Response to R.

Shmuel Kamenetzky on the Methodology

of Resolving Cases of Iggun

Be-chasdei Ha-Kadosh Barukh Hu, Yishtabach Shemo

Shalom C. Spira
4 Elul, 5780
(fourth edition, revised)

INTRODUCTION

The Ha-Ma’or journal of Shevat-Adar 5776, p. 35, contains a letter to the editor by R.
Shmuel Tsarch followed by an article by R. Shmuel Yehudah Leib Landesman (pp. 36-45) –
both of Monsey, New York, USA – both professing that a certain [anonymous] agunah case
cannot be resolved on the basis of mekach ta‘ut to nullify the original kiddushin, and instead that
the wife remains married to her original husband.1 Because neither R. Tsarch nor R. Landesman
identify the principals of the case, it is impossible to draw any practical conclusion from their
contribution to Ha-Ma’or. On the other hand, R. Landesman’s article appears almost verbatim in
the Kovetz Ginat Veradim journal,2 Vol. 28 (Tevet 5776), pp. 167-174. That Kovetz Ginat
Veradim includes several other articles devoted to the same case (pp. 162-166, 175-186, 257),
and which identify the principals of the case as Ms. Tamar Epstein vs. Mr. Aharon Friedman.
Returning our attention to Ha-Ma’or journal, we find that the immediately following
edition of Nissan-Iyar 5776, p. 152, contains a letter to the editor by R. Shlomo Klein,
congratulating Ha-Ma’or for rejecting the claim of mekach ta‘ut in the aforementioned case.3
The Ha-Ma’or editor then immediately responds to R. Klein that on Erev Purim 5776 he
received notice of a letter of the [anonymous] protagonists (ba‘alei ha-devarim) that they have
accepted the ruling of R. David Feinstein to reject the claim of mekach ta‘ut and hence to
recognize that the wife remains married to her original husband. Once again, the principals of the
case are not identified in this exchange between R. Klein and the editor. On the other hand,
returning our attention to Kovetz Ginat Veradim, we find that the immediately following edition,


The first edition of this essay was published on 22 Elul, 5778 at
<http://www.scribd.com/document/387494357/Response-to-R-Shmuel-Kamenetzky>. The second edition was
published on 21 Kislev, 5779 and the third edition was published on 13 Adar II, 5779, always at the same address.
That same day (viz. 13 Adar II, 5779), the third edition was sent by e-mail to R. Nota Zvi Greenblatt. Hence, for
purposes of clarity, in the present fourth edition of the essay (published on 4 Elul, 5780, once again at the same
address), the text from “Introduction” until “Section J” inclusive is reproduced verbatim from the third edition,
exactly as those words would have been read by R. Greenblatt. The only changes to the main text fourth edition
commence from Section K. Indeed, to preserve the authenticity of the numbered footnotes as they would have been
read by R. Greenblatt, the present footnote [which did not appear in the first three editions] is not numbered but
instead is marked with an “aleph.”
1
<http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=57182&st=&pgnum=35&hilite=>
2
Published by “disciples and chassidim of Satmar” (R. Binyamin Berkovitz, ed.) I am grateful to R. Daniel
Eidensohn and R. David Eidensohn for bringing the Kovetz Ginat Veradim to my attention.
3
<http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=57923&st=&pgnum=152>
viz. Vol. 29 (Nissan 5776), pp. 46-54, contains additional articles devoted to the same case, and
once more identifying the protagonists as Epstein vs. Friedman. These additional articles include
a letter (p. 53) by R. Shalom Kamenetzky dated 12 Adar II, 5776, which defers to the ruling of
R. David Feinstein that there is no basis for mekach ta‘ut, and therefore that Ms. Epstein remains
married to Mr. Friedman. [Seemingly, then, the letter to which the editor of Ha-Ma’or refers in
his correspondence with R. Klein is precisely this same letter of R. Shalom Kamenetzky, seeing
as 12 Adar II is just one day prior to Eruv Purim.]
To that effect, in a documented telephone conversation, R. Shmuel Kamenetzky – father
of R. Shalom Kamenetzky, and a member of the Mo‘etzet Gedolei ha-Torah of the Agudath
Israel of America – elucidates his personal understanding of the case of Epstein vs. Friedman.4
Namely, R. Kamenetzky points to the fact that R. Nota Zvi Greenblatt ruled that the original
kiddushin between Epstein and Friedman were nullified by virtue of mekach ta‘ut (mistaken
acquisition) occasioned by the husband’s mental illness. Accordingly, continues R. Kamenetzky,
despite that fact that R. David Feinstein – also a member of the Mo‘etzet Gedolei ha-Torah of the
Agudath Israel of America – ruled (quite the contrary) that the original kiddushin between
Epstein and Friedman still remains, nevertheless the opinion of R. Greenblatt is sufficiently
authoritative to exempt R. Kamenetzky from any obligation to intervene. Similarly, R. Shalom
Kamenetzky – prior to his letter of 12 Adar II, 5776 deferring to R. David Feinstein – had
previously written that he spoke with his father R. Shmuel Kamanetzky, and that R. Shmuel
Kamenetzky responded “kedai Ha-Rav Rabbeinu Nota shlit”a li-smokh alav le-hatir ishah zu mi-
kavlei iggunah,” viz. R. Nota Zvi Greenblatt is sufficiently authoritative that we can rely upon
him to rescue this lady from her agunah situation.5
In the following essay, this writer will analyze R. Shmuel Kamenetzky’s methodology,
hypothesizing that – be-mechilat Kevod Torato – R. Kamenetzky’s methodology might be based
on an innocent misinterpretation of a responsum of R. Moshe Feinstein, an innocent
misinterpretation that was generated by three writers prior to R. Kamenetzky: R. Yom Tov ha-
Levi Schwartz, R. Isaac Liebes and R. Michael J. Broyde.
This student undertakes the enterprise by announcing in advance two caveats, as follows.
Firstly, already 3.5 years ago, this author published an essay containing a footnote recognizing
both Ms. Epstein and Mr. Friedman as tzaddikim gemurim to whose credit redounds that their
case has caused an expansion of Torah study, analogous to the comment of Rashi to Numbers
27:5.6 That certainly remains the case now, 3.5 years later. Accordingly, both Ms. Epstein and
Mr. Friedman are hereby honoured by the publication of the present essay. Secondly, in no way
is there any disrespect (chas ve-chalilah) intended toward R. Shmuel Kamenetzky by the present
essay. On the contrary, this student is already on the record as honouring and congratulating R.
Shmuel Kamenetzky for rescuing brain dead patients,7 and – regarding that particular issue of

4
<http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2018/07/transcript-and-comments.html>
5
<http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2015/12/tamars-heter-protecting-rav-shmuel.html>
6
See Shalom C. Spira, “A Combination of Two Halakhically Kosher Prenuptial Agreements to Benefit the Jewish
Wife,” footnote 3 (of that essay), available at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/176990434/Prenuptial-Agreements>.
7
See Shalom C. Spira, “The Halakhic Definition of Life in a Bioethical Context,” available at
<http://www.scribd.com/document/375175373/Halakhic-Bioethic>. Whereas R. Shmuel Kamenetzky is not
explicitly identified by name in that essay, it is well known that R. Shmuel Kamenetzky [together with R. Feivel
Cohen] asked R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and R. Joseph Shalom Eliashiv to issue a statement on 18 Menachem
brain death – this is true even though it conflicts with the position of R. David Feinstein.8
Nevertheless, the Epstein vs. Friedman case may hypothetically be different, because R. Feivel
Cohen [viz. R. Shmuel Kamenetzky’s partner in fulfilling the mitzvah of rescuing brain dead
patients] himself published a responsum stating that Ms. Epstein remains married to Mr.
Friedman.9 In other words, whereas in the case of brain death it was R. Cohen and R.
Kamenetzky vs. R. David Feinstein, in the case of mekach ta‘ut it is R. Cohen and R. David
Feinstein vs. R. Kamenetzky.

A. THE RESPONSUM OF IGGEROT MOSHEH

In a series of sequential responsa, R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah I,

nos. 98-103 addresses the conundrum of a married lady who has been instructed by her
physicians that she cannot allow her inner ear to be moistened with water, such that the only way
she can safely immerse in a mikveh is with a vasaline-coated cotton plug. R. Feinstein recognizes
the gravity of the problem in the opening paragraph of his analysis by remarking that if no
halakhic license is found to allow this lady to immerse with the earplug, then the lady will
remain an “agunah,” viz. unable to return to shelom bayit with her husband. Fortuitously, R.
Feinstein is able to proceed to argue that the lady may indeed permissibly immerse with the
earplug, thus rescuing shelom bayit between husband and wife.
As posthumously chronicled by R. Moshe David Tendler,10 R. Feinstein’s earplug
responsum/responsa11 (written during the years 5694-5695 when R. Feinstein resided in Luban)
was/were12 at odds with the countervailing responsum of R. Yechezkel Abramsky (who then
resided in Slutzk). Accordingly, the report goes, these competing responsa of R. Feinstein and R.
Abramsky were sent to R. Chaim Ozer Grodzinsky for adjudication. R. Grodzinsky concurred

Av, 5751 that considers brain dead patients to be potentially alive. See R. David Shabtai, Defining the Moment:
Understanding Brain Death in Halakhah (Shoresh Press, 2012), pp. 309-310.
8
See “The Halakhic Definition of Life in a Bioethical Context,” op. cit., footnote 217 (of that essay) and
accompanying text.
9
<http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2016/01/rav-feivel-cohen-rules-heter-is.html> Furthermore, as can be seen there, R,
Cohen’s ruling is countersigned by R. Shlomo Eliyahu Miller. This writer [who presently resides in Montreal,
Canada] recalls how in early 5766, when R. Yonatan Binyamin Weiss (of Bnei Brak) immigrated to Canada and was
formally “crowned” at a reception (se‘udat hakhtarah) in honour of his being appointed as a Dayan on the Beth Din
of the Jewish Community Council of Montreal, a videotape containing congratulatory remarks by R. Shlomo
Eliyahu Miller was played in order to demonstrate that R. Weiss is worthy to serve the Montreal community. Thus,
R. Miller seems to be entitled to an opinion on matters of this nature.
10
R. Moshe David Tendler, Responsa of Rav Moshe Feinstein: Translation and Commentary (KTAV Publishing,
1996), p. 6.
11
It is not clear from R. Tendler’s report whether the reference is to R. Feinstein’s initial responsum alone (i.e.
Yoreh De‘ah I, no. 98) or to all of R. Feinstein’s sequential responsa on the same topic (i.e. Yoreh De‘ah I, nos. 98-
103). For this reason, the main text presently adored by the footnotes is careful to specify “responsum/responsa”, in
order to accommodate both hypothetical possibilities.
12
See supra, note 11.
with R. Feinstein, and added the compliment that R. Feinstein had formulated an analysis more
brilliant than that of which he [R. Grodzinsky] was personally capable.13
Of key interest within those responsa of R. Feinstein is the following passage in Yoreh
De‘ah I, no. 101, found on p.186 of that volume of Iggerot Mosheh:

“And regarding that which my beloved friend wrote [in protest against
me] ‘how are we authorized to rely on chiddushim – like these that I
clarified – for a practical [halakhic] purpose, especially when it contradicts
certain Acharonim?’ Behold I say [in response]: has there been an end and
a limit to the Torah, chas ve-chalilah, that we can only rule based on that
which is found in books, and when questions materialize that are not
found in books we will not adjudicate them even when it is within our
hands to adjudicate them? Certainly, in my humble opinion, it is forbidden
to say so, because certainly “He will aggrandize Torah” [(Isaiah 60:21)]
now, also, in our time. And [so] it is obligatory for everyone in whose
hands is the capacity to adjudicate every law that comes before him
according to his ability with rigorous investigation and interrogation in
Shas and poskim with straightforward understanding and with correct
proofs, even when it is a new law that is not addressed in the books. And
even regarding a law found in the books, certainly the [halakhic] decisor
must also understand it and adjudicate with his knowledge before he rules,
and not to rule simply because it is found [printed in the books] as such,
for such would constitute the equivalent of issuing a halakhic ruling from
a Mishnah [without genuine comprehension of Gemara and apprenticeship
of senior decisors], concerning which it is stated that the [so-called]
‘Tanna’im’ destroy the world, [referring not to actual Tanna’im but rather
to pseudo-scholars] who issue halakhic rulings based on the Mishnah
alone, [as explained] in Sotah 22a, see there in Rashi’s commentary. And
even if [a qualified halakhic authority’s] ruling is against certain geniuses
from our rabbis the Acharonim, what of it, behold certainly even we are
authorized to argue on the Acharonim, and sometimes even on a few
Rishonim, when there are correct proofs and [where] the principle [can be
upheld] with correct reasons, and regarding this kind of situation [the
Sages of the Gemara] said ‘a judge has only what his eyes see,’ as
elucidated in Bava Batra 131a, see there in Rashbam, so long as it is not
against the famous poskim, the masters of the Shulchan Arukh who are
accepted in all our countries, and regarding this kind of situation it is
stated [in the Gemara, Chullin 7a] ‘a place was left for me to be

13
Cf., however, the alternate version of this episode posthumously recounted by R. Shimon Finkelman, Reb Moshe:
The Life and Ideals of HaGaon Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (Mesorah Publications, revised and expanded edition, 2011),
p. 61, which does not identify the subject of dispute between R. Feinstein vs. R. Abramsky, and which instead
claims that the dispute occurred during “the five years from 1925 to 1930” [corresponding to 5684/5-5689/90 on the
Jewish calendar], in which case it could not have chronologically coincided with the composition of Iggerot
Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah I, nos. 98-103. It is unclear to this student whether this discrepancy between R. Tendler vs. R.
Finkelman is due to a typographical error on R. Finkelman’s part (be-mechilat Kevod Torato), or due to other
considerations.
 aggrandized’, and like the majority of the responsa of Acharonim that
adjudicate with chiddushim a number of laws for practical [halakhic]
purposes. Howbeit, he [the qualified halakhic authority of our era] may
not be arrogant in decision-making, and he must avoid [decision-making]
wherever possible, but in a place of great necessity, and all the more so in
a case of iggun like this case, for sure even we are obligated to issue a
ruling, [even] if it only seems to us [correct] to permit, and it is forbidden
for us to be [excessively] humble and to chain a daughter of Israel or to
cause a stumbling block with prohibitions or even to just cause
[gratuitous] loss of the money of Israel. And see Gittin 56a [which records
Rabbi Yochanan as remarking] ‘the humility of Rabbi Zechariah ben
Avkulus destroyed our Beit ha-Mikdash,’ which is [a] difficult
[statement]; why does he [Rabbi Yochanan] say ‘the humility of’? How is
this relevant to humility? And see in Maharatz Chiyot a correct matter [of
insight on this Gemara]. And [so] this [case of immersing with the cotton
plug] is literally of the same nature, and we are required to issue a
halakhic decision even in a practical sense when it appears to us with
proofs and with straightforward understanding, and especially in a place of
iggun like this, and to rescue from a stumbling block like this.”

In employing the term iggun in this passage – just as in employing the term agunah in
the opening paragraph of the first responsum – R. Feinstein is obviously deviating from the
classic terminology of agunah/iggun. The classic terminology of agunah/iggun refers to a lady
who seeks to remarry but is unable to do so, either because her long missing husband cannot be
proven dead, or because her long estranged husband refuses to grant a get. Here, by
contradistinction, R. Feinstein uses the term agunah/iggun in a fundamentally different way.
Here, both the husband and wife are on the same wavelength; both husband and wife seek to
return to shelom bayit, but there is a ritual question of Hilkhot Mikva’ot that is interfering with
that quest. The iggun or “chaining” is the hindrance from the wife returning to her own husband
and the husband returning to his own wife, as they both reciprocally seek.
As students of R. Feinstein, we can readily grasp why this case of aguanh/iggun – where
the husband and wife are both on the same wavelength, and it is simply a question of ritual
prohibition that is hindering their return to shelom bayit – should be markedly different than the
classic case of agunah/iggun where the wife seeks to be freed from her original husband without
that husband’s expressed consent. When the husband and wife are both on the same wavelength
and the problem involves a halakhic question of ritual prohibition, one can sometimes argue that
a minority view among the poskim to be lenient is sufficiently authoritative to serve as a basis for
reliance in a time of duress (she‘at ha-dechak), as per the Gemara, Niddah 6b that “Rabbi Eliezer
is worthy for reliance in a time of duress.”14 By contradistinction, in the classic case of

14
See R. Ovadiah Yosef, Teshuvot Yabi‘a Omer X, Yoreh De‘ah no. 43, for an elucidation of the parameters when
this principle may be employed. [N.B. In the first two editions of this essay, this student erred by writing “Rabbi
Elazar” (who, among actual Tanna’im, would be R. Elazar ben Shamu‘a), instead of correctly writing “Rabbi
Eliezer” (=Rabbi Eliezer ben Horkenos), the actual Tanna identified by the Gemara, Niddah 6b. The error is now
corrected in the present third edition of this essay. I am grateful to Reb Gerald Aranoff for politely and discretely
calling my attention to this error in a non-embarrassing manner, thereby enabling me correct the error in the present
third edition of this essay.]
agunah/iggun, when there is a contest between wife vs. husband, under no circumstances can
one rely on a minority view among the poskim to [ostensibly] “rescue” the wife from her agunah
condition. After all, the same way there is a she‘at ha-dechak for the wife, there is a
countervailing she‘at ha-dechak for the husband. Indeed, this principle is included within the
Torah commandment “thou shall not favour a pauper in his dispute [with another litigant]”
(Exodus 23:3). Viz., although the pauper is in a state of distress, the countervailing litigant is also
in a state of distress, and so we cannot invoke Niddah 6b to favour one litigant over the other.
Ergo, R. Feinstein never intended that his words in Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah I, no. 101
would apply to the classic agunah/iggun scenario.

B. CRITIQUE BY MA‘ANEH LA-IGGEROT

In 5734, four decades after R. Moshe Feinstein originally composed his earplug responsa
[presented in the previous section], R. Yom Tov ha-Levi Schwarz published Ma‘aneh la-Iggerot,
a wide-ranging critique of numerous responsa of R. Feinstein.15 To that effect, R. Schwarz,
Ma‘aneh la-Iggerot nos. 122-124, challenges R. Feinstein’s earplug analysis. Interestingly, R.
Schwarz actually concurs with R. Feinstein’s practical conclusion that the lady may indeed
immerse in the mikveh; R. Schwarz’ only grievance against R. Feinstein is that he argues on the
academic methodology of how to reach that same conclusion. [R. Schwarz does not relate to R.
Grodzinsky’s reported congratulatory remarks for R. Feinstein’s responsum/responsa.16]
In Ma‘aneh la-Iggerot no. 123, R. Schwarz specifically targets the passage in Iggerot
Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah I, no. 101 where R. Feinstein allows resolving iggun problems using novel
reasoning (viz. the same passage translated in full in Section A above). R. Schwarz remonstrates
by citing R. Ezekiel Landau, Teshuvot Noda bi-Yehudah, Even ha-Ezer II, no. 75, who addresses
a case of a lady where a question has arisen that she might have accidentally received kiddushin,
thereby potentially rendering her an agunah. R. Landau responds by enumerating seven (sic!)
independent reasons why there was no kiddushin in this particular case. R. Landau concludes his
responsum with the declaration: “And based on these seven heterim, even if a problem will be
found with one of them, in any event based on the others – and how much more so with the
combination of them all – this betulah is permitted, and behold she is an unmarried betulah as
she was before, and is permitted [to marry] any gentleman.” Ergo, argues R. Schwarz, we see
from Noda bi-Yehudah that – contrary to R. Feinstein – we cannot resolve agunah problems
based on novel reasoning, but rather only based on solid, time-honoured, unassailable reasoning.
R. Schwarz then continues his attack on R. Feinstein by citing a subsequent responsum of
R. Landau, Teshuvot Noda bi-Yehudah, Even ha-Ezer II, no. 129, which address a case of a
contested get. There [in a mathematically similar manner], R. Landau enumerates seven (sic!)
independent reasons to validate the get, and concludes with the declaration:

“In the end of the matter, when all is considered, this lady is completely
divorced, and she is permitted to marry any gentleman she wishes except a

15
<http://www.israel613.com/books/MEANE_IGROT-H.pdf>
16
See also R. Simchah Bunim Lazerson, Shulchan Shelomoh, Erkei Refu’ah III (Jerusalem, 5766), pp. 12-13, who
cites R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach as allowing a lady with a cotton earplug to immerse in the mikveh (at least under
certain circumstances). Neither R. Feinstein nor R. Schwarz nor R. Grodzinsky are cited there as having preceded R.
Auerbach on this matter.
 kohen. However, although her permission is clear for me, I do not want
others to rely on me unless his honour, my father-in-law, the great genius,
our master and teacher, Rabbi Yosef, chief rabbi and yeshivah teacher of
Posen will agree with this heter, and likewise his honour the rabbi who is
mesader17 [will agree with this heter]. And then the lady can marry
without someone protesting. And anyone who subsequently will question
the validity of the get will know that the net of fence of Rabbeinu Tam
[who pronounced an ostracism on those who gratuitously question the
validity of gittin] is spread under his feet. And therefore everyone should
be careful and listen to voice of halakhic decisors.”

So we see, argues R. Schwarz, that even with seven independent reasons to permit an
agunah, in this latest case R. Landau refused to allow others to rely on his responsum unless two
other Gedolim would agree in advance. Thus, continues R. Schwarz, once again contrary to R.
Feinstein, we cannot resolve agunah problems based on novel reasoning, but rather only based
on solid, time-honoured, unassailable reasoning.
R. Schwarz then proceeds to attack R. Feinstein from two different responsa published
within Teshuvot Rabbi Akiva Eger, Vol. 1. In the first, viz. no. 105, final paragraph, R. Akiva
Eger writes “we are orphans of orphans, [such that] because of a question we are not capable of
overriding the words of the Rishonim whose waters we drink.” In the second, viz. no. 117, a
response of R. Meir Posner to R. Akiva Eger, R. Posner writes: “This is my humble opinion [to
be lenient]. However, it is nevertheless not intended for practice, for I am not worthy to argue on
the Tzemach Tzedek [who is strict].” Ergo, claims R. Schwarz, we see from the words of R.
Akiva Eger and R. Meir Posner – yet again contrary to R. Feinstein – that we cannot resolve
agunah problems based on novel reasoning, but rather only based on solid, time-honoured,
unassailable reasoning.
Alas, R. Schwarz has misunderstood R. Feinstein’s invocation of the terminology
agunah/iggun in Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah I, no. 101. As we saw above, Section A, R.
Feinstein never claimed that one can resolve classic agunah/iggun scenarios based on novel
reasoning. Rather, R. Feinstein employed novel reasoning to address the case of a husband and
wife who are both on the same wavelength and who both wish to return to shelom bayit yet are
being hindered by a ritual prohibition. Thus, neither of R. Landau’s responsa (which grapple
with classic agunah/iggun problems, where there is a contest between wife vs. husband) are
relevant to R. Feinstein’s fact pattern. Likewise, R. Meir Posner’s responsum (which grapples
with a classic agunah/iggun problem, where there is a contest between wife vs. husband) is not
relevant to R. Feinstein’s fact pattern.
At the same time, a more formidable difficulty with R. Feinstein is posed by the
responsum of R. Akiva Eger cited by R. Schwarz, because R. Akiva Eger does not address the
classic agunah/iggun scenario. Nevertheless, it seems to this student that even here – with some
degree of careful distinction-drawing – we can rescue R. Feinstein by positing that R. Akiva
Eger addresses a special case which is different than R. Feinstein’s focus. Namely, R. Akiva
Eger addresses a situation where a question had arisen based on flimsy testimony that perhaps a

17
Presumably, R. Landau means the future rabbi who will serve as the mesader kiddushin when the lady attempts to
remarry. [It is also hypothetically possible, though much less likely, that R. Landau means the rabbi who was
mesader the contested get.]
lady had committed adultery such that perhaps a child subsequently born to her would be a
mamzer. Regarding this special case, R. Akiva Eger is answering that since there is a Teshuvat
ha-Rashba [what R. Akiva Eger calls “the words of the Rishonim whose waters we drink”]
which is lenient to uphold the innocence of the wife and hence the legitimacy of the born child,
here we are required to follow the traditional approach of Rashba, and we are forbidden to
innovate a stringency [contrary to Rashba] to delegitimize the newborn son. On this exceptional
case described by Rashba and R. Akiva Eger, R. Feinstein never intended to argue. In other
words, granted that novel reasoning can indeed sometimes be appropriate in reaching halakhic
conclusions regarding ritual prohibitions [as explained above, Section A], nevertheless R.
Feinstein will be forced to concede that this is not so if the novel reasoning will delegitimize a
newborn child as a mamzer contrary to the traditional approach of one of the Rishonim [such as
Teshuvot ha-Rashba].
In summary, then, R. Schwarz misunderstood R. Feinstein’s invocation of the
terminology agunah/iggun in Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah I, no. 101, such that R. Feinstein is
not contradicted by the two responsa of R. Landau and one responsum of R. Meir Posner that R.
Schwarz marshals. Furthermore, while the responsum of R. Akiva Eger cited by R. Schwarz
poses a greater difficulty against R. Feinstein, even there we can answer on behalf of R.
Feinstein that he will not agree to employ novel reasoning when it delegitimizes a child as a
mamzer contrary to the traditional approach of one of the Rishonim [such as Teshuvot ha-
Rashba].

