CONCEPCION C.

DAPLAS, City Treasurer, Pasay City, and Concurrent OIC, Regional Director Bureau of Local
Government Finance (BLGF) Region VII, Petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, represented by TROY
FRANCIS C. PIZARRO, JOSELITO F. FERNANDEZ, REYNALDO* L. LAZARO, MELCHOR B. PIOL, and ISMAEL S. LEONOR, and
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.

Present:

SERENO, C.J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

DEL CASTILLO,

PERLAS-BERNABE, and

CAGUIOA, JJ.

G.R. No. 221153 | 2017-04-17

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Baguio City

FIRST DIVISION

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition 1 for review on certiorari assailing the Decision 2 dated August 27, 2014 and the
Resolution 3 dated October 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 122851, which dismissed petitioner
Concepcion C. Daplas' (petitioner) petition for review, thereby upholding the Joint Decision4 dated May 8, 2007 of the
Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in the administrative aspects of the cases, docketed as OMB-C-A-05-0234-E
and OMB-C-A-06-0354-G. The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and violation of
Section 8 (A) of Republic Act No. (RA) 6713, and imposed the penalty of dismissal from service, and all its accessory
penalties, without prejudice to criminal prosecution.

The Facts

Petitioner joined the government service as a casual clerk for the Municipal Treasurer of Kawit, Cavite sometime in
1968, and had held various posts until she was appointed as the Pasay City Treasurer on May 19, 1989, with a gross
monthly salary of P28,722.00. At the time material to the complaints, petitioner was concurrently holding the position
of Officerin-Charge, Regional Director of the Bureau of Local Government Finance (BLGF) in Cebu City.5

Two (2) separate complaints were filed against petitioner by the Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection
Service (DOF-RIPS) and the Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman; respondents)
for averred violations6 of Sections 7 and 8 of RA 3019,7 Section 8 (A) of RA 6713,8 Section 2 of RA 1379,9 Article 18310
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and Executive Order No. (EO) 611 dated March 12, 1986,12 constituting Dishonesty,
Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, arising out of her failure to disclose the
true and detailed statement of her assets, liabilities, and net worth, business interests, and financial connections, and
those of her spouse in her Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALNs). 13 In particular, petitioner:

(1) failed to declare (a) a 1993 Mitsubishi Galant sedan with Plate No. TBH-238 (Galant sedan) registered under the
name of her late husband with an estimated value of P250,000.00; (b) her stock subscription in KEI Realty and
Development Corp. (KEI) valued at Pl,500,000.00 with a total paid up amount of P800,000.00;14 and (c) several real
properties in Cavite 15 (which had been the subject of a previous administrative complaint against her that had been
dismissed 16 ); and

(2) traveled multiple times abroad without securing a travel authority, which cast doubt on her real net worth and
actual source of income considering her modest salary. 17
For her part, petitioner insisted that she acquired her properties through lawful means, and maintained that she was
not totally dependent on her salary to finance the said acquisitions. 18 She alleged that:

(a) her late husband purchased the Galant sedan out of his personal money, hence, the same did not form part of their
conjugal properties; 19

(b) she had already divested her interest in KEI in 1998, along with her husband, but her husband and children
reacquired their respective shares sometime in 2003 ; 20 and

(c) her travels were sponsored by the government or by her relatives abroad. 21

The Ombudsman Ruling

In a Joint Decision22 dated May 8, 2007, the Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and
violation of Section 8 (A) of RA 6713, and imposed the penalty of Dismissal, and its accessory penalties, without
prejudice to criminal prosecution. 23 It observed that petitioner committed perjury under Article 183 of the RPC when
she failed to declare in her SALNs for 1997 to 2003 the Galant sedan, and her business interest in KEI in her 1997 SALN,
which is sufficient basis to hold her liable for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct. 24 Likewise, it found her liable for
violation of Section 8 of RA 6713 for her failure to disclose the said assets despite the legal obligation to do so.25

However, the Ombudsman found respondents to have failed to substantiate the charges that:

(a) petitioner's numerous foreign travels were indicia of her acquisition of unlawful wealth;26 and

(b) KEI was put up as a subterfuge for petitioner's ill-gotten wealth. 27

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Joint Order28 dated May 30, 2011,
prompting her to elevate her case before the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 122851.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision29 dated August 27, 2014, the CA dismissed the petition, holding that the Ombudsman's ruling was
sufficiently supported by substantial evidence. 30 It found that petitioner's failure to declare all her assets and business
interests constituted Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and a violation of Section 8 (A) of RA 6713.31 It gave no credence
to her defense of good faith considering that she knew of the said assets and gave no justification for their exclusion in
her SALNs.32 Moreover, it ruled that her resignation from the government service did not render the Ombudsman
ruling moot. 33

Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution34 dated October 22, 2015;
hence, the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the Joint Decision of the
Ombudsman finding petitioner liable for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and violation of Section 8 (A) of RA 6713, and
imposing on her the corresponding penalties.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

The requirement of filing a SALN is enshrined in no less than the 1987 Constitution35 in order to promote transparency
in the civil service, and operates as a deterrent against government officials bent on enriching themselves through
unlawful means. 36 By mandate of law, i.e., RA 6713, it behooves every government official or employee to accomplish
and submit a sworn statement completely disclosing his or her assets, liabilities, net worth, and financial and business
interests, including those of his/her spouse and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their
households,37 in order to suppress any questionable accumulation of wealth because the latter usually results from
non-disclosure of such matters. 38

In the present case, it is undisputed that petitioner failed to declare some properties in her SALNs for the years 1997 to
2003 despite the legal obligation to do so. Both the Ombudsman and the CA held that such omission provides
substantial basis to hold petitioner liable for the administrative offenses of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and violation
of Section 8 (A) of RA 6713, warranting the supreme penalty of dismissal from service, with all its accessory penalties.

The Court disagrees.

Records reveal that the element of intent to commit a wrong required under both the administrative offenses of
Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct39 are lacking to warrant petitioner's dismissal from service.

Dishonesty is committed when an individual intentionally makes a false statement of any material fact, practices or
attempts to practice any deception or fraud in order to secure his examination, registration, appointment, or
promotion. It is understood to imply the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, betray or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; and the lack of fairness and straightforwardness. 40

On the other hand, misconduct is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of
behavior.

To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the
official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest. 41
Without any of these elements, the transgression of an established rule is properly characterized as simple misconduct
only. 42 Most importantly, without a nexus between the act complained of and the discharge of duty, the charge of
grave misconduct shall necessarily fail.43

Indeed, the failure to file a truthful SALN puts in doubt the integrity of the public officer or employee, and would
normally amount to dishonesty. It should be emphasized, however, that mere non-declaration of the required data in
the SALN does not automatically amount to such an offense. Dishonesty requires malicious intent to conceal the truth
or to make false statements. In addition, a public officer or employee becomes susceptible to dishonesty only when
such non-declaration results in the accumulated wealth becoming manifestly disproportionate to his/her income, and
income from other sources, and he/she fails to properly account or explain these sources of income and acquisitions.44

Here, the Court finds that there is no substantial evidence of intent to commit a wrong, or to deceive the authorities,
and conceal the other properties in petitioner's and her husband's names. Petitioner's failure to disclose in her 1997
SALN her business interest in KEI is not a sufficient badge of dishonesty in the absence of bad faith, or any malicious
intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence.
It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for
ulterior purposes.45

Notably, petitioner readily admitted in her Counter-Affidavit her business interest in KEI in 1997, 46 which belied any
malicious intent to conceal. While concededly, the omission would increase her net worth for the year 1997, the Court
observes that the Ombudsman declared respondent's evidence insufficient to warrant a finding that petitioner had any
unexplained wealth.47 On the contrary, it found that her children have the financial capacity to put up KEI.48

It should be emphasized that the laws on SALN aim to curtail the acquisition of unexplained wealth. Thus, in several
cases 49 where the source of the undisclosed wealth was properly accounted for, the Court deemed the same an
"explained wealth" which the law does not penalize. Consequently, absent any intent to commit a wrong, and having
accounted for the source of the "undisclosed wealth," as in this case, petitioner cannot be adjudged guilty of the charge
of Dishonesty; but at the most, of mere negligence for having failed to accomplish her SALN properly and accurately.

Negligence is the omission of the diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time, and of the place. In the case of public officials, there is negligence when
there is a breach of duty or failure to perform the obligation, and there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is
flagrant and palpable. 50 An act done in good faith, which constitutes only an error of judgment and for no ulterior
motives and/or purposes, 51 as in the present case, is merely Simple Negligence.

In the same vein, petitioner's failure to declare the Galant sedan in her SALNs from 1997 to 2003 stemmed from the
fact that the same was registered in her husband's name, and purportedly purchased out of his personal money. 52
While such bare allegation is not enough to overthrow the presumption that the car was conjugal, neither is there
sufficient showing that petitioner was motivated by bad faith in not disclosing the same. In fact, the Ombudsman
conceded that petitioner's husband was financially capable of purchasing the car, 53 negating any "unexplained
wealth" to warrant petitioner's dismissal due to Dishonesty.
Likewise, the charge of Grave Misconduct against petitioner must fail. Verily, the omission to include the subject
properties in petitioner's SALNs, by itself, does not amount to Grave Misconduct, in the absence of showing that such
omission had, in some way, hindered the rendition of sound public service for there is no direct relation or connection
between the two. 54

Accordingly, the Court finds no reason to hold petitioner liable for the charges of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct,
but declares her guilty, instead, of Simple Negligence in accomplishing her SALN. Simple Negligence is akin to Simple
Neglect ofDuty,55 which is a less grave offense punishable with suspension without pay for one (1) month and one (1)
day to six (6) months, for the first offense. 56 Since the penalty of suspension can no longer be imposed on account of
petitioner's resignation,57 and considering that she readily admitted her omissions which do not appear to have been
attended by any bad faith or fraudulent intent, 58 the Court finds that the penalty of fine in the amount equivalent to
one (1) month and one (1) day59 of petitioner's last salary is reasonable and just under the premises.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated August 27, 2014 and the Resolution dated
October 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122851 are hereby SET ASIDE. A new one is ENTERED
finding petitioner Concepcion C. Daplas GUILTY of SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE in accomplishing her Statements of Assets,
Liabilities and Net Worth for the years 1997 to 2003, and is meted a fine in the amount equivalent to one (1) month
and one (1) day of her last salary.

SO ORDERED.

Office of the Ombudsman, Petitioner, vs. Nieto A. Racho, Respondent.

G.R. No. 185685 | 2011-01-31

SECOND DIVISION

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Office of the
Ombudsman(Ombudsman) assails the February 21, 2008 Decision2 and November 20, 2008 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals-Cebu (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00694 which reversed and set aside the administrative aspect of the April 1,
2005 Joint Order4 of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas.

The April 1, 2005 Joint Order of the Ombudsman found respondent Nieto A. Racho (Racho) guilty of dishonesty and
ordered him dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and perpetual disqualification from public office.
The assailed CA Decision, however, found Racho guilty of negligence only and reduced the penalty to suspension from
office for six months, without pay.

From the records, it appears that DYHP Balita Action Team (DYHP), in a letter dated November 9, 2001, reported to
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, Primo Miro, a concerned citizen’s complaint regarding the alleged unexplained
wealth of Racho, then Chief of the Special Investigation Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Cebu City.5 To
support the allegation, the complainant attached copies of bank certifications, all issued in June of 1999, by Metrobank
Cebu (Tabunok Branch),6 BPI Cebu (Mango Branch),7 and PCI Bank (Magallanes Branch).8 In total, Racho appeared to
have an aggregate bank deposit of P5,798,801.39.

Acting on the letter, the Ombudsman launched a fact-finding investigation and directed the BIR to submit Racho’s
Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) from 1995 to 1999. BIR complied with the order and gave copies
of Racho’s SALN. Soon, the Ombudsman found that Racho did not declare the bank deposits in his SALN, as mentioned
in the DYHP’s letter. Accordingly, the Ombudsman filed a Complaint for Falsification of Public Document under Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code (OMB-V-C-02-0240-E) and Dishonesty (OMB-V-A-02-0214-E) against Racho.
The Ombudsman, in its August 21, 2002 Memorandum, adopted the Final Evaluation Report9 of Administrative Officer
Elpidio Montecillo as the sworn complaint. Thereafter, Racho submitted his counter-affidavit attacking the procedural
infirmities of the complaint against him.10 At the scheduled clarificatory hearing, Racho invoked his right to remain
silent. On January 02, 2003, Graft Prosecution Officer (GPO) Pio Dargantes did not give weight to the bank documents
because they were mere photocopies. As a result, he dismissed the complaint for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-02-214-E) due
to insufficiency of evidence.11

On review, Director Virginia Palanca, through a memorandum dated May 30, 2003,12 decreed that Racho’s act of not
declaring said bank deposits in his SALN, which were disproportionate to his and his wife’s salaries, constituted
falsification and dishonesty. She found Racho guilty of the administrative charges against him and imposed the penalty
of dismissal from service with forfeiture of all benefits and perpetual disqualification to hold public office.

Racho moved for reconsideration13 but his motion was denied in an Order dated July 15, 2003.14

Racho appealed the said order of dismissal to the CA. On January 26, 2004, the CA reversed the Ombudsman’s ruling
and ordered the reinvestigation of the case.15

In compliance with the CA’s decision, the Ombudsman reinvestigated the case. In his Comment,16 Racho denied sole
ownership of the bank deposits. In support of his position, he presented the Joint Affidavit17 of his brothers and
nephew, particularly Vieto, Dean and Henry Racho, allegedly executed on December 18, 2004. In the joint sworn
statement, it was alleged that he and his siblings planned to put up a business and eventually established "Angelsons
Lending and Investors, Inc.," a corporation registered18 with the Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC) on April 30,
1999. To prove their agreement, Racho presented a Special Power of Attorney,19 dated January 28, 1993, wherein his
brothers and nephew designated him as the trustee of their investments in the business venture they were intending
to put up and authorized him to deposit their money into his questioned bank accounts to defray business-related
expenses. Racho averred that his wife also set up a small business named "Nal Pay Phone Services" registered under
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) on April 30, 1999.20

On January 10, 2005, in its Reinvestigation Report, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas found no reason to deviate
from its previous findings against Racho.21 Thus, the Reinvestigation Report disposed:

With all the foregoing, undersigned finds no basis to change, modify nor reverse her previous findings that there is
probable cause for the crime of FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT, defined and penalized under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code, against respondent Nieto A. Racho for making untruthful statements in a narration of facts in his
SALN. As there are additional facts established during the reinvestigation, re: failure of Mr. Racho to reflect his business
connections, then the Information filed against him should be amended to include the same. Let this Amended
Information be returned to the court for further proceedings.

SO RESOLVED.22

Racho filed a motion for reconsideration23 but the Ombudsman denied it in its April 1, 2005 Joint Order.24

Racho elevated the case to the CA by way of a petition for review25 under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court assailing the
administrative aspect of the April 1, 2005 Joint Order of the Ombudsman-Visayas.

On February 21, 2008, the CA rendered the challenged decision. Citing Pleyto v. Philippine National Police (PNP)-
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG),26 the CA opined that in charges of dishonesty "intention is an
important element in its commission."27 The CA ruled that Racho "never denied the existence of the bank accounts.
Instead, he undertook to explain that those were not wholly owned by him and endeavored to secure and submit
documentary evidence to buttress explanation. Judging from his conduct, there is want of intent to conceal
information. Intent, as held in the Pleyto case, is essential to constitute dishonesty and without the intent to commit a
wrong, the public officer is not dishonest, albeit he is adjudged to be negligent."28
Accordingly, the decretal portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on the administrative aspect of Ombudsman Visayas JOINT ORDER dated
April 1, 2005 is hereby GRANTED. The said JOINT ORDER, in so far as it affirmed the petitioner’s guilt for dishonesty and
imposed the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of all benefits and perpetual disqualification to hold office is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is adjudged GUILTY of NEGLIGENCE in accomplishing his Statement of Assets,
Liabilities and Networth (SALN) and is ORDERED to be SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE WITHOUT PAY FOR A PERIOD OF SIX
(6) MONTHS.29

The Ombudsman moved for reconsideration,30 but the CA stood by its decision and denied said motion in its
November 20, 2008 Resolution.31

Hence, this petition.

In its Memorandum,32 the Office of the Ombudsman submits the following:

ISSUES

I.

THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN THE INSTANT CASE IS SANCTIONED BY THE
MANDATE OF THE OFFICE AS AN "ACTIVIST WATCHMAN."

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS’ RELIANCE ON A FICTITIOUS DOCUMENT WHOSE AUTHENTICITY HAS BEEN PUT
TO QUESTION IN A SEPARATE CRIMINAL CASE PRESENTS AN EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE THAT AN APPEAL BY
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 SHOULD RAISE ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW CONSIDERING THAT –

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FOUND THE SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY AND THE JOINT AFFIDAVIT OFFERED AS
EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENT TO BE SPURIOUS, HOWEVER, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WITHOUT RULING ON
THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE SAME DOCUMENTS, RELIED ON THE SAME TO FIND RESPONDENT GUILTY ONLY OF
NEGLIGENCE;

AND

THE COURT OF APPEALS’ FINDING OF LACK OF INTENT ON THE PART OF RESPONDENT RACHO TO CONCEAL
INFORMATION IS NOT BASED ON THE EVIDENCE

III

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS REPEATEDLY RAISED THE SPURIOUS CHARACTER OF THE JOINT AFFIDAVIT AND
SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS. THE COUNTER-AFFIDAVITS COUNTERING ITS
AUTHENTICITY WAS SUBMITTED FOR THE FIRST TIME BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, AND NOT BEFORE THIS
HONORABLE COURT.
IV

THE DECISIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND ORDERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ARE IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY
EVEN PENDING APPEAL UNDER SECTION 7, RULE III OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, AS AMENDED; CONSEQUENTLY THE WRIT OF INJUNCTION EARLIER ISSUED SHOULD BE LIFTED.33

The Ombudsman argues that the CA failed to see the discrepancies on Racho’s Special Power of Attorney itself "such as
a statement that the date of registration of the Nal Pay Phone Services was ‘last April 30, 1999,’ when the Special
Power of Attorney had been allegedly executed on 28 January 1993."34 The Ombudsman insists that these
inconsistencies should have alerted the CA to delve more deeply into the case and check if Racho’s explanation through
the supposed dubious documents should be given weight at all.35

THE COURT’S RULING

The Court finds merit in the petition.

As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a
trier of facts.36 When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding on
the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the following recognized exceptions:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.37 [Emphasis supplied]

Undeniably, the findings of fact of the Ombudsman are different from those of the CA. Thus, the Court finds it
necessary to take a second look at the factual matters surrounding the present case.

From the records, it is undisputed that Racho admitted the bank accounts, but explained that the deposits reflected
therein were not entirely his. Racho proffered that some of the money came from his brothers and nephew as part of
their contribution to the business that they had planned to put up. He presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA),
dated January 28, 1993, and Joint Affidavit of his siblings that echoed his explanation.

In the appreciation of the said documents, the Ombudsman and the CA took opposing views. The Ombudsman did not
give weight to the SPA due to some questionable entries therein. The CA, on the other hand, recognized the fact that
Racho never denied the existence of the bank accounts and accepted his explanation. Accordingly, the CA decreed that
although Racho was remiss in fully declaring the said bank deposits in his SALN, the intent to make a false statement, as
would constitute dishonesty, was clearly absent.

The pivotal issue in this case, however, is whether or not Racho’s non-disclosure of the bank deposits in his SALN
constitutes dishonesty.

The Court views it in the affirmative.

Section 7 and Section 8 of Republic Act (R.A.) 301938 explain the nature and importance of accomplishing a true,
detailed and sworn SALN, thus:

Sec. 7. Statement of Assets and Liabilities. — Every public officer, within thirty days after assuming office, and
thereafter, on or before the fifteenth day of April following the close of every calendar year, as well as upon the
expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of
corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head Department or chief of an independent office, with the Office
of the President, a true, detailed and sworn statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his
personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: Provided,
That public officers assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their first
statement on or before the fifteenth day of April following the close of said calendar year.

Sec. 8. Prima Facie Evidence of and Dismissal Due to Unexplained Wealth. — If in accordance with the provisions of
Republic Act Numbered One Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-Nine, a public official has been found to have acquired
during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money
manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be ground for dismissal or
removal. Properties in the name of the spouse and dependents of such public official may be taken into consideration,
when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits in the name of or
manifestly excessive expenditures incurred by the public official, his spouse or any of their dependents including but
not limited to activities in any club or association or any ostentatious display of wealth including frequent travel abroad
of a non-official character by any public official when such activities entail expenses evidently out of proportion to
legitimate income, shall likewise be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this Section, notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary. The circumstances hereinabove mentioned shall constitute valid ground for the
administrative suspension of the public official concerned for an indefinite period until the investigation of the
unexplained wealth is completed.

In the case of Carabeo v. Court of Appeals,39 citing Ombudsman v. Valeroso,40 the Court restated the rationale for the
SALN and the evils that it seeks to thwart, to wit:

Section 8 above, speaks of unlawful acquisition of wealth, the evil sought to be suppressed and avoided, and Section 7,
which mandates full disclosure of wealth in the SALN, is a means of preventing said evil and is aimed particularly at
curtailing and minimizing, the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public
service. "Unexplained" matter normally results from "non-disclosure" or concealment of vital facts. SALN, which all
public officials and employees are mandated to file, are the means to achieve the policy of accountability of all public
officers and employees in the government. By the SALN, the public are able to monitor movement in the fortune of a
public official; it is a valid check and balance mechanism to verify undisclosed properties and wealth.

Complimentary to the above-mentioned provisions, Section 2 of R.A. 137941 states that "whenever any public officer
or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired."
By mandate of law, every public official or government employee is required to make a complete disclosure of his
assets, liabilities and net worth in order to suppress any questionable accumulation of wealth because the latter usually
results from non-disclosure of such matters. Hence, a public official or employee who has acquired money or property
manifestly disproportionate to his salary or his other lawful income shall be prima facie presumed to have illegally
acquired it.

It should be understood that what the law seeks to curtail is "acquisition of unexplained wealth." Where the source of
the undisclosed wealth can be properly accounted, then it is "explained wealth" which the law does not penalize.

In this case, Racho not only failed to disclose his bank accounts containing substantial deposits but he also failed to
satisfactorily explain the accumulation of his wealth or even identify the sources of such accumulated wealth. The
documents that Racho presented, like those purportedly showing that his brothers and nephew were financially
capable of sending or contributing large amounts of money for their business,42 do not prove that they did contribute
or remit money for their supposed joint business venture. Equally, the Special Power of Attorney43that was supposedly
issued by Vieto, Dido and Henry Racho in favor of Racho on January 28, 1993 to show their business plans, contained a
glaringly inconsistent statement that belies the authenticity of the document, to wit:

1. To be the Trustee Attorney-in-fact of our investment in ANGELSONS LENDING AND INVESTORS, INC. of whom we are
the Stockholders/Investors as well as the NAL PAY PHONE SERVICES, which was registered by the DTI last April 30, 1999
in the name of NIETO RACHO’s wife of whom we are likewise investors. [emphasis supplied]

Definitely, a document that was allegedly executed in 1993 could not contain a statement referring to a future date
"registered by the DTI last April 30, 1999." This certainly renders the intrinsic and extrinsic value of the SPA
questionable.

More important, the Joint Affidavits allegedly executed by Racho’s siblings and nephew to corroborate his story were
later disowned and denied by his nephew, Henry, and brother, Vieto, as shown by their Counter-Affidavits.44Henry
averred that he was out of the country at the time of the alleged execution of the Joint Affidavit on December 18, 2004
and he arrived in Manila only on September 16, 2005. Vieto, on the other hand, denied having signed the Joint
Affidavit. He disclosed that as a left-handed person, he pushes the pen instead of pulling it. He concluded that the
signature on the Joint Affidavit was made by a right-handed person.45 He likewise included a copy of his passport
containing his real signature for comparison.46

Thus, the SPA and Joint Affidavits which should explain the sources of Racho’s wealth are dubious and merit no
consideration.

Although Racho presented the SEC Certificate of Registration of Angelsons,47 the business that he supposedly put up
with his relatives, he showed no other document to confirm that the business is actually existing and operating. He
likewise tried to show that his wife built a business of her own but he did not bother to explain how the business grew
and merely presented a Certificate of Registration of Business Name from the DTI.48 These documents, however, do
not prove that Racho had enough other sources of income to justify the said bank deposits. Ultimately, only
P1,167,186.3349 representing his wife’s retirement benefits, was properly accounted for. Even this money, however,
was reduced by his loan payable of P1,000,000.00 as reflected in his 2000 SALN.50

Dishonesty begins when an individual intentionally makes a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or
attempting to practice any deception or fraud in order to secure his examination, registration, appointment or
promotion.51 It is understood to imply the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to
defraud, deceive or betray.52 It is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon one’s ability to perform his duties with
the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee.53 Section 52 (A)(1), Rule IV of the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service treats dishonesty as a grave offense the penalty of which is
dismissal from the service at the first infraction.54
Indeed, an honest public servant will have no difficulty in gathering, collating and presenting evidence that will prove
his credibility, but a dishonest one will only provide shallow excuses in his explanations.

For these reasons, the Court is of the view that Pleyto v. Philippine National Police (PNP)-Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG)55 which the CA cited as basis to exculpate Racho of dishonesty, is not applicable in this case. In
the Pleyto case, the Court recognized Pleyto’s candid admission of his failure to properly and completely fill out his
SALN, his vigorous effort to clarify the entries and provide the necessary information and supporting documents to
show how he and his wife acquired their properties.56 The Court found substantial evidence that Pleyto and his wife
had lawful sources of income other than Pleyto’s salary as a government official which allowed them to purchase
several real properties in their names and travel abroad.57

Unfortunately for Racho, his situation is different. The Court, thus, holds that the CA erred in finding him guilty of
simple neglect of duty only. As defined, simple neglect of duty is the failure to give proper attention to a task expected
from an employee resulting from either carelessness or indifference.58 In this case, the discrepancies in the statement
of Racho’s assets are not the results of mere carelessness. On the contrary, there is substantial evidence pointing to a
conclusion that Racho is guilty of dishonesty because of his unmistakable intent to cover up the true source of his
questioned bank deposits.

It should be emphasized, however, that mere misdeclaration of the SALN does not automatically amount to dishonesty.
Only when the accumulated wealth becomes manifestly disproportionate to the employee’s income or other sources of
income and the public officer/employee fails to properly account or explain his other sources of income, does he
become susceptible to dishonesty because when a public officer takes an oath or office, he or she binds himself or
herself to faithfully perform the duties of the office and use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the
benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of duties, a public officer is to use that prudence, caution and attention
which careful persons use in the management of their affairs.59

The Court has consistently reminded our public servants that public service demands utmost integrity and discipline. A
public servant must display at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity, for no less than the Constitution
mandates the principle that a public office is a public trust; and all public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people and serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.60

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 21, 2008 Decision and November 20, 2008 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals-Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The administrative aspect of the April 1, 2005 Joint Order of the
Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED
A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC June 13, 2012

RE:REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND

NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE
JUDICIARY.

x-----------------------x

A.M. No. 09-8-07-CA

RE: REQUEST OF PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM [PCIJ] FOR THE 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS,
LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEETS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS JUSTICES.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

In a letter,1 dated July 30, 2009, Rowena C. Paraan, Research Director of the Philippine Center for Investigative
Journalism (PCIJ), sought copies of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth (SALN) of the Justices of this Court
for the year 2008. She also requested for copies of the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) or the Curriculum Vitae (CV) of the
Justices of this Court for the purpose of updating their database of information on government officials.

In her Letter,2 dated August 13, 2009, Karol M. Ilagan, a researcher-writer also of the PCIJ, likewise sought for copies of
the SALN and PDS of the Justices of the Court of Appeals (CA), for the same above-stated purpose.

The two requests were ordered consolidated by the Court on August 18, 2009.3 On the same day, the Court resolved to
create a special committee (Committee) to review the policy on requests for SALN and PDS and other similar
documents, and to recommend appropriate action on such requests.4

On November 23, 2009, the Committee, chaired by then Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario submitted its
Memorandum5 dated November 18, 2009 and its Resolution6 dated November 16, 2009, recommending the creation
of Committee on Public Disclosure that would, in essence, take over the functions of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) with respect to requests for copies of, or access to, SALN, and other personal documents of
members of the Judiciary.

Meanwhile, several requests for copies of the SALN and other personal documents of the Justices of this Court, the CA
and the Sandiganbayan (SB) were filed. In particular, these requests include the:

(1) SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM,7 dated September 10, 2009, issued by Atty. E. H. Amat, Acting Director, General
Investigation Bureau-B of the Office of the Ombudsman, directing the Office of Administrative Services, Supreme Court
to submit two (2) copies of the SALN of Associate Justice Roland B. Jurado of the Sandiganbayan for the years 1997-
2008, his latest PDS, his Oath of Office, appointment papers, and service records.

(2) LETTER,8 dated April 21, 2010, of the Philippine Public Transparency Reporting Project, asking permission to be able
to access and copy the SALN of officials and employees of the lower courts.

(3) LETTER,9 filed on August 24, 2011, by Marvin Lim, seeking copies of the SALN of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona,
Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado
M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Portugal Perez,
Jose C. Mendoza, and Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno.

(4) LETTER,10 dated August 26, 2011, of Rawnna Crisostomo, Reporter, GMA News and Public Affairs also requesting
for copies of the SALN of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.,
Teresita Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto
A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Portugal Perez, Jose C. Mendoza, and Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno, for purposes of
producing a story on transparency and governance, and updating their database.

(5) LETTER,11 dated October 11, 2011, of Bala S. Tamayo, requesting for a copy of the 2010 SALN of any Justice of the
Supreme Court as well as a copy of the Judiciary Development Fund, for purposes of her securing a huge percentage in
final examination in Constitutional Law I at the San Beda College Alabang School of Law and for her study on the state
of the Philippine Judiciary, particularly the manner, nature and disposition of the resources under the JDF and how
these have evolved through the years.

(6) LETTERS, all dated December 19, 2011, of Harvey S. Keh, Lead Convenor of Kaya Natin! Movement for Good
Governance and Ethical Leadership, addressed to Chief Justice Renato C. Corona,12 Associate Justices Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr.,13 Teresita Leonardo-De Castro,14 Arturo D. Brion,15 Diosdado M. Peralta,16 Mariano C. Del Castillo,17
Jose Portugal Perez,18 and Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno,19 requesting for copies of their SALN and seeking permission to
post the same on their website for the general public.

(7) LETTER,20 dated December 21, 2011, of Glenda M. Gloria, Executive Director, Newsbreak, seeking copies of the
SALN of the Supreme Court Justices covering various years, for the purpose of the stories they intend to put on their
website regarding the Supreme Court and the Judiciary.

(8) LETTERS, all dated January 3, 2012, of Phillipe Manalang of Unlimited Productions, Inc., addressed to Associate
Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.,21 Teresita Leonardo-De Castro,22 Mariano C. Del Castillo23 and Jose Portugal
Perez,24 and Atty. Enriqueta Esguerra-Vidal, Clerk of Court, Supreme Court25 requesting for copies of the SALN of the
Supreme Court Justices for the years 2010 and 2011.

(9) LETTER,26 dated December 19, 2011, of Malou Mangahas, Executive Director, PCIJ, requesting for copies of the
SALN, PDS or CVs of the Justices of the Supreme Court from the year they were appointed to the present.
(10) SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM ET DUCES TECUM,27 issued on January 17, 2012, by the Senate, sitting as an
Impeachment Court, in connection with Impeachment Case No. 002-2011 against Chief Justice Renato C. Corona,
requiring the Clerk of Court, among others, to bring with her the SALN of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona for the years
2002 to 2011.

(11) LETTER,28 dated January 16, 2012, of Nilo "Ka Nilo" H. Baculo, Sr., requesting copies of the SALN of the Supreme
Court Justices for the years 2008 to 2011, for his use as a media practitioner.

(12) LETTER,29 dated January 25, 2012, of Roxanne Escaro-Alegre of GMA News, requesting for copies of the SALN of
the Supreme Court Justices for the network’s story on the political dynamics and process of decision-making in the
Supreme Court.

(13) LETTER,30 dated January 27, 2012, of David Jude Sta. Ana, Head, News Operations, News 5, requesting for copies
of the 2010-2011 SALN of the Supreme Court Justices for use as reference materials for stories that will be aired in the
newscasts of their television network.

(14) LETTER,31 dated January 31, 2012, of Michael G. Aguinaldo, Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs,
Malacañang, addressed to Atty. Enriqueta Esguerra-Vidal, Clerk of Court, Supreme Court, seeking her comments and
recommendation on House Bill No. 5694,32 to aid in their determination of whether the measure should be certified as
urgent.

(15) Undated LETTER33 of Benise P. Balaoing, Intern of Rappler.com, a news website, seeking copies of the 2010 SALN
of the Justices of the Court and the CA for the purpose of completing its database in preparation for its coverage of the
2013 elections.

(16) LETTER,34 dated April 27, 2012, of Maria A. Ressa, Chief Executive Officer and Executive Officer and Executive
Editor of Rappler, Inc., requesting for copies of the current SALN of all the Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan also for the purpose of completing its database in preparation for its coverage of the
2013 elections.

(17) LETTER,35 dated May 2, 2012, of Mary Ann A. Señir, Junior Researcher, News Research Section, GMA News and
Public Affairs, requesting for copies of the SALN of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona and the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court for the calendar year 2011 for the network’s use in their public affairs programs.

(18) LETTER,36 dated May 4, 2012, of Edward Gabud, Sr., Desk Editor of Solar Network, Inc., requesting for copies of
the 2011 SALN of all the Justices of the Supreme Court.

(19) LETTER,37 dated May 30, 2012, of Gerry Lirio, Senior News Editor, TV5 requesting for copies of the SALN of the
Justices of the Court for the last three (3) years for the purpose of a special report it would produce as a result of the
impeachment and subsequent conviction of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.

(20) LETTER,38 dated May 31, 2012, of Atty. Joselito P. Fangon, Assistant Ombudsman, Field Investigation Office, Office
of the Ombudsman, requesting for 1] certified copies of the SALN of former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona for the years
2002-2011, as well as 2] a certificate of his yearly compensation, allowances, and bonuses, also for the years 2002-
2011.

(21) LETTER,39 dated June 8, 2012, of Thea Marie S. Pias, requesting a copy of the SALN of any present Supreme Court
Justice, for the purpose of completing her grade in Legal Philosophy at the San Beda College of Law.
Pursuant to Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,40 the Court, upon recommendation of the OCA, issued its
Resolution41 dated October 13, 2009, denying the subpoena duces tecum for the SALNs and personal documents of
Justice Roland B. Jurado of the SB. The resolution also directed the Ombudsman to forward to the Court any complaint
and/or derogatory report against Justice Roland B. Jurado, in consonance with the doctrine laid down in Caiobes v.
Ombudsman.42 Upon compliance by the Ombudsman, the Court, in its Resolution43 dated February 2, 2010, docketed
this matter as a regular administrative complaint.44

Also, considering the development in Impeachment Case No. 002-2011 against Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, the
Court, on January 24, 2012, resolved to consider moot the Subpoena Ad Testificandum Et Duces Tecum issued by the
Senate impeachment court.45

In resolving the remaining pending incidents, the Court, on January 17, 2012 required the CA, the SB, the CTA, the
Philippine Judges Association, the Metropolitan and City Judges Association of the Philippines, the Philippine Trial
Judges League, and the Philippine Women Judges Association (PWJA), to file their respective comments.

In essence, it is the consensus of the Justices of the above-mentioned courts and the various judges associations that
while the Constitution holds dear the right of the people to have access to matters of concern, the Constitution also
holds sacred the independence of the Judiciary. Thus, although no direct opposition to the disclosure of SALN and other
personal documents is being expressed, it is the uniform position of the said magistrates and the various judges’
associations that the disclosure must be made in accord with the guidelines set by the Court and under such
circumstances that would not undermine the independence of the Judiciary.

After a review of the matters at hand, it is apparent that the matter raised for consideration of the Court is not a novel
one. As early as 1989, the Court had the opportunity to rule on the matter of SALN disclosure in Re: Request of Jose M.
Alejandrino,46 where the Court denied the request of Atty. Alejandrino for the SALNs of the Justices of the Court due to
a "plainly discernible" improper motive. Aggrieved by an adverse decision of the Court, he accused the Justices of
patent partiality and alluded that they enjoyed an early Christmas as a result of the decision promulgated by the Court.
Atty. Alejandrino even singled out the Justices who took part in the decision and conspicuously excluded the others
who, for one reason or another, abstained from voting therein. While the Court expressed its willingness to have the
Clerk of Court furnish copies of the SALN of any of its members, it however, noted that requests for SALNs must be
made under circumstances that must not endanger, diminish or destroy the independence, and objectivity of the
members of the Judiciary in the performance of their judicial functions, or expose them to revenge for adverse
decisions, kidnapping, extortion, blackmail or other untoward incidents. Thus, in order to give meaning to the
constitutional right of the people to have access to information on matters of public concern, the Court laid down the
guidelines to be observed for requests made. Thus:

1. All requests for copies of statements of assets and liabilities of any Justice or Judge shall be filed with the Clerk of
Court of the Supreme Court or with the Court Administrator, as the case may be (Section 8 [A][2], R.A. 6713), and shall
state the purpose of the request.

2. The independence of the Judiciary is constitutionally as important as the right to information which is subject to the
limitations provided by law. Under specific circumstances, the need for fair and just adjudication of litigations may
require a court to be wary of deceptive requests for information which shall otherwise be freely available. Where the
request is directly or indirectly traced to a litigant, lawyer, or interested party in a case pending before the court, or
where the court is reasonably certain that a disputed matter will come before it under circumstances from which it
may, also reasonably, be assumed that the request is not made in good faith and for a legitimate purpose, but to fish
for information and, with the implicit threat of its disclosure, to influence a decision or to warn the court of the
unpleasant consequences of an adverse judgment, the request may be denied.

3. Where a decision has just been rendered by a court against the person making the request and the request for
information appears to be a "fishing expedition" intended to harass or get back at the Judge, the request may be
denied.
4. In the few areas where there is extortion by rebel elements or where the nature of their work exposes Judges to
assaults against their personal safety, the request shall not only be denied but should be immediately reported to the
military.

5. The reason for the denial shall be given in all cases.

In the 1992 case of Re: Request for Certified True Copies of the Sworn Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Networth,47
the request was denied because the Court found that the purpose of the request was to fish for information against
certain members of the Judiciary. In the same case, the Court resolved to authorize the Court Administrator to act on
all requests for copies of SALN, as well as other papers on file with the 201 Personnel Records of lower court judges and
personnel, provided that there was a court subpoena duly signed by the Presiding Judge in a pending criminal case
against a judge or personnel of the Judiciary. The Court added that for requests made by the Office of the Ombudsman,
the same must be personally signed by the Ombudsman himself. Essentially, the Court resolved that, in all instances,
requests must conform to the guidelines set in the Alejandrino case and that the documents or papers requested for
must be relevant and material to the case being tried by the court or under investigation by the Ombudsman.

In 1993, the Court, in Request for Certified True Copies of the Sworn Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth of
former Judge Luis D. Dictado,48 ruled that the OCA may extend its granted authority to retired members of the
Judiciary.

With respect to investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman in a criminal case against a judge, the Court,
in Maceda v. Vasquez,49 upheld its constitutional duty to exercise supervision over all inferior courts and ruled that an
investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman without prior referral of the criminal case to the Court was an
encroachment of a constitutional duty that ran afoul to the doctrine of separation of powers. This pronouncement was
further amplified in the abovementioned case of Caiobes. Thus:

x x x Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot
determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an
administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before
it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule
should hold true regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before the
Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this
matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the administrative authority of the
Court, because in determining whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court passes upon not only
administrative liabilities but also administrative concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the case of Maceda v. Vasquez (221
SCRA 464[1993]).

The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that the case before it does or does not have
administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to
arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on
judicial independence.

Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only
the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Corollary to the above pronouncements, Section 7, Article III of the Constitution is relevant in the issue of public
disclosure of SALN and other documents of public officials, viz:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.

Emphasizing the import and meaning of the foregoing constitutional provision, the Court, in the landmark case of
Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.,50 elucidated on the import of the right to information in this wise:

The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this
system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people.
Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and
caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office is a public trust,
institutionalized in the Constitution to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere
empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied x x x.

x x x The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in
the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as
in checking abuse in government. (Emphases supplied)

In Baldoza v. Dimaano,51 the importance of the said right was pragmatically explicated:

The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of
information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation’s problems, nor a
meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is
needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed:
"Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if
either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." However, restrictions on access to certain records may be
imposed by law.

Thus, while "public concern" like "public interest" eludes exact definition and has been said to embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because such matters directly affect their lives, or
simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen,52 the Constitution itself, under Section
17, Article XI, has classified the information disclosed in the SALN as a matter of public concern and interest. In other
words, a "duty to disclose" sprang from the "right to know." Both of constitutional origin, the former is a command
while the latter is a permission. Hence, the duty on the part of members of the government to disclose their SALNs to
the public in the manner provided by law:

Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by
law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other
constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to
the public in the manner provided by law. [Emphasis supplied]

This Constitutional duty is echoed and particularized in a statutory creation of Congress: Republic Act No. 6713, also
known as "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees":53

Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. - Public officials and employees have an obligation to accomplish and submit
declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and
business interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in
their households.
(A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure. - All public officials and employees, except those who
serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall file under oath their Statement of
Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and those of their
spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.

The two documents shall contain information on the following:

(a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value and current fair market value;

(b) personal property and acquisition cost;

(c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like;

(d) liabilities, and;

(e) all business interests and financial connections.

The documents must be filed:

(a) within thirty (30) days after assumption of office;

(b) on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and

(c) within thirty (30) days after separation from the service.

All public officials and employees required under this section to file the aforestated documents shall also execute,
within thirty (30) days from the date of their assumption of office, the necessary authority in favor of the Ombudsman
to obtain from all appropriate government agencies, including the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such documents as may
show their assets, liabilities, net worth, and also their business interests and financial connections in previous years,
including, if possible, the year when they first assumed any office in the Government.

Husband and wife who are both public officials or employees may file the required statements jointly or separately.

The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections
shall be filed by:

(1) Constitutional and national elective officials, with the national office of the Ombudsman;

(2) Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively;
Justices, with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court; Judges, with the Court Administrator; and all national executive
officials with the Office of the President.
(3) Regional and local officials and employees, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions;

(4) Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, with the Office of the President, and those
below said ranks, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions; and

(5) All other public officials and employees, defined in Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, with the Civil Service
Commission.

(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives. - It shall be the duty of every public official or employee to identify and
disclose, to the best of his knowledge and information, his relatives in the Government in the form, manner and
frequency prescribed by the Civil Service Commission. (Emphasis supplied)

Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information, with its companion right of access to official
records, is not absolute. While providing guaranty for that right, the Constitution also provides that the people’s right
to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Jurisprudence54 has provided the following limitations to that right: (1) national security matters and intelligence
information; (2) trade secrets and banking transactions; (3) criminal matters; and (4) other confidential information
such as confidential or classified information officially known to public officers and employees by reason of their office
and not made available to the public as well as diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive
sessions of either house of Congress, and the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.

This could only mean that while no prohibition could stand against access to official records, such as the SALN, the
same is undoubtedly subject to regulation.

In this regard, Section 8 (c) and (d) of R.A. No. 6713 provides for the limitation and prohibition on the regulated access
to SALNs of government officials and employees, viz:

(C) Accessibility of documents. - (1) Any and all statements filed under this Act, shall be made available for inspection at
reasonable hours.

(2) Such statements shall be made available for copying or reproduction after ten (10) working days from the time they
are filed as required by law.

(3) Any person requesting a copy of a statement shall be required to pay a reasonable fee to cover the cost of
reproduction and mailing of such statement, as well as the cost of certification.

(4) Any statement filed under this Act shall be available to the public for a period of ten (10) years after receipt of the
statement. After such period, the statement may be destroyed unless needed in an ongoing investigation.

(D) Prohibited acts. - It shall be unlawful for any person to obtain or use any statement filed under this Act for:

(a) any purpose contrary to morals or public policy; or

(b) any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media for dissemination to the general public.
Moreover, the following provisions in the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 6713 provide:

Rule IV

Transparency of Transactions and Access to Information

xxxx

Section 3. Every department, office or agency shall provide official information, records or documents to any requesting
public, except if:

(a) such information, record or document must be kept secret in the interest of national defense or security or the
conduct of foreign affairs;

(b) such disclosure would put the life and safety of an individual in imminent danger;

(c) the information, record or document sought falls within the concepts of established privilege or recognized
exceptions as may be provided by law or settled policy or jurisprudence;

(d) such information, record or document compromises drafts or decisions, orders, rulings, policy, decisions,
memoranda, etc;

(e) it would disclose information of a personal nature where disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy;

(f) it would disclose investigatory records complied for law enforcement purposes, or information which if written
would be contained in such records or information would (i) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (ii) deprive a
person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (iii) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the
case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an
agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the
confidential source, or (iv) unjustifiably disclose investigative techniques and procedures; or

(g) it would disclose information the premature disclosure of which would (i) in the case of a department, office or
agency which agency regulates currencies, securities, commodities, of financial institutions, be likely to lead to
significant financial speculation in currencies, securities, or commodities or significantly endanger the stability of any
financial institution, or (ii) in the case of any department, office or agency be likely or significantly to frustrate
implementation of a proposed official action, except that subparagraph (f) (ii) shall not apply in any instance where the
department, office or agency has already disclosed to the public the content or nature of its proposed action, or where
the department, office or agency is required by law to make such disclosure on its own initiative prior to taking final
official action on such proposal.

xxxx

Rule VI

Duties of Public Officials and Employees

Section 6. All public documents must be made accessible to, and readily available for inspection by, the public during
working hours, except those provided in Section 3, Rule IV.

The power to regulate the access by the public to these documents stems from the inherent power of the Court, as
custodian of these personal documents, to control its very office to the end that damage to, or loss of, the records may
be avoided; that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the books and documents and other employees
may be prevented; and that the right of other persons entitled to make inspection may be insured.55

In this connection, Section 11 of the same law provides for the penalties in case there should be a misuse of the SALN
and the information contained therein, viz:

Section 11. Penalties. - (a) Any public official or employee, regardless of whether or not he holds office or employment
in a casual, temporary, holdover, permanent or regular capacity, committing any violation of this Act shall be punished
with a fine not exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months' salary or suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or removal
depending on the gravity of the offense after due notice and hearing by the appropriate body or agency. If the violation
is punishable by a heavier penalty under another law, he shall be prosecuted under the latter statute. Violations of
Sections 7, 8 or 9 of this Act shall be punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not exceeding
five thousand pesos (₱ 5,000), or both, and, in the discretion of the court of competent jurisdiction, disqualification to
hold public office.

(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal
of a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.

(c) Private individuals who participate in conspiracy as co-principals, accomplices or accessories, with public officials or
employees, in violation of this Act, shall be subject to the same penal liabilities as the public officials or employees and
shall be tried jointly with them.

(d) The official or employee concerned may bring an action against any person who obtains or uses a report for any
purpose prohibited by Section 8 (d) of this Act. The Court in which such action is brought may assess against such
person a penalty in any amount not to exceed twenty-five thousand pesos (₱ 25,000.00). If another sanction hereunder
or under any other law is heavier, the latter shall apply.

Considering the foregoing legal precepts vis-à-vis the various requests made, the Court finds no cogent reason to deny
the public access to the SALN, PDS and CV of the Justices of the Court and other magistrates of the Judiciary subject, of
course, to the limitations and prohibitions provided in R.A. No. 6713, its implementing rules and regulations, and in the
guidelines set forth in the decretal portion.

The Court notes the valid concerns of the other magistrates regarding the possible illicit motives of some individuals in
their requests for access to such personal information and their publication. However, custodians of public documents
must not concern themselves with the motives, reasons and objects of the persons seeking access to the records. The
moral or material injury which their misuse might inflict on others is the requestor’s responsibility and lookout. Any
publication is made subject to the consequences of the law.56 While public officers in the custody or control of public
records have the discretion to regulate the manner in which records may be inspected, examined or copied by
interested persons, such discretion does not carry with it the authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, or
copying of the records.57 After all, public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.58

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the requests contained in the (1) Letter, dated July 30, 2009, of Rowena C.
Paraan; (2) Letter, dated August 13, 2009, of Karol M. Ilagan; (3) Letter, dated April 21, 2010, of the Philippine Public
Transparency Reporting Project; (4) Letter, filed on August 24, 2011, by Marvin Lim; (5) Letter, dated August 26, 2011,
of Rawnna Crisostomo; (6) Letter, dated October 11, 2011, of Bala S. Tamayo; (7) Letters, all dated December 19, 2011,
of Harvey S. Keh; (8) Letter, dated December 21, 2011, of Glenda M. Gloria; (9) Letters, all dated January 3, 2012, of
Phillipe Manalang; (10) Letter, dated December 19, 2011, of Malou Mangahas; (11) Letter, dated January 16, 2012, of
Nilo "Ka Nilo" H. Baculo; (12) Letter, dated January 25, 2012, of Roxanne Escaro-Alegre; (13) Letter, dated January 27,
2012, of David Jude Sta. Ana; (14) Letter, dated January 31, 2012, of Michael G. Aguinaldo; (15) undated Letter of
Benise P. Balaoing; (16) Letter, dated April 27, 2012, of Maria A. Ressa; (17) Letter, dated May 2, 2012, of Mary Ann A.
Señir; (18) Letter, dated May 4, 2012, of Edward Gabud, Sr., Desk Editor of Solar Network, Inc.; (19) Letter, dated May
30, 2012, of Gerry Lirio, Senior News Editor, TV5; (20) Letter, dated May 31, 2002, of Atty. Joselito P. Fangon of the
Office of the Ombudsman; and (21) Letter, dated June 7, 2012, of Thea Marie S. Pias, insofar as copies of the 2011
SALN, PDS, and CV of the Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the Court of Tax
Appeals; Judges of lower courts; and other members of the Judiciary, are concerned, subject to the limitations and
prohibitions provided in R.A. No. 6713, its implementing rules and regulations, and the following guidelines:

1. All requests shall be filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals; for the lower courts, with the Office of the Court Administrator; and for
attached agencies, with their respective heads of offices.

2. Requests shall cover only copies of the latest SALN, PDS and CV of the members, officials and employees of the
Judiciary, and may cover only previous records if so specifically requested and considered as justified, as determined by
the officials mentioned in par. 1 above, under the terms of these guidelines and the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 6713.

3. In the case of requests for copies of SALN of the Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, the authority to disclose shall be made by the Court En Banc.

4. Every request shall explain the requesting party’s specific purpose and their individual interests sought to be served;
shall state the commitment that the request shall only be for the stated purpose; and shall be submitted in a duly
accomplished request form secured from the SC website. The use of the information secured shall only be for the
stated purpose.

5. In the case of requesting individuals other than members of the media, their interests should go beyond pure or
mere curiosity.1âwphi1

6. In the case of the members of the media, the request shall additionally be supported by proof under oath of their
media affiliation and by a similar certification of the accreditation of their respective organizations as legitimate media
practitioners.

7. The requesting party, whether as individuals or as members of the media, must have no derogatory record of having
misused any requested information previously furnished to them.

The requesting parties shall complete their requests in accordance with these guidelines. The custodians of these
documents59 (the respective Clerks of Court of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, and Court of Tax
Appeals for the Justices; and the Court Administrator for the Judges of various trial courts) shall preliminarily determine
if the requests are not covered by the limitations and prohibitions provided in R.A. No. 6713 and its implementing rules
and regulations, and in accordance with the aforecited guidelines. Thereafter, the Clerk of Court shall refer the matter
pertaining to Justices to the Court En Banc for final determination.

SO ORDERED
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM ( GSIS) and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as GSIS President &
General Manager, Petitioners, versus KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 170132 | 2006-12-06

Tagged under keywords

SECOND DIVISION

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) and its President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia (Garcia, for short) assail and seek to nullify the
Decision[1] dated June 16, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87220, as reiterated in its Resolution[2]
of October 18, 2005 denying Garcia's motion for reconsideration.

The recourse is cast against the following setting:

A four-day October 2004 concerted demonstration, rallies and en masse walkout waged/held in front of the GSIS main
office in Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, started it all. Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass action
participants were GSIS personnel, among them members of the herein respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa
GSIS ("KMG" or the "Union"), a public sector union of GSIS rank-and-file employees. Contingents from other
government agencies joined causes with the GSIS group. The mass action's target appeared to have been herein
petitioner Garcia and his management style. While the Mayor of Pasay City allegedly issued a rally permit, the absence
of the participating GSIS employees was not covered by a prior approved leave.[3]

On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a memorandum directing 131 union
and non-union members to show cause why they should not be charged administratively for their participation in said
rally. In reaction, KMG's counsel, Atty. Manuel Molina, sought reconsideration of said directive on the ground, among
others, that the subject employees resumed work on October 8, 2004 in obedience to the return-to-work order thus
issued. The plea for reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by the filing, on October 25, 2004, of
administrative charges against some 110 KMG members for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.[4]

What happened next is summarized by the CA in its challenged decision of June 16, 2005, albeit the herein petitioners
would except from some of the details of the appellate court's narration:

Ignoring said formal charges, KMG, thru its President, Albert Velasco, commenced the instant suit on November 2,
2004, with the filing of the Petition for Prohibition at bench. On the ground that its members should not be made to
explain why they supported their union's cause, petitioner [KMG] faulted respondent [Garcia] with blatant disregard of
Civil Service Resolution No. 021316, otherwise known as the Guidelines for Prohibited Mass Action, Section 10 of which
exhorts government agencies to "harness all means within their capacity to accord due regard and attention to
employees' grievances and facilitate their speedy and amicable disposition through the use of grievance machinery or
any other modes of settlement sanctioned by law and existing civil service rules." Two supplements to the foregoing
petition were eventually filed by KMG. The first, ... apprised [the CA] of the supposed fact that its Speaker, Atty. Molina,
had been placed under preventive suspension for 90 days and that the formal charges thus filed will not only deprive its
members of the privileges and benefits due them but will also disqualify them from promotion, step increment
adjustments and receipt of monetary benefits, including their 13th month pay and Christmas bonuses. The second, xxx
manifested that, on December 17, 2004, respondent [Garcia] served a spate of additional formal charges against 230 of
KMG's members for their participation in the aforesaid grievance demonstrations.

In his December 14, 2004 comment to the foregoing petition, respondent [Garcia] averred that the case at bench was
filed by an unauthorized representative in view of the fact that Albert Velasco had already been dropped from the GSIS
rolls and, by said token, had ceased to be a member - much less the President - of KMG. Invoking the rule against forum
shopping, respondent [Garcia] called [the CA's] attention to the supposed fact that the allegations in the subject
petition merely duplicated those already set forth in two petitions for certiorari and prohibition earlier filed by Albert
Velasco .... Because said petitions are, in point of fact, pending before this court as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 86130 and 86365,
respondent [Garcia] prayed for the dismissal of the petition at bench ....[5] (Words in bracket added.)

It appears that pending resolution by the CA of the KMG petition for prohibition in this case, the GSIS management
proceeded with the investigation of the administrative cases filed. As represented in a pleading before the CA, as of
May 18, 2005, two hundred seven (207) out of the two hundred seventy eight (278) cases filed had been resolved,
resulting in the exoneration of twenty (20) respondent-employees, the reprimand of one hundred eighty two (182) and
the suspension for one month of five (5).[6]

On June 16, 2005, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision[7] holding that Garcia's "filing of administrative charges
against 361 of [KMG's] members is tantamount to grave abuse of discretion which may be the proper subject of the
writ of prohibition." Dispositively, the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition [of KMG] is GRANTED and respondent [Winston F. Garcia] is hereby
PERPETUALLY ENJOINED from implementing the issued formal charges and from issuing other formal charges arising
from the same facts and events.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)

Unable to accept the above ruling and the purported speculative factual and erroneous legal premises holding it
together, petitioner Garcia sought reconsideration. In its equally assailed Resolution[8] of October 18, 2005, however,
the appellate court denied reconsideration of its decision.

Hence, this recourse by the petitioners ascribing serious errors on the appellate court in granting the petition for
prohibition absent an instance of grave abuse of authority on their part.

We resolve to GRANT the petition.

It should be stressed right off that the civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like the GSIS,[9] or those created by
special law.[10] As such, employees of covered GOCCs are part of the civil service system and are subject to circulars,
rules and regulations issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on discipline, attendance and general
terms/conditions of employment, inclusive of matters involving self-organization, strikes, demonstrations and like
concerted actions. In fact, policies established on public sector unionism and rules issued on mass action have been
noted and cited by the Court in at least a case.[11] Among these issuances is Executive Order (EO) No. 180, series of
1987, providing guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government employees. Relevant also is CSC
Resolution No. 021316 which provides rules on prohibited concerted mass actions in the public sector.

There is hardly any dispute about the formal charges against the 278 affected GSIS employees - a mix of KMG union and
non-union members - having arose from their having gone on unauthorized leave of absence (AWOL) for at least a day
or two in the October 4 to 7, 2004 stretch to join the ranks of the demonstrators /rallyists at that time. As stated in
each of the formal charges, the employee's act of attending, joining, participating and taking part in the strike/rally is a
transgression of the rules on strike in the public sector. The question that immediately comes to the fore, therefore, is
whether or not the mass action staged by or participated in by said GSIS employees partook of a strike or prohibited
concerted mass action. If in the affirmative, then the denounced filing of the administrative charges would be prima
facie tenable, inasmuch as engaging in mass actions resulting in work stoppage or service disruption constitutes, in the
minimum, the punishable offense of acting prejudicial to the best interest of the service.[12] If in the negative, then
such filing would indeed smack of arbitrariness and justify the issuance of a corrective or preventive writ.

Petitioners assert that the filing of the formal charges are but a natural consequence of the service-disrupting rallies
and demonstrations staged during office hours by the absenting GSIS employees, there being appropriate issuances
outlawing such kinds of mass action. On the other hand, the CA, agreeing with the respondent's argument, assumed
the view and held that the organized demonstrating employees did nothing more than air their grievances in the
exercise of their "broader rights of free expression"[13] and are, therefore, not amenable to administrative sanctions.
For perspective, following is what the CA said:

Although the filing of administrative charges against [respondent KMG's] members is well within [petitioner Garcia's]
official [disciplinary] prerogatives, [his] exercise of the power vested under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 8291 was
tainted with arbitrariness and vindictiveness against which prohibition was sought by [respondent]. xxx the fact that
the subject mass demonstrations were directed against [Garcia's] supposed mismanagement of the financial resources
of the GSIS, by and of itself, renders the filing of administrative charges against [KMG's] member suspect. More
significantly, we find the gravity of the offenses and the sheer number of persons ... charged administratively to be, at
the very least, antithetical to the best interest of the service....

It matters little that, instead of the 361 alleged by petitioner, only 278 charges were actually filed [and] in the
meantime, disposed of and of the said number, 20 resulted to exoneration, 182 to reprimand and 5 to the imposition of
a penalty of one month suspension. Irrespective of their outcome, the severe penalties prescribed for the offense with
which petitioner's members were charged, to our mind, bespeak of bellicose and castigatory reaction .... The fact that
most of the employees [Garcia] administratively charged were eventually meted with what appears to be a virtual slap
on the wrist even makes us wonder why respondent even bothered to file said charges at all. xxx.

Alongside the consequences of the right of government employees to form, join or assist employees organization, we
have already mentioned how the broader rights of free expression cast its long shadow over the case. xxx we find
[petitioner Garcia's] assailed acts, on the whole, anathema to said right which has been aptly characterized as
preferred, one which stands on a higher level than substantive economic and other liberties, the matrix of other
important rights of our people. xxx.[14] (Underscoring and words in bracket added; citations omitted.)

While its decision and resolution do not explicitly say so, the CA equated the right to form associations with the right to
engage in strike and similar activities available to workers in the private sector. In the concrete, the appellate court
concluded that inasmuch as GSIS employees are not barred from forming, joining or assisting employees' organization,
petitioner Garcia could not validly initiate charges against GSIS employees waging or joining rallies and demonstrations
notwithstanding the service-disruptive effect of such mass action. Citing what Justice Isagani Cruz said in Manila Public
School Teachers Association [MPSTA] v. Laguio, Jr.,[15] the appellate court declared:

It is already evident from the aforesaid provisions of Resolution No. 021316 that employees of the GSIS are not among
those specifically barred from forming, joining or assisting employees organization such as [KMG]. If only for this
ineluctable fact, the merit of the petition at bench is readily discernible.[16]

We are unable to lend concurrence to the above CA posture. For, let alone the fact that it ignores what the Court has
uniformly held all along, the appellate court's position is contrary to what Section 4 in relation to Section 5 of CSC
Resolution No. 021316[17] provides. Besides, the appellate court's invocation of Justice Cruz's opinion in MPSTA is
clearly off-tangent, the good Justice's opinion thereat being a dissent. It may be, as the appellate court urged¸ that
the freedom of expression and assembly and the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances stand on a
level higher than economic and other liberties. Any suggestion, however, about these rights as including the right on
the part of government personnel to strike ought to be, as it has been, trashed. We have made this abundantly clear in
our past determinations. For instance, in Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment,[18] a
case decided under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution, an en banc Court declared that it would be unfair to allow
employees of government corporations to resort to concerted activity with the ever present threat of a strike to wring
benefits from Government. Then came the 1987 Constitution expressly guaranteeing, for the first time, the right of
government personnel to self-organization[19] to complement the provision according workers the right to engage in
"peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law."[20]

It was against the backdrop of the aforesaid provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the Court resolved Bangalisan v.
Court of Appeals.[21] In it, we held, citing MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr.,[22] that employees in the public service may not engage
in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of government employees to organize is
limited to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to strike.

Jacinto v. Court of Appeals[23] came next and there we explained:

Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was positively recognized in Association of Court of
Appeals Employees vs. Ferrer-Caleja. But, as in the exercise of the rights of free expression and of assembly, there are
standards for allowable limitations such as the legitimacy of the purpose of the association, [and] the overriding
considerations of national security . . . .

As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the provision "in accordance with law."
This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such
right. Executive Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers to organize,
for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which "enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all
government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of
mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service" by stating that the Civil Service law
and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in government service shall be observed. (Emphasis and words in
bracket added; citations omitted)

And in the fairly recent case of Gesite v. Court of Appeals,[24] the Court defined the limits of the right of government
employees to organize in the following wise:

It is relevant to state at this point that the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that employees in the public service may not
engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and other forms of mass action that will lead in the temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service. The right of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or
associations only, without including the right to strike, adding that public employees going on disruptive unauthorized
absences to join concerted mass actions may be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Significantly, 1986 Constitutional Commission member Eulogio Lerum, answering in the negative the poser of whether
or not the right of government employees to self-organization also includes the right to strike, stated:

When we proposed this amendment providing for self organization of government employees, it does not mean that
because they have the right to organize, they have also the right to strike. That is a different matter. xxx[25]

With the view we take of the events that transpired on October 4-7, 2004, what respondent's members launched or
participated in during that time partook of a strike or, what contextually amounts to the same thing, a prohibited
concerted activity. The phrase "prohibited concerted activity" refers to any collective activity undertaken by
government employees, by themselves or through their employees' organization, with the intent of effecting work
stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise; it
includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature.[26] Indeed, for four straight days, participating KMG
members and other GSIS employees staged a walk out and waged or participated in a mass protest or demonstration
right at the very doorstep of the GSIS main office building. The record of attendance[27] for the period material shows
that, on the first day of the protest, 851 employees, or forty eight per cent (48%) of the total number of employees in
the main office (1,756) took to the streets during office hours, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.,[28] leaving the other employees to
fend for themselves in an office where a host of transactions take place every business day. On the second day, 707
employees left their respective work stations, while 538 participated in the mass action on the third day. A smaller
number, i.e., 306 employees, but by no means an insignificant few, joined the fourth day activity.

To say that there was no work disruption or that the delivery of services remained at the usual level of efficiency at the
GSIS main office during those four (4) days of massive walkouts and wholesale absences would be to understate things.
And to place the erring employees beyond the reach of administrative accountability would be to trivialize the civil
service rules, not to mention the compelling spirit of professionalism exacted of civil servants by the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. [29]

The appellate court made specific reference to the "parliament of the streets," obviously to lend concurrence to
respondent's pretension that the gathering of GSIS employees on October 4-7, 2004 was an "assembly of citizens" out
only to air grievances, not a striking crowd. According to the respondent, a strike presupposes a mass action
undertaken to press for some economic demands or secure additional material employment benefits.

We are not convinced.

In whatever name respondent desires to call the four-day mass action in October 2004, the stubborn fact remains that
the erring employees, instead of exploring non-crippling activities during their free time, had taken a disruptive
approach to attain whatever it was they were specifically after. As events evolved, they assembled in front of the GSIS
main office building during office hours and staged rallies and protests, and even tried to convince others to join their
cause, thus provoking work stoppage and service-delivery disruption, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the
prohibition against strikes by government personnel.[30]
The Court can concede hypothetically that the protest rally and gathering in question did not involve some specific
material demand. But then the absence of such economic-related demand, even if true, did not, under the premises,
make such mass action less of a prohibited concerted activity. For, as articulated earlier, any collective activity
undertaken by government employees with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to
realize their demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise, is a prohibited concerted mass action[31] and
doubtless actionable administratively. Bangalisan even went further to say the following: "[i]n the absence of statute,
public employees do not have the right to engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose."

To petitioner Garcia, as President and General Manager of GSIS, rests the authority and responsibility, under Section 45
of Republic Act No. 8291, the GSIS Act of 1997, to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for cause.
[32] At bottom then, petitioner Garcia, by filing or causing the filing of administrative charges against the absenting
participants of the October 4-7, 2004 mass action, merely performed a duty expected of him and enjoined by law.
Regardless of the mood petitioner Garcia was in when he signed the charge sheet, his act can easily be sustained as
legally correct and doubtless within his jurisdiction.

It bears to reiterate at this point that the GSIS employees concerned were proceeded against - and eventually either
exonerated, reprimanded or meted a one-month suspension, as the case may be - not for the exercise of their right to
assemble peacefully and to petition for redress of grievance, but for engaging in what appeared to be a prohibited
concerted activity. Respondent no less admitted that its members and other GSIS employees might have disrupted
public service.[33]

To be sure, arbitrariness and whimsical exercise of power or, in fine, grave abuse of discretion on the part of petitioner
Garcia cannot be simplistically inferred from the sheer number of those charged as well as the gravity or the dire
consequences of the charge of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as the
appellate court made it to appear. The principle of accountability demands that every erring government employee be
made answerable for any malfeasance or misfeasance committed. And lest it be overlooked, the mere filing of formal
administrative case, regardless of the gravity of the offense charged, does not overcome the presumptive innocence of
the persons complained of nor does it shift the burden of evidence to prove guilt of an administrative offense from the
complainant.

