA 922: 211 F-15E Strike Eagle; 443 F-16C Fighting
Provides the air component to both EUCOM and Falcon; 114 F-16D Fighting Falcon; 154 F-35A Lightning II
AFRICOM. 1 active air force (3rd); 5 wg ATK 141 A-10C Thunderbolt II
FORCES BY ROLE EW 14 EC-130H Compass Call
FIGHTER ISR 41: 2 E-9A; 4 E-11A; 2 OC-135B Open Skies; 27 U-2S; 4
1 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle TU-2S; 2 WC-135 Constant Phoenix
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK ELINT 22: 8 RC-135V Rivet Joint; 9 RC-135W Rivet Joint; 3
2 sqn with F-15E Strike Eagle RC-135S Cobra Ball; 2 RC-135U Combat Sent
3 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon AEW&C 31: 11 E-3B Sentry; 3 E-3C Sentry; 17 E-3G Sentry
COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE C2 4 E-4B
1 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk TKR 156: 126 KC-135R Stratotanker; 30 KC-135T
TANKER Stratotanker
1 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker TKR/TPT 59 KC-10A Extender
TRANSPORT CSAR 15 HC-130J Combat King II
1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules TPT 331: Heavy 182: 36 C-5M Super Galaxy; 146 C-17A
2 sqn with Gulfstream V (C-37A); Learjet 35A (C-21A); Globemaster III; Medium 104 C-130J/J-30 Hercules; Light
B-737-700 (C-40B) 23: 4 Beech 1900C (C-12J); 19 Learjet 35A (C-21A); PAX 22:
4 B-737-700 (C-40B); 4 B-757-200 (C-32A); 12 Gulfstream
Air Mobility Command (AMC) V (C-37A); 2 VC-25A Air Force One
Provides strategic and tactical airlift, air-to-air refuelling TRG 1,127: 178 T-1A Jayhawk; 444 T-6A Texan II; 505
and aeromedical evacuation. 1 active air force (18th); 12 T-38A/C Talon
wg and 1 gp HELICOPTERS
FORCES BY ROLE CSAR 74 HH-60G Pave Hawk
TANKER TPT • Light 62 UH-1N Huey
4 sqn with KC-10A Extender UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 244
9 sqn with KC-135R/T Stratotanker (+2 sqn with CISR • Heavy 200 MQ-9A Reaper
personnel only) ISR • Heavy 44: 3 EQ-4B; 31 RQ-4B Global Hawk; ε10 RQ-
TRANSPORT 170 Sentinel
1 VIP sqn with B-737-200 (C-40B); B-757-200 (C-32A) AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Point-defence FIM-92 Stinger
1 VIP sqn with Gulfstream V (C-37A) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
1 VIP sqn with VC-25 Air Force One AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder; IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II;
2 sqn with C-5M Super Galaxy SARH AIM-7M Sparrow; ARH AIM-120C/D AMRAAM
8 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III (+1 sqn personnel ASM AGM-65D/G Maverick; AGM-130A; AGM-176
only) Griffin; APKWS
1 sqn with C-130H Hercules (+1 sqn personnel only) ALCM • Nuclear AGM-86B (ALCM); Conventional
5 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules (+1 sqn personnel only) AGM-86C (CALCM); AGM-86D (penetrator); AGM-158
1 sqn with Gulfstream V (C-37A) JASSM; AGM-158B JASSM-ER
2 sqn with Learjet 35A (C-21A) ARM AGM-88A/B HARM
EW MALD/MALD-J
Air Education and Training Command BOMBS
1 active air force (2nd), 10 active air wg and 1 gp
Laser-guided GBU 10/12/16 Paveway II, GBU-24 Paveway
FORCES BY ROLE III; GBU-28
TRAINING INS/GPS guided GBU 31/32/38 JDAM; GBU-54 Laser
1 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III JDAM; GBU-15 (with BLU-109 penetrating warhead or
1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules Mk84); GBU-39B Small Diameter Bomb (250lb); GBU-
4 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 43B MOAB; GBU-57A/B MOP; Enhanced Paveway III
4 sqn with F-35A Lightning II
1 sqn with KC-46A Pegasus (forming) Reserve Organisations
1 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker
5 (flying trg) sqn with T-1A Jayhawk Air National Guard 107,450 reservists
10 (flying trg) sqn with T-6A Texan II FORCES BY ROLE
10 (flying trg) sqn with T-38C Talon BOMBER
1 UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper 1 sqn with B-2A Spirit (personnel only)
 North America 57

FIGHTER FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

5 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle 2 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (+1 sqn personnel

North America
1 sqn with F-22A Raptor (+1 sqn personnel only) only)
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F-35A Lightning II (personnel only)
11 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon GROUND ATTACK
GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II (+2 sqn personnel
4 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II only)
ISR ISR
1 sqn with E-8C J-STARS 1 (Weather Recce) sqn with WC-130J Hercules
COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
1 sqn with HC-130P/N Combat King 1 sqn with E-3B/C Sentry (personnel only)
1 sqn with HC-130J Combat King II (forming) COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE
1 sqn with MC-130P Combat Shadow 1 sqn with HC-130N Combat King
3 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk 2 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk
TANKER TANKER
17 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker (+1 sqn personnel 4 sqn with KC-10A Extender (personnel only)

only) 7 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker (+2 sqn personnel
3 sqn with KC-135T Stratotanker only)
TRANSPORT TRANSPORT
1 sqn with B-737-700 (C-40C) 1 (VIP) sqn with B-737-700 (C-40C)
6 sqn with C-17A Globemaster (+2 sqn personnel only) 2 sqn with C-5M Super Galaxy (+1 sqn personnel only)
12 sqn with C-130H Hercules 3 sqn with C-17A Globemaster (+9 sqn personnel only)
1 sqn with C-130H/LC-130H Hercules 6 sqn with C-130H Hercules
2 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules 1 sqn with C-130J-30 Hercules
1 sqn with WC-130H Hercules 1 (Aerial Spray) sqn with C-130H Hercules
TRAINING TRAINING
1 sqn with C-130H Hercules 1 (aggressor) sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II; F-15C/E
1 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle Eagle; F-16 Fighting Falcon; F-22A Raptor (personnel
4 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon only)
1 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper 1 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II
COMBAT/ISR UAV 1 sqn with B-52H Stratofortress
11 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper 1 sqn with C-5M Super Galaxy
1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
5 (flying training) sqn with T-1A Jayhawk; T-6A Texan
AIRCRAFT 579 combat capable
II; T-38C Talon (personnel only)
FTR 157: 127 F-15C Eagle; 10 F-15D Eagle; 20 F-22A
COMBAT/ISR UAV
Raptor
2 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper (personnel only)
FGA 336: 291 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 45 F-16D Fighting
ISR UAV
Falcon
1 sqn with RQ-4B Global Hawk (personnel only)
ATK 86 A-10C Thunderbolt II
ISR 16 E-8C J-STARS EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ELINT 11 RC-26B Metroliner AIRCRAFT 126 combat capable
CSAR 10: 2 HC-130N Combat King; 3 HC-130P Combat BBR 18 B-52H Stratofortress
King; 5 HC-130J Combat King II FGA 53: 49 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 4 F-16D Fighting
TKR 172: 148 KC-135R Stratotanker; 24 KC-135T Falcon
Stratotanker ATK 55 A-10C Thunderbolt II
TPT 218: Heavy 50 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium ISR 10 WC-130J Hercules (Weather Recce)
165: 123 C-130H Hercules; 20 C-130J/J-30 Hercules; 10 CSAR 6 HC-130N Combat King
LC-130H Hercules; 4 MC-130P Combat Shadow; 8 WC- TKR 70 KC-135R Stratotanker
130H Hercules; PAX 3 B-737-700 (C-40C) TPT 104: Heavy 42: 16 C-5M Super Galaxy; 26 C-17A
HELICOPTERS • CSAR 18 HH-60G Pave Hawk Globemaster III; Medium 58: 48 C-130H Hercules; 10
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • CISR • Heavy 35 C-130J-30 Hercules; PAX 4 B-737-700 (C-40C)
HELICOPTERS • CSAR 16 HH-60G Pave Hawk
MQ-9A Reaper

Air Force Reserve Command 68,700 reservists Civil Reserve Air Fleet
Commercial ac numbers fluctuate
FORCES BY ROLE
AIRCRAFT • TPT 517 international (391 long-range and
BOMBER
126 short-range); 36 national
1 sqn with B-52H Stratofortress (personnel only)
FIGHTER Air Force Stand-by Reserve 16,858 reservists
2 sqn with F-22A Raptor (personnel only) Trained individuals for mobilisation
58 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

US Special Operations Command Reserve Organisations

(USSOCOM) 63,150; 6,550 (civilian)
Naval Reserve Force
Commands all active, reserve and National Guard
Special Operations Forces (SOF) of all services based in FORCES BY ROLE
CONUS SPECIAL FORCES
8 SEAL det
Joint Special Operations Command 10 Naval Special Warfare det
Reported to comprise elite US SOF, including Special 2 Special Boat sqn
Forces Operations Detachment Delta (‘Delta Force’), 2 Special Boat unit
SEAL Team 6 and integral USAF support 1 SEAL Delivery Vehicle det

US Army Special Operations Command US Marine Special Operations Command

34,100 (MARSOC) 3,000
FORCES BY ROLE FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES SPECIAL FORCES
5 SF gp (4 SF bn, 1 spt bn) 1 SF regt (3 SF bn)
1 ranger regt (3 ranger bn; 1 cbt spt bn) COMBAT SUPPORT
COMBAT SUPPORT 1 int bn
1 civil affairs bde (5 civil affairs bn) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 psyops gp (3 psyops bn) 1 spt gp
1 psyops gp (4 psyops bn)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Air Force Special Operations Command
1 (sustainment) log bde (1 sigs bn) (AFSOC) 16,200
HELICOPTER FORCES BY ROLE
1 (160th SOAR) hel regt (4 hel bn)
GROUND ATTACK
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with AC-130J Ghostrider
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 1 sqn with AC-130U Spectre
APC • APC (W) 28: 16 M1126 Stryker ICV; 12 Pandur 1 sqn with AC-130W Stinger II
AUV 640 M-ATV TRANSPORT
ARTILLERY 20 3 sqn with CV-22B Osprey
MOR • 120mm 20 XM905 EMTAS
1 sqn with DHC-8; Do-328 (C-146A)
HELICOPTERS
2 sqn with MC-130H Combat Talon
MRH 51 AH-6M/MH-6M Little Bird
3 sqn with MC-130J Commando II
TPT 141: Heavy 69 MH-47G Chinook; Medium 72 MH-
3 sqn with PC-12 (U-28A)
60M Black Hawk
TRAINING
UAV
1 sqn with M-28 Skytruck (C-145A)
CISR • Heavy 12 MQ-1C Gray Eagle
1 sqn with CV-22A/B Osprey
ISR • Light 29: 15 XPV-1 Tern; 14 XPV-2 Mako
TPT • Heavy 28 CQ-10 Snowgoose 1 sqn with HC-130J Combat King II; MC-130J
Commando II
Reserve Organisations 1 sqn with Bell 205 (TH-1H Iroquois)
1 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk; UH-1N Huey
Army National Guard COMBAT/ISR UAV
FORCES BY ROLE 2 sqn with MQ-9 Reaper
SPECIAL FORCES EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 SF gp (3 SF bn)
AIRCRAFT 37 combat capable
Army Reserve ATK 37: 12 AC-130J Ghostrider; 13 AC-130U Spectre; 12
FORCES BY ROLE AC-130W Stinger II
COMBAT SUPPORT CSAR 3 HC-130J Combat King II
2 psyops gp TPT 97: Medium 49: 14 MC-130H Combat Talon II; 35
4 civil affairs comd HQ MC-130J Commando II; Light 48: 9 Do-328 (C-146A); 4
8 civil affairs bde HQ M-28 Skytruck (C-145A); 35 PC-12 (U-28A)
32 civil affairs bn (coy) TILT-ROTOR 49 CV-22A/B Osprey
HELICOPTERS
US Navy Special Warfare Command 9,850 CSAR 3 HH-60G Pave Hawk
FORCES BY ROLE TPT • Light 34: 28 Bell 205 (TH-1H Iroquois); 6 UH-1N
SPECIAL FORCES Huey
8 SEAL team (total: 48 SF pl) UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES • CISR • Heavy 30
2 SEAL Delivery Vehicle team MQ-9 Reaper

Reserve Organisations
Air National Guard
FORCES BY ROLE
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
1 sqn with C-130J Hercules/EC-130J Commando Solo
ISR
1 sqn with Beech 350ER King Air (MC-12W Liberty)
TRANSPORT
1 flt with B-737-200 (C-32B)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT
EW 3 EC-130J Commando Solo
ISR 13 Beech 350ER King Air (MC-12W Liberty)
TPT 5: Medium 3 C-130J Hercules; PAX 2 B-757-200
(C-32B)
Air Force Reserve
FORCES BY ROLE
TRAINING
1 sqn with AC-130U Spectre (personnel only)
1 sqn with M-28 Skytruck (C-145A) (personnel only)
COMBAT/ISR UAV
1 sqn with MQ-9 Reaper (personnel only)
Cyber
The Department of Defense (DoD) released a new Cyber
Strategy in September 2018. It said that China and Russia
were conducting persistent campaigns in and through
cyberspace that posed a long-term strategic risk to the US
and its allies. The US, the document continued, ‘will defend
forward to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its
source, including activity that falls below the level of armed
conflict’. The same month, the US released a National Cyber
Strategy that said as well as US vulnerability to peacetime
cyber attacks, the ‘risk is growing’ that adversaries ‘will
conduct cyber attacks against the United States during a
crisis short of war’.
Cyber Command was elevated to the level of a unified
combatant command in May 2018 (it was previously a sub-
unified command under US Strategic Command), and the
DoD is continuing to examine the possibility of separating
Cyber Command from the National Security Agency.
Cyber Command requested a budget of US$647m
for FY2018, representing a 16% increase on the previous
year. Its Cyber Mission Force (CMF) of 133 teams reached
IOC in October 2016 and the DoD said in May 2018 that
it had reached FOC in May 2018. The air force plans to
merge offensive and defensive cyber operations into a
full-spectrum cyber capability called the Cyber Operations
Squadron by 2026. In June, the DoD published a new
edition of the joint doctrinal paper that defines the roles and
responsibilities for cyberspace operations conducted by
the US armed forces. A month later, the air force formally
initiated the request-for-proposal process to develop a
cyber-weapons system for US Cyber Command, known
as the ‘Unified Platform’. High-level DoD cyber exercises
include the defence-focused Cyber Flag and Cyber
Guard series, which involve broader actors from across
North America 59
government and includes critical-national-infrastructure
scenarios.
North America
DARPA’s Plan X programme has been funding research
on cyber warfare since 2013. According to the army, this
‘gives commanders a way to see and respond to key cyber
terrain in the same way they react to actions on the physical
battlefield, and enables synchronizing cyber effects with
key related war-fighting functions such as intelligence,
signal, information operations and electronic warfare’.
In October 2012, then-president Barack Obama signed
Presidential Policy Directive 20 (PPD-20), the purpose
of which was to establish clear standards for US federal
agencies in confronting threats in cyberspace. Among
other provisions, PPD-20 stated that presidential approval
is required for any cyber operations with ‘significant
consequences’, although it was reported in August 2018
that President Trump had rescinded the directive.
DEPLOYMENT
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operations Resolute Support
8,475; 1 div HQ; 1 ARNG div HQ (fwd); 1 spec ops bn; 3
inf bde(-); 1 inf bn; 1 ARNG inf bn; 1 mne regt(-); 1 arty
bty with M777A2; 1 ARNG MRL bty with M142 HIMARS;
1 EOD bn; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde with AH-64E Apache; CH-
47F Chinook; UH-60 Black Hawk; 1 FGA sqn with F-16C
Fighting Falcon; 1 atk sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II; 1 EW
sqn with EC-130H Compass Call; 1 ISR gp with MC-12W
Liberty; 1 ISR unit with RC-12X Guardrail; 1 tpt sqn with
C-130J-30 Hercules; 1 CSAR sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk;
1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper; 1 ISR UAV unit with
RQ-21A Blackjack
US Central Command • Operation Freedom’s Sentinel 8,000
ARABIAN SEA: US Central Command • US Navy • 5th
Fleet: 1 SSGN; 1 DDGHM; 1 LSD; Combined Maritime
Forces • TF 53: 1 AE; 2 AKE; 1 AOH; 3 AO
ARUBA: US Southern Command • 1 Forward Operating
Location
ASCENSION ISLAND: US Strategic Command • 1
detection and tracking radar at Ascension Auxiliary Air
Field
ATLANTIC OCEAN: US Northern Command • US Navy
• 2nd Fleet: 6 SSBN; 20 SSGN; 4 CVN; 10 CGHM; 11
DDGHM; 7 DDGM; 3 FFHM; 3 PCF; 2 LHD; 3 LPD;
5 LSD
AUSTRALIA: US Pacific Command • 1,500; 1 SEWS at Pine
Gap; 1 comms facility at Pine Gap; 1 SIGINT stn at Pine
Gap; US Strategic Command • 1 detection and tracking
radar at Naval Communication Station Harold E Holt
BAHRAIN: US Central Command • 5,000; 1 HQ (5th
Fleet); 2 AD bty with MIM-104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3
BELGIUM: US European Command • 900
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: OSCE • Bosnia and
Herzegovina 6
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY: US Strategic
Command • 300; 1 Spacetrack Optical Tracker at Diego
Garcia; 1 ground-based electro-optical deep space
surveillance system (GEODSS) at Diego Garcia
60 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
US Pacific Command • 1 MPS sqn (MPS-2 with
equipment for one MEB) at Diego Garcia with 2 AKRH; 3
AKR; 1 AKEH; 1 ESD; 1 naval air base at Diego Garcia, 1
support facility at Diego Garcia
BULGARIA: US European Command • 150; 1 armd inf coy
with M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams; M2A3 Bradley
CAMEROON: US Africa Command • 300; MQ-1C Gray
Eagle
CANADA: US Northern Command • 150
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 8
COLOMBIA: US Southern Command • 50
CUBA: US Southern Command • 1,000 (JTF-GTMO) at
Guantánamo Bay
CURACAO: US Southern Command • 1 Forward
Operating Location
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
MONUSCO 3
DJIBOUTI: US Africa Command • 4,700; 1 tpt sqn with
C-130H/J-30 Hercules; 1 spec ops sqn with MC-130H/J; PC-
12 (U-28A); 1 CSAR sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk; 1 CISR
UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper; 1 naval air base
EGYPT: MFO 454; elm 1 ARNG recce bn; 1 ARNG spt bn
EL SALVADOR: US Southern Command • 1 Forward
Operating Location (Military, DEA, USCG and Customs
personnel)
GERMANY: US Africa Command • 1 HQ at Stuttgart
US European Command • 37,950; 1 Combined Service
HQ (EUCOM) at Stuttgart–Vaihingen
US Army 23,000
FORCES BY ROLE
1 HQ (US Army Europe (USAREUR)) at Heidelberg; 1
div HQ (fwd); 1 SF gp; 1 recce bn; 2 armd bn; 1 mech
bde(-); 1 fd arty bn; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde(-); 1 (cbt avn)
hel bde HQ; 1 int bde; 1 MP bde; 1 sigs bde; 1 spt bde;
1 (APS) armd bde eqpt set
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams; M2A3/M3A3 Bradley; M1296
Stryker Dragoon, M109A6; M777A2; AH-64D Apache;
CH-47F Chinook; UH-60M Black Hawk; HH-60M Black
Hawk
US Navy 500
USAF 13,100
FORCES BY ROLE
1 HQ (US Air Force Europe (USAFE)) at Ramstein
AB; 1 HQ (3rd Air Force) at Ramstein AB; 1 ftr wg
at Spangdahlem AB with 1 ftr sqn with 24 F-16C/D
Fighting Falcon; 1 tpt wg at Ramstein AB with 14
C-130J-30 Hercules; 2 Gulfstream V (C-37A); 5 Learjet
35A (C-21A); 1 B-737-700 (C-40B)
USMC 1,350
GREECE: US European Command • 400; 1 naval base at
Makri; 1 naval base at Souda Bay; 1 air base at Iraklion
GREENLAND (DNK): US Strategic Command • 160; 1 AN/
FPS-132 Upgraded Early Warning Radar and 1 Spacetrack
Radar at Thule
GUAM: US Pacific Command • 6,000; 4 SSGN; 1 MPS
sqn (MPS-3 with equipment for one MEB) with 2
AKRH; 4 AKR; 1 ESD; 1 AKEH; 1 bbr sqn with 6 B-52H
Stratofortress; 1 tkr sqn with 12 KC-135R Stratotanker; 1 tpt
hel sqn with MH-60S; 1 SAM bty with THAAD; 1 air base;
1 naval base
HONDURAS: US Southern Command • 380; 1 avn bn
with CH-47F Chinook; UH-60 Black Hawk
HUNGARY: US European Command • 100; 1 armd recce
tp; M3 Bradley
IRAQ: US Central Command • Operation Inherent Resolve
5,000; 1 div HQ; 1 cav bde(-); 1 EOD pl; 1 atk hel sqn with
AH-64D Apache
ISRAEL: US Strategic Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band
radar at Mount Keren
ITALY: US European Command • 12,750
US Army 4.200; 1 AB bde(-)
US Navy 4,000; 1 HQ (US Navy Europe (USNAVEUR))
at Naples; 1 HQ (6th Fleet) at Gaeta; 1 MP sqn with 4
P-8A Poseidon at Sigonella
USAF 4,350; 1 ftr wg with 2 ftr sqn with 21 F-16C/D
Fighting Falcon at Aviano; 1 CSAR sqn with 8 HH-60G
Pave Hawk at Aviano
USMC 200
JAPAN: US Pacific Command • 53,900
US Army 2,700; 1 corps HQ (fwd); 1 SF gp; 1 avn bn; 1
SAM bn
US Navy 20,250; 1 HQ (7th Fleet) at Yokosuka; 1 base at
Sasebo; 1 base at Yokosuka
FORCES BY ROLE
3 FGA sqn at Iwakuni with 10 F/A-18E Super Hornet;
1 FGA sqn at Iwakuni with 10 F/A-18F Super Hornet; 2
EW sqn at Iwakuni/Misawa with 5 EA-18G Growler; 1
AEW&C sqn at Iwakuni with 5 E-2D Hawkeye; 2 ASW
hel sqn at Atsugi with 12 MH-60R; 1 tpt hel sqn at
Atsugi with 12 MH-60S
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 CVN; 3 CGHM; 2 DDGHM; 8 DDGM (2 non-op); 1
LCC; 4 MCO; 1 LHD; 1 LPD; 2 LSD
USAF 12,150
FORCES BY ROLE
1 HQ (5th Air Force) at Okinawa – Kadena AB; 1 ftr
wg at Misawa AB with (2 ftr sqn with 22 F-16C/D
Fighting Falcon); 1 wg at Okinawa – Kadena AB with
(2 ftr sqn with 27 F-15C/D Eagle; 1 ftr sqn with 14
F-22A Raptor; 1 tkr sqn with 15 KC-135R Stratotanker;
1 AEW&C sqn with 2 E-3B/C Sentry; 1 CSAR sqn with
10 HH-60G Pave Hawk); 1 tpt wg at Yokota AB with 10
C-130J-30 Hercules; 3 Beech 1900C (C-12J); 1 Spec Ops
gp at Okinawa – Kadena AB with (1 sqn with 5 MC-
130H Combat Talon; 1 sqn with 5 MC-130J Commando
II; 1 unit with 5 CV-22 Osprey); 1 ISR sqn with RC-135
Rivet Joint; 1 ISR UAV flt with 5 RQ-4A Global Hawk
USMC 18,800
FORCES BY ROLE
1 mne div; 1 mne regt HQ; 1 arty regt HQ; 1 recce
bn; 1 mne bn; 1 amph aslt bn; 1 arty bn; 1 FGA sqn

with 12 F/A-18C Hornet; 1 FGA sqn with 12 F/A-18D
Hornet; 1 FGA sqn with 12 F-35B Lightning II; 1 tkr sqn
with 15 KC-130J Hercules; 2 tpt sqn with 12 MV-22B
Osprey
US Strategic Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at
Shariki; 1 AN/TPY-2 X-Band radar at Kyogamisaki
JORDAN: US Central Command • Operation Inherent
Resolve 2,300: 1 FGA sqn with 12 F-15E Strike Eagle; 1 CISR
UAV sqn with 12 MQ-9A Reaper
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF: US Pacific Command • 28,500
US Army 19,200
FORCES BY ROLE
1 HQ (8th Army) at Seoul; 1 div HQ (2nd Inf) located
at Tongduchon; 1 armd bde; 1 (cbt avn) hel bde; 1
MRL bde; 1 AD bde; 1 SAM bty with THAAD
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams; M2A2/M3A3 Bradley; M109A6;
M270A1 MLRS; AH-64D Apache; CH-47F Chinook;
UH-60L/M Black Hawk; MIM-104 Patriot; FIM-92A
Avenger; 1 (APS) armd bde eqpt set
US Navy 250
USAF 8,800
FORCES BY ROLE
1 (AF) HQ (7th Air Force) at Osan AB; 1 ftr wg at
Osan AB with (1 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D Fighting
Falcon; 1 atk sqn with 24 A-10C Thunderbolt II); 1 ftr
wg at Kunsan AB with (2 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D
Fighting Falcon); 1 ISR sqn at Osan AB with U-2S
USMC 250
KUWAIT: US Central Command • 14,000; 1 ARNG armd
bde; 1 ARNG (cbt avn) hel bde; 1 spt bde; 1 FGA sqn with
12 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 1 tpt sqn with 12 MV-22B Osprey;
1 CISR UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper; 2 AD bty with MIM-
104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3; 1 (APS) armd bde set; 1 (APS) inf
bde set
LATVIA: US European Command • 60; 1 tpt hel flt; 5 UH-
60M Black Hawk
LIBYA: UN • UNSMIL 1 obs
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 24
MARSHALL ISLANDS: US Strategic Command • 1
detection and tracking radar at Kwajalein Atoll
MEDITERRANEAN SEA: US European Command • US
Navy • 6th Fleet: 2 DDGHM; 6 DDGM; 1 LPD; 1 LCC
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 2 obs
MOLDOVA: OSCE • Moldova 1
NETHERLANDS: US European Command • 400
NIGER: US Africa Command • 800
NORWAY: US European Command • 1,000; 1 mne bn; 1
(USMC) MEU eqpt set; 1 (APS) SP 155mm arty bn set
PACIFIC OCEAN: US Pacific Command • US Navy • 3rd
Fleet: 8 SSBN; 21 SSGN; 4 SSN; 4 CVN; 10 CGHM; 21
DDGHM; 6 DDGM; 9 FFHM; 3 MCO; 1 LHA; 3 LHD; 5
LPD; 3 LSD
North America 61
PERSIAN GULF: US Central Command • US Navy • 5th
Fleet: 1 CGHM; 1 LHA; 1 LPD; 1 LSD; 10 PCFG; 6 (Coast
North America
Guard) PCC
Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-152: 4 MCO; 1 ESB
PHILIPPINES: US Pacific Command • Operation Pacific
Eagle - Philippines 250
POLAND: NATO • Enhanced Forward Presence 774; 1
ARNG armd bn with M1A1 AIM Abrams; M2A2 ODS
Bradley; M109A6
US European Command • 2,100; 1 armd bde HQ; 1 armd
cav sqn(-) with M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams; M3A3 Bradley; 1 SP
arty bn with M109A6; 1 atk hel flt with 4 AH-64D Apache;
1 tpt hel flt with 8 UH-60 Black Hawk
PORTUGAL: US European Command • 250; 1 spt facility
at Lajes
QATAR: US Central Command • 10,000: 1 bbr sqn
with 6 B-1B Lancer; 1 ISR sqn with 4 RC-135 Rivet Joint;
1 ISR sqn with 4 E-8C JSTARS; 1 tkr sqn with 24 KC-
135R/T Straotanker; 1 tpt sqn with 4 C-17A Globemaster; 4
C-130H/J-30 Hercules; 2 AD bty with MIM-104E/F Patriot
PAC-2/3
US Strategic Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar
ROMANIA: US European Command • 1,150; 1 armd inf
bn HQ; 2 armd/armd inf coy with M1A2 SEPv2 Abrams;
M2A3 Bradley; 1 tpt hel flt with UH-60L Black Hawk
SAUDI ARABIA: US Central Command • 500
SERBIA : NATO • KFOR • Joint Enterprise 685; elm 1
ARNG inf bde HQ; 1 recce bn; 1 hel flt with UH-60; OSCE
• Kosovo 5
SINGAPORE: US Pacific Command • 200; 1 log spt sqn; 1
spt facility
SOMALIA: US Africa Command • 500
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 7
SPAIN: US European Command • 3,200; 1 air base at
Morón; 1 naval base at Rota
SYRIA: US Central Command • Operation Inherent Resolve
2,000+; 1 ranger unit; 1 mne bn; 1 arty bty with M777A2; 1
MRL bty with M142 HIMARS
THAILAND: US Pacific Command • 300
TURKEY: US European Command • 1,700; 1 tkr sqn with
14 KC-135; 1 ELINT flt with EP-3E Aries II; 1 air base at
Incirlik; 1 support facility at Ankara; 1 support facility at
Izmir
US Strategic Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at
Kürecik
UKRAINE: JMTG-U 220 (trg mission); OSCE • Ukraine 70
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: US Central Command • 5,000:
1 ftr sqn with 6 F-22A Raptor; 1 ISR sqn with 4 U-2; 1
AEW&C sqn with 4 E-3 Sentry; 1 tkr sqn with 12 KC-10A;
1 ISR UAV sqn with RQ-4 Global Hawk; 2 AD bty with
MIM-104E/F Patriot PAC-2/3
UNITED KINGDOM: US European Command • 9,250
FORCES BY ROLE
1 ftr wg at RAF Lakenheath with 1 ftr sqn with 24
F-15C/D Eagle, 2 ftr sqn with 23 F-15E Strike Eagle; 1 ISR
62 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
sqn at RAF Mildenhall with OC-135/RC-135; 1 tkr wg at
RAF Mildenhall with 15 KC-135R/T Stratotanker; 1 spec
ops gp at RAF Mildenhall with (1 sqn with 8 CV-22B
Osprey; 1 sqn with 8 MC-130J Commando II)
US Strategic Command • 1 AN/FPS-132 Upgraded Early
Warning Radar and 1 Spacetrack Radar at Fylingdales
Moor
FOREIGN FORCES
Germany Air Force: trg units with 40 T-38 Talon; 69 T-6A
Texan II; 24 Tornado IDS; • Missile trg at Fort Bliss (TX)
Netherlands 1 hel trg sqn with AH-64D Apache; CH-47D
Chinook
Singapore Air Force: trg units with F-16C/D; 12 F-15SG;
AH-64D Apache; 6+ CH-47D Chinook hel
 North America 63

Arms procurements and deliveries – North America

North America
Selected events in 2018

„„ In June, Northrop Grumman acquired Orbital ATK for
US$7.8bn and assumed US$1.4bn of debt. Orbital
ATK is the main supplier of solid rocket motors for
US military missile systems and Northrop Grumman
is one of four US companies capable of supplying
missile systems. The US Federal Trade Commission
approved the acquisition, provided that Northrop
Grumman sell solid rocket motors to other missile
manufacturers on a non-discriminatory basis. Orbital
will become a division of Northrop Grumman and be
renamed Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems.
„„ In September, the US Air Force selected the MH-139
helicopter offered by Boeing and Leonardo to replace
its fleet of UH-1N Hueys used by forces guarding
intercontinental-ballistic-missile sites and perform-
ing VIP and search-and-rescue duties. The other two
contenders were based on the omnipresent UH-60
Black Hawk. Boeing was awarded a US$2.4bn con-
tract in September to supply up to 84 MH-139s.
„„ The Department of Defense published a report in
September on the US defence-industrial base, con-
cluding that it faced significant challenges, includ-
ing uncertain US government spending, a decline
in domestic manufacturing capability and capac-
ity, and a less skilled workforce. The health of the
country’s ‘lower tier’ manufacturers and the United
States’ dependence on foreign sole-source suppliers
of key materials, such as rare earth elements, were
highlighted as risks for the future. The report made
a number of recommendations, including strength-
ening oversight of foreign investments, expand-
ing direct investment in lower-tier manufacturing,
diversifying sources of supply and efforts to promote
STEM.
„„ In October, Canada selected the vessel for its Cana-
dian Surface Combatant programme. The Lockheed
Martin Canada and BAE Systems Global Combat Ship
design is based on the United Kingdom’s Type-26
frigate. Canada plans to build 15 vessels at an esti-
mated cost of C$56–60bn (US$43.4–46.5bn). Halifax-
based Irving Shipbuilding is the prime contractor, and
deliveries are expected to begin in the mid-2020s.
„„ L-3 Technologies and Harris Corporation announced
in October that they were to merge and form L-3
Harris Technologies. The companies state that this
will create the sixth-largest defence company in the
US. The merger has to be approved by various gov-
ernment offices but could be completed by mid-2019.

Table 4 US FY2018 defence-budget request: top 15 equipment programmes by value

Equipment Type Quantity Value (US$) Service Prime contractor
Virginia class SSGN 2 7.29bn US Navy General Dynamics Electric Boat
F-35A Lightning II FGA ac 48 4.67bn US Air Force Lockheed Martin
Columbia class SSBN - 3.00bn US Navy General Dynamics Electric Boat
KC-46A Pegasus Tkr ac 15 2.56bn US Air Force Boeing
F-35B Lightning II FGA ac 20 2.54bn US Marine Corps Lockheed Martin
B-21 Raider Bbr ac R&D 2.31bn US Air Force Northrop Grumman
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet FGA ac 24 1.99bn US Navy Boeing
P-8A Poseidon ASW ac 10 1.98bn US Navy Boeing
Gerald R. Ford CVN - 1.65bn US Navy Newport News Shipbuilding
JLTV AUV 3,390 1.32bn US Army Oshkosh Defense
F-35C Lightning II FGA ac 9 1.28bn US Navy Lockheed Martin
CH-53K Hvy tpt hel 8 1.27bn US Marine Corps Boeing
PAC-3MSE SAM 240 1.13bn US Army Lockheed Martin
UH-60M Black Hawk Med tpt hel 50 1.12bn US Army Sikorsky
John Lewis class AOR 2 1.09bn US Navy General Dynamics NASSCO
64 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Table 5 US fixed-wing fighter-aircraft exports, 2010–Oct 2018

Country Equipment 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Oct 2018
Australia F-35A 2 8
Egypt F-16C/D 7 20
Indonesia F-16C/D 5 4 5 4 2
Iraq F-16C/D 4 10 7
Israel F-35I 2 7 3
Italy F-16A/B 3
Italy F-35A 6* 2* 2*
Italy F-35B 1*
Japan F-35A 1 1* 4*
Morocco F-16C/D 3 13 6
Netherlands F-35A 1 1
Norway F-35A 2 2 6 6
Pakistan F-16C/D 14 14 1
Saudi Arabia F-15SA 4 26 17
Singapore F-15 4 2 8
South Korea F-15K 2 2 3
South Korea F-35A 3
Turkey F-16C/D 3 11
Turkey F-35A 2
United Arab Emirates F-16 3 3 1
United Kingdom F-35B 2 1 5 6 2
Total = 276 26 35 37 22 7 10 37 59 43
*final assembly outside US

Table 6 Canada: maritime procurement programmes, by order date

Programme Equipment Type Quantity Value (C$) Value (US$) Prime Order date
contractors
Maritime Helicopter CH-148 Cyclone ASW hel 28 3.2bn 2.46bn Sikorsky Nov 2004
Project
Victoria In-Service Victoria class SSK 4 2.6bn 2.44bn Babcock Jun 2008
Support Contract (VISSC) Canada
Halifax-class Halifax class FFGHM 12 4.3bn 3.10bn Lockheed Nov 2008
modernisation and Martin Canada
frigate life-extension
Arctic and Offshore Harry DeWolf class PSOH 5 3.6bn 2.81bn Irving Mar 2015
Patrol Ships Shipbuilding
Joint Support Ship Protecteur class AORH 2 3.4bn 2.63bn Vancouver Jun 2018
Shipyards
Canadian Surface Global Combat Ship FFGHM 15 56–60bn 43.4–46.5bn Irving -
Combatant (UK Type-26 mod) Shipbuilding
 North America 65

▼ Figure 4 Boeing: P-8A Poseidon Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA)

North America
The US Navy (USN) had taken delivery of over 70 P-8A
aircraft by mid-2018. Although there have been some
delays (it took 18 months for full-rate production to begin),
production was by mid-2018 months ahead of schedule. The
P-8A is derived from a pre-existing and tested design –
Boeing’s 737-800 commercial airliner. Military
specifications are incorporated during the normal build
process instead of being retrofitted. This process, called
‘in-line production’ by Boeing, is, in combination with
additional pre-delivery flights, reported to have saved
several millions of dollars from unit costs. Also, the USN
has for the P-8A adopted a ‘Spiral Development’ acquisition
process, where capability elements are defined early and
are then bought, tested and added incrementally. This
allows the aircraft to more rapidly reach initial operating
capability as well as generating savings from a more (New Zealand, Saudi Arabia and South Korea). The FY2011
predictable build schedule. Foreign sales have also helped,  US Defense Budget Request noted 117 P-8As with an
with four confirmed customers (Australia, India, Norway average unit cost estimated at US$229.45 million. This had
and the United Kingdom) and three more sales pending decreased to US$206.23m in the FY2019 request.

1992: Two LRAACA 2012: First USN 2013: Full Rate 2017: First 2021: Final
prototypes to be P-8A to be Production (FRP) Australian and USN P-8A to
delivered delivered planned to begin Indian P-8s to be delivered
be delivered
Planned

1985 1995 2005 2015 2025

Actual

1987: US request 1990: 2000: MMA 2011: First 2014: FRP 2016: First 2016: UK
for proposals for LRAACA programme USN P-8A begins Australian orders nine
Long-Range Air cancelled created delivered and Indian P-8As
ASW Capability P-8s
Aircraft (LRAACA) delivered

Planned and actual US Navy P-8A deliveries: cumulative totals*

80 Prime contractor
Boeing (US)
70
Selected subcontractors
60 Planned Actual BAE Systems, Inc. (US)
50
Bharat Electronics Ltd (IND)*
CFM International (FRA and US)
40
GE Aviation (US)
30 HAL (IND)*
Northrop Grumman (US)
20
Raytheon (US)
10 Spirit Aerosystems (US)
0 Telephonics (US)*
Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
*Indian P-8I Neptune variant
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
*Planned delivery schedule at time of Lot order
© IISS
166 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Chapter Five

Russia and Eurasia

 Improving air-ground cooperation is a focus for the 
armed forces, exemplified by the appointment of a
career ground-forces officer as C-in-C of the Russian
Aerospace Forces. Russia is also working to refine its
reconnaissance-strike complex. 
 This is another lesson from Russia’s operation in Syria,
which remains a springboard for senior commanders;
deployment there is important for promotion.
 Russia’s Su-57 development is progressing at a modest 
pace. Meanwhile, improved versions of a previous
generation, including the Su-35, are improving air
force capabilities.
Russia’s Navy commissioned its first new truly blue-
water principal surface combatant in some two
decades, including with a new, potentially more
capable air-defence system.
The creation of information troops and reinstatement
of the Main Directorate for Political-Military Affairs
showed that Russia’s command has sharpened its
attention on confrontation in the information domain.
Russia’s surge of naval capabilities into the Eastern
Mediterranean in late 2018 demonstrated its ability to
potentially pose challenges to NATO and other navies
in the region.

Russia real-terms total military expenditure, 2009–18 (US$bn, constant 2010)

100 20

80 12
US$bn, constant 2010

Year-on-year % change
60 4

40 -4

20 -12

0 -20
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Active military personnel – top 10

(25,000 per unit)

Russia Armenia 44,800

900,000
Kazakhstan 39,000
Ukraine 209,000
Turkmenistan 36,500
Azerbaijan 66,950
Georgia 20,650
Uzbekistan 48,000
Kyrgyzstan 10,900
Belarus 45,350
 Russia and Eurasia 167

Regional defence policy and economics 168 ►

Armed forces data section 184 ►

Arms procurements and deliveries 219 ►

Russia: top 5 deployments, November 2018

Russia and Eurasia

Russia
Ukraine (Crimea) – 28,000 Russia
Georgia – 7,000

Russia
Tajikistan – 5,000

Russia
Syria – 5,000 Russia
Armenia – 3,300

Short-range ballistic missile Attack helicopters, 2018 Tactical combat aircraft fleets,
launchers, 2018 2018
150 400 900

850
120 320

200
90 60
150
60 40
100

30 20
50

0 0 0
Russia – Army
Belarus
Ukraine
Armenia
Turkmenistan
Kazakhstan
Russia – Navy
Azerbaijan

Russia
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Azerbaijan
Kazakhstan
Belarus
Turkmenistan
Armenia
Georgia
Tajikistan
Kyrgyzstan

Russia – Air Force

Russia – Navy
Ukraine
Kazakhstan
Belarus
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Georgia

(fighter / fighter ground-attack, attack)

168 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Russia and Eurasia
RUSSIA
In March 2018, Russia went to the polls in its latest
presidential election. Vladimir Putin was again
returned to office. Continuity was also the order
of the day at the defence ministry: both Minister of
Defence Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff
General Valery Gerasimov retained their posts after
the election.
Nonetheless, there were some personnel
movements of note. Perhaps the most interesting
reshuffle in the defence ministry in some years was
the appointment of Colonel-General Sergei Surovikin,
a career Ground Forces officer, as commander-
in-chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Such an
appointment is unprecedented not only in Russian
but also Soviet history and perhaps reflects the
officially stated rationale behind the selection – to
improve cooperation between the Aerospace Forces
and the Ground Forces. However, air-force officer
Lieutenant-General Andrei Yudin kept his post as
deputy to the commander-in-chief. Before taking on
his new role, Surovikin had commanded Russia’s
armed forces in Syria for nine months and gained
significant experience during 2017’s major offensive
against the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL.
Syria: battle laboratory
Russia’s operation in Syria remains a springboard for
senior commanders; deployment there is important
for promotion. Since the mission began in late 2015,
more than 500 Russian generals have rotated through
the country on deployment. Indeed, the newly
appointed commanders-in-chief of the Eastern and
Central military districts have commanded Russian
troops in Syria.
Moscow’s mission in Syria has two principal
priorities: firstly, to bolster the regime of its ally,
Bashar al-Assad, and secondly, to use the deployment
as a test bed for the development of joint operations
and new weapons and tactics. For example, Russia
has put its concept of a joint information battlespace
into practice there, by providing troops with real-
time information on friendly and adversary forces.
The defence ministry has invested considerable
effort in improving cooperation between units and
refining the reconnaissance-strike complex. As part
of this, Russia continues to work on modernising its
reconnaissance capabilities, to detect and monitor
targets in real time, and to reduce the time between
the detection of a target and its engagement by
artillery, aircraft or precision weapons.
According to reports from the Russian defence
ministry, between the start of the mission in
September 2015 and August 2018, the Aerospace
Forces carried out 39,000 combat flights in Syria. A
little over half of these were completed at night. These
figures indicate improvements to both air capability
and aircrew proficiency. But activity fell in 2018: from
January to September, only 5,000 combat flights were
carried out, which was reportedly a reduction on
the previous year. This decline is largely due to the
balance of power in the conflict changing in favour
of the pro-government forces, which has allowed
Russia to reduce its military presence in Syria. In
summer 2018, a number of aircraft and helicopters
returned to Russia, including, it was reported, all
the new Mi-28 and Ka-52 attack helicopters. At the
beginning of autumn, about 30 aircraft remained
in Syria – the lowest number since the beginning of
Russia’s intervention.
The information dimension
The Syria campaign continues to be studied in Russian
military academies, leading to a range of lessons
for tactics and procurement. As well as lessons on
the efficacy of weaponry, one of the most important
relates to active information and psychological
operations, which are used to suppress an opponent’s
will to resist. Alongside traditional methods, such
as spreading leaflets, missions of this type have
reportedly also been conducted in cyberspace.
Russia announced in 2017 that it had formed
the Information Operations Troops. There is little
information available in public on this group’s
activities, although it is understood that its covert
activity is conducted mainly in cyberspace. In 2018,
the defence ministry reinstated the Main Directorate
for Military–Political Affairs, which has among its
key responsibilities the management of propaganda

and counter-propaganda, patriotic education and
psychological support for the armed forces. The
creation of these new organisations shows that the
Russian command has sharpened its attention on
confrontation in the information domain.
Personnel
As a result of Russia’s demographic crisis of the
1990s, the number of young men each year reaching
draft age remains low. Nonetheless, according to
official statements, in 2017 the armed forces reached
95% of target strength. This is the result of the high
number of contract personnel being recruited, which
reached over 380,000 in early 2018. Consequently, the
draft continues to be reduced. In spring 2018, 128,000
men were conscripted, less than in spring 2017.
Around 260,000 recruits in total were expected to be
conscripted over the course of 2018. The reduction
in the draft will continue and the current plan is to
have 499,200 contract personnel with only 150,000
conscripts in the armed forces by 2020.
Support units contain fewer contract personnel,
freeing contractors to instead be employed in front-
line combat units, including the Airborne Forces and
marines, which are recruiting two battalion tactical
groups of contract troops for each regiment or brigade.
These units are intended to solve the problem of uneven
training levels caused by the draft and demobilisation
cycle for conscripts serving only one year. Overall, 126
battalion tactical groups wholly comprising contract
troops have been formed in the Ground Forces and
Airborne Forces. These are reported to be at constant
combat readiness, which, for Russian analysts, is
understood to mean around 24-hours readiness to
move. Meanwhile, special forces, combined-arms
units in Russia’s peacekeeping forces (such as the 15th
Separate Motor-rifle Brigade) and submarine crews
are entirely staffed by contract personnel.
However, the contract-personnel level falls
short of the goal set at the beginning of the reform
effort, where the armed forces would be composed
entirely of fully combat-ready units. Conscripts still
represent a third of the armed forces and remain
only marginally fit for real combat operations; it is
understood that they have not been sent to Syria,
even in support roles.
New weapons
On 1 March 2018, in his annual address to the
Federal Assembly, Putin referred to the ongoing
development of innovative strategic-weapons
Russia and Eurasia 169
systems. Some of these were hitherto publicly
unknown. Burevestnik, a nuclear-powered ultra-long-
range cruise missile, is currently in test. According
to Russian reports, Peresvet mobile lasers have been
observed at Strategic Rocket Forces bases. A squadron
of modernised MiG-31 fighters equipped with the
Kinzhal hypersonic air-to-surface missile (modelled
on the 9M723 (SS-26 Stone) ballistic missile from the
Iskander-M system) is undergoing operational testing
in the Southern Military District, in the Caspian Sea
area. Less still is known about Poseidon, a  nuclear-
powered uninhabited underwater vehicle.
Russia and Eurasia
Specialists understand that these weapons are
currently prototypes. It is unclear whether they
will complete the test-and-development process.
The first tests of the Burevestnik cruise missile were
unsuccessful, and efforts are currently being directed
towards developing an improved model.
However, there are fewer doubts about the RS-28
Sarmat (SS-X-29), the new liquid-fuelled,  multiple
independently targetable re-entry vehicle-equipped
heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), to be
fitted out with the already-tested Avangard hypersonic
glide vehicle. Sarmat is intended to replace the RS-20
(SS-18 Satan) ICBM.
Despite Putin’s bold statements, these weapons
are not ‘game-changers’. They could be useful in
terms of securing a second-strike capability, but they
do not provide Russia with the capacity to mount
successfully an immediate counterforce nuclear
strike. It is possible that they are considered by
Moscow only as a reliable guarantee of preserving
Russia’s second-strike retaliatory capability, or
perhaps also a useful bargaining chip in any future
arms-control negotiations.
Infrastructure
The construction of military bases along the border
with Ukraine continues. The 152nd Logistics Brigade
was reported as formed at Liski in Voronezh in
February 2018. The 20th Combined Arms Army
(CAA), based close to the border, is still forming. In
addition to two motor-rifle divisions, the 20th CAA
includes an anti-aircraft brigade, an artillery brigade,
a missile brigade and a command-and-control
brigade, the 9th Signal Brigade at Voronezh.
There have been no significant changes in
the group of ground forces deployed to Crimea.
However, the Airborne Forces activated the 171st
Airborne Battalion in Feodosia in December 2017 and
the Aerospace Forces replaced the 12th Regiment’s
170 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
S-300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle) surface-to-air missile
(SAM) systems with S-400s. The modernisation of
Belbek airfield is the largest infrastructure project on
the Crimean Peninsula. Once the second runway is
complete, the airfield will be able to receive all types
of strategic-aviation assets. In addition, a squadron
of Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers equipped with anti-
ship missiles (possibly Kh-32s) may be permanently
stationed there, making the peninsula even more
important to Moscow in asserting its control over the
Black Sea.
Another significant development is the return of
Russian carrier aviation to the  NITKA land-based
carrier simulator in Crimea. Before the peninsula
was annexed, a new training centre was being built
by Russia in Yeysk, on the shores of the Sea of Azov,
though this was not completed. During summer
Command and control
Russia’s leadership often states that international affairs
are entering a period of rapid change and sustained
instability. President Vladimir Putin, for instance, has
pointed to the simultaneous growth of international
competition and the degradation of global governance
mechanisms. Chief of the General Staff General Valery
Gerasimov has discussed the evolution of the character
of war, noting increasing international competition
over energy, transit routes and access to markets. He
emphasises that the reasons for the use of military force
are broadening, and how quickly thriving states can now
be reduced to violent chaos.
Moscow categorises threats into two groups. The
first is the development of long-range, high-precision
weapons and mobile forces. These capabilities increase
the tempo of military activity, reducing operational
pauses in action. The second is based on the broad use of
political, economic, humanitarian, information and other
non-military measures, applied in coordination with the
protest potential of a population and supplemented by
military measures. As a result, according to Gerasimov,
it is increasingly important in contemporary conflicts to
be able to defend the population and strategic sites and
communications from the activity of special forces and
saboteurs and manage the system of territorial defence.
Taken together, these have led to the view in Moscow
that the (armed) protection of a state is not simply a
military matter, but one that requires the consolidation
of all agencies of state power. Indeed, Gerasimov has said
that territorial defence can only be organised with the
involvement of law-enforcement and security agencies.
2018, both regiments of the navy’s carrier-based
fighters were training in Crimea.
Meanwhile, plans to boost Russia’s military
presence in the Arctic have slowed and a new
Arctic motor-rifle brigade intended for the Yamal
Peninsula in northwest Siberia has been put on hold.
However, there are plans to build, before the end of
2019, a small air-defence base near Tiksi on Russia’s
northeast coast; there was a base near Tiksi during
the Cold War.
At the same time, recent investments in Arctic
airfields have proved their worth. After modernisation,
in 2018 a Tu-160 Blackjack strategic bomber was for the
first time able to land at Anadyr airfield in Chukotka.
In the same year, a group of Tu-142 anti-submarine
aircraft flew over the North Pole to the shores of
Alaska for the first time in some years. The provision
Furthermore, a priority for Moscow is to improve the
correlation between information management, decision-
making and executive actors across the state, in order to
improve responsiveness in times of crises. According to
Gerasimov, such views are now expressed in the Defence
Plan, a new form of strategic planning that emerged in
early 2013 and was subsequently updated for the period
2016–20.
Despite the widespread view in the Euro-Atlantic
community that Russian decision-making, apparently
unhindered by democratic processes, is a simpler and
faster process than in Western capitals, a number of
issues complicate the picture for the Russian leadership.
Firstly, the chain of command has in the past often
proved unreliable. For example, information – even
on strategic questions, such as during the early days of
the Ukraine crisis – is often inefficiently passed up the
chain, hindering timely decision-making. In addition,
instructions passed down the chain have sometimes
been fulfilled only tardily or incompletely, even in
implementing the strategic agenda set out in Putin’s
2012 May decrees. The leadership is making considerable
efforts to address such problems, but even if decision-
making in Moscow becomes faster, the quality of the
information on which decisions are based and the
effectiveness of action once decisions have been taken
are open to question.
Secondly, though organisations such as the Security
Council and the Main Directorate for Special Projects
(GUSP) exist to oversee such processes, it is often difficult
to coordinate the activities of different ministries,

Ground forces
New units have formed incrementally in 2018,
including a new (127th) motor-rifle division, formed
out of some of the existing brigades of the 5th Army
around Vladivostok, the upgrade of three of six
Airborne Forces tank companies to battalions and the
formation of a new tank battalion in Kaliningrad. The
established tank and motor-rifle divisions appear to
be moving towards achieving their full complement,
although most still lack at least one of their planned
regiments.
The planned gradual reduction in expenditure
on equipment purchases was confirmed at the
‘Armiya 2018’ military exhibition, where contract
agreements were down on 2017. In addition, a
significant proportion of the equipment mock-ups
seen in previous years are still not yet ready for
agencies and departments – as well as actors at federal,
regional and local levels – and between civilian and
military authorities. The armed forces have criticised the
civilian authorities for their lack of readiness, for example,
and their slow implementation of military orders, as
well as noting more practical problems in terms of
logistics, transport, reconnaissance and communications.
Indeed, in many ways, this is a reminder that Russia is
not monolithic, and that numerous vested interests
throughout the chain of command and across the various
parts of the state mean that the orchestration of Russian
state power is not always harmonious.
Recognising such problems, the authorities have looked
to improve information management and synchronisation.
Measures have included major exercises that not only
rehearse rapid deployments over long distances, but also
bring together actors from across the state, such as the
central bank and various ministries, including transport,
communications, health and agriculture.
Similarly, there have been strategic policing exercises,
such as Zaslon 2015, while the armed forces have
exercised with the National Guard – a force established
in 2016 to combine the interior troops, special-forces
and rapid-response troops, and other non-military
armed forces in Russia – to rehearse the protection of
strategically important locations (such as energy, industry
and transport centres) against saboteurs and terrorists.
Territorial-defence staffs are also being established to
improve coordination between regional and military
authorities.
Perhaps the most important development, however,
has been the establishment of the National Defence
Russia and Eurasia 171
serial production. At the show, it was announced
that a total of 132 T-14 tanks and T-15 heavy infantry
fighting vehicles would be delivered between 2018
and 2022. However, it was striking that there were
no contracts to buy in quantity new light armoured
vehicles. The Kurganets-25 tracked platform and the
wheeled Bumerang will be produced only in small
batches for testing in 2019–21.
Indeed, there has been continued emphasis on
recapitalising existing vehicle fleets. The 2016 T-72B3
upgrade (with a more powerful engine and improved
reactive armour) is currently being issued to tank
Russia and Eurasia
regiments in the new motor-rifle divisions and all B3
models are expected to be retrofitted to this standard
at some point. Deliveries of the BMP-2 infantry
fighting vehicle upgraded with the Berezhok combat
module (BMP-2M) began in the Central Military
Management Centre (NDMC), sometimes also known as
the National Defence Control Centre. Mikhail Mizintsev,
commander of the NDMC, has stated that the armed
forces must be ready to react quickly to crises without
having to endure a prolonged transition to a war footing
– in other words, the goal is to minimise the mobilisation
gap. The NDMC, which opened in 2014, facilitates
this and has an extensive remit. It has three levels of
command: a supreme command centre, which controls
the strategic nuclear forces; a combat command centre,
which monitors the global political–military situation
and provides forecasting and analysis; and a centre that
oversees everyday activities, coordinating the work
of security ministries and departments in peacetime,
including the Interior Ministry, foreign- and military-
intelligence organisations, the Ministry of Emergencies
and the Federal Security Service’s Border Guards. Indeed,
all defence-related information flows are narrowed into
this single channel, to enable all military movement
in Russia and international defence and security
developments to be tracked in real time.
As the hub of a nationwide network of such centres,
the NDMC is intended to unify all existing command
and monitoring systems across Russia and act as a single
point of coordination for information and control over all
agencies. It also oversees information and cyber security,
and monitors social networks, unrest and protests. Since
being commissioned, the NDMC has also supervised
equipment modernisation, strategic exercises and
combat operations in Syria. It represents a new stage in
the attempt to enhance and improve Russian command
and control.
 172 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

of
▼anti-submarine capability
Map 3 Russian forces in this2018
in Crimea, sensitive region is increasingly a concern for Moscow.
Selected Russian equipment in Crimea
UKRAINE Mariupol
Name Type
T-72B3 MBT Melitopol
BTR-82A APC (W) Yeysk
Berdyansk
Su-30SM Flanker FGA ac
ersonSu-27SM Flanker FGA ac
S-400 (SA-21 Growler) SAM
3K55 Bastion (SSC-5 Stooge) AShM
3K60 Bal (SSC-6 Sennight) AShM

Sea of Azov
Navy Air force VDV
Main roads Main railroads 39th Helicopter Regiment
De facto boundary between
Russian-occupied Crimea and
Dzhankoy 382nd Naval RUSSIA
mainland Ukraine
171st Airborne Battalion Infantry Battalion
37th Mixed Aviation Regiment
43rd Mixed
Aviation Regiment Kerch
31st Air Defence Division

Yevpatoriya
8th Artillery Regiment

318th Mixed 18th Surface-to-Air

Aviation Regiment Novofedorovka Gvardeiskoye Feodosiya Missile Regiment
Simferopol
12th Surface-to-Air 126th Naval Infantry Brigade*
Peravalnoye 11th Anti-Ship
Missile Regiment Belbek 38th Fighter Regiment Missile Brigade Novorossiysk
Balaklava Sevastopol Otradnoe
219th Independent Electronic Gelendzhik
Warfare Regiment
1 battalion from 11th 7th Mountain
Anti-Ship Missile Brigade 1096th Surface-to-Air Missile Regiment Airborne Division

 15th Independent Coastal Black Sea

Black Sea Fleet HQ  810th Naval
Missile Brigade
 11th Anti-Submarine Warfare Ship Infantry Brigade
 4th Independent Chemical,
Brigade  127th Independent
Biological, Radiological Regiment
 41st Missile Boat Brigade Reconnaissance
 68th Area Protection Ship Brigade Brigade

Potential strike
range of MiG-31 UKRAINE
equipped with
Kinzhal missile

Mariupol
Melitopol
Kherson
Berdyansk Yeysk
RUSSIA
Crimea-based aircraft could also be armed with the
130 km range Kh-35 (AS-20 Kayak) AShM and the Sea of Azov
260 km range Kh-35U (AS-20 Kayak) AShM Dzhankoy

Kerch
Yevpatoriya

Simferopol Novorossiysk

Sevastopol Gelendzhik

100 km 130 km 200 km 260 km 300 km 400 km

S-400 system: S-400 system: S-400 system: S-400 system: 3K60 Bal (SSC-6A 3K60 Bal (SSC-6 3K55 Bastion
40N6 surface- 48N6D surface- 9M96-2 surface- 9M96 surface- Sennight) coastal- Sennight) coastal- (SSC-5 Stooge)
to-air missile to-air missile to-air missile to-air missile defence cruise missile defence cruise missile coastal-defence
(improved version in cruise missile
*Potential ranges marked from notional location development)
© IISS

District in 2018. Further production of the Tornado-S
300 mm multiple-rocket launcher appears to have
been complicated by a legal case brought against the
manufacturer in July by the defence ministry.
Aerospace forces
The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) continued
during 2018 to absorb the lessons from their ongoing
involvement in Syria and to come to terms with
the more modest ambitions of Russia’s latest State
Armament Programme (SAP 2018–27).
Besides allowing new and upgraded aircraft and
weapons to be tested operationally, the Syria mission
has provided valuable experience for air and ground
crews. Workers from the defence-aerospace industry
have also supported the deployment from the air
base at Hmeimim in Syria.
The performance of Russian aircraft in Syria may
have allowed the VKS to take a more sanguine view of
the slow progress of the Su-57 being developed to meet
its future multi-role fighter (PAK-FA) requirement.
The Su-35S Flanker E made its operational debut in
Syria, as did one of its primary air-to-air missiles, the
R-77-1 (AA-12B Adder) active radar-guided medium-
range weapon. This Su-35 iteration of the Flanker was
originally conceived as an export-only product, but
as the PAK-FA was delayed it was adopted by the
air force as a gap-filler. Indications so far are that the
SAP to 2027 only supports the acquisition of a small
number of Su-57s (at least until 2023). Pre-production
versions of the Su-57 are being flown with an interim
engine, as the intended engine may not be ready for
series production before 2023.
Further indications of more modest near- to
medium-term acquisition aims for the VKS include
the emphasis on upgrades to existing bomber types,
and the intention to begin to build an upgraded
variant of the Tu-160 Blackjack, the Tu-160M2. The
latter features updated NK-32 engines (production
of which has been restarted), increased range and
updated avionics, which will serve as the basis for
those to be used in the PAK-DA next-generation
bomber requirement. Development continues of a
new bomber design, Tupolev’s Item 80, which is
meant to meet the PAK-DA requirement, but the pace
appears to have slowed. It is possible that PAK-DA
may be viewed increasingly as a complement to,
rather than a replacement for, the Blackjack. As
Tu-160M2 and PAK-DA enter production, the
Tu-95MS Bear strategic bomber may be gradually
withdrawn.
Russia and Eurasia 173
However, the emphasis for the VKS remains
the development and acquisition of a variety of
stand-off air-to-surface weapons for the bomber
fleet. As well as continuing to buy the Kh-101/
Kh-102 (AS-23A/B Kodiak) long-range cruise missile,
the development of both shorter- and apparently
longer-range land-attack weapons is under way.
The Kh-50 designation has been associated with a
smaller cruise missile likely intended for internal
carriage on aircraft whose weapons bay will not
accommodate the larger Kh-101. Boosting the
inventory of short-range air-launched precision-
Russia and Eurasia
guided weapons is also a priority. The air force has
relied on unguided free-fall bombs in Syria, in part
reflecting the need to complete the development of
or increase production rates on armaments projects
now reaching fruition, such as the Kh-30 family of
air-to-surface missiles.
Naval forces
At the end of July 2018, Admiral Gorshkov – the first
Project 22350 frigate – was finally commissioned
some 12 years after the ship was first laid down. This
marked the introduction into service of the first new
truly blue-water surface combatant in nearly two
decades. At the same time, a second Gorshkov-class
frigate was nearing completion, with four more in the
pipeline, possibly to be followed by an improved and
slightly enlarged version, the Project 22350M.
A factor in the effectiveness of these ships will
be whether issues have been resolved with the
development of their 3K96-2 (SA-NX-28) Poliment-
Redut air-defence missile system. If so, this would
mark a significant improvement in the Russian
Navy’s area air-defence capability.
In terms of legacy blue-water capabilities, the
much-needed refit of Russia’s sole aircraft carrier,
Admiral Kuznetsov, got under way in 2018. Indications
are that the work will focus on the refurbishment of
propulsion and electronic systems, rather than any
more substantial capability enhancements. Even so,
the vessel is unlikely to be back in operation before
the early 2020s; that could move further to the right
after the damage in October 2018 to the large floating
dry dock that carried the vessel.
It remains the case that the most significant recent
trend in Russian naval capabilities has been the
focus on the construction of relatively small surface
platforms and submarines armed with long-range
cruise and anti-ship missiles from the Kalibr family
of weapons. Even here, new deliveries in 2018 were
 Russia’s Kalibr family of anti-ship, land-attack and anti-
submarine weapons includes subsonic and supersonic
terminal-phase cruise missiles, the 3M54 (SS-N-27 Sizzler)
anti-ship missile and the 3M14 (SS-N-30) land-attack cruise
missile, as well as two rocket-boosted anti-submarine
torpedoes, respectively 91R1 and 91RT2. Export versions are
marketed under the Club banner, though some are range-
limited to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR). A subsonic anti- ship version of the 3M54 is also
offered for export, but this does not appear to be part of the
Russian Navy’s system.
The 3M14 (SS-N-30) long-range cruise missile has design
a range in the order of 2,000 km, but the export derivative is
Russian Navy launch platforms
restricted to just below the MTCR limit of 300 km. The 3M14
provides a conventional land- attack capability, particularly In addition to vessels built to launch Kalibr variants,
Russia has announced plans to modify a number of
for smaller classes of Russian naval vessels. Strikes on Syria
existing vessels to enable the same capability. This
using 3M14 have been launched from conventional includes eight Antey (Oscar II) guided-missile
submarines (Kalibr-PL) and surface combatants (Kalibr-NK) in submarines (with up to 72 missiles per vessel), and
the Caspian Sea, up to 1,500 km away. the Orlan (Kirov) nuclear-powered cruisers.
Club-S is in service with the navies of Algeria, China, India
and Vietnam, aboard their Kilo-class submarines. Whilst only In service Planned 1 3 6 9 12
the sea-launched versions of Club are known to have been Submarines Yasen
exported, other launch options are marketed. This includes Varshavyanka
the Club-K complex, which is designed to fit within a standard Destroyers Admiral Gorshkov
174 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

heritage from the Novator 3M10 Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson) shipping container. An air-launched derivative has also been Frigates Admiral Grigorovich
subsonic cruise missile, first deployed in 1986. The 3M14 has advertised as a possible development. Gepard
Gremyashchiy
Vasily Bykov
▼ Figure 11 Russia: Kalibr missile family

Kalibr (domestic variants) Club (Kalibr export variants)

Corvettes Buyan-M
Kalibr-NK Kalibr-PL Club-N Club-S Club-M/Club-K* Club-A Karakurt

Land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs)

Ground-launched Kalibr derivatives

3M14T 3M14K 3M14TE 3M14E 3M14KE 3M14AE

(SS-N-30) (SS-N-30) (SS-N-30) (SS-N-30) Range: 275 km 9M728 9M729
Range: 2,000 km+ Range: 2,000 km+ Range: 275 km  Range: 275 km  (SSC-7) (SSC-8 Screwdriver)
Range: <500 km Range: (est.) 2,000 km+

Anti-ship missiles (AShMs) Russia has developed new ground-launched

LACMs: the 9M728 (SSC-7) and the 9M729 (SSC-8
Screwdriver). Though their lineage has not been
officially stated, the missiles are assessed as
3M54T 3M54K 3M54TE 3M54E 3M54KE 3M54AE
derived from the 3M14 Kalibr and they are able to
(SS-N-27A Sizzler) (SS-N-27 Sizzler) (SS-N-27 Sizzler) (SS-N-27 Sizzler) Range: 220 km 
carry both conventional and nuclear warheads.
Range: 220 km Range: 220 km
The shorter-range 9M728 can be launched from a
variant of the 9K720 Iskander-M missile system. The
3M54TE1 3M54E1 3M54KE1 3M54AE1 launch vehicle can carry either or both 9M728
(SS-N-27B Sizzler) (SS-N-27 Sizzler) Range: 275 km cruise and 9M723 ballistic missiles internally.
Range: 275 km Range: 275 km The longer-range SSC-8 is believed to be a
version of the Russian Navy 3M14T, with an
assessed range in excess of 2,000 km. The United
Anti-submarine missiles States has formally protested against the apparent
Ground-launched deployment of this system; the US–Russia
Surface-vessel-launched Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty prohibits
91RT2 91R1 91RTE2 91RE1 Submarine-launched ground-launched ballistic- and cruise-missile
Range: 40 km Range: 50 km Range: 40 km Range: 50 km systems with ranges between 500 km and 5,500 km.
Air-launched
Status unconfirmed Status unconfirmed (The treaty does not cover sea-launched missiles.)
Assessed dual-capable

© IISS
*Club-K is a containerised system (using commercial ISO 20/40) and may also be mounted on ship decks
 Russia and Eurasia 175

proceeding slowly. Nonetheless, the first of the
improved Project 08851 Yasen-M-class submarines
began sea trials in September 2018. Programmes to
modernise the capabilities of a range of legacy large
surface platforms also continue, at a relatively slow
pace.
Also after a considerable delay, in June the navy
commissioned the amphibious landing ship Ivan
Gren, some 14 years after construction of the vessel
began. A relatively modest 120 metres in length and
displacing just 6,600 tonnes, the ship nevertheless
represents a considerable improvement over the
In 2018, the Strategic Rocket Forces completed the
rearmament of three missile divisions with the RS-24
Yars (SS-27 mod 2) ICBM. The plan remains to replace
all RS-12M Topol (SS-25 Sickle) and RS-12M2 Topol-M
(SS-27 mod 1) ICBMs with Yars by 2021, though
achieving this looks unlikely, given the production
rates that would be required. Nonetheless, thanks to
the rapid acquisition of new missiles, the Strategic
Rocket Forces stand out as the most advanced branch
of the Russian armed forces: as of 2018, some 79% of
its weapons were classed as ‘new’.

Russia and Eurasia

elderly inventory of amphibious shipping. A key DEFENCE ECONOMICS
question remains over the extent to which Moscow
plans to invest in further improvements in this area; Defence spending
only two of these ships have been ordered so far. Russia’s economy has exhibited only modest growth,
The navy has additionally sought to achieve or decline, since 2013. The economy grew by 1.5% in
strategic effect by moving platforms between 2017 and 1.7% in 2018. Russia’s Ministry of Economic
key theatres and undertaking some significant Development is forecasting 2.0% growth in 2020,
showcase deployments and concentrations of force. increasing to 3.3% by 2024, but new economic-policy
For example, in August 2018, the navy deployed initiatives will be needed if such a revival is to be
a group of more than a dozen ships, including at achieved. By contrast, the IMF forecasts only 1.2%
least six Kalibr-equipped vessels, in the eastern growth in 2023.
Mediterranean. Although dubbed an exercise, they Under the State Armament Programme (SAP)
appeared ready to support Russian operations 2011–20, Russian defence spending grew rapidly in
in Syria and to act as a deterrent to Western and real terms and as a share of GDP, peaking in 2015.
other naval forces operating in the area. In June, the Since then, the rate of growth has moderated and the
Northern Fleet carried out its largest Arctic exercise GDP share is now declining (see Table 11). The SAP
in a decade. Then, in September, the Pacific Fleet to 2020 was always regarded as a one-off process of
mounted an exercise involving more than 20 vessels, quickly tackling years of meagre funding, permitting
said to have been the largest since the end of the the transition to a more normal annual rate of arms
Cold War, followed quickly by a three-ship regional procurement after a few years. This time has arrived
deployment. These developments appeared to and, according to the Ministry of Finance’s plans,
mark a further increase in the level of Russian naval
activity, demonstrating at least an ability to deploy in
key regions, if not necessarily on a global scale. Table 11 Russian defence expenditure as % of
GDP
Strategic Rocket Forces Year ‘National defence’ Total military expenditure1
Compared to other service arms, Russia’s strategic Trillion roubles as % GDP Trillion roubles as % GDP
nuclear forces remain relatively immune to budget
2018 2.830 2.88 3.935 4.00
cuts. Nevertheless, they too have lost one of their
2017 2.666 2
2.90 3.712 4.032
major projects. In December 2017, it was announced
2016 2.982 2
3.46 3.831 4.452
that development of the Barguzin mobile railway
2015 3.181 3.81 4.026 4.83
complex would be discontinued due to financial
constraints, with the funds redirected to new strategic 2014 2.479 3.13 3.224 4.07
weapons. 2013 2.106 2.88 2.787 3.81
The most important of these is the new RS-28 2012 1.812 2.66 2.505 3.67
Sarmat (SS-X-29) heavy liquid-fuelled ICBM. Launch 2011 1.516 2.51 2.029 3.37
tests were carried out in December 2017 and twice 1
According to NATO definition
2
Excluding a one-off payment to reduce accumulated debts of defence-
more over the next six months, including a limited industry enterprises under the scheme of state-guaranteed credits.
firing of the first-stage engines. 2011–2017: actual spending; 2018: amended federal budget for 2018
176 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019 2018 Defence Spending (US$bn)
Real % Change (2017–18)
Between 10% and 20% increase
63.06
Between 3% and 10% increase
Between 0% and 3% increase 2
Between 0% and 3% decrease 1
Between 3% and 10% decrease .5
Between 10% and 20% decrease .01
More than 20% decrease
[1] Map illustrating 2018 planned defence-spending levels (in US$ at
Insufficient data © IISS market exchange rates), as well as the annual real percentage
change in planned defence spending between 2017 and 2018 (at
constant 2010 prices and exchange rates). Percentage changes in
defence spending can vary considerably from year to year, as states
revise the level of funding allocated to defence. Changes indicated
Russia here highlight the short-term trend in planned defence spending
between 2017 and 2018. Actual spending changes prior to 2017, and
projected spending levels post-2018, are not reflected.

