#WalangE1nan

Disclaimer: We tried our best, but we're still humans. Good luck to all of us :)
Provision-Notes Jurisprudence-Doctrine
Preamble
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and
humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the
common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the
blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice,
freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

NOTES:
- Not a source of rights
- Sets down the origins and purpose of the Constitution
- Aid in ascertaining ambiguous provisions
- "We": Not just the work of the framers, but of the people ratifying it through a plebiscite
Article 1
Article 1: National The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced - Magallona v Ermita [UNCLOS]: Petitioners assail that RA 9522, which adjusts the country's archipelagic baseline and
Territory therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting classifty baseline regime of Scarborough Shoal and KIG contravenes provision on national territory. Court maintains that
of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory, but only regulates sea-use rights over maritime zones and
insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of continental shelves. RA 9522 is there to help strengthen our claim in case a dispute arise with other nations.
the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the - South China Sea Dispute [HTE/LTE]: Philippines went to Arbitration Court to settle dispute regarding South China Sea
Philippines. and other seas. Court ruled that UNCLOS extinguished historical rights. The low-tide elevations of the SCS do not have
maritime entitlements and the high-tide elevations generate 12 nautical mile territorial sea. Islands whose natural condition
NOTES: can sustain stable community or economic activity may generate own EEZ/CS, while rocks which cannot sustain habitation
- Constitution is a municipal law, only binds nation promulgating it unless it is proved through have no EEZ/CS. Court enumerated the seas that are categorized under each
materials binding internationally like Treaty of Paris and Washington. Notes: Low tide elevations: Subi Reef, Hughes Reef, Mischief Reef, and Second Thomas Shoal ; High Tide elevations:
- Archipelago: unit of water studded with islands Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Ree, McKennan Reef ; Rocks: All high-tide
- Archipelagic principle: Straight baseline + "waters around, between and connecting the islands..." features in the Spratleys Islands
- Straight baseline: determine the internal waters
- Internal waters – all parts, landwards, extend of the land domain, not subject to the right of
innocent passage, absolute sovereignty
- Innocent passage: not pejudicial to the rights of the country, fishing is not innocent passage
- Maritime zones:
1. Territorial sea – 12 naut. miles form the baseline; the coastal state exercises exclusive sovereignty
2. Contiguous zone – 24 naut. mile from the baseline; the coastal state exercises jurisdiction is to
enforce customs, immigration and sanitation law
3. Exclusive economic zone – 200 naut. miles from the baseline; the coastal state has the right to
exploit the living and non-living resources
4. Continental Shelf: 200 n.m to 350nm. This is the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas
adjacent to the coastal state but outside the territorial sea. The coastal state has the right to explore and
exploit the natural resources in this area.

- Extent of sovereignty of the coastal state is only until the territorial sea
- The maritime zones are just maritime entitlements; it does not extend the jurisdiction or the territory
of the sovereign state
- After territorial sea is the high seas

Article 2

Article 2: Declaration of NOTES:
Principles and State Principles: binding rules in conduct of government (Sections 1-6)
Policies Policies: guidelines for the orientation of the state (Sections 7-28)
Purpose: shed light on meaning of other provisions and guide for departments
General rule: provisions of the constitution are self executing or else empower Congress
Exceptions: Article 2 provisions, section 2, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18, 19, 20, 23, 26, 27, 28 and Article 13
(social and economic rights)
Exceptions to exceptions: 15 (Health) and 16 (ecology)
Section 1 The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.
NOTES:
State: community of persons more or less numerous permanently occupying a definite portion
territory independent of external control, and possessing an organized government to which the great
body of inhabitants render habitual obedience.
Elements of a State:
A. People: Community of persons sufficient in number, capable of maintaining continued existence,
and held together by a common bond of law (2 people cannot be a state)
B. Territory: Consists of land and waters and air space and submarine areas. You do not cease to
become a state if your boundaries have not yet been finally settled, your boundaries are still disputed,
some of its territories is claimed by another state, all its territory has been occupied by a foreign
power, or lost control of its territory temporarily. (ie. Makati and Taguig)
C. Government: Institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and
carries out rules of action (US v Dorr)
- Government: Institution through which state exercises power
- Administration: Consists of set of people currently running the institution
- Presidential: there is a separation of powers -- legislative, executive and judicial.
- Republican: all government authority emanates from the people and exercised by representative
chosen by the people.
D. Sovereignty: capacity to conduct international relations
- doctrine - acts of de facto government which are not act of a political complexion are still good and
valid after liberation (Co Kim Cham)
- principle of sovereignty as auto-limitation – because the state is a sovereign entity, it cant consent to
a limitation of its own rights (People v Gozo)
#WalangE1nan
NOT SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS:
- Kilosbayan v Morato: Petitioners assail validity of initial Contract of Lease and subsequent ELA entered by PCSO and
PGMC on ground that PCSO violated its charter that prohibited it from entering a joint venture in sweepstakes etc. They
invoke Article 2 in assailing constitutionality. Court says that these are not self-executing provisions, which do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights.
- Tondo Medical v CA: DOH launched HSRA, a reform agenda to provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals through
socialized user fees and corporate restructuring of gov't hospitals. Petitioners contend that it contravenes Article 2 Sec 5, 9,
10, 11, 13, 15, 18. The SC dismissed the petition since the abovementioned provisions do not contain judicially enforceable
rights
- BCDA v COA: BCDA Board of Directors gave themselves and consultants year-end benefits and other bonuses, which are
supposedly not allowed. They contend that what they did is consistent with Sections 5 and 18 of Article II. Court said Article
II is not a source of enforceable rights and Section 5, 18 are non self-executing as ruled in Tondo Medical v CA.
- Espina v Zamora, Jr: The Retail Trade Liberalization Act now allows foreign nationals from engaging in retail trade
business in the country. Petitioners assail its constitutionality since it violates Article 2 Section 9, 19 (emphasis here), and 20.
Court ruled that Sections 9, 19, and 20 are not self-executing by nature thus not judicially demandable.
- Ocampo v Rear Admiral Enriquez: AFP Rear Admiral Enriquez issued directive to Army Commanding General acting on
President Duterte's verbal order regarding the interment of Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Ocampo, et al. invoked
Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II. Court said Tañada v. Angara already ruled that the provisions in Article II
of the Constitution are not self- executing.
GOVERNMENT
A. Functions
- Bacani v NACOCO [incorporated]: NACOCO requested transcript from stenographers and paid necessary fees. Contention
is that NACOCO is exempt from paying fees since it is a government entity. Court ruled NACOCO is NOT a government
entity. Although it was organized with a function the government chose to exercise to promote the coconut industry; it was
given a corporate power separate and distinct from government, and is subject to Corporation Law. Court defined a
government entity using definition in US v Dorr and classified the functions of the government into constituent (compulsory
functions which constitute the very bonds of society like peace and order from violence and robbery etc.) and ministrant
(Optional functions of the government like for public welfare that private wont usually do or that the government can do
better than private).
- ACCFA v CUGCO [unincorporated]: ACCFA became ACA while Union was trying to protest that it should be retained as
its Exlusive Bargaining Unit. Court held that CIR has no jurisdiction because ACA is performing ministrant government
functions, function that is beyond capability of private entities. Since ACA is a government entity, EBU cannot be granted to
Union since they cannot hold strike against ACA. The distinction in government function laid down in Bacani has become
obsolete due to growing complexities of modern society.
 #WalangE1nan

NOTES: - PVTA v CIR, Republic v Judge of CFI Rizal [unincorporated]: Private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their
Rules on suits against government agencies: alleged overtime services and the petitioner’s failure to pay for said compensation. PVTA said CIR has no jurisdiction
1. Incorporated: because it exercises governmental, not propriety functions. Court answered in affirmative and since it is a government agency,
- Has its own charter it can invoke doctrine in ACCFA.
- VFP v Reyes [sovereign function]: The law creating VFP put it under the supervision of DND, thus latter issued circular
- If its charter provides that it has the right to sue and be sued, it is an express consent and it is suable.
(SSS v CA) that it will conduct management audit on VFP. VFP contends that it is a private entity. Court ruled that if the nature of
- If its charter is silent, inquire into its function based on the purpose for which it was created. operation is either to promote social justice or stimulate patriotic sentiments and love for country, then these are sovereign
- Propriety: If the purpose is to obtain special corporate benefits of earn pecuniary profits, SUABLE functions although not apparent. Therefore, government exercises its sovereign functions through VFP.
- Governmental: if its is in the interest or advancement of public welfare, NOT SUABLE - Ramiscal v Sandiganbayan [GOCC]: Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted a joint inquiry into the alleged anomalies
2. Unincorporated: in the AFP-Philippine Retirement Benefits Systems (AFP-RSBS). It was found that the buying prices stated in the unilateral
- Performs government functions: not suable without state consent even if it perform propriety deeds did not match those stated in the bilateral deeds (corruption in funds). Petitioners contend SB has no jurisdiction
functions incidentally. because AFP-RSBS is not a GOCC. Court ruled that the AFP-RSBS is a GOCC, and that its funds are in the nature of public
- Propriety functions: SUABLE funds.Therefore, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case.
- Javier v Sandiganbayan [public office]: Petitioner was appointed as private sector representative to the National Book
- GOCC: Any agency organized as a stock or non‐stock corporation vested with functions relating to Development Board. She was given travel expense for a trip related to her functions in NBDB, which she refuses to give back
public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the government directly or when she failed to attend said trip. Petitioner contends SB has no jurisdiction since she is not a public officer. Court ruled that
indirectly through its instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable (stock corp at least 51% of "A public office is the right, authority, and duty, created and conferred by law, for a given period, either fixed or enduring at
stock) the pleasure of creating power, an individual invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
- Public corporation: one created by the State either by general or special act for purposes of exercised by him for the benefit of the public, then that person is a public officer." Thus, NBDB is a public office, and
administration of local government or rendering service in the public interest. Test to determine if it's petitioner is a public officer.
a public corporation is by looking at its relationship with the State; if it created by State to help carry - MIAA v CA [instrumentality]: City of Parañaque asks MIAA to pay due taxes since Local Government Code withdrew the
out its governmental functions, it is public. tax exemption for GOCCs. Court ruled that MIAA is not a GOCC, but rather a government instrumentality vested with
- Government Instrumentality: Exercises governmental functions but not full corporate powers. Administrative code provides that GOCC should either be a stock or non-stock corporation. A stock
- Sui generis: unique, a class by itself corporation has capital stock divided into shares, while non-stock has members but do not distribute its income as divident to
its members. Thus, MIAA is still exempted. As an instrumentality, it operates autonomously but still part of the National
Government machinery although not integrated with the department framework.
- BSP v COA [public corporation]: COA issued resolution that it will conduct an annual financial audit of BSP. BSP contend
that it is not a purely public nor purely private corporation. Court ruled that BSP was created by a special law to serve public
purpose, then it comes within the class of “public corporation”. It is treated by law as agency or instrumentality of the
government not subject to the tests of ownership or control and economic viability but to different criteria relating to their
public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives. Also, legislature was banned to create private entitiess
through special law at the time
- Funa v MECCO and COA [sui generis entity/GOCC]: MECO was created to foster unofficial relationship with Taiwan and
perform consular functions despite the agreement of PH with the PROC. Petitioner files mandamus to compel COA to audit
MECO since it is a GOCC. Court ruled that to be a GOCC, it must be/have: 1) either a stock or non-stock corporation, 2)
public character of its function, 3) government ownership over organization, but none is applicable to MECO. MECO is
uniquely situated, from its over-reaching corporate objectives while maintaining legal status as non-government entity, thus it
is sui generis.
- Phil. Society v COA [quasi-public]: Phil. Society was created by a special legislation because there was no corporation code
yet. It was initially imbued with power to apprehend violators and receive 1/2 of the fines imposed, but this was recalled by
EO 63. COA was supposed to conduct an audit but petitioner claims it is a private corporation. Court ruled charter test cannot
apply because at the time it was created, no law prohibits Congress to create private entities. A corporation may be private
although its charter contains provisions of a public character. These are quasi-public corporations, meaning private
corporations that render public service or wants.
- Serana v Sandiganbayan: Serana was a student regent charged with estafa before the SB for funds allegedly sourced from
Office of the President for a project which didn't push through. She contends that SB has no jurisdiction because she is not a
public officer with Salary Grade 27 above. Court ruled that since UP performs a legitimate governmental function, and she is
considered like a part of the Board of Trustees and she's vested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government,
then she is a public officer. SB has jurisdiction since she is under the second part of the enumerated officers which
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over.

