Legal Writing

Philippine
Copyright, 2014
by
ISBN 978-971-23-7492-0
ITEM CODE 85-OT- 00069-B
No portion of this book may be copied or reproduced in books,

pamphlets, outlines or notes, whether printed, mimeographed,
typewritten, copied in different electronic devices or in any other form,
for distribution or sale, without the written permission of the author
except brief passages in books, articles, reviews, legal papers, and
judicial or other official proceedings with proper citation.
Any copy of this book without the corresponding number and the
signature of either of the authors on his page either proceeds from an
illegitimate source or is in possession of one who has no authority to
dispose of the same.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
BY THE AUTHORS
I dedicate this book to my parents, Domiciano and Josefina Abad,
whom I cannot honor enough.
Roberto A. Abad
CONTENTS
1. Legal Writing
Scope of Legal Writing
Aims of the Book
2. The Legal Dispute
Meaning of Legal Dispute
Its Significance in Legal Writing
Legal Dispute and The Principal Issue
Importance of Principal Issue
3. Stages of Writing
Two Stages of Legal Writing
Value of Pre-Work
4. Getting at the Facts of the Case
Facts of a Case
Random Notes versus Summary
Facts Seen through the Issue
Cluttered Facts
Relevant Facts Extracted
Facts Set in Sequence
Writing Exercises
The Case of a Child and a Neighbor’s Dog
5. Knowing the Applicable Law or Rule
Sources of Law or Rule
Facts Reexamined
Writing Exercises
6. Getting into the Issues
Issues in Multiple Legal Disputes
Subordinate Controlling Issues
Relevant and Irrelevant Issues
A List of All Issues
Factual and Legal Issues
Correct Statement of the Issues
Threshold Issues
Writing Exercises
7. Roughing Out the Argument
Balanced Presentation
Anatomy of a Legal Argument
The Key Fact In Rules
The Case Fact
Meaning of “Rule”
Roughed Out Arguments
Creative Thinking
Arguments that Build Up
Arguments that Destroy
Pre-Work Reviewed
Writing Exercises
8. Introducing the Issues
Need for Introduction
Sufficiency of Introduction
The Statement of the Case
The Statement of Facts
Short Introductions
Writing Exercises
9. Writing the Argument
Jump Off Points
Three Statements of an Argument
Persuasive Arguments
Convincing Rule Statement
Convincing Fact Statement
Correct Conclusion Statement
Positioning Variation
Building Blocks of Arguments
Omitted Statement
Closing Statement
Writing Exercises
10. Tightening Your Work
Language Problems
Needless Words
Active versus Passive Voice
Third Person Speaks
Block Quotations
Writing Exercises
11. Writing Clearly
Right Connectives
Abstract versus Concrete Writing
Substitute Names
Headings
Writing Exercises
12. Writing Legalese
Legal Clichés
Old English
Sounding Formal
Cheap Words
Self-praise
Sentence-length Variety
Writing Exercises
13. Writing Legal Opinions
Illustrative Case: Chan v. Century Bank
14. Writing Trial Memoranda
Illustrative Case: Maranan v. Gonzalo Realty
Writing Exercises
15. Writing Petitions For Review
Illustrative Case: Excal Corp. v. Jimenez
Writing Exercises
16. Writing a Decision
Illustrative Case: Hudson Power Corp. v. Nemo Shipping
Writing Exercises
APPENDICES
Appendix A –– People v. Takad
Appendix B –– Garcia v. Silver Films, Inc
Appendix C –– National Supplies Authority v. Allied Shipping Corp
Appendix D –– Pointers in Answer School and Bar Examination
Questions
This edition includes pointers
in answering law school and bar
examination questions.
1.
Legal Writing
Scope of Legal Writing

This book is about the things that lawyers write to win others
over to their point of view. If you were a practicing lawyer, you
would be doing a lot of this kind of work. For instance, when your
client, say, a restaurant owner, writes to you regarding the threat of a
possible lawsuit from a customer who was taken ill after eating in your
client’s restaurant, you may have to write him back, giving him your
views regarding his probable liability based on the facts he tells you.
This is legal writing.
When the case gets to court, you would be filing a number of
pleadings like an answer to the customer’s complaint, denying your
client’s liability or minimizing it. Further down the road, you would
probably file for him assorted pleadings, motions, oppositions, replies,
rejoinders, memoranda, and other papers. These are legal writings.
And if you were to be the judge, who is also a lawyer, and must
decide the case, you would have to put your decision in writing,
announce its results, and reveal to the parties your reasons for the
decision. Under our laws, the parties are entitled to know why they
won or lost a case. The strength of your decision lies in the validity and
persuasiveness of the opinion supporting it. This, too, is legal writing.
But legal writing does not only begin when you pass the bar. As law
students, you begin to churn out some form of legal writing once you
enter law school. When you digest cases, answer examination
questions, and write your thesis or any other paper in law school, you
begin to train yourself for actual legal writing because the most basic
elements you need to apply in digesting cases and answering your law
school exams are the same ones you will use in legal writing in the
practice of law: the facts, the issue, and the arguments or principles of
law that resolve the issue.
Aims of the Book
The principal aim of this book is to help you write pleadings, legal
opinions, memoranda, and other position papers, clearly and
convincingly, and to win others to your point of view. Consequently,
apart from learning the general structure of effective legal writing, this
book will do more.
One. This book will help you identify and put together the facts on
which the issues of a case will be decided. As a rule, cases will not
come with the facts all sorted out for you. You will discover, as you
study the documents, hold interviews with the parties involved, or
simply examine the records, that the relevant facts in a case are far
from organized and come mixed up with the irrelevant. He who is able
to extract and organize the relevant facts would have the advantage of
arguing from uncluttered truth. You can get there if you persevere in
the lessons of this book.
Two. This book will also help you find the law or rule that applies to
your case given the nature of the legal dispute involved. You will
discover that laws are not restricted to those enacted by duly
constituted legislative bodies called “statute law.” A great body of
laws also evolves from judicial precedents, where courts interpret laws
as these apply to specific cases. This body of laws is referred to as
“case law.” Your knowledge of the law involved in your case, both
statute law and case law, must complement your knowledge of the
facts to prepare you for the job of writing to persuade your reader to
your point of view.
Three. This book will help you correctly identify the issue or issues
in a case. The issue does for an opinion or a pleading what the rudder
does for a ship. If you argue the wrong issue, it would be like pointing
your rudder to the wrong direction such that your argument would not
touch port and miss the real issue that the case presents. When this
happens, your case would be decided on an issue that you chose not to
be heard on. You can avoid this.
Four. This book will help you pack power into your arguments. It
will show you the elements of a balanced presentation of those
arguments and what it takes to destroy the argument of the opposite
side while building up your own. It will also show you the importance
of a closing statement and how you could prepare a most effective one.
Five. This book will show you how to edit your work, tighten your
sentences, and make your writing come through to your reader clearly.
A number of legal writing prescriptions in this book may appear
controversial to some but controversies initiate discussion and the free
marketplace of ideas always profits from it. All that is required is an
open mind.
Six. This book aims to help you write better. Some say that the
ability to write well is a natural gift that is not available to all. This
might be true. But the fact that you have gotten this far in your studies
gives you the right to assume that you have the gift to write. All you
have to do now is improve on your gift.
Master a few refurbished techniques collected in this book and you
are on your way to preparing adequate, clear, and convincing
pleadings, legal opinions, memoranda, and other position papers. Of
course, the greatest secret of success in writing well is in constantly
striving to use what you learn. They will not work unless you put them
into practice.
And beyond practice, to be a good a writer one must be a prolific
reader. Learn the styles of effective writers such as best selling authors,
opinion writers, and respectable journalists. During your stay in law
school you are forced to absorb the writing style used in laws and
jurisprudence, which may seem impressive but not the most effective
way of communication. This book will encourage you to view legal
writing as a communication skill as much as an advocacy skill.
2.
The Legal Dispute
A legal dispute lies at the heart of every case. In fact, most of your
writing assignments as a lawyer would probably be devoted to arguing
and resolving such a dispute.
Meaning of Legal Dispute

For the purpose of this book, there is a legal dispute when one
party complains of a violation of his right by another who, on the
other hand, denies such a violation. A legal dispute in this sense is
akin to a cause of action in a civil suit in which the defendant denies
the claim against him. It is this denial that tenders a legal dispute.
When a person renting an apartment allegedly could not pay the
agreed monthly rents yet refuses to leave his unit, a legal dispute
arises. This consists of: (a) the apartment owner’s claim that the
tenant fails to pay the agreed monthly rents and must leave his
unit; and (b) the tenant’s denial of the claim and insistence to retain
the unit. You have in this case a right protected by law, an alleged
violation of such right, and a denial of the allegation—a legal dispute.
The right claimed to have been violated must of course be a legal
right since courts will uphold and vindicate only those rights that are
established or recognized by law. For instance, a Filipino may claim
that he deserves to be allowed to travel to the United States. But, if the
U.S. embassy denies him the visa required for entry into that country,
he cannot file a lawsuit to compel its issuance since Philippine laws do
not grant him that right.
Likewise, the dispute over the demand that Filipino rather than
English be made the primary medium of instruction in all levels of
education is not a legal dispute since it does not involve an actual
violation of some right. The controversy, although of public interest,
will not to be resolved by litigation but by legislative action.
What is the legal dispute when a person allegedly refuses to pay his
debt? The legal dispute lies in: (a) the creditor’s claim that the
debtor unjustly refuses to pay his debt under a promissory note
that he issued in favor of the creditor; and (b) the debtor’s denial of
such a claim. Again, you have here a right protected by law, an alleged
violation of the right, and a denial of the allegation.
In a criminal case, the legal dispute consists in the State’s claim that
the accused has violated its right to compel obedience to its laws and in
the latter’s denial of the claim during his arraignment. So what does the
legal dispute consists of when a person defrauds another by selling a
fake Rolex watch to him for the price of a genuine one? This consists
of: (a) the State’s charge that the accused defrauded the
complainant by selling a fake Rolex watch to him for the price of a
genuine one; and (b) the accused’s denial of the charge.
Its Significance in Legal Writing

Why is it important in legal writing that you are able to know and
identify the legal dispute involved in a case?
Since a legal dispute involves a violation of a right protected by law
or which violation the law punishes, nothing less than the resolution of
such dispute could properly end it. Precisely, we say that a legal
dispute is at the heart of every case subject of legal writing because it
is like a tumor that would not go away until it is excised. Consequently,
if you fail to correctly identify the legal dispute and address it, you
would just be running around in circles, contributing nothing to its
final termination. That is how important it is!
Legal Dispute and the Principal Issue

As a rule, the legal dispute, recast in the format of an issue,
provides the principal issue in every case. Take the earlier case of the
tenant who could not pay the agreed monthly rents yet refuses to leave
his apartment unit. We said that the legal dispute consists in: (a) the
apartment owner’s claim that the tenant fails to pay the agreed monthly
rents and must leave his unit; and (b) the tenant’s denial of the claim
and insistence to retain the unit. Put in the format of an issue, the
principal issue is “whether or not the tenant who fails to pay the
monthly rents must leave the apartment unit.”
Take also the case of the person who refuses to pay his debt. We said
that the legal dispute lies in: (a) the creditor’s claim that the debtor
unjustly refuses to pay his debt under a promissory note that he issued
in favor of the creditor; and (b) the debtor’s denial of such a claim.
Rewritten in the format of an issue, the principal issue is “whether or
not the debtor unjustly refuses to pay his debt under a promissory
note that he issued in favor of the creditor.”
In the criminal case discussed above, we said that the legal dispute
consists in: (a) the State’s charge that the accused defrauded the
complainant by selling a fake Rolex watch to him for the price of a
genuine one; and (b) the accused’s denial of the charge. Recast as an
issue, the principal issue is “whether or not the accused defrauded
the complainant by selling a fake Rolex watch to him for the price
of a genuine one.”
What does the legal dispute consists of when a building official
issues to the owner an occupancy permit for a building with
inadequate fire exits? It consists of: (a) the complainant’s claim that
respondent building official issued to the owner an occupancy permit
for a building with inadequate fire exits in violation of Section 3(b) of
Republic Act 3019; and (b) the respondent’s denial of that claim.
Transformed into an issue, the principal issue is “whether or not
respondent building official issued to the owner an occupancy
permit covering a building that has inadequate fire exits in
violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act 3019.”
Importance of Principal Issue

Why is knowledge of the principal issue important to you? It is
important to you because your case will be decided for or against you
based on that issue. It is important because you judge the significance
of every argument that you want to use to persuade your reader by its
relevance to the principal issue. Any argument that does not touch base
with the principal issue or issues (there could be more than one
principal issue involved in a case) would be quite useless and a waste
of time.
3.
Stages of Writing
Legal writing, when methodically done, is much like a construction

of a building. You move in stages. You gather all the materials you
need, sort them out, cut them to size, and join them together according
to a plan. Before you end, you then give your building the finishing
work it requires.
Two Stages of Legal Writing

Legal writing also moves in stages. It has two main stages:
The First Stage is Pre-work. Here, you are at the beginning of your
writing assignment and are looking at the facts and evidence of the
case as they are made available to you. If it is a new case, the facts
might come from interviews of the persons involved in the problem or
from related documents that require sorting. These materials would be
absolutely raw. Quite often, the dates when the important events took
place are mixed up. On the other hand, if it is a case that has undergone
trial, you might be looking at the transcript of the testimonies of
witnesses and the documentary exhibits presented in the case.
Pre-work is a process. Whatever your assignment might be, your
pre-work would be inadequate unless you go through at least five
levels of efforts:
1. Establishing where the legal dispute lies in the case;
2. Discovering its relevant facts;
3. Knowing the laws or rules that apply to it;
4. Identifying the issue or issues that you would address; and
5. Roughing out the arguments that you would use.
The Second Stage is Write-up. Here, having all the ideas you need
concerning your legal writing assignment, your task is to put flesh,
color, and shape to them. You will now transform the sketches and
outlines you produced during pre-work into a full draft of the paper
required of you––a pleading, a legal opinion, a petition, a comment, a
memorandum, a position paper, or even a decision.
Editing and rewriting will complete the write-up stage.
Value of Pre-work
Most haphazardly finished legal writing can be traced to lack of pre-
work or to pre-work hastily done. The need for pre-work is true for all
kinds of presentations that are aimed to convince others to a certain
point of view. A successful salesman needs to have a complete
knowledge and mastery of his product, all its good points and bad.
With this edge, he can then develop his sales pitch or the line of
arguments he could draw from, polish them to perfection, and make a
sale. In a real sense, legal writing is a sort of presentation. The lawyer
should be able to make a convincing presentation of his case in the
limited time that he is able to hold his reader’s attention. To succeed in
this, the lawyer needs pre-work.
Lack of time to do pre-work, a frequent excuse, cannot be a valid
justification for dispensing with one. The writer who settles for an
opinion, pleading, or position paper not based on pre-work does not
care about the comprehensiveness and convincing quality of his work.
He just submits his work to his client or to the court for the sake of
meeting the deadline given to him. He does not care about its result.
This attitude, however, is the reason behind many failed legal writings
and careers. You do not want this.
4.
Getting at the Facts of the Case
Almost always, legal writing stands on two legs: (1) the facts and (2)
the laws involved in the case. And pre-work always starts with getting
the facts right.
Facts of a Case
When you study the facts of a case, you should not leave them until
you have come to a complete understanding of what the case is about
from every angle. When you are able to examine the position of the
opposite side just as you have examined that of your client, you would
be able to tell the latter that you know more about his case than he
does. You short-change your client when you casually read the facts
from your source materials without truly understanding and absorbing
their contents. Deep concentration and absorption is required of every
good preparation for a case.
Random Notes versus Summary

One way to study case materials is to make short random of the facts
of the case that you consider important as you go over them. This is a
good practice. But purely random notes do not give you the complete
picture. Because they are random, they are often uncorrelated and are,
therefore, useful only for work done in one sitting. When you set aside
your work and return to it after a long duration, your random notes
would have lost their correct meaning and you have to start all over
again. You would never be able to use these incomplete notes as a
permanent catalogue of the facts that you want to go back to repeatedly
at various stages of the proceedings in a case.
What you need is systematically prepared notes that adequately
capture the entire factual terrain of the case, with the important points
properly marked out. Studies in some English colleges show that there
is a better way than taking random notes for absorbing complex or
difficult texts or written materials. It is summarizing. You can best
understand and absorb written materials when you summarize their
contents. Your summary serves as a detailed map in your hand, able to
guide you in negotiating your way through the dispute involved.
Summarizing to compress the information you need, forces you to
search your materials for what is important. It compels you to toss an
item of fact over in your mind, assess its importance and relevance to
the issues in the case, and decide whether to keep it in or throw it out
of your summary. When you come to an item of fact and ask yourself,
“What is the significance of this fact to this case?” you begin to
wonder. Then, all your accumulated knowledge and experience bear on
that item of fact and, usually, your mind produces the right answer.
Facts seen through the Issue

When handling a new case, whatever stage you may find it, you
need to go over the materials very quickly and determine
preliminarily the principal issue or issues involved in the case. That
is your key to pre-work. Only when you have an idea of what the
principal issue is, could you make a good job of extracting the relevant
facts from your materials.
In a classroom experiment, the professor asked the students to do
pre-work by carefully reading the following facts about a case:
The Beers War

Atlas Brewery Company discovered that distributors
of San Manuel Brewery in Metro Manila had in their
warehouses hundreds of cases of empty beer bottles
owned by Atlas Brewery. The distributors of San Manuel
beer apparently bought the empty bottles from retailers
to reduce the volume of sales of Atlas beer in their areas.
The San Manuel beer distributors claimed, on the other
hand, that they merely retaliated against Atlas beer
distributors who had been buying and destroying the
empty bottles of San Manuel beer in their areas.
A law student, Fred Sanchez, complained that when he
drank beer with friends one evening in June at a
restaurant near his school, he found a cockroach in the
bottle of San Manuel beer that he had drunk from. He
vomited upon such discovery and suffered anxiety over
fear that he would get sick. He got angry with the
restaurant owner for serving the beer and threw the
bottle with the pest in it at him, causing injury on the
owner’s head. The restaurant owner blamed San Manuel
Brewery for the incident and sued it. San Manuel
Brewery, on the other hand, blamed Atlas Brewery and
its distributors for tampering with its products.
Fred Sanchez and his friends created a lot of noise
about poisoned San Manuel beer products and initiated
a boycott of those products. Their action found them
friends from among the Atlas Brewery distributors.
After the students read the above, they were asked to write in one
sentence a comprehensive summary of what the case is all about. They
were to complete the sentence: “The case is about…” Stop reading
after this paragraph for a moment and try to complete the sentence
yourself without re-reading the facts. “The case is about … . ”
The students gave a variety of answers but most of them gave the
equivalent of the following summaries:
1. The case is about the struggle between San Manuel
Brewery and Atlas Beer Company over the distribution
of their competing products.
2. The case is about how fierce competition in beer
distribution could be very ugly.
3. The case is about a law student’s crusade against
unsafe products that come out of the market.
4. The case is about tampering with bottled products
and the dangers it presents.
Actually, the facts above spoke of only one “case” ever having
developed among the parties involved. This is the lawsuit that the
restaurant owner filed against San Manuel Brewery for the injury he
suffered in the hands of an outraged customer whom he served with a
pest-laden bottle of beer. Did you get it right? Do not be discouraged if
you did not. Very few students perceived this detail because they did
not know what was expected of them when they read the article the
first time.
The point in the exercise is that, not knowing what they are looking
for, different people would tend to get different impressions out of the
same material that they have read. In the exercise, it is only after
reading the material are the students informed that they are to state
what the “case” is about.
Just how do you make a complete summary from raw data? One way
is to take out the non-essential facts from your written materials like
contracts, deeds, letters, records, books, testimonies or sworn
statements. Cross out those non-essential facts, leaving only the
essential ones on the page of each document or paper. Consider this
problem asked in a bar examination. The examiner probably picked up
the facts from the syllabus of the case and so indiscriminately copied a
lot of details that are not essential to the problem.
Section 10 of Ordinance No. 105 of Tagaytay City
provides that at least 5% of the total area of any
memorial park established within its jurisdiction shall be
set aside for charity burial of its pauper residents and
that no permit to establish, operate, and maintain a
private memorial park shall be granted without the
applicant’s conformity or agreeing to such condition.
The City argues that it is within its powers to pass said
ordinance; that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power; and that the portion taken is for public use, the
same being intended for paupers pursuant to its duty to
provide for the health and safety of its inhabitants.
Discuss the constitutionality of said ordinance.
The challenge is to make a short summary of the above by crossing
out the non-essential facts. Surely, you would be quite reckless if you
just wield a pen and cross out every word from the text that you fancy
as having of no use to you. What you need is a more precise pruning
knife. As already stated, that pruning knife is nothing else but your
understanding of the principal issue that the case presents. Only when
you know that issue or at least have a preliminary idea of what it is,
could you do a correct job of cutting away useless data to get to the
essential facts you need.
Fortunately, in the above problem, the bar examiner himself states
the principal issue for you: he wants you to “discuss the
constitutionality of the ordinance,” i.e., “whether or not it violates the
right that it seeks to regulate—the right of the owner to his land.”
Now, use this issue to prune away the facts that are not relevant to it.
Consider the first sentence of the problem:
Surely, the particular number of the ordinance involved (Ordinance
No. 105), the particular number of the section of the ordinance (Section
10), or the particular place where it was enacted (Tagaytay City) are
not relevant to the constitutionality of the ordinance. You will also note
that some details of the quoted problem are superfluous. For instance,
if the lots taken were to be “for charity burial,” it would be superfluous
to say that it would benefit “pauper residents.” Also, in the phrase “no
permit to establish, operate, and maintain a private memorial park,”
the words “establish” and “maintain” are superfluous because “to
operate” assumes these two terms.
The above sentence needed 63 words to describe the facts of the
problem. By crossing out the unneeded facts, what remains could be
summarized in only 26 words, less than half the original number. Thus,
rid of irrelevant details, your summary should read:
In practice, however, crossing out portions of the documents will
damage such documents and render them useless for other purposes.
Quite often, you need to preserve the documents in their original state.
Your alternative is to go over them, identify those facts that are
essential to your understanding of the issues in the case, and put those
facts in your outline.
provides that at least 5% of the total area of any memorial
park established within its jurisdiction shall be set aside
for charity burial of its pauper residents and that no
permit to establish, operate, and maintain a private
memorial park shall be granted without the applicant’s
conformity or agreeing to such condition.
Put together, the extracted facts should read like this:
The ordinance requires memorial parks to give away
to the poor 5% of their land area as a condition to being
granted permits to operate.
With the facts summarized in their barest essentials, it is now far
easier for you to see the problem in its simplest form. Do you agree?
You will no longer be distracted by unimportant and obtrusive facts.
Making a summary of the facts of the case you are tasked to write
about will do the same for you.
Cluttered Facts
As you have seen, it is only when you know the principal issue or at
least have a preliminary idea of what it is about that you could do a
correct job of making a summary of the facts of your case. Consider
the following testimonies, some conflicting, given by witnesses in an
actual rape case. The names have, of course, been changed. To make
the example simple for study, the transcripts have been edited and the
cross-examination by opposing counsels dispensed with. Go over it
once to enable you to get a sense of what the issue or issues are
between the parties.
Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN)
October 8
(Abridged and edited for study)
COURT STAFF: (After swearing in the witness) State
your name and personal circumstances.
WITNESS: I am Julia Torres, eighteen years old,
single, and a resident of Barrio Talaan, Lian, Batangas.
PROSECUTOR: With the Court’s permission. Do you
know Ronald Galang, the accused in this case?
A. Yes, sir. He is there (pointing to the accused).
Q. Why do you know him?
A. He raped me.
Q. Where did this happen?
A. It happened on the rice field near Mario’s house.
Q. How did Ronald rape you?
A. I struggled to get free but he pointed a knife at my
side and threatened to stab me if I called for help or
persisted in fighting back.
Q. So what did you do?
A. Out of fear, I gave in and he raped me.
Q. What did you do after Ronald raped you?
A. I kept the matter to myself for a while.
Q. Why?
A. Because I was afraid of the trouble that will happen
if my parents and brothers found out. They loved me so
much.
Q. For how long did you keep the matter to yourself?
A. After two days of worrying and feeling bad, I
finally told my aunt about it and she in turn told my
parents.
Q. What was the reaction of your parents?
A. They were quite furious and wanted to take the
matter into their own hands but cooler heads prevailed.
Q. So what did you do after that?
A. I went to the police to complain.
Q. Is that all that you did?
A. I also submitted myself to medical examination.
Q. When did Ronald rape you?
A. He raped me on June 12 at 7 p.m.
Q. How did you meet Ronald on June 12?
A. I went to the house of Celia in our barrio to attend
a wedding party and I saw him there.
Q. Do you have any relationship with Ronald?
A. None. He was only my suitor.
Q. What were your feelings during the party?
A. I was in high spirit because I met a lot of friends
and had a good time.
Q. Do you recall any unusual thing that happened at
that wedding party?
A. Someone exploded firecrackers nearby and this
caused a scare for a while.
Q. You said that you saw your suitor, Ronald, at the
party. Did you have occasion to talk to each other?
A. He wanted to talk to me but I ignored him because
I disliked him for a suitor. In fact, I stayed away from
him.
Q. What happened after you ignored him?
A. The married couple danced after supper and people
joined in.
Q. What did you do after the dancing?
A. At 11 p.m. I took leave to go and started to walk
home alone in the moonlight.
Q. Did anything unusual happen during your walk
home?
A. When I was about fifty meters from Mario’s house,
Ronald came behind me and requested that he walk me
home.
Q. What was your reaction to him?
A. I really did not like him. I declined and doubled my
steps.
Q. So what happened after you walked faster?
A. Ronald caught my arm and wrestled me to the
ground?
Q. What kind was the ground over there? A. It was
rough ground and dry.
Q. What did Ronald do while your were down on the
ground?
A. He covered my mouth with a hand so I could not
shout. He pointed a knife at me and forced me to yield to
him.
Q. Did it not bother you that you left the wedding
party alone by yourself?
A. No, sir. Walking alone did not bother me because I
knew everyone in the barrio.
Q. What route did you take going home?
A. I took a short cut across Mario’s farm, in the
direction of our house.
Q. Can you describe the path that you took?
A. The path was quite uneven and difficult.
Q. How was it?
A. I was used to it and I managed very well.
PROSECUTOR: That is all.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
October 12
WITNESS: I am Dr. Amado Ampil, of legal age,
married, and a medical examiner for the Province of
Batangas, and a resident of Batangas City.
PROSECUTOR: Have you ever examined a woman
by the name of Julia Torres?
A. Yes, I examined Julia Torres after she complained
to the Lian police that she had been raped. It took her
two days before reporting the incident.
Q. Could you describe her physical built?
A. She was of small built, 4 feet 11 inches in height,
and of fair complexion.
Q. What was your finding[s] after conducting a
medical examination of her?
A. I found after examining her body that she suffered
from laceration of the cervix posterior portion and
laceration of the vaginal canal posterior portion. The
lacerations are about two days old.
Q. Did you find any other injuries on her body?
A. None, sir.
Q. Did you prepare a medical report showing such
finding?
A. Yes, sir. This is my report. (Marked as Exhibit A.)
PROSECUTOR: That will be all.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
October 16
WITNESS: I am Ronald Galang, twenty years old,
DEFENSE COUNSEL: With the Court’s permission.
Do you know the complainant in this case, Ms. Julia
Torres?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. She testified that you raped her, what can you say
about that?
A. I did not rape Julia.
Q. But did you have sexual relation with her on the
evening of June 12?
A. Yes, sir. But she freely agreed to make love with me
that night of the wedding party at Celia’s house.
Q. The medical examiner testified that she found
lacerations on Julia’s vaginal canal when he examined
her two days later. What can you say about that?
A. That must be true. I discovered that evening that
Julia was a virgin because she bled. It worried me but
she said that it was not too painful.
Q. Did you communicate with each other after that
evening of June 12?
A. Julia called for me the following day, insisting that I
marry her because she was afraid she might have
become pregnant.
Q. What was your reply to her?
A. Because I had to look after my parents yet, I
declined, asking her to wait a while.
Q. And what was her reaction to that?
A. Julia became angry and threatened to complain to
her parents that I raped her.
Q. What was your reaction to what she said?
A. I still refused to marry her right away.
Q. So what did she do?
A. She accused me of raping her.
Q. What relation, if any did you have with Julia about
the time of the alleged rape?
A. Julia and I had been sweethearts for over two
months before June 12.
Q. How did you come to meet each other at that
wedding in Celia’s house?
A. On that evening we met by prior agreement at
Celia’s house right in our barrio.
Q. What happened when you met each other at that
wedding party?
A. Things started out well and I had some fun meeting
my friends. But, because of their jokes that I had some
other girl, Julia became angry and refused to talk to me.
Q. What did you do then?
A. I left to brood outside.
Q. How long did you stay outside?
A. Not too long. I returned to the party an hour later
after a friend called me inside.
Q. What did you do when the wedding party ended?
A. When the party ended, I walked alongside Julia
and tried to explain the jokes played by my friends.
Q. How did she react to your explanation?
A. She did not want to believe me at first. After
awhile, I convinced her to sit with me on a piece of log
near the house of Mario.
Q. What happened after you sat on that log?
A. The evening was romantic and we eventually
reconciled.
Q. What happened after you reconciled?
A. We kissed and embraced and, forgetting ourselves,
we made love on the grass.
Q. What did you do after you made love to Julia?
A. I walked with her up to about twenty meters of her
house.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: That is all.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
October 25

WITNESS: I am Mario Perez, forty-five years old,
married, farmer, and a resident of Barrio Talaan, Lian,
Batangas.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: With the court’s permission.
Do you remember where you were on the evening of
June 12?
A. I remember that I was home that evening of June
12.
Q. Why do you remember that evening?
A. I was told that a rape was committed on my farm
that evening and it so happened that my two-year old
daughter was then running a fever.
Q. Is it possible you went to bed early that evening?
A. I remember that I slept late because I had to watch
our sick daughter while my wife took her turn to rest.
Q. Was the farm visible that night?
A. The night was not so dark because the moon shone
brightly in the sky.
Q. What time did you go to bed after watching your
sick daughter?
A. I took my turn to sleep after midnight.
Q. During the time you were looking after your
daughter, do you remember hearing the outcry of a
woman from somewhere outside your house?
A. No. I heard no outcry from outside my house.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: That is all.
Obviously, the above testimonies contain much that is not connected
to the rape issue. They are filled with details that usually accompany
raw storytelling. When making a summary of them, whole sentences
can go and these would not affect the essence of the story.
Relevant Facts Extracted

Can you sort out the testimonies above and make a short summary
of the facts that really matter to the case? This is not difficult, as you
have earlier seen. Just remember the lesson you learned. First, try to
identify the legal dispute involved in the above case. Obviously, the
legal dispute consists in: (a) the government’s charge that Ronald raped
Julia; and (b) the latter’s denial of the charge. Second, rewrite the legal
dispute in the format of an issue to produce your principal issue then
put down this issue in bold print, and place it right before you as you
do your summarizing. Using this issue as guide, you can then peel
away from the narrations all the facts that are not connected to such
issue. It will hold you to your aim.
After rewriting your principal issue, it should read:
WHETHER OR NOT RONALD RAPED JULIA.
See how these lessons are applied to the testimony of Julia,
reproduced below. The facts relevant to the issue and essential to the
outline have been put in bold. The explanations for doing away with
the non-essential facts have been bracketed and [italicized.]
October 8
your name and personal circumstances. [Note: Obviously,
you do not need to put in your outline this statement about
the oath and the request made to the witness to state her
personal circumstances. They do not yield any fact of the
case.]
WITNESS: I am Julia Torres, eighteen years old,
[Note: The rape event tells a story. To make sense, every
story must say who are involved, what happened, when it
happened, where it happened, how it happened, and
possibly why it happened. These descriptions of Julia
Torres, the victim, are essential to appreciating her
humanity and put the legal dispute into its proper context.
Consequently you need them in your outline.]
PROSECUTOR: With the Court’s permission. Do you
know Ronald Galang, the accused in this case?
A. Yes, sir. [Note: When the witness says, “yes,” to a
question, the facts contained in the question, which she
affirms with her “yes” answer are implicitly incorporated
into the answer. If those facts are relevant, they should go
into your outline.] He is there (pointing to the accused).
A. He raped me. [Note: Surely relevant.]
Q. Where did this happen?
A. It happened on the rice field near Mario’s house.
[Note: This answers the question “where?”]
Q. How did Ronald rape you?
A. I struggled to get free but he pointed a knife at my
side and threatened to stab me if I called for help or
persisted in fighting back. [Note: Shows how it was
committed.]
Q. So what did you do?
A. Out of fear, I gave in [Note: Is this relevant to the
issue? Of course, for it shows why the rape succeeded.] and
he raped me. [Note: This is just a repeat of a previous
statement.]
Q. What did you do after Ronald raped you?
A. I kept the matter to myself for a while. [Note: Is this
relevant? Yes. Ordinarily, the victim of a grave wrongdoing
would complain about it to someone. Julia’s silence could
affect the credibility of her claim.]
Q. Why?
A. Because I was afraid of the trouble that will happen
if my parents and brothers found out. [Note: Since this is
Julia’s justification for incurring delay in reporting the
crime, it should be relevant like the preceding answer.] They
loved me so much. [Note: That her parents and brothers
loved her so much would have no bearing on the issue of
whether or not Ronald raped her.]
Q. For how long did you keep the matter to yourself?
A. After two days of worrying and feeling bad, I
finally told my aunt about it and she in turn told my
parents. [Note: Her reason for changing her mind and
eventually reporting the matter should also be considered
relevant in judging her credibility.]
Q. What was the reaction of your parents?
A. They were quite furious and wanted to take the matter
into their own hands but cooler heads prevailed. [Note: The
reaction is limited to her parents and brothers; it is
irrelevant to the rape issue.]
Q. So what did you do after that?
A. I went to the police to complain. [Note: Is this
relevant? Yes. Complaining to the police about the
commission of a crime lends credence to the claim that it
took place.]
Q. Is that all that you did?
A. I also submitted myself to medical examination.
[Note: Same reason as the above.]
Q. When did Ronald rape you?
A. He raped me on June 12 at 7 p.m. [Note: States the
time.]
Q. How did you meet Ronald on June 12?
A. I went to the house of Celia in our barrio to attend
a wedding party and I saw him there. [Note: This fact is
essential to an understanding of the antecedents of the
alleged crime.]
Q. Do you have any relationship with Ronald?
A. None. He was only my suitor. [Note: Some say that
this is irrelevant since it is possible for Ronald to rape Julia
whatever be their relationship. Others think, however, that
this is important since it shows that Ronald was attracted to
Julia.]
Q. What were your feelings during the party?
A. I was in high spirit because I met a lot of friends and
had a good time. [Note: Even if true, it does not help you
know whether or not Ronald raped Julia.]
Q. Do you recall any unusual thing that happened at that
wedding party?
A. Someone exploded firecrackers nearby and this caused
a scare for a while. [Note: Same as preceding observation.
Irrelevant.]
Q. You said that you saw your suitor, Ronald, at the party.
Did you have occasion to talk to each other?
A. He wanted to talk to me but I ignored him because
I disliked him for a suitor. In fact, I stayed away from
him. [Note: This is relevant because Julia’s attitude towards
Ronald, if true, would render it unlikely that she would let
him escort her home from the wedding party or have
consented sex with him.]
Q. What happened after you ignored him?
A. The married couple danced after supper and people
joined in. [Note: This fact has no bearing at all to the rape
case.]
Q. What did you do after the dancing?
A. At 11 p.m. I took leave to go and started to walk
home alone in the moonlight. [Note: This is relevant to the
issue because it shows the circumstances immediately
preceding the alleged rape.]
Q. Did anything unusual happen during your walk home?
A. When I was about fifty meters from Mario’s house,
Ronald came from behind me and requested that he
walk me home.
Q. What was your reaction to him? [Note: Same
observation as the preceding answer.]
A. I really did not like him. [Note: This is redundant, a
repetition of a previous statement.] I declined and doubled
my steps. [Note: This also sets the stage for the rape event.]
Q. So what happened after you walked faster?
A. Ronald caught my arm and wrestled me to the
ground? [Note: Use of force is an element of the rape.]
Q. What kind was the ground over there?
A. It was rough ground and dry. [Note: This could be
relevant if it somehow sheds light on the issue of whether or
not the rape took place.]
Q. What did Ronald do while you were down on the
ground?
A. He covered my mouth with a hand so I could not
shout. He pointed a knife at me and forced me to yield to
him. [Note: This is no doubt relevant since it tends to show
that Ronald raped Julia.]
Q. Did it not bother you that you left the wedding party
alone by yourself?
A. No, sir. Walking alone did not bother me because I
knew everyone in the barrio. [Note: This is relevant to
counter the claim that, being a woman, it was quite unlikely
for her to be walking home alone.]
Q. What route did you take going home?
A. I took a short cut across Mario’s farm, in the
direction of our house. [Note: This fact is needed to link
the other relevant facts together.]
Q. Can you describe the path that you took?
A. The path was quite uneven and difficult to ply. [Note:
This is probably irrelevant since it neither helps resolve the
issue of whether or not the rape took place nor does it help
tie the facts together.]
Q. How was it?
A. I was used to it and I managed very well. [Note: Same
observation as above.]
PROSECUTOR: That is all.
One thing wonderful about analyzing the facts to sort out the
relevant from the irrelevant is that such a process makes you see the
component parts of the problem and their relationships. And this
usually reveals to you some of the strengths and weaknesses of the
testimonies and the documents, the keys to developing the arguments
that you would eventually use when you start writing your paper. For
example, in analyzing whether Julia’s claim that she walked home
alone is relevant or not, one insight you got is that what she did was
rather unusual for a woman in the barrio to do. This could put a cloud
on her credibility.
Follow the same procedure in sorting out the testimonies of the
medical examiner, Ronald Galang and Mario Perez.
Facts Set in Sequence

Equally important to getting rid of irrelevant matters is putting the
events in the order of their occurrence. When the sequence of the
events is in disarray, with subsequent events told ahead of preceding
ones or with frequent flashbacks to the past as the story unfolds, you
are likely to get confused. You will be looking at items of facts that are
out of context or detached from their surrounding circumstances.
Take the testimony of Julia after the irrelevant facts have been
thrown out. It is far from being narrated in order of time. Thus––
–– Julia Torres is eighteen years old, single, and a

resident of Barrio Talaan, Lian, Batangas.
–– She knows Ronald Galang, the accused.
–– He raped her on the ricefield near Mario’s house.
[Julia’s testimony begins with the consummation of the
rape.]
–– She struggled to get free but he pointed a knife at
her side and threatened to stab her if she called for help
or persisted in fighting back. [She then backtracks a little
to narrate the struggle that preceded the sexual act.]
–– Out of fear, she gave in. [Here, Julia returns to the
consummation of the rape. In the next line, she moves
forward again.]
–– After the rape, she kept the matter to herself
because she was afraid of the trouble that will happen if
her parents and brothers found out.
–– After two days of worrying and feeling bad, she
finally told her aunt about it and the latter in turn told
her parents.
–– She went to the police to complain.
–– She submitted herself to medical examination.
–– He raped her on June 12 at 7 p.m. [Julia’s story
flashes back to the moment of the rape.]
–– She went to the house of Celia in our barrio to
attend a wedding party and she saw him there. [It is only
here that Julia tells how her story begins.]
–– Ronald was only her suitor.
–– He wanted to talk to her but she ignored him
because she disliked him for a suitor. In fact, she stayed
away from him.
–– At 11 p.m. she took leave to go and started to walk
home alone in the moonlight.
–– When she was about fifty meters from Mario’s
house, Ronald came behind her and requested that he
walk her home.
–– She declined and doubled her steps.
–– Ronald caught her arm and wrestled her on rough
and dry ground.
–– He covered her mouth with a hand so she could not
shout. He pointed a knife at her and forced her to yield
to him.
–– Walking alone did not bother her because she knew
everyone in the barrio.
–– She took a short cut across Mario’s farm, in the
direction of her house. [Julia ends her story at its middle
part, just before Ronald interferes with her journey home
and rapes her.]
If in writing your paper on the case, you choose to stick by the order
in which Julia tells her story, you could confuse your reader. Yet, it is
not difficult to sort out the facts and put them in the order of their
occurrence. Just spot the point where Julia’s story logically begins,
here, her encounter with Ronald at the wedding party, then, arrange
after it the other events in the order of their occurrence until you reach
the end of her story, her submission to medical examination.
Are you done? When you are done sorting out the facts in Julia’s
testimony, putting them in order, and drawing up your short summary,
it might look like the one below. The non-essentials have been
removed to reveal the essentials. Further, the order of the events has
been straightened out to show the correct sequence. The narration has
been rewritten to make the outline a third person narrative.
Julia Torres, eighteen years of age, single, said that she

went to the house of Celia at Barrio Talaan, Lian,
Batangas, on June 12 at 7 p.m. to attend a wedding
party. She saw her suitor, Ronald Galang, but ignored
him since she disliked him.
At 11 p.m. Julia took leave to go home alone. This did
not bother her because she knew everyone in the barrio.
She took a short cut across Mario Perez’s farm. About
fifty meters from the latter’s house, Ronald came behind
her and asked that he walk her home. She declined but
Ronald caught her arm and wrestled her on the rough
ground, covering her mouth so she could not shout.
Julia struggled to get free but Ronald pointed a knife
at her side and threatened to stab her. Out of fear, she
gave in and he ravished her.
After the rape, Julia kept the matter to herself for fear
of trouble if her parents and brothers found out. But, she
finally told her aunt. They went to the police and she
submitted to medical examination.
What benefits do you derive from arranging the facts in proper order
or sequence? The benefits are as follows:
1. The facts are easier to understand when put in the order of time.
The reason is simple: they follow a natural order or flow. Actual
human experience occurs in the order of time where one event follows
another with the ticking of the hour. A story that jumps ahead, goes
back to a previous event, and then returns to resume its advance where
it temporarily dropped off is unnatural. It can be quite confusing. The
human mind is not at ease with such a manner of storytelling.
2. When facts are arranged in the proper order, you would clearly
see how each fact relates to or connects with others. Each fact acquires
deeper significance when viewed along with related facts. That Ronald
sat on a piece of log with Julia would be meaningless if seen in
isolation. Before they sat on the log, she did not want to talk to him at
all. After sitting alongside each other on the log, they had a quick
romantic reconciliation. Their sitting on the log acquires significance.
3. When the factual versions of either side are put in order and
matched, you would also be able to see clearly the areas where the
respective versions agree and disagree. This in turn will furnish you
with a balanced appreciation of each opposing claim.
4. Facts, properly arranged, prepare you for the work of writing up
the facts of the case in your pleading or memorandum.
Apart from the benefits already mentioned above, making a
summary of your materials and arranging these in the proper sequence
enable you to create a compact index to the facts of the case, including
the testimonies and the documents you work on. Lawyers usually
handle a hundred cases at a time. With your compact summary, you do
not have to re-read your voluminous materials each time you want to
be reminded of the important details of the case. Your summary will be
your map in guiding you throughout the course of trial of the case and
during appeal.
Writing Exercises
1. For exercise, sort out the rest of the testimonies in the rape case,
make a summary of the relevant facts, and arrange them in order.
2. You have seen how little data are important to a case when the
facts have been sorted out for relevance and order. Consider the
following sample case:
The Case of a Child and a Neighbor’s Dog

Peter Banag, the father of a child who was attacked by a
neighbor’s dog, has come to consult you about the
possibility of his bringing a lawsuit against Arthur Sison, a
neighbor. Peter brought along Fred Puzon to the interview.
Fred witnessed what happened. The following is your
interview with him:
Interview with Mr. Fred Puzon,

accompanied by client, Mr.
Peter Banag. Sept. 21
Q. Fred, how old are you?
A. I am twenty-one, Attorney.
Q. What do you do for a living?
A. I work with the government.
Q. Where do you live?
A. I live at 24 Annapolis St., Cubao, Quezon City.
Q. Did you see the dog attack Mr. Banag’s daughter?
A. Yes, sir. I saw it bite Mary’s leg and even her arms
as she fell to the ground.
Q. Do you know who owned that dog?
A. Yes, sir, the dog belonged to Arthur Sison.
Q. What did you do when you saw the dog attack
Mary?
A. I immediately ran to help her but, unfortunately, I
tripped on the gutter and fell on my hands and knees.
Q. So what happened?
A. I recovered quickly, moved on, and kicked the dog
away. I then stood by to protect Mary from further
attacks.
Q. What happened to the dog?
A. The dog kept on barking and looked as if it would
attack us.
Q. Did it attack you?
A. No because Arthur came out of his house and sent
his dog into his yard.
Q. How about Mary, what happened to her?
A. Arthur picked her up, called a tricycle, and brought
her to a nearby clinic for treatment.
Q. And you, what did you do?
A. My friend then arrived and we left for the mall.
Q. Did you know how old Mary was at that time?
A. I found out that he was about six years old.
Q. How did you get to know Arthur?
A. We are neighbors. He lives at 12 Annapolis Street,
the same street where I lived.
Q. Do you know why Mary was near Arthur’s house?
A. She went there to buy ice-candies. Arthur had been
selling ice-candies at his house for sometime.
Q. How did you know that?
A. I myself used to buy ice-candies from him especially
during summer.
Q. When did the incident involving Mary happen?
A. It happened on September 12 at about 3 p.m.
Q. What were you doing at that time?
A. I was waiting on Annapolis Street for my friend
Henry Uy to come and pick me up so we could go to the
mall.
Q. Do you remember what day of the week it was?
A. It was a Saturday afternoon.
Q. What did you see Mary doing from where you
stood?
A. I saw Mary approach Arthur’s gate and knock on
it. But no one answered.
Q. So what did she do?
A. Still she kept on knocking softly at the gate.
Q. What happened next?
A. A young girl of her age passed by and Mary waived
at her.
Q. So what happened next?
A. Arthur’s dog came out to the yard. As Mary tested
the gate by pushing it, the gate yielded and the dog
jumped out.
Q. What did Mary do?
A. She held the gate open and called in saying that she
wanted to buy ice-candy. “Pagbilan nga po ng ice-
candy,” she said.
Q. So what happened?
A. That was the time I saw the dog go after her. It
attacked her from behind as she turned and ran to leave.
Q. What was your reaction to what you saw?
A. I was shocked for a moment.
You asked Peter why he came to consult with you and he said that he
asked Arthur to pay her daughter P20,000.00 in damages for what she
suffered but all he got was a letter from him. He gave you the
following letter.
Mr. Peter Banag

16 Annapolis St.,
Cubao, Quezon City
Dear Mr. Banag:
I regret that I could not grant your demand to pay you
P20,000.00 for the injuries that your daughter suffered
on September 12 when she came to my house at 12
Annapolis Street, Cubao, Quezon City. I was not at fault.
I was napping in my house on the afternoon your
daughter came to our gate. I was awakened when I
heard some commotion outside. I thought for a while
that people were quarreling. But I heard someone
shouting that my dog had attacked a child. I immediately
got up and ran out. As I did, I saw Fred Puzon, our
neighbor, trying to stop my dog, Prancer, from attacking
your daughter, Mary, who lay on the ground just outside
the gate. Other neighbors had started to come out to see
what was happening.
To augment the income of my family, I engaged in the
business of selling ice-candies at my house beginning in
March of last year. My sale had been brisk especially
during the summer days. I always sold my ice-candies at
the gate when people came to buy. That gate had an
automatic closer. But at times, I left it unlocked from the
inside because my children often went in and out. I had a
dog in my house, Prancer, but my gate carried a written
warning about the presence of that dog. Until that
afternoon of September 12, Prancer had not attacked
any one.
I immediately stepped out into the street as soon as I
can and sent Prancer inside. I was really surprised that
you had allowed your daughter to leave the house
without an escort. I myself took care that my young
children did not go out alone.
At any rate, I called a tricycle and brought Mary to a
medical clinic nearby for treatment of her wounds and
for an injection. Later, her mother followed us to the
clinic and she comforted her daughter. I paid the medical
bill.
I am sorry but I do not believe that I should be liable
to your daughter for damages.
Very truly yours,
Arthur Sison
Before you could give Mr. Banag your legal opinion on his case, you
need to do pre-work. Sort out the relevant facts from the irrelevant and
put the relevant facts in order. As in the rape case, try provisionally to
identify the legal dispute and get a sense of the principal issue that
divides your client, Peter, and his neighbor, Arthur. Have a clear
understanding of that issue and use it to guide you in extracting the
useful facts of the case. Then make a short summary of the facts from
your client’s point of view as well as from that of Arthur. Put your
work on paper.
5.
Knowing the Applicable Law or Rule
After working on the testimonies and documents in your case, you

would have produced an outline of the facts that are relevant to the
legal dispute that it presents. Now you are ready to make a search for
those specific laws or rules that, applied to the facts, will either help or
burden you in prosecuting or defending your side of the dispute.
Sources of Law or Rule

There are two general sources of laws and rules:
Statute law: This consists of laws and rules enacted by duly
constituted rule-making authorities like Congress (Republic Acts and
Batas Pambansa), the President (Presidential Decrees and Executive
Orders), the Supreme Court (Rules of Court), local government
councils (city or municipal ordinances), and administrative regulatory
agencies (implementing rules and regulations).
Case law: This consists of decisions of courts and persons or
agencies performing judicial functions. These decisions interpret and
apply statute law to specific situations. The rulings in these cases
become legal precedents that, when invariably affirmed and used,
become part of the law itself.
But just how do you locate the right law and legal precedents? Two
steps are suggested:
First. Identify the general nature of the legal dispute involved. In the
case between Julia and Ronald, the legal dispute consists in the
government’s allegation that Ronald had sex with Julia, employing
force and intimidation in violation of law, and in Ronald’s denial of the
charge. The case, therefore, concerns a crime that involves chastity.
This should lead you to the statute law on rape, namely, Article 266-A
of the Revised Penal Code. It reads:
Article 266-A. Rape; when and how committed. ––

Rape is committed —
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force or intimidation.
x x x x x x x x x
Second. Having become familiar with the facts of your case, search
for legal precedents that have more or less parallel facts. Nothing is
new in this world. You will discover that there is hardly any new case
that would have no parallel or similarity to a previous case that a court
or quasi-judicial body has once decided. Find the rulings in those
parallel case, whether for or against your side of the dispute, and you
will have more confidence in charting the course of your arguments.
Usually, it is the diligent that succeeds in tunneling the whole depth of
case law to extract the gold nuggets he needs to prevail in his assigned
case. Seize that advantage.
In rape cases, both the prosecution and the accused will find
Philippine jurisprudence rich in judicial precedents that will help their
case. Consider the following:
For the Prosecution

In the review of rape cases, jurisprudence has laid
down the following guiding principles: a) an accusation
in rape can be made with facility and while the
accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult
for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove the
charge; b) considering that, in the nature of things, only
two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the
testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with
great caution; and c) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merit and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense. (People v. Sta. Ana, G.R. 115657,
June 26, 1998.)
The failure of the victim to immediately report the
rape is not necessarily an indication of a fabricated
charge. (People v. Casil, 241 SCRA 285; People v.
Montefalcon, G.R. 111944, April 25, 1995.)
The absence of physical injury does not negate the
commission of rape. (People v. Gapasan, 243 SCRA 53.)
It would be improbable for a barrio girl of tender age
and definitely inexperienced in sexual matters to
fabricate a charge for no reason at all that will put
herself and her family in a very uncompromising
situation, which could even invite reprisal. (People v.
Vitor, 245 SCRA 392.)
Failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not
make voluntary the rape victim’s submission to the
criminal act of the accused. (People v. Marabillas, 303
SCRA 352.)
Threatening the victim with a knife, a deadly weapon,
is sufficient to cow the victim and it constitutes an
element of rape. (People v. Alquizalas, 305 SCRA 367.)
For the Defense
Although the “sweetheart theory” has not gained
favor with the courts, such is not always the case if the
hard fact is that the accused and the supposed victim
are, in truth, intimately related except that, as is usual in
most cases, either the relationship is illicit or the victim’s
parents are against it. (People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676.)
In rape cases, the claim of the complainant of having
been threatened appears to be a common expedient of
face-saving subterfuge. (People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676.)
Courts will take judicial notice of the fact that in the
rural areas, young ladies are strictly required to act with
circumspection and prudence and great caution is
observed so that their reputation will remain intact.
(People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676.)
In rape cases, the testimony of the offended party
must not be accepted with credulity. (People v. Godoy,
250 SCRA 676.)
As to be reasonably expected, a ravished woman
would instinctively call for help or at least flee her
lecherous captor to safer ground when opportunity
present itself. (People v. Sinatao, 249 SCRA 554.)
It is strange that even as complainant asserts sexual
abuse through violence and intimidation, she did not
offer any resistance when assaulted, an unlikely impulse
for a woman confronted with such an affront to her
honor, and it is odd that her supposed rape appears to be
punctiliously made. (People v. Sinatao, 249 SCRA 554.)
Apart from above sources of laws and rules, you have rules that
derive from the wisdom of common experience. These are especially
useful in resolving factual issues. Our jurisprudence is rich in these.
For example:
Errorless recollection of a harrowing incident cannot
be expected of a witness, especially when she is
recounting details of an experience so humiliating and so
painful as rape. (People v. Calayca, 301 SCRA 192.)
Fear has its bizarre way of rendering people immobile
even in life-and-death situations. (People v. Realin, 301
SCRA 495.)
Even the most trustful witnesses can sometimes make
mistakes but such innocent lapses do not necessarily
affect their credibility. (People v. Reduca, 301 SCRA 516.)
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from
the mouth of a credible witness but it must also be
credible in itself, such that common experience and
observation of mankind lead to the inference of its
probability under the circumstances. (People v. Perucho,
305 SCRA 770; People v. Lagmay, 306 SCRA 157.)
Inconsistency concerning a minor matter does not
affect the credibility of complainant’s testimony. (People
v. Empante, 306 SCRA 250.)
Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight
may, in proper situation, be considered sufficient
illumination, making the attack on the credibility of
witnesses solely on that ground unmeritorious. (People v.
Adoviso, 309 SCRA 1.)
The test to determine the value of the testimony of a
witness is whether or not such is in conformity with
human knowledge and consistent with the experience of
mankind. (People v. Dela Cruz, 313 SCRA 189.)
Match the applicable laws or rules with the relevant facts of your
case and you are ready to work on your arguments. Get a good book in
legal bibliography and learn how to search for the statutes and judicial
precedents that you need. These topics are not embraced in this book.
Facts Reexamined
Having discovered the laws or rules that apply to your case, you
should now be in a better position to review your summary of the facts
and add to it the other relevant facts that you may have omitted. You
could also subtract from your summary those facts that now appear
irrelevant to the applicable laws or rules and precedents that you have
discovered.
Writing Exercises
1. Go back to the case that Peter Banag consulted you with,

namely, the dog’s attack of her little daughter. Presumably, you
did your pre-work, sorted out the relevant from the irrelevant
facts, and put your facts in order. Consequently, you must
already have on paper an outline of the facts that you abstracted
from your interview with Fred Puzon and from Arthur Sison’s
letter to your client. Based on the issues and the facts, check out
and copy the laws or the rules that should properly govern them.
2. Check out too those parallel cases that the Supreme Court has
previously decided. See if the rulings and doctrines established
in these cases could be cited against you or to your advantage.
Put them all on paper as part of your pre-work.
6.
Getting Into the Issues
After making a short outline of the relevant facts of the case and
after ascertaining the laws or rules that apply to those facts, your next
step in pre-work is to pinpoint the specific issues that the conflicting
claims of the parties present and to put those issues down in writing.
Identifying the issues and writing them on paper are indispensable to
all kinds of legal writing for a simple reason: everything you write—
the facts, the law, the argument, and the relief—must take bearing on
those issues. You write aimlessly when you are unable to understand
the issues in your case or are unable to hold on to it.
You have learned that, as a general rule, the legal dispute itself,
recast in the format of an issue, provides the principal issue in every
case. You also learned that knowledge of the principal issue is
important because any argument you make will benefit you only to the
extent that you are able to relate it to that issue.
For example, the issue of whether or not Julia Torres ignored Ronald
Galang at the wedding party because she disliked him (rather than, as
Ronald claimed, she was angry with him because of the jokes played
by his friends) is remotely relevant to the principal issue of whether or
not Ronald raped Julia. In both cases, she ignored him and whether she
did for one or the other reason will not shed much light on the issue of
rape.
Issues in Multiple Legal Disputes

