Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I declare under penalty of perjury that I filed this motion with the Court via ECF
and email and emailed a true and correct copy to the following:
Counsel for Mazars USA LLP Counsel for Cyrus R. Vance, Jr.
20-2766-cv
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
DONALD J. TRUMP,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CYRUS R. VANCE, JR., in his official capacity as District Attorney of the County of
New York; MAZARS USA, LLP,
Defendants-Appellees.
an emergency basis, a stay pending appeal and an administrative stay of the district
court’s dismissal of his challenge to the Mazars subpoena. See Doc. 71, Trump v. Vance,
No. 1:19-cv-08694-VM (S.D.N.Y. August 20, 2020) (Exhibit A). Because the District
Attorney has agreed to stay enforcement only for “seven calendar days after the date of
a decision” by the district court, Doc. 52, the President needs relief before August 28,
2020 in order to preserve his opportunity for appellate review. The President thus
respectfully requests that the Court issue a stay pending appeal and that the stay remain
in effect until the President’s appeal is resolved and for one week afterward. The
President also asks the Court to issue, as it did the last time this case was on appeal, an
immediate administrative stay to preserve its ability to decide the motion for a stay
pending appeal.
INTRODUCTION
The Court should grant the President a stay pending appeal and, as needed, an
administrative stay. Absent a stay, the subpoena will be enforced and this appeal will be
mooted. That is quintessential irreparable harm. It should thus be unsurprising that this
Court issued a lengthy administrative stay in the prior appeal, the Supreme Court stayed
the mandate pending certiorari in the congressional subpoena cases, and the District
Attorney relented and voluntarily stayed enforcement of the subpoena on the eve of
argument before this Court and throughout the proceedings before the Supreme Court.
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In short, the President should be afforded appellate review of the district court’s 103-
The President also is likely to prevail on the merits. The only issue at this stage
is whether the Second Amended Complaint plausibly alleges that the Mazars subpoena is
payments made by Michael Cohen in 2016 plainly states a claim for overbreadth and
bad faith. Instead of accepting those plausible allegations as true, the district court
credited alternative explanations that it deemed more likely. That is a violation of settled
Second Circuit law. The district court’s characterization of these claims, which the
Supreme Court held that the President could press on remand, as nothing more than a
backdoor attempt to secure immunity is unfair. The district court may disagree with the
Supreme Court’s decision to remand this case for further proceedings. But that
Alternatively, the Court should grant a stay because the President raises serious
arguments and the balance of harms tips heavily in his favor. The idea that the District
Attorney needs these records so badly that there’s no time for appellate review—after
harm he might suffer pales in comparison to the case-mooting harm the President will
suffer.
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BACKGROUND
On September 19, 2019, the President filed suit challenging the subpoena that
the District Attorney issued to Mazars. The President also sought a preliminary
grounds and opposed the preliminary-injunction motion. The district court granted
dismissal under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and, in the alternative, denied the
Younger abstention, but agreed that the President wasn’t entitled to a preliminary
injunction. As a consequence, this Court vacated the judgment dismissing the lawsuit,
affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction, and remanded the case for further
proceedings. Trump v. Vance, 941 F.3d 631 (2d Cir. 2019). The President filed a petition
for writ of certiorari, and the District Attorney agreed to stay the subpoena’s
The Supreme Court granted review and, on July 9, 2020, affirmed this Court’s
judgment. Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020). The Supreme Court’s decision was
“limited to absolute immunity and heightened need.” Id. at 2431. Therefore, the Court
“directed that the case be returned to the District Court, where the President may raise
further arguments as appropriate.” Id.; see id. n.6. The Court was “unanimous[]” in
reaching this result. Id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment). The arguments
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for remand included, among others, “bad faith and … breadth.” Id. at 2430 (majority
op.).
he argued that the subpoena is invalid for at least two reasons. Doc. 57. First, it is
expedition.” SAC ¶56. Second, it “was issued in bad faith.” SAC ¶62. A week later, the
District Attorney moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Doc. 63.
Just yesterday, on August 20, 2020, the district court issued a 103-page decision
granting the District Attorney’s motion to dismiss. See Ex. A. In the district court’s
view, the SAC failed to plausibly allege that the Mazars subpoena either is overbroad
or was issued in bad faith and thus failed to state a claim. Id. at 47-102. That same day,
the President filed an emergency notice of appeal, Doc. 73, and sought a stay pending
appeal from the district court, Doc. 74. One hour ago, the district court denied a stay.
Doc. 75.
ARGUMENT
This Court has the power to issue stays and injunctions pending appeal. Fed. R.
