Japan's South Korea Predicament: International Affairs 94: 4 (2018) 735-754 Doi: 10.1093/ia/iiy029

Japan’s South Korea predicament
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ALEXANDRA SAKAKI AND JUNYA NISHINO
South Korea and Japan have frequently been described as ‘natural’ or ‘logical’
partners, facing common challenges in Asia and displaying a range of similarities.1
They are both democratic countries; they have converging socio-economic devel-
opment levels and similar cultural backgrounds; and they share a common ally in
the United States. South Korea, moreover, is Japan’s geographically closest neigh-
bour. Yet despite their proximity and the similarities between the two, bilateral
political relations have been volatile, going through periodic ups and downs for
decades. Unresolved historical issues, stemming especially from Japan’s colonial
rule of Korea from 1910 to 1945, repeatedly surface as irritants in the relation-
ship, impeding political cooperation that would be advantageous for both sides.
However, the deterioration of ties after 2011 was unprecedented in the history
of normalized relations since 1965. Such was the severity of the strains in the
relationship that no bilateral summit meetings were held for three and a half years
between May 2012 and November 2015. While some progress was made from
late 2015 onwards, including the signing of an intelligence-sharing agreement in
November 2016, a substantial improvement in relations is yet to be realized.
Against this backdrop, this article analyses Japan’s strategic thinking on South
Korea, focusing on the period after 2011 when relations began to deteriorate. While
not denying the importance of historical misunderstandings and misperceptions,
we emphasize the ways in which recent and current structural changes in the region
are affecting bilateral ties and exacerbating existing difficulties. We seek also to
assess how important South Korea is in the context of Japan’s grand strategy, and
to determine whether Tokyo perceives itself to possess sufficient leverage to win
over Seoul as a partner in regional security issues, including the challenge of facing
China’s rise. We find that the negative trajectory of political relations since 2011
has reinforced Japanese perceptions of South Korea as not only a difficult but also
an unreliable partner in regional security affairs. Even though policy-makers and
security experts see broad overlap in interests between the two countries, they
express widespread suspicion about South Korea’s strategic orientation, particularly
1
Yoshihide Soeya, The future of US–Japan–ROK trilateral cooperation: a Japanese perspective, NBR brief (Seattle:
National Bureau of Asian Research, March 2016), http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=659, p. 5; Kevin J.
Cooney and Alex Scarbrough, ‘Japan and South Korea: can these two nations work together?’, Asian Affairs
35: 3, Fall 2008, pp. 173–92 at p. 173. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article
were accessible on 25 April 2018.)
International Affairs 94: 4 (2018) 735–754; doi: 10.1093/ia/iiy029

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Alexandra Sakaki and Junya Nishino
in respect of its relations with China. While a broader agenda for bilateral security
cooperation is seen as desirable, the strategic value of South Korea from Japan’s
perspective is thus largely limited to dealing with the threat from North Korea.
Overall, policy-makers and experts are sceptical about the prospect of achieving
a complete turnaround with sustained improvement in bilateral political relations.
Such pessimism derives not only from enduring frictions over unresolved
historical issues, but also from structural changes in the regional order that are
perceived as complicating the relationship. From this perspective, shifts in the
power balance in Asia and the growing rivalry between the United States and
China have contributed to the deterioration of the relationship between Tokyo
and Seoul since 2011. In this article we identify three particular fault-lines in that
relationship—strategic, historical–psychological and economic—which in the
Japanese view have opened up as a result of structural changes in the region and
caused strains in bilateral political ties. Despite general doubts in Tokyo about the
prospects for a breakthrough in relations, policy-makers and experts neverthe-
less express cautious optimism about pursuing some forms of security coopera-
tion with South Korea. In particular, they highlight cooperation in the trilateral
context with the United States and in countering the North Korean threat, amid
growing concern in Seoul and Tokyo about the Pyongyang regime’s advances in
nuclear and missile technology.
Our analysis proceeds in four steps. First, we provide a brief overview of the
deterioration of political relations between Tokyo and Seoul since 2011. Second,
we highlight two areas in which Japan generally perceives an overlap of strategic
interests and priorities with South Korea, namely the North Korean threat and the
US alliance. Third, we analyse why policy-makers—despite general alignment of
interests on these two issues—view bilateral relations with pessimism. We analyse
the three fault-lines in the relationship specified above and show how structural
changes in the region compound existing sources of friction. The strategic fault-
line in particular complicates bilateral ties, with Tokyo and Seoul differing consid-
erably in their approaches to China. All three fault-lines have combined to generate
suspicion in Tokyo about the possibility of Seoul accepting the emergence of a
Chinese-led regional order to supplant the US-led order that has prevailed since
the Second World War. As a result, policy-makers in Japan doubt the extent to
which Seoul can be seen as a partner sharing similar values. In our conclusion,
we discuss Tokyo’s view of Seoul as a security partner and consider prospects for
future cooperation.
Our analysis draws on interviews conducted in October 2016 and in March and
April 2017 with experts and policy-makers in Tokyo and Seoul, many of whom
wish to remain unnamed as sources but nevertheless helped us to gain a deeper
understanding of bilateral relations and Japanese strategic thinking on South
Korea.2 The article focuses on Japan’s perspective, but we also highlight some of
the key divergences with South Koreans’ view of the relationship.
2
We would like to thank all these officials, scholars and journalists, who took time out of their busy schedules
for discussions.
736
International Affairs 94: 4, 2018

Past their peak? Relations before and after 2011

The unprecedented downturn in relations with South Korea since 2011 has been a
source of deep frustration in Japan. Until that point, bilateral ties overall seemed
to follow a positive trajectory, despite periodic setbacks. Since the 1990s, the two
countries had not only made progress towards resolving historical disputes, they
had also begun to initiate security cooperation both bilaterally and, with the United
States, trilaterally, especially following the 1993–4 North Korean nuclear crisis.
However, bilateral tensions flared in the 2000s over historical issues and clashing
claims to the Takeshima/Dokdo islets. Relations became particularly strained over
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s annual visits between 2001 and 2006
to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, regarded by Koreans as symbolizing Japan’s
unwillingness to confront and acknowledge past wrongdoings.3 The relationship
seemed to return to a positive trajectory following the inauguration of the conser-
vative administration of Myung-bak Lee in South Korea in 2008. Seoul responded
positively to Washington’s attempts to revive trilateral cooperation with Japan.4
Following North Korean provocations against South Korea, including the sinking
of the navy corvette Cheonan in 2010, Tokyo and Seoul agreed to pursue accords
for sharing military intelligence and the provision of logistic support to each
other’s military forces.5 Around this time, policy-makers in Tokyo were generally
optimistic about developing a common agenda with Seoul on regional security
issues beyond North Korea.6
A string of events in late 2011 and 2012 then led to the rapid cooling in bilat-
eral relations. While the initial trigger of the deterioration was a ruling by the
South Korean Constitutional Court in August 2011, the discussion of the three
fault-lines below shows that the downward trend was affected and reinforced by
structural changes in the region’s power balance. In the court ruling, the judges
found that the South Korean government had violated—through policy neglect—
the basic rights of Korean women forced into prostitution in Japanese military
camps during the Second World War, known as ‘comfort women’. The ruling
put Seoul under considerable pressure to take a stronger stance against Tokyo on
historical matters.7 Talks about the ‘comfort women’ issue have been complicated
by the erection of a commemorative statue for these women in front of Japan’s
embassy in Seoul by a civic group in December 2011.8 From Japan’s perspective,
the statue violates the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, under which
3
Kei Koga, ‘The Yasukuni question: histories, logics, and Japan–South Korea relations’, Pacific Review 29: 3,
2016, pp. 331–59.
4
Brad Glosserman and Scott A. Snyder, The Japan–South Korea identity clash: east Asian security and the United States
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), p. 137.
5
Yangmo Ku, ‘Transitory or lingering impact? The legacies of the Cheonan incident in northeast Asia’, Asian
Perspective 39: 2, April–June 2015, pp. 253–76.
6
Author’s interview with Kazuhiko Togo, former Foreign Ministry official, Tokyo, April 2017.
7
Junya Nishino, ‘Japan–ROK relations: overcoming the challenges’, in Yuki Tatsumi, ed., Japan’s foreign policy
challenges in east Asia: views from the next generation (Washington DC: Stimson Center, 2014), pp. 31–40; Hideki
Okuzono, ‘Kankoku shiho ga yurugasu nikkan kankei’ [South Korean judiciary rocking Japan–Korea rela-
tions], Toa, no. 559, Jan. 2014, pp. 96–105.
8
Daniel Sneider, ‘Behind the comfort women agreement’, Tokyo Business Today, 10 Jan. 2016, http://toyokeizai.
net/articles/-/99891.
737

