CASE TITLE: DE GUZMAN vs.

CA
KEYWORD: Definition of Common Carriers
PONENTE: Feliciano, J.
DOCTRINE:
Art. 1732 of the Civil Code makes no distinctions between a person or enterprise
offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and such service on
an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis.
FACTS:
1) Respondent Ernesto Cendaňa, a junk dealer, was engaged in buying up used
bottles and scrap metal in Pangasinan which it brought to Manila for resale using
his 2 six-wheeler trucks.
2) On his return trip, he would load his vehicles with cargo which various merchants
wanted delivered to Pangasinan, charging freight rates lower than the regular
commercial rates.
3) Petitioner Pedro De Guzman contracted with respondent for the hauling of 750
cartons of Liberty filled milk from General Milk Company’s warehouse in Makati and
Rizal, to Urdaneta.
4) 150 cartons were loaded on a truck driven by respondent himself, while 100
cartons were loaded on the other truck driven by Manuel Estrada, respondent’s
driver and employee.
5) Only 150 boxes were delivered to petitioner as the truck carrying the other 600
boxes was hijacked along McArthur highway by armed men, who took the truck, its
driver, his helper, and the cargo.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
1) Petitioner alleged that respondent failed to exercise the ordinary diligence
required of him by law as a common carrier which resulted to the loss, hence he
should be liable for the payment of P22,150, the claimed value of the lost
merchandise
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
1) Private respondent denied that he was a common carrier and argued that he
could not be held responsible since the loss was due to force majeure
RULING:
TRIAL COURT –GRANTED the petition
-It found private respondent to be a common carrier and held him liable for the
value of the undelivered goods
APPELLATE COURT –DENIED the petition
-The CA reversed the judgment and held that respondent had been engaged in
transporting return loads of freight “as a casual occupation—a sideline to his scrap
iron business” and not as a common carrier, hence cannot be held liable
SUPREME COURT –DENIED petition for review on certiorari and affirmed CA’s
decision as to respondent’s liability for payment of the lost merchandise
1) Private respondent may be properly characterized as a common carrier in
accordance with Art. 1732’s definition of a common carrier—“Common carriers are
persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation,
offering their services to the public.”
2) The above Article makes no distinction between one whose principal business
activity is the carrying of persons/ goods or both, and one who does such carrying
only as an ancillary activity (sideline).

3) Respondent cannot be held liable for the value of the lost goods because under
Art. 1745(6), a common carrier is held responsible-- and will not be allowed to
divest or to diminish such responsibility—even for acts of strangers like thieves or

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robbers, EXCEPT where such thieves or robbers in fact acted “with grave or
irresistible threat, violence/ force.”
4) In these circumstances, we hold that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably
be regarded as quite beyond the control of the common carrier and properly
regarded as a fortuitous event to which respondent should not be held liable.

TITLE: NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION VS CA

KEYWORD: Common Carrier; Private Carrier; Burden of Proof
PONENTE:PANGANIBAN, J.
DOCTRINE:
The true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods, provided it
has space, for all who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee.
A carrier which does not qualify under the above test is deemed a private carrier.
“Generally, private carriage is undertaken by special agreement and the carrier
does not hold himself out to carry goods for the general public. The most typical,
although not the only form of private carriage, is the charter party, a maritime
contract by which the charterer, a party other than the shipowner, obtains the use
and service of all or some part of a ship for a period of time or a voyage or
voyages.”
FACTS:
The MV Vlasons I is a vessel which renders tramping service and does not transport
cargo or shipment for the general public. Its services are available only to specific
persons who enter into a special contract of charter party with its owner.
Vlasons Shipping, Inc., owner of MV Vlasons I, entered into a contract of
affreightment or contract of voyage charter hire with National Steel Corporation.
On August 6, 7 and 8, 1974, the MV ‘VLASONS I’ loaded at the pier at Iligan City, the
NSC’s shipment of 1,677 skids of tinplatesand 92 packages of hot rolled sheets for
carriage to Manila. The shipment was placed in the three (3) hatches of the ship.
The vessel arrived with the cargo at Pier 12, North Harbor, Manila, on August 12,
1974. The following day, when the vessel’s three hatches containing the shipment
were opened by NSC’s agents, nearly all the skids of tinplates and hot rolled sheets
were allegedly found to be wet and rusty. The cargo was discharged and unloaded
by stevedores hired by the Charterer.
NSC filed with VSI its claim for damages suffered. On October 3, 1974, plaintiff
formally demanded payment of said claim but defendant VSI refused and failed to
pay. Plaintiff filed its complaint against defendant on April 21, 1976 in the CFI, Rizal.
PETITIONER’S (NSC) CONTENTION:
It sustained losses as a result of
1. the act, neglect and default of the master and crew in the
management of the vessel as well as
2. the want of due diligence on the part of the defendant
a. to make the vessel seaworthy and
b. to make the holds and all other parts of the vessel in which the
cargo was carried, fit and safe for its reception, carriage and
preservation—all in violation of defendant’s undertaking under their Contract of Voyage
Charter Hire.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S (VSI) CONTENTION:
1. MV ‘VLASONS I’ was seaworthy in all respects for the carriage of plaintiff’s
cargo;
2. Said vessel was not a ‘common carrier’ inasmuch as she was under voyage
charter contract with NSC as charterer under the charter party;