C. RESPONSUM OF BEIT AVI

As we saw in the previous section, in 5734, Ma‘aneh la-Iggerot misinterpreted a

responsum of R. Feinstein as claiming that classic agunah/iggun problems can be resolved on the
basis of novel reasoning. In the following section, we will argue that the same misinterpretation
of R. Feinstein was propagated a decade later, in 5745, with the publication of Teshuvot Beit Avi
Vol. 4, by R. Yitzchak Isaac Liebes.
R. Liebes, Teshuvot Beit Avi IV, no. 169, addresses the question of whether a get granted
by a husband to avoid money being seized by a secular judge is a valid get.18 R. Liebes
acknowledges that the majority of Rishonim consider financial coercion to be coercion that
would disqualify a get, but also points to a minority of Rishonim – viz. Rabbeinu Yerucham and
possibly also Tashbetz – whom R. Liebes claims do not consider financial coercion to be
coercion.19 Therefore, continues R. Liebes, because the agunah/iggun crisis in the USA is an

18
As already mentioned in the main text, the Beit Avi volume in which this responsum appears was published in
5745 (corresponding on the secular calendar to 1984/5), several years before the 1992 New York Get Law was
legislated. Furthermore, even the subsequent Beit Avi volume (i.e. Vol. 5) published by R. Liebes – the very final
volume that R. Liebes would ever publish in his physical lifetime – was published in 5750 (corresponding on the
secular calendar to 1989/1990), a couple of years prior to the legislation of the 1992 New York Get Law. Thus, at no
time did R. Liebes ever publish any responsum halakhah le-ma‘aseh validating gittin granted as a consequence of
the 1992 New York Get Law.
Nevertheless, because the issues that R. Liebes raises are conceptually relevant to the future 1992 New
York Get Law, some have attempted to argue that R. Liebes’ responsum in Beit Avi IV, no. 169 de facto validates
gittin granted following the future passage of the 1992 New York Get Law. That attempted argument is refuted by
this student in “A Combination of Two Halakhically Kosher Prenuptial Agreements to Benefit the Jewish Wife,” op.
cit.
emergency, in a time of emergency we can rely on the minority opinion of Rabbeinu Yerucham
[and possibly also Tashbetz] to validate the get.
While R. Liebes does not reference R. Feinstein ever in this responsum, it would appear
that R. Liebes’ argument is essentially predicated upon a misunderstanding of R. Feinstein,
Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah no. 101 – the very same misunderstanding that had first been
propagated by Ma‘aneh la-Iggerot. Namely, R. Liebes erroneously believes that R. Feinstein
ruled that one can rely on a minority view to resolve a classic agunah/iggun scenario which
classifies as a she‘at ha-dechak. Alas, R. Feinstein never intended such, and was only addressing
a case of mikveh immersion. By contradistinction, when it comes to the classic agunah/iggun
scenario, the same way there is a she‘at ha-dechak for the wife, so too there is a countervailing
she‘at ha-dechak for the husband, such that Exodus 23:3 prohibits us from arbitrarily favouring
the wife, as already explained above, Section A.
Quite possibly, R. Liebes corrects for his own misunderstanding [of R. Feinstein] by
adding two key limitations on R. Liebes’ own responsum: (a) R. Liebes will only validate the
financially coerced get where a qualified Beth Din had previously ruled that the husband is
obligated to deliver a get to the wife, and (b) even then, R. Liebes considers his responsum to
only be theoretical until “two rabbis who are outstanding in halakhic decision-making whose
names are renowned will concur with me.” Nevertheless, even with these stated two limitations,
the publication of R. Liebes’ fourth volume of Beit Avi may have reinforced the misperception of
Iggerot Mosheh first professed by Ma‘aneh la-Iggerot.

D. ARTICLE BY RABBI BROYDE

Three decades after the publication of the responsum of Beit Avi [analyzed in the
previous section], R. Michael J. Broyde published an article “Plonit v. Ploni: The Get from the
Man in a Permanent Vegetative State” in Ḥakirah Vol. 18 (Winter 2014). R. Broyde carefully
introduces his article – which argues to validate a get from a PVS husband in a particular
situation – with the caveat (p. 60) that “the author considers his English analysis tentative, as the
literature continues to grow.” R. Broyde’s caveat would prove prescient, because several months
later R. J. David Bleich would publish a countervailing article “The Get of Ẓefat” in Tradition
48:1 (Spring 2015), arguing to disqualify the same get.20 [A comprehensive survey of the overall
debate between R. Broyde vs. R. Bleich is beyond the scope of the present essay.]

19
See, however, “A Combination of Two Halakhically Kosher Prenuptial Agreements to Benefit the Jewish Wife,”
op. cit., Section B (of that essay), for evidence that even Rabbeinu Yerucham and Tashbetz might consider financial
coercion to constitute coercion which would disqualify a get.
20
R. Bleich’s article would benefit from two typographical corrections. On p. 36, the reference in footnote 9 should
read “Yated Ne’eman, 19 Sivan 5774” (not 5744). On p. 75, the reference in line 5 should read “Tosafot, Zevaḥim
2b” (not 2a).
More conceptually, an objection can be raised against the distinction R. Bleich (be-mechilat Kevod Torato)
draws on pp. 60-61 between patients who are mentally ill due to physiological reasons vs. due to trauma. R. Bleich
writes that “physiological illness is curable by medication; destroyed neural tissue is irreplaceable.” Yet, R. Moshe
Feinstein, Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah II, no. 146, p. 248, right-hand column, lines 12-18, surmises that patients
who are mentally ill – even due to destroyed neural tissue by trauma – might be healed through medical therapy that
has not yet been discovered, as well as through prayer. [How paradoxically ironic, then, that R. Feinstein takes a
more optimistic approach to the prognosis of mentally ill patients than R. Bleich, when in fact – on the matter of
defining brain death – it is R. Bleich who is more optimistic (in the sense that he deems brain dead patients to be
alive) than R. Feinstein (who – according to a substantial school of reporters within the oral record – deems brain
 As a postscript to R. Broyde’s own article (p. 88), R. Broyde cites a letter of R. Moshe
Mordekhai Farbstein in response to the Beth Din that arranged the get from a PVS husband. The
letter reads as follows, as excellently translated by R. Broyde:

“It appears that you did not understand the purpose of my public statement
on the matter. The intent was not to discuss the halakhic details with you
but to express my anguish and protest on the great wrong of the three
rabbinical judges who are not among the leading scholars of our
generation and arrogantly decided to rely on their own judgment to permit
a married woman [to marry another man] in a way that none of our great
rabbis have ever done, and to publicize the matter only after the fact.
Realize that even great leaders of the generation, like R. Akiva Eger, and
others, did not rely on themselves–they made their rulings conditional on
the approval of other Torah authorities. Before you actually issued the get,
you should have written your conclusions and reasoning, and sent them to
some of the leading halakhic authorities of the generation for approval.”21

Then, as a counter-response to R. Farbstein, R. Broyde (p. 89) posits that “it is clear that
R. Farbstein’s view is not the only view on such serious questions, and that R. Moshe Feinstein
adopted a more liberal view of who is qualified to voice an opinion as a matter of normative
halakhah in cases of iggun.” As evidence of this, R. Broyde cites Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah
I, no. 101 [presented in Section A of this essay], inferring from R. Feinstein that novel reasoning
can indeed be employed to resolve classic agunah/iggun scenarios.
Alas, like his predecessors Ma‘aneh la-Iggerot and Beit Avi, R. Broyde (be-mechilat
Kevod Torato) has misunderstood R. Feinstein. Iggerot Mosheh refers to using novel reasoning
to resolve a ritual prohibition where the wife and husband are both on the same wavelength and
wish to return to shelom bayit. At no time does Iggerot Mosheh intend to employ novel
reasoning to resolve a classic agunah/iggun situation involving a contest between wife vs.
husband. [Hence, we can appreciate the cogency of R. Farbstein’s letter regarding the PVS get,

dead patients to be dead; see “The Halakhic Definition of Life in a Bioethical Context,” op. cit.)] In any event, this
more conceptual objection to R. Bleich’s article does not necessarily detract from R. Bleich’s overall thesis to
disqualify the PVS get. After all, R. Bleich’s thesis is based on nine distinct sfekot le-chumra (tabulated on pp. 101-
102 of his article). The conceptual objection that this student is raising would negate only one of those nine sfekot le-
chumra (viz. safek le-chumra no. 6 on R. Bleich’s list).
21
In a footnote adorning his translation [-the same translation which has been adapted, with appropriate credit given
to R. Broyde, in the main text of the present essay], R. Broyde remarks:

“Of course, R. Farbstein’s criticism presumes that R. Zalman Nehemiah Goldberg’s

approbation was inauthentic. But if R. Goldberg’s approval was in fact validly given (or
not completely retracted; see previous note), then criticism of the judges for failing to
consult with any gedolim is inapt.”

Alas, R. Broyde (be-mechilat Kevod Torato) has not read R. Farbstein’s letter with sufficient care. R.
Farbstein did not criticize the judges for failing to consult with any gedolim. Rather, R. Farbstein criticized the
judges for failing to consult with a number of gedolim [-in the original Hebrew, itself cited by R. Broyde in his
article, R. Farbstein’s expression is “kamah ve-khamah mi-gedolei ha-poskim she-bi-zmanenu.”] Thus, even
consulting with R. Goldberg alone would not satisfy R. Farbstein.
as well as the cogency of R. Bleich’s subsequently published article arguing to disqualify the
same get.22]

22
A comprehensive survey of the overall debate between R. Broyde vs. R. Bleich is beyond the scope of this essay.
However, if one were to hypothetically accept R. Bleich’s conclusion, then one would have to grapple with an
urgent bioethical problem that R. Broyde raises in his article. Viz., R. Broyde (p.83) quotes the suggestion of R.
Yitzchak Yosef that medical attention be withdrawn from the PVS husband so that he can die and the agunah be
freed. Now, R. Broyde – refusing to authorize such passive euthanasia – infers from R. Yosef’s passive euthanasia
suggestion that it is actually a benefit to the PVS husband for us to deliver a get on his behalf to his agunah wife, so
that no one will actually contemplate following R. Yosef’s passive euthanasia proposal. Since, however, R. Bleich
rejects in principle [contrary to R. Broyde] the possibility of a get in this situation, if one were to hypothetically
accept R. Bleich conclusion, then one would then need to grapple that we are left with R. Yosef’s proposal for
passive euthanasia. Should R. Yosef’s proposal then be followed?
It seems to this student that the answer has already been provided by R. Eliezer Yehudah
Waldenberg, Teshuvot Tzitz Eliezer XVIII, no.19. Viz., R. Waldenberg rules that heroic medical measures must be
employed to resuscitate a PVS patient, even though this will prolong the agunah plight of his wife, concluding as
follows:

“…It is clear, therefore, that since to resuscitate him is encompassed within piku’ach
nefesh, that one cannot take into account in this case that which on the other side the lady
will continue through this [resuscitation] to be an agunah many years, with all the pain
and suffering and sympathy for her travail, because piku’ach nefesh overrides everything,
and it is incumbent upon her to accept the judgement of Heaven with love.”

In truth, R. Waldenberg’s words require qualification. One certainly cannot demand of the agunah wife
herself to resuscitate (or otherwise provide medical care for) her PVS husband with her own hands. After all, her
doing so [thereby prolonging her husband’s life, thereby ipso facto prolonging her own agunah status] imposes
intense emotional suffering upon herself, and she could plausibly argue that she is not required to endure such
suffering in order to fulfill the mitzvah of piku’ach nefesh. As R. J. David Bleich, Be-Netivot ha-Halakhah III
(KTAV Publishing, 2000), pp. 171-175 demonstrates, no bystander is required to experience suffering worth more
that the entire value of his/her wealth in order to fulfill the mitzvah of piku’ach nefesh. The agunah wife is thus
entitled to say, “I can’t be expected to impose such iggun suffering upon myself by prolonging my PVS husband’s
life. I would be willing more than all of my wealth to be freed from my iggun.” By contradistinction, all other
bystanders (not being the agunah wife) experience no such suffering in resuscitating (and/or medically treating) the
PVS husband [or at least they cannot be said to be experiencing suffering the magnitude of which exceeds their
entire wealth], and so those other bystanders are indeed obligated to resuscitate and/or medically treat the PVS
husband by virtue of piku’ach nefesh.
This paradox, viz. the fact that the wife is exempt from saving her husband’s life but that no one else is,
raises an intriguing corollary question. Would the wife be halakhically allowed to use force (e.g. a mandatory
police-enforced DNR order) to prevent all other bystanders from saving her husband’s life, thereby optimizing her
chances of being freed from her agunah status? At first glance, one might creatively justify such a course of action,
pursuant to the following precedent. Shakh on Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 163, se‘if katan 18 [as elaborated
by Gilyon Yad Avraham to Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De‘ah 157:1] rules (together with other poskim) – based on the
Gemara, Yevamot 79a – that when a Jew is captured by a gentile ruler, then he/she can rescue himself even though it
will cause the gentile ruler to capture someone else in his/her place. So, if a wife is trapped in functionally dead
marriage to a PVS patient, one could creatively argue that Shakh et al authorize the wife to free herself by using
force to prevent anyone from saving her husband’s life. Nevertheless, this creative argument – while praiseworthy in
an academic sense for expanding the horizons of our Torah study – is unsuccessful halakhah le-ma‘aseh. This is
because, as explained by Shalom C. Spira and Mark A. Wainberg, “HIV Vaccine Triage: Halakhic Considerations,”
Jewish Law Annual XX (2013), pp. 237-243, Shakh et al’s approach is disputed by Rema to Shulchan Arukh,
Choshen Mishpat 388:2 and other poskim. Thus, the principle that safek de-Oraita le-chumra dictates that the
agunah wife may not follow Shakh et al in practice.
 E. CUMULATIVE SUMMARY AND APPLICATION TO
EPSTEIN VS. FRIEDMAN

We have seen in the previous three sections that Ma‘aneh la-Iggerot, Beit Avi and R.
Broyde all misunderstood Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah I, no. 101 as authorizing novel
reasoning to resolve classic agunah/iggun scenarios. In fact, Iggerot Mosheh never intended this.
Accordingly, we might hypothesize that when R. Shmuel Kamenetzky commented that R.
Greenblatt is a sufficiently great authority for leniency in freeing Ms. Epstein from her iggun, R.
Kamenetzky (be-mechilat Kevod Torato) may have been innocently misled by the above
misinterpretation of those three scholars in how they read Iggerot Mosheh.
Indeed, addressing the case of Epstein vs. Friedman, R. Landesman (sec. 10 of his article)
seems to comment to a parallel effect, as follows:

“One who examines the responsa of the great respondents in all the
generations will find conclusively that even rabbis or batei din of great
Ge’onim did not allow themselves to rely upon their own reasoning in
laws of this nature, but rather only issued permissive rulings after the other
giants of the generation concurred with them.”

In a footnote to substantiate his thesis, R. Landesman points to the examples of Teshuvot

Maharsham III, no. 16; VI, no. 159; and VIII, no. 133.
Admittedly, R. Landesman himself (be-mechilat Kevod Torato) has a chequered record
on matters of gittin ve-kiddushin. On the one hand, R. Landesman’s opposition to R. Jacob
Kamenetzky’s hypothetically proposed prenup was a demonstration of good judgement by R.
Landesman, which paved the way for this student’s diamond-polished edition which corrected R.
Jacob Kamenetzky’s oversight.23 On the other hand, R. Landesman’s service as a Dayan on the
Beth Din that granted R. Aryeh Malkiel Kotler a heter me’ah Rabbanim might benefit from
correction [and this notwithstanding the fact that R. Kotler (be-mechilat Kevod Torato) has
himself since been promoted to the Mo‘etzet Gedolei ha-Torah of Agudath Israel of America] –
the correction for which has already been outlined in a footnote in a previous essay of this
student.24 Ergo, just because R. Landesman renders a judgement on gittin ve-kiddushin, it does
not mean it is automatically normative. [Sometimes it is, and sometimes it is not.] But the cited
responsa of Maharsham do prima facie appear to methodologically support R. Landesman
regarding Epstein vs. Friedman. Likewise, R. Landesman prima facie seems to be

23
See “A Combination of Two Halakhically Kosher Prenuptial Agreements to Benefit the Jewish Wife,” op. cit.,
footnote 85 (of that essay).
It may be noted that neither R. Jacob Kamenetzky nor any other mesader kiddushin has ever attempted to
employ the original draft of the prenup, such that no mishap actually arose from R. Jacob Kamenetzky’s oversight.
[N.B. According to the testimony of R. J. David Bleich, personally recounted to this student in a telephone
conversation, R. Jacob Kamenetzky did not concur with R. Landesman’s objection, calling the objection
“gibberish.” However, this student humbly disagrees with R. Jacob Kamenetzky, and does believe that R.
Landesman’s objection is appropriate, for the reasoning explained in the aforementioned footnote 85 of “A
Combination of Two Halakhically Kosher Prenuptial Agreements to Benefit the Jewish Wife,” op. cit.]
24
See “The Halakhic Definition of Life in a Bioethical Context,” op. cit., footnote 238 (of that essay).
methodologically supported [regarding Epstein vs. Friedman] by the two responsa of R. Landau
and the one responsum of R. Posner cited by R. Schwarz [presented above, Section B].
Thus, given the fact that numerous poskim are documented in Kovetz Ginat Veradim vols.
28-29 as ruling that Ms. Epstein is the wife of Mr. Friedman according to Torah law,25 the fact
that R. Nota Zvi Greenblatt would solitarily rule to the contrary does not appear to be sufficient
basis to overturn the halakhic conclusion of the majority.

F. CLARIFICATION OF RABBI GREENBLATT’S POSITION

In the previous section, we concluded that the fact that R. Nota Zvi Greenblatt would
void the kiddushin between Ms. Epstein and Mr. Friedman does not appear to be sufficient basis
to allow Ms. Epstein to remarry without a get, when R. Greenblat’s position is opposed by many
poskim. In the following section, we will call into question whether even R. Greenblatt himself is
certain that the kiddushin is voided, thus strengthening our intuition in the direction of
stringency.
Specifically, in a letter dated 14 Kislev, 5776, published in Kovetz Ginat Veradim vol. 28,
p. 186, R. Greenblatt concedes:

“I will certify here in writing that which I said to several talmidei

chakhamim who asked, and that is that I do not know Mr. Aharon

25
In addition to R. Shmuel Yehudah Leib Landesman, R. Feivel Cohen and R. David Feinstein [the three of whom
are cited in the introduction to the present essay], the scholars announcing that Ms. Epstein remains halakhically
married to Mr. Friedman include: R. Yitzchak Tuvia Weiss, Av Beit Din of Beit Din Tzedek of Eidah haCharedit.
together with his associate judges R. Moshe Sternbuch, R. Avraham Yitzchak Ulman, R. Naftali Frankel, R.
Yehoshua Rosenberger, R. Yaakov Mendel Yurovitch and R. Yehudah Fisher; R. Menachem Zechariah Frankel, Av
Beit Din of the Central Rabbinical Congress of the U.S.A. and Canada, together with his associate judges R. Hillel
Weinberger, R. Yitzchak Menachem Eichenstein and R. Yehudah Meshulam Dov Polotchek; R. Aharon Feldman,
rosh yeshivah of Ner Israel, Baltimore; R. Mordechai Shochatovitz, Av Beit Din of the Baltimore Beth Din, together
with his associate judges R. Moshe Heinemann and R. Yaakov Hoffer; R. Sariel Rosenberg, R. Yehudah Silman and
R. Yechezkel Peles, all of the Bnei Brak Beth Din; R. Yisrael Aryeh Knopfler, Av Beit Din, Beit Din Tzedek of
Lakewood, NJ; R. Nissim Karelitz of Bnei Brak; R. Yitzchak Zilberstein of Bnei Brak; R. Chaim Kanievsky of Bnei
Brak; R. Shmuel Eliezer Stern of Bnei Brak, R. Shlomo Eliyahu Miller, Av Beit Din of Toronto Kollel, Canada; R.
Mordechai Halperin, Av Beit Din of Sha‘arei Tzedek rabbinical court in Jerusalem, together with his associate
judges R. Hillel Meiras and R. Pinchas Spira; R. Pinchas Eliyahu Rabinowitz, Av Beit Din of Ezer Mishpat
rabbinical court in Monsey, NY, together with his associate judges R. Yosef Weingarten and R. Chanoch Zaltz; R.
Yechezkel Roth, Av Beit Din of Karlsburg and author of Teshuvot Emek ha-Teshuvah, together with his associate
judge R. Yitzchak Stein; R. Reuven Feinstein, rosh yeshivah of Tiferet Yerushalayim, Staten Island; R. Eliyahu
Pesach Romineck, rosh yeshivah of Ohavei Torah, Queens; R. Meir Hershkowitz, rosh yeshivah of Beit Binyamin,
Stamford; R. Aharon Moshe Schechter, rosh yeshivah of Rabbeinu Chaim Berlin, Brooklyn; R. Eliyahu Dov
Wachtfogel, rosh yeshivah of Zichron Moshe, South Fallsburg; R. Avraham Dov Bromberg, rosh yeshivah of Shaar
ha-Talmud, Lakewood, NJ; R. Yaakov Shraga Horowitz, rosh yeshivah of Beit Meir, Boro Park; R. Azriel Auerbach
of Jerusalem; and R. Shmuel Auerbach of Jerusalem.
Somewhat more nuanced, and also published in Kovetz Ginat Veradim, are the published letters of the
following three individuals who recommend that a Beth Din be convened to critically review R. Greenblatt’s claim
that mekach ta‘ut is applicable: R. Zalman Nechemiah Goldberg, Av Beit Din of Ha-Yashar ve-ha-Tov, Jerusalem;
R. Shalom Cohen, rosh yeshivah of Porat Yosef, Jerusalem; and R. Avraham Chaim Sherman, Jerusalem. [Shalom
C. Spira’s note of observation: Indeed, such a Beth Din was subsequently convened, viz. the Beth Din of R. David
Feinstein, and the conclusion reached was that Ms. Epstein is halakhically the wife of Mr. Friedman. Seemingly,
then, this conclusion can now be attributed to R. Goldberg, R. Cohen and R. Sherman.]
 Friedman, who should live, or Ms. Tamar Friedman, who should live, and
certainly it is not possible for me to know anything about their marriage,
nor on any detail between them. Rather, the Ga’on R. Shalom
Kamenetzky asked me that where there is testimony from expert
physicians on an individual that he is mentally ill which interferes with
marriage, if it is possible to cancel kiddushin on account of this, and I
answered that if it is clear and comparable to the case in the responsum in
Iggerot Mosheh,26 it is possible under specific conditions.”

