50 YEARS

NON-
PROLIFERATION
TREATY
Is there still a future for
nuclear arms control?
Dr Gabriele Reitmeier

ANALYSIS
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June 2020

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Contents
1 50 YEARS OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 4

1.1 Countries/groups and their positions 4

1.2 Track record of the NPT 5

1.3 NPT Review Conference 2020/21: framework conditions & objectives 5

1.4 The position of the European Union 6

2 POSITIONS OF SELECTED NUCLEAR POWERS 8

2.1 United States 8

2.2 Russian Federation 9

2.3 People’s Republic of China 9

3 NEW APPROACHES TO NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL 10

3.1 The CEND Initiative (Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament) 10

3.2 Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament 11

4 CLOSING REMARKS AND POLITICAL DEMANDS 11


Executive Summary
On March 5, 2020, the global community celebrated
the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT). The NPT Review Con-
ference (RevCon)¹ scheduled for May 2020 in New
York was postponed due to the coronavirus epidemic.
Let us hope that the participating states, especially
the five official nuclear powers (P5), will take advan-
tage of this interval to pursue their dialogue on strate-
gic security and nuclear arms control, as the nuclear
arms race and the erosion of the traditional disarma-
ment and arms control regime are at least as great
a threat to humanity as the pandemic. The proposal
by Russian President Vladimir Putin to convene a P5
1 50 years of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which entered into force
in March 1970, is the only binding multilateral treaty on
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation between
countries of the global community under international
law. Signed by 191 countries, it is also one of the world’s
most universal treaties. Only four states have not joined
the treaty: India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Sudan. The
status of North Korea, which withdrew from the treaty
in January 2003, has since been left open by the NPT
community.
The treaty consists of three pillars: 1) non-proliferation
(Articles I-III), i.e. the obligation of non-nuclear weapon
states (NNWS) to refrain from acquiring a nuclear
arsenal; 2) promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear
energy (Article IV); and 3) disarmament (Article VI), i.e.
the obligation of nuclear weapon states (P5 states) to
reduce their nuclear arsenals. The International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors compliance with the
treaty by means of on-site inspections.
1.1 Countries/groups and
their positions
The P5 group
This group consists of the officially recognized nuc-
lear powers, namely the US, France, the UK, Russia
(formerly the Soviet Union), and the People’s Repu-
blic of China. These countries were the initiators of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty and gained this status
by virtue of having developed and activated nuclear
1
The Review Conferences provide a framework for analysing progress in the implementation of the treaty’s objectives
every five years and defining the subsequent course of action.
POLICY PAPER 4
summit later this year seems promising. The United
States, China, France, and the United Kingdom have
now agreed to this proposal, which could provide new
momentum to establish a trilateral or even multila-
teral dialogue on arms control. However, there has
currently been no response from the United States
to Putin’s proposal to “renew the New START treaty
without delay and without preconditions,” announ-
ced officially before military representatives of the
Russian Department of Defense in December 2019.
The coronavirus pandemic once again demonstrates
to the world the necessity and urgency of effective
global governance and international cooperation –
whether in health policy or arms control.
warheads before January 1, 1967. They are also the
permanent members of the UN Security Council.
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI)
This group was founded after RevCon 2010 with the
primary agenda of implementing the action plan for
nuclear disarmament outlined during the conference.
In addition to its initiators, Australia and Japan, the
NPDI also includes Germany, Chile, Canada, Mexico,
the Netherlands, Nigeria, the Philippines, Poland,
Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. Germany has
served as coordinator since 2015.
New Agenda Coalition (NAC)
This group of non-nuclear weapon states consists of
Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, and South
Africa. Their primary goal is rapid nuclear disarma-
ment, as set out in Art. VI of the NPT. The members
of this group also signed and ratified the UN Treaty
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons of 2017.
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
With more than 120 members, this group is also
committed to nuclear disarmament and the disconti-
nuation of nuclear sharing.
Vienna Group of Ten
This group was formed by Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, Norway, and the EU countries of the Nether-
lands, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, and
Sweden. It advocates moratoria and a ban on nuclear
testing (Test Ban Treaty).

