Maj Ksoc= 20.000u.m.

=
n*VNAPLICAȚIA4:Osocietateîşimajoreazăcapitalulcu20.000u.m.,emiţând8.000deacţiunilaparitate.Capitalulsocialînaintedemajorareerade500.000u.m,iarrezervelede50.000u.m.Dacăr
atarentabilităţiifinanciarescadedupămajoraredela8%la7%,calculațidiluţiaprofituluipeacţiune.Rezultat final: Dil PPA = 0,03 u.m. VN = 20.000/8.000 = 2,5 u.m.Ksoc 0 = 500.000 u.m. =
VN*NN= 500.000/2,5 = 200.000n= 8.000Kpr0= Ksoc+Rez = 550.000DilPPA=Kpr 0 ∗Rr

hor has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Afully persuaded that there ought to be magistracy
and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath right to my obedience;
since, if there be noto end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and so on to posterity.
Secondly, That the princes and rulers now on earth are possessed of this power of Adam, by a right way of conveyance derived
to them.

§. 83.
If the first of theese texts include theologically-focused historical accounts, hymns, parables, didactic letters, erotica, sermons, poetry, and
prophecies.

Those books included in the Bible by a tradition or group are called canonical, indicating that the tradition/group views the collection as the true
representation of God's word and will. A number of Biblical canons have evolved, with overlapping and diverging contents from denomination to
denomination.[2] The Hebrew Bible overlaps with the Greek Septuagint and the Christian Old Testament. The Christian New Testament is a
collection of writings by early Christians, believed to be mostly Jewish disciples of Christ, written in first-century Koine Greek. Among Christian
denominations there is some disagreement about what should be included in the canon, primarily about the biblical apocrypha, a list of works
that are regarded with varying levels of respect.

Attitudes towards the Bible also differ among Christian groups. Roman Catholics, high church Anglicans, Methodists and Eastern
Orthodox Christians stress the harmony and importance of both the Bible and sacred tradition, [3][4]
 while many Protestant churches focus on
the idea of sola scriptura, or scripture alone. This concept rose to prominence during the Reformation, and many denominations today support
the use of the Bible as the only infallible source of Christian teaching. Others though, advance the concept of prima scriptura in contrast.[3]

The Bible has had a massive influence on literature and history, especially in the Western world, where the Gutenberg Bible was the first book
printed using movable type. [5][6] According to the March 2007 edition of Time, the Bible "has done more to shape literature, history,
entertainment, and culture than any book ever written. Its influence on world history is unparalleled, and shows no signs of abating." [5] With
estimated total sales of over 5 billion copies, it is widely considered to be the best-selling book of all time. [5][7][8] As of the 2000s, it sells
approximately 100 million copies annually. [9][10]

Contents

• 1 Etymology

• 1.1 Textual history

• 2 Development

• 3 Hebrew Bible

• 3.1 Torah

• 3.2 Nevi'im

• 3.3 Ketuvim

• 3.4 Original languages

• 4 Samaritan Pentateuch

• 5 Septuagint

• 5.1 Incorporations from Theodotion

• 5.2 Final form

• 6 Christian Bibles

• 6.1 Old Testament

• 6.2 New Testament

• 6.3 Development of the Christian canons

• 7 Divine inspiration

• 8 Versions and translations

• 9 Views

• 9.1 Other religions

• 9.2 Biblical studies

• 9.3 Higher criticism

• 10 Archaeological and historical research

• 11 Bible museums

• 12 Image gallery

• 13 Illustrations

• 14 See also

• 15 Notes

• 16 References

• 16.1 Works cited

• 17 Further reading

• 18 External links

Etymology
The word βιβλίον itself had the literal meaning of "paper" or "scroll" and came to be used as the ordinary word for "book". It is the diminutive
of βύβλος byblos, "Egyptian papyrus", possibly so called from the name of the Phoenician sea port Byblos (also known as Gebal) from whence
Egyptian papyrus was exported to Greece.

The Greek ta biblia (lit. "little papyrus books")[11] was "an expression Hellenistic Jews used to describe their sacred books" (the Septuagint).
[12][13] Christian use of the term can be traced to c. 223 CE.[14] The biblical scholar F.F. Bruce notes that Chrysostom appears to be the first
writer (in his Homilies on Matthew, delivered between 386 and 388) to use the Greek phrase ta biblia ("the books") to describe both the Old
and New Testaments together.[15]

Medieval Latin biblia is short for biblia sacra "holy book", while biblia in Greek and Late Latin is neuter plural (gen. bibliorum). It gradually came to
be regarded as a feminine singular noun (biblia, gen. bibliae) in medieval Latin, and so the word was loaned as singular into the vernaculars of
Western Europe.[16] Latin biblia sacra "holy books" translates Greek τὰ βιβλία τὰ ἅγια tà biblía tà hágia, "the holy books".[17]

The English word Bible is from the Latin biblia, from the same word in Medieval Latin and Late Latin and ultimately from Koinē Greek: τὰ
βιβλία, romanized: ta biblia "the books" (singular βιβλίον, biblion).[14]

Textual history
By the 2nd century BCE, Jewish groups began calling the books of the Bible the "scriptures" and they referred to them as "holy", or in Hebrew
‫( כִּתְ בֵי הַ ק ֹּדֶ ׁש‬Kitvei hakkodesh), and Christians now commonly call the Old and New Testaments of the Christian Bible "The Holy Bible" (in
Greek τὰ βιβλία τὰ ἅγια, tà biblía tà ágia) or "the Holy Scriptures" (η Αγία Γραφή, e Agía Graphḗ).[18] The Bible was divided into chapters in the
13th century by Stephen Langton and into verses in the 16th century by French printer Robert Estienne[19] and is now usually cited by book,
chapter, and verse. The division of the Hebrew Bible into verses is based on the sof passuk cantillation mark used by the 10th-
century Masoretes to record the verse divisions used in earlier oral traditions.[citation needed]

The oldest extant copy of a complete Bible is an early 4th-century parchment book preserved in the Vatican Library, and it is known as the Codex
Vaticanus. The oldest copy of the Tanakh in Hebrew and Aramaic dates from the 10th century CE. The oldest copy of a complete Latin (Vulgate)
Bible is the Codex Amiatinus, dating from the 8th century.[20]

Development
See also: Authorship of the Bible

The Isaiah scroll, which is a part of the Dead Sea Scrolls, contains almost the whole Book of Isaiah. It dates from the 2nd century BCE.

