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https://doi.org/10.1007/s12108-018-9381-5

Sociology’s Sacred Victims and the Politics


of Knowledge: Moral Foundations Theory
and Disciplinary Controversies

Mark Horowitz 1 & Anthony Haynor 1 &


Kenneth Kickham 2

# Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018

Abstract The field of sociology has long been subject to critique for alleged ideological
bias and left-wing groupthink linked to its social justice mission. Critics contend that the
construction of Bsacred victims^ by progressive intellectuals hinders their ability to
objectively appraise the circumstances of such vulnerable groups. To address this
criticism, we survey 479 sociologists in national universities and colleges in the U.S.
regarding three sensitive controversies: urban poverty in the black community; gendered
differences in occupational choices; and immigration. We find significant patterns in the
data. Commitment to the field’s Bmoral mission,^ preferred research paradigm, gender,
and especially political orientation are all significant predictors of sociologists’ views.
The results, we suggest, can be understood by conceptualizing the field of sociology as
an Bemotive community.^ In doing so, we draw upon current social psychological
research on moral foundations theory developed by Jonathan Haidt and colleagues.

Keywords Survey of sociologists . Sacred victims . Intuitionism . Moral foundations


theory . Emotive communities . Jonathan Haidt

Introduction

It is hardly news that sociologists lean left politically. Surveys of the field long suggest
a haven for progressive-minded scholars (Rothman et al. 2005; Sanderson and Ellis
1992), while many if not most proudly affirm their commitment to social justice and

* Mark Horowitz
mark.horowitz@shu.edu

1
Department of Sociology, Anthropology and Social Work, Seton Hall University, South Orange,
NJ 07079, USA
2
Political Science Department, University of Central Oklahoma, Edmond, OK 73034, USA
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economic equality. In his 2004 Presidential Address to the American Sociological


Association, Michael Burawoy (2005) extols the Brarely vanquished^ sociological
Bspirit^ – a Bmoral impetus^ and Bpassion^ for a better world that endures despite
the disciplinary pressures associated with the tenure process. While introductory
textbooks note the field’s twin roots of social reform and objective research, a subset
of radical or Bliberationist^ writers openly affirm Bcountersystem^ orientations on
behalf of the Bsocially oppressed^ (Feagin et al. 2015).
If such progressive sensibilities fail to raise alarm among sociologists, critics
highlight the dangers of ideological bias and academic groupthink (Stern 2018;
Winegard and Winegard 2018; Deflem 2013; Horowitz 1993; Lipset 1994). While
the social sciences and humanities as a whole are subject to critique, sociology in
particular (coupled perhaps with cultural anthropology) bears the biggest brunt of
disapproval. We have written elsewhere of the often caustic criticism of sociology’s
anti-biological, Bblank slate^ view of human nature (Horowitz et al. 2014). Indeed, for
decades evolutionary-oriented scholars have decried what they view as sociology’s
Bstagnation^ (Boutwell 2017), Bcrisis,^ (Lopreato and Crippen 2001), Bbiophobia^
(Ellis 1996), and even Bintellectual bankruptcy^ (Van den Berghe 1990).
Criticisms of the field transcend biology, however. Observers accentuate certain
Bsacred^ values among left academics, such as social justice and equality, which may
blind them to basic truths about the social world (Winegard and Winegard 2018; Martin
2016; Haidt 2012; Smith 2014). Especially relevant is what Haidt (2012) refers to as the
Bsacralization^ of vulnerable groups, such as racial and gender minorities. Rendering
such groups sacred – i.e., setting them apart as beyond reproach – allegedly undermines
objective appraisals of their circumstances. In this vein, Winegard and Winegard
(2018:19) argue that Bmuch of sociology^ adheres to what they call Bsacred cosmic
egalitarianism^ – the belief that Ball ethnic and cultural groups, social classes, and sexes
are relatively equal on all socially desired traits.^ Empirical inquiries that interrogate
this sacred belief – such as investigation of cognitive differences between sexes or
Braces^ – transgress the field’s moral sensibilities and trigger hostility or disgust.
Related knowledge claims that might be construed as injurious to vulnerable groups,
or limiting the prospects of social equality, are deemed Btaboo^ regardless of their
empirical defensibility. Among such taboo ideas in social science, Martin (2016:118)
writes, are that B‘victims’ are sometimes blameworthy^ or that Bstereotypes sometimes
match average group differences.^
To be sure, dismissal of unwanted ideas is not solely or even principally the province
of the political left. Outright science denial is widespread on the right, regarding
evolutionary theory, climate change, and more (see Mooney 2012). Our aim here, in
any event, is not to denounce the field’s political biases, but to gauge the issue
empirically: How deep are sociology’s (purportedly) ideological blind spots? Is it the
case, as Smith (2014:139) argues, that sociology comprises a Bsacred project^ (in the
Durkheimian sense)? Are ideas that tap the moral nerve of the field’s most sacred
values Bpurged^ from sociological discourse? And if so, are sociologists so Bblinded^
by their moral mission that a certain class of facts is indiscernible to them?
To address these questions we examine sociologists’ views of three enduring
controversies bearing on vulnerable groups: urban poverty in the black community;
gendered occupational choices; and immigration. These rather sensitive issues are
sharply divisive and often prompt conservative criticisms of the field. While our survey
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affords an opportunity to explore how sociologists construct knowledge, we stress that


we are less interested in criticizing our colleagues’ biases than in understanding them.1
In that spirit, we interpret the findings tentatively through the lens of social intuitionism
– elaborated in moral foundations theory – by the psychologist Jonathan Haidt and
colleagues (Haidt 2001, 2012; Haidt and Graham 2006; Haidt and Joseph 2004, 2007).
This piece is part of a larger project applying intuitionism to knowledge production
across the social sciences (Horowitz and Hughes 2018; Horowitz et al. forthcoming;
Yaworsky et al. 2015).2
Before unpacking our survey methodology, let us sketch the context of the contro-
versies that inform our chosen questions.

Contentious Legacies Then and Now

Urban poverty, especially in the African American community, has been a socio-
logical preoccupation for decades. Yet the issue, to put it mildly, hardly spurs
consensus. Viewed through a normative lens, the plight of the urban poor appears
more an ideological tug-of-war than an empirical problem appraised dispassion-
ately by the facts. Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s 1965 report on the BNegro Family^
certainly stirred passions in what became a cauldron of politicized social science.
Moynihan, an assistant secretary of labor with a sociology background, advocated
Bnational action^ to address what he viewed as the distinctive challenges of
entrenched black poverty and family instability. Despite his emphasis on centuries
of slavery and mistreatment, he was scorned by some on the left for Bblaming the
victim^ (Ryan 1976) due to his depiction of supposed Bpathologies^ of the black
Bmatriarchal^ family. Press reports of Moynihan’s coarse language and attention to
comparatively high rates of Billegitimacy,^ delinquency, and welfare dependency
among blacks fanned the flames of condemnation in the context of the black
power and feminist movements. Conservatives, on the other hand, tended to laud
the report’s emphasis on family structure in a now familiar trope on the right:
attribute the poverty of the black community to self-contained cultural habits that
no government intervention or jobs program could remedy.
Here is not the space to surmise what Moynihan Breally meant^ in his report. Yet the
relative causal weight assigned to culture versus structure in the perpetuation of inner-
city poverty remains as combustible as ever. In recent years, a number of prominent
sociologists have proclaimed Moynihan’s basic argument Bvindicated^ (Massey and
Sampson 2009) if not Bprophetic^ (Wilson 2009). These authors and others (See Small
et al. 2010) aim to bring culture back into the discussion of black urban poverty, though
Blargely^ as a mediating variable to the structural forces of joblessness, discrimination,
and social isolation. It appears, however, that assigning any Bautonomous^ weight to

1
Though we occasionally critique respondents’ views, particularly in the concluding discussion, we should
stress that we are progressives ourselves and our judgments should be situated in that light. The lead author
identifies as marxist humanist; the latter as communitarian and social democratic.
2
Our social-psychological approach differs from traditional Bsociology of knowledge^ approaches in that we
focus on shared moral intuitions and consequent political identities within academic communities that
influence the construction of knowledge Bbottom-up.^ We see this method as complementary to sociological
examinations of wider historical and cultural influences that shape knowledge production from without.
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culture continues to pique the passions of left scholars. Steinberg (2009), for example,
condemns Wilson for Brecapitulating^ the old Bculture of poverty^ discourse that he
attributes to both Moynihan and Oscar Lewis. For Steinberg, recognition of the role of
culture in abetting racial inequality is both Breactionary^ and Bludicrous.^3 For his part,
Darity (2011:269) derides Wilson’s political motivations in opening the door to culture.
Though Bpresumably unintended,^ Wilson offers a pseudo-scientific Bprop^ to
Obama’s Bcolor-blind racism,^ which Bminimizes the importance of race and racism
in understanding Black-White inequality.^ This is a major Bintellectual error,^ Darity
affirms baldly, as cultural factors Byield nothing in explaining racial disparities.^
Our report does not aim to settle the matter of structure versus culture in the inner
city. Nor do we pretend to resolve the other controversies in our survey. Our goal, more
modestly, is to take stock of the field regarding these delicate questions, with an eye to
sociologists’ political sensibilities. Are sociologists today receptive, at least in part, to
the role of cultural factors in contributing to urban poverty in the black community? Do
sociologists’ political orientations, gender, or other demographics predict their degree
of receptiveness? Moreover, to what extent do these issues touch a Braw nerve,^
prompting sociologists to Bpoliticize^ our survey questions in emotive or Btribal^
ways?
If hints of a culture of poverty continue to unsettle sociologists, claims of cognitive
sex differences may be the Bthird rail of university politics,^ as Sommers put it (2005).
Sommers was referring to the uproar following comments by then President of
Harvard, Larry Summers, who speculated at a science conference that innate sex
differences may play a role in women’s underrepresentation in STEM fields.4 Wide-
spread denunciations and a condemnatory faculty letter would follow, no doubt
contributing to Summers’ resignation a year later.
To be sure, Summers was not without supporters, such as the distinguished cognitive
scientist, Steven Pinker. Given his popular critique of the Bblank slate^ (2003) doctrine in
the social sciences, it is hardly surprising that Pinker would find Summers’ innatist
speculations congenial. Pinker (2005) chides the tendency of Summers’ critics to Bmangle^
his suggestion that innate differences may be Bone cause^ of the gender disparity into the
claim that they Bmust be the only cause.^ However, for Pinker, such confusion is not
incidental, but reflects the Bsacred and taboo beliefs^ to which many on the left pledge
Bfidelity.^ BAt some point in the history of the modern women’s movement,^ he laments,
Bthe belief that men and women are psychologically indistinguishable became sacred.^
A host of research has shown that sociologists tend to resist biological explanations
of human behavior, especially with regard to sensitive questions bearing on race or
gender disparities (e.g., Winegard and Winegard 2018; Horowitz et al. 2014; Lopreato
and Crippen 2001; Sanderson and Ellis 1992). Yet do sociologists today dismiss even
the plausibility of Summers’ hypothesis? Are they open to the possibility that average

