People vs.

Social Security Commission

Facts

Tolentino is an employee of the Social Security System with a position of Technical Assistant. He was
subsequently found to be guilty of dishonesty, as charged, and imposing upon him the penalty of
dismissal. The Administrator of the SSS filed charges against Tolentino for dishonesty and electioneering
and was later dismissed from office through Resolution No. 1003 (from the SSS).

Tolentino challenged Resolution No. 1003 for the reason that respondent Commission and the decision
of respondent Administrator which it affirmed, is null and void and of no effect whatever, for lack of
jurisdiction because the power, nay, jurisdiction to decide administrative cases against civil service
employees like petitioner is vested by the Civil Service Act of 1959 and the Civil Service Rules exclusively
in the Civil Service Commissioner.

Issue

Whether or not the Social Security Commission has jurisdiction over administrative actions filed before it
against its own erring employees

Ruling

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is vested by law. It is not acquired by the consent or acquiescence of
the parties, nor the unilateral assumption thereof by any tribunal. The settled rule is that jurisdiction of a
court or tribunal is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
And once acquired, jurisdiction continues, regardless of "subsequent happenings", until the case is
finally terminated

It is clear that under section 33 of the Civil Service Act (Republic Act 2260) heretofore quoted, before the
amendments introduced therein by Republic Act No. 6040, the sole power to impose disciplinary
sanctions on civil service employees was vested exclusively in the Commissioner of Civil Service. 

Clearly at the time the questioned Resolution No. 1003 was promulgated and implemented dismissing
petitioner- appellant Amado Tolentino, the respondents-appellees Social Security Commission, Gilberto
Teodoro and Angel Penano did not have the power to hear and decide administrative and disciplinary
charges filed against erring employees of the Commission.
Montilla vs. Hilario

Facts:

The provincial fiscal and the private counsel for the complainants seek to have set aside an order of
Judge Zoilo Hilario of that court overruling their objection to Congressman Floro Crisologo's intervention
as defense counsel in Criminal Case No. 129 "for murder with (and) frustrated murder" against the
municipal mayor and three members of the police force of Santa Catalina, Ilocos Sur.

The information charges that the defendants, "taking advantage of their respective public positions,
conspiring together . . . did then and there . . . assault, attack and shoot with their firearms" several
persons "with the intent to kill" and did kill one Claudio Ragasa and inflict physical injuries on three
others.

Issue:

W/N Congressman Floro Crisologo may appear as defense counsel in a criminal case against the
munincipal mayor and three members of the police force

Ruling:

Yes, he may appear as defense counsel. From the allegations of the information it does not appear that
the official positions of the accused were connected with the offenses charged. In fact, the attorneys for
the prosecution of stated that the motives for the crimes were "personal with political character." It
does not even appear, nor is there assertion, that the crimes were committed by the defendants in line
of duty or in the performance of their official functions.

Judged by the context of section 17 of Article VI, supra, and the proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention, the relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in our
opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the Constitution, the relation has to be such
that, in the legal sense, the offense can not exist without the office. In other words, the office must be a
constituent element of the crime as defined in the statue, such as, for instance, the crimes defined and
punished in Chapter Two to Six, title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code.

Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either murder or homicide
whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same except when the
perpetrator, being a public functionary, took advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in which
event the penalty is increased.

But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an aggravating
circumstance, its materiality arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the
criminals are public officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime.
Estudillo v. Baloma

Facts:

Jovelyn Estudillo (Jovelyn) assisted by her mother, Visitacion L. Estodillo, charges Judge Teofilo D.
Baluma with Gross and Inexcusable Ignorance of the Law. Complainant alleges that her administrative
complaint arose from the dismissal of Criminal Case for Other Acts of Child Abuse entitled People of the
Philippines, Plaintiff vs. Fredie Cirilo Nocos y Urot by respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Bohol, Branch 1, a Family Court.

The criminal case was originally filed for preliminary investigation with the 2 nd Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Bohol. After the requisite preliminary investigation, Judge James Stewart E.
Himalaloan found that there was sufficient ground to hold the herein accused for trial for the offense of
Other Acts of Child Abuse defined in Sec. 10 (1), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610. The record of the
case was transmitted to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor where, after a review by Third Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor, Macario I. Delusa, he filed an Information dated October 28, 2002. Petitioner
claims there was gross ignorance of law for failure of the prosecutor to subscribed and sworn the
information. The prosecution through Prosecutor Delusa filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
Revival on December 12, 2002 alleging that there was no necessity for the Information to be under oath
since he merely concurred with the resolution of the investigating judge and that he has properly
subscribed and signed the Information with the approval of the Provincial Prosecutor.

Issue:

W/N there is a requirement that the Information be sworn by the Prosecutor

Ruling:

No, there is not. It is clear that respondent erred in dismissing the information filed by Prosecutor Eric
M. Ucat on the ground that it was not sworn to. The Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly defines an
information as "an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor
and filed with the court" (Section 4, Rule 110). The Rules do not require that it be under oath for
otherwise, it would have provided so. On the other hand, a complaint is defined as "a sworn statement
charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public
officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated" (Section 5, Rule 110).

Evidently, respondent was of the belief, albeit erroneous, that both a complaint and an information
need to be under oath. But the oath is not required when it is a public prosecutor who files the
information because he does so under the oath he took when he qualified for his position. The position
of the public prosecutor was that the preliminary investigation had been conducted by the municipal
circuit trial judge of Tubigon-Clarin and the latter's resolution was concurred in by the prosecutors.