NOTES:
- De jure: established by the authority of the legitimate sovereign (Cory and GMA's since established
by the authority of the people)
- De facto: Established in defiance of the legitimate sovereign
- Kinds of de facto government:
1. De facto proper: That Government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by
voice of majority, rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter
2. De facto fovernment of paramount force: That which is established and maintained by the military
forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war
3. Independent government: That which is established as an independent government by inhabitants of
a country who rise in insurrection against a parent state
- Recognition of de facto government:
1. Domestic recognition: classification is not important until the government is ousted
2. International recognition: Depends on the recognition the government receives from the community
of nations
- You can only determine whether government is de jure or de facto after the ouster.
#WalangE1nan
B. De Jure and De Facto:
- Co Kim Cham [Government; de facto]: The SC held proceedings during the Japanese period still apply or continue after the
occupation because the governments established in the Philippines under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission
and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments (de facto gov.
of the second kind or a government of paramount force). The judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those
governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of
postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the
Philippines. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and
judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid.
- Letter of AJ Puno [revolution]: The present CA is a new court and distinct and different from the CA or the IAC prior to E.
O. No. 33. created after the massive reorganization of the revolutionary government of 1986. The People Power is a complete
overthrow of the established government of the country or state by those who were previously subject to it. It is to be noted
that the issuance of the E.O. No. 33 was during the time of revolutionary government of Aquino. She was exercising then the
powers of the executive and legislative hence she could modify, repeal, or amend the E.O. 33 and the appointments to the
Court of Appeals. A revolution is defined as the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by
those who were previously subject to it.
- Republic v Sandiganbayan [rights not operative during interrgnum]: During the interregnum, after the actual take-over of
power by the revolutionary government (on February 25, 1986) up to March 24, 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the
Provisional Constitution), the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no
constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the
successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government.
Thus, during this interregnum, a person could not invoke an exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was
neither a Constitution nor a Bill of Rights. Nevertheless, the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the ICCPR (“no one
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.”) and the UDHR
(“no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”), almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the State’s good
faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.
SOVEREIGNTY:
- People v Gozo [auto-limitation]: Petitioner still needs to secure a building permit to work on her house located inside a US
Naval territory. The Philippines merely consents that the US government could exercise its jurisdictions in certain places. The
Philippine Government does not abdicate its sovereignty over the bases or divest itself completely over offenses committed
therein. US has preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. President Reagan also reiterated this when he said
that the independence of Philippines and its sovereignty is absolute in its entire domain. It necessarily has to be exclusive
since if it were not, it will be a derogation of its sovereignty. The principle of auto-limitation says that through the consent of
the state, expressed or implied, it can restrict sovereign rights. There could be a diminution of jurisdictional rights but not a
disappearance. The state may also invite others in the exercise of its sovereignty but the place is still considered native soil.
So the bases mentioned are not and cannot be foreign territory.

Section 2 The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land [doctrine of incorporation] and adheres to - Kuroda v Jalandoni [International humanitarian law and GAPIL]: Kuroda questioned the validity of charges against for
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
NOTES:
- Only renounces aggressive war
- PH has dualist view – international law and municipal law are two different spheres
1. International law must be transformed into local law (Doctrine of Transformation) through
laws enacted by Congress or treaties concurred by it.
2. Doctrine of Incorporation – by mere constitutional declaration, international law already has
the force of/is incorporated into municipal law, but only if it is a customary law or treaties that have of US and thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in
become part of customary law
- Not all agreements are subject to ratification or concurrence by the senate—only when it involves
the definition or adoption of a policy is the senate concurrence required (Saguisag v Exec. Secretary) Executive Secretary to espouse the claims of Filipino Comfort women for an official apology, legal compensation, and other
- Generally accepted principles of internation law: norms of general or customary international law
that are binding on all states (ie. pacta sunt servanda- keep your promises)
#WalangE1nan
A. International Law & Doctrine of Incorporation:
acts committed in violation of The Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention which the PH is not a signatory to. The
Court ruled that the Rules and Regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly based on the
generally accepted principles of international law. In fact, these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent
nations, the United States and Japan, who were signatories to the two Conventions. Such rule and principles therefore form
part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our
Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and
principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Furthermore, when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed, the Philippines was under the sovereignty
the treaties between the belligerent countries.
- Vinuya v Romulo [Treaty of Peace]: Petitioners also pray that the court order the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
forms of reparation from Japan. Officials of the Executive Department declined to assist petitioner’s claims saying it had
already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan. The Court held
that they cannot compel the executive department to do so as the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the
conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines. WON to espouse petitioners’ claim against the Japan is left to the exclusive
determination and judgment of the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the
conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive Department, either by
writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner. In this case, the Executive
Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations
against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.
- Tañada v Angara [GATT-WTO]:The WTO DOES NOT intrude, limit and/or impair the constitutional powers of both
Congress and the SC and nor impair the PH sovereignty when congress would be burdened by its conformity with the WTO
agreement in enacting legislation. While our Consti mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services and labor at the same
time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on bases of equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. While sovereignty has
traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and
limitations voluntarily agreed to by the PH, expressly or impliedly as a member of the family of nations. By the doctrine of
incorporation, PH is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which by their inherent nature, they limit or
restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of
sovereignty. The underlying consideration in this partial sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting
states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens. The sovereignty of a state
therefore cannot in fact and in reality, be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations
imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations.
- Bayan v Zamora [VFA]: Since the VFA is a treaty concerning the military, both articles should apply. The Court is of the
firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the
agreement as a treaty. It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because
executive agreements in international law are binding as a treaty. The names given in a treaty are inconsequential as well. The
name of the treaty whether it is a protocol, agreement, pact, cordat, convention, declaration, etc. are of no prejudice to the
meanings given to them by the internal law of the State.

TERMS:
Treaty: International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those
involving agreements of a permanent character;
- Formal documents which require ratification with the approval of 2/3 of the Senate
- Considered superior to executive agreements and is regarded as being on the same level as a statute
as they are products of the acts of the Executive and the Senate
- If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty takes precedence over one that is prior
Executive Agreement: International agreements embodying adjustments of detail, carrying out well
established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less
temporary nature
- Become binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress
- Must remain traceable to an express or implied authorization under the Constitution, statutes, or
treaties
- Cannot create new international obligations that are not expressly allowed or reasonably implied in
the law they purport to implement. Once inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered
ineffective
Ratification: an executive act undertaken by the head of state or the government through which
formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. The State may provide other means as when the State
may provide in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty.
Soft law: an expression of non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior
(ex. UN Declaration of Human Rights, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a
specialized agency on intellectual property, International Labor Organization and the Food and
Agriculture Organization). It does not fall under the categories of international law set forth in Article
38, Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice.
Customary international law: or international custom is a source of international law as stated in the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, defined as the general and consistent practice of states
recognized and followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.
#WalangE1nan
- Saguisag v Exec. Secretary [EDCA]: EDCA is in the form of an executive agreement and may be bound through the
President without the need of senatorial votes for its execution. EDCA merely involves “adjustments in detail” in the
implementation of the MDT and the VFA. These are existing treaties between the Philippines and the U.S. that have already
been concurred in by the Philippine Senate and have thereby met the requirements of the Constitution under Art 18, Sec
25. because of the status of these prior agreements, EDCA need not be transmitted to the Senate. The right of the Executive to
enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage.
- Bayan v Romulo [RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement]: The RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement prohibits the surrender by
either party of individuals to international tribunals or entities, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to
prosecute the crime under its existing laws. Such waiver does not amount to an unconstitutional diminution or deprivation of
jurisdiction of Philippine courts. On the rationale that the Philippines has adopted the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution.
Furthermore, which has not been submitted to the Senate for concurrence, was contracted validly VIA EXCHANGE OF
NOTES. An exchange of notes falls into the category of inter-governmental agreements which is an internationally accepted
form of international agreement.
Rome Statute – This establishes the International Criminal Court with the power to exercise jurisdiction over persons for the
most serious crimes of international concern and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdiction. Under the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:
1) State Party – is legally obliged to follow all the provisions of a treaty in good faith
2) Signatory State – is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.
As of writing the ponencia, the Philippines is only a signatory state to the Rome Statute and not a State Party for lack of
ratification by the Senate. Any argument obliging the Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty would be premature.
- Deutsche Bank v CIR; CBK POWER v. CIR [tax treaty]:The BIR must not impose additional requirements that would
negate the availment of the reliefs provided for under international agreements. The SC held that the failure to strictly comply
with RMO 1-2000 (a mere procedural requirement) will not deprive the taxpayer of the benefits (preferential tax rate of 10%
BPRT instead of the regular 15% BPRT) provided under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty for as long as it possesses all the
requirements stated therein. According to the SC, the time-honored international principle of pacta sunt servanda demands the
performance in good faith of treaty obligations on the part of the states that enter into the agreement. Bearing in mind the
rationale of tax treaties, the period of application for the availment of tax treaty relief as required by RMO 1-2000 should not
operate to divest entitlement to the relief as it would constitute a violation of the duty required by good faith in complying
with a tax treaty-- as it would NOT be in harmony with the objectives of the contracting state to ensure that the benefits
granted under tax treaties are enjoyed by duly entitled persons or corporations.
B. International Law and Municipal Law
- Lim v Exec Secretary [Balikatan Exercise]: The Balikatan, as an executive agreement, was covered by the VFA which
allows regulatory mechanism allowing the US to visit when approved by the Philippine government. Furthermore, the VFA
permits United States personnel to engage in "activities," the exact meaning of which was left undefined, permitting a wide
scope of undertakings. (see doctrines discussed)
- Shangri-La v Developers: The Paris Convention mandates that protection should be afforded to internationally known
marks as signatory to the Paris Convention, without regard as to whether the foreign corporation is registered, licensed or
doing business in the Philippines. The said convention runs afoul to Republic Act No. 166, which requires the actual use in
commerce in the Philippines of the subject mark or devise. The SC ruled that our municipal law on trademarks regarding the
requirement of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is
being decided by a municipal tribunal. Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does
not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. For not meeting the
requirement of actual use of commerce in the Philippines (Sec 2, RA 166, requirement for registration), petitioner’s
registration cannot be granted.
- Ecole de Cuisine v Renaud Cointreau: At the time Ecole started using the subject mark, the same was already being used
by Cointreau, albeit abroad, of which Ecole’s directress was fully aware, being an alumna of the latter’s culinary school in
Paris, France. Hence, Ecole cannot claim any tinge of ownership whatsoever over the subject mark as Cointreau is the true
and lawful owner thereof. The present law on trademarks, Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual
Property Code of the Philippines, as amended, has already dispensed with the requirement of prior actual use at the time of
registration.
 #WalangE1nan

NOTES: C. Recognition of foreign judgements, GAPIL:

- In Mihares v. Ranada: International law becomes customary rules accepted as binding as a result of
two elements:
1) Established, widespread, and consistent practice on part of the state
2) Opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity; implicit element is a belief that the
practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.)
- Fr. Bernas has a definition similar to the one above. Customary international law has two factors:
1) State practice – the objective element/material factor, generality, uniformity and consistency.
2) Opinio juris – the subjective element/subjective factor, requires that the state practice or norm be
carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it.
- Mijares v Ranada: The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment in this country merely due to an
exorbitant assessment of docket fees is alien to generally accepted practices and principles in international law. Recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments is among those generally accepted principles of international law which forms part of
our land, as well as a right to defend against such enforcement on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments,
or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof.— However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of
the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. It emerges that there is a general right recognized within our body of laws, and affirmed by the Constitution, to
seek recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.

When a law satisfies the 2 factors it becomes part of customary international law which is then D. Soft Law:
incorporated into our domestic system. - Pharmaceutical v DOH [soft law; WHA guidelines not a treaty]: SC held that the RIRR expand the provisions of the
1. Discussion on international law in relation to municipal law in Lim v. ES: law/the Milk Code which did not prohibit advertising or other forms of promotion to the general public of products. The
2. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given
RIRR wrongly adopted the WHA Resolution (provides a prohibition on advertisement) as it is merely a soft law, not a treaty,
a standing equal, not superior, to national legislation. and thus cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need
of a law enacted by the legislature. Neither was it established that the provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary
Which prevails in case of conflict? international law that may be deemed part of the law of the land. Soft law includes recommendations, such as those in the
(a) IN PHILIPPINE COURTS: since a treaty has a force of a statute, a latter enactment of a WHA, which generally are not binding, but carry moral and political weight.
subsequent municipal law will prevail. A treaty is also subject to the police power of the state. -Knights of Rizal v DMCI [Venice charter as mere guidelines]: The Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus against the
(b) IN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL/ PERSPECTIVE OF OF PIL: treaty will always prevail. A officials of the City of Manila to stop the construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila project for violation of the Venice
state cannot plead its municipal law to justify non-comliance with an international obligation pursuant charter. The Venice Charter is merely a codification of guiding principles for the preservation and restoration of ancient
to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. monuments, sites, and buildings. The Venice Charter is not a treaty and therefore does not become enforceable as law. The
Philippines is not legally bound to follow its directive, as in fact, these are not directives but mere guidelines — a set of the
best practices and techniques that have been proven over the years to be the most effective in preserving and restoring
historical monuments, sites and buildings. Neither was it established that the principles contained therein are norms of general
or customary international law.
Section 3 Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is - IBP v Zamora [deployment of marines]:The President ordered PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for
the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. IBP is assailing that the joint visibility patrol violates the constitutional
integrity of the national territory. provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP. The calling of the Marines in this
case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The limited participation of the Marines is
evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines' authority. Since
none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to a civilian position to
speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the
PNP. The Marines render nothing more than assistance required in conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no "insidious
incursion" of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.