Thus, even R. Greenblatt himself seems to have post facto acknowledged that he is
unable to issue a ruling on the matter of Epstein vs. Friedman.
Admittedly, R. Greenblatt’s letter is immediately followed by another one on the same
page of Kovetz Ginat Veradim. This last letter, ostensibly dated the next day, viz. 15 Kislev,
5776, states:

“I hereby return to that which I wrote regarding this matter concerning the
lady Ms. Tamar Epstein, who married one gentleman who was
subsequently diagnosed with mental illness, such that physicians testified
his condition is incurable, and immediately she began to separate from
him. And it is agreed by the poskim that mental illness of such magnitude
that it is impossible for a spouse to live with him, similar to that which
they said ‘no human can live with a snake etc.,’ is a worthy reason to
annul kiddushin, for it is mekach ta‘ut, and even though [the usual
preference of ladies seeking a marriage partner is that] ‘it is better for two
people to live together etc.’, behold it is obvious that no lady would never
marry a gentleman with a punishing illness like this. And my clear opinion
is that the aforementioned lady is allowed to marry any gentleman.”

This last letter would then prima facie seem to indicate that – in the end – R. Greenblatt
has definitely ruled that Ms. Epstein may remarry without a get.
However, in a letter to the editor published in the immediately following Kovetz Ginat
Veradim (viz.vol. 29, p. 344), an anonymous writer (identified only by the initials H.B.S.) from
Lakewood, NJ claims that there is a mistake in the date of R. Greenblatt’s 15 Kislev letter. It
should not be dated 15 Kislev, 5776, but rather 15 Kislev, 5774. This is because – insists H.B.S.
– R. Greenblatt’s final verdict was the letter of 14 Kislev, 5776 stating that he is unable to issue a
definitive ruling on Epstein vs. Friedman.
In the end, we may be left with an enigma regarding the position of R. Greenblatt, but
what we can certainly say is that many countervailing poskim have stated definitively that Ms.
Epstein is indeed the wife of Mr. Friedman according to Torah law.

G. CONSULTATION WITH RABBI J. DAVID

BLEICH

26
A reference to R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer I, no. 80.
 Given the importance of this halakhic question, this student approached posek ha-dor R.
J. David Bleich, who has indeed published an article in Tradition 33:1 (Fall 1998) on the subject
of mekach ta‘ut as grounds to annul kiddushin. In order to ensure that R. Bleich would be
provided with accurate information, this student prefaced that consultation by first conferring
with R. Avraham J. Shmidman, Mara de-Atra of Lower Merion Synagogue in Philadelphia,
which the Epstein family attends. R. Shmidman confirmed that he has not personally issued any
ruling on Epstein vs. Friedman.27 Accordingly, this student asked R. Bleich what the halakhah is
regarding Epstein vs. Friedman, and whether R. Shmidman should be advised to resign.

On March 3, 2017, R. Bleich responded by e-mail as follows:

“I see no reason, nor any benefit, in resignation on the part of Rabbi Shmidman. I
presume that the gentleman in question is willing to submit all outstanding issues to a
competent Bet Din. That is certainly his right.

I would greatly appreciate a copy of Rabbi Greenblatt's letter and anything available from
Rabbi Kaminetsky.

Happy Purim and kol tuv.”

This student complied, sending R. Bleich by Canada Post express-mail service copies of
the letters of R. Greenblatt and R. Kamenetzky regarding Epstein vs. Friedman, as rendered
available by R. Daniel Eidensohn on his Da’as Torah website. [At that early juncture, this
student did not yet have access to Kovetz Ginat Veradim, and so R. Daniel Eidensohn was the
sole source of this information.]
Several weeks later, this student contacted R. Bleich a second time, informing him that
this student now had available [again from R. Daniel Eidensohn] copies of the letters of the
many poskim who maintain that Ms. Epstein is still married to Mr. Friedman. On March 30,
2017, R. Bleich responded with a second e-mail as follows:

“I think shev ve-al ta'aseh is the best policy.28

I would appreciate anything else you have regarding the Kamenetsky matter.
Chag kasher ve-sameach.”

27
In an e-mail of Feb. 27, 2017, R. Shmidman wrote (inter alia) “I am not in any way involved in this matter…
Thank you for your kind consideration and understanding.”
28
This first sentence within R. Bleich’s e-mail actually responds to a separate question regarding a ger katan (as per
the Gemara, Ketubot 11a), unrelated to Epstein vs. Friedman, and hence beyond the scope of this essay. [Both the
question regarding the ger katan – which was a potentially urgent matter – and the question regarding Epstein vs.
Friedman – likewise a potentially urgent matter, were submitted to R. Bleich simultaneously during the pre-Pesach
5777 season, and hence R. Bleich responded to them both in the same e-mail.] However, it is interesting to note that
R. Bleich’s response regarding the ger katan (viz. to be passive) is conceptually identical to his response regarding
Epstein vs. Friedman. I.e., at this point, R. Bleich was directing me not to take any action on Epstein vs. Friedman
[other than send him the requested materials.]
 This student complied once again, sending R. Bleich by Canada Post express-mail service
copies of the letters of the poskim who maintain that Ms. Epstein is still married to Mr.
Friedman. No immediate further response was heard from R. Bleich.
Consequently, over the following year, this student took the initiative to compose a first
draft of the present essay [again without actual access to Kovetz Ginat Veradim]. The first draft
was dated 12 Menachem Av, 5778, and was mailed by R. Bleich via Canada Post express-post
service, arriving at R. Bleich’s office (according to the Canada Post tracking service) on July 30,
2018. This student’s first draft only focused on the meaning of Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah I,
no. 101, and did not reach a final practical conclusion regarding Epstein vs. Friedman.29
In the meantime, on Aug. 22, 2018, Hamodia: The Daily Newspaper of Torah Jewry
electronically published an article which recognizes R. Shlomo Eliyahu Miller as a scholar
whose opinion is respected by the Agudath Israel of America.30 Ergo, this Hamodia article
seemed to indirectly augur in favour of publishing the first draft of this student’s essay, since R.
Miller has previously ruled that Ms. Epstein is married to Mr. Friedman.31 On the other hand,
this student had not yet received any response from R. Bleich. Accordingly, this student
consulted with R. Daniel Eidensohn, who (from Aug. 30-Sept. 2, 2018) indeed encouraged this
student to publish first draft of the essay, and so it was self-published in its first edition.32
Subsequently, on Oct. 9, 2018, this student was privileged to speak by telephone with R.
Bleich. R. Bleich confirmed that he had indeed received this student’s first draft, but continued
that there was no need for him to issue a ruling on Epstein vs. Friedman, since R. Bleich was
never presented with any evidence that the hypothetical fact pattern actually occurred. Perhaps it
is a situation of lo hayu devarim me-olam (a hypothetical that never materialized), as per the
Gemara, Eiruvin 40a.
Inspired by that conversation with R. Bleich, and realizing that R. Daniel Eidensohn had
received his information from Kovetz Ginat Veradim, this student investigated the first dozen
editions of Kovetz Ginat Veradim freely available at <http://www.hebrewbooks.org>, and
discovered that one of the editorial board members (viz. R. Moshe Berish Laufer) is a fellow
member of the Montreal Jewish community. Accordingly, this student asked his acquaintance
Reb Yehudah Yitzchak Krausz (who resides in the same immediate neighbourhood as R. Laufer)
to furnish this student with an actual copy of the relevant Kovetz Ginat Veradim edition(s) of
relevance to Epstein vs. Friedman. Indeed, on Nov. 15, 2018, Reb Krausz graciously provided
this student with the requested copies (viz. Kovetz Ginat Veradim vols. 28-29). Furthermore, on
Nov. 28, 2018, the Nissan-Iyar 5776 edition of Ha-Ma’or was rendered freely available at
<http://www.hebrewbooks.org>, containing a relevant exchange between R. Shlomo Klein and
the editor, as cited in the introduction of the present essay. Given the new reference information
from Kovetz Ginat Veradim and Ha-Ma’or, a second edition of this essay was self-published.33

29
I.e. the first draft of the essay consisted of supra, Sections A-E.
30
<https://hamodia.com/2018/08/22/chayim-aruchim-educates-rabbanim-contemporary-medical-issues/>
31
See supra, note 9.
32
Dated 22 Elul, 5778, and rendered freely available at <http://www.scribd.com/document/387494357/Response-to-
R-Shmuel-Kamenetzky>.
33
Dated 21 Kislev, 5779, and rendered once again freely available at the aforementioned address of
<http://www.scribd.com/document/387494357/Response-to-R-Shmuel-Kamenetzky>.
Once again, the focus was limited to clarifying the meaning of Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah I,
no. 101, without reaching a practical conclusion regarding Epstein vs. Friedman.
Subsequently, on Jan. 3, 2019, R. Yitzchak Miller, son of R. Shlomo Eliyahu Miller,
visited Montreal to serve as guest lecturer for the annual yartzeit class in memory of R. Pinchas
Hirschprung held at Montreal’s Beth Jacob school.34 The event was attended by a distinguished
audience, which included R. Yonatan Binyamin Weiss, current Av Beit Din of the Jewish
Community Council of Montreal, the non-immediate successor to R. Hirschprung.35 R. Akiva
Einstadter, Director of Ohr Le Nefesh (an agency that helps Montreal families cope with mental
illness), approached R. Yitzchak Miller after the lecture and told him that I wanted to speak to
him. R. Yitzchak Miller obligingly and graciously introduced himself to me, whereupon I
reciprocated by showing him his father's responsum in Kovetz Ginat Veradim Vol. 28, p. 179
[which is co-signed by R. Eliyahu Dov Wachtfogel, R. Moshe Green and R. Yechiel Tauber]
declaring Ms. Epstein to be halakhically the wife of Mr. Friedman. I asked R. Yitzchak Miller
whether his father actually wrote this responsum. R. Yitzchak Miller answered me that the
responsum is indeed truly that of his father. I further asked R. Yitzchak Miller whether the facts
that his father presents in the responsum are true. R. Yitzchak Miller answered me that the facts
are indeed true. Consequently, I left a series of telephone messages with R. Bleich, informing
him of these developments, developments that seemingly negate R. Bleich’s earlier evaluation
that lo hayu devarim me-olam.
Finally, on Jan. 17, 2019, this student reached R. Bleich directly by telephone. R. Bleich
acknowledged that he received and understood my earlier telephone messages. R. Bleich further
acknowledged that he now recognizes that Epstein vs. Friedman is indeed a real case. R. Bleich
additionally responded that this student is not halakhically obligated to further update the essay
on Epstein vs. Friedman, since anything this student writes will simply be a “kol korei ba-
midbar.”36 R. Bleich then continued that he is now granting this student limited permission [as
distinct from obligation] to update the present essay to a third edition, a third edition which
might actually suggest a practical solution to Epstein vs. Friedman. R. Bleich stipulated that he
was granting this student such limited permission on the strict conditions that the essay be
updated in such a way that (a) there are no polemics or politics [just as was in fact the case of the
first two editions of this essay] and (b) that the practical solution offered by this student be

34
Although the event is annually held in the Beth Jacob school, ladies and gentlemen who attend the lecture are
separated by completely different entrances at opposite ends of the spacious edifice, and a ceiling-high partition
divides the ladies’ and gentlemen’s sections for the lecture itself, such that there is no possible halakhic objection to
the venue of event.
35
After R. Hirschprung ascended to the Heavenly Academy in 5758, the position of Av Beit Din of the Jewish
Community Council of Montreal was inherited by R. Avraham David Niznik. After R. Niznik ascended to the
Heavenly Academy in 5767, the position of Av Beit Din of the Jewish Community Council of Montreal was
inherited by R. Yonatan Binyamin Weiss. Thus, R. Niznik was the immediate successor to R. Hirschprung, whereas
the current R. Weiss is the non-immediate successor to R. Hirschprung. [See also supra, note 9, for a description of
the celebration that was convened upon R. Weiss’ initial investiture as a Dayan in Montreal in 5766.]
36
This is a pun by R. Bleich on Isaiah 40:3. [In the original context, the prophet Isaiah speaks of a proclamation that
will be taken seriously in the time of the messianic redemption. In his pun, R. Bleich is borrowing the expression to
mean (le-havdil elef havdalot) a proclamation by this unworthy student that will be of little value, since others have
already written on the topic.]
rigorously justified by appropriate Oral Torah mekorot, thereby fulfilling the mitzvah of Talmud
Torah. Thus, we now turn to the next section of the present essay, which will endeavour to meet
R. Bleich’s strict expectations.

H. SOURCES REGARDING MEKACH TA‘UT IN KIDDUSHIN

In point of fact, R. Bleich’s aforementioned article in Tradition 33:1 contains many of the
appropriate Oral Torah mekorot necessary to offer a practical solution to Epstein vs. Friedman.
Ergo, we can presently incorporate the article by reference and diamond-polish its minor
errors/lacunae, as follows:

1. On pp. 116-117 of his article, R. Bleich analyzes Taz, Even ha-Ezer 17:15, who
allows liberating an agunah based on a minority view. R. Bleich remonstrates that the
relevance of Taz to matters of kiddushei ta‘ut is counterbalanced by the fact that Taz is
opposed by Rema, Bi’ur ha-Gra, Chelkat Mechokek and Machatzit ha-Shekel (ad loc.), as
well as by Chazon Ish, Even ha-Ezer 31:12.
Actually, it seems to this student that even Taz only allows relying on a minority
view insofar as relaxing the normal standards of evidence to establish widowhood is
concerned. Namely, where a husband has long disappeared and is presumed dead but
without the full evidence normally required by a Beth Din in order to deternine factual
accuracy, there might be reason to argue (as Taz does argue) that even a minority opinion
can bi-she‘at ha-dechak justify relaxing the normal standards of evidence. After all,
several Rishonim hold that the Torah empowers the Sages to define the parameters of
credible testimony necessary to post facto that a lady is widowed.37 By contradistinction,
in the markedly different case of kiddushei ta‘ut – where we know full well that the
husband is alive, and the source of conflict is that he refuses to co-operate with execution
of a get – we have no proof that even Taz would offer the claim that one can rely on a
minority opinion. After all, just as there is a she‘at ha-dechak for the wife who wants
kiddushei ta‘ut to be diagnosed, so too there is a countervailing she‘at ha-dechak for the
husband who wants to remain married. [This point parallels Section A, above.] And so all
poskim would agree that we cannot rely on a minority view to invoke kiddushei ta‘ut.

2. In endnote 27 of his article, R. Bleich critically reviews the ruling of R. Moshe

Feinstein, Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer I, nos. 79-80 that kiddushin can be annulled by
virtue of mekach ta‘ut if the groom is [unbeknownst to the bride at the time of kiddushin]
incurably physically incapable of marital relations, or if the groom is [unbeknownst to the
bride at the time of kiddushin] incurably psychotic [such that the groom is likewise
incapable of marital relations]. R. Bleich comments as follows:

“This position, however, is contradicted by an early-day authority.

Teshuvot ha-Rosh, klal 42, no. 5, accepted a woman’s contention that,
unknown to her that the time of the marriage, her husband was impotent

37
Re’ah quoted by Ritva to Yevamot 88a (s.v. mitokh), Ritva himself (ibid.), and Nimukei Yosef (ibid.). According
to Chazon Ish (Even ha-Ezer 22:3), this is also the position of Tosafot to Yevamot 88a (s.v. mitokh). [However,
Chazon Ish is disputed by his disciple R. Shmuel Wosner, Teshuvot Shevet ha-Levi IV, no. 163.]
 and ruled that he might be compelled to execute a get. Rosh did not rule
that a get was necessary on the grounds that, since impotence is a defect of
a nature such that is constitutes grounds for compelling a divorce, it also
serves as grounds for kiddushei ta’ut when concealed at the time of the
marriage.”

Alas, there are two typographical errors in R. Bleich’s remarks: (a) The reference
should actually be to Teshuvot ha-Rosh, klal 43 (not 42), no. 5. [Indeed, the accurate
citation of Teshuvot ha-Rosh appears in R. Yom Tov ha-Levi Schwarz, Ma‘aneh la-
Iggerot, nos. 165 and 168, in his own challenge against Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer I,
nos. 79-80. R. Schwarz insists that one cannot nullify kiddushin even in a situation of an
incurably psychotic husband.38] (b) In R. Bleich’s last sentence, “Rosh did not rule that a
get was necessary…” should be changed to the opposite, viz. “Rosh did not rule that a get
was unnecessary…” With these typographical corrections, we can now appreciate the
true meaning of R. Bleich’s remonstration against R. Feinstein.

3. While apparently unknown to R. Bleich at the time he wrote his Tradition 33:1
article, R. Hershel Schachter would subsequently publish an article in Beit Yitzchak Vol.
45 (5774) containing R. Joseph Ber Soloveitchik’s reaction to Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-
Ezer I, nos. 79-80.39 Namely, on p. 64, R. Schachter reports that R. Soloveitchik railed
against the phenomenon of American talmidei chakhamim who manifest a skewed sense
of values by being excessively stringent where they should be lenient and excessively
lenient where they should be stringent. Representative of this misguided behaviour, in R.
Soloveitchik’s estimation, was “a great man (adam gadol echad) who was stringent to
forbid tuna fish and lenient to allow a married lady to remarry without a get.” Although
R. Soloveitchik [as quoted by R. Schachter] does not identify this adam gadol echad by
name, it is clear that the reference must be to R. Moshe Feinstein, who forbids tuna fish
in Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah III, no. 8, and who permits a lady to remarry without a
get in the limited circumstances described by Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer I, nos. 79-
80.
Interestingly, three years after R. Soloveitchik ascended to the Heavenly
Academy, R. Bleich published Be-Netivot ha-Halakhah Vol. 1, containing a chapter (pp.
129-148) upholding R. Moshe Feinstein’s ruling to forbid tuna fish. But leaving aside the
tuna fish debate, what certainly emerges from R. Schachter’s report is that R. Joseph Ber
Soloveitchik can be reckoned as an ally to R. Yom Tov ha-Levi Schwarz in demanding
[contra R. Moshe Feinstein] that the marriage to an insane husband be respected as valid,
with no possibility of invoking mekach ta‘ut.

38
Additionally, while [from R. Schwarz’ perspective] superfluous in reaching his stringent conclusion, R. Schwarz
further remonstrates (contra R. Feinstein) that there is insufficient evidence that the specific husband [adjudicated
by R. Feinstein in Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer I, no. 80] was already ill at the time of kiddushin.
39
Of course, as indeed cited by R. Bleich in his original Tradition 33:1 article, R. Soloveitchik publicly rejected (in
a 1975 lecture, responding to R. Emanuel Rackman) the wholesale approach of using mekach ta‘ut as method of
rescuing agunot. The chiddush of R. Schachter, however, is that R. Soloveitchik did not even concur with the
limited employment of mekach ta‘ut in the extenuating circumstances adjudicated by R. Feinstein.
 4. R. Bleich, p. 98 of his article, cites R. Joseph Elijah Henkin, Peirushei Ivra no.
1, sec. 44 as opposing the use of mekach ta‘ut in any situation to nullify kiddushin,
whether it be a defect in the bride or a defect in the groom.40 However, in his subsequent
responsum regarding Epstein vs. Friedman (published in Kovetz Ginat Veradim Vol. 28,
p. 183), R. Nota Zvi Greenblatt testifies that R. Henkin orally told him that mekach ta‘ut
could be applied even for kiddushin on account of a defect in the bride. R. Greenblatt
seems to understand from this oral remark that R. Henkin completely retracted his
original written statement in Peirushei Ivra, such that mekach ta‘ut could likewise be
applied due a defect discovered in the groom. [However, R. Greenblatt’s extrapolation is
far from obvious, because R. Bleich, pp. 101-102 of his article, argues that even if
mekach ta‘ut could be applied to a defect discovered in the bride (contra Peirushei Ivrai),
we still would not be able to establish that mekach ta‘ut could be applied to a defect
discovered in the groom.]

5. Subsequent to the publication of R. Bleich’s original article in Tradition 33:1,

Reb Michael I. Rackman wrote a letter to the editor in Tradition 33:3 (Spring 1999).41
Reb Rackman’s letter contains a detailed challenge to R. Bleich’s original article. R.
Bleich counter-responds to the letter that “although the substantive comments in Mr.
Rackman’s letter are, in my opinion, entirely without merit, I am readily available to
anyone seeking further elucidation of any particular point.” R. Bleich further explains –
in defending himself from the accusation that he does not act with sufficient alacrity to
rescue agunot – that rescuing agunot is like practicing oncology; we know in advance
that some cases are (lo aleinu) incurable.
From the above exchange, one particularly intriguing argument raised by Reb
Rackman that emerges (contra R. Bleich) concerns R. Bleich’s invocation of the
principle of savrah ve-kiblah, viz. that if the wife continues to live with her husband even
after discovering the defect, she has forgiven the defect and is now absolutely married to
the husband irrespective of the defect. Mr. Rackman remonstrates:

“This argument clearly does not reflect marital reality. If the wife listened
to her rabbi who told her not to be hasty and to give the marriage a chance
to work, then she is deemed unable to get an annulment because she did
not leave “immediately.” The grave implication is that all rabbis, when
counselling wives who face marital problems, should point out that by a
wife trying to save a marriage, she may wind up trapped in it. (Does R.
Bleich give the warning?)
In civil law, if one buys a car that is a lemon, the law allows voiding of the
transaction even if the buyer allows the seller to try to repair it and the
buyer continues to drive it in the hope that it can be salvaged. Why is it

40
Found on p. 43 of Peirushei Ivra.
41
It would appear that the author of the letter is, in fact, the son of R. Emanuel Rackman who was the subject of R.
Soloveitchik’s 1975 lecture rejecting mekach ta‘ut as a wholesale basis for rescuing agunot (mentioned supra, note
39), although this biographical point is not rendered explicit in the exchange between Reb Michael I. Rackman and
R. Bleich.
 only a wife who, at the first sign that her husband might be a lemon, has to
immediately abandon all hope in order to void the transaction of
marriage?”

This remonstration of Mr. Rackman is relevant to [the future case of42] Epstein vs.
Friedman, since Ms. Epstein continued to live with Mr. Friedman even after she
discovered [what she later claims would be] mental illness in the husband. Ms. Epstein
was trying to give the marriage “one last chance,” but ultimately decided she could not
tolerate her husband’s condition and sought an annulment.
As R. Bleich did not publicly counter-respond point-for-point to Mr. Rackman,
his counter-response regarding Mr. Rackman’s approach to savrah ve-kiblah is unknown.

