A. Notarial Law
Examen pointed out that there was no longer any prohibition
1) 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
A.C. No. 10132, March 24, 2015
HEIRS OF PEDRO ALILANO REPRESENTED BY DAVID
ALILANO, Complainants, v. ATTY. ROBERTO E. EXAMEN, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) by the heirs of Pedro Alilano against Atty. Roberto E. Examen for
misconduct and malpractice for falsifying documents and presenting these as
evidence in court thus violating the Lawyer’s Oath,2 Canons 1,3 104and 19,5 and
Rules 1.01,6 1.02,7 10.01,8 and 19.019 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
Pedro Alilano and his wife, Florentina, were the holders of Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. P-23261 covering a 98,460 sq. m. parcel of land identified as Lot No.
1085 Pls-544-D located in Paitan, Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat.  Pedro and Florentina
died on March 6, 1985 and October 11, 1989, respectively.
It appears that on March 31, 1984 and September 12, 1984 Absolute Deeds of
Sale10 were executed by the Spouses Alilano in favor of Ramon Examen and his wife,
Edna.  Both documents were notarized by respondent Atty. Roberto Examen,
brother of the vendee.  Sometime in September 1984, Spouses Examen obtained
possession of the property.
On January 12, 2002, the heirs of Alilano filed a suit for recovery of possession
before the Regional Trial Court of Sultan Kudarat against Edna Examen and Atty.
Roberto Examen.11  It was during this proceeding that Atty. Examen introduced into
evidence the March 31, 1984 and September 12, 1984 Absolute Deeds of Sale.
On November 15, 2003,12 the heirs of Alilano filed this complaint alleging that Atty.
Examen, based on Barretto v. Cabreza,13 violated the notarial law when he notarized
the absolute deeds of sale since a notary public is prohibited from notarizing a
document when one of the parties is a relative by consanguinity within the fourth
civil degree or affinity within the second civil degree.  It is also alleged that Atty.
Examen notarized the documents knowing that the cedula or residence certificate
number used by Ramon Examen was not actually his but the residence certificate
number of Florentina.  Atty. Examen also falsely acknowledged that the two
witnesses personally appeared before him when they did not.  Lastly, it is alleged
that despite knowing the infirmities of these documents, Atty. Examen introduced
these documents into evidence violating his oath as a lawyer and the CPR.
In his defense, Atty.
under the Revised Administrative Code for a notary public to notarize a document
where one of the parties is related to him by consanguinity and affinity. 14  With
regard to the use of Florentina’s residence certificate as Ramon’s, Atty. Examen said
that he was in good faith and that it was office practice that the secretary type
details without him personally examining the output. 15  In any event, he reasoned
that the use of another’s residence certificate is not a ground for disbarment and is
barred by prescription based on IBP Resolution No. XVI-2004-13 dated January 26,
2004 where it was proposed that the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar
Discipline Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Section 1, Rule VIII, be revised to
include a prescription period for professional misconduct: within two years from
the date of the act.16cralawred
In its Report and Recommendation,17 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
found Atty. Examen liable for breach of the Notarial Law and introducing false
Absolute Deeds of Sale before court proceedings.  It stated that there was ample
evidence to support the complainants’ contention that the Spouses Alilano did not
voluntarily and knowingly convey their property, i.e. denials under oath by attesting
witnesses and NBI Report by Handwriting Expert Jennifer Dominguez stating that
Pedro Alilano’s signature in the September 1984 Absolute Deed of Sale was
significantly different from the specimen signatures.  It also noted that Ramon
Examen’s residence certificate number, date and place of issue were also falsified
since the residence certificate actually belonged to Florentina Pueblo.  It thus
recommended that the penalty of disbarment be imposed.
The IBP Board of Governors (BOG) in its June 26, 2007 Resolution 18 adopted the IBP
CBD’s report but modified the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for a
period of two years and a suspension of Atty. Examen’s Notarial Commission for a
period of two years.
Atty. Examen moved for reconsideration.  In its Notice of Resolution, the IBP BOG
denied the motion for reconsideration.  It also modified the penalty imposed to
suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year and disqualification
from re-appointment as Notary Public for a period of two years. 19cralawred
We agree with the IBP that Atty. Examen is administratively liable and hereby
impose a modified penalty.
In disbarment cases the only issue that is to be decided by the Court is whether the
member of the bar is fit to be allowed the privileges as such or not. 20  It is not
therefore the proper venue for the determination of whether there had been a
proper conveyance of real property nor is it the proper proceeding to take up
whether witnesses’ signatures were in fact forged.
NO PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS FOR 
ACTS OF ERRING MEMBERS OF THE BAR
In Frias v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada,21 the Court En Banc opined that there can be no
prescription in bar discipline cases.  It pointed out this has been the policy since
1967 with the Court’s ruling in Calo, Jr. v. Degamo22 and reiterated in Heck v.
Santos23 where we had the chance to state:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard
the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no
private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of
being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to
answer for.  It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law
as well as the administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from
the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution
of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the
disciplining arm of the Court.  This categorical pronouncement is aimed at
unscrupulous members of the bench and bar, to deter them from committing acts
which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct,
or the Lawyer’s Oath.  x x x
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act
to the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase the administrative
culpability of a lawyer…. (Italics supplied)24cralawlawlibrary
We therefore ruled in Frias, that Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the
IBP CBD was void and had no legal effect for being ultra vires and thus null and
void.25cralawred
This ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Bengco v. Bernardo,26 where
the Court stated that putting a prescriptive period on administrative cases involving
members of the bar would only serve to embolden them to disregard the very oath
they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private
complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being
completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer
for.
Atty. Examen’s defense of prescription therefore is of no moment and deserves
scant consideration.
THE SPANISH NOTARIAL LAW OF
1889 WAS REPEALED BY THE REVISED
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917  wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Prior to 1917, governing law for notaries public in the Philippines was the Spanish
Notarial Law of 1889.  However, the law governing Notarial Practice is changed with
the passage of the January 3, 1916 Revised Administrative Code, which took effect
in 1917.  In 2004, the Revised Rules on Notarial Practice 27 was passed by the
Supreme Court.
In Kapunan, et al. v. Casilan and Court of Appeals, 28 the Court had the opportunity
to state that enactment of the Revised Administrative Code repealed the Spanish
Notarial Law of 1889.  Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is petitioners’ contention that Notary Public Mateo Canonoy, who was related to
the parties in the donation within the fourth civil degree of affinity, was, under
Articles 22 and 28 of the Spanish Notarial Law, incompetent and disqualified to
authenticate the deed of donation executed by the Kapunan spouses in favor of
their daughter Concepcion Kapunan Salcedo.  Said deed of donation, according to
petitioners, became a mere private instrument under Article 1223 of the old Civil
Code, so that under the ruling laid down in the case of Barretto vs. Cabreza (33 Phil.,
413), the donation was inefficacious.  The appellate court, however, in the decision
complained of held that the Spanish Notarial Law has been repealed with the
enactment of Act No. 496.  We find this ruling to be correct.  In the case of
Philippine Sugar Estate vs. Poizart (48 Phil., 536), cited in Vda. de Estuart vs. Garcia
(Adm. Case No. 212, prom. February 15, 1957), this Court held that “The old
Spanish notarial law and system of conveyance was repealed in the Philippines
and another and different notarial law and system became the law of the land
with the enactment of Act No. 496.”29 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlawlibrary
In this case, the heirs of Alilano stated that Atty. Examen was prohibited to notarize
the absolute deeds of sale since he was related by consanguinity within the fourth
civil degree with the vendee, Ramon. The prohibition might have still applied had
the applicable rule been the Spanish Notarial Law. However, following the Court’s
ruling in Kapunan, the law in force at the time of signing was the Revised
Administrative Code, thus, the prohibition was removed.  Atty. Examen was not
incompetent to notarize the document even if one of the parties to the deed was a
relative, his brother. As correctly observed by the IBP
CBD:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
At the time of notarization, the prevailing law governing notarization was Sections
231-259, Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative Code and there was no
prohibition on a notary public from notarizing a document when one of the
interested parties is related to the notary public within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or second degree of affinity.30cralawlawlibrary
Note must be taken that under 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule IV, Section
3(c), a notary public is disqualified among others to perform the notarial act if he is
related by affinity or consanguinity to a principal within the fourth civil degree, to
SEC. 3. Disqualifications. – A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial
act if he:
(c)  is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or
consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree.
That Atty. Examen was not incompetent to act as a notary public in the present case
does not mean that he can evade administrative liability under the CPR in
conjunction with the provisions of the Notarial Law.
NOTARIES PUBLIC MUST PERFORM
THEIR DUTIES DILIGENTLY AND 
WITH UTMOST CARE
In Nunga v. Atty. Viray,31 this Court stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
…[N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized
may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that
those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the
public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be underscored
that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public
document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of
the authenticity thereof. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care
the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. 32 (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)cralawlawlibrary
Thus under the prevailing law at the time of notarization it was the duty of the
notary public to comply with the requirements of the Notarial Law.  This includes
the duty under Chapter 11, Section 251 of the Revised Administrative
Code:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of cedula [residence] tax.  – Every
contract, deed, or other document acknowledged before a notary public shall have
certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented their proper cedula
[residence] certificates or are exempt from the cedula [residence] tax, and there
shall be entered by the notary public as a part of such certification the number,
place of issue, and date of each cedula [residence] certificate as aforesaid.
cralawlawlibrary
Under Chapter 11, Section 249 of the Revised Administrative Code provided a list of
the grounds for disqualification:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 249. Grounds for revocation of commission.  – The following derelictions of
duty on the part of a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first
instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:
(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula
certificates.chanrobleslaw
In Soriano v. Atty. Basco,33 the Court stated that notaries public are required to
follow formalities as these are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected.  Thus,
the Notarial Law requires them to certify that a party to the instrument
acknowledged before him has presented the proper residence certificate (or
exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter its number, place of issue
and date as part of the certification. Failure to perform his duties results in the
revocation of a notary’s commission.  The Court said:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As a lawyer commissioned as a notary public, respondent is mandated to discharge
with fidelity the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being
dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. Faithful observance
and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment are
sacrosanct. He cannot simply disregard the requirements and solemnities of the
Notarial Law.34 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlawlibrary
Here, based on the submission of the complainants, it is clear that the residence
certificate number used by Ramon Examen and as notarized by Atty. Examen in
both Absolute Deeds of Sale was not in fact the residence certificate of Ramon but
Florentina’s residence certificate number.35  Atty. Examen interposes that he was in
good faith in that it was office practice to have his secretary type up the details of
the documents and requirements without him checking the correctness of same.
A notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with
public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. 36  Good faith cannot be a mitigating
circumstance in situations since the duty to function as a notary public is personal.
We note that the error could have been prevented had Atty. Examen diligently
performed his functions: personally checked the correctness of the documents.  To
say that it was his secretary’s fault reflects disregard and unfitness to discharge the
functions of a notary public for it is he who personally acknowledges the
document.  He was behooved under Section 251, Chapter 11 of the Revised
Administrative Code to check if the proper cedulas were presented and inspect if
the documents to be acknowledged by him reflected the correct details.  This Court
cannot stress enough that notarization is not a routinary act.  It is imbued with
substantive public interest owing to the public character of his duties 37.
Atty. Examen posits that the failure of a notary to make the proper notation
of cedulas can only be a ground for disqualification and not the proper subject for a
disbarment proceeding.  We disagree.
In violating the provisions of the Notarial Law, Atty. Examen also transgressed the
his oath as a lawyer, provisions of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court which provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor.  – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly and willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
public for a period of two (2) years from finality of this Decision.  He is
further WARNED that any similar act or infraction in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Department of Justice and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

By his negligent act of not checking the work of his secretary and merely SO ORDERED.
perfunctorily notarizing documents, it cannot be said that he upheld legal processes
thus violating Canon 1 of the CPR.  Neither can it be said that he promoted
confidence in the legal system.  If anything, his acts serve to undermine the
functions of a diligent lawyer. He thus ran afoul Rule 1.02 of the CPR. We cannot
stress enough that as a lawyer, respondent is expected at all times to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission
which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity
of the legal profession.38  A lawyer’s mandate includes thoroughly going over
documents presented to them typed or transcribed by their secretaries. 39cralawred

The Court notes that the case between the parties is not the first that reached this
Court.  In Edna Examen and Roberto Examen v. Heirs of Pedro Alilano and
Florentina Pueblo,40 Atty. Examen and his sister-in-law questioned via a petition for
certiorari41 the propriety of three Court of Appeals’ Resolutions relating to a case
involving Lot No. 1085 Pls-544-D this time with respect to its fruits.  There the Court
of Appeals (CA) after giving Atty. Examen 90 days to file his appellant’s brief, denied
a second motion for extension of time merely on the basis of a flimsy reason that he
had misplaced some of the transcript of the witnesses’ testimonies.  The CA did not
find the reason of misplaced transcript as good and sufficient cause to grant the
extension pursuant to Section 12,42 Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court.  It stated
that it was a “flimsy and lame excuse to unnecessarily delay the proceedings.” 43 
The CA was of the opinion that defendant-appellant’s, herein respondent, motion
was “a mockery of the procedural rules.”44  This Court denied the petition for
various procedural defects.45cralawred

With respect to the penalty imposed, given that Atty. Examen not only failed to
uphold his duty as a notary public but also failed to uphold his lawyer’s oath and ran
afoul the provisions of the CPR, the Court deems it proper to suspend Atty. Examen
from the practice of law for a period of two years following this Court’s decision
in Caalim-Verzonilla v. Pascua.46cralawred

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto E. Examen is hereby SUSPENDED from the

practice of law forTWO (2) YEARS.  In addition, his present notarial commission, if
any, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary
2) GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
XERXES A. ABADIANO vs. SPOUSES JESUS and LOLITA G.R. No. 156310 
MARTIR,
July 31, 2008
 
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated March 14, 2002 and its Resolution[2] dated November 21, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 51679. The CA affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental[3] declaring respondents as the owners of the
property in question.
 
The case stemmed from an action for quieting of title and/or recovery of
possession[4] of a parcel of land filed by herein respondents against Roberto
Abadiano, Faustino Montao, and Quirico Mandaguit. Petitioner Xerxes A. Abadiano
intervened in that case.
 
Lot No. 1318 of the Kabankalan Cadastre consists of 34,281 square meters covered
by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 20461 issued on November 19, 1923 in the
name of the spouses Inocentes Baares and Feliciana Villanueva. Before the issuance
of OCT No. 20461, however, Inocentes and the heirs of Feliciana Villanueva (who
had predeceased her husband) executed an Agreement of Partition dated June 1,
1922 over Lot No. 1318. The lot was partitioned and distributed as follows: (1)
14,976 sq m denominated as Lot No. 1318-A, in favor of Demetrio Baares; (2)
10,125 sq m denominated as Lot No. 1318-B, in favor of Ramon and David Abadiano
(grandchildren of Inocentes and Feliciana); and (3) 10,180 sq m denominated as Lot
No. 1318-C, in favor of Amando Baares. The partition is embodied in a Deed of
Partition executed on June 1, 1922 and notarized the following day by Notary Public
Jose Peralta with notarial inscriptions Reg. No. 64, Pag. 69, Libro III. [5]
 
On September 30, 1939, David Abadiano, who was absent during the execution of
the Agreement of Partition, executed a Deed of Confirmation acknowledging and
ratifying the document of partition.[6]
 
OCT No. 20461 was administratively reconstituted on February 15, 1962 and in lieu
thereof OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) was issued over Lot No. 1318, still in the name of
Inocentes Baares and Felicidad Villanueva. Annotated at the back of the
reconstituted title were the Agreement of Partition and the Deed of Confirmation. [7]
On June 14, 1957 Demetrio Baares sold his share of the lot to his son, Leopoldo. The
same was annotated at the back of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461). [8]
 
Subsequently, on February 21, 1962, Leopoldo Baares filed before the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Negros Occidental an ex-parte petition praying for: first, the
confirmation of the Agreement of Partition, the Conformity executed by David
Abadiano, and the Deed of Sale between him and his father; and second, the
cancellation of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) and, in lieu thereof, the issuance of a new
certificate of title over the property. In an Order datedFebruary 22, 1962, the court
ordered the cancellation of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) and the issuance of a new
certificate of title in the names of Dr. Leopoldo Baares, Amando Baares, and Ramon
and David Abadiano. Pursuant thereto, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
31862 was issued by the Register of Deeds for Negros Occidental. [9]
 
Petitioner insists that this is still the valid and subsisting title over Lot No. 1318 and
that no sale of the portion pertaining to Ramon and David Abadiano ever took
place.[10]
 
On the other hand, respondent spouses alleged that, prior to the issuance of TCT
No. T-31862, Ramon Abadiano, for himself and on behalf of David Abadiano, had
already sold their rights and interests over Lot No. 1318-C [11] to Victor Garde. The
sale was allegedly evidenced by a document of sale (Compra Y Venta) dated June 3,
1922 and acknowledged before Notary Public Jose Peralta and bearing notarial
inscription Doc. No. 64, Pag. No. 60, Book No. III, series of 1922. The sale was
allegedly affirmed by David Abadiano in a document dated September 30, 1939.[12]
 
They further alleged that from the time of the sale, Victor Garde and his heirs were
in continuous, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession and occupation in the
concept of an owner of Lot No. 1318-C.[13] On December 29, 1961, the heirs of
Victor Garde sold their rights and interests over Lot No. 1318-C [14] to Jose Garde,
who immediately took possession thereof. Jose Garde continuously planted
sugarcane on the land until he sold the property to Lolita Martir in 1979. [15]
 
After acquiring the property, respondent spouses continued to plant sugarcane on
the land. Sometime in March 1982, after respondent Jesus Martir harvested the
sugarcane he had planted on Lot No. 1318-C, defendant below Roberto Abadiano
(son of Ramon) allegedly entered the property and cultivated the remaining stalks
of sugarcane and refused to vacate despite demands to do so. The following year,
defendants Roberto Abadiano, Faustino Montao, and Quirico Mandaguit again
harvested the sugarcane on Lot No. 1318-C.[16] Further, the defendants also entered
the property and harvested the sugarcane on Lot No. 1318-B, [17] which by then had
been acquired by Lolita B. Martir from her adoptive father, Amando Baares. [18]
 
Thus, in April 1982, herein respondent-spouses filed the Action to Quiet Title and/or
Recovery of Possession with Damages before the then CFI of Negros Occidental.
 
In their Answer with Counterclaim,[19] defendants denied that the subject property
was ever sold by Ramon and David Abadiano, and that, consequently, defendant
Roberto Abadiano had inherited the same from Ramon. They also alleged, by way
of Special and Affirmative Defenses, that the subject land still belonged to the
estate of Ramon and David Abadiano and was never alienated. They alleged further
that the act of spouses Martir in planting sugarcane on the land was without
Robertos consent; that Roberto had demanded that the spouses Martir pay him
reasonable rental for the land but that they had persistently refused to do so; and
that sometime in March 1981, Roberto and the spouses Martir came to an
agreement whereby the defendant continued to cultivate the remaining stalks of
sugarcane left by plaintiffs and that until the harvest of said sugarcane, plaintiffs
never posed any objection thereto.
Xerxes Abadiano intervened in the proceedings before the trial court alleging
likewise that his predecessor Ramon Abadiano never sold their share of the
property to Victor Garde.[20]
 
After trial, the court issued a Decision[21] dated June 23, 1995, ruling in favor of the
spouses Martir, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants declaring plaintiffs spouses Jesus and Lolita Martir as the true and
legitimate owners of portions of Lot No. 1318 Kabankalan Cadastre denominated as
Lots 1318-B and 1318-C and ordering:
 
(1)               That the defendants Roberto Abadiano and the intervenor Xerxes
Abadiano shall surrender Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31862 to the Registrar of
Deeds of Negros Occidental who is directed to partially cancel said title and issue
new Certificate of Title corresponding to Lots 1318-B and 1318-C in the names of
the spouses Jesus and Lolita Martir;
 
(2)               That the defendants shall jointly and severally pay to the plaintiffs the
amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos representing the value of the
sugarcanes of plaintiffs which defendants harvested and milled with SONEDCO and;
 
(3)               To pay the costs of this suit.
 
SO ORDERED.[22]
 
 
The trial court rejected therein defendants contention that the Compra Y Venta was
null and void because the co-owner, David Abadiano, did not sign the same. It held
that the Supreme Court has ruled to the effect that the sale by a co-owner of the
entire property without the consent of the other co-owners was not null and void
but that only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, making the buyer a
co-owner. The trial court also held that although the Compra Y Venta was not
annotated either on the OCT or on the reconstituted OCT, the validity of the sale
was not vitiated. The registration or annotation is required only to make the sale
valid as to third persons. Thus, the trial court concluded that the Compra Y
Venta was valid between the parties, Ramon Abadiano and Victor Garde.
 
The trial court also brushed aside the defendants contention that the Compra Y
Venta contained the same notarial inscription as the Deed of Partition. It said that
assuming this to be true, this may be considered an error which did not nullify
the Compra Y Venta;  at most, the document would be non-registrable but still valid.
On the contention that the alleged confirmation executed by David Abadiano was
for the Deed of Partition and not for the Compra Y Venta, the trial court agreed. It,
however, interpreted the same to mean that David Abadiano must not have
authorized his brother to sell his share in Lot No. 1318-C. The effect was that David
Abadiano continued to be one of the registered owners of the property and his
heirs stepped into his shoes upon his death.
However, the trial court found that the plaintiffs (respondents) claim that they and
their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property for more
than sixty (60) years was duly established. In contrast, the court found that
defendants and intervenor, and their deceased parents, had not been in possession
of their share in the property. It held that the defendants and intervenor were
guilty of laches for failing to avail of the many opportunities for them to bring an
action to establish their right over Lot No. 1318-C.
 
Defendants appealed to the CA. However, the same was summarily dismissed in a
Resolution dated February 11, 1997 due to defendants failure to pay the required
docket fee within the period set. Nonetheless, the records were retained for the
appeal of Xerxes Abadiano, intervenor in the trial court.
 
On March 14, 2002, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the Decision of the RTC in
toto.[23]
 
Xerxes Abadiano now comes before this Court raising the following arguments:
 
A THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED, BASED ON ITS
MISAPPREHENSION AND/OR OMISSION OF THE FACTS, IN DISREGARDING THE
PRIMORDIAL ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OF SALE (COMPRA Y VENTA) IS
A SPURIOUS DOCUMENT
B THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONER
GUILTY OF LACHES OVER REGISTERED LAND[24]
 
 
The Petition is impressed with merit. We believe the trial court and the CA erred in
ruling for the respondents. Accordingly, we reverse the assailed Decision and
Resolution.
 
It is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed
by the CA, are accorded the highest degree of respect, and generally will not be
disturbed on appeal. Such findings are binding and conclusive on the Court. Further,
it is not the Courts function under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the
evidence presented. The jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review under Rule
45 is limited to reviewing only errors of law. Unless the case falls under the
recognized exceptions, the rule shall not be disturbed. [25]
However, this Court has consistently recognized the following exceptions: (1) when
the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in
making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record.[26]
 
In the present case, we find that the trial court based its judgment on a
misapprehension of facts, as well as on the supposed absence of evidence which is
contradicted by the records.
In appreciating the alleged Compra Y Venta presented by respondents, the trial
court concluded that [t]he parties have no quarrel on the existence of a Deed of
Sale of a portion of Lot No. 1318 executed by Ramon Abadiano for himself and as
representative of David Abadiano, dated June 3, [1922] in favor of Victor Garde. [27]
 
The trial court erred in its conclusion.
Borne very clearly by the records is the defendants repudiation of the existence of
the sale in their Answer with Counterclaim. They stated:
2. That defendants admit plaintiffs allegation in paragraph 4 that there has been no
particular designation of lot number (sic) for each of the co-owner (sic) of Lot No.
1318 but specifically deny under oath the other allegations thereof the truth being
that the property referred to here as Lot No. 1318 remains undivided to this day
that the owners thereof as shown by the TCT No. 31862 co-own the same pro-
indiviso;
 
3. That defendants have no knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations in paragraph 5[28] and therefore specifically deny the same under
oath the truth being that Ramon Abadiano and David Abadiano had not sold the
land at bar to anyone and that consequently, defendant Roberto Abadiano had
inherited the same from the former; x x x. [29] (emphasis supplied).
Likewise, petitioner specifically denied the allegations in paragraph 5 of the
Complaint. He alleged that the lot had never been sold or alienated and the same
still remains intact as the property of the Intervenor and his co-owners by operation
of law.[30]
This was testified to by Roberto Abadiano during the trial, thus:
Q: During the lifetime of your father, do you know if your father has ever sold to
any party his share on Lot No. 1318?
 
A: He has not sold his share.[31]
 
These statements were enough to impugn the due execution of the document.
While it is true that this Court had previously ruled that mere denials would not
have sufficed to impeach the document, in this case, there was an effective specific
denial as contemplated by law in accordance with our ruling that - defendant must
declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or
fabricated.  Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the
instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its
genuineness or due execution.  On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of
the genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument
upon a ground not affecting either.[32]
It was error then for the RTC to have brushed aside this issue and then make so
sweeping a conclusion in the face of such opposition. In light of this challenge to the
very existence of the Compra Y Venta, the trial court should have first resolved the
issue of the documents authenticity and due execution before deciding on its
validity. Unfortunately, the CA did not even discuss this issue.
 
We are cognizant, however, that it is now too late in the day to remand the case to
the trial court for the determination of the purported Compra Y Ventas authenticity
and due execution. Thus, we will resolve this very issue here and now in order to
put an end to this protracted litigation.
 
There is no denying that TCT No. 31862 is still the subsisting title over the parcel of
land in dispute. It is also a fact that the purported Compra Y Venta was not
annotated on TCT No. 31862 until April 1982, shortly before the complaint was
commenced, even though the deed was allegedly executed in 1922.
 
Considering that the action is one for quieting of title and respondents anchored
their claim to the property on the disputed Compra Y Venta, we find it necessary to
repeat that it was incumbent upon the trial court to have resolved first the issue of
the documents due execution and authenticity, before determining its validity.
 
Rule 130, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
 
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
 
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole;
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
 
Respondents attached only a photocopy of the Compra Y Venta to their complaint.
According to respondent Lolita Martir, the original of said document was in the
office of the Register of Deeds. They allegedly tried to obtain a copy from that office
but their request was refused. No other evidence but these bare assertions,
however, was presented to prove that the original is indeed in the custody of the
Register of Deeds or that respondents due and diligent search for the same was
unsuccessful.
 
The Rule states that when the original document is unavailable, has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution
or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may
prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. [33]
 
In the case at bar, respondents failed to establish that the offer in evidence of the
document was made in accordance with any of the exceptions allowed under the
abovequoted rule, and yet, the trial court accepted the document as genuine and
proceeded to determine its validity based on such assumption.
 
The trial court likewise brushed aside the apparent defect that the document
presented contained the same notarial inscription as the Agreement on Partition.
Indeed, the Deed of Partition and the Compra Y Venta, though executed on
different days, were notarized on the same day, and both documents contained the
signatures of the same witnesses and the same notarial inscription.
This notwithstanding, the court concluded, Assuming this to be true, same could be
considered an error which did not nullify, (sic) the Deed of Sale or Compra Y Venta.
At most, the document would be a non-registrable, but valid document. [34]
We stress that a notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal
manner therein expressed and has in its favor the presumption of regularity. [35]
In this case, while it is true that the error in the notarial inscription would not have
invalidated the sale if indeed it took place the same error would have meant that
the document cannot be treated as a notarial document and thus, not entitled to
the presumption of regularity. The document would be taken out of the realm of
public documents whose genuineness and due execution need not be proved. [36]
Accordingly, respondents not having proven the due execution and genuineness of
the purported Compra Y Venta, the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of
petitioner.
Next, we determine if petitioner is guilty of laches. On this issue, we rule in the
negative.
Under the Property Registration Decree,[37] no title to registered land in derogation
of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.[38] Indefeasibility and imprescriptibility are the cornerstones of land
registration proceedings.  Barring any mistake or use of fraud in the procurement of
the title, owners may rest secure on their ownership and possession once their title
is registered under the protective mantle of the Torrens system.[39] 
 
Nonetheless, even if a Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible,[40] the
registered landowner may lose his right to recover the possession of his registered
property by reason of laches.[41]
 Laches has been defined as neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in
conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an
adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity.  It is a delay in the assertion of a
right which works disadvantage to another because of the inequity founded on
some change in the condition or relations of the property or parties.  It is based on
public policy which, for the peace of society, ordains that relief will be denied to a
stale demand which otherwise could be a valid claim. [42]
The four basic elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or
of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is
made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the
complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the
defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit; (3)
lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant
would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the
defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant or the suit is not held
to be barred.[43]
 
The reason for the rule is not simply the lapse of time during which the neglect to
enforce the right has existed, but the changes of condition which may have arisen
during the period in which there has been neglect. In other words, where a court
finds that the position of the parties will change, that equitable relief cannot be
afforded without doing injustice, or that the intervening rights of third persons may
be destroyed or seriously impaired, it will not exert its equitable powers in order to
save one from the consequences of his own neglect. [44]
Though laches applies even to imprescriptible actions, its elements must be proved
positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature and cannot be established by mere
allegations in the pleadings.[45]
 
Based on the foregoing, we hold that petitioner is not guilty of laches. The evidence
on record does not support such finding.
 
Petitioner had reasonable ground to believe that the property, being still in the
name of his predecessor in interest, continued to be theirs, especially considering
that the annotation of the purported sale was done only in 1982. According to
petitioner, his father had told him that his (the fathers) inheritance was in the
possession of their uncle, Amando Baares who knew likewise that the property was
theirs.
Thus, Roberto Abadiano testified:
Q: Before Amando Baares died, did you know that your father is a part owner of Lot
No. 1318?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And did you not complain to Amando Baares that your father is a pert owner of
that lot?
 
A: No, Sir. We did not complain because he was our grandfather and when he dies,
the property will go back to us.[46]
 
And herein petitioner testified:
Atty. Garaygay
Q: Before the war who was occupying this lot which you claimed belonging (sic) to
your father?
A: The uncle of my father, Amando Baares, Sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, before and after the war and during the lifetime of Amando
Baares, he was the one in possession of Lot No. 1318?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was the condition of the lot under the possession of the lot under the
possession of Amando Baares was it under lease?
A: As far as I can remember, my father told me that his inheritance was with
Amando Baares, his uncle.[47]
 
From the testimonies of petitioner and the defendants during trial, it would appear
that they were unaware of any of respondents actions in relation to the property
until the death of their grandfather, Amando Baares. When they did find out that
respondents were occupying the land, they immediately took action to occupy what
they believed was still rightfully theirs.
On this point, petitioner testified, thus:
Q: When did you initiate the move to claim Lot No. 1318-B as your inheritance from
your late father?
A: It was shortly after the death of Amando Baares.
Q: Who were these, who initiated the move to claim Lot No. 1318-B?
A: I advised my brothers here in Kabankalan to take action to possess the land
which was then occupied before by our (sic) great uncle, Amando Baares.
Q: When was that, in what year, because we do not know when did your uncle (sic)
die?
A: It was after the death of Amando Baares sometime in 1973 or 1974.
 
Q: Why did it take you that long before you initiated the move to claim the
inheritance?
 
A: Considering that relatives were involved and the fact we understand that our late
parents revered our uncle so, we cautiously tried to take action shortly after his
death, so as not to antagonize our relatives.
Q: What did you do in order to claim your inheritance?
A: Now, after learning that it was being farmed by Lolita Martir, I advised my
brothers here in Kabankalan to go to Bacolod City to seek the intercession of the
Philippine Constabulary Commander in order to thresh out the matter in a way that
there will be no hostility or adverse reaction.
Q: What other reactions did you take, if any?
A: Well, I told my brother that they have a confrontation in the Office of the PACLAP
known as the Presidential Action Commission on Land Problems.
Q: Besides that confrontation at the PACLAP, what other action did you personally
take as an heir of Lot No. 1318-B?
A: After that confrontation, I advised my brothers to occupy the land in question to
farm it because it belongs to us.
Q: With respect to the Transfer Certificate of Title, what action, if any, did you
undertake?
A: Well, we drew out a Declaration of Heirship and Adjudication and after it was
approved by the Court, it was annotated at the back of the Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-31862 and we were given a co-owners copy of the said title by the
Register of Deeds.
xxxx
 
Q: Mr. Witness, when did you and your co-owners executed (sic) this Declaration of
Heirship and Adjudication over Lot 1318-B?
A: That was on July 17, 1976.
Q: Was that before or after the plaintiffs have filed this present case?
A: That was almost 6 or 7 years before this present case was filed. [48]
 
On the other hand, Roberto Abadiano testified:
Atty. Garaygay
Q: Now, according to you, your father is the co-owner of Lot No. 1318. Prior to the
death of your father, who was in possession of Lot No. 1318?
 