the host country is obliged to protect the dignity of consular posts. The bilateral
relationship deteriorated further in June 2012 when Seoul, at the last minute and
in response to domestic opposition, called off the signature of a General Security
of Military Information Agreement with Japan to exchange military intelligence,
which had already been fully negotiated. In August 2012, President Myung-bak
Lee made an unprecedented visit to the Takeshima/Dokdo islets,9 which was seen
in Japan as a provocation in the territorial dispute.10
There was some hope that relations with Korea could be reset following the
inauguration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in December 2012 and President
Geun-hye Park in February 2013. However, Park refused to meet with Abe, whom
South Koreans widely perceive as pursuing historical revisionism, and called on
‘Japan’s leaders to take a correct view of history’.11 Increasingly worried that the
impasse between its two principal allies in Asia was undermining its strategic inter-
ests, the United States decided to intervene, arranging a trilateral summit meeting
in March 2014. The initiative prepared the ground for a slow rapprochement between
Tokyo and Seoul, leading to the first bilateral meeting between Park and Abe in
November 2015. The following month, the two sides announced a breakthrough
in the ‘comfort women’ dispute: the Japanese foreign minister apologized in Abe’s
name to the women for their suffering, promising a Japanese contribution of a
billion yen into a South Korean foundation for victims; Seoul in turn promised
to work towards a solution regarding the ‘comfort women’ statue in front of
Japan’s embassy. Both sides also declared that the agreement ‘finally and irrevers-
ibly’ put an end to the dispute.12 The delicacy of the bilateral compromise was
underscored by the fact that the two foreign ministers issued separate statements
regarding their respective governments’ understanding of the agreement rather
than signing a jointly written document.13 After that, relations seemed to move
in a more cooperative direction, for example with the signing of a bilateral accord
on sharing military information in November 2016.
However, following Park’s removal from office in December 2016 over a corrup-
tion and cronyism scandal, the dispute over ‘comfort women’ flared up again.
Later in that same month, voicing criticism of the December 2015 accord, South
Korean activists erected another ‘comfort women’ statue in front of the Japanese
consulate in the port city of Pusan. Japan, viewing Seoul’s inability to counter
this move as a betrayal of the bilateral accord, decided to withdraw its ambas-
sador to South Korea for almost three months—the longest period in the bilateral
9
In his memoir, Lee stated that by 2012, the last year of his presidency, he thought ‘quiet diplomacy’ over the
territorial dispute with Japan was meaningless: Myung-bak Lee, Taetongryeong ui Sigan 2008–2013 [Presidential
period 2008–2013] (Seoul: RHK, 2015), pp. 404–406.
10
Kee-seok Kim, ‘Lee Myung Bak’s stunt over disputed islands’, East Asia Forum, 19 Aug. 2012, http://www.
eastasiaforum.org/2012/08/19/lee-myung-baks-stunt-over-disputed-islands/.
11
Cited in Peter McGill, ‘Why history is a problem for Park Geun-hye in confronting Japan’, East Asia Forum,
23 Sept. 2014, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/09/23/why-history-is-a-problem-for-park-geun-hye-in-
confronting-japan/.
12
Mike M. Mochizuki, ‘Japan–ROK pact on “comfort women”: will it help heal the wounds?’, Oriental Econo-
mist 84: 1, Jan. 2016, p. 6.
13
Mochizuki, ‘Japan–ROK pact’.
738

history of normalized relations.14 Pessimism in Tokyo was further fuelled by the
election in May 2017 of President Jae-in Moon, who had called for a renegotiation
of the 2015 ‘comfort women’ agreement in his electoral campaign and who as a
progressive politician was expected to take an uncompromising stance towards
Japan.15 Indeed, historical disagreements have continued to put strains on bilateral
relations since Moon’s inauguration.16
Overlapping strategic interests: North Korea and the United States

From Japan’s perspective, the deterioration of bilateral ties is particularly frustrating
given a strong alignment in strategic interests on two important issues, namely
the North Korean threat and the US presence. There is considerable divergence
between Tokyo and Seoul in their approaches to China, however, as will be shown
below in the section on the strategic fault-line.
North Korea
Ever since the Korean War in 1950–53, Japan has perceived a strong link between
its own security and that of South Korea, based on their shared alignment against
communism and the North Korean threat as well as their common alliance with
Washington. The United States relied heavily on its bases in Japan to provide
supplies and logistical support to its troops fighting in the Korean War.17 Japan
supported its ally, for example by providing medical treatment to wounded
soldiers, and by servicing and repairing US military equipment, using remnants
of its pre-1945 arms industry. Ever since, Tokyo’s policy-making community has
recognized that Japan—given its alliance with the United States—will be drawn
into any contingency on the Korean peninsula as an operating base for American
troops.18 The United States has shared this recognition, but has been wary of the
potential for Japanese anti-militarist sentiment and delayed decision-making to
interfere with any US military action. For this reason, Washington pressed Tokyo
to sign a ‘secret agreement’ in 1960, permitting US forces under UN command
to use bases in Japan without ‘prior consultation’ during a Korean contingency—
although the validity of this agreement is disputed today.19 South Korea’s impor-
tance to Japan was further underlined by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, who stated
14
Author’s interview with Tae-Hyo Kim, Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul, March 2017.
15
Junya Nishino, ‘Kankoku to shinseiken to nikkan kankei’ [South Korea’s new administration and Japan–South
Korea relations], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 24 May 2017, http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGKKZO16739310T-
20C17A5KE8000/.
16
For example, Japan was angered by Seoul’s decision to invite a former ‘comfort woman’ to a state banquet for
US President Donald Trump in November 2017 and later to serve ‘Dokdo shrimp’ caught near the disputed
islands. See Eun-ji Bahk, ‘South Korea delivers slap to Japan via Trump dinner’, Korea Times, 8 Nov. 2017,
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/11/356_238954.html.
17
Glosserman and Snyder, The Japan–South Korea identity clash, p. 97.
18
Author’s interviews with Hideshi Takesada, Takushoku University, Tokyo, April 2017; Narushige Michishita,
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo, April 2017.
19
Narushige Michishita, ‘Changing security relationship between Japan and South Korea: frictions and hopes’,
Asia–Pacific Review 21: 2, Nov. 2014, pp. 19–32 at p. 21.
739

