(Philosophy of Mind Series) Angela Mendelovici - The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality-Oxford University Press (2018)

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PHILOSOPHY DF MIND SERIES
OM E M ENTAL STATES seem to be “of" or “about" things or to "say" something.

For example, a thought might represent that grass is green. and a visual
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experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this book
is to explain this phenomenon.
It has been long assumed that the best way to explain intentionality is in terms
of tracking and informational relations, functional roles, and similar ingredients.
Mendelovici breaks from this tradition, arguing that the only empirically adequate
and in principle viable theory of intentionality is one in terms of phenomenal
consciousness. the felt. subjective, or qualitative feature of mental life. According
to her phenomenal intentronafily theory. there is a central kind of intentionality.
phenomenal intentionality, that arises from phenomenal consciousness alone, and
any other kind of intentionality derives from it.
The phenomenal intentionality theory faces important challenges in accounting

for the rich and sophisticated contents of thoughts. broad and object-involving
contents. and unconscious states. Mendelovici proposes a novel and particularly
strong version of the theory that can meet these challenges. The end result is a
radically internalistic picture of the mind. on which all phenomenally represented
\BASlSOF
contents are literally in our heads, and any non-phenomenal contents we in some
INTENTIONALIT
sense represent are expressly singled out by us.
OXFORD ISBN 973-0-19-086330-7

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PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
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Contents
Prcfacc xi
Overvicw xv
PART ONE} INTRODUCTION

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.... The Ostcmwc W... 0fFixiug R:f:rencc ;
.3. om. way. of Fixing ucre.c..cc 9
.4. Wbrrics mu. .5.» 0..=..~.v.- 1)efi......... .4

.5. Conclusion .9
1. <;....1. and Me//wdulugy u
2..x. M... is . Theory of 1....-.........i..,v2 1.
1.2.. Thcorylndcptndeiit Acctss m lntemizmaliry :3

2.3. Cunclusion 22%
PART TW’U I ALTERNATIVE THIURIES 0} INTENYIONALITY
3. r/.. Itlrmuxrb p.-mm./ix Tr.u/amg 17...... 3,
1... Tra(kingTheor|cs ..
3.1. om...-..» uflhu Mm....ci. Problem +2.. T..ck...g Ti.......< .5
3.1. Background and .\.......p..m.. 36
5-4- A M.,.....ci. C...-. P:‘rc:prua1Coior Rcprusciumriom .3

3.3. 0.}... M........ci. Cats .4
;.5. Obj:cmms 46
3-7- Rniiabi: Misrcprcxcntannn and me Significance nFTmck1ng .7

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viii (fantzrm Cuntz'n!.< ix
;.8. Conclusion 39 .9, iVarm;Imtun.rXMIr: mo

App:-ndix A: Obiccrions to I11: Mifimarch Probltm 59 8.1. '1'hc Pmbiciii Wltll Nonconscious Smcs 161
8.2. Dcnvazivisr Srraccgim is;

4. F1mrtiunaIRu/2 Tlie..r.e:.m.1 Tmkmg Ihm-.‘::.»1g..m 70 3,3, sanding 5...“; .59
+-I- Th: Functional Rule Theory 7x 5.4. Allcgcdly Nnncnnscious Occiirmirszaics I34,
4... Worricswirh sho...A.... F....c.io..a1 RolcTli:orics 7. .,§_ CW1...-..... .9.
4... Worries with LongAArm Functional Rel: Thmrics 75
4,4. The Real Problnuivirh Both TrackingTlicorics and Functional Min p1vi:,| THE As;-gcr VIEW
Kolc TllC0|’lk'!~ 79 9. I; In/zn/inrialiry a Rel.m/m I0 .. Carimit? 195
4... Conclusion 80 9... The Rclariun Viuwand .h: Aspcc[Vicw .96
9... Two Worries \\’i(l1 uh: Relimiii View we

PART THREE | THE PHENOMENAL INTENTXONALITY THEORY 9,, The Allggcd Vim.‘-5 ofthc R.~1;.;iun Vicw ma
;. The PhenomenalImz-mmmzligz Than} 83 9+ Cm,c[u5;o“ 119
sa. The Phenonicml b-renrionaliav Thwry 8. Apptndix F: Th. Aspcct Vicw and A.iv=.h..1.s... 130
5.2. Argumenrs for PIT 86 AppcndixG: c....m.;. ax Firsr- or s¢m..d.o.dc. sum orl7mp€r(ics .3.
54;. ldcnnry PIT 93 Appendix H; An i...c....J Thmy orT....h and Rcfcrcncc .3;
5.4. Challenging Casts 97
5-3. Conclusion ioo PART SIX | CONCLUSION
Appendix B: The Extent oFPl\cnomena1 Inrcnrmml-ry :01 m. CD7lL’lMSI07A: ltllirlilomllily and Ozlm Kzl.1Ira'P/aznammzt 24;
Appendix C: The Multiplt Arisablliry oflmrntional Sm-ts I04 io.i. Return (0 Olhcl’ Ways of Fixing Rcfcrcncc on lnrcnrionality 144
io.z. Radical Inrcrnalism 2.47
.1. P! 1'’; Static: .15 .4 Thmy .5/‘1nm.z.mmlizy [O9
9... Is l’ITaThcory on.......i......1i.y in Terms orphcnom.-hai Consciousness? 109 6.055.... .49
6.2. lsPITTrivial? ..4 5[B]_[Q(]RA[IH\'1§§
4... [si’IT 1....-....i..g.> ..; ,,..,E,. .67
6.4. Is PIT Naturalistic? us
6.5. Cunclusion H9
PART FOURI CHALLENGING cuts

7. Iinmglat ix;
7... The Challenge 6... PIT rm... Though. ....
7... Thoughts‘ i>hc..o....-mi Contents ..7
Sclf-Ascripuvism about Th....,;h.s' Allcgcd Comcnrs .;9
.4
7.4. Is Dcrivcd Mental Rtprcscnmtion a Typ: nfInrcnrionality2 is:

7.5. Conclusion: PIT about Thought .5.
App:ndiX D: Di.-rived Mclilal Rcprcsunmrion in 1>.-.ccp...i.. I54
Apptndlx E: A..i...d.»s .55
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Preface
THIS PROJECT BEGAN 15 years ago when. as an undergraduate at McGill, I set

out to write my undergraduate thesis on phenomenal consciousness. After reading
David Chalmers’ The Curm.’iau.r 1‘l/find. I decided that there wasn’t much more for
me to sayon phenomenal consciousness and resolved to steer clear ofthe topic. So I
turned to the problem of intentionality. But I soon came to realize that attempts to
understand ' ' " y‘ ‘ I ’ ‘y of‘ L ' ' " ‘I
fail. What's more, I came to believe that intentionality is in fact one and the same
thing as phenomenal consciousness. I wrote my undergraduate thesis on precisely

this topic (and the idealist consequences I took to ensue), and then my PhD thesis
on this same topic again (minus the idealism). This book is the culrnimtion ofthese
eilorts.
The ideas presented here have benefited from practically every philosophical inter-
action I have ever had with friends. colleagues, students. and mentors at McGill
University, Princeton University, the Australian National University, the University
ofW/estern Ontario, and elsewhere. I was especially lucky to benefit from the cxccp-
tionally rich intellectual environment at the n alinn National University, where I
spent time as a postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre for Consciousness and as a visitor.
Many of the ideas in this book have been presented in talks I have given at the
Australasian A of Philosophy Conference (2.008 and mu), the European
' '
Congress oFAnalytic Philosophy (wit), the 21rd World Congress of Philosophy at

)(|
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xii Pr: Em Pflfm xiii
the University of Athens, the Canadian Philosophical Association Meeting (zor;, . defended in Chapter 7. and to David Ch’-I1mers.who suggested that my ideas might
zol7), the Pacific American Association of Philosophy Meeting (2013),
2.ot4.. and “’°il‘ W5“ “5 1b°°k~
Princeton University, the Australian National University, the University ofToronro, I owe special gratitude to my parents, Lina and Marius, for exemplifying both
the University of Melbourne, the University of Western Australia. the Central Eu— insight and rigor in éicadfimic Work and {Of Ili¢ii'l0V€a 5i1PP°“- ind C0nfid=n¢< in Int»
ropean University, the University ofCrete, Oakland University, Victoria University I 3"‘ ‘5P‘d3llY $’3“f“l ‘O ”‘°‘h" and "W lama)’ I“ G'°°‘°—‘5P°°l““Y Glaglai
ml’
at Wellington, Tulane University, the University of Texas at Austin, the University M3733» and Ti')’Ph°“—f°i’ mating 1 nfai’ \1‘0Pi3“ ‘Vmk €iiVii0i'iii'i¢"[ for me at 0'"
of Waterloo, Cornell University, the University of Washington at St. Louis, ['1']: summer house. Most of this book (as well as the theses it is based on) was written
University of Minnesota, CUNY, the University of V€’isconsin—Madison, Yeshiva Elitfci
University, Wellesley College, W’aync State University, Charles Sturt University, Tl” “dim” and P’°d“‘3‘l°“ "am 3‘ OUP hm" b‘°" "‘m¢“d°“5lY h°lPf‘-‘I
Ru)“-.u,,;v¢,5i,§r Bo;-hum‘ and the ungversgty of western on,“-;o_ 1 thank [hg throughout the publication process. Thanks especially to Peter Ohlin, David
audiences a. rim talks. and especially my commentators Mike Collins, rm. chaimm. Isia Ng, Raj suchan. Thomas Mccarthy. and sangeuha vishwanti-an.
Janette Dinishak, Mark I-lerr, David Ivy, Charles Siewcrt, and Brad Thompson for My greatest d=bt by far is to David Boiiigflr "W Partner» Frcil-icnr co-and-on
their helpful and incisive colnlnentaries and our subsequent discussions. and (near) doppeigingcri When I firsr mcr David in 2008. 1 was surprised to find
lam c5P5cial1yindcb[Cd [0 [ha phmcmcnal Imgmionaljry Reading GmuP._ Tim someone with almost exactly the same philosophical views as me. This book has been
Bayne, David Eourget, Rob Stainton, and Chris VigerAfor reading an early version heavily influenced by all our discussions throughout the years, due to which our views
of this manuscript and providing valuable criticisms and concrete suggestions on have almost entirely converged (some residual disagreements remain concerning the
both content and presentations The final version grew out oliour many discussions. m3(€i‘i31 0fCl'|3PWi 9)- D3Vid liai Rid ¢V¢l’)’ Chi|Pf€|‘ °f‘l1i5 b00k m||liiPl€ fimfis and
1 am also extremely thankful to Charles Sicwert, Dcclan Smithies, Laura Cow, and diswsscd every single idea in it with m=- providing iicilvfiii criticisms and Mn morc
Adam Pautz for reading this manuscript in its entirety and providing extremely help- l"9lPf“l °°"5“”“C‘lV¢ 5“EEC5Ti°"5v and in man)’ 535“ 5P€“di“E l|°ui’5 and d3Y5 l'|3lPiiiS
ful and incisive feedback. Thanks ANU Philosophy
also to Daniel Stoljar and the ‘"5 Work ‘l“'°“§l" key ld°“5- I “m l”"“‘“5°lY ‘l"3"k[“l f°‘ 3” his l"‘]Pv 35 WE” 35 Fm’
ofMind Work—invProgress Group for reading and discussing several chapters ofthis his ““""3""l“S "‘°”‘1 5“PP°” ‘md "“3°““‘E°m°m-
work and providing extremely helpful feedback. I am also thankful to those who
read and provided helpful comments on ancestors of various chapters, especially
Frankjackson, Gilbert I-larman.]ack\l(/oods, Adam Pautz, Uriah Kriegel, David Pitt,
Philipp Koralus, Jimmy Martin, Paul Benacerraf, Anthony Appiah, Gideon Rosen,
Jeff Speaks, and David Davies.
This book has also benefited from numerous discussions that have helped me see
many issues in a new light. Thank you to Derek Baker, Sam Baker, John Bengson,
Mark Budolfson, David Chalmers, Tim Crane, Kati Farkas, Bill Fish, Tamar
Gendler, Terry Hotgan,]osh Knobe, Dan Korman, Uriah Kriegel,_lohn Maier, Carla
Merino, Matthew Moss, Daniel Nolan, Gurpreet Rattan, Susanna Schellenberg,
Vanessa Schouten, Daniel Stoljanjackie Sullivan, and Bas van Fraassen.
I am especially grateful to my dissertation supervisors, Frank Jackson and Gil
Harman, for encouraging me to write the dissertation I wanted to write, which
formed the basis of this book. and to my undergraduate |’.l'|CSlS supervisor, David
Davies, for encouraging me to write the undergraduate thesis I wanted to write,
which formed the basis ofmy dissertation. I owe special thanks to Jeffspeaks, who
raised an objection to my undergraduate thesis in zoo4 that inspired the views
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Overview
rm: AIM or this book is to defend a radically internalist theory ofintentionality,

the aboutness or directedness of mental states, on which intenrionality is simply
identical to phenomenal consciousness, which is an intrinsic, non-relational feature
ofmental life. This View has been described to me as obviously false, unfashionable.
and flying in the face ofeveryday intuition and cognitive science. It has also been
described to me as trivially true and uninteresting. I aim to defend a version of this
view that is true but not trivial, interesting but not false, and surprisingly conciliatory
with our intuitive and scientific understanding ofthe mind.
My target, inrenrionality, can be understood as the observed "aboutness" or
"directedness" ofrnental states. We inrrospectively notice that many mental states in
some way or other seem to “present,” “represent,” or be “about” things. For example,
you might notice that your current visual experiences represent a page before you,
some marks olivarious shapes and colors, and perhaps the words that these marks
form. You might also notice that your current thoughts represent that there is a page
with marks and words before you, something to do with your own mental states, or
a need for a cup ofcoffee. lnrentionaliry, roughly, is this phenomenon ofaboutncss
or directedness that \ve notice in these and other everyday cases.
My aim is to offer a theory of intentionality, a theory that describes the deep

nature ofintentionality, or, in other words, that tells us what intentionality really
1:, meraphysically speaking. Examples oftheories ofintentionality include tracking
xvi Ouerwzw 01/tri/mu xvii
tn€01'i¢5- On which Ch‘? "‘°5t I335“? kind °f l“["”l°“““‘Y I5 3 “"531 °" °‘h°‘ kmd the functional role theory are false, it does not pinpoint the precise reasons for their
Of tracking relation b€tW“n intetnal t¢Pi'€5°nt3ti°n5 find it5i'n5 in ti“ W°‘ld (5“v failure. Chapter 4 further argues that the fundamental problem with these theories
L"g'Y Dtctsltfi I935 and F0d0t 1937)» and i11nCti°n3l t01¢ th=0ti¢5- 0n which the i'n°5t ' isthat tracking relations and functional roles simply do not have what it takes to give
basic kind of intentionality is a matter of internal states’ functional dispositions ‘ rig: to in(en(ionali(y_
with respect to other internal states and perhaps also with respect to items in the Part III turns to my favored approach to intentionality, the phenomenal inten_
€nVlt°ntn¢nt (5¢5- c-g-. Harman 1937 and Blfidt 1939- tionality theory (PIT), on which the most basic kind of intentionality arises from
This book proposescivery different kind oftheory ofintentionality. the phcnoint ‘ phenomenal consciousness. Chapter 5 of Part III presents and motivates PIT. I
3'13‘ ln"“‘l°n3ll‘Y ‘h9°i'Y (PIT): “'l‘i5}‘ Gk“ tn? ni05t 535“ kind °fin“n‘l‘7n3ll'Y 1 argue that, unlike tracking theories and functional role theories, PIT provides the
to arise from a conceptually distinct mental feature. phenomenal consciousness. right kinds of ingredients to account for intentionality and is not clearly empirically
the felt. subjective. or “what it’s like" (Nagcl I974) aspect of mental life- This and inadequate. I distinguish between diitetcnt versions of PIT, focusing especially on
related views have recently been defended by various authors, including Horgan rny favored vtrsion, strong idgnflty PIT, which, roughly, takes every intentional
and ncnson (mi), tear (zoos). rarkas (mosh, mesa). stnwson (zoos), srewm property .0 be .a....rca .0 some phenomenal property. Chapter 5 of i»... 111
(1993) Montague IZOIO)» l3°“tg¢t (7—°1°1)- M€nd€l0ViCi (1010), Kriegel (2-On) considers and responds to some theoretical worries with PIT, such as that it is not
Pitt (1004, won), Pautz (zoxga), and Mendelovici and Bourget (2.014), and have naturalistic,
hiSt0tiC3l F003 intn‘ ‘Votks Of Bi'¢nt3n0 (1874) and H“55¢t[ (1900) This 5°01‘ Part IV furthersupports I’ITbyconsideringcertain challengingcasesfor the view.
proposesaversion ofPIT that is notonly motivated on in-principle grounds but also in doing so, it Hgshgs out my favored version of strong identity PIT and shows
°’“Pl'l‘31lY3d“l“3‘€ in that it 53" “CC°‘T"n°d3t9 3“ C3555 °fint°ntl°n31l‘Yv ln51"dl“E that it is both interesting and tenable. Chapter 7 of Part IV considers the challenge
those that are commonly thought to pose problems for PIT. raised by the case of thoughts, which appear to be rich in intentional content but
Iproceed as follows: Chapter ofI’art I fixes reference on our target, intentional»
1 Poor in Phgngn-.¢na1 ch3[ac[ef_ 1 afguc that thought; l1av¢ a kind of content that
“Y I “'5'” that While ‘M “°(l°"3 °f3b°“"‘“55 md dl"‘°“d“¢55 B°5“-“’° ‘°“’“d [hi5 does indeed arise from their fairly impoverished phenomenal characters, though this
target» they are too fully to P‘'°Vld‘ "5 with a firm grip on it- propose to replace 1 content is correspondingly impoverished. i further argue that. although thoughts do
these notions with an ostensive reference-fixing definition, which can be contrasted not phcnonicnally reprcsent many of their alleged contents, they do the next best
with other candidate definitions that take intentiomlity to be whatever plays certain thing; tlnty dgyiygtiygly {gPfg5gn( than.‘ Ipfoposg sglf-ascriptivism, 3 view on which
roles. suchas rules in Folk psychological or scientific theories of behavior. roles in we clerivatively represent various contents by ascribing them to ourselves, which is a
securing truth and reference, or simply roles in explaining how we get around in matter of being disposed to have thoughts accepting ourselves or our phenomenal
the Worldt On my approach. li1t€ntl0n3llty' l5 1| ph€n0i'n¢n0n WC 0h5€i'V€ and Want contents as representing these further contents. Although, as I argue, the resulting
to explain, rather than a posit in a theory primarily aimed at explaining something kind of derived mental representation does not qualify as a kind of imemnmalizy, it
else. qualifies as a kind of representation on a broad sense of the term.
ChapterofPart I specifies the kind oftheory ofintentionaliry we are after and
2. Anotl-int important chalkngg for PIT is that of accounting for i-ngntal states
describes two theory-independent ways of knowing about our intentional states: that W; taltt to ha in(gn[ignal but that appaar to havg no phenomenal character,
introspection and consideration of psychological role. Such states include standing states, like beliefs and desires that we are not currently
Part II considers and argues against what I take to be the two main competitors entertaining, as well as occurrent states that we are not aware of, such as noncon-
to my Favored approach to intentionality. tracking and Functional role theories. scious stares involved in language processing, blindsight, and early visual processing.
Cn1Pt¢F 5 Of Pitt H “EH55 thiit tracking tn°°i'l€5 (355 ii tni$tn3t€h Pt0bl5tn= tl'|3i'° Chapter 8 of Part IV addresses these challenges. I argue that standing states are not
are C3595 in Which Ffipfcifint 3 C0nt€nt that d0€S n0t Fnfitch anything WE Can
We genuinely intentional states. However, I also suggest that self-ascriptivism can be
plausibly be said to track, The tracking theory. then, is empirically inadequate, since extended to accommodate standing state contents and perhaps even standing states
it cannot accommodate all the required cases. Chapter 4 of Part II argues that the in their gn(ir([y_
mismatch problem also afllicts the best versions of the functional role theory. Now,
while the mismatch problem shows 1/94! the tracking theory and the best versions of
xviii Overview
Chapter 8 also argues that many nonconscious occurrent states. such as states
involved in early visual processing. are neither intentional not derivatively repv
resentational. While this position might seem fairly extreme, even “flying in the
face of cognitive science," it is arguably very much in line with the standard View
on the matter. It agrees with the standard view that such occuirent states track
or carry information about various items in the environment and play various
functional roles, and it also agrees that they represent various items, if all we mean
by “representation” is something that boils down to tracking, carrying information,
or having a functional role. The key disagreement with the standard view does not
concern nonconscious occurrent states, but rather amseiaus occurrent stares.
Part V, which consists in only one chapter, Chapter 9, turns to the question of
whether intentionality is a relation to distinctly existing entities that play the role of
intentionality of intentional states
I
content or whether, instead, is simply an aspect
or subjects, I argue in favor ofthe latter aspect view ofintentionality. \Vhile it might Intro duction
be thought that the alternative relation View has various virtues that the aspect View
lacks, such as according with common sense, allowing for public contents, helping us
make sense of structured intentional states, and accounting for conditions of truth
and reference, I argue that the aspect view fares no worse than the relation view when
it comes to these alleged virtues.
The main goal of this book is to offer, flesh our, and defend a theory of MY AIM is to provide a theory ofintentionality. Before comparing com-
intentionality, but I mentioned above, Chapter i
it also has a secondary aim. As pmng (hectic: ofimmdonahlyy it is important to fix firmly on our target
will argue that it is possible to get agood grip on the phenomenon ofintentionality and m g“ den on what kind of [hwry W: an art“ Charm‘ I Proposes
without defining it in terms of truth and reference, our abilities to get around in an osmnsivc way Op fixing rcfmmcc on imendomlky whik Chapter I
the world, folk psychology, or the scientific study of the mind. Throughout this Spcdfies what kind of meaty we want and overviews two sources up
book, I return to these alleged roles ofmrcntionality and argue that it turns out that theory-independent knowledge ofintentionality that we can use to test our
most of them are not in fact played by intenrionality itself but by various closely theories: introspection and considerations ofpsychological wk‘
related phenomena: The relevant ability to get around in the world is explained by a
combination offactors, including intentionality and tracking relations; the notions
of representation implicit in folk psychology don't correspond to intentionality but
to some combination of intentionality and derived representation; conditions of
truth and reference might end up requiring something more than merely having
intentional states, like a primitive correspondence relation or our specifications of
how we'd like to be interpreted; and the notions of representation invoked in the
mind-brain sciences are often a matter of tracking relations and functional roles.
The concluding chapter, Chapter io, returns to the alleged roles of intentionality
and summarizes these findings. The end result is a picture on which intentionalitv,
as picked out ostensively, is a matter of phenomenal consciousness, and the various
other roles intenrionality is sometimes thought to play are in fact often played by
distinct, although sometimes closely related, phenomena.
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1 Fixing Reference on Intentionaiity
THE AIM or this book is to provide a theory ofintentiomlity. The aim of this
chapter is to clarifyjust what a theory ofintentionality is a [h:O|'yMl[ is important to
get clear on this before we start. A theory ofintentionality is a theory that tells us that
intenrionality has a particular nature, but if it is unclear just what "intentionality"
refers to, then it is unclear what it is that such a theory says has that nature.
it ostensively using introspectively
I propose to get clear on our target by defining
accessible paradigm cases. My ostensive definition can be contrasted with alternative
definitions that may or may not end up picking out the same thing. I will suggest
that the ostensive definition does a better job ofcapturing the core notion we are
interested in. But first, I will say something about why common characterizations
ofintentionality in terms offiboutness" and “direcredness,” though they succeed
in gesturing toward our target, do not provide a satisfactory way of fixing firmly
upon it.
1.1 Aboutness and Directedness
lntentionality is sometimes characterized, at least as a first pass, as the "aboutness" or

"directedness" ofmental states (and perhaps other items) to things that may or may
3
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6 Part I: lnrradumon Chopin 1: I~‘ixmg Refmnre an Inrennpndttry 7
diey are “about" our experiences, that they “say” that I am pointing out the obvious. The ostensive definition arguably both does justice to the intuition behind
etc.’ the characterization of intentionality in terms of "aboutness" and “directedness"
The above examples show that we have mental states that have a certain feature and is an improvement over a definition of "intentionality" in terms of this
that we at least sometimes introspeetively notice and are tempted to describe characterization. If I am right, “aboutness" talk aims to characterize a phenomenon
using representational terms, such as “about," “of? “represent,” “present." and “saying that we have an antecedent grasp My ostensive definition picks out precisely
on.
something." T/mt feature, whatever it is, is intentionality. that phenomenon. so intuition behind characterizations of
it does justice to the
We can put things more precisely as follows: Call the mundane, everyday cases intentionality in terms of "abourness" and “directedness." lt offers an improvement
such as those described above our paradigm cases of intentionality. These are the over a definition of “intentionality” in terms of such characterizations, since it fixes
cases that will fon-n our initial sample of cases of intentionality for the purposes of firmly on our target. Unlike a definition of“intentionality" simply as aboutness or
our ostensive definition. Then we can fix reference on our target as follows: directedness, it avoids being fuzzy or metaphorical, since it merely moztiam our fuzzy
and metaphorical representational terms rather than use them. (Ofcourse, it uses the
intentionality The feature that in paradigm cases we sometimes both (i) notice term “representational term." but this is a term picltingout a class ofterms rather than
introspectively in ourselves and (ii) are tempted to describe using representa- a representational term itself.)’
tional terms, such as “about.” “of? “represent," “present,” or "saying something." We can use this ostensive definition of “intentionality” to define some related
notions: Intentional properties are ways things are or might be with respect to their
It is important to emphasize that the feature picked out by my definition is intentionality, or intentional ways things are or might be, and intentional states are
the feature of paradigm cases that we at least sometimes bath introspectively insrantiations of intentional properties. As I am using the terms. intentional states
notice and are tempted to describe representarionally. This allows that there are are not the same thing as intentional mental states, which are mental states that
features of paradigm
that we either introspectively notice ar are tempted to
cases include, but may not be exhausted by. the instantiation of intentional properties.
describe representationally, but not both, and that do not qualify as intentional. For For example, a judgment that grass is green might involve the instantiation of the
example. die definition does not by itselfrule out the view that paradigm cases have intentional property of representing that grass is green together with a particular
introspectively accessible phenomenal features that are distinct from intentionality. non-intentional ‘judgment’ component. So, it is an intentional mental state but not
It is also important to emphasize that, although we are using introspection to fix an intentional state,‘
reference on intentionality, the ostensive definition does not rule out the possibility What intentional properties and intentional stares “say” or are “directed at" are
of instances of intentionality that are not inrtospectively accessible, or even instances their intentional contents. More precisely. we can think of intentional content as
of intentionality that are not mental. Such cases would not be paradigm cases of
intentionality, but they would nonetheless be cases of intentionality so long as
they had the relevant feature exemplified by paradigm cases, For example. as far
One might object that “abo|Itness" taut gestures at ttrattntt rather than at the ostensively defined
as my definition is concerned, it could turn out that nonconscious beliefs and ‘
phenomenon (but set can: 1oi;.pp.l-9.{or I convincing argument against this), arm all. one might
the nonconscious states posited by cognitive science, which. presumably. are not a.rgI|e,we sometimes say that mental Stiles that fail to Rftr, like I thought that santa Claus exists. lire
introspectively accessible, are instances of intentionality. For the same reasons, the not teany about anything at all.
Now, We might agree that "aboiItness" taut is sometimes used to pick out reference but disagree that
ostensive definition does not rule out the possibility of instances oi intentionality
this means that 'abontness' taut, when uted to rhnrnererize intentionality. gostutos at reference. since
that we are not tempted to describe representationally. For example, it does not rule whatever "aboutrIexs" taut .5 supposed to gesture at is normally taiten to include mental States in which
out the possibility of moods and afterimages being instances ofintentionality. even (her! is a failure ofreference. suth as the thought that santo Claus exists. in any cost. il"‘aboIIzness"
taut X5 notmauy used to pick out reference, this only rntthet tuppont my claim that Chzlactetilauons of
though we (arguably) are not tempted to describe them representationally,
intentionality in terms of"-’Ibt)u!|'iess" would not provide an adequate definition t1fintcntionalil'y.Spenlt§
(zoiob) makes a sinular point, arguing (hill rot xucll reasons the "cluractenlat ion or intentionality is
aboiltness is only true to a rim approximation” (p. nu).
’ I take the category or thoughts ta intiud: fittuflent beliefs. aecurrent desirel. and othot oteuttent The term "Intentional state" is often used [0 mean what 1 mean by "intentional mental stator i dovtatt
“cognmve" states but not standing beliefs, standing desires. 0|’ othtt standing lta(¢$. set 9.4.1. from that usage because my discussion focuses on instanrianons ormtontionai properties. to it is useful
‘ Definitions ofkey tttms can he found in the glossary on p. :49. rot me to reserve the term nnttntionai stator rot them.
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8 Pan l.- lnrradiimnri Chap!!!‘ 1: Fixing Reference an lflltllliflfldlilj 9
follows: When we introspe ' notice intentional states, we notice the general 1 3 Other Ways of Fixing Reference
phenomenon that we are tempted to describe as “directedness" or “saying some-
thing.‘ But we also notice something we are tempted to describe as what our mental I have recommended an osrensive way of fixing firmly upon the phenomenon that
states are "directed at" or what they “say"- this is their (intentional) content.’ When the fuzzy and metaphoric ' notions of aboutness and directedness merely gesture
a state. property, or other item has a certain intentional content. we can say that it toward. This section considers some alternative ways of defining “intentionality”
(intentionally) represents that content.‘ For example. the judgment that grass is and shows that they might not pick out the same thing as the ostensive ‘
green represents the content <grass is green>.' (§§i.;.t— 1.3.4). It then argues that ifwhat we are interested in is the , ‘ enon that
It is worth emphasizing that my starting point is fairly iiuncommittal in that ‘aboutness" talk gestures at, the ostensive ‘ ‘ is preferable to these alternatives
my definition of "intentionality" and the introspective observations it is based (§L3ts)-
on do not ptejudge questions concerning the nature of intentionality. As far as
they are concerned, inrentionality might end up being a causal or other tracking
relation, a matter of the functional roles of internal states. or a matter of phenomenal l.].| FOLK PSVCHOLUGY
consciousness. My starting point is neutral on these and other possible views of
One approach to intentionality defines it in terms of its role in a third-personal folk
intentionality. Likewise. my starting point does not preiudge questions concerning
psychological. or common sense. theory of mind and behavior. We attribute beliefs.
the nature of contents. Contents might turn out to be ordinary objects and proper-
desires. and other mental states to each other, and we take these states to be related
ties, propositions. facts. sense data, ideas in a world of forms. ways of representing,
to one another in various ways and to have various other features. A definition of
properties of intentional states, or even intentional states or properties themselves.
“intentionality" in terms of folk psychology taltes intentionali to be whatever plays
Relatedly, my starting point does not prejudge any issues regarding the vehicles
a particular role in such a folk psychological theory."
of intentionalit . which are the bearers of intentional properties. The vehicles of Such a definition might not piclt out the salne thing as the ostensive ’ ' ' .
inrentionality could turn out to be. for example. subjects, symbols in a language of
For instance. it could turn out that what the ostensive definition picks out lacks
thought. brain states, internal states, or immaterial souls.
some of the extra features attributed to it by folk psychology. If these features are
For simplicity, however, I will assume that the vehicles of intentionality are
considered crucial by folk psychology, then the folk psychological notion will not
internal items that I will call (mental) representations. Since different intentional
pick out the ostensively defined phenomenon. For example. it could turn out that
states involve different vehicles of representation. this way of speaking allows us to
the ostensivel defined phenomenon does not play certain causal roles considered
talk about inten ‘states while remaining nonconimittal on their contents. which
crucial by folk psychology.
'
is useful when the content of a particular intentional state is under dispute.“ The folk psychological ’ might also pick
and the ostensive ’ ’
out different things if the folk p y ‘ ‘ definition fails to pick out anything
at all. Suppose that folk , ' fly is hopelessly false. Then its theoretical terms,
" whcn we inttospcctivcly notice intcntionality. we do so at least in patt by inttotptctivcly noticing out in “' 5 those putatively referring to intentional states. will fail to refer, and it will
sonttiitt. iiidctd. it ought be that thttc is nothing inotc to notice when wt notice inttntionality than
thcsc intcntioiial coiitcnts
turn out that what it calls“inrentionality" does not exist." But the ostensively defined
' l wcptttcnt" nioit broadly to describe tcptcscntation-liltc phciaoiaiena that an not
toititni-iics utc
instantts ofinlcnrionality, but contttt should disainbiguatc. The altttnativc would be to use a special
tttni. like "intcnd: rot having an Intentional conttnt. but this would be too swltwatd.
‘ coiittnts niightintludc propositionalconrenmlilte tgtass Isgreen), but niight alsoinelude ptoptictal tional capacities via tlicit alleged vehicles. However. this assumption. along with tlic assumption that
ot obyecnlal tontciits. like (green) and (George) (St! Montaguc 2007, otunkowslti ton, and vehicles ait iiitsnial iitins. tan bt discharged by replacing tlll( otnicntal tcpttscntations the niott
Mendelovicl aois. Ms). (1-ht notions of obyecrual and piopnctal contcnts stt something like ctanc‘s awkward talk nrinitntional capatititt and amending my discussion apprnpnzrely. See Ryder too; to.
(son) notions orconttnts and objects. tcsptcnvtlv. though not cquivaltnt.) a uscrul overview ordiltticni views nrthc icpisscntations.
"‘ in what rollowt. I will also Wm es assunic sonitt ng like a languagc orthouglit View (rodot I975). stt Sellnts l9§5. Lewis im. ataddonmitclicll and iacltion K996. and Fodor I937 tot this way offixing
on which thcit at. subptopotitional vehicles Ofrepresenratian, like IE1: and CAT. which come togcthct ttrtttntc on intcntionality.
to tonstinitt con-iplct vthiclts ortcpicscntaiion ttptcstnting coitiplct contcnts. Apart rtont I thinlt. " Paul and ratticia Chnreliland argue that folk psychology is false and hence that its posits rail to tcrtt
btiiig latgcly cottcct. this assumption provides a uscrul way ortallting about out patticulai icpttscnta. (ice. t.g.. Churchland iosi). lrthcy atc tight. and irwc takc intentionality to be inctcly a posit in rout
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to Part I: Inmzdurziim Chapter 1: I-'ixz‘ngRgfermc: an Irltmtiolmlitj ll
phenomenon might still exist. 50, the folk psychological notion might fail to pick It could also turn out that the two ways of defining “intentionality" do not pick out
out the same thing as the ostensive definition. the same thing because the definition based on the mind~brain sciences does not pick
out anything at all. Perhaps the best understanding of talk of representation in the
mind-brain sciences takes representational notions to be merely a dispensable fiction
ma. THE MlNl)»BRAlN SCIENCES (see Egan zoro). Then the mincl«btain sciences do not really posit representational
states after all. Another possibility is that they do posit representational states, but
Another approach to intentionality takes it to be a posit in scientific approaches
nothing plays the roles they are defined in terms of, so the notions of intentionality
to the mind and brain. For instance, some approaches in cognitive science aim to
based on the mind~brain sciences fail to refel: Again, this shows that this way of
explain mental processes and behavior in terms of operations over internal states that
defining “intentionality" might pick out the same thing as the ostensive way.
not
ate described as carrying information or “representing” various contents, and it is
not uncommon for neuroscientific theories to speak of neural structures as carrying
information about or "representing" their causes. A suggestion for an alternative way i.;.5 GETTING AROUND IN THE WORLD
ofpicking out our target, then, takes intentionality to be a posit in the l'nind—brain
For the most part, we manage to acquire the things we need, avoid the things that
sciences."
are harmful to us, perform sophisticated actions involving multiple steps, and, more
There are interesting questions in die philosophy of science surrounding the
generally, get around in the world fairly successfully. It is quite plausible that we
notions of representation operative in various disciplines and research programs.
do this by means of internal representations of the world. Inspired by this way of
What are these notions of representation? What roles do they play? Do different
thinking. we might take intentionality to be whatever explains successful behavior
research programs use the same notion of representation? Sotne philosophers
in the relevant way,“
explicitly claim to be trying to answer these types of questions and not the types
Behavioral phenomena such as those listed above call out for explanation, and it
ofqtlestions I'm concerned with.“
may very well be that the phenomenon we fixed on with our ostensive definition is a
It could turn out that this approach picks out the same thing as the phenomenon crucial part of this explanation. What is less clear is exactly what role the ostensively
we noticed introspectively in ourselves. But it also might turn out that the best
defined phenomenon plays. Vehicles of intentionality might have properties apart
elucidation: of the notions implicit in the mind-brain sciences pick out different
from intentional properties, such as syntactic, neural, or other broadly physical or
features of internal states than the one we ostensively picked out through introspec-
functional properties.“ It could turn out, then, that intentionality itself is causally
tive observation. One prima facie reason to think this might be the case is that it
impotent and it's these other properties of vehicles of intentionality—say, their
makes sense to ascribe at least some of the kinds of representational states operative syntactic properties—that are responsible for their usefulness in helping us get
in the mind—brain sciences to artifacts that we might not really believe to have
around in the world. If this (unhappy) situation were the case, an explanation of
genuine intentional powers, such as calculators and computers. This suggests that, at
successful behavior might not involve the ostensively defined phenomenon, and so
best. the ostensively defined phenomenon is a species ofwhatever representational
the approach to defining ‘intentionality" based on getting around in the world might
phenomenon is picked out by the mind-brain sciences. At worst, it is something else
fix reference on something other than what the ostensive definition picks out.
entirely.
The two definitions might also fail to pick out the same thing in skeptical scenarios
in which we do not in fact lnanage to acquire the things we need, avoid the things
that are harmful to us, or generally manage to get around in the world successfully,
psychology. then it will turn out that there is no Intentionality. (Note that the Churchlands do not think perhaps because we are brains in vats or dreaming, disembodied souls. In such
theta 2!! no intentional states ofany sort: set: Churehland 1939b.)
“ Sec. c.g.. Fodor i957. Millikan wk. and Cumtnlns i994. Note that Fodor takes intlzntionallty to be a
posit In computational cognitive science, as well is n posit in folk psychology; on i115 view, cognitive
science and folk psychology paint to the same thing. " Versions oftllis approach might also be versions of the approaches based on folk psychology or thc
“ Cummlns (too... pp. 2.7Ev-2.79), for instance. specifically claims (0 be describing a nation or rcpt!‘- mind-brzln scicnccsassciihca earlier.
sentatlon that IS useful for computational theories ofcognltlon but not necessarily (oi the kinds of “ See also Dretske's distinction between representational facts and more facts about representations
representation implicit in folk psychology. (-995. p- 3)-
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scenarios, the definition based on getting around in the world would fail to For of truth and reference in terms of causation (or other relations). it could turn out
reference on anything. since nothing in fact helps us get by in the world in the way that the second part of the story is secured by the fitst part. that the nature of sense
required. but the ostensive definition would not fail to refer. data and our relation to them makes it the case that intentional states refer to certain
items in certain conditions. But it could also turn out that the first part ofthe story
leaves open whether and how sense data. and hence intentionality, is c nected to
t.;.+ TRUTH AND R£rER£Nct—:
the world through reference. On such a theory, perceptual intentionality alone might
If mental states “say something.‘ then it seems to follow that what they say can not automatic " give rise to condi ons of ’ .
be either true or false. and if mental states are "of" or “about” something. then it Something similar might be true of other pictures of intentionality. Consider a
seems to follow that they can either refer or fail to refer to whatever they’re “of” or Frege—inspired picture on which intentionality is a matter of being appropriately
“about.” So. perhaps we can use the notions of truth and reference to fix on our target. related to abstract senses, while tmth and reference are a matter of how senses
One such approach takes intentionality to be the having of conditions of truth or connect with the world, Depending on how we characterize senses, their connecting
reference, while another takes intentionality to be that which gives rise to the having with the world might not occur automatically but might instead require an extra in—
of conditions of truth and reference.“ gredient, a “satisfaction” relation or some such. So, if truth and reference require the
This approach is certainly attractive. It promises to provide a substantive charac- ' defined _ " in ' with “' Delse.a ‘
' '
terization ofintentionality, defining it in terms of one of its apparently key features, of"inrentionality" in ren'ns ofconditions of truth and reference or what gives rise to
and it does justice to the intuitive idea that intentionality serves to connect us to the them will pick out this combined phenomenon rather than the ostensively defined
external world, the world outside the mind. It also does justice to the idea that, at phenomenon alone.
least when they are successful. there is some existing thing that intentional states are Relatedly. the definition in tenns of truth and reference would fail to pick out
in some sense directed at or about. The approach also seems fairly unobjectionable. the ostensively defined phenomenon if it fails to refer because having conditions
It certainly seems that intentional states have conditions oftruth and reference, that of truth and reference requires something in addition to the ostensively defined
what we think can be true or false, and that an object we represent can exist or fail phenomenon and our mental states exhibit the ostensively defined phenomenon
to exist. The claim that intentional states have dirions of truth and reference is but lack the additional ingredients. In such a case, there would be no such things
quite uncontroversial. as conditions of truth and reference, and so there would be nothing answering to the
But. like the other ' e definitions of “intentionalit
' considered above,
” definition of "ty" in temts of truth and reference. But there would still
“'
definitions in terms of truth and reference might fail to pick out the phenomenon be something answering to the ostensive definition.
picked out by the ostensive definition. They would fail to pick out the ostensively
defined phenomenon if intentionality did not atically connect us to the world
1.3.; WHY WE SHOULD PREFER THE OSTENSIVE DEFINITION
without the help of additional ingredients, Consider. for the sake of illustration.
a sense data theory of perceptual intentionality (a view, of course. which has few I have outlined various alternatives to the ostensive definition of ‘intentionality’
contemporary adherents"). On of characterizing such a theory, it can
one way and argued that these definitions might pick out something other than
' ‘ e
be divided into two main claims: First, perceptual intentionality is a relation of the ostensively defined phenomenon. Now. of course. there is no arguing over
awareness to sense data. Second, sense data refer to whatever external items cause de ‘ ’ . Different definitions of "intentionality" might pick out different things.
them (or bear some other special relation to them). The first claim olfets a story of and we are free to theorize about any of them. However. I want that if we
to suggest
perceptual intentionality in terms of sense data. while the second claim offers a story are ' ’ in the A L gestured at by " ‘ " and " “ ’ ess" talk,
we should prefer my fairly minimal ostensive definition. As we've seen. alternative
de ' ‘ of “intentionality” build in assumptions about their target that are not
See. e.g.. Siewert -992. Chalmers :oo4. Siegel zoto. and Byrne 2.009 for understandings ofintenrionah
‘
present in the ostensive definition. This leaves someone who adopts these alternative
my based on mm. reference. or are closely related notion ofaceuracy.
in the aoog PhilPapers Surveys, only we ofrespondenrs at leading English-speaking universities
definitions vulnerable to eliminativist threats: If there is nothing that satisfies
reported holding . sense am theory (Bouxget and Chalmers XOI4). the additional assumptions. then there is no intentionality, in their sense. But, I
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[4 Part I: Irmndumnn Chapter 1: F1xirlgRefirtn£e lm Irizmtramzltty 15
want to suggest, the phenomenon gestured at by “aboutness" and “directedness” the nature of the ostensively defined I henomenon to be M. The two theorists take
talk is not vulnerable to eliminativism in the same way. which suggests that the diiferent phenomena to have different natures.
extra assumptions that are built into the alternative definitions are substantive However, it seems to me that in the case of many debates on intentionality,
claims about, rather than defining features of, the phenomen we gesture at with there ofien is a real disagreement between L peting theories that employ dif—
“aboutness” and “directedness" talk. Ifthis is right, then there is reason to prefer my ferent definitions of “intentionality." Many theorists who define “intentionality“
fairly ’ ' ostensive ‘ ' ‘ .
in alternative ways still intend their theories to account for the phenomenon
Here is a thought experiment that supports this poin . Suppose that folk psy- that we introspectively observe and are tempted to describe representationally, the
chology is horribly mistaken, the mind—brain sciences have no need for a notion phenomenon gestured at by "aboutness" talk. For example, although Dretske (1995)
of content at all, and, relatedly, our best account of ho\v we successfully get by in does not employ an ostensive definition of his target, he states that his tracking
the world doesn't either. Suppose further that there is no determinate fact about theory covers anything answering to the term “intentionality":
how mental states are supposed to correspond to the world, and so there are
no such things as truth and reference, On this scenario, none of the alternative Brentano (I874) conjectured that a mark ofthe mental was intentional-
ways of defining “inrentionality” manage to pick out anything at all. Still. on this ity. Whatever, exactly, Brentano meant by intentionality, and whether
scenario, we might introspect and notice paradigm cases ofintentionality. We might or not he was right about its being a feature of all, and only, mental
notice perceptual experiences and thoughts that seem to be “about” or “directed” events, most philosophers take intentional characteristics (variously
at something or that seem to “say something.” And we might want to know how understood) to be distinctive ofa great many mental phenomena. What
this “aboutness” arises. This curiosity would not be misdirected. a mere result ofour follows is a brief catalog of those aspects of intentionality that have
ignorance that the alternative definitions fail to refer, Even if we knew that nothing, figured prominently in the recent literature. In each case we
most
not even paradigm cases, had the features invoked by the alternative definitions. find that a of the mind provides a satisfying
representational account
we would still be left with the question of how thoughts and experiences get to explanation ofintentionality. (Dretske r995, p. 2.8)
have the features we are tempted to describe using representational vocabulary like
The aspects of intentionality that Dretske claims to accommodate are the power to
“aboutness" and “directedness." What this shows is that observation of paradigm
misrepresent, aboutness. aspectual shape (roughly, our ability to represent things in
cases by itself gives rise to curiosity about “aboutness” and “directedness," which
different ways), and directedness (pp. 28-34). In effect, Dretske claims that all there
suggests that my ostensive definition best captures the notion of intentionality that
is to any kind ofintention-ality—like phenomenon we have any reason to believe in is
such talk gestures at.
captured by his account. So, even though he does not define “intentionality” in my
ostensive way, at least part of what he aims to account for is the ostensively defined
phenomenon, the phenomenon gestured at by "aboutness" talk.”
1.4 Worries with the Ostensive Definition Further reason to think that many theorists who define “intentionality" in
one of the I reject aim to be targeting a phenomenon that at least includes
ways
1 now turn to some potential worries one might have with the ostensive ‘ ’
die ostensively defined phenomenon is that they often use what appear to be
of intentionality. introspectively accessible paradigm cases to illustrate their claims, such as judgments
concerning barnyard animals and hallucinations of pink rats and daggers. Although
there could be intentional states that are not introspectively accessible with such
1.4.1 ARE WE TALKING PAST EACH OTHER?
contents, the examples are usually nosed to be of the kinds of states that are or at
When different theorists pick out their topic ofinterest in different ways. there is a least could be introspectively accessible.” This appeal to introspectible cases suggests
danger that they end up talking past one another. Suppose that the folk psycholog-
ically defined phenomenon is distinct from the ostensively defined phenomenon,
" Similarly, Fodor (($90) explicitly mm that his theory Solvls “fitenianols prolileiii" (pp. is7—iii).
It seems that there is no real disagreement to be had between someone who takes
"’ This is especially Clear iii discussions ofthe disiiiiicriaii ptflblcm, wliicli partly rely on iririiiriciis about
the nature of the folk psychological phenomenon to be N and someone who takes what is represented iii possible cases (e Baker I989 and Fador X990). If rliisc iiiriiiripiis arcirr
16 Part I: Inrrnduttnm (ilmprzr 1: Fixing Rrfrrtm 2 an Irilermnmz/II)’ t7
that whatever else theorists who fix reference on their target in ways other than my my ostensive definition that it keeps the clearly intentional inttospectivcly accessible
own are trying to do, they are also often trying to explain intentionality in my sense. feature of mental states separate from whatever it is that the proposed additional
paradigms have, In any case, the terminological difference between me and someone
L41 STANDING STATES who adopts an ostensive definition ' luding standing states as paradigms does not
make a substantive difference in what follows: Although my target is intentionality,
One might agree with my suggestion of defining y” ostensively but
“' '
in mysense, I also offer an account ofstanding states, as well as other alleged instances
find my choice of paradigms overly restrictive. All my paradigm cases are current of intentionality (see Part IV). The overall story offered would be the same whether
states, mental states that are used. entertained, or otherwise active at the time at or not we include standing states in out paradigm cases, though it would be stated
which they are had, such as judgments and perceptual states. But we might also want diiferentli/i
to include in our stock of paradigms some standing states, mental states that need
not be used. entertained, or otherwise active at the time at which they are had, such
t..¢..; PERCEPTION Am.) THOUGHT
as beliefs and desires that one is not currently entertaining. For example, the belief
you had five minutes ago that the Acropolis is in Athens is a standing state, and one The ostensive definition fixes on our target by pointing to several of its instances,
might suggest that it is a prime example ofintentionality." including instances in perception and instances in thought‘ But one might worry
My for not including standing states in my stock of paradigm cases is
reason that these instances do not belong to a unified natural kind. Perhaps we end up
that we do not have the same kind of introspective access to them as we do picking out a disjunctive kind, consisting of two distinct natural kinds. This might
to introspectivcly accessible occurrcnt states. While we can simply observe the be the case if perceptual states are importantly different from "cognitive" states such
intentionality ofmy r f “ paradigm cases, we cannot observe our standing states as thoughts, and so might call “perceptual intentionality" is not the same
what we
or their features. Instead. we infer that we have standing states, perhaps on the basis kind of thing as what we might call “cognitive intentionality." ifthis is the case. then
of our noticing that we sometimes have corresponding occurrent states or on the my paradigm cases are actually instances of two different kinds of phenomena, which
basis ofa folk psychological theory of mind and behavior. These ways of knowing i am mistakenly lumping together.
about standing states are relatively indirect compared to our ways of accessing my Of course, when we use multiple examples in an ostensive definition, there is
preferred paradigm cases, and, relatedly. their existence is less certain for us than that always a risk that they are very different in their natures and we end up picking
of my inrrospectively accessible paradigm cases. In short, then, we have an especially out a disjunctive kind. One response to this sort of worry is that this scenario is
secure epistemi introspectively accessible cases of intentionality, one that
access to unlikely. While it remains a possibility that I've picked out a disjunctive kind, it at
we do not have to standing states, which is why I do not include standing states in least initially seems that the observations concerning thought and those concerning
my paradigm cases. perception are similar in important ways. Both thought and perception are readily
Notice also that if, as the objector is likely to hold, the proposed additional described as “saying something" or being “directed at” something. And both in»
paradigms have the feature that we notice in my paradigm cases, then my choice to tentionality in , and intentionality in thought seem fairly distant from
not include them has no EECCI: My ostensive definition will cover them as well, and other kinds of phenomena, such as reflexive behaviors and the automatic control of
including them in our initial stock is unnecessary. We end up picking out the same vital functions. Their similarity to one another and distance from other phenomena
thing either way. suggest that there is an interesting natural kind that they both belong to.“
Excluding standing states only has an effect on what we end up picking out if A second response [0 this worry is that even if it turns out that perceptual
the proposed additional paradigms either do not exist or do not have the feature intentionality and cognitive intentionality are very diiferent phenomena that do
picked out by my osrensive definition. But, in such cases, it is arguably a virtue of
Ofcoutse. even tfintentionzlity ts n Ilnlfild natural kind. perceptual teptesentstton and teprtszntatlon
supposed to be inlultlflns about the kintb otcantents that a subytcl might notice tn herself, then its in '
, ‘ 5| t. ’
natural kinds. 1-» A myclzims
not clear where they at: supposed to cutnt rtont and why Wt sllollld put any Wtlgllt on them. hm. Since the tssut ts om Wl\eKl1ct intentionality ts . unified natural kind, not whether it has various
“ Thanks David Eaurgtt and Tim Bayne tot pressing tn: on this Worry.
(0 dISKllItt5ubl(iI1d$.
https://wvvw.qoppa.com/pdfstudio
is P/I7‘! I: lrltradurrilm C/mpltr 1: Flxlrlg Rrfmmr nn Intcrtmmdllly 19
not form a unified natural kind, this is not a problem, since my starting point includes both raw matter and interpretations, whereas we should only include
will not steer us too far in the wrong direction. Assuming our target is whatever interpretations.“
“aboutncss" and “directedness” talk gesture toward, the problem with approaches However, if the above view is correct. then it is not in fact the case that my
to fixing reference on our target that I want to reject is that they risk missing our approach is too permissive. My observations pick out intentional states, states that
target entirely. For example, defining our target as an explanatory posit in a theory “say” something, not non-' ' components or contributors to those states.
of behavior rislts missing our target if intentionality does not play the requisite role And so, my way of picking out the phenomenon of intentionality isn't meant to
in generating behavior. If nothing plays the requisite role (say, because the relevant if there were such a thing.
and wouldn't in fact pick out unintcrpreted raw matter.
parts of the theory are false). then it will turn out that there is no intentionality. If Instead, my method would pick out interpreted raw matter. or interpretations. It
something plays this role. but it is not whatever "aboutness" and " ‘ ess” talk “ might then turn out that sotne of our allegedly perceptual paradigm states are not
gesture toward, then will turn out that there is intentionality, but that it‘s not the mere perceptual states but instead thoughts or combinations of perceptual states
same thing as our targeted phenomenon. In Contrast, picking out a disjunctive kind and thoughts. If the above view is in fact correct, then, ultimately, a complete
does not carrywith it the risk of missing our target. Perhaps perceptual intentionality theory of intentionality should isolate the components of interpreted raw matter and
and cognitive intentionality are two entirely different kinds of things. Then we distinguish their contributions to intentionaliry. Note that nothing in my ostensive
would need two distinct, and perhaps unrelated. theories to explain them, and if definition rules out such a view from the get-go.
we start of? thinking of perceptual intentionality and cognitive intentionality as
relevantly similar. then it might take longer to reach such a conclusion. However.
such a conclusion has not been ruled out from the start because nothing in the way 1.5 Conclusion
we fixed intentionality requires that it be a unified phenomenon.“
on
The central aim ofthis book is to offer a theory of’ , the phenomenon
we at least sometilncs notice ' pectively in ourselves and are tempted to
[.44 PERCEPTUAL STATES l)0N.T HAVE CONTENTS describe using representational terms, and which, I've suggested, is the phenomenon
One might object that perceptual states don’t have contents, at least not prior to
that “aboutness" talk gestures at. This book develops a theory of this ostcnsively
defined phenomenon in terms ofa eptually distinct mental feature, phenomenal
an act of “interpretation.” For example, one might argue that the visual experience
consciousness, the “what it’s like" of mental states.
one enjoys when one views ti red ball is neutral between multiple external-world
possibilities, such as that there is a red ball in normal lighting conditions, that there is
This book also has a secondary aim. This chapter considered and rejected
alternative ways of fixing reference on intentionali via some of its alleged additional
a white ball lit by red light, etc. The experience does not by itself“say" which ofrhese
possibilities is the case, so it does not represent the ball as being any particular color
roles. Thus far, I have argued that intentionality might not play these roles. A
at all. Instead, a further state, such as a judgment, ' the perceptual state and
secondary line of argument in this book argues that intentionality alone in fact
I’
commits us to one or another possibi ty. On this view, there is a distinction between
due: no: play many of these roles. Many of them are played by something else. In
-intentional mental features of some , , ' experien , which we m ght Chapter 3, I argue that a crucial part of a story of how representations contribute to
successful behavior must invoke non-i ‘ features of representation namely,
call their “raw matter,” and further states that interpret them.
,
or “interpretations."
their tracking relations to external items. In Chapter 8. I argue that folk psychological
Interpretations are intentional, but mere raw matter is not. One might object
notions of content most closely c to a combination of intentional content
that if this view is correct, then my ostensive ’ ‘ is too permissive: it J
and derived mental representational content. In Chapter 8, I also argue that
the kinds of representation implicit in the mind-brain sciences are distinct from
" Ofcourle. whatever mm apparent I perceptual - and cognitive -
" y and that nonconscious occurrent states might satisfy these notions of
also seem qllflt diflerenr in certain respects. For instance. perceptual intentlonallty I! more vivid.
detailed. and closely related to phenomenology than mag... veintentlonality.I-1venrually.Iwlllofl’et a
3: ... ~ ‘ ...... . ppm ..
.' A t ' ' -
in perception ml in thought Chapter 7).
(see especially “ 'I'\tavis(;oo4)pre1ents (I View along time lines.
https:l/www.qoppa.comIpdfstudio
2.0 Part I: Intmduzrmn
representation but lack ' tionality, Chapter 9 argues that it is not even clear that
intentionality gives us conditions of truth and reference without the help of further
ingredients.
On the resulting picture, then, intcntionality is a matter of phenomenal conscious-
ness. and many of the other roles that are sometimes used to pick it out are in fact
played by something else.
y 2 Goals and Methodology
THE PREVIOUS cHAi='n-:RfixerI on our target, intentionality. This chapter consid-
ers what exactly we want to know about intentionality and some methods that can
help us come to know it. In §2..t, I consider what it would take to provide a theory
ofintentionality and the goals around which I will structure most of my discussion.
In §1..2, I suggest two theory-independent ways in which we can know about our
intentional states, which can be used to test competing theories ofintcntionality:
introspection and considerations ofpsychological role.
2.1 What is a Theory of Intentionality?
A theory of intentionality is a theory that describes the deep nature of inten-
tionality. where intentIon:iIity's (deep) nature is what it really is, metaphysically
speaking. For example, a theory ofintentionality might tell us that intentionality is a
tracking relation, a relation ofisomorphism between a Functionally defined system of
representations and abstract propositions. a primitive relation to properties. objects.
and facts, or an adverbial modification ofsubjectsi
My aim is to provide a theory ofintentionality that specifies the nature ofnll actual
and possible intentional states. But I will structure much of my discussion around a
zt
11 P47! I: Immiurrzun Chapter 2: Gaul: and Mzrbndalogy 2;
less ambitious goal. that of providing a theory that specifies what give: rise to actual intentionality, or derivatively intentional ways things are or might be. A derivarively
instances oforigirml intentionality. Let me explain these three italicized terms: intentional state is an instantiation ofa derivatively intentional property, and we
can say that something derivatively (intentionally) represents a content when it
Arising
instantiates a derivatively intentional property representing that content.
A gives rise to B (or, equivalently, B arises from A) when E is nothing over and
Note that although it is often thought that the line between original and
above A, e.g., because B is identical to, fully grounded in, constituted by, or realized
derived intentionality is to be drawn between mental instances ofintenrionality and
by A. A theory that tells us what gives rise to intentionality tells us what exactly
non»mental instances, there can also be mental cases of derived intentionality. Bour-
intentionality amounts to, though it might remain neutral on how exactly that ger one important early development of this idea, providing a wide
(zoioa) oflers
thing gets to amount to intentionality. For example, a theory ofintentionality might range of examples of derived mental intentionality. We will soon see that derived
claim that intentionality arises from tracking relations obtaining between internal
mental intentionality plays a role in most versions of the phenomenal intentionality
states and items in the environment, though it might remain neutral on whether theory, the view diat l will eventually defend. But it is also true of many alternative
intentionality is identical to this tracking relation, grounded in it, or arises from it in
views that accept a language of thought-like picture on which internally unstructured
some other way
representation representations that do not contain other representation
, as proper
parts, come together to form internally structured representations whose contents
Actual and Pnsrilzle Instances tIfIr1IenIirIr1a1it_y
are determined by their representation and the ways they are combined.
Actual, as opposed to merely possible, intentional states are intentional states
As Bourget (zoroa) notes. one natural way of understanding this idea taltes the
existing in the actual world. A theory ofintentionality might account for all actual
intentionality of internally structured representations to be derived from their
intentional states while allowing for the possibility of intentional states that it cannot
constituent internally unstructured representations and their mode of combination.
account for. For example, theory of intentionality in terms of tracking might
a
allow that there are non»actual possible worlds in which intentionality is a primitive
Although I will eventually propose a theory of intentionality that specifies the
phenomenon.’
nature of all actual and possible intentional states, I will structure much of my
discussion around the more modest goal of providing a theory of ntionality '
Original and Derived Intmtiwzaiity
that specifies what gives rise to actual instances of original intentionality. My
Original intentionality is intentionality that does not derive from other instances
reason for this is that it allows us to of intentionality in terms
classify theories
of intentionality. Original intentionality can be contrasted with derived intention-
of their most general common factors: what they take actual-world instances of
ality, which is intentionality that derives from other instances ofintentionality For
original intentionality to amount to, or, in other words, what they take to be the
example, one might think that linguistic expressions have derived intentionality that
actual-world “source” (Kricgel zou, zotab) of intentionality. As we will see, this
is derived from the original intentionality of mental states, e.g.. from our thoughts,
method of classifying theories ends up classifying them along familiar lines. Once
beliefs. interpretations, or communicative intentions (Grice 1989).
we have settled on the source of actual»world instances of intentionality. we will then
A few more definitions are in order: Originally intentional properties are ways
turn to providing a theory of intentionality, one that settles other
more complete
things are or might be with respect to their original intentionality, or originally
questions about intentionality, including those of how exactly intentionality arises
intentional ways things are or might be, and an intentional state is
from whatever it arises from, how it might arise in other possible worlds, and whether
an instantiation of an originally intentional property. We can say that something
and how original intentionality can yield derived intentionality.
'9' " (intentionally) represents a content when it instanriates an "
intentional property representing that content. Cotrespondingly, derivatively in-
2:2 Theory«I 4 4 Access to intentionality
tentional , rries are ways things are or might be with respect to their derived
As we will see in Chapters 3-5, many theories of intentionality make predictions as
‘ Compare: A physicallst theory ofmental states can be neutral on the question ofwhether nonphysieal to the contents of particular mental states. So, in order to assess these theories, it
mental states are possible. is useful to have a theory~indcpendent way of testing these predictions, i.c., a way
2.4 Part]: Inn-adur/mi Cbrzprerz:Gzml:rmdMrr/mdrzlugy 1,
that is independent of our theories of intentionality. Ifwe cannot test a theory’s which contents are concrete combinations of worldly objects and properties, sets of
predictions in a theoryvindependent way, then (except in cases where theories make possible worlds, or properties of intentional states.
inconsistent predictions), we cannot use a theory's predictions to help us decide The superficial character of an ' ntional state or content is the set of superficial
whether or not to accept it. features that characterize it as the intentional state or content that it is. Claims about
This section describes two theory—independent ways of finding out which con‘ the particular contents of particular intentional states are usually best interpreted as
tents we represent: introspection and considerations of psychological roles. Impor- claims about their superficial characters. For example, the claim that Justin Trudeau
tantly, my claim is only that these methods allow us to discern which contents is currently thinking that grass is green is a claim about the superficial character of
we represent, not that they can fully reveal to us the nature of our intentional his present intentional states, not their deep natures. Similarly, the claim that Put-
states and contents. As I will put it, they can tell us about an intentional state nam's (1975) Oscar and his Twin Earth duplicate, Toscar, have warery»stuff-related
or content's “superficial character," but not its deep nature. Before describing our thoughts with different contents is best understood as a claim about the superficial
theory—independcnt ways of knowing about intentional states and contents, then, it characters of Oscar and Toscar’s int ' states. Some generalization about
is helpful to first clarify the
distinction between deep nature and superficial character. intentional states are also best understood as claims about their superficial characters.
For example, the claims that most people can visually represent to million colors.
that perceptual states have more fine-grained contents than thoughts, and that
1..L.l DEEP NATURE AND SUPERFICIAL CHARACTER
nonconscious intentional states have vague or indeterminate contents are all best
Let us first consider an analogy: There is adistinction between two different kinds of understood as claims about the superficial characters of the relevant states,‘
questions we might ask about furniture. We might ask deep, metaphysical questions Theories of intentionality can make predictions about both the deep natures and
about the nature of furniture. For example. we might ask if being a piece of furniture the superficial characters of the contents we represent. For example, a theory of
is a physical or functional state, ifan item's status as a piece offurniture is dependent intentionality that predicts that the content of the concept CAT is the universal mt
on minds or societies, if being a piece offurniture is an intrinsic or extrinsic property, makes predictions about both this conrent’s deep nature and its superficial character.
and how pieces of furniture are related to the matter that constitutes them. These With respect to its deep nature, it predicts that the content of CAT is, at bottom, a
questions are questions about the “deep nature” of furniture, about what furniture universal. With respect to its superficial character, it predicts that the content has a
really is, metaphysically speaking. cat-ish, rather daan dog—ish or octopus-ish. superficial character, ie, that CAT has the
There is a different set of questions we lnight ask about furniture: We might ask content <cat>, rather than <dog> or <oetopus>.‘
what kind offurniture some piece offurniture belongs to, e.g., whether it is a couch, While I think it is possible to assess a theory's predictions about both the
a chair, or a futon. We might ask questions about the shapes, colors, material, or superficial characters and the deep natures of intentional states or contents, many
textures ofvarious pieces offurniturc, such as whether a particular table has a square of my central arguments will focus specifically on predictions about superficial
or a rectangular top or whether a particular couch is made of leather or pleathet. And characters. This is because, as we will soon see, it is quite plausible that we can know
we might ask questions about the uses or functions of certain kinds offurniture, such
as whether futons are used for sleeping, sitting, orboth. These are all questions about
what we might call the "superficial” features of furniture.
i introduce the distinction between the deep nature and the superficial character of contents in
I want to suggest that we can draw a parallel distinction between the “deep” and zol8, whcrcl l 5 best A VIEW:
"superficial" features ofintentionality. We have already defined the deep nature of about the superficial characters ofintentlonal states.
use angle brackets to ham: contents in a way that roughly refiecrs our intuitive way ofnaming them,
intentionality as what it really is, metaphysically speaking (§)..i). We can similarly 1
which is K, ; superficialcharacters. For example. thecontent (grass lr green-l> is the content we would
take the (deep) nature of intentional states and contens to be what they really express with “that grass is green." whrch ls a content with u grass~ls~greenAIsh superficial character.
are, mctapllyslcaliy speaking. Views ofthc deep nature of intentional states include I take a C-ish superficial character to be a superficial character that at least includes C-lsh—ness as 2
views on which they are states of bearing tracking relations to worldly objects and pzrtoraspeet.Thiswayof -1- - k H -- L 'in' I
or contents superficial character without fully specifying it. For example, we can say that a perceptual
properties, states of bearing primitive relations to abstract sets of possible worlds. or state representing a red square has a red-squate~ls|\ superficial character, but also that it has . red-lsh
intrinsic states of subjects. Views of the deep nature of contents include views on superficial character and that it has a square-ish superficial character.
:6 Par! 1: Imrrzdumlzrl Chapter 2: Goal: rlfllll‘/lt!170t1D/agy 27
about the superficial characters of our intentional states and contents prior to having In short, introspection can, at least sometimes and at least to a certain extent,
a theory ofintentionality and, indeed, prior to doing much philosophy at all, The inform us as to the superficial characters of our intentional states, though it does
next two subsections outline two ways in which we can do this. not reveal to us their deep natures. Before moving on, let me make two clarifications.
First. my claim that introspection can at least sometimes provide at least partial
access to the superficial characters ofour intentional states and contents is compari-
1 INTRDSPECTION
ble with the claim that there are intentional states and contents to which we have no
One theory-independent way in which we can know the superficial character ofour introspective access or only partial introspective access. For example, we presumably
intentional states and contents is through introspection. have no introspective access to the superficial characters of intentional
In §l.2, we saw that we can inrrospectively notice that we have intentional states. I states, and we arguably have no or only partial introspective access to the superficial
want to suggest that introspection can tell us a bit more than that. At least sometimes characters with broad contents, contents the representation of which
of states
and at least to a certain extent, introspection informs us as to which intentional depends on relations to the environment. However, it is natural to suppose that we
states we have. For example, introspection can tell me that I am presently thinking have at least partial access to the superficial characters of the contents we represent in
<a car is in my lap>, rather than, say, <an octopus is wrapped around my arm>. paradigm cases of intentionality (sec §l.z), since these are cases we notice introspec-
Further, the way that introspection tells me that I am thinking <a cat is in my lap> tively in ourselves. This is all I will need in order to make many of my arguments.
is not by providing me with a number, symbol, or other market that I have come The second caveat is that the claim that introspection does not reveal to us
to associatewith my thinking this content. Instead, introspection provides me with the nature of intentionality does not imply that what we are presented with in
some sort of access to some oi‘ the features of the content that characterize it as the introspection is not our contents in their entirety. It could be that introspection
particular content that it is and that distinguish it from other contents. In other presents us with our contents in their entirety but does not specifically tell us the deep
words, introspection provides me with some access to its superficial character. More natures of those contents, LC») what they are at bottom, lrletaphysically speaking‘ For
generally, introspection, at least sometimes and at least to a certain extent, can inform example, introspection might present us with structured propositions consisting of
us as to the superficial characters of our intentional states and contents. instantiated properties and existing objects but might not be able to tease apart and
l.n contrast, introspection does not reveal to us the deep natures of intentional identify those components. for whatever What is meant by the claim that
reason,
states and contents. In the above example, introspection tells me that I represent introspection does not reveal the nature of intentionality is simply that we cannot
<a cat is in my lap>, but it arguably‘ does not tell me whether this content is a simply tell. from introspection alone, what is the nature of intentionality.‘
set of possible worlds, a structured proposition, a way of ‘resenting, or an idea
in the mind ofGod. Similarly, introspection does not reveal to me the nature of my
z.2..; PSYCHOLOGICAL ROLES
intentional state; it does not tell me that my intentional state is a tracking relation to
cats and other things in the world, a complex set of fimctional roles. or a primitive A second theory—independent way of finding out about the superficial characters
relation to sets of possible worlds.theory of intentionality is a theory that
Since a of our intentional states and contents is through their psychological roles. Out
specifies the deep nature ofintcntionality, this means that, as suggested in Chapter I, intentional states generally play various psychological roles, and these psychological
introspection does not reveal to us the correct theory ofintentionality. Of course, roles are appropriate to which contents they represent. These roles mi§1t be roles in
this isnot to say that introspective evidence cannot form the basis ofargurnents for the inferences we are disposed to make, the behaviors we are disposed to engage in.
claims about the deep nature ofinrentionality, but only that introspection does not
simply tell us what it is.‘
experience of: ripe tomato has a mironnansn phenomenal character, evell rrrr does not reveal to us
whether Its ofbtlngahram var r
L .1. a» » ‘order
is to deny what is sometimes ca|lel*l"rev/elation" (rte, e.g.. cart
thought, or a primitive mental state. This
‘ See §y.3.r roran argument. xol7).
‘ Similarly, much of the debate on the hard problem ofconsciousness presupposes that W: ran at least ‘ 59¢ Mendelovlel 20:8 for discussion along tht lines otrlrlr section ofwh-at introspection can and cannot
sometimes introspeetively tell which phenomenal srarrs we have, even lflntrospection does not reveal tell usabout intentionality. 5:: also Bayne and Sptner zero for a congenial discussion oftlie limits or
to us the nature or phenomenal states. For example, might tell us that a
- Linux For Evaluation.
PDF Studio - PDF Editor for Mac, Windows, Linux. valualion. https://www.qoppa.com/pdfstudio
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18 Rm 1: lntraduuion ctmpmztt;o.t/tm1.i1o;mdt1ogy 2.9
or the higher—order thoughts or , ' : judgments about our intentional states
' ambi ous. I will structure much of my initial discussion around the question of what
we are able or likely to have. These roles might also be roles in contributing to our gives rise to all actual instances of original intentionality. As we will see, by providing
overall phenomenology, which might include our phenomenal , es or our ' us with theory-independent access to the contents uF at least some intentional states.
“grasped” representational , r on the world. introspection and considerations of psychological involvement can help us settle this
While it might be an open question precisely which roles any given intentional question.
state plays, I will assume that intentional states play a , ' D‘cal role appropriate With these preliminari under our belt. it's time to begin our search for a true
to their contents. In some way or other. intentional states behave as if they‘re there. I theory of intentionality! Part [1 considers approaches to intentionality that take it
will also assume that these psychological roles can often be detected by us. either to arise from tracking or functional roles and argues that they fail. Part III turns to my
through introspection or through third—person observation. If this is right. then favored approach. the phenomenal intentionality theory. and together with Part IV.
intentional states often leave some detectable traces in our minds or behaviors. and argues that it succeeds.
these traces can be used to help us find out which intentional states we have.’
Like introspective evidence. evidence from psychological role most clearly tells us
about an intentional state's superficial character. not its deep nature. For example,
Marias bringing an umbrella to work is evidence that she believes it might rain and
desires to stay dry. but it is not clearly evidence for or against the view that her
intentional primitive relation to a set of possible worlds. Of course. this
state is a
is not to say that facts about psychological roles cannot form the basis of arguments
for claims about the deep nature of intentionality, but only that an intentional state’s
psychological roles do not clearly reveal this nature to us. Accordingly, I will say that
an i ’ ' state is psychologically involved when it plays a psychological role
appropriate to its superficial character.
Importanrly, the claim that considerations of psychological involvement most
clearly tell us about an intentional state's superficial character does not imply that
it is not intentional states in their entirety that play the relevant psychological roles.
It might be that it is intentional states in their entirety that play various roles. but
which specific roles they play most clearly and uneontroversially tells us about their
superficial characters. not their deep natures.
2.3 Conclusion
In summary, a theory of intentionality is a theory that describes the deep nature of
intentionality. Though the theory of intentionaliry that I will propose is much more
‘ Even tr lllilnliflnal mm ll: eattttny impotent, our thremtm and behaviors should Sllll mpm their
(Dn(tn(S. so Considerations or psychological toh (In snll provide magnet 15 [0 What they rtprextnl.
rot Exlmpll. someone who believes (ha! ll is raining and desires to stay dry mu display appropriate
lzIlI~aV0lding behavior, mt tr the (‘OHRIIKS or her beliefs ttto desires do ttot play I msti role In
gtncrzting this bellz‘/iolt
II Alternative Theories of Intentionality
T H E T RACKING THE 0 RY and the Functional role theory are arguably the
two main competitors to my preferred theory of intcntionality. This part
argues that both theories face unforgivable problems: Chapter 5 argues that
tracking theories make false predictions about certain paradigm cases of
intentionality, while Chapter 4 argues that this problem also afllicts the
best versions of the functional role theory. I return to the tracking theory
again at the end of Chapter 4, where I argue that the underlying reason
that both tracking and functional role theories fail is that tracking relations
and functional roles are simply not the kinds ofthings that can give rise to
intentionality.
Part lll develops my preferred theory nfintentionality, the phenomenal
intentionality theory, which, we will see, succeeds precisely where tracking
and functional role theories fail.
3 The Mismatch Problem for Tracking Theories
TRACKING Tl-IEORIES TAKE intenrionality to arise from tracking relations that
internal states bear to items in the environment. This chapter argues that while
tracking theories have various attractions, including that of providing an account of
intentionality in terms ofperfecrly respectable natural phenomena, they are unable
to account for certain paradigm cases of intentionality. In these cases, there is :1
mismatch between the contents attributed by tracking theories and the contents
we have theory-independent reason to think we represent. This chapter overviews
tracking theories (§3. 1) and presents this mismatch problem (§§;.2.—;.5), arguing that
it cannot be avoided usingsophisticated maneuver involving modes ofpresentation,
nonconceptual contents. and other devices (§3.6). I close with a discussion of the
significance ofrracking (§;.7).
311 Tracking Theories
According to the tracking theory, original intentionality arises from tracking,
where tracking is detecting, carrying information about or having the function of
carrying information about, or otherwise appropriately corresponding to items in
L1;
;.t Par! I1.‘/ii]i’tY7ii1i’il/I Tlacaricr oflrrmmlmizluy Chapter 3.‘ T/:I(1Wi1mAi’th Prob/errlfir Datfiirlg Uaenrier it
the environment, such as particular objects, properties, or states of affairs, We can fimdan-iental physical items lacking mentality or items arising from them. Dretske,
state the core commitment of the tracking theory as follows: for example, describes his project as “an exercise in naturalism—or, if you prefer.
i metaphysics. Can you bake a mental cake using only physical yeast and
The tracking dieory All actual originally intentional states arise from tracking.
Hour?” (Dretske 1981, p. xi). Millikan (1984) similarly expresses a firm commitment
Recall that B arises from A when Bis nothing over and above A, perhaps because Bis to naturalism:“That our theory of the world has to be a totally naturalist theory I
identical to. fully grounded in, constituted by, or realized by A (§z,1). Recall also that am not prepared to argue” (p. 87).‘
original intenrionality is inrentionality that does not derive from other instances of
intentionality (§2..l). According to the tracking theory, then, tracking relations give
_3.2 Overview of the Mismatch Problem for Tracking Theories
rise to the most basic kind ofintentionality. and all other kinds ofintentionality (if
there are any) are derived from ir.’
When combined with information about what particular mental representations
There are difirerent versions of the tracking theory. Optimal-functioning track-
In the remainder
track, tracking theories make predictions as to what they repre
ing theories take the relevant tracking relation to be the causal relation that
.
holds between a mental representation and some item in conditions in which the
of this chapter, I argue that there is a certain class of cases, which I call “mismatch
cases,"in which tracking theories make the wrong predictions about whit/J contents
representation helps its bearer survive, flourish, or otherwise Function appropriately
we of mismatch cases means that the tracking theory is
represent, The existence
(see Tye 2.000).‘ Teleological tracking theories take the relevant tracking relation
empirically inadequate and hence false,
to be at least partly determin ’ by an organism’s L‘ ‘ 0' ‘ 5 tions, which might
My main example ofa mismatch case is that of perceptual color representations,
be a matter ofits evolutionary history (Millikan 1984, 1989, Papineau 1987, Dretske
the representa ion of colors involved in perceptual color states, though I briefly
1995, and Nealldcr 2.ol3).‘ Another approach is the asymmetric dependenc track-
consider other mismatch cases in §;.5. In a nutshell, my argument For the claim
ing theory. which, simplifying signi‘
on ‘_, a mental representation originally
diat perceptual color representations are a mismatch case for tracking theories goes
represents whatever causes it via a causal relation that does not depend on any other
like this: I’ ' color K it iii track " 5 like surface "
causal relations (Fodor 1987, 1990).‘
profiles, molecular properties of objects, or dispositions to cause certain internal
One alleged virtue of the tracking theory is that it is a naturalistic theory
states in us. But this is not what they represent; instead, they something
of intentionality, theory that appeals only to naturalistic items, which are
a
like primitive colors. These claims about what perceptual color representations
do and do not represent are prima facie obvious, but they are also supported by
‘ Nott that no particular toltcn intntal rtprtscntation nccd ht causcd by, carry information about, or
licar any other such relation to any conctttt existing thing in order for it to rcprcstiit. what is gtncrally
rtquitco for n toltcn incntal rcptcstntation r orrypc Rm ttprcstnt i content c is, roughly, rot tokens ’ While orctsltc takes iiarurslisin ahout iiircntionality to tcqiiirc that a theory only appcal to non-mental
or R occurring in particular circumstances to be Caused hy, carry information about, correspond to, or ingredients, Fodor's ofivcited passage expressing his coniniitnicnt to namlzlism only taltcs niturilisrn
bear some other such relation to c (or instsnccs o(C). to require that s thtory only appeal non-lnftnflbnfll ingredients. He writes:
to
‘ Tye (iooo) liolds Something liltt an optimal functioning thtoty, though he also involtcs teleological
I supposc that sooner or later the physicists will complete the catalogue they've been compiling
clcnicnts.
nfrhe iilriniatc and irrcdiicililc ptopcrtics or things. When thry do. tht liltcs or spin, rhitmi.
‘ Milliltan's view stutcs. roughly, that a representation Roriginally rcprcscnts contcnt C just in case the
and charge, will ptrliaps appcar upon tlicir list. not l1b0IAf7llIS surely won't; lntentionallty simply
systcnis that inaltt usc ofk (R's "consiirncrs") need the occui-rcncc ortoltcns of)! to corrcspond to c in
doesn't go tlist deep. its hard to see, in tact orthis consideration, how one can be a Realist shout
otdcr to pctrotni tht functions thry wcrt natunlly selected for erformirlg (their “proper functions").
intcniioiinlity without also being, to some tirtcnt or oriicr, a Reductmnist. lrthc stinaiitic and
Slightly more precisely. and slightly more in llne with Fodor's own nharzrcterilatinn, the asyniinttric
the intentional rcsl properties ofthings, it must bl: in virtue orthtir identity with (or maybe
str
dependence theory ststts that an internally unstructured rcprcscntation R rcprcscnts Content C irc
ortlitir supcrvenience on?) properties that are themselves neither intentional 7107 strnanric. If
(or instancts of c) catisc Iolttrls ofI'l(1n a law-liltc way) and for anything clsc, 1), thst causes tokens
alioiitncss is real, it niusthc ttnllysoincrhingclsc. (Fodor 1987, p. on cinphasir in original)
of R, tlit D-to-R conncction is asymmetrically dependent on the C-to»R conncction. The Dcto-R
conncction is asymmetrically dependent on the C-to-R conricction put in cost tht Dela-R conntction EvenIhough.forFnrlnr n PM i v ii. Rem
-
is olcpcndcnt on the C-to—R connection and tht C-to-R connection is not dcptndcnt on thc D-to-R that a nanitalistic ptoicct can appeal to are primarily uncontrovetsially physical and runcrional
’ r‘ is cashed out The D-to-R
. is dependent on the ingredients. since hc does not considtr possible yirwsthat inyohc ingredients whose status as physical
C—to—R connection yust in cast irtht C-tn-R connection hrtalt, tlicn thc D~to-R connection
wcrc to is I loch as L so. in ptncticc, his I0 nrlturallsm
would hrtalt as well. amounts (0 much the Sim! as ortrtltas.
1
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36 Part II: AI/email:/2 flzmics nflmmlrarur/II] (Juprn ;: The Mlsmaxrrb Pmblemfur Tmrlzmg Ihanzr ;7
theory-independent considerations from int A’
’ n and observed psychological while its superficial character is the set of superficial features that characterize it as
role: First, we can introspect on perceptual color states. and when we do. we [he particular content that it is. In the above example. the tracking theory in question
discover something like primirive colors rather than any of the items perceptual color is naturally understood as making I dictions about both the deep nature and the
representations can be said to track. Second. the psychological roles of perceptual superficial character ofthe content of HORSE. It tells us that the content of HORSE
color reprcsentat' also suggest that they represent primitive colors rather than has the deep nature of being a particular property, rather than an object. state of
anything they happen to track. For instance. they are inferentially related to beliefs affairs. or other item, though it remains neutral on what exactly properties are. It also
about primitive colors rather than beliefs about surface reflectance profiles or the tells us that the content of HORSE has a horse-ish superficial character, by which I
lik:4 Ifall this is right, then the tracking theory makes the wrong predictions in the mean a superficial character that at least includes horse-ish-ness as a part or aspect.
case of percept ' color representations, and we have a mismatch case. More simply, we can say that the tracking theory predicts that HORSE represents
The argument is simple and obvious: Perceptual color representations track one <hotse>, where <horse> is a content with a horse-ish superficial character.‘
thing but represent another, so the tracking theory delivers the wrong answer. But In §z.2.. we saw that it is possible to test a theory of intentionality's predictions
there are many methodological ‘ tions working in the background of this using two theory-independent methods. methods that do not presuppose any
argument, and it is open to various sophisticated replies. The next few sections particular theory ofintentionality: int r ’ and consideration of psychological
unpack the argument, clarify some of the assumptions at work. and overview the role. These methods most clearly tell us about a content’: superficial character, not
most compelling lines of response (Appendix A considers more) .‘ its deep nature. They most clearly tell us ml/irkv contents we represent without telling
us what those contents really are. at bottom. Accordingly. the predictions of the
tracking theory that I am concerned with are its ptedic ns about the superficial
3.3 Background and Assumptions
characters of represented contents, not its predictions about their deep natures.
Let us consider these two theory-independent methods of testing a theory of
When combined with information about what a reprt-sentati tracks, tracking
intentionality's predictions in more detail. In §z..z..2., we saw that introspection can
theories yield predictions as to what it represents. For example, suppose that. help tell us which intentional contents we represent by at least partially revealing
on a given tracking relation, the representation HORSE tracks the property of their superficial characters. For example. we can introspectively tell that we are
being a horse. Then a tracking theory taking this tracking relation to give rise to
representing <grass is green>, rather than <snow is white> or <there is an elephant
intentionality predicts that HORSE represents the property /Mme. sullting in the corner>. While introspection may not filly reveal the superficial
Section z.z.t distinguished between the deep nature and the superficial character characters of It” contents, it arguably provides some access to paradigm cases of
of contents. where the deep nature of a content is what it is, metaphysically speaking, intentionality. the introspectively accessible cases that we used to fix reference on
intentionality in §t.z..
Since at least some intentional states involving the representation HORSE are
‘ Paurz (zoos. zoub), Hardin (tyfiil), Aklns (X996). and others have argued that there is a "structural"
mismatch between the contents of representations and what they rraelr: There is a mismatch in
paradigm cases of ' ' nality, introspection can speak to the question of which
the relations of similarity and rlrlrerenee between what a set of representatlons represent and the content HORSE represents. introspection arguably suggests that it represents
relations of similarity and arlterenee between the Items that they track. For example, the contents (horse). a content with a horse-ish superficial character. in this way, introspection
of color representations have a certain structure leg. <red.> is more similar to <purpl¢.r> than
confirms the tracking theory's predict‘ that HORSE represents <horse>.
it u to <green,,>). which fails to match the structure of me rurraee reflectance profiles that color
representations tra . (e.g.. what Iain, tracks u not more similar to what mu-ra,. tracks than to what The second way of finding out about an intentional state's superficial character
curtain, tracks). ifrhis at right. rlren what color representations truck is not what they represent. see is by considering its psychological role. As suggested in §z..z.3. intentional states are
lvanowich mg for a lucid overview and defense ofthls line of argument.
My argument based on mismatch cases is more committal on some eonrraverslal lssuesAit invokes
' ~ rather '
involving less controversial claims about the relations between those rontents—but the problem it
points to u more blatant: we aunt need to examine the structural relarlnnr between what we track and ' Recall that a C-ish superficial character u a superficial character that ar learr includes Gish-nest as a
what we represent to see that they are different when, as 1 will argue, we can enneluae they are arrterenr parr or arpeer. and angle bracket notation names contents in a way that is reflective oftheir superficial
,,oM__,t ,-. a. ..D L 'IL characters. See n. ; orclraprer x.
‘I
38 Part II: /1/tentative ‘Means: rlflntmrmna/rly Chapter 1: The Illxirrlulr/7 Pnzblemfizr Tmtlzing Theories 39
psychologically involved. where an intentional state is psychologically involved when colored, such as a visual state representing a blue mug.’ Section 3.; considers other
it plays a psychological role that is appropriate to its content's superficial character. candidate mismatch cases.
Psychological involvement might involve playing a role in the drawing of inferences When combined with information about what perceptual color representations
and the generation of behavior, being available to introspection, or simply being track, the tracking theory makes predictions about what they represent. Perceptual
part ofa subject’s representational phenomenology. such as the ‘ henomenology of color representations arguably track physical properties of objects such as their
“grasping” a content. We lnight not always be able to discern an intentional state's surface reflectance profiles (dispositions to reflect, transmit, or emit such-and-such
psychological roles, but when we are, this can help inform us ofits content. proportions of such-and~such wavelengths of light), the categorical bases of surface
lnt ' ' states involving the concept HORSE arguably play psychological roles reflectance profiles, or the disposition to cause certain physical or functional states
appropriate to having the content <horse>. They are appropriately connected to in organisms like us.’ For ease of exposition, I will focus on the view that, on the
intentional states representing horse-related activities, perceptual states representing relevant tracking relations, perceptual color representations track surface reflectance
the perceptual features of horses, higherrorder thoughts about representing profiles, though the general form of argument applies with few modifications to
horses, horse— pp p iate behaviors, and an experienced “grasp” of horses. In alternative views."""
short, intentional states involving the concept HORSE play a psychological role
that is appropriate to representing the content <horse>, which suggests that
HORSE represents <horse>, a content with a horse-ish superficial character. 50. ' lzssllmt, as is p1aIAslble,that perceptual color representations are ruhpi-oporltlonnl rgpmenmioi-is.
considerations of psychological role confirm the tracking theory's prediction that representations with Contents that do not have a piopotirionnl form but thnr sometimes rorin pnrtt
of proposluunal contents, and that they originally represent thc relevant color contents. These
HORSE represents <horse>.
ISS|XlT\plI0l‘lS are congcninl to vicws on which there is a language ofthought: tcc §i.i. Alternative views
As we've seen, our theory-independent ways of finding out about the contents rnight deny that thctc are i l V at - - - to
of intentional states arguably confirm the tracking theory’s predictions about the u .. i ‘ emsfromthepropositionalrepresentationsDfwhichlhcyform parts(sI.'e.e.gi,Milllkan
|yK4 rot this lnrttr view). For thotc who hold thctc alternative views, my examples ofsubpmposrtional
content of HORSE. Another “good case‘ for the tracking theory is that of perceptual reprtsentatlonl representing colort run he Substtnlted with examples orpropositionnl representations
representations of shapes. The tracking theory might predict that perceptual shape representing contents involving colors, such as reprererltations rcprctcnting that a particular object has
a particular color, and the discussion can ht amended accordingly. See also n. IO or Chapter |. For
representations track particular shape properties and hence that they represent
those rctitrant to the idea that pcrccprunl states are intentional. sclme nonpetceptual niisinntch cases
particular shape contents, Our theoryrindependent onsideratioii arguably support ntc dctcriotd in sin.
such content attributions and thus confirm the tracking theory's predictions. ’ Tiles! options rot Wllat perceptual color representations track map onto well-known views of Will!
I will say that two contents match when they are exactly alike in superficial they relmss-at: Dmske (ms). Ty: (mesh. 1.000), and Byrne and Hilhcrt (zoos) lake pticcptnnl
L lot representations to represent surface rrlltcrnncc profiles: Armstrong ([963). Jackson and Pargetter
character. In the case of HORSE and perceptual shape representations, the contents (X937). Jackson (1993:), Lewis (rm). and smart (tg7§) take them to itprcscnt the categorical him
ascribed by the tracking theory arguably match the contents those representations ofsurface reflectance prohltt; and Cohen (2009) and Averill (I991) take thcni to represent relations
in fact represent. In what follows, i argue that there are cases in which the between putatlvtlycclored ohycrri and subjects. sot Gow 1014 rot In excellent overview.
‘" However, see Hardin 1938 for extensive discussion orthc dilacnltict involved in isolating the precise
contents ascribed by the tracking theory do not match the contents that are in fact external causes orcolor Experience.
represented. Such cases are mismatch cases for the tracking theory. cases in which Another option is to lake perceptual color representations to track qualia or dispositions to cause
it makes false predictions about a represented content's superficial character. The quail: in subjects, where qunlia nrc felt. Subyecnve. sensational. qualllnnve. or phenomenal mental
itcrns that are not inttntionnl Contents (See Peacock: tori, Levin zooo. nnd Shoemaker 1.00; for thc
tracking theory, then, has a mismatch problem.
view tllal perceptual color rcprtsrnrations represent disposition: to cause qunlin). i set views on which
perceptual eolor representations rrnclt tonicthing involving quzlla aside rot two reasons: rirtt. thc view
that there are qunlii IS largely, Ind i think correctly, rejected. One reason to reject quzlla is the so-called
transparencyofexperience: lnttospectlon simply does not reveal Sucll rlon- tent mental qualities (sci
3.4 A Mismatch Case: Perceptual Color , aiiiiti l-lninun 1990, Dretskt I995. Ty: zooo. and Menclelovlcl tom). Second. it IS unlikely rhatthe tracking
theorist will be attracted to such a view, since nppcnl to qualia X5 in tension with I corniriitrricnt to
namrallsmt Either qualiz are naturalistic IICXIIS or they are not. lfthey nrt, then the view that pcrccptunl
In this section, I focus on what I take to be one of the most obvious mismatch
color representations track quail: or disposition: to misc qnzliz boils down to one orthc physicalist
cases for the tracking theory, that of perceptual color representations, which are nltcrnnrivct listcd in the main text or something rirnilnr. irthty are not, tlicn appealing to quzlia IS
representations of color involved in visual states representing surfaces or objects as Incompatible with a commitment to natumlism.
1
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40 Part II: A/Inmzrir/e Theories oj'lm:nximm/1/_v (film/zm 3: The Mmmm/1 Pmb/nnflzr Yhmiuig Tlmms 4:
Combined. then. with the view that perceptual color representations track states’ psychological roles in no way suggest that SKY-BLUE's content has a SRPvish
surface reflectance profiles, the tracking theory predicts that perceptual color superficial L . So. considerations ofpsychological role also fail to support the
representations represent surface nce profiles. This prediction is a prediction tracking theory's predictions.
about the deep nature of the contents of , ' color representations. i.e., that So far. I have argued that our theoty—independent ways of knowing about
they are of a certain type. It is also
properties a prediction about which contents the contents of intentional states do not support the tracking theory's content
perceptual color representat' , . i.e., that they represent contents with attributions. Ofcourse. absence of evidence does not imply evidence of absence.
surface-reflectance-profile-ish superficial characters. For example. it might predict However. when combined with some further facts about the case. it does: While
that particular perceptual color representation, SKY-BLUE, has as its content a
a might only be involved in intentional states that are not
some representations
particular surface reflectance profile, SR1’ (pronounced "surp’"). This is not only .\ introspectively accessible and whose psychological roles we cannot discern. it turns
prediction about the deep nature of SKY-BLU as content. but also a prediction about out that many ' ' ' states ' ' ' D r , ' color , are
which content SKY-BLUE represents. i.e.. that it represents <SRP>. which is a content introspectively accessible and have psychological roles that we can discern. Indeed,
that has a SRP-ish superficial character. ‘ ‘ states ' ' ' gr , ‘color I ' are arguably amongst
The problem is that our theory-independent methods of finding out which the intentional states to which we have the best theory-independent access. We
contents we represent suggest against the tracking theory's predictions and in favor of are constantly confronted with them, we can easily notice them introspectively.
alternative content attributions that the tracking theory cannot accommodate. Let and we are often in a position to notice them play a role in guiding our reasoning
us first see how our two theory-independent methods suggest against the tracking and behavior. forming the targets of higher-order thoughts. and affecting out
L
theory's content attributions. overall r
I
r ‘ D So. if r K ' color
t
At least some perceptual states involving perceptual color representations are represented surface “ tance profiles. we should expect this to be supported
.i
paradigm cases of‘ ality. so they are introspectively accessible. But when by our theory-independent tions. Indeed. if any of the tracking theory’s
we introspect on these states, we notice nothing to do with specific surface re- content attributions can be supported by theory-independen considerat’ . these
Hectance profiles. For example. when we introspect upon intenti ‘ states involving ones should. Since they are not. this means not only that theory-independent
SKY-BLUE, we do not notice <SRI’> or any aspect or component ofsuch a content. considerations fail to support the tracking theory’s predictions but also that they
\Vhatever content we do notice does not have a SRP-ish superficial character. So. positively suggest against them. ‘
introspection fails to support the tracking theoty's predictions.“ The tracking dieory. then. wrongly predicts that perceptu ' color representations
Consideratio of pay L logical role also fail to support the tracking thcory's represent contents with surface-reflectance-profile-ish superficial characters. For
predictions. Our perceptual ' ' states representing colors do not behave as example. it wrongly predicts that SKY-BLUE represents <SRP>, a content with a
if they represented surface flectance profiles. They are not causally. inferentially. SRP—ish superficial character. We can call this kind oferror an error ofcornmission,
or otherwise interestingly related to beliefs about surface reflectance profiles or since it includes unwanted material in the superficial character of sitv-nLUr-:’s
higher-order thoughts stating that we perceptually represent surface reflectance content. Similar claims hold for other perceptual color representations. Since the
profiles. And they in no sense allow us to “grasp” such contents or have any other tracking theory makes false predictions about the superficial character of the con—
related phenomenological effects. These states’ psychological roles in no way suggest tents of perceptual color representatio , the case ofperceptua‘ color representations
that they represent surface reflectance properties. For example. intentional states is a mismatch case for the tracking theory. and the tracking theory faces the mismatch
involving §KY—BLUE do not behave as if they represented <SRP>: They do not problem. It is " inadequate and hence false.
allow us to draw inferences about SR1’ or to have higher-order thoughts saying We can sum ' this line ofreasoning in the case of SKY-BLUE in the following
that we represent <SRP>. and they do not have a SRP-ish phenomenology. These argument from commission:
(Cr) Ifthe tracking theory is true. then SKY-BLUE has the content <SRP>.
“ The related claim that colors don't look disposirxonal is a well-known complaint against views ortitt (Ca) SKY-BLUE does not have the content <SRP>.
content of perceptual color representations on which they represent dispositions to meet subjects H1
(C;) Therefore. the tracking theory is false.
various ways: see Boghossian and Velleman 1919 and MeGinn I996.
4;. Part II: Aliemalil/2 Themes nflnrmtllznttlzry Chapter, The Mtxmaxrly Pmblemjbr Tmkmg 'I‘beme.t 4;
In other words, the tracking theory predicts that SKY»BLUE represents a content absent countervailing theoretical beliefs, a perceptual intentional stare representing
with a SRP»ish superficial character, but in fact, it does not, so the tracking theory is that an object is sky-blue might lead to the judgment that the object is some shade of
false. (Cl), which expresses the tracking theory's (false) prediction, follows from the edenic blue, i.e., that it has a sui generis, primitive, non-dispositional, non-relational,
specification of the t.racking theory together with facts about what SKY-BLUE tracks, and non—mental property of blueness. So, considerations of psychological role also
while (C1) is supported by our theory-independent considerations that inform us as suggest that perceptual color representations represent edenic colors.
to which contents we represent. The problem is that it is quite implausible that perceptual color representations
I have argued that theory-independent considerations suggest against the
So far, track edenic colors. Edenic colors are qualitative, simple, primitive. sui generis.
tracking theory’s predictions about the superficial characters of perceptual color non—dispositional, and non-relational color-like features. But neither surface re»
representations. This gives us the argument from commission. I will now argue that flectarlce profiles not their categorical bases not other properties ofobjects involve
theory-independent considerations support alternative content attributions, which any such features. If there are no instantiated edenic color properties, then it is
cannot be accommodated by the tracking theory. This will lead to another argument hard to see how any tracking relation can single them out. What tracking relations
against the tracking theory, the argument from omission. relate us to are surface reflectance profiles, their categorical bases, and other related
We've noted that perceptual color representations are involved in intentional properties of objects, none of which are or involve edenic colors. Perceptual color
states that are introspectively accessible and have discernible psychological roles. So, representations do not track edenic colors, and so the tracking theory cannot say
our theory—independent ways of finding out about intentional states give us some that they represent them.
hint as to what they represent. Which content attributions, then, do they support? In short, the tracking theory falsely predicts that $KY~BLUE’s content is not
Introspection suggests that perceptual color representations represent qualitative. <edenic sky—blue>, a content with an edenic»sky»blue—ish superficial character. The
simple (not having constituent parts), primitive (not made up of other items), tracking theory, tlltn, makes an error of omission, since it wrongly omits certain
sui generis (in a category all of their own), non-dispositional, non-relational, and material from the superficial character of SKY-BLUE’s content. The same holds for
non»lnental color properties. In short, introspection suggests that perceptual color other perceptual color representations. From this, conclude that the case of
we can
representations represent contents that are, or at least involve, what Chalmers perceptual color representations is a for the tracking theory, that the
mismatch case
(zoos) calls edenic colors. For example, introspection upon intentional states tracking theory faces the mismatch problem, and that it is empirically inadequate
involving sKY—BLUE reveals a content with a qualitative, simple, primitive, sui and hence false.
generis, non-dispositional, non—rclational edenic-sky-blue-ish superficial character. We can summarize this line of reasoning in the case of $1-tY»Bx.UE in the following
i.e., <edenic sky-blue>. In sum, introspective considerations suggest that SKY—BI.UE argument from omission:
and other perceptual color representations represent edenic colors.“"‘
Considerations of psychological involvement also suggest that perceptual color (Oi) If the tracking theory is true, then SKY-BLUE does not have the content
representations represent edenic colors. Intentional states involving perceptual color <edenic sky~blue>,
representations are inferentially related to beliefs about edenic colors, they are avail- (Oz) SKY-BLUE has the content <edenic sky-blue).
able to form the basis ofhighcr-order thoughts about representing edenic colors, and (03) Therefore, the tracking theory is false.
they allow us to in some sense “grasp" contents involving edenic colors. For example,
In other words, the tracking theory predicts that SKY-BLUE does not represent
a content with an edenic-sky-blue-ish superficial character, but in fact it does
" Chalmers (zoos) describes tdcnlc color properties using the allegory ufthe garden orrdtn. “In the represent such a content. So, the tracking theory is false. Again, (Cr) expresses the
Garden ofEd.en. We had unmediated contact with tn: world. We wait dittttly acquainted with oblecls
tracking theorysprediction and follows froln the specification ofthe trackingtheory
in thc world and with tntit ptopattitt. osyttti watt simply prlienied to IIS WIIl'IDi|K causal mediatlun.
.9). In Eden. an appatantly red apple
and propertlcswert revealcdto II: in Kllell’ tttit mtllnslcglolyn (p. Kogctlicr with facts about what sl-zvalawr tracks, while (Oz) is supported by our
was “glotitnitly. perfectly, and ptitnitiytly tad" (p. 49). theory-independent considerations.
" Contemporary defenders of siitn a View include Mackie (.975), Holman (aim), Marina (1995).
Chalmers (zoos), Czmpbell (I993), Pzutta (MS), and Gov! (mt). Historically. Such a Vltw was notably
As we've seen, our theory-independent considerations can form the basis of two
held by Democritus. Descartes. Galileo. and Others. different arguments against the tracking theory, the argument from commission and
44 Par: 11: /lltemimw Tlzearm zflmeritinnalxty Chapter 3: The Ilrflsmatr/9 Pmlzlmfir Trarkmg Theories 45
the argument from omission. I think both arguments are effective, though, as we will and other sugars but represent edenic sweetness, while gustatory representations of
soon see, the argument from mission is stronger. bitterness might track a variety of toxins but represent edenic bitterness. Perceptual
I have focused on tracking theories that take perceptual color representations to [gr ’ of heaviness might also be a mismatch case, tracking relational
track surface reflectance profiles on the relevant tracking relations, but it should properties ofobjects but representing intrinsic properties."""
be clear that similar arguments apply to tracking theories taking perceptual color For every perceptual mismatch case, we might also find a toiresponding mi llIdlLll
representations to track the categorical bases of these surface reflectance profiles case involving concepts, the subpropositional representations involved primarily in
or disposi ons to cause certain physical or functional states. Theory-independent thoughts. For some of us, the contents ofour color concepts might be determined
considerations suggest against such content attributions and in favor of content by the contents of our perceptual color representations in a way that makes them
attributions the tracking theory cannot commodate. mismatch cases. For instance, someone’s concept BLUE might represent a range of
perceptually representable shades of blue. Such color concepts track something other
3.5 Other Mismatch Cases than what they represent: They track something like ranges of surface reflectance
profiles, but they represent something like ranges of edenic colors. If color concepts
The above arguments invite many sophisticated replies, but before considering some originally represent these contents, then this is a mismatch case.
ofthem, let us consider the scope ofthe alleged problem. There might also be conceptual mismatch cases that do not have perceptual
lwant to suggest that there are additional mismatch cases for the tracking theory, analogues. Moral concepts are good candidates. If}. L. Mackie (1977) is right, our
both in perception and in thought. Another perceptual case is that ofthe hot and moral concepts represent properties that are prescriptive, in that they offer subjects
cold representation involved in our tactile perceptual states representing ourselves reasons to act in certain ways, and objective, in that, when instantiated, they exist out
or other items as being hot, cold, warm, etc. Perceptual hot and cold representations there, in the world, independently of subjects and their preferences. But our moral
might be said to track mind-independent physical features, like temperature or heat, concepts arguably don’: track any such properties. Rather, they track harm, disre-
ordispositions to cause certain states or reactions in us." But theory—independent spect, unfairness, societal norms, disgust, personal aversions, and the like. If moral
considerations suggest that hot and cold representations do not represent such concepts originally represent these contents, then they are another mismatch case.
contents. We don't notice such contents upon introspection. and hot and cold Our concept of it self is another potential mismatch case. One intuitive view
representations simply don't behave as if they represented them (we are not disposed is that selves are simple enduring substances (see, c. Lowe 1996). Perhaps, then,
to form beliefs with related contents, we do not form higher—order states about our we represent ourselves and others as simple self substances. If there are in fact no
representation of such contents, etct). Instead, theory-independent considerations simple self substances, then it is quite likely that all we track are human animals,
suggest that perceptual hot and cold representations r somethinglike simple, Parfitian relations ofpsychological connectedness and continuity (Parfit I984), or
primitive, non-relational, sui generis edenic hotness and coldness. If this is right, simply peoples gaits and faces. In such cases, our concept ofthe selftracks something
then perceptual representations of hotness and coldness are mismatch cases for the
tracking theory.
Perceptual representations of smells might be another mismatch case for the
" See Mendelovici toiih. See
also Mendelovlci tom and 1.014 for a rcptcsentationalist view or moods
tracking theory. Such olfactory representations arguably track something like molec-
aha emotions oii which moods aria emotinrls tutti out to be mismatch cases rot rht tracking theory.
ular properties of volatile molecules but represent edenic olfactory properties." " An extreme View IS that an perceptual rcprlsrntanoni rzplesent something other that. what they track.
Gustatory representations ofsweetness similarly might track the presence of glucose (A Snmcwhal less extreme View IS that in tht case ofall "secondary" qualities. we represent romrthitig
other than what we track.) i-\lthnugh i am sympathetic to the rtrrrihr view. my arguments hridrrr
coihmii us to it. For instance, one might reasonably hold that perceptual teprtscrltanons ofspatial,
ttturrutai, or functional properties, such as representations oishapes and tables. manage to r.l0 a good
" Akms (ippo) argues that the best-candidate physical properties rot what perceptual hot aria told job oftracking What they represent.
track are hot and heat but rather 5 , propotrus, such as rhr SC: tho Chalmers (2006). who suggests that many representations represent edenic properties
rtlilions that hold between a sum|||us' temperature, the body part to which the stimulus is applied. the analogous to edenic redness, and aytui atui Hilbert (1006), who suggest that the arguments rot
body part‘: initial temperature. and the body parts tar: oftempetature change. tliminztlvism about culnrs ihoiiio also apply to other cases, such at those oriouuiii auii tastes (though
“’ See Mendelovici forthcoming-a aria MS. they take this to be a rraiotr to report the arguments).
'1
46 Part II: Alzrmuliue Tim/mt aflnrmrlanriliry C/mpter}: T/7: Mrsmattl; Problem/hr Tracking Theme; 47
other than what it represents. if it originally represents its content, we have another A defender of this strategy might concede that it is prima facie implausible that
mismatch case."'“ <SRP> is <edenic sky-blue> but maintain that it is already part ofher position that
Ofcourse, different people lnight have different concepts corresponding roughly the tracking theory’s predictions can be surprising, that the contents we observe from
to the same thing. For instance. some people might be dispositionalists about color a theory—independent perspective can seem distinct from the contents predicted by
or have Parfitian concepts of personal identity. Some of us might have reconstructed the theory. We should not be too worried about that, she might add, since there
our concepts ofhotness and coldness to represent temperature or heat‘ This means are ready explanations for why we lnight fail to recognize true identities. These
that, while some people’s concepts of colors, personal identity, or hotness and explanations center on the idea that we can represent one thing in two different
coldness might be mismatch cases, other people's might not be, But the existence of ways. eg, under two different modes ofptesentation, conceptually in one case but
a single mismatch case is enough to make trouble for the tracking theory. IfMaeltie’s nonconceptually in the other, or by using '. demonstrative, or other
concept of moral goodness is one of objective prescriptivity, Lowes concept ofthe special concepts in one case but not in the other. So, she might maintain, we, as
selfis one ofa simple substance, or some childs concept ofhomess represents edenic theorists. might represent <SRP> and <edenic sky-blue> in two different ways,
hotness, then, assuming these concepts are supposed to originally represent their which makes their identity non-obvious to us. Such moves are familiar from the
contents, the tracking theory faces the mismatch problem, debates on the mind-body problem, where 2 common strategy is to assert that
mental states are identical to physical states and then to attempt to explain away
appearances to the contrary. Indeed, one might claim that there is an “epistemic gap"
3.6 Obiections
between our concepts of the contents <SRP> and <edenic sky-blue> preventing
us from seeing that they are identical, similar to the alleged epistemic gap between
The arguments from omission and commission are fairly simple, but they invite
mental states and physical states, but that this epistemic gap needn’t correspond to a
various sophisticated replies. This section considers a few of the most interesting
metaphysical gap."
replies. while Appendix A siders a few more replies.
Let us grant that true identities might not always be obvious to us, that this might
be explained by appeal to dilferent ways ofrepresenting the same thing, and that all
z.6.t DEFENSE BY IDENTITY
this might apply to the of<SRP> and <edenic sky-blue>.“ However, all this
case
is irrelevant. since my arguments already allow us to conclude that <SRP> is not
One might attempt to defend the tracking theory by claiming that <SRP>, the identical to <edenic skyrblue>. To see this, note that we can rearrange my premises
content predicted by the tracking theory, just is <edenic sky-blue>, the content to argue directly for the non—identity of<SRP> and <edenic sky—blue>:
SKY-BLUE in fact represents. The tracking theory predicts that SKY-BLUE repre—
sents <SRP>, and theory-independent considerations suggest it represents <edenic
sky-blue>, but this is not a problem because <SRP>just it <edenic sky-blue>. This
strategy, in effect, denies (C2), the claim that SKY-BLUE does not have the content “ Thanks to Rob stainton rot insisting on objections ofthis iiayor.
“ There are two notahlc ways in which <slz.l>> might end up being identical to <edenic sky»blue>,
<SRP>, and (O1), the claim that ifthe tracking theory is true, then SKY—Bl.U£ does
actpitc appciring not to be. -rht nrst is that there is a single content with both a SRP-ish and an
not have the content <edenic sky-blue>. Call this the defense by identity strategy. edenic-sky-blue-lsh suprrhcial character. This it pottihlc just as it is possible rot there to be a single
ohyctr that is both red and round. (Recall that a C-ish superficial charactcr is a superficial character that
incliidts Crlslivnessz Set it. , orchaptrr 2.)
There IS another, rat iiiorc radical. proposal rot how <SRP> niight end up being identical to <edenic
" A useful hciitistic rot finding mismatch cases tor the tracking thcory is to look rot rcprcscnrations or sky—blue>, one that ainis to truly harness the (siipposcd) power oridcntity. This proposal maintains
irrins that resist rccluction. rhc reason thcy resist Kedllcllon itiiglit iust be that thelrcon(ents' superficial not only that <SRP> is identical to <edenic Sky-blue) but, hirthcr, that having a SRP-ish siiprrhcial
characters are entirely iinlilrc thc (presumably physical) items that they track and that are assumed character IS the sanic thing as having an edenlc-sky-blue-ish superficial rharacrcr. Recall that stiprrhcial
to form suitable candidates for their reduction base. Other possible cases include representations of characters arc rritiirrs or prope ofconrenrs, ways that contents art. so. this option would be
responsibility, iiisricc, agency, and niinihcrs. analogous to claiming that redness is identical to roundness. I don't think this proposal is cplsxemlcally
“’ in Chapter 7. i will argue that practically all concepts have original contents that cannot be accommo- possible, but nothing hangs on [ills right now. We will consider a VIEW like this in goons.
dated by rhr traclring theory. Establishing this, however, tcqtiircs too tntich atgiinicnr to be dialcctically (Returning to the mind-body prohlcrn, thr iirsr proposal is analogous to siihstancc nionisni. which is
iiscrul at this point. compatible witll property dualism, while the stcond proposal is analogous to property inonisni.)
1
48 Part II: Alternative Tlmzner /_if'lnmirmmli:y C/mpterj: The A/lumaxtly Prablemfir Tracking Ihmizt 49
(C2,) SK\'~EI.UE does not have the content <SRP>. The upshot of this discussion is that the tracking theorist who wants to insist
(Oz) SKY—BLUE has the content <edenic sky-blue). that <SRP> is simply identical to <edenic sky—blue> cannot defuse my arguments
(Nil) Therefore, <SRP> is not identical to <edenic sky-blue>. i with this claim alone. She must directly engage with the arguments for my premises.
l For example, she might take issue with (C2) by arguing that my theory-independent
This argument does not beg any questions against the <SRP>/<edenic sky-blue) considerations do not in fact support it, or she might take issue with (Or) by arguing
identity theorist, since the arguments for (C2) and (02,) do not presuppose that that the tracking theory does in fact predict that perceptual color representations
<SRP> is not identical to <edenic sl(y»blue>: (C2) and (02) are supported by represent edenic colors. In what follows, I consider some such replies, including ones
introspection and considerations ofpsychological role, which suggest that SKY-BLUE that make further use of ways of representing (see Appendix A for a few more). I then
does not represent <SRP> and that it does represent <edenic sky-blue>. return to the defense by identity strategy.
My arguments also give us the resources to argue that if the tracking theory is true,
then <SRP> is not identical to <edenie sky-blue>:
3.6.2. WAYS or REPRESENTING
(Ct) Ifthe tracking theory is true, then SKY-BLUE has the content <SRP>.
One might argue that perceptual color representations represent contents in special
(Or) If the tracking theory is true, then SKY-BLUE does not have the content
ways that occlude them from my theory—independent methods, so my methods
<edenic sky»blue>.
cannot be used to find out about these contents. For example, perceptual color
(N12) Therefore, if the tracking theory is true. then <SRP> is not identical to
representations might represent their contents under special modes of presentation,
<edenic sky-blue).
nonconceptually. or in some other special way, which occludes them from our
Again, (Cl) and (Or) are justified without assuming that <SRP> is not identical to theory»independent methods. Ifso. this would undercut my arguments for (C1,) and
<edenic sky—blue>, so the argument does not beg any questions against the tracking (02,), which rely on stlch methods.
theorist who wants to identify them. We previously saw that ways of representing might play a role in the defense by
What these two arguments show is that even though, p|‘C~(l'1COK‘C(lCall_V, it is a live identity strategy by explaining why we, as theorists, are not always able to recognize
possibility that <SRP> is identical to <edenic sky-blue>, once we either accept the true identities between the contents we theorize about. In other words, according
tracking theory or consult our theorydndepenclent methods for finding out about to the defense by identity strategy, we, as theorists, represent the same content
contents, this possibility gets ruled out. in different ways (e.g.. under two different modes of presentation), and the
two
What of ways of representing and epistemic gaps? C.-in‘t they be used to show that difference in ways of representing prevents us from noticing true identity claims.
somehow I am mistaken here? Ways of representing and the alleged possibility of On the present strategy, ways of representing play a different role: Representing
epistemic gaps without metaphysical gaps can be used to show that a claim that two subjects represent perceptual color contents in a special way that blocks our access
things are not identical might be mistaken, but not that it is mistaken. (After all, to them through theory-independent methods. Our theory-independent methods
there is an epistemic gap between lots of things that are in fact not identical, like might instead tell us about me relevant ways of representing or about nothing
the Moon and the pile ofungraded papers on my desk.) Appealing to epistemic gaps at all.
and ways of representing to defend the claim that <SRP> is identical to <edenic There are several problems with this strategy. First. there is a general methodolog—
sky-blue> is dialectically ineffective, since I don’t merely assert that the two are not ical worry: Any strategy that claims that neither introspection nor psychological
identical, but offer a non-questionsbegging argument for the claim. A dialectically
effective response would have to take issue with my premises and the arguments I
use to support them.“ by dispelling my atgiiiiiotits, but by lttiiigiiig IIS [0 a staiidoir, with algumtnls on both Sides. nowmt.
it is liatd to sit how and ooiild possibly motivate Such an idtiitity claim iiidtpaiidtiitly ortsiiimiiig Ill!
tracltlllg theory or a nearby view. See also §1.6i4.
(Notice tliat aii analogous strategy ln [ht case or the mindvbody ptoliitm is (uguably a bit iiiott
“ The ttactiiig llleonst might also imptovt llfl dialectical Situation by sliowiiig tliat [lit view that <SlU’> alluctlve, SIIICC at least Illtrc ill’: Indtptndcllt itgtimstitt against diialitm, siitii as (ht zrgufllcnt rtom
is idtiitital to <cdtniC Sky-bl|lE> tat. be lllflfpflldtnrly motivated, This would lmprollt lit! smiatioii iiot mental causation.)
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so Par! 11; A/temtttive T/Mont: iiflnimiiotiii/icy cltiiytiow T’?! Miimnolt Pruflemfbr mti/ting mono 5]
roles can tell us about the contents of intentional states risks denying that we have there.“"‘ More generally, one might worry that it is not clear why the relevant ways
any theory-independent access to the contents of particular intentional states. If ofrepresenting should result in the kind ofocclusion required in order to deny (C2).
we do not have theory—indepcndent access to the contents of particular intentional The fourth, and I think biggest, problem for this strategy is that even if per-
states, then there is no way to test competing theories’ predictions about which ceptual color representations have some contents that are occluded from our
contents we ICPYCSCDI. This leaves us to decide between theories largely on a priori theory-independent methods, the claim that no perceptual color contents remain
or metaphysical grounds, even when the theories under consideration make specific unoccluded is implausible. We can at least sometimes introspectively notice our per-
predictions.“ This is quite an unfortunate consequence for a defender of the tracking ceptual color states, and when we do, we notice them presenting represented objects
theory. particularly given that the tracking theory is supposed to stem from a as having various colors. Since we notice them introspectively and we are tempted
naturalistic mindset, a mindset that is supposed to in some way align with science to describe them representationally, they qualify as instances of intentionality (§l.z).
and empirical ways offinding things out.“ Moreover, these states that we introspectively notice play various psychological roles:
A second, and related. problem with this strategy is that if the intentional They are related to the beliefs \ve form about the objects they represent (eg., that
states predicted by the tracking theory are introspectively inaccessible and play they are blue, brown. or green), our higher-order thoughts about our perceptual
no psychological roles that we can discern, if they leave no detectable trace in states (e.g., that we visually represent blue cups, brown chairs, or green trees). and
our minds or behaviors, daen they risk becoming idly spinning wheels. It is not our overall phenomenology of representing (eg, the phenomenology of things
clear why we should posit, or even care about, such contents. If the tracking “striking" us a certain way. namely, as involvinga blue cup, a brown chair, a green tree.
theol-y’s contents are in fact explanatotily inert idly spinning wheels, this too is an etc.). All this suggests that even if perceptual color representations represent contents
unfortunate consequence for a theory that is supposed to stem from a naturalistic that are occluded from us, they (also) represent contents that are not occluded.
mindset.“ Further, theory—independent considerations concerning these contents suggest that
A third problem with this strategy is that it is not clear that it can work in the they are edenic color contents, which the tracking theory cannot account for. (O1)
first place because it is not clear why representing contents in certain ways should isstill true and the argument from omission still stands.
make them inaccessible to our theory~independent methods. For example, suppose One might suggest that our theory-independent methods latch onto modes of
we say that SKYrBLUE3 content is represented nonconceptually, that is, in a way presentation, qualia, or something else other than contents. Perhaps, for example, it
that does not involve or otherwise tcquire having the concepts that we, as theorists. is modes ofpresentation that we notice introspectively and that play psychological
would use to describe it. The problem is that it is not clear why representinga content roles such as those described in the previous paragraph. Thats all well and good. but
nonconceptually should prevent it from playinga psychological role characteristic of then modes of presentation \vould turn out to be what we introspectively observe and
the content that it is. Even ifnonconceptual contents are represented in a special way, are tempted to describe representationally, so they would turn out to be contents.
they are still represented, and they should still in some way or other behave as iftheylte
“jatltton (2004) argues along such lines that the issue otnontonctptual content is a too htttitlg in the
' l do ihinli that that at: relevant metaphysical considerations that can help ut decide littwttn debates on ttpteientztltmalism. Jaclttons wotty, roughly. is that nonconceptual contcnt is still Laurent,
competing theories (see§4.4and§§.z.z), butldo not think thtyait theonly tonsidttationt. and so it should othayt at S|X(l|.
" One might suggest that intuition can be used to test competing thtotitn predictions in a " Another wotty or this tott with the nonconcepmzl content strategy is that it it not cltat why
theory-independent way, but it it not clear why intuition would be a reliable inathod hctc unless it was nontonttptiial contents should no hidden rtoni inttotptction in the relevant way. Presumably. the
Itspanslvt to tho evidence rtotn lnttvspeclmn oi psychological tolt. citplanation is supposed to go ionitthing like this: in otdct to introspeetively notitt that wt tcptcitnt
"out I'mgl\K suggest that thc ttaiiting thcotys contents can still play i tolt in determining ttuth <SRP>, we need a concept representing <SRP>, and it needs to be appropriately connected to out
conditions. 1-ht problem with this suggestion IS that theta would not be tht ttuth conditions we catt pctctptuax tepttttntation or <SRP>. sinct sitwntuc represents its content nonconceptually. we can
aoout ot have any teasoti to think exist. This it otcautt the relevant ttuth conditions would he uttcily tcpttttnt it Without having a concept representing <SRP>. to its content octdnlt ht Inttuspecllvely
divnrctd rioin out Intentional ctpttitnct. lt would be cold cotnroii to tonitont who is worried about I(c:sslble. The ptohlcni with thit ttoty is that it does not explain why ti-an if we have thc tooiiittd
whether Kilt‘ world is as she takes it to be to tell hat thatsht hasrlo access to how she taltts tht world to he concepts and tht ttniiittd conntttions, we still cannot rzcognile anything to do with pattitulat tutracc
lint it ttally is that way. The ttiitli conditions we catt about and hayt any mEu|(xV: taaton to believe exist ttiitctantc profiles in out perceptual ttattt tcptcttnting colott. One way to put the iinpott of this
at: those connected [0 out intentional experience. so, positing the ttaclting ihtotye predicted contents ptohltni is that thc tcltyant occlusion mechanism cannot in tact ttndtt perceptual colot conttntt
cannot be hittihtd oy i need to Explzm ttuth conditions. tumcitntly itmcclssible (Cl theoryaindependent methods to allow us to toictt (C2).
1

