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Until upto a couple of years back, the news that Indian companies
having acquired American-European entities was very rare. However,
this scenario has taken a sudden U turn. Nowadays, news of Indian
Companies acquiring a foreign business is more common than other
way round.
Overseas deals
While the INDATA survey is restricted to corporate finance activity
involving Indian targets, the volume of overseas acquisitions by Indian
companies can no longer be ignored. Indian companies continued to
acquire abroad continued in H1 2005. There were 43 overseas
acquisitions by Indian acquirers in H1 2005 compared to 60 in the
whole of 2004 (Table 2).
Culture Shock.
Mergers are like marriages. The right partner must be selected after an
honest and meaningful courtship. There must be communication,
flexibility and mutual respect.
Employees begin to divert time and energy to wonder how their career,
power and prestige will be impacted. Gossip within the organization
competes with production and then the competition can gain a
foothold.
Funds are an obvious requirement for would-be buyers. Raising them may not be
a problem for multinationals able to tap resources at home, but for local companies,
finance is likely to be the single biggest obstacle to an acquisition. Financial institution in
some Asian markets are banned from leading for takeovers, and debt markets are small
and illiquid, deterring investors who fear that they might not be able to sell their holdings
at a later date. The credit squeezes and the depressed state of many Asian equity markets
have only made an already difficult situation worse. Funds apart, a successful Mergers &
Acquisition growth strategy must be supported by three capabilities: deep local networks,
the abilities to manage uncertainty, and the skill to distinguish worthwhile targets.
Companies that rush in without them are likely to stumble.
TATA GROUP THE EPITOME OF ACQUISITIONISTS
One Indian group epitomizes the current trend: The Tatas have been
the most aggressive and successful Indian group in acquiring prized
overseas assets.
IMPACT ON INDIA
This Tata buy-out of these two brands is much more than mere
acquisition of a company. It is a strong positive message that
Tata is sending across the globe about Indian companies and
India itself !
For all the billions that will be going out of the country, much more is
expected to come
Into India through these acquisitions.
SUCCESS ASSURED?
The Tatas have shown that they are cut from a different cloth. None of
the factors above
can be said to apply to the Tatas; their intentions are clear: Live, Let
Live, Grow & Flourish With Tatas.
CASE STUDY 1
GlaxoSmithKline, India
The merger in India brings together two strong companies to create a formidable
presence in the domestic market with a market share of about 7 per cent.
With this merger, GlaxoSmithKline has increased its reach significantly in India.
With a field force of over 2,000 employees and more than 5,000 stockiest, the company’s
products are available across the country. The enhanced basket of products of
GlaxoSmithKline, India will help serve patients better by strengthening the hands of
doctors by offering superior treatment and healthcare solutions.
GlaxoSmithKline, Worldwide
GlaxoSmithKline plc is the world’s leading research-based pharmaceutical and
healthcare company. With an R&D budget of over ₤2.3 billion (Rs.16, 130 crores),
GlaxoSmithKline has a powerful research and development capability, encompassing the
application of genetics, genomics, combinatorial chemistry and other leading edge
technologies.
The merger that was announced on march 7, 2000 between Deutsche Bank and
Dresdner Bank, Germany’s largest and the third largest bank respectively was considered
as Germany’s response to increasingly tough competition markets.
The merger was to create the most powerful banking group in the world with the
balance sheet total of nearly 2.5 trillion marks and a stock market value around 150
billion marks. This would put the merged bank for ahead of the second largest banking
group, U.S. based citigroup, with a balance sheet total amounting to 1.2 trillion marks
and also in front of the planned Japanese book mergers of Sumitomo and Sukura Bank
with 1.7 trillion marks as the balance sheet total.
The new banking group intended to spin off its retail banking which was not
making much profit in both the banks and costly, extensive network of bank branches
associated with it.
The merged bank was to retain the name Deutsche Bank but adopted the Dresdner
Bank’s green corporate color in its logo. The future core business lines of the new
merged Bank included investment Banking, asset management, where the new banking
group was hoped to outside the traditionally dominant Swiss Bank, Security and loan
banking and finally financially corporate clients ranging from major industrial
corporation to the mid-scale companies.
With this kind of merger, the new bank would have reached the no.1 position of
the US and create new dimensions of aggressiveness in the international mergers.
But barely 2 months after announcing their agreement to form the largest bank in the
world, negotiations for a merger between Deutsche and Dresdner Bank failed on April 5,
2000.