App. P. 8. Interim relief is warranted if there is “‘(a) irreparable harm and (b) either
(1) likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the
merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping
decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief.’” Citigroup Glob. Markets,
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Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010). The
arguments challenging the subpoena as overbroad and issued in bad faith. In so doing,
the Court also contemplated “appellate review” and reiterated that it “should be
particularly meticulous.” Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2430. Absent a stay pending appeal,
however, the President will be deprived of any appellate review of his claims. “Courts
routinely issue injunctions to stay the status quo when” events might “moot the losing
party’s right to appeal.” John Doe Co. v. CFPB, 235 F. Supp. 3d 194, 206 (D.D.C. 2017);
Ctr. For Int’l Envtl. Law v. Office of U.S. Trade Rep., 240 F. Supp. 2d 21, 22-23 (D.D.C.
2003) (explaining that the movant makes “a strong showing of irreparable harm” where
disclosure would moot any appeal); John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 488 U.S. 1306,
1309, (1989) (Marshall, J., in chambers) (“The fact that disclosure would moot that part
injury.”).
party. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund v. Eastland, 488 F.2d 1252, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1973), aff’d in
relevant part, 421 U.S. 491, 501 n.14 (1975). As the Supreme Court put it, “compliance
by the third person could frustrate any judicial inquiry” into the subpoena’s legality.
Eastland, 421 U.S. at 501 n.14; Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2035 (2020). Allowing
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this to happen would wrongly deny the plaintiff’s rights and “immunize [the] subpoena
from challenge” based on “the fortuity that documents sought by [the] subpoena are
not in the hands of a party claiming injury.” United States v. AT&T Co., 567 F.2d 121,
129 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In short, denying interim relief could “entirely destroy [plaintiffs’]
rights to secure meaningful review.” Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 595 F.2d 889, 890 (1st
round—which remained in place until the eve of argument when the parties reached an
mooting harm. That stay, in turn, was validated when the Supreme Court granted the
President a stay of the mandate pending certiorari in the congressional subpoena cases,
which involve the very same threat of irreparable harm. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP,
140 S. Ct. 581 (2019); Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, 140 S. Ct. 660 (2019). The President’s
harm from having appellate review denied is no less irreparable now than it was then.
“[c]learly … irreparable in nature.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bishop, 839
F. Supp. 68, 72 (D. Me. 1993). “Once the documents are surrendered,” in other words,
“confidentiality will be lost for all time. The status quo could never be restored.”
Providence Journal, 595 F.2d at 890. That is why the “disclosure of private, confidential
information,” even to the government, “‘is the quintessential type of irreparable harm
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that cannot be compensated or undone by money damages.’” Airbnb, Inc. v. N.Y.C., 373
In short, the question at this stage is straightforward: whether the President will
be allowed any appeal of his claims, or whether he’ll be deprived of that chance because
the District Attorney issued the subpoena to a third-party custodian with no incentive
to test its validity. The choice should be easy. Courts do not “proceed against a
President as [they] would against an ordinary litigant.” Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2432
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C.,
542 U.S. 367, 381-82 (2004)). Rather, “protections” against abusive process “‘apply with
special force to a President, in light of the office’s unique position as the head of the
Executive Branch.’” Id. at 2428 (majority op.) (quoting Brief for Respondent Vance 43).
That understanding “should inform the conduct of the entire proceeding, including the
timing and scope of discovery.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 707 (1997). Whatever else
this special solicitude provides, it at least affords the President the opportunity to
appeal. Concern for “the Presidency itself” should require that much. Trump v. Hawaii,
accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir.
2009). “Factual allegations” thus need only “be enough to raise a right to relief above
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the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The SAC
shouldn’t have been dismissed under this standard. The President plausibly alleged that
As the Supreme Court has explained, “grand juries are prohibited from engaging in
‘arbitrary fishing expeditions.’” Id. at 2428; id. at 2430 (explaining that the subpoena’s
“breadth” can be challenged). While the grand jury’s subpoena power is broad, it is “not
unlimited.” United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299 (1991); In re Eight Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 701 F. Supp. 53, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The subpoena cannot
be “out of proportion to the end sought.” See McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir.
the grand jury’s investigation.” R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. at 301; Virag v. Hynes, 54
N.Y.2d 437, 444 (1981) (grand jury subpoena must be assessed in “relation to the matter
under investigation”); In re Certain Chinese Family Benevolent & Dist. Ass’ns, 19 F.D.R. 97,
99 (N.D. Cal. 1956) (“The real question here is not the power of the Grand Jury to
investigate, but rather the alleged excessive use of that power in this case.”). Put simply,
materials” requested will yield “information relevant to the general subject of the grand
8
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The President plausibly alleged that the subpoena is not properly tailored to “the
certain individuals.” SAC ¶12. It asks for every document and communication related
to the President and his businesses, from any part of the world, over roughly the last
decade. SAC ¶18, 31-35. This is precisely the type of “en masse” demand of “such a
“fishing expedition.” Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 861-62 (8th Cir. 1956); In
re Grand Jury Investigation, 174 F. Supp. 393, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Indeed, the subpoena
is designed to include everything “in the imaginative concept of every shred of paper”
in Mazars’ possession related to the President and the Trump Organization. In re Harry
Alexander, Inc., 8 F.R.D. 559, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). On its face, then, the subpoena’s
unlimited breadth means that it cannot possibly be reasonably tailored to any particular
investigation.