Section 4 The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon
the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under
conditions provided by law, to render personal military or civil service.
Section 5 The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of
the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

NOTE:
- Recognizes a hierarchy of rights: first life, second liberty, third property
Section 6 The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Section 7 The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the paramount - Lim v Exec. Secretary [president and foreign relations]:
consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self- - Saguisag v Executive Secretary [supra sec 2]:
determination.
Section 8 The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from - Bayan v Zamora:
nuclear weapons in its territory.
Section 9 The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and
independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate
social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life
for all.
Section 10 The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.

Section 11 The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
Section 12 The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Section 13 The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism
and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
Section 14 The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men.
Section 15 The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.
#WalangE1nan
- Roe v Wade [right to life vs abortion]: A pregnant single woman brought a class action challenging the constitutionality of
the Texas criminal abortion laws, which proscribe procuring or attempting an abortion except on medical advice for the
purpose of saving the mother's life. The State does have an important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the
health of the pregnant woman. The State has important and legitimate interest in potential life and the health of a pregnant
woman who seeks medical consultation and treatment. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of
meaningful life outside the mother's womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and
biological justifications. If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe
abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
- Imbong v Ochoa [RH Law]: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the RH law as it violates several provisions in the Bill
of Rights, among others. Right to Life - a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a
scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization. the RH Law itself clearly mandates that
protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its viability
is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. The Constitution
recognizes that life begins at fertilization. As such, the RH Law sought to compromise the problem of overpopulation and the
State's interest in protecting the life of the unborn by permitting the use of contraceptives.
>> Court's rulings that are pertinent to Section 12:
1. Use of the word "primarily" by the RH-IRR to qualify the main effect of abortifacients - UNCONSTITUTIONAL
-- It redefined and contravened the definition of abortifacient under the RH Law - implied that a contraceptive will only be
considered as an abortifacient if its primary effect is abortion or the prevention of the implantation
2. Provision that the decision of the spouse undergoing the medical provedure will prevail in case of disagreement
between the spouses - UNCONSTITUTIONAL
-- Decision should be mutual because it affects family life
3. Provision that a minor requires parental consent in order to access family planning methods unless such minor is
already a parent or has suffered a miscarriage - UNCONSTITUTIONAL
- Both deprive the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent -- compelling
state interest can justify a state substitution of the same
- Wisconsin v Yoder [compulsory education]: Members of the Amish religion were convicted of violating Wisconsin's
compulsory school attendance law by declining to send their children to public or private school after they had graduated
from the eighth grade. They believed that it was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life, and that they would endanger
their own salvation.“The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general
power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not
the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.” Only those interests of the State of the highest order can overbalance
the primary interest of parents in the religious upbringing of their children.
- Ginsber v NY [parens patriae]:
- Orceo v COMELEC [rights are not absolute and can be restricted by government]:
- BSP v COA:
- Garcia v Drilon [VAWC; discrimination]: Rosalie Garcia filed a case against Jesus Garcia pursuant to RA 9262 or the
VAWC Law. Jesus Garcia is assailing RA 9262 on the ground that it is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection
clause. The Court ruled that equal protection merely requires that all persons or thing similarly situated should be treated
alike. In Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, Court ruled that equal protection clause allows classification due to
inherent inequality. The conditions for classification are: 1) be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences, 2) must be germane to the purpose of the law, 3) not limited to existing conditions only, 4) apply equally to each
member of the class.
- Imbong v Ochoa:
 #WalangE1nan

Section 16 The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
NOTES:
- SELF-EXECUTING PROVISION: Recognizes an enforceable right
- This right emanates from being a human (Oposa v Factoran)
Requisites for a Writ of Kalikasan: (LNL Archipelago or Oposa)
1. There is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology.
2. The actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act of omission of a public official or
employee, or private individuals or entity.
3. The actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in town or more cities or provinces Note: Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases: Sec 5. Citizen Suit – Any Filipino citizen representation of others,
Precautionary Principle: (GMO Case)
- Expresses the idea that governments are obligated to "foresee and forestall" harm to the environment a power plant would cause great environmental damage in the region of Zambales. The court ruled that the Casiño group
- Treated as a principle of last resort for purposes of evidence
- Applies only when the link between cause and effect cannot be established with full scientific
certainty
- Three elements: (a) Risk of harm are uncertain; (b) possibility of irreversible harm; (c) possibility of sufficient information in order to adequately protect of safeguard the right to a healthful and balanced ecology. The degree of
serious harm
Section 17 The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster
patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and
development.
- Oposa v Factoran [inter-generational justice and responsibility]: The minors (petitioners) asseverate that they "represent
their generation as well as generations yet unborn” and is asking the court to cancel all existing timber licenses and to cease
and desist from processing and approving the same. Court ruled that their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology concerns nothing less than self-preservation and
self-perpetuation.
- LLDA v CA [water pollution]:
- Arigo v Swift [damage to reef]:
- Resident Marine Mammals v Secretary Reyes [standing]: Resident Marine Mammals, represented by their stewards, claim
that they have locus standi. Respondent contends otherwise because they are neither natural nor juridical persons. Court ruled
that the Rules of Procedure For Environmental Cases gives the Resident Marine Mammals legal sanding because it allows
any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce environmental laws.
including minors or generations yet unborn may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws.
- Paje v Casiño [writ of kalikasan]: Casiño Group invokes the Writ of Kalikasan because they allege that the construction of
failed to substantiate its claims that the construction and operation of the power plant will cause environmental damage of the
magnitude contemplated under the writ of kalikasan.
Note: The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases liberally provide the courts with means and methods to obtain
environmental damage must be sufficiently grave, in terms of the territorial scope of damage, so as to call for the grant of this
extraordinary remedy. The court will decide whether or no they will grant the privilege of writ of kalikasan within sixty days
from the time the petition is submitted.
Fact finding power under the writ of kalikasan – 1) Anything related to the issuance, grant of a government permit issued or
information controlled by the government or private entity and 2) Information contained in documents such as environmental
compliance certificate and other government records.
- West Tower v PIC [precautionary principle not applied]: The residents of West Tower Condiminium were forced out of
their homes due to a leakage of one of FPIC's pipelines. The Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan with a Temporary
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO). Court held that West Tower has standing. The Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases do not require that one be directly affected by an environmental disaster. It clearly allows juridical
persons to file a petition on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced an healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation. Further, the precautionary principle is not applicable in this case -- the absence of certainty was not
an issue.
- Int'l Service v Greenpeace [GMO]:
- LNL Archipelago v Agham Party List Writ of kalikasan not applied]: Agham petitioned for a Writ of Kalikasan after LNL
Archipelago, a mining corporation, caused serious environmental damage when it cut down trees without authority. The court
ruled that Writ of Kalikasan may not be applied in this case because Agham did not prove that there was grave and evident
damage.
WRIT OF KALIKASAN: The remedy is available to a natural or juridical persons. It requires the concurrence of the
following elements:
1. An actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
2. The actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act of a public official or private individual
3. Actual threat will lead to environmental damage that prejudice life, health, or property of inhabitants of 2 or more
cities/provinces

NOTE:
- This does not mean that the government is not free to balance the demands of education against other
competing and urgent demands
Section 18 The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and - PNB v Dan Padao:
promote their welfare.

NOTE:
- Human factor has primacy over non-human factors in production
Section 19 The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by - Garcia v BOI [independent policy]:
Filipinos. - Tañada v Angara:
 #WalangE1nan

Section 20 The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and
provides incentives to needed investments.
Section 21 The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform. - Wilson Gamboa v Finance Secretary Teves:
Section 22 The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development.
Section 23 The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that
promote the welfare of the nation.
Section 24 The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-building.
Section 25 The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. - Navarro v Exec Secretary Ermita:
- Belgica v Ochoa:
Section 26 The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political - Pamatong v COMELEC [mere privilege, not a right]: Elly Pamantong a nuisance candidate alleged that COMELEC
dynasties as may be defined by law. violated his right to equal opportunities for public service under sec. 26, Article II. The court held that sec 26, Article II does
not bestow a right nor privilege to the level of enforceable right. It merely specifies a broad guideline for legislative or
execution action subject to limitation by the framers as not to impair the election process.
Note: Equal opportunities for public office:
1. Subject to limitation by the lawmakers in consideration to fair reasons such as practicality and logistic concerns.
2. These limitations must apply to everybody equally without discrimination
- Navarro v Exec. Sec. Ermita:
- Belgica v Ochoa:
Section 27 The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective
measures against graft and corruption.
Section 28 Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full - Neri v Senate:
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. - Pollo v Chairperson Karina David [reqs of privacy rights]: Ricky Pollo was dismissed from government service after his
assigned office computer was searched and found containing documents that showed his involvement in a controversy. Pollo
NOTES: assailed that the operation infringed his right to privacy. The court held that the constitution, on privacy of rights, guaranteed
- Obligation to make a full disclosure of all transactions by the government not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of “unreasonable” ones. Petitioner failed to exhibit that there was actual
- See In Re Production for a list of confidential judicial documents privacy and that this privacy is socially accepted as reasonable.
Note: Requirements to Privacy Rights:
1. the person exhibits actual privacy
2. the society is subject to recognize this reasonable.
- PSB v Senate Impeachment Court: Philippine Savings Bank seek to prohibit Senate Impeachment Court from requiring
them to testify and produce the foreign currency accounts that were allege to belong to Chief Justice Renato Corona. The
court finds that Senate Impeachment court may not subpoena to obtain the foreign currency deposit.
- In Re: Production of Court Records [rule for disclosure of court records]: Hon. Joseph Abaya wanted to examine the
rollos and the Agenda and Minutes of Deliberations of several cases in behalf of the House Impeachment Panel against the
Justice Corona. They court held that Abaya may not examine these documents and other communication because these fall
under the Deliberative Process Privilege.
Note: When Court Records are considered confidential: Internal Rules of the Supreme Court prohibits the disclosure:
1. The result of the raffle of cases – only available to the parties and their counsels, unless cases involve bar matters,
administrative cases and criminal cases involving the penalty of life imprisonment, which are treated with strict
confidentiality and where the raffle results are not disclosed even to the parties themselves.
2. Actions taken in the court's agenda – only available after the official release of the resolution embodying the court action. A
resolution is considered officially released once the envelope containing its final copy, addressed the parties, has been
transmitted to the process server for personal service to the mailing section of the Judicial Records Office.
3. Deliberative process of reaching a decision: Not only applies to SC Justices, but also Court officials and employees who
are privy to the deliberations. It Doesn’t just involve people but as well as documents and publications which are part—
Internal memoranda, research papers regarding certain decisions of the SC. This exists even after the decision has been
reached
 #WalangE1nan

Deliberative Process Privilege requisites:

1. Predecisional – If they were made in the attempt to reach a final conclusion
2. Deliberative – if it reflects give-and-take of the consultative process. Key question: whether disclosure of the information
would discourage candid discussion within the agency.
Note: Other court officials and employees when asked to act on these documents and other communications may claim the
privilege.
Other grounds for denying access to court records:
1. The disqualification by reason of privileged communication
2. The pendency of an action or matter.
- Belongs to the SC as a body and not just for the an individual
Article 6: The Legislative Department
 #WalangE1nan

