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Introduction
In the ten year period between 1988 and 1998 Pakistan saw itself governed by seven different political
administrations ending with a nonviolent coup in 1998. Coupled with long-standing social volatility, this
political instability encouraged the worsening of the nation‟s economic condition. Though Pakistan‟s
economy averted the financial crises that hit East Asian countries in 1998, it was one seemingly non-
economic event that triggered Pakistan‟s Debt Crisis of 1998. On May 28, 1998, Amidst a turbulent
domestic political environment and against the international community‟s advice, Pakistan responded to
five nuclear arm tests conducted by India with nuclear arms tests of its own – this exacerbated
Pakistan‟s already precarious situation and pushed it over the edge into crisis mode. As suggested in
the Middle East Economic Digest, “Pakistan has put national pride ahead of economic prudence by
testing its nuclear devices.”1
1
Counting the Nuclear Costs, Middle East Economic Digest, June 8 1998.
2
PAKISTAN: IMF Agreement, Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, November 26, 1998.
3
No Easy Fix, Business Asia, The Economist Intelligence Unit, January 10, 2000, p. 4.
Written by Lateef Mauricio / info@machetemag.com / Published on January 5, 2011 at Machete Mag: http://bit.ly/pakistandebtcrisis1998
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budget deficit was 5.4% of GDP – excessive public-sector borrowing to fund the deficit was one factor
that put upward pressure on consumer price inflation.
Political Instability
From 1988 to 1998, seven political administrations took control of Pakistan‟s government – each prime
minister with a different take on handling the nation‟s economic situation. The extreme nature of
political disputes, religious strife, and frequent violent skirmishes with arch-enemy and neighbor India,
made for risky environment for foreign investors and domestic movers of capital alike. Capital flight and
so-called „brain-drain‟ (the emigration of educated people) was on a consistent rise, and so was foreign
direct investment (FDI). Once a very decent $2bn in fiscal year 94/95, FDI dropped drastically to
$436m in 97/98 and continued to drop to $296m in 98/99.
4
PAKISTAN: East Asian Fallout, Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, December 2, 1997.
5
Country Report: Pakistan, Afghanistan, EIU Country Report, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1998, p. 11.
6
Haque, Mohammed Zahirul, Loan Default (non-payment of bank loans in Pakistan), Economic Review, September 1, 1996.
7
Rising to the Challenge in Asia: A Study of Financial Markets, Volume 9: Pakistan, Asian Development Bank, 1999, p. 38.
8
Bokhari, Farhan, General Appeal, The Banker, Financial Times Business Limited, December 1, 1999, p. 1.
Written by Lateef Mauricio / info@machetemag.com / Published on January 5, 2011 at Machete Mag: http://bit.ly/pakistandebtcrisis1998
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High-profile government disputes with Independent Power Producers (IPPs) further affected Pakistan‟s
image as a location for sound investment. The Nawaz Sharif administration that took over after the
Benazir Bhutto government (in power from 1994-1996) took exception to the exceeding debt Pakistan‟s
state-owned Water & Power Development Authority (WAPDA) owed to the IPPs. The Sharif
administration put a hold on many payments from WAPDA to IPPs and initiated high-profile public
hearings of involved parties, accusing the Bhutto administration of corrupt practices that allowed the
IPPs to charge the government unjustifiably high prices. WAPDA faced a $1.6bn bill from IPPs in 1998,
and at the time was projected to owe $3.4bn in 2001.9
Self-(In)correcting Reforms
In response to the incredibly low revenue base the government “increased taxation on a shrinking tax
base” that led to increased tax evasion and “the expansion of the underground economy, and resulted
in further tax hikes.”10 In January, 1998 the finance ministry announced the establishment of “a new tax
collecting entity called the Pakistan Revenue Service (PRS)” to replace the existing tax authority and
11
enhance tax collection. To alleviate private sector unemployment the government “partly
compensated by over-staffing in the public sector, which further reduced its efficiency. Double-digit
inflation created the need for nominal depreciation, which fed back into inflation.” 12 The Pakistani
government also helped to ensure disintermediation of domestic deposits in two ways, by imposing
high reserve requirements and increasing its direct borrowing to finance the fiscal deficit. This
contributed to lower returns on bank deposits, dropping saver confidence, which led to a continued
decline in bank profitability that already existed thanks to “increasing dollarization of the economy as
confidence in the rupee weaken[ed].”13
9
Pakistan Risks All in Clash with IPPs, Middle East Economic Digest, May 25, 1998.