in 1969 that ‘the security of the Republic of Korea is essential to Japan’s own
security’—a principle that was restated in subsequent years through government
publications.20 In the 1960s and 1970s, furthermore, Japan directly supported the
development of the South Korean defence industry, thereby contributing to
deterrence vis-à-vis North Korea.21
Since the 1990s, Japan has increasingly perceived North Korea as a direct threat
to its own security, given the regime’s advances in missile technology that have
brought Japan into range. This has reinforced Japanese perceptions of a security
link with South Korea to the point where analysts now see the Korean peninsula
and the Japanese archipelago as ‘strategically inseparable’.22 The North Korean
nuclear crisis of 1993–4, in which the United States nearly went to war against
the reclusive regime, served as a catalyst for Japanese debates, which focused on
two points.23 One concern was that a military confrontation on the peninsula
would have a direct negative impact on Japan’s security, owing to refugee flows and
possible retaliatory strikes by North Korea using its newly developed short-range
Nodong-1 missile. A second concern was that the US–Japan alliance could break
up over Tokyo’s failure to meet US expectations of support for war efforts. When
Washington asked Japan to provide various forms of rear-end logistical support
and repair services for its military equipment and to participate in a possible naval
blockade against North Korea in the event of war, Tokyo was reluctant to give
even indirect assistance.24 A military confrontation with North Korea was averted
in the end, but the crisis prompted Washington and Tokyo to review their security
cooperation and announce revised US–Japan Defence Cooperation Guidelines in
1997. These guidelines—clearly written with a possible future Korean contingency
in mind—signified a milestone, registering Tokyo’s agreement to provide rear-area
support in areas such as supply, transport, maintenance and medical services to the
United States, and also to cooperate on maritime and air traffic control ‘in response
to situations in areas surrounding Japan’.25 From Tokyo’s perspective, this implies
a clearer commitment to contribute to South Korea’s security, going beyond the
earlier, passive conception of serving as an operating base for US troops in a contin-
gency by taking a more active role, albeit still in the rear area.26
Rapid progress in North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities—especially
under the Kim Jong-un regime since 2012—has fortified perceptions in Tokyo
20
Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s economic power and security: Japan and North Korea (London: Routledge, 2013),
p. 58.
21
Michishita, ‘Changing security relationship’, p. 20.
22
Sugio Takahashi, ‘Japan upgrading of national security policy’, in National Institute for Defense Studies, ed.,
East Asian Strategic Review 2016, pp. 296–321 at p. 317, http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/east-
asian/e2016.html.
23
Richard Cronin, ‘The North Korean nuclear threat and the US–Japan security alliance: perceived interests,
approaches, and prospects’, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 29: 1, Winter 2005, pp. 51–73 at pp. 55–6.
24
Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes and Hugo Dobson, Japan’s international relations: politics,
economics and security (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 245; Nobuo Ishihara, Shusho Kantei no Ketsudan: Naikaku-
kanbo Fuku-chokan Ishihara Nobuo no 2600 Nichi [The decision of the Prime Minister’s Office: 2600 days of
Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobuo Ishihara ] (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1997).
25
Ministry of Defence, Japan, Guidelines for Japan–US Defence Cooperation, 23 Sept. 1997, http://www.mod.
go.jp/e/d_act/anpo/19970923.html.
26
Author’s interview with Michishita, Tokyo, April 2017.
740

of a strong security linkage with South Korea that calls for intensified bilateral
cooperation. However, there is a growing fear among Japanese analysts that North
Korea could explicitly threaten Japan with missiles—possibly even nuclear-tipped
weapons—to coerce it into denying the United States use of military bases in
a contingency.27 Particularly worrisome was North Korea’s success in March
2017 in simultaneously launching four missiles—three of which landed in Japan’s
exclusive economic zone. The missile launches, which according to Pyongyang
simulated a strike on US military bases in Japan, heightened concern that North
Korea was conducting a simulation of a ‘saturation attack’, a contingency in
which Japan’s missile defence system would be overwhelmed by the concurrent
launching of several missiles.28 Other worrisome technological advances by North
Korea include its successful test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
in August 2016 and the first use of solid fuel in a missile test in February 2017,
both of which improve the North’s capability to make preparations for a missile
launch without detection. North Korea’s successful launches in 2017 of two types
of intercontinental ballistic missiles—the Hwasong 14 and 15, estimated to have
ranges covering the US mainland partially or fully—have increased fears in both
Seoul and Tokyo of ‘security decoupling’ from the US alliance partner. Policy-
makers in both Asian countries question the reliability of US extended deter-
rence, given that Washington may face the decision whether to aid its allies when
US cities are threatened by devastating North Korean missiles. Such concerns are
amplified by US President Donald Trump’s emphasis on ‘America first’ policies.29
At the working level, Japanese and South Korean bureaucrats and military
officers tend to share a strong recognition of the need for cooperation on the
North Korean threat and to avoid this being disrupted by historical disputes. This
shared acknowledgement helps to maintain bilateral channels of communication
even when relations on the ‘high politics’ level deteriorate. Nevertheless, many
policy-makers and experts in Tokyo feel that South Korean public debates about
security tend to underestimate the significance of Japan, seemingly discounting
the country’s critical role as an operating base for US troops and provider of
rear-area support in a contingency.30 Japan may have unintentionally contrib-
uted to this lack of recognition: policy-makers in Tokyo tend to understate their
country’s importance in a Korean contingency, both because they fear arousing
debates about ‘entrapment’, given domestic anti-militarist sentiment, and because
North Korea might otherwise be tempted to issue explicit threats against Japan’s
civilian population to weaken the country’s resolve to support South Korea in
27
Takahashi, ‘Japan upgrading of national security policy’, p. 317.
28
Author’s interview with Michishita; Motoko Rich, ‘North Korea launch could be test of new attack strategy,
Japan analysts say’, New York Times, 6 March 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/world/asia/north-
korea-missiles-japan.html; Jesse Johnson, ‘North Korea says missile launches were training for striking US
bases in Japan’, Japan Times, 7 March 2017, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/03/07/national/north-
korea-says-missile-launches-part-training-striking-u-s-bases-japan/#.WRMiaGd_9B4.
29
For a detailed discussion of ‘decoupling’, see Mira Rapp-Hooper, ‘Decoupling is back in Asia: a 1960s play-
book won’t solve these problems’, War on the Rocks, 7 Sept. 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/decou-
pling-is-back-in-asia-a-1960s-playbook-wont-solve-these-problems/.
30
Many South Korean observers concede this point (author’s interviews with Cheol-hee Park, Seoul National
University, Seoul, March 2017; Kak-soo Shin, former ambassador to Japan, Seoul, March 2017).
741