Belarus

Ukraine

Moldova
Kazakhstan

Georgia Uzbekistan
Kyrgyzstan
Armenia Azerbaijan
Turkmenistan
Tajikistan

▲ Map 4 Russia and Eurasia regional defence spending1

revealed in July 2018, spending on ‘national defence’ In 2017, an additional factor led to a reduction
(the budget chapter covering the defence ministry’s in the reported level of spending. As part of its
military outlays) will increase to a modest extent in campaign to tighten contract discipline and effective
nominal terms in 2019–21. However, it is due to fall use of budget funding, the defence ministry decided
as a share of GDP from almost 2.9% in 2018 to 2.6% late in the year to withhold payments to defence
in 2021, resulting in a share of total military spending companies until contracts for the delivery of new
of approximately 3.6%. This corresponds to its level weapons had been completed. The outcome was that
before the start of the SAP to 2020. more than 200bn roubles (US$3.4bn) was withheld,
Understanding the trend of Russian military
spending has been complicated by technical factors
that have affected the reported defence budget. ▼ Figure 12 Russia: estimated total military
In 2016 and 2017, the ‘national defence’ chapter expenditure as % of GDP
included substantial sums to cover past debts to
5 4.83
the defence industry under the system of state- 4.45
guaranteed credits. This was used to boost spending 3.81
4.07 4.03 4.00
4
in the early years of the SAP. The debt settlement
amounted to 792 billion roubles (US$11.8bn) in 2016
3
% of GDP

and 187bn roubles (US$3.2bn) in 2017. But these

payments did not contribute to Russia’s defence 2
capability and should be excluded from any analysis
of the trend of actual military expenditure. Excluding 1
debt settlements, defence spending in nominal terms
fell by 6% in 2016 and 11% in 2017, compared with 0
the 28% growth in spending seen in 2015. 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

leading to a 6% underspend compared with the
total federal budget allocation to ‘national defence’
in 2017. The withheld payments were disbursed in
the early months of 2018, leading to an overspend
that was not foreseen when the year’s budget was
adopted. An amended version of the budget law for
2018 was adopted in early July and this increased
the allocation to ‘national defence’ by about 245bn
roubles (US$3.9bn), covering additional outlays
relating to the 2017 state defence order. The budget
was amended again in November but with only a
modest increase in defence spending. It remains to be
seen whether the withholding of payments late in the
year will become a regular practice.
A new State Armament Programme to 2027
With the formation of a new government following
the start of Vladimir Putin’s fourth term as president
in May 2018, Yury Borisov, formerly deputy defence
minister for procurement, replaced Dmitriy Rogozin
as deputy prime minister responsible for oversight
of the defence industry and first deputy chair of
the Military-Industrial Commission (chaired by
Putin). Borisov has a background in the electronics
industry. His successor as deputy defence minister
for procurement was Aleksey Krivoruchko, who
was from 2014 to June 2018 general director of
Kalashnikov, part of the Rostec state corporation.
Before his departure, Borisov had overseen the
preparation of Russia’s new SAP, replacing the one
to 2020. Originally, this was to have been for the years
2016–25, but at the beginning of 2015 it was postponed
until economic prospects were more certain. At first,
it was expected to run from 2018 to 2025 but in 2017 it
was decided that it should be a ten-year programme
to 2027. President Vladimir Putin finally approved
the new SAP in December 2017.
The state programme is classified. It is valued
in current prices and only the first five years are
operational; the second five are presented only in
general terms. Total funding of the defence ministry’s
forces under the SAP to 2027 will be 19 trillion roubles
(US$304bn); for the forces of other agencies, such as
the Federal Security Service, the Russian National
Guard and the Ministry of Emergencies, more than
3trn roubles (US$48.1bn) has been allocated. In
nominal terms, the defence ministry will receive the
same sum as under the previous programme, but in
real terms probably only 50–60% of the sum allocated
in the SAP to 2020. In addition, the defence ministry
will receive 1trn roubles (US$16bn) for infrastructure
Russia and Eurasia 177
investment directly related to the deployment of new
weapons. It is not known what share of the ministry’s
allocation relates to the first five years of the SAP,
but it is probably much more than the 31% allocated
under the previous SAP to 2020. However, this time,
probably because of the tense international situation,
there has been no indication of the number of new
systems to be delivered under the programme.
As before, strategic missiles have first priority.
Acquisition of the RS-24 Yars (SS-27 mod 2)
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) will continue,
and from around 2020 the new RS-28 Sarmat (SS-X-29)
Russia and Eurasia
heavy ICBM should enter service. A number of old
RS-18 (SS-19 Stiletto) ICBMs will be equipped with
the new Avangard hypersonic boost-glide vehicle.
The priority for the space forces will be to restore
Russia’s missile early-warning satellite network,
with the re-equipping of the ground-based warning
system with Voronezh radars nearing completion. The
air-defence forces will receive more S-400 surface-
to-air missile (SAM) systems, but from around 2020
they should begin to receive its successor, the delayed
S-500 endo-atmospheric missile-defence system. The
new medium-range S-350 Vityaz SAM should also
enter service.
The air force will probably acquire a smaller
number of new aircraft than under the previous
SAP. A high priority will be the renewal of the
transport-aircraft fleet, including introducing into
service the Il-76MD-90A, starting production of the
light Il-112 military transport and completing the
development of the medium Il-276. However, the
number of transports in service is unlikely to increase
much before 2025. Rotary-wing development may
be limited to upgraded versions of the Ka-52 and
Mi-28N helicopters. Russia has made rapid progress
in developing and deploying reconnaissance
uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) but still lacks a
strike system, which is set to be a high priority under
the new SAP. The heavy Okhotnik, being developed
by the Sukhoi design bureau, may be the first real
strike UAV to enter Russian service.
The Armata main battle tank will likely enter
service with the ground forces but not in large
numbers. As acknowledged by Borisov, Armata is too
expensive for mass acquisition. Instead, procurement
in quantity will focus on modernised T-72, T-80
and T-90 tanks. More Terminator combat vehicles
and Koalitsiya-SV self-propelled howitzers will be
acquired. Work on new robotic systems will likely be
a priority under the new programme.
178 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
It is clear that the navy will receive very few, if
any, heavy surface ships before 2027. More Project
22350 frigates and Project 20380 corvettes will
be built, plus some new Project 20386 corvettes
and a larger number of small missile ships armed
with Kalibr and Oniks cruise missiles. Submarine
building will focus on completing the series of
Project 995A Borey-A ballistic-missile boats armed
with Bulava missiles and Project 08851 Yasen-M
multi-role submarines, though from the early
2020s construction is expected to begin on the
first Khaski-class successor. The building of new
non-nuclear submarines depends, to a large extent,
on whether Russia is finally able to produce a viable
air-independent propulsion unit.
Defence industry
Rogozin now heads the state corporation for the
space-missile industry, Roscosmos, which was
established in August 2015. This is now undergoing
a major reorganisation, with the aim of improving
efficiency after a series of costly launch failures.
The vast state corporation Rostec, headed by
Sergey Chemezov, uniting 700 enterprises grouped
into 15 holding companies, looks set to absorb the
United Aircraft Corporation as an additional holding
company, achieving full control of the entire aviation
industry – fixed wing, helicopters, engines and
avionics. Reorganisation of the United Shipbuilding
Corporation now also seems likely, as it is one of the
least effective corporate structures of the defence
sector. The building of many new naval ships has
been subject to long delays.
A significant development for the defence industry
was the adoption in late 2017 of a government decree
establishing new pricing principles for military
products developed and produced under the state
defence order. It is designed as a cost-saving measure
and should increase profits for defence contractors,
making possible the financing of more investment
and re-equipping from company earnings rather
than budget sources. It should also promote the
development of more extensive subcontracting. This
was discouraged by the old system of pricing, which
left subcontractors with meagre profits. The new
approach is now being introduced, but it will take
some time before it is operational.
Meanwhile, the elaborate system to closely
monitor the use of budget funding under the state
defence order continues to function. While the defence
industry still complains of excessive bureaucracy
and intrusive monitoring, the procurement process
should lead to fewer diversions of funding to other
purposes and corruption associated with arms
procurement. In response to sanctions, a specialised
lead bank, Promsvyazbank – organised so as to
minimise its vulnerability to sanction pressures – has
been designated the principal bank for servicing the
state defence order.
Arms exports
In 2017, for the third year running, Russian arms-
manufacturing firms signed contracts totalling
approximately US$15bn. Once again, sales of aircraft
and air-defence systems accounted for a large
proportion of total exports. By July 2018, China had
received a regimental set of S-400s, while a deal for
the system worth a reported US$2.5bn was concluded
with Turkey, notwithstanding NATO opposition,
with deliveries to begin in late 2019 or early 2020.
India has signed a contract for the S-400, while
several other countries, including Iraq, Saudi Arabia
and Qatar, have expressed interest in buying it. Most
of the 24 Su-35 fighters sold to China in November
2015 have been delivered, while in February 2018 a
deal worth US$1.14bn was concluded with Indonesia
for 11 Su-35s. India and Malaysia have also expressed
interest in buying the aircraft. There is an expectation
that Russia’s use of a wide range of weaponry in
Syria will boost export sales.
BELARUS
Belarus’s armed forces are slowly completing their
long transformation from the force that separated
from the Soviet military into those of a middle-
sized European country. While official documents
underline the still-close military alliance with Russia,
Minsk’s position is more nuanced. In general, this
stems from ad hoc decisions rather than deliberate
policies by either Minsk or Moscow. Belarus lacks the
funds for significant military investments and has its
own distinct priorities, while Moscow is unwilling to
invest much in its ally without gaining more control
over Belarusian armed forces and facilities.
Security and defence policy
The Belarusian government rarely discusses its
security policy in public. However, while Minsk
has limited military goals, it is tailoring its armed
forces to tackle contemporary security challenges.
Indeed, Defence Minister Andrei Ravkov describes

the armed forces’ ongoing rearmament programme
as ‘selective’. In February 2018, the defence ministry
revealed plans to reduce the army’s stored weapons
and materiel by a quarter in order to save costs,
although the age of some of this equipment makes
the prospect of selling it on unlikely. There are two
principal drivers for security policy: political stability
and relations with Russia.
Internal security
In numerous official statements and semi-official
pronouncements, the government has demonstrated
concern over the potential for civil unrest to turn
into violent clashes and armed conflict, and perhaps
prompt foreign intervention. In recent years,
Belarusian defence officials have emphasised the
need to be ready to cope with multiple security
issues without external assistance. While leaders
frequently say little on Russia’s role in defending
Belarus, President Alexander Lukashenko said in
October 2018 that in case of a security crisis, there
could not be 100% reliance ‘even on Russia’. Earlier,
in February Lukashenko suggested that Russia’s
leadership does not see the need to supply the armies
of its allies. He also said that Minsk looks to ‘arm and
modernise’ together with fellow Collective Security
Treaty Organisation (CSTO) member states, although
there is only public information on cooperation
with Kazakhstan. Belarusian officials also highlight
defence cooperation with China.
Ravkov described new challenges and threats
facing the country late in the decade as including
‘terrorist and extremist organisations actively [using]
new concepts and mechanisms of regime change in
other countries’, advancing constitutional change
and violating these states’ ‘territorial integrity by
provoking internal armed conflicts’. Analysts assess
that he also included powerful foreign states in this
group of challenges. Minsk had observed events in
eastern Ukraine and was keen to prevent the same
happening in Belarus. In January 2016, Belarus
adopted a new military doctrine, revising the
previous version from 2001. Among potential military
threats, the document emphasised ‘hybrid warfare’
and ‘colour revolutions’. The former term implied
Russian intervention of the kind Moscow undertook
in eastern Ukraine, although Belarusian officials did
not say so directly. The latter term refers to purported
Western attempts at regime change of the sort alleged
by Moscow to have occurred since the mid-2000s in
Georgia and Ukraine, although Belarusian officials
Russia and Eurasia 179
did not cite these as examples. Belarus’s military
exercises and rearmament programme reflect
Minsk’s preparation for these scenarios. However,
there is little evidence that Minsk is preparing for any
direct confrontation with Western states or NATO,
even as an ally of Russia. According to the official
military daily newspaper Belorusskaya voennaya
gazeta, ‘the preparation of Belarusian armed forces
is aimed mostly at fighting terrorist groups and not
engaging in any large-scale hostilities’.
Relations with Russia
Russia and Eurasia
For Minsk, cooperation with Russia does not mean
that both countries should adhere to identical defence
policies or views on security. Belarus elaborates a
more nuanced opinion on NATO activities in the
region and is more muted in public pronouncements
than Moscow. In a 2015 television interview, Ravkov
called the increasing NATO presence in the region
‘a danger’, but stressed that ‘there is no military
threat’. Unlike Moscow, Minsk remains committed
to transparency by remaining in the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and opening
up Zapad 2017 exercises that included Belarusian
units to NATO and OSCE observers, as well as
observers from neighbouring countries, including
Ukraine.
That said, Minsk recognises Russia’s security
concerns and to an extent provides support for
Russia’s defence efforts. Belarus, which has limited
economic potential and resources, leverages
Moscow’s use of Belarusian defence capacities and
territory. Indeed, some elements of its armed forces
may be more important to Russia than to Belarus,
most notably air and missile defence. Analysts
consider that Minsk maintains these capabilities
mostly to play a role in the defence of Russia. It also
enables Minsk to avoid the permanent basing of
Russian forces in Belarusian territory, except for two
highly specialised technical facilities – the Russian
Navy’s long-range low-frequency communications
centre in Vileyka and the Hantsavichy early-warning
radar, both of which were established in Soviet or
early post-Soviet times. It is believed that Russia
does not pay directly for either facility; in return the
Belarusian military has free access to Russian military
facilities such as the Ashuluk military training area.
Analysts also understand that Belarus has access to
economic and other benefits from the Kremlin, with
these perhaps including subsidised oil and gas or
access to markets.
180 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Belarus’s geography dictates much of its security
policy. By the mid-2000s, it had NATO neighbours to
the north and the west, and since 2014, Ukraine, to
the south, has developed closer ties to the West. These
developments left Minsk with the choice of either
risking tension with the West or adjusting its policies.
Minsk chose the latter by renouncing most of its
earlier anti-Western rhetoric, increasing divergence
with Russia on foreign policy and defence matters
(higher transparency in exercises, maintaining its
obligations under the Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe, increasing self-reliance in military
policy), and increasing contacts with NATO and its
member states. The geopolitical situation with regard
to Russia, however, remained static. Belarus will
always be important to Russia, as it is situated next
to Russia’s core regions around Moscow. Because
of this, Moscow considers it necessary to have at
least minimal air- and missile-defence capacities in
Belarus, either under allied Belarusian command or
Russian units in-country. While Moscow would like
to increase its military capabilities in Belarus, with a
view to NATO states’ capacities to the west, in 2016
Minsk reportedly displayed reluctance to station
Russian 9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone) short-range
ballistic-missile systems under Russian command
in Belarus as Moscow refused to supply the systems
to Minsk. Prior to this, analysts had understood that
Russia was interested in obtaining for its forces an air
base in Belarus.
In 2016, Minsk and Moscow also completed the
formalities around the adoption of the 2009 agree-
ment on establishing a single air-defence system
for Belarus and Russia. The agreement essen-
tially formalised or confirmed already existing air-
defence cooperation mechanisms. The main joint
standby-alert duty arrangements (sovmestnoe boevoe
dezhurstvo) began in 1996, in addition to information
exchanges, joint training sessions and equipment
supplies. The joint operation of Belarusian and
Russian military units attached to this single air-
defence system will be coordinated from the
Russian air force’s central command centre. For all
other purposes, these units remain under national
command, but this would change in the case of
armed conflict, when a joint Belarus–Russia air-
defence command would be established. In 2017,
Minsk and Moscow amended the 2009 agreement
by specifying and limiting its scope: in the original
text, the joint command could be established in a
‘period of a threat’; the amendments stipulated the
establishment of such a command only in a ‘period
of immediate threat of aggression’.
In November 2017, the Belarus–Russia agreement
on supplying a joint regional group of Belarusian and
Russian troops entered force. Both parties agreed that
each had to supply their own national army units,
which shall become part of this group in case of an
imminent conflict – there is no permanently staffed
formation. Moscow has committed to supplying
Minsk with equipment and arms only during an
‘increasing military threat to the Union state [of
Belarus and Russia] and in times of war’.
The armed forces
When the independent Belarusian armed forces
formed in the 1990s, it was similar to its Russian
counterpart in terms of doctrine, training, equipment
and organisation, and officers moved between
the two forces. Now the two armed forces have
different missions, identities, structures, equipment
and training. Belarus switched to a brigade-based
organisational structure before Russia and kept
that structure after Russia started re-establishing
larger units. Belarus also maintains and modernises
many of the platforms that Russia is phasing out
and increasingly develops its own, sometimes in
cooperation with other countries, such as China.
However, the Belarusian armed forces are
deployed largely as they were in Soviet times. The
existing Western and Northwestern operational
commands, formed in 2001, reflect the tendency to
not make changes to military deployments unless
absolutely necessary. There have been some recent
changes, such as a new air-defence regiment armed
with Tor-M2E (SA-15 Gauntlet) surface-to-air missile
(SAM) systems and a battalion of internal troops
stationed near the Lithuanian border to guard the
nuclear power plant under construction there.
Minsk has said it will retain obligatory military
service for all men. Most of those drafted who have
secondary education serve for 18 months, while
those with a university degree serve for 12 months.
Conscripts can be assigned to serve in the army,
special forces, air defence and air force, internal
troops or border troops. However, the army is
looking to introduce a more flexible military-service
system and unlike in Soviet times does not call up
all conscripts. Conscripts with different educational
backgrounds and qualifications serve different types
of military service. According to official statements, in
2018, about 80% of conscripts were not immediately
 Russia and Eurasia 181

LATVIA
Daugavpils

7
LITHUANIA VITEBSK
8

6
Vilnius BELARUS
4
9
MINSK 10

2 11 Minsk
MAHILYOW Roslavl
1 12 13
GRODNO 3
14
15 RUSSIA
5 17 16

Russia and Eurasia

Bialystok
18
Klintsy
POLAND 19
BREST Army, special-operations
HOMYEL’
20 forces and specialist troops
Air force and air defence
UKRAINE Russian bases

1 Grodno 7 Polatsk 12 Fanipal 17 Baranavichy

6th Mechanised Brigade 
1st Anti-Aircraft Rocket Regiment
2 Lida
116th Attack air base (Su-25 atk
ac)
3 Navahrudak
255th Radio-technical Regiment

4 Astravets
1146th Anti-Aircraft Rocket
Regiment
5 Slonim
11th Mechanised Brigade

6 Liepiel
19th Mechanised Brigade
231st Artillery Brigade
377th Anti-Aircraft Rocket 15th Anti-Aircraft Rocket
 61st Fighter Base (MiG-29 ftr ac)
Regiment Brigade 120th Anti-Aircraft Rocket
8 Vitebsk 13 Machulishchy
Brigade
8th Radio-technical Brigade
103rd Airborne Brigade 50th Air Force and Air Defence
33rd Special Forces Detachment Forces base (Tpt ac/hel) 18 Hantsavichy
49th Radiotechnical Brigade Radar station
9 Vileyka
Transmitter 14 Maryina Gorka 19 Byaroza
5th Special Forces Brigade 16th Electronic Warfare
10 Barysau
Regiment
740th Anti-Aircraft Rocket 15 Asipovichy
Regiment 465th Missile Brigade 20 Brest
336th Rocket Artillery Brigade 38th Air Assault Brigade
11 Minsk
51st Artillery Brigade 111th Artillery Brigade
120th Mechanised Brigade
115th Anti-Aircraft Rocket
56th Communications Regiment 16 Babruysk
Regiment
147th Anti-Aircraft Rocket
Regiment
© IISS

▲ Map 5 Belarus: principal military bases

drafted for full-time military service. The armed
forces are increasing reserve service, which includes
usually university-educated recruits serving for
shorter periods over the course of two years. Later,
these reserves attend refresher courses and take part
in military exercises. Conscripts do not have the
freedom to choose whether to do full conscription
service or reserve service. Minsk is also looking to
increase the professional component, and the share
of professional servicemen and women in the army
rose from 16% in 2014 to 20% at the beginning of 2018.
Army
While the army still contains remnants of the Soviet
era, there are lines of modernisation. The government
pays particular attention to special-operations forces
and rocket and missile forces. No spending figures are
published, but the intensive involvement of special-
operations forces in exercises and the development
of new weapons for the rocket and missile units
provides evidence for this.
Minsk’s reliance on Russia for air-defence
equipment has led to lower levels of investment
in that domain. In recent years, however, Belarus
has only obtained from Russia some Tor-M2E SAM
systems, second-hand S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble)
SAM systems (for the air force), Yak-130 aircraft and
Mi-8MTV-5 helicopters.
Minsk plans to modernise its T-72 tanks, in both
Belarusian and Russian plants, and to purchase
more Belarusian-manufactured armoured vehicles,
namely the Volat V1 armoured utility vehicle and
182 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
the Kaiman armoured reconnaissance vehicle, and
the Belarusian-modernised BTR-70MB1 armoured
personnel carrier. Planned acquisitions for 2018
included Tor-M2E air-defence systems and radars
from Russia, and a number of uninhabited aerial
vehicles (UAVs), including types designed for
artillery targeting and reconnaissance.
Air force
The air force has been incrementally retiring
sophisticated platforms, such as Su-24 and Su-27
combat aircraft and Mi-24 attack helicopters, without
identified replacements. Officials insist that the
Yak-130 training/light-attack aircraft can take on the
roles of most of these systems. The delivery of 12
Su-30SM aircraft from Russia was due to start in 2018
but has been postponed.
Annual flying hours for pilots have increased
but remain at a relatively low level. In the Soviet
era, flying hours amounted to around 120 each year
per fighter pilot; by the late 2010s, this had fallen
to just 70–75 hours. Minsk considers the reduced
capabilities of the Belarusian Air Force to be as much
a problem for Russia as for Belarus. For many years,
it seemed that Minsk expected Moscow to deliver
newer aircraft, either for a symbolic fee or as payment
in goods. Conversely, Moscow has unsuccessfully
tried – since at least the beginning of 2013 – to have
Minsk accept the deployment of a Russian Air Force
regiment in Belarus.
Training and cooperation
Belarus has established military training departments
offering various programmes in major civilian
universities. After establishing an aviation-training
capability in the 2000s, pilots can now train at the
Military Academy and civilian Minsk State Higher
Aviation College.
The armed forces train on a bilateral and
multilateral basis with Russia but also with CSTO
forces – the Belarusian 103rd Airborne Brigade is part
of the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force (KSOR)
– as well as China. Belarusian special-operations
troops trained with their Chinese counterparts most
recently in 2018 in China, while People’s Liberation
Army troops last exercised in Belarus in 2017. In
May 2018, Minsk also held its first joint drills with
Kazakhstan. Belarus also takes part in NATO’s
Partnership for Peace programme and, according
to the foreign ministry, there have been about 125
joint Belarus–NATO activities since 1997. In 2015–
16, Belarus signed bilateral military-cooperation
agreements with its three neighbouring NATO
member countries, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.
Army exercises mostly focus on counter-
insurgency and urban warfare. Minsk has retired
numerous types of equipment that would be
required for offensive operations, especially armour
and artillery, bombers and attack helicopters, and
has abandoned some military facilities; for example,
its only military-helicopter base is in Kobryn, on the
border with Ukraine. Belarus has not purchased
modern mechanised armoured vehicles in significant
numbers, except for light-armoured platforms.
Defence economics and industry
Unlike its neighbours, Belarus has not responded to
growing regional tensions with more than a modest
defence-budget increase. From a low point of US$506
million in 2016, the 2018 budget reached US$629m.
Indeed, not only does Minsk see no pressing need
for larger investments in national security, it has
little money for these. In 2012, Minsk urged Moscow
to contribute to the financing of the Belarusian
armed forces, stressing their importance to Russia.
In February 2018, Lukashenko once again criticised
Russia for failing to build up the armies of the CSTO
members.
Little is spent on military equipment and Minsk
looks to avoid imports, preferring to produce it
domestically, even if this results in weaponry of
only limited capability. That is particularly true of
mechanised armoured vehicles. Indeed, Belarus’s
defence industry is one of the few sectors of national
industry that is significantly developing. The armed
forces’ inventory is increasingly supplied by Belarusian
firms, which is in itself an achievement. For a long
time after independence, Belarusian industry only
produced limited defence products, such as electronic
and optical equipment and various components. Now,
government officials openly articulate the aspiration
to develop more defence products, particularly
artillery and small arms. However, with the national
budget constrained, defence firms are currently
focused on improving their exports. According to the
State Military Industrial Committee (SMIC) of Belarus,
arms exports in 2017 were 15% up on the previous
year, exceeding US$1 billion, though these figures are
at variance with other public estimates, which place
overall exports at around half that. Some Belarusian
defence firms are in private hands, although they
operate under the control of the SMIC.

According to an official SMIC statement, 54%
of the ‘international interaction’ of the Belarusian
defence industry involves Russian partners, which, if
anything, indicates some success in internationalising
Belarus’s defence industries. Belarusian firms supply
many of the components for Russian arms, such
as electronics, tank sights and chassis for Russian
missiles, including for Moscow’s strategic nuclear
systems. However, as early as 2010, Russia began to
replace foreign components and Belarus has been no
exception. However, it is understood that Moscow
has so far failed to replace the Belarusian chassis in
Russian missile systems or to buy the Minsk-based
MZKT factory that produces them. Nonetheless, in
the long term, Belarus’s defence industry and the
national defence-industrial base will be undermined
by such efforts.
Russia and Eurasia 183
While most Belarusian defence products are
modernised Soviet designs, there are some new
products, including rockets and missiles. Belarus
designed, with Chinese support, the Polonez
multiple-launch rocket system, then developed
and manufactured a missile for it. Together with
China, Belarus has also for some time worked on
designing a SAM system. In addition, Minsk is
developing UAVs for the Belarusian armed forces.
In 2016, it demonstrated a first-strike system, the
Burevestnik-MB, which is armed with eight unguided
57 mm rockets, and two so-called ‘kamikaze’ mini-
Russia and Eurasia
UAVs. Efforts to manufacture indigenous armoured
vehicles started relatively recently. Two models of
light armoured vehicle – the Caiman and the Volat V1
– and the BTR-70MB1 variant have been designed for
the Belarusian armed forces.
184 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

MANOEUVRE
Armenia ARM Mechanised
1 (1st) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 MR regt, 1 maint bn)
Armenian Dram d 2017 2018 2019
1 (2nd) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 MR regt, 1 lt inf regt,
GDP d 5.57tr 6.14tr 1 arty bn)
US$ 11.5bn 12.5bn 1 (3rd) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 4 MR regt, 1 lt inf regt,
per capita US$ 3,857 4,190 1 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 maint bn)
Growth % 7.5 6.0 1 (4th) corps (4 MR regt; 1 SP arty bn; 1 sigs bn)
Inflation % 0.9 3.0
1 (5th) corps (with 2 fortified areas) (1 MR regt)
Other
Def bdgt [a] d 210bn 248bn
1 indep MR trg bde
US$ 435m 506m COMBAT SUPPORT
FMA (US) US$ 1m 0m 1 arty bde
US$1=d 482.70 490.17 1 MRL bde
[a] Includes imported military equipment, excludes military 1 AT regt
pensions 1 AD bde
Population 3,038,217
2 AD regt
2 (radiotech) AD regt
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 engr regt
Male 10.0% 3.0% 3.4% 4.3% 23.1% 4.7% EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Female 8.7% 2.7% 3.3% 4.4% 25.3% 7.0% ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 109: 3 T-54; 5 T-55; 101 T-72A/B
Capabilities RECCE 12 BRM-1K (CP)
IFV 231: 75 BMP-1; 6 BMP-1K (CP); 150 BMP-2
The armed forces’ main focus is territorial defence, given continuing
APC • APC (W) 130: 8 BTR-60; 100 BTR-60 look-a-like;
tensions with neighbouring Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. In
early 2018, a Modernisation Programme was released for the period 18 BTR-70; 4 BTR-80
2018–24. Despite economic constraints, the document outlined ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
the ambitious goal of reorganising the command structure and AEV MT-LB
modernising the equipment inventory. The programme includes ARV BREhM-D; BREM-1
sections on cyber- and information-domain capabilities. Armenia ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
is a member of the CSTO and maintains strong defence ties with MSL • SP 22+: 9 9P148 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 13
Russia, centred on equipment-procurement, technical-advice and 9P149 Shturm (AT-6 Spiral); 9K129 Kornet-E (AT-14
personnel-training programmes. Military doctrine remains influ-
Spriggan)
enced by Russian thinking. Armenia is also engaged in a NATO Indi-
vidual Partnership Action Plan. Conscription continues, but there
ARTILLERY 232
is a growing cohort of professional officers. The armed forces have SP 38: 122mm 10 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 28 2S3 Akatsiya
deployed on NATO and UN missions in Afghanistan, Kosovo and TOWED 131: 122mm 69 D-30; 152mm 62: 26 2A36
Lebanon, providing learning opportunities. Personnel train regu- Giatsint-B; 2 D-1; 34 D-20
larly and take part in annual CSTO exercises and with Russia in bilat- MRL 57: 122mm 47 BM-21 Grad; 273mm 4 WM-80;
eral drills. Equipment is mainly of Russian origin. Agreements have 300mm 6 9A52 Smerch
been reached in recent years to purchase modern Russian systems. MOR 120mm 12 M120
Serviceability and maintenance of mainly ageing aircraft have been
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
a problem for the air force. There is some capacity to manufacture
defence equipment for the domestic market, including electro-
SRBM • Conventional 16: 8 9K72 Elbrus (SS-1C Scud B);
optics, light weapons and UAVs, but Armenia is reliant on Russia for 4 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab); 4 9K720 Iskander-E
other equipment platforms and systems. UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR • Light 15 Krunk
ACTIVE 44,800 (Army 41,850 Air/AD Aviation AIR DEFENCE
Forces (Joint) 1,100 other Air Defence Forces 1,850) SAM
Paramilitary 4,300 Medium-range 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef); S-75 Dvina
Conscript liability 24 months (SA-2 Guideline); 9K37M Buk-M1 (SA-11 Gadfly)
Short-range 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); S-125 Pechora
RESERVE
(SA-3 Goa)
Some mobilisation reported, possibly 210,000 with military service
within 15 years Point-defence 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 9K310 Igla-1
(SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse); 9K333 Verba;
9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE GUNS
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4
Army 22,900; 18,950 conscripts (total 41,850) TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES Air and Air Defence Aviation Forces 1,100
1 SF bde 1 Air & AD Joint Command
 Russia and Eurasia 185

FORCES BY ROLE Russia 3,300: 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 74 T-72; 80 BMP-
GROUND ATTACK 1; 80 BMP-2; 12 2S1; 12 BM-21); 1 ftr sqn with 18 MiG-29
1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25UBK Frogfoot Fulcrum; 1 hel sqn with 8 Mi-24P Hind; 4 Mi-8MT Hip; 2
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SAM bty with S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant); 1 SAM bty
AIRCRAFT 15 combat capable with 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)
ATK 15: 13 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Su-25UBK Frogfoot United Kingdom OSCE 1
TPT 4: Heavy 3 Il-76 Candid; PAX 1 A319CJ
TRG 14: 4 L-39 Albatros; 10 Yak-52
HELICOPTERS
Azerbaijan AZE
ATK 7 Mi-24P Hind Azerbaijani New Manat m 2017 2018 2019
ISR 4: 2 Mi-24K Hind; 2 Mi-24R Hind (cbt spt) GDP m 69.1bn 77.5bn
MRH 10 Mi-8MT (cbt spt)
US$ 40.7bn 45.6bn
C2 2 Mi-9 Hip G (cbt spt)
per capita US$ 4,141 4,587
TPT • Light 7 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
Growth % 0.1 1.3

Russia and Eurasia

AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Long-range S-300PT (SA-10
Grumble); S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble) Inflation % 13.0 3.5
Def bdgt [a] m 2.64bn 2.74bn
Paramilitary 4,300 US$ 1.55bn 1.61bn
FMA (US) US$ 1m 0m
Police
US$1=m 1.70 1.70
FORCES BY ROLE
[a] Official defence budget. Excludes a significant proportion of
MANOEUVRE procurement outlays
Other
4 paramilitary bn Population 10,046,516
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Male 12.3% 3.4% 4.0% 4.9% 22.3% 2.6%
RECCE 5 BRM-1K (CP)
IFV 45: 44 BMP-1; 1 BMP-1K (CP) Female 10.8% 2.9% 3.7% 4.7% 24.1% 4.2%
APC • APC (W) 24 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-152
ABCV 5 BMD-1 Capabilities
The armed forces’ principal focus is territorial defence, in light of
Border Troops continuing tensions with neighbouring Armenia over Nagorno-
Ministry of National Security Karabakh. A defence doctrine was adopted in 2010. Azerbaijan
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE maintains a defence relationship with NATO and is in the fifth cycle
(2017–19) of its NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan. Azer-
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
baijan is looking to deepen ties with Belarus, Serbia, the UK and
RECCE 3 BRM-1K (CP) the US through military-cooperation agreements. Defence coop-
IFV 35 BMP-1 eration with Moscow is focused on equipment procurement and
APC • APC (W) 23: 5 BTR-60; 18 BTR-70 technical advice. Readiness within Azerbaijan’s conscript-based
ABCV 5 BMD-1 armed services varies between units. Azerbaijan has taken part
in multilateral exercises and its forces have trained with Turkish
troops in bilateral drills. The armed forces have little expedition-
DEPLOYMENT ary capability though they contribute to NATO’s Operation Resolute
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 121 Support in Afghanistan. Defence modernisation and procurement
has been a focus in the past decade, to replace the ageing inven-
ALBANIA: OSCE • Albania 1 tory of mainly Soviet-era equipment. The air force in particular
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 33 suffers from maintenance problems. Recent orders include for air-
defence and artillery systems and wheeled and tracked armoured
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1 vehicles, predominantly of Russian origin. Azerbaijan’s limited but
MOLDOVA: OSCE • Moldova 1 growing defence-industrial capabilities are centred on the Minis-
try of Defence Industry, which manages and oversees the produc-
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 40
tion of small arms and light weapons. While the country is reliant
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 2 on external suppliers for major defence-equipment platforms
and systems, some defence companies have started to export to
foreign markets.
FOREIGN FORCES
OSCE figures represent total Minsk Conference mission ACTIVE 66,950 (Army 56,850 Navy 2,200 Air 7,900)
personnel in both Armenia and Azerbaijan Paramilitary 15,000
Bosnia-Herzegovina OSCE 1 Conscript liability 18 months (12 for graduates)
Germany OSCE 1 RESERVE 300,000
Moldova OSCE 2 Some mobilisation reported; 300,000 with military service within
Poland OSCE 1 15 years
186 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE ISR • Medium 3 Aerostar
AIR DEFENCE
Army 56,850 SAM
FORCES BY ROLE Medium-range 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef)
COMMAND Point-defence 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 9K35 Strela-10
5 corps HQ (SA-13 Gopher); 9K32 Strela (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K34 Strela-3
MANOEUVRE (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K338
Mechanised Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)
4 MR bde GUNS
Light SP 23mm ZSU-23-4
19 MR bde TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2
Other
1 sy bde Navy 2,200

COMBAT SUPPORT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 arty bde PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11
1 arty trg bde CORVETTES • FS 1 Kusar (ex-FSU Petya II) with 2 RBU
1 MRL bde 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm gun
1 AT bde PSO 2: 1 Luga (Wodnik 2) (FSU Project 888; additional trg
1 engr bde role); 1 Neftegaz (Project B-92) (ex-Coast Guard)
1 sigs bde PCC 3: 2 Petrushka (FSU UK-3; additional trg role); 1
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Shelon (ex-FSU Project 1388M)
1 log bde PB 3: 1 Araz (ex-TUR AB 25); 1 Bryza (ex-FSU Project 722);
1 Poluchat (ex-FSU Project 368)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PBF 3 Stenka
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4
MBT 439: 95 T-55; 244 T-72A/AV/B; 100 T-90S
MHC 4: 2 Korund (Yevgenya) (Project 1258); 2 Yakhont
RECCE 15 BRM-1 (FSU Sonya)
IFV 216: 43 BMP-1; 33 BMP-2; 88 BMP-3; 7 BTR-80A; 45+ AMPHIBIOUS 6
BTR-82A LSM 3: 1 Polnochny A (FSU Project 770) (capacity 6 MBT;
APC 568 180 troops); 2 Polnochny B (FSU Project 771) (capacity 6
APC (T) 336 MT-LB MBT; 180 troops)
APC (W) 142: 10 BTR-60; 132 BTR-70 LCM 3: 2 T-4 (FSU); 1 Vydra† (FSU) (capacity either 3
PPV 90: 45 Marauder; 45 Matador MBT or 200 troops)
AUV 65+: 35 Cobra; 30+ Sand Cat LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGS 1 (FSU Project 10470)
ABCV 20 BMD-1
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES Air Force and Air Defence 7,900

AEV IMR-2; MT-LB FORCES BY ROLE
ARV BREM-L Brelianka FIGHTER
MW Bozena; GW-3 (minelayer) 1 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum; MiG-29UB Fulcrum
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
SP 10 9P157-2 Khrizantema-S (AT-15 Springer) 1 regt with Su-24 Fencer; Su-25 Frogfoot; Su-25UB Frog-
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 foot B
Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); TRANSPORT
9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); Spike-LR 1 sqn with An-12 Cub; Yak-40 Codling
ARTILLERY 598 TRAINING
SP 96: 122mm 46 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 33: 6 2S3 Akatsiya; 1 sqn with L-39 Albatros
18 2S19 Msta-S; 9 M-77 Dana; 155mm 5 ATMOS 2000; ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
203mm 12 2S7 Pion 1 regt with Ka-32 Helix C; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-24 Hind; PZL
TOWED 207: 122mm 129 D-30; 130mm 36 M-46; 152mm Mi-2 Hoplite
42: 18 2A36 Giatsint-B; 24 D-20 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
GUN/MOR 120mm 36: 18 2S9 NONA-S; 18 2S31 Vena AIRCRAFT 37 combat capable
MRL 147: 122mm 60+: 43 BM-21 Grad; 9+ IMI Lynx; 8 FTR 16: 14 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum
RM-70 Vampir; 128mm 12 RAK-12; 220mm 18 TOS-1A; ATK 21: 2 Su-24 Fencer†; 16 Su-25 Frogfoot; 3 Su-25UB
300mm 36: 30 9A52 Smerch; 6+ Polonez; 302mm 21 T-300 Frogfoot B
Kasirga TPT 4: Medium 1 An-12 Cub; Light 3 Yak-40 Codling
MOR 120mm 112: 5 Cardom; 107 M-1938 (PM-38) TRG 12 L-39 Albatros
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS HELICOPTERS
SRBM • Conventional 6: 2 IAI LORA; ε4 9M79 Tochka ATK 26 Mi-24 Hind
(SS-21 Scarab) MRH: 20+ Mi-17-IV Hip
 Russia and Eurasia 187

TPT 24: Medium 17: 1 Bell 412; 3 Ka-32 Helix C; 13 Mi-8 Bosnia-Herzegovina OSCE 1
Hip Light 7 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite Germany OSCE 1
UAV • ISR 16: Heavy 1 Heron; Medium 15: 4 Aerostar; 10+ Moldova OSCE 2
Hermes 450; 1 Hermes 900 Poland OSCE 1
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
United Kingdom OSCE 1
Long-range S-200 Vega (SA-5 Gammon); S-300PM/PMU2
Medium-range S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); 9K37M
Buk-M1 (SA-11 Gadfly); Buk-MB; S-125-2TM Pechora-2TM TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT
(SA-26) DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL
Short-range Abisr
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES Nagorno-Karabakh was part of Azerbaijan, but mostly
AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer) IR/ populated by ethnic Armenians. In 1988, when inter-
SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo) ethnic clashes between Armenians and Azeris erupted in
ASM Barrier-V Azerbaijan, the local authorities declared their intention
to secede and join Armenia. Baku rejected this and armed

Russia and Eurasia

Paramilitary ε15,000 conflict erupted. A ceasefire was brokered in 1994; since
then, Armenia has controlled most of Nagorno-Karabakh.
State Border Service ε5,000 While Armenia provides political, economic and military
Ministry of Internal Affairs support to Nagorno-Karabakh, the region has declared
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE itself independent – although this has not been recognised
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES by any other state, including Armenia. Baku claims
IFV 168 BMP-1/BMP-2 Nagorno-Karabakh and the occupied territories as part of
APC • APC (W) 19 BTR-60/70/80 Azerbaijan. Data presented here represents an assessment
ARTILLERY • MRL 122mm 3 T-122 of the de facto situation.
HELICOPTERS • ATK 24 Mi-35M Hind
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICULES Nagorno-Karabakh
ISR • Medium Hermes 900 Available estimates vary with reference to military holdings
in Nagorno-Karabakh. Main battle tanks are usually placed
Coast Guard at around 200–300 in number, with similar numbers for
The Coast Guard was established in 2005 as part of the other armoured combat vehicles and artillery pieces, and
State Border Service small numbers of helicopters. Overall personnel-strength
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE estimates are between 18,000 and 20,000. Some of the
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16 equipment listed may belong to Armenian forces.
PCG 3 Sa’ar 62 with 1 8-cell lnchr with Spike NLOS EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SSM, 1 hel landing platform ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
PBF 9: 1 Osa II (FSU Project 205); 6 Shaldag V; 2 MBT T-72
Silver Ships 48ft RECCE BRDM-2
PB 4: 2 Baltic 150; 1 Point (US); 1 Grif (FSU Zhuk) IFV BMP-1; BMP-2
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 5 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
ARS 1 Iva (FSU Vikhr) MSL
ATF 4 Neftegaz (Project B-92) (also used for patrol SP 9P148 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9P149 Shturm (AT-6
duties) Spiral)
MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
Internal Troops 10,000+ RCL 73mm SPG-9
Ministry of Internal Affairs ARTILLERY 232
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 2S3 Akatsiya
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES TOWED 122mm D-30; 152mm 2A36 Giatsint-B; D-20
APC • APC (W) 7 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80 MRL 122mm BM-21 Grad; 273mm WM-80
MOR 120mm M-74/M-75
DEPLOYMENT SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
SRBM • Conventional 9K72 Elbrus (SS-1C Scud B)
AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 120 HELICOPTERS
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: OSCE • Bosnia and ATK 5 Mi-24 Hind
Herzegovina 1 MRH 5 Mi-8MT Hip
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 1 AIR DEFENCE
SAM
Medium-range 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef); S-75 Dvina
FOREIGN FORCES (SA-2 Guideline)
OSCE figures represent total Minsk Conference mission Short-range 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); S-125 Pechora
personnel in both Armenia and Azerbaijan
 (SA-3 Goa)
188 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Point-defence 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 9K310 Igla-1 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

(SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse)
GUNS Army 10,700
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 FORCES BY ROLE
TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2 COMMAND
2 comd HQ (West & North West)
Belarus BLR MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
Belarusian Ruble r 2017 2018 2019 2 mech bde
GDP r 105bn 115bn
2 mech bde(-)
COMBAT SUPPORT
US$ 54.4bn 56.9bn
2 arty bde
per capita US$ 5,727.00 6,020.00 1 engr bde
Growth % 2.4 4.0 1 engr regt
Inflation % 6.0 5.5 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Def bdgt r 1.03bn 1.22bn ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
US$ 531m 604m MBT 542: 527 T-72B; 15 T-72B3 mod
US$1=r 1.93 2.02 RECCE 132 BRM-1; Cayman BRDM
IFV 932 BMP-2
Population 9,527,543
APC • APC (T) 58 MT-LB
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
AUV 8 CS/VN3B mod; GAZ Tigr
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Male 8.1% 2.4% 2.8% 3.8% 24.4% 4.8%
AEV BAT-2; IMR-2; MT-LB
Female 7.6% 2.3% 2.7% 3.7% 26.9% 10.2% VLB 24: 20 MTU-20; 4 MT-55A
MW UR-77
Capabilities NBC VEHICLES BRDM-2RKhB; RKhM-4; RKhm-K
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL
Located between Russia and NATO European members, the main
SP 160: 75 9P148 Konkurs; 85 9P149 Shturm
task of Belarus’s armed forces is maintaining territorial integrity.
MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs
The country’s latest military doctrine was approved in July 2016,
(AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn)
and identified as security challenges ‘hybrid methods’ and ‘colour
ARTILLERY 583
revolutions’. It also called for smaller, more mobile forces with
SP 333: 122mm 125 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 208: 125 2S3
improved counter-terrorism capabilities. Belarus is a member of
Akatsiya; 71 2S5; 12 2S19 Msta-S
the CSTO. Russia remains the country’s principal defence partner,
TOWED 152mm 72 2A65 Msta-B
though Minsk has also looked to improve defence cooperation
MRL 164: 122mm 128 BM-21 Grad; 220mm 36 9P140
with China and Turkey. The forces remain conscript-based and
Uragan
train regularly with other CSTO partners. There has been increased
MOR 120mm 14 2S12
emphasis on the training of territorial-defence troops to allow
AIR DEFENCE
them to better operate with the regular forces. There is a small
SAM Point-defence 2K22 Tunguska (SA-19 Grison)
heavy-airlift fleet that could be supplemented by civil transport
aircraft, and Minsk has a special-forces brigade trained for the
GUNS • SP 23mm ZU-23-2 (tch)
air-assault role. There is no requirement to independently deploy
and sustain the armed forces, but they could do so as a part of Air Force and Air Defence Forces 11,750
the CSTO. Russia continues to be Minsk’s main defence-equip- FORCES BY ROLE
ment supplier. In recent years, Belarus has received air-defence FIGHTER
systems and advanced combat-trainer/light-attack aircraft from 2 sqn with MiG-29/S/UB Fulcrum
Moscow. A small number of Su-30SM multi-role fighters is on GROUND ATTACK
order. The local defence industry manufactures vehicles, guided 2 sqn with Su-25K/UBK Frogfoot A/B
weapons and electronic-warfare systems, among other equip- TRANSPORT
ment. However, there is no capacity to design or manufacture 1 base with An-12 Cub; An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl; Il-76
modern combat aircraft. The sector also undertakes upgrade work Candid; Tu-134 Crusty
for foreign customers. TRAINING
Some sqn with L-39 Albatros
ACTIVE 45,350 (Army 10,700 Air 11,750 Special ATTACK HELICOPTER
Operations Forces 5,900 Joint 17,000) Paramilitary Some sqn with Mi-24 Hind
110,000 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Conscript liability 18 months (alternative service option) Some (cbt spt) sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-8MTV-5 Hip; Mi-
26 Halo
RESERVE 289,500 (Joint 289,500 with mil service EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
within last 5 years) AIRCRAFT 64 combat capable
 Russia and Eurasia 189

FTR 34: 28 MiG-29 Fulcrum/MiG-29S Fulcrum C; 6 MiG- 1 MRL bde

29UB Fulcrum B 2 engr bde
FGA (21 Su-27/UB Flanker B/C non-operational/stored) 1 EW unit
ATK 22 Su-25K/UBK Frogfoot A/B 1 NBC regt
TPT 8: Heavy 2 Il-76 Candid (+9 civ Il-76 available for 1 ptn bridging regt
mil use); Light 6: 1 An-24 Coke; 4 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134 2 sigs bde
Crusty EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
TRG 8+: Some L-39 Albatros; 8 Yak-130 Mitten* ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
HELICOPTERS APC • APC (T) 20 MT-LB
ATK 12 Mi-24 Hind NBC VEHICLES BRDM-2RKhB; RKhM-4; RKhM-K
TPT 26: Heavy 6 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 20: 8 Mi-8 Hip; 12 ARTILLERY 112
Mi-8MTV-5 Hip SP 152mm 36 2S5 Giatsint-S
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES TOWED 152mm 36 2A65 Msta-B
AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer) MRL 300mm 40: 36 9A52 Smerch; 4 Polonez
SARH R-27R (AA-10 Alamo A) SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS

Russia and Eurasia

ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge) SRBM • Conventional 96: 36 9K79 Tochka (SS-21
ARM Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter) (likely WFU) Scarab); 60 9K72 Elbrus (SS-1C Scud B)

Air Defence Paramilitary 110,000

AD data from Uzal Baranovichi EW radar
FORCES BY ROLE State Border Troops 12,000
AIR DEFENCE Ministry of Interior
1 bde S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble)
3 regt with S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble) Militia 87,000
1 bde with 9K37 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly); 9K332 Tor-M2E Ministry of Interior
(SA-15 Gauntlet)
1 regt with 9K322 Tor-M2E Internal Troops 11,000
2 regt with 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE DEPLOYMENT
AIR DEFENCE • SAM LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 5
Long-range S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble)
Medium-range 9K37 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly) UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 7
Short-range 17 9K332 Tor-M2E (SA-15 Gauntlet)
Point-defence 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 9K35 Strela-10 Georgia GEO
(SA-13 Gopher)
Georgian Lari 2017 2018 2019
Special Operations Command 5,900 GDP lari 38.0bn 41.6bn
FORCES BY ROLE US$ 15.2bn 16.7bn
SPECIAL FORCES per capita US$ 4,086.00 4,506.00
1 SF bde Growth % 5.0 5.5
MANOEUVRE
Inflation % 6.0 2.8
Mechanised
Def bdgt lari 770m 802m 790m
2 mech bde
US$ 307m 322m
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES FMA (US) US$ 37m 0m
APC • APC (W) 185: 32 BTR-70M1; 153 BTR-80 US$1=lari 2.51 2.49
ARTILLERY 42 Population 4,926,087
TOWED 122mm 24 D-30
GUN/MOR • TOWED 120mm 18 2B23 NONA-M1 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE • MSL Male 9.5% 2.8% 3.2% 4.1% 21.8% 6.4%
MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs
Female 8.7% 2.4% 3.0% 4.0% 24.2% 9.9%
(AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn)

Joint 17,000 (Centrally controlled units and

Capabilities
MoD staff ) Georgia’s main security preoccupations concern Russian military
deployments and the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South
FORCES BY ROLE
Ossetia. A Strategic Defence Review 2017–20 was published in
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE April 2017. This aimed at improving personnel structures, training
1 SRBM bde facilities and equipment and stressed a ‘total defence’ approach
COMBAT SUPPORT involving the armed forces and civil society. The document noted
1 arty bde the importance of Georgia’s reserve component for this frame-
190 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

work. A new defence white paper was published in 2017. Long- TOWED 71: 122mm 58 D-30; 152mm 13: 3 2A36
standing security cooperation with the US includes the Georgia Giatsint-B; 10 2A65 Msta-B
Defence Readiness Program, designed to boost military capabili- MRL 122mm 37: 13 BM-21 Grad; 6 GradLAR; 18 RM-70
ties. The armed forces are professional and are working to develop MOR 120mm 65: 14 2S12 Sani; 33 M-75; 18 M120
NATO compatibility, although conscription is still active. Despite
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
participation in several NATO multinational exercises, readiness
Short-range Spyder-SR
varies greatly between units and training levels tend to be vari-
able. Georgia’s armed forces have little expeditionary logistic Point-defence Grom; Mistral-2; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7
capabilities, contributing only to NATO’s Resolute Support mission Grail)‡; 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-
in Afghanistan. The backbone of the armed forces’ military equip- 14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)
ment is legacy Soviet-era systems with varying degrees of obsoles-
cence. The Major Systems Acquisitions Strategy 2019–25 outlines Aviation and Air Defence Command 1,300
efforts to procure new equipment in several areas, including air (incl 300 conscript)
defence, anti-tank systems, artillery, intelligence and aviation. The 1 avn base, 1 hel air base
country has only recently begun to develop a defence-industrial
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
base, and this is intended mainly to support the armed forces. The
State Military Scientific-Technical Center has demonstrated some AIRCRAFT 3 combat capable
maintenance, repair, overhaul and design capabilities for the pro- ATK 3 Su-25KM Frogfoot (6 Su-25 Frogfoot in store)
duction of light armoured vehicles. TPT • Light 9: 6 An-2 Colt; 1 Tu-134A Crusty (VIP); 2
Yak-40 Codling
ACTIVE 20,650 (Army 19,050 National Guard 1,600) TRG 9 L-29 Delfin
Paramilitary 5,400 HELICOPTERS
Conscript liability 12 months ATK 6 Mi-24 Hind
TPT 29: Medium 17 Mi-8T Hip; Light 12 Bell 205
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE (UH-1H Iroquois)
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR • Medium 1+ Hermes 450
Army 15,000; 4,050 conscript (total 19,050)
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
FORCES BY ROLE Medium-range 9K37 Buk-M1 (SA-11 Gadfly) (1-2 bn)
SPECIAL FORCES Point-defence 8 9K33 Osa AK (SA-8B Gecko) (two bty);
1 SF bde 9K33 Osa AKM (6-10 updated SAM systems)
MANOEUVRE
Light National Guard 1,600 active reservists opcon
5 inf bde
Army
Amphibious
2 mne bn (1 cadre) FORCES BY ROLE
COMBAT SUPPORT MANOEUVRE
2 arty bde Light
1 engr bde 1 inf bde
1 sigs bn
1 SIGINT bn Paramilitary 5,400
1 MP bn
Border Police 5,400
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 med bn Coast Guard
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HQ at Poti. The Navy was merged with the Coast
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Guard in 2009 under the auspices of the Georgian
MBT 123: 23 T-55AM2; 100 T-72B/SIM1 Border Police, within the Ministry of the Interior
RECCE 5: 1 BRM-1K; 4+ Didgori-2 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
IFV 71: 25 BMP-1; 46 BMP-2 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 21
APC 189+ PBF 6: 4 Ares 43m; 1 Kaan 33; 1 Kaan 20
APC (T) 69+: 3+ Lazika; 66 MT-LB
PB 15: 1 Akhmeta; 2 Dauntless; 2 Dilos (ex-GRC);
APC (W) 120+: 25 BTR-70; 19 BTR-80; Cobra; 8+
1 Kutaisi (ex-TUR AB 25); 2 Point; 7 Zhuk (3 ex-
Didgori-1; 3+ Didgori-3; 65 Ejder
UKR)

AUV 10+: ATF Dingo; 10 Cougar
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 1 Vydra
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
(ex-BLG) (capacity either 3 MBT or 200 troops)
ARV IMR-2
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 DEPLOYMENT
Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); FGM-148 Javelin AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 870; 1
GUNS • TOWED ε40: 85mm D-44; 100mm T-12 lt inf bn: UN • UNAMA 2 obs
ARTILLERY 240
SP 67: 122mm 20 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 46: 32 M-77 ALBANIA: OSCE • Albania 1
Dana; 13 2S3 Akatsiya; 1 2S19 Msta-S; 203mm 1 2S7 Pion CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: EU • EUTM RCA 35
 Russia and Eurasia 191

MALI: EU • EUTM Mali 1 lar priority, with new orders placed in 2018. However, airworthi-
ness across the air inventory remains problematic. Russia has also
SERBIA: OSCE • Kosovo 1
supplied Kazakhstan with S-300PS self-propelled surface-to-air
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 22 missile systems as part of a Joint Air-Defence Agreement, boost-
ing its long-range air-defence capability. Kazakhstan is growing its
TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT indigenous defence industry, and exports increased in 2017–18. A
joint venture with South African firm Paramount Engineering will
DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL deliver Arlan 4x4 vehicles. Further joint ventures and production
Following the August 2008 war between Russia and of rotary-wing and medium-lift fixed-wing aircraft are envisaged in
Georgia, the areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared cooperation with European companies.
themselves independent. Data presented here represents
the de facto situation and does not imply international
ACTIVE 39,000 (Army 20,000 Navy 3,000 Air 12,000
recognition as sovereign states. MoD 4,000) Paramilitary 31,500
Conscript liability 12 months (due to be abolished)

FOREIGN FORCES
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Russia and Eurasia

Russia 7,000; 1 mil base at Gudauta (Abkhazia) with (1
MR bde; 40 T-90A; 120 BTR-82A; 18 2S3; 12 2S12; 18 BM-
21; some S-300 SAM; some atk hel); 1 mil base at Djava/
Army 20,000
Tskhinvali (S. Ossetia) with (1 MR bde; 40 T-72; 120 BMP- 4 regional comd: Astana, East, West and Southern
2; 36 2S3; 12 2S12) FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Armoured
Kazakhstan KAZ 1 tk bde
Kazakhstani Tenge t 2017 2018 2019 Mechanised
3 mech bde
GDP t 52.0tr 59.9tr
Air Manoeuvre
US$ 159bn 184bn 4 air aslt bde

per capita US$ 8,762 9,977 COMBAT SUPPORT
Growth % 4.0 3.7 3 arty bde
Inflation % 7.4 6.4 1 SSM unit
3 cbt engr bde
Def bdgt t 412bn 517bn 610bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ 1.27bn 1.59bn
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
US$1=t 326.00 325.17 MBT 300 T-72BA
Population 18,744,548 RECCE 100: 40 BRDM-2; 60 BRM-1
Ethnic groups: Kazakh 63.3%; Russian 23.7%; Uzbek 2.8%;
IFV 607: 500 BMP-2; 107 BTR-80A
Ukraninan 2.1%; Tatar 1.3%; German 1.1%; other or unspecified APC 369+
5.7% APC (T) 150 MT-LB
APC (W) 209: 2 BTR-3E; 190 BTR-80; 17 Cobra
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus PPV 10+ Arlan
Male 12.8% 3.2% 3.7% 4.4% 20.8% 2.8% ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Female 13.2% 3.1% 3.6% 4.3% 23.0% 5.1% AEV MT-LB
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Capabilities MSL
SP 3+: 3 BMP-T; HMMWV with 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-
Kazakhstan’s new military doctrine, adopted in October 2017, 5 Spandrel); 9P149 Shturm (MT-LB with AT-6 Spiral)
indicates a change in focus from countering violent extremism
MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1
towards a wider concern for border security and hybrid threats to
national security. In May 2018, a new military branch was created Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn)
to protect against cyber threats. In the army, air-mobile units are GUNS 100mm 68 MT-12/T-12
held at the highest level of readiness. Kazakhstan entered a bilat- ARTILLERY 611
eral military agreement with Uzbekistan in September 2017 to SP 246: 122mm 126: 120 2S1 Gvozdika; 6 Semser; 152mm
cooperate on training and education, countering violent extrem- 120 2S3 Akatsiya
ism and reducing militant movements in their region. Kazakhstan TOWED 150: 122mm 100 D-30; 152mm 50 2A65 Msta-B
has a close defence relationship with Russia, reinforced by CSTO (122mm up to 300 D-30 in store)
and SCO membership, and Moscow operates a radar station at GUN/MOR 120mm 25 2S9 NONA-S
Balkash. In 2016, in an effort to improve training, Kazakhstan
MRL 127: 122mm 100 BM-21 Grad; 220mm 3 TOS-1A;
broadened the curriculum taught in military academies. Kazakh-
300mm 24: 6 BM-30 Smerch; 18 IMI Lynx (with 50 msl)
stan takes part in regional and CSTO exercises, including anti-terror
drills. By regional standards, the armed forces are both relatively (122mm 100 BM-21 Grad; 220mm 180 9P140 Uragan all
sizeable and well equipped, following the acquisition of significant in store)
amounts of new and upgraded materiel in recent years, primarily MOR 63 SP 120mm 18 Cardom; 120mm 45 2B11 Sani/
from Russia. Fighter/ground-attack aircraft seem to be a particu- M120
192 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS TPT 19: Medium 2 An-12 Cub; Light 16: 6 An-26 Curl,
SRBM • Conventional 12 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab) 2 An-72 Coaler; 6 C295; 2 Tu-134 Crusty; PAX 1 Tu-154
Careless
Navy 3,000 TRG 18: 17 L-39 Albatros; 1 Z-242L
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE HELICOPTERS
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 ATK 24: 20 Mi-24V Hind (some upgraded); 4 Mi-35M
PCGM 2 Kazakhstan with 1 Barrier-BK lnchr with 4 Hind
RK-2B SSM, 1 Arbalet-K lnchr with 4 9K38 Igla (SA-18 MRH 26: 20 Mi-17V-5 Hip; 6 Mi-171Sh Hip
Grouse), 1 AK306 CIWS TPT 14: Heavy 4 Mi-26 Halo; Light 10: 4 Bell 205 (UH-
PCC 1 Kazakhstan with 1 122mm MRL
1H Iroquois); 6 H145
PBF 3 Sea Dolphin
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
PB 6: 3 Archangel; 1 Dauntless; 1 Turk (AB 25); 1 Other
CISR • Heavy 2 Wing Loong (GJ-1)
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1
MCC 1 Alatau (Project 10750E) with 1 AK306 CIWS AIR DEFENCE • SAM
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGS 1 Zhaik Long-range S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon); S-300 (SA-10
Grumble); 40+ S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble)
Coastal Defence Medium-range 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef); S-75M Volkhov
FORCES BY ROLE (SA-2 Guideline)
MANOEUVRE Short-range 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); S-125 Neva (SA-3
Mechanised Goa)
1 naval inf bde Point-defence 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer); IR/
IFV 70 BTR-82A SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo); SARH R-33 (AA-9 Amos);
ARH R-77 (AA-12A Adder – on MiG-31BM)
Air Force 12,000 (incl Air Defence) ASM Kh-23 (AS-7 Kerry)‡; Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29
FORCES BY ROLE (AS-14 Kedge)
FIGHTER ARM Kh-27 (AS-12 Kegler); Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter)
1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum
2 sqn with MiG-31B/MiG-31BM Foxhound Paramilitary 31,500
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with MiG-27 Flogger D; MiG-23UB Flogger C National Guard ε20,000
1 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker Ministry of Interior
1 sqn with Su-27/Su-30SM Flanker
AIRCRAFT
GROUND ATTACK
TPT • Medium 1 Y-8F-200WA
1 sqn with Su-25 Frogfoot
TRANSPORT State Security Service 2,500
1 unit with Tu-134 Crusty; Tu-154 Careless
1 sqn with An-12 Cub, An-26 Curl, An-30 Clank, An-72 Border Service ε9,000
Coaler, C295M
Ministry of Interior
TRAINING
1 sqn with L-39 Albatros EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ATTACK HELICOPTER AIRCRAFT 7: Light 6: 4 An-26 Curl; 1 An-74T; 1 An-
5 sqn with Mi-24V Hind 74TK PAX 1 SSJ-100
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 15: 1 Mi-171; 14 Mi-
Some sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); H145; Mi-8 171Sh
Hip; Mi-17V-5 Hip; Mi-171Sh Hip; Mi-26 Halo
AIR DEFENCE Coast Guard
Some regt with S-75M Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Neva (SA-3 Goa); S-300/S-300PS (SA-10/10B Grumble); PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 22
2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef); S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon); PBF 11: 1 Aibar (Project 0210); 8 FC-19; 2 Saygak
2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful) PB 11: 4 Almaty; 5 Sardar; 2 Zhuk (of which 1 may be
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE operational)
AIRCRAFT 106 combat capable
FTR 46: 12 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum; 32
MiG-31/MiG-31BM Foxhound DEPLOYMENT
FGA 46: 12 MiG-27 Flogger D; 2 MiG-23UB Flogger C; 20 MOLDOVA: OSCE • Moldova 2
Su-27 Flanker; 4 Su-27UB Flanker; 8 Su-30SM
ATK 14: 12 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Su-25UB Frogfoot UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 5
ISR 1 An-30 Clank WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 5 obs
 Russia and Eurasia 193

COMBAT SUPPORT
Kyrgyzstan KGZ 1 arty bde
1 AD bde
Kazakhstani Tenge t 2017 2018 2019
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
GDP t 521bn 551bn
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
US$ 7.57bn 8.01bn
MBT 150 T-72
per capita US$ 1,208 1,254
RECCE 30 BRDM-2
Growth % 4.6 2.8
IFV 320: 230 BMP-1; 90 BMP-2
Inflation % 3.2 2.9 APC • APC (W) 55: 25 BTR-70; 20 BTR-70M; 10 BTR-80
Def bdgt t n.k n.k ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
US$ n.k n.k MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111
US$1=t 68.86 68.79 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
RCL 73mm SPG-9
Population 5,849,296

Russia and Eurasia

GUNS 100mm 36: 18 MT-12/T-12; 18 M-1944
Ethnic groups: Kyrgyz 71.7%; Uzbek 14.3%; Russian 7.2%; Dungan
1.1%; Uyguy 0.9%; other or unspecified 4.8% ARTILLERY 228
SP 122mm 18 2S1 Gvozdika
TOWED 123: 122mm 107: 72 D-30; 35 M-30 (M-1938);
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
152mm 16 D-1
Male 15.6% 4.0% 4.3% 4.7% 18.4% 2.1% GUN/MOR 120mm 12 2S9 NONA-S
Female 14.8% 3.9% 4.1% 4.6% 20.2% 3.4% MRL 21: 122mm 15 BM-21; 220mm 6 9P140 Uragan
MOR 120mm 54: 6 2S12; 48 M-120
Capabilities AIR DEFENCE
Although Kyrgyzstan is generally dependent on Russian assistance SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
for its defence requirements, it has started to expand its ties with GUNS 48
regional countries on issues such as defence-industrial coop-
SP 23mm 24 ZSU-23-4
eration. A July 2013 military doctrine detailed reforms including
plans for enhanced command and control, more effective military TOWED 57mm 24 S-60
logistics and a modern air-defence system. As part of Kyrgyzstan’s
effort to counter terrorism, the government ordered the creation Air Force 2,400
of an inter-agency working group to devise an anti-extremism and
FORCES BY ROLE
anti-terrorism programme. There is a close strategic relationship
with Russia and Kyrgyzstan is a member of both the CSTO and the FIGHTER
SCO. Moscow maintains a military presence, including a squadron 1 regt with L-39 Albatros*
of Su-25SM ground-attack aircraft at Kant air base, which it has TRANSPORT
leased since 2003. Talk are ongoing over a possible second Russian 1 regt with An-2 Colt; An-26 Curl
base. In 2018, bilateral cooperation agreements were signed with
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Joint training is held with regional ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
countries, including on anti-terror drills, but combat readiness 1 regt with Mi-24 Hind; Mi-8 Hip
remains an issue. Kyrgyzstan has a limited capability to deploy AIR DEFENCE
externally, and personnel are deployed to OSCE and UN missions Some regt with S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); S-75 Dvina
in Ukraine, Serbia and South Sudan. The armed forces possess
(SA-2 Guideline); 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef)
ageing land equipment and limited air capabilities, relying instead
on Russian support, training and deployments. There is little local EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
defence industry, although in 2018 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan dis- AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable
cussed defence-industrial cooperation and prospects for mutual TPT • Light 6: 4 An-2 Colt; 2 An-26 Curl
supplies of military products.
TRG 4 L-39 Albatros*
ACTIVE 10,900 (Army 8,500 Air 2,400) Paramilitary HELICOPTERS
9,500 ATK 2 Mi-24 Hind
Conscript liability 18 months TPT • Medium 8 Mi-8 Hip
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Medium-range 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef); S-75 Dvina (SA-
2 Guideline)
Army 8,500 Short-range S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES Paramilitary 9,500
1 SF bde
MANOEUVRE Border Guards 5,000 (KGZ conscript, RUS
Mechanised officers)
2 MR bde
1 (mtn) MR bde Internal Troops 3,500
194 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

National Guard 1,000 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

DEPLOYMENT Army 1,300; 1,950 conscript (total 3,250)

FORCES BY ROLE
MOLDVOA: OSCE • Moldova 2
SPECIAL FORCES
SERBIA: OSCE • Kosovo 2 1 SF bn
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1 obs MANOEUVRE
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 1 obs Light
3 mot inf bde
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 26
1 lt inf bn
Other
FOREIGN FORCES 1 gd bn
Russia ε500 Military Air Forces: 13 Su-25SM Frogfoot; 2 COMBAT SUPPORT
Mi-8 Hip 1 arty bn
1 engr bn
Moldova MDA 1 NBC coy
1 sigs bn
Moldovan Leu L 2017 2018 2019 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
GDP L 177bn 192bn ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
US$ 9.56bn 11.4bn APC 163
per capita US$ 2,694 3,227 APC (T) 69: 9 BTR-D; 60 MT-LB (variants)
Growth % 4.5 3.8 APC (W) 94: 13 BTR-80; 81 TAB-71
ABCV 44 BMD-1
Inflation % 6.6 3.6
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Def bdgt L 566m 616m
MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1
US$ 30.6m 36.8m
Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
FMA (US) US$ 12.8m 0m RCL 73mm SPG-9
US$1=L 18.50 16.76 GUNS 100mm 37 MT-12
Population 3,437,720 ARTILLERY 221
TOWED 69: 122mm 17 (M-30) M-1938; 152mm 52: 21
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 2A36 Giatsint-B; 31 D-20
Male 9.4% 2.8% 3.3% 4.0% 24.1% 5.1% GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 9 2S9 NONA-S
Female 8.9% 2.6% 3.1% 3.8% 24.9% 7.9% MRL 220mm 11 9P140 Uragan
MOR 132: 82mm 75 BM-37; 120mm 57: 50 M-1989; 7
Capabilities PM-38
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 39: 23mm 28 ZU-23;
The primary role of Moldova’s armed forces is to maintain territorial
57mm 11 S-60
integrity, though their size means they would be unable to offer
more than token resistance to a determined adversary. The forces
are constitutionally neutral. In early 2017, a National Defence Strat- Air Force 600 (incl 250 conscripts)
egy for 2017–21 was approved, including border defence, airspace FORCES BY ROLE
control and protection, and improvements to the military-training TRANSPORT
system, as well as equipment-modernisation imperatives. Moldova 1 sqn with An-2 Colt; Mi-8MTV-1/PS Hip; Yak-18
continues to build relations with both European states and NATO. AIR DEFENCE
The country signed up to the NATO Defence Capacity Building Ini-
1 regt with S-125 Neva (SA-3 Goa)
tiative in September 2014. Moldova is aiming to end mandatory
conscription and develop professional armed forces. The Profes- EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
sional Army 2018–2021 programme was approved in June 2018. AIRCRAFT
The services exercise regularly with NATO states. Moldova has no TPT • Light 3: 2 An-2 Colt; 1 Yak-18
requirement or capability to independently deploy and support HELICOPTERS
its forces overseas. However, service members have deployed as TPT • Medium 6: 2 Mi-8PS Hip; 4 Mi-8MTV-1 Hip
part of KFOR. The country has no defence-industrial capabilities AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Short-range 3 S-125 Neva (SA-3
beyond the basic maintenance of front-line equipment.
Goa) 

ACTIVE 5,150 (Army 3,250 Air 600 Logistic Support
1,300) Paramilitary 900 Paramilitary 900
Conscript liability 12 months (3 months for university graduates)
OPON 900 (riot police)
RESERVE 58,000 (Joint 58,000) Ministry of Interior
 Russia and Eurasia 195

DEPLOYMENT and increasing Russia’s influence in the near abroad and further
afield. Russia is a leading member of both the CSTO and the SCO.
ALBANIA: OSCE • Albania 1 The armed forces comprise a mix of volunteers and conscripts.
ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN: OSCE • Minsk Conference 2 Defence reforms launched in 2008 emphasised the shift from a
conscript-based mass-mobilisation army to smaller, more profes-
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: OSCE • Bosnia and sional ground forces. Morale has improved because of better pay,
Herzegovina 1 terms and conditions, and greater prestige associated with military
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 2; 3 obs service. The armed forces can independently deploy and sustain
forces on a global scale, although at extended distances force size
SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 41; OSCE • Kosovo 2; UN • would be modest. Its air-led intervention in Syria shows Russia can
UNMIK 1 obs deploy, sustain and maintain a high operational tempo for a fixed-
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1; 2 obs and rotary-wing air force, along with the required force-protection
package for the main operating base. Russia continues to moder-
UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 45
nise its nuclear and conventional weapons. The 2020 State Arma-
ment Programme (SAP) has been broadly successful, although
FOREIGN FORCES several of the more ambitious procurement goals were not met.