It is certainly not tailored to this particular grand jury investigation into business
records and bookkeeping related to 2016 payments by Michael Cohen. The subpoena
demands all financial records, documents, and communications (not just those related
to business transactions or New York reporting) from all entities associated with the
Trump Organization across the nation and world (not just those with a connection to
Michael Cohen or influence over New York reporting), over nearly a decade (including
five years before the conduct forming the basis for the investigation). SAC ¶¶18, 31-35.
By its terms, the subpoena reaches entire categories of documents that have nothing to
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do with the payments under investigation. For example, an accounting of the assets
York. SAC ¶¶22-45. Likewise, investigations into a contractual relationship between the
federal government and a Trump entity in Washington D.C has absolutely nothing to
do with these allegations. SAC ¶43. In short, the Mazars subpoena has all the hallmarks
of an overbroad demand. E.g. In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1973); Manning
That the subpoena reaches far beyond the subject of the investigation is not a
national and international issues. SAC ¶¶20, 22-27, 36-45. The Committee claims to be
Branch, reforms to federal laws involving the President, the proper authority given to
the Office of Government Ethics, and federal-lease management, among other things.
SAC ¶¶37-43. And the Committee tied the time period (dating back to 2011) to the
entity in Washington D.C. SAC ¶43. These purposes are issues “of national
importance” and claim to be grounded in constitutional and federal law. SAC ¶¶ 36-45.
None involve state criminal law, and none fall within the jurisdiction of the County of
New York, making it plausible—to say the least—that much of the information the
subpoena requests does not relate to the grand jury’s investigation. Vance, 140 S. Ct. at
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2449 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[I]t would be quite a coincidence if the records relevant to
The district court’s reasons for concluding otherwise are misplaced. Importantly,
it did not hold that the subpoena is properly tailored accepting the President’s allegation
that the investigation is about the 2016 payments made by Michael Cohen. As evidenced
by the District Attorney’s failure to offer any defense of the subpoena on these terms,
that conclusion would be untenable. The district court, moreover, accepted “that the
grand jury is investigating the 2016 Michael Cohen Payments.” Ex. A. at 66. It held,
however, that “the SAC does not support a reasonable inference that the grand jury’s
investigation is limited to those payments.” Id. In its view, the inference “is speculative
in light of the obvious alternative explanation that the grand jury’s broader requests
The court misunderstood its limited role at the pleadings stage. To be certain,
there can be “‘alternative explanations so obvious that they render plaintiff’s inferences
unreasonable.’” Id. at 27 (quoting L–7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 430
(2d Cir. 2011) (emphasis added)). But that doesn’t give a court license to disregard
factual allegations because it finds them less likely than alternative scenarios. “As Rule
8 implies, a claim should only be dismissed at the pleading stage where the allegations
are so general, and the alternative explanations so compelling, that the claim no longer
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appears plausible.” Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 617 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc). Thus,
“on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion it is not the province of the court to dismiss the complaint
on the basis of the court’s choice among plausible alternatives.” Anderson News, LLC v.
Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 190 (2d Cir. 2012).
“The question at the pleading stage,” in other words, “is not whether there is a
plausible alternative to the plaintiff’s theory; the question is whether there are sufficient
factual allegations to make the complaint’s claim plausible.” Id. at 189. After all, “there
may ... be more than one plausible interpretation of a defendant’s words, gestures, or
conduct may be plausible, that does not mean that the plaintiff’s allegation that that
conduct was culpable is not also plausible.” Id. at 189-90. “[T]he choice between or
among plausible interpretations of the evidence will be a task for the factfinder.” Id. at
190; Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011); Watson Carpet & Floor Covering,
Inc. v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 648 F.3d 452, 458 (6th Cir. 2011).
Yet the district court dismissed the overbreadth claim because it found the SAC’s
inference “consistent with” its alternative hypothesis. Ex. A. at 68. It found that the
SAC failed to plead that the investigation “could not include transactions and record
filings beyond those related to the 2016 Michael Cohen Payments.” Id. The grand-jury
investigation, in the district court’s view, “need not be so limited.” Id. And the court
speculated that “the scope of an investigation may broaden in short order.” Id. at 69.
Put simply, the President was faulted for failing to negate “the readily apparent possibility
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that this grand jury investigation could be as ranging and exploratory as the many grand
jury investigations that courts have approved in the past.” Id. at 70 (emphasis added).
This error alone makes dismissal of the overbreadth claim unsustainable. “When
a court confuses probability and plausibility, it inevitably begins weighing the competing
inferences that can be drawn from the complaint. But it is not [the court’s] task at the
appear[s] more likely’ from the facts of the complaint.” SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker
(U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 425 (4th Cir. 2015). That is what happened here. E.g., Wilson
v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 850 F.3d 368, 374 (8th Cir. 2017).