Section 1 The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a A. EXCEPTIONS TO NON-DELEGABILITY OF LP:
Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on - Rubi v Provincial Board of Mindoro [LGU]: Rubi was one of the non-christian Mangayenes that were displaced from their
initiative and referendum. original homes to reserved areas under Resolution No. 25 sanctioned by the Provincial Board of Mindoro. This action was in
accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917. Rubi questioned the validity of section 2145 as he claimed
NOTES: that it was an undue delegation of legislative power to the Provincial board of Mindoro. The court held that it is valid because
Legislative powers – make and alter and repeal laws is: an exception to the general rule is that legislative body may delegate legislative power to local authorities sanctioned by
- derivative and delegated immemorial practice.
- Plenary – Congress cannot repealable laws (no supermajority vote; *Kida v Senate (GR196271)) – - Antipolo Realty Corp v NHA [administrative]:
you are restricting the power of justice for as along as there is quorum to do business and the action is - Atitiw v Zamora [repealing power]:
taken by the majority, it is sufficient—you cannot get supermajority - SEC v Interport [absence of IRR]:
Limitations of Legislative Power B. REQUISITES OF VALID DELEGATION:
- Bill of rights – substantive limitations – BOR is the basic human rights of every citizen, right to due - Agustin v Edu [test of non-delegability]: President Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No. 229 that required each car
process, life, religion—inhibited from passing any law that will impair or restrict their rights owners to have at least one pair of early warning device (EWD). Edu, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner
- Manner of passing bills – generally three separate readings, voting requirement, certain form and issued Memorandum Circular No. 32 which stated the implemented rules and regulations in response to the requirement of
manner of passing bills of local application, appropriation bills can only originate form the HOR, not acquiring an EWD. Agustin questioned the validity of the Letter of Instruction and Memorandum Circle 32 as it reflected
the Senate undue delegation of legislative power. The court held that these are valid because it is complete in itself and sufficient.
General rule – LP, because it is only to congress by sovereign people, they cannot further delegate it - Guingona v Carague [automatic debt service]:
Valid delegation of legislative power: - Trade and Investment Development Corporation v CSC [rule making is not law making]:
1. Local Governments santioned by time immemorial practice within locality (see Rubi)
2. President in case of national emergency- pursuant to a law 1. Complete in itself
3. delegation of president to change tariff, customs, mortgage dues - Araneta v Gatmaitan:
Congress may delegate rule-making power: - Marcos v CA [Monetary Board Authority]:
1. Subordinate legislation – delegating to the Administrative agency the power to fill in the details of - Social Justice Society v DDB [drug testing]: Section 36 of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
the statute because the congress is busy and they cant anticipate everything—the congregate it to requires mandatory drug testing to candidates of the next election, students and employees. It is promulgated by the
administrative bodies who specialize and focus on that specific unit Dangerous Drug board. The petitioners assail that the said act is invalid because it is undue delegation of legislative power.
2. Contingent Legislation – gives to the body the business of ascertaining of facts necessary to put the The court held on the negative because the provision provided the policy and guidelines when it comes to drug tests.
law into action (see ABAKADA) Note: In the face of the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the increasing inability of the legislature to
Requisites for valid delegation of RM power: come directly with the many problem demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or entrusting to administrative
1. Completeness Test – law must set up the policy to be carried out or implemented agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has become imperative.
2. Sufficient Standard Test – law must provide for sufficiently determinable limits which can be found - Pacific Steam v LLDA [LLDA's power]:
in the law itself or in the statute related to it or in the original statute - Disini v Secretary of Justice: The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Petitioners contend
Requirements for implementing rules to have force of penal laws (see US v Panlilio): that congress invalidly delegated its power when it gave the Cyber Crime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the
1. Violation is made by a crime by the delegating statute power to formulate a national cyber security plan without any sufficient standards or parameters for it to follow. The court
2. Penalty is provided held that cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national cybersecurity
3. Regulation is publishe plan. The law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided the definition of cybersecurity.
The delegability test:
1. Completeness – the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test – adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
- QC PTCA v DepEd [revised guidelines for PTA]: Department of Education issued Department Order No. 54 entitled
“Revised Guidelines Governing Parent-Teacher Association to address the limitations of the guidelines in D.O 23 and in
response to the increasing reports of malpractice by officers and members of the PTA. Petitioners assail that it is
unconstitutional. The court held otherwise because this rule is pursuant to the rule making authority of Department of
Education.
Note:
1. The reason for the delegation of legislative powers in general are applicable to administrative bodies with.
2. Administrative agencies are not given ungettered power to promulgate rules. They must still need to comply with the
complete test and sufficient standard test.
 #WalangE1nan

2. Fixes a standard
- People v Rosenthal [standard of public interest]:
- Eastern Shipping Lines v POEA [discretion as to substantive contents]: The widow of Vitaliano Saco sought relief after
the death of her husband through the Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of POEA. The employer of
Saco, Eastern Shipping Lines, argued that the MC No. 2 is invalid and POEA has no authority to promulgate this regulation.
The court held that administrative bodies like POEA may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by ‘filling in’
the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.
Note: Power of subordinate legislation – with the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to
issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute.
- Tablarin v Gutierrez [NMAT]: The Secretary of Education and the Center for Educational Measurement created Section 5
(a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382 that requires the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for eligibility for
admission. Petitioner argues that it is an undue delegation of legislative power because it failed to establish the necessary
standard by the Board of Medical Education. The court believe that the necessary standard was set forth in the 1959 Medical
Act.
Important Jurisprudence: Edu v. Ericta – The standard may be either expressed or implied. xx the standard though does not
have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole.
- Osmeña v Orbos [power of ERB to add amounts]:
- Viola v Alunan [power to create positions]:
-Abakada v Ermita [ascertainment of facts]:

3. Filling in the details

- Fernandez v Sto. Tomas [authority to reorganize]: Chairman St. Tomas express the determination of the Commission to
implement Res No. 94-3710 (Merging of OCCS, OPIA, and OPR to form RDO). The re-arrangement of the administrative
units were questioned by petitioners stating that the it may only be done by the legislative authority which created the public
office. The Supreme Court ruled that the Civil Service Commission has the authority under the 1987 Revised Administrative
Code to change its internal organization in compliance with the changing need of the body. In addition, the legislative
authority expressly authorized the Commission to carry out the changes in the organization.
- Chiongbian v Orbos [authority to reorganize]: Congress passed RA No. 6734 (Organic Act of ARMM) which was made
through a plebiscite. President issued EO No.429 providing for the reorganization of the Administrative Region of Mindanao.
Petitioners assailed the unconstitutionality of RA 6734 because it unduly delegates legislative power to the president by
authorizing her to merge the existing regions. The court ruled that the president may determine the merging of regions,
because the administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes which falls under
the power of the president and not for political representation which is delegated to the legislative bosy.
- Pichay v Office of Deputy Exec. Secretary [authority to reorganize and appropriate funds for this purpose]:
President Arroyo created the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission which was abolished by President Aquino, however
transferring its function to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs. Petitioners assail that the transfer
and reorganization of PAGC is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court started that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the
president has the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve simplicity, economy, and
efficiency. The abolition of PAGC and the transfer of functions to ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the
president under his continuing “delegated legislative authority to reorganize” his own office. However the authority to
implement organizational changes is limited to transferring either an office or a function from the OPRES to another
department or agency.
Note:Vested in the President’s power is to recommend the budget necessary for the efficient and economical operation of the
government, meaning he is allowed to transfer any fund appropriated for the different executive departments which is
included in the general Appropriations Act.
- Arroyo v DOJ [collaboration of 2 committees]: COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a
committee jointly with the DOJ which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged election offences and anomalies
committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections. Petitioners assail the creation of the joint committee. The COMELEC has the
power to conduct preliminary investigation with regard to election related offenses. Given that at the present case, the
offences committed is in the course of a nationwide elections, it is necessary for the COMELEC to seek the assistance of the
state prosecutors of DOJ. Therefore the COMELEC and DOJ has the duty to ensure the prompt and fair investigation and
prosecution of election offences pursuant to their constitutional and statutory obligations.
- La Suerte v CA [Taxability of stemmed leaf tobacco]: Cigarette manufacturers claims that stemmed leaf tobacco are not
subject to excise tax because it does not fall within the definition of a “processed tobacco”. They question the validity of RR
No. 17-67 promulgated by the Secretary of Finance with regard to stemmed leaf tobacco taxation. The court in its decision
basing it on the the amended RR 17-67 which delineated what products of tobacco are partially prepared or partially
manufactured stated that, although there are different definitions as to what the term “stemmed leaf tobacco” means, there is
no doubt that it falls under the category of partially prepared tobacco which are subject to excise tax.
 #WalangE1nan

4. Undue Delegation
- People v Vera [discretion in implementation]: Mariano Cu Unjieng was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from
4 years of prision correctional to 8 years of prision mayor and costs, in his case against HSBC. He eventually applied for
probation under the Probation Law which was granted. The Manila Fiscal and private prosecutor opposed the probation and
assailed the Probation Law for being an undue delegation of legislative power. Court ruled that there must be an inquiry as to
whether the statute is complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the legislature. There should be nothing left to the
judgment of the appointee or delegate of the legislature. The SC ruled that there is indeed undue delegation. There are no
rules that can serve as a guide to the provincial boards in exercising discretionary power when determining whether the
Probation Law will apply or not.
- US v Barrias [delegated power to fix penalties]:
- US v Panlilio [delegated power to criminalize]: Panlilio assailed the law as it is a form of undue delegation of legislative
power to the DOA.After being held penalized of violating the said law, Panlilio assails it and claims that it is a form of undue
delegation of legislative power to the DOA. SC held that there is indeed undue delegation, because the said law does did not
provide for penalties, and therefore DOA should have no authority to impose the same to Panlilio. The power to criminalize
or penalize may be delegated only if the law itself provides that specific violations are punished or if a violation is made a
penal offense under the law. The law did not provide for penalties.
- People v Maceren [delegation of power to declare what acts constitute a crime]: 5 persons were accused of performing
electro fishing in Laguna in violation of the Fisheries Administrative Order (FAO). They argued that the order is a form of
undue delegation since the Fisheries Law does not include electro fishing as one of the forbidden modes of fishing. Rather,
only the FAO provided for the prohibition along with the penalty. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive
official the power to declare what acts should constitute a criminal offense, it can only authorize the issuance of regulations
and imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself.
- People v Dacuycuy [power to fix term of imprisonment]: Public school teachers were alleged to have violated the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers. The law provided that the courts can fix the term of imprisonment for violation thereof. The
teachers questioned the law since the duration of the penalty of imprisonment is left to the court without points of reference.
Courts cannot fix term of imprisonment without points of reference provided by the law. There is no standard to which the
court can impose the penalty.
- Ynot v Intermediate apellate Court [disposition of confiscated property]: The EO provided that authorities can dispose of
the property in their discretion as the Chairman of the Meat Inspection Commission “may see fit”. Ynot was caught
transporting those in a pump boat. The carabaos and carabeef were confiscated by authorities. Ynot assailed the law for being
an undue delegation of legislative power since it gives unbridled discretion to the Chariman to decide where the confiscated
items would go. Court ruled that the law gave the delegate broad power in determining where the proceeds of the confiscated
item would go to without affording due process.
- Pharamaceutical v DOH [WHO guidelines]: A delegate cannot provide for fines if the law does not provide the same. The
Milk Code does not provide any authority on the part of the DOH to to fix administrative fines. There is thus no standard for
the Secretary of DOH to adhere to in fixing the fines.
- Abakada v Purisima [encroachment of judicial power]:
- Phil Coconut v Republic [UCPB Shares distribution]: Several PDs and coco levy laws were issued with the end goal of
distributing to coconut farmers for the “advancement of national policy” the shares of a commercial bank. Court held that PD
755 allowed the PCA to promulgate its own rules and regulations without a fixed standard (i.e. who are to be considered
coconut farmers; no condition how to dispose shares; and no standard or guideline).
- Deutsche Bank v CIR [Contrary to treaty]:
- Belgica v Ochoa [PDAF]: Petitioners assail constitutionality of the Congressional Pork Barrel, PDAF, and Malampaya
Fund. The law has a “post-enactment authority” granting to individual legislators the power to determine how much of the
fund will go to a specific project. Congress as a body is bestowed the power of appropriation. The power cannot be exercised
by individual legislators. It has to be exercised collectively as a legislative body. Legislative power is vested to Congress
alone save for some exceptions. By delegating the power to appropriate exclusively conferred to Congress to individual
legislators, there is an invalid delegation of legislative power.

5. Executive Misapplication:
- Tatad v Secretary [DOE]:
6. Mire Directive
- Dagan v PRC [requisite of a valid administrative issuance]:
Section 2 The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified
voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.
Section 3 No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of
the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident
of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.