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3. In the course of the voyage from Iligan City to Manila, the MV ‘VLASONS I’
encountered very rough seas, strong winds and adverse weather
condition, causing strong winds and big waves to continuously pound
against the vessel and seawater to overflow on its deck and hatch covers,
which may be considered as force majeure;
4. Under the Contract of Voyage Charter Hire, defendant shall not be
responsible for losses/damages except on proven willful negligence of the
officers of the vessel,
a. the officers of said MV ‘VLASONS I’ exercised due diligence and
proper seamanship and were not willfully negligent
RULING:
TRIAL COURT:
In favor of VSI, NSC was ordered to pay the unpaid freight due and demurrage for
the delay in payment. (italized related to the topic in Transpo)
1. The MV ‘VLASONS I’ is a vessel of Philippine registry engaged in the
tramping service and is available for hire only under special contracts of
charter party as in this particular case.
2. The evidence shows that the MV ‘VLASONS I’ was seaworthy and properly
manned, equipped and supplied when it undertook the voyage. It had all
the required certificates of seaworthiness.
3. The cargo/shipment was securely stowed in three (3) hatches of the ship.
The hatch openings were covered by hatchboards which were in turn
covered by two or double tarpaulins. The hatch covers were water tight
and, under the hatchboards were steel beams to give support.
4. The claim of the plaintiff that defendant violated the contract of carriage is
not supported by evidence. As to the damage to the tinplates, there is
unrebutted testimony of witness Vicente Angliongto that tinplates ‘sweat’
by themselves when packed even without being in contract (sic) with
water from outside especially when the weather is bad or raining.
CA:
Affirmed with modification reducing the demurrage from P88,000.00 to P44,000.00
and deleting the award of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.
SC: (only related to the topic)
Issue: WON MV Vlason I is a private carrier?
Held: YES. In the instant case, it is undisputed that VSI did not offer its services to
the general public. As found by the RTC, it carried passengers or goods only for
those it chose under a “special contract of charter party.”As correctly concluded by
the CA, the MV Vlasons I “was not a common but a private carrier.”Consequently,
the rights and obligations of VSI and NSC, including their respective liability for
damage to the cargo, are determined primarily by stipulations in their contract of
private carriage or charter party.
Extent of VSI’ s Responsibility and Liability Over NSC’ s Cargo
It is clear from the parties’ Contract of Voyage Charter Hire that VSI “shall not be
responsible for losses except on proven willful negligence of the officers of the
vessel.”
Burden of Proof
Ineluctably, the burden of proof was placed on NSC by the parties’ agreement.

CASE TITLE: FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION VS COURT OF APPEALS

KEYWORD: Pipe line operator
PONENTE: Martinez, J.
DOCTRINE:
The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not exclude it from the

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definition of a common carrier.
FACTS:
Petitioner applied for a mayor’s permit with the Office of the Mayor of Batangas
City. However, before the mayor’s permit could be issued, the respondent City
Treasurer required the petitioner to pay a local tax pursuant to the Local
Government Code. In order not to hamper its operations, petitioner paid the tax
under protest in the amount of P 239, 019.01 for the first quarter of 1993.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: The Company (FPIC) as a pipeline operator with a
government concession granted under the Petroleum Act is exempt from paying tax
on gross receipts under Section 133 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
Moreover, Transportation contractors are not included in the enumeration of contractors under Section 131,
Paragraph 9h) of the Local Government Code.
Therefore, the authority to impose tax ‘on contractors and other independent
contractors’ under Section 143, Paragraph 9e) of the Local Government Code does
not include the power to levy on transportation contractors.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Petitioner cannot be considered engaged in
transportation business, thus it cannot claim exemption under Section 133 (j) of the
Local Government Code. Pipelines are not included in the term “common carrier”
which refers solely to ordinary carriers such as trucks, trains, ships and the like. The
term “common carrier” under the said code pertains to the mode or manner by
which a product is delivered to its destination.
RULING: Petition is GRANTED.
1. TRIAL COURT: The trial court dismissed the complaint ruling that
plaintiff is either a contractor or other independent contractor. The
exemption granted under Sec. 133 (j) encompasses only commuters
with taxes. Plaintiff is not a common carrier, but a special carrier
extending its services and facilities to a single specific or “special
customer” under a “special contract”.
2. APPELATE COURT: The CA affirmed the Trial Court’s dismissal of
petitioner’s complaint.
3. SUPREME COURT: Petition is GRANTED. Article 1732 of the Civil Code
defines a "common carrier" as "any person, corporation, firm or
association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation,
offering their services to the public."
The test for determining whether a party is a common carrier of goods is:
1. He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others as a public
employment, and must hold himself out as ready to engage in the transportation of
goods for person generally as a business and not as a casual occupation;
2. He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to which his business is
confined;
3. He must undertake to carry by the method by which his business is
conducted and over his established roads; and
4. The transportation must be for hire.
Based on the above definitions and requirements, there is no doubt that petitioner
is a common carrier. It is engaged in the business of transporting or carrying
goods, i.e. petroleum products, for hire as a public employment. It undertakes to
carry for all persons indifferently, that is, to all persons who choose to employ its
services, and transports the goods by land and for compensation. The fact that
petitioner has a limited clientele does not exclude it from the definition of a
common carrier.

RAFlores 2K Transportation Law Atty. Pascasio

CASE TITLE: IRGINES CALVO doing business under the name and style TRANSORIENT
CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE
CO., INC. (formerly Allied Guarantee Ins. Co., Inc.) respondent.
KEYWORD: “common carrier” =“public service”
PONENTE: MENDOZA, J
DOCTRINE:
The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business
activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying
only as an ancillary activity . . . Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any
distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on
a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic
or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier
offering its services to the “general public,” i.e., the general community or
population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a
narrow segment of the general population. Article 1732 deliberately refrained from
making such distinctions.
FACTS:
A contract was entered into between Calvo and San Miguel Corporation (SMC) for
the transfer of certain cargoes from the port area in Manila to the warehouse of SMC. The
cargo was insured by UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. When the shipment arrived and unloaded
from the vessel, Calvo withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator and delivered the same to
SMC·s warehouse. When it was inspected, it was found out that some of the goods
were torn. UCPB, being the insurer, paid for the amount of the damages and as
subrogee thereafter, filed a suit against Calvo.Petitioner, on the other hand,
contends that it is a private carrier not required to observe such extraordinary
diligence in thevigilance over the goods. As customs broker, she does not indiscriminately hold her
services out to the public but only to selected parties.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
Petitioner contends that contrary to the findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, she is not a common carrier but a private carrier because, as a customs
broker and warehouseman, she does not indiscriminately hold her services out to
the public but only offers the same to select parties with whom she may contract in
the conduct of her business.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
Defendant, being a customs brother, warehouseman and at the same time a
common carrier is supposed [to] exercise [the] extraordinary diligence required by
law, hence the extraordinary responsibility lasts from the time the goods are
unconditionally placed in the possession of and received by the carrier for
transportation until the same are delivered actually or constructively by the carrier
to the consignee or to the person who has the right to receive the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Calvo is a common carrier liable for the damages for failure to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods
RULING:
1. TRIAL COURT
Ordered petitioner to pay respondent, as subrogee, the amount
of P93,112.00 with legal interest, representing the value of
damaged cargo handled by petitioner, 25% thereof as attorney’s
fees, and the cost of the suit.
2. APPELLATE COURT
Affirmed the decision of the trial court.
3. SUPREME COURT
Affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

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The contention has no merit. In De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, the Court
dismissed a similar contention and held the party to be a common carrier, thus -
The Civil Code defines "common carriers" in the following terms:
“Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering
their services to the public."