1.2 Track record of the NPT
Many continue to regard the NPT as a milestone
of international disarmament and non-proliferation
diplomacy. The fact that no nuclear weapons have
been used in the past 75 years can undoubtedly be
considered a great success. However, when the treaty
is measured against its three pillars, a very different
picture emerges of its track record:
Non-proliferation: A key achievement of the NPT is that
it significantly contributed to limiting the proliferation
of nuclear weapons to a relatively small number of
countries. Only 13 of the world’s countries have ever
possessed nuclear weapons, and four of them – South
Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine – have relin-
quished their nuclear arsenals. This leaves nine (known)
nuclear weapon states – Israel, India, Pakistan, North
Korea, and the P5. The Vienna Nuclear Agreement with
Iran in 2016 was another great success that has since
been called into question by its unilateral termination by
the United States. However, efforts to achieve denuclea-
rization in North Korea have so far failed.
Most of the international community (122 countries in
total) has supported the principle of non-proliferation
by approving the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons (TPNW) in July 2017. This treaty has now
been signed by 80 countries and ratified by 35. This
means that 15 additional ratifications are currently re-
quired before the treaty enters into force. It prohibits the
development, production, testing, acquisition, storage,
transport, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons or
threats thereof. Nuclear sharing is also explicitly pro-
hibited. None of the nuclear powers or NATO member
countries (including Germany) have joined this initiative.
By contrast, it was supported by a global network of
hundreds of NGOs and principally coordinated by the
“International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons”
(ICAN), which received the Nobel Peace Prize for its
work in December 2017.
The principle of nuclear sharing, long practised by
NATO, is the object of criticism. The transfer and deploy-
ment of US nuclear weapons in other NATO countries
(Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Greece, Turkey) is
seen by many as a violation of the principle of non-pro-
liferation. The practice is also highly controversial from
the perspective of international law, as it leads to nuc-
lear weapons being stored on the territory of countries
that are considered non-nuclear weapon states².
Civilian use: The civilian use of nuclear energy is an
extremely multifaceted topic. On the one hand, it holds
2
For example, US weapons are stored in Germany even though Germany declared that it would not use nuclear weapons
when it joined NATO in 1955. This renunciation was reaffirmed by joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1969 and the
Two Plus Four Agreement in 1990.
3
While some countries such as France have not reserved the right to launch a nuclear strike, they would likely be willing
to consider nuclear retaliation against a major conventional attack.
POLICY PAPER 5
great potential in medicine, industry, agriculture, and
research; however, it also means that many countries
now meet key technical prerequisites that could allow
them to rapidly develop their own nuclear weapons. The
risk that non-state actors and terrorist groups might
come into possession of nuclear weapons has also
steadily risen.
Nuclear disarmament: The implementation of the
disarmament obligations outlined by Art. VI of the
NPT is currently far behind the agreed schedule,
even 50 years after the entry into force of the treaty.
Many critics accuse the nuclear powers of failing
to fulfil their disarmament obligations and instead
modernizing their arsenals and developing new
weapons and delivery systems. Although numbers
alone may give the impression that disarmament
is progressing – the number of nuclear weapons
worldwide has fallen from around 70,000 during the
Cold War to just under 14,000 today – critics argue
that the P5 nuclear powers have primarily been
disarming weapons that were no longer operational.
In parallel, they have modernized their arsenals. With
7,000 and 6,800 nuclear weapons each, Russia and
the United States currently still possess around 92
percent of the world’s nuclear arsenal. Furthermore,
of the nine nuclear powers, only the People’s Repu-
blic of China and India have renounced nuclear first
strikes (no first use policy)³.
Various efforts to accelerate nuclear disarmament
within the framework of the NPT such as the 13
steps towards complete nuclear disarmament set out
by RevCon 2000 or the NPT Action Plan of 2010 have
not yet achieved the desired goal. Failure to comply
with Art. VI of the NPT is causing increasing polariza-
tion over the past few years between nuclear weapon
states and non-nuclear weapon states, with explosive
potential for the treaty as a whole.
1.3 NPT Review Conference 2020/21:
framework conditions & objectives
The Review Conference 2020/21 is taking place wit-
hin a particularly challenging global security context.
Key factors include rising global tensions between
the major powers of the US, Russia, and China, the
termination of long-standing arms control agree-
ments, a renewed nuclear arms race, and an increase
in regional security risks. The impending erosion of
the traditional regime of disarmament and arms con-
trol can be seen particularly clearly in the following
developments:

J May 2018: Unilateral termination of the Iran nuclear
agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,
JCPOA) by the US. This agreement was seen as
a historic achievement and an important contributi
on by the EU to the global non-proliferation regime.
Its termination could trigger a new nuclear arms
race in the Middle East.
J February 2019: Termination of the INF Treaty
(Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) on the
prohibition of land-based intermediate-range nuclear
weapons between 500 and 5,500 kilometres. This
has a very negative impact on the security situation,
especially in Europe, which is now directly threa-
tened by new Russian intermediate-range missiles.
J May 2020: The Trump administration is also in the
process of withdrawing from the Treaty on Open
Skies, which allows the 34 signatory states to fly
unarmed reconnaissance flights across the territory
of the other signatories. This treaty was an im-
portant tool for military transparency and
trust-building.
J The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of
1996 has still not entered into force. Despite being
signed by 183 states and ratified by 166, eight of the
so-called “Annex 2” states are still missing, namely
Iran, Israel, Egypt, China, the US, India, Pakistan,
and North Korea. The last three countries have not
yet signed the treaty and are the only states to have
continued nuclear tests after 1996.
J The negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off
Treaty should be a top priority but is currently not
within sight
. pean nuclear deterrent (see Section II).
J No progress in the denuclearization of North Korea.
J A lack of progress with regard to a WMD-free zone
in the Middle East. The corresponding resolution of
the NPT dates back to 1995. There has been no
noteworthy progress so far4.
J In February 2021, the renewal of the New START
treaty on limiting strategic nuclear weapons in the
United States and Russia is due. If Moscow and
Washington do not come to an agreement, there will
be no arms control agreement in force for the first
time since 1972.
At the same time, the challenges are becoming
increasingly complex. The arms race has now spread
4
In 2018, the UN General Assembly instructed the UN Secretary-General to convene an annual conference on the further
development of the WMDFZ from 2019 onwards. The first conference was held in November 2019 at the UN headquar-
ters. The US did not accept the invitation.
5
RAND Corporation: How might Artificial Intelligence affect the risk of nuclear war, Security 2040 Series, 2018.
6
Elon Musk: “An open letter to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons”, Aug. 2017.
POLICY PAPER 6
to space and the cyberdomain. New technological and
military developments – such as cyberweapons and
hypersonic weapons or autonomous weapons sys-
tems controlled by artificial intelligence5 have ushered
in a third revolution in warfare – just as the invention
of gunpowder and nuclear warheads6. While the United
States, Russia, and China compete for technological
domination, smaller nuclear weapon states must fear
the loss of their second strike capability. This would
render the principle of “mutually assured destructi-
on” (MAD) obsolete once and for all. Arms control in
non-nuclear domains could become crucial to prevent
nuclear escalation in the future.
The Review Conference 2020 must also contend with
a particularly challenging internal context. Polarizati-
on has been steadily growing between the 191 NPT
states. The escalation was so severe during RevCon
2015 that not even a joint final declaration could
be agreed. The conflicts were primarily sparked by
insufficient progress in nuclear disarmament and the
creation of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle
East. This only increases the pressure on RevCon
2020 to succeed.
1.4 The position of the European Union
The termination of arms control treaties such as the
INF treaty has far-reaching consequences, especially
for Europe. The Trump administration has also consi-
derably diminished the credibility of the US’s commit-
ment to NATO. Calls to develop European deterrent
capacities as additional protection are increasing.
President Macron of France recently received a lot of
attention with his proposal for an independent Euro-
However, nuclear issues hold considerable potential
for division within the EU. France as a nuclear power
and the UK as a former member of the EU strictly
reject any ban on nuclear weapons. France continues
to see nuclear deterrence as a key element of its de-
fence strategy. With almost 300 nuclear warheads, its
“Force de frappe” is the third largest nuclear weapons
force of any officially recognized nuclear power,
behind the US and Russia. This arsenal will require
costly modernizations over the upcoming years. The
estimated investment of €35 billion represents an
enormous feat for the country.
By contrast, countries such as Sweden, Austria, and
Ireland – none of which are NATO members – de-