10
Rising to the Challenge in Asia: A Study of Financial Markets, Volume 9: Pakistan, Asian Development Bank, 1999, p. 5.
11
PAKISTAN: IMF Agreement, Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, November 26, 1998.
12
Rising to the Challenge in Asia: A Study of Financial Markets, Volume 9: Pakistan, Asian Development Bank, 1999, p. 5.
13
Rising to the Challenge in Asia: A Study of Financial Markets, Volume 9: Pakistan, Asian Development Bank, 1999, p. 46.
Written by Lateef Mauricio / info@machetemag.com / Published on January 5, 2011 at Machete Mag: http://bit.ly/pakistandebtcrisis1998
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One outlier reform stands out as an effort that didn‟t backfire economically, though it was politically
detrimental to the Nawaz Sharif administration. The administration set a deadline of July 10, 1998 for
loan “defaulters to begin repaying loans.”14 Since the non-performing loans (NPLs) are largely held by
high-profile, influential businesspeople, previous administrations have been reluctant to take action that
would inevitably lead to political suicide – this tough action helped to motivate banks and increase
saver confidence in the Pakistani banking system.
14
Foreign Exchange Falls as Loan Defaulters Arrested, Middle East Economic Digest, August 3, 1998.
15
Pakistan, EIU Country Profile, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1998, p. 15.
16
Rising to the Challenge in Asia: A Study of Financial Markets, Volume 9: Pakistan, Asian Development Bank, 1999, p. 7.
Written by Lateef Mauricio / info@machetemag.com / Published on January 5, 2011 at Machete Mag: http://bit.ly/pakistandebtcrisis1998
Page 4 of 12
The Tipping Point (Crisis Begins)
On May 28, 1998 “Pakistan […] put national pride ahead of economic prudence by testing its nuclear
devices.” Responding to five nuclear tests conducted by neighbor, and long-time foe, India, the Nawaz
Sharif administration conducted its own nuclear tests, insisting that it has the right to develop its own
nuclear defense posture. The United States and Japan had warned Pakistan against the nuclear tests,
and threatened the nation with sanctions. Foreseeing international reprisal Nawaz Sharif established
the National Self-Reliance fund to receive donations from resident and non-resident Pakistanis,
emphasizing in a statement made on June 2, 1998 that it is time to “‟[…] live as a proud nation rather
than live in fear.”17
The international community condemned the nuclear tests and the “IMF, Asian Development Bank and
Export-Import Bank of Japan […] stopped all aid to Islamabad.”18 On June 11 Pakistan declared a
unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests hoping to get back in good graces – the sanctions and loss of
promised funding would be devastating to the already unstable nation.
17
Counting the Nuclear Costs, Middle East Economic Digest, June 8 1998.
18
Moratorium on Nuclear Tests, Middle East Economic Digest, June 22, 1998.
19
Counting the Nuclear Costs, Middle East Economic Digest, June 8 1998.
Written by Lateef Mauricio / info@machetemag.com / Published on January 5, 2011 at Machete Mag: http://bit.ly/pakistandebtcrisis1998
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“Foreign currency deposits had grown rapidly to $11 billion by July 1997” from $3bn in the early 1990s,
becoming an important pillar of Pakistan‟s economy that accounted “for half of bank deposits in
Pakistan.”20 The freeze served to discourage future capital inflows and encourage immediate capital
flight through parallel channels. This pushed people to non-official methods of currency exchange and
worsened the vulnerable external financing position.
Halted Credit/Funding
With official credit accounting for over “80% of Pakistan‟s $30,000m of medium and long-term external
debt finance,” the nation was placed in a dangerous financial situation.21 In fact, a general consensus
amongst international ratings agencies and analysts predicted that sovereign default was a possibility
within three months of July 1998.22 SBP reserves, though increased from the preceding year to $2bn,
only represented about 1/3rd of foreign capital requirements for 98/99, which stood around $5.8bn –
increasing the nation‟s external vulnerability, especially given that a larger amount in expected foreign
loans was immediately put at risk on May 28. Foreign loans and assistance were expected to provide
somewhere between $2.5-3bn in funding from 1998-1999, of which $1.5bn were blocked by sanctions.
