Magic: A Problem in Semantics

Author(s): Dorothy Hammond

Source: American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 72, No. 6 (Dec., 1970), pp. 1349-1356
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the American Anthropological Association
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Magic: A Problem in Semantics
DOROTHY HAMMOND
Brooklyn College, C.U.N.Y.
Anthropologists, from Tylor to the present, have defined magic that, although it might
so
shade into or overlap with religion, it is a separate phenomenon distinct from religion.
Theorists have made different features the chief means of differentiation,but no matter
how defined the distinction cannot be easily or consistently maintained. This paper
suggests that the concept of magic as a distinct entity is the factitious result of ethno-
centric classification, and that magic should be included within religion as one type of
the practices of which religious ritual is composed. [magic; religion; theory, history of]

OF a considerable pears to be an inherent contradiction be-

HE PUBLICATION
number of articles, compilations, and
monographsduring the last decade testifies
to movementof the anthropologicalstudy of
religion out of its long stay in the doldrums.
Reawakened theoretical interest has been
accompanied by renewal attacks on the
perdurable problem of definition. Current
definitionsare not sufficientlyincisive.To de-
fine religionin Tillich'stermsas "theultimate
concern" leads to the possible inclusion of
anythingfrom politics to sport and thus can-
not single out a specific cultural institution.
The even more prevalentdefinitionby refer-
ence to a dichotomybetweensecular and sa-
cred, the idea of the "set apart,"is a mere
circularity, religion being the attributionof
religious significance. Recent attempts at
definitionaim less at universalessences than,
more modestly, at a clear designationof the
topic. The need to provide a ready index for
identificationhas led a numberof anthropol-
ogists to resume Tylor's position that reli-
gion entails a belief in spiritual beings
(Goody 1961; Horton 1960; Spiro 1966).
Consistency in the application of Tylor's
definition commits these writers to another
of his concepts, that magic is to be consid-
ered as separate from religion. Spiro thus
includes magic with politics and art as func-
tional alternatives to religion (1966:116).
Horton describesmagic as "secular"(1960:
218). This logical consequenceof the defini-
tion is disconcerting,for it contains what ap-
Accepted for publication 20 November 1969.
1349
tween the ideas of "secular"and "supernatu-
ral." Moreover, the ethnographicdata com-
pel recognition that a sharp distinction be-
tween magic and religion can hardly be sus-
tained. Spiro, in the course of making a
point about religion in his narrow sense of
the term, illustrates his argument with a
magical belief (1966:110). This may be the
result of momentarycarelessness,but Spiro's
slip does demonstratethe difficultyof main-
taining consistency in the differentiation.
Evans-Pritchard,who also advocates a
clear distinctionbetween magic and religion
(1965:33), attributes the confusion con-
cerning their relationship to semantic diffi-
culties (1965:110). By this he means the
problemsof translatingthe diverseterminol-
ogies from various cultures into anthropo-
logical categories.But the semantic problem
is in reality twofold: it consists not only of
the difficulties of translation, but also the
more elementary issue of what anthropolo-
gists mean by their own concepts.
As a general rule, twentieth-centuryan-
thropologistsdo not dichotomize magic and
religion. They tend rather to hyphenate
them and refer explicitly or implicitly to
some sort of continuum. However, the con-
ception of magic and religion as overlapping
or intergradingphenomena still conveys the
idea that the terms denote at least partially
distinct entities. Despite the overlap, they
contrast sufficiently to indicate that the
terms have the same hierarchicalstatus in a
classificationof belief systems.
1350 American Anthropologist
The consensus on some distinction be-
tween magic and religion is limited to the
idea that there is a distinction.Beyond this,
a review of the literature discloses irrecon-
cilable disagreements among theorists, as
well as inconsistencies within discussions
and discrepancies between conceptual
schemes and ethnographicdata. The source
of the difficultymay well lie in the distinc-
tion itself. If the idea that magic and reli-
gion have equal categoricalstatus is rejected
and magic subordinatedwithin the more in-
clusive category, it follows that the distinc-
tion makes a part into an equivalent and
separate whole. This mixing of levels of
classificationwould account for the continu-
ing confusion of which Evans-Pritchardso
justly complains. Anthropologistshave been
struggling with the spurious, and therefore
insoluble, problem of the extent and content
of the contrast between religion and magic.