Russia and Eurasia

The follow-on programme, SAP 2027, continues the emphasis on
Armenia OSCE 1
modernisation, though some aims are more modest. Russia can
Austria OSCE 1 design, develop and manufacture advanced nuclear and conven-
Estonia OSCE 1 tional weaponry. Its defence-industrial base, however, suffered
Germany OSCE 1 from the lack of investment in the 1990s, and more recently from
Hungary OSCE 1 the loss of access to Ukrainian components. The defence-aero-
space sector has been particularly successful in terms of exports,
Ireland OSCE 1
with the sale of combat aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems.
Kazakhstan OSCE 2
Kyrgyzstan OSCE 2 ACTIVE 900,000 (Army 280,000 Navy 150,000 Air
Russia ε1,500 (including 400 peacekeepers) 7 Mi-24 Hind/ 165,000 Strategic Rocket Force 50,000 Airborne
Mi-8 Hip 45,000 Special Operations Forces 1,000 Railway
Ukraine 10 mil obs (Joint Peacekeeping Force) Troops 29,000 Command and Support 180,000)
United States OSCE 1 Paramilitary 554,000
Conscript liability 12 months (conscripts now can opt for contract
Russia RUS service immediately, which entails a 24-month contract)

Russian Rouble r 2017 2018 2019

RESERVE 2,000,000 (all arms)
Some 2,000,000 with service within last 5 years; reserve obligation
GDP r 92.0tr 98.4tr to age 50
US$ 1.58tr 1.58tr
per capita US$ 10,956 10,950 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Growth % 1.5 1.7
Inflation % 3.7 2.8 Strategic Deterrent Forces ε80,000 (incl
Def exp [a] r 3.71tr 3.93tr personnel assigned from the Navy and
US$ 63.6bn 63.1bn Aerospace Forces)
Def bdgt r 2.67tr 2.83tr 2.91tr
Navy
US$ 45.7bn 45.3bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$1=r 58.34 62.40
SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 10:
[a] Calculated to be comparable with the NATO definition of 1 Kalmar (Delta III) with 16 R-29RKU-02 Statsiya-02 (SS-
defence expenditure
N-18 Stingray) nuclear SLBM, 2 single 400mm TT
Population 142,122,776 with SET-72 LWT, 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K
Ethnic groups: Tatar 3.71%; Armenian 0.8%; Bashkir 1.1%; HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT
Chechen 1%; Chuvash 1% 6 Delfin (Delta IV) with 16 R-29RMU2 Sineva/R-
29RMU2.1 Layner (SS-N-23 Skiff) nuclear SLBM, 4
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/
Male 8.8% 2.4% 2.4% 3.5% 24.5% 4.6% USET-80K Keramika HWT
Female 8.4% 2.3% 2.3% 3.4% 27.3% 10.0% 3 Borey (Dolgorukiy) with 16 Bulava (SS-N-32) nuclear
SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with USET-80K Keramika
Capabilities HWT/UGST Fizikov HWT
Russia supports capable conventional military forces and retains (1 Akula (Typhoon)† in reserve for training with
the second-largest nuclear arsenal in the world. The armed forces capacity for 20 Bulava (SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6
underpin an assertive foreign policy. Military aims are guar- single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/
anteeing sovereignty and territorial integrity and maintaining USET-80K Keramika HWT)
196 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Strategic Rocket Force Troops 50,000 Aerospace Defence Command

3 Rocket Armies operating silo and mobile launchers FORCES BY ROLE
organised in 12 divs. Regt normally with 10 silos (6 for AIR DEFENCE
RS-20/SS-18), or 9 mobile lnchr, and one control centre 2 AD div HQ
FORCES BY ROLE 4 SAM regt with S-300PM1/PM2 (SA-20 Gargoyle)
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE 5 SAM regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1
9 ICBM regt with RS-12M Topol (SS-25 Sickle) (SA-22 Greyhound)
8 ICBM regt with RS-12M2 Topol-M (SS-27 mod 1) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
3 ICBM regt with RS-18 (SS-19 Stiletto) AIR DEFENCE • SAM 222
9 ICBM regt with RS-20 (SS-18 Satan) Long-range 186: 90 S-300PM1/PM2 (SA-20 Gargoyle);
10 ICBM regt with RS-24 Yars (SS-27 mod 2)
 96 S-400 (SA-21 Growler)
4 ICBM regt (forming) with RS-24 Yars (SS-27 mod 2) Short-range 36 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
MISSILE DEFENCE 68 53T6 (ABM-3 Gazelle)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
RADAR 1 ABM engagement system located at Sofrino
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
(Moscow)
ICBM • Nuclear 334: ε63 RS-12M Topol (SS-25 Sickle)
(mobile single warhead); 60 RS-12M2 Topol-M (SS- Army ε280,000 (incl conscripts)
27 mod 1) silo-based (single warhead); 18 RS-12M2 4 military districts (West (HQ St Petersburg), Centre (HQ
Topol-M (SS-27 mod 1) road mobile (single warhead); Yekaterinburg), South (HQ Rostov-on-Don) & East (HQ
30 RS-18 (SS-19 Stiletto) (mostly mod 3, 6 MIRV per Khabarovsk), each with a unified Joint Strategic Command
msl) (being withdrawn); 46 RS-20 (SS-18 Satan) (mostly
FORCES BY ROLE
mod 5, 10 MIRV per msl); 103 RS-24 Yars (SS-27 mod 2;
COMMAND
ε3 MIRV per msl) road mobile; 14 RS-24 Yars (SS-27 12 army HQ
mod 2; ε3 MIRV per msl) silo-based 1 corps HQ
SPECIAL FORCES
Long-Range Aviation Command 8 (Spetsnaz) SF bde
FORCES BY ROLE 1 (Spetsnaz) SF regt
BOMBER MANOEUVRE
1 sqn with Tu-160/Tu-160M1 Blackjack Reconnaissance
3 sqn with Tu-95MS/MS mod Bear 2 recce bde
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Armoured
AIRCRAFT 1 (4th) tk div (1 armd recce bn, 2 tk regt, 1 MR regt, 1 arty
BBR 76: 10 Tu-160 Blackjack with Kh-55SM (AS-15B regt, 1 AD regt)
Kent) nuclear LACM; 6 Tu-160M1 Blackjack with Kh- 1 (90th) tk div (1 armd recce bn, 2 tk regt, 1 MR regt, 1
55SM (AS-15B Kent)/Kh-102 (AS-23 Kodiak) nuclear arty regt)
LACM; 46 Tu-95MS Bear H with Kh-55SM (AS-15B 2 tk bde (1 armd recce bn, 3 tk bn, 1 MR bn, 1 arty bn,
Kent) nuclear LACM; 14 Tu-95MS mod Bear H with 1 MRL bn, 2 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1 EW coy, 1 NBC coy)
Kh-55SM (AS-15B Kent)/Kh-102 (AS-23 Kodiak) nuclear 1 (3rd) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk regt, 2 MR regt, 1
LACM arty regt)
1 (144th) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk regt, 1 MR regt,
Space Command 1 arty regt)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 (150th) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 2 tk regt, 1 MR regt; 1
arty regt, 1 AD regt)
SATELLITES 101
14 (BMP) MR bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk bn, 3 armd inf
COMMUNICATIONS 59: 2 Blagovest; 2 Garpun; 13
bn, 2 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 AT bn, 2 AD bn, 1 engr bn, 1
Gonets-D/M (dual-use); 3 Mod Globus (Raduga-1M);
EW coy, 1 NBC coy)
4 Meridian; 3 Parus; 3 Raduga; 21 Rodnik (Strela-3M); 8
Mechanised
Strela-3
1 (2nd) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 1 tk regt, 2 MR regt, 1
EARLY WARNING 2 Tundra
arty regt, 1 AD regt)
NAVIGATION/POSITIONING/TIMING 25 1 (42nd) MR div (1 armd recce bn, 3 MR regt, 1 arty regt)
GLONASS 9 (BTR/MT-LB) MR bde (1 recce bn; 1 tk bn; 3 mech inf
ISR 10: 2 Bars-M; 1 GEO-IK 2; 1 Kondor; 1 Kosmos-2519; bn; 2 arty bn; 1 MRL bn; 1 AT bn; 2 AD bn; 1 engr bn; 1
2 Persona; 3 Resurs-P EW coy; 1 NBC coy)
ELINT/SIGINT 5: 4 Liana (Lotos-S); 1 Tselina-2 2 MR bde (4–5 mech inf bn; 1 arty bn; 1 AD bn; 1 engr bn)
RADAR 12; Russia leases ground-based radar stations 3 (lt/mtn) MR bde (1 recce bn; 2 mech inf bn; 1 arty bn)
in Baranovichi (Belarus) and Balkhash (Kazakhstan). 1 (18th) MGA div (2 MGA regt; 1 arty regt; 1 tk bn; 2 AD bn)
It also has radars on its own territory at Lekhtusi SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
(St Petersburg); Armavir (Krasnodar); Olenegorsk 10 SRBM/GLCM bde with 9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26
(Murmansk); Mishelevka (Irkuts); Kaliningrad; Pechora Stone/SSC-7) (multiple brigades also with 9M729 (SSC-8
(Komi); Yeniseysk (Krasnoyarsk); Baranul (Altayskiy); Screwdriver))
Orsk (Orenburg) and Gorodets/Kovylkino (OTH) 1 SRBM bde with 9K79-1 Tochka-U (SS-21B Scarab)

COMBAT SUPPORT
9 arty bde
1 hy arty bde
4 MRL bde
4 engr bde
1 MP bde
5 NBC bde
10 NBC regt
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
10 log bde
AIR DEFENCE
14 AD bde
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 2,750: 750 T-72B/BA; 800 T-72B3; 400 T-73B3 mod;
450 T-80BV/U; 350 T-90/T-90A (10,200 in store: 7,000
T-72/T-72A/B; 3,000 T-80B/BV/U; 200 T-90)
RECCE 1,700: 1,000 BRDM-2/2A (1,000+ BRDM-2 in
store); 700 BRM-1K (CP)
IFV 5,140: 500 BMP-1; 3,000 BMP-2; 540 BMP-3; 100 BTR-
80A; 1,000 BTR-82A/AM (8,500 in store: 7,000 BMP-1;
1,500 BMP-2)
APC 6,100+
APC (T) 3,500+: some BMO-T; 3,500 MT-LB (2,000 MT-
LB in store)
APC (W) 2,600: 800 BTR-60 (all variants); 200 BTR-70
(all variants); 1,500 BTR-80; 100+ BPM-97 Dozor (4,000
BTR-60/70 in store)
PPV Typhoon-K
AUV 100+: 100+ GAZ Tigr; some IVECO LMV
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
AEV BAT-2; IMR; IMR-2; IMR-3; IRM; MT-LB
ARV BMP-1; BREM-1/64/K/L; BTR-50PK(B); M1977;
MTP-LB; RM-G; T-54/55; VT-72A
VLB KMM; MT-55A; MTU; MTU-20; MTU-72; PMM-2
MW BMR-3M; GMX-3; MCV-2 (reported); MTK; MTK-2;
UR-77
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL
SP BMP-T with 9K120 Ataka (AT-9 Spiral 2); 9P149
with 9K114 Shturm (AT-6 Spiral); 9P149M with 9K132
Shturm-SM (AT-9 Spiral-2); 9P157-2 with 9K123
Khrizantema (AT-15 Springer); 9P163-3 with 9M133
Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan); 9K128-1 Kornet-T (AT-14
Spriggan)
MANPATS 9K111M Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1
Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn);
9K115-1 Metis-M (AT-13 Saxhorn 2); 9K115-2 Metis-M1
(AT-13 Saxhorn 2); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan)
RCL 73mm SPG-9
GUNS • TOWED 100mm 526 MT-12 (100mm 2,000
T-12/MT-12 in store)
ARTILLERY 4,342+
SP 1,610: 122mm 150 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 1,400: 800 2S3
Akatsiya; 100 2S5 Giatsint-S; 500 2S19/2S19M1/2S19M2
Msta-S/SM; 203mm 60 2S7M Malka (4,260 in store: 122mm
2,000 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 2,000: 1,000 2S3 Akatsiya; 850
2S5 Giatsint-S; 150 2S19 Msta-S; 203mm 260 2S7 Pion)
TOWED 150: 152mm 150 2A65 Msta-B (12,415 in store:
122mm 8,150: 4,400 D-30; 3,750 M-30 (M-1938); 130mm
650 M-46; 152mm 3,575: 1,100 2A36 Giatsint-B; 600 2A65
Russia and Eurasia 197
Msta-B; 1,075 D-20; 700 D-1 (M-1943); 100 M-1937 (ML-
20); 203mm 40 B-4M)
GUN/MOR 180+
SP 120mm 80+: 30 2S23 NONA-SVK; 50+ 2S34
TOWED 120mm 100 2B16 NONA-K
MRL 862+ 122mm 550 BM-21 Grad/Tornado-G; 220mm
200 9P140 Uragan; some 9K512 Uragan-1M; some TOS-
1A; 300mm 112: 100 9A52 Smerch; 12 9A54 Tornado-S
(3,220 in store: 122mm 2,420: 2,000 BM-21 Grad; 420
9P138; 132mm 100 BM-13; 220mm 700 9P140 Uragan)
MOR 1,540+: 82mm 800+ 2B14; 120mm 700 2S12 Sani;
240mm 40 2S4 Tulpan (2,590 in store: 120mm 1,900: 1,000
2S12 Sani; 900 M-1938 (PM-38); 160mm 300 M-160; SP
240mm 390 2S4 Tulpan)
Russia and Eurasia
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
SRBM 144:
Dual-capable 120 9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone)
Conventional 24 9K79-1 Tochka-U (SS-21B Scarab)
(some Scud in store)
GLCM • Dual-capable Some 9M728 (SSC-7); some
9M729 (SSC-8 Screwdriver)
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR • Heavy Tu-243 Reys/Tu-243 Reys D (service status
unclear); Light BLA-07; Pchela-1; Pchela-2
AIR DEFENCE
SAM 1,520+
Long-range S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant); S-300V4
(SA-23)
Medium-range 350: ε200 9K37M Buk-M1-2 (SA-11
Gadfly); ε90 9K317 Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly); ε60 9K317M
Buk-M3 (SA-17 Grizzly)
Short-range 120+ 9K331/9K332 Tor-M/M1/M2/M2U
(SA-15 Gauntlet) (9M338 msl entering service)
Point-defence 1,050+: 250+ 2K22M Tunguska (SA-19
Grison); 400 9K33M3 Osa-AKM (SA-8B Gecko); 400
9K35M3 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16
Gimlet); 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K38 Igla (SA-18
Grouse); 9K333 Verba; 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)
GUNS
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4
TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60
Reserves
Cadre formations
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
13 MR bde
Navy ε150,000 (incl conscripts)
4 major fleet organisations (Northern Fleet, Pacific Fleet,
Baltic Fleet, Black Sea Fleet) and Caspian Sea Flotilla
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES 58
STRATEGIC • SSBN 10:
1 Kalmar (Delta III) with 16 R-29RKU-02 Statsiya-02 (SS-
N-18 Stingray) nuclear SLBM, 2 single 400mm TT
with SET-72 LWT, 4 single 533mm TT with 53-65K
HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT
198 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
6 Delfin (Delta IV) with 16 R-29RMU2 Sineva/R-
29RMU2.1 Layner (SS-N-23 Skiff) nuclear SLBM, 4
single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/
USET-80K Keramika HWT
3 Borey (Dolgorukiy) with 16 Bulava (SS-N-32) nuclear
SLBM, 6 single 533mm TT with USET-80K Keramika
HWT/UGST Fizikov HWT
(1 Akula (Typhoon)† in reserve for training with
capacity for 20 Bulava (SS-N-32) nuclear SLBM, 6
single 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/
USET-80K Keramika HWT)
TACTICAL 48
SSGN 9:
8 Antey (Oscar II) with 2 12-cell lnchr with 3M45
Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck) AShM, 2 single 650mm
TT each with T-65 HWT/RPK-7 (SS-N-16 Stallion)
ASW msl, 4 single 553mm TT with 53-65K HWT/
SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT (of
which 2 in refit)
1 Yasen (Severodvinsk) with 1 octuple VLS with
3M54K (SS-N-27 Sizzler) AShM/3M55 Onyx (SS-N-
26 Strobile) AShM/3M14K (SS-N-30) dual-capable
LACM; 10 single 533mm TT with USET-80K
Keramika HWT/UGST Fizikov HWT
SSN 16:
9 Schuka-B (Akula I) with 4 single 533mm TT with 53-
65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika
HWT/3M10 Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson) nuclear
LACM (weapons in store), 4 single 650mm TT
with T-65 HWT/RPK-7 (SS-N-16 Stallion) ASW msl
(of which 6 in refit)
2 Schuka-B (Akula II) with 4 single 533mm TT
with 53-65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K
Keramika HWT/3M10 Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson)
nuclear LACM (weapons in store), 4 single 650mm
TT with T-65 HWT/RPK-7 (SS-N-16 Stallion) ASW
msl (of which 1 in refit)
2 Kondor (Sierra II) with 4 single 533mm TT with
TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika HWT/3M10
Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson) nuclear LACM
(weapons in store), 4 single 650mm TT with T-65
HWT
3 Schuka (Victor III) with 4 single 533mm TT with
53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT/USET-80K Keramika
HWT/3M10 Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson) nuclear
LACM (weapons in store), 2 single 650mm TT
with T-65 HWT
(1 Barracuda (Sierra I) (in reserve) with 6 single
533mm TT with TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K
Keramika HWT/3M10 Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson)
nuclear LACM (weapons in store))
SSK 23:
16 Paltus (Kilo) (of which 2 in refit) with 6 single
533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/
USET-80K Keramika HWT
6 Varshavyanka (Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT with 53-
65K HWT/TEST-71M HWT/USET-80K Keramika
HWT/3M54K (SS-N-27 Sizzler) AShM/3M14K (SS-
N-30) dual-capable LACM
1 Lada (Petersburg) (in test) with 6 single 533mm TT
with USET-80K Keramika HWT/3M54K (SS-N-
27 Sizzler) AShM/3M14K (SS-N-30) dual-capable
LACM
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 35
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 1 Admiral Kuznetsov
with 12 lnchr with 3M45 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck)
AShM, 24 8-cell 3S95 VLS with 3K95 Kindzhal (SA-N-9
Gauntlet) SAM, 2 RBU 12000 Udav 1 A/S mor, 8 Kortik
CIWS with 3M11 (SA-N-11 Grison) SAM, 6 AK630M
CIWS (capacity 18–24 Su-33 Flanker D Ftr ac; MiG-
29KR FGA ac; 15 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel, 2 Ka-31R Helix
AEW hel) (in refit since 2018)
CRUISERS 4
CGHMN 1:
1 Orlan (Kirov) with 20 lnchr with 3M45 Granit (SS-
N-19 Shipwreck) AShM, 6 6-cell B-203A VLS with
S-300F Fort (SA-N-6 Grumble) SAM, 6 6-cell B-203A
VLS with S-300FM Fort-M (SA-N-20 Gargoyle)
SAM, 16 octuple 3S95 VLS with 3K95 Kindzhal
(SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM, 2 quintuple 533mm TT
with RPK-6M Vodopad-NK (SS-N-16 Stallion) A/S
msl, 1 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 RBU 1000
Smerch 3 A/S mor, 6 Kortik CIWS with 9M311 (SA-
N-11 Grison) SAM, 1 twin 130mm gun (capacity
3 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) (1 other non-operational;
undergoing extensive refit and planned to return
to service in 2021)
CGHM 3:
3 Atlant (Slava) with 8 twin lnchr with 3M70 Vulkan
(SS-N-12 mod 2 Sandbox) AShM, 8 octuple VLS
with S-300F Fort (SA-N-6 Grumble) SAM/S-300FM
Fort M (SA-N-20 Gargoyle) SAM, 2 twin lnchr with
Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quintuple 533mm
ASTT with SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch
2 A/S mor, 6 AK630 CIWS, 1 twin 130mm gun
(capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel)
DESTROYERS 16
DDGHM 15:
5 Sarych (Sovremenny) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M80
Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 2 twin 3S90 lnchr
with 9K30 Uragan (SA-N-7 Gadfly) SAM, 2 twin
533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2
RBU 1000 Smerch 3 A/S mor, 4 AK630M CIWS, 2
twin 130mm guns (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW
hel) (of which 1 in refit)
8 Fregat (Udaloy I) with 2 quad lnchr with URK-5
Rastrub-B (SS-N-14 Silex) AShM/ASW, 8 octuple
3S95 VLS with 3K95 Kindzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet)
SAM, 2 quad 533mm ASTT with 53-65K HWT/
SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 4
AK630M CIWS, 2 100mm guns (capacity 2 Ka-27
Helix ASW hel)
1 Fregat (Udaloy II) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M80
Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 8 octuple 3S95
VLS with 3K95 Kindzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM,
2 Kortik CIWS with 3M11 (SA-N-11 Grison) SAM,
2 quintuple 533mm ASTT with 53-65K HWT/SET-
65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 twin
130mm gun (capacity 2 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel)
1 Admiral Gorshkov (Project 22350) with 2 8-cell
UKSK VLS with 3M14T (SS-N-30) dual-capable
LACM/3M54T (SS-N-27 Sizzler) AShM/3M55

Oniks  (SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM/91RT2 A/S msl,  4
8-cell VLS with 3K96-2 Poliment-Redut (SA-N-28)
SAM,  2 quad 324mm TT with Paket-NK LWT, 2
Palash CIWS, 1 130mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix
ASW hel)
DDGM 1:
1 Komsomolets Ukrainy (Kashin mod) with 2 quad
lnchr with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade)
AShM, 2 twin lnchr with Volnya (SA-N-1 Goa)
SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT with 53-65K HWT/
SET-65K HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1
twin 76mm gun
FRIGATES 14
FFGHM 10:
3 Admiral Grigorovich (Krivak V) with 1 8-cell VLS
with 3M54 (SS-N-27 Sizzler) AShM/3M55 Oniks
(SS-N-26 Strobile) AShM/3M14 (SS-N-30) dual-
capable LACM, 2 12-cell VLS with 9M317E Shtil-1
SAM, 2 twin 533mm TT with 53-65K HWT/SET-
65K HWT, 1 RBU 6000 A/S mor, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1
100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel)
2 Jastreb (Neustrashimy) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24
Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 4 octuple 3S95
VLS with 3K95 Kindzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet), 6 single
533mm ASTT with RPK-6M Vodopad-NK (SS-N-16
Stallion) A/S msl, 1 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor,
2 Kortik CIWS with 3M11 (SA-N-11 Grison), 1
100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) (of
which 1 in refit)
1 Steregushchiy (Project 20380) with 2 quad lnchr
with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM,
2 quad 324mm ASTT with Paket-NK LWT, 1
Kortik-M CIWS with 3M311 (SA-N-11 Grison)
SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1
Ka-27 Helix ASW hel)
4 Steregushchiy (Project 20380) with 2 quad lnchr
with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 3
4-cell 3S97 VLS with 3K96-3 Redut (SA-N-28) SAM
(in test), 2 quad 324mm ASTT with Paket-NK LWT,
2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27
Helix ASW hel)
FFGM 4:
1 Gepard with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-
25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M
(SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
1 Gepard with 1 8-cell VLS with 3M14T Kalibr-NK
(SS-N-30) dual-capable LACM/3M54T (SS-N-
27 Sizzler) AShM/3M5S Oniks (SS-N-26 Strobile)
AShM, 1 3K89 Palma CIWS with 9M337 Sasna-R
SAM, 1 76mm gun
1 Burevestnik (Krivak I mod)† with 1 quad lnchr with
URK-5 Rastrub-B (SS-N-14 Silex) AShM/ASW, 1
twin lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quad
533mm ASTT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K HWT, 2
RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 twin 76mm guns
1 Burevestnik M (Krivak II) with 1 quad lnchr with
URK-5 Rastrub-B (SS-N-14 Silex) AShM/ASW, 2
twin lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko SAM), 2
quad 533mm ASTT with 53-65K HWT/SET-65K
HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 100mm
guns
Russia and Eurasia 199
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 105
CORVETTES 49
FSGM 20
6 Buyan-M (Sviyazhsk) with 1 octuple VLS with
3M54 (SS-N-27 Sizzler) AShM/3M14 (SS-N-30)
dual-capable LACM, 2 sextuple lnchr with 3M47
Gibka (SA-N-10 Grouse) SAM, 1 AK630-M2 CIWS,
1 100mm gun
2 Sivuch (Dergach) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M80
Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 1 twin lnchr with
4K33AM Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 AK630M
CIWS, 1 76mm gun
12 Ovod (Nanuchka III) with 2 triple lnchr with P-120
Malakhit (SS-N-9 Siren) AShM, 1 twin lnchr with
Osa-MA2 (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1
Russia and Eurasia
76mm gun
FSM 29:
2 Albatros (Grisha III) with 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M
(SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU
6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 twin 57mm gun
18 Albatros (Grisha V) with 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M
(SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 1 RBU
6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 76mm gun
3 Buyan (Astrakhan) with 1 sextuple lnchr with 3M47
Gibka (SA-N-10 Grouse) SAM, 1 A-215 Grad-M
122mm MRL, 2 AK306 CIWS, 1 100mm gun
6 Parchim II with 2 quad lnchr with Strela-2 (SA-N-
5 Grail) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000
Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
PCFG 23:
5 Molnya (Tarantul II) with 2 twin lnchr with P-22
Termit-R (SS-N-2D Improved Styx) AShM, 2 AK630
MCIWS, 1 76mm gun
17 Molnya (Tarantul III) with 2 twin lnchr with 3M80
Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 2 AK630M CIWS,
1 76mm gun
1 Molnya (Tarantul III) with 2 twin lnchr with 3M80
Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 1 Palma CIWS, 1
76mm gun
PCF 1 Molnya (Tarantul III) with 2 AK630M CIWS, 1
76mm gun
PBF 13: 11 Raptor (capacity 20 troops); 2 Mangust
PBR 4 Shmel with 1 76mm gun
PB 15 Grachonok
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 43
MCC 1 Alexandrit (Project 12700) with 1 AK306 CIWS
MHI 8: 7 Sapfir (Lida) with 1 AK306 CIWS; 1 Malakhit
(Olya)
MHO 2 Rubin (Gorya) with 2 quad lnchr with Strela-2
(SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
MSC 22: 20 Yakhont (Sonya) with 4 AK630 CIWS (some
with 2 quad lnchr with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM); 2
Korund-E (Yevgenya) (Project 1258E)
MSO 10: 9 Akvamaren (Natya); 1 Agat (Natya II) (all with 2
quad lnchr (manual aiming) with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail)
SAM, 2 RBU 1200 Uragan A/S mor, 2 twin AK230 CIWS
AMPHIBIOUS
LANDING SHIPS • LST 20:
12 Project 775 (Ropucha I/II) with 2 twin 57mm guns
(capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops or 24 APC
(T) and 170 troops)
200 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

3 Project 775M (Ropucha III) with 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 1 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker
76mm gun (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops 1 regt with Su-33 Flanker D; Su-25UTG Frogfoot
or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
4 Tapir (Alligator) with 2-3 twin lnchr with Strela-2 1 regt with MiG-29KR/KUBR Fulcrum
(SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 twin 57mm guns (capacity 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound; Su-24M/M2/MR
20 tanks; 300 troops) Fencer
1 Ivan Gren (Project 11711) with 1 AK630M-2 CIWS, ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR
2 AK630M CIWS (capacity 1 Ka-29 Helix B hel; 13 1 regt with Su-24M/MR Fencer; Su-30SM
MBT/36 AFV; 300 troops) 1 sqn with Su-24M/MR Fencer
LANDING CRAFT 28 ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
LCM 26: 9 Akula (Ondatra) (capacity 1 MBT); 5 Dyugon 3 sqn with Il-38/Il-38N May*; Il-18D; Il-20RT Coot A;
(capacity 5 APC or 100 troops); 12 Serna (Project 11770 Il-22 Coot B
(capacity 2 APC or 100 troops) 8 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix
LCAC 2 Pomornik (Zubr) with 2 22-cell 140mm MS-227 1 sqn with Mi-14 Haze A
Ogon’ MRL, 2 AK630 CIWS (capacity 230 troops; either 2 sqn with Tu-142MK/MZ/MR Bear F/J*
3 MBT or 10 APC(T)) 1 unit with Ka-31R Helix
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 267 MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT
SSAN 9: 1 Orenburg (Delta III Stretch); 1 Losharik; 1 Nelma 1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Be-12 Mail*; Mi-8 Hip
(X-Ray) (Project 1851); 2 Halibut (Paltus) (Project 18511); SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT
3 Kashalot (Uniform); 1 Podmoskovye (Project 09787) 1 sqn with An-12PS Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134
SSA 1 Sarov (Project 20120) TRANSPORT
ABU 12: 8 Kashtan; 4 Project 419 (Sura) 1 sqn with An-12BK Cub; An-24RV Coke; An-26 Curl;
AE 9: 7 Muna; 1 Dubnyak; Akademik Kovalev (Project An-72 Coaler; An-140
20181) with 1 hel landing platform 2 sqn with An-26 Curl; Tu-134
AEM 2: 1 Kalma-3 (Project 1791R); 1 Lama TRAINING
AFS 1 Longvinik (Project 23120) 1 sqn with L-39 Albatros; Su-25UTG Frogfoot
AG 1 Potok 1 sqn with An-140; Tu-134; Tu-154, Il-38 May
AGB 5: 1 Dobrynya Mikitich; 1 Ilya Muromets; 2 Ivan ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Susanin; 1 Vladimir Kavraisky 1 sqn with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip
AGE 1 Tchusovoy TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
AGI 14: 2 Alpinist; 2 Dubridium (Project 1826); 1 Moma; 7 1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip
Vishnya; 2 Yuri Ivanov AIR DEFENCE
AGM 1 Marshal Nedelin 1 SAM regt with S-300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle)
AGOR 8: 1 Akademik Krylov; 1 Igor Belousov; 1 Seliger; 2 1 SAM regt with S-300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle); S-300PS
Sibiriyakov; 2 Vinograd; 1 Yantar (SA-10B Grumble)
AGS 69: 8 Biya; 19 Finik; 7 Kamenka; 5 Moma; 9 Onega; 1 SAM regt with S-300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle); S-400
5 Baklan (Project 19920); 4 Baklan (Project 19920B); 2 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
Vaygach; 10 Yug 1 SAM regt with S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble); S-400
AGSH 1 Samara (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
AH 3 Ob† EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AK 3: 2 Irgiz; 1 Pevek with 1 AK306 CIWS AIRCRAFT 217 combat capable
AOL 9: 2 Dubna; 3 Uda; 4 Altay (mod) FTR 67: 12 MiG-31B/BS Foxhound; 20 MiG-31BM
AOR 3 Boris Chilikin Foxhound; 17 Su-33 Flanker D; 18 Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker
AORL 2: 1 Kaliningradneft; 1 Olekma FGA 44: 19 MiG-29KR Fulcrum; 3 MiG-29KUBR
AOS 2 Luza Fulcrum; 22 Su-30SM
AR ε7 Amur ATK 46: 41 Su-24M Fencer; 5 Su-25UTG Frogfoot (trg
ARC 4: 3 Emba; 1 Improved Klasma role)
ARS 30: 1 Kommuna; 6 Goryn; 4 Mikhail Rudnitsky; 18 ASW 44: 12 Tu-142MK/MZ Bear F; 10 Tu-142MR Bear J
Project 23040; 1 Zvezdochka (Project 20180) (comms); 15 Il-38 May; 7 Il-38N May
AS 3 Project 2020 (Malina) MP 5: 4 Be-12PS Mail*; 1 Il-18D
ASR 1 Elbrus ISR 12 Su-24MR Fencer E*
ATF 55: 1 Okhotsk; 1 Baklan; ε3 Katun; 4 Ingul; 2 Neftegaz; SAR 3 An-12PS Cub
12 Okhtensky; 13 Prometey; 1 Prut; 4 Sliva; 14 Sorum ELINT 4: 2 Il-20RT Coot A; 2 Il-22 Coot B
AWT 1 Manych TPT 49: Medium 2 An-12BK Cub; Light 45: 1 An-24RV
AXL 10: 8 Petrushka; 2 Smolny with 2 RBU 2500 A/S mor, Coke; 24 An-26 Curl; 6 An-72 Coaler; 4 An-140; 9 Tu-134;
2 twin 76mm guns 1 Tu-134UBL; PAX 2 Tu-154M Careless
TRG 4 L-39 Albatros
Naval Aviation ε31,000 HELICOPTERS
FORCES BY ROLE ATK 8 Mi-24P Hind
FIGHTER ASW 83: 41 Ka-27PL Helix; 22 Ka-27M Helix; 20 Mi-14
1 sqn with MiG-31B/BS Foxhound Haze A
 Russia and Eurasia 201

EW 8 Mi-8 Hip J ARTILLERY 383

AEW 2 Ka-31R Helix
SAR 56: 16 Ka-27PS Helix D; 40 Mi-14PS Haze C
TPT 41: Medium 35: 27 Ka-29 Helix; 4 Mi-8T Hip; 4 Mi-
8MT Hip; Light 6 Ka-226T
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
Long-range 120: 56 S-300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle); 40
S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble); 24 S-400 (SA-21 Growler)
Short-range 12 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR R-27T/ET (AA-10B/D Alamo); R-60 (AA-8
Aphid); R-73 (AA-11A Archer); ARH R-77-1 (AA-12B
Adder); SARH R-27R/ER (AA-10A/C Alamo); R-33 (AA-
9A Amos)
ARM Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler); Kh-31P (AS-17A
SP 163: 122mm 95 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 68: 50 2S3
Akatsiya; 18 2S19 Msta-S
TOWED 152mm 100: 50 2A36 Giatsint-B; 50 2A65
Msta-B
GUN/MOR 66
SP 120mm 42: 12 2S23 NONA-SVK; 30 2S9 NONA-S
TOWED 120mm 24 2B16 NONA-K
MRL 54: 122mm 36 BM-21 Grad/Tornado-G; 220mm 18
9P140 Uragan
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHER
SRBM • Dual-capable 12 9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26
Stone)
GLCM • Dual-capable Some 9M728 (SSC-7)

Russia and Eurasia

AIR DEFENCE
Krypton); Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter) SAM
ASM Kh-59 (AS-13 Kingbolt); Kh-29T Long-range 48+: 48 S-400 (SA-21 Growler); S-300V4
AShM Kh-31A (AS-17B Krypton) (SA-23)
Short-range 12 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
Naval Infantry (Marines) ε35,000 Point-defence 70+: 20 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 50
FORCES BY ROLE 9K31 Strela-1/9K35 Strela-10 (SA-9 Gaskin/SA-13
COMMAND Gopher); 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)
3 corps HQ GUNS 23mm 60 ZSU-23-4
SPECIAL FORCES
4 (OMRP) SF unit Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops 2,000
11 (PDSS) cbt diver unit FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE COASTAL DEFENCE
Reconnaissance 5 AShM bde
1 recce bde 1 AShM regt
Mechanised
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
3 MR bde
COASTAL DEFENCE
1 MR regt
6 naval inf bde ARTY • SP 130mm ε36 A-222 Bereg
1 naval inf regt AShM 76+: 36 3K60 Bal (SSC-6 Sennight); 40 3K55
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE Bastion (SSC-5 Stooge); some 4K44 Redut (SSC-1 Sepal);
1 SRBM/GLCM bde with 9K720 Iskander-M (SS-26 some 4K51 Rubezh (SSC-3 Styx)
Stone/SSC-7)
COMBAT SUPPORT Aerospace Forces ε165,000 (incl conscripts)
2 arty bde A joint CIS Unified Air Defence System covers RUS, ARM,
AIR DEFENCE BLR, KAZ, KGZ, TJK, TKM and UZB
2 SAM regt with 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); Strela-1/ FORCES BY ROLE
Strela-10 (SA-9 Gaskin/SA-13 Gopher) BOMBER
2 SAM regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 3 regt with Tu-22M3 Backfire C
Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) 3 sqn with Tu-95MS/MS mod Bear
1 SAM regt with S-300V4 (SA-23) 1 sqn with Tu-160/Tu-160M1 Blackjack
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FIGHTER
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum (Armenia)
MBT 300: 50 T-72B; 200 T-72B3; 50 T-80BV 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound
IFV 1,061: 400 BMP-2; 661 BTR-82A 1 regt with MiG-31B/BS/BM Foxhound
APC 400 1 regt with MiG-31B/BS/BM Foxhound; Su-27/Su-27UB
APC (T) 300 MT-LB Flanker
APC (W) 100 BTR-80 1 regt with Su-27/Su-27SM/Su-27UB Flanker; Su-30M2
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE 2 regt with Su-30SM
MSL FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
SP 60 9P148 with 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound; Su-27SM Flanker; Su-
9P149 with 9K114 Shturm (AT-6 Spiral); 9P157-2 with 30M2; Su-30SM; Su-35S Flanker
9K123 Khrisantema (AT-15 Springer) 1 regt with Su-27SM Flanker; Su-35S Flanker
MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K135 1 regt with Su-35S Flanker; Su-30SM
Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan) 1 regt with Su-27 Flanker; Su-27SM3 Flanker; Su-30M2
GUNS 100mm T-12 1 regt with Su-25 Frogfoot; Su-30SM
202 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
GROUND ATTACK
1 regt with Su-24M/M2 Fencer; Su-34 Fullback
1 regt with Su-24M Fencer; Su-25SM Frogfoot
3 regt with Su-25SM/SM3 Frogfoot
1 sqn with Su-25SM Frogfoot (Kyrgyzstan)
3 regt with Su-34 Fullback
ISR
2 regt with Su-24MR Fencer*
2 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer*
1 flt with An-30 Clank
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL
1 sqn with A-50/A-50U Mainstay
TANKER
1 sqn with Il-78/Il-78M Midas
TRANSPORT
6 regt/sqn with An-12BK Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134
Crusty; Tu-154 Careless; Mi-8 Hip
1 regt with An-124 Condor; Il-76MD Candid
1 regt with An-12BK Cub; Il-76MD Candid
1 sqn with An-22 Cock
3 regt with Il-76MD Candid
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 bde with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35
Hind; Mi-26 Halo; Mi-8MTV-5 Hip
1 bde with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-26 Halo; Mi-8 Hip
1 bde with Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-26 Halo;
Mi-8 Hip
2 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35
Hind; Mi-8 Hip
1 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8PPA
Hip; Mi-8 Hip
1 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-8 Hip
1 regt with Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8 Hip
1 regt with Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-24P Hind; Mi-35 Hind;
Mi-8 Hip
2 regt with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip
2 sqn with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip
AIR DEFENCE
9 AD div HQ
4 regt with 9K37M Buk-M1-2/9K317 Buk-M2 (SA-11
Gadfly/SA-17 Grizzly); S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant)
1 bde with S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble)
4 regt with S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble)
7 regt with S-300PM1/PM2 (SA-20 Gargoyle)
9 regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-
22 Greyhound)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 1,223 combat capable
BBR 139: 61 Tu-22M3 Backfire C; 1 Tu-22M3M Backfire; 1
Tu-22MR Backfire (1 in overhaul); 46 Tu-95MS Bear; 14 Tu-
95MS mod Bear; 10 Tu-160 Blackjack; 6 Tu-160M1 Blackjack
FTR 222: 70 MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum; 12 MiG-
31B/31BS Foxhound; 80 MiG-31BM Foxhound; 50 Su-27
Flanker; 10 Su-27UB Flanker
FGA 412: 44 MiG-29SMT Fulcrum; 6 MiG-29UBT Fulcrum;
47 Su-27SM Flanker; 19 Su-27SM3 Flanker; 20 Su-30M2; 91
Su-30SM; 112 Su-34 Fullback; 73 Su-35S Flanker
ATK 264: 70 Su-24M/M2 Fencer; 40 Su-25 Frogfoot; 139 Su-
25SM/SM3 Frogfoot; 15 Su-25UB Frogfoot
ISR 87: 4 An-30 Clank; 79 Su-24MR Fencer*; 2 Tu-214ON;
2 Tu-214R
EW 3 Il-22PP
ELINT 31: 14 Il-20M Coot A; 5 Il-22 Coot B; 12 Il-22M Coot
B
AEW&C 18: 14 A-50 Mainstay; 4 A-50U Mainstay
C2 11: 4 Il-80 Maxdome; 2 Il-82; 4 Tu-214SR; 1 Tu-214PU-
SBUS
TKR 15: 5 Il-78 Midas; 10 Il-78M Midas
TPT 427: Heavy 111: 9 An-124 Condor; 2 An-22 Cock; 99
Il-76MD Candid; 1 Il-76MD-M Candid; Medium 65 An-
12BK Cub; Light 234: 114 An-26 Curl; 25 An-72 Coaler; 5
An-140; 9 An-148-100E; 27 L-410; 54 Tu-134 Crusty; PAX
17 Tu-154 Careless
TRG 227: 120 L-39 Albatros; 107 Yak-130 Mitten*
HELICOPTERS
ATK 375+: 117 Ka-52A Hokum B; 100 Mi-24D/V/P Hind;
90+ Mi-28N Havoc B; 8 Mi-28UB Havoc; 60+ Mi-35 Hind
EW 27: 20 Mi-8PPA Hip; 7 Mi-8MTRP-1 Hip
TPT 339: Heavy 33 Mi-26/Mi-26T Halo; Medium 306
Mi-8/Mi-8MT/Mi-8AMTSh/Mi-8AMTSh-VA/Mi-8MTV-5
Hip
TRG 69: 19 Ka-226U; 50 Ansat-U
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
ISR • Medium Forpost (Searcher II)
AIR DEFENCE • SAM 620:
Long-range 490: 160 S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble); 150
S-300PM1/PM2 (SA-20 Gargoyle); 20 S-300V (SA-12
Gladiator/Giant); 160 S-400 (SA-21 Growler)
Medium-range 80 9K37M Buk-M1-2/9K317 Buk-M2 (SA-
11 Gadfly/SA-17 Grizzly)
Short-range 50 96K6 Pantsir-S1/S2 (SA-22 Greyhound)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR R-27T/ET (AA-10B/D Alamo); R-73 (AA-11
Archer); R-60T (AA-8 Aphid); SARH R-27R/ER (AA-
10A/C Alamo); R-33/33S (AA-9 Amos A/B); ARH R-77-1
(AA-12B Adder); R-37M (AA-13A Axehead); PRH R-27P/
EP (AA-10E/F Alamo)
ARM Kh-25MP (AS-12A Kegler); Kh-25M (AS-12B
Kegler); Kh-31P/PM (AS-17A/C Krypton); Kh-58 (AS-11
Kilter)
ASM Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge); Kh-38; Kh-59/Kh-59M (AS-
13 Kingbolt/AS-18 Kazoo); Kinzhal; 9M114 Kokon (AT-6
Spiral); 9M120 Ataka (AT-9 Spiral 2); 9M120-1 Vikhr (AT-
16 Scallion)
AShM Kh-22 (AS-4 Kitchen); Kh-31A/AM (AS-17B/D
Krypton); Kh-32 (entering service); Kh-35U (AS-20 Kayak)
LACM
Nuclear Kh-55SM (AS-15B Kent); Kh-102 (AS-23
Kodiak); Conventional Kh-101 (AS-23 Kodiak); Kh-555
(AS-22)
BOMBS
Laser-guided KAB-500; KAB-1500L
TV-guided KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR; KAB-500OD;
UPAB 1500
INS/GLONASS-guided KAB-500S
Airborne Troops ε45,000
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
1 (AB Recce) SF bde
 Russia and Eurasia 203

MANOEUVRE MANOEUVRE
Air Manoeuvre Reconnaissance
2 AB div (1 tk coy; 2 para/air aslt regt; 1 arty regt; 1 AD 1 recce bde
regt) Armoured
2 AB div (2 para/air aslt regt; 1 arty regt; 1 AD regt) 1 tk div
1 indep AB bde 1 tk bde
3 air aslt bde 2 MR div
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Mechanised
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES 1 MR div
MBT 60 T-72B3 3 MR bde
IFV 20 BTR-82AM SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
APC • APC (T) 776: 700 BTR-D; 76 BTR-MDM 2 SRBM/GLCM bde with Iskander-M
AUV GAZ Tigr; UAMZ Toros 1 SRBM bde with Tochka-U
ABCV 1,291: 100 BMD-1; 1,000 BMD-2; 10 BMD-3; 30 COMBAT SUPPORT
BMD-4; 151 BMD-4M 2 arty bde

Russia and Eurasia

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES 1 (hy) arty bde

ARV BREM-D; BREhM-D 1 MRL bde
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE 1 engr bde
MSL 1 MP bde
SP 100 BTR-RD 1 NBC bde
MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs 2 NBC regt
(AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K115- COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 Metis-M (AT-13 Saxhorn 2); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 2 log bde
Spriggan) AIR DEFENCE
RCL 73mm SPG-9 3 AD bde
GUNS • SP 125mm 36+ 2S25 Sprut-SD Reserves
ARTILLERY 600+
FORCES BY ROLE
TOWED 122mm 150 D-30
MANOEUVRE
GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 250: 220 2S9 NONA-S; 30 2S9
Mechanised
NONA-SM; (500 2S9 NONA-S in store)
2 MR bde
MOR • TOWED 200+ 82mm 150 2B14; 120mm 50+ 2B23
NONA-M1 Northern Fleet
AIR DEFENCE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SAM • Point-defence 30+: 30 Strela-10MN; 9K310 Igla-
SUBMARINES 29
1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse); 9K333 Verba;
STRATEGIC 8 SSBN (of which 1 in refit and 1 in
9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch); 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin)
reserve)
GUNS • SP 23mm 150 BTR-ZD
TACTICAL 21: 4 SSGN; 11 SSN (of which 3 in refit
and 1 in reserve); 6 SSK (of which 1 in refit)
Special Operations Forces ε1,000 PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 10: 1 CV
FORCES BY ROLE (in refit); 1 CGHMN (1 other in refit); 1 CGHM; 7
SPECIAL FORCES DDGHM
2 SF unit PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10: 2
FSGM; 6 FSM; 4 PB
Railway Troops ε29,000 MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES
4 regional commands 10: 1 MHO; 2 MSO; 7 MSC
FORCES BY ROLE AMPHIBIOUS 6: 4 LST; 2 LCM
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
10 (railway) tpt bde Naval Aviation

FORCES BY ROLE
Russian Military Districts FIGHTER
1 regt with Su-33 Flanker D; Su-25UTG Frogfoot
Western Military District FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
HQ at St Petersburg 1 regt with MiG-29KR/KUBR Fulcrum
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR
Army 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound; Su-24M/M2/MR
FORCES BY ROLE Fencer
COMMAND ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
3 army HQ 1 sqn with Il-38 May; Il-20RT Coot A; Tu-134
SPECIAL FORCES 3 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix
2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde 1 sqn with Tu-142MK/MZ/MR Bear F/J
204 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

AIR DEFENCE ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

3 SAM regt with S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble); S- 1 sqn with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip
300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle); S-400 (SA-21 Growler); TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) 1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT AIRCRAFT
FTR 38: 20 MiG-31BM Foxhound; 18 Su-33 Flanker FTR 18 Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker
D FGA 8 Su-30SM
FGA 25: 19 MiG-29KR Fulcrum; 4 MiG-29KUBR ATK 10 Su-24M Fencer
Fulcrum; 2 Su-30SM ISR 4 Su-24MR Fencer*
ATK 18: 13 Su-24M Fencer; 5 Su-25UTG Frogfoot TPT 8: 6 An-26 Curl; 2 Tu-134 Crusty
(trg role) HELICOPTERS
ASW 21: 10 Il-38 May; 11 Tu-142MK/MZ/MR Bear ATK Mi-24P Hind
F/J ASW Ka-27 Helix
ISR 4 Su-24MR Fencer* TPT • Medium Ka-29 Helix; Mi-8 Hip
ELINT 3: 2 Il-20RT Coot A; 1 Il-22 Coot B
TPT 9: 8 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134 Naval Infantry
HELICOPTERS FORCES BY ROLE
ASW Ka-27 Helix A COMMAND
TPT • Medium Ka-29 Helix B; Mi-8 Hip 1 corps HQ
AIR DEFENCE • SAM MANOEUVRE
Long-range S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble); S-300PM1 Mechanised
(SA-20 Gargoyle); S-400 (SA-21 Growler) 1 MR bde
Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) 1 MR regt
1 naval inf bde
Naval Infantry SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
FORCES BY ROLE 1 SRBM/GLCM bde with Iskander-M
COMMAND COMBAT SUPPORT
1 corps HQ 1 arty bde
MANOEUVRE AIR DEFENCE
Mechanised 3 SAM regt
2 MR bde

1 naval inf bde Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops
FORCES BY ROLE
Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops COASTAL DEFENCE
FORCES BY ROLE 1 AShM regt
COASTAL DEFENCE
1 AShM bde Military Air Force
Baltic Fleet 6th Air Force & Air Defence Army
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FORCES BY ROLE
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 2 FIGHTER
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 8: 2 1 regt with Su-30SM
DDGHM; 6 FFGHM (of which 1 in refit) 1 regt with MiG-31B/BS/BM Foxhound; Su-27
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 25: 6 Flanker
FSGM; 6 FSM; 7 PCFG; 5 PBF; 1 PB 
 1 regt with Su-27SM Flanker; Su-35S Flanker
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES GROUND ATTACK
12: 1 MCC; 5 MSC; 6 MHI 1 regt with Su-34 Fullback
AMPHIBIOUS 13: 4 LST; 7 LCM; 2 LCAC ISR
1 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer
Naval Aviation
 1 flt with A-30 Clank
FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT
FIGHTER 1 regt with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134 Crusty
1 sqn with Su-27 Flanker ATTACK HELICOPTER
ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR 1 bde with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-
1 sqn with Su-24M/MR Fencer; Su-30SM 35 Hind; Mi-26 Halo; Mi-8MTV-5 Hip
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 regt with with Mi-24P/Mi-35 Hind; Mi-28N
1 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix Havoc B; Mi-8 Hip
TRANSPORT 1 regt with Mi-24P Hind; Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-8
1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Tu-134 Crusty Hip; Mi-8PPA Hip
 Russia and Eurasia 205

AIR DEFENCE Reserves

1 SAM regt with 9K37M Buk-M1-2 (SA-11 Gadfly); FORCES BY ROLE
S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant) MANOEUVRE
5 SAM regt with S-300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle) Mechanised
1 SAM regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 3 MR bde
Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Military Air Force
AIRCRAFT
14th Air Force & Air Defence Army
FTR 61: 31 MiG-31B/BS/BM Foxhound; 30 Su-27/
Su-27UB Flanker FORCES BY ROLE
FGA 85: 12 Su-27SM Flanker; 24 Su-30SM; 24 Su- FIGHTER
34 Fullback; 25 Su-35S Flanker 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound
1 regt with MiG-31B/BS/BM Foxhound
ISR 19: 4 An-30 Clank; 15 Su-24MR Fencer*
GROUND ATTACK
TPT 12 An-12/An-26/Tu-134
1 regt with Su-34 Fullback
HELICOPTERS

Russia and Eurasia

1 sqn with Su-25SM Frogfoot (Kyrgyzstan)
ATK 64+: 24 Ka-52A Hokum B; 16 Mi-24P Hind; 24
ISR
Mi-28N Havoc B; 12+ Mi-35 Hind
1 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E
EW 10 Mi-8PPA Hip
TRANSPORT
TPT • Medium 50 Mi-8 Hip
1 regt with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134 Crusty;
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
Tu-154; Mi-8 Hip
Long-range S-300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle); S-300V
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
(SA-12 Gladiator/Giant); S-400 (SA-21 Growler)
1 regt with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip
Medium-range 9K37M Buk-M1-2 (SA-11 Gadfly)
1 sqn with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip (Tajikistan)
Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
AIR DEFENCE
Airborne Troops 3 regt with S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble)
1 bde with S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble)
FORCES BY ROLE
1 regt with S-300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle)
SPECIAL FORCES
2 regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1
1 (AB Recce) SF bde
(SA-22 Greyhound)
MANOEUVRE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Air Manoeuvre
AIRCRAFT
3 AB div
FTR 40 MiG-31B/BS/BM Foxhound
Central Military District FGA 12 Su-34 Fullback
HQ at Yekaterinburg ATK 25: 12 Su-24M Fencer; 13 Su-25SM Frogfoot
ISR 9 Su-24MR Fencer E
Army TPT 36 An-12 Cub/An-26 Curl/Tu-134 Crusty/Tu-
FORCES BY ROLE 154 Careless
COMMAND HELICOPTERS
ATK 24 Mi-24 Hind
2 army HQ
TPT 46: 6 Mi-26 Halo; 40 Mi-8 Hip
SPECIAL FORCES
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde
Long-range S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble); S-300PM1
MANOEUVRE
(SA-20 Gargoyle); S-400 (SA-21 Growler)
Armoured
Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
1 tk div
3 MR bde Airborne Troops
Mechanised
FORCES BY ROLE
2 MR bde
MANOEUVRE
2 (lt/mtn) MR bde
Air Manoeuvre
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
1 AB bde
2 SRBM/GLCM bde with Iskander-M
COMBAT SUPPORT Southern Military District
2 arty bde HQ located at Rostov-on-Don
1 MRL bde
1 engr bde Army
2 NBC bde FORCES BY ROLE
2 NBC regt COMMAND
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 3 army HQ
2 log bde SPECIAL FORCES
AIR DEFENCE 3 (Spetsnaz) SF bde
3 AD bde 1 (Spetsnaz) SF regt
206 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

MANOEUVRE Naval Infantry

Reconnaissance
FORCES BY ROLE
1 recce bde
COMMAND
Armoured
1 corps HQ
1 MR div
MANOEUVRE
3 MR bde
Mechanised
1 MR bde (Armenia)
2 naval inf bde
1 MR bde (South Ossetia)
COMBAT SUPPORT
Mechanised
1 arty bde
1 MR div
AIR DEFENCE
1 MR bde
1 SAM regt
1 MR bde (Abkhazia)
1 (lt/mtn) MR bde Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE FORCES BY ROLE
2 SRBM/GLCM bde with Iskander-M
COASTAL DEFENCE
COMBAT SUPPORT
2 AShM bde
2 arty bde
1 MRL bde Caspian Sea Flotilla
1 engr bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 NBC bde PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 2 FFGM
2 NBC regt PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8: 1
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FSGM; 3 FSM; 1 PCFG; 1 PB; 2 PBR
2 log bde MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 3:
AIR DEFENCE 2 MSC; 1 MHI
4 AD bde AMPHIBIOUS 9 LCM
Black Sea Fleet Naval Infantry
The Black Sea Fleet is primarily based in Crimea, at
FORCES BY ROLE
Sevastopol, Karantinnaya Bay and Streletskaya Bay
MANOEUVRE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Mechanised
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 7 SSK (of which 1 in 1 naval inf regt
refit)
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 7: 1 CGHM; Military Air Force
1 DDGM; 3 FFGHM; 2 FFGM
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 35: 4 4th Air Force & Air Defence Army
FSGM; 6 FSM; 5 PCFG; 6 PB; 9 PBF; 2 PBR FORCES BY ROLE
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES FIGHTER
10: 1 MHO; 6 MSO; 2 MSC; 1 MHI 1 regt with Su-30SM
AMPHIBIOUS 10: 7 LST; 3 LCM 1 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum (Armenia)
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
Naval Aviation 1 regt with Su-27/Su-27SM Flanker; Su-30M2
FORCES BY ROLE 1 regt with Su-27/Su-27SM3 Flanker; Su-30M2
FIGHTER GROUND ATTACK
ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR 1 regt with Su-24M Fencer; Su-25SM Frogfoot
1 regt with Su-24M/MR Fencer; Su-30SM 2 regt with Su-25SM/SM3 Frogfoot
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 regt with Su-34 Fullback
1 sqn with Ka-27 Helix ISR
1 sqn with Mi-14 Haze
 1 regt with Su-24MR Fencer E
MARITIME PATROL/TRANSPORT TRANSPORT
1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Be-12PS Mail*; Mi-8 1 regt with An-12 Cub/Mi-8 Hip
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
AIRCRAFT 1 bde with Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8 Hip;
FGA 12 Su-30SM Mi-26 Halo
ATK 13 Su-24M Fencer 1 regt with Mi-28N Havoc B; Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8 Hip
ISR 4 Su-24MR Fencer E 2 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-28N Havoc B;
MP 3 Be-12PS Mail* Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8AMTSh Hip
TPT 6 An-26 1 sqn with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip (Armenia)
HELICOPTERS AIR DEFENCE
ASW Ka-27 Helix 1 regt with 9K317 Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly)
TPT • Medium Mi-8 Hip (MP/EW/Tpt) 1 regt with S-300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle)
 Russia and Eurasia 207

3 regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 Pacific Fleet

(SA-22 Greyhound)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE SUBMARINES 22
AIRCRAFT STRATEGIC 4 SSBN
FTR 46: 12 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 34 Su-27 Flanker TACTICAL 18: 5 SSGN (of which 3 in refit); 5 SSN
FGA 95: 12 Su-27SM Flanker; 12 Su-27SM3 Flanker; (of which 4 in refit); 8 SSK
14 Su-30M2; 21 Su-30SM; 36 Su-34 Fullback PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 8: 1 CGHM;
ATK 97: 12 Su-24M Fencer; 85 Su-25SM/SM3 Frogfoot
6 DDGHM (of which 2 in refit); 1 FFGHM
ISR 24 Su-24MR Fencer*
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 25: 4
TPT 12 An-12 Cub
FSGM; 8 FSM; 10 PCFG; 3 PB
HELICOPTERS
MINE WARFARE 8: 2 MSO; 6 MSC
ATK 117: 25 Ka-52A Hokum B; 44 Mi-28N Havoc
AMPHIBIOUS 9: 4 LST; 5 LCM
B; 8 Mi-24P Hind; 40 Mi-35 Hind
TPT 72: Heavy 10 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 62 Mi-8 Hip
Naval Aviation

AIR DEFENCE • SAM

Russia and Eurasia

Long-range S-300PM1 (SA-20 Gargoyle); S-400 FORCES BY ROLE
(SA-21 Growler) FIGHTER
Medium-range 9K317 Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly) 1 sqn with MiG-31B/BS Foxhound
Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
3 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix
Airborne Troops 2 sqn with Il-38 May*; Il-18D; Il-22 Coot B
FORCES BY ROLE 1 sqn with Tu-142MK/MZ/MR Bear F/J*
MANOEUVRE TRANSPORT
Air Manoeuvre 2 sqn with An-12BK Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134
1 AB div EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 air aslt bde AIRCRAFT
FTR 12 MiG-31B/BS Foxhound
Eastern Military District ASW 23: 11 Tu-142MK/MZ/MR Bear F/J; 12 Il-38
HQ located at Khabarovsk May
EW • ELINT 1 Il-22 Coot B
Army
TPT 6: 2 An-12BK Cub; 3 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134
FORCES BY ROLE
HELICOPTERS
COMMAND
ASW Ka-27 Helix
4 army HQ
TPT • Medium Ka-29 Helix; Mi-8 Hip
SPECIAL FORCES
1 (Spetsnaz) SF bde Naval Infantry
MANOEUVRE
FORCES BY ROLE
Armoured
1 tk bde MANOEUVRE
6 MR bde Mechanised
Mechanised 2 naval inf bde
4 MR bde AIR DEFENCE
1 MGA div 1 SAM regt
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
4 SRBM/GLCM bde with Iskander-M/K Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops
COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES BY ROLE
3 arty bde COASTAL DEFENCE
1 MRL bde 2 AShM bde
1 engr bde
1 NBC bde Military Air Force
4 NBC regt
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
11th Air Force & Air Defence Army
4 log bde FORCES BY ROLE
AIR DEFENCE FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
4 AD bde 1 regt with MiG-31BM Foxhound; Su-27SM
Flanker; Su-30M2; Su-30SM; Su-35S Flanker
Reserves 1 regt with Su-35S Flanker; Su-30SM
FORCES BY ROLE 1 regt with Su-25 Frogfoot; Su-30SM
MANOEUVRE GROUND ATTACK
Mechanised 1 regt with Su-24M/M2 Fencer; Su-34 Fullback
8 MR bde 1 regt with Su-25SM Frogfoot
208 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

ISR PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS

1 regt with Su-24MR Fencer E FRIGATES • FFHM 3 Nerey (Krivak III) with 1 twin
TRANSPORT lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quad
2 sqn with An-12 Cub/An-26 Curl/Tu-134 Crusty/ 533mm TT lnchr, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 1
Tu-154 Careless 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix A ASW hel)
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 191
1 bde with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-26 Halo PSO 5: 4 Komandor; 1 Okean (Project 22100) with 1
1 regt with Ka-52A Hokum B; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-26 Halo 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
1 regt with Mi-24P Hind; Mi-8 Hip PCO 23: 8 Alpinist (Project 503); 1 Sprut; 12 Okhotnik
AIR DEFENCE (Project 22460) with 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 hel landing
2 regt with 9K37M Buk-M1-2 (SA-11 Gadfly); platform; 2 Purga with 1 hel landing platform
9K317 Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly); S-300V (SA-12 PCC 35: 5 Molnya II (Pauk II); 3 Svetlyak (Project 10410)
Gladiator/Giant) with 2 AK306 CIWS; 18 Svetlyak (Project 10410) with
1 regt with S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble) 1 AK630M CIWS, 1 76mm gun; 8 Svetlyak (Project
3 regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 10410) with 2 AK630M CIWS; 1 Yakhont with 2
(SA-22 Greyhound) AK306 CIWS
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PCR 1 Slepen (Yaz) with 1 AK630 CIWS, 2 100mm
AIRCRAFT guns
FTR 20 MiG-31B/BS/BM Foxhound PBF 85: 55 Mangust; 3 Mirazh (Project 14310); 4
Mustang-2 (Project 18623); 21 Sobol; 2 Sokzhoi with 1
FGA 120: 23 Su-27SM Flanker; 6 Su-30M2; 31 Su-
AK306 CIWS
30SM; 26 Su-34 Fullback; 34 Su-35S Flanker
PBR 30: 2 Ogonek with 1 AK306 CIWS; 2 Ogonek with
ATK 102: 20 Su-24M Fencer; 10 Su-24M2 Fencer; 72
2 AK306 CIWS; 8 Piyavka with 1 AK630 CIWS; 18
Su-25/Su-25SM Frogfoot
Moskit (Vosh) with 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun
ISR 28 Su-24MR Fencer E
PB 12: 2 Morzh (Project 1496M; 10 Lamantin (Project
TPT 24: 22 An-12 Cub/An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134
1496M1)
Crusty; 1 Tu-154 Careless
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 37
HELICOPTERS
AE 1 Muna
ATK 36: 24 Ka-52A Hokum B; 12 Mi-24P Hind
AGB 3 Ivan Susanin (primarily used as patrol ships)
TPT 60: Heavy 4 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 56 Mi-8
with 2AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing
Hip
platform
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
AK 8 Pevek with 1 AK306 CIWS
Long-range S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble); S-300V (SA-
AKSL 5 Kanin 

12 Gladiator/Giant); S-400 (SA-21 Growler)
AO 3: 1 Ishim (Project 15010); 2 Envoron
Medium-range 9K317 Buk-M1-2 (SA-11 Gadfly);
ATF 17: 16 Sorum (primarily used as patrol ships) with
9K317 Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly)
2 AK230M CIWS; 1 Sorum (primarily used as patrol
Short-range 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)
ship) with 2 AK306 CIWS
Airborne Troops AIRCRAFT • TPT ε86: 70 An-24 Coke/An-26 Curl/An-72
Coaler/Il-76 Candid/Tu-134 Crusty/Yak-40 Codling; 16 SM-
FORCES BY ROLE
92
MANOEUVRE
HELICOPTERS: ε200 Ka-28 (Ka-27) Helix ASW/Mi-24
Air Manoeuvre
Hind Atk/Mi-26 Halo Spt/Mi-8 Hip Spt
2 air aslt bde
Federal Guard Service ε40,000–50,000
Paramilitary 554,000 Org include elm of ground forces (mech inf bde and AB
regt)
Border Guard Service ε160,000
FORCES BY ROLE
Subordinate to Federal Security Service
MANOEUVRE
FORCES BY ROLE Mechanised
10 regional directorates 1 mech inf regt
MANOEUVRE Air Manoeuvre
Other 1 AB regt
7 frontier gp Other
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 (Presidential) gd regt
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
IFV/APC (W) 1,000 BMP/BTR Federal Security Service Special Purpose
ARTILLERY 90: Centre ε4,000
SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika FORCES BY ROLE
GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 2S9 NONA-S SPECIAL FORCES
MOR 120mm 2S12 Sani 2 SF unit (Alfa and Vympel units)

National Guard ε340,000
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Other
10 paramilitary div (2–5 paramilitary regt)
17 paramilitary bde (3 mech bn, 1 mor bn)
36 indep paramilitary rgt
90 paramilitary bn (incl special motorised units)
Aviation
8 sqn
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
RECCE some BRDM-2A
IFV/APC (W) 1,650 BMP-2/BTR-70M/BTR-80/BTR-
82A/BTR-82AM
ARTILLERY 35
TOWED 122mm 20 D-30
MOR 120mm 15 M-1938 (PM-38)
AIRCRAFT
TPT 29: Heavy 9 Il-76 Candid; Medium 2 An-12 Cub;
Light 18: 12 An-26 Curl; 6 An-72 Coaler
HELICOPTERS
TPT 71: Heavy 10 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 60+: 60 Mi-8
Hip; some Mi-8AMTSh Hip; Light 1 Ka-226T
Cyber
The first official doctrinal statement on the role of the
Russian military in cyberspace, the ‘Conceptual Views
on the Activity of the Russian Federation Armed Forces
in Information Space’, was released at the end of 2011,
and described cyber-force tasks with little correlation to
those of equivalent commands in the West. In particular,
the document contains no mention of the possibility of
offensive cyber activity. It is also entirely defensive in
tone and focuses on force protection and the prevention of
information warfare, including allowing for a military role
in negotiating international treaties governing information
security. In January 2012, then chief of the general staff
Makarov gave a different picture of the three main tasks
in this area: ‘disrupting adversary information systems,
including by introducing harmful software; defending
our own communications and command systems’; and
‘working on domestic and foreign public opinion using
the media, Internet and more’. The third task is a reminder
that, unlike some other nations with advanced cyber
capabilities, Russia considers cyber warfare as an integral
component of information warfare. Operations in Crimea
from early 2014, in the wider information space concerning
the conflict in Ukraine and allegations of influence activity
in Western countries’ elections demonstrate that Russian
thinking and capacity has matured in these areas. In
February 2017, Defence Minister Shoigu provided the first
official acknowledgement that Russia had formed a new
information-warfare branch of the armed forces.
Russia and Eurasia 209
DEPLOYMENT
ARMENIA: 3,300: 1 mil base with (1 MR bde; 74 T-72; 80
BMP-1; 80 BMP-2; 12 2S1; 12 BM-21); 1 sqn with 18 MiG-
29 Fulcrum; 1 sqn with 8 Mi-24P Hind; 4 Mi-8MT Hip; 2
AD bty with S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant); 1 AD bty with
2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)
BELARUS: 1 radar station at Baranovichi (Volga system;
leased); 1 naval comms site
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: OSCE • Bosnia and
Herzegovina 2
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
MONUSCO 2; 14 obs
GEORGIA: 7,000; Abkhazia 1 mil base with (1 MR bde;
Russia and Eurasia
40 T-90A; 120 BTR-82A; 18 2S3; 12 2S12; 18 BM-21; some
S-300 SAM; some atk hel); South Ossetia 1 mil base with (1
MR bde; 40 T-72; 120 BMP-2; 36 2S3; 12 2S12)
KAZAKHSTAN: 1 radar station at Balkash (Dnepr system;
leased)
KYRGYZSTAN: ε500; 13 Su-25SM Frogfoot; 2 Mi-8 Hip spt
hel
MEDITERRANEAN SEA: 2 SSK; 1 FFGHM; 1 FFGM; 1 AGI
MIDDLE EAST: UN • UNTSO 5 obs
MOLDOVA/TRANSDNIESTR: ε1,500 (including 441
peacekeepers); 2 MR bn; 100 MBT/AIFV/APC; 7 Mi-24
Hind; some Mi-8 Hip
SERBIA: OSCE • Kosovo 1
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 3; 2 obs
SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 1 obs
SYRIA: 5,000: 1 inf BG; 3 MP bn; 1 engr unit; ε10
T-72B3/T-90; ε20 BTR-82A; Typhoon-K; Tigr; 12 2A65;
4 9A52 Smerch; TOS-1A; 9K720 Iskander-M; 10 Su-24M
Fencer; 6 Su-34; 4 Su-35S; 1 A-50 Mainstay; 1 Il-20M; 12
Mi-24P/Mi-35M Hind; 4 Mi-8AMTSh Hip; 1 AShM bty
with 3K55 Bastion; 1 SAM bty with S-400; 1 SAM bty with
S-300V4; 1 SAM bty with Pantsir-S1/S2; air base at Latakia;
naval facility at Tartus
TAJIKISTAN: 5,000; 1 (201st) mil base with (40 T-72B1; 60
BMP-2; 80 BTR-82A; 40 MT-LB; 18 2S1; 36 2S3; 6 2S12; 12
9P140 Uragan); 4 Mi-24P Hind; 4 Mi-8MTV Hip
UKRAINE: Crimea: 28,000; 1 recce bde, 2 naval inf bde; 1
arty bde; 1 NBC regt; 40 T-72B3 MBT; 80 BMP-2 AIFV; 200
BTR-82A; 20 BTR-80 APC: 150 MT-LB; 18 2S1 arty; 18 2S19
arty; 12 BM-21 MRL; 1 AShM bde with 3K60 Bal; 3K55
Bastion; 1 FGA regt with Su-24M/MR; Su-30SM; 1 FGA
regt with Su-27SM/SM3; Su-30M2; 1 FGA regt with Su-
24M/Su-25SM; 1 atk/tpt hel regt; 1 ASW hel regt; 2 AD regt
with S-400; Pantsir-S1; 1 Fleet HQ located at Sevastopol;
2 radar stations located at Sevastopol (Dnepr system)
and Mukachevo (Dnepr system); Donetsk/Luhansk: 3,000
(reported); OSCE • Ukraine 39
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 16 obs
210 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Tajikistan TJK ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 37: 30 T-72; 7 T-62
Tajikistani Somoni Tr 2017 2018 2019 IFV 23: 8 BMP-1; 15 BMP-2
GDP Tr 61.1bn 67.4bn APC • APC (W) 23 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80
US$ 7.14bn 7.35bn ARTILLERY 23
per capita US$ 801 807
TOWED 122mm 10 D-30
MRL 122mm 3 BM-21 Grad
Growth % 7.1 5.0
MOR 120mm 10
Inflation % 7.3 5.8 AIR DEFENCE • SAM
Def bdgt Tr 1.66bn 1.99bn Medium-range S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125
US$ 194m 217m Pechora-2M (SA-26)
US$1=Tr 8.55 9.16
Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡

Population 8,604,882 Air Force/Air Defence 1,500

Ethnic groups: Tajik 84.2%; Uzbek 12.2%; Kyrgyz 0.8%; Russian FORCES BY ROLE
0.5%; other or unspecified 2.3% TRANSPORT
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 1 sqn with Tu-134A Crusty
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Male 16.3% 4.8% 4.5% 4.9% 17.9% 1.4%
1 sqn with Mi-24 Hind; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17TM Hip H
Female 15.7% 4.6% 4.4% 4.7% 18.8% 2.0%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT
Capabilities TPT • Light 1 Tu-134A Crusty
The Tajik armed forces have little capacity to deploy other than TRG 4+: 4 L-39 Albatros; some Yak-52
token forces and almost all equipment is of Soviet-era origin. HELICOPTERS
Regional security and terrorism are concerns, due to the possi- ATK 4 Mi-24 Hind
bility that violence could spill over from Afghanistan. Tajikistan TPT • Medium 11 Mi-8 Hip/Mi-17TM Hip H
has been building its capability in this area by hosting a CSTO
counter-terrorism exercise, and by taking part in stability and Paramilitary 7,500
counter-terror exercises organised by US CENTCOM, hosting the
2017 iteration. Tajikistan is a member of the CSTO and there is Internal Troops 3,800
a large Russian military presence at the 201st military base. In
2018, India and Tajikistan agreed to strengthen defence coopera- National Guard 1,200
tion, in particular on counter-terrorism. Tajikistan has little capac-
ity to deploy other than token forces but border deployments Emergencies Ministry 2,500
have been stepped up recently in response to regional security
and terrorism concerns. In late 2016, a Military Cooperation Plan Border Guards
was signed with Russia. Moscow has indicated that Tajikistan is
to receive military equipment, including aircraft. Some donations DEPLOYMENT
of personal equipment have been received from the US. Barring
maintenance facilities, Tajikistan only has minimal defence- SERBIA: OSCE • Kosovo 1
industrial capacity. UKRAINE: OSCE • Ukraine 17
ACTIVE 8,800 (Army 7,300 Air Force/Air Defence
1,500) Paramilitary 7,500 FOREIGN FORCES
Conscript liability 24 months Russia 5,000; 1 (201st) mil base with (40 T-72B1; 60 BMP-2;
80 BTR-82A; 40 MT-LB; 18 2S1; 36 2S3; 6 2S12; 12 9P140
Uragan); 4 Mi-24P Hind; 4 Mi-8MTV Hip
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 7,300
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
3 MR bde
Air Manoeuvre
1 air aslt bde
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bde
AIR DEFENCE
1 SAM regt
 Russia and Eurasia 211

Mechanised
Turkmenistan TKM 1 (3rd) MR div (1 tk regt; 3 MR regt, 1 arty regt)
1 (22nd) MR div (1 tk regt; 1 MR regt, 1 arty regt)
Turkmen New Manat TMM 2017 2018 2019
4 MR bde
GDP TMM 133bn 150bn 1 naval inf bde
US$ 37.9bn 42.8bn Other
per capita US$ 6,643 7,412 1 MR trg div
Growth % 6.5 6.2 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
1 SRBM bde with SS-1 Scud
Inflation % 8.0 9.4
COMBAT SUPPORT
Def exp TMM n.k n.k 1 arty bde
US$ n.k n.k 1 (mixed) arty/AT regt
USD1=TMM 3.50 3.50 1 MRL bde
1 AT regt
Population 5,411,012
1 engr regt

Russia and Eurasia

Ethnic groups: Turkmen 77%; Uzbek 9%; Russian 7%; Kazak 2%
AIR DEFENCE
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 2 SAM bde
Male 13.0% 4.2% 4.7% 4.9% 20.5% 2.1%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Female 12.7% 4.1% 4.7% 4.9% 21.3% 2.8%
MBT 654: 4 T-90S; 650 T-72/T-72UMG
Capabilities RECCE 260+: 200 BRDM-2; 60 BRM-1; Nimr Ajban
IFV 1,038: 600 BMP-1/BMP-1M; 430 BMP-2; 4 BMP-3; 4
Turkmenistan has concerns over potential regional spillover from BTR-80A
the security situation in Afghanistan, but its armed forces lack
significant capabilities and equipment. Turkmenistan has main-
APC 902+
tained a policy of neutrality since 1995 and confirmed this com- APC (W) 874+: 120 BTR-60 (all variants); 300 BTR-70;
mitment in its 2016 military doctrine. This aimed to increase the 450 BTR-80; 4+ Cobra
armed forces’ defensive capability in order to safeguard national PPV 28+ Kirpi
interests and territorial integrity. Turkmenistan is not a member AUV 8 Nimr Ajban 440A
of the CSTO. While the ground forces are shifting from a Soviet-
ABCV 8 BMD-1
era divisional structure to a brigade system, progress is slow. The
armed forces are largely conscript-based and reliant on Soviet- ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
era equipment and doctrine, and the government has stated a MSL
requirement to improve conditions of service. Turkmenistan has SP 58+: 8 9P122 Malyutka-M (AT-3 Sagger on BRDM-2);
participated in multinational exercises but has limited capacity to 8 9P133 Malyutka-P (AT-3 Sagger on BRDM-2); 2 9P148
deploy externally and maintains no international deployments. Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel on BRDM-2); 36 9P149 Shturm
The air force has a modest capability; however, most of the aircraft (AT-6 Spiral on MT-LB); 4+ Baryer (on Karakal)
are of Soviet-era origin and have been stored or scrapped, and no
MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot
significant new procurement has occurred. The 2016 military doc-
trine was intended to partly redress these issues. There are plans (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115
to strengthen the border guard with new equipment and facilities. Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn)
Plans to bolster the naval forces have resulted in some procure- GUNS 100mm 60 MT-12/T-12
ments, leading to a modest improvement in the naval presence in ARTILLERY 765
the Caspian Sea. Barring maintenance facilities, Turkmenistan has SP 122mm 40 2S1
little domestic defence industry, but is building a number of patrol
TOWED 457: 122mm 350 D-30; 130mm 6 M-46; 152mm
vessels of Turkish design under licence.
101: 17 D-1; 72 D-20; 6 2A36 Giatsint-B; 6 2A65 Msta-B
ACTIVE 36,500 (Army 33,000 Navy 500 Air 3,000) GUN/MOR 120mm 17 2S9 NONA-S
Paramilitary 5,000 MRL 154+: 122mm 88: 18 9P138; 70 BM-21 Grad; RM-70;
Conscript liability 24 months 220mm 60 9P140 Uragan; 300mm 6 9A52 Smerch
MOR 97: 82mm 31; 120mm 66 M-1938 (PM-38)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
SRBM • Conventional 16 SS-1 Scud
Army 33,000 UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
5 Mil Districts CISR • Heavy CH-3A; WJ-600
FORCES BY ROLE ISR • Medium Falco
SPECIAL FORCES AIR DEFENCE
1 spec ops regt SAM
MANOEUVRE Short-range: FM-90; 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)
Armoured Point-defence 53+: 40 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 13 9K35
1 tk bde Strela-10 mod (SA-13 Gopher); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse);
212 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

9K32M Strela-2M (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14 PCGM 8 Arkadag (TUR Tuzla) with 2 twin lnchr with
Gremlin); Mistral (reported); QW-2 Otomat AShM, 2 twin Simbad-RC lnchr with Mistral
GUNS 70 SAM, 1 Roketsan A/S mor

SP 23mm 48 ZSU-23-4 PBF 24: 10 Bars-12; 6 Nazya (Dearsan 33); 5 Grif-T; 3
TOWED 22+: 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm 22 S-60 Sobol
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES PB 1 Point
ASM CM-502KG; AR-1 AMPHIBIOUS • LCM 1 Dearsan LCM-1
HELICOPTERS
Navy 500 MRH 2 AW139
TPT 3+: Medium some Mi-8 Hip; Light 3 AW109
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4
PCFG 2 Edermen (RUS Molnya) with 4 quad lnchr with Ukraine UKR
3M24E Uran-E (SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 2 AK630
Ukrainian Hryvnia h 2017 2018 2019
CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PCGM 2 Arkadag (TUR Tuzla) with 2 twin lnchr with GDP h 2.98tr 3.42tr
Otomat AShM, 2 twin Simbad-RC lnchr with Mistral US$ 112bn 126bn
SAM, 1 Roketsan A/S mor per capita US$ 2,656 2,964
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT• AGHS 1 (Dearsan 41m) Growth % 2.5 3.5
Inflation % 14.4 10.9
Air Force 3,000 Def bdgt [a] h 74.4bn 88.6bn
FORCES BY ROLE US$ 2.80bn 3.27bn
FIGHTER
FMA (US) US$ 99m 0m
2 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum; MiG-29UB Fulcrum;
USD1=h 26.60 27.07
GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with Su-25 Frogfoot [a] Including military pensions
1 sqn with Su-25MK Frogfoot Population 43,952,299
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-24 Hind Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
TRAINING Male 8.2% 2.2% 2.7% 3.6% 24.1% 5.5%
1 unit with L-39 Albatros Female 7.7% 2.1% 2.6% 3.4% 26.9% 10.9%
AIR DEFENCE
Some sqn with S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 Pechora Capabilities
(SA-3 Goa); S-125 Pechora-2M (SA-26); S-200 Angara
Ukraine’s overriding security concern is Russia’s support for sepa-
(SA-5 Gammon); FD-2000 (HQ-9); KS-1A (HQ-12)
ratists in the east of the country. The armed forces were unable to
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE offer any credible resistance to the Russian annexation of Crimea
AIRCRAFT 55 combat capable and struggled to combat the Russian-backed separatist forces.
FTR 24: 22 MiG-29A/S Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum Defence policy is centred on maintaining sovereignty and ter-
ATK 31: 19 Su-25 Frogfoot; 12 Su-25MK Frogfoot ritorial integrity. Ukraine adopted a revised doctrine in 2015 that
TPT • Light 3: 1 An-26 Curl; 2 An-74TK Coaler identified Moscow as a ‘military adversary’, called for ‘comprehen-
sive reform’ of the security sector and revoked the country’s ’non-
TRG 2 L-39 Albatros
block status’. Military reforms since 2015 have addressed the weak-
HELICOPTERS nesses exposed in 2014. Ukraine joined the NATO Partnership for
ATK 10 Mi-24P Hind F Peace programme in 1994, followed in 1997 by the creation of the
MRH 2+ AW139 NATO–Ukraine commission. In 2017, parliament identified NATO
TPT 11: Medium 8: 6 Mi-8 Hip; 2 Mi-17V-V Hip; Light membership as a strategic goal. There are two conscript intakes
3+ AW109 per year, but the longer-term ambition is to professionalise the
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES armed forces. The defence ministry’s development programme
AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer) aims to improve training, eventually aligning to NATO standards.
The armed forces participate in bilateral and multinational exer-
AIR DEFENCE • SAM
cises. Ukraine retains the notional capacity at least to deploy and
Long-range S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon); FD-2000 (HQ- sustain a modest force by air. Poor logistics capacity was exposed
9) after 2014 and addressing this is a priority. The equipment inven-
Medium-range S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 tory still consists predominantly of Soviet-era weaponry. Sustain-
Pechora-2M (SA-26); KS-1A (HQ-12) ing and in some cases upgrading these systems is a near-term
Short-range S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); S-125-2BM Pechora concern, although much will need to be replaced over the coming
decade. If not, the armed forces will face increasing problems with
obsolescence. The country has a broad defence industry, though
Paramilitary 5,000 its capabilities remain shaped, and limited, by its Soviet heritage.
Ukraine was a key provider of guided-weapons technologies in
Federal Border Guard Service ε5,000 the Soviet Union. It retains the capability to build Soviet-era land
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE systems and can maintain and modestly upgrade Soviet-era tacti-
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 33 cal combat aircraft.
 Russia and Eurasia 213

ACTIVE 209,000 (Army 145,000 Navy 11,000 Air IFV 1,137: 193 BMP-1/BMP-1AK; 890 BMP-2; 4
Force 45,000 Airborne 8,000 Special Operations BMP-3; 50+ BTR-3DA; some BTR-3E1; some BTR-4E
Bucephalus
Forces n.k.) Paramilitary 88,000
APC 338
Conscript liability Army, Air Force 18 months, Navy 2 years.
Minimum age for conscription raised from 18 to 20 in 2015
APC (T) 15+: 15 BTR-D; some MT-LB
APC (W) 313: 5 BTR-60; 215 BTR-70; 93 BTR-80
RESERVE 900,000 (Joint 900,000) 
 PPV 10 Kozak-2 

Military service within 5 years ABCV 30: 15 BMD-1, 15 BMD-2
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
AEV 53 BAT-2; MT-LB
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
ARV BREM-1; BREM-2; BREM-64; T-54/T-55
VLB MTU-20
Army 145,000 ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
4 regional HQ MSL
FORCES BY ROLE SP 9P149 with 9K114 Shturm (AT-6 Spiral)

Russia and Eurasia

MANOEUVRE MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113
Reconnaissance Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); FGM-148 Javelin; Stugna-P;
5 recce bn Corsar
Armoured GUNS 100mm ε500 MT-12/T-12
3 tk bde ARTILLERY 1,770
Mechanised SP 565+: 122mm 271 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 288: 235 2S3
9 mech bde Akatsiya; 18 2S5 Giatsint-S; 35 2S19 Msta-S; 203mm 6+
2S7 Pion (up to 90 2S7 Pion in store)
2 mtn bde
TOWED 515+: 122mm 75 D-30; 152mm 440: 180 2A36
Light
Giatsint-B; 130 2A65 Msta-B; 130+ D-20
4 mot inf bde
GUN/MOR • 120mm • TOWED 2 2B16 NONA-K
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES
MRL 348: 122mm 203: 18 9P138; 185 BM-21 Grad;
1 SSM bde
220mm 70 9P140 Uragan; 300mm 75 9A52 Smerch
COMBAT SUPPORT
MOR 120mm 340: 190 2S12 Sani; 30 M-1938 (PM-38);
5 arty bde
120 M120-15
3 MRL regt
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS
1 engr regt SRBM • Conventional 90 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab)
1 EW regt HELICOPTERS
1 EW bn ATK ε35 Mi-24 Hind
2 EW coy MRH 1 Lev-1
1 CBRN regt TPT • Medium ε24 Mi-8 Hip
4 sigs regt AIR DEFENCE
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT SAM
3 maint regt Long-range Some S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator)
1 maint coy Short-range 6 9K330 Tor-M
HELICOPTERS Point-defence 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 9K33
4 avn bde Osa-AKM (SA-8 Gecko)
AIR DEFENCE GUNS
4 AD regt SP 30mm 70 2S6
TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60
Reserves AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM Barrier-V
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE Navy 11,000 (incl Naval Aviation and Naval
Armoured Infantry)
3 tk bde After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, HQ shifted to Odessa.
Mechanised Several additional vessels remain in Russian possession in
3 mech bde Crimea
COMBAT SUPPORT 2 Regional HQ
1 arty bde EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 1
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES FRIGATES • FFHM 1 Hetman Sagaidachny (RUS Krivak
MBT 854: 720 T-64/T-64BV/BM; 100 T-72AV/B1; 28 III) with 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM,
T-80BV; 6 T-84 Oplot; (94 T-80; 530 T-72; 578 T-64; 20 2 quad 533mm ASTT with SET-65 HWT/53-65K HWT,
T-55 all in store) 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 AK630M CIWS, 1
RECCE 548: 433 BRDM-2; 115 BRM-1K (CP) 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel)
214 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7 TRAINING

CORVETTES • FS 1 Grisha (II) with 2 twin 533mm ASTT Some sqn with L-39 Albatros
with SAET-60 HWT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 A/S mor, 2 TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
57mm guns Some sqn with Mi-8; Mi-9; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
PHG 1 Matka (FSU Vekhr) with 2 single lnchr with P-15 AIR DEFENCE
Termit-M/R (SS-N-2C/D Styx) AShM, 1 AK630M CIWS, 6 bde with 9K37M Buk-M1 (SA-11 Gadfly); S-300P/PS/PT
1 76mm gun (SA-10 Grumble)
PBG 4 Gyurza-M (Project 51855) with 2 Katran-M IFV 4 regt with 9K37M Buk-M1 (SA-11); S-300P/PS/PT (SA-
turret with 1 twin lnchr with Baryer ATGM 10)
PB 1 Zhuk (FSU Grif) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 1 AIRCRAFT ε125 combat capable
MHI 1 Korund (Yevgenya) (Project 1258) FTR 71: ε37 MiG-29 Fulcrum; ε34 Su-27 Flanker
AMPHIBIOUS FGA ε14 Su-24M Fencer
LANDING SHIPS • LSM 1 Polnochny C (capacity 6 ATK ε31 Su-25 Frogfoot
MBT; 180 troops)
ISR 12: 3 An-30 Clank; ε9 Su-24MR Fencer E*
LANDING CRAFT • LCM 1 Akula (Ondatra)
TPT 30: Heavy 5 Il-76 Candid; Medium 1 An-70; Light
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 10
ε24: 3 An-24 Coke; ε20 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134 Crusty
ABU 1 Project 419 (Sura)
TRG ε32 L-39 Albatros
AG 1 Bereza
HELICOPTERS
AGI 1 Muna
C2 ε14 Mi-9
AKL 1
TPT 32: Medium ε30 Mi-8 Hip; Light 2 PZL Mi-2
AO 2 Toplivo
Hoplite
AWT 1 Sudak
AIR DEFENCE • SAM 322:
AXL 3 Petrushka
Long-range 250 S-300P/PS/PT (SA-10 Grumble)
Naval Aviation ε1,000 Medium-range 72 9K37M Buk-M1 (SA-11 Gadfly)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer)
ASW (2 Be-12 Mail non-operational) SARH R-27 (AA-10A Alamo)
TPT • Light (2 An-26 Curl in store) ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge)
HELICOPTERS ARM Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler); Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter); Kh-
ASW 7+: 4+ Ka-27 Helix A; 3 Mi-14PS/PL Haze A/C 28 (AS-9 Kyle) (likely WFU)
TPT • Medium 1 Ka-29 Helix-B
High-Mobility Airborne Troops ε8,000
Naval Infantry ε2,000 FORCES BY ROLE
FORCES BY ROLE MANOEUVRE
MANOEUVRE Air Manoeuvre
Light 1 AB bde
1 nav inf bde 4 air mob bde
1 nav inf bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES IFV 75+: 30 BMD-1; 45 BMD-2; some BTR-3E1; some
MBT 31 T-80BV BTR-4 Bucephalus
IFV some BMP-1 APC 180+
APC • APC (W) some BTR-60; some BTR-80 APC (T) 25 BTR-D
ARTILLERY APC (W) 155+: 1 BTR-60; 2 BTR-70; 122 BTR-80; 30+
SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika Dozor-B
TOWED 152mm some 2A36 Giatsint-B ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K111-1
Air Forces 45,000 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
3 Regional HQ ARTILLERY 118
FORCES BY ROLE TOWED • 122mm 54 D-30
FIGHTER GUN/MOR • SP • 120mm 40 2S9 NONA-S
4 bde with MiG-29 Fulcrum; Su-27 Flanker; L-39 Albatros MOR 120mm 24 2S12 Sani
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • SP 23mm some ZU-23-2 (truck
2 bde with Su-24M Fencer; Su-25 Frogfoot mounted)
ISR
2 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E* Special Operations Forces n.k.
TRANSPORT SPECIAL FORCES
3 bde with An-24; An-26; An-30; Il-76 Candid; Tu-134 Crusty 2 SF regt
 Russia and Eurasia 215

Paramilitary 88,000 Cyber

Ukraine remains the target of persistent and damaging
National Guard ε46,000 cyber attacks, which have prompted greater state attention
Ministry of Internal Affairs; 5 territorial comd and international support. In June 2016, a National Cyber
FORCES BY ROLE Security Coordination Centre was established, a year after
MANOEUVRE the publication of the National Cyber Security Strategy.
Armoured This centre is an agency of the National Security and
Some tk bn Defence Council and consists of representatives from the
Mechanised defence ministry, the armed forces and the SBU (security
Some mech bn service), among others. In early 2018, a Cyberthreats
Light Response Center was opened, providing inter-agency
Some lt inf bn coordination between the State Service of Special
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine,
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES the state-security service and the national police. Through

Russia and Eurasia

MBT T-64; T-64BV; T-64BM; T-72 a Cyber Defence Trust Fund, NATO states are extending
help to Ukraine in developing its technical capability to
IFV 83: BTR-3; 32+ BTR-3E1; ε50 BTR-4 Bucephalus; 1
counter cyber attacks. According to NATO, this help will
BMP-2
include establishing two Incident Management Centres.
APC 22+
NATO members visited the Serhiy Korolylov Zhytomyr
APC (W) BTR-70; BTR-80
Military Institute in 2018, with a view to establishing a
PPV 22+: Streit Cougar; Streit Spartan; 22 Kozak-2 

course on cyber security. Laboratory exercises as part of
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
this visit included defensive and offensive cyber operations
RCL 73mm some SPG-9
in support of a military scenario. Ukraine has also received
ARTILLERY
bilateral assistance from a number of NATO member states
TOWED 122mm some D-30
in addressing cyber threats.
MOR 120mm some
AIRCRAFT
TPT • Light 24: 20 An-26 Curl; 2 An-72 Coaler; 2 Tu- DEPLOYMENT
134 Crusty AFGHANISTAN: NATO • Operation Resolute Support 11
HELICOPTERS • TPT 8: Medium 7 Mi-8 Hip; Light 1
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
Mi-2MSB
MONUSCO 255; 8 obs; 2 atk hel sqn
AIR DEFENCE
SAM • Point-defence 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse) MOLDOVA: 10 obs
GUNS • SP 23mm some ZU-23-2 (truck mounted) SERBIA: NATO • KFOR 40; OSCE • Kosovo 1; UN •
UNMIK 3 obs
Border Guard ε42,000 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1; 3 obs
FORCES BY ROLE
SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2; 3 obs
MANOEUVRE
Light
some mot inf gp FOREIGN FORCES
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Albania OSCE 9
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Armenia OSCE 2
APC • PPV 17 Kozak-2 Austria OSCE 14
Azerbaijan OSCE 1
Maritime Border Guard Belarus OSCE 7
The Maritime Border Guard is an independent
Belgium OSCE 1
subdivision of the State Commission for Border
Bosnia-Herzegovina OSCE 50
Guards and is not part of the navy
Bulgaria OSCE 43
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Canada OSCE 35 • Operation Unifier 200
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 21
Croatia OSCE 11
PCT 1 Pauk I with 4 single 406mm TT, 2 RBU-1200
Czech Republic OSCE 14
A/S mor, 1 76mm gun
Denmark OSCE 8
PCC 4 Stenka
PB 12: 11 Zhuk; 1 Orlan Estonia OSCE 3
PBR 4 Shmel with 1 76mm gun Finland OSCE 23
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGF 1 France OSCE 18
AIRCRAFT • TPT Medium An-8 Camp; Light An-24 Georgia OSCE 22
Coke; An-26 Curl; An-72 Coaler Germany OSCE 28
HELICOPTERS • ASW: Ka-27 Helix A Greece OSCE 23
216 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Hungary OSCE 28 COMBAT SUPPORT

Ireland OSCE 11 1 arty bde
Italy OSCE 26 1 engr coy
Kazakhstan OSCE 5 1 EW coy
Kyrgyzstan OSCE 26 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Latvia OSCE 7 1 log bn
AIR DEFENCE
Lithuania OSCE 2 • JMTG-U 40
1 AD bn
Macedonia (FYROM) OSCE 31
Moldova OSCE 45 Luhansk People’s Republic ε14,000
Montenegro OSCE 3 FORCES BY ROLE
Netherlands OSCE 6 MANOEUVRE
Norway OSCE 12 Reconnaissance
Poland OSCE 41 1 recce bn
Portugal OSCE 2 Armoured
Romania OSCE 36 1 tk bn
Russia OSCE 39 Light
4 mot inf bde
Serbia OSCE 16
COMBAT SUPPORT
Slovakia OSCE 12
1 arty bde
Slovenia OSCE 1
1 engr coy
Spain OSCE 16 1 EW coy
Sweden OSCE 11 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Switzerland OSCE 8 1 log bn
Tajikistan OSCE 17 AIR DEFENCE
Turkey OSCE 10 1 AD bn
United Kingdom OSCE 65 • Operation Orbital 53 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
United States OSCE 70 • JMTG-U 220 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT T-64BV; T-64B; T-64BM†; T-72B1; T-72BA
TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT RECCE BDRM-2
DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL IFV BMP-1; BMP-2; BTR-4
APC
In late February 2014, Russian forces occupied Crimea. The APC (T) BTR-D; MT-LB; GT-MU
region then requested to join the Russian Federation after a APC (W) BTR-60; BTR-70; BTR-80
referendum, in March, regarded as unconstitutional by the
ABCV BMD-1, BMD-2
government in Kiev. Months after Russia’s annexation of
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Crimea, fighting began in Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk
MSL 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14
oblasts, with separatist forces there allegedly operating
Spriggan)
with Russian support. Conflict in the east has persisted
RCL 73mm SPG-9
since that date. The information displayed for these forces
GUNS 100mm MT-12
reflects equipment that has been observed as employed in
ARTILLERY
support of the separatist cause in eastern Ukraine. Data
SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 2S3 Akatsiya; 2S19
presented here represents the de facto situation and does
Msta-S†; 203mm 2S7 Pion
not imply international recognition.
TOWED 122mm D-30; 152mm 2A65 Msta-B
EASTERN UKRAINE SEPARATIST FORCES GUN/MOR
SP 120mm 2S9 NONA-S
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE TOWED 120mm 2B16 NONA-K
MRL 122mm BM-21 Grad
Donetsk People’s Republic ε20,000 MOR 82mm 2B14; 120mm 2B11 Sani
FORCES BY ROLE AIR DEFENCE
SPECIAL FORCES SAM
2 (Spetsnaz) SF bn Short-range 9K332 Tor-M2 (SA-15 Gauntlet)
MANOEUVRE Point-defence 2K22 Tunguska (SA-19 Grison); 9K32M
Reconnaissance Strela-2M (SA-7B Grail); 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 9K35
1 recce bn Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Grouse);
Armoured GROM
1 tk bn GUNS
Light SP 23mm ZU-23-2 (tch/on MT-LB)
6 mot inf bde TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-2; 57mm S-60
 Russia and Eurasia 217

FOREIGN FORCES ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Russia Crimea: 28,000; 1 recce bde, 2 naval inf bde; 1 arty
bde; 1 NBC bde; 40 T-72B3 MBT; 80 BMP-2 AIFV; 200 Army 24,500
BTR-82A; 20 BTR-80 APC: 150 MT-LB; 18 2S1 arty; 18 2S19 4 Mil Districts; 2 op comd; 1 Tashkent Comd
arty; 12 BM-21 MRL; 1 AShM bde with 3K60 Bal; 3K55 FORCES BY ROLE
Bastion; 1 FGA regt with Su-24M/MR; Su-30SM; 1 FGA SPECIAL FORCES
regt with Su-27SM/SM3; Su-30M2; 1 FGA regt with Su- 1 SF bde
24M/Su-25SM; 1 atk/tpt hel regt; 1 ASW hel regt; 1 AD regt MANOEUVRE
with S-300PM; 1 AD regt with S-400; 1 Fleet HQ located at Armoured
Sevastopol; 2 radar stations located at Sevastopol (Dnepr 1 tk bde
system) and Mukachevo (Dnepr system) • Donetsk/ Mechanised
Luhansk: 3,000 (reported) 11 MR bde
Air Manoeuvre
Uzbekistan UZB 1 air aslt bde

Russia and Eurasia

1 AB bde
Uzbekistani Som s 2017 2018 2019 Mountain
GDP s 254tr 338tr 1 lt mtn inf bde
COMBAT SUPPORT
US$ 48.8bn 43.3bn
3 arty bde
per capita US$ 1,520 1,326 1 MRL bde
Growth % 5.3 5.0 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Inflation % 12.5 19.2 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Def exp s n.k n.k MBT 340: 70 T-72; 100 T-64; 170 T-62 

US$ n.k n.k RECCE 19: 13 BRDM-2; 6 BRM-1
IFV 270 BMP-2
US$1=s 5203.03 7815.54
APC 359
Population 30,023,709 APC (T) 50 BTR-D
Ethnic groups: Uzbek 73%; Russian 6%; Tajik 5%; Kazakh 4%; APC (W) 259: 24 BTR-60; 25 BTR-70; 210 BTR-80
Karakalpak 2%; Tatar 2%; Korean <1%; Ukrainian <1% PPV 50 Maxxpro+
ABCV 129: 120 BMD-1; 9 BMD-2
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
AUV 11+: 7 Cougar; 4+ M-ATV
Male 12.1 4.2% 4.9% 5.2% 21.0% 2.3% ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Female 11.5% 4.0% 4.7% 5.2% 21.7% 3.1% ARV 20 Maxxpro ARV
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Capabilities MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111
Fagot (AT-4 Spigot)
Uzbekistan enacted a new military doctrine in early 2018, stress-
ing heightened security concerns over terrorism and the poten- GUNS 100mm 36 MT-12/T-12
tial spillover of instability from regional conflicts, particularly ARTILLERY 487+
from Afghanistan. It also noted a requirement for military mod- SP 83+: 122mm 18 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 17+: 17 2S3
ernisation. The new doctrine also focuses on border security and Akatsiya; 2S5 Giatsint-S (reported); 203mm 48 2S7 Pion
hybrid-warfare concerns. Uzbekistan is a member of the SCO, but TOWED 200: 122mm 60 D-30; 152mm 140 2A36 Giatsint-B
suspended its CSTO membership in 2012. It maintains bilateral GUN/MOR 120mm 54 2S9 NONA-S
defence ties with Moscow and in late 2018 a defence cooperation MRL 108: 122mm 60: 36 BM-21 Grad; 24 9P138; 220mm
agreement was reported with India. The armed forces are army 48 9P140 Uragan
dominated and conscript-based. Uzbekistan has a limited capacity
MOR 120mm 42: 5 2B11 Sani; 19 2S12 Sani; 18 M-120
to deploy its forces externally and does not have any international
deployments. The armed forces use mainly Soviet-era equipment.
A sizeable air capability was inherited from the Soviet Union, but Air Force 7,500
minimal recapitalisation in the intervening period has substan- FORCES BY ROLE
tially reduced the active inventory. Logistical and maintenance FIGHTER
shortcomings hinder aircraft availability. In recent years, there 1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum;
has been some procurement of rotary- and fixed-wing transport 1 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker
assets. Uzbekistan is reliant on foreign suppliers for advanced mili- GROUND ATTACK
tary equipment. A State Committee for the Defence Industry was
1 sqn with Su-24 Fencer
established in late 2017 to organise domestic industry and defence
orders. The 2018 defence doctrine calls for improvements to the
1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25BM Frogfoot
domestic defence industry. ELINT/TRANSPORT
1 regt with An-12/An-12PP Cub; An-26/An-26RKR
ACTIVE 48,000 (Army 24,500 Air 7,500 Joint 16,000) Curl
Paramilitary 20,000 TRANSPORT
Conscript liability 12 months Some sqn with An-24 Coke; C295W; Tu-134 Crusty
218 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

TRAINING TPT 69: Heavy 9: 8 H225M Caracal; 1 Mi-26 Halo; Medium

1 sqn with L-39 Albatros 52 Mi-8 Hip; Light 8 AS350 Ecureuil
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER AIR DEFENCE • SAM 45
1 regt with Mi-24 Hind; Mi-26 Halo; Mi-8 Hip; Long-range S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon); FD-2000
1 regt with Mi-6 Hook; Mi-6AYa Hook C (HQ-9)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Medium-range S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline)
AIRCRAFT 41 combat capable Short-range S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
FTR 12 MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum (18 more in store) AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
FGA 13 Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker (11 more in store) (26 Su- AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer); IR/
SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo)
17M (Su-17MZ)/Su-17UM-3 (Su-17UMZ) Fitter C/G non-
ASM Kh-23 (AS-7 Kerry); Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen)
operational)
ARM Kh-25P (AS-12 Kegler); Kh-28 (AS-9 Kyle); Kh-58
ATK 16: 12 Su-25/Su-25BM Frogfoot; 4 Su-24 Fencer
(AS-11 Kilter)
EW/Tpt 26 An-12 Cub (med tpt)/An-12PP Cub
(EW)
ELINT/Tpt 13 An-26 Curl (lt tpt)/An-26RKR Curl
(ELINT)
Paramilitary up to 20,000
TPT 7: Heavy 1 Il-76 Candid; Light 6: 1 An-24 Coke; 4 Internal Security Troops up to 19,000

C295W; 1 Tu-134 Crusty Ministry of Interior
TRG 14 L-39 Albatros
HELICOPTERS National Guard 1,000
ATK 29 Mi-24 Hind Ministry of Defence
 Russia and Eurasia 219

Arms procurements and deliveries – Russia and Eurasia

Significant events in 2018

„„ Production of the S-500 Prometey ballistic-missile-
defence and air-defence system began in March at
the Nizhny Novgorod Machine-Building Plant (NMZ)
and the Kirov Machine-Building Enterprise (KMP).
US media reported in May that the S-500 managed
to intercept a target at a range of 480 kilometres (a
new record). Russia wants to begin S-500 deliveries
the new engine are planned to be delivered from
2023.
„„ In September, Russia’s Rostec sold 60% of NPO
Molniya to Kalashnikov (51% of which is owned by
Rostec). NPO Molniya is an aerospace design firm
that supplies target drones to the Russian defence
ministry and led the Buran space-shuttle programme,

Russia and Eurasia

to front-line units in 2020.
„„ Ukrainian aerospace firm Antonov signed an
agreement with Boeing in July that will see the latter
supply parts enabling Antonov to resume aircraft
production. Prior to Russia’s annexation of Crimea
in 2014, Antonov sourced the majority of parts from
Russia.
„„ In August, Russia contracted Sukhoi for the first two
series-production Su-57 combat aircraft, which are
planned to be delivered by the end of 2020. They
will be fitted with the AL-41F-1 engine (Izdeliye 117)
used by the Su-35S while development of the Su-
57’s new engine (Izdeliye 30) continues. Su-57s with
which was cancelled in 1993. In 2014, NPO Molniya
was facing bankruptcy and unable to meet delivery
deadlines but has since been revived. Kalashnikov
hopes to expand into the space sector through the
acquisition.
„„ President Vladimir Putin authorised the takeover
of United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) by Rostec
in October. This will consolidate all of Russia’s
military-aerospace industry into one entity and
should make easier the funding of large aerospace
projects. However, unlike UAC, Rostec is currently
under sanctions by the US and the takeover could
negatively affect Russian aerospace exports.

▼ Figure 13 Russian Air Force: new tactical fighter deliveries, 2010–17

70
Su-27SM3
60 Su-30M2
Su-30SM
50
Su-34
Number of aircraft

40 Su-35S
MiG-29SMT
30

20

10

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

© IISS
220 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

▼ Figure 14 Russian next-generation armoured-vehicle programmes: progress as of late 2018

Armata

Prime contractor Planned in-service dates

T-14 MBT UralVagonZavod (UVZ) (2015) (late 2018)
2018 2020
Selected subcontractor/s
 Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant (2B-12-3A Stage:
1,500 hp engine) Low-rate initial production and
state tests
 Factory No. 9 (2A82-1M 125 mm
cannon) Notes:
T-15 IFV  KBP Instrument Design Bureau Deliveries of low-rate initial
(Epokha turret with 2A42 production batch ordered in 2015
30 mm gun) (82 T-14, 41 T-15, 9 T-16) expected to
complete in 2022
 KB Mashinostroyeniya (Afganit
active-protection system) High costs may result in limited
 NII Stali (Malakhit passive armour production run
complex)
T-16 ARV
 JSC Concern Sozvezdie (integrated
tactical command-and-control
system)

Kurganets

B-10 APC Prime contractor Planned in-service dates

KuganMashZavod (KMZ) (2015) (late 2018)
2018 2021
Selected subcontractor/s
 Yaroslavl Motor Plant (YaMZ-7801 Stage:
700 hp engine) Low-rate initial production and
factory tests
 KBP Instrument Design Bureau
(Epokha turret with 2A42 Notes:
B-11 IFV 30 mm gun) Delays caused by technical issues
 JSC Concern Sozvezdie (integrated and KMZ’s financial difficulties
tactical command-and-control
system)
 NII Stali (passive armour complex)

Bumerang

K-16 APC Prime contractor Planned in-service dates

Military Industrial Group (VPK) (2015) (late 2018)
2019 2020
Selected subcontractor/s
 Arzamas Machine-Building Plant Stage:
(AMZ) (vehicle manufacturer) Factory tests

 Yaroslavl Motor Plant (YaMZ-780 Notes:

K-17 IFV 700 hp engine) Factory tests planned to be
 KBP Instrument Design Bureau completed in 2019
(Epokha turret with 2A42
30 mm gun)
 NII Stali (passive armour complex)
 Russia and Eurasia 221

▼ Figure 15 Admiralty Shipyards: Project 636 Varshavyanka (Improved Kilo) and Project 677 Lada (St Petersburg)
attack submarines

In 1975 the Rubin Design Bureau began work on a replacement for

the Project 641/B (Foxtrot and Tango) submarines. The hull shape of Project 636
the 641/B displayed a lineage from wartime-era submarines, but with
the Paltus Project 877 (Kilo), Soviet designers opted for the more
hydrodynamically efficient ‘teardrop’ shape that was becoming
prevalent.
Between 1980 and 1997, over 40 Kilo submarines were built for the
Soviet Union (and Russia) and other customers. The 877 design
continued the Soviet preference for double-hulled submarines. Project 677
Subsequently, 18 export variants (877EKM) optimised for warmer
waters were sold. The incorporation of design refinements led to the

Russia and Eurasia

production of a further model, the Varshavyanka Project 636
(Improved Kilo), intended for export, primarily to Warsaw Pact
nations. Of these, two were sold to China, though a follow-on batch
of ten improved Project 636Ms were delivered to Algeria and China.
A subsequent variant, the Project 06361, was designed for Vietnam.
Both 636M and 06361 can operate the Klub family of cruise Prime contractor
missiles. Work began in the late 1980s on a replacement for Paltus, Admiralty Shipyards (RUS)
although construction of the resulting Project 677 Lada boat did not
Selected subcontractors
begin until 1996. Lada is the first Russian conventionally powered
submarine to have hydroplanes on the fin and, unlike Kilo, has a Gidropribor** (RUS)
single hull. Lada has a smaller displacement than Kilo, with improved Granit-Elektron (RUS)
manoeuvrability.
Kolomensky Zavod (RUS)
However, the project has suffered from problems relating to the
power plant and the air-independent propulsion (AIP) system. AIP NPO Avrora (RUS)
will not be fitted onto those Lada boats that remain to be built under NPO Novator* (RUS)
the contract. Likely because of the challenges with Lada builds, the
Okeanpribor (RUS)
Russian Navy ordered six domestic standard Project 06363 Kilo
submarines in 2010 and 2011, which were delivered on schedule in Rubin Design Bureau (RUS)
2014–16. The Russian Navy’s decision to order a second batch may *Klub/Kalibr cruise missiles ** Torpedoes
indicate confidence in the type, as well as a lack of available
alternatives.

Admiralty Shipyards Project 636 and 677 submarines: production rates, 1995–2017

Sep 2017

Dec 2014

Apr 2012

Jul 2009

Oct 2006

Jan 2004 Keel laid

Launched
Apr 2001 Commissioned

Jul 1998

Oct 1995
)

(6 )
2)

(6 3)

(6 -1)

(6 -2)

(6 -3)

(6 -4)

(6 -5)

VN (636 )

VN (063 )

VN (063 )

VN (063 )

VN (063 )

VN (063 )
(0 5)

(0 -6)

(0 -1)

(0 -2)

(0 -3)

(0 -4)

(0 -5)

)
)

-1
-2

-6
-1

-
RU 77-

7-

M M-

M 61-

M 61-

M 61-

M 61-

M 61-
77

PR 36M

PR 36M

PR 36M

PR 36M

AL 36M

AL 36M

3
63
36

36

PR (67

RU 636

RU 636

RU 636

RU 636

RU 636

RU 636
(6

(6

(6

63
C

S
PR

PR

RU

RU

© IISS
438 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Chapter Nine

Sub-Saharan Africa
 With few exceptions, a combination of ageing inven-
tories and a lack of procurement investment is limiting
the region’s ability to generate combat air power. 
 Amid continuing conflict and crises in the region,
positive developments included the rapprochement
between Ethiopia and Eritrea. 
 The African Union continues to work towards harmon-
ising its African Standby Force concept with the range
of ad hoc groupings that have developed, such as the
G-5 Sahel and the MNJTF combating Boko Haram.
China has deepened its defence presence in the
region with the establishment of its first overseas mili-
tary base at Djibouti.
With regional budgets still constrained, defence
spending declined by 5% between 2017 and 2018.

Sub-Saharan Africa defence spending, 2018 – top 5 Active military personnel – top 10
(10,000 per unit)
United States
Eritrea
US$643.3bn 201,750
South Sudan
185,000
Ethiopia 138,000

Nigeria 135,000
Total Democratic Republic
Sub-Saharan of the Congo 134,250
Africa
spending Angola 107,000
US$71.1bn
South Africa Angola Sudan 104,300

3.68bn 2.22bn South Africa 65,350

Uganda 45,000
Nigeria Kenya Cote d'Ivoire

1.75bn 1.28bn 935m

Rwanda 33,000

Patrol and coastal combatants

(10 per unit)
Nigeria
Angola
Cameroon
Ghana
Tanzania
Djibouti
Eritrea
Mozambique
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
 Sub-Saharan Africa 439

Regional defence policy and economics 440 ►

Armed forces data section 451 ►

Arms procurements and deliveries 501 ►

Deployments in Africa, November 2018

MINUSMA (Mali)
12,160 (troops and observers)

Rwanda Uganda Burundi

South Sudan (UNAMISS) Somalia (AMISOM) – 6,022 Somalia (AMISOM) – 5,073
– 2,797

Ethiopia
Somalia (AMISOM) – 4,323

UNMISS (South Sudan)

14,572 (troops and observers)
AMISOM (Somalia)
21,336 troops

MONUSCO (DRC)
14,270 (troops and observers) Ethiopia
Abyei (contested by Sudan and
South Sudan) (UNISFA) – 4,445

Deployments: top five African nations

Ethiopia – 12,596 Burundi – 5,851 MINUSCA (CAR)
Uganda – 6,557 Kenya – 4,192 11,182 (troops and observers)
Rwanda – 5,859 Top 5 PKO Missions,
November 2018

Transport aircraft Main battle tank fleets, 2018

(5 per unit) (50 per unit)
Angola 56 Sudan 465
(10 heavy / medium)

Sub-Saharan
Nigeria 32 Ethiopia 461

Africa
(5 medium)
Nigeria 319
Zimbabwe 25
Angola 300
Sudan 24
(7 heavy / medium)
Eritrea 270
South Africa 24
(7 medium) Uganda 239
Zambia 23
Democratic Republic of the Congo 174
Botswana 19
(3 medium) South Sudan 80
Cameroon 18
(3 medium) Kenya 78
Kenya 17
Chad 60
Madagascar 16 Mozambique 60
440 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Sub-Saharan Africa
Regional defence establishments remain preoccupied
with the causes and consequences of conflict and
instability. The eruption of new crises, such as that
in Cameroon, and flare-ups in areas long afflicted
by conflict and instability, such as the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), act as a reminder of the
fragility of peace and security in parts of the continent.
Threats remain multifaceted, ranging from
institutional weakness to direct challenges from
state and non-state actors, including terrorists. The
duration and fluid nature of some conflicts – which
cross borders and challenge states including by direct
military threat and asymmetric activity – not only
highlight the adaptability of regional adversaries but
also the requirement for long-term measures to tackle
wider development and security priorities, as well
as more immediate military imperatives. As well as
combat capabilities, good logistics, communications
and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
are important. Along with regional and continental
institutions, some defence organisations continue to
make progress in capacity-building, supported by a
range of external actors. However, a continuing task
for local governments and international partners is
ensuring that these efforts are sustainable.
Nonetheless, there were positive developments in
2018, including the rapprochement between Ethiopia
and Eritrea and the declaration on cooperation between
Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia. Measures also continue
on the continent to support the development of peace
and security, such as those of the African Union (AU).
An issue now identified by the AU is to bring into step
measures developed due to necessity – such as the ad
hoc Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), tackling
Boko Haram, and the African Capacity for Immediate
Response to Crises (ACIRC), which emerged after
conflict erupted in Mali in 2013 – with structures like
the African Standby Force (ASF), which are intended
to be a long-term and sustainable means of contending
with the continent’s security crises.
Conflict, terrorism and instability
The roster of regional security challenges grew
longer in 2018. The activity of secessionist groups in
Cameroon’s anglophone regions, together with the
military response by the government, have led to
particular concern over the impact that the fighting
is having on people in affected regions, including
those who are internally displaced. The actions of
Boko Haram have also had an impact on Cameroon’s
population in the north of the country, and the group
also remains active in northern Nigeria. Armed forces
from the MNJTF (which comprises troops from
Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria) remain
engaged on combat operations against this group
in the area of the Lake Chad Basin. The group has
suffered a series of setbacks and has lost territory, but
retains significant operational capacity and continues
its terrorist activity.
Amid continuing ground deployments and ground
combat, including internal deployments to counter
instability in Zamfara State, and the consequent
operational stresses on the armed forces, Nigeria has
looked to increase its air-to-ground combat-support
capacities. Two Mi-35 helicopters arrived in 2018,
while Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari’s visit
to the United States highlighted possible progress
towards the sale to Nigeria of 12 EMB-314 Super
Tucano aircraft, which was earlier blocked by the
Obama administration.
The challenge from insurgents has been enabled
by weak institutions and governance in the region, as
well as the effect of conflicts both in the region and
further north; Libya is a prime example. The 2013
near-collapse in Mali, which followed rapid advances
by Islamist groups, led to rapid French military action
to forestall a takeover by these groups and to bolster
local security forces. French forces remain engaged
on combat operations and capacity-building tasks in
Mali and regional states as part of Operation Barkhane,
which began in 2014. The challenges to this mission
are many, not least because of the terrain. It is also
challenging in terms of intelligence, surveillance and
combat- and logistics-support requirements.
France’s operations are conducted alongside
missions by regional states of the G5 Sahel grouping
(Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger).
In July 2017, the group created the G5 Sahel Cross-

Border Joint Force. The European Union financially
supports the joint force to the tune of €50 million
(US$56m), among other types of support for the
G5 Sahel. At full operational capability, the force
is planned to have some 5,000 military and police
personnel, with seven battalions spread across three
zones (centre, east and west). It is understood that the
force headquarters, based in Mali, relocated in late
2018 from Sévaré to Bamako. (The base at Sévaré was
targeted by terrorists earlier in the year.)
Further east, Somalia has long suffered from
the actions of al-Shabaab, as well as years of clan
violence and weak governance. International support
for the reconstruction of the Somali security sector
continues, with military training taking place in
Mogadishu. The African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) continues to engage in combat operations
against al-Shabaab, as do external actors, including
the US. The Somali authorities are to assume security
responsibility eventually and, according to the United
Nations, the government is planning for transfer of
responsibility in four areas: operational handover of
locations from AMISOM to the Somali security forces;
institutional capacity-building; the implementation of
the national-security architecture; and the alignment
of supporting activities, such as local governance
and stabilisation. However, with al-Shabaab still
demonstrating its operational capability through
continued attacks, any drawdown in AMISOM’s
strength or areas of responsibility will need to be
carefully managed.
Continental initiatives
Such security crises and conflicts involve the
deployment of military personnel and materiel from
multiple African states. However, external actors are
vital, not just in terms of the materiel and logistical
support they can offer, but also in financial terms.
Improving regional states’ capacity to act in
support of continental security requirements is key
to realising the ambition of regional standby forces,
which are part of the African Peace and Security
Architecture pursued by the AU. Each Regional
Economic Community (REC) is developing a standby
force and regional logistics depot, while in early
2018 the AU inaugurated the planned Continental
Logistics Base at Douala in Cameroon. RECs continue
to develop their standby forces, although the ASF
was declared operational by the AU in early 2016,
following the end of exercise Amani Africa II. The RECs
are increasingly active in addressing regional security
Sub-Saharan Africa 441
requirements. For instance, in September 2018 the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development
mandated Djibouti and Somalia to deploy troops
to South Sudan. This builds on the UN-authorised
Regional Protection Force, which began to deploy
in late 2017 – principally to the Juba area – in order
to allow United Nations Mission in South Sudan
(UNMISS) forces to redeploy to other locations.
Another example is the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) mission to Gambia in
2017.
Nonetheless, the challenge lies in synchronising
the ASF with the range of ad hoc groupings that have
developed, including the ACIRC, the G5 Sahel, the
MNJTF and the Regional Cooperation Initiative for
the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army. The
AU is pursuing initiatives in this regard, and has
been in discussion with the RECs, including on a legal
framework concerning the deployment and use of the
ASF. At its October 2018 Chiefs of Defence meeting,
the AU said that it would provide ‘mission and
logistical support, technical assistance and financial
support and resource mobilisation’, as part of its plan
to boost cooperation with ad hoc coalitions. The AU’s
Maputo Strategic Five-Year Work Plan on the African
Standby Force (2016–20) ‘underscored that the RECs
… are part of the overall security architecture of
the Union’. The plan charges key AU leaders with
ensuring that the activities of the RECs are consistent
with the aims and objectives of the AU.
However, the Maputo work plan is being revised.
The AU sees it as a ‘living document’, intended
to tackle political, technical and operational gaps
identified in lessons-learned processes coming out of
AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs). The AU said in
2018 that the work plan incorporated new elements
Sub-Saharan
‘that include the revision and development of an
Africa
AU PSO Doctrine and ASF concept; harmonisation
between the ASF Framework and ACIRC activities;
and enhanced cooperation between the ASF and
ad-hoc coalitions’.
Work is also under way, through the Maputo work
plan, to identify routine gaps in regional military
capacity, such as in strategic airlift. The possibility
of pursuing pre-approved contracts for strategic-lift
capabilities has been raised. Uganda, meanwhile, has
pledged a C-130 to the AU for ASF strategic lift, and
the AU’s Peace and Security Commission is looking
for more contributions. The AU was due to conduct
the last two of its REC strategic-lift assessments
in late 2018, for the North African Regional
442 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Capability and the Southern African Development
Community. An important development has been
the establishment of the AU’s Peace Fund, which
should provide more predictable funding for AU
PSOs. If fully operationalised, a source of African
funding for African peace-support operations could
fundamentally change the relationship between the
AU, UN and EU as well as other influential donors
such as the US, United Kingdom and France.
Foreign military presence: new influences
Foreign military support for multinational operations
and national armed forces continued in 2018. French
forces in West Africa and the Sahel region remain
engaged on operations, while France maintains a
significant presence in Djibouti, which is also home
to the US Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa.
From this location, US forces carry out regional
training activities, as well as military operations,
particularly in Somalia. US training activities on the
continent are broad, ranging from pre-deployment
training to mission-specific tasks, and a set of
exercise and support programmes continue, such
as the Flintlock counter-terrorism exercises and
the Africa Contingency Operations Training and
Assistance initiative. The US has been active in
supporting counter-terrorist operations in the Sahel.
As part of a deployment that has built up in recent
years, by May 2018 the US had about 800 personnel
deployed to Niger. The deployment includes training
teams dedicated to building local counter-terrorist
capacities, and armed Reaper uninhabited aerial
vehicles (UAVs) based at Niamey. Nonetheless, the
United States’ largest regional contingent remains
based at Djibouti’s Camp Lemonnier.
As well as France and the US, China is now resident
in Djibouti. For some years, Beijing has deployed
ships off the Horn of Africa on counter-piracy patrols,
though not as part of multinational missions, and
has increasingly taken part in UN peacekeeping
missions and developed defence and security ties
– as well as a range of economic links – across the
continent. Beijing has pledged to establish a China–
Africa peace fund and to continue military assistance
to the AU. Chinese press sources quoted an intended
50 security-assistance programmes. However,
China’s construction of port facilities in Djibouti,
and a military deployment there to the country’s first
overseas military base, has generated a new level of
scrutiny. A marine company is assessed to be present
at the base, though at the time of writing no principal
surface combatants were believed to have yet moored
alongside, though the PLA Navy has docked vessels
there including an amphibious vessel.
Other nations continue to deploy to sub-Saharan
Africa as part of multinational missions, including
EU operations from the Sahel to the Central African
Republic (CAR), as well as on national engagements
like bilateral training assistance. For example, a report
in May 2018 by the UN secretary-general referenced
a 14 March 2018 agreement between Somaliland and
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that the UAE ‘would
support training of “Somaliland” security forces and
that the construction of the military airbase and
naval base at Berbera would proceed as planned’.
The potential training of Somaliland forces was not
greeted positively in Mogadishu. The UK, meanwhile,
has long maintained advisory and training teams on
the continent. The establishment of the new regional
British Defence Staff in 2016 signalled a renewal of the
UK’s relationship with West African states.
Russia too has a relatively long history of
involvement on the continent, though in recent years
this has been restricted to the supply of military
equipment. Moscow’s involvement deepened in
late 2017 when the UN Security Council granted it
an exemption to the arms embargo on the CAR. In
early 2018, it was reported that Russian shipments of
small arms had taken place, along with the provision
of civilian instructors to train two battalions of
CAR troops. Non-governmental organisations have
expressed concern that the influx of new weapons
to government forces would in turn drive rebel
groups to increase their armament. Meanwhile, CAR
President Faustin-Archange Touadéra was reported
to have a Russian security adviser, as well as Russian
nationals in the presidential guard. Media sources
allege that the civilian instructors are in fact from
the same Russian private military company, labelled
‘Wagner’, that has been reported as active in Syria
and Ukraine, though this remains unconfirmed.
DEFENCE ECONOMICS
Macroeconomics
Economic growth firmed up across the continent,
rising from 2.7% in 2017 to 3.1% in 2018, according
to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This
was driven largely by increasing commodity
prices, notably in oil and metals, and a rebounding
economy in Nigeria. Other factors include improved
agricultural output and rising domestic consumption.
 Sub-Saharan Africa 443

▼ Figure 28 China: military engagement in Africa

China takes part in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa
as well as counter-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden. It
also provides maritime-security training off the east coast.
Beijing has also built more permanent military
infrastructure and now has a military base in Djibouti. It has
also financed and built military infrastructure in Ghana,
Tanzania and Zimbabwe, including training centres,
barracks, defence colleges and defence-ministry buildings.
Between 2016 and 2017, China also exported military
equipment to 20 states in North and sub-Saharan Africa,
including offshore-patrol vessels, armoured personnel
carriers, surface-to-air missile systems, uninhabited aerial
vehicles and training aircraft. Meanwhile, China has
invested heavily in the construction of ports, some with
major railway connections as part of regional connectivity
projects. While some of these may be associated with
China’s Belt and Road Initiative, China’s presence in Africa
has moved beyond solely economic or humanitarian
impulses, and there is now a distinct security and defence
focus to its engagement.

Military infrastructure
Peacekeeping operations
as of 30 Sep 2018
Port
El Hamdania port Military-related projects Countries that have
undertaken by the Chinese imported Chinese weapons
government include the
MINUSMA construction of the defence-
Staff officers: 8 ministry complex as well as
Contingent troops: 395 UNAMID
the Ghana Armed Forces
ALGERIA Staff officers: 9
Barracks, reportedly known
Contingent troops: 365
WESTERN as the Beijing Barracks
SAHARA EGYPT
UNMISS
Staff officers: 20
MAURITANIA
MINURSO Experts on mission: 5
MALI NIGER Police: 12
Experts on
mission: 11 SENEGAL SUDAN Contingent troops: 1,020

GHANA NIGERIA
DJIBOUTI PLA military base
SIERRA BENIN SOUTH
LEONE CÔTE CAMEROON SUDAN SOMALIA
D’IVOIRE
MONUSCO
Staff officers: 5
DEMOCRATIC KENYA Experts on mission: 9
REPUBLIC Contingent troops: 218
OF THE TANZANIA
Jamestown port CONGO
Construction of
construction Bagamoyo port;

Sub-Saharan
expansion of Dar-

Africa
Benin River port (deal ANGOLA es-Salaam port
signed Sep 2018) ZAMBIA MOZAMBIQUE Comprehensive
ZIMBABWE Training Centre (CTC)
Kribi deepwater port opened in February
construction – NAMIBIA 2018, Chinese built and
financed by China funded (US$30m)

Deep-water Cabinda SOUTH

port (Angola) – financed AFRICA
and built by China
China is planning the
Zimbabwe National construction of a coastal
Walvis Bay port
Defence College, financed port at Chongoene
construction
and built by China

© IISS
444 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

The rise in commodity prices was noteworthy.
According to the World Bank, oil prices rose from a
yearly average of around US$51 per barrel in 2015 to
around US$80 per barrel in October 2018, while prices
for South African coal rose from US$57 per metric
tonne (mt) in 2015 to US$100 per mt in October 2018.
Metal prices have also increased in recent years – for
instance in aluminium, copper, iron ore, nickel and
zinc – which enabled metal-exporting countries to
increase their mining output.
Despite this increase in commodity prices –
including in agricultural prices – which helped
resource-intensive economies, most regional
economies remained fragile. Although fiscal deficits
narrowed in central African states such as Cameroon,
Chad and Gabon, widening deficits and deteriorating
fiscal positions have led to rising debt levels in
other countries. Rising debt levels were also caused
by exchange-rate depreciation, while the interest
payments needed to service these debts further
constrained countries’ fiscal space. The IMF said that,
for oil exporters, interest payments accounted for
almost 15% of their total revenue in 2017; the figure
was almost 10% for the whole region.
Inflation rates fell in 2018 and stabilised at 8.6%, a
positive development explained by tighter monetary
policies in key countries such as Angola and Nigeria.
Other contributory factors were improved currency
stability and a more moderate increase in agricultural
prices than between 2011 and 2014.
However, regional growth was again weighed
down by the slower recovery in some of the larger
countries, such as South Africa, and persistent
conflict or instability in others, such as Burundi,
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South
Sudan. The economic disruption caused by conflict-

▼ Map 12 Sub-Saharan Africa regional defence spending1

Niger
Mali Chad
Cape Verde Senegal Sudan
Eritrea
Burkina Faso
Gambia
Guinea-Bissau Djibouti
Guinea Côte Ethiopia
d’Ivoire Nigeria
Sierra Leone Central South Sudan
African Rep.
Liberia Somalia
Ghana Benin Cameroon
Togo Uganda
Equatorial Guinea Kenya
Rwanda
Real % Change (2017–18) Republic of
Gabon
More than 20% increase Congo Burundi
Democratic
Between 10% and 20% increase Rep. of the Congo Seychelles
Between 3% and 10% increase
Tanzania
Between 0% and 3% increase
Between 0% and 3% decrease
Angola
Between 3% and 10% decrease
Malawi
Between 10% and 20% decrease
More than 20% decrease Zambia Mozambique
Insufficient data Madagascar
Zimbabwe
Botswana
2018 Defence Spending (US$m) [1] Map illustrating 2018 planned defence-
spending levels (in US$ at market exchange Namibia Mauritius
rates), as well as the annual real percentage
3,629 change in planned defence spending between
3,233 2017 and 2018 (at constant 2010 prices and Swaziland
exchange rates). Percentage changes in
1,530 defence spending can vary considerably from South Africa
year to year, as states revise the level of
1,000 funding allocated to defence. Changes Lesotho
500 indicated here highlight the short-term trend in
planned defence spending between 2017 and
100 2018. Actual spending changes prior to 2017,
50 and projected spending levels post-2018, are
not reflected.
© IISS

2.0
1.5 1.35
1.28 1.25
1.16 1.13
1.04
% of GDP
1.0
0.5
0.0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
▲ Figure 29 Sub-Saharan Africa regional defence
expenditure as % of GDP
related population displacement continues to affect
neighbouring states, as well as the area where conflict
takes place.
Economic success stories include Côte d’Ivoire,
where GDP was expected to grow by 7.4% in 2018 and
7.0% in 2019, slightly lower than the 7.8% figure seen
in 2017. Like Senegal, which grew by 7.0% in 2018,
Côte d’Ivoire has reaped the benefits of infrastructure
investments. Senegal’s ‘Emerging Senegal Plan’,
which launched in 2013, began a series of large
infrastructure projects, including power plants.
However, the fastest-growing region remained East
Africa. Ethiopia’s GDP grew by 7.5% in 2018, also
driven by infrastructure investments. In Kenya,
where growth was 6.0% in 2018, the main factor was
private consumption.
Growth in South Africa slowed down, from
1.3% in 2017 to 0.8% in 2018. Overall, South Africa’s
economic prospects remain mixed, with rising
wages and inflation under control, but also rising
unemployment. However, a change in government in
South Africa – as well as in Angola and Zimbabwe
– helped regenerate confidence over these countries’
economic trajectory.
Defence budgets and procurement
With economies still constrained, defence spending
in sub-Saharan Africa declined by 5.0% in real
terms between 2017 and 2018, after a decline of 5.1%
between 2016 and 2017.
In particular, the fall in Angola’s defence spending
drove totals down. While the budget rose in local-
currency terms, this still resulted in a decline in
US-dollar terms, given currency problems the
Sub-Saharan Africa 445
country experienced in 2018. Angola introduced a
floating exchange rate early in 2018 to protect its
foreign reserves, which led to a depreciation in its
currency. As a result, defence spending declined in
US-dollar terms from AOA536 billion (US$3.2bn) in
2017 to AOA546bn (US$2.2bn) in 2018.
In South Africa, years of economic
underperformance led defence spending to fall
further when measured in rand, although exchange
rates resulted in a slight increase in US-dollar
terms, from R48.6bn (US$3.65bn) in 2017 to R47.9bn
(US$3.68bn) in 2018. The most significant budget
cuts have been to those of the air force and navy.
As a result, the Department of Defence stated in its
2018 Annual Performance Plan that the proposals
elaborated in the 2015 defence review could not be
realised. This review restated South Africa’s ambition
to be the major regional power, though these
economic challenges will likely limit South Africa’s
aspirations until more funds can be generated.
By contrast, the budget in Nigeria rose from
N465bn (US$1.5bn) in 2017 to N567bn (US$1.7bn)
in 2018. While significant costs are disbursed on
ongoing operations in the north of the country, the
2018 budget bill provides funds for developing
naval capacities, including hydrographic survey
ships, landing ships, patrol craft and patrol boats.
The budget also indicated that the navy will acquire
an uninhabited aerial vehicle. Nigeria’s principal
maritime threats relate to piracy, illegal fishing and
the theft of oil in the country’s inland waterways,
deltas and coastal areas. Maritime-equipment
deliveries in 2018 included FPB 72 and FPB 110
MkII patrol boats from French shipyard OCEA.
Germany also donated five patrol boats in 2018 to
help Nigerian forces patrol Lake Chad and to help in
Sub-Saharan
the fight against Boko Haram.
Africa
Significantly in 2018, the United States changed
its stance regarding arms transfers to Nigeria. While
the Obama administration limited arms sales due
to security and humanitarian reasons, US President
Donald Trump lifted the ban as part of a general push
to increase US arms sales. This means that progress
might now be made on the plan to acquire 12
EMB-314 Super Tucano aircraft, in addition to related
training and spare parts, for a total estimated by the
US Defense Security Cooperation Agency at US$593
million. These aircraft are used elsewhere in a light-
attack role, and on arrival in Nigeria should further
reinforce the country’s capabilities for counter-
terrorism operations.
446 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Meanwhile, there were significant increases in
the defence budgets of some smaller sub-Saharan
African countries. Burkina Faso’s budget rose from
Fr112bn (US$192m) to Fr174bn (US$315m), while
budgets in Côte d’Ivoire and Tanzania also increased
– from Fr482bn (US$829m) to Fr517bn (US$935m)
in the former and from Sh1.19 trillion (US$532m)
to Sh1.73trn (US$757m) in the latter. The increase
in Tanzania may be explained by funds allocated to
enable the delivery of Super Puma helicopters in 2018,
a deal valued at €190m (US$225m), according to a
French parliamentary report on arms exports.
Defence industry
South Africa is home to the region’s most advanced
defence industries. However, limited defence
spending by the state in recent years has not helped
the country’s defence manufacturers, and exports
have not entirely compensated for this.
In 2017, the latest year for which data is available,
total export values declined to R3.62bn (US$272m),
from the 2016 total of R4.17bn (US$283m). Armoured
vehicles remained the principal export products, with
Paramount and Denel the key manufacturers.
Denel encountered difficulties that reflected
some of the broader challenges facing South African
defence firms. The company faced a liquidity crisis in
the wake of questions over governance. Attempts to
open Denel Asia in 2016, a joint venture in India with
VR Laser Asia, have been highlighted in the media. It
was intended to be a stepping stone to enable Denel
to penetrate Asian markets, but became involved in
broader allegations of corruption levelled against
the Gupta family – with whom the firm VR Laser
Asia was linked. Press reports alleged that had the
joint venture been set up as planned, it would likely
have benefited the Gupta family through preferential
terms. The company’s financial position was also
not helped by its acquisition of BAE Systems Land
Systems South Africa for R855m (US$67m) in 2015.
Reports indicated that as a result of its liquidity
problems, Denel had experienced difficulties in paying
its employees and suppliers on at least one occasion.
In turn, reportedly delayed payments to suppliers
generated knock-on delays in programme production.
In a bid to improve matters, Denel’s entire board was
replaced in April 2018, and the new leadership is
engaged in efforts to improve governance.
At the same time, South Africa is implementing
a national strategy to revive its defence industry.
Two important initiatives were launched in 2018: a
Defence Industry Fund (DIF) and a defence science
and engineering programme. The DIF is structured
around a public–private partnership (the private
firm Crede Capital Partners will operate the fund).
DIF will be able to lend money to defence companies
to develop their supply chain or guarantee exports.
The defence science and engineering programme,
meanwhile, targets universities in order to train
skilled personnel for the defence sector.
In other regional countries, defence manufacturing
remains limited in scale and at the lower end of the
technological spectrum. Most firms are involved in
the land sector, such as Uganda’s Impala Services
and Logistics, which produces armoured personnel
carriers. Nigeria’s defence-industrial base is the
most advanced after South Africa’s, and in 2018
an agreement was signed with Poland’s PGZ to
manufacture rifles under licence in the Ordnance
Factory Complex in Kaduna, which is operated by the
state-run Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria.
Nigeria also has a small-scale naval shipbuilding
capacity, with firms including Epenal Group
shipyard, Nautic Africa and Nigeria Naval Dockyard.
SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa’s defence review was conducted in
2011–13 and released in 2015. It set out a robust
regional role for the South African National Defence
Force (SANDF) and was accepted across government.
However, the review warned that the defence budget
was not only inadequate to support that ambition, but
also insufficient to prevent further decline in South
Africa’s defence capability. Nonetheless, funding
dropped to less than 1% of GDP in 2018, and the
SANDF has been warned to expect yet further cuts,
making any notion of an expanded regional security
role unrealistic.
The primary driver for the review’s
recommendations about South Africa’s regional
role was economic. The country needs a stable
environment within which it can continue to
develop and to expand exports into Africa; for
most of the continent it remains the most important
manufacturing economy. As then-president Thabo
Mbeki set out at the 2001 World Economic Forum in
Davos, this requires ‘peace, security and stability’ – a
prerequisite if South Africa is to attract the scale of
fixed capital investment it needs.
This desire motivated the decisions to deploy
SANDF personnel to Lesotho (1998), Burundi (2001–

09), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
(2001 to date), Comoros (2006) and the Central African
Republic (CAR) (2007–13). A vision of wider African
solidarity led to the deployments to Darfur (2004–16),
the provision of staff officers to African Union and
United Nations missions in Eritrea, Ethiopia and
Liberia for various periods, as well as engagement in
Côte d’Ivoire (2006) and Libya (2011) in support of the
South African president’s peace efforts.
However, the security challenge remains. South
Africa’s immediate region – the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) – is unstable: the
DRC remains beset by conflict; Lesotho, Swaziland
and Zimbabwe are fragile; and Mozambique is at
risk of renewed insurgency by Renamo rebels and
now faces what appears to be Islamist terrorism in
the north along the border with Tanzania. Angola,
meanwhile, faces the risk of renewed insurgency in
its oil-rich Cabinda exclave should it lose influence
in either of the Congos, which could provide safe
haven for guerrillas. Some analysts think that either
the Republic of Congo or the DRC will in future
dispute Angola’s possession of Cabinda, which is
geographically, ethnically and historically a part of
the former Congo kingdoms. Countries adjacent to
the SADC are even less stable: the Republic of Congo
is fragile, the CAR is a failed state, South Sudan is
embroiled in civil war and Burundi faces renewed
political and security problems.
The need for South Africa to remain engaged with
regional security issues therefore continues, but for
Pretoria to play a credible and effective role, it needs
the military capability to respond quickly to crises,
to participate in extended peace-support missions,
deal with disruptive state or non-state actors and
conduct constabulary operations, such as counter-
piracy patrols. It will not be possible, analysts argue,
to regenerate and develop the necessary military
capabilities at current funding levels.
A force challenged
Current funding levels place in question the ability
of the SANDF to meet even the objective of the
review’s first planning milestone – to ‘arrest the
decline in critical capabilities’ (the target date was
2018). The entire concept of ‘milestones’ in the review
has been undermined by budget cuts in 2018, which
will result in further capability reductions and the
generation of a ‘bow wave’ of requirements, as more
equipment becomes obsolete or non-operational
as a result of inadequate maintenance. Meanwhile,
Sub-Saharan Africa 447
training, which has also reduced over the past two
decades due to lack of funding, will be further
affected.
Government funding works on a three-year
medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) that
is intended to ensure a smooth funding flow. The
2018 budget was reduced from the amount that had
been originally set for this and the next two years in
the MTEF. A second wave of cuts is expected in the
budget issued halfway through the financial year,
with a real likelihood of more cuts during the current
five-year medium-term strategic framework (MTSF).
The impact of this is summed up in a key paragraph
of the Department of Defence’s (DoD’s) 2018 Annual
Performance Plan (APP). The APP says that ‘the
persistent disconnect between government’s defence
expectations and the resources allocated to defence
has eroded capabilities to the point where the SANDF
will be unable to fulfil its defence commitments. The
SANDF therefore cannot even support the current
modest level of ambition. South Africa’s defence
ambition and defence capacity are clearly at odds
with one another.’
The plan also says that a full review of the
department might be needed in order to align it with
available resources. It posits that the DoD may instead
have to plan against the defence review’s ‘Strategic
Policy Option 1’, which was based on an assumption
that reduced defence funding translates into ‘vastly
reduced defence capability’, which ‘does not support
a continental leadership role’ and is ‘unable to fully
comply with the constitutional requirements’.
The pressure on the army was lifted to an extent
by the decision in 2016 to withdraw the SANDF
battalion deployed in Darfur, meaning that the only
major deployed South African force was an army
Sub-Saharan
combat formation and air-force contingent attached
Africa
to the MONUSCO Force Intervention Brigade in the
DRC. The government has at various times talked
of additional deployments, including a return to
the CAR, but at the same time, the army lacks the
troops for effective border patrols. Meanwhile, the
navy is conducting patrols along the west coast of
Africa when it lacks sufficient ships (possessing in
its surface fleet only four frigates and four patrol and
coastal craft, barring minesweepers and auxiliaries)
to patrol home waters and the Mozambique Channel
– the route for half of South Africa’s oil imports. The
disconnect between what government expects of
the SANDF and what it is willing to fund remains a
critical problem.
448 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Meanwhile, the country’s foreign and national-
security policies are seen by analysts as incoherent.
Some cabinet ministers, at least in the former Zuma
administration, reportedly alleged Western plans for
‘regime change’ in South Africa. And there have been
closer ties with countries regarded as hostile to the
West, such as China and Russia as well as Cuba, Iran
and Venezuela. This attitude may also explain other
actions by the DoD or the SANDF, such as the last-
minute cancellation of live-fire missile exercises at the
Denel Overberg Test Range scheduled by the Italian
and Turkish navies in 2014 (the latter was reinstated
after protests by Ankara). There was also a last-minute
refusal of overflight rights (reinstated after protest at
ministerial level) for German Tornados for their long-
planned 2017 live-fire exercise at the same range. The
undertaking by the South African ambassador to
Venezuela on 18 July 2018 that Pretoria would provide
troops to defend that country against the United
States was quickly repudiated by the Department of
International Relations and Cooperation.
Equipment and training
Tight funding and a decade of overstretch have
left their mark: training exercises are fewer and
dramatically smaller in scale; equipment and
facilities cannot be properly maintained; and critical
equipment gaps remain unaddressed.
The air force still operates, for example, 1940s-era
C-47TPs for maritime surveillance and 1963-vintage
C-130s that lack the payload and range performance
for regional missions. The navy may soon have only
eight viable ships (four frigates and three submarines,
delivered between 2006 and 2008, and a 30-year-old
support ship), as its fleet of ageing patrol craft and
minehunters will need to be retired. The army has
not been able to replace its 1980s-vintage soft-skinned
vehicles or armoured personnel carriers, and has
funding for only 15 infantry companies to conduct
border patrols, instead of the planned 22. However,
the army may finally receive two battalion sets of the
new Badger infantry combat vehicle (ICV).
Political factors also pose challenges. For instance,
some assert that political pressure to award the
contract for three offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) to
China’s Poly Technologies may have been a factor in
the project being delayed after the tender process saw
Dutch company Damen being the preferred bidder.
Similarly, instead of training its own mechanics, the
army is employing Cuban mechanics to repair its
vehicles to an ad hoc standard rather than to baseline.
Operational lessons
At the same time, lessons have been learned from
South Africa’s deployments abroad. For instance, a
study of the combat in Bangui in March 2013 led to
some changes to the SANDF contingent deployed
to the DRC. For example, battalion commanders are
allowed to decide which weapons they take for each
mission, and each battalion is given some experienced
officers and NCOs for the duration of its deployment.
Meanwhile, officers who served in the CAR during
the clash in March 2013 support pre-deployment
training. And there are also three Rooivalk attack
helicopters for close support, in addition to five Oryx
helicopters to help air mobility and other tasks. When
the United Nations mooted replacing the Rooivalk
detachment with ‘cheaper’ Mi-24s, the South African
government objected, apparently to the extent of
warning that if the Rooivalk was withdrawn, the Oryx
helicopters and the South African battalion would
also be withdrawn.
South African contingents performed well in
the DRC, as previously in Burundi and in Darfur.
Similarly, anecdotal evidence from the Mozambique
Navy and from the South African tourism sector
suggests that the navy’s patrols in the northern parts
of the Mozambique Channel have reduced general
maritime crime – illegal fishing, smuggling and
people trafficking; there has been no pirate activity
since the patrols began in 2011.
SANDF engagement in peace-support and
constabulary missions has also proved useful in
building professionalism and boosting morale and
retention: there is a sense that personnel are carrying
out tasks for which they were trained. One indicator
of this is that the army now has middle-ranking
officers and senior NCOs that have completed ten
to 12 deployments. Professionalism has become
more evident among officers moving up through the
system, even if the mission and funding mismatch
continues to frustrate and concern service chiefs and
senior officers. That said, there remain some senior
officers whose appointments seem perplexing to
outside observers, and there have been reports that
senior personnel have been arrested on suspicion of
illicit activities, although this could become less of
a concern as operationally experienced officers and
NCOs are promoted.
There is, however, a near-term challenge in the
form of succession planning regarding the top posts.
The secretary for defence, the chief of the defence
force, the chief of defence staff, the chief of the army,
 Sub-Saharan Africa 449

the chief of the air force and the general officer
commanding special forces are all due to retire over
the next two years, and suitable successors are not
immediately apparent. There is no lack of suitable
officers, but poor succession planning has caused
a gap between officers due to retire too soon to be
available for these posts and others that will still be
too junior in rank in two years. This may require
some officers to be fast-tracked, but there is precedent
for that in the former South African Defence Force.
Defence economics
The primary challenge facing South Africa’s armed
forces remains the mismatch between funding and
commitments. While the budget has remained more
or less constant in US-dollar terms over the past few
years, it was inadequate to begin with and has not
matched inflation. In addition, with unemployment
a significant problem there is no specific SANDF exit
mechanism to plan for and manage departures, such
as improved severance packages. As a consequence,
the average age of SANDF personnel is steadily
increasing, while an increasing proportion of junior
ranks have families. The result has been that direct
(57.1% of the budget) and indirect personnel costs
absorb, according to treasury budget papers, almost
80% of the available funding.
This has put the SANDF in a difficult situation,
resulting in, according to official documents,
reductions in training exercises, air-force flying hours
and sea days (500 sea days for the entire fleet in the first
two years of the current three-year MTEF, shrinking to
417 in FY2020/21). It also makes it difficult to maintain
equipment and facilities properly, let alone close
strategic capability gaps or replace old equipment.
The present budget plan is to cut personnel from just
over 75,500 to about 74,660 by 2020 and reduce the use
of reserve personnel. However, this will depend on
finding an exit mechanism and the funds needed to
buy out those personnel who are no longer required,
and on the government not entering into new tasks
requiring significant personnel commitments.
With the economy shrinking, there are only slim
prospects for any real increase in defence funding,
even looking beyond the present three-year MTEF
and five-year MTSF. The DoD has, however, taken
a new approach in arguing its case for funding. It
has set out the importance of exports to the region –
which depend on stability that, in turn, can depend
on peace-support or constabulary operations – and
foreign-currency earnings from defence exports. The
Rooivalk attack helicopter, for instance, cost some R6.2
billion (US$642 million) to develop and manufacture,
and had by the end of 2013 generated foreign-
exchange revenues of more than R15bn (US$1.55bn)
from the export of subsystems (both 2013 rand).
There were some positive developments in the
medium-term (three-year) budget, but there remains
the chance of further cuts during the year. The army
may receive the first Badger ICVs, artillery command
systems and new water-purification equipment,
and the air force the first A-Darter infrared air-to-air
missiles and a new mobile communications system.
Some funds had been allocated to maritime and
light-transport aircraft, although those seem unlikely
to materialise since the money has been diverted to
personnel costs. The navy has been disappointed by
the fate of its planned three OPVs, which have been

Sub-Saharan
Africa
Table 20 SANDF budget by programme (in rand/US$ at yearly exchange rates)
Programme/Year 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21
Final Planned Actual Planned Revised Planned
Administration 5.5bn (409m) 5.6bn (432m) 5.5bn (426m) 5.9bn (437m) 5.8bn (430m) 6.3bn (448m)
Force Employment  3.4bn (358m) 3.7bn (281m) 3.4bn (259m) 3.8bn (276m) 3.6bn (264m) 3.8bn (270m)
Landward Defence 16.7bn (1.25bn) 17.1bn (1.3bn) 16.2bn (1.2bn) 18.2bn (1.3bn) 16.6bn (1.2bn) 17.0bn (1.2bn)
Air Defence  6.8bn (510m) 7.1bn (548m) 6.4bn (492m) 8.6bn (630m) 7.3bn (535m) 8.2bn (586m)
Maritime Defence 4.6bn (346m) 4.89bn (375m) 4.4bn (339m) 4.5bn (330m) 4.4bn (324m) 5.1bn (363m)
Military Health Support 4.6bn (349m) 4.91bn (376m) 4.7bn (362m) 5.4bn (395m) 5.3bn (387m) 5.8bn (416m)
Defence Intelligence 908m (68m) 948m (73m) 1bn (73m) 1bn (74m) 1bn (73m) 1.1bn (76m)
General Support 6.5bn (490m) 6.3bn (483m) 6.3bn (482m) 6.7bn (491m) 6.7bn (492m) 6.9bn (494m)
Total R49bn R50.6bn R48bn R50.4bn R50.7bn R54.0bn
(US$3.7bn) (US$3.9bn) (US$3.7m) (US$4.0bn) (US$3.7bn) (US$3.9bn)
Source: South African defence budget 2018
450 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
deferred, although contracts for three inshore patrol
vessels and a new survey ship have been signed.
However, it remains to be seen how far these plans
will be realised in the face of the weakening economy.
The Special Defence Account, which covers the
acquisition of equipment and systems, is due to
receive only R5.36bn (US$411m) in 2018/19, R5.29bn
(US$406m) in 2019/20 and R5.51bn (US$423m) in
2020/21, assuming that there are no further cuts.
Defence industry
The South African defence industry is much smaller
than it was in 1989, down from 130,000 employees
to 15,000 and from some 3,000 companies to fewer
than 200; it has also lost some key capabilities. The
main factor in this reduction was the 50% cut in
defence funding between 1989 and 1994, years that
saw operational costs increase. This was followed by
the costs of integrating the non-statutory forces and
the former SADF, moving to a regular force and then
nearly a decade of operational overstretch from 2001.
An outcome is that SANDF-funded research and
development (R&D), accounting for about 11.2% of
acquisition funding in the 2018/19 financial year, is set
to decline to 10.2% by 2020/21, forcing many projects
to be put on hold or even cancelled.
For a considerable time, the defence industry
was able to offset the shrinking SANDF acquisition
budget by exporting, and it continues to be successful
in the international market. The reduction in defence-
funded R&D has meant that companies have fewer
new products, which has affected export potential,
with exports in 2015 dropping below the level
reached in 2006.
Pretoria now appreciates the economic potential
of the defence industry, and a new defence-industry
strategy was approved in April 2018. The strategy
calls for streamlining the SANDF acquisition
and procurement processes, as well as focused
government support, but it will not succeed if defence-
acquisition funding cannot be increased and if there
is no support for joint ventures or partnerships with
foreign and international defence groups. However,
there is potential for such cooperation, given South
Africa’s success in secure communications, electronic
warfare, guided weapons and protected vehicles.
However, there will need to be a shift in government
thinking on foreign partnerships, given that the only
viable partners will often be Western states, rather
than favoured friends such as China and Russia (who
are also the defence industry’s primary competitors).
Another challenge lies in attempting to draft an
implementation plan when there is no certainty
regarding acquisition funding. That will make it
difficult for the defence industry to plan ahead and
may see more companies exit the sector.
 Sub-Saharan Africa 451

1 (4th) div (1 tk regt, 5 mot inf bde, 2 inf bde, 1 engr bde)
Angola ANG 1 (5th) div (2 inf bde)
New Angolan Kwanza AOA 2017 2018 2019 1 (6th) div (1 mot inf bde, 2 inf bde, 1 engr bde)
COMBAT SUPPORT
GDP AOA 21.0tr 28.2tr
Some engr units
US$ 127bn 115bn
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
per capita US$ 4,466 3,924 Some log units
Growth % -2.5 -0.1 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
Inflation % 29.8 20.5 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Def bdgt AOA 536bn 546bn MBT 300: ε200 T-55AM2; 50 T-62; 50 T-72
US$ 3.23bn 2.22bn LT TK 10 PT-76
USD1=AOA 165.92 246.31 ASLT 3+ PTL-02 Assaulter
RECCE 600 BRDM-2
Population 30,355,880
IFV 250 BMP-1/BMP-2
Ethnic groups: Ovimbundu 37%; Kimbundu 25%; Bakongo 13% APC 246
APC (T) 31 MT-LB
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
APC (W) 170+: ε170 BTR-152/BTR-60/BTR-80; WZ-551
Male 23.0% 4.9% 4.0% 3.3% 11.5% 1.0%
(CP)
Female 24.2% 5.1% 4.3% 3.7% 12.7% 1.4%
PPV 45 Casspir NG2000
ABCV BMD-3
Capabilities ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Though numerically one of the region’s largest and best- ARV T-54/T-55
equipped armed forces, the available inventory is limited in scale MW Bozena
with maintenance and readiness a challenge. The armed forces ARTILLERY 1,439+
are constitutionally tasked with ensuring sovereignty and territo-
SP 16+: 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 4 2S3 Akatsiya;
rial integrity, though maritime security and the protection of off-
shore resources is an increasing focus. There are growing military
203mm 12 2S7 Pion
ties with China. Luanda is looking to Beijing to help modernise its TOWED 575: 122mm 523 D-30; 130mm 48 M-46; 152mm
armed forces, and to develop its defence-industrial base. Defence 4 D-20
ties persist with Russia, which also provides support to the armed MRL 98+: 122mm 98: 58 BM-21 Grad; 40 RM-70; 240mm
forces. Angola retains conscription and, in recent years, force BM-24
health and education have been investment priorities. The armed MOR 750: 82mm 250; 120mm 500
forces train regularly and have participated in multinational exer- ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
cises with the US and others. Angola is the only regional state
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 (AT-3 Sagger)
with a strategic-airlift capacity and has a comparatively large
RCL 500: 400 82mm B-10/107mm B-11†; 106mm 100†
transport fleet, though availability remains an issue. Improving
the military-logistics system has been identified as a key require- GUNS • SP 100mm SU-100†
ment, but progress is unclear. Modernisation plans have been AIR DEFENCE
curtailed by the fall in oil prices. However, there have been some SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K36
acquisitions. The country ordered the C295 maritime-patrol air- Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)
craft in 2018 in light of security concerns in the Gulf of Guinea. GUNS
Defence industry is limited to in-service maintenance facilities, SP 23mm ZSU-23-4

Sub-Saharan
but Angola has ambitions to develop greater capacity by partner- TOWED 450+: 14.5mm ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23-2; 37mm

Africa
ing with countries such as China, Brazil, Russia and Portugal.
M-1939; 57mm S-60
ACTIVE 107,000 (Army 100,000 Navy 1,000 Air
6,000) Paramilitary 10,000 Navy ε1,000
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 21
PCO 2 Ngola Kiluange with 1 hel landing platform
Army 100,000 (Ministry of Fisheries)
PCC 5 Rei Bula Matadi (Ministry of Fisheries)
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE PBF 5 PVC-170
Armoured PB 9: 4 Mandume; 5 Comandante Imperial Santana
1 tk bde (Ministry of Fisheries)
Light
1 SF bde Coastal Defence
1 (1st) div (1 mot inf bde, 2 inf bde) EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 (2nd) div (3 mot inf bde, 3 inf bde, 1 arty regt) COASTAL DEFENCE • AShM 4K44 Utyos (SS-C-1B
1 (3rd) div (2 mot inf bde, 3 inf bde) Sepal – at Luanda)
452 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Air Force/Air Defence 6,000 AIR DEFENCE • SAM 122

Medium-range 40 S-75M Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline)‡
FORCES BY ROLE
Short-range 37: 25 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); 12 S-125
FIGHTER
Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
1 sqn with MiG-21bis/MF Fishbed
Point-defence 45: 10 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher)†; 15
1 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB/Su-30K Flanker
9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 20 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin)
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
1 sqn with MiG-23BN/ML/UB Flogger
AAM
1 sqn with Su-22 Fitter D
IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11
1 sqn with Su-25 Frogfoot
Archer)
MARITIME PATROL IR/SARH R-23/24 (AA-7 Apex)‡; R-27 (AA-10 Alamo)
1 sqn with F-27-200 MPA; C-212 Aviocar ASM AT-2 Swatter; HOT
TRANSPORT ARM Kh-28 (AS-9 Kyle)
3 sqn with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; An-32 Cline; An-
72 Coaler; BN-2A Islander; C-212 Aviocar; Do-28D Paramilitary 10,000
Skyservant; EMB-135BJ Legacy 600 (VIP); Il-76TD
Candid Rapid-Reaction Police 10,000
TRAINING
1 sqn with Cessna 172K/R
1 sqn with EMB-312 Tucano
Benin BEN
1 sqn with L-29 Delfin; L-39 Albatros CFA Franc BCEAO fr 2017 2018 2019
1 sqn with PC-7 Turbo Trainer; PC-9* GDP fr 5.37tr 5.81tr
1 sqn with Z-142
US$ 9.25bn 10.5bn
ATTACK HELICOPTER
per capita US$ 831 923
2 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-35 Hind; SA342M Gazelle (with
Growth % 5.606 6.039
HOT)
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Inflation % 0.144 2.3
2 sqn with AS565; SA316 Alouette III (IAR-316) (trg) Def bdgt fr 67.9bn 50.1bn
1 sqn with Bell 212 US$ 117m 91m
1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H US$1=fr 580.91 550.84
1 sqn with Mi-171Sh
Population 11,340,504
AIR DEFENCE
5 bn/10 bty with S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); 9K35 Strela-10 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
(SA-13 Gopher)†; 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); 9K33 Osa Male 21.6% 5.7% 4.8% 3.9% 13.2% 1.1%
(SA-8 Gecko); 9K31 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin); S-75M
Female 20.7% 5.5% 4.6% 3.8% 13.4% 1.8%
Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† Capabilities
AIRCRAFT 88 combat capable
The country’s small armed forces focus on border- and internal-
FTR 26: 6 Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker; 2 Su-30K Flanker; 18
security issues, as well as combating illicit trafficking. Border
MiG-23ML Flogger patrols increased and security was tightened after increased
FGA 42+: 20 MiG-21bis/MF Fishbed; 8 MiG-23BN/UB concern over the regional threat from Islamist groups. Maritime
Flogger; 13 Su-22 Fitter D; 1+ Su-24 Fencer security is a priority in light of continuing piracy in the Gulf of
ATK 10: 8 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Su-25UB Frogfoot Guinea. In 2018, the government merged the police and gen-
ELINT 1 B-707 darmerie into a new body called the Republican Police. There is
TPT 56: Heavy 4 Il-76TD Candid; Medium 6 An-12 Cub; a military-cooperation agreement with France, whose Senegal-
based forces have delivered training to boost Benin’s border-
Light 46: 12 An-26 Curl; 2 An-32 Cline; 8 An-72 Coaler; 8
surveillance capacity. The US has provided similar training to
BN-2A Islander; 2 C-212; 5 Cessna 172K; 6 Cessna 172R; the army and national police. US forces have also delivered pre-
1 Do-28D Skyservant; 1 EMB-135BJ Legacy 600 (VIP); 1 deployment training to the armed forces and training in profes-
Yak-40 sional ethics, anti-corruption and accountability to the Repub-
TRG 42: 13 EMB-312 Tucano; 6 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; lican Police. Benin’s forces took part in the academic section of
6 L-29 Delfin; 2 L-39C Albatros; 5 PC-7 Turbo Trainer; 4 the US AFRICOM Unified Focus 2018 exercise in Cameroon. Benin
PC-9*; 6 Z-142 contributes personnel to the Multi-National Joint Task Force fight-
ing Boko Haram. There is a limited capacity to deploy beyond
HELICOPTERS
neighbouring states without external support. The country has no
ATK 56: 34 Mi-24 Hind; 22 Mi-35 Hind
domestic defence-industrial capability.
MRH 60: 8 AS565 Panther; 9 SA316 Alouette III (IAR-316)
(incl trg); 8 SA342M Gazelle; 27 Mi-8 Hip/Mi-17 Hip H; 8 ACTIVE 7,250 (Army 6,500 Navy 500 Air 250)
Mi-171Sh Terminator Paramilitary 4,800
TPT • Light 8 Bell 212 Conscript liability 18 months (selective)
 Sub-Saharan Africa 453

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Botswana BWA

Army 6,500 Botswana Pula P 2017 2018 2019

FORCES BY ROLE GDP P 180bn 195bn

MANOEUVRE US$ 17.4bn 19.1bn
Armoured per capita US$ 7,584 8,168
2 armd sqn Growth % 2.36 4.618
Light
Inflation % 3.296 3.792
1 (rapid reaction) mot inf bn
Def bdgt [a] P 5.30bn 5.85bn
8 inf bn
Air Manoeuvre US$ 512m 572m
1 AB bn US$1=P 10.36 10.23
COMBAT SUPPORT [a] Defence, Justice and Security Budget
2 arty bn
Population 2,249,104
1 engr bn
1 sigs bn Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Male 15.9% 4.7% 4.5% 4.2% 16.5% 2.3%
1 log bn
1 spt bn Female 15.6% 4.8% 4.7% 4.5% 19.3% 3.1%

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Capabilities
LT TK 18 PT-76† The Botswana Defence Force (BDF) mainly comprises ground
RECCE 34: 3 AML-90; 14 BRDM-2; 7 M8; 10 VBL forces and a small, but comparatively well-equipped, air wing. The
APC 34 • APC (T) 22 M113; APC (W) 2 Bastion APC; major task for the BDF is to ensure territorial integrity, coupled
with domestic missions such as tackling poachers. There is also a
PPV 10 Casspir NG
history of involvement in peacekeeping operations. The BDF has
ARTILLERY 16+ reportedly been working on a defence doctrine that is believed
TOWED 105mm 16: 12 L118 Light Gun; 4 M101 to be influenced by US concepts and practices. Botswana has a
MOR 81mm some; 120mm some good relationship with the US and regularly sends its officers to
train there. The armed forces also train with other African nations,
Navy ε500 including Namibia, with whom it holds biannual exercises. The
operations centre for the Southern African Development Com-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
munity Standby Force is located in Gaborone. The BDF is an all-
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS
volunteer force. Recent personnel priorities include improving
PB 6: 2 Matelot Brice Kpomasse (ex-PRC); 3 FPB 98; 1 27m conditions of service, overhauling retirement ages and boosting
(PRC) capability. Growing relations with Beijing have seen some military
personnel travel to China for training. The air force has a reason-
Air Force 250 able airlift capacity, given the size of its armed forces, and the BDF
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE is able to deploy a small force by air if required. There is an ongoing
effort to identify a successor for the air arm’s primary combat air-
AIRCRAFT
craft, the F-5, while, in recent years, ground-based air defence
TPT 3: Light 1 DHC-6 Twin Otter†; PAX 2: 1 B-727; 1 has been improved. Local reports suggest a limited capacity in
HS-748† armoured-vehicle maintenance; beyond this, the country has no

Sub-Saharan
TRG 2 LH-10 Ellipse defence-industrial base.

Africa
HELICOPTERS
TPT • Light 5: 4 AW109BA; 1 AS350B Ecureuil† ACTIVE 9,000 (Army 8,500 Air 500)

Paramilitary 4,800 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Police Republicaine 4,800 Army 8,500
FORCES BY ROLE
DEPLOYMENT MANOEUVRE
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 4; 2 obs Armoured
1 armd bde(-)
CHAD: Lake Chad Basin Commission • MNJTF 150 Light
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • 2 inf bde (1 armd recce regt, 4 inf bn, 1 cdo unit, 1 engr
MONUSCO 49; 4 obs regt, 1 log bn, 2 ADA regt)
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 258; 1 mech inf coy(+) COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bde
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 3; 1 obs 1 engr coy
SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 2 obs 1 sigs coy
454 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 log gp Burkina Faso BFA
AIR DEFENCE
CFA Franc BCEAO fr 2017 2018 2019
1 AD bde(-)
GDP fr 7.30tr 7.87tr
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES US$ 12.6bn 14.3bn
LT TK 45: ε20 SK-105 Kurassier; 25 FV101 Scorpion per capita US$ 655 734
RECCE 72+: RAM-V-1; ε8 RAM-V-2; 64 VBL Growth % 6.4 5.9
APC 157: APC (W) 145: 50 BTR-60; 50 LAV-150 Commando Inflation % 0.4 2.0
(some with 90mm gun); 45 MOWAG Piranha III; PPV 12 Def bdgt fr 112bn 174bn
Casspir
US$ 192m 321m
AUV 6 FV103 Spartan
US$1=fr 580.94 550.83
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
ARV Greif; M578 Population 19,742,715
MW Aardvark Mk2
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL Male 22.5% 5.8% 4.3% 3.7% 11.3% 1.4%
SP V-150 TOW Female 21.8% 5.6% 4.5% 4.1% 13.3% 1.8%
MANPATS TOW
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav Capabilities
ARTILLERY 78 An increased terrorist threat has challenged Burkina Faso’s security
TOWED 30: 105mm 18: 12 L118 Light Gun; 6 Model 56 forces in recent years. The country is part of the G5 Sahel group-
pack howitzer; 155mm 12 Soltam ing and, as part of its support for this, France has supplied armed
MRL 122mm 20 APRA-40 pick-up trucks. The terrorist threat has led Ouagadougou to refocus
its military efforts to the north. There is cooperation with France
MOR 28: 81mm 22; 120mm 6 M-43
and Mali, particularly on border security. Aviation capacities are
AIR DEFENCE slowly improving, with the arrival of more helicopters. However,
SAM • Point-defence Javelin; 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 financial challenges hinder broader military-capability develop-
Gimlet); 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ ments. Military deployment capabilities are limited to neighbour-
GUNS • TOWED 20mm 7 M167 Vulcan ing countries without external support. Maintenance capacities
are limited and the country has no traditional defence industry.
Air Wing 500 ACTIVE 11,200 (Army 6,400 Air 600 Gendarmerie
FORCES BY ROLE 4,200) Paramilitary 250
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with F-5A Freedom Fighter; F-5D Tiger II
ISR
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
1 sqn with O-2 Skymaster
TRANSPORT Army 6,400
2 sqn with BD-700 Global Express; BN-2A/B Defender*; Three military regions. In 2011, several regiments were
Beech 200 Super King Air (VIP); C-130B Hercules; disbanded and merged into other formations, including
C-212-300 Aviocar; CN-235M-100; Do-328-110 (VIP) the new 24th and 34th régiments interarmes
TRAINING FORCES BY ROLE
1 sqn with PC-7 MkII Turbo Trainer* MANOEUVRE
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Mechanised
1 sqn with AS350B Ecureuil; Bell 412EP/SP Twin Huey; 1 cbd arms regt
EC225LP Super Puma Light
1 cbd arms regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 6 inf regt
AIRCRAFT 28 combat capable Air Manoeuvre
FTR 13: 8 F-5A Freedom Fighter; 5 F-5D Tiger II 1 AB regt (1 CT coy)
ISR 5 O-2 Skymaster COMBAT SUPPORT
TPT 19: Medium 3 C-130B Hercules; Light 15: 4 BN-2 1 arty bn (2 arty tp)
Defender*; 6 BN-2B Defender*; 1 Beech 200 King Air (VIP); 1 engr bn
1 C-212-300 Aviocar; 2 CN-235M-100; 1 Do-328-110 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
(VIP); PAX 1 BD700 Global Express ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
TRG 5 PC-7 MkII Turbo Trainer* RECCE 91+: 19 AML-60/AML-90; 8+ Bastion Patsas; 24
HELICOPTERS EE-9 Cascavel; 30 Ferret; 2 M20; 8 M8
MRH 7: 2 Bell 412EP Twin Huey; 5 Bell 412SP Twin Huey APC 44+
TPT 9: Medium 1 EC225LP Super Puma; Light 8 AS350B APC (W) 13+: 13 Panhard M3; Some Bastion APC
Ecureuil PPV 31 Puma M26-15
 Sub-Saharan Africa 455

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
RCL 75mm Type-52 (M20); 84mm Carl Gustav Burundi BDI
ARTILLERY 50+
Burundi Franc fr 2017 2018 2019
TOWED 14: 105mm 8 M101; 122mm 6
MRL 9: 107mm ε4 Type-63; 122mm 5 APR-40 GDP fr 5.87tr 6.18tr
MOR 27+: 81mm Brandt; 82mm 15; 120mm 12 US$ 3.40bn 3.44bn
AIR DEFENCE per capita US$ 312 307
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ Growth % 0.0 0.1
GUNS • TOWED 42: 14.5mm 30 ZPU; 20mm 12 TCM-20
Inflation % 16.6 1.2

Air Force 600 Def bdgt fr 110bn 117bn

FORCES BY ROLE US$ 63.5m 64.8m

GROUND ATTACK/TRAINING US$1=fr 1729.18 1799.57
1 sqn with SF-260WL Warrior*; Embraer EMB-314 Super Population 11,844,520
Tucano*
Ethnic groups: Hutu 85%; Tutsi 14%
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with AT-802 Air Tractor; B-727 (VIP); Beech 200 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
King Air; CN235-220; PA-34 Seneca Male 22.9% 5.2% 4.3% 3.7% 12.4% 1.1%
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Female 22.6% 5.2% 4.4% 3.7% 12.7% 1.5%
1 sqn with AS350 Ecureuil; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-35
Hind
Capabilities
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
The country’s political crisis has tested the cohesion of the armed
AIRCRAFT 5 combat capable
forces. Military-training activity with international partners largely
ISR 1 DA42M (reported) stalled in 2015 as a result. However, Burundi reportedly signed a
TPT 9: Light 8: 1 AT-802 Air Tractor; 2 Beech 200 King cooperation agreement with Russia in 2018 on counter-terrorism
Air; 1 CN235-220; 1 PA-34 Seneca; 3 Tetras; PAX 1 B-727 and joint training. The experience accumulated during UN opera-
(VIP) tions, where troops have gained valuable combat experience
TRG 5: 3 EMB-314 Super Tucano*; 2 SF-260WL Warrior* and military skills, partly compensates for the otherwise low level
HELICOPTERS of training. The armed forces have a limited capability to deploy
ATK 2 Mi-35 Hind externally, though they maintain a deployment to the AMISOM
mission in Somalia. Peacekeeping missions help to fund the armed
MRH 3: 2 Mi-17 Hip H; 1 AW139
forces, though financial challenges otherwise limit their effective-
TPT 4: Medium 1 Mi-8 Hip; Light 3: 1 AS350 Ecureuil; 2 ness. Apart from limited maintenance facilities, the country has no
UH-1H Huey domestic defence-industrial capability.

Gendarmerie 4,200 ACTIVE 30,050 (Army 30,000 Navy 50) Paramilitary

FORCES BY ROLE 21,000
SPECIAL FORCES DDR efforts continue, while activities directed at professionalising
the security forces have taken place, some sponsored by United Na-
1 spec ops gp (USIGN)
tions agencies.
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
APC • APC (W) some Bastion APC ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Sub-Saharan
Army 30,000

Africa
Paramilitary 250
FORCES BY ROLE
People’s Militia (R) 45,000 reservists (trained) MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
Security Company 250 2 lt armd bn (sqn)
Light
DEPLOYMENT 7 inf bn
Some indep inf coy
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 1; 1 obs
COMBAT SUPPORT
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • 1 arty bn
MONUSCO 1; 3 obs 1 engr bn
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1,720; 2 inf bn AIR DEFENCE
1 AD bn
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 1; 1 obs; UN • UNISFA 1 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
FOREIGN FORCES RECCE 55: 6 AML-60; 12 AML-90; 30 BRDM-2; 7 S52
France Operation Barkhane 250; 1 SF gp; 1 H225M; 1 Gazelle Shorland
456 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

APC 94
APC (W) 60: 20 BTR-40; 10 BTR-80; 9 Panhard M3; 15
Cameroon CMR
Type-92; 6 Walid CFA Franc BEAC fr 2017 2018 2019
PPV 34: 12 Casspir; 12 RG-31 Nyala; 10 RG-33L
GDP fr 20.3tr 21.3tr
AUV 15 Cougar 4×4
ARTILLERY 120 US$ 35.0bn 38.4bn
TOWED 122mm 18 D-30 per capita US$ 1,441 1,545
MRL 122mm 12 BM-21 Grad Growth % 3.5 3.8
MOR 90: 82mm 15 M-43; 120mm ε75 Inflation % 0.6 1.0
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Def bdgt fr 239bn 239bn
MSL • MANPATS Milan (reported)
RCL 75mm Type-52 (M20) US$ 411m 432m
AIR DEFENCE US$1=fr 580.93 553.07
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ Population 25,640,965
GUNS • TOWED 150+: 14.5mm 15 ZPU-4; 135+ 23mm
ZU-23/37mm Type-55 (M-1939) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 21.3% 5.3% 4.5% 4.0% 13.4% 1.5%
Air Wing 200
Female 21.0% 5.2% 4.5% 3.9% 13.4% 1.7%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 1 combat capable
TPT 2: Light 2 Cessna 150L†
Capabilities
TRG 1 SF-260W Warrior* Although internal stability has long been a focus for Cameroon’s
HELICOPTERS armed forces, the threat from Boko Haram and separatist move-
ATK 2 Mi-24 Hind ments have generated a significant response, particularly in the
northern area of the country bordering Nigeria. The government
MRH 2 SA342L Gazelle
continues to boost the size of the armed forces. In 2018, a fifth
TPT • Medium (2 Mi-8 Hip non-op) military region was created in response to security challenges in
the west stemming from separatist activity. Cameroon is part of
Reserves the Multinational Joint Task Force engaged on operations against
FORCES BY ROLE Boko Haram. There are long-standing military ties with France and
MANOEUVRE the US, including for support and training. The US has trained naval
Light personnel as part of the Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Partner-
10 inf bn (reported) ship. A military-assistance agreement was signed with China in
2018. The two countries have cooperated over the new floating
dock at Kribi, which it is hoped will improve operational readiness.
Navy 50 The AU’s continental logistic base was inaugurated at Douala in
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE early 2018. The armed forces are considered disciplined and well
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 4 organised, though in 2018 there were some allegations of abuse. In
AMPHIBIOUS • LCT 2 late 2018, the US said it would continue assisting the armed forces,
but urged accountability in the wake of the abuse allegations. The
Paramilitary ε1,000 army has contributed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations
and has strengthened its participation to deployments in the CAR.
General Administration of State Security There is only limited capability for power projection and deploy-
ment capabilities are limited to neighbouring countries without
ε1,000 external support. Many elements of the equipment inventory are
ageing, but infantry fighting vehicles and protected patrol vehicles
DEPLOYMENT were acquired from China and South Africa and gifted by the US.
The armed forces are improving their ISR capability with fixed-
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 760; 9 wing aircraft and small UAVs. Maritime capabilities improved in
obs; 1 inf bn recent years with the acquisition of more patrol vessels, both new
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 2 and second-hand. Cameroon has no defence-industrial capacity,
bar maintenance facilities.
SOMALIA: AU • AMISOM 5,073; 6 inf bn
UN • UNSOM 1 obs ACTIVE 15,400 (Army 13,500 Navy 1,500 Air 400)
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 3; 1 obs; UN • UNISFA 2 obs
Paramilitary 9,000

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Army 13,500
3 Mil Regions
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Light
1 rapid reaction bde (1 armd recce bn, 1 AB bn, 1 amph bn)
 Sub-Saharan Africa 457

1 mot inf bde (4 mot inf bn, 1 spt bn) Air Force 300–400
2 mot inf bde (3 mot inf bn, 1 spt bn)
FORCES BY ROLE
2 mot inf bde (2 mot inf bn, 1 spt bn)
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
3 (rapid reaction) inf bn
1 sqn with MB-326K; Alpha Jet*†
Air Manoeuvre
TRANSPORT
1 cdo/AB bn
Other 1 sqn with C-130H/H-30 Hercules; IAI-201 Arava; PA-23
1 (Presidential Guard) gd bn Aztec
COMBAT SUPPORT 1 VIP unit with AS332 Super Puma; AS365 Dauphin 2;
1 arty regt (5 arty bty) Bell 206B Jet Ranger; Gulfstream III
5 engr regt TRAINING
AIR DEFENCE 1 unit with Tetras
1 AD regt (6 AD bty) ATTACK HELICOPTER
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 sqn with SA342 Gazelle (with HOT); Mi-24 Hind
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
ASLT 18: 6 AMX-10RC; ε12 PTL-02 mod (Cara 105) 1 sqn with Bell 206L-3; Bell 412; SA319 Alouette III
RECCE 64: 31 AML-90; 15 Ferret; 8 M8; 5 RAM Mk3; 5 VBL EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
IFV 42: 8 LAV-150 Commando with 20mm gun; 14 LAV-150 AIRCRAFT 9 combat capable
Commando with 90mm gun; 12 Ratel-20 (Engr); ε8 Type-07P ATK 5: 1 MB-326K Impala I; 4 MB-326K Impala II
APC 64 ISR 2 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan
APC (T) 12 M3 half-track TPT 18: Medium 3: 2 C-130H Hercules; 1 C-130H-30
APC (W) 36: 15 Bastion APC (reported); 21 LAV-150 Hercules; Light 14: 1 CN235; 1 IAI-201 Arava (in store);
Commando 2 J.300 Joker; 1 MA60; 2 PA-23 Aztec; 7 Tetras; PAX 1
PPV 16 Gaia Thunder Gulfstream III
AUV 6+: 6 Cougar 4×4; Panthera T6 TRG 4 Alpha Jet*†
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES HELICOPTERS
ARV WZ-551 ARV ATK 2 Mi-24 Hind
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MRH 13: 1 AS365 Dauphin 2; 1 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 2
MSL
Mi-17 Hip H; 2 SA319 Alouette III; 4 SA342 Gazelle (with
SP 24 TOW (on Jeeps)
HOT); 3 Z-9
MANPATS Milan
TPT 7: Medium 4: 2 AS332 Super Puma; 2 SA330J Puma;
RCL 53: 75mm 13 Type-52 (M20); 106mm 40 M40A2
Light 3: 2 Bell 206B Jet Ranger; 1 Bell 206L3 Long Ranger
ARTILLERY 106+
SP 155mm 18 ATMOS 2000 AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
TOWED 52: 105mm 20 M101; 130mm 24: 12 M-1982 ASM HOT
(reported); 12 Type-59 (M-46); 155mm 8 M-71
MRL 122mm 20 BM-21 Grad
Fusiliers de l’Air
MOR 16+: 81mm (some SP); 120mm 16 Brandt FORCES BY ROLE
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS MANOEUVRE
SP 20mm RBY-1 with TCM-20 Other
TOWED 54: 14.5mm 18 Type-58 (ZPU-2); 35mm 18 1 sy bn
GDF-002; 37mm 18 Type-63
Paramilitary 9,000

Sub-Saharan
Navy ε1,500
Gendarmerie 9,000

Africa
HQ located at Douala
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE FORCES BY ROLE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16 MANOEUVRE
PCC 3: 1 Dipikar (ex-FRA Flamant); 2 Le Ntem (PRC Reconnaissance
Limam El Hidrami) with 1 76mm gun 3 (regional spt) paramilitary gp
PB 11: 2 Aresa 2400; 2 Aresa 3200; 2 Rodman 101; 4
Rodman 46; 1 Quartier Maître Alfred Motto DEPLOYMENT
PBR 2 Swift-38
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 4 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 755; 3
LCM 2: 1 Aresa 2300; 1 Le Moungo obs; 1 inf bn
LCU 2 Yunnan MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1; 1 obs
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
Fusiliers Marin MONUSCO 2; 4 obs
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Amphibious FOREIGN FORCES
3 mne bn United States 300; MQ-1C Gray Eagle
458 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

PB 2: 1 Espadarte; 1 Tainha (PRC-27m)

Cape Verde CPV PBF 1 Archangel
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Do-228
Cape Verde Escudo E 2017 2018 2019
GDP Ε 173bn 183bn Air Force up to 100
US$ 1.78bn 1.97bn FORCES BY ROLE
per capita US$ 3,301 3,622 MARITIME PATROL
Growth % 4.013 4.259 1 sqn with An-26 Curl
Inflation % 0.784 1.002 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Def bdgt Ε 954m 1.04bn AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 3 An-26 Curl†
US$ 9.8m 11.2m
US$1=E 97.63 92.99 Central African Republic CAR
Population 568,373 CFA Franc BEAC fr 2017 2018 2019
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus GDP fr 1.13tr 1.22tr
Male 14.4% 4.9% 5.0% 4.8% 17.6% 2.0% US$ 1.94bn 2.31bn
Female 14.3% 4.9% 5.0% 4.8% 19.3% 3.3% per capita US$ 389 454
Growth % 4.3 4.3
Capabilities Inflation % 4.1 4.0
In its legislative programme for 2016–21, the government out- Def exp fr 17.7bn 17.2bn
lined the priorities for Cape Verde’s defence forces, including US$ 30.5m 32.5m
territorial defence, maritime security, and EEZ and airspace pro-
tection. Although the armed forces are small and presently have US$1=fr 580.88 529.15
limited capability, the government has suggested reorganising Population 5,745,062
around marines, engineering and paramilitary national-guard
units. The government is interested in greater regional and inter- Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
national defence engagement; international partners provide
Male 20.0% 5.3% 4.7% 4.2% 14.1% 1.3%
some maritime-security training support. The armed forces take
part in multinational regional exercises and cooperative activi- Female 19.8% 5.3% 4.6% 4.2% 14.3% 2.1%
ties; the 2018 Africa Endeavour senior leaders’ symposium was
held in Cape Verde. Equipment capabilities remain limited, given Capabilities
the country’s geographical position, though the US donated patrol
boats in 2018 to bolster its maritime-security capacities. There is no Effective military and security organisations remain largely absent
defence industry, beyond limited maintenance facilities. in the wake of the violence in 2013 and the armed forces are insuf-
ficient for the country’s internal-security challenges. Instability
ACTIVE 1,200 (Army 1,000 Coast Guard 100 Air 100) continues to affect the country and – due to refugee flows – neigh-
Conscript liability Selective conscription (14 months) bouring states. The May 2015 Bangui Forum on National Reconcili-
ation agreed principles governing DDR. Under the National Recov-
ery and Peacebuilding Plan 2017–21, attempts to improve security
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE focus on DDR and SSR, among others. A National Superior Council
on Security will be set up to oversee the overall reform process.
Army 1,000 However, the UN’s MINUSCA mission remains the principal secu-
FORCES BY ROLE rity provider in the country. The CAR benefits from defence part-
MANOEUVRE nerships with France and Russia. Moscow has been deepening its
Light military ties in the country and has donated small arms. There are
also reports of Russian nationals in the presidential guard, as well
2 inf bn (gp)
as personnel – according to some reports, from a private military
COMBAT SUPPORT
company – operating in the country more broadly in a military
1 engr bn training and assistance role. Reports in 2018 indicated that China
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE delivered military vehicles. Apart from some equipment deliveries,
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES the country remains under a UN arms embargo. The armed forces
RECCE 10 BRDM-2 receive training from UN forces and the European Training Mission.
ARTILLERY • MOR 18: 82mm 12; 120mm 6 M-1943 Poor infrastructure and logistics capacity are other factors limiting
AIR DEFENCE the ability of the CAR armed forces to provide security across the
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela (SA-7 Grail)‡ country. There is no independent capability to deploy troops exter-
nally, while the lack of financial resources and defence-industrial
GUNS • TOWED 30: 14.5mm 18 ZPU-1; 23mm 12 ZU-23
capacity makes equipment maintenance problematic.

Coast Guard ε100 ACTIVE 7,150 (Army 7,000 Air 150) Paramilitary
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1,000
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5 Conscript liability Selective conscription 2 years; reserve obligation
PCC 2: 1 Guardião; 1 Kondor I thereafter, term n.k.
 Sub-Saharan Africa 459

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Pakistan 1,259; 10 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 hel sqn
Paraguay 1; 2 obs
Peru 209; 4 obs; 1 engr coy
Army ε7,000
Poland EUTM RCA 1
FORCES BY ROLE
Portugal 165; 1 AB coy • EUTM RCA 45
MANOEUVRE
Romania EUTM RCA 14
Light
Rwanda 1,378; 8 obs; 2 inf bn; 1 fd hospital
1 inf bn
Senegal 111; 1 atk hel sqn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Serbia 73; 2 obs; 1 med coy • EUTM RCA 7
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Spain EUTM RCA 8
MBT 3 T-55† Sri Lanka 115; 6 obs; 1 avn unit
RECCE 9: 8 Ferret†; 1 BRDM-2 Sweden EUTM RCA 9
IFV 18 Ratel Tanzania 445; 1 inf bn(-)
APC • APC (W) 14+: 4 BTR-152†; 10+ VAB†
Togo 6; 4 obs
ARTILLERY • MOR 12+: 81mm†; 120mm 12 M-1943†
United States 8
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Uruguay 2
RCL 106mm 14 M40†
Vietnam 4; 1 obs
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PBR 9†
Zambia 942; 8 obs; 1 inf bn
Air Force 150
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Chad CHA
AIRCRAFT • TPT 7: Medium 1 C-130A Hercules; Light 6:
CFA Franc BEAC fr 2017 2018 2019
3 BN-2 Islander; 1 Cessna 172RJ Skyhawk; 2 J.300 Joker
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 1 AS350 Ecureuil GDP fr 5.75tr 6.08tr
US$ 9.87bn 11.1bn
FOREIGN FORCES per capita US$ 810 890

MINUSCA unless stated Growth % -3.1 3.5

Argentina 2 obs Inflation % -0.9 2.1
Bangladesh 1,010; 9 obs; 1 cdo coy; 1 inf bn; 1 med coy Def bdgt fr 102bn 101bn
Benin 4; 3 obs US$ 176m 185m
Bhutan 2; 2 obs
US$1=fr 582.10 547.04
Bolivia 1; 2 obs
Bosnia-Herzegovina EUTM RCA 2 Population 15,833,116
Brazil 4; 3 obs
Burkina Faso 1; 1 obs Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Burundi 760; 9 obs; 1 inf bn Male 24.4% 5.5% 4.2% 3.6% 10.7% 1.0%
Cambodia 221; 6 obs; 1 engr coy Female 23.8% 5.4% 4.2% 3.7% 12.1% 1.4%
Cameroon 755; 3 obs; 1 inf bn
Colombia 2 obs Capabilities
Congo 10; 2 obs
Chad’s most pressing security concerns are instability in West
Egypt 1,015; 9 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 tpt coy
Africa and the Sahel and the need to prosecute counter-insur-
France 10; 1 UAV unit • EUTM RCA 40

Sub-Saharan
gency operations against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin
Gabon 436; 1 inf bn(-)

Africa
area. The forces are combat experienced, though some observ-
Gambia 2; 3 obs ers assess additional work is required in improving military strat-
Georgia EUTM RCA 35 egy, doctrine and command and control. The country is a key
Ghana 11; 4 obs contributor to the G5 Sahel and is an important component of
Guatemala 2; 1 obs the Multi-National Joint Task Force fighting Boko Haram. There is
Hungary 2; 2 obs strong defence cooperation with France and Operation Barkhane
Indonesia 208; 4 obs; 1 engr coy is headquartered in N’Djamena. Chadian military skills are widely
Italy EUTM RCA 3 recognised by partners, though there are some differences in
Jordan 7; 3 obs training levels across the force. French forces delivered training to
Kenya 7; 6 obs Chadian combat engineers in 2018. A lack of logistical capacity has
hindered routine rotations for deployed forces. The country’s ISR
Lithuania EUTM RCA 1
capability has been improved with the arrival of aircraft from the
Mauritania 744; 9 obs; 1 inf bn
US, following improvements in ground-attack and medium-airlift
Mexico 1 capability. Barring maintenance facilities, there is no domestic
Moldova 2; 3 obs defence-industrial capacity.
Morocco 765; 2 obs; 1 inf bn
Nepal 340; 4 obs; 1 MP coy ACTIVE 30,350 (Army 25,000 Air 350 State Security
Niger 3; 1 obs Service 5,000) Paramilitary 4,500
Nigeria 1 Conscript liability Conscription authorised
460 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

TPT 10: Medium 3: 2 C-27J Spartan; 1 C-130H-30

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Hercules; Light 4: 3 An-26 Curl; 1 Beech 1900; PAX 3: 1
B-737BBJ; 1 DC-9-87; 1 Gulfstream II
Army ε25,000 TRG 4: 2 PC-7 (only 1*); 1 PC-9 Turbo Trainer*; 1 SF-
7 Mil Regions 260WL Warrior*
FORCES BY ROLE HELICOPTERS
MANOEUVRE ATK 5 Mi-24V Hind
Armoured MRH 8: 3 AS550C Fennec; 3 Mi-17 Hip H; 2 SA316
1 armd bn TPT • Medium 2 Mi-171
Light
7 inf bn State Security Service General Direction
COMBAT SUPPORT (DGSSIE) 5,000 active
1 arty bn
1 engr bn Paramilitary 4,500 active
1 sigs bn Gendarmerie 4,500
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 log gp
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
DEPLOYMENT
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1,447; 3 obs; 1 SF coy; 2 inf bn
MBT 60 T-55
ASLT 30 PTL-02 Assaulter FOREIGN FORCES
RECCE 309+: 132 AML-60/AML-90; 22 Bastion Patsas;
Benin MNJTF 150
ε100 BRDM-2; 20 EE-9 Cascavel; 4 ERC-90F Sagaie; 31+
France Operation Barkhane 1,500; 1 mech inf BG; 1 FGA det
RAM Mk3
with 4 Mirage 2000C/D; 1 tpt det with 1 C-130H; 4 CN235M
IFV 131: 80 BMP-1; 42 BMP-1U; 9 LAV-150 Commando
with 90mm gun
APC • APC (W) 99: 24 BTR-80; 12 BTR-3E; ε20 BTR-60; Congo, Republic of COG
ε10 Black Scorpion; 25 VAB-VTT; 8 WZ-523
ARTILLERY 26+ CFA Franc BEAC fr 2017 2018 2019
SP 122mm 10 2S1 Gvozdika fr 5.06tr 6.31tr
GDP
TOWED 105mm 5 M2
US$ 8.72bn 11.5bn
MRL 11+: 107mm some Type-63; 122mm 11: 6 BM-21
Grad; 5 Type-81 per capita US$ 2,005 2,572
MOR 81mm some; 120mm AM-50 Growth % -3.1 2.0
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Inflation % 0.5 1.2
MSL • MANPATS Eryx; Milan fr 284bn 162bn
Def bdgt
RCL 106mm M40A1 US$ 490m 295m
AIR DEFENCE
US$1=fr 580.94 550.81
SAM
Short-range 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful) Population 5,062,021
Point-defence 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)
GUNS • TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4; 23mm Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
ZU-23 Male 21.1% 4.5% 4.0% 3.6% 15.6% 1.4%
Female 20.7% 4.4% 4.0% 3.8% 15.2% 1.7%
Air Force 350
FORCES BY ROLE Capabilities
GROUND ATTACK
Congo’s small armed forces have low levels of training and limited
1 unit with PC-7; PC-9*; SF-260WL Warrior*; Su-25 Frogfoot overall capability, and utilise ageing equipment. They have strug-
TRANSPORT gled to recover from the brief but devastating civil war in the late
1 sqn with An-26 Curl; C-130H-30 Hercules; Mi-17 Hip 1990s. France provides advisory assistance and capacity-building
H; Mi-171 support in military administration and military and police capa-
1 (Presidential) Flt with B-737BBJ; Beech 1900; DC-9-87; bility. Reports in late 2017 indicated some Chinese security assis-
Gulfstream II tance. The troop contingent deployed to the CAR was withdrawn
ATTACK HELICOPTER by the government in mid-2017, amid allegations of indiscipline.
1 sqn with AS550C Fennec; Mi-24V Hind; SA316 Alouette III Deployment capability is limited to neighbouring countries
without external support. The air force is effectively grounded for
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE lack of spares and serviceable equipment. The navy is largely a riv-
AIRCRAFT 14 combat capable erine force, despite the need for maritime security on the country’s
FTR 1 MiG-29S Fulcrum C† small coastline. A modernisation effort is under way and several
ATK 10: 8 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Su-25UB Frogfoot B MRAPs have been bought. Maintenance facilities are limited and
ISR 2 Cessna 208B Grand Caravan the country has no domestic defence-industrial capability.
 Sub-Saharan Africa 461

ACTIVE 10,000 (Army 8,000 Navy 800 Air 1,200) HELICOPTERS†

Paramilitary 2,000 ATK (2 Mi-35P Hind in store)
TPT • Medium (3 Mi-8 Hip in store)
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Atoll)‡

Army 8,000 Paramilitary 2,000 active

FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE Gendarmerie 2,000
Armoured FORCES BY ROLE
2 armd bn MANOEUVRE
Light Other
2 inf bn (gp) each with (1 lt tk tp, 1 arty bty) 20 paramilitary coy
1 inf bn
Air Manoeuvre Presidential Guard some
1 cdo/AB bn
FORCES BY ROLE
COMBAT SUPPORT
MANOEUVRE
1 arty gp (with MRL)
Other
1 engr bn
1 paramilitary bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 40: 25 T-54/T-55; 15 Type-59; (some T-34 in store) DEPLOYMENT
LT TK 13: 3 PT-76; 10 Type-62 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 10; 2 obs
RECCE 25 BRDM-1/BRDM-2
APC 133+
APC (W) 78+: 28 AT-105 Saxon; 20 BTR-152; 30 BTR-60; Côte d’Ivoire CIV
Panhard M3
PPV 55: 18 Mamba; 37 Marauder CFA Franc BCEAO fr 2017 2018 2019
ARTILLERY 56+ GDP fr 23.5tr 25.4tr
SP 122mm 3 2S1 Gvozdika US$ 40.5bn 45.9bn
TOWED 15+: 122mm 10 D-30; 130mm 5 M-46; 152mm D-20

per capita US$ 1,621 1,791
MRL 10+: 122mm 10 BM-21 Grad; 140mm BM-14;
140mm BM-16 Growth % 7.8 7.4
MOR 28+: 82mm; 120mm 28 M-43 Inflation % 0.8 1.7
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Def bdgt [a] fr 482bn 517bn
RCL 57mm M18 US$ 829m 935m
GUNS 15: 57mm 5 ZIS-2 (M-1943); 100mm 10 M-1944
US$1=fr 580.93 553.07
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 Shilka [a] Defence, order and security expenses
TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-2/ZPU-4; 37mm 28 M-1939; Population 26,260,582
57mm S-60; 100mm KS-19
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Navy ε800
 Male 19.9% 5.3% 4.6% 4.3% 14.9% 1.2%

Sub-Saharan
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Female 19.7% 5.3% 4.6% 4.2% 14.4% 1.5%

Africa
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8
PCC 4 5 Février 1979 Capabilities
PBR 4
The armed forces are still undergoing reconstruction, and SSR ini-
tiatives remain in place. A law on the defence forces’ organisation
Air Force 1,200
 was enacted in 2015. This detailed defence zones and military
FORCES BY ROLE regions, the creation of a general staff and general inspectorate
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK for the armed forces, and stressed the armed forces’ role in assist-
1 sqn with Mirage F-1AZ ing Ivorian society. In 2016 a Military Programme Law for 2016–20
TRANSPORT was adopted, planning for an incremental reduction in military
1 sqn with An-24 Coke; An-32 Cline; CN235M-100 strength up to 2020, to enable an increase in the gendarmerie.
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER In April 2016, the United Nations lifted the arms embargo that
1 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-35P Hind had previously been imposed on the country. This allowed Côte
d’Ivoire to start recapitalising its air force, notably with the deliv-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† ery of Mi-24 helicopters from Russia. As part of the SSR process, an
AIRCRAFT aviation academy was established in Abidjan, with limited rotary-
FGA 2 Mirage F-1AZ wing-pilot and maintenance training. The latter is also an issue for
TPT • Light 4: 1 An-24 Coke; 2 An-32 Cline; the small naval unit. The administration has moved to regulate
1 CN235M-100 promotion and salary structures to aid professionalisation, and
462 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

also improve military infrastructure. There is strong defence coop- Air Force ε1,400
eration with France, which has a significant training mission in the
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
country. Except limited maintenance facilities, Côte d’Ivoire does
not have domestic defence-industrial capabilities. AIRCRAFT
TPT • PAX 1 B-727
ACTIVE 27,400 (Army 23,000 Navy 1,000 Air 1,400 HELICOPTERS
Special Forces 2,000) Paramilitary n.k. ATK 4 Mi-24 Hind
Moves to restructure and reform the armed forces continue TPT • Medium 2 SA330L Puma (IAR-330L)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Special Forces ε2,000

FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
Army ε23,000
1 spec ops bde
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE Paramilitary n.k.
Armoured
1 armd bn Republican Guard n.k.
Light
7 inf bn Gendarmerie n.k.
Air Manoeuvre EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
1 cdo/AB bn ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
COMBAT SUPPORT RECCE 3 Cayman BRDM
1 arty bn APC • APC (W) some VAB
1 engr bn PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 1 Bian
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 log bn DEPLOYMENT
AIR DEFENCE
1 AD bn MALI: UN • MINUSMA 162; 1 obs; 1 sy coy
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES FOREIGN FORCES
MBT 10 T-55† France 950; 1 (Marine) inf bn; 2 SA330 Puma; 1 Gazelle
RECCE 18: 13 BRDM-2; 5 Cayman BRDM
IFV 10 BMP-1/BMP-2†
APC 41 Democratic Republic of the
APC (W) 40: 9 Bastion APC; 6 BTR-80; 12 Panhard Congo DRC
M3; 13 VAB
PPV 1 Snake Congolese Franc fr 2017 2018 2019
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES GDP fr 58.2tr 71.4tr
VLB MTU US$ 41.4bn 42.7bn
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE per capita US$ 478 478
MSL • MANPATS 9K111-1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
Growth % 3.414 3.824
(reported); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan) (reported)
Inflation % 41.5 23
RCL 106mm ε12 M40A1
ARTILLERY 36+ Def bdgt fr 422bn 483bn
TOWED 4+: 105mm 4 M-1950; 122mm (reported) US$ 301m 289m
MRL 122mm 6 BM-21 US$1=fr 1403.57 1671.60
MOR 26+: 81mm; 82mm 10 M-37; 120mm 16 AM-50
Population 85,281,024
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Medium 1 An-12 Cub†
AIR DEFENCE Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
Male 20.8% 5.7% 5.0% 4.2% 13.0% 1.1%
(reported)
Female 20.5% 5.6% 5.0% 4.2% 13.2% 1.5%
GUNS 21+
SP 20mm 6 M3 VDAA
TOWED 15+: 20mm 10; 23mm ZU-23-2; 40mm 5 L/60
Capabilities
On paper, the DRC has the largest armed forces in Central Africa.
Navy ε1,000 However, given the country’s size and the poor levels of train-
ing, morale and equipment, they are unable to provide security
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE throughout the country. Kinshasa has pursued several military-
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4 modernisation programmes, though plans to re-examine doctrine
PB 4: 3 L’Emergence; 1 Atchan 2 and organisation have seen little positive impact. When conflict
AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCM 1 Aby finally abates in the east, significant attention to wide-ranging
 Sub-Saharan Africa 463

DDR and SSR will be required, to continue the work intermittently MOR 528+: 81mm 100; 82mm 400; 107mm M30; 120mm
undertaken over the past decade. The mandate of the MONUSCO 28: 10 Brandt; 18 other
mission was renewed for another 12 months in March 2018. The AIR DEFENCE
UN’s Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) remains active in the east of SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
the country. Training will have improved for units operating with
GUNS • TOWED 64: 14.5mm 12 ZPU-4; 37mm 52
the FIB, while external-partner training and capacity-building
M-1939
assistance is also commonplace. The armed forces, which have
incorporated a number of non-state armed groups, struggle with
conflicting loyalties. There remains significant scope to improve Republican Guard 8,000
training, recruitment and retention. Deployment capability is FORCES BY ROLE
limited and the lack of logistics vehicles significantly reduces MANOEUVRE
transport capacity even within the country. The lack of sufficient Armoured
tactical airlift and helicopters is a brake on military effectiveness 1 armd regt
and there is some reliance on MONUSCO capabilities, which are
Light
also insufficient given the geographical scale of the country. Much
equipment is in poor repair and while new equipment has been 3 gd bde
acquired, the absence of any domestic defence-industrial capacity COMBAT SUPPORT
will mean that maintenance levels also hinder military capability. 1 arty regt

ACTIVE ε134,250 (Central Staffs ε14,000, Army Navy 6,700 (incl infantry and marines)
103,000 Republican Guard 8,000 Navy 6,700 Air 2,550) All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Air Force 2,550

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Army (Forces du Terre) ε103,000 AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable
The DRC has 11 Military Regions. In 2011, all brigades in ATK 4 Su-25 Frogfoot
North and South Kivu provinces were consolidated into 27 TPT 5: Medium 1 C-130H Hercules; Light 2 An-26 Curl;
new regiments, the latest in a sequence of reorganisations PAX 2 B-727
designed to integrate non-state armed groups. The actual HELICOPTERS
combat effectiveness of many formations is doubtful ATK 7: 4 Mi-24 Hind; 3 Mi-24V Hind
TPT • Medium 3: 1 AS332L Super Puma; 2 Mi-8 Hip
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Paramilitary
Light
6 (integrated) inf bde National Police Force
ε3 inf bde (non-integrated) Incl Rapid Intervention Police (National and Provincial
27+ inf regt forces)
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty regt People’s Defence Force
1 MP bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† FOREIGN FORCES
(includes Republican Guard eqpt) All part of MONUSCO unless otherwise specified
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Algeria 3 obs
MBT 174: 12–17 Type-59†; 32 T-55; 25 T-64BV-1; 100
Bangladesh 1,710; 5 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 avn coy; 2
T-72AV

Sub-Saharan
hel coy
LT TK 40: 10 PT-76; 30 Type-62†

Africa
RECCE up to 52: up to 17 AML-60; 14 AML-90; 19 EE-9 Belgium 1; 1 obs
Cascavel; 2 RAM-V-2 Benin 49; 4 obs
IFV 20 BMP-1 Bhutan 2 obs
APC 104+: Bolivia 3 obs
APC (T) 9: 3 BTR-50; 6 MT-LB Bosnia-Herzegovina 3 obs
APC (W) 95+: 30–70 BTR-60PB; 58 Panhard M3†; 7 TH Burkina Faso 1; 3 obs
390 Fahd Cameroon 2; 4 obs
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Canada (Operation Crocodile) 8
RCL 57mm M18; 73mm; 75mm M20; 106mm M40A1
China, People’s Republic of 223; 9 obs; 1 engr coy; 1 fd
GUNS 85mm 10 Type-56 (D-44)
hospital
ARTILLERY 726+
Czech Republic 1; 1 obs
SP 16: 122mm 6 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 10 2S3 Akatsiya
TOWED 125: 122mm 77 M-30 (M-1938)/D-30/Type-60; Egypt 155; 16 obs; 1 SF coy
130mm 42 Type-59 (M-46)/Type-59-I; 152mm 6 D-20 France 2
(reported) Ghana 469; 15 obs; 1 inf bn(-)
MRL 57+: 107mm 12 Type-63; 122mm 24+: 24 BM-21 Grad; Guatemala 150; 5 obs; 1 SF coy
some RM-70; 128mm 6 M-51; 130mm 3 Type-82; 132mm 12 India 2,625; 22 obs; 3 inf bn; 1 med coy
464 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Indonesia 180; 9 obs; 1 engr coy insurgency operations. The northern border dispute with Eritrea
Ireland 4 might abate in the wake of the late 2018 diplomatic rapproche-
ment. The 2017 defence white paper highlighted a requirement to
Jordan 4; 6 obs
modernise key capabilities, including intelligence and command,
Kenya 7; 5 obs as well as equipment, but funds for these remain limited. Djibouti
Malawi 857; 4 obs; 1 inf bn maintains strong defence cooperation with France; Djibouti hosts
Malaysia 2; 4 obs its largest foreign military base. The US also operates its Combined
Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa from Djibouti. Japan has based
Mali 1 obs
forces there for regional counter-piracy missions and the EU and
Mongolia 2 obs NATO have at various times maintained a presence to support
Morocco 527; 2 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 fd hospital their operations. China’s first overseas military base, including dock
Nepal 884; 10 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy facilities, was officially opened in Djibouti in 2017. Djibouti’s armed
Niger 5; 4 obs forces benefit from training received from France and the US. EU
NAVFOR Somalia has delivered training to the navy and coast-
Nigeria 2; 6 obs guard to strengthen their maritime-security capabilities. Djibouti
Pakistan 2,758; 18 obs; 4 inf bn; 1 hel sqn participates in a number of regional multinational exercises and
Paraguay 1; 6 obs contributed to the AMISOM mission in Somalia, but has limited
Peru 3; 8 obs capacity to independently deploy beyond its territory. Army
equipment consists predominantly of older French and Soviet-era
Poland 1 obs
equipment and while recent acquisitions have focused on mobil-
Romania 4; 7 obs ity and artillery, armoured-warfare capability remains limited. Bar
Russia 2; 14 obs limited maintenance facilities, the country has no defence-indus-
Senegal 7; 1 obs trial capacity.
Serbia 1 ACTIVE 10,450 (Army 8,000 Navy 200 Air 250
South Africa (Operation Mistral) 1,175; 7 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 atk Gendarmerie 2,000) Paramilitary 2,650
hel sqn; 1 hel sqn
Sweden 1; 1 obs
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Switzerland 3
Tanzania 1,003; 2 obs; 1 SF coy; 1 inf bn
Army ε8,000
Tunisia 11; 4 obs
FORCES BY ROLE
Ukraine 255: 8 obs; 2 atk hel sqn
4 military districts (Tadjourah, Dikhil, Ali-Sabieh and Obock)
United Kingdom 2
 MANOEUVRE
United States 3 Mechanised
Uruguay 930; 7 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 mne coy; 1 hel sqn 1 armd regt (1 recce sqn, 3 armd sqn, 1 (anti-smuggling)
Zambia 3; 7 obs sy coy)
Light
4 inf regt (3-4 inf coy, 1 spt coy)
Djibouti DJB 1 rapid reaction regt (4 inf coy, 1 spt coy)
Other
Djiboutian Franc fr 2017 2018 2019
1 (Republican Guard) gd regt (1 sy sqn, 1 (close
GDP fr 361bn 389bn protection) sy sqn, 1 cbt spt sqn (1 recce pl, 1 armd pl,
US$ 2.03bn 2.19bn 1 arty pl), 1 spt sqn)
per capita US$ 1,989 2,085 COMBAT SUPPORT
Growth % 6.7 6.7 1 arty regt
1 demining coy
Inflation % 0.7 1
1 sigs regt
Def exp fr n.k n.k
1 CIS sect
US$ n.k n.k COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
FMA (US) US$ 0.5m 0m 1 log regt
US$1=fr 177.76 177.72 1 maint coy
Population 884,017 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Ethnic groups: Somali 60%; Afar 35%
ASLT 1 PTL-02 Assaulter
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus RECCE 38: 4 AML-60†; 17 AML-90; 2 BRDM-2; 15 VBL
IFV 28: 8 BTR-80A; 16-20 Ratel
Male 15.4% 5.0% 4.9% 4.5% 14.1% 1.7%
APC 43
Female 15.3% 5.3% 5.8% 5.9% 19.9% 2.1% APC (W) 30+: 12 BTR-60†; 4+ AT-105 Saxon; 14 Puma
PPV 13: 3 Casspir; 10 RG-33L
Capabilities AUV 22: 10 Cougar 4×4 (one with 90mm gun); 2 CS/
Djibouti’s strategic location and relative stability have led a VN3B; 10 PKSV AUV
number of foreign states to base forces there. The armed forces’ ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
main responsibility is internal and border security, and counter- RCL 106mm 16 M40A1
 Sub-Saharan Africa 465

ARTILLERY 76 Italy 90
SP 155mm 10 M109L Japan 170; 2 P-3C Orion
TOWED 122mm 9 D-30 New Zealand 1 P-3K2 Orion
MRL 12: 107mm 2 PKSV AUV with PH-63; 122mm 10: 6 Spain Operation Atalanta 1 P-3M Orion
(6-tube Toyota Land Cruiser 70 series); 2 (30-tube Iveco United States US Africa Command: 4,700; 1 tpt sqn with
110-16); 2 (30-tube) C-130H/J-30 Hercules; 1 spec ops sqn with MC-130H; PC-
MOR 45: 81mm 25; 120mm 20 Brandt 12 (U-28A); 1 CSAR sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk; 1 CISR
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 15+ sqn with MQ-9A Reaper; 1 naval air base
SP 20mm 5 M693
TOWED 10: 23mm 5 ZU-23-2; 40mm 5 L/70
Equatorial Guinea EQG
Navy ε200 CFA Franc BEAC fr 2017 2018 2019
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

GDP fr 7.27tr 7.28tr
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12
PBF 2 Battalion-17
 US$ 12.5bn 13.2bn
PB 10: 1 Plascoa†; 2 Sea Ark 1739; 1 Swari†; 6 others per capita US$ 14,818 15,294
AMPHIBIOUS • LCT 1 EDIC 700 Growth % -3.2 -7.7
Inflation % 0.7 0.9
Air Force 250
Def exp fr n.k n.k
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ n.k n.k
AIRCRAFT
TPT • Light 6: 1 Cessna U206G Stationair; 1 Cessna 208 US$1=fr 582.08 550.83
Caravan; 2 Y-12E; 1 L-410UVP Turbolet; 1 MA60 Population 797,457
HELICOPTERS
ATK (2 Mi-35 Hind in store) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
MRH 5: 1 Mi-17 Hip H; 4 AS365 Dauphin Male 20.0% 5.4% 4.7% 4.0% 14.2% 1.6%
TPT 3: Medium 1 Mi-8T Hip; Light 2 AS355F Ecureuil II
Female 19.4% 5.2% 4.5% 3.8% 14.8% 2.3%
Gendarmerie 2,000+
Ministry of Defence
Capabilities
FORCES BY ROLE
 The army dominates the armed forces, with internal security the
MANOEUVRE principal task. Equatorial Guinea has been trying for several years
Other to modernise its armed forces. France maintains a military-coop-
eration detachment in Malabo, advising on defence-institutional
1 paramilitary bn
development issues and providing capacity-building support
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE through the naval-focused regional school at Tica, as well as some
AFV • AUV 2 CS/VN3B training activities with French forces based in Gabon and in the
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • 1 PB region as part of the Corymbe mission. There is only limited capa-
bility for power projection and deployments are limited to neigh-
Paramilitary ε2,650 bouring countries without external support. There has been sig-
nificant naval investment in recent years, including in both equip-
National Police Force ε2,500 ment and onshore infrastructure at Bata and Malabo, although
Ministry of Interior naval capabilities remain limited. Maritime-security concerns in
the Gulf of Guinea have resulted in an increased emphasis on bol-

Sub-Saharan
Coast Guard 150 stering the country’s maritime-patrol capacity. The air force has

Africa
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE received several new transport aircraft. Equatorial Guinea has only
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11 limited maintenance capacity and no traditional defence industry.
PB 11: 2 Khor Angar; 9 other ACTIVE 1,450 (Army 1,100 Navy 250 Air 100)
DEPLOYMENT ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
SOMALIA: AU • AMISOM 1,872; 2 inf bn
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2 obs Army 1,100
FORCES BY ROLE
FOREIGN FORCES MANOEUVRE
China 240: 1 mne coy(-); 1 med unit; 2 ZTL-11; 8 ZBL-08; Light
1 LPD; 1 ESD 3 inf bn(-)
France 1,450: 1 SF unit; 1 (Marine) combined arms regt (2 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
recce sqn, 2 inf coy, 1 arty bty, 1 engr coy); 1 hel det with ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
2 SA330 Puma; 1 SA342 Gazelle; 1 LCM; 1 air sqn with 4 MBT 3 T-55
Mirage 2000-5; 1 C-160 Transall; 2 SA330 Puma RECCE 6 BRDM-2
Germany Operation Atalanta 1 AP-3C Orion IFV 20 BMP-1
466 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

APC 35 Capabilities
APC (W) 10 BTR-152
PPV 25 Reva (reported) Eritrea has maintained large armed forces in response to historic
military tensions and conflict with neighbouring Ethiopia. Efforts
to sustain and modernise capabilities were restricted by a UN
Navy ε250
arms embargo, which was lifted in November 2018 following a
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE diplomatic rapprochement with Ethiopia. The armed forces have
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11 focused on border defence but now may have an opportunity
PSO 2: to restructure accordingly. Maritime security remains an issue,
1 Bata with 1 76mm gun, 1 hel landing platform including piracy. The UAE has established a military presence in
1 Wele Nzas with 2 AK630M CIWS, 2 76mm gun, 1 hel Eritrea and has continued to refurbish and expand port and air-
landing platform field facilities at Assab to support Gulf states participating in the
PCC 2 OPV 62 Yemen campaign. Eritrea maintains a large army due to manda-
tory conscription. For some the term of service is indefinite, and
PBF 2 Shaldag II
significant numbers of conscripts have chosen to leave the country
PB 5: 1 Daphne; 2 Estuario de Muni; 2 Zhuk
or otherwise evade service. These factors likely affect overall mili-
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT tary cohesion and effectiveness. A UN report alleged that the UAE
AKRH 1 Capitan David Eyama Angue Osa with 1 76mm gun had trained some air-force and navy personnel. A private Euro-
pean company has allegedly provided pilot training. Eritrea has
Air Force 100 not demonstrated any capacity to deploy beyond its borders.
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE The armed forces’ inventory primarily comprises outdated Soviet-
AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable era systems and modernisation was restricted by the UN arms
ATK 4: 2 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Su-25UB Frogfoot B embargo. The embargo will have resulted in serviceability issues,
notwithstanding allegations of external support, with some air-
TPT 4: Light 3: 1 An-32B Cline; 2 An-72 Coaler; PAX 1
craft likely cannibalised for parts and others illicitly overhauled
Falcon 900 (VIP)
abroad. The navy remains capable of only limited coastal-patrol
TRG 2 L-39C Albatros and interception operations. Apart from limited maintenance
HELICOPTERS facilities, the country has no domestic defence-industrial capacity.
ATK 5 Mi-24P/V Hind
MRH 1 Mi-17 Hip H ACTIVE 201,750 (Army 200,000 Navy 1,400 Air 350)
TPT 4: Heavy 1 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 1 Ka-29 Helix; Conscript liability 18 months (4 months mil trg) between ages 18
Light 2 Enstrom 480 and 40

RESERVE 120,000 (Army ε120,000)

Paramilitary
Guardia Civil ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE Army ε200,000
Other
Heavily cadreised
2 paramilitary coy
FORCES BY ROLE
Coast Guard n.k. COMMAND
4 corps HQ
MANOEUVRE
Eritrea ERI Mechanised
Eritrean Nakfa ERN 2017 2018 2019 1 mech bde
Light
GDP ΕRN 89.4bn 103bn
19 inf div
US$ 5.81bn 6.72bn
1 cdo div
per capita US$ 980 1,112
Growth % 5.0 4.2 Reserve ε120,000
Inflation % 9.0 9.0 FORCES BY ROLE
Def exp ΕRN n.k n.k MANOEUVRE
Light
US$ n.k n.k
1 inf div
USD1=ERN 15.37 15.37
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Population 5,970,646 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Ethnic groups: Tigrinya 50%; Tigre and Kunama 40%; Afar; Saho MBT 270 T-54/T-55
3% RECCE 40 BRDM-1/BRDM-2
IFV 15 BMP-1
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
APC 35
Male 19.9% 5.3% 4.6% 3.7% 14.1% 1.6% APC (T) 10 MT-LB†
Female 19.7% 5.3% 4.7% 3.8% 15.0% 2.3% APC (W) 25 BTR-152/BTR-60
 Sub-Saharan Africa 467

ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES

ARV T-54/T-55 reported Ethiopia ETH
VLB MTU reported Ethiopian Birr EB 2017 2018 2019
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111- GDP ΕB 1.81tr 2.14tr
1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)
GUNS 85mm D-44 US$ 80.9bn 83.8bn
ARTILLERY 258 per capita US$ 873 891
SP 45: 122mm 32 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 13 2S5 Giatsint-S Growth % 10.9 7.5
TOWED 19+: 122mm D-30; 130mm 19 M-46 Inflation % 9.9 12.7
MRL 44: 122mm 35 BM-21 Grad; 220mm 9 9P140 Uragan
Def bdgt ΕB 11bn 12bn
MOR 150+: 82mm 50+; 120mm/160mm 100+
AIR DEFENCE US$ 492m 469m
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ FMA (US) US$ 0.5m 0m
GUNS 70+ US$1=EB 22.34 25.58
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 Shilka
Population 108,386,391
TOWED 23mm ZU-23
Ethnic groups: Oromo 34.4%; Amhara 27%; Somali 6.2%; Tigray
6.1%; Sidama 4%; Guragie 2.5%; other or unspecified 19.2%
Navy 1,400
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 Male 21.7% 5.5% 4.6% 3.8% 12.8% 1.3%
PBF 9: 5 Battalion-17; 4 Super Dvora
Female 21.5% 5.5% 4.6% 3.9% 13.1% 1.6%
PB 3 Swiftships
AMPHIBIOUS 3
LS • LST 2: 1 Chamo† (Ministry of Transport); 1 Ashdod†
Capabilities
LC • LCU 1 T-4† (in harbour service) Ethiopia maintains one of the region’s largest and most capable
armed forces. It is a significant contributor to regional peacekeep-
Air Force ε350 ing. The 2018 rapprochement with Eritrea might affect military
dispositions. Countering al-Shabaab remains an ongoing mili-
FORCES BY ROLE tary commitment. Ethiopia maintains long-standing defence and
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK security ties with the US. Addis Ababa continues to support the
1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29SE/MiG-29UB Fulcrum Federal Government of Somalia militarily. The armed forces are
1 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UBK Flanker experienced by regional standards, following a history of combat
TRANSPORT operations. Training and experience is also gained through inter-
1 sqn with Y-12(II) national peacekeeping deployments. Ethiopia has demonstrated
TRAINING the capability to make significant contributions to the UN mis-
1 sqn with L-90 Redigo sions in Darfur and South Sudan. It is the largest overall troop
1 sqn with MB-339CE* contributor to UN peacekeeping missions and provides significant
numbers to the AMISOM mission in Somalia. The country’s inven-
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
tory comprises mostly Soviet-era equipment. Despite engaging in
1 sqn with Bell 412EP Twin Huey
a ten-year (2005–15) modernisation plan, most platform recapi-
1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H talisation is based on surplus stock from Hungary, Ukraine and the
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE US. Ethiopia has developed a modest local defence-industrial base,
AIRCRAFT 14 combat capable primarily centred on small arms, with some license production of
FTR 8: 4 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum; 1 Su-27

Sub-Saharan
light armoured vehicles. There is adequate maintenance capability
Flanker; 1 Su-27UBK Flanker but only a limited capacity to support advanced platforms.