mand that nuclear disarmament should occur as
rapidly as possible. The latter two countries also
ratified the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons of 2017. Most EU countries stand some-
where in between, covered by an expanded deterrent
in the form of NATO’s “nuclear umbrella”. Some of
them – Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy,
and the United Kingdom – even house US nucle-
ar weapons on their own territory. These highly
contrasting interests of EU states regarding nuclear
disarmament were expressed at RevCon 2015, pre-
venting an agreement on a joint position paper from
being reached.
The stance of EU countries on the issues of non-pro-
liferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy is
less controversial. The negotiation of the Iran nucle-
ar agreement was undoubtedly one of the greatest
moments in European foreign policy and decisively
contributed to strengthening the EU’s profile and
image in this area.
For RevCon 2020, the EU presented a joint position
paper7 outlining the most important objectives. The
EU’s primary goal is to bring the RevCon to a suc-
cessful conclusion and keep the Non-Proliferation
Treaty intact. It still explicitly advocates for all three
pillars of the NPT, including nuclear disarmament.
The participation of EU countries in the NPDI group
and the Vienna Group of Ten can allow the disar-
mament agenda to be gradually pursued. However,
establishing a consensus and developing a joint
disarmament strategy continues to prove impossible
in practice.
Other top priorities for the EU include renewing the
START agreement, ensuring the entry into force of
both the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, and
maintaining the Iran nuclear agreement.
In preparation for RevCon 2020, the EU provided
€1.3 million of funding to the UN Office for Disar-
mament (UNODA) for thematic and regional in-
formation events about the NPT. The goal was to
provide delegates from NPT signatory countries with
information about key controversial issues, and if
possible to achieve a rapprochement between their
positions. Since 2010, the EU has been funding the
activities of the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarma-
ment Consortium, a network of European
think tanks.
7
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at 50: a brief assessment by the European Union. Working paper
submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons, April 2019
8ENDERS, Tom: Wir müssen über Nuklearwaffen reden [We need to talk about nuclear weapons], DGAP March 2020;
MAJOR, Claudia: Germany’s dangerous nuclear sleepwalking, SWP Jan. 2018; KEMPIN, Ronja/OVERHAUS, Marco: Frank-
reichs nukleare Abschreckung im Dienste Europas [France’s nuclear deterrent in the service of Europe], SWP, Feb. 2020.
9 Survey by the Körber Foundation: Einmischen oder zurückhalten? [Get involved or keep our distance?], 2019.
POLICY PAPER 7
Does Europe need an independent
nuclear deterrent?
In his keynote address at the Paris Ecole de Guerre
in February 2020, President Macron proposed a joint
European nuclear deterrent outside of the NATO
and EU institutional frameworks. Given the changing
transatlantic relationship and the nuclear arms race,
Macron argued that Europeans should no longer limit
themselves to the role of onlookers. He offered to
provide greater insight into French nuclear strategy
to European partners, as well as the opportunity to
participate in exercises involving the French nuclear
deterrent. However, he also emphasized that Paris
continues to insist that its nuclear force should re-
main strategically independent and is not prepared to
embrace joint command under the EU or NATO. The
decision about the use of nuclear weapons thus re-
mains exclusively reserved for the French president.
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg rejected
Macron’s proposal, noting that the NATO nuclear
umbrella currently functions effectively. According
to Stoltenberg, this system must not be questioned
or jeopardized. Moving away from the NATO nuclear
umbrella is also rendered nearly impossible by the
fact that American nuclear bombs are being stored
in several EU countries. France’s nuclear arsenal
would anyway not be sufficient to replace US capa-
bilities in Europe. Instead, Stoltenberg invited the
French president to join NATO’s Nuclear Planning
Group. This could strengthen the European pillar wi-
thin NATO. However, this remains a taboo subject in
France, as it is equated with a willingness to submit
the country’s nuclear weapons to NATO control.
The opinion of the NATO Secretary-General is by no
means shared by everyone. Various experts8 have
suggested that Europe must build its own deterrent
capacities because it can no longer rely on the US
nuclear umbrella. The first step towards this could be
a nuclear cooperation between France and Germany.
It should be politically feasible to approach Macron
without moving away from NATO and the US.
While almost 40 percent of the German population
is in favour of a European nuclear deterrent provided
by France and the United Kingdom, only 22 percent
support the existing nuclear deterrence framework with
NATO9. Doubts about the reliability of American nuclear
guarantees have intensified significantly under the
Trump administration.