Witness
A: What I know is it was Amando Baares.
Q: You mean to say that when your father was still alive, it was Amando Baares who
was in possession of Lot No. 1318?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And until when did you know that Amando Baares has been in possession of Lot
No. 1318?
A: Up to 1976 when he died.
Q: After his death in 1976, who was in possession of the said lot?
A: I made a verification in the Office of the Register of Deeds, and when I went to
the said lot, it was vacant.
Q: When was that?
A: In 1976-1977, and I have it planted in 1978.[49]
That petitioner and his co-heirs waited until the death of Amando Baares to try and
occupy the land is understandable. They had to be careful about the actions they
took, lest they sow dissent within the family. Furthermore, they knew that their
parents revered Amando.[50]
 
The Court has recognized that this reaction cannot be characterized as such delay as
would amount to laches, thus:
 
in determining whether a delay in seeking to enforce a right constitutes laches, the
existence of a confidential relationship between the parties is an important
circumstance for consideration, a delay under such circumstances not being so
strictly regarded as where the parties are strangers to each other. The doctrine of
laches is not strictly applied between near relatives, and the fact that parties are
connected by ties of blood or marriage tends to excuse an otherwise unreasonable
delay.[51]
In addition, several other factors militate against the finding of laches on the part of
the petitioner.
 
When the Original Certificate of Title was reconstituted on February 15, 1962, no
annotation therein was made of the Compra Y Venta or of the Deed of Sale
between Ramon Abadiano and Victor Garde. Only the Agreement of Partition, the
Confirmation by David Abadiano, and the sale from Demetrio to Leopoldo Baares
were annotated therein.[52] Neither does the Deed of Sale of Demetrios share in
favor of Leopoldo, executed in 1957, mention that the property belonged to anyone
other than the parties to the Deed of Partition.[53]
 
Likewise, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31862, which was issued in 1962
pursuant to an Order of the Kabankalan CFI, was issued in the names of Leopoldo
Baares, Amando Baares, and Ramon and David Abadiano. Even at the time of the
issuance of said TCT, there was no annotation of the alleged sale to Victor Garde,
which according to respondents took place in 1922.
 
If respondents contention were true, the TCT should not have been issued in April
1962 in the name of Ramon and David Abadiano, but in the name of Victor Garde or
Jose Garde who by then had supposedly acquired the property by virtue of the
Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Sale executed on December 29, 1961. [54] As it is,
neither respondents nor any of their predecessors in interest participated in any of
the proceedings for the issuance of the OCT, the reconstituted OCT, or the TCT. The
petitioners testimony on the matter is revealing:
 
Q: Based on your investigation, did you find records of the proceedings of the
reconstitution of title of Lot 1318 or any evidence as to the participation of the
plaintiffs in this Reconstitution Petition?
A: Based on the existing records, they did not participate.
Q: How about in the Reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No. (sic) did the
plaintiffs participate therein?
A: They did not also.
 
Q: How about in the issuance of the new Transfer Certificate of Title, did the
plaintiffs participate therein?
A: No, sir.[55]
  
Again, the TCT bears out the fact that the purported Compra Y Venta to Victor
Garde was annotated thereon only on April 23, 1982. On the other hand, several
entries made in 1981 evince that petitioner and his co-heirs took steps after
Amandos death to assert their rights over the property. [56]
 
In 1976, the heirs of David Abadiano executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor
of Roberto Abadiano giving the latter authority to act, sue, and/or represent them
in any suit or action for recovery of possession or of whatever kind or nature. [57] For
their part, the heirs of Ramon Abadiano executed a Declaration of Heirship and
Adjudication over the part of Lot No. 1318 pertaining to their predecessor. [58]
Ranged against these positive steps, respondents only have their bare assertions to
support their claim that they indeed had possession of the land through their
predecessors in interest, which are insufficient to overcome the testimony that it
was Amando Baares and not Victor Garde who had possession of the property
during the formers lifetime, or that after Amandos death, the lot remained
unoccupied.
In sum, we find that petitioner is not guilty of such neglect or inaction as would bar
his claim to the property in question. In contrast, it is most telling that respondents,
who are claiming to have been in possession of the property by virtue of an alleged
duly constituted sale for almost 60 years, have themselves failed within that long
period to have the same property transferred in their name or even only to have
the sale annotated on the title of the property.
 
Finally, we come to the issue of damages. Petitioner prays that respondents be
made to pay actual damages of not less that P30,000.00 plus rentals on the
property from the time of the latters occupation, moral damages amounting
to P100,000.00, and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees.
 
The record shows that petitioner testified on the prevailing rate of rentals on the
subject property from the time of Amando Baares death in 1976 until the time of
the trial. According to petitioner, the rental rate from 1976 until 1985
was P3,000.00 per hectare, while from 1985 until the time of his testimony in 1994,
the rental rate was P5,000.00 per hectare. We thus rule that the actual damages
that may be awarded shall be based only on these rates. [59]
Considering, however, that petitioners co-heirs (defendants Roberto Abandiano, et
al.) were able to enter the property and harvest the sugarcane therein in 1981 and,
thereafter, the land remained unoccupied, the rent must be reckoned only from the
time respondents actually occupied the land until March 1981.
The claims for moral damages must be anchored on a definite showing that the
claiming party actually experienced emotional and mental sufferings. [60] In this case,
we find that petitioners testimony that he suffered from sleepless nights from
worrying about this case and considering the great distance he had to travel from
his home in Tacloban to see the case through are enough bases to award him moral
damages. With the award of moral damages, exemplary damages are likewise in
order.[61]
 
Attorneys fees are recoverable when exemplary damages are awarded, or when the
court deems it just and equitable. The grant of attorneys fees depends on the
circumstances of each case and lies within the discretion of the court. [62] Given the
circumstances of this case, we grant the prayer for attorneys fees.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51679
are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new one is entered:
 
(1)              reversing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros
Occidental in Civil Case No. 1331;
(2)              declaring the heirs of Ramon and David Abadiano as the lawful owners
of Lot No. 1318-B, a portion of Lot No. 1318 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-31862, Kabankalan Cadastre, Negros Occidental; and
 
(3)              ordering respondents to pay petitioner and his co-heirs rentals at the
rate of P3,000.00 per hectare per year, from the time of actual occupation of the
land in 1976 until March 1981, moral damages in the amount of P100,00.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00, and attorneys fees in the amount
of P10,000.00.
 
 
SO ORDERED.
CAMCAM VS CA
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
 
Petitioner Leonor Camcam (Leonor) and her husband Laureano Salvador (Laureano)
were the registered owners of two parcels of land, Lot Nos. 19554 and 18738 of the
Cadastral Survey of San Carlos, Pangasinan, located in the Barrio of Basista, San
Carlos, Pangasinan.
 
Laureano died intestate on December 9, 1941. He was survived by his wife-
petitioner Leonor; his brothers Agapito and petitioners Jose and Fortunato, all
surnamed Salvador; and the heirs of his deceased brother Luis Salvador (Luis),
namely, petitioners Virginia, Gloria, Florendo, Delfin, Rodrigo, Eleuterio, Narciso,
Onofre, Zenaida, and Aurelia, all surnamed Salvador.
 
On February 9, 1983, Leonor, together with her brothers-in-law Agapito, Jose,
Fortunato, and Luis heirs, filed before the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan a Complaint,[1] docketed as Civil Case No. SCC-833, against respondent
Arcadio Frias (Frias), for annulment of the following documents executed by Leonor
in Frias favor covering Lot Nos. 19554 and 18738:
1.           November 4, 1982 Deed of Adjudication with Sale of the entire Lot  No.
19554 and of Lot  No. 18738, for a P11,000 consideration signed by Leonor (Exhibit
B/1);[2]
2.           November 4, 1982 Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Sale of ONE-HALF ()
portion EACH [of the two lots] together with [Leonors] conjugal share of ONE-HALF
() EACH of the [two lots] with all the improvements thereon for a P45,000
consideration, signed by Leonor (Exhibit A/3);[3] and
 
3.           November 23, 1982 Deed of Absolute Sale of the other half of Lot  No.
18738, for a consideration of P3,000, signed by Leonor (Exhibit C/2).[4]
 
Before the trial court, petitioners advanced the following version of the case:
 
In November 1982, Frias offered to purchase the two lots from Leonor. Leonor,
however, was only willing to enter into a sale with right of repurchase within five
years. Frias agreed to Leonors condition but he deceived her into signing the Deed
of Adjudication-Exhibit B/1, after which he paid her P9,000 out of the P11,000
consideration, he promising that he would settle the balance of P2,000 before the
end of the month.
 
In the latter part of November 1982, Frias, instead of delivering the balance
of P2,000, again deceived Leonor into signing another document, the Deed of
Absolute Sale-Exhibit C/2, he telling her that since two lots were involved, she had
to sign another instrument pertaining to the other lot.
 
Upon verification with Rodolfo Acosta (Acosta), the notary public who notarized
Exhibits B/1 and C/2, petitioners discovered that the deeds Leonor signed
transferred ownership of the entire area covering the two lots. They also, upon
inquiry with the Register of Deeds at Lingayen, discovered that Original Certificate
of Title Nos. 11634[5] and 12027[6] in the name of Leonor and her husband covering
the two lots were cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 143752[7] and
143753[8] were in their stead issued in Frias name. Further, they discovered that
Frias registered the document-Exhibit A/3, which had the same date and notarial
details as those of Exhibit B/1.
 
Petitioners alleged that assuming that the documents are valid, it is void with
respect to the shares of Leonors co-heirs-co-petitioners as they were conveyed
without their knowledge and participation.
 
They thus prayed for judgment
(1)         Declaring null and void, the Deed of Adjudication with Sale dated
November 4, 1982 [Exhibit B/1], and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November
23, 1982 [Exhibit C/2] on the ground that the said documents did not reflect the
true intention of the parties x x x, moreover, the shares of the plaintiffs, other than
plaintiff Camcam, were included without their knowledge, participation and
consent x x x;
(2)         Declaring null and void, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition
and Sale dated November 4, 1982 [Exhibit A/3] based on the fact that it
is absolutely fictitious and simulated x x x;
(3)         That as a consequence of the nullity of [Exhibit A/3], TCT Nos. 143752 and
143753 be declared null and void and ordering the Register of Deeds of Lingayen,
Pangasinan to cancel said transfer certificates of titles issued in the name of
defendant Frias and the annotations on OCT Nos. 11634 and 12027 relative to the
cancellation be cancelled; or, in the alternative, the defendant Frias xxx be ordered
to execute a deed of reconveyance over the parcels subject of this suit in favor of
the plaintiffs, in the following proportion, to wit: one half (1/2) to plaintiff Camcam,
and the other half shall pertain to the other plaintiffs, namely, Agapito, Jose,
Fortunato and the heirs of the late Luis, all surnamed Salvador, in equal proportion;
(4)         Declaring plaintiffs Agapito, Jose, Fortunato, and the late Luis, all surnamed
Salvador, the latter being represented in this suit by his heirs, as the only legitimate
heirs to inherit the estate of their deceased brother, Laureano Salvador who died
on December 9, 1941, thereby excluding the widow from participating xxx;
(5)         Declaring the defendant liable for actual, compensatory and moral damages
to plaintiffs and litigation expenses, assessable in terms of money in such amount as
will be proved in court, and to pay exemplary damages as may be assessed by the
court;
(6)         Declaring the defendant liable for the attorneys fees in the amount of
P10,000.00 and to pay the costs.[9] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 
They likewise prayed for other just and equitable reliefs. [10]
 
Upon the other hand, Frias advanced the following version:
 
Leonor inherited the two lots, to the exclusion of her co-petitioners, under the old
Civil Code[11] and it was she who convinced him to buy them.
Leonor later changed her mind and was willing to sell only the whole of the
residential land, Lot No. 19554, and of the mango and coconut land, Lot No. 18739,
[12]
 as she was giving her brothers-in-law two weeks to buy the remaining portion
thereof,[13] hence, he and Leonor forged Exhibit B/1. Leonor later informed him that
her brothers-in-law could not buy the remaining portion of Lot No. 18739, hence,
he and Leonor forged Exhibit C/2.[14]
After the execution of the two documents dated November 4, 1982, Frias brought
them to the Municipal Building to pay taxes. When asked by an employee of the
then-Ministry of Agrarian Reform how much he paid for the lots, Frias confessed to
not having indicated the correct consideration on the documents because he
wanted to escape paying taxes such as capital gains taxes. On being informed of the
consequences of not reflecting the true consideration of the two lots in the
documents, he had the third document, Exhibit A/3, prepared which, after
explaining to Leonor the reason beyond the necessity therefor, she signed in notary
public Acostas office.[15]During the pendency of the proceedings before the trial
court, Leonors brother-in-law Agapito died and was substituted by his heirs, namely
petitioners Teofila, Felicidad, Mercedes, Lydia, Alfredo, Bienvenido, Efren, Lilia,
Erlinda, Melinda, Marylou, and Meriam, all surnamed Salvador.[16]
 
By Decision[17] of December 12, 1990, Branch 57 of the Pangasinan RTC, holding
that:  pronouncement. The expenses of the survey should be borne equally by plaintiffs-
We cannot agree that Leonor Camcam signed [these] document[s]  without
reading them. She signed [them] and read [them] because she was one who had
enough learning. x x x Besides that, Evangeline Pira, and Gertrudes Calpo signed it
themselves as [witnesses according to] the testimony of Atty. Rodolfo Acosta.
 
xxxx
But this is true only with regards to of the properties as [they are] conjugal in
nature. As regards x x x the other half of the property the rights of inheritance by x
x x brothers and sisters under the old law is provided thus:
Article 948. If there are brothers and sisters and nephews, who are children of
brothers and sisters of the whole blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the
latter per stirpes.
Article 953. In case there are brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters,
the widow or widower shall have a right to receive, in concurrence with the former,
the portion of the inheritance in usufruct granted him or her in Article 837.
Article 837. When the testator leaves no legitimate descendants or ascendants, the
surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance also in
usufruct[18] (The old civil code) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied), disposed as
follows:
 
WHEREFORE the other half [of the two lots] should be divided among the brothers
and sisters and nephews and nieces by the right of intestate succession; to brothers
and sisters, per capita; and the nephews and nieces per stirpes; of one-half of the
property. The remaining one-half belong[s] to defendant [herein-respondent
Frias].
Ordering the Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan to cancel TCT No. 143752
and 143753 and instead issue another title, one half of the property to the brothers
and sisters, per capita; and to the nieces and nephews per stirpes; the other half to
the defendants.[19] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On appeal,[20] the Court of Appeals, by Decision[21] of April 30, 1992, affirmed with
modification the trial courts decision. Thus it disposed:
 
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the lower court
dated December 12, 1990 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. One-half of the
properties in question belong to defendant-appellee Arcadio Frias, by virtue of the
valid sale by Leonor Camcam. The other half should be divided among the brothers,
nephews and nieces of the late Laureano Salvador by right of intestate
succession: to brothers per capita and to the nephews and nieces per stirpes.
 
THE Register of Deeds of Lingayen, Pangasinan is directed to cancel TCT Nos.
143752 and 143753 and issue the corresponding titles in accordance with the above
appellants and defendant-appellee. Costs against plaintiffs-appellants.
[22]
 (Underscoring supplied)
 
 
Their Motion for Reconsideration[23] having been denied,[24] petitioners filed the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari,[25] faulting the appellate court
1.       . . . IN NOT DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE THREE (3) DEEDS X X X
CONSIDERING THEIR PHYSICAL APPEARANCE AND CONDITIONS INDICATING
STRONGLY THE IRREGULARITIES OF THEIR EXECUTION.
2.       [IN NOT DECLARING THAT] THE SALES WERE ILLEGAL, CONSIDERING THE
OTHER PETITIONERS [,] BEING OWNERS OF THE OTHER HALF, HAVE THE
PREFERENTIAL RIGHT TO PURCHASE THAT HALF PORTION INSTEAD OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.[26]
Petitioners contend as follows:
From the appearance of these documents, particularly the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition and Sale (Annex A or Exh. A/3) and the Deed of Adjudication
with Sale (Annex B or Exh. B/1), while both were notarized by the same notary
public, yet they have identical notarial documentary identification, i.e., the same
documentary number to be 464, same page number 44, the same book number X
and the same series of 1982, and appeared to have been sworn before the notary
public on the same date November 4, 1982.
 
Aside from the anomalous situation created by the irregularly executed deeds and
advantageously employed by the private respondent, in order to conceal the
apparent irregularities, the private respondent claimed that the Deed of Partition
and Sale (Annex A or Exh A/3) dated November 4, 1982, was a consolidation deed
of the Deed of Adjudication with Sale dated November 4, 1982 (Annex B or Exh.
B/1) and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 23, 1982 (Annex C or Exh
C/2). However, summing up the consideration stated in Annex B of P11,000.00 and
the consideration stated in Annex C of P3,000.00, the total will naturally be
P14,000.00, but the alleged [consolidation] deed (Annex A or Exh A/3) shows the
consideration is not P14,000.00 but P45,000.00.[27]
  
Assuming, without admitting, that petitioner Leonor Camcam regularly sold her
one-half portion in the two parcels of land in favor of private respondent Arcadio
Frias, however, considering the preferential right of the other petitioners, who are
admittedlythe owners of the other half portion in said parcels of land, and
considering further the attendant circumstances of this case, as discussed above,
the petitioners, with the exception of petitioner Leonor Camcam, should be allowed
to jointly exercise their right of redemption, the consideration of which shall
proportionately be based on that Deed (Annex B or Exh. B/1) which was published
in the newspaper.[28] (Underscoring supplied)
The petition is bereft of merit.  given that petitioners already knew of the sale as early as 1983, they are guilty of
Without passing on the merits of Frias claim that Leonor originally sold to him of Lot
No. 18739 as reflected in the first November 4, 1982 document but later conveyed
the remaining thereof, hence, the execution of the second document bearing the
same date, an irregular notarization merely reduces the evidentiary value of a
document to that of a private document, which requires proof of its due execution
and authenticity to be admissible as evidence.[29] The irregular notarization or, for
that matter, the lack of notarization does not thus necessarily affect the validity of
the contract reflected in the document. Tigno v. Aquino[30] enlightens:
 
x x x [F]rom a civil law perspective, the absence of notarization of the Deed of
Sale would not necessarily invalidate the transaction evidenced therein. Article
1358 of the Civil Code requires that the form of a contract that transmits or
extinguishes real rights over immovable property should be in a public document,
yet it is also an accepted rule that the failure to observe the proper form does not
render the transaction invalid. Thus, it has been uniformly held that the form
required in Article 1358 is not essential to the validity or enforceability of the
transaction, but required merely for convenience. We have even affirmed that a
sale of real property though not consigned in a public instrument or formal writing,
is nevertheless valid and binding among the parties, for the time-honored rule is
that even a verbal contract of sale or real estate produces effects between the
parties.[31] (Underscoring supplied)
 
Petitioners alleged fraud on Frias part, hence, they had the burden of establishing
the same by clear and convincing evidence.[32] This they failed to discharge.
By Leonors account, she signed the three documents relying on Frias word that they
were deeds of mortgage, and she did not read them because she [did] not know
how to read,[33] When asked, however, on cross-examination about her educational
attainment, Leonor answered that she finished the third year of a nursing course at
San Juan de Dios Hospital.[34]
 