52 Par; 11: Alremariue Tlmrizr «l_flnmm‘armlil_y Cbapm-3: The Mlsmazl-/1 Prablrmjbr Tmtlemg Umrle: ;;
But if modes of presentation are contents, then they are within the scope of the in the case of the strategy presently under consideration, the reason is that the
tracking theory. and it needs to offer an account of them. The same goes for anything tracking theory doesn't even make any predictions about such facts in the first
else we might say our theory-independent considerations latch onto in lieu of place. The idea is that the tracking theory is only concerned with the deep natures,
content.” not the superficial characters. of intentional Contcnts, so it is not in conflict with
In short, the problem is that it is quite implausible to flat—out deny that our any discoveries our theory-independent methods might lead us to concerning their
theory—independent considerations are evidence for something answering to the no— superficial characters.
tion ofcontent. And, whatever this thing is, our theory-independent considerations If this strategy succeeds in preventing the tracking theory from making any
suggest that it includes edenic color contents, like <edenic sky-blue>. So, (0).) is predictions about superficial character, then this would lead to a quite undesirable
still true, and the argument from omission still goes through. At best, the ways of position for the tracking theorist. The tracking theory would only provide a
representing strategy brings us back to where we started: We are back at having (presumably partial) theory of the deep nature of contents, and not an answer to the
to account for contents of perceptual color representations that don't appear to be question of u//rich contents a particular representation represents, despite providinga
identical to anything that they can be said to track. And we gain nothing with this i‘ mapping from representations to contents when combined with information about
epicycle. It arguably worsens the situation because now we’re additionallycommitted ” what the representations [l'3Cl(.‘° In any case, as we will soon see, the strategy does
to introspecrively inaccessible and psychologically uninvolved, or“hidden," contents not in fact succeedin preventing the tracking theory from making any predictions
that arguably don’t do any explanatory work. about superficial character.
The main problem with this strategy is that, even if it can provide a response to the
\ argument from commission. it does nothing to address the argument from omission,
5.6.; THE TRACKING THEORY DOESN T MAKE PREDICTIONS ABOUT
The strategy involves accepting that if the tracking theory is true, then sltYAlaLt11=.'s
SUPERFICI.-\L CHARACTER
content is identical to the property XRP. Now, since superficial characters are
one might object [0 my claim that ([1: nmckjng fhgory fnakgs P1-gdicfions about features ofcontents, in order for SKY-BLUE’s content to have an edenic-sky-blue-ish
[1-m supgffidal cha[a([¢[5 of fgpfcsgnred comcmsy claiming (113; it only mak“ superficial character, it would have to have some edenil:»sky—bluevish feature. But
predictions about their deep natures. For instance, the tracking theory might SR1’ does not have any edenicvsky»blue»ish feature, and so SKI’ does not have an
Pfcdicr that 5xy.1;Lug's con[5n[ is [hg Pf()Pg[[y 51{p_ but no( that this cQn[¢n[ cdenic-sky-blue-ish superficial character. So, if the tracking theory is true. then
sup“-ficial chamcm-, If[I1g mocking djgory dQg5nl[ [nakg Pmjictions
has ;. 3R1>.i5h SKY-BLUE does not have :1 content with an edenic-sky-blue-ish superficial character,
about the superficial character of SKY»BLU£3 content, then perhaps we can reject Ind (01) 55 mic» 1‘ (“ms °“‘- ihflh that the tracking '5h€°|‘Y “Wk” P”dlC‘l°"5 3'30"‘
(Cl) and (Oi). superficial characters after all, and they are still false.
Likn (in strategy gppcaling no way; of mpmcnnjng that we have already mnsid, Put otherwise, the crux of the argument from omission is that the tracking theory
god, this stratggy ends up dmymg (hat the (mckjng [1-“,0,-y‘; pmdimons can 1,; cannot accommodate the central feature of sl(Y»lsl.U£’s content that we can isolate
Ecslccl using our thcor ndcpendent methods. However, in the case of the strategy using our rheoryindcpcndcnt methods. the edenicvskyblus-ish-ncssa It docs not
appealing to ways of representing, the reason for this is that our theory-independent matter whether we call this feature a superficial character or something else, and it
methods are not privy to the facts about our contents’ superficial characters, while does not matter how exactly the tracking theory ends up predicting that SKY-BLUE’s
content doesn't have it. indeed, we can drop the talk of superficial character
entirely and run the argument from omission in terms of this edcnic-sky-blue~isl'l
”’ McGinn (ms) raises 3 Similar objection to the use ofa mode ofpresentation strategy to defend the feature:
that colors :1’! dispositions [0 cause color experiences:
View
Nor IS I! possible to maintain that colorsvas-dispositions ZIC the de re objects ofvlslon, without
themselves corresponding to the de dicta content of color perception. since some rnnlici
P’°P'"‘“ will n==d N In mnoducsd in order to capture Ills dc dim conm-rofprrccpr-on—and ’° This is analogous to Boutget's (ronncoininga) point (l’|1Cpl’|yS|C3llSIfl about mental states does not tell
these w-ll lmsent essentially the same pmblema--V in 538) us which physical Stat: any given mental Star: Is identical to.
ll.
1

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54 Part II: Alzzma/iur Wyearitr a/‘lmennnrmliiy C/mptrrj: T11: Mxmmlr/I Pnzlzlzmfor Triméing Tlmrirr 55
(0i') If the tracking theory is true. then sxv-awe does not have acontentwith reiterated identities strategy, since it proceeds by reiterating the defense by identity
an edenic-sky-blue—ish feature. srraregys basic move. that of asserting an identity claim,
(O7/) sKY—BLU1-: has a content with an edenic—sky-blue-ish feature. Suppose I reply that edcnic-sky-blueeish-ness is not identical to SRP-ish-ness
(O3') Therefore. the tracking theory is false. because edenic-sky-blue-ish-ness has some property—say, that of being qualitative-
that SRI’»ish—ness lacks. The objector might reply that SRP-ish-ness does in fact have
sxr-1aLU£’s content has a certain edenic—sky-blue-ish feature, a certain qualitative,
that property, because SRl"vish—ness has some further property, P, which is identical
sui generis, primitive, non—dispositional, and non-relational feature. Even if some
to it. The reiterated identities strategy, in effect, reiterates the initial response that.
features of SKY-BLUES contents are not accessible to our rheoryindependent
in making a non-identity claim, I am making a mistake. My argument is implicitly
methods. this feature is, and so it needs to be accommodated by the tracking theory.
committed to multiple non-identity claims, each of which might be called into
The tracking theory predicts that sitv~BLU£’s content is SR1’, which is a property
question. On this response, it’s mistaken non—identity claims all the way up.
with various features. Ifedenioskyvblue»ish»ness is not among them, then the theory
One hint that something has gone wrong is that the response strategy greatly
cannot accommodate the case of SKYABLUE. It isn't, so it can’t."
overgenerates, allowing us to defend any identity claim by simply positing more
identities. Consider the following L D at the customer service desk:
§.6.4 REITERATED IDENTITIES
Customer service representative (Rep): Hello! How can I help you?
The first response strategy we onsidered was the defense by identity strategy, which Customer: I have complaint about my order. I ordered a six»ton African
a
fairly flatfootedly claimed that <SRI’> just is <edenic sky~blue>. Since <SRP> is elephant from your website, and what I received is a red brick.
<edenic sky»blue>, SKY—Bl.UE doe: represent <SRP>, and the tracking theory dues Rep: Yes! I hope you’re enjoying your elephant.
predict that SKY-BLUE represents <edenic sky-blue>, This allows us to reject (C2) Customer: I didn’t receive an elephant. I received a red brick.
and (Or). I argued that this response is dialectically ineifective because it ignores the Rep: Yes! The red brick is the elephant.
argument against the identity claim that I can provide by rearranging the premises Customer: No, it's not. The elephant depicted on your website has a big trunk.
of the arguments from commission and omission. The brick has no trunk.
However, there is a more radical version of the defense by identity strategy, one Rep: Yes, it does! There it is. (paints ta smfice afbrick)
that truly aims to harness the (supposed) power of identity by simply reiterating Customer: That is the surface of the brick.
the defense by identity strategy’: basic move, I will argue that this strategy also fails, Rep: The surface ofthe brick is a trunk.
and that the it fails illuminates the problem with the bare defense by identity
reason Customer: An elephant trunk is made of flesh. The surface of the brick is made
strategy. ofbrick.
Let us focus on how this strategy can be used to argue against (Or), since Rep: Yes.’ Being made offleshjtm‘ it being made ofbriclt.
the argument from omission is the more powerful of the two arguments. Recall Customer: Let me try again, This brick is six pounds, But the elephant was
that I argued for (Or) by arguing that there is nothing edenic-sky—blue-ish about supposed to be six tons.
the property SR1’ (or anything else SKY—BLUE might be said to track). But, Rep: Yes, ofcourse! The brick is six tons. Six pounds is six tons.
the <SRP>/<edenic sky-blue> identity theorist might suggest, I've neglected Customer: Look, just refund my three easy payments of$i9.99.
a further identity claim, the claim that edenic-sky-blue-ish—ncss is identical to Rep: Ofcourse! I have already issued you a refund.
some feature of SRP; perhaps it is identical to, say, SRI’»ish»ness. Since SR1’ has Customer: No, I right here that you just charged me again,
can see
SRP-ish-ness, and edcnic-sky-blue-ish—ness is identical to SRI’»ish-ness, SR1’ does Rep: Being charged again is getting a refund.
have eclenic—sky-blue-ish-ness after all, and we can reject (Or). We can call this the Customer: Can I speak with your supervisor?
Rep: Ofcoursc! I am my supervisor.
In order to defend a prima facie false identity claim, the customer service rep wheels
" Interestingly, this edenic-sky-blueush-ness mi be found in qualia and dispositions to cause quite. so
Ihlsklnd . mi 5 ' A I A against some t 4 Ve|leman's in more prima facie false identity claims, effectively denying any common ground
(I989) objections (see n. is). with her interlocutor. If her goal is simply to defend her position, this is a winning
L
36 Pim ll: A/tmwive Theme; oflmmrinnilliry Chapter ;: T/7: Immmztlr Prublemfir Tmtlmtg T/ream: 57
strategy; with no common ground to stand on. her interlocutor cannot lodge an 3 7 jeliable ' , inn and the Significance of Tracking
argument against her. The customer service reps strategy is. in effect. a skeptical
strategy. a strategy that works because justification has to end somewhere. Ihave argued that the tracking theory faces the mismatch problem. This means that
Indeed, since it is possible to turn any dispute into a dispute about identities, the intentionality is not a matter of tracking. However, it does not mean that tracking
reitented identities strategy can be used to defend any claim. For example. suppose is not important for reasoning and behavior. We can appreciate its importance
that I claim that the Moon is made of cheese. You investigate the Moon. find no by considering the usefulness of a certain kind of misrepresentation, reliable
cheese. and tell me that I'm wrong. I reply by saying that cheese is identical to rocks. misrepresenta '
and there are rocks on the Moon. so there is cheese on the moon. I have turned our An intentio ‘ state or representaci can be said to reliably misrepresent when
dispute into a dispute about identities. and now I can employ the reiterated identities it gets things wrong in the same way all the time. Assuming that objects never have
strategy. (At any point, I can also assert that you cannot see the truth of my claims edenic colors, perceptual color states are examples of reliable misrepresentation.
because you represent the items I want to identify in different ways, giving rise to an They reliably misrepresent in that they are always false. and they reliably misrepresent
epistemic gap that need not correspond to a metaphysical gap.) in that they occur in similar circumstances on multiple occasions, presumably
The moral of the story is that positing gratuitous identity claims does nothing to because theydo a fairly good job of tracking various environmental . Many
advance one’s position. Since the reiterated identities strategy is a winning strategy. other mismatch cases are also arguably cases of reliable misrepresentation."
it can always be used to defend an identity claim. so the fact that it can be employed The reliability of reliable misrepresentation makes it quite useful to us, despite the
in the case of a given identity claim is no reason whatsoever to think that the identity misrepresenta ‘ . For example, the fact that per: , ‘ color representa ' track
claim is true. In the case of the alleged identity between <SRP> and <edenic surface reflectance profiles is part of what makes them useful in helping us navigate
sky-blue>, the fact that we can defend this identity by identifying the features the world. Despite misrepresenting, they allow us to re—identify objects over time
of <SRP> with the features of <edenic sky-blue> does nothing to show that the and discriminate between objects of different types. For example, even though an
identity holds. apparently ted car doesn't really have the property of edenic redness that it appears
This points to the basic problem with both the defense by identity and the to have. our , " representing it as edenic red allows us to quickly identify it
reiterated "' strategies. If the tracking theorist's defense is to be convincing, it in the parking lot. Likewise, even though ripe tomatoes and unripe toes don‘t
is not enough for her to simply take on whatever identity claims suit her theory. Any really have the edenic properties of redness and greenness they , , lly appear
identity claims she takes on would have l\l be adequately motivated and defended. So, to have, we can use our perceptual color states to tell them apart. Other reliably
it is not enough to simply assert that, on her view. <SRI’>jusI 13 <edenic sky-blue> misrepresenti E states also track items that are significant to us. like temperatures.
or that, on her view, edenic-sky-blue-ish-nessjusi is some property ofSRP. These odors. sugars, and toxins, so they are also likely to be useful in similar ways. We can
identities would need to be m " and defended on independent grounds. But use them to avoid items that are likely to be harmful to us and seek out items that are
it is difficult to see how this can be done. The Fundamental problem remains: There likely to be beneficial. even though they misrepresent.
is absolutely no reason arising from the examination of the surfaces of objects, the
properties of light, or the relations between the two to think that SR1’ involves
anything like edenic—sky»bluevish-ness."
gaps. that idtntitiei att ntithtt titplanatoty not in need or titplanation. and that all this yams idtntity
claim a ttttain immunity rtom ttitititm. In tonttaat. mott stiaightrotwatd ways of timply denying
premises do not have tht same appeal. so thty don't ltqurlc tht taint attention. In any case, I tnntidtt
“ what I've described IS a “putt' ttitttattd ldtntititt strategy. a sttattgy that defends tht tlaiin that such revision Strategies in §A.a.a ompptndit A.
(SR?) I5 <edenic sky~blue> using tht (supposed) power oridtntity alone. ortouttt. this sttattgy “ Describing intentional states as reliably misttpttstnttng itnphts Khzl thty hayt tonditiont of ttuth
might be tomhtntd with othtt sttattgitt. such as that or Simply dtnying that SKY-ll.UE's tonttnt has ot ttrtttntt, which I‘ve tuggttttd is not something wt can taltt rot gtanttd (§t.t.t). I will eventually
a timplt, non-dlsposillonzl, and n-relational supttritial tnatatttt. -rhtt would be analogous to the suggest that inttntional stattt do have conditions ortnith and ttttttnte (§9.t.t), and it would not ht
tuatomtt sat-nta teplestlltztive dtn,' ,, Ittttittd tltphant was tit tont, whith might be mot. ttutationditgging to appeal to thott atgutntntt httt. In any case. not much KESKS on my claim that many
plausible than identifying hting tit tons with being Six pounds. 1 have totuttd on the putt ttitttatad mismatch tattt inisttpttttnt. Someone denying that intentional ttattt hattt conditions or tnith and
idtntitttt tttattgy httt hcczuk, it sttmt to int, many att talttn by tht idea that idtntity tlaimt tan tettttnct might dtny thit claim. while tttaining tht claim that many mitmatth (ISQS ate relidblt and
ht tompltttly opaque to ut. giving US: to epistemic gaps that need not totttipond lo ntttaphytital agttting with much orwhat follows.
1

- Linu For Evaluation. https://www.qoppa.com/pdfstudio
https:I/wwvv.qoppa.oomIpdfsl1ldio
58 Part II: Altemalll/e Tlmzm: nfln1m1irmali'1_~y ts/iipm 3; The /Wivrmlt/I pm/i/rm/ir rm/ring rbeioii so
In some cases. reliable misrepresentation might be more useful than veridical 3._B Conclusion
representation of the properties we track. Our perc ,. ' color representations
track a complex property but represent something simpler, which might be easier I have argued that the tracking theory faces the mismatch problem and. so. that we
to represent and manipulate than the more complex alternative. and the neglected should reject it.
information might not be particularly useful to us. Knowledge of surface " ance One might suggest that this is not a decisive reason to reject the tracking theory
profiles per important for survival, but being able to re-identify objects
se is not Every theory has its virtues and vices. and we should consider all the virtues and viccs
over of the same luminance, and pick out the
time, discriminate between objects of all competing theories before deciding between them. But this problem with the
ripe fruit and poi frogs is. If representing colors can guide our behavior trackingtheory is. I think, unforgivable. We set out observinga phenomenon that we
toward the environment just as well as representing surface “ ce profiles, and if wanted to explain. intentionality. There are at least some cases of this phenomenon
representing colors is cheaper or more efficient, then reliably misrepresenting edenic to which we have some kind of theory-independent access. The tracking theory fails
colors might be more advantageous than veridicaily representing surface reflectance to accommodate many of them. which makes it empirically inadequate. W/hile the
profiles. tracking theory may have many other virtues. whatever they are, they cannot make
Rejecting the tracking theory helps us properly appreciate the role that tracking up for empirical inadequa y.“
relations play in producing successful behavior: While cases of reliable misrep- We will return to the tracking theory in the next chapter. which also discusses
resentation most clearly illustrate just how useful mete tracking can be, tracking another theory ofintentionaliry. the f nctional role theory. We will see that versions
can play similar roles in cases of veridical representation, and even in cases of of the functional role theory that take tracking relations to be part of the relevant
internal states that are not intentional at all. In §i.3.3. we considered the possibility functional roles inherit the tracking theory‘s mismatch problem. We will also see
that intentionality has ‘ring to do with how we generate behavior that that there is a deeper problem facing both the functional role theory and the tracking
helps us get around in the world. While everything I've said is compatible with theory: Tracking relations and functional roles are simply not the kinds ofthings that
intentionality playing a special role in our successful interactions with the world, can give rise to intentionality.
we can now see that tracking is an important but distinct part of the picture.
We are able to successfully get around in the world not only because we have Appendix A: Objections to the Mismatch Problem
representations that represent certain contents that are useful for us to represent
but also because we are able to track certain features of our environment that I considered some replies to the mismatch problem in §;.6. This (optional) appendix
are important for us to keep track of, regardless of whether we also represent considers a few more.
them.“ The replies are divided into two kinds: Track‘ _-revising strategies take issue
with my claims about the tracking theory‘s predictions, i.e., with (Cl) and (01),
while e strategies take issue with my claims about what SKY-BLUE
‘ '
“ sonic oriliese poinrs are made in Mendelovici zor;b and rorrhcoiiiinga. Hardin (ins) and wrighr
represents, i.e.. with (C2) and (02).
(eons; make similar claims abour the userulness ornomvsridical color vision. and iacrmiidei (rm)
and Viger (2.006) also diseuss me usernlness oreerrain lrinds oimisrepresentation more generally,
The usefulness or reliable misrepresentation is illuirrarcd nicely by Msrurana and Varela's (r992) 11.1 Tracking-Revising Strateoies
allegory orrlic person in rhe submarine:
imagine a person who has always lived in a submarine. He has never left ir and has been rraincd Tracking-revising strategies take issue with my claims about the tracking theoty's
how to handle ir. Now, sranding on the shore and ice rhe submarine gracefully surfacing.
we are
predictions. denying (Ci) or (Or). The reply discussed in §;.6.; that tracking theories
We rlicn geron the radio and tell the navigaror inside: “congrarularionsl You avoided the reefs
and surfaced beautifully. You really know how to handle a submarine. The navigaror in she
subiriirinc, howcvcr. is perplexed: “What's rhis abour reefs and surfacing? All l did was push
some lcvcrs and turn knobs and make certain relarionships between iiidicarors as l operared rlie ii
See .4 aroirhe I in
it was all done in a prescribed sequence which l'm used to. l didn't do any
'
levers and knobs.
' V
problem and certain other similar tailures cannot be made up ror by alleged theoretical virtues such as
special maneuver, and on rop orrhas. you talk ro inc abour i submarine. You must be kidding!"
being naiuralirric. See also§6.4 tor a related discussion orrhe relative inerirsorernpirical adequacy over
(pp. as-n7)
rhcorerical virtues. like rhar orbeing nariiralisric.
https://wvvw.qoppa.com/pdfstudio
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do not make predictions about superficial characters is one such reply. This section mismatch cases. This would require realism about a primitive and causally potent
considers two more. version of a plethora of questionable items. as well as an appropriately selective
tracking relation—quite a tall order.“
A.l.l REALISM ABOUT EUENIC COLORS
A.r,7. TRACKING L.'NlNsT/iNTlA'rt-:D EDENIC COLOR PROPERTIES
One might suggest that edenic color properties are actually instantiated. .e.. that
realism is true of them.“ If edenic color properties are instantiated. perhaps our Another kind of tracking ' 5 strategy maintains that r , ' color rcp-
perceptual color representations track and represent them, and (Cr) and (Or) are resentations traclt and represent edenic color properties, which happen to be
false. uninstantiated. If so, we can reject (Cl) and (01). Indeed, perhaps it is possible for
In order for this strategy to work. these edenic colors must be causally potent. the tracking theory to say that , ' color representations reliably misrepresent,
since tracking theories require that represented properties either cause tokens of our which might seem independently plausible (see §3.7).
representations or make or have made some causal difference to our well-beingor that This is not immediately out of the question, since some tracking theories can
of our ancestors. The problem is that it is quite implausible that objects have causally allow for the tracking and representation of uninstantiared properties. For example,
potent edenic color properties. These properties would have to be something over the ' dependen theory allows us to track and represent uninstantiated
and above the ordinary physical properties that perceptual color representations can properties when there is a law-like causal connection between a representation and
uncontroversially be said to track. If there are such causally potent properties, it is the relevant uninstantiate ‘ property, and all other causal connections between the
surprising we have not discovered them yet by other means.” representation and other properties. including instantiated properties, are asymmet-
An additional worry is that even if there were causally potent edenic color rically dcpendent on it. Fodor (1990, pp. roo—rol) suggests this kind ofstrategy for
properties, in order for this strategy to be successful, a tracking theory would have dealing with the concept UNICORN: There is a causal connection between unicorns
to predict that it is these properties, and not surface reflectance profiles or other and UNICORN. and the causal connection between other items (eg., pictures of
properties percept ‘ color representation track. that are singled out by its favored unicorns) and UNICORN is asymmetrically dependent on it."
tracking relation. For example, for the optimal functioning theory to successfully However. it is implausible that the tracking theory tell such a story about the can
employ the strategy, it will have to fall out of the theory that perceptual color representation of edenic colors. Consider again the asymmetric dependence theory.
representations , edenic color properties rather than surface reflectance ln order to employ such a strategy, it has to say that the SRP-to-SKY-BLUE connec-
profiles. which would require that it is edenic color properties, and not surface tion is , iinllu ‘ r J on the edenic ‘, bl 'v-31.175 ' .
reflectance profiles, that contribute to wellrfunctioning in the relevant way. But this which is implausible given the strength of the former connection and the fact that
is implausible, since tracking surface refiectance profiles is arguably quite useful, and the latter ‘ is uninstantiared. Indeed, it is doubtful that there even is an
it is not clear that tracking colors would likewise be useful. edenic l", "~' Y-BLUE ‘ .Ourr , 'color , ' are
In any case, even if the strategy can be made to work for a given putative mismatch specifically rigged up to respond to properties like surface reflectance profiles. not
case—that is. even if in a given case what is represented can be found in the uninstantiated edenic properties.
actual world and is causally potent. and the tracking theory under consideration The prospects for this kind of strategy are no more promising for the optimal
successfully singles it out rather than other items the representation in question functioning tracking theory. On this theory. representation I whatever
might be said track—it is unlikely that this strategy will work in all putative
to cause them in optimal conditions, where optimal conditions are onditions
u/014/11
“ Campbell (ly9)), Cornmarl (lfl7l. I973), and Hacker (ism propose such pnmlnvlsl realist views or " Mendelovlcl zoub relatedly argues that tracking theories make it too easy to argue for rsalisiri about
color. See Hilbert and Byrne 1oo7. Pautz MS, Hardin fly“, and Gow mi. tor erltleal discussion. represented piopsrriss.
N
‘"Hardin (1933) argues agarnsr cornrnans (ms) rulisrn along these liner, arguing that ilpri ve eolor rodisr also suggests rliar UNICORH niiglir be an internally structured representation and so might not
properties are causally eifieaeious, rlirri we should be able to test for them by physical means. See also get its content directly from tracking (I990. p. iul. (See also Dretslre lyll tor this suggestion.) aur this
Byme and Hilbert mos fordiseussion. is not an Opllollt representations ofcolors. wliirli are unlikely to be lnremally srrurrurrd.
P’
6;. Par! 11: /Ilm-native 7'hearm oflntenrumaluy Clmprerg: TheAlism.trtb Prnbltmfér Tmrlrmg Tlmzries 6;
that promote survival. flourishing, or odrer kinds of appropriate functioning. To conditions that are of a different type than design conditions. and asymmetric
maintain that our perceptual color representations represent ' ' ‘ prop- ‘r 4 r'~‘ ‘al.lowfor'r incaseswherea r '
erties, the optimal functioning theorist would have to maintain that our perceptual is tokened as a result of a comparatively non-robust causal relation.
color representatio never occur in optimal conditions. Further, she would have The fact that the tracking theory only allows for misrepresentation in cases where
to maintain that were we to be in optimal conditions, edenic color properties, there is some kind of nonsemantic defect means that it cannot take perceptual
properties that never actually cause tokens of our per ' color representations,
color representations to uninstantiated properties, since perceptual color
would at least sometimes cause such tokens. But our perceptual color represent representation are as well behaved as any other representations in all the ways
help us survive, reproduce, and fulfill our goals, and so there is no basis on which to that might matter to it: they occur in each version of the tracking theory's favored
maintain that the onditions in which they occur are never optimal nor any reason nonsemantica" successful conditions, conditions in which there is no nonsemantic
to think that were they to occur in the presence of edenic colors, this would better defect. As a result, these occurrences cannot be deemed misrepresentations, and
help us survive, flourish. or function appropriately. the tracking theorist cannot allow perceptual color , ' to represent
The teleological tracking theory fares no better. On at least some versions of uninstantiated edenic colors.“
the theory, representations represent whatever properties our ancestors interacted
with that aided in the survival and reprod of the representations’ consuming
systems in specific ways. in order for such a View to allow for perceptual color 5.2 Content-Revising Strateaies
representations to r instantiated properties, these properties would have
to have been ‘ ' " in our cur r "' 5 with our Content-revising strategies take issue with my claims about what SKY—Bl.UE rep—
ancestors’ perceptual states as required. but they must not be instantiated in our resents, i .. with premises (C2) and (Oz), which are supposed to be supported
current environment. In the case of perceptual representations of color, the claim by our theory—independent methods. The reply appealing to ways of ‘ resenting
would be that our ancestors lived in an edenically colored world, while we don’t. discussed in §3.6.z is an example ofsuch a response strategy, since it appeals to ways
But the claim that our ancestors lived in an edenically colored world but we don‘t of representing to argue against my reasons for claiming that SKY-BLUE represents
is ad hoc and implausible. Another problem with this suggestion is that it is quite <edenic sky-blue>. Let us consider some more content-revising strategies.
plausible thatjust as our perceptual color representations are useful to us, they were
similarly useful to our ancestors, which explains why we have them now. So. by the
A.2..i THE RELIABILITY OF INTROSPECTION
lights of the theory, they should represent whatever it is useful for them to co-occur
with in our ancestors, which is the same thing that it is useful for them to co-occur One might object to my use ofintrospection to argue for (Oz) and (C2). my claims
with in us: surface reflectance profiles or the like, not edenic colors. 50. tum our about what SKY-BLUE does and does not represent. lntrospection, one might claim, is
ancestors lived in an edenically colored world. the theory would likely still predict not a reliable guide to represented contents, so it needn't trouble the tracking theorist
that our perceptual color representations , the likes of surface reflectance that it suggests against her predictions.
profiles rather titan edenic colors. While some uses of introspection are indeed problematic. my use is fairly innocu-
The problem can be put more 5 ", . It is a consequence of all tracking theories ous. I only need introspection to have a fairly limited access to intentional states: It
that there are certain - " ' in which a _ ’ cannot ,
need only partially reveal the superficial character of the contents of paradigm cases
Tracking theories only allow for misrepresentation in cases where there is a certain
nonsemantic defect, a defect apart from being inaccurate or non-veridical. In the
case of optimal functioning theories, misrepresentation can only occur when a
"srr also Mendelovici zoiyh and zoté, where I argue that cracking theonea cannot allow for clean
easexoheliable 'casesofteliable where nothing
' ' has '
representation doesn't help its bearer survive and flourish. This is because what causes gone wrong, and that this isproblem for them even rt there are no nrrur clean cases of reliable
a
or corresponds to the tokening of a representation in conditions in which it helps misrepresentation. While Mendelovici zouh and xoI6 argue against tracking theories
on me basis or
. . . . H .
its bearer survive and Hourishjusl Lt its intentional content. Similarly, teleological
can be roughly rnmryn of as arguing against tracking theories on the basis ofurul eaier ofteliable
tracking theories only allow a representation to misrepresent when it occurs in misrepresentation.
P
64 Part II: Altematm fimzrm oflnleniinna/ily Chapter}: Tin Alismdlr/J ml/mifii iiatiiig r/iaims as
of intentionality, cases that we can notice introspectively and use to fix reference particular surface reflectance profiles an object has from our perceptual experiences
on intentionality (see §z.2..z). This limited introspective access is compatible with ofits having a certain color or our belief that it has a certain color.
our having little or no access to the deep nature of intentional states and contents. Another suggestion is that intentional states involving SKY-BLUE play a role in
our mental processes." nonconscious intentional states. past intentional states,“ or discriminating between objects that are SR1’ and those that are not, so SKY-BLUE
intentional states we are not attending to.“ The introspective judgments I make does play a psychological role appropriate to representing <SRP>.
use of are limitations because they pertain to the superficial
not affected by these The problem with this suggestion is that mere discriminatory abilities, that is.
characters of contents that are currently being entertained and attended to.“ the mere ability to group and tell apart items having certain features, are at best
In any case, my arguments for (C2) and (Oz) should be effective for even weak evidence that we represent the properties they have in common. This is
those who are suspicious of introspective evidence of any kind, since they do not because mere tracking. tracking that does not give rise to intentionality, is sufficient
rely on introspection alone. They also make use of considerations of psycholog- for discrimination." Note that this is something that even the tracking theorist
ical role, which are unaffected by this objection and independently support my should accept. A tracking theorist who claims diat, on her favored tracking relation,
conclusions. perceptual color representations track and represent surface reflectance profiles
should agree that on other tracking relations they also track other properties, such
as the categorical bases of surface reflectance profiles, And so, she should agree
A.2..z. l)0 WI: REPRESENT <sRP> lN A PSYCHOLOGICALLV INVOLVED WAY?
that perceptual color representations can be used to discriminate between different
One might argue that, contrary to what I've said. SKY-BLUE plays a psychological role properties of these types, too. So even the tracking theorist should agree that
that suggests it represents <SRI’>. Ifthis is right, then perhaps the tracking theory's discrimination is more closely tied to tracking than to intentionality and so that it
content attributions are correct afi'er all. is at best weak evidence for the claim that a certain content is represented. What we
Let us consider some suggestions as to what the relevant psychological roles sug- need in order to use discriminatory responses to show that a putative represented
gesting that SKYvBLUE represents <SRP> might be. One suggestion is that perceptual content is psychologically involved is some hint that the discriminatory responses
states involving sltvvntulz cause or otherwise connect with beliefs representing are in some sense based on this content, not iust that they happen to correspond to
surface reflectance profiles. This might be because the contents of our color-related the content in some way.
beliefs are inherited partly from the contents of our perceptual color representations. A related suggestion is that our best processing story about color perception takes
and so color—related beliefs. as well as perceptual color representations. represent it to process information about surface reflectance profiles. Cones detect incoming
objects as having surface reflectance profiles. light of various wavelengths, and this information is processed and transformed by
The problem with this suggestion is that it merely allows the psychologically other retinal cells and then other parts of the visual system to result in color experi—
uninvolved contents posited by the tracking theory to permeate throughout the ences that also carry information about objects’ surface reflectance profiles, All stages
cognitive economy. The fact remains that neither our perceptual representations of of color processing carry information relating to surface rcflectance profiles, which
color nor our beliefs about colors behave as if they represented surface reflectance suggests that they, and the perceptual color states they sometimes result in. represent
profiles, For instance, absent the relevant scientific knowledge, we cannot infer which surface reflectance profiles in a psychologically involved way. Now, there might be
a sense in which it is correct to say that cones, ganglion cells. and other cells and
areas involved in color processing, including the perceptual color states we've been
" Thar wt have llllle at no access to out mental pnxtssti has httn dsi-ntinsttated in many ituditt. rot concerned with, carry information about wavelengths oflight and surface reflectance
exalnplt. suhittts asked [0 iiitinotiu a list ofword paits including "0c¢alI~M0oI1' watt inoit lilttly to
profiles. After all, we are granting that perceptual color states track surface reflectance
pitrtt Tide to otiiti laiands ofdetergrnt. but they did not ttahit that this pttrsitntt was at lelsl‘ paitly
caused by tlitit EXPOSIIIE to -ottanamoon" (Nisbfl! and Wilson .977). profiles, and carrying information about something is one way to track it But, as we
" casts of change blindness (Se: Rensink ti’ al. I997) might ht taken to suggest that us have littlt tit no have seen, mere tracking is at best weak evidence for intentionality. We can make
access (0 past inttntitinal stattt.
"cases tirinatttntiunal blindness (Ste Mack and Rock -99!) suggest wt liavt littlt or no atttss tn
intantional states we attending (9.
att not
“stt also aaynt and Spent! (Zola) rtii a congenial discussion urtht litiuts ofilltrospcctmn. “ SEC Mtndtluviti 2013b. mils. MS, l-latdin I991. and wtight too; rot sn-nilat ptnntt.
V
- Linux For Evaluation. https://www.qoppa.com/pdfstudio
66 Part II: Altrrrmlwt T/mints aflnrmrtan.zl:t_v Chapter}: mrtrtmttb Pmbltmfnr rm/tmg U/rant: 67
good sense of the role ofsurface reflectance profiles in color processing by appeal to Another. potentially more conciliatory, response is to say that in Oscar and
tracking and carrying information, without requiring that the resulting perceptual Toscar's case, broad contents are in fact at least partially discernible using my
color stares intentionally represent the properties they carry information about. theory-independent methods but the contents of perceptual color representations
In any case, even if it can be argued that considerations of psychological role that are predicted by the tracking theory are not discernible at all. While my
support taking SKY-BLUE to represent <SRP>, this only provides a response to the theory—independent methods do not allow us to fully discern the contents of Oscar
argument from commission. It only allows us to say that SKY-BLUE represents a con- and Toscar's concepts, they do narrow down the options by providing partial access
tent with a SRP—ish superficial character, and hence that (C2) is false, which provides to these contents‘ superficial characters. They do not tell us that Oscar. for example.
a response to the argument from commission. But it does nothing to allow us to reject represents a content with an H,O-ish superficial character, but they tell us that he
(01). the claim that with an edenic-sky-blue-ish
SKVPELUE represents a content represents a with a water»ish superficial character, where <H,O> is one
content
superficial character, and so the argument from omission is '1'
J
such content and <XYZ> is another. For instance. while Oscar and Toscar cannot
introspectively tell the difference between <H,O> and <XYZ>, they can both
tell that they represent a content that has a water-ish superficial character, rather
A.7..; EXTERNALISM AND THE THEORY-INDEPENDENT METHODS than an elephantvish superficial character. Similarly, Oscar and Toscars water-related
One might argue that perceptual color representatio have broad contents. con- concepts play various psychological roles in relation to their drinking and swimming
tents the representation of which depends on environmental Factors. and that my behavior, the inferences they make about taps. oceans, streams. the requirements for
theory-independent methods for finding out about our intentional states and their life, etc,. and they have an overall ‘water-ish" phenomenology. All this suggests that
contents are ineffective at telling us about broad contents. This would give us Oscar and Toscar’s concepts represent contents with water»ish superficial characters.
grounds to reject (C2) and (0).). So, one might suggest, theoIy»indepent:lent considerations do tell us something
To see why one might think that my theory-independent considerations do not
about Oscar and Toscar's concepts: They tell us that they represent contents with
tell us about broad contents, consider the Twin Earth thought experiment: Oscar, water-ish superficial characters, rather than contents with elephant-ish superficial
who lives on Earth, has a water ‘ 4 concept that represents <H,0>. Toscar, his characters or other superficial characters that would be completely ' " to any
intrinsic duplicate. lives on Twin Earth, where the clear watery stuff is XYZ, and introspective appearances or psychological roles.
as a result, has a <XYZ>.“ One might argue
water-related concept that represents In contrast, in the case of perceptual color representation , theoty—independent
that Oscar and Toscar's water-related intentional states play the same psychological considerations provide no hint whatsoever as to the representation of contents with
roles and are not introspectively discernible. After all. Oscar and Toscar engage in
surface- “ -profile-ish I E ' ‘ ch Theory ' " , ‘ consid-
all the same behaviors, and they cannot tell from introspection alone whether their erations suggest that SKY-BLUE represents a content with an eclenic-slty—blue—ish
superficial character, but it is not platmible to maintain that <SRP> has an
concepts represent <H,0> or <XYZ>.
There are several responses to this worry. One is that it is commonly thought to edenic-sky-blue-ish superficial character in the way that it might be plausible to
be an vlzjectinn to externalism. the View that there are broad contents, that broad
say that <H,O> has a water-ish superficial ch . Our theory-independent
considerations suggest against taking SKY—Bl.UE to represent <SRP> in the same
contents are not introspectively accessible or psychologically involved (e. Stich ,
way that they suggest against taking Oscar's water—related concept to represent
r983, Boghossian 1997. Sosa zoo7). This is why externalists often try to argue that
<elephant>.
they are introspectively accessible (e.g.. Burge i988) and psychologically involved
(e.g., Dretske 1995, Williamson zooo). lfthis attitude is correct. then if there is an
A final response that can be offered to this objection echoes the responses given
incompatibility between the assumptions underlying my methods and extemalism, earlier to some of the other c ‘ 6 strategies. Even if, ' color rep-
represent broad contents and broad contents are entirely shielded from
it is externalism that should be rejected.
our theor,‘ ‘ I ‘ " 0l.Il’Ki|C0|“ ' J I “ ” ' do
reveal " very c "‘ . something ' ‘ ' D edenic L‘ H ' L
This thing. whatever it is, arguably answers to our notion of content and so needs
“ This is, oreotttst. I common Variant or i>ttttttm's(tm)wtii»1tnowtt thought Cxpenlnull In Support or
txtflnilxsln abmtt lil'Ig|l|SK|t nteututg. to be accommodated by the tracking theory. So, even if the tracking theory‘s
1