3
Steinberg goes on: BIn Wilson’s explanatory schema, all of the immense power and resources vested in
political and economic institutions that could provide restitution and remedy for the descendants of slaves still
mired in poverty are trumped by kids strutting around in a ‘cool pose’ and by black men who are in need of
fathering classes.^
4
Summers hypothesized that women’s greater disinclination toward jobs that interfere with family and men’s
greater variance in mathematical ability (i.e., higher representation on the high and low ends) may play a larger
role than socialization and discrimination in the STEM gender disparity. Though suggesting partly innate
causes, Summers (2005) stressed that he would Blike nothing better than to be proved wrong.^
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biological differences between women and men play a role in occupational choices?
Finally, if sociologists dismiss this possibility, do they do so from the standpoint of
Btribal loyalty^ to Bsacralized^ victims, as Haidt and others contend?
The final controversy addressed in our survey is immigration. It is no doubt timely.
Britain’s Brexit, France’s National Front, and the startling rise of Trump are only the
most conspicuous headlines. As anti-immigrant sentiment fuels right-wing populism
across the globe, conservative observers mourn the respective Bsuicides^ of Europe and
the United States (Murray 2017; Buchanan 2011). In their view, rising numbers of
immigrants and their progeny undermine social cohesion and cultural (if not Christian)
identity in the West. Such authors draw attention to cases of Muslim extremism,
immigrant-related violence, and other alleged Bthreats^ to the social order. From their
standpoint, the policies of permissive immigration, globalism and multiculturalism
proffered by political elites only exacerbate the cultural Bdisintegration.^
The far right is not alone in voicing concerns over immigration, however. Observers
across the political spectrum warn of the dangers of Muslim migration in particular to
such liberal values as free expression, human rights and gender equality. Huntington’s
(1993) portentous Bclash-of-civilizations^ thesis certainly sketched such fault lines
between Islam and the West. More recently, a number of secular liberals (Harris and
Nawaz 2015; Hirsi Ali and Nomani 2017; Lindsay 2016) denounce what they see as
willful blindness among some on the so-called Bregressive left^ to the dangers of
Islamic extremism. For such critics, attacks like Charlie Hebdo and the killings of
homosexuals in the Islamic world should prompt rational scrutiny and reform of radical
Islam. Instead, those who raise such concerns, they attest, are met with charges of
BIslamophobia.^ Lindsay (2016) expounds what he views as the psychological under-
pinnings of such Bregressive leftists^ as a Bmoral community.^ Citing Haidt (2012), he
identifies Bperceived victimhood^ as a Bsacred belief^ of the group. Those who adhere
to the BReligion of Identity Politics,^ Lindsay puts it sardonically, express an Bexquisite
hypersensitivity^ to Muslims as victims of BWestern imperialism.^ Yet such sensitivity
does not extend to the actual abuses of women under Bstrict Islamic Sharia.^
As can be seen, the polemics of the issue are heady these days. But beneath the drama
remain pressing empirical questions: To what extent do migratory flows disrupt social
cohesion? Might there be thresholds beyond which migration and multicultural policies
spur social unrest? Moreover, does sociology’s social justice mission, with its purported
sacred victims, blind the field to potential downsides of progressive immigration policies?
Haidt (2016) chimes in on the matter in a provocative essay in The American
Interest. He argues that the appeal of right-wing populism cannot be understood solely
as symptoms of economic distress and authoritarian dispositions among disaffected
electorates (as important as these factors are). Nor should anti-immigrant sentiment be
reduced to Bracism pure and simple.^ Drawing on Durkheim, Haidt argues that
Bnativists^ perceive waves of migrants as a threat not just to their pocketbooks but to
their Bneed to live in a stable and coherent moral order.^ From this standpoint, the
anxieties of the Le Pen or Trump voter regarding the erosion of shared cultural identity,
language, and norms may sometimes reflect Blegitimate^ moral concerns and not solely
or always hatred and bigotry.5

5
Haidt stresses the adaptive (historical) roots of such concerns, noting the benefits of shared identity to group
trust, social capital, crime reduction, and prosperity.
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Curiously, the sociological literature on immigration offers little over the years on
the potentially disruptive effects of mass migration on cultural cohesion. It was not until
around 2000 that we begin to see more than occasional attention to the question. The
controversial study by Harvard political scientist, Robert Putnam (2007), signaled
perhaps a turning point given the flurry of research that followed. Putnam discovered
– in findings that disturbed his own liberal presentiments – that greater ethnic diversity
in communities across the United States is associated with lower levels of volunteerism,
civic engagement, and social trust. Diversity brings out the Bturtle^ in people, Putnam
wrote, as they Bhunker down,^ disengage, and even watch more television than they do
in more ethnically homogenous communities.
This is not to suggest unanimity regarding Putnam’s findings. Quite the contrary.
Responses to his paper (which now boasts over 4000 citations) reveal striking dis-
agreement regarding the relationship between diversity and social cohesion. In one
recent meta-analysis, for example, van der Meer and Tolsma (2014) point to a
Bcacophony^ of conflicting results, which they attribute to widespread conceptual
and operational inconsistencies in the literature. Even the oft-cited negative association
between ethnic heterogeneity and welfare state spending has been contested empirically
(see Banting and Kymlicka 2006). As we stress above, we do not aspire to resolve this
or the other controversies in this study. We will, rather, report on sociology’s disagree-
ments from the standpoint of the field’s political complexion. We hope that greater self-
awareness of the intuitive underpinnings of knowledge production holds promise for
deeper consensus on these and other controversial matters down the road.

Methods

Sample Selection and Survey

We compiled a list of all sociology programs in the U.S. News & World Report’s
BNational Universities^ and BNational Liberal Arts Colleges^ rankings. Accessing
publically available emails, we sent the survey to 3461 full-time sociology faculty in
the summer of 2017. After an initial email and follow up, we received 479 usable
surveys, for a 14% response rate.6
Table 1 reports relevant characteristics of our sample, including demographics and
respondents’ political orientations.
Substantively, our survey addresses three overlapping themes: 1) Sociology’s Moral
Mission; 2) Advocacy & Objectivity; and 3) Sociology Controversies. Table 2 lists the
questions.
Respondents were asked Likert-type items, i.e., whether they Bstrongly agree,^
Bagree,^ Bneither agree nor disagree,^ Bdisagree,^ or Bstrongly disagree^ with the 31

6
Our target population closely approximates U.S. Department of Labor (2016) data indicating 3500 sociol-
ogists employed nationwide in 2016. However, the voluntary nature of our survey, as well as our modest
response rate, suggest caution regarding generalizability. In that light, readers should construe our references to
Bsociologists’^ responses as applicable specifically to our sample. We should note, moreover, that of an initial
590 entrants, 111 did not answer a single substantive question. Were such Bpost-entry refusals^ unfriendly to
the substance of our survey, that would increase the likelihood of self-selection bias, though we are unable to
verify this.
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Table 1 Sample characteristics

Respondents Percent

Total N = 479* 100


Gender
Female 187 40
Male 284 60
Age
28–45 192 41
46–61 166 36
62+ 106 23
Academic rank
Assistant Prof 108 24
Associate Prof 145 32
Professor 198 44
Political orientation
Radical 101 21
Liberal 293 62
Moderate 59 13
Conservative 10 2
Libertarian 11 2

*
Table leaves out modest numbers of missing cases across categories

statements. Notice the list includes both normative statements as well as empirical
claims. As an exploratory study, we hope to provide a window into the ideological
tenor of the field and its potential impact on scientific knowledge and interpretation.
Moreover, we include before each controversy a vignette capturing our understanding
of the current state of the literature (see Appendix for vignette wording and rationale).
We are aware that formulating workable survey questions often invites objections,
especially regarding controversy. Hence we framed our statements in familiar language
and provided sociologists with wide latitude in their responses, including comment
boxes after each question. We begin here with a bird’s eye view of the field before
turning to interpretation of the striking patterns in the data.

Findings

Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of the discipline as a whole. We offer this simple
snapshot as a point of departure before delving more deeply into the results below.
Reviewing the table, we see that majorities of respondents affirm the Bmoral mission^
of the field. Just over two-thirds agree that sociology should be both a scientific and
moral enterprise, while 62% agree with Karl Marx’s famous dictum and 59% affirm that
a Bcentral aim^ of the field should be to Banalyze and transcend all forms of social
oppression.^ However, a strong majority (69%) does not believe that someone opposed
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Table 2 Survey Items

Sociology’s moral mission


(MM1) Sociology should be both a scientific discipline and a moral enterprise aimed at making the world a
better place.
(MM2) A central aim of sociology should be to analyze and transcend all forms of social oppression.
(MM3) I support Karl Marx’s famous dictum, BPhilosophers have merely interpreted the world in various
ways; the point, however, is to change it.^
(MM4) Someone opposed to marriage equality for lesbian and gay people has no business being a
sociologist.
(MM5) A central aim of sociologists should be to foster community consensus through empirically
informed dialogue among groups with conflicting interests and values.
(MM6) Sociology would benefit by increasing the number of political conservatives in the discipline.
Advocacy & objectivity
(AO1) Sociology is undermined by an excessively activist orientation in the discipline.
(AO2) Advocacy and research should be kept as separate as possible to protect the objectivity of the
research.
(AO3) A dispassionate attitude in research is important for accurate explanations of social phenomena.
(AO4) Pursuing social justice is in no way incompatible with making accurate explanations of even
controversial social phenomena.
Sociology controversies
• Urban Poverty in the Black Community
(SC1) It is plausible that cultural factors play a role in the perpetuation of inner-city poverty among the
black community.
(SC2) Structural factors (e.g., joblessness, poor schools, discrimination) that perpetuate inner-city poverty
in the black community profoundly outweigh any possible or likely negligible cultural factors.
(SC3) Solutions to inner-city poverty include some responsibility among the black community to address
the problems of violence and out-of-wedlock births.
(SC4) Any discussion of the responsibility of the black community to address problems of violence and
out-of-wedlock births in inner cities is culturally discriminatory, if not racist.
(SC5) Any discussion of the responsibility of the black community to address problems of violence and
out-of-wedlock births in inner cities amounts to blaming the victim.
(SC6) The attempt to investigate cultural factors in the perpetuation of inner-city poverty is likely
motivated by a desire to legitimize the racially/ethnically stratified status quo.
(SC7) The role of cultural factors in the perpetuation of inner-city poverty merits attention in sociology.
• Gendered Occupational Choices
(SC8) It is plausible that women’s greater representation than men in Bpeople-oriented^ professions
(social work, nursing, etc.) is due in part to a biological component.
(SC9) It is plausible that prenatal exposure to hormones plays a component role in males’ and females’
occupational choices.
(SC10) The impact of gender socialization and discrimination in gendered occupational choices
profoundly outweighs any possible or likely negligible biological factors.
(SC11) Political efforts to increase women’s representation in STEM fields, though desirable, may fall
short of parity due in part to average biological differences.
(SC12) It is not plausible to conclude that gender discrimination in the workplace has disappeared until
men and women are (at least roughly) equally represented in virtually all occupational categories.
(SC13) The attempt to find a biological component in gendered occupational choices is likely motivated
by a desire to legitimize the gender stratified status quo.
(SC14) The role of biological factors in influencing gendered occupational choices merits attention in
sociology.
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Table 2 (continued)

• Immigration and Cultural Cohesion


(SC15) It is plausible that calls to limit immigration sometimes reflect legitimate moral concerns for
cultural unity and shared identity and not solely economic anxiety or racism.
(SC16) Immigration policies should be informed by research on its potentially disruptive effects on social
cohesion.
(SC17) Muslim migration and rising populations in Europe are threatening Western values of human
rights and gender equality.
(SC18) Multicultural policies (bilingualism, etc.) have played some role in the rise of right-wing
populism in the United States.
(SC19) Any discussion of a threat that Muslim migration poses to European values is Islamophobic.
(SC20) Those who express concern about the effects of immigration on Bcultural cohesion^ or Bsocial
integration^ are likely to be xenophobic.
(SC21) The impact of immigrant flows on social and cultural cohesion merits attention in sociology.