Not all cases present one legal dispute that converts into one
principal issue. A lawsuit could involve multiple legal disputes and,
therefore, multiple principal issues. This is particularly true in civil
cases where there could be as many legal disputes as there are claims
of violations of separate rights of the parties. In these cases, you should
address each of the principal issues that the several legal disputes
present.
Occasionally, however, multiple legal disputes could converge into
one controlling issue. For example, in a lawsuit, Rudy Solis, a music
composer, claims that his friend Sergio Gomez appropriated as his own
and sold to a record company a song that he (Solis) had created.
Gomez’s denial of this claim would create the first legal dispute. A
further claim of Solis that Gomez maligned him as a thief of
intellectual property and Gomez’s denial of this additional claim would
constitute a second legal dispute in the case. Gomez, on the other hand,
claims that it was Solis who tried to steal the song from him. Solis’
denial of this claim would create the third legal dispute. A further
claim by Gomez that the lawsuit was malicious and Solis’ denial of this
claim would establish the fourth legal dispute.
The claims, the denials, and the counterclaims produce four legal
disputes in all because four rights were allegedly violated—two from
each side. Yet all these dispute seem to depend on just one controlling
issue: whether or not, Solis or Gomez, created the song. It would be
helpful to be aware that this convergence to one controlling issue could
happen. What is essential is to spot the controlling issue, the resolution
of which serves as the key to resolving the multiple legal disputes.
Subordinate Controlling Issues

Quite often, the resolution of the principal issue in a case depends
on how a subordinate issue raised in connection with it is resolved.
For example, the resolution of the principal issue of whether or not the
tenant has violated the lease by not paying the rent might depend on
the subordinate issue of whether or not the rent may be deemed paid by
a set off of the lessor’s separate debt to the tenant.
A second example would be the case of the tenant who did not pay
the rents, because he has in the meantime acquired ownership of the
apartment from the bank that foreclosed the mortgage on it. The
resolution of the principal issue would now depend on the subordinate
issue of whether or not the tenant subsequently acquired ownership of
the leased property. In these examples, the subordinate issues have
become the controlling issues that would decide the outcome of the
case.
Consider another example. Relying on advertisements about the
benefits to women of a facial cream called Maxim, Pacita Guerrero
bought the cream from a supermarket and used it. She developed
rashes that left scars on her face. She sued Maxim & Co., the
manufacturer of the cream, for damages. But the latter invoked the
small prints on the label of the cream container that warned against
possible allergy in the use of the cream. Since every consumer has the
right to buy only safe products from cosmetic manufacturers, Guerrero
claims that Maxim & Co. violated this right when it sold to her a facial
cream that harmed her face. Maxim denies this claim, however, stating
that Guerrero has been forewarned of possible allergy and that she
accepted the risk when she bought and used the cream.
The fact that Guerrero suffered rashes in using Maxim’s cream is
admitted. The legal dispute consists in Guerrero’s claim that Maxim
violated her right to be sold only safe products and Maxim’s denial of
the claim. The principal issue emanating from this dispute, then, is
whether or not Maxim violated Guerrero’s right to be sold only safe
products. The resolution of this issue depends, however, on the
subordinate controlling issue raised by the nature of Maxim’s
defense: whether or not Maxim has the right to market cosmetic
products that could cause harmful allergy to some, provided that the
product label discloses this risk.
In the case of the public works project director and his men who
allowed a private contractor to deviate from the agreed building plan
and reduce his scope of work yet got paid the original agreed price,
these public officers may raise the defense that the government ordered
an additional job done in exchange for the reduction in the scope of the
earlier agreement. The issue would be whether or not such an
agreement existed.
Relevant and Irrelevant Issues

Quite often, the opposing parties make conflicting claims regarding
the facts of the case in their pleadings or testimonies. Must you discuss
all the factual issues raised by these conflicting claims? Not all issues
raised in a case merit discussion and resolution. Only relevant issues
matter. Conflicting claims on collateral matters, if discussed to
establish the lack of credibility of a witness, could be relevant to the
side issue of whether or not to believe the testimony of that witness. As
a rule, however, only issues that when resolved determine the
outcome of the legal dispute are relevant to the case.
For instance, in the rape case, Ronald Galang claims that he was
Julia Torres’ boyfriend but she denies it, asserting that he was merely
her suitor. The issue regarding the character of their relationship is
relevant because, while it is possible for a man to rape his girlfriend, it
seems improbable that he would do so considering the love that binds
them. What is more, a finding that Ronald was Julia’s boyfriend would
establish her as a liar because she testified that he was merely her
suitor. This would discredit Julia’s other testimonies.
Conversely, irrelevant issues have no value in a case even if they
are debated and resolved since they are of no consequence to the
outcome of the legal dispute. For example, also in the rape case, the
issue of whether or not Ronald is a good son for preferring to look after
his parents rather than marry Julia is irrelevant. Being a good or a bad
son would not really help resolve the legal dispute that centers on
Julia’s charge that he raped her on the night in question and his denial
of the charge. Some good sons commit rape.
Is the subordinate issue of whether or not the winning contractor in a
government project is a “kumpare” of the head of the bidding
committee relevant to the charge that the latter gave that contractor
undue benefit? The answer is yes since that relationship could create a
bias. Is the issue of whether or not the bidding committee head arrived
five minutes late for the bidding relevant to that charge? Here, unless
his late arrival resulted in some favor to a bidder, the answer is no.
The lesson here is that you must distinguish between relevant and
irrelevant issues, dropping the irrelevant and focusing only on the
relevant. This is important because your discussion of irrelevant issues
would produce no advantage and might even weaken your position in
the case. On the other hand, if you make a mistake and drop a relevant
issue, you might be forfeiting that issue to your client’s loss.
A list of All the Issues

Issues are not too difficult to spot. There is an issue when the
contending parties do not agree on a given point. To detect an issue,
all you need to do is compare the facts and the laws that the two sides
claim and identify the areas of their disagreement. For closer
evaluation, it should make sense in pre-work to draw up a list of all the
issues that the opposing claims of the parties present. But, first, it
should equally make sense to take note of what the parties agree on.
Take the rape case. Both Ronald and Julia agreed that they attended
the wedding party at Barangay Talaan, Lian, Batangas, on the evening
of July 12. They disagreed, however, on the rest of what happened.
The following are the issues that their conflicting claims raise:
1. Whether or not Ronald was Julia’s suitor;
2. Whether or not she ignored him at the party because she disliked
him;
3. Whether or not she walked home alone from the party;
4. Whether or not Ronald caught up with her on the ricefield and
grabbed her;
5. Whether or not Ronald raped Julia, employing force and
intimidation; and
6. Whether or not Julia was prompted by a genuine desire for
justice in filing the charge of rape against Ronald.
In the above, the dominant issue is the fifth, whether or not Ronald
raped Julia, employing force and intimidation, since it embodies both
the principal issue and the legal dispute that the case presents. As for
the first issue in the list, whether or not Ronald was Julia’s suitor, it
may be regarded as a subordinate issue since its resolution could shed
light on the principal issue. As for the second issue in the list, whether
or not Julia ignored Ronald at the party, we have already said that this
is remotely relevant to the principal issue and so could be dropped
from the discussion.
But how about the other issues we identified above, namely, the
third, whether or not Julia walked home alone; the fourth, whether or
not Ronald caught up with her and grabbed her; and the sixth, whether
or not Julia was prompted by a genuine desire for justice in filing the
charge of rape against Ronald? Does each of these issues merit
separate discussions in the argument?
The answer is no. These three factual issues are intimately related
and may be considered as mere circumstances absorbed in the
controlling issue of whether or not Ronald raped Julia, using force and
intimidation. Julia’s walking home alone and Ronald’s catching up
with her to grab and wrestle her to the ground are closely related
antecedents of the rape. There is no point in discussing these
conflicting claims apart from the rape itself if no separate arguments
could be arrayed in support of each. On the other hand, Julia’s desire to
file criminal charges against Ronald is but a natural consequence of the
rape, if it indeed took place. It, too, need not be addressed
independently of the controlling issue of whether or not Ronald had
sex with Julia, using force and intimidation.
Let us consider the following claims, based on an actual case. For
study, they have been simplified to highlight the issues that the litigants
tender for adjudication:
Allan: I shipped frozen shrimps from Davao to Manila on Ben’s
vessel, using a refrigerated container rented from Cesar. The shrimps
arrived already spoiled in Manila due to the negligence of Ben or Cesar
or both.
Ben: I am not liable. The refrigerated container was defective. It was
old. My vessel’s captain was highly efficient in navigation.
Cesar: My refrigerated container was not old. It was in good
condition. The vessel’s crew was negligent in checking the power
supply to the container. I deny that the ship’s captain was a highly
efficient navigator. I insured myself with Dante’s Insurance against
damages to the shrimps while in my container during the voyage.
Dante: I am not liable since Cesar did not file his claim within 10
days of the discovery of the damages as the policy required.
The above presents two distinct legal disputes. There is a legal
dispute, we said, when one party complains of a violation of his right
by another who, on the other hand, denies such a violation. Under this
definition, the legal disputes consist of:
a) Allan’s claim that Ben and Cesar were negligent in

handling the shrimps and Ben and Cesar’s denial of the
claim; and
b) Cesar’s claim that Dante unjustifiably refused to honor
his liability under the insurance policy for the spoiled
shrimps and Dante’s denial of the claim.
The conflicting claims of the parties generate seven issues. Are all
these issues relevant to the legal disputes that the case presents? Let us
consider each of these issues:
1. Whether or not Ben and Cesar were negligent in handling the
shrimps (relevant since it is a statement of one of the principal issues in
the case);
2. Whether or not Cesar is entitled under the insurance policy to
reimbursement from Dante for liability for the damage to the shrimps
(relevant being a statement of one of the principal issues);
3. Whether or not the refrigerated container was defective (relevant
being determinative of Cesar’s liability);
4. Whether or not the refrigerated container was an old unit
(although an old unit could be in good running condition, its age could
give credence to the claim that it bogged down during the voyage, a
relevant point);
5. Whether or not the vessel’s captain was highly efficient in ship
navigation (this is definitely irrelevant unless it can be shown that the
shrimps died of dizziness because of the vessel’s bumpy ride);
6. Whether or not the vessel’s crew was negligent in checking the
power supply to the container (relevant being determinative of Ben’s
liability); and
7. Whether or not Cesar filed his claim against the insurance policy
on time (relevant being determinative of Dante’s liability).
Which among the above issues are controlling, meaning that the
outcome of the case hangs on their resolution? The third, whether or
not the refrigerated container was defective, could determine Cesar’s
liability; the sixth, whether or not the vessel’s crew was negligent in
checking the power supply to the container, could determine Ben’s
liability; and the seventh, whether or not Cesar filed his claim against
the insurance policy on time, could determine Dante’s liability.
Factual and Legal Issues
All too often, the conflicting claims of the parties could tender
factual as well as legal issues. An issue is factual when the
contending parties cannot agree that a thing exists or has actually
happened. For example, there is a factual issue when the prosecution
claims that the accused took and pocketed the victim’s cellular phone
during the time they were both in the library while the accused claims
that he did not and, in fact, never even went near the victim. The
factual issue in this case is whether or not the accused took and
pocketed the victim’s cellular phone.
Suppose the complainant claims that the traffic officer demanded a
bribe in exchange for returning complainant’s driver’s license while the
traffic officer claims that he did not. Is the issue of whether or not the
traffic officer demanded a bribe in exchange for returning
complainant’s driver’s license a factual or legal issue? It is a factual
issue.
There is also a factual issue when the plaintiff claims that the food
he ate at the defendant’s restaurant was spoiled while the latter claims
that it was not. Here, the factual issue is whether or not the food
plaintiff ate in the defendant’s restaurant was spoiled.
On the other hand, an issue is legal when the contending parties
assume a thing exists or has actually happened but disagree on its
legal significance or effect on their rights. For example, in a case of
rape, the prosecution and the defense might agree that the male organ
of the accused merely touched the sex organ of the victim and did not
penetrate it, yet they could disagree on whether or not the fact
amounted to rape. You have here the legal issue of whether or not there
is rape when the male organ merely touched the surface of the female
organ.
Suppose the respondent in an administrative case admits falsifying
his timecard to collect overtime pay from the government agency he
works for. Is the issue of whether or not respondent has, in falsifying
his timecard to collect overtime pay, committed grave misconduct that
warrants dismissal a factual or legal issue? It is a legal issue.
There is also a legal issue when there is an agreement that the
deceased died of cancer because of heavy smoking, but the family he
left behind and the cigarette company being sued disagree on the
latter’s liability for such death. The legal issue in this case then is
whether or not cigarette companies are liable for deaths caused by
smoking their products.
Correct statement of the Issues

Because the statement of the issue or issues in a case is critical to an
effective and focused legal writing, every issue should be correctly
phrased.
One. For instance, why are the statements of the issues preceded by
the words “whether or not”? By using the introductory words “whether
or not,” you automatically incorporate the opposing views, the positive
and the negative, into one statement of the issue. It, therefore, makes
for a fair statement of that issue.
Two. You will notice that the issues listed above are stated in terms
of what Julia claims the fact to be (e.g., whether or not Ronald was her
suitor) rather than in terms of Ronald’s opposite claims (whether or not
she was his sweetheart). The reason for this is that the plaintiff or the
accuser in a case always bears the burden of proving the affirmative of
his or her claims. As a general rule, therefore, the issues to be tried and
decided are best defined in terms of those affirmative claims.
For example, will you say “whether or not the defendant was
negligent in driving his car” or “whether or not the defendant was
careful in driving his car?” Since the plaintiff or the accuser in a case
always bears the burden of proving the affirmative of his claim, the
issues to be tried and decided are best defined in terms of those
affirmative claims.
An exception to this is when the defendant, the respondent, or the
accused in the case admits the facts constituting the claim against him
but raises a defense that exempts him from liability under it. For
example, the accused in a criminal case might admit that he killed his
victim yet pleads self-defense to avoid liability. In such a case, the
issue would be defined in terms of the defense he invokes: whether or
not the accused killed the victim in self-defense.
Three. Another thing is that the statement of the issue must be fair,
not slanted in favor of a party. For example, the statement of the issue
“whether Ronald used force or intimidation in raping Julia,” is not fair
since it already assumes that he raped her. The reader will detect the
resort to a slanted statement of the issue and doubt the integrity of the
advocating lawyer.
Four. The statement of the issue should also be comprehensive,
leaving no relevant point outside its embrace. For example, in the rape
case, “whether or not Ronald raped Julia,” is sufficiently
comprehensive to cover all subordinate issues of significance,
including whether or not the two are sweethearts.
Five. The statement of the issue must be specific and clear. For
instance, in a case involving the constitutionality of a law passed by
Congress, the statement of the issue, “whether or not the law is valid,”
is too ambiguous. It lacks sufficient details to enable the reader to
understand what matter is involved and follow the arguments in the
case. A clearer statement of the issue would be “Whether or not the
Bouncing Checks Law violates the constitutional right against being
imprisoned for non-payment of debt.” The writer must modify his
statement of the issue to cover the area of the case that he has chosen to
attack or defend.
Six. Try at all times to capture in your statement of the issue, the gist
or essence of the specific violation of right that the defendant
committed. Take the case of the debtor who refuses to pay what he
owes under the promissory note that he executed in favor of another. Is
it sufficient to say that the issue is “whether or not the debtor is liable
to the creditor?” No, you should rather say that the issue is “whether or
not the debtor unjustly refuses to pay his debt under a promissory note
that he issued in favor of the creditor.”
Is it sufficient to say that the issue is “whether or not the respondent
building official violated Section 3(b) of Republic Act 3019?” No, it
would be better to say, “whether or not the building official issued to
the owner an occupancy permit for a building that has inadequate fire
exits, in violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act 3019.”
An issue stated in this way will keep you on course when you write
your memorandum, position paper, decision, or petition.
Threshold Issues
One final point in this discussion: you must not overlook threshold
issues that cases sometimes present. Threshold issues are those that
could slam the door to any judicial consideration of the case on its
merits. For instance, a court could not decide a case falling outside the
scope of its authority, a case filed in the wrong place, a case filed by
the wrong party, or a case filed after too many years. Usually, threshold
issues are brought out by a motion to dismiss in a civil action or a
motion to quash in a criminal action, filed before the issues on the
merit of the case are joined by the filing of an answer in the first or a
plea of not guilty in the second.
The resolution of these threshold issues and similar others takes
precedence over the main legal disputes. For example, in the rape case,
if the criminal information is filed with the Municipal Trial Court
rather than the Regional Trial Court where it belongs, there is a
threshold issue of whether or not the former court has authority or
jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In any event, pleadings that
address threshold issues are crafted in the same way as other legal
writings.
Writing Exercises
1. Presumably, you have, as part of pre-work, defined the legal

dispute, identified the laws that govern the case of the child attacked by
a dog. Hopefully, you put these all on paper. Your next task is to
identify the principal issue or issues that the legal dispute or disputes
present as well as the subordinate issues following the example given
above in the rape case. Then, choose from the issues you have
identified, the controlling issue or issues that when resolved will put an
end to the dispute.
7.
Roughing Out the Argument
You have made an outline of the relevant facts; you have located the
laws or rules that apply to those facts; and, finally, you have identified
the issues in the case. You are now ready to take the next step in pre-
work: roughing out your arguments. This, in a sense, would be like
drawing up your plans before actually constructing your building.
Roughing out your arguments would give you an overall picture of
your presentation and provide purpose and direction to your writing.
Balanced Presentation
But first, take a familiar story that begs for an effective argument. A
son failed in one of his major subjects in college because he spent too
much time with his barkadas. His father warned him about such a
result but he did not mind him. When it happened, the father was so
angry that he refused to give his son money for re-enrollment. The son
now approaches his father to plead his case with him.
If you were the son, how would you present your case? Here is one
way:
Dad, I want to re-enroll this semester [he speaks of

what he wants to do, but not about what his dad wants to
do; and he fails to state the issue that his dad has to decide].
I would be happy if you let me re-enroll, dad, despite
what happened [he speaks of what will make him happy,
but omits to mention of what will make his dad happy].
If you don’t let me re-enroll, I will surely be unable to
finish my studies. [Shifting the blame.] How could you do
that to me? [Shifting the burden of explanation.]
Do you think the father would give in to his son’s request? Chances
are he would not. The son wronged his dad by ignoring his valid
warning. When the son failed to value the father’s effort in financing
his schooling by not studying diligently, his father’s moral and social
obligation to finance his schooling should be deemed over. Meanwhile,
the son did not plan his argument ahead of time and did not see the
issue from the father’s point of view. His efforts were doomed from the
start.
If he prepared well, the son would probably have followed a
different tack. He would have said instead:
Dad, please consider letting me re-enroll. I made a

mistake when I ignored your warnings concerning my
barkadas. I hope you could forgive me.
I really miscalculated my chances in that subject. But
as you can see, I passed my other major subjects with
high grades. I have learned my lesson and I promise not
to repeat my mistake. In fact, as you can see, I have
stopped going out with my barkadas altogether.
Dad, could you give me another chance?
Does this approach have a better chance? Definitely.

It is forthright, honest, and realistic. And it shows to the father what
he can still do for his son after what he did. First, the son stated clearly
what the issue is and that it is up to his father to decide it. (Dad, please
consider letting me re-enroll.) Next, he acknowledged the argument
against him (I made a mistake when I ignored your warnings) but he
immediately argued that it was a mistake his father could choose to
overlook (I hope you could forgive me). Then, he brought up the
arguments in his favor (I passed my other major subjects with high
grades … I promise not to repeat my mistake … I have stopped going
out with my barkadas altogether). Finally, he appealed to his father’s
good sense (Dad, could you give me another chance?).
Any attempt to persuade someone to accept your opinion or point of
view must, much like the above, consider the structure of a balanced
thesis presentation:
First –– A clear statement of your thesis or where you

stand on the issue to be resolved;
Second –– The arguments that can be made against your
position but with an explanation that those arguments do not
doom such position;
Third –– The arguments in favor of your position; and
Fourth –– An appeal to the good sense of the person or
persons who will resolve the issue. (In writing a decision,
this fourth element may, of course, be omitted by the judge
since he is the person who will resolve the issue.
Nonetheless, the judge must convince the reader that his
decision is correct.)
The above structure represents the psychology of every balanced

attempt to win others to your point of view in a controversy. But how
do you guard yourself against the mindless approach that characterizes
many legal writings? There is only one answer. Complete your pre-
work. Plan and rough out a balanced approach to your arguments
before writing them up. When you have done these, you would be
able to scout the whole terrain that your writing would cover, aided by
a map in your hand. You would be able to see the relevance and
strengths of your argument and decide how to most effectively present
them when you write.
How do you rough out your arguments so you could see a broad
picture of how they look when you are finished? Since the main thing
in roughing out your arguments is to see how they balance, use a
balance sheet format.
Recall that when you sorted out the facts of your case and looked up
the laws or rules that applied to those facts, what guided you was your
“statement of the issue” that the case presented. Now, however, in
crafting your arguments, you need to be guided by your thesis
statement or proposition. As counsel for Ronald, your thesis statement
would be: “Ronald did not rape Julia.” Write it clearly at the top center
of your balance sheet.
(Where You Stand on the Issue)

RONALD DID NOT RAPE JULIA
What is the point in adopting as your balance sheet heading your

thesis statement that “Ronald did not rape Julia,” rather than your
statement of the issue, “whether or not Ronald raped Julia.” The point
is that the thesis statement represents the goal you set for your
arguments. It will give you direction in shaping and coloring your
arguments.
Next, write on the left column of your balance sheet the arguments
that can be made against you, and on the right column write how such
arguments do not doom your case. In addition, write also on the right
column an enumeration of the positive arguments in your favor.
Finally, state underneath the arguments your closing statement, an
appeal to the good sense of the reader.

(Arguments Against (Arguments in Your

You) Favor)
(Appeal to Your Reader’s Good Sense)
You need to write only the gist of the arguments against you or for
you. It is during the write-up stage that you will develop and expand
these arguments and make them convincing. Still, your statement of
each of your arguments must be concise, clear, and logical so that,
looking at them on your balance sheet, you will be able to see the
whole picture.
Anatomy of a Legal Argument

But where will you get the arguments with which you will fill up your
above balance sheet?
You should understand what an argument is. An argument is a
reason you offer to prove your thesis or proposition. For example, in
the son’s case, his thesis or proposition is that “his dad should let him
re-enroll in school.” What reason can the son offer to prove his thesis
correct? One reason the son can offer is that, “although he failed in one
subject, he did not do so badly since he got high grades in his other
subjects.” He still merits support from his dad.
In the rape case, your thesis or proposition might be that Ronald did
not rape Julia. What reason can you offer to prove your thesis correct?
A reason that you could offer is that, although Mario lived near where
the rape supposedly took place, he did not hear Julia’s outcry. Is this a
good reason? Yes, since it makes sense.
The great bulk of legal arguments are in the mold of the classic
categorical syllogism. A most basic example of this is the following:
Major premise: All men are mortal.
Minor premise: Jose is a man.
Conclusion: Jose is mortal.
The major premise, all men are mortal, is a statement of a generally
accepted rule or truth. The minor premise, Jose is a man, is a statement
that brings a particular thing or individual within the class or situation
covered by the generally accepted rule or truth. The conclusion, Jose is
mortal, is a statement that follows after the major and minor premises,
deducing that the generally accepted rule or truth applies to the
particular thing or individual.
Here is an example. Arguing from common experience, a witness
can be discredited in this manner:
People who lie cannot be believed.
Armando lied in his testimony.
Therefore, he cannot be believed.
You need to understand that every sound legal argument is a
combination of the right rule and the right fact. For example, what
argument can you make if your thesis or proposition is that “Jose
should be punished for crossing the red light.”
First, you can state the rule that “Crossing the red light is punishable
by law.”
Next, you can state the fact in Jose’s case that “Jose crossed the red
light.”
Finally, you can state your conclusion that “Therefore, Jose should
be punished by law.”
To sum up: Crossing the red light is punishable by law. Jose crossed
the red light. Therefore, Jose shall be punished by law.
The above argument consists of three statements: the rule statement
(crossing the red light is punishable by law), the case fact statement
(Jose crossed the red light), and the conclusion statement (therefore,
Jose should be punished by law).
The Key Fact in Rules

You will note that the rule statement (crossing the red light is
punishable by law) has a fact component for its subject, namely,
“crossing the red light.” This is logical because all rules identify the
facts on which they will operate or apply. We will call this fact
component of the rule (crossing the red light in our example) its “key
fact.” It is a key fact because its presence in the case of Jose opens up
such case to the application of the rule.
To further illustrate this, the law that punishes theft identifies the key
fact to which the law applies. It applies, according to the penal code, to
“the taking, with intent to gain but without violence against or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things, of the personal property
of another without the latter’s consent.” If the case fact involving a
particular individual, say Cesar, shows that he took the property of
another under the circumstances described in the law, then the law will
apply to Cesar, given that its key fact is present in his case. When the
key fact component of the rule statement is present in the case fact
statement, you have a positive match. The rule applies to the case fact.
Thus:
Any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence against or intimidation of person nor force upon
things, shall take the property of another without the
latter’s consent, shall be punished for theft.
Cesar took, with intent to gain, Mario’s cellphone
from his desk when his back was turned and without his
consent.
Consequently, Cesar shall be punished for theft.
What argument can you make, on the other hand, if your thesis or
proposition is in the negative, namely that David cannot be punished
for crossing the red light? First, you can state the rule that “beating the
red light is punishable by law” (the rule that governs beating the red
light) “but crossing the yellow light does not amount to crossing the
red light” (an interpretative rule that excludes crossing the yellow light
from the meaning of crossing the red light). Next, you can state the
case fact that “David actually crossed a yellow light.” Finally, you can
state the conclusion that “Therefore, David cannot be punished by
law.” Thus––
Crossing the red light is punishable by law. But
crossing the yellow light does not amount to crossing the
red light. David actually crossed a yellow light.
Therefore, David cannot be punished by law.
The key fact on which the general rule operates is “crossing the red
light.” But this is not found in the particular case of David for he
“actually crossed a yellow light.” Consequently, the punishment due to
persons who cross red lights does not apply to David. His crossing a
yellow light repels the operation of the law, producing a negative
conclusion.
Let us take another example. The law gives the right to bear the
surnames of the father and the mother only to legitimate children. If the
issue is whether or not the law will apply to a particular child, the key
fact in the law (the fact that the child needs to be legitimate) must be
present in his case. If the case fact is that Justo is an “illegitimate
child,” the law does not apply to him. Justo has no right to bear the
surnames of his father and his mother. The rule does not apply to his
case fact.
The above arguments, positive as well as negative, typify the classic
categorical syllogism, applied to legal writing. This is made up of three
statements: (1) the statement of a rule that applies to a given fact or set
of facts (the rule statement); (2) the statement of the fact of a
particular case that opens up such case or closes it to the application of
the rule (the case fact statement); and (3) the conclusion that the rule
applies or does not apply to the particular case (the conclusion
statement).
The Case Fact

As already stated, rules usually identify the key fact upon which
such rules will apply. Only when this “key fact” exists in a particular
case, i.e., in the “case fact” will the rule apply to such case.
Is it the rule that dictates what the fact of a particular case ought to
be or is it the fact of the case that dictates what the rule ought to be? Of
course, the answer is that it is the fact of a particular case that
determines what will govern it, not the other way around. In our first
example, we can apply the rule that “crossing the red light is
punishable by law” to the case of Jose because “Jose crossed the red
light.”
When preparing your argument, therefore, begin by ascertaining the
fact or facts of your case. Once you know the facts, you can check
these out again whatever rule is proposed to govern them. But it is not
that easy. Theoretically, the facts of a case do not change. Facts are
facts and you cannot alter them. Unfortunately, however, putting your
finger on the correct facts of a case can be difficult since the evidence
of those facts can be marred by the witness’ bias, by human error in
observing them, by lack of ability to communicate what one observed,
and, not too rarely, even by a motive to lie.
And, even when the correct facts of a particular case or its “case
fact” has been ascertained, you will observe that the “rule” that applies
to it can significantly change as you turn that case fact around, showing
its different hues and contours. For this reason, prepare to deal with
issues regarding what your case fact truly is.
Meaning of “Rule”
Once you have ascertained your case fact, where will you find the
“rule,” the key fact of which is in favor of or against your case fact
and which would either produce the positive or negative conclusion
that you desire?
The term “rule” used in this discussion has a broad scope. As
previously mentioned in Chapter 5, Knowing the Applicable Law or
Rule, includes legislated rules like:
a. Constitutional provisions. Where the fact of the case is that the
government has taken possession of your client’s land for road building
without paying him for it, you can invoke the Constitutional provision
that “private property shall not be taken except upon payment of just
compensation” to prove your thesis that your client is entitled to
compensation.
b. Statutory provisions. Where your opponent’s client pleads lack of
liability for a wrong he has committed because he did not know that
the law forbade it, you can invoke the provision of the civil code that
“ignorance of the law excuses no one” to prove your thesis that he is
liable.
c. Rules of Court provisions. Where the accused offers money to the
complainant for dropping the case, you can cite the provision of the
Rules of Court that “an offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt” to prove your
thesis that the accused is guilty of the charge.
But the “rule” also includes case laws or judicial precedents. Judicial
precedents are the most convenient source of argument. The
hardworking lawyer or student, the plodder, will discover a treasury of
arguments in the law reports. In real life, no problem is new.
Somewhere, the issues you now face have been argued and resolved in
a variety of ways. All you have to do is tap the law books where they
are indexed and preserved.
Take for example the defense of alibi. If your opponent invokes it,
you can easily put it down by invoking an abundance of precedents
that says:
The defense of alibi, as a rule, is considered with

suspicion and is always received with caution, not only
because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but because
it can be easily fabricated. (People v. Paraiso, 349 SCRA
335.) Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification of
the accused by the prosecution witnesses who have no
motive to lie. (People v. Lovedorial, 349 SCRA 402.)
If you are on the other side, a counterargument exists:
Alibi can be believed where it can be shown that the
accused was at another place at the time of the
commission of the offense and it was physically
impossible for him to be at the place where it happened.
(People v. Plana, 370 SCRA 542.) And when the
prosecution is unable to establish the guilt of the
accused, alibi assumes importance. (People v. Morales,
363 SCRA 342.)
The “rule” also includes widely accepted truths that derive from
logic, common sense, or even common experience. For example, if the
issue is whether or not the accused killed the victim in self-defense,
you can put down such defense by evidence that shows that he died of
a gunshot wound on his back. Common sense dictates that shooting the
victim on his back is incompatible with defending oneself. Another
good example is the truth that “it would be improbable for a barrio girl
of tender age and definitely inexperienced in sexual matters to
fabricate a charge of rape for no reason at all.” This is a “truth”
developed from observance of common life in the countryside. You
can invoke it as a form of rule in arguing the credibility of the
complainant in a rape case.
Roughed Out Arguments

Having seen the anatomy of every sound legal argument, you should
be ready, if you were counsel for Ronald, to rough out your argument
on the rape charge against him.
On the left column of your balance sheet, one argument that your
opponent can make out against Ronald is that “vaginal lacerations
usually found in rape victims were found in Julia.” Spelled out, the
applicable rule here would be that “vaginal lacerations are usually
found in rape victims.” The case fact is that “Julia had vaginal
lacerations,” the conclusion would be that she probably had been
raped.
Ronald might in turn state on the opposite column of his balance
sheet his counter argument that “as a virgin Julia could have
lacerations during consented sex.” Spelled out, the applicable rule here
is that “true, vaginal lacerations are usually found in rape victims but
(stating an exception to the rule) such lacerations can also be found in
consented sex with a virgin.” Applying this rule to the case fact that
“Julia was a virgin,” the conclusion would be that “the lacerations
found in her do not necessarily indicate rape.” When placed in your
balance sheet of arguments, the above should read:


You) Favor)
Vaginal lacerations
As a virgin, Julia could
usually found in rape
have vaginal lacerations
victims were found in
during consented sex.
Julia.
Some students who were given the task of making an outline of their
arguments in the rape case showed a tendency to state only either the
case fact statement or the rule statement in their arguments. And a
good number of them did not know how to look for meaningful points
that support their thesis or proposition. They confessed that their
undergraduate courses simply did not give them that kind of
preparation and training.
For example, a student regarded as a strong argument to prove that
Ronald did not rape Julia the point that “he and she were sweethearts.”


You) Favor)
He and she were

sweethearts.
It might be a good argument but it states only the case fact in his
argument, omitting the applicable rule, which, presumably, is that “it is
not likely for a man to rape his sweetheart.” The better way to rough
out the argument is to say, “Being sweethearts, it was not likely for
Ronald to rape Julia.” Both the case fact and the rule are incorporated
in this outline argument.
A student, taking the side of the prosecution, attempted to refute
Ronald’s above argument but he simply stated as counterargument the
case fact that “Ronald was only a suitor.”

RONALD RAPED JULIA
(Arguments in
(Arguments Against You)
Your Favor)
Being sweethearts, it was not likely Ronald was

for Ronald to rape Julia. only a suitor.
Since the student did not state the applicable rule in his outline
argument, he could very well end up saying, “it is likely for a suitor to
rape the girl he courts.” But, not being consistent with human
experience, this argument is not plausible.
Probably, the student’s unstated rule is that “uncorroborated claims,
when denied by the adverse party, may be considered self-serving.” In
such a case, he should combine this with his “case fact” and produce
the counterargument that: “But, uncorroborated, Ronald’s claim is self-
serving since Julia never admitted it.” An alternate counterargument is
that: “Being only a suitor, Ronald was capable of committing the
rape.”

RONALD RAPED JULIA
(Arguments
(Arguments in Your Favor)
Against You)
Being
But, uncorroborated, Ronald’s claim
sweethearts, it
is self-serving since Julia never
was not likely
admitted it. Or, being only a suitor,
for Ronald to
he was capable of the crime.
rape Julia.
The lesson here is that you must think your argument through to its
essential elements so you could test its validity or soundness.
Let us go to another example, this time of a student in search of an
argument to support his view that Ronald raped Julia. The student
wrote this point in his favor: “Julia ignored Ronald during the wedding
party so this made him feel bad.”
RONALD RAPED JULIA
(Arguments
Against (Arguments in Your Favor)
You)
Julia ignored Ronald during the

wedding party, making him feel bad.
Is the above a good argument? No. It does not appear to have any
reasonable relation to the student’s thesis that Ronald raped Julia. The
beauty of a balance sheet format is that your thesis, “Ronald raped
Julia,” is written prominently on top of your proposed arguments. To
test the validity of the argument that the student raised, just see if his
thesis follows from it. Thus: if he says “Julia ignored Ronald during
the wedding party, making him feel bad,” could you deduce from this
that “Ronald raped Julia?” When the two ideas do not connect, the
argument is invalid.
Below are the other roughed out arguments and the closing
statement that Ronald could use. See if they connect to the writer’s
thesis or proposition.

(Arguments in Your
(Arguments Against You)
Favor)
Because women will rarely But not when the
admit to having been raped woman’s testimony, like
unless true, a rape victim’s that of Julia, is
testimony can stand alone. inherently incredible.
Absence of bruises on
her body despite rough
grounds negates rape by
use of force.
Being a barrio woman,

it is likely that someone
like Ronald walked her
home at that late hour.
(Appeal to Your Reader’s Good Sense)

It is but fair that testimony inconsistent with common
experience is not believed.
Creative Thinking
When you have exhausted legislated rules and court precedents in
search of suitable arguments that will support your thesis or
proposition and these do not satisfy you, try creative thinking. Let your
subconscious mind take over the problem. This process often yields
indigenous solutions and pleasant surprises. And the steps are simple.
First, be sure that your mind gets all the data and inputs about the
case that your source materials would yield. Working like a computer,
the mind will process only those facts that have been put into it.
Second, pose the problem to your mind. For example, ask your mind
the question: “How can I prove that Ronald did not rape Julia?” Repeat
this question to yourself a number of times until you are satisfied that it
has been planted into your mind.
Third, forget about the case. Take time out and let your
subconscious mind do the work. Go to sleep. You will be surprised that
the answer will pop out of your head in the middle of what you are
doing. Be prepared to jot it down immediately.
Arguments that Build Up

Apart from being able to form a combination of the right “rule” and
the right “case fact” to support your thesis or proposition, here is a list
of other arguments that you can use to build up your side of an issue:
a. The favorable testimony comes from a credible
witness. The testimonies of those who are involved in the
case or their relatives and friends are often regarded as
partisan. Those with no bias, one way or the other, are
excellent witnesses. For example, the medico-legal expert
and the farm owner, Perez, in the rape case have no bias or
motive to testify falsely in the case.
b. The party’s version is inherently credible and
consistent with common experience. The truth of narrative
stories is often judged by its compatibility with common
experience. For example, if the fact that Ronald and Julia
were sweethearts can be established, you can believe his
claim that they forgot themselves when one evening they
stopped and sat down in the middle of a rice field.
c. All the elements or requisites of a valid claim or
defense have been proved. Some laws prescribe factual
elements or requisites in order for claims or defenses to be
operative. You make a good argument when you prove that
you have established them all. For example, the prosecution
in the case against Ronald can show that it has established
all the elements of the crime of rape to warrant conviction.
Arguments that Destroy

Pointing out that the opposite party invokes the wrong “rule” or that
he has failed to prove the “case fact” component of his argument are
the basic ways of destroying his thesis or proposition. Below are some
additional arguments that provide the same result.
a. The argument raised is irrelevant. An argument is
irrelevant when it does not help resolve the issue one way or
the other. When your opponent says, “Ronald is immoral
and irresponsible because he refuses to marry Julia even
when he admits that he took her innocence from her,” you
can say, “The argument is irrelevant since being
irresponsible does not make a man a rapist.”
b. The argument has little weight given the other
considerations in the case. Here you can assume that your
opponent has made a valid argument but you hasten to state
that other considerations outweigh that argument. Thus,
when your opponent says, “Ronald’s failure to see Julia’s
parents to explain his side shows his guilt,” you could say,
“That failure can be explained. Their sons would have killed
Ronald if he immediately went to see them after their
daughter cried rape.”
c. The argument is baseless. A claim made with no fact
to support it is baseless. When your opponent says, “Julia is
a good, innocent girl who would not cry rape if it were
untrue,” you could say, “But, that is baseless since there is
no evidence to show that she is good and innocent.”
d. The argument is contrary to common experience.
As a rule, claims that go against ordinary human experience
are bizarre and cannot be believed. When your opponent
says, “Julia was not afraid to walk home alone through
empty rice fields near midnight,” you can say, “That is
unbelievable. No woman in her right mind will do that.”
e. The argument is inconsistent with undeniable facts.
No assertion can defeat facts that cannot lie. When your
opponent says, “Julia wasted no time to file her complaint
against Ronald,” you can say, “The record shows that she
showed up at the police station two (2) days after the alleged
rape.”
f. The argument is inconsistent with a prior claim.
Persons who say one thing now and another thing later
cannot be relied on to tell the truth. When your opponent
says, “Julia testified that Ronald was her suitor,” you can
say, “She once admitted to a friend that she was his
sweetheart.”
The above enumerations of arguments that build up or destroy are of
course not intended to be exclusive. The mind and the imagination are
limitless and no list such as what has been drawn up above can contain
them.
Further, this book uses simple cases for easy illustrations but real
cases can be complex and can bring forth arguments that cannot be
captured in a box. You must consider other arguments or reasons and
use them so long as they tend to support the stand you have taken. If
you learn the basic lessons in this book, doubtless, you can handle the
demands of more difficult and complex legal writings.
Pre-work Reviewed
As pre-work comes to an end, a summary of the steps taken under it
should round up the discussion. Pre-work consists of the following
steps:
a. Ascertain the legal dispute. After going over your
materials quickly, do you detect the presence of a legal
dispute where one claims that another has violated his right
and where this other denies such violation? Rewrite your
statement of the legal dispute in the format of an issue and
put this down in writing to guide you in making an outline
of the facts and in looking for the laws and rules that apply
to such facts.
b. Make an outline of the relevant facts. Now go over
your materials again, this time more closely, and make an
outline of the relevant facts of the case, discarding the
irrelevant. Afterwards, complete your work on the facts by
arranging them in correct order.
c. Identify the Issues. Identify the principal issue or
issues raised in that case and, if present, the subordinate
controlling issues as well. Make a list of all the other issues
that the parties to the case raised, then choose from these
what are relevant to the resolution of the legal dispute or
disputes involved.
d. Rough out your argument. Rough out your argument
on a paper, using the balance sheet format. Write on top of
the balance sheet the stand you take on the relevant issue
presented. Write on the left column of the balance sheet the
arguments against you and on the right column your
refutation of such arguments plus the positive arguments in
your favor. State only the gist of those arguments. At the
bottom of the balance sheet, write your closing statement,
usually an appeal to the good sense of the reader.
Writing Exercises
If you did the work suggested in this book, you would no doubt have
identified the principal issue or issues as well as the subordinate issues
that the legal dispute or disputes in the case of the girl that a neighbor’s
dog attacked present.
Now, decide whether or not you will recommend to your client, Mr.
Banag, the filing of a lawsuit against Mr. Sison. Rough out on paper
the arguments that you can use in support of the advice that you choose
to recommend to him.
8.
Introducing the Issues
After completing pre-work, you are now ready for the write-up
stage. You cannot submit your outline of argument to the court because
it will probably not make any sense to the judge. You alone would be
able to understand your outline. Consequently, you have to flesh out
your outline-argument, give it color and shape, and make it strong and
convincing to your reader.
Need for Introduction

At the start of this book, we defined legal writing as the things that
lawyers write to win others over to their point of view. But you
cannot just hit your reader with your point of view respecting an issue
without telling him the circumstances of the case that brought about the
issue. He just would not be able to see your point of view.
An argument set forth without some preamble of facts can be
likened to an answer that a student writes on his examination notebook.
It represents his point of view on the question that the professor asked
in the test paper. To illustrate this point, take this answer in a political
law question.
3. He is not right. Although the Constitution provides

that no law shall be passed impairing the obligations of
contract, the Supreme Court has ruled that the police
power of the state empowers the legislature to enact laws
regulating contracts in the interest of the public welfare.
Every contract is presumed to carry with it the
reservation that it shall be subject to laws passed
subsequent to their perfection.
In this case, the law in question is a valid exercise of
police power since it seeks to protect the interest of the
poor. Therefore, Gregorio is wrong. The law is
constitutional.
Can you fully grasp what the student’s argument above is all about?
Not likely, since you do not have the benefit of knowing the
background facts and the issue behind the answer. This is not to say, of
course, that a direct answer like the above will not work in a classroom
setting. It will. We may presume that the professor who will check the
answer knows the question that the student addresses. It will make no
sense, therefore, for the student to repeat the professor’s question in his
answer.
Unfortunately, most lawyers bring into their law practice their
mindsets as students. They would often hit the judge directly with their
argument without adequately introducing the issue that they present to
him for resolution. They wrongly assume that the judge has the
background facts planted firmly in his head and that he has been
waiting with bated breath to read the pleadings as soon as these are
filed. Quite often, the assumption is wrong.
The judge may have read the previous pleadings in the case, he may
have conducted the trial, and he may have heard the testimonies of the
witnesses, but he cannot be expected to remember all these each time
he reads a party’s pleading as it reaches his hands. The odds are that he
would not because:
a. The attention span of human beings is quite limited.
Hence, the judge might be present in the course of the
testimony but it is too much to expect him to have listened
to everything that had been said. You cannot assume that he
barred inner thoughts and other distractions during every
proceeding in a case. Consequently, you have to lay to him
those facts that are relevant to the issue that he would
resolve.
b. Hearings in the Philippine system are piecemeal. The
judge hears the testimonies of the various witnesses over
some period of time, from one to five years in certain cases.
Consequently, when some facts make up the issue in the
case or its incident, you need to restate those facts to the
judge.
c. It is possible that the judge had gotten the facts wrong
from past pleadings or during the hearing. You may have to
correct those impressions by recalling the facts as they were.
d. In the case of the justices of an appellate court, you
need to apprise them of the facts of the case simply because
they did not hear the evidence and they rely on the lawyer’s
summaries of them.
Even if your own client supplied the facts on which he seeks your
opinion regarding an issue arising from them, you still need to restate
those facts to him to insure that he and you have a shared
understanding of the facts. In this way, you would have no
misunderstanding with him.
Now, let us go back to the student’s answer in the examination
notebook. Since you are not the professor correcting that answer, we
will reproduce for you the question asked the student. See if you can
appreciate the student’s answer better.
[Question.] The legislature enacted a law fixing the
amount of rentals that apartment owners may impose
upon their tenants. Gregorio, an apartment owner,
assails the law as unconstitutional in that setting the
rates of rentals is not a proper and constituent function
of government. Besides, the law violated the freedom of
contract between apartment owners and their tenants. Is
he right? Explain.
[Answer.] He is not right. Although the Constitution
provides that no law shall be passed impairing the
obligations of contract, the Supreme Court has ruled
that the police power of the state empowers the
legislature to enact laws regulating contracts in the
interest of the public welfare. Every contract is
presumed to carry with it the reservation that it shall be
subject to laws passed subsequent to their perfection.
In this case, the law in question is a valid exercise of
police power since it seeks to protect the interest of the
poor. Therefore, Gregorio is wrong. The law is
constitutional.
Does it not help to state the background of the legal dispute between
the parties and the issue that it presents before you state your opinion
or point of view on that issue? It does. Without that background, you
can never hope to get your reader to understand your opinion or
argument.
Sufficiency of Introduction
But how much background facts do you put into your pleading or
opinion to introduce the issue or issues that you will address? There is
but one answer: only as much background facts as are needed for
an understanding of the issue or issues that the parties present. The
rules governing ordinary appeals provide the standard for sufficiency.
They recognize the need for two statements to introduce the issue or
issues in a case: (a) the statement of the case; and (b) the statement of
the facts. This might well be the model for other legal writings like
memoranda, comments, position papers, petitions, and even decisions.
The Statement of the Case

The purpose of a statement of the case is to provide a clear and
concise statement of the nature of the action, a summary of the
proceedings so far had, any challenged order or decision issued in the
case, and other matters necessary to an understanding of the
controversy.
You should underline the phrase “necessary to an understanding of
the controversy” because many lawyers are fond of making
longwinded and elaborate “statement of the case.” Invariably, they also
throw in a detailed summary of what the parties allege in the complaint
and the answer when this is hardly needed in most cases.
Take an appellant’s brief that the losing party filed with the Court of
Appeals in an appeal from a Regional Trial Court’s decision. The only
issue the case presented was whether or not the defendant maligned the
plaintiff by publicly accusing her of stealing her jewelry. See if this
simple issue justifies the elaborate details that filled up the appellant’s
statement of the case, edited to protect the identities of the persons
involved.
Statement of the Case

Plaintiff-appellee Celia De Leon filed a civil action
against defendant-appellant Laura Casal for damages
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. 45678.
Plaintiff De Leon alleged in her complaint that on
March 10 at the Hotel Intercontinental, in the presence
of a certain Ms. Rita Young and other persons,
defendant Casal maliciously, recklessly, or in bad faith
injured her good name and business reputation by
accusing her of stealing her jewelry and that in making
the accusation, defendant Casal allegedly stated:
“Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto kanina.
Nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta?
Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kuwarto; ikaw ang
kumuha.”
Plaintiff De Leon further alleged that the above
statements were false, untrue, and malicious, made by
defendant Casal, knowing at the time she uttered them
that they were false and untrue; that she uttered them
with actual malice and ill will which caused the dishonor,
discredit, and contempt of plaintiff De Leon; that
because of the accusation, plaintiff De Leon was bodily
searched, her bag and car were also searched, and these
were seen and witnessed by her friends, acquaintances,
and the general public. Plaintiff De Leon likewise alleged
that all the above acts committed against her were
instigated and initiated by defendant Casal with actual
malice and ill will, causing her dishonor and placing her
in public contempt.
After summons was served on defendant Casal, she
filed an answer with counterclaim. She denied plaintiff
De Leon’s charge, claiming that at no time was the latter
singled out for confrontation or investigation much less
did defendant Casal accuse her or utter the subject
remarks. For filing a malicious suit against her,
defendant Casal sought payment of attorney’s fees by
plaintiff De Leon.
Later, the lower court set the case for pre-trial
conference. Both parties filed their respective pretrial
briefs in compliance with an order of the lower court
that calendared the case for pre-trial conference. The
pre-trial conference having been terminated, trial
commenced with plaintiff De Leon testifying, followed by
corroborating witnesses. During defendant Casal’s turn
to present evidence, she had no witness but herself.
The lower court rendered a decision dated August 21
holding defendant Casal liable for publicly maligning
plaintiff De Leon and ordering the former to pay the
latter actual and moral damages. Considering that the
decision was contrary to law and the evidence, defendant
Casal appealed from it to this Honorable Court.
Probably, Casal’s lawyer thought that the bits of information he
provided in his above statement of the case would assist the Court of
Appeals in understanding and resolving the issue that the parties raised.
They would not. Firstly, the issue was simply whether or not Casal
maligned De Leon by publicly accusing her of stealing her jewelry.
Making reference in the statement of the case to the service of
summons, to the holding of a pre-trial conference, and to the number of
witnesses presented by either side provides no help to the court in
understanding the issue.
Secondly, down the road in his brief, Casal’s lawyer would be
writing a statement of facts that summarizes the conflicting evidence of
the parties regarding the alleged defamatory remarks. This is the place
to introduce the factual issue, not in the statement of the case.
Besides, where trial has taken place, it would usually serve no useful
purpose to recite in the statement of the case the allegations of the
parties in their pleadings. With the evidence adduced at the trial, the
court would render its decision, not on the basis of those allegations
but on the basis of the evidence so adduced. It should be sufficient for
the purpose of identifying the principal issues tendered by the
pleadings to simply mention the basic legal disputes that the claims of
the parties produced.
Rewritten, the statement of the case, purged of non-essentials, might
look like this:

Plaintiff-appellee Celia De Leon filed a complaint for
damages against defendant-appellant Laura Casal
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case
45678 for falsely accusing her of stealing Casal’s jewelry.
Casal denied this charge in her answer and asserted a
counterclaim for attorney’s fees against De Leon for
having filed an unjustified suit. After trial, the lower
court rendered a decision, holding defendant Casal liable
in actual and moral damages for maligning De Leon.
This prompted the latter to appeal the decision to this
Court.
At times, specific allegations in a pleading constitute evidence of

judicial admission and, therefore, may be vital to the case. But these
allegations need not be in the statement of the case. It will usually be
enough that you cite them in the argument section of your
memorandum or paper. Of course, where a judgment on the pleadings
or a summary judgment has been sought by one or both parties, a
recitation of the allegations of the complaint and answer in the
statement of the case will be useful.
In criminal cases, lawyers also often quote the criminal information
as part of their statement of the case. Is this needed? It is not. Unless
the allegations in the information are in issue, it will be pointless to
quote the contents of the information in your statement of the case. It
will be sufficient to point out that the accused has been charged with a
particular crime like theft or homicide.
The Statement of Facts

The statement of the case describes the nature of the action and the
proceedings it had gone through. The “statement of facts,” on the other
hand, narrates the transaction or event that created the legal dispute and
led to the filing of the suit. In an eviction case, the statement of facts
may be expected to recite that the landlord and the tenant came to an
agreement over the lease, that the tenant violated the agreement, that
the landlord made a demand on the tenant to vacate the property, and
that the latter refused to do so. The statement of facts may also be
expected to narrate the tenant’s defense for declining to leave the
landlord’s property.
The usual concern here is whether or not your statement of facts
should present only your client’s version of the facts of the case. A
great majority of lawyers believe that since you are expected to
champion your client’s side of the case, you are not required to do your
opponent the favor of reciting his version of the facts in your brief. It is
up to each side to present a statement of facts based on his client’s
version.
But you do not do your opponent any favor with a two-sided
statement of facts. Actually, you do yourself and the court the favor of
better understanding the issue and the arguments you present when you
show the conflicting claims of the parties. And this is what will serve
your case well. The statement of facts, like the statement of the case, is
neither intended as nor is the place for arguments. Its function is to
introduce the issue or issues that the case presents.
You may look at the structure of a memorandum, opinion, brief,
petition, comment, position paper, decision, or similar legal writing as
follows:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STATEMENT OF FACTS
PLAINTIFF’S DEFENDANT’S
VERSION OF THE VERSION OF THE
FACTS FACTS
THE ISSUE OR ISSUES
BODY OF ARGUMENTS
RELIEF
You can see from the flow of thoughts in the above diagram that, if
your purpose were to build up your facts to enable your reader or the
court to have a full grasp of the issue or issues that you intend to argue,
then it makes no sense to present only one side’s version of the facts.
Issues are the product of disagreement. Only by fairly showing the
conflicting claims of the parties can the court or your reader truly
understand the issues that divide them.
Besides, the Rules of Court require parties to include their
conflicting claims in their respective statement of facts. Section 13(d)
of Rule 44 requires the appellant’s statement of facts to make “a clear
and concise statement in a narrative form of the facts admitted by both
parties and of those in controversy.” In the case of the appellee’s brief,
Section 14(b) requires the appellee merely to state whether he accepts
the statement of facts in the appellant’s brief, which includes the
conflicting versions. If he does not, he should merely point out its
insufficiencies or inaccuracies without repeating the matters in the
appellant’s statement of facts.
Since the background facts are meant to give the judge or the reader
a fair understanding of the case and the issues that the parties present,
you should fairly state your opponent’s version of those facts. You
should not report that version with a slant in your favor, whether
obvious or subtle, believing that you will gain some advantage in this
way. The background facts are not the place for argument or for
opinionated narrative. The reader will eventually see your unfair tactics
and your distortions may boomerang on you.
The next question is how much details must go into your statement
of the facts? The test of sufficiency of the statement of facts of your
pleading is its ability to enable the judge or the reader to understand,
with minimum words, the issue or issues that you want him to resolve
and the arguments that you adduce on those issues.
Many students and lawyers feel insecure about an austere statement
of facts. They strongly feel that, unless the statement of facts includes
all the details that the evidence yields, whether or not these are
remotely relevant to the issue or issues presented, their facts would be
incomplete. A good number of them also feel that, unless evidence
favorable to their case is included in their statement of facts, they could
not use it in their arguments. They forget that the purpose of the
statement of facts is merely to provide a background of the transaction
or event involved to enable the court or the reader to see the issues in
their proper context.
Remember the defamation case discussed above? The appellant’s
brief (also edited) has been reproduced below. Its statement of the case
and statement of facts are quite lean but observe how the argument
section pours out all the needed evidentiary details, including
quotations from critical portions of the transcripts of testimonies.
Observe, too, how the recital of the two versions of the facts of the
case does not result in the giving of advantage to the opposite side.
[CAPTION OMITTED]
Defendant-appellant Laura Casal, by counsel,
respectfully states:

Plaintiff-appellee Celia De Leon filed a complaint for
damages against defendant-appellant Laura Casal
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case
45678 for falsely accusing her of stealing Casal’s jewelry.
Casal denied this charge in her answer and asserted a
counterclaim for attorney’s fees against De Leon for
having filed an unjustified suit. After trial, the lower
court rendered a decision, holding Casal liable in actual
and moral damages for maligning De Leon. This
prompted the latter to appeal the decision to this Court.
Statement of Facts
Plaintiff De Leon testified that at 4:30 p.m. on March
10 she dropped in, as wedding coordinator, at a room at
the Hotel Intercontinental in Makati to see the bride who
was then preparing for her wedding at a nearby
church.1 De Leon left after a few minutes to attend to
the venue of the reception.2 At about 5 p.m., she
returned to the bride’s room where defendant Casal, the
bride’s cousin, confronted her, claiming that she must
have taken her jewelry because she alone came in and
out of the room.3 Casal’s jewelry was missing.4 The
hotel called the police to investigate the matter. They
searched De Leon and took her fingerprints.5
Casal testified, on the other hand, that she brought
with her to the bride’s room a paper bag containing the
things that she would wear and a set of jewelry valued at
about P1 million.6 She waited for her turn to be made-
up and, meantime, placed her paper bag on a table.7 The
others in the room were the bride’s parents, other
relatives, the couturier, and the make-up artists.8 De
Leon came in but left after some minutes.9
After she had been made-up, Casal went to the
bathroom to put on her gown. When she later searched
the paper bag for her jewelry, it was gone.10 The police
searched the room but did not find it. They investigated
those who had access to the room, including De Leon.11
Casal denied confronting the latter and implying that
she took the jewelry.12 Later after the wedding, the
police came and took the fingerprints of all the people
who had access to the bride’s room at the time of the
loss.13
Statement of the Issue

The only issue in this case is whether or not Casal
maligned De Leon by publicly accusing her of stealing
her jewelry.
Arguments
I.
CASAL DID NOT PUBLICLY ACCUSE DE LEON
OF STEALING HER JEWELRY
The trial court gave credence to De Leon’s testimony
that Casal singled her out as the jewelry thief, telling her
in the presence of others, “Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng
kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta?
Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kuwarto, ikaw ang kumuha.”
The trial court concluded from this that Casal indeed
publicly humiliated her without justification.
But the trial court ignored the other significant
portions of De Leon’s testimony. She said in
contradiction to the above that she learned she had been
suspected because a certain Noel later told her that the
group of Casal had their eyes on her. Thus,
Q: What did Mr. Sanchez, the bridegroom’s
father, tell you?
A: He said, “What happened at the hotel? It is
a shame that someone from the bride’s side lost
her jewelry.”
Q: Then what did you answer?
A: I told him that what happened to me is
more shameful because I was merely going about
my work and I had been suspected. He then told
me, “Suspected, who told you that you had been
suspected?” I pointed to Noel and I said, “He
told me that I had been suspected.” And then
Mr. Sanchez faced Noel, “Young man, from
whom did you learn that Celia had been
suspected as the jewelry thief?” And Noel said,
“From Mrs. Casal’s group, sir.” 14
The above is a revelation. For, if it were true that
Casal had publicly accused her of taking the jewelry
when she went into the bride’s room, what was the point
in her claiming after that public confrontation that it
was from Noel that she learned she had been suspected?
This is absurd. Clearly, De Leon’s initial statement had
been a lie. Basic is the rule that, to be believed, a
testimony should be in accord with the common order of
things.15
Besides, Mrs. Villanueva, De Leon’s own witness did
not confirm what De Leon said. Mrs. Villanueva testified
that what Casal said was, “Siya lang yung nakita kong
galing sa C.R.”16 However interpreted, this statement
did not at all suggest that Casal had publicly and
maliciously accused De Leon of stealing the jewelry.
Further, De Leon admitted in the course of her
testimony that she learned of Casal’s loss of her jewelry
only on the following day, March 11. Indeed, as she
testified, she could not believe what Mr. Mariano told
her concerning such loss. Thus:
Q: After that what happened next?
A: Mr. Mariano said, “The reason, young lady, is that
Mrs. Casal had lost her jewelry worth P1 million.”
Q: And then what happened?
A: And then I said, “She lost it? She should have been
careful considering how expensive the jewelry was.” Our
conversation ended there.17
xxx xxx xxx
Q: While you were still in the room the people there

were excitedly talking about what happened, is that
right?
A: Yes. But I did not know what was missing at that
time.
Q: But later you were informed that what was missing
was the jewelry in the paper bag?
A: No. I was informed the following day.
Q: And who informed you the following day that what
got lost was the jewelry of Mrs. Casal?
A: Mr. Mariano. He was the father of the bride.18

If De Leon learned of the fact of loss of the jewelry
only on the following day, March 11, what was her basis
in claiming that in the afternoon of October 10 when she
stepped into the bride’s room at the hotel a second time,
Casal publicly accused her of taking her jewelry? Her
claim makes no sense.
II.
ASSUMING CASAL SAID THE WORDS IMPUTED

TO HER, IT IS NOT SHOWN THAT SHE DID SO
MALICIOUSLY AND IN BAD FAITH.
The trial court ruled that by the words she used,
“Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala
mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng
kuwarto, ikaw ang kumuha,” Casal implied by this that
only De Leon could have taken the jewelry. She made
this accusation with malice and bad faith since she did so
without any solid proof.
But, assuming that Casal indeed uttered those words,
the circumstances show that she did not do so
maliciously or in bad faith. Malice is defined as the
intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or
excuse, with intent to inflict an injury or under
circumstances that the law will imply an evil intent.19 In
libel and slander, malice involves an evil intent or motive
arising from spite or ill will or personal hatred.20 In the
law of malicious prosecution, it is the intentional doing of
a wrongful act without legal justification, and may be
inferred from the absence of probable cause.21
It cannot be said that an accusation expressed during
a startling event, when the person who made it was in a
state of shock or disbelief at her loss, made it with
deliberate malice. Things happened spontaneously. Casal
could not have had the opportunity to reflect and
deliberate on her action upon discovering her loss. She
uttered what first came into her mind, a natural thing
under the circumstances.
Besides, her suspicion of De Leon was not altogether
baseless. Admittedly, the latter went in and out of the
room hurriedly.22 She said so herself.23 Clearly, Casal
was not motivated by any ill will or personal hatred
when she supposedly uttered her suspicion. And when
she supposedly sought an investigation of the incident
focusing on De Leon, she merely exercised her right. Qui
jure suo utitur nulum damnum facit. One who exercises
his rights does no injury. Even if damage results from a
person’s exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque
injuria.
In fact, however, the investigation did not single out
De Leon. All the people in the room at that time were
interviewed, their bags were searched, and their
fingerprints taken. The relatives of Casal were not
spared from the interrogation, the body and bag search,
and the fingerprinting.24
Closing Statement
It does frequently happen that some valuable things

are suddenly discovered stolen in a big household, in a
classroom, or in an office full of personnel. Since it is
likely that only one was a thief, would it be best that the
loss be endured and overlooked for the sake of
protecting the sensibilities of the greater number who are
presumably innocent? Surely not, since it is finding out
the truth by investigating and searching everyone who
had the opportunity of committing the offense that will
remove the cloud of suspicion from him. Feelings might
get hurt but the truth will set every one free.
Relief
WHEREFORE, defendant-appellant Laura Casal

respectfully prays the Court to set aside the decision of
the trial court dated August 17 and dismiss the
complaint against her.
The next question is: in preparing your statement of facts, must you
source your facts from both the direct and cross-examination of the
witnesses from either side? Where the parties have conflicting
versions, it would seem best when you prepare the background or
introductory facts to extract your facts solely from the direct
testimonies of the witnesses from either side. The direct testimonies
of witnesses, as a rule, embody the versions that the parties espouse.
When the cross-examinations have done some damage to the
testimony of your opponent’s witnesses, use these in the argument
portion where they would have greater impact and telling effect.
Short Introductions
The need to introduce the issue with some background facts or
antecedent circumstances (the equivalent of the statement of facts) is
not limited to a memorandum that a party submits after trial. They
work, too, for incidental issues brought up in the course of the
proceedings. Take for example this motion to quash a criminal
information filed in an estafa case. The motion can only be understood
if the argument is preceded by a recital of the information that the party
seeks to quash. Observe how the issue then flows into the argument.
[CAPTION OMITTED]
MOTION TO QUASH
Accused Sergio M. Lazaro, by counsel, respectfully
states:
The Charge
The prosecution has accused Sergio M. Lazaro of
estafa by misappropriation or conversion under Article
315, paragraph 1(B), of the Revised Penal Code. The
information reads:
That on or about August 15 in Makati City
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, while acting for and in
behalf of Lovely Garments Corporation,
obtained from Asiatic Bank a loan in the amount
of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND US Dollar
($100,000.00) using as collateral a deed of
assignment dated July 27 executed in favor of
Asiatic Bank conveying all its rights, title and
interests in confirmed purchase order No. 1234
of its foreign buyer, Macy’s Inc. of the United
States; that far from complying with the
undertaking in the deed of assignment, said
accused, did then and there, willfully and
feloniously defraud Asiatic Bank, by allowing
the payment of the purchase order covered by
the deed of assignment to another entity; that
upon the maturity of the loan from Asiatic Bank,
the accused failed to pay said loan; that despite
repeated demands from Asiatic Bank, said
accused failed and refused to pay the loan of
$100,000.00 to the damage and prejudice of said
bank in the aforesaid amount.
Issue Presented
The only issue accused Lazaro presents in this motion

to quash is whether or not the facts charged in the
information constitute the offense of estafa by
misappropriation or conversion.
Elements of Estafa by
Misappropriation or Conversion
The elements of estafa by misappropriation or
conversion, of which accused Lazaro has been charged,
are as follows:
One. That money or goods be received by the
accused in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return, the same;
Two. That there be misappropriation or
conversion or denial on the part of the accused
of such receipt;
Three. That such misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the
accused is to the prejudice of another; and
Four. That there is a demand made by the
offended party on the accused.
Argument
For estafa by misappropriation or conversion to apply
to the transaction subject of this criminal action, it is
essential that accused Lazaro, acting for Lovely
Garments, receive the money in trust for or as an agent
of the bank. The classic example of this kind of estafa
involves the trust receipt. In such a transaction, the
offender receives goods in trust for the bank but he is
unable to account for the goods or the proceeds of their
sale. Consequently, he is liable for estafa by
misappropriation or conversion. (People v. Cuevo, 104
SCRA 312).
In People v. Cuevo (supra), the information
clearly alleged that the accused received the
merchandise “in trust” for the bank “under an
express obligation … to account for the said
merchandise, or to deliver and turn over to the
[bank] the proceeds of the sale [of such
merchandise].” Since the accused in that case
failed to account for the merchandise or turn
over the proceeds of its sale, the prosecution
charged him with estafa.
In contrast, the information in the present
case, broken down to its essentials, alleges that:
1. Lovely Garments (represented by accused
Lazaro) obtained a loan of US$100,000.00 from
the Bank;
2. In getting the loan, Lovely Garments used
as collateral a deed of assignment in favor of the
bank in which Lovely Garments conveyed all its
rights, title and interests in a purchase order of a
foreign buyer, Macy’s Inc. of the United States;
3. Far from complying with the deed of
assignment, however, accused Lazaro defrauded
the Bank by allowing the payment of the
purchase order to another entity;
4. When the loan matured, accused Lazaro
failed to pay it; and
5. Despite demands from the Bank, he failed to
pay the loan.
Quite clearly, the present criminal action is based on
the failure of a borrower to pay a bank loan. But failure
to pay a loan is not a criminal act. When the borrower
spends the money for his benefit, he could not be said to
have misappropriated or converted the money to the
prejudice of the bank.
In a loan, it is understood that the borrower spends
the money for his purpose. He does not act as agent of
the bank with respect to the money he borrowed for his
use. Indeed, the information does not say that the
accused was to hold the loan money in trust for the bank
or for a purpose that places him under an obligation to
account for where the money went.
Article 315, No. 1(b) does not apply when the contract
between the accused and the complainant has the effect
of transferring to the accused the ownership of the thing
received. (Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 1971
Edition, p. 628.) When the bank gave Lovely Garments a
loan, it transferred ownership of that money to Lovely
Garments. Indeed, it has been held that when the
contract is a loan of money, the accused debtor cannot be
held liable for estafa for merely refusing to pay, or
denying having contracted, the debt. (U.S. v. Ibañez, 19
Phil. 559.) Loan money is known as mutuum. It is a loan
for consumption and the ownership of the thing loaned
passes to the borrower.
Wherefore, the accused Sergio M. Lazaro respectfully
prays the Court to issue an order quashing the
information and dismissing the case.
In a different light, an opposition to a motion for postponement
would probably exemplify a pleading that needs the least introduction.
Still, the lawyer opposing the postponement must, as a minimum
requirement for understanding the issue that his opposition tenders,
state the background facts. Thus—
[CAPTION OMITTED]
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO RESET HEARING
Plaintiff Benjamin S. Amurao, by counsel, respectfully
states:
1. [The introduction:] On June 11 defendant filed a
motion to reset the hearing set on June 24 at 8:30 a.m. on
the ground that his counsel has to attend another
hearing on the same date and time in a criminal case
before the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna.
2. [The statement of the issue:] But plaintiff must
oppose the motion.
3. [The argument:] It will be recalled that the hearing
on June 24 was set by agreement of the parties, with
both counsel consulting their calendars of hearings. The
motion to reset means that defendant’s counsel gave low
priority to this case, hence, he would willingly sacrifice it
for his other case. This is unjustified.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays the Court
to deny defendant’s motion to reset the hearing of this
case set on June 24.
Very often, when a party appeals a decision of the Court of Appeals
to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for review of the decision, the
latter court would require the other party, called the respondent, to
comment on the petition. Since the petition has already presented the
relevant facts of the case and introduced the issues that have to be
resolved, will it be necessary for the respondent to restate the facts and
the issue in his comment?
You should look at it this way. When you file your comment months
and several other intervening businesses later, the court will have lost
focus of your case. Consequently, it is essential for the respondent,
whom you represent, to give a brief background of the facts and the
issue in his comment to enable the court to recall what the case is about
and appreciate the comment.
And when the petitioner files a reply to the respondent’s comment,
the reply should itself recall the antecedents of the case in order to put
his reply arguments in the proper context. But the introduction in the
reply should not repeat the elaborate introduction made in the petition.
It should be lean and terse, confined to the highlights of past pleadings,
a reminder only, not a full repetition of what had been previously said.
Writing Exercises
If you did pre-work on the facts, the law, the issues, and the outline
of your arguments in the case of the girl attacked by a neighbor’s dog,
you would be ready to leave pre-work and move to writing up the legal
opinion that the girl’s father requested from you. Begin by drafting the
background facts of the case that will introduce the issue or issues that
it presents.
1TSN, May 22, pp. 19-20.

2Id., p. 22.
3Id., p. 24.
4Id., p. 27.
5Id., p. 29.
6TSN, May 27, p. 9.
7Id., p. 10.
8Id., p. 12.
9Id., p. 14.
10Id., p. 17.
11Id., p. 18.
12Id., p. 21.
13Id., p. 24.
14TSN, May 22, 2003, pp. 19-20.
15People v. Baquiran, L-20153, June 29, 1967; People v. Acusar, 82
Phil. 490; People v. Maron, G.R. 56858, December 27, 1982.
16TSN, June 15, pp. 8-10.
17TSN, May 22, pp. 35-36.
18TSN, June 5, pp. 26-27.
19Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., 1990.
20Becker v. Brinkop, 230 Mo. App. 871, 78 S.W. 2d 538, 541.
21Palermo v. Cottom, Mo. App., 525 S.W. 2d 758.
22TSN, May 27, p. 9.
23TSN, May 27, pp. 11-12.
24TSN, June 4, pp. 19-21.
9.
Writing the Argument
After writing the introduction to the issue or issues in the case, you
step into the second part of the write-up stage: putting flesh and color
to your arguments and making your closing statement.
Jump Off Points

As a rule, you need to be launched into your argument by some topic
or opening statement. Most experienced writers jump off with a topic
statement that signals or defines the direction of their argument. This is
usually done in two ways:
1. You can launch your argument by briefly stating your opponent’s
claim with the intention of defining the area that your argument will
attempt to assail. For example:
[Your statement of the opposing claim:] In support of

their first assignment of error, petitioners contend that
since its inception in the 1970s, the club in practice has
not been a corporation. They add that it was only the
respondent spouses, motivated by their own personal
agenda to make money from the club, who
surreptitiously caused its registration with the SEC.
They then assert that, at any rate, the club has already
ceased to be a corporate body. Therefore, no intra-
corporate relations can arise as between the respondent
spouses and the club or any of its members. Stretching
their argument further, petitioners insist that since the
club, by their reckoning is not a corporation, the SEC
does not have the power or authority to inquire into the
validity of the expulsion of the respondent spouses.
Consequently, it is not the correct forum to review the
challenged act. In conclusion, petitioners put respondent
spouses to task for their failure to implead the club as a
necessary or indispensable party to the case.
[Your argument:] These arguments cannot pass judicial

muster. Petitioners’ attempt to impress upon this court
that the club has never been a corporation is devoid of
merit. It must fail in the face of the Commission’s
explicit finding that the club was duly registered and a
certificate of incorporation was issued in its favor x x x.
It ought to be remembered that the question of whether
the club was indeed registered and issued a certification
or not is one which necessitates a factual inquiry. On this
score, the finding of the Commission, as the
administrative agency tasked with among others the
function of registering and administering corporations,
is given great weight and accorded with high respect. We
therefore have no reason to disturb this factual finding
relating to the club’s registration and incorporation.
[Another argument:] Moreover, by their own admission

contained in the various pleadings, which they have filed
in different stages of this case, petitioners themselves
have considered the club as a corporation. This
admission, under the rules of evidence, binds them and
may be taken or used against them. Since the admission
was made in the course of the proceedings in the same
case, it does not require proof, and actually may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. x
x x (Vesagas v. Court of Appeals, 371 SCRA 508, 513-514;
penned by Justice Reynato S. Puno.)
Note that, in the above, the jump off statement is followed by two
arguments that strike at the merit of the opposing position.
2. You can also begin your argument by stating your thesis or
proposition, your intention being to support it with the argument that
follows. For example:
[Statement of your thesis:] The trial court correctly

disbelieved his alibi. [Your argument:] Alibi and denial, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative and self-serving evidence that deserve no weight
in law. They cannot be given greater evidentiary value
over a credible witness’ testimony on affirmative
matters. Except for Lina Linatoc’s corroboration, the
only evidence supporting the alibi and denial of
appellant is his own say-so. And Lina happens to be his
common-law wife; thus her testimony is necessarily
suspect and cannot prevail over the offended party’s
positive identification of the accused as her rapist.
(People v. Viernes, 372 SCRA 231, 249-250; penned by
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban.)
Go over any legal writing and almost always you will discover the
use of the same pattern: a topic sentence (the opposing claim or the
writer’s thesis) followed by the argument.
Three Statements of an Argument

We said that every sound legal argument is the right rule and the
right fact, put together. A legal argument is made up of three
statements: (1) the statement of a rule that applies to a given fact or
set of facts (the rule statement); (2) the statement of the fact of a
particular case that opens up such case or closes it to the application
of the rule (the case fact statement); and (3) the conclusion that the
rule applies or does not apply to the particular case (the conclusion
statement).
Your balance sheet or short form argument may just say, “For a
woman, it was not likely for Julia to walk home alone in the middle of
the night.” Actually, what you are saying is that [the rule:] “Filipino
women do not walk home alone so late in the night. Still, [the case
fact:] Julia said that she did. Therefore, [the conclusion:] she must
have lied.” Written up into a full argument, it might read like this:
[The rule:] Filipino practice and tradition in the rural

areas tend to protect women, especially young girls,
when they go out late in the evening. When the girl
attends a night party, the host usually arranges for a
relative or a friend to walk her home. [The case fact:] In
this case, Julia, a young girl raised in the rural areas,
testified that she walked home alone after the wedding
party although it was already late at night and she had
to walk across rice fields to get home. [The conclusion:] It
may be inferred from this that she had not told the truth.
Indeed, it seemed more probable that her sweetheart,
Ronald, escorted her home.
Your balance sheet argument may just say, “Mario did not hear
Julia’s outcry.” Actually, what you are saying is that [the rule:]
“Women forced to submit to sex against their will would naturally
make loud outcries for help. [The case fact:] Mario did not hear Julia
make an outcry. Therefore, [the conclusion:] Ronald did not rape her.”
Written up into a full argument, the above might read like this:
[The rule:] A woman forced to submit to a man’s

sexual attack will no doubt make a loud outcry. [The case
fact:] In this case, although the rape allegedly took place
just 50 meters away from Mario’s house, a distance that
would have enable the latter to hear Julia’s shriek for
help when it happened, Mario testified that he did not
hear such an outcry. [The conclusion:] Inevitably, the
conclusion is that Julia made no outcry, she having
assented to Ronald’s moves.
Persuasive Arguments
Why is awareness of the three essential statements of your legal
argument (the rule, the case fact, and the conclusion) important when
you write up that argument? It is important because the effectiveness
of your argument depends on how ably you write up each
statement of your argument into a convincing part. This is all what
an argument is about, convincing another to buy your point of view.
Knowing the essentials enables you to dismantle your argument,
reinforce or improve the weak parts, emphasize the strong, and put
them together again to produce a persuasive argument.
Convincing Rule Statement
If your rule is that women will ordinarily not admit having been
raped unless true and if your case fact is that Julia admitted having
been raped by Ronald, then your conclusion will be that Julia’s
admission is probably true. Will the following be a sufficient write-up
of your argument?
Since women will ordinarily not admit having been

raped unless true and since Julia admitted to having
been raped by Ronald, it follows that her admission of
that rape is probably true.
But the above argument is too bare to ensure its full acceptance by
the reader. Full acceptance comes from being convinced, first, that the
rule you propose is correct and, second, that the key fact to which the
rule applies is similar to (or different from) the case fact (the fact of the
particular case). An insurance salesman cannot hope to succeed in
selling insurance by simply telling his client the basic statement:
“Insurance is good for family men. Since you are a family man,
insurance is good for you.” His client can accept the fact that he is a
family man, but he needs convincing that, as a rule, insurance is good
for family men.
It is the same with the above argument in the rape case. Your reader
can accept the case fact that Julia admitted to having been raped by
Ronald since this fact is not denied. But your reader needs to be
convinced that women as a rule will not admit to being raped unless
true. You need to write more about it to convince your reader as to its
correctness.
Rewritten to reinforce your rule statement, the argument might go
like this:
[The rule statement:] It takes lots of courage for any
woman to cry out and testify that she has been raped.
When she steps forward to confess what happened to
her, she exposes herself to the humiliation of
acknowledging that a man has ravished her body and
violated her virginity. The police investigation will surely
make a spectacle of her. And rowdy police investigators
are not known for prudence and gentleness. She also has
to bare her body to the prying hands of a medical
examiner who is a stranger to her. And, as soon as her
neighbors learn of it, she permanently loses her good
reputation. Suitors will avoid her like a leper. For these
reasons, women are not likely to admit to being raped
unless true. [The case fact statement:] Since Julia
acknowledged having been raped by Ronald, [The
conclusion:] her testimony may be assumed to be true.
The writer of the above is not satisfied with the bare rule statement
“that women will ordinarily not admit to being raped unless true.” He
shows how true and valid the statement is, given the great troubles to
which the rape victim places herself when she dares come out to
complain. The writer’s vivid description of her travails enables the
reader to go through the experience and sympathize with the rape
victim. This is what it means when we said earlier that the
effectiveness of your argument depends on how ably you write up each
statement of your argument into a convincing point.
In a case decided by the Supreme Court,1 Caltex shipped a quantity
of fuel oil on board a vessel owned by Delsan Transport from Batangas
to Zamboanga City. Caltex insured its cargo with Home Assurance.
Unfortunately, the vessel sank near Panay Gulf by an inclement
weather, taking with it the entire cargo of oil. After Home Assurance
paid Caltex for its loss, it filed a suit against Delsan Transport to
recover what it paid.
But Delsan Transport argued that, under the Insurance Code, Caltex,
as shipper of the goods, should be deemed to warrant that the vessel
was seaworthy. Delsan Transport argued that, since Home Assurance
paid Caltex its loss, the implication is that it accepted the latter’s lack
of fault and the vessel’s seaworthiness. And being seaworthy, the
vessel’s sinking could only be imputed to force majeure, relieving
Delsan Transport of any liability.
Given the above case fact statement, the focus now shifts to the rule
statement that applies to such fact. It is here—in the rule section—that
the Court focused its argument in favor of Home Assurance. Thus:
The payment made by [Home Assurance] for the

insured value of the lost cargo operates as waiver of its
right to enforce the term of the implied warranty against
Caltex under the marine insurance policy. [By this
statement the Court concedes for argument’s sake the “case
fact” that the payment resulted in a waiver of Caltex’s
warranty.] However, the same cannot be validly
interpreted as automatic admission of the vessel’s
seaworthiness by [Home Assurance] as to foreclose
recourse against [Delsan Transport] for any liability
under its contractual obligation as a common carrier.
[Here the court sets down its thesis or proposition.] The
fact of payment grants Home Assurance subrogatory
right which enables it to exercise legal remedies that
would otherwise be available to Caltex as owner of the
lost cargo against [Delsan Transport].2 [Now it states its
conclusion.] Article 2207 of the New Civil Code x x x.
[What follows is a reinforcement of the rule statement in
the Court’s argument:] The right of subrogation has its
roots in equity. It is designed to promote and to
accomplish justice and is the mode which equity adopts
to compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one who in
justice and good conscience ought to pay.3 It is not
dependent upon, nor does it grow out of, any privity of
contract or upon written assignment of claim. It accrues
simply upon payment by the insurance company of the
insurance claim. [Then the Court restates its conclusion
from another point of view:] Consequently, the payment
made by [Home Assurance] to Caltex (assured) operates
as an equitable assignment to the former of all the
remedies which the latter may have against [Delsan
Transport].
You will note from the Court’s discussion of its chosen rule
statement, that it had recourse to statute and case laws to reinforce the
validity of that view. This is the task of legal research. You need to
fathom the depths of jurisprudence for the right rulings and precedents
that apply to the facts of the particular case.
You will note from the Court’s discussion of its chosen rule
statement, that it had recourse to statute and case laws to reinforce the
validity of that view. This is the task of legal research. You need to
fathom the depths of jurisprudence for the right rulings and precedents
that apply to the facts of the particular case.
Convincing Fact Statement

At times, the parties to the dispute could agree that a specific rule
governs a case but they are unable to agree whether the key fact to
which it applies is similar to or different from the fact of the case. In
this situation, it is the statement of the case fact that needs building up.
In the rape case against Ronald, he could concede the “rule” that a
woman’s testimony, standing alone, can support a conviction for rape
provided it is conclusive, logical, and probable. But he could choose to
show that Julia’s testimony is the opposite, i.e., inconclusive, illogical,
and improbable.
[The rule:] Although a woman’s testimony, standing

alone, can support a conviction for rape, such testimony
must be conclusive, logical, and probable.
[The case fact:] But, firstly, the medico-legal officer
who examined Julia’s whole body did not find any bruise
either on her back or on her arms. Yet, she testified that
she struggled to get free from Ronald on rough ground, a
situation that would surely have produced those bruises.
What happened, then, is that Ronald made love to her
gently, consistent with his claim that she consented to the
sexual act.
[Another case fact:] Secondly, Julia’s testimony that
she walked home alone after the wedding party is
improbable especially since it was nighttime and she had
to walk across rice fields. A Filipina woman would
naturally ask the host or a friend to walk with her home.
Indeed, this was what probably happened. Her
sweetheart, Ronald, escorted her.
[Still another case fact:] Thirdly, the rape allegedly
took place just 50 meters away from Mario’s house. At
that distance, surely, Mario who was still awake would
have heard Julia shriek for help when it happened. A
woman forced to submit to a man’s sexual attack would
no doubt make a loud outcry. The fact that no one heard
Julia’s outcry shows that she assented to Ronald’s
moves.
[The conclusion:] For the above reasons, Julia’s
testimony cannot support a judgment for conviction.
You will note from the above that each of the three case facts raised
to reinforce Ronald’s case fact statement is in itself an argument that
embodies a rule, a case fact, and a conclusion. What does this tell you?
This tells you that several arguments could be clustered to bring home
just one major point. This also tells you that the variety by which
arguments can be structured, combined, and set apart are limitless.
Although all sound arguments use the same building blocks (rule, case
fact, and conclusion), they cannot be channeled into a simple formula.
In a case, the Supreme Court found no disagreement among the
parties regarding the rule that defines the jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). All
agreed that the DARAB had exclusive jurisdiction over disputes
concerning tenancy relationship. But the Court readily acknowledged
that the parties disagreed on the facts of the case. Consequently, in
ruling in favor of the respondent tenants, the High Court reinforced the
case fact statement in its argument. Thus:
[The rule:] In Estates Development Corporation v. CA,

the essential elements of a tenancy relationship were
listed in this wise: “For DARAB to have jurisdiction over
a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between
the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take
hold over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all
its indispensable elements, to wit: 1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2)
subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
3) there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to
bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is
personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.”
[Statement of the opposing claim:] Petitioner claims that
private respondent were not her tenants, and that they
raised the defense of tenancy in the criminal case merely
to escape prosecution for qualified theft. On the other
hand, private respondents assert that they were
petitioner’s tenants, as shown by the evidence adduced
by the parties before the RTC.
[The conclusion:] After a careful review of the records
of this case, we hold that an agrarian dispute existed
between the parties. [The case fact:] First, the subject of
the dispute between them was the taking of the coconuts
from the property owned by petitioner. Second, private
respondents were the overseers of the property at the
time of the taking of the coconuts, as can be gleaned
from the Kasabutan (or Agreement) executed between
them on November 25, 1991 x x x. Third, petitioner
allowed private respondents to plant coconut, coffee,
jackfruit and cacao as shown by the said Agreement x x
x. Finally, a tenurial arrangement exists among herein
parties as regards the harvesting of the agricultural
products, as shown by the several remittances made by
private respondents to petitioner. These are
substantiated by receipts. (Monsanto v. Zerna, 371 SCRA
664, 675-676; penned by Justice Artemio V. Panganiban.)
One effective technique in presenting multiple points in favor of

your view is to put them in a numbered series as in the above. By
numbering the facts that persuaded the Court in concluding that the
DARAB had jurisdiction over the case, it lent the strength of number to
its argument.
Correct Conclusion Statement

The examples above of uses of the combinations of rule and case
fact statements also show how the third statement, the conclusion
statement, must logically flow from its two (2) premises. When stating
your conclusion, you simply draw an inference that the fact of a
particular case opens it up or closes it to the application of the rule that
governs such case.
The idea behind being able to recognize and understand each of the
three statements that make up your argument is that such recognition
and understanding will enable you to reinforce that statement in your
argument that seems most vulnerable. Conversely, it enables you to
destroy your opponent’s thesis or proposition by attacking the essential
statement of his argument, his rule, his case fact, or his conclusion that
seems weakest.
Positioning Variation
Conventionally, arguments are started off with a statement of the
applicable rule, followed by a statement of the case fact, and ended by
a conclusion that the rule applies or does not apply to the case fact.
This conventional sequence has been observed in the sample argument
below. It states the rule that, in cases involving contracts, exemplary
damages may be awarded when the defendant acts in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. And, after
ascertaining the case fact that defendant has not acted in that manner,
the Court makes the conclusion that plaintiff is not entitled to
exemplary damages. Thus:
[The rule:] The law on exemplary damages is found in
Section 5, Chapter 3, Title XVIII, Book IV of the Civil
Code. These are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages. They
are recoverable in criminal cases as part of the civil
liability when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances; in quasi-delict, if the
defendant acted with gross negligence; and in contracts
and quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
[The case fact:] BPI Investments did not act in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner, when it asked for preliminary attachment. It
was just exercising a legal option. The sheriff of the
issuing court did the execution and the attachment. [The
conclusion:] Hence, BPI Investments is not to be blamed
for the excessive and wrongful attachment. (BPI
Investment Corp. v. D.G. Carreon Commercial Corp., 371
SCRA 58, 70; penned by Justice Bernardo P. Pardo.)
In writing up an argument, must you always follow the conventional

sequence of rule, fact, and conclusion? The answer is no. Actually,
your argument will make sense so long as you are able to string along
those three essential statements whatever may be their order or
positions.
In a case, although the Supreme Court acknowledged the rule that
the drawer of a dishonored check who informed its payee that he did
not have sufficient funds in the bank cannot be considered to have
violated Batas Pambansa 21, it made a case fact finding that the
accused in that case did not give that information to the complainant.
The Court thus drew up the conclusion that the rule could not apply to
the accused. But the Court in this case chose to follow a different
sequence. It began with the conclusion, followed it up with the rule,
and then the case fact.
[The conclusion:] The case of Magno v. Court of

Appeals relied upon by accused-petitioner, does not find
application to the present case. [The rule:] In Magno, we
held that there was no violation of the bouncing checks
law because there was evidence that complainant was
told by the drawer that he did not have sufficient funds
in the bank. The drawer, from the very beginning, never
hid the fact that he did not have funds with which to put
up the warranty deposit, and openly intimated the same
to complainant. Although the ruling in Magno was
reiterated in the case of Idos v. Court of Appeals, again,
we note that in Idos, petitioner repeatedly notified the
complainant of the insufficiency of funds. In both cases,
the complainant was duly notified by the drawer of the
insufficiency of funds. It also serves to emphasize that in
Idos, petitioner’s acquittal was not based on
complainant’s knowledge that petitioner did not have
sufficient funds in the bank. x x x
[The case fact:] In the case under consideration,
accused-petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to
substantiate her claim that private respondent knew that
she (accused-appellant) had difficulty maintaining
sufficient funds in or credit with the bank. On the other
hand, private respondent during cross-examination
categorically denied having been advised by accused-
petitioner not to deposit the checks: x x x (Lagman v.
People, 371 SCRA 686, 696-697; penned by Justice
Santiago M. Kapunan.)
In an argument in another case, the Supreme Court also followed a
different internal sequence. It began with the case fact, followed it up
with the rule, and then the conclusion. The petitioners in the case filed
a petition for review with the Court of Appeals but the latter court
dismissed the case for failure of the petitioners to enclose a certified
true copy of the adverse decision and resolutions of the trial court. On
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
See the three elements in the High Court’s argument.
[The case fact:] The copies of the decision and

resolution of the Regional Trial Court attached to the
petition for review filed by petitioners in the Court of
Appeals are duplicate originals. However, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for review of petitioners
on the ground that copies of the decision and resolution
of the Regional Trial Court must be certified true copies.
[The rule:] The Court of Appeals based its action on
Rule 42, Section 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
but this rule provides that petition for review of
decisions and resolutions of Regional Trial Courts must
“be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or
true copies of judgments or final orders of both lower
courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the
Regional Trial Court. [The conclusion:] It suffices,
therefore, that a copy of a decision or resolution attached
to a petition for review is a duplicate original. (Lee v.
Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 707, 714-715; penned by
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza.)
Building Blocks of Arguments
As you may have noted, every sound legal argument takes shape,
using as building blocks the three essential statements: the rule, the
case fact, and the conclusion. Observe how the following decision of
the Supreme Court in KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v. Court of Appeals
(65 SCRA 237), penned by Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro who
advocated and practiced simplicity and clarity in writing, put together
the arguments, using those same building blocks. The case concerns
two Filipino passengers who were offloaded from an airplane to give
their seats to two white passengers.
DECISION
In this appeal by way of certiorari the Koninklijke

Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V., otherwise known as the
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (hereinafter referred to as
the KLM) assails the award of damages made by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 40620 in favor of the
spouses Rufino T. Mendoza and Consuelo T. Mendoza
(hereinafter referred to as the respondents).
Sometime in March 1965, the respondents approached
Tirso Reyes, manager of a branch of the Philippine
Travel Bureau, a travel agency, for consultations about a
world tour, which they were intending to make with their
daughter and a niece. Reyes submitted to them, after
preliminary discussions, a tentative itinerary, which
prescribed a trip of thirty-five legs; the respondents
would fly on different airlines. Three segments of the
trip, the longest, would be via KLM. The respondents
expressed a desire to visit Lourdes, France, and
discussed with Reyes two alternate routes, namely, Paris
to Lourdes and Barcelona to Lourdes. The respondents
decided on the Barcelona-Lourdes route with knowledge
that only one airline, Aer Lingus, serviced it.
The Philippine Travel Bureau to which Reyes was
accredited was an agent for international air carriers,
which are members of the International Air Transport
Association, popularly known as the “IATA,” of which
both the KLM and the Aer Lingus are members.
After about two weeks, the respondents approved the
itinerary prepared for them and asked Reyes to make
the necessary plane reservations. Reyes went to the
KLM, for which the respondents had expressed
preference. The KLM thereafter secured seat
reservations for the respondents and their two
companions from the carriers, which would ferry them
throughout their trip, with the exception of Aer Lingus.
When the respondents left the Philippines (without their
young wards who had enplaned much earlier), they were
issued KLM tickets for their entire trip. However, their
coupon for the Aer Lingus portion (Flight 861 for June
22, 1965) was marked “RQ” which meant “on request.”
After sightseeing in American and European cities
(they were in the meantime joined by their two young
companions), the respondents arrived in Frankfurt,
Germany. They went to a KLM office there and obtained
a confirmation from Aer Lingus of seat reservations on
Flight 861. After meandering in London, Paris and
Lisbon, the foursome finally took wing to Barcelona for
their trip to Lourdes, France.
In the afternoon of June 22, 1965, the respondents
with their wards went to Barcelona airport to take their
plane, which arrived at 4:00 o’clock. At the airport, the
manager of Aer Lingus directed the respondents to
check in. They did so as instructed and were accepted for
passage. However, although their daughter and niece
were allowed to take the plane, the respondents were off-
loaded on orders of the Aer Lingus manager who
brusquely shoved them aside with the aid of a policeman
and who shouted at them, “Coños! Ignorantes
Filipinos!”
Mrs. Mendoza later called up the manager of Aer
Lingus and requested that they provide her and her
husband means to get to Lourdes, but the request was
denied. A stranger, however, advised them to take a
train, which the two did; despite the third class
accommodations and lack of food service, they reached
Lourdes the following morning. During the train trip the
respondents had to suffer draft winds as they wore only
minimum clothing, their luggage having gone ahead with
the Aer Lingus plane. They spent $50 for that train trip;
their plane passage was worth $43.35.
On March 17, 1966 the respondents, referring to KLM
as the principal of Aer Lingus, filed a complaint for
damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila
arising from breach of contract of carriage and for the
humiliating treatment received by them at the hands of
the Aer Lingus manager in Barcelona. After due
hearing, the trial court awarded damages to the
respondents as follows: $43.35 or, its peso equivalent as
actual damages, P10,000 as moral damages, P5,000 as
exemplary damages, and P5,000 as attorney’s fees, and
expenses of litigation.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
KLM sought complete exoneration; the respondents
prayed for an increase in the award of damages. In its
decision of August 14, 1969, the Court of Appeals
decreed as follows: “Appellant KLM is condemned to
pay unto the plaintiffs the sum of $43.35 as actual
damages; P50,000 as moral damages; and P6,000 as
attorney’s fees and costs.”
Hence, the present recourse by the KLM.
The KLM prays for exculpation from damages on the
strength of the following particulars, which were
advanced to but rejected by the Court of Appeals:
(a) The air tickets issued to the respondents stipulate
that carriage thereunder is subject to the “Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air,” otherwise known
as the “Warsaw Convention,” to which the Philippine
Government is a party by adherence, and which
pertinently provides:
“ART. 30. (1) In the case of transportation to
be performed by various successive carriers and
falling within the definition set out in the third
paragraph of Article I, each carrier who accepts
passengers, baggage or goods shall be subject to
the rules set out in the convention, and shall be
deemed to be one of the contracting parties to
the contract of transportation insofar as the
contract deals with that part of the
transportation which is performed under his
supervision.
“(2) In the case of transportation of this
nature, the passenger or his representative can
take action only against the carrier who
performed the transportation during which the
accident or the delay occurred, save in the case
where, by express agreement, the first carrier
has assumed liability for the whole journey.”
(b) On the inside front cover of each ticket the
following appears under the heading “Conditions of
Contract”:
“1. x x x (a) Liability of carrier for damages
shall be limited to occurrences on its own line,
except in the case of checked baggage as to
which the passenger also has a right of action
against the first or last carrier. A carrier issuing
a ticket or checking baggage for carriage over
the lines of others does so only as agent.”
(c) All that the KLM did after the respondents
completed their arrangements with the travel agency
was to request for seat reservations among the airlines
called for by the itinerary submitted to the KLM and to
issue tickets for the entire flight as a ticket-issuing agent.
The respondents rebut the foregoing arguments, thus:
(a) Article 30 of the Warsaw Convention has no
application in the case at bar which involves, not an
accident or delay, but a willful misconduct on the part of
the KLM’s agent, the Aer Lingus. Under Article 25 of
the same Convention the following is prescribed:
ART. 25. (1) The carrier shall not be entitled
to avail himself of the provisions of this
convention which exclude or limit his liability, if
the damage is caused by his willful misconduct
or by such default on his part as, in accordance
with the law of the court to which the case is
submitted, is considered to be equivalent to
willful misconduct.
“(2) Similarly, the carrier shall not be entitled
to avail himself of the said provisions, if the
damage is caused under the same circumstances
by any agent of the carrier acting within the
scope of his employment.” (italics by
respondents)
(b) The condition in their tickets, which purportedly
excuse the KLM from liability appears in very small
print, to read which, as found by the Court of Appeals,
one has practically to use a magnifying glass.
(c) The first paragraph of the “Conditions of
Contract” appearing identically on the KLM tickets
issued to them indubitably shows that their contract was
one of continuous air transportation around the world:
“1. x x x ‘carriage’ includes the air carrier
issuing this ticket and all carriers that carry or
undertake to carry the passenger or his baggage
hereunder or perform any other service
incidental to such air carriage. . . . Carriage to be
performed hereunder by several successive
carrier is regarded as a single operation.”
(d) The contract of air transportation was exclusively
between the respondents and the KLM, the latter merely
endorsing its performance to other carriers, like Aer
Lingus, as its subcontractors or agents, as evidenced by
the passage tickets themselves which on their face
disclose that they are KLM tickets. Moreover, the
respondents dealt only with KLM through the travel
agency.
[The issue presented, as stated above, is whether or
not KLM is liable for damages.]
1. [The conclusion:] The applicability insisted upon by
the KLM of Article 30 of the Warsaw Convention cannot
be sustained. [The rule:] That article presupposes the
occurrence of either an accident or a delay, [The case
fact:] neither of which took place at the Barcelona
airport; what is here manifest, instead, is that the Aer
Lingus, through its manager there, refused to transport
the respondents to their planned and contracted
destination.
2. [The conclusion:] The argument that the KLM
should not be held accountable for the tortious conduct
of Aer Lingus because of the provision printed on the
respondents’ tickets expressly limiting the KLM’s
liability for damages only to occurrences on its own lines
is unacceptable. [The case fact:] As noted by the Court
of Appeals that condition was printed in letters so small
that one would have to use a magnifying glass to read the
words. Under the circumstances, [The rule:] it would be
unfair and inequitable to charge the respondents with
automatic knowledge or notice of the said condition so as
to preclude any doubt that it was fairly and freely agreed
upon by the respondents when they accepted the passage
tickets issued to them by the KLM.
[The rule:] As the airline which issued those tickets
with the knowledge that the respondents would be flown
on the various legs of their journey by different air
carriers, the KLM was chargeable with the duty and
responsibility of specifically informing the respondents
of conditions prescribed in their tickets or, in the very
least, to ascertain that the respondents read them before
they accepted their passage tickets. [The case fact:] A
thorough search of the record, however, inexplicably
fails to show that any effort was exerted by the KLM
officials or employees to discharge in a proper manner
this responsibility to the respondents. [The conclusion:]
Consequently, we hold that the respondents cannot be
bound by the provision in question by which KLM
unilaterally assumed the role of a mere ticket-issuing
agent for other airlines and limited its liability only to
untoward occurrences on its own lines.
3. [The rule:] Moreover, as maintained by the
respondents and the Court of Appeals, the passage
tickets of the respondents provide that the carriage to be
performed thereunder by several successive carriers “is
to be regarded as a single operation,” which is
diametrically incompatible with the theory of the KLM
that the respondents entered into a series of independent
contracts with the carriers which took them on the
various segments of their trip. [The conclusion:] This
position of KLM we reject. [The case fact:] The
respondents dealt exclusively with the KLM which
issued them tickets for their entire trip and which in
effect guaranteed to them that they would have sure
space in Aer Lingus Flight 861. The respondents, under
that assurance of the internationally prestigious KLM,
naturally had the right to expect that their tickets would
be honored by Aer Lingus to which, in the legal sense,
the KLM had indorsed and in effect guaranteed the
performance of its principal engagement to carry out the
respondents’ scheduled itinerary previously and
mutually agreed upon between the parties.
4. [The case fact:] The breach of that guarantee was
aggravated by the discourteous and highly arbitrary
conduct of an official of the Aer Lingus which the KLM
had engaged to transport the respondents on the
Barcelona-Lourdes segment of their itinerary. [The rule:]
It is but just and in full accord with the policy expressly
embodied in our civil law which enjoins courts to be
more vigilant for the protection of a contracting party
who occupies an inferior position with respect to the
other contracting party, [The conclusion:] that the KLM
should be held responsible for the abuse, injury, and
embarrassment suffered by the respondents at the hands
of a supercilious boor of the Aer Lingus.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals dated August 14, 1969 is affirmed, at KLM’s
cost.
Omitted Statement
At times, you could omit from your argument one of its essential
statements—your rule, your case fact, or even your conclusion—if that
element is so evident that it goes without saying.
For example, if you could show by evidence of his birth certificate
that the defendant has lied about his age, you could immediately
conclude that what he said about his age could not be believed. You
need not state your “rule” that “falsehoods cannot be believed” since
this goes without saying.
Likewise, you could also omit stating your conclusion when it is
already obvious based on how you clearly discussed your “rule” and
your “case fact.” Leaving it to your reader to draw his own conclusion
could work very well. Take for example this argument in a Supreme
Court decision:
[The issue:] The principal issue raised is the validity of
the donation executed by Catalina in favor of Violeta.
[The rule:] Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, the
donation of an immovable must be made in a public
instrument in order to be valid, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charges which the
donee must satisfy. As a mode of acquiring ownership,
donation results in an effective transfer of title over the
property from the donor to the donee, and is perfected
from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by
the donee, provided the donee is not disqualified or
prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the
donation is accepted, it is generally considered
irrevocable, and the donee becomes the absolute owner
of the property. The acceptance, to be valid, must be
made during the lifetime of both the donor and the
donee. It may be made in the same deed or in a separate
public document and the donor must know the
acceptance by the donee.
[The case fact:] In the case at bar, the deed of donation
contained the number of the certificate of title as well as
the technical description of the real property donated. It
stipulated that the donation was made for and in
consideration of the “love and affection which the
DONEE inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of
liberality and generosity.” x x x
The donee’s acceptance of the donation was explicitly
manifested in the penultimate paragraph of the deed x x
x.
x x x The fact that it was acknowledged before a
notary public converts the deed of donation in its
entirety into a public instrument. x x x (Quilala v.
Alcantara, 371 SCRA 311, 317-319; penned by Justice
Consuelo Yñares-Santiago.)
In the above, the conclusion that the deed of donation in question

meets all the requirements of a valid donation is quite obvious and did
not have to be stated.
The danger, however, is that many lawyers and students presume
that their rule, their case fact, or their conclusion is quite evident that
they need not state it in their argument. It often happens that they
misread how their average readers think. The omitted proposition or
conclusion could be quite unclear to these readers. In such a case, the
argument has no force. Consequently, in case of doubt, it will be best to
completely deploy all the essential statements of your argument.
Closing Statement
On occasions, it will help to make a closing statement. The idea
behind every closing statement is to depart on a good note after
packing your pleading with every sort of argument in support of your
stand. Consequently, your closing argument should not appear to argue
even if it may appeal to the good sense of the judge exercised in your
favor. How can you do this? Recall to your reader those truths that
underlie every good decision in identical cases. He cannot disagree
with that. Consider this closing statement in the rape case:
Concluding Statement
Ronald is entitled to an acquittal. In rape, the Court must thoroughly

examine the evidence of the complainant since only her testimony
stands between conviction and acquittal. Where her testimony is
inconsistent with common experience and defies reason as in this case,
it should not be believed. The version of the accused may itself be
weak but the conviction cannot rest on such weakness. It must stand on
the strength of the prosecution’s evidence alone.
Prayer
Wherefore, the accused respectfully prays that judgment be rendered

acquitting him of the charge of rape.
x x x x x x x x x
Writing Exercises
1. If you did pre-work on the case of the girl whom a neighbor’s dog
attacked, you will have already roughed out your arguments. You
should be ready by now to flesh these out. Do so applying the
principles, lessons, and techniques that you have learned.
2. Write up, too, your closing statement in the case.
1Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 369 SCRA 24

(2001), penned by Justice Sabino R. De Leon, Jr.
2Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works, Inc. v. William Lines, Inc.,
306 SCRA 762, 778 (1999).
3Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 184 SCRA 54, 58 (1990), citing Boney, Insurance
Commissioner v. Central Mutual Ins. Co. of Chicago, 197 S.E. 122.
10.
Tightening Your Work
Completing the write-up portion of your pleading or paper would

not be enough if your aim were excellence in writing. Editing is
essential to excellent writing. Indeed, some say that true writing is
rewriting.
Each person, like you, has his writing style and he is entitled to
conform to that style. This book does not suggest that you change your
style; it only suggests some ways you can make your writing style even
better. These suggestions aim to help you write clearly and vigorously,
in your own style. Consequently, when the suggestions appear to
hinder your writing style, disregard them. But keep an open mind to
make changes when you discover something useful for you in the
lessons provided in this and in the succeeding chapters.
Language Problems
Ordinary people complain that they encounter so much difficulty
and frustration in trying to understand the “legal garbage” that lawyers
put down in their opinions or pleadings, even though these would be
read by or are ultimately intended for non-lawyers.
One reason for this is that most lawyers simply lack practical
training in the art of making opinions or writing thesis. The emphasis
in law schools is on learning enough of the law to pass the class or the
bar examinations rather than on writing about the law for others.
Because of this, what the law students acquire are skills in making
loose syllabi, outlines, or short notes needed for preparing for the
examinations. These are not writings intended for convincing others to
accept a point of view.
Consequently, on leaving law school, most law graduates write
pleadings in the familiar format they knew—disorganized, long-
winded, and repetitious loose notes. And, to compensate for inadequate
training, a good number of these graduates resort to using in their
pleadings out-of-context “legalese words or phrases” cut out of some
Supreme Court decisions. As young lawyers, they hope to impress
more than to persuade.
Here is a classic example in the use of needless words, claimed to be
the work of a lawyer:
I hereby give, transfer, and convey to you, each and
every interest, right, title, claim, and benefit that I have
in the said orange, together with its rind, skin, juice, and
pulps, with all the rights and benefits appurtenant
thereto, including the full power to bite, or suck, or
otherwise eat the same or give the same away, with or
without the rind, skin, juice, and pulps, anything
hereinbefore or hereinafter or in any other means of
whatever nature or kind whatsoever to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Yet, all that the lawyer wanted to say is:
Have an orange.
Needless Words
Think of a memorandum in a case as a pot of special dish, a mixture
of different ingredients in prescribed quantities, mixed together, and
cooked as the dish required. If you pour five cups of water when the
recipe calls for only one cup, you would be watering down the taste of
your dish. A memorandum with more words that are needed to bring
home its message to the reader has the same result. Useless
circumlocutions clutter and dissipate the power of your message.
Consequently, you must develop the practice of throwing out excess
words, phrases, and sentences and tightening your work to make it
compact and terse.
Vigorous writing, said Strunk and White in that famous little book,
Elements of Style,1 is concise. “A sentence should contain no
unnecessary words, a paragraph no unnecessary sentences, for the
same reason that a drawing should have no unnecessary lines and a
machine no unnecessary parts. This requires, not that the writer make
all sentences short, or avoid all detail and treat subjects only in outline,
but that every word tell.”
Under the Revised Rules of Court, every party to a lawsuit must
send to his adversary a copy of every pleading or paper that he files in
court. The rules prefer that a messenger personally deliver the copy but
sending it by registered mail is also allowed. It has been noted,
however, that some lawyers furnished copies of their papers to their
opponents by registered mail even if the latter held office just next
door. For this reason, Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that when a lawyer sends a copy of his paper
to his opponent by registered mail he should include an explanation for
doing it that way.
In a case, one lawyer included this explanation in his paper:
EXPLANATION
Pursuant to Section 11 of Rule 13 of the New Rules on

