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FBI Tampa
4 June 2020

(U) THE INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE UPLOADED TO ANY DATABASES, USED
FOR ANY PURPOSES, OR DISSEMINATED TO ANY OTHER RECIPIENT WITHOUT THE ADVANCED
AUTHORIZATION OF THE FBI.

(U) THIS PRODUCT EXPRESSES THE PERSPECTIVE OF THIS OFFICE AND MAY NOT BE REFLECTIVE
OF THE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE FBI.

(U//FOUO) Social Media Very Likely Used to Spread Tradecraft Techniques

to Impede Law Enforcement Detection Efforts of Illegal Activity in Central
Florida Civil Rights Protests, as of 4 June 2020

(U) Executive Summary

(U//FOUO) FBI Tampa assesses protest agitatorsa in the Tampa area of responsibilityb (AOR)
very likelyc promoted the use of sophisticated tradecraft related to communication methods to
impede law enforcement. Social media platforms were largely leveraged to push out intelligence
and tradecraft which educated protestors on ways to intercept and disseminate the movement of
law enforcement officers, techniques to reduce a technology footprint, and methods to ensure
mobile device security. This assessment is made with medium confidence,d based on a review of
social media platforms and reporting from a law enforcement agency.

(U//FOUO) FBI Tampa assesses protest agitators very likely spread information regarding
methods to disrupt law enforcement efforts to provide safety and protection to peaceful
protestors. Social media platforms were utilized to spread information on ways to disrupt officer
line of sight, deteriorate the effectiveness of officer issued safety gear, and hinder safety
measures to protect attendees and the public (i.e., identification of individuals with tear gas and
crowd control gates). This assessment is made with medium confidence, based on a review of
social media platforms and reporting from a law enforcement agency.

(U//FOUO) FBI Tampa assesses protest agitators seeking to evade law enforcement detection
very likely advertised methods to obfuscate their true identities. Protestors were encouraged to
hide identifying features through clothing and accessories. Furthermore, protestors were
informed of license plate readers in high traffic areas, which led to the advocacy of taxi or car
services instead. This assessment is made with medium confidence, based on a review of social
media platforms and reporting from a law enforcement agency.

a
(U) For the purpose of this intelligence product, FBI Tampa defined a protest agitator as an individual who intends
to commit violence or intends to incite others to commit violence in violation of local, city, state, or federal law.
b
(U//FOUO) FBI Tampa’s domain, or territorial area of responsibility (AOR), encompasses the following Florida
counties: Brevard, Charlotte, Collier, Desoto, Glades, Hardee, Hendry, Hernando, Hillsborough, Lee, Manatee,
Orange, Osceola, Pasco, Pinellas, Polk, Sarasota, and Seminole.
c
(U) See Appendix A: Expressions of Likelihood.
d
(U) See Appendix B: Confidence in Assessments and Judgments Based on a Body of Information.

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(U//FOUO) Protest Agitators Very Likely Promoted Use of Sophisticated Communication

Method Tradecraft to Impede Law Enforcement

(U//FOUO) FBI Tampa assesses protest agitators in the Tampa AOR very likely promoted the
use of sophisticated tradecraft related to communication methods to impede law enforcement.
Social media platforms were largely leveraged to push out intelligence and tradecraft which
educated protestors on ways to intercept and disseminate the movement of law enforcement
officers, techniques to reduce a technology footprint, and methods to ensure mobile device
security.
 (U//FOUO) According to a Florida law enforcement agency, protestors utilized police
scanner style devices to relay police movements to other protestors. The law enforcement
agency reported protestors broadcasting officer-related traffic real-time through an
identified social media platform.
 (U//FOUO) According to social media, a public post suggested protestors follow the live
calls for service feature on a Florida law enforcement agency’s website in order to alert
protestors of new dispatches to the protest area. According to the Florida law
enforcement agency, the website runs a ten minute delay to mitigate impact on law
enforcement actions.
 (U//FOUO) According to social media, public posts educated attendees in the utilization
of a faraday cage or the removal of the cellphone battery to cease cellular tracking. The
post stated the use of airplane mode does not prevent cellphone tracking.
 (U//FOUO) According to social media, protestors were told to assume law enforcement
had intercepted all information transmitted from a cellphone to include livestream feeds.
 (U//FOUO) According to social media, protest attendees with iPhones were encouraged
to use passcodes and to disable fingerprint and/or face scanning security features; and to
activate “Emergency SOS” which will disable the phone except for the passcode unlock
feature.