The law makes no distinction between a carrier offering

its services to the general community or solicits business only
from an arrow segment of the general population. Note that the
transportation of goods holds an integral part of Calvo’s business,
it cannot indeed be doubted that it is a common carrier.
So understood, the concept of “common carrier” under Article
1732 may be seen to coincide neatly with the notion of “public
service,” under the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No.
1416, as amended) which at least partially supplements the law
on common carriers set forth in the Civil Code.

CASE TITLE: FGU Insurance Corporation vs. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation
and Lambert Eroles
PONENTE:Vitug, J.
DOCTRINES:
Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or
air, for hire or compensation, offering their services to the public, whether to the
public in general or to a limited clientele in particular, but never on an exclusive
basis.
The true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods, providing
space for those who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee.
Given accepted standards, GPS scarcely falls within the term “common carrier"
FACTS:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver (30) units of
Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard one of its Isuzu truck, driven by Lambert
Eroles, from the plant site of Concepcion Industries, Inc., along South Superhighway
in Alabang, Metro Manila, to the Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City. While
the truck was traversing the north diversion road along McArthur highway in
Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified truck, causing it
to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.
ISSUE: WON GPS is common carrier
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to Concepcion
Industries, Inc., and sought reimbursement from GPS. Since the trucking company
failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a complaint for damages and breach of contract
of carriage against GPS and its driver Lambert Eroles.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
Respondents asserted that GPS was the exclusive hauler only of Concepcion
Industries, Inc., since 1988, and it was not so engaged in business as a common
carrier. Respondents further claimed that the cause of damage was purely
accidental
RULING:
CA decision REVERSED. GPS, being an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion

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Industries, Inc., rendering or offering its services to no other individual or entity,
cannot be considered a common carrier. (Define Common Carrier and cite True Test
of a Common Carrier).
GPS cannot escape from liability. GPS is liable culpa contractual. The mere proof of
existence of contract of carriage and the failure to comply therewith, justify, prima
facie, corresponding right of relief. As the driver of the insured was not shown to be
at fault, he cannot be ordered to pay FGU because the driver is not the party to the
contract of carriage.

CASE TITLE: PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC. and TAGUM
PLASTICS, INC., petitioners, vs. SWEET LINES, INC., DAVAO VETERANS ARRASTRE
AND PORT SERVICES, INC. and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
KEYWORD: Prescriptive period, 7,000 bags of low density polyethylene shipped
from Los Angeles to Manila
PONENTE: REGALADO, J.
DOCTRINE: “where the contract of shipment contains a reasonable requirement of
giving notice of loss of or injury to the goods, the giving of such notice is a condition
precedent to the action for loss or injury or the right to enforce the carrier's liability.
Such requirement is not an empty formalism. The fundamental reason or purpose
of such a stipulation is not to relieve the carrier from just liability, but reasonably to
inform it that the shipment has been damaged and that it is charged with liability
therefor, and to give it an opportunity to examine the nature and extent of the
injury. This protects the carrier by affording it an opportunity to make an
investigation of a claim while the matter is fresh and easily investigated so as to
safeguard itself from false and fraudulent claims.”
FACTS: A total 7,000 bags of low density polyethylene (600 bags of polyethylene
641 and 6,400 bags of polyethylene 647) were shipped from Baton Rouge, LA to
Manila on board SS VishvaYash, a vessel belonging to the Shipping Corporation of
India (SCI). From Manila, the cargoes were shipped to Davao on board MV Sweet
Love, a vessel owned by Sweet Lines. The consignee was Far East Bank with arrival
notice to Tagum Plastics, Inc., Tagum, Davao City. The cargoes were insured by Far
East Bank with the Philippine American General Insurance Co (Philamgen) and were
covered by bills of lading which contained the following stipulation in paragraph 5:
Claims for shortage, damage, must be made at the time of delivery to
consignee or agent, if container shows exterior signs of damage or
shortage. Claims for non-delivery, misdelivery, loss or damage must be
filed within 30 days from accrual. Suits arising from shortage, damage or
loss, non-delivery or misdelivery shall be instituted within 60 days from
date of accrual of right of action. Failure to file claims or institute judicial
proceedings as herein provided constitutes waiver of claim or right of
action. In no case shall carrier be liable for any delay, non-delivery,
misdelivery, loss of damage to cargo while cargo is not in actual custody of
carrier.
On May 15, 1977, the shipment(s) were discharged from the interisland
carrier into the custody of the consignee. A survey conducted on July 8, 1977
showed that of the shipment totalling 7,000 bags, originally contained in 175
pallets, only a total of 5,820 bags were delivered to the consignee in good order
condition, leaving a balance of 1,080 bags. Some of the 1,080 bags were either
MISSING OR DAMAGED beyond the point of being useful for the intended purpose.
Before trial, a compromise agreement was entered into between the
complainants and SCI and F.E. Zuellig, thus, only Sweet Lines and Davao Arrastre

RAFlores 2K Transportation Law Atty. Pascasio

remained as defendants.
ISSUE/S: 1. Whether or not there was a prescriptive period
2. Assuming the said prescriptive period exist and are thus legal
and valid, did the petitioners (PhilAmGen) act within the
prescriptive period
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Herein petitioners, by their own assertions that — In
connection with Pars. 14 and 15 of defendant Sweet Lines, Inc.'s Answer, plaintiffs
state that such agreements are what the Supreme Court considers as contracts of
adhesion (see Sweet Lines, Inc. vs. Hon. Bernardo Teves, et al., G.R. No. L-37750,
May 19, 1978) and, consequently, the provisions therein which are contrary to law
and public policy cannot be availed of by answering defendant as valid defenses.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: In the present case and under the aforestated
assumption that the time limit involved is a prescriptive period, respondent carrier
duly raised prescription as an affirmative defense in its answer setting forth
paragraph 5 of the pertinent bills of lading which comprised the stipulation thereon
by parties.
RULING:
1. TRIAL COURT
The Trial Court ruled in favor of Philamgen and Tagum Plastics.
2. APPELLATE COURT
The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground of prescription and denied the motion
for reconsideration.
3. SUPREME COURT

The decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed. In the case at bar,
there is neither any showing of compliance by petitioners with the requirement for
the filing of a notice of claim within the prescribed period nor any allegation to that
effect. It may then be said that while petitioners may possibly have a cause of
action, for failure to comply with the above condition precedent they lost whatever
right of action they may have in their favor or, token in another sense, that
remedial right or right to relief had prescribed. #QUINTOS

CASE TITLE: ASIA LIGHTERAGE AND SHIPPING INC. V. CA AND PRUDENTIAL

GUARANTEE AND ASSURANCE, INC.
KEYWORD/S: No fixed or known routes; no terminals; issues no tickets; typhoon
PONENTE: PUNO, J.