Civil Procedure, explanation is hereby given that a copy
of this pleading was served upon opposing counsel by
means of registered mail and not by personal service, the
latter mode being impractical due to and for the reasons
that heavy volume of deliveries/service/filing of equally
important pleadings, motions, notices of the law firm in
other courts or tribunals and to opposing counsels or
parties render such personal service impossible not to
mention the separate and different geographical distance
that need to be traversed if personal service is resorted
to.
Yet, all that the lawyer wanted to say is:
Explanation: Defendant has to serve a copy of this

comment on the plaintiff by registered mail because of
the distance and the lack of a messenger who can make a
personal service.
Just how do you tighten a piece of legal writing without sacrificing
the color and substance of your argument? It is simple. Take out those
words, phrases, or sentences that do not contribute to your reader’s
understanding of what you are saying.
Consider the arguments that an airline company offered in its
defense against a suit by disgruntled passengers.2 The spouses Manuel
and Karen Romano and their friends Julio Fernan, Vicky Sandoval, Art
Gatchalian, and Laura Sevilla decided to take a vacation in Bangkok,
Thailand. They asked Sweet Travel, Inc. to book them on a morning
flight on May 8. Sweet Travel in turn endorsed the booking to Hope
Tours, Inc., a member of the International Air Transport Association
(IATA) and an agent of China Airlines (CAL). On May 5 Hope Tours
issued the tickets on behalf of CAL on the faces of which appeared the
word “OK” to signify a confirmed booking status for each of the
passengers.
But, when the group checked in for their flight, only the Romanos
had confirmed reservations. CAL put the rest on waiting list but only
Fernan and Sandoval got seats on the plane when some confirmed
passengers did not show up. CAL advised Gatchalian and Sevilla to get
on another airline’s flight that was leaving hours later. CAL declined,
however, to make the arrangement for them. Eventually, only four (4)
of the original six boarded the CAL flight. Because the four travelers
had to wait for hours at the Bangkok airport for their two companions,
their host had to leave them. They had to fend for themselves and give
up their scheduled afternoon tours. On returning to Manila, the group
sued CAL, Sweet Travel, and Hope Tours for damages arising from the
expenses, inconveniences, and frustrations that they suffered.
In defending itself, CAL claimed that it received reservations for the
six passengers on May 4, recorded them in its computers, and
confirmed the reservations subject to actual ticketing not later than
noon of May 5 or the reservations would automatically be cancelled.
At Sweet Travel’s request, CAL extended the ticketing deadline to
noon of May 6 and later to noon of May 7. Meantime, Sweet Travel
endorsed the ticketing of the six passengers to Hope Tours.
But, since neither Sweet Travel nor Hope Tours reconfirmed the
bookings of the group before the May 7 time limit, these were
cancelled due to expired ticketing option. At 2 p.m. of the same day,
Sweet Travel rebooked the group on a waitlist status for the same
flight. On May 8, CAL confirmed the bookings for the Romano
spouses but not those for their four companions. When the six of them
came to the airport and presented their tickets, CAL accepted only the
Romanos for check-in despite the confirmed status written on all their
tickets. Only when some confirmed passengers appearing on CAL’s list
did not show up, did it take Fernan and Sandoval in. Gatchalian and
Sevilla had to take a Thai Airlines’ flight late that afternoon.
Below is how CAL’s counsel presented his client’s arguments.
Defendant CAL did not violate its contract of carriage
with the plaintiffs. The two plaintiffs with the surname
Romano, who were holding confirmed reservations, were
immediately accommodated on defendant CAL’s Flight
CL 507/May 8/Manila-Thailand. On the other hand, the
two other plaintiffs namely Fernan and Sandoval, who
were wait listed, eventually boarded the subject flight
because not all confirmed passengers for said flight
showed up at the NAIA. As to the two remaining
passengers, namely Gatchalian and Sevilla, they were
waitlisted passengers who, therefore, cannot demand
that they be accommodated on the same flight since they
were not holding confirmed reservations thereon.
Defendant CAL never repudiated the contract it
entered into with the two plaintiffs with the surname
Romano as it was willing, and in fact, did fulfill its
obligation to fly said plaintiffs to Bangkok, Thailand, in
accordance with the nature and extent of its commitment
to said plaintiffs under their completed transactions. It
must be remembered that it was the two plaintiffs with
the surname Romano who refused to board the plane
early and who chose to wait for two or three hours to
ascertain whether the other plaintiffs can board the
flight that day. Hence, any alleged inconvenience and
discomfort suffered by the two plaintiffs with the
surname Romano involving their travel arrangements on
the day of the flight cannot be attributed to defendant
CAL since for there to be any breach by defendant CAL,
there must have been refusal and failure to abide by the
terms of the contract by defendant CAL which is not the
case herein (Cf., Arts. 1156 and 1159 in relation to Arts.
1305, et seq., Civil Code).
Neither can the two plaintiffs with the surname
Romano impute liability to CAL for any vicarious
emotional suffering they claim to have experienced
respecting the circumstances of the other four plaintiffs.
Each of the members of the group had a contract with
defendant CAL that is entirely separate and distinct
from that of the others as “contracts take effect only
between the parties and cannot be binding upon nor be
enforced against one who is not a party to it” (Ozaeta v.
Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 7, 11; see also Capital
Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. v. Central Azucarera del
Danao, 221 SCRA 99, 104). Therefore, the two plaintiffs
with the surname Romano have no standing to question
any arrangement that may have been effected between
defendant CAL and the four other plaintiffs who were
wait listed.
Given the foregoing discussion, it is with more reason
that defendant CAL cannot be held accountable for
whatever confusion and disturbance that was allegedly
suffered by plaintiffs Fernan, Sandoval, Gatchalian, and
Sevilla. As passengers with unconfirmed reservation, the
extent of defendant CAL’s obligation to said plaintiffs
[other than the two passengers with the surname
Romano] is defined by their status as wait listed
passengers.
This circumstance indicated that defendant CAL
could not have reneged on any obligation to board the
plaintiffs [other than the two passengers with the
surname Romano] on the subject flight because such
duty never materialized as it was subject to the change in
the status of said plaintiffs from wait listed to confirmed
passengers. In effect, any obligation on the part of
defendant CAL to board the remaining plaintiffs at such
point was yet a potentiality to be determined by the
availability of accommodations and consequent
confirmation of their bookings.
Further, it must be noted that despite their
unconfirmed bookings, two of the four wait listed
plaintiffs, namely, Fernan and Sandoval, were able to
board the flight with defendant CAL’s intervention. This
positively disputes plaintiff’s claim that defendant CAL
violated its contract with the said four plaintiffs because
on the contrary, defendant CAL actually rendered
service beyond the requirements of its contract with the
wait listed plaintiffs.
In all these subject transactions, neither is there any
fact on record which shows that defendant CAL was less
than diligent in the performance of its service to the
plaintiffs or that it deviated from the established
procedure warranted by the circumstances. Nor is there
any incident which would negative the courteous
assistance defendant CAL’s employees have accorded the
plaintiffs. In fact, defendant CAL was more than
attentive to the plaintiffs as it gave way to their request
by accommodating two (2) of the four (4) plaintiffs on
the same flight that day upon defendant CAL’s
intercession.
The argument is plausible but it seems that the author did not go
over his pleading to rid it of useless and sometimes redundant words or
phrases. Here are the suggested revisions:
Defendant [this description of CAL’s position in the suit
need not be repeated all throughout the paper; describing
CAL as “CAL” is adequate] CAL did not violate its
contract of carriage with the plaintiffs (group) [since the
plaintiffs were collectively identified in the statement of facts
as “the group,” it would be less confusing to consistently
describe them as such rather than according to their
position in the suit]. The two (2) plaintiffs with the
surname Romano(s) [calling a couple by their surnames
“the Romanos” is less cumbersome and correct; since the
Romanos are a couple, it is also superfluous to say that they
are two], who were holding had [“had” is shorter yet the
meaning is not changed] confirmed reservations, were
immediately accommodated taken into the [“taken into”
is less stiff] on defendant CAL’s Flight CL 507/ May 8/
Manila-Thailand [since the details of the flight are not in
issue, it will be superfluous to mention them]. On the
other hand [‘on the other hand’ is supposed to tie together
two contrasting ideas; it is inappropriate here since what
follows does not present a different situation] the two (2)
other plaintiffs [when a number is written in word, here
“two,” you usually do not have to write its equivalent in
figures (2) inside a parenthesis for that would be
superfluous unless you are writing a check.] namely
Fernan and Sandoval, who were while at first [“while at
first” sounds better since it introduces a subsequent event]
wait listed, eventually boarded the subject flight because
not all after confirmed passengers for said flight did not
showed up at the NAIA [this phrase has been shortened
with no change in meaning]. As to the two (2) remaining
passengers, namely [crossed out because it repeats what
had already been said] Gatchalian and Sevilla they were
wait listed passengers who, therefore, [superfluous to
mention that “they were wait listed” because of later
statement that they had no confirmed reservations] cannot
demand that they be accommodated on the same flight
the right to board [the “right to board” is shorter] since
they were not holding did not have [“did not have” is
simpler] confirmed [superfluous] reservations thereon.
Defendant CAL never repudiated the its contract it
entered into with the two (2) plaintiffs with the surname
Romanos. as it was willing, and In fact, did fulfill its
obligation to fly it flew said plaintiffs them to Bangkok,
Thailand, in accordance with as was the nature and
extent of its commitment to said plaintiffs under their a
completed transaction. [The words that were crossed out
can be dispensed with.] Of course, It must be remembered
that it was the two (2) plaintiffs with [plain clutter!] the
surname Romanos who refused to board the plane early
and who chose to wait for two or three hours to ascertain
whether if the others plaintiffs can board the flight that
day were allowed on the plane [“were allowed on the
plane” is more direct]. Hence, any alleged if the Romanos
suffered inconvenience and discomfort suffered by the
two (2) plaintiffs with the surname Romano involving
with respect to their travel arrangements on the day of
the flight, they cannot be attributed to defendant blame
this on CAL since for there to be any breach by
defendant CAL, there must have been refusal and failure
to abide it neither refused nor failed to abide by the
terms of the contract by defendant CAL which is not the
case herein with them. [Here the sentence was shortened
by excising unneeded words and rewriting a few.] (Cf., Arts.
1156 and 1159 in relation to Arts. 1305, et seq., Civil
Code).
After the revision, the first two paragraphs of CAL’s arguments read
like this:
CAL did not violate its contract of carriage with the
group. The Romano spouses had confirmed reservations
and were immediately taken into the flight. Fernan and
Sandoval, while at first wait listed, were eventually
allowed to board after confirmed passengers did not
show up at the NAIA. Gatchalian and Sevilla, the
remaining two, could not demand the right to board
since they did not have confirmed reservations.
CAL never repudiated its contract with the Romanos.
In fact, it flew them to Bangkok, Thailand, as was its
obligation, in accordance with the nature of its
commitment under a completed transaction. Of course,
the Romanos refused to board the plane early and chose
to wait two or three hours to ascertain if the others were
allowed on the plane. Therefore, if the Romanos suffered
inconvenience and discomfort with respect to their travel
arrangements for the day, they cannot blame these on
CAL since it neither refused nor failed to abide by its
contract with them. (Cf., Arts. 1156 and 1159 in relation
to Arts. 1305, et seq., Civil Code.)
Do you sense the difference when work is tightened by deleting

unnecessary words and phrases? Below is the rest of the argument
after revision. Compare it with the original, examine what was done to
tighten the argument, and trace the revisions on the original to
appreciate the changes made.
Neither can the Romanos impute liability to CAL for
their emotional grief in having witnessed the fate of their
companions. Each passenger has a contract with CAL
that is separate and distinct from those of the others.
“Contracts take effect only between the parties and
cannot be binding upon nor enforced against one who is
not a party to it” (Ozaeta v. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA
7, 11; see also Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. v.
Central Azucarera del Danao, 221 SCRA 99, 104). The
Romanos have no standing to question CAL’s
transactions with the others who were wait listed.
It follows from the above that, with more reason, CAL
cannot be held liable for the confusion and disturbance
that Fernan, Sandoval, Gatchalian, and Sevilla allegedly
suffered. Since the latter did not have confirmed
reservations, CAL’s obligations to them are defined by
their wait listed status.
The circumstances show that CAL could not have
reneged on its obligation to board the four wait listed
passengers because this obligation depended on the
change of their booking status from “wait listed” to
“confirmed.” The obligation to board them was a mere
possibility that depended on seat availability and
confirmation of bookings.
Further, CAL intervened to allow Fernan and
Sandoval to board the flight despite their unconfirmed
bookings. This refutes the claim that CAL violated its
contracts with the wait listed passengers. On the
contrary, CAL served them beyond what those contracts
required.
The record fails to show that CAL was less than
diligent in its service to the passengers or that it deviated
from established procedures. Nor does the record show
that CAL’s staffs failed to render courteous assistance to
them. Indeed, CAL was more than attentive in that it
boarded on the same flight two of those who had been
wait listed.
A great number of lawyers today still write as if they are being paid
based on the quantity of words they put into their pleadings.
Unfortunately, their works suffer in quality, adversely affecting their
chances of winning their cases. They simply cannot get the sympathy
of judges to whom they submit work that requires tiresome reading. In
the end, these lawyers earn even less. Consequently, remain vigilant in
spotting unneeded words in your writing. Since these have a way of
creeping into your work, learn to recognize them. Below are examples
of what could be done to get them out of your sentences. Sense the
strength that sentences gain when unneeded words are taken out
without changing their message.
The question as to whether the Whether the

accused is guilty must be accused is guilty
resolved in court. must be resolved
in court. (10 as
against 14 words)
There is no doubt but that the No doubt the law

law must be obeyed. must be obeyed.
(7 against 11
words)
The sincerity of his conviction is His sincere

conceded but it does not suffice. conviction, while
conceded, is not
enough. (8 against
12)
It must be stressed that Administrative

administrative complaints are complaints are
accusatorial in nature (if the accusatorial! (4
sentence needs to be stressed, against 11)
underline it or put an
exclamation point at the end).
But more than what has just More, a legal

been observed, a legal impediment bars
impediment stands in the way of the lenient
giving the lenient treatment treatment
appellant invokes in his appeal. appellant invokes
in his appeal. (13
against 25)
It is that the records of the case The records of

do not afford any basis on which the case do not
to judge the degree of show appellant’s
instruction of the appellant, no degree of
evidence having been taken instruction, no
relative thereto because he evidence having
entered a plea of guilty. been taken
regarding it
because of his
plea of guilty. (25
against 38)
On April 30 all the rights, On April 30 all of

interests, and participation Garcia’s interests
(since “all interests” embraces in the property
rights and participation, the were sold at
latter words are superfluous) of public auction.
Garcia in the said property (15 against 20)
were sold at public auction.
At the outset, it should be Clearly, the
clarified that (if your accused did not
clarification comes at the admit his guilt. (8
beginning of your discussion, it against 15)
might be superfluous to make a
point of it by saying, “At the
outset.”), the accused did not
admit his guilt.
The decision subject of this Respondent

petition has been rendered by Judge Jaime Solis
respondent Judge Jaime Solis, rendered the
hereinafter referred to as the decision subject
respondent judge (this last of this petition.
phrase is useless when the case (11 against 21)
involves only one judge; you
could just refer to him straight
as respondent judge).
A credit card is used for A credit card is

borrowing purposes. used for
borrowing. (7
against 8)
It is more in keeping with reason It stands to

to hold that once guilt is reason that once
admitted, evidence can be guilt is admitted,
dispensed with. evidence can be
dispensed with.
(14 against 19)
He is a man who cannot be He cannot be
trusted. trusted. (4 against
8)
This is a case that is difficult to This case is

understand. difficult to
understand. (6
against 9)
His version is a strange one. His version is

strange. (4
against 6)
The reason why he fled is that he He fled out of

was afraid. fear. (5 against
10)
In spite of the fact that she got Although paid,

paid, she refused to drop the she refused to
case. drop the case. (8
against 15)
We call your attention to the fact We remind you

that you have not left your that you have not
address with us. left your address
with us. (12
against 16)
The fact that he had not His failure

succeeded worried him. worried him. (4
against 9)
The fact that she had arrived Her arrival

saddened him. saddened him. (4
against 8)
Carlos, who was the star witness Carlos, the star

in the case, was missing. witness in the
case, was missing.
(9 against 11)
Baguio, which was the venue of Baguio, the venue

the conference, was cool. of the conference,
was cool. (8
against 10)
While they were having dinner, During dinner,

the accused shot the victim. the accused shot
the victim. (7
against 10)
Republic Act No. 123 (since 123 Republic Act 123

is a number, describing it as does not apply. (6
such is superfluous) does not against 7)
apply.
Under the circumstances, With Ignacio

however, with coaxing and tempting and
cajoling on the part of the seducing her,
accused, there was nothing Ruby agreed to
unlikely in the stage of sexual have sex with
congress with complainant being him. (11 against
reached. 26)
Active versus Passive Voice

One technique works to tighten and enliven any writing: use of the
active voice in place of the passive voice. English has two voices: (1)
the active; and (2) the passive voices. The passive voice is indirect,
limp, and weak. For example: “Abel was killed by Cain.” Abel is the
subject of the sentence yet he does nothing in the sentence. Something
was being done to him. And the sentence needed five words to describe
what happened.
On the other hand, the active voice is direct, vigorous, and strong.
“Cain killed Abel.” Cain is the subject of the sentence and he is doing
something in the sentence. The sentence needed only three words to
describe what happened. Sense the difference.
Abel was killed by Cain. Cain killed Abel.
Computer programs for composing sentences usually carry

suggestions for grammar and good writing. One of these is their
preference for active over passive voice. The following excerpt from a
pleading illustrates the lifeless quality of a work heavily dependent on
the use of passive voice. Counsel used mostly the passive voice in
showing that the motorcycle driver, whom his company’s truck
sideswiped, negligently moved by the truck’s side.
Apparent is the fact that the negligence of the truck
driver was not established. Nowhere in the victim’s
testimony does it state that the truck driver was driving
negligently. More apparent is the fact that the truck he
was driving was moving slowly following the flow of the
traffic and was therefore proceeding with caution. This
is so in view of the fact that, as the victim himself
testified, there was a traffic jam and it was physically
impossible for big trucks to drive fast.
On the contrary, and what is equally clear from the
above testimony, is the fact that the victim was
proceeding without any caution and at the same time
was at the wrong side of the road. This is so because it is
always the natural and actual operational tendency of
big trucks (especially those with trailers) to make wide
turns to the left or to the right. Now, naturally, when a
prudent man sees or is driving beside it, his reaction
would be to distance himself from the said truck or
better still to stop completely until the truck passes. But
despite this, the victim completely did the opposite thing.
He was not careful to stop and allow the truck to pass.
The revised version, employing the active voice, appears below:
Apparently, the prosecution failed to prove the

driver’s negligence. Indeed, the victim did not claim that
the truck driver drove his truck negligently. More
evidently, the latter proceeded with caution and moved
slowly with the flow of traffic. This follows from the fact
that, as the victim himself said, a traffic jam beset the
road and this made it impossible for big trucks to move
fast.
On the contrary, the victim clearly testified that he
proceeded without caution and on the wrong side of the
road. By their nature, big trucks (especially those with
trailers) tended to make wide turns either to the left or to
the right. Naturally, a prudent man driving alongside
such a truck would keep distance from it or, better still,
would come to a complete stop and let the truck pass
first. Here, the victim did the opposite thing: he did not
care to stop and allow the truck to pass.
See how the work dramatically improves by the simple process of

converting from passive to active voice. Consider the following
additional examples of sentences using the passive voice that have
been converted to active voice:
The documents Manuel fabricated the

were fabricated by documents. (4 as against 6
Manuel. words)
The ransom note

Adama wrote the ransom
was written by
note. (5 against 8)
appellant Adama.
It is the contention
of appellant Cruz Cruz contends that he duly
that his defense of established his alibi. (8 against
alibi was duly 15)
established.
There was enough

light inside the With enough light in the
house to enable house, Celestina could
Celestina to recognize the intruders. (11
recognize the against 14)
intruders.
It was admitted by
Petitioner admits that he filed
petitioner that
motions for reconsideration of
motions for
the assailed decision. (12
reconsideration
against 20) [The word
were filed by him
“above” may be deleted when
with reference to
the discussion involves no
the above assailed
other decision.]
decision.
The passive voice of course has its use. For example: “Celso was
killed.” The subject (Celso) is not acting but is being acted upon. This
shows the cold brutality of what had been done to him. On the whole,
however, passive voice should be the exception and active voice
should dominate your writing. When you are able to do this, your
writing will acquire new vigor; your style will be enhanced.
Third Person Speaks

Legal writing is often best written in the third person, as most
written works are. The main reason for this is that he who writes in the
third person, focuses attention to his work or message rather than to
himself. Besides, a statement is more forceful and convincing without
personal pronouns. It carries more conviction.
I believe that God exists. God exists.

It is my opinion that smoking Smoking causes
causes cancer. cancer.
I think that Jose committed the Jose committed

crime. the crime.
Writing in third person says exactly the same thing but it has more
punch. “I believe” makes the sentence weak and defensive. Also, when
you say, “I believe, etc.” you are writing about yourself. You are
placing yourself between the reader and your topic. Furthermore, “I
think” and “I feel” are redundant since the reader knows that the
statements belong to you as their author.
Do not try, however, to conceal “I think” in the phrase “the writer
thinks” or “in the opinion of the writer.” These are substitute first
persons and are even more annoying.
In the opinion of the Something should be

writer, something should done about the problem
be done about the immediately. (8 as
problem immediately. against 14 words)
Here are other first person substitutes:
One never knows what Anything might happen.

might happen. (3 against 6)
A person should always Credit is essential. (3

have credit. against 6)
Courts often write in substituted first person. Nothing is essentially
wrong with this and tradition in the Philippines seems to favor such a
format. But there is merit in courts writing in the third person since it is
shorter, yet the meaning remains exactly the same.
In our considered opinion, the The defendant

defendant acted in bad faith. acted in bad faith.
(The court’s statement about (6 as against 10
itself diverts attention from words.)
the real subject of the
sentence, the bad faith of the
accused.)
We do not find any reversible The trial court

error on the part of the trial committed no
court. reversible error. (7
against 14)
Be that as it may, however, we Still, the penalty of

take the view that the penalty suspension from
of suspension from office is too office is too severe.
severe. (10 against 20)
We find it difficult to disregard The accused’s

the extrajudicial confession of extrajudicial
the accused just because he confession is
repudiated it during the trial. difficult to
disregard just
because he
repudiated it
during trial. (15
against 20)
Again, observe that the second versions are shorter yet their meaning
remains exactly the same. And when the courts or the parties use third
person in their writings, they are able to avoid talking about
themselves. All the focus falls on the merit of the case.
The defendant thinks that the The evidence is

evidence is strong. strong.
In the opinion of the prosecution, The accused

the accused defrauded the victim. defrauded the
victim.
The Court finds that the accused The accused is

is guilty as charged. guilty as
charged.
Writing in second person creates the same problem.
You (second-person) cannot help liking This book

this book. (The focus is on the second is
person rather than on the central irresistible.
message.)
Writing in second person has of course its uses as when you write a
recipe for some dish or you write a how-to-do-it book like this one.
The sentences in this format function as suggestions or instructions.
Block Quotations
Another way of cramping your work with unnecessary words is the
use of excessive block quotations. Take this argument in an
administrative action against a judge for gross ignorance of the law.
The complainant filed the charge against the judge after receiving an
adverse decision in his case. The judge employed the following
argument in his defense.
The task of a judge as dispenser of justice is not easy.

Because he must decide a case one way or the other, he
usually cannot satisfy all the litigants involved. Here,
complainant Sison, the losing party, seemed unhappy
over respondent judge’s decision and has filed an
administrative case against him for alleged gross
ignorance of the law. But, as the Supreme Court said in
Flores v. Abesamis:
As everyone knows, the law provides ample
judicial remedies against errors or irregularities
being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise
of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against
errors or irregularities which may be regarded
as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or
admission of evidence, or in construction or
application of procedural or substantive law or
legal principle) include a motion for
reconsideration or after rendition of a judgment
or final order, a motion for new trial), and
appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error
or irregularities, which may be deemed
extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical,
capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect
of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions
of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a
motion for inhibition, a petition for change or
venue, as the case may be.
Now, the established doctrine and policy is
that disciplinary proceedings and criminal
actions against Judges are not complementary or
suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial
remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary.
Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial
remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the
corresponding action or proceeding, are
prerequisites for the taking of other measures
against the persons of the judges concerned,
whether of civil, administrative, or criminal
nature. It is only after the available judicial
remedies have been exhausted and the appellate
tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door
to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or
administrative liability may be said to have
opened, or closed.
You put unnecessary burden on your reader when, as in the above,
you bodily quote large chunks from Supreme Court decisions and then
leave it to him to determine which portion of what you quote directly
applies to your case. In reality, judges simply scan these quotations, if
they do not skip them altogether, hoping to spot the portions that make
sense in the case. When that fails, few would bother to reread the
quotations.
To lighten the burden of your reader, simply quote the important
portion of the court’s ruling or paraphrase it before quoting it. In this
way, you give your reader the option of skipping the quotations if he
finds no need for reading them. In a case, the surety company, which
guaranteed the timely completion of a building, tried to avoid liability
by pointing out that the building owner neglected to report the
contractor’s delay the first time the owner noted it. Observe below how
the owner’s counsel paraphrased the Supreme Court ruling that he
invokes before quoting it:
Although David found Marc Builders to have incurred
some delay earlier in April in pursuing the project, such
delay was not substantial. Only about three months from
the start of the project had passed. David considered
taking some adverse action but, on further
consideration, he realized that the delay did not yet
threaten the timely completion of the project, which had
been set on November 27, still several months away.
Consequently, David found it premature to cancel the
contract and file a claim against the contractor’s surety
for such non-threatening delay.
The Supreme Court held in Umali v. Court of
Appeals,3 that [here is the paraphrasing] slight defaults or
mere suspicions of possible defaults did not toll the
period for filing the claim against the surety bond. Thus:
Fundamental likewise is the rule that, except
where required by the provisions of the contract,
a demand or notice of default is not required to
fix the surety‘s liability. Hence, where the
contract of suretyship stipulates that notice of
the principal‘s default be given to the surety,
generally the failure to comply with the
condition will prevent recovery from the surety.
There are certain instances, however, when
failure to comply with the condition will not
extinguish the surety‘s liability such as failure to
give notice of slight defaults, which are waived
by the obligee; or on mere suspicion of possible
default; or where, if a default exists, there is
excuse or provision in the contract exempting the
surety from liability therefor; or where the
surety already has knowledge or is chargeable
with knowledge of the default.
Moreover, when a doctrine of law invoked is quite well-known and
is securely entrenched in past precedents, it would serve no useful
purpose to quote from portions of so many decisions of the Supreme
Court. In fact, you could simply cite those decisions in your work
without having to copy portions of them.
Writing Exercises
The following portions of a memorandum filed in a theft case need

tightening. Use the lessons you learned in eliminating needless words
and using the active voice.
On or about 10:30 a.m. of May 23, respondent Jaime
Gozon, accompanied by his accountant, went to Carlton
Beer Parañaque Sales Office and requested for the
reconciliation of his account. He was attended thereto by
Financial Analyst Ben Lazo. The warehouseman, Cenon
Veles, was requested by Lazo to bring the needed
documents for reconciliation and to attend the meeting
as well.
While waiting for Mr. Veles, Lazo was requested by
Gozon that he be allowed to see BPI Check No. 17894
dated June 20 in the amount of P4,709,760.00, claiming
that it was already covered by the return of equivalent
value of beer empties to Carlton. This claim was
disputed by Lazo who explained that P2,700,000.00
worth of empties was still unaccounted for. This,
notwithstanding, check custodian Belen Yusi was asked
by Lazo to immediately show to Gozon the postdated
check in question.
The requested check, however, was attached to a bond
paper, containing, among others, BPI Check No. 27867
postdated to July 8 in the amount of P11,500,000.00. The
bond paper containing these checks was initially given to
Gozon’s accountant, but was subsequently gotten hold of
by Gozon. Thereafter, the latter instructed his
accountant to pack-up their things and they hurriedly
left the sales office.
Yusi pleaded with Gozon to return the checks and
even tried to prevent him from leaving but all her efforts
proved futile. As the events happened so fast, Yusi failed
to notify the security guards about the incident, hence,
the failure of the latter to prevent Gozon and his
accountant from leaving the sales office at 10:51 a.m. or
barely eleven minutes from the time of their arrival.
Gozon claims that the relation between Carlton Beer
and him was one of creditor-debtor and that their
problem lay in the reconciliation of accounts and the
non-payment of the beer empties which cannot give rise
to a criminal prosecution for theft. Carlton Beer cannot
agree. In the first place, the issue is not the non-payment
of beer empties, but a criminal act of stealing. Secondly,
the stolen check BPI Check No. 27867 dated July 8 in the
amount of P11,500,000.00 was issued by Gozon in
payment of the contents of Carlton Beer products and
not for empties thereof (Annexes A, B, and C).
While it is probably true that the matter of Gozon’s
illegal taking of the checks was never discussed during
the subsequent reconciliation meetings of the parties,
this could be explained. The reconciliation of account,
which was an offshoot of the parties’ agreement to
purchase and sell, was governed by the Civil Code while
the criminal act of theft was covered by the penal code.
This was precisely the reason why the theft committed
by Gozon on May 23 was never discussed nor considered
by the representatives of Carlton Beer, whenever the
parties were discussing the issue of reconciliation of
account.
1Fourth Edition, p. 23.

2The details have been changed to protect the privacy of the persons
involved.
3189 SCRA 529, 545-546 (1990).
11.
Writing Clearly
One of the primary criteria for good writing is clarity in writing. A

good number of techniques have been developed for writing clearly.
This book will address some of the most helpful ones in legal writing.
Right Connectives
Communicated thoughts can be likened to a cargo train. A
locomotive engine leads several cars of cargo to their destination with
each car connected to the next by special coupling mechanisms.
Without these connections, the cargo cars would go nowhere.
When you put together several sentences or ideas to deliver one
message, you need coupling mechanisms to tie these ideas together.
These are called connectives or transitory devices. They help the reader
see the connections between your sentences or paragraphs. Without
them, many readers would be confused regarding your intentions.
Take for example this sentence:
The deceased was rich. She left P50,000.00 to her maid

in her will.
Insert the connective “indeed” between the sentences and see its
effect on the message.
The deceased was rich. Indeed, she left P50,000.00 to
her maid in her will.
The message brought about by the connective “indeed” is that the

deceased must have really been rich because she could afford to give
away P50,000.00 to a maid. In other words, the second sentence
affirms the truth of the first sentence.
Now, change the connective “indeed” with the word “yet” and see
the effect.
The deceased was rich. Yet, she left P50,000.00 to her

maid in her will.
Sense the difference that the change in connective makes. Now, the
message is different. The deceased was quite rich, probably a
billionaire, but she was too stingy and gave her faithful maid only
P50,000.00. From a positive image, the deceased acquires a negative
one.
In spoken language, the listener usually succeeds in getting the
connections between the speaker’s ideas because the latter gets an
assist in clarifying his meaning from his gestures, from the expression
of his face, from the tone of his voice, or from his pauses. These are
not available in written language. You need the help of connectives or
transitory devices to link your ideas one after the other and present a
unified thought. You cannot assume that your reader can read
unspoken tie-ups between ideas.
The English language has many useful connectives:
CONNECTIVES FUNCTION EXAMPLES

And Connects two Defendant
ideas of the same refused to
kind. acknowledge
his debt and
he would not
pay it.
Besides, what is Adds another a) Plaintiff

more, thought to the called
furthermore, in first. (They could defendant by
addition, and be used phone.
again interchangeably.) Besides, he
wrote him a
letter.
b) He is
stupid. What
is more, he is
ugly. (A
negative
thought is
added to
another
negative
thought.)
First, next, then, Arranges ideas a) First, he

and finally; in order. introduced
meanwhile himself to
(describing her; next, he
simultaneous dated her;
occurrences); then, he
later; since then proposed to
her; and
finally, he
married her.
b) Carlos
robbed the
store.
Meanwhile,
Jose stood
outside as
lookout.
c) He sued
her. Later, he
agreed to
settle with
her.
d) He won a
million pesos.
Since then he
has not
stopped
spending the
money.
Nearby, above, Arranges ideas The victim

below, beyond, in space. was sleeping
to the right, to in his room.
the left Nearby, the
accused was
stealing his
things.
But, still, Connects two a) Juliet said

however, on the contrasting that she cried
other hand, yet, ideas. They for help. But
nevertheless, and could, as a rule, Mario
rather be used testified that
interchangeably he did not
but each seems hear her
to fit best in cries.
certain b) The
combinations of plaintiff
contrasting claims that
ideas. the debtor
had not paid
him. On the
other hand,
the debtor
claims that
he had paid
the plaintiff.
c) He was
poor yet
generous.
d) He did not
love her.
Rather, he
lusted after
her.
In fact, as a Connects the Alibi is a

matter of fact, first idea with a weak defense.
indeed second one that In fact, it
points it up; the crumbles in
second idea the face of a
affirms or positive
supports the identification.
validity of the
first idea.
For example, for Adds an The freedom

instance illustration to an of speech is
idea. not absolute.
For example,
you cannot
walk into a
crowded
theater and
shout “Fire!
Fire!”
In other words Adds an Mark longs

explanation to an to see her
idea or ideas always, listen
to her voice,
and touch
her. In other
words, he
loves her.
Therefore, so, Connects an idea The accused

hence, with another that acted in self-
consequently, follows from it. defense.
and accordingly Therefore, he
is not guilty.
Of course, to be Grants an All men are

sure exception or created
limitation to an equal. Of
idea. course, some
men are more
intelligent
than others.
In short, to sum Summarize He lost his

up, and in brief several ideas. job, he sold
all he had to
pay his debts,
and he still
owed more.
In short, he
was
bankrupt.
The beauty of using connectives to put together two or more ideas in

legal writing is that they also serve as tools for developing logical
reasoning. You are able to test the relation between ideas by trying one
connective in place of another.
Do not think, however, that connectives are the only devices you can
use for joining ideas. You can join two sentences together simply by
putting into the second sentence a word that points to a word you used
in the first. These are called word bridges. For example:
If the purpose of reorganization is to be achieved,

changes in the rankings of the employees should be
expected. For one to insist on having his old rank would
render the exercise useless.
In a case, the law in question was the provision of the Civil Code
that provides that attorney’s fees “cannot be recovered” except under
certain circumstances. Thus:
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees

and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs,
cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant’s act or omission has
compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to
incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against
the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or
proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident
bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly
valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In action for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household
helpers, laborers, and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s
compensation and employer’s liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability
arising from crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just
and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered.
Counsel for the plaintiff offered the following argument that
challenged the award of attorney’s fees against his client. Counsel did
not use the appropriate connectives.
Non-recovery is the general rule. Ramos has the

burden of proving that his claim for attorney’s fees
against Acme Company falls within the exceptions. The
trial court had to make a finding that the exception he
claims in fact exists.
Here, the trial court has made no finding that Ramos’
case falls within the exceptions. The trial court awarded
him exemplary damages. It might also award him
attorney’s fees. The trial court did not find any factual
basis for awarding exemplary damages. Its award of
attorney’s fees is just as baseless.
As the decision of the trial court shows, Acme
Company acted in good faith in filing the suit against
Ramos for the purpose of quieting its title to the subject
land. Acme Company obtained judgment against the
former owner of the land. It levied on the property in
due course. It bought the same at public auction. Ramos
questioned the execution proceedings. The Court of
Appeals upheld them. It affirmed Acme Company’s
right to place the title to the land in its name.
Could you see the connections between the sentences or the ideas?
Compare the same argument, this time with the proper connectives.
See if the argument has become clearer.
Since non-recovery is the general rule, then Ramos has

the burden of proving that his claim for attorney’s fees
against Acme Company falls within the exceptions.
Further, the trial court has to make a finding that the
exception he claims in fact exists.
Here, the trial court has made no finding that Ramos’
case falls within the exceptions. True, the trial court
awarded him exemplary damages and, therefore, it might
also award him attorney’s fees. But, since the trial court
did not find any factual basis for awarding exemplary
damages, then its award of attorney’s fees is just as
baseless.
Moreover, as the decision of the trial court shows,
Acme Company acted in good faith in filing the suit
against Ramos for the purpose of quieting its title to the
subject land. First, Acme Company obtained judgment
against the former owner of the land; second, it levied on
the property in due course; and third, it bought the same
at public auction. Ramos questioned the execution
proceedings but the Court of Appeals upheld them and
affirmed Acme Company’s right to place the title to the
land in its name.
Abstract versus Concrete Writing

Excessive use of big, general words like equality, justice, grave
abuse of discretion, executory, commenced, or jurisdiction can result in
abstractionism. Using these words often tempts you into believing that
you have said something profound when you may have actually said
almost nothing––at least nothing that a reader can really understand
and use in his life.
An abstraction is any word that applies to a large class of things
rather than to any single, concrete object or idea. Every word is in
some measure an abstraction, but some abstractions are more general
than others. Too many abstract words make for vagueness, even
meaninglessness. Good writing is specific; it makes things real.
The opposite of abstract is concrete. Concrete words are words
that stand for real things, things that appeal in one way or another
to the senses. “Structure,” for example, is more general than “house,”
“house” is more general than “shed,” and “shed” is more general than
“a dilapidated little shack with makeshift walls and a cardboard roof.”
Stick to concrete words as much as possible. The secret is that, if
you are writing an essay on an abstract subject, pin it down
quickly with specific examples that illustrate exactly what you
mean. To illustrate:
Although no formal agreement is necessary to

establish conspiracy and said conspiracy may be inferred
from the circumstances attending the commission of the
crime, yet conspiracy like any other ingredient of the
offense must be established by clear and convincing
evidence. There must be evidence of intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose. (People
v. Agda, 111 SCRA 330.)
The reader would probably be able to understand better the abstract

principle stated above if it could be translated into an actual example.
Thus––
True, in conspiracy the prosecutor does not have to

present proof that the conspirators held a conference, sat
around the table, agreed on their evil plot to commit the
crime, and sealed their agreement with a written
contract. Still, the prosecutor must show concert of
action among them. Evidence that a group of armed men
barged into a bank at the waive of their leader’s hand,
with some staying outside as lookouts, with others
emptying the tellers cash boxes, and with all departing in
deliberate haste at a command, clearly shows their
concerted action and unity of purpose, the ingredients of
conspiracy.
Consider the following legal opinion. In the 70s, the government did
not only take taxes from imported cargoes, it also undertook the
handling and delivery of these cargoes from the hold of the ship to the
importer’s truck. The government collected substantial fees for this
extra service. But it refused to answer for losses that importers incurred
due to thieveries and neglect of government workers. In rejecting the
claims of importers for damages, one opinion said:
That there are practical, as distinguished from merely

logical, reasons in support of such a view should be
apparent from the recognition of the likelihood that the
government would ever so often be hailed into court
considering that engaged as it has lately been in varied
activities appropriate to a welfare state the probability of
private parties being adversely affected by action taken
by it is not remote. A loss of property right could always
be plausibly alleged. A claim for money could easily by
conjured. Thus, the demands on the government’s time
and energy could reach limits well-nigh intolerable.
After all it is an admitted fact that our people display no
hesitancy in going to court whenever they feel aggrieved,
even if the injury is more fancied than real. Thus, the
functional or sociological approach to law would seem to
call for a similar conclusion.
Actually, the gist of the argument is that if the government must
answer all lawsuits that could possibly be brought against it and pay
damages, the government would have no time and resources left to
attend to its important functions. But, since the argument was written
in the abstract, the ordinary men who are affected by the resolution of
the issue involved would have no hope of truly understanding the
reasons given to support the argument. Rewritten for the ordinary
reader, it might read:
Practical reasons support the rule that the state or the

government cannot be sued without its consent. For, if
the government can be sued and required to pay
damages for all the wrongs it has done, the queue to the
court would indeed be long. The government would be
facing suits for profits that businessmen lost because of
mismanaged traffic, for deaths or sicknesses caused by
uncollected garbage, for cars wrecked by roads left in
disrepair, or for compensation to those who failed to land
jobs due to worthless training in public schools. The
lawsuits would be infinite. For everyone has a reason to
complain against the government.
If the state must face all sorts of suits and pay
damages, most government officials would be tied up in
court appearances and unable to do their work. What is
more, awards of damages would soon empty the public
treasury. When these happen, the traffic would get
worse, the uncollected garbage would mount, the roads
would be impassable, and public schools would close
down. The people who sued the state would have killed
it.
Substitute Names
Identifying the parties based on their positions in the case, such as
“the complainant” and “the accused,” “the plaintiff” and “the
defendant,” “the petitioner” and “the respondent,” “the appellant” and
“the appellee,” or “the protestant” and “the protestee” often results in
confusion and the need to return to the statement of the case to be
reminded on who is who. Unfortunately, most readers get lost in or are
confused by the use of these descriptions in lengthy articles.
The parties have names like Theresa Luna, Lino Gonzalez, San
Miguel Corporation (SMC), or Philippine Airlines (PAL). It would be
better to use these names throughout your discussions especially when
the case reaches a higher court and the parties begin to assume
cumbersome and confusing descriptions like “the plaintiff-appellant,”
“the defendant-appellee,” “the defendant-petitioner,” or “the plaintiff-
respondent.” Some lawyers still draft contracts that refer to people as
“the party of the first part” and “the party of the second part.” Modern
legal writers have long abandoned these substitute names.
Headings
If a legal paper is short, may be two or three pages, headings that
divide the discussions into subject matters might not be necessary. But,
when the paper is long and abound in a variety of topics, it would help
to use headings. Headings help readers detect the turns that discussions
make as they shift from one topic to another.
Headings are of two kinds: (1) general; and (2) specific.
1. General headings provide some kind of signposts that point out to
the reader the grounds he is about to cover in his reading. Examples of
these are the “Statement of the Case,” “Statement of the Facts,”
“Subject Matter of the Case,” “Issues Presented,” “Assignment of
Errors,” “Conclusion,” and “Relief.”
General headings are essential to trial memoranda, briefs on appeal,
and petitions for review. In fact, procedural rules require the use of
some of these headings. And even when not so required, they are as
essential to legal writings as floor numbers are on elevators. General
headings help you get quickly to the portion of a substantial legal work
that you want to read or go back to.
2. Specific headings, on the other hand, are like newspaper
headlines. They attempt to capture in a few words the essence of a
particular argument or discussion. This kind of heading is especially
helpful in marking out the beginning of every new topic in a row of
topics. For example, a discussion that argues the point that the
prosecution has failed to prove damage in an estafa case, the writer
could place the following heading at the middle of the page, properly
underlined or put in bold type:
1. The Element of Damage

Most lawyers, however, prefer to use specific headings that also sum
up the point made in each argument. Thus:
I.
THE BANK SUFFERS NO DAMAGE FROM ITS
TRANSACTION WITH THE ACCUSED
Note that, as a rule, subheadings are in the present tense and are not
punctuated with a period.
Writing Exercises
Make the following abstract legal points concrete, with the end in
view of convincing your reader regarding their correctness:
1. Police power rests upon public necessity and upon the
right of the state and of the public to self-protection. For this
reason, its scope expands and contracts with changing
needs.
2. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be
equated with psychological incapacity.
3. Unlawful aggression does not exist where the peril to
one’s life, limb, or right is neither actual nor imminent.
12.
Writing Legalese
Another reason why ordinary people find it hard to understand legal

writing is the tendency of many lawyers to use peculiarly legalese
language. But some will say that lawyers have a language all their own
and a peculiar way of putting their thoughts into writing. They argue
that injecting legal jargons is the traditional way of writing and any
other method would violate tradition and diminish the awe and mystery
to which lawyers are entitled. Your belief is of course entitled to
respect. But the changing world and the demand to be understood have
begun to challenge the validity of this belief. Legal clichés belong to a
bygone era. Modern legal writing demands simplicity, clarity, and
accuracy.
As someone said, the law is a “device for social control.” The
government enacts laws to govern human conduct. Laws forbid people
from doing evil things or from hurting others. They also require people
to do things that are needed for the good of all in the community. Since
effective obedience to laws requires an understanding of them, laws
should be written in plain and ordinary English or Filipino that the
average layman could understand.
Legal Clichés
Admittedly, some lawyers are notorious for copying words or
phrases, usually found in old case reports or law books, which they
deem profound or which give a sense of importance to what they write.
They probably believe that their individual style of writing would
somehow gain added substance and strength using those borrowed
words and phrases. But, in truth, these legal clichés have become
hackneyed and weak through much repetition. Worse, to non-lawyers,
they sound so unnatural and pretentious, if not arrogant. Ask yourself
the question. Would you use this kind of language when writing to
your mother or to your friends? If you would not, why use them in
your pleadings? The judges and your clients to whom you usually
address yourself are your elders or friends.
Take these examples:
Petitioner respectfully submits that Respondent

respondent court gravely abused its court
discretion. (Since petitioner filed the gravely
pleading, it would be superfluous for abused its
him to identify himself as the party discretion.
making the submission; “respectfully” is (6 as
a good word but when it is thrown in as against 10
a matter of form, the sincerity is gone.) words)
Even a cursory perusal of Section 21 Section 21

will readily reveal (this might sound did not
like, “If you have the brains, the authorize
meaning of the law should be clear to respondent
you after a casual reading”) that nothing court to
therein was mentioned or impliedly issue a writ
stated about the authority of respondent of
court to issue a writ of execution in execution
cases covered by the said rule. in cases
covered by
it. (18
against 37)
Lest it be forgotten, (this might sound The law is
like, “You are forgetful, so hear this”) supreme. (4
the law is supreme. against 8)
We humbly submit (this might seem to The answer

others like a declaration of your innate is no!! (4
humility) that the answer to the against 13)
foregoing query is a resounding no (if
you want your no answer to resound, use
exclamation points.)
Suffice it to state (this might sound like, Plaintiff

“With your level of intelligence, it would was in
be definitely useless to say more”) that estoppels.
plaintiff was in estoppels. (4 against
9)
The argument is untenable (but The

probably better than declaring the argument
argument untenable is proving it). It fails fails to
to take into account the fact that the consider
accused did not see the oncoming that the
truck. accused did
not see the
oncoming
truck. (14
against 21)
Petitioner’s argument is bereft of merit Petitioner’s

(if it really lacks merit, it would argument
probably be better to prove it rather than ignores the
declare it). It ignores the law. law. (5
against 10)
Preambles like the above legal clichés get in the way and do not add
to the meaning of the main message of the sentence. Still, if your
purpose is to write something about what you did in the case or pass
judgment upon the other person’s point of view rather than just show
how his view lacks merit, it is your choice.
There was no denial of the acts Although he

of intercourse having taken admitted the sexual
place, but the accused would intercourse, Ignacio
insist that complainant did so would insist that
willingly the explanation, Ruby freely agreed
according to him, being that to it, she being his
she was his sweetheart. sweetheart. (19
against 33)
Old English
Many prefer, despite the language revolution that drives a changing
world, to stick to old English usages. That is to be respected. But if you
are the kind that would want to address young readers as well, you
might consider the following suggestions:
In the case at bar, the Here, the court declined

court declined to apply to apply the rule.
the rule.
The facts in the instant The facts are not

case (this phrase is disputed.
superfluous if you are
discussing no other case)
are not disputed.
The parties in the case at The parties have agreed

bench (same effect as to arbitration.
“instant” case) have
agreed to arbitration.
The requirements are, to The requirements are as

wit: follows:
He left for Manila. He left for Manila.

Arriving thereat, he Arriving there, he
phoned his dad. phoned his dad.
He wrote her a letter, a He wrote her a letter,

copy of which is copy enclosed as Annex
attached hereto as Annex A.
A.
Upon receipt of the Upon receipt of the

aforesaid decision, decision, petitioner filed
petitioner filed his notice his notice of appeal.
of appeal.
When the witness saw When the witness saw

the ceiling on fire, he the ceiling on fire, he was
was alarmed thereby. alarmed by it (or “it
But the door lock had alarmed him”). But the
jammed so by reason door lock had jammed so
thereof, he left through he left through the
the window. window.
He approached the room He approached the room

and looked therein. and looked in it.
As the crowd marched, As the crowd marched,

he went therewith. he went with it.
He brought a chair and He brought a chair and

sat thereon. sat on it.
The accused stopped the The accused stopped the

tricycle and alighted tricycle and alighted
therefrom. He forthwith from it. He then dragged
dragged her to the her to the tricycle.
tricycle.
The case against The case against

petitioner herein was set petitioner was set for
for hearing. hearing.
The said motion was The prosecution opposed

opposed by the the motion. (Quite often,
prosecution. you can do without the
word “said” especially
when the article speaks of
only one motion.)
The trial was postponed The trial was postponed
to enable the accused to enable the accused to
therein to prepare his prepare his defense.
defense.
Comes now petitioner, Petitioner, by counsel,

through the undersigned states:
counsel, unto this
Honorable Court, most
respectfully states:
Sounding Formal
Legal writing should not be made up exclusively of big, formal
words dressed in tuxedos. The standard for all effective writing is
being understood. Some lawyers, in the mistaken belief that they will
sound more dignified, insist on using polysyllabic words like
“accompanied” instead of “went with,” “informed” instead of “told.”
Quite often, however, they merely succeed in sounding like stuffed
shirts.
The accused was in Blando had a gun.

possession of a gun.
Appellant posits that he has Appellant assumes

the right. that he has the right.
Mario Reyes commenced a Mario Reyes filed an

complaint for ejectment eviction suit against
against Josephine Cruz. Josephine Cruz. (9
against 10)
The finding of the court is The court’s finding

based on the factual milieu rests on appellant’s
presented by appellant. version of the facts.
Petitioner’s contentions are Petitioner’s claims

nebulous if not speculative. are vague if not
speculative.
Laura stated that the Laura said that the

accused detained her. Al accused detained her.
contrario, the accused On the other hand,
declared that she came the accused claimed
voluntarily. that she came
voluntarily.
Albeit incidental, his Though incidental,

traversal of plaintiff’s his rejection of
statement is portentous. plaintiff’s claim is
ominous.
The duty of the court is to The court’s duty is to

adjudicate the contentious decide the conflicting
positions of the parties. claims of the parties.
Any pronouncement of the Anything the court

court will only be advisory. says will only be
advisory.
It would then result that on Based on the above

the basis of the foregoing discussion, an
disquisition, an amendment amendment of the
of the criminal information criminal information
cannot be allowed. cannot be allowed.
He denied detaining Laura, He denied detaining

contrary to her Laura, contrary to
asseverations in her her positive
testimony. testimony.
This is indubitable proof of This is

Soberano’s criminal intent. unquestionable proof
of Soberano’s
criminal intent.
He prevented her from He prevented her

communicating with from talking with
anyone. anyone.
Objectively and subjectively However viewed, the

considered, the circumstances point
circumstances point towards to appellant’s
appellant’s innocence and innocence and do not
are incompatible with support the charges.
attributions of guilt.
In the light of the foregoing Because of the

circumstances, it was circumstances, the
improvident for the court a court below recklessly
quo to conclude that concluded that
appellant detained the appellant detained
complainant. the complainant.
The serious illegal detention Charging Joel with

theory appears to be an serious illegal
impulsion upon complainant detention seems to be
and her relatives who, a thought born of the
frantic about the ardor of worries that Melba
appellant in his romance and her relatives had
with complainant wanted to over his intense love
keep appellant away from for her. They wanted
her because she apparently to separate them
no longer reciprocated his since she did not seem
love with the same degree of to have deep feelings
passion. for him anymore.
The police accompanied the The police went with

accused to the courtroom. the accused to the
courtroom.
The court informed the The court told the

accused of his rights. accused of his rights.
He appeared to be guilty. He seemed guilty.
He consumed his lunch. He ate his lunch.

He desired a lawyer of his He wanted a lawyer of
own. his own.
The sheriff implemented the The sheriff carried

court order. out the court order.
The individual has been He has been arrested.

arrested.
He likes the manner in He likes the way in

which it was done. which it was done.
As a rule, when you can choose between an easy, familiar expression

and one that seems more “dignified,” the easier word is the better
choice if it means exactly the same thing. You may of course use the
more formal word without any adverse effect. But you need to guard
against the temptation of trying to sound dignified. Your writing will
have natural dignity if it is serious and thoughtful. It is when you try to
doctor it up with high-flown, stately-sounding, polysyllabic substitutes
for direct and simple words that you begin to sound pompous.
Cheap Words
But this does not mean that you should always use short or familiar
words. Some words are so familiar that they have become the
equivalent of a large number of other words. They have ceased to have
any specific meaning. Examples of these are descriptive words like
good, nice, pretty, ugly, bad, awful, big, little, fast, slow, funny, crazy,
great, and fine. They are used everyday to describe anything that
sounds positive or negative. This steak is good (tasty, tender, fresh,
etc.). The movie is good (entertaining, amusing, well priced, ably
directed, etc.) Check the thesaurus until you find a more precise
meaning for your particular purpose.
For example, the word “crazy” has different shades: insane, mad,
lunatic, unbalanced, psychopathic, cracked, non compos mentis,
touched, bereft of reason, moonstruck, scatterbrained, maniacal,
delirious, irrational, lightheaded, incoherent, rambling, doting,
wandering, amuck, frantic, raving, pixilated, eccentric, demented,
deranged, schizophrenic. Do not dwell in the slum of cheap language
when the thesaurus offers you riches that you can use.
Self-praise
Many judges and lawyers tend to add remarks in their decisions or
pleadings about how diligently they have worked on their cases. These
remarks are common and often well intended but, to non-lawyers, they
sound like self-praise. In these modern days, judges and lawyers might
want to consider editing out such remarks since they divert attention
from the main message of the sentence. For example:
A meticulous scrutiny of the evidence The record

of record [it is like saying, “take note shows that
that I am meticulous in my work”] defendant
shows that defendant offered offered
convincing proof of his claim. convincing
proof of his
claim. (11 as
against 17
words)
In our considered opinion [“you must The

know that we carefully weighed defendant
everything before forming this acted in bad
opinion”], the defendant acted in bad faith. (6
faith. against 10)
After we have thoroughly and The record

conscientiously gone over the record satisfactorily
of the case (“yes, we want you to know shows that
that we worked very, very hard on this the evidence
one”), we are sufficiently satisfied substantiates
(but if one is satisfied, it cannot be less the
than sufficiently) that the observations
observations and conclusions and
contained in the foregoing conclusions
memoranda are fully substantiated in the
and supported (the point is somewhat memoranda.
overstated) by the evidence on record. (17 against
37)
A careful scrutiny (“yes, we carefully The

scrutinize everything in the case”) of testimonies
the testimonies coming from the of Ruby and
complainant and the accused fails to Ignacio do
yield to the conclusion that a finding not show the
of his guilt is warranted. latter’s guilt.
(12 against
27)
The Court had thoroughly delved into No amount

the records of the instant case and of
painstakingly assayed the evidence examination
adduced by the parties. We find the of the
evidence of the prosecution grossly prosecution’s
insufficient to sustain a conviction. evidence
could justify
a finding of
guilt of the
accused. (17
against 34)
Sentence-length Variety
Try to listen to people speak and you will observe that their
sentences vary in length. Even before you learned how to write, you
knew language as you hear it spoken by others. And, though you could
read and write sentences later in years, your everyday conversations
have remained largely verbal. In other words, your inner ear is tuned to
verbal sentences of various lengths.
Take for example these words from a father whose son wanted to go
out with his friend on a Friday evening:
I’ll let you go out but be here by twelve o’clock

midnight at the latest. And when I say twelve o’clock
midnight, I don’t mean that you can come home at
twelve-thirty in the morning or twelve-fifteen or twelve-
five. I mean twelve midnight. Believe me because I warn
you that you will not be able to go out with your friends
again if you come home any later than twelve. Mark my
word.
Do you see how the lengths of the sentences vary from medium to
long, to short, to long, and to short?
I’ll let you go out but be here by twelve o’clock

midnight at the latest. (16 words)
And when I say twelve o’clock midnight, I don’t mean
that you can come home at twelve-thirty in the morning
or twelve-fifteen or twelve-five. (25)
I mean twelve midnight. (4)
Believe me because I warn you that you will not be
able to go out with your friends again if you come home
any later than twelve. (27)
Mark my word. (3)
Writing is, in the final analysis, a form of talk––preserved talk.