Clarifying her statement that she did not know how to read, Leonor explained that
she knew how to read but her eyesight was blurred.[35] Leonors granddaughter-
witness Gertrudes Calpo (Gertrudes) who signed as witness in Exhibit B/1 declared,
however, that she read the contents of Exhibit B/1 to Leonor, [36] thus belying
petitioners claim that Leonor signed the same without knowing its true contents.
As for Exhibit A/3 which petitioners maintain is spurious, Leonors signature therein
being allegedly forged,[37] Leonor herself admitted having signed the same,[38] and
this was corroborated by Gertrudes.[39]
As for Leonors co-petitioners invocation of their right of redemption of the share of
Leonor in the lots sold to Frias, points of law, theories, issues of fact, and arguments
not brought to the attention of the trial court ordinarily are not considered by a
reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. [40] Besides,
laches, having raised their right of redemption for the first time in 2000 when they
filed the present petition.[41]
AT ALL EVENTS, even assuming that the invocation by Leonors co-petitioners of
their right of redemption was timely made, it cannot be considered a valid exercise
thereof as it was not accompanied by a reasonable and valid tender of the entire
repurchase price.[42]
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing disquisition, DENIED.
 SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174240               March 20, 2013
SPOUSES LEHNER and LUDY MARTIRES, vs. MENELIA CHUA
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Amended Decision, 1 as well as the
Resolutions2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 30, 2005, July 5, 2006
and August 28, 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 76388. The assailed Decision of
the CA reversed and set aside its earlier Decision, dated April 30, 2004, in favor of
petitioners. The July 5, 2006 Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration, while the August 28, 2006 Resolution denied petitioners' Second
Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
Subject of the instant controversy are twenty-four memorial lots located at the Holy
Cross Memorial Park in Barangay Bagbag, Novaliches, Quezon City. The property,
more particularly described as "Lot: 24 lots, Block 213, Section: Plaza of Heritage-
Reg.," is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 342914. Respondent,
together with her mother, Florencia R. Calagos, own the disputed property. Their
co-ownership is evidenced by a Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care,
denominated as Contract No. 31760, which was executed on June 4, 1992. 3
On December 18, 1995, respondent borrowed from petitioner spouses the amount
of ₱150,000.00. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage over the
abovementioned property. Respondent committed to pay a monthly interest of 8%
and an additional 10% monthly interest in case of default. 4
Respondent failed to fully settle her obligation.
Subsequently, without foreclosure of the mortgage, ownership of the subject lots
were transferred in the name of petitioners via a Deed of Transfer. 5
On June 23, 1997, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City a Complaint against petitioners, Manila Memorial Park Inc., the company which
owns the Holy Cross Memorial Park, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City,
praying for the annulment of the contract of mortgage between her and petitioners
on the ground that the interest rates imposed are unjust and exorbitant.
Respondent also sought accounting to determine her liability under the law. She
likewise prayed that the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and Manila Memorial
Park, Inc. be directed to reconvey the disputed property to her. 6
On November 20, 1998, respondent moved for the amendment of her complaint to
include the allegation that she later discovered that ownership of the subject lots
was transferred in the name of petitioners by virtue of a forged Deed of Transfer
and Affidavit of Warranty. Respondent prayed that the Deed of Transfer and
Affidavit of Warranty be annulled.7 In their Manifestation dated January 25, 1999,
petitioners did not oppose respondent's motion. 8 Trial ensued.
After trial, the RTC of Quezon City rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners, the
dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered against Menelia R.
Chua and in favor of the Sps. Lehner Martires and Ludy Martires; and Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. as follows:
1. The Complaint is denied and dismissed for lack of merit;
2. The counterclaims are granted as follows:
a. Menelia R. Chua is ordered to pay the Sps. Martires the amount of ₱100,000.00
as moral damages; the amount of ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the
amount of ₱30,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees plus costs of suit.
b. Menelia R. Chua is ordered to pay Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. the
amount of ₱30,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.9
On appeal, the CA affirmed, with modification, the judgment of the RTC, disposing
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit, and the decision of the trial court dated 03 August 2002 is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION as to the amount of moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees. Plaintiff-appellant Menelia R. Chua is hereby ordered to pay the
defendant-appellees Spouses Martires the amount of ₱30,000.00 as moral
damages; ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and attorney's fees of ₱10,000.00
plus costs of suit.
Insofar as defendant-appellee Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. is concerned,
the attorney's fees awarded is reduced to ₱10,000.00 plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.10
The CA ruled that respondent voluntarily entered into a contract of loan and that
the execution of the Deed of Transfer is sufficient evidence of petitioners'
acquisition of ownership of the subject property.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 11 Petitioners opposed it.12
On September 30, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed Amended Decision with
the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the movant's Motion for Reconsideration.
Accordingly, the decision of this Court dated April 30, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 76388,
which had affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
221, in Civil Case No. Q-97-31408, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and it is hereby
declared that:
(1) The assailed decision dated August 3, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City Branch 221 in Civil Case No. Q-97-31408 is hereby Reversed with the following
MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
(1) The Deed of Transfer dated July 3, 1996, as well as the Affidavit of Warranty, are
hereby declared void ab initio;
(2) The loan of ₱150,000.00 is hereby subject to an interest of 12% per annum.
(3) The Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City [are] hereby directed to cancel the registration or annotation of ownership of
the spouses Martires on Lot: 24 lots, Block 213, Section: Plaza Heritage – Regular,
Holy Cross Memorial Park, being a portion of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
342914 issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, and revert registration of
ownership over the same in the name of appellant Menelia R. Chua, and Florencia
R. Calagos.
(4) The movant, Menelia R. Chua, is hereby ordered to pay the spouses Martires the
amount of ₱150,000.00 plus interest of 12% per annum computed from December
18, 1995 up to the time of full payment thereof and, after deducting payments
made in the total amount of ₱80,000.00, the same shall be paid within ninety (90)
days from the finality of this decision. In case of failure to pay the aforesaid amount
and the accrued interests from the period hereinstated, the property shall be sold
at public auction to satisfy the mortgage debt and costs, and if there is an excess,
the same is to be given to the owner.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.13
The CA reconsidered its findings and concluded that the Deed of Transfer which, on
its face, transfers ownership of the subject property to petitioners, is, in fact, an
equitable mortgage. The CA held that the true intention of respondent was merely
to provide security for her loan and not to transfer ownership of the property to
petitioners. The CA so ruled on the basis of its findings that: (1) the consideration,
amounting to ₱150,000.00, for the alleged Deed of Transfer is unusually
inadequate, considering that the subject property consists of 24 memorial lots; (2)
the Deed of Transfer was executed by reason of the same loan extended by
petitioners to respondent; (3) the Deed of Transfer is incomplete and defective; and
(4) the lots subject of the Deed of Transfer are one and the same property used to
secure respondent's ₱150,000.00 loan from petitioners.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,14 but the CA denied it in its
Resolution dated July 5, 2006.
On July 26, 2006, petitioners filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration, 15 but again,
the CA denied it via its Resolution dated August 28, 2006.
Hence, the present petition based on the following grounds:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE DEED OF
TRANSFER EXECUTED BY THE RESPONDENT IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS BY
RULING THAT:
1. The Deed of Transfer executed by respondent in favor of petitioners over the
subject property was not entered in the Notarial Book of Atty. Francisco Talampas
and reported in the Notarial Section of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
2. The Deed of Transfer was not duly notarized by Atty. Francisco Talampas
inasmuch as there was no convincing proof that respondent appeared before
Notary Public Atty. Talampas.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEED OF
TRANSFER EXECUTED BETWEEN THE RESPONDENT AND THE PETITIONERS
CONSTITUTED AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE CONSIDERING THAT:
1. Said issue was not raised in any pleading in the appellate and trial
courts.1âwphi1
2. Respondent herself admitted that a separate mortgage was executed to secure
the loan.16
The petition lacks merit.
At the outset, the instant petition should be denied for being filed out of time.
Petitioners admit in the instant petition that: (1) on July 18, 2006, they received a
copy of the July 5, 2006 Resolution of the CA which denied their Motion for
Reconsideration of the assailed Amended Decision; (2) on July 26, 2006, they filed a
Motion to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration attaching thereto the said
Second Motion for Reconsideration; (3) on September 5, 2006, they received a copy
of the August 28, 2006 Resolution of the CA which denied their Motion to Admit as
well as their Second Motion for Reconsideration; and (4) they filed the instant
petition on October 20, 2006.
Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for review on
certiorari under the said Rule "shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from or of the denial of the
petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of
the judgment." Relative thereto, Section 2, Rule 52 of the same Rules provides that
"no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the
same party shall be entertained." Based on the abovementioned dates, the start f
the 15-day period for the filing of this petition should have been reckoned from July
18, 2006, the time of petitioners' receipt of the CA Resolution denying their Motion
for Reconsideration, and not on September 5, 2006, the date when they received
the CA Resolution denying their Second Motion for Reconsideration. Thus,
petitioners should have filed the instant petition not later than August 2, 2006. It is
wrong for petitioners to reckon the 15-day period for the filing of the instant
petition from the date when they received the copy of the CA Resolution denying
their Second Motion for Reconsideration. Since a second motion for reconsideration
is not allowed, then unavoidably, its filing did not toll the running of the period to
file an appeal by certiorari.17 Petitioners made a critical mistake in waiting for the CA
to resolve their second motion for reconsideration before pursuing an appeal.
Perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory but
also jurisdictional.18 For this reason, petitioners' failure to file this petition within
the 15-day period rendered the assailed Amended CA Decision and Resolutions final
and executory, thus, depriving this Court of jurisdiction to entertain an appeal
therefrom.19On this ground alone, the instant petition should be dismissed.
In any case, even granting, arguendo, that the present petition is timely filed, the
Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings and conclusions of the CA
in its disputed Amended Decision.
Anent the first assigned error, petitioners are correct in pointing out that notarized
documents carry evidentiary weight conferred upon them with respect to their due
execution and enjoy the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by
evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to
falsity.20 However, the presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be
affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular. 21 A
defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and reduce it
to a private instrument.22 Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization
of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to
a duly-notarized document is dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity
of such document is preponderance of evidence.23
In the present case, the CA has clearly pointed out the dubious circumstances and
irregularities attendant in the alleged notarization of the subject Deed of Transfer,
to wit: (1) the Certification24 issued by the Clerk of Court of the Notarial Section of
the RTC of Makati City which supposedly attested that a copy of the subject Deed of
Transfer is on file with the said court, was contradicted by the Certification 25 issued
by the Administrative Officer of the Notarial Section of the same office as well as by
the testimony of the court employee who prepared the Certification issued by the
Clerk of Court, to the effect that the subject Deed of Transfer cannot, in fact, be
found in their files; (2) respondent's categorical denial that she executed the subject
Deed of Transfer; and (3) the subject document did not state the date of execution
and lacks the marital consent of respondent's husband.
Indeed, petitioners' heavy reliance on the Certification issued by the notary public
who supposedly notarized the said deed, as well as the Certification issued by the
Clerk of Court of the Notarial Section of the RTC of Makati City, is misplaced for the
following reasons: first, the persons who issued these Certifications were not
presented as witnesses and, as such, they could not be cross-examined with respect
to the truthfulness of the contents of their Certifications; second, as mentioned
above, these Certifications were contradicted by the Certification issued by the
Administrative Officer of the Notarial Section of the RTC of Makati City as well as by
the admission, on cross-examination, of the clerk who prepared the Certification of
the Clerk of Court, that their office cannot, in fact, find a copy of the subject Deed of
Transfer in their files;26 and third, the further admission of the said clerk that the
Certification, which was issued by the clerk of court and relied upon by petitioners,
was not based on documents existing in their files, but was simply based on the
Certification issued by the notary public who allegedly notarized the said Deed of
Transfer.27
Assuming further that the notarization of the disputed Deed of Transfer was
regular, the Court, nonetheless, is not persuaded by petitioners' argument that such
Deed is a sufficient evidence of the validity of the agreement between petitioners
and respondent.
While indeed a notarized document enjoys the presumption of regularity, the fact
that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. 28 The
presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary.29 In the present case, the presumption cannot be made to apply,
because aside from the regularity of its notarization, the validity of the contents and
execution of the subject Deed of Transfer was challenged in the proceedings below
where its prima facie validity was subsequently overthrown by the questionable
circumstances attendant in its supposed execution. These circumstances include: (1)
the alleged agreement between the parties that the ownership of the subject
property be simply assigned to petitioners instead of foreclosure of the contract of
mortgage which was earlier entered into by them; (2) the Deed of Transfer was
executed by reason of the loan extended by petitioners to respondent, the amount
of the latter's outstanding obligation being the same as the amount of the
consideration for the assignment of ownership over the subject property; (3) the
inadequacy of the consideration; and (4) the claim of respondent that she had no
intention of transferring ownership of the subject property to petitioners.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the
findings of the CA that the agreement between petitioners and respondent is, in
fact, an equitable mortgage.
An equitable mortgage has been defined as one which, although lacking in some
formality, or form or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute,
nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property as security
for a debt, there being no impossibility nor anything contrary to law in this intent. 30
One of the circumstances provided for under Article 1602 of the Civil Code, where a
contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, is "where it may be fairly
inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the
payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation." In the instant case,
it has been established that the intent of both petitioners and respondent is that
the subject property shall serve as security for the latter's obligation to the former.
As correctly pointed out by the CA, the circumstances surrounding the execution of
the disputed Deed of Transfer would show that the said document was executed to
circumvent the terms of the original agreement and deprive respondent of her
mortgaged property without the requisite foreclosure.
With respect to the foregoing discussions, it bears to point out that in Misena v.
Rongavilla,31 a case which involves a factual background similar to the present case,
this Court arrived at the same ruling. In the said case, the respondent mortgaged a
parcel of land to the petitioner as security for the loan which the former obtained
from the latter. Subsequently, ownership of the property was conveyed to the
petitioner via a Deed of Absolute Sale. Applying Article 1602 of the Civil Code, this
Court ruled in favor of the respondent holding that the supposed sale of the
property was, in fact, an equitable mortgage as the real intention of the respondent
was to provide security for the loan and not to transfer ownership over the
property.
Since the original transaction between the parties was a mortgage, the subsequent
assignment of ownership of the subject lots to petitioners without the benefit of
foreclosure proceedings, partakes of the nature of a pactum commissorium, as
provided for under Article 2088 of the Civil Code.
Pactum commissorium is a stipulation empowering the creditor to appropriate the
thing given as guaranty for the fulfillment of the obligation in the event the obligor
fails to live up to his undertakings, without further formality, such as foreclosure
proceedings, and a public sale.32
In the instant case, evidence points to the fact that the sale of the subject property,
as proven by the disputed Deed of Transfer, was simulated to cover up the
automatic transfer of ownership in petitioners' favor. While there was no
stipulation in the mortgage contract which provides for petitioners' automatic
appropriation of the subject mortgaged property in the event that respondent fails
to pay her obligation, the subsequent acts of the parties and the circumstances
surrounding such acts point to no other conclusion than that petitioners were
empowered to acquire ownership of the disputed property without need of any
foreclosure.
Indeed, the Court agrees with the CA in not giving credence to petitioners'
contention in their Answer filed with the RTC that respondent offered to transfer
ownership of the subject property in their name as payment for her outstanding
obligation. As this Court has held, all persons in need of money are liable to enter
into contractual relationships whatever the condition if only to alleviate their
financial burden albeit temporarily.33
Hence, courts are duty-bound to exercise caution in the interpretation and
resolution of contracts lest the lenders devour the borrowers like vultures do with
their prey.34 Aside from this aforementioned reason, the Court cannot fathom why
respondent would agree to transfer ownership of the subject property, whose value
is much higher than her outstanding obligation to petitioners. Considering that the
disputed property was mortgaged to secure the payment of her obligation, the
most logical and practical thing that she could have done, if she is unable to pay her
debt, is to wait for it to be foreclosed. She stands to lose less of the value of the
subject property if the same is foreclosed, rather than if the title thereto is directly
transferred to petitioners. This is so because in foreclosure, unlike in the present
case where ownership of the property was assigned to petitioners, respondent can
still claim the balance from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale, if there be any. In
such a case, she could still recover a portion of the value of the subject property
rather than losing it completely by assigning its ownership to petitioners.
As to the second assigned error, the Court is not persuaded by petitioners'
contention that the issue of whether or not the subject Deed of Transfer is, in fact,
an equitable mortgage was not raised by the latter either in the RTC or the CA.
It is true that, as a rule, no issue may be raised on appeal unless it has been brought
before the lower tribunal for its consideration.35 Higher courts are precluded from
entertaining matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the
proceedings below, but ventilated for the first time only in a motion for
reconsideration or on appeal.36However, as with most procedural rules, this maxim
is subject to exceptions.37 In this regard, the Court's ruling in Mendoza v.
Bautista38 is instructive, to wit:
x x x Indeed, our rules recognize the broad discretionary power of an appellate
court to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not
assigned. Section 8 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 8 Questions that may be decided. - No error which does not affect the
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from
or the proceedings therein will be considered, unless stated in the assignment of
errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued
in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.
Thus, an appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if
they are not assigned as errors in the appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not
assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within
contemplation of law; (c) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete
resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing
piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but
raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue
submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (e)
matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned;
and (f) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination
of a question properly assigned, is dependent.39
In the present case, petitioners must be reminded that one of the main issues
raised by respondent in her appeal with the CA is the validity and due execution of
the Deed of Transfer which she supposedly executed in petitioners' favor. The Court
agrees with respondent that, under the factual circumstances obtaining in the
instant case, the determination of the validity of the subject Deed of Transfer would
necessarily entail or involve an examination of the true nature of the said
agreement. In other words, the matter of validity of the disputed Deed of Transfer
and the question of whether the agreement evidenced by such Deed was, in fact,
an equitable mortgage are issues which are closely related, which can, thus, be
resolved jointly by the CA.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Amended Decision and
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated September 30, 2005, July 5, 2006 and
August 28, 2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 76388, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014
THELMA M. ARANAS,  v. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO,
CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M.
ANDERSON, AND FRANKLIN L. MERCADO,  to be examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma’s motion through the order of
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties
for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by
the administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional unless the
interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction
extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the
estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether property
included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased
spouse.
Antecedents
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his
second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V.
Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and
Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage, namely:
respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned
corporate shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson
Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real properties in
exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian,
Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.
On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a
petition for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio’s estate
(Special Proceedings No. 3094–CEB).1 The RTC granted the petition considering that
there was no opposition. The letters of administration in favor of Teresita were
issued on September 7, 1992.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio on
December 14, 1992 for the consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in
the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had “left no real properties but
only personal properties” worth P6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of
P32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00; pieces of jewelry valued at
P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30
shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P22,708.25. 2
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the
inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and
January 8, 1993.
On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8,
1993,3 supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks covering
the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of stock; 4the deed of assignment executed by
Emigdio on January 10, 1991 involving real properties with the market value of
P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par
value of P4,440,700.00;5 and the certificate of stock issued on January 30, 1979 for
300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P30,000.00.6
On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under
oath on the inventory, and that she (Thelma) be allowed 30 days within which to
file a formal opposition to or comment on the inventory and the supporting
documents Teresita had submitted.
On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to
present evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the court to resolve the
motion for approval of the inventory. 7cralawred 
On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave
of court to examine Teresita on the inventory.
With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on
the issue of what properties should be included in or excluded from the inventory,
the RTC set dates for the hearing on that issue.8cralawlawlibrary 
Ruling of the RTC
After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued on March
14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had
excluded properties that should be included, and accordingly ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court
hereby denies the administratrix’s motion for approval of inventory. The Court
hereby orders the said administratrix to re–do the inventory of properties which are
supposed to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado by including
therein the properties mentioned in the last five immediately preceding paragraphs
hereof and then submit the revised inventory within sixty (60) days from notice of
this order.
The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an account of her
administration of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to her
possession. She must render such accounting within sixty (60) days from notice
hereof.
SO ORDERED.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary  reversed and set aside insofar as the inclusion of parcels of land known as Lot No.
On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the
reconsideration of the order of March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real
properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to
Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land covered by the deed of assignment had
already come into the possession of and registered in the name of Mervir
Realty.10Thelma opposed the motion.
On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration, 11 stating that
there was no cogent reason for the reconsideration, and that the movants’
agreement as heirs to submit to the RTC the issue of what properties should be
included or excluded from the inventory already estopped them from questioning
its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue.
Decision of the CA
Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
approve the inventory, and in ordering her as administrator to include real
properties that had been transferred to Mervir Realty, Teresita, joined by her four
children and her stepson Franklin, assailed the adverse orders of the RTC
promulgated on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by petition for certiorari, stating:
I THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING
THAT THE REAL PROPERTY WHICH WAS SOLD BY THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO
DURING HIS LIFETIME TO A PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY
CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.
II THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
JURISDICTION (sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING
THAT REAL PROPERTIES WHICH ARE IN THE POSSESSION OF AND ALREADY
REGISTERED IN THE NAME (OF) PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY
CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.
III THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONERS ARE NOW ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING ITS JURISDICTION IN
PASSING UPON THE ISSUE OF WHAT PROPERTIES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE
INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO MERCADO. 12
On May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari, disposing as
follows:13
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is GRANTED
partially. The assailed Orders dated March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 are hereby
3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an area of 53,301 square meters subject matter
of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the various parcels of
land subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment dated February 17, 1989 and
January 10, 1991 in the revised inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is
concerned and affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition
for  certiorari  because the order of the RTC directing a new inventory of properties
was interlocutory; that pursuant to Article 1477 of the Civil Code, to the effect that
the ownership of the thing sold “shall be transferred to the vendee” upon its
“actual and constructive delivery,” and to Article 1498 of the Civil Code, to the
effect that the sale made through a public instrument was equivalent to the
delivery of the object of the sale, the sale by Emigdio and Teresita had transferred
the ownership of Lot No. 3353 to Mervir Realty because the deed of absolute sale
executed on November 9, 1989 had been notarized; that Emigdio had thereby
ceased to have any more interest in Lot 3353; that Emigdio had assigned the parcels
of land to Mervir Realty as early as February 17, 1989 “for the purpose of saving, as
in avoiding taxes with the difference that in the Deed of Assignment dated January
10, 1991, additional seven (7) parcels of land were included”; that as to the January
10, 1991 deed of assignment, Mervir Realty had been “even at the losing end
considering that such parcels of land, subject matter(s) of the Deed of Assignment
dated February 12, 1989, were again given monetary consideration through shares
of stock”; that even if the assignment had been based on the deed of assignment
dated January 10, 1991, the parcels of land could not be included in the inventory
“considering that there is nothing wrong or objectionable about the estate planning
scheme”; that the RTC, as an intestate court, also had no power to take cognizance
of and determine the issue of title to property registered in the name of third
persons or corporation; that a property covered by the Torrens system should be
afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title; that the RTC, by disregarding the
presumption, had transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed settled
jurisprudence on the matter; and that the RTC also gravely abused its discretion in
holding that Teresita,  et al. were estopped from questioning its jurisdiction because
of their agreement to submit to the RTC the issue of which properties should be
included in the inventory.
The CA further opined as follows:
In the instant case, public respondent court erred when it ruled that petitioners are
estopped from questioning its jurisdiction considering that they have already
agreed to submit themselves to its jurisdiction of determining what properties are
to be included in or excluded from the inventory to be submitted by the
administratrix, because actually, a reading of petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration dated March 26, 2001 filed before public respondent court clearly
shows that petitioners are not questioning its jurisdiction but the manner in which it
was exercised for which they are not estopped, since that is their right, considering
that there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of limited
jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order dated March 14, 2001 denying the
administratrix’s motion for approval of the inventory of properties which were
already titled and in possession of a third person that is, Mervir Realty Corporation,
a private corporation, which under the law possessed a personality distinct and
separate from its stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil
of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of
Mervir Realty Corporation should stand undisturbed.
Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court had no authority to
determine the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction
and even if public respondent court was not merely acting in a limited capacity as a
probate court, private respondent nonetheless failed to adjudge competent
evidence that would have justified the court to impale the veil of corporate fiction
because to disregard the separate jurisdictional personality of a corporation, the
wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established since it cannot be
presumed.14
On November 15, 2002, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration of Teresita,
et al.15
Issue
Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain
properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been either
transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the
decedent during his lifetime?
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
I Was certiorari the proper recourse to assail the questioned orders of the
RTC?
The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Thelma contends that the resort to the
special civil action for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC by Teresita and her
co–respondents was not proper. Thelma’s contention cannot be sustained.
The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on
whether the assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature.
In Pahila–Garrido v. Tortogo,16 the Court distinguished
between final and interlocutory orders as follows:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The
first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by
execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely
dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon.  An interlocutory
order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held
and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a
judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to
be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order
or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ of
preliminary injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be
the subject of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory
order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily
suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency
of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the
merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse
party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many
appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are
interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order
may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with
the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment
itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order
is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the approval of
the inventory and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for
reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties
in the inventory was not yet a final determination of their ownership.  Hence, the
approval of the inventory and the concomitant determination of the ownership as
basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject to
revision at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.
In Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court, in affirming the
decision of the CA to the effect that the order of the intestate court excluding
certain real properties from the inventory was interlocutory and could be changed
or modified at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings, held
that the order of exclusion was not a final but an interlocutory order “in the sense
that it did not settle once and for all the title to the San Lorenzo Village lots.” The
Court observed there that:
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may
pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject
to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be
instituted by the parties (3 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition,
pages 448–9 and 473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L–42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262,
266).18 (Bold emphasis supplied)
To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals,19 where the Court declared that
a “probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon
questions of title provisionally,” and reminded, citing Jimenez v. Court of Appeals,
that the “patent reason is the probate court’s limited jurisdiction and the principle
that questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action.” Indeed, in the
cited case of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals,20 the Court pointed out:
All that the said court could do as regards the said properties is determine whether
they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then
the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action
for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate
court cannot do so. (Bold emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al.
to take against the assailed orders. The final judgment rule embodied in the first
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court,21 which also governs appeals in
special proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and
resolutions) of a court of law “that completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable” may be
the subject of an appeal in due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory
order or resolution (interlocutory because it deals with preliminary matters, or that
the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered) is expressly
made non–appealable.
Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of
the possibility that material issues may be finally determined at various stages of
the special proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the
specific instances in which multiple appeals may be resorted to in special
proceedings, viz:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. – An interested
person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a
Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order
or judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive
share of the estate to which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a
deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim
against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final
determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no
appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial
rights of the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion
for a new trial or for reconsideration.
Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not come under any
of the instances in which multiple appeals are permitted.
II Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the inclusion of
the properties in the estate of the decedent?
In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion for including properties in the inventory notwithstanding their having
been transferred to Mervir Realty by Emigdio during his lifetime, and for
disregarding the registration of the properties in the name of Mervir Realty, a third
party, by applying the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction.
Was the CA correct in its conclusion?
The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in reaching its
conclusion, ignored the law and the facts that had fully warranted the assailed
orders of the RTC.
Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may
be granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent
and willing to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of
administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty–bound to direct the
preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the
surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit the
inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of administration
pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. – Within
three (3) months after his appointment every executor or administrator shall return
to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of
the deceased which has come into his possession or knowledge. In the
appraisement of such estate, the court may order one or more of the inheritance
tax appraisers to give his or their assistance. The usage of the word all in Section
1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the
decedent in the inventory.22 However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which
has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties must
be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession
as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase  true
inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be
excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of another
person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the
estate of the decedent is “to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining
the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making a final and
equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the
administration of the estate.”23 Hence, the RTC that presides over the
administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what
properties should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta,24 the
CA cannot impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of
which properties are to be included or excluded from the inventory in the absence
of “positive abuse of discretion,” for in the administration of the estates of
deceased persons, “the judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and the appellate
courts should not interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by them,
unless it be shown that there has been a positive abuse of discretion.” 25As long as
the RTC commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be
respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is
special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to
be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to
that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from
the decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to
determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to
be administered by the administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be
still revised. As the Court said in Agtarap v. Agtarap:26
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court
or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the
will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to
the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The
patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited
jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one in charge of estate
proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to
outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by
title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do
as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in
the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator,
and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court
exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of
title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and
convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a
piece of property without prejudice to final determination of ownership in a
separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are
not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the
settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of
each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive
property of the deceased spouse.27 (Italics in the original; bold emphasis supplied)
It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its directive
for the inclusion of the properties in question in its assailed order of March 14,
2001, viz:
In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted that Emigdio Mercado
was one of the heirs of Severina Mercado who, upon her death, left several
properties as listed in the inventory of properties submitted in Court in Special
Proceedings No. 306–R which are supposed to be divided among her heirs. The
administratrix admitted, while being examined in Court by the counsel for the
petitioner, that she did not include in the inventory submitted by her in this case
the shares of Emigdio Mercado in the said estate of Severina Mercado. Certainly,
said properties constituting Emigdio Mercado’s share in the estate of Severina
Mercado should be included in the inventory of properties required to be submitted
to the Court in this particular case.
In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado also
admitted in Court that she did not include in the inventory shares of stock of Mervir
Realty Corporation which are in her name and which were paid by her from money
derived from the taxicab business which she and her husband had since 1955 as a
conjugal undertaking. As these shares of stock partake of being conjugal in
character, one–half thereof or of the value thereof should be included in the
inventory of the estate of her husband. In the third place, the administratrix of the
estate of Emigdio Mercado admitted, too, in Court that she had a bank account in
her name at Union Bank which she opened when her husband was still alive. Again,
the money in said bank account partakes of being conjugal in character, and so,
one–half thereof should be included in the inventory of the properties constituting
as estate of her husband.
In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing in this case that Lot
No. 3353 of Pls–657–D located in Badian, Cebu containing an area of 53,301 square
meters as described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cebu is still registered in the name of Emigdio
S. Mercado until now. When it was the subject of Civil Case No. CEB–12690 which
was decided on October 19, 1995, it was the estate of the late Emigdio Mercado
which claimed to be the owner thereof. Mervir Realty Corporation never intervened
in the said case in order to be the owner thereof. This fact was admitted by Richard
Mercado himself when he testified in Court. x x x So the said property located in
Badian, Cebu should be included in the inventory in this case.
Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several parcels of land by the
late Emigdio S. Mercado to Mervir Realty Corporation on January 10, 1991 by virtue
of the Deed of Assignment signed by him on the said day (Exhibit N for the
petitioner and Exhibit 5 for the administratrix) was a transfer in contemplation of
death. It was made two days before he died on January 12, 1991. A transfer made
in contemplation of death is one prompted by the thought that the transferor has
not long to live and made in place of a testamentary disposition (1959 Prentice Hall,
p. 3909). Section 78 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 provides that
the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the
time of his death of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the
decedent has at any time made a transfer in contemplation of death. So, the
inventory to be approved in this case should still include the said properties of
Emigdio Mercado which were transferred by him in contemplation of death.
Besides, the said properties actually appeared to be still registered in the name of
Emigdio S. Mercado at least ten (10) months after his death, as shown by the
certification issued by the Cebu City Assessor’s Office on October 31, 1991 (Exhibit
O).28
Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and the
jurisprudence relevant to the procedure for preparing the inventory by the
administrator. The aforequoted explanations indicated that the directive to include
the properties in question in the inventory rested on good and valid reasons, and
thus was far from whimsical, or arbitrary, or capricious.
Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from Severina Mercado
should be included in the inventory because Teresita, et al. did not dispute the fact
about the shares being inherited by Emigdio.
Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code in August 3, 1988, their property regime was the conjugal
partnership of gains.29 For purposes of the settlement of Emigdio’s estate, it was
unavoidable for Teresita to include his shares in the conjugal partnership of gains.
The party asserting that specific property acquired during that property regime did
not pertain to the conjugal partnership of gains carried the burden of proof, and
that party must prove the exclusive ownership by one of them by clear, categorical,
and convincing evidence.30 In the absence of or pending the presentation of such
proof, the conjugal partnership of Emigdio and Teresita must be provisionally
liquidated to establish who the real owners of the affected properties were, 31 and
which of the properties should form part of the estate of Emigdio. The portions that
pertained to the estate of Emigdio must be included in the inventory.
Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in the name of
Mervir Realty, the RTC made findings that put that title in dispute. Civil Case No.
CEB–12692, a dispute that had involved the ownership of Lot 3353, was resolved in
favor of the estate of Emigdio, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering
Lot 3353 was still in Emigdio’s name. Indeed, the RTC noted in the order of March
14, 2001, or ten years after his death, that Lot 3353 had remained registered in the
name of Emigdio.
Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all in Civil Case No. CEB–12692.
Such lack of interest in Civil Case No. CEB–12692 was susceptible of various
interpretations, including one to the effect that the heirs of Emigdio could have
already threshed out their differences with the assistance of the trial court. This
interpretation was probable considering that Mervir Realty, whose business was
managed by respondent Richard, was headed by Teresita herself as its President. In
other words, Mervir Realty appeared to be a family corporation.
Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor of Mervir
Realty was a notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from the
inventory of the properties involved. A notarized deed of sale only enjoyed the
presumption of regularity in favor of its execution, but its notarization did not per
se guarantee the legal efficacy of the transaction under the deed, and what the
contents purported to be. The presumption of regularity could be rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary.32 As the Court has observed in Suntay v.
Court of Appeals:33
x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the
presumption of regularity, it is not the intention nor the function of the notary
public to validate and make binding an instrument never, in the first place, intended
to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The intention of the
parties still and always is the primary consideration in determining the true
nature of a contract.(Bold emphasis supplied)
It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares of stock of Mervir
Realty with the real properties owned by Emigdio would still have to be inquired
into. That Emigdio executed the deed of assignment two days prior to his death was
a circumstance that should put any interested party on his guard regarding the
exchange, considering that there was a finding about Emigdio having been sick of
cancer of the pancreas at the time.34 In this regard, whether the CA correctly
characterized the exchange as a form of an estate planning scheme remained to be
validated by the facts to be established in court.
The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the name of
Mervir Realty could not be a valid basis for immediately excluding them from the
inventory in view of the circumstances admittedly surrounding the execution of the
deed of assignment. This is because:
The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a system
of registration of titles to lands. However, justice and equity demand that the
titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or
negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud
or of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is
to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the
title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of registration or
that may arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system
shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration
officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties. 35
Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the deed of assignment of
January 10, 1991, such lots should still be included in the inventory to enable the
parties, by themselves, and with the assistance of the RTC itself, to test and resolve
the issue on the validity of the assignment. The limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an
intestate court might have constricted the determination of the rights to the
properties arising from that deed,36 but it does not prevent the RTC as intestate
court from ordering the inclusion in the inventory of the properties subject of that
deed. This is because the RTC as intestate court, albeit vested only with special and
limited jurisdiction, was still “deemed to have all the necessary powers to exercise
such jurisdiction to make it effective.”37
Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for
the important purpose of resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement
to the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Coderequired every compulsory heir and the
surviving spouse, herein Teresita herself, to “bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he (or she) may have received from the decedent, during
the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order
that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in
the account of the partition.” Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided
that any advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir “may be heard
and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and
the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the
questions and on the heir.” Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and limited
jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the matters relating to the
inventory of the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of
properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the
decedent.38
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the
inventory of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the
RTC as an intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with
circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to include
all properties in the possession of the administrator or were known to the
administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could
turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no
patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular
performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the
judicial or quasi–judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or
board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or
to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board
exercising judicial or quasi–judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical
manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 39
In light of the foregoing, the CA’s conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the RTC was unwarranted and erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review
on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 15,
2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by the
Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in Cebu to proceed
with dispatch in Special Proceedings No. 3094–CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the
late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the case;
and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10303, April 22, 2015
JOY A. GIMENO, Complainant, v. ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review Resolution No. XX-2011-2641 of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in CBD Case No. 07-2069, which imposed on
Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide (Atty. Zaide) the penalty of one-year suspension from the
practice of law, revocation of notarial commission, if existing, and two years
suspension from being commissioned as a notary public, for violation of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice (Notarial Practice Rules).2
The Case
On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno (Gimeno) filed a complaint3 with the
IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline, charging Atty. Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a
notary public's office; (2) falsification; (3) use of intemperate, offensive and abusive
language; and (4) violation of lawyer-client trust. In her complaint, Gimeno alleged
that even before Atty. Zaide's admission4 to the Bar and receipt5 of his notarial
commission, he had notarized a partial extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute
sale on March 29, 2002.6 She also accused Atty. Zaide of making false and irregular
entries in his notarial registers.7 Gimeno further submitted that she was Atty.
Zaide's former client. She engaged the services of his law firm Zaragoza-
Makabangkit-Zaide Law Offices (ZMZ) in an annulment of title case that involved
her husband and her parents-in-law. Despite their previous lawyer-client
relationship, Atty. Zaide still appeared against her in the complaint for estafa and
violation of RA 30198 that one Priscilla Somontan (Somontan) filed against her with
the Ombudsman. Gimeno posited that by appearing against a former client, Atty.
Zaide violated the prohibition against the representation of conflicting clients'
interests.9 Lastly, Gimeno contended that Atty. Zaide called her a "notorious
extortionist" in the same administrative complaint that Somontan filed against
her.10 In another civil case where she was not a party, Gimeno observed that Atty.
Zaide referred to his opposing counsel as someone suffering from "serious mental
incompetence" in one of his pleadings.11 According to Gimeno, these statements
constitute intemperate, offensive and abusive language, which a lawyer is
proscribed from using in his dealings. In his answer 12 dated September 13, 2007,
Atty. Zaide argued that he did not notarize the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial
partition. As it appeared on the notarial page of this document, his notarial stamp
and falsified signature were superimposed over the typewritten name of Atty.
Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer who actually notarized this document. 13 Atty. Zaide
claimed that Gimeno falsified his signature to make it appear that he notarized it
before his admission to the Bar. On the alleged falsification of his notarial entries,
Atty. Zaide contended that he needed to simultaneously use several notarial
registers in his separate satellite offices in order to better cater to the needs of his
clients and accommodate their growing number.14 This explains the irregular and
non-sequential entries in his notarial registers. Further, Atty. Zaide argued that
Gimeno was never his client since she did not personally hire him as her counsel.
Gimeno engaged the services of ZMZ where he previously worked as an associate.
The real counsel of Gimeno and her relatives in their annulment of title case was
Atty. Leo Montalban Zaragoza, one of ZMZ's partners. 15 On this basis, the
respondent should not be held liable for representing conflicting clients' interests.
Finally, he denied that he used any intemperate, offensive, and abusive language in
his pleadings.16
The IBP Proceedings
On October 4, 2007, the IBP CBD issued an order setting the case for mandatory
conference.17 After this, both parties were required to submit their position papers.
In his report and recommendation18 dated May 18, 2010, Commissioner Pedro A.
Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo) found Atty. Zaide administratively liable for
violating the Notarial Practice Rules, representing conflicting interests, and using
abusive and insulting language in his pleadings. He noted that Atty. Zaide violated
Section 1 (a) and 1 (b), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules when he maintained
several active notarial registers in different offices. These provisions respectively
require a notary public to "keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful
inspection, a chronological official register of notarial acts consisting of a
permanently bound book with numbered papers" and to "keep only one active
notarial register at any given time."19
However, Commissioner Magpayo opined that Atty. Zaide should not be held
administratively liable for usurping a notary public's office. The investigating
commissioner noted that the evidence presented on this issue is not enough to
prove that Atty. Zaide signed and notarized the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial
partition even after his admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial
commission.20
Commissioner Magpayo also found that the evidence presented proved that
Gimeno was indeed Atty. Zaide's former client. He disagreed with Atty. Zaide's
defense that Gimeno only hired ZMZ but did not personally hire him to defend
them in their annulment of title case. The retainer of a law firm is equivalent to the
retainer of all its lawyers.21 But despite this previous attorney-client relationship,
the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for
representing conflicting interests since the annulment of title case is totally
unrelated to the Ombudsman complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno
through Atty. Zaide.
Finally, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide used intemperate,
offensive, and abusive language when he called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist"
in one of his pleadings.22
For violating the Notarial Practice Rules, Commissioner Magpayo recommended
that Atty. Zaide be suspended for three months, and for another six months for
employing abusive and insulting language.23
The IBP Board of Governors' Findings
In its November 19, 2011 resolution, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) opined
that the evidence on record fully supports the findings of the investigating
commissioner. However, the Board modified the recommended penalty and
imposed instead the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law,
revocation of notarial commission, if existing, and two years suspension from being
commissioned as a notary public.24
This Court notes that at the time the document was purportedly notarized, Atty.
Zaide's details as a lawyer and as a notary public had not yet existed. He was
admitted to the Bar only on May 2, 2002; thus, he could not have obtained and
used the exact figures pertaining to his roll number, PTR number, IBP number and
the expiration date of his notarial commission, prior to this date, particularly on
March 29, 2002.
This circumstance, coupled with the absence of any evidence supporting Gimeno's
claim such as a witness to the alleged fictitious notarization, leads us to the
conclusion that Atty. Zaide could not have notarized the document before his Bar
admission and receipt of his notarial commission.
We can only conclude that his professional details, which were only generated after
his Bar admission, were stamped on the March 29, 2002 document. How this
happened is not clear from the evidence before us.

Atty. Zaide sought for the reconsideration25 of the Board's November 19, 2011 b. Maintaining different notarial registers in separate notarial offices
resolution but this was also denied in its subsequent June 21, 2013 resolution. 26
The Court's Ruling We find that Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by maintaining different
notarial registers in several offices. Because of this practice, the following notarized
The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors' findings and recommended documents had been irregularly numbered and entered:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
penalty, and accordingly confirms them. Document27 Date Doc. No. Page Book Year
Special Power of
6/20/05 273 55 18 2005
For an orderly disposition of the case, we shall discuss each of the main issues that Attorney
the parties identified. Secretary's Certificate 10/28/05 226 46 18 2005
Affidavit of Quitclaim 10/31/05 272 55 18 2005
Violation of the Notarial Practice Rules Affidavit of Loss 4/17/06 54 11 25 2006
Affidavit of Two
4/17/06 310 61 25 2006
a. Usurpation of a notarial office Disinterested Persons
Petition for Issuance of
4/17/06 72 15 25 2006
As the investigating commissioner found, Gimeno did not present any concrete Owner's Duplicate copy
evidence to show that Atty. Zaide notarized the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial Affidavit of Parental
4/19/06 461 93 23 2006
partition prior to his admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial commission. Consent
It appears that this document originally carried the name of one Atty. Elpedio Confirmation of Sale 4/21/06 283 56 25 2006
Cabasan, as notary public. Atty. Zaide's signature and notarial stamp that bears his Deed of Absolute Sale 4/27/06 304 60 25 2006
name, roll number,, PTR number, IBP number, and the expiration date of his Section l(a), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules provides that "a notary public
notarial commission, were merely superimposed over Atty. Cabasan's typewritten shall keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection as provided in these
name. Rules, a chronological official notarial register of notarial acts consisting of a
Notably, Atty. Zaide admitted that the details stamped on the document are his true permanently bound book with numbered pages." The same section further provides
information. However, he denied that he personally stamped and signed the that "a notary public shall keep only one active notarial register at any given
document. In fact, this document never appeared in his notarial register and was time."28 On this basis, Atty. Zaide's act of simultaneously keeping several active
never included in his notarial report for the year 2002. He contended that Gimeno notarial registers is a blatant violation of Section 1, Rule VI.
falsified his signature and used his notarial stamp to make it appear that he was the
one who notarized it. The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to maintain only one
active notarial register and ensure that the entries in it are chronologically
arranged. The "one active notarial register" rule is in place to deter a notary public
from assigning several notarial registers to different offices manned by assistants
who perform notarial services on his behalf.
Since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the notary public must also
personally administer the notarial acts 29 that the law authorizes him to execute.
This important duty is vested with public interest. Thus, no other person, other than
the notary public, should perform it.
On the other hand, entries in a notarial register need to be in chronological
sequence in order to address and prevent the rampant practice of leaving blank
spaces in the notarial register to allow the antedating of notarizations.
In these lights, we cannot accept Atty. Zaide's explanation that he needed to
maintain several active notarial registers in separate offices so he could
accommodate the increasing number of his clients requiring his notarial services.
This Court stresses that a notary public should not trivialize his functions as his
powers and duties are impressed with public interest. 30 A notary public's office is
not merely an income-generating venture. It is a public duty that each lawyer who
has been privileged to receive a notarial commission must faithfully and
conscientiously perform.
Atty. Zaide should have been acutely aware of the requirements of his notarial
commission. His flagrant violation of Section 1, Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules
is not merely a simple and excusable negligence. It amounts to a clear violation of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer
[should] uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and legal processes."
Representing conflicting interests
The investigating commissioner properly noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held
liable for representing conflicting clients' interests.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
In Aninon v. Sabitsana,31 the Court laid down the tests to determine if a lawyer is
guilty of representing conflicting interests between and among his clients.
One of these tests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the
full discharge of a lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that
duty.32Another test is whether a lawyer would be called upon in the new relation
to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their
connection or previous employment.33
Applying these tests, we find no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide appeared
against Gimeno, his former law firm's client. The lawyer-client relationship between
Atty. Zaide and Gimeno ceased when Atty. Zaide left ZMZ. Moreover, the case
where Gimeno engaged ZMZ's services is an entirely different subject matter and is
not in any way connected to the complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno
with the Ombudsman.
The prior case where Gimeno hired ZMZ and where Atty. Zaide represented her
family pertained to the annulment of a land title. Somontan was never a party to
this case since this only involved Gimeno's relatives. On the other hand, the case
where Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno involved Somontan's Ombudsman
complaint against Gimeno for her alleged mishandling of the funds that Somontan
entrusted to her, and for Gimeno's alleged corruption as an examiner in the
Register of Deeds of Iligan City. Clearly, the annulment of title case and the
Ombudsman case are totally unrelated.
There was also no double-dealing on the part of Atty. Zaide because at the time
Somontan engaged his services, he had already left ZMZ. More importantly,
nothing in the record shows that Atty. Zaide used against Gimeno any confidential
information which he acquired while he was still their counsel in the annulment
of title case.
Under these circumstances, Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for violating the
prohibition against the representation of conflicting interests.
Use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in professional dealings
The prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in a
lawyer's professional dealings, whether with the courts, his clients, or any other
person, is based on the following canons and rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts. (emphasis supplied)
As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide, in the reply that he drafted in the Ombudsman
case, called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist." 34 And in another case, Gimeno
observed that Atty. Zaide used the following demeaning and immoderate language
in presenting his comment against his opposing counsel:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND HUMILIATION in
the whole Justice System, and the Department of Justice in particular, where the
taxpayers paid for her salary over her incompetence and poor performance as a
prosecutor... This is a clear manifestation that the Public prosecutor suffers serious
mental incompetence as regard her mandate as an Assistant City
Prosecutor.35(emphasis supplied)
This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice of his words
— a conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court.