The main issue of the failure was Dresdner Bank’s investment arm, Kleinwort
Benson, which the executive committee of the bank did not want to relinquish under any
circumstances.
In the preliminary negotiations it had been agreed that Kleinwort Benson would
be integrated into the merged bank. But from the outset these considerations encountered
resistance from the asset management division, which was Deutsche Bank’s investment
arm.
It has been a hectic year at London-based Standard Chartered Bank, going by its
acquisition spree across the Asia-Pacific region. At the helm of affairs, globally, is Rana
Talwar, group CEO. The quintessential general, he knew what he was up against when
he propounded his 'emerging stronger' strategy - of growth through consolidation of
emerging markets - for the turn of the Millennium: loads of scepticism. The central issue:
Stan Chart’s August 2000 acquisition of ANZ Grindlays Bank, for $1.3 billion.
Everyone knows that acquisition is the easy part, merging operations is not. And
recent history has shown that banking mergers and acquisitions (MERGERS &
ACQUISITION’s), in particular, are not as simple to execute as unifying balance sheets.
Can Stan Chart’s proposed merger with ANZ Grindlays be any different?
The '1' refers to the new entity, which will be India's No 1 foreign bank once the
integration is completed. This should take around 18 months; till then, ANZ Grindlays
will exist separately as Standard Chartered Grindlays (SCG). The '2' and '3' are Citibank
and Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp (HSBC), India's second and third largest
foreign banks, respectively.
That makes the new entity the world's biggest 'emerging markets' bank. By way of
strengths, it will have treasury operations that will probably go unchallenged as the
country's most sophisticated. Best of all, it will be a dynamic bank. Thanks to pre-merger
initiatives taken by both banks, it could per- haps boast of the country's fastest growing
retail-banking business.
StanChart knows it mustn't let its energy dissipate. It has been growing at a claimed
annual rate of 25 per cent in the last two years, well over the industry average of below
10 per cent. But maintaining this pace won't prove easy, with Citibank and HSBC just
waiting to snip at it. The ANZ Grindlays acquisition had happened just before that,
though the process started in early 1999, at Stan Chart’s headquarters in London. At first,
it was just talk of a strategic tie-up with ANZ Grindlays, which had the same colonial
British antecedents.
But this plan was abandoned when it became evident that all decision-making
would vacillate between Melbourne and London, where the two are headquartered. By
December, ANZ had expressed a willingness to sell out, and StanChart initiated the due-
diligence proceedings. It wasn't until March that a few senior Indian bank executives
were let into the secret. Now, it's time to get going. A new vehicle, navigators in place,
engines revving and map charted, the road ahead is challenging and full of promise. To
steer clear of trouble is the only caution advised by industry analysts, as the two banks
integrate their businesses. Sceptics don't see how StanChart can really be greater than the
sum of its parts.
The aggression, though, is not as raw as it sounds. Behind it all is a strategy that
everyone at StanChart seems to be in synchrony with. And behind that strategy is Talwar,
very much the originator of the oft-repeated phrase uttered by every executive - "getting
the right footprint". The other key words that tend to find their way into every discussion
are 'focus' and 'growth'.
The Tata group was infusing a fresh 30 million pounds into Tata tea that had been
used to buy an 85.7% stake in the UK-based Tetley last year. Already high on a heady
brew of a fresh buy and caffeine, most missed what Krishna Kumar's statement meant.
Tata Tea’s much hyped acquisition of Tetley, one of the world’s biggest tea
brands, isn’t proceeding according to the plan. 15 months ago, the Kolkata based Rs 913
crore Tata Tea’s buyout of the privately held The Tetley Group for Rs 1843 crore had
stunned corporate watchers and investment bankers alike. It was a coup! An Indian
company had used a leveraged buyout to snag one of the Britain’s biggest ever brands. It
was by far, the biggest ever leveraged buyout by an Indian company.
Tata Tea didn’t pay cash upfront. Instead, it invested 70 million pounds as equity
capital to set up Tata Tea. It borrowed 235 million to buy the Tetley stake. The plan was
that Tetley’s cash flows would be insulated from the debt burden.
When Tata Tea took the big gamble to buy Tetley, its intent was very clear. The
company had established a firm foothold in the domestic market and had a controlling
position in growing tea. Going global looked like the obvious thing to do. With Tetley,
the second largest brand after Lipton in its bag, Tata Tea looked ready to set the Thames
on fire.