Consequently, when you write sentences at more or less uniform
lengths, you strain the inner ear. You write unnaturally. When you find
pleadings of lawyers or decisions of courts boring or strenuous reading,
it is your inner ear refusing to take what you read.
For example, the oppositor of a petition for the appointment of a
guardian for three minors offered the following arguments to defeat the
petition:
Romina is not qualified to be appointed guardian of

the orphaned minors and administrator of their cash
savings and properties. She treated the large amounts of
cash that she received on behalf of the minors like they
were her own. Although she is an accounting major
graduate, she did not segregate the cash she got by
depositing these in a bank in trust for them, something
that parents do for their children’s savings. Had she
done this, she would have an unquestionable record of
the money she received on their behalf and the money
she withdrew for expenses. Ironically, she claims that she
has much experience in handling money for other people
since she once worked for a bank.
What is more, Romina was aware that the resources of
the deceased parents of the kids show no potential for
growth and that the cash they have in the bank could
just run out. Yet, she has not presented any plan to the
Court for seeing the kids through college with what
resources they have left. Instead, she squandered their
money on unbelievable expenses, given that in just seven
months, she spent P1.2 million in household expenses for
them. This means that for two kids in elementary and
one in high school, she spent an average of P158,000.00
monthly for them.
The above is of course faultless in grammar and clarity. Anyone who

prefers to write in this way would not make any mistake. It is a correct
way of writing. But to ordinary readers, the sentences are invariably
long and, therefore, seem unnatural for easy storytelling. If you want
your writing to be easier on the inner ear and interesting, the important
principle to remember is to capture in writing the basic rhythm of
speech. Vary your sentence length. Sense the change in this suggested
re-writing to vary the sentence length:
Romina is not qualified to be appointed administrator

of the cash and other properties of the orphaned minors
since she treated these as if they were her own. For one
thing, she is an accounting major. Yet, she did not
segregate the amounts she received by depositing these
in a bank in trust for the minors, something that parents
do all the time for their children’s savings. Clearly, she is
irresponsible. Had she opened those accounts for them,
she would have an unquestionable record of the money
she received on their behalf and the money she withdrew
for expenses. Ironically, she used to work for a bank. The
experience apparently did not profit her, given the
manner she treated the money belonging to the minors.
What is more, Romina knew that the resources of the
deceased parents of the kids show no potential for future
growth. The cash in the bank is exhaustible. Yet, she has
not presented any plan to the Court for seeing the kids
through college with what resources they have left. In
truth, she squandered their money. They were just two
kids in elementary school and one in high school but in
just seven months, she spent P1.2 million for them in
household expenses, an average of P158,000.00 monthly.
Would you believe it?
Writing Exercises
The following has been lifted from a Supreme Court decision but the
names of the persons and places involved have been changed to protect
the real parties. Some portions have been deleted to shorten it for this
editing exercise. The decision, as written, is logical and grammatically
correct. It follows a certain style, however, that would be difficult,
except for the most discerning, to understand on first reading. The
author favors long, complex periodic sentences where the main noun
meets its verb after a number of intervening digressions. And he does
not treat the events in the ordinary sequence. The challenge is to
rewrite it, using the editing techniques you have learned above, and
make it clear and appealing to the ordinary reader.
Fate apparently dealt a low blow to the Romero family

when on the evening of November 30, 1970, the daughter,
Rita, not even fifteen then, alone in the rented room in a
house at Aliw Beach, Zamboanga City, where she was
living with her mother, who was then away for the night,
was, according to her complaint for rape, compelled to
submit twice because of force to the sexual advances of
the accused Hector Galos, also a boarder in the same
house. There was no denial of the acts of intercourse
having taken place, but the accused would insist that
complainant did so willingly, the explanation, according
to him, being that she was his sweetheart. He would
stress likewise his continued presence in the room until
the dawn of the next day and the absence of any outcry
on her part, which could have been heard by those
staying in the adjoining rooms. His testimony as to the
absence of force being employed was corroborated by
another boarder, who occupied the adjacent room, and
the owner of the house itself. The lower court preferred
to believe the girl’s version and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua. The severity of the penalty inflicted
under the circumstances where, as is not unusual in rape
cases, there is a conflict of testimony as to what actually
did transpire, led us to peruse with greater care the
records of the proceeding. x x x As will be more fully
explained, a careful scrutiny of testimony coming from
the complainant and the accused fails to yield the
conclusion that a finding of guilt is warranted. We have
to reverse.
The disparity in the versions offered by the contending
parties cannot obscure certain indubitable facts. The
accused did not by the use of force or deceit gain
entrance into the rented room where the sordid incident
took place. There was no denial of the version by him
and his two witnesses that earlier in the evening the
complainant was with a group, included in which was
the accused, engaged in drinking and light banter. It
could very well be that the euphoric feeling induced by
this young girl’s imbibing the tuba wine led to the
relaxation of what could be inhibiting factors. Once
inside the room, and with the accused apparently being a
suitor whose advances had not been spurned, to put it at
its mildest, it was not expected that sexual intimacies
would take place. It could very well be that the young
lady did not initially agree to indulge in an act of
intercourse. Under the circumstances, however, with
coaxing and cajoling on the part of the accused, there
was nothing unlikely in the stage of sexual congress
being reached. What is more, it happened twice. There
could have been a third time, except that it was foiled
because the chair on which it was attempted gave way
due to the combined weight of the participants. The man
had no weapon with which to intimidate the
complainant. There were no intimations that there was
opposition on her part. She did not yell or scream. The
two witnesses on either side of the room, separated only
by a thin plywood partition, certainly would have been
aware of any breathing. That certainly was not
indicative of rape. Moreover, to repeat, the accused
stayed until dawn. Even early the next morning, they
were seen together. x x x Hence acquittal ought to have
been the proper verdict.
1. The accused has in his favor the presumption of
innocence. That is a mandate of the fundamental law. It
may be noted that even when the previous Organic Act
did not so provide, a defendant according to the early
case of U.S. v. Asiao, decided in 1902, with Justice Torres
as ponente, “must be presumed to be innocent until [his]
guilt is proven by satisfactory testimony. … The burden
of proof is thus on the prosecution to demonstrate guilt.
Every vestige of doubt having a rational basis must be
removed. More specifically, where the offense charged is
rape through force, there must be a showing of
compulsion being resorted to and coercion being
employed. The element of voluntariness must be lacking.
x x x
2. The opinion of the Court is not to be misinterpreted.
It goes no further than to acknowledge that the proof
submitted on behalf of complainant did not measure up
to the exacting standard required in cases of this nature.
In the light of the applicable constitutional provision
and the authoritative precedents requiring full respect
for the constitutional rights of an accused, a reversal is
called for. x x x
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is set
aside and the accused is acquitted of rape.
13.
Writing Legal Opinions
Every so often, a client would seek your legal opinion on some

matter of concern to him. Before rushing into an opinion, however, you
would do well to keep the following in mind:
One. Ascertain the purpose for which your client seeks your
opinion. Does he merely want to know his rights? Does he need to
show your opinion to others? Does he have to make an important
decision that could have deep repercussions for him and others? Is he
facing a potential lawsuit? Your client is not a lawyer and, unless you
go deep into his reason for seeking your opinion or try to understand
his real problem, he could be posing the wrong questions to you. And,
consequently, you could be giving him the wrong answers.
In a case, a client asked her lawyer his opinion regarding what
constituted psychological incapacity for marriage. After her lawyer
told her, she preoccupied herself with establishing evidence that her
husband was psychologically incapacitated for marriage to the point
that she strained to fit the facts of her case into what the law required.
She gave this evidence to his lawyer. But the Court was unconvinced
and did not grant annulment. Yet, as it turned out, the couple was in the
first place married without a proper marriage license. Not being at
fault, she was entitled to annulment on this ground but she had to go
through so much expense and hardships in establishing a weak case
based on another ground because, before responding to her query, her
lawyer did not bother to find out what she needed his opinion for.
Do not settle, therefore, for a hypothetical question. Try to get your
client’s trust. If you cannot, it might be preferable that you refrain from
giving her an opinion or that you make it doubly clear to her that the
opinion you give might be the wrong one for her. In this way, you
avoid taking the blame for any mishap.
Second. Do pre-work. Get all the facts you need for forming a
competent opinion. A wrong factual premise will naturally produce a
wrong legal diagnosis. Go over the materials you got from your client,
ascertain the legal dispute involved, and put down in writing the
principal issue that it produces. Next, make a summary of the relevant
facts of the case and put them in correct sequence. Identify the issues
that have to be resolved and rough out the arguments that support your
thesis.
Third. After pre-work, do the write-up, following what you learned
earlier in this book. Introduce the issues by providing the background
facts that are needed to understand those issues. You prevent a
misunderstanding with your client when you summarize for him the
facts on which you rely in rendering your opinion.
Illustrative Case: Chan v. Century Bank

Below is a sample legal opinion. Like similar examples in this book,
do not consider it a prescribed form. Forms are hardly important. It is
substance that matters although, in legal writing, substance must meet
certain minimum requirements of content. These are: a) background
facts that adequately introduce the issues in the case, b) a statement of
what those issues are, c) the position you take on those issues, d) the
arguments that may be made against you, e) the arguments in your
favor, and f) what you want your reader to do under the circumstances.
Format and style are up to you.
September 14, 2013

Mr. Rogelio G. Chan
Milan Furniture Co., Inc.
245 Juan Luna Street
Binondo, Manila
Dear Mr. Chan:
Here is the opinion that you requested.
The facts, as I gather from you and your documents,
are as follows:
On May 12, 2012 you applied with the Century Bank
in Binondo, Manila, on behalf of Milan Furniture Co.,
Inc., for a letter of credit, Annex A, covering its
importation of hardwood from Vietnam. On arrival of
the goods, the bank agreed to advance the payment of
their price to your supplier. In turn, you executed a
promissory note in the name of Milan Furniture, Annex
B, undertaking to pay back the bank’s advance within
three months of the date of the note. You also signed a
trust receipt, Annex C, covering receipt of the goods.
The trust receipt provided that, in case of the sale of
the imported hardwood, Milan Furniture would turn
over the proceeds of that sale to the bank to apply to
your loan. Because Milan Furniture had been unable to
pay its promissory note to the bank when it fell due, on
October 17, 2012 the lawyers of the bank sent you a
demand letter, Annex D, requesting full payment of the
debt or return of the goods.
I understand that, on receipt of the letter, you tried to
negotiate with the manager of the bank, offering to
return the imported hardwood that you were yet unable
to sell or use. But the bank manager rejected your offer,
stating that the bank did not accept goods in payment of
debts owed it. Since further negotiations also failed, the
bank sent you a final demand for payment on December
4 under a threat of filing a criminal complaint for estafa
involving the trust receipt that you executed in its favor.
The question you pose is whether or not, under the
above facts, you may be held liable for estafa under PD
115, the Trust Receipt Law, in relation to Section 1(b) of
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
In my opinion, since the bank opted not to accept the
goods even when you offered to return them on behalf of
Milan Furniture, it should be deemed to have withdrawn
its earlier demand from you to pay or “return the goods
covered by said Trust Receipt.” Effectively, the bank
chose to consider Milan Furniture to have already
bought those goods, altogether removing the transaction
from the coverage of Section 13 of the Trust Receipt
Law.
I base my opinion on the following:
The relevant provision of the Trust Receipt Law or PD
115 provides:
SEC. 13. Penalty Clause. — The failure of an
entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of
the goods, documents or instruments covered by
a trust receipt to the extent of the amount owing
to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt
or to return said goods, documents or
instruments if they were not sold or disposed of
in accordance with the terms of the trust receipt
shall constitute the crime of estafa, punishable
under the provisions of Article Three Hundred
and Fifteen, Paragraph One (b), of Act
Numbered Three Thousand Eight Hundred and
Fifteen, as amended, otherwise known as the
Revised Penal Code. x x x
The related provisions of Section 1(b), Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code, under which the violation is
made to fall, states:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). –– Any person
who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned herein below x x x:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence,
namely:
x x x x x x x x x
b. By misappropriating or converting, to the

prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in
trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property.”
From the above, the following are the elements of
estafa involving a trust receipt:
1. The entrustee received the goods under a trust
receipt from the entruster under an obligation to turn
over the proceeds of the sale of the goods or to return
said goods;
2. The entrustee misappropriated or converted the
goods by failing to turn over the proceeds of their sale or
to return said goods to the entruster;
3. The misappropriation or conversion is to the
prejudice of the entruster; and
4. The entruster made a demand on the entrustee.
One of the elements of estafa involving a trust receipt
is that the entrustee [in this case, you or Milan
Furniture] received the goods under a trust receipt from
the entruster [in this case, Century Bank] under an
obligation to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the
goods or to return said goods. The Trust Receipt Law,
PD 115, provides in Section 11 that the liability for estafa
under paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 of the Penal Code
arises in case of “the failure of an entrustee to turn over
the proceeds of the sale of the goods … or to return said
goods.”
The trust receipt in this case, Annex A, echoes the
above provisions of the Trust Receipt Law. Under it,
Milan Furniture or you as its signatory, undertook “to
turn over to the BANK the proceeds” of the sale of the
goods1 or, “in case of non-sale,” to “return the goods
covered by this Trust Receipt to the BANK upon its
demand.”2
But the terms of the trust receipt does not end there.
The trust receipt, Annex A, gives Century Bank an
option not “to accept the return of the goods.” In effect,
Century Bank could chose to regard such goods already
sold to Milan Furniture even though the latter could and
wanted to return them. The seventh paragraph of the
Trust Receipt, Annex A, thus reads:
We agree that the BANK is not obliged to
accept any return of the goods under this Trust
Receipt by us or to consider any return thereof if
accepted or demanded by the BANK, as
satisfaction of our indebtedness to the BANK.
Century Bank in fact availed itself of the above option.
It opted not to accept the goods even when you offered to
return them. Consequently, Century Bank should be
deemed to have withdrawn its earlier demand that you
or Milan Furniture pay or “return the goods covered by
said Trust Receipt immediately.” Effectively, Century
Bank chose by its action to consider the subject goods
sold to Milan Furniture, altogether removing the
transaction from the coverage of Section 13 of the Trust
Receipt Law.
The essence of the crime of conversion or
misappropriation is that the offender to whom money or
goods has been entrusted has unfaithfully or with abuse
of confidence failed to return what was merely entrusted
to him and appropriated it for his own. Here, neither
Milan Furniture nor you could be considered as having
unfaithfully or with abuse of confidence
misappropriated and converted the goods subject of the
trust receipt. Century Bank did not want those goods
back. It had regarded them sold outright to Milan
Furniture. The latter’s liability for the goods should,
therefore, be considered purely civil.
Moreover, Section 13 of the Trust Receipt Law
provides that the “failure of an entrustee to turn over the
proceeds of the sale of the goods … or to return said
goods … if they were not sold or disposed of in
accordance with the terms of the trust receipt shall
constitute the crime of estafa.” The essence of the penal
provision of the law, therefore, is that the entruster [here,
Century Bank] has entrusted the good to the entrustee
[Milan Furniture or you] for him to sell. Once sold, the
entrustee was to turn over the proceeds of the sale to the
entruster.
Section 13 does not embrace instances where the goods
are turned over by the entrustor to the entrustee for the
latter’s use in his own business. This is clear from the
ruling of the Supreme Court in Colinares v. Court of
Appeals3 that reads:
Also noteworthy is the fact that Petitioners are
not importers acquiring the goods for re-sale,
contrary to the express provision embodied in the
trust receipt. They are contractors who obtained
the fungible goods for their construction project.
At no time did title over the construction
materials pass to the bank, but directly to the
Petitioners from CM Builders Centre. This
impresses upon the trust receipt in question
vagueness and ambiguity, which should not be
the basis for criminal prosecution in the event of
violation of its provisions.4
In this case, on May 12, 2012 Century Bank agreed
with Milan Furniture to open a letter of credit (LC) on
the latter’s behalf to cover a shipment of hardwood from
Vietnam for use in its manufacture of furniture.
Notwithstanding that Milan Furniture imported the
hardwood in question so it could use them in
manufacturing furniture, Century Bank made you, a
representative of your company, sign a trust receipt that
made it appear as if Century Bank had turned over the
hardwood to Milan Furniture for it to sell to others and
to turn over to the bank the proceeds of the sale. The
Supreme Court has long condemned such practice. Thus,
it said in the Colinares case:
The practice of banks of making borrowers
sign trust receipts to facilitate collection of loans
and place them under the threats of criminal
prosecution should they be unable to pay it may
be unjust and inequitable, if not reprehensible.
Such agreements are contracts of adhesion
which borrowers have no option but to sign lest
their loan be disapproved. The resort to this
scheme leaves poor and hapless borrowers at the
mercy of banks, and is prone to
misinterpretation, as had happened in this case.
Eventually, PBC showed its true colors and
admitted that it was only after collection of the
money, as manifested by its Affidavit of
Desistance.5
That the transaction was a loan is made clear from
paragraph 1 of the agreement for the opening of a letter
of credit between Century Bank and MHTI, Annex A. It
provides that, in consideration of the opening of the
letter of credit on behalf of Milan Furniture in the
amount of US$39,060, the latter undertook to pay the
bank on demand for all drafts drawn against such letter
of credit, with interest at 13% per annum. The title to
the goods never really passed to the bank. Century Bank
did not import them from Vietnam; it merely opened a
letter of credit for the benefit of Milan Furniture. The
supplier shipped the hardwood to Milan Furniture
under the cover of that letter of credit. In short, Century
Bank merely provided the loan that financed the
shipment.
Since the transaction was a loan, Milan Furniture’s
liability to Century Bank should only be regarded as
civil. The criminal action against you must fail. It is but
fair and the investigating prosecutor or the court should
see the point.
A word of reservation: I base my opinion on the
language of the laws involved as well as on settled
judicial precedents. But, in the event the bank files a
criminal complaint against you, there is the chance,
however small, that the public prosecutor may just
decide to file it in court, subjecting you to the hassle,
expense, and risk that criminal trials entail. But I am
confident that, ultimately, you will be absolved.
Please let me know if I can be of further service to you
in this matter.
Very truly yours,
ANNA ELIZABETH A. DE DIOS
There is one last point. Legal opinions have their limitations. You
have to realize that not all legal disputes are best resolved through
judicial remedies. Litigations are best avoided, if the economics do not
make sense, as when your client’s debtor is practically bankrupt. In
such a case, your client would merely be throwing away good money,
by incurring expenses for docket fees and attorney’s fees with no hope
of recovering anything. Further, a legal confrontation could irreparably
damage relationships that may be far more valuable than the benefits
derived from a judicial resolution of the dispute.
Law is based on wisdom but law is not wisdom.
1Third paragraph, Trust Receipt, Annex B.

2Id., fifth paragraph.
3339 SCRA 609 (2000).
4At p. 623.
5Supra, at pp. 623-624.
14.
Writing Trial Memoranda
In trials by jury in the United States and other countries that have
adopted that system of hearing and deciding cases, trial is usually
followed by oral arguments from both sides. Counsel stands before a
jury of ordinary men and women, orally sums up his case and tries to
persuade them with evidence and arguments to accept his client’s point
of view. In the Philippines, only one person—the judge who is trained
and experienced in the law—sits to hear the case in its entirety and
passes judgment on the dispute. Because cases are tried in installments
over a period of time, usually a year or two, counsels often need to
argue their cases at the end of trial. They do this by written
memoranda.
As we said earlier, pre-work is indispensable to a substantial and
convincing trial memorandum. It will do well for you, therefore, to go
over the pleadings, the transcript of the testimonies of the witnesses,
and the documentary exhibits. Working on these materials, identify the
legal dispute involved and, based on it, draw up the principal issue in
the case. From there, proceed to make an outline of the relevant facts
that the opposing parties claim and pinpoint the issues that you need to
address.
After pre-work, write up your client’s memorandum in the case.
Make sure that your memorandum embodies the following
indispensable parts:
1. A summary of the nature of the action and the court proceedings
so far had in it;
2. A summary of the facts of the case—the transaction or event that
brought about the legal dispute and the lawsuit—as seen from the
opposing points of view of the parties;
3. A statement of the relevant issues that the parties present for
resolution; and
4. An orderly presentation of the arguments that support your
client’s position.
Illustrative Case: Maranan v. Gonzalo Realty

In a case, the president of a corporation, acting in his own name,
leased one of the properties of his company to a third person at a fixed
rent for 25 years. After the president left, the tenant brought a lawsuit
to enforce the contract against his company. Following the trial,
defendant company filed a memorandum in the case, reproduced
below. It shows a species of such pleading. Certain details have been
altered to preserve the privacy of the parties involved.
Republic of the Philippines

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
National Capital Judicial Region
Mandaluyong City, Branch 156
RAMON C. MARANAN,
Plaintiff,
-versus- SCA No. CV 0341

GONZALO REALTY CORP.,
Defendant.
x--------------------------------------x
DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM
Defendant, by counsel, respectfully submits its

memorandum in the case:
The Case
Plaintiff Ramon C. Maranan filed this action for

declaratory relief and damages against defendant
Gonzalo Realty Corporation, claiming that the Court
needed to ascertain the rights of the parties under a
contract of lease between them before its terms were
violated. In its answer, Gonzalo Realty claimed that it
did not authorize the contract of lease and that the
action was improper for declaratory relief. The parties
claimed moral damages and attorney’s fees against each
other.
The Facts
At the trial, Maranan gave his version of the events.

He had been renting the land in question from Gonzalo
Realty from April 2002 under a Contract of Lease,
Exhibit A (Transcript of Stenographic Notes, August 27,
2012, p. 5). Ted Gonzalo, its president and director,
represented Gonzalo Realty in that contract (id., p. 6).
The contract was for twenty-five years at P3,000.00 rent
per month, which he had always paid. At the beginning
Ted or Celia, his secretary, gave Maranan unofficial
receipts for the rents but from August 2010 Gonzalo
Realty began to give him official receipts (id., p. 13).
From September 2011, however, Gonzalo Realty refused
to take his monthly rents, insisting that he should
increase this to P8,000.00 (id., p. 14).
Maranan went to Gonzalo Realty’s office and asked
Edmund Gonzalo, its new president, to honor the
contract signed by the former president, Ted Gonzalo.
But Edmund and her sister, Judith Gonzalo, told him
that the contract was void. Maranan had not since seen
Ted Gonzalo. These events prompted him to file the
present action. A second witness, Fred Simon testified
that he had been paying Maranan’s rents to Susan, the
secretary of Gonzalo Realty at its office and that,
although Edmund knew of such payments, he did not
object to them (Exh. H).
Judith Gonzalo, a stockholder, a member of the board
of directors, and the corporate secretary of Gonzalo
Realty (TSN January 30, 2009, pp. 5-6), presented her
company’s version. She served as company president
from August 2010 to December 2011, succeeding her
brother Ted (id., p. 7) who served from 2004 to July
2010. Later, her other brother Edmund took over as
president. Gonzalo Realty had been leasing lots and a
building in San Dionisio, Baclaran and Tambo in
Parañaque (id., p. 8), including the two small lots subject
of this case (id., p. 9).
Judith first learned of the lease of the two small lots to
Maranan in 2010 when, on becoming Gonzalo Realty’s
president, she asked their secretary to instruct all the
tenants to pay their rents directly to Gonzalo Realty and
no longer to Ted. Beginning in August 2006 Maranan
paid his rents to Gonzalo Realty, which issued him
official receipts (id., p. 10; Exh. B to B-19). The company
did not issue the other receipts that Maranan presented
in court (Exh. D to D-34), some of which included official
receipts issued by his brother Ted’s company, the TRG
Enterprises (id., p. 11). TRG stood for Ted R. Gonzalo.
Gonzalo Realty did not authorize Ted to enter into the
lease contract, Exh. A, with Maranan (id., p. 12). Judith
first saw it only in August or September 2011 while she
was making her rounds of their properties. When Judith
asked Maranan if they could already increase his rents,
the latter produced a lease contract with Ted Gonzalo for
twenty-five years at P2,000.00 rent per month with no
escalation (id., p. 13). As soon as she saw the contract,
Judith wrote Maranan, informing him of its invalidity
and demanded an increase in his rent to P8,000.00 per
month, subject to a 10% yearly increase (id., p. 14).
According to Gonzalo Realty’s by-laws, its president’s
powers were purely managerial or administrative (id., p.
14; see Sections 4 and 5). This allowed him to lease
corporate properties for not more than one year; for
leases over one year, the contracts had to pass Judith and
be approved by the board of directors of the company
(id., p. 15). In this case, the board learned of Maranan’s
contract with Ted only in August 2011. It neither
authorized nor ratified that contract (id., p. 17). To
defend itself against the suit, Gonzalo Realty had to hire
the services of counsel for P100,000.00 and P3,000.00 for
every hearing he attended (id., pp. 17-18).
The Issues
The Court defined the issues in this case in its pre-trial

order as follows:
1. Whether or not the Contract of Lease executed by
and between Ted Gonzalo and Ramon Maranan binds
Gonzalo Realty; and
2. Whether or not either party is entitled to damages
and attorney’s fees.
Arguments
I.
TED GONZALO DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO
BIND GONZALO REALTY TO THE LONG-TERM
LEASE AGREEMENT THAT HE SIGNED WITH
MARANAN
Maranan claims that Gonzalo Realty is bound by the
contract that he entered into with Ted Gonzalo since, as
president of Gonzalo Realty, the latter had the necessary
authority to act for it. But the fact that Ted was Gonzalo
Realty’s president in 2002 did not mean that all his acts
were the acts of the corporation. Consider the following:
First. Ted did not enter into the subject contract of
lease on behalf of Gonzalo Realty, either as its president
or as its agent. The portion of the contract, Exhibit A,
which identified who the parties were to that agreement,
shows that Maranan contracted only with Ted in his
personal capacity. Thus––
This Contract is made and entered into by and
between:
TED R. GONZALO, of legal age, Filipino,
married, with residence and postal address at
336 J.P. Rizal St., Mandaluyong City, hereinafter
referred to as the LESSOR;
-and-
RAMON C. MARANAN, of legal age, Filipino
with residence and postal address at 478 Tangco
St., Mandaluyong City, hereinafter referred to as
the LESSEE.
Since the above contract specified Ted Gonzalo as the
“lessor” of the property, Maranan cannot pretend that
he entered into that contract with Gonzalo Realty itself.
The latter’s name does not appear on the face of the
contract at all. As a businessman, Maranan is intelligent
and his eyes were open. He should be held bound by the
representations in that contract that he had dealt only
with Ted in his personal capacity.
Second. The contract falsely claimed that Ted owned
the subject lots. The “whereases” clause unmistakably
states:
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the LESSOR [Ted Gonzalo] is the
registered owner of two parcel of land, covered
and embraced by Lot 25, containing an area of
102 square meters and Lot 26 with an area of 15
square meters, both situated at Banaba
Subdivision, Poblacion, Mandaluyong City;
WHEREAS, the LESSEE desires to lease the
above mentioned two Lots and the Lessor is
willing to lease the same unto said Lessee, under
the following terms and conditions, to wit:
x x x x x x x x x
Maranan testified that he knew that the two Lots

belonged to Gonzalo Realty even before he leased them
(TSN, August 27, 2002, p. 29). He, therefore, acted with
malice and bad faith when he nonetheless agreed to lease
them from Ted under an understanding, which was a
false one as Maranan very well knew, that Ted owned the
property. A party who had acted in this way could not
avail himself of any equitable relief from the
consequences of his improper conduct.
Third. It does not help Maranan’s case that he
admitted in the course of re-cross that before he leased
the property from Ted, he had seen the deed of exchange,
Exhibit G, which Gonzalo Realty entered into with Acme
Realty Corp. for a swap of the lots between them. Since
that document was a sample of how Gonzalo Realty, a
corporation, contracted with third persons, Maranan
was familiar with the form used. Indeed, he admitted
that he read the front portion of the deed of exchange
and saw that, although the contracting party was
Gonzalo Realty, the document declared that Ted, its
president, represented it in the transaction.
Still, when it came to the two Lots that Maranan
allegedly leased from Gonzalo Realty, he went along with
the idea that Ted would act on his own, in a personal
capacity, rather than as Gonzalo Realty’s representative.
Maranan could not, therefore, claim ignorance of what it
took to bind a corporation to a contract. He knew that
the lease contract did not bind Gonzalo Realty.
Fourth. Even if Maranan and Ted had wanted the
latter to bind Gonzalo Realty into that contract, still Ted
could not do so. Section 23 of the Corporation Code vests
in the board of directors the corporate powers of a
corporation, including the power of control over all its
properties.
Sec. 23. The board of directors or trustees. ––
Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the
corporate powers of all corporations formed
under this Code shall be exercised, all business
conducted and all property of such corporation
controlled and held by the board of directors or
trustees to be elected from among the holders of
stocks, or where there is no stock, from among
the members of the corporation, who shall hold
office for one (1) year and until their successors
are elected and qualified.
As president, Ted only had powers of general
administration under the corporation’s by-laws (TSN,
January 30, 2011, p. 14). Article 1877 of the Civil Code
governs the scope of his authority. Thus:
Art. 1877. An agency couched in general terms
comprises only acts of administration, even if the
principal should state that he withholds no
power or that the agent may execute such acts as
he may consider appropriate, or even though the
agency should authorize a general and unlimited
management.
Consequently, with his limited powers, Ted could not
encumber the properties of the corporation for a twenty-
five-year lease with no adjustments in rent. Such is not
an act of general administration. Indeed, Article 1878(8)
of the Civil Code provides that a person acting for his
principal, like Ted acting for Gonzalo Realty, needs a
special power of attorney “to lease any real property to
another for more than one year.” Thus:
Art. 1878. Special powers of attorney are
necessary in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(8) To lease any real property to another

person for more than one year;
xxx xxx xxx
Here, neither the complaint nor the contract of lease

states that Ted had been empowered with a special
power of attorney approved by the Board of Directors of
Gonzalo Realty to lease its two Lots to Maranan for
twenty-five years with no change in rental.
Fifth. Assuming that Ted had the authority to enter
into long-term lease contracts on behalf of Gonzalo
Realty even without a special power of attorney from its
board of directors (a point that is not conceded), still he
could not have bound Gonzalo Realty to the particular
contract subject of this case. Article 1883 of the Civil
Code provides that, if an agent “acts in his own name,
the principal has no right of action against the persons
with whom the agent has contracted; neither have such
persons against the principal.”
Here, clearly, Ted acted in his own name.
Consequently, Maranan had no right of action against
Gonzalo Realty.
II.
GONZALO REALTY HAS NOT RATIFIED THE

CONTRACT OF LEASE BETWEEN TED GONZALO
AND MARANAN
Maranan next claims that Gonzalo Realty should be
considered as having ratified the contract in question
considering how it had received monthly rents from him
as evidenced by the receipts that it issued.
But Gonzalo Realty could not ratify a contract that it
did not know existed. Judith Gonzalo testified that they
learned of the contract of lease between Ted and
Maranan only in August 2010 and Gonzalo Realty lost
no time to assail it. Indeed, neither Maranan nor his
warehouseman, Fred Simon, testified to having
previously discussed with Judith or Edmund Gonzalo,
whom they knew were directors and later presidents of
the company, the matter of the twenty-five-year contract
of lease.
Nor could Maranan capitalize on the fact that he had
faithfully paid monthly rentals of P2,000.00 for the
property from 2007 to August 2011.
Consider the following:
1. As Judith Gonzalo testified, when she took over
from Ted as president of Gonzalo Realty in August 2010,
she simply continued to have the rentals collected from
the known existing tenants on their properties. She had
assumed, in the absence of any written contract in the
files of the corporation, that these tenants were,
consistent with Guillermo’s limited authority, on a
month-to-month lease only since they were paying rents
on a monthly basis.
Consequently, Maranan cannot infer from the fact of
Gonzalo Realty’s receipt of rentals from him beginning
in August 2010 that it had knowledge and approved of
his 2007 contract of lease. Only when Maranan invoked
his alleged twenty-five-year contract with Ted and sent a
copy of it to Gonzalo Realty around August 2011 did the
latter learn of its existence. And Gonzalo Realty
promptly informed Maranan that the contract was void.
2. The receipts that Maranan got for the rents he paid
are consistent with Gonzalo Realty’s lack of knowledge
of the contract and his occupation of the property in
2007. The paper trail of receipts he offered is interesting
and proves this point. Consider the following:
First. The lease evidently ran for over two years from
April 2007 to July 2010 as a secret, illicit agreement
solely between Maranan and Ted. The receipts
corresponding to this period were mostly unofficial,
written on scratch papers of various sizes (Exh. D to D-
34). In some cases, official receipts had been issued but
these were in the name of TRG Enterprises, a business
that belonged to Ted. TRG stood for Ted R. Gonzalo. For
five years, therefore, Maranan and Ted actually cheated
Gonzalo Realty of earnings from its property.
Second. Official receipts from Gonzalo Realty
appeared only from August 2010, consistent with Judith
Gonzalo’s testimony that only from that month did their
company begin to collect rents from Maranan (Exh. B to
B-19). She testified that they assumed that Maranan had
been leasing the property on a month-to-month basis
and they collected rents from him in good faith on the
basis of that belief.
III.
GONZALO REALTY IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES

For having instituted this baseless and malicious suit,
Maranan should be held liable to Gonzalo Realty for
moral damages and attorney’s fees.
WHEREFORE, defendant Gonzalo Realty
Corporation respectfully prays the Court to render
judgment:
1. Dismissing the petition for lack of merit; and
2. Ordering plaintiff Ramon C. Maranan to pay
defendant moral damages of P1 million and attorney’s
fees of P100,000.00 plus appearance fee for counsel at
P3,000.00 per hearing.
[Explanation: A copy of this memorandum has been
served on the adverse party by registered mail in view of
the distance and the absence of a messenger who could
make a personal service.]
Manila for Muntinlupa City, May 12, 2009.
ISABELA H. FONTILA Counsel for

Gonzalo Realty Corp.
2nd Flr. Olympia Bldg.
445 Buendia Avenue
Makati City
Atty. Roll No. 23456
IBP 544498 12-21-09
PTR 8723254 01-02-09
MCLE Compliance III-295
Email: ihfontilla@yahoo.com
Copy furnished:
Atty. Shaira A. Cruz
346 President Avenue
Parañaque City
Writing Exercises
You will find in Appendix A of this book the important portions of

the record of an actual carnapping case. The names of persons and
places involved have been changed to protect the privacy of those
involved. And, although the materials have been edited, the purpose is
only to eliminate collateral discussions and control length. What
remains are faithful to their substance.
Assume that the case has been submitted for decision and the court
has required you to file a memorandum in support of your client’s case,
whether you choose to be lawyer for the prosecution or for the accused.
Use what you have learned and go through the process suggested in
this book.
1. Read the materials closely and determine the legal dispute by
ascertaining what right of a party the other has violated.
2. Make an outline of the relevant facts of the case, arranging them
in the order of time.
3. Afterwards, study the laws and rules involved in such a dispute.
4. List down all the issues involved and identify the controlling
issue or issues that, when resolved, will end the legal dispute.
5. Rough out your argument on a paper, using the balance sheet
format. At the bottom of the balance sheet, write your closing
statement, usually an appeal to the good sense of the reader.
6. Write up your memorandum, introducing the issue or issues,
fleshing out your arguments, and making a closing statement.
Finally, edit your work to rid it of needless words and improve
its clarity.
You cannot learn legal writing by just knowing its theories and
techniques. You sharpen an ax only by passing it through a grinding
stone. And this practice case is such a grinding stone.
15.
Writing Petitions for Review
When you lose a case in the Court of Appeals, your last recourse is
an appeal by certiorari from that court’s decision to the Supreme
Court. This appeal is also available from the decision of the
Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial Court on pure questions of law.
Although appeal by certiorari is essentially an appeal, it is initiated by
filing a petition for review that has the features of an original
complaint or petition. Thus, apart from making a concise statement of
the matters involved as well as the arguments you rely on in support of
your petition, you need to incorporate in it the formal parts of an
initiatory pleading like the parties’ identities, verification, and a
certificate of non-forum shopping. Additionally, you have to show the
timeliness of your action.
The Supreme Court is not bound to entertain every petition for
review of a decision of the Regional Trial Court, the Sandiganbayan, or
the Court of Appeals. In fact, the Supreme Court gives due course to
only a very small number of the hundreds of petitions for review filed
with it monthly. This is dictated by necessity. The High Court has very
limited capacity for fully reviewing every decision rendered by those
courts.
So how do you get the Supreme Court to give due course to your
particular petition for review? The main thing, of course, is that you
must present a meritorious case. But even if your case were really
meritorious, it will not do if the Supreme Court is unable to see and
appreciate its merit. To succeed, your petition must be:
1. Clear—You need to be understood. If you present a hazy picture
of your case, it would be doomed from the start. Take pains to rewrite
your draft over and over until it is so clear that your reader can
understand what the case is about in one reading. That is probably all
the chance you would get in the first place to earn a due course—one
reading. Some of the techniques for writing clearly have been
discussed earlier. Use them.
2. Brief—You need to be understood fast. You can be sure that all
petitions for review are read, if not by a justice himself, at least by
some competent lawyer-assistant who do initial screening or
summarizing of sort. If you make a lengthy presentation because you
use more words and sentences than you need to, your reader will lose
interest in your case, his mind will wander away, and you will lose
him. Result: No due course. You need, therefore, to tighten your work
and make it terse to fit into the time that your reader mentally allots to
you.
3. Interesting—You need, above all, to create in the Supreme Court’s
mind an interest in your case. And you can do this only if you can
convince it that the court below has committed a grievous wrong that
compels the High Court to intervene. Small wrongs have small
chances. Quite often, a strong and compelling yet respectful language
would do it since you need to communicate a sense of controlled anger
over the injustice done your case. A timid and equivocal voice is
seldom heard.
It will also help if, in the Court’s mind, deciding your case will
contribute to the development of jurisprudence. Cases that present
novel issues tend to get into first base because the Supreme Court is
also a teaching court.
Final point. A large number of petitions, some probably
meritorious, get thrown out every year on account of incompleteness.
The rules require you to include the following in your client’s petition:
a) The full names of the petitioner (appellant) and the respondent
(the adverse party);
b) An indication of the material dates showing when your client, the
petitioner, received notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
subject of the petition, when he filed a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if he did, and when he received notice of its denial;
c) A concise statement of the matters involved in the petition [the
facts of the case, the issues petitioner presents in relation to the
appealed decision, and the position he takes on those issues];
d) The reasons or arguments he relies on for the allowance of the
petition;
e) His verification of the facts stated in the petition; and
f) A sworn certification that petitioner has not indulged in the evil of
forum shopping signed by the petitioner himself.
In addition to the above, your client is required to:
a) Pay the docket and other fees;
b) Attach to his petition a clearly legible duplicate original, or a
certified true copy of the judgment, final order, or resolution subject of
review and its requisite number of plain copies;
c) Attach, too, such material portions of the record below as would
support the petition;
d) File the required number of plain copies of the petition;
e) Submit an affidavit of service of copies of the petition on the
adverse party and the court below by personal service or by registered
mail with registry receipts attached and with an explanation why
personal service was not done;
f) See to it that the affidavit of service, the verification, and the
certification of non-forum shopping indicate competent evidence of the
identities of the persons who swore to such documents; and
g) If petitioner is represented by counsel, indicate in the petition
counsel’s IBP official receipt, PTR, Roll of Attorney, and MCLE
Compliance or exemption numbers as well as counsel’s email address
and phone numbers.
The rules provide that the failure of the petitioner to comply with
any of the above requirements “shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof.” Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
have rigidly, some says arbitrarily, dismissed cases for non-compliance
and refused to reconsider the dismissal even when the parties seek to
rectify unintended omissions.
Illustrative Case: Excal Corp. v. Jimenez

Here is a sample petition for review. Some details have been altered
to protect the privacies of the persons involved.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EXCAL CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
- versus - G.R. No. __________
(CA-GR. CV 70743)
Spouses CARLO and EDNA
JIMENEZ, Spouses LUIS and
BELLA GOZON, and Spouses
ROGER and LORNA LIM,
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------x
PETITION FOR REVIEW
Petitioner, by counsel, respectfully states:
The Parties
1. Petitioner Excal Corporation (Excal) is a domestic

corporation engaged in the importation and distribution
of gasoline and other petroleum products. It holds offices
at the Excal Building, Makati Avenue, Makati City.
2. Respondent spouses Carlos and Edna Jimenez (the
Jimenezes), spouses Luis and Bella Gozon (the Gozons),
and spouses Roger and Lorna Lim (the Lims) are
Filipinos, of legal ages and residents of Bacolod City.
They can be served with the processes of the Court thru
their counsel of record, Atty. Ramon L. Samson at 4th
Floor, Hermanos Building, Garcia Road, Bacolod City.
Material Dates
3. On December 18, 2012 Excal received a copy of the

adverse decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
70743 dated December 12, 2012, a certified true copy of
which is attached to the original of this petition as Annex
A. Consequently, Excal had until January 2, 2004 within
which to file a petition for review of that decision.
4. On January 2, 2013 Excal filed with this Court a
motion for extension of thirty days from that date or
until February 1, 2013 within which to file its petition for
review of the Court of Appeals’ decision. Excal is filing
this petition within the period it asked for.
Statement of the Matters Involved
5. For an unknown reason, in the course of the

discharge of gasoline from a truck to the underground
storage tank of a gas station, the fuel being discharged
caught fire. When the truck driver who had left his truck
unattended returned and saw the fire, he immediately
drove his truck away from the gas station but dragged
along a hose that spewed flames. These set the nearby
buildings on fire.
6. In ruling that liability for the accident belonged to
Excal, which happened to have sold the fuel to the
independent gas station dealer involved in the case, the
Court of Appeals made the following rulings:
One. Since Excal and the gas station dealer
continued transacting business without renewing
or extending their dealership contract in writing
after it had expired, Excal should be considered
as having replaced its dealer and directly become
the operator of the gas station;
Two. Also because of its failure to extend or
renew such dealership contract in writing, the
damage caused by the gas station fire should be
borne by Excal.
Three. Excal is liable notwithstanding that the
truck belonged to an independent hauler and the
gas station belonged to an independent
petroleum dealer.
Four. Suppliers of fuel like Excal continue to
be liable for the neglect of others in distributing
and storing the fuel they have sold.
7. Excal implores the Court to rectify the above
rulings for not only do they contravene the law, they are
also irrational and unjust.
The Facts and the Case
8. The facts of the case are not in dispute. Excal

supplied gasoline and other petroleum products to two
classes of gasoline stations: those that it owned and those
that belonged to independent dealers. In the latter case,
the dealers owned the building and other structures in
their gas stations except gas-pumping and related
equipment. Neither the dealers nor their employees
worked for Excal.1
9. In this case, Excal had a Retail Dealer Contract2

with James Ursal who owned and operated a gas station
in Burgos Avenue, Bacolod City. Although this contract
expired in May 2008, they continued to transact business
with each other in the usual way.3
10. To facilitate delivery of its products to its dealers,
Excal engaged the services of independent haulers who
were equipped with their own tank trucks and hired
their own truck drivers. In this case, Excal had a
contract of haulage with Vicente Rama4 who did
business under the name Rama Freight Services.5 Under
the contract, Rama assumed exclusive liability for any
damage arising from the neglect of his employees.
Section 3.2 of that contract provides:
3.2 “Any and all drivers, mechanics and other
personnel, of the CONTRACTOR (Rama) are
not, and under no circumstances shall be
deemed, personnel and employees of EXCAL
and for this reason the CONTRACTOR alone
shall be answerable for the payment of their
wages and salaries and the safeguarding of their
health and safety and the performance of the
other obligations in accordance with existing
laws and regulations, it being further understood
as a consequence that the CONTRACTOR alone
shall be responsible for any and all accidents,
injuries and death involving said personnel,
agents, and/or employees.”
11. At about 10 o’clock on the morning of January 3,
2010, James Ursal bought a tank-truck of gasoline from
Excal. After issuing the invoice and the receipt covering
payment, Excal loaded the gasoline into the tank truck of
Rama, then driven by his truck driver, Jose Noble. The
tank truck left the oil depot and proceeded to the gas
station in Burgos Avenue.6
12. While gasoline was being discharged from the tank
truck into the fill pipe that led to the gas station’s
underground tank, Noble left his truck unattended to
buy dried fish from the nearby marketplace. On
returning to the station, he saw that fire had broken out
from the underground fuel tank. But rather than detach
the rubber hose from the flaming fill pipe, he drove his
truck in reverse, dragging along a flaming fuel hose.
Flames from the hose set the buildings owned by the
Jimenezes, the Gozons, and the Lims on fire.7 The
authorities were never able to establish what started the
fire in the underground tank.
13. As a result of the fire, the Jimenezes, the Gozons,
and the Lims filed separate actions for damages against
Excal, Ursal (the gas station operator), and Rama (the
truck owner) in Civil Cases 123567, 123569, and 123572
of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City. These were
consolidated in Branch 28 of the court. After trial, the
trial court rendered a decision, an authentic copy of
which is here attached as Annex B, a) holding Excal,
Rama, and Ursal solidarily liable for negligence that led
to the conflagration; and b) ordering them to pay the
Jimenezes P1.5 million, the Gozons P1.2 million, and the
Lims P1.7 million in actual damages and P100,000.00
each in attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.
14. Excal, Ursal, and Rama appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 70743. Excal filed
its appellant’s brief, copy here attached as Annex C. In
response, the Jimenezes, the Gozons, and the Lims filed
a consolidated appellees’ brief, copy here attached as
Annex D.
15. On December 12, 2012 the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court, hence, this
petition.
Questions of Law Presented
Petitioner Excal presents the following questions of
law:
1. Whether or not Excal may be considered at fault for
continuing to do business with James Ursal, an
independent petroleum dealer, without renewing or
extending their expired dealership agreement;
2. Whether or not a causal connection exists between
Excal’s failure to renew or extend its dealership contract
with Ursal and the fire that inflicted damages on the
buildings surrounding the latter’s gas station;
3. Whether or not Excal is liable for the fire that
occurred during the unloading by an independent hauler
of the fuel it sold to an equally independent dealer at the
latter’s gas station; and
4. Whether or not a supplier of fuel can be held liable
for the neglect of others in distributing and storing such
fuel.
Reasons for Allowing the Petition
I.
A RULING THAT PARTIES ARE AT FAULT FOR
CONTINUING THEIR BUSINESS WITHOUT
RENEWING THEIR CONTRACT CONTRAVENES
THE LAW.
The Court of Appeals blames Excal for the gas station
fire. It ruled that, since James Ursal operated that gas
station under an expired dealership contract, Excal
should be deemed to operate it directly and assume
liability for the fire. Said the Court of Appeals:
Excal was negligent for having allowed the
continued operation of the gasoline station in
selling and storing its products for over one year,
from May 2008 until the fire incident in January
2010, without an existing dealership contract. It
bears to note that Excal’s five (5) year dealership
contract with appellant James Ursal had long
expired as of May 2008. Notwithstanding, Excal
continued to deliver gas and petroleum products
to the gasoline station upon the request of one
Rolando Arnaiz. Clearly, there was no dealer to
speak of in respect of the subject gasoline station
in the absence of a dealership contract, with the
result that the said gasoline station should be
considered as being run by Excal itself, thereby
making the station a company-operated one.
Consequently, Excal cannot disown the
petroleum products that it delivered at the time
of the fire incident. Responsibility cannot
therefore be transferred by appellant to a
particular dealer in the absence of a contract to
that effect. If at all, the persons running the
gasoline station are merely its agents in the
business. As held in Pleasantville Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, “the rule is
that the principal is responsible for the acts of
the agent, done within the scope of his authority,
and should bear the damage caused to third
persons.”
Conceding arguendo that the dealership
contract was impliedly renewed, with whom did
Excal renew its contract, when at the time of the
conflagration it was the spouses Rico and Sonia
Ursal who operated the gasoline station? This
question was not squarely answered by Excal.
James Ursal executed a Special Power of
Attorney in favor of Rico Ursal and such Special
Power of Attorney expired with the expiration of
James Ursal’s contract with Excal in 2008. Excal
did not enter into another contract with Rico
Ursal. All told, no dealership agreement existed
at the time of the incident in January 3, 2010,
hence, Excal is not relieved of any liability as
result of the conflagration. (At pp. 8 and 9)
But, with due respect to the Court of Appeals,
although Excal’s contract with James Ursal expired in
May 2008, they continued to do business with each other
observing the same terms and conditions provided in
that contract. By their acts, therefore, they impliedly
extended or renewed their dealership contract. This
principle of implied extension or renewal is quite
fundamental. All sorts of everyday contracts rest on it,
including leases on buildings and hires of services. The
world of business cannot grind to a halt just because
parties are too busy to renew or extend their contracts.
Implied renewals or extensions of contracts are not
outlawed in this country.
Just as bizarre is the Court of Appeals’ ruling that
since Excal and James Ursal did not renew their
dealership contract in “writing,” Excal should be
regarded as the direct operator of the gas station, with
James Ursal acting merely as its agent. Again, no law or
jurisprudence supports this ruling. There is nothing in
the law on ownership of property or business that says
that a supplier automatically becomes the owner and
operator of his dealer’s business once they fail to renew
their dealership agreement in writing.
The Court of Appeals’ ruling would give rise to many
absurd and ridiculous situations. For instance, in
contracts of lease of apartments, the failure of the
apartment owner and his tenant to renew their expired
lease contract would, following the Court of Appeals’
ruling, make the apartment owner liable if his tenant
brings in obnoxious materials into that apartment to the
prejudice of the neighbors. Because of the non-renewal
of the lease contract the tenant becomes the owner’s
agent, making the owner of the apartment liable for his
tenant’s acts. No law supports this proposition.
II.
THE ALLEGED NEGLECT OF EXCAL TO
RENEW ITS DEALERSHIP CONTRACT WITH
URSAL DID NOT CAUSE THE GAS STATION FIRE
AND SO IT CANNOT BE THE SOURCE OF EXCAL’S
LIABILITY
But, assuming that Excal was negligent in failing to
renew its dealership contract with James Ursal, still it
cannot be held liable for the damages brought about by
the fire.
Basic is the rule in quasi-delicts that, in order to
recover damages, a causal connection between the fault
or negligence and the damage must exist. Negligence as
giving rise to a cause of action for damages for personal
injuries requires not only proof of damage to the
plaintiff and negligence on the part of the defendant but
also the connection of cause and effect between such
negligence and the damage.8
This Court has consistently ruled that, for liability to
attach, it must be shown that the damage to the plaintiff
was the natural and probable, or direct and immediate,
consequences of the defendant’s culpable act or
omission.9 In other words, the fault or negligence must
be the proximate cause of the damage. Proximate cause
has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.10
Here, however, no rational link exists between Excal’s
alleged neglect in failing to renew its supply agreement
with James Ursal and the act that set the buildings
around the gas station on fire. Consequently, the non-
renewal of the agreement creates no liability on Excal’s
part.
III.
THE SUPPLIER OF FUEL TO AN INDEPENDENT
DEALER CAN BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE FIRE
THAT OCCURRED DURING THE UNLOADING OF
THAT FUEL BY AN EQUALLY INDEPENDENT
HAULER
The Court of Appeals held that Excal should
nonetheless be held responsible for the damages caused
by the fire since it had not yet completed delivering the
gasoline to James Ursal when the fire broke out. It said:
Assuming further, that there was an existing
dealership contract between Excal and James
Ursal at the time of the fire incident, still Excal
cannot avoid liability by contending that the
ownership of the petroleum products had
already been transferred to James Ursal upon
payment of the price and delivery of the
products. It bears to stress that at the time the
fire broke out, there was as yet no complete
delivery of the petroleum products since the tank
truck was still in the process of discharging
gasoline.
But the unrefuted evidence on record shows that Excal
sold and transferred possession and control of the
gasoline involved in this case to its dealer, James Ursal,
when the latter’s representative Rolando Arnaiz went to
the oil depot, bought the gasoline, paid for them, and
had Rama’s tank truck receive them for delivery to
Ursal’s gas station.11
Under a contract of sale, Excal ceased to be the owner
of the petroleum products from its receipt and turnover
at Excal’s depot. James Ursal acquired ownership of
them while they were on transit and while being
unloaded at his gasoline station. The New Civil Code
provides:
Art. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold
shall be transferred to the vendee upon the
actual or constructive delivery thereof.
What is more, the tank truck and its supply of
gasoline safely arrived at James Ursal’s gas station. As
an independent hauler of petroleum products, Rama
assumed the responsibility for delivering them safely to
Ursal’s gas station. As an independent dealer, Ursal
assumed responsibility for receiving the products,
opening the right fill pipe, allowing gasoline to be
discharged into it, and supervising the proper use of its
facilities. Surely, it would be unreasonable to suggest
that Excal, the company from which depot the fuel came,
should monitor and supervise the use of its products
wherever they may be found.
Although petroleum products, like gasoline and
liquefied petroleum gas or LPG, are flammable
materials, they are widely and commonly used even in
households. Those who buy these materials may be
assumed to know how to use them safely. Still accidents
do happen. But must the supplier of these products be
liable for all such accidents?
In this case, as the trial court and the Court of
Appeals found, while gasoline from the tank truck was
being discharged into the gas station’s underground
tank, the truck driver left it unattended to buy
something from the nearby market. For an unknown
cause, the underground tank caught fire. On his return,
the truck driver maneuvered the truck in reverse
without detaching the rubber hose from the flaming fill
pipe of the underground tank. Consequently, he dragged
along the flaming fuel hose that set the surrounding
buildings of the Jimenezes, the Gozons, and the Lims on
fire.
The Court of Appeals has no valid reason for holding
Excal solidarily liable with Rama. Neither Noble (the
truck driver who worked for Rama) nor Rama himself
worked for Excal. Excal contracted with Rama, an
independent hauler, to haul and deliver petroleum
products from its oil depot to its customers. And under
the Hauling Contract that governed their relation, Rama
took it upon himself to assume exclusive liability for any
damage that his employees may cause. Its Section 3.2
provides:
3.2 “Any and all drivers, mechanics and other
personnel, of the CONTRACTOR (Jose
Villaruz) are not, and under no circumstances
shall be deemed, personnel and employees of
EXCAL, and for this reason the
CONTRACTOR alone shall be answerable for
the payment of their wages and salaries and the
safeguarding of their health and safety and the
performance of the other obligations in
accordance with existing laws and regulations, it
being further understood as a consequence that
the CONTRACTOR alone shall be responsible
for any and all accidents, injuries and death
involving said personnel, agents, and/or
employees.” (underscoring supplied.)
Of course, the Court of Appeals held that Excal was
negligent in allowing the particular tank truck enter its
depot and load the gasoline intended for James Ursal’s
gas station although it was not among the several tank
trucks listed in the Hauling Contract. Said the Court of
Appeals:
Likewise, Excal was negligent in allowing through its
employee, Cesar Ruiz, appellant-hauler’s truck with
plate No. NVC-245 to enter its depot and load Excal’s
products despite the fact that same was not among those
listed in the hauler’s contract. In this regard, Section 4.2
of the hauler’s contract provides:
“4.2 In order to faithfully comply with its
commitments to EXCAL as herein stipulated, the
CONTRACTOR binds and obligates himself to assign
three units tank trucks for the exclusive use of hauling
requirement of EXCAL and such units herein and
hereby assigned are particularly identified and described
as follows:
Plate No. Capacity

NVC 248 10
NVC 482 10
TH-FVG 484 10
But the undisputed evidence on record shows that

Excal took the extra precaution of ensuring that the
particular tank truck of Rama had all the requirements
needed to make a safe delivery of its petroleum
products.12
Besides, although the truck involved was not in the list
mentioned, the contract did not prohibit Rama from
using other trucks that also met what it required. What
was controlling in the agreement was Rama’s obligation
to provide tank trucks that are properly equipped to
carry Excal’s products to its customers. And Rama
complied with it.
More importantly, the fire in this case did not
originate from the tank truck nor did it occur as a result
of any defect in that truck.13 Consequently, the Court of
Appeals had no basis for exploiting the use of the
unlisted truck in the delivery of the gasoline to James
Ursal’s gas station.
Nor did an employer-employee relationship exist
between Excal and James Ursal or Rico Ursal, the
independent dealer and his manager. They did not work
for Excal. The Retail Dealer Contract between Excal and
James Ursal specifically relieved Excal of any liability
for damages arising from fault in the storage and
handling of its petroleum products at the gas station.
Paragraph 14 of their contract provides:
“INDEPENDENT BUSINESSMAN. BUYER
(James Ursal) discloses that he is an independent
businessman/business and as such it guarantees
that SELLER (Excal) will be free and harmless
from any claims or suits of whatsoever nature
arising from BUYER’s operation of the business.
Excal did not at all exercise control over the operation
of the gutted gasoline station.
IV.
A RULING THAT SUPPLIERS OF FUEL ARE

LIABLE FOR THE NEGLECT OF OTHERS IN
DISTRIBUTING AND STORING SUCH FUEL
CONTRAVENES THE LAW
The Court of Appeals ruled that Excal was
accountable for the fire that occurred at James Ursal’s
gas station because it was remiss in providing adequate
measures for the safe distribution and storage of the fuel
that Ursal bought from it. It held that:
Moreover, Excal was remiss in its obligation of
providing adequate measures for the safe
distribution of its petroleum products. One who
has in its possession or its control articles or
products which are highly inflammable, like
gasoline, is duty-bound to take exceptional
vigilance, care and precaution in the handling
thereof to prevent any injury or damage to
others. Such degree of care and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand to prevent and
undue risk of harm to others, appellant Excal
failed to exercise. Consequently, its contention
that it is no longer responsible once the prepaid
product left its depot is erroneous since it is
obliged to ensure not only the safe delivery but
the safe storage as well of its products.
But, in the first place, there is no evidence that the fire
at James Ursal’s gas station could be traced to an
inadequate distribution or storage safety measure that
was the responsibility of Excal. The immediate cause of
the conflagration in the neighborhood of the gas station
was the truck driver’s neglect in leaving his truck
unattended while discharging gasoline and in backing it
out of the gas station with its hose spewing out fire.
Surely, there was nothing that Excal could reasonably do
to prevent what happened since it did not supervise or
control the work of Rama’s driver.
As independent businesses, both the hauler of fuel
products and the operator of the gas station have to
answer for their own actions and the doings of their
employees. These haulers and gas station operators do
apply, like any other business, for government permits
and licenses appropriate to the nature of their activities
and requiring compliance with the standards of safety
prescribed for their particular businesses. It would be
unreasonable and unjust to impose on manufacturers
and suppliers an unending liability for the mishandling
and misuse of their products by any person wherever
these may be found.
Prayer
WHEREFORE, petitioner Excal Corporation
respectfully prays the Court to render judgment
modifying the decision of the Court of Appeals by
absolving Excal from any liability in the case.
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs as are just and
equitable under the circumstances.
[Explanation: Copies of this petition have been served
on the adverse parties by registered mail in view of the
distance involved and lack of messenger who could
undertake personal service.]
Makati City for Manila, January 31, 2013.
SHAIRA A. CRUZ
Counsel for Petitioner Excal Corp.
5th Floor, Homer Building
245 Bataan Street, Palanan, Makati
City
Atty. Roll 22345
IBP No. 545698 12-21-12
PTR No. 6453254 01-02-2013
Email: sacruz@yihee.com
Tel. and Fax 8765432
Verification and Certification

I, Atty. Amy V. Villalon, of legal age and with office
address at the Excal Building, Makati Avenue, Makati
City, after having sworn in accordance with law, depose
and state that:
1. I am the General Counsel and Corporate Secretary
of Excal Corporation, duly empowered to cause the filing
of this petition on its behalf under a board resolution,
copy here attached;
2. I have read the foregoing petition and the facts
stated in it are true based on the authentic record of the
case;
3. I have not theretofore commenced any action or
filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency;
4. To the best of my knowledge, no such action or
claim is pending therein; and
5. If I should thereafter learn that the same or a
similar action or claim has been filed or pending, I shall
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to this
Court.
AMY V. VILLALON
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 31st

day of January 2009 in Makati City. Affiant exhibited to
me his LTO Driver’s License No. N10-68262687, expiring
on May 24, 2012.
BEN I. MADRID
Notary Public
Attorney’s Roll 45678
Appointment No. 678
Until December 31, 2013
PTR # 56789 1-12-13 Manila
IBP # 24680 1-12-13
1234 Quezon Avenue, Q.C.
bim@madridlaw.com
Doc. No. 218;
Page No. 27;
Book No. I;
Series of 2013.
Copy furnished:
The Court of Appeals

Ma. Orosa St., Ermita, Manila
Atty. Noel C. Javier

Javier Santos Reyes & Garcia
2nd Floor, Standard Bldg.
Magsaysay Drive, Bacolod City
Atty. Roy B. Cancio

Empress Bldg.
Damaso St., Bacolod City
Atty. Liberador Guadiz

Hanson Bldg., Iresare St.
Bacolod City
Writing Exercises
An actor and his talent manager sued a film producer for rescission
of the actor’s movie contract and damages. Before filing an answer, the
producer entered into a compromise agreement with the talent manager
maintaining the contract but providing for payment of a substantial
sum to the actor. The latter told the court, however, that he did not
authorize the agreement for what he wanted was for the producer to
release him from the contract. Meantime, as the case dragged on, the
actor got involved in a film festival scandal that diminished his image.
When the producer offered to release him from his contract, he
suddenly had a change of heart. He told the court that he would now
accept the compromise agreement signed by his talent manager and
sought a judgment based on that agreement. Over the producer’s
objections, the trial court rendered judgment approving the
compromise agreement and directing the producer to pay the amount
mentioned in it. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed that
judgment.
For exercise, write a petition for review on behalf of the film
producer, appealing the decision of the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court. The materials you need consist in the copies of the
Court of Appeals’ decision, the film producer’s appellant’s brief, and
the actor’s appellee’s brief. These are found in Appendix B of this
book. Certain details about the parties and the events have been
changed to protect the privacy of those involved. The challenge is for
you to seek a reversal of the Court of Appeals’ decision.
1TSN, July 28, 2010, pp. 29-34.