The real problem is what is the place of
magic in religion;how does the part fit into
the whole?
Like most ethnological terminology, reli-
gion and magic are words in common usage.
Their employment to classify institutionsof
other cultureshas necessitatedradicalredefi-
nition to free the terms from their cultural
matrix and to eliminate inherentvalue judg-
ments. To what extent all ethnocentrismhas
been overcome is open to question.Ward H.
Goodenough holds that anthropologicalus-
age still expresses ethnocentric rather than
objective judgment (1963:480). The fact
that current usage continues to reflect theo-
ries of nineteenth-centuryevolutionists sup-
ports his charge.The delineationof magic as
a distinct anthropologicalcategory is more
the work of Frazer than of any other single
theorist. By redefining religion as belief in
spiritual beings, Tylor had made it possible
to include a wide variety of belief systems in
the same category as Christianity. Magic,
however, he discussed merely as a survival;
thus relegated, the term retained its pejora-
tive connotation(Tylor 1889: Vol. 1, Ch. 4).
Frazer, however, related magic more closely
to religion, although an underlying ethno-
[72, 1970
centrism assigned magic to an earlier stage
in the evolution of belief systems. Because
he accepted Tylor's definition of religion,
personification served to differentiate be-
tween the earlier and later stages. Unlike re-
ligion, magical belief lacks personification,
and its practicesexploit supernaturalmecha-
nisms (Frazer 1900:48-60). These two
characteristics-impersonal forces and ma-
nipulative techniques-remain as current
criticaldiagnosticfeatures.
Durkheim and Malinowski each added
another dimension to the definition of
magic. Durkheim based his distinction on
the organization of personnel: religion in-
volves the community and establishes a
church, but magic concerns individualsand
forms only a clientele (1915:43-45). Mali-
nowski focused on the purposesof ritual.He
attributedintangible,long-termgoals to reli-
gious rituals in contrast to the employment
of magic to supplement inadequacies in
technology for the achievementof concrete,
immediateends (1948:67-70).
Because most supernaturalbelief systems
contain both personifiedand nonpersonified
conceptionsof supernaturalpower, the crite-
rion of personificationonly rarely permits
definite assignment. Frazer was entirely
aware of this fact, which he accounted for
as part of the evolutionary sequence. Such
beliefs representedtransitionsfrom magic to
religion or the conservative retention of
older elements into the later stage. But with-
out the explanation provided by an evolu-
tionary doctrine, the intermediateis merely
indeterminate, and much of the ethno-
graphic data demonstratethe inadequacyof
the criterion.
The differentiationmade by Durkheimre-
ceived one of its most direct attacks from
Warner on the basis of his fieldwork in
Australia (1937:229-243). Among the
Murngin, the same totemic rituals are used
for individualtherapyas for communalwel-
fare; the communityis directly or indirectly
participantin transactionsbetween the ma-
gician and client, and thus magic has a
church no differentfrom religion. Other de-
HAMMOND] Magic: A Problem in Semantics
scriptive materials bear out Warner'spoint
that the line between public and private is
extremely tenuous.
Malinowski'scontrast between the practi-
cal goals of magical ritual and the broad so-
cial values fostered by religious ritual seems
to hinge more on terminologythan on sub-
stance. The differenceseems to be a stylistic
choice of concrete or abstract phrasing.
Trobriandgarden magic for a plentiful har-
vest contributesnot only to subsistencebut
also to those values to Trobriandethos ex-
pressed in the production of excessive
amounts of food and its lavish display. The
analysis of what social values mean in spe-
cific terms often reveals that the "good life"
of a people entails, or is symbolized by,
good crops or increase in cattle herds or
some equally material good. And it is more
the symbolic significanceof these items than
the technological uncertainty that tends to
surround them with ritual (W. H. Good-
enough 1963:478; Nadel 1957:193).