68 Pan II: Almmtrwe Tlimrier qfiln/mrionalizy C/lap/er}: The zirimiho-b Ilrfiblfrrljo?’ I'm/mtg zhtorm so
prediction that SKY-BLUE represents <SRP> cannot be disconfirmed using our is that <edenic' sky blue> involves edenic' blue-ish-ness, which is a qualitative
theory-independent methods, this does not affect my claims that these methods color-like feature, and nothing like that is found in SR1’. Surface reflectance profiles
reveal a content that the tracking theory cannot accommodate. So, even if this are dispositions to reflect certain proportions ofdifferent wavelengths oflight, but
strategy can help us reject (C2,) and provide a response to the argument from neither light, particular wavelengths of light, not dispositions to reflect, transmit,
commission, it cannot help us reject (Oz), so the argument from omission still or emit light are literally qualitatively blue—i.rh. This is simply not part of our best
stands." understanding oflight or the surfaces ofobjects. There is no qualitative blue-ish-ness.
and hence no edenic' blue-ish-ness, to be found in SR1’. So, a revised version ofthe
argument from omission still goes through, one that replaces (02,) with (O2.'), and
A.z.d REVISING (02,)
(OI) with (Or'):
I have suggested that SKY-BLUE represents a content with 3 qunlitatlvci simple, prim-
itive, sui generis, non-dispositional, non—relational edenic-sky-blue-ish superficial (or) If the trackjngtheoryistrue, then SKY—BLUE does not represent <edenic‘
character, i.e., <edenic sky-blue>. But, one might suggest, perhaps our introspective sky-blue>.
t ’ I| and n " inn of psy " ' 0' " do not get us all
the way to this claim. Perhaps introspection does not really support the claim that There are two ways the objector might insist that surface rcfiectance profiles
color contents have certain structural features like being primitive or sui generis, involve edenic' blue-ish-ness. First, she might simplybuild a qualitative blue-ish—ness
and perhaps the psychological role of perceptual color states is also silent on these into SR1’. On the resulting view, we are mistaken as to the true nature of surface
features. If so, might knock those features off of our characterization of
then we reflectance prof-iles—rhey do involve a qualitative blue-ish-ness, perhaps even as an
SKY-BLUEYS content, What we are left with is the claim that SKY~BLUE represents extra nonphysical component.
a content with a qualitative sky»blue—ish feature; let us call this content <edenic' This response importantly modifies our understanding of surface reflectance
sky-blue). lfso, then we might reject (Oz) in favor of(O2‘): profiles, building in a qualitative blue-ish—ness that cannot be understood in terms
of surface reflectance profiles’ other features (otherwise, we would not have had to
(O73) SKY—BLUI-1 represents <edenic' sky-blue>. build it in). This strategy results in somethingvery much like primitive color realism,
and everything we said about realist strategies in §A.IJ applies here, too.
By rejecting (Oz), this response blocks the argument from omission." The other way to insist that surface relicctance profiles involve edenic'
Now, I don't think the reasons for rejecting (Oz) in favor of (023) are right: sky-blue-ish-ness is by identifying the problematic qualitative blue-ish-ness with
Arguably, what we notice upon introspection of perceptual color states are deter» some property ofSRI’: SR1’ due: involve a qualitative blue-ish-ness, not because it is
minately primitive, simple, etc., color features, and, arguably, our perceptual color tacked onto it, as on the previous suggestion, but rather because some other feature
states behave as if color contents have those features. of SRP, feature F,ju5t it this qualitative blue-ish-ness.
in any case, even if we grant that out theory—independent consideration only This strategy leads us straight back to the reiterated identities strategy, discussed
support (Of), this is enough to make an argument from omission. The problem in §;,6,4, which involves defending a prima facie false identity claim by wheeling
in more prima facie false identity claims, effectively denying any relevant common
ground with one’s opponent. While this strategy makes for a possible defense, it
” Another tttpohtt to the objection would be to train. that We do not lnltnrionally ttpttstht broad does so because it is effectively a skeptical strategy, taking advantage of the fact that
Culfltnts ind. 50, that the riot that my Khcoryflndzpendtnt do iiot ttu HS about them
justification has to end somewhere. The fact remains: There is absolutely no reason
IS not a pmblem. iii Chapter 7, I algue rot a view On which We do not iiitttitiotitiiy l’€pl’¢S€I1( braid
Contents. thiiiigh we dttivstivtiy Kepfestnt them. Where derived menizl ttpttstiititioii is tiot I Species arising from the physical examination ofthe surfaces ofobjects alone to think that
flfIl|(cn[|Dn1li(y, oiit p|fl.i|lH’Ig that line oritgiiiimit here woiiid take [15 too rat afield. they involve anything like edenic' bluishness.
4‘ lfwe Jddirlclnilly idtiitiry (edCl’Ii(' sky-blue) with <$RP>, thth wt also hm a iitw way ofemplnylng
(ll: dtrtiitt by |dEl1[l[y Sxratcgy described iti §3.6i| to rcjtcr (C2) iiid mid the argumtnt riom
commission. in whit follows, i roeiis tht argument rtoiti omission, Slntt this is the part of the
oii
ttspoiise that is new.
‘I

Chaplet‘ 4; Fumrinrml Roz; Thmritrand Tracking Tlmmzx Again 7;
1 The Functional Role Theory
According to the functional role theory, original intentionality arises from represen-
tations’ functional roles. We can put the core view as follows:
The functional role theory All (actual) originally intentional states arise from
mental representations‘ functional roles.
Recall that B arises from A when E is nothing over and above A. perhaps because
5 is identical to, fully grounded in. constituted by, or realized by A, and that
original intentionality is intentionality that does not derive from other instances of
intentionality (§z.r). According to the functional role theory, then, the functional
roles of mental representations give rise to the most basic kind of intentionality. and
ofintentionality are derived from it.‘
any other kinds
4 Functional Role Theories and Tracking Theories Again
Harman (1987) distinguishes between two different kinds
dleories: Short—arm functional role theories restrict the relevant functional roles
of functional role
to internal functional roles, functional roles that representations have in relation to
other representations or other internal items. such as roles in inference. In contrast,
long-arm functional role theories take the relevant roles to include both internal
functional roles and long-arm functional roles, functional roles with respect to items
in the external environment. such as roles in tracking or directing behavior toward
various items.‘
THE PREVXOUS CHAPTER discussed the tracking theory, which states that all
Shortvarm functional role theories generally restrict the relevant kinds of internal
actual cases of original intentionality arise from trackingt This chapter considers
roles to roles in ' ‘ and reasoning. For example. a short-arm functional role
anothct theory of intentionality, the functional role theory, which takes original
theory might claim that the representation AND represents <conjunction> in virtue
intentionality to arise from representations functional dispositions with respect
of playing the following role in inference. where A and B are representations with
to one another and perhaps other items in the world—in short, their functional
propositional contents:
roles,
I will argue that one version of the functional role theory, the short-arm version, (Al) From judging A AND B. one is likely to judge A.
which takes the relevant functional roles to be roles that representations have in (A2) From judgingA AND B, one is likely to judge B.
relation to other representations or other internal items, faces challenges in securing (Ag) From judging A and judging B, one is likely to judge A AND B.
determinate content and explaining why such functional roles should give rise to
intentionality in the first place (§4.z). These problems motivate the alternative According to short-arm functional role theories, all it takes for AND to represent
long«arm version of the theory, which takes the relevant functional roles to include <conjunction> is for it to have this sort of functional role. The short—arm functional
tracking or other relations to the environment. Unfortunately, as we will see. the role theory claims that other representations have their contents fixed in this way,
longaarm functional role theory inherits the tracking theory's mismatch problem
(§4.3). Finallyv §4.4 argues that the deep diificulty with both the tracking theory
The l'...mlm..l ml: theory is also sometimes known as “conceptual role semantics" or “inferential role
and the functional role theory is that tracking relations and functional roles simply
semantics,"Defendersofthe view include Harman (tofiz. X957). Block (lgas). Fie|d(i977a, 1977b). and
do not have what it takes to give rise to intentionality. Peacocke ((992,).
The tracking theory is . limit cm of the Iong~arm functional role theory, utmg the only relevant
nlmloml roles to be speeifie kinds oflong-arm functional roles.
7o
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72 Part II: Al/z T/Imrit: oflmm/i’armlit_y Clmpm 4: Furrztialtdl Ralr 77/sane: and Tmt-kmg Thmie: Again 7;
too. For example, the concept BACHELOR might have its content fixed by its role in Bonjour (1998) puts this kind ofworry as follows: We can think ofthe short—arm
the following inferences: functional role theory as claiming that there is an isomorphism between the network
of inferential relations between representations and the network of enrailment
(Br) From judging 0 is A BACHELOR, one is likely to judge 015 A MAN.
and perhaps other relations between contents. Representation then present the
(B2) From judging 0 IS A BACHELOR, one is likely tojudge 0 IS UNMARRIED.
contents that they are associated with by virtue of this isomorphism. But, Bonjour
(B5) From judging o is A MAN and o is UNMARRIED, one is likely to judge 0
claims. it is not clear why the existence of such an isomorphism between the
IS A BACHELOR.
inferential network between representations and the network of relations between
According to short-arm functional role theories. what it takes for BACHELOR to contents should make the representations represent the contents.
represent <bachelor> is for it to play a functional role like the one specified above. Why couldn't there be a set of items standing in [an inferential] structure
MAN and UNMARRIED likewise get their contents from the functional roles they exactly isomorphic to the [network of relations between contents] while still
play, including their roles involving the representation BACHELOR.‘ having no content at all? [T]herc is no reason atall to take the obtaining of
According to long-arm functional role theories. the functional roles that give rise such an isomorphism to be aruficient condition for having a specific content....
to original intentionality include not only internal roles, such as those mentioned
(honjour 1998, p. 177: emphasis in original)
above, but also long-arm roles, such as roles in tracking external world properties and
generating behavior. For example. on a long-arm functional role theory, the content In other words, there is no reason to think that internal functional roles should give
of BACHELOR might be determined not only by its role in inferences involving rise to intentionality.
UNMARRIED and MAN, but also by tracking relations it bears to the environment
It is possible to understand Searle's (1980) Chinese room argument as making
a similar point. According to Searle, no amount of syntactic manipulation suiiices
(c.g., to the property of being a bachelor) or tracking relations that UNMARRIED,
MAN, or other related concepts bear to the environment. for having conrent—mere syntax doesn't get you semantics. Searle argues for this
claim using a thought experiment in which a monolingual English»spealting subject
4.2 Worries with Short-Arm Functional Role Theories is placed in with a rule book relating Chinese characters to other Chinese
a room
characters. The subject receives strings of Chinese characters through
an input slot,
The long»arm version ofthe functional role theory is arguably more promising than looks up those characters in the rule book, and returns the specified characters
the short-arm version (sec, c. Harman r987), but it is instructive to consider some through an output slot. In doing so, he might be simulating one side ofa conversation
of the shortcomings of the short-arm version in order to appreciate some of the in Chinese, but neither he nor the room understands Chinese. If this is right, then
possible merits of the long-arm version. merely having internal states that play particular internal functional roles does not
One worry with short»arm functional role theories has to do with how give rise to inrcntionality.
inrentionality can arise from functional roles in the first place. Short-arm functional This is also a way ofthinking ofHarnads (r99o) symbol groundingproblcm. Har-
role theories claim that having internal states playing various internal functional nad argues that representations can't get their contents from their functional roles
roles gives rise to intentionality, presumably in that it either is, constitutes, realizes, with respect to one another because the representa that any given representation
’
or grounds intentionality. But, might wonder, why should playing an internal
we is functionally related to are contentless prior to such content determination. He
functional role give rise to intcnrionaliry at all? Once we have a state that plays some likens the possibility ofrepresentations getting their contents from their functional
internal role, why isn’t that the end of the story? Why is there a further bit of the story roles with respect to one another to learning Chinese from a Chinese-Chinese
on which, because of their internal roles, internal states get to have contents? it seems dictionary: To someone who does not know any Chinese, a Chinese»Chinese
that there shouldn't be, that mere internal roles are not sufficient for intentionaliry. dictionary merely relates one meaningless symbol to another. Analogously, content
can't transfer from ouc representation to another, because there's no content in the
system of representations to begin with. The problem, we might say, is that having
’ As before, i assume that many of the vehicles of original intcntionaliry are subpmpositional internal states playing internal functional roles simply doesn't automatically give rise
representations. but the discussion can for those who disagree. See n. in of
be amended accordingly
Chapter and cm.
x
to intentionaliry.
74 Part 11: Almmriw Tl/tam: nfIrr!erIIiarml1t_y C/mp/er 4: Ftmrmmal Rule T/June: and Tranlzirrg T/Inner Again 75
It is instructive to consider whether similar worries appear to al-Hict the tracking x represents <bachelor>
theory. Just as one might wonder why functional roles should give rise to intention- Y FCPYCSCDIS <l'T|ll'|>
ality. one might also wonder why tracking relations should give rise to intentionality. 2 represents <unmarried>
Our representatio bear various tracking relations to multiple things in their envi-
ronments, but why, one might ask, should that give rise to the having of content? I re-
But an equally good interpretation is this one:
turn to this question at the end of this chapter, but for now. we might agree that such
x represents <mare>
worries do not seem quite as gripping in the case ofthe tracking theory as in the case
Y represents <female>
of the short-arm functional role theory. A speculative proposal for why this might 2 represents <horse>
be the case is that tracking relations seem to relate us to items that are well suited to
playing the roles ofcontents—namely, objects, properties, and states of affairs. These And there are plenty of other equally good ways to assign contents.‘
are the kinds ofthings that we find at the far end oftracking relations, and they look Of course. the more representations we add, the more constrained the set of
like good candidates for being identified with contents. Internal functional roles, admissible interpretations becomes. We might hope to have enough representations
however. do not relate representations to anything that could plausibly play the roles to rule out all but one possible interpretation But this is not so.
of contents. They only, at best, relate representation to one another. This makes The “swapping argument" offered by Bourget (MS) and Mendelovici and Bourget
an alleged connection between internal functional roles and intentionality appear (forthcoming) shows that even if the internal functional roles of a set of represen»
problematic in a way that an alleged connection between tracking and intentionality tations can determine the logical relationships between their contents (e.g.. their
might not. entailment relationships), daese logical relationships cannot uniquely determine
There is a further question for the short—arm functional role theorist: Supposing their specific contents. Suppose that there is at least one assignment A of contents
that we grant that internal functional roles give rise to intentional states, which to a given set R of representations that is consistent with their internal functional
intentional states do they give rise to? One might worry that the assignment of roles and logical relationships. The contents assigned by A can be modeled as
contents to a system of functionally related , is ’ ’ ' ‘ which are functions from possible worlds to certain entities (truth values
by the representa ' ' functional roles. To see this. consider again the case of for thoughts, extensions for concepts’). Now picture all the objects at a given possible
BACHELOR. From (Bl), (B2), and (E3), it was clear to us what content BACHELOR world W laid on a surface. We can identify each object by its position on the
is supposed to have: It's supposed to have whatever content is related as described eg, as “the object at location L." For any concept, we can characterize
surface,
to the concepts MAN and UNMARRIED, namely <bachelot>. However, this only its extension at W ’ing to A in terms of a specific location (for 'ndividual
appears clear to us because \ve assume that MAN and UNMARRIED have already concepts), a set of locations (for monadic concepts), or a structure of locations
been assigned the contents <man> and <unmarried>. But this is not how content (for rl-ary concepts, where n > 1). Now, if we keep these specifications unchanged
determination works on the short-arm functional role view. Content does not How but swap the locations of some objects on our surface, making sure to swap pairs
from one representation to another (after all, where would it start?). Rather, an of objects that are not both inside or outside the extensions of all concepts. our
entire system off " related representations is supposed to have its contents specifications will “ new extensions for some concepts. By construction, the
determined all at once. But then the relevant functional roles of BACHELOR are resulting assignment of intensions makes true (or false) all the same thoughts in R as
better represented by 031’), (B2.'), and (B3’): A, but it is a different assignment involving different contents for certain concepts
(Bl') From judging 0 is x, one is likely to judge 0 is Y.
(EL) From judging o is x, one is likely to judge o is z. This way or putting the worry assumes that there are subproposltiorlal representations But the
03;’) From judging o is Y and o is 2. one is likely to judge 0 is x. same worry arises lfwe deny this assumption and rare propositional tepresenttltlons to be internally
unstructured. Functional relations between Fulhfiedged propositional representations are no more
capable nfslngllng our unique content attributions than the functional relations among their parts.
Now it is not so clear how to interpret X, Y. and 2, One possible interpretation is the > no, r r ,,;M,,$,,,, t t a N. n! butthe
following: non-propositional representations more generally.
V
76 Par! 11: A/termmvl Thznrm gflmm Hand!!!) Chapter 4: Functional Rule Theatre: and Tmt/ting Themes Again 77
of R. Using this procedure, we can plausibly construct huge numbers of alternative other items. and these items are good andidates for being identified with contents.
interp that are consistent with any set of logical relationships determined
‘ To put the point metapho ally, tracking relations seem to "reach out" into the world
'
by internal functional role.‘ and "grab" hold of contents. This is why it mi t be thought that tracltingsomething
The upshot is that, while it may be fairly plausible that internal functional roles can suificefor represendng it. The long-arm functional role theory can say more or
can get us more content from some content, it is questionable whether they can get less the thing. Long—arm relations, the relations that reach into the external
same
us some content from no content, and even if we assume that they can. they arguably world. “grab” contents From theworld and inject them into a representario ‘system.
cannot assign content determinately. They are then transformed and passed around drroughout the system. thanks to the
functional relations between representations.
Long-arm functional role theories might also be thought to address the content
4.3 Worries with Long-Arm Functional Role Theories
determinacy problem. The problem of content determinacy arises because internal
functional roles are arguably not enough to uniquely determine content. The
The worries with short-arm functional role theories mentioned above motivate a long-arm theory avoids the problem by adding relations between representations
move to longtarrn functional role theories. According to long-arm functional role
and the external world to the mix. These relations impose some constraints on the
theories, intentionality is a matter of both a representations internal functional admissible ’ rpretations of a system of representations. For example. Sllppost Ill!
roles and its ‘ ‘ dispositions with respect to items in the environment. The
representation MAN tracks the property of being a man. The long-arm functional
relevant environmental factors might include tracking relations and dispositions to role theory might claim that this fixes its content as <man>, which rules out an
cause behavior, though most long-arm functional role theorists focus on tracking
interpretation of BACHELOR as having the content <mare>. If enough representa-
relations, and I will, too. The intuitive idea is that tracking relations to external items tions have their contents fixed by tracking relations, perhaps there is no longer room
give rcpresentatio some intentional content. which then gets passed around to the for multiple assignments of contents. Again, put metaphoric “ tracking relations ,
entire system of representatio via the representation ' internal functional roles.’ “grab” content from the world and "inject" it into the representational system. It then
Long-arm functional role theories might be thought to address both of the gets passed around via internal functional roles. If all goes well, this fixes a unique
above-mentioned worries with short-arrn functional role theories. The first worry content for all representati , ' ‘ “ng the ones that are not directly hooked up to
has to do with why mere internal roles should result in intentionality. To see how the external world via tracking.‘
long-arm functional role theories might address this worry, recall that the worry is Unfortunately, by invoking elements of the tracking theory, the long—arm func-
not so pressing for tracking theories. Tracking relations relate us to properties and tional role theory inherits the tracking rheory’s mismatch problem (described in the
previous chapter). In some cases, the wrong content gets “grabbed” from the world
and “injected” into the system. For example, the representation SKY—BLUE tracks a
‘ The tote idea of the swapping atgninent I5 inspired by l>titnain't (i977) inotlel-theotetie aigiinient particular surface reflectance profile or the like, and. according to the long-arm func-
againtt eottetponoenee theories ortnith. Bonjour (toga, pp, i7s~i77) also iaitet wntnet ahoiit eontent
indeterminacy {oi the rtinetional tole theoty, and i<tiplte‘t (ion) quill atgntnent ean he iinaeistooa at
tional role theory, this at least partly determines its content. SKY-BLUE is functionally
poting acontent tletettnlnaey challenge that apphet to functional role theories. roaoi (ton) also tanet related to other representadons. which have their contents determined partly by
iintletdetettiilnation wottiet with pioeeaiiial teniantiet. see also Rey iero, naltet I915. and l-lotowitt their ‘ ' ' dispositions in relation to SKY-BLUE. In this way, introspectively
X991.
oiahani et al. (1007) etteno tiith indetetininaey worries to the ttatlting theory as well, atgiiing that foreign and p L ' D’ " uninvolved content enters the representatio ‘ system
no raet ean s an (i,,.,)c.,. l,,- . I A inaltlnga and comes to infect not only representations that get their contents from tracking
tiniilai an tit s also c v\ who , ca t what we talte
but also representations that are ‘ ionally related to them in the right way.
an intentional State [0 teret (0 (mar ~tognitite intent“) can solve the “stopping” ptohleni. the ptohieni
ortletetinining what eitaetly an intentional ttate tereti to.
‘ l tee aside two-raetot views. which sill: that thete ate two kinds oreontent, one that it a intttet or
riinetiooal role and one that is a ntattet orttaeltlng (tee. e.g.. riela ion. and alotlt W93). -mo.raetoi
views combine ttaelting and riinetinnal role view: in that they talte thete to he two kinds oforiginal
intentionality, one If ,, ttaelting andone atinng rtoni functional tolet. so. they ttgtiahly inherit It. ll h ttiat ' ' I’ 1e l' tlnlnln
the problems tlistiiatetl above rot both the tiatlting theory and the hinetional role theoty. dltenrlinzcy WDH’ ,. which apply to ttaelting theories as well, at sttawtons (zoo!) "ttopping ptohletn:
1