Can Germany contribute to disarmament
by withdrawing from nuclear sharing?
In a newspaper interview¹0, the chairman of the
SPD parliamentary group in the Bundestag Rolf
Mützenich recently called for debate on whether
nuclear sharing is still appropriate in modern times.
This was prompted by the Minister of Defence
Kramp-Karrenbauer’s decision to replace obsole-
te Tornado fighter-bombers with American F-18
aircraft, clearly signalling a commitment to the
continuation of nuclear sharing.
Mützenich argued that the Trump administration’s
new nuclear strategy was no longer limited to de-
fensive use and could also be used offensively. He
suggested that this, together with the planned mo-
dernization of the nuclear weapons stored in Europe,
would raise the risk of escalation to
unmanageable levels. As such, he argues that
storing nuclear weapons here does not actually
improve the security of the continent. Mützenich
called on the German government to stop storing
tactical nuclear weapons at the US military base
in Büchel in the future as a contribution to nuclear
disarmament.
2 Positions of selected nuclear powers
2.1 United States
Whereas former US President Barack Obama
committed himself to the vision of a world free
of nuclear weapons in his historic Prague speech
in 2009 and signed the “New START” treaty limi-
ting launchers for strategic nuclear weapons with
then-Russian President Medvedev, his successor
Donald Trump is pursuing the older principle of
nuclear deterrence.
This is shown by the Trump government’s new nucle-
ar strategy paper of February 2018 (Nuclear Posture
Review), which announced the modernization of
nuclear submarines, intercontinental ballistic missi-
les, and strategic bombers. The review also reaffirms
the modernization of US nuclear bombs stationed in
Europe decided previously under Barack Obama. The
measures are justified by citing armament efforts by
10
Tagesspiegel, May 3, 2020: es wird Zeit, dass Deutschland die Stationierung zukünftig ausschließt [It’s time for Ger-
many to stop stationing nuclear weapons in the future].
11
Mölling, Christian: Ausstieg geht anders. Ein Kommentar zur Debatte um nukleare Teilhabe in Deutschland [With-
drawal doesn’t work like that. A commentary of nuclear sharing in Germany], DGAP, May 11, 2020; Brauss, Heinrich:
Rolf Mützenich hat Unrecht [Rolf Mützenich is wrong], FAZ, May 7, 2020.
POLICY PAPER 8
The interview triggered a series of strong political reac-
tions. The position expressed by Rolf Mützenich is not
only in opposition to that of the Minister of Defence, but
also to many of the positions of his fellow party mem-
bers, including the Foreign Minister and the Minister of
Economic Affairs. His critics, which include recognized
experts in the field of security and defence policy11,
agree that Germany’s withdrawal from nuclear sharing
would shake the very foundations of the NATO military
alliance. They argue that Germany would be imposing
risk onto other allies and effectively escape its shared
responsibility in the joint security of Europe. It is also
possible that other countries might follow Germany’s
example. If so, the United States would no longer have
any reason to carry the risk of a protective nuclear um-
brella for Europe. This would be a fatal development for
European security and the transatlantic partnership.
In light of Russian military strategy, such a development
must be avoided at all costs. Russia would be readily
prepared to confront NATO with a nuclear threat that is
limited to Europe with the goal of keeping America out
of a regional conflict and decoupling Europe from US
protection. Germany’s exit from NATO nuclear sharing
would therefore increase the risk of escalation and the
likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons and would not
contribute to nuclear disarmament.
Russia, China, and North Korea, as well as Russia’s
breach of the INF treaty.
In addition, a new series of smaller and less destructi-
ve nuclear weapons (low-yield weapons) with an explo-
sive power of up to 20 kilotons will be developed. This
is primarily intended to deter Russia from an attack.
However, they also target the unpredictable threat
posed by North Korea.
In the nuclear strategy paper, the US also reserves the
option to resume nuclear testing, and President Trump
has openly spoken out against ratifying the Compre-
hensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). This may
signify the end of this treaty, despite its importance for
nuclear arms control.
Furthermore, the US continues to reserve the option of
a nuclear first strike. Under “extreme circumstances”