to marriage equality has Bno business being a sociologist,^ while under half (44%)
affirms as a Bcentral aim^ the communitarian effort to foster consensus around conflict-
ing societal interests. Finally, sociologists are sharply and evenly divided over whether
increasing the number of political conservatives would benefit the field.
Questions of Badvocacy and objectivity^ appear especially discrepant. Though a
solid majority sees no inherent incompatibility between pursuing social justice and
scientific accuracy (73%), sociologists are sharply divided over the importance of a
Bdispassionate^ attitude in research and whether advocacy and research should be kept
Bas separate as possible.^ Thirty-five percent agrees that an Bexcessively activist
orientation^ is undermining the field, while just over half (51%) disagrees.
Regarding the controversies, some general patterns emerge despite varying responses
by topic. Respondents broadly agree (79%) that cultural factors may play a role in black
urban poverty, yet two thirds affirm that structural factors Bprofoundly outweigh^ such
cultural factors. A small majority (53%) agrees that the black community has Bsome
responsibility^ to address the problems of violence and out-of-wedlock births, while
about one fifth views it as Bculturally discriminatory^ or victim-blaming to acknowledge
as much. About one fifth (19%) agrees as well that those who investigate cultural factors
are Blikely motivated to legitimize the racially-ethnically stratified status quo.^
There is stronger uniformity regarding the role of biology in gendered occupational
choices. Only one third of respondents acknowledges that a biological role in occupa-
tional choice is Bplausible,^ with 27% open to the possibility that prenatal hormones
play a role. Indeed, sociologists overwhelmingly agree (79%) that gender socialization
and discrimination Bprofoundly outweigh^ any possible biological factors; and only a
fraction (11%) affirms that political efforts to address the STEM gender disparity may
Bfall short of parity due in part to average biological differences.^ Finally, a sizable
minority (41%) agrees that those who search for a biological component are Blikely
motivated to legitimize the gender stratified status quo^ (with one third disagreeing).
Sociologists’ views on immigration are mixed. The field is about evenly divided
over whether calls to limit immigration may sometimes reflect Blegitimate moral
concerns.^ While only 12% agrees that rising Muslim migration and populations in
Europe threaten Western values, less than a third (30%) affirms that discussing a
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Table 3 Distribution of responses

Survey Item Item Descriptions N Percent*


Agree/Disagree

Sociology’s moral mission


MM1 Sociology should be both a scientific and moral enterprise 477 67 / 20
MM2 Sociology should analyze and transcend oppression 472 59 / 21
MM3 I support Marx’s dictum to change the world 475 62 / 15
MM4 Opponents of gay marriage should not be sociologists 475 11 / 69
MM5 Sociologists should try to foster community consensus 470 44 / 27
MM6 More political conservatives would benefit discipline 474 30 / 30
Advocacy & objectivity
AO1 Sociology undermined by excessive activism 479 35 / 51
AO2 Advocacy and research should be separate for objectivity 478 44 / 43
AO3 Dispassionate attitude in research important for accuracy 479 47 / 39
AO4 Pursuing social justice not incompatible with accurate research 472 73 / 16
Sociology controversies
SC1 Plausible that cultural factors play a role in urban poverty 474 76 / 13
SC2 Structural factors profoundly outweigh cultural factors 472 66 / 12
SC3 Black community has some responsibility for problems 466 52 / 25
SC4 Discussion of responsibility of black community racist 469 19 / 57
SC5 Discussion of responsibility of black community blames victim 469 21 / 57
SC6 Investigating cultural factors motivated to legitimize status quo 469 19 / 53
SC7 Cultural factors merit attention in sociology 469 83 / 06
SC8 Women in people-oriented professions partly biological 468 33 / 45
SC9 Prenatal hormones play role in occupational choices 467 27 / 41
SC10 Socialization/discrimination profoundly outweigh biology 463 79 / 07
SC11 STEM political efforts may fall short due partly to biology 467 11 / 75
SC12 Discrimination not ended until equal gender representation 463 31 / 48
SC13 Find biological component motivated to legitimize status quo 464 41 / 33
SC14 Biological factors merit attention in sociology 469 66 / 23
SC15 Calls to limit immigration sometimes legitimate 462 42 / 40
SC16 Policies should be informed by potentially disruptive effects 462 53 / 25
SC17 Muslim migration threatens human rights/gender equality 463 12 / 66
SC18 Multicultural polices played role in right-wing populism 461 54 / 23
SC19 Discussion of Muslim threat to values is Islamophobic 465 30 / 45
SC20 Those concerned with cultural cohesion likely xenophobic 462 49 / 22
SC21 Immigrant flows on social cohesion merits attention in sociology 465 86 / 04

*
Percentages rounded and collapse Agree/Strongly Agree and Disagree/Strongly Disagree

possible threat is BIslamophobic.^ Virtually half of the field (49%) agrees that those
who express concern about the impact of immigration on Bcultural cohesion^ are
Blikely to be xenophobic.^ Finally, modest majorities agree that policy should be
informed by immigration’s potentially Bdisruptive effects^ (53%) and that
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multicultural policies have played Bsome role^ in the rise of right-wing populism in
the United States (54%).

Sociology’s Mosaic

Let’s shift our lens now to the striking patterns in the data. Here we get a glimpse into
the Bpolitics of knowledge^ in the field. As we see in Tables 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8,
sociologists differ systematically in their responses based on their commitment to the
field’s moral mission, preferred research paradigm, gender, and – most notably –
political orientation. Indeed, each of these factors predicts respondents’ views across
the survey. Tables 4 and 8 report difference of means tests and regression results,
respectively. Tables 5, 6 and 7 provide descriptive baselines with regard to where the
various groupings stand on the survey items. Reading these tables in conjunction
captures nicely the meaning and statistical significance of the findings.
Beginning with Table 4, we see a sharp contrast in views between sociologists
who are Bstrong adherents^ of the moral mission and the rest of the field.7 Strong
adherents differ significantly from their colleagues on every survey item except
SC18. Although space does not permit comment on each item, we invite readers to
notice the clear direction of the findings. Strong adherents are significantly less
likely to reveal concern about excessive activism in the field or that social justice
or advocacy may undermine scientific objectivity (AO1, AO2, AO3, AO4). As for
the controversies, strong adherents reveal a pattern of positions that for purpose of
discussion we will term Bvulnerable-group-partial.^8 For instance, they are signif-
icantly more likely to affirm the negligibility of cultural factors in black urban
poverty and to view any discussion of the black community’s responsibility as
victim blaming or culturally discriminatory (SC2, SC4, SC5). They are signifi-
cantly less likely to acknowledge any biological component to women’s occupa-
tional choices or potential limits to gender parity in STEM (SC8, SC9, SC10,
SC11). Finally, strong adherents are significantly less likely to consider calls to
limit immigration as potentially legitimate or rising Muslim migration to Europe
as a threat to Western values of human rights and gender equality (SC15, SC17).
Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 report sociologists’ responses by preferred research paradigm,9
gender, and political orientation. Here again the patterns are conspicuous. Regarding

7
We designate as strong adherents those respondents who marked Bagree^ or Bstrongly agree^ to each of the
first three Bmoral mission^ questions of our survey (MM1, MM2, MM3). Strong adherents make up 43% of
the sample.
8
Vulnerable-group-partial can be interpreted in a double sense. Sociologists who are most partial to
vulnerable groups (seeing themselves as working on their behalf, defining the field in terms of the fight
against oppression) tend toward partiality when interpreting relevant evidence about such groups. We
elaborate on aspects of this partiality in our discussion below.
9
Respondents were provided a list of fourteen research approaches from which they could choose those
Bcentral^ to their work: ethnic studies; gender studies; class studies; intersectionality; feminism; Marxism;
communitarianism; functionalism/neofunctionalism; symbolic interaction; critical theory; phenomenology/
ethnomethodology; postmodernism/post-structuralism; rational choice/exchange theory; and evolutionary
theory/biology. The most commonly chosen were class studies (40%), ethnic studies (32%), gender studies
(34%), and intersectionality (28%); the least common were communitarianism (4%), evolutionary theory/
biology (5%), and functionalism/neofunctionalism (5%).
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Table 4 Difference of means tests for moral mission group

Survey Moral Difference of Item Descriptions


Item Missiona Meansb

MM4 2.46 0.484 Opponents of gay marriage should not be sociologists


MM5 3.62 0.636 Sociologists should try to foster community consensus
MM6 2.69 −0.483 More political conservatives would benefit discipline
AO1 1.98 −1.395 Sociology undermined by excessive activism
AO2 2.41 −1.155 Advocacy and research should be separate for objectivity
AO3 2.61 −1.009 Dispassionate attitude in research important for accuracy
AO4 4.33 0.762 Pursuing social justice not incompatible with accurate research
SC1 3.59 −0.383 Plausible that cultural factors play a role in urban poverty
SC2 4.26 0.682 Structural factors profoundly outweigh cultural factors
SC3 3.08 −0.326 Black community has some responsibility for problems
SC4 2.81 0.561 Discussion of responsibility of black community racist
SC5 2.92 0.577 Discussion of responsibility of black community blames victim
SC6 2.91 0.674 Investigating cultural factors motivated to legitimize status quo
SC7 3.87 −0.324 Cultural factors merit attention in sociology
SC8 2.32 −0.668 Women in people-oriented professions partly biological
SC9 2.35 −0.570 Prenatal hormones play role in occupational choices
SC10 4.46 0.541 Socialization/discrimination profoundly outweigh biology
SC11 1.59 −0.688 STEM political efforts may fall short due partly to biology
SC12 3.14 0.575 Discrimination not ended until equal gender representation
SC13 3.67 0.936 Find biological component motivated to legitimize status quo
SC14 3.14 −0.442 Biological factors merit attention in sociology
SC15 2.52 −0.792 Calls to limit immigration sometimes legitimate
SC16 3.06 −0.441 Policies should be informed by potentially disruptive effects
SC17 1.91 −0.528 Muslim migration threatens human rights/gender equality
SC18 3.27 −0.118c Multicultural polices played role in right-wing populism
SC19 3.17 0.603 Discussion of Muslim threat to values is Islamophobic
SC20 3.58 0.460 Those concerned with cultural cohesion likely xenophobic
SC21 3.99 −0.229 Immigrant flows on social cohesion merits attention in sociology

a
Indicates average level of agreement with item among the Moral Mission group (agree or strongly agree with
MM1 – MM3)
b
Difference = mean for Moral Mission group (n = 207) - mean for remaining respondents (n = 270)
c
Difference for SC18 is not statistically significant. All other differences are statistically significant at p < .001

research paradigm, Table 5 reports three choices that draw the sharpest contrast in
sociologists’ views (as we do not have space to address all 14). On virtually every item,
respondents with a research focus on intersectionality evince more vulnerable-group-
partial responses. Their views are antithetical to those of their rational choice col-
leagues, with symbolic interactionists typically in between. Notice that 81% of inter-
sectional sociologists believes a central aim of the field is to analyze and transcend all
forms of oppression, compared to 33% of rational choice theorists (MM2). Only 11%
affirms that the field is undermined by excessive activism, versus 60% of rational
Table 5 Distribution of responses by select research paradigms
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Survey Item Item Descriptions Intersectionality (Percent* Symbolic Interaction (Percent* Rational Choice (Percent*
agree/disagree) agree/disagree) agree/disagree)