FGA 2 MiG-29SE Fulcrum
TPT • Light 5: 1 Beech 200 King Air; 4 Y-12(II)
TRG 16+: 8 L-90 Redigo; 4 MB-339CE*; 4+ Z-143/Z-242

HELICOPTERS
MRH 8: 4 Bell 412EP Twin Huey (AB-412EP); 4 Mi-17
Hip H
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer); IR/
SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo)
FOREIGN FORCES
United Arab Emirates Operation Restoring Hope 1,000;
1 armd BG; Leclerc; BMP-3; G-6; Agrab Mk2; 2 FSGHM;
2 LST; 6 LCT; 4 Archangel; 3 AH-64D Apache; 2 CH-47F
Chinook; 4 UH-60M Black Hawk; Wing Loong I (GJ-1) UAV;
4 MIM-104F Patriot PAC-3
Africa
ACTIVE 138,000 (Army 135,000 Air 3,000)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Army 135,000
4 Mil Regional Commands (Northern, Western, Central
and Eastern) each acting as corps HQ
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Light
1 (Agazi Cdo) SF comd
1 (Northern) corps (1 mech div, 4 inf div)
1 (Western) corps (1 mech div, 3 inf div)
1 (Central) corps (1 mech div, 5 inf div)
1 (Eastern) corps (1 mech div, 5 inf div)
468 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES

ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73
MBT 461+: 246+ T-54/T-55/T-62; 215 T-72B (AA-11 Archer); IR/SARH R-23/R-24 (AA-7 Apex); R-27
RECCE ε100 BRDM-1/BRDM-2 (AA-10 Alamo)
IFV ε20 BMP-1
APC 300+ DEPLOYMENT
APC (T) some Type-89
APC (W) 300+: ε300 BTR-60/BTR-152; some Type-92 SOMALIA: AU • AMISOM 4,323; 6 inf bn
AUV some Ze’ev SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2,122; 17 obs; 3 inf bn
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 1,684; 5 obs; 2 inf bn; UN •
ARV T-54/T-55 reported; 4 BTS-5B UNISFA 4,368; 77 obs; 1 recce coy; 3 inf bn; 2 arty coy; 1
VLB MTU reported
engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 5 fd hospital; 1 hel sqn
MW Bozena
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Gabon GAB
Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K135 Kornet-E (AT-14 Spriggan)
RCL 82mm B-10; 107mm B-11 CFA Franc BEAC fr 2017 2018 2019
GUNS 85mm D-44 GDP fr 8.67tr 9.48tr
ARTILLERY 524+ US$ 14.9bn 17.2bn
SP 10+: 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 10 2S19 Msta-S
per capita US$ 7,373 8,385
TOWED 464+: 122mm 464 D-30/M-30 (M-1938); 130mm
Growth % 0.451 2.042
M-46; 155mm AH2
MRL 122mm ε50 BM-21 Grad Inflation % 2.7 2.8
MOR 81mm M1/M29; 82mm M-1937; 120mm M-1944 Def bdgt [a] fr 155bn 145bn
AIR DEFENCE US$ 267m 263m
SAM US$1=fr 580.93 550.82
Medium-range S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline)
[a] Includes funds allocated to Republican Guard
Short-range S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ Population 2,119,036
GUNS
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4 Shilka
TOWED 23mm ZU-23; 37mm M-1939; 57mm S-60 Male 19.1% 5.9% 5.7% 4.9% 14.4% 1.9%
Female 18.3% 5.5% 5.0% 4.0% 13.2% 2.0%
Air Force 3,000
FORCES BY ROLE Capabilities
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Oil revenues have allowed the government to support small but
1 sqn with MiG-23ML Flogger G/MiG-23UB Flogger C regionally capable armed forces, while the country has benefited
1 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker from the long-term presence of French troops acting as a security
TRANSPORT guarantor. There is regular training with French forces and with the
1 sqn with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; An-32 Cline; C-130B regionally deployed French navy, as well as with the US and other
Hercules; DHC-6 Twin Otter; L-100-30; Yak-40 Codling international partners. Military medicine is well regarded. Gabo-
(VIP) nese forces took part in the 2018 Obangame Express exercise. The
TRAINING armed forces retain sufficient airlift to ensure mobility within the
1 sqn with L-39 Albatros country and even a limited capability to project power by sea and
1 sqn with SF-260 air. Apart from limited maintenance facilities, there is no domestic
defence-industrial capacity.
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
2 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-35 Hind; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; ACTIVE 4,700 (Army 3,200 Navy 500 Air 1,000)
SA316 Alouette III Paramilitary 2,000
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 19 combat capable
FTR 11: 8 Su-27 Flanker; 3 Su-27UB Flanker
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
FGA 8 MiG-23ML/UB Flogger G/C
TPT 15: Medium 9: 3 An-12 Cub; 2 C-130B Hercules; 2
Army 3,200
C-130E Hercules; 2 L-100-30; Light 6: 1 An-26 Curl; 1 An- Republican Guard under direct presidential control
32 Cline; 3 DHC-6 Twin Otter; 1 Yak-40 Codling (VIP) FORCES BY ROLE
TRG 16: 12 L-39 Albatros; 4 SF-260 MANOEUVRE
HELICOPTERS Light
ATK 18: 15 Mi-24 Hind; 3 Mi-35 Hind 1 (Republican Guard) gd gp (bn)
MRH 19: 1 AW139; 6 SA316 Alouette III; 12 Mi-8 Hip/ (1 armd/recce coy, 3 inf coy, 1 arty bty, 1 ADA bty)
Mi-17 Hip H 8 inf coy
 Sub-Saharan Africa 469

Air Manoeuvre Paramilitary 2,000

1 cdo/AB coy
COMBAT SUPPORT Gendarmerie 2,000
1 engr coy FORCES BY ROLE
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
 MANOEUVRE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Armoured
RECCE 77: 24 AML-60/AML-90; 12 EE-3 Jararaca; 14 2 armd sqn
EE-9 Cascavel; 6 ERC-90F4 Sagaie; 7 RAM V-2; 14 VBL Other
IFV 12 EE-11 Urutu (with 20mm gun) 3 paramilitary bde

APC 64 11 paramilitary coy
APC (W) 30: 9 LAV-150 Commando; 5 Bastion APC; 3 Aviation
WZ-523; 12 VXB-170; 1 Pandur 1 unit with AS350 Ecureuil; AS355 Ecureuil II
PPV 34 Ashok Leyland MPV
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AUV 12 Aravis
HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 4: 2 AS350 Ecureuil; 2
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
AS355 Ecureuil II
MSL • MANPATS Milan
RCL 106mm M40A1
ARTILLERY 67 DEPLOYMENT
TOWED 105mm 4 M101
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 436; 1 inf
MRL 24: 107mm 16 PH-63; 140mm 8 Teruel
MOR 39: 81mm 35; 120mm 4 Brandt bn(-)
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 41
SP 20mm 4 ERC-20 FOREIGN FORCES
TOWED 37+: 14.5mm ZPU-4; 23mm 24 ZU-23-2; 37mm France 450; 1 AB bn
10 M-1939; 40mm 3 L/70 Spain Operation Barkhane 45: 1 C295M
Navy ε500
HQ located at Port Gentil Gambia GAM
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Gambian Dalasi D 2017 2018 2019
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 9
PB 9: 4 Port Gentil (FRA VCSM); 4 Rodman 66; 1 Patra† GDP D 69.4bn 77.1bn
AMPHIBIOUS LANDING CRAFT • LCM 1 Mk 9 (ex- US$ 1.48bn 1.61bn
UK) per capita US$ 705 740
Growth % 4.6 5.4
Air Force 1,000
Inflation % 8.0 6.2
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Def bdgt D n.k n.k
1 sqn with Mirage F-1AZ US$ n.k n.k
TRANSPORT US$1=D 46.84 48.05
1 (Republican Guard) sqn with AS332 Super Puma; ATR-
42F; Falcon 900; Gulfstream IV-SP/G650ER Population 2,092,731
1 sqn with C-130H Hercules; CN-235M-100 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

Sub-Saharan
1 sqn with Bell 412 Twin Huey (AB-412); SA330C/H Male 18.6% 5.2% 4.8% 4.4% 14.7% 1.6%

Puma; SA342M Gazelle
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable
FGA 6 Mirage F-1AZ
ATK 2 MB-326 Impala I
MP (1 EMB-111* in store)
TPT 6: Medium 1 C-130H Hercules; (1 L-100-30 in store);
Light 2: 1 ATR-42F; 1 CN-235M-100; PAX 3: 1 Falcon 900;
1 Gulfstream IV-SP; 1 Gulfstream G650ER
TRG (4 CM-170 Magister in store) 
 cooperation agreement was signed with Senegal in 2017, aimed
HELICOPTERS
MRH 2: 1 Bell 412 Twin Huey (AB-412); 1 SA342M
Gazelle; (2 SA342L Gazelle in store)
TPT 7: Medium 4: 1 AS332 Super Puma; 3 SA330C/H
Puma; Light 3: 2 H120 Colibri; 1 H135
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR U-Darter
(reported)
 support of UN missions across the continent. Its largest deploy-
Africa
Female 18.4% 5.3% 5.0% 4.6% 15.5% 1.9%
Capabilities
The armed forces are undergoing SSR in the wake of political insta-
bility in 2016–17. Gambia’s small forces have traditionally focused
on maritime security and countering human trafficking. The US
provides limited military training assistance. France resumed mili-
tary assistance in 2017 and supports training and SSR. There is also
cooperation with neighbouring states. A security and defence
at generating joint patrols and exercises. ECOWAS maintains its
ECOMIG mission of 500 troops in Gambia, with financial support
from the EU. Following the departure of long-serving president
Jammeh, there has been a focus on clarifying political–military
relations. Personnel are being trained to form a new presidential
guard. The armed forces participate in multinational exercises,
including the US-led Obangame Express, and have deployed in
470 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

ment is of more than 200 troops to the UNAMID mission in Sudan.

The equipment inventory is limited, with serviceability in doubt for
Capabilities
some types. Gambia has no significant defence-industrial capabili- Ghana’s armed forces are among the most capable in the region,
ties. with a long-term development plan covering both the current
and the next decade. The ability to control its maritime EEZ is of
ACTIVE 800 (Army 800) increasing importance due to piracy and resource exploitation,
and this underpins the navy’s expansion plans. Internal and mari-
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE time security are central military tasks, along with participation in
peacekeeping missions. The US delivers training and support and
there is also significant and long-standing defence engagement
Gambian National Army 800 with the UK, which in 2017 ran a strategic-leadership programme
FORCES BY ROLE for Ghanaian and other regional participants at the Kofi Annan
MANOEUVRE peacekeeping centre. Air-force training, close-air support and
Light airlift capabilities have developed in recent years. There are plans
2 inf bn to organise additional realistic training programmes and exercises,
as well as to improve military infrastructure. The army is a regular
COMBAT SUPPORT
contributor to UN peacekeeping operations and has pledged to
1 engr sqn
maintain 1,000 personnel in readiness for such missions. Ghana
Marine Unit ε300 has started to develop forward operating bases, principally with
the objective of protecting the country’s oil resources. Plans persist
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE to develop air capabilities; a contract for Super Tucano aircraft was
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8 awarded in 2015. There have been some defence acquisitions from
PBF 4: 2 Rodman 55; 2 Fatimah I China. Apart from maintenance facilities and some ammunition
PB 4: 1 Bolong Kanta†; 3 Taipei (ROC Hai Ou) (one production, the country has no traditional defence-industrial base.
additional damaged and in reserve) The formation of the Defence Industries Holding Company was
intended to enable the armed forces to engage in civil–military
Air Wing collaborative projects.
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ACTIVE 15,500 (Army 11,500 Navy 2,000 Air 2,000)
AIRCRAFT
TPT 5: Light 2 AT-802A Air Tractor; PAX 3: 1 B-727; 1
CL-601; 1 Il-62M Classic (VIP)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Army 11,500
DEPLOYMENT FORCES BY ROLE
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 2; 3 obs COMMAND
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 3; 2 obs 2 comd HQ
MANOEUVRE
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 211; 1 inf coy Reconnaissance
1 armd recce regt (3 recce sqn)
FOREIGN FORCES Light
Ghana ECOMIG 50 1 (rapid reaction) mot inf bn
6 inf bn
Nigeria ECOMIG 200
Air Manoeuvre
Senegal ECOMIG 250
2 AB coy
COMBAT SUPPORT
Ghana GHA 1 arty regt (1 arty bty, 2 mor bty)
1 fd engr regt (bn)
Ghanaian New Cedi C 2017 2018 2019 1 sigs regt
GDP C 205bn 243bn 1 sigs sqn
US$ 47.0bn 51.8bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 log gp
per capita US$ 1,663 1,787
1 tpt coy
Growth % 8.4 6.3 2 maint coy
Inflation % 12.4 9.5 1 med coy
Def bdgt C 822m 991m 1 trg bn
US$ 189m 211m EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$1=C 4.35 4.69 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
RECCE 3 EE-9 Cascavel
Population 28,102,471 IFV 48: 24 Ratel-90; 15 Ratel-20; 4 Piranha 25mm; 5+
Type-05P 25mm
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
APC 105
Male 19.0% 5.0% 4.3% 3.8% 15.2% 2.0% APC (W) 55+: 46 Piranha; 9+ Type-05P
Female 18.8% 5.0% 4.4% 4.0% 16.2% 2.3% PPV 50 Streit Typhoon
 Sub-Saharan Africa 471

ARTILLERY 87+
TOWED 122mm 6 D-30 Guinea GUI
MRL 3+: 107mm Type-63; 122mm 3 Type-81
Guinean Franc fr 2017 2018 2019
MOR 78: 81mm 50; 120mm 28 Tampella
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES GDP fr 93.2tr 107tr
AEV 1 Type-05P AEV US$ 10.3bn 11.5bn
ARV Piranha reported per capita US$ 790 865
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Growth % 8.2 5.8
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav
AIR DEFENCE Inflation % 8.9 8.2
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ Def bdgt fr n.k n.k
GUNS • TOWED 8+: 14.5mm 4+: 4 ZPU-2; ZPU-4; US$ n.k n.k
23mm 4 ZU-23-2
US$1=fr 9,087.89 9,263.73
Navy 2,000 Population 11,855,411
Naval HQ located at Accra; Western HQ located at
Sekondi; Eastern HQ located at Tema Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Male 20.9% 5.3% 4.4% 3.7% 14.0% 1.7%
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14 Female 20.5% 5.2% 4.4% 3.7% 14.1% 2.1%
PCO 2 Anzone (US)
PCC 10: 2 Achimota (GER Lurssen 57m) with 1 76mm Capabilities
gun; 2 Dzata (GER Lurssen 45m); 2 Warrior (GER
Gepard); 4 Snake (PRC 47m) Guinea’s armed forces remain limited in size and capacity, although
PBF 1 Stephen Otu (ROK Sea Dolphin) reforms since 2010 have brought them back under political control
PB 1 David Hansen (US) and begun a process of professionalisation. SSR, supported by the
EU, is ongoing, with improvements seen in units dispatched to
Air Force 2,000 Mali. Internal-security challenges reportedly led to the composi-
tion of mixed army–gendarmerie units. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
FORCES BY ROLE is a key concern, as is illegal trafficking and fishing. A military-pro-
GROUND ATTACK gramme law for the period 2015–20 may not be fully implemented
1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum*; L-39ZO*; MB-339A* due to funding issues. Defence cooperation with France and the
ISR US has led to financial and training assistance, including AFRICOM
1 unit with DA-42 support for Guinea’s MINUSMA deployment to Mali. France has
TRANSPORT also supported the Mali deployment. Guinea participates in multi-
1 sqn with BN-2 Defender; C295; Cessna 172 lateral exercises, such as the US-led Obangame Express, and a small
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER airborne detachment trained with Moroccan troops in early 2018.
1 sqn with AW109A; Bell 412SP Twin Huey; Mi-17V-5 In late 2017, the government announced that it would reinstate
Hip H; SA319 Alouette III; Z-9EH military service for students in 2018. This is expected to include
45 of days military training and six months of local service. Much
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† of the country’s military equipment is ageing and of Soviet-era
AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable vintage; serviceability will be questionable for some types. There
ATK (3 MB-326K in store) is very limited organic airlift and France is supporting the devel-
TPT 10: Light 10: 1 BN-2 Defender; 3 C295; 3 Cessna 172; opment of a light aviation observation capability. In 2018, Guinea
3 DA42; (PAX 1 F-28 Fellowship (VIP) in store) refurbished patrol boats originally donated by the US in the late
TRG 8: 4 K-8 Karakorum*; 2 L-39ZO*; 2 MB-339A* 1980s, as part of general plans to reinforce its maritime units.
HELICOPTERS Guinea is also attempting to improve its logistics and military-

Sub-Saharan
MRH 10: 1 Bell 412SP Twin Huey; 3 Mi-17V-5 Hip H; 2 health capacities. There are no significant defence-industrial capa-

Africa
SA319 Alouette III; 4 Z-9EH bilities, though the president reportedly said that the armed forces
TPT 6: Medium 4 Mi-171Sh; Light 2 AW109A should take on more of a role in national industry.

ACTIVE 9,700 (Army 8,500 Navy 400 Air 800)

DEPLOYMENT Paramilitary 2,600
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 11; 4 obs Conscript liability 2 years
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
MONUSCO 469; 15 obs; 1 inf bn(-) ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
GAMBIA: ECOWAS • ECOMIG 50
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 870; 1 mech inf bn Army 8,500
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 163; 1 obs; 1 engr coy FORCES BY ROLE
SOMALIA: UN • UNSOS 2 obs MANOEUVRE
Armoured
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 861; 10 obs; 1 inf bn
1 armd bn
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 9; 4 obs; UN • UNISFA 6; 2 obs
Light
SYRIA/ISRAEL: UN • UNDOF 12 1 SF bn
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 7; 6 obs 5 inf bn
472 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

1 ranger bn DEPLOYMENT
1 cdo bn
Air Manoeuvre MALI: UN • MINUSMA 865; 3 obs; 1 inf bn
1 air mob bn SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2; 1 obs
Other SUDAN: UN • UNISFA 1; 1 obs
1 (Presidential Guard) gd bn
COMBAT SUPPORT WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 5 obs
1 arty bn
1 AD bn Guinea-Bissau GNB
1 engr bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE CFA Franc BCEAO fr 2017 2018 2019
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES GDP fr 784bn 818bn
MBT 38: 30 T-34; 8 T-54 US$ 1.35bn 1.48bn
LT TK 15 PT-76
per capita US$ 794 852
RECCE 27: 2 AML-90; 25 BRDM-1/BRDM-2
IFV 2 BMP-1 Growth % 5.9 4.5
APC 59 Inflation % 1.1 2.0
APC (T) 10 BTR-50 Def bdgt fr n.k n.k
APC (W) 30: 16 BTR-40; 8 BTR-60; 6 BTR-152 US$ n.k n.k
PPV 19: 10 Mamba†; 9 Puma M36
US$1=fr 580.73 553.02
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
ARV T-54/T-55 reported Population 1,833,247
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111- Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel) Male 21.9% 5.4% 4.5% 3.7% 12.0% 1.3%
RCL 82mm B-10 Female 21.7% 5.6% 4.8% 4.1% 13.4% 1.7%
GUNS 6+: 57mm ZIS-2 (M-1943); 85mm 6 D-44
ARTILLERY 47+ Capabilities
TOWED 24: 122mm 12 M-1931/37; 130mm 12 M-46
Guinea-Bissau’s armed forces have limited capabilities and are in
MRL 220mm 3 9P140 Uragan
the midst of both DDR and SSR programmes. There are embryonic
MOR 20+: 82mm M-43; 120mm 20 M-1938/M-1943 schemes to recruit professionals. Defence policy is focused mainly
AIR DEFENCE on tackling internal-security challenges, in particular drug traffick-
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ ing. International defence cooperation has reduced since the 2012
GUNS • TOWED 24+: 30mm M-53 (twin); 37mm 8 coup d’état. The US lifted its restrictions on foreign assistance only
M-1939; 57mm 12 Type-59 (S-60); 100mm 4 KS-19 in 2014. The ECOWAS mission in Guinea-Bissau has been extended
until September 2019. The authorities have looked elsewhere for
Navy ε400 defence cooperation; in 2017 a letter of intent was signed with
Indonesia. Training remains limited and there are problems with
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE recruitment and retention, as well as in developing adequate non-
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 4: 1 commissioned-officer structures. The number of generals and
Swiftships†; 3 RPB 20 admirals more than doubled between 2009 and 2017. A pension
system was established and funded only in 2015, with interna-
Air Force 800 tional financing. The armed forces participate in multinational
exercises, such as the US-led Obangame Express in 2018. China
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
has donated some non-lethal military and civilian equipment, but
AIRCRAFT
much of the country’s military equipment is ageing. With no sig-
FGA (3 MiG-21 Fishbed non-op) nificant defence industry, equipment maintenance will remain a
TPT • Light 4: 2 An-2 Colt; 2 Tetras limiting factor on military capability.
HELICOPTERS
ATK 4 Mi-24 Hind ACTIVE 4,450 (Army 4,000 Navy 350 Air 100)
MRH 5: 2 MD-500MD; 2 Mi-17-1V Hip H; 1 SA342K Conscript liability Selective conscription
Gazelle Manpower and eqpt totals should be treated with caution. A
TPT 2: Medium 1 SA330 Puma; Light 1 AS350B Ecureuil number of draft laws to restructure the armed services and police
have been produced
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Paramilitary 2,600 active
Army ε4,000 (numbers reducing)
Gendarmerie 1,000
FORCES BY ROLE
Republican Guard 1,600 MANOEUVRE
Reconnaissance
People’s Militia 7,000 reservists 1 recce coy
 Sub-Saharan Africa 473

Armoured Capabilities
1 armd bn (sqn)
Light The armed forces are concerned with maintaining regional stabil-
ity and combating security threats, particularly from neighbour-
5 inf bn
ing Somalia. There are plans to establish a separate Coast Guard
COMBAT SUPPORT
Service, to assume some maritime-security responsibilities from
1 arty bn the navy. A long-standing defence and security agreement with
1 engr coy the UK includes a permanent UK training unit, which is to increase
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE support for maritime security and open a counter-IED training
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES centre. There are also significant defence ties with the US and evi-
MBT 10 T-34 dence of developing relationships with the Chinese and Jordanian
LT TK 15 PT-76 armed forces. Involvement in a number of regional security mis-
RECCE 10 BRDM-2 sions and multinational exercises may also foster improved levels
of cooperation and interoperability. Training has received atten-
APC • APC (W) 55: 35 BTR-40/BTR-60; 20 Type-56 (BTR-
tion, given the need to prepare for AU deployments. Regular oper-
152) ational deployments have increased military experience and confi-
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE dence. Kenya’s armed forces regularly participate in multinational
RCL 75mm Type-52 (M20); 82mm B-10 exercises. Kenya remains a key contributor to AMISOM in Somalia,
GUNS 85mm 8 D-44 demonstrating limited capacity to project power immediately
ARTILLERY 26+ beyond its own territory. The armed forces also provide smaller
TOWED 122mm 18 D-30/M-30 (M-1938) contributions to other UN missions and are a leading element of
MOR 8+: 82mm M-43; 120mm 8 M-1943 the East African Standby Force. Recent equipment investments
AIR DEFENCE have focused on improving counter-insurgency capabilities,
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ including the procurement of helicopters, armoured vehicles and
ISR systems. There are plans to renew the fixed-wing transport fleet
GUNS • TOWED 34: 23mm 18 ZU-23; 37mm 6 M-1939;
to support regional deployments. There is a limited defence indus-
57mm 10 S-60
try focused on equipment maintenance and the manufacture of
small-arms ammunition.
Navy ε350
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE ACTIVE 24,100 (Army 20,000 Navy 1,600 Air 2,500)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4 Paramilitary 5,000
PB 4: 2 Alfeite†; 2 Rodman 55m
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Air Force 100
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Army 20,000
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Cessna 208B
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
FOREIGN FORCES Armoured
Nigeria ECOMIB 100 1 armd bde (1 armd recce bn, 2 armd bn)
Light
1 spec ops bn
Kenya KEN 1 ranger bn
1 inf bde (3 inf bn)
1 inf bde (2 inf bn)
Kenyan Shilling sh 2017 2018 2019
1 indep inf bn

Sub-Saharan
GDP sh 8.20tr 9.15tr Air Manoeuvre

Africa
US$ 79.2bn 89.6bn 1 air cav bn
per capita US$ 1,695 1,865 1 AB bn
Growth % 4.9 6.0 COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bde (2 arty bn, 1 mor bty)
Inflation % 8.0 5.0
1 ADA bn
Def bdgt [a] sh 124bn 130bn 1 engr bde (2 engr bn)
US$ 1.20bn 1.27bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FMA (US) US$ 1m 0m ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
US$1=sh 103.45 102.15 MBT 78 Vickers Mk 3
[a] Includes national intelligence funding RECCE 92: 72 AML-60/AML-90; 12 Ferret; 8 S52 Shorland
APC 200
Population 48,397,527 APC (W) 95: 52 UR-416; 31 Type-92; 12 Bastion APC; (10
Ethnic groups: Kikuyu ε22–32% M3 Panhard in store)
PPV 105 Puma M26-15
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Male 19.6% 5.5% 4.3% 4.1% 15.1% 1.3% ARV 7 Vickers ARV
Female 19.5% 5.5% 4.4% 4.1% 15.0% 1.8% MW Bozena
474 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

ARTILLERY 111 PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 5 (2

SP 155mm 2+ Nora B-52 on Lake Victoria)
TOWED 105mm 47: 40 L118 Light Gun; 7 Model 56 pack
howitzer
Air Wing
MOR 62: 81mm 50; 120mm 12 Brandt EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 6: 2 Cessna 208B Grand
MSL • MANPATS Milan Caravan; 3 Cessna 310; 1 Cessna 402
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav HELICOPTERS
HELICOPTERS MRH 3 Mi-17 Hip H
MRH 37: 2 Hughes 500D†; 12 Hughes 500M†; 10 Hughes TPT 5: Medium 1 Mi-17V-5; Light 4: 2 AW139; 1
Bell 206L Long Ranger; 1 Bo-105
500MD Scout Defender† (with TOW); 10 Hughes 500ME†;
TRG 1 Bell 47G
3 Z-9W
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 94: 20mm 81: 11
Oerlikon; ε70 TCM-20; 40mm 13 L/70 DEPLOYMENT
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • ASM TOW
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 7; 6 obs
Navy 1,600 (incl 120 marines) DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE MONUSCO 7; 5 obs
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7 LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1
PCO 1 Jasiri with 1 76mm gun MALI: UN • MINUSMA 8; 3 obs
PCF 2 Nyayo
PCC 3: 1 Harambee II (ex-FRA P400); 2 Shujaa with 1 SOMALIA: AU • AMISOM 4,046: 3 inf bn
76mm gun SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 11; 7 obs
PBF 1 Archangel SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 89; 2 obs; 1 MP coy
AMPHIBIOUS • LCM 2 Galana
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AP 2
FOREIGN FORCES
Air Force 2,500 United Kingdom BATUK 350; 1 trg unit
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK Lesotho LSO
2 sqn with F-5E/F Tiger II
TRANSPORT Lesotho Loti M 2017 2018 2019
Some sqn with DHC-5D Buffalo†; DHC-8†; F-70† (VIP); GDP M 35.7bn 38.5bn
Y-12(II)†
US$ 2.75bn 2.98bn
TRAINING
Some sqn with Bulldog 103/Bulldog 127†; EMB-312 per capita US$ 1,361 1,466
Tucano†*; Hawk Mk52†*; Hughes 500D† Growth % -1.6 0.8
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Inflation % 5.3 6.3
1 sqn with SA330 Puma† Def bdgt m 723m 661m
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† US$ 55.6m 51.2m
AIRCRAFT 37 combat capable
US$1=M 13.00 12.92
FTR 21: 17 F-5E Tiger II; 4 F-5F Tiger II
TPT 17 Light 16: 4 DHC-5D Buffalo†; 3 DHC-8†; 9 Population 1,962,461
Y-12(II)†; (6 Do-28D-2 in store); PAX 1 F-70 (VIP)
TRG 29: 8 Bulldog 103/127†; 11 EMB-312 Tucano†*; 5 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Grob 120A; 5 Hawk Mk52†* Male 16.0% 4.9% 4.4% 4.3% 17.0% 2.8%
HELICOPTERS Female 15.8% 5.1% 5.0% 5.1% 16.8% 2.7%
ATK 3 AH-1F Cobra
MRH 9 H125M (AS550) Fennec Capabilities
TPT 20: Medium 12: 2 Mi-171; 10 SA330 Puma†; Light 8
Bell 205 (UH-1H Huey II) Lesotho has a small ground force and an air wing for light trans-
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES port and liaison. A SADC force deployed in country at the end of
2017 to support the government following the assassination of
AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder
the army chief. The force was due to leave in late 2018. Lesotho’s
ASM AGM-65 Maverick
armed forces are charged with protecting territorial integrity and
sovereignty and ensuring internal security. Lesotho is a SADC
Paramilitary 5,000 member state. The armed forces are a voluntary service. Morale
Police General Service Unit 5,000 may have been undermined by instability in the country and by
the requirement for a SADC force to provide stability. There is no
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE independent capacity to deploy and support an operation beyond
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES national borders. Lesotho’s limited inventory is obsolescent by
APC • PPV 25 CS/VP3 modern standards, and there is little possibility of any significant
 Sub-Saharan Africa 475

procurement to replace ageing equipment. The acquisition of Capabilities

light helicopters has been identified as a goal. Barring very limited
maintenance, there is no defence-industrial capacity. Liberia’s developing armed forces and security institutions are
now operating without in-country support formerly provided by
ACTIVE 2,000 (Army 2,000) UNMIL, which completed its mandate in March 2018. A revised
National Security Strategy was produced in 2017, reportedly clari-
fying the roles of Liberia’s security institutions. The government is
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE emphasising national security as part of its development agenda,
in order to fill the gap left by the end of UNMIL. However, some
Army ε2,000 UN-level support continues for the security and justice sectors. The
army chief of staff has said that priorities include improving train-
FORCES BY ROLE ing, operational readiness and personnel welfare. There are plans
MANOEUVRE to establish an air wing to boost the country’s search-and-rescue,
Reconnaissance movement and logistics, medevac and maritime-patrol capacities.
1 recce coy Historical ties with the US have led to a deep defence relationship,
Light which in recent years has focused on areas such as force health,
including schemes to improve recruitment and retention. A US
7 inf coy mentoring mission that ended in 2017 worked on defence admin-
Aviation istration, engineering and explosive-ordnance disposal. Subse-
1 sqn quent US assistance has focused on maritime security and medical
COMBAT SUPPORT skills. There is cooperation also in military medicine, coming only
1 arty bty(-) years after significant US assistance as part of the Ebola response.
A military-cooperation agreement with Nigeria was signed in 2007
1 spt coy (with mor)
and has led to training for soldiers and personnel for the embry-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE onic air wing. In 2018, the first two pilots graduated after a new
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES round of fixed-wing-aircraft training in Nigeria. The armed forces
MBT 1 T-55 are able to deploy and sustain small units, such as to the MINUSMA
RECCE 30: 4 AML-90; 2 BRDM-2†; 6 RAM Mk3; 10 mission in Mali. Equipment recapitalisation will be dependent on
finances as well as the development of a supporting force struc-
RBY-1; 8 S52 Shorland
ture. Liberia has no domestic defence industry, bar limited mainte-
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE nance support capacities.
RCL 106mm 6 M40
ARTILLERY 12 ACTIVE 2,010 (Army 1,950, Coast Guard 60)
TOWED 105mm 2
MOR 81mm 10 ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Air Wing 110 Army 1,950
AIRCRAFT
FORCES BY ROLE
TPT • Light 3: 2 C-212-300 Aviocar; 1 GA-8 Airvan
MANOEUVRE
HELICOPTERS
Light
MRH 3: 1 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 2 Bell 412EP Twin Huey
1 (23rd) inf bde with (2 inf bn, 1 engr coy, 1 MP coy)
TPT • Light 1 Bell 206 Jet Ranger COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 trg unit (forming)
Liberia LBR
Coast Guard 60

Sub-Saharan
Liberian Dollar L$ 2017 2018 2019 All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD

Africa
GDP L$ 3.29bn 3.22bn
US$ 3.29bn 3.22bn DEPLOYMENT
per capita US$ 694 663 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 115; 1 obs; 1 inf coy(-)
Growth % 2.5 3.0
Inflation % 12.4 21.3
Def bdgt L$ 14.4m 16.0m 15.5m
US$ 14.4m 16.0m
FMA (US) US$ 2.5m 0m
US$1=L$ 1.00 1.00
Population 4,809,768
Ethnic groups: Americo-Liberians 5%

Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus

Male 22.1% 5.5% 4.5% 3.4% 13.1% 1.4%
Female 21.6% 5.4% 4.5% 3.6% 13.4% 1.5%
476 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Madagascar MDG RCL 106mm M40A1
ARTILLERY 25+
Malagsy Ariary fr 2017 2018 2019 TOWED 17: 105mm 5 M101; 122mm 12 D-30
GDP fr 35.8tr 40.5tr MOR 8+: 82mm M-37; 120mm 8 M-43
US$ 11.5bn 12.5bn AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 70: 14.5mm 50 ZPU-
per capita US$ 449 475 4; 37mm 20 PG-55 (M-1939)
Growth % 4.2 5.0
Navy 500 (incl some 100 Marines)
Inflation % 8.3 7.8
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Def bdgt fr 208bn 243bn PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8
US$ 66.8m 74.9m PCC 1 Trozona
US$1=fr 3,116.06 3,244.13 PB 7 (ex-US CG MLB)
AMPHIBIOUS • LCT 1 (ex-FRA EDIC)
Population 25,683,610

Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Air Force 500
Male 19.9% 5.3% 4.8% 4.1% 14.3% 1.5% FORCES BY ROLE
TRANSPORT
Female 19.6% 5.3% 4.8% 4.1% 14.3% 1.8%
1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Yak-40 Codling (VIP)
1 (liaison) sqn with Cessna 310; Cessna 337 Skymaster;
Capabilities PA-23 Aztec
The army dominates the country’s modest armed forces, and TRAINING
there remains the risk of military intervention in domestic politics. 1 sqn with Cessna 172; J.300 Joker; Tetras
Ensuring sovereignty and territorial integrity are principal defence TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
aspirations; maritime security is also an area of focus. Madagas- 1 sqn with SA318C Alouette II
car is a member of SADC and its regional Standby Force. In 2018,
the country signed an ‘umbrella defence agreement’ with India
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
to explore closer defence ties and an intergovernmental agree- AIRCRAFT • TPT 16: Light 14: 1 An-26 Curl; 4 Cessna
ment with Russia on military cooperation. There is no independent 172; 1 Cessna 310; 2 Cessna 337 Skymaster; 2 J.300 Joker;
capacity to deploy and support an operation beyond national 1 PA-23 Aztec; 1 Tetras; 2 Yak-40 Codling (VIP); PAX 2 B-737
borders. The equipment inventory is obsolescent and with eco- HELICOPTERS • MRH 4 SA318C Alouette II
nomic development a key government target, equipment recapi-
talisation is unlikely to be a priority. Paramilitary 8,100
ACTIVE 13,500 (Army 12,500 Navy 500 Air 500) Gendarmerie 8,100
Paramilitary 8,100
Conscript liability 18 months (incl for civil purposes)
Malawi MWI
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Malawian Kwacha K 2017 2018 2019
GDP K 4.53tr 5.03tr
Army 12,500+ US$ 6.24bn 6.89bn
FORCES BY ROLE per capita US$ 326 349
MANOEUVRE Growth % 4.0 3.3
Light
Inflation % 12.2 9.2
2 (intervention) inf regt
Def bdgt K 27.6bn 15.3bn 22.0bn
10 (regional) inf regt
COMBAT SUPPORT US$ 38.0m 21.0m
1 arty regt US$1=K 725.62 730.39
3 engr regt
Population 19,842,560
1 sigs regt
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
1 log regt Male 23.0% 5.6% 4.6% 3.7% 11.4% 1.2%
AIR DEFENCE
Female 23.2% 5.7% 4.7% 3.7% 11.7% 1.5%
1 ADA regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Capabilities
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
The army is the largest element of the Malawi Defence Force
LT TK 12 PT-76 (MDF). In recent years, the army has been used to help with trans-
RECCE 73: ε35 BRDM-2; 10 FV701 Ferret; ε20 M3A1; 8 port-infrastructure development and to attempt to control illegal
M8 deforestation. The Malawi Defence Force Act came into operation
APC • APC (T) ε30 M3A1 half-track in 2004. The armed forces are constitutionally tasked with ensur-
 Sub-Saharan Africa 477

ing sovereignty and territorial integrity. Providing military assis- Paramilitary 4,200
tance to civil authorities in times of emergencies and support
to the police are additional tasks. Counter-trafficking is a role for Police Mobile Service 4,200
the MDF’s small air wing and the naval unit. Development plans EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
include enhancing combat readiness and improving military medi- ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
cine and engineering. Malawi is a member of the SADC and its RECCE 8 S52 Shorland
Standby Force. In 2018, the country signed an ‘umbrella defence AIRCRAFT
agreement’ with India to explore closer defence ties. The armed TPT • Light 4: 3 BN-2T Defender (border patrol); 1
forces have contributed to AU and UN peacekeeping operations, SC.7 3M Skyvan
including in Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC. The armed services are all- HELICOPTERS • MRH 2 AS365 Dauphin 2
volunteer. There is no independent capacity to deploy and support
an operation beyond national borders. The UK provided training
and support for the armed forces’ deployment to the DRC, where DEPLOYMENT
troops contribute to the Force Intervention Brigade. Although the DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
military inventory is obsolescent, there are no public requirements MONUSCO 857; 4 obs; 1 inf bn
for modernisation. Apart from limited maintenance facilities, the
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 2; UN • UNISFA 1
country has no defence industry.
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 3 obs
ACTIVE 10,700 (Army 10,700) Paramilitary 4,200
Mali MLI
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
CFA Franc BCEAO fr 2017 2018 2019
Army 10,700 GDP fr 8.93tr 9.59tr
FORCES BY ROLE US$ 15.4bn 17.4bn
MANOEUVRE per capita US$ 813 892
Mechanised Growth % 5.4 5.1
1 mech bn Inflation % 1.8 2.5
Light Def bdgt [a] fr 381bn 403bn 423bn
1 inf bde (4 inf bn)
US$ 655m 731m
1 inf bde (1 inf bn)
US$1=fr 580.93 550.82
Air Manoeuvre
1 para bn [a] Defence and interior security budget
COMBAT SUPPORT Population 18,429,893
3 lt arty bty Ethnic groups: Tuareg 6–10%
1 engr bn
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
12 log coy Male 24.1% 5.1% 3.9% 3.0% 11.0% 1.5%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Female 23.9% 5.4% 4.4% 3.7% 12.3% 1.5%
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
RECCE 66: 30 Eland-90; 8 FV701 Ferret; 20 FV721 Fox; 8 Capabilities
RAM Mk3 The armed forces are focused on countering rebel and Islamist

Sub-Saharan
APC • PPV 31: 14 Casspir; 9 Marauder; 8 Puma M26-15 groups. A defence-reform process is ongoing, with assistance from
external partners. A 2015–19 military-programming law aims to

Africa
ARTILLERY 107
improve recruitment and training. Mali is supported by neighbour-
TOWED 105mm 9 L118 Light Gun
ing states in the G5 Sahel partnership, and benefits from training
MOR 81mm 98: 82 L16A1; 16 M3 assistance from France, the EU and the US. France maintains bases,
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 72: 12.7mm 32; personnel and equipment in Mali as part of Operation Barkhane.
14.5mm 40 ZPU-4 The EU Training Mission, whose mandate has been extended to
March 2020, has trained more than 10,000 soldiers, many at the
Navy 220 Koulikoro training centre. The EUTM has also delivered training
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE to the air force. The armed forces also participate in multinational
exercises, particularly those focused on counter-terrorism capabili-
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 1
ties. There are no deployments of formed units abroad. Equipment
PB 1 Kasungu (ex-FRA Antares) and maintenance capabilities are limited, and the serviceability
of some vehicles is in doubt. The air force has no combat aircraft
Air Wing 200 and only a small number of attack helicopters. Strengthening air
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE capability is a priority and contracts have recently been signed
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Do-228 with Brazil for training aircraft, France for transport helicopters
HELICOPTERS • TPT 8: Medium 3: 1 AS532UL and Russia for attack helicopters. The country has no significant
defence industry.
Cougar; 1 SA330H Puma; 1 H215 Super Puma Light 5: 1
AS350L Ecureuil; 4 SA341B Gazelle ACTIVE 10,000 (Army 10,000) Paramilitary 7,800
478 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE National Police 1,000

Militia 3,000
Army ε10,000
FORCES BY ROLE DEPLOYMENT
The remnants of the pre-conflict Malian army are being
reformed into new combined-arms battlegroups, each of DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
which comprise one lt mech coy, three mot inf coy, one arty MONUSCO 1 obs
bty and additional recce, cdo and cbt spt elms
MANOEUVRE FOREIGN FORCES
Light All under MINUSMA comd unless otherwise specified
8 mot inf BG Albania EUTM Mali 4
Air Manoeuvre Armenia 1
1 para bn Austria 3 • EUTM Mali 12
COMBAT SUPPORT Bangladesh 1,415; 3 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 2 sigs coy; 1
1 engr bn tpt coy
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT Belgium 130; 1 recce unit; 1 tpt flt with 1 C-130H Hercules
1 med unit • EUTM Mali 20
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Benin 258; 1 mech inf coy
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Bhutan 4
RECCE BRDM-2† Bosnia-Herzegovina 2
APC • APC (W) 23+: 4+ Bastion APC; 10+ BTR-60PB; 9 Bulgaria EUTM Mali 5
BTR-70
 Burkina Faso 1,720; 2 inf bn
ARTILLERY 30+ Burundi 2
TOWED 122mm D-30 Cambodia 303; 2 eng coy; 1 EOD coy
MRL 122mm 30+ BM-21 Grad
Cameroon 1; 1 obs
Air Force Canada 138; 1 hel sqn with 2 CH-47F; 5 Bell 412
FORCES BY ROLE Chad 1,447; 3 obs; 1 SF coy; 2 inf bn
TRANSPORT China 403; 1 sy coy; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital
1 sqn with BT-67; C295W; Y-12E Côte d’Ivoire 162; 1 obs; 1 sy coy
TRAINING Czech Republic 3; 2 obs • EUTM Mali 41
1 sqn with Tetras Denmark 1
TRANSPORT/ATTACK HELICOPTER Egypt 327; 3 obs; 2 sy coy; 1 MP coy
1 sqn with H215; Mi-24D Hind; Mi-35M Hind El Salvador 156; 1 hel sqn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Estonia 3 • Operation Barkhane 50 • EUTM Mali 4
AIRCRAFT 4 combat capable Finland 4 • EUTM Mali 1
TPT • Light 11: 1 BT-67; 1 C295W; 7 Tetras; 2 Y-12E (1 France 24 • Operation Barkhane 1,750; 1 mech inf BG; 1 log
An-24 Coke; 2 An-26 Curl; 2 BN-2 Islander all in store) bn; 1 hel unit with 4 Tiger; 3 NH90 TTH; 6 SA330 Puma; 4
TRG 4 A-29 Super Tucano* (6 L-29 Delfin; 2 SF-260WL SA342 Gazelle • EUTM Mali 13
Warrior* all in store) Gambia 3; 2 obs
HELICOPTERS Georgia EUTM Mali 1
ATK 4: 2 Mi-24D Hind; 2 Mi-35M Hind Germany 430; 1 obs; 1 sy coy; 1 int coy; 1 UAV sqn •
MRH (1 Z-9 in store) EUTM Mali 147
TPT • Medium 2 H215; (1 Mi-8 Hip in store); Light (1 Ghana 163; 1 obs; 1 engr coy; 1 avn flt
AS350 Ecureuil in store) Greece EUTM Mali 2
Guatemala 2
Paramilitary 7,800 active Guinea 865; 3 obs; 1 inf bn
Hungary EUTM Mali 7
Gendarmerie 1,800
Indonesia 9; 1 obs
FORCES BY ROLE
Ireland EUTM Mali 20
MANOEUVRE
Italy 2 • EUTM Mali 12
Other
Jordan 61; 1 obs
8 paramilitary coy
Kenya 8; 3 obs
National Guard 2,000 Latvia 17 • EUTM Mali 3
FORCES BY ROLE Liberia 115; 1 obs; 1 inf coy(-)
MANOEUVRE Lithuania 38; 1 obs • EUTM Mali 2
Reconnaissance Luxembourg EUTM Mali 2
6 (camel) cav coy Mauritania 8
 Sub-Saharan Africa 479

Mexico 3 Special Mobile Force ε1,750

Montenegro EUTM Mali 1 FORCES BY ROLE
Nepal 153; 3 obs; 1 EOD coy MANOEUVRE
Netherlands 241; 1 recce coy • EUTM Mali 1 Reconnaissance
Niger 861; 2 obs; 1 inf bn 2 recce coy
Nigeria 83; 4 obs; 1 fd hospital Light
Norway 15 5 (rifle) mot inf coy
Pakistan 3 COMBAT SUPPORT
1 engr sqn
Portugal 2 • EUTM Mali 12
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Romania 3 • EUTM Mali 3 1 spt pl
Senegal 1,095; 2 inf bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Serbia EUTM Mali 3 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Sierra Leone 10; 2 obs IFV 2 VAB with 20mm gun
Slovenia EUTM Mali 4 APC • APC (W) 12: 3 Tactica; 9 VAB
Spain 1 • EUTM Mali 292 ARTILLERY • MOR 81mm 2
Sri Lanka 200; 7; 1 sy coy
Coast Guard ε800
Sweden 241; 1 int coy • EUTM Mali 6
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Switzerland 6
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17
Togo 937; 2 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 fd hospital
PCC 2 Victory (IND Sarojini Naidu)
Tunisia 4; 1 obs PCO 1 Barracuda with 1 hel landing platform
United Kingdom 2 • Operation Barkhane 90; 1 hel flt with 3 PB 14: 10 (IND Fast Interceptor Boat); 1 P-2000; 1 SDB-
CH-47SD Chinook HC3; • EUTM Mali 8 Mk3; 2 Rescuer (FSU Zhuk)
United States 24 AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4: 1 BN-2T Defender; 3 Do-
228-101

Mauritius MUS Police Air Wing

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Mauritian Rupee R 2017 2018 2019
HELICOPTERS
GDP R 460bn 479bn MRH 9: 1 H125 (AS555) Fennec; 2 Dhruv; 1 SA315B
US$ 13.3bn 14.0bn Lama (Cheetah); 5 SA316 Alouette III (Chetak)
per capita US$ 10,504 11,015
Growth % 3.8 3.9 Mozambique MOZ
Inflation % 3.7 5.1
Mozambique New Metical M 2017 2018 2019
Def bdgt [a] R 8.06bn 7.54bn 8.49bn
GDP M 804bn 878bn
US$ 234m 221m
US$ 12.6bn 14.6bn
US$1=R 34.48 34.14
per capita US$ 426 481
[a] Police service budget
Growth % 3.7 3.5
Population 1,364,283
Inflation % 15.3 6.0

Sub-Saharan
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Def bdgt M 5.97bn 7.86bn

Africa
Male 10.2% 3.7% 3.7% 4.0% 23.5% 4.2% US$ 93m 131m
Female 9.7% 3.5% 3.7% 3.9% 24.1% 6.0% US$1=M 63.92 60.16

Population 27,233,789
Capabilities
The country has no standing armed forces; instead, security tasks Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
are met by the police force’s Special Mobile Force (SMF), formed Male 22.4% 5.8% 4.9% 3.8% 10.8% 1.3%
as a motorised infantry battalion. The SMF is tasked with ensuring Female 22.1% 5.8% 5.1% 4.2% 12.2% 1.6%
internal and external territorial and maritime security. India pro-
vides support to the Mauritian National Coast Guard, which is a
branch of the police force. The SMF trains along traditional military
Capabilities
lines but has no ability to deploy beyond national territory. There The country faces a growing internal threat from Islamist groups,
is no defence industry, beyond very limited maintenance facilities. with attacks being carried out in the north of the country. The May
2018 death of RENAMO opposition leader Afonso Dhlakama also
ACTIVE NIL Paramilitary 2,550 raised concerns over renewed armed clashes between the former
resistance movement and the government. The armed forces are
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE tasked with ensuring territorial integrity and internal security, as
well as tackling piracy and human trafficking. The integration of
Paramilitary 2,550 RENAMO personnel into the military is a long-standing objective.
480 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Mozambique has defence relationships with China, Portugal and Air Force 1,000
Russia. In 2017, the UN raised concerns that Mozambique was
receiving defence support from North Korea, a claim the govern- FORCES BY ROLE
ment rejected. The armed forces use conscription to meet their FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
personnel requirements. The ministry is reportedly to implement 1 sqn with MiG-21bis Fishbed; MiG-21UM Mongol B
a military HIV policy, including more screening, to try to reduce HIV TRANSPORT
incidence. The armed forces have no capacity to deploy beyond 1 sqn with An-26 Curl; FTB-337G Milirole; Cessna 150B;
Mozambique’s borders without assistance. Maintaining ageing Cessna 172; PA-34 Seneca
Soviet-era equipment, which makes up the bulk of its inventory, ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
will be problematic, not least in the absence of any local defence
1 sqn with Mi-24 Hind†
industry. Moreover, Mozambique’s recent economic performance
will likely limit the government’s ability to recapitalise. EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 8 combat capable
ACTIVE 11,200 (Army 10,000 Navy 200 Air 1,000) FGA 8: 6 MiG-21bis Fishbed; 2 MiG-21UM Mongol B
Conscript liability 2 years
ISR 2 FTB-337G Milirole
TPT 6: Light 5: 1 An-26 Curl; 2 Cessna 150B; 1 Cessna
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 172; 1 PA-34 Seneca; (4 PA-32 Cherokee non-op); PAX 1
Army ε9,000–10,000 Hawker 850XP
HELICOPTERS
FORCES BY ROLE
ATK 2 Mi-24 Hind†
SPECIAL FORCES
TPT • Medium (2 Mi-8 Hip non-op)
3 SF bn
AD • SAM • TOWED: (S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline) non-
MANOEUVRE
Light op‡; S-125 Pechora SA-3 Goa non-op‡)
7 inf bn
COMBAT SUPPORT Namibia NAM
2-3 arty bn
2 engr bn Namibian Dollar N$ 2017 2018 2019
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT GDP N$ 176bn 184bn
1 log bn
US$ 13.2bn 14.1bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
per capita US$ 5,589 5,923
Equipment estimated at 10% or less serviceability
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Growth % -0.8 1.1
MBT 60+ T-54 Inflation % 6.1 3.5
RECCE 30 BRDM-1/BRDM-2 Def bdgt N$ 6.40bn 5.96bn
IFV 40 BMP-1
US$ 481m 457m
APC 326
APC (T) 30 FV430 US$1=N$ 13.32 13.04
APC (W) 285: 160 BTR-60; 100 BTR-152; 25 AT-105 Saxon Population 2,533,224
PPV 11 Casspir
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Male 18.5% 5.4% 4.8% 4.2% 14.4% 1.7%
Fagot (AT-4 Spigot)
Female 18.1% 5.3% 4.9% 4.4% 16.1% 2.3%
RCL 75mm; 82mm B-10; 107mm 24 B-12
GUNS 85mm 18: 6 D-48; 12 PT-56 (D-44)
ARTILLERY 126
Capabilities
TOWED 62: 100mm 20 M-1944; 105mm 12 M101; The defence authorities aim to develop a small, mobile profes-
122mm 12 D-30; 130mm 6 M-46; 152mm 12 D-1 sional force. According to the constitution, the Namibian Defence
MRL 122mm 12 BM-21 Grad Force’s (NDF’s) primary mission is territorial defence. Secondary
MOR 52: 82mm 40 M-43; 120mm 12 M-43 roles include assisting the civil power in domestic support opera-
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 290+ tions, assisting the AU and the SADC and supporting UN missions.
SP 57mm 20 ZSU-57-2 The NDF Development Strategy 2012–22 states that the NDF
TOWED 270+: 20mm M-55; 23mm 120 ZU-23-2; 37mm design should be based on a conventional force with a force-pro-
90 M-1939; (10 M-1939 in store); 57mm 60 S-60; (30 S-60 jection capability. Namibia is a member of the AU and the SADC,
with which the navy exercises as part of its Standing Maritime
in store)
Committee. There is a permanent commission on defence and
Navy ε200 security with Zambia that meets annually. An MoU on training and
cooperation was signed with Botswana in late 2018. While the NDF
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE receives a comparatively large proportion of the state budget, the
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12 government has acknowledged that funding problems led train-
PBF 8: 2 DV 15; 6 HSI 32 ing to almost cease, especially for recruits, though the services
PB 4: 3 Ocean Eagle 43 (capacity 1 Camcopter S-100 continued training at low levels. Namibia has deployed on AU and
UAV); 1 Pebane (ex-ESP Conejera) UN missions, but there is only limited capacity for independent
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES power projection. The NDF is equipped for the most part with
ISR • Light 1 S-100 Camcopter ageing or obsolescent systems, which it has ambitions to replace.
 Sub-Saharan Africa 481

However, economic difficulties make this unlikely in the near term. AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 F406 Caravan II
The country has a limited defence-manufacturing sector covering HELICOPTERS • TPT • Medium 1 S-61L
armoured vehicles, tactical communications and ammunition, as
well as some broader industrial business interests. Marines ε700
ACTIVE 9,900 (Army 9,000 Navy 900) Paramilitary Air Force
6,000 FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 1 sqn with F-7 (F-7NM); FT-7 (FT-7NG)
ISR
Army 9,000 1 sqn with O-2A Skymaster
FORCES BY ROLE TRANSPORT
MANOEUVRE Some sqn with An-26 Curl; Falcon 900; Learjet 36; Y-12
Reconnaissance TRAINING
1 recce regt 1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum*
Light ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 sqn with H425; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-25 Hind D; SA315 Lama
3 inf bde (total: 6 inf bn)
(Cheetah); SA316B Alouette III (Chetak)
Other
1 (Presidential Guard) gd bn EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
COMBAT SUPPORT AIRCRAFT 12 combat capable
1 arty bde with (1 arty regt) FTR 8: 6 F-7NM; 2 FT-7 (FT-7NG)
1 AT regt ISR 5 Cessna O-2A Skymaster
1 engr regt TPT 6: Light 5: 2 An-26 Curl; 1 Learjet 36; 2 Y-12; PAX 1
1 sigs regt Falcon 900
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TRG 4+ K-8 Karakorum*
1 log bn HELICOPTERS
ATK 2 Mi-25 Hind D
AIR DEFENCE
MRH 5: 1 H425; 1 SA315 Lama (Cheetah); 3 SA316B
1 AD regt
Alouette III (Chetak)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TPT • Medium 1 Mi-8 Hip
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT T-54/T-55†; T-34† Paramilitary 6,000
RECCE 12 BRDM-2
IFV 7: 5 Type-05P mod (with BMP-1 turret); 2 Wolf Police Force • Special Field Force 6,000 (incl
Turbo 2 mod (with BMP-1 turret) Border Guard and Special Reserve Force)
APC 61
APC (W) 41: 10 BTR-60; 3 Type-05P; 28 Wolf Turbo 2 DEPLOYMENT
PPV 20 Casspir
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2
ARV T-54/T-55 reported SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 1; 3 obs; UN • UNISFA 3; 1 obs
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
RCL 82mm B-10
GUNS 12+: 57mm; 76mm 12 ZIS-3
Niger NER

Sub-Saharan
ARTILLERY 72 CFA Franc BCEAO fr 2017 2018 2019

Africa
TOWED 140mm 24 G-2 GDP fr 4.77tr 5.23tr
MRL 122mm 8: 5 BM-21 Grad; 3 PHL-81
US$ 8.22bn 9.46bn
MOR 40: 81mm; 82mm
AIR DEFENCE per capita US$ 438 489
SAM • Point-defence FN-6; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡ Growth % 4.9 5.3
GUNS 65 Inflation % 2.4 3.9
SP 23mm 15 Zumlac Def bdgt fr 100bn 128bn
TOWED 50+: 14.5mm 50 ZPU-4; 57mm S-60
US$ 172m 231m

Navy ε900 US$1=fr 580.92 553.06

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Population 19,866,231

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 7 Ethnic groups: Gourma 55.3%; Djerma Sonrai 21%; Touareg 9.3%;
PSO 1 Elephant with 1 hel landing platform Peuhl 8.5%; Kanouri Manga 4.6%; other or unspecified 1.3%
PCC 3: 2 Daures (ex-PRC Haiqing (Type-037-IS)) with 2
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
FQF-2300 A/S mor; 1 Oryx
PB 3: 1 Brendan Simbwaye (BRZ Grajaú); 2 Terrace Bay Male 24.6% 5.4% 4.1% 3.2% 11.5% 1.3%
(BRZ Marlim) Female 24.1% 5.5% 4.3% 3.4% 11.2% 1.3%
482 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Capabilities TPT 7: Medium 1 C-130H Hercules; Light 5: 1 An-26

Curl; 2 Cessna 208 Caravan; 1 Do-28 Skyservant; 1 Do-
Maintaining internal and border security are key roles for the armed 228-201; PAX 1 B-737-700 (VIP)
forces, in light of the regional threat from Islamist groups. Defence-
HELICOPTERS
policy developments in recent years have enabled Niger’s armed
ATK 2 Mi-35P Hind
forces to professionalise. The country is a member of the G5 Sahel
group and part of the Multinational Joint Task Force fighting Boko MRH 5: 2 Mi-17 Hip; 3 SA342 Gazelle
Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. France has conducted joint counter-
terrorism operations with Niger’s armed forces, while Germany has Paramilitary 5,400
developed an air-transport base at Niamey to supply its troops in
neighbouring Mali. France maintains an air contingent at Niamey, Gendarmerie 1,400
where there is also a detachment of US UAVs. Niger’s armed forces
are combat experienced and relatively well trained, receiving train- Republican Guard 2,500
ing support from France, Italy and the US. Deployment capabilities
are limited to neighbouring countries without external support. National Police 1,500
Operations in austere environments have demonstrated adequate
sustainment and manoeuvre capacity. However, the armed forces
are generally under-equipped and -resourced for the tasks they DEPLOYMENT
face. Apart from limited maintenance facilities, the country has no CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 3; 1 obs
domestic defence-industrial capability.
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
ACTIVE 5,300 (Army 5,200 Air 100) Paramilitary MONUSCO 5; 4 obs
5,400 MALI: UN • MINUSMA 861; 2 obs; 1 inf bn
Conscript liability Selective conscription, 2 years

FOREIGN FORCES
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
France Opération Barkhane 500; 1 FGA det with 2 Mirage
2000C; 2 Mirage 2000D; 1 tkr/tpt det with 1 C-135FR; 1
Army 5,200 C-160; 1 UAV det with 4 MQ-9A Reaper
3 Mil Districts
Germany Opération Barkhane 2 C-160
FORCES BY ROLE Italy MISIN 70
MANOEUVRE
United States 800
Reconnaissance
4 armd recce sqn
Light Nigeria NGA
7 inf coy
Air Manoeuvre Nigerian Naira N 2017 2018 2019
2 AB coy GDP N 115tr 129tr
COMBAT SUPPORT US$ 376bn 397bn
1 engr coy
per capita US$ 1,995 2,050
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 log gp Growth % 0.8 1.9
AIR DEFENCE Inflation % 16.5 12.4
1 AD coy Def bdgt N 465bn 567bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE US$ 1.53bn 1.75bn
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES FMA (US) US$ 0.5m 0m
RECCE 132: 35 AML-20/AML-60; 90 AML-90; 7 VBL
US$1=N 305.29 325.00
APC 45
APC (W) 24: 22 Panhard M3; 2 WZ-523 Population 203,452,505
PPV 21 Puma M26-15 Ethnic groups: North (Hausa and Fulani), Southwest (Yoruba),
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Southeast (Ibo); these tribes make up ε65% of population
RCL 14: 75mm 6 M20; 106mm 8 M40
ARTILLERY • MOR 40: 81mm 19 Brandt; 82mm 17; Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
120mm 4 Brandt Male 21.7% 5.6% 4.5% 3.6% 13.6% 1.5%
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 39 Female 20.8% 5.4% 4.4% 3.6% 13.7% 1.7%
SP 20mm 10 Panhard M3 VDAA
TOWED 20mm 29 Capabilities
Nigeria is the region’s principal military power and faces numer-
Air Force 100
ous security challenges, including from Boko Haram and militants
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE in the Delta. The challenge from Boko Haram, and the relative
AIRCRAFT 2 combat capable weaknesses exposed in the armed forces, have led to reform initia-
ATK 2 Su-25 Frogfoot tives. There have been operational changes, including attempts to
ISR 6: 4 Cessna 208 Caravan; 2 DA42 MPP Twin Star implement counter-insurgency tactics and generate forward-oper-

ating bases and quick-reaction groups. Nigeria is central to several
regional security initiatives and is part of the Multinational Joint
Task Force. It is a key member of the ECOWAS Standby Force. Mili-
tary and security assistance is either discussed or under way with
Germany, the UK and the US. The UK bases its British Defence Staff
West Africa in Nigeria. Efforts have been made to improve train-
ing, notably in the air force, with the establishment of Air Training
Command and Ground Training Command. The UK has deployed
short-term training teams to Nigeria. Contractors have also been
used to improve training levels. Nigeria is able to mount regional
operations, though its deployable capacities remain limited. There
is a plan (with finance allocated in the 2018 budget) to acquire
JF-17 combat aircraft. Deliveries of attack helicopters continue,
and an effort has been made to refurbish previously stored air-
craft. A number of small coastal-patrol boats have been acquired
in recent years in light of security requirements in the Delta region.
Nigeria is developing its defence-industrial capacity, including the
development of local production facilities for small arms and pro-
tected patrol vehicles.
ACTIVE 135,000 (Army 100,000 Navy 25,000 Air
10,000) Paramilitary 80,000
Reserves planned, none org
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Army 100,000

FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
1 spec ops bn
3 (mobile strike team) spec ops units
1 ranger bn
MANOEUVRE
Armoured
1 (3rd) armd div (1 armd bde, 1 arty bde)
Mechanised
1 (1st) mech div (1 recce bn, 1 mech bde, 1 mot inf bde, 1
arty bde, 1 engr regt)
1 (2nd) mech div (1 recce bn, 1 armd bde, 1 arty bde, 1
engr regt)
1 (81st) composite div (1 recce bn, 1 mech bde, 1 arty
bde, 1 engr regt)
Light
1 (6th) inf div (1 amph bde, 2 inf bde)
1 (7th) inf div (1 spec ops bn, 1 recce bn(-), 1 armd bde, 7
(task force) inf bde, 1 arty bde, 1 engr regt)
1 (8th Task Force) inf div (2 inf bde)
1 (82nd) composite div (1 recce bn, 3 mot inf bde, 1 arty
bde, 1 engr regt)
1 (Multi-national Joint Task Force) bde (2 inf bn(-))
Other
1 (Presidential Guard) gd bde (4 gd bn)
AIR DEFENCE
1 AD regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
MBT 319: 176 Vickers Mk 3; 100 T-55†; 12 T-72AV; 31
T-72M1
LT TK 157 FV101 Scorpion
RECCE 342: 90 AML-60; 40 AML-90; 70 EE-9 Cascavel; 50
FV721 Fox; 20 FV601 Saladin Mk2; 72 VBL
IFV 32: 10 BTR-4EN; 22 BVP-1
Sub-Saharan Africa 483
APC 655+
APC (T) 317: 250 4K-7FA Steyr; 67 MT-LB
APC (W) 282+: 110 Cobra; 10 FV603 Saracen; 110 AVGP
Grizzly mod/Piranha I 6x6; 47 BTR-3UN; 5 BTR-80;
some EE-11 Urutu (reported)
PPV 56+: 16 Caiman; 8 Maxxpro; 9 Proforce Ara; 23
REVA III 4×4; Streit Spartan; Streit Cougar (Igirigi);
Streit Typhoon; Bigfoot
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
ARV 17+: AVGP Husky; 2 Greif; 15 Vickers ARV
VLB MTU-20; VAB
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav; 106mm M40A1
ARTILLERY 517+
SP 155mm 39 Palmaria
TOWED 106: 105mm 50 M-56; 122mm 49 D-30/D-74;
130mm 7 M-46; (155mm 24 FH-77B in store)
MRL 122mm 42: 10 BM-21 Grad; 25 APR-21; 7 RM-70
MOR 330+: 81mm 200; 82mm 100; 120mm 30+
AIR DEFENCE
SAM • Point-defence 16+: 16 Roland; Blowpipe; 9K32
Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
GUNS 90+
SP 23mm 30 ZSU-23-4 Shilka
TOWED 60+: 20mm 60+; 23mm ZU-23; 40mm L/70
Navy 25,000 (incl Coast Guard)
Western Comd HQ located at Apapa; Eastern Comd HQ
located at Calabar; Central Comd HQ located at Brass
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 1
FRIGATES • FFGHM 1 Aradu† (GER MEKO 360) with
8 single lnchr with Otomat AShM, 1 octuple Albatros
lnchr with Aspide SAM, 2 triple STWS 1B 324mm ASTT
with A244 LWT, 1 127mm gun (capacity 1 med hel)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 121
CORVETTES • FSM 1 Erinomi† (UK Vosper Mk 9) with
1 triple lnchr with Seacat† SAM, 1 twin 375mm A/S
mor, 1 76mm gun
PSOH 4: 2 Centenary with 1 76mm gun; 2 Thunder (ex-
US Hamilton) with 1 76mm gun
Sub-Saharan
PCFG 1 Sipri† (FRA Combattante) with 2 twin lnchr with
Africa
MM38 Exocet AShM, 1 76mm gun
PCF 2 Siri (FRA Combattante IIIB) with 1 76mm gun
PCO 4 Kyanwa (ex-US CG Balsam)
PCC 2 Ekpe† (GER Lurssen 57m) with 1 76mm gun
PBF 33: 21 Manta (Suncraft 17m); 4 Manta MkII; 3
Shaldag II; 2 Torie (Nautic Sentinel 17m); 3 Wave Rider
PB 74: 1 Andoni; 1 Dorina (FPB 98); 5 Okpoku (FPB 72);
1 Karaduwa; 1 Sagbama; 2 Sea Eagle (Suncraft 38m); 15
Stingray (Suncraft 16m); 40 Suncraft 12m; 4 Swiftships;
2 Town (of which one laid up); 2 Yola†
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 2:
MCC 2 Ohue (ITA Lerici mod)
AMPHIBIOUS 4
LC • LCVP 4 Stingray 20
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1
AX 1 Prosperity
484 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Naval Aviation ISR 1: Medium (9 Aerostar non-operational); Light 1+

Tsaigami
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
HELICOPTERS
AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡; PL-9C
MRH 2 AW139 (AB-139)
ASM AR-1
TPT • Light 3 AW109E Power†
BOMBS • INS/GPS guided FT-9
Special Boat Service 200
Paramilitary ε80,000
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
FORCES BY ROLE Security and Civil Defence Corps 80,000
SPECIAL FORCES EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 SF unit ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
APC 80+
Air Force 10,000 APC (W) 74+: 70+ AT105 Saxon†; 4 BTR-3U; UR-416
FORCES BY ROLE PPV 6 Springbuck 4x4
Very limited op capability AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 4: 1 Cessna 500 Citation I; 2
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK PA-31 Navajo; 1 PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain
1 sqn with F-7 (F-7NI); FT-7 (FT-7NI) HELICOPTERS • TPT • Light 5: 2 Bell 212 (AB-212);
MARITIME PATROL 2 Bell 222 (AB-222); 1 Bell 429
1 sqn with ATR-42-500 MP; Do-128D-6 Turbo SkyServant;
Do-228-100/200 DEPLOYMENT
TRANSPORT
2 sqn with C-130H Hercules; C-130H-30 Hercules; G-222 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 1
1 (Presidential) gp with B-727; B-737BBJ; BAe-125-800; DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
Beech 350 King Air; Do-228-200; Falcon 7X; Falcon 900; MONUSCO 2; 6 obs
Gulfstream IV/V
GAMBIA: ECOWAS • ECOMIG 200
TRAINING
1 unit with Air Beetle† GUINEA-BISSAU: ECOWAS • ECOMIB 100
1 unit with Alpha Jet* LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 1
1 unit with L-39 Albatros†*; MB-339A*
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 83; 4 obs; 1 fd hospital
1 unit with Super Mushshak; DA40NG
1 hel unit with Mi-34 Hermit (trg) SOMALIA: UN • UNSOS 1 obs
ATTACK HELICOPTER SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 5; 7 obs
1 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-35 Hind†
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 126; 7 obs; 1 sigs unit; 1 fd
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
hospital; UN • UNISFA 2; 2 obs
1 sqn with H215 (AS332) Super Puma; (AS365N)
Dauphin; AW109LUH; H135 WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 4 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
AIRCRAFT 60 combat capable FOREIGN FORCES
FTR 12: 10 F-7 (F-7NI); 2 FT-7 (FT-7NI) United Kingdom 50 (trg teams)
ELINT 2 ATR-42-500 MP
TPT 32: Medium 5: 1 C-130H Hercules (4 more in store†);
1 C-130H-30 Hercules (2 more in store); 3 G.222† (2 more Rwanda RWA
in store†); Light 18: 3 Beech 350 King Air; 1 Cessna 550
Rwandan Franc fr 2017 2018 2019
Citation; 8 Do-128D-6 Turbo SkyServant; 1 Do-228-100; 5
Do-228-200 (incl 2 VIP); PAX 9: 1 B-727; 1 B-737BBJ; 1 GDP fr 7.60tr 8.39tr
BAe 125-800; 2 Falcon 7X; 2 Falcon 900; 1 Gulfstream IV; US$ 9.14bn 9.71bn
1 Gulfstream V per capita US$ 772 800
TRG 118: 58 Air Beetle† (up to 20 awaiting repair); 3 Alpha
Growth % 6.1 7.2
Jet A*; 10 Alpha Jet E*; 2 DA40NG; 23 L-39ZA Albatros†*;
12 MB-339AN* (all being upgraded); 10 Super Mushshak Inflation % 4.8 3.3
HELICOPTERS Def bdgt fr 90.4bn 92.3bn 101bn
ATK 15: 2 Mi-24P Hind; 4 Mi-24V Hind; 3 Mi-35 Hind; 2 US$ 109m 107m
Mi-35P Hind; 4 Mi-35M Hind US$1=fr 831.55 863.97
MRH 11+: 6 AW109LUH; 2 Bell 412EP; 3+ SA341 Gazelle
TPT 19: Medium 11: 2 AW101; 5 H215 (AS332) Super Population 12,187,400
Puma (4 more in store); 3 AS365N Dauphin; 1 Mi-171Sh; Ethnic groups: Hutu 80%; Tutsi 19%
Light 9: 4 H125 (AS350B) Ecureuil; 1 AW109; 1 Bell 205;
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
3 H135
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 2+ Male 20.7% 5.3% 4.4% 4.2% 13.3% 1.0%
CISR • Heavy 1+ CH-3 Female 20.3% 5.3% 4.4% 4.3% 15.3% 1.5%
 Sub-Saharan Africa 485

Capabilities MRH 12: 1 AW139; 4 Mi-17 Hip H; 1 Mi-17MD Hip H; 1

Mi-17V-5 Hip H; 5 Mi-17-1V Hip H
Rwanda is one of the principal security actors in the East African TPT • Light 1 AW109S
region, with disciplined and well-trained armed forces. Their
principal missions are to defend territorial integrity and national
sovereignty. The country fields a relatively large army, but units
Paramilitary
are lightly equipped, with little mechanisation. Rwanda signed a
Mutual Defence Treaty with Kenya and Uganda in 2014 and par-
District Administration Security Support
ticipates in the East African Standby Force. A law on downsizing
Organ ε2,000
and demobilising elements of the armed forces was published in
October 2015 and there have in recent years been official retire- DEPLOYMENT
ment ceremonies for those reaching rank-related retirement ages.
The lack of fixed-wing aircraft limits the armed forces’ ability to CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 1,378; 8
independently deploy much beyond personnel overseas. There obs; 2 inf bn; 1 fd hospital
have been some acquisitions of modern artillery and armoured SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2,774; 23 obs; 3 inf bn; 2
vehicles. There is limited maintenance capacity but Rwanda does hel sqn
not possess a defence-industrial base
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 1,671; 5 obs; 2 inf bn; UN •
ACTIVE 33,000 (Army 32,000 Air 1,000) Paramilitary UNISFA 2; 3 obs
2,000
Senegal SEN
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
CFA Franc BCEAO fr 2017 2018 2019
Army 32,000 GDP fr 12.3tr 13.4tr
FORCES BY ROLE US$ 21.1bn 24.2bn
MANOEUVRE per capita US$ 1,331 1,485
Light Growth % 7.2 7.0
2 cdo bn Inflation % 1.3 0.4
4 inf div (3 inf bde)
Def bdgt fr 179bn 193bn 201bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
US$ 309m 348m
1 arty bde
FMA (US) US$ 0.3m 0m
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES US$1=fr 580.94 553.08
MBT 34: 24 T-54/T-55; 10 Tiran-5 Population 15,020,945
RECCE 106: ε90 AML-60/AML-90; 16 VBL Ethnic groups: Wolof 36%; Fulani 17%; Serer 17%; Toucouleur 9%;
IFV 35+: BMP; 15 Ratel-90; 20 Ratel-60 Man-dingo 9%; Diola 9% (of which 30–60% in Casamance)
APC 90+
APC (W) 50+: BTR; Buffalo (Panhard M3); 30 Cobra; 20 Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
WZ-551 (reported) Male 20.7% 5.4% 4.7% 4.0% 12.3% 1.3%
PPV 40 RG-31 Nyala Female 20.5% 5.4% 4.8% 4.2% 15.1% 1.7%
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
ARV T-54/T-55 reported Capabilities
ARTILLERY 171+

Sub-Saharan
Senegal’s armed forces have robust international relationships
SP 11: 122mm 6 SH-3; 155mm 5 ATMOS 2000

Africa
and experience in deployments abroad. Their focus is internal
TOWED 35+: 105mm some; 122mm 6 D-30; 152mm 29 and border security, including countering insurgency in the
Type-54 (D-1)† country’s south and Islamist activity in neighbouring states, as
MRL 10: 122mm 5 RM-70; 160mm 5 LAR-160 well as combating narcotics trafficking. Under the ‘Horizon 2025’
MOR 115: 81mm; 82mm; 120mm programme, the defence authorities intend to reorganise and re-
AIR DEFENCE 
SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 equip key defence organisations and renew infrastructure. Areas
(SA-7 Grail)‡ for improvement include mobility and firepower. Despite limited
resources, there are plans to improve operational capabilities and
GUNS ε150: 14.5mm; 23mm; 37mm
introduce cohesive training regimes for garrisoned troops and in
tactical training centres. There are also plans to increase personnel
Air Force ε1,000 numbers by around 4,000. Senegal’s principal defence relationship
FORCES BY ROLE is with France, which has a military presence in country of some
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 350 troops and with which it signed a defence-cooperation agree-
1 sqn with Mi-17/Mi-17MD/Mi-17V-5/Mi-17-1V Hip H; ment in 2013. French military forces deliver training assistance,
Mi-24P/V Hind including in search and rescue. The US also provides security assis-
tance, including to the national police and gendarmerie. In Sep-
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE tember 2018, Senegal opened a counter-terrorism training centre
HELICOPTERS at the CET-7 military base at Thies, funded through the US State
ATK 5: 2 Mi-24V Hind E; 3 Mi-24P Hind Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance programme. Senegal takes
486 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

part in the US Flintlock counter-terrorism exercise and with US AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 39: 14.5mm 6 ZPU-4
partner nations from the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partner- (tch); 20mm 21 M693; 40mm 12 L/60
ship. The armed forces are able to deploy personnel using organic
airlift, as demonstrated during the deployment to Gambia, but
short-notice movements of heavy equipment would be problem-
Navy (incl Coast Guard) 950
atic without external assistance. Modernisation of the air force is FORCES BY ROLE
a priority, and Senegal is looking to revive a modest jet capability SPECIAL FORCES
with the intended purchase of two L-39s, having ordered a small 1 cdo coy
number of turboprop trainers. Refurbished Mi-24 helicopters have
been returned to the inventory, while land-force recapitalisation is EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
taking place in light of the Horizon 2025 programme. Bar limited PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 5
maintenance facilities, the country has no domestic defence- PCO 1 Fouladou (OPV 190 Mk II)
industrial capability. PCC 1 Njambour (FRA SFCN 59m) with 2 76mm gun
ACTIVE 13,600 (Army 11,900 Navy 950 Air 750) PBF 1 Ferlo (RPB 33)
Paramilitary 5,000 PB 2: 1 Conejera; 1 Kedougou
Conscript liability Selective conscription, 24 months AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 2
LCT 2 Edic 700
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
AG 1

Army 11,900 (incl conscripts) Air Force 750

7 Mil Zone HQ
FORCES BY ROLE
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE MARITIME PATROL/SEARCH & RESCUE
Reconnaissance 1 sqn with C-212 Aviocar; CN235; Bell 205 (UH-1H
4 armd recce bn Iroquois)
Light ISR
1 cdo bn 1 unit with BN-2T Islander (anti-smuggling patrols)
6 inf bn TRANSPORT
Air Manoeuvre 1 sqn with B-727-200 (VIP); F-27-400M Troopship
1 AB bn TRAINING
Other 1 sqn with R-235 Guerrier*; TB-30 Epsilon
1 (Presidential Guard) horse cav bn ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
COMBAT SUPPORT 1 sqn with AS355F Ecureuil II; Bell 206; Mi-35P Hind; Mi-
1 arty bn
171Sh
1 engr bn
3 construction coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 sigs bn AIRCRAFT 1 combat capable
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TPT 10: Light 8: 1 BN-2T Islander (govt owned, mil op);
1 log bn 1 C-212-100 Aviocar; 2 CN235; 2 Beech B200 King Air; 2
1 med bn F-27-400M Troopship (3 more in store); PAX 2: 1 A319; 1
1 trg bn B-727-200 (VIP)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE TRG 7: 1 R-235 Guerrier*; 6 TB-30 Epsilon
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES HELICOPTERS
ASLT 27 PTL-02 Assaulter ATK 5: 3 Mi-24V Hind D; 2 Mi-35P Hind
RECCE 145: 30 AML-60; 74 AML-90; 10 M8; 4 M20; 27 MRH 1 AW139
RAM Mk3 TPT 8: Medium 2 Mi-171Sh; Light 6: 1 AS355F Ecureuil II;
IFV 26 Ratel-20 1 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois); 2 Bell 206; 2 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
APC 81
APC (T) 12 M3 half-track Paramilitary 5,000
APC (W) 22: 2 Oncilla; 16 Panhard M3; 4 WZ-551 (CP)
PPV 47: 8 Casspir; 39 Puma M26-15 Gendarmerie 5,000
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARV 1 Puma M36
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
MSL • MANPATS Milan RECCE 11 RAM Mk3
ARTILLERY 82 APC 35:
TOWED 20: 105mm 6 HM-2/M101; 155mm 14: ε6 APC (W) 23: 6 Bastion APC; 5 EE-11 Urutu; 12 VXB-
Model-50; 8 TR-F1 170
MRL 122mm 6 BM-21 Grad (UKR Bastion-1 mod) PPV 12 Gila
MOR 56: 81mm 24; 120mm 32 AUV 25 Ejder Yalcin
 Sub-Saharan Africa 487

DEPLOYMENT ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 111; 1
atk hel sqn
People’s Defence Force
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • Land Forces 200
MONUSCO 7; 1 obs FORCES BY ROLE
GAMBIA: ECOWAS • ECOMIG 250 SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF unit
LIBERIA: UN • UNMIL 1 MANOEUVRE
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 1,095; 2 inf bn Light
1 inf coy
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1; 2 obs
Other
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 39 1 sy unit
COMBAT SUPPORT
FOREIGN FORCES 1 MP unit
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
France 350; 1 Falcon 50MI
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Spain Operation Barkhane 57; 1 C-130H Hercules RECCE 6 BRDM-2†
ARTILLERY• MOR 82mm 6 M-43†
Seychelles SYC AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 14.5mm ZPU-2†;
ZPU-4†; 37mm M-1939†
Seychelles Rupee SR 2017 2018 2019
GDP SR 20.4bn 21.9bn
Coast Guard 200 (incl 80 Marines)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
US$ 1.50bn 1.56bn
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8
per capita US$ 15,859 16,377 PCO 3: 1 Andromache (ITA Pichiotti 42m); 2 Topaz (ex-
Growth % 5.3 3.6 IND Trinkat)
Inflation % 2.9 4.4 PBF 1 Hermes (ex-IND Coastal Interceptor Craft)
Def exp SR n.k n.k PB 4: 2 Le Vigilant (ex-UAE Rodman 101); 1 Etoile
US$ n.k n.k (Shanghai II mod); 1 Fortune (UK Tyne)
US$1=SR 13.65 14.01 Air Force 20
Population 94,633 EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus TPT • Light 5: 1 DHC-6-320 Twin Otter; 2 Do-228; 2 Y-12
Male 10.0% 3.3% 3.6% 4.0% 27.5% 3.1%
Female 9.5% 3.0% 3.2% 3.5% 24.7% 4.7%
Sierra Leone SLE
Capabilities Sierra Leonean Leone L 2017 2018 2019

The Seychelles maintains one of the smallest standing armed GDP L 26.6tr 30.1tr
forces in the world. Its proximity to key international shipping US$ 3.61bn 3.75bn

Sub-Saharan
lanes is of strategic significance. The Seychelles People’s Defence per capita US$ 488 496

Africa
Force (PDF) primarily focus on maritime security and counter- Growth % 3.7 3.7
piracy operations. The country hosts US military forces conduct-
Inflation % 18.2 15.6
ing maritime-patrol activities on a rotational basis, including the
operation of unarmed UAVs. India maintains strong defence ties Def bdgt L 86.5bn 107bn 127bn
with the Seychelles, donating equipment, providing maintenance US$ 11.7m 13.3m
and supporting efforts to enhance its maritime-patrol and -surveil- US$1=L 7,366.21 8,028.44
lance capability. There are ongoing plans to further the Seychelles’
Population 6,312,212
defence cooperation with China. The Seychelles has participated in
and hosted a number of multinational maritime-security exercises. Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
The PDF does not deploy overseas and has a limited capacity to
Male 20.8% 4.9% 4.2% 3.7% 13.4% 1.6%
deploy and support troops operating in the archipelago. Modern
Female 20.9% 5.1% 4.4% 4.0% 14.7% 2.2%
platforms in the air force and coastguard comprise donations from
China, India and the UAE. There is no traditional domestic defence
industry. Capabilities
The armed forces’ primary task is to ensure internal and border
ACTIVE 420 (Land Forces 200; Coast Guard 200; Air security and provide forces for continental peacekeeping missions.
Force 20) With international support, there remains a focus on building
488 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

defence institutions, generating formal defence documentation

and improving planning functions. The UK is heavily involved in Somalia SOM
supporting the development of Sierra Leone’s security institutions
and improving training. UK training has developed command-and- Somali Shilling sh 2017 2018 2019
control systems around disaster response, and readiness training GDP US$ 7.05bn 7.41bn
for peace-support operations. UK training is also intended to boost
per capita US$ 7.05bn 7.41bn
the capacity of the police force, so that military support is only
needed in major emergencies. The intent is for Freetown’s Horton Growth % 2.3 3.1
Academy to develop into a regional centre of excellence for SSR. Inflation % n.k. n.k.
Defence ties with China include personnel exchanges and capac- Def bdgt US$ n.k. n.k.
ity-building for peacekeeping operations. The armed forces’ ability
US$1=sh 1.00 1.00
to deploy anything other than small units is constrained by force
size and logistics-support capacity. Logistics support received a *Definitive economic data unavailable
boost in 2017 with the donation by ECOWAS states of soft-skinned Population 11,259,029
vehicles, water bowsers and fuel trucks. Capability remains limited
in other areas, including in assets that would enable air and mari- Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
time surveillance. There is no domestic defence-industrial capabil-
Male 21.4% 5.4% 4.3% 4.0% 14.4% 0.9%
ity.
Female 21.5% 5.4% 4.2% 3.8% 13.5% 1.3%
ACTIVE 8,500 (Joint 8,500)
Capabilities
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE Internal stability remains fragile following decades of conflict and
insurgency. Deployed international forces provide security, stabili-
Armed Forces 8,500 sation and capacity building, with a transition plan in place for the
country to assume full security responsibility. The Somali National
FORCES BY ROLE
Army (SNA) remains weak in terms of both organisation and mili-
MANOEUVRE tary capability. US forces are deployed independently to Somalia
Reconnaissance and target militant groups. Plans to professionalise, legitimatise
1 recce unit and unite the loose collections of clan-based militia groups that
Light form the SNA have yet to be fully realised. Although training pro-
3 inf bde (total: 12 inf bn) grammes have been delivered by a number of countries, organisa-
COMBAT SUPPORT tions and private-security companies there are no common train-
1 engr regt ing standards throughout the army. There is no capacity to deploy
1 int unit beyond national borders, while there is minimal national infra-
1 MP unit structure available to support domestic operations. The equip-
1 sigs unit ment inventory is limited, and government plans to re-establish
and equip Somalia’s air and maritime forces remain unfulfilled.
COMBAT SUPPORT
There is no domestic defence-industrial capability.
1 log unit
1 fd hospital ACTIVE 19,800 (Army 19,800)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
APC • PPV 4: 3 Casspir; 1 Mamba Mk5
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Army 19,800 (plus further militias (to be
RCL 84mm Carl Gustav integrated))
ARTILLERY 37
FORCES BY ROLE
TOWED 122mm 6 Type-96 (D30)
COMMAND
MOR 31: 81mm ε27; 82mm 2; 120mm 2
4 div HQ
HELICOPTERS • MRH 2 Mi-17 Hip H/Mi-8 Hip† 

MANOEUVRE
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS 7: 12.7mm 4; 14.5mm 3
Light
Maritime Wing ε200 Some cdo bn(+)
12 inf bde (3 inf bn)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
2 indep inf bn
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 2: 1
Other
Shanghai III†; 1 Isle of Man
1 gd bn
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
DEPLOYMENT ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 3 APC 47+
APC (W) 38+: 25+ AT-105 Saxon; 13 Bastion APC; Fiat
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 10; 2 obs
6614
SOMALIA: UN • UNSOM 2 obs; UN • UNSOS 1 obs PPV 9+: Casspir; MAV-5; 9+ Mamba Mk5; RG-31 Nyala
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 4; UN • UNISFA 2; 1 obs AUV 12 Tiger 4×4
 Sub-Saharan Africa 489

Paramilitary APC • APC(W) Fiat 6614

ARTILLERY • MRL various incl BM-21 Grad
Coast Guard AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • 23mm ZU-23
All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD
Ministry of the Interior
FOREIGN FORCES Coast Guard 600
Under UNSOM command unless stated All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD
Burundi 1 obs • AMISOM 5,073; 6 inf bn
Djibouti AMISOM 1,872; 2 inf bn
Puntland
Ethiopia AMISOM 4,323; 6 inf bn Army ε3,000 (to be integrated into Somali
Finland EUTM Somalia 7 National Army)
Ghana UNSOS 2 obs
Hungary EUTM Somalia 4 Maritime Police Force ε1,000
India 1 obs EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Italy EUTM Somalia 123 AIRCRAFT • TPT 4: Light 3 Ayres S2R; PAX 1 DC-3
Kenya AMISOM 4,046; 3 inf bn HELICOPTERS • MRH SA316 Alouette III
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS
Mauritania UNSOS 1 obs
All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD
Netherlands EUTM Somalia 11
Nigeria UNSOS 1 obs
Pakistan UNSOS 1 obs South Africa RSA
Portugal EUTM Somalia 4 South African Rand R 2017 2018 2019
Romania EUTM Somalia 3
GDP R 4.65tr 4.91tr
Serbia EUTM Somalia 6
US$ 349bn 377bn
Sierra Leone 2 obs • UNSOS 1 obs
per capita US$ 6,180 6,560
Spain EUTM Somalia 13
Sweden EUTM Somalia 4 Growth % 1.3 0.8
Turkey 1 obs • 200 (trg base) Inflation % 5.3 4.8
Uganda 530; 2 obs; 1 sy bn • AMISOM 6,022; 7 inf bn • Def bdgt R 48.6bn 48.0bn 50.7bn
UNSOS 1 obs US$ 3.65bn 3.68bn
United Kingdom 43; 3 obs • UNSOS 40; 2 obs • EUTM FMA (US) US$ 0.3m 0m
Somalia 4 US$1=R 13.32 13.04
United States Africa Command 500
Population 55,380,210

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL Male 21.4% 5.4% 4.3% 4.0% 14.4% 0.9%
Data presented here represents the de facto situation. This Female 21.5% 5.4% 4.2% 3.8% 13.5% 1.3%
does not imply international recognition as a sovereign
state. Much of this equipment is in poor repair or inoperable. Capabilities
Somaliland While on paper the region’s most capable armed forces, economic

Sub-Saharan
problems have undermined the armed forces’ effectiveness. Roles

Africa
Army ε12,500 include protecting the state and maintaining territorial integrity,
as well as supporting the police service in specific circumstances.
FORCES BY ROLE
The Department of Defence Strategic Plan 2015–2020 is the force’s
MANOUEVRE primary policy instrument. This maps out five strategic-planning
Armoured milestones, the first of which is to arrest the decline of critical
2 armd bde military capabilities. South Africa contributes to UN operations and
Mechanised has been a key component of the Force Intervention Brigade in the
1 mech inf bde Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) since its inception. It is
Light a member of the SADC Standby Force. Historically, South African
14 inf bde forces have also played a significant role in training and supporting
COMBAT SUPPORT other regional forces. Continuing budget cuts are likely to have an
2 arty bde adverse effect on training. The SANDF can independently deploy
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT its forces across the continent, deploys regularly on peacekeeping
1 spt bn missions, and participates in national and multinational exercises.
Equipment availability on some deployments, such as helicopter
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† units in the DRC, has been a cause for concern. While the SANDF
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES has a well-established modernisation plan, the ability to deliver
MBT T-54/55 on this is hindered by funding problems and a number of pro-
RECCE Fiat 6616 grammes are behind schedule. There is concern in the army over
490 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

the obsolescence of principal equipment. South Africa has the con- Armoured
tinent’s most capable defence industry, including the state-owned 4 tk regt
Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR) and weapons Mechanised
manufacturer Denel. However, defence-budget cuts and reduced 6 mech inf bn
domestic procurement have increasingly required South Africa to
Light
look to export markets. A National Defence Industry Council was
launched in 2016 to support arms exports. 14 mot inf bn
3 lt inf bn (converting to mot inf)
ACTIVE 65,350 (Army 40,200 Navy 7,100 Air 9,900 Air Manoeuvre
South African Military Health Service 8,150) 1 AB bn
2 air mob bn
RESERVE 15,050 (Army 12,250 Navy 850 Air 850 Amphibious
South African Military Health Service Reserve 1,100) 1 amph bn
COMBAT SUPPORT
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 7 arty regt
2 engr regt
Space AIR DEFENCE
5 AD regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SATELLITES • ISR 1 Kondor-E EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Army 40,200 MBT 24 Olifant 2 (133 Olifant 1B in store)
ASLT 50 Rooikat-76 (126 in store)
FORCES BY ROLE
IFV 534 Ratel-20/Ratel-60/Ratel-90
Regt are bn sized. A new army structure is planned
APC • PPV 810: 370 Casspir; 440 Mamba
with 3 mixed regular/reserve divisions (1 mechanised, 1
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
motorised and 1 contingency) comprising 12 brigades (1
ARV Gemsbok
armoured, 1 mechanised, 7 motorised, 1 airborne, 1 air-
VLB Leguan
landed and 1 sea landed)
MW Husky
COMMAND
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
2 bde HQ
MSL
SPECIAL FORCES
SP ZT-3 Swift
2 SF regt(-)
MANPATS Milan ADT/ER

MANOEUVRE
RCL 106mm M40A1 (some SP)
Reconnaissance
ARTILLERY 1,240
1 armd recce regt
SP 155mm 2 G-6 (41 in store)
Armoured
TOWED 155mm 6 G-5 (66 in store)
1 tk regt(-)
MRL 127mm 6 Valkiri Mk II MARS Bataleur; (26 Valkiri
Mechanised
Mk I and 19 Valkiri Mk II in store)
2 mech inf bn
MOR 1,226: 81mm 1,190 (incl some SP on Casspir &
Light
Ratel); 120mm 36
8 mot inf bn
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES
1 lt inf bn
ISR • Light up to 4 Vulture
Air Manoeuvre
AIR DEFENCE
1 AB bn
SAM • Point-defence Starstreak
1 air mob bn
GUNS 76
Amphibious
SP 23mm (36 Zumlac in store)
1 amph bn
TOWED 35mm 40: 22 GDF-002; 18 GDF-005A/007
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty regt
1 engr regt Navy 7,100
1 construction regt Fleet HQ and Naval base located at Simon’s Town; Naval
3 sigs regt stations located at Durban and Port Elizabeth
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
1 engr spt regt SUBMARINES • TACTICAL • SSK 2 Heroine (Type-
AIR DEFENCE 209/1400 mod) with 8 533mm TT with AEG SUT 264
1 ADA regt HWT (1 additional boat in refit since 2014, awaiting
funds to complete)
Reserve 12,250 reservists (under-strength) PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES 4:
FORCES BY ROLE FFGHM 4 Valour (MEKO A200) with 2 quad lnchr
MANOEUVRE with MM40 Exocet Block 2 AShM (upgrade to Block
Reconnaissance 3 planned); 2 16-cell VLS with Umkhonto-IR SAM, 1
3 armd recce regt 76mm gun (capacity 1 Super Lynx 300 hel)
 Sub-Saharan Africa 491

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 4 South African Military Health Service 8,150;
PCC 3: 2 Warrior (ISR Reshef) with 1 76mm gun; 1 Warrior ε1,100 reservists (total 9,250)
(ISR Reshef)
PB 1 Tobie (2 additional in reserve) Cyber
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 2
MHC 3 River (GER Navors) (Limited operational roles; South Africa published a National Cybersecurity Policy
training and dive support) Framework in 2011. Since then, the defence-intelligence
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2 branch of the Department of Defence has been tasked with
AORH 1 Drakensberg (capacity 2 Oryx hels; 100 troops) developing a comprehensive cyber-warfare strategy and
AGHS 1 Protea (UK Hecla) with 1 hel landing platform a cyber-warfare implementation plan. A Cyber Security
Incident Response Team (CSIRT) operates under the State
Maritime Reaction Squadron Security Agency.
FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE DEPLOYMENT
Amphibious
1 mne patrol gp DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
1 diving gp MONUSCO • Operation Mistral 1,175; 7 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 atk
1 mne boarding gp hel sqn; 1 hel sqn
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT MOZAMBIQUE CHANNEL: Navy • 1 FFGHM
1 spt gp SUDAN: UN • UNAMID • Operation Cordite 3; 10 obs
Air Force 9,900
Air Force HQ, Pretoria, and 4 op gps South Sudan SSD
Command & Control: 2 Airspace Control Sectors, 1 Mobile
South Sudanese Pound ssp 2017 2018 2019
Deployment Wg, 1 Air Force Command Post
GDP ssp 348bn 631bn
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK US$ 3.06bn 3.98bn
1 sqn with Gripen C/D (JAS-39C/D) per capita US$ 243 307
GROUND ATTACK/TRAINING Growth % -5.2 -3.2
1 sqn with Hawk Mk120* Inflation % 188 106
TRANSPORT
Def bdgt [a] ssp 11.0bn 13.0bn 15.9bn
1 (VIP) sqn with B-737 BBJ; Cessna 550 Citation II; Falcon
50; Falcon 900
 US$ 97.2m 81.7m
1 sqn with C-47TP US$1=ssp 113.62 158.66
2 sqn with Beech 200/300 King Air; C-130B/BZ; C-212 [a] Security and law enforcement spending
ATTACK HELICOPTER
1 (cbt spt) sqn with AH-2 Rooivalk Population 10,204,581
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
4 (mixed) sqn with AW109; BK-117; Oryx
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Male 21.5% 6.0% 4.9% 4.0% 13.6% 1.4%
AIRCRAFT 50 combat capable Female 20.8% 5.9% 4.2% 3.6% 13.1% 1.1%
FGA 26: 17 Gripen C (JAS-39C); 9 Gripen D (JAS-39D)
TPT 24: Medium 7: 2 C-130B Hercules; 5 C-130BZ Capabilities

Sub-Saharan
Hercules; Light 13: 3 Beech 200C King Air; 1 Beech 300

Africa
South Sudan has been in a state of civil war with armed opposi-
King Air; 3 C-47TP (maritime); 2 C-212-200 Aviocar†; 1 tion groups since 2013, which has delayed plans to rationalise and
C-212-300 Aviocar†; 2 Cessna 550 Citation II; 1 PC-12; (9 transform the former militia force. In November 2018, the Sudan
Cessna 208 Caravan in store) PAX 4: 1 B-737BBJ; 2 Falcon People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) was officially renamed the South
50; 1 Falcon 900 Sudan People’s Defence Force (SSPDF) and previous plans to pro-
TRG 59: 24 Hawk Mk120*; 35 PC-7 Mk II Astra fessionalise and restructure the force were renewed, including
HELICOPTERS the establishment of two separate new commands for air-defence
ATK 11 AH-2 Rooivalk and riverine units. Allegations continue of child-soldier recruit-
MRH 4 Super Lynx 300 ment. It is unclear if the 2018 peace agreement will be success-
TPT 70: Medium 36 Oryx; Light 34: 26 AW109; 8 BK-117 fully implemented. In 2018, South Sudan reportedly signed a
defence agreement with South Africa, including scope to cooper-
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IIR IRIS-T
ate on procurement and training. There is no capacity to deploy
BOMBS • Laser-guided GBU-12 Paveway II
and sustain military units beyond national borders. Equipment is
primarily of Soviet origin with some light arms of Chinese origin.
Ground Defence There have been efforts to expand the small air force in recent
FORCES BY ROLE years and the two newly acquired L-39 combat-capable trainers
MANOEUVRE are reportedly operational. US sanctions and an EU arms embargo
Other remain in place, although a December 2016 vote for a wider UN
12 sy sqn (SAAF regt) arms embargo was unsuccessful. South Sudan has no established
492 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

domestic defence industry but has reportedly sought to develop Ethiopia 2,122; 17 obs; 3 inf bn
an ammunition-manufacturing capacity in recent years. Fiji 2
ACTIVE 185,000 (Army 185,000) Germany 3; 11 obs
Ghana 861; 10 obs; 1 inf bn
Guatemala 4; 3 obs
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Guinea 2; 1 obs
India 2,351; 18 obs; 2 inf bn; 1 engr coy; 1 fd hospital
Army ε185,000 Indonesia 2; 3 obs
FORCES BY ROLE
Japan 4
3 military comd
Jordan 4
MANOEUVRE
Kenya 11; 7 obs
Light
8 inf div Korea, Republic of 273; 2 obs; 1 engr coy
COMBAT SUPPORT Kyrgyzstan 1 obs
1 engr corps Moldova 1; 2 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Mongolia 867; 7 obs; 1 inf bn
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES Myanmar 1; 1 obs
MBT 80+: some T-55†; 80 T-72AV† Namibia 2
APC • PPV Streit Typhoon; Streit Cougar; Mamba Nepal 1,745; 13 obs; 2 inf bn
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE Netherlands 6
MSL • MANPATS HJ-73; 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn) New Zealand 2; 3 obs
RCL 73mm SPG-9 (with SSLA) Nigeria 5; 7 obs
ARTILLERY Norway 14
SP 122mm 2S1 Gvozdika; 152mm 2S3 Akatsiya
Pakistan 4; 2 obs
TOWED 130mm Some M-46
Papua New Guinea 2 obs
MRL 122mm BM-21 Grad; 107mm PH-63
MOR 82mm; 120mm Type-55 look-alike Paraguay 1 obs
AIR DEFENCE Peru 1; 3 obs
SAM Philippines 2 obs
Short-range 16 S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa) (reported) Poland 1 obs
Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; QW-2 Romania 2; 5 obs
GUNS 14.5mm ZPU-4; 23mm ZU-23-2; 37mm Type-65/74 Russia 3; 2 obs
Rwanda 2,774; 23 obs; 3 inf bn; 2 hel sqn
Air Force Senegal 1; 2 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Sri Lanka 172; 2 obs; 1 fd hospital; 1 hel sqn
AIRCRAFT 2 combat capable Sweden 2 obs
TPT • Light 1 Beech 1900 Tanzania 5; 4 obs
TRG ε2 L-39 Albatros* Togo 2
HELICOPTERS
Uganda 2
ATK 5: 2 Mi-24V Hind; 3 Mi-24V-SMB Hind
Ukraine 1; 3 obs
MRH 9 Mi-17 Hip H
United Kingdom 333; 1 engr coy
TPT 3: Medium 1 Mi-172 (VIP); Light 2 AW109 (civ livery)
United States 7
Vietnam 1; 2 obs
FOREIGN FORCES Zambia 2; 4 obs
All UNMISS, unless otherwise indicated Zimbabwe 1; 2 obs
Australia 23; 1 obs
Bangladesh 1,601; 7 obs; 1 inf coy; 2 rvn coy; 2 engr coy
Benin 3; 1 obs
Bhutan 2; 2 obs
Bolivia 3 obs
Brazil 6; 5 obs
Cambodia 79; 6 obs; 1 MP unit
Canada 5; 5 obs
China, People’s Republic of 1,040; 5 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr
coy; 1 fd hospital
Denmark 11
Egypt 1; 2 obs
El Salvador 1; 2 obs
 Sub-Saharan Africa 493

Mechanised
Sudan SDN 1 mech inf div
1 indep mech inf bde
Sudanese Pound sdg 2017 2018 2019
Light
GDP sdg 830bn 119bn 15+ inf div
US$ 45.8bn 33.2bn 6 indep inf bde
per capita US$ 1,123 792 Air Manoeuvre
Growth % 1.4 -2.3 1 air aslt bde
Amphbious
Inflation % 32.4 61.8
1 mne div
Def exp sdg n.k n.k
Other
US$ n.k n.k 1 (Border Guard) sy bde

US$1=sdg 18.12 35.66 COMBAT SUPPORT
3 indep arty bde
Population 43,120,843
1 engr div (9 engr bn)
Ethnic and religious groups: Muslim 70% mainly in North;
Christian 10% mainly in South; Arab 39% mainly in North EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus MBT 465: 20 M60A3; 60 Type-59/Type-59D; 305
Male 21.9% 5.8% 4.5% 3.7% 12.8% 1.6% T-54/T-55; 70 T-72AV; 10 Al-Bashier (Type-85-IIM)
Female 21.2% 5.7% 4.2% 3.6% 13.6% 1.4% LT TK 115: 70 Type-62; 45 Type-63
RECCE 206: 6 AML-90; 70 BRDM-1/2; 50–80 FV701
Capabilities Ferret; 30–50 FV601 Saladin
IFV 152+: 135 BMP-1/2; 10 BTR-3; 7 BTR-80A; WZ-523
Sudan’s armed forces focus on continued tensions with neigh- IFV
bouring South Sudan. There are also ongoing concerns regarding APC 415+
opposition groups operating in the south, including in Darfur, with
APC (T) 66: 20-30 BTR-50; 36 M113
the government relying on paramilitary forces to provide internal
security. The UN maintains two significant peacekeeping mis-
APC (W) 349+: 10 BTR-70M Kobra 2; 50–80 BTR-152; 20
sions in Sudan. Sudan is part of the Saudi-led coalition interven- OT-62; 50 OT-64; 3+ Rakhsh; 10 WZ-551; WZ-523; 55-80
tion in Yemen. A defence agreement was signed with Iran in 2008; V-150 Commando; 96 Walid
it is believed to have included assistance in the development of ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Sudan’s domestic arms industry. The armed forces are conscript- MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); HJ-8;
based and will have gained operational experience from internal- 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 Spriggan)
security deployments and the Saudi-led coalition. By regional stan- RCL 106mm 40 M40A1
dards, Sudan’s armed forces are relatively well equipped, with sig- GUNS 40+: 40 76mm ZIS-3/100mm M-1944; 85mm D-44
nificant holdings of both ageing and modern systems. While there ARTILLERY 860+
is a UN arms embargo in place, it is limited to equipment used
SP 66: 122mm 56 2S1 Gvozdika; 155mm 10 Mk F3
within the Darfur region. Recent acquisitions have been Russian
TOWED 128+: 105mm 20 M101; 122mm 21+: 21 D-30;
and Ukrainian government surplus, apart from new Chinese jet
trainers. The state-run Military Industry Corporation manufactures D-74; M-30; 130mm 75 M-46/Type-59-I; 155mm 12
a range of ammunition, small arms and armoured vehicles for the M114A1
domestic and export market. The majority of the corporation’s MRL 666+: 107mm 477 Type-63; 122mm 188: 120 BM-21
products are based on older Chinese and Russian systems. Grad; 50 Saqr; 18 Type-81; 302mm 1+ WS-1 
MOR 81mm;

Sub-Saharan
82mm; 120mm AM-49; M-43
ACTIVE 104,300 (Army 100,000 Navy 1,300 Air

Africa
AIR DEFENCE
3,000) Paramilitary 20,000 SAM • Point-defence 4+: 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡;
Conscript liability 2 years for males aged 18–30 FN-6; 4+ 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko)
RESERVE NIL Paramilitary 85,000 GUNS 966+
SP 20: 20mm 8 M163 Vulcan; 12 M3 VDAA
TOWED 946+: 740+ 14.5mm ZPU-2/14.5mm ZPU-
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 4/37mm Type-63/57mm S-60/85mm M-1944; 20mm 16
M167 Vulcan; 23mm 50 ZU-23-2; 37mm 80 M-1939; (30
Army 100,000+ M-1939 unserviceable); 40mm 60
FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES Navy 1,300
5 SF coy EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MANOEUVRE PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 11
Reconnaissance PBR 4 Kurmuk
1 indep recce bde PB 7: 1 13.5m; 1 14m; 2 19m; 3 41m (PRC)
Armoured AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT 5
1 armd div LCVP 5
494 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3 DEPLOYMENT

AG 3
SAUDI ARABIA: Operation Restoring Hope 3 Su-24 Fencer
Air Force 3,000 YEMEN: Operation Restoring Hope 950; 1 mech BG; T-72AV,
BTR-70M Kobra 2
FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER
2 sqn with MiG-29SE/UB Fulcrum FOREIGN FORCES
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK All UNAMID, unless otherwise indicated
1 sqn with FTC-2000* Bangladesh 356; 3 obs; 2 inf coy
GROUND ATTACK Benin UNISFA 2 obs
1 sqn with A-5 Fantan Bhutan 1; 1 obs • UNISFA 1; 1 obs

1 sqn with Su-24M Fencer Bolivia UNISFA 1; 3 obs
1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25UB Frogfoot Brazil 1 obs • UNISFA 3 obs
TRANSPORT Burkina Faso 1; 1 obs • UNISFA 1 obs
Some sqn with An-30 Clank; An-32 Cline; An-72 Coaler; Burundi 3; 1 obs • UNISFA 2 obs
An-74TK-200/300; C-130H Hercules; Il-76 Candid; Y-8 Cambodia 1 obs
1 VIP unit with Falcon 20F; Falcon 50; Falcon 900; F-27; China, People’s Republic of 374; 1 engr coy
Il-62M Classic Ecuador 1; 1 obs; • UNISFA 1 obs
TRAINING Egypt 854; 20 obs; 1 inf bn

1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum* El Salvador UNISFA 1 obs
ATTACK HELICOPTER Ethiopia 1,684; 5 obs; 2 inf bn • UNISFA 4,368; 77 obs; 1
2 sqn with Mi-24/Mi-24P/Mi-24V/Mi-35P recce coy; 3 inf bn; 2 arty coy; 1 engr coy; 1 sigs coy; 5 fd
Hind hospital; 1 hel sqn
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Gambia 211; 1 inf coy
2 sqn with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-171 Germany 7
AIR DEFENCE Ghana 9; 4 obs • UNISFA 6; 2 obs
5 bty with S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline)‡ Guatemala UNISFA 1; 2 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Guinea UNISFA 1; 1 obs
AIRCRAFT 71 combat capable India UNISFA 2; 2 obs
FTR 22: 20 MiG-29SE Fulcrum C; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum B Indonesia 800; 4 obs; 1 inf bn • UNISFA 2 obs
ATK 32: 15 A-5 Fantan; 6 Su-24/M Fencer; 9 Su-25 Frogfoot; Iran 1; 3 obs
2 Su-25UB Frogfoot B Jordan 11; 5 obs
ISR 2 An-30 Clank Kenya 87; 2 obs; 1 MP coy
TPT 24: Heavy 1 Il-76 Candid; Medium 6: 4 C-130H Korea, Republic of 2
Hercules; 2 Y-8; Light 13: ε3 An-26 Curl; 2 An-32 Cline; 2 Kyrgyzstan 1 obs
An-72 Coaler; 4 An-74TK-200; 2 An-74TK-300; PAX 4: 1 Malawi 2 • UNISFA 1
Falcon 20F (VIP); 1 Falcon 50 (VIP); 1 Falcon 900; 1 Il-62M Malaysia 3; 1 obs • UNISFA 1 obs
Classic Mongolia 2 • UNISFA 1; 2 obs
TRG 21: 6 FTC-2000*; 11 K-8 Karakorum*; 3 UTVA-75 Namibia 1; 3 obs • UNISFA 3; 1 obs
HELICOPTERS Nepal 359; 7 obs; 2 inf coy • UNISFA 5; 1 obs
ATK 40: 25 Mi-24 Hind; 2 Mi-24P Hind; 7 Mi-24V Hind E; Nigeria 126; 7 obs; 1 sigs unit; 1 fd hospital • UNISFA 2;
6 Mi-35P Hind 2 obs
MRH ε3 Mi-17 Hip H Pakistan 1,170; 2 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 engr pl; 1 med pl
TPT 27: Medium 23: 21 Mi-8 Hip; 2 Mi-171; Light 4: 1 Bell Peru 1; 1 obs • UNISFA 2 obs
205; 3 Bo-105 Russia UNISFA 1 obs
AIR DEFENCE • SAM • Medium-range: 90 S-75 Dvina Rwanda 1,671; 5 obs; 2 inf bn • UNISFA 2; 3 obs
(SA-2 Guideline)‡ Senegal 39
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Sierra Leone 4 • UNISFA 2; 1 obs
Atoll)‡; R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer); ARH R-77 South Africa 3; 10 obs
(AA-12A Adder) Sri Lanka UNISFA 2; 5 obs
Tanzania 818; 5 obs; 1 inf bn • UNISFA 1; 2 obs
Paramilitary 20,000 Thailand 9; 1 obs
Togo 2; 5 obs
Popular Defence Force 20,000 (org in bn Ukraine UNISFA 2; 3 obs
1,000); 85,000 reservists (total 105,000) Zambia 5; 4 obs • UNISFA 1; 2 obs
mil wing of National Islamic Front Zimbabwe 2; 5 obs • UNISFA 1; 2 obs
 Sub-Saharan Africa 495

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Tanzania TZA 1 log gp
AIR DEFENCE
Tanzanian Shilling sh 2017 2018 2019
2 ADA bn
GDP sh 116tr 127tr
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
US$ 51.8bn 55.6bn ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
per capita US$ 1,034 1,090 MBT 45: 30 T-54/T-55; 15 Type-59G
Growth % 6.0 5.8 LT TK 57+: 30 FV101 Scorpion; 25 Type-62; 2+ Type-63A
Inflation % 5.3 3.8 RECCE 10 BRDM-2
APC • APC (W) 14: ε10 BTR-40/BTR-152; 4 Type-92
Def bdgt sh 1.19tr 1.73tr
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
US$ 532m 757m RCL 75mm Type-52 (M20)
US$1=sh 2,230.92 2,279.11 GUNS 85mm 75 Type-56 (D-44)
Population 55,451,343 ARTILLERY 344+
TOWED 130: 122mm 100: 20 D-30; 80 Type-54-1 (M-30);
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus 130mm 30 Type-59-I
Male 21.9% 5.5% 4.5% 3.8% 12.9% 1.3% GUN/MOR 120mm 3+ Type-07PA
Female 21.5% 5.5% 4.5% 3.8% 13.1% 1.8%
MRL 61+: 122mm 58 BM-21 Grad; 300mm 3+ A100
MOR 150: 82mm 100 M-43; 120mm 50 M-43
Capabilities
Navy ε1,000
Non-state actors pose the principal threat to Tanzania’s security,
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
with terrorism, poaching and piracy of concern. A developing rela-
tionship with China has led to a series of procurements and train- PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 14
ing contacts. There are also defence-related ties with Israel, Paki- PCC 2 Mwitongo (ex-PRC Haiqing)
stan and Russia. The armed forces take part in multinational exer- PHT 2 Huchuan each with 2 533mm ASTT
cises in Africa and have provided some training assistance to other PB 10: 2 Ngunguri; 2 Shanghai II (PRC); 2 VT 23m; 4
African forces. Training relationships also exist with extra-regional Mambwe (Damen Fast Crew Supplier 3307)
armed forces, including the US. Tanzania’s contribution to the UN’s AMPHIBIOUS 3
Force Intervention Brigade in the eastern DRC, notably its special
LCM 2 Mbono (ex-PRC Yunnan)
forces, will have provided many lessons for force development as
LCT 1 Kasa
well as direct combat experience. However, there is only a limited
capacity to project power independently beyond the country’s
borders. Budget constraints have limited recapitalisation ambi- Air Defence Command ε3,000
tions and, although heavy equipment is ageing, airlift capacity FORCES BY ROLE
has improved with the delivery of new helicopters. There are local FIGHTER
ammunition facilities, but otherwise Tanzania relies on imports for
3 sqn with F-7/FT-7; FT-5; K-8 Karakorum*
its military equipment.
TRANSPORT
ACTIVE 27,000 (Army 23,000 Navy 1,000 Air 3,000) 1 sqn with Cessna 404 Titan; DHC-5D Buffalo; F-28
Paramilitary 1,400 Fellowship; F-50; Gulfstream G550; Y-12 (II)
Conscript liability Three months basic military training combined TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
with social service, ages 18–23 1 sqn with Bell 205 (AB-205); Bell 412EP Twin Huey
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
RESERVE 80,000 (Joint 80,000)

Sub-Saharan
AIRCRAFT 17 combat capable

Africa
FTR 11: 9 F-7TN; 2 FT-7TN
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE ISR 1 SB7L-360 Seeker
TPT 12: Medium 2 Y-8; Light 7: 2 Cessna 404 Titan; 3
Army ε23,000 DHC-5D Buffalo; 2 Y-12(II); PAX 3: 1 F-28 Fellowship; 1
FORCES BY ROLE F-50; 1 Gulfstream G550
SPECIAL FORCES TRG 9: 3 FT-5 (JJ-5); 6 K-8 Karakorum*
1 SF unit HELICOPTERS
MANOEUVRE MRH 1 Bell 412EP Twin Huey
Armoured TPT 2: Medium 1+ H225M; Light 1 Bell 205 (AB-205)
1 tk bde AIR DEFENCE
Light SAM
5 inf bde Short-range 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)†; S-125 Pechora
COMBAT SUPPORT (SA-3 Goa)†
4 arty bn Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
1 mor bn GUNS 200
2 AT bn TOWED 14.5mm 40 ZPU-2/ZPU-4†; 23mm 40 ZU-23;
1 engr regt (bn) 37mm 120 M-1939
496 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Paramilitary 1,400 active forces’ capabilities, including air-transport and maritime capaci-
ties. Apart from limited maintenance facilities, the country has no
Police Field Force 1,400 domestic defence-industrial capability.
18 sub-units incl Police Marine Unit ACTIVE 8,550 (Army 8,100 Navy 200 Air 250)
Air Wing Paramilitary 750
Conscript liability Selective conscription, 2 years
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT • TPT • Light 1 Cessna U206 Stationair
HELICOPTERS ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
TPT • Light 4: 2 Bell 206A Jet Ranger (AB-206A);
2 Bell 206L Long Ranger Army 8,100+
TRG 2 Bell 47G (AB-47G)/Bell 47G2 FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Marine Unit 100 Reconnaissance
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE 1 armd recce regt
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS Light
All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD 2 cbd arms regt
2 inf regt
DEPLOYMENT 1 rapid reaction force
Air Manoeuvre
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 445; 1 inf
1 cdo/para regt (3 cdo/para coy)
bn(-)
Other
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN • 1 (Presidential Guard) gd regt (1 gd bn, 1 cdo bn, 2
MONUSCO 1,003; 2 obs; 1 SF coy; 1 inf bn indep gd coy)
LEBANON: UN • UNIFIL 159; 1 MP coy
 COMBAT SUPPORT
1 cbt spt regt (1 fd arty bty, 2 ADA bty, 1 engr/log/tpt bn)
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 5; 4 obs
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 818; 5 obs; 1 inf bn; UN •
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
UNISFA 1; 2 obs
MBT 2 T-54/T-55
LT TK 9 FV101 Scorpion
Togo TGO RECCE 86: 3 AML-60; 7 AML-90; 29 Bastion Patsas; 36
EE-9 Cascavel; 6 M8; 3 M20; 2 VBL
CFA Franc BCEAO fr 2017 2018 2019 IFV 20 BMP-2
GDP fr 2.77tr 2.96tr APC 34
US$ 4.77bn 5.35bn APC (T) 4 M3A1 half-track
per capita US$ 611 668 APC (W) 30 UR-416
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE
Growth % 4.4 4.7
RCL 75mm Type-52 (M20)/Type-56; 82mm Type-65 (B-10)
Inflation % -0.7 0.4 GUNS 57mm 5 ZIS-2
Def bdgt fr 51.9bn 58.0bn ARTILLERY 30+
US$ 89.4m 105m SP 122mm 6
US$1=fr 580.97 553.12 TOWED 105mm 4 HM-2
MRL 122mm Type-81 mod (SC6 chassis)
Population 8,176,449 MOR 82mm 20 M-43
AIR DEFENCE • GUNS • TOWED 43 14.5mm 38 ZPU-4;
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
37mm 5 M-1939
Male 20.1% 5.1% 4.5% 4.1% 14.3% 1.5%
Female 20.0% 5.1% 4.5% 4.2% 14.7% 2.0% Navy ε200 (incl Marine Infantry unit)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Capabilities PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 3
The armed forces are adequate for the internal-security role, but PBF 1 Agou (RPB 33)
they have limited deployment capacity. Togo is increasingly con- PB 2 Kara (FRA Esterel)

cerned by piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and other illegal maritime
activities and is strengthening its cooperation with neighbours Air Force 250
to address these threats. Military-training cooperation continues
FORCES BY ROLE
with France, which provides peacekeeping training for Togolese
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
personnel participating in MINUSMA. There is also a peacekeep-
ing training centre in Lomé. The US Africa Contingency Operations 1 sqn with Alpha Jet*; EMB-326G*
Training and Assistance programme has also provided training TRANSPORT
assistance. Togo’s deployment capabilities are limited to its region 1 sqn with Beech 200 King Air
without external support. Financial challenges limit the armed 1 VIP unit with DC-8; F-28-1000
 Sub-Saharan Africa 497

TRAINING A number of years spent targeting the Lord’s Resistance Army has
1 sqn with TB-30 Epsilon* also ensured experience in counter-insurgency tactics. There are
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER plans to establish a National Defence College. Uganda is one of the
1 sqn with SA315 Lama; SA316 Alouette III; SA319 largest contributors to the East Africa Standby Force and in 2014
signed a Mutual Defence Treaty with Kenya and Rwanda. Train-
Alouette III
ing levels are adequate, particularly for the special forces, and are
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE† improving after recent experiences. There is regular training with
AIRCRAFT 10 combat capable international partners, including at Uganda’s own facilities, and
TPT 5: Light 2 Beech 200 King Air; PAX 3: 1 DC-8; 2 Ugandan forces have gained experience at the US Joint Readiness
F-28-1000 (VIP) Training Centre. Airlift is limited, though the country was able to
TRG 10: 3 Alpha Jet*; 4 EMB-326G *; 3 TB-30 Epsilon* deploy an armoured element to southern Sudan in 2013. Rotary-
HELICOPTERS wing aviation has improved in recent years, partly due to US assis-
MRH 4: 2 SA315 Lama; 1 SA316 Alouette III; 1 SA319 tance. While logistical support remains superior to that of many
other regional states, the motorised infantry still lacks sufficient
Alouette III
transport and logistics capacity. Uganda’s mechanised forces are
TPT • Medium (1 SA330 Puma in store) relatively well equipped in these areas, though heavy equipment
is disparate and ageing. Improvements include the arrival of MRAP
Paramilitary 750 and other protected vehicles. There is limited defence-industrial
capacity, though there is some manufacturing of light armoured
Gendarmerie 750 vehicles. Uganda’s 2015–19 Security Sector Development plan
Ministry of Interior included the establishment of an engineering centre at Maga-
FORCES BY ROLE maga, as well as a defence-research centre at Lugazi.
2 reg sections ACTIVE 45,000 (Ugandan People’s Defence Force
MANOEUVRE 45,000) Paramilitary 1,400
Other
1 (mobile) paramilitary sqn RESERVE 10,000

DEPLOYMENT ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 6; 4 obs
Ugandan People’s Defence Force ε40,000–
LIBERIA: UN • UNMIL 1 45,000
MALI: UN • MINUSMA 937; 2 obs; 1 inf bn; 1 fd hospital FORCES BY ROLE
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2 MANOEUVRE
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 2; 5 obs Armoured
1 armd bde
WESTERN SAHARA: UN • MINURSO 2 obs Light
1 cdo bn
Uganda UGA 5 inf div (total: 16 inf bde)
Other
Ugandan Shilling Ush 2017 2018 2019 1 (Special Forces Command) mot bde
GDP Ush 96.8tr 107tr COMBAT SUPPORT
US$ 26.6bn 27.9bn 1 arty bde
AIR DEFENCE

Sub-Saharan
per capita US$ 707 717
2 AD bn

Africa
Growth % 4.5 5.9
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
Inflation % 5.6 3.8 ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
Def bdgt Ush 1.58tr 1.47tr 1.47tr MBT 239+: 185 T-54/T-55; 10 T-72; 44 T-90S; ZTZ-85-IIM
US$ 434m 384m LT TK ε20 PT-76
US$1=Ush 3,635.79 3,835.06 RECCE 46: 40 Eland-20; 6 FV701 Ferret
IFV 31 BMP-2
Population 40,853,749 APC 150
APC (W) 58: 15 BTR-60; 20 Buffel; 4 OT-64; 19 Bastion
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
APC
Male 23.9% 5.6% 4.8% 3.9% 10.6% 0.9% PPV 92: 42 Casspir; 40 Mamba; 10 RG-33L
Female 24.0% 5.7% 4.9% 4.0% 10.5% 1.1% AUV 15 Cougar
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
Capabilities ARV T-54/T-55 reported
Uganda’s armed forces are well equipped and are important con- VLB MTU reported
tributors to East African security. Operational experience and train- MW Husky
ing have led to improvements in administration and planning, as ARTILLERY 333+
well as in military skills including counter-IED and urban patrolling. SP 155mm 6 ATMOS 2000
498 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

TOWED 243+: 122mm M-30; 130mm 221; 155mm 22: 4

G-5; 18 M-839 Zambia ZMB
MRL 6+: 107mm (12-tube); 122mm 6+: BM-21 Grad; 6
Zambian Kwacha K 2017 2018 2019
RM-70
MOR 78+: 81mm L16; 82mm M-43; 120mm 78 Soltam GDP K 245bn 281bn
AIR DEFENCE US$ 25.7bn 25.8bn
SAM per capita US$ 1,491 1,450
Short-range 4 S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa) Growth % 3.4 3.8
Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡; 9K310 Igla- Inflation % 6.6 8.5
1 (SA-16 Gimlet) Def bdgt K 3.20bn 3.50bn
GUNS • TOWED 20+: 14.5mm ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4; US$ 337m 320m
37mm 20 M-1939
US$1=K 9.52 10.92
Marines ε400 Population 16,445,079
All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Air Wing Male 23.1% 5.4% 4.6% 3.8% 12.1% 1.0%
FORCES BY ROLE Female 22.9% 5.4% 4.6% 3.8% 12.1% 1.3%
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with MiG-21bis Fishbed; MiG-21U/UM Mongol Capabilities
A/B; Su-30MK2 Flanker Zambia faces no immediate external threat, though its border with
TRANSPORT the Democratic Republic of the Congo presents a security chal-
1 unit with Y-12 lenge. China has become an important investor in the country
over the past decade, including military training and weapons
1 VIP unit with Gulfstream 550; L-100-30
sales. Ensuring territorial integrity and border security, and a
TRAINING commitment to international peacekeeping operations, are the
1 unit with L-39 Albatros†* armed forces’ key tasks. Given equipment obsolescence and a
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER comparatively small establishment strength, there could be chal-
1 sqn with Bell 206 Jet Ranger; Bell 412 Twin Huey; Mi- lenges in adequately fulfilling this role. Zambia is a member of
the AU and SADC and the services have participated in exercises
17 Hip H; Mi-24 Hind; Mi-172 (VIP)
with international and regional partners including for the SADC
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE Standby Force. Zambia’s largest peacekeeping contribution is to
AIRCRAFT 16 combat capable the MINUSCA operation in the Central African Republic. As well
FGA 13: 5 MiG-21bis Fishbed; 1 MiG-21U Mongol A; as growing defence ties with China, in April 2017 Zambia signed
a defence deal with Russia for equipment spare-parts support.
1 MiG-21UM Mongol B; 6 Su-30MK2 Flanker
The armed forces are all-volunteer. The US has provided funding
TPT 6: Medium 1 L-100-30; Light 4: 2 Cessna 208B; 2 and material support for army and air-force pre-deployment train-
Y-12; PAX 1 Gulfstream 550 ing for the CAR peacekeeping mission. In the air force, procedural
TRG 3 L-39 Albatros†* trainers and full-mission simulators have been bought to support
HELICOPTERS the L-15 advanced jet trainer/light-attack aircraft from China. The
armed forces have limited capacity to self-deploy and sustain
ATK 1 Mi-24 Hind (2 more non-op)
forces beyond national borders. While there is a need to moder-
MRH 5: 2 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 3 Mi-17 Hip H (1 more nise the equipment inventory, funds remain limited. The country
non-op) has no defence-industrial base, apart from limited ammunition
TPT 4: Medium 2: 1 Mi-172 (VIP), 1 Mi-171 (VIP); production.
Light 2 Bell 206A Jet Ranger
ACTIVE 15,100 (Army 13,500 Air 1,600) Paramilitary
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
1,400
AAM • IR R-73 (AA-11 Archer); SARH R-27 (AA-10
Alamo); ARH R-77 (AA-12 Adder) (reported) RESERVE 3,000 (Army 3,000)
ARM Kh-31P (AS-17A Krypton) (reported)
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE
Paramilitary ε600 active
Army 13,500
Border Defence Unit ε600
FORCES BY ROLE
Equipped with small arms only
COMMAND
3 bde HQ
DEPLOYMENT SPECIAL FORCES
1 cdo bn
SOMALIA: AU • AMISOM 6,022; 7 inf bn; UN • UNSOM
MANOEUVRE
530; 2 obs; 1 sy bn; UN • UNSOS 1 obs
Armoured
SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2 1 armd regt (1 tk bn, 1 armd recce regt)
 Sub-Saharan Africa 499

Light TPT • Light 12: 9 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois/AB-205); 3

6 inf bn Bell 212
COMBAT SUPPORT TRG 5 Bell 47G
1 arty regt (2 fd arty bn, 1 MRL bn) UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 3+
1 engr regt ISR • Medium 3+ Hermes 450
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE AIR DEFENCE
Some equipment† SAM • Short-range S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES
MBT 30: 20 Type-59; 10 T-55 AAM • IR PL-5E-II
LT TK 30 PT-76 ASM 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger)
RECCE 70 BRDM-1/BRDM-2 (ε30 serviceable)
IFV 23 Ratel-20 Paramilitary 1,400
APC • APC (W) 33: 13 BTR-60; 20 BTR-70
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES Police Mobile Unit 700
ARV T-54/T-55 reported FORCES BY ROLE
ANTI-TANK/ANTI-INFRASTRUCTURE MANOEUVRE
MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) Other
RCL 12+: 57mm 12 M18; 75mm M20; 84mm Carl Gustav 1 police bn (4 police coy)
ARTILLERY 182
TOWED 61: 105mm 18 Model 56 pack howitzer; 122mm Police Paramilitary Unit 700
25 D-30; 130mm 18 M-46 FORCES BY ROLE
MRL 122mm 30 BM-21 Grad (ε12 serviceable) MANOEUVRE
MOR 91: 81mm 55; 82mm 24; 120mm 12 Other
AIR DEFENCE 1 paramilitary bn (3 paramilitary coy)
SAM • MANPAD 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
GUNS • TOWED 136: 20mm 50 M-55 (triple); 37mm 40 DEPLOYMENT
M-1939; 57mm ε30 S-60; 85mm 16 M-1939 KS-12
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: UN • MINUSCA 942; 8
Reserve 3,000 obs; 1 inf bn
FORCES BY ROLE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: UN •
MANOEUVRE MONUSCO 3; 7 obs
Light SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 2; 4 obs
3 inf bn
SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 5; 4 obs; UN • UNISFA 1; 2 obs
Air Force 1,600
FORCES BY ROLE Zimbabwe ZWE
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
Zimbabwe Dollar Z$ [a] 2017 2018 2019
1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum*
1 sqn with L-15* GDP US$ 17.6bn 19.4bn
TRANSPORT per capita US$ 1,185 1,269
1 sqn with MA60; Y-12(II); Y-12(IV); Y-12E Growth % 3.7 3.6
1 (VIP) unit with AW139; CL-604; HS-748 Inflation % 0.9 3.9

Sub-Saharan
1 (liaison) sqn with Do-28
Def bdgt US$ 341m 420m

Africa
TRAINING
2 sqn with MB-326GB; MFI-15 Safari US$1=Z$ 1.00 1.00
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER [a] Zimbabwe dollar no longer in active use
1 sqn with Mi-17 Hip H Population 14,030,368
1 (liaison) sqn with Bell 47G; Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois/
AB-205) Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
AIR DEFENCE Male 19.1% 5.5% 4.5% 4.4% 13.6% 1.8%
3 bty with S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa) Female 19.5% 5.6% 4.8% 4.5% 14.0% 2.7%
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE†
Very low serviceability Capabilities
AIRCRAFT 21 combat capable
Political instability and a weak economy are the key challenges for
TPT 23: Light 21: 5 Do-28; 2 MA60; 4 Y-12(II); 5 Y-12(IV);
the state. The August 2018 presidential election resulted in victory
5 Y-12E; PAX 2: 1 CL-604; 1 HS-748
for Emmerson Mnangagwa, though it saw troops deployed on
TRG 51: 15 K-8 Karakourm*; 6 L-15*; 10 MB-326GB; 8 the streets amid unrest. Ensuring sovereignty, territorial integrity
MFI-15 Safari; 12 SF-260TW and border security, and providing internal-security support to
HELICOPTERS the police, are tasks for the armed forces. They also take an active
MRH 5: 1 AW139; 4 Mi-17 Hip H political role, evidenced by their role in toppling former president
500 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Robert Mugabe. Zimbabwe is a member of the AU and the SADC, TOWED 122mm 20: 4 D-30; 16 Type-60 (D-74)
and takes part in SADC Standby Force exercises. In March 2018, MRL 76: 107mm 16 Type-63; 122mm 60 RM-70
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with President Mnan-
MOR 146: 81mm/82mm ε140; 120mm 6 M-43 

gagwa with future defence cooperation an agenda item. Zimba-
bwe and China have defence ties, while Belarus is also looking to AIR DEFENCE
improve ties with the country. The armed forces are all-volunteer. SAM • Point-defence 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
In 2018, a ‘special allowance’ was paid to military personnel to GUNS • TOWED 116: 14.5mm 36 ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4;
boost overall pay. Military leaders have identified training as a 23mm 45 ZU-23; 37mm 35 M-1939
development priority. Small numbers of personnel have deployed
on peacekeeping operations, but there is no capacity to sustain a
force far beyond national borders. Recapitalising an obsolescent
Air Force 4,000
equipment inventory is also a priority. This, however, will depend FORCES BY ROLE
on economic recovery, and perhaps the extent to which China and FIGHTER
Russia will provide support. State-owned small-arms and muni- 1 sqn with F-7 II†; FT-7†
tions manufacturer Zimbabwe Defence Industries has struggled
after nearly two decades of Western sanctions, but there are plans
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
to revive the plant. 1 sqn with K-8 Karakorum*
(1 sqn Hawker Hunter in store)
ACTIVE 29,000 (Army 25,000 Air 4,000) Paramilitary GROUND ATTACK/ISR
21,800 1 sqn with Cessna 337/O-2A Skymaster*
ISR/TRAINING
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE 1 sqn with SF-260F/M; SF-260TP*; SF-260W Warrior*
TRANSPORT
Army ε25,000 1 sqn with BN-2 Islander; CASA 212-200 Aviocar (VIP)
FORCES BY ROLE ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
COMMAND 1 sqn with Mi-35 Hind; Mi-35P Hind (liaison); SA316
1 SF bde HQ Alouette III; AS532UL Cougar (VIP)
1 mech bde HQ 1 trg sqn with Bell 412 Twin Huey, SA316 Alouette III
5 inf bde HQ AIR DEFENCE
SPECIAL FORCES 1 sqn
1 SF regt
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MANOEUVRE
AIRCRAFT 45 combat capable
Armoured
1 armd sqn FTR 9: 7 F-7 II†; 2 FT-7†
Mechanised ISR 2 O-2A Skymaster
1 mech inf bn TPT • Light 25: 5 BN-2 Islander; 7 C-212-200 Aviocar; 13
Light Cessna 337 Skymaster*; (10 C-47 Skytrain in store)
15 inf bn TRG 33: 10 K-8 Karakorum*; 5 SF-260M; 8 SF-260TP*; 5
1 cdo bn SF-260W Warrior*; 5 SF-260F
Air Manoeuvre HELICOPTERS
1 para bn ATK 6: 4 Mi-35 Hind; 2 Mi-35P Hind
Other MRH 10: 8 Bell 412 Twin Huey; 2 SA316 Alouette III
3 gd bn TPT • Medium 2 AS532UL Cougar (VIP)
1 (Presidential Guard) gd gp
AIR-LAUNCHED MISSILES • AAM • IR PL-2; PL-5
COMBAT SUPPORT
(reported)
1 arty bde

AD • GUNS 100mm (not deployed); 37mm (not
1 fd arty regt
2 engr regt deployed); 57mm (not deployed)
AIR DEFENCE
1 AD regt Paramilitary 21,800
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

Zimbabwe Republic Police Force 19,500
ARMOURED FIGHTING VEHICLES
incl air wg
MBT 40: 30 Type-59†; 10 Type-69†
RECCE 115: 20 Eland-60/90; 15 FV701 Ferret†; 80 EE-9
Police Support Unit 2,300
Cascavel (90mm)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS
IFV 2+ YW307
All operational patrol vessels under 10t FLD
APC • APC (T) 30: 8 ZSD-85 (incl CP); 22 VTT-323
ENGINEERING & MAINTENANCE VEHICLES
ARV T-54/T-55 reported; ZJX-93 ARV DEPLOYMENT
VLB MTU reported
ARTILLERY 254 SOUTH SUDAN: UN • UNMISS 1; 2 obs
SP 122mm 12 2S1 Gvozdika SUDAN: UN • UNAMID 2; 5 obs; UN • UNISFA 1; 2 obs
 Sub-Saharan Africa 501

Arms procurements and deliveries – Sub-Saharan Africa

Significant events in 2018

„„ In June, Airbus signed a memorandum of „„ The Pakistani government reportedly provided a

understanding with Côte d’Ivoire to develop the US$184.3m guarantee for the production of three
country’s aerospace industry. JF-17 fighter aircraft for Nigeria in October. Nigeria
set aside a small amount of funding for three JF-17s
„„ South Africa launched its Defence Industry Fund (DIF) in 2016 and has since continued adding to the fund.
in July, the creation of which was recommended in Nigeria’s 2018 budget included funding for a second
2015. The DIF will raise money from private investors batch of three fighters. It is not clear how many JF-17s
and for the South African defence industry. South Nigeria plans to acquire in total.
Africa’s defence SMEs have struggled to source
investment in recent years. „„ In November, the South African authorities
announced further delays to the Project Hoefyster
„„ South Africa’s long-running A-Darter air-to-air programme. Local company Denel was supposed
missile programme completed qualification tests in to begin supplying in 2015 over 200 Badger 8x8
September and deliveries will likely begin in 2019. armoured vehicles based on Patria’s AMV, but
The A-Darter was co-developed with Brazil and has software problems, delays in developing different
an imaging infrared (IIR) seeker, making it more variants and problems with Denel’s finances mean
resistant to countermeasures. The South African Air that deliveries are now expected to begin in
Force already operates the IIR IRIS-T missile. It is not 2022.
clear if A-Darter is intended to replace the IRIS-T in
South African service.