Moreover, the Court invites attention to its holding in MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., a case involving over 800 public school
teachers who took part in mass actions for which the then Secretary of Education filed administrative complaints on
assorted charges, such as gross misconduct. Of those charged, 650 were dismissed and 195 suspended for at least six
(6) months The Court, however, did not consider the element of number of respondents thereat and/or the dire
consequences of the charge/s as fatally vitiating or beclouding the bona fides of the Secretary of Education's challenged
action. Then as now, the Court finds the filing of charges against a large number of persons and/or the likelihood that
they will be suspended or, worse, dismissed from the service for the offense as indicating a strong and clear case of
grave abuse of authority to justify the issuance of a writ of prohibition.

The appellate court faulted petitioner Garcia for not first taping existing grievance machinery and other modes of
settlement agreed upon in the GSIS-KMG Collective Negotiations Agreement (CAN) before going full steam ahead with
his formal charges.[34]

The Court can plausibly accord cogency to the CA's angle on grievance procedure but for the fact that it conveniently
disregarded what appears to be the more relevant provision of the CNA. We refer to Article VI which reads:

The GSIS Management and the KMG have mutually agreed to promote the principle of shared responsibility ... on all
matters and decisions affecting the rights, benefits and interests of all GSIS employees .... Accordingly, ... the parties
also mutually agree that the KMG shall not declare a strike nor stage any concerted action which will disrupt public
service and the GSIS management shall not lockout employees who are members of the KMG during the term of this
agreement. GSIS Management shall also respect the rights of the employees to air their sentiments through peaceful
concerted activities during allowable hours, subject to reasonable office rules ....[35] (Underscoring added)
If the finger of blame, therefore, is to be pointed at someone for non-exhaustion of less confrontational remedies, it
should be at the respondent union for spearheading a concerted mass action without resorting to available settlement
mechanism. As it were, it was KMG, under Atty. Alberto Velasco, which opened fire first. That none of the parties
bothered to avail of the grievance procedures under the GSIS-KMG CNA should not be taken against the GSIS. At best,
both GSIS management and the Union should be considered as in pari delicto.

With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss at length the legal standing of Alberto
Velasco to represent the herein respondent union and to initiate the underlying petition for prohibition. Suffice it to
state that Velasco, per Joint Resolution No. 04-10-01 approved on October 5, 2004 by the KMG Joint Executive-
Legislative Assembly, had ceased to be member, let alone president, of the KMG, having previously been dropped from
the rolls of GSIS employees.[36] While the dropping from the rolls is alleged to have been the subject of a CA-issued
temporary restraining order (TRO), the injunction came after Atty. Velasco had in fact been separated from the service
and it appears that the TRO had already expired.

As a final consideration, the Court notes or reiterates the following relevant incidents surrounding the disposition of
the case below:

1. The CA had invoked as part of its ratio decidendi a dissenting opinion in MPSTA, even going to the extent of
describing as "instructive and timely" a portion, when the majority opinion thereat, which the appellate court ignored,
is the controlling jurisprudence.

2. The CA gave prominence to dispositions and rattled off holdings[37] of the Court, which appropriately apply only to
strikes in the private industry labor sector, and utilized the same as springboard to justify an inference of grave abuse of
discretion. On the other hand, it only gave perfunctory treatment if not totally ignored jurisprudence that squarely
dealt with strikes in the public sector, as if the right to strike given to unions in private corporations/entities is
necessarily applicable to civil service employees.

3. As couched, the assailed CA decision perpetually bars respondent Garcia - and necessarily whoever succeeds him as
GSIS President - not only from implementing the formal charges against GSIS employees who participated in the
October 4 - 7, 2004 mass action but also from issuing other formal charges arising from the same events. The injunction
was predicated on a finding that grave abuse of discretion attended the exercise of petitioner Garcia's disciplinary
power vested him under Section 45 of RA 8291.[38] At bottom then, the assailed decision struck down as a nullity,
owing to the alleged attendant arbitrariness, not only acts that have already been done, but those yet to be done. In
net effect, any formal charge arising from the October 4-7, 2004 incident is, under any and all circumstances, prejudged
as necessarily tainted with arbitrariness to be slain at sight.

The absurdities and ironies easily deducible from the foregoing situations are not lost on the Court.

We close with the observation that the assailed decision and resolution, if allowed to remain undisturbed, would likely
pave the way to the legitimization of mass actions undertaken by civil servants, regardless of their deleterious effects
on the interest of the public they have sworn to serve with loyalty and efficiency. Worse still, it would permit the
emergence of a system where public sector workers are, as the petitioners aptly put it, "immune from the minimum
reckoning for acts that [under settled jurisprudence] are concededly unlawful." This aberration would be intolerable.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the writ of
prohibition issued by that court is NULLIFIED.

No Cost.
SO ORDERED.

DAVAO CITY WATER DISTRICT REPRESENTED BY ITS GENERAL MANAGER, RODORA N. GAMBOA,
PETITIONER, VS. RODRIGO L. ARANJUEZ, GREGORIO S. CAGULA, CELESTINO A. BONDOC, DANILO L. BUHAY, PEDRO
E. ALCALA, JOSEPH A. VALDEZ, TITO V. SABANGAN, MARCELINO B. ANINO, JUANITO C. PANSACALA, JOEMARIE B. ALBA,
ANTERO M. YMAS, ROLANDO L. LARGO, RENEBOY U. ESTEBAN, MANUEL B. LIBANG, ROMEORICO A. LLANOS, ARTHUR
C. BACHILLER, SOCRATES V. CORCUERA, ALEJANDRO C. PICHON, GRACIANO A. MONCADA, ROLANDO K. ESCORIAL,
NOEL A. DAGALE, EMILIO S. MOLINA, SHERWIN S. SOLAMO, FULGENCIO I. DYGUAZO, GUALBERTO S. PAGATPAT,
JOSEPH B. ARTAJO, FELIXBERTO Q. OBENZA, FLORANTE A. FERRAREN, ELSA A. ELORDE, CARLOS P. MORRE, JAMES
AQUILINO M. COLOMA, JOAQUIN O. CADORNA, JR., LORNA M. MAXINO, ROMULO A. REYES, NOEL G. LEGASPI,
ELEANOR R. LAMOSTE, WELMER E. CRASCO, DELIO T. OLAER, VICENTE R. MASUCOL, IRENEO A. CUBAL, EDWIN A. DELA
PENA, JIMMY A. TROCIO, WILFREDO L. TORREON, ALEJANDRITO M. ALO, RAUL S. SAGA, JOSELITO P. RICONALLA,
TRISEBAL Q. AGUILAR, ARMAN N. LORENZO, SR. AND PEDRO C. GUNTING, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 194192 | 2015-06-16

EN BANC

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] of the Decision[2] of the Twenty Third Division of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 02793-MIN dated 7 October 2010, affirming the 14 January 2009 Resolution No. 09-0047 rendered by
the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

The Facts

Petitioner Davao City Water District (DCWD) is a government-owned and controlled corporation in Davao City
represented by its General Manager Engr. Rodora N. Gamboa (GM Gamboa).

The private respondents, namely, Rodrigo L. Aranjuez, Gregorio S. Cagula, Celestino A. Bondoc, Danilo L. Buhay, Pedro
E. Alcala, Joseph A. Valdez, Tito V. Sabangan, Marcelino B. Anino, Juanito C. Pansacala, Joemarie B. Alba, Antero M.
Ymas, Rolando L. Largo, Reneboy U. Esteban, Manuel B. Libang, Romeorico A. Llanos, Arthur C. Bachiller, Socrates V.
Corcuera, Alejandro C. Pichon, Graciano A . Moncada, Rolando K. Escorial, Noel A. Dagale, Emilio S. Molina, Sherwin S.
Solamo, Fulgencio I. Dyguazo, Gualberto S. Pagatpat, Joseph B. Artajo, Felixberto Q. Obenza, Florante A. Ferraren, Elsa
A. Elorde, Carlos P. Morre, James Aquilino M. Coloma, Joaquin O. Cadorna, Jr., Lorna M. Maxino, Romulo A. Reyes, Noel
G. Legaspi, Eleanor R. Lamoste, Welmer E. Crasco, Delio T. Olaer, Vicente R. Masucol, Ireneo A. Cubal, Edwin A. dela
Pena, Jimmy A. Trocio, Wilfredo L. Torreon, Alejandrito M. Alo, Raul S. Saga, Joselito P. Riconalla, Trisebal Q. Aguilar,
Arman N. Lorenzo, Sr. and Pedro C. Gunting (Aranjuez, et al.) are officers and members of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa
Davao City Water District (NAMADACWAD). They were charged with several administrative cases due to acts
committed during the anniversary celebration of DCWD such as wearing of t-shirts with inscriptions and posting of
bond papers outside the designated places. The inscriptions and postings bore employees' grievances.

The records show that as early as 16 May 2007, the members and officers of NAMADACWAD have been staging pickets
in front of the DCWD Office during their lunch breaks to air their grievances about the non-payment of their Collective
Negotiation Agreement (CNA) incentives and their opposition to DCWD's privatization and proposed One Hundred
Million Peso Loan.

On 31 October 2007, GM Gamboa issued an Office Memorandum addressed to all department managers concerning
the different activities that would take place during DCWD's then upcoming anniversary celebration. The Memorandum
reads:

Please be informed that the opening activities of our 34th anniversary this coming 09 November 2007 are the
motorcade and the fun run. The assembly area will be at the Victoria Plaza Mall parking, in front of Cynthia's Lechon
Hauz, 6:00 o'clock in the morning.

In view of this, everybody is expected to be there except only those who are assigned as a skeletal force. All carpool
vehicles are also enjoined to proceed at the said area. The participants are free to wear any sports attire. Further, you
are advised to sign in the attendance sheet provided by the HRD.[3]

On 8 November 2007, the officers and members of NAMADACWAD held an Emergency General Assembly and they
agreed to wear NAMADACWAD t-shirts with inscriptions stating, "CNA Incentive Ihatag Na, Dir. Braganza Pahawa Na!"
on the day of the anniversary.[4]

Came the anniversary, officers and members sported t-shirts with inscriptions "CNA Incentive Ihatag Na, Dir. Braganza
Pahawa Na!" at the beginning of the Fun Run at Victoria Plaza at around 6:30 in the morning and continued to wear the
same inside the premises of the DCWD office during the office hours. Also, one of the members of the Board of
Directors of NAMADACWAD Gregorio S. Cagula (Cagula), with the help of some of its members, attached similar
inscriptions and posters of employees' grievances to a post in the motor pool area, an area not among the officially
designated places[5] for posting of grievances as prescribed by DCWD's Office Memorandum[6] dated 8 February 1996
and pursuant to CSC Memorandum Circular No. 33,[7] Series of 1994 (MC No. 33).[8]

As a consequence of their actions, GM Gamboa sent a Memorandum dated 14 November 2007 addressed to the
officers and members of NAMADACWAD, requiring them to explain the reasons for the attire they wore during the
anniversary celebration. Through a collective letter dated 19 November 2007, the officers and members explained that
the Memorandum only required the employees to wear any sports attire, though theirs were with additional
inscriptions containing grievances. They countered that the inscriptions were but manifestations of their constitutional
rights of free speech and freedom.of expression.[9]

On 23 November 2007, another Memorandum was sent to the officers of NAMADACWAD requiring them to explain
within 72-hours why they should not be held liable for the actions committed by Cagula.[10]

Finding prima facie case against them, GM Gamboa filed formal charges against the officers and members of
NAMADACWAD as follow:
1. For DCWD Administrative Case No. 34-2007 against the officials of NAMADACWAD for violation of Existing Civil
Service Law and Rules of Serious Nature defined under Section 46 [12], Book V of Executive Order No. 292,[11] in
relation to Rule IV, Section 52 B [4] of the Civil Service Resolution No. 991936[12] dated August 31, 1999 and Civil
Service Resolution No. 021316[13] dated October 11, 2002 and MC No. 33 dated October 21, 1994.[14]

2. For DCWD Administrative Case Nos. 11-2007 to 33-2007 and 35-2007 to 44-2007 involving the individual members
of NAMADACWAD for violation of Existing Civil Service Law and Rules of Serious Nature defined under Section 46 [12],
Book V of Executive Order No. 292,[15] in relation to Rule IV, Section 52 B [4] of the Civil Service Resolution No. 991936
dated August 31, 1999 and Civil Service Resolution No. 021316 dated October 11, 2002.

After giving those concerned the opportunity to explain through several hearings and submission of additional
evidence, the Hearing Committee, through the authority given by DCWD to hear the administrative charges, filed on 14
March 2008 its Consolidated Resolution and Recommendation finding the officers and members of the NAMADACWAD
guilty as charged with penalties ranging from suspension to dismissal from service with all accessory penalties under
the CSC Law and Rules.[16]

On 19 March 2008, GM Gamboa issued several Orders[17] adopting the recommendation submitted by the Hearing
Committee but modifying some of the corresponding penalties in view of mitigating circumstances such as first
infraction and substantial justice. However, three officials namely Rodrigo L. Aranjuez, Cagula and Celestino A. Bondoc
were penalized with dismissal from the service for the reason that the infraction was the second administrative offense
of serious nature.[18]

Aggrieved, Aranjuez, et al., filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration[19] with Prayer to Suspend the Immediate
Execution of the Orders dated 19 March 2008. The Motion for Reconsideration was thereafter submitted for resolution
after the Hearing Committee waived the filing of a Comment. On 17 April 2008, the Motion was denied by DCWD.

On 2 May 2008, Aranjuez, et al., filed an appeal before the CSC bringing up, among other issues, the violation of their
constitutional rights to assemble and petition for redress of grievances.[20]

In its Comment, DCWD defended the Orders on the basis of Section 6 of CSC Resolution No. 021316[21] which provides
that the concerted activity like the participation of the officers and employees during the fun run wearing t-shirts with
inscriptions was prohibited because it was done during office hours; Moreover, the act of Cagula in posting papers with
grievances outside the designated areas was a clear violation of MC No. 33 in relation to 8 February 1996 Office
Memorandum. It was submitted that due to Cagula's membership in the Board of Directors of NAMADACWAD, the
other officers were solidarity responsible for his actions.[22]

CSC Resolution

On 14 January 2009, CSC issued a Resolution[23] partly granting the consolidated appeal and held that the collective act
of respondents in wearing t-shirts with grievance inscriptions during office hours was not within the ambit of the
definition of prohibited mass action punishable under CSC Resolution 021316 since there was no intent to cause work
stoppage. However, though not prohibited under the Resolution, the act was considered as an offense punishable
under "Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations." CSC further ruled that Cagula's act of posting of
grievances outside the designated areas was a clear violation of MC No. 33. By reason of Cagula's position, the other
officers of NAMADACWAD were considered as having agreed and conspired to commit the said act and as such are as
liable as Cagula.

On the other hand, and contrary to the assertions of DCWD, the violations committed by the private respondents are
not serious in nature due to the lack of any abusive, vulgar, defamatory or libelous language. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Consolidated Appeal filed by Rodrigo L. Aranjuez, et al. is PARTLY GRANTED. The Orders dated March
19, 2008 issued by the General Manager Rodora N. Gamboa finding appellants guilty of Violation of Existing Civil Service
Law and Rules of Serious Nature (Section 46 [12] Book V of Executive Order No. 292, in relation to Rule IV, Section 52 B
[4] of the CSC Resolution No. 991936 dated August 31, 1999 and CSC Resolution No. 021316 dated October 11, 2002
and CSC MC No. 33 dated October 21, 1994), are hereby MODIFIED. Accordingly, appellants are hereby found liable for
Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and are meted the following penalties, to wit:

1. As to members Danilo Buhay, Pedro E. Alcala, Joseph A. Valdez, Tito V. Sabangan, Marcelino B. Anino, Juanito C.
Pansacala, Joemarie B. Alba, Antero M. Ymas, Rolando L. Largo, Reneboy U. Esteban, Manuel B. Libang, Romeorico A.
Llanos, Arthur C. Bachiller, Socrates V. Corcuera, Alejandro C. Pichon, Graciano A. Moncada, Rolando Escorial, Noel A.
Dagale, Emilio S. Molina, Sherwin S. Solano, Danilo L. Buhay and Fulgencio I. Dyguazo, the penalty of reprimand;

2. As to officers Gualberta S. Pagatpat, Joseph A. Artalo, Felixberto Q. Obenza, Florante A. Ferraren, Elsa A. Horde,
Carlos P. Morre, James Aquilino M. Coloma, Joacquin O. Cadorna, Jr., Lorna M. Maximo, Romulo A. Reyes, Noel G.
Legazpi, Eleanor R. Lamoste, Welmer E. Crasco, Delio T. Olaer, Vicente R. Masucol, Ireneo Cubal, Rodrigo L. Aranjuez,
Gregorio S. Cagula and Celestino A. Bondoc, the penalty of reprimand and strong warning that a repetition of the same
shall be dealt with severely.

3. As to members Edwin A. dela Pena, Jummy A. Trocio, Wilfredo A. Torreon, Alejandrito M. Alo, Raul S. Saga, Joselito
P. Riconalla, Trisebal Q. Aguilar, Arman L. Lorenzo, Sr. and Pedro C. Gunting, they are likewise found guilty of the
offense of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations but are not meted a penalty considering that they are
casual employees whose renewal of appointments were held in abeyance.[24]

Aggrieved, DCWD filed a Petition for Review under Rules 43 before the Court of Appeals alleging procedural and
substantive infirmities of the CSC Resolution.

The Court of Appeals' Decision

In its decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto[25] the resolution of CSC.

The appellate court disagreed with the contention of DCWD that there was a violation of any provision of Resolution
No. 021316 in this wise:

As correctly observed by the Civil Service Commission, the act of respondents in sporting a t-shirt with the inscription
"CNA INCENTIVE IHATAG NA, DIRECTOR BRAGANZA, PAHAWA NA!" during the fun run and even inside the office
premises hardly qualifies as a prohibited concerted mass action under CSC Resolution No. 021316.

xxxx

To say the least, Section 5 of Resolution No. 01316 provides a specific guideline as to what constitutes a prohibited
concerted activity. A prohibited concerted activity must be one undertaken by government employees, by themselves
or through their association, with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption, in order to realize their
demands or force concessions. In the case at hand, we can readily observe that respondent's participation in the fun
run, as well as their behavior inside the premises of DCWD office during the regular working hours of that day indicate a
complete absence of any intention on their part to effect a work stoppage or disturbance. In fact, as attested by both
parlies, all the respondents participated with the planned activities and festivities on that day.[26]
The appellate court was likewise in agreement with the CSC which considered as simple violation of office rules the
posting of banners outside the designated posting areas by Cagula. Also like the CSC, it ruled that such offense is not
punishable with the penalty of dismissal.

The DCWD is now before us still with its basic arguments, though rephrased:

I.

The court a quo failed to rule on the issue whether or not the respondents' Consolidated Appeal filed before the CSC
was sufficient in form and substance.

II.

The court a quo erred in ruling that the concerted mass action on November 9, 2007 was not prohibited under
Resolution No. 021316.

III.

The court a quo erred in ruling that Resolution No. 021316 and MC No. 33 are considered "reasonable office rules and
regulations" within the purview of Section 52 C [3] of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases.

IV.

The court a quo erred in ruling that respondents' act of posting white bond papers with union-related inscriptions on
their t-shirts while inside the office premises does not constitute serious violation of Civil Service Rules but only a
violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations, despite the fact that the said Memorandum Circular No. 33 is a
CSC-issued Memorandum and not DCWD-issued Rules.

V.

The court a quo erred in ruling that MC No. 33 was not violated by respondent Gregorio S. Cagula and the rest of the
officials of NAMADACWAD who were charged in DCWD Administrative case No. 34-2007.

VI.

The court a quo erred in not taking into consideration that respondents Aranjuez, Cagula and Bondoc were second-time
offenders who were previously charged and penalized for violation of MC No. 33, thereby justifying their dismissal from
the service.

VII.

The court a quo erred when it failed to rule on the issue of whether the decisions of a government agency, acting as
Disciplining Authority, in disciplinary cases are immediately executory upon receipt thereof.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds no merit in the petition.

Prefatorily, DCWD contends that the appeal of Aranjuez, et al., should have been dismissed by the CSC for non-
compliance with Section 46 of CSC Resolution No. 991936, particularly their failure to file a notice of appeal, their
failure to show proof of payment of the appeal fee and the petition's invalid verification and certification of non-forum
shopping.
We are not persuaded.

Though the appeal before the CSC lacked a notice of appeal as required by CSC Resolution No. 991936 or the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS),[27] the Consolidated Memorandum filed by the private
respondents was enough to be considered as a sufficient compliance with the rules. The Memorandum delineates the
errors asserted against DCWD and the discussions supporting their arguments. We find merit in the sufficiency of the
Memorandum rather than strict compliance in view of the constitutional right of every employee to security of tenure.
A more relevant consideration of public interest is accorded whenever the merits of a case collide with rigid application
of the rules.[28]

Further, we find that the Civil Service Commission, the agency directly concerned, the ruling of which was upheld by the
Court of Appeals on review, correctly exercised jurisdiction over respondent's appeal from the decision of petitioner
DCWD, thereby ruling against, if sub silentio, the argument of petitioner that the appeal should be dismissed for lack of
proof of payment of appeal. The Civil Service Commission and the Court of Appeals considered the procedural issue
raised by petitioner as a surmountable bar to the resolution of the main issue of respondents' constitutional right to
free expression[29] as amplified with specificity by their guaranteed right as workers to peaceful concerted activity and
their entitlement to security of tenure.[30] The decisions of the Civil Service Commission and the Court of Appeals are
squarely supported by Adalim v. Taniñas[31] stating that:

In a number of cases, we upheld the CSC's decision relaxing its procedural rules to render substantial justice. The
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service themselves provide that administrative investigations shall be
conducted without strict recourse to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings.
The case before the CSC involves the security of tenure of public employees protected by the Constitution. Public
interest requires a resolution of the merits of the appeal instead of dismissing the same based on a rigid application of
the CSC Rules of Procedure. Accordingly, both the CSC and the CA properly allowed respondent employees' appeal
despite procedural lapses to resolve the issue on the merits.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[32] this Court pronounced that technical rules of procedure are not
ends in themselves but primarily devised and designed to help in the proper and expedient dispensation of justice. In
appropriate cases, therefore, the rules may have to be so construed liberally as to meet and advance the cause of
substantial justice. While it is desirable that the rules of procedure are faithfully and even meticulously observed,
courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If
the rules are intended to ensure the orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher objective they seek which is
the protection of substantive rights of the parties.[33]

Substantial justice, in other words must prevail. In Paler,[34] We said:

When substantial justice dictates it, procedural rules may be relaxed in order to arrive at a just disposition of a case.
The purpose behind limiting the period of appeal is to avoid unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to
put an end to controversies. A one-day delay as in this case, does not justify denial of the appeal where there is
absolutely no indication of intent to delay as in this case, does not justify denial of the appeal where there is absolutely
no indication of intent to delay justice on the pail of Paler and the pleading is meritorious on its face.

We rule in favor of the allowance of respondents' appeal because:

Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most
mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties'
right to an opportunity to be heard.[35] (Emphasis supplied)
Quoting again the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,[36] we pointed out that this Court can temper rigid rules in
favor of substantial justice. We find that pronouncement apt and fit to this case. Thereby we are not detained by the
omissions of the respondents in their resort to the CSC, and we thus proceed to the merits of the petitioners'
submissions.

Lastly, on the form, we find no merit in the contention that Aranjuez was not authorized to sign on behalf of the other
petitioners. Pursuant to Union Resolution No. 015-2008[37] attached as Annex A to the Appellants' 015-2008
Consolidated Memorandum dated 26 March 2008, the officers and members of NAMDACWAD gave Aranjuez a general
authority to represent the organization in all legal matters to be filed for whatever purpose it may serve. From the
general and broad grant of authority, Aranjuez possessed the specific authority to sign in behalf of his principal the
verification and certification against non-forum shopping required of the petition.

To the kernel, then.

DCWD primarily contends that CSC and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the concerted mass action on 9
November 2007 is not prohibited under Resolution No. 021316. We disagree.

DCWD relies on Resolution No. 021316, which states:

Section 6. Permissible Concerted Mass Action. - A concerted activity or mass action done outside of government office
hours shall not be deemed a prohibited concerted activity or mass action within the contemplation of this omnibus
rules provided the same shall not occasion or result in the disruption of work or service.[38]

DCWD argues that since the concerted or mass action was done within government office hours, such act was not
permissible, therefore prohibited. Otherwise stated, a concerted activity done within the regular government office
hours is automatically a violation of Section 6 of the Resolution.

Notably, however, a prohibited concerted mass action is defined not in Sec. 6 of Resolution No. 021316 but in Sec. 5
thereof. Thus:

Section 5. Definition of Prohibited Concerted Mass Action. - As used in this Omnibus Rules, the phrase "prohibited
concerted activity or mass action" shall be understood to refer to any collective activity undertaken by government
employees, by themselves or through their employees organizations, with the intent of effecting work stoppage or
service disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession, economic or otherwise, from their respective
agencies or the government. It shall include mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature.[39] (Emphasis
ours).

The operative phrases are "any collective activity" and "work stoppage or service disruption." Without the intent at
work stoppage or service disruption, the concerted activity is not prohibited. The time and place of the activity are not
determinative of the prohibition. Whether done within government hours, a concerted activity is allowed if it is without
any intent at work stoppage.

We cannot isolate the provision of Section 6 of the Resolution from definition of prohibited activity in Section 5 thereof.
It is erroneous to interpret the provisions in such a way that an act not within the circumstances as defined under
Section 5 can still be regarded as prohibited if done within government hours. To subscribe to the argument of DCWD
would in effect expand the definition provided by Resolution No. 021316 on what constitutes a prohibited mass action.

It is clear that the collective activity of joining the fun run in t-shirts with inscriptions on CNA incentives was not to
effect work stoppage or disrupt the service. As pointed out by the respondents, they followed the advice of GM
Gamboa "to be there" at the fun run. Respondents joined, and did not disrupt the fun run. They were in sports attire
that they were allowed, nay required, to wear. Else, government employees would be deprived of their constitutional
right to freedom of expression.[40] This, then, being the fact, we have to rule against the findings of both the CSC and
Court of Appeals that the wearing of t-shirts with grievance inscriptions constitutes as a violation of Reasonable Office
Rules and Regulations.

First off and as correctly pointed out by the charged officials and members in their 19 November 2007 Reply Letter to
DCWD, they did not violate the 31 October 2007 Office Memorandum issued by GM Gamboa relating to the proper
attire to be worn during the fun run. The Office Memorandum was clear in its order that the participants are free to
wear any sports attire during the event. To reiterate, the t-shirts they wore fall within the description of "any sports
attire" that the Memorandum allowed to be worn.

More importantly we need to refer to GSIS v. Villaviza (GSIS case).[41] It was there ruled that the acts of GSIS
employees wearing similarly colored shirts while attending a public hearing inside the GSIS Office, with clenching of fists
and orating against the then President Winston Garcia, were not constitutive of a prohibited activity but were only an
exercise of their constitutional freedom of expression.[42] We repeat

In this case, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU office wearing red shirts to witness a public
hearing do not amount to a concerted activity or mass action proscribed above. CSC even added that their actuations
can be deemed an exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of expression. The CA found no cogent reason to
deviate therefrom.

As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to regulate the political rights of those in the
government service, the concerted activity or mass action proscribed must be coupled with the "intent of effecting
work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession." Wearing similarly colored
shirts, attending a public hearing at the GSIS-IU office, bringing with them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some
even badmouthing the guards and PGM Garcia, are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work stoppage or
service disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands or force concession.

Precisely, the limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 are there to temper and
focus the application of such prohibition. Not all collective activity or mass undertaking of government employees is
prohibited. Otherwise, we would be totally depriving our brothers and sisters in the government service of their
constitutional right to freedom of expression.[43]

DCWD also found that Cagula and the rest of the officials violated MC No. 33 in relation to 8 February 1996 Office
Memorandum. DCWD also argues that a violation of this circular constitutes as a serious violation of CSC Rules as the
circular is a CSC-issued Memorandum and not just a mere issuance of DCWD.

CSC issued MC No. 33 in recognition of the rights of the government employees to air their grievances balanced by the
delivery of services to the public which should not be prejudiced. MC No. 33 sets down rules governing the posting of
posters and other similar materials within the premises of government agencies as follows:

1. All head of agencies are hereby directed to provide specific spaces within their respective premises, preferably near
the bundy clock, at the canteen or places normally frequented by employees, where employees' unions/associations
could post their posters.

2. x x x.

3. The hanging of posters and streamers shall only be allowed in the designated areas.

4. No poster, placard, streamer or other similar materials containing abusive, vulgar, defamatory or libelous language
shall be allowed.

Pursuant to this mandate, the former General Manager of DCWD issued an office memorandum designating the
bulletin board at the motorpool area below the Office of the Purchasing Division and the side of the office building
beside the guard house where the bundy clock is located as the designated areas for posting of grievances.[44] Clearly,
the DCWD Office Memorandum hews close and faithfully to MC No. 33. It is a reasonable rule issued by the heads of
the agencies in order to regulate posting of grievances of the employees.

It is correct to conclude that those who enter government service are subjected to a different degree of limitation on
their freedom to speak their mind; however, it is not tantamount to the relinquishment of their constitutional right of
expression otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of their employment.[45] Unarguably, a citizen who accepts
public employment "must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom." But there are some rights and freedoms so
fundamental to liberty that they cannot be bargained away in a contract for public employment. It is the Court's
responsibility to ensure that citizens are not deprived of these fundamental rights by virtue of working for the
government.[46]

The GSIS case pronounced:

Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the land to voice out their protests
against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their
freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the members thereof have
renounced or waived this basic liberty.

This freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.

In simple paraphrase we say, regulation of the freedom of expression is not removal of the constitutional right.

Apparently, DCWD, not satisfied by the CSC ruling that a violation of the memorandum is punishable with reprimand,
argues that what occurred was a serious violation implying that a higher penalty is warranted.

Under Section 52 (C) (3), Rule IV of Resolution No. 991936,[48] violation of reasonable office rules and regulations is
punishable with reprimand on the first offense and suspension ranging from one to thirty days for the second offense.

In Re: Failure of Various Employees to Register their Time of Arrival and/or Departure from Office in the Chronolog
Machine, the charged court employees were penalized for violation of reasonable office rules and regulations due to
their violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 36-2001 requiring all employees to register their daily
attendance, in the Chronolog Time Recorder Machine (CTRM) and in the logbook of their respective offices. Following
Resolution No. 991936 that violation of reasonable rules and regulations is a light offense, the Court penalized its erring
employees with the penalty of reprimand.[49]

Thus, in line with the civil service rules and jurisprudence, we conclude that a violation of an office memorandum,
which was issued as an internal rule to regulate the area for posting of grievances inside the office premise, is only a
light offense punishable by reprimand.

Rules and regulations are issued to attain harmony, smooth operation, maximize efficiency and productivity, with the
ultimate objective of realizing the functions of particular offices and agencies of the government.[50]

On the submissions that the decisions of a government agency, acting as Disciplining Authority, are immediately
executory upon receipt thereof, we need merely cite Section 37 of the Resolution No. 991936 which clearly provides
that:

Section 37. Finality of Decisions. — A decision rendered by heads of agencies whereby a penalty of suspension for not
more than thirty (30) days or a fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days' salary is imposed, shall be final and
executory. However, if the penalty imposed is suspension exceeding thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty (30) days salary, the same shall be final and executory after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a
motion for reconsideration or an appeal and no such pleading has been filed.[51]

As distinguished by the law, if the imposed suspension exceeds thirty days or the fine imposed is in an amount over
thirty-day salary, the decision will only attain finality after the lapse of the reglementary period in the absence of any
motion for reconsideration or appeal. Penalties within the 30-day threshold are immediately executor penalties.
In this case, the members and officials, except the casual employees who were not meted with penalty as the renewal
of their employment was held in abeyance, were sanctioned with penalties ranging from suspension of work from one
(1) month and one (1) day to dismissal from service.[52] Evidently, the finality and execution of the judgment did not
take place after the lapse of the reglementary period because as previously discussed, the members and officials were
able to file their consolidated appeal in lieu of notice of appeal.

As clear as the provision on the finality of decisions is Section 42 of Resolution No. 991936 on the effect of motions for
reconsideration. Thus

Section 42. Effect of Filing. — The filing of a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period of fifteen (15)
days shall stay the execution of the decision sought to be reconsidered.[53] (Emphasis ours)

The first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law. If the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity
as the quoted provision, there is no room for construction or interpretation. The letter must be taken to mean exactly
what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed.[54]

The ponente appreciates the concurrence of Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen. No need was seen, though, to add to the
ruling that the present facts limited.

WHEREFORE, We DENY the petition for review on certiorari. Nonetheless, the decision of the CSC which was affirmed in
toto by the CA is MODIFIED. The finding of administrative liability of and the penalty of reprimand against the
NAMADACWAD members namely Danilo L. Buhay, Pedro E. Alcala, Joseph A. Valdez, Tito V. Sabangan, Marcelino B.
Anino, Juanito C. Pansacala, Joemarie B. Alba, Antero M. Ymas, Rolando L. Largo, Reneboy U. Esteban, Manuel B.
Libang, Romeorico A. Llanos, Arthur C. Bachiller, Socrates V. Corcuera, Alejandro C. Pichon, Graciano A. Moncada,
Rolando K. Escorial, Noel A. Dagale, Emilio S. Molina, Sherwin S. Solamo, and Fulgencio I. Dyguazo are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.

The finding of liability against the casual employees namely Edwin A. dela Pena, Jummy A. Trocio, Wilfredo L. Torreon,
Alejandrito M. Alo, Raul S. Saga, Joselito P. Riconalla, Trisebal Q. Aguilar, Arman N. Lorenzo, Sr. and Pedro C. Gunting is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

As to officers Gualberto S. Pagatpat, Joseph B. Artajo, Felixberto Q. Obenza, Florante A. Ferraren, Elsa A. Elorde, Carlos
P. Morre, James Aquilino M. Coloma, Joaquin O. Cadorna, Jr., Lorna M. Maxino, Romulo A. Reyes, Noel G. Legaspi,
Eleanor R. Lamoste, Welmer E. Crasco, Delio T. Olaer, Vicente R. Masucol, Ireneo Cubal, Rodrigo L. Aranjuez, Gregorio S.
Cagula and Celestino A. Bondoc, the penalty of reprimand and strong warning that a repetition of the same shall be
dealt with severely is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180291 July 27, 2010

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as
PRESIDENT and GENERAL MANAGER of the GSIS, Petitioners,

vs.
DINNAH VILLAVIZA, ELIZABETH DUQUE, ADRONICO A. ECHAVEZ, RODEL RUBIO, ROWENA THERESE B. GRACIA,
PILAR LAYCO, and ANTONIO JOSE LEGARDA, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
August 31, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 98952, dismissing the petition for certiorari of
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) assailing the Civil Service Commission's Resolution No. 062177.

THE FACTS:

Petitioner Winston Garcia (PGM Garcia), as President and General Manager of the GSIS, filed separate formal charges
against respondents Dinnah Villaviza, Elizabeth Duque, Adronico A. Echavez, Rodel Rubio, Rowena Therese B. Gracia,
Pilar Layco, and Antonio Jose Legarda for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service pursuant to the Rules of Procedure in Administrative Investigation (RPAI) of GSIS Employees and Officials, III, D,
(1, c, f) in relation to Section 52A (3), (20), Rule IV, of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(URACCS), in accordance with Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, committed as follows:

That on 27 May 2005, respondent, wearing red shirt together with some employees, marched to or appeared
simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and
support for Messrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises;

xxx xxx xxx

That some of these employees badmouthed the security guards and the GSIS management and defiantly raised
clenched fists led by Atty. Velasco who was barred by Hearing Officer Marvin R. Gatpayat in an Order dated 24 May
2005 from appearing as counsel for Atty. Molina pursuant to Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. 6713 otherwise known as the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees;

That respondent, together with other employees in utter contempt of CSC Resolution No. 021316, dated 11 October
2002, otherwise known as Omnibus Rules on Prohibited Concerted Mass Actions in the Public Sector caused alarm and
heightened some employees and disrupted the work at the Investigation Unit during office hours.2

This episode was earlier reported to PGM Garcia, through an office memorandum dated May 31, 2005, by the Manager
of the GSIS Security Department (GSIS-SD), Dennis Nagtalon. On the same day, the Manager of the GSIS Investigation
Unit (GSIS-IU), Atty. Lutgardo Barbo, issued a memorandum to each of the seven (7) respondents requiring them to
explain in writing and under oath within three (3) days why they should not be administratively dealt with.3

Respondents Duque, Echavez, Rubio, Gracia, Layco, and Legarda, together with two others, submitted a letter-
explanation to Atty. Barbo dated June 6, 2005. Denying that there was a planned mass action, the respondents
explained that their act of going to the office of the GSIS-IU was a spontaneous reaction after learning that their former
union president was there. Aside from some of them wanting to show their support, they were interested in that
hearing as it might also affect them. For her part, respondent Villaviza submitted a separate letter explaining that she
had a scheduled pre-hearing at the GSIS-IU that day and that she had informed her immediate supervisor about it,
attaching a copy of the order of pre-hearing. These letters were not under oath.4
PGM Garcia then filed the above-mentioned formal charges for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service against each of the respondents, all dated June 4, 2005. Respondents were again directed to
submit their written answers under oath within three (3) days from receipt thereof.5 None was filed.

On June 29, 2005, PGM Garcia issued separate but similarly worded decisions finding all seven (7) respondents guilty of
the charges and meting out the penalty of one (1) year suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.

On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found the respondents guilty of the lesser offense of Violation of
Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and reduced the penalty to reprimand. The CSC ruled that respondents were
not denied their right to due process but there was no substantial evidence to hold them guilty of Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service. Instead,

x x x. The actuation of the appellants in going to the IU, wearing red shirts, to witness a public hearing cannot be
considered as constitutive of such offense. Appellants' (respondents herein) assembly at the said office to express
support to Velasco, their Union President, who pledged to defend them against any oppression by the GSIS
management, can be considered as an exercise of their freedom of expression, a constitutionally guaranteed right.6 x x
x

PGM Garcia sought reconsideration but was denied. Thus, PGM Garcia went to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for
Review under Rule 43 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.7 The CA upheld the CSC in this wise:

The Civil Service Commission is correct when it found that the act sought to be punished hardly falls within the
definition of a prohibited concerted activity or mass action. The petitioners failed to prove that the supposed concerted
activity of the respondents resulted in work stoppage and caused prejudice to the public service. Only about twenty
(20) out of more than a hundred employees at the main office, joined the activity sought to be punished. These
employees, now respondents in this case, were assigned at different offices of the petitioner GSIS. Hence, despite the
belated claim of the petitioners that the act complained of had created substantial disturbance inside the petitioner
GSIS' premises during office hours, there is nothing in the record that could support the claim that the operational
capacity of petitioner GSIS was affected or reduced to substantial percentage when respondents gathered at the
Investigation Unit. Despite the hazy claim of the petitioners that the gathering was intended to force the Investigation
Unit and petitioner GSIS to be lenient in the handling of Atty. Molina's case and allow Atty. Velasco to represent Atty.
Molina in his administrative case before petitioner GSIS, there is likewise no concrete and convincing evidence to prove
that the gathering was made to demand or force concessions, economic or otherwise from the GSIS management or
from the government. In fact, in the separate formal charges filed against the respondents, petitioners clearly alleged
that respondents "marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a
mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for Mssrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter surreptitiously
entered the GSIS premises." Thus, petitioners are aware at the outset that the only apparent intention of the
respondents in going to the IU was to show support to Atty. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, their union officers. The
belated assertion that the intention of the respondents in going to the IU was to disrupt the operation and pressure the
GSIS administration to be lenient with Atty. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, is only an afterthought.8

Not in conformity, PGM Garcia is now before us via this Petition for Review presenting the following:

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

WHETHER AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL MAY APPLY SUPPLETORILY THE PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF COURT ON
THE EFFECT OF FAILURE TO DENY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT AND FAILURE TO FILE ANSWER, WHERE THE
RESPONDENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS DID NOT FILE ANY RESPONSIVE PLEADING TO THE FORMAL
CHARGES AGAINST THEM.
II

WHETHER THE RULE THAT ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS CANNOT BE EQUATED WITH DUE PROCESS IN JUDICIAL
SENSE AUTHORIZES AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL TO CONSIDER IN EVIDENCE AND GIVE FULL PROBATIVE VALUE TO
UNNOTARIZED LETTERS THAT DID NOT FORM PART OF THE CASE RECORD.

III

WHETHER A DECISION THAT MAKES CONCLUSIONS OF FACTS BASED ON EVIDENCE ON RECORD BUT MAKES A
CONCLUSION OF LAW BASED ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF A DOCUMENT THAT NEVER FORMED PART OF THE CASE
RECORDS IS VALID.

IV

WHETHER FURTHER PROOF OF SUSBTANTIAL REDUCTION OF THE OPERATIONAL CAPACITY OF AN AGENCY, DUE TO
UNRULY MASS GATHERING OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSIDE OFFICE PREMISES AND WITHIN OFFICE HOURS, IS
REQUIRED TO HOLD THE SAID EMPLOYEES LIABLE FOR CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE
PURSUANT TO CSC RESOLUTION NO. 021316.

WHETHER AN UNRULY MASS GATHERING OF TWENTY EMPLOYEES, LASTING FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR DURING
OFFICE HOURS, INSIDE OFFICE PREMISES AND WITHIN A UNIT TASKED TO HEAR AN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE, TO
PROTEST THE PROHIBITION AGAINST THE APPEARANCE OF THEIR LEADER AS COUNSEL IN THE SAID ADMINISTRATIVE
CASE, FALLS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND
PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY.

VI

WHETHER THE CONCERTED ABANDONMENT OF EMPLOYEES OF THEIR POSTS FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR TO HOLD AN
UNRULY PROTEST INSIDE OFFICE PREMISES ONLY CONSTITUTES THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF
REASONABLE OFFICE RULES AND REGULATIONS.9

The Court finds no merit in the petition.

Petitioners primarily question the probative value accorded to respondents' letters of explanation in response to the
memorandum of the GSIS-IU Manager. The respondents never filed their answers to the formal charges. The
petitioners argue that there being no answers, the allegations in the formal charges that they filed should have been
deemed admitted pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which provides:

SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted.- Material averment in the complaint, other than
those as to the amount of liquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of
usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied specifically and under oath.
According to the petitioners, this rule is applicable to the case at bench pursuant to Rule 1, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court which reads:

SECTION 4. In what cases not applicable. - These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. (underscoring supplied)

The Court does not subscribe to the argument of the petitioners. Petitioners' own rules, Rule XI, Section 4 of the GSIS'
Amended Policy and Procedural Guidelines No. 178-04, specifically provides:

If the respondent fails to file his Answer within five (5) working days from receipt of the Formal Charge for the
supporting evidence, when requested, he shall be considered to have waived his right to file an answer and the PGM or
the Board of Trustees, in proper cases, shall render judgment, as may be warranted by the facts and evidence
submitted by the prosecution.

A perusal of said section readily discloses that the failure of a respondent to file an answer merely translates to a
waiver of "his right to file an answer." There is nothing in the rule that says that the charges are deemed admitted. It
has not done away with the burden of the complainant to prove the charges with clear and convincing evidence.

It is true that Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules can be applied in a "suppletory character."
Suppletory is defined as "supplying deficiencies."10 It means that the provisions in the Rules of Court will be made to
apply only where there is an insufficiency in the applicable rule. There is, however, no such deficiency as the rules of
the GSIS are explicit in case of failure to file the required answer. What is clearly stated there is that GSIS may "render
judgment as may be warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution."

Even granting that Rule 8, Section 11 of the Rules of Court finds application in this case, petitioners must remember
that there remain averments that are not deemed admitted by the failure to deny the same. Among them are
immaterial allegations and incorrect conclusions drawn from facts set out in the complaint.11 Thus, even if respondents
failed to file their answer, it does not mean that all averments found in the complaint will be considered as true and
correct in their entirety, and that the forthcoming decision will be rendered in favor of the petitioners. We must not
forget that even in administrative proceedings, it is still the complainant, or in this case the petitioners, who have the
burden of proving, with substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint or in the formal charges.12

A perusal of the decisions of the CA and of the CSC will reveal that the case was resolved against petitioners based, not
on the absence of respondents' evidence, but on the weakness of that of the petitioners. Thus, the CA wrote:

Petitioners correctly submitted the administrative cases for resolution without the respondents' respective answer to
the separate formal charges in accordance with Section 4, Rule XI of the RPAI. Being in full control of the administrative
proceeding and having effectively prevented respondents from further submitting their responsive answer and
evidence for the defense, petitioners were in the most advantageous position to prove the merit of their allegations in
the formal charges. When petitioner Winston Garcia issued those similarly worded decisions in the administrative cases
against the respondents, it is presumed that all evidence in their favor were duly submitted and justly considered
independent of the weakness of respondent's evidence in view of the principle that ''the burden of proof belongs to
the one who alleges and not the one who denies."13

On the merits, what needs to be resolved in the case at bench is the question of whether or not there was a violation of
Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316. Stated differently, whether or not respondents' actions on May 27, 2005
amounted to a "prohibited concerted activity or mass action." Pertinently, the said provision states:

Section 5. As used in this Omnibus Rules, the phrase ''prohibited concerted activity or mass action'' shall be understood
to refer to any collective activity undertaken by government employees, by themselves or through their employees
organizations, with intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands of force
concession, economic or otherwise, from their respective agencies or the government. It shall include mass leaves,
walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature. (underscoring supplied)

In this case, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU office wearing red shirts to witness a public
hearing do not amount to a concerted activity or mass action proscribed above. CSC even added that their actuations
can be deemed an exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of expression. The CA found no cogent reason to
deviate therefrom.

As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to regulate the political rights of those in the
government service, the concerted activity or mass action proscribed must be coupled with the "intent of effecting
work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession." Wearing similarly colored
shirts, attending a public hearing at the GSIS-IU office, bringing with them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some
even badmouthing the guards and PGM Garcia, are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work stoppage or
service disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force concession.
Precisely, the limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 are there to temper and
focus the application of such prohibition. Not all collective activity or mass undertaking of government employees is
prohibited. Otherwise, we would be totally depriving our brothers and sisters in the government service of their
constitutional right to freedom of expression.

Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the land to voice out their protests
against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their
freedom of expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the members thereof have
renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.

A review of PGM Garcia's formal charges against the respondents reveals that he himself was not even certain whether
the respondents and the rest of the twenty or so GSIS employees who were at the GSIS-IU office that fateful day
marched there or just simply appeared there simultaneously.14 Thus, the petitioners were not even sure if the
spontaneous act of each of the twenty or so GSIS employees on May 27, 2005 was a concerted one. The report of
Manager Nagtalon of the GSIS-SD which was the basis for PGM Garcia's formal charges reflected such uncertainty.
Thus,

Of these red shirt protesters, only Mr. Molina has official business at the Investigation Unit during this time. The rest
abandoned their post and duties for the duration of this incident which lasted until 10:55 A.M. It was also observed
that the protesters, some of whom raised their clenched left fists, carefully planned this illegal action as evident in their
behavior of arrogance, defiance and provocation, the presence of various recording gadgets such as VCRs, voice
recorders and digital cameras, the bad mouthing of the security guards and the PGM, the uniformity in their attire and
the collusion regarding the anomalous entry of Mr. Albert Velasco to the premises as reported earlier.15

The said report of Nagtalon contained only bare facts. It did not show respondents' unified intent to effect disruption or
stoppage in their work. It also failed to show that their purpose was to demand a force concession.

In the recent case of GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS,16 the Court upheld the position of petitioner GSIS
because its employees, numbering between 300 and 800 each day, staged a walkout and participated in a mass protest
or demonstration outside the GSIS for four straight days. We cannot say the same for the 20 or so employees in this
case. To equate their wearing of red shirts and going to the GSIS-IU office for just over an hour with that four-day mass
action in Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS case and to punish them in the same manner would most certainly be
unfair and unjust.

Recent analogous decisions in the United States, while recognizing the government's right as an employer to lay down
certain standards of conduct, tend to lean towards a broad definition of "public concern speech" which is protected by
their First Amendment. One such case is that of Scott v. Meters.17 In said case, the New York Transit Authority (NYTA),
responsible for operation of New York City's mass transit service, issued a rule prohibiting employees from wearing
badges or buttons on their uniforms. A number of union members wore union buttons promoting their opposition to a
collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, the NYTA tried to enforce its rule and threatened to subject these
union members to discipline. The court, though recognizing the government's right to impose reasonable restrictions,
held that the NYTA's rule was "unconstitutionally overboard."

In another case, Communication Workers of America v. Ector County Hospital District,18 it was held that,

A county hospital employee's wearing of a "Union Yes" lapel pin during a union organization drive constituted speech
on a matter of public concern, and the county's proffered interest in enforcing the anti-adornment provision of its dress
code was outweighed by the employee's interest in exercising his First Amendment speech and associational rights by
wearing a pro-union lapel button.19

Thus, respondents' freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and CSC's Resolution No. 02-1316 defining
what a prohibited concerted activity or mass action has only tempered or regulated these rights. Measured against that
definition, respondents' actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass action. The CSC and the
CA were both correct in arriving at said conclusion.

WHEREFORE, the assailed August 31, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals as well as its October 16, 2007 Resolution in
CA G.R. SP No. 98952 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
ELENO T. REGIDOR, JR. and CAMILO B. ZAPATOS, Petitioners, versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), Respondents.

G.R. No. 166086-92 | 2009-02-13

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the
reversal of the Sandiganbayan Decision[2] dated September 24, 2004, convicting petitioners Eleno T. Regidor, Jr.
(Mayor Regidor), former City Mayor, and Camilo B. Zapatos (Zapatos), former member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod
of Tangub City (petitioners), of the crime of falsification of public documents.

The Facts

Petitioners, along with Aniceto T. Siete, former Vice-Mayor, and one Marlene L. Mangao,[3] then Acting Secretary of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub City, were charged with the crime of falsification of public documents in the
following Informations:[4]

Criminal Case No. 13689 filed on May 10, 1989

That on or about the 23rd day of June, 1988, in the City of Tangub, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., Aniceto T. Siete, Camilo B. Zapatos and Marlene Mangao, all public
officers being then the City Mayor, Vice Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, Temporary
Presiding Officer, and Acting Sangguniang Panglungsod Secretary, respectively, of said City, and as such are authorized
to attest and approve resolutions of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, and committing the crime herein charged in relation
to their office, with grave abuse of confidence and taking advantage of their official/public positions, conspiring and
confabulating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Resolution 50-A, of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub City, entitled: "A RESOLUTION GRANTING A SALARY INCREASE OF ALL EMPLOYEES
EXCEPT CHIEFS, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF OFFICERS (sic) AND CITY OFFICIALS OF TANGUB CITY AT ONE HUNDRED PESOS
(P100) A MONTH EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1988," by then and there making it appear that the aforesaid Resolution was
deliberated upon, passed and approved by the Sangguniang Panglungsod when in truth and in fact as accused well
knew it was never taken up by said body, to the damage and prejudice of the Government.

Contrary to law.

Criminal Case No. 13690 filed on May 10, 1989

That on or about the 30th day [of] June, 1988, in Tangub City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., Aniceto T. Siete and Marlene L. Mangao, all public officers being the City Mayor,
Vice-Mayor, and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and Acting Sangguniang Panglungsod Secretary,
respectively, of the said City, and as such are authorized to attest and approve resolutions of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod, and committing the crime herein charged in relation to their office, with grave abuse of confidence and
taking advantage of their official/public positions, conspiring and confabulating with one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Resolution No. 56, of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub, entitled:
RESOLUTION APPROVING SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET NO. 2 OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD OF TANGUB CITY
FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1988," by then and there making it appear that the aforesaid Resolution was deliberated
upon, passed and approved by the Sangguniang Panglungsod when in truth and in fact as accused well knew it was
never taken up by the said body, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

Contrary to law.

Criminal Case No. 13691 filed on May 10, 1989

That on or about the 30th day of June, 1988, in Tangub City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., Aniceto T. Siete, and Marlene L. Mangao, all public officers being the City Mayor,
Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, and Acting Sangguniang Panglungsod Secretary,
respectively, of said City, and as such are authorized to attest and approve resolutions of the Sangguniang Panglungsod,
and committing the crime herein charged in relation to their office, with grave abuse of confidence and taking
advantage of their official/public positions, conspiring and confabulating with one another, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify Resolution No. 56-A of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub entitled:
"RESOLUTION APPROVING SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET NO. 2 OF THE INFRA FUND OF TANGUB CITY FOR THE CALENDAR
YEAR 1988," by then and there making it appear that the aforesaid Resolution was deliberated upon, passed and
approved by the Sangguniang Panglungsod when in truth and in fact as accused well knew it was never taken up by said
body, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

Contrary to law.

Criminal Case No. 13692 filed on May 11, 1989

That on or about the 14th day of July, 1988, in Tangub City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., Aniceto T. Siete, and Marlene L. Mangao, all public officers, being the City Mayor,
Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and Acting Sangguniang Panglungsod Secretary,
respectively of said City, and as such, are authorized to attest and approve resolutions of the Sangguniang Panglungsod,
and committing the crime herein charged in relation to their office, with grave abuse of confidence and taking
advantage of their official/public positions, conspiring and confabulating with one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify Resolution No. 63 of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub, entitled: "A
RESOLUTION EARNESTLY REQUESTING HONORABLE ALFREDO BENGZON, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
MANILA, THRU THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, CANDIDO TAN, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, REGION X, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY,
TO APPOINT DR. SINFORIANA DEL CASTILLO AS CITY HEALTH OFFICER IN TANGUB CITY HEALTH OFFICE," by then and
there making it appear that the aforesaid Resolution was deliberated upon, passed and approved by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod when in truth and in fact as accused well knew it was never taken up by said body, to the damage and
prejudice of the government.

Contrary to law.

Criminal Case No. 13693 filed on May 10, 1989

That on or about the 14th day of July, 1988, in Tangub City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., Aniceto T. Siete and Marlene L. Mangao, all public officers being the City Mayor,
Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and Acting Sangguniang Panglungsod Secretary,
respectively, of said City, and as such, are authorized to attest and approve resolutions of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod, and committing the crime herein charged in relation to their office, with grave abuse of confidence and
taking advantage of their official/public positions, conspiring and confabulating with one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Resolution No. 61 of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub, entitled: "A
RESOLUTION REVERTING THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000) FROM THE CONSTRUCTION
OF SPORT CENTER TO COVER UP DEFICIENCIES OF APPROPRIATION IN THE INFRASTRUCTURE FUND," by then and there
making it appear that the aforesaid Resolution was deliberated upon, passed and approved by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod when in truth and in fact as accused well knew it was never taken up by the said body, to the damage and
prejudice of the government.

Contrary to law.

Criminal Case No. 13694 filed on May 10, 1989

That on or about the 21st day of July, 1988, in the City of Tangub, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., Camilo B. Zapatos and Marlene Mangao, all public officers being the City
Mayor, Temporary Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and Acting Sangguniang Panglungsod Secretary,
respectively, and as such, are authorized to attest and approve resolutions of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, and
committing the crime herein charged on relation to their office, with grave abuse of confidence and taking advantage of
their official/public positions, conspiring and confabulating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously falsify Resolution No. 64, of the Sangguniang Panglungsod entitled: "A RESOLUTION ADOPTING A
POSITION PAPER REGARDING THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE AND OPERATION OF TANGUB CITY AND REQUESTING
HONORABLE LOURDES R. QUISUMBING FOR A RECONSIDERATION OF HER MEMORANDA," by then and there making it
appear that the aforesaid resolution was deliberated upon, passed and approved by the Sangguniang Panglungsod
when in truth and in fact as accused well knew it was never taken up by the said body, to the damage and prejudice of
the government.

Contrary to law.

Criminal Case No. 13695 filed on May 11, 1989

That on or about the 21st day of July, 1988, in Tangub City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., Camilo B. Zapatos and Marlene L. Mangao, all being public officers being City
Mayor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member and concurrently Temporary Presiding Officer and Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Secretary, respectively, of said City and as such, are authorized to attest and approve resolutions of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod, and committing the crime herein charged in relation to their office, with grave abuse of
confidence and taking advantage of their official/public positions, conspiring and confabulating with one another, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Resolution No. 68, of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Tangub, entitled: "RESOLUTION REQUESTING THE HONORABLE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, MALACANANG, MANILA FOR AUTHORITY TO PURCHASE TEN (10) UNITS OF MOTORCAB, ONE (1)
DOZEN MICROSCOPE COMPOUND, ONE (1) SET ENCYCLOPEDIA TEXTBOOKS, ONE (1) SET BRITANICA DICTIONARY,
SEVEN (7) UNITS ELECTRIC TYPEWRITER (20" CARRIAGE), ONE (1) UNIT ELECTRIC FAN AND ONE (1) UNIT LOMBARDINI
DIESEL ENGINE 4ID 820 FOR USE OF VARIOUS OFFICES OF TANGUB CITY," by then and there making it appear that the
aforesaid Resolution was deliberated upon, passed and approved by the Sangguniang Panglungsod when in truth and in
fact as accused well knew it was never taken up by the said body, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

Contrary to law.
Upon their arraignment on July 8, 1991, petitioners entered a plea of not guilty to all the charges. Marlene L. Mangao
was not arraigned as the Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over her person. Hence, an order for her arrest was
issued which remains unserved up to the present. On the other hand, Aniceto T. Siete passed away on March 12, 1991
before he could be arraigned.[5] Upon agreement of the parties, no pre-trial conference was conducted. Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued. In the course of trial, two varying versions arose and, as found by the Sandiganbayan, are
culled as follows:

Evidence for the Prosecution

The accused are all public officers in the City Government of Tangub City. Accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. was then the
incumbent Mayor who assumed office on May 5, 1988, while accused Aniceto T. Siete as the incumbent Vice-Mayor
and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. Accused Camilo B. Zapatos was the Acting Presiding Officer of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod, while accused Marlene L. Mangao, who was a clerk in the Office of the Mayor, was
designated as Acting Secretary of the City Council during the period corresponding to the alleged commission of the
crimes charged against the accused.

When accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. assumed the mayoral post on May 5, 1988, it has been the practice that the
proposals for resolutions and ordinances originated from him or his office. Often, when a proposal is put in the agenda
of the Sangguniang Panglungsod, a prepared resolution is already available so that it will be easier for the City Council
to just accept or adopt the resolutions.

During the session of the Sangguniang Panglungsod on July 27, 1988, the Council was presented with the Minutes for
the sessions held on June 23, 30, July 14 and 21, respectively. The minutes of said sessions reflected resolutions and
ordinances allegedly taken up, deliberated and passed upon by the Sangguniang Panglungsod namely: Resolution 50-A
on June 23, 1988, Resolution 56 and 56-A on June 30, Resolution No. 63 and 61 on July 14, Resolution 64 and 68 on July
21. The actual copies of the Resolutions, Appropriations and Ordinances all contained the signatures of the four (4)
accused and approving the same.

However, some of the Council Members questioned the validity of the said Resolutions and Ordinances. They alleged
that the Resolutions and Ordinances were neither taken up, deliberated nor passed upon during the above-mentioned
dates. Roberto O. [Taclob],[6] [private complainant] a former council member, testified that the questioned Resolutions
were not taken up and thus could not have been deliberated nor passed upon. His testimony was corroborated by
prosecution witnesses, Estrelita M. Pastrano, Elizabeth L. Duroy Albarico and Agustin L. Opay, all former members of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tangub City [private complainants]. Although the questioned resolutions were
subsequently ratified by the Sanggunian through Resolution 94 by a vote of five (5) to four (4), with the four (4)
complaining witnesses abstaining, dated October 15, 1988, the Council Members still filed a complaint with the
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) an administrative case against the four (4) accused for
misconduct in office and neglect of duty. The councilors claim that they were prevented from [attending] the sessions
of the Sanggunian for seven (7) months because the schedule of sessions was randomly changed without them being
notified. Accused Mayor Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., together with the other co-accused were preventively suspended from
July to September of 1989 but were subsequently not found guilty by the DILG. Despite signing an Affidavit of
Desistance, thinking that the Sandiganbayan is bound by the findings of the DILG, the complainants pursued the cases
against the four (4) accused. Thus, the criminal complaints filed with the Sandiganbayan were continued and trial
ensued on January 8, 1992.

Evidence for the Defense

In his defense, Mayor Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. testified that before approving resolutions or ordinances, he consults his
legal counsel to check if there are any irregularities in the resolutions and whether or not the resolutions are beneficial
to the City of Tangub. He also stated that he did not attend or participate in the sessions of the City Council, asserting
that, as Mayor, he did not, in any way, influence the deliberations of the Sanggunian. He stressed that the Sangguniang
Panglungsod is totally independent of his office and as the approving officer of the Municipal Government, he relies on
the certification of the Presiding Officer that the resolutions and the ordinances are valid and lawful before affixing his
signature. The accused, Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. contends that he signed the questioned resolutions in good faith and with
the belief that they were deliberated and passed upon.

It is further contended by accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. that the questioned Resolutions were taken up and passed upon
during the sessions. The same accused further claimed that the minutes of the sessions of the Sanggunian were
inaccurate since the entire proceedings were not completely and accurately taken down by the stenographer or Council
Secretary present during the meetings, thus, the deliberations on the questioned resolutions were not entirely
recorded. Lastly, the same accused claimed that the complainants even admitted in their Affidavit of Desistance the
inaccuracy of the minutes "x x x although the matters taken during the sessions of the Sangguniang Panglungsod
wherein we were present, were discussed and deliberated upon, we are not sure whether or not said deliberations and
discussions were recorded in the minutes x x x." The defense of the accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. is corroborated by the
testimony of Rogelio Taburada,[7] [Taburada] who was then a Councilor of Tangub City.

As for the other accused Sanggunian Member and Acting Presiding Officer Camilo B. Zapatos, he opted not to take the
witness stand and instead adopted the evidence of his co-accused Eleno T. Regidor Jr.

The Sandiganbayan's Decision

On September 24, 2004, the Sandiganbayan held that the petitioners' defenses of good faith and lack of intent failed to
cast doubt on the allegations of the prosecution. The pieces of evidence and the testimonies of the prosecution's
witnesses revealed that Resolution Nos. 50-A,[8] 56,[9] 56-A,[10] 63[11] 61,[12] 64[13] and 68[14] (assailed
Resolutions) established the moral certainty or degree of proof which would produce conviction in an unprejudiced
mind. Thus, it disposed of this case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the above cases as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 13689, the Court finds the accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. and Camilo B. Zapatos, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision
Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS of Prision Mayor minimum as the maximum penalty
and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

2. In Criminal Case No. 13690, the Court finds the accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Falsification of Public Document was defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and,
there being no modifying circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT
(8) YEARS of Prision Mayor minimum as the maximum penalty and to pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

3. In Criminal Case No. 13691, the Court finds the accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and,
there being no modifying circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT
(8) YEARS of Prision Mayor minimum as the maximum penalty and to pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

4. In Criminal Case No. 13692, the Court finds the accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and,
there being no modifying circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT
(8) years of Prision Mayor minimum as the maximum penalty and to pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
5. In Criminal Case No. 13693, the Court finds the accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and,
there being no modifying circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT
(8) YEARS of Prision Mayor minimum as the maximum penalty and to pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

6. In Criminal Case No. 13694, the Court finds the accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. and Camilo B. Zapatos, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision
Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS of Prision Mayor minimum as the maximum penalty
and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

7. In Criminal Case No. 13695, the Court finds the accused Eleno T. Regidor, Jr. and Camilo B. Zapatos, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision
Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS of Prision Mayor minimum as the maximum penalty
and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In so far as Aniceto T. Siete is concerned, who died before arraignment could be held, the case against him is hereby
considered dismissed by reason of his death.

Let a Warrant of Arrest issue against Marlene L. Mangao for her immediate apprehension and in order to answer the
charges leveled against her.

SO ORDERED.

The Issues

Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration[15] which was, however, denied by the Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution[16] dated November 26, 2004. Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:

I. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OR LACK
OF JURISDICTION AS NO CRIME OF FALSIFICATION WAS COMMITTED BY THEM;

II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONERS WHEN THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION
WAS TOO WEAK TO WARRANT CONVICTION [BECAUSE] IT MISERABLY FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;

III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT/VALUE TO THE AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE OF THE
COMPLAINANTS AND THE EXONERATION BY THE DILG OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGE AGAINST THEM;

IV. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE OF REGIDOR THAT HE HAS NO
PARTICIPATION IN THE PREPARATION, BEING THE CITY MAYOR HIS RULE WAS ONLY TO APPROVE THE RESOLUTIONS;
[AND]
V. THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION IS INCREDIBLE THAT ACCUSED TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THEIR POSITION[.]
CONSPIRACY WAS NOT ESTABLISHED.[17]

Moreover, petitioners asseverate that there is no falsification in this case under Article 171, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code because they did not cause it to appear that other persons participated in an act or proceeding when they
did not in fact so participate. Petitioners submit that they did not feign such participation because the private
complainants physically and actually participated in passing the assailed resolutions. The participation of Mayor Regidor
came only after the assailed resolutions were submitted to him for approval. Likewise, there is no falsification under
paragraph 7 of Article 171 because petitioners passed and approved authentic, genuine and original documents.
Petitioners submit that paragraph 7 involves falsification of a non-existent document and the falsifier produces one
purporting to be the original. Petitioners also opine that the DILG's dismissal[18] of the administrative complaint and
the private complainants' act of executing affidavits of desistance[19] should be given weight. Intent to gain and/or bad
faith were not shown by petitioners as some of the assailed resolutions do not involve money matters. Further,
petitioners argue that Taburada's testimony should have been accorded more weight and credence than the testimony
of private complainant Taclob. Petitioners claim that Taburada, as a former member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod,
clearly testified that he was present at the time all the assailed resolutions were deliberated upon and approved,[20]
while Taclob's testimony was not credible and trustworthy considering that he executed two (2) affidavits of
desistance. Taburada's testimony was not at all discussed by the Sandiganbayan; hence, its decision was not supported
by evidence. Most importantly, petitioners reiterate their contention that the minutes[21] were defective and
inaccurate. Thus, petitioners pray that they be acquitted in the name of due process and based on the long-standing
policy of the State to acquit the accused if the quantum of evidence is insufficient to convict, as in the case at bench.
[22]

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), claims
that the issues raised by the petitioners were purely questions of fact because the same would entail the review of all
pieces of evidence and evaluation of the weight and probative value thereof. The OSP also claims that petitioners
questioned the sufficiency of evidence presented by the prosecution which were relied upon by the Sandiganbayan.
Thus, the OSP submits that the instant Petition should be denied outright for it is not the function of this Court under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to re-examine the pieces of evidence duly submitted by the parties. On the
merits, the OSP argues that petitioners by virtue of their respective offices and functions, held positions directly
connected with the proposal, deliberation, passage and approval of the assailed resolutions as found by the
Sandiganbayan and as duly supported by evidence. Intent to gain and/or bad faith is inconsequential, as the law
punishes the act of falsification as a violation of public faith. The OSP alleges that the petitioners deliberately attempted
to and, in fact, did conceal the falsity of the documents by making it appear that the assailed resolutions were valid on
their face, as the same were approved and signed by the petitioners. Moreover, the DILG ruling dismissing the
administrative complaint filed against the petitioners and the affidavits of desistance executed by the private
complainants were of no moment. Thus, the OSP posits that the prosecution's evidence was overwhelming and
sufficient to prove the guilt of the petitioners beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification defined and
penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.[23]

The ultimate issue in this case is whether petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of
public documents.