(e.g. the use of biological weapons against the US), the
US President may order the use of nuclear weapons
in response to a non-nuclear attack. This response
is subject to the principle of proportionality. In other
words, the response must be proportionate to the
attack. The new nuclear strategy paper extends the
definition of “extreme circumstances” to cyberattacks
on nuclear power plants and energy or water supply
infrastructure.
With its unilateral termination of the Iran agreement,
its withdrawal from the INF treaty with Russia, and the
failed nuclear talks with North Korea, the Trump admi-
nistration has dealt a severe blow to the international
arms control regime.
Instead, it is pursuing the alternative approach of a
trilateral arms control regime between the US, Russia,
and China that covers all nuclear weapons systems.
However, it has not yet succeeded in persuading either
country to participate. For example, it made the rene-
wal of the New START treaty beyond February 2021
conditional on the inclusion of any new strategic we-
apons possessed by Russia and China. Both countries
have already refused this condition. If an extension is
not negotiated, there will no longer be any arms cont-
rol agreements in force from 2021 onwards.
In its position paper for RevCon 2020¹², the US focu-
ses on the CEND initiative (see Section III), calls for
stricter IEAE monitoring methods in the form of the
“Additional Protocol”, and otherwise limits itself to
criticism of Iran, North Korea, and Syria.
2.2 Russian Federation
After the end of the Cold War, the West did not con-
sider there to be an acute nuclear threat from Russia
for 15 years. This changed abruptly when President
Putin declared in 2005 that “the collapse of the Soviet
Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of
the 20th century”¹³ and that he had decided to restore
Russia to its former greatness.
Since the Kremlin is aware that it would not have the
upper hand against NATO in a conventional war, it re-
lies on the so-called “escalate to deescalate” strategy.
This reserves the option of limited nuclear deescala-
tion strikes (e.g. against NATO bases, ground forces,
aircraft, navy, etc.) that are designed to persuade
¹² The U.S. Approach to the 2019 NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting Working paper submitted by the United States of
America, April 2019.
¹³ PUTIN, Vladimir: Speech on the state of the nation, April 2005; ZEIT-Online: Eine Frage der Glaubwürdigkeit [A question of
credibility], April 21, 2005.
¹4 Nuclear disarmament. Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation, March 2019 and Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty. Working paper submitted by the Russian Federation, April 2019.
¹5 Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the People’s Republic of China. Report
submitted by China, April 2019 - China also submitted five other position papers.
POLICY PAPER 9
the enemy to surrender in order to avoid widespread
nuclear war. Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons are
ideally suited for this strategy. By contrast, NATO
does not currently have any clear strategy to deter
such deescalation strikes.
Russia has long been in violation of the INF treaty
with the development of its new class of nucle-
ar-equipped intermediate-range missiles (SSC cruise
missile system based in the Kaliningrad area and
the European part of Russia). Repeated attempts to
persuade Russia to abandon the offending missile
programme and resume compliance with the treaty
have failed. In turn, Russia accuses the US of viola-
ting the INF treaty with its missile defence system
based in Eastern Europe (Poland, Romania), arguing
that this system can also fire land-based cruise
missiles in addition to defensive missiles. Russia
also claims that the procurement and use of inter-
mediate-range armed drones by the US fall under the
prohibitions of the INF treaty. With regard to strategic
nuclear weapons, Russia is adhering to the provisions
of the New START treaty and is currently deploying
no more than the permitted 1550 strategic nuclear
warheads. Russia also submitted position papers
for RevCon 2020¹4, one on nuclear disarmament and
one on the nuclear test ban. In these papers, Russia
reaffirms the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons
as the most important objective of its foreign policy
and re-emphasizes that it has dismantled more than
85 percent of its nuclear arsenal in the past 30 years.
However, Russia also clearly asserts that its nuclear
weapons remain necessary due to external threats
(the global US anti-missile defence system, weaponi-
zation of space).
Russia is especially emphatic in its criticism of the
NATO nuclear umbrella, claiming that it blatantly vio-
lates the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and urges all nuc-
lear powers not to store nuclear weapons outside of
their own territories. Russia remains committed to
the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and strongly condemns
the US announcement that it will not ratify the treaty.
It emphasizes the urgent need for multilateral secu-
rity talks, especially between nuclear powers.
2.3 People’s Republic of China
The position papers published by China for the Rev-
Con¹5 assert that China is pursuing a purely defensive
 POLICY PAPER 10

national defence policy that maintains its nuclear
forces at the minimum size necessary to preserve
national security (its nuclear arsenal is currently esti-
mated to consist of fewer than 300 nuclear warheads).
Beijing emphasizes that it does not offer a nuclear
umbrella to other countries and does not station
nuclear weapons in other countries. It has undertaken
a commitment not to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear weapon states or designated WMD-free
zones. In addition, it is the only nuclear power besides
India to renounce nuclear first strikes, and it signed the
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996, as well as the Central
Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone treaty in April 2015.
China therefore considers that it cannot be compa-
red to Russia and the United States, which currently
possess around 90 percent of the world’s nuclear
arsenal. China would only be prepared to enter into ne-
gotiations for nuclear disarmament after a significant
reduction of this arsenal.
For this reason, China rejects the US’s proposal for a
trilateral arms control regime with Russia and the United
States. It remains unclear whether China would be willing
to engage with the US’s proposal for a bilateral strategic
security dialogue. In return, China calls upon the US and
Russia to reinstate the INF treaty and renew the New
START treaty. However, China does not wish to join any
potential successor of the INF treaty, knowing that much
of the Chinese missile arsenal falls under the affected
range (500 - 5,500 km) and would therefore be prohibited
by the treaty. China has extensively developed its own
weapons within this category over the past 30 years¹6.