Saint Paul Writing His Epistles, 16th-century painting.

 Professor John K. Riches, Professor of Divinity and Biblical Criticism at the University of Glasgow, says that "the biblical texts themselves are the
result of a creative dialogue between ancient traditions and different communities through the ages", [21] and "the biblical texts were produced
over a period in which the living conditions of the writers – political, cultural, economic, and ecological – varied enormously". [22] Timothy H. Lim, a
professor of Hebrew Bible and Second Temple Judaism at the University of Edinburgh, says that the Old Testament is "a collection of
authoritative texts of apparently divine origin that went through a human process of writing and editing." [23] He states that it is not a magical book,
nor was it literally written by God and passed to mankind. Parallel to the solidification of the Hebrew canon (c. 3rd century BCE), only
the Torah first and then the Tanakh began to be translated into Greek and expanded, now referred to as the Septuagint or the Greek Old
Testament.[24]

In Christian Bibles, the New Testament Gospels were derived from oral traditions in the second half of the first century. Riches says that:

Scholars have attempted to reconstruct something of the history of the oral traditions behind the Gospels, but the results have
not been too encouraging. The period of transmission is short: less than 40 years passed between the death of Jesus and the
writing of Mark's Gospel. This means that there was little time for oral traditions to assume fixed form. [25]

The Bible was later translated into Latin and other languages. John Riches states that:

The translation of the Bible into Latin marks the beginning of a parting of the ways between Western Latin-speaking Christianity
and Eastern Christianity, which spoke Greek, Syriac, Coptic, Ethiopic, and other languages. The Bibles of the Eastern Churches
vary considerably: the Ethiopic Orthodox canon includes 81 books and contains many apocalyptic texts, such as were found at
Qumran and subsequently excluded from the Jewish canon. As a general rule, one can say that the Orthodox Churches
generally follow the Septuagint in including more books in their Old Testaments than are in the Jewish canon. [25]

Hebrew Bible
Tanakh

[show]
Torah  (Instruction)
Nevi'im  (Prophets)[show]
Ketuvim  (Writings)[show]
•
Main article: Development of the Hebrew Bible canon

The Nash Papyrus (2nd century BCE) contains a portion of a pre-Masoretic Text, specifically the Ten Commandments and the Shema Yisrael prayer.

The Masoretic Text is the authoritative Hebrew text of the Hebrew Bible. It defines the books of the Jewish canon, and also the precise letter-text
of these biblical books, with their vocalization and accentuation.

The oldest extant manuscripts of the Masoretic Text date from approximately the 9th century CE, [26] and the Aleppo Codex (once the oldest
complete copy of the Masoretic Text, but now missing its Torah section) dates from the 10th century.

reflects the threefold division of the Hebrew Scriptures, Torah ("Teaching"), Nevi'im ("Prophets") )‫תנ"ך‬ :Hebrew( The name Tanakh

.and Ketuvim ("Writings")

Torah
Main article: Torah
See also: Oral Torah
 A Torah scroll recovered from Glockengasse Synagogue in Cologne.

The Torah (‫)ּתֹורה‬

ָ is also known as the "Five Books of Moses" or the Pentateuch, meaning "five scroll-cases".[27] Traditionally these books were
considered to have been written almost entirely by Moses himself.[28] In the 19th century, Julius Wellhausen and other scholars proposed that the
Torah had been compiled from earlier written documents dating from the 9th to the 5th century BCE, the "documentary hypothesis".
[28] Scholars Hermann Gunkel and Martin Noth, building on the form criticism of Gerhard von Rad, refined this hypothesis, while other scholars
have proposed other ways that the Torah might have developed over the centuries. [28]

Samaritan Inscription containing portion of the Bible in nine lines of Hebrew text, currently housed in the British Museum

The Hebrew names of the books are derived from the first words in the respective texts. The Torah consists of the following five books:

•Genesis, Beresheeth (‫)בראשית‬
•Exodus, Shemot (‫)שמות‬
•Leviticus, Vayikra (‫)ויקרא‬
•Numbers, Bamidbar (‫)במדבר‬
•Deuteronomy, Devarim (‫)דברים‬
The first eleven chapters of Genesis provide accounts of the creation (or ordering) of the world and the history of God's early relationship with
humanity. The remaining thirty-nine chapters of Genesis provide an account of God's covenant with the biblical
patriarchs Abraham, Isaac and Jacob (also called Israel) and Jacob's children, the "Children of Israel", especially Joseph. It tells of how God
commanded Abraham to leave his family and home in the city of Ur, eventually to settle in the land of Canaan, and how the Children of Israel
later moved to Egypt. The remaining four books of the Torah tell the story of Moses, who lived hundreds of years after the patriarchs. He leads
the Children of Israel from slavery in Ancient Egypt to the renewal of their covenant with God at biblical Mount Sinai and their wanderings in the
desert until a new generation was ready to enter the land of Canaan. The Torah ends with the death of Moses. [29]

The commandments in the Torah provide the basis for Jewish religious law. Tradition states that there are 613 commandments (taryag mitzvot).