Section 4 The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided
by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected
NOTE:
- If you are filling in the predecessor when they cant finish their term/resigned—you are considered
serving a full term even if its already mid-way. This is in determining for 2 consecutive term
limitation
Section 5 (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of
this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided
by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
NOTES:
How to increase HOR capacity:
1. Creating new districts
2. Creating new provinces – entitled to 1 district rep regardless of population
3. new city with one legislative district (250k inhabitants, it is entitled to at least 1 legislative district)
- You don’t need to increase again by 250k to be entitled to another district (see Mariano v
COMELEC)
For parameters and computation of allocation of seats in HOR (see VFP and BANAT)
For guidelines for party-lists (see Atong Paglaum et al)
#WalangE1nan
1. Par 2: Party list Representation
- Ang Bagong Bayani v COMELEC [8-point guideline]:
- Veterans Federation Party v COMELEC [computation for apportionment, not mandatory]: After the special elections, the
party-list representative seats in HoR were not filled up. PAG-ASA filed a petition to fill up the number of seats allowed by
the Constitution or 20% of HoR total membership. SC ruled that he 2% requirement is valid insofar as this threshold is the
gatekeeper for the qualification of party-lists to additional seats. The Constitution merely prescribes a ceiling of 20%. If there
is no sufficient qualifying parties to fill the maximum of 20%, there is no need to allocate the remaining seats to those who
did not meet the 2% threshold. The Constitution explicitly provides that for a party-list to avail a seat in HoR, it must garner
at least 2%. A party-list can never have a seat in the HoR if it did not garner at least 2% votes. The top party-list is used as the
basis for allocating additional seats. Subsequent party-lists can never have equal representations with that of the top party-list.
(Formula overturned by Banat case)
COMPUTATION: First, rank them from highest to lowest based on the number of votes then divide its votes by the total
votes cast by all parties. Those who get at least 2% should have a guaranteed seat. Only these parties shall be included in the
computation of additional seats. Second, determine the number of additional seats the first party is entitled to by dividing the
number of votes of the first party to the total votes for party-list system. If the proportion of votes without rounding off is at
least 6%, the first party is entitled to 2 additional seats. If it is higher or equal to 4 but less than 6, party is entitled to one
additional seat. If less than 4, no additional seat. Third, determine the number of additional seats for other parties by dividing
the number of votes of that party with the number of votes of first party and then multiplying it with the number of additional
seats allocated for first party
- AKLAT v COMELEC [disqualified party-list]:
- Bantay v COMELEC [disclosure of names]:
- Phil. Guardians v COMELEC [participation in previous election]: Phil Guardians was delisted by COMELEC since it
failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections. The Court ruled that the law is clear
that there are two distinct and separate grounds for cancellation of registration. The word or is a disjunctive term signifying
the disassociation of one thing from the other.
- BANAT v COMELEC [mere ceiling, new computation]: BANAT filed a petition to proclaim the 20% of party-list
representatives. BANAT assailed the formula promulgated in Veterans as proportional representation is mandated by
Constitution. BANAT argues that the allocation of additional seats must be based on the total votes for party-lists and not
with reference to the top party-list only. Contradictory to the ruling in Veterans, the SC held that the 2% threshold should not
be the determining factor in terms of the additional seats to be given to party-lists who have qualified; such requirement is
unconstitutional.
COMPUTATION: Same step as VFP only in computation of guaranteed seats. In computing the additional seats, guaranteed
seats shall no longer be included because they’ve been allocated.The remaining seats is the maximum seats reserved for party-
list reps minus the number of guaranteed seats. No fractional seats since there is no provision in the law providing for it,
therefore only look at the whole integer. So, first, determine the remaining seats and compute for the percentage of votes for
each party. Second, get the product of the percentage and the remaining available seats. The whole integer of this product
shall be the additional seats obtained for the party. Last step is to apply the three-seat cap.
- Abayon v COMELEC [ party-list and HRET]:
 #WalangE1nan

- Ang Ladlad v COMELEC [moral issues]: Ang Ladlad sought to be registered and accredited as a party-list before the
COMELEC. The application was denied on moral grounds. Court ruled that disapproval of party-list on moral grounds per se
insufficient governmental interest. The moral grounds must be secular in nature, that is, that there is a public interest sought to
be protected. COMELEC did not even provide any danger to the public in relation to immoral grounds it mentioned.
- Layug v COMELEC [jurisdiction of COMELEC]:
- Magdalo v COMELEC [qualifications in re to amnesty]: MAGDALO sought to be registered with the COMELEC as a
regional party in NCR. COMELEC denied the application since Constitution denies the application of organizations who seek
to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means. MAGDALO perpetrated acts in the Oakwood Mutiny. Court ruled
that MAGDALO used violence and unlawful means. Individuals must submit affidavit renouncing use of such violence or
other harmful means.
Note: Registration – act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election laws
Accreditation – relates to the privileged participation that our election laws grant to qualified registered parties
- Dayao v COMELEC [members not belongin to M&UR sector]: LPGMA was granted party-list accreditation. Petitioners
sought to have the accreditation nullified since LPGMA allegedly does not represent a marginalized sector of society.
Sec. 6 of RA 7941 states that COMELEC may, upon verified complaint, refuse or cancel the registration of a party on any of
the following grounds:
a. It is a religious sect/denomination, org, or association, organized for religious purposes
b. Advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal
c. A foreign party or organization
d. Receiving support from any foreign government, political entity, whether directly or indirectly through any of its officers or
members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes
e. Violates or fails to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to elections
f. Declares untruthful statements in its petition
g. Has ceased to exist for at least a year
h. Fails to participate in the last 2 preceding elections OR fails to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the 2 preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered
- Atong Paglaum et al [new 6 point guideline]: New guidelines for the new parameters of the party-list system:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system (national parties, regional parties, and sectoral parties)
2. National and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent the
marginalized or underrepresented
3. Political parties can participate in the party-list elections provided that they register under the party-list system and do not
field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in the legislative
district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the
party-list system. Such wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in well-defined
constituencies. What is important is that their political advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined constituencies include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority number of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented must belong to
the marginalized or underrepresented sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent
the marginalized and underrepresented or that represent those who lack well defined political constituencies either must
belong to their respective sectors or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sector. The nominees of national
and regional must be bona fide members of the said parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified,
provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
- Abang Lingkod v COMELEC [meaning of national, regional, sectoral]: Petitioner’s registration was cancelled due to
failure to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented. SC ruled that, in insisting
that petitioner present evidence showing such track records is unconstitutional. There is no mention in RA 7941, moreso in
the new and controlling guidelines as established in the case of Atong Paglaum. No requirement of track record to be
presented by sectoral organizations intending to participate in party-list elections. What the Constitution requires is presence
of a principal advocacy that covers special interests and germane to the concerns of the sector it represents.
- Lico v COMELEC [expulsion]: Lico is the representative of Ating Koop in the HoR. Pursuant to an internal agreement of
Ating Koop, Lico was to serve for 1 year only. Lico failed to honor the agreement. Ating Koop then expelled Lico from the
party and instituted a new member therein. Ating Koop sought the expulsion of Lico before the Comelec. Court ruled that
Lico is already a member of the HoR. Thus, the HRET has full jurisdiction to hear and decide the validity of his title as a
member of the HoR. Intra-party matters do not remove the authority of HRET to decide the validity of a member of the HoR.
 #WalangE1nan

NOTES: 2. Par 1, 3, and 4: Reapportionment through special law

Apportionment: the determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or other - Tobias v Abalos [par. 3 thru special law; Mandaluyong]: The case involved the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong
subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in into 2 representative districts. With the elevation of Mandaluyong from municipality into a highly urbanized city, both
proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population Mandaluyong and San Juan were recognized by RA 7675 as distinct representative districts. This was challenged on the
Rules on apportionment: ground that RA 7675 did not mention any census indicating that San Juan and Mandaluyong had the minimal requirement of
a) Apportionment shall be made in accordance with the number of respective inhabitants [among 250,000 inhabitants needed to constitute a district. It is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain
provinces, cities and Metro Manila area], on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws. Hence, the court presumed that Congress had made
But: (i) each city with not less than 250,000 inhabitants shall be entitled to at least one representative; due consideration of the minimum requirement.
and (ii) Each province, irrespective of number of inhabitants, is entitled to at least one representative.
b) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent It ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city.
territory. This is intended to prevent gerrymandering. To hold that reapportionment can be made only through a general law would create an inequitable situation where a new city
c) Congress to make reapportionment of legislative districts within three years following the return of or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. That intolerable
every census. situation would deprive the people in the city or province a particle of that sovereignty.
The creation of provinces, cities, municipalities, or barangays, must comply with the following The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its
conditions: conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.
1. The creation of a local government must follow the criteria fixed in the LGC The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by
2. Such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than
3. There must be a plebiscite in the political units affected a general reapportionment of the law.
Reapportionment: the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in - Mariano v COMELEC [par 3 through special law; Makati City]: Petitioners of this case are assailing RA 7854, which
population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation. converts the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City of Makati, as it attempts to create another legislative
Gerrymandering: formation of one legislative district out of separate territories for the purpose of district in Makati. With the premise that reapportionment is not allowed through special law and that Makati’s population is
favoring a candidate or a party, is not allowed only 450,000 as of 1999, they forward that such enactment is unconstitutional.
[i] Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The
- Congress cannot be compelled to make a reapportionment even if there is movement of the people or Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law.
because there is a substantial change in the population of a certain municipality As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, OTHER
- Only congress can create provinces and cities (see Sema v COMELEC) THAN a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and
- The creation does not require the confirmation of a plebiscite if it does not involve the creation of a providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district.
local government unit [ii] As to the issue on the population, the case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for
- If you’re going to create/add a legislative district, you don’t need a plebiscite cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to
- If it’s a province however with a political subdivision and Legislative district, you need a have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another
plebiscite 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district. —clearly, Makati has met the minimum population requirement.
- Same rule applies to a city since it is also a Political subdivision, however if that city is entitled to a - Sema v COMELEC [ARMM RLA Power]: The SC said: There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the
legislative district because its population size is 250k—a plebiscite is required delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of
Requisites for creation and conversion of Local Government; As a general rule, the creation of a the Constitution provides that each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have
local government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based on at least one representative. Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that any province that may
verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit: hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than 250k shall be entitled in the
• Income: as an average income of not less than 20,000,000 for the immediately preceding 2 immediately following election to at least one Member (in the HOR). Thus, the power to create a province or a city with a
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices as verified by DOF. population of 250,000 or more requires the power to create a legislative district. Accordingly, the delegation granted by
• Population: determined as the total number of inhabitants in be not less than 150,000 as certified by Congress to the ARMM to create provinces and cities is unconstitutional, because Congress cannot validly delegate the power
NSO. to create legislative districts for the HOR, since the power to increase the allowable membership in the HOR and to
• Land Area: must be contiguous AND at least 2000 sq kms as certified by the Land Management reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.
Bureau (LMB) of the DENR.

Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum requirements.
The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises 2 or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of 1
or more islands.
The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
 #WalangE1nan

3. Rules on Apportionment (inhabitants and ratio)

- Montejo v COMELEC [par 3&4; redistricting Leyte]: While concededly the conversion of Biliran into a regular province
brought about an imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the 5 districts of Leyte, the issue involves
reapportionment of legislative districts, and Petitioner’s remedy lies with Congress. The power to reapportion districts solely
lies on the Congress. While this Court can strike down an unconstitutional reapportionment, it cannot itself make the
reapportionment as petitioner would want. Power granted to COMELEC in the ordinance was to adjust the number of
members, and not authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district (i.e. change in the
allocations per district). COMELEC may only perform minor adjustments of the reapportionment. Minor adjustments include
adjustment in the correct name of a municipality or when a municipality in between which is still in the territory of one
assigned district is forgotten, among others.
- Herrera v COMELEC [redistricting Guimaras and population size]: Petitioners aver that the apportionment of the
Province of Guimaras into 2 districts is not equitable due to [1] disproportionate representation (claimed that the districting
results in a disparity of representation in that, in the 1st district, there is a ratio of 1 board member per 18,739 voters while in
the 2nd district, the ratio is 1 board member per 14, 050 voters) and [2] the districts do not comprise a compact, contiguous
and adjacent area.
The Court ruled that:
[i] The basis for division shall be the number of inhabitants of the province concerned not the number of listed or registered
voters. The districting of the Province of Guimaras was based on the official 1995 Census of Population as certified by the
National Statistics Office.
[ii] The municipalities belonging to each district are compact, contiguous and adjacent. Contiguous and adjacent means
adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a common border, connected, and/or touching along boundaries often for considerable
distances. On its face, the map of Guimaras shows that the municipalities grouped together are contiguous or adjacent.