Our Ruling

The instant Petition is bereft of merit.

The law in point is Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, which clearly provides:

Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. - The penalty of prision mayor and a
fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of
his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in any act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by
them;

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

5. Altering true dates;

6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;

7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original
exists, or including in such a copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or

8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who shall commit any of the offenses enumerated
in the preceding paragraphs of this article, with respect to any record or document of such character that its
falsification may affect the civil status of persons.[24]

Thus, for falsification of a public document to be established, the following elements must concur: 1) that the offender
is a public officer, employee, or notary public; 2) that he takes advantage of his official position; and 3) that he falsifies a
document by committing any of the aforementioned acts. Likewise, in falsification of public or official documents, it is
not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of
a public document, what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein
solemnly proclaimed.[25]

In this case, the petitioners are charged under Article 171, paragraphs 2 and 7 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners
Regidor and Zapatos, as Mayor, and Member and Temporary Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panglungsod,
respectively, made it appear that private complainants, among others, participated in the Sangguniang Panglungsod
sessions when they did not in fact so participate,[26] and issued, in authenticated forms, the assailed resolutions
purporting to be copies of original documents when no such originals exist.

We hold that all the elements of the offense punishable under Article 171, paragraphs 2 and 7 of the Revised Penal
Code are present in this case.

First. Petitioners were public officers at the time of the commission of the offenses charged. Mayor Regidor was then
Mayor of Tangub City, while Zapatos was a member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and was a Temporary Presiding
Officer thereof.

Second. The petitioners took advantage of their respective official positions because they had the duty to make or to
prepare, or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of the document, or have the official custody of the document
which they falsified.[27] Zapatos, as a member and, at the time, Temporary Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod, had the duty to make or prepare or intervene in the preparation of the assailed resolutions. In like
manner, Mayor Regidor cannot claim that as mayor he had no participation in the making, or preparation of, nor any
intervention in the assailed resolutions.

Under Section 180[28] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, or the Local Government Code of 1983, which was in effect at the
time the crimes imputed were committed, the city mayor had the power to veto the ordinances and resolutions
enacted or adopted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod. Contrary to Mayor Regidor's submission, the veto power confers
authority beyond the simple mechanical act of signing an ordinance or resolution as a requisite to its enforceability.
Thus, this Court held that the concurrence of a local chief executive in the enactment of an ordinance or resolution
requires not only a flourish of the pen, but the application of judgment after meticulous analysis and intelligence as
well.[29]
Third. While petitioners' witness, Taburada, testified that he was present during the Sangguniang's deliberations of the
assailed resolutions,[30] private complainant Taclob also testified that the resolutions were not discussed and approved
during the respective sessions of the Sangguniang Panglungsod.[31] The minutes of the sessions, as well, do not reflect
any deliberation and/or approval by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of the assailed resolutions. Initially, when Taburada
was asked if the minutes faithfully recorded all the matters deliberated upon during the sessions of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod on June 23, June 30, July 14, and July 21, 1988, he readily affirmed it. But after the Sandiganbayan called
for a recess when the counsel for the parties had a heated discussion, Taburada claimed that the minutes of the
sessions on said dates did not contain all the matters taken up during those sessions, particularly the deliberation and
approval of the assailed resolutions.[32] Yet, the resolutions were questioned by private complainants precisely
because the alleged deliberation and voting thereon were not at all conducted as reflected in the minutes[33] of the
Sanggunian session of July 27, 1988. On said date, after taking up other matters, the Sangguniang Panglungsod, upon
motion of Taclob, went into a closed-door session. Then a nominal voting was conducted in order to determine
"whether said resolutions were brought before the session for deliberation or [if] the nature of said resolutions [was]
reflected in the minutes."[34] Majority of the members voted "no," while Taburada answered "no comment"[35]
because he did not actually read the minutes at the time, but he nonetheless signed the same.[36] To the same
question, Zapatos also answered "no comment." These material inconsistencies in Taburada's testimony, pitted against
the testimonies of the private complainants and the documentary evidence, proved fatal to petitioners' cause.

It must be borne in mind that weighing heavily against the petitioners' defense is the well-settled doctrine that findings
of fact of trial courts - in this case, the Sandiganbayan - particularly in the assessment of the credibility of witnesses, is
binding upon this Court, absent any arbitrariness, abuse or palpable error.[37]

While the petitioners do not wish to impute much significance to the minutes, they are important in the resolution of
this case.

In a similar case, De los Reyes v. Sandiganbayan, Third Division,[38] this Court, citing a number of cases,[39] highlighted
the importance of the minutes taken in the pertinent proceeding, relying thereon to ascertain the truth when
confronted by conflicting claims of parties. Hence, this Court held:

Thus, the Court accords full recognition to the minutes as the official repository of what actually transpires in every
proceeding. It has happened that the minutes may be corrected to reflect the true account of a proceeding, thus giving
the Court more reason to accord them great weight for such subsequent corrections, if any, are made precisely to
preserve the accuracy of the records. In light of the conflicting claims of the parties in the case at bar, the Court,
without resorting to the minutes, will encounter difficulty in resolving the dispute at hand.[40]

We see no reason to deviate from this ruling.

Added to this is the Memorandum of Agreement[41] entered into by the Office of the Mayor and the Sangguniang
Panglungsod on August 12, 1988, "recalling all SP resolutions not duly passed and/or approved by the majority of the
members thereat." Further, the Sangguniang Panglungsod, in its Resolution No. 94[42] dated October 15, 1988, opted
to re-approve the assailed resolutions "which were alleged to [have been] implemented but not discussed," rather than
move for the amendment of the minutes. These acts belie petitioners' claims that the minutes were inaccurate for
failing to include therein the deliberations and approval of the assailed resolutions. Indeed, if the minutes merely
omitted any mention of the discussion on, and approval of, the subject resolutions, there would have been no need to
resubmit them for the approval of the Sanggunian. It would have been more convenient to simply effect the correction
of the minutes.

Likewise, petitioners' reliance on the affidavits of desistance executed by the private complainants fails to impress this
Court. Our ruling in Balderama v. People[43] is instructive:
A recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and reservation. The Court looks with disfavor upon
retractions of testimonies previously given in court. It is settled that an affidavit of desistance made by a witness after
conviction of the accused is not reliable, and deserves only scant attention. The rationale for the rule is obvious:
affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary
consideration. Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable. There is always the probability that it will later be
repudiated. Only when there exist special circumstances in the case which when coupled with the retraction raise
doubts as to the truth of the testimony or statement given, can retractions be considered and upheld.

The affidavits of desistance cannot prevail over the categorical statements of the private complainants, the very same
affiants who executed the same. Moreover, based on the testimonies of the private complainants, they merely
executed the affidavits of desistance after the DILG dismissed the administrative complaint and after Mayor Regidor
asked them to execute the same, because they had the impression that the DILG ruling would, in one way or another,
be binding on the Sandiganbayan, and they simply wanted to avoid having to spend for their fare in going to the
Sandiganbayan for the trial.

This impression was likewise noted by the Sandiganbayan in its assailed Decision. The impression was so prevalent that
even the petitioners themselves relied on the DILG dismissal of the administrative charge, contending that it should
have been given greater weight by the Sandiganbayan, at least to create a serious and reasonable doubt to warrant
their acquittal.

The petitioners' contention lacks merit.

It is a fundamental principle in the law on public officers that administrative liability is separate from and independent
of criminal liability. A simple act or omission can give rise to criminal, civil or administrative liability, each independently
of the others. This is known as the "threefold liability rule." Thus, absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an
administrative prosecution, and vice-versa. In this criminal prosecution, the dismissal of the administrative cases
against the petitioners will not necessarily result in the dismissal of the criminal complaints filed against them.

Based on the foregoing disquisitions, the Sandiganbayan's conviction of petitioners had ample factual mooring, after
the prosecution presented both documentary and testimonial pieces of evidence. Time and again, we held that we are
not a trier of facts; hence, we defer to the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan which had more opportunity and
facilities to examine and evaluate the evidence presented.[44]

To repeat, settled is the rule that findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan in cases before this Court are binding and
conclusive in the absence of a showing that they come under the established exceptions, among them: 1) when the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; 2) the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; 3) there is a grave abuse of discretion; 4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; 5) said findings
of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; and 6) the findings of fact of the
Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence on record.[45] We found none of these exceptions in the
present case. Thus, we accord respect and weight to the Sandiganbayan's findings, a portion of which aptly and
judiciously states, to wit:

Based on the foregoing, this Court finds the contentions of the accused untenable. Their defense of good faith and lack
of intent has failed to cast doubt on the allegations of the prosecution. In the falsification of public or official
documents, whether by public officials or by private persons, it is not that there be present the idea of gain or intent to
injure a third person. Verily, the pieces of evidence reveal the specific acts of the four (4) accused in the commission of
the crime of falsification. Firstly, the accused caused it to appear in a document that members of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod participated in the sessions, deliberations and passed the questioned resolutions. The said resolutions
reflect the attendance of all the members of the Sanggunian on the dates thereon, including their unanimous approval
of the resolutions. The pieces of evidence and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, however, reveal otherwise.
If, in truth and in fact, Resolutions 50-A, 56, 56-A, 63, 61, 64 and 68 were indeed taken up and passed upon on their
respective dates, it would be contrary to human reason why the members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod who
approved it unanimously, to suddenly file a case against the accused and deny the existence of a legislative act they
authored. Secondly, the accused are found to have committed the act of issuing in authenticated form, a document
purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such document exists. In issuing the subject Resolutions,
Mayor Eleno T. Regidor, Jr., Vice-Mayor Aniceto T. Siete and SP Camilo B. Zapatos, consummated the crime of
falsification by purporting them to be original copies of valid, deliberated and approved resolutions when no such
documents exist and no proceedings regarding them ever took place as established by the prosecution. Their defense
that the minutes of the sessions were inaccurate and did not reflect the deliberations concerning the questioned
resolutions, does not convince this Court. The testimonies of complainants Roberto O. [Taclob], Estrelita M. Pastrano,
Elizabeth L. Duroy and Agustin L. Opay, all former members of the City Council during the terms of the accused, must
be given great weight and credence. In falsification of a public document, the falsification need not be made on an
official form. It is sufficient that the document is given the appearance of, or made to appear similar to the official form.

All told, the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in ruling that the petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of falsification of public documents.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the Sandiganbayan Decision dated September 24, 2004 in Criminal
Cases Nos. 13689, 13690, 13691, 13692, 13693, 13694 and 13695 is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

FOFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, vs. ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR., Respondent.

G.R. No. 164679 | 2011-07-27

SECOND DIVISION

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Through a petition for review on certiorari, [1] the petitioner Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) seeks the
reversal of the decision [2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 28, 2004, in "Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. v. Office of the
Ombudsman and Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), etc.," docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68893. The assailed
decision annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman dated July 30, 2001, [3] finding Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr.
guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

Andutan was formerly the Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the
Department of Finance (DOF). On June 30, 1998, then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora issued a Memorandum
directing all non-career officials or those occupying political positions to vacate their positions effective July 1, 1998. [4]
On July 1, 1998, pursuant to the Memorandum, Andutan resigned from the DOF. [5]

On September 1, 1999, Andutan, together with Antonio P. Belicena, former Undersecretary, DOF; Rowena P. Malonzo,
Tax Specialist I, DOF; Benjamin O. Yao, Chairman and Executive Officer, Steel Asia Manufacturing Corporation (Steel
Asia); Augustus S. Lapid, Vice-President, Steel Asia; Antonio M. Lorenzana, President and Chief Operating Officer, Steel
Asia; and Eulogio L. Reyes, General Manager, Devmark Textiles Ind. Inc., was criminally charged by the Fact Finding and
Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Ombudsman with Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents, and violations of
Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. [6]
As government employees, Andutan, Belicena and Malonzo were likewise administratively charged of Grave
Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
[7]

The criminal and administrative charges arose from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) to
Steel Asia, among others. [8]

During the investigation, the FFIB found that Steel Asia fraudulently obtained TCCs worth Two Hundred Forty-Two
Million, Four Hundred Thirty-Three Thousand, Five Hundred Thirty-Four Pesos (P242,433,534.00). [9] The FFIB
concluded that Belicena, Malonzo and Andutan - in their respective capacities - irregularly approved the "issuance of
the TCCs to several garment/textile companies and allowing their subsequent illegal transfer" to Steel Asia. [10]

On November 11, 1999, the Ombudsman ordered the respondents therein (respondents) to submit their counter-
affidavits. Only Malonzo complied with the order, prompting the Ombudsman to set a Preliminary Conference on
March 13, 2000.

Upon the respondents' failure to appear at the March 20, 2000 hearing, the Ombudsman deemed the case submitted
for resolution.

On July 30, 2001, the Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. [11] Having been separated
from the service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all leaves, retirement and other benefits and
privileges, and perpetual disqualification from reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of
the government, including government owned and controlled agencies or corporations. [12]

After failing to obtain a reconsideration of the decision, [13] Andutan filed a petition for review on certiorari before the
CA.

On July 28, 2004, [14] the CA annulled and set aside the decision of the Ombudsman, ruling that the latter "should not
have considered the administrative complaints" because: first, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 provides that the Ombudsman
"may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that x x
x [t]he complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of"; [15] and second,
the administrative case was filed after Andutan's forced resignation. [16]

THE PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS

In this petition for review on certiorari, the Ombudsman asks the Court to overturn the decision of the CA. It submits,
first, that contrary to the CA's findings, administrative offenses do not prescribe after one year from their commission,
[17] and second, that in cases of "capital" administrative offenses, resignation or optional retirement cannot render
administrative proceedings moot and academic, since accessory penalties such as perpetual disqualification and the
forfeiture of retirement benefits may still be imposed. [18]
The Ombudsman argues that Section 20 of R.A. 6770 is not mandatory. Consistent with existing jurisprudence, the use
of the word "may" indicates that Section 20 is merely directory or permissive. [19] Thus, it is not ministerial upon it to
dismiss the administrative complaint, as long as any of the circumstances under Section 20 is present. [20] In any case,
the Ombudsman urges the Court to examine its mandate under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and hold
that an imposition of a one (1) year prescriptive period on the filing of cases unconstitutionally restricts its mandate.
[21]

Further, the Ombudsman submits that Andutan's resignation from office does not render moot the administrative
proceedings lodged against him, even after his resignation. Relying on Section VI(1) of Civil Service Commission (CSC)
Memorandum Circular No. 38, [22] the Ombudsman argues that "[a]s long as the breach of conduct was committed
while the public official or employee was still in the service x x x a public servant's resignation is not a bar to his
administrative investigation, prosecution and adjudication." [23] It is irrelevant that Andutan had already resigned
from office when the administrative case was filed since he was charged for "acts performed in office which are inimical
to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general public." [24] Furthermore, even if Andutan
had already resigned, there is a need to "determine whether or not there remains penalties capable of imposition, like
bar from reentering the (sic) public service and forfeiture of benefits." [25] Finally, the Ombudsman reiterates that its
findings against Andutan are supported by substantial evidence.

THE RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS

Andutan raises three (3) counterarguments to the Ombudsman's petition.

First, Andutan submits that the CA did not consider Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 as a prescriptive period; rather, the CA
merely held that the Ombudsman should not have considered the administrative complaint. According to Andutan,
Section 20(5) "does not purport to impose a prescriptive period x x x but simply prohibits the Office of the Ombudsman
from conducting an investigation where the complaint [was] filed more than one (1) year from the occurrence of the
act or omission complained of." [26] Andutan believes that the Ombudsman should have referred the complaint to
another government agency. [27] Further, Andutan disagrees with the Ombudsman's interpretation of Section 20(5).
Andutan suggests that the phrase "may not conduct the necessary investigation" means that the Ombudsman is
prohibited to act on cases that fall under those enumerated in Section 20(5). [28]

Second, Andutan reiterates that the administrative case against him was moot because he was no longer in the public
service at the time the case was commenced. [29] According to Andutan, Atty. Perez v. Judge Abiera [30] and similar
cases cited by the Ombudsman do not apply since the administrative investigations against the respondents in those
cases were commenced prior to their resignation. Here, Andutan urges the Court to rule otherwise since unlike the
cases cited, he had already resigned before the administrative case was initiated. He further notes that his resignation
from office cannot be characterized as "preemptive, i.e. made under an atmosphere of fear for the imminence of
formal charges" [31] because it was done pursuant to the Memorandum issued by then Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora.

Having established the propriety of his resignation, Andutan asks the Court to uphold the mootness of the
administrative case against him since the cardinal issue in administrative cases is the "officer's fitness to remain in
office, the principal penalty imposable being either suspension or removal." [32] The Ombudsman's opinion - that
accessory penalties may still be imposed - is untenable since it is a fundamental legal principle that "accessory follows
the principal, and the former cannot exist independently of the latter." [33]

Third, the Ombudsman's findings were void because procedural and substantive due process were not observed.
Likewise, Andutan submits that the Ombudsman's findings lacked legal and factual bases.

ISSUES
Based on the submissions made, we see the following as the issues for our resolution:

I. Does Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative investigation a year
after the act was committed?

II. Does Andutan's resignation render moot the administrative case filed against him?

III. Assuming that the administrative case is not moot, are the Ombudsman's findings supported by substantial
evidence?

THE COURT'S RULING

We rule to deny the petition.

The provisions of Section 20(5) are merely directory;

the Ombudsman is not prohibited from conducting an

investigation a year after the supposed

act was committed.

The issue of whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 is mandatory or discretionary has been settled by jurisprudence. [34] In
Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun, [35] the Court, speaking through Justice Austria-Martinez, held:

[W]ell-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe [Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada, Jr., A.M.
No. P-99-1342, September 20, 2005, 470 SCRA 218;Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA
476;Heck v. Judge Santos, 467 Phil. 798, 824 (2004);Floria v. Sunga,420 Phil. 637, 648-649 (2001)]. Administrative
offenses by their very nature pertain to the character of public officers and employees. In disciplining public officers and
employees, the object sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee but the improvement of the public
service and the preservation of the public's faith and confidence in our government [Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No.
151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481;Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,414 Phil. 590, 601 (2001)].

Respondents insist that Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770, to wit:

SEC. 20.Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsmanmaynot conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative
act or omission complained of if it believes that:

xxxx

(5) The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of. (Emphasis
supplied)

proscribes the investigation of any administrative act or omission if the complaint was filed after one year from the
occurrence of the complained act or omission.
In Melchor v. Gironella [G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476], the Court held that the period stated in
Section 20(5) of R.A. No. 6770 does not refer to the prescription of the offense but to the discretion given to
theOmbudsmanon whether it would investigate a particular administrative offense. The use of the word "may" in the
provision is construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion [Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138,
February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481;Jaramilla v. Comelec, 460 Phil. 507, 514 (2003)]. Where the words of a statute
are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, they must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation [Melchor v. Gironella, G.R. No. 151138, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 476, 481;National Federation of
Labor v. National Labor Relations Commission, 383 Phil. 910, 918 (2000)].

In Filipino v. Macabuhay [G.R. No. 158960, November 24, 2006, 508 SCRA 50],the Court interpreted Section 20 (5) of
R.A. No. 6770 in this manner:

Petitioner argues that based on the abovementioned provision [Section 20(5) of RA 6770)], respondent's complaint is
barred by prescription considering that it was filed more than one year after the alleged commission of the acts
complained of.

Petitioner's argument is without merit.

The use of the word "may" clearly shows that it is directory in nature and not mandatory as petitioner contends. When
used in a statute, it is permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while the word "shall" is imperative, operating
to impose a duty which may be enforced. Applying Section 20(5), therefore,it is discretionary upon the Ombudsman
whether or not to conduct an investigation on a complaint even if it was filed after one year from the occurrence of the
act or omission complained of. In fine, the complaint is not barred by prescription. (Emphasis supplied)

The declaration of the CA in its assailed decision that while as a general rule the word "may" is directory, the negative
phrase "may not" is mandatory in tenor; that a directory word, when qualified by the word "not," becomes prohibitory
and therefore becomes mandatory in character, is not plausible. It is not supported by jurisprudence on statutory
construction. [emphases and underscoring supplied]

Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an administrative investigation
after the lapse of one year, reckoned from the time the alleged act was committed. Without doubt, even if the
administrative case was filed beyond the one (1) year period stated in Section 20(5), the Ombudsman was well within
its discretion to conduct the administrative investigation.

However, the crux of the present controversy is not on the issue of prescription, but on the issue of the Ombudsman's
authority to institute an administrative complaint against a government employee who had already resigned. On this
issue, we rule in Andutan's favor.

Andutan's resignation divests the Ombudsman

of its right to institute an administrative

complaint against him.

Although the Ombudsman is not precluded by Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 from conducting the investigation, the
Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan because the latter was not a public servant
at the time the case was filed.

The Ombudsman argued - in both the present petition and in the petition it filed with the CA - that Andutan's
retirement from office does not render moot any administrative case, as long as he is charged with an offense he
committed while in office. It is irrelevant, according to the Ombudsman, that Andutan had already resigned prior to the
filing of the administrative case since the operative fact that determines its jurisdiction is the commission of an offense
while in the public service.

The Ombudsman relies on Section VI(1) of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 38 for this proposition,
viz.:

Section VI.

1. x x x

An officer or employee under administrative investigation may be allowed to resign pending decision of his case but it
shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the proceeding against him. It shall also be without prejudice to the
filing of any administrative, criminal case against him for any act committed while still in the service. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The CA refused to give credence to this argument, holding that the provision "refers to cases where the officers or
employees were already charged before they were allowed to resign or were separated from service." [36] In this case,
the CA noted that "the administrative cases were filed only after Andutan was retired, hence the Ombudsman was
already divested of jurisdiction and could no longer prosecute the cases." [37]

Challenging the CA's interpretation, the Ombudsman argues that the CA "limited the scope of the cited Civil Service
Memorandum Circular to the first sentence." [38] Further, according to the Ombudsman, "the court a quo ignored the
second statement in the said circular that contemplates a situation where previous to the institution of the
administrative investigation or charge, the public official or employee subject of the investigation has resigned." [39]

To recall, we have held in the past that a public official's resignation does not render moot an administrative case that
was filed prior to the official's resignation. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr., [40] we held that:

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan [A.M. No. P-03-1726,22 July 2004, 434 SCRA 654, 658], this Court
categorically ruled that the precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with an offense punishable by
dismissal from the servicedoes notrender moot the administrative case against him.Resignation is not a way out to
evade administrative liability when facing administrative sanction.The resignation of a public servant does not preclude
the finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall still be answerable [Baquerfo v. Sanchez, A.M. No. P-
05-1974,6 April 2005, 455 SCRA 13, 19-20]. [emphasis and underscoring supplied]

Likewise, in Baquerfo v. Sanchez, [41] we held:

Cessation from office of respondent by resignation [Reyes v. Cristi, A.M. No. P-04-1801, 2 April 2004, 427 SCRA 8] or
retirement [Re: Complaint Filed by Atty. Francis Allan A. Rubio on the Alleged Falsification of Public Documents and
Malversation of Public Funds, A.M. No. 2004-17-SC, 27 September 2004;Caja v. Nanquil, A.M. No. P-04-1885, 13
September 2004] neither warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in
the service [Tuliao v. Ramos, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1065, 348 Phil. 404, 416 (1998), citing Perez v. Abiera, A.C. No. 223-J, 11
June 1975, 64 SCRA 302; Secretary of Justice v. Marcos, A.C. No. 207-J, 22 April 1977, 76 SCRA 301] nor does it render
said administrative case moot and academic [Sy Bang v. Mendez, 350 Phil. 524, 533 (1998)]. The jurisdiction that was
this Court's at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent
public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case [Flores v. Sumaljag, 353 Phil. 10, 21 (1998)].
Respondent's resignation does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be
answerable [OCA v. Fernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1511, 20 August 2004]. [emphases and underscoring supplied)
However, the facts of those cases are not entirely applicable to the present case. In the above-cited cases, the Court
found that the public officials - subject of the administrative cases - resigned, either to prevent the continuation of a
case already filed [42] or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one. [43] Here, neither situation obtains.

The Ombudsman's general assertion that Andutan pre-empted the filing of a case against him by resigning, since he
"knew for certain that the investigative and disciplinary arms of the State would eventually reach him" [44] is
unfounded. First, Andutan's resignation was neither his choice nor of his own doing; he was forced to resign. Second,
Andutan resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while the administrative case was filed on September 1, 1999,
exactly one (1) year and two (2) months after his resignation. The Court struggles to find reason in the Ombudsman's
sweeping assertions in light of these facts.

What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before the Ombudsman filed the
administrative case against him. Additionally, even if we were to accept the Ombudsman's position that Andutan
foresaw the filing of the case against him, his forced resignation negates the claim that he tried to prevent the filing of
the administrative case.

Having established the inapplicability of prevailing jurisprudence, we turn our attention to the provisions of Section VI
of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38. We disagree with the Ombudsman's interpretation that "[a]s long as the breach
of conduct was committed while the public official or employee was still in the service x x x a public servant's
resignation is not a bar to his administrative investigation, prosecution and adjudication." [45] If we agree with this
interpretation, any official - even if he has been separated from the service for a long time - may still be subject to the
disciplinary authority of his superiors, ad infinitum. We believe that this interpretation is inconsistent with the principal
motivation of the law - which is to improve public service and to preserve the public's faith and confidence in the
government, and not the punishment of the public official concerned. [46] Likewise, if the act committed by the public
official is indeed inimical to the interests of the State, other legal mechanisms are available to redress the same.

The possibility of imposing

accessory penalties does not

negate the Ombudsman's lack

of jurisdiction.

The Ombudsman suggests that although the issue of Andutan's removal from the service is moot, there is an
"irresistible justification" to "determine whether or not there remains penalties capable of imposition, like bar from re-
entering the public service and forfeiture of benefits." [47] Otherwise stated, since accessory penalties may still be
imposed against Andutan, the administrative case itself is not moot and may proceed despite the inapplicability of the
principal penalty of removal from office.

We find several reasons that militate against this position.

First, although we have held that the resignation of an official does not render an administrative case moot and
academic because accessory penalties may still be imposed, this holding must be read in its proper context. In Pagano
v. Nazarro, Jr., [48] indeed, we held:

A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful
purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case [Tantoy, Sr. v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 156128,9 May 2005, 458
SCRA 301, 305]. The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioner's separation from government
service.Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions - that of separation from service - may no longer be imposed
on the petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is later found guilty of administrative
offenses charged against her, namely, the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.
[emphasis and underscoring supplied]
Reading the quoted passage in a vacuum, one could be led to the conclusion that the mere availability of accessory
penalties justifies the continuation of an administrative case. This is a misplaced reading of the case and its ruling.

Esther S. Pagano - who was serving as Cashier IV at the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Benguet - filed her
certificate of candidacy for councilor four days after the Provincial Treasurer directed her to explain why no
administrative case should be filed against her. The directive arose from allegations that her accountabilities included a
cash shortage of P1,424,289.99. She filed her certificate of candidacy under the pretext that since she was deemed
ipso facto resigned from office, she was no longer under the administrative jurisdiction of her superiors. Thus,
according to Pagano, the administrative complaint had become moot.

We rejected Pagano's position on the principal ground "that the precipitate resignation of a government employee
charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from the servicedoes notrender moot the administrative case against
him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when facing administrative sanction." [49] Our
position that accessory penalties are still imposable - thereby negating the mootness of the administrative complaint -
merely flows from the fact that Pagano pre-empted the filing of the administrative case against her. It was neither
intended to be a stand-alone argument nor would it have justified the continuation of the administrative complaint if
Pagano's filing of candidacy/resignation did not reek of irregularities. Our factual findings in Pagano confirm this, viz.:

At the time petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy, petitioner was already notified by the Provincial Treasurer that
she needed to explain why no administrative charge should be filed against her, after it discovered the cash shortage
ofP1,424,289.99 in her accountabilities.Moreover, she had already filed her answer.To all intents and purposes, the
administrative proceedings had already been commenced at the time she was considered separated from service
through her precipitate filing of her certificate of candidacy.Petitioner's bad faith was manifest when she filed it, fully
knowing that administrative proceedings were being instituted against her as part of the procedural due process in
laying the foundation for an administrative case. [50] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Plainly, our justification for the continuation of the administrative case - notwithstanding Pagano's resignation - was her
"bad faith" in filing the certificate of candidacy, and not the availability of accessory penalties.

Second, we agree with the Ombudsman that "fitness to serve in public office x x x is a question of transcendental
[importance] [51]" and that "preserving the inviolability of public office" compels the state to prevent the "re-entry [to]
public service of persons who have x x x demonstrated their absolute lack of fitness to hold public office." [52]
However, the State must perform this task within the limits set by law, particularly, the limits of jurisdiction. As earlier
stated, under the Ombudsman's theory, the administrative authorities may exercise administrative jurisdiction over
subordinates ad infinitum; thus, a public official who has validly severed his ties with the civil service may still be the
subject of an administrative complaint up to his deathbed. This is contrary to the law and the public policy behind it.

Lastly, the State is not without remedy against Andutan or any public official who committed violations while in office,
but had already resigned or retired therefrom. Under the "threefold liability rule," the wrongful acts or omissions of a
public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. [53] Even if the Ombudsman may no longer file
an administrative case against a public official who has already resigned or retired, the Ombudsman may still file
criminal and civil cases to vindicate Andutan's alleged transgressions. In fact, here, the Ombudsman - through the FFIB
- filed a criminal case for Estafa and violations of Section 3(a), (e) and (j) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
against Andutan. If found guilty, Andutan will not only be meted out the penalty of imprisonment, but also the
penalties of perpetual disqualification from office, and confiscation or forfeiture of any prohibited interest. [54]

Conclusion

Public office is a public trust. No precept of administrative law is more basic than this statement of what assumption of
public office involves. The stability of our public institutions relies on the ability of our civil servants to serve their
constituencies well.
While we commend the Ombudsman's resolve in pursuing the present case for violations allegedly committed by
Andutan, the Court is compelled to uphold the law and dismiss the petition. Consistent with our holding that Andutan is
no longer the proper subject of an administrative complaint, we find no reason to delve on the Ombudsman's factual
findings.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the Office of the Ombudsman's petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRM the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68893, promulgated on July 28, 2004, which annulled and set aside the July 30, 2001
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman, finding Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, DESIDERIO W. MACUSI, JR., SHERIFF IV,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 25, TABUK CITY, KALINGA, RESPONDENT.

A.M. No. P-13-3105 (Formerly A.M. No. 10-7-83-MTCC) | 2013-09-11

FIRST DIVISION

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Criselda M. Paligan (Paligan) was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 429-06, entitled Ms. Criselda M Paligan v. Spouses
Cornelio and Leonila Tabanganay, an action for collection of sum of money with damages, before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) of Tabuk City, Kalinga. In a letter dated July 23, 2009,[1] addressed to the Presiding Judge, MTCC,
[2] Tabuk City, Kalinga, Paligan inquired as to the status of the writ of execution issued on September 10, 2008 by the
MTCC in Civil Case No. 429-06, since she had not received any report or information whether the said writ bad already
been served. Paligan also furnished the Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, of Tabuk City, Kalinga, a
copy of her letter.

Judge Victor A. Dalanao (Dalanao ), MTCC, Tabuk City, Kalinga, through a 1st Endorsement dated July 29, 2009,[3]
referred Paligan's letter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action. Judge Dalanao reported
that the writ of execution, issued in Civil Case No. 429-06 on September 10, 2008, was received by the Office of the
Provincial Sheriff on September 19, 2008. A return was made on October 30, 2008 informing the court that the writ was
returned “unserved.” Thereafter, no other report on the writ was made. Judge Dalanao further observed that “a lot of
cases are similarly situated, where not even a report [has been] submitted as prescribed by the Rules of Court.”

In a 2nd Endorsement dated August 17, 2009,[4] the OCA referred Judge Dalanao’s 1st Endorsement dated July 29,
2009 and Paligan’s letter dated July 23, 2009 to Atty. Mary Jane A. Andomang (Andomang), Clerk of Court, RTC, Tabuk
City, Kalinga, for comment and appropriate action.

Complying with the 2nd Endorsement, Atty. Andomang sent a Comment and Report on Civil Case No. 429-06 of
[MTCC]-Tabuk City, dated September 30, 2009 to the OCA. In her Comment and Report, Atty. Andomang recounted
that she already required the Deputy Sheriff[5] to explain why no report was made on the writ in Civil Case No. 429-06
since October 2008. The Deputy Sheriff explained to her in a letter dated September 14, 2009 that no report was made
because Paligan never appeared at the Office to coordinate the implementation of the said writ. Atty. Andomang
claimed that she had always reminded the Deputy Sheriff of his duties and responsibilities in serving writs and making
periodic reports.

Instead of filing a reply to Atty. Andomang’s Comment and Report as directed by the OCA, Judge Dalanao submitted a
letter dated November 6, 2009 with an inventory of cases[6] “if only to show the acts of the Sheriff.” Judge Dalanao
pointed out that the Sheriff[7] was inconsistent: making reports in some cases, although some of said reports were late,
and making no reports at all in other cases. Judge Dalanao further noted that five years has already lapsed without
execution in several cases. He has also yet to receive the Sheriff’s estimate of expenses for approval. Judge Dalanao
lastly averred that after receiving complaints from parties, he already verbally brought up the matter with the Executive
Judge, and even personally talked to the Sheriff several times to remind the Sheriff of his duties and responsibilities.

In his letter dated November 16, 2009,[8] Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr. (Macusi), Sheriff IV, RTC-Branch 25, Tabuk City,
Kalinga, defended himself by calling attention to the fact that he was appointed as Sheriff only in 2006, while some of
the writs of execution in Judge Dalanao’s inventory of cases were issued as early as 1997. While admitting that in some
cases, there were late reports or no reports at all on the writs of execution, Macusi argued that “(t)he rule states that
the Sheriff must act with celerity and promptness when they are handed the Writs of Execution; yet, the rule also states
that when party litigants, in whose favor the Writs, have been issued, frustrate the efforts of the Sheriffs to implement
those Writs, the latter are relieved from such duty and incur no administrative liability therefor.”[9] Macusi additionally
wrote that he did not report regularly despite the presence of the rules since he “relied on the dictates of practicality so
as not to waste supplies. Rules, accordingly are there to guide but they are not absolute[,] what matters is what one
accomplishes.”[10] Macusi then informed the OCA that he had been, in fact, sued before the courts because of his
accomplishments as a Sheriff. As for his failure to submit his estimate of expenses for Judge Dalanao’s approval, Macusi
explicated that he dispensed with the same for the winning parties were already willing to assist him and pay for his
expenses.

The OCA, finding that Macusi violated Rule 39, Section 14 and Rule 141, Section 9 of the Rules of Court, sent the latter a
letter dated December 2, 2009[11] directing him to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him.

In his letter-compliance dated January 4, 2010,[12] Macusi provided the following explanation:

1. That I was appointed Court Interpreter on May 24, 2004 and was designated Sheriff in April 2005;

2. That the Writs of Execution issued in the year 1997-2004 were not properly turned over to the undersigned; hence,
I could not make any follow-ups and updated reports;

3. That the Writs of Execution without initial or updated reports could not be blamed on the undersigned because as
early as August 2006 [please see attached reports marked as annex A], I already informed the Honorable Court of the
stand of the plaintiff, Rural Bank of Tabuk [K-A], Inc. regarding the Writs of Execution issued in its favor – THAT THE
WRITS OF EXECUTION WILL ONLY BE DELIVERED AND EXPLAINED TO THE LOSING PARTY LITIGANTS – thus; what report
could be made in such a scenario. Please see also attached reports marked as Annex A-1 on the stand of the plaintiff of
scheduling the service of the Writs of Execution, this was reported to the Hon. Court in August 2008. Kindly compare
this with the report where plaintiffs through their counsels who always coordinate with the Office of the Clerk of Court
of RTC BR 25 where I am serving as the Sheriff resulted to either partial or full satisfaction of the amount of execution
[said report is marked as Annex A-2];

4. That Plantiff Rural Bank of Tabuk [K-A] Inc. does not like to make the necessary deposit for the Sheriff’s expenses in
IMPLEMENTING OR EXECUTING the Writs of Execution because the company [Rural Bank] had been and is spending
thousands of pesos for litigation expenses [please see attached report marked as Annex B]. Thus; no estimated
expenses could be shown, though I AM ACCOMPLISHING THE FORM FOR ESTIMATED EXPENSES WHENEVER I SERVED
COURT PROCESSES and said form is attached and marked as Annex C;

5. That I am attaching OCA Circular No. [44-2007] marked as Annex D to show why Cooperatives does (sic) not need to
make the necessary deposits for Sheriff’s expenses; hence, no estimated expenses to be accomplished and shown;

6. That I have done everything I could to comply with the Rules of Court on Execution and satisfaction of Judgment;
hence, I should not be liable for a disciplinary action because “…the rule also states that when party litigants, in whose
favor the Writs, have been issued, frustrate the efforts of the Sheriffs to implement those Writs, the latter are relieved
from such duty and incur no administrative liability therefore.”

In a Resolution dated August 18, 2010,[13] the Court treated the instant matter as an administrative complaint against
Macusi and referred the same to Executive Judge Marcelino K. Wacas (Wacas), RTC-Branch 25, Tabuk City, Kalinga, for
investigation, report, and recommendation. The Court also directed Atty. Andomang to facilitate, in coordination with
all concerned, the immediate implementation of the writs of execution listed in Judge Dalanao’s inventory and submit a
status report thereon within 30 days from notice.

After his investigation, Judge Wacas submitted a Resolution dated April 20, 2012.[14] Judge Wacas found substantial
evidence that Macusi violated Rule 39, Section 14 and Rule 141, Section 10 of the Rules of Court. According to Judge
Wacas, Macusi exercised “some degree of discretion,” having his own rules and unmindful of the existing rules and
established jurisprudence. Judge Wacas took into account the following:

[T]he attention of this Court was partly focused on the length of service of Mr. Macusi as Deputy Sheriff and that is for
the period of more than 3 years and by reason of the same, this Court could say that he wrongly interpreted some basic
rules in the implementation of writs of execution and the disbursement of expenses relative thereto. Another point to
consider, is the principle of first offense which has the effect of mitigating the administrative liability.[15]

In the end, Judge Wacas recommended that Macusi be found guilty of simple neglect of duty and meted the penalty of
a fine in the amount of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00).

The OCA, in its Memorandum dated October 17, 2012,[16] agreed with the conclusions of fact of Judge Wacas and
recommended that:

1. [T]he instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative case;

2. Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr., Sheriff IV, Branch 25, RTC, Tabuk, Kalinga, be found GUILTY of Simple Neglect of Duty and
a penalty of FINE in the amount of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) be imposed upon him, with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.[17]
In a Resolution dated February 6, 2013,[18] the Court re-docketed the administrative complaint against Macusi as a
regular administrative matter and required Macusi to manifest within 10 days from notice if he was willing to submit
the matter for decision/resolution based on the records/pleadings filed.

Macusi[19] submitted his Manifestation and Motion dated May 30, 2013, informing the Court that he was deemed
resigned from government service by operation of law when he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of City
Councilor in Tabuk City, Kalinga for the 2010 Local Elections. He prayed that the Court dismiss the administrative case
against him for being moot and academic.

As found by Judge Wacas and the OCA, Macusi violated Rule 39, Section 14 and Rule 141, Section 10 of the Rules of
Court, which provide:

RULE 39

EXECUTION, SATISFACTION AND EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS

xxxx

Sec. 14. Return of writ of execution. – The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it immediately after
the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after
his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the reason therefor. Such writ shall continue in
effect during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the
court every (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires.
The returns or the periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court
and copies thereof promptly furnished the parties. (Emphasis ours.)

RULE 141

LEGAL FEES

xxxx

Section 10. Sheriffs, PROCESS SERVERS and other persons serving processes. –

xxxx

With regard to sheriff’s expenses in executing writs issued pursuant to court orders or decisions or safeguarding the
property levied upon, attached or seized, including kilometrage for each kilometer of travel, guards’ fees, warehousing
and similar charges, the interested party shall pay said expenses in an amount estimated by the sheriff, subject to the
approval of the court. Upon approval of said estimated expenses, the interested party shall deposit such amount with
the clerk of court and ex-officio sheriff, who shall disburse the same to the deputy sheriff assigned to effect the process,
subject to liquidation within the same period for rending a return on the process. The liquidation shall be approved by
the court. Any unspent amount shall be refunded to the party making the deposit. A full report shall be submitted by
the deputy sheriff assigned with his return, and the sheriff’s expenses shall be taxed as costs against the judgment
debtor.
The raison d’ etre behind the requirement of periodic reports under Rule 39, Section 14 of the Rules of Court is to
update the court on the status of the execution and to take necessary steps to ensure the speedy execution of
decisions.[20] Macusi did not deny that he failed to file periodic reports on the Writ of Execution dated September 10,
2008 in Civil Case No. 429-06, as well as on the writs of execution in the other cases in Judge Dalanao’s inventory. In his
defense, however, he asserted that the prevailing party in the cases, including Paligan, failed to coordinate or refused
to cooperate with him in the implementation of their respective writs of execution; and that the writs of execution
were not properly turned over to him when he was appointed Sheriff in April 2005. Macusi’s excuses cannot exonerate
him.

In Mariñas v. Florendo,[21] the Court stressed that:

Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice and as agents of the law, high standards are expected of
them. They are duty- bound to know and to comply with the very basic rules relative to the implementation of writs of
execution.

It is undisputed that the most difficult phase of any proceeding is the execution of judgment. The officer charged with
this delicate task is the sheriff. The sheriff, as an officer of the court upon whom the execution of a final judgment
depends, must necessarily be circumspect and proper in his behavior. Execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is
the life of the law. He is to execute the directives of the court therein strictly in accordance with the letter thereof and
without any deviation therefrom. (Citations omitted.)

As observed by Judge Wacas, Macusi exercised excessive discretion in the execution of the writs and in the filing of
reports thereon. He seemed to have entirely overlooked that the nature of a sheriff’s duty in the execution of a writ
issued by a court is purely ministerial. As such, a sheriff has the duty to perform faithfully and accurately what is
incumbent upon him. Conversely, he exercises no discretion as to the manner of executing a final judgment. Any
method of execution falling short of the requirement of the law deserves reproach and should not be countenanced.
[22]

Moreover, difficulties or obstacles in the satisfaction of a final judgment and execution of a writ do not excuse Macusi’s
total inaction. Neither the Rules nor jurisprudence recognizes any exception from the periodic filing of reports by
sheriffs. If only Macusi submitted such periodic reports, he could have brought his predicament to the attention of his
superiors and the issuing courts and he could have given his superiors and the issuing courts the opportunity to act
and/or move to address the same.[23]

A sheriff is guilty of violating Rule 141, Section 10 of the Rules of Court if he fails to observe the following: (1) prepare
an estimate of expenses to be incurred in executing the writ; (2) ask for the court’s approval of his estimates; (3) render
an accounting; and (4) issue an official receipt for the total amount he received from the judgment debtor.[24]

There is no showing herein that Macusi complied with the foregoing procedure. Macusi even actually admitted that he
did not submit an estimate of expenses because the winning parties in some of the cases willingly spent for the
execution of their writs. Macusi’s explanation only makes matters worse for him as sheriffs are not allowed to receive
any voluntary payments from parties in the course of the performance of their duties. Corollary, a sheriff cannot just
unilaterally demand sums of money from a party-litigant without observing the proper procedural steps. Even assuming
such payments were indeed given and received in good faith, this fact alone would not dispel the suspicion that such
payments were made for less than noble purposes. Neither will the parties’ acquiescence or consent to such expenses
absolve the sheriff for his failure to secure the prior approval of the court concerning such expense.[25]

Sheriffs and their deputies are the front-line representatives of the justice system, and if, through their lack of care and
diligence in the implementation of judicial writs, they lose the trust reposed on them, they inevitably diminish the faith
of the people in the Judiciary. It cannot be overstressed that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct,
official and otherwise, of the personnel who work there, from the judge to the lowest employee. As such, the Court will
not tolerate or condone any conduct of judicial agents or employees which would tend to or actually diminish the faith
of the people in the Judiciary.[26]

Macusi’s prayer for dismissal of the present case for being moot is baseless. Macusi’s constructive resignation from
service through filing of his Certificate of Candidacy for the 2010 Local Elections does not render the case against him
moot. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when a court employee is facing administrative
sanction.[27] As the Court held in Baquerfo v. Sanchez[28]:

Cessation from office of respondent by resignation or retirement neither warrants the dismissal of the administrative
complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot and
academic. The jurisdiction that was this Court’s at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by
the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. Respondent’s
resignation does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable. (Citations
omitted.)

Considering the grave responsibilities imposed on him, Macusi had been careless and imprudent in discharging his
duties. Neither neglect nor delay should be allowed to stall the expeditious disposition of cases. As such, he is indeed
guilty of simple neglect of duty, which is the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task. Simple
neglect of duty signifies “disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.”[29]

Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, (simple) neglect of duty is punishable by
suspension of one month and one day to six months for the first offense. However, under Sec. 19, Rule XIV of the same
Rules, the penalty of fine (instead of suspension) may also be imposed in the alternative.[30] Following the Court’s
ruling in several cases involving (simple) neglect of duty, this Court finds the penalty of a fine in the amount of
P4,000.00, as recommended by Judge Wacas and the OCA, just and reasonable.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Desiderio W. Macusi, Jr., former Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Tabuk City,
Kalinga, GUILTY of Simple Neglect of Duty and imposes upon him the penalty of a FINE in the amount of P4,000.00.
Considering Jvlacusi's resignation, the Court directs the Office of Administrative Services to compute Macusi's terminal
leave credits and the Fiscal Management Office to compute the monetary equivalent thereof, from which his fine of
P4,000.00 shall be deducted.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 131012 April 21, 1999

HON. RICARDO T. GLORIA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports,
petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO A. ABAD, VIRGILIA M. BANDIGAS, ELIZABETH A. SOMEBANG and NICANOR
MARGALLO, respondents.

MENDOZA, J

This case arose out of the unfortunate strikes and walk-outs staged by public school teachers on different dates in
September and October 1990. The illegality of the strikes was declared in our 1991 decision in Manila Public School
Teachers Association v. Laguio, Jr., 1 but many incidents of those strikes are still to be resolved. At issue in this case is
the right to back salaries of teachers who were either dismissed or suspended because they did not report for work but
who were eventually ordered reinstated because they had not been shown to have taken part in the strike, although
reprimanded for being absent without leave.

The facts are as follows:

Private respondents are public school teachers. On various dates in September and October 1990, during the teachers'
strikes, they did not report for work. For this reason, they were administratively charged with (1) grave misconduct, (2)
gross neglect of duty, (3) gross violation of Civil Service Law Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations. (4)
refusal to perform official duty, (5) gross insubordination, (6) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and
(7) absence without leave (AWOL), and placed under preventive suspension. The investigation was concluded before
the lapse of 90-day suspension and private respondents were found guilty as charged. Respondent Nicanor Margallo
was ordered dismissed from the service effective October 29, 1990, while respondents Amparo Abad, Virgilia Bandigas,
and Elizabeth Somebang were ordered suspended for six months effective December 4, 1990. 2

Respondent Margallo appealed to the Merit Systems and Protection Board (MSPB) which found him guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposed on him a six-month suspension. 3 The other respondents also
appealed to the MSPB, but their appeal was dismissed because of their failure to file their appeal memorandum on
time. 4

On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) affirmed the decision of the MSPB with respect to Margallo, but found
the other three (Abad, Bandigas, and Somebang) guilty only of violation of reasonable office rules and regulation, by
filing to file applications for leave of absence and, therefore, reduced the penalty imposed on them to reprimand and
ordered them reinstated to their former positions.

Respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in this Court. Pursuant to Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-
95, the case referred to the Court of Appeals which, on September 3, 1996, rendered a decision (1) affirming the
decision of the CSC with respect to Amparo Abad, Virgilia Bandigas, and Elizabeth Somebang but (2) reversing it insofar
as the CSC ordered the suspension of Nicanor Margallo. The appellate court found him guilty of violation of reasonable
office rules and regulations only and imposed on him the penalty of reprimand.

Private respondents moved for a reconsideration, contending that they should be exonerated of all charges against
them and that they be paid salaries during their suspension. In its resolution, dated July 15, 1997, the Court of Appeals,
while maintaining its finding that private respondents were guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations
for which they should be reprimanded, ruled that private respondents were entitled to the payment of salaries during
their suspension "beyond ninety (90) days." Accordingly, the appellate court amended the dispositive portion of its
decision to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petition is hereby DENIED. CSC Resolution Nos., 93-2302 dated June 24,
1993 and 93-3124 dated August 10, 1993 (In re: Amparo Abad), CSC Resolution Nos. 93-2304 dated June 24, 1993 and
93-3227 dated August 17, 1993 (In re: Virgilia Bandigas) and CSC Resolution Nos. 93-2301 undated and 93-3125 dated
August 10, 1993 (In re: Elizabeth Somebang) are hereby AFFIRMED while CSC Resolution Nos. 93-2211 dated June 21,
l993 are hereby MODIFIED finding petitioner Nicanor Margallo guilty of a lesser offense of violation of reasonable office
rules and regulations and meting upon him the penalty of reprimand. Respondent DECS is ordered to pay petitioners
Amparo Abad, Virgilia Bandigas, Elizabeth Somebang and Nicanor Margallo their salaries, allowances and other benefits
during the period of their suspension/dismissal beyond the ninety (90) day preventive suspension. No pronouncement
as to costs. 6

Petitioner Ricardo T. Gloria, then Secretary of Education, Culture, and Sports, moved for a reconsideration insofar as
the resolution of the Court of Appeals ordered the payment of private respondents' salaries during the period of their
appeal. 7 His motion was, however denied by the appellate court in its resolution of October 6, 1997. 8 Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner contends that the administrative investigation of respondents was concluded within the 90-day period of
preventive suspension, implying that the continued suspension of private respondents is due to their appeal, hence,
the government of their salaries. Moreover, petitioner lays so much store by the fact that, under the law, private
respondents are considered under preventive suspension during the period of their appeal and, for this reason, are not
entitled to the payment of their salaries during their suspension. 9

Petitioner's contentions have no merit.

I. PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION AND THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION IN CASE OF EXONERATION

The present Civil Service Law is found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. 292). So far
as pertinent to the questions in this case, the law provides:

Sec. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction

(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumetalities, province, cities and municipalities shall have
jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction. The decision shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in
an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to
the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending
appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty removal, in which case the same shall be executory only
after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.

(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal,
the respondent shall be considered shall be considered having been under preventive suspension during the pendency
of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal.

Sec. 51. Preventive Suspension. — The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer
or employee under his authority pending as investigation, if the charge against such officers or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe
that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service.
Sec. 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension, Pending Administrative Investigation. — When the administrative case against
the officers or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the
period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the
respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case
is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondents, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the
period of suspension herein provided.

There are thus two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable
by removal or suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending investigations (§51) and (2) preventive suspension
pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the
respondent is exonerated (§ 47(4)).

Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. 10 It is a measure intended to enable to enable the
disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or any way
influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period,
the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after investigation respondent is
found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should be reinstated.

A. No Right to Compensation for Preventive Suspension Pending Investigation Even if Employee is Exonerated

Is he entitled to the payment of salaries during the period of suspension? As already stated, the Court of Appeals
ordered the DECS to pay private respondents their salaries, allowances, and other benefits "beyond the ninety (90) day
suspension." In other words, no compensation was due for the period of the preventive suspension pending
investigation but only for the period of preventive suspension pending appeal in the event the employee is exonerated.

The separate opinion of Justice Panganiban argues that the employee concerned be paid his salaries after his
suspension.

The Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) provided for the payment of such salaries in case of exoneration. Sec. 35
read:

Sec. 35. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. — When the administrative case against
the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service within
the period of sixty (60) days after the date of suspension of the respondent, the respondent shall be reinstated in the
service. If the respondent officers or employee is exonerated, he shall be restored to his position with pay for the
period of suspension. 11

However, the law was revised in 1975 and the provision on the payment salaries during suspension was deleted. Sec.
42 of the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807) read:

Sec. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. — When the administrative case against
the officers or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the
period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the
respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service; Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case
is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the
period of suspension herein provided.
This provision was reproduced in §52 of the present Civil Service Law. It is noteworthy that the Ombudsman Act of
1989 (R.A. No. 6770) categorically provides that preventive suspension shall be "without pay." Sec. 24 reads:

Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of
duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more
than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is
due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension herein provided.

It is clear that the purpose of the amendment is to disallow the payment of salaries for the period of suspension. This
conclusion is in accord with the rule of statutory construction that —

As a rule, the amendment by deletion of certain words or phrases in a statute indicates that the legislature intended to
change the meaning of the statute, for the presumption is that the legislature would not have made the deletion had
the intention been not in effect a change in its meaning. The amended statute should accordingly be given a
construction different from that previous to its amendment. 12

The separate opinion of Justice Panganiban pays no heed to the evident legislative intent to deny payment of salaries
for the preventive suspension pending investigation.

First, it says that to deny compensation for the period of preventive suspension would he to reverse the course of
decisions ordering the payment of salaries for such period. However, the cases 13 cited are based either on the former
rule which expressly provided that "if the respondent officer or employee is exonerated, he shall be restored to his
position with full pay for the period of suspension" 14 or that "upon subsequent reinstatement of the suspended
person or upon his exoneration, if death should render reinstatement impossible, any salary so withheld shall be paid,
15 or on cases which do not really support the proposition advanced.

Second, it is contended that the exoneration of employees who have been preventively suspended is proof that there
was no reason at all to suspend them and thus makes their preventive suspension a penalty.

The principle governing entitlement to salary during suspension is cogently stated in Floyd R. Mechem's A Treatise on
the Law of Public Offices and Officers as follows:

§864. Officer not entitled to Salary during Suspension from

Office. — An officer who has been lawfully suspended from his office is not entitled to compensation for the period
during which he was so suspended, even through it be subsequently determined that the cause for which he was
suspended was insufficient. The reason given is "that salary and perquisites are the reward of express or implied
services, and therefore cannot belong to one who could not lawfully perform such services." 16

Thus, it is not enough that an employee is exonerated of the charges against him. In addition, his suspension must be
unjustified. The case of Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals itself similarly states that "payment of salaries corresponding to
the period [1] when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges which
caused his suspension and [2] when the suspension is unjustified. 17
The preventive suspension of civil service employees charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or
neglect of duty is authorized by the Civil Service Law. It cannot, therefore, be considered "unjustified," even if later the
charges are dismissed so as to justify the payment of salaries to the employee concerned. It is one of those sacrifices
which holding a public office requires for the public good. For this reason, it is limited to ninety (90) days unless the
delay in the conclusion of the investigation is due to the employee concerned. After that period, even if the
investigation is not finished, the law provides that the employee shall be automatically reinstated.

Third, it is argued in the separate opinion that to deny employees salaries on the "frivolous" ground that the law does
not provide for their payment would be to provide a "tool for the oppression of civil servants who, though innocent,
may be falsely "charged of grave or less grave administrative offenses." Indeed, the possibility of abuse is not an
argument against recognition of the existence of power. As Justice Story aptly it, "It is always a doubtful course, to
argue against the use or existence of a power, from the possibility of its abuse. . . . [For] from the very nature of things,
the absolute right of decision, in the last resort, must rest somewhere — wherever it may be vested it is susceptible of
abuse." 18 It may be added that if and when such abuse occurs, that would be the time for the courts to exercise their
nay-saying function. Until then, however, the public interest in an upright civil service must be upheld.

Finally, it is argued that even in the private sector, the law provides that employees who are unjustly dismissed are
entitled to reinstatement with full pay. But that is because R.A. No. 6715 expressly provides for the payment to such
employees of "full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and . . . other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed
from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement." 19 In the case of
the public sector, as has been noted, the provision for payment of salaries during the preventive suspension pending
investigation has been deleted.

B. Right to Compensation for Preventive Suspension

Pending Appeal if Employee is Exonerated

But although we hold that employees who are preventively suspended pending investigation are not entitled to the
payment of their salaries if they are exonerated, we do not agree with the government that they are not entitled to
compensation for the period of their suspension pending appeal if eventually they are found innocent.

Preventive suspension pending investigation, as already discussed, is not a penalty but only means of enabling the
disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. On the other hand, preventive suspension pending
appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect subsequently considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the
administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the
suspension. Thus, §47(4) states that respondent "shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the
pendency of the appeal in the event he wins." On the other hand, if his conviction is affirmed, i.e., if he is not
exonerated, the period of his suspension becomes part of the final penalty of suspension or dismissal.

It is precisely because respondent is penalized before his sentence is confirmed that he should be paid his salaries in
the event he is exonerated. It would be unjust to deprive him of his pay as a result of the immediate execution of the
decision against him and continue to do so even after it is shown that he is innocent of the charges for which he was
suspended. Indeed, to sustain the government's theory would be to make the administrative decision not only
executory but final and executory. The fact is that §47(2) and (4) are similar to the execution of judgment pending
appeal under Rule 39, §2 of the Rules of Court. Rule 39, §5 provides that in the event the executed judgment is
reversed, there shall be restitution or reparation of damages as equity and justice may require.

Sec. 47 of the present law providing that an administrative decision meting out the penalty of suspension or dismissal
shall be immediately executory and that if the respondent appeals he shall be considered as being merely under
preventive suspension if eventually he prevails is taken from §37 of the Civil Service Decree of 1975 (P.D No. 807).
There was no similar provision in the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260), although under it the Commissioner of
Civil Service could order the immediate execution of an administrative decision in the interest of the public service. 20
Nor was there provision for immediate execution of administrative decisions ordering dismissal or suspension in §695
of the Administrative Code of 1917, as amended by C.A. No. 598, §1. 21 Nonetheless, under R.A. No. 2260 the payment
of salaries was ordered in cases in which employees were found to be innocent of the charges 22 or their suspension
was held to be unjustified, because the penalty of suspension or dismissal was executed without a finding by the Civil
Service Commissioner that it was necessary "in the interest of the public service." 23 On the other hand, payment of
back salaries was denied where it was shown that the employee concerned was guilty as charged and the immediate
execution of the decision was ordered by the Civil Service Commissioner "in the interest of the public service." 24

Nothing in what has thus far been said is inconsistent with the reason for denying salaries for the period of preventive
suspension. We have said that an employee who is exonerated is not entitled to the payment of his salaries because his
suspension, being authorized by law, cannot but unjustified. To be entitled to such compensation, the employee must
not only be found innocent of the charges but his suspension must likewise be unjustified. But through an employee is
considered under preventive suspension during the pendency of his appeal in the event he wins, his suspension is
unjustified because what the law authorizes is preventive suspension for a period not exceeding 90 days. Beyond that
period the suspension is illegal. Hence, the employee concerned is entitled to reinstated with full pay. Under existing
jurisprudence, such award should not exceed the equivalent of five years pay at the rate last received before the
suspension was imposed. 25

II. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ENTITLED TO BACK SALARIES

ALTHOUGH FOUND GUILTY OF VIOLATION OF OFFICE

RULES AND REGULATIONS AND REPRIMANDED

Private respondents were exonerated of all charges against them for acts connected with the teachers' strikes of
September and October 1990. Although they were absent from work, it was not because of the strike. For being absent
without leave, they were held liable for violation of reasonable offices rules and regulations for which the penalty is a
reprimand. Their case thus falls squarely within ruling in Bangalisan, which likewise involved a teacher found guilty of
having violated reasonable office rules and regulations. Explaining the grant of salaries during their suspension despite
the fact that they were meted out reprimand, this Court stated:

With respect to petitioner Rodolfo Mariano, payment of his backwages is in order. A reading of the resolution of the
Civil Service Commission will show that he was exonerated of the charges which formed the basis for his suspension.
The Secretary of the DECS charged him with and he was later found guilty of grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty,
gross violation of the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform
official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and absence without official
leave, for his participation in the mass actions on September 18, 20 and 21, 1990. It was his alleged participation in the
mass actions that was the basis of his preventive suspension and, later, his dismissal from the service.

However, the Civil Service Commission, in the questioned resolution, made a finding that Mariano was involved in the
"mass actions" but was absent because he was in Ilocos Sur to attend the wake and interment of his grandmother.
Although the CSC imposed upon him the penalty of reprimand, the same was for his violation of reasonable office rules
and regulations because he failed to inform the school of his intended absence and neither did he file an application for
leave covering such absences.

Under Section 23 of the Rule Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and other pertinent civil service laws, in
violations of reasonable office rules and regulations, the first offense is punishable by reprimand. To deny petitioner
Mariano his back wages during his suspension would be tantamount to punishing him after his exoneration from the
charges which caused his dismissal from the service. 26
In Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, 27 a public school who was found guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations for having been absent without leave and reprimanded was given back salaries after she was exonerated of
the charge of having taken part in the strikes.

Petitioner Secretary of Education contends, however, that respondent Abad, Bandigas, and Somebang signed a letter in
which they admitted having taken part in the mass action. This question cannot be raised now. The Civil Service
Commission gave no weight to this letter in view of individual letters written by three citing reasons for their absences,
to wit: Abad, because he decided to stay home to correct students papers; Bandigas, because she had to accompany
her brother to the Commission on Immigration, and Somebang because of "economic reasons." Petitioner did not
appeal from this ruling. Hence, he is bound by the fanctual findings of the CSC and the appellate court.

WHEREFORE, the decision, dated September 3, 1996, as amended by the resolutions, dated July 15, 1997 and October
6, 1997, of the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of salaries to private
respondents shall be computed from the time of their dismissal/suspension by the Department of Education, Culture,
and Sports until their actual reinstatement, for a period not exceeding five years.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Bellosillo, Vitug, Kapunan, Quisumbing, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result and subject to its modification expressed in its separate opinion of Mr. Justice Panganiban.

Melo, J., in the result.

Panganiban, J., please see separate opinion.

Puno, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, JJ., we joined the separate opinion of Justice Panganiban.

Separate Opinions

PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;

I concur with the ponencia insofar as it denies the petition and affirms the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolutions
finding private respondents guilty only of violation of office rules and regulations, meting upon them the penalty of
reprimand and reinstating them in the civil service.
I beg to disagree, however, insofar as it deprives private respondents their back salaries corresponding to the entire
period of their preventive suspension.

Private Respondents Liable

for Violation of Reasonable

Office Rules and Regulations

Like the majority, I do not find any reversible error or abuse of discretion in the factual finding of the Court of Appeals
that private respondents did not actually participate in the September 1991 mass actions staged in violation of law by
various public schoolteachers. They were, however, found to have absented themselves from their classes without
filing an application for leave of absence. For this lapse, they indeed deserve a reprimand, pursuant to Section 23, Rule
XIV (Discipline) of the Rules Implementing the Civil Service Law, as well as existing jurisprudence which I shall cite later.

Private Respondents Entitled

to Back Salaries Without

Qualification or Deduction

Mr. Justice Mendoza's ponencia defines two kinds of preventive suspension for civil service employees charged with
offenses punishable with removal or suspension: "(1) preventive suspension pending investigation (§51) and (2)
preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal
but, after review, the respondent is exonerated (§47(4)). 1

Accordingly, the esteemed justice makes a distinction in the grant of back salaries. In the first instance, he says, the
suspended employees (pending investigation) are NOT entitled to back pay, regardless of whether they are eventually
exonerated from the charges for which they were investigated. However, if and when they are exonerated after appeal,
they may be granted back salaries, but only those corresponding to the appeal or review period until actual
reinstatement, and not exceeding five years.

This stance being adopted by the majority reverses several unanimous en banc decisions, in which this Court ordered
payment of back salaries without qualification or deduction. In Miranda v. Commission on Audit, 2 noting that the
applicable law mandated that preventive suspension should not be longer than 90 days, deemed Miranda's suspension
for almost eight (8) years unreasonable and unjustified. It thus resolved that he was entitled to back wages for the
period of his suspension not exceeding five (5) years, consistent with existing jurisprudence. 3

In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, 4 the Court ordered that Petitioner Mariano "be given back wages without deduction
or qualification from the time he was suspended until his actual reinstatement which, under prevailing jurisprudence,
should not exceed five years." The Court ruled: "To deny petitioner Mariano his back wages during his suspension
would be tantamount to punishing him after his exoneration from the charges which [had] caused his dismissal from
the service." 5

The same rationale was given in Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, 6 in which we also granted Petitioner Jacinto "back wages,
without deduction or qualification, from the time she was suspended until her actual reinstatement, the total of which,
under prevailing jurisprudence, should not exceed five years."
In fact, in Garcia v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, 7 where the petitioner, several years after he had been summarily
dismissed from the government service purportedly for dishonesty, was granted executive clemency "not because of
lack of sufficient proof of his commission of the offense

but . . ., more importantly, he did not commit the offense charged," the Court found it "fair and just to award petitioner
full back wages from 1 April 1975 when he was illegally dismissed, to 12 March 1984 when he was reinstated, . . .
without deduction or qualification." Empathizing with petitioner, the Court

held: 8

. . . Verily, law equity and justice dictate that petitioner be afforded compassion for the embarrassment, humiliation
and, above all, injustice caused to him and his family by his unfounded dismissal. This Court cannot help surmising the
painful stigma that must have caused petitioner, the incursion on his dignity and reputation, for having been adjudged,
albeit wrongfully, a dishonest man . . .

Indeed, where the suspension of civil servants has, from the very beginning, no reason other than to ensure an
unhampered investigation, there is no justification for withholding their salaries, whether immediately upon
investigation or after appeal or petition for review, much less after their exoneration. They need not even be found fully
innocent of any misdemeanor, as the public school-teachers concerned in Bangalisan and Jacinto who were actually
found to have violated reasonable office rules and regulations. Such administrative offense, however, is punishable
with reprimand only, not suspension or dismissal. Hence, they were granted their back salaries for the period of their
suspension, because they had not committed any grave act warranting their suspension.