While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language
abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive. 36

On many occasions, the Court has reminded the members of the Bar to abstain
from any offensive personality and to refrain from any act prejudicial to the honor
or reputation of a party or a witness. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyer's language even in his pleadings, must be dignified. 37

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the recommended

penalty of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty.
Paul Centillas Zaide is found GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
and for using intemperate, offensive and, abusive language in violation of Rule 8.01,
Canon 8 and Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His
notarial commission, if existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is
declared DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of
two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.c

3. DISQUALIFICATIONS
Adm. Case No. 6475               January 30, 2013
FE A. YLAYA, vs. ATTY. GLENN CARLOS GACOTT
DECISION
BRION, J.:
For the Court's consideration is the disbarment complaint 1 tiled by Fe A. Ylaya
(complainant) against Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott (respondent) who allegedly
deceived the complainant and her late husband, Laurentino L. Ylaya, into signing a
"preparatory" Deed of Sale that the respondent converted into a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of his relatives.
After the submission of the respondent's comment to the complaint, the Court
referred the complaint to the Commission on Bar Discipline ofthe Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, evaluation and recommendation.
The complainant alleged that she and her late husband are the registered owners of
two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title ( TCT) Nos. 162632
and 162633 located at Barangay Sta. Lourdes, Puerto Princesa City. Prior to the
acquisition of these properties, TCT No. 162632 (property) was already the subject
of expropriation proceedings filed by the City Government of Puerto Princesa (City
Government) on May 23, 1996 against its former registered owner, Cirilo Arellano.
The expropriation case was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan and
Puerto Princesa, Branch 95, and was docketed as Civil Case No. 2902. The RTC
already fixed the price and issued an order for the City Government to deposit
₱6,000,000.00 as just compensation for the property. 2
The respondent briefly represented the complainant and her late husband in the
expropriation case as intervenors for being the new registered owners of the
property. The complainant alleged that the respondent convinced them to sign a
"preparatory deed of sale" for the sale of the property, but he left blank the space
for the name of the buyer and for the amount of consideration. The respondent
further alleged that the deed would be used in the sale to the City Government
when the RTC issues the order to transfer the titles. 3 The respondent then
fraudulently – without their knowledge and consent, and contrary to their
understanding – converted the "preparatory deed of sale" into a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated June 4, 2001,4 selling the subject property to Reynold So and Sylvia
Carlos So for ₱200,000.00.5
The complainant denied that she and Laurentino were paid the ₱200,000.00
purchase price or that they would sell the property "for such a measly sum" when
they stood to get at least ₱6,000,000.00 as just compensation. 6
The complainant also claimed that the respondent notarized the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated June 4, 2001 even though Reynold and Sylvia (his mother’s sister) are his
uncle and his aunt, respectively.7
The respondent denied all the allegations in the complaint. 8
The respondent argued that the complainant’s greed to get the just
Compensation9 caused her to file this "baseless, unfounded and malicious"
disbarment case.10 He claimed that the sale was their voluntary transaction and that
he "simply ratified the document."11 He also claimed that Reynold and Laurentino
had originally jointly purchased the properties from Cirilo Arellano on July 10, 2000;
that they were co-owners for some time; and that Laurentino subsequently sold his
share to Reynold under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001. 12
The respondent specifically denied asking the complainant and her late husband to
execute any "preparatory deed of sale" in favor of the City Government. 13 He also
denied that the Deed of Absolute Sale contained blanks when they signed it. 14 That
he filed for the spouses Ylaya and Reynold an opposition to the just compensation
the RTC fixed proved that there was no agreement to use the document for the
expropriation case.15 He also argued that it was clear from the document that the
intended buyer was a natural person, not a juridical person, because there were
spaces for the buyer’s legal age, marital status, and citizenship, 16 and he was even
constrained to file a subsequent Motion to Intervene on behalf of Reynold because
the complainant "maliciously retained" the TCTs to the subject properties after
borrowing them from his office.17 Lastly, he denied violating the Rules on Notarial
Practice.18
On September 4, 2006, the respondent filed a Motion to Resolve or Decide the Case
dated August 24, 2006 praying for the early resolution of the complaint. 19
On December 5, 2006, the complainant filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the
Verified Complaint and To Dismiss the Case dated November 14, 2006. 20
On February 28, 2008, the complainant executed an Affidavit 21 affirming and
confirming the existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale notarized on March 6, 2000;22 the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated
April 19, 2000;23 and the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized in 2001. 24 The respondent
submitted this Affidavit to the IBP as an attachment to his Motion for
Reconsideration of April 21, 2008.25
The IBP’s Findings
In her Report and Recommendation dated November 19, 2007, IBP Commissioner
Anna Caridad Sazon-Dupaya found the respondent administratively liable for
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 (A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct) and Canon 16 ("A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys
and properties of his client that may come into his possession) of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (2004
Rules on Notarial Practice).26 She recommended his suspension from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months.27
In its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-30228 dated December 14, 2007, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted the IBP Commissioner’s finding, but increased the penalty
imposed to two (2) years suspension and a warning:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner [in] the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent’s
violations of Canon 1, [Rule] 1.01 and Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule IV, Sec. 39(c) of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC (2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice), Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott is hereby SUSPENDED from practice of law for
two (2) years with a Warning that commission of a similar offense will be dealt with
more severely. [emphases supplied]
On May 8, 2008, the respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 21,
2008, attaching, among others, a copy of the complainant’s Affidavit dated February
27, 2008, admitting the existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale between Cirilo and Laurentino; the MOA between Laurentino and
Reynold; the Deed of Absolute Sale between Laurentino and Reynold; and the
Compromise Agreement between Reynold and the complainant dated November
14, 2006 for the expropriation case.29
On September 4, 2008, the respondent filed a Manifestation with the Supreme
Court, requesting that the IBP be directed to resolve his Motion for
Reconsideration.30
By Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010, 31 the IBP Board of
Governors denied the respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration for failing to raise
any new substantial matter or any cogent reason to warrant a reversal or even a
modification of its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-302.32
On March 14, 2012, the respondent filed a Petition for Review (on appeal) assailing
the IBP’s findings, as follows:33
a) In conveniently concluding that the Deed of Absolute Sale was pre-signed and
fraudulently notarized without requiring Fe Ylaya to adduce evidence in a formal
hearing thus, violated the respondent’s right to due process as he was not able to
cross-examine her. This is not to mention that the complainant failed to offer
corroborative proof to prove her bare allegations;
b) In sweepingly and arbitrarily disregarded/skirted (sic) the public documents
(MOA and 2 other DOAS) duly executed by the parties therein and notarized by the
respondent;
c) In totally ignoring the complainant’s Affidavit admitting the genuineness and due
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in issue;
d) In arbitrarily concluding the absence of co-ownership by Reynold So and Fe Ylaya
of the subject lots despite the existence of a notarized MOA clearly showing the co-
ownership of Ylaya and So; and
e) In finding the respondent/appellant’s act of notarizing the DOAS as contrary to
the notarial rules.
The Issues
From the assigned errors, the complainant poses the following issues:
(1) whether the IBP violated the respondent’s right to due process; and
(2) whether the evidence presented supports a finding that the respondent is
administratively liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
The Court’s Ruling
We set aside the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and those
of the IBP Board of Governors finding the respondent liable for violating Canon 1,
Rules 1.01 and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC. 34
We however hold the respondent liable for violating Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for being remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his
client’s properties. We likewise find him liable for violation of (1) Canon 15, Rule
15.03 for representing conflicting interests without the written consent of the
represented parties, thus, violating the rule on conflict of interests; and (2) Canon
18, Rule 18.03 for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him.
a. Due process violation
The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard. Denial of due process
means the total lack of opportunity to be heard or to have one’s day in court. As a
rule, no denial of due process takes place where a party has been given an
opportunity to be heard and to present his case; 35 what is prohibited is the absolute
lack of opportunity to be heard.
The respondent claims that the IBP violated his right to due process because he was
not given the "amplest opportunity to defend himself, to cross examine the witness
complainant, to object to the admissibility of documents or present controverting
evidence"36 when the IBP rendered its conclusion without requiring the complainant
to adduce evidence in a formal hearing and despite the absence of corroborative
proof. He insists that these defects rendered the complainant’s allegations as
hearsay, and the IBP’s report, recommendation or resolution null and void.
Although the respondent failed to have a face-to-face confrontation with the
complainant when she failed to appear at the required mandatory conference on
October 6, 2005,37 the records reveal that the respondent fully participated during
the entire proceedings and submitted numerous pleadings, including evidence,
before the IBP. He was even allowed to file a motion for reconsideration supported
by his submitted evidence, which motion the IBP considered and ruled upon in its
Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010.38
In Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization v. Laguesma, 39 we held that due
process, as applied to administrative proceedings, is the opportunity to explain
one’s side. In Samalio v. Court of Appeals,40 due process in an administrative context
does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where
the opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or through pleadings, is
accorded, no denial of procedural due process takes place. The requirements of due
process are satisfied where the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.
Similarly, in A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. v. Office of the President, 41 we held that "due
process, as a constitutional precept, does not always, and in all situations, require a
trial-type proceeding. Litigants may be heard through pleadings, written
explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral arguments. The standard of due
process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of
latitude[, provided that] fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally
objectionable for being violative of due process, for an administrative agency to
resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence
submitted by the parties."42
In this case, the respondent’s failure to cross-examine the complainant is not a
sufficient ground to support the claim that he had not been afforded due process.
The respondent was heard through his pleadings, his submission of alleged
controverting evidence, and his oral testimony during the October 6, 2005
mandatory conference. These pleadings, evidence and testimony were received and
considered by the IBP Commissioner when she arrived at her findings and
recommendation, and were the bases for the IBP Board’s Resolution.
Moreover, "any seeming defect in the observance of due process is cured by the
filing of a motion for reconsideration. A denia of due process cannot be successfully
invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration. Undoubtedly in this case, the requirement of the law was afforded
to the respondent."43
We also note that the respondent, on a Motion to Resolve or Decide the Case dated
August 24, 2006, submitted his case to the IBP for its resolution without any further
hearings. The motion, filed almost one year after the mandatory conference on
October 6, 2005, significantly did not contain any statement regarding a denial of
due process. In effect, the respondent himself waived his cross-examination of the
complainant when he asked the IBP Board of Governors to resolve the case based
on the pleadings and the evidence on record. To quote his own submission:
1. On June 30, 2004, a complaint was filed in this case;
2. On October 19, 2004, the respondent filed his comment with all its attachments
denying all the allegations in the complaint;
3. On June 23, 2005, the respondent filed his position paper. On April 28, 2006, the
respondent also filed his supplemental position paper. By contrast, up to this date,
the complainant/petitioner has not filed her verified position paper thus, waived
her right to file the same;
4. There being no other genuine issues to be heard in this case as all the defenses
and counter-arguments are supported by documentary evidence, it is most
respectfully prayed that the instant case be resolved on its merits or be ordered
dismissed for lack of merit without further hearing;
5. Further, considering that there is an on-going case in Branch 52 of the Regional
Trial Court of Palawan in Civil Case No. 2902 for Expropriation involving the same
property, and such fact was deliberately omitted by the complainant in her Verified
Complaint as shown in the certification of non-forum shopping, the outright
dismissal of this case is warranted, hence, this motion; and
6. This is meant to expedite the termination of this case. 44 (underscore ours; italics
supplied)
Finally, we note Section 11, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which provides that:
No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the Investigator’s
Report shall be considered as substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon
considering the whole record, finds that such defect has resulted or may result in a
miscarriage of justice, in which event the
Board shall take such remedial action as the circumstances may warrant, including
invalidation of the entire proceedings.
In this case, the IBP Commissioner’s findings were twice reviewed by the IBP Board
of Governors – the first review resulted in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-302 45 dated
December 14, 2007, affirming the IBP Commissioner’s findings, but modifying the
penalty; the second review resulted in Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October
8, 2010,46denying the respondent’s motion for reconsideration. In both instances,
the IBP Board of Governors found no defect or miscarriage of justice warranting a
remedial action or the invalidation of the proceedings.
We emphasize that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis in that
they are neither purely civil nor purely criminal; they involve investigations by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers,47 not the trial of an action or a suit.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended
to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is
neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members
who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
[emphases deleted]
The complainant in disbarment cases is not a direct party to the case but a witness
who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.48 Flowing from its sui generis
character, it is not mandatory to have a formal hearing in which the complainant
must adduce evidence.
From all these, we find it clear that the complainant is not indispensable to the
disciplinary proceedings and her failure to appear for cross-examination or to
provide corroborative evidence of her allegations is of no merit. What is important
is whether, upon due investigation, the IBP
Board of Governors finds sufficient evidence of the respondent’s misconduct to
warrant the exercise of its disciplinary powers.
b. Merits of the Complaint
"In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is
preponderance of evidence which the complainant has the burden to
discharge."49 Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one
side is, as a whole, superior to or has a greater weight than that of the other. It
means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
compared to the presented contrary evidence.
Under Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, in determining whether
preponderance of evidence exists, the court may consider the following: (a) all the
facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are
testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, and the probability or
improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and
also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial;
and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is
necessarily with the greater number.50 By law, a lawyer enjoys the legal
presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is
proven, and that as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his
duties in accordance with his oath.51
The IBP Commissioner set out her findings as follows:
The undersigned, after a careful evaluation of the evidence presented by both
parties, finds that the charges of the complainant against the respondent are
worthy of belief based on the following:
First, the allegation of the respondent that Reynold So was actually co-owner of
spouses Ylanas (sic) in the properties subject of the Deed of Sale between Felix
Arellano and Spouses Ylanas (sic) is hard to believe despite the presentation of the
Memorandum of Agreement.
It is elementary in Rules of Evidence that when the contents of a written document
are put in issue, the best evidence would be the document itself. In the Deed of Sale
between Felix Arellano and Spouses Ylanas (sic), the buyer of the subject properties
is only Laurentino L. Ylaya married to Fe A. Ylaya. The document does not state that
Reynold So was likewise a buyer together with Laurentino Ylaya, or that the former
paid half of the purchase price.
Also, it is hard for this Commission to believe that Reynold So, assisted by a lawyer
at that and who allegedly paid half of the purchase price, would not insist for the
inclusion of his name in the Deed of Sale as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title
subsequently issued.
The Memorandum of Agreement between the spouses Ylaya and Reynold So
produced by the respondent cannot overturn the belief of this Commission
considering that the Memorandum of Agreement was executed more than a month
AFTER the Deed of Sale between Felix Arellano and the Ylayas was notarized. This is
not to mention the fact that the complainant denied ever having executed the
Memorandum of Agreement. A close examination of the signatories in the said
Memorandum of Agreement would reveal that indeed, the alleged signatures of the
complainant and her husband are not the same with their signatures in other
documents.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Memorandum of Agreement is valid,
thereby making Laurentino Ylaya and co-owner Reynold So co-owners of the
subject properties (Please see Annex "B" of respondent’s Comment), this
Commission finds it hard to believe Laurentino Ylaya would sell it to Reynold So for
₱200,000 x x x when his minimum expenses for the purchase thereof is already
₱225,000.00 and he was expecting to receive ₱7,000,000.00, more or less. That
would mean that if Reynold So and the complainant were co-owners, the
₱7,000,000.00 would then be equally divided among them at ₱3,500,000.00 each,
far above the ₱200,000.00 selling price reflected in the pre-signed Deed of Sale.
As to the second issue, this Commission believes that the respondent committed
serious error in notarizing the Deed of Sale and the Memorandum of Agreement
between his uncle Reynold So and Laurentino Ylaya based on Rule IV, Section 3 (c)
of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC which provides as follows:
"Sec. 3. Disqualifications – a notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial
act if he:
(a) x x x.
(b) x x x.
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or
consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree."
The defense therefore of the respondent that he did not violate the
aforementioned Rule becausehis uncle Reynold So, the buyer is not the principal in
the Subject Deed of Sale but the seller Laurentino Ylaya (please see page 3 of the
respondent’s Supplemental Position Paper) is misplaced. Clearly, both the buyer
and the seller in the instant case are considered principals in the contract entered
into.
Furthermore, if we are to consider the argument of the respondent that his uncle
was not a principal so as to apply the afore-quoted provision of the Rules, the
respondent still violated the Rules when he notarized the subject Memorandum of
Agreement between Laurentino Ylaya and his uncle Reynold So. Clearly, both
complainant and Reynold So were principal parties in the said Memorandum of
Agreement.52
The respondent argues that the IBP Commissioner’s findings are contrary to the
presented evidence, specifically to the MOA executed by Laurentino and Reynold
acknowledging the existence of a co-ownership; 53 to the complainant’s Ex Parte
Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and To Dismiss the Case dated
November 14, 2006 where she stated that the parties have entered into a
compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 2902, and that the disbarment complaint
arose from a misunderstanding, miscommunication and improper appreciation of
facts;54to her Affidavit dated February 27, 200855 affirming and confirming the
existence, genuineness and due execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized
on March 6, 2000;56 and to the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized in 2001. 57
In all, the respondent claims that these cited pieces of evidence prove that this
administrative complaint against him is fabricated, false and untrue. He also points
to Atty. Robert Peneyra, the complainant’s counsel in this administrative case, as
the hand behind the complaint.58 According to the respondent, Atty. Peneyra
harbors ill-will against him and his family after his father filed several administrative
cases against Atty. Peneyra, one of which resulted in the imposition of a warning
and a reprimand on Atty. Peneyra.59
Reynold, in his Affidavit dated October 11, 2004, confirms that there was a co-
ownership between him and Laurentino; that Laurentino decided to sell his half of
the property to Reynold because he (Laurentino) had been sickly and in dire need of
money to pay for his medical bills; that Laurentino agreed to the price of
₱200,000.00 as this was almost the same value of his investment when he and
Reynold jointly acquired the property; and that the sale to Reynold was with the
agreement and consent of the complainant who voluntarily signed the Deed of
Sale.60
After examining the whole record of the case, we agree with the respondent and
find the evidence insufficient to prove the charge that he violated Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No.
02-8-13-SC. Specifically, (1) the evidence against the respondent fails to show the
alleged fraudulent and deceitful acts he has taken to mislead the complainant and
her husband into signing a "preparatory deed of sale" and the conversion into a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 in favor of Reynold; and (2) no prohibition
exists against the notarization of a document in which any of the parties interested
is the notary’s relative within the 4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity, at
that time the respondent notarized the documents.
In her Report and Recommendation,61 the IBP Commissioner concluded that the
respondent is liable for deceit and fraud because he failed to prove the existence of
a co-ownership between Laurentino and Reynold; in her opinion, the signatures of
the complainant and of her husband on the MOA "are not the same with their
signatures in other documents."62
We do not agree with this finding. While the facts of this case may raise some
questions regarding the respondent’s legal practice, we nevertheless found nothing
constituting clear evidence of the respondent’s specific acts of fraud and deceit. His
failure to prove the existence of a co-ownership does not lead us to the conclusion
that the MOA and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001 are spurious and
that the respondent was responsible for creating these spurious documents. We are
further persuaded, after noting that in disregarding the MOA, the IBP Commissioner
failed to specify what differences she observed in the spouses Ylaya’s signatures in
the MOA and what documents were used in comparison.
Apart from her allegations, the complainant’s pieces of evidence consist of TCT Nos.
162632 and 162633;63 her Motion for Leave to Intervene in Civil Case No. 2902
dated May 17, 2000;64 the RTC order in Civil Case No. 2902 dated November 6, 2000
fixing the price of just compensation;65 the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4,
2001;66the spouses Ylaya’s Verified Manifestation dated September 2, 2002, filed
with the RTC in Civil Case No. 2902, assailing the Motion to Deposit Just
Compensation filed by the respondent on behalf of Reynold and manifesting the
sale between Laurentino and Reynold;67 the Provincial Prosecutor’s Subpoena to
the complainant in connection with the respondent’s complaint for libel; 68 the
respondent’s complaint for libel against the complainant dated August 27,
2003;69 the complainant’s Counter Affidavit dated March 26, 2004 against the
charge of libel;70 and the respondent’s letter to the Provincial Attorney of Palawan
dated April 5, 2004, requesting for "official information regarding the actual
attendance of Atty. ROBERT Y. PENEYRA" at an MCLE seminar. 71
We do not see these documentary pieces of evidence as proof of specific acts
constituting deceit or fraud on the respondent’s part. The documents by
themselves are neutral and, at the most, show the breakdown of the attorney-client
relationship between the respondent and the complainant. It is one thing to allege
deceit and misconduct, and it is another to demonstrate by evidence the specific
acts constituting these allegations.72
We reiterate that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is on the
complainant; the Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant
establishes her case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. 73Preponderance
of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to
or has a greater weight than that of the other party. When the pieces of evidence of
the parties are evenly balanced or when doubt exists on the preponderance of
evidence, the equipoise rule dictates that the decision be against the party carrying
the burden of proof.74
In this case, we find that the complainant’s evidence and the records of the case do
not show the respondent’s deliberate fraudulent and deceitful acts. In the absence
of such proof, the complaint for fraud and deceit under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility must perforce be dismissed.
We note that the respondent has not squarely addressed the issue of his
relationship with Reynold, whom the complainant alleges to be the respondent’s
uncle because Reynold is married to the respondent’s maternal aunt. 75However,
this is of no moment as the respondent cannot be held liable for violating Section
3(c), Rule IV of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC because the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June
4, 200176 and the MOA dated April 19, 200077 were notarized by the respondent
prior to the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC on July 6, 2004. The notarial law in
force in the years 2000 - 2001 was Chapter 11 of Act No. 2711 (the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917) which did not contain the present prohibition against
notarizing documents where the parties are related to the notary public within the
4th civil degree, by affinity or consanguinity. Thus, we must likewise dismiss the
charge for violation of A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
c. Liability under Canons 15, 16 and 18 We find the respondent liable under Canon
15, Rule 15.03 for representing conflicting interests without the written consent of
all concerned, particularly the complainant; under Canon 16 for being remiss in his
obligation to hold in trust his client’s properties; and under Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for
neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him.
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 states:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. [emphasis ours]
The relationship between a lawyer and his client should ideally be imbued with the
highest level of trust and confidence. Necessity and public interest require that this
be so. Part of the lawyer’s duty to his client is to avoid representing conflicting
interests. He is duty bound to decline professional employment, no matter how
attractive the fee offered may be, if its acceptance involves a violation of the
proscription against conflict of interest, or any of the rules of professional conduct.
Thus, a lawyer may not accept a retainer from a defendant after he has given
professional advice to the plaintiff concerning his claim; nor can he accept
employment from another in a matter adversely affecting any interest of his former
client. It is his duty to decline employment in any of these and similar circumstances
in view of the rule prohibiting representation of conflicting interests. 78
The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies "even if the
lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer
has to oppose for the other, or that there would be no occasion to use the
confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the
two actions are wholly unrelated."79 The sole exception is provided in Canon 15,
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility – if there is a written consent
from all the parties after full disclosure.
Based on the records, we find substantial evidence to hold the respondent liable for
violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The facts
of this case show that the respondent retained clients who had close dealings with
each other. The respondent admits to acting as legal counsel for Cirilo Arellano, the
spouses Ylaya and Reynold at one point during the proceedings in Civil Case No.
2902.80 Subsequently, he represented only Reynold in the same
proceedings,81 asserting Reynold’s ownership over the property against all other
claims, including that of the spouses Ylaya.82
We find no record of any written consent from any of the parties involved and we
cannot give the respondent the benefit of the doubt in this regard. We find it clear
from the facts of this case that the respondent retained Reynold as his client and
actively opposed the interests of his former client, the complainant. He thus
violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
We affirm the IBP Commissioner’s finding that the respondent violated Canon 16.
The respondent admits to losing certificates of land titles that were entrusted to his
care by Reynold.83 According to the respondent, the complainant "maliciously
retained" the TCTs over the properties sold by Laurentino to Reynold after she
borrowed them from his office.84 Reynold confirms that the TCTs were taken by the
complainant from the respondent’s law office.85
The respondent is reminded that his duty under Canon 16 is to "hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Allowing a
party to take the original TCTs of properties owned by another – an act that could
result in damage – should merit a finding of legal malpractice. While we note that it
was his legal staff who allowed the complainant to borrow the TCTs and it does not
appear that the respondent was aware or present when the complainant borrowed
the TCTs,86 we nevertheless hold the respondent liable, as the TCTs were entrusted
to his care and custody; he failed to exercise due diligence in caring for his client’s
properties that were in his custody.
We likewise find the respondent liable for violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 for
neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him. Despite the respondent’s admission that
he represented the complainant and her late husband in Civil Case No. 2902 and
that he purportedly filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene in their behalf, the records
show that he never filed such a motion for the spouses Ylaya. The complainant
herself states that she and her late husband were forced to file the Motion for
Leave to Intervene on their own behalf. The records of the case, which include the
Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by the spouses Ylaya, support this conclusion. 87
Canon 18, Rule 18.03 requires that a lawyer "shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection [therewith] shall render him
liable." What amounts to carelessness or negligence in a lawyer’s discharge of his
duty to his client is incapable of an exact formulation, but the Court has consistently
held that the mere failure of a lawyer to perform the obligations due his client is per
se a violation.88
In Canoy v. Ortiz,89 we held that a lawyer’s failure to file a position paper was per se
a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Similar to
Canoy, the respondent clearly failed in this case in his duty to his client when,
without any explanation, he failed to file the Motion for Leave to Intervene on
behalf of the spouses Ylaya. Under the circumstances, we find that there was want
of diligence; without sufficient justification, this is sufficient to hold the respondent
liable for violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
d. The Complainant’s Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and to
Dismiss the Case and her Affidavit
We are aware of the complainant’s Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified
Complaint and To Dismiss the Case dated November 14, 2006 90 and her
Affidavit91 affirming and confirming the existence, genuineness and due execution
of the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized on March 6, 2000. 92 The complainant
explains that the parties have entered into a compromise agreement in Civil Case
No. 2902, and that this disbarment complaint was filed because of a
"misunderstanding, miscommunication and improper appreciation of facts"; 93 she
erroneously accused the respondent of ill motives and bad intentions, but after
being enlightened, she is convinced that he has no personal or pecuniary interests
over the properties in Civil Case No. 2902; that such misunderstanding was due to
her unfamiliarity with the transactions of her late husband during his lifetime. 94 The
complainant now pleads for the respondent’s forgiveness, stating that he has been
her and her late husband’s lawyer for over a decade and affirms her trust and
confidence in him.95 We take note that under their Compromise Agreement dated
November 14, 2006 for the expropriation case,96 the complainant and Reynold
equally share the just compensation, which have since increased to ₱10,000,000.00.
While the submitted Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw the Verified Complaint and to
Dismiss the Case and the Affidavit appear to exonerate the respondent, complete
exoneration is not the necessary legal effect as the submitted motion and affidavit
are immaterial for purposes of the present proceedings. Section 5, Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court states that, "No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated
by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme
charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same." Court for final action.1âwphi1
In Angalan v. Delante,97 despite the Affidavit of Desistance, we disbarred the The Supreme Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of
respondent therein for taking advantage of his clients and for transferring the title law.102 It exercises such disciplinary functions through the IBP, but it does not
of their property to his name. In Bautista v. Bernabe, 98 we revoked the lawyer’s relinquish its duty to form its own judgment. Disbarment proceedings are exercised
notarial commission, disqualified him from reappointment as a notary public for under the sole jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and the IBP’s recommendations
two years, and suspended him from the practice of law for one year for notarizing a imposing the penalty of suspension from the practice of law or disbarment are
document without requiring the affiant to personally appear before him. In this always subject to this Court’s review and approval.
cited case, we said: The Penalty
Complainant’s desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does not exonerate In Solidon v. Macalalad,103 we imposed the penalty of suspension of six ( 6) months
respondent or put an end to the administrative proceedings. A case of suspension from the practice of law on the respondent therein for his violation of Canon 18,
or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the Rule 18.03 and Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the Josefina M. Aniñon v. Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr., 104 we suspended the
record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule respondent therein from the practice of law for one (1) year, for violating Canon 15,
is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Under the circumstances, we
or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the find a one (1) year suspension to be a sufficient and appropriate sanction against
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private the respondent.
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and WHEREFORE, premises considered, we set aside Resolution No. XVIII-.2007-302
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of dated December 14, 2007 and Resolution No. XIX-2010-545 dated October 8, 2010
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice of the IBP Board of Governors, and find respondent Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott
in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of GUILTY of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18
the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a penalty, he is SUSPENDED from the
the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no practice of law for one (1) year, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper similar act will be dealt with more severely.
administration of justice.99 SO ORDERED.
In sum, in administrative proceedings against lawyers, the complainant’s desistance
or withdrawal does not terminate the proceedings. This is particularly true in the
present case where pecuniary consideration has been given to the complainant as a
consideration for her desistance. We note in this regard that she would receive
₱5,000,000.00, or half of the just compensation under the Compromise
Agreement,100 and thus agreed to withdraw all charges against the
respondent.101 From this perspective, we consider the complainant’s desistance to
be suspect; it is not grounded on the fact that the respondent did not commit any
actual misconduct; rather, because of the consideration, the complainant is now
amenable to the position of the respondent and/or Reynold.
e. Procedural aspect
We remind all parties that resolutions from the IBP Board of Governors are merely
recommendatory and do not attain finality without a final action from this Court.
Section 12, Rule 139-B is clear on this point that:
Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. –
xxxx
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that
the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together BERNARD N. JANDOQUILE, vs. ATTY. QUIRINO P. REVILLA, JR., 
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainant Bernard N. Jandoquile
against respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr. The Facts of the case are not
disputed. Atty. Revilla, Jr. notarized a complaint-affidavit 2 signed by Heneraline L.
Brosas, Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa and Elmer L. Alvarado. Heneraline Brosas is a
sister of Heizel Wynda Brosas Revilla, Atty. Revilla, Jr.'s wife. Jandoquile complains
that Atty. Revilla, Jr. is disqualified to perform the notarial act 3 per Section 3( c),
Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Disqualifications. – A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial
act if he: (c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by
affinity or consanguinity of the principal4within the fourth civil degree.
Jandoquile also complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not require the three affiants in
the complaint-affidavit to show their valid identification cards.
In his comment5 to the disbarment complaint, Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not deny but
admitted Jandoquile’s material allegations. The issue, according to Atty. Revilla, Jr.,
is whether the single act of notarizing the complaint-affidavit of relatives within the
fourth civil degree of affinity and, at the same time, not requiring them to present
valid identification cards is a ground for disbarment. Atty. Revilla, Jr. submits that
his act is not a ground for disbarment. He also says that he acts as counsel of the
three affiants; thus, he should be considered more as counsel than as a notary
public when he notarized their complaint-affidavit. He did not require the affiants to
present valid identification cards since he knows them personally. Heneraline
Brosas and Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa are sisters-in-law while Elmer Alvarado is the
live-in houseboy of the Brosas family. Since the facts are not contested, the Court
deems it more prudent to resolve the case instead of referring it to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for investigation. Indeed, Atty. Revilla, Jr. violated the
disqualification rule under Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. We agree with him, however, that his violation is not a sufficient ground
for disbarment. Atty. Revilla, Jr.’s violation of the aforesaid disqualification rule is
beyond dispute. Atty. Revilla, Jr. readily admitted that he notarized the complaint-
affidavit signed by his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity. Section 3(c),
Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice clearly disqualifies him from
notarizing the complaint-affidavit, from performing the notarial act, since two of
the affiants or principals are his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity.
Given the clear provision of the disqualification rule, it behooved upon Atty. Revilla,
Jr. to act with prudence and refuse notarizing the document. We cannot agree with
his proposition that we consider him to have acted more as counsel of the affiants,
not as notary public, when he notarized the complaint-affidavit. The notarial
certificate6 at the bottom of the complaint-affidavit shows his signature as a notary
public, with a notarial commission valid until December 31, 2012. He cannot
therefore claim that he signed it as counsel of the three affiants.
On the second charge, we agree with Atty. Revilla, Jr. that he cannot be held liable.
If the notary public knows the affiants personally, he need not require them to
show their valid identification cards. This rule is supported by the definition of a
"jurat" under Section 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A "jurat"
refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person
before the notary public and presents an instrument or document; (b) is personally
known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity; (c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the
notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such
instrument or document. In this case, Heneraline Brosas is a sister of Atty. Revilla,
Jr.’s wife; Herizalyn Brosas Pedrosa is his wife’s sister-in-law; and Elmer Alvarado is
the live-in houseboy of the Brosas family. Atty. Revilla, Jr. knows the three affiants
personally. Thus, he was justified in no longer requiring them to show valid
identification cards. But Atty. Revilla, Jr. is not without fault for failing to indicate
such fact in the "jurat" of the complaint-affidavit. No statement was included
therein that he knows the three affiants personally. 7 Let it be impressed that Atty.
Revilla, Jr. was clearly disqualified to notarize the complaint-affidavit of his relatives
within the fourth civil degree of affinity. While he has a valid defense as to the
second charge, it does not exempt him from liability for violating the
disqualification rule. As we said, Atty. Revilla, Jr.’s violation of the disqualification
rule under Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice is not a
sufficient ground to disbar him. To our mind, Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not commit any
deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or gross immoral conduct, or any other
serious ground for disbarment under Section 27, 8 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
We recall the case of Maria v. Cortez9 where we reprimanded Cortez and
disqualified him from being commissioned as notary public for six months. We were
convinced that said punishment, which is less severe than disbarment, would
already suffice as sanction for Cortez’s violation. In Cortez, we noted the prohibition
in Section 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice that a person shall not
perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document (1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the
notarization and (2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise
identified by the notary public through a competent evidence of identity. Cortez
had notarized a special power of attorney without having the alleged signatories
appear before him. In imposing the less severe punishment, we were mindful that
removal from the Bar should not really be decreed when any punishment less
severe such as reprimand, temporary suspension or fine would accomplish the end
desired. Considering the attendant circumstances and the single violation
committed by Atty. Revilla, Jr., we are in agreement that a punishment less severe
than disbarment would suffice. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr.,
is REPRIMANDED and DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public, or
from performing any notarial act if he is presently commissioned as a notary public,
for a period of three (3) months. Atty. Revilla, Jr. is further DIRECTED to INFORM the
Court, through an affidavit, once the period of his disqualification has lapsed.
SO ORDERED.
4) REFUSAL TO NOTARIZE AND FALSE OR INCOMPLETE CERTIFICATES
A.C. No. 6470, July 08, 2014
MERCEDITA DE JESUS,  v. ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZ-MALIT
RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:
Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Mercedita De Jesus (De Jesus)
against respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the following
grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and unworthiness to become
an officer of the Court.
THE FACTS OF THE CASE
In the Affidavit-Complaint 1 filed by complainant before the Office of the Bar
Confidant on 23 June 2004, she alleged that on 1 March 2002, respondent had
drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely
named the former as its absolute and registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee
sued complainant for perjury and for collection of sum of money. She claimed that
respondent was a consultant of the local government unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan,
and was therefore aware that the market stall was government-owned.
Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two contracts that caused
complainant legal and financial problems. One contract was a lease agreement
notarized by respondent sometime in September 1999 without the signature of the
lessees. However, complainant only found out that the agreement had not been
signed by the lessees when she lost her copy and she asked for another copy from
respondent. The other contract was a sale agreement over a property covered by a
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which complainant entered into with a
certain Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998. Respondent drafted and
notarized said agreement, but did not advise complainant that the property was still
covered by the period within which it could not be alienated. In addition to the
documents attached to her complaint, complainant subsequently submitted three
Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by respondent and an Affidavit of Irene
Tolentino (Tolentino), complainant’s secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were not signed
by the principals named therein and bore only the signature of the named attorney-
in-fact, Florina B. Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentino’s Affidavit corroborated
complainant’s allegations against respondent. 2
On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of the Supreme Court issued a Resolution
requiring respondent to submit her comment on the Complaint within ten (10) days
from receipt of notice.3 In her Comment,4 respondent explained that the mortgage
contract was prepared in the presence of complainant and that the latter had read
it before affixing her signature. However, complainant urgently needed the loan
proceeds so the contract was hastily done. It was only copied from a similar file in
respondent’s computer, and the phrase “absolute and registered owner” was
inadvertently left unedited. Still, it should not be a cause for disciplinary action,
because complainant constructed the subject public market stall under a “Build
Operate and Transfer” contract with the local government unit and, technically, she
could be considered its owner. Besides, there had been a prior mortgage contract
over the same property in which complainant was represented as the property’s
absolute owner, but she did not complain. Moreover, the cause of the perjury
charge against complainant was not the representation of herself as owner of the
mortgaged property, but her guarantee that it was free from all liens and
encumbrances. The perjury charge was even dismissed, because the prosecutor
found that complainant and her spouse had, indeed, paid the debt secured with the
previous mortgage contract over the same market stall. With respect to the lease
agreement, respondent countered that the document attached to the Affidavit-
Complaint was actually new. She gave the court’s copy of the agreement to
complainant to accommodate the latter’s request for an extra copy. Thus,
respondent prepared and notarized a new one, relying on complainant’s assurance
that the lessees would sign it and that it would be returned in lieu of the original
copy for the court. Complainant, however, reneged on her promise. As regards the
purchase agreement of a property covered by a CLOA, respondent claimed that
complainant was an experienced realty broker and, therefore, needed no advice on
the repercussions of that transaction. Actually, when the purchase agreement was
notarized, complainant did not present the CLOA, and so the agreement mentioned
nothing about it. Rather, the agreement expressly stated that the property was the
subject of a case pending before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB); complainant was thus notified of the status of the subject property.
Finally, respondent maintained that the SPAs submitted by complainant as
additional evidence were properly notarized. It can be easily gleaned from the
documents that the attorney-in-fact personally appeared before respondent;
hence, the notarization was limited to the former’s participation in the execution of
the document. Moreover, the acknowledgment clearly stated that the document
must be notarized in the principal’s place of residence. An exchange of pleadings
ensued after respondent submitted her Comment. After her rejoinder, complainant
filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Submission of Additional Evidence. 5 Attached
thereto were copies of documents notarized by respondent, including the
following: (1) an Extra Judicial Deed of Partition which referred to the SPAs naming
Limpioso as attorney-in-fact; (2) five SPAs that lacked the signatures of either the
principal or the attorney-in-fact; (3) two deeds of sale with incomplete signatures of
the parties thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn Statement; (5) a lease contract that
lacked the signature of the lessor; (6) five unsigned Affidavits; (7) an unsigned
insurance claim form (Annual Declaration by the Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation
Letter to a potential investor in Japan; (9) an unsigned Bank Certification; and (10)
an unsigned Consent to Adoption. After the mandatory conference and hearing, the
parties submitted their respective Position Papers.6Notably, respondent’s Position
Paper did not tackle the additional documents attached to complainant’s Urgent Ex
Parte Motion.
THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP
In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid,
Jr. recommended the immediate revocation of the Notarial Commission of
respondent and her disqualification as notary public for two years for her violation
of her oath as such by notarizing documents without the signatures of the parties
who had purportedly appeared before her. He accepted respondent’s explanations
with respect to the lease agreement, sale contract, and the three SPAs pertaining to
Limpioso. However, he found that the inaccurate crafting of the real estate
mortgage contract was a sufficient basis to hold respondent liable for violation of
Canon 187 and Rule 18.038 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he also
recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for six months. 9 The
IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-245 dated 22 May 2008,
unanimously adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for one year.10 Respondent filed her first Motion for
Reconsideration11 and Second Motion for Reconsideration.12 She maintained that
the additional documents submitted by complainant were inadmissible, as they
were obtained without observing the procedural requisites under Section 4, Rule VI
of Adm. No. 02-08-13 SC (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice). 13 Moreover, the
Urgent Ex Parte Motion of complainant was actually a supplemental pleading,
which was prohibited under the rules of procedure of the Committee on Bar
Discipline; besides, she was not the proper party to question those documents.
Hence, the investigating commissioner should have expunged the documents from
the records, instead of giving them due course. Respondent also prayed that
mitigating circumstances be considered, specifically the following: absence of prior
disciplinary record; absence of dishonest or selfish motive; personal and emotional
problems; timely good-faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the
consequences of her misconduct; full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board
or cooperative attitude toward the proceedings; character or reputation; remorse;
and remoteness of prior offenses.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XX-2012-119 dated 10 March
2012, denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration for lack of substantial reason
to justify a reversal of the IBP’s findings. 14
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, Director for Bar Discipline Pura
Angelica Y. Santiago – through a letter addressed to then acting Chief Justice
Antonio T. Carpio – transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment
Complaint against respondent.15
THE COURT’S RULING
After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint against respondent and the
parties’ submissions in this case, the Court hereby modifies the findings of the IBP.
Before going into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court shall
first dispose of some procedural matters raised by respondent. Respondent argues
that the additional documents submitted in evidence by complainant are
inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of Section 4, Rule VI of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. A comparable argument was raised in Tolentino v.
Mendoza,16 in which the respondent therein opposed the admission of the birth
certificates of his illegitimate children as evidence of his grossly immoral conduct,
because those documents were obtained in violation Rule 24, Administrative Order
No. 1, Series of 1993.17 Rejecting his argument, the Court reasoned as follows:
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that “evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these
rules.” There could be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to
the issue. The only question, therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide for
the inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly for having been obtained in
violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for
sanctions against persons violating the rule on confidentiality of birth records, but
nowhere does it state that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule
would render said records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the Revised
Rules of Evidence only provides for the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a
result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that said
rule against unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only to protect a person
from interference by the government or the state. In People vs. Hipol, we explained
that:
The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern itself
with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the
relationship between the individual and the State and its agents. The Bill of Rights
only tempers governmental power and protects the individual against any
aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its
agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts complained of in this case.
The alleged "warrantless search" made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the
treasurer's office, can hardly fall within the ambit of the constitutional proscription
on unwarranted searches and seizures.
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the
subject birth records as evidence against respondent, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the Revised Rules
on Evidence do not provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates
in question, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be
properly taken into consideration in the resolution of this administrative case
against respondent.18Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision
declaring the inadmissibility of documents obtained in violation thereof. Thus, the
IBP correctly considered in evidence the other notarized documents submitted by
complainant as additional evidence. Respondent’s argument that the Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion of complainant constitutes a supplemental pleading must fail as well.
As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or adds
something to the primary pleading. Its usual office is to set up new facts which
justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject matter
as the controversy referred to in the original complaint. 19 Accordingly, it cannot be
said that the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by complainant was a supplemental
pleading. One of her charges against respondent is that the latter notarized
incomplete documents, as shown by the SPAs and lease agreement attached to the
Affidavit-Complaint. Complainant is not legally barred from submitting additional
evidence to strengthen the basis of her complaint.
Going now into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court finds
that she committed misconduct and grievously violated her oath as a notary public.
The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The Court
has repeatedly stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary
act, but one invested with substantive public interest. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by law, entitled to
full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his notarial
duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of a notarized document
would be undermined.20 Where the notary public admittedly has personal
knowledge of a false statement or information contained in the instrument to be
notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate
to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may
dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be
undermined, and public confidence in notarial documents diminished. 21 In this
case, respondent fully knew that complainant was not the owner of the mortgaged
market stall. That complainant comprehended the provisions of the real estate
mortgage contract does not make respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only
heightens the latter’s liability for tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly, respondent’s
conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 122 and Rules 1.0123 and 1.0224 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue enjoying the solemn office of a notary
public. In several instances, the Court did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who were
found to be utterly oblivious to the solemnity of their oath as notaries public. 30 Even
so, the rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and the Court will not disbar a lawyer where a lesser penalty will suffice to
accomplish the desired end.31 The blatant disregard by respondent of her basic
duties as a notary public warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from
the practice of law and perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a notary
public.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit is found guilty of violating
Canon 1 and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
as well as her oath as notary public. Hence, she is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for ONE YEAR effective immediately. Her notarial commission, if still existing,
is IMMEDIATELY REVOKED and she is hereby PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from
being commissioned as a notary public.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the personal records of respondent as
a member of the bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country
for their information and guidance.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Respondent’s explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by