4. Rules on Apportionment (contiguous, compact, adjacent)

5. Rules on Apportionment (population size}
- Samson v Aguirre [absence of certification as to income, population and are not fatal; presumed valid]: Every statute is
presumed valid. Every law is presumed to have passed through regular congressional processes. A person asserting the
contrary has the burden of proving his allegations clearly and unmistakably. Samson assailed RA 8535 which created the City
of Novaliches. According to him, the RA failed to conform to the requirements of the LGC as to certifications in income,
population, and land area (see notes), and that it has not been proved that the mother city QC would not suffer adverse effects
from the creation of Novaliches. Court held against him. The presence and oral declarations of the government officials armed
with records during the public deliberations and hearings are more effective certifications than mere certificates which are
routinely signed. They, thus attested the ff facts: (a) Income – earned 26, 952, 128.26 preceding two years; (b) Population –
around 347, 310; (c) Land area was not considered since under Article 11 of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Code
the petitioner need only to comply with income, population or land area. The representatives all declared that Novaliches
exceeded the requirements. The QC mayor was also present during deliberations, and his conformity implies that there is no
damage done to QC. The non-receipt of copies is too insubstantial to sustain invalidity of a statute. Samson failed to overturn
the presumption of constitutionality accorded legislative acts.
- Aldaba v COMELEC [par 3&4]: A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in
the immediately following election. In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately
following election, such city shall have a district representative. There is no showing in the present case that the City of
Malolos has attained or will attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10 May 2010 elections
which is the immediately following election after the supposed attainment of such population. Certifications on demographic
projections can only be issued by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB), or the NSO Administrator or his
designated certifying officer. What has been submitted was an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of NSO.
Furthermore, the Certification, which states that the population of Malolos “will be 254,030 by the year 2010,” violates the
requirement that intercensal demographic projections shall be “as of the middle of every year.” Thus, the City of Malolos is
not qualified to have a legislative district of its own and the enactment of RA 9591, which created a legislative district for
Malolos City, is declared unconstitutional.
 #WalangE1nan

- Navarro v Ermita [land area as a factor]: The petitioners of this case assail the enactment of RA 9355, which created the
province of Dinagat Islands. It only had a population of 120,813 which is below the LGC minimum population requirement of
250,000 inhabitants. Neither did its approximate land area of 802.12 square kilometers meet the LGC minimum land area
requirement of 2,000 square kilometers. But even so, RA 9355 is declared valid because:
[i] even when the exemption to the land area requirement is absent in the LGC for provinces (being limited to municipalities
and cities with 1 or more islands), the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC stating,
“The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of 1 or more islands,” is declared
VALID as it reflects the true legislative intent; there appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to
cities and municipalities, but not to provinces especially considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago,
there being a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province
than in most cities or municipalities.
[ii] while land area is considered as an indicator of viability of a LGU, it is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot
become a province, taking into account its average annual income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by
the Bureau of Local Government Finance, which is 4x more than the minimum requirement of P20M for the creation of a
province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable.
Carpio dissenting:
[i] Exempting provinces “composed of one (1) or more islands” from the minimum land area requirement, is void for being
ultra vires. The implementing rule, being a mere administrative regulation to implement the Local Government Code, cannot
amend the Code but must conform to the Code.
[ii] The said requirement are: (1) minimum income requirement and (2) either the minimum land area OR minimum
population requirement. In short, two of the three minimum requirements must be satisfied, with the minimum income
requirement one of the two. The Dinagat Islands province does not meet either the minimum land area requirement or the
minimum population requirement.

6. Rules on Apportionment (Following return of census):

- Bagabuyo v COMELEC [no need for plebiscite in apportionment and reapportionment:]

Section 6 No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the 1. Citizenship
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write,
and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected,
and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
election.
NOTES:
- Qualification of members of the HOR
A. Domicile and Residence
1. Residence – synonymous with Domicile, (Civil Code) where you are physically
2. Domicile – intention to reside in a fixed place, where you intend to return home
B. Terms
There are 2 ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization.
There are 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen (Bengzon
case): (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Natural-born citizen: is a person who must be a (a) Filipino citizen since birth, and (b) someone who on jurisdiction, the candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a
does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Naturalized citizens: Those who still need to perform any act to obtain citizenship.
Repatriation: simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only seven (7) months, because of the
and registering the said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned
resides or has resided. This will result to the recovery of the original nationality of the person.
Requisites of Domicile of choice
1. Residence (physically)
2. Intention to remain
3. Intention to abandon domicile
- Lease agreement does not manifest the permanency of domicile requires (see Domino)
- Even if you’re leasing, you just need to show that you intended to establish your
domicile there and you intend to leave your old domicile behind
#WalangE1nan
- Bengson III v HRET [recovery of NBC status]: The SC ruled that the act of repatriation allows the person to recover, or
return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship. Thus, respondent Cruz, a former natural-born Filipino
citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship when he enlisted in the United States Marine Corps, was deemed to have recovered
his natural- born status when he reacquired Filipino citizenship through repatriation, hence the challenge on his qualification
as a member of the HoR is debunked.
- Aquino v COMELEC [domicile of origin; in relation to Sec. 17 on Jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunal]: Aquino won the
election for the position of representative of the 2nd legislative, but was thereafter declared by COMELEC that Aquino was
not qualified at all for lack of constitutional qualification of residence although he has resided in Makati for 1 year and 13
days. In order for a person to qualify as a candidate for a district, he must prove that he has established not just residence but
domicile of choice. The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” i.e., his domicile, is that to
which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. Domicile of origin is not easily
lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a
bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose. There must be clear and positive proof of showing abandonment of domicile. Aquino’s
connection to Makati is an alleged lease agreement of a condo unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent
home is evident in his leasing instead of buying one. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the COMELEC. For the issue
member of the HoR, and therefore that same person is not yet under the jurisdiction of the HRET.
- Marcos v COMELEC [ abandonment of origin]: The Court upheld the qualification of Imelda Marcos, despite her own
following:
[i] A minor follows the domicile of his parents; Tacloban became her domicile of origin by operation of law when her father
brought their family to Leyte;
[iI] Domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive
proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue;
[iII] The wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean
the same thing in Political Law; when Mrs. Marcos married Ferdinand Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and
merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium;
[iv] Even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after
her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin,
as her domicile of choice.
- Domino v COMELEC [mere lease of house]: Domino filed his COC for representative in a district. He indicated that he
resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for 1yr and 2mos. He was disqualified by COMELEC because his
change of domicile was not established by clear and positive proof. The lease contract entered into does not adequately
support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani but it does
not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile. The mere absence of
individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or
change of domicile. Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot cannot be used, in the absence of other
circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon
his residence in Quezon City is further strengthened by his act of registering as voter therein. While voting is not conclusive
of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where DOMINO registered in his
former barangay.
- Perez v COMELEC [registration in another district]: Petitioner claims that Aguinaldo, a candidate for representative of the
3rd district of Cagayan, resides and is a registered voter in Gattaran, which is outside the 3rd district. Petitoner also presented
evidence of respondent’s COC for governor in the previous year stating Gattan as residence. The Court ruled for Perez. The
fact that a person is registered as a voter in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in another district. Moreover, the
residence, and not a COC, ought to be the determining factor whether or not an individual has fulfilled the Constitution’s
residency requirement. Considering the purpose of the residency requirement, to ensure that the person elected is familiar
with with the needs and problems of his constituency, it is enough that there is proof of the requirements on domicile-- which
Perez proved through the contract of lease, marriage certificate, certificate of live birth, and personal letters all in Tugegarao.
 #WalangE1nan

- Fernndez v HRET [established domicile]: The SC found the interpretation of the HRET, declaring Fernandez ineligible to
hold office as a member of the HOR representing the 1st Legislative District of Laguna for failing to comply with the 1-year
residency requirement, to be overly restrictive and unwarranted under the factual circumstances of this case. There are real
and substantial reasons for petitioner to establish Sta. Rosa as his domicile of choice and abandon his domicile of origin
and/or any other previous domicile: Fernandez and his wife have a business in Sta. Rosa, their children went to school there,
and they even bought a property there. The HRET puts undue emphasis on the fact that petitioner is only leasing a townhouse
in Sta. Rosa while he owns houses in Pagsanjan and Cabuyao. The Constitution does not require a congressional candidate to
be a property owner in the district where he seeks to run but only that he resides in that district for at least a year prior to
election day—to use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or
residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement. This Court would be, in
effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office, which property requirement would be
unconstitutional.
- Tagolino v HRET [one-year residency]: SC held Lucy Torres cannot validly substitute Richard Gomez, whose COC was
cancelled pursuant to Section 78 of the OEC—which has to its effect as if he has not been a candidate at all; his COC is
considered void ab initio. Note that a valid COC is as a condition sine que non for the substitution of candidate thus, the
reason why Lucy cannot sub for Richard. Richard's "disqualification" was due to his failure to comply with the one year
residency requirement constituting a misrepresentation of his residence which is a ground for denial due course to and/or
cancellation of COC under Sec 78. A section 78 petition speaks of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC based on a
person’s misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for the elective office aspired for and thus, refers to
statements affecting one’s qualifications for elective office such as age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of
natural-born Filipino status; no substitution allowed. This must be DISTINGUISHED from DISQUALIFICATION IN SEC
68 OF THE OEC which speaks of a disqualification of the candidate based on the election offenses enumerated therein; a
person disqualified can be validly substituted.
- Reyes v COMELEC [one-year residency]: The Court sustained the decision to cancel Reyes’ COC for the position of
representative of Marinduque for non-compliance with the one-year residency requirement as she was still an American
citizen. Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon reacquisition of
Filipino citizenship, he must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the
period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice. In this case, there is no showing that
the petitioner reacquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that the petitioner renounced her
American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner claim that she
served as Provincial Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to
prove her one-year residency for she has never recognized her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American
citizen.

2. Additional Qualifications:
- Social Justice Society v DDB [drug testing]: Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed
COMELEC resolution, imposes an additional qualification for candidates for senator. As couched, said Sec. 36(g)
unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of
a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be
proclaimed as senator-elect. Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations.
Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution.

Section 7 The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall
begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election.
No member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
NOTES:
- Term – period of time allotted to the office by law (legislators – 6 years/3 year)
- Tenure – period of time the officer actually holds office (not necessarily aligned)
The case of Dimaporo v. Mitra which held that “filing of COC for a different position is a voluntary
renunciation” has been abandoned because of the Fair Elections Act. New rule: An elective official
who files his certificate of candidacy is not considered ipso facto resigned, an appointive official
however who files a COC is deemed ipso facto resigned. (Farinas v. Executive Secretary, 2003)
Section 8 Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House
of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
Section 9 In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to - Lucero v COMELEC [ requisites of special elections]:Lucero lost to Ong for the position of district representative of
fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
If there is a vacancy it is NOT MANDATORY to have a special election, the matter is left to the
discretion of congress.
Lucero Case: In case of special elections there is no need to fill in unless Congress decides to.
However, if there is a failure of elections Congress MUST fill in the vacancy.
#WalangE1nan
- Dimaporo v Mitra [forfeiture of elective position; term]: After filing a COC for the position of Regional Governor of
ARMM, Dimaporo's name was excluded from the Roll of Members of the HOR pursuant to the Omnibus Election Code
which provides that any elective office is deemed resigned from his office upon filing of his COC for another position.
Having lost in the 1990 elections for the position of RG of ARMM, petitioner expressed his intention to the Speaker of the
HOR -to resume performing his duties and functions as elected Member of Congress,- but he failed in his bid to regain his
seat. The Court held that “filing of COC for a different office/position is constitutes a voluntary renunciation of the elective
office”. A public office is a public trust. Public officers should serve with the highest degree of responsibility and integrity.
Rationale: If you allow an elective officer to file for another office other than the one he was elected to, then that clearly
shows that he did not intend to serve the mandate of the people which was placed upon him and therefore he should be
considered ipso facto resigned. The filling of a certificate shall be considered as an overt act or abandoning or relinquishing
his mandate to the people and he should therefore, resign if he want to seek another position which he feels he could be of
better service.
FURTHERMORE, Petitoner’s contention that the “voluntary renunciation of office” cuts short the term of office of a Member
of Congress does NOT hold water. “Term” is different from “tenure” of office. The term of office prescribed by the
Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature. However, the period during which an officer actually holds
the office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than
the term or it may not even exist at all. Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a
certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, NOT his term. The term
remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.
Northern Samar. Lucero moved for a special election in light of the snatched ballots at precinct 13 wherein no elections were
held. The court described the REQUISITES FOR SPECIAL ELECTIONS:(1) That there is a failure of election;and (2) That
such failure would affect the results of the election. If the difference in the total number of votes between the two
congressmen is less than the total voters of precinct 13, there would be a special election because the results can affect the
winner.
Furthermore, as regards the FIXING OF THE DATE OF THE SPECIAL ELECTIONS, the Comelec should see to it that (1)
it should not be later than 30 days after the cessation of the cause of the postponement or suspension of the election or failure
to elect; and (2) it should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in failure to
elect. In the case, the delay was primarily caused by the legal skirmishes and maneuvers of the petitioners, therefore the
holding of the special election after almost 2 years may still be deemed to be reasonably close to the date of the election not
held.
- Tolentino v COMELEC [special and regular elections; RA6645]: Pres. GMA nominated Senator Guingona as Vice-
President, thus, leaving a vacancy in the Senate. The Senate passed Res. 84 [provided that the candidate with the 13th highest
number of votes shall serve for the unexpired term of former Sen. Guingona which was 3 years] calling on COMELEC to fill
the said vacancy through a special election to be held SIMULTANEOUSLY with the regular elections on May 2001. The
petitioners assailed the validity of the special election as it failed to give additional notice as required by RA6645.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing the date of the special
election, which shall not be earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy
in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give
notice to the voters of, among other things, the office or offices to be voted for.
The Court ruled that the special election was held validly. Sec. 2 of RA 6645 (which was passed to implement art 6, sec. 9 of
the constitution), EXPRESSLY PROVIDES that in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. In a special election, the rule is that if a statute expressly provides
that an election to fill the vacancy shall be held at the next regular election, the statute FIXES the date, hence, the election is
NOT INVALIDATED by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty to give notice (in this case, COMELEC) failed
to do so. (as opposed to if the law does not fix the time and place but empowers some authority to fix those, the statutory
provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory and failure to do so will make election void) The law then charges
the voters with knowledge of the statutory notice and COMELEC’s failure to give additional notice does not negate the
election.
 #WalangE1nan