a contingency.31 To the bewilderment of Japanese policy-makers and experts,
South Koreans seem to allow historical issues to cloud their strategic thinking.
Under the new security policy laws passed by Japan’s parliament in September
2015, Japan could theoretically provide logistical support not only to the United
States but also to South Korea in the event of a crisis on the peninsula.32 However,
such cooperation currently seems hard to imagine, as Seoul has repeatedly voiced
concern, based on historical sensitivities, about Japanese troops entering the
Korean peninsula.33 The new security legislation triggered fear in South Korea
that Japan might exercise its right of collective self-defence in a contingency and
send forces to help US troops under attack on the peninsula without asking for
Seoul’s permission. Seoul thus sought assurance that Tokyo would respect South
Korean sovereignty.34
As in Japan, so in South Korea too feelings of insecurity about the Pyongyang
regime have risen to an unprecedented level.35 In particular, the North’s test launch
of an SLBM in 2016 represents a new order of threat because it enables the regime
to more easily overcome the defences of its southern neighbour, which currently
point exclusively to the north.36 Some Japanese observers thus find signs of a
growing recognition by South Korean experts and journalists of Japan’s impor-
tance—including its advanced anti-submarine warfare capabilities. For example,
since 2016 the conservative newspapers Dong-A Ilbo and Chosun Ilbo have published
articles advocating closer security relations with Japan.37
Beyond military contingency scenarios, there are some differences between
Japanese and South Korean strategic interests vis-à-vis North Korea. South Korea’s
main objective is to work towards eventual unification, preferably through a
gradual process of engaging with the North.38 This mandates close policy cooper-
ation with the United States and China, both of which are viewed by Seoul’s
decision-makers as having significant influence on inter-Korean relations. By
contrast, they see Japan as having less relevance, and thus accord it lower prior-
31
Author’s interview with Michishita.
32
Soeya, The future of US–Japan–ROK trilateral cooperation.
33
South Koreans are sceptical about Japanese international contributions of a military nature, believing that
Tokyo has not fully repented of its militarist past and therefore does not warrant trust in its peaceful inten-
tions. See Hong Nack Kim, ‘Japanese–South Korean relations under the second Abe government, 2012–2014’,
International Journal of Korean Studies 18: 1, Spring–Summer 2014, pp. 2–25 at p. 19; E. J. R. Cho and Ki-young
Shin, ‘South Korean views on Japan’s constitutional reform under the Abe government’, Pacific Review online,
14 Nov. 2017, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2017.1397731.
34
Youngshik Bong, ‘ROK and US views on the foreign policy of the Abe administration’, in Gilbert Rozman,
ed., Asia’s alliance triangle: US–Japan–South Korea relations at a tumultuous time (Basingstoke: Asan Institute for
Policy Studies/Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 61–73 at p. 71.
35
Author’s interview with Young-kwan Yoon, Seoul National University, Seoul, March 2017.
36
Alexandra Sakaki and Gudrun Wacker, China–Japan–South Korea: a tense ménage à trois, SWP research paper
no. 5 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2017), p. 14, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/
contents/products/research_papers/2017RP05_skk_wkr.pdf.
37
For articles in English supportive of cooperation with Japan, see e.g. ‘Will S. Korea and Japan sign the bilat-
eral military agreement?’, Dong-A Ilbo, 19 Oct. 2016, http://english.donga.com/Home/3/all/26/763575/1;
‘THAAD can no longer be a political football’, Chosun Ilbo, 14 Feb. 2017, http://english.chosun.com/site/
data/html_dir/2017/02/14/2017021401539.html.
38
Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, Park Geun-hye jeongbu ui tongil Gusan [Park Geun-hye administra-
tion’s initiative for Korean unification] (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 2015), http://www.unikorea.go.kr/
ebook/UnificationPolicy/UnificationPolicy.pdf.
742

ity.39 Japanese observers are somewhat ambivalent about the prospect of a unified
Korea; for example, experts have for many years debated the risk of rising anti-
Japanese nationalism following unification.40 Tokyo’s main objective vis-à-vis
North Korea is to encourage the regime to give up its weapons of mass destruc-
tion. Moreover, Tokyo is keen on resolving the ‘abduction issue’—referring to
the alleged kidnapping of at least 17 Japanese nationals by North Korea in the
1970s and 1980s. Seoul has shown limited interest in this issue, despite similar
cases of South Korean nationals being abducted.41 These gaps in strategic interests
sometimes cause frictions between Seoul and Tokyo.
The United States

Japanese policy-makers and experts perceive a strong overlap in strategic interests
with South Korea regarding their common ally, the United States. Both Tokyo
and Seoul view Washington as their most important security partner and thus
share an interest in keeping it engaged in regional security affairs. This explains
why both countries have proved inclined—at least to some degree—to accommo-
date US demands for an improved bilateral relationship and for cooperation on the
trilateral level despite ongoing historical disputes. From Washington’s perspec-
tive, closer cooperation between its most important Asian allies strengthens US
influence in the region and increases its leverage. Especially over the past decade,
Washington has sought to go beyond its traditional ‘hub-and-spokes’ policy,
which emphasized bilateral ties with each of its Asian allies, encouraging stronger
ties and integration between those countries.42 By pursuing the latter approach,
it hopes to benefit from flexible ‘minilateral’ security cooperation while also
working towards a more mobile military force structure less strongly determined
by geographical boundaries.43 US-initiated trilateral cooperation with Japan and
South Korea has thus been a driving force in facilitating bilateral security coopera-
tion between Tokyo and Seoul.44 Nevertheless, while Washington successfully
pushed the two allies to participate in joint missile-tracking exercises in October
and December 2017, its proposal to hold a trilateral naval exercise including three
US aircraft carriers in mid-November was rejected by Seoul.45 From Japan’s
39
Cheol-hee Park, ‘Korea–Japan relations under deep stress’, in Rozman, ed., Asia’s alliance triangle, pp. 87–104
at pp. 101–2.
40
Masao Okonogi, ‘The North Korean crisis and Japan’s choice’, in Wonmo Dong, ed., The two Koreas and the
United States (London: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), pp. 119–29 at p. 129.
41
Richard Samuels, ‘Kidnapping politics in East Asia’, Journal of East Asian Studies 10: 3, Sept.–Dec. 2010, pp.
363–95.
42
43
Choi Kang, ‘Retrospect and prospect of the ROK–US alliance at 60 and beyond’, in Rozman, ed., Asia’s alli-
ance triangle, pp. 29–41 at p. 33.
44
Junya Nishino, Japan’s security relationship with the Republic of Korea: opportunities and challenges, CSIS Strategic
Japan working paper (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2017), https://
csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/170401_Japan_ROK_0.pdf ?jz3COYNovbBS2I2GlA8kOFxsWWm
Sxzt1, p. 12.
45
The missile-tracking exercises were held on 24–25 Oct. and 11–12 Dec. 2017. Regarding South Korea’s refusal
to hold a trilateral naval exercise, see Hiroshi Minegishi, ‘South Korea rejected Japan involvement in joint US
military drills’, Nikkei Asian Review, 13 Nov. 2017, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-
Relations/South-Korea-rejected-Japan-involvement-in-joint-US-military-drills?page=1.
743

perspective, such wavering by Seoul will continue to complicate efforts to ensure
credible deterrence through the US alliance structure.46
South Korea as a difficult and unreliable partner: the three fault-lines
Despite broadly overlapping strategic interests with South Korea in respect of
both North Korea and the United States, Japanese decision-makers and experts
are pessimistic about the prospects for cooperation. From their perspective, the
downturn in relations since 2011 cannot be explained by the existence of historical
disagreements alone. Rather, shifts in the regional structure and balance of power
have accentuated three fault-lines between Tokyo and Seoul that are undermining
the bilateral political relationship. First and most importantly, a strategic fault-
line has emerged between the perspectives of Tokyo and Seoul regarding China’s
rise, breeding bilateral suspicion and mistrust. Second, a historical–psychological
fault-line, which has marked relations throughout the postwar era, has widened as
a result of both the shifting power balance between Tokyo and Seoul and domestic
developments in the two countries, including the 2011 ruling by the South Korean
Constitutional Court mentioned above. Finally, an economic fault-line has begun
to open up between Japan and South Korea amid shifting patterns of economic
interdependence in the region.
The strategic fault-line: dissonance on China