In response to funding blocks, Pakistan‟s finance ministry publicly stated that it might be forced to
declare a moratorium on its foreign debt totaling over $30bn.
20
Rising to the Challenge in Asia: A Study of Financial Markets, Volume 9: Pakistan, Asian Development Bank, 1999, p. 46.
21
Counting the Nuclear Costs, Middle East Economic Digest, June 8 1998.
22
PAKISTAN – Debt Default Looms, Middle East Economic Digest, July 20, 1998.
Written by Lateef Mauricio / info@machetemag.com / Published on January 5, 2011 at Machete Mag: http://bit.ly/pakistandebtcrisis1998
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Support from Islamic Nations
Between July and August of 1998, Islamic nations pitched in to help Pakistan‟s financial situation. The
Islamic Development Bank provided $700m package to finance imports and encourage exports while
Kuwait provided a $250m loan.
Worsening Fundamentals
Exchange Rates
In the early 1990s Pakistan liberalized its foreign exchange system substantially – setting its exchange
rate as a managed float based on a trade-weight basket that was adjusted frequently to contain
inflationary pressures. Immediately after conducting the nuclear tests Pakistan put a total stop to all
foreign exchange withdrawals. As of June 30, 1998 the SBP attempted to defend its currency by
devaluing the Pakistani rupee by 4.4%, pushing it up from PKR 44/$1 to PKR 46/$1 – many analysts
viewed this devaluation as a last ditch measure to avoid a debt moratorium.23 The official exchange
rate was at PKR 46/$1 on May 28, 1998 and weakened more than 30% to PKR 60/$1 on the open
market in late-July, 1998.
23
Pakistan Devalues Currency by 4.4%, New York Times, June 30, 1998.
24
PAKISTAN – Debt Default Looms, Middle East Economic Digest, July 20, 1998.
Written by Lateef Mauricio / info@machetemag.com / Published on January 5, 2011 at Machete Mag: http://bit.ly/pakistandebtcrisis1998
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Figure 1 below shows a general worsening of major economic indicators, except for the inflation rate
which, as mentioned above in “Economic Indicators: Hardly Improving,” did not represent the real
inflation rate that has actually risen to double the inflation rate listed in Figure 1.
25
Mian, Yawar, Gulf States Primed to Give Financial Support, Middle East Economic Digest, June 15, 1998
Written by Lateef Mauricio / info@machetemag.com / Published on January 5, 2011 at Machete Mag: http://bit.ly/pakistandebtcrisis1998
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Still, these statements would not possibly hold true for fiscal year 98/99 given the near evaporation of
foreign exchange reserves, a staggering balance of payments gap (estimated over $4bn), de-liberalized
foreign exchange and currency system, and general decline in investor confidence. Certainly, a
general shrinking of the economy, would show us smaller amounts/figures but their percentages in
relation to GDP are what really matter. Figure 2 below shows a continued improvement from 1996
onwards in Pakistan‟s trade and current account deficits – but put into perspective, the would still be
bleak unless drastic reforms are implemented.
Exchange Rates
In June, 1998 attempting to defend its currency, and to increase foreign exchange reserves, Pakistan
allowed foreign currency holders to convert foreign deposits at the special rate of PKR 46/$1 as long as
they acted before September 1, 1998. In addition to providing the special exchange rate, converted
rupee deposits would benefit from full confidentiality and become exempt from wealth and income tax
for a defined period of time.
On July 22, 1998 Pakistan introduced a “two-tier exchange rate mechanism […] comprising the official
rate” of PKR 46/$1 “and the floating interbank rate” which was PKR 52/$1. At the same time Pakistan
Written by Lateef Mauricio / info@machetemag.com / Published on January 5, 2011 at Machete Mag: http://bit.ly/pakistandebtcrisis1998
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removed the SBP band that was previously fixed at PKR 46/$1 for spot buying and PKR 46/$1 for spot
selling.26
The debt rescheduling was critical, but one policy touch assured the aversion of sovereign default – the
forcible curtailment of imports. Concerted efforts by the finance ministry in early June, 1998 included
“plans to cut imports by $700m and increase exports by 15% to $1.3bn.”28
26
Rising to the Challenge in Asia: A Study of Financial Markets, Volume 9: Pakistan, Asian Development Bank, 1999, p. 25.
27
No Easy Fix, Business Asia, The Economist Intelligence Unit, January 10, 2000, p. 4.