Nevi'im
Main article: Nevi'im
Books of Nevi'im

 
Former Prophets
• Joshua
• Judges
• Samuel
• Kings
Latter Prophets (major)
• Isaiah
• Jeremiah
• Ezekiel
Latter Prophets (Twelve minor)
• Hosea
• Joel
• Amos
• Obadiah
• Jonah
• Micah
• Nahum
• Habakkuk
• Zephaniah
• Haggai
• Zechariah
• Malachi
Hebrew Bible
•

is the second main division of the Tanakh, between the Torah and Ketuvim. It )", romanized: Nəḇî'îm, "Prophets‫נְבִיאִ ים‬ :Hebrew( Nevi'im

), the narrative books of Joshua, Judges, Samuel and Kings ‫נביאים ראשונים‬ Nevi'im Rishonim ( contains two sub-groups, the Former Prophets

.), the books of Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel and the Twelve Minor Prophets‫נביאים אחרונים‬ Nevi'im Aharonim ( and the Latter Prophets

The Nevi'im tell the story of the rise of the Hebrew monarchy and its division into two kingdoms, ancient Israel and Judah, focusing on conflicts
between the Israelites and other nations, and conflicts among Israelites, specifically, struggles between believers in "the L ORD God"[30] (Yahweh)
and believers in foreign gods,[31][32] [33][34][35]
 and the criticism of unethical and unjust behaviour of Israelite elites and rulers;  in
which prophets played a crucial and leading role. It ends with the conquest of the Kingdom of Israel by the Assyrians followed by the conquest of
the Kingdom of Judah by the Babylonians and the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem.

Former Prophets
The Former Prophets are the book

ow on earth are possessed of this power of Adam, by a right way of conveyance derived to them.

§. 83.
If the first of these fail, the power of Adam, were it never so great, never so certain, will signify nothing to the present fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as hor has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Afully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the personl our author has been in his attempts, to set up
a monarchical absolute power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by what has been already said; but were that absolute
monarchy as clear as our author would desire it, as I presume it is the contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of
mankind now in the world, unless he also make out these two things.
First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes and rulers now on earth are possessed of this power of Adam, by a right way of conveyance derived
to them.

§. 83.
If the first of these fail, the power of Adam, were it never so great, never so certain, will signify nothing to the present fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and
whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is
necessary that they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with
this power over them.

§. 82.l our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by
what has been already said; but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our author would desire it, as I presume it is the
contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world, unless he also make out these two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes and rulers now on earth are possessed of this power of Adam, by a right way of conveyance derived
to them.

§. 83.
If the first of these fail, the power of Adam, were it never so great, never so certain, will signify nothing to the present fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and
whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is
necessary that they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with
this power over them.

§. 82.l our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by
what has been already said; but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our author would desire it, as I presume it is the
contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world, unless he also make out these two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes anhough it be never so plain, that there ought to be government in the world, nay, should all men be
of our author’s mind, that divine appointment had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men cannot obey any thing, that
cannot command; and ideas of governm

§. 82.
How successfu
How successful our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Afully persuaded that there
ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath
right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other
men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that
signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make
a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the
person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power,
unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be
no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and
scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as innocently change their
governors, as they do their physicians, if the personl our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute
power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by what has been already said; but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our
author would desire it, as I presume it is the contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world,
unless he also make out these two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes and rulers now on earth are possessed of this power of Adam, by a right way of conveyance derived
to them.

§. 83.
If the first of these fail, the power of Adam, were it never so great, never so certain, will signify nothing to the present fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and
whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is
necessary that they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with
this power over them.

§. 82.l our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by
what has been already said; but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our author would desire it, as I presume it is the
contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world, unless he also make out these two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes and rulers now on earth are possessed of this power of Adam, by a right way of conveyance derived
to them.

§. 83.
If the first of these fail, the power of Adam, were it never so great, never so certain, will signify nothing to the present fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and
whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is
necessary that they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with
this power over them.
§. 82.l our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by
what has been already said; but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our author would desire it, as I presume it is the
contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world, unless he also make out these two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes and rulers now on earth are possessed of this power of Adam, by a right way of conveyance derived
to them.

§. 83.
If the first of these fail, the power of Adam, were it never so great, never so certain, will signify nothing to the present fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and
whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is
necessary that they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with
this power over them.

§. 82.l our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by
what has been already said; but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our author would desire it, as I presume it is the
contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world, unless he also make out these two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes anhough it be never so plain, that there ought to be government in the world, nay, should all men be
of our author’s mind, that divine appointment had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men cannot obey any thing, that
cannot command; and ideas of governm

§. 82.
How successfu

How successful our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Afully persuaded that there
ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath
right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other
men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that
signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make
a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the
person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power,
unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be
no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and
scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as innocently change their
governors, as they do their physicians, if the personl our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute
power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by what has been already said; but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our
author would desire it, as I presume it is the contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world,
unless he also make out these two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes and rulers now on earth are possessed of this power of Adam, by a right way of conveyance derived
to them.
§. 83.
If the first of these fail, the power of Adam, were it never so great, never so certain, will signify nothing to the present fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and
whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is
necessary that they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with
this power over them.

§. 82.l our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by
what has been already said; but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our author would desire it, as I presume it is the
contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world, unless he also make out these two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes and rulers now on earth are possessed of this power of Adam, by a right way of conveyance derived
to them.

§. 83.
If the first of these fail, the power of Adam, were it never so great, never so certain, will signify nothing to the present fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and
whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is
necessary that they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with
this power over them.

§. 82.l our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by
what has been already said; but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our author would desire it, as I presume it is the
contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world, unless he also make out these two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes anhough it be never so plain, that there ought to be government in the world, nay, should all men be
of our author’s mind, that divine appointment had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men cannot obey any thing, that
cannot command; and ideas of governm

§. 82.
How successfu

How successful our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Afully persuaded that there
ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath
right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other
men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that
signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make
a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the
person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power,
unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be
no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and
scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as innocently change their
governors, as they do their physicians, if the personl our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute
power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by what has been already said; but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our
author would desire it, as I presume it is the contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world,
unless he also make out these two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes and rulers now on earth are possessed of this power of Adam, by a right way of conveyance derived
to them.