- Ocampo v HRET [rule on second placers]: In an elective office: the issue is eligibility of the officer-elect; the court or
tribunal cannot declare the protestant (or the candidate who the second highest number of votes) as having been elected. The
fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the
office does not give the candidate who obtained the 2nd highest number of votes the right to be declared the winner of the
elective office. After the HRET had declared Mark Jimenez ineligible for office, Pablo Ocampo, the second placer, moved
that he be declared the winner, the SC said that there must be a final judgment (of disqualification) before the election in order
that the votes of the disqualified candidate can be considered “stray”. The obvious rationale is that in voting for a candidate
who has not been disqualified by final judgment during election day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any
intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom
they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government. Thus, to proclaim the second placer would be anathema to the
most basic precepts of republicanism and democracy enshrined in our Constitution. It would, in effect, be advocating a
massive disenfranchisement of the majority of the voters of the 6th district of Manila.

Section 10 The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No
increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.
Section 11 A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more 1. Privileges from Arrest:
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member - People v Jalosjos [convicted legislator]:The SC denied the motion of Congressman Jalosjos that he be allowed to fully
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
discharged the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee hearings despite his
any committee thereof. having been convicted by the trial court of a non-bailable offense. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members
to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
NOTES: basis for valid classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial
- Immunity only works while congress is in session; whether or not the legislator is present distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
- Applies for offenses punishable by not more than 6 years of imprisonment (Trillanes v Pimentel – Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
Reclusion Perpetua, therefore immunity does not apply) The denial was premised on the following:
- Immuned from arrest, but not immuned from suit (different from President's immunity from suit) [i] membership in Congress does not exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons;
Parliamentary immunity: Congress not precluded to punish you, can work outside Congress as long [ii] one rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense, i.e., it is the
as made in the exercise of function (see also Osmeña v Pendatun) injury to the public, not the injury to the complainant, which state action in criminal law seeks to redress;
[iii] election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. It would amount to
the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they
would be considered immune from arrest during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same (i.e.
being an elective official does not result in a substantial distinction that allows a different treatment); and
[iv] accused-appellant is provided with an office at the House of Representatives with a full complement of staff, as well as an
office at the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, where he attends to his constituents; he has, therefore, been
discharging his mandate as member of the HOR, and being a detainee, he should not even be allowed by the prison authorities
to perform these acts.
- Trillanes v Pimentel [re-election to office and criminal charge]: Antonio Trillanes, a detention prisoner in relation to the
“Oakwood incident” sought leave that he be allowed to attend to his official functions as Senator. He anchored his motion on
his right to be presumed innocent, and claims that the Jalosjos ruling should not be applied to him, because he is a mere
detention prisoner and is not charged with a crime involving moral turpitude. The SC denied Trillanes’ petition on the ground
that Sec. 13, Art. 3 of the Consti, explicitly provides that crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua are nonbailable. There is
not distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged. The provisions apply
equally to rape (Jalosjos; crime involving moral turpitude) and coup d’etat cases (Trillanes) because both are punishable by
reclusion perpetua. The Court further said that the presumption of innocence does not necessarily carry with it the full
enjoyment of civil and political rights. Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense
applies equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners like Jalosjos. Neither does the condonation doctrine
apply. The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. There is likewise no prior term to speak of. Neither does it
apply to criminal cases.
 #WalangE1nan

Rationale: His electoral victory only signifies that when the voters elected him to the Senate, they did so with full awareness
of the limitations on his freedom of action and with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which
he could accomplish within the confines of prison. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers
has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
Condonation: doctrine in administrative law that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct
committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to
the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefore. [we no longer practice condonation]

2. Parliamentary freedom of speech and debate

- Jimenez v Cabangbang [coverage]: Although a member of the HOR, Cabangbang’s publication of the letter imputing
several AFP members to a planned coup is not covered by privileged communication as it was not in the performance of his
official duties. Protected “speech or debate” refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as
well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either
in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in
question.
- Pobre v Defensor-Santiago [violation of lawyer's oath]: Santiago made a statement of her personal anger and frustration at
not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. Even when the Court is not hesistant to impose some form of disciplinary
authority on Santiago, the Court could not impose disciplinary sanctions upon the her because of her Constitutional Privilege
of Parliamentary Immunity. Doing such would result to encroachment of powers of Legislative Body. THEREFORE, SC
REFERRED the matter to Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action bc court feels that the lady senator has
gone beyond the limits of decency and good conduct. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct
also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.

Parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the
Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege
accorded to the individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the
benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.
Section 12 All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a
full disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the House concerned of a
potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are
authors.
Section 13 No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in - Dante Liban v Gordon [Office of PNRC Chairman]: The Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Chairman is not an
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned official or employee of the Executive branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither Constitution; Not being a government official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office
shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased or employment. Thus ,the fact that Gordon is the chairman does not mean that he forfeits his seat in the Senate. The PNRC is
during the term for which he was elected. not government-owned but privately owned, privately funded, and privately run. The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC
members are private individuals; and it must be autonomous, neutral, and independent pursuant to the National Society of the
NOTES: Movement.
Two prohibitions
1. They cannot hold office or employment in government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality (does
not prevent the legislators from private interest, they can still have private interest)
-If they accept employment in any other office in the government, they automatically forfeit their
seat in the congress
2. Prohibition on appointment to office that is created during the term in which he or she is elected
- Applies to the entire duration of the term and not tenure, even if you resign it still applies
 #WalangE1nan

Section 14 No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any
court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary,
during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for
his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
- Puyat v De Guzman [appearing "in intervention"]: Members of the Batasang Pambasa are not allowed to appear as
counsel before an administrative body. Especially so if he merely enters as an intervenor, and claims he has interest over the
case right after buying stocks the moment he was disqualified to appear as counsel. Without this prohibition, an assemblyman
who would like to influence an administrative body can just simply acquire a minimal participation in the interest of the client
and then intervene anytime.

There are three prohibitions under Sec. 14:

1. Personal appearance as counsel before any court, quasi-judicial body, or tribunal
2. Direct or indirect financial interest in any government contract, franchise or special privilege during
his term.
-The contracts referred to here are those involving "financial interest," that is, contracts from which
the legislator expects to derive some profit at the expense of the government.
- Provision uses the word “term” and not “tenure”
3. Intervention in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where
he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

Section 15 The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session,
unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it
may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays,
Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.

Section 16 (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority
vote of all its respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and
under such penalties, as such House may provide.
(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A
penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any
question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn
for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
NOTES:
1. (par 1) Election of officers (see Baguilat)
- Congress becomes properly organize once the officers have been elected (Senate president, Speaker
of the House)
- Majority and Minority floor leaders– not the officers recognized by the Constitution
- Each house may decide on how they will appoint choose the other officers
- Election of the Senate President and Speaker = by majority vote of ALL the members, not just
majority of
the house but all the members of the House (look at the total membership, not just the majority of the
quorum present)
2. (par. 2) Quorum to do business (see Avelino)
- majority of the members
- If there is less than majority, the smaller number can adjourn day to day and can compel the
attendance of absent members
3. (par. 3) Internal rules and discipline of Congress (see Arroyo)
- General Rule – internal matters or the internal rules are beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, the Congress can choose to suspend their own rulesException – if the legislative rule affects
private rights, they cannot suspend it
- Relevant: Sec 21 (hearings in aid of legislation—involve private individuals, those affected by the
rule under Sec. 16 which authorizes Congress to suspend or implement its own rules)
4. (par. 3) The ability of each house to punish its members for disorderly behavior (see Osmeña
and Santiago cases)
- If you are going to discipline your own member, it must be concurrence of 2/3 of that house o If you
want suspend a member of the HOR/Senator – suspension must not exceed 60 days o HOR cannot
discipline a Senator, - Senator cannot discipline a member of the HOR
#WalangE1nan
1. Officers of Congress
- Baguilat Jr v Speaker Alvarez [majority and minority]: Senator Baguilat claims that he should be the minority leader since
it was a long standing practice in Congress that the candidate for House Speaker with the 2nd highest number of votes shall
be the minority leader. The Court ruled that the Constitution only provided for the manner of electing the Senate President
and House Speaker, the mechanism for electing other officers are at the discretion of each Houses and embodied in their own
internal rules. Since these are matters of internal procedures, they are not permanent in nature and can be changed. Since
before the voting commenced, Fariñas clarified the mechanism for electing Majority and Minority Leader and there was no
opposition to it prior to the votation. Then, this has become part of the House's internal rules.
2. Meaning of "quorum to do business" and "compulsion to attend"
- Avelino v Cuenco [par. 2; quorum]: Avelino was removed as Senate President when he walked out along with 9 other allies
during a session. The 12 senators who were left then and there moved to vote for Senator Cuenco as SP. Avelino claims that
there was no quorum and that to validly elect another SP, the votes of the 12 left should've been unanimous. The Court ruled
"Majority of each House shall constitute a quorum", "Each House" did not mean "all members" but those available not
counting senators abroad. Since 1 Senator was abroad, he wasn't counted and 23/2 = 11.5 so 12 senators constitutes a quorum.
The court also ruled that they did not need to vote unanimously to approve or dissaprove a motion, since what is needed is the
majority vote of the quorum.
- People v Jalosjos [detention as valid reason not to attend]:
- Datu Abas Kida v Senate [supermajority]: RA 10153 was passed synchronizing the elections of the ARMM with the
national and local elections of the country. Petitioners question its validity since they said it was repealing RA 9054 without
abiding with the provision of Article 17 Section 1 saying that "a vote of no less than 2/3 of each House voting separately is
needer to effectively amend RA 9054". The Court ruled that the Constitution provides that as long as majority of the members
are present, and within the quorum a vote of majoirty is sufficient to enact or approve acts. The supermajority vote
requirement in RA 9054 serves to restrain the supposed plenary power of Congress and has an effect of passing an
irrepealable law which is invalid.
3. International Rules and Discipline:
- Arroyo v De Venecia [par. 3; determination of rules]: The validity of RA 8240 or sin taxes was being assailed due to the
alleged violation of the rules of the House which petitioner contends to be constitutionally mandated. He claims that House
failed to abide by its rules of procedure when it ignored the motion of Rep. Arroyo before voting to approve said law. The
Court ruled that the violation that petitioner contends is a matter of internal procedure, which is at the discretion of each
House. The Court cannot take cognizance unless there is a violation of private rights or constitutional provisions.
- Osmeña v Pendatun [par. 3; disorderly behavior]: Congressman Osmeña delivered a privilege speech wherein he gave
serious allegations about the President. The House suspended him for 15 months. He contends that under Section 15 of
Article 6, he has parliamentary immunity. The Court ruled that Section 15 guarantees the legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear from criminal or civil actions before the courts and any other forum outside the Congressional Hall.
However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself. Rule 17 Section 7 of Rules of House
recognized its power to hold members responsible for words spoken in debate. Thus, Congress can discipline Osmeña for his
disorderly behavior.
- Santiago v Sandiganbayan [order of suspension]: Senator Santiago was charged of violation of Anti-Graft and Corruption
Law. As a result, Sandiganbayan issued a decision suspending Santiago for 90 days. Santiago assails authority of SB to issue
said preventive suspension. The Court said that the issuance of an order of suspension is a ministerial duty of the Court upon
determinantion that an information is valid. The order of suspension is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its
members since the former is a preventive suspension and the latter is a penalty.
4. Duty to keep Journals and Records:
- US v Pons [journal and records]: Pons was being charged with a violation of a law that according to him was actually
passed by Congress on March 1 already but on the midnight of February 28, Congress stopped the clock to be able to reach
the deadline to be able to pass said law. He claims that he shouldn't be charged since the law was enacted when COngress
shouldn't be in session anymore, he presented witnesses who testified to his claim. The Court ruled that imperative reasons of
public policy require that the authenticity of laws should rest upon public memorials of the most permanent character. Public
documents shall be given greater weight than oral testimonies since the latter is susceptible to faulty memory of witnesses.
- Casco v Gimenez [journal and records]: Casco imported urea and formaldehyde. He contends that the term "urea
formaldehyde" in RA 2609 should be construed as "urea and formaldehyde since the bill approved in Congress contained the
conjunction "and" between the two terms. He cited statement made on the Senate floor to back his claims. The Court ruled
that statemets made do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate or intent of the HOR. The enrolled bill contains "urea
formaldehyde" and not the one with "and". Enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts.
 #WalangE1nan

