Accademia Editoriale

Equality and Cognition in Plato's Divided Line

Author(s): Kent Moors
Source: Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica, New Series, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1984), pp. 147-157
Published by: Fabrizio Serra editore
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 Equality and Cognition in Plato's Divided Line

Kent Moors

At Republic 509D-511E, Socrates presents the image of the

divided line. That there exists an dimension to the
epistemol?gica!
image, has been well-established by Platonic scholarship1, although
the specific character of this dimension remains a matter of some

dispute2. As Socrates indicates later in the dialogue3, the use of

image4 in reflecting the method and objects of philosophy has its

limitations 5. Several commentators have noted restrictions concern

ing the extent to which the divided line may be read as an orchestra
tion of the objects of knowledge6. Additionally, the position and
1
See, for example, G.M.A. Grube, Plato's Thought, Boston 1958, 244 f.;
J. Klein, A Commentary on Plato's "Meno?, Chapel Hill 1965,113 ff.; R.L. Hart,
'The Imagination in Plato', Intern. Philosoph. Quart. 5, 1965, 441; E.A. Have
lock, Preface to Plato, New York 1967, 232 n. 45; J. Moreau, 'The Platonic
Idea and its Three-fold Function: A Synthesis', Intern. Philosoph. Quart. 9,
1969, 506 f.; and R.S. Brumbaugh, 'The Divided Line and the Direction of
Inquiry', Philosoph. Forum 2, 1970-71, 193.
2
See, for example, J.L. Stocks, 'The Divided Line of Plato Rep. VP,
Class. Quart. 5, 1911, 73-88; HJ. Paton, 'Plato's Theory of EIKASIA', Proceed.
Aristotelian Soc. n.s. 22, 1922, 69-104; P. Shorey, 'Ideas and Numbers Again',
Class. Philol. 22, 1927, 217 f.; D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, Oxford 1951,
65; J.S. Wu, 'A Note on the Third Section of the Divided Line', New Schol
asticism 43, 1969, 269-275; AJ. Boyle, 'Plato's Divided Line. Essay I: The
Problem of Dianoia', Apeiron 1, 1973, 1-11; and Grube, op. cit. 256.
3 See 533A1-5: "No
longer ...will you be able to follow?not because of
any lack of willingness on my part?rather you would not see an image of what
we are saying, but the truth itself, as it appears to me. But if it is so or not,
this no longer deserves to be affirmed confidently. But that something of this
kind is seen, is most certain". All translations are mine from the text of
J. Burnet (Platonis Opera I-V, Oxford 1900-7).
4 It is Glaucon who
requires the use of image to put forth the objectives
of philosophy in the Republic. See 487E4-6.
5 Cf. and 590A10-B5.
497E3-4, 507A1-2, 509C940,
6
See, for example, Hart, loc. cit.

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148 K. Moors

function of method within the line itself, while often noticed7, is

also regarded by many as a provisional statement on standards of
a statement which is to be accepted more as an adumbra
cognition8,
tion than as an explanation of what philosophy does 9.
Socrates presents the line as a whole image, placing the reader
in the position of having to comprehend the synoptic nature of its

presentation10. It is highly problematic, given the manner of its

portrayal, that the line is intended to produce any single sub-section

which is to be regarded as self-sufficient u. Each of the four sub
sections identified bears fundamental connections with others 12, re
sulting in a whole image which must be approached with a view
toward how theimage relates to a broad statement on knowledge 13.
Further, the divided line is the middle image in a sequence of three
consecutive images presented by Socrates?the image of the sun pre