78 Part II: Almmzwe Thelma: q/"lrrmtzrrutulzxy r:lmpm- 4: I'lAni’[im1a[Ra[t Thames ml 7'mr/mg Theories/igazrt 79
A possible way out of this worry is to say that representations that bear the our behaviors toward them. For example, perceptual color representatiolt , which
relevant kind of tracking relations to the world get their contents not solely ii-om I’ve argued represent edenic colors (§z.4), do not direct our behaviors toward edenic
tracking but also froln their internal functional rules. It might turn out, then, that colors (they do not allow us to discriminate between different edenic colors, identify
in the alleged mismatch cases, the internal functional role of a representation is instances of particular edenic colors, etc.) but instead direct our behaviors toward
incongruent with what it tracks. For example, SKY-BLUE might track a particular what they track. e.g., surface reflectance profiles.
surface reflectance profile but play the internal role appropriate to having the In short, the short-arm functional role theory leads to the long«arm functional
content <edenic skyAblue>. Indeed, I appealed to such discrepancies between what role theory, and the long-arm functional role theory inherits the tracking theory’s
a representation tracks and the content most congruent with its internal role in mismatch problem, making it empirically inadequate.
order to argue that the contents attributed by the tracking theory are psychologically
uninvolved (§;.4). The long»arm functional role theorist might suggest that this
internal functional role of SKY-BLUE partly determines its content and so, we can 4.4 The Real Problem with Both Tracking Theories and Functional
avoid saying that it representsparticular surface rcflcctancc profile.
a Role Theories
Unfortunately, though, what we end up with is a situation in which the two
determinants of content pull in different directions, and it is dii-Tacult to see how The mismatch problem shows that the tracking theory and the long—arm functional
they could inform or qualify each other so as to result in a single univocal content role theory have counterexamples and thus that they are false. But it elocsn’t tell us
assignment. It looks like the long»arm theorist must choose between having the ullqy they are false It doesn’t tell us just what is wrong with them.
contentof SKY-BLUE determined solely by tracking or having it determined solely I want to suggest that the Real Problem with invoking tracking to account for
by internal functional role, and she would have to make this Choice in a principled intentionality is that no amount ofcausal or other tracking relations between mental
way (e.g.. it won't do to say that content is determined by tracking relations except states and the world sulfices to give rise to genuine intentionality. While tracking
in mism ‘ cases). Presumably the same applies to other representations involved relations relate us to items that might appear to be well suited for being identified
in discordant tracking relations and internal functional roles. If we let tracking with contents, such as objects, properties, and states ofaflairs, they in no sense make
determine content in such cases, then we face the mismatch problem. If we let those items available to representational systems, let alone make them available for
internal functional role deterrnine content, then we risk lapsing into indeterminacy being passed around from one representation to another. As I suggested above, it
worries. It’s far from clear that there is a principled way to invoke both ingredients can be tempting to think oftracking relations as “grabbing" contents from the world
that avoids both problems.’ and “injecting” them into our thoughts and experiences, or perhaps as “reachingout”
I have focused on long—arm functional role theories where the long—arm relations into the world and allowing our minds to make epistemic contact with them. But no
are tracking relations. but similar points apply to long-arm theories where the mere causal or other tracking relation can make good on these metaphors. Causally
long—arm relations are a matter ofour behaviors or dispositions to behavior directed or otherwise interacting with objects and their properties doesn’t somehow pull
at things in the world.]ust as there are mislnatches between a representations content them outofthe world and place them into our minds Nor does it allow ottr minds
and what it tracks, so too are there misma L between a representatiolfs content to somehow reach out into the world to touch them. Bearing a tracking relation to
and that to which it directs our behaviors. This is because many of the mismatch somethingdoes not somehow present that thing to us, make us aware of it, allow us to
cases for tracking theories are cases of reliable misrepresentation (see §3.7), and entertain it, or make us have that thing in mind. The Real Problem with the tracking
in of reliable misrepresentation, represented items do not exist or are not
cases theory and long»arm functional role theory is not that tracking relations sometimes
instantiated in the external world, which makes it difficult to see how we can direct “grab" the wrong contents, but that tracking relations can’t “grab” anything at all. All
they can do is track.
For this reason, theories relying on tracking relations not only fail to attribute
9 One prlnuplcd way ofcomlzlning tracking and short-arm l'urtttlotta1.icterrttttttthts Dfconrcnl takes
psychologically involved contents in mismatch cases but, worse, preclude the con-
perceptual rtpleiclllazlolls (0 get rhtlt Cmlteflrs from tracking and all other Itplcsentanbns K0 gct
their Conllnls rm.-rt Internal functional role. attt this approach docshlt allow us [0 mad the mlsmzlcll tents they attribute from being psychologically involved in the first place. This is
problem, tam many mismatch me; are perceptual. because they cannot make contents available or usable in whatever ways contents
7 PDF Studio - PDF Editor for Mac, Vifindows,
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are available or usable, They cannot make contents introspectively accessible or
available in reasoning or the 0 neration of behavior, and they cannot make contents
contribute to how things seem to us or to our representational phenomenology.
Items on the far end of a tracking relation are simply not available to us. our
reasoning, our introspective abilities. or our understanding of the world. This holds
not only in mismatch cases, but also in cases where there happens to be a match
between what a representation tracks and what it represents. In such cases, it is not in
virtue of tracking relations that a representntion’s content is psychologically involved.
If cracking and long-arm functional role theories sometimes deliver the right answer.
they do so by accident.
Recall that one of the problems with the short-arm functional role theory was
that it was not clear why playing a certain internal functional role should give
rise to intentionality at all. If the claims of this section are correct, then it is
also not clear why tracking relations should give rise to intentionality. The Real
Problem with tracking and functional role theories, then, is that neither tracking
The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory
nor internal functional role not some ombination of the two is suficient for
intenti ‘ ' y. These ingredients are simply not enough to give rise to entertaining or
otherwise representing a content, In the next chapter. I will argue that phenomenal
consciousness is.”
I NOW TURN to my favored theory of intentionality. the phenomenal
445 Conclusion intentionality theory (PIT). on which original intentionality arises from
phenomenal .Chapter 5 presents and argues for PIT and
In this and the previous chapter. we considered two theories of intentionality, overviews the version of PIT that will emerge from the discussion in the rest
the tracking theory and the functional role theory, which take the source of ofthis book. Chapter 6 considers PIT3 status as a theory ofintentionalityt
intentionality to be tracking relations and functional roles, respectively. We saw that arguing that it escapes various theoretical worries.
these theories fact both empirical objections, which tell us that they are false, and
deep in-principle objections. which tell us why they fail. The next chapter considers
the phenomenal intentionality theory. which, I will argue. succeeds precisely where
tracking and functional role theories fail.
'“ sitnunt thoughts at: expressed by Bonjour (toys, 55.), who argues that what he tout the symbolic
theory or thought cannot account (at out ilIKl'0Sp:clIV¢ access to out thought contents. snnnntiy.
johnston (1.oo7) also argues that ttaektnt ttlat Ions cannot account rot the epttttntt" ofexpetienced
contents to out minds. Putnam (tom alto argues that the Vicw that reference is some particulatcausal
ttiatton ttqutttt an tttta brill: (act that that causal ttxataon IS tht ttrttantt toianon. In conversation.
chm Vigcl hat txpttssto tittnlat wotntt that even iftracking ttiataont can connect us to. tay, aoga
they cannot attount rot our understanding ot "gmsp"ot'd0gs. what thttt tompiaantt have in common
at the idea that ntttt tracking relations cannot. all by themselves. do nnythlng mott than none.
https:I/wvvw.qoppa.comIpdfstudio
5 The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory
THE VIEW or intentionality that I will propose and develop in this and the next
few chapters takes its main ingredient to be phenomenal consciousness. the felt,
subjective, or “what it’s like” aspect ofmental life. The overall view can be describcd
very simply: Original intentionality is identical to phenomenal consciousness, and
there is no derived intentionality, though there are non-intentional representational
states that derive from intentional states.
My specific view is a version of: more general theory. which I will call “the phe-
nomenal intentionality theory," on which all original intentionality arises from phe»
nomenal consciousness. Unlike tracking theories and functional role theories, which
locate the “source” (Kriegel zorr, 2.ox;b) ofintentionality in the relations between
representations and other representations and/ or the external environment, the
phenomenal intentionality theory takes the “source" ofintentionality to be our own
subjective inner lives. For this reason, the phenomenal intentionality theory might
be described as taking a “consciousness first" (Pautz 2.0133) approach to intentional-
ity, taking all intentlonality to ultimately derive from phenomenal consciousness.
In this chapter, I First argue for the phenomenal intentionality theory and then
begin to home in on my specific version. Along the way, I note various nearby fallback
positions that are available to those who accept some, but not all, ofmy claims.
In
7
84 Pan Ill: The Phenomenal Inmumzmluy filmy (lraptrrr: The P/Jtrlomma/Irllmlmrmlily Themy as
5.1 The PL ' Irltentionality Theory a phenomenal state with a red—square—ish phenomenal ' might automatically
represent the content <red square>.‘
The phenomenal intentionali y theory (PIT) takes its main ingredient to be Intentionality that arises from phenomenal consciousness is sometimes called
(phenomenal) consciousness, the L," 've, experiential, felt, or “what it's like” I, I, , are ways things
(Nagel I974.) feature of mental life that is introspectively obvious in cases such as are or might be with respect to their phenomenal intentionality, or phenomenal
those of pain. experiences of redness, and experiences oi'de'j'a vu. Like intentionality. intentional ways things are or might be. A phenomenal intentional state is an
phenomenal consciousness is something we can notice introspectively. It is the ins ’ of a phenomenal intentional property. and its content is its phenom-
'
introspectively noticeable feature that is subjective. experienced, or felt. enal content.‘ In the above example, the state of representing <red square> is
We can define phenomenal properties as ways things are or might be with respect a phenomenal intentional state and the content <red square> is its phenomenal
to phenomenal consciousness, or phenomenal ways things are or might be, and content. We can call the view that at least some originally intentional states are
phenomenal states as instantiations of phenomenal properties. A (‘ L " ) r‘ ' ‘ ' state weak PIT. When combined with the claim that there
conscious mental state, or, simply, a (phenomenal) experience. is a mental state are intentional states, PIT entails weak l’IT."’
that includes, but may not be exhausted by. the of phenomenal‘ PIT is r "‘ with the of ‘
t‘ ' ' ‘ ' states,
properties. The specific ‘what it's like," or felt. quality of a phenomenal state or intentional states that are not ‘ L ' intendonal states. so long as they are not
experience is its phenomenal ‘ For example. the experience of pain. the
. originally intentional states. that is, so long as they are derived from phenomenal in-
experience of red, and the feeling of den vu have what we might call “pain-ish," tentionality in some way. Advocates of PIT have offered various views of how exactly
“red-ish,” and “déja vu-ish" phenomenal c" , respectively,‘ —phenomenal intentional states might derive from r ‘ ' intentionality.
According to PIT. phenomenal consciousness is implicated in all instances of Bourget (zoloa) describes four derivation mechanisms: derived intentional states
intentionality. It gives rise to original intentionality, from which all other kinds of can get their contents from the states they are composed of. the functional relations
intentionality are derived. Recall that B arises from A when E is nothing over and they bear to phenomenal intentional states, descriptive reference, and deference.
above A, perhaps because B is identical to, fully grounded in, nstituted by, or Kriegel (toll) claims that non—phenomcnal ' ‘ states, such as standing
realized by A, and that original intentionality is intentionality that does not derive
from other ' of intentionality (§z.l). We can then formulate PIT as follows:
Versions ofPlT have been tltrtntittl hy statlt (I990, I991). sttawson (I9§Q. aoox), I’lr( (I999. 2.004).
PIT All (actual) originally intentional states arise from phenomenal Hntgan and Tierlwn (zooz), toat (2003), Kxiegel (2.003. 1.007, aoii), railtas (soolla. zoolb). Horgarl
consciousness. and otahani (zoos). Chllmets (toio). paint (aoioa). Montagiit (ioio), laonigtt (ioioa. zGl7C.
forthcomingw), Mendelovicl(1oto), Mendeloviciand noiitgst (1014. forrllcamlltgl, and voting (ms).
The underlying idea is that at least some phenomenal states are inherently Hnssstl (X900) and Btemano (ism art notable histotiosl pttcsotnts.
Note that whtthti a state's contents att phenomenal tonttnts is not a matttt ofwhieh tonttnts thty
intentional. They are not “raw feels." mere feelings or qualia. Instead, by their very
ait (t.g.. (grass is gIe:n> 0|’ <tht cat is on (ll: mzt)) but tathst a matttt orm viitnt or what the statt
nature, they automatically , a content or “say something.” As Loar (2.003, gtts to have this content: wt might say a states phenomenal tonttnts at: those that it phsnomsntuy
§l2.) puts it. phenomenal L ctet is not mere mental paint; it is, by its nature, tsptsttnta. so. it is compatible with PIT that two suits represent iht Same tontsnt but only one of
them phenomenally teptsstnt it and hence has it as its phenomenal tonttnt.
“paint that points.” According to PIT, for example, a phenomenal state with a
Wezlt PIT is not a vttslon or PIT but tathtt a wealtenln.gafPIT, in that it does not ttqnitt that all otig.
red-ish phenomenal character might automatically , the content <red> and inally inttntional statss ais phenomenal inttntitmal statts Similarly. weak tpttstntationahsm is not a
L l it Cl'Ialln(rSlo04).
'
‘ Sicwefl (toot, xoll) and Smithies (zotz. MS) are two notahlt proponents ofweak PIT hnt not PIT.
m, M . . . . .
‘ on some VItVl$ of - ,..i.,....i L .0
otigmar ... 'g~ ' L In . ltisslmllarly
the samt thing~all there is to a phtniinitnal state is its specific rslt quality. But on otllervlews. the two
' ' ' '
postitilt to ht commllled to tht View that tracking in rnnttional roles give HS: [0 otiginal Illlemlonallly
alt distinct. rot example. tslational views or phenomenal tonssioiisntss taltt phtnomtnal ptoptitits
wi inn liting committed to the tmlting ihtoty ot tht rnnstional tolt thtoiy.
to be relations to distinctly existing phenomenal shatattets. which might be alisttatt piopsitiss sense
sinitliiss atsspts wealt PIT while ttplititly denying l>n-, maintaining that some inttntionality
tlata. ot something tlst (Pzun. X01031 aontgtt lamb. fonhcoming-b, Dluske tags. tytan aooi, Tye
atiivss ttoin consoioiisntss thsnigh not all otit. F0! Smithies, (ll! distinguishing tnailt orinttntionthty
x - l lt - ' iatt * . he asptttsoi L statss oi ptopsttits
that tlttitts rtom eonsciousness is that of playing a normative tolt in tht ianonal yllstificanon onithtt
without being phenomenal states 0! ptopsitits in tlitll’ tntittty (stt Appendix G orchaptsi 9).
and action.
I’
M Par! III: The I’ln-nnmznallnrmtianalr/y Theory C/mflerj: 777: PbermmmalInmrrimtaliry filmy 87
beliefs and other ‘W ‘.dcrivc from the _ L ' ‘ ‘states the functional role theory face both empirical and in-principle objections. The two
of an ideal interpreter. Pautz (10132) suggests that some states derive their contents argumtnls for PIT show that PIT succeeds precisely where these other theories fail.
from sensory phenomenal states and Lewisian principles of interpretation. Horgan
and Tienson (zooz) defend a view on which some thoughts have broad contents that
5.1.1 THE ARGUMENT FROM MATCHING
derive from phenomenal ional states together with phenomenal
' ‘ ' ‘
"grounding presuppositions." And Searle (r99o, I99], 199:.) can be interpreted A mismatch case for a theory of intentionality is a case in which a representa-
as holding that some non-phenomenal ' ' states derive from potential tion's content does not match the content it is predicted to have by the theory.
phenomenal ’ ' ‘ states.‘ where 2 representations content matches the content it is predicted to have
Although I am sympathetic to the dcrivativist idea (see Chapter 7 and §8.;.2.). the by a theory when the represented content and the predicted content have the
version of PIT I will propose maintains that, strictly speaking, there is no derived In other words. mismatch cases are cases in
same superficial characters (see §;.3).
intentionality. On this view. all intentionali is original intentionality. which arises which a theory makes the wrong predictions as to which content a representation
from phenomenal . We can call dais View “strong PIT": ICPICSCHU.
Strong PIT All (actual) intentional states arise from phenomenal consciousness, In Chapter 3, I argued that there are mismatch cases for tracking and long-arm
functional role theories. I focused on the case of , ' color representations.
According to strong PIT, all i ' states are phenomenal intentional states.
arguing that tracking and long—an-n functional role theories predict that percep-
Strong PIT entails PIT (it is, after all, a version ofPIT), and, when combined with something like surface reflectance profiles.
tual color representations
the claim that there is intentionality, it entails weak PIT.’ instead suggest that they represent edenic
hut theory-independent " s
Although my aim is to argue for a version ofstrong PIT. Ibegin by arguing for PIT colors. For instance, tracking and long-arm functional role theories might predict
as a generalapproach. In Part IV, I arrive at my version ofstrong PIT by arguing that
that the perceptual color representa iuu SKY-BLUE represents <SRP>, which is
derivativism fails and the best way to make sense of putative non—phenomenal inten~
identical to particular surface reflectance profile, SR1’, but theory-independent
a
tional mental states involves either ascribing to them phenomenal ' ' "ty or considerations from intros, and psychological roles suggest that it represents
denying that they have any intentionality at all.‘ <edenic sky-blue>. Roughly, the tracking and long-arm functional role theories’
content attribution makes an error of commission in that it includes material that
5.2 " for PIT is not represented (namely, "' u to do with surface reflectance profiles), and
it makes an error of omission in that it fails to include material that is represented
I think the most convincing argument for PIT involves showing how it can be (namely something to do with edenic sky-blueness). In short. the tracking and
fmitfully developed so as to handle a wide variety of cases and shed light on diverse long-arm functional role theories predict that SKY-amt-;'s content has features it
issues, which is part of what the remainder of this book attempts to do. But for doesn't have and that it doesn’t have features it does have.
now. I will present two preliminary for thinking that this is an approach This and other mismatch cases are tough cases for the tracking theory and the
worth pursuing. In the previous two chapters, we saw that the tracking theory and long-arm functional role theory. but. I want to suggest, they are easy for PIT (though
we might worry that PIT has its own mismatch cases—see below). Let us see how
PIT handles the case ofpe , ' color representations‘
While many phenomenal intentionality theorists can be Hlttrprtted as accepting amid mental In order for PIT to yield predictions that we can confirm using our
intentionaliry. the nu. is most explicitly articulated in Bourget zoioa,Mendelovici1oro.Kriegel1.oiI.
theory-independent methods, it should tell us what particular intentional states
Bourget and M¢ndel0vI£I1ol6,znd Mendelovici and Bonrget mu. forthcoming.
Strong prr hu been defended by rm (2.004). Mendeloviei (zoro). Farkas (xoosa), and Young (tors). represent. In particular, it should specify the superficial characters (§2..z.r) of
Kriegel (mm) Irguet that this is also the View of Brentano (I 37.). Srrawson pg“. zoos). at times, I! particular intentional states. So far, we do not have a specific enough version of PIT
u gPI'I".rhough" " am ta‘
to yield such predictions. However, there are general considerations that suggest that
' -
real).
For Ill overview and discussion on-11: see Kriegel lOl3I7, Mendelovici and Boiirger aou, forthcoming. PIT has the to say that the I SKY-BLUE r
‘ a content
and Bourget and Mendelovici ms. with the tight superficial character.
7
88 Partlll: The Pbrnnm:mllnrmr1'nnali1;y Them) c/iapttty: Thlpbtnamnmllnftnrianalilj rltmy 29
A theory that predicts that the content of SKY—BI.UE is <SRP> makes an error match their ‘ ‘ phenomenal characters, and the concepts of goodness and
of omission because the content of SKY-BLUE has a superficial character with baclness might , primitive goodness and badness (see §g.5). which also seem
a qualitative, primitive, simple, sui generis. non-disp '. and non-relational to match their associated phenomenal characters. In short. PIT Can 2CCOmm0dIl¢
sky-blue-ish-ness that cannot be found in what the theory has to olTer, i.e.. surface the contents of many of the mismatch cases for tracking and long—arm functional
reilectance profiles. PIT, though, does have a qualitative, primitive, simple. sui role theories.
generis,non»" K ' and ‘ ' ", bl ’L ‘T Y-BLUE
'
PIT also fares well in many cases that are not problematic for the tracking
has an associated phenomenal which we might call J/:_y-blue-ixh. and
, rheory and the long-arm functional role theory. Shape representations represent
which arguably has the relevant qualitative, primitive, etc., sky-blue-ish-ness. PIT shape contents. like <square>, which correspond to their associated “shape-ish”
might identify this phenomenal character with the content <edenic sky-blue> or phenomenal ' . Indeed, there seems to be the relevant kind ofmatch in most
take the phenomenal character to constitute. realize, or ground the ’ ' ‘ r "0 cases (§l.2.) of’ ' “ yin , r ' Perception presents us with a
content. On all these options, PIT can say that SKY-BLUE has a content that involves multimodal structured represented scene D of the representation ofvisual.
'
a qualitative, primitive. simple. sui gcneris, nontdispositional. and non-relational auditory, tactile, and other contents. accompanied by a rich and complex assortment
slty—blue-ish—ness. In short. <edenic sky-blue) matches‘ sky-blue-isb. so a theory that oftttatt hlllz‘ ‘ ' L For‘ avi --al p of a ripe tomato
says that the representation of <sky-blue> with the phenomenal
arises from states involves a rich representation of the shape and size of the tomato. its color. texture.
character sky-blur-is}: has the resources to avoid an error of omission. and illumination, its location relative to the perceiver, etc. This content matches the
We can also see how PIT has the resources to avoid an error of commission. A experience’s phenomenal L ,which involves phenomenal L relating
theory that predicts that the content of SKY-BLUE is <SRP> makes an error of to shape. size. color. texture.illumination, and location. More generally. we might
commission because the superficial character of the content of SKY-BLUE doesn't expect that the contents ofparadigrn cases of tionality in perception will lnatch
‘
have anything to do with surface reflectance profiles. PIT has room to say that the their phenomenal characters, making it possible for PIT to accommodate them.
phenomenal character sky-5/ue—i.rh yields a content that has superficial features that If all this is right, then PIT has the resources to get the right answer in many
do not contain such unwanted material—all they contain is a _ " r ' ' '
t
casest.-t' ' " paradigm, , ‘cases. Sincemanyof
etc., sky—blue—ish—ness.‘° Notice that this does not preclude such a content from these cases are ones that PIT’s main competitors cannot handle. this provides strong
having a deep nature that is not revealed by our theory-independent methods, support for PIT. Indeed, it is hard to see what other view can handle the cases. since
since an error ofcommission only arises when the superficial rhzrrat-{er of a theory’s it is not clear that there are any items other than phenomenal characters that match
predicted content contains unwanted material.“ our perceptual color contents and that our intentional states can plausibly be said to
In the same way, PIT can accommodate many other mismatch cases for the single out.“
tracking theory and the long—atm functional role theory. Perceptual states repre—
senting hotness and coldness represent edenic hotness and coldness (sec §3.$)- which
“ One might Suggest that a pl’llI\xtiVlSr lhcory ttrinttntinnality. ont that taltts inttntitmaltty not In atitt
rtnm anything (ttthtt than itself). can also Iccumrnodifl the cat: or perceptual tolot ttattt—and.
indttd. any case. This it ttut, but not impttttiyt. Unless it IS tomhintd with a httthtt stoty abmll haw
’ lam using the notion ortnatthinptn an txttndtd stntt Compared to tht utt tn l>att ii. on this ttttndtd tnttnttonality ttlatti to nthtt phtnomtna (tat. :.g.. ClIal!l'lers' (type) nanttallstit dualism rot ulcll a
ttntt. content A matthtt tttm B (whith may 0! may not ht a tttnttnt) when all the rtatuttt of K5 pttmitivtit thtoty or tonstiousnttt). ttnpttieal adequacy it not an accomplishment rot primitivismt
tupttrttial thatacttt II’: had by B (whflheror not B hata tuptthtialthatatttt and whtthttot not thttt since it can attommodatt any tlatms about whtth tnnttnta any pattitulat ttatt rcplestnls simply hy
.. of‘ = -» it inthttttwo hat. This does not tntan that pnIl’I|uVlsln is false hut only that tht tatt that it I1 empirically udtquatt
tht two ustt att tlnttly ttlattd and context tltatly disnrnblguates. does not do muth In Support it.
“’ lndtttl. it it not itttplausthlt that the distinguishing rtantttt or phenomenal thatattttt. tht rtatutts My Mason rot not being a ptimitivist IX that. :5 watt sttn. and at I will rutthtt atgut, phenomenal
that identify and thataetttttt than as the phenomenal Characters that thty at clllde no unwanted consciousness and lntentlonality are impressively related. so any theory, primirivist or not. will have to
matanal. lr so, thtn wt might be able [0 simply identily a tnnttnti tuptthttal thatatttt with thttt l.tt.thtt- ' " L ' ‘
distinguishing rtatutta ta ht ttlattd tn Wm: othtt way. I will argue that the two att in rat identical (my. Ifthis is right. then
" This it why it would not autotnatteally ht a ptohlttn if sttt-stun‘; pttditttd tonttnt had a mttttal dttp ptitttititittn tollapttt into a Version of PIT. tintt it ends up accepting that phtnomtnal GOHDCIDIISHESS
natutt. as on ttttinns ofPIT that simply idtnttry Intentional ttmttnta wtth phenomenal thatattttt. gives titt to intentianality (by being idtntttal K0 tt). Tht tttws might be dtrrtttttt in spirit. In that
7‘
go 1’.m11r.- The "bznanrmallnrmnnnd/Ir)’ Tbeury C}mpl:r5: The Pbermmomllnzznrranaliry Tlzmy 9:
I have argued that PIT can handle cases that its main competitors cannot handle. states. Suppose you are in a phenomenal state with a blue—ish phenomenal character.
This does not, however. show that PIT yields the right predictions in all cases of It might seem that simply by being in this state, you automatically have blueness
inrentionality. In other words, it does not show that PIT does not face its own before your mind; you're automatic " representing <bIue>. Nothing else need be
mismatch problem. Most of the “good” cases for PIT that we have encountered so added to your state in order for you to represent <blue>. In the same way, ifyou have
far are cases ofintrospecvjvely accessible perceptual states, so one might worry that a phenomenal state with a ‘-‘ .1 ' I‘ phenomenal character, you automatically
other kinds of intentional mental states pose a mismatch problem for PIT. These represent <blue square>.
states might include thoughts, nonconscious states. and any states representing rich Ofcourse. we never enjoy a blue»ish or a L‘ .1 ’ L phenomenal L
descriptive contents, object-involving contents. and broad contents. in isolation. Our overall phenomenal states are much richer. involving phenomenal
In Part IV, I argue that PIT can adequately handle these challenging cases (see also characters x , “' D to the Ll" "’ ' shapes of , ’ objects.
§5.4 of this chapter for an overview of the general approach). For now, it is worth their distances from us and other objects. the sounds they make, their textures.
noting that most of the challenging cases are not paradigm cases of intentionality. their temperatures. and many of their other features. But the above claims are
That we represent rich " 'ptive thought contents. object-involving contents, arguably true for more complex phenomenal states. Consider your entire visual
broad contents, and nonconscious contents is not introspecrively obvious, like that phenomenal state, which involves a plethora of phenomenal " . When
we I So, what these r‘- “ a‘ D I41: ‘ "I r
‘ 4 perhaps you are in this phenomenal state, you automatically represent a plethora of visual
even that they intentionally represent—-is less certain and theoretically up for grabs. perceptual contents. eg., that there are hand-shaped objects and white pages with
The only nonnegot‘ ' ‘ challenging case for PIT is that of thought, since thoughts black marks in front of you. etc. just as having a h‘ .1 ’ L phenomenal
are paradigm cases. But even in this case. it is less obvious just what is intentionally character automatically results in the representation of <bIue square>, so too
represented in any given thought. eg., whether thoughts or the concepts they does your total visual phenomenal state automatically result in the representation
involve represent definitions, prototypes, sensory contents, objects and kinds. or of the visual content you're presently enjoying. The same goes for other kinds
something else. So, before even considering I’IT's pros, for ommodati D the of perceptual states. It seems, then, that having phenomenal states sufices for
above— ioned challenging cases, we can make the following argument for PIT: having intentional states and so that phenomenal consciousness is the right kind
PIT is theonly view \ve've encountered so far that can accommodate all the clear of ingredient for giving rise to intentionality. In the first instance, this motivates
paradigm cases, so there is good reason to think it's true. weak PIT. the claim that at least some original inte from phenomenal " y arises
consciousness, but I will soon show how these claims can be extended to also
motivate PIT.
5.1.2 THE REAL REASON TO ACCEPT PIT Horgan and Tienson (zooz) argue along similar lines for something like weak
In the previous chapter, I argued that neither tracking nor internal functional roles PIT:“ I“ ' " _ " subjects that ' all the same _ L '
properties throughout their existences, share a wide variety of intentional properties.
not some combination of the two sufiices for intenrionality. Internal functional roles
don't spontaneously give rise to intentionality, and tracking relations can't “grab” This is supported largely by ' I ‘ e considerations: Roughly. the idea is that
contents from the world and insert them into our minds. In short, tracking relations
we can introspectively tell that certain types of phenomenal states are inherently
intentional and that certain types ofintentional states are L ' phenomenal.
and functional roles are simply not the right kinds of ingredients to give rise to
'
intentionality. This is the Real Problem with tracking and functional role theories. This allows us to conclude that certain types of i ' and phenomenal states
go together and so that phenomenal ' " share a \vide variety ofintentional
In contrast. phenomenal consciousness arguably is the right kind of ingredient
A
“ y. That phenomenal L
properties. From this, Horgan and Tienson co ' " that there is phenomenal
to give rise to int can give rise to
intentionality might even seem obvious from the mere onsiderarion of phenomenal intentionality, i.e.. that weak PIT is true.
prilnitivism "nu" consciousness to intennonality. whereas in does the reverse. but further arguments “ More precisely. Horgan and Tienson's conclusion is that men n original intentionaliry that .5
pull in rm. arm spirit ofPlT (§6.i). evmrritrarit/:1] delerrnirred by phenomenal consciousness.
92. Ilm Ill: The PlmmnlzmzlIriteri/mmzluy Umny Cbapzzrrl ' ‘be Phf7!/)77ltn/I/lrlliflllufldlllj Them; 9;
Siewert (I998) can also be interpreted as arguing for weak PIT using similar are not up to the task. This gives us reason to take seriously the possibility that all
considerations: Roughly, the idea is that in virtue of having phenomenal states, one is original intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness. Indeed, it is not clear
automatically assessable for accuracy. For example, suppose you have a phenomenal what else could do the trick.“
state with a blue-square-in—front-of3you—ish phenomenal character. In virtue of hav- As in die case of the argument from matching, colnplications arise in the case
ing this phenomenal state. you are accurate or inaccurate depending on whether there of thoughts, nonconscious states, and any states with rich descriptive contents,
is a blue square in front of you. Since being assessable for accuracy is suificient for hav— objectrinvolving contents, or broad contents. It is not clear that the relevant contents
ing intentional states, at least some phenomenal states give rise to intentional states." are phenomenal contents, and so it is not clear whether consciousness has what
That phenomenal consciousness is the right kind of ingredient to give rise it takes to give rise to all instances of original i " y. As suggested in the
to intentionality is r: Suppose all of PIT’s testable predictions about previous subs ' , the problematic ' ‘ states are not paradigm cases of
superficial characters turned out to be true. That would be great. It would mean that intentionality, so what to say about them is somewhat up for grabs. In Part IV, I argue
PIT was empirically adequate, that it delivered the right answer in all cases. And if that phenomenal consciousness gives rise to whatever intentionality these states have
die main competing theories were not empirically adequate, then this would provide and, hence, that PIT can ccommodate them (see §5.4 for an overview). But. again.
very strong support for PIT indeed. However, ifphenomenal ’ were not even before considering these cases, we can make a fairly strong case for PIT: PIT is
up to the taskof giving rise to intentionality, then PIT would be a nonstarter. This the only theory we’ve encountered so far that can account for original intentionality
is why it is significant that it 13 up to the task. in terms ofingredients that it can plausibly be said to arise from.“
As I mentioned above, in the first instance, the fact that phenomenal ' -
ness is the right sort of thing to give rise to intentionality only supports weak PIT. 5.3 Identity PIT
since it does not yet support the claim that phenomenal consciotuness gives rise to
all original intentionality. But when we factor in the Real Problem with tracking So far, I have structured my discussion in terms of the relatively modest goal of
theories and functional role theories, we obtain an argument for PIT. Tracking determining what gives rise to actual instances oforiginal intentionality (see §z.l). I
relations and functional roles are two of the main contenders for giving rise to have argued that it is phenomenal consciousness, not tracking relations or functional
original intentionality. but we have seen that tracking relations and functional roles
" One might suggest that a ptimitivlst view orintentionality can avoid the Real Problem. This is true,
" whilt i agree that being assessable rot accuracy is suliicienr ror intentionality, and even that having primirivisrn simply posits intentional starts. but. as in the cast ofyrimitivism's rcsponie to the
since
phenomenal starts appears to male one assessable tor accuracy. i don't find it entirely iinconrrovtrsial n. [Z (or my reasons tor rejecting ptimiriviim.
mismatch problem. this is not lrnpresilve. See
that intentional states give rise to accuracy conditions all by themselves. So, rm not sure it PIT should " one might also object that even if there is an intimate relationship berwetn some inttnrional and
a i .pirnat . I I §i.;.. phenomenal states. this does little to support wtalt PIT and PIT because it it compatible with an
and§g.;.4.) lrlinving conditions ortruth and terertnce requires more than intentionality. then perhaps alternative view of the ' between and ' ’ . '
appearances are deceiving. and having phenomenal starts is rm! sulhcient for assessability ror accuracy, the view that all actual eases or phenomenal consciousness arise from intentionality, perhaps together
even irit is sulhcient rot intentionality. with some Further ingredients. indeed. Gertler (zoolb) obiccrr to siewtrta (rm) irgumtnt along
l-lowtvtr, l thirilr there is something importantly right and persuasive about siewert‘s argument. in these lines (set siewert 1.004 for a response), and bailey and Richards (coin) object to iiorgan and
having a phenomenal trperienct, it certainly Stems to you that you are assessable for aceuracy. it stems Tienson's (1.001) argument on similar grounds.
to you that the world might either correspond to the phenomenal characters ofyour phenomenal states Though not all versions or PIT qualify as versions orreprestntnrionalism, the version ofl’lT that
or it might not. For example, when you are in a phenomenal start with a blue-square-in-front-of-you-lsh 1 will eventually argue for does. This means that in order to fully argue for my view, i do not have to
phenomenal character it seems to you that the world might either correspond to this phenomenal (and should not) reject rcprescnrationalism but only the versions oi’ it that are not versions of PIT. in
character. in that it might involve something blue and square in a certain location in rront or you, $5., and Appendix E, l argue that intentionality arises rrom consciousness by being identical to it and
or it might not. This suggests a revised version of Siewert's argument. one that does not rely on that all phenomenal states give rise to intentional states. These claims together rule out all versions of
premises concerning the relationship between intentionality and assessabili for accuracy that we teprestnrationalism citcepr thost that take every phtnomtnal state to be identical to some intentional
might ultimately want to reject. The revised argument runs as follows: when you are in certain state, a claim that is consistent with my version ofPIT. when combined with my arguments in part
phenomenal states, it seems to you that you are assessable tor aceurney. The best erplanation for lv rot the claim that every intentional start is a phenomenal sratt, these claims rule out vcrsions
this apparent assessability for accuracy is that because or being in your phenomenal state, you are oirtptettntationalism that are not versions of mt. (In 9o.i, i argue that the compatibility betwetn
representing. lrthats riglii. then at least some phenomenal starts give rise to intentional states. and representationalism and P11" does not threaten PIT‘: status as a theory otinttntionality in terms of
there is phenomenal intentionality. consciousness rather than a theory oreonsciousness in terms olintenrionality.)
7
Linu For Evaluation.
94 Par! Ill: Th: Plzmnmma/In/mxionaltry Theory Chapter ;: The Pbmamerml intentionality Theory 9;
roles, that are responsible for actual instances of original intentionality. This fixes phenomenal properties, it also denies that n intentional properties are
on a general approach to ' , one that takes its source to be phenomenal identical to phenomenal I I .
consciousness. My favored view is identity PIT. A prima facie reason to favor it is that it offers
This section turns to the further question of precisely haw original intentionality a clear story of what originally intentional states. properties. and contents really
arises from phenomenal My suggestion, roughly. is that original in-
.
m’!——(l'ity are phenomenal states, properties. and characters—whilc other views
tentiona" arises from phenomenal consciousness by being identical to it. Original of the relationship between original i ‘ ' y and phenomenal
intentio " y is a species ofphenomenal (perhaps the only species of often require further story to tell
a us what intentional states, properties, and
phenomenal -see Appendix B of dais chapter).
’
contents are. For example, die realization view tells us that originally intentional
We can call the view that every actual originally intentional state is identical to a states are realized by phenomenal states. but it does not tell us what kinds of things
phenomenal state the state identity view. A natural extension of the state identity they are such that they can be thus realized—for instance, are they functional states?
view " '‘ all " intentional, , with L , , .On ’ A '
The constitution view tells us that originally intentional states are in some sense
the resulting property identityview, originally representing a content is one and the “made up of phenomenal
" states. but it too does not tell us what exactly they are
same thing as instantiating a I L ‘ property.” Another natural extension of such that they can be made up of phenomenal states without being identical to them.
the state identity view also identifies the content: oforiginally intentional states with A version of PIT that endorses the property identity view but not the
state and
their phenomenal t/mmtterr. I will call this View the content-character identity content-character identity view tells us what intentional states and properties are
view." but does not tell us what their contents are. In short. identity PIT, which identifies
We can call the version of PIT that combines the state identity view. the property intentional states, properties, and contents with phenomenal states, properties. and
identity view, and the content-character identity view idendty PIT. According to characters, respectively, is the only version of PIT we’ve got that tells us what original
identity PIT, every " intentional state is identical to some phenomenal intentionality really is. For this reason, I take identity PIT to be the default view and
state, every originally intentional pmperty is identical to some phenomenal property, ask whether we have reason to deviate from it.
and every D “ represented content is identical to some phenomenal charac- Introspective considerations provide some positive support for the identity view.
ter. Roughly, identity PIT is the view that original intenrionalit is a species of Both phenomenal states and originally intentional states are at least sometimes
phenomenal introspectable. VVhen we introspect upon them, we notice various ‘mental qualities,"
Alternative views of the relationship between original intentionality and p‘‘ which may be phenomenal characters, intentional contents, or something else. But
LI
enal consciousness introduce some distance between the two, taking the relationship when we introspect upon mental states involving both an ' intentional
to be one of ' ’ , realization, or grounding rather than one of identity. For content and an introspectable phenomenal L , we do not notice two distinct
example. a realization view might take originally intentional states to be realized mental qualities. Rather. introspection reveals only one mental quality. For example.
by phenomenal states without being identical to them. Since this view denies that when you notice the whiteness of this page, it seems introspectively inaccurate to
instantiations of 'ginally intentional properties are identical to instantiations of say that your experience involves two distinct whiteness-related mental qualities, a
white-ish phenomenal L and the represented content <white>. But since
the experience clearly does involve the representation of whiteness and a white-ish
K L ‘ L . we should conclude that the intentional content <white>
‘B. 1
it-ter ' ' ' vv ,' is identical to the ‘~' ' ‘~ phenomenal . In other words. there is only
and phenomenal prupcrncs emails an identity between originally intentional starts and phenomenal
one whiteness ‘ 4 mental quality, and it may be correctly described as both a
states. But it it less cleu’ irrirt reverse ellxailmenl holds: in single properly instantiation can be an
irrtrtnrirrinn oitwtr distinct properties. then tvtry originally intentional stat: might be I phenomenal represented feature of the represented page and a phenomenal character. Similar
state without (very or nally intentional pmptrry being a phenomenal property. points apply to other mental qualities that we introspectively notice in experience."
" The tonrrnrtirtrrrrer identity View does not automatically follow from the slate identity view: The
state identity View might be true while phenomenal characters are identical to intentional IMIEI, not
their contents. On such a view. what is “felt” when we are in one ofthese states is not the same thing as
what is represented. However. I take it that this View is somewhat unnatural. " The introspective observations appealed [0 here IR similar to the transparency that are '
often taken to support tepresentatiorulism. ont way or putting ritt transparency observations is tint:
7
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9.; Pm 111; T/1:1’/Iennrrlerlallntmliamr/Ily Thenry Chapter ;: The Pbmomenalln/erurazmlzry Them) 97
This suggests an identity between intentional contents and phenomenal
characters. It also supports the state and property identity views: Since intentional
states and properties are char ‘ and individuated by their contents and While there are reasons to take PIT seriously, the view faces some challenging cases.
phenomenal states and properties are characterized and individuated by their l.n Part IV. I argue for I’IT—friendly treatments of these cases. In this section. I briefly
phenomenal characters, it is a small Further step to conclude that the observed overview these treatments. As we will see, the view that will emerge is a version of
intentional states and properties are identical to the observed phenomenal states strong PIT, on which alli ‘ states are phenomenal ‘ states. ’ '
and properdes. respectively. There are three general approaches that PIT might take toward alleged cases
Let us now briefly consider some objections to identity PIT, which might motivate of mental states with phenomenal . Inflatianism maintains that the
us to reject it in favor of a view that introduces some distance between original mental states do in fact have phenomenal contents. Eliminativisnr maintains that
" y and phenomenal ess. The first is that intentionality and the mental states do not exist or that they do not intentionally represent the relevant
phenomenal have very difl'erent natures. with intentionality being a
' contents.“ Finally, derivativism maintains that the relevant contents are derivatively
relation to distinctly existing items that play the role of contents and phenomenal intentionally represented.“ My overall strategy for dealing with challenging cases is 2
consciousness being a mere modification of subjects. If intentionality and ,,‘- om- combination of eliminativism and inflationism, though in some cases it is derivativist
enal consciousness do indeed have different natures, then they cannot be identical, in spirit.
but original intentionality might still arise from phenomenal 'ousness in some
other way, eg, by being grounded in it. T/Jaughtx
I address this worry with identity PIT in Part V, where I argue that intentionality Thoughts are occurrent mental states that we are in when we do what we commonly
is not in fact relational in the relevant sense. But those who do not accept the call “thinking.” The problem with thoughts is that the contents we often want
arguments of that part might prefer a fallback position that rejects identity PIT in to ascribe to them, which might include complex descriptive contents, broad
favor of an alternative version of PIT, such as one that takes the relationship between contents. and object-involving contents (see also below). do not seem to match their
original intentional’ y and phenomenal to be that of constitution, phenomenal characters. so it is implausible that these contents are phenomenally
realization, or grounding. represented. If they are not phenomenally represented, then it is not clear how PIT
A second reason to reject the state identity view in favor of one of the alternatives can accommodate them.
is in order to allow for the multiple realization—or. we might say, the “multiple Chapter 7 responds to this challenge. I argue that thoughts have “immediate
arisabili "—of originally intentional properties: We might want to allow that contents," which are, roughly, the contents that are “running through our minds"
of the same "
I
, , arise in different ways.
' '
at any given moment. Thoughts‘ immediate contents arguably match their phenom-
Since identity PIT identifies every originally intentional property with some enal characters. making them good candidates for being phenomenally represented.
phenomenal property. identity PIT precludes this kind of multiple arisability. But These immediate contents do not, however, include many of the contents we
multiple "“ with other views of the relationship between
is compatible might intuitively want to ascribe to thoughts. But, I will suggest. even though we
original ‘ ‘ " y and phenomenal do not immediately these alleged contents. we do the next best thing:
It is far From clear that the relevant kind of multiple arisability is possible, but we derivatively them. I defend a “self-ascriptivist" view of this derived
those who think it is might opt for one of the weaker views of the relationship mental representation, on which we derivatively represent various contents by
between_ ‘ and‘ L
" ' ‘ " y (‘ " ‘
ascribing them to ourselves or our mental states. On this view. thoughts’ alleged
of possible motivations for allowing for multiple arisability takes us too far afield, so
I relegate their " to Appendix C of this chapter.
"’ What eilmlnzllvlsm eliminates need rim be the mental stile in its entirety but might only be the alleged
- r I «I . ' ' ' ' ' thete
ate heliert but deny that they intentionally teptesent. ..e.. that they intltnle intentional states. (See also
When we pay attention tomlrexperie . what we notice are contents. not mere phenomenal chettetets the definition nf"intentional mental net: on p. 7.)
“raw feels" [See Harman l§9O and Tye mo. pp. 45-SI].
at " Thete thtee sttitegiet nte described in Bmuget and Mendeloviei zoté.
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98 p.mm.- Tb: 1»mumm...1rmmmnzay mm (Simpler ;: The Plzmomnml Intmrmrm/1/y Thuny 99
contents derive from our dispositions to have a certain kind of thought with a contents and obiecbinvolving contents are intentionally represented, but it is deriva-
self-ascriptive phenomenal content, a phenomenal content that specifies that a tivist in spirit in that it claims that such contents are :z'zrirz./:21‘:/sly represented, though.
thought or concepts immediate content cashes out intofurther content. The
a again. derived mental representation is not a kind ofintentionality. Again, there is a
resulting derived contents might be thought ofas capturing our best understanding nearby derivativist fallback position that takes derived mental representation to be a
of what we mean when we think a thought, or what we really intend to be getting at. kind of intentionality.
As I will argue, derived mental representation is not a type ofintentionality, and
so, strictly speaking, the derived contents of thoughts are not derived intentional Smmiing .S‘nzm
COHICHIS. Standing states are mental states that need not be used, entertained, or otherwise
This approach to thought is inflationist in that it takes at least some thought active at the time at which they are had. such as beliefs and desires that one is
contents to be phenomenal contents. but it is also eliminativist in that it denies not currently entertaining or ”assumptions' of the visual system. The worry with
that other alleged thought contents are intentionally represented, It is. however. standing states is that they appear to be intentional. but they are not phenomenal;
derivativist in spirit in that it maintains that thoughts a'erii/atively represent some there is nothing it is like to have a standing state. So, they do not have phenomenal
of the contents they do not phenomenally represent. though it is not a genuine form intentionality.
of derivativism since it denies that the relevant sort of derived representation is a Chapter 8 argues that there are no genuinely intentional standing states. We
kind of intentionality. It is worth noting. however, that there is a nearby fallback might have various dispositions to have oeeurrent states, and we might even have
position that accepts my view of thought and takes derived mental representation to distinct structures in our heads corresponding to these dispositions. but neither of
be a kind ofintentionality. This approach would be both inflationist and derivativist these count as genuinely intentional. However, I also argue that the self-ascriptivist
rather than both inflationist and eliminativist. treatment ofthe alleged contents ofthought developed in Chapter 7 can be extended
to accommodate the contents of at least some of the standing states we intuitively
Brand and 0bjeu‘—[m/olr/ing Intentional Cmztmrs ascribe to ourselves. and perhaps even some standing states in their entirety.
Broad contents, contents the representation of which is at least partly determined by Like my strategy with states with broad and object-involving contents, this
environmental factors. are arguably not phenomenally represented, For example, in strategy is eliminativis in that it denies that there are intentional standingstates. but
the familiar Twin Earth thought experiment (Putnam 1975), Oscar and his intrinsic it is derivativist in spirit in that it claims that standingstate contents or standing states
duplicate. Toscar. live in different environments. and. as a result, when they think the themselves can be ultimately derived from phenomenal intentional states. Again,
thoughts they would express with “Water is wet," they think thoughts with different there is a derivativist fallback position that takes this derived mental representation
contents. However, assuming intrinsic duplicates are phenomenally alike, Oscar and to be a kind ofintentionality.
Toscar enjoy phenomenal states with the same phenomenal characters. So, broad
contents are not phenomenal contents. Nonromrizlm Otrurrem Slate:
Object-involving contents are contents that constitutively involve a particular Noneonscious occurrent states are occurrent states (states that are used. under-
object, property. kind, or other worldly item. For example. suppose Lina perceptually gone, or activated at the time that they are had) that are not phenomenally conscious.
experiences a particular cat. Mitten. We might say that Lina's thought content Examples include states in early visual processing. nonconscious states involved in
constitutively involves Mitten. But Mitten is not a constitutive part of the phenom— language processing, and nonconscious thoughts. Like standing states, the problem
enal character of Lina's experience, not, arguably. would Lina have had a different with these states is that many of them seem to be intentional but not phenomenal,
phenomenal experience if Mitten were replaced by an indistinguishable duplicate. so it looks like their contents are not phenomenal contents.
So, it seems, object-involving contents are not phenomenal contents. Chapter 8 argues that most allegedly nonconscious occurrent states neither
Chapter 7 argues that thoughts and other mental states. including perceptual originally nor derivatively represent the contents we might want to ascribe to them.
states, can derivatively represent broad contents and object-involving contents in I argue that this eliminativist position is not as drastic as it might at first appear and
much the same way that they derivatively represent other non-phenomenal thought that it is arguably more in line with what might be considered the standard view on
contenu. This selfiaseriptivist strategy is eliminativist in that it denies that broad the topic than inflationist and derivativist alternatives.
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In contrast with the case of thoughts. standing states, and states with broad or My aim in this chapter was to provide some initial motivations for PIT, outline
olajcctvinvolving contents, I do not attempt to capture the contents we might want my favored version of the view, and preview how I defend and develop i ‘n what
to attribute to nonconscious oecurrent states with a kind of derived representation. follows. As we have seen, PIT is most plausible and best motivated in the case of
The reason for this is that. will argue, unlike in the case ofthe above-mentioned
as I introspectively accessible perceptual states. Part IV argues that PIT can also make
kinds ofstates. we do not in some sense target or intend the relevant contents. We good sense ofother kinds of states, such as thoughts. standing states. and occurrenr
do in sortie sense take ownership over them or intuitively take them to be part
not nonconscious states.
of our overall representational , r
on the world. So. there is both no need to
capture the contents we might take them to have and no basis on which to take us to
derivatively represent them. " B: The Extent of Phenom ‘ Intentionality
While the strategy for most allegedly noneonscious occurrent states is elimina-
tivist, I leave open the possibility that there are phenomenal states we are not aware
This chapter argued for PIT. on which original ‘ ‘ y is phenomenal
of that give rise to intentional states we are not aware of. If there are such states, then intentionality. We largely left open, however. the question of which states have
the strategy for them would be inflationist.
phenomenal intentionality. Let us turn to this question now.
The discussion so far shows that phenomenal intentionality is pervasive in the
The overall view that I have sketched in this section is a version of strong PIT, since case of perceptual states. Many perceptual states are rich in phenomenal L .
it takes all intentionality to be phenomenal intentionality. This might seem like an and this phenomenal character matches their intentional contents. This makes them
unattractive view, since it denies intentionality to no phenomenal states. However, prime candidates for having phenomenal ' ' " y.
as we will see in Chapters 7 and 8, it does justice to much of the content and many of
It is sl'ghtly less clear whether thoughts have phenomenal intentionality. Many
the intentional states we might want to recognize on intuitive or theoretical grounds proponents and sympathizers of PIT have argued that thoughts have rich phe-
by showing that they are derived from phenomenal intentionality or track various nomenal L corresponding to many of their rich contents (e.g., Siewert
items and play various functional roles. 1998. 1011. Horgan and Tienson zooz, Pitt 2.004, Kriegel 1011, Montague zero,
When strongPIT is combined with identity PIT (the version ofPIT that, roughly, and Chudnoff 2.01;, zotsa, zotsb). In Chapter 7, I present a more moderate view
original " y with (L §5.z). we
" '5 ' ’ ' '
of the phenomenology of thought. on which thoughts have fairly impoverished
arrive at strong identity PIT, the view that every intentional state, property, and phenomenal L , which are responsible for the contents we are immediately
content is identical to some phenomenal state, property. and content, respectively. aware of in having thoughts but not for many of the contents we intuitively want to
This 'n broad outline, is my overall view. ascribe to them.
So far, I've suggested that perceptu ' states and thoughts have phenomenal inten-
5.5 Conclusion tionality. Let us now turn to the related question of whether all phenomenal states
give rise to phenomenal intentionality. If they do. then phenomenal intention yis
According to PIT, intencionality is a matter of phenomenal consciousness. the ‘what as extensive as phenomenal consciousness itself.
of beingin certain mental states.
it's like” If PIT is true, then there is some reason to expect all phenomenal states to give rise
I have suggested a fairly strong and simple version of PIT, strong identity PIT, on to intentional’ . If not all phenomenal states gave rise to intentionality, then there
which everyintentional state is identical to some phenomenal state, every ' tional would be two very difl'ercnt types of phenomenal states, those that do and those
property is identical to some phenomenal property. and every intentional state’; that do not give rise to intentionali y. This would be quite strange. Why should
content is identical to its phenomenal L In short, according to strong
. some _ L ' states ‘ ailv give rise to the r ofa content,
identity PIT, intentionality is a species, perhaps the only species (see Appendix B). while others do not? Absent specific reasons to think that there is such a significant
of phenomenal . Wltile this is the view I believe to be correct. I have division between phenomenal states. the view that all phenomenal states give rise to
pointed out various nearby fallback positions. intentionality seems more likely.
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I07. 1>m11I.- 17!:I’beIwmmA/Inlmlitmaligy Theory Chapter ;.- The Phmummal lnlenriar/i1[i!_y Uumy log
Let us consider two possible reasons to think that not all phenomenal states to capture experiences’ phenomenal characters (see Bourget and Mendelovici 2014.
give rise to intentional states. One reason is that, strange or not, it must be so. and Pautz zoo6, zoroa)."
since we know there are mental states that have phenomenal characters but no lfall this is right, then consideration ofparticular cases arguably does not compel
corresponding intentional contents. Putative examples of such cases are discussed us to accept phenomenal states that are not intentional states. Let us now turn to
at length in the literature on representatioitalism, the view that all actual cases of another reason to accept such states.
phenomenal arise from intentionality, perhaps together with some This reason stems from a PIT-like picture ofintentionality that takes intention»
further ingredients. Identity PIT combined with the view that all phenomenal ality to arise from phenomenal states, but only when they are organized in the right
states give rise to intentionality qualifies as a version of representa " , since '
way (see Farkas wt; and Masrour zorg). On Farkas' view, roughly, phenomenal
it maintains that all phenomenal states are identical to intentional states (sec §6.i for states give rise tointentionality when they bear the tight relations to other past and
why this does not threaten PIT’s status as a theory ofintentionality). So, this version present phenomenal states. For example, a certain type of perceptual phenomenal
of PIT faces many of the same alleged counterexarnples as tionalism, such state might change in various ways when we have the experience ofmoving our heads,
as those ofpains, moods, emotions, itches, perspectival experiences, and perceptual approaching objects, etc. When all the right relations are in place, we “externalize"
disturbances like phosphenet p ii it c and blurry vision." phenomenal states of that type, thereby taking them to qualify external objects.
I do believe that all phenomenal states give rise to intentionality. But, since none This is what makes them intentional states. On Farkas' view. the phenomenal states
ofwhat follows depends on this claim, this is not the place to enter these debates.“ involved in color vision bear the right relations to other phenomenal states, so they
I do, however, want to briefly suggest that PIT is in a better position to deal with are externalized and hence intentional. In contrast, the phenomenal states involved
many of the alleged A
t
' to r
than many ,
HI
in pain experiences do not bear the right relations other phenomenal states, and
to
versions of representationalism. so they are not externalized and hence are not intentional.
The prominent versions of tepresentationalism in question combine represen— While this picture is attractive in many ways, it is not clear to me why being
rationalism with a traclrjng theory of intentionality.“ The resulting tracking rep- externalized is a necessary condition for being an intentional state. Perhaps the idea
resentationalism must capture the phenomenal characters of our experiences by is that phenomenal states that are not externillized do not “say" anything about the
appeal to what we track, which is severely limiting when we consider the extent of the mind-independent world and so are not intentional. But why couldn't an intentional
mismatch problem for tracking theories (see Chapter 3) For example, this makes it state say something about the minddepemient world or simply present us with a
difficult for tracking representationalism to account for the phenomenal chiiriicters content, perhaps a non-propositional content? For example, suppose phenomenal
ofcolor experiences, pains, and moods, But versions of rcpresentatiunali III that are states with a blue»ish phenomenal ‘ didn’t bear the relevant relations to other
not committed to the tracking theory do not face such limitations, and so they do not phenomenal states. Suppose, for instance, that vision is normally black and white,
face the same counterexamples as tracking i presentationalism; they can appeal to but we occasionally experience blue phosphenes. In this scenario, Farltas might be
edenic color contents and other contents corresponding to uninsrant' ’ properties right that we would not externalize blueness—phenomenal states with :1 blue-ish
phenomenal character would not qualify putative mind—independent objects as
being blue. But they would still represent <blue>. The scenario would be similar to a
related scenario in which the content <cat> sporadically occurred to someone who
" A potentially proiilotnatit :35! not discussed much in the debates on Kepresentatianalism is tliat ottitt
attinidr compontntsofrhougllti, t.g., the "litlttr" bitora lstliertltat I7. lfzttimdes luv: corresponding otherwise never perceived or thought about cats. In this latter case, we should say
phenomenal characters, then this poses another challenge rot (ll: View tliat all phenomenal States give that our subject has intentional states representing <cat> that are not externalized.
rot to intentionalSrat:s.SeeAppcndIx E0{Cl‘|zpK¢l’7,WlIlClI 1456 tS(hilaKll(ud(S have thzraclelislit
contents corresponding to their phenomenal characters.
Likewise, we should say the same thing about the former case of<blue>. So, even if
" See, {.5 Block X996 anti Kind 200;, 1015 rot 1i’g|ll‘l'\tn!$ igainst reprexlnlilicnzlism bzsrd on pains,
moods, bodily stntittons. and other kinds orstatet. For represenlanonalxsl Iccflunls orrttnlt cases,
see. e.g.. Han-nan 199a. Tye xggsa. iooo. zoos. Drttske l9y§, Byfllt loci. Crane zoog, lsoin mos. “ Elsewhere. 1 have argued for a notttraoltit-lg rtptosentntionilist picture or moods and emotions on
Mendeloviei 1013:, 1014, laottrgtt 1015. 1017b, and Smilhlcs MS. Wlliclltheyrellalvlymisrepresentuninstantiatrd ,, ,.
' (Mendeloviclzol}a:And20|4)anL‘l
“ See tye moo. Dtelskt i995. and Lytan X995 rot Sucll views and Bourgtt and Mendclovicl 2014 and tinitlar afpainsl
Seager and Bourgzt 2.007 rot overviews. (Mendelovlti rottlttorntnga).
I04 pm111.- Hieriiiiiniiiiizzmimiiiiii/iii Theory C/7aplcr_t.' W1:I’!/erianlmizlln/mnwzaluy ‘./‘hwy 103
we agree with Farkas’ story about when phenomenal states are externalized, we might realization, or grounding is to allow for the multlplt arisability of originally in»
nonetheless maintain that all phenomenal states give rise to ' ' “ y. regardless tentional properties, where an originally intentional property is multiply arisable
ofwhethet they are externalized." just in case instantiations of this property can arise in different ways. According
The question of whether all phenomenal states give rise to intentionality clearly to the identity view. any given originally intentional property is identical to some
deserves further consideration. but I take the present discussion to suggest in favor phenomenal property, so it cannot have insranti that arise independently of
of an aflirmarive answer. However. for those not convinced by my claims. identity that phenomenal property Alternative views, such as the realization. constitution.
PIT combined with an acceptance of phenomenal states that do not give rise to and grounding views. allow that instantiations of the same originally intentional
intentional states makes an attractive fallback position that is compatible with most property can arise in different ways.
everything that follows. In order to assess this motivation for moving away from identity PIT. let us
I have argued that every phenomenal state gives rise to an intentional state. When consider the two central kinds of multiple arisability that we might want to allow
combined with strong identity PIT. this means that every phenomenal state is for: First, we might want to allow for the metaphysical possibility of originally
identical to some intentional state and every intentional state is identical to some intentional states arising from non~phenomenal states. just as the tracking theory
phenomenal state, a view that qualifies as a version of representationalism as well as a and the functional role theory might want to allow that intentionality might arise
version of PIT. A plausible extension ofthis view takes every phenomenal property independently oftheir favored ingredients in other possible worlds. PIT might want
to be identical to intentional property and every phenomenal character to
some to allow forposxible cases of original inrentionality that are not cases of phenomenal
be identical to intentional content. On the resulting view, inrentionality is
some intentionality. For example. it might want to allow that an originally intentional
not just A species ofphenomenal consciousness. but the only species otlphenomcnal property whose instantiation arise from phenomenal states in the actual world has
consciousness. instantiations that do not arise from phenomenal c in other possible
worlds. Perhaps. for instance, originally intentional states with the content <blue
triangle> in the actual world arise from phenomenal states. but there are other
Appendix C: The Multiple Arisability of Intentional States possible worlds containing illlentiullai stares representing the same content that arise
from tracking relations to blueness and triangularity."
Section 5.3 argued for identity PIT, on which every originally intentional state is Identity PIT does not allow for this possibility. This is because it identifies
identical to some phenomenal state. every originally intentional property is identical originally inte ' properties with phenomenal properties. As a result. any actual
to some phenomenal property. and every originally represented content is identical or possible originally intentional states have to be instantiations of the corresponding
to some phenomenal character. I suggested that one reason we might want to phenomenal properties. In contrast. the realization, constitution. and grounding
reject the identity view in favor of a view that takes the relationship between views can allow that an originally intentional property might have actual-world
phenomenal ' " and phenomenal ess to be one ofconstitution. instantiations that are realized by, constituted by, grounded in, or perhaps even
identical to phenomenal states but other—world instantiations that are realized by.
c ' ’ by, grounded in, or identical to something else.
“As ' ' 'i “iheappaieiiw WI iii l ;om¢il.,,.s1,,. It is not clear to me that we need to allow for cases of original intentionality in
imiiv Iri-ii i V P II M i- I ( '-(P,,9;.,,.pp,.;;,
iliiii ETC iioi cisis orpliiiioiiiiiiil
' '
iii iiiigiiiil). This aoaiiiiioii or'*iiimiiloiiiliiy" ties iiiioiiiioiiiliiy very closely to ¢l(K€l’I’I3ll1.a[lOn.Wl’ult
Otllcl’ possible Worlds ~ l l‘i2Vc argucd
.
my aosiiiiioii omiiieiiiiiiiiiiliiy" dots iioi. wliiili iiiigrii lead to iiii iiispioioii irioi oiii dlsigfttmenl is that tracking relations and functional roles do not give rise to intenrionality in the
merely [€rmlnC|lC|glC1l. lrilio disagrltment Wei’: mefely Kelmlnaloglcal. that would iioi be i problem actual world. If they do not give rise to intentionality in the actual world. then
roi mi, iiiio. I only wiiii iii iiigiii ilioi txlfrnzllllllon is iioi iiqiiiiia roi iiiiiiiiloiiiiiiy XII mystrflt or ,3:
for intentionality,
.
--iiiiiiiiioiioliiyr HOWEVCI’. l do ililiili (l‘i2( EVER oii l=iikii' siiiio. iiiiio iii YCISOHS roi thinking Ihal i they are not metaphysica" so they do not give rise
phennmtnal Stile riiliiig io mi ilii iigiii I’tlI(l0nS [D Other pliiiioiiiiiiil Suits Could nonellicltss b! an
|li(¢I'IKlOnal iiiio. SIHCC ii Could IIOI'Il.‘Il’l¢l(SS iopimiii S0mt[lIXng Cxistlng |nd¢pC|'id¢1I[ly oreiipiisoiioi.
The example of lI0l|-EX(¢Yhil|Z¢d blue-lSl‘I pl\€lI0m€nal Sfltts IS arguably $|XCl’\ i Case: siiori cxpcrlencts
l’¢p|’tS€I'|l soiiiiiliiiig. <blu¢>, ilioi Cuuld EXKSI iiiilepeiiiioiii orliiliig oiipiiioiiooa (ii least ii rai as mii " similiily. pllyslcallsts olioiii the iiiliiil might win! iii allow iliiii iliiii are possible wiiilili iii wiilili ilioii
iiiliiioix iiipoiiiiioo ii ooiiooiiioa). iiinonpllyslcll miiiai.
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I06 Partlll: ThePhenomnmllnlmrmmzlily 'l'Im7ry C/Mpler 5: Tbs Phenamtnal Intmnnmtltly Theory 107
to intencionality in any world. So. we do not need to allow for tracking relations for such cases. since they allow that multiple distinct and independent phenomenal
or functional roles to give risc to originally intentional states in other possible states can give rise to instantiations of the same intentional property.
worlds. For similar reasons, PIT need not allow anything else in the actual world Again, though. it is not entirely clear that we need to allow for such cases, since
to give rise to intentionality in other possible worlds. We might further argue it is not entirely clear that instantiations of distinct and independent phenomenal
that it would be surprising if there was some other ingredient that could give Propcfllcs can represent the same contents. The proposed picture of the two cases
rise to original intentionality. It's hard enough to l-ind one that can do the trick! described above is dissatisfying because in the case of the perceptual representation of
So. absent good reason to think that there are alternative ways of getting original redness, representing redness consists in having a phenomenal state with a rich and
intentionality, we need not accommodate the kind of multiple arisability described vivid red-ish visual phenomenal character. while in the case of the thought about
above. redness. representing redness consists in having a much more attenuated, much less
The only option that we might want to leave open is that of other possible worlds rich, phenomenal character. This phenomenal character might not even be properly
containing sui generis or primitive instances of original intentionality. instances of described as “red-ish”; it might merely consist of auditory imagery ofthe word “red”
original intentionality that do not arise from phenomenal consciousness or anything or an amodal representation of redness. One might wonder if such an impoverished
else. W/hile this suggestion strikes me as more plausible than the suggestion that phenomenal character really is sufficient for representing redness, given that, in the
tracking or functional roles give rise to original intentionali y in other possible perceptual case. representing redness involves having a much richer or more vivid
worlds 't is somewhat difficult to get a grip on. lfPIT is right. then intentionality is phenomenal character. In Chapter 7, I argue that the impoverished phenomenal
intimately related to phenomenal consciousness in our world. For the imagined sui character of thoughts only yields a correspondingly impoverished content. On this
generis phenomenon to really count as original intentionality, it would have to be view, the thought and the perceptual state allegedly representing <unique red> turn
the same type of thing as our original intentionality. But then original intentionality out to have different phenomenal contents. If the arguments of Chapter 7 are sound,
would have to have a nature that allows it to arise from phenomenal consciousness then the above—mentioned example is not one of instantiations of the same originally
or to be a sui generis phenomenon that exists distinctly from phenomenal conscious- intentional property arising from instantiations of distinct phenomenal properties,
ness, and it's difl-icult to see what kind of nature that would be. The case would be very and so we do not need to retreat from identity PIT in order to accommodate it.
much unlike cases of multiple realizability of functional states by distinct physical More generally, ifimpovcrished phenomenal characters cannot yield rich intentional
states. In these cases, functional states have a functional nature, and it is completely contents, the kind of multiple arisability involved in the above example cannot in fact
intelligible how diverse physical states can realize something with this nature. But in OCCUI.
the alleged case of the multiple arisability of original intentionality under discussion. There is another reason to want to allow for this second kind of multiple
it is unclear what the relevant nature of original intentionality could be such that it arisability. One might suggest that it is possible to have two intentional states with
can arise both from phenomenal consciousness and all on its own. the same intentional contents but that differ in how "intense" they are. Suppose that
A second kind of multiple arisability we might want to allow for involves in one case, you imagine a red circle while relaxed and focused. while in another case,
instantiations of a single originally intentional property arising from instantiations of you imagine a red circle while preoccupied. One might suggest that, on one way of
independent phenomenal properties. For example. compare a perceptual state rep- fleshing out the example, in both cases you represent the same intentional content
resenting something as unique red and a thought representing somediing as unique but at different intensities. Metaphorically, we might say that the two states are alike.
red. These states might both be instantiations of the same originally intentional except that one has the volume turned up higher than the other. just as turning up
property, the intentional property oforiginally representing <unique red>. But. one the volume on the radio doesn't change which song is playing, so too does increasing
might say. they arise from distinct phenomenal states. an intentional state's intensity not change its content.
Identity PIT cannot allow for such cases. Since it identifies originally intentional The two cases in the preceeding example are both instances of imagination, but
properties with phenomenal properties. instantiations of any given originally in- we might be able to concoct similar examples of two perceptual states that are alike
tentional property cannot arise from instantiations of independent phenomenal with respect to content but different with respect to intensity. It might also be
properties. In contrast. the realization, constitution. and grounding views can allow that perception and imagination can represent the satne contents but with different
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ios Part III: The I'bmammalln1mtinnal:1y Umry
intensities." Perhaps differences in attention also make for differences in intensity
without differences in content."
However. it is not clear to me that there are cases ofintentional states widi the
same contents that differ in intensity. It could be that any apparent difference in
intensity is really a difference in content. For example. the imaginative state of a red
circle that one enjoys while relaxed and focused might be more detailed or precise
than the imaginative state of a red circle that one enjoys while preoccupied. Likewise,
perceptual states might be more detailed than imaginative states, even when they
represent what we might intuitively classify as being the same contents.” And in
the same way. differences in attention might make for differences in the details
represented, and hence for differences in content." So, it is not clear that there is
good reason to accept that we can represent the very same contents more or less
intensely.
.5122::i.li..?:’:.iE.’:§?:i5‘;$132?Zi}‘:.:‘;:.‘Zi?2t.'Z;Z§l§§iT.‘;Z3fJ:Z‘:‘.'2:fii‘Zf 5 measameowor
kind of multiple arisability to be at best inconclusive. Absent further considera '
in favor of the possibility of this kind of multiple arisability, I conclude, somewhat
tentatively, that we should stick with identity PIT.
In summary, if we think that instantiat' of the same on inally ' '
property can arise in distinct ways, then there is reason to prefer a realization,
, or grounding version of PIT over identity PIT. I am skeptical that
, x x , IN THE PREVIOUS cha ter, we saw that the henomenal intentionalit theor
there are such reasons. so my bets are on identity PIT. Still. the alternative views are P P Y y
(PIT) can succeed where alternative theories fail. We ended with a discussion of
attractive fallback positions for those who want to allow for the multiple arisability hall ‘ hI f PIT hi
dt ddr 55 _n Pan IV Bur Em [HS_
SONIC C CHEIKIECESCS Of , W C PYOITHSC 03 C I , I
of originally intentional properties. Everything that follows
.
can be adapted to be
_ _ . , chapter briefly considers some theoretical worries with PIT that challenge its status
made compatible with these alternative views.
as an admissible candidate for a theory ofintentionality. For those eager to move on
to the problem cases, however. this chapter may be skipped or read out of sequence.
Here. I consider the objections that PIT. or at least my version of PIT. cannot
properly be considered theory of intentionality in terms of consciousness rather
a
on than a theory of conscious in terms ofintentionality (§6-I) and that PIT is trivial
Such I View might be inspited by l-liii-tie‘; claims that iiiiaginatlve states ll’! faint copies orpeieepnial I ' _ U _ “ _ “ yd‘ __
iinptestions, thoiigii Hiitne alto toolt imaginative states to dittet rtoiti petoeptiial states in heing less (554): o(§5-3)- °"t . W‘ 65-4)‘
ptecise DI degtaded in vatioiis ways(Hull|c tm. LL! and l.i.;). = I , )and Kriegel(1ol5a) As we will see, PIT escapes all these worries.
rot tslevant discussion ottliis view.
" Mote generally. irdiltetetiees in what one is attending to can nitlte : dilretenee to one‘; phenomennl
states lint not to the originally intentional states they give tise to. then illsuntizllolls or distinct 5_1 15 my a Theory of Intent,-onamy in Terms of phenomenal
phenomenal properties can give tie: to instantiattoiis orthe Sam! otiginally intentional property (see I. . ,
Nickel 1007, spealis ZOIOI1 1615, and Block aoto). "" ‘
“’isiiiiiget (2ol7d) intensity actou all expetietieet ate fully explained by
ai-goes that diltetenees in
diltetenees dstettninacy.
in content
My favored version of PIT, strong identity PIT, claims that every intentional state.
" lteins that ate attended no iniglit be teptesented tnote detetniinately oi as inote dettiled. salient. ot
rottgtonnded than items that ate not attended to (chalitiets aoo4. Nanay 1010. Kotalits aou. and property, and content is identical to some phenomenal state. property. and character,
Bourget aot7d). respectively. Additionally. I accept that every phenomenal state, property. and
I09
no Parllll: TbePbmnmenuIlna'enrinna/ily Tim; Chapter 6: PIT’: smrrcr as a Tbmy qf'lmentianalit)r rrr
character is identical to some intentional state. property, and content, respectively terms of consciousness rather than a theory of co in terms of intention-
(see Appendix B of Chapter 5). For our purposes here, let us call strong identity PIT ality. However. when strong identity PIT‘ (or any version of PIT) is combined with
together with this extra claim strong identity PIT‘. On this view, intentionality and some assumptions about the nature of the items to be identified that the advocate
phenomenal ' are one and the same thing. of PIT is likely to hold, the resulting combination is properly considered a theory
One might worry that since strong identity PIT‘ takes the relation between the of intentionality in terms of consciousness rather than a theory of consciousness
intentional and the phenomenal to be that ofidentity, it doesn't make sense to say in terms of intentionality. Strong identity PIT‘ together with these extra assump-
that it provides an account of the intentional in terms of the phenomenal. After all, tions is not ompatible with representationalism together with corresponding
identity is symmetric, so it might seem arbitrary to say that strong identity PIT‘ assumptions.
accounts for the inten ' ‘in terms of the phenomenal rather than the phenomenal Before unpacking these points, let us consider the analogous case of the
in terms of the intentional. mind-brain identity theory, which is supposed to be a theory of mental states in
This worry does not apply to all versions of PIT. Versions of PIT that allow terms of brain states. The mind-brain identity theory, which states that every
for phenomenal states that are not intentional states have a non-arbitrary way of mental state is identical to some brain state, is compatible with the claim that
saying that phenomenal states are in some sense prior to or more fundamental than every brain state happens to be identical to some mental state. Call a version of the
intentional states. The same holds for versions of PIT that take the relation between mindrbrain identity theory that accepts this further claim the mind-brain identity
originally intentional states and phenomenal states to be that of constitution, theory‘. But then, one might ask, what makes the mind—brain identity theory‘ a
grounding, or realization. However, the worry does apply to PIT in general since theory of mental states in terms of brain states rather than a theory of brain rtares in
not all versions of it can clearly be seen to be theories of intenrionality in terms terms of mental states, a kind ofmentalism about brain states?
of phenomenal consciousness rather than theories of phenomenal c ’ es: in Strictly speaking, the mind-brain identity theory‘ is the same view as the mentalist
terms of intentionality. alternative. So. if a theorist who maintains that mental states are brain states is taken
One way to bring out the worry is to note that strong identity PIT‘ (and hence to be offering a theory of mental states in terms of brain states, it must be in virtue
PIT) is I " ' with K " the view that _ L
’ ‘ conscious- offurrher claims she accepts. The relevant claims might be claims to the effect that
ness arises from intentionality, perhaps together with additional ingredients. Indeed. mental/ brain states are, at bottom, more like what we previously thought brain states
strong identity PIT‘ is the same view as a version of representationa" that states like than the other way around. For example, she might take mental/ brain states
are
that every phenomenal state, property, and character is identical to some intentional to be spatially located and physically constituted, and to have the level of internal
state. property, and content, respectively, and every intentional state, property, and complexity we might have previously ‘L ‘ to brain states rather than the level
content is identical to some phenomenal state, property, and character. respectively.’ ofinternal complexity we might have previously attributed to mental states. We can
But representational’ is often thought of as a theory of consciousness in terms call the mind-brain identity theory‘ combined with these further commitments the
of intentionality (see Dretske r995 and Tye zooo, but see Chalmers zoo4, Bourget mind-brain identity theory'+. While the mind—brain identity theory‘ is the same
torch. and Smithies MS, for a dilferent characterization), while PIT is supposed to view as the menralist alternative, the "+" version of the view is not equivalent to
be a theory ofintentionality in terms ofconsciousness. How can this be ifversions an analogous "+" version ofmenralism. We might say that the mind-brain identity
of PIT are identical to versions ofrepresentationalism? theory'+ “fits” mental states to brain states, while mentalism “fits” brain states to
I want to suggest that, strictly speaking, strong identity PIT’ (and strong identity mental states.
PIT and PIT more generally) is not properly onsidered a theory ofintentionality in Similarly, although strong identity PIT‘ is the same View as a version of rep-
resenrationalism. s of PIT and representationalism accept certain further
claims about the nature of the items to be identified. yielding incompatible “+"
Note that this version or rcprmnrarronahrrrr is a far cry from what might be considered the most versions of their of PIT hold that intentionality/phenomenal
views. Advocates
paradigmatic versions ofthe view, which take phenomenal consciousness ro ante rrorn a combination
consciousness has more of the characteristics we might have previously attributed
or hrncrionai roles and intentionalrty, which is taken to be a speties ofrraeking relation. (Set Dretske
r9g§, Tye 1995b. moo. aooo, and Lycan 1996 for examples ofthis view and Eourger and Mendeluviei to phenomenal c than the characteri tics we might have previously
..
aor. and Seager and Bourger 2on7 tor overviews.) attributed to ‘ ‘ " v while, , L‘ ‘ of ,
.
in l’arrlII: The Pbmnmnmllmmliana/it] flzmy Chapter 6: PIT’: Sm-us tn (1 Theory aflmmxianalizy ll;
hold that intentionality/phenomenal rt ' usness has more of the characteristic TABLE 6.l
we might have ,, ', attributed to "ythanthe ‘ ‘ we "
Some Characteristics that Might hc Commonly Atttihrtted tn
lntcntionality and Phcnomenal c
might have previously attributed to phenomenal In short. strong .
identity PlT'+ (and strong identity PIT+ and PIT+) “fits” the intentional to the lntentionality Phenomenal consciousness
K ‘ ‘ while , " "fits" the_ ‘
‘ ‘to the‘ ‘ '
relatively abundant tclatiyclyscatcc
Many of the characteristics that we arguably commonly attribute to intentionality
extcrnalistic internaltlistic
differ From those we ommonly attribute to phenomenal consciousness. First. inten-
relational non-relational
tionalitymight be taken to be relatively abundant. in that , r ‘states. thoughts.
nanrsslitahlt tcsisrsnatntaliratinn
standing states, nonconscious occurrent states, and perhaps even non-mental items
like stop signs. words. tree rings. and compasses are taken to have it. In contrast,
phenomenal ' typically thought to be somewhat scarcer. On some
is
views. only sensory states, like perceptual states. emotional states. and experiences of best thought of as a theory ofintentio " y in terms of phenomenal e
inner speech, have it. while on other views, occurrent thoughts have it, too. However, rather than a theory of phenomenal in terms ofintentionali y. In con-
normally. standing states and nonconscious occurrent states are not taken to have it, trast. a theory that takes intentionality ‘ L nal consciousness to be relatively
and neither are stop signs, words, tree rings, and compasses. ‘ “ " ' ' and clearly tr... “ L‘ "lits' ," ‘con-
Second. externalism is often thought to be true of intentionality. in that which sciousness to intentionality. Such a theory is best considered a theory of phenomenal
intentional states a subject has are mpposed to be at least partly determined by consciousness in terms of intentionality rather than a theory of intentionality in
features ofhet external environment (see Putnam i975 and Burge r979). In contrast. terms ofplicnomenal .‘ '
internalism is usually thought to be true of phenomenal ' . in that a According to the version of PIT I develop throughout the rest of this book.
subject’s phenomenal states are taken to be determined solely by internal factors. intentionalityl phenomenal consciousness is relatively scarce (Chapters 7 and 8).
Third, intentionality is often thought to be relational. in that intentional states are internalistic (Chapters 7 and 9). non-relational (Chapter 9). and resistant to
taken to be relations to distinctly existing entities that one entertains, is aware of, or naturalization (§6.4). Strictly speaking, then, this makes my overall view strong
otherwise represents, such as propositions (see Chapter 9). In contrast. phenomenal identity PIT'+. However. for ease of exposition, 1 will continue to write as if
consciousness is usually taken not to be relational in the same way. Having a blue-ish PIT is implicitly committed to the additional L the proponents of
phenomenal state is not generally thought to involve a relation to a distinctly existing PIT are likely to accept, and so I will write as if it is the “+” version of the
entity, a blue-ish-ne , rather. phenomenal states are thought of as non-relational view}
properties of experiencing subjects.
Fourth, intentionality is often taken to be naturalizable, in that it is supposed to
Theories that take phenomenal/intentional states to have some nr the rtanrtes that are generally
arise from broadly physical phenomena, such as tracking relations or functional roles.
ascrlhcdK0 phenomenal states and some nrrhe reanrrcsthat are generally ascrihed lo intentional rtatcs
In contrast, whether or not phenomenal is taken to be naturalizable, it occupy a gray 1.one.F0r crarnple. anntger (zorob. forthcoming-b) and Paul! (1010:) tllte intentional
ant.t..t tttntttatty Though rheyendorse
is often taken to resist naturalization: Ifit can be naturalized. it is not easy to see how. L » - '
PIT. they alsn sometimes aesttihe their views as versions of"tepresentatIonalism."
These four L : it’. we - I \ttribute to ' ’ " and p‘~ One might suggest that enrnrnitrnents regarding the reantrts of the items to he identified are
enal cons ' are summarized in Table Grid already paclted into the relevant identity claims. and so when the advocate of strong identity
A view that qualifies as both a version of PIT and a version of representationalism PIT’ -the inrenrrnnrl is identical to the phenomenal." she means something drlrerenr than a
says
. , L .. ‘Fm . . ,
and that takes ituernionality/phenomenal s to be scarce. internalist. takes intentionality tn be by definition relatively ahnndant. elrternalistic. relannnal, and nanrralirahlc,
non-relational. and resistant to naturalization “fits” i " y to phenome- while the advocate of PIT takes phenomenal consciousness to be by definition relatively scarce.
nal consciousness. Such a theory claims that. at bottom, phenomenal conscious- nun-relational. and not clearly naturallxable. nit otherwise. on this suggestion, strong
identity PIT’ just is strong identity l>lT'+.
ness/intentionality is more like what we generally take phenomenal ' ess
Whether this is the case depends on the meanings nrthe rcrrns "phenomenal consciousness" and
to be like than what we generally take intentionality to be like. Such a theory is ' ‘ ‘tor .,
H4 Pd?‘!1II.' The phennnmazrmmnm/in Theory Clmprer i1: PIT’: Sum: 45 (I Thwry aflrt/mtiuwl/it] us
6.2 Is PIT Trivial? known meanings of our terms “intentionality" and “phenomenal consciousness.”
Then PIT, and, perhaps, the argument from the Real Reason. would be a priori. But
One might worry that PIT is trivial. following immediately from the definitions of notice that the same is true in the case of any a posteriori identity claim. A prime
"intentionality" and “phenomenal consciousness." If PIT was trivial in this way. it example of an a posteriori identity claim is ‘Water is H,O." But this identity claim
would be true but unimpressive. too would be rendered priori if we simply stipulated ‘water" and “H,O” to have
a
But it is not trivial. Both “intentionality” and “phenomenal consciousness" are their shared referent, H,O, as the a priori known meaning of the terms.‘
defined by pointing to a feature we recognize in a set of examples. In the case of
"intentional.ity," our target feature is the one that we are tempted to characterize using § _3 Is PIT Interesting?
representational terms like “ , sent," “present,” “about,” or “directed,” whereas in
the case of “phenomenal ." our target feature is the felt, subjective. A related \vorry is that identity PIT is simply uninteresting or unsurprising. If it
experiential, or “what it's like” aspect of mental life. It does not follow immediately is true, then it merely points to the fact that something is self»identical, which
from our definitions that the thing we are tempted to characterize in representational is a boring kind of fact. Before considering more nuanced versions of this worry,
terms is such that it is felt, subjective, or experiential or that it gives rise to these
note that the fact that some claim is an identity claim is not in itself an objection
features in some other way. So, PIT does not follow trivially from my definitions. to its being interesting, since many identity claims are interesting. such as claims
Indeed, the above considerations show not only that PIT does not follow trivially identifying mental states with brain states, colors with surface reflectance profiles,
from our definitions but also, further, that it cannot be established ‘ " ’
moral facts with naturalistic facts, phenomenal characters with tracked properties,
through reasoning alone, i.e,. that it is a posteriori rather than a priori. and elephants with bricks (§;.6.4). In any case. even ifa particular identity claim
One might object that the claim that PIT is a posteriori is in tension with my is uninteresting, this is not an objection to its appeal as a theory. It is far outside
second argument for PIT, the gument from the Real Reason, which seems to he the scope of my project to argue against all the exciting identity theories on offer in
a priori. Indeed, some versions of this argument seem to involve a priori thought philosophy. but I will hazard that the most bold and provocative of such claims, the
experiments. There is no tension, however, because the argument from the Real ones that are most interesting, are most likely to be false and that this is part ofwhat
Reason is not a priori. The Real Reason to accept PIT is that consciousness is makes them so interesting. We have trouble seeing how these unlikely identity claims
the right kind of ingredient to give rise to intentionality and it is not clear that might be true, and this makes them surprising, provocative, and exciting. When we
anything else is. That consciousness can give rise to intentionality is supposed to be come to appreciate a true identity claim, though, it loses some of its mystique.
evident from introspective " of phenomenal and intentional states and a Identity theories, then, are in 2 bit of a bind: They are likely either interesting but
priori reasoning about those states. The relevant kind of i 1'
ive considerat‘ false or true but less interesting. The upshot is that it is no objection to an identity
depends on more than simply [l'I€ definitions of r L menal consciousness and claim that it is uninteresting simply because that it might actually be true.
we can see
intentionality. It relies on our introspective grasp ofwhat those definitions pick out A more nuanced objection is identity theories shed light on the
that. while some
or refer to, i.e., phenomenal consciousness and intentionality itself This grasp allows nature of their targets, identity PIT does not, and this makes it uninteresting. For
us to learn from the armchair a posteriori truths about what our definitions pick out, example, mind-brain identity theory (the “+" version. at least) purports to tell us
a
which allows us to see that tracking relations and functional roles cannot give rise to new facts about the nature ofmental states, such as that they are spatially located.
intcntionality and that phenomenal consciousness can. But this is also true ofidentity versions of PIT (again, at least the "+” versions).
Now, of course. we might take what is grasped when we introspect- Such views “fit” intentionaliry to phenomenal consciousness, and in so doing.
" and phenomenal consciousness itselfAto be packed into our a priori they uncover new facts about intentionality, e.g., that it is scarce, non—relational,
internalistic, and resistant to natu.ralization—and even simply that it is experiential.
is possible. it would be inadvisable [0 define tatiist (Elm in such ii committal way, since (ht tetnis would
ran to tors: ifthe phenomena in question raiitd to have the listed rsaniits. In any case. 1 an not using
the terms in this way. so. given my definitions. strictly speaking, strong idenllly pm" is not jusl strong ‘ Thanks to Tim Bayne and David Bciurget rot pressing me on the kinds of wotms discussed in this
identity mr-+. section,
no P47! III: The Pbcrramtrml lnienlwnaltly I hear; Chapter 6: PIT} Sum; as a T/Jtvrj ty”lmmn'armIn;y rr7
Another worry along similar lines is that, while some identity theories account One might object to PIT on the basis of ’ commitments. One L;
for their targets in terms of their constituent parts, identity PIT does not seem to is that since PIT's '0' ' includeat ' to , L '
do so, and this makes it unappealing as a theory ofintentionality. For example. the consciousness, which is not obviously naturalis ' . PIT might not end up being
mind-brain identity theory might explain mental states in terms of the constituent naturalistic. and so we should reject it. Mendelovi i and Bourget (1.014) respond
parts ofche brain states they are purportedly identical to. But if identity PIT is true, to this objection by arguing that either PIT is naturalistic or naturalism is not an
an intentional state need not be made up of multiple constituent phenomenal states, appropriate commitment for a theory of intentionality. In a nutshell. the idea is that
It could even be that every intentionall phenomenal state is simple. in that it has no either consciousness is a naturalistic item or it is not. If it is, then PIT is naturalistic.
constituent parts. If it is not, then we should nonetheless accept ciousness as part of our ontology.
I agree that identity PIT does not automatically provide a theory ofintentionality since eliminativism about s is not an option. But then naturalism does
in terms of constituent parts and that this is a difference between the view and many not reflcct the admissible 5' ' commitments for a theory of intentionality,
other identity theories.‘ But I do not think much follows from this. This does not and so it is not an rtt
constraint on such a theory. Put otherwise. the only
threaten the truth of the theory, since not all things have constituents and even things H, r ' ontological constraint on a theory (at least a theory of things that exist)
that do have ' can be largely .1
‘ without a I’ account of is a commitment to entities that exist. Phenomenal exists, so. as far as
their constituents.‘ This feature of identity PIT also does not threaten its status as ontological I. are concerned, it is acceptable for a theory to invoke it.
'
a theory of intentionality, since a theory of intentionality is a theory that tells us This is true whether or not phenomenal consciousness can be naturalized.’
intentionality’s nature, not necesarily a theory that tells us intentionality’s nature A second worry pertaining to nat is that PIT combined with my claim
in terms nfils amstituentparts. This also doesn’t threaten how interesting the theory that only phenomenal can give rise to intentionality (§5.2.) cannot
is, since, although it may be interesting to have a theory of something in terms of be combined with a natu " it view of phenomenal consciousness. Along these
its constituent parts, it is not " uninteresting to have a different kind of lines, Pautz (zoiia) argues that advocates of PIT that take the failure of naturalism
theory that nonetheless tells us about the nature of its target. about intentionality to motivate PIT are committed to denying naturalism about
phenomenal onsciousness, This is because any arguments against naturalistic
accounts of intentionality would also provide arguments against PIT combined
6.4 Is PIT Naturalistic?
with a " ' view of ‘ " view ‘ ' for such a ‘
would ' ‘
I
accountfor' ' " vintermsof " ' ’ D " This
As we saw in Part II, much theorizing on intentionality assumes that we want a
I
objection does not directly apply to my view, since I do not claim to have argued
naturalistic theory. a theory appealing only to tic items, which are either
of intentionality. But of
‘
against all possible naturalistic views a restricted version
Fundamental physical items lacking mentality or items constituted by. realized by, or
the objection does apply: PIT together with my conclusions ofPart II that tracking
grounded in such items.’
and functional role theories fail rule out a tracking or functional role theory of
phenomenal consciousness.
Now. clearly, if we cannot account for A in terms of C, then we cannot account
‘ See, however, Chapter 9. for A in terms of B and B in terms of C. So, the general claim that underlies
‘ Compare: A gthearyofintentiollaliry miglltaecount iurinttnncnallty intetintotcansai
Pautz‘s objection is clearly correct. But this does not pose a problem for PIT unless
'
teiationt without accounting rot eansai teiationt in mote hasie tetms.
’ we might distinguish between ontological nttmuam, which is a commitment to a eettain ontology we have independent thinlt that a tracking or functional role theory of
reasons to
mitpotteaiy delivered by science. which it usually taken to consist in tnndamentai physical entities phenomenal And even if we had such reasons and they were
’ s is true.
lacking mentality and entities composed orot tealiled by such entities. ana methodclogleal natu-
.-niicin, which is a methodological commitment to a broadly seientiiie methodolog (see shapito .997,
Chomsky zooo, Maddy toot, Horst tooo. Papineau toio. Menaeiosiei aoio, eh. r. and Mendeloviei
and Bourget aoi. rot eneh aistinetions). Mendelovrci and Bourget aoi. ana Mendeloviei 1.oIc.(h. 1
-
Along similar lines. st.-iwson (zen) argues that a teahttit version or namralism should accept the
.
L itina tn
. . . . .
am. th.. * ' ' L r i
and that PIT is mote methodologicall natntahstie than tricking theoties. But the kind or naturalism existence orphenomenai conserouslless. on sttawsons version otnannahsm. rrr is Impmblematieally
at issue in this section is ontologicalnannahtm. the hind ofnamtzlisrn that is otten taken to motivate natntahstie.
the tracking theory (see Millikan im. 1). :7. Rider 1937.)). 97. and ntetsite igu, p. it).
H8 : Plymamzmtl lnrmriomzlily Um»; Chapter 6: PIT’: Stalm Jr A Theory qflntenrianaliry no
compelling, this would only succeed in generating an impasse, with arguments for phenomenal consciousness, which, we are granting here, is not very well understood.
such a theory of consciousness pitted against arguments against it based on the But unless we have reason to think that what tracking or functional role theories tell
arguments from Part II and Chapter 5. us about the nature ofintentionality is true, the mere fact that they say more is merely
In any case, even ifit turns out that a tracking or functional role theory ofphenom- a desire-satisfying virtue.
enal consciousness is true, all is not lost for PIT. This would mean that some of the natutalism is a desire-satisfying virtue, but this does
So. not support the truth
arguments of Part II are mistaken. The problems with those arguments, such a view of naturalistic theories. Since we are interested in finding out which theory is
in ght say, is that they fail to take into account that tracking relations or functional
tme. rather than which theory we should laape to be true, the kind of virtues we
roles give rise to phenomenal Once we take this into account, we can
.
are concerned with truth-indicating virtues. The question, then, is whether
are
see how tracking and functional roles can indeed give rise to intentionality.
natutalism is a is “yes,” but this does
truth»indicating virtue. The answer, again,
The final objection concerning natutalism that I will consider suggests that even not support naturalistic theories over PIT. Naturalism is a truth~indicating virtue
though the above two objections do not warrant the outright rejection ofl’lT, the because it is a special case of a more general truth-indicatingvirtue, that ofappealing
fact that tracking and functional role theories are naturalistic is surely a virtue that only to things that exist, a point that brings us back to the points ofMendelovici and
they have and that PlTlacks. When deciding between theories, we need to weigh all Bourget zor4 discussed above. Since (let us grant) the naturalistic items invoked by
their virtues and vices, including their stance with respect to natutalism.“ naturalistic theories of intentionality exist, naturalistic theories appeal only to things
Before responding to this objection, it is important to clarify what we might mean that exist. But, given that phenomenal consciousness exists, PIT also appeals only to
by a “virtue.” A virtue ofa theory might be taken to be a feature of the theory that things that exist, so it also has the more general ttudvindicating virtue of appealing
provides evidence of its truth, which we might call a truth-indicating virtue, or it only to things that exist. While commitment to an ontology consisting only of
might be taken to be a feature of the theory that makes it more desirable that it naturalistic items is a truth—indicating virtue, so too, and for the same reasons, is
be true, which we might call a desire<satisfying virtue. For example, a particular commitment to an ontology consistingonly ofnaturalistic ‘terns and consciousness.
epistemological theory that defeats skepticism has a desire-satisfying virtue: we So, natutalism provides no support ofthe truth ofnaturalistic theories over PIT.
would like to defeat skepticism, so we have reason to desire that the theory be true. We might add that the idea that we need to weigh all the virtues and vices of
But, absent independent reason to think that skepticism can be defeated, that an competing theories before deciding between them is attractive but incorrect—and,
epistemological theory can defeat skepticism is not evidence ofits truth, and so it is in the case of the dispute between the theories under consideration, particularly
not a truth—indicating virtue. misleading. It suggests that the tracking and functional role theories can accept the
Now, the fact that tracking and functional role theories are naturalistic is clearly mismatch problem and the Real Problem as vices but “make up" for them with other
a virtue in the desire-satisfying sense. This is true for a deeper reason than that we virtues. But, as suggested in §).8, some vices are simply unforgivable. The mismatch
might simply want natutalism to be true. lt is true because it is more desirable for problem shows that tracking theories and the best versions of functional role theories
a theory to invoke items that we a fairly good understanding of, like
already have are empirically inadequate. They make the wrong predictions in certain paradigm
tracking relations, than to invoke items that are not well understood. like (let us cases of intentionality. But ' inadequacy is not a vice you can make up for
grant) phenomenal consciousness. One reason for this isthat a theory invoking with other virtues. lfa theory is empi ally inadequate, it is false. Even if natutalism
better understood items is likely to say more about the nature of our target than a were a trutlrindicating virtue that favored tracking and functional role theories over
theory invoking less well understood items. Tracking and functional role theories, PIT, this would not make up for their being fizlse.”
then, might provide a more satisfying account of intentionality, oifering a fairly
precise picture of how intentionality relates to the rest of the world, especially the 6.5 Conclusion
physical world. PIT, in contrast. might be thought to say less about intentionality.
since intentionality’s relation to much of the rest of the world depends on that of Making sense of how an identity theory like strong identity PIT can be nontrivial
and interesting and how it can shed light on a phenomenon, particularly when it
’ Kriegel (aorx, p. x72) endorses something me this outlook. arguing that considerations ofempirieal
adequacy need to be weighed against theoretical virtues, ma that ofbeing naturalistic. "’ See also Mendeluvici zoto, ch. s and Mendelovtcl and Boutget ion; to: similar points.
n.o pm Ill: ThePhmamrna/Intmrian/1/it} T/Mary
does not reveal an underlying structure of constituent parts, is tricky, but I have
argued that there is good sense to be made of strong identity PIT’s status as a theory
of intentionality. For those who are still taken by the idea that PIT is in some sense
uninformative as a theory, note that many co r d| y philosophers have assumed
or argued that it is false, which alone suggests that it is nontrivial and interesting.
In short, PIT is a legitimate contender for a theory ofintentionality, one that is
worth taking seriously. Let us now turn to how it can be made to work.
IV Challenging Cases
IN THE PREVIOUS part, we saw that PIT is a well—rnotivated theory of
intentionality. succeeding precisely where alternative theories fail. How—
ever, we also saw that PIT faces challenges in ‘ iug atious kinds
of mental states. This part turns to these challenging cases: Chapter 7
considers the case oftlnoughts, including thoughts with broad contents and
object-involving contents, and Chapter 8 considers nonconscious states,
including standing states and nonconscious occurrent states. I will argue
that there are natural PIT-friendly ways of treating these challenging cases
that can be motivated largely on independent grounds.
This part has two aims: First. in showing how PIT can deal with
apparently problematic cases in natural and uncontorted ways, I hope to
show that the theory is viable and interesting‘ Second, by seeing how PIT
might be developed in a of cases, I hope to further flesh out
wide range
and motivate my favored version oi'I’IT. On my view, which is a version
ofstrong PIT. the intentional mind is restricted to the phenomenal mind,
which is itself fairly limited, but derived mental representation and other
representation-like phenomena play many of the roles that intentionality
might have previously been thought to play.
7 Thought
in PREVIOUS CHAPTERS, I argued for the phenomenal intentionality theory
(PIT), the view that all original intentionality arises from phenomenal c<7nscious—
ness. Thoughts are a challenging case for PIT, since we at least sometimes take them
[0 represent a Variety ofcontcnts that do not seem to match their Corresponding phe»
nomenal characters. such as rich, complex, and sophisticated descriptive contents,
object—involving contents, and broad contents.
This chapter argues that thoughts have both phenomenal contents and
derived contents. which are derived from phenomenal contents, and that the
above-mentioned problematic contents are merely derivatively represented.
I proceed as follows: §7.r clarifies the challenge, §7.7. argues that thoughts have
phenomenal contents, §7,; argues that many of thoughts’ alleged contents are
derivatively represented, and §7.4 argues that derived mental representation is
not a kind of intentionality, which makes the proposed view of thought content
compatible with strong PIT.
- Lin Forr Evaluation. https://www.qoppa.com/pdfstudio
.14 Part IV: C/1alIenging(,lz.r:x Cl1ap!:r7: Tbaugbx us
7.1 The F‘ " for PIT from Thought are no phenomenal characters beyond sensory phenomenal ‘ which .
might include perceptual, imagistic, verbal, and emotional phenomenal characters.
Thoughts are occurrent intentional mental states that we are in when we do A conservative View of wATeR’s phenomenal character might take it to consist in
what we commonly call "thinking.“ judgments, entertainings. occurrent beliefs, verbal imagery of the word 'water" or visual imagery of water.
and occurrent desires count as thoughts, but perceptual r ‘ , emotional According to liberalism, there are cognitive phenomenal L which are .
experiences, and standing states do not. My focus in this chapter is on thoughts that y phenomenal “ that are special to thoughts in that they do not
we are in some sense aware ofhaving. Thoughts that we are not in any sense aware of generally occur in other types of mental states, such as perceptual states, bodily
having, if there are any, are instances of allegedly nonconscious occurrent states and sensations, or emotional states. A possible liberal view of V/AT!-:R's phenomenal
are covered by what I say about such states in Chapter 8.‘ character is that it is or includes a simple or sui generis water-ish phenomenal
I will assume that the vehicles of intcntionality underlying thoughts are made character, a phenomenal that is not normally found ouuide of thought.
up of concepts, which are subpropositional representations involved primarily in Other possible liberal views take it to be a complex cognitive phenomenal character
thoughts. For example, the thought that Mitten is a cat might involve the concepts t responding to various aspects of WATER’: alleged content.‘
MITTEN and CAT, which represent the contents <Mitten> and <cat>, respectively. The problem is that V/ATi=.k’s alleged contents do not seem to match‘ its phe-
For convenience, I will structure much of the discussion around the contents of nomenal character, whether it is a sensory phenomenal character consisting of verbal
concepts.‘ and perceptual imagery. a complex cognitive phenomenal character, or a simple sui
The problem with thoughts and the concepts they involve is that their alleged generis cognitive water-ish phenomenal L . For instance, wATER's alleged
conten ‘- contents they are often thought to have, either on the basis of descriptive contents, like <the clear, potable liquid that flows from taps, is essential
intuition or on the basis ofphilosophical or psy ' ‘ 0' al theory—do not seem to for human life, and fills rivers, lakes, seas, and oceans around here>. are quite
be phenomenal contents, so it is not clear how exactly PIT can account for them. complex and nuanced, specifying many of water's features, such as its being clear,
To see the problem, let us consider in some detail the case of the concept WATER, potable, and essential for human life. These contents fail to match the sensory or
which might be taken to represent a reference-fixing descriptive content like <the cognitive phenomenal characters that WATER might be said to have. WAT:-:R's alleged
clear, potable liquid that Hows from taps, is essential for human life. and fills rivers, object-involving content. <H,O>, also does not match its phenomenal character:
lakes, seas, and oceans around here>, a descriptive content that doesn't serve to there doesn’t seem to be anything particularly l-l,O-ish about our phenomenal state
fix on a referent, like <clear, potable liquid>, object-involving content, like
or an when we use the concept WAT ER, especially if we don’t k.now that water is l-[,O, Since
<H,O>, which involves the externally existing kind H,0. Some ofthese contents, \vIAT£I1's alleged contents don’t match its phenomenal character, it is implausible that
like <H,O>, might be broad contents, contents the representatio of which is at these contents are phenomenally represented, Similar claims hold for other concepts
least partly “ ' ‘ by environmental factors. and thoughts.‘
It is implausible that WATER phenomenally represents the have-mentioned We can isolate the following two ‘aallenges facing PIT in the case of thought,
contents. To see why, consider the phenomenal corresponding to the which will correspond to the two parts of my proposal:
use of the concept WATER, or. in short. WATER’; phenomenal L There .
are different views of what this phenomenal character might be. which we can
organize in terms of a distinction that is sometimes made between conservative ‘ st: Srrawson ma. stewttt tggs. Horgan and Tienson 1001, Pin IOCQ,Cl’I|Id1|0KlOi§I,KHtgll1.0|§b,
and liberal views of cognitive phenomenology. According to conservatism. there and Montague 3016 foralgumenls folllberlllsm andTyeand Wright Ion foradefense ofconservatlsm.
St! aim Bayne and fol’: t- '
‘ Content A matches item B (which may 0|’ may not be a content] when all the features ol’A's superficial
Eluflctel’ are had by B. SE: n. 9 orchapttt 5 tot Lhls atttnaaa sense or-tnatthr
In 1 am y ' ' ' PIT ‘ thoughts. Firnhu _,,. L - A
not oflheir attitudes. tag. the attitudes oijudgmenr 01 .«1ttate,ia.ttnts tht prospects ofrombimng my can’: in NI
account with tantnn views ortht attitudes In Appendix 2 Olthls Chaplet, wh.th IS best ttaa arm the as constituents, which I take (0 be pnma facie implausible (Except pelh-lpi in can ofobjeet-involving
test ortht chzptzl. content: about out own tntntai ttattt . . 0|’ phenomenal characters), they cannot capture
' st: also :1. IO ofclupler L objecbinvolving tonttntt. (See §s-4-)
I15 Pimll’: chautugmg CA!!! Chapter 7: Tbnugbt |1.‘7
Challenge l: Specify the phenomenal content of thoughts. 2_T_hough ' P‘ ' Contents
Challenge 2.: Accommodate the alleged contents of thoughts.
One might reject eitherchallenge. For example, one might maintain that thoughts This section argues that thought has a kind of content that is distinct from its alleged
do not have phenomenal contents at all. though perhaps they derivatively represent content and that is a good candidate for being thought’s phenomenal content. This