Applying the above five-point analysis of R. Bleich’s article to Epstein vs. Friedman, it
seems to this student as follows. We will assume [for argument’s sake] that the halakhah follows
Mr. Rackman’s remonstration against R. Bleich’s invocation of savrah ve-kiblah, such that Ms.
Epstein is not a situation of savrah ve-kiblah. Furthermore, we will assume [for argument’s sake]
that the halakhah follows R. Greenblatt’s verdict that we must follow Iggerot Mosheh to annul in
the situation of undisclosed mental illness in the groom, contra R. Yom Tov ha-Levi Schwarz
and R. Joseph Ber Soloveitchik [and also possibly contra R. Joseph Elijah Henkin, although in
any event – as mentioned – R. Greenblatt claims that R. Henkin ultimately retracted and
concurred with Iggerot Mosheh.] But even granted these points in favour of Mr. Rackman and R.
Greenblatt, the following four sfekot le-chumra remain regarding the particular case of Epstein
vs. Friedman:

a) In the case of Iggerot Mosheh, medical documents signed by accredited physicians at a

hospital were presented to the Beth Din of Baltimore [who then forwarded the
information to Iggerot Mosheh] that the husband was mentally ill. By contradistinction,
in our case of Epstein vs. Friedman, no such information has ever been presented to any
Beth Din. Rather, R. Greenblatt’s Beth Din was told that Mr. Freedman is mentally ill
with OCD plus PPD, without R. Greenblatt’s Beth Din seeing the documentation in
question. Indeed, the documentation in question is not signed by anyone, but is rather the
anonymous composition of unknown healthcare workers, such that it is not even clear
that such documentation could be accepted by R. Greenblatt’s Beth Din. Thus, there is a
legitimate safek whether Mr. Friedman is actually mentally ill.
This doubt appears to be corroborated by the thematically parallel responsum of R.
Eliezer Yehudah Waldenberg, Teshuvot Tzitz Eliezer VI, no. 42, ch. 1. That responsum
deals with a request of a wife to a Beth Din to compel a husband to grant a get to his wife
on the grounds that the husband is afflicted by paranoid schizophrenia. In order to
process the wife’s claim, R. Waldenberg’s Beth Din received evidence provided by
expert physicians both in writing and by oral testimony [in the presence of the Beth Din]
regarding the mental health of the husband. The names of the physicians were clearly
made known to R. Waldenberg’s Beth Din. By contradistinction, in our case of Epstein
vs. Friedman, no names of any physicians were ever made known to the Beth Din of R.

42
Ms. Epstein only accepted kiddushin from Mr. Friedman several years after the exchange between Reb Rackman
and R. Bleich.
 Greenblatt; everything is anonymous and hence shrouded in doubt. Ergo, there remains a
legitimate safek whether Mr. Friedman is actually mentally ill.

b) Even if Mr. Friedman is actually mentally ill with OCD plus PPD, it is not clear that this
matches the mental illness described by Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer I, no. 80. In that
situation, the husband was so severely psychotic that he fled from his wife and was
unwilling to live with her ever again. By contradistinction, in the case of Mr. Friedman,
he has not fled his wife and [apparently as current as today] would still be delighted to
return to shalom bayit with his wife. Furthermore, Mr. Friedman continues to maintain
employment as an attorney in Congress, which [leaving aside insightfully amusing
witticisms regarding the legal profession and/or the civil service] seems to indicate a
certain degree of healthy psychological disposition on the part of Mr. Friedman. Ergo,
there is a legitimate safek whether Mr. Friedman’s purported mental illness matches the
severity described by Iggerot Mosheh.

c) Even if Mr. Friedman is mentally ill and even if his mental illness matches the severity
described by Iggerot Mosheh, we would still have to prove that Mr. Friedman was
already mentally ill at the time of kiddushin. In the case of Iggerot Mosheh, R. Feinstein
was presented with a signed medical opinion that the illness already existed at the time of
kiddushin, since the husband had been psychiatrically hospitalized before (as well as
after) the kiddushin. By contradistinction, there does not appear to be any substantive
evidence that Mr. Friedman was mentally ill at the time of kiddushin. To wit: perhaps the
musical band at the wedding of Ms. Epstein to Mr. Friedman gave Mr. Friedman a
concussion [minutes after the kiddushin was already orchestrated] by playing “od
yishama” at a high decibel on the public amplification speakers, and it is only from then
on that Mr. Friedman was mentally ill. If so, there would be no grounds for mekach ta‘ut.

d) Even if Mr. Friedman is mentally ill, and even if his mental illness matches the severity
described by Iggerot Mosheh, and even if we can prove that Mr. Friedman was already
mentally ill at the time of kiddushin, nevertheless halakhic judicial procedure demands
that the evidence to this effect be presented to the original Beth Din that adjudicated
Epstein vs. Friedman [viz. the Baltimore Beth Din], and also that both litigants [including
Mr. Friedman] be present at the Beth Din when it adjudicates this matter. These two
principles of halakhic judicial procedure were highlighted by the Langer case, as
described by R. Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems I (KTAV Publishing, 1977),
pp. 174-175.43
Now, in the case of the psychotic groom adjudicated by Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer I,
no. 80, at all times the same Beth Din adjudicated the question of the husband’s status,
voluntarily consulting with R. Moshe Feinstein when it wished to arrive at a final verdict.
By contradistinction, in Epstein vs. Friedman, R. Greenblatt’s Beth Din suddenly
accepted responsibility for the case [involving the allegedly mentally ill groom] without

43
It should be noted that R. Bleich’s published analysis does not arrive at a final verdict on the Langer case itself.
Indeed, the Langer case beyond the scope of the present essay. [This student hastens to add that the competing
protagonists in the Langer case are tzaddikim gemurim, to whose credit it redounds that they caused an expansion of
Torah study. See Rashi to Numbers 27:5.]
 receiving any authorization from the Baltimore Beth Din that had previously adjudicated
the case [and which actually denies any significant mental illness on the part of the
groom]. Furthermore, in the situation adjudicated by Iggerot Mosheh, the husband was
always welcome to attend the Beth Din sessions when the Beth Din ruled that his
marriage was voided by virtue of mekach ta‘ut. It was the psychotic husband who refused
to attend the Beth Din sessions after every reasonable invitation was extended. By
contradistinction, Mr. Friedman was never invited to attend R. Greenblatt’s Beth Din
when it ruled that his marriage was voided by virtue of mekach ta‘ut.
In light of these two violations of halakhic judicial procedure in Epstein vs. Friedman by
the Beth Din of R. Greenblatt (be-mechilat Kevod Torato), we have a legitimate safek
that the verdict of R. Greenblatt’s Beth Din may be inherently void ab initio.

Accordingly, in light of the above-described four sfekot le-chumra regarding Epstein vs.
Friedman, it tentatively seems to this student that we must invoke the principle “the burden of
proof devolves upon the plaintiff” (as per the Gemara, Bava Kamma 46b) and so the halakhah
follows the many poskim44 who have ruled that the plaintiff Ms. Epstein is still the wife of the
defendant Mr. Friedman according to Torah law. Indeed, among this list of poskim we find R.
Yechezkel Roth, the same R. Yechezkel Roth whom R. Moshe Feinstein consulted on how to
write in get in Monsey, New York.45 Thus, the list of poskim includes a scholar who apprenticed
with R. Moshe Feinstein [quite apart from the fact that R. Moshe Feinstein’s own son R. David
Feinstein has arrived at the identical conclusion] and so can be trusted to help formulate our
tentative conclusion that Ms. Epstein remains halakhically married to Mr. Friedman.46

44
Cited supra, note 25.
45
Specifically, R. Aryeh Kaplan, “A “Get” in Monsey,” Jewish Observer, Dec. 1976, reports that when the question
arose in 1973 of how to write a get in Monsey for the first time [viz. how to geographically describe Monsey in the
text of the get], both R. Kaminetzky as well as R. Feinstein [when each approached individually by three members
of the Monsey kollel] absolutely refused to render a halakhic decision on this weighty matter without consulting the
other. It was only after R. Feinstein and R. Kaminetzky met together and discussed the matter in detail [first
privately among themselves, and then at an expanded meeting which included the three Monsey kollel members]
and arrived at a consensual halakhic ruling as to the correct formulation [-and, furthermore, received approval for
their consensual ruling from R. Yechezkel Roth, R. Moshe Stern, R. Moshe Neuschloss and R. Nathan Horowitz]
that the first get was finally written in Monsey on Oct. 29, 1975. [That report is posthumously republished by R.
Kaplan’s widow in The Aryeh Kaplan Reader (Mesorah Publications, 1983), pp. 74-82.]
46
Indeed, R. Yechezkel Roth’s ruling that Ms. Epstein remains the wife of Mr. Friedman appears on verdict
(published in Kovetz Ginat Veradim Vol. 28, p. 257) disqualifying R. Nota Zvi Greenblatt (be-mechilat Kevod
Torato) from ruling any further on matters of gittin ve-kiddushin, and this also seems to reflect apprenticeship with
R. Moshe Feinstein. After all, as a consequence of the Langer case, R. Moshe Feinstein similarly disqualified R.
Shlomo Goren. Specifically, writing in Ha-Pardes journal of Tevet 5733, p. 2, R. Moshe Feinstein posits:

"Regarding the terrible matter that was orchestrated in the Land of Israel, that the recently
chosen Chief Rabbi said, as has been publicized, that he can find ways in halakhic
decision-making to be lenient regarding weighty questions, and he also immediately
acted so by allowing a brother and sister to marry into the congregation after they were
already forbidden by an esteemed Beth Din, and this episode created a tumult among
the Gedolei Torah in the Land of Israel. And we received the Da'at Torah of
the Ga'on R. Yechezkel Abramsky shlit"a, and all the giants and yeshiva heads in the
Land of Israel concurred, that they announce that all [the Chief Rabbi's] halakhic verdicts
and decisions are nullified. So we gathered in the chamber of the Agudat ha-Rabbanim of
 I. ANALYSIS OF RABBI HERSHEL SCHACHTER AND RABBI
MORDECHAI WILLIG

In the previous section, we tentatively concluded that it would seem that mekach ta‘ut
cannot be applied in Epstein vs. Friedman. In the following section, we will discover that this
tentative conclusion appears to be strengthened by oral lectures delivered by R. Hershel
Schachter and R. Mordechai Willig.
As a caveat of caution, this student notes that R. Schachter and R. Willig (be-mechilat
Kevod Toratam) have erred in their approach to the agunah problem by their advocacy for the
1993 Beth Din of America prenup, a prenup which actually results in gittin pessulin and hence
only serves to exacerbate the agunah problem.47 At the same time, it is illuminating to discover
in the present section that even R. Schachter and R. Willig – having erred by their advocacy for
the 1993 Beth Din of America prenup – seem to acknowledge that mekach ta‘ut cannot be
applied to Epstein vs. Friedman. Namely, in a lecture of Jan. 10, 2016,48 R. Schachter says
(employing Yiddish vocalization) as follows:

“When the she’elos are presented to the chakhamim, you have to tell all of the
details of the case. The ba‘al ha-bayis who is asking may not realize which details
are crucial and which are not. For example, recently there was a case of a girl who
was an agunah de-Oraisa. The husband for sure is alive; he didn’t drown
anywhere. He refused to give her a get. So they were tumelen and tumelen. So
they went to a certain big talmid chakham to give a psak on the case. So they
never told him the facts of the case. They never told him that the two
psychologists never met the husband. They never told him that the girl was in a
beis din - this beis din, the other beis din, it was going on forever. They never told
him all the details of the case. So they said: if they would have told him the
details, he would never have given the psak. That was very unfair. That psak is
not valid. If you get a Chakham to give a psak without knowing the facts of the
case, so that's a psak be-ta‘us, that psak is not valid at all.”

the great rabbis and great yeshiva heads to adjudicate this, for this affects all Jews in all
countries, and besides that, all rabbis and supporters of Torah are anyway obligated to
protest against those who offend the honour of the Torah - which is the Honour of
Heaven - such that all of Israel are obligated to protest and correct the wrongdoing.
Therefore we are also joining the Da'at Torah of the Ga'on R. Yechezkel
Abramsky shlit"a and the agreement of all the giants of the Land of Israel that all [the
Chief Rabbi's] halakhic verdicts and decisions are nullified."
47
See “A Combination of Two Halakhically Kosher Prenuptial Agreements to Benefit the Jewish Wife,” loc. cit.,
Section A of that essay. Indeed, this has been more recently confirmed by the ruling of R. Moshe Sternbuch at
<https://www.scribd.com/doc/273292099/Rav-Moshe-Sternbuch-condemns-prenuptial-
agreements?secret_password=tfA9agf8H8M7dDE9Hk4N>.
48
Available at <http://www.torahweb.org/audio/rsch_011016_video.html>, the relevant portion beginning at 33:20
into the recording.
 Similarly, in a lecture of Nov. 6, 2017,49 R. Willig remarks (employing Yiddish
vocalization) as follows:

“Someone who cannot control himself, based upon a psychiatrist’s report, it’s
very possible if he marries a woman who doesn’t know about this condition and
then he refuses to give her a get when she discovers the condition, they were
never married. Reb Moshe has a teshuvah about it.50 He’s bothered by
the Shulchan Arukh ruling in siman kuf nun daled of Even ha-Ezer which seems
to say that someone who acts out towards his wife... maybe he beats his wife...
you need a get. And Reb Moshe answers: that person, although it seems that
he’s out of control – no, can control himself. We’ll call him a rasha; he makes
poor choices. But there are some people, who have such a serious condition... I’m
not speaking psychiatry; the psychiatrists will give it various names... they can hit
a woman and think she’s an apple – just delusional. That individual thinks a
woman is an apple... so... that fits into your first category. Again, without a degree
in psychiatry. I have no PhD, I have no MD, I only have a DD; that seems to have
put me in enough trouble without the other degrees. So that’s certainly a case I
believe which qualifies. Yes, there are other situations on the other extreme. A
person who’s guilty of pedophilia, we’re not going to say ‘he had this yetzer ha-
ra to abuse children, so we’re going to let him off the hook.’ Chas ve-
shalom, that’s out of the question. So, are there grey areas in between? Of course.
We deal with them not only from the perspective of psychology – assigning
blame, which is certainly relevant – I think my stakes are even higher: does this
woman need a get or not? In the halakhic world, that’s even a higher stake. And
there are cases which, unfortunately, as some of those who are familiar with the
halakhic world know, in the fairly recent past, certain rulings were given that a
certain individual rose to a level where the marriage was rendered null and
void ab initio. I think it was terrible decision... a terrible decision... I don’t think
the person rose to that level. And I spoke to a very, very qualified psychologist,
who basically agreed with me. So... I’m not belittling your question. It’s a very
serious question; I think Dr. Goldberg will address it. I’m just explaining how
high the stakes can go – even in terms of eshes ish – which is as high as we get in
our hierarchy.”

Admittedly, neither R. Schachter nor R. Willig identify the names of the protagonists of
the case(s) that they are analyzing. Thus, it is hypothetically possible that neither R. Schachter
nor R. Willig are discussing Epstein vs. Friedman. Nevertheless, the impression of this student is
that – whether or not R. Schachter and/or R. Willig actually intended to discuss Epstein vs.
Friedman – their substantive analysis is equally transposable to Epstein vs. Friedman, thereby
strengthening our tentative conclusion in Section H above.

49
Available at <https://www.yutorah.org/sidebar/lecture.cfm/888097/rabbi-mordechai-i-willig-dr-scott-
goldberg/the-role-of-psychology-in-jewish-communities/>, the relevant portion beginning at 18:50 into the
recording.
50
A reference to R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer I, no. 80.
 J. RESTORATION OF MS. EPSTEIN TO SHELOM BAYIT
WITH MR. FRIEDMAN

Until now, we have tentatively concluded that the righteous Ms. Epstein remains the wife
of the righteous Mr. Friedman. In the present section, we turn our attention to a corollary issue:
granted that they remain married according to Torah law, but is it permitted for Ms. Epstein to
actually return to shelom bayit with her husband Mr. Friedman? If she can, it would be a mitzvah
to encourage this course of action.51 And as for the righteous second husband, since the RCA
now converts 3 times as many ladies as gentlemen,52 there should be no hypothetical difficulty
swiftly finding him an excellent replacement shiddukh. Thus, all the righteous protagonists in
this episode can be honoured and live happily ever after. The fundamental conundrum, however,
is whether it is at all permitted for Ms. Epstein to return to shelom bayit with Mr. Friedman, in
light of the Torah prohibition – Numbers 5:13 as elucidated by the Gemara, Yevamot 100b – for
a married lady who has willfully cohabited with an alien gentleman to return to her original
husband [as well as to the alien gentleman].
To that effect, among the many poskim53 who have announced that Ms. Epstein is the
wife of Mr. Friedman, some of these54 have further announced that Ms. Epstein is forbidden to
return to shelom bayit with Mr. Friedman, precisely as a consequence of Numbers 5:13.
However, it is noteworthy that the balance of poskim [who have announced that Ms. Epstein is
the wife of Mr. Friedman] have made no such assertion prohibiting Ms. Epstein from returning
to shelom bayit.
Perhaps we can explain these other poskim by tentatively hypothesizing a two-tiered
safek le-kula to allow Ms. Friedman to return to shelom bayit with her husband Mr. Friedman, as
follows:

(1) Perhaps Mr. Friedman has the halakhic ability to willfully deny that Ms. Epstein ever
cohabited with any other gentleman other than Mr. Friedman. Although Mr. Epstein
underwent a siddur kiddushin [officiated by R. Greenblatt] to an alien gentleman,
perhaps that siddur kiddushin was entirely a shpiel, and can be ignored by Mr.
Friedman. This can be compared to the Mishnah, Nedarim 90b, which teaches that a
husband is not required to believe his wife when she tells him that she cohabited with

51
See sources cited by Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. “hava’at shalom.” Furthermore, the Gemara, Yoma 9a-b, derives
from I Samuel 2:22 that because Chofni and Pinchas (the two kohanim officiating at Shiloh, sons of the High Priest)
delayed from bringing shelom bayit between wives and husbands, Scripture regards Chofni and Pinchas as though
they (chas ve-chalilah) committed gilui arayot. And see also R. Yitzchak Zilberstein, Chashukei Chemed al
Mesekhet Ketubot (5767), pp. 349-351, who rules that a person is obligated to spend up to a fifth of his wealth in
order to fulfill the mitzvah of bringing peace between a husband and wife.
52
See Shalom C. Spira, “A Census of Sherbrooke Street for Purposes of Hilkhot Eiruvin,” footnote 4 (of that essay),
available at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/264957339/Sherbrooke-Street-Eruv>.
53
Cited supra, note 25.
54
R. Menachem Zechariah Silber, R. Hillel Weinberger; R. Yitzchak Isaac Menachem Eichenstein, R. Yehudah
Meshulam Dov Polochek, R. Yitzchak Stein, R. Yechezkel Roth. This is also the position of R. David Eidensohn (-
confirmed in personal e-mail correspondence with him).
 an alien gentlemen. R. David Lau, Maskil le-David (first edition, 5768), ch. 45,55
analyzes the halakhic mechanics behind why the husband has the epistemological
capacity to willfully deny his wife’s claim [seemingly overriding Numbers 5:13],
explaining that the husband’s epistemological capacity arises either (a) as a result of
the Sages of the Talmud annulling the marriage to the original husband or (b) as a
result of the emergency power the Sages of the Talmud have [on a strictly ad hoc
basis] to override a Torah prohibition, in this case bring Numbers 5:13.
Now, in the case of Epstein vs. Friedman, if we go with approach (a), then – by Ms.
Friedman refusing to believe Ms. Epstein that she cohabited with a different
gentleman – that would seemingly create the paradox that his marriage to Ms. Epstein
would be annulled, and Ms. Epstein would be free to remarry without a get! R. Lau
(Maskil le-David, pp. 549-551) anticipates this problem [as a matter of academic
Torah study, not in practical specific reference to Epstein vs. Friedman56] and
responds that approach (a) obviously cannot mean that the Sages actually annulled the
original kiddushin. [After all, that would institutionalize the ability of any married
lady to abandon her husband at will, chas ve-chalilah.] Rather, what approach (a)
means is that the Sages delayed [as distinct from annulled] the “chalot” (legally
recognized mercantile effect) of the kiddushin until after the lady stopped cohabiting
with the alien gentleman. And on the other hand, if we go with approach (b), we have
no such problem altogether.57
So, in summary, perhaps Mr. Friedman can willfully deny that Ms. Epstein ever
cohabited with any other gentleman, and then she is permitted to return to shelom
bayit with him.

(2) Even if R. Lau’s analysis is inapplicable to Epstein vs. Friedman, such that Mr.
Friedman does not have the ability to deny that Ms. Epstein cohabited with an alien
gentleman, perhaps we can still insist that the righteous Ms. Epstein has been
anoosah pursuant to the Gemara, Shevu‘ot 26a,58 for she was following the Beth Din

55
Available at <http://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=41222&st=&pgnum=537>.
56
In point of fact, Epstein vs. Friedman was only admitted to Beth Din for the first time in 5769, a year after R. Lau
already published Maskil le-David (first edition), and so was not specifically intended by R. Lau in his published
analysis. [See Kovetz Ginat Veradim, Vol. 28, p.162, which reports that Epstein vs. Friedman was first presented to
the Baltimore Beth Din on 17 Tevet, 5769.]
57
Because there is a safek whether the halakhah follows approach (a) or (b), then [even according to R. Lau] Ms.
Epstein cannot rely on approach (a) to continue to reside at the same address as the alien gentleman, since that
would constitute [at least] doubtful yichud of a lady with an alien gentleman and would be forbidden even for
piku’ach nefesh, as per the Gemara, Sanhedrin 75a.
58
That Gemara expounds upon Leviticus 5:4 to exculpate a person who becomes confused by honest
emotions beyond his/her control. Or Zaru'a, Hilkhot Yibbum ve-Kiddushin no. 637, employs this
very exposition to exonerate from all sacrificial liability a gentleman who waits the statutory three months of
clarification after his (apparently) childless brother died to wed the widow through levirate marriage, and then some
time later discovers that the widow had been pregnant all along from her original husband, with the fetus being
concealed. Since the brother acted in good faith, his unlawful incest is deemed to be anoose (an innocent accident
for which no atonement is required), as opposed to shogeg (an inadvertent transgression for which atonement is
required).
 of R. Nota Zvi Greenblatt in good conscience, and thus she should be allowed to
return to shelom bayit with her righteous original husband Mr. Friedman. Arguably,
this safek le-kula may be corroborated by the recently released list of 69 conversion
batei din of the Diaspora recognized by the Chief Rabbinate of Israel,59 a list which
includes R. Greenblatt’s Beth Din.60

K. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

The above material, including the introduction and Sections A-J, was published verbatim
as the third edition of this essay on 13 Adar II, 5779 (corresponding on the secular calendar to
March 20, 2019). As such, the third edition of the essay was immediately sent by e-mail the same
day (March 20, 2019) to R. Nota Zvi Greenblatt [whose contact information is publicized by the
Chief Rabbinate of Israel’s list of 69 recognized Diaspora batei din for conversion.61] No
response was received from R. Greenblatt.
Subsequently, on March 27, 2019, a kol korei appeared in Hamodia: The Daily
Newspaper of Torah Jewry, p. 35, signed [in the following order] by R. Shmuel Kamenetzky, R.
Yechezkel Roth, R. David Feinstein, [R.] Zvi Ausch and [R.] Binyamin Zev Landau, announcing
that it is a mitzvah to medically treat brain dead patients.62 That kol korei is truly remarkable for
two reasons: (a) it apparently represents a reversal of R. David Feinstein’s previously espoused
position [described in the introduction of the present essay, final paragraph] that a brain dead
patient should be considered halakhically dead; and (b) R. Yechezkel Roth’s willingness to co-
sign a proclamation with R. Shmuel Kamenetzky seems to prima facie contradict R. Roth’s
previous announcement that Ms. Epstein remains the wife of Mr. Friedman and that R. Roth
even disqualifies R. Nota Zvi Greenblatt from ever arranging gittin ve-kiddushin.63 Because of
the confusion generated by the latter item (b), this student sent a copy of the essay the very same
day (March 27, 2019) to R. Shabsai Asher Tayar [dayan at “Melbourne’s Halachic Appropriate
Dispute Resolution” Beth Din64] to see whether he concurs with its contents. R. Tayar graciously
responded by e-mail, explaining that he detected a couple of minor peripheral errors in the
essay,65 but had no objection to the core thesis of the essay.