28
Mian, Yawar, Gulf States Primed to Give Financial Support, Middle East Economic Digest, June 15, 1998
Written by Lateef Mauricio / info@machetemag.com / Published on January 5, 2011 at Machete Mag: http://bit.ly/pakistandebtcrisis1998
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indicators proved the nation‟s precarious position: GDP growth in 98/99 was 3.1% (6% was projected),
national savings rate fell to 12% (from 14% in 97/98), exports declined by 10% (projected to increase
by 15%), the national debt rose by 8% (amounting to 97% of GDP), and liquid foreign-exchange
reserves were stifled at $930m by the end of 97/98.29
The military ruler announced a package of reforms that were to begin being rolled out immediately.
The reforms were geared towards increasing the revenue base by simplifying the tax structure (greater
reliance on transparent self-assessment schemes); encourage exports by subsidizing the price of
wheat to PKR 300 per bag (up from PKR 280) and refraining from rising power and gas rates (inputs);
stopping the increasing dollarization of the economy by discontinuing foreign exchange bearer
certificates; development of low-income areas and populations in the form of a PKR 20bn fund; cutting
the fiscal deficit by reducing defense expenditures by PKR 7bn; encourage a higher national savings
rate and savers confidence by cutting interest rates by 2% on government bonds and saving schemes.
Another notable reform effort was based on the controversial topic regarding non-performing loans –
still weighing down the nation‟s economy at a total of $4.06bn in defaulted loans. On October 16, 1999
Musharraf gave the loan defaulters one month (until November 16, 1999) “to repay a portion of their
debt” and agree on a settlement plan with their respective banks.30
Lessons Learned
Nuclear or Not, Sound Economics Prevail
The biggest mistake Pakistan made was to test its nuclear devices – the nation was immediately
sanctioned and billions of dollars in expected foreign aid/loans/credits were halted – along with a
deteriorating economic condition this nuclear test event pushed Pakistan into a full-on crisis. As a
result, many analysts would argue that the main lesson learned here is not to go up against the
international community – I believe this is a moot point, as a nuclear test was imminent in response to
arch-rival India‟s display of military force. It‟s also very clear that any economic reforms require proper
follow-through to ensure their efficacy and success – economic control by seven different
administrations in just ten years almost made this sort of prudence impossible. There are a few
takeaways, political adjustments aside, that one can learn from this case and possibly apply towards
the aversion of a debt crisis similar to Pakistan‟s in 1998.
Securing Inflows
Since foreign direct investment is amongst the most stable and desirable type of inflow it seems that
Pakistan should have placed more emphasis on protecting FDI mechanisms than shutting them down.
29
No Easy Fix, Business Asia, The Economist Intelligence Unit, January 10, 2000, p. 3.
30
Bokhari, Farhan, General Appeal, The Banker, Financial Times Business Limited, December 1, 1999, p. 1.
Written by Lateef Mauricio / info@machetemag.com / Published on January 5, 2011 at Machete Mag: http://bit.ly/pakistandebtcrisis1998
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The foreign currency deposit freeze locked up $13bn in money belonging to Pakistanis and foreigners
alike – this amount represented about 1/3rd of the nation‟s debt obligation and doomed it to be at the
mercy of international aid organizations – which were not going to support the nation with funds
anyway. Even in crisis mode, FDI brings benefits other than money that are important to maintain
economic progress, i.e. foreign technology and skills transfers).
The freeze on foreign currency deposits wasn‟t the only thing that restricted capital inflows from
alleviating the crisis. Remittances have been on a consistent decline since 88/89 when they were at
$2.5bn, dropping down to $1.1bn in 98/99.31 This decline certainly sharpened after the crisis in May
1998 – but it was also a result of a failing banking system – where banks were forced to charge
excessive rates in order to cover its own reserve requirements. Thus, banking system reform was long
overdue in Pakistan, not just to secure domestic savings confidence, but also to encourage foreign
capital inflows.
31
No Easy Fix, Business Asia, The Economist Intelligence Unit, January 10, 2000, p. 4.
32
Iqbal, Zafar, Jeffrey James, and Graham Pyatt, Three-Gap Analysis of Structural Adjustement in Pakistan, Journal of Policy
Modeling, 22 no. 1, January 2000, p. 135.
Written by Lateef Mauricio / info@machetemag.com / Published on January 5, 2011 at Machete Mag: http://bit.ly/pakistandebtcrisis1998
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