complainant sometime in September 199925 is incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy
of the agreement bore the lessees’ signatures, she could have given complainant a
certified photocopy thereof. It even appears that said lease agreement is not a
rarity in respondent’s practice as a notary public. Records show that on various
occasions from 2002 to 2004, respondent has notarized 22 documents that were
either unsigned or lacking signatures of the parties. Technically, each document
maybe a ground for disciplinary action, for it is the duty of a notarial officer to
demand that a document be signed in his or her presence. 26

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it
are the very same ones who executed it and who personally appeared before the
said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein.27 Thus, in acknowledging that the parties personally came and appeared
before her, respondent also violated Rule 10.01 28 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer that she shall do no falsehood. 29
A.C. No. 6677, June 10, 2014
EUPROCINA I. CRISOSTOMO vs  ATTY. PHILIP Z. A. NAZARENO
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court’s resolution is an administrative complaint 1 filed by complainants
Euprocina I. Crisostomo (Crisostomo), Marilyn L. Solis (Solis), Evelyn Marquizo
(Marquizo), Rosemarie Balatucan (Balatucan), Mildred Batang (Batang), Marilen
Minerales (Minerales), and Melinda D. Sioting (Sioting) against respondent Atty.
Philip Z. A. Nazareno (Atty. Nazareno), charging him with making false declarations
in the certifications against forum shopping subject of this case in disregard of
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, and malpractice as a notary public in
violation of  the Code of Professional Responsibility.cra1awredjgc
The Facts
Sometime in 2001, complainants individually purchased housing units (subject
properties) in Patricia South Villa Subdivision, Anabu-II, Imus, Cavite, from Rudex
International Development Corp. (Rudex).2In view of several inadequacies and
construction defects3 in the housing units and the subdivision itself, complainants
sought the rescission of their respective contracts to sell before the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), seeking the refund of the monthly
amortizations they had paid.4 The first batch of rescission cases was filed by herein
complainants Sioting5 on May 24, 2002, and Crisostomo6and Marquizo7 on June 10,
2002, while the second batch of rescission cases was filed by complainants
Balatucan8 on March 3, 2003, Solis9 and Ederlinda M. Villanueva10 (represented by
Minerales) on May 12, 2003, and Batang11 on July 29, 2003. In all the foregoing
rescission cases, Rudex was represented by herein respondent Atty. Nazareno.
Judgments of default were eventually rendered against Rudex in the first batch of
rescission cases.12Sometime in August 2003, Rudex filed three (3) petitions for
review13 before the HLURB assailing the same. In the certifications against forum
shopping attached to the said petitions, Rudex, through its President Ruben P. Baes,
and legal counsel Atty. Nazareno, stated that it has not commenced or has
knowledge of any similar action or proceeding involving the same issues pending
before any court, tribunal or agency 14 – this, notwithstanding the fact that Rudex,
under the representation of Atty. Nazareno, previously filed an ejectment case on
September 9, 2002 against Sioting and her husband, Rodrigo Sioting (Sps. Sioting),
before the Municipal Trial Court of Imus, Cavite (MTC). 15On January 29, 2004,
Rudex, again represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed another complaint 16 against Sps.
Sioting before the HLURB for the rescission of their contract to sell and the latter’s
ejectment, similar to its pending September 9, 2002 ejectment complaint. Yet, in
the certification against forum shopping attached thereto executed by the Head of
its Credit and Collection department, Norilyn D. Unisan, 17 Rudex declared that it has
not commenced or is not aware of any action or proceeding involving the same
issues pending before any court, tribunal or agency. 18 The said certification was
notarized by Atty. Nazareno himself.19
On April 1, 2004, six (6) similar complaints20 for rescission of contracts to sell and
ejectment, plus damages for non-payment of amortizations due, were filed by Atty.
Nazareno, on behalf of Rudex, against the other complainants before the HLURB.
The certifications against forum shopping attached thereto likewise stated that
Rudex has not commenced or has any knowledge of any similar pending action
before any court, tribunal or agency. 21On February 21, 2005, complainants jointly
filed the present administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Nazareno,
claiming that in the certifications against forum shopping attached to the
complaints for rescission and ejectment of Rudex filed while Atty. Nazareno was its
counsel, the latter made false declarations therein that no similar actions or
proceedings have been commenced by Rudex or remained pending before any
other court, tribunal or agency when, in fact, similar actions or proceedings for
rescission had been filed by herein complainants before the HLURB against Rudex
and Atty. Nazareno, and an ejectment complaint was filed by Rudex, represented by
Atty. Nazareno, against Sps. Sioting. In addition, complainants asserted that Atty.
Nazareno committed malpractice as a notary public since he only assigned one (1)
document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) in all the certifications against forum
shopping that were separately attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for
rescission and ejectment.22
Despite notice, Atty. Nazareno failed to file his comment and refute the
administrative charges against him.23
In the interim, the HLURB, in the Resolutions dated April 14, 2005 24 and May 12,
2005,25 dismissed Rudex’s complaints for rescission and ejectment 26 on the ground
that its statements in the certifications against forum shopping attached thereto
were false due to the existence of similar pending cases in violation of Section 5,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.cra1awredjgc
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation27 dated March 8, 2012, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero recommended the
suspension of Atty. Nazareno for a period of six (6) months for his administrative
violations. The Investigating Commissioner found, among others, that there were
unassailable proofs that the certification against forum shopping attached to
Rudex’s ejectment complaint against Sps. Sioting had been erroneously declared,
considering that at the time Rudex filed the said complaint in September 2002, Sps.
Sioting’s rescission complaint against Rudex, filed on May 24, 2002, was already
pending. Hence, it was incumbent upon Rudex to have declared its existence, more
so, since both complaints  involve the same transaction and essential facts, and a
decision on the rescission complaint would amount to res judicata on the ejectment
complaint.28  In this relation, the Investigating Commissioner observed that Atty.
Nazareno cannot claim innocence of his omission since he was not only Rudex’s
counsel but the notarizing officer as well. Having knowingly made false entries in
the subject certifications against forum shopping, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that Atty. Nazareno be held administratively liable and thereby
penalized with six (6) months suspension. 29In a Resolution30 dated April 15, 2013,
the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating
Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation, but modified the recommended
penalty from a suspension of six (6) months to only one (1) month.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not Atty. Nazareno should be held
administratively liable and accordingly suspended for a period of one (1)
month.cra1awredjgc
The Court’s Ruling
The Court affirms the IBP’s findings with modification as to the penalty imposed.
Separate from the proscription against forum shopping 31 is the violation of the
certification requirement against forum shopping, which was distinguished in the
case of  Sps. Ong v. CA32 as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The distinction between the prohibition against forum shopping and the
certification requirement should by now be too elementary to be misunderstood.
To reiterate, compliance with the certification against forum shopping is separate
from and independent of the avoidance of the act of forum shopping itself. There is
a difference in the treatment between failure to comply with the certification
requirement and violation of the prohibition against forum shopping not only in
terms of imposable sanctions but also in the manner of enforcing them. The former
constitutes sufficient cause for the dismissal without prejudice to the filing of the
complaint or initiatory pleading upon motion and after hearing, while the latter is a
ground for summary dismissal thereof and for direct contempt.  x x x.33
Under Section 5,  Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false entries in a
certification against forum shopping constitutes indirect or direct contempt of
court, and subjects the erring counsel to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party
shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a
claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the
best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there
is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim
has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom
to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion
and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with
any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court,
without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the
acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum
shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
(Emphases supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the realm of legal ethics, said infraction may be considered as a violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code) which read as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
In this case, it has been established that Atty. Nazareno made false declarations in
the certifications against forum shopping attached to Rudex’s pleadings, for which
he should be held administratively liable. Records show that Atty. Nazareno, acting
as Rudex’s counsel, filed, in August 2003, petitions for review assailing the
judgments of default rendered in the first batch of rescission cases without
disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the existence of the
ejectment case it filed against Sps. Sioting which involves an issue related to the
complainants’ rescission cases. Further, on January 29, 2004, Rudex, represented by
Atty. Nazareno, filed a complaint for rescission and ejectment against Sps. Sioting
without disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the existence of
Sioting’s May 24, 2002 rescission complaint against Rudex as well as Rudex’s own
September 9, 2002 ejectment complaint also against Sps. Sioting. Finally, on April 1,
2004, Atty. Nazareno, once more filed rescission and ejectment complaints against
the other complainants in this case without disclosing in the certifications against
forum shopping the existence of complainants’ own complaints for rescission.
Owing to the evident similarity of the issues involved in each set of cases, Atty.
Nazareno – as mandated by the Rules of Court and more pertinently, the canons of
the Code – should have truthfully declared the existence of the pending related
cases in the certifications against forum shopping attached to the pertinent
pleadings. Considering that Atty. Nazareno did not even bother to refute the
charges against him despite due notice, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate
from the IBP’s resolution on his administrative liability. However, as for the penalty
to be imposed, the Court deems it proper to modify the IBP’s finding on this score.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat,34 a penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice
of law was imposed against the lawyer therein who was shown to have deliberately
made false and untruthful statements in one of his pleadings. Given that Atty.
Nazareno’s infractions are of a similar nature, but recognizing further that he, as
may be gleaned from the foregoing discussion, had repetitively committed the
same, the Court hereby suspends him from the practice of law for a period of one
(1) year. Separately, the Court further finds Atty. Nazareno guilty of malpractice as a
notary public, considering that he assigned only one document number (i.e., Doc.
No. 1968) to the certifications against forum shopping attached to the six (6) April 1,
2004 complaints for rescission and ejectment despite the fact that each of them
should have been treated as a separate notarial act. It is a standing rule that for
every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial register at the time of the
notarization, among others, the entry and page number of the document notarized,
and that he shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his
register.35 Evidently, Atty. Nazareno did not comply with the foregoing rule.
Worse, Atty. Nazareno notarized the certifications against forum shopping attached
to all the aforementioned complaints, fully aware that they identically asserted a
material falsehood, i.e., that Rudex had not commenced any actions or proceedings
or was not aware of any pending actions or proceedings involving the same issues in
any other forum. The administrative liability of an erring notary public in this
respect was clearly delineated as a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code in
the case of Heirs of the Late Spouses Villanueva v. Atty. Beradio, 36 to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false statement or
information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or
her notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public
accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity
and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined and public confidence
on notarial documents diminished. In this case, respondent’s conduct amounted to
a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires
lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal
processes. Respondent also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes
lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.37 
In said case, the lawyer who knowingly notarized a document containing false
statements had his notarial commission revoked and was disqualified from being
commissioned as such for a period of one (1) year. Thus, for his malpractice as a
notary public, the Court is wont to additionally impose the same penalties of such
nature against him. However, due to the multiplicity of his infractions on this front,
coupled with his willful malfeasance in discharging the office, the Court deems it
proper to revoke his existing commission and permanently disqualify him from
being commissioned as a notary public. Indeed, respondent ought to be reminded
that:38
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized
may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public
document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further proof
of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able
to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a
private instrument.
xxxx
When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of the document
under his hand and seal he gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one
of the purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary public,
in addition to the solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery of
documents, is to authorize such documents to be given without further proof of
their execution and delivery. Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver
responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and
to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Failing in this, he must accept the
consequences of his unwarranted actions.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Philip Z. A. Nazareno is found GUILTY of making
false declarations in the certifications against forum shopping subject of this case,
as well as malpractice as a notary public. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely. Further, he is PERMANENTLY DISQUALIFIED from
being commissioned as a notary public and, his notarial commission, if currently
existing, is hereby REVOKED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondent’s personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
JOY T. SAMONTE vs ATTY. VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J:
For the Court’s resolution is a Complaint 1 dated March 15, 2013, filed before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), by complainant Joy T. Samonte
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil (respondent), praying
that the latter be disbarred for acts unbecoming of a lawyer and betrayal of trust.
The Facts
Complainant alleged that sometime in October 2012, she received summons from
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch XI,
Davao City, relative to an illegal dismissal case, i.e., NLRC Case RAB-XI-10-00586-12,
filed by four (4) persons claiming to be workers in her small banana
plantation.2 Consequently, complainant engaged the services of respondent to
prepare her position paper, and paid him the amount of P8,000.00 3 as attorney’s
fees.4 Despite constantly reminding respondent of the deadline for the submission
of her position paper, complainant discovered that he still failed to file the
same.5 As such, on January 25, 2013, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision 6 based
on the evidence on record, whereby complainant was held liable to the workers in
the total amount of P633,143.68.7 When complainant confronted respondent about
the said ruling, the latter casually told her to just sell her farm to pay the farm
workers.8 Because of respondent’s neglect, complainant claimed that she was left
defenseless and without any remedy to protect her interests against the execution
of the foregoing judgment;9 hence, she filed the instant complaint.
In an Order10 dated March 26, 2013, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
directed respondent to submit his Answer to the complaint.
In his Answer11 dated April 19, 2013, respondent admitted that he indeed failed to
file a position paper on behalf of complainant. However, he maintained that said
omission was due to complainant’s failure to adduce credible witnesses to testify in
her favor. In this relation, respondent averred that complainant instructed her to
prepare an Affidavit12 for one Romeo P. Baol (Romeo), who was intended to be her
witness; nevertheless, respondent was instructed that the contents of Romeo’s
affidavit were not to be interpreted in the Visayan dialect so that the latter would
not know what he would be testifying on. Respondent added that complainant’s
uncle, Nicasio Ticong, who was also an intended witness, refused to execute an
affidavit and testify to her lies. Thus, it was complainant who was deceitful in her
conduct and that the complaint against him should be dismissed for lack of merit. 13
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation14 dated March 14, 2014, the IBP-CBD found
respondent administratively liable and, accordingly, recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Essentially, the IBP-
CBD found respondent guilty of violating Rule 10.01, Canon 10, and Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), as well as the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice.15
In a Resolution16 dated December 13, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the aforesaid Report and Recommendation, finding the same to be
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court concurs with and affirms the findings of the IBP, with modification,
however, as to the penalty in order to account for his breach of the rules on notarial
practice.
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust
and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-
mindful of their cause, and accordingly, exercise the required degree of diligence in
handling their affairs. Accordingly, lawyers are required to maintain, at all times, a
high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote their full attention, skill, and
competence to their cases, regardless of their importance, and whether they accept
them for a fee or for free.17To this end, lawyers are enjoined to employ only fair and
honest means to attain lawful objectives. 18 These principles are embodied in Rule
10.01 of Canon 10 and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the CPR, which respectively read
as follows:
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
In this case, it is undisputed that a lawyer-client relationship was forged between
complainant and respondent when the latter agreed to file a position paper on her
behalf before the NLRC and, in connection therewith, received the amount of
P8,000.00 from complainant as payment for his services. Case law instructs that a
lawyer-client relationship commences when a lawyer signifies his agreement to
handle a client’s case and accepts money representing legal fees from the
latter,19 as in this case. From then on, as the CPR provides, a lawyer is duty-bound to
“serve his client with competence and diligence,” and in such regard, “not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him.”
However, it is fairly apparent that respondent breached this duty when he
admittedly failed to file the necessary position paper before the NLRC, which had, in
fact, resulted into an adverse ruling against his client, i.e., herein complainant. To
be sure, it is of no moment that complainant purportedly failed to produce any
credible witnesses in support of her position paper; clearly, this is not a valid
justification for respondent to completely abandon his client’s cause. By voluntarily
taking up complainant’s case, respondent gave his unqualified commitment to
advance and defend the latter’s interest therein. Verily, he owes fidelity to such
cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. 20 In Abay v.
Montesino,21 it was explained that regardless of a lawyer’s personal view, the latter
must still present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law to
support his client’s cause:
Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to
such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter’s
cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Otherwise stated, he owes
entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his client’s rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to
the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law,
legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any
and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he
may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is
demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to
the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice,
does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the
legal profession.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In light of the foregoing, the Court therefore agrees with the IBP that respondent
should be held administratively liable for violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the
CPR.
Likewise, the IBP correctly found that respondent violated Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of
the CPR. Records show that he indeed indulged in deliberate falsehood when he
admittedly prepared23 and notarized24 the affidavit of complainant’s intended
witness, Romeo, despite his belief that Romeo was a perjured witness. In Spouses
Umaguing v. De Vera,25 the Court highlighted the oath undertaken by every lawyer
to not only obey the laws of the land, but also to refrain from doing any
falsehood, viz.:
The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but
also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to
the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his
clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the
rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no
means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and
trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that “[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by
any artifice.”26 (Emphases supplied)
Notably, the notarization of a perjured affidavit also constituted a violation of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Section 4 (a), Rule IV thereof pertinently provides:
SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. - A notary public shall not perform any notarial act
described in these Rules for any person requesting such an act even if he tenders
the appropriate fee specified by these Rules if:
(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or
transaction is unlawful or immoral[.](Emphasis supplied)
On this score, it is well to stress that “notarization is not an empty, meaningless
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest. It must be underscored
that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public
document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of
authenticity thereof. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face. For this reason, a notary public must observe with utmost care the
basic requirements in the performance of their duties; otherwise, the confidence of
the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.” 27
Having established respondent’s administrative liability, the Court now determines
the proper penalty.
The appropriate penalty to be meted against an errant lawyer depends on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. In Del Mundo
v. Capistrano,28 the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his
failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with his client.
Similarly, in Conlu v. Aredonia, Jr.,29 the same penalty was imposed on a lawyer for
his inexcusable negligence in failing to file the required pleading to the prejudice of
his client. Hence, consistent with existing jurisprudence, the Court adopts the
penalty recommended by the IBP and accordingly suspends respondent from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Moreover, as in the case of Dela Cruz v.
Zabala,30 where the notary public therein notarized an irregular document, the
Court hereby revokes respondent’s notarial commission and further disqualifies him
from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil is found GUILY of violating Rule
10.01, Canon 10 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of one (1) year,
effective upon his receipt of this Resolution. Moreover, in view of his violation of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, his notarial commission, if still existing, is
hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary
public for a period of two (2) years. Finally, he is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondent’s personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let
copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office
of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
5) Commission Period and Examination
A.C. No. 8384 : April 11, 2013
EFIGENIA M. TENOSO Complainant, v. ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Etigenia M. Tenoso (complainant) tiled a complaint against Atty. Anselmo S.
Echanez (respondent) alleging that respondent was engaged in practice as a notary
public in Cordon, lsabela, without having been properly commissioned by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City, Isabela. This is the RTC exercising
jurisdiction over the Municipality of Cordon. This alleged act violates Rule III of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC). To support her allegations,
complainant attached the following documents to her pleadings:
a. Two (2) documents signed and issued by RTC Santiago City Executive Judge Efren
M. Cacatian bearing the names of commissioned notaries public within the
territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Santiago City for the years 2006 to 2007 and
2007 to 2008.1 Respondent's name does not appear on either list;cralawlibrary
b. Copies of ten (10) documents that appear to have been notarized by respondent
in the years 2006, 2007, and 2008; and
c. A copy of a certification issued by Judge Cacatian stating that a joint-affidavit
notarized by respondent in 2008 could not be "authenticated as to respondent's
seal and signature as NO Notarial Commission was issued upon him at the time of
the document's notarization."2chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In his two-page Answer, respondent denied the allegations saying, "I have never
been notarizing any document or pleadings"3 and added that he has "never
committed any malpractice, nor deceit nor have violated thelawyers (sic) oath".4 He
dismissed such allegations as being "preposterous, full of lies, politically motivated
and x x x meant to harass or intimidate him".5chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Also, he surmised that the documents annexed to the Affidavit-Complaint were
"tampered and adulterated," or that "somebody might have forged his signature."6
He failed to attend the mandatory conference and likewise failed to file his Position
Paper. In his Report and Recommendation dated 29 September 2008, Investigating
Commissioner Atty. Salvador B. Hababag recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and disqualified from being
commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years for violating Rules 1.01 and 10.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In a Resolution dated 11 December 2008,
the IBP Board of Governors affirmed the findings of the Investigating Commissioner
but increased the penalty of suspension from six (6) months to one (1) year.
Respondent did not file a Motion for Reconsideration or any other subsequent
pleading. On 12 August 2009, the IBP Board of Governors transmitted its Resolution
to the Supreme Court for its action following Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
The Court modifies the IBP Board of Governors' Resolution.
Complainant presented evidence supporting her allegation that respondent had
notarized various documents in Cordon, Isabela from 2006 to 2008 and that
respondent's name does not appear on the list of notaries public commissioned by
the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela for the years 2006 to 2007 and 2007 to 2008.
Respondent failed to present evidence to rebut complainant's allegations. Per
Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,9 the burden of proof is vested upon the
party who alleges the truth of his claim or defense or any fact in issue. Thus, in
Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator v.
Gutierrez,10 where a party resorts to bare denials and allegations and fails to
submit evidence in support of his defense, the determination that he committed
the violation is sustained. Respondent merely posited that the notarized documents
presented by complainant were "tampered and adulterated" or were results of
forgery, but he failed to present any proof.11 Respondent also resorted to a
sweeping and unsupported statement that he never notarized any document.
Accordingly, the reasonable conclusion is that respondent repeatedly notarized
documents without the requisite notarial commission. Time and again, this Court
emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that "a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most
important functions of the State - the administration of justice - as an officer of the
court."12 Accordingly, '"lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of
legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing." Similarly,
the duties of notaries public are dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest.14 "Notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for notarization
converts a private document to a public instrument, making it admissible in
evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due
execution." In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed
party-litigants, courts, other lawyers and the general public to the perils of ordinary
documents posing as public instruments. As noted by the Investigating
Commissioner, respondent committed acts of deceit and falsehood in open
violation of the explicit pronouncements of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Evidently, respondent's conduct falls miserably short of the high standards of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing required from lawyers. It is proper that
he be sanctioned.
WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez guilty of engaging in notarial
practice without a notarial commission, and accordingly, We SUSPEND him from the
practice of law for two (2) years and DISQUALIFY him from being commissioned as a
notary public for two (2) years. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar
act in the future shall merit a more severe sanction.
SO ORDERED.
ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY LABORATORY HIGH SCHOOL (SLU-LHS) FACULTY and STAFF
vs. ATTY. ROLANDO C. DELA CRUZ
A.C. No. 6010; August 28, 2006
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
 