59
Available at
<https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/beit_din_in_world/he/%D7%A8%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%9E%D7%AA%
20%D7%91%D7%AA%D7%99%20%D7%93%D7%99%D7%9F%20%D7%9C%D7%92%D7%99%D7%95%D7
%A8%20%D7%91%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%9D.pdf>.
60
As of the time of publication of this essay, R. Greenblatt’s Beth Din is recognized on p. 4 (final row) of the Chief
Rabbinate of Israel list.
61
See supra, notes 59-60.
62
Available at <https://hamodia.com/digital-edition/wednesday-03-27-2019/>. The kol korei is translated into
English and analyzed in Section Z of “The Halakhic Definition of Life in a Bioethical Context,” op. cit. (supra, note
7).
63
See supra, note 46.
64
<http://www.mehadrbeisdintribunal.com/>
65
R. Tayar remonstrated with the following two points:
 Subsequently, on Aug. 22, 2019, this student asked R. Daniel Eidensohn if it is true that
Mr. Friedman is still being barred from synagogues for failing to grant a get to Ms. Epstein.
[Such a social ostracism would suggest that Ms. Epstein is still the wife according to Torah law
of Mr. Friedman.] On the following Motza’ei Shabbat (Aug. 24, 2019), R. Eidensohn e-mailed
me as follows.

“Ahron responded: I was thrown out of the yeshiva in Silver Spring by

Rabbi Reingold and Rabbi Aharon Lopiansky, out of other shuls by Rabbi
Michoel Frank, and Rabbi Dovid Rosenbaum. Have a great Shabbos.”

This response by Mr. Friedman is not entirely clear in terms of answering my question
with precision, as my question was whether Mr. Friedman currently as of today is still barred
from synagogues. [On the other hand, Mr. Friedman’s lack of clarity is commonplace in second-
hand e-mail communications of this nature, and certainly does not rise to the threshold of
demonstrating the existence of mental illness.] Accordingly, this student left R. Bleich a
telephone message transmitting to him Mr. Friedman’s apparently ambiguous message.
Subsequently, on Sept. 11, 2019, Hamodia: The Daily Newspaper of Torah Jewry (the de
facto newspaper of the Mo‘etzet Gedolei ha-Torah of Agudath Israel of America) published an
article describing the workings of the U.S. House of Representatives Ways and Means
Committee.66 This is the very same committee on which Mr. Friedman works as an attorney, and
– given the sophisticated duties expected of this committee as described by the article – it would
seem [to this reader] that Mr. Friedman is mentally healthy, such that there are no grounds for
mekach ta‘ut in his marriage with Ms. Epstein. Accordingly, this student once again left R.
Bleich a telephone message updating him appropriately.
Subsequently, on Sept. 18, 2019, Vol. 14 of Kol Zvi (Wexner Kollel Elyon of RIETS,
5773) was published online,67 including an article on kiddushei ta‘ut by R. Mordechai Willig. On
p. 8, R. Willig accepts the ruling of R. Moshe Feinstein [which – as R. Willig observes – is

“I noticed that in footnote 22 you write that one cannot rely on the Shakh because the
Rema (and others) disagrees, and safek de-Oraita le-chumra. Your reasoning [is] going
against darkei ha-psak. That’s like saying the Halakhah doesn’t follow Shulchan Arukh
because the Tur held otherwise. The (general) rule is we follow the later opinion unless
he can be proven to be mistaken. You haven’t proven the Shakh to be mistaken.
“Typo on page 23. You wrote: write in get (instead of write a get).”

In response to R. Tayar, this student would propose: Regarding footnote 22, R. Tayar’s remonstration is
well taken, and so this student would reformulate the footnote as follows. An examination of the original Jewish
Law Annual article (referenced by footnote 22) reveals that the debate between Rema et al vs. Shakh et al hinges
upon the question (in elucidating the Gemara, Yevamot 79a) whether we are allowed to extrapolate from Hilkhot
Tefillah to practical lifeboat ethics (where the human bystander must actively intervene, as distinct from pray), and
given that R. Moshe Feinstein has himself vacillated on this (as reflected in contradictory versions of the same
responsum, viz. Iggerot Mosheh, Choshen Mishpat II, no. 74, sec. 1), we are justified in invoking the principle sfek
nefashot le-hakel (Gemara, Shabbat 129a) to forbid the agunah from preventing all other bystanders from saving her
husband’s life. Regarding the typographical error on page 23, R. Tayar is eminently correct, and so once again I
thank him for rescuing me from error.
66
<https://hamodia.com/2019/09/11/ways-means-weigh-rollback-state-local-tax-deduction-cap/>
67
<http://www.hebrewbooks.org/59850>
equally shared by R. Zvi Pesach Frank68] that mental illness in the groom constitutes grounds
for kiddushei ta'ut. R. Willig then further reports:

“I heard from an expert psychiatrist that also borderline mental

disturbance is included within this [ruling of R. Feinstein and R. Frank],
because it can occur that he [the patient] can become psychotic, i.e. he has
no grasp of reality, and this would be called an insane person without
knowledge as described by Iggerot Mosheh, and this requires analysis in
terms of the final verdict.”

R. Willig does not identify who the anonymous expert psychiatrist who told him this is.
Indeed, taking this anonymous expert psychiatrist's analysis to an extreme, every Jewish
marriage could be nullified as kiddushei ta'ut, since there is always a problem with every
groom, as per the Gemara, Shabbat 130a that “every ketubah has a glitch.” Indeed, it is quite
clear that Numbers 5:14 does not accept taking this anonymous expert psychiatrist’s analysis to
an extreme (be-mechilat Kevod Torato), since the verse in question speaks of a jealous husband
subjecting his wife to the Sotah procedure, on which account the Name of the Holy One, Blessed
Be He, which is written with sanctity, is placed in water. Obviously, the Torah requires this
procedure because and only because the lady is still the wife of the husband, despite the
husband’s manifestation of a certain measure of paranoia. Accordingly, this student once again
left R. Bleich a telephone message updating him appropriately.
Subsequently, on Dec. 25, 2019, Ami journal (issue 448) published an article highlighting
the efforts of R. Mendel Zilber (a.k.a. the Freimener Rav, author of Teshuvot Moznei Tzedek),
rosh beit din of the Central Rabbinical Congress (CRC) of the U.S.A. and Canada, to universally
forbid nullification of kiddushin as a solution to the agunah problem.69 [Epstein vs. Friedman is
never explicitly mentioned by name in the article, but a careful comparative reading of Kovetz
Ginat Veradim Vol. 28, p. 164 reveals that R. Zilber is the same rosh beit din who served as the
leading signor on a proclamation by the CRC declaring Ms. Epstein to be married to Mr.
Friedman.70] The article describes how R. Zilber recruited 130 scholars worldwide to sign an
announcement forbidding recourse to kiddushei ta‘ut.71 The announcement declares that any lady

68
R. Willig cites the reference to R. Frank as Teshuvot Har Tzvi, Even ha-Ezer no. 180. Actually, this is a mistake
(be-mechilat Kevod Torato), because as correctly pointed out by the International Beth Din, the precise reference is
Teshuvot Har Tzvi, Even ha-Ezer Vol. 2, no. 180. See
<https://www.internationalbeitdin.org/storage/app/uploads/public/59c/8e7/fb3/59c8e7fb3e5ef725409179.pdf> [N.B.
My citation of this correct observation of the International Beth Din does not necessarily imply agreement with all
published decisions of the International Beth Din. After all, in a letter of 17 Iyar, 5779, the Jewish Community
Council of Montreal asks the public not to rely on heterim or gittin issued by the International Beth Din (be-mechilat
Kevod Torato). See <http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2019/06/bitul-kiddushin.html>.]
69
“Preserving the Sanctity of Jewish Marriage and the Integrity of our Immutable Mesorah,” pp. 116-133. I am
grateful to R. Daniel Eidensohn for sending me a copy.
70
On the CRC proclamation he is identified as R. Menachem Zechariah Zilber, a variant name of the identical R.
Mendel Zilber described by the Ami article.
71
The signed announcement is freely available at <https://daattorah.blogspot.com/2019/10/bitul-kiddushin.html>.
Also of interest are photographs of R. Zilber meeting with many of the scholars in question [immediately prior to
their signing the announcement], available at <https://daattorah.blogspot.com/2019/10/bitul-kidushin-meeting-in-
lakewood.html>.
who remarries without a get based on a claim of kiddushei ta‘ut is [together with her new so-
called “husband”] under the ecclesiastic ostracism pronounced by Rambam [in a responsum cited
by Beit Yosef to Even ha-Ezer 6] regarding a kohen who marries a divorcee. After all, Beit
Shmuel (Even ha-Ezer 6, se‘if katan 13) extends the same ostracism to any Yisrael who marries a
lady in transgression of Jewish law.
Quite significantly, among these 130 signatures [recruited by R. Zilber] is that of R.
Yechezkel Roth. This suggests that R. Roth’s previous March 27, 2019 signature on the brain
death proclamation [where he co-signed with R. Shmuel Kamenetzky72] does not represent a
retraction of his ruling that Ms. Epstein is indeed the wife of Mr. Friedman. [For if R. Roth had
retracted, why would he now issue a ruling universally forbidding nullification of kiddushin as a
solution to the agunah problem?] Rather, in all likelihood, R. Roth envisaged no contradiction
between joining R. Kamenetzky regarding brain death and simultaneously insisting that Ms.
Epstein is the wife of Mr. Friedman.73 Accordingly, this student once again left R. Bleich a
telephone message updating him appropriately.
Subsequently, on Jan. 1, 2020, the Agudath Israel of America celebrated its siyum of the
thirteenth daf yomi cycle at Metlife Stadium in New Jersey.74 Speakers at the event included R.

72
See supra, note 62.
73
Presumably, the reason R. Roth would envisage no contradiction between the two matters is as follows. A careful
examination of all first-hand statements ever issued by R. Shmuel Kamenetzky on the matter of Epstein vs.
Friedman reveals that R. Shmuel Kamenetzky has consistently denied ever personally issuing a heter for Ms.
Epstein to remarry without a get. Firstly, in a statement dated 8 Tammuz, 5775 [published in Kovetz Ginat Veradim
Vol. 28, p. 178], R. Shmuel Kamenetzky declares “I never permitted rescuing a lady from her agunah situation by
annulling the kiddushin of Marat Tamar (Epstein) Friedman.” Secondly, in a letter addressed to R. Yitzchak Tuviah
Weiss and dated the fifth day of the week of Va-Yeitzei, 5776 [published in Kovetz Ginat Veradim Vol. 29, pp. 46-
47], R. Shmuel Kamenetzky posits “I never entered to adjudicate or to rule regarding the details of the question, and
also my son Rabbi Shalom never issued any heter regarding this. Rather, when the question arose, I said it should be
referred to the great Ga’on R. Nota Zvi Greenblatt, shlit”a, in order to receive his ruling…” R. Shmuel Kamenetzky
then proceeds to acknowledge that because the ruling of R. Greenblatt has subsequently been challenged, the
question should ultimately be referred to R. David Feinstein. Thirdly, in a documented telephone conversation from
5778 regarding Epstein vs. Friedman [after R. David Feinstein already ruled that Ms. Epstein is the wife of Mr.
Friedman], referenced supra, note 4, R. Shmuel Kamenetzky acknowledges R. David Feinstein’s ruling and then
concludes “I don’t get involved in this.” Thus, given R. Shmuel Kamenetzky’s consistent public denial of having
issued any heter for Ms. Epstein, R. Roth apparently felt comfortable joining him in good conscience on the matter
of brain death.
[N.B. See also R. Shmuel Tsarch, letter published in Ha-Ma’or of Shevat-Adar 5776 (already cited supra,
note 1), which reports that he specifically spoke to R. Shmuel Kamenetzky by telephone and the latter affirmed what
he already wrote R. Yitzchak Tuviah Weiss, viz. that he [R. Shmuel Kamenetzky] will accept whatever ruling R.
David Feinstein issues regarding this case. (R. Tsarch then adds that he subsequently met R. David Feinstein at a
simchah and that R. David Feinstein personally told him there is no basis of kiddushei ta‘ut in this case.) While not
representing a first-hand statement by R. Kamenetzky, it corroborates the first-hand statements of R. Kamenetzky.]
74
The logistics of this event generated more than one halakhic conundrum. Firstly, because Leviticus 20:26 requires
Jews to separate themselves from the cultural norms of Noahides, R. Moshe Feinstein has expressed disapproval of
Jews coincidentally orchestrating a celebration on January 1 (the civil vacation day designated by Noahides as New
Year’s Day). In one responsum (Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer II, no. 13), R. Feinstein appears to limit his
disapproval to a matter of preference, whereas in another responsum (Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah III, no. 85), R.
Feinstein appears to couch it in terms of strict law. [For an attempt to reconcile the discrepancy between these two
responsa, see Appendix B of Shalom C. Spira, “The Quest for an Effective Synagogue Partition Plan,” ] Secondly,
one of the speakers at the event was R. Aryeh M. Kotler, rosh yeshivah of Beth Midrash Gavoha in Lakewood, New
Reuven Feinstein, R. Shmuel Kamenetzky and R. Aharon Feldman [all protagonists in Epstein
vs. Friedman], yet none of them mentioned Epstein vs. Friedman in their public remarks at the
siyum. Furthermore, a videotaped address of R. Chaim Kanievsky [who has ruled that Ms.
Epstein remains the wife of Mr. Friedman75] was shown at Metlife Stadium, in which he was
introduced as Maran, Sar ha-Torah, Rabban Shel Kol Bnei ha-Golah [“our teacher, the prince of
Torah, the Rabbi of the entire Diaspora”], a title which suggests that the Agudath Israel of
America should accept R. Kanievsky’s conclusion that Ms. Epstein is indeed the halakhic wife of
Mr. Friedman. However, that videotaped address of R. Kanievsky did not explicitly mention
Epstein vs. Friedman. Also speaking at the event was R. Aharon Shiff, Av Beit Din of
Machazikei ha-Dat community in Antwerp, Belgium [one of the aforementioned 130 scholars
publicized as having signed R. Mendel Zilber’s proclamation universally forbidding nullification
of kiddushin]. However, R. Shiff did not mention the subject of nullification of kiddushin in his
public remarks at the siyum.
On the other hand, a different speaker at the siyum – who was never before recognized as
a protagonist on either Epstein vs. Friedman or on kiddushei ta‘ut, but whose public siyum words
could be hypothetically construed to be shedding light on the same – was R. Yissachar Frand.
Said R. Frand at Metlife Stadium:

"Both of my sons give Gemara shi'urim to ba'alei batim at night, and both
report that the wives of these men express the feeling that - quote - 'their
husbands are different men; they are better husbands, better fathers and
better Yidden.' And that is something that all women should keep in mind.
Because having a husband learn the daf yomi requires great sacrifices on
your part. But besides the mitzvah of Talmud Torah that you will share in
the olam ha-ba, you will see immediate benefits in this world as well.
[Raising his voice, R. Frand emphasizes:] You will have a different
husband. [R. Frand pauses for applause, and then continues.] During the
last shemitah, a group of non-frum Israelies were convinced to keep
the shemitah. In order for them to do something with their free time,
a kollel was organized, and they sat and learned. But the wives were not
happy with their decision; where would the money come from? But then
something happened. Their wives saw metamorphosis in their husbands.
Their husbands became different people, better husbands and better fathers
and better human beings. The women then became their biggest supporters
because they saw what limud ha-Torah does to a Jew."76

Jersey. According to posek ha-dor R. J. David Bleich, that individual is currently in violation of Cherem de-
Rabbeinu Gershom until he achieves forgiveness from his first wife Ms. Hinda Feinstein. See reference cited supra,
note 24. Nevertheless, once the event was already a fait accompli and recorded on video at
<https://hamodia.com/2020/01/01/watch-livestream-siyum-hashas/>, this student was allowed to watch the video at
a later date with the justification that viewing it was necessary le-havin u-le-horot (to reach a halakhic determination
for which sufficient information would otherwise not be available), as per the Gemara, Sanhedrin 68a. [This was
obviously a case-specific allowance which does not necessarily set a precedent for the future.]
75
Kovetz Ginat Veradim, Vol. 28 (Tevet 5776), p. 178.
76
Video of siyum (referenced supra, note 74), at 1:14:44-1:16:21 into the recording.
 R. Frand’s remarks indicate that even a flawed husband can be rehabilitated through the
study of Torah. Arguably [though not necessarily intended as such], R. Frand’s remarks dovetail
harmoniously with what R. Shlomo Eliyahu Miller writes regarding Epstein vs. Friedman77 that
there was no kiddushei ta‘ut because he [R. Miller] consulted with two physicians who told him
that OCD and PPD do not represent incurable mental illness but rather personality defects [and,
presumably, those defects can be transcended through Torah study.78] Accordingly, this student
once again left R. Bleich a telephone message updating him appropriately.
Subsequently, on Jan. 15, 2020, R. Daniel Eidensohn published a refutation of R. Hershel
Schachter’s responsum from 16 Tevet, 5771 on Epstein vs. Friedman. In retrospective context, at
that previous time in 5771, Ms. Epstein had not yet broached the subject of nullifying her
kiddushin and was rather seeking a get from Mr. Friedman. It was in that context that R.
Schachter issued a 5771 responsum claiming that “it is correct to convince the husband to
divorce his wife.” The refutation published by R. Eidensohn demonstrates that R. Schachter (be-
mechilat Kevod Torato) misquoted the putative sources on which he relies, and that – quite the
contrary – since it is Ms. Epstein who is unilaterally rebelling against her husband, Torah law
seems79 to demand that an announcement be issued encouraging Ms. Epstein to return to shelom
bayit with her husband (Mr. Friedman), as per the Gemara, Ketubot 63b that such an
announcement is made in the synagogues to encourage a moredet to return to shelom bayit with
her husband.80 While this refutation of R. Schachter’s responsum does not directly bear on the
question of mekach ta‘ut – and indeed R. Hershel Schachter himself seems to have indicated in a
5776 public lecture that there are no grounds for mekach ta‘ut in Epstein vs. Friedman81 –
nevertheless the refutation of R. Schachter’s responsum is illuminating because it seemingly

77
Kovetz Ginat Veradim, Vol. 28 (Kislev 5776), p. 179.
78
Likewise of interest were the public siyum remarks of R. Chaim David Zwiebel (at 27:05-27:13 into the video
recording), who called the daf yomi program “the daf ha-sefinah, the blatt Gemara that defines our existence.” R.
Zwiebel is homiletically referring to the Gemara, Yevamot 121a, which records how Rabbi Akiva kept himself afloat
in a storm-tossed sea by grasping the plank of a ship (daf shel sefinah). He means to convey that by learning Torah,
a Jew can navigate the vicissitudes of life. Now, while not mentioned by R. Zwiebel, the entire point of Yevamot
121a is to show that an agunah cannot necessarily always remarry [as occurred when Rabbi Akiva was originally
seen drowning, which created an initial hypothetical supposition that his wife could remarry, but that hypothetical
supposition was subsequently corrected with the discovery of Rabbi Akiva’s survival.] Ergo, taking a holistic
approach to R. Zwiebel’s speech, he may be arguably implying that Torah study can rehabilitate a flawed husband
and thus negate the supposition to annul kiddushin as a matter of mekach ta‘ut, a message arguably identical to the
speech of R. Frand as well as the responsum of R. Miller.
79
The reason for the insertion of the cautionary word “seems” here is on account of the variant position of R. Joseph
Elijah Henkin, to be discussed infra, note 91.
80
It should also be noted that no outsider may arbitrarily tell a husband [outside of the Beth Din process] to divorce
his wife, since that would violate a safek issur de-Oraita of “you shall not covet your fellow’s wife” (Exodus 20:14).
See “A Combination of Two Halakhically Kosher Prenuptial Agreements to Benefit the Jewish Wife,” op. cit.,
footnote 6a (of that essay). [However, given the position of R. Henkin to be presented infra, note 91, this might not
automatically be germane to Epstein vs. Friedman. See there for further discussion.]
81
See supra, note 48.
confirms the published statement of the Beth Din of Baltimore82 that all those who previously
told Mr. Friedman to write a get to his wife owe Mr. Friedman an apology.
Subsequently, on Jan. 29, 2020, R. A. Yehuda Warburg published an open letter to R.
Mendel Zilber on the subject of kiddushei ta‘ut, responding to some of the points R. Zilber raised
in his [aforementioned Dec. 25, 2019] Ami interview.83 Interestingly, at one point in the letter, R.
Warburg refers obliquely to “the Philadelphia and Borough Park cases,” possibly [though not
necessarily] indicating that his letter is intended to refer [at least in part] to Epstein vs. Friedman
[being a Philadelphia case].84 In any event, R. Warburg’s letter also posits that [contrary to what
R. Zilber had reported in his interview, and indeed contrary to what appears earlier in the present
essay85] R. Joseph Ber Soloveitchik actually concurred with R. Moshe Feinstein to nullify
kiddushin in the case described by Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer I, no. 80.86 [In fact, while not
explicitly mentioned by R. Warburg, this is the case of the insane groom, and thus the precedent
of interest for Epstein vs. Friedman.] R. Warburg’s claim is based on R. Hershel Schachter’s
biography of R. Joseph Ber Soloveitchik entitled Mi-Pninei ha-Rav (Flatbush Beth Hamedrosh,
2001), p. 212.
Let us now evaluate the accuracy of R. Warburg’s claim vis-à-vis R. Soloveitchik. The
following is a verbatim translation of the relevant passage in Mi-Pninei ha-Rav:

“About thirty-five years ago, a rabbi published an article (in an English

journal) in which he proposed that just as the Ga’on R. Moshe Feinstein
ruled in Iggerot Mosheh (Even ha-Ezer I, no. 80) that in a situation of a
major defect (such as where [the husband] cannot engage in marital
relations) that there is no need for a get altogether, not even on a rabbinic
level, so too it would seem where the [domestic harmony] evaporates due
to mutual incompatibility, behold it is retroactively revealed that there was
mutual incompatibility at the time of the act of kiddushin, and it is correct
to establish in such a case it should be considered as kiddushei ta‘ut, such
that there is no need for a get whatsoever, even on a rabbinic level. And
when these words were delivered to our teacher [R. Joseph Ber
Soloveitchik], he became angry and very upset and claimed and said: are
we going to say that anyone who buys shares [on the stock market] and
they depreciate after time, that this would be considered mekach ta‘ut. Of
course not. And he pointed to the words of Tosafot, Bava Kamma (110b,
s.v. de-adata). And that which the Gemara there in Bava Kamma asks
‘shall we say that on realization of this he never offered her kiddushin’ this

82
Kovetz Ginat Veradim, Vol. 29 (Nissan 5779), pp. 47-49.
83
<https://www.internationalbeitdin.org/storage/app/media/uploaded-files/BeitDinZilberLetter.pdf>
84
P. 7 of R. Warburg’s letter, line 2. Philadelphia is never explicitly mentioned in R. Zilber’s interview [nor in the
kol korei highlighted by R. Zilber’s interview] such that it is potentially significant that R. Warburg introduces
mention of Philadelphia.
85
Supra, text accompanying note 39.
86
P. 6 of R. Warburg’s letter, lines 4-11.
 applies only in the specific and limited case there, as elucidated there in
Tosafot.”