something like their alleged contents. Such a view is somewhat against the spirit content, which 1 call immediate content, is the content that “runs through our
of most versions of PIT, which take phenomenal intentionality to be pervasive minds" or that is immediately available to intentional mental
us when we are in an
(see, e.g., Hotgan and Tienson zooz, Pitt 2.oo4), and, if we think that thoughts do state. Subsection 7.z.l argues that thoughts have immediate contents. §7.2..z argues
have phenomenal it is incompatible with the claim that all phenomenal
L ,
that thoughts’ immediate contents are distinct from their alleged contents, §7J..;
states give rise to original intenrionality. which I want to accept (see Appendix B of discusses some ' ' philosophic ‘ and scientific views of concepts, and §7.z.4
Chapter 5). In any case, in what follows, I argue that thoughts do have phenomenal argues that immediate contents are good candidates for being thoughts’ phenomenal
contents and sothat this challenge, whether or not we should accept it. is met. COHICHKS.
One might reject the second challenge by questioning our reasons for taking
thoughts to I some of the above-mentioned alleged contents. For example. a 7.1.1 THOUGHTS HAVE IMMEDIATE CONTENTS
descriptivist might question whether thoughts represent object—involving contents,
Immediate contents are the contents we are immediately aware of when we are in
and an internalist might question whether they represent broad contents (see Farltas
an intentional mental state. Metaphorically, they are the contenu that are “before
zoosa and Pitt 1999). While lam sympathetic to these positions. I think that we in
our mind’s eye," or that ‘run through our heads.” My claim is that thoughts, at least
some important sense take ourselves to such contents, as evidenced by the
the ones that we are in any sense aware of, have immediate contents. For example.
fact that many ofus have strong intuitions in their favor. Object-involving and broad
when it suddenly occurs to you that you have been lecturing past the end of class
contents figure in our best ways of J “ B ourselves and the ' ts
or that the department meeting was yesterday. not today, there is some content that
our thoughts carry. This is reason to want to find a theoretical home for these
you entertain and that you are aware of. \Vhat you are aware of in these cases are your
alleged contents. The same goes for other alleged contents that we might be tempted
thoughts’ immediate contents.”
to reject. In any case, as we will see, a virtue of my account is that it does not
One might agree that in the above examples we are aware of mmerhing but suggest
force any individual to accept any alleged contents that she does not in some sense
antecedently accept.‘
that what we are aware of is not a content. Perhaps what we are aware of are mere
fleeting ‘ L ' characters, the r involved in , . or our
ln what follows, 1 develop an account that responds to both challenges. My
'
representing a certain content. Let us consider these alternatives in turn.
proposal meets the first challenge by specifying a kind of thought content apart
from thoughts’ alleged contents that is plausibly phenomenally represented. lt meets
die second challenge by specifying a way in which thoughts derivatively mentally ttiiisttyativt iayotatts or PIT ratt a challenge in accounting rot tht alleged taiittnts ofrhougllfl. Io
represent many of their alleged contents. Appendix D argues that a similar strategy tht truth of lihttahsiti IS not tiitiugh to avoid tht uitihltins with thought. A: wt will soon itt. iuy
can be used to capture some allegedly non-phenomenal contents in rceptionl’
I
gtiittal ttiattgy rot solving tht ptohltnit ls coinpatihla with both lihtialisin and ttnisti-vatitiii. though
my’, rh t lnn
'- aPlT- , ’ of L L i... uuih .
lihttaliini. (Thanks to ehatlti sitwttt rut tncollnglng nit ,.h thtst points. stt also sitwtn
I99! rat a tungulial way olthlnklng ortht issues.)
‘ Note that it is out intuitions not out iutmsptttitt atttst to out own intentional states. that iiiotiyate By -itnnittliatt tonttnts" I do not uitan contents that tlittttly atquaiiit us with thtit lalgtls. that wt
tilting ohyttt-involving tunttnts ttmusiy. out lutnisptttlvt uhtttvitions tan at but only ttll us that ltnow without nitiliatitin. at that hayt sonit othtt special tpisttinoltigital slams (though it niigii nun
wt hayt lhmlylts with oh;ttt.inyoliting xltpt?1ll1'Al thutnttm. not thoughts that litttally involve ututcts out that nnnitdiitt ttiiittiut hayt some such rtanitta). l simply nitan tht tonttnts that wt have "before
i.t, thoughts with object-involving dllp natimt (itt §a.a.i rot tht Superficial thatatttt/titty; hatiitt our minds tyt' whtn wt have i tl'|mIght—nu tntnt, no list
A- ' - aggairot I A ' s» also' Htuisrtit I rm iht '
Although iuy rotut is on thought, pttttpuial siaitts also have itnnitaiatt toiittntt. whtn you p¢l€£iV:
tlaiiii that wt ttpttstnt nolrploposltiflllal toiittiits. a dog. your pflteplual statt might ttptsttnt vatiout lmmldlltt tonttntt Konespondlllg Io IKS thapt,
‘ Muth urtht aistutsion ofPlT iii tht tatt urthtitight ttntttt on atguing rot llbetzllsm (sta, e.g.. Hotgan tolot. tht iuiyt it is moving. its distinct away hunt you, and ptihaps tytn iishly,h.ltttl rtaiutts. tuiih as
and 1-itntoii zoo). and put 2004]. nowtytt, as tht tiittuttiau in this itttioii shows. both liberal and that uniting a dog (mutt on this in Appendix D).
us Part IV: Chal/engzng Cam Claapm- - Tkumghl tag
The first su estion is that what we are aware of are mere P lienomenal characters V
We can conclude that thouE hts, and resumabl the concc ts the involve, have
phenomenal characters that are not also contents. While what we are aware of might immediate contents, contents that we are immediately aware of when we are in an
be phenomenal characters (indeed, this is the view that I will recommend), it does intentional state.
not seem they are mere phenomenal characters. Some examples of states that might
be taken to have mere phenomenal characters are pains, moods. and emotions. These
CONCLPTS‘ IMMEm.~\TE CONTLNTS ARE DISTINCT FROM THEIR
states, it might be claimed, are mere raw feels (but see Appendix B ofChapter 5 for
ALLEGED CONTENTS
reasons to reject this view). If what we were immediately aware of in having thoughts
were mere phenomenal characters, then having a thought would be as these states are I will now argue that the immediate contents of thoughts and concepts are distinct
claimed to be view on which they have mere Phenomenal characters, involving
on a from their alleged contents and provide some options as to how to characterize these
an awareness of nothing more than a raw feel. But having thoughts is nothing like contents. I will start with some examples in which a concepts immediate content is
this. We are not aware of mere raw feels. Instead. what we seem to be immediately distinct from its alleged contents and then argue that mostcases are like myexamples.
aware of in havinga thought is something that the thought “says,” i.e., a content. In ‘ I will focus on concepts. but since concepts make up the vehicles of thought, my
deed, the very fact that thoughts are uncontroversial as examples ofintentional men‘ claims apply fairly directly to thoughts as well.
ral states but controversial as examples of phenomenal mental states suggests that
their features that we are aware of are intentional. even ifthey are also phenomenal. 1Wmber.umdNumem/.r
It is also implausible that what we are immediately aware of are merely the Anumber concept—say, the concept 0f}7},987-might have as its alleged content
representations involved in thought. i.e., the items having intentional properties but the number 373,987 or a description of the number, perhaps involving our under-
not the intentional properties themselves. Representations might be symbols in a standingof succession or our ability to count. However. when we use our concept
language of thought. brain states, functional states, or states of an immaterial soul. of 373.987. what we are aware of is arguably not the number itself or
immediately
But it does not seem that we are aware ofany such things in havinga thought. Again, a description ofit but rather the numeral “;73.987,” perhaps in addition to the fact
what we are aware of is something that thoughts “say,” not the thing that does the that it stands for a number or number—iike thing and a rough ballpark sense of the
saying. number itself.
On the most straightforward way of understanding the third suggestion that Bourget (mr7c) argues that when we think about numbers, \vhat we grasp are
what we are immediately aware ofis our thinking a particular content, it is not in numerals. not numbers. The considerations he uses to argue for his claim also
conflict with my claims. According to this suggestion. we are immediately aware of support my claim that the immediate contents ofour number concepts are numerals
two things: a content and the act of thinking that content (or the fact that we are rather than numbers or descriptions of numbers. One intuitive consideration is that,
thinking it). This suggestion agrees with my claim that there are contents that we as far as what is in our immediate awareness is concerned, it seems that numerals
are immediately aware of. It adds the further claim that we are immediately aware of like 373,987" could stand for entirely dilfcrent numbers than they in fact stand for,
thinking them, which is something that I am neutral on. which suggests that when we use such numerals. we are not immediately aware of
One might object thatit is not clear that immediate contents are genuine contents the numbers or descriptions of numbers they stand for. Another consideration is
because it is not clear that they have all the features required for something to that the same arithmetic equations seem more or less obvious depending on the
qualify as a content. For example, one might suggest that contents must have, be, notation we use to symbolize them. For example, seeing that 7 X too = no is easy in
or determine truth conditions, play a specific role in a folk psychological theory of decimal notation but difficult in binary notation (in X uooioo = 1010111100). This
mental states and behavior. or figure in certain cognitive scientific, psychological, suggests that, at least when dealing with large numbers, we perform number—related
or ncuroscientific theories. However. given the ostensive way we fixed reference tasks by working with numerals, not numbers or descriptions of numbers. This in
on intentionality in Chapter 1, having any of these features is not automatically 2 turn suggests that in many cases when we use our number concepts, the contents we
requirement for something to count as a content. This does not mean, of course, are immediately aware of are not numbers themselves but only numerals (perhaps
that immediate contents do not have some or all of the aforementioned features but together with a sense that they stand for numbers or number»like things and a
just that their status as contents is not dependent on their having them. ballpark sense of the magnitudes of the numbers they stand for).
A
C;1flfIPY7: Waugh: 151
no pm 114 C/mllmgmg cm
you entertain its stipulated definition suggests that what you are immediately aware
We can think of our number concepts’ immediate contents as mental tags
or symbols standing for numbers or related contents. In most cases, when we
of when you use ENT is not its alleged Content.
just as we can think of numerals as tags for numbers or other related contents,
think number—related thoughts, our immediate content. involve these tags, instead
we can think of <Ent> as a mental tag for EN'r's stipulated definition. When we
of what we in some sense take them to stand for. This might be because it is
reason using ENT, we do not rtln its entire stipulated definition through our heads.
easier or lnore efiicienr for us to be immediately aware of numerals and related
contents than of numbers or descriptions of numbers, or because we are simply
Instead, we are only immediately aware of the simpler content <Ent>, which we
in some sense accept as standing for the full definition. As in the case of number
unable to become immediately aware of numbers or descriptions of numbers
themselves.”
concepts, being immediately aware of<Ent> might be easier or more efficient than
If all this is right. then number concepts have immediate contents that are distinct being immediately aware of ENT's full definition.
from their alleged contents.
If all this is right, then ENT has an immediate content that is distinct from its
alleged contents.
Slipularzd Concept:
I want to suggest that these claims about number concepts and stipulated concepts
Suppose that while working through some complicated philosophical reasoning, you
apply more generally to pretty much all concepts. What we are typically immediately
reach an intermediary conclusion4say, that physicalism is committed to the a priori
aware of when we use concepts is not their alleged contents but rather some simpler
entailment of the phenomenal facts by the physical facts. You might stipulate <l.et immediate contents that serve as mental tags for their alleged contents.
Ent = physicalism is committed to the a priori entailment ofthe phenomenal facts Earlier, we saw that concepts have various kinds of alleged contents:
by the physical facts). You might then your ad hoc concept ENT in your further
use
reference-fixing descriptions, descriptions that do not serve to fix reference, and
deliberations. For instance, you might it to represent to yourselfa premise in an
use
object-involving contents. In order to argue that concepts immediate contents are
argument against physicalism.
not their alleged contents, I will consider these various types of alleged contents in
ENT might be said to have as its alleged content the content you defined
turn and argue that, in most cases, they are not concepts’ immediate contents.
it as standing for, <physicalism is committed to the a priori entailment of the Reference-fixing descriptive contents contain enough information to zero in on a
phenomenal facts by the physical facts>. However, when you use ENT, this content
referent, but it is implausible that we are immediately aware of all this information
is not running through your head in its entirety; it is not what you are immediately every time we use a concept." For example, the concept SUPERVENIENCE might rep-
aware of. Instead, what you are immediately aware of is another content, <Ent>,
resent the reference-fixing description <l’roperties in class A supervene on properties
which might consist in the word “l-int." mental imagery, a gisty, partial, or schematic in class B ilf all worlds that are alike with respect to the B properties are alike \vith
understanding of ENT’s stipulated definition, or a “new" simple or sui generis
respect to the A properties>, but, just as we are not immediately aware of the full
content.
stipulated definition of ENT every time we use the concept, we are not immediately
Note that the key observation is not that you have difficulty putting the content aware of sur-ERvt:NxENcE’s full definition every time we use that concept.
of ENT into words or that you can use the concept without doing so. it is that when Descriptive contents that serve to merely characterize a concepts referent, rather
you use of its alleged content (its
ENT, you do not seem to be immediately aware
than to fix reference on it, also contain more information about a concepr's target
stipulated definition). You can see this from the fact that using ENT does not seem
than we seem to be immediately aware of when we use the concept. For example, the
to come with an immediate awareness ofthe notions ofphysicalism or a priority. In
concept BIRD might be taken to represent a prototype (Rosch I975), which might
contrast. when you entertain EN'r’s stipulated definition, perhaps by spelling it out
include features such as having wings, having feathers, laying eggs, and having the
to yourself, you are immediately aware of such notions or something nearby. This ability to Fly. But \vhen we think <Tweety is a bird>, we are not immediately aware
difference between what you are immediately aware of when you use Em‘ and when
" Indeed. largely thanks to Kripke (.971), it is controversial that we In any sense have such information.
‘° Bourget (mm) argues that. at least in the ease oflarge numbers. we think in numerals because we are
But 5:: Jackson |993a. Ktoon i987. and the arguments tn come for defenses ofthe claim.
simply unable to grasp the corresponding numbers.
I}: Am IV: Chnllengrng Case; Chapter 7: Tlmugbt I}}
ofail this information pertaining to birds. Perhaps we use this information to classify these kinds of contents are any given concepts immediate contents, and the answer
Tweety as a bird or to make inferences about Tweety's features based on the fact that might differ for concepts ofdifferent items or for concepts of the same item had by
he is a bird, but this does not require that it is immediately running through our different subjects or by the same subject on different occasions. We will discuss these
minds when we think <Tweety is a bird>. options in more detai In §7.z.4.
It might seem that objcctainvolving contents. like worldly properties, kinds, and For now, though, we can conclude that, like number concepts and stipulated
objects, are better candidates for being concepts’ immediate contents. Perhaps when concepts, most concepts have immediate contents. and these immediate contents are
we use the concepts SUPERVENIENCE, BIRD, and WATER. we are immediately aware distinct from their alleged contents. Like number concepts and stipulated concepts,
of the supervenience relation itself, the kind bird, and the kind H ,0, respectively. it might even make sense to describe immediate contents as setting as tags standing
However, although we can name these contents with simple expressions, like “the for more complex contents dtat arebeyond our immediate awareness. It might be
supervenience relation," “the kind bird," and "the kind H ,0," these kinds of contents easier or more efficient for us to bring these simpler immediate contents to mind
are oftentimes quite complex and hidden from us in a way that makes it implausible than our concepts' full alleged contents, or we might simply be unable to become
that they are our immediate contents. The supervenience relation is the relation that immediately aware of these alleged contents.
obtains between pairs of classes of properties when a world cannot differ with respect
to the properties in one, supervening, without differing with respect to the
class
7.1..t THIN AND THICK CONCEPTS
properties in the other class. if the supervenience relation were SUPERVENIENCI-:’s
content, it would be quite complex, just like the concepts corresponding descriptive The view that thoughts and concepts have immediate contents that are distinct from
content. Again, it is implausible that we are immediately aware of such a content their alleged contents is congenial to some views in philosophy, psychology, and
every time we think about supervenience. neuroscience that draw similar distinctions between the concepts used in thought
Similarly, the kind H,0 is the kind composed of molecules containing two and other mental activities pertaining to an item, on the one hand. and fuller
hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom, which is arguably more complex and representations we have of that item, on the other.
sophisticated than what we are immediately aware of when we think about water. Barsalou (1993. 1999) distinguishes between what he calls ‘concepts," which are
It is also hidden from us in that we in no sense have immediate access to all this temporary constructions in working memory that allow one to perform certain tasks
information about I-[,0 on the basis of our WATER concept alone. which suggests relating to an item, such involving categorization or inference drawing, and
as tasks
that we are not immediately aware of such a content. The kind bird might similarly ones body ofknowledge pertaining to an item, which is stored in long-term memory.
be a kind that has a particular genetic profile or evolutionary history. Again, this Barsalou’s concepts are constructed on the fly from one’s body of knowledge in
kind would make for quite a complex, sophisticated. and hidden content, and, again. long-term memory. Since concepts are constructed based on the demands of the task
it that we become immediately aware of it just by using the concept
is implausible at hand, we can have multiple concepts relating to any given item. For Barsalou. both
BIRD. concepts and the relevant bodies of knowledge are largely perceptual, in that their
lfrhe foregoing is right, then most concepts do not immediately represent their contents are derived from perception.
alleged contents. Now. as in the cases of number concepts and stipulated concepts, Prinz (zooz) defends a similar view that distinguishes between “proxytypes"
we are still aware ofxamething when we use concepts like SUPERVENIENCE, BIRD, corresponding to an item. which are temporary constructions in working memory,
and WATER, so these concepts have immediate contents of some sort. And again, and long-term memory networks, which contain the full body of knowledge we
there are various options as to what these immediate contents might be: A concept's have concerning the item. Proxytypes are so called because drinking and odter
immediate contents might be or partly consist in inner speech (e.g.. the word concept-involving tasks make use of them in place of their corresponding long—term
"supervenience"); mental imagery (eg. a mental image of one thing above another); memory network. So, for example, while we have a long—term memory network
a of the concepts alleged contents (e.g., an idea
gisty, partial. or schematic grasp containing diverse representations of dogs, when we drink about dogs, we do not
of some kind of logical dependence): a sui generis. perhaps simple, content, not make use of this entire network but only a part of it, which in some sense stands
understandable in terms of other contents (c.g.. a notion ofsupervenience as its own for the whole. Like Barsalou. Prinz takes proxytypes to be constructed on the fly. so
kind of thing); or a combination of these options. lt is an open question which of which part of our dog network we use on any given occasion depends on the task at
1;. pm IV: Challenging cam Chapter 7: Thought 1;;
hand. And, again like Barsalou, Prinz takes both proxytypes and long-term memory In short, my immediate contents are. more or less. the thin contents that occur in
networks to be perceptual. thoughts."
Views of learning and concepts that are based on clutnlting. the process by which I will say more about derived content shortly, but for now it is worth noting that
2 larger number of individual chunks of information are bundled together to form derived contents need not correspond to the thick contents described by the above
a smaller number ofchunks of information (Miller 1956). are also congenial to my views. As we will see, derived contents correspond to what we take ourselves to rep-
proposal. For example, Wickelgren (I979. 1992) claims that when we learn a new resent. which might include reference—fixing descriptive contents, objecr—involving
concept or proposition. a new cell assembly representing a new idea (a “chunk idea”) contents, and broad contents. None of these contents need correspond to existing
is recruited to stand for a group of old cell assemblies representing old ideas (the structures in the brain, so they need not have the same kind of psychological reality
‘constituent ideas’). The new and old cell assemblies are ely linked in both
'
as thick concepts are supposed to have on the above views.
directions, allowing us to move from the chunk idea to the constituent ideas and vice
vetsa. What is interesting about Wicltelgren’s picture is drat chunking involves not
only the association of “constituent ideas” with one mother but also the recruitment 7.1.4, THOUGHTs' PHENOMENAL CONTENTS
of new “chunk ideas” to in some sense stand for them. Similar ideas are found in Hebb The first challenge facing PIT in the case of thought is that ofspecifying thoughts‘
(1949) and elsewhere.
phenomenal contents. In setting out this challenge, we saw that the alleged contents
Along similar lines, Eliasmith (1013) proposes a theory of neural processing that of droughts and concepts do not match their phenomenal characters, so they
posits what he calls “semantic pointers.‘ Semantic pointers are pointer: because they
are unlikely candidates for being ‘ 5‘ ’ phenomenal contents. In the previous
“point" to more L‘ ’ representati , in much the same way that a pointer
subsections, we also saw that thoughts and concepts have immediate contents, which
in a computer program points to information stored at a particular memory location. are distinct from their alleged contents. These immediate contents. I want to suggest.
Semantic pointers are semantic because they are themselves representation that
are thoughts’ phenomenal contents.
contain information—rhcy contain a “lossy" compressed version of the information
We can support the claim that thoughts’ immediate contents are phenomenal
present in the more " ’ representations that they point to. On Eliasmith’s
contents with an argument from matching, similar to the argument for PIT in
view, much cognition involves operations over pointers rather than what they §5.z.t. If thoughts’ immediate contents match their phenomenal c‘ it is
cters,
point to. but, when needed, semantic pointers can be “dereferen "‘ to access the plausible that they are phenomenally represented. To make this argument, I will
information that they point to. consider several broad options regarding which immediate contents any given
The above views roughly claim that there are two distinct types ofconceprs and concept represents and argue that on all these options. it is quite plausible that
contents corresponding to categories or other represented items: “thin” concepts
concepts have gphenomenalc‘
‘ ' .
with 1. rrespondingly “thin” contents, which suflice for many tasks relating to the A concept might have a verbal. affective. perceptual. or other kind of sensory
item. and “thick” concepts with correspondingly ‘thick’ contents, which correspond immediate content. For example. the concept surERvENn=.Nci=.'s immediate con-
to a fuller understanding of the item. Not only are these thin and thick concepts
tent tn ght be the word "supervenience‘ and a visual image of one thing above
distinct, but, on most of these views, their contents are also distinct. For Eliasmith, another. This View is congenial to Barsalou and l’rinz's neo»empiricist views of
thin concepts represent lossy compressed versions of their t esponding thick concepts, on which thin concepts represent perceptual contents. For example. they
contents, while for Prinz and Barsalou. thin concepts represent proper parts of their might say that a concept of a dog represents the word "dog" or an image of a
corresponding thick contents. dog, which is drawn from a thicker concept of a dog that includes these and other
These thin contents roughly correspond to my immediate contents, while the contents.
thick contents even more roughly correspond to the kinds of derived contents that
I will i ‘ later. Like immediate contents, thin contents are the contents of
occutrent thoughts. though thin contents are often taken to play other roles, such
‘‘Anmi......,;.. ' v ' A I -
as roles in recognitional tasks. which immediate contents might or might not play. thoughts that have thin contents but not immediate contents.
Vifindows, Linux.
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.35 nmlz/. Cballmgmg Cases Chapter 7: 71;»/iglyr t;7
It is not implausible that concepts with sensory immediate contents also have clearly compatible with a liberal conc , ' of cognitive phenomenolog , since it
matching sensory phenomenal ‘ . For example, if SUPERVENIENCI-IVS im- is unclear on what basis we could plausibly maintain that the required sui generis
mediate content is simply a qu "" y content corresponding to the word
phenomenal characters sensory."
'
are
“supervenience" and a visual image of one thing above another. then it is not The above kinds of contents are not mutually exclusive: An immediate content
I‘ “‘ that it has a L’ 5., ' 4‘ y and visual _ L ' character. might qualify as being of more than one kind. For example. an abstract Ptfctplull
This suggestion would only commit us to sensory phenomenal t‘ , so it is immediate content might qualify as both sensory and schematic. and. as I will suggest
compatible with conservatism about cognitive phenomenology.
below. an immediate content can be both schematic and sui generis.
A concept might instead, or in addition, have a schematic immediate content, The above options can also be combined in that an immediate content might
an immediate content that is a mpressed, gisty. abstract. or otherwise schematic
include parts ofdifferent kinds. For example. the concept BIRD might
or aspects
version of its corresponding thick or alleged content. For example, the immediate have an immediate content that includes a sensory content involving visual imagery
content of SUPERVENIENCE might be a gisry unarticulated grasp of a definition of
of a bird as well as a schema content involving a gisty grasp ofdlc fit! that birds art
'
supetvenience, with aspects corresponding to various parts of the definition. This a kind of animal. The concept KNOWLEDGE might have an immediate content with
option is congenial to w‘ews of thin contents on which they are “lossy" compressed a sensory component involving quasi-auditory imagery of the word “knowledge. a
or schematic versions of thick contents, like Eliasmith's view. Such contents might schematic component involving a L matic grasp ofknowledge's relations to truth.
include a gisry or abstract characterization of thick contents without including all justification, and belief. and a simple sui generis <knowledge!> component. As
their details. before. it is not implausible that concepts with such immediate contents that are
Again. it is not implausible that concepts with schematic immediate contents . .
of sensory. L
or simple I have
L‘ L- J
u
have matching schematic pl'1cnomenalcL . For example, if sui=i=.i1v1~:N12Nci:’s phenomenal '
immediate content is a gisry unardculatcd grasp of a definition ofsupervenience, it
It could also be that we have multiple concepts corresponding to a given category
is not implausible that it has a matching gisty supervenience-ish feel. The schematic or other item, each with different immediate contents. Indeed, this seems likely.
phenomenal cl suggested by this proposal might be abstract or otherwise given the plausible claim that what exactly enters in our immediate awareness
schematic sensory phenomenal characters. in which case they can be accepted corresponding to a given item seems to differ in different circumstances. This is
by the conservative about cognitive phenomenology. A‘ ' . they might be very much in line with Barsalou and Prinz's claim that concepts are created on
schematic phenomenal characters unique to thought, which only the liberal can the fly based on task demands. Again. if what enters our ‘mmediate awareness
accept. corresponding to an item differs in different circ e , it is not implausible that
A concept might instead, or in addition, have a unique, special, or sui generis our phenomenal characters differ as well.
immediate content, an immediate content that is not simply a part of its alleged l have outlined various options as to concepts‘ immediate contents and phenome—
but that is a “new” content, all of its own. Such immediate contents might
contents nal characters. suggesting that it is quite plausible on all the options that immediate
be internally unstructured, not having parts that are also contents. Perhaps, for contents and phenomenal L match. There may be g phenomenological
example, the content that occurs to us when we think about knowledge is not some or other considerations for preferring one set of options to another for any given
partial grasp of our full understanding of ' wledge but rather a “new" sui genetis concept, but for the purposes of defending PIT. it does not really matter which set
simple content, <knowledge!>. Such aview is consistent with Wickelgren's proposal of options we accept, so I will leave the question open.
that entirely new chunk ideas get recruited to stand for their corresponding chunk However, before continuing, I will digress to mention one view that I find
constituents. attractive, which is that most concepts' immediate contents are (or at least include
Again, it is not implausible that concepts with sui generis immediate contents have a part or aspect that is) sui generis, simple, and schematic, involving a gisry grasp
matching sui generis phenomenal ch ,phcnomenal c‘ that are notjust
parts of their alleged contents. For example, if KNoWL£Dc£'s immediate content is
a sui generis unstructured content. it is not implausible that it has a matching sui
“ out see Bayne and Spener zero and Mendeloviei and Bcurger 10!; for relevant discussion or the
generis ‘ knowledge—i ‘~ phenomenal character. This proposal is most unclaritiesufthesensory/nomsenmry distinction.
https:IIwww.qoppa.oomIpdfstudio
us um IV: Challenging CIISIS Chapter 7: Thnughz r39
of some parts or aspects of their corresponding alleged contents. This might be WATER arguably tracks H,O, or perhaps clear watery stuff. so the tracking theory can
possible if immediate contents are (or have parts or aspects that are) internally only accommodate the concept's alleged descriptive or object-involving contents.
unstructured. in that they do not involve proper parts that are also immediate Similarly, WATER plays a functional role characteristic ofa concept that represents a
contents, but externally ’ in that they have properties of having values complex description that refers to or characterizes H,O. or watery stuff in general, so
on certain dimensions.“ An example of such internally unstructured but externally again. the functional role theory can at best only capture wA‘l'i»:n's alleged contents.
structured contents is the contents of perceptual color representation Any given .
So, tracking and functional role theories arguably face a mismatch problem in the
color content is literally having hues. sarurations, and
internally unstructured. not case ofthoughts immediate contents.
brightnesses as distinct parts. At the same time, it is externally structured, since it If all this is right, then we can strengthen the argument from the mismatch prob-
has values on the dimensions of hue, saturation. and brightness. lem against tracking theories and functional role theories discussed in Chapters 1
Something similar might be true of the immediate contents of many concepts. and 4 and the argument from ‘ ' g for PIT discussed in Chapter 3: Concepts
For example, the immediate content of KNOWLEDGE might be an internally and thoughts have immediate contents that cannot be accommodated by tracking
unstructured sui generis content, <lr.nowledge!>, one that is not simply excerpted and functional role theories but that can be accommodated by PIT.
from its alleged contents, which, we miyit suppose, include contents like <true>, More relevant to our present purposes, we can see how we have met the first
<justiiied>, and <belief>. Despite being internally unstructured, <ltnowledge!> challenge, that of identifying the phenomenal contents of thoughts. I have argued
might share properties with the contents <true>, <jusrified>, and <belief>. This that concepts have immediate contents that are distinct from their alleged con-
might account for the sense we have that the immediate content of KNOWLEDGE tents. These immediate contents can plausibly be said to match their phenomenal
involves sonle kind of inarticulate gisty grasp of some of its alleged contents. In characters. This makes it plausible that the phenomenal contents of concepts—:ind
short, <knowledge!> has properties in common with its alleged contents but does those of the thoughts they constitute—are none other than these immediate
not include them as parts. contents."
The view I Find attractive. then, is that concepts’ immediate contents are or
include parts or aspects that are simple, sui generis, and schematic in the ways
described above and that they have matching simple, sui generis, and schematic 7.3 Self-Ascriptivism about Thoughts’ Alleged Contents
phenomenal ' They might also, in some cases, include sensory parts or
.
aspects with matching sensory phenomenal characters. While this is my preferred I now turn to the second challenge, that of accounting for thoughts’ alleged contents.
view, everything that follows is compatible with the alternative views outlined above. including rich descriptive contents, object-involving contents, and broad contents.
So far. I have argued that concepts‘ immediate contents can plausibly be said to l will suggest that thoughts derivatively represent these contents. On the view I
match their corresponding phenomenal cL ters. This makes it plausible that the will propose. self-ascriptivisni, we derivatively represent various alleged contents by
immediate contents of thoughts and concepts are phenomenal .Either they aseribing them to ourselves or our mental states.”
are identical to phenomenal characters, or our representing them arises from our It is instructive to consider non-mental cases of derived representation. On some
phenomenal states in some other way. views. words, signs, and other non-mental items derive their contents from the
lndeed, it is not clear how else we could come to represent immediate contents if contents of mental states. For example. stop signs mean <stop!> and the word "cat"
not phenomenally. The contents predicted by tracking and functional role theories
arguably do not match thoughts’ immediate contents. For example. the concept
" In order ro (silly account for the immediate content or thought using the immediate contents
or concepts. we need Ill account of how phenomenal contents combine to rorrn more complex
phenomenal contents. This is general challenge for PIT, one that might be thought to arise in a
2
“ This terminology comes from Chalmers (sore). particularly acute rorrn when PIT is combined with . nomrelational view ofinrentionaliry. so i defer
btternally structured contents are ......nlly represented in a multidimensional state space organited discussion ofit ro 99.”.
by similarity. See Churehland (lglga, lgys. zoos). Palmer (r gyg). and Rosenthal (mo) (or various ways " An early version ofthe view proposed here is presented In Mendelovici aoro. The current version is
ofdeveloping the idea of: perceptual state space representing mental contents or other mental features greatly indebted to countless discussions win. David Bourgel. about the View iuelland derived mental
based on their similarities along various dimensions. representation more generally.
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140 um IV: ctia/zmgttig Casts Chapter 7: Though; I4!
means <cat> at least largely because we take. stipulate, or accept stop signs to mean I begin by offering an account of how we take ourselves to mean one content by
<stop!> and “cat” to mean <cat>. where this might be a matter of our explicit another (§7.3.t) and then offer an account of derived mental representation based on
and tacit intentions and agreements. In short, we might say that “cat” means <cat> it (§7.;.2.). Subsection 7.5.; explains how this meets the second challenge."
and stop signs mean <stop!> because in some way or other we ascribe them these
contents. 7.5.1 TAKING ONE CONTENT T0 MEAN ANOTHER
Iwant to suggest that a similar kind of derived representation also occurs in mental
I suggested that a relatively undemanding way ofselflascribing a content involves
states. just as we can ascribe contents to external objects. so too can we ascribe
taking one content to stand for or mean another. But how can we understand this
contents to ourselves and our mental states. Consider the stipulated concept ENT.
taking?
We take its immediate content. <Ent>, to mean or stand for a more complex content,
As a First pass. we might say that taking one content, C, to mean another content,
<I" ’ " is t ' ‘ to the a priori " ofthg _ ‘- ' fact; by
C+. is a matter ofbeing disposed, upon sufiicient reflection, to have thoughts stating
the physical facts>, which we might abbreviate < Ent+ >. Afier all. we stipulated that
that C “cashes out" into C+. In the case of ENT, I am disposed to have thoughts like
<Ent> is to stand for <Ent+>, and if we asked ourselves what we mean by <Ent>.
<<Ent> just is <Ent+>> or ewhat I mean by <Ent> is <Ent+>>. These thoughts
wewould answer <Ent+>. I want to suggest that because of all this. the content
say that <Ent+> is an elucidation. unpacking. precisification. expansion, or, more
<Enr> derivativcly represents <Ent+>, just as “cat“ derivatively represents <cat>.
generally. a cashing out of <Ent>. They say that <Ent+> is in some sense a better
I also want to suggest that, by extension. the concept ENT derivatively represents
version of<Ent>: <Ent+ > gets at what < Ent> was goingafter. but in a more precise.
< Ent+ >.
explic’ detailed. or perspicuous way.
,
The guiding idea is that the way we target contents that we aren't immediately
We can call thoughts that state that an immediate content at least partly cashes out
aware of is by in some way ascribino them to ourselves or our mental states. In slogan
into another content cashing out thoughts. In some cases. such as the case of ENT,
form, we mean what we take ourselves to mean." There are different ways in which
cashing out thoughts provide a complete specification ofwhat we mean by a content.
we might self-ascribe contents, some of which are more demanding than others. For
However, it is more often the case that any given cashing out thought only provides a
example. we might overtly stipulate that one content is to stand for another. as we do
partial specification. For example, if I ask myself what I mean by <bachelor>. I might
in the case of ENT. A less demanding way ofself-ascribing a content is by (perhaps
have multiple cashing out thoughts, such as <Part of what I mean by <bachelor> is
implicitly) taking it to be what we really mean or intend by some other content.
<somerhing that’s d) >, <Another part of what I mean is <something that's
In what follows, I elaborate upon this less demanding way of selflascribing
'
contents and show how it an form the basis of an account on which we dcrivatively
represent many of our thoughts’ alleged contents. My proposal is tentative and will " stir-asttapthiatti is Slmlllr in spixitto the dtthtatitht sttattgies dtrttidtd by Bolus?! (lolea). xtatgti
inevitably fail to capture many subtleties. My aim is not to provide a definitive (loll), paiitt (1013:), and othtt aavotattt of m- it. that it Kakts Wm! kind or tiimphttiititititai
account of the minimal sufficient conditions for taking ourselves to mean a content l¢pl¢S¢lIlili0I1 to be atttttiihita by pllenomfllal lnlcntlonlllty. it 15 also tittiiiat In tatioiit proposals
itiaaa by athmtatat ortht View: tirthiti and Illicit Conctpn described in 97.”. On which thin toiittptt
by another content but rather to provide a proof of concept: I want to provide a
(at Conlellls) iii ttatita S6115: “ttatia rat" thtit Coflespunding [hick toiictptt (ot cotitttitt). rot exatitpit,
realistic sketch of a picture of how we can derivatively represent rich and complex pthias (zooa) ptoitytypas at: to called beczust thty att pmxiet rot iiirtittiiitioti stottd iii lllclf
contents that are beyond our immediate awareness. tottttpotiaititt ioiigtttiti |'l|(|'l|0fy tittwotitt. (See also thatitiith Lou atid Wlcktlgrtn igta.)
tty, , 4" rtoiiith * ’w 4 M
to be that orcotivetitiotiai ttpttteiitititiii. when we delivillivcly ttptttttit by tpetiryitig. ititettaitig. OX
othttwitt taking otit thing to meat. lnathtr. Derived ttittitax l’!pl’£$¢I|iIKlDl|t of iiiy Son. is not Simply
attitta in tht SENS! ofbeing Cnnsinlcted out ortitighiai hitttithitiahty 0! hi the mist of Simply being
" This idea is shttnat tti spitit In one of rtaiiit Jacitsoirt (1001. tggta. xyyib) giii llg ideas rot hit attiatttt ortiiit mtitatit 0! tittitapt being iitta ill lltu ofanothlr. The derived Colllflfls my attoiitit
dtsclipllvixm ahtiiit iatigtiagt. tht ltaockein idea that words 1!: vtihtiitaty ttgiit. A(¢oldilIg to this idea. delivers att Eonltllls that §I|b)(CKS tatgtt 01 ititaiia. II1 tht Sllllt way that We taigttiit lnlflld tht aoiitttitt
the tartttiica totithtitiiit ora wtita at: not Imposed oi. |lS hy the world. hiit att hi at. Impoflinl way up at mtanlngx arttitittiitiotiai ttpttsetitatitiiit. As we Will see In §G.l. this makes it more piaiitthit that
tia MS. rot eiiiiitiplt. we might use 'Alis(oll:" to tart. (0 whattytt happens to he taittauy Rlalcd (0 DIIK ,, . ._, . . . A. W in‘. . mom
uawoftllc tatiti iii siith-atia-stith away hitt we mind L just at tatily Dawn tht I91’!!! [0 Rrtl’ K0 whotytt tiittittaoiial ttattt to dclfllcd states. However. as 1 atgiit (here and hi §7. ., aathtta itiatitai rtplcstntalnon
was tht ttachet araititaiiatt. it H0! hi fact a type orititttithmahty.
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141. Part IV: Challenging cases Chapter 7: Though: in
male>>, etc. These cashing out thoughts together, but not severally. specify what I Finally. cashing out thoughts specify our taking one content to mean another. but
mean by <bachelor>.“""‘" we need not actually have such thoughts in order to count as meaning one content
There are a few further points to be made about cashing our thoughts. by another. It is enough to be disputed to have such thoughts. For example. I need
First, the cashing out relation figuring in cashing out thoughts is transitive: If not constantly think to myself that <Ent> cashes out into <Ent+>; it is enough that
you accept diat A cashes out into B and that B cashes out into C. then you are I am disposed to have such thoughts.“
committed to A cashing out into C. For example. suppose you have the cashing out With these points in mind, we can use the notion of a cashing out thought to
thoughts < <bachclor> cashes out into <unmarried man> > and < <unmarried man> characterize that of taking a content to mean another content:
cashes out into (unmarried male human> >. Then you are committed to <bachelor>
(Taking) Subject 5 takes a representation’s immediate content C to mean C+ if
cashing out into <unmarried male human>.
S has a set of dispositions to have cashing our thoughts that together specify
Second, the cashing out relation is such that if A cashes out into B, then for any
that C cashes out into C+ (upon sufficient reflection).“
content C that has A as an elcment and any content C+ dlat is identical to C except
that in it 8 plays the role of A, C cashes out into C+. We can call this property that of There are a few things to note about (Taking).
being inheritahle, since the cashing out relations between contents are inherited by First. (Taking) makes what an immediate content cashcs out into relative to a
the structured contents of which they are a part. For example, suppose you have the subject. This is because cashing out thoughts specify what 4 subject means by a
cashing out thought stating that <man> cashes out into <male human>. Then you eontent. Making (Taking) relative to a subject allows different subjects to take the
are committed to <unmarried mal-l> cashing out into <unmarried male human>. same contents to mean difl'erent things. For example. I might take <baehelor> to
mean <unmarried man>, while you might take it to mean <available man).
Second, in (Taking), C is always an immediate content of some representation. but
C+ may or may not be an immediate content of a representation. This is because. at
“ In some cases, due to cognitive limitations, we might not he able to entettain in ii single thought what
least in the case of the kind of derived mental representation I will soon use (Taking)
we talte outselves to mean hy a content. hot example. i might undetstand the conceivahility atgument
against physiealism as an atgument having thtee pattieulat ptemites and a pattieulat conclusion but. to define. it is always immediate contents that we take to mean something. but what
due toeognitive limitations, not he ahle to have a thought spttirying thatthe full atgument is atashing we take them to mean might be either the immediate contents of other actual or
out of<!h¢ conceivahility argItment>. still. tot sseh statement in the atgument. I might have a cashing
potential states. or other items that are not immediate contents. such as worldly
out thought stating that it is a statement in the atgument playing a patticulat role. rot example. I might
thinlt (By (the conceivahility argument) I mean. in pan, (In atgnment that has as a ptemise that items. In the cases we have discussed so far, immediate COHIEMS Cash 01“ 31110 0'5“
zombie: ate conceivable>>. immediate contents, but §7.;.z discusses cases in which they cash out into other
“’ cashing out thoughts that ate stipulatoty (e.g.. <hy <£nt> l hetehy mean <EnK+>>) do not have ttuth
“CINE.”
values. But cashing out thoughts that ate not stipulatoty might have ttuth values (e.g <<l-Int) just
is <l-:nt+») iind might be ttue (e.g.. <<El1t+> is an expansion or <ElI(>>, on some views of the
immediate contents or EN1’) ot false (t.g., <<Ent+>. that is what I was thinlting all along hy <ent»).
rot out putposes. it doesn't mattet whethtt eashingout thoughts have ttuth values. and. irthey do. what “ ln chaptet r. I atgue that, sttietly spealting. dispositions such as these do not count as genuinely
they ate. All that matttta is that we ate disposed to have the televant cashing out thoughts. intentional, ct even dei-ivatively tepttsentational. so sttietly speaking, on my ovei-all view, the televant
oompate: As rat asderived teptestntat n in language istoneemed.what mattets is that we tacitly ot takings need not he intentional ot detivatively teptesentational mental states. (We might. though.
othetwise accept that "cat" means <eat>, out it does not mattct whethet these acceptances have tntth happen to have detivatively teptesentational states specifying that one content cashes out into another.
values on irthey do. what they ate (rot example. it doesn't mattet if out acceptances entail that "cat" hut this is not icquited hy my account.) See also n. [9 orchaptet s rot why selflasctiptlons need not
means <ca[> independently orus. whirh presumably would he raise). themselves he self-ascribed in otdet to do theit wotlt. -nianlts to Declan smithies rot ptompting these
‘ chtis viget has suggested to me that the phenomenology orthought also includes a sense that out clatineations
contents can he eashed out in vatsous ways. This suggestion is plausible: it seems that we do have an “ (ralting) only ptovides sulrieient conditions rot talting a content to mean anothtt content in otdet to
awaieness that out undetitanding ofa tatget is not limited to what is diteetly heroic out minds at any allow that theta ate othet ways ofaehleving the sihrne tesnlt. This is apptoptiate hecause the notion or
given moment. The suggestion is also congenial to my view: lrthete is such a phenomenology. then we talting aims to eaptnte the somewhat fully pl’!-Kheoxulc idea or (ptthaps tacitly) aeeepting that one
might have not only dispositions to have cashing out thoughts specifying that one content is to stand thing stands iot anothet.
rot anothet has also occuttently tcptesented phenomenal contents in some sense pointing to the tact “ one might wotty that talting c to he a content maltes cashing out thoughts metsstmantic. in that
that we have sueh dispositions to have cashing out thoughts, which would miilte out eontents' cashings they ate ahout contents. and that it it implausihle that we have dispositions so have such metasemantie
out qllllr litetally intended hy us. Although I don't want to mtltc this a tequitement rot talting a cotittnt thoughts. liowevet. thete undemanding ways orhaving metasemantic thoughts. rot example, one
ate
to mean anothetcontent, a neathy view to the one that l am ptoposing does. see also I1.l9 orchaptet s. way orthinltmg that I mean aeontent is to think the content itseltand then thinlt ethatitwhat I mum).
144 pm IV: Challenging Case: ChapI(r7.‘ Thaugbz us
Third, nodiing in (Taking) rules out the possibility that an immediate content C altemative self—ascriptivist view might aim to specify the " of manifestation
means more dian one content. This would happen if the cashing out thoughts that for the relevant dispositions more precisely so as to avoid such indeterminacy.
Uué
a subject is disposed to have together specified that an immediate content Cashes
out into more than one content. This allows for the possibility of our taking a single
7.3.2. DERIVED MENTAL REPRESENTATION
immediate content to mean, for example, both a description and an object-involving
CODKCHL Self- ascribing contents is s ‘I ‘ for derived representation. and taltingone mental
Fourth, (Taking) generally generates a plethora of contents that we take ourselves state to mean another is one way in which we can self—ascribe contents So, when we
to mean. Since the cashing out relation is transitive and inheritable, we count as take immediat content C to mean C+, C derivatively represents C+ (for us). By
taking our contents to mean not just whatever content we are disposed to think extension, we can say that when an intentional mental state or representation has
they cash out into but also whatever content we are disposed to think that content an immediate content with derived contents, it too counts as having those derived
cashes out into, whatever content is obtained by ‘ 5 any of these contents’ contents." So, we can specify a notion of derived mental representation as follows?’
parts with whatever we are disposed to think the] cash out into, and so on. In this
(DMR) Immediate content C (and any state or vehicle with immediate content
way, we can end up taking our immediate contents to mean contents that are fairly
C) derivatively represents C+ (for S) if S takes C to mean C+."
distant from what is in our immediate awareness, contents that. due to cognitive
or other limitations. we might not even be able to entertain in a single mental My project here is to provide a I’IT»fi-iendly account of thoughts‘ alleged con-
act—or at all. This does not contradict my guiding principle that we mean what tents, which are the contents we want to ascribe to thoughts. such as descriptive,
we take ourselves to mean. In effect, out cashing out thoughts state that we are more object-involving. and broad contents. For our purposes, it is useful to distinguish
than happy to “replace” occurrences of one content in our thoughts with those of between two types of alleged contents that we might want to capture, those that
another, more precise, detailed, or perspicuous content. When we apply all these can be phenomenally represented, at least in K ‘ iple. and those that cannot. For
“replacements” at once, we arrive at ourbest un ‘ “‘ auf the immediate content example, the concept MODAL REALISM might have as its alleged content a descrip-
we were initially entertaining. This is the content we were in some sense targeting all tion that can. at least in principle, be phenomenally represented. In contrast, we
along. might not be able to phenomenally represent object-involving contents like WAT!-:it's
Finally, since what counts as sufficient reflection is vague, which contents we take
our immediate contents to mean can be indeten-ninate. This is by design. While there
are clear cases in which we take a content to mean another content, which contents “iii eiitiiet wotit (Mendeloviei loin), I provided a tciietnii rat derived tneiitiii teptesentiition iiiit
tiiiiid be filled in with diiteieiit iiiaiiirestatidii eondniinis to yield diiretent nolluni iirdetived nientii
we in some sense target as out meanings is ofien ‘ inate. For example, while
'
Rpffltnlaliun. which I suggested toiiid Captllle diiteteiit kinds of alleged eonteiitt. wiiieti inigiit be
it might be clear that I take <Ent> to mean <Ent+>, it might be indeterminate iiseriiitdt - T ' ,, ' I 1 ' '
iewut IL A ,, 4 iiiepietiiie
whetheri take <uncle> to cash out into <a parent's brother), <a parent’; brother or a I | -
' ’
here because I think that which contents we take ourselves to mean is indeterminate, and attempts
parent's brother-in-law>, or <any older male family membct>, When I entertain the to r(moVE tiiis indeterminacy, while iiiey rniglfl indeed be iiseriii tin Constructing tettiin nations of
content <uncle>, I might not in some sense target one of these particular contents iiseriii rot etttein piitposes. ate not iieipriii rot eiptiiting tiie alleged ednteiiti we intiiitiveiy
eeintent
target, wiiieii is iiiy niiin goal iiete.
but instead simply aim more or less in their general di The vagueness in .
" siieitnet (loll. mi.) provides a view Simllzf to seisesei-iptivitiii 0l| wiiieii a teptetentationkeonient is
the definition of (Taking) allows for this kind of indeterminacy. since we might detetinined by tiie way its Subject IS disposed to tevise ttie Iepresentarion in me riinite.
be disposed to have different cashing our thoughts in different circumstances. and " This last step allows iis K0 siy that eiintepts and thoughts. and not inst tiieii iininediete contents.
which circumstances count as the relevant ones is left a little bit open. However, an detivztively tepteseiit tiieit alleged ttintents, but it is not iiiendiitoty. lfwe db nol tiite this last step.
we can insteid say that, ittieiiy speaking. concepts do not derivativtly iepieseiii tiieit alleged eontetits.
llul tiieii immediate contents do. which Shollild be gflfld enongi I0 offer 2 theoretical tionie riii alleged
contents in a way eoiiipatiiiie PIT.
wiieie (th4i‘> in... < ,- _i mash. .i,;,,t " rot HUW. it does not mine! wiietiiet derived tepteseniititin is a kind iirdetned Intellriandlily. we tiitii
dueiieieii iinitiii-iied man, that is What I meant). iii eiteei. this audit; In to mention ii Conlflll by to this issue in §7.4.
“Sing IL (This iiiiiy ornieiitiiiiiing by iisiiig
Slmllix to that dckrlbed iii oetidsdirs ([96]) eeeoiiiit of
is ” (DMR) piiwides only tnmeient conditions tot derived tepteseiitiiidn ii. dtdet [0 allow tiiiit tiiete are
‘saying that“) otiiet ways ufderivztively ieptesentiiig. we will eneinintei inetiiet siieii way in §a.i.i.
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I46 Part IV: chrzttngtng cam (Zhapxer 7: Tlmughr 147
alleged content <H,O>, which is the natural kind I-1,0 itself. and GEORGI-:'s alleged specifies that <water> cashes out into water+ ir:e{/T .e., whatever <water+> refers
content <George>. which is George himself. perhaps because worldly objects and to. which. lets say, is the kind (-1.0. The key difference between the two cashing
kinds are simply not the kinds of things that can enter phenomenal L ." ' our thoughts is that in the second. <water+> is used. and so has its usual referent,
Again. it is instructive to consider non—mental cases of derived representation. H ,0. while in the first, it is mentioned. As a result, a subject disposed to have die
We can distinguish between the following two ways of ascribing contents: First, first cashing out thought means <water+> by <water>. while a subject disposed to
we can ascribe a content by directly relating a vehicle of representation to the have the second cashing out thought means <H.O>, which is just H .0 itself, by
content itself. e.g., by stipulating that the vehicle of representation is to stand for <watet>."
the content. might stipulate that the word “bachelor” is to stand
For example, we The above example illustrates how my account can capture descriptive contents
for <unmarried man>, a content that our stipulation directly specifies. We can call (like the reference-fixing description <water+>) through direct derived represen-
this kind of derived representatio direct derived representation. since it involves tation. and object-involving contents (like the kind—involving content <H,O>)
directly specifying the derivatively represented content. through indirect derived representation. The example of the object-involving con-
Second. we can ascribe a content by indirectly specifying it, eg., by using a tent <H,O> is also an example of the indirect derived representation of a broad
definite description or other " ' 0 expression or mental state to pick out tl1e content. Oscar and Toscar have the same dispositions to have cashing out thoughts.
content, without directly representing the content ourselves. For example, we might but. since their environments are importantly different. <water+> picks out dif—
stipulate that a salt shaker is to stand for whoever is the funniest person alive. which ferent kinds for them. So, they indirectly derivatively represent different contents.
might. unbeknownst to us. be Eleni. We can call this kind of derived representation with Oscar derivatively representing <H,O> and Toscar derivatively representing
indirect derived representation. since it involves indirectly specifying a vehicle of <XYZ>.
derived representations content. While direct derived representatio only allows Deferential contents are a special case of indirect derived representation that can
us to derivatively represent contents that we can at least in principle antecedently yield both descriptive and object-involving broad contents. Suppose I am disposed
represent independently of the derivation mechanism in question, indirect derived to have the cashing out thought <by <water>, I mean whatever the experts mean
representa ' allows us to represent contents we might not even in principle be able by “water">. Then my concept WATER derivatively represents whatever experts
to represent without the derivation mechanism. happen to mean by “water.” If what experts mean by "water" is a descriptive content
The sel.f—ascriptivist account I have suggested allows for derived mental repre- like <water+>, then my reptesentati WATER ' " ‘ derivatively represents
sentation of both kinds. Direct derived mental representation involves taking an this descriptive content. If what experts mean by "water" is the object-involving
immediate content to mean another immediate content, while indirect derived content <H,O>. then my representation indirectly derivatively represents this
mental representation involves taking an immediate content to mean the referent of objecbinvolving content.“ This example also illustrates how indirect derived repre-
another immediate content. The difference between the two cases lies in the contents sentation yields broad contents. which can be either descriptiv or object-involving:
of the cashing our thoughts we are disposed to have. Our cashing out thoughts can in both of these deferential cases. my content is a broad content. since which content
directly specify that C means an ‘mmediate content or that C means :11: referent
of an immediate content (which usually isn't itself an immediate content. though it
may be).
" In this ctarnplt. wxren rcrcts to 1-r.o vi a reference-fixing description. <waK:H>. Mots gen
For example, the cashing out thought <by <water>, I mean <water+>>. where erally, thc self-ascriprivist proposal IS congenial to dttcriptiyittn. providing a psychological hotnc
<water+ > is a reference-fixing description of H,O. specifies that <watet> cashes out rot reference-fixing descriptions in out ditpotitiont to have cashing our thoughts. octtriptivisrn IS
into <water+>. In contrast. the cashing out thought <by <water>, I mean water+ > controversial due to arguments by Kripk: (ma). Putnam (-975). and others. but. as we will soon
sat. self-ascrlptlvism can supply thc building blocks ncctssary to zluwer suth arguments along tht
lines Iuggcntd hy Kroon (1937). Jackson (X9932). and Chalmert (zoo). aota), including dtrtrcnct to
our past. ruturc. or ideal selves, our recogmtionitl abilities. and rigidified. causal, and rnttalinguistit
dcrtriptiont. In any case. my proposal is compatible with other views orrtrcrtnct. what is required for
ao
' ' ; 1 kinds. 1-L us In indirectly derivatively represent a content is that we can ram [0 it.
enough. at leasronaviewrhnr 1 ' - L is l “ what thc experts mean by “water 5 presumably a matter ofrhe derived contcnt orrhc taper-ts‘ conccpt
prcsuniahly. phenomenal characters do not include worldly objects and kinds. wamt. which is. presumably. nor itselfdeferentinl in the turn: way.
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148 Par! I V: Clmllnnging Cam Chapter 7: ‘I’!/aught I49
it is that I r , depends on environmental Factors. namely. what experts mean concept involves being disposed to have cashing out thoughts stating that an
by “water.” immediate content partially cashes out into whatever is the referent of certain other
Another kind of deferential content involves deferring to past stages ofourselves or immediate contents. For example, suppose that for each instance of a taste content
ourselves in certain idealized circumstances. For example, suppose that after a long in a particular range, we are disposed to have a partial cashing out thought stating
night at the bar, I am unable to recall what I stipulated <Ent> to mean. I might that tartness is such that the referent oft/mt instance is an instance of tartness. These
nonetheless have the cashing out thought <by <l?.nt>, I mean whatever I meant cashing out thoughts together specify that the immediate content of TART cashes
by <Ent> yesrerday> or <by <Ent>, I mean whatever I would mean while sober out into that particular range of worldly properties. and so. by (Taking) and (DMR),
and Well-rested). Again. this sort of indirect derived representation allows for both TART’ ‘‘ , ‘ theobjec "gcontent ' °iflLl|IKl'Il'lgC0f ‘
’ and object-involving broad contents.“ properties.
Note that all this is compatible with my guiding idea that we mean what we Recognitional concepts of both sorts might be quite common. with appar-
take ourselves to mean. Although in deferential cases. we hand over control of our ently sophisticated concepts being recognitional or having a recognitional part.
meanings to someone else or to a different version ofourselves. we do this willingly. For instance. perhaps we are disposed to have cashing our thoughts stating that
Indeed, all cases of indirect mental representation involve willingly handing over <knowledge> partially cashes out into a partial description like <a mental state that
control of our meanings." involves having a true. justified belief> and, for each case in a certain class of cases.
Another special case worth mentioning is that of recognitional concepts. There cashing out th ,‘ stating that knowledge is such that that case is an instance
are two kinds of recognitional concepts we can use my account to make sense 0E The of knowledge. By (Taking) and (DMR), KNOWLEDGE derivatively represents the
first kind is an instance of direct derived representation. Suppose that the alleged partial description and the class of cases. This might be the best way to capture what
content of TART is a particular range of contents of taste experiences. which we we take <knowledge> to mean. The same might be true of many other concepts."
recognize when we encounter but have no other means of characterizing. Here is
how my account can capture this content: For each instance of a taste content in the
74.; MEETING THE SECOND CHALLENGE
range, we are disposed to have a partial cashing out thought stating that tartness is
such that that instance is an instance of tartness. These partial cashing our thoughts The second challenge for PIT was to show that it can accommodate the alleged
together specify that die immediate content of TART cashes out into this range of contents of thoughts. To meet this challenge in the way I have proposed. alleged
taste contents. By (Taking) and (DMR), TART then derivatively represents this range contents must be derived contents, and derived mental representation must not
of taste contents. presuppose any kinds of intentionality that cannot be accommodated by PIT.
Indirect derived representation allows us to make sense of a second kind of There are various sorts of alleged contents that we might want to capture.
recognitional concept, one whose derived content is or is determined by the set of including rich descriptive contents and object-dependent contents, either of which
worldly items that a concept in some sense applies to. This kind of ecognitional might be broad. We've seen that self-ascriptivism has the resources to capture all
these types of alleged contents: Descriptive contents can be directly or indirectly
derivatively represented, while object-dependent contents can be indirectly deriva-
J4
tively represented. Broad contents are ' ' derivatively represented ‘
" Whether deferring to past or future stages ofoneselfnecessarily yields contents rh... are broad depends
or object-dependent contents.
on whether we count historical or future facts concerning the state of . subject tron. the skin in at
environmental rim. it we do, then the kind or content obtained from past and future deference is
automatically broad, but ifwe do not, then .. may be nirrow. (See Farkas xoolb rnr relevant discussion
ofhmv ro construe internalism.) “ Why not just take all concepts to he reeognitional concepts ofrhis son? on sneh a view. what our
“ Thegiiiding mean what we take ourselves to mean isalsowhy i do not w..... to taythar what ,5.“ i. I - » I- item we raltethem toapply to.
The reason not to take this epproin. to all concepts is that in order to count asderivativelyreprerenting
“good” ' riuearnwrut ' 1 I otherv/ise“good' ' it such contenu. we wouid have to take our immediate contents .o mean them. and it it not clear that
would impose contents on us ri... we might no. intend. My inebriated selfar the bar who insists that by we do so .n all cases. Additionally, in some cases we have It least some contents ofother types. eg.
<supervenienee> she means (1 relation ufmetapliysical priority and dependence) l1IS nor as much or descriptions. that we take our immediate contents to mean and rhnr wonid be neglected by such an
2 right ro mean what she takes herselfto mean is my sober selfin -good" circumstances. account.
no part IV: c/nizzrnging Cases Chapter 7: Though: I5!
Which particular contents of the aforementioned types a given subject represents take C to mean C+, then the right answer is that I don’t derivatively represent C+."
depends on her I dispositions to have cashing out thoughts. It might turn Let us now turn to the second condition for meeting the second challenge. Since
out that any given subject does not represent some types of alleged contents. It might PIT takes all original intc " y to be phenomenal intentionality, in order to
even turn out that there are some types of alleged contents that no one represents. So. meet the second challenge, my account of derived content must not require that
our account might end up being slightly or even massively revisionary with respect there be any original intentionality that isn't phenomenal intentionality.
to which alleged contents we represent. However, in cases where our reasons for My account meets this requirement. What it is to represent a derived content is
thinking we represent a I ‘ sort of alleged content stem from our intuitions to have various dispositions to have cashing our thoughts, thoughts with contents
about particular cases, we are likely to derivatively represent content of that sort. of the form <C into C+>. These contents have three elements: C. C+.
cashes out
This is because our int about our representation of certain alleged contents
‘ ‘
and the cashing out relation. C is always an immediate content of some (actual or
and our derived representation of those same contents arguably come from the same possible) representation. so it is a phenomenal content. In the ease of direct derived
source: our taking ourselves to represent them. For this reason, we should expect this representation. C+ is also an it is also a phenomenal content.
immediate content. so
account to be fairly successful at capturing the contents we have intuitive reasons to In the case of indirect derived representation, C+ is a referent of immediate contents
take ourselves to represent." or direct derived contents. which are phenomenal contents, so it is a matter of
[ii any case. there is reason to let the chips fall where they may when it comes to phenomenal contents and how the world is (and anything else that might be required
derived mental representation. The guiding idea of this section is that the only way to for reference. so long as it is not a source ofnon-phenomenal ori lnal intentionality).
target a content that we do not immediately , that is not “forced” upon us by The third element of cashing out thoughts. the represented cashing out relation, is
experience, is to in some sense accept ourselves as I ’ D it. If this guiding idea also a phenomenal content. Unlike the alleged contents we've discussed, this content
is correct, then there is simply no way to target contents that are neidrer forced upon is simple and unsophisticat ‘ enough to plausibly be just a matter of havi ng a certain
us nor accepted by us. So. for example, in in which I am simply not disposed
a case phenomenal , ' . All that is required is that we are able to have phenomenal
to have cashing our thoughts like <by <warer>, I mean <water+ > >, it is simply not experiences like that of one thing being an expansion, _ "’ unpacking. ‘ ' .
correct to say that my concept WATER represents <water+>. I neither phenomenally magnification. or more detailed version of another, that of accepting one thing as
represent this content not take myself to it. so imposing the content on me a replacement for. substitution for, or better version of another, or simply that of one
would be in Violation of our guiding idea. If, for whatever reason. I happen not to thing being what we meant or intended by another. It is not implausible that there
are phenomenal states with the required kinds of phenomenal ' Although .
I think that representing such contents is probably a matter ofcognitive phenomenal
" Thttt art two notcwotthy scenarios on which my proposal might tori up being quite tcyiuontty. The characters. it is also not wholly implausible that they can be accounted for in terms
of purely sensory phenomenal c‘ .”
(a possibility we ltrt open in§7.a.i. on this sccnano tht only conttnts wt would be able to derivatively
IEPIGKDI p ' , ‘ ' ‘ ' '
a content requires that it can be immediately ttprrstnttii, and indirectly derivatively trprcstnting a
' ' ' ' Hnw r ' ' S
are not as severe as night ht thought. It is not clear that tornplct and tophitticatta derived content: “ The saint holds ' tiscswhctt sclr-asti-iptivitni ascrihtsa contcnt that we rrittt rotthcortntal rrasons.
cannot be consttuctcci out orstnsory tontcnts. which rnight include schematic scntoty contents (stt
Prinz 2001 for a defense or such a view). in any case. it is not implausible that we in tact rtprtsrnt intuitions about panicular cases. Even in this case. thc view gitts us tht tight answrti The intttnalist
nolbsensory. as well as stntory, irntntdiatc contents. along with corresponding sensory and cognitive “, hr P, aoctprt'~ “‘es ‘
phenomenal tharactcts (see 57.2.4), so the pottntial rot such linutations arguably does not atisr. sh (An tit ' “ " ‘ ’ lsssit gooo simply
The scconii scenario in which my View rnight end up oting quite tevisionary is that III which than because ofhet misguided theoretical beliefs.
is no reference, which is a possihility that our starting point ltrt opcn (§i.i..). If it ttuns out that (ln any case, such an intenialist should be comforted by the fact that the representation of these
there it no such thing as rcrcrcncc. then thtrt is no inclircct derived lepre1entItlon.aI1d thcrc are no htoatl contents strnis entirely (torn inttrnsl factors: hct own phenomenal sratts aricl dispositions to
ob}ect-involving contcnts. In this catc, I agtcc that thc ticw is ttyisionary. hut it arguably gives us the have rurthtt phtnonitnal slates.)
right answer, sintc irthttc is no tcrcrcncc. then any intuitions wt hatt that we represent parntulst Note ' y ' ttrhayc. , V” and some animals
contents with object-involving nature art presumably entirely rtustaltcn. in any case. in son... I
an can have , - iuotaurii .
suggcst that thctc probably is such thing as rcrrtcnct. Thanlts to Declan sniithics rot prompting this clarification.
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.5; pm IV: ctutzmgtng Casts Chapter 7: Umuglrt is;
If all this is right, then the self-ascriptivisr picture is compatible with PIT. and we phenomenal , e is like, which is a determinate matter.“ In contrast. since
have met the second challenge of accommodating thoughts‘ alleged contents. (Taking) makes I to a " , whose - "' of are V
only vaguely specified, it can be indeterminate what we derivatively represent. This
difference between derived mental representation and paradigm intentional states
7.4 Is Derived Mental Representation a Type of Intentionality? is another reason to think that derived mental representat' kind of is not a
intentionality.
I have purposefully avoided calling derived mental representation “derived inten- Section 5.4 distinguished between ' " , eliminativist. and deriva-
tionality' in order to remain neutral on the question of whether it is indeed a tivist strategies PIT might take toward alleged cases of mental states with
type of intentionality. Recall that we fixed reference on intentionality ostensively by -phenomenal contents. lnflationism claims that the mental states do in
pointing to paradigm cases, which are inrrospectively accessible cases such as those fact have phenomenal contents. eliminativism claims that the mental states
of perceptually representing a red square or thinking that it's raining (§i.2.). Whether do not exist or that they do not have the relevant contents, and derivativism
derived mental representation counts as a kind of intentionality depends on whether claims that the mental states derivatively intentionally represent the relevant
it is the same kind of thing as our paradigm cases. COHKCHKS.
I want to suggest that derived mental representation is sufficiently different The view of thoughts presented in this chapter is both inflationist and elimina-
in nature from paradigm cases of intentionality so as to not qualify as a kind tivist. It is inflationist in that it takes thoughts to have phenomenal contents. and it
of intentionality, though it arguably satisfies a broader everyday notion of rep- is eliminativist in that it denies that thoughts intentionally represent their alleged
resentation. Since paradigm cases involve introspectively accessible contents and contents. It is, however, derivativist in spirit in that it takes alleged contents to be
immediate contents are the contents we are immediately aware of, the contents we derivatively represented, but, strictly speaking. it does not qualify as a version of
notice in these cases are quite plausibly immediate contents, which are phenomenal derivativism because it does not take derived mental representation to be a kind of
contents. So, the question of whether derived mental representati is a kind of intentionality." The overall strategy, then, is consistent with strong PIT. the view
intenrionaliry turns on whether derived mental representation belongs to the same that all’ ' " y is phenomenal‘ " y (see §5.r).
kind as phenomenal intentionality. Of course. the formulation of the above claims is sensitive to the way we
I think the answer is clearly "no." There are many dissimilarities between phe- fix reference on intentionality. If we for reference in a way other than my own.
nomenal intentionality and derived mental representa ' , but one of the most we might end up picking out a disjunctive kind that includes both phenome-
significant differences is that what a representation derivatively represents, but not nal intentionality and derived mental representation. Then the view I propose
what it phenomenally represents, is always relative to a subject. Strictly speaking. would qualify as a kind of derivativism and be incompatible with strong PIT.
when S takes C to mean C+, C doesn't just derivatively represent C+; C derivatively Relatedly, those who think that my ostensive definition picks out a broader kind
represents C+ fir S. Compare: When we take stop signs to represent <stop!>, than phenomenal intentionality, kind that includes derived mental represen-
a
they represent <stop!> for us. They don’t represent <stop!> for ants, cats. or
tation. would take derived mental representation to be a kind of derived in-
tables, and they don't represent <stop!> in and of themselves. In contrast, when we tentionality. The derivativist version of self-ascriptivism about thoughts’ alleged
plmmmemzlly a content, we do so full stop.” contents is another fallback position for those who believe that there is some-
There is another important difference between derived mental representation thing very deep in common between original intentionality and derived mental
and phenomenal intentionality: There are determinate facts of the matter as to
representation.
which contents we phenomenally I t. These facts depend on what our
"rim IS not to say that phenomenal intentionality does not involve a eenain subjectivity in that
phenomenal Contents at: experienced and pout: to th: l¢ptEl¢nt|ng Suhiefl (St! Knegel zoub tot "orcoutse. trim might be vagueness l|'l out deIt1'ipl‘iI7rI-\‘ Dftllcse rm;
the idea that phenomenal lllttnllonallty is subjective). Thanks to Lallla Gow rot prompting this " See also sttawmn (zoofi). who claims that derived representation is a kind of aboutness but not a kind
clarification. aflnttntlonallly.
an
-Vlfindows, Linux.
Lin hltps:IIwww.qoppa.oomIpdfsludio
.54 Part 11/.« (.1,a1/tngtng Out: (Ilmpm 7: Tlmag/it I35
7.5 Conclusio . PIT about Thought arise in the case of perception. For example. a perceptual state representing a pine
tree 411' ll pine tree (Siegel zoos, zoio) might be thought to have a rich descriptive
I have suggested a PIT-friendly view of thought content on which thoughts have or object—involving content, and a perceptual state oiia particular object might be
both immediate contents. which are phenomenal contents, and derived contents, thought to have a content involving that object as a L part (Schellenberg
which we represent simply because we take ourselves to represent them. in short. we zero). If the phenomenal L of perceptual states do not match such alleged
think in phenomenal tags that we take to stand for more complex and sophisticated contents. then they pose a challenge for PIT.
contents. As in the case ofthought. we can say that perceptual states d'eriwttiue{y represent
There is an optimistic and a pessimistic take on the resulting View The pessimistic such contents. Presumably, in having perceptual experiences, there is some content
take is that we only ever represent our impoverished immediate contents and any we are immediately aware of. so at least sortie I I ' states have immediate
impression to the contrary is a mere illusion, brought on by our disposition to have contents. lia subject is disposed to have cashing out droughts that together specify
cashing out thoughts. When we “look for" certain alleged contents. we find them that a perceptually represented immediate content. C. cashes out into C+. then she
before our mind's eye. at least sometimes and to a certain extent, which leads to the takes C to mean C+. And if she takes C to mean C+. then C derivatively represents
mistaken impression that we were thinking them all along. But this is merely a kind C+ (For her). and so does any state or representa mmediately X ’ ’ D C. ’
of refrigerator light illusion, since we were not in fact thinking them all along. On I 1-
uany, , ’stateor ‘ ‘
-
', , "DC.
this construal of the overall view, the phenomenon of derived mental representati For example, suppose that when a subject sees a pine tree as a pine tree. she
gives us the illusion ofrich and contentful thought, when in reality. all we ever think has a visual experience that, in some sense, represents not only particular shapes
are our impoverished phenomenal contents.“ and colors but also the property of being a pine tree or the kind pine tree. Here
My preference is for a more optimistic take. one on which. although the only is how my account accommodates this case: The perceptual state has a particular
contents we inlrntimm/ly r are our limited and impoverished immediate immediate content. C, which is phenomenally represented. C might consist in a
contents. our dispositions to have cashing out thoughts allow us to effectively particular configuration of shapes and colors or even a gisty pine-tree-ish content.“
bootstrap our way out of the confines of our own consciousness, opening us up to The subject is also disposed to have various cashing out thoughts to the eiieet that C
a world ofrich, complex. and sophisticated contents. including actual objects
even cashes out into <an evergreen coniferous tree with needle-shaped leaves>, or simply
and other items in the external world. These contents are the contents we in some <leind of tree that experts call “pine">. Such cashing our thoughts together specify
sense target. intend, or take ourselves to represent, so. in some important sense. they a content, C+. that might be thought of as our subject's best characterization or
are genuinely ours." understanding of a pine tree. By (Taking). our subject rakes C to mean C+. and by
(DMR). her r , ' representatio with the immediate content C derivatively
represents C+.
Appendix D: Derived Mental Representation in Perception Similarly. suppose we want to say that a particular subject perceptually repre-
sents an object»involving content, such as the content <Mitten>, which is the
The account of derived mental ,resentation developed in this chapter applies not flesh-and—blood cat, Mitten. My account accommodates this case as follows: Our
only to thoughts but also to intentional mental states more generally, ' "
subject has a perceptual state with a certain phenomenal content. C, which might
perceptual states. This is useful. since it might be thought that the challenges facing consist in various sensory contents (e.g., cat imagery). schematic contents (e.g.. a gisty
PIT in the case of thought~n.im ',, those of accommodating the reprcsentati depiction of Mitten), or sui generis contents (e.g.. a primitive content <Mitten!>).
of rich descriptive contents. object—involving contents. and broad contents—also Our subject is also disposed to have cashing our thoughts specifying that C cashes
out into whatever item has such—and—such features, which. if all goes well. is Mitten
“This is the pittutt I endorsed In Mendtlovlelzoto.Bourget(1.oI7t.ibrthcoming-ejendorses a similar
picnttt on which we leprcsem less than we tend to think we do.
4;
Bollrget (action) can be tntupmtd as having such an optimistic Spin. claiming that various derivation
. . . .
"The View that the Immediate content: of perceptual slates Include non-Sensory parts 01' asptcts ls con-
mechanisms give tist to genuine inttnnonahty. genial to tht View that perceptual experience involves cognitive phenomenology (st: Montague zocy).
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no H171 IV: (.'/M/lmgmg Carer Chapter 7. mug!» r57
himself. Our subject thereby takes C to mean <Mitten> —i.e., Mitten himself—and desire. hope. or fear—and a content, which is what is believed. desired. etc. So far, I
so her representation ofC derivatively represents < Mitten) J‘ have not said anything about attitudes, since my target is intentionality. the having
One attractive consequence of allowing for derived lnental representation in of contents. But, since attitudes are an integral part ofthoughts. PIT should at least
perception is that it lessens the disappointment that might come with an error theory be compatible with an account of attitudes. This appendix overviews three views of
about the contents of perceptual color states.“ In Chapter 3, I argued that perceptual attitudes and argues that PIT is compatible with all of them. though my version of
color representations ( “ ) represent edenic colors, which happen not to PIT is particularly congenial to one in particular.“
be instantiated. As a result. perc , ' color representat reliably misrepresent: The standard view of attitudes is arguably attitude functionalisln, the View that
roughly, they get things wrong in the same way all the time. However, depending on an intentional mental state‘: attitude is a matter of its functional role (Fodor i987).
our dispositions to have cashing out thoughts involving our perceptual color con- For example, desires might be intentional mental states that play the functional role
tents. our , , color I I
might‘ ’, I .
properties
. . , .
characteristic of desire, such as that of causing us to try to bring about their contents
that putatively colored objects actually have. For example, as a result of coming to given what we believe.
realize that there are no edenic colors, I might come to reconstruct my color concepts An alternative view is attitude phenomenalism, the view that an intentional
so that they pick our properties I think objects in fact have—say, dispositions to mental state’s attitude is a matter of its having certain characteristic phenomenal
cause color experiences. This reconstruction might be a matter of coming to take characters (Horgan and Tienson zooz, Pitt 2.oo4,_lorba 1.016). For example. beliefs
the immediate contents of my color concepts to mean such dispositional contents. might have a phenomenal L of conviction, while desires might have a
In line with such changes. I might also come to take the immediate contents of my phenomenal ‘ of yearning or attraction.
, , ’color , ‘ to mean the sari. J’ , ' ' 'contents.This might A third view is attitude representationalisttt, the view that an intentional mental
involve, for example. being disposed to have cashing our thoughts that together states attitude is a matter of its having certain characteristic contents (Pearce
specify that, say, <sky-blue>, my perceptual color content, cashes out into <the zol6).“’ On such a view, each distinct attitude involves a characteristic content,
disposition to cause , K ‘ stares representing <slty—blue> in subjects like me the representation of which makes it the attitude that it is. For instance, to desire
in normal viewing condirions>. My perceptual color representations would then something might be to represent it as good, desirable. or rewarding. To believe
derivatively represent dispositions to cause certain perceptual states, which objects something might be to represent it as being the case, or true. On this view. a belief
do have. They would then have two contents, one immediate and one derived, only that l’ and a desire that I’ are alike with respect to some parts or aspects of their
the first ofwhich would be in error." contents but differ with respect to others.”
Appendix E: Attitudes
“ Recall thaton my use oftenrlinology, an intentional state IS an instantiation oran intentional property.
The category of thoughts includes t beliefs, occurrcnt desires. occurrent while an intentional mental state n a mental state that includes. but may not be exhausted by. the
instantiation or intentional properties. so. thonglrts are Intentional mental states but may not be
hopes, occurrent fears, and other propositional (or non—proposi onal) attitudes. It is
intentional stares. (See §l.a,)
typically thought that such states involve two component . an atu'tude—e.g.. belief. " See also itriegel (loljh). who argues that belief-like anti desire-like states have characteristic contents.
"’ c ., tor the attrtntle reprerentorionalist, suggested to me by Adam Paur1.iswhether when one
thlnksabztethat-clauseconr:nr.e.g., u hire, on: automatically hears partitnlarartinnietowaro
it. one view is that such states count as mere "conslderlngs." the Cognitlve analognrr or imaginings
" Derived mental representation in perception requires that the original eontenrs of perccpntal states
Another view I5 that such states eonnt at beliefs. on the rormer view, we needn't add any cltaracteri
can figure in cashing our thonghrs. which requires that the phenomenal contents orpereepnial states
rontents to a thavclullse content in order to connt as considering it. whereas on the latter view. we
can ngnre in rhonghts. This night involve perceptnal phenomenal eonrents entoeeieiing in cashing ont
needn't add any characteristic contents to a that-clanse content in order eonnr as believing it. i don't
thonghts (or cashing ont thought-perception hyhrni states), or easlnng our thoughts descriptive] or think the question or which particular attitude-related content: a particular thonght has ean be easily
demonstratlvely rererring to them. Ruled, but my sympathies he with the view that the aeranlt attxntck IS that of belier, intentional
“ Ofcoutst, this is only a desire-satisfying vrrnie. not a tnith-indicating virtnc (see p. iii). rtates generally seem to carry a kind oreomnntment to the truth of what is teprelentcd (consider, tor
“rhtnlts to Charles sicwert tor entonragrng me to elaborate on how derived mental representation erarnple, pereepntal states). and avoiding inch a commitment rcqniret nentraliting it (tor the atrintele
applies in the case orperccpnon, representatlonalist, this might involve thinking a content like rhings might or might not be rueh that p).
153 Pm IV: C}/allmgmg Case: C/mprer 7: Thnug/II 159
The above views are not mutually exclusive. For example. if attitude phenomenal- thoughts have attitudes. PIT must then maintain that they arise from phenomenal
ism is true and the relevant phenomenal properties are special Functional properties. consciousness or that they are merely derived representational states. Neither option
then attitude functionalism is also true. More interestingly for my purposes, as we is entirely implausible. The first option takes the contents individuating the attitudes
will soon see, attitude phenomenalism and attitude representationalism might both to be phenomenal contents. One consideration in support of this view is that. as
be true. Horgan and Tienson (Loot), Pitt (2.004), Goldman (1993), and Jorba (2.016) have
It is not my purpose to decide between these views. Instead, here, iwant to show argued. there is a clear phenomenal difference between thoughts with the saint
that PIT is compatible with all these options. thar~clause contents but different attitudes, e.g., between a belief that it's raining
On attitude functionalism, what makes a mental state a belief, desire. or other type and a desire that its raining. So, it is not entirely implausible that the contents
of attitude is its functional role. Assuming that attitudes are not intentional features individuating the attitudes are phenomenal contents. However, as in the case of the
of mental states, attitude functionalism places attitudes outside the scope of PIT, alleged contents of thoughts. one might worry that these phenomenal contents don't
since PIT is only a theory ofintentionality. ls PIT compatible with such a view of match the contents the attitude representationalist takes to individuate the attitudes.
attitudes? It seems so. There is no obvious barrier to PIT accepting the view that The other option for i “ D attitude' " with a r L '
intentional mental states can play various functional roles and that a mental state's intentionality theoretic account of thought takes the contents individuating the
attitude is a matter of playing such roles. attitudes to be derived. On such aview, i ‘states involving different attitudes
Similarly, PXT is compatible with the claim that attitudes are a matter of phe- would involve impoverished, perhaps sensory, schematic, or sui gencris, phenomenal
nomenal states, so PIT is compatible with attitude phenomenalism. However, contents, which we take to mean fuller or more precise specifications of attitude
when combined with my favored version of PIT, which takes every phenomenal contents, For example, a desire for ice cream might involve a gisty desire-ish content
property to be identical to some intentional property (see Appendix B of Chapters). that we take to mean <good>, <desirable>, <rewarding>, <to be had>, etc. Then the
attitude phenomenalism entails attitude rcpresentationalism. So, if one wants to representation r ' D this gisty desire»ish content would derivatively represent
be an attitude phenomenalist but not an attitude representationalist, one should this content. One attraction of this combination of attitude representationalism
reject the claim that every phenomenal property is identical to sortie intentional with self-ascriptivism it nicely accommodates a diverse range of attitudes
is that
property. W/hile I don't want to reject this claim, rejecting it has no downstream beyond those ofbeliefand desire, such as those of fearing, hypothesizing, aspiring,
ramifications, so it is a nearby fallback position for those who want to endorse hoping, wishing, and regretting. First, it can accommodate these attitudes without
attitude phenomenalism but not attitude representational" according them too much psychological reality: We have such attitudes simply
On attitude represenrationalism, whether or not it is combined with attitude phe- because we In/at ourselves to have such attitudes. Second, it makes sense of subtly
nomenalism, attitudes are squarely within the scope of PIT and, more specifically, diiferenr attitudes, such as those of hoping and wishing. by taking the difference
within the scope ofa phenomenal intentionality theoretic account ofthought, since between them to lie largely in how we construe them.
Attitudes are an integral part of thoughts. so an account of the content of
thoughts, and of intentionality more generally, should be compatible with an
Adam Pautz has suggested to the that neithtt or tht above two options is tatitrattoty: The view account of attitudes. l have overviewed three accounts of the attitudes and argued
thit Considering it
the default tutinlde is implausible. since it is unclezf Whether intttiy considtting a
that PXT is compatible with all of them. My sympathies lie with a combination of
aonttiit combined with tht alleged L thatattttittic contents ofvarious attitude: can really amount
to having those afllludes. and tht View that beliefis the dtraiiit attintdt untitttutt tht motivation rot attitude representationalistii and the view that attitudes have fairly thin phenomenal
attitudt reptescnlationalism, since ontt wt allow that ont ktndorthoiight has an tittta built-in attitude contents and fairly sophisticated and subtle derived contents, but the odier options
iiidtotndtnt orany chntattttistit conlents. wt might as wtu allow that may an do. I don't thinit that
provide fallback positions for those who are not convinced ofthis view.
tithat orthtat Obilflions IS decisive: rht altitude leplestntanonzlist that taitts tontidtting to be the
dtrniiit zttitude might say that all it is to have a htittr. dttitt, tic. is to EDi’ISld=[ (ha! a particular tonttot
is ttut. good, ttt.; no mott wont iittda to be done by thttt consldetingi. Such a View might amount [0
a deflated iindttttanding ofbeliefi desire. and otiitt Illltudes. And tht altllude rcpresenfltlonzlisl w.
taittt htiittto ht the dttaiiit attinidt i'i'ugl1K maintain that coming with a kind ortoininitmtnt K0 ttuth
is not a riitthet rtatutt oru thought tot an uittntionai ttatt inott gtnttauy), hot tathtt falls out ortht
very nanitt orhtiiig a thought (ot an inttntionai ttatt). Thinking that P inst ii committing to its ttuth.
- Vifindows, Linux.
Li For Evaluation. hflpszllwwmqoppa oorrilpdlshidio
Chapm A’: Nanmmtium Sum :61
have derived intentional , §8.3 argues for my preferred view of standing
states; and §8.4 argues for my preferred view of nonconscious occurrent states.
§_.1 The Problem with Nonconscious States
Recall that PIT is the view that all originally intentional states arise from phenom-
enal states (see Chapter 5). PIT faces a challenge when it comes to nonconscious
states: It seems that there are nonconscious intentional mental states, states that are
intentional but not phenomenally How. then, do they get their contents?‘
.
We can divide the nonconscious states we might want to ommodate into two
general types: The first is that of standing states, mental states that need not be used.
entertained. or otherwise active at the time at which they are bad. Standing states
can be contrasted with occurrent states, mental states that are used, entertained,
8 Nonconscious States or otherwise active at the time at which they are had. Examples of standing states
include beliefs, desires. and memories that are not continuously beingentertained at
the time that they are had, as well as “assumptions” ofthe visual system (Mart 1982.)
and states of knowing the grammar of our language (Chomsky r965) that are not
continuously in use. For instance, suppose you have a desire to eat ice cream, a desire
you intend to satisfy after reading this chapter. Presumably, you are not tinuously
occurrently desiring that you eat ice cream while reading this chapter. Still. you
ACCORDING TO THE phenomenal " y them-y (PIT), [ht imcmjomj
'
nonetheless count as having the desire. even if it is not continuously ' g to
mind, or at least the originally intentional mind, is the conscious mind. This might you, so it is a standing state. In contrast, the intentional states this text is causing in
seem like a hopelessly outdated view. one that flies in the face of cognitive science. y0|l HOW 31'! OCCUITCHI SKIKCS.
Indeed, one might argue that one of the important contributions of the
most The second type of onscious state that we might want to accommodate is that
D ' ' revolution was the acceptance of nonconscious mental states and processes. of nonconsci t states, which are occurrent states that lack phenom-
Searle (1990) notably argued that all intentional states are either conscious enal charactet. Some ,' of ‘ states are
or potentially conscious, claiming that his conclusions wreak havoc on cognitive occurrent states in early visual processing, nonconscious occurrent visual states of
science. The view I defend in this chapter may seem to be even more extreme than blindsight patients, and thoughts. '
Searle's, since it denies intentionalit y to all onscious states. regardless of whether Both standing and occurrent nonconscious stares admit of a further distinction
daey are potentially conscious. But my approach is in fact quite conciliatory. Rather between personal and subpersonal states: Some standing and occurrent noncon-
than wreak havoc on what we might take to be the standard view of nonconscious scious states are personal states, states that can be said to be had by entire
states, the view implicit in much scientific theorizing about the mind and brain, my persons. Examples of nonconscious personal states include standing beliefs, standing
view. I argue, is very much in line with it. desires, and nonconscious thoughts. Even though we cannot introspectively observe
This chapter proceeds as follows: §8.1 clarifies the challenge for PIT, distinguish. nonconscious personal states, we sometimes ascribe such states to ourselves and
ing two different types of nonconscious states that we might want to commodate: others, perhaps based on intuition or a folk psychological theory of mind (see §r I)
standing states and allegedly nonconscious occurrent states; §8.:. overviews and
provides my reasons for rejecting versions of PIT that take nonconscious states to
' See Sm hits (2011. MS. ch. x). who argue; out there are such nonconscious states and that they pol: a
problem for PIT.
- LI Forr Evaluation. https://www.qoppa.com/pdfstudio
167. pm IV: Challenging Cases Chapters: Nanmruriaus Sum is;
or perhaps based on scientific theories of mind and behavior. In contrast. some $2 Derivativist Strategies
standing and occurrent nonconsciuu stats are subpersonal states. states that are
properly attributed to subsystems of persons rather than to persons themselves. For Several advocates of PIT have proposed a derivativist treaunent of nonconscious
example, standing and occurrent states in early visual processing might be such states. states. Kriegel (zolgb), an advocate of PIT who endorses derivarivism about a wide
Our for accepting subpersonal states are usually that they are posited by
reasons variety of none iuu states, somewhat metaphorically expresses the derivativist
scientific theories (see §L3.7.).' View as follows:
The problem posed by all lcincls of nonconscious states is the same: Many of [I]ntention:tlity is injected into the world with the appearance of a certain
diem seem to be intentional mental states, but they also seem to lack phenomenal kind of phenomenal character [O]nce this phenomenal character appears.
character—there seems to be nothing it is like to have a belief one isn’t occurrently and brings in its train “original intentionality.” intentionality can be “passed
thinking or to nonconsciously process “ 0 information. As a result. it seems around" to things lacking this (or any) phenomenal character. (p. 3)
that their intentionality cannot be phenomenal ‘ity. So. it is not clear how
'
On this picture, once we have original intentionality. it can be “passed around"
PIT can ommodate them. to items lacking phenomenal I will later suggest that intentionality
.
In §5.4, we saw that there are three general strategies PIT might take toward any cannot transfer from one object to another and that this is the core reason to reject
alleged intentional but menal mental state: According to inflationism. a derivativist picture. But first, let us canvass some derivativist options.
the mental state does in fact have phenomenal contents. According to eliminati tn.
0 I ' " vicwis‘, ‘F dc.’ ‘ ‘ on which, ' " '
the mental state does not exist or does not intentionally represent the relevant con- if they
states derivatively represent the contents they would originally K
tents. Finally, according to derivativism, the mental state derivatively intentionally (Scarle i990, 199:, i992, Bourget zotoa; see also
were phenomenally
represents the relevant contents.
Graham et al. zoo7. Kriegel 1013b, and Pitt MS-b for discussion). According to
In what follows, I argue that there are no genuinely intentional standing states. potentialist ‘ nonconscious states derive their intentional properties
' ' ' .
However, I also suggest that the notion of derived mental representation devel- from the intentional properties of the phenomenally states a subject
oped in Chapter 7 can be extended to apply to some personal standing states. merely pulmlially has. We can think of this picture using Kriegels metaphor as
so that at least some personal standing state contents, and perhaps even some ..
follows: The potential original ‘ of phenomenally ' states is
personal standing states in their entirety, qualify as derivatively represented. Since passed around to corresponding ion states.
I do not take derived mental representation to be a kind of intentionality (see Another vie\v is functionalist derivativism, on which conscious states are
§7.4), this view is, strictly speaking, eliminativist, but there is a nearby derivativist derivatively intentional because they bear the right kinds of functional relations
fallback position for those who take derived mental representation kind of
to be a
to actual and , ' ‘ states, ‘ ' “ I '- ' ' ‘ states
'ntentionaliry. (Graham et al. 2.oo7, Horgan and Graham z.oo9, Loat zoo}, Bourget zoioa. Pautz
The view of nonconscious occurrenr states that I will recommend is a L‘
2.oo8, Lona. Chalmers Loio, p. xxiv). This view is much like the functional role
of inflationism and eliminativism: Some allegedly ion intentional states theory described in §4.i. except that it includes phenomenal ' ‘ states.
might have phenomenal " and phenomenal contents that we are not aware Recall that one worry with the functional role theory was that it cannot assign
of. However, it is implausible that all of them do. For those that don't, I recommend contents determinately. Functionalist derivativism addresses this worry by taking
eliminativism, which, lwill argue, isverymuch in line with the standard view of these phenomenal intentional states to, as Graham et al. (2.007. p. 479) put it, “serve as
states. ‘anchor points’ of determinate intentionality” (see also Paut-z zoos, p. 2.67). The
In short, my View is a combination of eliminativism and inflationism about idea is that these anchor points. perhaps together with other factors, constrain
allegedly nonconscious states. Before considering the view in detail. let us first the possible interpretations of a system of representations enough so that there
consider the derivati st alternative. is only one adtnissible illlcll .’ This picture is particularly well illustrated
‘ See Drayron ‘D014 rot discussion arm: personal/subpersonal distinction. ‘ But see Boulget MS, which argues that these views do nm in fact avoid indeterminacy worries.
Ll - Forr Evaluation. https://www.qoppa.com/pdfstudio
I64 Part 114- chi/ztngitig cm Chapter ll: Nonmmtmu: Sum: :65
by Kriegel’s metaphor. On this picture, intentionality gets passed around from nearby fallback position.) On derivativist self-ascriptivism, intentionality gets passed
phenomenal intentional states to non-phenomenal states that are appropriately around from self-ascriptions to other items.
functionally related. Let us now turn to assessing derivativism. Kriegel (Lon) suggests that one reason
Pautz's (zoos, Lona) consciousness-based best systems theory is a version of to prefer derivativism to ' isi strategies is that it offers a more conciliatory
‘ “ 'derivativism inspired by Lewis‘ (r974) a priori functionalism that takes position. since it allows us to say that nonconscious states intentionally represent.
the relevant functional roles to be determined by folk psychology.‘ According to albeit derivatively. However, I will soon argue that considerati of the putatively
this view, a subject derivatively intentionally represents a on-phenomenal content intentional states in question reveals that an eliminativist (and. in sotne cases, an
C just in case the “best interpretation” assigns to her an intentional state with the inflationist) strategy is in fact more conciliatory than the alternative derivativist
content C. The best terpretation, roughly, is the one that satisfies the a priori strategies. Ifthese arguments are sound, then they dispel Kl-iegel's motivation for
principles of folk psychology, including the ‘principle of rationality," which states derivativism.
that a subjects behavior is generally rational given her beliefs and desires, and the Even if derivativism yields predictions that are more in line with our prior
‘principle of humanity,‘ which states that a subject's intentional states are the ones expectations, as Kriegel claims, daere is a fundamental concern with the view, which
that it is reasonable for her to have given her evidence, which, for Pautz, is a matter is that intentionality is just not the kind of thing that can be passed around as would
ofhet history of phenomenal intentional perceptual states.‘ be required. The worry is that even derivativism appears to give us what appear
A third derivativist view is in isi derivativism,
’ " D to which to be the right in all cases, the view fails because the various derivation
answers
nonconsci states derivatively intentionally represent the contents that a possible mechanisms are not in fact suflicient for generating new instan of intentionality.
ideal interpreter would interpret them as having using intentional systems theory We might call this problem the Real Problem with derivativism, since it is analogous
(Kriegel 1.011). Intentional systems theory is a theory that aims to predict a system's to the Real Problem for tracking and functional role theories.’
behavior by attributing to it beliefs and desires and assuming that it IS rational (that Of course, everyone will agree that not any old relation something bears to an
is, assuming that its behavior aims to satisfy its desires given its beliefs). On Kriegel's actual or possible intentional state results in derived intentionality. One L‘ gcannot
picture, roughly. a nonconscious state x (lcrivatively represents a content C when “catch” another thing’s intentionality simply by being sufficiently close to it or by
a (possible) ideal agent employing intentional system’s theory is disposed to have bumping into it. So, even if a derivativist theory's predictions are in line with prior
a ,L ' intentionally represents C. On dlis
intentional state stating that x expectations, there remains a further question of whether the derivation mechanisms
picture, intentionality gets passed around from the possible ideal agent’s phenomenal in question can really ‘pass’ content around as required.‘
intentional states to other subjects’ nonconscious states.‘ I want to suggest that the kinds of relations potentialist, functionalist, and
Finally, we might add to our list of derivativist options derivativist interpretivist derivativism invoke are not sufficient for generating instances of
self-ascriptivism, the view that we rlel-ivatively " tcptcsem vntious ' ' intentionality. Before considering these versions of derivativism, let us first consider
contents by " 0 them to ourselves or our mental states. Derivativist
‘ derivativist selfascriptivism. In this case, there is ptima facie reason to think that
self-ascriptivism is a combination of self—ascriptivism (§7.3) and the View that the
resulting derived mental representation is a kind of intentionality. (ln §7.4, I argued
for eliminativist self-ascriptivism but noted that derivativist self-asctiptivism is a " one kind ortoniplaint zgalllsl patticiilat dctivativist sttategiei is that thcy cannot accommodate all
the putative cases of nonconscious intentionality. ctahani et al. (aim) and Knegel (ton) algu:
that ' ' ’ cannot intentional states that are not
even potentially phenomenally tonicions. siich at any allegedly intentional itatci involved in early
vitiial pnxessmg. Kriegel (ton) also aigncc that tiinctionaliit dctivativiim cannot accommodate
Adam Pautz has alsocalled this vieiv "phenomenal ritnctionalitnit (tee hit zoo! and 1013:). nonconscious intention ity in entitcly non-phenomenal laciints. Smithies (MS. eh. i) iimilatly atgiics
Paurl hitthct claims that similarconsiderationsconslllin the lntetpictation ora inoictti language and that what amoiint to vatioiis totitit of dctita vism cannot arlequateiy accoiint rot all alleged cases or
that the meaning oflinguistic etpteisioni in a tiiliiecri language can in tiitn itiiliieiicc the intentional iioiiconicioni intentionality. My wotty. in conttait. IS that even if derivativism appeals to give Us the
etatct she coiinti at (aoii, pp. mam).
having "right atittvett" in all cases, thc vitiv fails occaiiac thc Vlfious detivation iticchanisint at. not iialricieni
l‘aut1's consciousness-based best tyitcmi theoty. which I've classified as a version of tiinctioii ist rot intentionality.
‘ ' K - ,;
aiavetsioii or ' ' * ' douwithnllt ' in convctiation, ltati tatltai has capteiicd ainiilat Conclrns with derivativist self-Iscllplivillfl, which i
the intetptctct. see also rain: aoiaa. ii. 31. completely agree Wllh. net approach in Falkzs tooaa teiiecta such concerns.
I66 Pm]!/: Challenging Cm: Chapter if: Nuniimsnims Siam :57
intentionality gets passed around. Consider a case where you simply stipulate to Why isn’t the full story simply that we have actual and potential phenomenal
yourself: <By <P>, I mean <grass is green». In this your mental content
case, intentional states that are causally and dispositionally related to actual and potential
<P> comes to stand for <grass is green> (for you). Section 7.4 argued that this non—intentional states?
sort of derived representation is not a case of derived intentionality, though it may On Pautz’s (7.008) view, the relevant functional roles are fixed by a prioti folk
satisfy an everyday notion ofrepresentation. The point here. however, is that there is psychological principles. These principles functionally define beliefs, desires, and
some prima facie platsibility to the idea that self-ascriptions can “pass” intentionality other states in terms of their connection to one’s evidence, which, for Pautz, is the
around. Taking something to have a certain content makes it have that content (for phenomenal content ofone’s past and present perceptual states. I am doubtful that
you). folk psychology defines beliefs, desires, and other such states in this way, but let us
Things are not so clear on potentialist derivativism, On this view, items that are assume that it does. Then it would indeed turn out that we have beliefs, desires, and
r ‘ "y phenomenally conscious inherit the content that they would have were other folk psychological states and that they are derived from phenomenal states in
they to be phenomenally conscious. For example, ifa merely potentially phenomenal the way that Pautz describes. But it would still be a further question whether such
state is such that, were it to be made phenomenally it would have the , states have intentionality, and it is not clear why we should accept that they do.
phenomenal intentional content <grass is green>, men it has the derived intentional (If we say that folk psychological states have intentionality by definition, then we
content <gl-ass is gi-een>. The problem is that it is unclear just why a potentially are operating with a different definition of "intentionality" than the ostensive one,
phenomenal state should qualify as being derivatively intentional. as opposed to and their having intentionality in this sense is consistent with their failing to have
merely potentially intentional. After all, while the state is potentially phenomenal, intentionality in the sense under discussio ; see also §l.;.l.)
it is not deriwztir/ely phenomenal, so why does it get to count as detivatively Compare: Suppose we define a fiiofaetlllnldng-Ilia! C" as a sofa seating a person
intentional rather than merely potentially intentional? Note that whether or not thinking that C. If people ever sit and think on sofas, then there will indeed
we say that potentially originally intentional states are derivatively intentional is be sofa—thinking-that Cs for various contents C, But it does not follow that
not merely a matter of terminological choice. In Chapter i, \ve fixed reference on any intentionality has transferred from people to sofas. Similarly, simply defining
intentionality ostcnsively by pointing to paradigm cases of the phenomenon. Saying folk psychological states in terms of their relations to phenomenal intentional
that potentially originally intentional states are themselves intentional commits us to stares does not suffice for intentionality to transfer from the phenomenal in-
their belonging to the class ofitems we picked out using this ostensive definition."'° tentional states to the folk psychologically defined states. It wouldn't make the
Next, let us consider functionalist derivativism. On this view, intentionality flows defined states have a derived form of the pheno we defined ostensively in
from actual or potential phenomenal ' ‘ states to other functionally related Chapter l.“
states. The worry here is that it is not clear why intentionality should transfer from Finally, let us consider Kriegel’s interpretivist derivativism, the view that non
actual or potential phenomenal states to other states. In general, bearing a causal conscious states have as their derived intentional content the content that an
relation to something with intentionality does not result in the intentionality being ideal interpreter would attribute to them using intentional systems theory. Like
passed around. Internal states with intentionality might bear lots of causal relations
of other internal states and external items, but not all these items thereby
to all sorts
become intentional. Why, dien, would any of these items become intentional? " In response to this, Adam Paulz has told int that he can accept that his Vl€W does not deliver I kind
orinttntionnlity, out only a lunii 0f“inttnll0nnllty'." Ifso, then wt hnvt no disagreement rtgardlng
tht points made l’1El’E.l‘lflW!V£Y.:i1ll‘l'Im€dlaK¢ ptohltni with this constmal nfhis theory is that now it
IS not clear what it is supposed to lit a thtoty af(:xc:p[ perhaps tht i ptioti ltnuwn meanings offolk
psychological tttins). lfthe tntgot orih. thtoty IS not uI(£n[l0n:Ill[y, mute needs to be tnid about what
’ Seirlt(lgqi),roughly,atguesthattil!onlyrhlngtllatcznbeustdK0 hlchruntentsnonconicious Kicllylls tntgtt is supposed to b¢(1ndwhyItls a corrtctthea i ll/. Compare‘ Without: Stztedtligrt.
‘ ouiii ' r nH ' th Vbestonlysuppons
' '
the tracking thtoty tells us only that there 1!: tracking relations. which is something that Everyflnt can
the claim that thttt is a dtittininnit way in whith we Elli’! assign them tonttntt on the basis or the agree with.
routine: they would have |f¢unS:l0|i\S. it does not provide n reason rot thinking that nnncnnsnous Halts in CI)n[l'aS(, ellmlnatlvlst self-ascriptivisrn is i thtoty or how we tatgtt oonttnts that wt nit not
ntt intentional in tht rust place. initnediiittly awatt or. in Chxpter 7. 1 urged that tht only way we can do 50 is through itlritctiptions
“’ sii-nilatly. Sttawson (i994. 2.004) argues that intto dispositions do not give rise to intentional states. set (too also §iu.2.). The view his 2 stated tzrget, and rut argued that (here in in-principle rtawns to
§s.; rot niott discussion. think it Successfully captures it Ind, funlltl, (hat it is the only titw that can.
7
tea p.m1z/1 Challenging Cast: Cl,-apm I: Nollrnnsriaus States I69
derivativist self-ascriptivism, interpretivist derivativism takes the passing around of from intentionality. What it gives rise to is one thing standing for another thing
intentionality to require something like ascriptions of intentional states. But whereas for wrneone. Our ascriptions make a stop sign stand for <stop!> for us, and our
derivativist selfvascriptivism claims that we derivatively represent a content when we self-ascriptions make internal states stand for contents they don't phenomenally
ascribe it to our internal states, interpretivist derivativism claims that we derivatively represent far us. But, as argued in §7.4, intentional states are not relative to subjects
represent a content when an idealngmt would ascribe it to our internal states. In both in this way. Rather, intentionality is a matter of a state or subject entertaining or
cases, derived intentionality results from an agent ascribing a content to something otherwise having a content in and ofitself. So. taking one thing to stand for another
else. does not result in a derived version of intentionality. Genuine intentionality is an
Recall that on self-ascriptivism, when a content or representation comes to entirely different kind of beast.
derivatively represent sortie content, it only, strictly speaking, derivatively represents We can conclude from the preceding discussion that derivativist self-ascriptivism
the content fir
the rubjert making the asmptian. In the above example, the subject is the most viable version ofderivarivism, but even it does not deliver derived inten-
who stipulates <By <I’>. I mean <grass is green>> does not thereby make it the case Iiarm/it}. rather than mere derived representation that happens to be derived from
that the content <P>, or even her internal state representing that content, comes to intentionality. However, of the derivativist options. derivativist self-ascriptivism
represent <grass is green> in and of itself. Instead, she makes it the case that <I’>, makes the best fallback position for advocates of PIT who want to accept derived
and perhaps also her internal state representing <I’>, comes to represent <grass is intentionality.