The rationale for the grant of back salaries to suspended public servants is their exoneration from the charges leveled
against them that were punishable with either dismissal or suspension. Needless to say, only when the charges carry
either of these extreme administrative penalties may they be preventively suspended pending investigation. If, after
investigation, they are found to be innocent or culpable of lesser offenses not punishable with suspension or dismissal,
they must be immediately reinstated AND granted full back salaries corresponding to the period of their suspension. In
the first place, if they have been found to be not guilty of any offense warranting even just a suspension, there is no
justifiable reason to deprive them of work and of income therefor. In these cases, their preventive suspension must be
deemed unjustified.

The majority admits that preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty, but is only a means of enabling
the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. 9 Not being a penalty, there is therefore NO reason
to deny employees their salaries for such period, especially after they are proven innocent of any offense punishable
with suspension or dismissal. I respectfully submit that to withhold an exonerated employee's pay for such period
would in fact transform the nature of preventive suspension into a penalty — a penalty which is unauthorized by law, in
contravention of the fundamental right of every individual to due process, and therefore unconstitutional.

The "no-work-no-pay" principle should not be applied in these cases. We must consider that, ordinarily, suspended
employees are willing to work, but they do not have a choice. Because of some serious charges leveled against them,
they are not allowed to report for work. Investigations may take up to ninety (90) days or three (3) months. In the
meantime, they do not receive their salaries and other benefits. And yet, the charges against them may have been
baseless or aggravated without good reason, in which case their suspensions are unjustified ab initio. In these
instances, I repeat, it is but right to grant them full back pays.

Admittedly, the purpose behind preventive suspensions pending investigation is noble. It is intended to enable the
disciplining authorities or the investigating officials to probe the charges against respondents by preventing the latter
from intimidating or in any was influencing witnesses against them. 10 But, I submit, it would be totally unfair to
respondents who are undeserving of the penalty of suspension or dismissal to be deprived of their salaries for such
period. To repeat, they cannot be faulted for not rendering any work during the period of preventive suspension,
because that is merely what the law mandates.
Significantly, the Civil Service Law does not state that exonerated employees are not entitled to back salaries
corresponding to the preventive suspension period. Such silence of the law should not ipso facto be interpreted as a
denial of the right, pursuant to rules on statutory construction. In any event, the rules on the interpretation of laws are
mere tools used to ascertain legislative intent. 11 They are not necessarily applicable at all times, particularly when the
intention to change the meaning of the previous law is not clear. In the case of the present Civil Service Law, which is
found in Executive Order No. 292 issued by then President Corazon Aquino in the exercise of her legislative powers
under the Freedom Constitution, its legislative purpose cannot be clearly established, because it has no recorded
deliberations from which to verify such intent. Consequently, we should not completely rely on the general rule on
amendment by deletion. 12 We should nor hold the omission of words in the later statute as necessarily altering the
construction of the earlier one, for we may do so only "where the intent of the legislature to make such change is clear
of construction." 13

In any event, in the absence of an express prohibition on the payment of back salaries, any doubt should be settled in
favor of the employee. As our fundamental law explicitly mandates, "The State shall afford full protection to labor . . ."
14 This Court has invariably declared that it will not hesitate to tilt the scales of justice in favor of the working class, for
the Constitution dictates that "the State . . . shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare." 15 There is
no reason not to apply this principle in favor of civil service employees as well, for they are very much part of the
working class. And the government as their employer should set the example in upholding the constitutional mandate
to safeguard their rights and interests.

Needless to say, our Construction stands above all laws; more so, above any treatise including that of Mechem which
the ponencia cites. The interpretation of general laws on public officers in foreign jurisdictions has no application in the
present case, as our law has no explicit injunction against the payment of back salaries for preventively suspended
employees. Moreover, the United States Constitution provides no express mandate, similar to that found in our
Constitution, to "afford full protection to labor" and to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare."

The grant of back pay is a matter not merely of compassion and mercy for employees temporarily suspended from
work but, more important, of justice and equity. The exoneration of the employees proves that there was no reason at
all to suspend them in the first place. To deny them their incomes on the frivolous ground that the law does not
expressly provide for the grant thereof would provide a tool for the oppression of civil servants who, though innocent,
may be falsely charged of grave or less grave administrative offenses. It plainly opens the door to harassment of public
officials and employees by unjustly depriving them of their meager incomes and consequently subjecting them and
their families to difficult circumstances.

Even in the private sector, the law and the existing jurisprudence grant employees who are unjustly dismissed from
work not only reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, but also full back wages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits or benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time their compensation
was withheld from them up to the time they were actually reinstated. 16

Civil Service Law Different

from Ombudsman Act

In this regard, I believe the Civil Service Law should be distinguished from the Ombudsman Act (RA 6770) which
categorically and expressly provides that the suspended employee who is exonerated after preventive suspension is
entitled to reinstatement, but not back salaries, viz.:

Sec. 24. Preventive suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of
duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more
than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is
due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension herein provided. (Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, in Callanta v. Ombudsman, 17 although some of the petitioners were only reprimanded by the Court for
violation of the Ethical Standards Law, no back pay was awarded.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DENY the petition and to GRANT private respondents full back salaries, without qualification or
deduction, from the time of suspension, including the period of preventive suspension, until actual reinstatement.

Separate Opinions

PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;

I concur with the ponencia insofar as it denies the petition and affirms the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolutions
finding private respondents guilty only of violation of office rules and regulations, meting upon them the penalty of
reprimand and reinstating them in the civil service.

I beg to disagree, however, insofar as it deprives private respondents their back salaries corresponding to the entire
period of their preventive suspension.

Private Respondents Liable

for Violation of Reasonable

Office Rules and Regulations

Like the majority, I do not find any reversible error or abuse of discretion in the factual finding of the Court of Appeals
that private respondents did not actually participate in the September 1991 mass actions staged in violation of law by
various public schoolteachers. They were, however, found to have absented themselves from their classes without
filing an application for leave of absence. For this lapse, they indeed deserve a reprimand, pursuant to Section 23, Rule
XIV (Discipline) of the Rules Implementing the Civil Service Law, as well as existing jurisprudence which I shall cite later.

Private Respondents Entitled

to Back Salaries Without

Qualification or Deduction

Mr. Justice Mendoza's ponencia defines two kinds of preventive suspension for civil service employees charged with
offenses punishable with removal or suspension: "(1) preventive suspension pending investigation (§51) and (2)
preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal
but, after review, the respondent is exonerated (§47(4)). 1
Accordingly, the esteemed justice makes a distinction in the grant of back salaries. In the first instance, he says, the
suspended employees (pending investigation) are NOT entitled to back pay, regardless of whether they are eventually
exonerated from the charges for which they were investigated. However, if and when they are exonerated after appeal,
they may be granted back salaries, but only those corresponding to the appeal or review period until actual
reinstatement, and not exceeding five years.

This stance being adopted by the majority reverses several unanimous en banc decisions, in which this Court ordered
payment of back salaries without qualification or deduction. In Miranda v. Commission on Audit, 2 noting that the
applicable law mandated that preventive suspension should not be longer than 90 days, deemed Miranda's suspension
for almost eight (8) years unreasonable and unjustified. It thus resolved that he was entitled to back wages for the
period of his suspension not exceeding five (5) years, consistent with existing jurisprudence. 3

In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, 4 the Court ordered that Petitioner Mariano "be given back wages without deduction
or qualification from the time he was suspended until his actual reinstatement which, under prevailing jurisprudence,
should not exceed five years." The Court ruled: "To deny petitioner Mariano his back wages during his suspension
would be tantamount to punishing him after his exoneration from the charges which [had] caused his dismissal from
the service." 5

The same rationale was given in Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, 6 in which we also granted Petitioner Jacinto "back wages,
without deduction or qualification, from the time she was suspended until her actual reinstatement, the total of which,
under prevailing jurisprudence, should not exceed five years."

In fact, in Garcia v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, 7 where the petitioner, several years after he had been summarily
dismissed from the government service purportedly for dishonesty, was granted executive clemency "not because of
lack of sufficient proof of his commission of the offense

but . . ., more importantly, he did not commit the offense charged," the Court found it "fair and just to award petitioner
full back wages from 1 April 1975 when he was illegally dismissed, to 12 March 1984 when he was reinstated, . . .
without deduction or qualification." Empathizing with petitioner, the Court

held: 8

. . . Verily, law equity and justice dictate that petitioner be afforded compassion for the embarrassment, humiliation
and, above all, injustice caused to him and his family by his unfounded dismissal. This Court cannot help surmising the
painful stigma that must have caused petitioner, the incursion on his dignity and reputation, for having been adjudged,
albeit wrongfully, a dishonest man . . .

Indeed, where the suspension of civil servants has, from the very beginning, no reason other than to ensure an
unhampered investigation, there is no justification for withholding their salaries, whether immediately upon
investigation or after appeal or petition for review, much less after their exoneration. They need not even be found fully
innocent of any misdemeanor, as the public school-teachers concerned in Bangalisan and Jacinto who were actually
found to have violated reasonable office rules and regulations. Such administrative offense, however, is punishable
with reprimand only, not suspension or dismissal. Hence, they were granted their back salaries for the period of their
suspension, because they had not committed any grave act warranting their suspension.

The rationale for the grant of back salaries to suspended public servants is their exoneration from the charges leveled
against them that were punishable with either dismissal or suspension. Needless to say, only when the charges carry
either of these extreme administrative penalties may they be preventively suspended pending investigation. If, after
investigation, they are found to be innocent or culpable of lesser offenses not punishable with suspension or dismissal,
they must be immediately reinstated AND granted full back salaries corresponding to the period of their suspension. In
the first place, if they have been found to be not guilty of any offense warranting even just a suspension, there is no
justifiable reason to deprive them of work and of income therefor. In these cases, their preventive suspension must be
deemed unjustified.
The majority admits that preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty, but is only a means of enabling
the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. 9 Not being a penalty, there is therefore NO reason
to deny employees their salaries for such period, especially after they are proven innocent of any offense punishable
with suspension or dismissal. I respectfully submit that to withhold an exonerated employee's pay for such period
would in fact transform the nature of preventive suspension into a penalty — a penalty which is unauthorized by law, in
contravention of the fundamental right of every individual to due process, and therefore unconstitutional.

The "no-work-no-pay" principle should not be applied in these cases. We must consider that, ordinarily, suspended
employees are willing to work, but they do not have a choice. Because of some serious charges leveled against them,
they are not allowed to report for work. Investigations may take up to ninety (90) days or three (3) months. In the
meantime, they do not receive their salaries and other benefits. And yet, the charges against them may have been
baseless or aggravated without good reason, in which case their suspensions are unjustified ab initio. In these
instances, I repeat, it is but right to grant them full back pays.

Admittedly, the purpose behind preventive suspensions pending investigation is noble. It is intended to enable the
disciplining authorities or the investigating officials to probe the charges against respondents by preventing the latter
from intimidating or in any was influencing witnesses against them. 10 But, I submit, it would be totally unfair to
respondents who are undeserving of the penalty of suspension or dismissal to be deprived of their salaries for such
period. To repeat, they cannot be faulted for not rendering any work during the period of preventive suspension,
because that is merely what the law mandates.

Significantly, the Civil Service Law does not state that exonerated employees are not entitled to back salaries
corresponding to the preventive suspension period. Such silence of the law should not ipso facto be interpreted as a
denial of the right, pursuant to rules on statutory construction. In any event, the rules on the interpretation of laws are
mere tools used to ascertain legislative intent. 11 They are not necessarily applicable at all times, particularly when the
intention to change the meaning of the previous law is not clear. In the case of the present Civil Service Law, which is
found in Executive Order No. 292 issued by then President Corazon Aquino in the exercise of her legislative powers
under the Freedom Constitution, its legislative purpose cannot be clearly established, because it has no recorded
deliberations from which to verify such intent. Consequently, we should not completely rely on the general rule on
amendment by deletion. 12 We should nor hold the omission of words in the later statute as necessarily altering the
construction of the earlier one, for we may do so only "where the intent of the legislature to make such change is clear
of construction." 13

In any event, in the absence of an express prohibition on the payment of back salaries, any doubt should be settled in
favor of the employee. As our fundamental law explicitly mandates, "The State shall afford full protection to labor . . ."
14 This Court has invariably declared that it will not hesitate to tilt the scales of justice in favor of the working class, for
the Constitution dictates that "the State . . . shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare." 15 There is
no reason not to apply this principle in favor of civil service employees as well, for they are very much part of the
working class. And the government as their employer should set the example in upholding the constitutional mandate
to safeguard their rights and interests.

Needless to say, our Construction stands above all laws; more so, above any treatise including that of Mechem which
the ponencia cites. The interpretation of general laws on public officers in foreign jurisdictions has no application in the
present case, as our law has no explicit injunction against the payment of back salaries for preventively suspended
employees. Moreover, the United States Constitution provides no express mandate, similar to that found in our
Constitution, to "afford full protection to labor" and to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare."

The grant of back pay is a matter not merely of compassion and mercy for employees temporarily suspended from
work but, more important, of justice and equity. The exoneration of the employees proves that there was no reason at
all to suspend them in the first place. To deny them their incomes on the frivolous ground that the law does not
expressly provide for the grant thereof would provide a tool for the oppression of civil servants who, though innocent,
may be falsely charged of grave or less grave administrative offenses. It plainly opens the door to harassment of public
officials and employees by unjustly depriving them of their meager incomes and consequently subjecting them and
their families to difficult circumstances.

Even in the private sector, the law and the existing jurisprudence grant employees who are unjustly dismissed from
work not only reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, but also full back wages, inclusive of
allowances and other benefits or benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time their compensation
was withheld from them up to the time they were actually reinstated. 16

Civil Service Law Different

from Ombudsman Act

In this regard, I believe the Civil Service Law should be distinguished from the Ombudsman Act (RA 6770) which
categorically and expressly provides that the suspended employee who is exonerated after preventive suspension is
entitled to reinstatement, but not back salaries, viz.:

Sec. 24. Preventive suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of
duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more
than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is
due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension herein provided. (Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, in Callanta v. Ombudsman, 17 although some of the petitioners were only reprimanded by the Court for
violation of the Ethical Standards Law, no back pay was awarded.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DENY the petition and to GRANT private respondents full back salaries, without qualification or
deduction, from the time of suspension, including the period of preventive suspension, until actual reinstatement.

Footnotes

1 200 SCRA 323 (1991).

2 Decision, pp. 4-5, Rollo, pp. 36-37.

3 Decision, p. 6, Rollo, p. 38.

4 Supra.

5 Per Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Nathanael P. de Pano and Maximiano C. Asuncion.
6 Resolution dated July 15, 1997, pp. 8-9, Rollo, pp. 29-30.

7 Petition, Annex D, Rollo, p. 63.

8 Rollo, p. 31.

9 Petition, p. 9, Rollo, p. 15.

10 Thus, Rule XIV of the Implementing Rules of the Civil Service Commission provides in pertinent parts:

Sec. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment of penalty for misconduct in office but is considered to be a
preventive measure.

Sec. 25. The period within which a public officers or employee charged is placed under preventive suspension shall not
be considered part of the actual penalty of suspension imposed upon the employee found guilty.

11 Emphasis added.

12 RUBEN AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 76-77 (1990).

13 Miranda v. Commission on Audit, 200 SCRA 657 (1991); Bangalasan v. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 619 (1997),
Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 657 (1997); and Garcia v. Commission on Audit, 226 SCRA 356 (1993).

In Miranda v. Commission on Audit, supra, although the facts arose when P.D. No. 807 was already in effect, the Court
ordered payment of "backwages" during the period of preventive suspension citing as authority the case of Abellera v.
City of Baguio, 125 Phil. 1035 (1967). However, in Abellera the Court allowed recovery of salaries only for the time that
the employee was suspended pending appeal. No compensation was paid for the period of suspension pending
investigation. The employee in that case was preventively suspended from January 18, 1960 to May 24, 1960. As the
investigation lasted more than 90 days, he was reinstated in office. He was later found guilty and ordered dismissed
from the service effective July 10, 1961. On appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, the penalty was reduced to
two months suspension without pay and he was finally reinstated on November 11, 1963. The employee's suspension
from office July 10, 1961 to November 10, 1963 was held to be unjustified and he was ordered paid his salaries for that
period. But no award for the period of preventive suspension from January 18, 1960 to May 24, 1960 was granted.

In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, supra, this Court held that the payment of salaries for the period during which an
employee is suspended may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges which caused the suspension and when
the suspension and when the suspension unjustified, citing the cases of Miranda v. Commission on Audit, supra, and
Abellera v. City of Baguio, supra, which, as noted, did not really allow compensation for the period of preventive
suspension. On the other hand, the other case cited, Tañala v. Legaspi, 121 Phil. 541 (1965), was decided under §260 of
the Administrative Code of 1917, which unlike the present law, provided for the payment of back salaries for the period
of preventive suspension.

In Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, supra, the award of back salaries in favor of petitioner Jacinto was based on the ruling in
Bangalisan as above summarized. The decision in that case is, therefore, subject to the sound observation made on the
decision in Banglisan. On the other hand, the case of Garcia v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, supra, did not involve
any question on suspension — preventive or otherwise.
14 R.A. No. 2260, §35.

15 ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917, §260.

16 Emphasis added.

17 276 SCRA at 631.

18 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).

19 LABOR CODE, ART. 279.

20 Yarcia v. City of Baguio, 144 Phil 351 (1970); Abellera v. City of Baguio, supra.

21 What it provided was that the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service may be appealed to the Civil Service
Board of Appeals whose decision shall be final unless reversed or modified by the President.

22 Tañala v. Legaspi, supra.

23 Abellera v. City of Baguio, supra.

24 Yarcia v. City of Baguio, supra; Villamor v. Lacson, 120 Phil. 1213 (1964).

25 Miranda v. Commission on Audit, supra at 662 (1991), citing Gabriel v. Domingo, 189 SCRA 672 (1990); Rubio v.
PHHC, 185 SCRA 656 (1990); Gementiza v. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 477 (1982); Balquiedra v. CFI of Capiz, 80 SCRA
123 (1977); Cristobal v. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175 (1977).

Justice Panganiban contends that since the rule limiting recovery of salaries to five years is based on the rule in private
employment, in case of illegal dismissal, the rule applicable to government employment should now be changed
because Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, has removed the limitation and now allows recovery
of "full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the
time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement." As long as the rule was
based on caselaw, the contention would be plausible. But the change in the labor law was made by statute and courts
cannot simply apply the statute to government employment without amending that statute.

26 276 SCRA at 631-632.

27 281 SCRA 567 (1997).

PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;

1 Main Decision, p. 6.
2 200 SCRA 657, 662, August 16, 1991, per Paras, J.

3 I believe that this five-year limitation on back salaries of civil servants should be reexamined. This restriction
has no statutory basis. Rather, it was founded on the old Mercury Drug rule limiting back wages to illegally dismissed
employees in the private sector. As the Court, through Justice Cecilia Muñoz Palma, then held in Cristobal v. Melchor
(78 SCRA 175, 187, July 29, 1977; citing Mercury Drug Co., Inc. v. CIR, [56 SCRA 694, April 30, 1974]):

Applying by analogy the rulings of this court in the matter of fixing backwages to employees who were victims of unfair
labor practices of their employers, so as to obviate the necessity of a hearing on the point and avoid further delay, and
considering the lapse of almost nine years before appellant filed this suit. We resolve to grant back salaries at the rate
last received by him only for a period of five (5) years without qualification and deduction.

However, the limitation on back wages in the private sector has been deleted, by virtue of Sec. 34 of RA 6715,
amending Art. 279 of the Labor Code, which now reads:

ART 279. Security of Tenure . . . An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and
to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him
up to the time of his actual reinstatement.

Hence, we ruled in Bustamante v. NLRC (infra, pp. 70-71; per Padilla, J.):

. . . The clear legislative intent of the amendment in Rep. Act No. 6715 is to give more benefits to workers than was
previously given them under the Mercury Drug rule or the "deduction of earnings elsewhere" rule Thus, a closer
adherence to the legislative policy behind Rep. Act No 6715 points to "full backwages" as meaning exactly that, i.e.,
without deducting from backwages the earnings derived elsewhere by the concerned employee during the period of his
illegal dismissal. In other words, the provision calling for "full backwages" to illegally dismissed employees is clear, plain
and free from ambiguity and, therefore, must be applied without attempted or strained interpretation. Index animi
sermo est.

Therefore, in accordance with R.A No. 6715, petitioners are entitled to their full backwages, inclusive of allowances and
other benefits or their monetary equivalent from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the
time of their actual reinstatement.

This being the case, I believe that civil service employees should also be granted the same benefit of full back wages
without qualification or deduction. The matter, however, has not been raised as an issue in the present Petition. Hence,
although I mentioned it during the Court's deliberation, the question could not be ruled upon without violating the
fundamental tenets of due process.
G.R. No. 108072 December 12, 1995

HON. JUAN M. HAGAD, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, petitioner,

vs.

HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE, Presiding Judge, Branch XXVIII, Regional Trial Court, Mandaue City, Mandaue
City Mayor ALFREDO M. OUANO, Mandaue City Vice-Mayor PATERNO CAÑETE and Mandaue City Sangguniang
Panlungsod Member RAFAEL MAYOL, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

The determination of whether the Ombudsman under Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 6770,1 otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, has been divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective
officials by virtue of the subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 7160,2 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, is the pivotal issue before the Court in this petition.

The petition seeks (a) to annul the writ of preliminary injunction, dated 21 October 1992, issued against petitioner by
respondent trial court and (b) to prohibit said court from further proceeding with RTC Case No. MDE-14.3

Parenthetically, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Arturo Mojica assumed the office of Juan Hagad, now resigned,4
who took the initiative in instituting this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.

The controversy stemmed from the filing of criminal and administrative complaints, on 22 July 1992, against herein
respondents Mayor Alfredo Ouano, Vice-Mayor Paterno Cañete and Sangguniang Panlungsod Member Rafael Mayol, all
public officials of Mandaue City, by Mandaue City Councilors Magno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa O. Bercede with the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. The respondents were charged with having violated R.A. No. 3019, as
amended,5 Articles 1706 and 1717 of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713.8 Councilors Dionson and Bercede
averred that respondent officials, acting in conspiracy, had caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No.
018/92 by increasing the allocated appropriation therein from P3,494,364.57 to P7,000,000.00 without authority from
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City. The complaints were separately docketed as Criminal Case No. OMB-
VIS-92-391 and as Administrative Case No. OMB-VIS-ADM-92-015.

A day after the filing of the complaints, or on 23 July 1992, a sworn statement was executed by Mandaue City Council
Secretary, Atty. Amado C. Otarra, Jr., in support of the accusations against respondent officials. The next day, petitioner
ordered respondents, including Acting Mandaue City Treasurer Justo G. Ouano and Mandaue City Budget Officer Pedro
M. Guido, to file their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days from receipt of the order. Forthwith, Councilors Dionson
and Bercede moved for the preventive suspension of respondent officials in the separately docketed administrative
case.

Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension, respondent officials, on 05 August 1992, prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and
decide the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the
power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive
suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the President.

In their opposition, filed on 10 August 1992, Dionson and Bercede argued that the Local Government Code of 1991
could not have repealed, abrogated or otherwise modified the pertinent provisions of the Constitution granting to the
Ombudsman the power to investigate cases against all public officials and that, in any case, the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate local officials under the Ombudsman Act had remained unaffected by the provisions of the
Local Government Code of 1991.

During the hearing on the motion for preventive suspension, the parties were directed by the Deputy Ombudsman to
file their respective memoranda.

In his memorandum, Mayor Ouano reiterated that, under Sections 61 and 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991,
the Office of the President, not the Office of the Ombudsman, could lawfully take cognizance of administrative
complaints against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city or an independent component city and to
impose disciplinary sanctions, including preventive suspensions, and that there was nothing in the provision of the
Constitution giving to the Office of the Ombudsman superior powers than those of the President over elective officials
of local governments.

In an Order,9 dated 10 September 1992, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman denied the motion to dismiss and
recommended the preventive suspension of respondent officials, except City Budget Officer Pedro M. Guido, until the
administrative case would have been finally resolved by the Ombudsman.10 Respondent officials were formally placed
under preventive suspension by the Deputy Ombudsman pursuant to an Order11 of 21 September 1992.

On 25 September 1992, a petition for prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order, was filed by respondent officials with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. Acting favorably on
the pleas of petitioning officials, respondent Judge issued, on even date, a restraining order directed at petitioner,
enjoining him ". . . from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order of preventive suspension issued in OMB-
VIS-ADM-92-015."

Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition but it was to no avail. The court a quo, on 15 October 1992, denied the motion
to dismiss and issued an Order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, holding thusly:

So by following and applying the well-established rules of statutory construction that endeavor should be made to
harmonize the provisions of these two laws in order that each shall be effective, it is the finding of this Court that since
the investigatory power of the Ombudsman is so general, broad and vague and gives wider discretion to disciplining
authority to impose administrative sanctions against a responsible public official or employee while that of Section 60
of the New Local Government Code provides for more well defined and specific grounds upon which a local elective
official can be subjected to administrative disciplinary action, that it Could be considered that the latter law could be an
exception to the authority and administrative power of the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation against local
elective officials and as such, the jurisdiction now to conduct administrative investigation against local elective officials
is already lodged before the offices concerned under Section 61 of Republic Act No. 7160.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Order is hereby issued:

1) Expanding the restraining order dated September 25, 1992 issued by the Court into an Order for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction upon the posting of the petitioners of the bond in the amount of Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) conditioned that the latter will pay all the costs that may be adjudged to the adverse party and/or
damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction, if the Court will finally adjudge that the petitioners are not
entitled thereto, and

2) Denying the respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated September 28, 1992 for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 12

A writ of preliminary injunction was issued on 21 October 1992.13 A motion for reconsideration made by petitioner was
denied by the trial court.

The instant recourse seeks the nullification of the order of 15 October 1992 and the writ of preliminary injunction of 21
October 1992 both issued by the trial court and prays that respondent judge be directed to desist from further
proceeding with RTC Case No. MDE-14.

There is merit in the petition.

The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section 13 (1,) Article XI, of the 1987 Constitution,14
thus:

Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient;

while his statutory mandate to act on administrative complaints is contained in Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 that reads:

Sec. 19. Administrative complaints. — The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or
omissions which:

1. Are contrary to law or regulation;

2. Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;

3. Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in accordance with law;

4. Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;

5. Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or

6. Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of

justification.
Section 21 of the same statute names the officials who could be subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman, viz.:

Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and
the Judiciary. (Emphasis supplied)

Taken in conjunction with Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, petitioner thus contends that the Office of the Ombudsman
correspondingly has the authority to decree preventive suspension on any public officer or employee under
investigation by it. Said section of the law provides:

Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment, the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of
duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more
than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is
due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension herein provided.

Respondent officials, upon the other hand, argue that the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over local officials
must be deemed to have been removed by the subsequent enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 which
vests the authority to investigate administrative charges, listed under Section 6015 thereof, on various offices. In the
case specifically of complaints against elective officials of provinces and highly urbanized cities, the Code states:

Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. — A verified complaint against any erring local elective officials
shall be prepared as follows:

(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an independent component city
or component city shall be filed before the Office of the President.

Thus respondents insist, conformably with Section 63 of the Local Government Code, preventive suspension can only
be imposed by: ". . . the President if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or an
independent component city; . . . " under sub-paragraph (b) thereof:

(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt is
strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the respondent
could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence; Provided,
That, any single preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided,
further, That in the event that several administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot be
preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and
known at the time of the first suspension.

In his comment, which the Court required considering that any final resolution of the case would be a matter of
national concern, the Solicitor-General has viewed the Local Government Code of 1991 as having conferred, but not on
an exclusive basis, on the Office of the President (and the various Sanggunians) disciplinary authority over local elective
officials. He posits the stand that the Code did not withdraw the power of the Ombudsman theretofore vested under
R.A. 6770 conformably with a constitutional mandate. In passing, the Solicitor General has also opined that the
appropriate remedy that should have been pursued by respondent officials is a petition for certiorari before this Court
rather than their petition for prohibition filed with the Regional Trial Court.

Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly,
the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so
inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other . Well settled is the
rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored,16 and that courts must generally assume their congruent
application.17 The two laws must be absolutely incompatible,18 and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the
inference of implied repeal may be drawn.19 The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est
optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence.20 The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the
existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes.21 Hence, all doubts must be resolved against
any implied repeal,22 and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the
subject.23

Certainly, Congress would not have intended to do injustice to the very reason that underlies the creation of the
Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution which "is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom."24

Quite interestingly, Sections 61 and 63 of the present Local Government Code run almost parallel with the provisions
then existing under the old code. Section 61 and Section 63 of the precursor local Government Code of 1983, 25 under
the heading of "Suspension and Removal," read:

Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Complaints. — Verified complaints against local elective officials shall be prepared as follows:

(a) Against any elective provincial or city official, before the Minister of Local Government.

Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. — (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if
the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal
official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official.

(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable
ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is
strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases,
preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.

(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to
the continuation of the proceedings against him until its termination. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the
case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of
suspension.

The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective provincial or
city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the
Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the
common grant. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what already
prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the
Office of the President.
Respondent local officials contend that the 6-month preventive suspension without pay under Section 24 of the
Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60-day preventive suspension provided by Section 63 of the Local
Government Code to even now maintain its application. The two provisions govern differently. In order to justify the
preventive suspension of a public official under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and
(a) the charge against the officer or employee should involve dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in
the performance of duty; (b) the charges should warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued
stay in office would prejudice the case filed against him. The Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive
suspension to all public officials, whether elective or appointive, who are under investigation. Upon the other hand, in
imposing the shorter period of sixty (60) days of preventive suspension prescribed in the Local Government Code of
1991 on an elective local official (at any time after the issues are joined), it would be enough that (a) there is reasonable
ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, (b) the evidence of culpability is
strong, (c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d) the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.

Respondent officials, nevertheless, claim that petitioner committed grave abuse of discretion when he caused the
issuance of the preventive suspension order without any hearing.

The contention is without merit. The records reveal that petitioner issued the order of preventive suspension after the
filing (a) by respondent officials of their opposition on the motion for preventive suspension and (b) by Mayor Ouano of
his memorandum in compliance with the directive of petitioner. Be that, as it may, we have heretofore held that, not
being in the nature of a penalty, a preventive suspension can be decreed on an official under investigation after charges
are brought and even before the charges are heard. Naturally, such a preventive suspension would occur prior to any
finding of guilt or innocence. In the early case of Nera vs. Garcia,26 reiterated in subsequent cases,27 we have said:

In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the administrative complaint, suffice
it to say that the suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but
only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such
investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal,
then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer
pending his investigation and before the charges against him are heard and be given an opportunity to prove his
innocence.

Moreover, respondent officials were, in point of fact, put on preventive suspension only after petitioner had found, in
consonance with our ruling in Buenaseda vs. Flavier,28 that the evidence of guilt was strong. Petitioner gave his
justification for the preventive suspension in this wise:

After a careful and honest scrutiny of the evidence submitted on record, at this stage, it is the holding of this office that
the evidence of guilt against the respondents in the instant case is strong. There is no question that the charge against
the respondents involves dishonesty or gross misconduct which would warrant their removal from the service and
there is no gainsaying the fact that the charge for falsification of veritable documents like city ordinances are very
serious charges that affect the very foundations of duly established representative governments. Finally, it is likewise
the holding of this office at this stage that the continued stay in office of respondents may prejudice the judicious
investigation and resolution of the instant case.29

Finally, it does appear, as so pointed out by the Solicitor General, that respondent official's petition for prohibition,
being an application for remedy against the findings of petitioner contained in his 21 September 1992 order, should not
have been entertained by the trial court. The proscription in Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770 reads:

Sec. 14. Restrictions. — No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by
the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is
outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the
Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

Likewise noteworthy is Section 27 of the law which prescribes a direct recourse to this Court on matters involving
orders arising from administrative disciplinary cases originating from the Office of the Ombudsman; thus:

Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — . . .

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed
to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the
order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
(Emphasis supplied)

All told, petitioner is plainly entitled to the relief prayed for, and we must, accordingly; grant the petition.

WHEREFORE, the questioned writ of preliminary injunction of 21 October 1992 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and RTC
Case No. MDE-14 is hereby ordered DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202303 June 4, 2014

GERARDO R. VILLASEÑOR AND RODEL A. MESA, Petitioners,

vs.

OMBUDSMAN AND HON. HERBERT BAUTISTA, City Mayor, Quezon City, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the March 15, 20121
and June 18, 20122 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA). in CA G.R. SP No. 121378, which dismissed for utter lack of
merit the petition to nullify or restrain the immediate implementation of the June 17, 2003 Joint Decision of the Office
of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-01-0376 and OMB-ADM-0-01-0390, directing the dismissal from the service and
one-year suspension of petitioners Gerardo R. Villaseñor (Villaseñor) and Rodel A. Mesa (Mesa), respectively.

The Facts

The petitioners, along with several others, were administratively charged in connection with the Manor Hotel fire
tragedy that took place on August 18, 2001, killing 74 people and causing injury to others. Petitioner Villaseñor was an
electrical inspector from the Electrical Division, and petitioner Mesa was an inspector from the Electrical Engineering
Office, both of Quezon City.

In OMB-ADM-0-01-0376, petitioner Villaseñor was charged with grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and gross negligence. In OMB-ADM-00390, both petitioners were charged with violation of Section 4 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).

In its Joint Decision dated June 17, 2003, the Investigating Panel of the Office of the Ombudsman ruled as follows:

1. In OMB-ADM-0-01-0376, Villaseñor was found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
gross neglect of duty for which he was meted the penalty of dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties.

2. In OMB-ADM-0-01-0390, Mesa was found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for which he
was meted the penalty of one year suspension without pay.

In its Memorandum,3 dated July 26, 2004, the Ombudsman approved the findings in the Joint Decision as regards the
petitioners.

On December 13, 2004, Villaseñor and Mesa filed their separate motions for reconsideration4 of the Joint Decision.

In the Memorandum,5 dated March 2, 2006, the Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Mesa and
those of the other accused, and affirmed in toto the Joint Decision. Villaseñor’s motion for reconsideration, however,
was not enumerated as one of the pleadings resolved.6
On April 18, 2006, Mesa appealed to the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 93891. Villaseñor made no appeal, his
motion for reconsideration before the Ombudsman being yet unresolved.

In the Order7 dated August 23, 2006, pending resolution of Mesa’s appeal and Villaseñor’s motion for reconsideration,
the Ombudsman directed the Mayor of Quezon City and the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government to enforce the Joint Decision immediately upon receipt of the order.

On September 20, 2011, Villaseñor and Mesa filed a special civil action for certiorari8 before the CA docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 121378, assailing the August 23, 2006 Order of the Ombudsman ordering the immediate implementation of
the Joint Decision despite the pendency of Villaseñor’s motion for reconsideration and Mesa’s appeal. They prayed that
the said order be annulled and an injunction be issued to restrain its implementation.

In the assailed March 15, 2012 Resolution,9 the CA dismissed the petition for utter lack of merit. It held that the
Ombudsman decision was immediately executory pending appeal and would not be stayed by the filing of the appeal or
issuance of an injunctive relief.

In the assailed June 18, 2012 Resolution,10 the CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

Issues And Arguments

Petitioner Villaseñor argues that his constitutional right of not to be deprived of life, liberty and property without due
process of law, was grossly violated by the Ombudsman when:

1. He was prevented from cross-examining complainant’s witnesses;

2. He failed to receive any copy of any order relative to the preliminary conference of the case; and

3. His dismissal from the service was ordered implemented while his motion for reconsideration remains unresolved.

He argues that the order of dismissal cannot be deemed executory as it has not yet attained finality on account of his
unresolved motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner Mesa, on the other hand, argues that the order of suspension against him should not have been
implemented pending his appeal with the CA, in accordance with Section 7 of Rule III of the Office of the Ombudsman’s
Rules of Procedure. He argues that Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 17, which took effect on September 7, 2003 and
amended said Section 7, should not be applied to his case because it was promulgated long after the rendition of the
order of his suspension on June 17, 2003. Mesa further argues that to apply the amendment to him will give it a
retroactive effect which is prohibited under Article 4 of the Civil Code.

Both petitioners aver that Ombudsman v. Samaniego,11 the case relied upon by the CA, cannot be applied to their case
because the principal basis of the ruling was Section 7, as amended, which they insist is inapplicable to them.
The first two issues raised by petitioner Villaseñor do not relate to the assailed CA Resolutions, which ruled upon the
Order of the Ombudsman implementing the Joint Decision. They are, therefore, irrelevant to the present petition. The
sole issue before the Court now is, thus:

Whether the Ombudsman’s order of dismissal from the service and suspension of one year can be implemented
pending resolution of petitioner Villaseñor’s motion for reconsideration before the Ombudsman, and petitioner Mesa’s
appeal before the CA?

The Ruling of the Court

The petition must fail.

Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, dated
September 15, 2003, provides:

SEC. 7. Finality and execution of decision.– Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction
where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision
may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set
forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or
Order denying the motion for reconsideration.

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the
respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the
salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office
of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or
failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against such officer.

[Emphases supplied]

From the above, it can be gleaned that the Ombudsman decisions in administrative cases may either be unappealable
or appealable. Unappealable decisions are final and executory, and they are as follows: (1) respondent is absolved of
the charge; (2) the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand; (3) suspension of not more than one month; and (4)
a fine equivalent to one month’s salary. Appealable decisions, on the other hand, are those which fall outside said
enumeration, and may be appealed to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within 15 days from receipt of the
written notice of the decision or order denying the motion for reconsideration. Section 7 is categorical in providing that
an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and that such shall be executed as a matter of course.

Petitioner Mesa was ordered suspended for one year without pay, while petitioner Villaseñor was ordered dismissed
from the service. These are plainly appealable decisions which are immediately executory pending appeal.

The petitioners cannot argue that A.O. No. 17, which makes appealable decisions of the Ombudsman immediately
executory, cannot be applied to them. It is of no moment that A.O. No. 17 took effect on September 7, 2003, after the
Joint Decision was issued against Mesa and Villaseñor on June 17, 2003. Of note are the facts that the Joint Decision
was approved by the Ombudsman on November 26, 2004; the motions for reconsideration thereto were denied on
March 2, 2006; and the Joint Decision was ordered implemented on August 23, 2006, all after A.O. No. 17 had already
become effective.

Article 4 of the Civil Code does indeed provide that laws shall have no retroactive effect. Rules regulating the procedure
of courts, however, are retroactive in nature, and are, thus, applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of
their passage. As a general rule, no vested right may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules, hence,
retroactive application does not violate any right of a person adversely affected.12

The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are procedural in nature and therefore, may be applied
retroactively to petitioners’ cases which were pending and unresolved at the time of the passing of A.O. No. 17. No
vested right is violated by the application of Section 7 because the respondent in the administrative case is considered
preventively suspended while his case is on appeal and, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and
such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. It is important to note that
there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional
offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in
an office.13

The nature of appealable decisions of the Ombudsman was, in fact, settled in Ombudsman v. Samaniego, where it was
held that such are immediately executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the
issuance of an injunctive writ.14 The petitioners argue that this particular case cannot be applied to them because it
was based on Section 7, as amended by A.O. No. 17,which cannot be applied to them retroactively. Their argument
cannot be given credence. As already discussed, Section 7 may be retroactively applied in the case of the petitioners.

It is, therefore, beyond cavil that petitioner Mesa’s appeal cannot stay the implementation of the order of suspension
against him.

Petitioner Villaseñor argues that the Ombudsman erred in implementing the order of dismissal against him despite his
pending motion for reconsideration with the same office.

The records show that both petitioners duly filed their respective motions for reconsideration on December 13, 2004.
In the March 2, 2006 Memorandum of the Ombudsman, Mesa’s motion for reconsideration, among others, was denied.
Thus, he appealed to the CA. A review of the said Memorandum reveals, however, that Villaseñor’s motion for
reconsideration was not enumerated15 as one of the pleadings submitted for resolution, and nowhere was his liability
discussed or even mentioned therein. It is, therefore, apparent that Villaseñor’s motion for reconsideration was never
resolved by the Ombudsman, for which reason he has been unable to file an appeal with the CA.

Nonetheless, Villaseñor’s pending motion for reconsideration cannot stop his order of dismissal from being executory.
Memorandum Circular No. 01, series of 2006, of the Office of the Ombudsman, provides in part:

Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, otherwise known as, the "Ombudsman Rules of Procedure" provides
that: "A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course."

In order that the foregoing rule may be strictly observed, all concerned are hereby enjoined to implement all
Ombudsman decisions, orders or resolutions in administrative disciplinary cases, immediately upon receipt thereof by
their respective offices.

The filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review before the Office of the Ombudsman does not
operate to stay the immediate implementation of the foregoing Ombudsman decisions, orders or resolutions.
xxx

[Emphasis supplied]

Thus, petitioner Villaseñor’s filing of a motion for reconsideration does not stay the immediate implementation of the
Ombudsman’s order of dismissal, considering that "a decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases
shall be executed as a matter of course" under Section 7. As already explained, no vested right of Villaseñor would be
violated as he would be considered under preventive suspension, and entitled to the salary and emoluments he did not
receive in the event that he wins his eventual appeal.

The Ombudsman did not, therefore, err in implementing the orders of suspension of one year and dismissal from the
service against the petitioners.

The Court notes, however, that under Section 8 of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as
amended by A.O. No. 17, the Hearing Officer shall decide a motion for reconsideration within S days from the date of
submission for resolution. Petitioner Villaseñor filed his motion for reconsideration on December 13, 2004, on the same
day as petitioner Mesa, whose motion was duly resolved. Whether by oversight or negligence, a period nearly I 0 years
has elapsed without action on Villase11or's motion for reconsideration. The Office of the Ombudsman is called upon to
be more vigilant in carrying out its functions and in complying with the periods laid clown in the law.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 15, 2012 and June 18, 2012 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, in CA
G.R. SP No. 121378 are AFFIRMED.

The Office of the Ombudsman is DIRECTED to resolve the motion for reconsideration of petitioner Gerardo R. ViIlaseñor
in OMB-A DM-0-01-03 76 and OMB-ADM-0-01-0390 with immediate dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 183337 April 23, 2010

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner,

vs.

GREGORIO MAGNAYE, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

The Civil Service Commission (CSC) assails in this petition for review on certiorari,1 the February 20, 2008 Decision2 and
the June 11, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85508. The CA reversed the July 20, 2004
Decision of the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. IV (CSCRO-IV) and ordered the reinstatement of
respondent Gregorio Magnaye, Jr. (Magnaye) with payment of backwages and other monetary benefits.

THE FACTS

In March 2001, Mayor Roman H. Rosales of Lemery, Batangas, appointed Magnaye as Utility Worker I at the Office of
Economic Enterprise [Operation of Market] (OEE). After a few days, Mayor Rosales detailed him to the Municipal
Planning and Development Office.

In the May elections of that year, Mayor Rosales was defeated by Raul L. Bendaña, who assumed office on June 30,
2001. Thereafter, Magnaye was returned to his original assignment at the OEE. On July 11, 2001, Bendaña also placed
him on detail at the Municipal Planning and Development Office to assist in the implementation of a Survey on the
Integrated Rural Accessibility Planning Project.

On August 13, 2001, the new mayor served him a notice of termination from employment effective the following day
for unsatisfactory conduct and want of capacity.

Magnaye questioned his termination before the CSC head office on the ground that Mayor Bendaña was not in a
position to effectively evaluate his performance because it was made less than one and one-half months after his
(Mayor Bendaña’s) assumption to office. He added that his termination was without basis and was politically
motivated.

The CSC head office dismissed, without prejudice, Magnaye’s complaint because he failed to attach a certificate of non-
forum shopping. Thereafter, Magnaye filed a complaint with the regional office of the Civil Service (CSCRO-IV).

The CSCRO-IV dismissed Magnaye’s complaint for lack of merit. It upheld his dismissal from the service on the ground
that Mayor Bendaña’s own assessment, together with the evaluation made by his supervisors, constituted sufficient
and reasonable grounds for his termination.

Magnaye sought recourse through a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, citing CSCRO-IV’s alleged errors of
fact and of law, non-observance of due process, and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Adopting the stance of the Office of the Solicitor General, the CA ruled in Magnaye’s favor, mainly on the
ground that he was denied due process since he was not informed of what constituted the alleged unsatisfactory
conduct and want of capacity that led to his termination. It summarized the positions of the OSG as follows:

On January 18, 2005, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its manifestation and motion, in lieu of comment,
praying that the assailed decision be set aside. The OSG argued that Petitioner’s termination was illegal. The notice of
termination did not cite the specific instances indicating Petitioner’s alleged unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity.
It was only on July 29, 2003, or almost two years after Petitioner’s dismissal on August 13, 2001 that his former
Department Heads, Engr. Magsino and Engr. Masongsong, submitted an assessment and evaluation report to Mayor
Bendaña, which the latter belatedly solicited when the Petitioner appealed to the CSC Regional Office. Hence, the
circumstances behind Petitioner’s dismissal became questionable.

The OSG also found no evidence at the CSC Regional Office level that Petitioner was informed of his alleged poor
performance. There was no evidence that Petitioner was furnished copies of 1) Mayor Bendaña’s letter, dated July 29,
2003, addressed to CSC Regional Office praying that Petitioner’s termination be sustained; and 2) the performance
evaluation report, dated July 29, 2003, prepared by Engr. Magsino and Engr. Masongsong. The OSG claimed that
Petitioner was denied due process because his dismissal took effect a day after he received the notice of termination.
No hearing was conducted to give Petitioner the opportunity to refute the alleged causes of his dismissal. The OSG
agreed with Petitioner’s claim that there was insufficient time for Mayor Bendaña to determine his fitness or unfitness
for the position.3 [Emphasis supplied]

Thus, the fallo of the CA Decision4 reads:

"WHEREFORE, the petition is Granted. The Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. 4’s Decision, dated July 20,
2004 is hereby Set Aside. Accordingly, Petitioner is ORDERED REINSTATED with full payment of backwages and other
monetary benefits. This case is hereby REMANDED to the Civil Service Commission for reception of such evidence
necessary for purposes of determining the amount of backwages and other monetary benefits to which Petitioner is
entitled.

SO ORDERED."
THE ISSUES

In this petition, the Civil Service Commission submits the following for our consideration:

"I. The dropping of respondent from the rolls of the local government unit of Lemery, Batangas was in accord with Civil
Service Law, rules and jurisprudence.

II. The respondent resorted to a wrong mode of appeal and violated the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction."

The principal issue, therefore, is whether or not the termination of Magnaye was in accordance with the pertinent laws
and the rules.

The eligibility of respondent Magnaye has not been put in issue.

THE COURT’S RULING

The Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The CSC, in arguing that Magnaye’s termination was in accord with the Civil Service law, cited Section 4(a), Rule II of the
1998 CSC Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions which provides that:

Sec. 4. Nature of appointment. The nature of appointment shall be as follows:

a. Original – refers to the initial entry into the career service of persons who meet all the requirements of the position.
xxx

It is understood that the first six months of the service following an original appointment will be probationary in nature
and the appointee shall undergo a thorough character investigation. A probationer may be dropped from the service
for unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity anytime before the expiration of the probationary period. Provided that
such action is appealable to the Commission.

However, if no notice of termination for unsatisfactory conduct is given by the appointing authority to the employee
before the expiration of the six-month probationary period, the appointment automatically becomes permanent.

Under Civil Service rules, the first six months of service following a permanent appointment shall be probationary in
nature, and the probationer may be dropped from the service for unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity anytime
before the expiration of the probationary period. 5

The CSC is of the position that a civil service employee does not enjoy security of tenure during his 6-month
probationary period. It submits that an employee’s security of tenure starts only after the probationary period.
Specifically, it argued that "an appointee under an original appointment cannot lawfully invoke right to security of
tenure until after the expiration of such period and provided that the appointee has not been notified of the
termination of service or found unsatisfactory conduct before the expiration of the same."6
The CSC position is contrary to the Constitution and the Civil Service Law itself. Section 3 (2) Article 13 of the
Constitution guarantees the rights of all workers not just in terms of self-organization, collective bargaining, peaceful
concerted activities, the right to strike with qualifications, humane conditions of work and a living wage but also to
security of tenure, and Section 2(3), Article IX-B is emphatic in saying that, "no officer or employee of the civil service
shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law."

Consistently, Section 46 (a) of the Civil Service Law provides that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law after due process."

Our Constitution, in using the expressions "all workers" and "no officer or employee," puts no distinction between a
probationary and a permanent or regular employee which means that both probationary and permanent employees
enjoy security of tenure. Probationary employees enjoy security of tenure in the sense that during their probationary
employment, they cannot be dismissed except for cause or for failure to qualify as regular employees. This was clearly
stressed in the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Rowena Paden,7 where it was written:

To put the case in its proper perspective, we begin with a discussion on the respondent's right to security of tenure.
Article IX (B), Section 2(3) of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that

"[n]o officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law." At the
outset, we emphasize that the aforementioned constitutional provision does not distinguish between a regular
employee and a probationary employee. In the recent case of Daza v. Lugo8 we ruled that:

The Constitution provides that "[N]o officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause provided by law." Sec. 26, par. 1, Chapter 5, Book V, Title I-A of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 states:

All such persons (appointees who meet all the requirements of the position) must serve a probationary period of six
months following their original appointment and shall undergo a thorough character investigation in order to acquire
permanent civil service status. A probationer may be dropped from the service for unsatisfactory conduct or want of
capacity any time before the expiration of the probationary period; Provided, That such action is appealable to the
Commission.

Thus, the services of respondent as a probationary employee may only be terminated for a just cause, that is,
unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity. [Emphasis supplied]

x x x.

X x x the only difference between regular and probationary employees from the perspective of due process is that the
latter's termination can be based on the wider ground of failure to comply with standards made known to them when
they became probationary employees."

The constitutional and statutory guarantee of security of tenure is extended to both those in the career and non-career
service positions, and the cause under which an employee may be removed or suspended must naturally have some
relation to the character or fitness of the officer or employee, for the discharge of the functions of his office, or
expiration of the project for which the employment was extended. 9 Further, well-entrenched is the rule on security of
tenure that such an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil service under
a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable right (to the position), which is protected not only
by statute, but also by the Constitution [Article IX-B, Section 2, paragraph (3)] and cannot be taken away from him
either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with previous notice and hearing.10
While the CSC contends that a probationary employee does not enjoy security of tenure, its Omnibus Rules recognizes
that such an employee cannot be terminated except for cause. Note that in the Omnibus Rules it cited,11 a decision or
order dropping a probationer from the service for unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity anytime before the
expiration of the probationary period "is appealable to the Commission." This can only mean that a probationary
employee cannot be fired at will.

Notably, jurisprudence has it that the right to security of tenure is unavailing in certain instances. In Orcullo Jr. v. Civil
Service Commission,12 it was ruled that the right is not available to those employees whose appointments are
contractual and co-terminous in nature. Such employment is characterized by "a tenure which is limited to a period
specified by law, or that which is coterminous with the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is
limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made."13 In Amores M.D. v. Civil
Service Commission,14 it was held that a civil executive service appointee who meets all the requirements for the
position, except only the appropriate civil service eligibility, holds the office in a temporary capacity and is, thus, not
entitled to a security of tenure enjoyed by permanent appointees.1avvphi1

Clearly, Magnaye’s appointment is entirely different from those situations. From the records, his appointment was
never classified as co-terminous or contractual. Neither was his eligibility as a Utility Worker I challenged by anyone.

In support of its position that an appointee cannot lawfully invoke the right to a security of tenure during the
probationary period, petitioner CSC banked on the case of Lucero v. Court of Appeals and Philippine National Bank.15
This case is, however, not applicable because it refers to a private entity where the rules of employment are not exactly
similar to those in the government service.

Mayor Bendaña dismissed Magnaye for lack of capacity and unsatisfactory conduct. Section 26, paragraph 1, Chapter 5,
Book V, Title I-A of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 states:

(1) Appointment through certification.—An appointment through certification to a position in the civil service, except
as herein otherwise provided, shall be issued to a person who has been selected from a list of qualified persons
certified by the Commission from an appropriate register of eligibles, and who meets all the other requirements of the
position.

All such persons must serve a probationary period of six months following their original appointment and shall undergo
a thorough character investigation in order to acquire permanent civil service status. A probationer may be dropped
from the service for unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity any time before the expiration of the probationary
period: Provided, That such action is appealable to the Commission.

While unsatisfactory conduct and want of capacity are valid causes that may be invoked for dismissal from the
service,16 the CA observed that the Memorandum issued by Mayor Bendaña terminating Magnaye’s employment did
not specify the acts constituting his want of capacity and unsatisfactory conduct. It merely stated that the character
investigation conducted during his probationary period showed that his employment "need not be necessary to be
permanent in status."17 Specifically, the notice of termination partly reads:

You are hereby notified that your service as Utility Worker I, this municipality under six (6) month probationary period,
is considered terminated for unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity, effective August 14, 2001.

You are further notified that after a thorough character investigation made during your such probationary period under
my administration, your appointment for employment need not be necessary to be automatically permanent in
status.18
This notice indisputably lacks the details of Magnaye’s unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity. Section VI, 2.2(b) of
the Omnibus Guidelines on Appointments and other Personnel Actions (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, Series of
1993, as amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 1994), provides:

2.2. Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance

xxx

b. An official who, for one evaluation period, is rated poor in performance, may be dropped from the rolls after due
notice. Due notice shall mean that the officer or employee is informed in writing of the status of his performance not
later than the fourth month of that rating period with sufficient warning that failure to improve his performance within
the remaining period of the semester shall warrant his separation from the service. Such notice shall also contain
sufficient information which shall enable the employee to prepare an explanation. [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]

Magnaye asserts that no performance evaluation was made between March 2001 when he was hired by Mayor Rosales
until August 14, 2001 when his services were terminated by Mayor Bendaña.19 It was only on July 29, 2003, at Mayor
Bendaña’s behest, that his two supervisors prepared and submitted the evaluation report after the CSCRO-IV directed
him to file an answer to Magnaye’s appeal.20

This has not been rebutted. It being not disputed, it was an error on the part of the CSCRO-IV to rely on such belated
performance appraisal. Common sense dictates that the evaluation report, submitted only in 2003, could not have
been the basis for Magnaye’s termination.

Besides, Mayor Bendaña’s own assessment of Magnaye’s performance could not have served as a sufficient basis to
dismiss him because said mayor was not his immediate superior and did not have daily contacts with him. Additionally,
Mayor Bendaña terminated his employment less than one and one-half months after his assumption to office. This is
clearly a short period within which to assess his performance. In the case of Miranda v. Carreon,21 it was stated:

The 1987 Constitution provides that "no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except
for cause provided by law." Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a government officer or employee may be
removed from the service

on two (2) grounds: (1) unsatisfactory conduct and (2) want of capacity. While the Code does not define and delineate
the concepts of these two grounds, however, the Civil Service Law (Presidential Decree No. 807, as amended) provides
specific grounds for dismissing a government officer or employee from the service. Among these grounds are
inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties. In the case at bar, respondents were dismissed on
the ground of poor performance. Poor performance falls within the concept of inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties which, as earlier mentioned, are grounds for dismissing a government official or
employee from the service.

But inefficiency or incompetence can only be determined after the passage of sufficient time, hence, the probationary
period of six (6) months for the respondents. Indeed, to be able to gauge whether a subordinate is inefficient or
incompetent requires enough time on the part of his immediate superior within which to observe his performance. This
condition, however, was not observed in this case. x x x. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

The CSC is the central personnel agency of the government exercising quasi-judicial functions.22 "In cases filed before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."23 The
standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when, on the basis of the evidence on record, there is reasonable ground to
believe that the person terminated was evidently wanting in capacity and had unsatisfactory conduct. In this case, the
evidence against Magnaye was woefully inadequate.

Moreover, Magnaye was denied due process. We ruled in Tria v. Chairman Patricia Sto. Tomas24 that the prohibition in
Article IX (B) (2) (3) of the Constitution against dismissal of a civil service officer or employee "except for cause provided
by law" is a guaranty of both procedural and substantive due process. Procedural due process requires that the
dismissal comes only after notice and hearing,25 while substantive due process requires that the dismissal be "for
cause."26

Magnaye was denied procedural due process when he received his notice of termination only a day before he was
dismissed from the service. Evidently, he was effectively deprived of the opportunity to defend himself from the charge
that he lacked the capacity to do his work and that his conduct was unsatisfactory. As well, during his appeal to the
CSCRO-IV, he was not furnished with the submissions of Mayor Bendaña that he could have opposed. He was also
denied substantive due process because he was dismissed from the service without a valid cause for lack of any factual
or legal basis for his want of capacity and unsatisfactory conduct.

Thus, we reject petitioner’s argument that the CA erred when it acted upon the erroneous remedy availed of by
respondent when he filed a petition for review considering that the assailed decision is not in the nature of "awards,
judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions" as prescribed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. While Sections 71 and 72 of Rule V (B) of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil

Service 27 provide for the remedy of an appeal from decisions of its regional offices to the Commission proper,
Magnaye’s petition to the CA comes under the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The CA correctly cited Republic v. Lacap,28 where a violation of due process is listed to be among the noted exceptions
to the rule. As discussed above, Magnaye’s dismissal was tainted with irregularity because the notice given to him
comes short of the notice contemplated by law and jurisprudence. The CA correctly exercised jurisdiction over this case
where standards of due process had been patently breached.

Having been illegally dismissed, Magnaye should be reinstated to his former position without loss of seniority and paid
backwages and other monetary benefits from the time of his dismissal up to the time of his reinstatement. In our
decision in Civil Service Commission v. Gentallan,29 we ruled that for reasons of justice and fairness, an illegally
dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to backwages and other monetary benefits
from the time of his illegal dismissal until his reinstatement because he is considered as not having left his office.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The February 20, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its June 11, 2008
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 85508 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175276 May 31, 2011

ISABELO L. GALANG, Petitioner,

vs.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 175282

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.

ISABELO L. GALANG, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

These are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari1 filed by Isabelo L. Galang and Land Bank of the
Philippines (Land Bank) to assail the Decision2 dated May 25, 2006 and Resolution3 dated October 25, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91910. The CA had reversed and set aside Resolution Nos. 0408944 and
0512565 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) denying Galang’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution6 and motion
for reconsideration.

The facts of the case are undisputed.

On June 20, 1988, Isabelo L. Galang, the Branch Manager of Land Bank Baliuag, Bulacan was charged with Dishonesty,
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, Gross Neglect of Duty, Violation of Rules and
Regulations, and Receiving for Personal Use a Fee, Gift or Other Valuable Thing in the Course of Official Duties or in
Connection Therewith when such Fee is Given by Any Person in the Hope or Expectation of Receiving a Favor or Better
Treatment than that Accorded Other Persons or Committing Acts Punishable Under the Anti-Graft Laws. The case was
docketed as Administrative Case No. 88-002.7

Allegedly, Galang demanded money from four borrowers of the bank, namely, Ceferino Manahan, Gregorio Modelo,
Sotero Santos and Feliza de Vera, in return for a reduction of interest rates and condonation of penalty charges on their
overdue loans. The complaint further accuses Galang of making unauthorized disbursements for the repair of the
company car. Along with Galang, the borrowers also charged Conrado Ocampo, a Project Analyst in the same branch,
for his alleged participation in soliciting money from them.

On November 3, 1989, the Hearing Officer of Land Bank issued a Joint Resolution dismissing both charges for
insufficiency of evidence. This was later reversed by Land Bank’s General Counsel, Corazon P. Del Rosario, who
recommended Galang and Ocampo’s dismissal to the Board of Directors.

On April 26, 1990, the Board of Directors issued Resolution No. 90-0438 which approved Del Rosario’s recommendation
but modified the penalty to forced resignation with forfeiture of all benefits. Aggrieved, Galang and Ocampo appealed
to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).

In a Decision9 dated March 8, 1991, the MSPB sustained the penalty imposed upon Galang and Ocampo but found
them liable only for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and
Receiving for Personal Use a Fee, Gift or Other Valuable Thing in the Course of Official Duties or in Connection
Therewith when such Fee is Given by Any Person in the Hope of Receiving a Favor or Better Treatment than that
Accorded Other Persons. The MSPB, however, absolved Galang of the charges of Gross Neglect of Duty and Violation of
Rules and Regulations. Galang and Ocampo filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Decision10 dated
June 11, 1991.

Before the CSC, Galang and Ocampo’s appeal was dismissed for lack of merit through Resolution No. 93-100111 dated
March 12, 1993. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in Resolution No. 93-3812.12

Galang alone filed a petition for certiorari13 with the Supreme Court alleging grave abuse of discretion committed by
the CSC. In a Resolution14 dated June 20, 1995, the Court referred the matter to the CA pursuant to Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95.15

On November 21, 1996, the CA rendered a Decision16 in CA-G.R. SP No. 37791 nullifying Resolution Nos. 93-1001 and
93-3812. The appellate court excluded the affidavits of the complainants as inadmissible in evidence for lack of cross-
examination. Without them, it found no substantial evidence to hold Galang administratively liable.

Subsequently, Galang filed a Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration17 with a prayer for the CA to order his
reinstatement and the payment of his back wages, bonuses and other fringe benefits reckoned from the date of his
dismissal. Land Bank, likewise, moved for reconsideration.

In a Resolution18 dated September 5, 1997, the CA granted Galang’s motion and directed Land Bank to reinstate him
and to pay him back salaries not exceeding five years. Land Bank received notice of said resolution on September 15,
1997, but filed no appeal.
Consequently, Galang filed a Motion to Effect Entry of Judgment.19 On November 14, 1997, Land Bank filed before this
Court a Petition for Certiorari20 which was docketed as G.R. No. 131186.

In a Resolution21 dated January 17, 2001, this Court dismissed the petition. This Court concluded that Land Bank’s
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, was merely an afterthought
considering that it failed to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of said Rule. The bank moved for
reconsideration but was denied. Thus, on August 7, 2001, this Court issued an Entry of Judgment.22

In the meantime, Galang was reinstated in the payroll on August 16, 2001. However, on December 14, 2001, Galang
wrote Land Bank’s President, Margarito Teves, complaining that he has yet to receive Personnel Economic Relief
Allowance (PERA), Representation and Travel Allowance (RATA), Meal Allowance and Rice Subsidy. He claimed that
since this Court found Land Bank’s petition for certiorari to be a mere afterthought, he should have been reinstated on
October 1, 1997 – after the fifteen (15)-day period to appeal the Resolution dated September 5, 1997 had lapsed.
Galang also insisted that his back salaries be computed based on the current salary rate prescribed for his previous
position.23

In a letter24 dated February 8, 2002, Land Bank expressed its willingness to pay Galang Meal Allowance and Rice
Subsidy. It, however, refused to include PERA and RATA as part of his back salaries for 1990 to 1995; the former,
because it was authorized to be paid to LBP employees only in 1997 and the latter, because he was unable to discharge
the functions of his office. Land Bank further explained that Galang could not be reinstated, or his back wages paid from
October 1, 1997 since there was yet no final and executory decision of the court then. The bank maintained that his
salaries were computed correctly, based on the prevailing rate for the period when he was unable to work in
accordance with the Court’s ruling in Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals.25

On June 7, 2002, Galang filed a Motion for Clarification26 with this Court to settle the following issues:

9.1 Whether Respondent is entitled to Meal and Rice Allowances, Representation and Travel Allowance and Housing
Allowance, and the basis thereof;

9.2 Whether the payment of Provident Fund is limited to five (5) years only;

9.3 The basis for computing the 5-year backwages;

9.4 Whether Respondent should have been reinstated since October 1, 1997.27

On July 24, 2002, this Court issued a Resolution28 which noted without action Galang’s motion for clarification in view
of the Entry of Judgment29 on August 7, 2001.

On May 15, 2003, Galang filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution30 with the CSC to enforce the November 21,
1996 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 37791, which ordered his reinstatement and the payment of his backwages
for five years.

The Commission denied said motion in Resolution No. 040894 dated August 9, 2004. Galang moved for reconsideration,
but his motion was denied in Resolution No. 05-1256 dated September 13, 2005. The CSC held that execution will not
lie because Land Bank had complied with the appellate court’s decision.

On November 5, 2005, Galang filed a Petition for Review31 under Rule 43 with the CA.
In the assailed Decision dated May 25, 2006, the appellate court granted said petition and declared Galang entitled to
PERA, RATA and other benefits attached to his position. However, it upheld his reinstatement on August 16, 2001 and
sustained the computation of his back wages based on the prevailing rate at the time of his dismissal. The motions for
reconsideration respectively filed by Galang and Land Bank were likewise denied by the appellate court in its Resolution
dated October 25, 2006.

Hence, on December 8, 2006, Galang filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court raising the following issues:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE COMPUTATION OF PETITIONER’S BACKWAGES SHOULD BE
BASED ON HIS CURRENT SALARY LEVEL; AND

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT AS EARLY AS 01
OCTOBER 1997.32

For its part, Land Bank filed a petition for review on certiorari on December 22, 2006 based on the following assignment
of errors:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
RULED THAT [PERSONNEL] ECONOMIC RELIEF ALLOWANCE (PERA) AND REPRESENTATION AND [TRANSPORTATION]
ALLOWANCE (RATA) SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE PAYMENT OF RESPONDENT’S BACKWAGES.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS LIKEWISE COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT HELD THAT RESPONDENT GALANG IS STILL ENTITLED TO THE PAYMENT OF MEAL ALLOWANCE AND RICE
SUBSIDY.33

In order to resolve these twin petitions, the Court must address the following questions: (1) When should Galang be
reinstated? (2) What should be the basis of computing his back salaries? and (3) Is he entitled to PERA, RATA, Meal
Allowance and Rice Subsidy?

Citing the case of Cristobal v. Melchor,34 Galang contends that his back wages should be computed based on the rate
of his salary at reinstatement. He argues that since Land Bank availed of the wrong remedy, his reinstatement should
be reckoned from October 1, 1997 or after the reglementary period to appeal had lapsed.

Land Bank, on the other hand, disputes Galang’s demand for PERA and RATA. It reasons that since the five-year period
for which Galang shall receive back salaries is from July 1990 to June 1995, he is not entitled to PERA, a benefit which
employees of the Land Bank started receiving only in 1997. As to RATA, Land Bank maintains that the nature of such
benefit precludes Galang from claiming it since he did not incur expenses for representation and transportation while
he was not allowed to work. Finally, it claims that it had already paid Galang’s Rice Subsidy and Meal Allowance.

We find the petition partly meritorious.

The Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 29235 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws define
reinstatement as the issuance of an appointment to a person who has been previously appointed to a position in the
career service and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct, been separated therefrom, or to the restoration of
one who has been exonerated of the administrative charges filed against him.

In the present case, Galang was absolved of the administrative charges against him in the CA Decision dated November
21, 1996. Upon motion, the appellate court issued the Resolution dated September 5, 1997, which ordered his
reinstatement and the payment of his back salaries for five years.

It is settled that an illegally terminated civil service employee is entitled to back salaries limited only to a maximum
period of five years, and not full back salaries from his illegal termination up to his reinstatement.36 Hence, in Galang’s
case, he is entitled to back salaries from July 1990 to June 1995. This is not disputed by the parties. Rather, the
uncertainty centers on when he should be reinstated.

The records show that Galang was reinstated in Land Banks’s payroll on August 16, 2001. He argues, however, that he
should be reinstated on October 1, 1997, after the fifteen (15)-day period to appeal the Resolution dated September 5,
1997 had lapsed.

Galang’s position on the effective date of his reinstatement is correct.

Well-entrenched is that a judgment or order becomes final upon the lapse of the period to appeal, without an appeal
being perfected or a motion for reconsideration being filed.37

In this case, Land Bank received notice of the CA Resolution dated September 5, 1997 on September 15, 1997. Thus, it
had fifteen (15) days from September 15, 1997, or until September 30, 1997 to file an appeal. Yet, Land Bank did not do
so. Instead, it filed a petition for certiorari with this Court on November 14, 1997.

However, an original action for certiorari is an independent action and is neither a continuation nor a part of the trial
resulting in the judgment complained of. It does not interrupt the course of the original action if there was no writ of
injunction, even if in connection with a pending case in a lower court.38 Section 7, Rule 65 on certiorari provides:

SEC. 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. – The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting
the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the
principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against public
respondent from further proceeding in the case. (Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, the petition for certiorari filed by Land Bank in G.R. No. 131186 did not suspend the running of the prescriptive
period to appeal. Besides, no temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction was issued in its favor that
could effectively toll the running of the prescriptive period.

It is true that there are instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order
issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a lower court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings on the
precept of judicial courtesy. The principle of judicial courtesy, however, remains to be the exception rather than the
rule.39 Unfortunately for Land Bank, this is not a proper case for the operation of the said principle.

Land Bank’s failure to interpose an appeal within fifteen (15) days from its receipt on September 15, 1997 of the
Resolution dated September 5, 1997, rendered the same final and executory on October 1, 1997. Galang’s
reinstatement therefore must be reckoned, not from August 16, 2001 but from October 1, 1997. This entitles him to
receive back wages as well from the date when he should have been reinstated on October 1, 1997 to August 15, 2001,
one day before he was actually reinstated.

Concomitant with reinstatement is the payment of back salaries. Section 59(e) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service on the effect of exoneration on certain penalties provides that in case the penalty imposed is
dismissal, he shall immediately be reinstated without loss of seniority rights with payment of back salaries. It was
enunciated in Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Salas40 that:

When an official or employee was illegally dismissed and his reinstatement has later been ordered, for all legal
purposes he is considered as not having left his office. Therefore, he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that
accrue to him by virtue of the office he held.

In this case, the second issue for resolution pertains to the base figure to be used in computing Galang’s back salaries.

Galang invokes the 1980 case of Cristobal v. Melchor41 as authority in saying that the computation of his back wages
should be based on his salary at reinstatement. However, we find Galang’s reliance on said case misplaced.

In Cristobal v. Melchor, Jose C. Cristobal was reinstated as an Assistant in the Office of the President, a position
different from his position as Private Secretary I which he held when he was terminated. Upon being reinstated, he was
paid the salary corresponding to that of a Private Secretary I at the rate when he was wrongfully dismissed fifteen (15)
years back. The Court ruled therein that Cristobal must be given a position and compensation commensurate and
comparable to that which he held, taking into account the increases in salary during the fifteen (15)-year period
preceding his reinstatement. To stress this point, the Court fixed his compensation at the rate prevailing at the time of
his reinstatement inclusive of allowances, benefits and increases in salary. Moreover, it ordered the respondents
therein to pay Cristobal the differential between the current rate of the salary, for a position commensurate to a
Private Secretary I, and the old rate from the time he "reported for duty"42 that is, from the time he was reinstated.

Clearly, what was in issue in Cristobal v. Melchor was the rate of Cristobal’s compensation upon his reinstatement, not
the rate of his back salaries. In fact, he did not dispute the payment of his back salaries for five years computed at the
rate when he was dismissed.43

The controlling rule on the rate at which back salaries shall be paid was laid down by the Court as early as 1977 in the
case of Balquidra v. CFI of Capiz, Branch II.44 In said case, the Court awarded back salaries to the petitioner therein at
the rate last received by him or his "original salary"45 for five years without qualification and deduction. This means
that the illegally dismissed government employee shall be paid back salaries at the rate he was receiving when he was
terminated unqualified by salary increases and without deduction from earnings received elsewhere during the period
of his illegal dismissal. We have invariably held so in Gementiza v. Court of Appeals,46 Ginson v. Municipality of Murcia,
et al.,47 Gabriel v. Domingo,48 and Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission.49 We find no reason to depart from the
said rule in the instant case.

Be that as it may, we cannot apply the foregoing rule in the computation of Galang’s back salaries from October 1, 1997
to August 15, 2001. His back salaries for such period represent recompense for the earnings he failed to realize because
he was belatedly reinstated. Following this Court’s pronouncement in Cristobal v. Melchor, Galang’s back salaries for
October 1, 1997 to August 15, 2001 should be computed at the rate prevailing at the proper date of his reinstatement
on October 1, 1997, inclusive of allowances, benefits and increases in salary prior to reinstatement.
Apart from back salaries, Galang demands payment of RATA, PERA, Meal Allowance and Rice Subsidy from Land Bank.

Back wages represent the compensation that should have been earned but were not collected because of the unjust
dismissal.50 This includes other monetary benefits51 attached to the employee’s salary following the principle that an
illegally dismissed government employee who is later reinstated is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue to
him by virtue of the office he held.

Pertinent to this case, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758,52 otherwise known as the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989, was enacted on July 1, 1989 to integrate certain benefits received by government official and employees
into their salaries. Section 12 of said Act provides:

SEC. 12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. - All allowances, except for representation and transportation
allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government
vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other
additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included
in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind,
being received by the incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue
to be authorized.

Existing additional compensation of any national government official or employee paid from local funds of a local
government unit shall be absorbed into the basic salary of said official or employee and shall be paid by the National
Government.

Section 17 of the Act, however, exempts incumbent government officials and employees from the operation of Section
12, thus:

SEC. 17. Salaries of Incumbents. - Incumbents of positions presently receiving salaries and additional
compensation/fringe benefits including those absorbed from local government units and other emoluments, the
aggregate of which exceeds the standardized salary rate as herein prescribed, shall continue to receive such excess
compensation, which shall be referred to as transition allowance. The transition allowance shall be reduced by the
amount of salary adjustment that the incumbent shall receive in the future.

The transition allowance referred to herein shall be treated as part of the basic salary for purposes of computing
retirement pay, year-end bonus and other similar benefits.

xxxx

Being an incumbent at the time, Galang would have continued to receive RATA, Meal Allowance and Rice Subsidy,
separate from his salary, had he not been illegally dismissed from service.

Representation and Transportation Allowance or RATA is a fringe benefit distinct from salary. Unlike salary which is
paid for services rendered, RATA belongs to a basket of allowances to defray expenses deemed unavoidable in the
discharge of office. Hence, it is paid only to certain officials who, by the nature of their offices, incur representation and
transportation expenses.53 The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Manual on Position Classification and
Compensation discusses the nature of the RATA and qualifies the entitlement of reinstated government employees
thereto in certain fiscal years:
The pertinent general provisions of the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) prior to FY 1993 and in the FY 1999 GAA
provided that the officials listed therein and those of equivalent ranks as may be determined by the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) are to be granted monthly commutable RATA. Hence, prior to FY 1993 and in FY 1999,
RATA were allowances attached to the position.

The pertinent provisions of the FYs 1993 to 1998 GAAs and in the FY 2000 GAA provided that the officials listed therein
and those of equivalent ranks as may be determined by the DBM while in the actual performance of their respective
functions are to be granted monthly commutable RATA. This provision was reiterated in the pertinent general
provisions of the subsequent GAAs. Hence, in FYs 1993 to 1998 and beginning FY 2000 and up to the present, the actual
performance of an official’s duties and responsibilities was a pre-requisite to the grant of RATA.

The rationale behind the qualifying phrase, "while in the actual performance of their respective functions," is to provide
the official concerned with additional funds to meet necessary expenses incidental to and connected with the exercise
or the discharge of the functions of the office. Thus, if the official is out of office, whether voluntary or involuntary, the
official does not and is not supposed to incur expenses. There being no expenses incurred, there is nothing to
reimburse.

Since RATA are privileges or benefits in the form of reimbursement of expenses, they are not salaries or part of basic
salaries. Forfeiture or non-grant of the RATA does not constitute diminution in pay. RATA may be spent in variable
amounts per work day depending on the situation. Entitlement thereto should not be proportionate to the number of
work days in a month, inclusive of regular and special holidays falling on work days. (Emphasis supplied.)1avvphi1

For emphasis, the five-year period covered in the computation of Galang’s back salaries and other benefits is from July
1990 to June 1995. Also, he shall receive back salaries and other benefits for the period during which he should have
been reinstated from October 1, 1997 to August 15, 2001. Since the General Appropriations Act (GAA) for 1993 to 1998
and in the year 2000 onwards require the actual performance of duty as a condition for the grant of RATA, Galang shall
not receive RATA in those years but shall be entitled to RATA only from July 1990 to December 1992 and in the year
1999.

On the other hand, Personnel Economic Relief Allowance (PERA) is a ₱500 monthly allowance authorized under the
pertinent general provision in the annual GAA. It is granted to augment the pay of government employees due to the
rising cost of living.

On February 12, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 825054 (GAA for CY 1997), which granted PERA to all government
employees and officials as a replacement of the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA).55 This explains why Land Bank
employees began receiving PERA only in 1997 – because prior to 1997, said benefit was called by another name, COLA.
Hence, Land Bank is still liable to pay the monthly PERA to Galang.

In his Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, Galang acknowledges receipt of "Rice Allowance, which was monetized
based on the value of a sack of rice within the period from July 1990 to June 1995."56 Still, he claims Rice Subsidy for
the succeeding years. Considering, however, that Galang is entitled to back wages only from July 1990 to June 1995 and
from October 1, 1997 to August 15, 2001, his claim for Rice Subsidy for the intervening years has no legal basis.

As to Meal Allowance, Land Bank concedes Galang’s entitlement thereto, albeit, it claims that it had already paid the
same.

Jurisprudence dictates that the burden of proving payment of monetary claims rests on the employer. The rationale for
this rule was explained in G & M Philippines, Inc. v. Cuambot57:
x x x [O]ne who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. The reason for the rule is that the pertinent personnel
files, payrolls, records, remittances and other similar documents - which will show that overtime, differentials, service
incentive leave, and other claims of workers have been paid - are not in the possession of the worker but in the custody
and absolute control of the employer. Thus, the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been
discharged with payment falls on the debtor, in accordance with the rule that one who pleads payment has the burden
of proving it. x x x58

To prove payment of Galang’s meal allowance for 1988 and July 1990 to 1995 in the amount of ₱34,860.00, Land Bank
annexed Disbursement Order No. 02-02-017059 dated February 8, 2002 to its Comment60 in CA-G.R. SP No. 91910.
However, said disbursement order lacks the signature of Galang as recipient. Verily, we cannot take such document as
conclusive proof that Galang has been paid his meal allowance. Taking into account our determination that Galang
ought to be reinstated earlier, Land Bank shall likewise be liable to pay his Meal Allowance from October 1, 1997 to
August 15, 2001.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 25, 2006 and Resolution dated October 25, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 91910 are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Land Bank of the Philippines is ordered to pay Isabelo L.
Galang: (a) back salaries for five (5) years from the time of his unlawful dismissal in July 1990 to June 1995 at the rate
last received by him without qualification and deduction; (b) back salaries from the proper date of his reinstatement on
October 1, 1997 until August 15, 2001, at the rate prevailing on October 1, 1997 inclusive of increases in salary; (c) Cost
of Living Allowance (COLA) from July 1990 to June 1995; (d) Personnel Economic Relief Allowance (PERA) from October
1, 1997 to August 15, 2001; (e) Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) from July 1990 to December 1992
and for the year 1999; (f) Meal Allowance in the amount of ₱34,860.00; and (g) Meal Allowance and Rice Subsidy for
October 1, 1997 to August 15, 2001.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 81563 December 19, 1989

AMADO C. ARIAS, petitioner,

vs.

THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

G.R. No. 82512 December 19, 1989

CRESENCIO D. DATA, petitioner,

vs.

THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

Paredes Law Office for petitioner.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The facts of this case are stated in the dissenting opinion of Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino which follows this majority
opinion. The dissent substantially reiterates the draft report prepared by Justice Griño-Aquino as a working basis for the
Court's deliberations when the case was being discussed and for the subsequent votes of concurrence or dissent on the
action proposed by the report.

There is no dispute over the events which transpired. The division of the Court is on the conclusions to be drawn from
those events and the facts insofar as the two petitioners are concerned. The majority is of the view that Messrs. Arias
and Data should be acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt. The Court feels that the quantum of evidence needed to
convict petitioners Arias and Data beyond reasonable doubt, as co-conspirators in the conspiracy to cause undue injury
to the Government through the irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds, has not been satisfied.

In acquitting the petitioners, the Court agrees with the Solicitor-General 1 who, in 80 pages of his consolidated
manifestation and motion, recommended that Messrs. Arias and Data be acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de
oficio. Earlier, Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Eleuterio F. Guerrero had also recommended the dropping of Arias from
the information before it was filed.

There is no question about the need to ferret out and convict public officers whose acts have made the bidding out and
construction of public works and highways synonymous with graft or criminal inefficiency in the public eye. However,
the remedy is not to indict and jail every person who may have ordered the project, who signed a document incident to
its construction, or who had a hand somewhere in its implementation. The careless use of the conspiracy theory may
sweep into jail even innocent persons who may have been made unwitting tools by the criminal minds who engineered
the defraudation.

Under the Sandiganbayan's decision in this case, a department secretary, bureau chief, commission chairman, agency
head, and all chief auditors would be equally culpable for every crime arising from disbursements which they have
approved. The department head or chief auditor would be guilty of conspiracy simply because he was the last of a long
line of officials and employees who acted upon or affixed their signatures to a transaction. Guilt must be premised on a
more knowing, personal, and deliberate participation of each individual who is charged with others as part of a
conspiracy.

The records show that the six accused persons were convicted in connection with the overpricing of land purchased by
the Bureau of Public Works for the Mangahan Floodway Project. The project was intended to ease the perennial floods
in Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila.

The accused were prosecuted because 19,004 square meters of "riceland" in Rosario, Pasig which had been assessed at
P5.00 a square meter in 1973 were sold as residential land" in 1978 for P80.00 a square meter. The land for the
floodway was acquired through negotiated purchase,

We agree with the Solicitor-General that the assessor's tax valuation of P5.00 per square meter of land in Rosario,
Pasig, Metro Manila is completely unrealistic and arbitrary as the basis for conviction.
Herein lies the first error of the trial court.

It must be stressed that the petitioners are not charged with conspiracy in the falsification of public documents or
preparation of spurious supporting papers. The charge is causing undue injury to the Government and giving a private
party unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence.

The alleged undue injury in a nutshell is the Government purchase of land in Pasig, Rizal for P80.00 a square meter
instead of the P5.00 value per square meter appearing in the tax declarations and fixed by the municipal assessor, not
by the landowner.

The Sandiganbayan, without any clear factual basis for doing so has assumed that the P5.00 per square meter value
fixed by the assessor in the tax declarations was the correct market value of the Mangahan property and if the
Government purchased the land for P80.00 a square meter, it follows that it must have suffered undue injury.

The Solicitor General explains why this conclusion is erroneous:

1. No undue injury was caused to the Government

a. The P80.00 per square rneter acquisition cost is just fair and reasonable.

It bears stress that the Agleham property was acquired through negotiated purchase. It was, therefor, nothing more
than an ordinary contract of sale where the purchase price had to be arrived at by agreement between the parties and
could never be left to the discretion of one of the contracting parties (Article 1473, New Civil Code). For it is the essence
of a contract of sale that there must be a meeting of the minds between the seller and the buyer upon the thing which
is the object of the contract and upon the price (Article 1475, New Civil Code). Necessarily, the parties have to
negotiate the reasonableness of the price, taking into consideration such other factors as location, potentials,
surroundings and capabilities. After taking the foregoing premises into consideration, the parties have, thus, arrived at
the amount of P80.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable price for the Agleham property.

It bears stress that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove that the true and fair market value in 1978 of
the Agleham property was indeed P5.00 per square meter only as stated by the assessor in the tax declaration (Exhibit
W). On the contrary, the prosecution's principal witness Pedro Ocol, the Assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig, admitted
that the purchase price of P80.00 per square meter paid for the Agleham property as stated in the Deed of Sale (Exhibit
G) is reasonable (tsn, August 19,1983, p. 20) and fair (Ibid, p. 76); that 'the value of lands within the town of Pasig
ranges from P80.00 to P500.00' (Ibid, p. 21); that the Agleham property is "around 300 meters" from Ortigas Avenue,
"adjacent to the existing Leongson [Liamson] Subdivision ... and near Eastland Garment Building" (Ibid, pp. 12-13); that
said property is surrounded by factories, commercial establishments and residential subdivisions (Ibid, pp. 73-74); that
the P5.00 per square meter assessed valuation of the Agleham property appearing on the tax declaration (Exhibit W)
was based on actual use only (lbid, pp. 26-27), it being the uniform rate for all ricefields in Pasig irrespective of their
locations (Ibid, pp. 72-74) and did not take into account the existence of many factories and subdivisions in the area
(Ibid., pp. 25-27, 72-74), and that the assessed value is different from and always lower than the actual market value
(Ibid, pp. 22-23). (At pp. 256-259, Rollo)

A negotiated purchase may usually entail a higher buying price than one arrived at in the course of expropriation
proceedings.

In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay (149 SCRA 305, 310 [1987]) we struck down the martial law decree that
pegged just compensation in eminent domain cases to the assessed value stated by a landowner in his tax declaration
or fixed by the municipal assessor, whichever is lower. Other factors must be considered. These factors must be
determined by a court of justice and not by municipal employees.

In the instant case, the assessor's low evaluation, in the fixing of which the landowner had no participation, was used
for a purpose infinitely more weighty than mere expropriation of land. It forms the basis for a criminal conviction.

The Court is not prepared to say that P80.00 to P500.00 a square meter for land in Pasig in 1978 would be a fair
evaluation. The value must be determined in eminent domain proceedings by a competent court. We are certain,
however, that it cannot be P5.00 a square meter. Hence, the decision, insofar as it says that the "correct" valuation is
P5.00 per square meter and on that basis convicted that petitioners of causing undue injury, damage, and prejudice to
the Government because of gross overpricing, is grounded on shaky foundations.

There can be no overpricing for purposes of a criminal conviction where no proof adduced during orderly proceedings
has been presented and accepted.

The Court's decision, however, is based on a more basic reason. Herein lies the principal error of the respondent court.

We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems-dishonest or negligent
subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence is suddenly swept into a conspiracy
conviction simply because he did not personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from
inception, and investigate the motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing, his signature as the final
approving authority.

There appears to be no question from the records that documents used in the negotiated sale were falsified. A key tax
declaration had a typewritten number instead of being machine-numbered. The registration stampmark was antedated
and the land reclassified as residential instead of ricefield. But were the petitioners guilty of conspiracy in the
falsification and the subsequent charge of causing undue in injury and damage to the Government?

We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents, received procedures, and
questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office could personally do all these things in all
vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a
reasonable extent 'on their subordinates and on the good faith of those prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into
negotiations. If a department secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call the
restaurant about the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was present at the luncheon, inquire whether
the correct amount of food was served and otherwise personally look into the reimbursement voucher's accuracy,
propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any
executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be
signed. There are hundreds of document , letters and supporting paper that routinely pass through his hands. The
number in bigger offices or departments is even more appalling.

There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy
charge and conviction.

Was petitioner Arias part of the planning, preparation, and perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to defraud the
government?

Arias joined the Pasig office on July 19, 1978. The negotiations for the purchase of the property started in 1977. The
deed of sale was executed on April 20, 1978. Title was transferred to the Republic on June 8, 1978. In other words, the
transaction had already been consummated before his arrival. The pre-audit, incident to payment of the purchase, was
conducted in the first week of October, 1978. Arias points out that apart from his signature linking him to the signature
on the voucher, there is no evidence transaction. On the contrary, the other co-accused testified they did not know him
personally and none approached him to follow up the payment.

Should the big amount of P1,520,320.00 have caused him to investigate . gate the smallest detains of the transaction?

Yes, if the land was really worth only P5.00 a square meter. However, if land in Pasig was already worth P80.00 a square
meter at the time, no warning bell of intuition would have sounded an inner alarm. Land along Ortigas Avenue on the
way to Pasig is now worth P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 a square meter. The falsification of the tax declaration by changing
"riceland" to "residential' was done before Arias was assigned to Pasig besides, there is no such thing as "riceland" in
inner Metro Manila. Some lots in outlying or easily flooded areas may still be planted to rice or kangkong but this is only
until the place is dedicated to its real purpose which is commercial, industrial, or residential. If the Sandiganbayan is
going to send somebody to jail for six years, the decision should be based on firmer foundation.

The Sandiganbayan asked why Arias kept the documents from October, 1978 to June 23, 1982. Arias explained that the
rules of the Commission on Audit require auditors to keep these d documents and under no circumstance to relinquish
custody to other persons. Arias was auditor of the Bureau of Public Works in Pasig up to September 1, 1981. The seven
months delay in the formal turnover of custody to the new auditor was explained by prosecution witness Julito
Pesayco, who succeeded him as auditor and who took over the custody of records in that office.

The main reason for the judgment of conviction, for the finding of undue injury and damage to the Government is the
alleged gross overprice for the land purchased for the floodway project. Assuming that P80.00 is indeed exorbitant,
petitioner Arias cites his testimony as follows:

Q In conducting the pre-audit, did you determine the reasonableness of the price of the property?

A In this case, the price has been stated, the transaction had been consummated and the corresponding Transfer
Certificate of little had been issued and transferred to the government of the Philippines. The auditors have no more
leeway to return the papers and then question the purchase price.

Q Is it not a procedure in your office that before payment is given by the government to private individuals there
should be a pre-audit of the papers and the corresponding checks issued to the vendor?

A Correct, Your Honor, but it depends on the kind of transaction there is.

Q Yes, but in this particular case, the papers were transferred to the government without paying the price Did you not
consider that rather odd or unusual? (TSN, page 17, April 27,1987).

A No, Your Honor.

Q Why not?

A Because in the Deed of Sale as being noted there, there is a condition that no payments will be made unless the
corresponding title in the payment of the Republic is committed is made.

Q In this case you said that the title is already in the name of the government?
A Yes, Your Honor. The only thing we do is to determine whether there is an appropriation set aside to cover the said
specification. As of the price it is under the sole authority of the proper officer making the sale.

Q My point is this. Did you not consider it unusual for a piece of property to be bought by the government; the
sale was consummated; the title was issued in favor of the government without the price being paid first to the seller?

A No, Your Honor. In all cases usually, payments made by the government comes later than the transfer.

Q That is usual procedure utilized in road right of way transaction?

A Yes, Your Honor. (TSN, p. 18, April 27,1987).

Q And of course as auditor, 'watch-dog' of the government there is also that function you are also called upon by
going over the papers . . . (TSN, page 22, April 27,1987). I ... vouchers called upon to determine whether there is any
irregularity as at all in this particular transaction, is it not?

A Yes, Ma'am.

Q And that was in fact the reason why you scrutinized also, not only the tax declaration but also the certification by Mr.
Jose and Mr. Cruz?

A As what do you mean of the certification, ma'am?

Q Certification of Mr. Jose and Mr. Cruz in relation to PD No. 296, A They are not required documents that an
auditor must see. (TSN, page 23, April 27,1987).

and continuing:

A ... The questioning of the purchase price is now beyond the authority of the auditor because it is inasmuch as
the amount involved is beyond his counter-signing authority. (TSN, page 35, April 27, 1987). (At pp. 15-16, Petition.
Underlinings supplied by petitioner)

The Solicitor General summarizes the participation of petitioner Data as follows:

As regards petitioner Data's alleged participation, the evidence on record shows that as the then District Engineer of
the Pasig Engineering District he created a committee, headed by Engr. Priscillo Fernando with Ricardo Asuncion,
Alfonso Mendoza, Ladislao Cruz, Pedro Hucom and Carlos Jose, all employees of the district office, as members,
specifically to handle the Mangahan Floodway Project, gather and verify documents, conduct surveys, negotiate with
the owners for the sale of their lots, process claims and prepare the necessary documents; he did not take any direct
and active part in the acquisition of land for the Mangahan floodway; it was the committee which determined the
authenticity of the documents presented to them for processing and on the basis thereof prepared the corresponding
deed of sale; thereafter, the committee submitted the deed of sale together with the supporting documents to
petitioner Data for signing; on the basis of the supporting certified documents which appeared regular and complete on
their face, petitioner Data, as head of the office and the signing authority at that level, merely signed but did not
approve the deed of sale (Exhibit G) as the approval thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works; he
thereafter transmitted the signed deed of sale with its supporting documents to Director Anolin of the Bureau of Public
Works who in turn recommended approval thereof by the Secretary of Public Works; the deed of sale was approved by
the Asst. Secretary of Public Works after a review and re-examination thereof at that level; after the approval of the
deed of sale by the higher authorities the covering voucher for payment thereof was prepared which petitioner Data
signed; petitioner Data did not know Gutierrez and had never met her during the processing and payment of her claims
(tsn, February 26, 1987, pp. 10-14, 16-24, 31-32). (At pp. 267-268, Rollo.)

On the alleged conspiracy, the Solicitor General argues:

It is respectfully submitted that the prosecution likewise has not shown any positive and convincing evidence of
conspiracy between the petitioners and their co-accused. There was no direct finding of conspiracy. Respondent Court's
inference on the alleged existence of conspiracy merely upon the purported 'pre-assigned roles (of the accused) in the
commission of the (alleged) illegal acts in question is not supported by any evidence on record. Nowhere in the
seventy- eight (78) page Decision was there any specific allusion to some or even one instance which would link either
petitioner Arias or Data to their co-accused in the planning, preparation and/or perpetration, if any, of the purported
fraud and falsifications alleged in the information That petitioners Data and Arias happened to be officials of the Pasig
District Engineering Office who signed the deed of sale and passed on pre-audit the general voucher covering the
subject sale, respectively, does hot raise any presumption or inference, that they were part of the alleged plan to
defraud the Government, as indeed there was none. It should be remembered that, as aboveshown, there was no
undue injury caused to the Government as the negotiated purchase of the Agleham property was made at the fair and
reasonable price of P80.00 per square meter.

That there were erasures and superimpositions of the words and figures of the purchase price in the deed of sale from
P1,546,240.00 to P1,520,320.00 does not prove conspiracy. It may be noted that there was a reduction in the affected
area from the estimated 19,328 square meters to 19,004 square meters as approved by the Land Registration
Commission, which resulted in the corresponding reduction in the purchase price from P1,546,240.00 to Pl,520,320.00.
The erasures in the deed of sale were simple corrections that even benefited the Government.

Moreover, contrary to the respondent Court's suspicion, there was nothing irregular in the use of the unapproved
survey plan/technical description in the deed of sale because the approval of the survey plan/ technical description was
not a prerequisite to the approval of the deed of sale. What is important is that before any payment is made by the
Government under the deed of sale the title of the seller must have already been cancelled and another one issued to
the Government incorporating therein the technical description as approved by the Land Registration Commission, as
what obtained in the instant case. (At pp. 273-275, Rollo)

We agree with the counsel for the People. There is no adequate evidence to establish the guilt of the petitioners,
Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, beyond reasonable doubt. The inadequate evidence on record is not sufficient to
sustain a conviction.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan insofar as it convicts and sentences petitioners Amado C.
Arias and Cresencio D. Data is hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioners Arias and Data are acquitted on grounds of reasonable
doubt. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:

The lone issue in these consolidated petitions for review is whether the Sandiganbayan committed a reversible error in
convicting the petitioners, Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, of having violated Section 3, paragraph (e), of the Anti
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in connection with the scandalous overpricing of land purchased by the Government as
right of way for its Mangahan Floodway Project in Pasig, Rizal. The pertinent provision of the Anti-Graft Law reads as
follows:

SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers-In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law. the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

xxxxxxxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

The amended information against them, to which they pleaded not guilty, alleged:

That on or about the period covering April, 1978 to October 1978, in Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and with
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Cresencio D. Data, being then the district Engineer of the province of
Rizal, Ministry of Public Works, and as such, headed and supervised the acquisition of private lands for the right-of-way
of the Mangahan Floodway Project of the Government at Sitio Mangahan, Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila; accused
Priscillo G. Fernando, then the Supervising Engineer of the Office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public
Works who acted as assistant of accused Cresencio D. Data in the Mangahan Floodway Project; accused Ladislao G.
Cruz, then the Senior Engineer of the Office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works, who was charged
with the acquisition of lots needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project; accused Carlos L. Jose then the Instrumentman
of the office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works who acted as the surveyor of the Mangahan
Floodway Project; accused Claudio H. Arcaya, then the Administrative Officer I of the Rizal District Engineer's Office,
Ministry of Public Works who passed upon all papers and documents pertaining to private lands acquired by the
Government for the Mangahan Floodway Project; and accused Amado C. Arias, then the Auditor of Rizal Engineering
District, Pasig, Metro Manila, who passed upon and approved in audit the acquisition as well as the payment of lands
needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project all taking advantage of their public and official positions, and conspiring,
confederating and confabulating with accused Natividad C. Gutierrez, the attorney-in-fact of Benjamin Agleham, who is
the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila and covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 0097, with accused Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. -Jose and Claudio Arias, acting with evident bad faith, while
accused Cresencio D. Data, Priscillo G. Fernando and Amado C. Arias, acting with manifest partiality in the discharge of
their official public and/or administrative functions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause undue
injury, damage and prejudice to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines by causing, allowing and/or
approving the illegal and irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds in favor of and in the name of
Benjamin P. Agleham in the amount of P1,520,320.00 under General Voucher No. 8-047, supported by a certification,
dated September 14, 1978, which was purportedly issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, and certified xerox
copies of Tax Declarations Nos. 47895 and A-018-0091 1, both in the name of Benjamin P. Agleham, and an alleged
owner's copy of Tax Declaration No. 49948, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, said supporting documents
having been falsified by the accused to make it appear that the land mentioned in the above-stated supporting papers
is a residential land with a market value of P80.00 per square meter and that 19,004 square meters thereof were
transferred in the name of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines under Tax Declaration No. 49948, when in
truth and in fact, the afore-stated land is actually a riceland with a true and actual market value of P5.00 per square
meter only and Tax Declaration No. 49948 was truly and officially registered in the names of spouses Moises Javillonar
and Sofia San Andres, not in the name of the Government, and refers to a parcel of land at Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila;
that the foregoing falsities were committed by the accused to conceal the fact that the true and actual pace of the
19,004 square meters of land of Benjamin P. Agleham, which was acquired in behalf of the Government by way of
negotiated purchase by the accused officials herein for the right of way of the Mangahan Floodway project at an
overprice of P1,520,320.00 was P92,020.00 only; and finally, upon receipt of the overpriced amount, the accused
misappropriated, converted and misapplied the excess of the true and actual value of the above-mentioned land, i.e.,
P1,428,300.00 for their own personal needs, uses and benefits, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the
amount of P1,428,300.00. (pp. 2931, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)

Priscillo Fernando did not face trial for he has remained at large, his present whereabouts being unknown (p. 48,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 75, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563).

In 1975, the Bureau of Public Works initiated the Mangahan Floodway Project to ease the perennial floods affecting the
towns of Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila. The project would traverse the northern and southern portions of Ortigas
Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila (Exhibits A and A-1). An announcement was published in leading newspapers advising
affected property owners to file their applications for payment at the District Engineer's Office (p. 29, Sandiganbayan
Decision, p. 56, Ibid.).

The implementation of the Mangahan Floodway Project was entrusted to the Pasig Engineering District headed by the
District Engineer, Cresencio Data. He formed a committee composed of Supervising Civil Engineer Priscillo Fernando, as
over-all in charge, Alfonso Mendoza and Pedro Hucom for acquisition of improvements, and Instrumentman Carlos Jose
for surveys (p. 26, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 53, Ibid.). The team was tasked to notify lot owners affected by the
project of the impending expropriation of their properties and to receive and process applications for payment.

The reclassification of all lands around the Mangahan Floodway Project was suspended in 1975 by order of the
President (p. 45, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 72, Ibid.). Implementing that order, a memorandum was sent to Data on
August 27,1976, by Public Works Director Desiderio Anolin, directing that all affected lands covered by the Mangahan
Floodway Project shall be excluded from reevaluation and reassessment (Annex A, Exh. DD, Counter-Affidavit of Data,
p. 70, Sandiganbayan Decision, P. 97, Ibid).

Among the lots affected was a 19,004-square-meter portion of a 30,169-square-meter riceland in Pasig registered in
the name of Benjamin Agleham under Original Certificate of Title No. 0097 issued on May 5, 1977 (Exh. H). The land
was previously owned by Andrea Arabit and Evaristo Gutierrez, parents of the accused Natividad Gutierrez.

After Agleham acquired the 3-hectare land in 1973 from the Gutierrez spouses, he had it subdivided into three (3) lots
under plan (LRC) Psd-278456 which was approved by the Land Registration Commission on June 1, 1978 (Entry No.
27399/12071, Exh. H). Lot 1, with an area of 19,004 square meters, is the portion that Agleham, through Natividad
Gutierrez, sold to the Government in 1978 for the Mangahan Floodway Project.

On December 15, 1973, Agleham's property, classified as a "ricefield" with an area of 3.2 hectares, was declared for
taxation under Tax Declaration No. 28246 (Exh-Y). Its assessed value was P4,800 or P0.15 per square meter (p. 10,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 37, Ibid.). On February 27, 1978, another Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. Y-1) was issued
for the same ricefield" with a revised area of 30,169 square meters. The declared market value was P150,850 (or P5 per
square meter), and the assessed value was P60,340.

Ten months later, or on December 15, 1978, Tax Declaration No. 47895 was cancelled and replaced by Tax Declaration
No. A018- 00911 (Exh. Y-2) wherein the market value of the same "ricefield," jumped to P301,690 (P10 per square
meter). Its assessed value was fixed at P120,680. The description and value of the property, according to Pedro Ocol,
the assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig, was based on the actual use of the property (riceland) not on its potential use
(p. 13, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 40, Ibid.). The valuation was based on a compilation of sales given to the Municipal
Assessor's office by the Register of Deeds, from which transactions the Assessor obtained the average valuation of the
properties in the same vicinity (p. 14, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 41, Ibid.).
Among those who filed an application for payment (Exhs. FF and FF-1) at the District Engineer's Office was the accused,
Natividad Gutierrez, who was armed with a Special Power of Attorney allegedly executed on February 24,1978 by
Benjamin Agleham in her favor (Exhs. C and C-1). She submitted a falsified xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895
(Exh. B) bearing a false date: December 15,1973 (instead of February 27, 1978) and describing Agleham's 30,169-
square-meter property as "residential" (instead of riceland), with a fair market value of P2,413,520 or P80 per square
meter (instead of P150,845 at P5 per square meter). Its assessed value appeared to be P724,056 (instead of P60,340).
Gutierrez submitted Agleham's Original Certificate of Title No. 0097 (Exh. H-1), the technical description of the
property, and a xerox copy of a "Sworn Statement of the True Current and Fair Market Value of Real Property" required
under P.D. No. 76 (Exh. 1). The xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895 was supposedly certified by the Municipal
Treasurer of Pasig, Alfredo Prudencio.

The documents supporting Agleham's claim were "examined" by the Administrative Officer, accused Claudio Arcaya,
who, after initiating them, turned them over to accused Ladislao G. Cruz, A Deed of Absolute Sale for Lot 1 (19,004
square meters valued at P80 per square meter) was prepared by Cruz who also initialed the supporting documents and
transmitted them to District Engr. Data.

On April 20,1978, the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhs. G and G-1) was signed by Data and Gutierrez (as attorney-in-fact of
Agleham). Thereafter, Data sent the papers to Director Desiderio Anolin of the Bureau of Public Works who
recommended to the Assistant Secretary of Public Works the approval of the Deed of Sale (Exh. G-1). Afterwards, the
documents were returned to Data's office for the transfer of title to the Government. On June 8, 1978, the sale was
registered and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12071 (Exh. T) was issued in the name of the Government.

General Voucher (Exh. S) No. 85-2-7809-52 dated "9/29/78" for the amount of P1,520,320 bore fourth certifications of.
(1) Cruz as Senior Civil Engineer; (2) Priscillo G. Fernando as Supervising Civil Engineer II; (3) Cresencio Data as District
Engineer II and (4) Cesar V. Franco as Project Acting Accountant (p. 56, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 83, Ibid.).

On October 23, 1978, the voucher and its supporting documents were pre-audited and approved for payment by the
accused, Amado C. Arias, as auditor of the Engineering District. The next day, October 24, 1978, sixteen (16) PNB checks
with Serial Nos. 188532 to 188547, inclusive (Exhs. X to X-1 5), for the total sum of Pl,520,320.00 were issued to
Gutierrez as payment for Agleham's 19,004-square-meter lot.

In October, 1979, an investigation was conducted by the Ministry of National Defense on the gross overpricing of
Agleham's property. During the investigation, sworn statements were taken from Alfredo Prudencio, Municipal
Treasurer of Pasig (Exh. AA), Pedro Ocol, Assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig (Exh. BB), and the accused Claudio
Arcaya (Exh. EE). Prudencio denied having issued or signed the certification dated September 14,1978 (Exh. J), attesting
that Agleham's property covered by Tax Declaration No. 47895 had a market value of P2,413,520 and that the taxes
had been paid from 1975 to 1978. Prudencio also impugned the initial (purporting to be that of his subordinate Ruben
Gatchalian, Chief of the Land Tax Division) that was affixed below Prudencio's typewritten name in Exhibit J. Both
Prudencio and Gatchalian disowned the typewritten certification. They declared that such certifications are usually
issued by their office on mimeographed forms (Exh. J-1).

Assistant Municipal Assessor Pedro Ocol produced and Identified the original or genuine Tax Declaration No. 47895
dated February 27, 1978, and a certified copy thereof (Exh. Y-1). Therein, Agleham's property of 30,169 square meters
was classified as a "ricefield" and appraised at P5 per square meter, with an assessed value of P60,340 and a market
value of PI 50,850. Ocol testified that the supposed xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. B), which Gutierrez
submitted as one of the supporting documents of the general voucher (Exh. S), was fake, because of the following tell-
tale signs:

(1) the tax declaration number was typewritten, not machine numbered as in the genuine tax declaration, Exhibit
Y;
(2) the stampmark of registration was antedated to December 15, 1973 in the fake, instead of the correct date
February 27, 1978-- in the genuine tax declaration;

(3) the classification of the property was "residential," instead of "ricefield" which is its classification in the genuine
document; and

(4) the lot was over priced at P80 per square meter in the fake tax declaration, instead of the appraised value of
only P5 per square meter appearing in the genuine declaration.

Also found to be fake was Tax Declaration No. 49948 in the name of the Republic of the Philippines (Exhs. K and K-1).
The genuine Tax Declaration No. 49948 (Exhs. U and V-2) was actually filed on October 18, 1978 in the names of the
spouses Moises Javillonar and Sofia Andres, for their 598-square-meters' residential property with a declared market
value of P51,630.

The Agleham deed of sale was pre-audited by the auditor of the Rizal Engineering District, Amado Arias, who approved
the payment of Pl,520,320 to Gutierrez without questioning the fact that the amount of the purchase price therein had
been altered, i.e., "snow-flaked (sic) and later superimposed by the amount of P1,520,320 in words and figures" (p. 71,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 98, Ibid.), nor checking the veracity of the supporting documents listed at the back of the
General Voucher (Exh. S), numbering fifteen (15) in all, among which were:

(1) the fake Tax Declaration No. 47895 showing that the value of the land was P80 per square meter (Exh. B);

(2) fake Tax Declaration No. 49948 In the name of the Republic of the Philippines (Exh. K)

(3) the forged certification of Municipal Treasurer Prudencio that the fair market value of 'the land was P100 per
square meter (Exh. J);

(4) a false certification (Exh. D) dated September 19, 1978 signed by accused Cruz, Jose, and Fernando, certifying
that the Agleham property was upon ocular inspection by them, found to be "residential;"

(5) a falsely dated certification where the original date was erased and a false date (February 15, 1978) was
superimposed (Exh.E), issued by Engr. Fernando pursuant to DPWTC Circular No. 557, certifying that he had examined
the real estate tax receipts of the Agleham property for the last three (3) years;

(6) the technical description of the land (Exhs. F and F-1) attached to the deed of sale dated April 20, 1978 was not
an approved technical description for the subdivision survey executed by Geodetic Engineer Cipriano C. Caro was
verified and approved by the Land Registration Commission on May 28,1978 only. There were "substantial variations"
noted by the Sandiganbayan between the approved technical description and the technical description of the land in
the deed of sale (p. 61, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 88, Ibid.);

(7) the special power of attorney dated February 24, 1978, supposedly given to Gutierrez by Agleham (Exhs. C, C-1)
bore a fictitious residence certificate Agleham (p. 64, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 91, Ibid.); and

(8) the fake Sworn Statement on the Current and Fair Market Value of Real Properties (Exh. Z) dated October 1,
1973, contained a forged signature of Agleham, presumably made by Gutierrez herself The Sandiganbayan observed
that Agleham's supposed signature "appears to be identical to accused Gutierrez' signatures in the General Voucher
(Exh. S), in the release and Quitclaim which she signed in favor of Agleham on July 20, 1983 (Exh. CC), and in her
affidavits (Exhs. FF and FF-1)." (pp. 64-65, Sandiganbayan Decision, pp. 91-92, Ibid.).
After payment of the Agleham claim, all the supporting documents were kept by Arias. Even after he had been replaced
by Julito Pesayco on September 1, 1981, as auditor of the Rizal Engineering District, he did not turn over the documents
to Pesayco. It was only on June 23, 1982, after this case had been filed in the Sandiganbayan and the trial had begun,
that Arias delivered them to Pesayco (Exh. T-1).

After a trial lasting nearly six years, the Sandiganbayan rendered a 78-page decision on November 16, 1987, whose
dispositive portion reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Natividad G. Gutierrez, Cresencio D. Data, Ladislao G. Cruz,
Carlos L. Jose, Claudio H. Arcaya and Amado C. Arias GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 3,
paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as ascended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and
hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for THREE (3) YEARS, as minimum to SIX (6)
YEARS, as maximum; to further suffer perpetual disqualification from public office; to indemnify jointly and severally,
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of P1,425,300, and to pay their proportional costs of
this action. (p. 104, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)

Both Arias and Data appealed.

Arias anchors his petition for review of the Sandiganbayan's decision (G.R. No. 81563) on his contention that the court's
findings that he conspired with his co-accused and that he was grossly negligent are based on misapprehension of facts,
speculation, surmise, and conjecture.

Data's main defense is that the acquisition of the Agleham property was the work of the committee of Prescillo
Fernando iii which he did not take an active part, and that the price which the government paid for it was reasonable.
Hence, it uttered no jury in the transaction.

In his consolidated brief or comment for the State, the Solicitor General recommends the acquittal of the petitioners
because the Agleham property was allegedly not grossly overpriced.

After deliberating on the petitions in these cases, we find no error in the decision under review. The Sandiganbayan did
not err in finding that the petitioners conspired with their co-accused to cause injury to the Government and to unduly
favor the lot owner, Agleham.

A conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally must be proven by a
number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances (People vs. Maralit, G.R. No. 71143, Sept. 19,1988; People vs.
Roca, G.R. No. 77779, June 27, 1988).

This case presents a conspiracy of silence and inaction where chiefs of office who should have been vigilant to protect
the interest of the Government in the purchase of Agleham's two-hectare riceland, accepted as gospel truth the
certifications of their subordinates, and approved without question the million-peso purchase which, by the standards
prevailing in 1976-78, should have pricked their curiosity and prompted them to make inquiries and to verify the
authenticity of the documents presented to them for approval. The petitioners kept silent when they should have
asked questions they looked the other way when they should have probed deep into the transaction.

Since it was too much of a coincidence that both petitioners were negligent at the same time over the same
transaction, the Sandiganbayan was justified in concluding that they connived and conspired to act in that manner to
approve the illegal transaction which would favor the seller of the land and defraud the Government.
We cannot accept Arias' excuse that because the deed of sale had been signed and the property transferred to the
Government which received a title in its name, there was nothing else for him to do but approve the voucher for
payment. The primary function of an auditor is to prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant
expenditures of government funds.

The auditorial function of an auditor, as a representative of the Commission on Audit, comprises three aspects: (1)
examination; (2) audit: and (3) settlement of the accounts, funds, financial transactions and resources of the agencies
under their respective audit jurisdiction (Sec. 43, Government Auditing Code of the Phil.). Examination, as applied to
auditing, means "to probe records, or inspect securities or other documents; review procedures, and question persons,
all for the purpose of arriving at an opinion of accuracy, propriety, sufficiency, and the like." (State Audit Code of the
Philippines, Annotated by Tantuico, 1982 Ed., p. 57.)

Arias admitted that he did not check or verify the papers supporting the general voucher that was submitted to him for
payment of Pl,520,320 to Agleham or his attorney-in-fact, Natividad Gutierrez. Arias did not question any person for the
purpose of determining the accuracy and integrity of the documents submitted to him and the reasonableness of the
price that the Government was paying for the less than two-hectare riceland. We reject his casuistic explanation that
since his subordinates had passed upon the transaction, he could assume that it was lawful and regular for, if he would
be a mere rubber stamp for his subordinates, his position as auditor would be useless and unnecessary.

We make the same observation concerning District Engineer Cresencio Data who claims innocence because he
allegedly did not take any direct and active participation in the acquisition of the Agleham property, throwing the
blame on the committee which he created, composed of Fernando, Asuncion, Mendoza, Cruz, Hucom and Jose that
negotiated with the property owners for the purchase of properties on the path of the Mangahan Floodway Project. He
in effect would hide under the skirt of the committee which he himself selected and to which he delegated the task that
was assigned to his office to identify the lots that would be traversed by the floodway project, gather and verify
documents, make surveys, negotiate with the owners for the price, prepare the deeds of sale, and process claims for
payment. By appointing the committee, he did not cease to be responsible for the implementation of the project.
Under the principle of command responsibility, he was responsible for the manner in which the committee performed
its tasks for it was he who in fact signed the deed of sale prepared by the committee. By signing the deed of sale and
certifications prepared for his signature by his committee, he in effect, made their acts his own. He is, therefore, equally
guilty with those members of the committee (Fernando, Cruz and Jose) who accepted the fake tax declarations and
made false certifications regarding the use and value of the Agleham property.

The Solicitor General has pointed out that Data signed, but did not approve, the deed of sale of Agleham's property
because the approval thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works. It should not be overlooked,
however, that Data's signature on the deed of sale was equivalent to an attestation that the transaction was fair,
honest and legal. It was he who was charged with the task of implementing the Mangahan Floodway Project within his
engineering district.

We find no merit in the Solicitor General's argument that the Agleham riceland was not overpriced because the price of
P80 per square meter fixed in the deed of sale was reasonable, hence, the petitioners are not guilty of having caused
undue injury and prejudice to the Government, nor of having given unwarranted benefits to the property owner and/or
his attorney-in-fact, Gutierrez. He further argues that the valuation in the owner's genuine tax declaration may not be
used as a standard in determining the fair market value of the property because PD Nos. 76 and 464 (making it
mandatory in expropriation cases to fix the price at the value of the property as declared by the owner, or as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower), were declared null and void by this Court in the case of Export
Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305, and other related cases.

That argument is not well taken because PD Nos. 76 and 464 (before they were nullified) applied to the expropriation
of property for public use. The acquisition of Agleham's riceland was not done by expropriation but through a
negotiated sale. In the course of the negotiations, there was absolutely no allegation nor proof that the price of P80 per
square meter was its fair market value in 1978, i.e., eleven (11) years ago. What the accused did was to prove the value
of the land through fake tax declarations (Exhs. B, F, K), false certifications (Exhs. J, D and E) and a forged sworn
statement on the current and fair market value of the real property (Exh. Z) submitted by the accused in support of the
deed of sale. Because fraudulent documents were used, it may not be said that the State agreed to pay the price on the
basis of its fairness, for the Government was in fact deceived concerning the reasonable value of the land.

When Ocol testified in 1983 that P80 was a reasonable valuation for the Agleham's land, he did not clarify that was also
its reasonable value in 1975, before real estate values in Pasig soared as a result of the implementation of the
Mangahan Floodway Project. Hence, Ocol's testimony was insufficient to rebut the valuation in Agleham's genuine
1978 Tax Declaration No. 47895 that the fair valuation of the riceland then was only P5 per square meter. A Tax
Declaration is a guide or indicator of the reasonable value of the property (EPZA vs. Dulay, supra).

The petitioner's partiality for Agleham/Gutierrez may be inferred from their having deliberately closed their eyes to the
defects and irregularities of the transaction in his favor and their seeming neglect, if not deliberate omission, to check,
the authenticity of the documents presented to them for approval. Since partiality is a mental state or predilection, in
the absence of direct evidence, it may be proved by the attendant circumstance instances.

WHEREFORE, I vote to affirm in toto the decision of the Sandiganbayan in SB Crim. Case No. 2010, with costs against
the petitioners, Amado Arias and Cresencio Data.

Feliciano, Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:

The lone issue in these consolidated petitions for review is whether the Sandiganbayan committed a reversible error in
convicting the petitioners, Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, of having violated Section 3, paragraph (e), of the Anti
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in connection with the scandalous overpricing of land purchased by the Government as
right of way for its Mangahan Floodway Project in Pasig, Rizal. The pertinent provision of the Anti-Graft Law reads as
follows:

SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers-In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law. the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

xxxxxxxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

The amended information against them, to which they pleaded not guilty, alleged:

That on or about the period covering April, 1978 to October 1978, in Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and with
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Cresencio D. Data, being then the district Engineer of the province of
Rizal, Ministry of Public Works, and as such, headed and supervised the acquisition of private lands for the right-of-way
of the Mangahan Floodway Project of the Government at Sitio Mangahan, Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila; accused
Priscillo G. Fernando, then the Supervising Engineer of the Office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public
Works who acted as assistant of accused Cresencio D. Data in the Mangahan Floodway Project; accused Ladislao G.
Cruz, then the Senior Engineer of the Office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works, who was charged
with the acquisition of lots needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project; accused Carlos L. Jose then the Instrumentman
of the office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works who acted as the surveyor of the Mangahan
Floodway Project; accused Claudio H. Arcaya, then the Administrative Officer I of the Rizal District Engineer's Office,
Ministry of Public Works who passed upon all papers and documents pertaining to private lands acquired by the
Government for the Mangahan Floodway Project; and accused Amado C. Arias, then the Auditor of Rizal Engineering
District, Pasig, Metro Manila, who passed upon and approved in audit the acquisition as well as the payment of lands
needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project all taking advantage of their public and official positions, and conspiring,
confederating and confabulating with accused Natividad C. Gutierrez, the attorney-in-fact of Benjamin Agleham, who is
the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila and covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 0097, with accused Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. -Jose and Claudio Arias, acting with evident bad faith, while
accused Cresencio D. Data, Priscillo G. Fernando and Amado C. Arias, acting with manifest partiality in the discharge of
their official public and/or administrative functions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause undue
injury, damage and prejudice to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines by causing, allowing and/or
approving the illegal and irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds in favor of and in the name of
Benjamin P. Agleham in the amount of P1,520,320.00 under General Voucher No. 8-047, supported by a certification,
dated September 14, 1978, which was purportedly issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, and certified xerox
copies of Tax Declarations Nos. 47895 and A-018-0091 1, both in the name of Benjamin P. Agleham, and an alleged
owner's copy of Tax Declaration No. 49948, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, said supporting documents
having been falsified by the accused to make it appear that the land mentioned in the above-stated supporting papers
is a residential land with a market value of P80.00 per square meter and that 19,004 square meters thereof were
transferred in the name of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines under Tax Declaration No. 49948, when in
truth and in fact, the afore-stated land is actually a riceland with a true and actual market value of P5.00 per square
meter only and Tax Declaration No. 49948 was truly and officially registered in the names of spouses Moises Javillonar
and Sofia San Andres, not in the name of the Government, and refers to a parcel of land at Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila;
that the foregoing falsities were committed by the accused to conceal the fact that the true and actual pace of the
19,004 square meters of land of Benjamin P. Agleham, which was acquired in behalf of the Government by way of
negotiated purchase by the accused officials herein for the right of way of the Mangahan Floodway project at an
overprice of P1,520,320.00 was P92,020.00 only; and finally, upon receipt of the overpriced amount, the accused
misappropriated, converted and misapplied the excess of the true and actual value of the above-mentioned land, i.e.,
P1,428,300.00 for their own personal needs, uses and benefits, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the
amount of P1,428,300.00. (pp. 2931, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)

Priscillo Fernando did not face trial for he has remained at large, his present whereabouts being unknown (p. 48,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 75, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563).

In 1975, the Bureau of Public Works initiated the Mangahan Floodway Project to ease the perennial floods affecting the
towns of Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila. The project would traverse the northern and southern portions of Ortigas
Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila (Exhibits A and A-1). An announcement was published in leading newspapers advising
affected property owners to file their applications for payment at the District Engineer's Office (p. 29, Sandiganbayan
Decision, p. 56, Ibid.).

The implementation of the Mangahan Floodway Project was entrusted to the Pasig Engineering District headed by the
District Engineer, Cresencio Data. He formed a committee composed of Supervising Civil Engineer Priscillo Fernando, as
over-all in charge, Alfonso Mendoza and Pedro Hucom for acquisition of improvements, and Instrumentman Carlos Jose
for surveys (p. 26, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 53, Ibid.). The team was tasked to notify lot owners affected by the
project of the impending expropriation of their properties and to receive and process applications for payment.

The reclassification of all lands around the Mangahan Floodway Project was suspended in 1975 by order of the
President (p. 45, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 72, Ibid.). Implementing that order, a memorandum was sent to Data on
August 27,1976, by Public Works Director Desiderio Anolin, directing that all affected lands covered by the Mangahan
Floodway Project shall be excluded from reevaluation and reassessment (Annex A, Exh. DD, Counter-Affidavit of Data,
p. 70, Sandiganbayan Decision, P. 97, Ibid).
Among the lots affected was a 19,004-square-meter portion of a 30,169-square-meter riceland in Pasig registered in
the name of Benjamin Agleham under Original Certificate of Title No. 0097 issued on May 5, 1977 (Exh. H). The land
was previously owned by Andrea Arabit and Evaristo Gutierrez, parents of the accused Natividad Gutierrez.

After Agleham acquired the 3-hectare land in 1973 from the Gutierrez spouses, he had it subdivided into three (3) lots
under plan (LRC) Psd-278456 which was approved by the Land Registration Commission on June 1, 1978 (Entry No.
27399/12071, Exh. H). Lot 1, with an area of 19,004 square meters, is the portion that Agleham, through Natividad
Gutierrez, sold to the Government in 1978 for the Mangahan Floodway Project.

On December 15, 1973, Agleham's property, classified as a "ricefield" with an area of 3.2 hectares, was declared for
taxation under Tax Declaration No. 28246 (Exh-Y). Its assessed value was P4,800 or P0.15 per square meter (p. 10,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 37, Ibid.). On February 27, 1978, another Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. Y-1) was issued
for the same ricefield" with a revised area of 30,169 square meters. The declared market value was P150,850 (or P5 per
square meter), and the assessed value was P60,340.

Ten months later, or on December 15, 1978, Tax Declaration No. 47895 was cancelled and replaced by Tax Declaration
No. A018- 00911 (Exh. Y-2) wherein the market value of the same "ricefield," jumped to P301,690 (P10 per square
meter). Its assessed value was fixed at P120,680. The description and value of the property, according to Pedro Ocol,
the assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig, was based on the actual use of the property (riceland) not on its potential use
(p. 13, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 40, Ibid.). The valuation was based on a compilation of sales given to the Municipal
Assessor's office by the Register of Deeds, from which transactions the Assessor obtained the average valuation of the
properties in the same vicinity (p. 14, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 41, Ibid.).

Among those who filed an application for payment (Exhs. FF and FF-1) at the District Engineer's Office was the accused,
Natividad Gutierrez, who was armed with a Special Power of Attorney allegedly executed on February 24,1978 by
Benjamin Agleham in her favor (Exhs. C and C-1). She submitted a falsified xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895
(Exh. B) bearing a false date: December 15,1973 (instead of February 27, 1978) and describing Agleham's 30,169-
square-meter property as "residential" (instead of riceland), with a fair market value of P2,413,520 or P80 per square
meter (instead of P150,845 at P5 per square meter). Its assessed value appeared to be P724,056 (instead of P60,340).
Gutierrez submitted Agleham's Original Certificate of Title No. 0097 (Exh. H-1), the technical description of the
property, and a xerox copy of a "Sworn Statement of the True Current and Fair Market Value of Real Property" required
under P.D. No. 76 (Exh. 1). The xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895 was supposedly certified by the Municipal
Treasurer of Pasig, Alfredo Prudencio.

The documents supporting Agleham's claim were "examined" by the Administrative Officer, accused Claudio Arcaya,
who, after initiating them, turned them over to accused Ladislao G. Cruz, A Deed of Absolute Sale for Lot 1 (19,004
square meters valued at P80 per square meter) was prepared by Cruz who also initialed the supporting documents and
transmitted them to District Engr. Data.

On April 20,1978, the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhs. G and G-1) was signed by Data and Gutierrez (as attorney-in-fact of
Agleham). Thereafter, Data sent the papers to Director Desiderio Anolin of the Bureau of Public Works who
recommended to the Assistant Secretary of Public Works the approval of the Deed of Sale (Exh. G-1). Afterwards, the
documents were returned to Data's office for the transfer of title to the Government. On June 8, 1978, the sale was
registered and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12071 (Exh. T) was issued in the name of the Government.

General Voucher (Exh. S) No. 85-2-7809-52 dated "9/29/78" for the amount of P1,520,320 bore fourth certifications of.
(1) Cruz as Senior Civil Engineer; (2) Priscillo G. Fernando as Supervising Civil Engineer II; (3) Cresencio Data as District
Engineer II and (4) Cesar V. Franco as Project Acting Accountant (p. 56, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 83, Ibid.).

On October 23, 1978, the voucher and its supporting documents were pre-audited and approved for payment by the
accused, Amado C. Arias, as auditor of the Engineering District. The next day, October 24, 1978, sixteen (16) PNB checks
with Serial Nos. 188532 to 188547, inclusive (Exhs. X to X-1 5), for the total sum of Pl,520,320.00 were issued to
Gutierrez as payment for Agleham's 19,004-square-meter lot.

In October, 1979, an investigation was conducted by the Ministry of National Defense on the gross overpricing of
Agleham's property. During the investigation, sworn statements were taken from Alfredo Prudencio, Municipal
Treasurer of Pasig (Exh. AA), Pedro Ocol, Assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig (Exh. BB), and the accused Claudio
Arcaya (Exh. EE). Prudencio denied having issued or signed the certification dated September 14,1978 (Exh. J), attesting
that Agleham's property covered by Tax Declaration No. 47895 had a market value of P2,413,520 and that the taxes
had been paid from 1975 to 1978. Prudencio also impugned the initial (purporting to be that of his subordinate Ruben
Gatchalian, Chief of the Land Tax Division) that was affixed below Prudencio's typewritten name in Exhibit J. Both
Prudencio and Gatchalian disowned the typewritten certification. They declared that such certifications are usually
issued by their office on mimeographed forms (Exh. J-1).

Assistant Municipal Assessor Pedro Ocol produced and Identified the original or genuine Tax Declaration No. 47895
dated February 27, 1978, and a certified copy thereof (Exh. Y-1). Therein, Agleham's property of 30,169 square meters
was classified as a "ricefield" and appraised at P5 per square meter, with an assessed value of P60,340 and a market
value of PI 50,850. Ocol testified that the supposed xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. B), which Gutierrez
submitted as one of the supporting documents of the general voucher (Exh. S), was fake, because of the following tell-
tale signs:

(1) the tax declaration number was typewritten, not machine numbered as in the genuine tax declaration, Exhibit
Y;

(2) the stampmark of registration was antedated to December 15, 1973 in the fake, instead of the correct date
February 27, 1978-- in the genuine tax declaration;

(3) the classification of the property was "residential," instead of "ricefield" which is its classification in the genuine
document; and

(4) the lot was over priced at P80 per square meter in the fake tax declaration, instead of the appraised value of
only P5 per square meter appearing in the genuine declaration.

Also found to be fake was Tax Declaration No. 49948 in the name of the Republic of the Philippines (Exhs. K and K-1).
The genuine Tax Declaration No. 49948 (Exhs. U and V-2) was actually filed on October 18, 1978 in the names of the
spouses Moises Javillonar and Sofia Andres, for their 598-square-meters' residential property with a declared market
value of P51,630.

The Agleham deed of sale was pre-audited by the auditor of the Rizal Engineering District, Amado Arias, who approved
the payment of Pl,520,320 to Gutierrez without questioning the fact that the amount of the purchase price therein had
been altered, i.e., "snow-flaked (sic) and later superimposed by the amount of P1,520,320 in words and figures" (p. 71,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 98, Ibid.), nor checking the veracity of the supporting documents listed at the back of the
General Voucher (Exh. S), numbering fifteen (15) in all, among which were:

(1) the fake Tax Declaration No. 47895 showing that the value of the land was P80 per square meter (Exh. B);

(2) fake Tax Declaration No. 49948 In the name of the Republic of the Philippines (Exh. K)

(3) the forged certification of Municipal Treasurer Prudencio that the fair market value of 'the land was P100 per
square meter (Exh. J);
(4) a false certification (Exh. D) dated September 19, 1978 signed by accused Cruz, Jose, and Fernando, certifying
that the Agleham property was upon ocular inspection by them, found to be "residential;"

(5) a falsely dated certification where the original date was erased and a false date (February 15, 1978) was
superimposed (Exh.E), issued by Engr. Fernando pursuant to DPWTC Circular No. 557, certifying that he had examined
the real estate tax receipts of the Agleham property for the last three (3) years;

(6) the technical description of the land (Exhs. F and F-1) attached to the deed of sale dated April 20, 1978 was not
an approved technical description for the subdivision survey executed by Geodetic Engineer Cipriano C. Caro was
verified and approved by the Land Registration Commission on May 28,1978 only. There were "substantial variations"
noted by the Sandiganbayan between the approved technical description and the technical description of the land in
the deed of sale (p. 61, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 88, Ibid.);

(7) the special power of attorney dated February 24, 1978, supposedly given to Gutierrez by Agleham (Exhs. C, C-1)
bore a fictitious residence certificate Agleham (p. 64, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 91, Ibid.); and

(8) the fake Sworn Statement on the Current and Fair Market Value of Real Properties (Exh. Z) dated October 1,
1973, contained a forged signature of Agleham, presumably made by Gutierrez herself The Sandiganbayan observed
that Agleham's supposed signature "appears to be Identical to accused Gutierrez' signatures in the General Voucher
(Exh. S), in the release and Quitclaim which she signed in favor of Agleham on July 20, 1983 (Exh. CC), and in her
affidavits (Exhs. FF and FF-1)." (pp. 64-65, Sandiganbayan Decision, pp. 91-92, Ibid.).

After payment of the Agleham claim, all the supporting documents were kept by Arias. Even after he had been replaced
by Julito Pesayco on September 1, 1981, as auditor of the Rizal Engineering District, he did not turn over the documents
to Pesayco. It was only on June 23, 1982, after this case had been filed in the Sandiganbayan and the trial had begun,
that Arias delivered them to Pesayco (Exh. T-1).

After a trial lasting nearly six years, the Sandiganbayan rendered a 78-page decision on November 16, 1987, whose
dispositive portion reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Natividad G. Gutierrez, Cresencio D. Data, Ladislao G. Cruz,
Carlos L. Jose, Claudio H. Arcaya and Amado C. Arias GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 3,
paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as ascended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and
hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for THREE (3) YEARS, as minimum to SIX (6)
YEARS, as maximum; to further suffer perpetual disqualification from public office; to indemnify jointly and severally,
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of P1,425,300, and to pay their proportional costs of
this action. (p. 104, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)

Both Arias and Data appealed.

Arias anchors his petition for review of the Sandiganbayan's decision (G.R. No. 81563) on his contention that the court's
findings that he conspired with his co-accused and that he was grossly negligent are based on misapprehension of facts,
speculation, surmise, and conjecture.

Data's main defense is that the acquisition of the Agleham property was the work of the committee of Prescillo
Fernando iii which he did not take an active part, and that the price which the government paid for it was reasonable.
Hence, it uttered no jury in the transaction.
In his consolidated brief or comment for the State, the Solicitor General recommends the acquittal of the petitioners
because the Agleham property was allegedly not grossly overpriced.

After deliberating on the petitions in these cases, we find no error in the decision under review. The Sandiganbayan did
not err in finding that the petitioners conspired with their co-accused to cause injury to the Government and to unduly
favor the lot owner, Agleham.

A conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally must be proven by a
number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances (People vs. Maralit, G.R. No. 71143, Sept. 19,1988; People vs.
Roca, G.R. No. 77779, June 27, 1988).

This case presents a conspiracy of silence and inaction where chiefs of office who should have been vigilant to protect
the interest of the Government in the purchase of Agleham's two-hectare riceland, accepted as gospel truth the
certifications of their subordinates, and approved without question the million-peso purchase which, by the standards
prevailing in 1976-78, should have pricked their curiosity and prompted them to make inquiries and to verify the
authenticity of the documents presented to them for approval. The petitioners kept silent when they should have
asked questions they looked the other way when they should have probed deep into the transaction.

Since it was too much of a coincidence that both petitioners were negligent at the same time over the same
transaction, the Sandiganbayan was justified in concluding that they connived and conspired to act in that manner to
approve the illegal transaction which would favor the seller of the land and defraud the Government.