Sociology’s moral mission


MM1 Sociology should be both a scientific and moral enterprise 81 / 09 74 / 16 46 / 35
MM2 Sociology should analyze and transcend oppression 81 / 05 29 / 55 33 / 33
MM3 I support Marx’s dictum to change the world 76 / 06 31 / 53 33 / 30
MM4 Opponents of gay marriage should not be sociologists 19 / 35 14 / 67 09 / 74
MM5 Sociologists should try to foster community consensus 52 / 20 46 / 26 39 / 34
MM6 More political conservatives would benefit discipline 21 / 40 26 / 27 53 / 23
Advocacy & objectivity
AO1 Sociology undermined by excessive activism 11 / 74 29 / 55 60 / 26
AO2 Advocacy and research should be separate for objectivity 23 / 65 31 / 53 67 / 28
AO3 Dispassionate attitude in research important for accuracy 27 / 53 46 / 38 77 / 09
AO4 Pursuing social justice not incompatible with accurate research 81 / 09 80 / 09 60 / 29
Sociology controversies
SC1 Plausible that cultural factors play a role in urban poverty 60 / 18 82 / 06 88 / 16
SC2 Structural factors profoundly outweigh cultural factors 84 / 04 59 / 13 44 / 21
SC3 Black community has some responsibility for problems 38 / 34 52 / 22 74 / 10
SC4 Discussion of responsibility of black community racist 29 / 40 31 / 46 07 / 74
SC5 Discussion of responsibility of black community blames victim 32 / 37 17 / 54 09 / 77
SC6 Investigating cultural factors motivated to legitimize status quo 28 / 30 18 / 56 05 / 77
SC7 Cultural factors merit attention in sociology 73 / 07 89 / 02 88 / 02
SC8 Women in people-oriented professions partly biological 19 / 61 22 / 55 42 / 37
SC9 Prenatal hormones play role in occupational choices 19 / 52 20 / 56 37 / 28
SC10 Socialization/discrimination profoundly outweigh biology 92 / 02 84 / 03 64 / 14
Table 5 (continued)

Survey Item Item Descriptions Intersectionality (Percent* Symbolic Interaction (Percent* Rational Choice (Percent*
agree/disagree) agree/disagree) agree/disagree)

SC11 STEM political efforts may fall short due partly to biology 03 / 89 08 / 78 26 / 55
SC12 Discrimination not ended until equal gender representation 38 / 39 29 / 38 10 / 55
SC13 Find biological component motivated to legitimize status quo 55 / 14 49 / 26 19 / 48
SC14 Biological factors merit attention in sociology 43 / 27 57 / 26 77 / 09
SC15 Calls to limit immigration sometimes legitimate 27 / 51 40 / 34 60 / 21
SC16 Policies should be informed by potentially disruptive effects 44 / 30 51 / 25 59 / 22
SC17 Muslim migration threatens human rights/gender equality 05 / 68 10 / 70 26 / 52
SC18 Multicultural polices played role in right-wing populism 47 / 27 60 / 20 56 / 10
SC19 Discussion of Muslim threat to values is Islamophobic 39 / 30 21 / 46 19 / 56
SC20 Those concerned with cultural cohesion likely xenophobic 48 / 17 47 / 18 30 / 28
SC21 Immigrant flows on social cohesion merits attention 81 / 05 94 / 01 95 / 00

*
Percentages rounded and collapse Agree/Strongly Agree and Disagree/Strongly Disagree
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Table 6 Distribution of responses by gender

Survey Item Question Description Women (Percent* Men (Percent*


agree/disagree) agree/disagree)

Sociology’s moral mission


MM1 Sociology should be both a scientific and 81 / 12 58 / 25
moral enterprise
MM2 Sociology should analyze and transcend 73 / 10 51 / 28
oppression
MM3 I support Marx’s dictum to change the 74 / 08 56 / 20
world
MM4 Opponents of gay marriage should not 16 / 61 08 / 74
be sociologists
MM5 Sociologists should try to foster 48 / 23 42 / 29
community consensus
MM6 More political conservatives would 18 / 40 38 / 23
benefit discipline
Advocacy & objectivity
AO1 Sociology undermined by excessive 18 / 67 46 / 40
activism
AO2 Advocacy and research should be 31 / 57 53 / 34
separate for objectivity
AO3 Dispassionate attitude in research 33 / 53 57 / 30
important for accuracy
AO4 Pursuing social justice not incompatible 76 / 16 72 / 15
with accurate research
Sociology controversies
SC1 Plausible that cultural factors play a role 66 / 19 83 / 09
in urban poverty
SC2 Structural factors profoundly outweigh 78 / 06 58 / 16
cultural factors
SC3 Black community has some 43 / 33 57 / 19
responsibility for problems
SC4 Discussion of responsibility of black 27 / 47 13 / 65
community racist
SC5 Discussion of responsibility of black 28 / 46 16 / 61
community blames victim
SC6 Investigating cultural factors motivated 26 / 42 14 / 62
to legitimize status quo
SC7 Cultural factors merit attention in sociology 72 / 08 90 / 04
SC8 Women in people-oriented professions 28 / 53 37 / 39
partly biological
SC9 Prenatal hormones play role in 20 / 49 31 / 36
occupational choices
SC10 Socialization/discrimination profoundly 87 / 02 74 / 09
outweigh biology
SC11 STEM political efforts may fall short 05 / 85 14 / 68
due partly to biology
SC12 Discrimination not ended until equal 41 / 41 24 / 53
gender representation
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Table 6 (continued)

Survey Item Question Description Women (Percent* Men (Percent*


agree/disagree) agree/disagree)

SC13 Find biological component motivated to 53 / 22 33 / 40


legitimize status quo
SC14 Biological factors merit attention in 43 / 32 66 / 17
sociology
SC15 Calls to limit immigration sometimes 31 / 48 50 / 34
legitimate
SC16 Policies should be informed by 45 / 36 59 / 18
potentially disruptive effects
SC17 Muslim migration threatens human 06 / 74 16 / 60
rights/gender equality
SC18 Multicultural polices played role in r 43 / 29 62 / 19
ight-wing populism
SC19 Discussion of Muslim threat to values 34 / 36 27 / 52
is Islamophobic
SC20 Those concerned with cultural cohesion 52 / 16 47 / 26
likely xenophobic
SC21 Immigrant flows on social cohesion 80 / 06 91 / 03
merits attention

*
Percentages rounded and collapse Agree/Strongly Agree and Disagree/Strongly Disagree

choice theorists (AO1). A comparable contrast is visible across the moral mission and
advocacy and objectivity items.
Regarding the controversies, 84% of intersectional sociologists (versus 44% of rational
choice theorists) affirms that structural factors profoundly outweigh cultural factors in
perpetuating black urban poverty. Other ratios move in the same direction (e.g., 3% vs.
26% affirms that gender representation in STEM may fall short of parity in part due to
biology; 27% vs. 60% believes that calls to limit immigration may reflect legitimate moral
concerns; etc.). These results suggest that choice of disciplinary paradigm is not solely
analytical or pragmatic, the way a carpenter selects the right tool for a task. As we propose
below, sociologists’ research agendas and attendant theories are likely bound up with their
shared moral sensibilities and reinforced by like-minded colleagues in Btribal^ ways.
The regression models in Table 8 illustrate both the significance and direction of
these findings. Note that intersectional sociologists differ significantly from the rest of
the field on 20 of the 31 survey items. They do so in generally the opposite direction as
rational choice theorists, who differ significantly from their colleagues on 13 items.
Symbolic interactionists often, though not always, stake a middle ground.
Turning now to gender, we see that female respondents differ significantly from their
male colleagues on 26 of the 31 survey items. As seen in Table 8, women are
significantly more likely to affirm the moral mission of the field (MM1, MM2,
MM3) and less likely to express concern about the impact of advocacy on objectivity
(AO1, AO2, AO3). Women differ significantly on all but two of the controversy items
as well (SC19, SC20), and almost always in the same direction as their intersectional
colleagues. Hence we see a discernable affinity between women, intersectionality, and
adherence to the field’s moral mission.
Table 7 Distribution of responses by political orientation
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Survey Item Question Description Radicals (Percent* Liberals (Percent* Moderates (Percent*
agree/disagree) agree/disagree) agree/disagree)

Sociology’s moral mission


MM1 Sociology should be both a scientific and moral enterprise 86 / 06 72 / 16 31 / 46
MM2 Sociology should analyze and transcend oppression 78 / 09 63 / 18 28 / 43
MM3 I support Marx’s dictum to change the world 84 / 05 65 / 11 32 / 39
MM4 Opponents of gay marriage should not be sociologists 21 / 53 10 / 70 07 / 78
MM5 Sociologists should try to foster community consensus 39 / 23 46 / 24 47 / 34
MM6 More political conservatives would benefit discipline 14 / 49 28 / 30 49 / 03
Advocacy & objectivity
AO1 Sociology undermined by excessive activism 11 / 81 32 / 52 68 /15
AO2 Advocacy and research should be separate for objectivity 14 / 71 45 / 42 71 / 17
AO3 Dispassionate attitude in research important for accuracy 19 / 62 48 / 39 78 / 14
AO4 Pursuing social justice not incompatible with accurate research 87 / 07 78 / 12 41 / 36
Sociology controversies
SC1 Plausible that cultural factors play a role in urban poverty 56 / 20 77 / 13 93 / 05
SC2 Structural factors profoundly outweigh cultural factors 77 / 07 72 / 10 37 / 15
SC3 Black community has some responsibility for problems 30 / 45 52 / 24 71 / 04
SC4 Discussion of responsibility of black community racist 35 / 35 17 / 60 07 / 72
SC5 Discussion of responsibility of black community blames victim 37 / 34 20 / 56 07 / 72
SC6 Investigating cultural factors motivated to legitimize status quo 27 / 35 20 / 54 07 / 72
SC7 Cultural factors merit attention in sociology 65 / 11 85 / 06 96 / 02
SC8 Women in people-oriented professions partly biological 16 / 63 35 / 44 39 / 32
SC9 Prenatal hormones play role in occupational choices 12 / 60 27 / 40 35 / 28
SC10 Socialization/discrimination profoundly outweigh biology 94 / 02 83 / 03 54 / 19
Table 7 (continued)

Survey Item Question Description Radicals (Percent* Liberals (Percent* Moderates (Percent*
agree/disagree) agree/disagree) agree/disagree)

SC11 STEM political efforts may fall short due partly to biology 04 / 89 07 / 78 25 / 54
SC12 Discrimination not ended until equal gender representation 49 / 21 29 / 50 11 / 69
SC13 Find biological component motivated to legitimize status quo 56 / 14 42 / 31 18 / 56
SC14 Biological factors merit attention in sociology 36 / 37 56 / 22 77 / 11
SC15 Calls to limit immigration sometimes legitimate 21 / 57 43 / 41 54 / 21
SC16 Policies should be informed by potentially disruptive effects 28 / 43 56 / 24 74 / 07
SC17 Muslim migration threatens human rights/gender equality 06 / 74 07 / 70 29 / 47
SC18 Multicultural polices played role in right-wing populism 42 / 34 56 / 20 62 / 19
SC19 Discussion of Muslim threat to values is Islamophobic 41 / 33 32 / 42 05 /69
SC20 Those concerned with cultural cohesion likely xenophobic 66 / 11 50 / 17 22 / 45
SC21 Immigrant flows on social cohesion merits attention 73 / 08 89 / 03 93 / 00