▼ Figure 30 Sub-Saharan Africa: selected ongoing or completed procurement priorities in 2018

8
7
Number of countries

6
purchasing

5 East Africa
Southern Africa

Sub-Saharan
4 Central Africa

Africa
West Africa
3
2
1
0
s

s
He Sub iles

ips
**

M t
ter ines

rs

Fri rs
Co tes

V
els

d & l/A ry W *
Ro SW ing)

ole Atta ort A kers

el raft

s
Vs
ing ts
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er
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er

tte

(Fi Pat Rota ft**

ter

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Vs

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iss

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au
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iss

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oa
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itim xed
/IS mba
lB

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T

an
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ou
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M
nd

/Tr
e
as
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ea
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*Data reflects the number of countries with equipment-procurement contracts either ongoing or completed in 2018. Data includes only procurement programmes for which a production contract
has been signed. The data does not include upgrade programmes.
**Armoured fighting vehicles not including main battle tanks ***Includes combat-capable training aircraft IISS
©
Table 21 South Africa: major equipment-procurement programmes
Equipment Project Type Quantity Value (ZAR) Value Prime contractor Contract Notes
name (US$) date
Land
Starstreak and ESR Guardian Point-defence n.k. 801m 72.6m Denel Dynamics Dec 2002 Ground-Based Air Defence System (GBADS)
220 Thutwa SAM and Phase I; in-service date 2014
radar

Badger 8x8 Hoefyster IFV 242 15.4bn 1.6bn Denel Land Sep 2013 To replace Ratel; deliveries significantly
Systems delayed, now expected to begin in 2022
502 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Skyshield Fire Protector 35 mm anti- n.k. n.k. n.k. Denel Integrated 2014 GBADS Phase II: upgrade of 35mm guns and
Control System aircraft-gun Solutions and acquisition of Skyshield fire-control system;
upgrade Maritime deliveries ongoing

Umkhonto Ground- Outcome Short-range n.k. - - Denel Dynamics - GBADS Phase III: C4I upgrade for GBADS and
Based Launcher SAM acquisition of Umkhonto GBL SAM
(GBL)

Maritime
Vard 9 105 (UK Echo) Hotel AGHS 1 ε1.8bn ε135.2m Southern African Dec 2017 To be completed by end of 2021
Shipyards

Damen Stan Patrol Biro PCC 3 n.k. n.k. DCST Feb 2018 Inshore Patrol Vessel; original requirement
6211 for additional three offshore-patrol vessels
dropped in 2017 due to budget cuts
Heroine class n.k. SSK mid-life 3 - - TBD - Feasibility studies ongoing; contract expected
upgrade by 2020
Valour class Syne FFGHM mid- 4 - - TBD - Concept phase begun Feb 2016
life upgrade

Aerospace
A-Darter Assegai AAM IR n.k. 939m 73.63m Denel Mar 2015 Project begun late 1990s; Brazil joined 2007.
Deliveries one year behind production-
contract schedule
Metsi MPA ac TBD - - TBD - To replace C-47TP and C-212; procurement
TBD processes expected to begin 2019/20
Kiepie Lt Tpt ac

Seeker 400 Itambo Heavy ISR UAV TBD - - Denel Dynamics - Plan to reactivate UAV squadron announced
in 2016

PART TWO
Explanatory notes
The Military Balance provides an assessment of the armed
forces and defence expenditures of 171 countries and
territories. Each edition contributes to the provision of a
unique compilation of data and information, enabling
the reader to discern trends by studying editions as far
back as 1959. The data in the current edition is accurate
according to IISS assessments as of November 2018, unless
specified. Inclusion of a territory, country or state in The
Military Balance does not imply legal recognition or indi-
cate support for any government.
General arrangement and contents
The introduction is an assessment of global defence devel-
opments and key themes in the 2019 edition. There are
three analytical essays, followed by a graphical section
analysing comparative defence statistics by domain, as
well as key trends in defence economics.
Regional chapters begin with analysis of the military
and security issues that drive national defence policy devel-
opments, and key trends in regional defence economics.
These are followed by focused analysis, for certain coun-
tries, of defence policy and capability issues, and defence
economics. Next, detailed data on regional states’ military
forces and equipment, and defence economics, is presented
in alphabetical order. Graphics assessing important regional
arms procurements and deliveries complete each region.
The book closes with comparative and reference
sections containing comparisons of expenditure and
personnel statistics.
The Military Balance wall chart
The Military Balance 2019 wall chart is an assessment of the
dispositions of China’s armed forces, also highlighting key
features of its military-modernisation process. It provides
detail on each armed service, as well as the Strategic
Support Force, People’s Armed Police and the China Coast
Guard. The graphical display is complemented by a time-
line showing major modernisation events and relevant
equipment events.
Using The Military Balance
The country entries assess personnel strengths, organisa-
tion and equipment holdings of the world’s armed forces.
Force-strength and equipment-inventory data is based on
the most accurate data available, or on the best estimate
Explanatory Notes 503
Abbreviations and definitions
Qualifier
‘At least’ Total is no less than the number given
‘Up to’ Total is at most the number given, but could
be lower
‘About’ Total could be higher than given
‘Some’ Precise inventory is unavailable at time of press
‘In store’ Equipment held away from front-line units;
readiness and maintenance varies
Billion (bn) 1,000 million (m)
Trillion (tr) 1,000 billion
$ US dollars unless otherwise stated
ε Estimated
* Aircraft counted by the IISS as combat capable
- Part of a unit is detached/less than
+ Unit reinforced/more than
† IISS assesses that the serviceability of
equipment is in doubta
‡ Equipment judged obsolete (weapons whose
basic design is more than four decades old and
which have not been significantly upgraded
within the past decade)a
[a]
Not to be taken to imply that such equipment cannot be used
that can be made. In estimating a country’s total capabili-
ties, old equipment may be counted where it is consid-
ered that it may still be deployable.
The data presented reflects judgements based on infor-
mation available to the IISS at the time the book is compiled.
Where information differs from previous editions, this
is mainly because of changes in national forces, but it is
sometimes because the IISS has reassessed the evidence
supporting past entries. Given this, care must be taken in
constructing time-series comparisons from information
given in successive editions.
Country entries
Information on each country is shown in a standard
format, although the differing availability of informa-
tion and differences in nomenclature result in some vari-
ations. Country entries include economic, demographic
Reference
and military data. Population figures are based on demo-
graphic statistics taken from the US Census Bureau. Data
on ethnic and religious minorities is also provided in some
country entries. Military data includes personnel numbers,
504 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
conscript liability where relevant, outline organisation,
number of formations and units, and an inventory of the
major equipment of each service. Details of national forces
stationed abroad and of foreign forces stationed within the
given country are also provided.
Arms procurements and deliveries
A series of thematic tables, graphics and text follow the
regional data. These are designed to illustrate key trends,
principal programmes and significant events in regional
defence procurements. More detailed information on
defence procurements, organised by country, equipment
type and manufacturing company, can be found on the
IISS Military Balance+ database (https://www.iiss.org/publi-
cations/the-military-balance-plus). The information in this
section meets the threshold for a Military Balance country
entry and as such does not feature information on sales of
small arms and light weapons.
Defence economics
Country entries include defence expenditures, selected
economic-performance indicators and demographic aggre-
gates. All country entries are subject to revision each year
as new information, particularly regarding actual defence
expenditure, becomes available. On pp. 503–08, there are
also international comparisons of defence expenditure and
military personnel, giving expenditure figures for the past
three years in per capita terms and as a % of gross domestic
product (GDP). The aim is to provide a measure of mili-
tary expenditure and the allocation of economic resources
to defence.
Individual country entries show economic perfor-
mance over the past two years and current demographic
data. Where this data is unavailable, information from the
last available year is provided. All financial data in the
country entries is shown in both national currency and US
dollars at current – not constant – prices. US-dollar conver-
sions are calculated from the exchange rates listed in the
entry.
Definitions of terms
Despite efforts by NATO and the UN to develop a stan-
dardised definition of military expenditure, many coun-
tries prefer to use their own definitions (which are often
not made public). In order to present a comprehensive
picture, The Military Balance lists three different measures
of military-related spending data.
• For most countries, an official defence-budget
figure is provided.
• For those countries where other military-
related outlays, over and above the defence
budget, are known or can be reasonably esti-
mated, an additional measurement referred to as
defence expend­iture is also provided. Defence-
expenditure figures will naturally be higher than
official budget figures, depending on the range
of additional factors included.
• For NATO countries, a defence-budget figure, as
well as defence expenditure reported by NATO
in local currency terms and converted using IMF
exchange rates, is quoted.
NATO’s military-expenditure definition (the most
comprehensive) is cash outlays of central or federal
governments to meet the costs of national armed forces.
The term ‘armed forces’ includes strategic, land, naval,
air, command, administration and support forces. It also
includes other forces if they are trained, structured and
equipped to support defence forces and are realistically
deployable. Defence expenditures are reported in four cate-
gories: Operating Costs, Procurement and Construction,
Research and Development (R&D) and Other Expenditure.
Operating Costs include salaries and pensions for mili-
tary and civilian personnel; the cost of maintaining and
training units, service organisations, headquarters and
support elements; and the cost of servicing and repairing
military equipment and infrastructure. Procurement and
Construction expenditure covers national equipment and
infrastructure spending, as well as common infrastructure
programmes. R&D is defence expenditure up to the point
at which new equipment can be put in service, regardless
of whether new equipment is actually procured. Foreign
Military Aid (FMA) contributions are also noted.
For many non-NATO countries the issue of transpar-
ency in reporting military budgets is fundamental. Not
every UN member state reports defence-budget data (even
fewer report real defence expenditures) to their elector-
ates, the UN, the IMF or other multinational organisations.
In the case of governments with a proven record of trans-
parency, official figures generally conform to the stan-
dardised definition of defence budgeting, as adopted by
the UN, and consistency problems are not usually a major
issue. The IISS cites official defence budgets as reported
by either national governments, the UN, the OSCE or the
IMF.
For those countries where the official defence-budget
figure is considered to be an incomplete measure of total
military-related spending, and appropriate additional data
is available, the IISS will use data from a variety of sources
to arrive at a more accurate estimate of true defence
expenditure. The most frequent instances of budgetary
manipulation or falsification typically involve equip-
ment procurement, R&D, defence-industrial investment,
covert weapons programmes, pensions for retired mili-
tary and civilian personnel, paramilitary forces and non-
budgetary sources of revenue for the military arising from

ownership of industrial, property and land assets. There
will be several countries listed in The Military Balance for
which only an official defence-budget figure is provided
but where, in reality, true defence-related expenditure is
almost certainly higher.
Percentage changes in defence spending are referred
to in either nominal or real terms. Nominal terms relate to
the percentage change in numerical spending figures, and
do not account for the impact of price changes (i.e. infla-
tion) on defence spending. By contrast, real terms account
for inflationary effects, and may therefore be considered a
more accurate representation of change over time.
The principal sources for national economic statistics
cited in the country entries are the IMF, the OECD, the
World Bank and three regional banks (the Inter-American,
Asian and African Development banks). For some coun-
tries, basic economic data is difficult to obtain. GDP figures
are nominal (current) values at market prices. GDP growth
is real, not nominal growth, and inflation is the year-on-
year change in consumer prices.
General defence data
Personnel
The ‘Active’ total comprises all servicemen and women on
full-time duty (including conscripts and long-term assign-
ments from the Reserves). When a gendarmerie or equiva-
lent is under control of the defence ministry, they may be
included in the active total. Only the length of conscript
liability is shown; where service is voluntary there is no
entry. ‘Reserve’ describes formations and units not fully
manned or operational in peacetime, but which can be
mobilised by recalling reservists in an emergency. Some
countries have more than one category of reserves, often
kept at varying degrees of readiness. Where possible, these
differences are denoted using the national descriptive title,
but always under the heading of ‘Reserves’ to distinguish
them from full-time active forces. All personnel figures are
rounded to the nearest 50, except for organisations with
under 500 personnel, where figures are rounded to the
nearest ten.
Other forces
Many countries maintain forces whose training, organisa-
tion, equipment and control suggest that they may be used
to support or replace regular military forces, or be used
more broadly by states to deliver militarily relevant effect;
these are called ‘paramilitary’. They include some forces
that may have a constabulary role. These are detailed after
the military forces of each country, but their personnel
numbers are not normally included in the totals at the start
of each entry.
Explanatory Notes 505
Units and formation strength
Company 100–200
Battalion 500–1,000
Brigade 3,000–5,000
Division 15,000–20,000
Corps or Army 50,000–100,000
Cyber
The Military Balance includes detail on selected national
cyber capacities, particularly those under the control of,
or designed to fulfil the requirements of, defence organisa-
tions.
Forces by role and equipment by type
Quantities are shown by function (according to each
nation’s employment) and type, and represent what are
believed to be total holdings, including active and reserve
operational and training units. Inventory totals for missile
systems relate to launchers and not to missiles. Equipment
held ‘in store’ is not counted in the main inventory totals.
Deployments
The Military Balance mainly lists permanent bases and oper-
ational deployments, including peacekeeping operations,
which are often discussed in the regional text. Information
in the country-data sections details, first, deployments of
troops and, second, military observers and, where avail-
able, the role and equipment of deployed units. Personnel
figures are not generally included for embassy staff,
standing multinational headquarters, or deployments of
purely maritime and aerospace assets, such as Iceland Air
Policing or anti-piracy operations. Personnel deployed
on OSCE missions are listed as ‘personnel’ rather than
‘observers’.
Land forces
To make international comparison easier and more consis-
tent, The Military Balance categorises forces by role and
translates national military terminology for unit and
formation sizes. Typical personnel strength, equipment
holdings and organisation of formations such as brigades
and divisions vary from country to country. In addition,
some unit terms, such as ‘regiment’, ‘squadron’, ‘battery’
and ‘troop’, can refer to significantly different unit sizes in
different countries. Unless otherwise stated, these terms
Reference
should be assumed to reflect standard British usage where
they occur.
506 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Naval forces
Classifying naval vessels according to role is complex.
A post-war consensus on primary surface combatants
revolved around a distinction between independently
operating cruisers, air-defence escorts (destroyers) and
anti-submarine-warfare escorts (frigates). However, ships
are increasingly performing a range of roles. For this
reason, The Military Balance classifies vessels according to
full-load displacement (FLD) rather than a role-classifica-
tion system. These definitions will not necessarily conform
to national designations.
Air forces
Aircraft listed as combat capable are assessed as being
equipped to deliver air-to-air or air-to-surface ordnance. The
definition includes aircraft designated by type as bomber,
fighter, fighter/ground attack, ground attack and anti-
submarine warfare. Other aircraft considered to be combat
capable are marked with an asterisk (*). Operational group-
ings of air forces are shown where known. Typical squadron
aircraft strengths can vary both between aircraft types and
from country to country. When assessing missile ranges, The
Military Balance uses the following range indicators:
• Short-range ballistic missile (SRBM): less than 1,000 km;
• Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM): 1,000–3,000 km;
• Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM): 3,000–5,000 km;
• Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM): over 5,000 km.
Attribution and acknowledgements
The International Institute for Strategic Studies owes no
allegiance to any government, group of governments, or
any political or other organisation. Its assessments are
its own, based on the material available to it from a wide
variety of sources. The cooperation of governments of
all listed countries has been sought and, in many cases,
received. However, some data in The Military Balance is
estimated. Care is taken to ensure that this data is as accu-
rate and free from bias as possible. The Institute owes
a considerable debt to a number of its own members,
consultants and all those who help compile and check
material. The Director-General and Chief Executive and
staff of the Institute assume full responsibility for the data
and judgements in this book. Comments and sugges-
tions on the data and textual material contained within
the book, as well as on the style and presentation of data,
are welcomed and should be communicated to the Editor
of The Military Balance at: IISS, Arundel House, 6 Temple
Place, London, WC2R 2PG, UK, email: milbal@iiss.org.
Copyright on all information in The Military Balance
belongs strictly to the IISS. Application to reproduce
limited amounts of data may be made to the publisher:
Taylor & Francis, 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon,
Oxon, OX14 4RN. Email: society.permissions@tandf.co.uk.
Unauthorised use of data from The Military Balance will
be subject to legal action.
 Explanatory Notes 507

Principal land definitions

FORCES BY ROLE
Command: free-standing, deployable formation headquarters (HQs).
Special Forces (SF): elite units specially trained and equipped for unconventional warfare and operations in
enemy-controlled territory. Many are employed in counter-terrorist roles.
Manoeuvre: combat units and formations capable of manoeuvring. These are subdivided as follows:
Reconnaissance: combat units and formations whose primary purpose is to gain information.
Armoured: units and formations principally equipped with main battle tanks (MBTs) and infantry
fighting vehicles (IFVs) to provide heavy mounted close-combat capability. Units and
formations intended to provide mounted close-combat capability with lighter armoured
vehicles, such as light tanks or wheeled assault guns, are classified as light armoured.
Mechanised: units and formations primarily equipped with lighter armoured vehicles such as
armoured personnel carriers (APCs). They have less mounted firepower and protection
than their armoured equivalents, but can usually deploy more infantry.
Light: units and formations whose principal combat capability is dismounted infantry, with
few, if any, organic armoured vehicles. Some may be motorised and equipped with soft-
skinned vehicles.
Air Manoeuvre: units and formations trained and equipped for delivery by transport aircraft and/or
helicopters.
Amphibious: amphibious forces are trained and equipped to project force from the sea.
Other Forces: includes security units such as Presidential Guards, paramilitary units such as border
guards and combat formations permanently employed in training or demonstration
tasks.
Combat Support: combat support units and formations not integral to manoeuvre formations. Includes
artillery, engineers, military intelligence, nuclear, biological and chemical defence, signals
and information operations.
Combat Service includes logistics, maintenance, medical, supply and transport units and formations.
Support (CSS):

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
Light Weapons: small arms, machine guns, grenades and grenade launchers and unguided man-portable
anti-armour and support weapons have proliferated so much and are sufficiently easy to
manufacture or copy that listing them would be impractical.
Crew-Served crew-served recoilless rifles, man-portable ATGW, MANPADs and mortars of greater than
Weapons: 80mm calibre are listed, but the high degree of proliferation and local manufacture of
many of these weapons means that estimates of numbers held may not be reliable.
Armoured Fighting armoured combat vehicles with a combat weight of at least six metric tonnes, further
Vehicles (AFVs): subdivided as below:
Main Battle Tank armoured, tracked combat vehicles, armed with a turret-mounted gun of at least 75mm
(MBT): calibre and with a combat weight of at least 25 metric tonnes.
Light Tank (LT TK): armoured, tracked combat vehicles, armed with a turret-mounted gun of at least 75mm
calibre and with a combat weight of less than 25 metric tonnes.
Wheeled Assault armoured, wheeled combat vehicles, armed with a turret-mounted gun of at least 75mm
Gun (ASLT): calibre and with a combat weight of at least 15 metric tonnes.
Armoured armoured vehicles primarily designed for reconnaissance tasks with no significant
Reconnaissance transport capability and either a main gun of less than 75mm calibre or a combat weight
Reference

(RECCE): of less than 15 metric tonnes, or both.

Infantry Fighting armoured combat vehicles designed and equipped to transport an infantry squad and
Vehicle (IFV): armed with a cannon of at least 20mm calibre.
508 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Armoured lightly armoured combat vehicles designed and equipped to transport an infantry squad
Personnel Carrier but either unarmed or armed with a cannon of less than 20mm calibre.
(APC):
Airborne Combat armoured vehicles designed to be deployable by parachute alongside airborne forces.
Vehicle (ABCV):
Amphibious Assault armoured vehicles designed to have an amphibious ship-to-shore capability.
Vehicle (AAV):
Armoured Utility armoured vehicles not designed to transport an infantry squad, but capable of
Vehicle (AUV): undertaking a variety of other utility battlefield tasks, including light reconnaissance and
light transport.
Specialist Variants: variants of armoured vehicles listed above that are designed to fill a specialised role, such
as command posts (CP), artillery observation posts (OP), signals (sigs) and ambulances
(amb), are categorised with their parent vehicles.
Engineering and includes armoured engineer vehicles (AEV), armoured repair and recovery vehicles (ARV),
Maintenance Vehicles: assault bridging (VLB) and mine warfare vehicles (MW).
Nuclear, Biological armoured vehicles principally designed to operate in potentially contaminated terrain.
and Chemical Defence
Vehicles (NBC):
Anti-Tank/Anti- guns, guided weapons and recoilless rifles designed to engage armoured vehicles and
Infrastructure (AT): battlefield hardened targets.
Surface-to-Surface launch vehicles for transporting and firing surface-to-surface ballistic and cruise missiles.
Missile Launchers
(SSM):
Artillery: weapons (including guns, howitzers, gun/howitzers, multiple-rocket launchers, mortars
and gun/mortars) with a calibre greater than 100mm for artillery pieces and 80mm and
above for mortars, capable of engaging ground targets with indirect fire.
Coastal Defence: land-based coastal artillery pieces and anti-ship-missile launchers.
Air Defence (AD): guns and surface-to-air-missile (SAM) launchers designed to engage fixed-wing, rotary-
wing and uninhabited aircraft. Missiles are further classified by maximum notional
engagement range: point-defence (up to 10 km); short-range (10–30 km); medium-
range (30–75 km); and long-range (75 km+). Systems primarily intended to intercept
missiles rather than aircraft are categorised separately as Missile Defence.

Principal naval definitions

To aid comparison between fleets, the following definitions, which do not always conform to national definitions, are used:
Submarines: all vessels designed to operate primarily under water. Submarines with a dived
displacement below 250 tonnes are classified as midget submarines (SSW); those below
500 tonnes are coastal submarines (SSC).
Principal surface all surface ships designed for combat operations on the high seas, with an FLD above
combatants: 1,500 tonnes. Aircraft carriers (CV), including helicopter carriers (CVH), are vessels
with a flat deck primarily designed to carry fixed- and/or rotary-wing aircraft, without
amphibious capability. Other principal surface combatants include cruisers (C) (with an
FLD above 9,750 tonnes), destroyers (DD) (with an FLD above 4,500 tonnes) and frigates
(FF) (with an FLD above 1,500 tonnes).
Patrol and coastal surface vessels designed for coastal or inshore operations. These include corvettes
combatants: (FS), which usually have an FLD between 500 and 1,500 tonnes and are distinguished
from other patrol vessels by their heavier armaments. Also included in this category
are offshore-patrol ships (PSO), with an FLD greater than 1,500 tonnes; patrol craft
(PC), which have an FLD between 250 and 1,500 tonnes; and patrol boats (PB) with an
FLD between ten and 250 tonnes. Vessels with a top speed greater than 35 knots are
designated as ‘fast’ .
 Explanatory Notes 509

Mine warfare vessels: all surface vessels configured primarily for mine laying (ML) or countermeasures.
Countermeasures vessels are either: sweepers (MS), which are designed to locate and
destroy mines in an area; hunters (MH), which are designed to locate and destroy
individual mines; or countermeasures vessels (MC), which combine both roles.
Amphibious vessels: vessels designed to transport personnel and/or equipment onto shore. These include
landing helicopter assault vessels (LHA), which can embark fixed- and/or rotary-wing air
assets as well as landing craft; landing helicopter docks (LHD), which can embark rotary-
wing or VTOL assets and have a well dock; landing platform helicopters (LPH), which
have a primary role of launch and recovery platform for rotary-wing or VTOL assets with
a dock to store equipment/personnel for amphibious operations; and landing platform
docks (LPD), which do not have a through deck but do have a well dock. Landing ships
(LS) are amphibious vessels capable of ocean passage and landing craft (LC) are smaller
vessels designed to transport personnel and equipment from a larger vessel to land or
across small stretches of water. Landing ships have a hold; landing craft are open vessels.
Landing craft air cushioned (LCAC) are differentiated from Utility craft air cushioned
(UCAC) in that the former have a bow ramp for the disembarkation of vehicles and
personnel.
Auxiliary vessels: ocean-going surface vessels performing an auxiliary military role, supporting combat
ships or operations. These generally fulfil five roles: replenishment (such as oilers (AO)
and solid stores (AKS)); logistics (such as cargo ships (AK) and logistics ships (AFS));
maintenance (such as cable-repair ships (ARC) or buoy tenders (ABU)); research (such as
survey ships (AFS)); and special purpose (such as intelligence-collection ships (AGI) and
ocean-going tugs (ATF)).
Weapons systems: weapons are listed in the following order: land-attack cruise missiles (LACM), anti-ship
missiles (AShM), surface-to-air missiles (SAM), heavy (HWT) and lightweight (LWT)
torpedoes, anti-submarine weapons (A/S), CIWS, guns and aircraft. Missiles with a range
less than 5 km and guns with a calibre less than 57 mm are generally not included.
Organisations: naval groupings such as fleets and squadrons frequently change and are shown only
where doing so would aid qualitative judgements.

Principal aviation definitions

Bomber (Bbr): comparatively large platforms intended for the delivery of air-to-surface ordnance. Bbr
units are units equipped with bomber aircraft for the air-to-surface role.
Fighter (Ftr): aircraft designed primarily for air-to-air combat, which may also have a limited air-to-
surface capability. Ftr units are equipped with aircraft intended to provide air superiority,
which may have a secondary and limited air-to-surface capability.
Fighter/Ground multi-role fighter-size platforms with significant air-to-surface capability, potentially
Attack (FGA): including maritime attack, and at least some air-to-air capacity. FGA units are multi-role
units equipped with aircraft capable of air-to-air and air-to-surface attack.
Ground Attack (Atk): aircraft designed solely for the air-to-surface task, with limited or no air-to-air capability.
Atk units are equipped with fixed-wing aircraft.
Attack Helicopter (Atk rotary-wing platforms designed for delivery of air-to-surface weapons, and fitted with an
hel): integrated fire-control system.
Anti-Submarine fixed- and rotary-wing platforms designed to locate and engage submarines, many
Warfare (ASW): with a secondary anti-surface-warfare capability. ASW units are equipped with fixed- or
rotary-wing aircraft.
Anti-Surface Warfare ASuW units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft intended for anti-surface-
(ASuW): warfare missions.
Reference

Maritime Patrol (MP): fixed-wing aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) intended for maritime surface
surveillance, which may possess an anti-surface-warfare capability. MP units are
equipped with fixed-wing aircraft or UAVs.
510 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Electronic Warfare fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and UAVs intended for electronic warfare. EW units are
(EW): equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs.
Intelligence/ fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and UAVs intended to provide radar, visible-light or
Surveillance/ infrared imagery, or a mix thereof. ISR units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing
Reconnaissance (ISR): aircraft or UAVs.
Combat/Intelligence/ aircraft and UAVs that have the capability to deliver air-to-surface weapons, as well as
Surveillance/ undertake ISR tasks. CISR units are equipped with armed aircraft and/or UAVs for ISR and
Reconnaissance air-to-surface missions.
(CISR):
COMINT/ELINT/ fixed- and rotary-wing platforms and UAVs capable of gathering electronic (ELINT),
SIGINT: communications (COMINT) or signals intelligence (SIGINT). COMINT units are equipped
with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs intended for the communications-intelligence
task. ELINT units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft or UAVs used for
gathering electronic intelligence. SIGINT units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing
aircraft or UAVs used to collect signals intelligence.
Airborne Early fixed- and rotary-wing platforms capable of providing airborne early warning, with a
Warning (& Control) varying degree of onboard command and control depending on the
(AEW (&C)): platform. AEW(&C) units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft.
Search and Rescue units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft used to recover military personnel
(SAR): or civilians.
Combat Search and units are equipped with armed fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft for recovery of personnel
Rescue (CSAR): from hostile territory.
Tanker (Tkr): fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft designed for air-to-air refuelling. Tkr units are equipped
with fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft used for air-to-air refuelling.
Tanker Transport platforms capable of both air-to-air refuelling and military airlift.
(Tkr/Tpt):
Transport (Tpt): fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft intended for military airlift. Light transport aircraft are
categorised as having a maximum payload of up to 11,340 kg; medium up to 27,215 kg;
and heavy above 27,215 kg. Light transport helicopters have an internal payload of up
to 2,000 kg; medium transport helicopters up to 4,535 kg; heavy transport helicopters
greater than 4,535 kg. PAX aircraft are platforms generally unsuited for transporting
cargo on the main deck. Tpt units are equipped with fixed- or rotary-wing platforms to
transport personnel or cargo.
Trainer (Trg): fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft designed primarily for the training role; some also have
the capacity to carry light to medium ordnance. Trg units are equipped with fixed- or
rotary-wing training aircraft intended for pilot or other aircrew training.
Multi-role helicopter rotary-wing platforms designed to carry out a variety of military tasks including light
(MRH): transport, armed reconnaissance and battlefield support.
Uninhabited Aerial remotely piloted or controlled unmanned fixed- or rotary-wing systems. Light UAVs are
Vehicles (UAVs): those weighing 20–150 kg; medium: 150–600 kg; and large: more than 600 kg.
Reference
Table 22 List of abbreviations for data sections
AAA anti-aircraft artillery
AAM air-to-air missile
AAR search-and-rescue vessel
AAV amphibious assault vehicle
AB airborne
ABM anti-ballistic missile
ABU/H  sea-going buoy tender/with
hangar
ABCV airborne combat vehicle
ac aircraft
ACV  air-cushion vehicle/armoured
combat vehicle
ACS crane ship
AD air defence
ADA air-defence artillery
ADEX air-defence exercise
adj adjusted
AE auxiliary, ammunition carrier
AEM missile support ship
AEV armoured engineer vehicle
AEW airborne early warning
AFD/L auxiliary floating dry dock/small
AFS/H logistics ship/with hangar
AFSB afloat forward staging base
AFV armoured fighting vehicle
AG misc auxiliary
AGB/H icebreaker/with hangar
AGE/H  experimental auxiliary ship/with
hangar
AGF/H command ship/with hangar
AGHS hydrographic survey vessel
AGI intelligence collection vessel
AGM space tracking vessel
AGOR oceanographic research vessel
AGOS oceanographic surveillance vessel
AGS/H survey ship/with hangar
AH hospital ship
AIP air-independent propulsion
AK/L cargo ship/light
aka also known as
AKEH dry cargo/ammunition ship
AKR/H  roll-on/roll-off cargo ship/with
hangar
AKS/L stores ship/light
ALCM air-launched cruise missile
amb ambulance
amph amphibious/amphibian
AO/S oiler/small
AOE fast combat support ship
AOR/L/H  fleet replenishment oiler with RAS
capability/light/with hangar
AOT/L oiler transport/light
AP  armour-piercing/anti-personnel/
transport ship
APB barracks ship
APC armoured personnel carrier
AR/C/D/L repair ship/cable/dry dock/light
ARG amphibious ready group
ARH active radar homing
ARL airborne reconnaissance low
ARM anti-radiation missile
armd armoured
ARS/H  rescue and salvage ship/with
hangar
arty artillery
ARV armoured recovery vehicle
AS anti-submarine/submarine tender
ASBM anti-ship ballistic missile
ASCM anti-ship cruise missile
AShM anti-ship missile
aslt assault
ASM air-to-surface missile
ASR submarine rescue craft
ASTT anti-submarine torpedo tube
ASW anti-submarine warfare
ASuW anti-surface warfare
AT tug/anti-tank
ATBM anti-tactical ballistic missile
ATF tug, ocean going
ATGW anti-tank guided weapon
Atk attack/ground attack
ATS tug, salvage and rescue ship
AUV armoured utility vehicle
AVB aviation logistic support ship
avn aviation
AWT water tanker
AX/L/S training craft/light/sail
BA Budget Authority (US)
Bbr bomber
BCT brigade combat team
bde brigade
bdgt budget
BG battlegroup
BMD ballistic-missile defence
BMEWS  ballistic missile early warning
system
bn battalion/billion
bty battery
C2 command and control
casevac casualty evacuation
cav cavalry
cbt combat
CBRN  chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, explosive
cdo commando
C/G/H/M/N
 cruiser/with AShM/with hangar/
with SAM/nuclear-powered
CISR combat ISR
CIMIC civil–military cooperation
CIWS close-in weapons system
COIN counter-insurgency
comd command
COMINT communications intelligence
comms communications
coy company
CP command post
CPX command post exercise
CS combat support
CSAR combat search and rescue
CSS combat service support
CT counter-terrorism
CV/H/L/N/S
 aircraft carrier/helicopter/light/
nuclear powered/VSTOL
CW chemical warfare/weapons
DD/G/H/M
 destroyer/with AShM/with
hangar/with SAM
DDR disarmament, demobilisation and
reintegration
DDS dry deck shelter
def defence
det detachment
div division
ECM electronic countermeasures
ELINT electronic intelligence
elm element/s
engr engineer
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
EPF expeditionary fast transport vessel
eqpt equipment
ESB expeditionary mobile base
ESD expeditionary transport dock
EW electronic warfare
excl excludes/excluding
exp expenditure
FAC forward air control
fd field
FF/G/H/M frigate/with AShM/with hangar/
with SAM
FGA fighter ground attack
FLD full-load displacement
flt flight
FMA Foreign Military Assistance
FS/G/H/M corvette/with AShM/with hangar/
with SAM
Ftr fighter
FTX field training exercise
FY fiscal year
GBU guided bomb unit
gd guard
GDP gross domestic product
GLCM ground-launched cruise missile
GMLS Guided Missile Launching System
gp group
HA/DR  humanitarian assistance/disaster
relief
hel helicopter
how howitzer
HQ headquarters
HUMINT human intelligence
HWT heavyweight torpedo
hy heavy
IBU inshore boat unit
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
IFV infantry fighting vehicle
IIR imaging infrared
Reference
IMINT imagery intelligence
imp improved
indep independent
inf infantry
info ops information operations
512 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
INS inertial navigation system
int intelligence
IOC Initial Operating Capability
IR infrared
IRBM  intermediate-range ballistic
missile
ISD in-service date
ISR  intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance
ISTAR  intelligence, surveillance, target
acquisition and reconnaissance
JOINTEX joint exercise
LACM land-attack cruise missile
LC/A/AC/H/M/PA/P/L/T/U/VP
 landing craft/assault/air cushion/
heavy/medium/personnel air
cushion/personnel/large/tank/
utility/vehicles and personnel
LCC amphibious command ship
LGB laser-guided bomb
LHA landing ship assault
LHD amphibious assault ship
LIFT lead-in ftr trainer
LKA amphibious cargo ship
LLI long-lead items
lnchr launcher
LoA letter of acceptance
log logistic
LoI letter of intent
LP/D/H landing platform/dock/helicopter
LRIP low-rate initial production
LS/D/L/LH/M/T
 landing ship/dock/logistic/logistic
helicopter/medium/tank
lt light
LWT lightweight torpedo
maint maintenance
MANPAD man-portable air-defence system
MANPATS man-portable anti-tank system
MAREX maritime exercise
MBT main battle tank
MC/C/CS/D/I/O
 mine countermeasure coastal/
command and support/diving
support/inshore/ocean
MCM mine countermeasures
MCMV mine countermeasures vessel
MD military district
MDT mine diving tender
mech mechanised

 prepo pre-positioned
med medium/medical
medevac medical evacuation
MH/C/D/I/O
 mine hunter/coastal/drone/
inshore/ocean
mil military
MIRV  multiple independently targetable
re-entry vehicle
mk mark (model number)
ML minelayer
MLU mid-life update
mne marine
mod modified/modification
mor mortar
mot motorised/motor
MoU memorandum of understanding
MP maritime patrol/military police
MR  maritime reconnaissance/motor
rifle
MRBM medium-range ballistic missile SARH semi-active radar homing
MRH multi-role helicopter sat satellite
MRL multiple rocket launcher SDV swimmer delivery vehicles
MS/A/C/D/I/O/R SEAD suppression of enemy air defence
 mine sweeper/auxiliary/coastal/ SF special forces
drone/inshore/ocean/river SHORAD short-range air defence
msl missile SIGINT signals intelligence
mtn mountain sigs signals
MW mine warfare SLBM  submarine-launched ballistic
n.a. not applicable missile
n.k. not known SLCM submarine-launched cruise missile
NBC nuclear, biological, chemical SLEP service-life-extension programme
NCO non-commissioned officer SP self-propelled
nm nautical mile Spec Ops special operations
nuc nuclear SPAAGM  self-propelled anti-aircraft gun
O & M operations and maintenance and missile system
obs observation/observer spt support
OCU operational conversion unit sqn squadron
OP observation post SRBM short-range ballistic missile
op/ops operational/operations SS submarine
OPFOR opposition training force SSA  submersible auxiliary support
org organised/organisation vessel
OPV offshore patrol vessel SSAN  submersible auxiliary support
vessel (nuclear)
para paratroop/parachute
PAX  passenger/passenger transport SSBN  nuclear-powered ballistic-missile
submarine
aircraft
SSC coastal submarine
PB/C/F/G/I/M/R/T
 patrol boat/coastal/fast/with SSG guided-missile submarine
AShM/inshore/with SAM/riverine/ SSI inshore submarine
with torpedo SSGN  nuclear-powered guided-missile
PC/C/F/G/H/I/M/O/R/T submarine
 patrol craft/coastal/fast/guided SSK  attack submarine (hunter-killer)
missile/with hangar/inshore/with SSM surface-to-surface missile
CIWS missile or SAM/offshore/ SSN  nuclear-powered attack
riverine/with torpedo submarine
pdr pounder SSR security-sector reform
pers personnel SSW midget submarine
PG/G/GF/H str strength
 patrol gunboat/guided missile/
fast attack craft/hydrofoil surv surveillance
sy security
PGM precision-guided munitions
t tonnes
PH/G/M/T patrol hydrofoil/with AShM/with
tac tactical
SAM/with torpedo
tch technical
pl platoon
PKO peacekeeping operations temp temporary
PoR programme of record tk tank
PPP purchasing-power parity tkr tanker
PPV protected patrol vehicle TMD theatre missile defence
PRH passive radar-homing torp torpedo
tpt transport
PSO/H  peace support operations or tr trillion
offshore patrol ship/with hangar trg training
PTF semi-submersible vessel TRV torpedo recovery vehicle
ptn pontoon bridging TT torpedo tube
quad quadruple UAV unmanned/uninhabited aerial
R&D research and development vehicle
RCL recoilless launcher UCAC utility craft air cushioned
recce reconnaissance UCAV unmanned combat air vehicle
regt regiment utl utility
RFI request for information UUV unmanned/uninhabited
RFP request for proposals underwater vehicle
RIB rigid inflatable boat veh vehicle
RL rocket launcher VLB vehicle launched bridge
ro-ro roll-on, roll-off VLS vertical launch system
RRC/F/U rapid-reaction corps/force/unit VSHORAD very short-range air defence
RV re-entry vehicle WFU withdrawn from use
rvn riverine wg wing
SAM surface-to-air missile
SAR search and rescue
 Defence Spending Defence Spending Defence Spending Active Armed Estimated Active
current US$ m per capita (current US$) % of GDP Forces (000) Reservists (000) Paramilitary (000)
2016 2017 2018 2016 2017 2018 2016 2017 2018 2019 2019 2019
North America
Canada 15,738 18,563 18,235 445 521 508 1.02 1.12 1.05 67 27 5
United States 593,371 598,722 643,266 1,831 1,833 1,954 3.17 3.07 3.14 1,359 846 0
Total 609,109 617,285 661,501 1,695 1,704 1,812 3.01 2.92 2.97 1,426 873 5
Europe
Albania 114 110 131 39 37 43 0.99 0.86 0.87 8 0 1
Austria 2,888 3,158 3,384 331 361 385 0.74 0.76 0.74 21 158 0
Belgium 3,861 4,513 4,984 338 393 431 0.83 0.91 0.93 27 0 5
Bosnia-Herzegovina 165 165 172 43 43 45 0.97 0.00 0.86 11 0 0
Bulgaria 671 677 724 94 95 103 1.26 1.19 1.14 31 3 0
Croatia 591 658 758 137 153 178 1.14 1.20 1.26 15 18 3
Cyprus 335 397 417 278 325 337 1.66 1.83 1.74 15 50 1
Czech Republic 1,955 2,247 2,748 183 211 257 1.00 1.04 1.12 23 0 0
Denmark 3,514 3,780 4,246 628 674 731 1.15 1.16 1.20 15 46 0
Estonia 499 544 641 396 434 515 2.14 2.09 2.17 6 28 0
Finland 3,100 3,195 3,406 564 579 615 1.30 1.26 1.23 22 216 3
France 46,784 48,699 53,365 700 726 792 1.90 1.88 1.91 204 36 103
Germany 37,943 41,784 45,686 470 518 568 1.09 1.13 1.13 180 28 0
Greece 4,598 4,731 4,896 427 439 455 2.39 2.36 2.25 142 221 4
Hungary 1,061 1,290 1,637 107 131 167 0.84 0.93 1.05 28 20 12
Iceland 46 55 41 136 162 119 0.22 0.22 0.15 0 0 0
Ireland 994 1,040 1,122 201 208 221 0.33 0.31 0.31 9 4 0
Table 23 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel

Italy 22,112 22,887 24,870 357 368 400 1.19 1.18 1.19 171 18 176
Latvia 407 531 684 207 273 355 1.48 1.75 1.99 6 16 0
Lithuania 637 817 1,057 223 289 378 1.49 1.73 2.02 20 7 14
Luxembourg 205 280 404 352 471 668 0.35 0.45 0.59 1 0 1
Macedonia (FYROM) 106 114 125 50 54 59 0.99 1.01 1.01 8 5 8
Malta 58 64 70 139 155 156 0.51 0.51 0.49 2 0 0
Montenegro 68 75 79 106 117 129 1.56 1.57 1.47 2 0 10
Netherlands 9,121 10,113 11,297 536 592 659 1.16 1.22 1.24 35 5 6
Norway 6,000 6,196 6,798 1,140 1,165 1,265 1.62 1.55 1.54 23 40 0
Poland 9,101 9,981 10,812 236 259 281 1.93 1.90 1.97 118 0 73
Reference 513

Reference
 Defence Spending Defence Spending Defence Spending Active Armed Estimated Active
current US$ m per capita (current US$) % of GDP Forces (000) Reservists (000) Paramilitary (000)
2016 2017 2018 2016 2017 2018 2016 2017 2018 2019 2019 2019
Portugal 2,443 2,527 2,582 225 233 249 1.19 1.16 1.09 27 212 25
Romania 2,763 3,643 4,631 128 169 216 1.46 1.72 1.93 69 50 57
Serbia 501 546 707 70 77 100 1.31 1.32 1.48 28 50 4
Slovakia 974 1,118 1,283 179 205 236 1.09 1.16 1.20 16 0 0
Slovenia 446 474 532 225 240 253 1.00 0.97 0.97 7 2 0
Spain 9,975 13,353 15,117 205 273 306 0.81 1.02 1.05 120 15 76
Sweden 5,738 5,935 6,224 581 596 620 1.12 1.11 1.12 30 0 0
514 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Switzerland 4,653 4,786 4,972 569 581 600 0.69 0.70 0.70 21 135 0
Turkey 8,664 7,885 7,897 108 98 97 1.00 0.93 1.11 355 379 157
United Kingdom 52,965 52,350 56,105 822 808 862 1.98 1.99 2.00 148 80 0
Total 246,056 260,718 284,605 393 415 452 1.33 1.35 1.37 1,966 1,841 738
Russia and Eurasia
Armenia 431 435 506 141 143 166 4.09 3.77 4.04 45 210 4
Azerbaijan 1,395 1,554 1,611 141 156 160 3.69 3.82 3.53 67 300 15
Belarus 506 531 604 53 56 63 1.06 0.98 1.06 45 290 110
Georgia 319 307 322 65 62 65 2.22 2.02 1.93 21 0 5
Kazakhstan 1,134 1,265 1,590 62 68 85 0.83 0.79 0.86 39 0 32
Kyrgyzstan n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 11 0 10
Moldova 27 31 37 8 9 11 0.34 0.32 0.32 5 58 2
Russia [a] 44,470 45,695 45,349 312 321 319 3.46 2.90 2.88 900 2,000 554
Tajikistan 194 194 217 23 23 25 2.79 2.72 2.95 9 0 8
Turkmenistan n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 37 0 5
Table 23 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel

Ukraine 2,555 2,798 3,272 58 64 74 2.74 2.50 2.59 209 900 88

Uzbekistan n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 48 0 20
Total** 51,033 52,811 53,509 179 185 187 2.91 2.54 2.51 1,435 3,758 853
Asia
Afghanistan 2,593 2,169 2,064 78 64 59 13.35 10.72 10.13 174 0 149
Australia 23,617 24,446 26,555 1,027 1,052 1,131 1.87 1.77 1.86 58 21 0
Bangladesh 2,629 2,930 3,159 17 19 20 1.12 1.12 1.10 157 0 64
Brunei 409 327 367 936 738 815 3.59 2.70 2.50 7 1 1
Cambodia 656 788 951 41 49 58 3.27 3.57 3.94 124 0 67
China 143,668 151,455 168,202 104 109 121 1.28 1.26 1.25 2,035 510 660
Fiji 52 51 50 56 55 54 1.13 1.04 0.95 4 6 0
 Defence Spending Defence Spending Defence Spending Active Armed Estimated Active
current US$ m per capita (current US$) % of GDP Forces (000) Reservists (000) Paramilitary (000)
2016 2017 2018 2016 2017 2018 2016 2017 2018 2019 2019 2019
India 51,438 58,026 57,874 41 45 45 2.26 2.23 2.15 1,445 1,155 1,586
Indonesia 7,380 8,596 7,318 29 33 28 0.79 0.85 0.73 396 400 280
Japan 46,456 45,692 47,256 367 361 375 0.94 0.94 0.93 247 56 14
Korea, DPR of n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 1,280 600 189
Korea, Republic of 33,648 35,876 39,211 661 701 763 2.38 2.33 2.37 625 3,100 9
Laos n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 29 0 100
Malaysia 4,187 3,476 3,869 135 111 122 1.41 1.11 1.11 113 52 23
Mongolia 101 85 105 33 28 34 0.90 0.76 0.82 10 137 8
Myanmar 2,282 2,149 1,951 40 39 35 3.61 3.19 2.73 406 0 107
Nepal 314 336 431 11 11 14 1.48 1.35 1.49 97 0 15
New Zealand 2,163 2,353 2,365 483 522 520 1.17 1.17 1.15 9 2 0
Pakistan 9,188 9,746 11,204 45 48 54 3.30 3.20 3.65 654 0 282
Papua New Guinea 82 71 63 12 10 9 0.43 0.36 0.30 4 0 0
Philippines 2,475 2,727 2,792 24 26 26 0.81 0.87 0.84 142 131 11
Singapore 10,017 10,288 11,000 1,733 1,747 1,835 3.23 3.18 3.17 73 313 8
Sri Lanka 2,005 1,863 1,739 90 83 77 2.46 2.13 1.88 255 6 62
Taiwan 9,902 10,488 11,041 422 446 469 1.87 1.83 1.83 163 1,657 11
Thailand 5,820 6,294 6,508 85 92 95 1.41 1.38 1.33 361 200 94
Timor-Leste 26 25 26 21 20 20 1.04 0.92 0.84 2 0 0
Vietnam 4,073 4,372 4,829 43 45 50 2.02 1.98 2.00 482 5,000 40
Total** 365,180 384,630 410,929 91 95 101 1.46 1.44 1.43 9,350 13,346 3,779
Middle East and North Africa
Table 23 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel

Algeria 10,218 10,077 9,928 254 246 238 6.38 6.01 5.27 130 150 187
Bahrain 1,523 1,480 1,480 1,105 1,049 1,026 4.73 4.19 3.77 8 0 11
Egypt 5,300 3,212 2,900 56 33 29 1.59 1.36 1.16 439 479 397
Iran 17,456 20,957 19,591 211 256 236 4.32 4.87 4.56 523 350 40
Iraq 16,976 19,271 17,259 445 492 429 9.95 10.02 7.47 64 0 145
Israel 19,868 18,892 18,536 2,430 2,276 2,200 6.25 5.39 5.07 170 465 8
Jordan 1,474 1,635 1,635 180 160 156 3.81 4.07 3.90 101 65 15
Kuwait 5,743 5,791 6,179 2,027 2,014 2,119 5.18 4.80 4.28 18 24 7
Lebanon 1,740 1,866 2,122 279 300 348 3.38 3.44 3.74 60 0 20
Libya n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k.
Reference 515

Reference
 Defence Spending Defence Spending Defence Spending Active Armed Estimated Active
current US$ m per capita (current US$) % of GDP Forces (000) Reservists (000) Paramilitary (000)
2016 2017 2018 2016 2017 2018 2016 2017 2018 2019 2019 2019
Mauritania 138 145 158 37 39 41 2.94 2.93 3.04 16 0 5
Morocco 3,327 3,491 3,633 99 103 106 3.22 3.19 3.07 196 150 50
Oman 9,102 8,687 8,947 2,713 2,537 2,561 13.80 12.27 10.95 43 0 4
Palestinian Territories n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 0 0 n.k.
Qatar n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 17 0 5
Saudi Arabia 81,526 89,067 82,933 2,895 3,117 2,506 12.64 12.97 10.77 227 0 25
Syria n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 139 0 100
516 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Tunisia 975 833 915 88 73 79 2.33 2.09 2.20 36 0 12

United Arab Emirates n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 63 0 0
Yemen n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 40 0 0
Total** 175,367 185,404 176,217 411 431 394 5.76 5.88 5.10 2,287 1,683 1,031
Latin America and the Caribbean
Antigua and Barbuda 7 6 7 73 66 74 0.47 0.41 0.44 0 0 0
Argentina 5,205 6,172 4,234 119 139 95 0.94 0.97 0.89 74 0 31
Bahamas 121 99 91 369 299 272 1.02 0.81 0.70 1 0 0
Barbados 38 39 39 132 132 134 0.79 0.77 0.76 1 0 0
Belize 22 24 23 63 66 59 1.23 1.28 1.19 2 1 0
Bolivia 443 543 503 40 49 44 1.29 1.44 1.20 34 0 37
Brazil 23,516 29,245 27,952 114 141 134 1.31 1.42 1.46 335 1,340 395
Chile 3,444 4,006 4,249 195 225 237 1.38 1.45 1.42 77 40 45
Colombia 9,201 10,150 10,642 195 213 221 3.25 3.23 3.16 293 35 188
Costa Rica 409 390 454 84 79 91 0.71 0.67 0.75 0 0 10
Table 23 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel

Cuba n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 49 39 27
Dominican Republic 458 496 603 43 46 59 0.63 0.65 0.74 56 0 15
Ecuador 1,565 1,565 1,698 97 96 103 1.57 1.50 1.58 40 118 1
El Salvador 146 146 141 24 24 23 0.61 0.59 0.55 25 10 17
Guatemala 289 260 256 19 17 15 0.42 0.34 0.32 18 64 25
Guyana 51 57 56 69 77 76 1.46 1.60 1.55 3 1 0
Haiti 7 7 8 1 1 1 0.09 0.08 0.08 0 0 0
Honduras 297 267 329 33 30 36 1.37 1.16 1.38 15 60 8
Jamaica 139 142 228 47 47 81 0.99 0.96 1.48 4 1 0
Mexico 4,917 4,568 5,227 40 37 41 0.46 0.40 0.44 277 82 59
Nicaragua 73 84 82 12 14 13 0.55 0.60 0.61 12 0 0
 Defence Spending Defence Spending Defence Spending Active Armed Estimated Active
current US$ m per capita (current US$) % of GDP Forces (000) Reservists (000) Paramilitary (000)
2016 2017 2018 2016 2017 2018 2016 2017 2018 2019 2019 2019
Panama 751 746 738 203 199 194 1.30 1.21 1.12 0 0 26
Paraguay 267 273 313 39 39 45 0.74 0.70 0.75 12 165 15
Peru 2,225 2,166 2,301 72 70 73 1.14 1.01 1.00 81 188 77
Suriname n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 2 0 0
Trinidad and Tobago 1,622 1,125 920 1,329 923 757 7.16 4.94 3.95 4 0 0
Uruguay 489 515 486 146 153 144 0.93 0.87 0.80 21 0 1
Venezuela 1,273 741 n.k. 41 24 n.k. 0.54 0.35 n.k. 123 8 220
Total** 56,975 63,831 61,582 92 102 97 1.14 1.16 1.18 1,559 2,151 1,195
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola 2,968 3,233 2,215 147 110 73 3.11 2.60 1.85 107 0 10
Benin 98 117 91 9 11 8 1.14 1.27 0.82 7 0 5
Botswana 561 512 572 254 231 254 3.58 2.98 3.07 9 0 0
Burkina Faso 150 192 315 8 10 16 1.32 1.53 2.16 11 0 0
Burundi 66 64 65 6 6 5 2.12 1.87 1.70 30 0 1
Cameroon 388 411 432 16 16 17 1.20 1.21 1.11 15 0 9
Cape Verde 11 10 11 19 17 20 0.64 0.56 0.56 1 0 0
Central African Rep 27 31 33 5 5 6 1.53 1.58 1.50 7 0 1
Chad 159 176 185 13 15 12 1.58 1.78 1.61 30 0 5
Congo 562 490 295 116 99 58 7.22 5.75 2.82 10 0 2
Côte d'Ivoire 755 829 935 32 34 36 2.08 2.05 1.94 27 0 n.k.
Dem Republic of the Congo 442 301 289 5 4 3 1.12 0.73 0.68 134 0 0
Djibouti n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 10 0 3
Table 23 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel

Equatorial Guinea n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 1 0 0
Eritrea n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 202 120 0
Ethiopia 451 492 469 4 5 4 0.62 0.61 0.55 138 0 0
Gabon 203 267 263 117 150 124 1.45 1.75 1.51 5 0 2
Gambia n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 1 0 0
Ghana 195 189 211 7 7 8 0.45 0.40 0.41 16 0 0
Guinea 162 200 165 13 16 14 1.91 2.06 1.52 10 0 3
Guinea-Bissau n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 4 0 0
Kenya 1,222 1,199 1,275 26 25 26 1.73 1.51 1.44 24 0 5
Lesotho 44 56 51 23 28 26 1.82 2.01 1.75 2 0 0
Reference 517

Reference
 Defence Spending Defence Spending Defence Spending Active Armed Estimated Active
current US$ m per capita (current US$) % of GDP Forces (000) Reservists (000) Paramilitary (000)
2016 2017 2018 2016 2017 2018 2016 2017 2018 2019 2019 2019
Liberia 13 14 16 3 3 3 0.39 0.44 0.48 2 0 0
Madagascar 59 67 75 2 3 3 0.59 0.58 0.59 14 0 8
Malawi 29 38 21 2 2 1 0.53 0.61 0.31 11 0 4
Mali 546 655 731 31 37 40 3.89 4.28 4.08 10 0 8
Mauritius 215 234 221 160 172 162 1.77 1.88 1.66 0 0 3
Mozambique 102 93 131 4 4 5 0.91 0.74 0.91 11 0 0
Namibia 404 481 457 166 194 180 3.69 3.79 3.44 10 0 6
518 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019

Niger 166 172 231 9 9 12 2.21 2.09 2.34 5 0 5

Nigeria 1,751 1,525 1,746 9 8 9 0.43 0.41 0.43 135 0 80
Rwanda 95 109 107 7 9 9 1.12 1.19 1.07 33 0 2
Senegal 254 309 348 18 21 23 1.73 1.88 1.77 14 0 5
Seychelles n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 0 0 0
Sierra Leone 13 12 13 2 2 2 0.35 0.32 0.35 9 0 0
Somalia n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 20 0 0
South Africa 3,211 3,651 3,678 59 67 66 1.09 1.05 0.99 65 0 15
South Sudan 98 97 82 8 7 8 3.19 3.39 2.56 185 0 0
Sudan n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 104 0 20
Tanzania 525 532 757 10 10 14 1.10 1.03 1.34 27 80 1
Togo 82 89 105 11 11 13 1.84 1.87 1.88 9 0 1
Uganda 463 434 384 12 11 9 1.83 1.65 1.39 45 10 1
Zambia 305 337 320 20 21 19 1.46 1.32 1.22 15 3 1
Zimbabwe 394 341 420 27 25 30 2.44 1.95 2.17 29 0 22
Table 23 International comparisons of defence expenditure and military personnel

Total** 17,190 17,955 17,714 17 18 17 1.16 1.13 1.04 1,555 213 228
Summary
North America 609,109 617,285 661,501 1,695 1,704 1,812 3.01 2.92 2.97 1,426 873 5
Europe 246,056 260,718 284,605 393 415 452 1.33 1.35 1.37 1,966 1,841 738
Russia and Eurasia 51,033 52,811 53,509 179 185 187 2.91 2.54 2.51 1,435 3,758 853
Asia 365,180 384,630 410,929 91 95 101 1.46 1.44 1.43 9,350 13,346 3,779
Middle East and North Africa 175,367 185,404 176,217 411 431 394 5.76 5.88 5.10 2,287 1,683 1,031
Latin America and the
56,975 63,831 61,582 92 102 97 1.14 1.16 1.18 1,559 2,151 1,195
Caribbean
Sub-Saharan Africa 17,190 17,955 17,714 17 18 17 1.16 1.13 1.04 1,555 213 228
Global totals 1,520,909 1,582,632 1,666,057 208 214 223 2.02 1.99 1.98 19,578 23,863 7,829
* Estimates. **Totals exclude defence-spending estimates for states where insufficient official information is available in order to enable approximate comparisons of regional defence-spending between years
[a] ‘National Defence’ budget chapter. Excludes other defence-related expenditures included under other budget lines (e.g. pensions) – see Table 11, p.175

Table 24 Index of country/territory abbreviations
AFG.......................................................Afghanistan
ALB.................................................................Albania
ALG..................................................................Algeria
ANG.................................................................Angola
ARG........................................................... Argentina
ARM............................................................. Armenia
ATG..................................... Antigua and Barbuda
AUS...............................................................Australia
AUT.................................................................. Austria
AZE...........................................................Azerbaijan
BDI................................................................. Burundi
BEL.................................................................Belgium
BEN.....................................................................Benin
BFA.......................................................Burkina Faso
BGD........................................................Bangladesh
BHR................................................................Bahrain
BHS..............................................................Bahamas
BIH.........................................Bosnia-Herzegovina
BIOT....................British Indian Ocean Territory
BLG................................................................Bulgaria
BLR..................................................................Belarus
BLZ.................................................................... Belize
BOL...................................................................Bolivia
BRB............................................................. Barbados
BRN.................................................................. Brunei
BRZ..................................................................... Brazil
BWA...........................................................Botswana
CAM......................................................... Cambodia
CAN................................................................Canada
CAR................................Central African Republic
CHA.....................................................................Chad
CHE.........................................................Switzerland
CHL......................................................................Chile
CIV........................................................Côte d’Ivoire
CMR.......................................................... Cameroon
COG..........................................Republic of Congo
COL.............................................................Colombia
CPV......................................................... Cape Verde
CRI.............................................................Costa Rica
CRO.................................................................Croatia
CUB.....................................................................Cuba
CYP................................................................. Cyprus
CZE................................................ Czech Republic
DJB................................................................Djibouti
DNK.............................................................Denmark
DOM......................................Dominican Republic
DPRK. Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of
DRC..........Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECU................................................................Ecuador
EGY.....................................................................Egypt
EQG.............................................Equitorial Guinea
ERI..................................................................... Eritrea
ESP......................................................................Spain
EST...................................................................Estonia
ETH................................................................Ethiopia
FIN.................................................................. Finland
FJI..............................................................................Fiji
FLK................................................. Falkland Islands
FRA...................................................................France
FYROM.....................Macedonia, Former Yugoslav
Republic
GAB..................................................................Gabon
GAM.............................................................. Gambia
GEO............................................................... Georgia
GER..............................................................Germany
GF...................................................... French Guiana
GHA.................................................................. Ghana
GIB................................................................Gibraltar
GNB...................................................Guinea-Bissau
GRC................................................................. Greece
GRL........................................................... Greenland
GUA......................................................... Guatemala
GUI...................................................................Guinea
GUY................................................................Guyana
HND...........................................................Honduras
HTI........................................................................Haiti
HUN..............................................................Hungary
IDN............................................................ Indonesia
IND...................................................................... India
IRL.................................................................... Ireland
IRN......................................................................... Iran
IRQ......................................................................... Iraq
ISL....................................................................Iceland
ISR........................................................................Israel
ITA..........................................................................Italy
JAM............................................................... Jamaica
JOR.................................................................. Jordan
JPN.................................................................... Japan
KAZ........................................................ Kazakhstan
KEN....................................................................Kenya
KGZ.......................................................... Kyrgyzstan
KWT................................................................ Kuwait
LAO......................................................................Laos
LBN.............................................................. Lebanon
LBR...................................................................Liberia
LBY..................................................................... Libya
LKA.............................................................. Sri Lanka
LSO................................................................ Lesotho
LTU.............................................................. Lithuania
LUX...................................................... Luxembourg
LVA.................................................................... Latvia
MDA.............................................................Moldova
MDG......................................................Madagascar
MEX.................................................................Mexico
MHL............................................... Marshall Islands
MLI.........................................................................Mali
MLT.....................................................................Malta
MMR.......................................................... Myanmar
MNE .................................................... Montenegro
MNG...........................................................Mongolia
MOR.............................................................Morocco
MOZ....................................................Mozambique
MRT......................................................... Mauritania
MUS............................................................ Mauritius
MWI.................................................................Malawi
MYS..............................................................Malaysia
NAM............................................................. Namibia
NCL..................................................New Caledonia
NER..................................................................... Niger
NGA.................................................................Nigeria
NIC.............................................................Nicaragua
NLD.......................................................Netherlands
Reference 519
NOR................................................................Norway
NPL.................................................................... Nepal
NZL......................................................New Zealand
OMN..................................................................Oman
PT........................................ Palestinian Territories
PAN............................................................... Panama
PAK............................................................... Pakistan
PER....................................................................... Peru
PHL..........................................................Philippines
POL.................................................................. Poland
PNG......................................... Papua New Guinea
PRC...........................China, People’s Republic of
PRT...............................................................Portugal
PRY..............................................................Paraguay
PYF.............................................. French Polynesia
QTR.....................................................................Qatar
ROC..........................Taiwan (Republic of China)
ROK...........................................Korea, Republic of
ROM............................................................ Romania
RSA........................................................South Africa
RUS....................................................................Russia
RWA..............................................................Rwanda
SAU.......................................................Saudi Arabia
SDN.................................................................. Sudan
SEN................................................................ Senegal
SER....................................................................Serbia
SGP............................................................Singapore
SLB................................................ Solomon Islands
SLE........................................................ Sierra Leone
SLV........................................................... El Salvador
SOM.............................................................. Somalia
SSD...................................................... South Sudan
STP...................................São Tomé and Príncipe
SUR.............................................................Suriname
SVK................................................................Slovakia
SVN.............................................................. Slovenia
SWE............................................................... Sweden
SYC........................................................... Seychelles
SYR.......................................................................Syria
TGO..................................................................... Togo
THA..............................................................Thailand
TJK.............................................................. Tajikistan
TKM....................................................Turkmenistan
TLS......................................................... Timor-Leste
TTO.......................................Trinidad and Tobago
TUN................................................................. Tunisia
TUR...................................................................Turkey
TZA...............................................................Tanzania
UAE......................................United Arab Emirates
UGA............................................................... Uganda
UK.................................................United Kingdom
UKR................................................................Ukraine
URY...............................................................Uruguay
US........................................................ United States
UZB.........................................................Uzbekistan
VEN............................................................Venezuela
Reference
VNM............................................................. Vietnam
YEM.........................................Yemen, Republic of
ZMB................................................................Zambia
ZWE..........................................................Zimbabwe
520 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2019
Table 25 Index of countries and territories
Afghanistan AFG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
Albania ALB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Algeria ALG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
Angola ANG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451
Antigua and Barbuda ATG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393
Argentina ARG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393
Armenia ARM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
Australia AUS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
Austria AUT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Azerbaijan AZE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
Bahamas BHS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396
Bahrain BHR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334
Bangladesh BGD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
Barbados BRB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
Belarus BLR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
Belgium BEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Belize BLZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
Benin BEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 452
Bolivia BOL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398
Bosnia-Herzegovina BIH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Botswana BWA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 453
Brazil BRZ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400
Brunei BRN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Bulgaria BLG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Burkina Faso BFA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 454
Burundi BDI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455
Cambodia CAM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
Cameroon CMR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456
Canada CAN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Cape Verde CPV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458
Central African Republic CAR. . . . . . . . . . . . 458
Chad CHA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459
Chile CHL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404
China, People’s Republic of PRC. . . . . . . . . . 256
Colombia COL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407
Congo, Republic of COG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460
Costa Rica CRI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410
Côte d’Ivoire CIV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461
Croatia CRO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Cuba CUB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410
Cyprus CYP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Czech Republic CZE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Democratic Republic of the Congo DRC. . 462
Denmark DNK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Djibouti DJB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 464
Dominican Republic DOM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412
Ecuador ECU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413
Egypt EGY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
El Salvador SLV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415
Equatorial Guinea EQG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465
Eritrea ERI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466
Estonia EST. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Ethiopia ETH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467
Fiji FJI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
Finland FIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
France FRA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Gabon GAB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468
Gambia GAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469
Georgia GEO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Germany GER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Ghana GHA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 470
Greece GRC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Guatemala GUA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416
Guinea GUI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471
Guinea-Bissau GNB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 472
Guyana GUY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418
Haiti HTI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418
Honduras HND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419
Hungary HUN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Iceland ISL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
India IND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
Indonesia IDN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
Iran IRN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
Iraq IRQ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344
Ireland IRL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Israel ISR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
Italy ITA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Jamaica JAM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420
Japan JPN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
Jordan JOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
Kazakhstan KAZ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Kenya KEN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 473
Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of
DPRK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
Korea, Republic of ROK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
Kuwait KWT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
Kyrgyzstan KGZ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Laos LAO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
Latvia LVA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Lebanon LBN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353
Lesotho LSO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474
Liberia LBR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475
Libya LBY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
Lithuania LTU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Luxembourg LUX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic
FYROM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Madagascar MDG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476
Malawi MWI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476
Malaysia MYS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
Mali MLI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477
Malta MLT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Mauritania MRT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
Mauritius MUS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 479
Mexico MEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421
Moldova MDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
Mongolia MNG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
Montenegro MNE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Morocco MOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358
Mozambique MOZ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 479
Multinational Organisations. . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Myanmar MMR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
Namibia NAM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480
Nepal NPL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
Netherlands NLD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
New Zealand NZL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
Nicaragua NIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
Niger NER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481
Nigeria NGA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482
Norway NOR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Oman OMN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360
Pakistan PAK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
Palestinian Territories PT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362
Panama PAN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
Papua New Guinea PNG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
Paraguay PRY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426
Peru PER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
Philippines PHL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
Poland POL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Portugal PRT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
Qatar QTR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
Romania ROM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
Russia RUS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Rwanda RWA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 484
Saudi Arabia SAU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365
Senegal SEN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485
Serbia SER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Seychelles SYC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 487
Sierra Leone SLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 487
Singapore SGP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
Slovakia SVK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
Slovenia SVN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Somalia SOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488
South Africa RSA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489
South Sudan SSD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 491
Spain ESP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Sri Lanka LKA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
Sudan SDN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493
Suriname SUR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
Sweden SWE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Switzerland CHE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Syria SYR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368
Taiwan (Republic of China) ROC . . . . . . . . . 307
Tajikistan TJK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Tanzania TZA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 495
Thailand THA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
Timor-Leste TLS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
Togo TGO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 496
Trinidad and Tobago TTO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
Tunisia TUN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
Turkey TUR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Turkmenistan TKM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
Uganda UGA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 497
Ukraine UKR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
United Arab Emirates UAE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
United Kingdom UK. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
United States US. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Uruguay URY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431
Uzbekistan UZB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Venezuela VEN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433
Vietnam VNM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
Yemen, Republic of YEM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
Zambia ZMB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 498
Zimbabwe ZWE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 499