§. 83.
If the first of these fail, the power of Adam, were it never so great, never so certain, will signify nothing to the present fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and
whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is
necessary that they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with
this power over them.

§. 82.l our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by
what has been already said; but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our author would desire it, as I presume it is the
contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world, unless he also make out these two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.

Secondly, That the princes and rulers now on earth are possessed of this power of Adam, by a right way of conveyance derived
to them.

§. 83.
If the first of these fail, the power of Adam, were it never so great, never so certain, will signify nothing to the present fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and
whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is
necessary that they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with
this power over them.

§. 82.l our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in Adam, the reader may judge [99] by
what has been already said; but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our author would desire it, as I presume it is the
contrary, yet it could be of no use to the government of mankind now in the world, unless he also make out these two things.

First, That this power of Adam was not to end with him, but was upon his decease conveyed intire to some other person, and
so on to posterity.
Secondly, That the princes anhough it be never so plain, that there ought to be government in the world, nay, should all men be
of our author’s mind, that divine appointment had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men cannot obey any thing, that
cannot command; and ideas of governm

§. 82.
How successfu

§. 83.
If the first of these fail, the power of Adam, were it never so great, never so certain, will signify nothing to the present fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to m 

CAPITOLUL 1CARACTERIZAREA GENERALĂ A INSTITUŢIILOR PUBLICE

1.1. Definirea instituţiilor publice
Instituţiile publice au un rol important în cadrul statului deoarece prin intermediul acestorastatul îşi
îndeplineşte funcţiile şi rolul. De asemenea, procesele economice în economia de
piaţă, precum şi în alte tipuri de economii, sunt influenţate de stat prin intermediul sectorului
public.Sfera de cuprindere a instituţiilor  publice este vastă, statul acţionând practic 
în toatedomeniile vieţii economice sau sociale. De asemenea, una din caracteristicile cele mai
importanteale economiilor secolului XX, care se continuă şi în secolul XXI, este
expansiunea sectorului public. Statul, prin intermediul instituţiilor de care dispune
sau prin intermediul întreprinderilor aacţionat, în funcţie de politica urmată în diferite perioade,
asupra redistribuirii produsului intern brutîn economie, a influenţat pozitiv sau negativ desfăşurarea
anumitor activităţi.O primă modalitate de definire a instituţiilor publice o prezintă Legea
privind finanţele publice nr. 500/2002 potrivit căreia "instituţii publice" reprezintă
denumirea generică ce
includeParlamentul,  Administraţia  Prezidenţială,  ministerele,  celelalte organe de s
pecialitate  aleadministraţiei publice, alte autorităţi publice, instituţiile publice autonome, precum
şi instituţiile dinsubordinea acestora, indiferent de modul de finanţare al lor.Instituţiile publice în
sensul Legii 273/2006 privind finanţele publice cuprind „autorităţileunităţilor administrativ-
teritoriale, instituţiile publice şi serviciile publice de interes local, cu personalitate juridică,
indiferent de modul de finanţare a activităţii acestora”.O altă modalitate de a defini
instituţiile publice este aceea legată de caracteristicile bunurilor  produse de către acestea şi modul
de verificare sau, altfel spus, de modul de distribuire a acestoracătre beneficiari. Din acest punct
de vedere, se poate spune că instituţiile publice produc bunuri  publice care se distribuie, de
regulă, în mod gratuit, urmărind satisfacerea la un nivel maxim posibila cerinţelor consumatorilor,
sau la preţuri accesibile consumatorilor. Producerea de bunuri publiceeste, de regulă, obiectul de
activitate al unei instituţii publice. De aceea, fiind legate, din punct devedere financiar, de bugetul
public, instituţiile publice sunt organizate după principiul "non profit".Există şi excepţia
potrivit căreia o instituţie este publică, în funcţie de caracteristicile  prestaţiilor
acesteia, adresându-se publicului larg. Delimitarea unor asemenea instituţii nu ţine seama
în primul rând de caracteristicile finanţării, de dependenţa lor de bugetul statului, ele putândfi chiar
private sau să funcţioneze după principiile finanţelor private.
1.2. Clasificarea instituţiilor publice
Instituţiile publice pot fi clasificate după mai multe criterii, astfel:I. După importanţa activităţii,
instituţiile publice pot fi grupate în :a) Insisfacerea la un nivel maxim posibila cerinţelor
consumatorilor, sau la preţuri accesibile consumatorilor. Producerea de bunuri publiceeste, de
regulă, obiectul de activitate al unei instituţii publice. De aceea, fiind legate, din punct devedere
financiar, de bugetul public, instituţiile publice sunt organizate după principiul "non profit".Există
şi excepţia potrivit căreia o instituţie este publică, în funcţie de
caracteristicile  prestaţiilor acesteia, adresându-se publicului larg. Delimitarea unor
asemenea instituţii nu ţineseama în primul rând de caracteristicile finanţării, de dependenţa lor
de bugetul statului, ele putândfi chiar private sau să funcţioneze după principiile finanţelor private.
1.2. Clasificarea instituţiilor publice
Instituţiile publice pot fi clasificate după mai multe criterii, astfel:I. După importanţa activităţii,
instituţiile publice pot fi grupate
în
:a) Instituţiile  administraţiei  publice centrale ce cuprind: Parlamentul,  Preşedenţia 
României, Guvernul, ministerele şi celelalte autorităţi centrale de specialitate ale
administraţiei publice şiinstituţiile din subordinea lor directă. b) Instituţii ale administraţiei
publice locale ce cuprind: consiliile comunale, orăşeneşti, judeţene
şiConsiliul General al Municipiului Bucureşti, ca autorităţi deliberative, şi primarii, preşe
dinţiiconsiliilor judeţene şi primarul general al municipiului Bucureşti, ca autorităţi executive.II.
După statutul juridic, instituţiile publice se clasifică în:a) Instituţii publice cu perso
 