When applied to ethnographicdata, none
of these theories completely differentiates
magic from religioneven in regardto the se-
lected critical trait. Nor do they correlate
with one another; the increase ceremonies
of the Arunta are classed as religion by
Durkheim but magic by Frazer, and Tro-
briand garden rituals, which Malinowski
terms magic, would be religion accordingto
Durkheim. If more features are taken into
account, the line blurs all the more.
Marett is probably the best-known early
theorist to advance the concept of a magi-
coreligious continuum (1914:28). He con-
curred in Frazer's concept of magic as an
earlier stage of religion, but his own judg-
ment that belief in mana was as much reli-
gion as animism led him to reject personifi-
cation as a main criterion and to reject a
clear-cut distinctionbetween magic and reli-
gion.
Benedict, far more than Marett, cogently
formulated the idea that magic and religion
form a continuum. She disregardedevolu-
tionary sequence and put aside most of the
discrepantsubsidiarycriteria to concentrate
1351
on the conception of supernaturalpower.
Benedict describedreligion as entailing two
polar attitudes,one of which might predomi-
nate in a given instance, but both might be
expressed simultaneously. These attitudes
Benedict termed "animism," Tylor's con-
cept, and "animatism,"adapted from Mar-
ett. Maretthad coined "animatism"to desig-
nate a primitive diffuse supernaturalism
from which animism and mana had both
evolved (1914:14). In Benedict'susage, ani-
mism reflects "man's experience with per-
sons" and animatism reflects their "experi-
ence with things" (1938:647). Practice fol-
lows concept: where the supernaturalis per-
sonified, ritual strives for rapport;where the
supernaturalis impersonal,ritual strives for
control. Mana and its analogues-wakan,
manitu, and orenda--conceptualize the im-
personal supernatural. Magic falls neatly
into place as the body of formalized proce-
dures by which such power is controlledand
utilized.
Goode, like Benedict, dismisses dichot-
omy in favor of a continuum.Unlike Bene-
dict, he does not bypass the differentcriteria
suggestedby various theoristsbut boldly at-
tempts to overcome the contradictions
within and among the separate schemes by
combining them all into a single structure.
His suggested bipolar continuum opposes
ideal types of magic and religion in which
magic contrastswith religion in the concrete
specificity of its goals, its manipulativeatti-
tude, instrumentalcharacter,belief in imper-
sonal power, professional-client relation-
ships, individualism, voluntarism, and un-
scheduled performance(1951:52-55).
Goode's model rests on the expectation
that on analysis the descriptive data will
form significant clusters toward the two
poles. If the traits do not exhibit substantial
correlation,the ideal types are merely hypo-
thetical constructs. There seems to have
been little testing of the actual extent of cor-
relation on which the relevance of Goode's
model depends. Notable exceptions, how-
ever, come readily to mind. Australian in-
crease ceremonies are manipulative but
1352 American Anthropologist [72, 1970
communaland obligatory.Trobriandgarden of primitivereligion magic clearly has cogni-
ritual is instrumentalwith specific concrete tive value. Benedict, like Marett, relied on
goals, but it is also obligatory, communal, mana or mana-likeconcepts to explicate the
and calendrical. Among the Zuni, the gods world view implicitin magic.
may be manipulatedratherthan supplicated. The critics of this interpretation have
Bunyoro magic horns used instrumentallyin pointed out its major flaw. Malinowski
behalf of a client become "personalized" surely goes too far in his dismissalof mana
(Beattie 1967:229). concepts as part of religion at all (1948:
Of the two continuum models, Benedict's 58). Norbeck, however, justly contendsthat
has had wider influence.Her comprehensive many ethnographic accounts of magic de-
and economical theory, Norbeck (1961:35) scribe no such concept nor indicate that the
notes, provides the conceptual basis implicit practitionersof magic entertain any idea of
in the analysesof many ethnologists.A sam- this kind (1963:510). Apparent logical ne-
pling of the literature confirms Norbeck's cessity or desire for a neat theory are insuffi-
comment. There is some shying away from cient grounds for imputing its covert pres-
the term "supernatural";"nonempirical"is ence.