In the face of China’s growing influence and power, Japan has sought to align itself
with democratic maritime powers throughout the region to defend the US-led
liberal international order. From this perspective South Korea, as a neighbouring
democratic country, is an attractive partner for Japan.47 Indeed, Tokyo’s National
Security Strategy of December 2013 names South Korea as one of the countries in
the region with which stronger cooperation is sought.48 In Prime Minister Abe’s
strategic vision, stronger relations with South Korea would help to consolidate the
rules-based order in Asia.49 However, despite the inherent attractiveness of South
46
Kunihiko Miyake, Ken Jimbo, Yuki Tatsumi and Kohtaro Ito, ‘A view on regional political–military develop-
ments: third quarter of 2017’, East Asia Quarterly, Nov. 2017 (Tokyo: Canon Institute for Global Studies), p.
4, http://www.canon-igs.org/research_papers/CIGS-EASQ_2017_Q3.pdf.
47
It is notable, however, that two related strategic concepts, the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ and the Asian
‘Democratic Security Diamond’, voiced during the first and second Abe administrations respectively, did
not specifically name South Korea as a key component in this outreach. However, it seems that the ‘Arc of
Freedom and Prosperity’, proposed by Foreign Minister Taro Aso in 2006, was conceived as including South
Korea (see Yuichi Hosoya, ‘The rise and fall of Japan’s grand strategy: the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity”
and the future Asian order’, Asia Pacific Review 18: 1, May 2011, pp. 13–24 at p. 16). The ‘Democratic Security
Diamond’ was proposed in late 2012, when doubts about Seoul were spreading amid deteriorating relations.
Nevertheless, in his speeches, Abe did name South Korea as a partner that he considered ‘like-minded’ and
with which he wanted to cooperate (see Yuichi Hosoya, ‘A Japanese perspective: the Korean public and limits
of trilateral cooperation’, Global Asia 12: 1, Spring 2017, pp. 42–45 at p. 44).
48
Office of the Prime Minister, National Security Strategy (Tokyo, 17 Dec. 2013), p. 23, http://www.kantei.go.jp/
foreign/96_abe/documents/2013/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/17/NSS.pdf.
49
Hosoya, ‘A Japanese perspective’; Togo Kazuhiko, ‘Japanese foreign policy: Abe II and beyond. With a future
perspective of Japan–Korea relations’, in Takashi Inoguchi, ed., Japanese and Korean politics: alone and apart from
each other (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 195–220 at p. 215.
744

Korea as a partner, Japanese policy-makers and experts express substantial doubts
about the feasibility of strategic cooperation with Seoul regarding China, based
on diverging perceptions and priorities.
While Seoul is not fully comfortable with China’s assertiveness in the region,
it does not share Tokyo’s perception of a military threat. Although South Korea
and China have some competing maritime claims, there is no territorial dispute
between the two comparable to that between Japan and China. Recent years
have seen growing concern in Japan, among experts and the wider public, about
Chinese maritime activities in the East China Sea around the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands, which are controlled by Tokyo and claimed by Beijing. In particular,
Japanese feelings towards China deteriorated rapidly after a Chinese fishing vessel
collided—apparently intentionally—with a Japanese Coast Guard ship around the
islands in September 2010.50 Beijing’s assertiveness regarding its disputed territorial
and maritime claims in the South China Sea have reinforced Japanese perceptions
of China as pursuing a strategy of creeping expansionism in the region.51
By contrast, South Korea does not feel threatened by China to the same
extent. Public opinion polls clearly reflect the differing threat perceptions. For
example, a poll conducted by Genron NPO and the East Asia Institute in June
and July 2016 asked respondents which country they felt posed a military threat.
Among Japanese respondents, the top answers were China (80.4 per cent) and
North Korea (72.8 per cent). South Korean respondents, on the other hand,
named North Korea (83.4 per cent) and Japan (37.7 per cent), with China (36.0
per cent) in third place.52 Nevertheless, South Korean frustration with Beijing has
increased to some extent in recent years. Economic and political pressure from
China in 2016 and 2017 with the intention of pushing Seoul to reconsider the
stationing of the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile
defence system in the southern part of the country caused dismay among the
South Korean public, with polls showing a sharp deterioration in feelings towards
China as a result.53 In recent years, Seoul has also been irritated by Chinese reluc-
tance to condemn North Korean provocations, such as the North’s shelling of the
South’s Yeonpyeong Island in 2010.
Whereas China has become Japan’s top priority in security policy, South Korea
remains preoccupied in its strategic outlook by the threat from North Korea and
the division of the peninsula. Thus, strategic interests between Seoul and Tokyo
no longer overlap to the extent that they did during the Cold War, when both
50
Cabinet Office of Japan, Gaiko ni kan suru yoron chosa [Public opinion poll on foreign policy], Jan. 2017, http://
survey.gov-online.go.jp/h27/h27-gaiko/index.html.
51
Alexandra Sakaki, ‘Keeping the dragon at bay: the South China Sea dispute in Japan’s security strategy’, in
Enrico Fels and Truong-Minh Vu, eds, Power politics in Asia’s contested waters: territorial disputes in the South China
Sea (Heidelberg: Springer, 2016), pp. 425–40.
52
Genron NPO and East Asia Institute, The 4th Japan–South Korea joint public opinion poll (2016): analysis report on
comparative data (Tokyo and Seoul, July 2016), http://www.genron-npo.net/pdf/forum_2016_en.pdf, p. 27.
53
Jiyoon Kim, John J. Lee and Chungku Kang, Changing tides: THAAD and shifting Korean public opinion toward the
United States and China, issue brief (Seoul: Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 20 March 2017), http://en.asaninst.
org/contents/changing-tides-thaad-and-shifting-korean-public-opinion-toward-the-united-states-and-
china/.
745

countries faced a wider communist threat.54 South Korea today views China
primarily through the prism of its North Korea strategy, in addition to seeing
it as an economic partner with a large, attractive market, a point we will explore
further below. Seoul hopes to leverage Chinese influence on Pyongyang in order
to make progress in inter-Korean relations and in denuclearization talks. As North
Korea has become increasingly isolated in recent years, the regime has become
more dependent on China for survival and development—making Beijing a
crucial actor from Seoul’s perspective. Reflecting these trends, North Korea’s
trade dependence on China amounted to around 90 per cent in 2016—signifi-
cantly higher than a decade ago, when estimates put the figure at around 30 per
cent.55 South Korea, furthermore, views China as an important stakeholder on the
peninsula because it was a signatory to the Korean War armistice in 1953. Chinese
endorsement is thus indispensable for realizing the eventual goal of unification on
the peninsula.56 These factors combine to make South Korea reluctant to be drawn
into an overt balancing strategy against China.57
Seoul’s and Tokyo’s differing responses to China’s rise and to the growing
Sino-US rivalry in the region have bred substantial mistrust on both sides.
Focused on making progress in inter-Korean relations, Seoul has attempted to
drive a wedge between Pyongyang and its Chinese patron and ally. To that end,
President Park strove to upgrade Seoul–Beijing relations while also seeking to
launch trilateral strategic dialogue with the United States and China.58 However,
Japan interpreted such moves as a tilt towards Beijing, seeing the Park govern-
ment as prioritizing improvement in its relationship with China over repairing
its relationship with Japan.59 Tokyo’s leaders feared an increasing acceptance by
South Korea of a new Chinese-led regional order supplanting the existing US-led
order. Strategic suspicion has been reinforced by a widespread belief in Japan that
South Korea has historically always orientated itself towards the dominant power
in the region.60
Conversely, South Koreans—and especially South Korean media outlets—
have become increasingly critical of Japan’s security policy and what they see as
the country’s hawkish stance vis-à-vis China, especially under Prime Minister Abe.
54
Hiroshi Nakanishi, The structural change and future of Japan–South Korea relations: a Japanese perspective, East Asia
Foundation Policy Debates no. 34 (Seoul, 15 Sept. 2015), http://www.keaf.org/book/EAF_Policy_Debate_
The_Structural_Change_and_Future_of_Korea-Japan_Relations:_A_Japanese_Perspective?ckattempt=1.
55
Eleanor Albert, The China–North Korea relationship, CFR Backgrounder (New York, 26 April 2017), https://
www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship; Dick K. Nanto, ‘Increasing dependency: North
Korea’s economic relations with China’, Korea’s Economy, vol. 27, 2011, pp. 75–83 at p. 77, http://keia.org/sites/
default/files/publications/30848_nanto_sp.pdf.
56
Nishino, Japan’s security relationship, p. 9.
57
Daniel Sneider, ‘Advancing trilateral cooperation: a US perspective’, in US–ROK–Japan trilateralism: building
bridges and strengthening cooperation (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2016), pp. 1–12.
58
Presidential Candidate Park Geun-hye’s Election Pledge Book, 10 Dec. 2012, p. 357, http://18park2013.pa.go.
kr/trend/news_notice_view.html?idx=989&bid=BIX004&page=1&icnt=10&searchField=&searchWord=;
Guy Taylor, ‘South Korea pushes three-way alliance with US, China to address North Korea threat’, Washington
Times, 15 Oct. 2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/oct/15/park-geun-hye-of-south-korea-
eyes-alliance-with-us/.
59
Nishino, ‘Japan–ROK relations’.
60
Author’s interviews with Takesada; Hiroyuki Akita, Nikkei Shimbun, Tokyo, April 2017; Japanese officials,
Tokyo, Oct. 2016.
746