This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members and Staff of the Saint
Louis University-Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) against Atty. Rolando
C. Dela Cruz, principal of SLU-LHS, predicated on the following grounds:
1) Gross Misconduct:
From the records of the case, it appears that there is a pending criminal case for
child abuse allegedly committed by him against a high school student filed before
the Prosecutors Office of Baguio City; a pending administrative case filed by the
Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created by SLU
for his alleged unprofessional and unethical acts of misappropriating money
supposedly for the teachers; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty
before the NLRC, Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal deduction of
salary by respondent.
2) Grossly Immoral Conduct:
In contracting a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage; and
3) Malpractice:
In notarizing documents despite the expiration of his commission.
According to complainant, respondent was legally married to Teresita Rivera on 31
May 1982 at Tuba, Benguet, before the then Honorable Judge Tomas
W. Macaranas. He thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with one Mary
Jane Pascua, before the Honorable Judge Guillermo Purganan. On 4 October 1994,
said second marriage was subsequently annulled for being bigamous.
 
On the charge of malpractice, complainant alleged that respondent deliberately
subscribed and notarized certain legal documents on different dates from 1988 to
1997, despite expiration of respondents notarial commission on 31 December
1987. A Certification[1] dated 25 May 1999 was issued by the Clerk of Court of
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, to the effect that respondent had not
applied for commission as Notary Public for and in the City of Baguio for the period
1988 to 1997. Respondent performed acts of notarization, as evidenced by the
following documents:
1.                  Affidavit of Ownership[2] dated 8 March 1991, executed by Fernando T.
Acosta, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
2.                  Affidavit[3] dated 26 September 1992, executed by Maria Cortez Atos,
subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
3.                  Affidavit[4] dated 14 January 1992, executed by Fanolex James A. Menos,
subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
4.                  Affidavit[5] dated 23 December 1993, executed by Ponciano V. Abalos,
subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
5.                  Absolute Date of Sale[6] dated 23 June 1993, executed
by Danilo Gonzales in favor of Senecio C. Marzan, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
6.                  Joint Affidavit By Two Disinherited Parties[7] dated 5 March 1994,
executed by Evelyn C. Canullas and Pastora C. Tacadena, subscribed and sworn to
before Rolando Dela Cruz; 
7.                  Sworn Statement[8] dated 31 May 1994, executed
by Felimon B. Rimorin, subscribed and sworn to before Rolando Dela Cruz;
8.                  Deed of Sale[9] dated 17 August 1994, executed by Woodrow Apurado in
favor of Jacinto Batara, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz; 
9.                  Joint Affidavit by Two Disinterested Parties[10] dated 1 June 1994,
executed by Ponciano V. Abalos and Arsenio C. Sibayan, subscribed and sworn to
before Rolando Dela Cruz;
10.              Absolute Deed of Sale[11] dated 23 March 1995, executed by
Eleanor D.Meridor in favor of Leonardo N. Benter, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
11.              Deed of Absolute Sale[12] dated 20 December 1996, executed
by Mandapat in favor of Mario R. Mabalot, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz;
12.              Joint Affidavit By Two Disinterested Parties[13] dated 17 April 1996,
executed by Villiam C. Ambong and Romeo L. Quiming, subscribed and sworn to
before Rolando Dela Cruz;
13.              Conditional Deed of Sale[14] dated 27 February 1997, executed by
Aurelia Demot Cados in favor of Jose Ma. A. Pangilinan, notarized by
Rolando Dela Cruz;
14.              Memorandum of Agreement[15] dated 19 July 1996, executed by JARCO
represented by Mr. Johnny Teope and AZTEC Construction represented by Mr.
George Cham, notarized by Rolando Dela Cruz.
 
Quite remarkably, respondent, in his comment, denied the charges of child abuse,
illegal deduction of salary and others which are still pending before the St. Louis
University (SLU), National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Prosecutors
Office. He did not discuss anything about the allegations of immorality in
contracting a second marriage and malpractice in notarizing documents despite the
expiration of his commission.
After the filing of comment, We referred[16] the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP conducted the mandatory preliminary conference.
The complainants, thereafter, submitted their position paper which is just a
reiteration of their allegations in their complaint.
Respondent, on his part, expressly admitted his second marriage despite the
existence of his first marriage, and the subsequent nullification of the former. He
also admitted having notarized certain documents during the period when
his notarial commission had already expired. However, he offered some
extenuating defenses such as good faith, lack of malice and noble intentions in
doing the complained acts.
After the submission of their position papers, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution. On 30 March 2005, Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his
report and recommended that:
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent
be administratively penalized for the following acts:
 
a. For contracting a second marriage without taking the appropriate legal steps to
have the first marriage annulled first, he be suspended from the practice of law for
one (1) year, and
b. For notarizing certain legal documents despite full knowledge of the expiration of
his notarial commission, he be suspended from the practice of law for another one
(1) year or for a total of two (2) years.[17]
On 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors, approved and adopted the
recommendation of Commissioner Pacheco, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering that Respondent contracted a second marriage without
taking appropriate legal steps to have the first marriage annulled, Atty. Rolando
C. dela Cruz is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and for
notarizing legal documents despite full knowledge of the expiration of
his notarial commission Atty. Rolando C. dela Cruz is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for another one (1) year, for a total of two (2) years Suspension from the
practice of law.[18]
 
This Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to fault respondent well taken,
except as to the penalty contained therein.
At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in
the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right
to practice law only during good behavior, and he can be deprived of it for
misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to
be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or
right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to
suspend, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the
duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of
suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the profession a
person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to an office of attorney and, thus, to protect the public
and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish an
attorney. Elaborating on this, we said on Maligsa  v. Atty.  Cabanting,[19] that the Bar
should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair
dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A member of the legal
fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the
confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of
the legal profession. Towards this end, an attorney may be disbarred or suspended
for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which
include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
all of these being broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in
his professional or private capacity.
 
Equally worthy of remark is that the law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy
of standards among its members. There is no distinction as to whether the
transgression is committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private
life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney
at one time and a mere citizen at another.[20] Thus, not only his professional
activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably upon
the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be
the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities. [21]
 
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must
possess good moral character. Possession of such moral character as requirement
to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice must be continuous.Otherwise,
membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good
moral conduct.[22]
 
In the case at bench, there is no dispute that respondent and Teresita Rivera
contracted marriage on 31 May 1982 before Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. In less
than a year, they parted ways owing to their irreconcilable differences without
seeking judicial recourse. The union bore no offspring. After their separation in-fact,
respondent never knew the whereabouts of Teresita Rivera since he had lost all
forms of communication with her. Seven years thereafter, respondent became
attracted to one Mary Jane Pascua, who was also a faculty member of SLU-
LHS. There is also no dispute over the fact that in 1989, respondent married Mary
Jane Pascua in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Baguio City, Branch
68. Respondent even admitted this fact. When the second marriage was entered
into, respondents prior marriage with Teresita Rivera was still subsisting, no action
having been initiated before the court to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity or
annulment of respondents prior marriage to Teresita Rivera or a judicial declaration
of presumptive death of Teresita Rivera.
Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the bigamous
second marriage in 1989, having been admitted to the Bar in 1985. As such, he
cannot feign ignorance of the mandate of the law that before a second marriage
may be validly contracted, the first and subsisting marriage must first be annulled
by the appropriate court. The second marriage was annulled only on 4 October
1994 before the RTC of Benguet, Branch 9, or about five years after respondent
contracted his second marriage. The annulment of respondents second marriage
has no bearing to the instant disbarment proceeding. Firstly, as earlier emphasized,
the annulment came after the respondents second bigamous marriage. Secondly, as
we held in In re:  Almacen, a disbarment case is sui  generis for it is neither purely
civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct
of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not
determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal
of a disbarment case does not affect its course, then neither will the judgment of
annulment of respondents second marriage also exonerate him from a wrongdoing
actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear preponderance of
evidence - in disciplinary proceedings against members of the Bar is met, then
liability attaches.[23]
 
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court cites grossly immoral conduct as a ground
for disbarment.
 
The Court has laid down with a common definition of what constitutes immoral
conduct, vis--vis, grossly immoral conduct. Immoral conduct is that conduct which
is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community  and what is
grossly immoral,  that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. [24]
 
Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes immoral conduct. But is it so gross as to
warrant his disbarment? Indeed, he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of
morality required of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery
of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of
contracting a second marriage while the first marriage was still in place, is contrary
to honesty, justice, decency and morality. [25]
However, measured against the definition, we are not prepared to consider
respondents act as grossly immoral. This finds support in the following
recommendation and observation of the IBP Investigator and IBP Board of
Governors, thus:
 
The uncontested assertions of the respondent belies any intention to flaunt the law
and the high moral standard of the legal profession, to wit:
 
a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of
almost seven (7) years, he has not been romantically involved with any woman;
 
b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his
wife, whom he described to be very intelligent person;
c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with relation to
his wife;
e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when the
mother and child went to Australia;
f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate. [26]
 
In the case of Terre v. Terre,[27] respondent was disbarred because his moral
character was deeply flawed as shown by the following circumstances, viz: he
convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and
void ab  initio and that she was legally single and free to marry him. When
complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went
through law school while being supported by complainant, with some assistance
from respondents parents. After respondent had finished his law course and gotten
complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support
and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely to a hospital.
 
In the case of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[28] respondent was also disbarred for his
grossly immoral acts such as: first, he abandoned his lawful wife and three children;
second, he lured an innocent young woman into marrying him; third,
he mispresented himself as a bachelor so he could contract marriage in a foreign
land; and fourth, he availed himself of complainants resources by securing a plane
ticket from complainants office in order to marry the latters daughter. He did this
without complainants knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure
complainant that everything is legal.
 
Such acts are wanting in the case at bar. In fact, no less than the respondent himself
acknowledged and declared his abject apology for his misstep. He was humble
enough to offer no defense save for his love and declaration of his commitment to
his wife and child.
 
Based on the reasons stated above, we find the imposition of disbarment upon him
to be unduly harsh. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
may be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court. Disbarment should
never be decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired. [29] In
line with this philosophy, we find that a penalty of two years suspension is more
appropriate. The penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended by the IBP is too
light and not commensurate to the act committed by respondent.
As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized several documents during the
years 1988-1997 after his commission as notary public had expired, respondent
humbly admitted having notarized certain documents despite his knowledge that
he no longer had authority to do so. He, however, alleged that he received no respondent, need not be discussed, as they are still pending before the proper
payment in notarizing said documents. forums. At such stages, the presumption of innocence still prevails in favor of the
  respondent.
It has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty,  
meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantive public WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz guilty of immoral conduct,
interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries in disregard of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is
public. Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, and
making it admissible in court without further proof of its another two (2) years for notarizing documents despite the expiration of his
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its commission or a total of four (4) years of suspension.
face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the  
basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Court
the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. [30] Administrator, as well as the IBP, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be the personal records of the respondent.
treated as a mere casual formality. The Court has characterized a lawyers act of  
notarizing documents without the requisite commission to do so as reprehensible, SO ORDERED.
constituting as it does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of  
public documents.[31]
 
The Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done
by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or
commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action or one,
performing a notarial act without such commission is a violation of the lawyers oath
to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear
that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and
purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly
proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. By acting as a
notary public without the proper commission to do so, the lawyer likewise violates
Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
In the case of Buensuceso  v. Barera,[32]  a lawyer was suspended for one year when
he notarized five documents after his commission as Notary Public had expired, to
wit: a complaint for ejectment, affidavit, supplemental affidavit, a deed of sale, and
a contract to sell. Guided by the pronouncement in said case, we find that a
suspension of two (2) years is justified under the circumstances. Herein respondent
notarized a total of fourteen (14) documents [33] without the
requisite notarial commission.
Other charges constituting respondents misconduct such as the pending criminal
case for child abuse allegedly committed by him against a high school student filed
before the Prosecutors Office of Baguio City; the pending administrative case filed
by the Teachers, Staff, Students and Parents before an Investigating Board created
by SLU; and the pending labor case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty before the NLRC,
Cordillera Administrative Region, on alleged illegal deduction of salary by
HEINZ R. HECK, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS (RTC CDO)
DECISION
CALLEJO SR., J.:
May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents without the requisite
notary commission more than twenty years ago be disciplined therefor? This is the
novel issue presented for resolution before this Court.
The instant case arose when in a verified Letter-Complaint dated March 21, 2001
Heinz R. Heck prayed for the disbarment of Judge Anthony E. Santos, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City.
The complainant alleged that prior to the respondents appointment as RTC judge
on April 11, 1989, he violated the notarial law, thus:
Judge Santos, based on ANNEX A, was not duly commissioned as notary public until
January 9, 1984 but still subscribed and forwarded (on a non-regular basis)
notarized documents to the Clerk of Court VI starting January 1980
uncommissioned until the 9th of January 1984.
a) Judge Santos was commissioned further January 16th 1986 to December
31st 1987 and January 6th 1988 to December 31st 1989 but the records fail to show
any entry at the Clerk of Court after December 31st 1985 until December 31st 1989.
b) Judge Santos failed to forward his Notarial Register after the expiration of his
commission in December 1989.[2]
...
WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing complainant pray[s] to order respondent:
1. To disbar Judge Anthony E. Santos and to prohibit him from all future public
service.
2. To forfeit [the] retirement benefits of Judge Santos.
3. To prohibit Judge Santos from future practice of Law.
4. To file a criminal suit against Judge Santos.
5. To conduct a speedy investigation and not to grant/accept any delaying tactics
from Judge Santos or any agency and or public servants involved in this
administrative case.
6. To pay all costs and related costs involved in this administrative case.
and prays for other relief in accordance with equity and fairness based on the
premises.[3]
The complainant submitted a certification from Clerk of Court, Atty. Beverly Sabio-
Beja, Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, which contained the following:
THIS CERTIFIES that upon verification from the records found and available in this
office, the following data appear:
1. The name Atty. Anthony E. Santos is listed as a duly commissioned notary public
in the following years:
a. January 9, 1984 to December 31, 1985
b. January 16, 1986 to December 31, 1987
c. January 6, 1988 to December 31, 1989
2. Based on the records of transmittals of notarial reports, Atty. Anthony E. Santos
submitted his notarial reports in the ff. years:
a. January 1980 report - was submitted on Feb. 6, 1980
b. February to April 1980 report - was submitted on June 6, 1980
c. May to June 1980 report - was submitted on July 29, 1980
d. July to October 1980 report - submitted but no date of submission
e. November to December 1980-no entry
f. January to February 1981 - no entry
g. March to December 1981 - submitted but no date of submission
h. January to December 1982 - submitted but no date of submission
i. January to June 1983 - submitted on January 5, 1984
j. July to December 1983 - no entry
k. January to December 1984 - submitted on January 20, 1986
l. January to December 1985 - submitted on January 20, 1986
4. Records fail to show any entry of transmittal of notarial documents under the
name Atty. Anthony Santos after December 1985.
5. It is further certified that the last notarial commission issued to Atty. Anthony
Santos was on January 6, 1988 until December 31, 1989. [4]
In his Answer dated June 13, 2001, the respondent judge categorically denied the
charges against him. He also submitted a certification [5] from Clerk of Court, Atty.
Sabio-Beja, to prove that there was no proper recording of the commissioned
lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro as well as the submitted notarized
documents/notarial register. The respondent further averred as follows:
That the complainant has never been privy to the documents notarized and
submitted by the respondent before the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, nor his rights prejudiced on account of the said
notarized documents and therefore not the proper party to raise the said issues;
That the complainant was one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 94-334 entitled
Vinas Kuranstalten Gesmbh et al. versus Lugait Aqua Marine Industries, Inc., and
Heinz Heck, for Specific Performance & Sum of Money, filed before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City, wherein respondent is the Presiding
Judge. The undersigned resolved the case in favor of the plaintiffs. [6]
Pursuant to the report of the Office of the Court Administrator recommending the
need to resort to a full-blown investigation to determine the veracity of the parties
assertions, the Court, in a Resolution dated September 10, 2001, resolved to: (a)
treat the matter as a regular administrative complaint; and (b) refer the case to
Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation,
report and recommendation.[7]
In his Letters dated December 10, 2001 and February 1, 2002, the complainant
requested that the hearing be held at Cagayan de Oro City. Justice Cruz initially
denied the request but upon the complainants insistence, the matter was
forwarded to the Court, which favorably acted thereon in a Resolution dated July 8,
2002.[8] The complainant presented his evidence in Cagayan de Oro City before
retired Court of Appeals Justice Romulo S. Quimbo.[9]
In a Sealed Report dated August 14, 2003, Investigating Justice Edgardo P. Cruz
made the following recommendation:
It is recommended that [i] respondent (who retired on May 22, 2002) be found
guilty of violation of the Notarial Law by (a) notarizing documents without
commission; (b) tardiness in submission of notarial reports; and (c) non-forwarding
of his notarial register to the Clerk of Court upon expiration of his commission; and
[ii] that for these infractions, he be suspended from the practice of law and barred
from being commissioned as notary public, both for one year, and his present
commission, if any, be revoked.[10]
According to the Investigating Justice, the respondent did not adduce evidence in
his defense, while the complainant presented documentary evidence to support the
charges:
It is noteworthy that in his answer, respondent did not claim that he was
commissioned as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983 nor deny the accuracy of
the first certification. He merely alleged that there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized
Documents/Notarial Register. And, as already observed, he presented no evidence,
particularly on his appointment as notary public for 1980 to 1983 (assuming he was
so commissioned) and submission of notarial reports and notarial register.
On the other hand, the second certification shows that there were only two Record
Books available in the notarial section of the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Cagayan de
Oro City); and that the (f)irst book titled Petitions for Notarial Commission contains
items on the Name, Date Commission was issued and Expiration of Commission of
the notary public. First entry appearing was made on December 1982.
If respondent was commissioned in 1980 to 1983, then the first book would disclose
so (at least, for the years 1982 and 1983). However, he did not present said book.
Neither did he present a certification from the Clerk of Court, RTC of Misamis
Oriental, or documents from his files showing that he was commissioned in 1980 to
1983. Similarly, he did not submit a certificate of appointment for all those years.
Under Section 238 of the Notarial Law, such certificate must be prepared and
forwarded by the Clerk of Court, RTC, to the Office of the Solicitor General, together
with the oath of office of the notary public.[11]
Thus, the Investigating Justice concluded, based on the evidence presented by the
complainant, that the respondent notarized documents in 1980 and 1983 without
being commissioned as a notary public therefor, considering that his earliest
commission of record was on January 9, 1984. [12]
The Procedural Issues
Before the Court passes upon the merits of the instant complaint, a brief
backgrounder.
On the Applicability of Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC
On September 17, 2002, we issued Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, [13] to wit:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are
lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action
of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyers Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of
breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the
discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a
disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned
as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on
the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or
otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both
respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.
Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment cases
against members of the bar who were likewise members of the court were treated
separately. Thus, pursuant to the new rule, administrative cases against erring
justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan, judges, and lawyers in the government
service may be automatically treated as disbarment cases. The Resolution, which
took effect on October 1, 2002, also provides that it shall supplement Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court, and shall apply to administrative cases already filed where the
respondents have not yet been required to comment on the complaints.
Clearly, the instant case is not covered by the foregoing resolution, since the
respondent filed his Answer/Comment on June 13, 2001.
The Procedure To Be Followed In Disbarment Cases Involving A Retired Judge For
Acts Committed While He Was Still A Practicing Lawyer
The undisputed facts are as follows: (1) the respondent is a retired judge; (2) the
complainant prays for his disbarment; and (3) the acts constituting the ground for
disbarment were committed when the respondent was still a practicing lawyer,
before his appointment to the judiciary. Thus, the respondent is being charged not
for acts committed as a judge; he is charged, as a member of the bar, with
notarizing documents without the requisite notarial commission therefor.
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on Disbarment and Discipline of
Attorneys provides:
Section 1. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state
clearly, and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of
persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme
Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate
and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in the
government service: Provided, however, That all charges against Justices of the
Court of Tax Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with
them, shall be filed with the Supreme Court: Provided, further, That charges filed
against Justices and Judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their
appointment to the Judiciary, shall be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court
for disposition and adjudication.[14]
The investigation may thereafter commence either before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), in accordance with Sections 2 to Sections 12 of Rule 139-B, or
before the Supreme Court in accordance with Sections 13 and 14, thus:
Section 13. Supreme Court Investigators. - In proceedings initiated motu proprio by
the Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires,
the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to
any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the
investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in Sections 6 to 11 hereof,
save that the review of the report shall be conducted directly by the Supreme
Court.
Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court designated
Investigator.  Based upon the evidence adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor
General or other Investigator designated by the Supreme Court shall submit to the
Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact and recommendations
together with the record and all the evidence presented in the investigation for the
final action of the Supreme Court.
It is clear from the Rules then that a complaint for disbarment is cognizable by the
Court itself, and its indorsement to the IBP is not mandatory. The Court may refer
the complaint for investigation, report and recommendation to the Solicitor
General, any officer of the court or a judge of a lower court, on which the Court will
thereafter base its final action.[15]
Although the respondent has already retired from the judiciary, he is still
considered as a member of the bar and as such, is not immune to the disciplining
arm of the Supreme Court, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 6 [16]of the 1987
Constitution.Furthermore, at the time of the filing of the complaint, the respondent
was still the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro
City. As such, the complaint was cognizable by the Court itself, as the Rule
mandates that in case the respondent is a justice of the Court of Tax Appeals or the
lower court, the complaint shall be filed with the Supreme Court. [17]
The Substantive Issues
The Retirement Or Resignation Of A Judge Will Not Preclude The Filing Thereafter
Of An Administrative Charge Against Him For Which He Shall Still Be Held
Answerable If Found Liable Therefor
The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the service
does not necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to determine the veracity of
the allegations of the complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary authority over
members of the bench. As we held in Gallos v. Cordero:[18]
The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative
complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent, had ceased in office
during the pendency of his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce
the respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof.
A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and
dangerous implications... If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of
his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and
faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty
proper and imposable under the situation. [19]
However, recognizing the proliferation of unfounded or malicious administrative or
criminal cases against members of the judiciary for purposes of harassment, we
issued A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC[20] which took effect on November 3, 2003. It reads in
part:
1. If upon an informal preliminary inquiry by the Office of the Court Administrator,
an administrative complaint against any Justice of the Court of Appeals or
Sandiganbayan or any Judge of the lower courts filed in connection with a case in
court is shown to be clearly unfounded and baseless and intended to harass the
respondent, such a finding should be included in the report and recommendation of
the Office of the Court Administrator. If the recommendation is approved or
affirmed by the Court, the complainant may be required to show cause why he
should not be held in contempt of court. If the complainant is a lawyer, he may
further be required to show cause why he or she should not be administratively
sanctioned as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the court.
2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the compulsory retirement of
a Justice or Judge; (b) for an alleged cause of action that occurred at least a year
before such filing and (c) shown prima facie that it is intended to harass the
respondent, it must forthwith be recommended for dismissal. If such is not the
case, the Office of the Court Administrator must require the respondent to file a
comment within ten (10) days from receipt of the complaint, and submit to the
Court a report and recommendation not later than 30 days from receipt of the
comment. The Court shall act on the recommendation before the date of
compulsory retirement of the respondent, or if it is not possible to do so, within six
(6) months from such date without prejudice to the release of the retirement
benefits less such amount as the Court may order to be withheld, taking into
account the gravity of the cause of action alleged in the complaint.
Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a retiring or retired judge or
justice to be dismissed outright, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
complaint must have been filed within six months from the compulsory retirement
of the judge or justice; (2) the cause of action must have occurred at least a year
before such filing; and, (3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to harass the
respondent.
In this case, the Administrative Complaint dated March 21, 2001 was received by
the Office of the Court Administrator on March 26, 2001. [21] The respondent retired
compulsorily from the service more than a year later, or on May 22, 2002. Likewise,
the ground for disbarment or disciplinary action alleged to have been committed by
the respondent did not occur a year before the respondents separation from the
service. Furthermore, and most importantly, the instant complaint was not prima
facieshown to be without merit and intended merely to harass the
respondent. Clearly, therefore, the instant case does not fall within the ambit of the
foregoing resolution.
A Judge May Be Disciplined For Acts Committed Before His Appointment To The
Judiciary
It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts committed prior to his
appointment to the judiciary.[22] In fact, even the new Rule itself recognizes this, as
it provides for the immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition and
adjudication of charges against justices and judges before the IBP, including those
filed prior to their appointment to the judiciary.[23] It need not be shown that the
respondent continued the doing of the act or acts complained of; it is sufficient that
the evidence on record supports the charge on the respondent, considering the
gravity of the offense.
Indeed, there is jurisprudence to the effect that the act complained of must be
continuing in order for the respondent judge to be disciplined therefor. In Sevilla v.
Salubre,[24]  the respondent judge was charged with violating Canon 16 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, for acts committed while he was still a practicing
lawyer. The respondent therein refused to turn over the funds of his client despite
demands, and persisted in his refusal even after he was appointed as a
judge. However, the Court also stated in this case that the respondents subsequent
appointment as a judge will not exculpate him from taking responsibility for the
consequences of his acts as an officer of the court. [25]
In the case of Alfonso v. Juanson,[26] we held that proof of prior immoral conduct
cannot be used as basis for administrative discipline against a judge if he is not
charged with immorality prior to his appointment. We ratiocinated, thus:
...[I]t would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that since he had wandered
from the path of moral righteousness, he could never retrace his steps and walk
proud and tall again in that path. No man is beyond information and redemption. A
lawyer who aspires for the exalted position of a magistrate knows, or ought to
know, that he must pay a high price for that honor - his private and official conduct
must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety. ... [27]
The Court ruled in that case that the complainant failed to prove the charges by
substantial evidence.[28] The complainant therein presented evidence pertaining to
the respondents previous indiscretion while still a practicing lawyer; no evidence
was, however, adduced to prove that the latter continued to engage in illicit acts
after being appointed to the bench. Thus, the respondent was exonerated in this
case because the complainant failed to present evidence that the indiscretion
continued even after the respondent was appointed to the judiciary.
The practice of law is so ultimately affected with public interest  that it is both the
right and duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to promote the public
welfare. The Constitution vests this power of control and regulation in this Court.
[29]
The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary
power over attorneys, which authority is not only a right but a bounden duty as
well. This is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members. [30]
Notarizing Documents Without The Requisite Commission Therefore Constitutes
Malpractice, If Not The Crime Of Falsification Of Public Documents
It must be remembered that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest, such that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. [31] Notarization by
a notary public converts a private document into a public one, making it admissible
in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due
execution.[32]
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be
treated as a mere casual formality. [33] The Court has characterized a lawyers act of
notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefore as reprehensible,
constituting as it does not only malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of
public documents.[34] For such reprehensible conduct, the Court has sanctioned
erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of law, revocation of the notarial
commission and disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment. [35]
In the case of Nunga v. Viray,[36] the Court had the occasion to state -
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at
a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be
subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without such
commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically,
the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when
he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood,
which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the
prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.[37] The importance of the function of a notary public cannot, therefore, be
over-emphasized. No less than the public faith in the integrity of public documents
is at stake in every aspect of that function.[38]
The Charge Against The Respondent Is Supported By The Evidence On Record
The respondent did not object to the complainants formal offer of evidence,
prompting the Investigating Justice to decide the case on the basis of the pleadings
filed.[39] Neither did he claim that he was commissioned as notary public for the
years 1980 to 1983, nor deny the accuracy of the first certification. The respondent
merely alleged in his answer that there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized
Documents/Notarial Register. Furthermore, as found by the Investigating Justice,
the respondent presented no evidence of his commission as notary public for the
years 1980 to 1983, as well as proof of submission of notarial reports and the
notarial register.[40] The respondent in this case was given an opportunity to answer
the charges and to controvert the evidence against him in a formal
investigation. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not
enough that he deny the charges; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him.[41]
The respondents allegation that the complainant was not a party in any of the
documents so notarized, and as such was not prejudiced thereby, is unavailing. An
attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties
as an attorney and counselor which include the statutory grounds under Section 27,
Rule 138[42] of the Revised Rules of Court. Any interested person or the court motu
proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings. There can be no doubt as to the right
of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and doings of
public officers which citizens feel are incompatible with the duties of the office and
from which conduct the citizen or the public might or does suffer undesirable
consequences.[43]
An Administrative Complaint Against A Member Of The Bar Does Not Prescribe
The qualification of good moral character is a requirement which is not dispensed
with upon admission to membership of the bar. This qualification is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its continued
possession is essential to maintain ones good standing in the profession. It is a
continuing requirement to the practice of law and therefore does not preclude a
subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning
ones mental or moral fitness before he became a lawyer. This is because his
admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the
qualifications to become a lawyer.[44] The rule is settled that a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to
admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law. [45]
Furthermore, administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own,
distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. [46] As we
held in the leading case of In re Almacen:[47]
[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and
the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of
the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. ....[48]
In a case involving a mere court employee[49] the Court disregarded the Court
Administrators recommendation that the charge for immorality against the
respondent be dismissed on the ground that the complainants failed to adduce
evidence that the respondents immoral conduct was still ongoing. Aside from being
found guilty of illicit conduct, the respondent was also found guilty of dishonesty for
falsifying her childrens certificates of live birth to show that her paramour was the
father. The complaint in this case was filed on August 5, 1999, almost twenty years
after the illicit affair ended.[50] The Court held that administrative offenses do not
prescribe.[51]
Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that an
administrative complaint against an erring lawyer who was thereafter appointed as
a judge, albeit filed only after twenty-four years after the offending act was
committed, is not barred by prescription. If the rule were otherwise, members of
the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers,
prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately
come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever
administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to
protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the administration of
justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of
the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring
members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This
categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and
bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyers Oath. This should
particularly apply in this case, considering the seriousness of the matter involved -
the respondents dishonesty and the sanctity of notarial documents.
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time, from the commission of the offending act
to the institution of the administrative complaint, will not erase the administrative
culpability of a lawyer who notarizes documents without the requisite authority
therefor.
At Most, The Delay In The Institution Of The Administrative Case Would Merely
Mitigate The Respondents Liability
Time and again, we have stressed the settled principle that the practice of law is not
a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess
the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership
in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty,
and fair dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar. [52] By his
actuations, the respondent failed to live up to such standards; [53] he undermined the
confidence of the public on notarial documents and thereby breached Canon I of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal
processes. The respondent also violated Rule 1.01 thereof which proscribes lawyers
from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. [54] In
representing that he was possessed of the requisite notarial commission when he
was, in fact, not so authorized, the respondent also violated Rule 10.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer that he shall do no falsehood.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct
that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court. While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it, we will likewise not disbar
him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.
[55]
 Furthermore, a tempering of justice is mandated in this case, considering that
the complaint against the respondent was filed twenty-four years after the
commission of the act complained of;[56] that there was no private offended party
who came forward and claimed to have been adversely affected by the documents
so notarized by the respondent; and, the fact that the respondent is a retired judge
who deserves to enjoy the full measure of his well-earned retirement benefits.
[57]
 The Court finds that a fine of P5,000.00 is justified in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is found GUILTY of notarizing
documents without the requisite notarial commission therefor. He is hereby
ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. NO. 6753 - September 5, 2012]