substituted as though "empirical"were any Norbeck (1961:49), therefore, suggests
less a category of the observer than "natu- that religion includes three power concepts:
ral." An occasional obeisance is made to personifiedpower, impersonalpower such as
other variables, but discussionslargely tend mana, and "a conceptionof supernaturalef-
to follow Benedict's emphasis on concep- ficiency or power inherent in certain me-
tions of supernaturalpower and the modes chanical cause and effect sequences." In
of access to it. short, although some magical practices can
In much of the writing the terms most be related to mana, a large residue appears
frequentlyassociatedwith magic are "imper- as unexplainedautomaticefficacy.Magic ex-
sonal," "mechanical," "automatic," "com- ploits a seeming cause-and-effectsequence
pulsive," "coercive," "efficient," "learned without any accountingfor either the nature
techniques,"and "acquiredskills." Such as- of the cause or the nexus between them.
sociations indicate that usage gives more Some anthropologiststake this qualityof be-
weight to the employmentof power than to ing inexplicable to be the very essence of
the nature of the power. This emphasis what constitutes magic. It is a "mysterious
seems a naturalcorollaryof the shifts in an- art" (Bidney 1963:505); magic lacks theory
thropological interest. Nineteenth-century (Howells 1948:49); magic has no cosmo-
theorists such as Tylor and Frazer were pri- logical content (Middleton 1967:ix); magic
marily concerned with the cognitive func- specifically refers to that which cannot be
tion of religion. For a considerable time made orderly and comprehensible(Galtier
thereafter, attention turned to sociological 1963:506).
and affective functions. Discussions of these If magical systems are without rationale
subjects could refer to the procedures of or meaning,it is their pervasivenessand per-
magic without much concern for the con- sistence that are truly inexplicable.Magic is
ception of its power. presumed to have only expressive functions
More recently,however, reflectinggeneral and an attributedinstrumentalutility. But it
intellectualinterest in problemsof meaning, is most unlikely that magic can have these
anthropologists are again turning to the values for human beings unless they some-
study of how men create a meaningfulorder how perceive its relevance to their concep-
out of their experiencesin a chancy and in- tion of reality. Otherwise, magic is utterly
differentuniverse: "attemptsto provide ori- anomalous-a symbol without a referent, a
entation for an organism which cannot live projectionwithout a source.
in a world it is unable to understand" There are substantial data to show that
(Geertz 1968:314). In Benedict's analysis such a position is hardly tenable. The fairly
 HAMMOND] Magic: A Problem in Semantics
frequent attribution of all deaths and major
misfortunes to witchcraft and sorcery, for
example, patently demonstrates cognition in
magic. Witchcraft and sorcery reflect social
conflict and obviously express hostility and
resentment of loss. Rituals are used as in-
struments of prevention and vengeance, but
they also express a cosmology. The cosmos
is held to be benign or neutral; evil derives
from the character of human beings. No
matter how elliptically phrased, it is a seri-
ous statement about the nature and locus of
evil.
Primitive societies rarely produce their
own theologians. Usually the task of ab-
stracting conceptual content from symbolic
expression in myth and ritual devolves on
ethnologists who have tended to concentrate
on myth. Kluckhohn (1965:147) suggests
that the preference reflects the importance
of statements of belief in Western religions.
Perhaps it has seemed easier to move from
one set of words-the myth-to another set
of words-a statement of its meaning-than
to translate rituals into statements. That
which is communicated by a gesture is often
hard to put into words.
With difficulty or not, a reasonably close
reading of the anthropological literature dis-
closes that magic ritual does indeed commu-
nicate its meaning. The gesture is under-
stood, but the commenters seem to resist
recognizing their own insight. Those who
deny cognition in magic seem not to be lis-
tening to what they themselves say. Howells,
for example, in one passage finds no ade-
quate explanation for the potency of magic
(1948:49-50); elsewhere he writes that
magic gives man the "conviction that he can
take care of himself. . . . Man can put his
best foot forward with magic; he can act on
his own behalf. . ." (1948:63).