DOCTRINE:
Petitioner is a common carrier whether its carrying of goods is done on an irregular
rather than scheduled manner, and with an only limited clientele. A common carrier
need not have fixed and publicly known routes. Neither does it have to maintain
terminals or issue tickets.

FACTS:
In 1990, 3,150 metric tons of Better Western White Wheat in bulk was shipped by
Marubeni American Corporation on board the vessel M/V NEO CYMBIDIUM V-26
for delivery to the consignee, General Milling Corporation in Manila. Such was
insured by Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. against loss or damage. When
the vessel arrived in Manila, the cargo was transferred to the custody of the
petitioner, which was contracted by the consignee as carrier to deliver the cargo to
its warehouse in Pasig. Thereafter, 900 metric tons of the shipment was loaded on
barge for delivery to consignee but the transport of cargo was suspended due to a
warning of an incoming typhoon. Later, the petitioner proceeded to pull the barge

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to Engineering Island off Baseco to seek shelter from the typhoon. A few days after,
the barge developed a list because of a hole it sustained after hitting an unseen
protuberance underneath the water and thereafter, it sank, resulting to the total
loss of the remaining cargoes not recovered.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
Asia Lighterage contends that it is not a common carrier but a private carrier.
Allegedly, it has no fixed and publicly known route, maintains no terminals, and
issues no tickets. It points out that it is not obliged to carry indiscriminately for any
person. It is not bound to carry goods unless it consents. In short, it does not hold
out its services to the general public.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
Petitioner is a common carrier, thus, it is liable to private respondent for the
former’s failure to exercise extra ordinary diligence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is a common carrier- YES.
RULING: PETITION IS DENIED.
TC: It ruled in favor of Prudential, ordering petitioner to pay the former the
amount of indemnity, attorney’s fees and cost of the suit.
CA: It affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification in the sense that the
salvage value of P201,379.75 shall be deducted from the amount of
P4,104,654.22.
SC: The Supreme Court ruled for Prudential. It declared that the definition of
common carriers in Article 1732 of the Civil Code makes no distinction
between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or
goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity.
It also did not distinguish between a person or enterprise offering
transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering
such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Further, we
ruled that Article 1732 does not distinguish between a carrier offering its
services to the general public, and one who offers services or solicits
business only from a narrow segment of the general population. In the
case at bar, the principal business of the petitioner is that of lighterage and
drayage and it offers its barges to the public for carrying or transporting
goods by water for compensation. Petitioner is clearly a common carrier.

CASE TITLE: Bascos v. Court of Appeals

KEYWORD: hauling contract
PONENTE:Campos, JR., J.
DOCTRINE:

Common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance

over the goods transported by them
FACTS:
Rodolfo Cipriano, representing CIPTRADE, entered into a hauling contract with
Jibfair Shipping Agency Corporation whereby the former bound itself to haul the
latter’s 2000m/tons of soya bean meal from Manila to Calamba. CIPTRADE
subcontracted with petitioner EstrellitaBascos to transport and deliver the 400
sacks of soya beans. Petitioner failed to deliver the cargo, and as a consequence,
Cipriano paid Jibfair the amount of goods lost in accordance with their contract.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
Petitioner denied that there was no contract of carriage since CIPTRADE leased her
cargo truck, and that the hijacking was a force majeure. The trial court ruled against

RAFlores 2K Transportation Law Atty. Pascasio

petitioner.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
Cipriano demanded reimbursement from petitioner but the latter refused to pay.
Cipriano filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage.
ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner is a common carrier.
RULING:
TRIAL COURT:
The trial court ruled against petitioner and granted the writ of preliminary
attachment for breach of contract of carriage.
CA:
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trail court, holding that petitioner
was a common carrier, found that she admitted in her answer that she did business
under the name A.M. Bascos Trucking and that said admission dispensed with the
presentation by private respondent, Rodolfo Cipriano, of proofs that petitioner was
a common carrier.
SC:
Yes. Petitioner is a common carrier. SC ruled if favor of respondent.
(1) Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as "(a) person,
corporation or firm, or association engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for compensation,
offering their services to the public." The test to determine a common carrier is
"whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the carrier
which he has held out to the general public as his occupation rather than the
quantity or extent of the business transacted." In this case, petitioner herself has
made the admission that she was in the trucking business, offering her trucks to
those with cargo to move. Judicial admissions are conclusive and no evidence is
required to prove the same.
(2) Common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods transported by them. Accordingly, they are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods are lost, destroyed or
deteriorated. There are very few instances when the presumption of negligence
does not attach and these instances are enumerated in Article 1734. In those cases
where the presumption is applied, the common carrier must prove that it exercised
extraordinary diligence in order to overcome the presumption. The presumption of
negligence was raised against petitioner. It was petitioner's burden to overcome it.
Thus, contrary to her assertion, private respondent need not introduce any
evidence to prove her negligence. Her own failure to adduce sufficient

CASE TITLE: Estela L. Crisostomo vs. Court of Appeals

PONENTE: Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:
Crisostomo contracted the services of Caravan Travel and Tours Intl. to arrange and
facilitate her booking and accommodation in a tour dubbed "Jewels of Europe",
where she was given a discount by reason that the company's ticketing manager,
MeriamMenor, was her niece. Thereafter, Menor went to her aunt's house to
deliver the latter's travel documents and plane tickets, instructing her to be at the
airport on Saturday, June 15, 1992, two days after the delivery of the tickets.
Without checking her tickets, Crisostomo went to the airport on Saturday, only to
find out that the flight she was supposed to take had already departed the previous
day, which was the departure date of her ticket. Upon complaining to Menor, the
latter convinced Crisostomo to take another tour - the "British Pageant"- which
reuired the payment of an additional S300. Upon her return from her European
tour, Crisostomo demanded from respondent the reimbursement of the difference