CAPITOLUL 1CARACTERIZAREA GENERALĂ A INSTITUŢIILOR PUBLICE
1.1. Definirea instituţiilor publice
Instituţiile publice au un rol important în cadrul statului deoarece prin intermediul acestorastatul îşi
îndeplineşte funcţiile şi rolul. De asemenea, procesele economice în economia de
piaţă, precum şi în alte tipuri de economii, sunt influenţate de stat prin intermediul sectorului
public.Sfera de cuprindere a instituţiilor  publice este vastă, statul acţionând practic 
în toatedomeniile vieţii economice sau sociale. De asemenea, uown who has a right to direct me, and whose
prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is necessary that
they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with this power over
them.

§. 82.
How successful our author has been in his attempts, to set up a monarchical absolute power in A

In both these rights, there being supposed an exclusion of all other men, it must be upon some reason peculiar to Adam, that
they must both be founded.

That of his property our author supposes to arise from God’s immediate donation, Gen. i. 28. and that of fatherhood from the
act of brld with things fit for food and raiment, and other necessaries of life, subservient to his design, that man should live and
abide for some time upon the face of the earth, and not that so curious and wonderful a piece of workmanship, by his own
negligence, or want of necessaries, should perish again, presently after a few moments continuance; God, I say, having made
man and the world thus, spoke to him,ugh to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but
there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be
obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that
power over him. If this were not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is
without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men
too might as often and as innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who
has a right to direct me, and whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an
obligation to obedience, it is necessary that they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person
who by right is vested with this power over them.
§. 82.pirical use refers to phenomena only, that is, to objects of a possible experience. That the latter use alone is admissible
will be clear from the following considerations. [239] What is required for every concept is, first, the logical form of a concept
(of thought) in general; and, secondly, the possibility of an object to which it refers. Without the latter, it has no sense, and is
entirely empty, though it may still contain the logical function by which a concept can be formed out of any data. The only way
in which an object can be given to a concept is in intuition, and though a pure intuition is possible a priori and before the
object, yet even that pure intuition can receive its object, and with it its objective validity, by an empirical intuition only, of
which it is itself nothing but the form. All concepts, therefore, and with them all principles, though they may be possible a
priori, refer nevertheless to empirical intuitions, that is, to data of a possible experience. Without this, they can claim no
objective validity, but are a mere play, whether of the imagination or of the understanding with their respective
representations. Let us take the concepts of mathematics as an example, and, first, with regard to pure intuitions. Although
such principles as ‘space has three dimensions,’ ‘between two points there can be only one straight line,’ as well as the
representation of the object with which that science is occupied, may be produced in the mind a priori, they would have no
meaning, if we were not able at all times [240] to show their meaning as applied to phenomena (empirical objects). It is for this
reason that an abstract concept is required to be made sensuous, that is, that its corresponding [196] object is required to be
shown in intuition, because, without this, the concept (as people say) is without sense, that is, without meaning. Mathematics
fulfil this requirement by the construction of the figure, which is a phenomenon present to the senses (although constructed a
priori). In the same science the concept of quantity finds its support and sense in number; and this in turn in the fingers, the
beads of the abacus, or in strokes and points which can be presented to the eyes. The concept itself was produced a
priori, together with all the synthetical principles or formulas which can be derived from such concepts; but their use and their
relation to objects can nowhere be found except in experience, of which those concepts contain a priori the (formal) possibility
only.
That this is the case with all categories and with all the principles drawn from them, becomes evident from the fact that we
could not define any one of them (really, that is, make conceivable the possibility of their object), 1 without at once having
recourse to the conditions of sensibility or the form of phenomena, to which, as their only possible objects, these categories
must necessarily be restricted, it being impossible, if we take away [241] these conditions, to assign to them any meaning, that
is, any relation to an object, or to make it intelligible to ourselves by an example what kind of thing could be intended by such
concepts.
[When representing the table of the categories, we dispensed with the definition of every one of them, because at that time it
seemed unnecessary for our purpose, which concerned their synthetical use only, and because entailing [197] responsibilities
which we were not bound to incur. This was not a mere excuse, but a very important prudential rule, viz. not to rush into
definitions, and to attempt or pretend completeness or precision in the definition of a concept, when one or other of its
characteristic marks is sufficient without a complete enumeration of all that constitute the whole concept. Now, however, we
can perceive that this caution had even a deeper ground, namely, that we could not have defined them, even if we had
wished;1 for, if we remove all conditions of [242] sensibility, which distinguish them as the concepts of a possible empirical use,
and treat them as concepts of things in general (therefore as of transcendental use), nothing remains but to regard the logical
function in judgments as the condition of the possibility of the things themselves, without the slightest indication as to where
they could have their application and their object, or how they could have any meaning or objective validity in the pure
understanding, apart from sensibility.]2
No one can explain the concept of quantity in general, except, it may be, by saying that it is the determination of an object, by
which we may know how many times the one is supposed to exist in it. But this ‘how many times’ is based on successive
repetition, that is on time, and on the synthesis in it of the homogeneous.

Reality, again, can only be explained in opposition to a negation, if we think of time (as containing all being) being [198]
either filled or empty.

Were I to leave out permanence (which means existence at all times), nothing would remain of my concept of substance but the
logical representation of a subject which I think I can realise by imagining something which is a subject only,
without [243] being a predicate of anything. But in this case we should not only be ignorant of all conditions under which this
logical distinction could belong to anything, but we should be unable to make any use of it or draw any conclusions from it,
because no object is thus determined for the use of this concept, and no one can tell whether such a concept has any meaning
at all.