*
Percentages rounded and collapse Agree/Strongly Agree and Disagree/Strongly Disagree
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Table 8 OLS regression results

DV Unstandardized Coefficients* R2 N

Research Paradigm Gender Political Orientation

Intersectionality Symbolic Rational Female Radical Liberal Moderate


Interactionism Choice/
Exchange

MM1 .268* .167 −.345* .245* 1.931** 1.428** .505* .243 477
MM2 .469** −.007 −.410** .353** 1.441** .989** .255 .244 472
MM3 .223* −.081 −.421** .305** 1.637** 1.114** .254 .271 475
MM4 .276** −.023 −.047 .126 1.071** .743** .492* .089 475
MM5 .220* .000 −.112 .075 .544* .598** .420 .030 470
MM6 −.096 .074 .177 −.377** −1.413** −.936** −.295 .184 474
AO1 −.592** −.059 .521** −.497** −2.192** −1.494** −.544* .342 479
AO2 −.480** −.215 .443* −.344** −1.833** −.951** −.222 .255 478
AO3 −.511** .075 .754** −.349** −1.438** −.740** −.062 .230 479
AO4 .274* .192 −.237 −.142 1.395** 1.143** .132 .162 472
SC1 −.300** .327** .316* −.311** −.961** −.517** −.257 .153 474
SC2 .410** −.239* −.244 .256** 1.408** 1.287** .774** .203 472
SC3 −.154 .097* .326* −.295** −1.349** −.771** −.300 .156 466
SC4 .376** −.260* −.231 .331** 1.251** .647** .351 .174 469
SC5 .376** −.115 −.419** .212* 1.232** .724** .313 .164 469
SC6 .473** −.239* −.335* .311** 1.107** .756** .309 .162 469
SC7 −.143 .338** .192 −.307** −.869** −.492** −.233 .155 469
SC8 −.388** −.300* −.076 −.227* −1.454** −.945** −.866** .129 468
SC9 −.142 −.380** .273 −.245* −1.220** −.731** −.612* .115 467
SC10 .291** .183* −.214 .275** 1.352** 1.086** .417* .229 463
SC11 −.258** −.155 .285* −.290** −1.581** −1.419** −.997** .200 467
SC12 .118 .083 −.234 .274** 1.205** .617** .102 .136 463
SC13 .381** .152 −.319* .365** 1.509** 1.176** .631* .186 464
SC14 −.068 −.038 .350* −.429** −1.151** −.742** −.454* .122 469
SC15 −.330** −.007 .244 −.274* −1.655** −1.111** −.842** .146 462
SC16 −.024 .037 −.095 −.378** −1.258** −.638** −.239 .133 462
SC17 .098 −.110 .182 −.212* −1.761** −1.579** −.993** .181 463
SC18 −.016 .239* −.013 −.407** −.328 .034 .027 .057 461
SC19 .363** −.237* −.219 .152 1.336** 1.077** .346 .164 465
SC20 −.035 −.012 −.188 .132 1.404** 1.119** .477* .131 462
SC21 −.128 .243** .156 −.189** −.769** −.431** −.219 .115 465

*Intercept terms are not shown; significance tests are one-tailed (** p < .01; * p < .05)

While the significance of gender in our sample is clear, it turns out that political
orientation divides the discipline most sharply. We will have much to say about this
below, as we believe attention to politics best explains the field’s interpretive mosaic.
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Recall from Table 1 that 83% of our sample identifies as liberal/left (62% liberal, 21%
radical), compared to 13% that identifies as moderate and 4 % as conservative or
libertarian. These percentages are consistent with prior reports of liberal predominance
in the field (Gross and Simmons 2007; Shields and Dunn 2016). Notwithstanding the
dearth of conservatives, the relevance of political orientation to sociologists’ views is
unmistakable. As we see in Table 7, radical, liberal and moderate respondents differ in a
Bstairway^ fashion on every survey item. As would be expected, radicals tend to mirror
their intersectional colleagues with consistent vulnerable-group-partial responses. The
significance of these political differences is made plain in the regression models in
Table 8.10 While moderates differ significantly from their outlying conservative col-
leagues on 13 items, liberals and radicals differ significantly on every question except
SC18. Moreover, the large coefficients bear out the impact of politics on the variation in
sociologists’ views.
It is beyond our scope to attend to each survey item. Yet we encourage the reader to
examine Tables 7 and 8 closely to appreciate the rift in respondents’ perceptions by
political identity.

Discussion

In recent stinging critiques, Deflem (2013:160–163) and Martin (2016:1) decry what
they see as their field’s ongoing shift from science to left-wing ideology. BPolitics has
now taken the place of scholarship,^ Deflem avers, noting that BMax Weber’s admo-
nition that ‘the prophet and the demagogue do not belong on the academic platform’
has been completely lost on a considerable number of sociology professors today.^ For
Martin, this Bleftward tilt^ eschews Bideologically unpalatable facts^ from sociological
inquiry, not least those that counter the Bliberal narrative^ of social equality and
autonomy for Bprotected groups.^
While Deflem points to the institutionalization of Bpublic sociology^ within the
ASA, neither author queries sociologists themselves in support of their critical ap-
praisals. No doubt some will consider the data we marshal in this study as vindication
of their criticisms. Consider the views of several of our respondents11:

& Too many sociologists are viewed as political radicals who do not tolerate other
opinions.
& There are a lot of results in our field that I do not believe because I don’t trust that
they weren’t slanted by the strong political commitments of their authors.
& My colleagues cannot see the world clearly. Some view all findings through a lens
of racial grievance. Others bend every single discussion to the topic of gender. They
look at the world through a straw and miss a lot of what is going on.
& I am still a liberal Democrat and I intensely detest everything about today’s
Republican Party. Still, I think that sociology has become such a left-dominated
10
Due to the (expectedly) sparse representation of conservatives and libertarians in our sample, we combine
them as the reference group in the political orientation regression models.
11
We were delighted to receive 3020 remarks in the comment boxes across the substantive questions of our
survey (for an average of around six remarks per respondent). Trivial edits are made on occasion for reading
convenience.
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field that we exhibit Bgroupthink^ on many of our issues, to the point that we have
become intellectually soft.

Do our survey results warrant this biting line of critique? Do the data reveal a wholly
politicized field bereft of scientific heft and exclusive of dissenting voices?
If we attend to sociologists’ explicit views on politics and epistemology, we see
much more ambivalence than ideological uniformity. Recall from Table 3 that sociol-
ogists are sharply divided over issues of advocacy and objectivity (AO1, AO2, AO3)
and whether the field would benefit by increasing the number of conservatives in its
ranks (MM6). Although a large majority (73%) sees no inherent incompatibility
between pursuing social justice and accurately explaining even controversial social
phenomena (AO4), almost half of the field (47%) believes a dispassionate attitude is
important in research (AO3). Moreover, despite Deflem’s (2013) lament about Weber’s
demise, unprompted endorsements of the great theorist’s classic distinction between
value-relevant inquiry and value-neutral method abound in respondents’ remarks.12 In
the end, as we review the range of respondents’ comments, we see a reflective field
wrestling with the tenacious question of whether normative commitments necessarily
skew research. Indeed, the predominant position in the comments strikes us as both
reasonable and banal – that bias is inevitable in social research, so the challenge is to
deliberately minimize its distorting impact.13 While many dismiss the attainability of
Bpure^ objectivity, not a single respondent ditches the pursuit of truth altogether. None
takes an extreme epistemological relativist position (i.e., that there is no Btruth^ to even
approximate, that Btruth^ claims are reducible to power dynamics, etc.). Perhaps the
fact that only 9 % of respondents identifies Bpostmodernism/post-structuralism^ as a
central research paradigm is relevant here.
Of course, the pertinent question is whether sociologists on the whole are successful
in putting their biases aside. Perhaps the Weberian musings above merely sketch an
ideal posture of which the field falls short.
As we stress throughout, our aim in this study is not to Bcall out^ our colleagues’
biases from our own settled positions. Nor do we attempt to adjudicate the controver-
sies. Though we partially sympathize with conservative criticism of the field, we do so,
as we disclose above, as left/liberals ourselves. With those caveats in mind, we do see
substantial evidence of disciplinary Bblind spots,^ especially regarding gendered occu-
pational choices, though the field appears less homogenous than critics imagine.
Indeed, the bulk of criticism applies more narrowly to radical and intersectional
sociologists most inclined to vulnerable-group-partial responses. To wit: 20% of
radicals deny the plausibility of cultural factors playing any role in perpetuating black
urban poverty; 63% deny a biological component in women’s greater representation in
people-oriented professions; and 57% do not believe that calls to limit immigration may
sometimes reflect Blegitimate moral concerns^ for cultural unity and identity (Table 7:
SC1, SC8, SC15). These views (among others) strike us as untenable. Yet rather than

12
The following comments are typical: BYou can have the passion – but tone it down when doing the research
– see Weber;^ BMax Weber’s Science as a Vocation is still the best articulation of the delicate balance we do –
and should – all strive for.^
13
E.g., BYou have to be willing to set aside deeply held biases and learn from and listen to data. Big challenge
here, maybe the biggest;^ BSome passions provide the energy needed to get to the heart of the matter; some
passions blind us to reality. Passions need to be recognized, clearly admitted, and, sometimes, managed.^
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engage in normative critique, let us sketch, necessarily tentatively, what we see as the
emotive dynamics underlying sociologists’ impassioned disagreements. As we note
above, we find contemporary social-psychological research on social intuitionism,
elaborated in Bmoral foundations theory^ (MFT), to be helpful in this regard (Haidt
2001, 2012; Haidt and Graham 2006; Haidt and Joseph 2004, 2007).