3 New approaches to nuclear arms control

3.1 The CEND Initiative (Creating an
Environment for Nuclear Disarmament)
The CEND initiative was launched by the nuclear we-
apon state of the US, primarily designed and advocated
by Christopher Ford, the Assistant Secretary of State for
International Security and Non-Proliferation. It makes
three fundamental assumptions: (a) nuclear weapons
continue to be relevant for nuclear deterrence, (b) a
reduction of nuclear weapons can only be considered
once the global security situation has significantly im-
proved, and (c) the past approach that focused on nuc-
lear disarmament of the US and Russia failed because it
did not pay attention to the nuclear armament of China,
India and Pakistan. For CEND, the most important
goal is therefore to initiate a new strategic dialogue at
a global level to improve the global security situation.
Existing dialogue formats (e.g. the UN Conference on
Disarmament or the First Committee of the UN General
Assembly) have not yet achieved any results.
Christopher Ford¹7 presented the CEND concept for the
first time at the NPT Preparatory Committees in 2018
and 2019¹8 and later also at the UN Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva (2019) and the NATO Confe-
rence on Weapons of Mass Destruction (2019). The first
CEND Plenary Meeting was held in July 2019 at the US
Department of State¹9. Delegates from 42 countries, in-
cluding the five official nuclear weapons states (P5) and
non-NPT members such as Israel, India, and Pakistan
accepted the invitation. Russia was the second-largest
delegation. Although this event marked the beginning of
a potentially significant disarmament initiative, it recei-
ved relatively little following in the international press.
Three thematic working groups were established:
J Removal of incentives to buy, expand, or maintain
a nuclear arsenal
J Improvement of the effectiveness of existing
institutions and mechanisms of nuclear disarmament
J Development of measures that could help to reduce
the likelihood of war between nuclear powers
The working groups continued their debates in No-
vember 2019 in London, with 62 delegates from 31
countries, establishing a two-year work programme.
The third meeting of the working groups, scheduled for
April in New York, was cancelled due to the coronavi-
rus pandemic. It is currently too early for a definitive
assessment of this initiative.
Critics²0 have accused the CEND initiative of citing
the precarious global security situation as a pretext

16
PAUL, Michael: Chinas nukleare Abschreckung [China’s nuclear deterrent], SWP 2018.
17
FORD, Christopher: Our Vision for a constructive, collaborative disarmament discourse, March 2019 and Lessons from
Disarmament history for the CEND Initiative, April 2019.
18
Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND) Initiative. Working paper submitted by the United States of
America to the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 RevCon, April 2019.
19
POTTER, William: Taking the pulse at the Inaugural Meeting of the CEND-Initiative, July 2019.
20
GIBBONS, Rebecca: Can this new approach on nuclear disarmament work? January 2019; Meyer, Paul: The NPT: a make
or break review Conference in 2020? May 2019.
 POLICY PAPER 11

to avoid taking responsibility for nuclear arms cont-
rol and disarmament. The mere existence of nuclear
weapons already poses a high security risk per se.
Reducing or abolishing them could already represent
a significant contribution towards stabilizing the
global security situation.
sing the transparency of arsenals, and strengthening
international cooperation.
In a joint declaration²3 at the conclusion of a conference
in Berlin in February 2020, the initiative presented “buil-
ding blocks for nuclear disarmament” in the following
areas:

3.2 Stockholm Initiative for J Reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in

Nuclear Disarmament security policy and doctrines

This initiative was proposed by the foreign ministers
of 16 non-nuclear weapon states²¹, including Germa-
ny, and was launched by the Swedish government
in 2019. It aims to give new practical momentum to
nuclear disarmament and to restart the dialogue
between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear we-
apon states. In doing so, it hopes to make a decisive
contribution towards the success of the upcoming
RevCon.
In its position paper for RevCon 2020²², the initiative
calls for concrete disarmament measures that could
be pursued in collaboration with the nuclear we-
apon states. It follows the so-called “stepping stone
approach”, which proposes pragmatic intermediate
steps that can be accomplished in the short term as
a way of building up to nuclear disarmament. The
steps are classified into four areas: decreasing the
importance of nuclear weapons in military doctrines
and similar policies, reducing nuclear risks, increa-
J Minimization of conflict risks and the risk of
accidental use of nuclear weapons
J Increase in transparency regarding armaments
and doctrines, and strengthening of arms control
architecture in the nuclear field
J Strengthening of cooperation and trust-building
Critics²4 reproach the initiative of failing to provide
new momentum. Instead, they argue that it simply
repeats demands that had already been decided in
past NPT conferences, such as the 13 steps towards
complete nuclear disarmament (RevCon 2000) or
the NPT Action Plan of 2010. Neither of these mea
sures have accomplished the desired results to
date. Additionally, two of the member states of
the Stockholm Initiative – Germany and the
Netherlands – have stationed nuclear weapons
within their territories and have done nothing
to disarm them.