B. The President plausibly alleged the subpoena was issued in bad faith.
As this Court has explained, evidence of “improper purpose [can] overcome the
presumption of propriety of the grand jury subpoena.” In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 961
F.3d 138, 152 (2d Cir. 2020); Virag, 54 N.Y.2d at 442-43. Naturally, issuing a grand jury
purpose. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d 1060, 1063 (9th Cir. 1994). But a subpoena
also can be deemed “abusive” if it is limitless in scope. Burns v. Martuscello, 890 F.3d 77,
92 (2d Cir. 2018). No “law” permits the District Attorney to subject the President to
such “abuse.” Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2428; id. at 2433 & n.1 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in
the judgment).
Here, the District Attorney has admitted to copying the Mazars subpoena from
a subpoena drafted by the House Oversight Committee rather than drafting a subpoena
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tailored to his own investigation. SAC ¶22. This complete disregard for the tailoring
requirement alone states a claim of bad faith. Burns, 890 F.3d at 92. Worse, the District
Attorney issued the subpoena in response to—and in retaliation for—a dispute over
the scope of an earlier subpoena to the Trump Organization. SAC ¶16. When the
District Attorney realized he would not be getting the President’s tax returns via a
subpoena to the Trump Organization itself, he immediately sought them from Mazars
and then abusively copied an unrelated subpoena issued by the House Oversight
Committee. SAC ¶¶17-20. Retaliation is an improper and harassing purpose, and the
subpoena can’t be enforced for this reason. In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 961 F.3d at 152;
In any event, the District Attorney’s shifting defenses for the copycat subpoena
only serves to confirm the absence of a legitimate basis. In the first round of litigation,
the District Attorney’s story was that “the decision to mirror the earlier subpoena was
about efficiency, meaning it was intended to facilitate the easy production by Mazars of
a set of documents already collected, and to minimize any claim that the Office’s request
imposed new and different burdens”—that is, he was trying to facilitate “expeditious
production of responsive documents.” SAC ¶22. But the ban on abusive subpoenas
cannot be overcome based on what is easiest for the custodian or most convenient for
the prosecutors.
Thus, upon reflection (inspired by the need to coherently defend his choice on
remand), the District Attorney decided to abandon rather than defend his efficiency
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rationale. In his most recent briefing to the district court, the District Attorney argued
that “it makes perfect sense that the subpoenas seek the same information [as the
congressional subpoena], as they both relate to public reports about the same potentially
improper conduct.” Doc. 63 at 3. His shifting justification is, alone, troubling and
evidence of pretext. Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 137 (2d Cir. 2000);
Weinstock v. Columbia University, 224 F.3d 33, 58 (2d Cir. 2000). Even worse for the
District Attorney, however, his newly minted justification is utterly implausible. In fact,
he previously (and wisely) acknowledged that the grand jury’s criminal investigation is
not ‘coextensive with the investigation of the House Committee’ and that ‘the Mazars
Subpoena does not define the scope of the grand jury investigation.’” SAC ¶26. There
is no good faith basis for suggesting at the eleventh hour that the information covered
Here, too, the district court credited alternative explanations over the President’s
plausible allegations of bad faith. The timing of the subpoena didn’t create an inference
of bad faith, according to the district court, because “this sequence of events could
obviously be explained in ways that do not impugn the presumptive validity of the
Mazars Subpoena.” Ex. A. at 50. The decision to seek the tax returns from Mazars
instead of from the Trump Organization “need not reflect bad faith” either, the district
court reasoned. Id. at 50-51. In all, the district court admitted that its preferred
explanations “might not in fact be the case,” but it dismissed the President’s complaint
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because they might well be. Id. at 51. This is a textbook case of a court overriding well-
pled allegations because it has decided that alternative explanations make more sense.
But the court’s ability “to conjure up some non-discriminatory motive to explain the
[the District Attorney’s] alleged conduct is not a valid basis for dismissal. It is only when
explanation implausible that a court may dismiss a complaint.” Hassan v. N.Y.C., 804
The court’s herculean effort to explain away the District Attorney’s decision to
copy a congressional subpoena proves the point. The court recognized that it was
copied for “efficiency,” Ex. A at 60, and the “specific legislative purposes” for which
that congressional subpoena was issued “are not within the jurisdiction of a New York
grand jury,” id. at 61. Even still, the court held that it wasn’t even plausibly in bad faith
because copying a subpoena isn’t per se illegal, id. at 58, the District Attorney might have
had an unknown basis for copying it, id. at 62, and it’s possible that the investigations
overlap since sometimes federal and state investigations overlap, id. at 62-63. This
attempt to “impose the sort of ‘probability requirement’ at the pleading stage which
Iqbal and Twombly explicitly reject” is likely to be reversed. Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
III. Alternatively, the President has raised serious questions and the balance
of hardships tips decidedly in his favor.