Accordingly, it emerges that R. Warburg’s claim (be-mechilat Kevod Torato) is based on

an innocent misreading of Mi-Pninei ha-Rav. There is no evidence from Mi-Pninei ha-Rav that
R. Joseph Ber Soloveitchik ever endorsed the words of Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer I, no. 80.
Rather, what we see in Mi-Pninei ha-Rav is that an anonymous rabbi writing an English article
endorsed Iggerot Mosheh and sought to extrapolate from it that in any case of mutual
incompatibility, we can likewise void the kiddushin. When this article was brought to R.
Soloveitchik’s attention, R. Soloveitchik rejected the entire article, stating clearly that the notion
of kiddushei ta‘ut is circumscribed to the specific and limited case of Bava Kamma 110b
[involving a lady whose husband died childless and she becomes eligible for yibum involving a
demonstrably repulsive brother-in-law, a fact pattern totally irrelevant to Epstein vs. Friedman,
and indeed most agunah predicaments.] Ergo, there is no contradiction to R. Hershel Schachter’s
later report in Beit Yitzchak Vol. 45 (5774), p. 64 that R. Soloveitchik actually disagreed with
Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer I, no. 80. [Namely, R. Soloveitchik actually held that the
kiddushin from the groom with alleged mental illness is valid kiddushin and could not be
voided.]
In any event, even if R. Warburg’s claim regarding R. Soloveitchik would have
hypothetically been correct [which it is not], it would not change the practical halakhic outcome
of Epstein vs. Friedman, since – as explained above87 – the (thus far) tentative conclusion that
Ms. Epstein remains the wife of Mr. Friedman is based on quadruple compounded doubt to the
side of stringency even assuming for argument’s sake that the halakhah follows Iggerot Mosheh,
Even ha-Ezer I, no. 80. That said, in fairness to R. Warburg, his letter never explicitly mentions
Epstein vs. Friedman (only “Philadelphia”) and so is not necessarily concerned with Epstein vs.
Friedman anyway, though the oblique “Philadelphia” reference raises such a possibility.
Subsequently, on March 5, 2020, R. Pinchas Spira88 published online Kedushat ha-
Nissuin: Odot Heskemei Kedam Nissuin, a detailed refutation of the 1993 Beth Din of America
prenup.89 While this refutation does not directly bear on the question of mekach ta‘ut, it is
nevertheless illuminating in the context of Epstein vs. Friedman, given a 2012 symposium which
was organized at Yeshiva University devoted to the very case of Epstein vs. Friedman. Namely,
at that March 29, 2012 event, both R. Hershel Schachter and R. Jeremy Stern lectured with the
claim that had Ms. Epstein signed the 1993 Beth Din of America prenup, her agunah tragedy
could have been prevented.90 Alas, it would emerge from the 2020 refutation to the 1993 Beth

87
Text accompanying notes 43-46.
88
No immediate relation to this student, despite the identical family name.
89
<https://hebrewbooks.org/60970>. R. Spira’s treatise had previously appeared in print form in a first edition
during 5775 and then in a second expanded edition during 5777. Even so, the online publication on March 5, 2020
[of the second expanded edition] allowed a wider dissemination of its contents. This material is also cited
approvingly by R. Shalom Ber Levin, “Heskem Kedam Nissuin,” Or Yisrael, Vol. 78 (Adar Sheni 5779), pp. 186-
196, once again refuting the 1993 Beth Din of America prenup. [And, of course, R. Spira and R. Levin’s respective
contributions serve to confirm what posek ha-dor R. Bleich already concluded years earlier (in rejecting the 1993
Beth Din of America prenup), as elucidated in Section A of this student’s prenup essay (cited supra, note 6).]
90
<https://yucommentator.org/2012/04/panel-featuring-current-agunah-confronts-crisis/>
Din of America prenup that signing the 1993 Beth Din of America prenup would not have helped
Ms. Epstein anyway, since it would have furnished her with an invalid get.91

91
Another objection that may be raised with the joint presentation of R. Schachter and R. Stern is that they ask
during the symposium (as cited supra, note 90) that Mr. Friedman should volunteer to write Ms. Epstein a get. In
fact, Exodus 20:14 forbids any outsider from arbitrarily telling a husband to divorce his wife.
However, in fairness to R. Schachter and R. Stern, we may take cognizance of the fact that several weeks
after the March 29, 2012 symposium, R. Gil Student published a novel halakhic argument to require Mr. Friedman
to grant Ms. Epstein a get. Namely, R. Student [writing a comment on a guest post at
<https://www.torahmusings.com/2012/04/protesting-without-coercing/>, April 24, 2012, at 9:36 a.m.] cites R.
Joseph Elijah Henkin, Edut le-Yisrael (New York, 1949), p. 144, who rules that even if a wife unilaterally rebels
against her husband through no halakhically recognized fault of the husband, nevertheless if an effort was
subsequently orchestrated to broker peace between the husband and wife and the effort fails, then if 12 months have
already passed, there is now a mitzvah for the husband to grant a get to his rebellious wife. R. Student observes that
this prescription precisely matches the fact pattern of Epstein vs. Friedman, such that Mr. Epstein now has a mitzvah
to grant Ms. Epstein a get. [And obviously, under such circumstances, Exodus 20:14 would not be germane.] On the
other hand, in a response to R. Student [posted on the same medium, April 25, 2012, at 1:31 a.m.], an astute reader
invokes R. Joseph Shalom Eliashiv, Kovetz Teshuvot I (Jerusalem, 5760), who disputes R. Henkin and instead rules
that [even after the passage of 12 months] the husband is not obligated to grant a get, even in the case of a wife who
can legitimately prove that she is disgusted with her husband, and all the more so in the case of a wife who
unilaterally rebels against her husband through no halakhically recognized fault of the husband [the latter being the
case that perfectly describes Epstein vs. Friedman.] As R. Eliashiv cogently observes, this seems to be the
straightforward meaning of Shulchan Arukh Even ha-Ezer 77:2. [N.B. The astute reader (be-mechilat Kevod Torato)
mistakenly references responsum no. 134 of R. Eliashiv’s volume, when in fact the correct reference is responsum
no. 174.] In a subsequently published treatise, R. Avraham Shmuel Yehudah Gestetner, Av Beit Din of Shaar ha-
Mishpat in Monsey, NY, demonstrates that the majority of poskim concur with R. Eliashiv [at least in the case of a
wife who unilaterally rebels against her husband through no halakhically recognized fault of the husband, which
perfectly describes Epstein vs. Friedman]. See p. 4 of the PDF available at
<http://daattorah.blogspot.com/2015/10/tamar-epstein-rav-gestetner-condemns.html>.
Cf. R. Jonathan Reiss, who – in a 1999 article (published long before Epstein vs. Friedman evolved)
available at
<https://www.jlaw.com/Articles/divorcebeit.html> – claims that the halakhah must necessarily follow R. Henkin
because he is supported in this regard by R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De‘ah IV, no. 15, sec. 2. [My
thanks to Dr. Amihai Radzyner for bringing this source to my attention.] Alas, R. Reiss (be-mechilat Kevod Torato)
overlooks the fact that the volume of Iggerot Mosheh in question was posthumously published and so is unreliable
in ascertaining R. Moshe Feinstein’s true verdict. [Cf. R. Gestetner, op. cit., p. 8 of the PDF, who ironically also
cites this same posthumously published responsum of Iggerot Mosheh, although regarding a different aspect.
Namely, within the same posthumously published responsum, Iggerot Mosheh allows a heter me’ah rabbanim for a
husband whose rebellious wife refuses to appear before Beth Din, a conclusion which R. Gestetner seeks to apply to
Epstein vs. Friedman. And while it is intellectually dishonest (be-mechilat Kevod Torato) for R. Gestetner to fail to
mention that this volume of Iggerot Mosheh was posthumously published, at least on the latter point of heter me’ah
rabbanim, R. Feinstein’s posthumously published view conforms with the consensus of poskim (-while we cannot
necessarily say the same for R. Reiss’ recruiting of R. Feinstein as an ally to R. Henkin).]
In the opinion of this student, the debate of R. Henkin vs. R. Eliashiv should be adjudicated based on the
following methodology. R. Moshe Sofer, Teshuvot Chatam Sofer, Even ha-Ezer no. 116 rules that when an
unresolved debate among the poskim exists whether a recalcitrant husband can be coerced to deliver a get, a Beth
Din cannot coerce, since the validity of a get coerced by Beth Din is contingent on the recalcitrant husband’s true
inner wish to follow the mitzvah that devolves upon him as elucidated by Rambam, Hilkhot Gerushin 2:20. Since
the recalcitrant husband sincerely believes the posek who says that coercion is illicit, he has no true inner wish to
follow a mitzvah when the Beth Din [which tries to follow the other posek] coerces him, and so the resulting get will
be void. Now, let us add to this calculation of Chatam Sofer the subsequent analysis of Chazon Ish (Even ha-Ezer
99:2, s.v. yesh) that if a Beth Din mistakenly tells a recalcitrant husband (contrary to halakhah) that he is in a
situation of being obligated to write a get, the mistaken statement of the Beth itself ipso facto constitutes coercion of
the husband which nullifies the subsequent get. As such, given the unresolved debate between R. Henkin vs. R.
Eliashiv, a Beth Din cannot even tell Mr. Friedman that he is obligated to write a get to Ms. Epstein. [Indeed,
 Subsequently, on April 7, 2020, R. Yaakov Perlow, head of Agudath Israel of America,
ascended to the Heavenly Academy. Given the social distancing legally required in the context
of the global COVID-19 pandemic, a memorial event was broadcast via internet on April 28,
2020, at which (inter alia) both R. Shmuel Kamenetzky and R. Aharon Feldman spoke.92 Neither
of them explicitly mentioned Epstein vs. Friedman, but their common remarks (which focused
on the vacuum in psak halakhah now created by the loss of their mentor) could hypothetically be
construed as implying that they both mourn the absence of an individual who could have
resolved Epstein vs. Friedman.
Around the same time, on April 13, 2020, Hamodia published an announcement from
Misaskim, referring to “the continued and developing guidance of our daas Torah, Rav
Yechezkel Roth” in the context of the global pandemic.93 [Significantly, R. Yechezkel Roth had
previously ruled that Ms. Epstein is the wife of Mr. Friedman,94 and although he subsequently
co-signed the brain death verdict by R. Shmuel Kamenetzky,95 he (R. Roth) further subsequently
co-signed the proclamation of 130 scholars universally forbidding mekach ta‘ut as a solution to
the agunah problem.96 So it is this very same R. Yechezkel Roth who is now being recognized
by Hamodia as representing da‘at Torah.]
Also around the same time, on April 28, 2020, Hamodia published an article reporting
how Congress has been disrupted long-term by the global pandemic.97 [Significantly, Mr.
Friedman works as an attorney U.S. House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee, and
thus his employment would presumably be curtailed by this development.] Accordingly, this
student immediately e-mailed (that same day) R. Daniel Eidensohn, R. David Eidensohn and R.
Avraham Yerucham Shmidman98 to inquire whether there are any medical updates on Mr.
Friedman’s psychiatric condition. [After all, the stress of an OCD plus PPD patient facing loss of

without explicitly articulating the fancy lomdut of synthesizing Chatam Sofer with Chazon Ish, the foregoing is
essentially the practical conclusion of the Baltimore Beth Din, as published in Kovetz Ginat Vol. 29 (Nissan 5776),
p. 48, which rules that Ms. Epstein remains the wife of Mr. Friedman, and furthermore that Mr. Friedman is under
no obligation whatsoever to write a get to Ms. Epstein. Clearly, the Baltimore Beth Din has ruled like R. Eliashiv
contra R. Henkin.]
Parenthetically, although R. Gestetner is never cited by name in Kovetz Ginat Veradim, it is clear that the
editor relied upon his responsum on Epstein vs. Friedman in reaching the identical conclusion that there is no
kiddushei ta‘ut. Specifically, Kovetz Ginat Veradim Vol. 28 (Tevet 5776), p. 162 presents “hishtalshelut ha-inyanim
ke-sidran she-nikhtav al yedei Rav echad” (a recapitulation of the events in Epstein vs. Friedman, as they are
chronicled by a certain Rabbi), which is actually borrowed verbatim from R. Gestetner’s treatise. I am grateful to R.
Daniel Eidensohn for bringing this to my attention.
92
<https://agudah.org/azkarah-speeches/>
93
<https://hamodia.com/2020/04/13/updated-misaskim-policy-shivah-services/>
94
Cited supra, note 46.
95
Cited supra, note 62.
96
See supra, notes 71-73.
97
<https://hamodia.com/2020/04/28/worried-virus-u-s-house-wont-return-now/>
98
The former two rabbis are acquainted with Mr. Friedman, and the latter rabbi is acquainted with Ms. Epstein’s
family.
his employment would be expected to clinically manifest itself in the patient becoming
psychotic, if the patient was truly ill to the extent his kiddushin should be nullified as a matter of
mekach ta‘ut.]
Subsequently, on May 31, 2020, this student spoke by telephone with Reb Yehudah
Yitzchak Krausz (this student’s delegate to R. Moshe Berish Laufer, editorial board member of
Kovetz Ginat Veradim) to update him on the above developments regarding Epstein vs.
Friedman, and to inquire whether anything more had been published in Kovetz Ginat Veradim. A
week later, on June 6, 2020 and again on June 12, 2020, Reb Krausz telephoned this student in
response that he confirmed with R. Laufer that nothing further on the subject had been published
in Kovetz Ginat Veradim. Additionally, Reb Krausz continued that he was personally aware how
several scholars signed in good conscience on the proclamation of R. Mendel Zilber [as reported
in the aforementioned Ami journal article of Dec. 25, 201999] universally forbidding recourse to
mekach ta‘ut as a solution to the agunah problem, and that a Cherem devolves upon both the
wife and her new so-called “husband.”
In the meantime, on June 3, 2020, R. David Eidensohn e-mailed this student to confirm
that Mr. Friedman is of normal psychiatric health and is not manifesting any symptoms of mental
illness. This latest report of R. Eidensohn is significant, both in its own right as credible
testimony,100 as well as in its timing, now over 12 months since R. Nota Zvi Greenblatt received
by e-mail the third edition of the present essay, with its tentative conclusion that Ms. Epstein is
the wife of Mr. Friedman, and with no subsequent response ever offered by R. Greenblatt. After
all, R. Chaim Ozer Grodzinsky, in his posthumously published Teshuvot Achiezer IV, no. 15,
suggests that just as the Gemara, Avodah Zarah 35a speaks of giving a 12-month delay for
publicizing the reason for a gezeirah, so too this time limit can be applied to writing responsa in
our era as well. Ergo, it would seem that this student has exercised all the due diligence that is
necessary regarding Epstein vs. Friedman and is now halakhically authorized to adjudicate
Epstein vs. Friedman with a definitive conclusion. This does not seem to be an authorization that
can be glibly ignored by the present student, for as R. Moshe Feinstein has stated [in the context
of R. Shlomo Goren’s controversial ruling on the Langer case]: “All rabbis and supporters of
Torah are anyway obligated to protest against those who offend the honour of the Torah – which
is the Honour of Heaven – such that all of Israel are obligated to protest and correct the
wrongdoing.”101 Or in the words of the aforementioned proclamation signed by 130 scholars

99
See supra, notes 69-71.
100
It is true that R. David Eidensohn is not a physician (and kal va-chomer not a psychiatrist), but he can still offer a
common sense evaluation of how he envisages the disposition of Mr. Friedman. Ergo, as I have no documented
psychiatric evaluation of Mr. Friedman by a physician telling me otherwise, R. David Eidensohn’s common sense
evaluation of Mr. Friedman is halakhically significant. [Indeed, since the burden of proof is on the plaintiff (as per
the Gemara, Bava Kamma 46b), it is Ms. Epstein who is required to provide documented psychiatric evidence of
mental illness regarding Mr. Friedman, which she has not.] To that effect, R. Eidensohn’s track record about
reporting the facts regarding Epstein vs. Friedman can be reviewed on his website at <torahhalacha.blogspot.com>.
101
Cited supra, note 46. Indeed, R. Shlomo Eliyahu Miller, in a responsum published in Kovetz Ginat Veradim Vol.
29 (Nissan 5776) insists that the obligation to protest against Ms. Epstein remarrying without a get is equivalent to
[and even more obvious than] the obligation that R. Moshe Feinstein enjoyed to protest against R. Shlomo Goren’s
ruling in the Langer case. R. Miller explains that the obligation is a function of Deut. 1:17 (“you shall not fear any
person”). For further discussion of the parameters of Deut. 1:17, see R. J. David Bleich, Be-Netivot ha-Halakhah I
(KTAV Publishing, 1996), pp. 57-61.
[publicized in Ami journal of Dec. 25, 2019]: “Anyone who relies on these kind of permissions
[for a lady to remarry based on kiddushei ta‘ut alone], whether the [second] husband or the wife
or the rabbis involved… it is a mitzvah to publicize their names in public in order to denigrate
them and to distance them from the congregation and assembly.”
Still, before we proceed to adjudicate, it is important to review the public policy lessons
from the eighteenth century cause célèbre of the Get of Cleves, where a precedent was set to
limit the ability of outside rabbis to adjudicate precisely this kind of halakhic situation. We will
now conduct such a review in the following section.

L. THE GET OF CLEVES VS. THE NON-GET OF PHILADELPHIA

The Get of Cleves, which has been described as belonging to “the rabbinic Hall of
Fame,” concerned a paranoid husband whose delivery of a get to his wife precipitated a global
102

controversy as to whether the husband’s action carried halakhic meaning. The majority view,
represented by R. Ezekiel Landau, validated the get, [though, in an amazing miracle, the wife
reportedly agreed to return to her paranoid husband (for what the majority considered to be a
second marriage and what the dissenters considered to be the original marriage, which lasted
happily ever after).103] The conflicting arguments in this matter are summarized by R. Yitzchak
Zilberstein, Chashukei Chemed al Mesekhet Ketubot (5767), pp. 159-167.104
Noteworthy in this debate is the silence from R. Pinchas ha-Levi Horowitz. Tradition
records the following special reason for the latter’s demurral to join the fray.105 At the time the
Get of Cleves surfaced (1766-1767), R. Horowitz was seeking refuge in the city of Yampol,
where he was hosted by Yampol’s Av Beit Din R. Mordechai Zev Orenstein. [This was several
years after R. Ezekiel Landau (former Av Beit Din of Yampol) emigrated from Yampol to Prague
in 1755.] While there, and under the supervision of his host, R. Horowitz indeed formulated a
lengthy responsum on the Get of Cleves, validating the get. Following the writing standards of
that era, R. Horowitz intended to pour dust on the responsum in order to accelerate the ink-
drying process. By misadventure, he reached for the wrong receptacle, pouring from an inkwell

Admittedly, the family of R. Joseph Elijah Henkin reports that R. Henkin did not concur [or it least did not
fully concur] with R. Moshe Feinstein on the Langer case. See
<http://asif.co.il/download/asif_A/asiftlm/asif%20tlai/asif%201%20329-355%202.pdf>. However, as explained
there, in the Langer case, a specific halakhic concern arose regarding being stringent regarding halakhic standards
of conversion [which led R. Goren, supported or at least partially supported by R. Henkin, to disqualify a conversion
and thereby resolve the Langer case], and furthermore the fact that protecting the borders of the State of Israel
constitutes a matter of piku’ach nefesh (as per the Gemara, Eiruvin 45a) inspired R. Henkin to maintain that the
benefit of the doubt should ceteris paribus be granted by the Chief Rabbi of that same State of Israel. Neither of
those considerations are relevant in Epstein vs. Friedman, and so R. Miller’s extrapolation from R. Moshe
Feinstein’s reaction (in the context of the Langer case) is certainly valid when applied to Epstein vs. Friedman.
102
See R. J. David Bleich, Tradition 48:1 (Spring 2015), pp. 103-105.
103
See R. Bleich’s description, cited supra, note 102.
104
Available at <https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=49713&st=&pgnum=155&hilite=>.
105
R. Zvi Yechezkel Michelson, Tiferet Zvi glosses on R. Zvi Hirsch Charif, Ateret Zvi (Peiterkov, 5668), p. 7. The
identical episode is recounted by R. Hershel Schachter, Mi-Pninei ha-Rav (Flatbush Beth Hamedrosh, 2001), p. 171,
quoting R. Joseph Ber Soloveitchik in the time of his father R. Moshe Soloveitchik.
instead, blotting out his oeuvre in the process. Undaunted, R. Horowitz then announced his
intention to re-transcribe his analysis to validate the get. At this point, R. Orenstein intervened,
asking R. Horowitz to refrain from troubling himself to do so, since a sufficient number of other
poskim were already involved on the case. R. Horowitz deferred to his host. Two or three years
later, in 1769, R. Horowitz would be appointed to the position of Av Beit Din of Frankfurt, a
community which had stipulated as a prerequisite that it would not hire any Av Beit Din who had
validated the Get of Cleves. Thus, it emerged in retrospect that R. Horowitz’ deferral to R.
Orenstein rescued him for the future.
This episode implies that the successful resolution of R. Horowitz’ career problem [and
perhaps even the successful resolution of the entire Get of Cleves conundrum] occurred precisely
because even a great luminary such as R. Horowitz had the humility not to become involved in a
contested get situation. Arguably, then, the public policy lesson of the Get of Cleves is that “too
many cooks ruin the kitchen,” and it is best to leave such halakhic questions in the hand of a
select few poskim.106 Ergo, there is an a priori argument to be advanced that perhaps this student
should not adjudicate Epstein vs. Friedman [which is also a contested halakhic situation
involving an (allegedly) paranoid husband].
Of further interest in this regard is that in 1752, just a few years prior to the Get of
Cleves, at a time when R. Ezekiel Landau served as Av Beit Din of Yampol (1745-1755), R.
Landau brokered a peaceful compromise solution to the debate between R. Jacob Emden and R.
Jonathan Eibeshutz [as to whether the mystical amulets that were allegedly written by the latter
were evidence of heretical ideas] in order to protect the Honour of the Torah. R. Landau
promulgated an ostracism on anyone who would disparage the reputation of either R. Emden or
R. Eibeshutz, in essence silencing the dispute. 107 As such, the Av Beit Din of Yampol (R.
Landau) set a precedent to prevent outside rabbis from “joining the fray” of a cause célèbre.
[Indeed, one might hypothesize that the subsequent Av Beit Din of Yampol (R. Orenstein) was
perhaps motivated by this very same precedent when he asked R. Horowitz to refrain from re-
transcribing his responsum on the Get of Cleves.108] So, once again, an a priori argument can be
advanced that perhaps this student should not adjudicate Epstein vs. Friedman.109