Morality Binds, Blinds – and Primes

In his popular book, The Righteous Mind, Jonathan Haidt (2012) unpacks what he
views as a foundational principle of moral psychology: morality binds and blinds.
Drawing on Bmultilevel^ Darwinian selection and Durkheimian theory, Haidt argues
that people have evolved to form Btribal^ moral communities, replete with sacred
symbols and rituals that bind them together into cohesive groups.
Haidt maintains that part of humans’ evolutionary inheritance is a moral
template made up of six intuitions or foundations: harm/care; fairness/cheating;
liberty/oppression; loyalty/betrayal; authority/subversion; and sanctity/degrada-
tion. Such foundations are seen as inherited yet modular features of the brain that
served adaptive purposes in human prehistory (i.e., reacting to suffering with care
helped insure kin survival; responsiveness to fairness/cheating helped insure gains
and minimize losses from reciprocal relationships; feelings of group loyalty helped
insure advantage in the context of intergroup competition for resources; etc.). We
do not have space to elaborate on the evolutionary argument (see Haidt and
Graham 2006 for detailed discussion).14
Haidt and colleagues contend that the six moral foundations are by no means
inherited uniformly across the population.15 Indeed, conservatives and liberals differ
systematically in the mix and intensity of their moral foundations. Specifically, the
political morality of people on the liberal-left end of the spectrum is saturated by the
twin sensibilities of care and fairness. Actions or policies that are perceived to harm,
oppress, or cheat the vulnerable are especially likely to trigger liberals’ moral emotions.
Although conservatives and libertarians share liberals’ concern for care and fairness,
they tend to do so either more provincially or less intensely. That is, conservatives tend
to target their compassion to members of their own Btribe,^ while libertarians appear to
experience less empathetic concern on the whole than other political groupings (see
Iyer et al. 2012). Conservatives’ moral template is wider than liberals’, however, and
activates more acutely all six moral foundations. Above all, conservatives have much

14
Haidt et al.’s evolutionary approach is consistent with wide-ranging literature in behavioral genetics,
neuroscience and psychology confirming a biological underpinning to people’s personalities and consequent
political identities (Block and Block 2006; Hatemi et al. 2014; Hibbing et al. 2013; Mooney 2012). Of course,
sociologists who adhere to a cultural determinist or Bblank slate^ view of human behavior dismiss the notion
that people’s political orientations could be influenced by their genes (Pinker 2003; Horowitz et al. 2014).
Although we cannot revisit the debate here, we find the mounting transdisciplinary evidence, including large-
scale twin studies, simply too extensive to discount. We should stress that the influence of genes on personality
is interactive rather than deterministic. Contemporary political psychology suggests that innateness accom-
panies wide societal influence and developmental flexibility (Haidt and Joseph 2007). Hence people are
Bprewired^ with certain characterological predispositions that sway but do not determine their later political
identities.
15
The following two paragraphs are modified from Horowitz and Hughes (2018) and Horowitz et al.
(forthcoming).
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stronger feelings of group loyalty, respect for authority, and moral purity than liberals.
While leftists appear geared up to challenge authority on behalf of the vulnerable,
conservatives tend to honor hierarchical relationships, exuding Btough love^ sentiments
in lieu of the egalitarian protectiveness of the left.
Central to moral foundations theory is that these contrasting moral intuitions on the
left and right unconsciously trigger political judgments. MFT stresses that people make
judgments intuitively based on unconscious Bflashes of approval or disapproval^
toward morally-charged affairs (Haidt and Joseph 2004:56). Conscious deliberation
comes afterward, typically serving to rationalize people’s automatic (Bgut^) reactions.
Moreover, people tend to gravitate (consciously or otherwise) towards others with
kindred moral intuitions, forming Bmoral tribes^ or what we call Bemotive
communities.^ Through ongoing interaction, emotive communities tend to reproduce
and reinforce their shared moral emotions. Although religious life may denote the
deepest wellspring of social bonds, we witness such communities throughout society,
wherever people jointly address matters of moral concern. Undeniably, sociology and
much of academia attend to precisely such matters.16
Given sociology’s overwhelmingly left/liberal complexion, MFT would expect
the discipline to reproduce a discourse that Bvibrates^ with care and fairness
sensibilities. From this standpoint, sociologists’ sustained attention to the harmful
consequences of social stratification expresses precisely their shared moral senti-
ments to protect vulnerable groups. Yet critics contend that in Bsacralizing^
vulnerable groups, the field undercuts its scientific credibility. Certain factual
claims or lines of inquiry – such as those addressed in this survey – are dismissed
as morally repugnant whatever their empirical promise. Although our survey
hardly serves as a Btest^ of MFT, the fact that political orientation is the strongest
predictor of sociologists’ views is consistent with its expectations. Might radical
sociologists’ sharper repudiation of the survey’s themes (i.e., culture of poverty,
biological component to careers, immigration’s drawbacks) reflect the relative
intensity of their underlying moral emotions?
If this analysis is correct, sociology can be understood as an emotive commu-
nity where people of left/liberal politics produce, perform and ultimately police
their underlying sensibilities. Budding sociologists are no doubt Bprimed^ by their
sensibilities as they navigate the paradigms of their field and choose empirical
questions of interest. Hence certain theories or theorists, ideas or interpretations,
may be viewed as inviting or not based less on their scientific merits than on their

16
Haidt (2012) acknowledges his debt to Hume and the ancients for highlighting the systematic fallibility of
reason before the passions and wider interactive influences. His social intuitionism, we might add, finds
resonances in the Bnon-rational^ tradition in sociology. Although he draws expressly from Durkheim –
stressing the adaptive roots of collective effervescence and sacralization – Haidt’s approach is arguably
prefigured by Pareto (especially his discussion of the Bresidues^); the pragmatist conception of constructed
rather than correspondent Btruths;^ and Weber’s admonition regarding the tension between detached scientific
observation and the craving for emotive experience. Haidt’s innovation, we would argue, is in explicitly
anchoring the intuitions in evolved biology, with implications for individual differences and ideological
polarization. The result is a much more chastened view of Enlightenment rationalism (Haidt goes so far as
to reproach what he dubs the Brationalist delusion^ in Western moral philosophy). We will have more to say in
our concluding remarks. But suffice to note here that we are on the whole less pessimistic about the prospects
for reasoned judgments in science, informed in fact by the very intuitionist insights that his evolutionary story
reveals.
Am Soc

emotive resonance.17 In this sense we propose that when applying moral intui-
tionism to academic knowledge production, it is useful to extend Haidt’s principle
above to Bmorality binds, blinds, and primes.^ Many sociologists, as we will see,
express unfamiliarity with the literature surrounding one or more of the contro-
versies. We wonder, however, the extent to which this lack of knowledge may not
be incidental, but reflect their own moral intuitions and the group boundaries of
Bappropriate^ disciplinary inquiry.18
In the concluding section we draw heavily from respondents’ comments to reveal
how sociology’s moral boundaries are (re)produced and policed. We reveal a discourse
that is particularly sensitive and often fervent when it comes to depictions of vulnerable
groups. Indeed, the prevalence in the comments of victimization narratives, trigger-
ready outrage, and the impugning of other scholars’ motives lend support to an
intuitionist model of moral reasoning. That is, when sociologists are presented with
claims that counter their shared moral intuitions, many are set one way or another to
rationalize them away. As Haidt puts it, BWhen the facts conflict with sacred values,
almost everyone finds a way to stick with their values and reject the evidence^ (cited in
Mooney 2014).
We should again stress that our analysis here is necessarily speculative. Although we
received thousands of comments, they were optional throughout the survey, and we
cannot make a claim to generalizability. We can say that the sentiments cited are
consistent with how the controversies have played out in public debate. At the very
least, there is an appreciable subset of sociologists who view knowledge production in
their field in markedly ardent and tribal terms.

Sacred Victims, Forbidden Questions

B‘Culture’ is not innate,^ one respondent writes, Bit arises FROM structural factors^
[emphasis theirs].
This respondent’s view is echoed by many sociologists when asked whether cultural
factors may plausibly play a role in inner-city poverty in the black community.
BCultural factors like hyper masculinity and materialism are the consequences of
poverty rather than the cause,^ one notes. Another adds: BStructure causes culture.
Change the structure, culture will follow.^ This reduction of culture to social structure
is surprising in a field generally attentive to the interpenetration of social and cultural
forces. Indeed, many respondents suggest that culture and social structure are Bnot
easily separable;^ Ba complex mix;^ Beach produces the other dialectically;^ and so on.
When we examine the range of remarks to the culture-of-poverty statements, the
principal view is that structural factors such as poverty, joblessness, and institutional
racism largely condition the cultural factors, though the latter have some partial
autonomy. As one respondent puts it: BEven if (sub)cultural factors are, inextricably,
a direct product or bi-product of ‘structural factors’ (my belief), it would still be
accurate to say that they ‘play a role’ because of their proximate connection to attitudes

17
One author recalls from his days in graduate school how a particular professor was scrawled a Brational
choice theorist^ as an epithet on a stall in the department’s bathroom.
18
The lead author encountered visible consternation from sociology colleagues due to his emerging interest in
biosociology.
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and behavior.^ This view, we concede, mirrors our own on the matter. Yet it appears
alongside more one-sided and reductionist claims of culture as an epiphenomenon of
social structure. Few respondents reverse the causal arrow, for example, by suggesting
that culture may drive changes in the social structure.
Might it be that some sociologists jettison their otherwise multidimensional under-
standing of social behavior due to their collective instincts to protect the black urban
poor? One respondent believes so, noting with irony: BLeave it to sociologists to argue
ad nauseam for the unique explanatory power of culture and then pull a 180 the
moment that stance appears to conflict with their prevailing narrative.^ If that
Bprevailing narrative^ is in fact one of Bsacred victimization,^ opening the door to
culture, even collaterally, appears to prompt mechanical dismissal. Including values,
beliefs and practices into the explanatory schema implies that the black underclass may
have a hint of agency in perpetuating their circumstances. For some, that empirical
possibility is verboten.
Sociologists’ aversion to cultural explanations in this context is evidenced by many
highly emotive reactions to the suggestion that the inner city black community has any
Bresponsibility^ for their circumstances (SC3). The following remarks are representa-
tive of scores of victimization narratives we received:

& The idea of Bresponsibility of black community^ erases or disregards the immense
trauma that decades of institutional racism has had on people–the hopelessness was
created, and it has real mental health implications that can’t just be solved by taking
personal responsibility.
& One cannot call structural factors imposed by external forces Bcultural^ factors. If
we peel back the layers, we see institutional racism and policies deliberately aimed
at destroying African American communities; not culture.
& I qualify my agreement by stating that culture is adaptive and given society’s war
against the African-American community (especially Black men), is it any wonder
that the culture includes violence?
& White people created these problems, white people need to fix them.
& It would be like saying that it is the responsibility of a rape victim to not get raped.

We do not have space to share the plethora of comparable responses. Suffice


to note that effectively denying the agency of the black urban poor is wide-
spread, coupled with affirmations of their existing dignity and responsibility
before overwhelming structural oppression.19 Even those sociologists apparently
open to culture virtually always stress its negligibility before institutional forces.
Again, we must note, in a field traditionally attentive to the interplay of structure
and agency, it is unusual to witness such categorical dismissals of autonomous
behavior. The defensive tone of some sociologists on this matter suggests the
field continues to be inhospitable to examining cultural aspects of poverty.
Consider the concerns of the following respondents:

19
E.g., BThere IS an incredibly strong and ‘responsible’ black community in EVERY SINGLE MAJOR US
CITY^ [emphases theirs].
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& Sociologists in general have been unwilling to confront this issue because they’re so
afraid of being accused of Bblaming the victim,^ or because they simply want to
place the blame elsewhere.
& Many years of teaching has taught me that we lose a lot of credibility with students
when we do not acknowledge the agency of African Americans, or depict them
solely as Bvictims.^
& If I dared to say any of the things I’m saying in this survey in any non-anonymous
situation it would probably be the end of my career. I just bite my lip and say all of
the politically correct things I’m supposed to say, or (more often) just try to avoid
saying anything, since even some whites who say the politically correct thing can
still be accused of racism, so I try to just keep my mouth shut.

We are unable to gauge how prevalent such self-censorship may be in the discipline.
Yet the impugning of motives and trigger-ready outrage expressed by some sociologists
give cause for concern:

& Talking about the Bblack community^ as opposed to the rest of us seems
racist to me.
& Preaching to people whose behavior is tied to constraining structural circumstances
is paternalistic and usually self-defeating.
& I really *really* hope you’re not seriously considering white supremacist ideas as
valid ideas to explore [emphasis theirs].
& Excuse me taking this personally and the expletive to follow – but this viewpoint is
so *f*cking* irritating. The assumption that the Bblack^ community is culturally
different than the rest of the Americans is one those perpetual racist ideas that
continues to circulate [respondent’s edit].