Statement after statement can be found
that point to the central concept in magic.
"In magic man depends on his own strength
." (Frazer 1900:711). "Magic is the one
and only specific power, a force unique of
its kind, residing exclusively in man..."
(Malinowski 1948:56). "Magic is not
thought to take place by itself .... It is only
1353
when men make magic . . . that results are
to be expected" (Beattie 1964:206). Magic
"is never looked upon as one of the forces
of nature which can be utilized by man, but
is regarded as a cherished cultural posses-
sion which derives its powers from man's
abstinence and from his knowledge of tradi-
tion" (Evans-Pritchard 1967:4). The power
that makes magic effective is a projection of
man's capacity to act effectively by means of
his knowledge and skill.
Analysis of myths for the meaning of
magic also seems to have encountered some
anthropological resistance. It is true, as Na-
del remarks, that there are magical systems
without associated myths (1957:192); but
this sometimes can also be said of other
kinds of rituals. According to Evans-Pritch-
ard, the relatively few Zande myths about
magic do not account for its power (1967:
10-12). Although Trobriand mythology is
much richer, Malinowski emphasized that it
too lacks such explanation (1948:117).
There are, however, myths elsewhere that do
have bearing on what magic signifies. In
Winnebago mythology Hare achieves a
sense of identity with his human kinsmen;
with the acquisition of arrows, a bow, and
the skill to use them he acquires the sym-
bolic essence of human culture. And thus, as
the exemplar of what is truly human, he
proceeds to make curing rituals (Radin
1948).
It is hard to see how a myth could more
plainly state its meaning than the Nupe myth
that tells of a man who once attempted to
seek out god. His long arduous quest was
fruitless, and he returned to report that god
was both distant and indifferent. Men, there-
fore, must help themselves by learning how
to make "medicine" (Nadel 1954:17-18).
The reluctance to find the rituals and myths
of magic meaningful might hint that anthro-
pologists too share the attitude Malinowski
(1948:51) describes: seems to stir
".'Magic'
up in everyone some hidden mental forces,
some lingering hopes in the miraculous,
some dormant beliefs in man's mysterious
possibilities."
These human potentialities are not so
1354 American Anthropologist
mysterious. Norbeck (1961:50) suggests
that magic has its mundane analogue in
technology. To a certain extent this is obvi-
ously true, and yet it seems to miss the main
point. Horton (1968:66) arguesthat a tech-
nological prototype tends to give rise to ex-
planatory models that are secular or scien-
tific in character. Although this sequence
need not be universallytrue, it supportsthe
idea that magic and technology per se are
not closely linked. Magic seems to concern
techniques far less than the user's skill,
knowledge,or talents. Leach's comment that
mark. But "libido" in the strictly psycho-
tency" (1967:98) is perhaps closer to the
the mark.But "libido"in the strictlypsycho-
analytic sense-and judging by the tenor of
his article that is how Leach means it--
scarcely refers directly to man's capacity for
effective action on the basis of culturallyac-
quired skills. Levi-Straussplainly considers
magic to be a projection of human action,
but he does not make entirely clear the
groundsfor his interpretation.Moreover,his
analysis seems to involve an unnecessarily
complex sequence of processes of projec-
tion, introjection, and reprojection (1966:
220-221).
On the whole, it seems both economical
and reasonable to reinterpret Norbeck's
triad of power concepts on the basic as-
sumption that these are best understood as
projective symbols. The power of spiritual
beings reflects the authorityof other people.
(Whether this is the authorityof the clan as
Durkheim had it or that of the father in the
Freudian view is here immaterial.) Magical
power reflects the capabilities of the self,
and mana, the dynamic forces of the physi-
cal universe.
Man's ability to acquire skills and use
them to shape his world is thus projectedas
one of the universal superordinatepowers.