In the South Korean media, Abe is portrayed as an ultra-nationalist or extremely
right-wing politician.61 Apparently, political leaders in Seoul have begun to view
Japan’s security posture vis-à-vis China as a destabilizing factor in the region—
even posing a greater threat to stability than Chinese actions. South Koreans fear
that a power struggle between Japan and China could easily escalate into a regional
conflict that would inevitably involve Seoul.62
The historical–psychological fault-line

Historical issues have had a negative impact on relations between Japan and South
Korea throughout the post-1945 period. Leaders in both countries share some
of the blame for arousing nationalist sentiments and provoking each other on
divisive issues, thereby jeopardizing bilateral relations. The resolution of histor-
ical disputes is complicated by the fact that Japan has been the most significant
negative ‘other’ in the construction of South Korea’s modern national identity.63
South Koreans are frustrated by what they see as persistently mixed signals from
Japan in confronting its past misdeeds, observing that apologies and reconciliation
initiatives tend to prompt rightist/nationalist backlashes and countermoves.64 In
turn, the Japanese policy-making community and the wider public perceive South
Korea as a nation preoccupied with the past and incapable of shaking off its hatred
of Japan.65 For example, Shotaro Yachi, who was appointed the first head of the
National Security Secretariat in 2013, described the anti-Japanese atmosphere in
South Korea as a ‘tinderbox’, in which even a small event can ignite a massive
outcry.66 Moreover, from the perspective of the ‘new conservative mainstream’
leaders in Tokyo, who are less inclined than some of their predecessors to apolo-
61
See e.g. ‘Yonhap editorial: worrisome Abe statement’, Yonhap News Agency, 7 Jan. 2013, http://english.yonhap-
news.co.kr/yhedit/2013/01/07/53/5100000000AEN20130107008100315F.HTML; ‘Japan to allow use of impe-
rial flag’, Chosun Ilbo, 8 Aug. 2013, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/08/08/2013080801455.
html.
62
‘Jungil galdeung, dongbugaui sae hwayakgo’ [China–Japan conflict, a new powder keg of north-east Asia],
Yonhap News Agency, 19 Dec. 2013, http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/international/2013/12/17/060200000
0AKR20131217001900073.HTML; ‘Yun Byung-se oegyojanggwan, yeouido yeonguwon gukje simpojieom
gijoyeonseol’ [Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se’s speech at Yeouido Institute], 10 April 2014, https://m.blog.
naver.com/PostView.nhn?blogId=mofakr&logNo=140210296234&proxyReferer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.
google.co.jp%2F.
63
T. J. Pempel, ‘Japan and the two Koreas: the foreign-policy power of domestic politics’, in Marie Söderberg,
ed., Changing power relations in northeast Asia: implications for relations between Japan and South Korea (New York:
Routledge, 2011), pp. 55–76.
64
For example, when Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in 1995 pressed for a parliamentary resolu-
tion expressing Japanese remorse for its misdeeds in the Second World War, his initiative was countered by a
number of nationalist-minded LDP members, who successfully watered down the final text of the resolution
and thereby cast doubts among Japan’s neighbours about the sincerity of the apology. As another example,
Shinzo Abe’s government announced in 2014 that it would re-examine the process of drafting the Kono state-
ment of 1993, which for the first time acknowledged the involvement of Japan’s military in coercing ‘comfort
women’ to provide sex to Japanese soldiers during the Second World War. Many South Koreans regarded this
re-examination as a clear attempt to whitewash Japan’s responsibility in the comfort women issue, thereby
eviscerating past apologies.
65
Gilbert Rozman, ‘Realism versus revisionism in Abe’s foreign policy in 2014’, in Rozman, ed., Asia’s alliance
triangle, pp. 241–54 at p. 241.
66
‘Behind the new Abe diplomacy: an interview with Cabinet Advisor Yachi Shotaro (part one)’, Nippon.com,
8 Aug. 2013, http://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00089/.
747

gize for the past, South Korea poses a threat to Japan’s ‘ontological security’, or
stable sense of self over time.67 Attitudes on historical issues have hardened in both
Japan and South Korea over recent years, reducing the room for compromise.
The shifting attitudes on both sides are affected by mutual perceptions of the two
countries’ relative power status as well as by domestic developments.
Given their country’s rising economic and political clout in the world, South
Koreans have developed a strong sense of national pride. Confidence was spurred
by Myung-bak Lee’s pursuit of a ‘global Korea’ strategy, which envisioned a
leadership role for Seoul on the global stage. At the same time, South Koreans
have perceived Japan as losing international importance, given the country’s
prolonged economic recession.68 The frequent changes in the Japanese premier-
ship—with six prime ministers during the Myung-bak Lee administration of
2008–2013—were seen as a further sign of weakness. Reflecting these percep-
tions, Lee commented in August 2012 that Japan had become less influential in the
international community.69 To observers in Tokyo, this remark—coupled with
Lee’s provocative visit to the Takeshima/Dokdo islets the same month—seemed
to reflect South Korean contempt for Japan as a declining nation. Tokyo’s policy-
makers also feel that Seoul has been voicing its demands on historical issues
with greater confidence, impelled by a negative trend in South Korean public
sentiments towards Japan as well as the 2011 Constitutional Court ruling on the
‘comfort women’ issue. Thus when President Geun-hye Park took office in 2013,
she came under intense political scrutiny regarding her policy on Japan—not
least because she is the daughter of the former military dictator Chung-hee Park,
known for his affinity to Japan. Well aware of this scrutiny, she took an uncom-
promising stance on historical issues. Her decision to attend the September 2015
military parade in Beijing celebrating the 70th anniversary of China’s victory over
Japan in the Second World War fortified Japanese perceptions of Seoul tilting
towards Beijing.
In Japan, concern about the security environment and frustration about the
country’s two ‘lost decades’ of stagnation have also fuelled nationalist sentiment.
At the same time, policy-makers and the broader public have grown disillusioned
about attempts at reconciliation with Seoul. They feel that South Koreans have
disregarded Japan’s past apologies and efforts to settle historical issues, for example
the so-called ‘Kono statement’ of 1993 and the ‘Murayama statement’ of 1995.
Regardless of past agreements, they believe, Seoul continually makes new claims,
moving the goalposts and making it impossible ever to reach a satisfactory conclu-
sion. Indicating Japanese ‘fatigue’ with apologies, a poll by the newspaper Yomiuri
Shimbun in 2015 found that 63 per cent of Japanese respondents felt their country
67
See also the article by Rohan Mukherjee in this issue, ‘Japan’s strategic outreach to India and the prospects of a
Japan–India alliance’, International Affairs 94: 4, July 2018, pp. 835–59; Richard Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s
grand strategy and the future of east Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), p. 125.
68
Author’s interview with Masao Okonogi, Keio University, Tokyo, April 2017.
69
‘Lee Myung-bak taetongryeong, gukjesahoe ye il yeonghyangryeok yejeongalji ana’ [President Lee Myung-
bak says Japan hasn’t been as influential as before in the international community], Donga Ilbo, 13 Aug. 2012,
http://news.donga.com/Culture/3/07/20120813/48602704/1.
748