Of the concept of cause also (if I leave out time, in which something follows on something else by rule) I should find no more in
the pure category than that it is something which enables us to conclude the existence of somethi

pirical use refers to phenomena only, that is, to objects of a possible experience. That the latter use alone is admissible will be
clear from the following considerations. [239] What is required for every concept is, first, the logical form of a concept (of
thought) in general; and, secondly, the possibility of an object to which it refers. Without the latter, it has no sense, and is
entirely empty, though it may still contain the logical function by which a concept can be formed out of any data. The only way
in which an object can be given to a concept is in intuition, and though a pure intuition is possible a priori and before the
object, yet even that pure intuition can receive its object, and with it its objective validity, by an empirical intuition only, of
which it is itself nothing but the form. All concepts, therefore, and with them all principles, though they may be possible a
priori, refer nevertheless to empirical intuitions, that is, to data of a possible experience. Without this, they can claim no
objective validity, but are a mere play, whether of the imagination or of the understanding with their respective
representations. Let us take the concepts of mathematics as an example, and, first, with regard to pure intuitions. Although
such principles as ‘space has three dimensions,’ ‘between two points there can be only one straight line,’ as well as the
representation of the object with which that science is occupied, may be produced in the mind a priori, they would have no
meaning, if we were not able at all times [240] to show their meaning as applied to phenomena (empirical objects). It is for this
reason that an abstract concept is required to be made sensuous, that is, that its corresponding [196] object is required to be
shown in intuition, because, without this, the concept (as people say) is without sense, that is, without meaning. Mathematics
fulfil this requirement by the construction of the figure, which is a phenomenon present to the senses (although constructed a
priori). In the same science the concept of quantity finds its support and sense in number; and this in turn in the fingers, the
beads of the abacus, or in strokes and points which can be presented to the eyes. The concept itself was produced a
priori, together with all the synthetical principles or formulas which can be derived from such concepts; but their use and their
relation to objects can nowhere be found except in experience, of which those concepts contain a priori the (formal) possibility
only.

That this is the case with all categories and with all the principles drawn from them, becomes evident from the fact that we
could not define any one of them (really, that is, make conceivable the possibility of their object), 1 without at once having
recourse to the conditions of sensibility or the form of phenomena, to which, as their only possible objects, these categories
must necessarily be restricted, it being impossible, if we take away [241] these conditions, to assign to them any meaning, that
is, any relation to an object, or to make it intelligible to ourselves by an example what kind of thing could be intended by such
concepts.
[When representing the table of the categories, we dispensed with the definition of every one of them, because at that time it
seemed unnecessary for our purpose, which concerned their synthetical use only, and because entailing [197] responsibilities
which we were not bound to incur. This was not a mere excuse, but a very important prudential rule, viz. not to rush into
definitions, and to attempt or pretend completeness or precision in the definition of a concept, when one or other of its
characteristic marks is sufficient without a complete enumeration of all that constitute the whole concept. Now, however, we
can perceive that this caution had even a deeper ground, namely, that we could not have defined them, even if we had
wished;1 for, if we remove all conditions of [242] sensibility, which distinguish them as the concepts of a possible empirical use,
and treat them as concepts of things in general (therefore as of transcendental use), nothing remains but to regard the logical
function in judgments as the condition of the possibility of the things themselves, without the slightest indication as to where
they could have their application and their object, or how they could have any meaning or objective validity in the pure
understanding, apart from sensibility.]2
No one can explain the concept of quantity in general, except, it may be, by saying that it is the determination of an object, by
which we may know how many times the one is supposed to exist in it. But this ‘how many times’ is based on successive
repetition, that is on time, and on the synthesis in it of the homogeneous.

Reality, again, can only be explained in opposition to a negation, if we think of time (as containing all being) being [198]
either filled or empty.

Were I to leave out permanence (which means existence at all times), nothing would remain of my concept of substance but the
logical representation of a subject which I think I can realise by imagining something which is a subject only,
without [243] being a predicate of anything. But in this case we should not only be ignorant of all conditions under which this
logical distinction could belong to anything, but we should be unable to make any use of it or draw any conclusions from it,
because no object is thus determined for the use of this concept, and no one can tell whether such a concept has any meaning
at all.

Of the concept of cause also (if I leave out time, in which something follows on something else by rule) I should find no more in
the pure category than that it is something which enables us to conclude the existence of somethi

pirical use refers to phenomena only, that is, to objects of a possible experience. That the latter use alone is admissible will be
clear from the following considerations. [239] What is required for every concept is, first, the logical form of a concept (of
thought) in general; and, secondly, the possibility of an object to which it refers. Without the latter, it has no sense, and is
entirely empty, though it may still contain the logical function by which a concept can be formed out of any data. The only way
in which an object can be given to a concept is in intuition, and though a pure intuition is possible a priori and before the
object, yet even that pure intuition can receive its object, and with it its objective validity, by an empirical intuition only, of
which it is itself nothing but the form. All concepts, therefore, and with them all principles, though they may be possible a
priori, refer nevertheless to empirical intuitions, that is, to data of a possible experience. Without this, they can claim no
objective validity, but are a mere play, whether of the imagination or of the understanding with their respective
representations. Let us take the concepts of mathematics as an example, and, first, with regard to pure intuitions. Although
such principles as ‘space has three dimensions,’ ‘between two points there can be only one straight line,’ as well as the
representation of the object with which that science is occupied, may be produced in the mind a priori, they would have no
meaning, if we were not able at all times [240] to show their meaning as applied to phenomena (empirical objects). It is for this
reason that an abstract concept is required to be made sensuous, that is, that its corresponding [196] object is required to be
shown in intuition, because, without this, the concept (as people say) is without sense, that is, without meaning. Mathematics
fulfil this requirement by the construction of the figure, which is a phenomenon present to the senses (although constructed a
priori). In the same science the concept of quantity finds its support and sense in number; and this in turn in the fingers, the
beads of the abacus, or in strokes and points which can be presented to the eyes. The concept itself was produced a
priori, together with all the synthetical principles or formulas which can be derived from such concepts; but their use and their
relation to objects can nowhere be found except in experience, of which those concepts contain a priori the (formal) possibility
only.