MILA VIRTUSIO, Complainant, v. ATTY. GRENALYN V. VIRTUSIO, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who failed to use the money given by
another to fund the checks she issued as accommodation party in payment for the
property that was purchased by such person and performed a notarial act without
commission.
The Facts and the Case
On June 14, 2005, Mila Virtusio (Mila) filed with this Court a Complaint 1Ï‚rνll for
disbarment against her husband's distant relative, Atty. Grenalyn V. Virtusio.Mila
alleged that sometime in 1999 Atty. Virtusio convinced her to buy a house and lot at
North Olympus Subdivision in Novaliches, Quezon City, from its developer,
Stateland Investment Corporation (Stateland). Mila agreed for Atty. Virtusio to use
her personal checks in paying the seller with Mila reimbursing her. Under this
arrangement, Mila gave Atty. Virtusio the following
amounts: P 95,000.00, P 25,000.00, P 65,000.00, P 64,000.00 and P 64,000.00. All of
these were properly receipted except for the P 95,000.00 for which she got a
receipt from her for only P 90,000.00.2Ï‚rνll On October 25 and November 24,
1999, Mila deposited identical amounts of P 64,000.00 each in Atty. Virtusio s
checking account with Equitable Bank.3Ï‚rνll In all, Mila gave her P 441,000.00.
To her surprise, however, Mila began receiving letters from Stateland, demanding
that she make good the dishonored checks that it got. When she confronted Atty.
Virtusio regarding this, the latter assured her that she would take care of the
problem. But the demand letters persisted.
For fear of losing the property, Mila directly dealt with Stateland in January 2000.
She then found out that her arrearages had come close to P 200,000.00, inclusive of
penalty and interest. In order not to lose the property, Mila and her husband
decided to settle their overdue obligation with money they borrowed at high
interest.4Ï‚rνll In turn, Stateland turned over to her three checks of Atty. Virtusio,
each for P 71,944.97, with the notation "DAIF."5Ï‚rνllÏ‚rνll
Mila further alleged that Atty. Virtusio declined to return to her the money the
latter misappropriated despite demand. Only when Mila threatened to file a case
against her did Atty. Virtusio agree to pay her on February 20, 2001 by executing a
deed of sale in her favor covering her Mazda car. Despite the sale, however, Atty.
Virtusio pleaded with Mila and her husband to let her keep the car meanwhile since
she needed it in her work. When she refused to give up the car, Mila filed a replevin
case against Atty. Virtusio that the court eventually decided in Mila s
favor.6Ï‚rνll But, as it turned out, Atty. Virtusio had managed to register the car in
her children s name and sold it to a third person. Mila filed a case of estafa against
Atty. Virtusio7Ï‚rνll apart from the present disbarment case.
Mila claimed that Atty. Virtusio evaded the return of money she misappropriated,
impeded the execution of a final judgment, and engaged in conduct that discredits
the legal profession, all in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
rendering her unfit to remain a member of the bar. 8ςrνllςrνll
In a July 27, 2005 Resolution,9Ï‚rνll the Court required Atty. Virtusio to comment on
the complaint. She asked for extension of time to comply but did not file her
comment just the same.10Ï‚rνll On Mila s motion,11Ï‚rνll the Court again required
Atty. Virtusio to file her comment and to show cause why she had not complied
with its previous orders.12Ï‚rνll Still, she did not file any comment, prompting the
Court to impose on her on November 15, 2006 a P 500.00 fine. The court again
reiterated its order for her to file her comment. 13ςrνllςrνll
With no response, on August 1, 2007, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to
resend its November 15, 2006 Resolution to Atty. Virtusio 14Ï‚rνll but this was
returned unserved with the notation, "RTS-Person moved out." On December 3,
2007 the Court ordered the resending of the May 3 and November 15, 2006
Resolutions to Atty. Virtusio, this time at an address in Sta. Mesa that Mila
furnished. When this last resolution was returned unserved with the notation, "RTS-
Unclaimed," the Court issued a Resolution15ςrνllon April 30, 2008 that considered
Atty. Virtusio to have waived her right to file a comment considering that she filed
none despite having sought an extension from the Court. The Court also referred
the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation. The IBP Investigating Commissioner directed Atty. Virtusio to file
a position paper. She filed a motion for extension of time to file the same but did
not. Based on the pleadings on hand, the IBP Investigating Commissioner reported
having found that Atty. Virtusio appropriated portions of the money that Mila gave
her for payment to Stateland, thus evidencing her moral unfitness to practice the
profession. The Commissioner recommended the imposition of the penalty of one
year suspension from the practice of law with a two-year disqualification from
reappointment as Notary Public, given that she had notarized documents despite
the expiration of her notarial commission. The IBP Board of Governors approved
the report and recommendation. Atty. Virtusio filed a motion for reconsideration of
the IBP Investigating Commissioner s action on April 30, 2009. 20Ï‚rνll She explained
that her failure to file her position paper was brought about by her belief that she
needed to wait for the IBP s action on her motion for extension of time to file the
same. Thus, she prayed that her attached position paper be admitted and
considered in resolving her motion for reconsideration. In her version of the facts,
Atty. Virtusio wants to convince the Court that she committed no intentional
wrongs and that she was but a victim of circumstances. Although she admitted
using Mila s money rather than pay Stateland with it, she explained that, having
been busy attending to her sick son in Manila, she failed to monitor her check
disbursements, entrusting it to an office staff. Only in December 1999 was she able
to audit the same and discover the mismanagement of her funds and its co-
mingling with office funds, resulting in overlapping of accountabilities and non-
funding of the checks for Stateland when they fell due. On becoming aware of the
lapses, however, Atty. Virtusio borrowed P 165,000.00 from Engr. Marciano de
Guzman so she could pay Mila but, having failed to pay him as well, he went after
Mila who was co-maker of the loan. When Atty. Virtusio tried to make further
arrangements to pay what she owed Mila, the latter refused to negotiate and did
not acknowledge the past payments she had already made. When Atty. Virtusio
refused to yield to Mila s demand for payment of the entire P 165,000.00, she filed
a replevin case, a complaint for estafa, and disbarment charge against her.
Atty. Virtusio averred that in October 2006 she and Mila entered into a verbal
agreement whereby she would pay her P 200,000.00, with P 87,500.00 up front, in
exchange for Mila s dismissal of all her actions. Notwithstanding that the
compromise agreement had not been formalized, Atty. Virtusio claimed that it
obliterated her liabilities, given that she substantially settled her obligations to Mila.
Atty. Virtusio also pointed out, that the charges against her were not born of some
professional relation between Mila and her. She had acted as an accommodation
party, allowing Mila to make use of her personal checks to facilitate the purchase of
a property from Stateland. And, assuming that the predicament she finds herself in
has a bearing on her professional conduct, the same does not amount to grossly
immoral conduct since she owned up to her responsibilities and exerted tireless
effort to settle her accounts. Atty. Virtusio claimed that she should not be penalized
for violation of the notarial law since this offense did not form part of the original
complaint to which she was required to respond. At any rate, she merely committed
an oversight. She had religiously renewed her notarial commission yearly since May
1995. When she notarized the questioned documents, she believed in good faith
that she had renewed her notarial commission for 2006 and 2007 just as before.
She asked not to be punished for her mistake since it was brought about by her
sincere commitment to extend free legal service to the disadvantaged. Lastly, Atty.
Virtusio asked the Court to reconsider the harsh penalty imposed on her in the light
of the peculiar circumstances of her case and the good faith she showed. On June
26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution XIX-2011-
47728Ï‚rνll denying the motion despite an affidavit of desistance that Mila filed in
the meantime.29Ï‚rνll As provided in Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,
the IBP forwarded the instant case to this Court for final action.
Questions Presented
The questions presented in this case are:
1. Whether or not the IBP erred in finding Atty. Virtusio guilty of grave misconduct
in her dealings with Mila and in notarizing documents without a renewed
commission; andcralawlibrary
2. Assuming Atty. Virtusio was guilty of some offenses, whether or not the IBP
imposed the appropriate penalties on her.
chanrobles virtual law library
Rulings of the Court
Lawyers are, as officers of the court and instruments for the administration of
justice, expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of
morality, honesty, and fair dealing. A lawyer s gross misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, is ground for suspension or disbarment under the
principle that, since good moral character is an essential qualification for the
admission to the practice of law, maintaining such trait is a condition for keeping
the privilege. By her own account, Atty. Virtusio admitted misusing the money that
Mila entrusted to her for payment to Stateland. Her excuse is that she lost track of
her finances and mixed up her office funds with her personal funds. But this excuse
is too thin. She admitted misusing P 165,000.00 of Mila s money, which is not petty
cash. Indeed she tried to borrow money from a third person to cover it up rather
than just offer her shallow excuse to Mila. Atty. Virtusio s use for personal purpose
of money entrusted to her constitutes dishonest and deceitful conduct under the
Code of Professional Responsibility. It provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
chanrobles virtual law library
Atty. Virtusio cannot absolve herself of liability by claiming that she failed to attend
to her finances because she had to look after a sick child at that time. Assuming she
had such a child, the fact is that it was not by mere oversight that she failed to
finance the checks for Stateland. For, if this were so, she could have easily rectified
her mistake by using her other funds. In truth, she spent the money that Mila
entrusted to her because she had no other funds. Indeed, she had to borrow money
from a third party later to remedy her financial problems.
What is more, supposedly to cover up for her fault, Atty. Virtusio executed a deed
of sale covering her car in Mila s favor rather than return the money she defalcated.
But, again acting with guile, she withheld possession of the car and transferred its
registration in the name of her children.
Atty. Virtusio is guilty by her above acts of gross misconduct that warrants her
suspension for one year from the practice of law following Section 27, 32Ï‚rνll Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.
The Court cannot also countenance Atty. Virtusio s notarization of documents after
her notarial commission had expired. Although the IBP discovered this violation of
the notarial law only in the course of the proceedings and was not a subject matter
of Mila s complaint, it cannot close its eyes to the same. Besides, Atty. Virtusio had
an opportunity to defend herself against this additional charge. 33Ï‚rνll Her defense
is that she thought that she had renewed her commission.
Again, Atty. Virtusio s defense is unsubstantial. She did not renew her notarial
commission for two years, 2006 and 2007, not just one. She could not have missed
that fact considering that, as she said, she had been renewing her commission
yearly from 1995 to 2005.
A lawyer who notarizes a document without a proper commission violates his
lawyer s oath to obey the law. He makes it appear that he is commissioned when he
is not. He thus indulges in deliberate falsehood that the lawyer s oath forbids. This
violation falls squarely under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Canon 7 as well.34Ï‚rνll A proper sanction is
authorized.35ςrνllςrνll
Considering, however, that based on the evidence Atty. Virtusio had notarized only
two documents without a proper notarial commission, the Court finds her
suspension from notarial practice for one year adequate. 36ςrνllςrνll
That Mila had agreed after some financial settlement to withdraw her complaint
against Atty. Virtusio cannot exempt the latter from the prescribed sanction. She
has outraged the country s professional code and this demands a measure of
justice. As the Court said in Spouses Soriano v. Atty. Reyes, 37ςrνlldisbarment is a
disciplinary action taken for the public good. Consequently, it is as a rule not subject
to some compromise entered into with the complainant. Besides, Mila's evidence is
already a matter of record and the Court cannot simply ignore the
same.38ςrνllςrνll
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS Atty. Grenalyn V. Virtusio GUILTY of gross
misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and IMPOSES on her the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for one
year, effective immediately. In addition, the Court REVOKES any Notarial
Commission she may presently have and DISQUALIFIES her from applying for it for
one year also effective immediately. Further, she is WARNED of a more severe
penalty should she commit a similar infraction in the future.
Let cop1es of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant. Finally, let this
judgment be made part of Atty. Virtusio's personal record 1n the latter office.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6963             February 9, 2006
VICTORINA BAUTISTA vs. ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE,
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a Complaint1 filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) on November 16, 2004, complainant Victorina
Bautista2 prays for the suspension or disbarment of respondent Atty. Sergio E.
Bernabe for malpractice and unethical conduct in the performance of his duties as a
notary public and a lawyer.
Complainant alleged that on January 3, 1998, respondent prepared and notarized
a Magkasanib na Salaysay3purportedly executed by Donato Salonga and
complainant’s mother, Basilia de la Cruz. 4 Both affiants declared that a certain
parcel of land in Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan, was being occupied by Rodolfo Lucas
and his family for more than 30 years. Complainant claimed that her mother could
not have executed the joint affidavit on January 3, 1998 because she has been dead
since January 28, 1961.5
In his Answer,6 respondent denied that he falsified the Magkasanib na Salaysay. He
disclaimed any knowledge about Basilia’s death. He alleged that before he
notarized the document, he requested for Basilia’s presence and in her absence, he
allowed a certain Pronebo, allegedly a son-in-law of Basilia, to sign above the name
of the latter as shown by the word "by"  on top of the name of Basilia. Respondent
maintained that there was no forgery since the signature appearing on top of
Basilia’s name was the signature of Pronebo.
On April 4, 2005, respondent filed a manifestation 7 attaching thereto the affidavit of
desistance8 of complainant which reads in part:
Ako na si, VICTORINA BAUTISTA CAPA, x x x matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa
batas ay malaya at kusang loob na nagpapahayag ng mga sumusunod:
1. Na ako ang siyang tumatayong nagrereklamo laban kay Abogado, SERGIO
EXQUIVEL BERNABE, sa isang kaso sa Tanggapan ng Integrated Bar of the
Philippines na may Blg. CBD CASE NO. 04-1371;
2. Na ang nasabing habla ay hindi ko kagustuhan sapagkat iyon ay pinapirmahan
lamang sa akin ni ELISEO OLOROSO at ng kanyang Abogado na si Atty. MARCIAL
MORFE MAGSINO at sa katunayan hindi ako nakaharap sa Notaryo Publiko na si
Abogado CARLITOS C. VILLARIN;
3. Na ang pagpapapirma sa akin ay isang panlilinlang at ako ay ginawang
kasangkapan para sirain ang magandang pangalan nitong si Abogado SERGIO
ESQUIVEL BERNABE;
4. Na dahil sa ganitong pangyayari, aking hinihiling sa Tanggapan ng Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) na ang reklamo ko laban sa nasabing Abogado SERGIO
ESQUIVEL BERNABE ay mapawa[la]ng bisa.
In the report dated August 29, 2005, the Investigating
Commissioner9 recommended that:
1. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be suspended from the practice of the legal
profession for one (1) month;
2. Any existing commission of Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe as notary public, be
revoked; and
3. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be barred from being granted a notarial
commission for a period of one (1) year.10
In a resolution dated October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted
and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with
modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year
and his notarial commission be revoked and that he be disqualified for
reappointment as notary public for two years.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
The records sufficiently established that Basilia was already dead when the joint
affidavit was prepared on January 3, 1998. Respondent’s alleged lack of knowledge
of Basilia’s death does not excuse him. It was his duty to require the personal
appearance of the affiant before affixing his notarial seal and signature on the
instrument.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the
same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him
to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the
parties to the deed will enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the affiant.11
Respondent’s act of notarizing the Magkasanib na Salaysay  in the absence of one
of the affiants is in violation of Rule 1.01,12 Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Notarial Law.13 By affixing his signature and notarial seal on
the instrument, he led us to believe that Basilia personally appeared before him and
attested to the truth and veracity of the contents of the affidavit when in fact it was
a certain Pronebo who signed the document. Respondent’s conduct is fraught with
dangerous possibilities considering the conclusiveness on the due execution of a
document that our courts and the public accord on notarized documents.
Respondent has clearly failed to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of his
function as a notary public and to comply with the mandates of the law. 14
Respondent was also remiss in his duty when he allowed Pronebo to sign in behalf
of Basilia. A member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public should not
notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him. The acts of the affiants
cannot be delegated to anyone for what are stated therein are facts of which they
have personal knowledge. They should swear to the document personally and not
through any representative. Otherwise, their representative’s name should appear
in the said documents as the one who executed the same. That is the only time the
representative can affix his signature and personally appear before the notary
public for notarization of the said document. Simply put, the party or parties who
executed the instrument must be the ones to personally appear before the notary
public to acknowledge the document.15
Complainant’s desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does not exonerate
respondent or put an end to the administrative proceedings. A case of suspension
or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the
record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule
is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension
or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice
in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of
the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to
the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.16
We find the penalty recommended by the IBP to be in full accord with recent
jurisprudence. In Gonzales v. Ramos,17 respondent lawyer was found guilty of
notarizing the document despite the non-appearance of one of the signatories. As a
result, his notarial commission was revoked and he was disqualified from
reappointment for a period of two years. In addition, he was suspended from the
practice of law for one year.
Finally, it has not escaped our notice that in paragraph 218 of complainant’s affidavit
of desistance, she alluded that Atty. Carlitos C. Villarin notarized her Sinumpaang
Salaysay19 dated November 12, 2004 which was attached to the complaint filed with
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, without requiring her to personally
appear before him in violation of the Notarial Law. This allegation must likewise be
investigated.
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional
Responsibility, the notarial commission of respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe,
is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period
of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one
year, effective immediately. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or
of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date
of receipt of this Decision in order to determine when his suspension shall take
effect.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is
DIRECTED to investigate the allegation that Atty. Carlitos C. Villarin notarized
the Sinumpaang Salaysay  of Victorina Bautista dated November 12, 2004 without
requiring the latter’s personal appearance.lavvph!1.net
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of
this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157434             September 19, 2006
SPOUSES CLARO and NIDA BAUTISTA, vs. BERLINDA F. SILVA
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
To establish his status as a buyer for value in good faith, a person dealing with land
registered in the name of and occupied by the seller need only show that he relied
on the face of the seller's certificate of title.1 But for a person dealing with land
registered in the name of and occupied by the seller whose capacity to sell is
restricted, such as by Articles 1662 and 1733 of the Civil Code or Article 1244 of the
Family Code, he must show that he inquired into the latter's capacity to sell in order
to establish himself as a buyer for value in good faith. 5 The extent of his inquiry
depends on the proof of capacity of the seller. If the proof of capacity consists of a
special power of attorney duly notarized, mere inspection of the face of such public
document already constitutes sufficient inquiry. If no such special power of attorney
is provided or there is one but there appear flaws in its notarial
acknowledgment mere inspection of the document will not do; the buyer must
show that his investigation went beyond the document and into the circumstances
of its execution.
Appealed by Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
are the November 21, 2001 Decision6 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
487677 which affirmed in toto the January 10, 1995 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Civil Case No. 3091-V-89, and the February 27, 2003 CA Resolution
which denied the motion for reconsideration.
Civil Case No. 3091-V-89 is a Complaint for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale and
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-2765, Reconveyance and Damages filed with
the RTC, Branch 171, Valenzuela, Metro Manila by Berlina F. Silva (Berlina), through
Hermes Dorado (Dorado) as Attorney-in-Fact, against Spouses Claro and Nida
Bautista (Spouses Bautista). Spouses Bautista filed their Answer 8 and a Third-Party
Complaint against Berlina's husband, Pedro M. Silva (Pedro). 9 In an Order dated
August 6, 1991, the RTC declared third-party defendant Pedro in default for failure
to file an answer to the Third-Party Complaint. 10
The undisputed facts of the case, as found by the RTC, are as follows:
1. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37189 of the Registry of Deeds for xxx
Metro Manila District III over a parcel of land (Lot 42, Block 10, of the subdivision
plan (LRC) Psd-210217, Sheet 2, being a portion of Lot 903, Malinta Estate, LRC
Record No. 5941) situated in xxx Barrio of Parada, Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
containing an area of 216 square meters, more or less, was registered in the names
of Spouses Berlina F. Silva and Pedro M. Silva on August 14, 1980;
2. That on March 3, 1988, Pedro M. Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of his
wife Berlina F. Silva, thru a Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed on
November 18, 1987 by Berlina F. Silva in his favor, signed and executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
B-37189 in favor of defendants-spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista; and
3. That as a consequence, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 37189 was cancelled and
in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-2765 of the Registry of Deeds for
the Valenzuela Branch was issued in the names of Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida
Bautista on March 4, 1988.11
Based on the evidence presented, the RTC also found that the signature appearing
on the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) as that of Berlina Silva is a forgery, and that
consequently the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Pedro in favor of Spouses
Bautista is not authorized by Berlina.12
The RTC rendered judgment on January 10, 1995, the decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1988 executed by Pedro M.
Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of Berlina F. Silva, in favor of defendants-
spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista over the parcel of land, described and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37189 Metro Manila District III, null
and void and the resulting Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-2765 of Valenzuela
Registry in the name of Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista cancelled and that
Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37189 reinstated.
2. Ordering defendants to reconvey the property covered by the said Transfer
Certificate of Title No. V-2765 together with the improvements thereon to the
plaintiff.
3. Condemning the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 in the
concept of reasonable attorney's fees and the costs of suit.
Defendants' counterclaim is dismissed.
Judgment on default is hereby entered in favor of the third-party plaintiffs Spouses
Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista against third-party defendants Pedro M. Silva,
condemning the third-party defendant Pedro Silva to indemnify/pay third-party
plaintiffs Spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista the amount of Seventy Thousand
Pesos (P70,000.00) the contract price of the sale of the property, with interest at
the legal rate from the date of the execution of the said document on March 3,
1988 until the amount is fully paid and for whatever amount that the third–party
plaintiffs were adjudged and paid to the plaintiff by reason of this decision and the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.13
Spouses Bautista filed an appeal with the CA which, in its November 21, 2001
Decision, affirmed in toto the RTC decision;14 and, in a Resolution
dated February 27, 2003, denied the Motion for Reconsideration. 15
Hence, the herein petition filed by Spouses Bautista praying that the CA Decision
and Resolution be annulled and set aside on the following grounds:
I. Respondent as represented by Hermes Dorado in his capacity as attorney-in-fact
has no legal authority to file action against spouses petitioners.
II. The petitioners are considered as purchasers in good faith and for value having
relied upon a Special Power of Attorney which appears legal, valid and genuine on
its face.
III. Gratia argumenti that the special power of attorney is a forgery and the deed of
sale executed by the husband is null and void, the nullity [thereof] does not include
the one half share of the husband.16
The petition fails for lack of merit.
As to the first ground, petitioners argue that for lack of authority of Dorado to
represent respondent, the latter's Complaint failed to state a cause of action and
should have been dismissed.17
The argument holds no water.
True, there was no written authority for Dorado to represent respondent in the
filing of her Complaint. However, no written authorization of Dorado was needed
because the Complaint was actually filed by respondent, and not merely through
Dorado as her attorney-in-fact. As correctly observed by the CA, respondent herself
signed the verification attached to the Complaint. 18 She stated therein that she is
the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3091-V-89 and that she caused the preparation of the
Complaint.19 Respondent also personally testified on the facts alleged in her
Complaint.20 In reality, respondent acted for and by herself, and not through any
representative, when she filed the Complaint. Therefore, respondent being the real
party in interest, by virtue of the then prevailing Articles 166 21 and 17322 of the Civil
Code, the Complaint she filed sufficiently stated a cause of action. The sufficiency of
the Complaint was not affected by the inclusion of Dorado as party representative
for this was an obvious error which, under Section 11 of Rule 3, 23 is not a ground for
dismissal, as it may be corrected by the court, on its own initiative and at any stage
of the action, by dropping such party from the complaint. 24
Anent the second ground, there is no merit to petitioners' claim that they are
purchasers in good faith.
That the SPA is a forgery is a finding of the RTC and the CA on a question of
fact.25 The same is conclusive upon the Court, 26 especially as it is based on the
expert opinion of the NBI which constitutes more than clear, positive and
convincing evidence that respondent did not sign the SPA, and on the
uncontroverted Certification of Dorado that respondent was in Germany working as
a nurse when the SPA was purportedly executed in 1987.
The SPA being a forgery, it did not vest in Pedro any authority to alienate the
subject property without the consent of respondent. Absent such marital consent,
the deed of sale was a nullity.27
But then petitioners disclaim any participation in the forgery of the SPA or in the
unauthorized sale of the subject property. They are adamant that even with their
knowledge that respondent was in Germany at the time of the sale, they acted in
good faith when they bought the subject property from Pedro alone because the
latter was equipped with a SPA which contains a notarial acknowledgment that the
same is valid and authentic.28 They invoke the status of buyers in good faith whose
registered title in the property is already indefeasible and against which the remedy
of reconveyance is no longer available.29 In the alternative, petitioners offer that
should respondent be declared entitled to reconveyance, let it affect her portion
only but not that of Pedro.30
Whether or not petitioners are buyers for value in good faith is a question of fact
not cognizable by us in a petition for review. 31 We resolve only questions of law; we
do not try facts nor examine testimonial or documentary evidence on record. We
leave these to the trial and appellate courts to whose findings and conclusions we
accord great weight and respect, especially when their findings concur. 32 We may
have at times reversed their findings and conclusions but we resort to this only
under exceptional circumstances as when it is shown that said courts failed to take
into account certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.33 No such exceptional circumstance obtains in the present case
for we find the conclusions of the RTC and CA supported by the established facts
and applicable law. However, we do not fully subscribe to some of their views on
why petitioners cannot be considered in good faith, as we will discuss below.
A holder of registered title may invoke the status of a buyer for value in good faith
as a defense against any action questioning his title.34 Such status, however, is never
presumed but must be proven by the person invoking it. 35
A buyer for value in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice
that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays full and
fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the
claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys the property with
the well-founded belief that the person from whom he receives the thing had title
to the property and capacity to convey it.36
To prove good faith, a buyer of registered and titled land need only show that he
relied on the face of the title to the property. He need not prove that he made
further inquiry for he is not obliged to explore beyond the four corners of the
title.37 Such degree of proof of good faith, however, is sufficient only when the
following conditions concur: first, the seller is the registered owner of the
land; 38 second, the latter is in possession thereof;39 and third, at the time of the
sale, the buyer was not aware of any claim or interest of some other person in the
property,40 or of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to
convey title to the property.41
Absent one or two of the foregoing conditions, then the law itself puts the buyer on
notice and obliges the latter to exercise a higher degree of diligence by scrutinizing
the certificate of title and examining all factual circumstances in order to determine
the seller's title and capacity to transfer any interest in the property. 42 Under such
circumstance, it is no longer sufficient for said buyer to merely show that he relied
on the face of the title; he must now also show that he exercised reasonable
precaution by inquiring beyond the title. 43 Failure to exercise such degree of
precaution makes him a buyer in bad faith.44
In the present case, petitioners were dealing with a seller (Pedro) who had title to
and possession of the land but, as indicated on the face of his title, whose capacity
to sell was restricted, in that the marital consent of respondent is required before
he could convey the property. To prove good faith then, petitioners must show that
they inquired not only into the title of Pedro but also into his capacity to sell.
According to petitioners, to determine Pedro's capacity to sell, they conducted the
following forms of inquiry: first, they inspected the photocopy of the SPA presented
to them by Pedro;45 second, they brought said copy to Atty. Lorenzo Lucero (the
notary public who prepared the deed of sale) and asked whether it was
genuine;46 and third, they inspected the original copy of the SPA after they
advanced payment of Php55,000.00 to Pedro.47 Essentially, petitioners relied on the
SPA, specifically on its notarial acknowledgment which states that respondent
appeared before the notary public and acknowledged having executed the SPA in
favor of Pedro.
The RTC and CA, however, found such inquiry superficial. They expected of
petitioners an investigation not only into the whereabouts of respondent at the
time of the execution of the SPA48 but also into the genuineness of the signature
appearing on it.49
We find such requirements of the RTC and CA too stringent that to adopt them
would be to throw commerce into madness where buyers run around to probe the
circumstances surrounding each piece of sales document while sellers scramble to
produce evidence of its good order. Remember that it is not just any scrap of paper
that is under scrutiny but a SPA, the execution and attestation of which a notary
public has intervened.
To what extent, therefore, should an inquiry into a notarized special power of
attorney go in order for one to qualify as a buyer for value in good faith?
We agree with one author who said:
x x x To speak of "notice", as applied to the grantee, is to follow the language of the
Statue of Elizabeth. Its proviso protects the man who purchases "upon good
consideration and bona fide * * * not having at the time * * * any manner of
notice or knowledge." The term "notice", however, is really but an approach to the
test of good faith, and all modern legislation tends toward that point.
Thus, some present day statutes (outside of the Uniform Law) may speak of notice,
actual and constructive, and define both terms, but they should be "liberally
construed, so as to protect bona fide purchaser for value." They may require the
grantee to have "knowledge" of the debtor's intent, but save for technical purposes
of pleading, the term is read in the light of the rules we are studying. It comes
always to a question of the grantee's good faith as distinct from mere negligence. 50
There must, indeed, be more than negligence. There must be a conscious turning
away from the subject x x x. As put by the Supreme Court, the grantee must take
the consequences if he "chooses to remain ignorant of what the necessities of the
case require him to know." The search, therefore, is described by the question, did
the grantee make a choice between not knowing and finding out the truth; or
were the circumstances such that he was not faced with that choice? (Emphasis
ours)
This means that no automatic correlation exists between the state of forgery of a
document and the bad faith of the buyer who relies on it. A test has to be done
whether the buyer had a choice between knowing the forgery and finding it out, or
he had no such choice at all.
When the document under scrutiny is a special power of attorney that is duly
notarized, we know it to be a public document where the notarial acknowledgment
is prima facie evidence of the fact of its due execution. 51 A buyer presented with
such a document would have no choice between knowing and finding out whether
a forger lurks beneath the signature on it. The notarial acknowledgment has
removed that choice from him and replaced it with a presumption sanctioned by
law that the affiant appeared before the notary public and acknowledged that he
executed the document, understood its import and signed it. In reality, he is
deprived of such choice not because he is incapable of knowing and finding out but
because, under our notarial system, he has been given the luxury of merely relying
on the presumption of regularity of a duly notarized SPA. And he cannot be faulted
for that because it is precisely that fiction of regularity which holds together
commercial transactions across borders and time.
In sum, all things being equal, a person dealing with a seller who has possession
and title to the property but whose capacity to sell is restricted, qualifies as a buyer
in good faith if he proves that he inquired into the title of the seller as well as into
the latter's capacity to sell; and that in his inquiry, he relied on the notarial
acknowledgment found in the seller's duly notarized special power of attorney. He
need not prove anything more for it is already the function of the notarial
acknowledgment to establish the appearance of the parties to the document, its
due execution and authenticity.52
Note that we expressly made the foregoing rule applicable only under the operative
words "duly notarized" and "all things being equal." Thus, said rule should not apply
when there is an apparent flaw afflicting the notarial acknowledgment of the
special power of attorney as would cast doubt on the due execution and
authenticity of the document; or when the buyer has actual notice of circumstances
outside the document that would render suspect its genuineness.
In Domingo v. Reed,53 we found that the special power of attorney relied upon by
the buyers contained a defective notarial acknowledgment in that it stated there
that only the agent-wife signed the document before the notary public while the
principal-husband did not. Such flaw rendered the notarial acknowledgment of no
effect and reduced the special power of attorney into a private document. We
declared the buyer who relied on the private special power of attorney a buyer in
bad faith.
In Lao v. Villones-Lao,54 and Estacio v. Jaranilla,55 we found that the buyers knew of
circumstances extrinsic to the special power of attorney which put in question the
actual execution of said document. In Domingo Lao, the buyer knew that the agent-
wife was estranged from the principal-husband but was living within the same city.
In the Estacio case, we found admissions by the buyers that they knew that at the
time of the purported execution of the special power of attorney, the alleged
principal was not in the Philippines. In both cases we held that the buyers were not
in good faith, not because we found any outward defect in the notarial
acknowledgment of the special powers of attorney, but because the latter had
actual notice of facts that should have put them on deeper inquiry into the capacity
to sell of the seller.
In the present case, petitioners knew that Berlina was in Germany at the time they
were buying the property and the SPA relied upon by petitioners has a defective
notarial acknowledgment. The SPA was a mere photocopy 56 and we are not
convinced that there ever was an original copy of said SPA as it was only this
photocopy that was testified to by petitioner Nida Bautista and offered into
evidence by her counsel.57 We emphasize this fact because it was actually this
photocopy that was relied upon by petitioners before they entered into the deed of
sale with Pedro. As admitted to by petitioner Nida Bautista, upon inspection of the
photocopy of the SPA, they gave Pedro an advanced payment of Php55,000.00; this
signifies that, without further investigation on the SPA, petitioners had agreed to
buy the subject property from Pedro.
But then said photocopy of the SPA contains no notarial seal. A notarial seal is a
mark, image or impression on a document which would indicate that the notary
public has officially signed it.58 There being no notarial seal, the signature of the
notary public on the notarial certificate was therefore incomplete. The notarial
certificate being deficient, it was as if the notarial acknowledgment was unsigned.
The photocopy of the SPA has no notarial acknowledgment to speak of. It was a
mere private document which petitioners cannot foist as a banner of good faith.
All told, it was not sufficient evidence of good faith that petitioners merely relied on
the photocopy of the SPA as this turned out to be a mere private document. They
should have adduced more evidence that they looked beyond it. They did not.
Instead, they took no precautions at all. They verified with Atty. Lucero whether the
SPA was authentic but then the latter was not the notary public who prepared the
document. Worse, they purposely failed to inquire who was the notary public who
prepared the SPA. Finally, petitioners conducted the transaction in haste. It took
them all but three days or from March 2 to 4, 1988 to enter into the deed of sale,
notwithstanding the restriction on the capacity to sell of Pedro. 59 In no way then
may petitioners qualify as buyers for value in good faith.
That said, we come to the third issue on whether petitioners may retain the portion
of Pedro Silva in the subject property. Certainly not. It is well-settled that the nullity
of the sale of conjugal property contracted by the husband without the marital
consent of the wife affects the entire property, not just the share of the wife. 60 We
see no reason to deviate from this rule.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated November 21,
2001 and Resolution dated February 27, 2003 of the Court of Appeal are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
6) Notarial Jurisdiction
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The Scriptures tell the story of the brothers Jacob and Esau [1], siblings who fought
bitterly over the inheritance of their father Isaac's estate. Jurisprudence is also
replete with cases involving acrimonious conflicts between brothers and sisters
over successional rights. This case is no exception.
On February 19, 1994, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A.
Guerrero and respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died at the Metropolitan Hospital in
Tondo, Manila. On May 24, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the
last will and testament of the decedent in Branch 95 [2] of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City where the case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-94-20661.
The petition alleged the following: petitioner was named as executrix in the
decedent's will and she was legally qualified to act as such; the decedent was a
citizen of the Philippines at the time of her death; at the time of the execution of
the will, the testatrix was 79 years old, of sound and disposing mind, not acting
under duress, fraud or undue influence and was capacitated to dispose of her
estate by will. Respondent opposed her elder sister's petition on the following
grounds: the will was not executed and attested as required by law; its attestation
clause and acknowledgment did not comply with the requirements of the law; the
signature of the testatrix was procured by fraud and petitioner and her children
procured the will through undue and improper pressure and influence.
In an order dated November 9, 1994, the trial court appointed petitioner as special
administratrix of the decedent's estate. Respondent opposed petitioner's
appointment but subsequently withdrew her opposition. Petitioner took her oath as
temporary special administratrix and letters of special administration were issued to
her. On January 17, 2000, after petitioner presented her evidence, respondent filed
a demurrer thereto alleging that petitioner's evidence failed to establish that the
decedent's will complied with Articles 804 and 805 of the Civil Code. In a resolution
dated July 6, 2001, the trial court denied the probate of the will ruling that Article
806 of the Civil Code was not complied with because the will was "acknowledged"
by the testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrix's, residence at No. 40 Kanlaon
Street, Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a commissioned
notary public for and in Caloocan City. The dispositive portion of the resolution
read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds, and so declares that it
cannot admit the last will and testament of the late Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura
to probate for the reasons hereinabove discussed and also in accordance with
Article 839 [of the Civil Code] which provides that if the formalities required by law
have not been complied with, the will shall be disallowed. In view thereof, the Court
shall henceforth proceed with intestate succession in regard to the estate of the
deceased Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura in accordance with Article 960 of the [Civil
Code], to wit: "Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place: (1) If a person
dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its
validity, xxx."
SO ORDERED.[3]
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but the appellate court
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the resolution of the trial court. [4]
Thus, this petition.[5]Petitioner admits that the will was acknowledged by the
testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrix's residence in Quezon City before Atty.
Directo and that, at that time, Atty. Directo was a commissioned notary public for
and in Caloocan City. She, however, asserts that the fact that the notary public was
acting outside his territorial jurisdiction did not affect the validity of the notarial
will. Did the will "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses
before a notary public acting outside the place of his commission satisfy the
requirement under Article 806 of the Civil Code? It did not.
Article 806 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the
will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.
One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a notarial
will is that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses.[6] This formal requirement is one of the indispensable requisites for the
validity of a will.[7] In other words, a notarial will that is not acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and the instrumental witnesses is void and cannot be
accepted for probate.
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before
some competent officer and declaring it to be his act or deed. [8] In the case of a
notarial will, that competent officer is the notary public. The acknowledgment of a
notarial will coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare before
an officer of the law, the notary public, that they executed and subscribed to the
will as their own free act or deed.[9] Such declaration is under oath and under pain
of perjury, thus paving the way for the criminal prosecution of persons who
participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free
consent of the testator.[10] It also provides a further degree of assurance that the
testator is of a certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to the
persons instituted as heirs or designated as devisees or legatees in the will. [11]
Acknowledgment can only be made before a competent officer, that is, a lawyer
duly commissioned as a notary public.
In this connection, the relevant provisions of the Notarial Law provide:
SECTION 237. Form of commission for notary public. -The appointment of a notary
public shall be in writing, signed by the judge, and substantially in the following
form:
GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
PROVINCE OF ___________
This is to certify that ____________, of the municipality of ________ in said
province, was on the ___ day of __________, anno Domini nineteen hundred and
_______, appointed by me a notary public, within and for the said province, for the
term ending on the first day of January, anno Domini nineteen hundred and _____.
_________________
Judge of the Court of
irst Instance[12] of said
Province
SECTION 240. Territorial jurisdiction. - The jurisdiction of a notary public in a
province shall be co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public
in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess
authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. (emphases
supplied)
A notary public's commission is the grant of authority in his favor to perform
notarial acts.[13] It is issued "within and for" a particular territorial jurisdiction and
the notary public's authority is co-extensive with it. In other words, a notary public
is authorized to perform notarial acts, including the taking of acknowledgments,
within that territorial jurisdiction only. Outside the place of his commission, he is
bereft of power to perform any notarial act; he is not a notary public. Any notarial
act outside the limits of his jurisdiction has no force and effect. As this Court
categorically pronounced in Tecson v. Tecson:[14]
unless the law itself declares its continuing validity. Here, mandatory and
prohibitory statutes were transgressed in the execution of the alleged
"acknowledgment." The compulsory language of Article 806 of the Civil Code was
not complied with and the interdiction of Article 240 of the Notarial Law was
breached. Ineluctably, the acts of the testatrix, her witnesses and Atty. Directo were
all completely void.
The Court cannot turn a blind eye to Atty. Directo's participation in the preparation,
execution and unlawful "acknowledgment" of Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura's will.
Had he exercised his notarial commission properly, the intent of the law to
effectuate the decedent's final statements[15] as expressed in her will would not
have come to naught.[16] Hence, Atty. Directo should show cause why he should not
be administratively sanctioned as a member of the bar and as an officer of the
court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation on
the possible misconduct of Atty. Macario O. Directo.
SO ORDERED.