4 Closing remarks and political demands

Most of the international community, namely the
non-nuclear weapon states, fundamentally agree on
what needs to be done. Their key requirements are
summarized below. However, the willingness of the
nuclear weapon states to respond to these demands
is limited in light of the increasingly precarious global
security situation. This means that it is all the more
important to breathe new life into a strategic dialogue
on nuclear arms control. The NPT Review Conference
2020 represents a good opportunity. But whether the
CEND and Stockholm initiatives can provide any new
momentum remains to be seen.
The traditional bilateral approach to arms control that
only involved Russia and the United States in treaties
must now be considered obsolete. Even if the nuclear
arsenals of China, India, and Pakistan are currently
far behind the two major nuclear powers in terms of
numbers alone, they are slowly but steadily catching
up. Trilateralization or even multilateralization of
arms control therefore seems necessary.
However, China and other small nuclear powers have
insisted that their participation in multilateral arms
control negotiations is contingent on a significant

21
The initiative was formed by Argentina, Germany, Finland, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Canada, Kazakhstan, South Korea,
New Zealand, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Spain.
22
Unlocking disarmament diplomacy through a „stepping stone“ approach. Working paper submitted by Sweden, April
2019.
23
Building blocks for the promotion of nuclear disarmament in: Der NW wird 50 - Nukleare Abrüstung vorantreiben – un-
sere Zukunft sichern [The NPT is 50 – Advancing nuclear disarmament – Securing our future], Febr 2020. www.auswärti-
ges-amt.de.
24
ICAN: Ergebnis der Stockholm-Initiative enttäuschend [Disappointing results for the Stockholm Initiative], February 2020.

reduction in the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the
United States. Precisely this condition is not currently
met. With the termination of the INF treaty and the
impending expiry of the New START treaty 2021, the
distance is threatening to grow even larger.
Despite being a long-term goal worth pursuing, the
complete abolition of all nuclear weapons required by
the signatories of the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) of 2017 seems to currently
represent an obstacle to the willingness of the nucle-
ar powers to enter into talks.
In the future, arms control can no longer focus solely
on nuclear weapons, as technological innovations
such as artificial intelligence have long been fin-
ding their way into modern weapons systems. The
signatories of the UN Convention on Conventional
Weapons (CCW) have recently presented an initial set
of “guiding principles”²5 on the use of autonomous
weapons systems.
Political demands:
The German government, in collaboration with its
European partners, must exploit every avenue to halt
the dangerous spiral of armament. To do this, it is
essential to implement the following goals:
J The Non-Proliferation Treaty must be preserved
as the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament
and non-proliferation regime. The nuclear weapon
states of India, Israel, and Pakistan must finally be
persuaded to join the treaty.
J The validity of the agreements of RevCons 1995,
2000, and 2010 – namely the 13 practical steps
towards complete nuclear disarmament, the
64-point action plan for nuclear disarmament, and
the Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone – must
be upheld, as these measures have not yet been
implemented.
J A five-year renewal of the New START treaty
until 2026 is a top priority. This could prevent
further destabilization and provide valuable time
to negotiate the most urgent strategic issues and
begin new initiatives.
J The enforcement of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
is also a top priority. This treaty has already been
signed by 184 countries and ratified by 168. Every
²5 Guiding principles on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems, November 2019
POLICY PAPER 12
EU country has joined. Its verification system
has proven to be very effective, and a de facto
global moratorium on nuclear tests has been
established. However, the so-called Annex 2
states, namely the most important nuclear
weapon states, have not yet ratified the treaty,
which is blocking its entry into force.
J The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty is also
immensely important. Without plutonium and
highly enriched uranium, the production of nuclear
weapons is impossible, yet the Non-Proliferation
Treaty does not include a ban on such sub-
stances.
J Following the termination of the INF treaty,
Germany and France should step up their diplo-
matic efforts and trust-building measures within
the framework of the NATO-Russia Council to
petition Russia not to deploy intermediate-range
missiles to the west of the Urals.
J To maintain the Iran nuclear agreement
(JCPoA), the EU should establish an investment
promotion programme that safeguards the invest-
ments and trading of European companies. Private
banks are currently unwilling to invest due to US
sanctions.
J Efforts should be made to resume the dialogue
between the international community and North
Korea in order to develop a mutually binding road
map towards the denuclearization of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
J A legally binding treaty establishing a WMD-free
zone in the Middle East must continue to be a top
political priority for the region. The latest mediation
efforts by the United Nations in November 2019
must be continued.
J Until a new disarmament and arms control regime
is established, Germany’s participation in nuclear
sharing must continue.
J The security and monitoring system of the IAEA
should be strengthened. Western industrialized
countries are demanding that the so-called Addi-
tional Protocol should become the standard. This
sharpens the reporting requirements and extends
access options for IAEA inspectors. However, many
emerging and developing countries may consider
that their state sovereignty is being restricted.