no longer needed to apologize for the past.70 The policy-making community in
Tokyo believes that it is time to construct a more mature relationship with South
Korea, in recognition of the country’s emergence as a developed economy.71 This
implies moving away from Japan’s traditional ‘deference diplomacy’ of continu-
ously yielding to South Korean demands. However, Seoul views such thinking as
proof of a revisionist trend in Japanese politics.72 Such suspicions are exacerbated
by the particular reservations felt by South Koreans about Prime Minister Abe,
whom they see as sending ambiguous messages on historical issues that cast doubts
about his sincerity and true intentions in reconciliation efforts.73 The majority of
Japanese observers, on the other hand, feel that overall Abe has shown himself
to be a pragmatist who has come a long way on historical issues, considering his
nationalist mindset.74
The latest bilateral rift over the ‘comfort women’ issue has left both sides
questioning the extent to which they share a commitment to the same funda-
mental values. South Koreans argue that for them a true partner on the issue of
values would be a country that recognizes and confronts its past wrongdoings,
including human rights violations. They do not view Japan as living up to that
standard, seeing it as reluctant to confront history, in particular on the ‘comfort
women’ issue.75 In Tokyo, on the other hand, policy-makers and experts doubt
Seoul’s capacity to act as a partner sharing values on two counts. First, they expect
such a partner to stick to international agreements.76 Japanese observers question
Seoul’s reliability in this regard, sensing a lack of determination to implement the
2015 ‘comfort women’ deal, including the removal of the statue in front of the
Japanese Embassy.77 Second, they expect a partner with whom they share values
to defend the liberal international order by confronting Chinese assertiveness.
Japanese observers were thus disenchanted by South Korea’s seemingly common
front with China on historical issues and the apparent acceptance of a China-led
regional order during the Park administration.78 These doubts led the Japanese
government to change its description of South Korea in the Diplomatic bluebook in
2015, eliminating a reference to the ‘share[d] fundamental values such as freedom,
democracy, and respect for basic human rights’.79
70
‘Yomiuri poll finds voters feel Japan has apologized enough but some split on Abe war speech’, Japan Times,
20 Aug. 2015, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/08/20/national/history/yomiuri-poll-finds-voters-
feel-japan-apologized-enough-split-abe-war-speech/ (accessed February 2017).
71
Author’s interviews with Michishita; Japanese officials, Tokyo, Oct. 2016.
72
Bong, ‘ROK and US views’, p. 67.
73
Author’s interview with Park.
74
Author’s interview with Togo.
75
Author’s interviews with Young-Kwan Yoon, Seoul National University, Seoul, March 2017; Sook-jong Lee,
East Asia Institute, Seoul, March 2017.
76
Author’s interview with Okonogi.
77
While many Japanese officials contend that Seoul implicitly pledged to work towards the removal of the statue
in the 2015 ‘comfort women’ deal, South Korean officials deny that any such promise was made.
78
Author’s interviews with Okonogi; Yoshihide Soeya, Keio University, Tokyo, April 2017.
79
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic bluebook 2014, p. 13, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/
bluebook/; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic bluebook 2015, p. 28, http://www.mofa.go.jp/
policy/other/bluebook/. The reference to shared values was also dropped in Prime Minister Abe’s annual
policy statement to the Diet. Some Japanese media reported that the change was also connected to the arrest
of a Japanese journalist in South Korea. See e.g. ‘Kankoku to nihon, kachi kyoyu, bungen kieru gaimusho
749

The economic fault-line

Shifting power relations have had a direct impact on trade patterns in Asia, with
implications for the Tokyo–Seoul relationship. Following the normalization of
the bilateral relationship in 1965, Japanese aid contributed significantly to South
Korea’s economic development.80 After the end of the Cold War, Tokyo continued
to support Seoul, for example in overcoming the 1997 Asian financial crisis. At the
same time, however, Japan’s economic importance relative to South Korea gradu-
ally declined. Since the mid-1970s, Japan’s share in South Korea’s external trade
has declined, following a similar downward trend in the US share.81 This negative
trend largely reflects South Korea’s gradual emergence as a global economy with
diversified trade relations.82 Following the end of the Cold War, South Korea
expanded its trade both with former countries of the Soviet Union and with
China. South Korea–China trade in particular grew rapidly following Beijing’s
accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 (see figure 1). Since 2009, South
Korea’s volume of trade with China has exceeded that of its trade with the United
States and Japan combined.83 Even though bilateral trade between Japan and South
Korea has grown in absolute terms for most of the post-Cold War era, Japan’s
share of South Korea’s external trade dropped from 18.6 per cent in 1995 to 7.4 per
cent in 2015.84 Moreover, almost a quarter of South Korea’s foreign direct invest-
ment is in China, whereas less than 3 per cent is in Japan.85 In economic terms,
then, Japan’s importance to South Korea has declined significantly, while China’s
has grown. These economic trends have reinforced South Korean tendencies to
discount Japan’s importance and to avoid balancing behaviour vis-à-vis Beijing.
Conversely, South Korea’s share in Japan’s external trade has remained relatively
unchanged over the past two decades, with only a slight decline from 6.2 per cent
in 1995 to 5.7 per cent in 2015.86
As an advanced economy, South Korea is no longer dependent on Japanese
funds and technology to the extent that it was two or three decades ago. The
Japan–South Korea economic relationship has thus shifted from a vertical to a
more horizontal configuration, in which both countries stand on a relatively equal
footing with similar technological sophistication and knowhow.87 Indeed, some
Japanese increasingly perceive South Korea as an economic competitor.88 For
HP’ [Japan and Korea, shared values, expression dropped from Foreign Ministry homepage], Asahi Shimbun,
evening edn, 4 March 2015, p. 6.
80
Bruce Cumings, Korea’s place in the sun, updated edn (London: Norton, 2005), pp. 318–22.
81
Kan Kimura, ‘Why can’t Seoul and Tokyo get along?’, Nippon.com, 30 Jan. 2014, http://www.nippon.com/
en/in-depth/a02701/.
82
Kimura, ‘Why can’t Seoul and Tokyo get along?’.
83
Kevin Stahler and Kent Troutman, South Korea’s Faustian dilemma: China–ROK economic and diplomatic ties (part
I) (Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 14 April 2014), https://piie.com/blogs/
north-korea-witness-transformation/south-koreas-faustian-dilemma-china-rok-economic-and-0; Sakaki and
Wacker, China–Japan–South Korea, p. 18.
84
IMF, Direction of trade statistics, http://www.imf.org/en/Data.
85
Bank of Korea, ECOS economic statistics system, http://ecos.bok.or.kr/flex/EasySearch_e.jsp.
86
IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics.
87
Author’s interview with South Korean official, Seoul, March 2017.
88
Sakaki and Wacker, China–Japan–South Korea, p. 16.
750

Figure 1: Trade shares of South Korea’s major trading partners (% of South Korea’s
total trade in goods)
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics.
their part, South Koreans are also concerned about regional competition, finding
themselves in an uncomfortable position between the established economic power
of Japan and a rapidly advancing China.
In Japan, policy-makers have grown more concerned in recent years that South
Korea’s economic dependence on China may result in political dependence, driving
Seoul to accept a Chinese-led regional order.89 Such fears have been reinforced
since 2015 by three key decisions. First, in March 2015 Seoul opted to join the
Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, an institution widely seen as
created to rival the US- and Japan-led Asian Development Bank. Second, about
two months later, South Korea chose to sign a bilateral free trade agreement with
Beijing, while negotiations on such an accord with Japan have remained stalled
for years. Finally, in October 2017 Seoul decided to mend its strained relations
with Beijing over the THAAD deployment by reassuring China with the so-called
‘three noes’, pledging that it would not consider (1) additional THAAD deploy-
ments, (2) participation in a US missile defence network or (3) joining a trilateral
military alliance with the United States and Japan. This decision in particular was
viewed by Japanese observers as an indication of South Korea’s vulnerability to
Chinese economic coercion and attempts to drive a wedge into the US–South
Korea alliance.90 Moreover, Japanese observers fear that the renegotiation of the
South Korea–US free trade agreement (KORUS), which the Trump administra-
89
Author’s
interview with Michishita.
90
Yoichi Funabashi, ‘South Korea and the curse of geopolitics’, Japan Times, 11 Dec 2017, https://www.
japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/12/11/commentary/world-commentary/south-korea-curse-geopolitics/#.
WjOUA2ff4uU.
751