That this is the case with all categories and with all the principles drawn from them, becomes evident from the fact that we
could not define any one of them (really, that is, make conceivable the possibility of their object), 1 without at once having
recourse to the conditions of sensibility or the form of phenomena, to which, as their only possible objects, these categories
must necessarily be restricted, it being impossible, if we take away [241] these conditions, to assign to them any meaning, that
is, any relation to an object, or to make it intelligible to ourselves by an example what kind of thing could be intended by such
concepts.
[When representing the table of the categories, we dispensed with the definition of every one of them, because at that time it
seemed unnecessary for our purpose, which concerned their synthetical use only, and because entailing [197] responsibilities
which we were not bound to incur. This was not a mere excuse, but a very important prudential rule, viz. not to rush into
definitions, and to attempt or pretend completeness or precision in the definition of a concept, when one or other of its
characteristic marks is sufficient without a complete enumeration of all that constitute the whole concept. Now, however, we
can perceive that this caution had even a deeper ground, namely, that we could not have defined them, even if we had
wished;1 for, if we remove all conditions of [242] sensibility, which distinguish them as the concepts of a possible empirical use,
and treat them as concepts of things in general (therefore as of transcendental use), nothing remains but to regard the logical
function in judgments as the condition of the possibility of the things themselves, without the slightest indication as to where
they could have their application and their object, or how they could have any meaning or objective validity in the pure
understanding, apart from sensibility.]2
No one can explain the concept of quantity in general, except, it may be, by saying that it is the determination of an object, by
which we may know how many times the one is supposed to exist in it. But this ‘how many times’ is based on successive
repetition, that is on time, and on the synthesis in it of the homogeneous.

Reality, again, can only be explained in opposition to a negation, if we think of time (as containing all being) being [198]
either filled or empty.

Were I to leave out permanence (which means existence at all times), nothing would remain of my concept of substance but the
logical representation of a subject which I think I can realise by imagining something which is a subject only,
without [243] being a predicate of anything. But in this case we should not only be ignorant of all conditions under which this
logical distinction could belong to anything, but we should be unable to make any use of it or draw any conclusions from it,
because no object is thus determined for the use of this concept, and no one can tell whether such a concept has any meaning
at all.