2Exhibit 5 for Petron.
3TSN, February 7, 2010, pp. 4-7.
4Exhibit 1 for Petron.
5TSN, December 5, 2006, pp. 3-15; TSN, July 28, 2006, pp. 22-35.
6TSN, June 29, 2010, pp. 6-13.
7TSN, December 5, 2010, pp. 4-7; TSN, December 15, 2010, pp.
27-31; TSN, December 16, 2010, pp. 14-15.
8De Gregorio v. Go Chong Bing, L-7663, December 2, 1957.
9Algarra v. Sandejas, 22 Phil. 293; Taylor v. Meralco, 16 Phil. 8; De
Gregorio v. Go Chong Bing, 102 Phil. 556.
10Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186.
11TSN, June 29, 2010, pp. 6-13.
12TSN, July 28, 2010, pp. 27-29.
13TSN, December 16, 2010, p. 15.
16.
Writing a Decision
In a decision, the judge makes a choice of which opposing claims he

accepts as true or correct. But, since due process entitles every litigant
to know the reason or reasons for the decision in his case, it is
incumbent for the judge to make a clear, logical, and convincing
presentation of that decision. As a rule this requires that he lays down:
(a) the conflicting claims of the parties, (b) the issues that separate
them, (c) the resolution of those issues, and (d) an adjudication of the
respective rights and liabilities of the parties.
Some judges tend to write excessively lengthy decisions, believing
that they are expected to summarize the pleadings of the parties and the
testimonies of all the witnesses in the case before addressing the issues
that the case presents. But, this is unnecessary. As already stated in
Chapter 7, what is required is only such amount of background facts as
would be sufficient to enable the reader to understand the issues that
the parties raise.
A few judges believe that making findings of fact means that they
can simply make a summary of the facts as they found these to be
without need of resolving the conflicting factual versions of the parties.
At times, they precede this summary with the court introduction: “The
facts of this case as found by the Court are as follows.” This is wrong
because a party is entitled to know the reason why the judge rejects his
version in favor of that of his opponent.
The best and simplest approach in dealing with conflicting factual
versions is to briefly summarize both versions, identify the relevant
issues of fact and resolve such issues, stating the reason for accepting
one version and not the other. In a maritime case, a commercial vessel,
temporarily under the command of a government-license harbor pilot,
bumped into a power barge that had been lashed to the wharf and
supplied electricity to the city. The power barge owner filed a lawsuit
against the vessel for the damage suffered by its barge. For its defense,
the vessel placed the blame on the harbor pilot and insisted that the
barge did not suffer any compensable damage.
Illustrative Case: Hudson Power Corp. v. Nemo

Shipping
The sample decision below sets a correct pattern for adjudicating the
issues raised in the case.

Branch 115, Manila
HUDSON POWER CORP.,

Plaintiff,
- versus - Civil Case No. 16295
NEMO SHIPPING CORP.,
Defendant.
x----------------------------------x
DECISION
Plaintiff Hudson Power Corporation (HPC) filed this
action against Nemo Shipping Corporation for the
alleged fault of its vessel’s captain that resulted in
damage to its power barge at the Layag Wharf in
Cagayan de Oro City. Nemo Shipping resisted the action,
claiming that the fault lay, not with its vessel, but with
either the harbor pilot who commanded her during
docking or with HPC itself.
Stipulated Facts
At the pre-trial hearing, the parties stipulated on the

following facts:
1. Nemo Shipping’s vessel, the MV Iligan, and HPC’s
power barge 102 were at the Layag wharf, Cagayan de
Oro City on March 20, 2005;
2. Power barge 102 was a non-propelled vessel;
3. Capt. Henry Suntay was the master or captain of
MV Iligan;
4. While maneuvering at the Layag wharf, MV Iligan
hit HPC’s power barge 102;
5. Nestor J. Canto, the manager of power barge 102,
filed a marine protest; and
6. The Board of Marine Inquiry (BMI) acquired
jurisdiction over the separate marine protests filed by
Mr. Canto and Capt. Suntay.
The Evidence of the Parties

At the trial, HPC presented Atty. Renato Collar, the
BMI presiding officer who testified that the BMI heard
the marine protests of Mr. Canto1 and Capt. Suntay.2
After the Board submitted its findings
and
3
recommendations to the Philippine Coast Guard. The
latter rendered a decision on November 23, 2011, finding
Nemo Shipping liable for ramming HPC’s power barge
102.4 Ms. Elena Lazaro, a BMI stenographer, identified
the transcript of stenographic notes5 taken during the
hearing.
HSC’s only other witness was Mr. Nestor Canto, the
plant manager of power barge 102 that supplied
electricity to the Mindanao power grid. Based on his
testimony, he immediately went to the wharf soon after
learning of the ramming incident. He noted sludge oil
leaking from a crack on the power barge’s hull. To stop
the oil leak, he applied water epoxy on the barge’s
clutch. In his report, a certain Mr. Neri estimated the
damage to the barge at P1 million. Mr. Canto used this
report as basis for his marine protest.
Despite the ramming, the power barge soon resumed
generating power. Months later, HPC dry-docked it with
the National Shipyard Corporation or Nasco for repair.6
HPC paid Nasco P6,775,000.007 for the works. Further,
HPC suffered P500,000.00 in moral damages and spent
P18,000.00 for its marine protest and the case.
Nemo Shipping, on the other hand, presented as
witness the Chief Mate of MV Iligan, Senen Torres.
Based on Torres’ testimony, at the time of the incident,
Capt. James Yabut, a harbor pilot, commanded MV
Iligan. The Philippine Ports Authority or PPA assigned
harbor pilots to assume mandatory control of vessels
docking at the Layag Wharf. Capt. Yabut did not work
for Nemo Shipping of MV Iligan at the time of the
docking, Chief Mate Torres stood beside Capt. Yabut
and relayed his commands to the crew.
Capt. Yabut gave his first command, “Slow ahead
engine.” This meant that those in control of the engine
room below were to move the vessel slowly forward. The
command came when the vessel was about 200 meters
from the wharf and was traveling at a speed of 15
kilometers per hour. Responding, the vessel slowed
down. When she came to about 100 meters from the
wharf, Capt. Yabut gave his next command, “Dead slow
ahead.” The vessel moved even slower. When she came
to some 25 meters from the wharf or 50 meters from the
power barge, Capt. Yabut gave the command, “Engine
stop.” The vessel was then moving westward parallel to
the wharf and towards the barge. He gave his next
command, “drop anchor,” just when MV Iligan was just
15 to 20 meters from the power barge. The vessel slowed
down but her bow managed to bump the hull of HPC’s
power barge berthed at the wharf.
The impact of the bump on the power barge was slight
and did not cut her ropes. Although it tripped off the
power lines, it caused no hull damage either to MV
Ilagan or to HPC’s power barge 102. The barge had two
rubber tires serving as fenders to protect its steel hull
from vessels maneuvering around the wharf.
Unfortunately, MV Ilagan hit the part of the hull that
had no rubber tire protection.
Chief Mate Torres, himself an expert mariner, found
fault in the way the harbor pilot maneuvered MV Iligan.
Diligence required Capt. Yabut to first test the capability
of the vessel’s twin engines before maneuvering her. He
did not. What is more, he failed to order the dropping of
the anchor before giving the command, “engine stop,” to
halt the vessel’s momentum. He miscalculated her
distance and speed.
Mr. Jerry Roces, legal assistant of Nemo Shipping,
testified that as a consequence of the filing of the
complaint, his company suffered moral damages and
incurred expenses for attorney’s fees.
The Issues
The case presents the following issues:

First, whether or not Nemo Shipping is liable to HPC
for what damages its power barge 102 may have suffered
on the occasion of its ramming by MV Iligan; and
Second, whether or not the parties are entitled to
damages and attorney’s fees.
Discussion
1. No one disputes the fact that, at the time of the

ramming of power barge 104, Capt. Yabut, a harbor
pilot commanded MV Iligan as it maneuvered to berth
alongside the Layag wharf in Cagayan de Oro City as
required by maritime rules. Sections 8, Article III of PPA
Administrative Order 03-85 provides:
SEC. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service. –– For
entering a harbor and anchoring thereat, or
passing through rivers or straits within a
pilotage district, as well as docking and
undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting from
one berth or another, every vessel engaged in
coastwise and foreign trade shall be under
compulsory pilotage.
x x x
Since Nemo Shipping had no choice but to yield the
navigational control of its vessel to compulsory pilotage
by Capt. Yabut, the latter and the Harbor Pilot’s
Association with their bondsmen should be the ones to
assume liability for any accident that resulted from the
docking procedure. This is but fair especially since HPC
did not care to present any witness to show that Nemo
Shipping, through its captain and crew, was at fault in
responding to Capt. Yabut’s command.
The fact is that Nemo Shipping’s chief mate, a licensed
mariner, testified without contradiction that Capt. Yabut
was at fault in calculating the vessel’s speed and distance
and in giving improper commands during the maneuver.
Consequently, he alone or the Harbor Pilot’s Association
should answer for the consequences of such fault.
2. HPC of course puts the blame on Nemo Shipping,
alleging that the latter’s vessel failed to respond
adequately to the astern maneuvers directed by the
harbor pilot. To support this claim, HPC relied heavily
on the findings of the BMI8 and the decision of the
Philippine Coast Guard9 in BMI Case 567-01 as well as
in the transcript of stenographic notes10 of the
testimonies of Capt. Suntay and Capt. Yabut before the
Board.
But the record will show that when HPC filed its
complaint, it based its cause of action solely on the fact of
the collision. Thus:
“3. On 20 March 2010 at around 0019 Hrs.
while the aforesaid Power Barge 102 is docked
and stationed at Layag Wharf, Cagayan de Oro
City, defendant’s vessel –– MV Iligan, piloted by
a certain Captain Henry Suntay and assisted by
port pilot Captain James Yabut, hit and rammed
Power Barge 104”;
HPC did not allege as cause of action the result of the
administrative investigation conducted by the BMI.
Indeed, HPC admittedly filed the present court action
without awaiting the findings and decision of the BMI
and the Philippine Coast Guard concerning the docking
incident. In fact, HPC admits so much in its complaint:
“10. During the hearing of the twin Marine
Protests before the Board of Marine Inquiry
(BMI), both parties failed to settle amicably and
decided to proceed with the presentation of their
respective evidences and witnesses. The
proceedings before the BMI are administrative
in nature and this quasi-judicial body has no
jurisdiction to award damages. To date, said
Marine Protest remains unresolved despite
plaintiff’s motion for its early resolution”;
Clearly, therefore, HPC chose to have the trial court
directly hear and resolve the issue of negligence tendered
by Nemo Shipping’s denial of the allegation in its answer.
HPC assumed, therefore, the burden of proving in court
that the captain and crew of MV Iligan acted negligently
during the docking maneuvers. HPC cannot discharge
that burden by simply presenting a copy of the
subsequent findings and decision of the BMI and the
Philippine Coast Guard.
Nor could HPC comfort itself that it may be deemed to
have amended its complaint and modified its cause of
action when it presented in evidence copies of those
administrative findings and decision.11 The rule on
implied amendment cannot apply because Nemo
Shipping in fact formally objected to HPC’s introduction
of the findings and decision of the BMI and Philippine
Coast Guard.12
Parenthetically, it could very well have happened that
Nemo Shipping did not appeal the decision of the BMI
and the Philippine Coast Guard to the Department of
Transportation and Communication thinking that it
would have the opportunity to absolve itself of the
charge of negligence during the hearing before this
court. And the events proved it correct.
The HPC cannot also make use of the transcripts of
stenographic notes of the testimonies that Capt. Suntay
and Capt. Yabut gave before the BMI. Nemo Shipping
objected to the admission of those transcripts for being
hearsay. HPC did not establish during the trial that
Capt. Suntay and Capt. Yabut were deceased or unable
to testify, warranting the presentation in evidence of
their testimonies before the BMI.13
3. Besides, the testimony of Mr. Torres, the chief mate
of MV Iligan who transmitted Capt. Yabut’s commands
to the engine room, is undisputed. These commands were
inadequate to reverse the vessel’s speed and momentum
as it moved towards the wharf. Thus:
Q: And do you remember the commands that
Harbor Pilot Yabut issued as you neared the
Layag Wharf?
A: Yes. After he boarded the vessel, he issued
the command “slow ahead engine.”
Q: What was the speed of the vessel when he
gave that command?
A: About one knot.
Q: What is the equivalent of that in terms of
kilometers?
A: 15 to 29 kilometers per hour.
Q: And at the time Mr. Yabut gave that
command, how far was the vessel from Layag
Wharf?
A: She was about 200 meters from the wharf.
Q: And when the command “slow ahead
engine” was given, how did the vessel respond?
A: The vessel slowed down.
Q: What command did Capt. Yabut give after
the first?
A: He said, “dead slow ahead.”
Q: What did that mean?
A: The vessel was to go even slower.
Q: How far was the vessel from the Layag
Wharf when that command “dead slow ahead”
was given?
A: She was approximately 100 meters from
the wharf.
Q: And how did the vessel respond to the
command “dead slow ahead”?
A: It slowed down some more.
Q: After the “dead slow ahead” command,
what command did Capt. Yabut next give, if
any?
A: He commanded, “engine stop.”
Q: What did that mean?
A: It meant stopping the power that moved
the vessel.
Q: Did that mean engine shut down?
A: No. It meant stopping the vessel’s
propellers.
Q: After he gave that command “engine stop,”
did the propellers continue to move?
A: No, sir. They stopped.
Q: How far was the vessel from the power
barge when Capt. Yabut gave the command
“engine stop”?
A: About fifty meters.
Q: What was the rate of travel of the vessel
when Capt. Yabut gave the command “engine
stop”?
A: Less than one knot.
Q: You said that the vessel was moving
parallel to the wharf when Capt. Yabut gave the
command “stop engine.” Did he give any other
command?
A: He ordered, “drop anchor.”
Q: How soon did he give that command after
the “stop engine” command?
A: About three to four seconds later.
Q: When he gave the command “drop
anchor,” how far was the MV Iligan from the
HPC power barge?
A: Approximately 15 meters to 20 meters. The
vessel still had momentum.
Q: What response did the vessel make after
the command “drop anchor”?
A: The vessel further slowed down.14

(underscoring supplied)
Evidently, Capt. Yabut’s delayed commands caused
MV Iligan to ram the power barge. He miscalculated
during the maneuvers of the vessel its speed and distance
from the Layag wharf. As Mr. Torres testified:
Q: As an experienced mariner, would you
have given the same orders that Harbor Pilot
Yabut gave during the docking of MV Iligan on
March 20, 2005?
A: No, sir.
Q: What would you have done under those
same circumstances?
A: I would have first put to test the capacity of
the vessel’s twin engine before approaching the
pier of Layag Wharf.
Q: After testing the engine, what would you
have done?
A: I would have given the standard
commands. First, “slow ahead,” followed by
“drop anchor,” then “engine stop.”
Q: Why drop the anchor before stopping the
engine?
A: The vessel had a momentum; dropping the
anchor would have stopped it.
Q: To what do you account the accident?
A: Harbor Pilot’s error.
Q: Why do you blame the harbor pilot?
A: He approached the wharf with too much
speed. He should have reduced the vessel’s speed
before approaching the dock. I think he
miscalculated the distance and speed of the
vessel.15 (underscoring supplied)
HPC did not present evidence to controvert the chief
mate’s testimony. Based on it, the harbor pilot clearly
did not observe that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance that the circumstances demanded. Capt. Yabut
should, therefore, be held personally liable for the
damages caused to the power barge. Section 11(1),
Article III of PPA Administrative Order 03-85 supports
this conclusion, thus:
SEC. 11. Control of vessels and liability for
damage. ––
On compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor
Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be
responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or
to life and property at ports due to his negligence
or fault. He can only be absolved from liability if
the accident is caused by force majeure or
natural calamities provided he has exercised
prudence and extra diligence to prevent or
minimize damage.
Section 31, Article V of the same
administrative order provides:
SEC. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot
or Pilot’s Association. –– The duties and
responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as
follows:
x x x x x x x x x
f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the

direction of a vessel from the time he assumes his
work as a pilot thereof until he leaves it
anchored or berthed safely; Provided, however,
that his responsibility shall cease at the moment
the Master neglects or refuses to carry out his
order. (underscoring supplied)
In Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of
Appeals,16 the Supreme Court ruled that a harbor pilot
is personally liable for damages arising from his neglect
in maneuvering a vessel under his command. Thus:
In general, a pilot is personally liable for
damages caused by his own negligence or default
to the owners of the vessel, and to third parties
for damages sustained in a collision. Such
negligence of the pilot in the performance of a
duty constitutes a maritime tort. In common law,
a shipowner is not liable for injuries inflicted
exclusively by the negligence of the pilot
accepted by a vessel compulsorily. The
exemption from liability for such negligence
shall apply if the pilot is actually in charge and
solely in fault. (underscoring supplied)
4. HPC of course argues that, even with the harbor
pilot’s presence, Capt. Suntay remained in full control
and command of MV Iligan, citing Section 11(2), Article
III of PPA Administrative Order 03-85. Thus:
The master shall retain overall command of
the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he
can countermand or overrule the order or
command of the harbor Pilot on board. In such
event, any damage caused to a vessel or to life
and property at ports by reason of the fault or
negligence of the Master shall be the
responsibility and liability of the registered
owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice
to recourse against the Master. Such liability of
the owner or master of the vessel or its pilots
shall be determined by competent authority in
appropriate proceedings in the light of the facts
and circumstances of each particular case.
(underscoring supplied)
But the overall responsibility of the master of the
vessel should be reconciled with the specific
responsibility of the harbor pilot for assuming control of
the command of the ship for the purpose of maneuvering
the vessel and berthing it at the wharf. The rules provide
that the harbor pilot is liable for any damage “due to his
negligence or fault”17 and “his responsibility shall cease
at the moment the master neglects or refuses to carry out
his order.”18
Evidently, since HPC bears the affirmative of its
action, it had the burden of proving that Capt. Yabut
gave the correct commands but MV Iligan’s crew failed
to obey them, resulting in the accident. HPC could have
also proved that, although Capt. Yabut gave patently
wrong commands, the master of the vessel had the
opportunity to countermand them. Here, however, HPC
failed to present evidence establishing either of these
propositions. All that HPC has proved in this case is that
the proximate cause of the ramming of the power barge
was Capt. Yabut’s negligence, he having been in
command and control of the vessel, when she negotiated
the waters approaching the wharf.
HPC of course claims that the proximate cause of the
accident was MV Iligan’s engine failure during the
docking maneuver. But, again, HPC did not present
evidence to establish this claim. Actually, Philippine
Coast Guards’ records show that the vessel had been
seaworthy before, during, and after the incident. MV
Iligan, said the certificate of inspection, “has been duly
inspected in accordance with existing regulations and
found to have complied with the requirements regarding
the condition of the hull, machinery, navigational, fire-
fighting equipment, manning and life-saving
appliances.”19
5. Besides the Layag Wharf is a public berthing place,
built for use by self-propelled vessels like MV Iligan.
Indeed, the wharf supported substantial traffic of cargo
and passengers for Cagayan de Oro City. Consequently,
non-propelled vessels had no business berthing
permanently at the wharf to perform some other service.
Yet HPC permanently lashed its power barge 102, a non-
propelled vessel, to such busy wharf to supply electricity
to the Mindanao power grid. Mr. Canto of HPC
confirmed this during his testimony:
Q: So this power barge was non-propelled, is
that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: It was non-propelled because it was not
equipped to navigate the water on its own power,
right?
A: Yes.
Q: You had to tow that barge, using another
boat, in order to move it, is that right?
A: Yes.
Q: Yet, knowing that your power barge was
non-propelled, you moored it to the Layag
Wharf, is that right?
A: Yes.
Q: You are familiar with Layag Wharf?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You know for a fact that Layag Wharf was
being used for loading and unloading passengers
and cargoes, is that right?
A: That’s what I observed.20
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Since when had your power barge been

moored at Layag Wharf?
A: From way back in 2003.
Q: Your purpose in berthing the power barge
alongside that wharf was to supply electricity to
the Mindanao Grid in the long term, is that
right?
A: Yes.
Q: So in other words, you berthed your barge
on that wharf not for the purpose of loading or
unloading cargoes but to supply electricity to the
area on a long-term basis, is that correct?
A: Yes.21
Clearly, when HPC placed its power barge alongside
the wharf, it voluntarily assumed the risk of being hit or
rammed by vessels that frequently maneuvered around
the wharf to get a berth. Under the doctrine of
assumption of risk, HPC is barred from recovering
damages. Thus:
A plaintiff who voluntarily assumes a risk of
harm from the negligent or reckless conduct of
the defendant cannot recover for such harm. The
defense may arise where a plaintiff, by contract
or otherwise, expressly agrees to accept a risk of
harm arising from the defendant’s conduct, or
where a plaintiff who fully understands a risk of
harm caused by the defendant’s conduct, or by a
condition created by the defendant, voluntarily
chooses to enter or remain, or to permit his
property to enter or remain, within the area of
such risk, under circumstances manifesting his
willingness to accept the risk.22 (underscoring
supplied)
What is more, although HPC lashed its power barge
permanently to that busy commercial wharf, it took no
steps to protect the barge from the constant
maneuvering of vessels that docked in and out of the
wharf. It did not secure insulating posts or adequate
rubber bumpers on its vulnerable sides. Mr. Canto of
HPC admitted this.
Q: It was common for ordinary boats to load
and unload cargoes and passengers at that wharf
and then leave as soon as their businesses were
done?
A: Yes.
Q: So when you planted your power barge
alongside that wharf, with intent to stay long and
practically become a part of the wharf itself, did
you take the precaution of guarding your hull
against those maneuvering boats?
A: Actually, we planned to move the barge
inward near HPC’s land-based plant in Cagayan
de Oro City but the mooring area had not yet
been completed.
Q: Meantime, did you take steps to protect
your barge at the wharf from being rammed by
incoming and outgoing boats with wooden posts
lashed together to served as its fenders?
A: No, sir, because the PPA did not allow us to
build structures or posts to protect our power
barge.
Q: Yet, you maintained yourself there? A: Yes.
The record shows that HPC placed only two rubber
tires along the length of the vulnerable side of its power
barge.23 These were clearly insufficient and were unable
to fully absorb the bump caused by Capt. Yabut’s faulty
maneuvers.
6. In its complaint, HPC claims more or less P1 million
as actual damages. In the list of damages and incidental
loss,24 NPC estimated a total of P1 million as damages,
broken down as follows:
MATERIAL
1. 3-INCHES ROPE 3 ROLL 135,000.00
2. SLUDGE OIL IN THE
630 LTRB 1,575.00
TANK
3. STEEL PLATE
5 SHT 50,000.00
1”X4’X8’
4. INNER BEAM
2 LGNT 25,000.00
SUPPORT
5. UNDERWATER
EPOXY 3 KIT 54,000.00
P265,575.00
GENERATION LOST
112,000
1. POWER BARGE 104 240,000.00
KWH
6,480
2. POWER BARGE 102 12,960.00
KWH
3. GEN. SANTOS
DIESEL
1,963
4. POWER PLANT 3,926.00
KWH
P256,886.00
ESTIMATED COST
FOR THE REPAIR
P
OF DAMAGE PORTION
477,539.00
SAY P 1,000,000.00
But as HPC’s complaint admits, the above consists of

mere estimates of the damages and incidental losses that
it suffered. As it happened, it did not present proof of its
actual damages and losses. Admittedly, HPC did not
bother to have the alleged damage that its power barge
suffered immediately repaired. Such damage being
slight, HPC operated the power barge for months and
waited for the time when she was scheduled for dry-
docking and general repairs. Consequently, HPC never
established the specific injury that the bumping incident
supposedly inflicted on its barge.
The only evidence HPC presented was its contract of
general repair25 with Naseco and a voucher for
P6,775,000.00 showing that it partially paid
26
P6,775,000.00 to Naseco for the dry-docking and
repair of its barge. But, in the first place, HPC’s contract
of repair with Naseco shows on its face that the repair
had nothing to do with the supposed damage that the
barge suffered from the bumping by MV Iligan. The
contract shows that the damage to be repaired was
caused by typhoon “Ruping” that struck Naga, Cebu on
November 13, 2003. In fact, its first whereas clause
states:
WHEREAS, in view of the urgent need to
repair Power Barge No. 104 which was damaged
on November 13, 2003, when typhoon “Ruping”
struck Naga, Cebu; to put the same back into
commercial operation, HPC requested quotation
from CONTRACTOR (Naseco) who has the only
dry-docking facilities in the Philippines suited
for this type of Barge due to her size, aside from
the fact that it is also a government-owned and
controlled corporation. (underscoring supplied)
Basic is the rule that damages must not only be
capable of proof, it must be actually proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty.27 Damages cannot be
presumed or be based on flimsy and non-substantial
evidence, nor upon speculation, conjecture or
guesswork.28 Here, HPC failed to prove the damages
with reasonable certainty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the above, the Court
renders judgment, dismissing the complaint. It also
dismisses Nemo Shipping’s compulsory counterclaim for
insufficiency of evidence to prove it.
SO ORDERED.
It used to be that decisions did not employ headings. Today,
however, a number of justices and judges have begun using headings to
identify sections of their decisions. This is an important development
because headings serve as guideposts to readers especially in
ponderous decisions. Any device that improves the level of
communication from the writer to the reader is most welcome.
Writing Exercises
A government-owned forwarding company shipped a cargo of

powdered milk from Manila to Davao City on board the defendant
shipping line’s vessel. The goods did not reach their beneficiaries,
however, prompting the forwarding company to file an action for
damages against the shipping line.
The only issue presented in the case is whether or not defendant’s
vessel delivered the cargo of milk to plaintiff’s consignee in Davao
City. The trial judge wrote a decision in this maritime case, reproduced
at the end of this book in Appendix C. Probably, the trial judge thought
that he had to summarize in his decision all the evidentiary details that
the transcript of stenographic notes grinded out. This is quite
unnecessary.
Applying what you learn, see if you can make the decision leaner
without sacrificing the purpose of the statements of the case and the
facts. The decision has been edited to protect the privacies of the
persons involved and to make the material suitable for study.
1Exhibit D.
2Exhibit E.
3Exhibit H.
4Exhibit G.
5Exhibit I.
6Exhibit K.
7Exhibit L.
8Exhibit G.
9Exhibit H.
10Exhibits I and J.
11Section 5, Rule 10.
12See Defendant’s Comment on the Formal Offer of Evidence,
September 16, 2004.
13Section 47, Rule 130.
14TSN, November 25, 2004, pp. 10-18.
15TSN, November 25, 2008, pp. 25-26.
16297 SCRA 30.
17Section 11(1), Article III of PPA Administrative Order 03-85.
18Section 32(f), Article V of PPA Administrative Order 03-85.
19Exhibit 7-B.
20TSN, June 30, 2008, pp. 18-19.
21TSN, June 30, 2008, pp. 19-20.
2257 Am Jur 2d, p. 663.
23TSN, November 25, 2008, p. 21.
24Exhibit B.
25Exhibit K.
26Exhibit L.
27Choa Tek Hee v. Phil. Publishing Co., 34 Phil. 447; Sanz v. Lavin
Bros., 6 Phil. 299; Rubiso v. Rivera, 41 Phil. 39; Heredia v. Salinas, 10
Phil. 157; Song Fo & Co. v. Hawaiian-Philippine Co., 34 Phil. 447;
Siguenza v. CA, 137 SCRA 510; Refractories Corp. v. IAC, 176 SCRA
539.
28Hua Ling Electrical Equipment v. Reyes, 145 SCRA 713; Danao
v. CA, 154 SCRA 447; Perfecto v. Gonzales, 128 SCRA 635; Raagas v.
Troya, 22 SCRA 839.
APPENDIX A

Regional Trial Court
Pasig City
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,
– versus – Crim. Case No. 12345-H
Violation of R.A. 6539
ROMULO TAKAD,
(Anti-Carnapping Act)
Accused.
x----------------------------------------x
INFORMATION
The prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges
Romulo Takad with the crime of violation of R.A. 6539 (Anti-
Carnapping Act), committed as follows:
On or about November 21, 2007, in Pasig City and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, with
intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the
owner, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and drive away a Kawasaki
motorcycle with sidecar, colored black, bearing plate No.
TU-9952, with a value of P80,000.00, belonging to Bayan
Development Corporation, represented by Zenny G.
Aguirre, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
Contrary to law.
Pasig City, November 22, 2007.
Isidro T. De Leon
Prosecutor III
I certify that this information is filed pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112

of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, the accused having
opted not to avail of his right to a preliminary investigation and not
having executed a waiver of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ismael T. Duldulao
Prosecutor III
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 22nd day of November,

2007 in Pasig City.
David P. Collantes
Asst. City Prosecutor
By the authority of the City Prosecutor under Office Order No.

2001-021 dated June 21, 2006.
Andres C. Ranjo
Prosecutor III
Approving Prosecutor
Witnesses:
1. Zenny G. Aguirre, 54 Helena St., Teresita Vill., Marikina City
2. Carlos P. Parlade, 84 West Road, Maybunga, Pasig City
3. Mario S. Mankas, 94 West Road, Maybunga, Pasig City
Bail Recommended: One Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos
(P180,000.00)

Branch 123
Pasig City
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Plaintiff,
- versus - CRIM. CASE NO. 12345-

H
ROMULO C. TAKAD,
Accused.
x----------------------------------------
-x
TRANSCRIPT of stenographic notes taken at the hearing on January