(U//FOUO) Protest Agitators Very Likely Spread Information on Methods to Disrupt

Efforts to Provide Safety and Protection to Peaceful Protestors

(U//FOUO) FBI Tampa assesses protest agitators very likely spread information regarding
methods to disrupt law enforcement efforts to provide safety and protection to peaceful
protestors. Social media platforms were utilized to spread information on ways to disrupt officer
line of sight, deteriorate the effectiveness of officer issued safety gear, and hinder safety
measures to protect attendees and the public (i.e., identification of individuals with tear gas and
crowd control gates).

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 (U//FOUO) According to social media, a public post had UNCLASSIFIED

been circulated instructing protest agitators to throw
“paint bombs”, described as water balloons filled with
thick paint, to blind law enforcement officers and slicken
their gear. A separate post indicated the use of paint
bombs would make law enforcement officers susceptible
to tear gas when they remove the gas mask to clean off
the paint.
 (U//FOUO) According to social media, it was
communicated that protestors should not publicly display
neutralizing tear gas or pepper spray.
 (U//FOUO) According to social media, suggestions were
made for protestor agitators to carry a set of Allen keys
(U) Public post regarding use of paint
in order to unlock crowd control gates. bombs to blind officers and slicken their
gear.
(U) Source: Social Media Platform, 3 June
(U//FOUO) Protest Agitators Seeking to Evade Law 2020
Enforcement Very Likely Advertised Methods to Obfuscate
True Identifies

(U//FOUO) FBI Tampa assesses protest agitators seeking to evade law enforcement detection
very likely advertised methods to obfuscate their true identities. Protestors were encouraged to
hide identifying features through clothing and accessories. Furthermore, protestors were
informed of license plate readers in high traffic areas, which led to the advocacy of the use of
taxi or car services instead.
 (U//FOUO) According to social media, public posts advised protestors to cover their face,
hair, tattoos, and wear a mask.
 (U//FOUO) According to social media, protestors were advised to use an umbrella to
protect themselves from projectiles, in addition to assisting in hiding an individual’s
identity.
 (U//FOUO) According to social media, public posts conveyed the use of license plate
readers scanning and tracking license plates, specifically in high traffic areas.

(U) Scope Note

(U) For the captioned Tactical Intelligence Report, the information was derived from law
enforcement agency reporting and open source reporting to include a wide variety of social
media platforms. This product includes contributions from the Tampa Bay Regional Intelligence
Center (TBRIC). The open source information queried provided both corroboration and context.
The queries took place from 29 May 2020 through 4 June 2020 and the information was current
as of 4 June 2020.

(U) FBI Tampa prepared this External Tactical Intelligence Report. Please address comments and queries to the FBI
Tampa Command Post at 813-253-1000.

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(U) Appendix A: Expressions of Likelihood

(U) Phrases such as “the FBI judges” and “the FBI assesses,” and terms such as “likely” and
“probably” convey analytical judgments and assessments. The chart below approximates how
expressions of likelihood and probability correlate with percentages of chance. Only terms of
likelihood should appear in FBI products; the chart includes terms of probability strictly for
comparison, as they sometimes appear in reporting of other government agencies. Furthermore,
the FBI does not arrive at judgments through statistical analysis; and will not use terms of
probability to convey uncertainty in external FBI intelligence products.

UNCLASSIFIED

Almost Roughly
Terms of Very Very Almost
No Unlikely Even Likely
Likelihood Unlikely Likely Certain(ly)
Chance Chance

Roughly
Terms of Highly Improbable Probable Highly Nearly
Remote Even
Probability Improbable (Improbably) (Probably) Probable Certain
Odds

Percentages
of Chance
1-5% 5-20% 20-45% 45-55% 55-80% 80-95% 95-99%

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(U) Appendix B: Confidence in Assessments and Judgments Based on a Body of Information

(U) Confidence levels reflect the quality and quantity of the source information supporting a
judgment. Consequently, the FBI ascribes high, medium, or low levels of confidence to
assessments, as follows:

(U) High confidence generally indicates the FBI’s judgments are based on high quality
information from multiple sources. High confidence in a judgment does not imply the assessment
is a fact or a certainty; such judgments might be wrong. While additional reporting and
information sources may change analytical judgments, such changes are most likely to be
refinements and not substantial in nature.

(U) Medium confidence generally means the information is credibly sourced and plausible but
not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence.
Additional reporting or information sources have the potential to increase the FBI’s confidence
levels or substantively change analytical judgments.

(U) Low confidence generally means the information’s credibility or plausibility is uncertain,
the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or the
reliability of the sources is questionable. Absent additional reporting or information sources,
analytical judgments should be considered preliminary in nature.

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