At the very least, the President’s claim raises “‘sufficiently serious questions going
to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation’” and the “balance of hardships
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tip[s] decidedly toward … preliminary relief.’” Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 35. Eastland is
1254. The plaintiff sued the bank and several congressional defendants for a declaration
that the subpoena was unenforceable and for an injunction prohibiting the defendants
from enforcing or complying with it. Id. at 1254-56. When the district court denied a
TRO, the D.C. Circuit reversed and stayed enforcement. Id. at 1256. The “decisive
element” favoring a stay, the D.C. Circuit explained, was that “unless a stay is granted
this case will be mooted, and there is likelihood, that irreparable harm will be suffered
The D.C. Circuit added that the stay was warranted because the dispute raised
“serious constitutional questions” that “require more time” and raised issues “of such
significance that they require” further “consideration and deliberation.” Id. When the
district court then denied a preliminary injunction on remand, the D.C. Circuit reversed
again and entered another stay to preserve the status quo. Id. at 1257. The D.C. Circuit
reiterated that plaintiff’s claims should be considered on final judgment to “ensure” that
the case “is determined with the best available perspective, both as to the underlying
evidence and the appraisal thereof by the District Judge.” Id. at 1257.
This Court should follow Eastland. Here, too, the President faces “irreparable
harm” if he does not receive interim relief. Id. at 1256. And here, too, the President
raises “serious constitutional questions” that should be resolved following full merits
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briefing, oral argument, and this Court’s “best available perspective” after thoughtful
“consideration and deliberation.” Id. at 1256-57. Hence, the fact that the President will
suffer irreparable harm if the subpoena is not stayed and Mazars reveals his information
Also like Eastland, the balance of harms in this case tips decidedly in favor of a
preliminary injunction. A stay will cause only negligible harm to the District Attorney.
A stay will not affect whether the grand jury gets the subpoenaed documents: If the
District Attorney wins this case, he will get the documents; and if he loses, he was never
entitled to the documents anyway. Accordingly, his only injury is the time delay between
receiving the documents now versus receiving the documents later—a non-irreparable
injury that is far outweighed by the harm that disclosure would cause the President.
Araneta v. United States, 478 U.S. 1301, 1304-05 (1986) (Burger, C.J., in chambers)
(granting a stay despite the public’s “strong interest in moving forward expeditiously
with a grand jury investigation” because “the risk of injury to the applicants could well
be irreparable and the injury to the Government will likely be no more than the
inconvenience of delay”).
“poses no threat of irreparable harm” to him. John Doe, 488 U.S. at 1309 (Marshall, J.,
constitute irreparable harm”); Providence Journal, 595 F.2d at 890; Judicial Watch, Inc. v.
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U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 514 F. Supp. 2d 7, 11 (D.D.C. 2007); Fund For Animals v.
Norton, 281 F. Supp. 2d 209, 222 (D.D.C. 2003); 22nd Avenue Station, Inc. v. City of
Minneapolis, 429 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1152 (D. Minn. 2006). Indeed, having voluntarily
delayed enforcement for nearly a year, the District Attorney cannot complain about any
Last, the public interest weighs strongly in favor of preserving the status quo.
The District Attorney simply “does not have an interest” in issuing an overbroad and
bad-faith subpoena to the President, Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196,
237 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), and allowing the District Attorney to evade appellate review is
not in the public interest. “Although … the public has an interest in ensuring that the
that there is an immediate public interest in enforcing … [now] rather than after a full
hearing.” Cigar Ass’n of Am. v. FDA, 317 F. Supp. 3d 555, 563 (D.D.C. 2018). In sum,
all of the factors governing a plaintiff’s entitlement to preliminary relief strongly favor
the President. The President made these same points to the Supreme Court in the
congressional subpoena cases, and the Supreme Court granted stays in both cases. See
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court should grant the motion for a stay pending appeal.
The President respectfully requests that the stay remain in effect until the President’s
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appeal is resolved, and for one week afterward. The Court should also grant an
s/ William S. Consovoy
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ATTACHMENTS
Exhibit Document D.Ct. Dkt.
A District Court Opinion 71
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Exhibit A
Case
Case 20-2766, Document
1:19-cv-08694-VM 16-3, 08/21/2020,
Document 71 Filed2913938,
08/20/20 Page2 ofof
Page 1 104
103
appeal, both the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit and the United States Supreme Court agreed that the
process. See Trump v. Vance, 941 F.3d 631 (2d Cir. 2019);
Complaint (“SAC”), Dkt. No. 57.) Now before the Court is the
reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Motion and
INTRODUCTION
2
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documents.