tion has pursued, could make Seoul even more likely to bow to Chinese economic
pressure.91
Overall, then, the shifting patterns of economic relations have reinforced some
of the negative trends in the Tokyo–Seoul relationship shaped by the other two
fault-lines. Nevertheless, at the same time South Koreans have become more
apprehensive about their economic vulnerability vis-à-vis China, both because of
China’s economic retaliation over the THAAD deployment and because of the
slowdown of the Chinese economy.92 These concerns could motivate Seoul to
seek better relations with Tokyo in order to avoid becoming overly dependent
on Beijing.
Conclusion
The downturn in relations with South Korea since 2011 has generated substantial
doubts among Japanese policy-makers about the prospect for bilateral strategic
cooperation with Seoul. This leaves Tokyo with a predicament. On the one hand,
South Korea is recognized as a strategically important country for Japan’s security,
particularly given North Korea’s recurrent provocations and rapid advances in
nuclear and missile technology under the current regime. Demonstrating the
credibility of their deterrence, through bilateral and trilateral security coopera-
tion, has become an increasingly urgent task for Seoul and Tokyo as well as
Washington. On the other hand, Japanese policy-makers feel that their capability
to bring about a reset in relations with Seoul is limited. Structural changes in
the region—including China’s rise and shifts in the relative power between Japan
and South Korea—have combined with domestic developments to undermine
the Tokyo–Seoul relationship by opening up the three fault-lines discussed
above. Mutual suspicion about each other’s intentions and strategic orientation
has increased substantially as a result. Bilateral ties have been affected especially
by the rise of China, exposing Tokyo’s and Seoul’s differing interests and threat
perceptions vis-à-vis Beijing. Some Japanese experts are hopeful that growing
disillusionment with China, especially over the THAAD dispute, will drive Seoul
closer to Tokyo. Nevertheless, most observers expect divergence between the
two countries’ approaches to continue, with Seoul shying away from taking sides
against Beijing.93 Even though South Korea is recognized as an essential partner in
deterring the North Korean regime, the lack of a common approach to China—
Japan’s most pressing security concern—reduces South Korea’s importance in the
broader regional outlook of policy-makers in Tokyo.94
Japanese hopes for resolving historical issues with Seoul have also been shattered.
Until around 2011, liberal-minded politicians and opinion-formers were confident
that an eventual settlement could be achieved if Tokyo made its sincerity plain.
Now, however, pessimism has enveloped the policy-making community, which
91
Miyake et al., ‘A view on regional political–military developments’, p. 4.
92
Author’s interviews with South Korean Foreign Ministry official, Seoul, March 2017; Sook-jong Lee.
93
Author’s interviews with Okonogi; Soeya.
94
Author’s interviews with Akita; Soeya.
752

perceives almost insurmountable challenges in South Korea’s anti-Japanese public
sentiments and nationalism. From Tokyo’s perspective, Seoul’s preoccupation
with the past prevents it from acting or thinking strategically and consistently in
bilateral ties.95 At the same time, growing resentment against South Korea among
the Japanese public also constrains policy options for decision-makers. Japan’s
willingness to tackle divisive historical issues will further erode if the two sides
do not find a way to move forward with the 2015 ‘comfort women’ agreement.
Overall, the Japanese policy-making community lacks ideas on how the country
could proactively revive the bilateral relationship or counteract the negative trends
that are undermining it. Japan finds itself possessing insufficient leverage and
economic ‘carrots’ to win South Korea as a partner on the broader agenda of
regional security issues and persuade it to distance itself from China and the lucra-
tive Chinese market. Rather than perceiving the economic benefits to be gained
from a potential free trade agreement with Tokyo, Seoul fears a negative impact
on South Korean companies facing competition from superior Japanese products
in their domestic market. It is thus difficult for Japan to leverage economic incen-
tives in the bilateral relationship. Moreover, Tokyo’s policy-makers and experts
believe South Korea needs Japan more for its security than the other way around.96
From their perspective, while US forces stationed in South Korea are important as
a deterrent against the North, in any contingency scenario Japan would play a vital
role, both by permitting US forces in Japan to assist Seoul and by providing rear-
area support itself. However, to the dismay of Japanese observers, South Koreans
are more inclined to voice suspicion about revisionist trends than to appreciate
Tokyo’s commitment to their security.
While lacking a long-term strategic vision for bilateral ties, Japanese policy-
makers do recognize the need to promote cooperation on the North Korean
threat in the short term. Tokyo will thus focus on this objective in its relations
with Seoul. The trilateral format with the United States is seen as the most
promising option, having the virtue of depoliticizing some forms of coopera-
tion and insulating initiatives from bilateral tensions.97 Moreover, Washington’s
mediation between Seoul and Tokyo in the trilateral context is seen as having
a positive impact, although experts doubt whether the Trump administration
will pursue as active a facilitation role as the Obama administration.98 At least
on the working level there is growing convergence among defence officials from
the three countries on deterrence issues relating to the North Korean threat.
Tokyo is unlikely to pursue bilateral security cooperation actively beyond North
Korea, except for some cooperation on non-traditional security matters such as
transnational crime, disaster relief or climate change. Nevertheless, to the extent
possible, Japan will seek to encourage Seoul to uphold the US-led regional order
rather than accepting the emergence of a Chinese-led order. Given Japan’s lack
of leverage over South Korea, it will need to rely primarily on the United States
95
As noted above, South Koreans view this as a misperception on Japan’s part.
96
Author’s interview with Takesada.
97
98
Author’s interview with Sook-jong Lee.
753

to induce Seoul to adopt more critical positions vis-à-vis China. The deployment
of a THAAD missile defence battery in South Korea illustrates that Washington
can serve Japan’s security interests in respect of the regional balance of power by
compelling Seoul to take steps that it might otherwise avoid for fear of upset-
ting relations with Beijing. Nevertheless, reliance on US mediation has its own
pitfalls. The relationship between President Trump and President Moon is said to
be strained and difficult, complicating alliance management.99 Beijing may seek
to exploit growing South Korean suspicions about Trump in order to draw Seoul
closer into its orbit. Tokyo, for its part, will seek to minimize the impact of histor-
ical issues on North Korea-focused security cooperation. To that end, Tokyo will
urge Seoul to adopt a ‘two-track approach’ that tackles bilateral historical matters
separately from economic and security matters. Nevertheless, even on North
Korea, bilateral and trilateral cooperation might be affected by some divergences
in strategic interests. While the current Jae-in Moon government in South Korea
hopes to establish channels of dialogue with the North, Japan favours a more hard-
line approach that sustains pressure on the regime.
99
Ankit Panda, ‘China and South Korea: examining the resolution of the THAAD impasse’, The Diplomat, 13
Nov 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/china-and-south-korea-examining-the-resolution-of-the-thaad-
impasse/.
754

Japan's South Korea Predicament: International Affairs 94: 4 (2018) 735-754 Doi: 10.1093/ia/iiy029

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Japan’s South Korea predicament

International Affairs 94: 4 (2018) 735–754; doi: 10.1093/ia/iiy029

INTA94_4_03_Sakaki_Nishino.indd 735 29/06/2018 15:24

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Past their peak? Relations before and after 2011

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Overlapping strategic interests: North Korea and the United States

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The United States

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The strategic fault-line: dissonance on China

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The historical–psychological fault-line

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The economic fault-line

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