green >fbrher. The same holds in non-mental cases ofderived representati n. Strictly If. as I've ommended, the advocate of PIT rejects derivativist strategies, she is
speaking, stop signs represent <stop!> far us. They do not represent <stop!> for left to choose between inflationism and “ 'sm about any given alleged case of
'
ants, Martians, or for stop signs, and they do not unqualifiedly 1'
<stop!> nonconscious intentionality, Since, in most cases, it is implausible to ‘main that
in and of themselves. Similarly, then, if an ideal interpreter interprets a subject's allegedly ' intentional states are in fact phenomenally conscious, this
internal state x as having content C, this should only result in x representing C fizr leaves us with a largely eliminativist View of these states, which is my preferred view.
the ideal interpreter, and not for the subject, for x, or in and ofitself. Put otherwise, The remainder of this chapter argues that such a largely eliminativist strategy is quite
even ifinterpretivist derivativism describes a derivation mechanism that succeeds in plausible and can be " independently of PIT.
getting content to pass from phenomenal intentional states to nseious states,
the contents it ascribes are only relative to the ideal interpreter. These content
attributions are irrelevant to the subject, just as a stop sign's meaning for us is 8.3 Standinn States
irrelevant to the stop sign."
The only way to derivatively represent content that is relevant to the subject Standing states include both personal states, like standing beliefs, standing desires,
of derived representation is for the subject to ascribe that content to herself or and memories. and subpersonal states, like ‘assumptions’ of the visual system.
her states or contents. This brings us back to derivativist self-ascriptivism. \Vhile Standing states pose a challenge For PIT because they seem to be intentional but
I take derivativist self-ascriptivism to be the most viable derivativist option, I not phenomenal.
think it too ‘ ‘ ‘Fails to get " to flow from K‘
' ' ' states This section argues that there are no intentional standing states. Section 8.3.:
to non-phenomenal states. The problem is that what self-ascription gives rise to considers the claim that there are personal standing states. like beliefs and de-
is not a derived version of intendonality but rather something utterly different sires, that intentional, and argues that there are none. Section 8.;.2.. though,
are
suggests that (eliminative) self-ascri, ' ' can be extended so as to apply to
at least some alleged personal standing state contents or even personal standing
" One might object Kill! (ht ideal intttpteters Content attributions predict the tubjttr: btnaviot. not her states in their entirety. Section 8.3.; suggests that folk psychological notions of
own, to tnt Knllrcnks are dcnvanvely Rpflsflllld by the subpttt. While wt may grant that the content standing(and, ‘‘ , )<"" D ' ‘I uatlta ' of_ " ' ' '
Inlibuliolls at ,. illlc snbjttts behavior. II is snu notclcal why this should nnitt tnttn in Iny
intentional states and derived mental representational states. Finally, §8.;.4 con-
way significant (0 her Iidicl than existing merely nt the tyt onnt beholder, 1.5. the ideal lnflrprtltlt
These Contents at: notcomcnrs that the subject in any way Itctpls. acklIaWl(d5u,0rI|S¢S. They ntmry siders to what extent these points can be extended to cover subpersonal standing
provide rot aconvcnient way ofpredicting ntt behavior. states.
170 Pm IV: Challenging Case: Chapter .7: Nanronstinus Sham 17!
8.;.r PERSONAL STANDING STATES the mind, such as one marked by having a distinct structure, between cases in which
we have a personal standing state and those in which we do not.
One might claim that there are personal standing states. like beliefs and desires, and
Schwitzgebel (zooi) provides a variety of cases in which he claims it is arbitrary to
that they are intentional. We can distinguish two views of personal standing states
either ascribe or not ascribe a particular standing belief to an individual. One kind
on which they are intentional: On the distinct structures view. personal standing
of case involves gradual forgetting:
states are or include distinct internal structures that continuously intentionally
represent their contents, where distinct (intenial) structures are distinct, fairly
When I was in college. I knew the last name of the fellow whose first name
localizable, and persistent structures in our heads. On this view, the contents of
was “Konstantin” and who lived across the hall from me in Freshman year. I
personal intentional standing states are in some sense “written” in our brains.
have not been in contact with him since 1987, and my memory ofhim is slowly
The second view. dispositionalism, is the view that personal standing states are
fading. When I was twentytfive, if you asked me his last name, I probably but
dispositions to have occurrent states with the same or similar contents or other
not certainly would have given you the right answer. Reminiscing with college
relevant dispositions, such as dispositions to behave in particular ways. Both w‘ews
buddies, it might easily have mind; in a distracting circumstance alien
come to
agree that there are personal intentional standing states, but they disagree on whether
from my college environment, it might not have come at all, or maybe with
they are distinct structures or dispositions. Mixed views are also available. such as
effort, or maybe only later as I was driving home and not giving the matter any
views on which some intentional standing states are distinct structures and others are
conscious attention. Now, at thirty-two. I cannot give you the answer with any
dispositions.“
certainty. and I would probably get it slightly wtong—but maybe if I chanced
In what follows. I first put pressure on the distinct structures view, arguing that
to see him in San Francisco I would find the correct name coming out of my
dispositionalism is preferable to it. I then argue that dispositionalism is not quite
mouth. I could tell you that his name starts with a ‘G'. and if you told me what
right either, since the relevant dispositions are not genuinely intentional. I then
it was I would confidently recognize it—maybe even correct you if you made
argue that even if some alleged personal standing states do involve or correspond to
a little mistake in pronouncing it. I could pick it out on a multiple-choice
distinct structures, these structures should not be characterized as intentional when
rest with similar-looking alternatives. Ten years from now. I shall not be able
they are not being used. Any distinct structures
might have do not rantinuomly
we
to recall it under any circumstances. but I could probably still pick it out on
intentionally represent.
a multiple-choice test, unless the alternatives were very close. As I get older.
One reason to be suspicious of the distinct structures view is that it seems there is
I could be misled by less and less similar alternatives, until success requires
no non-arbitrary way of deciding which distinct structures to posit. The occurrent
alternatives so divergent as no longer to test my knowledge that his name was
states we are disposed to have form a continuum of cases that differ in whether we
such and such, but only my knowledge of whether, for example, his name was
have ever had an occurrent version of the state or nearby states before, how likely we
a short Chinese name or a mid—length German one. At eighty, I shall have no
are to have the state in various circumstances, and how much thinking or processing
memory of Konstantin whatsoever. (pp. 76-77)
is required in order to have the state. This mggests that there is no clear division in
Schwiugebel claims that, while it may be clear that in his college days he had the
belief that Konstantin's last name was “Guericke' and that when he turns Bo he does
not have the belief, there is no determinate time at which he passes from having
" on tonte views. the only concepts and other ttptettntnttons Kl'III we have ate those involved in out
tttttent intentional Sllitst hot on othet views. at miyit be eotteet to toy that we -hm“ tonteptt and the belief to not having it. Any choice of such a point would be arbitrary. Instead.
teptetentationt even when they one not In HR. ptthnpt httnttee they at! tnpnetttetot physical ttnttttttet Schwitzgebel suggests that for much of the time between his college days and his
in our brains. It might eettn (hat, on the lane! vtewt. teptttentnttont have then eontentt even while
not in use. whieh would tnnite thent Handing ttttet. no-vtvtt. the sense in which they "have" then
turning 80. he is in a state of “in-between belief,‘ where he neither believes not fails
content: when not in use is not the Sam: at that in which dixlinct tttttetutes nte supposed to have thtit to believe that Konstantin's last ‘Guerickef’ Schwitzgebel provides several
name is
tontentt, heptetenuttont that all‘ not in use hnt thntvte in tone tente eonnt is having"have" content: more examples of in-between believing. including cases in which a subject's avowed
In Illa! when they eonttthntte to oeetttttnt intentional states they eontnhntt those contents. Diflinfl
beliefs conflict with her judgments about particular cases, cases of self-deception.
ttntetuxet. onthe othet hand. one Supposed to eonttnttotttiy ttptetent thest eontentt even when nm
tn use. and cases of gradual learning (Schwitzgebel Z001, zoo2.).
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Schwitzgebel suggests that such cases are best accommodated by a dispositionalis: (i974) had subjects watch a video of a car accident. They were then asked either
account of belief on which beliefs are clusters of dispositions to engage in certain “About how fast were the cars going when they smashed into each other?” or similar
behaviors or enter certain mental states, ‘ " 0 phenomenal states. In his college
'
questions using more neutral language. such as “About how fast were the cars going
days, Schwitzgebel has all or most of the dispositions characteristic of the belief when they hit each other?” Subjects who were presented with the question using
that Konstantin's last name is "Guericke," while at so, he has none or almost none die word “smashed” estimated higher speeds. with a mean estimate of 4o.8 miles per
of them. At the in—between stages. he has some but not all of dtese dispositions, hour, compared to those in the ‘hit" and other neutral conditions. with the mean
and that is what it is for him to have the in-between belief. That he has some but estimate of “.0 miles per hour for "hit." Those in the ‘smashed’ condition were also
not all of the dispositions is all there is to be said about whether he has the belief; more likely to falsely remember seeing broken glass. This type of effect of new input
dtere is no further fact of the matter as to whether he really has it. as to whether on memory retrieval is known as the misinformation elfect.
"l(onstantin’s last name is either recorded somewhere deep in [his] memory or it is Many other experiments by Loftus and others have produced similar results. ln
not" (Schwitzgebel zoor. p. 82.). another study. Braun et al. (zooz) had subjects read a Disneyland advertisement
Similarly, Searle (1991) suggests that an advantage of his view that all intentional asking them to recollect their childhood experien at Disneyland. Among other
states are at least potentially conscious is that it allows us to say that there is no deep things. the ad described shaking hands with Bugs Bunny. After reading the ad, 16%
fact of the matter as to whether one has a particular standing belief. For example, he of subjects falsely remembered that theyhad in fact shaken hands with Bugs Bunny at
suggests that there is no fact of the matter as to whether he should count as believing Disneyland. (We know these are false memories because Bugs Bunny is not a Disney
that doctors wear underwear or that station wagons are inedible (Searle 1991, p. 61.). character.)
Searle suggests that rather than think of the mind as “a big fllingcabinet in which we These and other similar results suggest that memory recollection is largely a
store a whole lot of information” (p. 6;), we should instead think of what we have constructive process. Events are not simply recorded in one's head and then replayed
as “a whole lot of capacities in the brain for generating conscious thoughts" (p. 63). on demand. Rather, we use whatever resources are available to construct plausible
Like Schwitzgebel, Searle proposes something like a dispositionalist view of standing reconstructions of what might have happened. These s include hints from
states, though the dispositions he identifies with standing states are dispositions to our current environment, such as the phrasing of certain questions, which is why we
have phenomenal intentional stares.“ are susceptible to the misinformation effect.
Schwitzgebel and Searle’s examples tell against the distinct structures view. The The reconstructive nature of memory exacerbates the problem for the distinct
problem is that having a distinct structure is roughly an all«or-nothing matter, but structures view concerning which standing states to attribute to people. Should we
having belief can be a matter of degree. Having a disposition or a cluster of
a attribute to a subject in I.oftus' original car crash study the belief that the car was
dispositions, on the other hand, is a matter of degree—you can be disposed to engage going at around 34 miles per hour or the belief that it was going at around 41 miles per
in certain belief—app1'opriate behaviors or have certain further belief-related mental hour? What should we say about whether, prior to questioning. the subject believed
states, but not others, in certain circumstances, but not in others, and with a certain there was broken glass? The dispositional view can say that the subject. prior to
likelihood. questioning. has. say. the disposition to judge that the car was traveling at around
The past few decades of psychological research on episodic memory, our memory 34 miles per hour in one set of circum es, the disposition to judge that the car
for events, also suggests against the distinct structures view. The best going View was traveling at around 41 miles per hour in another set of circumstances. and so on.
seems to be that recalled episodic memory episodes are largely reconstructed, partly There is no further question about what she really believed prior to questioning. The
based on cues from the immediate environment and background knowledge, rather same goes for die broken glass.
than read off a stored representa ' ."‘ In a pioneering study, Lofius and Palmer All this helps to further erode the picture of the mind as containing a giant
receptacle of explicitly encoded beliefs, desires. etc. and instead suggests one on
which the mind is a producer of thoughts and experiences. But one might object that
even if this shows that in many cases of episodic memory, and perhaps other kinds
" See also Audi (197:. 1994). who defends a very different kind ofdispositionalist view.
" .....s1ngu .1 Add , -. - - zM,d..,1,.,. of standing states, we do not have distinct corresponding to the relevant
aon and De Btigard m. for philosophical discussion. states, this does not mean that there are no distinct structures orresponding to any
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I74 1=.m1V- clniuaiging CJSIS Chapter): lVnr1um:timlJ Sr/ms I73
standing states. For example. perhaps there are distinct structures corresponding to and other alleged standing states are dispositions to generate occurrent states (or
my knowledge of my own name and other facts I know by rote. Call this the rate other responses). we should also say that this is not sufficient for continuously
knowledge objection. intentionally representing the contenu of those occurrent states. In other words.
The dispositiorialist might respond that, again. there is a continuum of such cases we accept an eliminative dispositionalism for the “standing states” of perceptual
and any way of drawing a line between cases that are supposed to involve a distinct systems consisting in the disposition to generate conscious occurrent perceptual
structure and those that are not would be arbitrary. even if the line is drawn close representations. so we should similarly accept an eliminative dispositionalism for
to one extreme. Further, given that many cases of personal standing states are to be standing states more generally.
treated as dispositions, it would be more parsimonious to treat them all that way. One might object that we are disposed to manifest the relevant dispositions in
even those that do not directly tell against the distinct structures view. There is more more circumstances in the case of personal standing states like beliefs and desires
to say about the rote knowledge objection. but I will
it aside for now and return
set than in the perceptual case. But we can imagine cases of perceptual systems being as
to it shortly. disposed to manifest the relevant dispo ‘ ‘ as the systems generating belief. etc.
So far. we have seen that various considerations militate in favor of disposi- Suppose that after some trauma involving a red square, I am disposed to hallucinate
tionalism and against the distinct structures view. While I am sympathetic to red squares all over the place. Still, when I am not hallucinating a red square, I do
dispositionalism, it is not quite the view I want to adopt. Dispositionalism accepts not count as intentionally representing a red square. Likewise. we can imagine cases
that there are intentional personal standing states but claims that they are nothing of the systems underlying belief. etc., being disposed to produce an occurrent state
but dispositions. In contrast, while I accept that some cases involve nothing but in very rare circumstances (indeed. perhaps most cases are like this). Ifwe do not
dispositions, I do not think we should grant them the status of in/mtiana/. We might count as having “standing states" intentionally representing perceptual contents that
i.i...
say that ' " ‘view, as I have, ‘ it.is a I - -
we are disposed to entertain in equally rare circumstances, we should not count 5
it reduces intentional personal standing states to dispositions. A view closer to having personal standing states ' " representing various contents in the
my preferred view. in contrast, is eliminative dispositionalism. which denies the non-perceptual case either. At best. the difference between perceptual systems’
of genuinely ‘ ' ‘ personal standing states and claims that what we dispositions to generate conscious occurrent intentional states and belief. etc.,
have instead are various dispositions (see, however. §8.;.z. where I suggest we can say systems’ dispositions to generate intentional states is a matter of degree.
a bit more about personal standing states). not kind. So. we should not grant one set of dispositions the status ofbeing genuinely
The picture of memory and standing states that emerges from the above discussion intentional but not the other. We should grant neither this status.“
is more congenial to eliminative dispositionalism than to reductive dispositionalism. Strawson (i994, 2.004) similarly argues that mere dispositions do not give rise to
The picture that emerges is similar in certain respects to a plausible picture of certain intentional states:
aspects of our perceptual systems, the systems generating occurrent perceptual states.
Perceptual systems have the capacity or disposition to generate various kinds of [I]t is no more true to say that there are states of the brain, or of [a subject.]
c ' occurrent intentional , r ' other responses) in
states (and various Louis. that have intrinsic mental content, when Louis is in a dreamless and
various circurristances. but we do not want to say that they ontinuously ‘ ' -
ally represen the contents they are disposed to generate or that they sort of or
“ Dcclan Smllhies has suggested that IlI0ll’I:l’ potential dlsatialogy ii that persnnal standing states like
in-between intentionally represent these contents. For example, my visual system
beliefs 4 ' supposed k ' ' ' ., _, in " iuok
is disposed to generate a conscious occurrent state representing a red square (and occurrent Slates. whereas ii is niii (lea! inav [lit dlspositional "standing siaic" Oflllt visual System iliai
various other responses) in various circumstances. but it would be incorrect to say i luv! in mind are dispositions [0 liaiiivioi. For this reason. ii might be lnolc explanatorily useful
In ascnllt illlellllollality to personal standing states iiian vii -nanaing visual states." which motivates
that I intentionally a red square when this disposition is not manifested
axctiblng Inlentionality (0 iii. roiiiia (ases and ll0K in [ht latter. However. the ssianaiiig uaiu" urine
In the case of perceptual systems, the disposition to generate conscious occurrent visual 4
' 4 disposed: ,, ' 0rexample.being
states (and perhaps other responses) is not sufl-icienr for representing the content disposed iii hallucinate red square: minis wiili a disposition ui engage in cmiiii ted-squateflelated
behaviors. Additionally. asvve will 10011 It! in §I.;.;, we (III perfectly well iiccuiniiioiiaia Kl’IE usefulness
of those occurrent states when the disposition is not being manifested. If all we ofpersanal uaniliiig mm like belief! and ileum in explaining behavior Without liking lhtm to be
have in the case of the non-perceptual systems underlying belief. desire. memory, genuinely intentional.
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experienceless sleep, than it is true to say that there are states of a CD that have c ' ‘intentionally , their contents while they are not being used.
intrinsic musical content as it sits in its box.... It is true of Louis that he believes Suppose that perceptual systems also have distinct structures corresponding to sortie
that water is wet and likes black olives. just as it is true of this CD that it is a CD
of the conscious occurrent representations that we are disposed to have. say. of
of Beethoven's fifteenth string quartet. But there are no mental phenomena in familiar scenes (e.g., your living room, a favorite view). It would still not be right
the dreamless [portion of reality that consists in Louis], just as there is no music representing these familiar scenes even when we
to say that we count as ’ "
in the room as the CD sits on the shelf. (Strawson 1994., p. r67)
are not ' representing them. The elitninarivist can allow for such distinct
structures in perceptual systems, so she can likewise allow for such distinct structures
Strawson concludes that “strictly speaking, [there ate] no dispositional nonexpc.-3.
in belief, etc., systems. In neither case are they intentional when they are not being
ential mental phenomena" (Strawson 1994, p. ré7)._]ust as a CD sitting on the shelf
used. This view is eliminativist, in that it denies that we have genuinely intentional
does not play music. and (we might add) the p I ' representa involved '
personal standing states, but it also accepts that we may have distinct structures.
in conscious perceptual experience that are not being used do not intentionally
which, the view maintains, do not count as intentional when they are not being used.
represent perceptual contents, so too do dispositional states that are not being
Since my interest is in denying that there are intentional personal standing states. it
manifested fail to intentionally represent their contents. "
does not matter to me whether it turns out that eliminative dispositionalism or this
While I have recommended eliminative " I " m over views that accept
of eliminativism is correct.
'
more general version
'
the ' of intentional personal standing states, I want to suggest that the I have argued that we should treat personal standing states generally in the
eliminativist need not deny the existence of distinct structures, so long as these
same way that we treat certain of the “standing states” of out perceptual systems.
structures do not continuously " represent. Let us return to the rote
might wonder, it so tempting to treat at least some of them
'
But why.
'
one is
knowledge L‘ , the objection to (reductive) dispositionalism that memory
differently. particularly those corresponding to beliefs and desires? Why do we think
'
research doesn't establish that we fail to have distinct structures corresponding to all
we continuously intentionally represent our belief and desire contents, even when
standing states. One might claim, for example, that memory research does not show
we do not entertain or otherwise occurrently represent them, whereas we have no
that we don't have distinct internal structure corresponding to our knowledge of
a
such temptation to think we continuously represent perceptual contents we are not
our own names, which, presumably, is not very susceptible to the misinformation
I representing? The reason is that, as we will see in the next subsection, we
eifect. Earlier. I suggested that the (reductive) dispositionalist has grounds to claim
m/er ourselves to have standing states like beliefs and desires, whereas we do not take
that such standing states should be given a (reductive) dispositionalist treatment.
ourselves to have perceptual “standing states."
This objection is also an objection to eliminative dispositionalism, since the
eliminative dispositionalist does not accept the existence of genuinely intentional
distinct structures corresponding to any personal standing states. The eliminativist 8.3.1 SELF-ASCRIPTIVISM ABOUT PERSONAL STANDING STATE CONTENTS
about personal intentional standing states can appeal to the same considerations
ln §7.g. I suggested a self-ascriptivist View of the alleged contents of thought, on
as the reductive dispositionalist to argue that all we really have in the relevant
which we derivatively represent these contents by taking our immediate contents to
cases are dispositions to have occurrent states (and perhaps other responses). But,
represent them. This section examines whether this kind of self—ascriptivism can be
interestingly. there is another. more conciliatory, response open to an eliminativist
extended to the case of at least some personal standing states.
about personal intentional standing states who is not particularly wedded to
The intuition behind self—ascriptivism is that the only way to target contents
eliminative dxspvritianalism: Even if \ve do have distinct structures corresponding
that are not phenomenally represented—that are not. it were, forced upon us by
as
to some of our personal standing states. it does not follow that these structures
experience—is to ascribe them to ourselves. There are many ways in which we might
ascribe contents to ourselves. In §7.;, I proposed a fairly undemanding way in which
we might do this in the case of thoughts and the concepts they involve:
"rm(Ms..) Ir " poinrw' ... »,,,,,,,p,_,,,_J
is stored on youtcompvttrefs hard drive are encodings or "recipes": . 5 enting photographs. given the
Immediate content C (and any representations or intentional mental states with
h -I toois ‘innnsheadmerely
L ' 1' "recipe" immediate content C) deriwzlively represent: C+ (for S) if S takes C to mean C4».
rot generating phenomenal intentional states or other responses.
5 ralter C to mean C+ if S has a set of dispositions to have cashing out thoughts that
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together specify that C cashes out into C+. Carlyingout thoughts are thoughts stating So far, this offers a theoretical home for the amterlts of beliefs, desires. and any
that one content is an elucidation, unpacking. precisification, or in some other way other personal standing states we are disposed to ascribe to ourselves. but it doesn’t
a “better” version of another. provide an account of their attitudes. It doesn’t. for instance, tell us what makes a
I want to suggest that we can expand our notion of derived mental representation standing belief a belitf rather than a hope. a desire, or an intention. But many of the
to capture at least some standing state contents. particularly those corresponding to same options that are available for accounting for the attitudes of occurrent thoughts
beliefs, desires. and other personal standing states that we accept largely on intuitive are open to us here. Appendix E of Chapter 7 argued that my picture of thought is
grounds. just might selfaascribe contents to our immediate contents. so too
as we compatible with views that take attitudes to be a matter of functional roles (attitude
can we self-ascribe contents to ourselves independently of any particular immediate ‘" If ‘ L (AttlKudc_L " l or , ’
contents. This simply involves taking aurielver to represent various contents. As contents (attitude representationalis ) but that it is particularly congenial to a
in the case of self-ascriptiinsm about the alleged contents of thoughts, this might version of attitude representationalism that takes the contents special to each
involve being disposed to accept that we represent various contents. For example, attitude to be derived contents. On this version of attitude representarionalism, a
suppose I am disposed to accept that I represent that the Acropolis is in Athens. thought is a desire, say. rather than a belief because it has a phenomenal content that
Simply in virtue of this, I count as derivatively representing that the Acropolis is in we take to mean a further content, like (good),
Athens. This is true even though I may have no distinct structure that derivatively Attitude representationalism also allows us to say that at least some personal stand-
represents this content. ing states in their entirety, and not just their contents. are derivatively represented.
This kind of self-asctiptivism involves ascribing contents to ourselves rather than On this combined view, we might count as having a standing desire that P simply
to our immediate contents. We might specify the resulting kind of derived mental because we take ourselves to represent, say. that P is good.
representa ' as follows: This depends, of course, on attitude representationalism being true. If attitude
representationalism is false, then the view that personal standing states derivatively
(Taking-standing) Subject S takes herself to have a state with content C+ if
(i) S is disposed to accept that she has a state with content C (upon sufl-icient represent their contents only offers a theoretical home for the alleged contents of
personal standing states and not the attitudes they allegedly involve. This is a fallback
reflection), and (2.) either C is identical to C-9» or 5 takes C to mean C+.
position for those who reject attitude representati "
(DMR-standing) Subject S derivatively represents C+ (for S) if 5 takes herself
.
to have a state with content C+.
Self-ascriptivism about personal standing states combines nicely with self-ascriptivism
about the alleged contents of thoughts. lfa subject is disposed to accept that she has diipoairions ro oeeui-renily represenr should quality as derivatively represenring without having ro be
ielhaierihed it seem the har is lower ror takings than for other kinds orsraies.
a state with a particular content. C, and C derivatively represents C+ for her, then
l wult ro suggesr rhar rairings have a special sraius in yiirue or their self-Iscliptlve contents. which
she counts as taking herself to represent C+ and. hence. as derivatively representing allows them ro do their work without our having ro take ourselves so have rheni. We can rhinlr or
C+ (for herself For example. suppose I am disposed to accept that I have a state takings as providing a kind ofendotsement. a seal or approval. on our dispositions. sorting the ones
riiar determine the eonrenrs we in some sense rargei or intend from the orherr. Requiring taking: to
, 0 the phenomenal content <the Acropolis is in Athens>, and I also take
themselves be relcasorihed would lead to a regress. where endorsements would have ro riieniselves be
'
the phenomenal content <the Acropolis is in Athens> to mean some more complex endorsed in order ro do any endorsing.
content <the Acropolis is in Athens+>. Then I count as derivatively representing The only other alternative is to rate our preienr phenomenal srares ro endorse our takings. While l
rhinir that somerhing like this rnighr he going on (see n. si or chaprer 7). requiring this for a content
<the Acropolis is in Athens+>.""' to he in some sense raigered by us would he quite demanding. In order for a content ro be in some
sense targeted or "ours," we would have ro eirher phenomenally represenr ii or point ro ii in some way
in our phenomenal consciousness as all times. But we ire iemporal heings, existing over time. We do
nor need ro oonsranrly be clinging onto all our contents in rhii way in order (or them to eounr as
"As in rht use of (Taking). defined in §7.i.i. the relevant dispositions doing the work in "ours." The lest demanding nirernirire, then, is to lei rnlrings do the endorsing and to allow them to
(-raking-sia 4' ,) musr he diaposirions ri. have phenomenal intentional states. See ma. do so wirhour themselves having ro he endorsed. Howrvet. a nearby alrernariie posirion require: our
" One niignr wonder whether we have in rnire ourselves to hive rairingi in order for these ralriiigs to do phenomenal irarea in in some sense defer in or rarger our eiishing our diiposirioni and dispositions
their work, i.e., wherher ralringi have to rheinseliei be self-ascribed. The answer xs“no” (see also ii. iaor to accept ourselves as having various srarer in order for riiore dirposiiionr io result in derived mental
chnprer 7). One miglir object that irrairings can do their work wiriiour being selfnasctlbed. then mere represenrarion.
180 pm 114- cmzzmgmg Cart: Clmpm J: Nnntarmlaus Sure: tin
As we've seen. there are derivativist and eliminativist versions of self-ascriptivism or indirectly derivatively represented. Phenomenal contents and derived contents are
(§7.4 and §8.z). However, the arguments in §7.4 and §8.r. suggest against deriva. the contents we in sortie sense target or accept as our own. so they serve as something
tivism, and the arguments in §8.;.r support eliminativism. This leaves us with my like attractors for our ration " guided behaviors. Even though we may not always be
preferred view. eliminativist seIf- riptivism, but a derivarivist self-ascriptivism is a occurrently thinking most of these targeted contents. we tend to home in on them as
fallback post on for those who endorse self-ascriptivism but are not convinced by we acquire relevant information and as they become relevant to our inferences and
my arguments against derivativism and for eliminativism. behaviors.
Recall that, roughly, we directly derivatively represent a content when we are
disposed to have cashing out thoughs that specify the content by literally containing
83.; FOLK PSYCHOLOGY
the content in their immediate contents. For example, BACHELOR might directly
In §r.;.r. I onsidered an H ' to fixing reference on intenrionality that takes derivatively represent <unmarried man> for a subject thanks to her disposition
intentionality to be a posit in our folk psychological theory of mind and behavior. to have a cashing our thought with the content <by <bachelor>. I mean <un-
On this approach, folk psychology is a theory that attributes beliefs, desires, and married man». Such a subject's concept BACHELOR in some sense targets the
other states to subjects. and intentionality is a feature such states are taken to have. content <unmarried man>. As a result. when it is relevant, and when she is being
The reason I rejected this approach is that it could end up picking out something sufliciently reflective, she is likely to infer that bachelors are unmarried and to
other than the core phenomenon we are interested in when we are interested in the use this information to guide her bachelorarelated inferences and behavior. For
“aboutness” or "directedness" of mental states. or nothing at all. example, she is likely not to apply her concept to john. who she believes to
I want to suggest that the folk psychological approach does not in fact end up be married. Irnportantly, we cannot predict such inferences and behaviors based
picking out intentionality. Exactly what notion of “intentionality" folk psychology solely on her ‘a, phenomenal contents. We also need to know
is committed to is an open empirical question, as far as what we've said so far is something about which further intentional states involving the concept BACHELOR
concerned. However, it is clear that the “intentional” states that folk psychology she is likely to endorse. Attributing to her bachelor-related standing and occur-
attributes to us are not limited to those that happen to be phenomenal ' ' ‘ rent states with rich direct derived contents is one way of keeping track of this
states. Rather. these states include personal standing and personal occurrent states information.
representing many of the non-phenomenal contents described in Chapter 7. such as Similarly, attributing to subjects various indirect derived contents can be predic-
rich descriptive contents and object-involving contents. many of which are broad tively useful. Indirect derived representation involves beingdisposed to have cashing
contents. Insofar as the contents assigned by folk psychology are supposed to be out droughts that specify an immediate contents derived content by referring to it,
in some sense targeted, endorsed. or accepted by the representing subject. or to in rather than by containing it. Although a subject may not know what she refers to,
some sense capture the representing subject’s point ofview, the only available options and hence which indirect derived contents she derivatively represents, she in some
are phenomenal contents and derived contents. So. in the best-case scenario, folk sense has a “path” to her content. She is in principle able to figure out what it is that
psychology attributes to subjects phenomenal and derived contents, and the notion she ' “‘ ‘ derivatively represents by finding out relevant facts about the world.
of "intentionality" implicit in folk psychology picks out the disjunctive kind of phe- For example, if a subject in" ' derivatively represents water by being disposed to
nomenal intentionality or derived mental representation. In the worst-case scenario. have cashing out thoughts that specify that <water> cashes out into the clear watery
the folk psyr‘ ' g‘notion of
' “’ " y” includes vatinns
‘
t
about '
stuff around here. then she in some sense knows how her indirect derived contents
r- .
that phenomenal ‘ ' y and derived mental representation do depend on facts about the world and which parts of the world she needs to investigate
not satisfy and. So. ends up picking out nothing at all. to find out what <water> means for her, namely. the parts containing the clear watery
Supposing that the best-case scenario obtains. we can see why folk psychology is stuff around here. might expect her to progressively home in on her targeted
\We
so predictively accurate, even though it does not limit itself to positing intentional indirect derived content as shefinds out more relevant facts about the world. As
states, and even though it may not even distinguish between intentional states and she does so, her <water>-related behaviors will also progressively come to converge
derivedmental 'rare Fo|kPsyrL - -c,,,,,..,, -L imp on her target. H,O. Knowing her indirect derived contents can help us predict her
together phenomenal contents with derived contents, which can be either directly inferences and behaviors in circumstances in which she learns relevant information
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about her environment that helps her home in on the self-ascribed targets of her most directly to the case of episodic memory and cases that might be thought to
water—related rhoughts.‘°'“ be relevantly similar. like those of belief and desire. In some cases of subpersonal
In short, it is not implausible that the folk psychological notion of “intentionality" standing states, such as the case ofedge-detecting neurons that are not in use, there
bundles together information about the phenomenal and derived contents of might be good reason to think that there are distinct structures underlying our
occurrent and standing states, yielding a picture of our mental life that includes dispositions (e.g., the neurons diemselves). In other cases it might be less plausible.
norjust out moment—by-moment intentional contents but also the phenomenal and such as in the case ufour standing knowledge ofour grammar. As far as what we’ve
derived contents that we in some sense target and that our inferences and behaviors said,it is an open empirical question which, if any, subpersonal standing states are or
tend to converge on. involve distinct structures.
However, the reasons for thinking that any distinct structures or dispositions
corresponding to personal standing states are not genuinely ' ‘ also apply to
8.3.4 SUBPERSONAL STANDING STATES
subpersonal states. The argument against reductive dispositionalism about personal
The discussion in this section has focused on personal standing states, such as the standing states was an argument by analogy. Perceptual systems have dispositions
beliefs and desires we take ourselves to have on intuitive grounds. Some. but not all, to generate conscious occurrent intentional states (and other responses), but these
of the points made above apply to subpersonal standing states like the "assumptions" dispositions are best thought of as mere dispositions to have intentional states, not
ofthe visual system. the states ofedge-detecting neurons that are not in use, and out genuinely ' ' states themselves. Similarly, any dispositions corresponding
standing knowledge of the grammar of our own language. to beliefs, desires. and other personal standing states are nothing more than mere
As in the case ofpersonal standing states, we can distinguish between two views dispositions. In the same way, even if subpersonal standing states are or involve
of intentional subpersonal standing states: they might be distinct internal structures, dispositions to have occurrent intentional states (or other responses), we should take
or they might be dispositions. which might include dispositions to have occurrent them to be mere disposition rather than genuinely ' ’ mental states.
states with the same or similar contents, to engage in various behaviors, or to have Similarly. the argument against taking any distinct structures corresponding to
various related internal states. Mixed views are also possible. personal standing states to be intention ' was an argument by analogy. If we have
The arguments for preferring dispositionalism over the distinct structures View distinct structures corresponding to the dispositions to have conscious perceptual
do not clearly extend to subpersonal standing states, since these arguments apply states, we should not say that they continuously intentionally represent the contents
that they are used to consciously represent. Likewise, we should not say that any
distinct structures corresponding to personal standing states like beliefs and desires
“ tiiiige's(i97s)wei1-known example oflhe eoneept m-iiiui-is nicely iiliismites their claims. Bert and continuously represent the contents of any related occurrent states. For the same
his innimic duplicate. who we can eall twin Bert, are members of iiiireieni iingiiisiic coininiiniiiei. reason, we should not take any distinct structures corresponding to subpersonal
In Bert's linguistic Community "aflhlilis" Kefers to an inflammation 0fKlI£jO|n[S,WI’1ll¢ in Twin Bert's
linguistic community, ‘-nitiiiiiis" iereis to In Inflammation or me jomls oi iiiigiis, I condition Illa!
standing states to be genuinely intentional either. Even if such structures play a role
we might Call ‘-tiiniiiiiiiis" in tngiiiii. Bert and Twin Bert's iiiiioiiei coincide up iiniii they VISII iiieii in intentionally representing various contents when they are in use, they do not
d0C(0IS complaining zboul meii Sluptcted "iiiiiiiiis" iii iiieii iiiigbi. Bert is eonioieo by his dacwli continuously represent them when they are not.
while Twin Ben is noi. aiia Khtll iiiimiies diverge, Wl(l'\ semi a|’!l1l’ilIS<r¢li(¢d blhaVml'5 beeoniing
directed loward Iflhlilis and Twin Bert‘; becoming aiieeiea toward thatthrius. impoimniiy. Bert and
Although, as I have suggested, we derivatively represent many of the contents of
Twin aims beiinyioii nie ieiiied toward llllll diireieni targets prezlslly tiecoiiie Bert and Twin Bert iii personal standing states, and perhaps even some personal standing states in their
some impoimni semi weie Kzlgeling aiireiene diseases with men respective Concepts all along. i sense entirety, the same does not apply to most subpersonal standing states. Since we do
mm is captured by the notion ofinditect derived mental Ieprtstnlanon. Knowing the lndlflct derived
contents ofthui’ concepts iieipi I15 pinoiei i in Cil’Curl\s[uI\C!S in which they learn relevant
not in most cases ascribe such states or their alleged contents to ourselves, we do
information nboiii What they weie targeting. not in most cases derivatively represent them or their contents. In the next section,
Am‘ i we" ' or L - t - ‘mordtl however, I argue that even though nonconscious occurrent states do not have inren»
roi 2 given content to ieni to SDlI'|((lIlng. We might rim S|lClI In understanding beeniiie we giiieiany
tional or derived contents, they might be said to represent in some other extended
nrni by dt!Ll’ipU0n and we know the relevant desttiptinns (lee ii. ii orciinoiei 7;, because we ion: by
having an Illlcrnal eritenon roi iereiniice (see Appendix H of Chapter 9), oi l)tCa|l5t we bniie ii ptioti oi sense that requires no more than tracking relations and functional roles. As we will
inniiiive insight on wiini deieiinines conditions oi iereience. see, subpersonal standing states (as well as personal standing states and practically
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tar, 11m1V.- Chrzfltngmg Cm C/Mpler K: Nontnnsciaus Sam; is;
any other kind of internal state) can also be said to represent in this extended sense, firing in Vr do not intentionally represent edges and the occurrent states involved in
and this might be all we need in order to satisfy our needs with respect to such states. n 'linguistic , 5 do not
' ’ " rules of grammar
or other contents.
I will argue for the eliminativist strategy by showing that it is very much in
8.4 Allegedly Nonconscious Occurrent States
line with what we might call the Standard View of ious occurrent stares.
Here are some claims that I take to be part of the Standard View and that the
There are many different kinds of allegedly nonconscious personal and subpersonal
advocate of PIT who is an eliminativist about nonconscious states can
occurrent states that we might want to treat as reprcsentati ‘ in some way, such as
accept:
states of individual neurons. synapses, or other neural states, computational states,
distributed states of a neural network, states involved in nonconscious priming and
implicit bias. and thoughts. Many have raised doubts as to whether (SVI) Allegedly nonconscious occurrent states track various items, eg., edges.
we should really think of such states as representational.“ If not. then there is no For example, they might be causally sensitive to the relevant items. or
objection to PIT from nonconscious occurrent states. I will sidestep this issue and they might correspond to them in particular way when functioning
a
grant, for the sake of argument, that there is at least a loose or extended sense in properly.
which all of the states mentioned above qualify as “representational,” whether or not (SVL) Allegedly nonconscious occurrent states play various functional roles.
it is explanatorily useful to think of them in this way. The worry, then, is that these Forexample. they might cause or be caused by other states, or they might
states are intentional but not phenomenal and, so, that it is not clear how PIT can be connected in various ways to behavior.
accommodate them. (SV;) Most, if not all, allegedly noneonscious occurrent states are not phenom-
This section argues that, in most cases, the correct view of allegedly nonconscio enally conscious.
occurrent states is eliminativist: most of these states are not intentional, even though
they might carry information or “represent" in some sense. However, I also want to This much we can all agree on. We can agree that allegedly nonconseious occurrent
suggest that in some cases inflationism might be correct: some of these states might states bear various tracking relations and play various functional roles and, further.
in fact be phenomenal intentional states. that most of them are not phenomenally ious. Now, if all we mean by
“representation” is something that is assumed to amount to some construction
our of tracking relations and functional roles. ' ‘ “ computational roles. then
8.4.1 ELIMINATIVISM ABOUT MOST NONCONSCIOUS OCCURRENT STATES
we can also agree that allegedly nonconscious states “represent” in this
The eliminativist strategy about a mental state says that either the state does not exist I 1 J enel.:[llSCall I ' in " T“ , '
or it is not intentional. I want with a few exceptions, eliminativism
to suggest that, (for "representation assumed to amount to no more than Tkaclring relations and
is the correct view about most of the above-mentioned (allegedly) onconscious functional roles"). So. we can also agree on this claim:
occurrent states. These states include the subpersonal occurrent states posited
by neuroscience and computational and connectionist models of the mind. For (SV4) Allegedly nonconscious occurrent states TR-represent various contents.
example, the eliminativism I want to accept maintains that edge- ’ ting neurons
Note that (SV4) leaves open the question of whether the notion of TR-representation
is explanatorily useful and, if so, for which purposes. It also leaves open the question
"rortrtarup1¢.r” - _ ~ tta...rr..ur' ‘
of whether there is a single privileged notion of this sort or whether there are
- ' '
features. Egan (zero) similarly algues that computation should rat understood nan-rcpresenlatiollllly
and that representational descriptions of comprutalronal systems only provide a pragrrratrt "gloss." multiple interesting notions of this sort that might be useful for diflerent purposes.
Ramsey (1.007) argues that Stilts ofneural networks art not representational. Chomsky (rm) Ind
The advocate of PIT who is an eliminativist about ious occurrent states
Orlandi (tor.) argue that subpersonal vis tram should not he understood as representational. Can
(rota) mggesls that individual neurons or even groups ofneurons are not Cltal’ tam ofrepusentltion: does not think TR—representarion is intentionali but she need not deny that it
,
see alsoSullivan (mo) rot discussion. exists or thatit is explanatorily useful.
Vwndows, Linux.
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htIps1Iwww.qoppa.oonlIpdlslu<flo
186 pm IV: Challenging Carer C}/Apln 11: Nlmmnrcmu: Siam r87
So far, we have seen that there is much agreement between the advocate of PIT T” representation. But there is another reading of (SV6) as committing
who takes an eliminativist approach to allegedly nonconscious occurrent states and the Standard View to a of TR-representation:
somewhat inflaliormry picture
the Standard View. Indeed, the advocate of PIT can also accept the further claim, TR-representation is the Real Deal when it
intentionality, the only comes to
which I assume is part of the Standard View, that, like allegedly nonconscious interesting notion in the area to be had. Such an inflationary picture is likely to lead us
states, A L " states T” , : to expect quite a lot from TR—representation. For instance, it might lead us to expect
that TR-represented contents are not massively disjunctive or indeterminate. or that
(SV5) Phenomenally states TR-represent. they correspond to the contents we intuitively ascribe. In contrast, the advocate of
the deflationary reading of the Standard View (and the advocate of PIT) is likely
The advocate of PIT who takes an eliminativist approach to allegedly nonconscious to relax the 1 ' on T” I ‘ allowing TR r ' contents
occurrent states can agree that phenomenally states, states that involve to be massively " ' ' , indeterminate. and quite foreign to intuitive content
phenomenal consciousness, bear various tracking relations to various items and play ascriptions.“
Various functional roles and, when they bear the right tracking relations and play the Regardless of which of the above two readings we give to (SV6), the disagree-
right functional roles, they TR-represent. Indeed, this is also a plausible thing to say ment over (SV6) is not over the core nature of allegedly nonconscious occurrent
about standing states, including subpersonal standing states. states—everyone agrees that all relevant aspects of their core nature are fully
Where, then, might wonder. is the disagreement between the Standard View
one characterized by (SV1) darough (SV4). Even an advocate of the inflationary reading
and the advocate of PIT who
is an eliminativist about allegedly nonconscious of(SV6) agrees here: even though she believes that TR-representation is the Real
occurrent states? The main disagreement, I want to suggest, lies over this final claim Deal when it comes to intentionality, she still believes that this Real Deal is nothing
that I will take, for the sake of argument," to be part of the Standard View: over and above tracking and Functional roles. So even she believes that (SVI)
through (SV4) provide a full specification of the relevant aspects of the nature of
(SV6) The intentionality of phenomenall conscious states is a kind of nonconscious states.
T“-representation. Where does this leave us? Recall that my aim is to defend PIT against the objection
that it cannot accommodate allegedly nonconscious occurrent states. We can now
see that it can say all the same things about the nature of such states as the Standard
According to (SV6), the intentional‘ y of our phenomenall ' states is noth-
ing over and above the TR-representation that we End in, say, nonconscious early
View: it can accept (SVI) through (SV4). So, it can accommodate them perfectly
well.
visual processing. Of course, TR—representatio may be more complex
Further. accommodating allegedly nonconscious occurrent states does not require
and sophisticated in various ways than none TR-representation, and its
PIT to adopt an inflationist or derivativist strategy, on which these states are
being conscious might involve some additional ingredients, such as that of playing
' Indeed. such 0' arguably r afurrher ' I from the
a special functional role. But. at bottom, according to (SV6), the intentionality
Standard View. since they would claim that, say, states in early visual processing
of phenomenally ious states is just more of the same of what gives us the
require a connection to consciousness in order to represent in the sense that the
TR—representational features of conscious occurrent states. This, of course, is
Standard View takes them to represent, a claim that not only fails to be part of the
precisely where the defender of PIT disagrees. since she takes intentionality to
Standard View but also is arguably at odds with it. So, not only is eliminativist an
require phenomenal ’ .
Now, (SV6) might suggest a somewhat deflationary view of the intentionality strategy defensible, but it is also arguably more c y to the Standard View
than the inilationist and derivativist alternatives.
of phenomenally ious states—their intentionality is nothing mare than
"arr ,‘ c .4 Avro riranh - - I “ Seeespecially Cummins (r994). who develops a notion ofrepresentarion . . computational theories of
View and the version om-r that is eliminativist about allegedly nonconscious standing status, and my cognition that does not yield determinate contents, (correctly) maintaining that this is not a problem
proposal is even more conciliatory than advertlsed. given on purposes.
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188 ram 11/: clnzzzmging Gm Cimprrr & Nnnmrtrriuus Slam :89
What should we say about the remaining point of disagreement, the disagreemen surroundings. Eliminativism about this kind of case would end it at that. But it
over (SV6)? This disagreement does not concern the core nature of allegedly might not be implausible to add to the story the inilationist claim that the driver
nonconscious states, so it does not aifect my claim here that PIT can satisfactorily has phenomenal states he is not aware of. which allows that he has phenomenal
ccommodatc allegedly nonconscious oecurrent states. It does. nevertheless. affect intentional states representing his surroundings that he is not aware of.
the truth of PIT, since if (SV6) is true, then PIT is presumably false. But I have That our brains house phenomenal states that we are not aware of may seem
already addressed (SV6): Chapters 3 through 5 argued that intentionality. the feature bizarre. but it should not trouble us. There are many phenomenal states that we
we '
I ely notice in I
' 1", cases, ' " 5 ,‘ " 'consciolu are not aware ofi most notably the phenomenal states of others. just as there
paradigm cases, is not ofttaclting relations and functional roles but rather
a matter are phenomenal states that 1 of in others, so too might
am not aware there be
a matter of phenomenal c . If those arguments are sound, then (SV6) is phenomenal states I am not of in my own brain.“
aware
false, and PIT's departure from the Standard View is well supported. Inflationism is attractive in die case of the absent-minded driver because the
states we want to ascribe to him are very much like the phenomenal intentional
states we would want to ascribe to an attentive driver in a similar situation, For
8.4.: INI-‘LATIONISM ABOUT SOME ALLEGEDLY NDNCONSCIOUS
example, suppose the absent-minded driver “sees” a red light. Recall that the case
OCCURRENT STATES
of conscious pe r
‘ color representations is a ‘ case for tracking and
I have argued for eliminativism about some allegedly nonconscious occurrent states. long-arm functional role theories (§;.4 and §4-3): perceptual color representations
Another option would be an inflationist strategy that takes these states to have represent one thing (something like <edenic red>) and track another (something
phenomenal ' 'ity. This kind of strategy accepts much of the Standard
‘ like a particular surface refl profile). An eliminativist strategy applied to the
View, but it rejects (SV3), the claim that allegedly nonconscious occurrent states absent-minded driver's state of “seeing” a red light would maintain that. at best,
are not phenomenally conscious. Bourget (zoroa, 1.015), Mendelovici (zero), and the driver has an internal state that T“—represents a particular surface reflectance
Pitt (MS-b, MS-a) suggest a strategy of this sort, arguing that many allegedly profile. But we might want to say that the absent-minded driver represents some
nonconscious occurrent states are in fact phenomenally ' . of the same contents that the attentive driver represents while driving on the
There are two reasons for not taking this strategy in the case of most allegedly same route, such as <edenic red>. If the arguments in Chapters 5 and 4 are
nonconscious occurrent states: First, it is far from clear that these states are sound, we cannot TR-represent <edenic ted>, since we do not track and are not
phenomenally ’ , and, second, even if they are phenomenally ‘ , it is functionally related to any matching item in the world. So, if we want to say
Far from clear that their phenomenal contents line up with their alleged contents. For that the absent-minded driver represents <edenic red>. we should say that he
r
example, is far from clear that edge ting neurons are phenomenally
’ ' . phenomenally represents it, which involves r ‘ 5 arr inliationist strategy about his
and even if they are, it is unlikely that their phenomenal contents are something like SIIIC.
<edge> (rather than. say. some phenomenal content that they share with all other This sort of inflationist strategy might also be attractive in other cases where we
neurons of the same type). want to ascribe to subjects contents that they are not aware ofl especially when such
However, there might be some cases in which these reasons do not apply. There contents cannot be TR-represented. For instance, this might be an attractive way to
might be cases in which the relevant states are plausibly phenomenally ’ deal with some cases of subliminal stimuli.
and, further, their phenomenal contents correspond to at least some of the contents
we have reason to ascribe to them. Consider the case of Armstrong's (r968)
absent-minded driver. who suddenly ‘comes to” and realizes that he has been driving
“ It does not matter, rnr our purposes, whether these phenomenal states count as mine. lfwe adopt a
on “autopilo for some time. One might suggest that, although he was not aware of
"
notion of subjects on which subjects are organisms. then these states are mine. in’. instead. we adopt a
it, he was representing the road, the signs. and the cars before him. What are we to norionur i ' ’ ‘llnlfi fl '
say about this kind ofcase? are nnr mine. sincethey are not unified with ..., other phenomenal mm. Instead, they belong to other
subjects. perhaps subjects comprised or single experiences. on either picture, though, the phenomenal
One thing we can say that should be fairly uncontroversial is that, while slarer exist. which is all we really need. For simplicity, 1 will say that the driver has phenomenal states
on autopilot, the driver has occurtent internal states that TR-represent his that he 15 not aware of, but nothing hangs on this ehoiee.
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19o Part I V: Clmlkrlging Cases Chapmx: Ntnttattsttttts Slam 19)
Many studies have shown that subliminal stimuli, stimuli that are presented in 8.5 Conclusion
such a way that subjects do not report conscious awareness ofthem, are in some sense
K ‘. affecting subsequent mental states and behaviors. For example, Krosnick PIT is arguably most plausible in the case of conscious perceptual states, which are
et al. (r992) presented subjects with nine slides of a target person engaging in normal rich in phenomenal characters matching much of the content we want to ascribe
daily activities, such as getting into a car. These slides were immediately preceded by to them. This and the previous chapter considered various states that are more
urns subliminal exposures of either positive-affect-arousing slides (e.g.. two kittens) challenging for PIT: thoughts, standing states, and nonconscious occuttent states.
or negative-affect-arousing slides (e.g.. a bucket of snakes). Subjects who had been The trouble with these states is that they do not appear to have phenomenal contents.
exposed to the positive-afl'ect-arousing slides tended to evaluate the target person so it is not clear how PIT can accommodate them.
more positively than those who had been exposed to the negative-affect-arousing I have suggested a largely eliminativist strategy for dealing with (hem, Thoughts
slides. don't ' ’ " represent their alleged contents. there are no genuinely inten-
An eliminativist view might maintain that Krosnick et al.’s subjects did not tional standing states. and nonconscious occuttent states either have phenomenal
intentionally represent the sublirninally presented images. though they may have cha or are not genuinely intentional. The resulting view is compatible with
TR-represented them or related contents. An inflationist view, however, can say that strong PIT. the view that all ‘ ‘ " y is phenomenal intentionality.
they had phenomenal ' ' states that they were simply unaware of. The overall view might seem quite extreme. rejecting many contents we might
Something similar might be said of the relevant blindsight states of blindsigh want to say we represent, but it is conciliatory to both our intuitive. empirical.
patients. These are patients with early visual cortical damage who claim not to see and theoretical reasons for positing many of the rejected contents. Although most
anything in a portion of their visual field but nonetheless can answer questions nonconscious occuttent states and subpersonal standing states do not exhibit
about what is presented in that area better than chance (Weiskrantz i986. i997). genuine intentionality. they can be said to TR-represent, where TR-representation
An eliminativist view would claim that, at best. blindsighr states represent various requires nothing more than tracking relations and functional roles. We can say
the sense ufttotkiatgut ,‘ D ‘ ' ‘ ‘roles. In contrast,
' ' '
something similar about thoughts and many personal standing states. but we can also
an inflationist view might take blindsight states to have phenomenal " '
say something more in these cases: Although we don't really ’ “ represent
that blindsight subjects are not aware of. This position is congenial to the view that the alleged contents of thoughts and personal standing states, in many cases we do
blindsight states are phenomenally states that we are not aware of (Gertler the next best thing: We derilmtiuzly represent them.
2.oola).“ One might wonder what justifies the dilferential treatment of nonconscious
It is not my aim to settle the case for or against inflationism about any particular occ states and subpersonal standing states, on the one hand. and thoughts and
type of nonconscious state. My aim, rather, is to show that PIT quite plausibly has many personal standing states, on the other. Why do the latter but not the former
the to adequately handle various types of nonconscious states, using either involve derived representation.
an eliminati ' or an inflationist strategy." The, admittedly fuzly, reason for seeking a derivativist-in-spirit treatment of the
alleged contentsof droughts and personal standing states is that they form an
of our conceptions of ourselves as thinking, perceiving. and generally
integral part
" see alto Phillips (3015). who atgues that allegedly noneonsettnas states. including hlindsight states.
representing subjects. Their alleged contents are amongthe contents that we in some
ntight be phenomenally conscious states that we ate unawate of, and Pitt (M5-la). who argues that
hlindsight states might be phenotnenallye us without hetng eonsetous tn anothet sense.
'
"lnilationistn might also help stsong PIT tespond to a challenge that eotnet rtotn the atgutnents
in Block sot; togethet with an additional assumption. Block atgues that nont.-onseious seeing and not show that seeing and consciousness can he dissociated heeause it is not clear that the allegedly
conscious seeing ate the same type orthing one teason he cites rot thtnlttttg this is that conscious and noncomcmus states ate not phenomenally eonseiaut. If they ate phenomenally conscious. as Phillips
nonconscious seeing can be integrated. For instance, we can experience conscious visual illusions that suggests, then we can agreewith Bloek that they ate ulesofseelng and that noneonsetous andeonsetnns
are partly ' ' Block's View that ’ ’ are a"
‘ ' seeing ate the satne type orthing. on this suggestion, at least sotne tnstaneesotnoneonseious seeing ate
same kind orthing. when combined with the assumption that ennseions seeing it essentially intentional ' 1' I L' L , ,, |IyUIyiIiIyIIl ‘ '
(tathet than being tnetely teptesentational in some othet sense), suggests that thete ate noneonseious orseetng. catetul eonsidetstion orthese issues and debates taltet us too rat afield. but, rot out putposes.
states or seeing that ate intentional. whieh eonttadiets sttong PIT (and my eltmmlnvisr/xnllllionlsl tt sutrteet to say that thete might be good teason to adopt an inliattonttt sttategy in a sutpnsingly wide
position on allegedly noneonseious states). Phillips (aott) argues that the entpitttal evidence does tange ofallegedly noneonseious SKIKCL
.9: 1am1V.- Chit/lmging Czuer
sense target, that we take ourselves and others to be committed to, and that we
hold each other accountable for. These are the contents that we have some kind
of ownership over. ln contrast, most of our nonconscious occurrcnt states do not
figure in our selflconception in this way." And, fortunately, the reason for Wanting
to accommodate the alleged contents we take ourselves to represent is precisely what
makes it the case that we derivatively represent them: We ta/ee ourselves to represent
them.
In conclusion, all intentionality is phenomenal ' ' " , and this is, perhaps
surprisingly, quite compatible with our scientific understanding of nonconscious
states and our everyday understanding of ourselves as representing subjects.
V The Aspect View
I HAVE ARGUED for strong identity PIT, which is. roughly. the view
that intentionality
is identical to phenomenal This view
’ .
leaves open animportant question about the nature of intentionality: Is
intentionality a relation to distinctly existing items that play the role of
contents, such as objects, properties, and propositions, or is it a matter of
having intentional states with certain integral aspects? This part further
fleshes out my picture ofintentionality by arguing against a relational view
of intentionality and for the alternative aspect view. We will see that the
relation view faces two important worries, and that the aspect view can do
everything the relation view can do but without a commitment to reificd
COIIICCHIS.
" This .5 related. but not equivalent, m mg rm Illa! most thoughts and standing mm are supposed m
be personal states (state: ma: can be ma m be had by entire persons. like behefs. desires, and oecurunt
thoughts). while most or the nonconscious oeeurrtnt states under consideration are supposed [0 be
subpetsonal States.
- Li For
9 Is Intentionality a Relation to a Content?
OUR AIM is to provide a theory ofintentionality. a theory that describes its nature.
I have argued for strong identity PIT. the view that every intentional property is
:4phenomenal property. every intentional state is a phenomenal state, and every
intentional state's content is its phenomenal Chnrac‘er4 This view tells us that all
intentionality is in some sense "felt," that what is represented is simply what is felt.
and, more generally. that the nature of intentionality is that of being identical to
phenomenal consciousness‘
All this, however, leaves open one important question about the nature ofinten-
tionality: Is intentionality a relation to distinctly existing contents, or is it a matter
of having intentional states with certain integral aspects? This is a question about
contents (Are contents distinctly existing entities or are they aspects of intentional
states?). as well as a question about how we represent them (Do we have contents by
being related to them or by having intentionalwith certain aspects?)
states
The relational view ofintentionality is arguably the common sense view. On the
Face ofit, intentionality appears to be a relation to items that exist in their own right
and that are represented. For example, the belief that grass is green might seem to
be a relation to the very fact that grass is green. a fact that obtains whether or not
we represent it, and a perceptual experience of Eleni might seem to be a relation to
I95
196 Rm 1/: Th:A:pm Vim C/mpler 9.’ I: Ifllfllflflfltlllfj ix Rzlimm ta 4 Carireru? :97
Eleni herself, who also exists whether or not we represent her. However, as we will speaking. An intentional state's deep nature can be contrasted with its superficial
soon see. there are reasons to reject the commonsense relation view and to accept character, the set of features that characterize it as the kind ofstatc that it is (§2..z.t).
the alternative aspect view. on which intentionality is an integral aspect ofsubjects Since the relation view and the aspect view are views about the deep nature of
and their mental states. intentional states, they might agree on the superficial character of some intentional
It might seem that the arguments I've presented so far have already settled the state, while disagreeing on its deep nature. For example, they might agree that the
issue in favor of the aspect view. Identity PIT, together with the prima facie plausible thought that grass is green represents the content <grass is green>, rather than
claim that phenomenal states are not relations to distinctly existing phenomenal <snow is \vhite>, while disagreeing on whether the state is a relation to a distinctly
characters, entails the claim that intentional states are not relations to distinctly existing entity playing the role of its content.
existing contents. This is tme, but one might worry that this does not provide
a compelling argument for the aspect view, since, consistent with most of my
9.1.: THE RELATION VIEW
arguments so far, we might reject identity PIT in favor ofa version of PIT that
takes original intentionality to arise from phenomenal without being The relation view states that to intentionally represent C is to bear a certain
identical to it. Such versions of PIT put some distance between phenomenal relation (other than instantiation) to C. where C is an item existing distinctly
consciousness and original intentionality. potentially allowing intentionaliry to be from the representing ofC in that it is not merely a part, component, or aspect of
relational in the relevant way while phenomenal is not. Indeed, §5.; the representingof C. On the relation view, contents are items that exist in their
considered the commonsense relation view as the basisof an objezriun to identity PIT, own right (or, at least, not simply because they are parts. components, or aspects
and deferred to this chapter for a response. So, while the arguments so far, combined of intentional states), and we represent them by getting appropriately related to
with the assumption that consciousness is non-relational, support the aspect view, them. For silnplicity of exposi on, unless otherwise specified, I will use the term
there are nearby views that avoid this commitment and that \vould be very well “relation’' for any relation other than instantiation, so we can simply say that the
motivated if the relation view was shown to be true.‘ relation view claims that intentionality is a relation to distinctly existing contents.
My aim in this chapter is to argue for the aspect view on grounds independent of For example, the relation view might claim that intentionally representing that
PIT and to show how it might be developed. This will help complete our picture of grass is green is a matter of bearing a relation to the fact or proposition that grass
thenature of intentionality, as well as our defense of identity PIT. I will proceed as is green, which exists distinctly from our ' " representing that grass is
follows: Section 9.1 describes the relation view and the aspect view; §9.z raises some green.“
doubts with the relation view; and §9.; considers some challenges for the aspect view The distinctly existing items that are to be identified with contents might be ordi»
and argues that it fares no worse than the relation view. I close with a briefdiscussion nary concrete items (like cats, mats, and states of affairs), properties, propositions,
of the overall theory ofintentionaliry that results from combining the aspect view sense data, combinations of these items, or something else. The relevant relation
with strong identity PIT (§9.4). might be a tracking relation, a similarity relation, or an irreducibly mental relation.
like an awareness, acquaintance, or grasping relation. Note that the relation view
9.1 The Relation View and the Aspect View not only claims that intentionality involves being appropriately related to distinctly
existing items but also further claims that these items are what we represenl. They
The relation view and the aspect vie\v are views about the deep nature of are quite literally what we think, judge, and perceptually represent. In the case of
intentionality, where an intentional state’: deep nature is what it it, metaphysically occurrent intentional states, they are what we entertain.
‘ l have also not atgued rot a null-rclatmnal view of phenomenal eonttioniiittt. Like many others. I
’ The ttiatinii vitw is nrttii assumed without atgnnitnt. lint Ste raiitz 1.007 and lsnntgtt foflhcomingeb
will assume this view without explicit atgnnient (but tee Gcrlltr zoola rot an explicit defense). For
rot tiplitit dtrtnm.
nnt purposes. it snnitas to note that most dtrtiitittt of relational Views ofconsciausness also defend
ttlational views oflntentlonality (set. e. .Boutgtt 1.oxo:.f01thcomingvb,|"aut1 zoloa. Lyeiin aoonand ’ As before, i will simply assume that the subject-Side beilers of inttiitional pmpcrlits att nitntal
Tye 1.015). which is intlitati the fact that thteoinliinatioii ofa non-relational VICW riiitentionality tepttttiitntions. on tht ttlatitin view, thtn, iiittiitinnality IS a ttlatinn littwttn i-nental iepttstiitatioiit
with i ttlitional vitw orcnntcinnsntss has little appeal. inddlstlnctly existing items that ait identified with contents.
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198 P47‘! V: The Atpetr View C/Mpltr gr I5 Inzmriozlaliry a Rtldfilln In 11 Cameru? :99
An example of a relation view is the tracking theory of intentionality, on which The aspect view provides us with a very different picture of content than the
contents might be taken to be abstract , or propositions, perhaps in addi- relation view: While the relation View takes contents to be things that exist distinctly
tion to concrete objects, and the relevant relation is a species of causal, co—variation_ of our representing them, the aspect view takes contents to be nothing more than
or other tracking relation. It is also possible to construe the naive realist theory of aspects of our intentional states. These aspects are what we " represent.
‘
perception as a relation view of r ‘ intenrionality on which contents are In the case of occutrent states. they are what we entertain. Note that this does not
ordinary, usually concrete, objects and their properties, with the relevant relation require that we represent contents as aspects of intentional states but only that the
being a potentially unanalyzable I I relation. We can also think ofdle sen
'
deep nature of contents is that of being aspects of intentional states (sec §1.J..i).
dataviewasatheoryofr I “ " v0nWlllCl'lr
' I " " y '
For ease of exposition, it is useful to have a naming scheme for the relevant aspects.
is an awareness relation to mind-dependent mental particulars. or sense data. Despite Let us call the aspect of an intentional state representing C that is identical to its
being mind-dependent, sense data exist distinctly (but perhaps not independently) content—i.e., to C—a C-aspect.’ For example, representing the content <blue> is
from which is why the sense data view, at least on the
us and our relations to them, a matter of being in an ‘ ‘ ' state with a "' p r. Note that an ‘ '
present construal, qualifies as a relation view. lt is also posible to have a ptimitivist state having a blue-aspect needn't itself be blue or involve blueness in any way, where
relation view, on which the relevant relation is a primitive representation relation and blueness is a property that blue objects do or can have. The “C” in “C-aspect" is a
contents are either concrete items, abstract properties. abstract property clusters, or placeholder for a specification of precisely which aspect of an intentional state plays
propositions. the role of content. Indeed, a central question for the aspect view is that of whether
C-aspects involve C-ness, the property that the content C (allegedly) picks out. As
we will see in §9.;.4, there are views on which C—aspects involve C-ness and views on
9.1.2. THE ASPECT VIEW
which they do not, and these views interact in important ways with theories of truth
The aspect view states that to intentionally represent the content C is to have a and reference.
state with a particular aspect, where this aspect is identical to C.‘ An aspect of an Some possible variants of the aspect view include versions of the mind-brain
intentional state is die intentional state itself. the intentional property the state is an identity theory, versions of the functional role theory, and versions of PIT. An aspect
instantiation of. a property of this property, or an instantiation of the latter kind of version of the mind-brain identity theory might take intentional states to be neural
property.‘ lntuitively, the idea is that aspects are integral features of intentional states. states and contents to be aspects of neural states; aspect versions of functional role
having no existence distinct from intentional states or properties. The aspect view theories might take intentional states to be functional states and contents to be
has rootsin adverbialism about perceptual experience (Chisholm 1957b, Ducasse functional properties; and aspect versions of PIT might take intentional states to
1942., Sellars 1975), though r differs From adverbialism in its target and central aims, be phenomenal states and contents to be phenomenal ‘ . lt is also possible
and well-known objections to advetbialism do not apply to it (see Appendix F of this to hold a primitivist aspect theory (this is. roughly, Crane’s (zon) view).
chapter).‘
9.1.; INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM
‘ Thank: to Adam l>autz for suggesting the name “aspect view“ for !l’\lS view. The debate between the relation view and the aspect view does not directly map
‘ SeeAppendix 0 ofthis chapter ror discussion ofthere options.
onto the debate between internalism and exrernalism. According to externalism.
‘ Versions ofthe aspect view, or something nearby, have recently been defended by Pitt (aoop). Kriegel
(10477. mi), Crane (aoos, aou), and Mendelovici (aoio) and were arguably the views or Brennno at least some of a subject's intentional states are at least partly determined by
(tin). Hi-mil (tgoo). and Anseombe (I965). environmental factors, while according to intern “ , a subject's intentional states
Pitt (way) claims that intentional contents are psychological types, Kriegel (xoo7, 1011) claims that
are fully detemiined by her intrinsic properties. It is possible to hold an internalist
intenuonllconlents are ways orropresenting. or second-order intentional properties. and Crane (inn)
claims Illll intentiarlaliry is a primitive ri-rtlational phenomenon. Tye (xylg) also provides a notable
defense oran aspect view, though he has come In reject the view in later work (mgr. Tye aooo). See also
Kriegel (forthcoming) tor rolevanr discitsxion ofBtentano's views. ' Thanks In Chins Liu tor suggesting this way or naming aspecta
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relation w'ew. on which intentionality is a relation to distinctly existing contents This problem arises in the case of intentional states about objects that do not
and the contents a subject is related to are fully determined by her intrinsic exist, like Santa Claus (see. e.g.. Thau 1007.. Kriegel i.oo7, and Crane 1.001). When
properties (see. e.g..]ackson t998a, Bourget totob. forthcoming-b, and Pautz xotoa), Evangclia thinks about Santa Claus, there is no Santa Claus to figure in the content
Although less Common. it is also possible to hold an externalist aspect view. Such of her thought. What the relation view must take to play the role of content in
aview might take the aspects of intentional states that are identical to contents
her Santa Claus state. then. is something other than a concrete flesh-and-blood
to be extrinsic properties of subjects. On the externalist aspect view, intentionali y Santa Claus, such as a merely possible object, an abstract object. or a cluster of
is a relation to items outside the head. but these items are not taken to be properties. The worry is that any entities that can plausibly be identified with the
contents.‘
content <Santa Claus> will be exotic or peculiar entities that we should not be
committed to.
9.2 Two Worries with the Relation View I don’t think it is clear that accommodating the case of <Santa Claus) commits
the relan'on view to problematic entities. One view of <Santa Claus) that arguably
This section raises two worries with the relation view that help motivate the doesn't appeal to problematic entities takes it to be a cluster or other combination of
alternative aspect view: The first worry is an extension of the mismatch problem properties, such as the properties that we think of Santa Claus as having. Properties
for tracking and functional role theories (§;.z): Many relation views cannot plausibly might be taken to be tropes. which are patticu' ways that individual objects
J allthediverse' ' ‘ fflr9([h3(wgc3n -r I ,njoy_Rc1m°n are: Aristotelian universals. which are abstract properties that can be instantiated
views that avoid this problem are driven to ontological extremes. which suggests that in multiple items and exist only in their instances; or Platonic universals. which
are abstract properties that can be instantiated in multiple items and that exist
the relation view is wrongheaded.
The second worry is a generalization of the Real Problem for tracking and independently of their ‘ While Platonic universals might be exotic or
tances.
functional role theories (§4..4): No relation we can bear to the items that are peculiar, tropes and Aristotelian universals presumably are not, and it is far from
supposed to be identified with contents can make those items entertained or obvious that the content <Santa Claus) cannot be constructed out of them. If soy
otherwise represented by us. then the case of the content <Santa Claus> does not commit the relation view to
problematic entities.”
The worry. however. arises in a more acute fon'n in certain mismatch cases
9.1.: THE INVENTORY PROBLEM
for the tracking theory. like diat of , ' color representations (§;.4). If
The relation view might seem innocent and intuitive enough in many everyday my claims in Chapter 3 are correct. I , ' color representations
cases. For example. it seems fine to say that Evangelia's thoughts about George primitive color contents. like <blue,,>. that do not match any instantiated prop-
involve a relation to George himself. who forms part of her thought content. erties. Since perceptual color contents do not match any instantiated proper-
However, once we consider the wide and diverse range of contents we can entertain, ties. we cannot identify them with tropes or Aiistotelian universals. Since they
it seems that the relation view must posit uninstantiated properties. existing sets are presumably internally unstructured, in that they do not include other con—
of abstract or concrete possible worlds, or other “exotic” (Sainsbury zero) or tents as constituent parts," we also cannot identify them with combinations of
“peculiar” (Schellenberg zou) entities. This. I will argue. is problematic for reasons instantiated properties. did <Santa Claus>. We are left to identify per-
as we
beyond the mere fact that we arguably have no think they
independent reasons to ccptual color contents with Platonic universals or other peculiar entities. Other
exist.’
'
adiiii Plflll his sllggtxlcd (0 iiie ihii iheie aie possible vmioiis of die [licking iheoiy ihii iaiie
iiiieiiiidiiiiiiy io eiiiiiiii iii Clllsal of diiiei {licking Nllllonx (0 pidpeiiy lnlliniilllans. which 5!: IIOK “’ rye (1000). isyiiie (moi). Plllll (aoo7). and adiiigei (riiiihcoiiiiiig-hp take ll least peieepiiial
ideiiiihed with COIIICIIKS. §Il(l\ : view IS an eiaiiipie oraii txlenlilisl iipeei view.
eipeiieiiees (0 be ftlillons I0 yropefly eiiiiieii, Ind the view is very much in iiiie WIIl’| descnpilvixt
’ See especially ciiiie mi. rhaii Z001. Kriegel aim. Sthtllcnbtrg Ken and Pipllltlu mi. roi views oriereieiiee Uackson 1993:, xioiiii im).
Obyecflflns K0 the ieiiiioii view oi related views On iiieii gioiiiidi.
" They mlglll. iioiieiiieiese be eiiieiiiiiily siiiiehiied. see §;.;.; and §7.;.4.
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101 Part V: Tb:.4.«peu Wew Chapter in Is Irztmlzarra/try A Rt/alitm [0 A Clmlml? 20;
mismatch cases in which we represent internally unstmctured contents pose similar properties. Consider the visually represented content <there is a red square in front
problems.'‘''‘ of me). Since there are no instantiated color r perties, this content cannot be
I have focused on objectual and proprietal" contents. like <Santa C1aus> and " '5 ‘witha “U ' "'1 '5 Jstructuted, e D
<blue,,>. but the same points apply in the case of propositional contents. so a only of tropes or Aristotelian universals. The only existentially quantified stmctured
ommitment to propos nalism. the view that all intentional states represent proposition that can plausibly be identified with it involves Platonic universals.
propositional contents, cannot help us avoid the problem.“ The relation theorist Similarly. any matching set of abstract or concrete possible worlds or structured
presumably wants to identify propositional contents. like <grass is green>. with r r consisting in objects and properties will arguably have to involve Pla-
matching proposition-like entities, like facts, sets of concrete or abstract possible tonic elements matching the “red” bit of the content: ince diere are no instantiated
worlds. structured propositions consisting in objects and properties, or strucmred color properties, no such matching candidate contents can be plausibly constmcted
existentially quantified , r ‘ ‘ s. In the case of false propositional contents, out ofexisting ingredients found in the concrete world.
like <Santa Claus gave Eleni a trampoline). the view that this content is a fact ln summary, the problem is that it is not clear that the items that the relation view
is immediately of? the table, since there exists no fact that matches it. and hence takes us to be related to in fact exist. We can call this the inventory problem for
no fact that can plausibly be identified with it. One might worry, as in the ease the relation view, since the inventory of the mind threatens to outrun any inventory
of <Santa Claus>, that the remaining options commit us to exotic or peculiar of items we have independent reason to accept. The relation view must posit items
entities. specially tailored to play the roles of contents, While
such as Platonic universals.
Now, as in the case of the objectual content <Santa Claus>, it is not clear these items might be recruited to play other roles as well, it is far from clear that they
that accommodating <Santa Claus gave Eleni a trampoline> commits the relation are needed elsewhere.
view to problematic entities. The relation view might identify this content with There are a few points to make from all this. First, a commitment to items of
an existentially quantified structured proposition, which is constructed out of questionable existence such as Platonic abstracta takes the intuitive wind out of
unptoblema ' tropes or Aristotelian universals. the relation view’s sails. While the relation view can offer an intuitive treatment of
However. such a strategy does not work in cases of propositional contents Evangelia’s thoughts , uueorge, this intuitive treatment does not extend to
'
involving ' “ unstructured proprieral elements that don’t match instantiated her perceptual color states and many other intentional states she can enjoy. Above. 1
suggested that the relation view might be taken to be supported by commonsense
intuition. Whether or not commonsense intuition can support claims about the
" Schellenberg (lull) similarly argues that Views or perception taking us to be related to abstract deep nature of intentionality. any such support is arguably undercut by the relation
property clusters require peculiar entities to accommodate certain kinds ofcolor hallucinationx. tueh
at hallucinations or Hume's missing shade ofblue.
view’s unintuitive treatment of mismatch cases. (I will say more about whether
" The view till! contents are ioterrrlour, which are functions rrorrr postilrle worlds (and perhaps common sense supports the relation view in §9.;.r.)
contextual (actors) to exlenxi , also has trouble accommodating the content thlue,. >—or any other
Second, the relation view's _ ' ' ontological commiunents are themselves
» i etuuruiuherrt (0 questionable entities. If functions are sets orordered pails orirrputs
and outputs, their rrrrerrtroue are sets orordered pairs ofpossible worlds and extensions. [fan ordered
reasons to doubt the vie\v. lfindependent considerations suggest against accepting
p ‘is uiyi ’ '~ L ' ' ' ' L un rete such commitments, they are a cost to the theory (see especially Kriegel 2.011 for an
possible and ' ' Rur ' it’ ' irem ertreeir argument from ' ' parsimony against relation views committed to Platonic
is unclear that alternative conceptions ofintensioris, hrrretiohs. or ordered pain can avoid eoruuiiruieur
K0 problematic entities. For example. a view allowing functions to etitt independently orthe existence
universals). Of course, if there are strong reasons to believe the relation view. then
or the relevant ordered pairs orirrpurs urrd outputs would be committed to something hlte ‘Platonic’ this might be reason to accept the view together with its ontological commitments.
functions. which would themselves be ertotre or peculiar. Perhaps, rutterd. the intensions view can But if the aspect view can do everything the relation view can do, as I argue in
analyze away talk ofintensioris or functions. perhaps in terms of subjects‘ dispositions or something
else. Such a view may well errd up being . relation view of: dilrererrt Sort. or even an aspect view. rhd
§9.;. then we can make an argument in favor of the aspect view from ontological
would have to be considered in itt own right. (None oithls. oreourse, suggests that there Is anything parsimony. (Notice that the aspect view does not similarly take on questionable
problematic with using intensions to model contents.) ontological commitments. Even if it takes contents to be properties (such as
" I borrow the term “proprieul contents" from Kriegel (MS). who uses the term to deterihe my view or
the contents ofmoods (in Mendelovici zotga and 1014).
intentional properties or properties ofintentional , r ' ~see Appendix G of
" see Gnankuwski 2.01;, Montague 1.007, and Mendeltwici eors. The ltirrd ofpmpositiorlallsrn at issue this chapter). it need not accept that unrepresented contents really exist, so it can
here is whatl eall “shallow prupotrrroruiurrr in Mendelovicx rot», take contents to be tropes or Aristotelian universals.)
ma Part V: Tllz.-txpm View Clmpmp: Is Inzmtwnaliry .2 Rtla/inn ta 4 Cartlent.’ to;
Third. and I think most importantly, the extremes" to which the relation view We can put the point in terms of psychological involvement. Recall that psycho—
is pushed in order to accommodate the vast inventory of representable contents logical involvement is a matter of playing a role in mental life. such as that of being
suggests that the whole approach is wrongheaded. On the relation view. what we introspectively accessible, affecting further cognition or behavior, or merely partly
can represent is limited by a pre—set inventory of distinctly existing items, and co ' ’ g our representational r , ’ e on the world; in short. psychological
representing is a matter of getting appropriately related to these items. However, the involvement is a matter of contents behaving as if they're there (see §z..z.;). The
inventory of the mind shows no sign ofbeinglimited in this way. This is why the only problem is that, except in cases where we think about parts ofoutselves, concretely
relation views that can accommodate all the intentional states we can enjoy are those existing objects. properties. and states of affairs exist distinctly and usually indepen-
that push us to otherwise unwarranted ontological extremes. The world of concrete dently of us. our cognitive systems, and our intentional states. So. it‘s hard to see
objects, instantiated properties, and obtaining states ofaffairs is simply not enough how any relation we can bear to these distinctly and independently existing items can
to capture the vast inventory of the mind. But if the relation view is right, then it is make them psychologically involved. 50, contents can't be such items. Tables. chairs,
surprising that the only version of the view that can accommodate the inventory of and obtaining states of affairs are not thinkables, experienceables. entertainables, or,
the mind is one that posits a virtually unlimited inventory ofontologi “ dubious more generally, (intentionally) representables. They are not the kinds of things that
items. The picture this situation suggests is not that there exists a vast inventory of can play the role ofintentional contents.”
items that can form the contents ofour intentional states but rather that our minds The same worry afflicts other versions of the relation view that take contents to
have the ability to create their own contents. The represented world is composed not exist independently of us. Even if there existed the required items (eg.. Platonic
ofpre-existing things that our minds somehow manage to grab hold of but rather of universals. sets of possible worlds), it’s not clearhow we could come to entertain them
aspects ofour own internal states. or make them a '“ to our cognitive systems. The problem with the relation view
in general. then. is that being related to a “‘ ‘ and independently existing thing
doesn't make it available to you or in anyway psychologically involved.
9.2.7. THE REAL PROBLEM In §4-4. I argued that the Real Problem with any view that gets its contents from
The Real Problem with the relation view is that it’s hard to see how any relation tracking relations is that tracking relations cannot grab hold of externally existing
items, bringing them into our minds to make them available to us, or allow us to
to distinctly existing items can make them entertained or otherwise intentionally
reach out into the world to somehow cognitively touch them. Tracking relationsjut!
represented.
Let us First consider a relation view that takes contents to be concretely existing track. In order for tracking relations to give rise to intentionality, they would have
objects, their properties, and obtaining states of affairs. On this view. we literally to not only relate us to items in the world but also make these items available to out
i ' " represent—and, in the case of occurrent states. erl!ertal'rl—tables. cognitive systems. They would have to make these items psychologically involved.
chairs, and states of afl'airs, e.g.. consisting of tables being next to chairs. The Real making them available for use in thought. reasoning, ' ’ , and introspection.
Problem with this relation view is that no ordinary relation can behave like this. No
The Real Problem with the relation View is a generalization of this problem. lts
ordinary relation can allowus to literally entertain tables and chairs, to take hold of
objects existing in the concrete world and bring them into our minds to make them
available to out cognitive systems. it does not help to tiy that tht ttltyaiit aiitinttly existing ittint rot-in tonttltiitiyt pans orinttntiontl
ttatti and thus gain tntiy into tht cognilwe ttonoiny. ln tlrttt. this oiggtttion draws a line atoiina
intntal Vehicles and L and calls thott items togttlitt with toint oatticitlat way in which
they tit ttlatta -inttiitional statta" not this tlott not nialtt it any tltaitt how tht ittitts coiiit to play a
“ ont inigiit siiggtst that tht ttlation yiti-rs commitments att not all that eittttitit: it need only accept tolt inoiit ' 4 ' ' ‘ ' _ ’
omit Platonic Imiversals oi otlitt qllesllonilllll tiitititt, (horse ntttita to attoininoaatt tam in which l!a!¢S.Comp:le:“ U . .. I . ‘ ' 'tottrttto.i. hi‘ I
'
wt itpttstnt internally iinsoiittiitta Cnlllcnls tot which thttt an no tnatthing initaotiattd pioptttiea Qiitlitt city. and soint ttlation obtaining ottwttn tnt tntiital ttptttttitationt and Qiitott city. This
rsiit Such a View. orttiiiiat. would be oiiitt ad l\o(. ltsoint intttnally iiottnitnitta ploprienl tonttiitt would not mlk: Qiitott City psychologically ln\'ol\':d. ln ottltt tot the itlation ottwttn iotttoal itatti
ate l>latonit |ll'||VCYSalS. thto ottsiitnalily they all att. In any case. tytn itwt only had to atttot Jam: and the dlsnnclly tititting items to be identified with Collttnls to titaltt tht disllnclly tititting ltemi
qiitttionalilt entititt. this would still toininit US to an inappropriately inllatta ontology and cast aoiiot psyehologicallyi . IISK be soititthiiig tittia special alioiit it, lnit ll‘: iiiitltat htiwany ttlation
on the ttlation Vltw. can have siich a spttial rtatint.
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hard to see how any relation can do what tracking relations cannot. how any relation
because it It is supported by
has many virtues that the aspect view lacks: common
can grab hold of items that exist distincdy and sometimes independendy of us and sense, allows for public and unrepresented contents, makes sense of structured
make them available to us, or allow us to reach out and make solne kind of epistemic intentional states, has an easy time ommodati g various theories of truth and
contact with them refe , and is congenial to "
This section argues that die aspect view and the relation view—or at least the
9.3 The Alleged Virtues of the Relation View only viable versions of the relation view. the ones with excessive ontologies L all
the ‘same truth-indicating virtues. This provides a defense of the aspect view against
The previous section provided two arguments against the relation view. It might be objections to the effect that it lacks some of the relation view’s virtues. It also allows
claimed, though, that the relation view should still be preferred to the aspect view us to ‘ the argument from ontological , for the aspect View over
the relation view that we began in §9.z..i: The aspect View can do everything the
relation view can do but without _ ‘ nable ontological commitmcntsv 50 it Should
“ There is one relasion view that seeins so eseape this kind orwosry, she is n... sane e relevsns relis.
be preferred.
so be nund-dependens sense data. unlike other relrsion virws, she sense dasa view sakes oonsenrs so
be insesnal so us. kieking around in our heads. direosiy available so play various roles in she oognisive
seononiy. so. she sense dasa view's eonsenss osvi be psyoiiologieally involved. But she sense dasa view
is she ereepsion shas proves she nile, since she reanise or she sense data View in vlrsue or whieh is 9.1.! ACCORDING WITH COMMON SENSE
allow eonsenss so be psychologically involved is preeisely she resnire slius is his in eoninion with (isioss
verriom or) she upect view: is rakes (at leass peseepniai) intentionallty so only eonstitutively involve lt might be argued that the relation view is more commonsensical than the aspect
one’: insesniil ssrrer. allowing eonsenss so be psychologically involved by raising rhein so iiserally be view and that this is a reason to prefer it. For example, when Lina thinks about
in our heads, with she raes that we are relased so them in ii speeisl way doing noshing so eonsrilsiise
Whiskcrs, it might intuitively seem correct to describe her as hearing a relation to
so rheis psychological lnvoivsinenr. If we had sense dasa bus were not relased so sheni by she reievins
relation, they would ssill be able so be psyohologiosily involved. so, shs ssnse darn view sslli raees sbe the real live cat, Whiskers. Likewise, when Marius , , " represents Whiskers
Real Problem: The alleged iiisensionalisy relation, even on shis view. eannos makrcontents entertained on the mar, it might intuitively seem correct to describe him as hearing a relation to
or inerwise sepresensed in a psyebologioally involved way.
the state of affairs of Whiskers being on the mat.
" Bonjour (I998) raises ii siinilasworry with what he eaiis she "symbolizconception ofthought."on Wlllcll
insenrioniillry involves having sokens or inensal symbols whose “content is nos hired by sheis iiisrinsie One reason to think that the common sense view is the relation view is that
shssioses. bus is insread iniposed upon shein rsoiri outside by relasions orsoine sors in whieh they are the language we use to describe intentional states is relational. For example, a
involved‘ (p 165). The psobiens is that the syniboiie eoneepsion cannot snake sense orous awareness or
she sonrenrs orour intentional states:
sentence like “Marius perceptually experiences VVhiskers on the mat‘ has a relational
grammatical form. which suggests that it expresses a relation.” However. that
is‘ solsens orrhe iriensalese word eorresponding so 'sriangiiias' have she sepresensasive eonreiis
shis shey do enrirely by virtue orsranding in sueb an external relasion so srisngislar shlngs (or sentences describing intentional states have a relational fon-n does not automatically
even so she absrraes universal sriiingiiisrisy). shen she person having she sliougns, srapped as it mean that the relation view is the common sense view. Perhaps the language we
were on one end orshis relarion and having direct aeeess only so she solsens sheniselves. would
use to describe ‘ ‘ states is relational, but it is noncommittal on whether
lisve no wiry orbeing avvare olwliat she symbol thus sepresenrs. no way or having any inkling iis
aiiiiswiiaii " ‘ ' ‘ ‘ intentionality itself is relational,“ or perhaps our language is committed to the
sesuls sbss is. l subinis. plainly absurd. (pp. I57-168: footnote suppressed) relation view but we don't fully accept these commiunen . Or perhaps we do
Although laoniour rraines his worry as one abouthowwe can be aware ufour contents is is cleasshas -i r I
accept these and state have a
-
' our ‘ ’ ‘
she worry amiess all aspeess orpsyeboiogieai involveisiens. The probieni is that soniesiiing esnnos play
relational form, but they have non—relational trut.‘~ makers.“ Perhaps there isn't even
a role in she eognisive eeonoiny simply by being on she riir end ora eaussl or osbes kind orreiiision. see
also Paut1.(1oo7,2oiob),vIho considers a siinilas obieesion so his relasioiiai represenrasionsiiss view or
plieiioniensi eonseiousness.
soirsevrhas reiasedly. Kriegel (aorr) argues sbasselasion views shas raise insensionali is. be a relasion
‘° Bourget(xoiob.1.oi7a. lorthtonung-b) makes a snore sophisticated arguinens along sueii lines.
so absssiesa go sgainss she psineiple shas eonesese phenomena can only be explained in seriris oforher
" see crane sori,eii. sand Sainrbury aoio.
eonerese phenomena. sinee insenrionaiisy is a concrete pbenornenon. is cannos be espiained in resins
“ see Matthews‘ (iooo, aoo7) ineasiiseiriens-sheorerie approaeh so psoposisionai attitudes. Matthews
or s relasion so absssaosa. l>apinesu (sore) raises sirnilar worries wish reissionai views orpheiiosnensi
likens arsnbiisions orpsoposisional assinides so subjects so asrsibusions or weigbrs to objects. which
sssres:' , ' ',sse * ‘ ’ A 5 How
have a selasronai rosin, relaring an object so a number. bus whose rnish.niakers arguably do nos involve
can their isiesaphysiosi nasure entities shas lie ousside spree and sum"
esiesiriaiiy involve relasions so
ielssions so nurnbers. vapinerii (sore) rrialses a similar suggession abous phenonienal ssaises.
(F- 7)-
- Li For Evaluation. hflpszllwwmqoppa b
zos Ptm V: The /lspm View Chapter 1;: Is Imertltundlily .1 Relatitm to a Czmlml.’ 1.09
a clear common sense view at all. For instance, perhaps our common sense beliefs In any case, even if we grant that according with common sense is a
about’ ' " y are confused,’ ' or ' [Al truth-indicating virtue. this would not support any empirically adequate version
Even ifthere is a common sense view and it is a relation view, it is not clear that this of the relation view. Insofar as any view of intentionaliry seems to be suggested
supports the relation view over the aspect view because it is not clear that language by common sense intuitions. it seems to be a naive referential view, a view on
and common sense are reliable indicators of truth in this domain. This is arguably \vhich intentionaliry directly acquaints us with the referents and truth-makers of
supported by the fact that there are plausible explanations of why our language our intentional states. This is clearest in perception, where it might seem to us that
and common sense views might be relational that do not require the truth ofthe we are in direct contact with the world before us. But even in thought we seem to
relation view. One such explanation is that we think of intentional states as ' l '
be in direct contact with facts and everyday objects. For example. when you think
because it is more economical than thinking of them as having specific aspects. If about a loved one. it seems you are directly thinking about that flesh-and—blood
we thought of them as having specific aspects. we would need to use a special set person.
of representations ing these special aspects. Thinking of intentional states Something like these intuitions is expressed by Harman (t99o) when he argues
as relations to distinctly existing items. on the other hand. allows us to represent that the view that seeing red involves a relation to sense data is analogous to the view
them by reusing our pre-existing representatio of these distinctly existing items. that Ponce de Leon was searching for the idea ofthe Fountain ofYouth: [Ponce de “
For example. we can use the same representations that we use to think <The cat is Leon] was not looking for an idea of the Fountain of Youth. He already had the idea.
on the mat> to think <Marius believes that the cat is on the mat> (just as we reuse What he wanted was a real Fountain of Youth, not just the idea of such a thing’
some of the same words to form the two sentences. instead ofinvoking an entirely (p. 36). Similarly, one reason Kriegel (7.007) gives for rejecting relation views on
ne\v vocabulary specifically for intentional states and their contents). This might be which contents, such as <Bigfoot>, are or involve Platonic universals or sense data
more economical than using a new set of representations to represent intentional is that “intuitively, Bigfoot seems to be a non-mental concretum. though one that
states and their contents. does not exist. rather than an existing abstractum or mental concretum" (p. 3:0).
Ifsomething along the lines ofthis (admittedly speculative) story is true, then our Harman and Kriegel take the views theytarget to go against common sense intuition.
best explanation of why our language and common sense view are relational does not Intuitively. Ponce cle Leon was searching for a real. concrete Fountain ofYouth and
require the truth of the relation view. This would debunk any evidence we might the Bigfoot we think about is a non—mental concremm.
have from common sense and everyday language for the relation view. The common While Harman and Kriegel take common sense intuitions to tell against certain
sense view would be the relation view whether or not it is true. which means that its views. it is noteworthy that the alternative views they suggest also go against common
being the common sense view is not evidence of its truth. In other words, according sense intuitions. Harman's alternative View is that we represent intentional objects.
with common sense truth-indicating virtue (p. 118) of the relation
would not be a which are analyzed away somehow. perhaps in terms ofabsuact or nonexistent items.
view. Kriegel’s alternative view is a version of the aspect view on which contents are ways
Even if we cannot offer a specific story debunking the evidence for the relation ofrepresenting, or properties ofintentional properties. The problem is that it is no
view purportedly offered by common sense. we might still be skeptical of common more intuitive to say that Ponce de Leon was searc' DIUI an abrmzrr or rwriexirtem
'
sense'sability to track truth in this domain. In order for common sense to reliably Fountain of Youth than it is to say that he was searching for a mental Fountain of
track truth in a domain, it should have some kind of special access to that domain. Youth." Likewise, it is no more intuitive to say that when we think ofBigfoot we are
One might suggest that in the case of intentionaliry. this special access comes from thinking of properties of intentional states than it is to say that we are thinking of
introspection. abstracta.
The problem is that. at best. introspection can only tell us about the superficial The bottom line is that non: of the relation views currently on the table make
characters of intentional states; it does not simply reveal to us their deep natures it the case that intentionaliry is a relation to real. concrete Fountains of Youth
(§1.1..z). But the disagreement between the relation view and the aspect view is not
over the superficial characters of intentional states but over their deep namres. In
order for introspection to reveal the truth of the relation view, it would have to have
“ 5:: also Than 2001 rat tht very Slmllal point that Ponce dt Leon was not searching rat a nonexistent
a special kind of access to intentional states’ deep natures, which it does not. Fountain ttrvouth.
https:I/www.qoppa.oomIpdfsl1ldio
no pm V: The/fspecl View (flzaprer y: I: Illlfllilllrki/ll] A Relatilm to n Cimlml? Lu
or B gfoots, since there is no real. concrete Fountain of Youth or Bigfoot to be unrepresented contents and in allowing us to model contents in usefulways.“ Insofar
related to. If common sense tells us that we represent the Fountain of Youth and as we think that there are shared and unrepresented contents and that contents
Bigfoot by being related to them, then we must reject common sense and accept should be able to be modeled in the relevant ways. allowing for such contents is
that intentionality is not quite what we believe it to be. ifthe common sense view a truth-indicating virtue ofthe view. I will argue that the aspect view also has this
is the naive referential view, then any empirically adequate relation view will have virtue.
to be a little bit revisionary. So. even tf according with common sense were a
truth—indicating virtue, it would not be one that any viable version of the relation
view has, so it gives us no reason to prefer the relation view to the aspect view.“ Shared Comcm:
This is all as it should be if we agree that introspection does not reveal to us the Relation views that take contents to exist independently of intentional states can
deep nature of intentional states and their contents. if introspection does not reveal offer a neat account of how multiple subjects can represent the same contents: Since
the deep nature of contents. then it is hard to see how we could come to have veridical contents are items that exist independently of representing subjects, multiple subjects
common sense intuitions about the deep nature of contents. Where Harman and can become appropriately related to the very same content. For example, Lina and
Kriegel go wrong in their arguments is in taking intuition and introspection to Marius have ii belief with the same content that grass is green because they are both
shed light on not just the superficial characters of intentional states—-i.e.. on which related in the appropriate way to the very same thing. the content <grass is grcen>.
contents we represent—but also on their deep natures. For all introspection and In the same way. the relation view can account for how distinct intentional states in
intuition can reliably tell us, the content of Ponce de Leons searching might turn the same subject—for example. a belief and a desire—can have the same contents:
out to be an idea and what we are aware of when we think about dragons might be They are appropriately related to the same items.
something abstract or mental. indeed, all this provides an argument for the claim that On the aspect view, contents aren't distinctly existing items. and so it is difficult
introspection does not reveal the deep natures of contents: Insofar as introspection to see how multiple subjects can share them. However, the aspect view has an
suggests a view of the deep nature of intentionality. it is a view that we know with alternative way of understanding shared contents: Since contents are aspects of
near certainty to be false.“ intentional states. subjects represent alike when their intentional states are alike
In summary. it is not clear that the relation view better accords with common with respect to these aspects. How to flesh out this proposal depends on what
sense than the aspect view. But even if it did. it is not clear that this would be a exactly we take aspects to be. Recall that an aspect of an intentional state is
truth-indicating virtue. And even if it were. it would not be a truth-indicating virtue the intentional state itself, the intentional property the state is an instantiation
than any viable relation view has. So, common sense does not give us reason to favor of, a property of this property, or an instantiation of the latter kind of prop-
the relation view over the aspect view. erty. For our present purposes, we can isolate two broad option The relevant
aspects are either properties (intentional properties or properties of intentional
9.3.; ALLOWING FOR INDEPI-;N1)ENTLl' EXISTING CONTENTS properties) or states (instantiations of intentional properties or instantiation; of
properties of intentional properties). (See Appendix G for discussion of these
On most versions of the relation view, contents exist independently of intentional
options.)
states. This might be thought to confer various benefits in allowing for shared and
If aspects arc taken to be properties. then two subjects have the same contents
when they instantiate the same aspects. ln the above example, Lina and Marius
“ This poior. in eireer. is another way or making the poim m go.“ that the inventory problem imdereurr represent the same content because they have intentional states with the same
any support the relation view might he thought ro receive from common sense.
” This argument also blocks other nearby arguments for the relation view that appeal ro transparency
observations (Harman I9 go. Tye xooo) or other introspective observations. Such observations can only
reliably tell us about rhe superficial character ofmtentional states. not about their deep natures. since “ Versions orrhe sense data view rhrr take sense data ro be mind-dependent are an ereeprlorr. These
insofar as they can be taken ro tell us about their deep rrarurer. what they tell ur is most certainly r.lae. view; may not seem to have the purported virtues orrhe relation View described m this section. though
But in order (or introspective observations ro support rhe relation view. rhey would have ro rell us about modified verriohr orrhe argument: supporting the claim that the aspect VKW shares in these virtues
deep natures. might apply ro them.
Li - Forr Evaluation. https://www.qoppa.com/pdfstudio
httpszl/www.qoppa.comIpdfstudio
in Part I/: The Aspen l/inn
Clmprer 9.’ Ir Irrzmrmralizy 4 Rzlamm la a Cmlzznr.’ zl;
aspects, Since Lina and Marius instantiate the very same property, they quite literally
There is a potential problem for both versions of the aspect view: If we reject
share a content.”
a Platonic view of properties, we may be compelled to deny that the aspects of
One might worry that if we instead take contents to he states, they are irre-
uninstantiated ' ' states, and hence unrepresented contents (or content
deelnably private: Although you and I can have the same properties, we cannot
properties), exist." The worries facing non-Platonic views ofproperties in the case
have the same property imtzmlia/iwrs. But, while it is true that, on this picture, We
of unrepresented contents with uninstantiated properties more generally.
also arise
cannot entertain numerically identical contents, we can still entertain qualitatively
For example, we might want to speak of uninstantiated mass properties, masses
identical contents, and this is enough to say that we can share contents." In other
that no objects happen to have, or to make generalizations holding over all mass
words, on this picture, sharing contents amounts to having aspects that are the
properties, whether they are instantiated or not. There are various options for the
instantiation: of the same properties, Indeed, on this view, it might make sensg to
non»Platonisr here: She might say that uninstantiatcd properties merely possibly
introduce for the properties that contents are instantiations of—
a new term wc .,
exist, that they exist as objects of thought but have no “real” existence, that our
might call them content properties. We can then say that while Lina and Marius
claims about them should be understood as counterfactual claims that tell us what
strictly speaking. have numerically different contents, they have the same content
would happen were they to be instantiated, or that they simply do not exist in any
properties. Indeed, on the view that contents are states, much of what we want
sense. It is not my aim to settle the question of what the non—Platonist should say
;::3:’x:‘b:F‘:I: C;I;:::i::ig::,S siijctly speaking, only be true of content properties. about uninstantiated properties. My claim, instead, is that whatever she says about
5 er contents, e.g,, generalizations concerning the
.
uninstantiated properties in general should apply equally well to unrepresented
entailment relations ofcontents. might be best thought ofas generalizations over
contents.“
content properties."
Note that if accommodating truths about uninstantiated properties requires us
to accept Platonic universals, then the relation view and the aspect View are on par
Urirepresmttd Content:
with respect to their ontological The difference is that the aspect
that take contents to exist independently of intentional states can
.
Relation views
' ‘ ' . .
View takes us to instantiate the Platonic entities, while the relation view takes us to
offer a near account of unrepresented contents: Contents exist independently of us
be related to them in some other way. This would undercut any arguments from
and so they can exist without anyone representing them This allows us to make
parsimony for the aspect view, but it would not undercut the argument from the
sense oftru th s concerning particular contents that no one has ever represented. as
s ‘ '
Real Problem (§9.2.,2.), so if, as I am in the process of arguing, the aspect view has
well as to make generalizations that hold over all possible contents whether they at
) c all the same truth—indicating virtues as the relation view, the aspect view would still
represented or not.
come out ahead.
The asfdiecl: view takes contents to be aspects of intentional states, which, as
' - - .
mention e a ove, are either properties or states. Ari aspect view that takes contents
' - -
to be properties takes unrepresented contents to be uninstantiatecl properties.” Madeling Cimterits
An as p ect
b v‘new‘th at takes contents to be states instead rejects uninstantlatcd - . . .
It can be useful to model contents as sets of possible worlds. structured propoe
content s ut rep aces talk of such contents viltli
,- talk of unlnstantiated content
~ . ,
sitions, possible states of affairs, or other such items. Such models are useful for
properties.
" An Aristotelian vitw ofproperties has room to accept the Bxlsltnfit ofuninstanlizred properties rhar
"lnirtzooo. P .iu J orrmas inii are in some sense oninpoirdnriniianiiarea pmpctncsi So. a version ofrhe aspect VIEW combined wlili
‘ _
1-
ar response ro a iimildi’
-. oliieciioii to his type psycliologisrri. which takes
- .
1 intentional oonraiiii ro be psychological types. rhii VIKW orproparrias is only CDmmlll¢d io denying the uniristantiated properties rhar are
Cfcoilfit. we can also ha Vc Slml‘I ar. but not qualimllvtly !d¢n[iCTll, contents. This might be (trough to
v » . .
not composed oriiisianilaml properties.