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between the sum for the "Jewels of Europe" tour and the amount she owed
respondent for the "British Pageant" tour (P61,421.70), to which the respondent
company claimed as non-refundable. Consequently, she filed a complaint for breach
of contract of carriage and damages against the respondent.
Petitioner's Contention: Crisostomo alleged that her failure to join the original tour
was due to Menor'sfaiure to indicate the departure date on the ticket; that
respondent was negigent in informing her of the flight schedule; and that the British
Pageant tour was merely a substitute to the Jewels of Europe tour, entitling her to
rimbursement. It contends that as a common carrier, it should have exercised
extraordinary diligence in informing her of the flight's details.
Respondent's Contention: the failure of Crisostomo to join the first tour was
because of her own doing, because she did not bother to read or confirm her flight
schedule as printed on the ticket. It was correct in its contention that it exercised
the proper standard of care when it provided her with the opportunity to confirm
the schedule before the date of the flight. Lastly, it maintained that the British
Pageant tour was not a substitute for the tour which Crisostomo missed, not
entitling the latter to be reimbursed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Caravan did not observe the standard of care required
of a common carrier when it informed the petitioner wrongly of the flight schedule?
RULING:
TRIAL COURT:
Caravan travels was negligent in erroneously advising petitioner of Crisostomo's
departure date.
CA:
Reversed RTC : held that Crisostomo was more negligent, being a well-traveled
person and a lawyer, she should have known better than to simply rely on what her
niece told her.
SC:
Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
No. A common carrier is defined under Article 1732 of the Civil Code as persons,
corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for compensation,
affecting their services to the public. It is obvious from the above definition that
respondent is not an entity engaged in the business of transporting either
passengers or goods and is therefore, neither a private nor a common carrier.
Respondent did not undertake to transport petitioner from one place to another
since its covenant with its customers is simply to make travel arrangements in their
behalf. Respondent’s services as a travel agency include procuring tickets and
facilitating travel permits or visas as well as booking customers for tours. It is in this sense that the contract
between the parties in this case was an ordinary one for
services and not one of carriage.
Hence, the standard of care required of respondent is that of a good father of a
family under Article 1173 of the Civil Code. This connotes reasonable care
consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent person would have observed when
confronted with a similar situation.It is clear that respondent performed its
prestation under the contract as well as everything else that was essential to book
petitioner for the tour. Had petitioner exercised due diligence in the conduct of her
affairs, there would have been no reason for her to miss the flight. Needless to say,
after the travel papers were delivered to petitioners, it became incumbent upon
her to take ordinary care of her concerns. This undoubtedly would require that she
at least read the documents in order to assure herself of the important details
regarding the trip.

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CASE TITLE: Fisher vs. Yangco Steamship Company
KEYWORD: dynamite, explosives
PONENTE: Justice Carson
DOCTRINE:
CONTROL AND REGULATION OF CARRIERS,— The nature of the business of a
common carrier as a public employment is such that it is clearly within the power of
the state to impose such just and reasonable regulations thereon in the interest of
the public as the legislator may deem proper. Of course such regulations must not
have the effect of depriving an owner of his property without due course of law,
nor of confiscating or appropriating private property without just compensation,
nor of limiting or prescribing irrevocably vested rights or privileges lawfully acquired
under a charter or franchise. But aside from such constitutional limitations, the
determination of the nature and extent of the regulations, which should be
prescribed, rests in the hands of the legislator.
SHORT FACTS:
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.
The parties to the case are –
- FC Fisher (stockholder of YangcoStreamship Company)
- Yangco Steamship Company
- J.S. Stanley (Acting Collector of Customs of the Philippines)
On or about June 10, 1912 the directors of Yangco Steamship Company adopted a
resolution (ratified and affirmed by the shareholders of the company) that declares
and provides that goods that are to be carried by their vessels shall not include
dynamite, powder or other explosives. J.S Stanley however demanded and required
the company to accept and carry such explosives for carriage. Notwithstanding the
demands of Fisher, the manager, agents and servants of the company decline and
refuse to cease the carriage of such explosives.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS:
1. That the Acting Collector of Customs erroneously construes the provisions of Act
No. 98 in holding that they require the company to accept such explosives for
carriage notwithstanding the above mentioned resolution of the directors and
stockholders of the company, and
2. That if the Act does in fact require the company to carry such explosives it is to
that extent unconstitutional and void
3. That a common carrier in the Philippine Islands -may decline to accept for
carriage any shipment of' merchandise of a class which it expressly or impliedly
declines to accept from all shippers alike, because, as he contends "the duty of a
common carrier to carry for all who offer arises from the public profession he has
made, and is limited by it.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS:
1. That should the company decline to accept such explosives for carriage, the
respondent Attorney- General of the Philippine Islands and the respondent
prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila intend to institute proceedings under the
penal provisions of Act No. 98 of the Philippine Commission against the company,
its managers, agents and servants, to enforce the requirements of the Acting
Collector of Customs as to the acceptance of such explosives for carriage
2. That Sec. 3 of Act No. 98 impose an imperative duty on all common carriers to
accept for carriage, and to carry all and any kind of freight which may be offered for
carriage without regard to the facilities which they may have at their disposal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the refusal of the owners and officers of a steam vessel to accept
for carriage "dynamite, powder or other explosives" [from any and all shippers who
may offer such explosives for carriage] can be held to be a lawful act without regard

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to any question as to the conditions under which such explosives are offered for
carriage, or as to the suitableness of the vessel for the transportation of such
explosives, or as to the possibility that the refusal to accept such articles of
commerce in a particular case may have the effect of subjecting any person or
locality or the traffic in such explosives to an undue, unreasonable or unnecessary
prejudice or discrimination.
RULING:
NO. The nature of the business of a common carrier as a public employment is such
that it is clearly within the power of the state to impose such just and reasonable
regulations thereon in the interest of the public, as the legislator may deem proper.