ceding it and the image of the cave directly following 14.Commen

7 in the Re
See, for example, F.M. Cornford, 'Mathematics and Dialectic
public VI-VIP, Mind n.s. 49, 1932, 43 f.; J.A. Notopoulos, 'The Meaning of
EIKASIA in the Divided Line of Plato's Republic', Harv. Stud. Class. Philol. 47,
1936, 63; R. Haokforth, 'Plato's Divided Line and Dialectic', Class. Quart. 36,
1942, 1-9; I.M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines I-II, London
1962-63, II 78; E. Brann, 'The Music of the Republic', Ag?n 1, 1967, 59 f.;
N.O. Weiner, The Divided Line, the Convening Art and the Dramatic Structure
of Plato's "Republic", Diss. Univ. Texas-Austin 1969; and Brumbaugh, art.
cit. 192.
8
See, for example, R.S. Brumbaugh, 'Plato's Divided line', Rev. of Meta
physics 5, 1952, 533 f.; and Hart, art. cit. 451.
9 See R.
Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic, Oxford 19532, 164 f.
10
See, for example, L.E. Rose, 'Plato's Divided Line', Rev. of Metaphysics
17, 1964, 425-435; S.B. Pomeroy, 'Optics and the Line in Plato's Republic',
Class. Quart, n.s. 21, 1971, 389-392; and Notopoulos, 'The Meaning of EIKA
SIA', 199.
11
See, for example, Klein, op. cit. 19, 115; Grombie, op. cit. II 73; and
J.A. Bretlinger, 'The Divided Line and Plato's 'Theory of Intermediates' ',
Phronesis 8, 1963, 146466.
12
See, for example, A.S. Ferguson, 'Plato's Simile of Light. Part I?The
Similes of the Sun and the Line', Class. Quart. 15, 1921, 143 f.; and Brum
baugh, 'The Divided Line and the Direction of Inquiry', 174 ff.
13 See
J. de Romilly, 'Les diff?rents aspects de la concorde dans l'oeuvre
de Platon', Rev. d. philol. 46, 1972, 7-20.
14Both the sun and the line are identified as
images
' by the use of the
phrase ten eikona at 509 A9. The cave is identified as an image at 515A4:
eikona. Cf. 532A1?. with 533Alf.

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Equality and Cognition in Plato's Divided Line 149

tators have often found connections in the symbolic of the

language
images 15, and several have suggested a concerted be
relationship
tween levels in the line and levels in the cave 16.
The following note examines one possible function of the line
in terms of its relationship to the dialogue in which it is located.
Image for Plato is a symbolic device for the presentation of material
which is basic to the philosophic intention of dialogue, but which
cannot be easily projected in discussion 17. As such, it bears a close

15
See, for example, A.S. Ferguson, 'On a Supposed Instance of Dualism
in Plato', Philosoph. Rev. 30, 1921, 221-237; id., 'Plato's Simile of Light',
cit.; N.R. Murphy, 'The 'Simile of Light' in Plato's Republic', Class. Quart. 26,
1932, 93-102; J.A. Notopoulos, 'Socrates and the Sun', Class. Journ. 37, 1942,
260-274; id., 'The Symbolism of the Sun and Light in the Republic of Plato',
Class. Philol. 39, 1944, 163-172, 223-240; T. Ballauff, Die Idee der Paideia:
Eine Studie zu Piatons H?hlengleichnis und Parmenides' Lehrgedicht, Meisen
heim am Glan 1952 (Monogr. zur philos. Forsch. 7); JE. Raven, 'Sun, Divided
Line, and Cave', Class. Quart, n.s. 3, 1953, 22-32; D. Tarrant, 'The Cave and
the Sun', Hibbert Journ. 52, 1953-54, 360-367; O. Becker, 'Ueber eine schwer
erkl?rbare Stelle im platonischen H?hlengleichnis', Rh. Mus. 99, 1956, 201-205;
M.A. Aima, 'Contributi all'interpretazione del pensiero di Platone: L'esigenze
delTassoluto', Riv. stud., class. 7, 1959, 111-117; K. Schmitz-Moorman, Die
Ideenlehre Piatons im Lichte des Sonnengleichnisses des sechsten Buches des
"Staates", M?nster 1959; J. Malcolm, 'The Line and the Cave', Phronesis 8,
1962, 38-45; J. Ferguson, 'Sun, and Cave Class. Quart, n.s. 13,
Light, Again',
1963, 188-193; W. Luther, 'Wahreit, Licht, Sehen und Erkennen im Son
nengleichnis von Piatons Politeia-. Ausschnitt aus der Lichtmetaphysik der
Griechen', Stud. Generale 18, 1965, 479-496; RJ. Fogelin, 'Three Platonic
Analogies', Philosoph. Rev. 80, 1971, 371-382; and J.T. Bedu-Aido, 'A Theory
of Mental Development: Platon Republic V-VII\ Platon 28, 1976, 288-301.
16
See, for example, T. Nissen, 'ZurDeutung des platonischen H?hlengleich
nisses', Philologus 95, 1936, 270-277; J.R. Buisman, 'Der philosophische Hin
tergrun des platonischen H?hlengleichnisses', Mnemosyne 6, 1938, 49-62; C. Axe
los, 'Das Einsehen und das Voraussehen im platonischen H?hlgleichnis', Piaton
8, 1956, 95-99; K. Bormann, 'Zu Piaton, Politeia 514b8-515a3', Archiv f.
Geschichte d. Philosoph. 43, 1961, 1-14; J. Davies, 'A Note on the Philosopher's
Descent into the Cave', Philologus 112, 1968, 121-126; M. N?doncelle, 'Les
donn?es auditives et le probl?me du language dans l'all?gorie de la caverne',
Rev. Sciences Religieuses 44, 1970, 165-178; R.G. Tanner, 'DIANOIA and
Plato's Cave', Class. Quart: n.s. 20, 1970, 81-91; H. Lier, 'Zur Struktur des