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TO BE SO BOLD
2 Oral Argument at 47:45, Trump v. Vance, 941 F.3d 631 (No. 19-3204),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?465172-1/circuit-hears-oral-argument-
president-trumps-tax-returns (Judge Chin: “I’m talking about while in
office. That’s the hypo. Nothing could be done? That is your position?”
Counsel: “That is correct.”).
4
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dimmed. In that event not only the President but also any
official exculpation.
above the law and beyond the reach of any judicial process in
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be irrelevant as well.
3 Trump v. Vance, 941 F.3d at 646; Trump v. Vance, 395 F. Supp. 3d at 301-
16.
4 Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2431.
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similar practices.9
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I. BACKGROUND
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND10
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Apart from the tax records, the Mazars Subpoena sought the
11 The New York Times, citing anonymous sources, has reported that the
District Attorney “is exploring whether the reimbursements violated any
New York state laws,” in particular “whether the company falsely accounted
for the reimbursements as a legal expense. In New York, filing a false
business record can be a crime.” (SAC ¶ 12; William K. Rashbaum & Ben
Protess, 8 Years of Trump Tax Returns Are Subpoenaed by Manhattan D.A.,
New York Times (Sept. 16, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/16/nyregion/trump-tax-returns-cy-
vance.html.)
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37-43.)
12The House Ways and Means Committee, however, requested the President’s
tax returns from the Treasury Department and the IRS, in May 2019. The
House Committee on Financial Services also issued subpoenas (covering
different time periods) to Deutsche Bank and Capital One for financial
information related to the President and affiliated entities in an
investigation into corruption, terrorism, and money laundering. The House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued an identical subpoena
to Deutsche Bank in its investigation into foreign efforts to undermine
the U.S. political process. See generally Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140
S. Ct. 2019, 2027 (2020).
16
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B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
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because the conflict between federal and state actors and the
18
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appropriate.
dated July 16, 2020.) The Court heard the parties’ preview of
Court, the President filed the SAC on July 27, 2020. (See
SAC.) The SAC alleges that because the Mazars Subpoena was
19
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13Though the President alleges that the overbreadth and bad faith of the
Mazars Subpoena violate his legal rights held under Article II, the Court
does not understand the SAC to allege separate and discrete constitutional
claims of the sort suggested by the Supreme Court. See Trump v. Vance,
140 S. Ct. at 2430–31. The SAC does not specify any presidential duties
or policies that the District Attorney allegedly sought to manipulate,
and it does not clearly allege that Mazars’ compliance with the subpoena
would impede any specific Article II duty.
20
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d).)
argues that the President did not allege any burden to (or
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at the pleading stage, the President need not make the strong
22
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id.)
August 14, 2020. (See “Reply,” Dkt. No. 68.) First, the
9.) The District Attorney requests that the Court dismiss the
24
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submits that the President may not circumvent the robust case
proceedings.
A. MOTIONS TO DISMISS
25
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Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This
also Lynch v. City of N.Y., 952 F.3d 67, 75–76 (2d Cir. 2020)
factual allegations”).
26
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Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 430 (2d Cir. 2011); see also
Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 321 (3d Cir. 2011)
Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 320 n.18 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[W]hat
See, e.g., Hadid v. City of N.Y., 730 F. App’x 68, 71-72 (2d
27
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App’x 894, 898-99 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating that plaintiff did
Fund v. Royal Bank of Scotland Grp., PLC, 709 F.3d 109, 121
28
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Inc., 712 F.3d 705, 719 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that courts
29
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Discount Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999)
Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 547 F.3d 406, 425 (2d Cir.
their truth. See id.; Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d
767, 773 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that court could permissibly
30
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the legal standards for overbreadth and bad faith are not
The District Attorney agrees. (See Memo at 11–12 & n.5; 18–
14 As noted above, the Court does not understand the SAC to allege any
other discrete constitutional claims. See supra Section I.B.3. Given the
paucity of allegations suggesting any claim other than those of bad faith
and overbreadth, the Court concludes that any such claim would not be
plausible. The Court does not disregard the President’s arguments that an
overbroad or bad faith subpoena would violate his Article II rights, and
considers those arguments further below.
31
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bad faith set forth below take note of both federal and state
factual considerations.
The District Attorney agrees that the Court can resolve this
purpose.
32
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States v. Reed, 756 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 2014); see also
34
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360, 363 (N.Y. 1939)). The grand jury can “hardly be expected
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956)). Indeed, the
is not fully carried out until every available clue has been
v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642–43 (1950)); see also
35
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jury may conduct.” Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282
(1973)).
36
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issued in bad faith must come forward with more than mere
1253.
2. Overbreadth
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Locals 17, 135, and 608, 528 N.E.2d 1195, 1201 (1988)). Put
38
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County Grand Jury Subpoena, 830 N.E.2d 1118, 1126 (N.Y. 2005).