It appears from the record that the respondent corrected himself by issuing his Order of 27 February
2003 where he found that "the complaint, the affidavit of Alberto V. Estudillo, father of the victim, the
affidavit of Jovelyn L. Estudillo, the victim executed with the assistance of Visitacion Estudillo, her
mother, the medico-legal certificate issued by Isidro Fermites, Jr., on Jovelyn Estudillo, the certification
of the facts of birth of Jovelyn L. Estudillo, the records of the proceedings during the preliminary
examination at the First Level Court, its Order dated September 6, 2002 and the Resolution dated
September 19, 2002, this court finds probable cause to warrant that the accused be placed in the
custody of the law to stand trial."

The error of the respondent is not a serious one. He, however, must be reminded that as judge he must
be conversant with the rules and laws that it is his office of apply. He deserves a reprimand for his failure
to understand an elementary rule of law.
Espino vs. People

Espino was a senior sales executive in charge of liaising with import coordinators of the company
Kuehne and Nagel, Inc. (KN Inc.). His duties included the delivery of its commissions to the import
coordinators. He was charged by the Fiscal’s Office in Paranque with six (6) counts of estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) for allegedly rediscounting checks that were meant to be paid to the
company’s import coordinators.

The RTC later convicted Espino of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a)

Espino claims that he was denied due process when he was convicted of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) despite being charged with estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b). He argues that the elements constituting both modes of estafa are different, and that
this difference should be reflected in the Information. According to him, a charge under paragraph 1(b)
would not merit a conviction under paragraph 2(a). Thus, he emphasizes the alleged failure to inform
him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Issue

Whether a conviction for estafa under a different paragraph from the one charged is legally permissible

Ruling

Yes.

Article 3, Section 14, paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, requires the accused to be “informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him” in order to adequately and responsively prepare his
defense. The prosecutor is not required, however, to be absolutely accurate in designating the offense
by its formal name in the law. As explained by the Court in People v. Manalili:

It is hornbook doctrine, however, that “what determines the real nature and cause of the accusation
against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the
caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged
to have been violated, they being conclusions of law.” x x x.

The Court further explained in another case that the designation of the offense, by making reference to
the section or subsection of the statute punishing, it [sic] is not controlling; what actually determines
the nature and character of the crime charged are the facts alleged in the information.

Clearly, the fiscal’s statement in the Informations specifying the charges as estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, did not bind the trial court insofar as the characterization of the nature of the
accusation was concerned. The statement never limited the RTC’s discretion to read the Information in
the context of the facts alleged.
Treñas vs People

Facts:

Elizabeth Luciaja gave P150,000.00 to Atty. Hector Treñas to assist in the titling of a house and lot
located in Iloilo City. Treñas prepared and issued a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. He also
gave Elizabeth three Revenue Official Receipts amounting to P120,000. However, when Elizabeth
consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake. When confronted, Hector
admitted to her that the receipts were fake and that he used the money for his other transactions.
Elizabeth demanded the return of the money. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against Hector.

An Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the RTC Makati City which rendered
a Decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa. Petitioner appealed with the CA which also
rendered a Decision affirming that of the RTC.

Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that ₱
150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati City. Also, the evidence shows that the
Receipt issued by petitioner was without any indication of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile,
the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo
City. Petitioner claims that the only logical conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to him in
Iloilo City, especially since his residence and office were situated there as well. Absent any direct proof
as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the disputable presumption that things happened according
to the ordinary course of nature.

Issue:

Whether RTC Makati has jurisdiction over the controversy

Ruling:

No, it does not have jurisdiction. The place where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. For jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in
criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should
have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is
the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly
committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.

Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa was
committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City. Also, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by
Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to where the offense was committed.

Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by the prosecution
to prove that the offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati City. There is nothing in the
documentary evidence offered by the prosecution that points to where the offense, or any of its
elements, was committed.

There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, The RTC of that city has no
jurisdiction over the case.
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs People

Facts:

On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and convicted of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to
property . The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be
liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. 

The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising
from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the
employer’s subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes
conclusive and enforceable. The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute
independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the accused-employee would be to
amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already
been dismissed by the CA, then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final
and executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused was the employer’s subsidiary liability.

Issue:

W/N independent civil action must be reserve or else it will be deemed instituted with the criminal case.

Held:

No, there is no need. The 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed
instituted in a criminal prosecution—it is only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime
charged that is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action.

The 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to
proceed separately from criminal actions—what is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is
the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities
arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. Even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex
delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may—subject to the
control of the prosecutor—still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil
interest therein.
Beltran vs People

FACTS

Petitioner was married to Charmaine Felix on June 16, 1973. After 24 years of marriage and having four
children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on ground of psychological incapacity.
Charmaine on the other hand filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against petitioner and his
paramour. To forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the criminal complaint, petitioner filed
for the suspension of the criminal case on concubinage arguing that the civil case for the nullification of
their marriage is a prejudicial question.

ISSUE

Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage under psychological incapacity is a prejudicial
question to the criminal case of concubinage.

RULING

No, it is not a prejudicial question to a concubinage case. The rationale on the existence of prejudicial
questions is to avoid two conflicting issues. Its requisites are 1) that a civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue in the criminal action and 2) the resolution of the issue determines
whether or not the criminal action will proceed. In the present case, the accused need not present a
final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity
of his marriage other than the proof of a final judgment. More importantly, parties to a marriage should
not be allowed to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the competent
courts. So long as there is no such final judgment the presumption is that the marriage exists for all
intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife risks being prosecuted for
concubinage.

An action for a declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question to a concubinage case.

The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial
question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to
cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not
only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt
or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.