106
In the words of R. Shabtai, Defining the Moment (referenced supra, note 7), p. xxviii:

“There are some areas of Halakhah in which even some of the most pious,
knowledgeable, and renowned rabbis shy away from issuing rulings. These have
traditionally included resolving the often complex status of agunot, married women
whose husbands are missing or otherwise unwilling or unable to grant a valid divorce.
Resolving such questions erroneously has repercussions for generations – potentially
creating mamzerim, children of illicit relationships, who, along with their descendants,
may not marry within the community. There are generally only a few scholars in each
generation willing to accept this daunting responsibility and challenge.”
107
See R. Shnayer Z. Leiman, Iggeret Shelomim le-Rabbi Yechezkel Landau, available at
<https://leimanlibrary.com/texts_of_publications/120_Iggeret%20Shelomim.pdf>. Indeed, R. Aryeh Zev Ginzberg,
Teshuvot Divrei Chakhamim (New York, 1986), pp. 286-287, quotes an oral tradition from Chazon Ish that the
compromise brokered by R. Landau was truthful and correct, as evident inter alia from the fact that R. Eibeshutz’
book Urim ve-Tumim is studied in every beit midrash. [Parenthetically, this student heard the same approach from
the mouth of his own rosh yeshivah here in Montreal, R. Joshua H. Shmidman.]
108
Although no source is cited, a Wikipedia article devoted to the Get of Cleves
<https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%94%D7%92%D7%98_%D7%9E%D7%A7%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%95%D7
%95%D7%90> advances such a suggestion in the name of anonymous historians.
 However, upon more rigorous examination, the public policy lessons of the Get of Cleves
do not support such a conclusion in the context of Epstein vs. Friedman. In the case of R.
Horowitz, he sought to write a responsum to permit the lady to remarry with the get she had
received, a notion which many poskim were anyway professing. [Ergo, considerations of
humility augured in favour of R. Horowitz not commenting publicly.] By contradistinction, in
our contemporary specific case of Epstein vs. Friedman, overwhelming evidence has
accumulated [as catalogued above, Section K] to forbid a lady to remarry based on the fact that
she has no get, a notion which [not only conforms with what the consensus of poskim are already
professing but which also] has not yet been successfully communicated to the protagonists of the
situation.110 [Indeed, none of the debating poskim in the Get of Cleves ever suggested nullifying
the kiddushin, and this despite the fact that the groom was paranoid. Those who permitted the
wife to remarry did so because they regarded the groom to be sane (notwithstanding his
paranoia) and thereby validated of the get that the husband granted of his own free will. Thus,
Epstein vs. Friedman appears to be fundamentally different than the Get of Cleves.] Ergo, there
seems to be moral justification for this student to definitively adjudicate Epstein vs. Friedman.
Likewise, R. Landau’s gag order on R. Emden vs. R. Eibeshutz [an influential
background event to the Get of Cleves] can be coherently distinguished from Epstein vs.
Friedman. In R. Emden vs. R. Eibeshutz, concern had arisen regarding the mystical amulets that
R. Eibeshutz had written. R. Landau recognized that it was a situation of “that which is hidden
belongs to [the Holy One, Blessed Be He]” (Deut. 29:28), and so there was no reason to question
the chezkat kashrut (powerful legal presumption of kosher behaviour) of R. Eibeshutz, so long as
he would avoid suspicion by withdrawal from any further occupation with amulets. By
contradistinction, in the case of Epstein vs. Friedman, we are dealing with the problem of a lady
remarrying without a get, which is not at all a hidden matter, but rather “that which is revealed is
[an obligation] for us and our children forever to uphold all the words of this Torah” (Deut.
29:28). And thus, in the context of Epstein vs. Friedman, the Honour of the Torah demands
protest if the remarriage is not halakhically valid, precisely as R. Moshe Feinstein stated111 and
precisely as the 130 scholars recruited by R. Mendel Zilber signed.112
Quite significantly, as cited by R. Zilber in his Ami interview, R. Joseph Rosen, Teshuvot
Tzafenat Pa‘ane’ach I, no. 116, uses the following powerful language to repudiate the 5690

109
And see Reb Moshe: The Life and Ideals of HaGaon Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (cited supra, note 13), pp. 68-69,
where R. Finkelman cites a passage from R. Nota Zvi Greenblatt, Ke-Rei’ach Sadeh, who specifically compares the
halakhic decision-making process of R. Moshe Feinstein to the manner in which R. Yonatan Eibeshutz successfully
cleared his name during his [R. Eibeshutz’] controversy with R. Emden. [N.B. The original Hebrew text of that
passage of Ke-Rei’ach Sadeh has more recently been published online at
<https://tablet.otzar.org/he/book/book.php?book=606090&pagenum=139>. Ergo, this insight of R. Nota Zvi
Greenblatt ostensibly lends even further credence to the a priori argument that the public policy lessons of the Get
of Cleves dictate that this student should not adjudicate Epstein vs. Friedman.
110
On the occasion of Shabbat Vayeitzei 5780, Philadelphia’s Congregation Young Israel of the Main Line
announced a lecture entitled “What Does Being “Frum” Really Mean?” hosted at the home of Ms. Tamar Epstein
and her second husband. See <https://images.shulcloud.com/6201/uploads/December7.pdf>.
111
Cited supra, note 101.
112
Cited supra, note 71.
proposal of Yehudah Leib Epstein113 that every groom appoint his bride under the chuppah as an
agent to deliver herself a get whenever she becomes an agunah in the future:

“Today I received his honour’s letter with a booklet filled with insanities
and vanities (shtutim va-havalim), and they just wish to permit [the
prohibition of adultery with] a married lady and to increase mamzerim,
chas ve-chalilah, in Israel. And it seems that he [the author of the booklet;
Yehudah Leib Epstein] is a compatriot to the destructive man in
London,114 may his name be erased (yemach shemo). And I don’t wish to
even enter into correspondence with him, as elucidated in Sanhedrin 38b.
Only [I have written this responsum now so that] I have written a protest,
that chas ve-chalilah it should never ascend on one’s mind to orchestrate
insanities (shtutim) like these. And I will be brief. Joseph Rosen.”

The rhetoric employed by Tzafenat Pa‘ane’ach – including the phrase yemach shemo115 –
clearly illustrates that when a substandard solution is employed in practice by a rabbi to
(ostensibly) solve an agunah problem (but actually exacerbates the problem he is attempting to
resolve), there is an obligation upon all other rabbis to protest vocally. Ergo, when we approach
the Non-Get of Philadelphia [which, in contradistinction to the Get of Cleves, is a situation
which raises a red-flag in the eyes of (at least116) the majority of poskim as being a substandard
agunah solution] it is entirely appropriate for this student to arrive at a final adjudication of the
matter, so that a protest can be properly registered if so deemed necessary.
Finally, if there were any lingering doubt on the matter, posek ha-dor R. Bleich already
authorized this student in a telephone conversation on Jan. 17, 2019 to publish an essay on

See his biographical description by R. Zvi Gartner and R. Betzalel Karlinsky, “Ein Tnai be-Nissuin (2) – Ha-
113

Ma’avak al Kedushat ha-Yichus be-Yisrael,” Yeshurun Vol. 9 (Elul 5761), pp. 669-710.
114
As explained by R. Gartner and R. Karlinsky (op. cit.), the reference is to Joseph Shapatchnik, who in 5688 (i.e.
two years prior to Yehudah Leib Epstein’s proposal) published Cherut Olam, a proposal to solve the agunah
problem by formulating every kiddushin on stipulation.
115
See also R. Aharon Yehudah ha-Levi Grossman, Teshuvot Ve-Darashta ve-Chakarta, III, Choshen Mishpat no. 2,
who explains that in urgent circumstances it is permissible to say yemach shemo regarding a Jew who has
egregiously strayed from the Jewish faith. Interestingly, one of the precedents cited is R. Jacob Ettlinger, Teshuvot
Binyan Tziyon, I, no. 154 regarding a case of alleged adultery [although, in that particular case, R. Ettlinger is
inclined to permit the wife to return to her husband since – even if the allegation is true – she was under coercion.]
116
Actually, it is not clear that there is any posek anywhere in the world who supports Ms. Epstein’s remarriage
without a get, since R. Shalom Kamenetzky (in his letter of 12 Adar II, 5776, cited supra note 3 and accompanying
text) ultimately defers to R. David Feinstein to forbid the remarriage, since R. Nota Zvi Greenblatt may have also
retracted (as described supra¸ Section F), and since R. Shmuel Kamenetzky claims he takes no position on this
matter (as documented supra, note 73). Nevertheless, just to be on the safe side, what can be stated with
epistemological certainty at this point in the essay is that at least the majority of poskim forbid the remarriage of Ms.
Epstein without a get, and this is sufficient to fundamentally distinguish the Non-Get of Philadelphia from the Get of
Cleves.
Epstein vs. Friedman, provided certain caveats are respected,117 and so it is clear that this student
can now adjudicate the question at hand.

M. ADJUDICATION OF KIDDUSHEI TA‘UT IN PRINCIPLE

Let us first adjudicate whether kiddushei ta‘ut can ever be invoked in the context of a
defective husband. We will focus on the case of the husband incapable of marital relations
(Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer I, no. 79), since R. Feinstein’s second responsum annulling the
kiddushin of a mentally ill husband (Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer no. 80) is evidently
predicated upon his first responsum annulling the kiddushin of a husband incapable of marital
relations.
As described above in Section H,118 Ma‘aneh la-Iggerot challenges Iggerot Mosheh
based on Teshuvot ha-Rosh who requires a get in such an instance. However, what Section H
above overlooked is that R. Ovadiah Yosef, Teshuvot Yabi‘a Omer VII, Yoreh De‘ah no. 7,
hashmatot u-milu’im, defends Iggerot Mosheh by positing that Teshuvot ha-Rosh is referring to
an epoch where the kiddushin and nissu’in were separated by twelve months. Under such
circumstances, reasons Yabi‘a Omer, there was no basis to assume that the groom had the defect
at the time of kiddushin. By contradistinction, continues Yabi‘a Omer, in our era, where
kiddushin and nissu’in are performed in immediate succession, we know that the groom had the
defect at the time of kiddushin, and so Teshuvot ha-Rosh would agree with Iggerot Mosheh. This
defense of Yabi‘a Omer is potentially cogent, and was regrettably overlooked by this student in
Section H precisely because it was hidden in the hashmatot u-milu’im. Fortunately, this student’s
oversight is subject to compensation by the fact that Section H already anticipated that Iggerot
Mosheh might have a counter-rejoinder to Ma‘aneh la-Iggerot, and that we would accept for
argument’s sake that kiddushei ta‘ut can be invoked in the case of a seriously defective husband
[who is incapable of marital relations].119 Thus, the “argument’s sake” remains valid.
But what of the proclamation by 130 scholars [led by R. Mendel Zilber] universally
outlawing kiddushei ta‘ut as a means of rescuing any agunah? An examination of the relevant
Ami interview with R. Zilber reveals that it is based on the concept of the power of the Sages in
every generation to establish a fence as a matter of policy against behaviour which is a pirtzah,
viz. perceived by the public to represent a breach of Halakhah. To this effect, R. Zilber
reproduces a letter (dated 22 Kislev 5725) in which R. Moshe Feinstein – who had originally
permitted introduction of the DNA of a Noahide donor to assist an infertile Jewish married
couple to bear a child120 – forbids this same practice altogether due to the pirtzah it
represents.121,122 Ergo, concludes R. Zilber, we must apply by way of kal va-chomer123 the same

117
See text accompanying supra, note 36. To quote the golden words this student was privileged to hear directly
from the mouth of R. Bleich during that telephone conversation: “the matirim never explained themselves.”
118
Text accompanying supra, note 38.
119
For further responsa by R. Ovadiah Yosef on this topic, see Teshuvot Yabi‘a Omer IX, Even ha-Ezer nos. 36-38.
120
Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer I, nos. 10 and 71; idem, Even ha-Ezer II, no. 11.
121
R. Zilber explains that after several years of opposition expressed by various talmidei chakhamim to the original
ruling of R. Moshe Feinstein, R. Feinstein sent the following letter [photographed in the Ami article and presently
translated into English by this student (-Shalom C. Spira)] to all the leading rabbanim, including R. Zilber’s own
father R. Refael Zilber (author of Marpei le-Nefesh):
public policy reasoning to forbid invocation of kiddushei ta‘ut in our time [even though R.
Moshe Feinstein originally authorized it according to the technical letter of Halakhah in some
limited situations] because it is a pirtzah.
Indeed, we can fortify the argument of R. Zilber with additional source material. Namely,
the exact same concept [of the power of the Sages in every generation to establish a fence as a
matter of pirtzah] is enunciated by Chazon Ish, Orach Chaim 52:6 to forbid employment of a

“To his distinguished honour, Ha-Rav ha-Ga’on shlit”a,

Regarding the injection of DNA – concerning which they have written in my name that I
permitted [it] – I have found correct to communicate that I did not permit except in an
hour of major emergency (bi-she‘at ha-dechak gadol) that the wife is exceedingly
distressed, as clarified in my book Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer [Vol. 1] no. 71, such
that it is obvious to all that it is impossible to adjudicate this matter except for a rabbi
who is a major expert in the Torah and renowned for halakhic decisions (rav muvhak
gadol ba-Torah u-mefursam be-hora’ah) who will adjudicate this from all angles. And
because of this, on the one [practical] occasion that this [question] came to me, I
[actually] forbade, and chalilah for any rabbi to issue a permissive ruling on this matter
from my book [alone]. And one should see I wrote in my introduction to Iggerot Mosheh
on Orach Chaim [Vol. 1].
Alas, since there is still fear that they will be lenient to issue rulings – they who are not
worthy to adjudicate a weighty matter like this – and lest a stumbling block emerge to
permit even in a situation which is [actually] forbidden, it is necessary to build a fence
never to permit this under any circumstances, even the most expert rabbi.
His friend,
Moshe Feinstein”

A facsimile of this letter also appears in R. Zvi Hirsch Friedman, Tzvi Chemed Vol. 41 (Brooklyn, 5725), p.
34, available online at <https://hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=3178&st=&pgnum=34&hilite=>.
122
Cf., however, the approach of R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, published posthumously for the first time from
manuscript by Shulchan Shelomoh (op. cit., supra note 16), pp. 86-94. R. Auerbach [without ever mentioning R.
Feinstein even once] arrives at precisely the same technical verdict as R. Feinstein to permit the procedure, and
furthermore adds that there is no public policy fence yet in place to forbid this same procedure. In other words, like
R. Feinstein, R. Auerbach also acknowledges the power of the Sages in every generation to build a public policy
fence to prevent a pirtzah, except that R. Auerbach does not believe that such a public policy fence has yet been
built in the specific case of introducing a Noahide gentleman’s DNA.
In any event, as one can implicitly infer from R. Zilber’s remarks in the Ami interview, some are more
stringent than R. Feinstein, and claim that artificially introducing DNA is always proscribed even according to the
technical letter of Halakhah. See Ma‘aneh la-Iggerot (op. cit., supra note 15), nos. 166-167; R. J. David Bleich,
Bioethical Dilemmas (KTAV Publishing, 1998), pp. 208-209; and idem, The Philosophical Quest: Of Philosophy,
Ethics, Law and Halakhah (Maggid Books, 2013), pp. 134-135. A survey of that controversy is beyond the scope of
the present essay.
123
R. Zilber argues that this is an a fortiori deduction because of two considerations: (a) the perceived transgression
in the case of allowing an agunah to remarry without a get but instead based on kiddushei ta‘ut is more serious than
the perceived transgression in the case of introducing a Noahide gentleman’s DNA, and (b) even the technical letter
of the Halakhah [as enunciated by Iggerot Mosheh] to ever allow an agunah to remarry without a get but instead
based on kiddushei ta‘ut is more dependent on the situation-specifics of the fact pattern than in the case of
introducing a Noahide gentleman’s DNA. Ergo, says R. Zilber of kiddushei ta‘ut (as quoted in the interview,
employing Yiddish pronunciation): “It is therefore clear to me that Rav Moshe would say that it should never be
done under any circumstances, because there is no one alive today who can take the achrayus for permitting a
married woman to remarry along with the risk of mamzeirus.”
parasol/umbrella on the Sabbath [despite the fact that the parasol/umbrella represents a post-
Talmudic invention], given that “they [the Sages, in the Gemara, Shabbat 139a] forbade
spreading a canopy over a bed because [the people of Bashkar who inquired about this] were not
students of Torah, and behold the matter is given over to the Sages to establish a fence in a place
of pirtzah, and this is more stringent than a technical prohibition on an individual, for this is a
fence for the nation entirely and for all generations.”124
Nevertheless, it seems to this student that we can question the extrapolation from the
cases of artificial introduction of an Noahide gentleman’s DNA [which R. Feinstein ultimately
forbade as a matter of public policy] and using a parasol/umbrella on the Sabbath [which Chazon
Ish ultimately forbade as a matter of public policy] to kiddushei ta‘ut. In the former cases, we
are dealing with behaviour which unsophisticated observers deem to be a transgression between
the subject and the Omnipresent, such that the Gemara, Shabbat 139a [as well as other
sources125] authorizes the Sages of every generation – including our contemporary era – to
establish a fence. By contradistinction, in the latter case, we are dealing with a proposed public
policy stringency that ultimately causes a transgression between one human and another.
Namely, in the latter case, a bride arrives at Beth Din with the legitimate claim that she has been
defrauded by a groom who failed to disclose a massive personal defect that renders the marital
relationship completely impossible. If indeed such kiddushei ta‘ut is legitimately recognized by
the Talmud [as Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer I, no. 79 endeavours to argue, based on inferences
from Bava Kamma 110b and other passages], then by what right do post-Talmudic rabbis have to
establish a public policy that frustrates the legitimate claim of the defrauded bride? Perhaps,
then, R. Mendel Zilber and his accompanying 130 scholars are mistaken to assume that the Sages
of our era can establish a public policy frustrating a bride’s ability to claim kiddushei ta‘ut!126, 127

124
See R. Hershel Schachter, Be-Ikvei ha-Tzon, sec. 5, who cites Chazon Ish approvingly and argues that the same
consideration should forbid women’s prayer groups.
See also R. J. David Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems IV (KTAV Publishing, 1995), p. xvi, who –
while not mentioning Chazon Ish – reaches precisely the same conclusion as Chazon Ish [in analyzing the Gemara,
Shabbat 139a regarding Bashkar]: “In effect, perfectly acceptable forms of activity on Shabbat were forbidden
because the inhabitants of that city were poorly schooled in the laws of the Torah. Hence they were likely to
misapply a permissive ruling and incorrectly perceive other forbidden activities as halakhically sanctioned.”
Additionally, R. Bleich marshals further Talmudic sources which reinforce this conclusion of the power of the Sages
in every generation to establish public policy: Shabbat 153a, Avodah Zarah 59b, Chullin 15a, Shabbat 115a & 153b,
as well as Tosafot to Bava Kamma 99b.
See also R. Aryeh A. Frimer and R. Dov I. Frimer, “Women’s Prayer Groups: Theory and Practice,”
Tradition 32:2 (Winter 1998) Part 1, Addendum, Part 4, for additional halakhic sources to the same effect. [N.B. In
context, R. Frimer and R. Frimer are writing to refute R. Schachter’s above contention that we should extrapolate
the same to women’s prayer groups. Ironically, the one source that R. Frimer and R. Frimer overlook in their
impressive list is the very Chazon Ish cited by R. Schachter.]
125
Cited supra, note 124.
126
In the case of artificial introduction of a Noahide gentleman’s DNA, R. Feinstein has already explained (Iggerot
Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer I, no. 71, s.v. u-mah she-hevi be-Otzar ha-Poskim) that it would only be permitted [even
according to the technical letter of Halakhah] provided that both the Jewish husband and Jewish wife agree to the
procedure. Thus, the pirtzah which subsequently prompted R. Feinstein to establish a public policy fence against this
very same procedure was one uniquely involving the perception of a transgression between a person and the
Omnipresent. There was never any interpersonal transgression at stake. By contradistinction, the case of the
defrauded bride is clearly an interpersonal transgression, and here we have no Talmudic precedent (Shabbat 139a or
otherwise) to allow a public policy that frustrates the victim’s claim to justice [in effect exacerbating the
interpersonal transgression].
127
Parenthetically, once we are objecting to the extrapolation of R. Zilber [and his accompanying 130 scholars] in
the main text, it is appropriate to mention a second objection [albeit one that is more peripheral in nature and hence
relegated to the present footnote]. Namely, even after the public policy letter of R. Feinstein of 22 Kislev, 5725
[showcased by R. Zilber], it is not entirely clear that R. Feinstein consistently adhered to the public policy in
question [to universally forbid introduction of a Noahide gentleman’s DNA]. Specifically, in a responsum dated 24
Kislev, 5725 [i.e. just two days after the aforementioned public policy letter] and addressed to R. Mordechai Jacob
Breisch, R. Feinstein defends at length his original ruling to permit introducing a Noahide gentleman’s DNA, and
makes no mention of any public policy fence against a pirtzah. That rejoinder to R. Breisch appears in the latter’s
Teshuvot Chelkat Ya‘akov III (revised edition, Tel Aviv, 5752), nos. 17-21. R. Feinstein concludes his disquisition
with the sentence (bold font added merely for clarity by the present student, Shalom C. Spira): “And behold Kevod
Torato ha-Rav will see that my words [to permit the procedure] are true, that there is no [valid] reason in all
the words of Kevod Torato ha-Rav to forbid according to the law; however, after all of this, when on the one
occasion a case came to me, I [actually] did not permit.” Thus, R. Feinstein’s 24 Kislev responsum does
acknowledge [as he already did in his 22 Kislev letter] that he does not always permit the procedure, but on the other
hand [contrary to his 22 Kislev letter] makes no mention of a public policy fence.
Interestingly, R. Breisch himself seems to have been alerted to this anomaly, because in a counter-rejoinder
to R. Feinstein [published in Teshuvot Chelkat Ya‘akov III, no. 16] R. Breisch announces that he has independently
become apprised of R. Feinstein’s letter of 22 Kislev [-indeed, R. Breisch proceeds to transcribe the bulk of it
verbatim], but insists that he must nevertheless proceed to counter-attack R. Feinstein because [in R. Breisch’s
opinion] R. Feinstein’s original ruling should be completely retracted as a legal error. [Thus, in the following
sections of Teshuvot Chelkat Ya‘akov III, viz. nos. 17-21, R. Breisch critiques R. Feinstein’s argumentation in an
uninterrupted series of footnotes attacking every point rendered by the main text (-the main text consisting purely of
R. Feinstein’s 24 Kislev responsum).] In other words, R. Feinstein himself never intended to inform R. Breisch of
the public policy fence letter of 22 Kislev.
On the other hand, in his Dibberot Mosheh on Ketubot (Bnei Brak, 5744), R. Feinstein features an appendix
containing three responsa to defend his original ruling on permitting introduction of a Noahide gentleman’s DNA,
the first of which is in fact his 24 Kislev, 5725 letter to R. Breisch. Here, however, R. Feinstein adds in the title the
caveat “le-halakhah ve-lo le-ma‘aseh” (the law but not to be practiced), arguably representing an acknowledgement
by R. Feinstein of his earlier public policy fence letter of 22 Kislev, 5725. Also noteworthy regarding this Dibberot
Mosheh publication of the rejoinder to R. Breisch is that R. Feinstein’s final sentence is modified to read (bold font
added merely for clarity by the present student, Shalom C. Spira): “And now Kevod Torato ha-Rav will see that
my words [to permit the procedure] are true; however, after all of this, when on the one occasion a case came
to me, I [actually] did not permit.” This final sentence is a bit more conciliatory toward R. Breisch than that
published in Teshuvot Chelkat Ya‘akov, again arguably reflecting an acknowledgement of R. Feinstein of a public
policy fence.
In a later publication, viz. Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer IV, no. 32, sec. 5, R. Feinstein reviews his
previous Iggerot Mosheh responsa to permit introduction of a Noahide gentleman’s DNA, and also reviews his 24
Kislev, 5725 responsum published in Teshuvot Chelkat Ya‘akov, the latter which R. Feinstein further identifies as
being equally published in Dibberot Mosheh on Ketubot. However, R. Feinstein makes no mention of his public
policy fence letter of 22 Kislev, 5725 [and indeed does not mention any discrepancy between the language of his 24
Kislev, 5725 responsum published in Teshuvot Chelkat Ya‘akov vs. that published in Dibberot Mosheh on Ketubot.]
Rather, R. Feinstein insists regarding his original responsa “they are all true and clear as a matter of law; it is not
relevant to regret them and there is no concern with injecting the DNA of Noahides.” Suddenly, however, R.
Feinstein raises a shelom bayit caveat to be strict:

“But in practice I did not issue a ruling to do so, for the reason that regarding fulfillment
of the mitzvah of piryah ve-riv’yah for her husband, this [procedure] does not count as
anything, and [as for] the wife she is not obligated, and it is possible that what could
emerge from this is a great jealousy on the part of her husband [if she undergoes the
procedure, which offers no mitzvah achievement to the husband] and therefore this is not
good advice.”