3. Bad Faith
39
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Horowitz, 482 F.2d at 80; see also Grand Jury Subpoenas, 528
purpose does not allege the type of abuse that would overcome
(App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1982). As noted above, the Grand Jury
40
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City of N.Y., 472 N.Y.S.2d 967, 971 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1984);
(Simels), 767 F.2d 26, 29–30 (2d Cir. 1985). The grand jury’s
(N.Y. 1984).
41
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Attorney presses that the Court should not equate this high
42
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judgment))).
43
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omitted).
15In fact, categorically lessening the pleading standard for the President
in this context might have the additional impermissible consequence of
undermining the distinction between subpoenas issued by grand juries,
which are arms of the court, and non-judicial “office” subpoenas issued
by New York state agencies. Whereas grand jury subpoenas are presumptively
valid, state issuers of an office subpoena must affirmatively justify
their requests when challenged. See Virag, 430 N.E.2d at 1251; Sussman v.
N.Y.S. Organized Crime Task Force, 347 N.E.2d 638, 640–41 (N.Y. 1976)
(“Nor is this historical distinction between office and Grand Jury
investigations accidental.”). The Court declines to adopt a categorical
standard that risks blurring this important distinction.
45
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702. High respect for the President does not imply diminished
subpoenas.
III. DISCUSSION
46
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its issuance: (1) that it was issued at some point after the
18The Court notes that the Supreme Court and President cited Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) as relevant precedent for the bad faith
inquiry. See Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2428; SAC ¶ 51. The Court would
conclude that the President has failed to allege bad faith if Huffman,
the “civil counterpart” of Younger, controls the analysis. See Huffman,
420 U.S. at 611. Under this line of case law, “[a] state proceeding that
is legitimate in its purposes, but unconstitutional in its execution --
even when the violations of constitutional rights are egregious -- will
not warrant the application of the bad faith exception.” Diamond “D”
Constr. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2002). As explained
elsewhere in this Decision, the SAC’s allegations do not adequately
reflect that the grand jury investigation and Mazars Subpoena are
“anything other than a straightforward enforcement of the laws of New
York.” Schlagler v. Phillips, 166 F.3d 439, 443 (2d Cir. 1999).
48
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issued, a Grand Jury subpoena duces tecum may not be used for
plausible.
The SAC alleges that the District Attorney issued the Trump
19The Court notes that the SAC does not specify the date on which the
President objected to producing tax returns, and it will not rely on
extrinsic evidence such as the Shinerock Declaration to identify that
49
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Subpoena calls for tax returns obviously need not reflect bad
date. The Court will instead assume for the purposes of this Decision
that the President raised his specific objection regarding tax returns
before the District Attorney issued the Mazars Subpoena, because it would
not be reasonable to infer that the Mazars Subpoena was issued in
retaliation for objections that the President had not yet made. (See
Opposition at 6 (“Only after a disagreement arose over whether [the Trump
Organization Subpoena] required the production of tax returns was the
sweeping subpoena issued to Mazars.”).)
50
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that set forth the standards for motions under Rule 12(b)(6)
only natural anyway.” 550 U.S. at 554, 566. The Iqbal Court
51
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asks for tax returns and was issued approximately one month
N.Y.S.2d 367, 370 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1999). The simple fact
52
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that the Mazars Subpoena was issued shortly after the Trump
speculative.
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well have been issued for that particular purpose, the lack
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the legal standards set forth above in Section II. Though the
has not cited any authority for the proposition that a grand
law suggests that the mere copying of other sources does not
modify the subpoena, it noted that the simple fact that the
58
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Attorney did not issue the Mazars Subpoena in good faith based
imposed new and different burdens.” (SAC ¶ 22.) The SAC cites
59
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N.Y.S.2d at 370.
22The Court is also not persuaded by the President’s argument that the
District Attorney has given “inconsistent” or “shifting” justifications
for the Mazars Subpoena simply because the District Attorney claimed in
60
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issued for purposes that are not legitimately within the grand
his Memo that he and Congress are investigating the same “potentially
improper conduct,” rather than focusing on “efficiency” per se.
(Opposition at 23–24.) Whether or not the grand jury and Congress are
actually investigating similar conduct (and the Court need not and does
not decide that issue), it would obviously still be efficient for the
District Attorney to copy congressional subpoenas addressed to the same
records custodian. There is nothing inherently inconsistent about the two
explanations.
61
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subpoena (aside from the request for tax returns) -- the House
62
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inquiries.
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United States v. Davis, 906 F.2d 829, 832 (2d Cir. 1990)
(pertaining to suppression).24
64
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Nor does the SAC plausibly allege that the grand jury is
the President does not contest that “the true subject of the
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fundamentally flawed.
66
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the petitioner was served with one subpoena does not give it
already developed over the course of the prior year. (See SAC
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York Times for the proposition that “[i]n New York, filing a
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investigation . . .”).