iiialia sense ofsorne cases 0 -slinieii" contents. “ One might worry that one Option is closed ro the aspecrtlleorlst. rliai Dlunttpttserlted contents existing
" indeed, as rhis version or the aspect view. iniich or wlini 1 have said in pmloiis chapters might only in the mind as objects or ihoiiglir. How [his option plays oiir depends on wlini ir IS io think aooiir
e true w en Cons! HI: d as a Cllim anoiii corileritpropenlcs. ziiii Writing wirli rliii
- .
in mind Would have
contents.lfrliinking aopiir a onnrrnr Itquiles entertaining the content irselr. then any content rnai is
rhoiigm i; is also ihoiigm. and so the relevant aspects will exist. niir irwe are able to think ofcontents
‘ V
i-iiada ma CXPOSIUOI1 unnecessarily complicated wirh little payoff
iii
l=iii (ioog) make! such a Suggestion.
. -
wirhoiii Entertaining them (perhaps by denvatively representing them). then they can exist oiml, as
oblecrs orilioiiglii, Neither oprion raim special worries tor the aspect View.
- Ll For
2.l4 P1171 V: 'l'b:/{rpm View Chapter 9: II lnzmzturmliiy 4 Relarilm m a Cnrtlml.’ 11$
understanding the truth conditions of contents and the relations between various internally structured because they do not have proper parts that are also contents.
contents. Since the relation view maintains that contents are distinct from the having Roughly. internal structure is a matter of having parts. while external structure is a
ofcontents, it allows us to focus in on contents and to model them in such ways. matterof having properties.
However, it should by now be clear that even though, on the aspect view, contents four kinds of intentional structure \ve might want to accommodate:
So, there are
do not exist independently of intentional states, contents can still be considered the internal and external structure of vehicles, and the internal and external structure
separately from any particular intentional states. There is no reason why these ofintentional contents. Let us now consider in turn how the relation view and the
contents (or content properties) can’t be modeled using sets of possible worlds (eg., aspect view can accommodate these kinds ofstructure.
the sets of possible worlds in which intentional states with those contents are true),
Structured Vehicles
structured propositions, and the like. Compare: We can model the phenomenal
character of color experiences with a three-dimensional color space even if the Let us begin by examining the prospects of accommodating internally structured
phenomenal characters ofcolor experiences have no existence distinct from that of vehicles. Perhaps the most notable view on which vehicles of intention-ality are
color experiences, and we can model the length of physical objects on a line even
internally structured is the language of thought hypothesis (Fodot l9-/5), which
posits a set of internally unstructured representations that have syntactic features
if lengths have no independent existence from the physical objects having those
lengths. Having a "dependent" existence is no bar to being considered in isolation
determining how they can combine with one another to form internally structured
and modeled in various ways.“ representations that contain them as parts. For example, representing a red square
might involve the internally unstructured representations RED and SQUARE being
combined in a particular way to form the internally structured representation RED
9.3.; INTENTIONAL STRUCTURI: SQUARE. Fodor combines the language of thought hypothesis with a tracking theory
ofintentionality, which is a kind ofrelation view (Fodot r987, I990), but this is not
As mentioned earlier, the aspect view bears some resemblance to adverbialism, which
obligatory. The story so far makes no specific mention of whether contents are items
faces notorious difl-iculties in making sense of structured perceptual states (see also
that representations are related to or aspects of intentional states, so it can equally
Appendix F). One m'ght worry that the aspect view faces similar challenges in
well be combined with the aspect view. Similar points arguably apply to other views
accommodating intentional structure.
on which vehicles are structured. lfso, the aspect View can accommodate internally
There are two kinds of items we might want to say are structured: vehicles of
structured vehicles just as well as the relation view.
intentionality and contents. For example, we might want to say that the vehicle
Let us now turn to the prospects ofaccommodating externally structured vehicles
GRASS ts GREEN is structured, and we might want to say that its content. <grass
of intentionality. We might want to say that clifierent vehicles are similar to and
is gl-een>, is structured.
diflerent from one another without literally containing the same vehicles as parts.
There is a further orthogonal distinction we can make between two kinds of
Such a view might be attractive if we take vehicles to be neural activation patterns.
structure that either contents or vehicles might have: Contents or vehicles of
On a view taking vehicles to be externally but not internally structured, representing
intentionality are internally structured when they have proper parts that are also
a red square might involve having a vehicle that is similar in some respects to other
contents or representations. respectively. Contents or vehicles of intentionality
vehicles (eg. one representing a blue square) but diflerent in other respects. Again,
are externally structured when they have properties of having values on certain
this view on which vehicles are externally but not internally structured is equally
dimensions.“ For example, color contents are externally structured in that they
compatible with the relation view and die aspect view, since it makes no mention of
have values on the dimensions of hue, saturation, and brightness, but they are not
how the externally structured vehicles get to have their contents.
ln sum. both the relation view and the aspect view can plausibly accommodate
structured vehicles.
" See also M-ohms‘ (I994) account of how 2 system of ptoposltlonzl (anrenu can be used to model our
non-Rlatlonzl propositional tttttutlt tuttt.
“ All vtlntlts Ind contents wtll ht externally Structured In lots of ways, but not all or Kllcll txtttml
Sirurmred Camerm
tttttcttttt will be stttetzstlttg. Presumably, the kind ortttttnal tttttttott that IS interesting u the kind Both the aspect View and the relation view face challenges in accommodating struc—
that pertains to tltt feature: that ate rcltvznl to lndlvlduatlllg tottttott and Vehicles. tured (arzmlts. Now. some views might deny the existence of structured contents. For
- Ll For
2.i6 Part I/: 7'h:.4:pm View Chapter 9: Ir lnrmri/malizy a R:/.m‘mi In (I Cunmn? 217
example. on one version ofthe language of thought story. all there is to intentional It might seem that the relation view has an easier time accounting for internal
structure is the representation ofunstructured contents by structured vehicles. But structure, since it can say that the distinctly existing entities to be identified with
it really does seem that contents are structured, both internally and externally. It contents are internally structured in the ways required. For example. it might say
seems there’s internal structure because what we entertain or otherwise represent has that the content <grass is green) is the fact that grass is green. which itself has a
distinguishable parts or features that arguably qualify as contents. When we think predicative structure. This won’t do. though. since not all propositional contents are
that the cat is on the mat, there is a mi bit and a mat bit, which can reoccur in other true. so not all propositional contents can plausibly b entified with facts. In order
thoughts. such as the thought that the mat is on the cat. and both seem to consist to account for internally structured contents. then. it looks like the relation view will
in “saying” something. It also seems that contents can be externally structured. since need to invoke a new kind of structure. one distinct from the structure of facts.
they can be similar to one another without sharing parts. For example. the content The problem is that it is not clear how the relation view can make sense of such
<ted,> can be similar to <red5> in hue and saturation. though not in brightness. structure. Suppose some internally structured contents are composed of Platonic
These examples of internal and external structure cannot be explained solely in terms universals. The problem is that of explaining how exactly two Platonic universals
of the of vehicles, since the relevant structure seems present in what is
structure come together to form a unity that is more than the sum of its parts. For example.
represented. i.e.. in a mental states content. how do <brown> and <dog> come together to form (brown dog) rather than
Let us first consider the prospects of accommodating externally structured con» just the set consisting of the contents <brown> and <dog>? Or suppose some
tents on the relation view and the aspect view. If the relation view takes externally internally structured contents are composed of Platonic universals and existing
structured contents to be items like Platonic universals or abstract sets of possible concrete objects. The same problem arises in explaining how Platonic universals
worlds, then it can say that contents are externally structured when they are similar and existing concrete objects come together to form a unity (recall that the objects
to or dilferent from other contents in particular respects. For example, the perceptual needn't instantiate the relevant Platonic universals in order for us to represent
state representing <square> might involve a relation to the Platonic universal square. the relevant internally structured content). For example. how do <Bumper> and
which is similar to and different from the Platonic universal triangle in certain <gold(-ish> come together to form <Bumper is a goldfish> rather than just the set
respects. consisting of <Bumper> and < goldfish > .7“
ii
Like the relation view. the aspect View has little trouble accommodating There are many sophisticated accounts formally specifying the rules governing
structured contents. There is no reason why aspects cannot vary from one another the truth conditions of structured contents (see. e.g.. Frege i956, Russell ig;7.
along various dimensions. yielding a rich network of externally structured contents. Soames zoro. King 2.oo7. and Bealer r98z.). and one might suggest that a relation
It could very well turn out that many apparent cases of internal structure are in fact theoretic account of how contents come to be internally structured is to be found
cases of external structure. For example, it could be that the content <big dog> does there. However. insofar as these proposals include accounts of internally structured
not contain <big> and <dog> as constituent parts but is instead best thought of as an contents, internal structure is largely posited. not completely explained. For example,
internally unstructured content that is similar to and different from other contents and very roughly. Frege (i948) takes it to be part of the nature of contents that sortie
(e.g.. <small dog>, <big cat>) in certain ways. lfso. then being able to accommodate are “saturated” and others are “unsaturated.” allowing the saturated ones to fill in
external structure goes a long way for both the relation view and the aspect view. the unsaturated ones; Bealer (I981) appeals to “thought-building“ operations that
Things are more complicated when it comes to internal structure. The kinds mirror. but are not identical to. the relations holding facts together; King (1.007)
of internal structure we might want to account for include predicative structure takes complex linguistic facts and mental “ascriptions” to unify contents; and Soai-nes
(eg.. as in <grass is green>). truth—functional logical structure (e.g., as in <grass (zoio) appeals to a mental act of “predication.' Such views may point to the locus of
is green and snow is white>), and other kinds of logical structure (e.g.. as in internal structure, whether it be in the mind, in language, or in an abstract Platonic
<there is something green>. <gray eat>, <large goldfish>). The central challenge for
any view accepting internally structured contents is that of specifying how exactly
an internally structured content's constituent contents come together to form a
” rim last example is an Instinct ofrhe wellvknown problem ofthe unity or L proposition. the problem
structured whole. eg., how <red> and <square> combine to form <red squai-e>, olexplainuighow L ' m n A . ,, ...rmma----5 «i
and how (grass) and <green> combine to form <grass is green>, nitherthan a mere list or serofelements(see Russell I937. Gasltin zoom and King um).
- Lin For
2.i8 Part V: T/7:.4:pm View (.‘lmpm~ - Ii Imznziuniiluy iz Relatilm M 4 Canmit,’ 7.19
realm, but they ultimately appeal to unexplained structure or structure-building square—aspect way. In effect, we are accounting for internally structured second-order
ingredients that are specifically posited to give rise to internal structure. This is not states and properties in ofexternally structured first—order intentional states
terms
to say that such views are false but only that they cannot provide the relation view and properties, which, as we saw above, are much easier to accommodate.“
with a complete and intelligible explanation ofinternal structure. As it stands, the above account can explain only one kind of internal structure.
just as the relation View must account for how distinctly existing entities come that of conjunctively composed proprietal contents. Indeed, this is the kind of
together to form structured wholes. the aspect view must account for how aspects structure that we might be able to account for in terms of external structure anyways
of intentional states come together to form structured wholes. In the worst case the (see above), so we have not made much progress. We still do not have an account
aspect View might simply have to say that there are special “predicative” or other ways of predicative or other ltinds of structure. Perhaps there is room to account for
of combining aspects into structured wholes or appeal to other structure—building predieative or other structure in terms of the /rind: of aspects that are unified. In
elements. If so. the aspect View is arguably no worse off than the relation view. Let us line with what we’ve seen above, however, it seems likely that even such an account
briefly explore, though, the question of whether the aspect view can say a bit more will have to take some kinds of internal structure or struct L "'4' 5 ingredients
about internal structure, I want to suggest that at least some aspect views can provide to be primitive or at least unexplained.
an intelligible K‘ of at least some kinds of internal structure. The above discussion is far from providing a satisfactory account of how contents
Since aspects are states or properties. internally structured contents would have can be structured on either the relation View or the aspect view. However, it is
to be internally structured states or properties. What this looks like depends on worth pointing out that identity PIT, which identifies intentional contents with
whether aspects are intentional states or properties (i.e., “first-order" states or phenomenal characters (and which is compatible with both the relation view and
properties—see Appendix G), or if they are properties of such states or properties the aspect view), can rmummudiztc structured contents, even if it cannot fully explain
(i.e., “second-order" states or properties). Ifaspects are first-order states or properties. them. This is because the phenomenal characters of phenomenal states arguably
then internal structure involves two or more such items coming together to form an themselves have both internal and external structure. For example, an experience ofa
experienced unity that is more than the sum ofits parts, Note that it would not be blue and round ball involves both predicative structure and conjunctivcly composed
enough to simply say that internal structure involves aspects being co-instantiated by proprietal structure. The constituent phenomenal characters do not simply co-occur
the same vehicle, since it is not clear that mere co-instantiation by a vehicle unifies but, instead, modify each other in a certain way, forming an internally structured
the aspects to iorm a complex whole, For example, suppose a single vehicle has both a whole that is more than the sum of its parts." The constituent phenomenal
red—aspect and a square—-aspect. It is not clear whv primitive or unexplained
‘* characters, and perhaps also the internally structured whole, are also interestingly
structural relations, ofcourse—this should result in a ted-square—aspect rather than externally structured in that they have various properties that make them similar
just a red-aspect Cotinstantlated with a square-aspect. In other words, it’s not clear to and different from the phenomenal characters of other experiences. It may be
why it should result in the vehicle having the content <red squarc> rather than its mysterious or even incomprehensible to us just how phenomenal characters come
having two distinct contents, <rcd> and <square>. to have this structure. but since we arguably know that they dn have it. identity PIT
If, instead, aspects are second—order states or properties, then we have a natural can acwmmodare similarly structured contents, whether or not it can fully explain
way of accommodating at least some kinds of internal structure: Two aspects are them. This may be a consideration in favor ofidentity PIT, since it correctly predicts
unified into a single structured aspect when they are had by the same intentional that there are structured contents. ( But this is not, of course, a consideration in favor
state or property For example. representing <red square> might involve having a
single intentional state that has two aspects, a red—aspect and a squareaspect. Since
the combined aspects are had by the same intentional state, it is more plausible that
“ this is the basic idea riirir lies behind Kriegt.-1'5 (zoo7) Ckflnse ofzdvetbialism rrpiri the many property
they form an experienced unity that is more than just the sum ofits parts. Whereas
problem. Allowing for Internal structure ir in important advantage ormsiaiir oftlie aspect View that
in the case of the first-order view, the plausible outcome ofthe co-instantiation of a take contents to be properties oftnteritiorial states or lnstantiatmns Ofsuch properties (Such as itriegeri
redvaspect and a square«aspect is two distinct intentional states (or properties) being msipri) over other versions rim take Contents [Cl be intentional properties or states. See Appendix o pr
this chapter.
had by the same vehicle, in the case of the second-order view, the outcome is a single
“ Some Vetsiofli nfthe binding problem (see Revonsuo iy99 and Smythies 1994) can be understood as
intentional state (or property) that is two diFl'erent ways, 2 red-aspect way and a special Clsesofiht plnllltm Ofexplzlning the apparent lllltfnil structure Dfphenomrnnl consciousness.
- Li For
2.2.0 Part V: The/lspm Vim Clmpzrr y: 1: Inltrilloriillily a Rfltlflfifl m iz Cummr? u.r
ofthe aspect view over the relation View. since identity PIT can be combined with consider three types of theories of truth and reference—correspondence theories,
either view.)" identity theories, and mixed theories—and suggest that relation View and aspect
view versions of them are equally problemati I then propose a version of die
.
In summary, accounting for intentional structure, particularly the internal strucr
correspondence theory that might seem promising, which is compatible with both
ture of contents, is challenging, but the aspect view fares no worse than the relation
the relation and the aspect view.
view when it comes to accommodating internally and externally structured vehicles
and contents."
Correspondence T/Marie:
According to correspondence theories of truth (or reference), a content is true (or
9.3.4 TRUTH AND REFERENCE
refers) ifit appropriately corresponds to, but is not identical to, a state ofalfairs (or
it is quite plausible that intentional states have conditions oftrndl and reference, an item ofanothcr kind, such as an object or property). which is its truth—maker (or
that is. that there are conditions in which intentional states are true or refer to referent).
particular items. For example, an intentional state representing <grass is green> is The burden ofa correspondence theory is to explain the nature ofthe relevant cor-
true justin case grass is in fact green. I will take a theory of truth (or reference) to respondence relation. When do two items. which in many cases belong to different
be a theory that provides criteria that determine the conditions in which a mental ontological categories, “belong” together? For example, why is it that the content
state is true (or what it refers to). <grass is green> is supposed to go with the concrete fact that grass is green and the
One might think that it is easier to account for truth and reference on the relation content <George> is supposed to go with the flesh-and—blood individual George?
View than on the aspect view. Before evaluating this claim, I want to suggest that It might seem that the relation view is in a better position to ofler 2 correspondence
it is not entirely nonnegotiable that intentional states are true or refer in certain theory of truth and reference because distinctly existing contents often come with
conditions. While \ve cannot help but be confronted with intentionality through a built—in connection to the world, For instance, Platonic univcrsals are the sorts
introspection, we are not clearly similarly confronted with truth, reference. and of things that can be instantiated by ordinary objects. and propositions arc the
conditions of truth and reference. It is not (lazily incompatible with our experience sorts ofthings that can obtain. On a relation view involving Platonic universals, for
that there is no fact of the matter as to what is the “correct” relation between example, truth and reference are at least partly a matter of the Platonic universals we
intentional states and other items in the world (however. see below, where I will represent being instantiated in the appropriate ways. Similarly, ifwe take contents to
suggest that conditions of truth and reference lnight turn out to be introspectively be propositions, which might be structures consisting of Platonic univcrsals. sets of
accessible after all). Unless there are other strong reasons to think that there must be possible worlds. scenarios, or some such. then truth is a matter ofthese propositions
such things as truth and reference, facilitatinga theory of truth and reference may not obtaining. On a possible worlds view, this might. for instance. be a matter ofthe
be a truth»indicating virtue rather than lnerely a desire—satisfying virtue, a virtue that actual world being in a represented set of possible worlds.
makes it more desirable that a theory or claim be true. Ifit is merely a desire-satisfying Where the relation view invokes relations of instantiation and obtaining, the
virtue. then even ifthe relation view has it but the aspect view does not, it does not aspect view invokes its own primitive correspondence relation. One might worry
provide a reason to prefer the relation view, that such a primitive correspondence relation is mysterious and brute. However,
Even if facilitating an account of truth and reference is a truth~indicating virtue. both instantiation and obtaining are arguably quite mysterious themselves, and
it is not clear that this would suggest in favor of the relation view. In what follows, i perhaps even primitive and brute. Platonic universals and propositions, on the
one hand, and property instances and states of affairs or facts. on the other, are
very different kinds of things, usually belonging to entirely different ontological
" One could also make in argument rrom the minimization of mystery for idemiry PIT: Stmctured categories.“ Similarly, if we take contents to be sets of abstract possible worlds. then
contents are mysterious. and structured phenomenal Chafacltls are mysterious. Ifwe identify are two.
then we minimize the mystery.
”’ in Mendelovlcl forthcoming-b,I argue that there are pnnclpledobstacles to understanding how rnenrll
things. including intentional contents. combine. lrrlur lsright, then it should notbtsutpllslllg ifneither “Nora that this worry does not alto.-r the Aristotelian unlversals Vlt'W or properties. since (his VICW
the {Elation View not the aspect Vitw can fully explain structured contents. takes unlvetsals to be abstracted away from concrete property instances. so [litre are non-brute facts
- Li For
2.2.2 Pm’! V: The/Ispm Vizttz Claapzery: It Inrtwrmmzltzy R:/arm: In /1 Cmtmt?
A1 2.2.;
there have to be facts of the matter as to when an abstract possible world counts item if grass is not green. Since contents behave similarly whether or not they are
as “the same world as" a concrete actual world, a relation that is arguably brute true or refer. there is reason to reject such a disiunctivist View.“
and mysterious." Indeed, one might worry that the relation view simply kicks the On the aspect view, identity theory of truth and reference identifies true
an
challenge of accounting for truth and reference upstairs: we trade the question of and referring contents with aspects of intentional states. While this view avoids
how intentional states are supposed to correspond to the world for that of how disjunctivism. it is effectively a kind of semantic idealism. taking referents and
propositions or Platonic universals are supposed to correspond to the world.“ truth-makers to be aspects of our own intentional states. which. on many views, will
I will later consider another correspondence theory that I think is more promising be internal states (but see §9.;.;). When this view is combined with identity PIT,
than the ones mentioned here and that is available to both the relation view and the we end up with view on which referents and truth—malters are aspects of our own
a
aspect view. But for now, we can conclude that it is not clear that the relation view phenomenal states. Now. while this may be a deal—brea.ker for many. unless we have
has an easier time facilitating a correspondence theory of truth and reference than reason to think that avoiding semantic idealism is a truth-indicating virtue, rather
the aspect View than a desire-satisfying virtue. it is not automatically a reason to reject the view.
Identity Tlvenriex il/Iixed Theories
Perhaps we can avoid any mention of mysterious facts about when items in one Let us now consider the prospects for the relation view ofa mixed theory invoking
ontological category are “supposed to" go with items in another ontological category elements from both the identity and the correspondence theories. Note that the
by adopting an identity theory of truth (or reference). which states that a content identity theory’: problem that not all contents have referents or [1‘|.IKh~mal(crS applies
ifit is identical to a fact (or other item), which is its truth-maker
is true (or refers) most clearly to propositional contents, whose purported referents are obtaining
(or referent). states of affairs. and objectual contents. whose purported referents are particular
One might suggest that the relation View has an easier time facilitating an identity objects. But one might suggest that, on a relation view accepting Platonic universals,
theory of truth or reference because the truth—mal-ters and referents of intentional this problem does not afflict proprietal contents. whose purported referents are
states exist distinctly ofthose states. Such a view might claim that the contents of properties, since the Platonisr can accept that all proprietal contents refer. This might
true intentional states are simply worldly states of alfairs and the referents of referring motivate a mixed view, on which identity theory ofreference applies to proprietal
an
intentional states are other worldly items. contents or a subset of such internally unstructured ones).
contents (perhaps the
The problem with such a view is that not all contents have truth-makers or which refer to themselves. but truth and other instances of reference are a matter
referents, so we cannot identify all contents with their truth-makers and referents. of correspondence. Such a mixed View might take all contents to be constructed
Presumably the contents that can’t be identified with truth»ma.kers or referents will out of Platonic universals and logical relations (and perhaps indexical ingredients),
end up being abstract propositions. Platonic universals, or other such items. But with internally structured contents getting their conditions of truth and reference
this leads to an unattractive disiunctivism about contents on which there are two compositionally based on their constituent proprietal contents and their modes of
indistinguishable but very different ways of having contents with the same superficial composition (and perhaps indexical ingredients)!‘
characters. For example, on this view, the content <grass is gteen> is a concrete state While we can grant that this view manages to explain how we can refer to
of alfaits if grass is in fact green. but it is an abstract proposition or other alternative Platonic universals, we do not yet have an account of how some combination of
about which untmsals are related to which tonmto property Instances. so. ll IS not the case that we “ One might suggest that concrete fzcls and Platonic propositions ate ttnlly the same kind ontttn. which
ate tommittta [D a mysterious instantistton relation Whether 0|’ not WC aootpt the relation view. The
in some cases happens to be i Platonic item and in othot cases happtus to so a Cflncrlrt raot, hut (his
problem atitts rot the relation mw ptottttly because int invokes ptuputtus, these pmperlies must be suggestion yllsr tnovts the bump around under the rug. One new wontltts what makes a Platonic it: in
Platonic univottals (tee to .t). and a touotott not count as the same thing. What makes the concrete fact that grass is green and the
“ L€W|S (toss) calls such a rela n between possible worlds and tho actnalworld (I11: "selection ttlatton" Platonic ptopotltion that gtatt is green count as the same proposition?
and argues that I! is htutt and mysterious. " Such a view IS congenial to tltttnptivist VAEWS ofsome kinds urtorotonco (seejackson I998: and Lewis
" The sense aata View faces the Same challenges. Sense data are not the tutno kinds nfthmgs at sttutnal W34).
objects, so u IS not that how they are supposed to correspond to them.
- Vlfindows, Linux.
Li For
hflps:IIwww.qoppa.oomIpdfsludio
2.1.4 Part V: T}nArp:tt View Chapter y: I: lnmmuriii/l‘.7 ii Relation m A Cimzmr? Z25
Platonic universals is made true by or refers to something else. For example. consider way that the relation view's identity theory of re‘ for the representation of
the content <there is a blue ball). On the picture under consideratio , this is an properties is best combined with a espo nclcnce theory of truth."
internally st ‘ content involving <blue> and <ball>, which are identical to A potential worry with this view is that there is little reason to think that
their referents, the Platonic universals blue and ball. So far so good. But what makes properties ofintentional states are or even can be instantiated outside ofintentional
the internally structured whole true or false? Presumably. what would make it true states. In other words, there is little think that C-aspects involve C-ness
reason to
would be a concrete state of affairs of a blue ball existing. Since this concrete state of if C—ness is assumed to be a property that non—intentional items do or can have.
affairs is not ideritiozl to the internally unstructured content but. instead. something However, this does not automatically give us reason to reject the view, since one
that is supposed to tmespond in a particular way with it, this identity theory of might agree with me that the relevant aspects of intentional states are not—or even
the reference of (perhaps unstructured) proprietal contents is combined with a cannot be—instantiated by non-intentional items but nonetheless maintain that
correspondence theory of tmth and perhaps some kinds of reference. But then we C-aspects refer to C»ness, It's just that nothing does or perhaps even can have these
face the shortcomings of the correspondence theory again: we must appeal to facts properties outside the mind,”
about the instantiation of Platonic universals or the obtaining of propositions or
other items. We are again faced with the problem of explaining why two items of The AW/tithing T/Iemjy
distinct ontological categories—e.g.. Platonic universals and (in most cases) concrete I now want to propose a version of the correspo " theory that is compatible
items—“belong" together. with both the aspect view and the relation view. though it is particularly congenial to
Bonjour (I998, §6.7) offers what can be construed as an aspect theoretic version of the aspect view. On this view, the relevant correspondence relation is the matching
the above-mentioned mixed theory. Eonjour takes all intentional states to relation, where a content marches another item when the item has all the features
combinations of properties and indexical elements. On his account, intentional of the contents superficial L ." On this matching theory. a content is true
states with proprietal literally contain the properties they refer to. So, an
contents (or refers) if it matches some other item in the world, which is its truth-maker (or
intentional state with the content <triangle> literally contains the property of trian- referent)"
gularity. though it is not itself triangular.“ This is an identity theory of reference of at The main consideration in favor of the matching theory is that it captures what
least the intentional states representing proprietal contents, since the properties such we take to be required for truth and reference by our very own lights, When we
intentional states refer to are properties that they instantiate. This. in effect, is what entertain a content, we seem to have a clear idea of what it would take for the world
the claim that a C»aspect involves C—ness. the property that the content C (allegedly)
picks out, amounts to (see §9.i.1.). However, since, presumably. the trutlmmalters of
“ Note that this miitcd view is compatible with an Aristotelian view or ptopcttits since any llptextllled
many structured contents are not literally contained in our intentional states, the
properly is instantiated in the mind. so. it atguahly avoids the worry that it must invoke a wholly
view is most fruitfully combined with a correspondence theory of truth in the same mysterious instantiation telation. See n. no.
“Thttc at: two ystsions or ths ttsulting Vltw. hoth or which might seem unattiattiyc in that thty
paint a stailt vision otout ahi tics to ltnow ahout the mind-Independent world: on the htst version,
ptopositional intentional statcs generally assert tht cittttnal oi min ndtptndcnt :xiS(elI(: or items
“ 3on]0|L\'(l993)Wl’It:s:
having the ptopcnits their components tcrct to. But nothing cttcthal has (at perhaps even can have)
[T]he uniyctsal instantiated hy thoughts or tnangulat things is a mic complex uniyctsal tht relevant so in i f ......
haying tht universal tnangiilatity as one orits components, with other components pcttainmg ait systtmatlcally (and pcthaps necessarily) ralsc.
to other aspttts orthc content. to the kind or thought in question (hclitr, titsitc. intcntion. The second version orthis view drops the claim that ptopositional intcntional statcs gcnctally assert
contemplation. (mi). and pcihaps to rutthct matttts as wtll. such a conipltit universal would the tittmml ctisttnct oritcms having the ptopcttics thtit conttitutnt ptoptietal contcnts tcrct to and
have to be so stiuctutcd that n mcntal act could bean instance ofthe coinpltii universal without
mttcly taltts thtm m assctt the nttsicntt or items having the tclcyant properties. Since thc only items
it thereby hcmg litttally an initanccorttiangulaiity. intlttd without anything hcing such an that can have these properties are internal items. this hnngs iii back to semantic idealism, on which the
instance. (p. I34) tcrctcnts and tmth-makers ofour intentional States at. always mental items.
The choice between an alhtnconipassing cttoi theory and scmantit idtaliiin is an unhappy one, hut.
Bonjour also consiiicts and tcittti a ntnthy ticw on which [here an two ways or instantiating a unless we have Independent ttason to thinlt that hoth an tttot thtoty and stmantic idealism atc ralst.
ptnptity, perhaps titnilat to Atistotlts view on which thinlting about something ttnuitcs thc mind to hclng totctd into this choice is not automatically I reason to think the view is ralic.
be "capable ofteeelvlng (lie rotm oran object without hcing tht object" (D:Am'md ill a. 41911546). " SEE n. 9 orchaptct s.
-rhanlts to sam aaltct rot helpful diicutslon on Aristotle. " The matching thtoty is similar in naint and in spitit. hut not in tuhstancc, to Mantague'5 (aooo, 101;)
“matching view" oithe pctttption otohitcts.
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2.2.6 Part V: The/ltpm View Chapter g: I: Irltlrrilarm/it_y 4 Rtldliflrl tn 4 Content? 2.17
to be as it says it is or to contain what it is about—it would have to be like that, mind-independent world does or can match our contents. But there is more hope
where “that” picks out the content that is entertained and “like" expresses a relation than on the aspect theoretic version of the identity and mixed theories. since the
of similarity. This suggests a correspondence theory on which the correspondence requirements are far less demanding, particularly if superficial characters are or
relation is a kind of similarity relation. In which way are contents supposed to be include abstract or structural features of contents.” Of course, absent reasons to
Similar to their referents and truth-makers? My suggestion is that the relevant kind think that our intentional states are sometimes true or refer, this feature of the
of similarity is matching. which is a matter of the features of a content's superficial matching theory is not a truth-indicating virtue but only a desire-satisfying one.
characters being had by something in the rest ofthe world, The reason for this is that The matching theory of truth and reference is also available to the relation view.
it is the superficial characters of contents, not their deep natures, that are discerned in On the relation theoretic Version, truth and reference are a matter of the relation
introspection and that we take to characterize the world around us, so it is arguably view's distinctly existing contents, whatever they are, matching the world.
our contents’ superficial characters, and not their deep natures, that form the referent The view’s flexibility also allows it to be extended to the derived mental rep-
of “that” when we think that in order for our intentional states to be true the world resentational states discussed in §7,; and §8.;.2.: derived mental representational
would have to be like that. This is why we don't think that the world must be mental states are true or refer if their contents, which are possible phenomenal contents
when we think it must be like that, even ifcontents are in fact mental items. or obiectvinvolving contents (which are just objects, properties, and other items),
Alternative pictures of truth and reference arguably require too much or too little match the world. What it takes for a possible phenomenal content to match the
for truth and reference. The correspondence theories that we previously considered world is for its superficial character to be identical to features of the world. What
don't preserve the idea that truth and reference require that the world be similar it takes for an objecninvolving content to match the world is, arguably, for the very
to our intentional states (e.g., abstract propositions need to obtain, not be similar object, property, or other item to exist—after all, when we derivatively represent
to concrete states of affairs, and Platonic universals need to be realized by things object-involving contents, we do so because we take ourselves to mean the relevant
in the world, not be similar to them). So, these alternative correspondence theories items in their entirety, so their entire natures are their superficial characters, their
require too little of true or referring intentional states. in contrast, identity theories features that characterize them as the contents that they are.""’
require too much. We arguably don't intuitively require the world to have the same
deep nature as our contents in order for those contents to be true or refer. When
The upshot of this discussion is that, first, truth and reference are quite mysterious,
we think the world must be like that in order for our intentional states to be true or
both on the aspect View and on the relation view. Second, there are at least three views
refer, the way we think the world must be is captured by the superficial character
of our contents, the features of our contents that introspection discerns, and not
‘° Even lfmosrofthe aspectsofour mentalstares frulta match items in rheworld. there nnglu be room to: a
the deep nature of otlr contents, to which we are oblivious. If this is right, then the notion ofpartial truth-15 a klndofpartial matching. This tsatttactivs ifaur superficial characters involve
requirements for truth and reference are mere matching, not complete similarity, both features that are not lnunnnncd outside the mind (e.g perhaps. certain qualitative features) nnd
features that are (e.g., perhaps, certain structural features).
and certainly not numerical identity. This is what counts as truth and reference by
“ Here we are operating with an extended notion of: superficial character, on wlnch contents that are or
our own lights. Alternative theories are too demanding or not demanding enough, intentional contents count as having S|1p€|‘fiClfllClIil’€lCK¢KS.
but the matching theory is just right. “ Pautl (:.oo7) argues that only the relation view can make sense ofour knowlcdgc ofrhe similar
and differences between properties (hat we obtain solely by having certain experiences, such as our
The matching theory is congenial to the aspect view. It promises to avoid some
knowledge that orange, is more similar to vcd,, than it .5 to purple“ that we ought obtain solely by
of the unwanted consequences of aspect theoretic theories of truth and reference having experiences ofthe relevant colors. Tile aspect theorist might respond that. insofar as we have
that invoke elements from the identity theory. in particular, it avoids saying that such knowledge. it eornparlson ofthe content: ofcolor experiences, which are aspects
ls based on n
ofintentional The matching theory allows us [0 further say that, since these aspects refer to
truth and reference require that C-aspects be instantiated outside of the mind. states.
whatever external world items they match, the relations ofsimilarity and difference between them are
Truth and reference require only that C-aspects rrmtr/7 items outside the mind. likely to refleer the relations ofsimilariry and difference ofwhatever they refer to, which would be the
Of course, matching involves an identity between a content‘: superficial character properties ovnngc, ml,,, and purpk“ (assuming such properties exist— they do not, what we end
up with is conditional knowledge). What makes the knowledge we obtain in this case knowledge or
and something else, soit involves the sharing of properties. But, importantly, these
properties and not ofmete aspetts ofour intentional states is that the contents we use to think it refer
properties needn't be contents themselves. They might, for instance, be abstract to properties andare made true by facts about how properties are related. Any other theory oftrutll and
or structural properties of contents. Still, it is not clear whether anything in the reference that preserves a structural similarity between aspects and their referents andrrurh-maltetsean
say something similar.
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2.2.8 Hm V: 11;: /Lt/IIU I/mu Chapter 9: [S Intelllianil/1!_y a Rrbman IV A Camem.’ 2.2.9
of truth and reference Compatible with the aspect view: a \.ui'l'CSPOndCl|CC theory 9.5.6 TAKING STOCK
that accepts primitive \.uI’i'cSp0nd€nCC relation, a Bonjour- yle view mbining
a
I've considered various alleged virtues of the relation view over the aspect view: It
an identity theory of at least some kinds of reference with a correspondence theory
might be claimed that the relation view is better supported by common sense. pro-
of truth and perhaps other kinds of reference, and the matching theory. On the
vides a superior account of public and unrepresented contents, better accommodates
first two, intentionality may only secure conditions of truth and reference with the
intentional structure, is in a better position to account for truth and reference, and
help of further ingredients, while on the third, conditions of truth and reference
is more congenial to externalism. I have argued that the aspect view fares no worse
might simply fall out oiiintentional states. given our everyday understanding of truth
than the relation view with respect to all these alleged virtues. All this helps flesh
and reference (but see Appendix H). The same or analogous theories of truth and
out the aspect view and ward off potential objections. It also allows us to complete
reference are also available to the relation view. soit is not the case that either View is
an argument from parsimony for the view: The aspect view can do everything the
in a better position to facilitate a theory of truth and reference.
relation view can do without the relation view’s hefty ontological commitments. So,
we should prefer it.
9.3.5 EXTERNALISM
One might suggest that the relation view. but not the aspect view, is compatible with 9.4 Conclusion
externalism, the view that there are broad contents. Ifexternalism is true, this would
be a reason to prefer the relation view. I have argued for the aspect view of intentionality, on which representing C is a
One quick response to this kind of worry is that the aspect view it compatible matter of having an intentional state with a C-aspect, and against the alternative
with externalism. As discussed in §9.r.3, it is possible to hold an externalist aspect relation view, on which representing C is a matter ofbearing a special relation to
view. Such an aspect view might claim that the relevant aspects involve relations a distinctly existing item, C. The relation view reifies and (usually) externalizes
to the environment but that none of the environmental relara are themselves contents, taking them out ofthe mind and endowing them with their own distinct
properly considered cam:-rm (see n. 8). However, such a view is arguably somewhat existence. This move might be thought to confer various advantages, allowing for
unnatural. contents that are public, compositionally structured, apt for truth and reference,
I want to suggest, instead, that we can accommodate externalist intuitions in a and broad. But we have seen that moving contents out of the mind confers no such
way that is compatible with the aspect view by admitting broad derived contents. advantages. Instead, it , ' des contents from playing their single most important
Chapter 7 presented a self-a uipti it view of many of the alleged contents of role, that ofbeing entertained or otherwise represented. By taking contents to be
thought and showed how it can capture various types of broad contents, in- integral aspects of intentional states, the aspect view puts contents back in the
cluding natural kind contents, deferential contents, and objecbinvolving contents. mind, where they can be thought, entertained, and intentionally represented in a
When combined with an aspect View taking the relevant aspects to be intrinsic psychologically involved way.
properties of individuals, the result is a view that
internalist about original
is The aspect view helps complete our overall picture ofintentionality, Parts III and
intentionality but externalist about at least some kinds of derived mental rep- IV argued for strong identity PIT, the view that, roughly, original intentionality is
resentation.“ Such a view can arguably accommodate externalist intuitions suffi» identical to phenomenal . If my claims in this chapter are correct. this
ciently well to make externalism about original intentionality unnecessary (see §7.3 view is best combined with the aspect view, resulting, roughly, in a non—relational
and §8.3.z).“ View of phenomenal consciousnesslintentionality.
This allows us to respond to the worry raised in §§.; for identity PIT that original
intentionality and phenomenal consci cannot be identified because they
" Hotgan and Tienson (1002) also propose a view on which there are narrow plmiomcrtal content! and have different deep natures, with intentional states, but not phenomenal states,
broad derived contents.
being relations to distinctly existing contents. Since. as I argued in this chapter,
" Mtrtdtiovtci 2010. ch. I1. argues that extcmalist iiiru’ ‘arts. such as win Earth intuitions, are but
titotigiiroras irtrmtiirrg H5 aimiir derived contents, nut original L'uI1ten(s,arid so that titty are adequately intentionality is not relational in the way this objection supposes, there is no such
accommodated by broad derived contents. barrier to identifying them.
- Li For
2.10 Par; 1/: T17:/Irpm View Clmpzer 9: It lmmtiamzlizy 4 Relatiwz In 4 Can/mt? zit
On the resulting view. intentional contents are phenomenal characters, and phev importance of providing adverbial , phrases of perceptual ascriptions. The aspect
nomenal characters are aspects of phenomenal states. Which aspects of phenomenal View makes no claims concerning everyday language or even about the most useful
states phenomenal characters end up being depends on which aspects ofphenomenal way of formulating claims about intentional states. Perhaps our everyday language
states are elt or experienced (see Appendix G). Those aspects, whatever they are, are and our most useful scientific language for describing intentional states are implicitly
our contents. They are what we think. perceptually represent. or otherwise entertain. committed to the relation View and the adverbialist paraphrase project fails. The
They are our immediate contents (§7.z.t ), making up our immediate representational aspect View is neutral on this point. since it is only concerned with the nature of
perspective on the world. intentional states, not the language we do or should use to talk about them (see also
Assuming internalism about phenomenal consciousness, the resulting view is §94;4KjI The advocate ofthe aspect view might be happy to continue using everyday
radically internalistic. Not only is what determines which intentional contents we language even if it superficially appears to conflict with the nature of intenrionaliry.
represent in the head, but intentional contents themselves are quite literally in the as long as we do not take seriously the commitments of such language." Finally,
heacl——they are phenomenal states or properties of phenomenal states. Although adverbialism is only one version of the aspect view, a version that is arguably best
there is room on the picture for broad contents. as well as relations of truth and interpreted as taking the relevant aspects to be properties of intentional properties.
reference. it is the representing subject herselfwho determines her targeted contents Kriegel (Lou), an aspect theorist who takes contents to be properties ofintentional
(and perhaps even what is required for truth and reference—see Appendix H). In properties, calls his View "adverbialism" for this reason. But. as discussed in §9.i and
this way, the overall view respects what is arguably the core internalist idea that we especially Appendix G, there are other versions of the aspect view as well (on my
are the authors of our own contents (see also §ro.z). preferred view. the relevant aspects are states of intentional states).
]ackson’s many property problem (1977) is a \vell~ltnown worry with adverbialism.
and one might reasonably wonder whether a similar problem afflicts the aspect
Appendix F: The Aspect View and Adverhialism
view. Briefly. the many property problem is that there is no good way to paraphrase
sentences such as (g):
Adverbialism is the view that perceptual experiences are modifications of subjects.
such as ways of sensing, rather than relations between subjects and objects of (3) David experiences a red square and a blue triangle.
experience (Chisholm 1957b. Ducasse 1942., Sellars r975. Papineau Lou. and Gow
MS). Historically, adverbialism was meant to provide an alternative to the sense data
Here are two candidate paiaphrases:
theory. on which perceptual experience has an act-object structure and the objects of
experience are sense data. The way adverbialism avoids a commitment to sense data,
(4) David senses redly and squarely and bluely and triangularly.
and thus provides an alternative to the sense data theory, is by rejecting a relational
(5) David senses red-squarely and blue-triangularly.
conception of experience and instead claiming that experiences are modifications of
subjects. Adverbialism is so called due to its commitment to the " O tic project
(4) want do because it does distinguish between the where David
'
not case ex-
of offering plausible adverbialist paraphrases of perceptual ascriptions. such as (1), in periences a red square and a blue triangle and the case in which he experiences
terms of adverbial constructions such as (2.):
a blue square and a red triangle. (5) involves introducing a new predicate for
every set of properties an experience attributes to the same object. The problem
(1) David sees a red patch.
with this paraphrase is that it does not allow us to draw certain apparently valid
(2.) David senses redly.
inferences from (5). such as that David senses redly and that he senses squarely.
since “ted-squarely” is a primitive linguistic expression and does not decompose into
Although there are many similarities between adverbialism, as traditionally con-
“redly” and “squarely.”
ceived, and the aspect view, there are some important dilferences. One difference is
in their targets. Traditionally. adverbialism is a View of perceptual experience, while
the aspect View is a view ofintentiunality. Another difference concerns the perceived " Plpirieau (Lou) and (‘now (MS) make similar points.
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The many property problem concerns the adverbialists paraphrase project. which, or second-order properties/states. These choice points result in four possible views
as mentioned above. the aspect view need not endorse.“ But one might still of the relevant aspects.
wonder whether the aspect view faces something like this problem. Intentional states Two contemporary versions of the aspect view, Kriegel's (1.007. zolr) adverbialism
compose, but. one might argue. aspects cannot compose; they can only co-occur. and Pitt's (zoos) ' ‘ psychologism, take contents to be abstract or general
‘
If aspects only co-occur, then representing a blue triangle and a red square
can items. On Pitt's intentional , ‘ ‘ I contents are psychological types. and
.
will involve, say. the co»occurrence of four aspects: a blue-aspect, a triangle-aspect, we represent them by instantiating them. Pitt's view can be roughly understood as
J 11
a red-aspect. and a square-aspect. But this is also what representing a blue square an aspect view on which contents are with intentional propertie On
'
and a red triangle would involve. Thus, it seems the aspect view cannot distinguish Kriegel’s adverbialism, contents are ways ofrepresenting, or properties of intentional
between intentional states with difl"erent structures that involve the same basic properties. So. Kl-iegel’s view also takes contents to be properties."
elements." Alternatively, we might take contents to be not properties but rather inxranriatinns
As it stands. the same worry might be raised against the relation view that accepts of properties. or. in other words. states. On such a view. contents are concrete partic-
structured contents. Take a relation view on which the state of representing a red ular property instantiations rather than abstract or general ways things might be.
square and a blue triangle is an internally structured inten ‘ state involving
‘ Our choice between these Views will depend on what plays the role of content.
relations to redness, squareness, blueness, and triangularity. One might complain Content is what is intentionally represented. In the case of occurrent states. it is
that these relational properties can only be co-instantiated; all we have are a what is entertained. So. deciding between these views will depend on which aspect of
relation to redness, a relation to squareness. a relation to blueness, and a relation to intentional states is entertained or otherwise ' ’ "y represented. If, as seems
triangularity. But that is also what representing a blue square and a red triangle would plausible. what is entertained or otherwise intentionally represented is. in its deep
involve. So, it seems that the non-" it analogue of the many property problem
‘ nature. a concrete particular, not an abstract or general item, then contents are states.
also afliicts the relation view. not properties.
This does not show that no relation or aspect view can make sense of the cases. One might claim that worrying about the question of whether contents are
What is shows is that if we think that there are structured intentional states, then we properties or states is splitting hairs. Any aspect theorist will agree that both the
needastoryabout‘ ‘structure.’ ‘
' 9.3.; ‘J the r
' , of relevant properties and the relevant states exist and that we can speak ofeither. The
providing such a story for both the relation view and the aspect view and argues that question of which to call “contents” is of little consequence. The question is indeed
the aspect view is no worse off than the relation view. one of detail rather than one of the general direction of a theory of intentionality
(which is why it is relegated to this appendix). However. how we answer this question
makes a difference to the very fundamental question of what exactly it is that we
Appendix G: Contents as First- or Second-Order States or Properties entertain or otherwise represent. where this is to be understood as a question about
the deep nature ofcontents. What exactly is it that is running through our heads
The aspect view has various broad options as to what exactly are the aspects to be when think and perceive? Are these things general properties? Or are they
we
identified with contents. One choice point concerns whether contents are, on the particular property instantiations? Ifcontents are property insrantiations. then what
one hand, intentional properties or properties of intentional properties or, on the we literally entertain are concrete things, perhaps even physical things, presumably
other hand. instantiation: of either kind of property. In other words, the choice point in our heads. Ifcontents are properties, then what we entertain may be something
concerns whether contents are pmpertier, i.e presumably general
. or abstract ways abstract, perhaps even Platonic.
things are or might be. or stain‘. i.e., instantiations of properties. or particular ways
that particular things are. Another choice point concerns whether contents arefirm
" mu does not equate types with properties. but 1 will skate over nus detail.
" what lndlviduates intentional properties qua Intentional properties, which
Kriegel defines "content" as
oflntentional properties. So. any disagreement with him
leads to his raking contents to be properties
“ See also Paplneau mm and Gow M5 for similar palms. here might be merely terminological. unless he also waun [0 say that content: are what are entertained
’" See also Bailey and Richards (mu). who argue against PIT along with lines. (see below).
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2.;.«, Part V: Th:A.rp:r/ View Cbapmg: Is In/mnormtiiy a Rtlarmu In 4 Cmtmu? 235
This leads us to what I take to be the key reason to think that what we entertain characters are the specific “what it’s like" or felt qualities of phenomenal states,
are states. not properties, and hence to the view that the relevant aspects are states: our choice between these options will depend on what we want to say is “felt” in
lntentionality is a concrete _, L ‘ I‘ phenomenon, and ‘ states are' '
havinga pheno ‘ state. Presumably. what is felt is aconcretc particular property
concrete psy L ' D‘ 'statesof got otherwise‘
' ' "
1'
D instantiation, not a general or abstract property, which suggests in favor of taking
contents. By taking contents to be concrete psychological items. the state View phenomenal characters to he states rather than properties.
appropriately respecm these ideas. Though we can speak of the properties that lt is less clear whether phenomenal c‘ are,‘ 4 phenomenal prop-
our contenu are instantiation: ofi and though it may even be natural to call them erties (or states) or J 4 phenomenal properties (or states), ., whether
“contents” when speaking loosely, strictly speaking, what we entertain or otherwise what is felt is a phenomenal property (or state) in its entirety or a property (or
represent is a concrete property instantiation rather than the property it is an state) of a phenomenal property (or state). If phenomenal properties (or states)
instantiation of.“ are experienced in their entirety, then phenomenal L are just phenomenal
The second choice point concerns whether to take contents to be, on the one properties (or states). If phenomenal properties (or states) have experienced and
hand,fir.rt-vrdtr intentional states or properties (i e intentional states or properties unexperienced aspects (e.g., something that is “felt” and a “feeling” of dtat thing).
themselves) or, on the other hand. second-order intentional states or properties then phenomenal ' include only the experienced aspects, so they are
(i.e., states of intentional states or properties of intentional properties). Pitt's view, sec ' 4‘ phenomenal properties (or states),
roughly, takes contents to be first-order intentional properties, while Kriegel's view As in the case of intentional contents. we might have a weak reason to prefer the
takes contents to be second—otdet intentional properties. second—order view if we think it provides a better account of the internal structure of
Our choice between a first- and second-order view of contents will again depend phenomenal ‘ (§9.3.;). However, the choice is not obvious, and not much
on what plays the role of content. If what is entertained or otherwise intentionally hangs on it.
represented is a first—otder intentional property (or state) in its entirety, thcn Identity PIT identifies intentional contents with phenomenal characters, so, ifwe
contents are first-order properties (or states), while if it is only a property (or state) are to combine the aspect view with identity PIT, our views of intentional contents
of intentional properties (or states) that is entertained or otherwise intentionally and phenomenal characters must agree. I've suggested that there is independent
represented— ,, the feature that di“ a given intentional property (or reason to think that both in ‘ ' contents and phenomenal L are states,
state) from other intentional properties (or states)—then contents are second-order not properties. and that it is unclear whether these states are First- or second-order
properties (or states). states. though there may be reason to prefer the secontlaorclet view in both cases.
Subsection 9.3.; suggests that the second-order view may be in a better position to This. of course. is good news for identity PIT.
account for some internally structured contents than the first-order view. This might
be a reason to prefer it. However, it is not clearhow strong this reason is. since it is not
clear what is the best thing to say about internally structured contents. In any case. ‘N “ H: An Internal Theory of Truth and Reference
the choice between a first-order view and a second-order view is far from obvious
and has few downstream consequence , so I remain neutral on the issue. with a weak A theory of reference for mental states provides criteria that determine what a
preference for the second-order view. theory of truth for mental states
mental state refers to in variotu conditions, and a
The four options concerning the aspects with which to identify contents cor- provides criteria that determine the onditions in which a mental state is true.
respond to four general options ’ 5 phenomenal t.‘ . Phenomenal C respondenc and identity theories, as we have presented them, tell us what these
characters might be fitst- or second»order states or properties. Since phenomenal criteria are. For example, a orresponclence theory of truth states that a mental state
is true if it bears a certain corresponden relation to a fact, and an identity theory of
reference states that a mental state refers to an item if its content is identical to that
..
item.
One lrught worry that this makes contents yroblerrtaucally private. Subsection 9.3.1 addresses this
.
concern. suggesting that much ofwhat we want to say about shared contents is rm afthe properties
A further question about truth and reference, however. concerns what determiner
that eontents are instantrations of(“eontent properties“) Iltllei’ than contents themselves. these criteria. We can distinguish between two kinds of answers: The first is that
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2.36 Part V: T/12/{spar View Clmpxer 9: I: lmmiiurmlz/y a Relrmun 1:: /1 Clmteur? 237
we determine them, while the second is that the mind-independent world docs the determining the criteria oftruth and reference. For example. the rninddndcpendent
work for us. Let internal theory of truth (or reference) is one that
us say that an world itself might determine that a mental state refers to whatever item it bears
takes the criteria determining whether a mental state is true (or what it refers to) to a particular causal relation to, whatever item it is similar in a certain respect to,
be specified by us. and an external theory of truth (or reference) is one that takes or whatever item it bears some other relation to. This, in effect. is Lewis‘ (1984,)
the criteria determining whether a mental state is true (or what it refers to) to be response to Putnam. Lewis claims that external facts about natural kinds constrain
determined in part by factors other than our specifications.
at least the interpretation of our theories. These constraints are not “just more theory"
There are deep problems with internal theories oftruth and reference. According because they are supposed to be external constraints, constraints supplied by the
to internal theories, we specify the criteria determining the conditions in which a world itself, not by our theory.
mental state is true or what it refers to in different conditions. But in order for our Putnam (1983) argues that the problem with such external constraints is that
specifications to have any force, they must determinately refer to the conditions they result in a “magical" theory of truth and reference. Roughly, the idea is that
required for truth and reference. The problem is that, on pain of circularity, the any external constraints on truth and reference would have to involve new, brute,
criteria that determine the conditions of reference of our specifications can’t be nonphysical, and it ’ " ly semantic facts. For example, an external constraint
determined by the specifications themselves. For example, a theory of reference might specify that :1 particular causal relation, R, is the reference relation. The
might state that mental states refer to whatever they bear a particular relation R to. problem is that the fact that it is 2/91‘: relation—tather titan, say, some other causal or
In order for internally specify this criterion. our specification of the condition
us to other kind ofrclation—that has this special status is further fact about the world.
a
ofa mental states bearing R to something must already refer to the condition ofa one that is arguably brute, nonphysica', and irreducibly semantic. Putnam argues
mental states bearing R to something. Otherwise, our specification does not manage that this is unacceptable (at least by the lights ofhis opponent, whom he takes to
to fix on the condition that it purports to pick out and that is supposed to matter for be committed to physicalism).
reference. Put simply, our specifications cannot specify the criteria by which they While I don't think irreducibly semantic facts are automatically a deal-breaker,
refer, so, if “' ' oftruth and f are “ ’ ‘ by ' “ specified I do think there is something right about Putnam's charge. As he notes, there are
rules, these specifications must get their referents in some other way. many candidate criteria of truth and reference, each singling out dififerent candidate
This, in effect, is the import of Putnam’s (1977) model-theoretic argument against reference and truth-making relations. Which one ofthese is the correct criterion is
metaphysical realism. Putnam, roughly, argues that any consistent theory can be a further fact about truth and reference. Any such further fact would be primitive
interpreted (i,e., be assigned referents and truth-makers for its terms and sentences) and brute. But it is not clear why we should care about any such criteria singled
in “deviant” ways such that it comes out true, and there is no way internal to out by such further facts. What we care about when we care about truth and
the theory to specify the “intended” interpretation. Any r I J constraint on reference is not whether the world conforms to our tnenral states by some potentially
L
interpretation is "just more theory": it is just another sentence to be added to the arbitrary standards ‘ ' ‘ by potentially brute r 1 ical facts but rather
theory, which itself can be deviantly interpreted. These points are just as true of whether the world conforms to our mental states by nur standards. Suppose that
contents as they are ofscntences in a theory. Of course, contents are “interpreted" some brute metaphysical fact “ ' ed that C was the criterion for reference. If
all on their own in that they are ronzents, but they are not “interpreted” all on their we do not in some sense intend or accept C as the criterion for reference, then.
own in the relevant sense ofhaving conditions of truth and reference. In order to have insofar as we are interested in reference, we have no reason to care about whether
conditions oftruth and reference, some further facts must obtain, whether they are our mental states satisfy C, For example, suppose that, according to C, my content
put in place by us or the world (see §9.;.4). So. Putnam‘: worry applies to contents, <the longest goldfish alive> referred to a ham sandwich. Even though my content
as well as to theories. As he puts it, “You can’t single out a correspondence between and die ham sandwich satisfy C, my content does not refer to the ham sandwich
two things just by squeezing one of them hard" (Putnam I981, p, 73: emphasis in in any sense of “reference” that I care about. Even ifC coincided with my concept
original). This is true whether the thing you squeeze is a sentence in a theory or an of reference, in that, according to C, tny concept of reference referred to C, that
intentionally represented content. would not be enough, because my concept of reference might refer to some other
So, perhaps we should consider an external theory of truth and reference. standard, C’, according to C’. What would make C matter is for my concept of
According to an external theory, factors external to our specifications play a role in reference to refer to it by my awn standards. But then it’s my standards that make
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11 2.39
C matter, that single it out as the relation to identify with reference, not the (Refers) A content C refers to some item x if x is wholly distinct from C and x
worlds. has the features of(or is similar to) C5 superficial character.
In short. what we care about is whether our mental states relate to the world as
measured by our own standards. in the ways that we intend, whatever they are, not The conditions specified by (True) and (Refers) are logical constructions out of
in ways measured by some external standard. The only theory oftruth and reference identity, similarity, and superficial character, which are abstractions from items we
that can deliver is an internal theory. Nothing else will do. can directly refer to. So, we can arguably specify the relevant conditions out of
I want to suggest that the matchingtheory introduced in §9.3.4 can be construed as contents that refer to them without needing their help. Of course, in order for the
an internal theory that avoids the difficulties mentioned above for internal theories. matching theory to provide an internal constraint on truth and reference for any
For the matching daeory to avoid these difficulties, its criteria of truth and reference given subject, she must in some sense represent the truth and reference rules herself.
must be specified by us using contents that refer to these criteria independently of This is far from providing a satisfactory internal theory of reference. but I think
whether they satisfy them. In Putnam's terms, we need an internal constraint that is it's a start. Many questions remain, such as those concerning the sense in which we
not “just more theory," one that is already interpreted. can be said to represent the matching criteria (do we phenomenally or derivatively
It is not implausible that there are some items that we can refer to without the represent them ?), whether different truth and reference rules apply to different kinds
help ofthe criteria specified by the matching theory. These might include items we of contents (do we have different reference rules for contents about mental and
can “directly” refer to, such as our own mental states, their features, our minds. and non-mental states?), whether the criteria by which contents that refer without the
ourselves. Perhaps we can directly refer to these items by simply having them and help of our matching rules can be properly considered internal (can we properly
attending to them in the right way so as to set them apart in thought, or perhaps, be said to specify them and is it a problem if not?), how many different ways of
in some cases. \ve refer to them by having higher—order thoughts that embed them. referring there are (can we refer directly, through abstraction and construction of
Unlike in the case of reference to mind-independent obiects, we /7/we these items directly referring contents, through matching, and through description’), and how
in our minds, available to be singled out. In this case, we are not singling out a the different ways of referring that we want to accept can interact with each other
correspondence between two items by squeezing one of them really hard; we can (can we refer by descriptions composed of contents that directly refer or refer by
squeeze our intended targets directly. matching. as well as contents that refer by matchingi). But. ifsuch a theory can be
Other items we might be able to refer to without the help ofthe matching criteria made to work, then we arrive at a truly internalist conception ofthe mind, one on
are abstractions from or constructions out of the items we can directly refer to. which any phenomenal contents, derived contents, or criteria oftruth and reference
These items might include certain properties and relations that are exemplified by that we have are fully determined by non-relational, intrinsic, and accessible aspects
items we can directly refer to, such as the relation of similarity, the property ofbeing ofour own minds.
mental. and the property ofbeing identical, all ofwhich are arguably exemplified by
mental states. They might also include logical constructions of these items, such as
the conditions ofone mental state being similar to another, the condition ofa mental
state not being mine, or the condition ofnot being mental,
if the matching theory can be specified using contents that only refer to items
ofthe above-mentioned kinds, then perhaps it internally specified
can serve as an
criterion for truth and reference. The matching theory states that a content is true
if it matches the world and that a content refers to an item if it matches that item.
More explicitly. the matching theory specifies criteria along the following lines:
(True) A content C is true ifthere is some item x such that x is wholly distinct
from C and x has the features of (or is similar to) C5 superficial
character.
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VI Conclusion
- Li For
1 Conclusion: Intentionality and Other Related
Phenomena
WE STARTED on by noticing that we have visual experiences. auditory experi»
ences, thoughts, and other mental states that we describe as presenting, representing,
or “saying something.” We took intentionality to be this phenomenon that we
at least sometimes notice introspectively in ourselves (Chapter 1). I then argued
that intentionality, this “saying something" that we introspectively observe. is not
a matter of our tracking external items or having internal states that play certain
functional roles (Chapters 3-4). Instead, it is a matter ofphenomcnal consciousness.
the subjective, felt. or qualitative aspect of mental life (Chapters 5-6). This is,
roughly. the phenomenal intentionality theory, on which there is a central type of
intentionality, phenomenal intentionality, that arises from phenomenal conscious-
ness alone, and all other kinds of intentionality at least partly derive from it. On
my specific version of PIT. strong identity PIT, phenomenal intentionality is the
only kind of intentionality (strong PIT), and phenomenal consciousness gives rise
to phenomenal intentionality simply by being identical to it (identity PIT). In
Chapter 9, I Further argued that intentionality is non—rclational, in that intentional
states are not relations to distinctly existing items that play the roles of contents.
Instead. intentional states are modifications of subjects, and contents are aspects of
intentional states.
1-45
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.44 pm VI: Curlclmian ch.zpmm.»c‘.,m/mm 24;
On my picture, intentionality is scarcer than we may have previously thought. lO.I.l FOLK PSYCHOLOGY
Unlike many other versions of PIT, my version takes a hard line when it comes
We attribute to ourselves and others contentful states, such as beliefs, desires, and
to the alleged contents of thoughts, standing states, and nonconscious occurrent
perceptual experiences, which help us make sense of and predict each other's behave
states. Thoughts derivatively represent the contents we might have antecedently
ior. One approach to intentionality, then, is to take our target to be a posit in such
taken them to represent, but this derived mental representation is not a kind of
a folk psychological theory of mind. We rejected this approach to intentionality,
intentionality (Chapter 7). Standing states also have derived contents that do not
but we can still ask what, if anything, plays the relevant role in folk psychological
qualify as intentional, and nonconscious occurrent states neither intentionally nor
theory. In Chapter 1. I argued that this way of fixing on intentionality might not
derivatively represent (Chapter 8).
pick out the same thing as my ostensive definition. In §8.3.3, I argued that our
In §6.r. I suggested that what makes my version of strong identity PIT a theory
folk psychological notions keep track of much more than our moment-by-moment
of inlentiandlity in terms of phenomenal consciousness rather than a theory of
phenomenal contents; they arguably keep track of a combi ion of phenome-
plaenamerml mmvmumers in terms of intentionality is that it “fits" intentionality
nal contents, direct derived contents, indirect derived contents, and derivatively
to consciousness rather than consciousness to intentionality. In other words, it
representational standing states. I also suggested that this is a particularly useful
attributes to consciousness/intentionality the features we might want to attribute to
combination of things to keep track of if what we want to do is predict behavior. Folk
consciousness rather than the features we might want to attribute to intentionality.
psychology has confiated variom distinct factors, only some ofwhich are genuinely
We are now in a position to see how this is true. Phenomenal s is often
‘
intentional. to yield a notion of content that helps us navigate our complex social
thought to be relatively scarce (compared to the supposed abundance of intention—
world.
ality), internalistic, non-relational, and resistant to naturalization. Chapters 7-8
argued that intentionality is as scarce as phenomenal consciousness is thought to
be and that externalist intuitions best motivate externalism about derived mental
representation, not intentionality; Chapter 9 argued for a non-relational and lO.I,L THE MIND-BRAIN SCIENCES
probably internalistic conception ofintentionality: and one upshot ofChapters ;—4
Another way ofhxing reference on intentionality is via its alleged role in scientific
is that intentionality is fairly resistant to naturalization. If all this is right, then theorizing about the mind and brain. Although we dismissed this n, ach, we
intentionality fits phenomenal consciousness, not the other way around, and my might still ask what answers to the representati In-like notions invoked in the
version ofstrong identity PIT is properly thought ofas a theory of intentionality mind-brain sciences. In Chapter 8, I argued that the nonconscious states posited by
in terms of phenomenal ' ess.
various scientific approaches do not intentionally I I emphasized the points
.
of agreement between this view and what I take to be the standard view on the mat-
10.1 Return to Other Ways of Fixing Reference on Intentionality ter: Nonconscious states might track various items in the environment, play various
functional roles. and fail to have phenomenal features. They might even be fruitfully
Although my focus has been on intentionality, the discussion has shed light on described as "representing” various contents, where this notion of representation
related phenomena along the way. A theme diat emerges is that intentionality does (“TR-representation") is ‘ ‘ as involving no more than tracking and func-
not play all the roles it thought to play. Chapter I briefly overviewed
is sometimes tional roles. Like nonconsc' states. phenomenally conscious states and standing
various possible ways offixing reference on intentionality and argued that. if what we statesmight also have such TR-representational features in addition to their intena
are interested in is the l L nomenon gestured at by "aboutness" and “directedness” tional features, although they need n’t in any way match the states’ phenomenal con-
talk, there is reason to prefer my fairly minimal ostensive definition, since this tents or derived contents. While the mind-brain sciences might invoke representa»
phenomenon of " L " or “directedness" might fail to have the features deemed tional notions that pick out intentionality or derived mental representation, many of
essential by alternative definitions. Let us consider these approaches again to see what the rcprescntatiuirlilte nations at play arguably pick out something along the lines of
has become ofthese other features. T“ representat‘
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2.45 Pan VI: Cum/usnm Chapltr Ia: Cuntlusmn 2.47
to.t.; GETTING AROUND IN THE WORLD determining L " ' of truth and reference according to such a view is an open
question, depending on whether the fact that truth and reference are a matter of
Another approach to inrentionality that I initially rejected takes it to be a matter of
matching falls out of the nature of inrentionality or is a further fact.‘
havingan internal representation ofthe world that we use for the purposes of getting
by. We might be moved toward such an H L by considerat' ofour impressive
ability to get what we need, avoid the things that are harmful to us, plan sophisticated io.r.5 TAKING STOCK
actions well in advance of the time for action, and in general survive in the world. In Chapter 1. I argued that d of “inrentionality” in terms of folk psychology.
Again, we dismissed dtis rproach, but we can still ask what plays the relevant roles notions used in the mind-brain sciences, getting around in the world. and truth and
in hclping us get around in the world. From what we’ve seen, we can conclude that, reference might not pick out the same thing as my I ’ ’ ostensive definition.
apart from inrentionality iuelf. one important factor in the generation of mccessful We are now in a position to see that, for the most part, they probably in fact do not.
behavior is bearing tracking relations to items in the world. We manage to get by What answers to the folk psychological definition is probably. at best. a combination
not only by intentionally representing things but also by tracking things that are of inrentionality and derived mental representation: what answers to the mind-brain
important to us. The importance of tracking is underscored in mismatch cases for the scientific definition is arguably various notions of TR»representation; what answers
tracking theory, cases where inrentionality and tracking come apart. I have argued to the definition in terms of getting around in the world at least involves a
that there are several cases like this and that the kind of reliable misrepresentation combination of both tracking and inrentionality; and what answers to the definition
they often involve might be quite useful for getting around in the world. We ofien in terms of truth and reference is an open question, with my preferred answer being
gain no additional benefit when it comes to the successful generation of behavior inrentionality in combination with particular intentional states specifying how we
by representing the same thing that we track rather than representing something are to be interpreted (see n. t). It turns out, then, that inrentionality, in our sense, does
else with the very same tracking relations in place. And in certain cases, it might
not in fact play many of the roles that it is sometimes thought to play. Despite this, it
be cheaper, easier. or more cificicnt to K something other than what we plays a central role in the mind, constituting the very stuff of thought and perceptual
track. experience. and allowing us to derivatively represent a plethora ofcontents beyond
the confines of our own consciousness.
ro.t,4 TRUTH AND REFERENCE
Another way of approaching inrentionality is from the perspective of truth and
10.2 Radical im
reference. We can take inrentionality to be the having of conditions of truth or
"
reference, or that which gives rise to conditions of truth or reference. I decided
The overall view I have presented is a sketch of a radically internalist picture of
against this approach as a way of fixing on inrentionality because it is not entirely
the mind, one that places the mind firmly within the representing subject. I do not
clear that intent" " y gives rise to conditions oftruth or ‘ nce without the help
simply mean that it is internalist in that intrinsic duplicates represent alike (in fact.
of further ingredients, or even dtat it gives rise to conditions of truth or reference
there are important ways in which they need not represent alike). Rather. I mean that
ar all. But we can still ask what accounts for conditions of truth and reference, if
it takes the power to target or mean a content to stem entirely from within, making
anything‘
our contents was in the fullest sense. Intentional contents are not items existing on
In §9.3.4, we saw that truth and reference pose a special challenge to any theory of
inrentionality and that my overall view is compatible with various theories of truth
their own that we happen to get related to. Instead, they are aspects of our very
and reference. One view takes truth and reference to be a primitive correspondence
relation. If dtis view is correct, then intentionality all on its own does not secure
' Appendix H ofChap!er g argued that n .5 possible to understand the matching theory I! an internal
conditions of truth and reference. and an approach to intentionality in terms of truth theory of lmth and reference, on which what determine the criteria of truth and reference are our
and reference will pick out a c " of inrentionality and this correspondence own stipulations 1 this view is correct, what X5 required for having conditions oftruth and reference
is particular intentional (or perhaps derivatively representational) states. So what plays in: role of
relation. Another view, which is my preferred view. takes truth and reference to be
determining conditions of truth and reference is inrentionality together with the having or time
a matter of our represented contens arching die world. What plays the role of particular Intentional or derived representational mm.
1.48 pm VI: Carlilusion
own minds. belonging entirely to our own consciousness, and any non-phenomenal
contents that we count as representing, including any broad or objectvinvolving
contents, are specifically welcomed by us. targeted by our self—ascriptions, and never
forced upon us by semantic powers beyond our control. If the claims of Appendix
H are correct, our mental states’ conditions of truth and reference are fully outs too,
in that we determine the criteria of truth and reference against which our mental
states are assessed.
The general outlook can be contrasted with radically externalist and relationalist
conceptions of the mind on which our contents are determined by forces wholly
beyond our control, lying at the far end of a causal or other kind of relation.
Any semantic properties we might have of this sort are inaccessible and irrelevant
to phenomenological and epistemol U’ ' concerns and. more generally. to our
conceptions of ourselves as representing and knowing subjects. The subject who
wonders whether she is a brain in :4 var or whether her premises support her Glossary
conclusion is not concerned with such inaccessible contents, but with whether the
contents the intends are true or false or support each other, It is the contents that we
target that figure in our conceptions ofourselves as representing subjects. Any other
semantic features we might be said to have are in an important sense not really nurs.
In short, on the radically internalist picture, we are the authors of our own iii i.
The view that , ,
I
, ' are
i
' ‘of subjects, such as ways
contents. either because they are parts of our very own consciousness. or because
ofscllslng. rather than relations between tiioytttt and objects oftxptritiict.
Alleged contents (of a state or representation) The contents that a state or representation is
we specifically intend them by self-ascribing them. They are fully welcome, fully often thought to have. usually on the basis of intuition Di pliilosophiealor psychological theory.
endorsed, and fully mm. Arising B arise: from A (or, equivalently. A grim 7‘!!! to B) when E is nothing ovtt and above A.
eg.. because B is identical to, Fully grounded in, constituted by, or realized by A.
Aspect (of an intentional state) The intentional state itself, the intentional property the state is
an lnflanliillon of. i , , , ‘this property, otnn lnsmnrutlon nrtht latter kind orptopetty.
Aspcclvicw Tht View that to intcntiunall ttptcttnt tht Cuntcnt c is to how a State with a
pottitiilnt aspect. whet: Kllis ntpttt |SldCl1[iCfilKO c.
Attitude functionalism The View that an intentional mental states attitude is a matter of its
functional role.
Attitude phenomenalism The View that an intentional mental states attitude is a matter ofits
having certain ‘ ‘ phenomenal characters.
Attitude reptesentationalism The view that an ll'I[L'n[l0r|al mental state’: attitude is a matter of
its having certain Cl12l’aC[cI'lV(iC contents.
Attitiidtt The ortitiidt Component orthoiightt and standing ttitts.
Broad content An intentional ttitti Content it Ilrnzzzf ion in titt it is or least partly dtttnnintd
by cnvironmcntal roctort.
Cashing our thoughts Thoughts that State that an iniinttliatt content at least partly Cisllcs not
into another content.
C«aspect The aspect of an intentional state representing C that is identical to its content.
C-ness The property that the content C (allegedly) picks out.
Cognitive phenomenal characters Non-sensory phenomenal characters that are special to
thtnightt in that thty do not gtn:ral.l_VOCflll’ in Ollicr types ornitntal ttnttt. Such at pttttntiitl
ttnttt, bodily Sensiltluns, or emotiunal States.
Concepts The tiibpmpnsition ’ representations involved piirnatily in thoughts.
zw
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250 Glossary Glossary 2.5]
Conditions of truth (or reference) (of an intentional state or content) The conditions in Error of it on The error a theory of inrenrionality makes when the content it assigns to a
which an intentional state or content is true (or refers to particular items). reprcsenration Iaclts features that its represented contents superiicial character has.
Co (about the phenomenal character of thought) The view that there are no phe-
' Ltperiencc sec (Phenomenal) crpcricncc.
nomenal characters beyond sensory phenomenal characters, which might include perceptual, Externalism (about mental content) The view that there are broad contents.
imagisric, verbal. and emotional phenomenal characters. ", contents, '
‘ ‘ ‘ or Contt-nts. phc—
content see (intentional) content. Derived content. and Represent. nomcnal characters, or representations that have properties of having values on certain
Content-characteridentityview The view that the intentional contents of originally ||'l(Cl'|r dimensions.
tional states are identical to their phenomenal characters. External theory of truth (or reference) A theory of truth (or reference) that takes the criteria
Correspondence theory of truth (or reference) The view that a content is true (or refers) if it determining whether a mental state is true (or what it refers to) to be determined at least in
appropriately corresponds to. but is not identical to. a state of alfairs (or an item of another part by factors other than our specifications.
kind. such as an object or property), which is its truthrnialtcr (or referent). " ' “ ‘ ' ' The view that
‘ states are ‘ ' ‘ be- ‘ ‘ ‘
(Deep) nature (of an intentional content/state/property) What an intentional con- cause they bear the right kinds of functional relations to actual and potential occuirent states.
tent/state/properry really Li, meraphysically speaking. including phenomenal intentional stares.
ncnvarively intentional property A Way things are or might be with respect to their derived Functional role theory The view that all (actual) originally intentional states arise from mental
inrenrionality, or a dcrivativcly intcntional way things are or might be. representations" ‘roles.
III. . mum‘. ..°'-a..[‘.. Giving rise to see Arising.
’
‘ P‘°P€“."-
F r II i J i
. . . -
D
. .
” l reprarnts a
A identity PIT The version of PIT that combines the start identity VICW. the property identity
contcnt when it instantiats a deriv2tiv:l_ intentional proptny representing that content. view, and the content-character identity view. the view that every originally tentitinal
Derivar' in (aboutanallegedily nonconscious tentionalstate) The view that the relevant
‘ state u identical to sortie phenomenal stare, every originauy intentional property is dcnrical to
contents are dcrivativcly intentionally tcprcscntcd. some phenomenal property. and every originally intentional state's content is idenneal to its
Dcrivativist self-ascriptivirnt The View that we dcrivarivcly intentionally represent various phenomenal character.
contents by arcrihing them to ourselves or our mlmral states. identity theory ortrurli (or reference) The view that a content is true (or refers) ifit is identical
Derived content Conttntthat is derivatively represented. See also (DMR) and (DMR-standing). to a fact (or other item). which is its truth-maker (or referent).
Derived intentionality lntetirionality that derives from other instances of inrenrionality. comer-it Ar.‘ ’ ‘tart-ui . . J
i ‘ that
Desire-satisfyingvirtue A feature of a theory or claim that makes it more desirable that it be ‘runs through our minds" or that is immediately available to us when we are in the intentional
true. state or use the representation.
Direct derived representation Derived represeiitation in which a vehicle of derived representa- Indirect derived representation Derived repi-est-iitation in which we take a vehicle of derived
tion represents a content that our takings. stipulations. ctc. directly specify. representation to represent ri content that our takings. stipulations. etc. do not directly
Ditpotitionalisui (about personal standing states) The view that personal standing states are specify.
“ , ' ‘ L similar ' other relevant disposi~ lnflationism (about an allegedly noticonscious intentional mental state) The view that the
rions. such as dispositions to behave in particular ways. Also called reduetivcdiipositiunalisoi. mental state has phenomenal contents.
Distinct (internal) struictuta Distinct. fairly localizablc. and persistent structures in our heads. (Intentional) content Things ofthc sanie ltind as what we are tempted to describe as whit: our
Distinct structures view The view that personal standing states arc distinct internal structures mental states are ‘directed at‘ or what they “say” when \vc introspcct on paradigm cases of
that continuously intentionally represent their contents. intcnrionali
(DMR) Immediate content C (and any state or vehicle with immediate content C) derivative/y lntentionaliry The feature that in paradigm cases we sometimes both (i) notice spectively '
represents C+ (for S) ifs takes C to mean C+. in ourselves and (ii) are tempted to describe using representational ten-ris. such as ‘about.’ “of?
(DMR-standing) Subject 5 tin-ii/mi/cl} vrprtsrurs Cr (for S) ifs takes herself to have a state with ‘represent: ‘present.’ or tying something."
"
content C+. (intentionally) representing something rrireniiirorrl/gv represents 2 content when it insranriatcs
Edcnir colors colors exactly as they appear to be, i.c.. simple. primitive. sui generis, an intentional property with that content.
non-disposittonal. non-relational. and nonamental color properties. Intentional mental state A mental state that includes, but may not be exhausted by. the instan-
Eliiuinative dispositionalistn (ahour personal standing states) The view that thcrc are no per- tiation orintcnttonal properties.
sonal intentional standing states but only dispositions to have oecurrent states with the same lntentionail property A way things are or might be with respect to their inrenrionality. or an
or s milar contents or other dispositions, such as dispositions to behave in particular ways. intentional way things are or might
Eliuiinati im (about anallegedly nonconrcious intentional mental state) The view that the intentional state An instantiation ofnn intentional propcrry.
mental state does not exist or does not intentionally represent the relevant contents. Internalism (about mental content) The view that there are no broad contents.
' ‘ ' i '4 , rhmlcing.
'
I D
nrothcr internally ‘contents, ' ' or Cuntcntsphc» -
represcntinga content. nomenal characters, or representations that have proper parts that are also contents. phcnoin.
Error orconrinisrion The crror z theory or inrenrionality male-r when the content it assigns to cnaleharacrers.crrepresentarions, , tively.
a representation has siiperhciai character with rearurei that its reprcscnred content does not
a internal theol'yaftrullI(otl'cfcrcnce) A theory or truth (or reference) that ralrcs the cri-
have. teru dererrnining whether a mental sure is true (or what it rereis (0) to be spccinrd
by us.
:5: Glossary Gland?) 1.5}
' "‘ Thevicw that stares‘
' ' ' " repre
‘ ' rhenotnenal intentionaliry .l.e...y (PIT) The vicw that an aenial originally intentional natet
sent the .onrents that a possible ideal interpreter would aterihe (0 them using intentional ante rrorn phenomenal states.
sysrenis theory. .i.a. arises from ' _
Liberalism (about the phenorneiial eharaerer or.l.o..gh.) The view that Illmtgllts have cogni- phenomenal inten ‘anal property A nay thing. are or might be with tcspect (0 then phenom-
tivc phenomenal eharaertrs. enal intentional or a phenornenal intentional way (lungs are ot might be.
Long-arm hrnetionai role theory A hinetional ml: rlreory that takes the relevant mlcs ... " ‘state An‘ ofa,‘
' ' “ ‘property
'
include both internal functional roles and long—arm hirietinnal roles. which are fllnctlonal rolts Phcnomenally repretenreti eontent see Phenomenal content.
with respect to items in the extenial environment. vhenontenal property A way things are or might be with respetr to phenomenal consciousness.
Matching .. content A .......;.n eonrent B when thcy are cxactly alike in siiprrheinl character: or a phenomenal nay things are or might he
1.. content A .nantm item a (which may or may nor be a content) when all the rentrrt-t ofA's (phenomenally)eonteio..s(.nenral)state A .nen.al stare rl.a. includes our niay not be or.
superficial chznctcr are had by B. liauttedhyatlic‘ - ' or; , ,« Alsocalledai' eaperi.
Matching theory ortrnth (and rererenee) The new that aeonrenr IS flu: (... refers) iii. matches enee.
some orher irein in the world. which IS its .r...h....al... (or tcfctcnt). Phenomenal one An instantiation ota phenonrenal propeny.
(Mental) representations internal ..en.. that at. the vehicles nhnrentinnnliry. - The View that,
-- tnnstionsttaret ' - represenrrhe
Mismatch ease (re. a theory ofinoentionality) A use .n which a rheory ofintcntionality n.al.t-s contents they would originally represent if they were phenomenally conscious.
false predictions regarding thc snperlitial character nrrepresentea contents. Primitivisln (about original intentionality) The view that original intentionahty is primitive.
Mode orpresentation A guise under which a eonten. is represented. Property identity view The view that every originally intentional property is identical to sortie
Multiple arisahility An intentional ptopertyis mu/ltplja ' ' ins! in east inttantiariontofthis phenomenal property.
property can arise in d.ifl'crcnt ways. Propositional content A content with a propositional form, c.g.. <grass is gr¢cn>.
Natnrar tie ioeint rtineiainenral physical itcms lacking n.e...ahty and itetnt trising From rhein. Propoiitionalism The view that all intentional states represent propositional contents.
- theories - -- T coricsui‘ ‘ tiiatappcalonlytn
'- _ ' " ‘ ‘ ‘ '' An ' ‘ Statc is ,
' " mimlwd when it plays a
L I
ircnis. D‘ ' role appropriate to its superficial character.
Nonconccptual represent.-ition A way of representing a content that does not involve or Qualia Felt. subjective, sensational. qualitative. or phenomenal mental items that are not
otherwise require having the concepts required to describe it. represented contents.
Nonconscious occurrenr state An occutrent state that is not phenomenally conscious. Reducrive ditpositionalism (about standing states) See Dispotittonalisni (about standing
Non-phenomenal intentional stat: An intentional state that is not a phenomena] intentional states).
state. Relation view The view dist to intentionally represent C is to bear a particular rclation (other
Non-propositional content A content that does not have a propositional form. c.g., <blue> and than instantiation) to C. where C is an item existing distinctly from the representing of C.
<Gem‘gK>. Represent Rrcpmcrm C when t: is Rs intcntionallcuntcntt c is Rs dctivcd content. or c is R's
‘“ , r ’ ' with a I K ' ‘ ‘content, i.e.. a content on some everyday, scientific, or other notion ofrcpreseiitatioii, which need not be that
content that does not have .a propositional form. of intentionality.
Ohjecbinvolving tontent A content that constitutivcly involves a particular object. property, Representation A nientsl representation or other item that teprtsents.
kind, or other worldly item. llepresetitatioiialirin The view that all actual cases of phenomenal consciousness arise from
Occtirrent flax: A mental state that is used, entertained. or otherwise active at the time at which intentionality, perhaps together with some further ingredients.
it is had. Self-ascriptivism The view that we derivauvely represent various contents by ascrihitig them to
Original inrentionallty lntentionality that does not derive from other instances or intentional- ourselves or our mental states.
ity. Sensory,‘ The 3 ' eharaetett or sensory stat...
r‘ ’V‘nally intentional property A my things are or might be with respect to their original such as perceptual and emotional states.
intentionality. or an originally intentional my things are or might be. Short-arm fiinctional role theory A functional role theory that takes the relevant Functional
originally intentional state An instantiation ofan originally intentional property roles to be internal functional roles. which are functi ‘ roles that rcprcscnuttonx have in
Originally representing Somlcthing angina]/y reprcrtntl a content when it instantiates an origi~ relation to other representations or other internal items.
nally intentional property representing that content. Standing state A mental state that need not be used. entertained, or otherwise active at the time
Paradigm cases ofintcntionality Mundane, everyday cases of mental states like those described at which it is had.
in §i.i. State identity view The view that every originally intentional state it identical to sotne phenom-
Personal state A sure that can be said to be had by an entire person. enal state.
Phenomenal character The specific "what it's like‘ or felt quality of: phenomenal state. Strong identity PIT The View that every intentional state. property. and content is identical to
(Phenomenal) consciousness The subjective. experiential, felt. or ‘what it's like‘ feature of some phenomenal state, property. and content, respectively.
mental life. Strong identity PIT‘ Strong identity PIT together with the view that every phenoinenal state is
Phenomenal content Th of a phenomenal intentional state. identical to some intentional stale.
( Phenomenal) experience See (Phenomenally) conscious (mental) Suit. Sttongidentity pl'r+ Strung identity PIT together will] the view that intentionality has the
features normally attributed to phenomenal ' .
.
154 C/tzsmry
Strong PIT The vi:w that all (mun!) intentional states ansc from phcnnmcnal starts.
Subpcrsorul sure A state that |s had bya subsystem urn pcrson. rathzr than uh: person hcrsclf.
Snbproposilional rcprcscntation A rcprcscnranon whose content docs not have a propositional
form bu: that can rnnn a pan on propositional content, L‘.g.. «no and <bluc>.
‘" _ 5
‘ 'chaxacwr T‘ ‘an’ ' ‘ rare U.’
' ‘cunzcnr that L
ix as :11: content that it as.
(Taking) Subject 5 make: a representation’; immcdiarc courcnr C an mm c+ if s has a sci of
dispusiriuns Eu havccashmgour daoughn that rogrrhtr spcdry (ha: C cashes our intoC+ (upon
sufficicnz rcflcction).
(Taking-standing) Subject 5 mm hersclfm hat/In mm wnh content C+ am) 5 as disposcd to
accept that she has a star: wnh content c (upon sufficacm rcflccnon), and (1) cache: c+ is
identical to c ur 5 takes c to mean c+.
Theory ofinrcntionaliry A theory that dtscxibcs ah: dttp nature ofintcntionaldzy.
Theory ofu-nth and reference A theory that pmvadcs Crittna that determine the condiiium an
which a mental state is true or whna it refers (0.
Thoughts Orcurrenr mental sxarcs ahn wt: are |n when we dfl what w: commonlycall “xhanhangr
Tracking Dmaang. carrying infnrmariun or havmgthc funcnun or .n yingmfomuanon about,
or otherwise - csponding n, amn. an [he tnvaronmcnt.
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Scllaxs. w. s. (.995). Empiricism and .1.9 philosophy 9r......9l.M.....m... s...a.9... .7. l>l..19,..pl9 Tyc. M. (.9999). A rcprcscrlulional .1.99.y ufpzins and .l.9.. phcnomanal 919.99.... . 1..-/.....p;..~...1
41...»... ...999.9. I’rrxp:t!iur.1.9:ux—x;9.
59119.9. W. s. (1973). 11.9 9.1.9.9191 .1.9p.y 9: .119 919.99.. 9; 99999.19... Alrtapbllusaphy. T99. M. (.9995). Tm nab/9». .fc..»....-..m.....- ,1 Rrprrxmtutinml 11.9.7 afthr .vlm.....m..1
s(Ap.7~l)....—.s9. Mind. MIT Press. Can-lbnclgc. MA.
Shapiro. L. A. (.997). Th: 9...... or naxuxc: Rethinking naturalrsric theories 91 lmcnrionaliry. Tyc. M. (9999). Canxnamm, Cabr. and c9...».m. MIT Press. Cambridge, MA.
I’h.!n.mpIumIP:y:lmIogy. lo(;):;o9—;n. Tyc. M. (.9911). The expcricncc of 9.99.199: An inrcntionalisl .l.99ry. Revue Inlzrnatinnalz .1:
Shoenukcr. S. (1oo;). Conrcnr. character and color. Plrilasaphimllxxua. 19:151-178. 1>;..z9.9pz.... 9999-99.
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ms Btbli/rgmphj
Tye, M. (1009). Canxdntanm Revtlritrd: Matmalmn wit/mu: P/m1nm:mzICum':pt.1. MIT Press.
Cn111b1idgc. MA.
Tye. M. (21:15). Phenomenal extemalism, Lulu: and the planet Xcnon. In Sabarcx, M., Sosa, D..
and Horgan. T., :ds., C11/111111111 .111 1111 11/11/11111;», afjargzwm 1011, pp. 190-1111. MIT Press.
Cambridge, MA.
Tyc. M.. and w11g111. 11. (11111). 11 111e1e n phcnomcnulogy 11r1111111g111.>1n Baync, 1:, 11.11 Montague,
M., eds, Cagnilivt Phenatnzrtalagy. pp. 115-1111. 011111111 Universuy 111111. 01111111.
Vigtr, c. D. (11115). 11 1111 11111 of perception 111 p1111ade accurate rcprcscnmuons? A C35: 1111
rh: "no" sid:. 111 Srainlon, R. cd., Cm1Iem[>amr_y 171111111111 Cogmtiut 11121111. pp. 175-111.
Blackwell, Maldcn MA.
Wciskrancz, 1.. (1935). Blinrirtgh/: /1 C111: 5111111 and lmplim/wrzx. 01151111 University Puss.
Oxford.
Wciskranrz, L. (1997). Cnrzmamnex: I./1:: 1mdI~'om1d. Oxford Univcrsny Press, Oxford.
V/ickdgrcn, W. A. (1979). Cllunking and zonsoljdzzinnz A " ' xynrhcsis of wmannc
nctworks, configuring 111 cundixioning. 5.11 v<rsus cogmzivc lcarning, normal forgetting, 111e
amnesia synd1o1ne.nn11 1111 hippocampa] 111111111 sysrcm. 12111111111111”/R11,e11, X6(1):.1.4»6o.
Wickclgrcn. W. A. (1991). V/cbs. cell assgmblics. and chunking in neural nets. Cmm-pr: in
Index
1\1’e11ro.1rier1r:, 1(1): 5;.
Williamson, T. (moo). l\’r1nw/zdgeunzl In I.1mi1:. Oxford Univcrsity Press, Oxfurd.
W ght, w. (wag). " ; rcprcscntationalisln and color. 1v11z.1111,1;1111z 1217111111/11;).
I6(+):s1s—s19-
Yo|1ng,C.A. (11115). “henomcml intcntionali .11 1111 problcn\of1:ogn1[1vc 111111111. P111’) 1111111.
Ibuumess, xv. xvi. rs. 7, 7ns. 9. 11-13, 18. 19. phmamcnal c11;11nc1e1.1 11 aspcus. 14111
The University ofWcsrc1n 011111111.
3m1Ln1 aspect new
351-51 Isanu. 180. 244
advcrbialism, 198. 214, 1.30-1.11, z.;\ aspect V11.-\v,xviii, 111,115,191-119,
11151111111111. 111 I-43444
1.111 1111- m1ny pruptrly pn1111e1.1. 1. 1 -11115, 111-111 1he argument 1'1o111 pammony for, :03, 106-219
St: 11:» 1111111111111 and .11111cn11 111 6111- or second-p1der 11am or
p111pe11111.111- 11.1111-119,111-1;;
Akins,Ka1hl:cn. }6n6,44n1§
a1 11 nlcfcmc o1'11Ie11111y PIT (111 relauan vxew 11 An
argument (111111 commission, 33-11;, 46. 5;. 11I1;e1-111111 111 xdenriry 1111')
54. as, ex. ssms, 87-88 11e1in1111111 nn 1911
.11 11a11111111r111111.41
dependence thmrics or
'
argumcnr (111111 omission. 41-41, .16. inrentionaliry. $11 (racking 1111-111111 111‘
31-54,511,512-59.37-as intcntionalizy: axymrncrric
111 11111111 1111111. 11
dependence tracking 111e11111s
arkingv 33-34. 71. 72-741 84» 891-11. 9.%—97. 111111111115,1o1n11.114111,1;s-159,179
I02, I10 arnmdc fun<nunaLism, 157-1511, 179
definuion 111.11 anmxde p111no1nen1111n1. xoznn, 1s7-159. r9
111111111111 11111111111111. 111-1111 157-119. 9
1111111111 1ep1n1n1111n11n1111111.
11111 1111- M1 1-111111111. With (radung 1.11 11111111111111 1e11.1.e11p1111e.11 117-111. 171-1111
11111111.
ml: 1111111111 (st: 1:111 Prublcnl) I~11-1y1.us.u7
11111 1111 11111 11e1n111 to «cup! 11.1 phcnomuui
Inzcnnnnahzy 11111111 11” phcnomcnal
13111111111, Lawrence. 1,;-111.117
1r1(:nnn1|aIizy 111111,. Arguments (111)
111-11111. s11 1111111111,; 11111;; 1111111111111
Aspen!
binding p1o111en1. 1191137
C-mpcrr, 119. 11;-111.111-111
d»cfini1im1u¢'. 191
Hindsight, 111111, 111. 1911
11 5111- 11 11111111111111 mm or p111p¢111=., N11. 1111. 1111n11, 1oEm.9.
3111111,
111-111.111-111.111-1,, 19o—191n17
1.67
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7.68 Indix Index :69
Bogl1ossian,l’aul. .;on1z, 54n31, 66 contents. phenomenal characters. and shared cor1r:nr1.z1 1-111, zunéu directedness. Se: aboutness
Bonj0u1,L11wrcncc.73.761'1é.8on1o1 representations s1111111111111111.11111 1111111 11.,.1111.1111111.11111) disj11nc1ivisn1. See 111’ 1 1:111:11.
11161119, 114-115, 1121 concepts. 90, 113-159 1.151111111111111,111,111.111.111.111.111,
Druske, Frcd, xvi, 11n16,1 34, 35, 35115,
Bourger, David. 1111-1111, 11111, 111121, 161111, d1i1r1n11'1l.1-0?-141.1111 114‘!-I51 1451115.1so—1s1.1s4.zso.uB—x49
ggng, }9n11, 61n}9, 66, 84m,
dcfi11111r1n 111'. 41. 114 11111111111111111111..111111p11v11. .11. 191-111. 1111.
2;. smao. s9n3s. 73-76. 84111. Rs. Ssnz. 1111-14-7
xoznz;-14,.11o,11on1,116—1l7n
11111111-1:111 views of, 111-134, xsoms
8En6, 86n8. 971-111, 111111111;-1.1. 1111311 11111111111111
11111111111 11111111111. 1 11-111
1111-1113. 1o8nn;o-31. 1111, 111.11., 113111. prurorypc tonc1p1s.9o, 111-151 Cranc. Tim, xii, 7115, 8n9, 198n6.
102.1113, 11111111 11111111, 41-59,711-79. 17-1123.
11;n4,116n7,117.119,119n1o,1z9—-130. recogmrioml concepts, 1111-119.17 199, 2.oon9 102-103,1;ii,1;6,189,z.o1—2o;.Se:
1z9n1o.15on1o.137n13,1;9n16, 1411118. supulzlcd 1-1311111111, 11a—111.119~14o.14x,
Cummins, Robert, 1onn13—14. 187n2.4. aka mismatch cases: perceptual eolor
66, 16E
154nn4Lv4;.163,16;n3,188,196nI. 1
111111111111 ri1111 concepts. 111~115, 14111111 representations; reliable
197111., 1.ao.zo1n1o,zo7n7.o
cons1ciou3n:ss.Set phcnomcnal deep nzture (of'111tcntio11ality, intentional m1sr1pt1s111ta1111.1
111111111111, P11111111, 4, 51.1. 1;. 151.19.31.11. tle1‘in111o11of. 6
consciousntss states, and contents), xv, 11-28, 11
2.1,
86117, 198n6 rc.1111111 al>ouz.Eo—61.é9
conzcnrs 36-57, 40, 51-14, 63-64, 1111, 88n11, 96.
broad 1111111111, 17, 66-68, 116, 111. 130-187.. 11111111 1o111~cp11o11 all 63-69
11 1b1111:1prepu11n'ons,4. 113. 197~19z1.1111-1111. 1a6n6, 196-197. 199, 111;, 1.1.6,
l3ln10.I99-2.00.z2.K,130.1.44.1.49 1111111111; 1.1111111111111111 11111.11 11111.11. 11-11
111-111,111-114
}.13—210. 21on15. 1.3; Egan, P111111, 11. 1311111
11 1 11.111111351151111 {.11 1111 1.111111111111111 11113111 1111111111 11111111,}... 11111 COl’IC¢Pl’S:
11-.111111o111111y rhcory, 111 1.1. 117-111. 111.
definition afi :1, 1.4
d11in111onof. 11 24-116, 119-111. 119~119 Eliasmitl1,Cl1rls, 11.1, 136, 11111111
11;-1111115111, 111.119-155 (1m1z11.1'1111 derivativisr strategy about allegedly
1.1 11111111 1.1'.7.11..1111111111111 (111 1111111 11111) elimlnativism
psychology; 11 -ascnpnusm: 11.11.11 111111.411) conrenr p1op111i11, 11 1.111 non-phenomenal inrcnrional srarcs. 11111.. 1.1111 (11. 111111111 11111111111111.1111...)
definiuon of, 91 111111111111 1.111.111 35-116.97-100, 14111111
111111 11111111
ihblll’ inrcntionaliry. 11-11
By1n1:,A.lcx,4n1,1znl7.39n9,4§n1X. 1lefi1111io11 a1‘, 3 1111111 allegedly 1.1111111111111111 111111.111. 111111. 1111.... .11.1...1111..111111111.1-1111111111111111111 (111
6onn3(~—37. 1ozn2.3. 1111311111. 111111111 111111111 111111111 1111 1111111111 i11Kc11nona.l1r_v: 111111-111 99-1111. 161., 161-169. 1117 111.111.111.111. 11111131. 11111111 111131111.
reprmnrarion.self-a1111p11v11111] 111511111011 or‘. 97 ..111..,1111.11111.11.11 11111111111111 111111)
11 1111111111, 1.111111111111111 (111 11111111.. 11111) 1.1.1.111... or, 1111-11;.
1111111111111 1111 1111111111111. 1111.... 1111111111 (:11 1111111111, 1.111111111111111 11111111)
cashing our. 141-159 1111111.197,111.1119.117,111-11, P11111111. 111111, 16s~ 169; 9111111 11111111111111. 11111111 1111111 (:11 11111111 eliminanv1sm 111.1111)
1111111111111. 111', .11 11 6111-111 .—11111111.111.111 111111 1. 11111111111, 9. 111-1-111111111111,151-111,161,114-15;
.11
eliminarivist strategy about allegedly
11.111111 1111111 1111111151.... 1111111111, 111-111.1111-119,111-1;; funczlunalisr (lcflVariVlS|'1I‘1.lCfil'1lK|0!I oi‘. IE1-164.
511111.. 11111111,; .11.. 1111111111111 11111111 1 111111.111(111..11.1.1.11111111.111.11.)
nomphenomenal intentional srarcs,
11.11111111111111.11.11y191111111. 161. 161111:
cashing out rhoughts. 97-98, 141-159, 11111111111.11.111./1....111.11.11111.111.1111.. 1.111 pmblerns w11l1. 165-169 97-100, 191
1:l:nvaKiv1sm. 163. 161111111111 1r1ck1'11g and
1.111111111111111 derivarivisln. 1115111111111 61, 164:
abour broad cements. 98-99
178-181. 179n19
77. 77111, 1.lefin111on of. 97
1
1111111111111 1111 1111111111. 116.
d:fi111r1on M141
,
165-169
911111111111 19111..
71, 111.11rs11r.111111.1.1 1-11.111111, 111-111, pn1111111l111 1l111v111v1111111111i11111111 11, 1511 1111111 11111111111111 111111111111 11111., 911-1111. 161,
121111.11 1111111111; 1111 11161151111, 1.1-1.1;
111-1 511 01 T11-11111111111.-111o11. 1117. 11171124 11111111.... 11;-157 111-1s11.1s1,1u
,1111..1111e1111o1.111111 or, 111 1111111.
is 11111111111111. 11111111 1111.11. 111,111-11101111131111.1111...11-11,117.
511 111117 11111111.; .1111 1b11111sr1111l1115 starts, 151, 1é1~1é9- 13o-111
no11—p1opu1111o11al 11111111111 (11: 1111111111111 1111111111;
11.11111 111111111111. 11
1111. 141
Chalmers, David, xi—xiii. 12.nn17—1B, 42. 11171111111 11111111111 111.111.111.111 1-111111111:
1
about standing states. 99. 161. 119-114,144
1111111;-1.1, 4311121, 35111, 3§n4.. 1191.11, derived representation
,,.11,.111.1111.1.1111.) 11111111 ri1a11g)1r1,98—9s. 153. 191 (setalm
111111111 1.1111111111111111. 11-11. 111-111 (11: also
1o8n)1,11o,1}81114.147n51,163 111111-1111119111,; 1111111111; (:1: 11.111111191111115 1111-11:11.11.»-11111)
11111111111111. 11111.17 11111.11 1111g1111y
Chisholm, Roderick, 5m.. 198, 1.30 111111.111)
..1.1..11111.11111111.11 111.111.111.111 11.11.) emotions. 1o1,1o1n2.§.1o;n7.5.12.8
ob1=c1111l11111r11111,1r1a.1o1,11;
Chudnofl". Ellj2l1.1o1.1Lsn3 111111111 111111111 111.111.111.111. (:11 111111111 error ofcommission. See argument from
1. onrolugirally 111111111111 1111111111»: 111111011 11111:
ehunking, 154 1111 1111111111 111111111111 1'...)
11.111111111110111 derived 1.111111111111111 commission
11112111111111.1111
cognitive phenomenology, 1131, 1141-117. p1.11.111111111l1111111.11.- (11: 91111111111111 1111111111) 51: 1111111111111 from
111111 1161111115111...
1111111111111111..11111111 1111111111111-11111. 119-1111,
1;é—1;9.1;on)6,151,153 °‘1>=K<P!imI1-3--9.19.91,114-1s1s,191.11o omission
14111111, 14111111, 116. 1 11
absrracra. 1111-113, 111-111, 111-111.
11 1>111o1.11
cognitive science, 1o-11, 1on1;. Se: 41:11 111111». 11111 1111111111 1111111 11111111111111.
error theory. Se: rcliablt misrepresentation
z16.117.1z1-11-1.11;
mind-brain sclcnccs asporslblc 1911111. 1111-111, 111;, 11 1-11., 1.16.
defimtions of. 1161 111-111, 1111-111.11, :x1:1n:lism.Ste broad conrenr
color. See edcnic colors; mismatch cases: 111-111 descriptlvism,85,11(1on17,1471I;1, 149n3s.
perceptual color representations p1'upo§11lon=1l:1)n1(nrs. Sng. ;91~1x.7;n5,11;1, 18zm.1, zz;n.14 Farkas. l(:1talin,x . xvi, 85m. 86m.
commonsense psychology. 5:: folk 1O1.nlS1lll. 1111117 11111 1111111111111 1111111111. 11 1 11.111111511131111 1211 1111
103-104.. 114.115, 11.6. 143111;, 165n8
p111p1.111I CDIIIEHKS, 3119, 1o1«m-t. 111.111.1111. 111.111.111.111 1.1111111111111119 theory. 90. 91.
psychology Fodor.Jerry. xvi. 8n1o.9n11. 1om;.
1111111117 97-98, 114-116, 1111-155. 1311-111
complex conzenrs. phenomenal characters. d111,s.11-11.197-195,111.511.11.119-11a, 1gnn19-Lo, 54, )4n4, ;5ns. 61, 76n6.
as 511151 1111». 1111111111111 1111111111; as disnnct (111111 11111-nediare
and representations. Set structured 1111116. 1111111. 1111 COIIKCIIK). 1; 1- ,1 1 116—1171171157.u§
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2.70 lndzx Index 2.71
Folk psychology, 9-I0, ionnig—x4, I61. ié7, inflation is: strategy about allcgcdly intentional state matching (ofcontcnts oi contcnts and other
243. 247 nomphcnonicnal intcntional states, dctp naflxrc of(:e: dcep niniici items)
v1§C0\.ll|( ntiiii pniiis of, I30»: 3:, us
517-100 ilcfinmcn oi, -
dcfiiiiiinn ol, x, x~. iiiiii-1
iiiiiniiigaiiieniinnniiiy” iii mini ni iii role in, XVL Ibmfl allcgnll)‘ nunronsufllls 0C(|l|'l’Cn( SKAKCX, loo. Ll(fl\’aIl\'€ly lnlenrlonfll Slit: (Se! dcflved XI: aiin niismalcll cm, niiiniiiiii Ptflblflli:
9-Io, ixnlj, Htl-6, H8. ifiu-181,14; |51,x37|ll3-I90 icpieieiiiiiinni pllcnfinlcnil (l'ml’aCl’Cl’: is iiiiiiiiing intentional
iiinciiannl l'0lt tl1:orics,x\'i~xviii, 3. 70-80, niioiii Kllclugllfli 97-72:, H! otiynally mlcnllonnl )(i|’(‘ (sellnltlfllollal _ (Glitch!
ii7—u9. 199, 2.4; dcfiniuun oi. 97 niigiiiii lnrcntlollality McGinn, Colin, 4onn., sznzg
definition of. 7i infoiimiion, ID, l8$~l5l7. Sn aim iiipiiiiiiii Kllaratltf iii‘(msiiii:iiii-iii Clldfahlel) mfntal rcprcscnlations. s—9nio. is, 7:.
lcngdflll version: dtfinlucln iii 7]: 7|-71., 76-—l(L7 TR-ftprcscnlatloll si: atia lntcfllioflllll)‘
mismatch ptohlcm fat. XVI. 77- 9i 79-Ho, 87—:;n.
i97ri;, 10§nI7
intcntionality intcmalism, in. us. I5in37, :18. 2.4.4.
dtfinliiml iii‘. 3
i it). i is.. i, [SCIILTD llllslnarcll pmbltm)
nspi-ci VIEW in (St! Ixpflit view) radical iiitcriialixm, no, us. z.)7—z4x
Real Problem fnnxvii. 71/7+ 7(~—77i 79-80, 90- sllbpfopuslllunal mental iipiiiininiiniin mini
deep IIAKUYE nriiii Llttp HAIL!!!) inrrospcclion r¢pm)‘!nXaK|L!l’\S IS, 39n8: Lanccpts as. is, l:4;
92-93, ms—in6. ms (uzaba Rea1l‘rol>l:ni)
ciivnd iiiiniiiiniiiiiiy, ii—i,, I51-X53 ixmiiia is iiini in iiianingnniiniinniiiiy." XVi. 5-3, ii—i 4. diifiiiiiinii ni‘, i:uis,iinia,7zn;.7si-s
siioii-aim vcinoii: dci-iiniioii of. "I: 71-75
d¢l’lVfl(lVl$l Sflitcgv abuul allegedly I3, I51. IQ! (sttdbainttntlollallly: DSKUHQWC Millikan, Ruth. lOn13.]4.34.n}. gs. ggnll.
ll0Xl~pl|=l'lOmCn2l rcntional states: derived drfinflion ni‘)
getting iiniind in (ll: World iipimniniinn) IX nni pmviiiiiig access K0 dccp |141IlIfE3,8. iii—i7.
H6-u7n7
definmgfiiiigniioiiaiii, iii KCHIIX niiii ml: in, .m.
" L'l.|mll141IlVlSm abnlll. ii— I4 iisns. ios—zio, zioiiis mind-body problem, 47. 47n12..
xviii,i|—i1,i;—i4,§X.146.247 infllnill‘ llltcnnunallly im iniuiiionaiiiy: Origlml as noi pmvidiiig arttss X0 5l2I|d1i’|gS(2lE\', i5— i- 43-49013
in!tl’IKiDm|liK_Y
Gow, Liiuia, xii, ;9n9, 411114, 6on36, as Suppolllngldcntlry PIT. 5')'9l1 mind-brain identity Ellcofy
ll‘Kl’D5ptCKl\'¢ aCc<SS!0,XV|, 5-3. l)~l4, is. is-i~. ltllmg |lS about Il\€ zrirzrla nriniiii and iirmnic. Exlnlpll nraii ahpcfil Vltw, X99
l§Ll'|}9, 2.30, 2.311135, z32.n56 ii as an
K-1464.77. an, 87,9s—96. mi, i X4‘! X5. Iz6I15. 11.0. 116 example nan idclllity Kllcory,
Gniiim, George, 76n6, 77nx, I63. l65n7 iii. I6 |. l03‘10(!, inx—i I n. iinnii. iin, 116,
IS In i l i—i I 3,
25 i lhtniy-ifldtpcndull way nraniiing Dill 2l)m.\( ii §>l I6
in mttnnonill .V(vlK€S,XVl,16Al7- XVXE, 4o—4»i. 48.
oiiginnl lllrcnllonalirj/'Llel'iniKlDn of. LLALI: syn.
mind-brain sciences
Hardin, C, L., ;6n6, ;9niu. s8n;4, 49-54.66—é3. E7-88. i l.5l|6. ins—iin, L16 ufits
rn‘
at
in term:
§
:5
§
5
6onn;6—;7, 65n4,5 z9iis.4is.4anio.~ i71,76Xl7,3l.3'i.§4.§S. inii iiii Kllniplrency ninipiniiiic. inn. i.
X§l’Il’I4- .iia,9i—9s.nn.ia.i~ioi,i;r. rolein.xvi. xviii, ia-i i. i a—i4, i9—zo, izx.
Harman. Gilbert, xii, xvi, 391111. 71, 72.. 93-g6nX9. iinnis is. in
uiiiiii. i i I. I53, I 36n45, inn. |5;vl66, 196.
9s—96ni9, IOUXZ3. 2.o9—i.io, zionzs 1.18, zzfinsq, us (It! aka immediate commxs, misinfotmatiun cfict, 172-174
Hilbert, David. 39n9, 45ni8. 6onn;6—37 pllenamcllfll iniiiiiininiiiyi Jackson, Frank, xii, 9mi, 59n9, 5inz7, iginix, mismatch cases
DSKEHSEVE definition ol::£(1{<lI1¢nl oi‘, 6; XVI, 54, (0l’IC<FlS ind iiinnyiii, iia- | 19
Hoigaii, Tcimcc, xii, xvi, 7sii6, 77nB, izgni. iiionm I4,7n3I. 199-100, 1OInlO.
ii—i.a. i4—i-;. IX-1,113. I3‘.-Iii, inn. is,~, Canctptuil color l¢P|‘<S(‘nlaHDnS, 45. i§§
BE, 91, 9;nI6, mi. 11511}, 12.6, iL6n7, z;;n44. z31—131
144- :47 diiiniiioii of. xi, i7
X57, I59, [63, i6;, I6§n7, zzxns; paradigm KISQS of: d¢fin|()C|l| iii: 6; I H9, 17, ,7, iiiioiiniis. 4;ni—,
Hussctl, Edmund, xvi, ssnz, i98n6 {Q51-(‘Iv!§‘90-9l,XSlAX§$.l6i'),X3E
Kind. Amy, ioznz; giisiiioiy rtprtsflllallnnsi «as
ieiiiinn vi:w niiiee ieiiiinii vim) lttflvlntsi R‘prCS£I\(iIlOl|). as
iheug ilepzndeiii acres: iu. u—z8, ii-ix. Kricgcl, Uriah, xii, xvi. 2.}, 3;, 85-86, sgni,
idealism (semantic). u.;, z7.3n47 hot and inin l‘(p\'(‘S('l'ltaKl0X\5i H. 3349
4o~«.48. 47-54. 54-65, K743i i I-O-I is (set 86nn6-8, I01, io8m.3. u8n9, iL5n;,
immediate contents moral cciiicepts, 45- K7
iiii lnlrospefliu i |‘}I¢O|’y-illdtptndflll way
-
i4mi8, iszmg, is7n4E. i6;—i69, moods, 4sni7, iz8 (sttalsa nioodx)
as aiptflx orinininnnii SKZKCS, L30 niiindiiig oiii ibniii intentional iiniiii
6,
oi‘ A([l[|XdCS, is9 igsnis, 2.oon9, 2.6!. LOLHI4, 1.03, 7.06. non-pcrcepninl mm. 4546
psydlnlugkal lllvfilvemenr. IS a
nimiiiiii; oiii iiiniigiin. X-H —i 5.; (St: nzii (fishing K’\€0l’y~lXId€p€l1dcnK way nriiiiiiiiig 0|." innni
1.09-2.10.1191136,}.3l,L§;—2§4,23)n§9 niriciniy flyfesrnlllluni. ii
iiioiigiiis; Stlf-aS{|’lpK|V/lim)
DUI
lnltnklonll iiniei)
pckcpnllil Color rcpieiuiiiiinn, iris, s3—4¢.
definition of", (£7 4(--(-9«77—79-X7‘39-15$-K39. mi~z.oX
Wllfll ii iiieniy of, IX ~11
2
nrpiiiaigm cases, iii languflg: ntiiioiigiii. 3, 3—9nIo, 7.}, ;9n8, icpiesuiianoiis niiiic :=l.li 45-46
intentional content. See contiint:
123,213-2.16 llllsmaltll plclllltm
ofpcxtpmal sum, iu- i S6 SE! 1150 llIaKCl‘lil1g(()fK.0Il[¢l\(<l:
phtnomcilal COHKEHKS, 97. ii,s—i 19, IS i, inmiiionaliiy mismatch problem
is Lewis, David, 9nlI. 39n9, 86, I64, z7.7.n4I.
i s4—i is intcnitlonal mental state Ll£fiX|K|Bl| of, is
ychelllarll‘ lmnlcdliie Lnllftlllx: dtfillitloll ni: i in; iiciiniiion of, 7 man“. 237
Loni, Brian, xvi. 84. sgni, is; ini lvngvalm riinciinnii ml: lhlflllti. in. 77-79.
I36—xsB. iss.iso 5.2 ALra inieniinniiiiy 7g—isn, R7-90, Xlg, i ix—ng
S('n§Dl"f iiniiiniiiii COIIICHKS. dtfixllllon oi: i '63: intentional ptopctty Wifliam, 84m, IOLIIZ4, iioni. l96nl
Lycai-i,
ind iiii pl1tn0lIl¢i’I2ll1\(€n(ll)l'lill(y (h¢Dl’y.
I};-|}8,ljOn}5ilil, KS9 dcfinlllflll oi‘. 7 Xlsvlzéi iis—i :9
Sui gkflkfls illlmtdlill L‘0n(€rI\‘S: ditiniiinii oi: i is: dniivaiiuiy inrtnrinnal Plupcrty (St: d({lV¢d and d\: tclauon Vltw, mi —mi
|§6"I}3, I55, I59 mplesrnkitlofl)
Macldc,}. L., 4Znl4. 45-46
for shurnami Functional ml: thcotiu. I iK~i )9
oiiiiougiiiii 3) iiiiiiigiiis plltnumtnal inniini. ii,-. originally ll‘llfl‘lKl0llal propcfly (set lntcnlibnillly: many propcrly problem, 2l9n36, 2.31-137. for Hlclilng Kllfnrics. xvi. ‘£S~59i 79-80. 37-9»,
ii7—i ii, KS1: is Ill: phznDl1IElI:lC0nKI.‘n{ ni ciiynii llllcnllflnrllliyl m’-tithing Kllcofy niiniiii ind rcfentntti ini—io;. iiii—ias
culling OM! lhcughis, I51 SI! niii iiiieiiiiiiiiniiiy Snake l'niXtl'\ing inrinniiniiii Ilflfllliltll 623:5
125-118, 2.38-2.39, 2.46-2.47
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-
2.7:. Index Index 17;
modes ofpresenration Pautz. Adam. xii. xvi. ;6n6. 41111.1, 6on;6. inprrcepxion. 39.91. mi, u~1 1 1:. qualia. 39n11. 51, s4n;1.84, 118
and cpixtemic gaps. .7. 11, so 8;,84ni,85nz.86, 111;, 11;n1,11-,—. in mi, 97-91, 111
11111115111. definition oi. wnix
1: occluding contents. 4-1'31 See Alsn phcimmenal imemionallty tlieo
141n1s, 157—1;8n5o, 15;-151,
ni’1epmen1ing
See nlxa \-lay)
i64nn4—6, 167. 167ml, l96nl, 197111. phennmenel intenriunality ehem-y. xvi, xvii,
Montague, Michelle, xvi, 8n9, tlsnz, (Cl. radical intcmalism. 2.30. 115, 2.47-1.48
1g8n4.zoo,zoon8,2.o1nio,2o6n19, ;1,so—19a,1;1n57,14;-1...,
12.311},15§n44,.z.ozn1s,zi.5n49 axgui-1-11»n:sl'ot.s~.—9:., 114~11;, 113419. Real Problem
2.2.7 n51
moods, 1111, 101111,, lognzs 11-1~11e, 11on1x with trarl.111gai11l inng.11n1 fiiricriorial mle eheenes.
Pcacocke, Christopher, 391111. 54n31. 71m
ax n. example ofzn eepeee view. we 11.11. "y—Xo. 90, 91-11. 1111-1115. 119, 111;
perception. 17-19. 131111, 44-45, 63-66, 89. wixh short-arm functional role theori 71/74.
neuroscience. 10-11. See «[11 m indebrxin definition oi; in XVIL
91, 101, IO6—103. 12.6. 13;, 154-136, identity PIT: definition of. 94: and the ielanon view. 715-77. so. 91-92. tomes
sciences
E51143. 2.o1niz,2.o6n1B. 2.09-2.10 191. 11.: combined with the aspect view. with denvnzivnni, 165-169
naive realism aelverbialisrvicw nrim xdvctbialixml u9~z;o. us. 1Ai~144. K91-11.94496. ma. wieh relation VICWS, ice, z.N~xo6. 1osnnix—19.
an example or‘: 1eln1iu11 view. 1;x,1a9—11o
71$
naive min. View or, 1911 in-mos.1os~11:.1vs—1vs,119«11a. 11 1. 11;
natutalism about inrcntiunainy, 111.. semi: data new of. 19:, 111611111. mg-lie, 11 ms. 11e11il.111,1a,—1.e. 11,1 Real Reason For accepting the phenomenal
ns. 244 1111111 (se:aLra sens: data) strong identity Pi‘l.defin1rion oi‘, loo. mi.
eleiininen er. 11-1,
intcnrlonaliry theory. Sr: phenomenal
See alto misnurch (ax; 1111-1 11.119. 141
and ehe pltcnomcnal inzentmmlily theory, xvii. intentionaliry theory: arguments for
personal states strung identity PlT‘:defi111zion or, no. 1n9~111
116-119. 116-11.;.117»111n7 cltallenyngcase For an phenomenal
as 1 strong PIT: defixurion of. 86: 36117.97. iao. recognitional concepts, 148-149
andtrackingthcorics. ,...,,1en.., 50. ,,n.,. intentioinlity xhenry, 16 1— 161. 169-1 31 10;-111.111,1s;,1s1,11a.14x and epistemic 5,1111. av (Xe: also ways oi‘
117»119.i1v~111i11v definition of. 161 weal PIT: dei"1n1nnn of: is: 3111114-5. ss.91~s1. reptesenllngl
nonconceptual content phenomenal character 911115 eel‘e1ence,xviii, 7115. 57n33. 9oni4, 1111-1111,
definizinn at‘. so cognitive pheneenenei character: definition of. 111: and the aspect view. 11s~11o,1;s. m~m. 119 2.30
1nd epmemie gaps, .7, 45, 56 ll‘ld\0ughI.xV|l. 115-111, isonin, 151; phenomenal intentional states and curresp(1i1dei'i(e ihemy 111'. 111 -1.13. 11;, us
11occludiiigcontenn, 4911 .n perception. isnu (1.. .11.. cognitive
1
properties defining “ineenein11ni1ey" in terms er. XVI. mi.
Se: nLw M zyx oi‘ 1t-p1e1e111111g phenomenology; liberalism; phenomenal
definition oi‘. 55 11-14. 1411-141
nonconscious occurrenr states, 6, 19-10, 25, mineneei
See also phtllofllenal imemionzlity climinativixn1 about,11-i4.iioi1i6.i.1o.1.46—1-)7
54: 7-45
ehe deep nenne er. 114-11; (I2: Alta truth iiniineeivinn about
11 1 elulllengingcasc 1'01 ehe phenomenal definition of. 34 phcnomcnal states and properties
fixing reference on iittentiomlity,
imcntinnzlity {l\CCi\’}l.XVHAXVlil.90v9319‘-X00. as identical to intentional enn1ene (see phenomenal definiuon oi‘, 34
I I4. I 18. I 51.. I66 (see RBI) inrcntiimali
15a-1n1. 134-191; iiirentionaliry tlteoiy- identity PIT) Se: aim phenoinennl eeneeinuenen
ciszeimvc nenninnn ofl
Llcl'ivzn\'i§m about. 99- too. 151, 16;— 169. 187 M lnarclling intentional contcltx. 5x -39, 111-111 Pitt, David, xii, xvi, 85m.. 86n7, ioi. i2.5n;, iden tliemy of. 111-1115, 113 11;
llefiiinion oi? 99. 161 1 s s. 1 59
115, 1z6n7. 157, 1;9,1s;,1761117.1izs. internal versus external tlieoiy oi. 1111111. us~zs9.
elimimnvixni about. sw—1oo, (11. 134-13 1. yeiisory phenomcnal:l'i2racrer:deFiiIiuo1I or,
19on2.6,i98nG. z12.m.7,z1zn;o.
1
l4‘n1
I11 . 144 -114-1 1s. 15-139. |;on56,
1 151 (set
133-234. mnsfi Inarchiiig theory oi’. 115-113. 1.1K-119.146-2-)7
infiazlonism about, loo, 1 :11, 1117, 1 15-19:: 'e phenomenology: ronservarisnl]
1he smlcnlre or. 34111, 11;—11e. 114-1” primitivism about intcntionality, 89—9onl11 Se: aka truth
Se: also phennnienei consciousness ggnis, 106. I98 relation view. xvi ,11i.,11;,19;—2.39,
occutrent stares
tlclinii-ion of. 1 s
phenomenal consciousness l’rinz,]esse,i5;-134,133, 137, 141111s.1;on;s 1 44
tioi1conxeiousotcurtei1t state: (see noncenscious
dL'fifl|KlDl| of. 84 definition all I9.‘
properties, views of. 197-198, 101-205, L09.
featumsof. 1.1.1.,,1.e-e,; .1 Inobicction to identity PIT. 96. |9B
occurren! states)
and 111.111.111.11 (re: nalurallsill about inrenrioixality. 111411, 115, 117, 111-111, 151-134
pcrtepmal states (1.: pcteepliunl and eoinincii sense. 195-1 yé, 1m, 11:7-no
thoughts (set thoughts)
and an phenomenal .neene1en1iny theory) propositions, 19;, 197493, 1:11-10}, and enernnlixxn, 1a9~1nn
and the phenomenal intenziomliry theory (see 113-114. 111-114
object-involving contents ihe inventory pmble-rn inn zoo—1al
phenomenal ixircnrionzliry theory]
ehaiieng1ng em for me nhenenienei
as a psychological involvement aililomoloyialparsiinany,1.D111D6—z*i.9
relational view of. 34111, 111.
iritentionality theory. 90. 9 1. 97~9x. 1 1 1. deiin1nu11 of. 1--11 xhe niuvi: rzferc1itia|\'iew.zo9—1io
114—11s. 111ns.11~>—1s(1.1xe—1x1
phenomenal contents as a feature ofcoinei-its.17~1ll,11g the Real Problem wnh zoo. 1o.1~1ee. Loénni 1A1 1,
renditions oftrutli and reference of, 2.27 eon1enn that een 111.1.-en'1 he phenomenally 11 1, 11;
and the Real Problem (11: Real Problem)
definition of. 73 represented. 1.,.1es.
1. a theory-independent way or finding out about reliable misrepresentation, 57-53, 6;n4o.
definition ofi 83
obiect-involving contents as distinct from intentionalxtalcx.xvi.l7*13, 1s~1i.ia«ii.ex.
oi‘pe1cepuo11. l17n9. 154-1115 73-79.10;"?-511551246
iinmediaie contents. 111-131 4"-S-9.64-6!, 7~78. 30,8-,~8E. 1e;—1e(.
,
oftl'1oughx.xviii. 17, 111~11s representation. R, iiniz
Se: 11:11 plwenoilicnal intentiumli psychological role. Se: psychological
derived representation (ne nlcrived inteimonalizy:
paradigm eases (ofintcnriunality), 11-19, contents involvement derived repmenunon: seliieeeripuvimil
27. s7. 40. 63-64. 89-90. 93. 151-133. phenomenal intentionality Putnam. 1;, 66n4.6. 76n6. sonic, 98. 111, (xetinteiiticmlily)
i|'IKQI1K|flnall’(yl’l:SEn(I(|0I'|
166. 188 definition oh 115 u,7n3i. 2.}6—1;8 'i‘Re1epre1enm1nn. ixs-191. 143.147
dei'ii1irionof.6 the :XK(‘X|t ofl 1o1—io4
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1.74 Indzx Index 275
rcprcscnmrion:lism,1oz,. 1o3n:.s 11 1111111111 1111111 111111111,“ 1111, ori1111111;11.1.i11_1. as. 1 -1 1111111 , yof , ‘ 391-111.
111.111 5 1' 11111911111111, 16-i7(Se:11l:o inrciiuonalixy, paradigm 11111111i11111i11y1.1.. 1_,11,1v11,1o.9s.s~-199, 95-951119, 111,111;
or) 111.1“
. .1 11111111111119 111'¢1,111.-.111) 1-1111 TR-rcprcscnrarlon, 121,-191,145,117
«11111191.111111,1i1.» 111, 1.11-191 161-161, 159-1211, dcfinirion 01197. 114
11111111111] 1111111111511.-1:11,
11111i1, xviii, 50111.6, 99111.1, 1111-113, 119
definiriun of, 91111 5. 191 1911-191 11 11111111,; 1111pr:v:11shcd 1111111111,, 157 (:11 11111
cuncspundencerhcory 111-111115.145
1. :111g1q11=s¢11111i9111i111111 11111111111111 111‘. 1911 1:11‘-axcnprivism 1l111111, xvii, 99, mo, 111, 161. 111111111111: 111111111111 11111111151111)
.111i11i1111“1111:111i91111111_ 1 min: of, xv
1111-1111119111 117-119.191-111,111,145 1.1111111111111111. 1111111111111, 114, 111, 1111-1191111111111
11-14,111,145 1»-
1919111 1i1:11i1c1111111111.1i1111111i11111i11,11111111911111. SubpenonalXtallllillgsulex, 151-1151. 1111-1111, nunconscious Okfunclll Harm)
cIi111i11.1111is111 al1eu1,11-1.1, 0. 111111. vml-01 no.
199-111, 2+4 H!-»—n3-1, 1-11:-1:11. 1.15 asparadigmcases11i‘i111e1111111ui11v 4—é. 14,111.71 1.1 (111 .1111 11111111111 11.111111111111111 11111111)
rcvclarion. z6—1.7ns (szralm inrruspurion: Srrawsnn. Galen, xvi, 76115, 77112;. 35111, ,1i1¢11111111111ic11111=111s oi‘. 91--11. 19 111-111, 1d:|K|lyll|:o|’yof, 111-115, 1111. 11;
as not providing access 19 deep 1111-111 (111111 11111111111111 19111111111111 1111111111 11111111 :x1:ri1al1l1:oryi)|',1;;-119.1471-11
215112117113.11;11;.1;;1141.1ae111o.
d1a11gl11s) 111111 1g1i1co1yot',zzs-113.1111-1;g.14s—1.47
narurcs) 175-176
.»ciii11111p11vis111 11191111 1111. 91-111, 1119, 111,
Twin E11111 1i1o11gl11 cxpcrin1cnr.z;,66—681
smxcrurcd conrcnrs, phcnomcnal 137-159. 191-191,111, 114.1431 -4*
98,2.2.Sns4,
sc11¢u111i111g, 5111111111, .153.2.oo,1oon9, characters. and rcprescnrarions, xvi . 5:: 1111 11111111111
Tye,Micl1acl, H, ;4.n:., 59n9. ;9n11. 8.1,n1.
10 HI ll 2.14-2.10 Ti::nson.]ol1n. Xvi. 76n6,77n8, Xsnz, 86.91.
95-951119, 1o1.nnz.3—2.4., 1111. 1191-11,
Schwirzgclz-:1, Eric. 171-17; :11c1111i.1111111111111111111191111. 111, 11111111. 9;111s.1o1.11;11;.11.e,11s117,1;7,1;9,
111-119;91.1111119111111111111111111111. 119-11111 11511;. 196111, 193115, 11111119. 119111.;
Scarlejohn, 4m, 73, 7én(s. 77115. Hsnz, 86, 15;. 155117. 11111151
oi1cp1:s:111a11o111.11.1-11;
16o,16;,166n9.1-/1 rracking
inrcrml 11111c1111e111(:a11m111. 1 11. 111-1a1, 111111y 111111: 1119111111 1111,11-,111;_s111111
sclfqscrlprlvlsm 114-1111,11;-111; 1'11i1c11111111111i1-1111111911. d=I-2111111111 of. 11-14
abuuurziriides,157419.177-1xo,191-191. sr ‘ conrcnrs. phcnomcnal
119-1111111£11,11m11111i11111,111-111 (1.1 1111.1 1i1c11m‘11i11:11 at‘. 57'ifi. 1314-117, 141, 145
1i§.1o7 1119115: 91111111111111‘. 1111131 Hacking 111191111 1 111e111io111i11_v,
111111111111. 11111 1ep1:s11111111111.1
111111 1115111 11111111111111 1111111.-111111111111.1,11,
and 1111111111, 1111111111, 111111111111, 1191111111-111 Ti1.11,11111111.1io11
151-151.151,154-161,161-169,139
subpcrsonal stares Hacking tlicorics ofinzcnzionaliry. xv—xvi‘1, vchiclcs ofinrcnrionality R—9n1o.124.
11111111 111111111; 1111111111191. mo. 111. 111.
11 11 1»i11i1111gi11g11911'o1 1111 pi1=1111111111111 33-69, 74.. 76-77, 102-105, 105-106. 117-118. 197m
177-1111.191-191,141,143
mrcnrionzliry 1111111,». 1111-1111. 111-114. 116n6, 117-119, 117—i18r17. 115, 145 drfiniriun af. 1!
11111111 111o11,;1111,1vi 117-91. 1111. 111, 119-119,
1g1-1g1,11n,1«,141,14- 134-119 asyirimenir dtpclldtncc rheones, 1M11-61 Vcllcman, David, 401111, S4n;1
161
and rmrh 11ml rzferencc afdcrivcd miirenb,
1116111111111 111‘.
dcfiriinon of. 14 Vlgcr, Chris. xii. 5111114. 2191111,. 1411-111
2:71:19 Sullivamjaquclint, xii, 13.11111 11 :11 1111111111 on 1111111111 91111, 197-1911 virtue
50115: 111111. 8, 11-13, 197-193, zoénifi, supcrficial character. 13-1s, 811110, 116115 1111111111111 pr0l>l:m f111.11vi. 33-Sy. 79-So, 17--111. desim-sarisrying.111-119, 11111116. 111,117
1.09-1.10, 1111115, 1111141419 deii11i11o11o1’, is lm. 1111,1111-1:9 1111111-i111ii1-111115. 1 121-1 11. 1 1.511411. 197,
11 1111111111111 111 1 1111111 11111111111111 way (11: 11111111111. ng zrackingzheories. 14,5151-15: 113-111». 11-
sensory conr:nz.9c. 1;5—118,1;oi1;6,15.1;5
inzumoiulit
9
=11 iiidepeildeilmccns 1o) R:alProbl1:m fix, xvii, 7‘)-80. 901 91-9!. 105- 11.16.
Sic-gel, Susanna, Izn17, 15;
11111 1111 1111111i1111g1i11111_1~ 11€11111i1 11111 1111111111 (11: 119. 19; ways of rcprcscnring
Sicwcrr, Cliarlcs, xii, xvi, .1, 111117. 8511;, 91. 1111111111; 1i11111,1111'11111i1 11111 1:r1111111) 1111111131111 1111-k111g1i1¢o1-111, 19. 61-6) and 111111111111 gapS,4'1 48. 11
91.nI4,9;n16,1o1,12.3n;,1z6-1z6n7, 11111 1111 111111111111 111111111111, is-13. 411-49, 11-15,
rransparcncy, rhc argumcnr fmm. 25 1111111111113 1o111<111s, 19-sz
156n47 6 1-54. 67-69, 87-89 (11: 11111 1111111111111
Sec zransparcncy of , ricncc ‘X/ickclgrcn. Wayne. 134.1;6, l4ln18
1119111111)
Smirhics,Dccl:n,xii,8§1'i§.1m.n2.3, 11o,
11111 1111 1111111111 1111111111 1111 asptcr 11191, 191, 1111
143nz1., 151n38,161n1. 165n7, 1751116
Speaks.Jcff. xii. 4. 1111., 711;, 1o8m.9
Sptncr, Maja, 1.7115,1s.11144. 117111; raking one conrcnr to mcai-1 anorhcr.
51111111111. Rob, xii, 471111 139-159. 177-180, 191-191.
standing states 11111111111111 oi‘. 1.11
as 1 1111111111111-1511111 11-1: pi111111111=111i
(mum: on, 141-1-ts
inlcnriunzliky 1111111,. xv1l,9u, 9;,99. 111. ulcological rracking rheorics of
1511-151, 169-184 inrcnzionaliry. Se: rraclung rhcories of
11111111111111 9:, 11. 9,. 111
inrcnrionaliry: rclcological tracking
dtllvarivixlllalmul, 161. 161-169, 139-151
zlicorics
dispcsinionzlism 1111111: 1111111111111 11. 1-111 179-177.
181-15: rcrminological disagrecmcnr
11111111 111111111111 11111 1111 11111111111111 91, 1191 1911111111113 1111 111111 “1nrei1non:.liry", 11-1-, (11: «L11
179-177. 1x1-11» 1:111:11.-:1 r111111g 11121111111111 1111:111io1111ii1y)
<11111i11a1ivis1-11 about. 99. 151. 159-114, 144 rl1ougl1rs,17-18.11.;-159