platonischen H?hlengleichnisses', Hermes 99, 1971, 209-216; and P. Carriv?,

'Encore la caverne, ou 4 = 8', Et. Philosoph,
n.s. 30, 1975, 387-397.
17
See, for example, M.W. Bundy, 'La phantasia chez Platon', Univ.
North Carolina Stud. Class. Philol. 19, 1922, 362-403; D; Tarrant, 'Imagery in

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150 K. Moors

" "
resemblance to the often-seen usage of like-to-like comparisons in
the dialogues 18. Image provides direction to discourse; it is not
intended to provide a precise equivalent of either the objects of

philosophy or philosophic method. While dialogue is the employment

of there are examples in the dialogues of Plato's caution
speech,
concerning the precision which speech can convey on matters which
do not allow realistic relationships to matters of the senses 19. In
Book 7 of the Republic, for example, we are told that the precise
use of dialectic is beyond the realm of speech applied to matters of
the senses20, an application which constitutes the foundation for all
normal communication21.

Plato's Republic', Class. Quart. 40, 1946, 17-34; A. de Marignac, Imagination

et dialectique: Essai sur l'expression du spirituel par l'image dans le dialogues
de Platon, Paris 1951; R. Danielson, Untersuchungen zu den platonischen Gleich
nissen und Vergleichen der Dialogue bis zum "Staat", Diss. Univ. Kiel 1956;
D. Gallop, 'Image and Reality in Plato's Republic', Archiv f. Geschichte d. Phi
losoph. 47, 1965, 113-131; S. Ringbom, 'Plato on Images', Theoria 31, 1965,
86-109; and D.H. Mills, Image and Symbol in Plato's "Republic", Diss. Univ.
Iowa 1971. See also A. Pelletier, 'L'image du 'frelon' dans la R?publique de
Platon', Rev. d. philol. 22, 1948, 131-146.
18 See
Rep. 350C4-8; Polit. 269D5, 278C1; Euthyph. 5D1; Gorg. 476A8,
488C5-D2, 510B4; Critias 107D5; Crat. 436C5; Soph. 230B6; Parm. 148B4;
Laws 722A1-2, 757C, 868A2-3; Tim. 30C6, 32B4; Phaedr. 240C2?.; Ep. 7.
323D10?.; Minos 313B1-3; and Aristotle N. E. 1169b5-10.
19On the
deficiency of speech, as it is reflected in Platonic dialogues, see,
for example, A. Loepfe, Die Wortstellung im griechischen Sprechsatz, erkl?rt an
St?cken aus Piaton und Meander, Diss. Univ. Freiburg 1940; B. Parain, Essai
sur le logos platonicienne, Paris 1942; J. Sulliger, 'Platon et le probl?me de la
communication de la philosophie', Annuaire Soci?t? Suisse d. Philosoph. 11,
1951, 155-175; F. Desmurs, Zur Theorie des Logos bei Platon, Diss. Univ.
Innsbruck 1952; C.J. Classen, Sprachliche Deutung als Treibkraft platonischen
und sokratischen philosophierens, Munich 1959; F. Egermarm, 'Platonische
Sp?tphilosophie und Platonischen bei Aristoteles', Hermes 87, 1959, 133-142;
G. Verbeke, 'De zin can het filosofisch gesprek biz Plato', Tijdschrift voor
Philosophie 25, 1963, 439-475; B. Witte, 'Der eik?s logos in Piatos Timaios',
Archiv f. Geschichte d. Philosoph. 46, 1964, 1-16; W.B. Bondeam, Plato and
Logos, Diss. Univ. Chicago 1965; D. Mannsperger, 'Zur Sprache der Dialektik
bei Piaton', in Synusia: Pest g?be f?r Wolf gang Schadewaldt, ed. H. Flashar and
K. Gaiser, Pfullingen 1965, 161-171; and J. Dalfen, 'Gedanken zur Lekt?re
platonischen Dialogue', Zeitschr. f. Philosoph. Forsch. 29, 1975, 169-194.
20 See
Rep. 532A6-B1. Cf. Theaet. 189E6-7; Soph. 263E3-5; and Phaedr.
277B5-C6.
21 See
Rep. 413B4-C3, 476C9-478D10, 506C2-10, 589B8-C4; Polit. 277E6