69
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Cir. 2017) (noting that claims did not cross the line “from
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25The Court also rejects the President’s assertion that the presumption
of regularity is “weaker when employed against the President.” (Opposition
at 18.) As noted above in Section II.C., the Court does not interpret the
high respect due to the President to alter the substantive legal standards
that govern whether a grand jury has acted in bad faith or issued an
overbroad subpoena. The many considerations that counsel against lightly
attributing bad faith to the grand jury do not lose their force simply
because the President says so, and the presumption of regularity that
attaches to grand jury proceedings is not toothless at the pleading stage.
71
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U.S. at 282.
the President claims this Court must accept. On its own terms,
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26Because the Court need not consider the foregoing public matters for
their truth or convert the Motion into a motion for summary judgment, the
Court denies the President’s request for discovery in the Letter as moot.
See also infra Section III.C.1.
73
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requests.
(SAC ¶ 18.) The Court finds that the President has not
to a grand jury subpoena. The law requires only that the time
75
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committed.
States v. Doe, 457 F.2d 895, 901 (2d Cir. 1972) (“[T]he grand
76
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omitted)); United States v. Cohn, 452 F.2d 881, 883 (2d Cir.
York courts have held that a witness may not refuse to answer
77
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Provision Salesmen, the Court finds that the SAC does not
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Acquisition, Corp., the Trump Old Post Office LLC, the Trump
SAC ¶ 32.)
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(N.Y. 1992).
state law.27
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Dated June 26, 1986 (Kuriansky), 513 N.E.2d 239, 239 (N.Y.
Revocable Trust (‘the Trust’). The Trust is the sole ultimate owner of
The Trump Organization, Inc.; Trump Organization LLC; The Trump
Corporation; DJT Holdings LLC; DJT Holdings Managing Member LLC; Trump
Acquisition, LLC; and Trump Acquisition Corp. The Trust is [also] the
majority ultimate owner of the Trump Old Post Office LLC.” (SAC ¶ 6.)
“[T]he Trump Organization . . . is headquartered in New York.” (Opposition
at 19.)
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and each related entity from the inside out.” SAC ¶ 35. He
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communications.
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investigation”).
upon to prepare the returns and reports, the grand jury can
Berry, 521 F.2d 179, 182-83 & n.1 (10th Cir. 1975) (denying
Supp. 699, 701-03 & n.3 (D.N.J. 1995) (deeming IRS’s request
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703 & n.3 (deeming IRS’s request for “accounting work papers
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persons.
Nor does the SAC adequately allege that the request for
-- with the named Mazars partner. Cf. id. In this regard, the
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this matter.
Letter motion for discovery as moot given that the Court finds
30Of note, the SAC makes no attempt to quantify the volume of the requested
production. Based on the facts alleged in the SAC, this is not a case in
which the requests call for a production so voluminous as to be
potentially indicative of overbreadth. Cf. Application of Harry
Alexander, 8 F.R.D. 559, 560-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (deeming subpoena that
requested documents from 35 entities unreasonable where the records of a
single department within one of the 35 entities would fill fifteen four-
drawer cabinets).
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reasons stated above, the Court is not persuaded that the SAC
jury, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, and so finds that the SAC
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556 U.S. at 686; Biro v. Conde Nast, 807 F.3d 541, 545 (2d
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by the facts of this case. The Court denies the Letter motion
as moot.
2. Leave to Amend
dismiss the SAC with prejudice. The Court will grant this
request.
SAC. See Hu v. City of N.Y., 927 F.3d 81, 107 (2d Cir. 2019)
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v. Citigroup Inc., 659 F.3d 208, 212–13 (2d Cir. 2011) (“We
Campo v. Sears Holdings Corp., 371 F. App’x 212, 218 (2d Cir.
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4644799, at *12 (2d Cir. Aug. 12, 2020). Under Rule 15, “leave
329, 345 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
182 (1962)). The Supreme Court has detailed the factors that
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v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1086 (2d Cir. 1977) (whether to
Board v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 856 (2d Cir. 1981); see
321, 331 (1971); AEP Energy Servs. Gas Holding Co. v. Bank of
Am., N.A., 626 F.3d 699, 725 (2d Cir. 2010). “In gauging
the dispute.’” Ruotolo v. City of N.Y., 514 F.3d 184, 192 (2d
344, 350 (2d Cir. 1993)). Courts also consider the reasons
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[motion for leave to amend is] made.” AEP Energy, 626 F.3d at
Calmare Therapeutics Inc., 918 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 2019)
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can lead not only to the loss of evidence and the fading of
activity.” Virag, 430 N.E.2d 1252. And even though this case
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S. Ct. 2551, 2575 (2019) (noting that courts are “not required
The Court also need not ignore that the President has
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why they could not have been alleged in the SAC, particularly
v. Artuz, 271 F.3d 360, 363 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that
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phases of this case. While the Court need not find here that
highlighted above.
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IV. ORDER
of the County of New York, to dismiss (Dkt. No. 62) the Second
SO ORDERED.
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Victor
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