7, 2004 before the HON. LORNA S. ACOSTA.
Appearances:
Prosec. ISIDRO T. DE LEON, Public Prosecutor.
Atty. PAULO A. CRUZ, Counsel for the Accused
ZENNY G. AGUIRRE – Prosecution witness
COURT: Call the witness.
INTERPRETER: Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you will
give in this trial shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God.
A. I do, ma’am.
INTERPRETER: State your name and personal circumstances.
A. ZENNY AGUIRRE, 33 years old, employee of Bayan
Development Corp., and residing at 54 Helena St., Tanza Village,
Marikina.
PROSEC. DE LEON: The witness is being presented to testify on
the loan obtained by Ma. Teresa Lacsamana, the live-in-partner of the
accused, respecting the tricycle subject of this case; also on the
whereabouts of the tricycle and how the accused took it while in
possession of a certain Carlos Parlade, the assignee of the tricycle. May
it please your honor?
COURT: Proceed.
PROSEC. DE LEON: (DIRECT EXAMINATION)
Q. Ms. Aguirre, what is your work?
A. I am an account officer of Bayan Development Corporation or
BDC.
Q. Since when have you been with the BDC?
A. Since 1995.
Q. What kind of business is BDC doing?
A. It extends loans to Sakbayan members and the members of
Tricycle Operators and Drivers Associations or TODA.
Q. Do you remember having extended a loan to Ma. Teresa
Lacsamana?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When was that?
A. Sometime in May 2003.
Q. How much loan did she get?
A. It was a group loan of P480,000.00 but her share in it was
P80,000.00.
Q. Do you have evidence of that loan?
A. We have the promissory note, the chattel mortgage, and the
Kasunduan.
Q. I am showing to you a copy of a Kasunduan, is this it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now on the third page or this Kasunduan, there are six
“borrowers,” will you kindly point to us the name of Ma. Teresa
Lacsamana?
A. This is her name.
PROSEC. DE LEON: (Witness pointing to the document.) We
request that the document be marked as Exhibit “A.”
COURT: Mark them.
PROSEC. DE LEON: Whose signature is this on top of the typed
name Ma. Teresa Lacsamana?
A. That is her signature.
Q. How did you know that it is her signature?
A. I was present when she signed that document.
Q. Are you authorized to represent BDC before this Court?
A. Yes, sir, I have a written authority.
Q. What happened after you granted that loan to Ms. Lacsamana?
A. We released the tricycle to her. That was the time I met the
accused Takad because he came with her to get the tricycle.
Q. What was the paying period of the loan?
A. Thirty months, sir.
Q. Did Ms. Lacsamana comply with the paying period?
A. No, sir, sometimes she failed to pay.
Q. When was her last payment?
A. If I am not mistaken her last payment was for the month of July
2007.
Q. What action did the BDC take when Ms. Lacsamana defaulted in
her loan after July 2007?
A. BDC pulled out the tricycle from her on October 2, 2007.
Q. What was its basis for pulling out the tricycle?
A. Under the Kasunduan, if the borrower was unable to pay, the
tricycle could be pulled out from him.
Q. What did you do with the tricycle?
A. We gave it to the treasurer of the group, Mr. Ricardo Marasigan,
for him to manage.
Q. By the way, Ms. Aguirre, in whose name was the Official Receipt
and the Car Registration of the tricycle registered?
A. In the name of Ma. Teresa Lacsamana.
Q. Are these the copies of the CR and OR, previously marked as
Exhibit “B” and “B-1”?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. For how long was the tricycle placed under the temporary
management of the treasurer of the group?
A. More or less 15 days.
Q. After 15 days, what happened?
A. I agreed with Ms. Lacsamana to give her until October 17 within
which to redeem the tricycle and, if not, we will permanently repossess
the tricycle.
Q. Did Ms. Lacsamana comply with her undertaking?
A. No, sir.
A. On October 18 we got the tricycle from the treasurer of their
group.
Q. What happened after that?
A. October 18 was a Friday. On October 22, Ms. Lacsamana and Mr.
Takad went to our office. They wanted to pay the outstanding balance
of her loan so we could release the tricycle.
Q. Did you allow them to pay her outstanding balance?
A. No, sir.
Q. What happened after you did not allow them to pay her
outstanding balance on the loan?
A. Takad said, “Huwag na huwag kong makikita ang tricycle sa
Pasig.”
A. We kept it for a while until November 20.
Q. And what did you do with it after November 20?
A. We gave the tricycle to Carlos Parlade, the new assignee.
Q. Did you have documents to show this assignment to Mr. Parlade?
A. None because, before we could draw up one, at 1:00 o’clock on
the early morning of November 21, Mr. Parlade told me that the
tricycle was missing. He called the office in the morning.
Q. What did you do about it?
A. I went to see Mr. Parlade and asked him for details regarding how
the tricycle was lost.
Q. What did he tell you?
ATTY. CRUZ: Asking for hearsay evidence, Your Honor.
PROSEC. DE LEON: He already testified that she went to Carlos
Parlade and asked him for details. My question is a follow up, Your
Honor.
COURT: Answer.
A. He told me that he saw the tricycle being driven away by
someone.
Q. Did Mr. Parlade tell you who stole the tricycle?
A. He described the man as small, with short hair, and with a face
towel on his shoulder.
Q. Do you remember having given a statement to the police?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Showing to you this statement dated November 21, 2007, is this
the statement that you mentioned?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. There is a signature on top of the word “nagsasalaysay,” do you
know whose signature it is?
A. My signature.
PROSEC. DE LEON: We request that her statement be marked as
Exhibits “C” for the prosecution.
COURT: Mark them as requested.
PROSEC. DE LEON:
Q. Apart from that statement, do you remember having given any
other with respect to this incident?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I’m showing to you this statement dated November 22,
previously marked as Exhibit “D,” is this the other statement you
referred to?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Whose signature is that over the name Zenny Aguirre?
A. My signature, sir.
Q. How much was the value of the vehicle?
A. P80,000.00.
Q. Where is it right now?
A. I do not know where the tricycle is right now.
PROSEC. DE LEON: That is all.
COURT: Cross.
ATTY. CRUZ: (CROSS EXAMINATION)
Q. The Certificate of Registration of the tricycle dated May 29, 2007
is in the name of Ma. Teresa Lacsamana and the LTO Official Receipt
of the same date is also in her name. Are these the evidence of her
ownership of the tricycle?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I understand that your company, BDC, loaned to Ms. Lacsamana
the money that she used to buy the tricycle, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. She was to pay BCD in daily installments according to the
Kasunduan, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did Ms. Lacsamana execute a chattel mortgage on the tricycle in
favor of BDC?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is the execution of the chattel mortgage part of the Kasunduan?
A. Yes, sir, that is one of the documents.
Q. When she was not able to pay the installments, it was BDC that
took the tricycle from Ms. Lacsamana?
A. Yes, sir, with the group.
Q. I understand that at the time you took the tricycle from her, Ms.
Lacsamana asked you not to take the tricycle yet but to give her a
chance to pay her arrears?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But you did not grant her request?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you get a court order transferring ownership of the tricycle
from Ms. Lacsamana to BCD before you took the tricycle?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you get a court order authorizing you to take the tricycle
from Ms. Lacsamana?
A. No, sir.
Q. You took it from her because she could not pay her debt, is that
right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you make an effort to buy the tricycle from Ms. Lacsamana
before it was stolen?
A. No, sir.
Q. It is your understanding that when she did not pay her debt, the
ownership of the tricycle is automatically transferred to BDC, is that
right?
A. No, sir, since she had not paid her obligation, BDC still owns the
tricycle.
Q. Let us make it clear, you said that BDC loaned Ms. Lacsamana
the money, which she used to buy the tricycle; it was not BDC that
bought the tricycle, it was Ms. Lacsamana who bought the tricycle?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who is the owner of the tricycle?
A. Ma. Teresa Lacsamana is the owner of the tricycle. But the
money she used in buying the tricycle was the money of BDC.
Q. In other words, as you understood it, if she did not pay the loan,
the BDC becomes the owner of the tricycle, correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Because of your understanding, you did not bother to file any
action in court to transfer ownership of the tricycle from Lacsamana to
BDC, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. According to you, the tricycle was stolen from near the house of
Carlos Parlade at 1:00 o’clock of November 21, 2007. Since you were
not there when it happened, you merely heard about it from Mr.
Parlade is that correct?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Mr. Parlade told you about it at 7:00 o’clock of that same
morning, is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Mr. Parlade told you that he and the driver of the tricycle, saw a
man driving away with the tricycle, is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. He also told you that, unfortunately, he did not recognize the man
because he was driving away, is that right?
A. They did not know him but then he recognized him because they
faced each other.
Q. But Mr. Parlade told you that he did not know the accused Takad
personally?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Did Mr. Parlade tell you that he was able to see the man’s
appearance as well as his face?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. And when you heard from Mr. Parlade that the tricycle had been
stolen, you thought right away that it was the accused Takad who did
it, is that right?
A. Yes, Sir. That formed in my mind.
Q. You thought that the thief was accused Takad because he warned
you against his seeing the tricycle in Pasig, is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. And you told Parlade about who you thought took the tricycle, is
that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. And, based on your description of accused Takad, Mr. Parlade
agreed with you?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. You said that after the BDC finally pulled out the tricycle from
Mr. Marasigan on November 18, Ms. Lacsamana and accused Takad
went to BDC and offered to redeem the tricycle by paying all the
arrears on it, is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Under what authority did you refuse Ms. Lacsamana the right to
redeem her tricycle by paying all her arrears?
A. I asked my boss if we would allow her to get it back. We had
reports that the tricycle might be dismantled and its parts sold
(kahuyin). My boss answered in the negative. The accused had a
reputation for dismantling tricycles in Palatiw.
Q. You said that, after you refused redemption of the tricycle,
accused Takad said, “Wag na wag kong makikita ang tricycle na ‘yan
sa Pasig.” And it was this remark that made you conclude that he was
the one who stole the tricycle. Is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Are you sure that all he said was, “Wag na wag kong makikita
ang tricycle na ‘yan sa Pasig.” That is all he said?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Did he say, in addition, “Kung makikita ko ‘yan sa Pasig,
nanakawin ko ‘yang tricycle na ‘yan.” Did he say that?
A. No, Sir.
Q. If he did not say “kung makikita ko ‘yan sa Pasig, nanakawin ko
‘yang tricycle na ‘yan,” the idea that he meant to steal the tricycle in
Pasig is only your idea. Is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. He could have very well meant that “kung makikita ko ‘yan sa
Pasig, idedemanda ko kayo ng carnapping dahil wala kayong
karapatang kunin ang tricycle sa kanya.” That is what he could have
meant. Is that right?
A. Maybe, Sir.
ATTY. CRUZ: That is all, Your Honor.
COURT: Re-direct
PROSEC. DE LEON: No redirect, Your Honor.
(CAPTION OF CASE OMITTED)
TRANSCRIPT of stenographic notes taken at the hearing of the
above entitled case on January 27, 2008.
COURT: You may call your witness.
PROSEC. DE LEON: May we call to the witness stand Mr. Carlos
Parlade.
COURT: Swear in the witness.
INTERPRETER: Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you will
give in this trial shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the
truth, so help you, God.
A. I do, ma’am.
A. Carlos Parlade, 50 years old, married, construction worker,
presently residing at #84 West Road, Maybunga, Pasig City.
PROSEC. DE LEON: His testimony is being offered to prove that
BDC gave the tricycle subject of this case to Mr. Parlade; that when he
went home sometime on November 21, 2007, he saw the accused steal
the tricycle; he will identify his statement and the accused in this case
and give other relevant statements.
Q. Mr. witness, where were you on November 21, 2007 at 1:00
o’clock in the morning?
A. I was in my house.
Q. Where is your house located, Mr. Parlade?
A. At 84 West Road, Maybunga, Pasig City.
Q. On November 21, 2007 at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning, do
you remember any unusual incident that happened in that place?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what was that unusual incident?
A. I lost a tricycle.
Q. Where did this tricycle come from?
A. From BDC, sir.
Q. What were you doing at that time?
A. I had just entered the house then.
Q. And what were you doing then?
A. Since it was raining and I was wet, I changed my clothes.
Q. What did you do after that?
A. I went out of the house to chain the tricyle.
Q. Were you able to chain the tricycle after you went out of your
house?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why not?
A. Because I saw someone pushing the tricycle away.
Q. When you said “tinutulak niya ang tricycle,” to whom are you
referring to?
A. The person who got the tricycle.
Q. Is that person who got the tricycle in Court?
A. Yes, sir, he is the one.
INTERPRETER: Witness pointed to a person seated on the bench
who, when asked, gave his name as Romulo Takad.
PROSEC. DE LEON: After you saw the accused pushing the
tricycle away, what did you do?
A. I shouted at him. I said “Hoy, bat dala-dala mo iyang motor.”
Q. What did the accused do, if any?
A. He turned and faced me.
Q. Were you able to recognize him?
A. The face, I recognized him.
Q. Would you please describe the place where this happened?
A. A light from the post lighted the place. The tricycle was five
meters from my house.
Q. What kind of light was that, Mr. witness?
A. It was a big streetlight.
Q. You said that the tricycle was five meters from your house when
you saw the accused pushing it. How far was the accused from your
house?
A. Also five meters, sir.
Q. After you shouted at him, what did the accused do?
A. He faced me, kicked start the engine, and then drove away.
Q. What did you do next, if any?
A. I ran after him but since the tricycle ran so fast, I was not able to
catch up with it.
Q. What did you do after that, if any?
A. I reported the theft of the tricycle to Ms. Zenny Aguirre and we
looked for the tricycle the whole night.
Q. Were you able to locate it?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you execute an affidavit with regards to this case?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I am showing to you a sworn statement earlier marked as Exhibit
E, is this your statement?
A. This is the one.
Q. Whose signature is this over the name Carlos Parlade?
A. That is my signature.
PROSEC. DE LEON: That would be all, Your Honor.
COURT: Cross.
ATTY. CRUZ: Your affidavit says that you appeared before the
police at 1:30 p.m. on November 21, 2007, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The tricycle was stolen in the early morning of November 21, and
you gave your statement to the police in the afternoon of the same day,
is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The police investigator asked you the questions and then you
gave your answers, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. All the answers that appear on this sworn statement were exactly
as you told the police, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did you read the sworn statement before you sign it?
A. I was asked to read it.
Q. You signed it because you found nothing wrong with it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You said in your sworn statement that you are a member of the
Maybunga Security Force, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Your work involved looking for persons who commit crimes in
your barangay, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you aware then that it was important for you, as a witness to
a crime, to give a good description of the person whom you saw stole
your tricycle?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You said that you saw his face. Did you see it clearly?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you note that he had fair or light complexion?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You also naturally noted that he had short crop hair, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You also noticed that he had pronounced jaws?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But, although you noted these details of his face, you still did not
tell the police when you reported the crime that he had fair or light
complexion, is that right?
A. Because the police did not ask me those details.
Q. But, since you knew because of your experience that those details
were important to the police, when you were not asked, you did not
bother to still give the police your description of the face of this
person?
A. I was not able to remember those.
Q. Please go over your sworn statement and tell us if you gave to the
police those descriptions of the accused that you mentioned?
A. I said here, in answer to #14, “medyo maigsi ang buhok.”
Q. But the other description that he is of light complexion and has
pronounced jaws, did you put that in your statement?
A. No, sir.
Q. I read from your sworn statement that you arrived at your house
at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning and you said that you saw no
one around, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You mean that the place was empty of people?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you parked the tricycle on the sidewalk next to your house?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You said that, as you went out of your house, you saw the
accused pushing the tricycle away, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, you said that when you saw the accused with the tricycle,
he was five meters from you, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In other words, he was somewhat near you?
A. Yes, sir, “medyo malapit siya.”
Q. Now, you said “medyo malapit siya,” please read what you said
in your sworn statement about the distance of the accused from you at
that time.
A. “Nang makita ko medyo malayo na ang tricycle na itinutulak ng
isang tao.”
Q. You said when you testified that he was “medyo malapit” but
you said in your affidavit, “medyo malayo,” which is correct?
A. I said he was a bit far because he was five meters from me.
Q. You said that you shouted at the man on the tricycle and he
looked back but he suddenly started the motor and drove away with the
tricycle, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Since the purpose of the man was to flee from you, he merely
glanced back, is that right?
A. Hindi po, opo, medyo matagal po.
Q. Opo, hindi po, what is really your answer?
A. Opo, medyo matagal po.
Q. After the taking of the tricycle, you spoke to Zenny Aguirre of
BDC, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And she told you that in October, Takad warned her against
seeing the tricycle in Pasig?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But when you saw Zenny, you had not yet met the accused Takad,
is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I understand that you went back to the police station on
November 21, at 5:30 in the afternoon?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The police told you that Takad had been arrested and you have to
come back and identify him, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When you went to the police station, they led you into a room
and the investigator pointed out Takad to you, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And he asked you if he was the one who took the tricycle?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In other words, you were not shown the accused Takad in a police
line up with other persons of the same built so you could try to pick
him out as the tricycle thief?
A. No, sir.
Q. When you saw him at the police station, was his appearance and
physical built the same as when you saw him take the tricycle?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is his appearance and built now the same as when you saw him
take the tricycle on November 21, 2007.
A. It seems he changed.
Q. What change did you notice?
A. He became fairer, now.
Q. That is the only change you noticed?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I notice that your answers to the questions are in Tagalog, are you
familiar with the Tagalog language?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When you say in Tagalog that “ang katawan ng tao ay manipis,”
does that mean that he is slim?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when you say that his body is “katamtaman ang laki,” does
that mean that he is medium built?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when you say the body is “malapad,” that means that he is
somewhat big?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you please read to us from item 14 of your affidavit the
description of the built of the person whom you saw stole the tricycle?
A. “Answer: Medyo malapad ng konti ang katawan at medyo maiksi
ang buhok.”
ATTY. CRUZ: May I request the accused Takad to stand up. Will
you agree with me that the body of the accused Takad, that the body is
medium built only?
A. I cannot tell.
ATTY. CRUZ: (Talking to the accused) How tall are you?
A. “5’5 ½”
Q. What is your weight?
A. 120 pounds.
ATTY. CRUZ: That would be all.
COURT: REDIRECT.
PROSEC. DE LEON: No redirect, Your Honor.
above entitled case on February 19, 2008.
COURT: Swear the witness.
INTERPRETER: Do you solemnly swear that the evidence you
would give in this trial shall be the truth and nothing but the truth?
WITNESS: Yes, I do.
WITNESS: Mario S. Mankas, 19 years old, jobless, residing at 66
West Road, Maybunga, Pasig City.
COURT: Your witness.
PROSEC. DE LEON. Your Honor, we are offering the testimony of
this witness to prove that he witnessed a carnapping incident on
November 21, 2007 and other matters in relation thereto.
COURT: Proceed.
PROSEC. DE LEON: (DIRECT EXAMINATION)
Q. Mr. Mankas, on November 21, 2007 at around 2 a.m., do you
remember where you were?
A. I was playing computer at a neighbor’s house.
Q. Do you remember any unusual incident that happened at that
time?
A. Yes, sir, I saw Kuya Carlos running after a tricycle.
Q. Who is this Kuya Carlos?
A. His full name is Carlos Parlade.
Q. What did you do then?
A. I also ran after the tricycle behind Kuya Carlos.
Q. Where you able to see that person driving the tricycle?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. If he is in the courtroom could you point to that person?
INTERPRETER: Witness pointed to a man wearing a beige T-shirt
and maong pants, who gave his name as Romulo Takad.
PROSEC. DE LEON:
Q. What was your position in relation to the tricycle when you saw
this man?
A. I was four steps away from him.
Q. Could you describe the place, whether or not it was lighted?
A. It was lighted.
Q. In relation to this incident, do you remember having executed an
affidavit?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I am showing to you a Sinumpaang Salaysay, is this your
affidavit?
A. Yes, sir, it is the one.
Q. Whose signature is this on top of the name Mario Mankas?
A. It is mine.
PROSEC. DE LEON: May I ask that the Sinumpaang Salaysay be
marked as our Exhibit “F.” I think I have no more questions, Your
Honor.
COURT: Cross.
ATTY. CRUZ: May it please, Your Honor.
COURT: Proceed.
ATTY. CRUZ: (CROSS-EXAMINATION)
Q. Your name is Mario?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. May I call you Mario?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Mario, your sworn statement says that you appeared before the
police at 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of November 21, 2003, is that
right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. The police investigator asked you the question and then you gave
your answer, is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. So, all the answers that appear in the sworn statement were
exactly as you told them to the police investigator?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. How far was your neighbor’s house, where you played computer,
from the house of your Kuya Carlos?
A. About 10 meters, sir.
Q. This house where you played computer was along West Road. Is
that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. The way I understand it, you were playing computer at the time
the tricycle of Kuya Carlos was stolen?
A. I just finished playing the computer.
Q. So, what were you doing at the time the tricycle was stolen?
A. I was washing my hands at the gate in the front yard.
Q. So, where was the faucet located?
A. Near the side of the gate.
Q. When you were washing your hands, were you facing the road or
were you facing the house?
A. I was facing the road.
Q. So, as you were washing your hands, you saw the tricycle and
your Kuya Carlos running after it?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Do you know how to drive a tricycle?
A. No, Sir.
Q. Are you familiar with the speed of tricycle passing along West
Road shortly after midnight?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. What is the usual speed of tricycles passing West Road after
midnight?
A. “Medyo mabilis.”
Q. You said in your sworn statement that this tricycle was running
very fast. Would you say that it was running at least twice the usual
speed of tricycles running on that road after midnight?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When you saw the tricycle, was the tricycle in front of you or it
has already passed you?
A. It was still in front of me.
Q. And it was running, according to you at twice the speed of other
tricycles?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Now, you said that you saw your Kuya Carlos running after the
tricycle. Is that right?
Q. So, how far was he behind the tricycle?
A. About 9 to 10 meters away?
Q. You said that the tricycle was running at a very fast speed. If the
driver of the tricycle was driving very fast, you will agree with me that
you only had a brief glance of the driver. Is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And apart from the fact that the tricycle was running at a very fast
speed, you could not have seen much of the person driving it because,
as you said in paragraph 5 of the affidavit, “hindi ko gaanong
namukhaan dahil nakayuko ako.” Is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Now, because you only had a glance of the man and because your
head was bowed down, when you were asked by the police to describe
the man on the tricycle, you could only describe his built. Is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. As he was moving away from you, did the driver wave his arms?
A. No, Sir.
Q. Did he stand on the tricycle seat?
A. No, Sir.
Q. Did he swing his body to the right or to the left?
A. No, Sir.
Q. So, he sat still on the tricycle holding the steering bars as the
tricycle sped away from you. Is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. That was how you saw him. Is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Are you sure?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. You merely had a glance at him, right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Your head was bowed down. The man did not move but he just
sat still holding the steering bars of the tricycle. Yet, you said in your
affidavit that you were able to identify him partly by how his body
moved?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, you said in your affidavit that you were able to identify the
man on the tricycle as the accused Takad because of the shape of his
body?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Was the man on the tricycle that you saw a hunchback?
A. No, Sir.
Q. Did his body have an abnormal shape?
A. None, Sir.
Q. Was there anything about the shape of the body of the man on the
tricycle that is different from the body of other men of the same size as
him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was abnormal about his body?
A. Medyo maskulado, sir.
ATTY. CRUZ: May ask the accused to stand up and turn his back for
the Court to observe whether his is a mascular person.
PROSEC. DE LEON: Your Honor, that is way back year 2003 and
today is already February 2004. The built of a man changes especially
when he is in jail, Your Honor.
ATTY. CRUZ: Well, Carlos Parlade testified that accused Takad had
the same appearance during the taking of the tricycle as when he was
in Court.
Q. You also said that you identified the man on the tricycle by the
shape of his nape or “batok”?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Was the nape of the man on the tricycle abnormally shaped?
A. No, Sir.
Q. So, it looks like the “batok” of other people. Is that right?
A. Not really, Sir.
Q. What is the difference between the “batok” of that man on the
tricycle and the “batok” of other men?
A. The nape of this man was longer.
ATTY. CRUZ: Will the prosecution stipulate that the length of the
nape of the accused is about 2 inches from the neckline of his T-shirt?
PROSEC. DE LEON: We so stipulate.
ATTY. CRUZ: Who brought you to the police station to give your
statement?
A. It was Kuya Carlos.
Q. He told you that you were going there to look at the person who
stole the tricycle?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. You were brought to the police station because you were going to
look at the accused so you can identify him. Is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did the police place the accused Takad on a line of several men
who were more or less of the same built as he was?
A. No, Sir. He was just sitting.
Q. And when you entered the room, someone pointed the accused
Takad to you. Is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. So, before you gave your statement to the police, you already had
a good look at Takad?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. So, when you were asked to describe the physical built of the
person who stole the tricycle, Takad was there in the room with you. Is
that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Because you were looking at him there, you were able to say that
he was medium built. Is that right?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. In that room?
A. Yes, Sir.
ATTY. CRUZ: That is all, Your Honor.
PROSEC. DE LEON: No re-direct, Your Honor.
above entitled case on March 12, 2008.
INTERPRETER: (swearing the witness) Do you solemnly swear
that the evidence you will give in this trial shall be truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
WITNESS: Yes, I do, Ma’am.
WITNESS: Romulo Takad, 43 years old, married, residing at 374
Villa Street, Palatiw, Pasig City.
COURT: Proceed.
ATTY. CRUZ: (DIRECT EXAMINATION) We are offering the
testimony of the witness to belie the claim that he stole the tricycle
subject of this case.
Q. Mr. witness, do you know Teresa Lacsamana?
A. Yes, Sir. She is my live-in partner.
Q. Are you married?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you know a tricycle with Plate No. TS-9952 that the
information said you stole from the possession of Carlos Parlade?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know who owns that tricycle?
A. Yes, sir. It belongs to Ma. Teresa Lacsamana, sir.
Q. How do you know that she is the owner of the tricycle?
A. Because I was with her when she got the tricycle from BDC.
Q. Who represented BDC when you went there?
A. Ms. Zenny Aguirre, sir.
Q. Why were you there when Ms. Lacsamana took the tricycle?
A. She told me to accompany her so I could drive it home.
Q. Ms. Aguirre testified that Ms. Lacsamana defaulted on her
installment payments, is that true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And, because of that she said that BDC pulled out the tricycle
from Ms. Lacsamana and turned it over to Mr. Ricardo Marasigan, the
treasurer of their group.
A. No, sir.
Q. What is the truth?
A. The truth is that we were the once who brought the tricycle to the
house of Ricardo Marasigan.
Q. Why did you bring the tricycle to the house of Mr. Marasigan?
A. Because Ms. Aguirre requested us to bring it there.
Q. What is the reason for that?
A. In the meantime, the tricycle was to be in the care and custody of
the treasurer of their group.
Q. According to Ms. Aguirre the tricycle was pulled out by BDC
from Ms. Lacsamana on November 18, 2006, is that true?
A. No, sir.
Q. What is the truth?
A. The truth is that she took the tricycle from the treasurer of the
group on October 18, 2006.
Q. Were you and Ms. Lacsamana informed about the action of BDC
before they pulled out the tricycle?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why do you remember that they pulled out the tricycle on
October 18, 2006?
A. Because there was a verbal agreement between Ms. Lacsamana
and Ms. Aguirre that Ms. Lacsamana could redeem the tricycle by
paying her arrears on October 17. Ms. Lacsamana mortgaged her car to
raise the money.
Q. And, was Ms. Lacsamana able to pay what she owed on October
17, 2006?
A. No, sir, because we arrived late at the office of BDC and it was
already closed.
Q. And, what did you do?
A. On October 18, we went to the house of the treasurer of the group
to request him to accompany us to BDC but we found out that the
tricycle had already been taken from him.
Q. And, did you go to BDC as you said you will?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And, whom did you see there?
A. Ms. Aguirre, sir.
Q. And, what did you tell her?
A. Ms. Lacsamana and I requested Ms. Aguirre to allow us to pay
what was due on the tricycle.
Q. And, what did she tell you?
A. Ms. Aguirre would not allow us.
Q. Did she tell you why she would not allow you?
A. She said that her company did not want to give us the tricycle
anymore because we did not have the means to pay the balance.
Q. How much did Ms. Lacsamana owe BDC on the date you went
there to redeem the tricycle?
A. According to Ms. Aguirre it was more than P14,000.00.
Q. And, did you have enough money to pay your balance of more
than P14,000.00 at the time you went there?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. According to Ms. Aguirre after she declined Ms. Lacsamana’s
attempt to redeem the tricycle, you warned her that you should not see
the tricycle in Pasig implying that you threatened to do something if
that happened, is that true?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why? What was it that you told her concerning the tricycle?
A. I pleaded with Ms. Aguirre that I hope I will not see the tricycle
in our place because it was going to hurt us if we will see it there
considering that we spent a lot of time and sweat looking after the
tricycle and it would pain us so much to see it there.
Q. And, what did Ms. Aguirre tell you after you told her what you
said?
A. Ms. Aguirre said, okay.
Q. Between the time you spoke to Ms. Aguirre and the time that you
were taken by police officers on November 21, 2007, did you see the
tricycle in Pasig?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did anyone tell you among your friends or relatives having seen
the tricycle in Pasig between the time you talked to Ms. Aguirre and
the time you were taken by the police on November 21, 2007?
A. None, sir.
Q. Carlos Parlade testified that he saw you take the tricycle of Ms.
Lacsamana away from near his house at 374 West Road, Maybunga,
Pasig City, where it was parked at 1:00 o’clock in the morning of
November 21, 2007. Mario S. Mankas also testified that at 2:00
o’clock in the morning of the same day he saw you driving away the
tricycle from the house of Carlos Parlade. Now you were present when
they testified about this?
A. I was here, sir.
Q. What can you say about these testimonies of Mr. Parlade and Mr.
Mankas?
A. Those were not true, sir.
Q. Do you remember where you were on the early morning of
November 21, 2007?
A. I was at the house sleeping.
Q. Who else were in your house in the morning of November 21,
2007?
A. I was alone, sir.
Q. Where was Ms. Lacsamana?
A. She was in Singapore, sir.
Q. How were you able to remember that you were at home in the
morning of November 21, 2007?
A. Because I was awakened by the police who took me.
Q. When Mr. Parlade was asked in his Sinumpaang Salaysay in a
question and answer form and I quote: “Q – Ano ba ang itsura ng
taong nakita mong nagnakaw ng inyong tricycle? A. Nakasando ng
kulay puti, nakapantalon ng maong, medyo malapad ng konti ang
katawan at medyo maiksi ang buhok.” Please stand up, Mr. Witness, so
the Court can observe whether you are slim, medium built, or wide in
body. What is your height, Mr. Witness?
A. 5’5 ½ inches, sir.
Q. And, what is your weight now?
A. 120 lbs., sir.
Q. What was your weight on November 21, 2007?
A. It was probable that I weighed less because “baksak ang
katawan.”
Q. Do you have evidence of how you looked on November 21, 2007
or about that date?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why do you say that, do you have evidence?
A. I had my picture taken at Pariancillo after the police arrested me.
INTERPRETER: Witness is turning over his picture to the
interpreter and to the presiding judge.
ATTY. CRUZ:
Q. And, when was this pictures taken?
A. Before my inquest.
ATTY. CRUZ: May we request that this picture be marked as
Exhibits “1” for the defense.
COURT: Mark it.
ATTY. CRUZ: How old are you, Romulo?
A. Going to 43, sir.
Q. During the past 40 years, were you ever charged with the
commission of any crime before the police, the barangays, the courts,
or the fiscal’s offices?
A. None, sir.
ATTY. CRUZ: That will be all, Your Honor.
COURT: Cross?
PROSEC. DE LEON: Mr. Witness, you mentioned that you reside at
374 Villa Street, Palatiw, Pasig City. How far is this from West Road,
Maybunga, Pasig City?
A. It is quite far, sir.
Q. Give us an estimate of the distance?
A. From the Pasig Kapitolyo to Edsa Shrine in Ortigas.
Q. Do you reckon by road distance, using the regular route?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is there available public transportation running that route on a 24-
hour basis?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In other words, if you want to go to Maybunga Pasig you can go
there anytime?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did you feel when the tricycle was taken from Teresa
Lacsamana?
A. I had hurt feelings.
Q. Since you were hurt, if you were given the chance to get back the
tricycle, would your hurt feelings be cured?
A. Some of my pains would be relieved.
Q. Since that would relive your pains, you would do any means to
get the tricycle?
A. I will do everything to repossess the tricycle in a legal way.
Q. What do you mean by doing everything to get the tricycle back in
a legal way?
A. What I mean in a legal way is we will pay BDC what we owe on
the tricycle.
Q. You mentioned a while ago that you tendered payment but Ms.
Aguirre rejected it, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. At that instance when she rejected the payment, what came into
your mind aside from the pain that you felt?
A. I pleaded with Ms. Aguirre.
Q. You pleaded with her, how did you plea with her?
A. I pleaded with Ms. Aguirre that I hope the tricycle will not be
seen in our place.
Q. And, did you come to know that the tricycle was given to Mr.
Parlade?
A. It was only when the tricycle was stolen that I came to know that
it was given to Carlos Parlade.
COURT: Redirect?
ATTY. CRUZ: No redirect, Your Honor.
COURT: Session resumed. Call your last witness.
ATTY. CRUZ: May we call on our last witness, Maria Teresa
Lacsamana, to the witness stand.
INTERPRETER: (swearing the witness) Do you solemnly swear
that the evidence you will give in this trial shall be the truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
WITNESS: Yes, I do ma’am.
INTERPRETER: Please state your name, age, and other personal
circumstances.
WITNESS: MARIA TERESA LACSAMANA, 33 years old, single,
businesswoman, residing at No. 374 Villa Street, Palatiw, Pasig City.
ATTY. CRUZ: I am offering the testimony of the witness for the
purpose of belying the testimony of Ms. Aguirre concerning the
circumstances under which the tricycle was taken from her.
Q. Do you know the accused Romulo Takad?
A. Yes, sir.
A. He is at present my live-in partner, sir.
Q. Are you married?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you know this tricycle with Plate No. TS-9952 that Ms.
Aguirre said you took from BDC by way of loan?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Ms. Aguirre said that you defaulted in the installment payments
of the tricycle, is that true?
A. I was unable to pay the installments for fifteen days.
Q. When you were unable to pay those installments, what happened
to the tricycle?
A. Ms. Aguirre took it and we surrendered it to our treasurer, Mr.
Marasigan.
Q. What agreement, if any, did you have with Ms. Aguirre
concerning the payment of the amount due to BDC?
A. Ms. Aguirre gave me a deadline to pay the balance.
Q. Do you remember the date of that deadline?
A. She gave us a deadline of October 17.
Q. Were you able to pay your balance on the tricycle on October 17?
A. No, sir, I was not able to pay on October 17 because I was only
able to get the money in the afternoon.
Q. Where did you get the money you were going to use to pay for
the balance of the tricycle?
A. I mortgaged my car for P100,000.00.
Q. Were you able to pay for your balance on that tricycle on October
17, 2006 as you agreed with Ms. Aguirre?
A. I went to BDC to pay my balance but it was already closed and I
returned on October 18 to pay but Ms. Aguirre did not accept my
payment.
Q. How much at that time did you owe BDC when you went there
on October 18?
A. I owed it P14,000.00 including the interest.
Q. Did you have money to pay for the balance?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You said that Ms. Aguirre refused to accept your payment, did
she tell you the reason why she refused to accept your payment?
A. She did not give any reason why she did not accept the balance
that I was paying her but she said if she gave me another chance I
might not able to pay the rest.
Q. Now, according to Ms. Aguirre after she refused to allow you to
redeem the motorcycle, accused Romulo Takad, told her that he should
not see the tricycle in Pasig City, is this true?
A. Romulo Takad told Ms. Aguirre that if she will not accept the
balance they were tendering if possible that he should not see the
tricycle in Pasig because it was going to hurt him.
Q. And, what was the reaction of Ms. Aguirre when Romulo Takad
said that?
A. There was no reaction from Ms. Aguirre but she only said, “Sige,
pero taga-Pasig lang din ako.”
Q. Where were you in the early morning of November 21, 2006?
A. I was in Singapore, sir.
Q. When did you leave for Singapore?
A. November 16, sir.
Q. And, when did you come back to the Philippines?
A. December 14, sir.
ATTY. CRUZ: That is all for the witness, Your Honor.
COURT: Cross?
PROSEC. DE LEON: When did you leave for Singapore, Madam
Witness?
A. November 16, sir.
Q. What year, Madam Witness?
A. 2007, sir.
Q. In other words, on November 21, 2007 you did not have personal
knowledge whatsoever of what transpired since you were in
Singapore?
A. Yes, sir, I did not have any knowledge of it.
PROSEC. PARAS: No more questions, Your Honor.
COURT: Redirect?
ATTY. CRUZ: No redirect, Your Honor.
KASUNDUAN
Ang kasunduang ito ay sa pagitan ng BAYAN DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, na babanggitin dito bilang BDC at ng SCCPPTODA
2 na babanggitin dito bilang SAMAHAN.
Kaming mga kasapi ng SCCPPTODA 2, sa pulong na ginanap
ngayong ika-19 ng March 2007, ay nagkaisa at nagpasya sa mga
sumusunod:
1. Na ang halangang nahiram sa BDC Sakbayan Program ay
gagamitin lamang sang-ayon sa inaprubahang proyekto sa ilalim ng
Sakbayan Program. Ito ay ang mga sumusunod:
1.1 Paunang pondo para sa GROUP GUARANTEE FUND na
itatatag para sa SAMAHAN.
1.2 Pambili ng bagong motor at bagong sidecar.
2. Na ang halagang nahiram ng SAMAHAN na Four Hundred
Eighty Thousand Pesos (P480,000.00) o Eighty Thousand Pesos
(P80,000.00) bawat isa ay babayaran lamang sa loob ng thirty (30)
months na may interest rate na thirty-six percent (36%) per annum,
add-on.
3. Na ang bawat kasapi ng samahan ay maghuhulog-bayad araw-
araw sa itinalagang Ingat-Yaman ng SAMAHAN sang ayon sa mga
sumusunod:
3.1 Halagang P147.65 araw-araw sa loob ng thirty (30) months
pagkatapos ng ibinigay na taning na bilang ng araw para sa “break-in
period.”
4. Na ang araw-araw na hulog bayad ng mga kasapi ng SAMAHAN
ay idedeposito lingguhan tuwing araw ng Miyerkules sa itinalagang
Ingat-Yaman sa Bangko kung saan ang SAMAHAN ay nagbukas ng
isang “Checking Account” na nasa pangalan ng kanilang Lider at
Ingat-Yaman;
5. Na ang halagang inutang sa BDC ng SAMAHAN as babawasan
ng dalawa’t kalahating porsyento (2.5%) o halagang P12,000.00. Ang
nasabing ibinawas na halaga ay magsisilbing paunang pondo na
ilalagak sa GROUP GUARANTEE FUND ng SAMAHAN.
5.1 Na ang Group Guarantee Fund ng SAMAHAN ay ilalagak
sa pag-iingat ng BDC sa pangalan ng SAMAHAN;
5.2 Ang bawat kasapi ng SAMAHAN ay maghuhulog ng
P10.00 araw-araw bilang lagak-kontribusyon sa Group Guarantee
Fund. Ito ay isasabay sa araw-araw na hulog-bayad para sa utang
sa BDC na nabanggit sa Kasunduan 3.1;
5.3 Na ang Group Guarantee Fund ng SAMAHAN ay kikita ng
interes na nagkakahalaga ng 5% kada taon.
5.4 Ang Group Guarantee Fund ng SAMAHAN ay hindi
maaaring galawin/gamitin ng sinuman sa SAMAHAN sa
anumang oras o pagkakataon. Ito ay lubusang ibibigay sa
SAMAHAN kapag ang utang sa BDC ay lubos nang nabayaran.
6. Na itinalaga si Danilo Mortel bilang Pangulo o Lider ng
SAMAHAN na siyang tagapangalaga nito; si Ricardo Marasigan
bilang Ingat-Yaman na siyang tagapangasiwa sa araw-araw na
koleksyon at kalagayang pananalapi ng SAMAHAN; at si Jerry
Bolivar, bilang Awditor, na siyang mangangalaga sa katumpakan ng
koleksyon at mga bagay-bagay na may kinalaman sa pananalapi ng
SAMAHAN;
7. Na ang itinalagang Lider ng SAMAHAN ay mangunguna sa
pagpapatupad ng KASUNDUAN;
8. Na ang itinalagang Ingat-Yaman ay mahigpit na magpapasunod sa
itinakdang araw-araw na hulog bayad sang-ayon sa kas. 3.1, at
lingguhang mag-uulat sa kalagayang pananalapi at ng pagpapatupad ng
koleksyon;
9. Na ang awditor ay magpapatibay sa katumpakan sa ulat ng Ingat-
Yaman batay sa kanyang sariling pagtutuos;
10. Na ang SAMAHAN ay magdaraos ng regular na pagpupulong na
gaganapin tuwing Biyernes sa ganap na 1:00 ng hapon;
10.1 Ang nasabing regular na pagpupulong ay dadaluhan ng
BDC Account Officer sa loob ng tatlong (3) buwan matapos
maibigay ang bagong tricycle. Pagkatapos noon, ang pagdalo ng
Account Officer ay magiging dalawang beses na lamang bawat
buwan o sang-ayon sa pangangailangan;
11. Ang SAMAHAN sa pangunguna ng Lider ay magpapatuloy sa
regular na lingguhang pagpupulong hanggang matapos at lubos na
mabayaran ang pagkakautang ng SAMAHAN sa BDC upang
mapangalagaan ang pinansiyal at kapakanan ng bawat kasapi;
12. Ang sinumang kasapi ng SAMAHAN na lumiban sa regular na
pagpupulong na walang pasubali at/o matibay na dahilan ay
magmumulta ng P50.00 sa bawat pagliban. Ito ay ilalagak sa Bangko
ng SAMAHAN;
13. Ang multa sa pagliliban sa pulong ay dapat mabayaran sa loob
ng dalawang araw mula sa araw ng kaukulang pagpupulong. Ang
pagwawalang bahala sa nasabing multa ay mangangahulugan ng
pagbawas nito sa araw-araw na hulog-bayad ng kasaping nagkasala;
14. Ang patuloy na pagliban sa pagpupulong at pagwawalang bahala
sa pagbabayad-multa ay mangangahulugan ng paggamit sa sinasaad sa
probisyon bilang 15.1 ng kasunduang ito;
15. Na pananagutan ng SAMAHAN na bayaran o punan/ takpan ang
anumang pagkukulang sa hulog-bayad ng sinuman o alinman sa kasapi
ng SAMAHAN sa itinakdang araw ng bayaran sa BDC. Ito ay upang
hindi tumalbog ang hulog-tseke ng buong SAMAHAN. Subalit;
15.1 Kapag ang isang kasapi ay hindi makabigay ng tatlong
karampatang arawang hulog-bayad sa loob ng isang kinsenas o
napapaloob sa isang tseke sa BDC, ang kanyang tricycle ay
hahatakin ng SAMAHAN kasama ang linya (TODA) at/o
prangkisa at ito ay pangangasiwaan ng SAMAHAN upang ang
arawang kita nito ay tuwirang gagamitin ng SAMAHAN para sa
darating na arawang hulog-bayad ng kasaping nagkasala;
15.2 Ang nahatak na tricycle ay mananatili sa pangangasiwa ng
SAMAHAN hanggat’t hindi lubos na nababayaran ang nagging
pagkukulang sa SAMAHAN;
15.3 Ang tricycle na mula sa inutang sa BDC ay hindi maaaring
isanla, ibenta o ilipat ng pagmamay-ari hangga’t hindi pa
lubusang nababayaran ang utang at pananagutan sa BDC;
15.4 Bilang pagtataguyod sa mga nabanggit sa itaas na
kasunduan Blg. 15.2, at bilang proteksyon para sa SAMAHAN
laban sa anumang maaaring pagmamalabis ng sinumang kasapi,
ang buong SAMAHAN ay lalagda sa isang DEED OF SALE na
ilalagak sa pag-iingat ng BDC. Pinagtitibay din ng kasunduan na
hangga’t tumutupad ng lubos sa kasunduan ang buong
SAMAHAN, ang nasabing DEED OF SALE ay winawalang
halaga at bisa ng BDC.
16. Na anuman ang mangyari sa alinmang tricycle ng sinumang
kasapi ng SAMAHAN (e.g., manakaw, masira bunga ng aksidente),
ang buong pagkakautang, balanse o natitirang pagkakautang ng
SAMAHAN sa BDC ay babayaran at aabonohan pa rin ng buong
SAMAHAN;
17. Na ang biniling motorsiklo o tricycle ay ipapatala bilang
pampublikong sasakyan (dilaw na plaka) sa loob at hindi lalagpas ng
dalawang (2) buwan mula sa araw ng pagbibigay ng BDC sa naturang
motor o tricycle sa SAMAHAN;
18. Na ang SAMAHAN ay magsisilbing modelo o magandang
halimbawa sa buong TODA at komunidad sa pamamagitan ng
pagtangkilik at pagtupad sa “Siyam na Kapasyahan” ng BDC
SAKBAYAN PROGRAM;
19. Na ang pagiging matagumpay ng SAMAHAN sa paghawak ng
kanilang proyekto na pinayagan sa ilalim ng BDC SAKBAYAN
PROGRAM, ang siyang magsisilbing daan tungo sa patuloy o
pagtuloy-tuloy ng mga serbisyo ng BDC sa SAMAHAN at kanilang
TODA;
20. Na ang bawat kasapi ng SAMAHAN ay nauunawaan at
sumasang-ayon sa lahat ng nilalaman nitong Kasunduan at anumang
paglabag ninuman sa mga kasapi dito ay magsisilbing daan upang ang
BDC, sa pamamagitan ng SAMAHAN ay putulin ang ugnayan sa
tiwaling kasapi at gawin ang sumusunod;
20.1 Hatakin ang tricycle o mga tricycle kasama ng linya
(TODA) at/o prangkisa ng tiwaling kasapi na kabilang sa Chattel
Mortgage Contract sa BDC.
TULUNGAN NAWA KAMI NG DIYOS NA MAGAMPANAN NG
TAPAT ANG AMING MGA TUNGKULIN AT PANANAGUTAN.
PINAGTIBAY AT
NILAGDAAN:
BORROWERS:
JERRY BOLIVAR DANILO MORTEL RODEL
MA. TERESA LANDIGAN JULIO ANDIN
LACSAMANA
RICARDO MARASIGAN
KINATAWAN NG BDC:
ZENNY G. AGUIRRE
Senior Account Officer
BDC Ortigas Branch
REPUBLIKA NG
PILIPINAS)
MAKATI CITY ) S.S.
Sa harap ko, na isang Notaryo Publiko sa Makati City ngayong ika
April 2, 2002, ay dumulog ang mga nakalagda sa itaas, na may
katibayan ng paninirahan sa nabanggit sa ilalim ng kani-kanilang
pangalan, na nakilala ko silang lahat bilang nagsasagawa ng naritong
kasulatan na pinatunayan nila sa harap ko na malayang ginawa at
tinanggap at ayon sa kanilang kagustuhan.
SAKSI ANG AKING LAGDA AT SELYONG PANTATAK,
ngayong ika April 2, 2006 dito sa Makati City.
JOSEPH B. CARREON
Notary Public
Appointment No. M-212 (3/20/2006 to 12/31/2007)
Roll No. 51613; Surigao Sur
MCLE No. IV-0095784
PTR No. 076892 01-31-06 Makati
IBP No. 345986 01-21-06 Makati
2nd Floor 3560-B Hilario St.,
Fairview, Quezon City
Kas. Blg. 315;
Pahina 57;
Aklat Blg. 2;
Taon 2006.
APPENDIX B

Branch 107, Manila
BRENDA SIMON and LORENZO

GARCIA,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Case No.
- versus -
30012
SILVER FILMS, INC.,
Defendant.
x----------------------------------x
ORDER
For resolution are the following incidents:
1. Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendant Silver Films, Inc.;
2. Manifestation/Motion to Deny Silver Film’s Motion to Dismiss
filed by plaintiff Lorenzo Garcia;
3. Motion to Dismiss filed by plaintiff Brenda Simon;
4. Opposition with Motion to Strike Out the Motion to Dismiss of
Brenda Simon filed by plaintiff Lorenzo Garcia;
5. Comment on the Opposition filed by defendant Silver Films, Inc.;
6. Motion for Leave to file Supplemental Complaint and to Admit
Attached Supplemental Complaint filed by plaintiff Garcia;
7. Motion for Production, Inspection, and Copying of Documents
filed by plaintiff Garcia;
8. Opposition to the Motion for Leave to File Supplemental
Complaint and Motion for Production of Documents filed by defendant
Silver Films, Inc.;
9. Manifestation filed by plaintiff Garcia on July 4, 2004;
10. Comment thereon filed by plaintiff Simon;
11. Comment on Manifestation filed by defendant Silver Films, Inc.;
and
12. Manifestation filed by plaintiff Garcia on August 16, 2004.
Defendant Silver Films, Inc. first moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the dispute between the parties had already been settled
and amicably resolved as per amendment to the 2000 and 2002
Contract dated June 17, 2003. Plaintiff Simon filed also a motion to
dismiss on the basis of the said Amendment and manifested that she is
no longer interested in pursuing the case. Plaintiff Garcia opposed the
two motions alleging among others that the Amendment dated June 17,
1998 was executed without his knowledge and consent and contained
provisions which were grossly disadvantageous to him and should
therefore be disapproved; that plaintiff Simon is not the real party in
interest and hence, not in a position to move for the dismissal of the
case; that plaintiff Simon’s motion does not comply with Sections 4, 5
and 6 of the Revised Rules of Court and prayed that plaintiff Simon’s
motion to dismiss be stricken out from the record.
Defendant Silver Films, Inc. joined plaintiff Simon in moving for
the dismissal of the case via its opposition to the motion to strike out
arguing that the motion to dismiss filed by plaintiff Solis was in
accordance with Section 1, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court and
that plaintiff Simon, as manager of plaintiff Garcia can legally bind
him. Plaintiff Garcia then moved for leave to file supplemental
complaint and to admit supplemental complaint as well for production,
inspection, and copying of the original contracts executed by plaintiff
with defendant Silver Films, Inc. for the years 2000, 2001, 2002
including the amendment, which was opposed by defendant Silver
Films, Inc.
Subsequently, in the interest of expediting the settlement of the case,
after several preliminary conferences initiated by the Court and which
were attended only once by representative of defendant Silver Films,
Inc., plaintiff Garcia manifested his willingness to honor the
Amendment dated June 17, 2003 provided that the same be considered
a compromise agreement and judgment be rendered by this Court in
accordance therewith. Both defendant Silver Films, Inc. and plaintiff
Simon were not amenable to the same. Defendant Silver Films, Inc.
suggested instead that the case be settled by implementing the
agreement reached in the preliminary conference held on June 23, 2003
and likewise, expressed its willingness to release plaintiff Garcia from
his 1999 and 2002 contracts. In reply, plaintiff Garcia observed that
defendant Silver Films, Inc. and plaintiff Simon appear to be
repudiating the very same Amendment they vigorously sought to
enforce and bind plaintiff Garcia.
From the foregoing, this Court notes that notwithstanding that the
Amendment dated June 17, 2003 was the basis of defendant Silver
Films, Inc.’s motion to dismiss, said defendant expressed its non-
conformity with plaintiff Garcia’s manifestation to abide by the terms
of said amendment for purposes of settling the case. The same holds
true with respect to plaintiff Simon who initially prayed for the
dismissal of the case on the basis of said amendment. The amendment
however shows that she executed the same in her capacity as
manager/agent of plaintiff Garcia and thus, her act/representation
legally binds the principal, plaintiff Garcia, pursuant to the rules on
agency.
In view thereof, this Court, in the exercise of its discretion, resolves
to render judgment based on the Amendment to the 2000 and 2002
Contract dated June 17, 2003 considering the same as a Compromise
Agreement between the parties. All the other motions are hereby
denied for having become moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, October 24, 2004
(Name omitted)
Judge

Branch 107, Manila
BRENDA SIMON and LORENZO

GARCIA,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Case No.
- versus -
30012
SILVER FILMS, INC.,
Defendant.
x----------------------------------x
ORDER
For the resolution are the following incidents:

1) Motion to Defer Filing of Answer and Motion for
Reconsideration Re: Order dated October 24, 2004 filed by defendant
Silver Films, Inc., through counsel, on November 20, 2004; 2)
opposition thereto filed by plaintiff Lorenzo Garcia, through counsel,
on December 27, 2000; 3) Reply to Opposition filed by defendant
Silver Films, Inc., through counsel, on January 10, 2005; 4) Motion to
Strike Out filed by Garcia, through counsel, on November 28, 2004; 5)
Opposition thereto filed by defendant, through counsel, on November
29, 2004.
Defendant Silver Films, Inc. moved for reconsideration of the Order
of the Court dated October 24, 2004 alleging among others that there
was no basis in fact and in law for a compromise agreement there
being no compromise agreement submitted by the parties for the
approval of the Court; the judgment contained in the questioned order
cannot be deemed a judgment under Rule 36, nor a judgment by
default, judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment since herein
defendant has not yet filed its answer to the complaint; if the motion to
dismiss filed by defendant has been denied, then the basis thereof —
addendum dated June 17, 1998, cannot be used as the basis for
judgment on compromise; there was denial of due process as defendant
was not given the opportunity to file its answer after its motion to
dismiss had been denied.
Likewise, said defendant moved to defer the filing of its answer. In
opposition thereto, plaintiff Garcia argued that defendant seeks to
repudiate the Amendment dated June 17, 1998 in its attempt to have
the questioned order reconsidered but invokes the same amendment to
have the instant complaint dismissed; the subject amendment has all
the requisites of a compromise agreement having been signed by the
parties and their respective counsel and subsequently ratified by
plaintiff Garcia; defendant has no reason to complain of denial of due
process in the issuance of the questioned order being the one who
submitted the subject amendment as basis for the dismissal of the
complaint. In reply, defendant stressed non-compliance with the rules
of procedure laid down by the Supreme Court on the part of the court
warranting a reconsideration of the questioned order.
Plaintiff Garcia also moved that the pleadings filed by defendant be
stricken off the records for failure to comply with the three-day notice
rule prescribed by the Rules. Herein defendant opposed the same
alleging that the copy of the motion received personally by plaintiff
was in addition to the copy thereof sent by registered mail by
defendant at least four days before the scheduled hearing.
Plaintiff Brenda Simon did not file comment/opposition to the
questioned order despite the extension granted.
Anent the procedural aspect, the motions filed by defendant Silver
Films, Inc. were sent through registered mail on February 20, 2005 and
set for hearing four days after, February 24, 2005, hence, complied
with the Rules. In any case, plaintiff Garcia’s opposition to the said
pleadings cured whatever procedural defect there may be (Jardin v.
Hallasgo, 117 SCRA 535, 1982).
Going over the merits of the instant motion for reconsideration, this
Court agrees with the defendant Silver Films, Inc. that indeed no
formal compromise agreement was submitted by the parties for the
approval of the court. Yet, said defendant urged this court to believe
that there was such a settlement of dispute between the parties in view
of the Amendment dated June 17, 2003 which it in fact used as basis
for asking the dismissal of the complaint. Further, plaintiff Brenda
Simon joined said defendant in moving for the dismissal of the
complaint on the same ground alleging amicable settlement through a
compromise agreement, which is the subject amendment. For purposes
of expediting the settlement of this case, plaintiff Garcia expressed
willingness to abide by the terms of the subject amendment albeit
initially not agreeable to it. When the Court finally rendered judgment
based on the subject amendment per order dated October 24, 2004,
defendant Silver Films, Inc. questioned the same.
After a careful study of the arguments raised by the parties in
support of their respective claims, this Court resolves to adhere to its
previous ruling that a compromise agreement was entered into by the
parties through the Amendment dated June 1998.
A perusal of the Amendment dated June 2003 shows that it was duly
signed by plaintiff Simon as agent of plaintiff Garcia and defendant
Silver Films, Inc. and their respective counse. Through the terms
thereof are disadvantageous to him, plaintiff Garcia ratified the same.
Thus, for all intents and purposes, the subject amendment has all the
attributes of a compromise agreement though not denominated as such.
It bears stressing that defendant Silver Films, Inc. and plaintiff
Brenda Simon, in their respective motion to dismiss, considered the
amendment a settlement of the dispute between the parties with
plaintiff Simon categorically calling the same a compromise
agreement. After having led this Court to believe that settlement had
been reached by the parties through the subject amendment, defendant
would now urge the Court to disregard the amendment just because
events have transpired after the execution thereof which would render
compliance with the terms thereof difficult more so after the
ratification of the same by plaintiff Garcia.
With the approval of the amendment dated June 1999 as a
Compromise Agreement, the proceedings in this case are terminated
and the pending motions at the time of the approval thereof are denied
for having become moot and academic as embodied in the questioned
order.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion to Defer Filing of Answer filed by
defendant Silver Films, Inc. are hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, March 6, 2004
(Name omitted)
Judge
COURT OF APPEALS
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
LORENZO GARCIA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus - CA-G.R. CV No. 54389
SILVER FILMS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant,
x-------------------------------x
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S BRIEF
Defendant-appellant, SILVER FILMS, INC., by counsel,
respectfully avers:
I
Prefatory Statement
Plaintiff-appellee Lorenzo Garcia in the instant case claims, with the
lower Court’s sanction, that there is a Compromise Agreement between
the parties involved.
Defendant-appellant Silver Films, Inc., however, categorically
denies the existence of a Compromise Agreement and further asserts
that it is entitled to file an Answer on account of the denial by the
lower court of its Motion to Dismiss.
II
Statement of the Facts
1.01 Plaintiff Brenda Simon (Simon) and plaintiff-appellee Lorenzo
Garcia (Garcia) filed with the lower Court a Complaint dated 27 May
2003 which sought the rescission of the 2002 Agreement entered into
with defendant-appellant Silver Films, Inc.
1.02 While the case was pending, a renegotiation between plaintiff-
appellee Garcia, represented by Simon, and defendant-appellant Silver
Films took place which resulted in an Amendment dated 17 June 2003
that superseded all terms and conditions embodied in their previous
contracts.
1.03 Defendant-appellant Silver Films and plaintiff-appellee Simon
separately filed Motions to Dismiss on the ground that the dispute
involving the parties had already been settled through said
Amendment.
1.04 Plaintiff-appellee Garcia opposed the Motions to Dismiss,
alleging that he did not authorize Simon to represent him in the
renegotiation of the agreements.
1.05 Subsequently, Garcia, in a Manifestation dated 03 July 2004,
expressed his willingness to honor the terms and conditions of the
Amendment dated 17 June 2003 on the supposition that the same shall
be considered a Compromise Agreement.
1.06 Defendant-appellant Silver Films and plaintiff-appellee Simon
vehemently opposed Garcia’s proposal to treat the aforesaid
Amendment as a Compromise Agreement. Instead, defendant-
appellant suggested that the terms and conditions to the Agreement
reached by the parties during the preliminary conference held on 23
July 2004 be adhered to, i.e., defendant-appellant shall release
plaintiff-appellee Garcia from his contractual commitments.
1.07 The trial court, in an order dated 24 October 2004, treated the
Addendum to the 1996 and 1998 Contracts dated 17 June 2003 as a
Compromise Agreement and denied all pending motions, including the
Motions to Dismiss separately filed by defendant-appellant Silver
Films and Simon.
1.08 Defendant-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order dated 24 October 2004. The lower court, however, rendered an
order dated 06 March 2005 which denied the aforecited motion for
reconsideration and ruled in favor of plaintiff Garcia, stating that:
“a compromise agreement was entered into by the parties through
the Amendment dated 17 June 2003.
x x x
SO ORDERED.”
1.09 Hence, this appeal.
III
Assignment of Errors
2.01 The lower Court erred in treating the Amendment dated 17
June 2003 as a Compromise Agreement between the parties.
2.02 The lower Court erred in depriving defendant-appellant Silver
Films, Inc. of its right to procedural due process, said defendant-
appellant being entitled to file an answer after the Court denied its
motion to dismiss.
2.03 The lower Court erred in making two (2) diametrically opposed
moved: (1) in denying the motion to dismiss filed pursuant to the
Amendment; and (2) in treating the rejected Amendment as the
Compromise Agreement itself.
IV
Argument
The Amendment dated 17 June 1999
cannot be treated as the Compromise
Agreement itself.
3.01 The Court’s order dated 24 October 2004 categorically stating
that there was a Compromise Agreement between the parties is totally
unfounded because it was rendered without properly considering the
facts.
3.02 The vehement objection and written opposition of defendant-
appellant Silver Films, Inc., and plaintiff Simon to the alleged
Compromise Agreement clearly show the absence of a “meeting of
minds” between the parties involved.
3.03 In Godoy v. Court of Appeals (250 SCRA 629), the Supreme
Court aptly characterized a compromise as a “bilateral act or
transaction.” The questioned Compromise Agreement lacks this
indispensable element; completely absent in said Compromise
Agreement is “an unqualified agreement among the parties to be bound
by the judgment on consent,” a fundamental requirement laid down by
the Supreme Court in Republic v. Bisaya Land Transportation Co., Inc.
(81 SCRA 8 [1978]).
3.04 Despite the foregoing judicial pronouncements, the lower Court
arrogated unto itself the power to declare the existence of a
Compromise Agreement, in utter disregard of defendant-appellant’s
vigorous objection and opposition.
Defendant-appellant was deprived of

its right to procedural due process
because after its motion to dismiss
was denied, it was not given
the opportunity to file its Answer
as required by the Rules of Court
3.05 The denial of the motion to dismiss ipso facto entitles the
movant to file an answer. This is sufficiently clear in Section 4, Rule
16 of the Rules of Court which mandates, in part:
“If the motion is denied, the movant shall files his answer within the
balance of the period prescribed…”
3.06 The defendant-appellant was deprived of its right to file an
answer when the lower Court terminated all judicial proceedings after
rendering the order dated 06 March 2005 denying all pending motions,
including the motion to dismiss filed by defendant-appellant, and
treating the Amendment dated 17 June 1999 as the Compromise
Agreement itself, the existence of which is disputed by defendant-
appellant.
3.07 In Home Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals (273
SCRA 360), the Supreme Court authoritatively stated the consequence
resulting from the denial of a motion to dismiss in this manner:
“… in case of a denial of the motion, the movant is not deprived of
the rights to submit its own case and to present its evidence.”
3.08 The lower Court disregarded all the foregoing considerations,
in clear violation of defendant-appellant’s procedural right to due
process, i.e., its opportunity to be heard.
The lower Court erred in making two
(2) diametrically opposed moves.
3.09 Defendant-appellant maintains that the lower Court cannot
deny its motion to dismiss filed pursuant to the Amendment dated 17
June 2003 at the same time consider said Amendment as the
Compromise Agreement itself because these two (2) acts are wholly
repugnant or absolutely irreconcilable.
4.01 The denial of the motion to dismiss, in fact, amounts to a
rejection of the Amendment itself. This indisputable circumstance bars
the lower Court from treating the rejected Amendment as the
Compromise Agreement itself.
V
Prayer
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant-appellant Silver
Films, Inc. respectfully prays that the decision appealed from be
reversed and set aside.
Defendant-appellant prays for cost of suit and for such further or
other relief as may be deemed just or equitable.
Pasig City for Manila.
04 July 2006.
ROMAN CRUZ & TAPALES
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
Suite 877 Harbor View Bldg.
Roxas Boulevard, Manila
IBP 544498 12-21-13
PTR 8723254 01-02-13
MCLE Compliance IV-295
Email: ihfontilla@yahoo.com
By:
PAULO A. CRUZ
PTR 8529903 06-09-06
IBP 440693 04-28-06
Copy furnished:
MARIA LEILA B. PENERA
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellees
5/F Rivera Santos Building
54 Antonio Luna Street
Sta. Cruz, Manila
COURT OF APPEALS Manila
SECOND DIVISION
LORENZO GARCIA ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus - CA-G.R. CV No. 54389
SILVER FILMS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant,
x-------------------------------x
APPELLEE’ S BRIEF
Plaintiff-Appellee Lorenzo Garcia, through counsel, respectfully
states:
Prefatory Statement
On its face, the Defendant-Appellant’s Brief dated July 4, 2000, and
served on plaintiff-appellee Garcia on July 21, 2004, utterly fails to
comply with the requirements of Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of
Court. The caption does not even indicate the docket number of the
case in the Court a quo. Hence, the appeal deserves outright dismissal.
Counter-Statement of Facts
The Statement of Facts in the Defendant-Appellant’s Brief contains
inaccuracies, which need to be rectified, lest this Honorable Court be
misled.
In paragraph 1.06 its statement of the facts, defendant-appellant
Silver Films, Inc., makes reference to an alleged Agreement reached by
the parties during the preliminary conference held on July 23, 2000. No
such Agreement exists. The records do not show the slightest hint of
any agreement reached by the parties on July 23, 2004.
Indeed, defendant-appellant Silver Films cannot claim to have
entered into the imagined agreement, because a day after the
preliminary conference, or on July 24, 2004, it still filed a Motion for
Extension of time within which to file its Comment on plaintiff-
appellee Garcia’s Manifestation dated July 3, 2000, whereby the
plaintiff-appellee decided to honor the “Amendment to the 2000 &
2002 Contract” dated June 17, 2003.
In other words, if it were true, as defendant-appellant Silver Films
claims, that the parties entered into an agreement during the July 23,
2004 preliminary conference, the defendant-appellant would not have
bothered to file its Motion for Extension, and waste its time preparing
its Comment wherein it merely manifested its willingness to release
plaintiff-appellee Garcia from his 2000 and 2002 contracts.
ARGUMENTS
First Assigned Error:

The Lower Court erred
in treating the Amendment
dated June 17, 2003 as a
Compromise Agreement.
The Court a quo did not so err.
A scrutiny of the “Addendum to the 2000 & 2002 Contract, dated
June 17, 2005 shows that it was signed by defendant-appellant Silver
Films assisted by its counsel, and by plaintiff Brenda Simon in
representation of plaintiff-appellee Garcia assisted by counsel. While
initially, plaintiff-appellee Garcia refused to honor the Amendment,
nevertheless per his Manifestation dated July 3, 2004, he ratified the
Amendment. Thus, the Amendment has all the requisites of a
compromise agreement.
Defendant-Appellant Silver Films even admitted in writing the
validity of the compromise agreement when it declared in its Motion to
Dismiss dated June 27, 2003 that “in an agreement dated 17 June 2003
between the parties all incidents which are the subject of the complaint
in the above-captioned case were settled and amicably resolved.”
Second Assigned Error:

in depriving defendant-
appellant Regal Films
of its right to procedural
due process, said defendant-
appellant being entitled to
file an Answer after the
denial of its Motion to
Dismiss.
The Court a quo did not so err.
Defendant-Appellant Silver Films cannot claim denial of procedural
due process, inasmuch as it was the one who submitted and brought to
the attention of the Court a quo the Amendment dated June 19, 1999
containing the terms of amicable settlement between the parties. It
cannot now complain if the Court a quo stamped its imprimatur on the
Amendment and treated it as a compromise agreement –– which is
what it really is.
Besides, the rule giving the defendant the opportunity to file an
Answer after the denial of its motion to dismiss, applies only when the
ground invoked in such motion to dismiss is one of those enumerated
in Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. In such case, an Answer is
necessary in view of the existence of litigable issues raised in the
Complaint, which need to be responded to.
In the case at bar, defendant-appellant Silver Films motion to
dismiss was grounded on the amicable settlement between the parties.
It goes without saying that the Court a quo has the power to protect the
rights of the parties and ensure compliance with the terms and
conditions of the amicable settlement.
Verily, the Court a quo acted most judiciously and rightly in treating
the Amendment dated June 17, 2003 as a compromise agreement, and
in denying defendant-appellant Silver Films’ motion to dismiss. Had
the Court a quo not done so, the result would have been unfair and
unjust to plaintiff-appellee Garcia, because the case would have been
dismissed without defendant-appellant Silver Films having complied
with its contractual commitments under the Amendment. Up to now,
defendant-appellant Silver Films has not paid the following to plaintiff-
appellee Garcia pursuant to the Amendment:
(a) The amount of P100,000.00 in consideration for the waiver
by plaintiff-appellee Garcia of any and all rights to the parcel of
land covered by his talent contracts; and
(b) The additional amount of P1,000,000.00 by way of talent
fees under the 1998 contract.
Plaintiff-appellee Garcia had long ago performed his part of the
bargain. Defendant-appellant Silver Films does not deny and has never
put in issue the performance by the plaintiff-appellee of his obligations
as an actor. In fact, the agreed movies of the plaintiff-appellee had all
been shown a long time ago. Neither can defendant-appellant Silver
Films dispute that the plaintiff-appellee had already dropped all his
claims to the parcels of land, which he was supposed to receive in
consideration for his appearance in the movies produced by the
defendant-appellant.
What we have here is plain and simple stubborn refusal of
defendant-appellant Silver Films to compensate plaintiff-appellee
Garcia for his services rendered as an actor.
Third Assigned Error:

in making two diametrically
opposed moves.
The Court did not so err.
If anybody is guilty of inconsistency of actions, it is defendant-
appellant Silver Films. Such self-contradiction is best exemplified by
the defendant-appellant’s act of invoking the Amendment dated June
17, 2003 in insisting on the dismissal of the case, but repudiating the
same Amendment in arguing that there is no compromise agreement
between the parties.
Fortunately, the Court a quo saw through defendant-appellant Silver
Films’ devious and sinister ploy to evade its contractual obligations to
plaintiff-appellee Garcia, and avoid payment of the amounts due to the
plaintiff-appellee under the Amendment dated June 17, 2003. As
earlier stated, had the Court a quo simply dismissed the case as desired
by defendant-appellant Silver Films, grave injustice would have
occurred, because the defendant-appellant has no intention whatsoever
of honoring its commitments under the Amendment. Plaintiff-Appellee
Garcia would have been compelled to litigate anew to enforce the
Amendment.
Thus, action of the Court a quo is not only supremely Solomonic, but
it also avoided multiplicity of suits.
CONCLUSION
Under the facts and circumstances, it is, clear that defendant-

appellant Silver Films came to this Honorable Court with unclean
hands, not having paid a single centavo due to plaintiff-appellee Garcia
under the Amendment dated June 17, 2003, while pretending to have
been aggrieved by the action of the Court a quo. Defendant-Appellant
Silver Films has been able so many times to get away with not paying
the fees due to its talents. This time, this Honorable Court should not
allow the defendant-appellant to escape.
It has been more than three years since the Amendment was
executed. To date, plaintiff-appellee Garcia is holding an empty bag. It
is time for this Honorable Court to write finis to this case by declaring
the appealed Orders immediately final and executory, the same being
in the nature of a judgment upon a compromise agreement (Pls. see:
Prudence Realty & Dev. Corp. v. CA, 231 SCRA 379, 388-389, citing
World Machine Enterprises v. IAC, 192 SCRA 459).
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, plaintiff-appellee Garcia respectfully prays of this

Honorable Court to dismiss the instant appeal, and to affirm in toto the
questioned Orders or the Court a quo dated October 24, 2004 and
March 6, 2005, respectively, declaring such Orders to be immediately
final and executory.
[Explanation: A copy of this Appellee’s Brief has been served on the
adverse party by registered mail in view of the distance and the lack of
messenger who can make a personal service.]
Manila, August 1, 2002.