We cannot accept Arias' excuse that because the deed of sale had been signed and the property transferred to the
Government which received a title in its name, there was nothing else for him to do but approve the voucher for
payment. The primary function of an auditor is to prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant
expenditures of government funds.

The auditorial function of an auditor, as a representative of the Commission on Audit, comprises three aspects: (1)
examination; (2) audit: and (3) settlement of the accounts, funds, financial transactions and resources of the agencies
under their respective audit jurisdiction (Sec. 43, Government Auditing Code of the Phil.). Examination, as applied to
auditing, means "to probe records, or inspect securities or other documents; review procedures, and question persons,
all for the purpose of arriving at an opinion of accuracy, propriety, sufficiency, and the like." (State Audit Code of the
Philippines, Annotated by Tantuico, 1982 Ed., p. 57.)

Arias admitted that he did not check or verify the papers supporting the general voucher that was submitted to him for
payment of Pl,520,320 to Agleham or his attorney-in-fact, Natividad Gutierrez. Arias did not question any person for the
purpose of determining the accuracy and integrity of the documents submitted to him and the reasonableness of the
price that the Government was paying for the less than two-hectare riceland. We reject his casuistic explanation that
since his subordinates had passed upon the transaction, he could assume that it was lawful and regular for, if he would
be a mere rubber stamp for his subordinates, his position as auditor would be useless and unnecessary.

We make the same observation concerning District Engineer Cresencio Data who claims innocence because he
allegedly did not take any direct and active participation in the acquisition of the Agleham property, throwing the
blame on the committee which he created, composed of Fernando, Asuncion, Mendoza, Cruz, Hucom and Jose that
negotiated with the property owners for the purchase of properties on the path of the Mangahan Floodway Project. He
in effect would hide under the skirt of the committee which he himself selected and to which he delegated the task that
was assigned to his office to Identify the lots that would be traversed by the floodway project, gather and verify
documents, make surveys, negotiate with the owners for the price, prepare the deeds of sale, and process claims for
payment. By appointing the committee, he did not cease to be responsible for the implementation of the project.
Under the principle of command responsibility, he was responsible for the manner in which the committee performed
its tasks for it was he who in fact signed the deed of sale prepared by the committee. By signing the deed of sale and
certifications prepared for his signature by his committee, he in effect, made their acts his own. He is, therefore, equally
guilty with those members of the committee (Fernando, Cruz and Jose) who accepted the fake tax declarations and
made false certifications regarding the use and value of the Agleham property.

The Solicitor General has pointed out that Data signed, but did not approve, the deed of sale of Agleham's property
because the approval thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works. It should not be overlooked,
however, that Data's signature on the deed of sale was equivalent to an attestation that the transaction was fair,
honest and legal. It was he who was charged with the task of implementing the Mangahan Floodway Project within his
engineering district.

We find no merit in the Solicitor General's argument that the Agleham riceland was not overpriced because the price of
P80 per square meter fixed in the deed of sale was reasonable, hence, the petitioners are not guilty of having caused
undue injury and prejudice to the Government, nor of having given unwarranted benefits to the property owner and/or
his attorney-in-fact, Gutierrez. He further argues that the valuation in the owner's genuine tax declaration may not be
used as a standard in determining the fair market value of the property because PD Nos. 76 and 464 (making it
mandatory in expropriation cases to fix the price at the value of the property as declared by the owner, or as
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower), were declared null and void by this Court in the case of Export
Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305, and other related cases.

That argument is not well taken because PD Nos. 76 and 464 (before they were nullified) applied to the expropriation
of property for public use. The acquisition of Agleham's riceland was not done by expropriation but through a
negotiated sale. In the course of the negotiations, there was absolutely no allegation nor proof that the price of P80 per
square meter was its fair market value in 1978, i.e., eleven (11) years ago. What the accused did was to prove the value
of the land through fake tax declarations (Exhs. B, F, K), false certifications (Exhs. J, D and E) and a forged sworn
statement on the current and fair market value of the real property (Exh. Z) submitted by the accused in support of the
deed of sale. Because fraudulent documents were used, it may not be said that the State agreed to pay the price on the
basis of its fairness, for the Government was in fact deceived concerning the reasonable value of the land.

When Ocol testified in 1983 that P80 was a reasonable valuation for the Agleham's land, he did not clarify that was also
its reasonable value in 1975, before real estate values in Pasig soared as a result of the implementation of the
Mangahan Floodway Project. Hence, Ocol's testimony was insufficient to rebut the valuation in Agleham's genuine
1978 Tax Declaration No. 47895 that the fair valuation of the riceland then was only P5 per square meter. A Tax
Declaration is a guide or indicator of the reasonable value of the property (EPZA vs. Dulay, supra).

The petitioner's partiality for Agleham/Gutierrez may be inferred from their having deliberately closed their eyes to the
defects and irregularities of the transaction in his favor and their seeming neglect, if not deliberate omission, to check,
the authenticity of the documents presented to them for approval. Since partiality is a mental state or predilection, in
the absence of direct evidence, it may be proved by the attendant circumstance instances.

WHEREFORE, I vote to affirm in toto the decision of the Sandiganbayan in SB Crim. Case No. 2010, with costs against
the petitioners, Amado Arias and Cresencio Data.
G.R. No. 126557 - March 6, 2001

RAMON ALBERT, petitioner, v. CELSO D. GANGAN, in his capacity as Chairman, Commission on Audit, ROGELIO
ESPIRITU, in his capacity as Commissioner, Commission on Audit, SOFRONIO URSAL, in his capacity as Commissioner,
Commission on Audit, EMMA M. ESPINA, in her capacity as Director, Commission on Audit, and LAKAMBINI RAZON, in
her capacity as Then Resident Auditor for National Home Mortgage Finance Corp., respondents.

BUENA, J.:

This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify Commission on Audit (COA) Decision No. 2700 dated February 19, 1993,
finding petitioner, then President of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), liable for the amount
of P36,796,711.55 covering the payment of the loan proceeds for the lot acquired by the Alyansang Maka-Maralitang
Asosasyon at Kapatirang Organisasyon (AMAKO) which was disallowed in audit.

The facts are undisputed:

The Housing and Urban Development Coordination Council (HUDCC) together with the Presidential Commission for
Urban Poor (PCUP), NHMFC, and Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation (HIGC) formed an inter-agency committee to
conceptualize and prepare the guidelines and procedures for the Community Mortgage Program (CMP),1 a sub-
program of the Unified Home Lending Program (UHLP). The CMP is an innovative scheme in mortgage financing where
an undivided tract of land may be acquired by several beneficiaries through the concept of community ownership. It
was adopted to assist residents of blighted or depressed areas to initially own the lots they occupy, and, eventually, to
build a decent house thereon to the extent of their affordability within the concept of low-cost-home financing and
after due compensation to the landowner. The beneficiaries of the financing shall then form or establish an association,
or cooperative, duly registered with appropriate governmental agencies and accredited with the PCUP. Under the
financing procedure of the CMP, an application of an association for a loan is coursed through duly accredited
originators, such as the National Housing Authority (NHA), and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs).2

On August 20, 1988, the NHMFC Board issued Resolution No. 419, Series of 1988, approved the CMP.3

On December 19, 1988, Carlos P. Doble, then Vice President of HIGC, issued an appraisal policy for the CMP which was
concurred in by the HIGC President, Federico Gonzales, herein petitioner, NHMFC OIC/EVP, and HUDC Teodoro
Katigbak.4 On the same date, Doble likewise issued to HIGC Technical Service Department personnel the Appraisal
Policy for the CMP.5

On April 12, 1989, the NHMFC board issued Resolution No. 546, Series of 1989, approving the amended/expanded
guidelines for CMP.6

On April 4,1989, the Sapang Palay Community Development Foundation Inc., (Foundation) applied for accreditation
with the NHMFC as originator of land and housing project through a Purchase Commitment Line. The application
consists of sixteen (16) project sites situated in different parts of the country. Among these is the AMAKO Project which
was submitted for accreditation to the NHMFC by Nelson Concepcion, President of the Foundation. The AMAKO project
refers to seventy-three (73) hectares of land located at Sta. Catalina, Angeles City, which was offered by Severino H.
Gonzales, Jr. Construction, Co, Inc. (SHGCCI), through its shareholder, Engineer Ceres Pajaron, to the members of
AMAKO. Mr. Concepcion who was also the concurrent head of the PCUP's Housing and Settlement Division, delivered
on September 7, 1989, to the CMP Unit - then under Mortgage Takeout Department (MROD)-HMFC - the project
documents of AMAKO for pre-evaluation which were returned to the Foundation on September 22, 1989 by the CMP
unit.

On October 4, 1989, Mr. Concepcion submitted an application for Purchase Commitment Line in the amount of
P36,794,250.00, specifically for the AMAKO project together with an Information Sheet of the Foundation, the AMAKO
project profile, and the Department of Agrarian Reform certification dated December 4, 1988. On the same day, Mr.
Generozo Cruz, Foundation Vice President and PCUP Director, redelivered the documents to the CMP unit to discuss
the Foundation's proposal on the AMAKO project.

On October 5, 1989, the Officer-in-charge of the Credit and Collection Group, NHMFC, recommended to petitioner the
grant of an additional line in favor of Sapang Palay Community Development Foundation, Inc., in the total amount of
P36,8000,000.007 - approved by the NHMFC Credit Committee on October 13, 1989 - subject, however, to the approval
of the NHMFC Board.

On December 14, 1989, the NHMFC, upon the recommendation of the CMP Task Force, together with the Certification
of Mortgage Examinations,8 issued a Letter of Guaranty in favor of SHGCCI.9 Thereafter, the disbursement voucher (No.
89F2-5732) was prepared by the CMP Task Force in favor of SHGCCI.10 Mr. Rogelio Olaguer, head of the CMP Task
Force, likewise inspected the project site and assured petitioner that the project is above board and in accordance with
the NHMFC-CMP guidelines. With this assurance, petitioner approved the payment to the SHGCCI. Thus, on January 4,
1990, the amount of P36,796,711.55 under Philippine National Bank - Land Bank of the Philippines Check No. 362994,
was released to Engineer Severino A. Gonzales, Jr. of the SHGCCI.11

Sometime in June 1990, petitioner instructed the Community Mortgage Management Office (CMMO) to conduct a
routine inspection of the AMAKO Project. Upon verification, it was discovered that the AMAKO project was three (3)
months in arrears in their amortization. As a consequence, petitioner, sometime in July 1990, tasked the Committee on
Evaluation of Originating Institutions to investigate the originators with respect to their compliance with corporate
circulars, other rules and regulations issued by NHMFC regarding its lending programs. One of the originators
investigated was the Foundation which was instrumental in the granting of the loan to the AMAKO Project.12
On September 3, 1990, the COA Resident Auditor of NHMFC disallowed the loan granted to the AMAKO Project for the
following reasons: (a) non-submission of documentary requirements/non-complying or defective documents as
required under NHMFC Corporate Circular No. CMP-001; and (b) irregular/excessive expenditures per COA Circular No.
85-55A dated September 8, 1985. The Auditor determined the following officers of NHMFC, as personally liable, viz.:
petitioner as President; Fermin T. Arzaga, OIC, Finance, Corpan & Computer Services Group; Roger Olaguer, Head, CMP
Task Force; Vivien Noble, Deputy Head, CMP Task Force; Ernesto Salvador, Executive Asst. CMP Task Force; Cynthia O.
Alas, Div. Chief II, Budget and Irma Fuentes, COD, CMMO.13

On September 18, 1990, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman a letter-complaint against his subordinate employees
who appeared to be responsible for the fraud with respect to the AMAKO loan transaction.14 However, said complaint
was withdrawn by petitioner's successor, Acting President Florentino Mauricio, and re-filed with the Civil Service
Commission on August 5, 1991. Petitioner also filed a civil case for sum of money, annulment, damages and attorney's
fees with preliminary attachment, against SHGCCI, AMAKO, Sapang Palay & Development Foundation, Inc., and other
persons responsible for the misrepresentation, tortious and fraudulent acts in connection with the loan granted to
AMAKO project.15 The complaint was subsequently amended to include Rogelio Olaguer, Ernesto S. Salvador and
Vivien Noble, who are employees of NHMFC, and Eugenio M. Cunanan, Jr. of HIGC.16

On October 19, 1990, petitioner requested for the lifting of the disallowance on the loan grant to AMAKO17 which was
denied on October 25, 1990. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration which was elevated to the COA Corporate Audit
Office pursuant to Section 65 of PD 1445.18

On February 19, 1993, the COA rendered Decision No. 2700, finding petitioner as among the persons liable for the
amount representing the payment of the loan proceeds obtained by AMAKO. COA disallowed the plan payment
because it found the payment irregular and an excessive expenditure, and held petitioner primarily liable pursuant to
Section 103 of P.D. 1445.19

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the above-mentioned decision was denied on August 29, 1996 per COA
Decision No. 96-484,20 excerpts of which reads:

"x x x - x x x - x x x

"In a motion for reconsideration dated April 6, 1993, Mr. Albert, thru Counsel, contended that he (Mr. Albert) cannot
and should not be held personally liable for the amount of the loan as he acted only in the performance of his official
duties and that there was no clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence on his part.

"This Commission finds the explanation or justification devoid of merit. It is significant to note that Mr. Albert himself
was the final approving authority of the transaction in question and that the officers/employees who processed the
same were directly under his supervision. The CMP Task Force created in his very own office provides a situation where
he could have conclusively determined the validity of a transaction involving such large amount as P36,796,711.55.

"Likewise, this Commission cannot with expediency exculpate Mr. Albert from liability by accepting his claim of good
faith and exercise of due diligence, otherwise this principle would be rendered worthless. Good faith and exercise of
due diligence are disputable presumptions, and these presumptions are overcome by evidence of specific acts
constituting an offense, as where there exists the fact that loss of government funds resulted from official action.
Besides, Section 3 (9) of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) declares to be unlawful the act of 'entering, in behalf of the
Government, into contract or transaction manifestly or grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby.'"

Aggrieved, petitioner now comes to this Court contending that he cannot be held personally liable for the amount of
P36,796,11.55 representing the loan proceeds to AMAKO, because the questioned COA decisions do not have any
findings that he has knowingly participated in the alleged fraudulent transaction. He claims that there is no clear
showing that he acted in bad faith, with malice, or gross negligence when he approved the loan transaction. The
approval of the loan was based on the certification of the duly authorized officers of the Community Mortgage Program
Task Force.

While the petition is pending , NHMFC filed a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage against
AMAKO which was represented by its president, Mr. Mario J. Mamawan, before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City
docketed as FC Case No. 98-10.

On March 31, 1998, the property was sold at public auction with NHMFC as the highest bidder. A Certificate of Sale was
subsequently issued in favor of NHMFC.21

The AMAKO property was then published and offered for sale three times in April 1999, and once in May 1999, but with
no bidder. The property was then offered under the negotiated sale of rights over foreclosed property offer of which
was published in June 1999.

In response to the published offer, VIVE EAGLE LAND, INC. (VIVE) offered to purchase the property for P40,000,000.00.

On October 21, 1999, the Board of Directors of the NHMFC approved the sale22 in favor of VIVE per its Resolution No.
2998 Series of 1999.23 The sale was confirmed on November 18, 1999.24

We find the petition meritorious.

The mere fact that a public officer is the head of an agency does not necessarily mean that he is the party ultimately
liable in case of disallowance of expenses for questionable transactions of his agency. Petitioner, as head of the agency,
cannot be held personally liable for the disallowance simply because he was the final approving authority of the
transaction in question and that the officers/employees who processed the same were directly under his supervision.25
Though not impossible, it would be improbable for him to check all the details and conduct physical inspection and
verification of the application of AMAKO considering the voluminous paperwork attendant to his office. He has to rely
mainly on the certifications, recommendations and memoranda of his subordinates in approving the loan. The
processing, review and evaluation of the loan application passed through the responsible and authorized officers of the
CMP Task Force. As admitted by the Director of the Corporate Audit Office, Emma M. Espina, the officers of the CMP
Task Force erred in discharging these assigned duties.26 Moreover, the high appraisal of the subject property cannot be
attributed to herein petitioner because the valuation of the said property is undertaken by the HIGC,27 an entity
separate and distinct from the NHMFC and over which petitioner exercises no control or supervision.

We have consistently held that every person who signs or initials documents in the course of transit through standard
operating procedures does not automatically become a conspirator in a crime which transpired at a stage where he had
no participation. His knowledge of the conspiracy and his active and knowing participation therein must be proved by
positive evidence. The fact that such officer signs or initials a voucher as it is going the rounds does not necessarily
follow that the said person becomes part of a conspiracy in an illegal scheme. The guilt beyond reasonable doubt of
each supposed conspirator must be established.28 Thus, in Pareño vs. Sandiganbayan29 we held that:

"It is rather apparent that under the Sandiganbayan's decision, a department secretary, bureau chief, commission
chairman, agency head, department head or chief of office would be equally culpable of every crime arising from
transactions or held guilty of conspiracy simply because he was the last of a long line of officials or employees who
acted upon or affixed their signatures to a transaction. We cannot allow this because guilt must be premised on a more
knowing personal and deliberate participation of each individual who is charged with others as part of a conspiracy.
There must be more convincing proof which in this case is wanting." (Underscoring Supplied)
The rationale behind this ruling is best enunciated in the early case of Arias vs. Sandiganbayan30 where we
emphatically ruled:

"We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems- dishonest or negligent
subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence- is suddenly swept into a conspiracy
conviction simply because he did not personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from
inception and investigate the motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final
approving authority.

"x x x - x x x - x x x

"We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents, received procedures and
questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office could personally do all these things in all
vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a
reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter
into negotiations. If a department secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call
the restaurant about the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was present at the luncheon, inquire
whether the correct amount of food was served, and otherwise personally look into the reimbursement voucher's
accuracy, propriety and sufficiency. There has to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such
detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that
must be signed. There are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers that routinely
pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or departments is even more appalling.

"There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy
charge and conviction." (Italics Supplied)

Additionally, the assailed decision failed to mention petitioner's direct participation in the fraudulent scheme. It merely
held that petitioner be immediately and primarily held responsible for the disallowance, for the simple reason that, as
the approving officer, any transaction presented to him for approval is subject to his discretion. His reliance on the
supposed review and evaluation done by his subordinates is also discretionary on his part. The COA concluded that
whatever misrepresentation and/or abuse in the performance of their duties made by the subordinates make
petitioner, as head of the agency, also liable, considering that these people acted on his behalf and with his approval.31
Such reasoning is non-sequitur.

Section 103 of Presidential Decree No. 1445,32 which was the basis of petitioner's liability for the disallowance,
expressly provides:

"Sec. 103 General liability for unauthorized expenditures. - expenditures of government funds or uses of government
property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to be directly
responsible therefor." (Italics Ours)

Under the said provision, an official or employee shall be personally liable for unauthorized expenditures if the
following requisites are present, to wit: (a) there must be an expenditure of government funds or use of government
property; (b) the expenditure is in violation of law or regulation; and (c) the official is found directly responsible
therefor.

There is no evidence on record to show that petitioner had knowledge of the fraudulent scheme perpetrated by some
employees of the NHMFC. In fact, petitioner immediately filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against the
subordinate employees who appeared to be responsible for the fraud. He also directed the filing of a civil case against
the originator and other persons responsible for misrepresentation. All these acts are indicative that he had no
knowledge of the fraudulent scheme perpetrated by certain officials or employees of his agency. No less than
Lakambini Q. Razon, State Auditor IV of the Commission on Audit, in her letter dated January 8, 1991 to the Director of
the Corporate Audit Office, wrote that:

"In the said memorandum, we informed Mr. Albert that we had considered his participation in the AMAKO transaction,
but we cannot lift his liability as head of the Corporation pursuant to the provisions of Section 2, P.D. 1445 and Section
32 of the Manual on Certificate of Settlement and Balances. This prompted Mr. Albert to request for reconsideration on
the action taken by this Office on the appeal submitted previously.

"Considering the reasons given and circumstances surrounding the case, we believe that the President cannot
determine the irregularities committed in this transaction. As a matter of fact, an administrative case was filed by the
President of NHMFC against several officials of the Corporation and other government agencies to the office of the
Ombudsman on October 1, 1990. x x x"33

The actions taken by petitioner involved the very functions he had to discharge in the performance of official duties. He
cannot, therefore, be held civilly liable for such acts unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross
negligence.34 Inasmuch as no evidence was presented to show that petitioner acted in bad faith and with gross
negligence in the performance of his official duty, he is presumed to have acted in the regular performance of his
official duty. Similarly, it is a basic tenet of due process that the decision of a government agency must state the facts
and the law on which the decision is based. The COA decision merely stated conclusions of law. Facts and
circumstances, as well as the why's, the what's and the how's of the disallowance, were patently missing, inaccurate or
incomplete. The COA cannot just perform its constitutional function of disallowing expenditures of government funds
at sheer discretion. There has to be factual basis why the expenditure is alleged to be fraudulent or why was there a
misrepresentation. Liability depends upon the wrong committed and not solely by reason of being the head of a
government agency. The COA even mentioned the anti-graft law which imputes liability for a grossly disadvantageous
contract entered into by a government functionary. But as to why and how the disbursement of funds in this case was
considered disadvantageous must be duly supported by findings of facts.

Consequently, respondent COA committed a grave abuse of its discretion when it held petitioner personally liable for
the subject disallowance.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the respondent Commission on Audit are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, insofar as they refer to petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

BUENCAMINO CRUZ, Petitioner, versus THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents

GARCIA, J.:
Thru this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Buencamino Cruz seeks to set
aside the Decision dated 30 January 1998[1] of the Sandiganbayan in its Criminal Case No. 22830, finding him guilty of
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, and its Resolution dated 14 July 1998,[2] denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The factual antecedents are not at all disputed:

Following the May 1992 local elections and his proclamation as mayor-elect of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite,
Victor Miranda sought an audit investigation of the municipality's 1991-1992 financial transactions. Petitioner
Buencamino Cruz served as municipal mayor of the town in 1991 until his term ended in the middle of 1992.

Acting on the request, the Commission on Audit (COA) issued COA Order No. 19-1700 constituting a Special Audit
Team. In the course of the investigation, the Special Audit Team discovered that certain anomalous and irregular
transactions transpired during the covered period, the most serious being the purchase of construction materials
evidenced by Sales Invoices No. 131145 and 131137 in the aggregate amount of P54,542.56, for which payment out of
municipal funds was effected twice. The double payments were made in favor of Kelly Lumber and Construction Supply
(Kelly Lumber, for short) and were accomplished through the issuance of two (2) disbursement vouchers (DVs), i.e., DV
No. 101-92-06-1222 and DV No. 101-92-01-195. Petitioner signed the vouchers and encashed the two (2)
corresponding PNB checks, both of which were payable to his order.

The findings of the Audit Team were embodied in a 336-page SAO Report No. 93-28, on the basis of which petitioner
was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. The provision reads:

Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

The Information[3] against petitioner, filed before the Sandiganbayan and thereat docketed as Criminal Case No.
22830, alleged:

That on June 26, 1992, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Buencamino M. Cruz, a public officer being
then the Municipal Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite and while in the performance of his official function, acting in evident bad
faith, did then and there wilfully, (sic) unlawfully and criminally pay Kelly Lumber and Construction Supply the amount
of Fifty Four Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two Pesos and 56/100 (P54,542.56), Philippine Currency, despite the fact
that said account had been previously paid by the Municipality, thus, causing undue injury to the Government in the
amount aforestated.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "Not Guilty". In time, trial ensued.
In a decision[4] dated 30 January 1998, the respondent court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 and sentenced him "to serve imprisonment of Seven (7) years, and One (1), month
as minimum, to Ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum, with consequent perpetual disqualification from holding
public office, as provided by law."

The anti-graft court predicated its judgment of conviction on the strength of the following main premises:

The numerous, other alleged anomalies and irregularities fully detailed and outlined in said S.A.O. Report No. 93-28 did
not appear to the Special Audit Team, as meriting prosecution of those who might have been guilty thereof. But, the
same report strongly recommended prosecution as notwithstanding . . . the subsequent refund of the total amount of
P54,542.56 from the supplier, Kelly Lumber . . . for the alleged double payment especially due . . . to the fact that the
amount was not directly paid to the supplier but the Municipal Mayor, as shown in Exh. "1" for P150,000.00 and Exh.
"H" for P20,000.00 and Exhs. "1-1" and "H-1' showing that the said two checks were actually encashed by the Municipal
Mayor, respondent herein ( See: p.192 of the S.A.O. Report No. 93-28). A painful examination of Exhs. "B" and "B-1" to
"B-11' shows that although there was a total sum due of P31,198.01 and supported by documents under Disbursement
Voucher No. 101-9201-194, they are really, only supported by documents showing the statement of the account
thereof and yet Sales Invoice No. 131145 was not attached to support the voucher. Besides, said Sales Invoice No.
131145 had already been paid previously as shown by a photocopy of PNB Check No. 214785, dated January 30, 1992
(see. Exh. "B-2-A") which proves that payment was made upon the prior request of the accused Buencamino M. Cruz,
and that the said amount of P21,041.56 had already been paid under the same Voucher No. 101-9201-194. Also Exhs.
"E", "E-1" to "E-7" show that under Disbursement Voucher No. 1163, dated June 26,1992, payment had been made
together with other invoices, per PNB Check No. 197813 in the total sum of P150,000.00; whereas, the same account of
P33,501.00 had already been paid on January 30, 1992, thereby, showing that there is double payment and the two
checks issued in payment of these two invoices to the accused: Buencamino Mallari-Cruz as payee, shows indubitably,
that there was a willful act, with malice aforethought, in having a second payment made, in order that the accused may
be able to pocket the money, as he in fact did by encashing the said two checks. For it is likewise evident under the
principle RES IPSA LOQUITOR (The thing speaks for itself), namely: that if the money of P54,542.56 were indeed
payment for the goods delivered by the supplier-Kelly Lumber and Construction Supply, simple reason and well
accepted commercial practice demand for the checks in the first place, to made payable to the suppliers of goods sold
in payment thereof. But, why should payment be made to Mayor Buencamino M. Cruz, when he ought not to derive
any material benefits, whatsoever, or any pecuniary interest from the transactions entered into by him, for and on
behalf of the Municipality, . . . .

The only excuse given by the accused when he finally testified in his own defense, in very lame. For the excuse he gave,
in explaining the anomaly or irregularity is that he was not aware of the double payment and that, he just signed the
voucher for payment, as the last officer to sign the voucher, in order to effect payment thereon, to the supplier . . ., and
that it was the duty of the Municipal Treasurer to verify the actual deliveries of the goods sold and their payment
afterwards. This may be true, if the ensuing checks issued in payment of the goods covered by the voucher for
payment, were made payable, indeed, to the real suppliers of the goods, and not made payable to the Mayor, . . ., and
who in fact encashed the checks. The only real defense put up here by the accused is that: The supplier-Kelly Lumber
and Construction Supply had subsequently reimbursed the Municipality of the amount of P54,542.56 thereby
precluding denial of the double payment as shown in Exh. "1" of the accused, . . . . (Underscoring in the original).

With his motion for reconsideration having been denied, per the graft court's resolution of 17 July 1998,[5] petitioner is
now with us via the instant recourse.

Petitioner acknowledges signing the DVs which paved the way for the double payment situation. He also admits
encashing the checks corresponding to the DVs in question. He nonetheless urges the setting aside of the assailed
decision, anchoring his virtual plea for acquittal on four (4) basic issues, to wit: (1) the fatally flawed Information filed
against him; (2) the applicability in his favor of what he tagged as the Arias Doctrine; (3) the absence of bad faith on his
part; and (4) the refund of the amount representing overpayment.

We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found nothing therein to warrant a reversal of the challenged
decision of the respondent court.
Petitioner maintains, anent the first issue, that the Information filed against him was fatally defective in that it did not
allege that he is an officer "charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions."

Petitioner's contention is flawed by the very premises holding it together. For, it presupposes that Section 3(e) of R.A.
3019 covers only public officers vested with the power of granting licenses, permits or similar privileges. Petitioner has
obviously lost sight, if not altogether unaware, of our ruling in Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan,[6] where we held that a
prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public
officer is "charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions". Following is an excerpt of what we said in
Mejorada:

Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any public officers (sic) declared
unlawful. Its reference to "any public officer" is without distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared
unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph [Section 3] (e) is
intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers (sic) or government corporations which,
under the ordinary concept of "public officers" may not come within the term. It is a strained construction of the
provision to read it as applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or
other concessions. (Emphasis and words in bracket supplied)

At any rate, the Local Government Code, particularly Section 444 (b)(3)(iv and v), Chapter 3, Title II, Book III thereof,[7]
empowers municipal mayors to issue licenses and permits. Any suggestion that a reference to such power in the
information is a condition sine qua non for a successful prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 has to be
rejected. As the Solicitor General aptly observed, matters of law are deemed incorporated or read into the information.

Still, with respect to the first issue, petitioner submits that a conviction could arise only for an inculpatory act alleged in
the information and duly established in the trial, arguing in this regards that the information alleged that Kelly Lumber
was paid twice for the same materials but what was found during the trial was that the said payment was given to
petitioner. Pressing the point, petitioner states in fine that a variance obtains between what was alleged in the
Information filed in this case and what was proven during trial.

We are not persuaded.

As held in Socrates vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines[8]:

xxx Evidentiary facts need not be alleged in the information because these are matters of defense. Informations need
only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the trial. x x x (Underscoring supplied)

And what petitioner took to be a variance between the allegation in the information, i.e., the excess payment was given
to Kelly Lumber, and the acts proven, i.e., the payment in excess was given to petitioner, is more apparent than real.
The perceived variance cannot plausibly be taken as invalidating the information and necessarily petitioner's conviction.
As may be noted, the information in question states that "x x x accused Buencamino M. Cruz, a public officer being then
the Municipal Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite and while in the performance of his official function, acting in evident bad faith,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally pay Kelly Lumber and Construction Supply the amount of Fifty
Four Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two Pesos and 56/100 (P54,542.56), Philippine Currency x x x". What was found
during the trial, however, was that, albeit double payment was eventually made, or appeared to have been made, to
Kelly Lumber, the covering checks initially were made payable to petitioner. As a matter of fact, Kelly Lumber was even
made to appear to have refunded and returned the second or double payment, as demonstrated by a Certification to
this effect issued on the 19th day of March 1997 and signed by Bacoor Municipal Treasurer Salome U. Esagunde, which
Certification reads in its material part, as follows:

CERTIFICATION
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that as per records of this office, Kelly Hardware & Construction Supply paid this office the
following:

1. Refund to double payment on Voucher No. 101-92-06-1222, paid under OR#4251401 dated September 30,
1993................................................... P33,500.00

2. Refund to double payment on Voucher No. 101-92-01-195, paid under OR No. 4251402 dated September 30,
1993......................................................21,041.56

Total - (posted at CBV# 101-9309-2273).........P54,542.56

Issued this 19th day of March, 1997 upon request of _____________ for whatsoever legal purpose this may serve.

(Signed)

SALOME U. ESAGUNDE

Municipal Treasurer

Moreover, petitioner even admitted in his memorandum[9] that "the refund by Kelly Lumber and Construction Supply
is the best proof that he did not pay himself for the costs of the supply x x x."

It bears stressing that an information needs only allege the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense[10], in this case, the fact that petitioner made payment to Kelly Lumber twice, without need of going into
specifics of how such payment was made. The accompanying details of the process of payment can be established
during trial through evidentiary offer.

Invoking the lessons taught in Arias vs. Sandiganbayan[11], petitioner next argues that he cannot be held guilty of
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 for, following the doctrine established in that case, he had every right to rely, to a
reasonable extent, on the bona fides of his subordinates, referring to the municipal treasurer and accountant, who
prepared the DVs and the checks in question.

Petitioner's reliance on Arias is very much misplaced. As may be recalled, this Court, in acquitting the accused in Arias,
made the following pronouncements:

We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents, received procedures, and
questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly-sized office could personally do all these things in all
vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a
reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter
into negotiations. If a department secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call
the restaurant about the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was present at the luncheon, inquire
whether the correct amount of food was served, and otherwise personally look into the reimbursement voucher's
accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such
detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that
must be signed. There are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers that routinely
pass through his hands. x x x.
There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy
charge and conviction. (Italics in the original; Underscoring supplied).

Unlike in Arias, however, there exists in the present case an exceptional circumstance which should have prodded
petitioner, if he were out to protect the interest of the municipality he swore to serve, to be curious and go beyond
what his subordinates prepared or recommended. In fine, the added reason contemplated in Arias which would have
put petitioner on his guard and examine the check/s and vouchers with some degree of circumspection before signing
the same was obtaining in this case.

We refer to the unusual fact that the checks issued as payment for construction materials purchased by the
municipality were not made payable to the supplier, Kelly Lumber, but to petitioner himself even as the disbursement
vouchers attached thereto were in the name of Kelly Lumber. The discrepancy between the names indicated in the
checks, on one hand, and those in the disbursement vouchers, on the other, should have alerted petitioner - if he were
conscientious of his duties as he purports to be - that something was definitely amiss. The fact that the checks for the
municipality's purchases were made payable upon his order should, without more, have prompted petitioner to
examine the same further together with the supporting documents attached to them, and not rely heavily on the
recommendations of his subordinates.

It need no stretching of the mind to understand that the person or entity in whose favor a voucher is processed should
also be the payee appearing in the checks issued to satisfy the same. Yet, for still unexplained reasons, petitioner chose
to deviate from what to us is an ordinary accounting procedure, doubtless for a consideration less than honest.

Apropos the third issue, it is petitioner's submission that, while he might have been negligent in the performance of his
duties, the prosecution had not, at its end, established his being in bad faith.

Whether or not petitioner acted in good or bad faith in effecting what, at bottom, is an unauthorized double payment,
addresses a question of credibility. As a general proposition, the determination of credibility is the domain of the trial
court, not this Court.[12] And it cannot be overemphasized that the respondent court has declared petitioner to have
acted with "malice afterthought", a disposition which, in the language of that court, "is evident from checks originally
issued in payment for goods paid twice made in favor of the accused himself." [13]

Added the respondent court:

Indeed by the mere fact that the accused herein had two (2) checks issued to him in his name, and then, collecting the
money in cash without any reason therefore (sic), is evident bad faith, as against bonafides (good faith) for his very act
of having these two (2) checks in his name runs against the 'gamut' of public accountability . . . .

Lest it be overlooked, the offense defined under Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed even if bad faith is not
attendant, the elements of the crime being:

(1) that the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them;

(2) that the prohibited act/s were done in the discharge of the public officer's official, administrative or judicial
functions;

(3) that they cause undue injury to any party, whether Government or a private person;
(4) that such injury is caused by giving any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such party; and

(5) that the public officers acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. [14]

In Sistoza vs. Desierto, et al.,[15] we held:

xxx Evidently, mere bad faith or partiality and negligence per se are not enough for one to be held liable under the law
since the act of bad faith or partiality must in the first place be evident or manifest, respectively, while the negligent
deed should both be gross and inexcusable. Xxx

Given the above perspective, it is abundantly clear that a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed even
through negligence provided that said negligence is both gross and inexcusable.

Assuming, in gratia argumenti, that petitioner did not act in bad faith, he cannot plausibly deny that his negligence
under the premises was not only gross but also inexcusable. For, although the checks were on their face payable to him
even as the supporting disbursement vouchers were in the name of Kelly Lumber, petitioner still affixed his signature
thereon. It is unthinkable that such irregularity, given his stature and the nature of his position, would have passed him
unnoticed. In turn, his subordinates could not have so easily, and with such daring, presented him with a set of
questionable documents - as petitioner would want to impress this Court - without his instructions.

Finally, it is puerile for petitioner to contend that Kelly Lumber's act of refunding the amount subject of double
payment argues against the idea of the government suffering damages. The injury suffered by the government is
beyond cavil. This conclusion was aptly explained by the Sandiganbayan in the following wise:

Damage to the government in that instance [referring to the alleged double payment] is inevitable for the simple
reason that money taken from the coffers was used by someone else for about two years and without paying interest
and without authority for its use. (N.B. 19 March 1997 is only two months short of two years from filing of this case).

Moreover, refund of the amount subject of the prosecution is not one of those enumerated under Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code[16] which would totally extinguish criminal liability. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code applies in
a suppletory character as provided for under Article 10[17] of the same Code.

As regards the penalty imposed by the respondent court, we find the same to be proper in point of severity, albeit its
employment of the term "prision mayor" is inappropriate. It is proper because Section 9 of R.A. 3019 provides:

SECTION 9. Penalties for violations -

(a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omission enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5
and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen
years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any
prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income.

In the same breath, however, the use of the same term is inappropriate because the penalty of prision mayor is
imposable only for felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code or when a special law specifically provides for
such penalty for a given crime. As we have said in People vs. Simon:[18]
With respect to the first example, where the penalties under the special law are different from and are without
reference or relation to those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the
application of penalties under said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions based on or applicable only to said
rules for felonies under the Code. In this type of special law, the legislative intendment is clear.

The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example, Republic Act No. 6539. While it is true that the
penalty of 14 years and 8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium period
of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for carnapping.
Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying circumstances stated in the law do not
correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic
Act No. 6539 and special laws of the same formulation. (Italics in the original; Underscoring supplied)

Republic Act 3019 under which petitioner was prosecuted and convicted is a special law which does not provide for a
penalty of "prision mayor" for any of the acts punishable therein. Accordingly, a modification of the decision under
review with respect to its penalty component is in order.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of the Sandiganbayan AFFIRMED,
with the modification that petitioner BUENCAMINO MALLARI-CRUZ is hereby sentenced to a prison term of seven (7)
years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from holding
public office, as provided by law.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 171491 September 4, 2009

DR. CASTOR C. DE JESUS, Petitioner,

vs.

RAFAEL D. GUERRERO III, CESARIO R. PAGDILAO, AND FORTUNATA B. AQUINO, Respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is a petition for review seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated September 30, 2005 of the Court
of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 83779, and its Resolution2 dated February 9, 2006 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
Culled from the records are the following facts:

Nilo A. Bareza, Records Officer III of the Philippine Council for Aquatic and Marine Research and Development
(PCAMRD), made out a check payable to himself and drawn against the Asean-Canada Project Fund, a foreign-assisted
project being implemented by PCAMRD. To avoid being caught, Bareza stole Land Bank Check No. 070343 from the
trust fund of the PCAMRD from the desk of Arminda S. Atienza, PCAMRD Cashier III. He filled out the check for the
amount of ₱385,000.00, forged the signatures of the authorized signatories, made it appear that the check was
endorsed to Atienza, and with him as the endorsee, encashed the check that was drawn against the PCAMRD Trust
Fund. Then, he deposited part of the money to the Asean-Canada Project Fund and pocketed the difference.3

Atienza discovered that the check in question was missing on the third week of February 1999 while preparing the
Report of Checks Issued and Cancelled for the Trust Fund for the month of January. Not finding the check anywhere in
her office, Atienza called the bank to look for the same. She was shocked to learn from a bank employee that the check
had been issued payable in her name. When Atienza went to the bank to examine the check, she noticed that her
signature and the signature of Dir. Rafael D. Guerrero III (Guerrero), PCAMRD Executive Director, were forged. She also
found out that Bareza appeared to be the person who encashed the check.4

Bareza admitted his wrongdoings when he was confronted by Atienza about the incident, but begged that he be not
reported to the management. Bareza also promised to return the money in a few days. Against her good judgment,
Atienza acquiesced to Bareza’s request, seeing Bareza’s remorse over his transgressions. But Atienza also felt uneasy
over her decision to keep silent about the whole thing, so Atienza persuaded Bareza to inform Fortunata B. Aquino
(Aquino), PCAMRD Director of Finance and Administrative Division, about what he did. Bareza, however, decided to
confess to Carolina T. Bosque, PCAMRD Accountant III, instead.5

When Bareza revealed to Bosque what he had done, he was also advised to report the matter to Aquino, but, Bareza
became hysterical and threatened to commit suicide if his misdeeds were ever exposed. Due to his fervent pleading
and his promise to repay the amount he took, Bosque, like Atienza, assented to his plea for her to remain silent.6

True to his word, Bareza deposited back ₱385,000.00 to the PCAMRD account on February 25, 1999.7

On July 27, 2001, following rumors that an investigation will be conducted concerning irregularities in the said project,
Bareza set fire to the PCAMRD Records Section in order to clear his tracks.8

A fact-finding committee was thus created by virtue of PCAMRD Memorandum Circular No. 309 to investigate the
burning incident and forgery of checks by Bareza. After investigation, the fact-finding committee found sufficient
evidence to charge Bareza with dishonesty, grave misconduct and falsification of official document.10 The fact-finding
committee likewise found sufficient evidence to charge Atienza with inefficiency and incompetence in the performance
of official duties11 and Bosque with simple neglect of duty.12

Concomitant to the above findings, Guerrero formed an investigation committee to conduct formal investigations on
the charges filed against Bareza, Atienza and Bosque.13 The investigation committee found Bareza guilty of dishonesty
and grave misconduct and recommended his dismissal from the service. It also found sufficient basis to uphold the
charge filed against Atienza and Bosque, and recommended a minimum penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day
suspension for Atienza, and a maximum penalty of six (6) months suspension for Bosque.14

On September 10, 2001 the PCAMRD adopted the findings of the investigation committee but imposed only the penalty
of six (6) months suspension on Atienza and only three (3) months suspension on Bosque.15

Not convinced with the results of the investigation and the penalties imposed on Bareza, Atienza and Bosque,
petitioner exerted efforts to obtain a copy of the complete records of the proceedings had. Upon reading the same,
petitioner was of the opinion that the investigation conducted by the fact-finding committee and investigation
committee was perfunctorily and superficially done, and made only to whitewash and cover-up the real issues because
the report exonerated other persons involved in the crimes and omitted other erroneous acts. According to him, these
circumstances led to partiality in deciding the charges. Hence, petitioner filed with the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon (Ombudsman) a complaint against Guerrero, Cesario R. Pagdilao (Pagdilao), PCAMRD Deputy
Executive Director, and Aquino, among others, for incompetence and gross negligence.16 The case was docketed as
OMB Case No. L-A-02-0209-D.

In their Joint Counter-Affidavit and Complaint for Malicious Prosecution17 dated July 9, 2002, the respondents argued
that the complaint is wanting in material, relevant and substantive allegations and is clearly intended only to harass
them. Furthermore, they contended that petitioner failed to identify the persons he claims were exonerated, and
worse, petitioner failed to state with particularity their participation in the crimes.18

In his Consolidated Reply and Counter-Affidavit19 dated July 25, 2002, petitioner belied the allegation of the
respondents that his complaint was lacking in substance. He stressed that the report of the investigation committee
that was submitted by the respondents reinforced his claim that the investigation relative to the forgery and arson case
was indeed perfunctory and superficial, designed only to whitewash and cover-up the real issues. To bolster his
contention, he pointed out that the sworn affidavit of Bareza revealed that the latter was able to use certain funds of
the Asean-Canada Project by encashing blank checks that were previously signed by Pagdilao. Thus, he averred that the
failure to implicate Pagdilao as a conspirator to the crime of forgery shows that the investigation was just a farce.
Petitioner also claimed that Atienza and Bosque were not charged with the proper administrative offense to avoid their
dismissal from the service. Petitioner pointed to the command responsibility of respondents over Bareza, Atienza and
Bosque. He maintained that had they been prudent enough in handling PCAMRD’s finances, the forgery of checks and
the arson incident could have been avoided. Furthermore, petitioner alleged that being the head of PCAMRD, Guerrero
should have pursued investigations on the criminal aspect of the cases of forgery and arson because a huge amount of
government money was involved therein. His act, therefore, of declaring the cases closed after the conduct of the
investigations in the administrative aspect only is contrary to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No.
3019) because its object is to conceal "more big anomalies and issues."20

In a Decision21 dated August 5, 2002, the Ombudsman recommended the dismissal of the administrative case filed
against the respondents for lack of merit. It agreed with the respondents that the complaint was couched in general
terms that contains no material, relevant and substantial allegation to support the theory of cover-up or whitewash.
The Ombudsman also held that there is nothing to sustain petitioner’s allegation that Pagdilao should be implicated in
the forgery because petitioner failed to sufficiently prove that the check that was signed in blank by Pagdilao was Land
Bank Check No. 070343, or the subject check encashed by Bareza. Even assuming that the forged check was the one
signed in blank by Pagdilao, the Ombudsman opined that the latter still cannot be said to have participated in the
forgery because the check was in the custody and safekeeping of Atienza, the cashier, when it was stolen. In the same
vein, the Ombudsman found no adequate basis in the petitioner’s allegation that Guerrero charged Atienza and Bosque
with erroneous administrative infractions to lessen their liability, noting that Guerrero merely adopted the
recommendation of the fact-finding and investigation committees as to what they should be charged with. The
Ombudsman added that Guerrero cannot be indicted for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 or be held
administratively liable for his failure to initiate criminal cases against Bareza, Atienza and Bosque because he had no
personal knowledge of the commission of the crimes allegedly committed by them.22

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the Ombudsman denied it in an Order23 dated November 25, 2003.
According to the Ombudsman, nowhere in petitioner’s complaint did he allege that respondents should be blamed for
arson and forgery because of command responsibility. It held that petitioner’s averment of the same only in his reply-
affidavit and in his motion for reconsideration should be disregarded altogether since it materially and belatedly alters
his original cause of action against the respondents, which cannot be allowed.24

Not accepting defeat, petitioner elevated the matter by way of a petition for review25 under Rule 43 before the
appellate court. Petitioner claimed that the Ombudsman gravely erred when it recommended the dismissal of the
charges against the respondents and denied his motion for reconsideration despite the existence of a prima facie case
against them for incompetence and gross negligence.
On September 30, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the August 5, 2002 Decision and November
25, 2003 Order of the Ombudsman in OMB Case No. L-A-02-0209-D. The appellate court found that the Ombudsman
correctly dismissed the complaint against the respondents. The appellate court held that petitioner questioned the
handling of the PCAMRD finances without specifying the particular acts or omissions constituting the gross negligence
of the respondents. The charges, being broad, sweeping, general and purely speculative, cannot, by their nature,
constitute a prima facie case against the respondents.26

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said Decision but it was denied by the appellate court in the Resolution
dated February 9, 2006.

Hence, the present petition raising the following issues for our resolution:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
DENIED IN ITS DECISION PETITIONER’S PETITION AND AFFIRMED THE OMBUDSMAN’S DECISION OF AUGUST 5, 2002 IN
OMB-L[-A]-02-020[9]-D, RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF THE CASE BY RELYING SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY ON THE
GENERAL RULE/PRINCIPLE THAT THE COURTS WILL NOT INTERFERE IN THE INVESTIGATORY AND PROSECUTORY
POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN, IGNORING THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE – PRESENCE OF COMPELLING REASONS AND
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE EXERCISE THEREOF.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR AND A GRAVE
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND MISAPPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE IS NO PRIMA
FACIE OR PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST RESPONDENTS, [THAT] IF CONSIDERED, WILL ALTER THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
RULED THAT RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE.27

Simply put, we are asked to resolve whether the appellate court erred in affirming the dismissal of the complaint. We
hold that it did not.

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence, i.e., that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the
complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that
mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation
likewise cannot be given credence. Hence, when the complainant relies on mere conjectures and suppositions, and fails
to substantiate his allegations, the administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit.28

Mainly, petitioner ascribes incompetence and gross negligence to respondents because according to him, the
fraudulent use of PCAMRD funds and arson would not have happened had they not been remiss in the performance of
their duties. Specifically, he averred that Guerrero, being the head of PCAMRD, should have seen to it that all the
resources of the government are managed and expended in accordance with laws and regulations, and safeguarded
against loss and waste; Pagdilao should have ensured that the signed blank checks were used for what they were
intended; and that anomalies would have been avoided had Aquino supervised Bareza, Atienza and Bosque, her
subordinates, properly and efficiently. In sum, petitioner argues that they are accountable because of command
responsibility.291avvphi1

We agree with the appellate court and the Ombudsman that the complaint against the respondents should be
dismissed. A perusal of petitioner’s allegations clearly shows that they are mere general statements or conclusions of
law, wanting in evidentiary support and substantiation. It is not enough for petitioner to simply aver that respondents
had been derelict in their duties; he must show the specific acts or omissions committed by them which amount to
incompetence and gross negligence. This, he failed to do. Hence, the complaint was correctly dismissed for lack of
merit.

Petitioner’s allegation that he has specified the acts and omissions of respondents which show that they are guilty of
dishonesty and falsification lacks merit. Aside from the fact that nowhere in the records does it appear that he has
indeed shown the particular acts or omissions of respondents constituting dishonesty or which amounted to
falsification of whatever nature, it must be emphasized that the case he filed before the Ombudsman was an
administrative complaint for incompetence and gross negligence. Hence, these are the two charges he needed to prove
by substantial evidence, not any other crime or administrative infraction. At the very least, petitioner should have
shown how his accusations of dishonesty and falsification constituted incompetence and gross negligence on the part
of the respondents.

To further persuade us that his complaint was wrongly dismissed, petitioner argues that he had in his petition
established the existence of probable cause to hold respondents liable for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No.
3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.30 He then concludes that "if there is sufficient basis to indict the
respondents of a criminal offense then with more reason that they should be made accountable administratively
considering the fact that the quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings is merely substantial
evidence."31

This argument likewise has no merit. It is worthy to note that petitioner is merely proceeding from his own belief that
there exists sufficient basis to charge respondents criminally. This is not within his province to decide. He could not
arrogate unto himself the power that pertains to the proper authorities enjoined by law to determine the absence or
existence of probable cause to indict one of a criminal offense.

More importantly, an administrative proceeding is different from a criminal case and may proceed independently
thereof.32 Even if respondents would subsequently be found guilty of a crime based on the same set of facts obtaining
in the present administrative complaint, the same will not automatically mean that they are also administratively liable.

As we have said in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza33 and which we have reiterated in a host of
cases,34 a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case.
Conversely, respondents’ acquittal will not necessarily exculpate them administratively. The basic premise is that
criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two
will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.35

It must be stressed that the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability. The purpose of administrative
proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public
trust. On the other hand, the purpose of criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime.36 To state it simply,
petitioner erroneously equated criminal liability to administrative liability.

Neither will the allegation of the principle of command responsibility make the respondents liable. In the absence of
substantial evidence of gross negligence of the respondents, administrative liability could not be based on the principle
of command responsibility.37 Without proof that the head of office was negligent, no administrative liability may
attach. Indeed, the negligence of subordinates cannot always be ascribed to their superior in the absence of evidence
of the latter’s own negligence.38 While it may be true that certain PCAMRD employees were sanctioned for negligence
and some other administrative infractions, it does not follow that those holding responsible positions, like the
respondents in this case, are likewise negligent, especially so when the contentions of petitioner remain
unsubstantiated.

WHEREFORE, there being no sufficient showing of grave and reversible error in the assailed decision and resolution, the
petition is DENIED. Said Decision dated September 30, 2005 and Resolution dated February 9, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83779 are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 213500

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and THE FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION BUREAU (FFIB), OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY AND OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICES (MOLEO), Petitioners

vs

PS/SUPT. RAINIER A. ESPINA, Respondent

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated February 27, 2014 and the
Resolution3 dated July 15, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131114, which modified the Joint Resolution4
dated December 19, 2012 and the Joint Order5 dated July 8, 2013 of petitioner the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman) in the administrative aspect of the case, docketed as OMB-P-A-12-0532-G,6 and, thereby, found
respondent PS/Supt. Rainier A. Espina (Espina) administratively liable for Simple Misconduct.

The Facts

On July 11 and 17, 2012, petitioner the Fact-Finding Investigation Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO) filed before the Ombudsman an affidavit-complaint7 and
a supplemental complaint,8 respectively, charging Espina and several other PNP officers and private individuals for: (a)
violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 7080,9 RA 3019,10 RA 918411 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), and
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents under Article 217 in relation to Article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (b) Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty; arising from alleged anomalies that
attended the Philippine National Police's (PNP) procurement of 40 tires, and repair, refurbishment, repowering, and
maintenance services of a total of 28 units of V-150 Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs), and the related transportation and
delivery expenses of 18 units of LAV s between August and December 2007.12 It averred that the PNP did not comply
with the bidding procedure prescribed under RA 9184 and its IRR, in that: (a) copies of the bid documents were not
furnished to possible bidders; (b) no pre-procurement and pre-bid conferences were held; (c) the invitation to bid was
not published in a newspaper of general circulation; (d) the procuring agency did not require the submission of
eligibility requirements as well as the technical and financial documents from the bidders; and (e) no post qualification
was conducted. Further, it claimed that there were "ghost deliveries," i.e., the tires were never delivered to the PNP
and no repair and refurbishment works were actually performed on the LAVs.13 The alleged anomalous transactions
are as follows:

Transactions Amount

1. Procurement of 40 tires for 10 LAVs ₱2,940,000.00

2. Repowering and refurbishing of 10 LAVs 142,000,000.00

3. Repair and maintenance of 18 LAVs 255,600,000.00

4. Transportation and delivery expenses14 9,200,000.00

Total ₱409, 740,000.0015

Espina, as the Acting Chief of the Management Division of the PNP Directorate for Comptrollership at the time the
procurements were made,16 was impleaded in the aforesaid complaints for noting/signing the Inspection Report
Forms (IRFs),17 which confirmed the PNP's receipt of the tires and other supplies, and the performance of repair and
refurbishment works on the LAVs. According to the FFIB-MOLEO, by affixing his signature on the IRFs, Espina
supposedly facilitated the fraudulent disbursement of funds amounting to ₱409,740,000.00 when no goods were
actually delivered and no services were actually rendered.18

In defense, Espina denied any participation in the bidding and/or procurement process and maintained that he
belonged to the Management Division which is responsible for the inspection of deliveries made to the PNP after the
bidding and procurement process.19 He also pointed out that pursuant to the Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) No.
XXA20 dated November 17, 1993, his only duty, as the said division's Acting Chief, was to note the reports. According to
him, it was not his responsibility to personally inspect and confirm deliveries and go beyond the contents of the IRFs
submitted by his subordinates, absent any irregularity reported by the property inspectors who are tasked to check and
examine deliveries.21

The Ombudsman Ruling

In a Joint Resolution22 dated December 19, 2012, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Espina and several
other PNP officers for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Section 65 (b) (4) of RA 9184, and for Malversation of Public
Funds through Falsification under Article 217 in relation to Article 171 of the RPC. The Ombudsman also found them
guilty of Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty and, accordingly, recommended their dismissal from government
service.23

Specifically, the Ombudsman held that Espina executed indispensable acts which led to the completion of the illegal
transactions.24 The Ombudsman likewise found it incredulous that the repair and refurbishment works on the LAV s
were completed in only seven (7) days, i.e., from December 20, 2007 to December 27, 2007, considering the magnitude
of the work involved, which included the delivery of the LAVs for repair, the inspection and acceptance of materials to
be used, the actual conduct of repair and refurbishment works, and the delivery, inspection, and acceptance of the
repaired and refurbished LAVs.25 The Ombudsman even noted the admission of one of the experts engaged in the
repair of the LAVs that the repair and refurbishment works thereon were still on-going as late as February 2008 until
2010 and, hence, could not have been completed in December 2007.26

On reconsideration, the Ombudsman, through a Joint Order27 dated July 8 2013, dropped the charges against Espina
and several other PNP Officers, for violation of Section 65 (b) (4) of RA 9184, but sustained the other findings, including
their dismissal from service in view of their administrative liability. In denying Espina's motion for reconsideration in the
administrative case, the Ombudsman pointed out that while it was not Espina's duty to make his own inspections of the
alleged deliveries and work as the same devolved upon the property inspectors, "it was incumbent upon [Espina] to
affix his signature only after checking the completeness and propriety of the documents."28 Such disregard of duty
paved the way for the consummation of four (4) highly illegal and irregular transactions, i.e., the disbursement of
government funds despite apparent non-delivery of the items and non-performance of works procured.29

Aggrieved, Espina filed a petition for review30 before the CA, imp leading both the Ombudsman and the FFIB-MOLEO
(collectively, petitioners), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 131114.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision31 dated February 27, 2014, the CA ruled in favor of Espina and held that his act of affixing his signature on
the IRFs could not be considered as Grave Misconduct because he did not: (a) unlawfully use his official position for the
purpose of benefiting himself;32 and (b) exhibit corrupt or depraved motives, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rules. It observed that Espina had no participation in the bidding and procurement process as
he belonged to the PNP's Management Division whose function is to inspect and note the deliveries to the PNP after
the required bidding and procurement process had taken place. As such, no liability could attach to him absent a nexus
between his functions as Acting Chief of the Management Division and the alleged anomalous procurement process.33
The CA found Espina guilty, instead, of Simple Misconduct, a less grave offense punishable with suspension for one (1)
month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense. It rejected Espina's
defense of reliance in good faith on the acts of his subordinates, holding that he had the obligation to supervise them
and ensure that the IRFs and Work Orders they prepared, as well as every procurement-related document released by
his division, were regular, lawful, valid, and accurate, considering the significance of the transaction related to the
disbursement of public funds over which great responsibility attached.34

However, the CA absolved Espina from the charge of Serious Dishonesty, considering that he did not personally prepare
the IRFs but merely affixed his signatures thereon. At best, he imprudently failed to check and counter-check the
contents of the IRFs and the Work Orders he signed, which, however, does not equate to Serious Dishonesty.35

There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the CA imposed on Espina a three-month suspension reckoned
from the time he was actually dismissed from service.36

Dissatisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration37 which was, however, denied by the CA in a Resolution38 dated
July 15, 2014; hence, the present petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Espina should be held administratively liable for the charges
imputed against him.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

At the outset, the Court emphasizes that as a general rule, factual findings of the Ombudsman are conclusive when
supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight, especially when affirmed by the CA.39 In
this case, except as to the legal conclusion on what administrative offense was committed by Espina, the Ombudsman
and the CA both found that Espina signed the IRFs even if there were actually no tires delivered to the PNP and no
repair and refurbishment works performed on the LA Vs. Accordingly, these findings of fact are conclusive and binding
and shall no longer be delved into, and this Court shall confine itself to the determination of the proper administrative
offense chargeable against Espina and the appropriate penalty therefor.

In the case at bar, Espina was charged with grave misconduct and serious dishonesty before the Ombudsman which
found him guilty as charged, and imposed on him the supreme penalty of dismissal from government service with all its
accessory penalties, while the CA adjudged him guilty only of simple misconduct and punished him with a three-month
suspension.

Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose.40 It is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior and
to constitute an administrative offense, the misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the
official functions and duties of a public officer.41 It is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.42

There are two (2) types of misconduct, namely: grave misconduct and simple misconduct. In grave misconduct, as
distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard
of an established rule must be manifest.43 Without any of these elements, the transgression of an established rule is
properly characterized as simple misconduct only.44
On the other hand, dishonesty, which is defined as the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness, lack of integrity,"45 is classified in three (3) gradations, namely: serious, less serious, and simple.46
Serious dishonesty comprises dishonest acts: (a) causing serious damage and grave prejudice to the government; (b)
directly involving property, accountable forms or money for which respondent is directly accountable and the
respondent shows an intent to commit material gain, graft and corruption; (c) exhibiting moral depravity on the part of
the respondent; (d) involving a Civil Service examination, irregularity or fake Civil Service eligibility such as, but not
limited to, impersonation, cheating and use of crib sheets; (e) committed several times or in various occasions; (j)
committed with grave abuse of authority; (g) committed with fraud and/or falsification of official documents relating to
respondent's employment; and (h) other analogous circumstances.47 A dishonest act without the attendance of any of
these circumstances can only be characterized as simple dishonesty.48 In between the aforesaid two forms of
dishonesty is less serious dishonesty which obtains when: (a) the dishonest act caused damage and prejudice to the
government which is not so serious as to qualify as serious dishonesty; (b) the respondent did not take advantage of
his/her position in committing the dishonest act; and (c) other analogous circumstances.49

Both grave misconduct and serious dishonesty, of which Espina was charged, are classified as grave offenses for which
the penalty of dismissal is meted even for first time offenders.50

Here, the CA correctly observed that while Espina may have failed to personally confirm the delivery of the procured
items, the same does not constitute dishonesty of any form inasmuch as he did not personally prepare the IRFs but
merely affixed his signature thereon after his subordinates supplied the details therein.

Neither can Espina's acts be considered misconduct, grave or simple. The records are bereft of any proof that Espina
was motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or deliberate intent of violating the law, or disregarding any established
rule, or that he wrongfully used his position to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty
and the rights of others.

However, after a circumspect review of the records, the Court finds Espina administratively liable, instead, for Gross
Neglect of Duty, warranting his dismissal from government service.51 At the outset, it should be pointed out that the
designation of the offense or offenses with which a person is charged in an administrative case is not controlling, and
one may be found guilty of another offense where the substance of the allegations and evidence presented sufficiently
proves one's guilt,52 as in this case. Notably, the FFIB-MOLEO's supplemental complaint accused Espina with failure to
exercise due diligence in signing the IRFs, which is sufficient to hold him liable for Gross Neglect of Duty.53

Gross neglect of duty is defined as "[n]egligence characterized by want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to
act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious
indifference to the consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care that even
inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property."54 In contrast, simple neglect of duty is the
failure of an employee or official to give proper attention to a task expected of him or her, signifying a "disregard of a
duty resulting from carelessness or indifference."55

As aptly observed by the CA, Espina had the obligation to supervise his subordinates and see to it that they have
performed their respective functions in accordance with law.56 To recall, Espina was the Acting Chief and Head of the
PNP's Management Division and, as such, had supervisory powers over the departments or sections which comprise it,
namely: (a) the Internal Control and Inspection Section (ICIS); (b) the Accountability and Assistance Section; (c) the
Management Improvement Section; and (d) the Claims and Examination Section (CES).57 Espina himself admitted that
the property inspectors who were tasked to personally inspect deliveries to the PNP belong to the ICIS which was under
his management and stewardship.58 In Lihaylihay v. People,59 the Court pointed out that the nature of the public
officers' responsibilities and their role in the procurement process are compelling factors that should have led them to
examine with greater detail the documents which they are made to approve.

Here, while SOP No. XX4 dated November 17, 1993 which Espina cited does not expressly require the Head of the
Management Division to physically re-inspect, re-check, and verify the deliveries to the PNP as reported by the
property inspectors under him, his duty was not simply to "note" or take cognizance of the existence of the IRFs, but to
reasonably ensure that they were prepared in accordance with law, keeping in mind the basic requirement that the
goods allegedly delivered to and services allegedly performed for the government have actually been delivered and
performed. As aptly pointed out by the Ombudsman in its Joint Order dated July 8, 2013, "it was incumbent upon
[Espina] to affix his signature only after checking the completeness and propriety of the documents."60 However, while
Espina claims that all the necessary supporting documents such as photographs and delivery receipts were attached to
the IRFs at the time they were routed to him for his signature,61 the Court is hard-pressed to find proof substantiating
such claim to justify his passive attitude towards them. In this jurisdiction, it is axiomatic that he who alleges a fact has
the burden of proving it.62 Without evidence showing otherwise, the Court is constrained to conclude that the IRFs
submitted to Espina for his signature were without supporting documents and could not, perforce, be taken at face
value and relied upon. As this Court ruled in Jaca v. People,63 a superior cannot rely in good faith on the act of a
subordinate where the documents that would support the subordinate' s action were not even in his (the superior's)
possession for examination.

Moreover, the timing of the alleged repair and refurbishment works was suspect. The short seven (7)-day period in
December, 2007 during which the repair and refurbishment works were made on the LAV s should have prompted
Espina to doubt the veracity of the IRFs. As correctly observed by the Ombudsman, it is improbable that the repair and
refurbishment works on the LAVs were carried out from December 20 to 27, 2007, given the magnitude of the work
involved and the fact that such period included the delivery of the LAV s for repair, the inspection and approval of the
materials to be used for the repairs, the actual repair and refurbishment, and the delivery of the LA Vs to the PNP after
the repair.64

The foregoing should not have escaped Espina's attention had he faithfully discharged the obligations attendant to his
office.1âwphi1 Indeed, the Court has pronounced that a public officer's high position imposes upon him greater
responsibility and obliges him to be more circumspect in his actions and in the discharge of his official duties.65 This
particularly applies to the instant controversy, especially where Espina's signature was one of the final steps needed for
the release of payment for the procured items.66 In fact, the disbursement vouchers prepared by the Logistics Support
Service (LSS)

Finance Service were routed back to the CES of the Management Division under Espina's supervision for final
examination of all claims.67 With all these considerations, Espina was expected to employ diligence in ensuring that all
claims were supported by complete pertinent documents. As succinctly put by the CA, Espina's duty as Acting Chief was
not merely ministerial and perfunctory as it related to the disbursement of funds over which a great responsibility
attached.68

More so, considering the sheer magnitude of the amount in taxpayers' money involved, i.e., ₱409,740,000.00, Espina
should have exercised utmost care before signing the IRFs. It is of no moment that the disbursement of the
₱409,740,000.00 was spread over several transactions and not through a single payment or that only the IRFs relating
to the delivery of supplies were allegedly presented;69 the fact remains that taxpayers' money was spent without the
corresponding goods and services having been delivered to the government. Indeed, no rule is more settled than that a
public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people.70

Espina cannot trivialize his role in the disbursement of funds and bank on the lack of confidential written reports from
his subordinates which would have prompted him to make further inquiry. As aptly pointed out by petitioners, Espina
was the last person to affix his signature and, as such, had the power, if not the duty, to unearth and expose anomalous
or irregular transactions.71 Espina cannot blindly adhere to the findings and opinions of his subordinates, lest he be
reduced to a mere clerk who has no authority over his subordinates and the sections he oversees.

The Court is not unaware of the ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan72 (Arias) that heads of offices may rely on their
subordinates. For the Arias doctrine to apply, however, there must be no reason for the head of offices to go beyond
the recommendations of their subordinates,73 which is not the case here.
Given the amounts involved and the timing of the alleged deliveries, the circumstances reasonably impose on Espina a
higher degree of care and vigilance in the discharge of his duties. Thus, he should have been prompted to make further
inquiry as to the truth of his subordinates' reports. Had he made the proper inquiries, he would have discovered the
non-delivery of the procured items and the non-performance of the procured services, and prevented the unlawful
disbursement. However, he did not do this at all. Instead, he blindly relied on the report and recommendation of his
subordinates and affixed his signature on the IRFs. Plainly, Espina acted negligently, unmindful of the high position he
occupied and the responsibilities it carried, and without regard to his accountability for the hundreds of millions in
taxpayers' money involved.