CASE TITLE: LOADSTAR SHIPPING CO., INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE MANILA
INSURANCE CO., INC. KEYWORD: M/V Cherokee
PONENTE:Davide, Jr.
DOCTRINE:
A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability
under the Civil Code provisions governing common carriers. That liability arises the
moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier, without regard to whether or
not such carrier has also complied with the requirements of the applicable
regulatory statute and implementing regulations and has been granted a certificate
of public convenience or other franchise.
SHORT FACTS:
On 19 November 1984, LOADSTAR received on board its M/V “Cherokee” the
following goods for shipment: a) 705 bales of lawanit hardwood; b) 27 boxes and
crates of tilewood assemblies and others; and c) 49 bundles of mouldings R & W (3)
ApitongBolidenized. The goods, amounting to P6,067,178, were insured for the
same amount with Manila Insurance Company against various risks including
“TOTAL LOSS BY TOTAL LOSS OF THE VESSEL.” On 20 November 1984, on its way to
Manila from the port of Nasipit, Agusandel Norte, the vessel, along with its cargo,
sank off Limasawa Island. As a result of the total loss of its shipment, the consignee
made a claim with LOADSTAR which, however, ignored the same. As the insurer,
MIC paid P6,075,000 to the insured in full settlement of its claim, and the latter
executed a subrogation receipt therefor.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
LOADSTAR denied any liability for the loss of the shipper’s goods and claimed that
the sinking of its vessel was due to force majeure and that it is not considered a
common carrier due to the lack of a certificate of public convenience. LOADSTAR
also maintains that the vessel was seaworthy and was duly inspected by the
maritime safety engineers of the Philippine Coast Guard, who certified that the ship
was fit to undertake a voyage.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION:
MIC claims that LOADSTAR was liable, notwithstanding that the loss of the cargo
was due to force majeure, because the same concurred with LOADSTAR’s fault or
negligence. Also, the “limited liability” theory is not applicable in the case at bar
because LOADSTAR was at fault or negligent, and because it failed to maintain a
seaworthy vessel. Authorizing the voyage notwithstanding its knowledge of a
typhoon is tantamount to negligence.
RULING: The SC held that LOADSTAR is a common carrier. It is not necessary that
the carrier be issued a certificate of public convenience, and this public character is
not altered by the fact that the carriage of the goods in question was periodic,
occasional, episodic or unscheduled and that the doctrine of limited liability does
not apply where there was negligence on the part of the vessel owner or agent.
LOADSTAR was at fault or negligent in not maintaining a seaworthy vessel and in

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having allowed its vessel to sail despite knowledge of an approaching typhoon.

CASE TITLE: Home Insurance Co. vs. American Steamship Agencies, Inc.
KEYWORD: Shortage on Peruvian fish meal
PONENTE:Bengzon, J.P., J.
DOCTRINE: As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner of the vessel
from liability for the negligence of its agent is not against public policy, and is
deemed valid.
FACTS:
The case involves a charter party contract which is one of affreightment over the
whole vessel;and section 2, paragraph 2 of said charter provides that the owner is
liable for loss or damage to the goods caused by the personal act or default of the
owner or its manager, but however exempts the owner of the vessel from any loss

or damage or delay arising from any other source even from the neglect or fault of
the captain or crew. Here, 21,740 jute bags of Peruvian fish meal through SS
Crowborough were covered by clean bills of lading, consigned to San Miguel
Brewery, insured by plaintiff-appellee Home Insurance Company, and were
discharged into the lighters of defendant Luzon Stevedoring Company upon its
arrival in Manila. When the cargo was delivered to consignee San Miguel Brewery,
Inc. there were shortages amounting to P12,033.85; and consequently plaintiffappellee
Home Insurance Company, as subrogee to consignee San Miguel, filed a
complaint against defendant Luzon Stevedoring Corporation and defendantappellant
American Steamship Agencies.
Defendant Luzon Stevedoring Corporation alleged that it delivered with
due diligence the goods in the same quantity and quality that it had received the
same from the carrier.
Defendant-appellant American Steamship denied liability by alleging that
under the provisions of the Charter party referred to in the bills of lading, the
charterer, not the shipowner, was responsible for any loss or damage of the cargo.
The Court of First Instance absolved defendant Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation, having found the latter to have merely delivered what it received from
the carrier in the same condition and quality. However, it ordered defendantappellant
American Steamship Agencies to pay plaintiff since the stipulation in the
charter party contract exempting the owner of the vessel from liability is against
public policy; and that in case of loss, destruction or deterioration of goods,
common carriers are presumed at fault or negligent. Subsequently, defendantappellant
American Steamship appealed directly to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the stipulation in the charter party of the owner's non-liability is
valid so as to absolve the defendant-appellant American Steamship Agencies from
liability for loss.
RULING:
Yes, the stipulation is valid. A common carrier undertaking to carry a special cargo
or chartered to a special person only, becomes a private carrier; and the Civil Code
provisions on common carriers should not be applied where the carrier is a private
carrier. And as stated in the charter party, recovery cannot be had, for loss or
damage to the cargo, against the shipowners, unless the same is due to personal
acts or negligence of said owner or its manager, as distinguished from its other
agents or employees. In this case, no such personal act or negligence has been
proved.
Petition denied. The judgment appealed from is reversed and defendant-appellant
American Steamship Agencies is absolved from liability to plaintiff-appellee Home

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Insurance Company.

Case Title: Epitancio San Pablo vs. Pantranco South Express Inc
Keyword: black double
Ponente:GANCAYCO, J
Doctrine: Ferry implies the crossing of open seas, thus the service is not merely a
ferry service but is actually a coastwise shipping which requires the application of separate CPC.