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Equality and Cognition in Plato's Divided Line 151

This note will suggest that the ratio provided by Socrates in the
development of the line must produce an of the middle two
equality
sub-sections of the line. This equality results in the disparity be
tween the two main segments of the line (the visible and the in

telligible) being produced by the disparity between the first sub

segment (image) and the fourth sub-segment (knowledge). In addi
tion to any number of other aspects in the line's construction and
function in the dialogue, this disparity between the projections of
appearance-as-image and the recognition of knowledge-as-truth pro
vides a symbolic presentation of a major theme in the dialogue as
a whole.
Let us turn first to the line itself. Socrates divides the line into
two initial segments which are unequal in length. These major seg
ments are identified as the visible (horaton) and the intelligible
(no?ton). A further sub-division of each segment is accomplished

employing the same ratio as that used in the original division. We

are not told which of the original segments is the longer, but since
the division in the same ratio in each case, information on
proceeds
the line's structure may be obtained. The visible segment is divided
into two unequal sub-segments?relating to image (eikasia) and to
sensible things (pistis). The intelligible segment is also divided into
two unequal sub-segments?relating to mathematical things (dianoia)
and knowledge (no?sis).
The identification of objects with each sub-section is provi
sional 22, but the objects of cognition presented in the image reflect
an intensifying certainty concerning the level of awareness being
provided by each sub-segment.
It is proposed that the line be viewed in the following manner:

<p d
I""horaton ~~1 I no?ton I

eikasia pistis dianoiano?sis

abc d

278E10; Euthyd. 286Dlff.; Crat. 429Dlff.; Soph. 264A1-B3; and Theaet.

170Blff.
22
See Hart, art. cit. 441.

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 152 K. Moors

We have assumed for the purpose of this diagram that the seg
ment # (the intelligible) is longer than the segment <p(the visible).
Regardless of which segment is depicted as th? longer, the ratio
would, of course, still hold. The ratio can be expressed as follows:

a:b: :cp:fr
c:d: :<p:&
r.a:b: :c:d

This relationship has been portrayed variously in algebraic terms23.

In the above diagram, the ratio is presented in the following

relationships: (1) cp:S: :3:6; (2) a:b: :1:2; and (3) c:d: :2:4. We
thus arrive at pistis (sensible things) equalling in length dianoia (ma
thematical things). Such an equality of the two middle sub-segments
of the line can be demonstrated using the ratio originally advanced
by Socrates:

<p:&: :c:d
(p:c: :i:d
<p:b: :d:d
.-.<p:c: :q>:?>
thus b = c

The identification of the equality between pistis and dianoia is

quite important in any attempt to arrive at the epistemological mean

ing of the line. The equality of length between the two middle sub
segments results in the original inquality between the two main seg
ments (the visible and the intelligible?cp and &) being explained by
the inequality between eikasia (image) and no?sis (knowledge). Ross
suggests that, since the equality in never mentioned by Plato, it must
be considered unintentional24. Gould, on the other hand, believes
that the resulting equality between pistis and dianoia proves embaras
sing to Plato and, for that reason, he chooses to pass over it in
silence25. Lutoslawski considers the structure of the line to be so

23 cit. 119 n. 27; W. Jaeger, Paideia: The

See, for example, Klein, op.
Ideals of Greek Culture I-III, trans. G. Highet, New York 19452, II 88 ff.;
J. Wild, Plato's Theory of Man: An Introduction to the Realistic Philosophy
of Culture, Cambridge Mass. 1948, 177 f.; and J. Kayser, 'Noble Lies and
Justice: On Reading Plato', Polity 5, 1973, 506.
24
Ross, op. cit. 45.
25 T.
Gould, 'Four Levels of Reality in Plato, Spinoza, and Blake', Arion 8,
1969, 31.