MARIA LEILA B. PENERA
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee
5/F Rivera Santos Building
54 Antonio Luna Street
Sta. Cruz, Manila
PTR 346874 01-08-97 Manila
IBP 674980; 01-07-97 Manila
MCLE Compliance IV-123
Email: mlbp@penlaw.ph
Copy Furnished:
ROMAN CRUZ & TAPALES
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
Suite 877 Harbor View Bldg.
Roxas Boulevard, Manila

COURT OF APPEALS
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
LORENZO GARCIA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, CA-G.R. CV No. 54389
- versus -
SILVER FILMS, INC.,
Defendant-
Appellant,
x---------------------------------- (Justices’names omitted)

x
PROMULGATED: June 5,
2004
DECISION
Before us on appeal is the Order of Branch 107 of the Regional Trial

Court of Manila treating and approving the “Amendment to the 2000
and 2002 Contract” as a compromise agreement in Civil Case No.
30012, “Brenda Simon and Lorenzo Garcia v. Silver Films, Inc.,” for
rescission of contract with damages.
In 2000 Lorenzo Garcia (Garcia) a television artist and movie actor,
and his manager Brenda Simon (Simon) entered into a contract with
Silver Films, Inc. (Silver Films) whereby Silver Films undertook to
convey to Garcia a parcel of land located in Quezon City, aside from
giving him talent fees, in consideration for his services as actor in the
films it was going to produce.
After appearing in a number of films and despite demands, Silver
Films failed to convey to Garcia the parcel of land.
In 2002, Garcia, Simon, and Silver Films again entered into another
agreement incorporating the same undertaking that Silver Films would
convey to Garcia the same lot. Again, despite Garcia’s appearance in
several films produced by Silver Films, the undertaking remained
unheeded, spawning the complaint subject of the present appeal.
Silver Films moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that the case was already settled/compromised by the execution of an
“Amendment to the 2000 and 2002 Contract” (Amendment) by Silver
Films and Simon in her capacity as Garcia’s manager/agent which
Amendment was attached as Annex “A” to the complaint.
Simon likewise moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
same ground invoked by Silver Films.
Garcia, claiming that the Amendment was executed without his
knowledge and consent and that it contained provisions
disadvantageous to him, opposed the motion of Silver Films. Garcia
also opposed his talent manager’s motion, claiming that she had ceased
to be his manager and that, therefore, she had no authority to enter into
and sign the Amendment.
Before the scheduled preliminary conference of the case at the court
a quo, Garcia manifested his willingness to now honor the Amendment
provided that it be considered as a compromise agreement and that
judgment be rendered in accordance therewith.
Later, alleging that the relationship between Garcia and Silver Films
had become acrimonious, Simon commented that Silver Films was
more inclined to release Garcia from the 2000 and 2002 contracts than
to abide by the terms and conditions of the Amendment, and that if
Silver Films opposed Garcia’s manifestation, she would be inclined not
to honor the Amendment.
Silver Films confirmed Simon’s comment and manifested that it was
releasing Garcia from the 2000 and 2002 contracts. Garcia countered
that as Simon and Silver Films were repudiating the Amendment, he
was deprived of what is rightly due him.
By Order of October 24, 2004, the court a quo “in the exercise of its
discretion,” resolved to render judgment based on the Amendment to
the 1999 and 2002 Contract, which it considered to be a Compromise
Agreement between the parties.
Hence, this appeal, Silver Films assigning as errors of the court a
quo the following:
“. . . in treating the Amendment dated 17 June 2003 as a
Compromise Agreement between the parties.
“. . . in depriving the defendant-appellant Silver Films, Inc. of its
right to procedural due process, said defendant-appellant being entitled
to file an answer after the Court denied its Motion to Dismiss.
“. . . in making two (2) diametrically opposed moves: (1) in denying
the Motion to Dismiss filed pursuant to the Amendment and (2) in
treating the rejected Amendment as the Compromise Agreement
itself.”
In the main, Silver Films argue that there was no “meeting of minds”
between the parties to the Amendment, citing the case of Galoy, et al.
v. CA (250 SCRA 629) which characterized a compromise agreement
as a bilateral transaction and that of Republic v. Bisaya Land
Transportation Co., Inc. (81 SCRA 8) which held that in order that a
judgment by compromise can be rendered, there must be “an
unqualified agreement among the parties to be bound by the judgment
on consent.”
The argument is untenable.
The cases cited by Silver Films are not in point.
In the Galoy case, nowhere in the judgment does it appear nor can it
be inferred that the court took into account any agreement or
concessions made by the parties. The decision rendered therein was
based entirely on the merits.
In the Republic case, although there was a motion for judgment
based on consent which amounted to a judgment based on compromise
agreement, there was no “meeting of the minds among the parties” for
before they could come to an unqualified agreement on the judgment
requested to be entered, appellee-corporation-movant withdrew the
motion for judgment on consent.
In the instant case, there was an Amendment to the contract signed
by Simon and Silver Films’ representative to which amendment Garcia
through his Manifestation expressed his conformity. There was,
therefore, consent of all the parties.
The amendment/compromise agreement was perfected and is
binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because
of a change of mind of Silver Films and/or Simon by claiming, in their
Opposition/Reply to Garcia’s Manifestation, that after the 2000
National Films Festival fiasco in which Garcia was involved, the
relationship between the parties had become bitter to render
compliance with the terms and conditions of the Amendment no longer
possible and consequently release Garcia from the 2000 and 2002
contracts (vide Olaybar v. NLRC, 237 SCRA 819 [1994]).
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
APPENDIX C

Branch 86, Manila
NATIONAL SUPPLIES AUTHORITY
and NATIONAL TRUCKING
AUTHORITY,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Case No.
- versus -
62709
ALLIED SHIPPING CORP.,
Defendant.
x-----------------------------------------------
x
DECISION
This is an action for damages arising from alleged breach of the
contract of carriage, filed by the plaintiffs National Supplies Authority
(NSA) and National Trucking Corporation, both government
corporations, against defendant Allied Shipping Corporation (Allied
Shipping) for its alleged failure to deliver to plaintiff NSA’s consignee
4,868 bags of non-fat dried milk worth P2,794,232.00 plus freight
prepaid in the amount of P8,707.65 for a total of P2,862,939.64.
During the pre-trial, the parties offered for resolution by the court
the following issues:
1. Whether or not defendant Allied Shipping was able to deliver the
cargo involved herein, which it carried on board its vessel, to the
consignee Mr. Hassan Salim of plaintiff NTC in Zamboanga;
2. Whether or not defendant Allied Shipping exercised the
extraordinary diligence required of common carriers in connection
with the cargo subject matter of this case;
3. Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to its claim for actual,
exemplary, and moral damages; and
4. Whether or not the defendant is entitled to recover damages from
the plaintiffs under its counterclaim.
After the pre-trial, the parties presented their respective evidence,
testimonial and documentary.
Evidence for the plaintiffs.
1. Vicente Tuason, plaintiff NSC’s manager for Relief Operations,

testifying on direct examination on May 19, 2003 with respect to the
procedural flow in the transport of relief goods, declared that his
department engaged the services of defendant common carrier to ship
the commodities involved; that upon NSC’s delivery of the
commodities to the common carrier, the latter would issue the
corresponding bill of lading acknowledging receipt of the commodities
on board its vessel and of the payment of freight; that the NSC sent the
bill of lading to the consignee of its goods, namely, Mr. Hassan Salim
of NTC; that upon receipt of the bill of lading, Mr. Salim would go to
the defendant common carrier to surrender the consignee’s copy of the
bill of lading in exchange for the release of the commodities and,
accordingly, sign the corresponding delivery receipt; that NTC is still
in possession of the consignee’s copy of the bill of lading covering its
commodities because they were not received by Salim; and that Salim,
however, had no letter explaining why he was returning the bill of
lading in 2003.
On cross-examination, however, Ruiz testified that from 2000 to the
present, he has been in charge of relief operations; that Hassan Salim
belonged to the Freight Forwarding Operations Department of the
NTC; that they have some amount of control or supervision over those
in the Freight Forwarding Operations Department; that he sent the bills
of lading by registered mail to Salim who received them; that he never
went to Zamboanga City and did not hold office there; that Salim
allegedly reported, by telephone call the non-delivery of the
commodities covered by the bills of lading to supervisor Leonora
Sotto, who was in charge of shipping but is no longer connected with
the NTC, and this information was relayed or told to him by manager
Justo Belema of the Freight Forwarding Department; that no written
report, however, was made to him by Sotto or Belema; that he did not
require Salim to report in writing; that they were supposed to make
monthly reports; that he does not know if Salim made a report to
Belema; that he is familiar with the signature of Salim though he never
saw him signing documents; that Salim is no longer connected with the
NTC, having voluntarily resigned when an investigation was
conducted on the missing commodities that were allegedly not received
by their Zamboanga office; that Salim resented the investigation; and
that Ruiz does not know what happened to the investigation.
2. Atty. Gregorio Lantana, second witness for the plaintiff, testified
on August 25, 2007 that he has been the claim insurance manager of
the NTC since 2003; that he came to know the defendant Allied
Shipping when he was asked to investigate the loss of 5,824 bags of
non-fat dried milk; that in December 2003, he went to Zamboanga City
and conferred with Hassan Salim, Banch Supervisor of their
Zamboanga office; that Salim told him that he did not receive the
shipment and showed him the original copies of the consignee’s bill of
lading; that he went to the local office of Allied Shipping and conferred
with the latter’s representative; that said representative told him that
the goods were already withdrawn by Salim but he could not produce
any receipt signed by Salim; that he went back to Manila bearing with
him the original bills of lading; that he made a report dated December
14, 2003, which he submitted to Atty. Homer Garrido (Exh. L to L1);
that on February 3, 2004, he went back to Zamboanga city for further
investigation and conferred with Salim; that Salim insisted that he did
not withdraw the goods from Allied Shipping; that he postponed the
investigation to the following day, but Salim did not appear and,
instead, sent somebody to submit his signed resignation to him and
Helen Jacinto, the domestic forwarding manager of NTC; that he then
went to Allied Shipping to confer with its representative who insisted
that the goods were withdrawn by Salim; that he was given xerox
copies of the cargo delivery receipts which did not bear the signature
Salim; that the checker of Allied Shipping told him that the signatures
on the receipts are not the same as the signature of Salim; that he
knows the signature on the receipts are not the same as the signature of
Salim; that he just saw the signature if Salim, but did not see him sign;
that he did not ask the checker of Allied Shipping to make a written
statement that Salim signed the receipts; that upon arrival in Manila, he
prepared a claim letter to Allied Shipping, dated March 11, 2004 (Exh.
F, F-1); that Artemio Carpio, claims officer of Allied Shipping, sent a
reply letter, dated March 15, 2004, denying their (NTC’s) claim (Exh.
G); that, thereafter, in March or April, 2004, be conferred personally
with Carpio whom he asked for evidence showing that Salim received
the good, and submitted copies of the cargo delivery receipts earlier
submitted by Allied Shipping checker; that Carpio sent another letter to
NTC, dated April 26, 2004, denying the claim of NTC (Exh. H); that
the NTC management referred the matter to the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) which filed this case; that for
OGCC’s services, NTC agreed to pay P100,000.00 at attorney’s fees;
that CARE, on the other hand, prepared a report of Loss, Damage, etc.
which it sent to the NTC containing the value of the lost relief goods
(Exhibits I, I-1 to I-17); that the figures contained in Exhibits I-17 and
I-14 are not clear; that after receiving the claims of CARE, the NTC
paid the same to CARE Philippines, as evidenced by the subrogation
receipts issued by CARE, dated January 31, 2006 (Exh. K); July 10,
2002 (Exh. K-2); October 8, 2006 (Exh. K-3); February 27, 2003 (Exh.
K-4); February 27, 2007 (Exh. K-5); June 29, 2007 (Exh. K-6); and
June 29, 2007 (Exh. K-7), in the total amount of P3,295,475.03, out of
which the plaintiff NTC has paid the total amount of P2,257,141.64.
On cross-examination, the same witness testified that in December
2004, he went to Zamboanga City to conduct an investigation on the
CARE goods and conferred with a representative of Allied Shipping;
that when he learned that the commodities were no longer in the
custody of Allied Shipping, he went back to Zamboanga; that he was
not satisfied with the first investigation he conducted; that he was not
able to pinpoint the persons responsible for the loss of the
commodities; that he conducted further investigation and asked
additional questions from Salim; that after talking to the checker of
Allied Shipping, he wanted to test the credibility of Salim whose
credibility he doubted to some extent; that he had several persons to
suspect – Salim, the checker and other personnel of Allied Shipping
and third parties, or a conspiracy of all of them; that the day before
Salim resigned, he talked to him on February 2, 2005; that after asking
Salim several questions; he was reluctant to answer and so, he
postponed his investigation; that instead the following day, Salim sent
somebody else to submit his resignation letter; that since Salim was
one of his suspects, he asked him questions which would tend to show
that Salim received, or know what happened to the commodities; that
after February 3, 2005, he never saw Salim anymore; that he went back
to the office of Allied Shipping at the Pier in Zamboanga and talked to
the checker but did not write down his name in his report (Exh. N); that
when he believed that he had completed his investigation; he made his
report; that the Allied Shipping checker gave him copies of the cargo
delivery receipts showing that Salim received the goods subject matter
of this case, and these are part of the exhibits (Exh. 4, dated October
17, 2003; Exh. 4-A, dated October 20, 2003; Exh. 4-B, dated October
25, 2003, and Exhibit 4-C, dated October 1999; and up to December
1999); that Helen Jacinto continued doing business with Allied
Shipping after Salim resigned; that Salim was only five (5) years in
service and not yet entitled to retirement (hearing of July 27, 2007);
that he met Salim on February 2, 2005; that on February 3, 2005, Salim
never showed up; that his meeting with a representative of Allied
Shipping took place on February 4, 2004; that the Allied Shipping
representative gave him copies of cargo delivery receipts; that he
received some of the delivery receipts earlier in December 2004; that
he showed the receipts to Salim who told him that the signatures are
not his; that, except for some of the delivery receipts dated December,
2003 and January, 2004, the rest were submitted to him by a
representative of Allied Shipping; that the delivery receipts, dated
December 3, 2003, December 19, 2003, December 23, 2003, January
11, 2004, February 4, 2004, were received by him from the Allied
Shipping representative in Zamboanga; that Salim denied having
signed the said receipts when he showed them to him on the first week
of December, 2003; that when he talked with Salim in their office, after
receiving the delivery receipts from the representative of Allied
Shipping, he did not ask Salim to go with him to Allied Shipping for
confrontation with the representative of Allied Shipping who said
Salim did not sign those receipts because of the peace and order
conditions at that time; that there were constant bombings in the area
and the relationship between Christian and Muslims was not good; that
he did not know what would happen if there was confrontation
between Salim and the Allied Shipping and he had no reason to doubt
the signature of Salim; that he went back to Zamboanga in 2005 for
further investigation because he was not satisfied with the outcome of
his first investigation as he was unable to pinpoint the person
responsible for the loss of the cargoes; that he went to Zamboanga to
further investigate Salim because he doubted his credibility; that he
could not point to any definite person responsible; that on February 2,
2004 Salim was reluctant to answer his questions, while on February 3,
Salim did not appear anymore at the scheduled conference, so that
these facts strengthened his doubt on Salim’s credibility; that as of
now, he has no reason, on the basis of the documentary evidence, about
Salim’s guilt; that he had no participations in the hearing of Allied
Shipping for the shipment of the goods; that it is stated at the back of
the Bills of Lading (Exhs. D to D-8) that it should be released only to
the consignee or his authorized representative; that there is nothing in
the bill of lading which would prohibit Allied Shipping from delivering
the cargoes to the consignee’s representative who would acknowledge
receipt thereof in the cargo delivery receipt. (Hearing of August 20,
1996)
Evidence for the defendants.
3. Ricardo Samson, first witness for the defendant testified on

October 8, 2007 that he has been a delivery checker of Jose Razon
Shipping Agency, with office at Zamboanga City, since 1999; that he
took care of the delivery of cargoes from the port to the consignee or
his authorized representative; that he required the production of the
consignee’s copy of the original covering the particular shipment or a
certified true copy thereof from their office; that upon production of
said bill of lading, he checked the container van and its seal; that, if it
is okay, he asks the consignee or his representative to break the seal
and open the van and then they load the cargo of non-fat dry milk on
the consignee’s truck; that they checked the cargo loaded on the truck
and he counts them; that he then prepares the delivery receipt and have
it signed by the consignee’s representative; that he knows NTC which
has kept a branch in Zamboanga City from 1998; that he made
deliveries to NTC; that the last time he made deliveries to it was from
October to December, 2003, specifically to Hassan Salim whom he had
known personally since 1998 when he was still a delivery checker for
Compania Maritima; that he started working as a delivery checker of
Jose Razon Shipping Agency in August, 1999; that proof of the
deliveries he made to Salim from October to December 2003 are the
original and xerox copies of the cargo delivery receipts; that he has
other original delivery receipts but they got lost because in 2006, their
office was renovated and all records and files were placed temporarily
in boxes; that said receipts got lost and cannot be located, despite
diligent efforts to locate them; that exhibits 4, 4-a to 4-g, 4-q, 4-r are
original copies, while exhibits 4-h to 4-p are xerox copies thereof; that
he signed the cargo delivery receipts marked as Exh. 4-J and 4-J-1; 4-K
and 4-K-11; 4-P and 4-P-1; 4-q and 4-q-1; 4-r and 4-r-1; that the other
cargo receipts were signed by Angel de Leon, their head checker
(Exhs. 4, 4-x-1 and 4-x-2; 4-q and 4-q-1; that the other cargo delivery
receipts were signed by his co-checker Ismael Zamora (Exhs. 4-a and
4-a-1; 4-b and 4-b-1; 4-c and 4-c-1; 4-d and 4-d-1; 4-e and 4-e-1; 4-f
and 4-f-1; 4-h and 4-h-1; 4-i and 4-i-1; 4-l and 4-l-1; 4-m and 4-m-1; 4-
n and 4-n-1; 4-o and 4-o-1; that aside from his signatures, he could
identify the signatures of his co-checkers Armand Lara and Ariel
Zumar because they have been working together for the same company
for many years and he has seen them sign their signatures in his
presence and he is familiar with their signatures; that he can identify
the signatures appearing at the lower left-hand portion of the cargo
delivery receipt. Exh. 4 (Rollo, p. 493), under the printed words
reading: “Received the above in good order condition;” that in Exhibit
4, the signature appearing under the said printed word is that of Lito
Asis, a representative of NTC who went to Allied Shipping when there
is a shipment of the NTC to withdraw the cargo, and that his signature
is familiar to him because there were several occasions when Asis
signed the delivery receipts in his presence; that he does not know the
signature (Exh. 4-a-2) appearing under the same printed words in the
cargo delivery receipt, Exh. 4-a (Rollo, p. 494); that he does not know
the signature (Exh. 4-b-a) appearing under the same printed words in
the cargo delivery receipt marked as Exh. 4-B (Rollo, p. 495); that the
signature marked as Exh. 4-c-a, appearing on the delivery receipt, Exh.
4-c (Rollo, p. 496) is that of Lito Asis; that he does not know the
signature (Exh. 4-D-2) appearing on the delivery receipt, Exh. 4-D
(Rollo, p. 497); that the signature marked as Exh. 4-E-2 appearing on
the delivery receipt marked as Exh. 4-E is that of Hassan Salim; that
the signature marked as Exhibit 4-F-2 appearing on the delivery receipt
marked as Exhibit 4-F (Rollo, p. 499) is that of Salim; that the
signature marked as Exhibit 4-O-2 in Exhibit 4-O (Rollo, p. 508) is
that of Salim; that the signatures marked as Exhibits 4-i-2; 4-j-2, 4-k-2,
and 4-l-2 and appearing in the cargo delivery receipts, marked,
respectively as Exhibits 4-i (Rollo, p. 502); 4-J (Rollo, p. 503); 4-K
(Rollo, p. 504); and 4-l (Rollo, p. 505), are those of Asis; that he does
not know the signatures of the consignee’s representatives marked as
Exhibits 4-g-2, 4-m-2, 4-p-2, and 4-r-2, appearing in the cargo delivery
receipts marked, respectively as Exhibits 4-g (Rollo, p. 501); 4-n
(Rollo, p. 507), 4-p (Rollo, p. 509), 4-q (Rollo, p. 510), and 4-r (Rollo,
p. 511); that with the representation of a certified true copy of the bill
of lading stamped “Please release” by the person carrying it, ha had no
doubt in releasing the cargo to such person.
On cross-examination, the same witness testified that the cargoes
covered by the delivery receipts, Exhibits 4-p, 4-q and 4-r, were
delivered to the persons who presented the true copies of the delivery
receipts and paid the handling charges, whom he presumed was a
representative of the NTC; that their practice was to released the goods
to the consignee or his authorized representative; that there were times
when the consignee Hassan Salim went to the port just to make sure if
the shipments were delivered to them; that Salim told them to just
allow his driver, assistant, or brother to sign the delivery receipts
because he has allegedly many other appointments to attend to; that
Salim talked personally to him and Armand Lara, head checker; that
the goods covered by the delivery receipts, Exh. 4-e, 4-f, 4-h and 4-o
were signed by Salim in his presence.
4. Ismael Zamora, second witness for the defendant, testified on
October 29, 2007 that he has been a delivery and release checker of
Jose Razon Shipping Agency from 1986 to the present; that he knows
plaintiff NTC which frequently shipped goods through defendant
Allied Shipping; that these were unloaded at the port and were brought
to NTC warehouse by trucks belonging to Jose Razon Trucking; that
January 2004 was the last time for them to deliver bags of non-fat dried
milk; that from October 2003 to January 2004 they handled similar
shipments of non-fat dried milk and, as a delivery checker, he
delivered those cargoes to Hassan Salim, manager of NTC who
received the cargoes himself; that he saw Salim personally receive the
cargoes for every delivery made; that after he made the deliveries, he
told Salim to sign the delivery receipts which he did sign either
personally or made his companion sign; that he asked the consignee or
his representative to sign the delivery receipts, Exhibits 4 to 4-r; that
Exh. 4-x-1 is the signature of their head checker Armand Lara; that
they were together and he saw him sign; that Exh. 4-x-2 is the
signature of Lito Asis, assistant manager of Salim; that he saw Asis
sign the delivery receipts whenever he received the goods; that Exh. 4-
a-1 is his signature; that Exh. 4-a-2 is his signature; that Exh. 4-b-2 is
the signature of Salim’s subordinate; that Exhibit 4-c1 is his signature;
that Exhibits 4-d-1, 4-e-1, 4-h-1; 4-i-1; 4-l-1; 4-m-1, 4-n-1 and 4-o-1
are his signatures; that Exhibits 4-d-2, 4-g-2 and 4-m-2, 4-n-2, 4-p-2,
4-q-2 are the signatures of Salim’s subordinate; that Exhibits 4-e-2, 4-f-
2, 4-h-2 and 4-o-2 are the signatures of Salim; that Exhibits 4-f-1 and
4-g-1 are the signatures of Armand Lara; that Exhibits 4-i-2, 4-j-2, 4-k-
2 and 4-l-2 are the signatures of Lito Asis; that Exhibits 4-j-1, 4-k-1, 4-
p-1, 4-q-1 and 4-r-1 are the signatures of his co-checker Ariel Zumar;
that after the delivery of the cargo, the person who received the cargo
signed the delivery receipt; that not all the delivery receipts were
signed by Salim, some were signed by his subordinates, and this is so
because sometimes Salim told him that he had other appointments and
so he instructed his subordinates to sign the receipt in his absence; that
during all the deliveries he made, Salim and his subordinates were
present.
On cross-examination, the same witness testified that even if the
consignee Hassan Salim was present all the time during the deliveries,
there were times when he did not sign the delivery receipts because
sometimes he went to attend some important appointments and left
before the deliveries were completed and just directed his subordinates
to sign for him (Hearing of November 17, 2007).
5. Atty. Ariel M. Luna, third witness for the defendant testified that
he is the corporate secretary and administrative head of Allied
Shipping; that on March 15, 2004, Allied Shipping, thru Artemio
Carpio, head of its Claims Department, sent a reply-letter to NTC’s
letter of March 11, 2004, relative to 5,824 bags of milk loaded on its
vessels (Exh. 1); that Carpio conducted an investigation and then wrote
another letter to NTC, dated April 26, 2004, informing him that the
5,824 bags of milk were delivered to the consignee Hassan Salim, the
NTC authorized branch representative as per the Allied Shipping cargo
delivery receipts and container list attached thereto (Exh. 2); that
Allied Shipping received a letter, dated February 1, 1989, from Helen
Jacinto, Domestic Freight Forwarding Operations Manager, NTC,
stating that Hassan Salim was no longer authorized to represent NTC
in whatever capacity, effective January 31, 2004, and that Antonio
Evanglelista was appointed O.I.C for the NTC Zamboanga Branch
(Exh. 3); that because of the filing of this case, Allied Shipping was
compelled to engage the services of counsel for P150,000.00 and has
further spent P60,000.00 to secure the attendance of witnesses from
Zamboanga, including airplane tickets, hotel bills, allowances of
witnesses and expenses of counsel in coming to court; and the cost of
filing this case, plus moral damages for tainting the defendant’s
reputation by filing this suit in the amount of P2,000,000.00 and
exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00.
On cross-examination, the same witness testified that the filing of
this case affected the business credibility of the defendant and brought
hardship in soliciting business. (Hearing of January 23, 2008).
On February 1, 2008, the same witness further testified that he
prepared a summary of expenses incurred by LSC in this case (Exh. 4;
Rollo, p. 492), with supporting documents. (Exhs. 4-a to 4-f; 4-h to 4-
n; Rollo, pp. 312-325.)
From the evidence adduced by the parties during the trial, it is
established that on April 20, 2003, plaintiff NSC and CARE entered
into an Agreement under which they undertook to continue a Food
Assistance Programs, a jointly sponsored nutrition project for
preschool children and pregnant and nursing mothers, in support of
which CARE bound itself to acquire by donation from the United
States Government, food commodities (non-fat dried milk and other
available USDA foods deemed suited to the need) for a three-year
period beginning January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2004 (Exh. A); that
in order to comply with such agreement, plaintiff NSC engaged the
services of its co-plaintiff NTC to receive and store the commodities,
including their transshipments and deliveries to various beneficiaries as
may be directed by the Department of Health (DOH), as per the
Contract of Services entered into on August 12, 2000 between NSC
and NTC (Exh. B); that pursuant to its agreement with NTC, the DOH
issued to NTC several delivery orders (Exh. C, C-1 to C-16) directing
the latter to effect the shipment and delivery of non-fat dried milk to
the Municipal Health Oficer (MHO), Isabela, West, Basilan (Exhs. C,
C-1); to the MHO, Isabela North, Basilan (Exh. C-2); to the MHO,
Lamitan East, Basilan (Exh. C-3); to the MHO, Lamitan West, Basilan
(Exh. C-4); to the MHO, Lantawan, Basilan (Exh. C-5); to the MHO,
Maluso, Basilan (Exh. C-6); to the MHO, Sumisip, Basilan (Exh. C-7);
to the MHO, Tipo-tipo, Basilan (Exh. C-8); to the MHO, Tuburan,
Basilan (Exh. C-9); to the Provincial Health Officer (PHO), Jolo, Sulu
(Exh. C-10); to the PHO, Dipolog City (Exh. C-11); to the City Health
Officer (CHO), Dapital City (Exh. C-12); to the CHO, Dipolog City
(C-13); to the PHO, Pagadian City (C-14); to the CHO, Pagadian City
(C-15); and to the CHO, Zamboanga City (Exh. C-16); that,
accordingly, on various dates in September and October, 2003, NTC
shipped Five Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty Four (5,824) bags of
non-fat dried milk to its consignee Hassan Salim, NTC Branch,
Zamboanga City, thru various vessels of the common carrier, defendant
Allied Shipping which issued the corresponding Bills of Lading in
favor of NTC (Exhs. T-1, T-2, T-3; T-6; T-8; T-9; T-10 and T-11; Exhs.
D, D-1, to D-8), with freight and wharfage dues prepaid in Manila in
the total amount of P68,707.65 (Exhs. E, E-1, E-2, E-3, E-4, E-5, E-6,
E-7 and E-8); that Hassan Salim was the consignee designated in all
the bills of lading covering the various shipments (Exhs. L to L-1-a; N
to N-1); that in a letter dated March 11, 2004 (Exh. F to F-3), plaintiff
NTC demanded from the defendant Allied Shipping reimbursement of
the value of the subject bags of non-fat dried milk, but said demand
was denied on the ground that the said goods were already delivered to
Salim (Exhs. C and H; 1 and 2).
It appears that while Hassan Salim was the consignee named in all
the bills of lading, and while he personally attended the deliveries of
the individual shipments to NTC, together with his subordinates, there
were times when, although present at the early stages of the deliveries,
he had to leave in order to attend other appointments allegedly, and
allowed or authorized his subordinates to continue receiving the
deliveries and to sign the corresponding delivery receipts after the
deliveries of the cargoes taken out of the container vans were
completed. Ricardo Samson and Ismael Zamora, who were there,
attested to the presence of Hassan Salim when Allied Shipping made
its deliveries to NTC. Plaintiffs NTC and NSC never effectively
rebutted these. They utterly failed to present Hassan Salim to refute or
deny the same if they were not true. Hence, delivery of the
commodities in question by Allied Shipping to NTC is established.
It is also significant to point out that even Atty. Gregorio Lantana,
second witness for the plaintiff, testified that on February 2, 2005, the
day before Hassan Salim resigned from his position as Branch
Supervisor of NTC, Zamboanga City, he talked to Salim. He asked
Salim several questions on the missing cargoes and the latter was
reluctant to answer. And so, Atty. Lantana postponed his investigation
to another day. Why was Salim reluctant to answer when he was the
person responsible for the goods, being the consignee thereof and the
Branch Supervisor of the NTC? According to Atty. Lantana, instead of
appearing for further investigation the following day, Salim, whose
credibility he doubted and who was one of his suspects, sent somebody
else to submit his resignation letter; that Atty. Lantana wanted to ask
Salim questions which would tend to show that he received or knew
what happened to the commodities, but after February 3, 2005, he
never saw Salim anymore. Salim’s avoidance of further investigation
and his resignation from the NTC are telltale evidence of his guilt.
“The wicked flee, even when no man pursueth, but the righteous are as
bold as a lion.”
Furthermore, why was Salim allowed to resign? Why were
administrative charges not filed against him? And why was he not
included as a party defendant in this case so that the plaintiffs could
have recovered damages from him? Why was the government so weak-
kneed, fearful and impotent against Salim? Why? Why?
Under the circumstances, and considering the evidence presented by
the plaintiffs as against the unrebutted evidence for the defendant on
the delivery of the commodities in question to Salim, the plaintiffs
have failed to prove their causes of action by clear preponderance of
evidence. Hence, their complaint must be dismissed. The defendant, on
the other hand, must be awarded damages on its counterclaims which
the court finds justified under the circumstances, by way of
reimbursement for their expenses arising out of this litigation in the
amount of P50,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount of P70,000.00.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiffs, dismissing the latter’s complaint,
and ordering the plaintiffs, pursuant to the defendant’s counterclaims,
to pay, jointly and solidarily, to the defendant, actual damages in the
amount of P50,000.00, and attorney’s fees in the amount of P70,000.00
plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, May 14, 2008.
(Name omitted)
Judge
APPENDIX D
Pointers in Answering School

and Bar Examination Questions
1. Matters of Form
If you were a bar candidate or just a law student preparing for a
school exam, you could be writing your answer according to the
following format:
The Tagaytay City ordinance concerning memorial parks is
unconstitutional. The Constitution provides that private property
shall not be taken for public use without payment of just
compensation. But mere government regulation of the use of
private property to promote public welfare does not amount to
taking of property. It is when property is appropriated and applied
to some public purpose that there is taking that is compensable.
Here, the ordinance does not merely regulate use of lots within the
memorial park. Five percent of the lots are required to be given
away for free to the poor of the city to promote their welfare.
Consequently, there is taking without payment of just
compensation. The ordinance is unconstitutional.
What is wrong with this?
First, it violates the ordinary rule of paragraphing. The first line is
brought to the leftmost edge of the page while the succeeding lines are
the ones that are indented. It is usually the other way around.
Second, visually, it projects a solid wall, an obstacle course, that
challenges the examiner to penetrate. “This one,” says the examiner,
“is giving me a hard work correcting his paper.” And the thing that
lawyers hate most is hard work.
Would the following format be more agreeable to the eye?
Definitely.
8.
The issue is whether or not Alfredo’s dismissal violates his freedom
of religious worship and its free exercise.
The Constitution provides that the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious worship without preference shall forever be allowed. Indeed,
in the hierarchy of values, such freedom is deemed superior to
contractual and property rights.
Here, to Alfredo, Sabbath is not a day for work but for worship just
as much as most others believe that Sunday is a day of rest and
worship. If he is dismissed because of the exercise of his freedom, the
dismissal is unconstitutional.
Here, the number tag of the question you are answering is placed at
the center of the first line. But you could also put it before the first
word of your answer, if that is what you prefer.
Like the above, observe paragraphing when you shift from one idea
to the next. Paragraph breaks give the examiner a brief respite after
each point. Visually, his task seems easier when divided into short or
medium length paragraphs. You make the examiner’s journey through
your notebook easier.
Always start on a new page for every numbered question. It is neat
and turning to a new page gives the examiner a sense of
accomplishment in correcting your notebook.
2. Making corrections
When correcting a mistake, simply run a line across the erroneous
word or sentence. For example:
The President dismissed the mayor.
Here, if you want to change the word “dismissed” to “suspended,”
simply run one line across the word you want to change, and then write
the correct word over it if the space permits. Otherwise, run the line
thru the rest of the sentence and rewrite it like this:
The President dismissed the mayor suspended the mayor.
3. Budgeting time
Always budget your time. Count the numbers of questions asked and
divide these by the time available to you. That will give you an idea of
how much time you have to spend on each item. At halftime, check
where you are and consider working faster when you have fallen
behind.
It would be a pity if you have to pass your notebook with some
questions left unanswered. You suffer full deductions for every
unanswered question. In a question that requires you to give a reason
for your answer, you would always get some points for a plausible
answer even if it is essentially wrong. On the other hand, if you work
in haste, you could miss one item in the set of questions. Since, an
unanswered item suffers a full deduction, this can make the difference
between your passing and failing the exam. Consequently, you might
want to consider placing a checkmark on each item you have already
answered so you will know if you missed any.
4. Enumeration questions
Sometimes, examiners would ask you enumeration questions like
what the elements of a particular crime are or what marriages are void
from the beginning. When you are certain of your answer, you might
answer the last question like this:
The following marriages are void from the beginning:
1. Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age
even with the consent of parents and guardians;
2. Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to
perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with
either or both parties believing good faith that the solemnizing
officer had the legal authority to do so;
3. Those solemnized without license, except those covered by
the preceding;
4. Those bigamous and polygamous marriages not falling under
Article 42;
5. Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as
to the identity of the other; and
6. Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
But, when you are unsure of your answer or could not give all that
are required, do not number your enumerations. Use the colon and
semi-colons like this:
The following marriages are void from the beginning: those
contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the
consent of parents and guardians; those solemnized by any person
not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages
were contracted with either or both parties believing good faith
that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so; those
contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the
identity of the other; and those subsequent marriages that are void
under Article 53.
As a rule, the examiner scans the answers and will rarely go back to
count what you wrote. He will decide by impression. If you write it this
way, the examiner would likely assume that you have put in
everything.
5. Problem questions
Students of law usually come from different educational
backgrounds, not all of them with suitable preparations for resolving
legal problems. You probably first encountered the essay-type of test
questions in high school. And, most likely, no one taught you how to
write an essayed answer. Still, your teachers somehow allowed your
work to pass, giving you a sense that you had done right.
Since your method worked for you in high school, you brought it
with you to college. Again, you may have managed to get by on it.
Then, you entered law school. But law maintains an intellectual
discipline all its own. Unfortunately, a number of you may not have
fully adapted to that discipline and have refused to change your
answering pattern. Although you have moved into a new city, you still
use the map of the old city. No wonder you sometimes get lost.
For most parts, presenting a sound legal position on any question
follows the mold of the classic categorical syllogism. Although no one
can say that answers to problem questions must follow a fixed model,
you would not make a mistake if you use this syllogism as such model.
It is exemplified by this problem and answer:
Problem: Is Carlos mortal?
Answer: All men are mortal.
Carlos is a man.
Therefore, Carlos is mortal.
The first part of the answer states the rule as to who are regarded as
mortal, thus, “All men are mortal.” It is a rule statement. The second
part of the answer applies the rule to the fact of the case, thus, “Carlos
is a man.” The rule that all men are mortal applies to Carlos because he
is a man. The third part of the answer is the conclusion, “Therefore,
Carlos is mortal.”
But, by the nature of rules, they are hardly ever absolute. They often
recognize exceptions to their applications or on occasions need to be
interpreted to meet the peculiarities of specific cases. For instance,
suppose the last problem is altered somewhat:
Problem: Is Helen mortal?
Answer: All men are mortal; men include women.
Helen is a woman.
Therefore, Helen is mortal.
The statement “all men are mortal“ gives the general rule. The
statement that “men include women” acknowledges a relevant
interpretation of that rule. The statement, “Helen is a woman,” applies
the rule to Helen. The conclusion is then drawn that Helen is mortal.
The same pattern: rule, application to case, and conclusion can be used
in answering problem questions in classrooms and bar examinations.
For a deeper understanding of legal logic, read Chapters 6, 7, and 8 of
this book.
But consider adding an introduction or topic statement to your
answer pattern. The topic statement introduces the subject of your
answer. It helps orient the examiner to the particular problem that you
are about to tackle. If you are certain of your answer, it would be
preferable that, for topic sentence, you write down your thesis or the
position you have taken with respect to the issue that the problem
presents, e.g., “Helen is mortal.” If not, just state the issue and make it
your topic sentence, e.g., “The issue is whether or not Helen is mortal.”
Your answer pattern will now be: Topic, Rule, Application to case,
and Conclusion or TRAC. Let us have a simple legal problem:
Problem: Jose crossed the red light while driving an ambulance in an
emergency. Did he violate the rule that punishes crossing the red light?
Answer:
[T] Jose should be punished for crossing the red light while driving
an ambulance in an emergency. (Alternative topic sentence: The issue
is whether or not Jose should be punished for crossing the red light
while driving an ambulance in an emergency.)
[R] Crossing the red light is punishable by law (the general rule) but
driving an ambulance on an emergency is exempt (an exception).
[A] Jose crossed the red light while driving an ambulance on an
emergency.
[C] Therefore, Jose did not violate the rule that punishes crossing
the red light.
Examiners rarely use simple problems. The trick is that they prefer
asking questions involving the application, not of the general rule or
law itself, but of judicial interpretations of that law or the exceptions to
it.
Now let us take up an actual bar examination problem. It says:
Section 10 of Ordinance No. 105 of Tagaytay City provides that
at least 5% of the total area of any memorial park established
within its jurisdiction shall be set aside for charity burial of its
pauper residents and that no permit to establish, operate, and
maintain a private memorial park shall be granted without the
The City argues that it is within its powers to pass said
ordinance; that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power;
and that the portion taken is for public use, the same being intended
for paupers pursuant to its duty to provide for the health and safety
of its inhabitants.
Before tackling the problem, however, you need to get a clear
understanding of its facts. The trick is to sort out the relevant facts
from the irrelevant. To be able to do this, you need to identify the issue
that the problem presents. In most cases it is found at the end of the
problem. Here, it is found in the sentence: Discuss the
constitutionality of said ordinance. You can encircle or underline it
to get a correct focus on what you need to answer because bar
candidates or students are often distracted by other aspects of the
problem. Transposed in the format of an issue, it reads: whether or not
the ordinance is constitutional.
So, having identified the issue, you are now ready to work on the
facts and sort out the relevant from the irrelevant. What facts are
relevant to the constitutionality of the ordinance? The answer is
simple: it is the provision of the ordinance that affects the rights of the
owner of the memorial park.
Since no rule stops you from writing notes on the questions sheet,
feel free to go over the facts and underline those that are relevant to the
issue. Are the number and section of the ordinance relevant to its
constitutionality? No. How about the fact that it was enacted by
Tagaytay City? Neither. As already stated, go for the provision of the
ordinance that affects the right of the owners of memorial parks. Thus,
the ordinance “provides that at least 5% of memorial park…be set
aside for charity burial…” or “no permit to operate… shall be
granted.” You may skip the words “establish” and “maintain” as
redundant but you must underline the phrase “without the applicant’s
conformity,” being relevant to the owner’s exercise of his right. The
words “agreeing to such condition” is redundant.
In the next paragraph, underline the “City argues that it is within its
powers to pass said ordinance” and “a valid exercise of police power”
since this is the city’s argument that its ordinance is constitutional. But
skip “and that the portion taken is for public use, the same being
intended for paupers pursuant to its duty to provide” since the relevant
provisions of the ordinance already states this. Finally, underline “for
the health and safety of its inhabitants” since this goes into the exercise
of police power.
This is how the problem would appear on the questionnaire after you
underline the relevant facts:
Section 10 of Ordinance No. 105 of Tagaytay City provides that
at least 5% of the total area of any memorial park established
within its jurisdiction shall be set aside for charity burial of its
pauper residents and that no permit to establish, operate, and
maintain a private memorial park shall be granted without the
applicant’s conformity or agreeing to such condition. The City
argues that it is within its powers to pass said ordinance; that the
ordinance is a valid exercise of police power; and that the portion
taken is for public use, the same being intended for paupers
pursuant to its duty to provide for the health and safety of its
inhabitants.
Without the words that we skipped, the question would read like
this:
Ordinance … provides that at least 5% of … memorial park … be
set aside for charity burial … no permit to … operate … without the
applicant’s conformity.
City argues … it is within its powers to pass said ordinance … a
valid exercise of police power … for the health and safety of its
inhabitants.
Does the above present the question more clearly? Definitely! For a
more extensive discussion of the facts and the issues of a case, read
Chapters 3 and 5 of this book.
Now that you have identified the issue and checked out the relevant
facts, you are ready to look for the applicable rule. This is actually
your problem-solving stage. Here, it would be best to do a little pre-
work on the margin of your questionnaire.
What law or principle applies to the problem concerning the
ordinance that requires owners of memorial parks to give 5% of their
lands to the poor for free? Is it an exercise of police power, like an
ordinance that requires owners of land to set back their houses three
meters from their property line to maintain an aesthetic environment?
Or is it an exercise of the power of eminent domain, like an ordinance
expropriating private land for use in road building? The answer is the
second since the ordinance does more than regulate use of property. It
takes title to part of the memorial park from the owner. Thus, begin
your answer by stating the general rule provided in the Constitution
that “Private property shall not be taken for public use without
payment of just compensation.”
But remember this. Like the crossing-the-red-light case, the
examiner is usually not after the application of the general rule per se.
That is too elementary. He is usually after the interpretation of the
general rule or its exception.
How has the rule that “private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation” been interpreted? Does any one of
these interpretations apply to our case? Let us consider various
interpretations and choose the right one:
–– There is taking of private property for public use when the
government invades the property in a permanent in character.
–– Taking by the national government of the property of local
government is compensable taking.
–– Mere government regulation of the use of private
property is not “taking” that requires compensation.
–– There is taking of private property for public use when
the government takes the title over the property from the
owner.
The first interpretation (there is taking of private property for public
use when the government invades the property in a permanent in
character) is not relevant to the issue since the government did not
forcibly take possession of or invade the property in our case. The
second interpretation (taking by the national government of the
property of local government is compensable taking) is also not
relevant since the case involves private land. But the third
interpretation (mere government regulation of the use of private
property is not “taking” that requires compensation) is relevant. This is
the position taken by the city government on the issue raised in the
case. The fourth interpretation (there is taking of private property for
public use when the government takes the title over the property from
the owner) is relevant since the government wanted to take ownership
of 5% of the land so it can give them to the poor.
Is there an exception in which the government can take private
property and not have to pay for it? There is one exception: the taking
is not compensable in cases of destruction of injurious private property.
Example is bird-flue infestation of privately owned chicken farms. The
government can order their destruction to prevent the spread of the
decease without having to pay just compensation. Does this apply to
our case? No. Then do not include it in your answer.
After such pre-work, you are now ready to write you answer using
the TRAC model (topic, rule, application to case, and conclusion):
5. The Tagaytay City ordinance concerning memorial parks is
unconstitutional. (Alternative topic statement: The issue is whether
or not the Tagaytay City ordinance concerning memorial parks is
unconstitutional.)
The Constitution provides that private property shall not be taken
for public use without payment of just compensation. Mere
government regulation of the use of private property to promote
public welfare does not amount to taking of that property. It is
when the government takes the title over the property that there is
taking that is compensable.
Here, the ordinance does not merely regulate use of lots within
the memorial park. The government takes five percent of the lots so
it could give them free to the poor of the city. Consequently, there
is taking without payment of just compensation. The ordinance is
unconstitutional.
Answers need not be long-winded. Give a straight answer and you
would be able to finish your exam early and help the examiner
facilitate correction of your booklet. Long answers do not help.
Here is another sample problem.
8. Alfredo was a government employee in the Department of
Agriculture. After reading some verses in the Bible closely, he
came to believe in his heart that Sabbath fell on Wednesdays, not
on Sundays, as others believe. Consequently, he refused to report
for work on Wednesdays despite several warnings from his
superiors concerning it. Because of his habitual absence during
Wednesdays, his superiors dismissed him from work. He sought
reconsideration of the dismissal but this was denied.
Is his dismissal from work a violation of the freedom of religion
provided by the Constitution? Explain your answer.
Like the previous problem, you must first sort out the facts. In
sorting them out, be guided by the issue that the examiner presents.
And where do you find the issue in this problem? Again, it is towards
the end of the problem: “Is his dismissal from work a violation of
the freedom of religion provided by the Constitution?” You can
encircle or underline it. Transpose it then into the format of an issue
and it will read: whether or not Alfredo’s dismissal from work
violates his freedom of religion.
Having identified the issue, you can further work on the facts of the
case to determine what facts are relevant to the determination of
validity of Alfredo’s dismissal from work. With this in mind, the facts
that you need to underline are:
8. Alfredo was a government employee in the Department of
Agriculture. After reading some verses in the Bible closely, he
came to believe in his heart that Sabbath fell on Wednesdays, not
on Sundays as others believe. Consequently, he refused to report
for work on Wednesdays despite several warnings from his
superiors concerning it. Because of his habitual absence during
Wednesdays, his superiors dismissed him from work. He sought
reconsideration of the dismissal but this was denied. Is his
dismissal from work a violation of the freedom of religion provided
by the Constitution? Explain your answer.
Without the words that we skipped, the question would read like
this:
Alfredo … a government employee … believes in his heart that
Sabbath fell on Wednesdays … Because of his habitual absence
during Wednesdays, his superiors dismissed him from work … a
violation of the freedom of religion …?
With the relevant facts and the issue known, your next step is to
search for the applicable general rule, and its interpretations or
exceptions. Apparently, the general rule that applies to the case is
found in the Constitution, thus, “The Constitution provides that the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious worship without preference shall
forever be allowed.” A relevant interpretation of this general rule
would be one made by the Supreme Court: “Indeed, in the hierarchy of
values, such freedom is deemed superior to contractual and property
rights.” The right to dismiss an employee is implicit in a contract of
employment.
Following the TRAC model, the answer would read something like
this:
8.
The issue is whether or not the dismissal violates the freedom
of religious worship and its free exercise. (Alternate topic
sentence “The dismissal violates the freedom of religious worship
and its free exercise.”)
The Constitution provides that the free exercise and enjoyment
of religious worship without preference shall forever be allowed.
Indeed, in the hierarchy of values, such freedom is deemed superior
to contractual and property rights.
Here, to Alfredo, Sabbath is not a day for work but for worship just
as much as most others believe that Sunday is a day of rest and
worship. If he is dismissed because of the exercise of his freedom, the
dismissal is unconstitutional.
Actually, the answer is wrong but it is logical and written well. It is
certain to earn significant points for the student or candidate.
Developing an ability to answer questions clearly and logically already
improves your chances of passing your exam.
Now, here is an actual question asked in the bar. The facts are short
but you can still underline the relevant facts as was done in previous
examples:
2. A and B were married on January 1, 1980. Two weeks later,
on their way home from honeymoon, the car A was driving turned
turtle. A died instantly while B was unharmed. A month thereafter,
B had illicit relations with C. On October 5, 1980, B gave birth to
X. In X’s birth certificate, B declared that X’s father is C.
Resolve the issue of X’s paternity with reasons.
Here is the topnotcher’s answer. Although he used the TRAC
model, he omitted the T or topic sentence, something that you could
also do.
2. Under the Civil Code of the Philippines, a child born after 180
days following the celebration of marriage and within 300 days
following its dissolution is presumed legitimate [the general rule].
Against that presumption, only physical impossibility of access
between the couple during the first 120 days of the 300 days, which
preceded the birth of the child, can be used [the exception].
In this case, X was born within the period above contemplated.
There was no physical impossibility of access between the spouses
A and B during the early part of the first 120 days that preceded the
birth of the child the fact being that they were on their honeymoon
prior to A’s death.
The fact that the mother declared against the legitimacy of the
child is inconsequential. This the law expressly provides.
X is the legitimate child of A and B.
Here is another sample problem:
3. Patrick and Liza were married by the Provincial Governor of
Cagayan. At the time of the celebration of their marriage, both
spouses believed in good faith that provincial governors had the
authority to solemnize marriages. What is the status of the
marriage? Support your answer.
Using the TRAC model, one student answered it in this manner:
3. The marriage between Patrick and Liza is valid.
Under the Family Code, one of the requisites of a valid marriage
is the authority of the solemnizing officer. But lack of authority
will not impair the validity of the marriage if either or both of the
parties believed in good faith through mistake of fact that the
solemnizing officer had such authority, without prejudice to the
civil or criminal liability of such officer.
Here, since both spouses believed in good faith that Reverend
Juan Sanchez was a priest with authority to solemnize marriage,
their marriage shall be regarded as valid but Sanchez may be
civilly or criminally prosecuted.
The reference to the liability of the unauthorized officer is irrelevant
to the issue that the case presents. Students or bar candidates have the
tendency to bear away from the issue and address other concerns
probably to show that they know more than just what was being asked
of them. The result is not what they expect. Addressing an irrelevant
point often results in a deduction from what could have been a perfect
score. Stay on the issue. Do not digress from it.
6. Multiple Choice Questions
Multiple-choice questions are actually a matching test. You have the
main stem of the question on the one hand and the several choices of
answers on the other. But the point of every question is the same. You
are expected to match the main stem with the correct choice of answer.
Questions are usually of several types. Here are some samples.
a) Name the thing described.
A party’s allegation in a pleading filed in another case [the
main stem of the question] constitutes (a) extrajudicial admission
(b) judicial admission (c) hearsay evidence (d) privileged matter
[the choices].
The main trick in answering multiple-choice questions is to apply a
process of elimination. You sometimes have four or three answers to
choose from. Usually, if there are four choices, two are definitely and
clearly inappropriate. They are outright dummies and you can call
them that. In the problem, answers (c) and (d) are the dummies since a
party’s statement in his pleading is neither hearsay matter nor is
privileged. Answer (b) is a correct characterization of a party’s
allegation in his pleading. It seems acceptable but is actually a wrong
answer and for that reason you can call it the phony. It is a wrong
answer because the pleading where the allegation is found has been
filed in another case. What remains is (a), the correct answer. It is the
correct answer because an admission made outside the courtroom
constitutes extrajudicial admission.
Here is another sample of the “name the thing” variety:
The law that will determine jurisdiction over a particular case
[the main stem of the question] is the law in force at the time (a)
the summons is served (b) the cause of action accrued (c) the
action is filed (d) the issues in the action are joined [the choices].
Answers (a) and (d) are the dummies because they are clearly
inapplicable. Answer (c) is the phony because, although the filing of
the action constitutes judicial demand and arrests the running of the
prescriptive period, it is the wrong answer. The correct answer is (b)
because it is only at the commencement of the action that the
jurisdiction of the court over it can be known.
b) Complete the sentence.
Positively stated, police power is the power (a) to ensure equal
protection (b) to maintain peace and order (c) to call on the armed
forces to suppress lawlessness (d) to enact laws that promote the public
welfare.
Answers (a) and (c) are the dummies because they are clearly
inapplicable. Answer (b) is the phony because, although the term
police is associated with peace and order, it is the wrong answer. The
correct answer is (d) because police power is actually has to do with
making reasonable laws and rules.
Another sample:
Laws enjoy the presumption that they are (a) needed (b)
constitutional (c) published (d) accepted.
Answers (c) and (d) are the dummies because they are clearly
inapplicable. Answer (a) is the phony because, although laws may be
presumed needed, it is irrelevant in the context of the fact the question
is asked in a political law exam. The correct answer is (b) because laws
are presumed constitutional.
c) Find the rule that applies to the facts.
A law that provides for the drafting of only able-bodied men,
not women, to fight the rebels in Mindanao (a) is consistent with,
(b) violates, (c) is irrelevant to, (d) champions, the right to equal
protection.
If the party offering a mere photocopy of a document
intentionally destroyed the original, (a) the original will be
presumed adverse to him (b) he will be barred from offering the
photocopy (c) he will be punished for contempt (d) his action will
be dismissed.
Try to answer the above yourself. Identify the dummies, the phony,
and the correct answer among the choices. Do the same in the
following varieties of multiple choice questions.
d) Find the facts on which the rule applies.
Fire marshals may conduct administrative searches of houses to
check on violations of the fire code provided they have (a)
inspection orders from the fire chief (b) the city council’s
approval (c) a search warrant (d) their badges.
Censorship of motion picture is allowed to guard the public
against (a) evil deeds (b) bad acting (c) excessive admission fee
(d) obscenity.
e) Find the right exception to the rule.
Under the parole evidence rule, when an agreement is in
writing, no evidence of the terms of such agreement can be
presented except (a) the written agreement itself (b) the testimony
of the parties regarding those terms (c) secondary evidence of
such agreement.
f) Find the correct interpretation of a rule.
Constitutional equality accepts the need for classifying men, ideas,
and things provided that such classifications are (a) desirable (b)
reasonable (c) indispensable (d) understandable.
g) Find the legal justification for an act.
President Aquino denied admission of former president Ferdinand
Marcos into the Philippines under her power (a) to protect national
security (b) to maintain peace and order (c) to enforce a judicial order
(d) to direct foreign relation.
The law requiring registration of labor unions does not violate the
freedom of association because (a) such registration is for listing
purposes only (b) unionism needs regulation for the protection of their
members (c) registration is needed to give unions juridical personalities
(d) the interest of the State is paramount.

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Scope of Legal Writing

The Legal Dispute

Meaning of Legal Dispute

Its Significance in Legal Writing

Legal Dispute and the Principal Issue

Importance of Principal Issue

Legal writing, when methodically done, is much like a construction

Two Stages of Legal Writing

Random Notes versus Summary

Facts seen through the Issue

The Beers War

COURT STAFF: (After swearing in the witness) State

Relevant Facts Extracted

Facts Set in Sequence

–– Julia Torres is eighteen years old, single, and a

Julia Torres, eighteen years of age, single, said that she

The Case of a Child and a Neighbor’s Dog

Interview with Mr. Fred Puzon,

Mr. Peter Banag

Very truly yours,

Knowing the Applicable Law or Rule

After working on the testimonies and documents in your case, you

Sources of Law or Rule

Article 266-A. Rape; when and how committed. ––

For the Prosecution

1. Go back to the case that Peter Banag consulted you with,

Getting Into the Issues

Issues in Multiple Legal Disputes

Subordinate Controlling Issues

Relevant and Irrelevant Issues

A list of All the Issues

a) Allan’s claim that Ben and Cesar were negligent in

Correct statement of the Issues

1. Presumably, you have, as part of pre-work, defined the legal

Roughing Out the Argument

Dad, I want to re-enroll this semester [he speaks of

Dad, please consider letting me re-enroll. I made a

Does this approach have a better chance? Definitely.

First –– A clear statement of your thesis or where you

The above structure represents the psychology of every balanced

(Where You Stand on the Issue)

What is the point in adopting as your balance sheet heading your

(Where You Stand on the Issue)

(Arguments Against (Arguments in Your

(Appeal to Your Reader’s Good Sense)

Anatomy of a Legal Argument

The Key Fact in Rules

The Case Fact

The defense of alibi, as a rule, is considered with

Roughed Out Arguments

(Where You Stand on the Issue)

(Arguments Against (Arguments in Your

(Where You Stand on the Issue)

(Arguments Against (Arguments in Your

He and she were

(Where You Stand on the Issue)

Being sweethearts, it was not likely Ronald was

(Where You Stand on the Issue)

Julia ignored Ronald during the

(Where You Stand on the Issue)

Being a barrio woman,

(Appeal to Your Reader’s Good Sense)