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OM E M ENTAL STATES seem to be “of" or “about" things or to "say" something.

The phenomenal intentionality theory faces important challenges in accounting

OXFORD ISBN 973-0-19-086330-7

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Published in the Unnmi Sum oi':\n-Acma 'UxIon.i Lfimmm Pm»

Oxford Un1\'cn|n, Press m x

CU’ data x: on fii: a: rim Llbh'|l')/ \>i'Cungr:s~

Pnnrcd by Shtridan Bookx, Luc., United Sum or Ammca

PART ONE} INTRODUCTION

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1. <;....1. and Me//wdulugy u

2..x. M... is . Theory of 1....-.........i..,v2 1.

1.2.. Thcorylndcptndeiit Acctss m lntemizmaliry :3

PART TW’U I ALTERNATIVE THIURIES 0} INTENYIONALITY

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3-7- Rniiabi: Misrcprcxcntannn and me Significance nFTmck1ng .7

viii (fantzrm Cuntz'n!.< ix

;.8. Conclusion 39 .9, iVarm;Imtun.rXMIr: mo

8.2. Dcnvazivisr Srraccgim is;

4... Conclusion 80 9... The Rclariun Viuwand .h: Aspcc[Vicw .96

9... Two Worries \\’i(l1 uh: Relimiii View we

5-3. Conclusion ioo PART SIX | CONCLUSION

PART FOURI CHALLENGING cuts

7.4. Is Dcrivcd Mental Rtprcscnmtion a Typ: nfInrcnrionality2 is:

THIS PROJECT BEGAN 15 years ago when. as an undergraduate at McGill, I set

thing as phenomenal consciousness. I wrote my undergraduate thesis on precisely

Congress oFAnalytic Philosophy (wit), the 21rd World Congress of Philosophy at

rm: AIM or this book is to defend a radically internalist theory ofintentionality,

or directedness that \ve notice in these and other everyday cases.

My aim is to offer a theory of intentionality, a theory that describes the deep

1 Fixing Reference on Intentionaiity

1.1 Aboutness and Directedness

lntentionality is sometimes characterized, at least as a first pass, as the "aboutness" or

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