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Equality and Cognition in Plato's Divided Line 153

occasional that any significant statement on

its specific dimensions is
ill-advised26. Robinson regards the line as a basically incoherent image,
from which no meaningful conclusions about structural aspects can
be made27.
The equality between pistis and dianoia, however, also provides
a way of determining the each sub-segment has to the
relationship
entire figure. Let us arrange the original ratios of the line such that:

=
q>:? a:b = c:d = hn
-hen </=(l/n+l) (ft)
ft= n (cp)
.,a=d (n/n+1) (cp)28

We may now extract the other three identifications by employing

the same approach: b:c (n/n+1) (cp); c=^b [1/n/n+l) (ft)]; and
d= a [1 /(n/n+1) (ft)]. All of this results from the original ratio
presented by Socrates, and occupies a basic relationship to the manner
in which the entire image is constructed. It is not the structure of
the line itself which reflects the provisional problems associated with
it by commentators. Rather, it is in the application of the image to
the dimensions of cognition that one is confronted with provisionally.
As an line presents an approximation of the
image, the divided
way by which one comes to knowledge. Likewise, it presents an
of how the of knowledge serves to place
approximation acquisition
lower levels of cognition in perspective. It is not, however, intended
either as a specific commentary on how one arrives at knowledge
or as a precise rendition of distinctions among levels of cognition.
The image is a heuristic device, and one of its dimensions may well
results from the equality between pistis and dianoia.
Theequality need not, and probably does not, indicate a precise

equivalence in the domains of the two sub-segments. Rather, by

and mathematical things at parity, Socrates
placing physical things
the disparity perceived between the world of appearance
heightens
and the world of what truly is. Pistis and dianoia both relate to
26W.
Lutoslawski, The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic, London 1897,
305-306
27
Robinson, op. cit. 194.
28 is a revised version of a proof originally offered by Ross, op. cit. 45.
This

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 154 K. Moors

things. Pistis
encompasses physical objects, that which is, in other
words, accepted as "real" in the world of the senses. Dianoia, on
the other hand, is an abstraction from the world of the senses, since
mathematical objects are the portrayal of a purified awareness of

figure and While

relation. abstractions, mathematical things still
relate to what
is perceived by the senses. As Socrates makes clear
later in Book 7 29, an understanding of mathematics, though necessary
as a prolegomenon to philosophy, is not itself sufficient for the acqui
sition of knowledge30. Dianoia serves to remove from concern the

exigencies of the sensual world, but is not a complete break with it.
The "middle" position of physical and mathematical things in
the line reflects the position of opinion, which occupies a middle

position between knowledge and ignorance, according to the discus

sion as the end of Book 531. Opinion is there contrasted with both
knowledge and ignorance. It is not an
of what
understanding truly
is, nor is it the pursuit of things which are not. It is the acceptance
of certain beliefs. This acceptance, however, creates problems. So
crates notes that opinion rejects the existence of the noble itself and
the idea of the beautiful
itself32. Opinion cannot discern the one

thing that is true;

it posits than many things are noble, or just, or
holy, and also, owing to its position between what is and what is
not, portrays these same things as shameful, unjust, or unholy33.
Those who love opinion34, Socrates states, consider many things to
be just, but not justice itself, having opinions, but not knowing what

they have opinions about35. The argument, and Book 5, concludes

with Socrates and Glaucon agreeing that the philosophers?the lovers
of wisdom? rather than the philodoxers?the lovers of opinion?

29
See, for example, 529A9 ff.
30 'Mathematische Beispiele bei Platon',
See, for, example, W. Ettelt,
Gymnasium 68, 1961, 124-145; A. Frajese, Platone e la matem?tica nel mondo
antico, Roma 1963; and W. Broecker, 'Piatos Vorlesungen', Forschungen und
Fortschritte 40, 1965, 89-92.
31 See 477A9 ff.
32 479A1-2.
33 479A3-8.
34 The two at 480A6 and A12 are the only occur
usages of philodoxous
ences of the term in the Platonic canon.
35 479E3-5.

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Equality and Cognition in Plato's Divided Line 155

embrace each thing as it is truly *, the clearer expres

foreshadowing
sion of this point in Book 7 37.
The middle position38 of opinion precludes its understanding of
what is actually true, although opinion does not automatically become
that which is actually false. Opinions cannot isolate what is true from
the several things which appear to be true. Opinion, despite its or
chestration of beliefs, is predicated upon appearance and upon what
the senses convey. A basic theme in the Platonic dialogues addresses
the distinction between opinion and knowledge39. Philosophy, the
attempt to embrace each thing as it truly is, transcends opinion.
The deficiencies of belief must be uncovered before philosophy can
begin in earnest. The initial stage of this uncovering is provided by
the most fundamental ingredient of Socratic method?elenchus40.

Through this "questioning nature" of Socratic inquiry, interlocutors

are made aware of certain shortcomings in opinions they hold.