Of the concept of cause also (if I leave out time, in which something follows on something else by rule) I should find no more in
the pure category than that it is something which enables us to conclude the existence of somethi
e plain of the case is this. God having made man, and planted in him, as in all other animals, a strong desire of self-
preservation; and furnished the woling of order, and establishment of government in its exercise and use amongst men, unless
there were a way also taught how to know the person, to whom it belonged to have this power, and exercise this dominion over
others. It is in vain then to talk of subjection and obedience without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I never so fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as
innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and
whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is
necessary that they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with
this power over them.ent in the fancy, though never so perfect, though never so right, cannot give laws, nor prescribe rules to
the actions of men; it would be of no behoof for the settling of order, and establishment of government in its exercise and use
amongst men, unless there were a way also taught how to know the person, to whom it belonged to have this power, and
exercise this dominion over others. It is in vain then to talk of subjection and obedience without telling us whom we are to
obey: for were I never so fully persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at
liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and
distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though
submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such
men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the
world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can
never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise
that power over him. If this were not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is
without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men
too might as often and as innocently change their governors, as they do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who
has a right to direct me, and whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an
obligation to obedience, it is necessary that they know not only, that there is a power somewhere in the world, but the person
who by right is vested with this power over them.ent in the fancy, though never so perfect, though never so right, cannot give
laws, nor prescribe rules to the actions of men; it would be of no behoof for the settling of order, and establishment of
government in its exercise and use amongst men, unless there were a way also taught how to know the person, to whom it
belonged to have this power, and exercise this dominion over others. It is in vain then to talk of subjection and obedience
without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I never so fully persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the
world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be
no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any
other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to
the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him
that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal
power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is
the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be no distinction between pirates
and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and scepters would become the
inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as innocently change their governors, as they do their
physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and whose prescriptions I am bound to follow. To settle
therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is necessary that they know not only, that there is a power
somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with this power over them.ent in the fancy, though never so
perfect, though never so right, cannot give laws, nor prescribe rules to the actions of men; it would be of no behoof for the
settling of order, and establishment of government in its exercise and use amongst men, unless there were a way also taught
how to know the person, to whom it belonged to have this power, and exercise this dominion over others. It is in vain then to
talk of subjection and obedience without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I never so fully persuaded that there ought to
be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath right to my
obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may
be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies
nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a
subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person
to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can
be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be no distinction
between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and scepters would
become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as innocently change their governors, as they
do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and whose prescriptions I am bound to follow.
To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is necessary that they know not only, that there is a
power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with this power over them.ent in the fancy, though never
so perfect, though never so right, cannot give laws, nor prescribe rules to the actions of men; it would be of no behoof for the
settling of order, and establishment of government in its exercise and use amongst men, unless there were a way also taught
how to know the person, to whom it belonged to have this power, and exercise this dominion over others. It is in vain then to
talk of subjection and obedience without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I never so fully persuaded that there ought to
be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath right to my
obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may
be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies
nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a
subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person
to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can
be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be no distinction
between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and scepters would
become the inheritance only of violence and rapine. Men too might as often and as innocently change their governors, as they
do their physicians, if the person cannot be known who has a right to direct me, and whose prescriptions I am bound to follow.
To settle therefore men’s consciences, under an obligation to obedience, it is necessary that they know not only, that there is a
power somewhere in the world, but the person who by right is vested with this power over them.. It is in vain then to talk of
subjection and obedience without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I never so fully persuaded that there ought to be
magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath right to my
obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may
be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies
nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a
subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person
to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can
be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be no
distinctiotment had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men cannot obey any thing, that cannot command; and ideas of
government in the fancy, though never so perfect, though never so right, cannot give laws, nor prescribe rules to the actions of
men; it would be of no behoof for the settling of order, and establishment of government in its exercise and use amongst men,
unless there were a way also taught how to know the person, to whom it belonged to have this power, and exercise this
dominion over others. It is in vain then to talk of subjection and obedience without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I
never so fully persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it
appears who is the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him
that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to
government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have
authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but
there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be
obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that
power over him. If this were not so, there would be no distinctiotment had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men
cannot obey any thing, that cannot command; and ideas of government in the fancy, though never so perfect, though never so
right, cannot give laws, nor prescribe rules to the actions of men; it would be of no behoof for the settling of order, and
establishment of government in its exercise and use amongst men, unless there were a way also taught how to know the
person, to whom it belonged to have this power, and exercise this dominion over others. It is in vain then to talk of subjection
and obedience without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I never so fully persuaded that there ought to be magistracy
and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath right to my obedience;
since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may be myself,
as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but
submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a subject, to
convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person to whom
this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can be
satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be no
distinctiotment had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men cannot obey any thing, that cannot command; and ideas of
government in the fancy, though never so perfect, though never so right, cannot give laws, nor prescribe rules to the actions of
men; it would be of no behoof for the settling of order, and establishment of government in its exercise and use amongst men,
unless there were a way also taught how to know the person, to whom it belonged to have this power, and exercise this
dominion over others. It is in vain then to talk of subjection and obedience without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I
never so fully persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it
appears who is the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him
that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to
government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have
authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but
there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be
obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that
power over him. If this were not so, there would be no distinctiotment had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men
cannot obey any thing, that cannot command; and ideas of government in the fancy, though never so perfect, though never so
right, cannot give laws, nor prescribe rules to the actions of men; it would be of no behoof for the settling of order, and
establishment of government in its exercise and use amongst men, unless there were a way also taught how to know the
person, to whom it belonged to have this power, and exercise this dominion over others. It is in vain then to talk of subjection
and obedience without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I never so fully persuaded that there ought to be magistracy
and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath right to my obedience;
since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may be myself,
as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but
submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a subject, to
convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person to whom
this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can be
satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be no distinctiod;
yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no
marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other.
And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the
direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that
there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of
right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the
person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and
lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and scepters would hough it be never so
plain, that there ought to be government in the world, nay, should all men be of our author’s mind, that divine appointment
had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men cannot obey any thing, that cannot command; and ideas of government in
the fancy, though never so perfect, though never so right, cannot give laws, nor prescribe rules to the actions of men; it would
be of no behoof for the settling of order, and establishment of government in its exercise and use amongst men, unless there
were a way also taught how to know the person, to whom it belonged to have this power, and exercise this dominion over
others. It is in vain then to talk of subjection and obedience without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I never so fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would hough it be never so plain, that there ought to be government in the world, nay, should
all men be of our author’s mind, that divine appointment had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men cannot obey any
thing, that cannot command; and ideas of government in the fancy, though never so perfect, though never so right, cannot give
laws, nor prescribe rules to the actions of men; it would be of no behoof for the settling of order, and establishment of
government in its exercise and use amongst men, unless there were a way also taught how to know the person, to whom it
belonged to have this power, and exercise this dominion over others. It is in vain then to talk of subjection and obedience
without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I never so fully persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the
world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be
no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any
other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to
the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him
that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal
power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is
the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be no distinction between pirates
and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and scepters would hough it be never so
plain, that there ought to be government in the world, nay, should all men be of our author’s mind, that divine appointment
had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men cannot obey any thing, that cannot command; and ideas of government in
the fancy, though never so perfect, though never so right, cannot give laws, nor prescribe rules to the actions of men; it would
be of no behoof for the settling of order, and establishment of government in its exercise and use amongst men, unless there
were a way also taught how to know the person, to whom it belonged to have this power, and exercise this dominion over
others. It is in vain then to talk of subjection and obedience without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I never so fully
persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is
the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to
rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any other. And therefore, though submission to government be every
one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command,
it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of
designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to
submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were
not so, there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be
obeyed, and crowns and scepters would hough it be never so plain, that there ought to be government in the world, nay, should
all men be of our author’s mind, that divine appointment had ordained it to be monarchical; yet, since men cannot obey any
thing, that cannot command; and ideas of government in the fancy, though never so perfect, though never so right, cannot give
laws, nor prescribe rules to the actions of men; it would be of no behoof for the settling of order, and establishment of
government in its exercise and use amongst men, unless there were a way also taught how to know the person, to whom it
belonged to have this power, and exercise this dominion over others. It is in vain then to talk of subjection and obedience
without telling us whom we are to obey: for were I never so fully persuaded that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the
world; yet I am never the less at liberty still, till it appears who is the person that hath right to my obedience; since, if there be
no marks to know him by, and distinguish him that hath right to rule from [98] other men, it may be myself, as well as any
other. And therefore, though submission to government be every one’s duty, yet since that signifies nothing but submitting to
the direction and laws of such men as have authority to command, it is not enough to make a man a subject, to convince him
that there is regal power in the world; but there must be ways of designing, and knowing the person to whom this regal
power of right belongs: and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power, unless he can be satisfied who is
the person who has a right to exercise that power over him. If this were not so, there would be no distinction between pirates
and lawful princes; he that has force is without any more ado to be obeyed, and crowns and scepters would