Without the tools of an intuitionist social psychology, we find it difficult to under-


stand how considering possible cultural dimensions of poverty could prompt such
accusations of paternalism, racism and white supremacy. It appears that asking these
forbidden questions expels the questioner from the group’s moral community. Recall
that over a quarter of female, radical, and intersectional sociologists agrees that
investigating such factors is Blikely motivated by a desire to legitimize the racial-
ethnic status quo^ (Tables 5, 6 and 7, SC6). In one extreme case, a respondent
exclaims: BYou are a white supremacist and I hate everything about this survey.^ Most
do not express such hostility, yet discomfort with the line of inquiry is common. In fact,
a frequent strategy to avoid such questions is to deflect to matters compatible with the
victimization narrative:

& Is it even possible to begin examining cultural factors while ignoring capitalism and
the history of racism and white privilege? How about address white privilege
instead?
& The culture of poverty we need to examine is the set of values held by policy
makers and corporations that devalues the lives of the poor and of people of color.
& When we begin discussing child abuse and substance abuse in rural white com-
munities then we can start talking to black communities about appropriate or
inappropriate responses to their circumstances.
Am Soc

We can see in their discursive practices how sociologists deflect, denounce, or


dismiss undesirable questions. We see comparable moves across the controversies,
especially with regard to gender. Many sociologists express disbelief at raising the
possibility of biology playing even a component role in occupational choice (SC8,
SC9). BJesus, really?^ asks one; BAre you freaking kidding me?^ responds another;
BHow. Are. You. Even. Asking. This. Question.^ [sic] writes a third. Although quite a
few sociologists are open to the matter empirically, the predominant view is that
biology’s role is trivial before decisive social and historical forces:

& There are biosocial differences between males and females but the effects of those
differences on occupational choice, is [sic] irrelevant.
& Sure, it’s plausible; but the evidence sounds VERY weak and needs to be treated as
such. [emphasis theirs]
& The social OUTWEIGHS the biological, especially when looking at the unrepre-
sentative work done with girls with CAH [congenital adrenal hyperplasia]. [Em-
phasis theirs]

A few sociologists explicitly link their dismissal of biology to a Bblank slate^ view of
human behavior: BWomen’s vaginas and breasts are probably the only thing about them
that has a biological component.^ Another reveals: BI am a strict tabula rasa sociologist.
Any differences in behavior by sex is actually gender and is the result of socialization.^
As we note above, the Bblank slate^ view of human nature has been subject to
incisive critique across the sciences in recent decades (Horowitz et al. 2014). That a
grouping of sociologists continues to categorically reject biology’s influence is peculiar.
Our hunch that such rejections are rooted at least in part in the collective emotions of
the field is bolstered by respondents’ impassioned responses. As we saw with black
urban poverty, many sociologists are all too ready to express outrage or impugn the
motives of those raising such questions:

& The biology argument sounds similar to early attempts to pinpoint biological
differences between Blacks and Whites that are now laughable.
& This is absurd. Shame on you researchers for creating a Bcontroversial issue^ that is
not in fact controversial according to sociological data.
& Ugh. So this is actually my field of study. There is, for example, a massive body of
brain research that has been analyzed and debunked this kind of approach. Even if
there were a biological component, what would be the point in focusing on it since
it is not changeable?
& This would be the equivalent of arguing that Black people are underrepresented in
STEM due to biological reasons - this is racist and the idea that women have
different aptitude for science is sexist, and what kept women out of universities
until the 1970s.
& There is no verified claim that gender difference and gender inequality is biolog-
ically driven. See Ann Fausto-Sterling. The vignette misrepresents the social
science data and is offensive.

Numerous respondents echo such sentiments. Notice the language of offense and
shaming, and the consequent attributions of racism and sexism. Yet to borrow from
Am Soc

Pinker (2005) – Can the truth ever be Bracist^ or Bsexist^? Let us posit as accurate the
meta-analyses of women’s and men’s cognitive differences, say, in visuospatial
abilities and mental rotation (e.g., Halpern et al. 2007; Maeda and Yoon 2013;
Voyer et al. 1995). On average differences in these domains may help explain why
men are so predominant in the physical sciences and engineering, especially given
men’s higher variability in mathematical performance (i.e., greater representation on
the high-ability and low-ability extremes). Might having a knack for a less common
and marketable skill factor into occupational choice? Note that this need not negate
the impact of culture and discrimination in shaping occupational outcomes. Social-
ization and sexism no doubt accompany average biological differences in a multidi-
mensional dynamic. Sociologists are often distinguished in their theories and statis-
tical modeling for teasing out complex, intersecting variables. But in the case of
disparate gendered outcomes, such sophistication founders before biological factors
that may bear on social inequality. As the respondent above states – what’s the point
in studying factors that are not Bchangeable^?
In our view, it serves neither science nor social justice to subordinate the pursuit of
truth to politics. Many sociologists appear inclined to do so, however, especially on this
issue. Recall that a third of respondents does not agree that the issue merits attention in
the field (Table 3, SC14). BLet the biologists do the biology^ is a common view.
BSociologists have limited time and the social environmental factors are already so
complex,^ notes another. Even among those who Bagree,^ many do so only nominally:

& I’m not opposed to someone studying this, if only to debunk it.
& Yes, so that they can be discredited. Biological determinism around race and gender
is so ingrained in the U.S. that it must be addressed and debunked.
& I would never state that someone should refrain from exploring a research question
even if I think it’s a waste of time or money.
& It only merits attention insofar as we have data that show that gender does not
universally have the same effects on occupational choices or the division of labor.
& Who am I to say don’t study that? I mean, maybe we should study if fish retire? Do
salads feel pain when we eat them?

We do not deny the reality of a disciplinary division of labor. Researchers cannot be


expected to investigate phenomena outside their expertise. Yet it is hard to distinguish
the views above from intellectual prejudice. For many sociologists, the science is
settled and the battle lines are clear. They see it as their mission to discredit or deride
any hint of what they view as biological Bdeterminism.^ The only Bfacts^ that count are
those that discount the role of biology in social outcomes.
Ironically, if the science is Bsettled,^ it tends to point in the opposite direction as
presumed. Although we do not aim in this study to resolve the controversies, in this
case the mounting evidence cannot be ignored. The psychological literature is vast and
cross-cultural, with wide-ranging evidence suggesting average sex differences across
numerous cognitive domains (see Halpern 2013 for an overview). In some
(aforementioned) areas, males tend to outperform females, while in others females
have an on average advantage (e.g., reading and writing abilities, facial recognition).
Examining how these differences influence occupational choice strikes us as a valid
component of a multidimensional (biopsychosocial) explanation of social stratification.
Am Soc

In fact, as we indicate in the vignette, recent studies show large sex differences in
vocational interests, where males tend to express greater interest working with things
while females tend to prefer working with people (Su et al. 2009; Su and Rounds
2015). Though socialization no doubt plays a vital role, it is hardly scientific to reject a
possible biological component by ideological fiat. Biology has been shown to be
relevant, for example, in studies of girls with congenital adrenal hyperplasia (Beltz
et al. 2011; Berenbaum and Beltz 2016). Girls exposed prenatally to increased male
hormones do tend to express more interest in things than in people.
About a third of respondents express openness to the question (though many
doubting more than a trivial hormonal influence). Most simply mock or dismiss
the possibility. BWhen did we become biological determinists?^; BHow are pro-
fessions biologically based (saying nothing about gender and biology)?!
Ridiculous.^ What is bizarre about such statements is that they directly contradict
the language of the vignette and survey. We stress throughout the importance of
socialization and discrimination, and inquire about the role of biology as a
plausible component. Nonetheless, in what appears to be a kind of Bmotivated
misreading,^ many sociologists misinterpret the words or infer a sexist agenda.
The emotions on the matter are palpable. As one chagrined respondent puts it,
BBiology seems to threaten all that we hold dear.^ Another states, BSociobiology
is, thank goodness, largely debunked.^
The tenor of such responses suggests, of course, more than mere intellectual
disagreement about the veracity of available evidence. Indeed, we appreciate the
respondents who express their feelings openly: BI’m unclear how a biological
factor could contribute to this difference – and as a sociologist the idea makes
me uncomfortable!^ Many others variably dismiss the biological studies as
debunked, fear their scientific headway, and all the while concede ignorance of
the actual biosocial literature! One can hardly Bleave the biology to the
biologists^ while preemptively rejecting their findings. It is not surprising in this
context to hear sociologists reveal sympathy to biosocial explanations as a kind
of moral confessional:

& I’m going to out myself right here: I do believe that our bodies affect our
personalities and preferences, and that the parts of us that make us more male or
more female (call it hormones or structures or whatever) do affect our bodies, and
that affects our experiences. I think social and cultural factors play a bigger role, but
I have studied way too much physiology and psychology to ignore patterns tied to
sex hormones.

One wonders how many sociologists are Bin the closet^ about their receptivity to
biology. As with the culture of poverty, it appears forbidden to concede that a
vulnerable group may make Bchoices^ that even partially account for their social
location. Such Bchoices^ must be imposed strictly by domination from without. To
suggest otherwise apparently Bouts^ oneself as a defender of social hierarchy.
As we turn to the final controversy, we encounter the same array of discursive
practices employed on behalf of the sacred victim, in this case, the immigrant. Recall
that only 12% of respondents agrees that rising Muslim migration to Europe threatens
Western values of human rights and gender equality (Table 3, SC 17). Some
Am Soc

respondents’ curt reactions are revealing: BWhat?!!!;^ BEyes roll;^ B??? Nope^ [punc-
tuation theirs]. Many go beyond dismissing a possible threat to denying the premise of
Western values:

& Western society neither values human rights or gender equality.


& We’re doing fine threatening gender equality all by ourselves, thank you. Also,
that’s a stereotypical way to see Muslims. There are Muslim feminists.
& Assuming that Muslim populations Bthreaten Western norms of human rights and
gender equality^ is abhorrent.
& Agree not because they are Muslim, but because they are subject to systematic
discrimination on the basis of their status as Muslim.
& This is a very loaded statement. It assumes that something about Islam is inferior to
human rights and gender. In my opinion, the United States is very guilty of human
rights and gender (and many other) forms of oppression and discrimination.

Again there are myriad such remarks we do not have space to report. As we saw
with prior controversies, some sociologists are open to the matter empirically, though
most are prone to emotive dismissals. Either the West does not share these values, or is
an active threat to such values, or causes Muslim migrants to become a threat.
Whatever the case, the vulnerable immigrant is held above reproach.
Respondents’ depictions of host societies are hardly as benign as their view of immi-
grants. Sociologists consistently deny in their comments that calls to limit immigration
sometimes reflect legitimate moral concerns for cultural unity or shared identity (SC15).
Time and again they stress that although such cultural concerns exist, they are not morally
legitimate. BHow is a call for cultural unity not racist?^ one asks. BSuch claims mask
prejudice and racism,^ notes another. BI don’t believe these are ‘legitimate’ concerns,^
writes a third. BWe all have multiple cultural histories and ancestry. What’s legitimate about
being afraid of the diversity that we already have even within our own heritage?^
Beyond denying the legitimacy of such concerns, some eschew the notion of shared
cultural identity altogether:

& I can’t think of any Bcultural unity^ or much Bshared identity^ people across our
country have EVER had. I’ve lived in several states and have encountered people of
all ages speaking different languages (e.g., Polish, German, Spanish, Russian, etc.).
Many places welcome such diversity of peoples and think that it STRENGTHENS
the place. [emphases theirs]
& I don’t even know what Bmoral concerns for cultural unity and shared identity^
means. Go across the US. The only shared identity is that we are Americans and
have some cultural unity around that idea.
& America has long been heterogeneous. Calls for cultural unity seem a bit hollow.