Facts: PANTRANCO is engaged in the land transportation business with PUB service
for passengers and freight and various certificates for public conveniences CPC to
operate passenger buses from Metro Manila to Bicol Region and Eastern Samar.
PANTRANCO twrote to Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) requesting authority
to lease/purchase a vessel named M/V "Black Double" "to be used for its project to
operate a ferryboat service from Matnog, Sorsogon and Allen, Samar that will
provide service to company buses and freight trucks that have to cross San
Bernardo Strait. Despite the refusal or the Marina to give due course to the request,
Pantranco nevertheless acquired the MV Double . It wrote the Chairman of the
Board of Transportation (BOT) that it proposes to operate a ferry service to carry its
passenger buses and freight trucks between Allen and Matnog in connection with
its trips to Tacloban City.Without awaiting action on its request PANTRANCO started
to operate said ferry service. Acting Chairman Jose C. Campos, Jr. of BOT ordered
PANTRANCO not to operate its vessel until the application for hearing. BOT
rendered its decision holding that the ferry boat service is part of its CPC to operate
from Pasay to Samar/Leyte by amending PANTRANCO's CPC. Epitacio San Pablo and
Cardinal Shipping Corporation who are franchise holders of the ferry service in this
area interposed their opposition.
RC: It claims that it can operate a ferry service in connection with its franchise for
bus operation in the highway from Pasay City to Tacloban City "for the purpose of
continuing the highway, which is interrupted by a small body of water, the said
proposed ferry operation is merely a necessary and incidental service to its main
service and obligation of transporting its passengers from Pasay City to Tacloban
City. Such being the case, there is no need to obtain a separate certificate for public
convenience to operate a ferry service between Allen and Matnog to cater
exclusively to its passenger buses and freight trucks.
PC: They claim they adequately service the PANTRANCO by ferrying its buses, trucks
and passengers.
Issue: Whether or not Pantranco is authorized to operate a ferry service or
coastwise or interisland shipping service along its authorized route as an incident to
its franchise without the need of filing a separate application for the sam
Ruling:
No. The term "ferry" implied the continuation by means of boats, barges, or rafts,
of a highway or the connection of highways located on the opposite banks of a
stream or other body of water. The term necessarily implies transportation for a
short distance, almost invariably between two points, which is unrelated to other
transportation while steamboat or motorboat service is between the different
islands, involving more or less great distance and over more or less turbulent and
dangerous waters of the open sea, to be coastwise or inter-island service. The
conveyance of passengers, trucks and cargo from Matnog to Allen is certainly not a
ferry boat service but a coastwise or interisland shipping service. Under no
circumstance can the sea between Matnog and Allen be considered a continuation
of the highway. While a ferry boat service has been considered as a continuation of
the highway when crossing rivers or even lakes, which are small body of waters -

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separating the land, however, when as in this case the two terminals, Matnog and
Allen are separated by an open sea it can not be considered as a continuation of the
highway.
Respondent PANTRANCO should secure a separate CPC for the operation of an
interisland or coastwise shipping service in accordance with the provisions of law.
Its CPC as a bus transportation cannot be merely amended to include this water
service under the guise that it is a mere private ferry service. #SANTOS, A.

TITLE: NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION VS CA

KEYWORD: Common Carrier; Private Carrier; Burden of Proof
PONENTE:PANGANIBAN, J.
DOCTRINE:
The true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods, provided it
has space, for all who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee.
A carrier which does not qualify under the above test is deemed a private carrier.
“Generally, private carriage is undertaken by special agreement and the carrier
does not hold himself out to carry goods for the general public. The most typical,
although not the only form of private carriage, is the charter party, a maritime
contract by which the charterer, a party other than the shipowner, obtains the use
and service of all or some part of a ship for a period of time or a voyage or
voyages.”
FACTS:
The MV Vlasons I is a vessel which renders tramping service and does not transport
cargo or shipment for the general public. Its services are available only to specific
persons who enter into a special contract of charter party with its owner.
Vlasons Shipping, Inc., owner of MV Vlasons I, entered into a contract of
affreightment or contract of voyage charter hire with National Steel Corporation.
On August 6, 7 and 8, 1974, the MV ‘VLASONS I’ loaded at the pier at Iligan City, the
NSC’s shipment of 1,677 skids of tinplatesand 92 packages of hot rolled sheets for
carriage to Manila. The shipment was placed in the three (3) hatches of the ship.
The vessel arrived with the cargo at Pier 12, North Harbor, Manila, on August 12,
1974. The following day, when the vessel’s three hatches containing the shipment
were opened by NSC’s agents, nearly all the skids of tinplates and hot rolled sheets
were allegedly found to be wet and rusty. The cargo was discharged and unloaded
by stevedores hired by the Charterer.
NSC filed with VSI its claim for damages suffered. On October 3, 1974, plaintiff
formally demanded payment of said claim but defendant VSI refused and failed to
pay. Plaintiff filed its complaint against defendant on April 21, 1976 in the CFI, Rizal.
PETITIONER’S (NSC) CONTENTION:
It sustained losses as a result of
1. the act, neglect and default of the master and crew in the
management of the vessel as well as
2. the want of due diligence on the part of the defendant
a. to make the vessel seaworthy and
b. to make the holds and all other parts of the vessel in which the
cargo was carried, fit and safe for its reception, carriage and
preservation—all in violation of defendant’s undertaking under their Contract of Voyage
Charter Hire.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S (VSI) CONTENTION:
1. MV ‘VLASONS I’ was seaworthy in all respects for the carriage of plaintiff’s
cargo;
2. Said vessel was not a ‘common carrier’ inasmuch as she was under voyage
charter contract with NSC as charterer under the charter party;