To be sure, this caveat appears strange (be-mechilat Kevod Torato), since – quite apart from the fact that it
does not mention the earlier public policy fence letter of 22 Kislev, 5725 – R. Feinstein already specifically stated in
 On the other hand, in fairness to R. Zilber and his accompanying 130 scholars, there may
arguably be two precedents to invoke public policy even in such a context, viz., Maggid Mishneh
on Rambam, Hilkhot Ishut 14:8; and R. Akiva Sofer, Teshuvot Da‘at Sofer, Even ha-Ezer no. 49,
as follows.128
First, regarding Maggid Misheh, he addresses Rambam’s codification that if a wife
unilaterally rebels against her husband, the Beth Din asks her why she is doing so, and if she
answers “I am disgusted by him and cannot willingly live with him,” then the Beth Din coerces

his original ruling (Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer I, no. 71, s.v. u-mah she-hevi be-Otzar ha-Poskim) that the
procedure would only be permitted provided that both the Jewish husband and Jewish wife agree to the procedure.
Why, then, should there be a jealousy concern? Perhaps what R. Feinstein means to offer is the emotional insight
that the husband will originally agree to the procedure but that once it is already a fait accompli, the husband will
regret his original agreement and then become jealous of his wife. Of course, this emotional insight will still not
explain R. Feinstein’s chequered record on the public policy fence question.
The mystery is further thickened when one considers the analysis of R. J. David Bleich on R. Feinstein’s
retraction (or purported retraction). Namely, in a 1985 lecture at Long Beach, California (moderated by Dr. Reuven
Avraham Cyrulnik, and available at <https://www.yutorah.org/sidebar/lecture.cfm/761452/rabbi-dr-j-david-
bleich/questions-and-answers-with-doctors-part-3/>, 8:30-12:45 into the recording), R. Bleich augurs that artificial
introduction of a Noahide gentlemen’s DNA “is absolutely forbidden.” A member of the audience objects that R.
Moshe Feinstein wrote a responsum permitting the procedure. R. Bleich responds that R. Feinstein retracted his
responsum. The member of the audience then counter-objects that R. Saul Berman recently visited Long Beach and
told the same audience that R. Feinstein’s purported retraction was not genuine. R. Bleich counter-responds by
reassuring the audience that R. Feinstein’s retraction was genuine. Yet, writing several years later in Be-Netivot ha-
Halakhah III (KTAV Publishing, 2001), p. 136, R. Bleich seems to adopt a markedly different approach:

“And although many think that the Ga’on R. Moshe Feinstein zatza”l retracted his heter
regarding artificial introduction of a Noahide gentleman’s DNA, and this emerged for
them from a letter that was publicized in Tzvi Chemed and Refu’ah le-Or ha-Halakhah,
Vol. 1; behold in Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer IV, no. 32, sec. 5, he clearly wrote that
his words in his previous responsa on this topic ‘are all true and clear as a matter of law;
it is not relevant to regret them,’ except that he nevertheless wrote that one should not
advise doing so for reasons that are not inherent to the question of whether the procedure
is forbidden or permitted.”

Seemingly, in these later comments, R. Bleich accepts (at least to some extent) R. Berman’s thesis that R.
Feinstein’s purported retraction was not genuine. Hence, we remain with a mystery whether or not R. Feinstein
retracted.
In the end, the reality is that R. Moshe Feinstein was not always consistent in all the rulings he delivered.
Namely, there are several outstanding halakhic issues (including the synagogue partition, conversion of an adopted
baby, double-ring ceremonies for kiddushin, opening a refrigerator door on the Sabbath) where R. Feinstein
contradicts himself throughout his responsa, as documented by this student in “The Quest for an Effective
Synagogue Partition Plan,” footnote 25, available at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/168693341/Synagogue-Partition>.
Thus, R. Feinstein’s chequered record on the public policy fence question may well be of the same nature.
[Additionally or alternatively, it may be noted that there is a legitimate epistemological question regarding the entire
provenance of the seventh volume of Iggerot Mosheh [as described in “The Halakhic Definition of Life in a
Bioethical Context,” op. cit., footnote 239 (of that essay)], which might account why Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer
IV, no. 32, sec. 5 – contained as it is within that seventh volume – is not entirely consistent with the earlier 22
Kislev, 5725 public policy fence letter.] Ergo, we remain with a question of whether R. Feinstein consistently
adhered to the public policy in question to universally forbid introduction of a Noahide gentleman’s DNA as R.
Zilber claims in his Ami interview.

Maggid Mishneh is apparently overlooked by R. Zilber in his Ami interview, whereas Da‘at Sofer is obliquely
128

mentioned, albeit without citing the precise reference.

the husband to deliver a get to the wife. Maggid Mishneh observes that all other Rishonim
dispute Rambam and rule that it is forbidden to coerce the husband to deliver a get in such a
case.129 Continues Maggid Mishneh:

“Not only that, but even if the law would [hypothetically] be like
[Rambam’s] words, it would be appropriate to establish a fence in this
matter, because of the wayward ladies (prutzot) and because of the
spoilage of the generation (kilkul ha-dor), so that a [married] lady should
not set her eyes upon a different gentlemen, and remove herself from her
husband. How much more so [is this true] given that they [the Rishonim
who oppose Rambam] convincingly demonstrated that we do not coerce
him according to the letter of the law.”

In principle, then, Maggid Mishneh signals his hypothetical willingness to establish a

public policy fence to curtail a married lady’s ability to direct a Beth Din to coerce her husband
to deliver a get, even though such a public policy fence is clearly treading upon an interpersonal
transgression.
Second, regarding Da‘at Sofer, his responsum is addressed to
R. Zev Zvi ha-Kohen Klein of Buenos Aires, Argentina, who complained to Da‘at Sofer about
an anonymous “rabbi”130 in Argentina who on two occasions allowed a lady to remarry without a
get on the grounds of kiddushei ta‘ut. In the first case, the bride claimed that the groom was
physiologically incapable of marital relations, and in the second case, the bride claimed that the
groom was anatomically incapable of marital relations because the groom was androgynous.
Both invocations of kiddushei ta‘ut were decried by R. Klein as unacceptable leniencies, and so
he sought counsel from Da‘at Sofer. After analyzing the halakhic sources regarding these two
cases, Da‘at Sofer concludes with the following public policy verdict:

“And the words of his distinguished honour [R. Klein] – may he live – are
very correct, that in this generation which is completely bankrupt (she-
parutz bi-mlo’ah), especially in the country of Argentina which is
confused with haughtiness, there will be a massive stumbling block if they
rely on permissive rulings of this nature based on kiddushei ta‘ut, for the
ladies will come upon the gentlemen – if there will be fights between them
– with specious claims of kiddushei ta‘ut. And kohanim are alacritous to
stand against the breach (peretz), to establish a fence.”

In effect, then, Da‘at Sofer directs R. Klein to always forbid invocation of kiddushei ta‘ut
as a solution to the agunah problem in Argentina [even in the most egregious case of a husband
incapable of marital relations], in order to establish a fence in a place of pirtzah. And, while it is
not clear from his responsum, Da‘at Sofer seems to hint at the desirability of establishing such a

129
Indeed, Shulchan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 77:2 rules like the balance of Rishonim (against Rambam), viz. that we
may not coerce the husband to deliver a get to his wife in such an instance.
130
The quotation marks appear in the responsum itself, apparently indicating that either R. Kein or R. Sofer [or both]
did not regard the anonymous rabbi in question as being invested with any real halakhic stature.
fence throughout the world as well [even beyond Argentina], since he speaks of “this generation
which is completely bankrupt.” Ergo, what Da‘at Sofer seems to have hinted in his responsum is
now [as reported by Ami journal of Dec. 25, 2019] apparently being activated/actualized by R.
Zilber and his 130 accompanying scholars.
So the question now becomes whether these two precedents of Maggid Mishneh and
Da‘at Sofer are sufficient to authorize R. Zilber and his 130 accompanying scholars to establish a
public policy fence to universally outlaw kiddushei ta‘ut as a solution to the agunah problem.
We will leave this as an open question, worthy of further investigation.

N. ADJUDICATION OF KIDDUSHEI TA‘UT IN PRACTICE

In the previous section we analyzed whether – as a matter of principle – we can ever

invoke kiddushei ta‘ut nowadays as a solution to the agunah problem. Were the answer to be
negative [as is indeed the position of R. Zilber and his accompanying 130 scholars], that would
easily lead to a definitive conclusion regarding Epstein vs. Friedman. However, we left the
principled matter as an open question, and so cannot resolve Epstein vs. Friedman on that
principled basis alone. Rather, on the basis of practical considerations specifically relevant to
Epstein vs. Friedman, we will now endeavour to reach a definitive halakhic conclusion in the
following section.
The Gemara, Yoma 6a inquires why the High Priest must separate from his wife during
the seven day sequestration period prior to Yom ha-Kippurim. The Gemara initially answers that
perhaps his wife will become a doubtful niddah during those seven days, and if the High Priest
nevertheless cohabits with her, he will become ritually unable to officiate in the Temple on Yom
ha-Kippurim. To this the Gemara immediately retorts: “Are we dealing with wicked people?” In
other words, it would be an act of wickedness for the High Priest to cohabit with a doubtfully
niddah wife.
In Section H above, we enumerated not one, not two, not three, but actually four
independent and legitimate reasons to raise a doubt that there is a claim of mekach ta‘ut in Ms.
Epstein receiving kiddushin from Mr. Friedman.131 In the 17 full months that have elapsed since
the publication of that quadruple-doubt-to-the-side-of-stringency and its immediate conveyance
to R. Nota Zvi Greenblatt, this student has not received any refutation to any of those four
legitimate reasons. Importantly, here we are dealing with a halakhic issue which is more severe
than cohabitation with a niddah, because not only is polyandry a form of gilui arayot [like
cohabiting with a niddah] but it also produces a mamzer [unlike cohabiting with a niddah]. Ergo,
if it unthinkable to the Gemara that a High Priest cohabit with a doubtful niddah, how much
more so should it be unthinkable to the Jewish faith that any alien gentleman cohabit with Ms.
Epstein when she is still at least doubtfully married to Mr. Friedman [and doubtfully married to
that effect on four distinct counts].
Indeed, R. Greenblatt may not feel any need to respond to this student altogether, since
(a) his letter of 14 Kislev, 5776 – analyzed above in Section F – may already indicate that he
withdraws from diagnosing Epstein vs. Friedman as a case of kiddushei ta‘ut, or alternatively (b)
his original ruling of kiddushei ta‘ut was based entirely on the facts provided to him by R.
Shalom Kamenetzky, and the latter (R. Shalom Kamenetzky) has publicly retracted,

131
Text accompanying notes 43-46.
acknowledging that Ms. Epstein is the wife of Mr. Friedman according to Torah law.132 Thus,
with the evaporation of the factual basis upon which R. Greenblatt’s ruling was established, it
may be self-understood that R. Greenblatt’s ruling is retroactively nullified (be-mechilat Kevod
Torato). Furthermore, even if R. Greenblatt were to hypothetically reject both (a) and (b) and
instead insist that (c) his kiddushei ta‘ut ruling maintains, we demonstrated in Sections A-E
above that (contrary to a misreading of Iggerot Mosheh by later scholars, be-mechilat Kevod
Toratam) a Jew cannot rely on a minority opinion to resolve agunah problems which pit husband
against wife.133 So one way or the other, Ms. Epstein is still [at least doubtfully] married to Mr.
Friedman. Or as Rashi to Pesachim 4b, s.v. mi havei mekach ta‘ut comments, just because a
plaintiff arrives at Beth Din “with libels” claiming mekach ta‘ut, it does not automatically mean
that those libels allow the original mercantile transaction to be reversed.
And now we will strengthen the quadruple-doubt-to-the-side-of-stringency [-specifically,
the fourth doubt to that effect, viz. that the Beth Din of R. Greenblatt (be-mechilat Kevod Torato)
disobeyed proper judicial procedure], based on two recent sources.
First, R. Joseph Shalom Eliashiv, Kovetz Teshuvot III (Jerusalem, 5763), no. 202
addresses a case where – five years after a civil divorce (but with no get) – a wife presents a
cogent plea that the husband be coerced to deliver a get, but the husband refuses to appear before
Beth Din. Can the Beth Din adjudicate the case in absence of the husband? After analyzing what
the Rishonim say about this problem, R. Eliashiv concludes:

132
See supra, note 3 and accompanying text. The full text of the letter reads as follows:

“Night preceding 12 Adar II, 5776

It is now that I have received the verdict of the Beth Din led by the Ga’on R. David
Feinstein shlit”a, and I have come with the present [letter] to make known that certainly
as they ruled so shall it arise, and just as already my father and teacher the Ga’on [R.
Shmuel Kamenetzky] shlit”a has written. And I have already transmitted the verdict of
the Beth Din to the protagonists of the case, that there is no power for voiding the
kiddushin whatsoever at all. And to those who listen let there be pleasantness and a
blessing of goodness should come upon them. And may [the Holy One, Blessed Be He]
seal the breaches of his nation Israel.

With this I have come to sign,

Shalom Kamenetzky”
133
And see R. J. David Bleich, “Methodology of Psak” (Tradition 51:2, Spring 2019, p. 36), who expresses the
same idea as follows:

“More generally, a person does not have the right to rely upon a da‘at yachid, an
individual opinion, even when expressed by an early Acharon, by invoking the principle
eilu ve-eilu divrei E(-)okim chayyim [(Gemara, Eiruvin 13b)]… Whatever that authority
wrote or said is absolutely true in the realm of transcendental Halakhah but the veracity
of his pronouncements has nothing to do with applied psak halakhah. Psak halakhah
takes place in an entirely different universe. In that universe, applications of canons of
applied psak are determinative.”

[N.B. See also introduction of Arukh ha-Shulchan, s.v. ha-omnam kol zeh le-filpul ha-Torah, who seems to
have preempted R. Bleich to the same effect.]
 “And all of this relates to receiving testimony outside of his presence, but
in our case the sides did not stand even once yet [before this Beth Din],
and that is what the Acharonim write in [Even ha-Ezer] no. 17 that we
require a situation where already several times [both sides] presented their
claims and already stood before the judges, and [the judges] can then
adjudicate the law.
But if they [the judges] did not hear the claims of both sides, but only
[instead] the Beth Din heard one side, behold this side can claim whatever
ascends upon its spirit – what his heart desires – and especially in our case
where she knows that her husband will not appear before the Beth Din.
And it is forbidden for a judge to hear the claim of a litigant without his
[countervailing] compatriot.”

Seemingly, this ruling of R. Eliashiv, when applied to Epstein vs. Friedman, should
prevent the Beth Din of R. Greenblatt from reaching a verdict of kiddushei ta‘ut when that Beth
Din only heard from Ms. Epstein and not from Mr. Friedman. Indeed, Mr. Friedman was never
invited before the Beth Din of R. Greenblatt altogether, thereby indicating that R. Greenblatt’s
Beth Din’s determination was ab initio invalid. The situation was fundamentally different in
Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer I, no. 80, where the psychotic groom fled for fourteen years from
his bride, and refused all reasonable entreaties of [what was then] the Beth Din of Baltimore to
appear before Beth Din. Given that a disciple who does not learn after five years is deemed
pedagogically incorrigible (as per the Gemara, Chullin 24a), Iggerot Mosheh was justified in
concluding that – as a matter of judicial notice – this groom will never agree to appear before the
Beth Din of Baltimore, and a ruling of kiddushei ta‘ut by the Beth Din of Baltimore could be
processed even in his absence.
Second, on the occasion of the twelfth Daf Yomi Siyum celebration in 5772, Agudath
Israel of America published Kovetz Ha-Me’ir la-Olam: Chiddushei Torah va-Halakhah (Shlomo
Gottesman, ed.) That compendium contains an article “Din Holekh Achar Beit Din Yafeh, ve-
He’arah be-Viku’ach al ha-Get mi-Klev” by R. Levi Langer. Analyzing the Gemara, Sanhedrin
31b, R. Langer explains why nowadays – so long as there is an established Beth Din in the city –
one Jewish litigant cannot force another to go a Beth Din of a different city, and that this is why
most poskim were in fact lenient [in principle134] on the cause célèbre of the Get of Cleves. R.
Langer’s approach would seemingly prevent the Beth Din of R. Greenblatt from assuming
responsibility for Epstein vs. Friedman without the agreement of both litigants, when the case
was already being adjudicated by the Beth Din of Baltimore. The situation was fundamentally
different in Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer I, no. 80, where [what was then the Beth Din of
Baltimore] was already handling the case of the psychotic groom, and only approached R. Moshe
Feinstein to confirm its hunch that there was indeed kiddushei ta‘ut.
In light of the above, the Jewish faith requires Ms. Epstein to immediately separate from
her second husband. While we live in an unredeemed world (until the messianic redemption
arrives) and so all Jews must respect the laws of the constitutional liberal democracies in which
they live [which includes refraining from harassing Ms. Epstein], the rabbinate can still profess

134
As mentioned supra, note 103 and accompanying text, it is reported that – quite miraculously – the wife in the
Get of Cleves ultimately agreed to return to her husband, thus obviating the need for the lenient majority on that
controversy to apply its verdict in practice.
[in a non-harassing manner toward Ms. Epstein] what the Jewish faith articulates.135 To that
effect, this student will not presently enter a verdict on whether the Jewish faith allows Ms.
Epstein to return to shelom bayit with her first husband [which may hypothetically be the case, as
explained above in Section J], since this essay has already accomplished a significant feat by
reaching the practical conclusion that the first husband is [at least as a matter of doubt] her real
husband according to Torah law. After Ms. Epstein separates from her second husband, she can
ask the question of a qualified Beth Din to see whether [pursuant to Section J above] she can
return to shelom bayit with her first husband.

O. A FINAL COMMENT: ELEPHANT EARS AND THE

ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM

The proverbial elephant in the room, of course, is that now that we have demonstrated
that Ms. Epstein is still married to her first husband [at least as a matter of doubt] according to
the Jewish faith, then what solution does she have to escape her agunah predicament. The
response is not emotionally easy to digest, but rather involves the realization that the word
“agunah,” as it is commonly employed [including by the present essay], is a colloquial
expression analogous to the “elephant ears,” “chocolate butterflies” and “hot dogs” sold at the
local glatt kosher bakery where this student resides in Montreal. To be sure, Leviticus ch. 11
proscribes consumption of proboscidean, papilionoidean or canine flesh. Yet the aforementioned
foodstuffs are available with a reputable Montreal hashgachah because it is self-understood that
the advertised titles are not meant literally. The same holds true with a lady who proclaims
herself to be an agunah because she seeks a get from her recalcitrant husband. Invocation of the
term agunah does not necessarily mean that we can pressure the husband to divorce his wife, and
in fact we are forbidden by Exodus 20:14 from arbitrarily doing so outside the Beth Din process.
Indeed, the Beth Din itself can only take action to [sometimes] order a get or [at other times]
coerce a get if it is situation where the husband has abused his wife in one of the ways described
by Shulchan Arukh Even ha-Ezer nos. 77 and 154.136 Truly then, as R. Bleich writes, rescuing
agunot is like practicing oncology; there are some cases we cannot help.137

135
Noteworthy in this regard is the episode related by Hindy Krohn, The Way It Was: Touching vignettes about
growing up Jewish in the Philadelphia of long ago (Mesorah Publications, 1989), pp. 195-198, regarding Mrs.
Mindele Reiser, who lost her first two boys, and being a neighbour of R. Moshe Lipshitz [the Chassidic mentor of
Philadelphia in the early twentieth century] asked R. Lipshitz what she could do to merit viable offspring. R.
Lipshitz advised her that her brother-in-law’s widow [still residing in Europe] required a chalitzah from her
[Mindele’s] husband, and so her husband should travel back to Europe to orchestrate the requisite chalitzah. Despite
the massive expense such a voyage entailed, Mindele obligingly saved up every penny she could so that her husband
was indeed able to ultimately traverse the ocean and perform the chalitzah. Soon after, Mindele and her husband
were blessed with a viable child, Max Reiser. Concludes Mrs. Krohn: “Today Max Reiser is retired. He and his
good wife spend their time doing charitable works. He embodies the grace of Old Philadelphia with the honor and
honesty of the truly frum Jew.” This story can serve as an inspiration to Ms. Epstein to spare no expense in fulfilling
her mitzvah of immediately moving to a new home. After all, it was Ms. Epstein herself who recently hosted a
Philadelphia lecture entitled “What Does Being “Frum” Really Mean?” (as cited supra, note 110)
136
See supra, note 91.
137
See supra, text accompanying footnote 41. At the same time, a bride and groom can prophylactically avoid future
agunah problems by [prior to the act of kiddushin] employing the prenup this student has already published (cited
supra, note 6) – the only prenup currently recognized by the consensus of poskim as being potentially effective to
rescue a Jewish wife from becoming an agunah.
 These directives apply uniquely to Jews. Noahides, by contradistinction, are governed by
a different halakhic standard, where every wife can terminate her marriage at will by leaving her
husband’s home with no need for a get altogether, as per Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 9:8, “And
you shall be holy unto Me, for Holy is I, Ha-Shem, and I have separated you from amongst the
nations to be Mine” (Leviticus 20:26). As Jews, we must maintain our holiness by respecting the
fact that Ms. Epstein is still married [at least as a matter of doubt] to Mr. Friedman, and –
moreover – by respecting the fact that we are forbidden to arbitrarily pressure [outside of the
Beth Din process] Mr. Friedman to write a get to Ms. Epstein.
Thus, it is heartening to watch the recorded lecture of R. Shalom Kamenetzky at the
recent Agudath Israel of America daf yomi siyum on Tractate Shabbat celebrated on Aug. 11,
2020, who after stumbling several times while attempting to quote Proverbs 31:29 [which
describes how a husband lauds his wife], finally apologizes with the words: “excuse me.”138 That
is precisely what is warranted and therapeutic in the context of Epstein vs. Friedman. Namely, R.
Shalom Kamenetzky seems to have now indicated that Mr. Friedman deserves an apology,
precisely as the Baltimore Beth Din has encouraged.139 May that apology inspire Ms. Epstein to
immediately separate from her second husband as required by Torah law, and may all the
protagonists in Epstein vs. Friedman merit to be written in the book of Tzaddikim Gemurim on
the coming Rosh ha-Shanah.

138
<https://agudah.org/siyum-that-celebrates-months-of-sacrifice/>, at 20:44 into the recording.
139
Kovetz Ginat Veradim Vol. 29 (Nissan 5776), pp. 47-49.