Sociologists’ apparent obtuseness to shared identity is predictable from a MFT


perspective. As principled universalists, whose underlying left/liberal intuitions do
not attune them strongly to parochial loyalties, it is not surprising that calls for cultural
unity would Bseem a bit hollow.^ The danger, however, is that the field’s sensibilities
may blind them to potentially anomic consequences of mass immigration. If diversity is
a desired (even sacred) end, then sociologists may be primed to neglect its potential
Am Soc

downsides. This is curious in a field whose roots trace back to Durkheim, yet as we
discuss in the introduction, it appears to be the case. As a leading immigration scholar
concedes: BNot enough of the literature has been directly concerned with the impact of
immigration on the receiving society; far too much focuses exclusively on the changes
occurring to immigrants and their descendants^ (Richard Alba, personal communica-
tion, August 10, 2018).
If sociological studies of immigration reflect the field’s moral intuitions, it is
expected that the lived experiences of migrants – their suffering, discrimination,
cultural bereavement, etc. – would take center stage. This is valuable work that,
needless to say, we endorse for its scientific contributions as well as its sensitizing role
in the broader public debate over immigrant rights. The worry, however, is that
sociologists may not be as responsive to those, largely on the political right, who resist
immigration for reasons not reducible to solely scapegoating or racism (as relevant as
these factors are). Many sociologists have difficulty wrapping their heads around this
idea. Many simply deny it: BI see ‘cultural threat’ as reflective of racially prejudiced
sentiment;^ BI strongly agree that racism and economic anxiety motivate these calls;^
BXenophobia for some…stupidity for others^ [ellipsis theirs]. One respondent scorns
cultural concerns as Bjust an excuse racist cracker hillbillies try to use.^ Few express
such animus openly. Yet we fear a climate of inquiry in a field either obtuse or hostile to
collective sentiments they do not share. BIt amazes me how sociologists can champion
identity politics for disenfranchised groups,^ one respondent avers, Bwhile ignoring
them for the group in the majority or in dominant positions.^
We should note that respondents seldom conceal their political sympathies on the
issue. In this context, it is unsurprising that only 28% of radical sociologists (and about
half of the field) believes public policy should be informed by research into immigra-
tion’s potentially disruptive effects (Tables 3 and 7, SC16). Of that number, many either
doubt such disruption, recast it in a positive light, or otherwise stress what they view as
the benefits of immigration:

& ??? What disruptive effect and what social cohesion? [punctuation theirs]
& Doesn’t all of this research show that over time the perception of cultural threat
subsides?
& Perhaps it ruptures social cohesion but this shifts into a new kind of community that is
far more inclusive and diverse than before. That kind of disruption wouldn’t be bad.
& I assume it would be disruptive, but on some level I tend to think this disruption can
be/is morally ameliorative.

While an upbeat hunch about migratory flows is suitable as a hypothesis, some


sociologists bend the stick so far as to put their politics ahead of the research. Others
deflect to more Bappropriate^ questions. By this point the discursive maneuvers should
be familiar:

& Investigate the Bdisruptive effects on the social cohesion^ of immigrant families,
separated by economic necessity and by political hysteria.
& It seems like we should look, first, to how immigration has disrupted indigenous or
involuntary contingencies. Would be more helpful to look at how our foreign policy
affects immigration if we do not want newcomers.
Am Soc

& I agree as long as policy is also informed by research that shows that more diverse
communities thrive.
& No, if the research leads to segregation and other racist policies. Yes, if the research
finds ways to successfully help immigrant community join with existing commu-
nities and develop successful avenues for cultural exchange and appreciation (and
avoid appropriation).

One wonders upon reading these lines when a hypothesis becomes a prejudice, or
when one’s moral intuitions invite confirmation bias. Immigration policy should be
informed with research – but only if it shows that more diverse communities thrive?
What if more diverse communities thrive less, as Putnam’s (2007) provocative findings
suggest?20 Must research be subject first to a litmus test of political congeniality?

Concluding Remarks

Our understanding of knowledge construction among sociologists appears removed, we


concede, from the Enlightenment ideals of rational inquiry and dispassionate discovery.
After all, disciplinary inquiry bound up with moral signaling and political identity hardly
inspires confidence in the Bobjectivity^ of sociological investigations. Worse yet, perhaps
our report will be embraced by those who dismiss (or celebrate) the human sciences as
mere storytelling, unconstrained by the facts of a social world Bout there.^
As we suggest above, we do not infer from our findings such a pessimistic
interpretation. Nor do the emotive dynamics of controversy tempt us toward epistemo-
logical relativism. In our view, appreciating the intuitive dimensions of social science
practice holds promise for better approximating Enlightenment ideals. If we treat, for
example, Merton’s (1973) classic Bnorms of science^ as aspirational rather than
axiomatic, the insights of moral foundations theory might help bridge Btribal^ disci-
plinary divisions. In this sense we can only aspire to the Bdisinterestedness^ Merton
defends, while maintaining a commitment to the fruits of Borganized skepticism.^21
20
We cannot appraise the merits of Putnam’s study here. We encountered, however, some foreseeable
repudiation: BHa! Like Robert Putnam’s work? With his discredited cross-sectional frequency distributions
that were supposed to show some causal relationship between diversity and social cohesion? This is the kind
of work I am referring to that just reflects prior beliefs and then packages them up as robust empirical tests.
Give me a break!^
21
We do not embrace such ideals nonchalantly, nor see science in some inexorable march of progress. We
recognize that historical claims of Bdisinterested^ knowledge all too often conceal colonial, patriarchal and
other hegemonic interests. Yet in the end we affirm the struggle to put Btruth over tribe^ – to build consensus
based on shared facts.
This conventional view contrasts sharply with standpoint epistemology and feminist critiques of Bobjective^
science as Bmasculine.^ It is indeed striking that gender has proven to be a significant predictor of scholars’
views in this study as well as in our surveys of anthropologists (Horowitz et al. forthcoming; Yaworsky et al.
2015). Women tend more than men to align with their politically radical colleagues regarding relativist
epistemologies and vulnerable-group-partial interpretations of evidence. Recall that female sociologists are
significantly less likely than males to affirm the importance of a dispassionate attitude in research (Table 6 and
8, AO3). In their review of an international database of almost 120,000 respondents, Graham, Haidt and
colleagues (Graham et al. 2011) find that women reveal on average keener sensitivity than men to care and
harm concerns when rendering moral judgments. It appears, hence, that interpretive differences by gender may
have at least partially intuitive roots. See Horowitz et al. (forthcoming) for elaboration of this argument
regarding anthropologists’ divergent views of science, prehistoric violence, and indigenous knowledges.
Am Soc

Let us close, thus, by reiterating a belabored point: We do not cite our colleagues to
denounce their ideology. Our aim in dissecting the controversies is to gain greater
consciousness of ourselves as an emotive community of scholars. We have, to be sure,
injected our own critical voice, and we have been especially attentive to that subgroup
of radical and intersectional sociologists most inclined to sacralize the victim. Yet as
progressive intellectuals we share those same moral intuitions. Our hope, in intuitionist
terms, is that if we bind ourselves less tribally to sacred beliefs (e.g., Thou shalt not
consider sex differences in gendered behavior), we will become less blind to
countervailing claims or evidence. This is not to suggest that progressive sensibilities
necessarily lead us astray. Egalitarian instincts to protect the vulnerable are both a
resource and constraint in knowledge production. After all, some of the most important
work in critical social science has been animated by such instincts.
The challenge is to resist receiving contrary ideas through a tribal lens; to be aware
of how our intergroup academic identities are emotively anchored; and to be less
trigger-ready to dismiss even unsettling propositions from intellectual or political
challengers. In brief – we strive to turn down the temperature. This in no way implies
acceptance or even nonchalance toward the political right, especially its authoritarian
extreme. While their intuitions nudge them toward partial truths as well, the psycho-
logical evidence strongly suggests much greater resistance to science on the right
(Mooney 2012). This is not just empirically shortsighted – but dangerous – given the
denial of climate change and the recrudescence of overt racism in a time of Balternative
facts.^ We must, of course, combat such ideology in the political sphere. Yet in the
sphere of science, where the pursuit of truth expresses our highest ideal, we best serve
by casting out the beam of thine own eye first.

Appendix: Survey Vignettes

Note: We constructed the vignettes not as comprehensive overviews but to capture the
major fault lines of controversy. We did not include bibliographies or references to
specific authors to best tap respondents’ views of the substantive claims made, rather
than their reactions to possible caricatures of the authors in the field. The exclusion of
references also aided readability. Vignette I draws verbatim from a few lines in
Patterson (2015); vignette II paraphrases American Psychological Association (2006)
and Beltz et al. (2011); vignette III paraphrases Haidt (2016).

Please Read the Following Vignette About Inner-City Poverty and Respond to the
Questions Below:

Postwar Bculture-of-poverty^ theories applied to U.S. inner cities fell out of favor in
the 1960s–70s, as social scientists came to see discussion of cultural factors as
examples of blaming the victim. In recent years, however, social scientists are bringing
culture back into the discussion. They argue that although structural factors like
joblessness, social isolation, and poor schools are decisive factors, a violent culture
among male black youth plays a role as well in perpetuating the black Bunderclass.^
Such values include hypermasculinity and sexual conquest, extreme individualism and
materialism (including contempt for low-wage work), and reverence for the gun.
Am Soc

Consistent with such research, some observers call on solutions that stress the govern-
ment’s role in addressing key structural factors, while also highlighting the responsi-
bility of the black community to confront the problems of violence and out-of-wedlock
births that they believe help perpetuate inner-city poverty.

Please Read The Following Vignette About Gendered Occupational Choices and
Respond to the Questions Below:

Women’s persistent underrepresentation in science, technology, engineering and


mathematics (STEM) careers continues to spur social scientific investigation. There
is widespread consensus among social scientists that gender socialization and discrim-
ination are key limitations to women’s access to such occupations. More controversial,
however, is the claim that gendered occupational choice has a sex-related biological
component. Research reveals average difference in aptitude between females and males
on skills such as verbal abilities (where women tend to score slightly higher) and
visuospatial abilities (when men tend to have a slight edge). Moreover, research
demonstrates average differences in occupational preferences, with males more inclined
to work with things and females more inclined to work with people. A recent study
reveals a biological contribution to such differences, showing that girls with congenital
adrenal hyperplasia (atypical exposure to prenatal androgens) expressed greater interest
in things relative to people than unaffected females.

Please Read the Final Vignette About Immigration and Respond to the Questions
Below:

Few issues are as divisive today as immigration. Palpable anxieties polarize Europe
and the United States over their respective Muslim and Hispanic populations. Social
science literature devotes considerable attention to immigrants’ experiences of margin-
alization and institutionalized discrimination. Perhaps less studied are the implications
of immigration for social and cultural integration. Social scientists have found that anti-
immigrant sentiment is rooted more in perceptions of Bcultural threat^ than in economic
anxiety. In this vein, some observers view the call to limit immigration as reflecting in
part legitimate moral concerns of shared identity and collective trust that should not be
reduced to economic anxiety or dismissed as simply racist. Europe’s rising Muslim
populations, for example, spur the fear that Islamic values and customs threaten
Western norms of human rights and gender equality. In the U.S. context, some fear
that cosmopolitan policies, such as bilingual education, if not balanced by concerns for
assimilation and shared values, may nourish the fractious cultural environment that
helped prompt the rise of Trump.

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