Verily, this Court has repeatedly emphasized the time-honored rule that a "[p ]ublic office is a public trust [and] [p]ublic
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives."74 This high constitutional standard of
conduct is not intended to be mere rhetoric and taken lightly as those in the public service are enjoined to fully comply
with this standard or run the risk of facing administrative sanctions ranging from reprimand to the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service.75 Erring public officials may also be held personally liable for disbursements made in
violation of law or regulation, as stated in Section 52,76 Chapter 9, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code
of 1987.77 Thus, public officers, as recipients of public trust, are under obligation to perform the duties of their offices
honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their ability.78 Unfortunately, Espina failed miserably in this respect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated February 27, 2014 and the Resolution dated July 15,
2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131114 are hereby SET ASIDE. A new one is ENTERED finding respondent
Rainier A. Espina GUILTY of GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY. Accordingly, he is DISMISSED from government service with all
the accessory penalties.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 223762

TOMAS N. JOSON III, Petitioner

vs.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM , J.:

Challenged in this Petition for Certiorari1 is the Decision2 dated January 29, 2015 and Resolution3 dated January 19,
2016 rendered by the Commission on Audit (COA) in Decision No. 2015-019 denying the Petition for Exclusion from
Liability4 filed by Petitioner Tomas N. Joson III and affirming the Notice of Disallowance ND No. L-09-05-005(2004-
2007)5 .

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

In 2007, a Special Audit Team (SAT) of the COA conducted a special audit of selected transactions of the Provincial
Government of Nueva Ecija for calendar years 2004-2007. The SAT found an irregular award made by the province for
the construction of the Nueva Ecija Friendship Hotel to A.V.T. Construction. Thereafter, the SAT issued Notice of
Disallowance ND No. L-09-05-005(2004-2007) disallowing the payments made to A.V.T. Construction in the total
amount of Php155,036,681.77 on the following grounds:6

1. The construction of the Hotel (Phase-II Hotel and Lobby) with a total contract cost of ₱75,970,000.00 was awarded to
A.V.T. Construction, an ineligible contractor, without complying with the eligibility check process, contrary to the
provisions of Section 21.27 and 238 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9184;

2. Despite the ineligibility issue, two more contracts costing Php35,037,826.50 and Php40,890,744.57, representing
additional works for the Hotel, were awarded to the same contractor by way of alternative method of procurement;
and

3. The Hotel remains unoperational due to the failure of the contractor to complete the project and the issuance of a
Suspension Order effective July 30, 2007 by the project engineer and the provincial engineer duly noted by the former
Govemor.9

The SAT found the members of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC), the BAC Technical Working Group (TWG), the
provincial accountant, the provincial engineer and herein Petitioner in his capacity as provincial governor of Nueva Ecija
and as head of the procuring entity, solidarily liable for the disallowed amount. Petitioner was held solidarily liable for
entering into the contract with A.V.T. Construction and for approving the payment vouchers to the latter.
Petitioner appealed the disallowance. However, the Director of the Fraud Audit and Investigation Office, Legal Services
Sector (LSS) of the COA denied the appeal and affirmed the disallowance in his LSS Decision10 No. 2009-344 dated
November 27, 2009. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is denied for lack of merit and ND No. L-09-5-005 (2004-2007)
dated May 14, 2009 in the total amount of P155,036,681.77 is hereby affirmed.11

Petitioner then filed a petition for exclusion from liability arguing that he should not be held liable for the disallowed
amount since the determination of whether a prospective bidder is eligible or not is the exclusive responsibility of the
BAC and if there is indeed a liability, the members of the BAC should be held liable since they are the persons directly
responsible for the transaction.

The COA in its Decision No. 2015-01912 denied the petition. The COA found Petitioner liable for the disallowed amount
since he failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty. Had he done so, Petitioner could have
discovered the inadequacies of the contract's supporting documents and the winning bidder's ineligibility. Being a
signatory in the contracts, Petitioner is presumed to have prior knowledge that the bidding process was tainted with
ineligibility. As such, Petitioner cannot seek refuge from the Arias doctrine. The fallo thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions of former Governor Tomas N. Jo son III and of Provincial
Accountant Romeo T. Del Mundo, both of the Provincial Government of Nueva Ecija, for exclusion from liability under
Notice of Disallowance No. L-09-05-005 (2004-2007) dated May 14, 2010 are hereby DENIED. Accordingly, petitioners
Joson and Del Mundo, together with the other persons named liable, shall remain solidarily liable for the subject
disallowance.13

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration14 of the COA decision, but the same was denied by the COA in its
Resolution dated January 19, 2016.

Hence this Petition raising the following issues:

I. WHETHER RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON AUDIT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO EXERCISE DUE DILIGENCE IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY RELATIVE TO THE AW ARD OF THE CONTRACT.

II. WHETHER RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON AUDIT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT COMPLETELY DISREGARDED THE FACT THAT THE PROJECT WAS COMPLETED,
ACCEPTED, AND NOW BEING UTILIZED BY THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT.15

Ultimately, the issue to be resolved in this case is whether the COA gravely abused its discretion in holding petitioner
personally liable for the disallowed amount of Php 155,036,681.77.

Petitioner alleged that the COA gravely abused its discretion in holding him personally liable for the disallowed amount.
He claimed that the BAC has the responsibility to check and determine the eligibility of the prospective bidders. Thus,
petitioner, as head of the procuring entity and the local chief executive, has the right to reasonably rely on the faithful
performance by the BAC of its duties. Petitioner further claimed that there was no reason for him to be particularly
cautious and probe every step in the bidding process. As head of the procuring entity, he had to rely to a reasonable
extent on the good faith of his subordinates in the regular performance of their duties. Finally, petitioner argued that
his alleged prior knowledge of the incompleteness of documents and the ineligibility of A.V.T. Construction was merely
presumed by the BAC through his signature on the contracts.
On the other hand, respondent argued that petitioner failed to exercise the necessary due diligence in the performance
of his duty relative to the award of the contract. Had he done so, petitioner could have discovered the glaring
inadequacies of the contract's supporting documents and the winning bidder's ineligibility. Being the signatory in the
contracts, he had every opportunity to examine the supporting documents. Thus, petitioner is presumed to have prior
knowledge that the bidding process was tainted with irregularity due to non-compliance with the eligibility
requirements in R.A. No. 9184. As such, petitioner cannot invoke the doctrine laid down in Amado C. Arias v. The
Sandiganbayan.16

The petition is granted.

The COA found the petitioner liable under Section 19 of the Manual on Certificate of Settlement and Balances, which
provides:

19 .1 The liability of public officers and other persons for audit disallowances shall be determined on the basis of: (a)
the nature of the disallowance; (b) the duties, responsibilities or obligations of the officers/persons concerned; (c) the
extent of their participation or involvement in the disallowed transaction; and (d) the amount of losses or damages
suffered by the government thereby.x x x

xxxx

19.1.2 Public officers who certify to the necessity, legality and availability of funds/budgetary allotments, adequacy of
documents, etc. involving the expenditure of funds or uses of government property shall be liable according to their
respective certifications.

19.1.3 Public officers who approve or authorize transactions involving the expenditure of government funds and uses of
government properties shall be liable for all losses arising out of their negligence or failure to exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family.

Related to the foregoing is Section 103 of the Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445 or the Government Auditing Code of
the Philippines, which states that:

SECTION 103. General liability for unlawful expenditures. - Expenditures of government funds or uses of government
property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to be directly
responsible therefor.

Under this provision, an official or employee shall be personally liable for unauthorized expenditures if the following
requisites are present, to wit: (a) there must be an expenditure of government funds or use of government property;
(b) the expenditure is in violation of law or regulation; and (c) the official is found directly responsible therefor.17

Here, petitioner was held liable because he failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty relative to
the award of the contract. By his signature in the award of the contract to A.V.T. Construction and the contract itself,
the COA held that petitioner is presumed to have prior knowledge that the bidding process was tainted with irregularity
due to the ineligibility of A.V.T. Construction. As head of the procuring entity and the former governor of Nueva Ecija,
the COA maintained that petitioner has a duty to ensure that all the requirements are met and complied with before
entering into a contract with A.V.T. Construction.

This Court already discussed the general policy of the Court m sustaining the decisions of administrative agencies as in
the case of Filomena G. Delos Santos, et. al., v. Commission on Audit18 that:
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the CoA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and
disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is
tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's,
property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check
and balance system inherent in our form of government.

Corollary thereto, it is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially
one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but
also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are
accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness
that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition
questioning its rulings.x x x.19

However, We are reminded that said general policy should not be applied in a straitjacket as there are instances
wherein the decisions of these agencies should be reviewed by this Court. One of those instances is when the
administrative agency committed grave abuse of discretion, as in this case. There is grave abuse of discretion when
there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of
law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim, and despotism.20 In this
case, the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioner liable for the disallowed amount.

Petitioner as the governor of Nueva Ecija and head of the procuring entity pursuant to its duty provided in Section
37.2.121 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9184, approved the recommendation of the BAC to
award the contract to A.V.T. Construction following their evaluation of all the documents submitted by the latter.
Corollarily, petitioner awarded the contract to A.V.T. Construction and signed the same in behalf of the local
government of Nueva Ecija.

The payments to A.V.T. Construction was disallowed by COA for the reason that the prequalification or eligibility
checklist using the "pass/fail" criteria, the Net Financial Contracting Capacity (NFCC), and Technical Eligibility
documents are missing.

It is well to note that the missing documents, the eligibility checklist using the pass/fail criteria,22 the NFCC23 and the
technical eligibility documents, pertain to the pre-qualification stage of the bidding process. Under R.A. No. 9184, the
determination of whether a prospective bidder is eligible or not falls on the BAC. The BAC sets out to determine the
eligibility of the prospective bidders based on their compliance with the eligibility requirements set forth in the
Invitation to Bid and their submission of the legal, technical and financial documents required under Sec. 23.6, Rule VIII
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9184.24

Thus, the presence of the eligibility checklist, the NFCC and the technical eligibility documents are the obligations and
duties of the BAC. The absence of such documents are the direct responsibility of the BAC. Petitioner had no hand in
the preparation of the same. He cannot therefore be held liable for its absence.

Yet, the COA held petitioner liable because of his award of the contract to A.V.T. Construction. The COA relied on Escara
v. People,25 where this Court held that the doctrine in Arias vs. Sandiganbayan26 is unavailing due to Escara's
foreknowledge of an infirmity in the contract, thus:

We agree with the Sandiganbayan that Arias and Magsuci find no application to the instant case, thus:

The above defense of Escara cannot exonerate him from criminal liability. It is true that in the cases of Arias vs.
Sandiganbayan (180 SCRA 309) and Magsuci vs. Sandiganbayan (240 SCRA 13), the Supreme Court rejected the theory
of criminal liability where the head of office, in discharging his official duties, relied in good faith on the acts of his
subordinate. The High Tribunal ruled that there should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval
appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction. In this case, however, accused Escara had
foreknowledge of the irregularity attendant in the delivery of the lumber supplied by Guadines. In his letter (Exhibit "I")
dated January 23, 1993 addressed to Engineer Bert Nierva, of the Provincial Engineering Office of Quezon, he
acknowledged that the materials intended for the construction of the Navotas Bridge had been confiscated by the
DENR officials. Such foreknowledge should have put him on alert and prompted him, at the very least, to make inquiries
into the transaction and to verify whether Guadines had already rectified or submitted the proper legal documents to
recover the ownership of the confiscated lumber from the DENR. This he did not do. Instead, he immediately signed the
Inspection Report (Exhibits "F" and "38- B") and Disbursement Voucher (Exhibits "D" and "11") and looked the other
way, thus, ignoring the fact that the lumber he was authorizing payment for had already been confiscated in favor of
the government.27

Here, COA alleged that petitioner is presumed to know the infirmity of the contract. The COA in its Decision dated
January 29, 2015 reasoned that:

In this case, Governor Joson himself was the signatory in the contracts executed prior to the approval of payments. He
had the opportunity to examine the supporting documents even before entering into the contracts. He should not have
approved the award and signed the contracts due to the absence of the eligibility documents. And because he was the
one who signed the contract on behalf of the province, he is presumed to have prior knowledge that the bidding
process was tainted with irregularity due to the absence of complete documents. Thus, Governor Joson cannot seek
protection from the Arias doctrine.28

However, in the landmark case of Arias v. Sandiganbayan,29 this Court held that the head of the office or agency can
rely to a reasonable extent on the good faith of their subordinates, thus:

We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems-dishonest or negligent
subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence-is suddenly swept into a conspiracy
conviction simply because he did not personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from
inception, and investigate the motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing, his signature as the final
approving authority.

xxxx

We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents, received procedures, and
questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office could personally do all these things in all
vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a
reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into
negotiations. If a department secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call the
restaurant about the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was present at the luncheon, inquire whether
the correct amount of food was served, and otherwise personally look into the reimbursement voucher's accuracy,
propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any
executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be
signed. There are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers that routinely pass
through his hands. The number in bigger offices or departments is even more appalling.

There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy
charge and conviction.30 (Emphasis Ours)

In this case, We hold that petitioner can invoke the protective mantle of the doctrine laid down in Arias. The COA
merely presumed petitioner's foreknowledge of the infirmity of the contract on the latter's signature. Unlike in Escara
where the latter acknowledged in a letter that the materials intended for the construction of the Navotas Bridge had
been confiscated by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Thus, Escara should have inquired
into the transaction and to verify the ownership of the lumber materials. In the present case, other than the mere
signature of the petitioner, no other evidence was presented by the COA to show that petitioner had actual prior
knowledge of the ineligibility of A.V.T. Construction. Nothing appears on record that would prompt petitioner to
thoroughly review and go over every document submitted by A.V.T. Construction, considering that they were already
evaluated and scrutinized by the BAC.

The fact that petitioner is the head of the procuring entity and the governor of Nueva Ecija does not automatically
make him the party ultimately liable for the disallowed amount. He cannot be held liable simply because he was the
final approving authority of the transaction in question and that the employees/officers who processed the same were
under his supervision.31

As this Court held in the case of Ramon Albert v. Celso D. Gangan, et. al.:32

We have consistently held that every person who signs or initials documents in the course of transit through standard
operating procedures does not automatically become a conspirator in a crime which transpired at a stage where he had
no participation. His knowledge of the conspiracy and his active and knowing participation therein must be proved by
positive evidence. The fact that such officer signs or initials a voucher as it is going the rounds does not necessarily
follow that the said person becomes part of a conspiracy in an illegal scheme. The guilt beyond reasonable doubt of
each supposed conspirator must be established.33 (Emphasis Ours)

Petitioner, being the head of the procuring entity in addition to his duties as the governor of Nueva Ecija, is responsible
for the whole province. With the amount of paperwork that normally passes through in his office and the numerous
documents he has to sign, it would be counterproductive to require petitioner to specifically and meticulously examine
each and every document that passes his office. Thus, petitioner has the right to rely to a reasonable extent on the
good faith of his subordinates.

Mere signature of the petitioner in the award of the contract and the contract itself without anything more cannot be
considered as a presumption of liability.1avvphi1 It should be recalled that mere signature does not result to a liability
of the official involved without any showing of irregularity on the document's face such that a detailed examination
would be warranted.34 Liability depends upon the wrong committed and not solely by reason of being the head of a
government agency.35

The COA further held that petitioner failed to exercise due diligence because under Section 37.2.3 of the Implementing
Rules of R.A. No. 9184, the eligibility requirements are part of the contract. In failing to examine the supporting
documents of the contract before he signed the same, petitioner can be held equally liable with the BAC.

Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9184 in Section 37.2.3, the following shall form part of the
contract:

37.2.3. The following documents shall form part of the contract:

a) Contract Agreement;

b) Conditions of Contract;

c) Drawings/Plans, if applicable;
d) Specifications, if applicable;

e) Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid;

f) Bidding Documents;

g) Addenda and/or Supplemental/Bid Bulletins, if any;

h) Bid form including all the documents/statements contained in the winning bidder's two bidding envelopes, as
annexes;

i) Eligibility requirements, documents and/or statements;

i) Performance Security;

k) Credit Line issued by a licensed bank in accordance with the provisions of this IRR-A, if applicable;

1) Notice of Award of Contract and winning bidder's "Conforme" thereto; and

m) Other contract documents that may be required by existing laws and/or the procuring entity concerned. (Emphasis
Ours)

However, the said provision does not provide that the head of the procuring entity, in this case, petitioner Governor
Joson III, must ensure that each of the above-mentioned documents should be present in the contract before he signs
the same on behalf of the local government of Nueva Ecija. What the provision merely provides is that the said
documents form part of the contract. The said provision does not mention any direct responsibility on the part of the
head of the procuring entity to ensure that the said documents are attached in the contract before signing the same. In
fact, in Section 37.2.436 of the IRR, there is no mention of eligibility documents to facilitate the approval of the contract
by the head of the procuring entity.

Assuming that petitioner Joson III committed a mistake in not ensuring that the eligibility documents were attached to
the contract, it is settled that mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable absent any clear showing that
they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.37 In this case, there is no showing that
petitioner Joson III was motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith in failing to ensure that the
eligibility documents of A.V.T. Construction were not attached to the contract. In fact, there was even no evidence that
petitioner was aware that A.V.T. Construction was ineligible due to the absence of the pre-qualification or eligibility
checklist using the "pass/fail" criteria, the NFCC and the Technical eligibility documents. Good faith is always presumed.
Here, the COA failed to overcome the presumption of good faith.

Further, it would be unjust to let petitioner shoulder the disallowed amount not only because petitioner was not the
one directly responsible for the absence of the eligibility documents of A.V.T. Construction, but also because the
government had already received and accepted benefits from the utilization of the hotel specially when there is no
showing that petitioner was ill-motivated or that he had personally profited from the transaction.38 Here, the Nueva
Ecija Friendship Hotel, now named Sierra Madre Suites, is fully functional and in operation. It now operates as one of
the provincial government's economic enterprises.40 It is therefore unjust enrichment to the prejudice of the
petitioner to make him personally liable for the disallowed amount considering that the hotel is being enjoyed and
ulitized by the provincial government.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED.

The Decision dated January 29, 2015 and Resolution dated January 19, 2016 rendered by the Commission on Audit
(COA) in Decision No. 2015-019 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as it held petitioner Tomas N. Joson III
solidarily liable for the amount of the disallowance.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183871 February 18, 2010

LOURDES D. RUBRICO, JEAN RUBRICO APRUEBO, and MARY JOY RUBRICO CARBONEL, Petitioners,

vs.

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, MAJ. DARWIN SY
a.k.a. DARWIN REYES, JIMMY SANTANA, RUBEN ALFARO, CAPT. ANGELO CUARESMA, a certain JONATHAN, P/SUPT.
EDGAR B. ROQUERO, ARSENIO C. GOMEZ, and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo2 (Amparo Rule), Lourdes D. Rubrico, Jean Rubrico Apruebo, and Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel assail and seek to
set aside the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 31, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00003, a petition commenced
under the Amparo Rule.

The petition for the writ of amparo dated October 25, 2007 was originally filed before this Court. After issuing the
desired writ and directing the respondents to file a verified written return, the Court referred the petition to the CA for
summary hearing and appropriate action. The petition and its attachments contained, in substance, the following
allegations:

1. On April 3, 2007, armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron (AISS, for short) based in
Fernando Air Base in Lipa City abducted Lourdes D. Rubrico (Lourdes), then attending a Lenten pabasa in Bagong Bayan,
Dasmariñas, Cavite, and brought to, and detained at, the air base without charges. Following a week of relentless
interrogation - conducted alternately by hooded individuals - and what amounts to verbal abuse and mental
harassment, Lourdes, chair of the Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan, was released at Dasmariñas, Cavite, her
hometown, but only after being made to sign a statement that she would be a military asset.

After Lourdes’ release, the harassment, coming in the form of being tailed on at least two occasions at different places,
i.e., Dasmariñas, Cavite and Baclaran in Pasay City, by motorcycle-riding men in bonnets, continued;

2. During the time Lourdes was missing, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio Gomez (P/Insp. Gomez), then sub-station commander of
Bagong Bayan, Dasmariñas, Cavite, kept sending text messages to Lourdes’ daughter, Mary Joy R. Carbonel (Mary Joy),
bringing her to beaches and asking her questions about Karapatan, an alliance of human rights organizations. He,
however, failed to make an investigation even after Lourdes’ disappearance had been made known to him;

3. A week after Lourdes’ release, another daughter, Jean R. Apruebo (Jean), was constrained to leave their house
because of the presence of men watching them;

4. Lourdes has filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and
administrative complaint for gross abuse of authority and grave misconduct against Capt. Angelo Cuaresma
(Cuaresma), Ruben Alfaro (Alfaro), Jimmy Santana (Santana) and a certain Jonathan, c/o Headquarters 301st AISS,
Fernando Air Base and Maj. Sy/Reyes with address at No. 09 Amsterdam Ext., Merville Subd., Parañaque City, but
nothing has happened; and the threats and harassment incidents have been reported to the Dasmariñas municipal and
Cavite provincial police stations, but nothing eventful resulted from their respective investigations.

Two of the four witnesses to Lourdes’ abduction went into hiding after being visited by government agents in civilian
clothes; and

5. Karapatan conducted an investigation on the incidents. The investigation would indicate that men belonging to the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), namely Capt. Cuaresma of the Philippine Air Force (PAF), Alfaro, Santana,
Jonathan and Maj. Darwin Sy/Reyes, led the abduction of Lourdes; that unknown to the abductors, Lourdes was able to
pilfer a "mission order" which was addressed to CA Ruben Alfaro and signed by Capt. Cuaresma of the PAF.

The petition prayed that a writ of amparo issue, ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any
threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file
an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also
prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
Before the CA, respondents President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, then Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff, Police Director-General (P/Dir. Gen.) Avelino Razon, then Philippine National Police
(PNP) Chief, Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Roquero of the Cavite Police Provincial Office, Police Inspector (P/Insp.)
Gomez, now retired, and the OMB (answering respondents, collectively) filed, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory averments against them. The OSG
also denied the allegations against the following impleaded persons, namely: Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and
Sy/Reyes, for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations’ truth. And by way of
general affirmative defenses, answering respondents interposed the following defenses: (1) the President may not be
sued during her incumbency; and (2) the petition is incomplete, as it fails to indicate the matters required by Sec. 5(d)
and (e) of the Amparo Rule.4

Attached to the return were the affidavits of the following, among other public officials, containing their respective
affirmative defenses and/or statements of what they had undertaken or committed to undertake regarding the claimed
disappearance of Lourdes and the harassments made to bear on her and her daughters:

1. Gen. Esperon – attested that, pursuant to a directive of then Secretary of National Defense (SND) Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr., he ordered the Commanding General of the PAF, with information to all concerned units, to conduct an
investigation to establish the circumstances behind the disappearance and the reappearance of Lourdes insofar as the
involvement of alleged personnel/unit is concerned. The Provost Marshall General and the Office of the Judge Advocate
General (JAGO), AFP, also undertook a parallel action.

Gen. Esperon manifested his resolve to provide the CA with material results of the investigation; to continue with the
probe on the alleged abduction of Lourdes and to bring those responsible, including military personnel, to the bar of
justice when warranted by the findings and the competent evidence that may be gathered in the investigation process
by those mandated to look into the matter;5

2. P/Dir. Gen. Razon - stated that an investigation he immediately ordered upon receiving a copy of the petition is on-
going vis-à-vis Lourdes’ abduction, and that a background verification with the PNP Personnel Accounting and
Information System disclosed that the names Santana, Alfaro, Cuaresma and one Jonathan do not appear in the police
personnel records, although the PNP files carry the name of Darwin Reyes Y. Muga.

Per the initial investigation report of the Dasmariñas municipal police station, P/Dir. Gen. Razon disclosed, Lourdes was
abducted by six armed men in the afternoon of April 3, 2007 and dragged aboard a Toyota Revo with plate number XRR
428, which plate was issued for a Mitsubishi van to AK Cottage Industry with address at 9 Amsterdam St., Merville
Subd., Parañaque City. The person residing in the apartment on that given address is one Darius/Erwin See @ Darius
Reyes allegedly working, per the latter’s house helper, in Camp Aguinaldo.

P/Dir. Gen. Razon, however, bemoaned the fact that Mrs. Rubrico never contacted nor coordinated with the local
police or other investigating units of the PNP after her release, although she is in the best position to establish the
identity of her abductors and/or provide positive description through composite sketching. Nonetheless, he manifested
that the PNP is ready to assist and protect the petitioners and the key witnesses from threats, harassments and
intimidation from whatever source and, at the same time, to assist the Court in the implementation of its
orders.61avvphi1

3. P/Supt. Roquero – stated conducting, upon receipt of Lourdes’ complaint, an investigation and submitting the
corresponding report to the PNP Calabarzon, observing that neither Lourdes nor her relatives provided the police with
relevant information;

4. P/Insp. Gomez – alleged that Lourdes, her kin and witnesses refused to cooperate with the investigating Cavite PNP;
and
5. Overall Deputy Ombudsman Orlando Casimiro - alleged that cases for violation of Articles 267 and 124, or kidnapping
and arbitrary detention, respectively, have been filed with, and are under preliminary investigation by the OMB against
those believed to be involved in Lourdes’ kidnapping; that upon receipt of the petition for a writ of amparo, proper
coordination was made with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and other Law Enforcement Offices
(MOLEO) where the subject criminal and administrative complaints were filed.

Commenting on the return, petitioners pointed out that the return was no more than a general denial of averments in
the petition. They, thus, pleaded to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, Santana, Alfaro,
Capt. Cuaresma, Darwin Sy, and Jonathan. And with leave of court, they also asked to serve notice of the petition
through publication, owing to their failure to secure the current address of the latter five and thus submit, as the CA
required, proof of service of the petition on them.

The hearing started on November 13, 2007.7 In that setting, petitioners’ counsel prayed for the issuance of a temporary
protection order (TPO) against the answering respondents on the basis of the allegations in the petition. At the hearing
of November 20, 2007, the CA granted petitioners’ motion that the petition and writ be served by the court’s process
server on Darwin Sy/Reyes, Santana, Alfaro, Capt. Cuaresma, and Jonathan.

The legal skirmishes that followed over the propriety of excluding President Arroyo from the petition, petitioners’
motions for service by publication, and the issuance of a TPO are not of decisive pertinence in this recital. The bottom
line is that, by separate resolutions, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case; denied the motion for a
TPO for the court’s want of authority to issue it in the tenor sought by petitioners; and effectively denied the motion for
notice by publication owing to petitioners’ failure to submit the affidavit required under Sec. 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court.8

After due proceedings, the CA rendered, on July 31, 2008, its partial judgment, subject of this review, disposing of the
petition but only insofar as the answering respondents were concerned. The fallo of the CA decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, partial judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant petition with respect
to respondent Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Supt. Edgar B. Roquero, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio C.
Gomez (ret.) and the Office of the Ombudsman.

Nevertheless, in order that petitioners’ complaint will not end up as another unsolved case, the heads of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police are directed to ensure that the investigations already
commenced are diligently pursued to bring the perpetrators to justice. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon are directed to regularly update petitioners and this Court on the status of
their investigation.

SO ORDERED.

In this recourse, petitioners formulate the issue for resolution in the following wise:

WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and dropping President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.

Petitioners first take issue on the President’s purported lack of immunity from suit during her term of office. The 1987
Constitution, so they claim, has removed such immunity heretofore enjoyed by the chief executive under the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions.
Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government,
albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986
Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that
it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure.9 The Court
subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of
the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and why this must be so:

Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil
or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high
office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore,
it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to
the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the
executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties
imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.10 x x x

And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to what specific presidential act or omission
violated or threatened to violate petitioners’ protected rights.

This brings us to the correctness of the assailed dismissal of the petition with respect to Gen. Esperon, P/Dir. Gen.
Razon, P/Supt. Roquero, P/Insp. Gomez, and the OMB.

None of the four individual respondents immediately referred to above has been implicated as being connected to, let
alone as being behind, the alleged abduction and harassment of petitioner Lourdes. Their names were not even
mentioned in Lourdes’ Sinumpaang Salaysay11 of April 2007. The same goes for the respective Sinumpaang Salaysay
and/or Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay of Jean12 and Mary Joy.13

As explained by the CA, Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon were included in the case on the theory that they, as
commanders, were responsible for the unlawful acts allegedly committed by their subordinates against petitioners. To
the appellate court, "the privilege of the writ of amparo must be denied as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon
for the simple reason that petitioners have not presented evidence showing that those who allegedly abducted and
illegally detained Lourdes and later threatened her and her family were, in fact, members of the military or the police
force." The two generals, the CA’s holding broadly hinted, would have been accountable for the abduction and threats
if the actual malefactors were members of the AFP or PNP.

As regards the three other answering respondents, they were impleaded because they allegedly had not exerted the
required extraordinary diligence in investigating and satisfactorily resolving Lourdes’ disappearance or bringing to
justice the actual perpetrators of what amounted to a criminal act, albeit there were allegations against P/Insp. Gomez
of acts constituting threats against Mary Joy.

While in a qualified sense tenable, the dismissal by the CA of the case as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon is
incorrect if viewed against the backdrop of the stated rationale underpinning the assailed decision vis-à-vis the two
generals, i.e., command responsibility. The Court assumes the latter stance owing to the fact that command
responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied under international law, has little, if at all, bearing in
amparo proceedings.

The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed
combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their
control in international wars or domestic conflict."14 In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of
criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,15 foreshadowing
the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he
be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of
individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for
failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators16 (as opposed to crimes he ordered).

The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statute17 of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to which the
Philippines is signatory. Sec. 28 of the Statute imposes individual responsibility on military commanders for crimes
committed by forces under their control. The country is, however, not yet formally bound by the terms and provisions
embodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate has yet to extend concurrence in its ratification.18

While there are several pending bills on command responsibility,19 there is still no Philippine law that provides for
criminal liability under that doctrine.20

It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for
extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that
the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in
accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution.21 Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these
proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity
through omission, for individual respondents’ criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other
words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an
infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed. As the Court stressed in Secretary of National Defense v.
Manalo (Manalo),22 the writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and effective procedural relief against
violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo
suit, however, "is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or
administrative liability requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings."23 Of the same
tenor, and by way of expounding on the nature and role of amparo, is what the Court said in Razon v. Tagitis:

It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial
killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance [threats thereof or
extra-judicial killings] for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [or extra-
judicial killings].

xxxx

As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized
separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and
are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not
spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal x x x are matters of substantive law that only the
Legislature has the power to enact.24 x x x

If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to
determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and
harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the
premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not
be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative
disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be any.

Petitioners, as the CA has declared, have not adduced substantial evidence pointing to government involvement in the
disappearance of Lourdes. To a concrete point, petitioners have not shown that the actual perpetrators of the
abduction and the harassments that followed formally or informally formed part of either the military or the police
chain of command. A preliminary police investigation report, however, would tend to show a link, however hazy,
between the license plate (XRR 428) of the vehicle allegedly used in the abduction of Lourdes and the address of
Darwin Reyes/Sy, who was alleged to be working in Camp Aguinaldo.25 Then, too, there were affidavits and
testimonies on events that transpired which, if taken together, logically point to military involvement in the alleged
disappearance of Lourdes, such as, but not limited to, her abduction in broad daylight, her being forcibly dragged to a
vehicle blindfolded and then being brought to a place where the sounds of planes taking off and landing could be
heard. Mention may also be made of the fact that Lourdes was asked about her membership in the Communist Party
and of being released when she agreed to become an "asset."

Still and all, the identities and links to the AFP or the PNP of the alleged abductors, namely Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana,
Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, have yet to be established.

Based on the separate sworn statements of Maj. Paul Ciano26 and Technical Sergeant John N. Romano,27 officer-in-
charge and a staff of the 301st AISS, respectively, none of the alleged abductors of Lourdes belonged to the 301st AISS
based in San Fernando Air Base. Neither were they members of any unit of the Philippine Air Force, per the
certification28 of Col. Raul Dimatactac, Air Force Adjutant. And as stated in the challenged CA decision, a verification
with the Personnel Accounting and Information System of the PNP yielded the information that, except for a certain
Darwin Reyes y Muga, the other alleged abductors, i.e., Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana and Jonathan, were not members of
the PNP. Petitioners, when given the opportunity to identify Police Officer 1 Darwin Reyes y Muga, made no effort to
confirm if he was the same Maj. Darwin Reyes a.k.a. Darwin Sy they were implicating in Lourdes’ abduction.

Petitioners, to be sure, have not successfully controverted answering respondents’ documentary evidence, adduced to
debunk the former’s allegations directly linking Lourdes’ abductors and tormentors to the military or the police
establishment. We note, in fact, that Lourdes, when queried on cross-examination, expressed the belief that Sy/Reyes
was an NBI agent.29 The Court is, of course, aware of what was referred to in Razon30 as the "evidentiary difficulties"
presented by the nature of, and encountered by petitioners in, enforced disappearance cases. But it is precisely for this
reason that the Court should take care too that no wrong message is sent, lest one conclude that any kind or degree of
evidence, even the outlandish, would suffice to secure amparo remedies and protection.

Sec. 17, as complemented by Sec. 18 of the Amparo Rule, expressly prescribes the minimum evidentiary substantiation
requirement and norm to support a cause of action under the Rule, thus:

Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required.—The parties shall establish their claims by substantial
evidence.

xxxx

Sec. 18. Judgment.—x x x If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the
privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.
(Emphasis added.)

Substantial evidence is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of liability
against the person charged;31 it is more than a scintilla of evidence. It means such amount of relevant evidence which
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might
opine otherwise.32 Per the CA’s evaluation of their evidence, consisting of the testimonies and affidavits of the three
Rubrico women and five other individuals, petitioners have not satisfactorily hurdled the evidentiary bar required of
and assigned to them under the Amparo Rule. In a very real sense, the burden of evidence never even shifted to
answering respondents. The Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the appellate court’s determination of the
answering respondents’ role in the alleged enforced disappearance of petitioner Lourdes and the threats to her family’s
security.

Notwithstanding the foregoing findings, the Court notes that both Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon, per their
separate affidavits, lost no time, upon their receipt of the order to make a return on the writ, in issuing directives to the
concerned units in their respective commands for a thorough probe of the case and in providing the investigators the
necessary support. As of this date, however, the investigations have yet to be concluded with some definite findings
and recommendation.

As regards P/Supt. Romero and P/Insp. Gomez, the Court is more than satisfied that they have no direct or indirect
hand in the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats against her daughters. As police officers,
though, theirs was the duty to thoroughly investigate the abduction of Lourdes, a duty that would include looking into
the cause, manner, and like details of the disappearance; identifying witnesses and obtaining statements from them;
and following evidentiary leads, such as the Toyota Revo vehicle with plate number XRR 428, and securing and
preserving evidence related to the abduction and the threats that may aid in the prosecution of the person/s
responsible. As we said in Manalo,33 the right to security, as a guarantee of protection by the government, is breached
by the superficial and one-sided––hence, ineffective––investigation by the military or the police of reported cases
under their jurisdiction. As found by the CA, the local police stations concerned, including P/Supt. Roquero and P/Insp.
Gomez, did conduct a preliminary fact-finding on petitioners’ complaint. They could not, however, make any headway,
owing to what was perceived to be the refusal of Lourdes, her family, and her witnesses to cooperate. Petitioners’
counsel, Atty. Rex J.M.A. Fernandez, provided a plausible explanation for his clients and their witnesses’ attitude,
"[They] do not trust the government agencies to protect them."34 The difficulty arising from a situation where the
party whose complicity in extra-judicial killing or enforced disappearance, as the case may be, is alleged to be the same
party who investigates it is understandable, though.

The seeming reluctance on the part of the Rubricos or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to pose a hindrance to
the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in question to its natural end. To repeat what the Court
said in Manalo, the right to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of one’s right by the government. And
this protection includes conducting effective investigations of extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats of
the same kind. The nature and importance of an investigation are captured in the Velasquez Rodriguez case,35 in which
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights pronounced:

[The duty to investigate] must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be
ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not a step taken
by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon offer of proof, without an
effective search for the truth by the government. (Emphasis added.)

This brings us to Mary Joy’s charge of having been harassed by respondent P/Insp. Gomez. With the view we take of
this incident, there is nothing concrete to support the charge, save for Mary Joy’s bare allegations of harassment. We
cite with approval the following self-explanatory excerpt from the appealed CA decision:

In fact, during her cross-examination, when asked what specific act or threat P/Sr. Gomez (ret) committed against her
or her mother and sister, Mary Joy replied "None …"36

Similarly, there appears to be no basis for petitioners’ allegations about the OMB failing to act on their complaint
against those who allegedly abducted and illegally detained Lourdes. Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the OMB has
taken the necessary appropriate action on said complaint. As culled from the affidavit37 of the Deputy Overall
Ombudsman and the joint affidavits38 of the designated investigators, all dated November 7, 2007, the OMB had, on
the basis of said complaint, commenced criminal39 and administrative40 proceedings, docketed as OMB-P-C-07-0602-E
and OMB-P-A 07-567-E, respectively, against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes. The requisite orders
for the submission of counter-affidavits and verified position papers had been sent out.

The privilege of the writ of amparo, to reiterate, is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances or threats of similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a
public official or employee or a private individual.

At this juncture, it bears to state that petitioners have not provided the CA with the correct addresses of respondents
Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes. The mailed envelopes containing the petition for a writ of amparo
individually addressed to each of them have all been returned unopened. And petitioners’ motion interposed before
the appellate court for notice or service via publication has not been accompanied by supporting affidavits as required
by the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the appealed CA partial judgment––disposing of the underlying petition for a writ of
amparo without (1) pronouncement as to the accountability, or lack of it, of the four non-answering respondents or (2)
outright dismissal of the same petition as to them––hews to the prescription of Sec. 20 of the Amparo Rule on archiving
and reviving cases.41 Parenthetically, petitioners have also not furnished this Court with sufficient data as to where the
afore-named respondents may be served a copy of their petition for review.

Apart from the foregoing considerations, the petition did not allege ultimate facts as would link the OMB in any manner
to the violation or threat of violation of the petitioners’ rights to life, liberty, or personal security.

The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and
security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life.42 It is an extraordinary writ
conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced
disappearances.43 Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the
Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the
desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.

In their petition for a writ of amparo, petitioners asked, as their main prayer, that the Court order the impleaded
respondents "to immediately desist from doing any acts that would threaten or seem to threaten the security of the
Petitioners and to desist from approaching Petitioners, x x x their residences and offices where they are working under
pain of contempt of [this] Court." Petitioners, however, failed to adduce the threshold substantive evidence to establish
the predicate facts to support their cause of action, i.e., the adverted harassments and threats to their life, liberty, or
security, against responding respondents, as responsible for the disappearance and harassments complained of. This is
not to say, however, that petitioners’ allegation on the fact of the abduction incident or harassment is necessarily
contrived. The reality on the ground, however, is that the military or police connection has not been adequately proved
either by identifying the malefactors as components of the AFP or PNP; or in case identification is not possible, by
showing that they acted with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government. For this reason, the Court is unable
to ascribe the authorship of and responsibility for the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the harassment
and threats on her daughters to individual respondents. To this extent, the dismissal of the case against them is correct
and must, accordingly, be sustained.

Prescinding from the above considerations, the Court distinctly notes that the appealed decision veritably extended the
privilege of the writ of amparo to petitioners when it granted what to us are amparo reliefs. Consider: the appellate
court decreed, and rightly so, that the police and the military take specific measures for the protection of petitioners’
right or threatened right to liberty or security. The protection came in the form of directives specifically to Gen. Esperon
and P/Dir. Gen. Razon, requiring each of them (1) to ensure that the investigations already commenced by the AFP and
PNP units, respectively, under them on the complaints of Lourdes and her daughters are being pursued with urgency to
bring to justice the perpetrators of the acts complained of; and (2) to submit to the CA, copy furnished the petitioners,
a regular report on the progress and status of the investigations. The directives obviously go to Gen. Esperon in his
capacity as head of the AFP and, in a sense, chief guarantor of order and security in the country. On the other hand,
P/Dir. Gen. Razon is called upon to perform a duty pertaining to the PNP, a crime-preventing, investigatory, and
arresting institution.

As the CA, however, formulated its directives, no definitive time frame was set in its decision for the completion of the
investigation and the reportorial requirements. It also failed to consider Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon’s
imminent compulsory retirement from the military and police services, respectively. Accordingly, the CA directives, as
hereinafter redefined and amplified to fully enforce the amparo remedies, are hereby given to, and shall be directly
enforceable against, whoever sits as the commanding general of the AFP and the PNP.

At this stage, two postulates and their implications need highlighting for a proper disposition of this case.
First, a criminal complaint for kidnapping and, alternatively, for arbitrary detention rooted in the same acts and
incidents leading to the filing of the subject amparo petition has been instituted with the OMB, docketed as OMB-P-C-
O7-0602-E. The usual initial steps to determine the existence of a prima facie case against the five (5) impleaded
individuals suspected to be actually involved in the detention of Lourdes have been set in motion. It must be pointed
out, though, that the filing44 of the OMB complaint came before the effectivity of the Amparo Rule on October 24,
2007.

Second, Sec. 2245 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an amparo petition should a criminal action have, in the
meanwhile, been commenced. The succeeding Sec. 23,46 on the other hand, provides that when the criminal suit is
filed subsequent to a petition for amparo, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action where the Amparo
Rule shall nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under the Rule. Under the terms of said Sec. 22, the present
petition ought to have been dismissed at the outset. But as things stand, the outright dismissal of the petition by force
of that section is no longer technically feasible in light of the interplay of the following factual mix: (1) the Court has,
pursuant to Sec. 647 of the Rule, already issued ex parte the writ of amparo; (2) the CA, after a summary hearing, has
dismissed the petition, but not on the basis of Sec. 22; and (3) the complaint in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E named as
respondents only those believed to be the actual abductors of Lourdes, while the instant petition impleaded, in
addition, those tasked to investigate the kidnapping and detention incidents and their superiors at the top. Yet, the acts
and/or omissions subject of the criminal complaint and the amparo petition are so linked as to call for the consolidation
of both proceedings to obviate the mischief inherent in a multiplicity-of-suits situation.

Given the above perspective and to fully apply the beneficial nature of the writ of amparo as an inexpensive and
effective tool to protect certain rights violated or threatened to be violated, the Court hereby adjusts to a degree the
literal application of Secs. 22 and 23 of the Amparo Rule to fittingly address the situation obtaining under the premises.
48 Towards this end, two things are at once indicated: (1) the consolidation of the probe and fact-finding aspects of the
instant petition with the investigation of the criminal complaint before the OMB; and (2) the incorporation in the same
criminal complaint of the allegations in this petition bearing on the threats to the right to security. Withal, the OMB
should be furnished copies of the investigation reports to aid that body in its own investigation and eventual resolution
of OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the OMB shall be given easy access to all pertinent documents and evidence, if any,
adduced before the CA. Necessarily, Lourdes, as complainant in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E, should be allowed, if so minded,
to amend her basic criminal complaint if the consolidation of cases is to be fully effective.

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS this petition for review and makes a decision:

(1) Affirming the dropping of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the petition for a writ of amparo;

(2) Affirming the dismissal of the amparo case as against Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon,
insofar as it tended, under the command responsibility principle, to attach accountability and responsibility to them, as
then AFP Chief of Staff and then PNP Chief, for the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the ensuing
harassments allegedly committed against petitioners. The dismissal of the petition with respect to the OMB is also
affirmed for failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced
disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed; and

(3) Directing the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, or his successor, and the incumbent Director-General of the PNP, or his
successor, to ensure that the investigations already commenced by their respective units on the alleged abduction of
Lourdes Rubrico and the alleged harassments and threats she and her daughters were made to endure are pursued
with extraordinary diligence as required by Sec. 1749 of the Amparo Rule. They shall order their subordinate officials, in
particular, to do the following:

(a) Determine based on records, past and present, the identities and locations of respondents Maj. Darwin Sy, a.k.a.
Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and one Jonathan; and submit certifications of
this determination to the OMB with copy furnished to petitioners, the CA, and this Court;
(b) Pursue with extraordinary diligence the evidentiary leads relating to Maj. Darwin Sy and the Toyota Revo vehicle
with Plate No. XRR 428; and

(c) Prepare, with the assistance of petitioners and/or witnesses, cartographic sketches of respondents Maj. Sy/Reyes,
Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and a certain Jonathan to aid in positively identifying and
locating them.

The investigations shall be completed not later than six (6) months from receipt of this Decision; and within thirty (30)
days after completion of the investigations, the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Director-General of the PNP shall
submit a full report of the results of the investigations to the Court, the CA, the OMB, and petitioners.

This case is accordingly referred back to the CA for the purpose of monitoring the investigations and the actions of the
AFP and the PNP.

Subject to the foregoing modifications, the Court AFFIRMS the partial judgment dated July 31, 2008 of the CA.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191805 November 15, 2011

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ,
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner,

vs.

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ.
GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an
officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name "HARRY," ANTONIO CRUZ,
ALDWIN "BONG" PASICOLAN and VINCENT CALLAGAN, Respondents.

x------------------------x
G.R. No. 193160

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ,
POLICE DIR. GEN. JESUS A. VERSOZA, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, BGEN. REMEGIO M. DE VERA, 1st LT. RYAN S.
MATUTINA, LT. COL. LAURENCE E. MINA, ANTONIO C. CRUZ, ALDWIN C. PASICOLAN and VICENTE A. CALLAGAN,
Petitioners,

vs.

NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Before this Court are two consolidated cases, namely, (1) Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari dated 20 April 2010
(G.R. No. 191805), and (2) Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 19 August 2010 (G.R. No. 193160).1 Both Petitions
assail the 12 April 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data is GRANTED.

Respondents Gen. Victor S. Ibrado, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Z. Ochoa, PCSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino,
PSSupt. Jude W. Santos, Col. Remigio M. De Vera, Lt. Col. Laurence E. Mina and 1Lt. Ryan S. Matutina, or their
replacements in their official posts if they have already vacated the same, are ORDERED to furnish this Court within five
(5) days from notice of this decision, official or unofficial reports pertaining to petitioner – covering but not limited to
intelligence reports, operation reports and provost marshal reports prior to, during and subsequent to September 6,
2009 – made by the 5th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, its branches and subsidiaries, including the 17th Infantry
Battalion, Philippine Army.

The above-named respondents are also DIRECTED to refrain from using the said reports in any transaction or operation
of the military. Necessarily, the afore-named respondents are ORDERED to expunge from the records of the military all
documents having any reference to petitioner.

Likewise, the afore-named respondents, as well as respondents Police Director General Jesus Ame Versoza, Antonio
Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicente Callagan are DIRECTED to ensure that no further violation of petitioner’s rights to
life, liberty and security is committed against the latter or any member of his family.

The petition is DISMISSED with respect to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on account of her presidential immunity
from suit. Similarly, the petition is DISMISSED with respect to respondents Calog and George Palacpac or Harry for lack
of merit.

Petitioner’s prayer for issuance of a temporary protection order and inspection order is DENIED.

Noriel Rodriguez (Rodriguez) is petitioner in G.R. No. 191805 and respondent in G.R. No. 193160. He is a member of
Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas (KMP).
On the other hand, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (former President Arroyo), Police Director General (PDG.) Jesus A.
Verzosa, Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSupt.) Jude W. Santos, Brigadier General (Brig. Gen.) Remegio M. De Vera,
First Lieutenant (1st Lt.) Ryan S. Matutina, Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col.) Laurence E. Mina, Antonio C. Cruz (Cruz), Aldwin
C. Pasicolan (Pasicolan) and Vicente A. Callagan (Callagan) are respondents in G.R. No. 191805 and petitioners in G.R.
No. 193160. At the time the events relevant to the present Petitions occurred, former President Arroyo was the
President of the Philippines. PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina were
officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP). Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan were Special Investigators of the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in Region II.

Antecedent Facts

Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its
members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.2

On 6 September 2009, at 5:00 p.m., Rodriguez had just reached Barangay Tapel, Cagayan onboard a tricycle driven by
Hermie Antonio Carlos (Carlos), when four men forcibly took him and forced him into a car. Inside the vehicle were
several men in civilian clothes, one of whom was holding a .45 caliber pistol. Subsequently, three more persons arrived,
and one of them carried a gun at his side. Two men boarded the car, while the others rode on the tricycle.3

The men tied the hands of Rodriguez, ordered him to lie on his stomach, sat on his back and started punching him. The
car travelled towards the direction of Sta. Teresita-Mission and moved around the area until about 2:00 a.m. During the
drive, the men forced Rodriguez to confess to being a member of the New People’s Army (NPA), but he remained
silent. The car then entered a place that appeared to be a military camp. There were soldiers all over the area, and
there was a banner with the word "Bravo" written on it. Rodriguez later on learned that the camp belonged to the 17th
Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.4

Rodriguez was brought to a canteen, where six men confronted him, ordering him to confess to his membership in the
NPA. Due to his exhaustion, he unintentionally fell asleep. As a result, the men hit him on the head to wake him up.
After the interrogation, two of the men guarded him, but did not allow him to sleep.5

In the morning of 7 September 2009, the men tied the hands of Rodriguez, blindfolded him and made him board a
vehicle. While they were in transit, the soldiers repeatedly hit him in the head and threatened to kill him. When the car
stopped after about ten minutes, the soldiers brought him to a room, removed his blindfold, and forced him to confess
to being a member of the NPA. During the interrogation, the soldiers repeatedly hit him on the head. Thereafter, he
was detained inside the room for the entire day. The soldiers tied his stomach to a papag, and gave him rice and viand.
Fearing that the food might be poisoned, he refused to eat anything. He slept on the papag while being tied to it at the
waist.6

On 8 September 2009, the men forced Rodriguez into a vehicle, which brought them to Bugey and Mission. While
passing houses along the way, the men asked him if his contacts lived in those houses. When he failed to answer, a
soldier pointed a gun to his head and threatened to kill him and his family. Because he remained silent, the soldiers
beat him and tied him up. The vehicle returned to the military camp at past 1:00 p.m., where he was again subjected to
tactical interrogation about the location of an NPA camp and his alleged NPA comrades. He suffered incessant mauling
every time he failed to answer.7

At dawn on 9 September 2009, soldiers armed with rifles took Rodriguez and made him their guide on their way to an
NPA camp in Birao. Accompanying them was a man named Harry, who, according to the soldiers, was an NPA member
who had surrendered to the military. Harry pointed to Rodriguez and called him a member of the NPA. He also heard
Harry tell the soldiers that the latter knew the area well and was acquainted with a man named Elvis. The soldiers
loaded Rodriguez into a military truck and drove to Tabbak, Bugey. While he was walking with the soldiers, he noticed a
soldier with the name tag "Matutina," who appeared to be an official because the other soldiers addressed him as
"sir."8
Upon reaching Birao on foot, the soldiers looked for and was able to locate a certain Elvis and told him that Rodriguez
had identified his whereabouts location. The soldiers forced Rodriguez to convince Elvis to disclose the location of the
NPA camp. They brought the two to the mountains, where both were threatened with death. When the soldiers
punched Elvis, Rodriguez told them that he would reveal the location of the NPA camp if they let Elvis go home. They
finally released Elvis around 3:00 p.m. that day. The soldiers and Rodriguez spent the next three nights in the
mountains.9

On 12 September 2009, the soldiers again hit Rodriguez and forced him to identify the location of the NPA camp. He
was blindfolded and warned to get ready because they would beat him up again in the military camp. Upon arrival
therein, they brought him to the same room where he had first been detained, and two soldiers mauled him again.
They repeatedly punched and kicked him. In the afternoon, they let him rest and gave him an Alaxan tablet. Thereafter,
he fell asleep due to over-fatigue and extreme body pain. The soldiers, however, hit him again. After giving him a pen
and a piece of paper, they ordered him to write down his request for rice from the people. When he refused, the
soldiers maltreated him once more.10

On 13 September 2009, the soldiers forced Rodriguez to sign documents declaring that he had surrendered in an
encounter in Cumao, and

that the soldiers did not shoot him because he became a military asset in May. When he refused to sign the document,
he received another beating. Thus, he was compelled to sign, but did so using a different signature to show that he was
merely coerced.11

The soldiers showed Rodriguez photographs of different persons and asked him if he knew the men appearing therein.
When he told them that he did not recognize the individuals on the photos, the soldiers instructed him to write down
the name of his school and organization, but he declined. The soldiers then wrote something on the paper, making it
appear that he was the one who had written it, and forced him to sign the document. The soldiers took photographs of
him while he was signing. Afterwards, the soldiers forced him down, held his hands, and sat on his feet. He did not only
receive another beating, but was also electrocuted. The torture lasted for about an hour.12

At 11:00 p.m. on 15 September 2009, the soldiers brought Rodriguez to a military operation in the mountains, where
he saw Matutina again. They all spent the night there.13

In the morning of 16 September 2009, the soldiers and Rodriguez started their descent. When they stopped, the
soldiers took his photograph and asked him to name the location of the NPA camp. Thereafter, they all returned to the
military camp. The soldiers asked him to take a bath and wear a white polo shirt handed to him. He was then brought
to the Enrile Medical Center, where Dr. Juliet Ramil (Dr. Ramil) examined him.14 When the doctor asked him why he
had bruises and contusions, he lied and told her that he sustained them when he slipped, as he noticed a soldier
observing him. Dr. Ramil’s medical certificate indicated that he suffered from four hematomas in the epigastric area,
chest and sternum.15

Back at the camp, the soldiers let Rodriguez eat with several military officials and took pictures of him while he was
eating with them. They also asked him to point to a map in front of him and again took his photograph. Later, they told
him that he would finally see his mother. 16

Rodriguez was brought to another military camp, where he was ordered to sign a piece of paper stating that he was a
surrenderee and was never beaten up. Scared and desperate to end his ordeal, he signed the paper and was warned
not to report anything to the media.17
Around 6:00 a.m. on 17 September 2009, the soldiers instructed petitioner to take a bath. They gave him a pair of jeans
and perfume. While he was having breakfast, the two soldiers guarding him repeatedly reminded him not to disclose to
the media his experience in the camp and to say instead that he had surrendered to the military.18

At 9:00 a.m. on the same day, the mother and the brother of Rodriguez arrived surrounded by several men. His mother,
Wilma Rodriguez (Wilma), talked to Lt. Col. Mina. Rodriguez heard one of the soldiers tell Wilma that he had
surrendered to the military and had long been its asset. His brother, Rodel Rodriguez (Rodel), informed him that the
men accompanying them were from the CHR, namely, Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan. Upon seeing Rodriguez, Cruz
instructed him to lift up his shirt, and one of the CHR employees took photographs of his bruises.19

A soldier tried to convince Wilma to let Rodriguez stay in the camp for another two weeks to supposedly prevent the
NPA from taking revenge on him. Respondent Calog also approached Rodriguez and Rodel and asked them to become
military assets. Rodel refused and insisted that they take Rodriguez home to Manila. Again, the soldiers reminded them
to refrain from facing the media. The soldiers also told them that the latter will be taken to the Tuguegarao Airport and
guarded until they reached home.20

Rodriguez and his family missed their flight. Subsequently, the soldiers accompanied them to the CHR office, where
Rodriguez was made to sign an affidavit stating that he was neither abducted nor tortured. Afraid and desperate to
return home, he was forced to sign the document. Cruz advised him not to file a case against his abductors because
they had already freed him. The CHR personnel then led him and his family to the CHR Toyota Tamaraw FX service
vehicle. He noticed that a vehicle with soldiers on board followed them.21

The Tamaraw FX pulled over and respondent 1st Lt. Matutina boarded the vehicle. Upon reaching a mall in Isabela,
Rodriguez, his family, Callagan, 1st Lt. Matutina and two other soldiers transferred to an orange Toyota Revo with plate
number WTG 579. Upon reaching the boundary of Nueva Ecija and Nueva Viscaya, 1st Lt. Matutina alighted and called
Rodriguez to a diner. A certain Alan approached Rodriguez and handed him a cellphone with a SIM card. The latter and
his family then left and resumed their journey back home.22

Rodriguez reached his house in Sta. Ana, Manila at 3:00 a.m. on 18 September 2010. Callagan and two soldiers went
inside the house, and took photographs and a video footage thereof. The soldiers explained that the photos and videos
would serve as evidence of the fact that Rodriguez and his family were able to arrive home safely. Despite Rodriguez’s
efforts to confront the soldiers about their acts, they still continued and only left thirty minutes later.23

On 19 September 2009, Dr. Reginaldo Pamugas, a physician trained by the International Committee on Torture and
Rehabilitation, examined Rodriguez and issued a Medical Certificate stating that the latter had been a victim of
torture.24

Around 7:00 a.m. on 3 November 2010, Rodriguez and his girlfriend, Aileen Hazel Robles, noticed that several
suspicious-looking men followed them at the Metro Rail Transit (MRT), in the streets and on a jeepney.25

On 7 December 2009, Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of
Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal
Properties dated 2 December 2009.26 The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG.
Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera,
1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac (Palacpac), Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan. The petition prayed for the following
reliefs:

a. The issuance of the writ of amparo ordering respondents to desist from violating Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and
security.
b. The issuance of an order to enjoin respondents from doing harm to or approaching Rodriguez, his family and his
witnesses.

c. Allowing the inspection of the detention areas of the Headquarters of Bravo Co., 5th Infantry Division, Maguing,
Gonzaga, Cagayan and another place near where Rodriguez was brought.

d. Ordering respondents to produce documents submitted to them regarding any report on Rodriguez, including
operation reports and provost marshall reports of the 5th Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), prior to, on and subsequent to 6 September 2009.1âwphi1

e. Ordering records pertinent or in any way connected to Rodriguez, which are in the custody of respondents, to be
expunged, disabused, and forever barred from being used.27

On 15 December 2009, we granted the respective writs after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged that Rodriguez
had been abducted, tortured and later released by members of the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.28
We likewise ordered respondents therein to file a verified return on the writs on or before 22 December 2009 and to
comment on the petition on or before 4 January 2010.29 Finally, we directed the Court of Appeals to hear the petition
on 4 January 2010 and decide on the case within 10 days after its submission for decision.30

During the initial hearing on 4 January 2010, the Court of Appeals required the parties to submit affidavits and other
pieces of evidence at the next scheduled hearing on 27 January 2010.31

On 8 January 2010, respondents therein, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed their Return of the
Writ, which was likewise considered as their comment on the petition.32 In their Return, respondents therein alleged
that Rodriguez had surrendered to the military on 28 May 2009 after he had been put under surveillance and identified
as "Ka Pepito" by former rebels.33 According to his military handlers, Corporal (Cpl.) Rodel

B. Cabaccan and Cpl. Julius P. Navarro, Rodriguez was a former member of the NPA operating in Cagayan Valley.34
Wanting to bolt from the NPA, he told Cpl. Cabaccan and Cpl. Navarro that he would help the military in exchange for
his protection.35

Upon his voluntary surrender on 28 May 2009, Rodriguez was made to sign an Oath of Loyalty and an Agent’s
Agreement/Contract, showing his willingness to return to society and become a military asset.36 Since then, he acted
as a double agent, returning to the NPA to gather information.37 However, he feared that his NPA comrades were
beginning to suspect him of being an infiltrator.38 Thus, with his knowledge and consent, the soldiers planned to stage
a sham abduction to erase any suspicion about him being a double agent.39 Hence, the abduction subject of the instant
petition was conducted.40

Meanwhile, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Consolidated Return of the Writ dated 15 January 2010,41 alleging that
they had exercised extraordinary diligence in locating Rodriguez, facilitating his safe turnover to his family and securing
their journey back home to Manila. More specifically, they alleged that, on 16 September 2009, after Wilma sought
their assistance in ascertaining the whereabouts of her son, Cruz made phone calls to the military and law enforcement
agencies to determine his location.42 Cruz was able to speak with Lt. Col. Mina, who confirmed that Rodriguez was in
their custody.43 This information was transmitted to CHR Regional Director Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga. He, in turn, ordered
Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan to accompany Wilma to the 17th Infantry Division.44

When the CHR officers, along with Wilma and Rodel, arrived at the 17th Infantry Battalion at Masin, Alcala, Cagayan,
Brigade Commander Col. de Vera and Battalion Commander Lt. Col. Mina alleged that Rodriguez had become one of
their assets, as evidenced by the Summary on the Surrender of Noriel Rodriguez and the latter’s Contract as Agent.45
The CHR officers observed his casual and cordial demeanor with the soldiers.46 In any case, Cruz asked him to raise his
shirt to see if he had been subjected to any maltreatment. Cruz and Pasicolan did not see any traces of torture.
Thereafter, Rodriguez was released to his family, and they were made to sign a certification to this effect. During the
signing of the document, herein CHR officers did not witness any threat, intimidation or force employed against
Rodriguez or his family. 47

During their journey back to the home of Rodriguez, the CHR officers observed that he was very much at ease with his
military escorts, especially with 1st Lt. Matutina.48 Neither was there any force or intimidation when the soldiers took
pictures of his house, as the taking of photographs was performed with Wilma’s consent.49

During the hearing on 27 January 2010, the parties agreed to file additional affidavits and position papers and to have
the case considered submitted for decision after the filing of these pleadings.50

On 12 April 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision.51 Subsequently, on 28 April 2010, respondents
therein filed their Motion for Reconsideration.52 Before the Court of Appeals could resolve this Motion for
Reconsideration, Rodriguez filed the instant Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 191805), raising the
following assignment of errors:

a. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for temporary protection order.

b. The Court of Appeals erred in saying: "(H)owever, given the nature of the writ of amparo, which has the effect of
enjoining the commission by respondents of violation to petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security, the safety of
petitioner is ensured with the issuance of the writ, even in the absence of an order preventing respondent from
approaching petitioner."

c. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that respondent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo had command responsibility.53

On the other hand, respondents therein, in their Comment dated 30 July 2010, averred:

a. The Court of Appeals properly dropped then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a party-respondent, as she may
not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.

b. Petitioner had not presented any adequate and competent evidence, much less substantial evidence, to establish his
claim that public respondents had violated, were violating or threatening to violate his rights to life, liberty and
security, as well as his right to privacy. Hence, he was not entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas
data or to the corresponding interim reliefs (i.e. inspection order, production order and temporary protection order)
provided under the rule on the writ of amparo and the rule on the writ of habeas data.54

On 19 August 2010, PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, BGen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Lt. Col. Mina, Cruz, Pasicolan and
Callagan filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking the reversal of the 12 April 2010 Decision of the Court of
Appeals.55 They alleged that Rodriguez –

Has not presented any adequate and competent evidence, must less substantial evidence, to establish his claim that
petitioners have violated, are violating or threatening with violation his rights to life, liberty and security, as well as his
right to privacy; hence, he is not entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data and their
corresponding interim reliefs (i.e., inspection order, production order and temporary protection order) provided under
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.56
In ascertaining whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in issuing its assailed Decision and Resolution,
the following issues must be resolved:

I. Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the writs of amparo and habeas data have
already been issued in his favor.

II. Whether former President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent on the basis of the presidential immunity from
suit.

III. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases.

IV. Whether the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or threatened by respondents in G.R. No.
191805.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the writs of amparo and habeas data were promulgated to ensure the
protection of the people’s rights to life, liberty and security.57 The rules on these writs were issued in light of the
alarming prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.58 The Rule on the Writ of Amparo took
effect on 24 October 2007,59 and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data on 2 February 2008.60

The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it partakes of a
summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs
available to the petitioner.61 It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial
evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.62 Rather, it serves both preventive and curative roles in
addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.63 It is preventive in that it breaks the
expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent
punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.64

Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a person’s right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order
to achieve unlawful ends.65 As an independent and summary remedy to protect the right to privacy – especially the
right to informational privacy66 – the proceedings for the issuance of the writ of habeas data does not entail any
finding of criminal, civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations in the petition are proven through substantial
evidence, then the Court may (a) grant access to the database or information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in
case the database or information contains erroneous data or information, order its deletion, destruction or
rectification.67

First issue: Grant of interim reliefs

In the petition in G.R. No. 191805, Rodriguez prays for the issuance of a temporary protection order. It must be
underscored that this interim relief is only available before final judgment. Section 14 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo clearly provides:

Interim Reliefs. – Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court, justice or judge may grant
any of the following reliefs:

Temporary Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner
or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a government agency or by an
accredited person or private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an organization,
association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of this Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers
involved.

The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend temporary protection to the
petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall
issue.

The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be imposed by the
court, justice or judge.

(a) Inspection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in
possession or control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring,
surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon.

The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of
witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.

If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, the court,
justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.

The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be
threatened or violated.

The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the date, time, place
and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all
parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance, unless extended for justifiable reasons.

(b) Production Order. – The court, justice, or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person
in possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects
or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the
petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant.

The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the information, in which
case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.

The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the parties.

(c) Witness Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may refer the witnesses to
the Department of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic
Act No. 6981.

The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or to accredited persons or
private institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety. (Emphasis supplied)

We held in Yano v. Sanchez68 that "[t]hese provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a
judicious determination of the amparo petition." Being interim reliefs, they can only be granted before a final
adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once
granted, necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant petitioner the privilege of the
writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary protection order independently of the former. The order
restricting respondents from going near Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege of the writ.

Second issue: Presidential immunity from suit

It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo and habeas
data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced
disappearance or extrajudicial killing. As we held in Razon v. Tagitis:69

It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility,
or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to
address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence
to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the
remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the
responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that
should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of
their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the
burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of
the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is
preserved and his liberty and security are restored.70 (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, in the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision71 found respondents in G.R. No. 191805 – with the
exception of Calog, Palacpac or Harry – to be accountable for the violations of Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and
security committed by the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army. 72 The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition with respect to former President Arroyo on account of her presidential immunity from suit.
Rodriguez contends, though, that she should remain a respondent in this case to enable the courts to determine
whether she is responsible or accountable therefor. In this regard, it must be clarified that the Court of Appeals’
rationale for dropping her from the list of respondents no longer stands since her presidential immunity is limited only
to her incumbency.

In Estrada v. Desierto,73 we clarified the doctrine that a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even
for acts committed during the latter’s tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that courts should look with disfavor
upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication
of a right, to wit:

We reject [Estrada’s] argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors
and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate
Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio." Since the Impeachment Court is now
functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he
can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has
nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been
subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in
the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the
resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:

"x x x xxx xxx

Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for example, and the
President resigns before judgment of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment court or by the body, how
does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?

Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation would render
the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the
ordinary courts."

This is in accord with our ruling in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez that "incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from
being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. xxx

We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed
against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no
stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the
alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the
President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to
hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of
public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same
footing as any other trespasser.

Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the
privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v.
Nixon, US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents
relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's associates were facing charges
of conspiracy to obstruct justice and other offenses which were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National
Headquarters in Washington's Watergate Hotel during the 1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was
named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among others, that
the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and removed from office before
he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that
"when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on
the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the
fair administration of criminal justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the US Supreme Court further held that
the immunity of the President from civil damages covers only "official acts." Recently, the US Supreme Court had the
occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones where it held that the US President's immunity from
suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.74 (Emphasis supplied)

Further, in our Resolution in Estrada v. Desierto,75 we reiterated that the presidential immunity from suit exists only in
concurrence with the president’s incumbency:

Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity from suit. His arguments are
merely recycled and we need not prolong the longevity of the debate on the subject. In our Decision, we exhaustively
traced the origin of executive immunity in our jurisdiction and its bends and turns up to the present time. We held that
given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner,
as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting
President. Petitioner's rehashed arguments including their thinly disguised new spins are based on the rejected
contention that he is still President, albeit, a President on leave. His stance that his immunity covers his entire term of
office or until June 30, 2004 disregards the reality that he has relinquished the presidency and there is now a new de
jure President.

Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys immunity from suit during his term of
office. He buttresses his position with the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:
"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.

The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision for the
President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out this second sentence, at
the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee
members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the president shall be immune from suit during
his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing
litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily?

Fr. Bernas:

The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is
immune from suit.

Mr. Suarez:

So there is no need to express it here.

Fr. Bernas:

There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit
and to add other things.

Mr. Suarez:

On the understanding, I will not press for any more query, madam President.

I thank the Commissioner for the clarification."

Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term means the time during which the officer
may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one
another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter
than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. From the deliberations, the intent of the
framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term.76
(Emphasis supplied)

Applying the foregoing rationale to the case at bar, it is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential
immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo
proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.

Third issue: Command responsibility in amparo proceedings

To attribute responsibility or accountability to former President Arroyo, Rodriguez contends that the doctrine of
command responsibility may be applied. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo,77 command responsibility pertains to
the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons
subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict."78 Although originally used for ascertaining criminal
complicity, the command responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil cases for human rights abuses.79 In
the United States, for example, command responsibility was used in Ford v. Garcia and Romagoza v. Garcia – civil
actions filed under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act.80 This development in the use of
command responsibility in civil proceedings shows that the application of this doctrine has been liberally extended
even to cases not criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may likewise find application in
proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo. As we held in Rubrico:

It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for
extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that
the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in
accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution.

xxx xxx xxx

If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to
determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and
harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the
premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not
be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative
disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be any.81 (Emphasis supplied.)

Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents
are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise
remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of command
responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. In this regard, the Separate Opinion of Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales in Rubrico is worth noting,
thus:

That proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or administrative liability
should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility. Taking Secretary of National Defense v.
Manalo and Razon v. Tagitis in proper context, they do not preclude the application of the doctrine of command
responsibility to Amparo cases.

Manalo was actually emphatic on the importance of the right to security of person and its contemporary signification as
a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. It further stated that protection includes conducting
effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings
or enforced disappearances, or threats thereof, and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.

Tagitis, on the other hand, cannot be more categorical on the application, at least in principle, of the doctrine of
command responsibility:

Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were remiss in their duties
when the government completely failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires. We hold
these organizations accountable through their incumbent Chiefs who, under this Decision, shall carry the personal
responsibility of seeing to it that extraordinary diligence, in the manner the Amparo Rule requires, is applied in
addressing the enforced disappearance of Tagitis.

Neither does Republic Act No. 9851 emasculate the applicability of the command responsibility doctrine to Amparo
cases. The short title of the law is the "Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and
Other Crimes Against Humanity." Obviously, it should, as it did, only treat of superior responsibility as a ground for
criminal responsibility for the crimes covered.http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/feb2010/gr_183871_2010.html
- fnt20cm Such limited treatment, however, is merely in keeping with the statute’s purpose and not intended to rule
out the application of the doctrine of command responsibility to other appropriate cases.

Indeed, one can imagine the innumerable dangers of insulating high-ranking military and police officers from the
coverage of reliefs available under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The explicit adoption of the doctrine of command
responsibility in the present case will only bring Manalo and Tagitis to their logical conclusion.

In fine, I submit that the Court should take this opportunity to state what the law ought to be if it truly wants to make
the Writ of Amparo an effective remedy for victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof. While there is a genuine dearth of evidence to hold respondents Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and P/Dir. Gen.
Avelino Razon accountable under the command responsibility doctrine, the ponencia’s hesitant application of the
doctrine itself is replete with implications abhorrent to the rationale behind the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.82
(Emphasis supplied.)

This Separate Opinion was reiterated in the recently decided case of Boac v. Cadapan,83 likewise penned by Justice
Carpio-Morales, wherein this Court ruled:

Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases to determine criminal liability.
The Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement as far as amparo cases are concerned.

Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command responsibility in amparo cases to
instances of determining the responsible or accountable individuals or entities that are duty-bound to abate any
transgression on the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.

If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to
determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and
harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the
premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not
be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative
disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be any.

In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those accountable
individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such
application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to
be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.

Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal
liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government agency. (Emphasis
supplied.)

As earlier pointed out, amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors have been established
by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, and
(b) accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in the
enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii)
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or
(iii) those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance. Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the
doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within
these foregoing definitions.
a. Command responsibility of the President

Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings, it must now be
resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.

To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain:

a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the
crime as his subordinate;

b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and

c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the
perpetrators thereof.84

The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces,85 necessarily possesses control over the military that
qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine. 86

On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a strict standard of
knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be established through circumstantial evidence.87 In the
Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive knowledge. This view is
buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as the Institutionalization of the Doctrine of
‘Command Responsibility’ in all Government Offices, particularly at all Levels of Command in the Philippine National
Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies (E.O. 226).88 Under E.O. 226, a government official may be held liable for
neglect of duty under the doctrine of command responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be
committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of
responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or
immediately after its commission.89 Knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed
when (a) the acts are widespread within the government official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly
or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate staff or office personnel are
involved.90

Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the commander-in-chief of the
armed forces, the president has the power to effectively command, control and discipline the military.91

b. Responsibility or accountability of former President Arroyo

The next question that must be tackled is whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence that former
President Arroyo is responsible or accountable for his abduction. We rule in the negative.

Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the "Melo Commission" and the "Alston
Report," respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had knowledge of and information on, and should have known that a
climate of enforced disappearances had been perpetrated on members of the NPA.92 Without even attaching, or at the
very least, quoting these reports, Rodriguez contends that the Melo Report points to rogue military men as the
perpetrators. While the Alston Report states that there is a policy allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame
on the President, we do not automatically impute responsibility to former President Arroyo for each and every count of
forcible disappearance.93 Aside from Rodriguez’s general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish
her responsibility or accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should
have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or
prevent it.

Fourth issue: Responsibility or accountability of respondents in G.R. No. 191805

The doctrine of totality of evidence in amparo cases was first laid down in this Court’s ruling in Razon,94 to wit:

The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider
any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible
evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the
evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay
evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.95 (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, the same being
supported by substantial evidence. A careful examination of the records of this case reveals that the totality of the
evidence adduced by Rodriguez indubitably prove the responsibility and accountability of some respondents in G.R. No.
191805 for violating his right to life, liberty and security.

a. The totality of evidence proved by substantial evidence the responsibility or accountability of respondents for the
violation of or threat to Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security.

After a careful examination of the records of these cases, we are convinced that the Court of Appeals correctly found
sufficient evidence proving that the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military abducted
Rodriguez on 6 September 2009, and detained and tortured him until 17 September 2009.

Rodriguez’s Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 December 2009 was a meticulous and straightforward account of his horrific
ordeal with the military, detailing the manner in which he was captured and maltreated on account of his suspected
membership in the NPA.96 His narration of his suffering included an exhaustive description of his physical surroundings,
personal circumstances and perceived observations. He likewise positively identified respondents 1st Lt. Matutina and
Lt. Col. Mina to be present during his abduction, detention and torture,97 and respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and
Callagan as the CHR representatives who appeared during his release.98

More particularly, the fact of Rodriguez’s abduction was corroborated by Carlos in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 16
September 2009,99 wherein he recounted in detail the circumstances surrounding the victim’s capture.

As regards the allegation of torture, the respective Certifications of Dr. Ramil and Dr. Pamugas validate the physical
maltreatment Rodriguez suffered in the hands of the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division.
According to the Certification dated 12 October 2009 executed by Dr. Ramil,100 she examined Rodriguez in the Alfonso
Ponce Enrile Memorial District Hospital on 16 September 2009 and arrived at the following findings:

FACE

- 10cm healed scar face right side

- 2cm healed scar right eyebrow (lateral area)

- 2cm healed scar right eye brow (median area)

- 4cm x 2cm hematoma anterior chest at the sternal area right side

- 3cm x 2cm hematoma sternal area left side

- 6cm x 1cm hematoma from epigastric area to ant. chest left side

- 6cm x 1cm hematoma from epigastric area to ant. chest right side

- Multiple healed rashes (brownish discoloration) both forearm

- Multiple healed rashes (brownish discoloration)

- both leg arm

- hip area/lumbar area101

Dr. Pamugas performed a separate medical examination of Rodriguez on 19 September 2009, the results of which
confirmed that the injuries suffered by the latter were inflicted through torture. Dr. Pamugas thus issued a Medical
Report dated 23 September 2009,102 explicitly stating that Rodriguez had been tortured during his detention by the
military, to wit:

X. Interpretation of Findings

The above physical and psychological findings sustained by the subject are related to the torture and ill-treatment done
to him. The multiple circular brown to dark brown spots found on both legs and arms were due to the insect bites that
he sustained when he was forced to join twice in the military operations. The abrasions could also be due to the
conditions related during military operations. The multiple pin-point blood spots found on his left ear is a result of an
unknown object placed inside his left ear. The areas of tenderness he felt during the physical examination were due to
the overwhelming punching and kicking on his body. The occasional difficulty of sleeping is a symptom experience (sic)
by the subject as a result of the psychological trauma he encountered during his detention.

XI. Conclusions and Recommendations

The physical injuries and psychological trauma suffered by the subject are secondary to the torture and ill-treatment
done to him while in detention for about 11 days. The physical injuries sustained by the subject, of which the age is
compatible with the alleged date of infliction (sic).103 (Emphasis supplied.)

In assessing the weight of the Certifications, the Court of Appeals correctly relied on the medical finding that the
injuries suffered by Rodriguez matched his account of the maltreatment inflicted on him by the soldiers of the 17th
Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army. Further, the kind of injuries he sustained showed that he
could not have sustained them from merely falling, thus making respondents’ claim highly implausible.

Despite these medical findings that overwhelmingly supported and lent credibility to the allegations of Rodriguez in his
Sinumpaang Salaysay, respondents in G.R. No. 191805 still stubbornly clung to their argument that he was neither
abducted nor detained. Rather, they claimed that he was a double agent, whose relationship with the military was at all
times congenial. This contention cannot be sustained, as it is far removed from ordinary human experience.

If it were true that Rodriguez maintained amicable relations with the military, then he should have unhesitatingly
assured his family on 17 September 2009 that he was among friends. Instead, he vigorously pleaded with them to get
him out of the military facility. In fact, in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 December 2009104 Wilma executed, she
made the following averments:

18. Na nang Makita ko ang aking anak ay nakaramdam ako sa kanya ng awa dahil sa mukha syang pagod at malaki ang
kanyang ipinayat.

19. Na niyakap ko sya at sa aming pagkakayakap ay binulungan nya ako na wag ko syang iiwan sa lugar na iyon;

xxx xxx xxx

23. Na sinabihan ako ng mga sundalo na kung pwede daw ay maiwan muna ng dalawang linggo sa kampo ako at si
Noriel para daw matrain pa si Noriel sa loob ng kampo;

24. Na hindi ako pumayag na maiwan ang aking anak;

xxx xxx xxx

33. Na sa kasalukuhan, hanggang ngayon ay nag-aalala pa ako sa paa (sic) sa kaligtasan ng aming buong pamilya, lalo na
kay Noriel; xxx105

Also, Rodel made the following supporting averments in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 3 December 2009:106

24. Na nang makita ko si Noriel, hindi sya makalakad ng diretso, hinang-hina sya, malaki ang ipinayat at nanlalalim ang
mga mata;

25. Na nang makita ko ang aking kapatid ay nakaramdam ako ng awa dahil nakilala ko syang masigla at masayahin;

26. Na ilang minuto lang ay binulugan nya ako ng "Kuya, ilabas mo ako dito, papatayin nila ako."

27. Na sinabihan kami ni Lt. Col. Mina na baka pwedeng maiwan pa ng dalwang linggo ang aking kapatid sa kanila para
raw ma-train sya.

28. Na hindi kami pumayag ng aking nanay; xxx107

Moreover, the Court of Appeals likewise aptly pointed out the illogical, if not outrightly contradictory, contention of
respondents in G.R. No. 191805 that while Rodriguez had complained of his exhaustion from his activities as a member
of the CPP-NPA, he nevertheless willingly volunteered to return to his life in the NPA to become a double-agent for the
military. The lower court ruled in this manner:
In the Return of the Writ, respondent AFP members alleged that petitioner confided to his military handler, Cpl.
Navarro, that petitioner could no longer stand the hardships he experienced in the wilderness, and that he wanted to
become an ordinary citizen again because of the empty promises of the CPP-NPA. However, in the same Return,
respondents state that petitioner agreed to become a double agent for the military and wanted to re-enter the CPP-
NPA, so that he could get information regarding the movement directly from the source. If petitioner was tired of life in
the wilderness and desired to become an ordinary citizen again, it defies logic that he would agree to become an
undercover agent and work alongside soldiers in the mountains – or the wilderness he dreads – to locate the hideout of
his alleged NPA comrades.108 (Emphasis supplied.)

Furthermore, the appellate court also properly ruled that aside from the abduction, detention and torture of Rodriguez,
respondents, specifically 1st Lt. Matutina, had violated and threatened the former’s right to security when they made a
visual recording of his house, as well as the photos of his relatives, to wit:

In the videos taken by the soldiers – one of whom was respondent Matutina – in the house of petitioner on September
18, 2009, the soldiers even went as far as taking videos of the photos of petitioner’s relatives hung on the wall of the
house, as well as videos of the innermost part of the house. This Court notes that 1Lt. Matutina, by taking the said
videos, did not merely intend to make proofs of the safe arrival of petitioner and his family in their home. 1Lt. Matutina
also desired to instill fear in the minds of petitioner and his family by showing them that the sanctity of their home,
from then on, will not be free from the watchful eyes of the military, permanently captured through the medium of a
seemingly innocuous cellhpone video camera. The Court cannot – and will not – condone such act, as it intrudes into
the very core of petitioner’s right to security guaranteed by the fundamental law.109 (Emphasis supplied.)

Taken in their totality, the pieces of evidence adduced by Rodriguez, as well as the contradictory defenses presented by
respondents in G.R. No. 191805, give credence to his claim that he had been abducted, detained and tortured by
soldiers belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military.

It must be pointed out, however, that as to respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan, there was no substantial
evidence to show that they violated, or threatened with violation, Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security. Despite
the dearth of evidence to show the CHR officers’ responsibility or accountability, this Court nonetheless emphasizes its
criticism as regards their capacity to recognize torture or any similar form of abuse. The CHR, being constitutionally
mandated to protect human rights and investigate violations thereof,110 should ensure that its officers are well-
equipped to respond effectively to and address human rights violations. The actuations of respondents unmistakably
showed their insufficient competence in facilitating and ensuring the safe release of Rodriguez after his ordeal.

b. The failure to conduct a fair and effect investigation amounted to a violation of or threat to Rodriguez’s rights to life,
liberty and security.

The Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly states that the violation of or threat to the right to life, liberty and security
may be caused by either an act or an omission of a public official.111 Moreover, in the context of amparo proceedings,
responsibility may refer to the participation of the respondents, by action or omission, in enforced disappearance.112
Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to respondents who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the
burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.113

In this regard, we emphasize our ruling in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo114 that the right to security of a
person includes the positive obligation of the government to ensure the observance of the duty to investigate, viz:

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. In the context of
the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the
1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the
policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As
the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty
and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when
they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government
apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or
their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the
importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz:

(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be
ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step
taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof,
without an effective search for the truth by the government.

xxx xxx xxx

Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to security" not only as prohibiting the
State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right to
liberty. The ECHR interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human
Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey. In this case, the claimant's son had been
arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The family's requests for information and investigation
regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a violation of her son's right to security
of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:

... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and procedural rules
of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from
arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her
whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to
safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that
a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since.115 (Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, this Court rules that respondents in G.R. No. 191805 are responsible or accountable for the violation
of Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security on account of their abject failure to conduct a fair and effective official
investigation of his ordeal in the hands of the military. Respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj.
Gen. Ochoa, Col. De Vera and Lt. Col. Mina only conducted a perfunctory investigation, exerting no efforts to take
Ramirez’s account of the events into consideration. Rather, these respondents solely relied on the reports and
narration of the military. The ruling of the appellate court must be emphasized:

In this case, respondents Ibrado, Verzosa, Bangit, Tolentino, Santos, De Vera, and Mina are accountable, for while they
were charged with the investigation of the subject incident, the investigation they conducted and/or relied on is
superficial and one-sided. The records disclose that the military, in investigating the incident complained of, depended
on the Comprehensive Report of Noriel Rodriguez @Pepito prepared by 1Lt. Johnny Calub for the Commanding Officer
of the 501st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, Philippine Army. Such report, however, is merely based on the
narration of the military. No efforts were undertaken to solicit petitioner’s version of the subject incident and no
witnesses were questioned regarding the alleged abduction of petitioner.

Respondent PDG Verzosa, as Chief of the PNP, is accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise
known as the "PNP Law," specifies the PNP as the governmental office with the mandate "to investigate and prevent
crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution." In this case,
PDG Verzosa failed to order the police to conduct the necessary investigation to unmask the mystery surrounding
petitioner’s abduction and disappearance. Instead, PDG Verzosa disclaims accountability by merely stating that
petitioner has no cause of action against him. Palpable, however, is the lack of any effort on the part of PDG Verzosa to
effectively and aggressively investigate the violations of petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security by members of the
17th Infantry Battalion, 17th Infantry Division, Philippine Army.116 (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the absence of a fair and effective official investigation into the claims of Rodriguez violated his right to
security, for which respondents in G.R. No. 191805 must be held responsible or accountable.

Nevertheless, it must be clarified that Rodriguez was unable to establish any responsibility or accountability on the part
of respondents P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Calog and Palacpac. Respondent P/CSupt. Tolentino had already
retired when the abduction and torture of Rodriguez was perpetrated, while P/SSupt. Santos had already been
reassigned and transferred to the National Capital Regional Police Office six months before the subject incident
occurred. Meanwhile, no sufficient allegations were maintained against respondents Calog and Palacpac.

From all the foregoing, we rule that Rodriguez was successful in proving through substantial evidence that respondents
Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, and Lt. Col. Mina
were responsible and accountable for the violation of Rodriguez’s rights to life, liberty and security on the basis of (a)
his abduction, detention and torture from 6 September to 17 September 2009, and (b) the lack of any fair and effective
official investigation as to his allegations. Thus, the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data must be granted in
his favor. As a result, there is no longer any need to issue a temporary protection order, as the privilege of these writs
already has the effect of enjoining respondents in G.R. No. 191805 from violating his rights to life, liberty and security.

It is also clear from the above discussion that despite (a) maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of respondents
in G.R. No. 191805, and (b) allowing the application of the command responsibility doctrine to amparo and habeas data
proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo was responsible or
accountable for the violation of his rights to life, liberty and property. He likewise failed to prove through substantial
evidence the accountability or responsibility of respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.

WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the Petition for Partial Review in G.R. No. 191805 and DENY the Petition for Review
in G.R. No. 193160. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.

The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G.
Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicent Callagan for
lack of merit.

This Court directs the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to take the
appropriate action with respect to any possible liability or liabilities, within their respective legal competence, that may
have been incurred by respondents Gen. Victor Ibrado, PDG. Jesus Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor
Ochoa, Brig. Gen. Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan Matutina, and Lt. Col. Laurence Mina. The Ombudsman and the DOJ
are ordered to submit to this Court the results of their action within a period of six months from receipt of this
Decision.

In the event that herein respondents no longer occupy their respective posts, the directives mandated in this Decision
and in the Court of Appeals are enforceable against the incumbent officials holding the relevant positions. Failure to
comply with the foregoing shall constitute contempt of court.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186050 December 13, 2011

ARTHUR BALAO, WINSTON BALAO, NONETTE BALAO, JONILYN BALAO-STRUGAR and BEVERLY LONGID, Petitioners,

vs.

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, EDUARDO ERMITA, GILBERTO TEODORO, RONALDO PUNO, NORBERTO GONZALES,
Gen. ALEXANDER YANO, Gen. JESUS VERZOSA, Brig. Gen. REYNALDO MAPAGU, Lt. P/Dir. EDGARDO DOROMAL, Maj.
Gen. ISAGANI CACHUELA, Commanding Officer of the AFP-ISU based in Baguio City, PSS EUGENE MARTIN and several
JOHN DOES, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 186059

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, SECRETARY GILBERTO TEODORO,

SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES, GEN. ALEXANDER YANO, P/DGEN. JESUS VERZOSA,
BRIG GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU, MAJ. GEN. ISAGANI CACHUELA ANDPOL. SR. SUPT. EUGENE MARTIN, Petitioners,

vs.

ARTHUR BALAO, WINSTON BALAO, NONETTE BALAO, JONILYN BALAO-STRUGAR and BEVERLY LONGID, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us are consolidated appeals under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparofrom the January 19, 2009
Judgment1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63, in Special Proceeding No. 08-AMP-
0001, entitled "In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Amparo in favor of James Balao, Arthur Balao, et al.
v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al." The RTC granted the petition for the writ of amparo but denied the prayer for
issuance of inspection, production and witness protection orders.

The Antecedents

On October 8, 2008, Arthur Balao, Winston Balao, Nonette Balao and Jonilyn Balao-Strugar, siblings of James Balao, and
Beverly Longid (petitioners), filed with the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo2
in favor of James Balao who was abducted by unidentified armed men on September 17, 2008 in Tomay, La Trinidad,
Benguet. Named respondents in the petition were then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita, Defense Secretary Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.,Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo V.
Puno, National Security Adviser (NSA) Norberto B. Gonzales, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen.
Alexander B. Yano, Philippine National Police (PNP) Police Director General Jesus A. Verzosa, Philippine Army (PA) Chief
Brig. Gen. Reynaldo B. Mapagu, PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) Chief Lt. P/Dir. Edgardo
Doromal, Northern Luzon Command (NOLCOM) Commander Maj. Gen. Isagani C. Cachuela, PNP-Cordillera
Administrative Region Regional Director Police Senior Supt. Eugene Gabriel Martin, the Commanding Officer of the AFP
Intelligence Service Unit (AFP-ISU) based in Baguio City and several John Does.

James M. Balao is a Psychology and Economics graduate of the University of the Philippines-Baguio (UP-Baguio). In
1984, he was among those who founded the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), a coalition of non-government
organizations (NGOs) working for the cause of indigenous peoples in the Cordillera Region. As head of CPA’s education
and research committee, James actively helped in the training and organization of farmers. He was also the President of
Oclupan Clan Association which undertakes the registration and documentation of clan properties to protect their
rights over ancestral lands. In 1988, while working for the CPA, he was arrested on the charge of violation of the Anti-
Subversion Law but the case was eventually dismissed for lack of evidence.

The testimonies and statements of eyewitnesses established the following circumstances surrounding James’s
disappearance:

On September 17, 2008, at around 8:30 in the morning, a man clad in black jacket, black shirt, black visor and gray
pants was standing infront of Saymor’s3 Store at Tomay, La Trinidad, Benguet. He had a belt bag and a travelling bag
which was placed on a bench. Vicky Bonel was at the time attending to the said store owned by her brother-in-law
while Aniceto G. Dawing, Jr. and his co-employee were delivering bakery products thereat. A white van then arrived
and stopped infront of the store. Five men in civilian clothes who were carrying firearms alighted from the van and
immediately approached the man poking their guns on him. They grabbed and handcuffed him. The man was asking
why he was being apprehended. One of the armed men addressed the people witnessing the incident, saying they were
policemen. Another warned that no one should interfere because the man was being arrested for illegal drugs.
Thereafter, they pushed the man inside the van. One of the armed men went back to the store to get the man’s
travelling bag. Before leaving the place, one of the armed men was also heard telling the driver of the van that they are
going to proceed to Camp Dangwa (PNP Provincial Headquarters in La Trinidad, Benguet). The van headed towards the
direction of La Trinidad town proper. The witnesses later identified the man as James Balao after seeing his photograph
which appeared in posters announcing him as missing.

The petition alleged that in May 2008, James reported surveillances on his person to his family, particularly to his sister
Nonette Balao (Nonette), and to CPA Chairperson Beverly Longid (Beverly). James supposedly observed certain vehicles
tailing him and suspiciously parked outside his residence, one of which was a van with plate number USC 922. He also
claimed to have received calls and messages through his mobile phone informing him that he was under surveillance by
the PNP Regional Office and the AFP-ISU. To prove the surveillance, the informer gave the exact dates he visited his
family, clothes he wore, and dates and times he goes home or visits friends and relatives. Attached to the petition were
the affidavits4 of Nonette and Beverly attesting to James’s reports of surveillance to his family and to the CPA.

It was further alleged that on September 17, 2008, around 7:00 in the morning, James sent a text message to Nonette
informing her that he was about to leave his rented house in Fairview Central, Baguio City and that he was going to
their ancestral residence in Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet to do his laundry. The travel time from Fairview, Baguio City to
Pico usually takes only 20 to 45 minutes. Around 8:00 a.m., Nonette, after discovering that James never reached their
parents’ house at Pico, started contacting their friends and relatives to ask about James’s whereabouts. No one,
however, had any idea where he was.

Thus, the Balao family, with the assistance of the CPA and other NGOs, tried to locate James. Teams were formed to
follow James’s route from Fairview, Baguio City to Pico, La Trinidad and people along the way were asked if they
happened to see him. These searches, however, yielded negative results. One of the teams also went to the office of
the AFP-ISU (PA-ISU) in Navy Base and the office of the Military Intelligence Group in Camp Allen, both in Baguio City,
but the personnel in said offices denied any knowledge on James’s whereabouts. The family likewise went to Baguio
Police Station 7 to report James’s disappearance. The report was duly entered on the blotter but there have been no
developments as of the filing of the petition. They also sought the help of the media to announce James’s
disappearance and wrote several government agencies to inform them of his disappearance and enlist their help in
locating him.

Petitioners, moreover, enumerated in their petition several incidents of harassments and human rights violations
against CPA officers, staff and members.

Contending that there is no plain, speedy or adequate remedy for them to protect James’s life, liberty and security,
petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of amparo ordering the respondents to disclose where James is detained or
confined, to release James, and to cease and desist from further inflicting harm upon his person. They likewise prayed
for (1) an inspection order for the inspection of at least 11 military and police facilities which have been previously
reported as detention centers for activists abducted by military and police operatives; (2) a production order for all
documents that contain evidence relevant to the petition, particularly the Order of Battle List and any record or dossier
respondents have on James; and (3) a witness protection order.

Petitioners simultaneously filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion5 for the immediate issuance of a writ of amparo pursuant
to Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

On October 9, 2008, the Writ of Amparo6 was issued directing respondents to file their verified return together with
their supporting affidavit within five days from receipt of the writ.

Respondents in their Joint Return7 stated: (1) that President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is immune from suit and should
thus be dropped as party-respondent; (2) that only Arthur Balao should be named petitioner and the rest of the other
petitioners dropped; (3) that there is no allegation of specific wrongdoing against respondents that would show their
knowledge, involvement or participation in the abduction of James; (4) that Exec. Sec. Ermita, Sec. Teodoro, Sec. Puno,
Sec. Gonzales, Gen. Yano, Gen. Cachuela, Gen. Mapagu and Gen. Verzosa in their respective affidavits denied having
such participation or knowledge of James’s abduction, set forth their actions taken in investigating the matter and
undertaking to continue exerting extraordinary diligence in securing the liberty of James and bring all those responsible
for his disappearance to the bar of justice, including military or police personnel when warranted by the findings of the
investigations; (5) that Supt. Martin already ordered an investigation, came up with interviews of several witnesses, and
held a dialogue with the Commander of the Military Intelligence Group I (MIG1) and the Commanding Officer of the
Internal Service Unit-Internal Security Group, Philippine Army;and (6) that petitioners themselves did not cooperate
with police authorities in the investigation and neither did they ask the National Bureau of Investigation to locate
James.

Respondents contended that the petition failed to meet the requirement in the Rule on the Writ of Amparo that claims
must be established by substantial evidence considering that: (1) petitioners’ allegations do not mention in anyway the
manner, whether directly or indirectly, the alleged participation of respondents in the purported abduction of James;
(2) Nonette and Beverly do not have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the abduction of James,
hence, their statements are hearsay with no probative value; and (3) the allegations in the petition do not show the
materiality and relevance of the places sought to be searched/inspected and documents to be produced, specifically
the requirement that the prayer for an inspection order shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses
having personal knowledge of the whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
Respondents further argued that it is the PNP as the law enforcement agency, and not the respondent military and
executive officials, which has the duty to investigate cases of missing persons. At most, the AFP may inquire on the
matters being alluded to them as may be ordered by the proper superior, which is primarily done for possible court
martial proceedings. Hence, their common denials of having any knowledge, participation or authorization for the
alleged disappearance of James Balao. Nonetheless, respondents executed their affidavits to show the actions they
have taken and reports submitted to them by the proper authorities, as follows:

Executive Secretary Ermitastated that upon receipt of copy of the petition for a writ of amparo, he caused the issuance
of a letter addressed to the PNP Chief and AFP Chief of Staff for the purpose of inquiring and establishing the
circumstances surrounding the alleged disappearance of James Balao, and which letters also called for the submission
of pertinent reports on the results of the investigation conducted, if any.8

Secretary Teodoro declared that soon after the promulgation by this Court of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, he issued
"Policy Directive on the Actions and Defenses Under the Amparo Rule" which instructed members of the AFP to
undertake specific measures even without waiting for the filing of an amparo petition in court whenever any member
of the AFP or any of its commands or units have been reported or published as being involved in the alleged violation of
an individual’s right to life, liberty and security or threat thereof, as a preparatory step in the filing of a verified return
as required by A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC. The AFP was therein also directed to immediately coordinate with the PNP, NBI,
DOJ and other government agencies in the attainment of the desired actions in the event a petition is filed. Said policy
directive was contained in his Memorandum dated October 31, 2007 to the Chief of Staff, AFP, and there is no reason
for him to doubt that the AFP will comply with it insofar as the present petition for writ of amparo is concerned.9

Secretary Puno confirmed receipt of a copy of the petition and said he will write to the PNP Chief to call for pertinent
reports relative to the circumstances of the alleged "taking" of the person in whose favor the writ of amparo was
sought. He undertook to make available any report he will receive from the PNP on the matter.10

NSA Gonzales asserted that as a public officer, he is presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with law,
which presumption remains undisturbed amid gratuitous assumptions and conclusions in the petition devoid of factual
and legal basis. Upon receipt of a copy of the petition, he caused to be issued letters/communications to the Director
General of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, the PNP Chief and the AFP Chief of Staff for the purpose of
making active inquiries and establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance insofar as the possible
involvement of military/police personnel is concerned. He undertook to provide the material results of investigations
conducted or to be conducted by the concerned agencies.11

General Yano narrated that prior to the receipt of a copy of the petition, he received a memorandum from the
Department of National Defense transmitting the letter of Bayan Muna Representative Teodoro A. Casiño inquiring
about the alleged abduction of James Balao. On the basis of said memo, he directed by radio message the NOLCOM
Commander to conduct a thorough investigation on the matter and to submit the result thereof to the AFP General
Headquarters. This was also done in compliance with the Policy Directive issued by Defense Secretary Teodoro. He
reiterated his October 6, 2008 directive to the PA Commanding General in another radio message dated October 16,
2008. He undertook to provide the court with material results of the investigations conducted by the concerned units
as soon as the same are received by Higher Headquarters.12

Lt. Gen. Cachuela said that even prior to the receipt of a copy of the petition, he was already directed by Higher
Headquarters to conduct a thorough investigation on the alleged abduction of James Balao. Acting on said directive, he
in turn directed the 5th Infantry Division, PA to investigate the matter since the place of the commission of the
abduction is within its area of responsibility. He undertook to furnish the court with a copy of the result of the
investigation conducted or to be conducted, as soon as NOLCOM receives the same.13

BGen. Mapagu on his part declared that there is nothing in the allegations of the petition that would show the
involvement of the PA in the reported disappearance of James Balao. He claimed that he immediately called the
attention of the "concerned staff" to give some information regarding the case and directed them to submit a report if
they are able to obtain information.14

Pol. Dir. General Verzosa set forth the actions and steps taken by the PNP, particularly the PNP Regional Office-
Cordillera (PRO-COR) headed by PCSupt. Eugene Martin, being the lead PNP unit investigating the case of James
Balao.15

Pol. Chief Supt. Martin recounted that in the afternoon of September 17, 2008, CPA Chairperson Beverly Longid called
up and informed him of the disappearance of James. On September 20, 2008, he was informed that James was
allegedly missing and immediately ordered the Office of the Regional Intelligence Division (RID) to send flash alarm to
all lower units to look for and locate James Balao. This was followed by a Memorandum with his picture and
description. Upon his orders, Police Station 1 of the Baguio City Police Office (BCPO) immediately conducted inquiries at
the boarding house of James at Barangay Fairview, Baguio City. Likewise, he ordered the creation of Task Force Balao to
fast track the investigation of the case. He further instructed the RID to exert all efforts and supervise all lower units to
intensify their investigation and ascertain the whereabouts and other circumstances surrounding the disappearance of
James. Results of the investigations conducted were set forth in his affidavit. He had constant coordination with the
CPA leaders and Balao family who divulged the plate numbers of vehicles allegedly observed by James prior to his
disappearance as conducting surveillance on his person. Upon verification with the Land Transportation Office, the said
vehicles were found to be registered under the following persons: TNH 787 – Narciso Magno of #20 Darasa, Tanauan,
Batangas; and USC 922 – G & S Transport Corp. On October 6, 2008, he received information regarding an abduction
incident in Tomay, La Trinidad whereupon he ordered the Provincial Director of Benguet to conduct an in-depth
investigation; said investigation disclosed that the person abducted was indeed James. On October 8, 2008, Task Force
Balao with the help of the CPA and Balao family were able to convince two witnesses in the abduction incident in
Tomay, La Trinidad, Benguet to shed light on the incident; as a result, cartographic sketches of the suspects were made.
In the morning of October 9, 2008, he presided over a dialogue which was attended by the Group Commander, MIG1
and Commanding Officer of ISU, ISG and PA, for the coordinated efforts to locate James. In the afternoon of the same
day, he met with the family and relatives of James to inform them of initial efforts and investigation of the case. The
Task Force Balao was also able to secure the affidavits of witnesses Aniceto Dawing and Vicky Bonel, and invited some
members of the CPA who retrieved James’s personal belongings in Fairview, Baguio City and his companions prior to his
disappearance on September 17, 2008 to appear before the Task Force Balao for some clarifications but none of them
appeared. The case is still under follow-up and continuing investigation to know what really happened, identify the
abductors, determine the real motive for the abduction and file the necessary charges in court against those
responsible.16

Also attached to the Return are the more detailed reports (with attached affidavits of other witnesses) dated October
14, 2008 and October 6, 2008 submitted by Task Force Balao Commander P/S Supt. Fortunato B. Albas to the PNP
Cordillera Regional Director. Pertinent portions of the two reports read:

xxxx

2. Inquiries conducted from Mr. Zusimo Unarosa, a resident of Nr 126, Purok 3, Central Fairview, Baguio City, claimed
that on the 1st week of September 2008, he frequently observed two (2) unidentified male persons aged 50-70 years
old and about 5’1" to 5’5" in height, bringing boxes from the house, the contents of which could not be determined.
However, averred that these two (2) male personalities are not familiar in the barangay. He further stated that he had
never seen a van conducting surveillance on the house and have not heard of any incident of kidnapping or abduction
in the community.

3. Mr[.] Anselmo Alukim, a neighbor, residing adjacent to the house of the subject, when interviewed, averred that he
observed some unidentified male and female persons visiting the said house.

4. Interview conducted on Mr[.] Danny Griba, a resident of said barangay averred that James Balao is not a resident or
occupant of the said house and claimed that he only saw the subject last summer and stated there are five (5)
unidentified persons occupying the said house. He further stated that three (3) male persons aged 40 to 50 years old
and a female aged between 20-30 years old goes out during day time with several boxes and returns at about 6:00 PM
to 7:00 PM on board a taxi cab again with some boxes of undetermined contents.

5. Mrs[.] Corazon Addun, resident of Nr 114, Purok 3, Central Fairview, Baguio City averred that the subject is not
residing in the said place and saw him only once, sometime on April 2008. She further narrated that a certain Uncle
John aged 40 to 50 years old and a male person aged 20 to 30 are among the occupants of said house. Accordingly, on
September 21, 2008, Uncle John went to the house of Mrs. Addun and over a cup of coffee told her that he will be
going to Sagada, Mountain Province purposely to locate a missing colleague who was sent there. Accordingly[,] he
received a phone call that his missing colleague (James Balao) did not reach the municipality and reported missing.
After that short talk, she never saw Uncle John again. Additionally, she did not notice any vehicle conducting
surveillance therein and any unusual incidents that transpired in said place.

xxxx

7. This office has likewise coordinated with MIG-1 and ISU, ISG, PA but both offices denied any knowledge on the
alleged abduction of James Balao.

8. It was found out that it was SPO4 Genero Rosal, residing within the vicinity, who followed-up the incident because it
was reported to him by his neighbors. That after he learned about [James’ abduction], he contacted PDEA, La Trinidad
PS, RID ad Intel BPPO to verify if they had an operation in Tomay, La Trinidad but all of them answered negative.

x x x x17

xxxx

3. A photocopy of the photograph of James Balao was presented to the witnesses wherein they confirmed that the
picture is the same person who was arrested and handcuffed. Another witness divulged that prior to the arrest of the
person in the picture/photograph, a red motorcycle with two (2) male riders allegedly conducted surveillance along the
highway about ten (10) meters away from the place where the victim was picked-up. Minutes later, a white Mitsubishi
Adventure arrived and took the victim inside the car. The motorcycle riding in tandem followed the Mitsubushi
Adventure en route to Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet. Another witness overheard one of the abductors
instructing the driver to quote "pare sa Camp Dangwa tayo."

4. Follow[-]up investigation resulted in the identification of a certain "KULOT" who also witnessed the alleged
abduction. However, he was hesitant to talk and instead pointed to the driver of the delivery van of Helen’s Bread. At
about 8:30 AM of October 9, 2008, Aniceto Dawing Jr[.] y Gano, the driver of the delivery van of Helen’s Bread,
surfaced and gave his statements on what he witnessed on the alleged abduction.

5. On October 12, 2008, one Vicky Bonel y Felipe, 19 years old, single, native of Atok, Benguet, resident of Tomay, LTB
and store keeper of Saymor[’s] Store appeared before the office of Benguet PPO and gave her sworn statement on the
alleged abduction. A cartographic sketch was made on the person who identified himself as policeman. She further
stated that it was when while she was tending her brother-in-law’s store, gun-wielding men, of about six or more,
handcuffed and shove the victim inside their vehicle. She recalled that she can recognize the abductors if she can see
them again.

6. Another witness stated that she was preparing her merchandise in the waiting shed of Lower Tomay when she
noticed a parked motorcycle beside the elementary school at about 7:00 AM of September 17, 2008. The rider of the
bike was suspiciously scouring the area and kept on calling someone from his cellular phone before the abduction was
made.
7. Baguio City Police Office conducted follow-up investigation and were able to secure affidavit of Florence Luken y
Mayames, 47 years old, married, and a resident of 135 Central Fairview averred that James Balao together with a
certain Uncle John about 65-75 years old, about 5’4" in height and a certain Rene about 30-35 years old and stands
5’5", were her neighbors for almost one year. She further stated that James Balao and company do not mingle with
their neighbors and only one person is usually left behind while James and Rene goes out at 6:00 or 7:00 AM and goes
back at around 6:00 or 7:00 PM.

She further averred that she did not notice any van or any kind of vehicle parked along the roadside infront of any
residence not his neighbors nor any person or persons observing the occupants of the said house. Accordingly, at
around 1:00 PM of September 26, 2008, a closed van (Ca[n]ter) with unknown plate number was seen parked infront of
the said house and more or less (10) unidentified male person[s] aging from 20-23 and an unidentified female entered
the alleged rented house of James Balao and took some table, chairs and cabinets then left immediately to unknown
destination.

8. Mrs[.] Mina Cabati Serdan the owner of the house being rented by James Balao averred that sometime May of 2007,
a certain Mr[.] June, a realtor agent, recommended to her that a certain James Balao will rent the house for one (1)
year term with an agreed monthly rent of fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00). She stated that James Balao had
extended his stay for almost 4 months. On the last week of August 2008, Mrs[.] Serdan called up James Balao through
phone to inform him that she will terminate his stay at the rented house on September 30, 2008. Mrs[.] Serdan further
stated that [she]visited the rented house only twice and that was the only time she saw James Balao with an
unidentified companions.

That she only discovered that James Balao was missing when a certain Carol informed her that he was missing. [Sh]e
further stated that she visited her house and found out that the said occupants have already left on September 26,
2008 and discovered that all personal belongings of the occupants have already been taken out by the relatives.

xxxx

VI. ACTIONS TAKEN:

1. That a composite team "TASK FORCE BALAO" from this office and the Regional Headquarters headed by [P/S SUPT]
FORTUNATO BASCO ALBAS was formed.

2. That the composite team of investigators conducted ocular inspection on the area.

3. On October 8, 2008, two (2) witnesses namely: Marjore Domingo Hipolito and Jenny Lynn Malondon Valdez gave
their sworn statements and cartographic sketch of one of the abductors.

4. On the morning of October 9, 2008, a dialogue was presided by RD, PRO-COR and attended by the Group
Commander, MIG1 and Commanding Officer of ISU, SG, PA. Both commanders denied the accusations against them.

5. In the afternoon of the same day, a meeting with the family and relatives of James Balao was again presided by RD,
PRO-COR wherein the results of the initial efforts and investigation were given to the family. He also reported the
surfacing of another two (2) witnesses who described the suspect who handcuffed James Balao.
6. PRO-Cordillera wrote a letter to the Cordillera Peoples Alliance requesting them to present Uncle John, Rene and his
other companions who are then residing in the same boarding house including all his companions on September 17,
2008 and prior to his disappearance.

REMARKS:

Case is still under follow-up investigation to identify the alleged abductors to determine the real motive of the
abduction and to file necessary charges against them in court.18

During the hearing, the affidavits and testimonies of the following witnesses were presented by petitioners:

Aniceto Dawing19 testified that on September 17, 2008, around 8:00 in the morning, while he was delivering bread at
Saymor’s Store in Tomay, La Trinidad, Benguet, a white van stopped infront of them and five armed men alighted. The
armed men, who introduced themselves as policemen in Filipino, held and pointed a gun at one male person. The
armed men told the male person that he was being apprehended for illegal drugs. They then let the male person board
the vehicle and informed him that they will proceed to Camp Dangwa. Dawing admitted that he did not know that it
was James whom he saw that time and came to know only of his identity when he saw a poster bearing James’s
photograph. On cross-examination, he stated that the white van did not have any markings that it was a police vehicle
and that the armed men were in civilian clothes and did not wear any police badges or identification cards. He just
assumed that they were policemen because of their posture and haircut and because they introduced themselves as
such.

Anvil Lumbag stated in his affidavit20 that he was also at Saymor’s Store in the morning of September 17, 2008 to buy
chicken. He said that a ToyotaRevo stopped infront of the store from where four men alighted. The men handcuffed a
man who was standing infront of the store and uttered "Walang makikialam, drugs kaso nito" while pointing a gun at
the said man. Then, they forced the man to board the Revo. Before the Revo fled, Lumbag heard one of the men say
that they will be going to Camp Dangwa. Lumbag’s affidavit, however, did not mention if it was James who was forcibly
taken by the armed men.

Beverly Longid21 testified that she got to know James when she was a member of the CPA youth organization in her
student days. Every time James will have an activity that is CPA-related, he would coordinate with Beverly, she being
the CPA chair. She also testified that prior to his disappearance, the last time she talked with James was in July or
August of 2008 when he reported surveillances on his person by the PNP and the AFP. In her affidavit, she alleged that
James reported to her several vehicles tailing him, one of which was a green van with plate number USC 922, the same
plate number she had seen at the Intelligence Security Unit in Navy Base, Baguio City, and which was attached to a
silver grey van.

Beverly admitted that at the time of the alleged abduction, she was in Baguio City, at the Office of the Cordillera
People’s Legal Center and that she only came to know that James was missing in the afternoon of September 18, 2008.
She also confirmed that they met with Pol. Supt. Martin to seek assistance regarding James’s disappearance.

Nonette Balao22 testified that she was at her bakeshop located in Km. 4, La Trinidad, Benguet in the morning of
September 17, 2008. At around 6:30 a.m., she received a text message from James saying that he will be going home to
their ancestral home to do some laundry. Thirty minutes later, she received another text message from James saying
that he was already leaving his place in Fairview, Baguio City. When around 8:00 a.m. James had not yet arrived at their
ancestral home, she got worried. She texted him but failed to get a reply, so she tried to call him. His phone, however,
had already been turned off. She then called the CPA office to check if James was there. She was told that he was not
there so she went to James’s house in Fairview at around 9:00 a.m. James’s housemates, however, told her that he left
at 7:00 a.m.
Nonette also testified that they only reported James’s disappearance to the police on September 20, 2008 because they
thought that it was necessary that a person be missing for at least 48 hours before the disappearance could be
reported. They went to Sub-Station Police Precinct No. 1 in Baguio and to the police precinct in La Trinidad to report
the matter. They also went to Camp Dangwa to see if James was there.

Nonette claimed that she became worried because James never switched off his mobile phone and since he already
texted her that he was coming home, he could have texted again if there was a change of plans. Also, James had told
them since April 2008 that he had been under surveillance. She does not know why James went to Tomay, La Trinidad.

Samuel Anongos stated in his affidavit23 that he is a member of the Education Commission of the CPA. He claimed that
when they conducted trainings and educational discussions on mining education in Abra, members of the AFP harassed
the community and committed various human rights violations. The AFP also allegedly held community meetings where
they said that the CPA is part of the New People’s Army. Attached to Anongos’s affidavit is a copy of a paper that the
AFP was allegedly distributing. It shows the organizational structure of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New
People’s Army (CPP-NPA) wherein CPA was identified as one of the organizations under the National Democratic Front
(NDF).24

RTC Ruling

On January 19, 2009, the RTC issued the assailed judgment, disposing as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:

ISSUE a Writ of Amparo Ordering the respondents to (a) disclose where James Balao is detained or confined, (b) to
release James Balao considering his unlawful detention since his abduction and (c) to cease and desist from further
inflicting harm upon his person; and

DENY the issuance of INSPECTION ORDER, PRODUCTION ORDER and WITNESS PROTECTION ORDER for failure of herein
Petitioners to comply with the stringent provisions on the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and substantiate the same.25

In denying respondents’ prayer that President Arroyo be dropped as party-respondent, the RTC held that a petition for
a writ of amparo is not "by any stretch of imagination a niggling[,] vexing or annoying court case"26 from which she
should be shielded. The RTC ruled that said petition is nothing more than a tool to aid the president to guarantee that
laws on human rights are devotedly and staunchly carried out. It added that those who complain against naming the
president as party-respondent are only those who "either do not understand what the Writ of Amparo is all about or
who do not want to aid Her Excellency in her duty to supervise and control the machinery of government."27

In upholding the standing of James’s siblings and Beverly to file the petition, the RTC held that what Section 2 of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparorules out is the right to file similar petitions, meaning there could be no successive petitions
for the issuance of a writ of amparo for the same party.

The RTC further held that "more likely than not," the motive for James’s disappearance is his activist/political leanings
and that James’s case is one of an enforced disappearance as defined under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. In so
ruling, the RTC considered (1) the several incidents of harassment mentioned in Beverly’s testimony and enumerated in
the petition; and (2) the references in the petition to the CPA as a front for the CPP-NPA.

The RTC likewise ruled that the government unmistakably violated James’s right to security of person. It found the
investigation conducted by respondents as very limited, superficial and one-sided. The police and military thus
miserably failed to conduct an effective investigation of James’s abduction as revealed by the investigation report of
respondents’ own witnesses, Supt. Martin and P/S Supt. Fortunato Basco Albas, the Commander of Task Force Balao. It
further noted that respondents did not investigate the military officials believed to be behind the abduction as said
military officials were merely invited to a dialogue and there was no investigation made in Camp Dangwa where the
abductors were believed to have taken James as narrated by the witnesses. Moreover, the RTC observed that despite
the undertaking of respondents to investigate the abduction and provide results thereof, four months have passed but
petitioners have not been furnished reports regarding the investigation.

As to the denial of the interim reliefs, the RTC stated that the stringent provisions of the rules were not complied with
and granting said reliefs might violate respondents’ constitutional rights and jeopardize State security.

Both parties appealed to this Court.

The Consolidated Petitions

Petitioners, in G.R. No. 186050, question the RTC’s denial of the interim reliefs.

Respondents, on the other hand, assail in their petition in G.R. No. 186059, the issuance of the writ of amparo. They
raise the following arguments:

THE TRIAL COURT’S JUDGMENT ORDERING RESPONDENT-PETITIONERS TO: (A) DISCLOSE WHERE JAMES BALAO IS
DETAINED AND CONFINED; (B) TO RELEASE JAMES BALAO CONSIDERING HIS UNLAWFUL DETENTION SINCE HIS
"ABDUCTION" AND (C) TO CEASE AND DESIST FROM FURTHER INFLICTING HARM UPON HIS PERSON IS BASED PURELY
ON CONJECTURES, SURMISES AND HEARSAY EVIDENCE; HENCE, IT MUST BE SET ASIDE.

II

RESPONDENT-PETITIONERS HAD PROVEN THAT THEY OBSERVED EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE AS REQUIRED BY

APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES.

III

THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN THE MANALO CASE ARE TOTALLY DIFFERENT FROM
THE CASE AT BAR; HENCE, THE TRIAL COURT GROSSLY ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULING THEREIN TO THE CASE AT BAR.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED PETITIONER-RESPONDENTS’ PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF AN INSPECTION
ORDER, PRODUCTION ORDER AND A WITNESS PROTECTION ORDER.28

Our Ruling
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated on October 24, 2007 amidst rising incidence of "extralegal killings"
and "enforced disappearances." It was formulated in the exercise of this Court’s expanded rule-making power for the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, albeit limited to these two
situations. "Extralegal killings" refer to killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial proceedings.29 On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are attended by the following characteristics: an
arrest, detention, or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting
with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts
of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such person outside the
protection of law.30

Section 18 of the Amparo Rule provides:

SEC. 18. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for
decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the
writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (Emphasis supplied.)

The threshold issue in this case is whether the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required by the Amparo
Rule to establish an enforced disappearance.

In granting the privilege of the writ of amparo, the trial court ratiocinated:

On record is evidence pointing to the more likely than not motive for James Balao’s disappearance – his
activist/political leanings. This is shown by the several incidents relating to harassments of activists as mentioned in the
unrebutted testimony of Beverly Longid and the enumeration made in par. 48 (a) to (cc) of the petition. There were also
references in the petition’s pars. 52 et. seq. to the CPA (of which James Balao was an active staff) as a front
organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army. More likely than not he was not taken to
parts unknown for reasons other than his involvement in the CPA, that is, politically-motivated. The Court considers
these facts enough circumstances to establish substantial evidence of an enforced disappearance as defined under the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo. For after all, substantial evidence requires nothing greater than "more likely than not"
degree of proof.31 (Emphasis supplied.)

The trial court gave considerable weight to the discussion in the petition of briefing papers supposedly obtained from
the AFP (Oplan Bantay-Laya implemented since 2001) indicating that the anti-insurgency campaign of the military
under the administration of President Arroyo included targeting of identified legal organizations under the NDF, which
included the CPA, and their members, as "enemies of the state." The petition cited other documents confirming such
"all-out war" policy which resulted in the prevalence of extrajudicial killings: namely, the published reports of the Melo
Commission and the UNHRC’s Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Mr. Philip Alston.
The petition also enumerated previously documented cases of extralegal killings of activists belonging to militant
groups, including CPA leaders and workers, almost all of which have been preceded by surveillance by military or police
agents and acts of harassment. Consequently, petitioners postulated that the surveillance on James and his subsequent
abduction are interconnected with the harassments, surveillance, threats and political assassination of other members
and officers of CPA which is his organization.

We hold that such documented practice of targeting activists in the military’s counter-insurgency program by itself
does not fulfill the evidentiary standard provided in the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance.

In the case of Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo,32 the Court noted that the similarity between the circumstances attending a
particular case of abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not,
necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. Accordingly, the trial
court in this case cannot simply infer government involvement in the abduction of James from past similar incidents in
which the victims also worked or affiliated with the CPA and other left-leaning groups.
The petition further premised government complicity in the abduction of James on the very positions held by the
respondents, stating that --

The abduction of James Balao can only be attributed to the Respondents who have command responsibility of all the
actions of their subordinates and who are the primary persons in the implementation of the government’s all out war
policy.33 (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo34 had the occasion to expound on the doctrine of command responsibility
and why it has little bearing, if at all, in amparo proceedings.

The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed
combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their
control in international wars or domestic conflict." In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal
complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the
present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be
remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual
criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to
prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered).

The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to which the
Philippines is signatory. Sec. 28 of the Statute imposes individual responsibility on military commanders for crimes
committed by forces under their control. The country is, however, not yet formally bound by the terms and provisions
embodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate has yet to extend concurrence in its ratification.

While there are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no Philippine law that provides for
criminal liability under that doctrine.

It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for
extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that
the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in
accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these
proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity
through omission, for individual respondents’ criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other
words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an
infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed. As the Court stressed in Secretary of National Defense v.
Manalo (Manalo), the writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and effective procedural relief against
violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo
suit, however, "is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or
administrative liability requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings." Of the same
tenor, and by way of expounding on the nature and role of amparo, is what the Court said in Razon v. Tagitis:

It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial
killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance [threats thereof or
extrajudicial killings] for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [or extrajudicial
killings].

xxxx

As the law now stands, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized
separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and
are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not
spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal x x x are matters of substantive law that only the
Legislature has the power to enact. x x x35

Subsequently, we have clarified that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo
proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the
complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. Commanders may therefore
be impleaded—not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or
at least accountability.36

In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,37 the Court defined responsibility and accountability as these terms are applied to amparo
proceedings, as follows:

x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft,
among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper
courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who
exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who
carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence
in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. x x x38 (Emphasis supplied.)

Assessing the evidence on record, we find that the participation in any manner of military and police authorities in the
abduction of James has not been adequately proven. The identities of the abductors have not been established, much
less their link to any military or police unit. There is likewise no concrete evidence indicating that James is being held or
detained upon orders of or with acquiescence of government agents. Consequently, the trial court erred in granting
amparo reliefs by ordering the respondent officials (1) to disclose where James Balao is detained or confined, (2) to
release him from such detention or confinement, and (3) to cease and desist from further inflicting harm upon his
person. Such pronouncement of responsibility on the part of public respondents cannot be made given the insufficiency
of evidence.39 However, we agree with the trial court in finding that the actions taken by respondent officials are "very
limited, superficial and one-sided." Its candid and forthright observations on the efforts exerted by the respondents are
borne by the evidence on record, thus:

x x x the violation of the right to security as protection by the government is unmistakable. The police and the military
miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of James Balao’s abduction as revealed by the investigation
report of respondent’s own witnesses Honorable Chief Superintendent Eugene Martin and Honorable Senior
Superintendent Fortunato Albas. The investigation was – to use the words in The Secretary of National Defense, et. al.,
v. Manalo et. al. – "verylimited, superficial and one-sided."

The actions taken were simply these: (a) organization of the "Task Force Balao"; (b) conduct of ocular inspection at the
place of abduction; (c) taking of sworn statements of civilian witnesses, whose testimonies did not prove much as
shown by the continued disappearance of James Balao; (d) dialogue with implicated military officials as well as family
members and friends of James Balao; and (e) writing of letter to the CPA. The Court does not want to second-guess
police protocols in investigation but surely some things are amiss where the investigation DID NOT INVESTIGATE the
military officials believed to be behind the abduction as they were merely invited to a dialogue and where the
investigation DID NOT LEAD to Camp Dangwa where the abductors were supposed to have proceeded as narrated by
the witnesses. To the mind of this Court, there is a seeming prejudice in the process of investigation to pin suspects
who are not connected with the military establishments. By any measure, this cannot be a thorough and good faith
investigation but one that falls short of that required by the Writ of Amparo.40

Respondents reiterate that they did their job the best they could and fault the petitioners instead for their non-
cooperation which caused delay in the investigation. They particularly blamed Beverly who failed to attend the October
15, 2008 invitation to appear before the investigators and shed light on James’s disappearance.
We are not persuaded.

First, the Task Force Balao had acknowledged the fact that Pol. Chief Supt. Martin was already in constant coordination
with the Balao family and CPA, and hence the investigators could have readily obtained whatever information they
needed from Beverly. Pol. Chief Supt. Martin even mentioned in his affidavit that Task Force Balao was able to secure
the testimonies of two eyewitnesses with the help of Beverly and the Balao family, and that as a result cartographic
sketches were made of some suspects.41 Moreover, Beverly had explained during the cross-examination conducted by
Associate Solicitor Paderanga that she was at the time coordinating with national and local agencies even as the police
investigation was ongoing.42 There is nothing wrong with petitioners’ simultaneous recourse to other legal avenues to
gain public attention for a possible enforced disappearance case involving their very own colleague. Respondents
should even commend such initiative that will encourage those who may have any information on the identities and
whereabouts of James’s abductors to help the PNP in its investigation.

Assuming there was reluctance on the part of the Balao family and CPA to submit James’s relatives or colleagues for
questioning by agents of the PNP and AFP, they cannot be faulted for such stance owing to the military’s perception of
their organization as a communist front: ergo, enemies of the State who may be targeted for liquidation. But more
important, such non-cooperation provides no excuse for respondents’ incomplete and one-sided investigations. As we
held in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo43 :

As regards P/Supt. Romero and P/Insp. Gomez, the Court is more than satisfied that they have no direct or indirect
hand in the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats against her daughters. As police officers,
though, theirs was the duty to thoroughly investigate the abduction of Lourdes, a duty that would include looking into
the cause, manner, and like details of the disappearance; identifying witnesses and obtaining statements from them;
and following evidentiary leads, such as the Toyota Revo vehicle with plate number XRR 428, and securing and
preserving evidence related to the abduction and the threats that may aid in the prosecution of the person/s
responsible. As we said in Manalo, the right to security, as a guarantee of protection by the government, is breached by
the superficial and one-sided––hence, ineffective––investigation by the military or the police of reported cases under
their jurisdiction. As found by the CA, the local police stations concerned, including P/Supt. Roquero and P/Insp.
Gomez, did conduct a preliminary fact-finding on petitioners’ complaint. They could not, however, make any headway,
owing to what was perceived to be the refusal of Lourdes, her family, and her witnesses to cooperate. Petitioners’
counsel, Atty. Rex J.M.A. Fernandez, provided a plausible explanation for his clients and their witnesses’ attitude,
"[They] do not trust the government agencies to protect them.The difficulty arising from a situation where the party
whose complicity in extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance, as the case may be, is alleged to be the same party
who investigates it is understandable, though.

The seeming reluctance on the part of the Rubricos or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to pose a hindrance to
the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in question to its natural end. To repeat what the Court
said in Manalo, the right to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of one’s right by the government. And
this protection includes conducting effective investigations of extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats of
the same kind. The nature and importance of an investigation are captured in the Velasquez Rodriguez case, in which
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights pronounced:

"[The duty to investigate] must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be
ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not a step taken
by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon offer of proof, without an
effective search for the truth by the government."44 (Emphasis supplied.)1avvphi1

Indeed, why zero in on James’s own kin and colleagues when independent eyewitnesses already provided firsthand
accounts of the incident, as well as descriptions of the abductors? With the cartographic sketches having been made
from interviews and statements of witnesses, the police investigators could have taken proper steps to establish the
personal identities of said suspects and yet this was not done, the police investigators not even lifting a finger to
ascertain whether the cartographic sketches would match with any enlisted personnel of AFP and PNP, or their civilian
agents/assets. As to the vehicles, the plate numbers of which have earlier been disclosed by James to his family and the
CPA as used in conducting surveillance on him prior to his abduction, the military merely denied having a vehicle with
such plate number on their property list despite the fact that the same plate number (USC 922) was sighted attached to
a car which was parked at the PA-ISU compound in Navy Base, Baguio City. As to the other plate number given by
James (TNH 787), while the police investigators were able to verify the name and address of the registered owner of
the vehicle, there is no showing that said owner had been investigated or that efforts had been made to locate the said
vehicle. Respondents’ insistence that the CPA produce the alleged companions of James in his rented residence for
investigation by the PNP team, while keeping silent as to why the police investigators had not actively pursued those
evidentiary leads provided by eyewitnessesand the Balao family, only reinforce the trial court’s observation that the
investigators are seemingly intent on building up a case against other persons so as to deflect any suspicion of military
or police involvement in James Balao’s disappearance.

In view of the foregoing evidentiary gaps, respondents clearly failed to discharge their burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of James’s abduction. Such ineffective investigation extant in the records of this case
prevents us from completely exonerating the respondents from allegations of accountability for James’ disappearance.
The reports submitted by the PNP Regional Office, Task Force Balao and Baguio City Police Station do not contain
meaningful results or details on the depth and extent of the investigation made. In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, the Court
observed that such reports of top police officials indicating the personnel and units they directed to investigate can
never constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal detailed investigative reports of the activities
undertaken to search for the victim.45 In the same case we stressed that the standard of diligence required – the duty
of public officials and employees to observe extraordinary diligence – called for extraordinary measures expected in the
protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent handling and investigation of extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearance cases.

As to the matter of dropping President Arroyo as party-respondent, though not raised in the petitions, we hold that the
trial court clearly erred in holding that presidential immunity cannot be properly invoked in an amparo proceeding. As
president, then President Arroyo was enjoying immunity from suit when the petition for a writ of amparo was filed.
Moreover, the petition is bereft of any allegation as to what specific presidential act or omission violated or threatened
to violate petitioners’ protected rights.46

In order to effectively address thru the amparo remedy the violations of the constitutional rights to liberty and security
of James who remains missing to date, the Court deems it appropriate to refer this case back to the trial court for
further investigation by the PNP and CIDG and monitoring of their investigative activities that complies with the
standard of diligence required by the Amparo Rule. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the "PNP
Law"47 specifies the PNP as the governmental office with the mandate to "[i]nvestigate and prevent crimes, effect the
arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution." The trial court should further
validate the results of such investigations and actions through hearings it may deem necessary to conduct.

Lastly, on the denial of the prayer for interim reliefs under the Amparo Rule.

An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo
petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision.48 A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant
an inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party
seeking the order.49 In this case, the issuance of inspection order was properly denied since the petitioners specified
several military and police establishments based merely on the allegation that the testimonies of victims and witnesses
in previous incidents of similar abductions involving activists disclosed that those premises were used as detention
centers. In the same vein, the prayer for issuance of a production order was predicated on petitioners’ bare allegation
that it obtained confidential information from an unidentified military source, that the name of James was included in
the so-called Order of Battle. Indeed, the trial court could not have sanctioned any "fishing expedition" by precipitate
issuance of inspection and production orders on the basis of insufficient claims of one party.

Nonetheless, the trial court is not precluded, as further evidence warrants, to grant the above interim reliefs to aid it in
making a decision upon evaluation of the actions taken by the respondents under the norm of extraordinary diligence.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 186050 and 186059 are PARTLY GRANTED. The Judgment dated January 19,
2009 of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63, in Special Proceeding No. 08-AMP-0001 is
MODIFIED as follows:

1) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo;

2) AFFIRMING the denial of the prayer for inspection and production orders, without prejudice to the subsequent grant
thereof, in the course of hearing and other developments in the investigations by the Philippine National
Police/Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group and the Armed Forces of the Philippines;

3) ORDERING the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or his successor, and the incumbent
Director General of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, to CONTINUE the investigations and actions already
commenced by the Philippine National Police Regional Office–Cordillera, Baguio City Police, Northern Luzon Command,
Philippine National Police/Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, Philippine Army-
Intelligence Service Unit and other concerned units, and specifically take and continue to take the necessary steps:

(a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by Task Force Balao;

(b) to locate and search the vehicles bearing the plate numbers submitted by the petitioners and which James Balao
had reported to be conducting surveillance on his person prior to his abduction on September 17, 2008, and investigate
the registered owners or whoever the previous and present possessors/transferees thereof; and to pursue any other
leads relevant to the abduction of James Balao;

The incumbent Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff, Philippine National Police Director General, or their
successors, shall ensure that the investigations and actions of their respective units on the abduction of James Balao
are pursued with extraordinary diligence as required by Sec. 17 of the Amparo Rule.

For purposes of these investigations, the Philippine National Police/Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group shall periodically report the detailed results of its investigation to the trial court for its consideration
and action. On behalf of this Court, the trial court shall pass upon the sufficiency of their investigative efforts. The
Philippine National Police and the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group shall have six
(6) months from notice hereof to undertake their investigations. Within fifteen (15) days after completion of the
investigations, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the DirectorGeneral of the Philippine
National Police shall submit a full report of the results of the said investigations to the trial court. Within thirty (30) days
thereafter, the trial court shall submit its full reportto this Court.

These directives and those of the trial court made pursuant to this Decision shall be given to, and shall be directly
enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff, Director General of
the Philippine National Police and Chief of the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
and other concerned units, under pain of contempt from this Court when the initiatives and efforts at disclosure and
investigation constitute less than the EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE that the Amparo Rule and the circumstances of the
case demand; and1awphi1

4) DROPPING former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as party-respondent in the petition for writ of amparo;

This case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63 for continuation of
proceedings in Special Proceeding No. 08-AMP-0001 for the purposes of monitoring compliance with the above
directives and determining whether, in the light of any recent reports or recommendations, there would already be
sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents responsible, or, at least, accountable. After making such
determination, the trial court shall submit its own report and recommendation to this Court for final action. The trial
court will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its tasks under this decision;

Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to answer for any responsibilities
and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.