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3. In the course of the voyage from Iligan City to Manila, the MV ‘VLASONS I’
encountered very rough seas, strong winds and adverse weather
condition, causing strong winds and big waves to continuously pound
against the vessel and seawater to overflow on its deck and hatch covers,
which may be considered as force majeure;
4. Under the Contract of Voyage Charter Hire, defendant shall not be
responsible for losses/damages except on proven willful negligence of the
officers of the vessel,
a. the officers of said MV ‘VLASONS I’ exercised due diligence and
proper seamanship and were not willfully negligent
RULING:
TRIAL COURT:
In favor of VSI, NSC was ordered to pay the unpaid freight due and demurrage for
the delay in payment. (italized related to the topic in Transpo)
1. The MV ‘VLASONS I’ is a vessel of Philippine registry engaged in the
tramping service and is available for hire only under special contracts of
charter party as in this particular case.
2. The evidence shows that the MV ‘VLASONS I’ was seaworthy and properly
manned, equipped and supplied when it undertook the voyage. It had all
the required certificates of seaworthiness.
3. The cargo/shipment was securely stowed in three (3) hatches of the ship.
The hatch openings were covered by hatchboards which were in turn
covered by two or double tarpaulins. The hatch covers were water tight
and, under the hatchboards were steel beams to give support.
4. The claim of the plaintiff that defendant violated the contract of carriage is
not supported by evidence. As to the damage to the tinplates, there is
unrebutted testimony of witness Vicente Angliongto that tinplates ‘sweat’
by themselves when packed even without being in contract (sic) with
water from outside especially when the weather is bad or raining.
CA:
Affirmed with modification reducing the demurrage from P88,000.00 to P44,000.00
and deleting the award of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.
SC: (only related to the topic)
Issue: WON MV Vlason I is a private carrier?
Held: YES. In the instant case, it is undisputed that VSI did not offer its services to
the general public. As found by the RTC, it carried passengers or goods only for
those it chose under a “special contract of charter party.”As correctly concluded by
the CA, the MV Vlasons I “was not a common but a private carrier.”Consequently,
the rights and obligations of VSI and NSC, including their respective liability for
damage to the cargo, are determined primarily by stipulations in their contract of
private carriage or charter party.
Extent of VSI’ s Responsibility and Liability Over NSC’ s Cargo
It is clear from the parties’ Contract of Voyage Charter Hire that VSI “shall not be
responsible for losses except on proven willful negligence of the officers of the
vessel.”
Burden of Proof
Ineluctably, the burden of proof was placed on NSC by the parties’ agreement.

CASE TITLE: Planters Products, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

KEYWORDS: Charter-Party; UREA FERTILIZER

DOCTRINE: A public carrier shall remain as such, notwithstanding the charter of the
whole or portion of a vessel by one or more persons, provided the charter is limited
to the ship only, as in the case of a time-charter or voyage-charter. It is only when

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the charter includes both the vessel and its crew, as in a bareboat or demise that a
common carrier becomes private, at least insofar as the particular voyage covering
the charter-party is concerned. Indubitably, a shipowner in a time or voyage charter
retains possession and control of the ship, although her holds may, for the moment,
be the property of the charterer.
FACTS: Planters Products, Inc. (PPI), purchased from Mitsubishi International
Corporation (MITSUBISHI) of New York, U.S.A., Urea 46% fertilizer which the latter
shipped in bulk aboard the cargo vessel M/V “Sun Plum” owned by private
respondent Kyosei Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha (KKKK) from Alaska, U.S.A., to Port Point,
San Fernando, La Union, Philippines.
Prior to its voyage, a time charter-party on the vessel M/V “Sun Plum” pursuant to
the Uniform General Charterwas entered into between Mitsubishi as
shipper/charterer and KKKK as shipowner.
Before loading the fertilizer aboard the vessel, four (4) of herholdswere all
presumably inspected by the charterer’s representative and found fit to take a load
of urea in bulk. “The vessel’s hold to be properly swept, cleaned and dried at the
vessel’s expense and the vessel to be presented clean for use in bulk to the
satisfaction of the inspector before daytime commences.”
After the Urea fertilizer was loaded in bulk by stevedores hired by and under the
supervision of the shipper, the steel hatches were closed with heavy iron lids,
covered with three (3) layers of tarpaulin, then tied with steel bonds. The hatches
remained closed and tightly sealed throughout the entire voyage.
Upon arrival of the vessel at her port of call, the steel pontoon hatches were
opened with the use of the vessel’s boom. The hatches remained open throughout
the duration of the discharge.
It took eleven (11) days for PPI to unload the cargo. The survey report submitted by
CSCI (Cargo SuperintendentsCompany Inc.) to the consignee (PPI) dated 19 July
1974 revealed a shortage in the approximating 18 M/T was contaminated with dirt.
ISSUE: WON the charter party changed the character of the public carrier to a
private carrier?
LOWER COURT: IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER. Lower Court held the carrier liable. A
common carrier is presumed negligent in case of loss or damage of the goods it
contracts to transport
CA: REVERSED. The cargo vessel M/V “Sun Plum” owned by private respondent
KKKK was a private carrier and not a common carrier by reason of the time charterparty.
SC: NO. A “charter-party” is defined as a contract by which an entireship, or some
principal part thereof, is let by the owner toanother person for a specified time or
use. A contract ofaffreightment by which the owner of a ship or other vessel lets
the whole or a part of her to a merchant or other person for the conveyance of
goods, on a particular voyage, in consideration of the payment of freight.
Charter parties are of two types: (a) contract of affreightment which involves the
use of shipping space on vessels leased by the owner in part or as a whole, to carry
goods for others; and, (b) charter by demise or bareboat charter, by the terms of
which the whole vessel is let to the charterer with a transfer to him of its entire
command and possession and consequent control over its navigation, including the
master and the crew, who are his servants.
Contract of affreightment may either be time charter, wherein the vessel is leased
to the charterer for a fixed period of time, or voyage charter, wherein the ship is
leased for a single voyage.In both cases, the charter-party provides for the hire of
the vessel only, either for a determinate period of time or for a single or
consecutive voyage, the shipowner to supply the ship’s stores, pay for the wages of
the master and the crew, and defray the expenses for the maintenance of the ship.
When petitioner chartered the vessel M/V “Sun Plum”, the ship captain, its officers

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and compliment were under the employ of the shipowner and therefore continued
to be under its direct supervision and control. Hardly then can we charge the
charterer, a stranger to the crew and to the ship, with the duty of caring for his
cargo when the charterer did not have any control of the means in doing so. This is
evident in the present case considering that the steering of the ship, the manning of
the decks, the determination of the course of the voyage and other technical
incidents of maritime navigation were all consigned to the officers and crew who
were screened, chosen and hired by the shipowner.

It is therefore imperative that a public carrier shall remain as such, notwithstanding

the charter of the whole or portion of a vessel by one or more persons, provided
the charter is limited to the ship only, as in the case of a time-charter or voyagecharter.
HOWEVER, the presumption of negligence on the part of the respondent carrier has
been efficaciously overcome by the showing of extraordinary zeal and assiduity
exercised by the carrier in the care of the cargo. The period during which private
respondent was to observe the degree of diligence required of it as a public carrier
began from the time the cargo was unconditionally placed in its charge after the
vessel’s holds were duly inspected and passed scrutiny by the shipper, up to and
until the vessel reached its destination and its hull was re-examined by the
consignee, but prior to unloading. #ENCARNACION

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