NOTES: - Astorga v Villegas [enrolled bill]: Senator Tolentino claims that the enrolled copy of a HB recently enacted into law was a
5. (para. 4) Journal records wrong version of the bill approved by Senate. The SP, upon learning this, officially withdrew his signature and clarified that
1. Journal – abbreviated account of daily proceedings (personal journal) (See Pons) this meant that hsi signature in the enrolled bill is invalid and no effect. The President also withdrew his signature. Astora, the
- May be published from time to time except that congress may exclude parts of it that affects national Vice Mayor affected by said HB, contends that the attestation already made is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment. The
security Court ruled that there is nothing too imporatant in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of
- Value – it ensures publicity of the proceedings and the corresponding responsibility of members to authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved, and the certification does not add to the
certain constituents and provides for what actually transpired in the legislature validity of the bill nor cure any defect it has prior to passage. It is the approval of Congress and not the signature of the oficers
- Has conclusive weight since it is an official act of the legislature – its as if the legislature created his
that is essential. To prove whether the text is the actual text approved by Congress, they looked at the journal and it affirms
own diary the allegations of Senator Tolentino, and so the bill was not duly enacted into law.
2. Records – word per word transcript of the deliberations of congress - Abakada v Ermita [bicameral committee]: There were disagreeing provisions in the House and Senate versions for the
3. Enrolled bill – duly authenticated copy of the bill or resolution with the signature of the speaker and
RVAT. To reconcile these and pursuant to Congress rules, they formed the BCC. The BCC inserted several provisions like
president, and is duly authenticated by both secretaries from both houses (see Casco) the standby authority of the President and erased the "No pass" provision. Petitioners question the constitutionality of RA
- Enrolled bill prevails over the Journal because it is conclusive and it is certified and authenticated 9337 since BCC made changes into it. The Court ruled that parliamentary rules are merely procedural and Congress is best
(see Astorga) judge of how it should conduct its own business.The issue raised cannot be taken up by the Court since it is only an interal
rule of each house.
Section 17 The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the 1. Nature and power of electoral tribunal
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective - Angara v Electoral Commission [nature and power]: Angara was proclaimed member of the National Assembly. Ysnua
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be filed a protest within the time frame given by the Electoral Commission. Angara contends that Electoral Commission has no
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be jurisdiction and that he was already proclaimed a member of the Nat'l Assembly. The Court ruled that the Constitution vested
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on upon the Electoral Commission to be "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations members." Thus, it was acting within its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognziance of the protest. Being an
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal independent constitutional body, it can promulgate its own rules and regulations.
shall be its Chairman. - Reyes v COMELEC [sole judge; supra sec 6]: Private respondent claims that petitioner's COC for representative of lone
district of Marinduque is defective because it contained material misrepresentation since she was an American citizen.
NOTES: COMELEC cancelled her COC due to her failure to comply with RA 9225 for naturalization. She was proclaimed winner and
- Composition: 3 members from the SC, 6 members from the Congress on the basis of proportional took her oath but is yet to assume office. COMELEC issued certificate of finality declaring her COC void. She now assails
representation the jurisdiction of COMELEC. Court ruled that the COMELEC ends authority only when an candidate is proclaimed winner,
- Definition of election contest: (See Vera v Avelino) takes oath, and assumes office. Since, she is yet to assume office COMELEC still has jurisdiction. WIth regards to her
- Filed by one legislator against another: (See Vera also) nationality, she failed to comply with the requirements of RA 9225. For her residency, a Filipino who becomes naturalized
- Jurisdiction of COMELEC ends and HRET begins: (See Reyes or Abayon) elsewhere abandons his domicile of origin. Upon reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, he must show that she chose to
establish her domicile here and the period of residency shall be counted from the time she made it her domicile of choice.
There is no showing that she abandoned her previous domicile since she is still an American citizen.

2. Election Contest
- Vera v Avelino [definition of election contest]: Senate issued a resolution preventing petitioners to be sworn and seat as
members of the Senate pending reolution of the protest against them. The petitioners instituted this action against their
colleagues and the jurisdiction of the Senate in issuing said resolution. The Court ruled that the functions given to the
Electoral Tribunal only included "sole judge of contests relating to the elections...". Electoral contests "relate only to statutory
contests in which the contestant seeks not only to oust winner, but also to have himself inducted into the office". Since those
who questioned their qualification are among their peers in the Senate, the tribunal has no jurisdiction and the Congress
maintains its jurisdiction. The Senate has under parliamentary practice, the power to inquire into the credentials of any
member.
- Roces v HRET [standing to contest]: Miles Roces & Harry Ang-Ping were competitors for 3rd Leg.Dist. of Manila,
registered voter Alejandro Gomez challenged Ang-Ping’s qualification (being not anatural-born citizen), Ang-Ping was
substituted by wife Zenaida. COMELEC denied due course, votes in favor of Ang-Ping not counted. COMELEC enbanc
(motu proprio) issued assailed resolution striking out Ang-Ping’s name & denying Mrs. Ang-Ping’s substitution. Ang-Ping
filed case before HRET w/c gave due course & permitted substitution. Hence, Roces filed present petition. The Court ruled
that The HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and quali cations of the members of the House
of Representatives and has the power to promulgate procedural rules to govern proceedings brought before it. This exclusive
jurisdiction includes the power to determine whether it has the authority to hear and determine the controversy presented. One
of the three essential elements of jurisdiction is that proper parties must be present. Consequently, the HRET merely exercised
its exclusive jurisdiction when it ruled that Mrs. Ang Ping was a proper party to contest the election of Roces.
 #WalangE1nan

- Guerrero v COMELEC [substitution]: Petitioner claims that Fariñas has a defective COC therefore questioning the validity
of his position as a member of the HOR and he claims he is the rightful owner. Fariñas already took his oath and assumed
office. COMELEC dismissed the claim saying that it has no jurisidiction over the case. The Court ruled that HRET already
assumes jurisdiction and that the issue of defective COC and the invalid substitution which is a statutory requirement made by
COMELEC is also under the authority of HRET. The Constitution provided that the function of HRET is "to be the sole judge
of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its members". There is no distinction between
constitutionally mandated qualifications and those prescribed by statutes.
- Abayon v HRET [jurisdiction over party-list]: Abayon's qualification to sit in the HOR is being questioned since they claim
that he and his party-list do not represent the M&UR sectors. Abayon claims that HRET had no jurisdiction over his person
since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the HOR. The Court said
that although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes
a member of the HOR. The wording of the Constitution on those who will make up the HOR ("those who....shall be elected
through a party-list system") shows that it is the party-list representatives who are "elected" into office, not their parties or
organizations. By virtue of Article 6 Section 17, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed
and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.

3. Pre-proclamation controvery
- Chavez v COMELEC [pre-proclamation]: Melchor Chavez was diqualified to run as Senator. He then prays before
COMELEC to order said election officials to delete the name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates
tally sheets, election returns and to count all votes cast for him in favor of Francisco Chavez. The COMELEC resolved to
delete his name but not resolved the issue to count his votes in favor of Francisco. Hence, this petition. The Court said that
while the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local elective officials (Sec.
242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President,
Senator and Member of the House of Representatives
4. Composition
- Abbas v SET [judicial and legislative participation]: Abbas proposes that the rules on SET be amended to allow his portest
to be vote on only by the 3 justices-members of the SET, since he claims that the senators in the tribunal are interested party
to the protest. The Court ruled that the Constitution, by providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme
Court and Members of the Senate, it intended that both those "judicial" and "legislative" components commonly share the
duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The fact that the
proportion was 2 to 1, it is clear that the "legislative component" cannot be totally excluded from participation in the
resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. No amendment of
its rules can confer on 3 justices-members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

5. Independence:
- Bondoc v Pineda [non-partisan]: Pineda, a member of the LP, initially won as the representative for a district in Pampanga.
Upon protest of his rival, Bondoc from the NP, there was a recount of votes. After recount, it was found that Bondoc indeed
won. Senator Camasura of the LP, a member of the SET voted to elect Bondoc since he fairly won over Pineda. LP, in order
to contain the situation, expelled Camasura from its membership on grounds of disloyalty to his party. Since he was not a
member of the LP anymore, a resolution was promulgated removing him from the SET. The Court ruled that judges, the
members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, imparitality
and independence, even from the political party they belong. Thus, disloyalty to party is not a valid ground to expel a meber
of the tribunal.

6. Action/Decision:
- Lerias v HRET [election returns; best evidence]: Lerias initially won for representative of Souther Leyte. When a recount
of votes was being done for the district, unidentified men stole the ballot boxes but luckily left the election returns. Ind
eclaring Mercado as the rightful winner, they based it on photocopies of the COMELEC's COC instead of Lerias' original
copies of the COC of the MBOC and PBOC and the ERs of the MBOC. They claimed that they used the COMELEC's COC
since the latter had erasures and markings. The Court said that in an election contest where it involves correctness of the
number of votes of each candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves. If the ballots are not
available, ERs would be the best evidence. Considering this, Lerias would still be the winner.

Section 18 There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio
Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each
House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the
Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission
shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
NOTES:
Composition: 25 members (1 Senate President Ex-officio chairman, 12 senate, 12 HOR)
- 12 is not mandatory (See Guingona)
- Function is to accept or confer nominations
Section 19 The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days
after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the
President and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in
session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and
functions as are herein conferred upon it.
#WalangE1nan
- Daza v Singson [political alignment]: Daza was removed as representative of LP in the Commission on Appointments due
to the recent political realignment in the House where 24 members of LP joined the LDP swelling the latters numbers in the
HOR. Daza claims that the political realignment was invalid because LDP is not a a registered political party. The Court ruled
that the authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect
at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes
must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political
loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another. The contention that
LDP is not duly registered was debunked by COMELEC's resolution granting LDP's registration.
- Coseteng v Mitra [proportional representation]: Coseteng, the only candidate from KAIBA contends that she should be
appointed as member of the Commission on Appointments and HRET since she was endorsed ba 9 members of the minority.
The Court ruled that computing under proportional representation, for a party to secute a seat in the Commission, at least 10%
(depends on number of total members) of the members of the House should belong to said party. Since KAIBA only has one
member which is less than 1% of the House membership, she is not entitle to one of the 12 seats.
- Guingona v Gonzales [undue reduction of representation of another party]: Applying the formula for determination of
membership to Commission by each political party, LDP got 7.5, NPC got 2.5, LAKAS NUCD for 1.5, and LP-PDP-LABAN
fot .5. When they elected members, LDP rounded up to 8, NPC rounded down to 2, LAKAS to 1 and LP-PDO to 1. This
composition is now being questioned. The Court ruled that based on the mathematical computation of proportional
representation. each of these political parties is entitled to a fractional membership in the Commission on Appointments.
Rounding up constituted an undue reduction of the other parties' represenation. To fill the 12 positions is not mandatory. The
Court provided these guidelines: 1) In the Senate, a political party or coalition must have at least two duly elected senators for
every seat in the Commission on Appointments. 2) Where there are more than two political parties represented in the Senate,
a political party/coalition with a single senator in the Senate cannot constitutionally claim a seat in the Commission.