An acknowledgment taken outside the territorial limits of the officer's jurisdiction is

void as if the person taking it ware wholly without official character. (emphasis
supplied) Since Atty. Directo was not a commissioned notary public for and in
Quezon City, he lacked the authority to take the acknowledgment of the testatrix
and the instrumental witnesses. In the same vein, the testatrix and her witnesses
could not have validly acknowledged the will before him. Thus, Felisa Tamio de
Buenaventura's last will and testament was, in effect, not acknowledged as required
by law.

Moreover, Article 5 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall
be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.

The violation of a mandatory or a prohibitory statute renders the act illegal and void
A.C. No. 7036
JUDGE LILY LYDIA A. LAQUINDANUM, vs ATTY. NESTOR Q. QUINTANA
DECISION
 
PUNO, C.J.:
This administrative case against Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana (Atty. Quintana) stemmed
from a letter[1] addressed to the Court filed by Executive Judge Lily Lydia A.
Laquindanum (Judge Laquindanum) of the Regional Trial Court of Midsayap,
Cotabato requesting that proper disciplinary action be imposed on him for
performing notarial functions in Midsayap, Cotabato, which is beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of the commissioning court that issued his notarial commission, and for
allowing his wife to do notarial acts in his absence.
In her letter, Judge Laquindanum alleged that pursuant to A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC,
executive judges are required to closely monitor the activities of notaries public
within the territorial bounds of their jurisdiction and to see to it that notaries public
shall not extend notarial functions beyond the limits of their authority. Hence, she
wrote a letter[2] to Atty. Quintana directing him to stop notarizing documents within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato (which
is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court that issued his
notarial commission for Cotabato City and the Province of Maguindanao) since
certain documents[3] notarized by him had been reaching her office.
 
However, despite such directive, respondent continuously performed notarial
functions in Midsayap, Cotabato as evidenced by: (1) the Affidavit of Loss of ATM
Card[4] executed by Kristine C. Guro; and (2) the Affidavit of Loss of Drivers
License[5] executed by Elenita D. Ballentes.
 
Under Sec. 11, Rule III[6] of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Atty. Quintana could
not extend his notarial acts beyond Cotabato City and
the Province of Maguindanao because Midsayap, Cotabato is not part
of Cotabato City or the Province of Maguindanao. Midsayap is part of
the Province of Cotabato. The City within
the province of Cotabato is Kidapawan City, and not Cotabato City.
Judge Laquindanum also alleged that, upon further investigation of the matter, it
was discovered that it was Atty. Quintanas wife who performed notarial acts
whenever he was out of the office as attested to by the Joint Affidavit [7]executed by
Kristine C. Guro and Elenita D. Ballentes.
 
In a Resolution dated February 14, 2006,[8] we required Atty. Quintana to comment
on the letter of Judge Laquindanum.
In his Response,[9] Atty. Quintana alleged that he filed a petition for notarial
commission before Branch 18, Regional Trial Court, Midsayap, Cotabato. However,
the same was not acted upon by Judge Laquindanum for three weeks.He alleged
that the reason for Judge Laquindanums inaction was that she questioned his
affiliation with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Cotabato City Chapter, and
required him to be a member of IBP Kidapawan City Chapter and to obtain a
Certification of Payments from the latter chapter. Because of this, he opted to
withdraw his petition. After he withdrew his petition, he claimed that Judge
Laquindanum sent a clerk from her office to ask him to return his petition, but he
did not oblige because at that time he already had a Commission for Notary
Public[10] issued by Executive Judge Reno E. Concha of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, Cotabato City.
 
Atty. Quintana lamented that he was singled out by Judge Laquindanum, because
the latter immediately issued notarial commissions to other lawyers without asking
for so many requirements. However, when it came to him, Judge Laquindanum
even tracked down all his pleadings; communicated with his clients; and
disseminated information through letters, pronouncements, and directives to court
clerks and other lawyers to humiliate him and be ostracized by fellow lawyers.
 
Atty. Quintana argued that he subscribed documents in his office at Midsayap,
Cotabato; and Midsayap is part of the Province of Cotabato. He contended that he
did not violate any provision of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, because he was
equipped with a notarial commission. He maintained that he did not act outside
the province of Cotabato since Midsayap, Cotabato, where he practices his legal
profession and subscribes documents, is part of the provinceof Cotabato. He
claimed that as a lawyer of good moral standing, he could practice his legal
profession in the entire Philippines.
 
Atty. Quintana further argued that Judge Laquindanum had no authority to issue
such directive, because only Executive Judge Reno E. Concha, who issued his
notarial commission, and the Supreme Court could prohibit him from notarizing in
the Province of Cotabato.
 
In a Resolution dated March 21, 2006,[11] we referred this case to the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) for investigation, report and recommendation.
 
In the February 28, 2007 Hearing[12] before the OBC presided by Atty. Ma. Crisitina
B. Layusa (Hearing Officer), Judge Laquindanum presented a Deed of Donation,
[13]
 which was notarized by Atty. Quintana in 2004. [14]Honorata Rosil appears as one
of the signatories of the document as the donors wife. However, Honorata Rosil
died on March 12, 2003, as shown by the Certificate of Death [15] issued by the Civil
Registrar of Ibohon, Cotabato.
Judge Laquindanum testified that Atty. Quintana continued to notarize documents
in the years 2006 to 2007 despite the fact that his commission as notary public for
and in the Province of Maguindanao and Cotabato City had already expired on
December 31, 2005, and he had not renewed the same. [16] To support her claim,
Judge Laquindanum presented the following: (1) Affidavit of Loss [of]
Title[17] executed by Betty G. Granada with subscription dated April 8, 2006
at Cotabato City; (2) Certificate of Candidacy[18] of Mr. Elias Diosanta Arabis with
subscription dated July 18, 2006; (3) Affidavit of Loss [of] Drivers License [19] executed
by Anecito C. Bernabe with subscription dated February 20, 2007 at Midsayap,
Cotabato; and (4) Affidavit of Loss[20] executed by Santos V. Magbanua with
subscription dated February 22, 2007 at Midsayap, Cotabato.
 
For his part, Atty. Quintana admitted that all the signatures appearing in the
documents marked as exhibits of Judge Laquindanum were his except for the
following: (1) Affidavit of Loss of ATM Card[21] executed by Kristine C. Guro; and (2)
Affidavit of Loss of Drivers License[22] executed by Elenita D. Ballentes; and (3)
Affidavit of Loss[23] executed by Santos V. Magbanua. He explained that those
documents were signed by his wife and were the result of an entrapment operation
of Judge Laquindanum: to let somebody bring and have them notarized by his wife,
when they knew that his wife is not a lawyer. He also denied the he authorized his
wife to notarize documents. According to him, he slapped his wife and told her to
stop doing it as it would ruin his profession.
Atty. Quintana also claimed that Judge Laquindanum did not act on his petition,
because he did not comply with her requirements for him to transfer his
membership to the Kidapawan Chapter, wherein her sister, Atty. Aglepa, is the IBP
President.
 
On the one hand, Judge Laquindanum explained that she was only performing her
responsibility and had nothing against Atty. Quintana. The reason why she did not
act on his petition was that he had not paid his IBP dues, [24]which is a requirement
before a notarial commission may be granted. She told his wife to secure a
certification of payment from the IBP, but she did not return.
 
This was denied by Atty. Quintana, who claimed that he enclosed in his Response
the certification of good standing and payments of his IBP dues. However, when the
same was examined, there were no documents attached thereto.Due to oversight,
Atty. Quintana prayed that he be given time to send them later which was granted
by the Hearing Officer.
 
Finally, Atty. Quintana asked for forgiveness for what he had done and promised
not to repeat the same. He also asked that he be given another chance and not be
divested of his privilege to notarize, as it was the only bread and butter of his
family.
 
On March 5, 2007, Atty. Quintana submitted to the OBC the documents [25] issued by
the IBP Cotabato City Chapter to prove that he had paid his IBP dues.
 
In a Manifestation[26] dated March 9, 2007, Judge Laquindanum 
submitted a Certification[27] and its entries show that Atty. Quintana paid his IBP
dues for the year 2005 only on January 9, 2006 per Official Receipt (O.R.) No.
610381. Likewise, the arrears of his IBP dues for the years 1993, 1995, 1996, and
1998 to 2003 were also paid only on January 9, 2006 per O.R. No. 610387. Hence,
when he filed his petition for notarial commission in 2004, he had not yet
completely paid his IBP dues.
 
In its Report and Recommendation,[28] the OBC recommended that Atty. Quintana
be disqualified from being appointed as a notary public for two (2) years; and that if
his notarial commission still exists, the same should be revoked for two (2)
years. The OBC found the defenses and arguments raised by Atty. Quintana to be
without merit, viz:
 
Apparently, respondent has extended his notarial acts in Midsayap and Kabacan,
Cotabato, which is already outside his territorial jurisdiction to perform as Notary
Public.
Section 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides, thus:
 
Jurisdiction and Term A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial
acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a
period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in which the
commissioning court is made, unless earlier revoked [or] the notary public has
resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.
 
Under the rule[,] respondent may perform his notarial acts within the territorial
jurisdiction of the commissioning Executive Judge Concha, which is in Cotabato City
and the [P]rovince of Maguindanao only. But definitely he cannot extend his
commission as notary public in Midsayap or Kabacan and in any place of
the province of Cotabato as he is not commissioned thereat to do such
act. Midsayap and Kabacan are not part of either Cotabato City or [P]rovince of
Maguindanao but part of the province of North Cotabato. Thus, the claim of
respondent that he can exercise his notarial commission in Midsayap, Cotabato
because Cotabato City is part of the province of Cotabato is absolutely devoid of
merit.
 
xxxx
 
Further, evidence on record also shows that there are several documents which the
respondents wife has herself notarized. Respondent justifies that he cannot be
blamed for the act of his wife as he did not authorize the latter to notarize
documents in his absence. According to him[,] he even scolded and told his wife not
to do it anymore as it would affect his profession.
 
In the case of Lingan v. Calubaquib et al., Adm. Case No. 5377, June 15, 2006 the
Court held, thus:
 
A notary public is personally accountable for all entries in his notarial register; He
cannot relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck to their (sic)
secretaries
 
A person who is commissioned as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the
entries in his notarial register. Respondent cannot take refuge claiming that it was
his wifes act and that he did not authorize his wife to notarize documents. He is
personally accountable for the activities in his office as well as the acts of his
personnel including his wife, who acts as his secretary.
 
Likewise, evidence reveals that respondent notarized in 2004 a Deed of
Donation (Rollo, p. 79) wherein, (sic) Honorata Rosel (Honorata Rosil) one of the
affiants therein, was already dead at the time of notarization as shown in a
Certificate of Death (Rollo, p.80)  issued by the Civil Registrar General of Libungan,
Cotabato.
 
Sec. 2, (b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides, thus[:]
 
A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document (1) is not in the notarys presence personally at the time of
the notarization; and (2) is not personally known to the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
 
Clearly, in notarizing a Deed of Donation without even determining the presence or
qualifications of affiants therein, respondent only shows his gross negligence and
ignorance of the provisions of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
 
xxxx
 
Furthermore, respondent claims that he, being a lawyer in good standing, has the
right to practice his profession including notarial acts in the entire Philippines. This
statement is barren of merit.
 
While it is true that lawyers in good standing are allowed to engage in the practice
of law in the Philippines.(sic) However, not every lawyer even in good standing can
perform notarial functions without having been commissioned as notary public as
specifically provided for under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. He must have
submitted himself to the commissioning court by filing his petition for issuance of
his notarial (sic) Notarial Practice. The commissioning court may or may not grant
the said petition if in his sound discretion the petitioner does not meet the required
qualifications for [a] Notary Public. Since respondent herein did not submit himself
to the procedural rules for the issuance of the notarial commission, he has no
reason at all to claim that he can perform notarial act[s] in the entire country for
lack of authority to do so.
 
Likewise, contrary to the belief of respondent, complainant being the
commissioning court in Midsayap, Cotabato has the authority under Rule XI of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice to monitor the duties and responsibilities including
liabilities, if any, of a notary public commissioned or those performing notarial acts
without authority in her territorial jurisdiction. [29]
 
xxxx
 
We adopt the findings of the OBC. However, we find the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for six (6) months and revocation and suspension of Atty.
Quintana's notarial commission for two (2) years more appropriate considering the
gravity and number of his offenses.
 
After a careful review of the records and evidence, there is no doubt that Atty.
Quintana violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he committed the following acts: (1) he notarized documents
outside the area of his commission as a notary public; (2) he performed notarial
acts with an expired commission; (3) he let his wife notarize documents in his
absence; and (4) he notarized a document where one of the signatories therein was
already dead at that time.
 
The act of notarizing documents outside ones area of commission is not to be taken
lightly. Aside from being a violation of Sec. 11 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, it also partakes of malpractice of law and falsification. [30]Notarizing
documents with an expired commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey
the laws, more specifically, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Since the public is
deceived into believing that he has been duly commissioned, it also amounts to
indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer's oath proscribes. [31] Notarizing
documents without the presence of the signatory to the document is a violation of
Sec. 2(b)(1), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, [32] Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, and the lawyers oath which unconditionally requires
lawyers not to do or declare any falsehood. Finally, Atty. Quintana is personally
accountable for the documents that he admitted were signed by his wife. He cannot
relieve himself of liability by passing the blame to his wife. He is, thus, guilty of
violating Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers
not to directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
 
All told, Atty. Quintana fell miserably short of his obligation under Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all
times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
That Atty. Quintana relies on his notarial commission as the sole source of income
for his family will not serve to lessen the penalty that should be imposed on him. On
the contrary, we feel that he should be reminded that a notarial commission should
not be treated as a money-making venture. It is a privilege granted only to those
who are qualified to perform duties imbued with public interest. As we have
declared on several occasions, notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest
necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented
from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general.
It must be underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document, making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of the authenticity thereof.[33]
 
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the notarial commission of Atty. Nestor Q. Quintana, if still
existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as
notary public for a period of two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for six (6) months effective immediately, with a WARNING that the repetition
of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely. He is DIRECTED to report
the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable this Court to determine when his
suspension shall take effect.
 
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as a
member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
A.M. No. 09-6-1-SC, January 21, 2015
RE: VIOLATION OF RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This case stemmed from three (3) letter-complaints for Violation of Rules on
Notarial Practice endorsed to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for appropriate
action. The first letter-complaint,1 dated March 2, 2009, was filed by the
commissioned notaries public within and for the jurisdiction of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, namely, Atty. Butch Cardinal Torio, Atty. Nepthalie Pasiliao, Atty.
Dominique Evangelista, and Atty. Elizabeth C. Tugade (complainants) before the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Lingayen, Pangasinan (RTC-Lingayen)
against Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. (Atty. Siapno) for notarizing documents without a
commission.
In their letter, complainants alleged that Atty. Siapno was maintaining a notarial
office along Alvear Street East, Lingayen, Pangasinan, and was performing notarial
acts and practices in Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City without the requisite
notarial commission. They asserted that Atty. Siapno was never commissioned as
Notary Public for and within the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan
City. Instead, he applied and was commissioned to perform notarial functions by
Executive Judge Anthony Sison of the RTC, San Carlos City, Pangasinan from March
22, 2007 to December 31, 2008. His notarial commission, however, was never
renewed upon expiration. Complainants presented evidence supporting their
allegations such as the pictures of Atty. Siapno’s law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan;
and documents to prove that Atty. Siapno performed acts of notarization in
Lingayen, Natividad and Dagupan City, to wit: (1) Addendum to Loan and Mortgage
Agreement2 showing that the Promissory Note was notarized before Atty. Siapno in
Lingayen, Pangasinan in 2007; (2) Deed of Absolute Sale, 3 dated January 24, 2008,
notarized in Natividad, Pangasinan; (3) Joint Affidavit of Two Disinterested Persons
Re: Given Name and Date of Birth,4 dated January 6, 2009, notarized in Dagupan
City; and (4) Acknowledgement of Debt, 5dated January 24, 2008, notarized in
Dagupan City.
Complainants also averred that Atty. Siapno had delegated his notarial authority to
his secretaries, Mina Bautista (Bautista) and Mary Ann Arenas (Arenas), who wrote
legal instruments and signed the documents on his behalf.
On March 17, 2009, the RTC-Lingayen forwarded the said letter-complaint to the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)6 which, in turn, indorsed the same to the
OBC.
The second letter-complaint7 was filed by Audy B. Espelita (Espelita) against Atty.
Pedro L. Santos (Atty. Santos). It alleged that in 2008, Espelita lost his driver’s
license and he executed an affidavit of loss which was notarized by Atty. Santos. The
said affidavit, however, was denied for authentication when presented before the
Notarial Section in Manila because Atty. Santos was not commissioned to perform
notarial commission within the City of Manila.
The third letter-complaint8 came from a concerned citizen reporting that a certain
Atty. Evelyn who was holding office at Room 402 Leyba Bldg., 381 Dasmariñas
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, had been notarizing and signing documents for and on
behalf of several lawyers.
In its Resolution,9 dated June 9, 2009, the Court directed the Executive Judge of the
RTC-Lingayen to conduct a formal investigation on the complaint against Atty.
Siapno and Executive Judge Reynaldo G. Ros (Judge Ros) of the RTC-Manila to
conduct a formal investigation on the alleged violation of the Notarial Law by Atty.
Santos, and the illegal activities of a certain Atty. Evelyn, and thereafter, to submit a
report and recommendation thereon.
Re: Complaint against Atty. Siapno
With regard to the complaint against Atty. Siapno, the Executive Judge conducted a
hearing wherein the complainants affirmed the allegations in their letter-complaint.
For his part, Atty. Siapno denied the accusations and averred that the law office in
Lingayen, Pangasinan, was not his and that Bautista and Arenas were not his
secretaries.10
In her Report and Recommendation,11 the Executive Judge found that Atty. Siapno
was issued a notarial commission within the jurisdiction of Lingayen, Pangasinan,
from January 20, 2003 to December 31, 2004 and February 8, 2005 to December 3,
2006. His commission, however, was cancelled on June 8, 2006 and he was not
issued another commission thereafter. The Executive Judge found Atty. Siapno to
have violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Commission when he performed notarial
functions without commission and recommended that he be fined in the amount of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
The Court agrees with the findings of the Executive Judge but not to the
recommended penalty.
A review of the records and evidence presented by complainants shows that Atty.
Siapno indeed maintained a law office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, just beside the law
office of one of the complainants, Atty. Elizabeth Tugade. It was also proven that
Atty. Siapno notarized several instruments with an expired notarial commission
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court. Section 11, Rule III of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may perform
notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning
court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year
in which the commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary public has
resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.
Under the rule, only persons who are commissioned as notary public may perform
notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the court which granted the
commission. Clearly, Atty. Siapno could not perform notarial functions in Lingayen,
Natividad and Dagupan City of the Province of Pangasinan since he was not
commissioned in the said places to perform such act.
Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless and routine act. It is invested with substantive public interest that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. 12 It must be
emphasized that the act of notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.
By performing notarial acts without the necessary commission from the court, Atty.
Siapno violated not only his oath to obey the laws particularly the Rules on Notarial
Practice but also Canons 1 and 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
proscribes all lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct and directs them to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
at all times.13
In a plethora of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers to disciplinary action for
notarizing documents outside their territorial jurisdiction or with an expired
commission. In the case of Nunga v. Viray,14 a lawyer was suspended by the Court
for three (3) years for notarizing an instrument without a commission. In Zoreta v.
Simpliciano,15 the respondent was likewise suspended from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years and was permanently barred from being commissioned as a
notary public for notarizing several documents after the expiration of his
commission. In the more recent case of Laquindanum v. Quintana,16 the Court
suspended a lawyer for six (6) months and was disqualified from being
commissioned as notary public for a period of two (2) years because he notarized
documents outside the area of his commission, and with an expired commission.
In a letter,17 dated July 29, 2013, Judge Ros informed the Court that he could not
have complied with the June 9, 2009 and August 4, 2009 orders of the Court
because he was no longer the Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila at that time. To
date, no formal investigation has been conducted on the alleged violation of Atty.
Santos and the reported illegal activities of a certain Atty. Evelyn.
With respect to the complaints against Atty. Santos and a certain Atty. Evelyn, the
Clerk of Court is ordered to RE-DOCKET the same as separate administrative cases.
The incumbent Executive Judge of the RTC-Manila, whether permanent or in acting
capacity, is ordered to conduct a formal investigation on the matter and to submit
his Report and Recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of copy of this
decision.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juan C. Siapno, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for two (2) years and BARRED PERMANENTLY from being
commissioned as Notary Public, effective upon his receipt of a copy of this decision.
Let copies of this decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Office
of the Court Administrator, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the
Bar Confidant, and be recorded in the personal files of the respondent.
With respect to the complaints against Atty. Pedro L. Santos and a certain Atty.
Evelyn, the Clerk of Court is ordered to RE-DOCKET them as separate administrative
cases. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered to conduct
a formal investigation on the matter and to submit his Report and Recommendation
within sixty (60) days from receipt of a copy of this decision.
SO ORDERED.

Considering that Atty. Siapno has been proven to have performed notarial work in
Ligayen, Natividad and Dagupan City in the province of Pangasinan without the
requisite commission, the Court finds the recommended penalty insufficient.
Instead, Atty. Siapno must be barred from being commissioned as notary public
permanently and suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.

Re: Complaints against Atty. Santos and Atty. Evelyn