Right from the start, Tetley was never a easy buy. In 1996, Allied Domecq, the
liquor and retail conglomerate, had put Tetley on the block. Even then Tata Tea, nestle,
Unilever and Sara lee had put in bids, all under 200 million pounds. Allied wanted to
cash on the table. Tata Tea didn’t have enough of its own. The others bids also did not go
through. Eventually, Tetley group together with a consortium of financial investors like
Prudential and Schroders, bought the entire equity stake for 190 million pounds in all
cash deal. Two years later, Tetley went for an IPO, hoping to raise 350-400 million
pounds. But the IPO never took place. Soon afterwards, the investors began looking for
exit options. Tetley was once again on the block.
It was until Feb 2000 that the due diligence was completed. By this time, the
Tata's were ready with their offer. They would pay 271 million pounds to buy the entire
Tetley equity and the funds would go towards first paying off Tetley’s 106 million debt.
The balance would go the owners.
The offer price did not include rights to Tetley coffee business, which was sold to
the US-based Rowland Coffee Roasters and Mother Parker’s Tea and Coffee in Feb 2000
for 55 million pounds.
For Tetley new owners, too, the problems were only just beginning. The deal
hinged on Tetley’s ability, over and above covering its own debts, to service the loans
Tata Tea had taken for the acquisition. That’s where reality bites.
Consider the facts. When Tata Tea acquired Tetley through Tata Tea, it sunk in 70
million pounds as equity and borrowed 235 million pounds fro ma consortium to finance
the deal. Implicit in the LBO was that Tetley’s future cash flows would fund the SPV’s
interest and principal repayment requirements. At an average interest rate of 11.5%,
Tetley needed to generate 22 million pounds in interest alone on a loan o 190 million
pounds. Add to this the interest on the high cost vendor loan notes of 30 million pounds
—it worked out to be 4.5 million and the charges on the working capital portion,
amounting to 2 million pounds per annum. All this works out to about 28 million pounds
in interest alone per year.
At the same time, it also has to pay back the principal of 110 million pounds over
a nice period through half yearly installments. This works out to 12 million pounds per
year. If you were to assume that depreciation and restructuring charges were pegged at
last year’s levels, the bill tots up to 48 million pounds a year. In FY 1999, the Tetley’s
cash flows were 29 million pounds.
Some of the problems could have been obviated if Tetley’s cash flows had
increased by 40 % in FY 2001 over the previous year. That way, the company would
have covered both its own commitments as well as of the Tata's. But the situation
worsened. Major UK retailers clamped down on grocery prices last year. That
substantially reduced Tetley’s pricing flexibility.
Besides, the UK tea markets have been under pressure for some time now.
According to the UK government’s national food survey, there has been a substantial fall
in the consumption of mainstream teas- tea-bag black teas drunk with milk and sugar.
Also the tea drinking population in UK has come down from 77.1% to 68.3% in 1999.
On the other hand, natural juices and coffee have consistently increased their market
share.
So, when it was confronted by Tetley’s sliding performance, what options did
Tata Tea have? On its own, it could not do much. The last year has been one of the worst
years for the Indian tea industry and Tata Tea has also been affected. The drop in tea
prices and a proliferation of smaller brands in the organized segment have taken toll on
Tata Tea’s performance. In FY 2001, Tata Tea’s net profit fell by 19.59% from Rs
124.63 crore to Rs 100.21 crore. Income from operations declined by 8.72%.
But letting Tetley sink under the weight of the interest burden would have been an
unthinkable option, given the prestige attached to the deal.
Thus from the above case we infer that Tata had to shell out a lot of money to
cover all the debts of Tetley which was found not worthy enough by the general public.
Conclusion
The giant positive strides that Brand India has taken in last few years
are nothing less than astonishing. Indian Businessmen and
Entrepreneurs are set out to revamp Indian image that will be boasting
world’s biggest corporation’s in near future. All the sectors, be it Steel,
manufacturing, Information technology, Auto and FMCG are all buzzing
with Mega Indian acquisitions.
One size doesn't fit all. Many companies find that the best way to get ahead is to expand
ownership boundaries through mergers and acquisitions. For others, separating the public
ownership of a subsidiary or business segment offers more advantages. At least in theory,
mergers create synergies and economies of scale, expanding operations and cutting costs.
Investors can take comfort in the idea that a merger will deliver enhanced market power.
M&A comes in all shapes and sizes, and investors need to consider the complex issues involved
in M&A. The most beneficial form of equity structure involves a complete analysis of the costs
and benefits associated with the deals