36 480A11-12.
37 See 532A6-B1.
38 See E. 'Methexis und Metaxy bei Platon', Journ. Philol. 5,
Hoffmann,
1919, 48-70.
39
See, for example, O. Ihm, Lieber den Begriff der Platonischen doxa und
deren Verh?ltnis zum Wissen der Ideen, Diss. Univ. Leipzig 1877; CA. Viano,
'II significato della doxa nella filosofia di Piatone', Riv. filosof?a 43, 1952, 167
185; J. Vives-Sol?, 'Episteme y doxa en la ?tica plat?nica', Convivium 11/12,
1961, 99436; T. Ebert, Meinung und Wissen in der Philosophie Piatons: Unter
suchungen zum "Charmides", aMenon", und "Staat", Berlin 1974; E. Tielsch,
Die Platonischen Versionen der griechischen Doxalehre, Meissen 1970; I. Sprute,
Der Begriff der "Doxa" in der platonischen Philosophie, G?ttingen 1962; id.,
'Zur Problematik der Doxa bei Platon', Archiv f. Geschichte d. Philosoph. 51,
1969, 56-70; P. Friedl?nder, Plato Uli, trans. H. Meyerhoff (Princeton, 1964
692), I 171-210; P. Plass, 'Philosophical Ananymity and Irony in the Platonic
Dialogues', Am. Journ. Philol. 85, 1964, 258; and L. Campbell, 'Introduction
to the Statesman', The "Sophistes" and "Politicus" of Plato, Oxford 1867,
xxviii.
40 See
Rep. 475Ea, 539B2-7; Theaet. 155C8-D3; Apol. 20B9-E2, and 22E6
23A3. On the didactic dimension of elencbus, see Robinson, op. cit. 12; N. Gul
ley, The Philosophy of Socrates, London 1968, 33, 37 ff.; G. Ryle, Plato's
Progress, London 1966, 213; J. T?te, 'Plato and Didacticism', Hermathena 48,
1933, 93-113; R. Dieterle, Platons "Laches" und "Charmides": Untersuchungen
zur elenktischaporetischen Struktur der platonishen Fr?hdialogue, Diss. Univ.
Freiburg 1966; R.E. Allen, Plato's "Euthyphro" and the Earlier Theary of
Forms, New York 1970, 47; and J.A. Stewart, Plato's Doctrine of Ideas, New
York 1964, 31 f.

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 156 K. Moors

Elenchus cannot, however, address opinion in general. It is always

applied to specific opinions held by specific individuals.

The transition which is effected by Socrates at the end of
Book 5,
however, introduces a demand that opinion itself be po
sitioned, rather than particular opinions held on particular subjects.
Books 6 and 7 direct one's attention away from what is accepted
and based upon what appears to be and toward what is
by opinion
produced by philosophy and based upon what truly is. The middle
image of the three grand symbolic expressions in those two books
acts as a fulcrum about which a theory of cognition is reflected in
terms. Whereas the image of the sun presents a basic
figurative
relationship between the source of what is true and truth's recog
nition, and the cave offers a picture of the relationship between truth
and the individual who perceives it, the divided line offers a schema

tizing of cognitive awareness.

cast as a basic distinction between what is seen and
Initially
what is considered by the intellect, the divided line encompasses
three basic dimensions: thatwhich is apprehended as being thatwhich
it actually is not (image); that which is apprehended as being that
which it actually is (knowledge); and those things which partake of
the middle ground between what actually is not and what actually
is (physical and mathematical things). By presenting these two last
categories as figuratively equal, Socrates expresses in symbolism the
basic disparity in cognition which the line addresses?the disparity
between appearance and truth.
The four sub-segments of the line correspond to three levels of
awareness, with the middle level relating to both the physical and
the intellectual perception of objects. The posited equality between
pistis and dianoia in the schematic, however, prompts us to consider
the only inequality remaining in the line. That inequality obliges us
to recognize the basic direction of Socratic investigation?one which
proceeds from what appears to be to what is actually true. Such is
the essential nature of Socratic philosophizing. The divided line
provides us with a sketch, not a blueprint. The ratios employed, and
the resulting equality of pistis and dianoia, seem appropriate when
considered in the manner outlined in this note. It is most unlikely
a one it to what it is
that such figure is unintentional when applies
that philosophy seeks to replace. The four sub-segments of the line

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Equality and Cognition in Platon Divided Line 157

relate to three levels of awareness, and those three levels of awareness

require that we consider the two cognitive domains bridged by Pla

tonic dialogue41.

Duquesne University

41Cf.
533E7-534A8.

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