The traditionalhostility between deistic be-
lief and magical belief is understandable.An
ideology that holds man to be wholly depen-
dent on powerful gods must view a concep-
tion of man as one of the ruling forces in
the cosmos as hubris of a most literal and
damnablekind.
[72, 1970
Erwin R. Goodenough, discussing the
persistenceof magical practices in Judaism,
writes that religious symbols "originallyof
direct and inherent power . . . have grad-
ually been made to refer in additionto more
remote spiritual forces" (1953:160). The
use of the adjective "remote"is highly sug-
gestive. In small-scalesocieties, effective ac-
tion is performedby the self and by familiar
others. In large-scale societies, the exercise
of power by distant authoritiesor even un-
known agents may provide the source for
the projection of "remote spiritual forces."
But the immediaciesare never wholly super-
seded, and even those religions that place
most weight on a transcendentomnipotent
deity retain practices expressingthe projec-
tion of the immediate.
Spiro, who defines religion narrowly as
belief in superhumanbeings, argues that the
child's dependency on adults "develops im-
ages of powerful figures" and that these
"deep-seatedperceptivesets, acquiredin the
very early experienceof the child, comprise
the essential basis for the actor's conviction
that the beliefs which comprisethe religious
tradition of his society are true" (1964:
113). On the same basis it can be argued
that the validity of magical belief is equally
rooted in the child's experience. The child
quite early discovershis own power to sum-
mon and dismiss, to grasp and release, to
build and destroy. Maturationand encultu-
ration further his sense of mastery,and this
experiencewill be repeatedevery day of his
effectivelyfunctioninglife. Magic is no mere
compensatoryfantasy to palliate the inade-
quacies of primitive technologies. The sim-
pler hand technologieswould more likely in-
duce a greater sense of mastery than ma-
chine technology, no matter how productive
and efficient. Witness the satisfaction in
building a fire, even with the help of a box
of matches and the Sundaypaper,compared
to resetting the thermostat.Moreover, it is
not the incompetentsof a society who are
grantedmagicalpower.
The awarenessof the power of the self is
by no means necessarilylimited to mastery
over technological processes and material
 HAMMOND] Magic: A Problem in Semantics
objects.Although it is the dependencyof the
child that "developsimages of powerful fig-
ures," this need not develop an accompany-
ing feeling of utter helplessness.The beloved
child in almost any society may well have a
keen sense of his own ability to manipulate
adults. In the give-and-takeof intimate asso-
ciation those in subordinatepositions are not
without means to gain compliancewith their
desires from their superiors. And those in
positions of authority are obviously able to
control the actions of other people.
One must also recognize that beliefs in
impersonal power, such as mana, have an
equally early and significant base in the
child's experience with pressure, motion,
heat, light, and all the other manifestations
of a dynamic universe. There has been no
attempt in this paper to analyze mana con-
cepts. It has, however, been assumed that
the existence of impersonalpower is one of
the fundamental postulates of many reli-
gions.
The position that religious cosmology is
comprised of three equally legitimate con-
cepts of superordinatepower makes the real-
ity of magic as a separate entity altogether
doubtful. The potency symbolized in magi-
cal practices is interwoven with the other
powers. It can be used to exploit mana or
constrain the gods. Conversely, such power
may be the gift of a supernaturalbeing. It
seems appropriatethen to limit the range of
meaning of the term-to restrict"magic"to
the designationof mechanicalreligiousprac-
tices. This is, in effect, the way many an-
thropologistsactuallyuse the term, although
they do so without any explicit rationale.
Magic would serve as a denotation for one
type of ritual behavior, and thus belong to
the set of terms in that category, such as
prayer or sacrifice. With these propitiatory
rites it is contrastive,not with religion.
Just as prayerand sacrificeexpressthe be-
lief that the universeis governedby personi-
fied beings whom one can reach by words
and gifts, so magical practices express the
belief in human powers as effective forces.
The use of such practices in rituals ad-
dressedto the gods is not a discordantintru-
1355
sion of magic into religion. The composite
ritual states that the gods do not rule alone;
their will and power are accompaniedby the
will and power of men.
Examinationof the concept indicatesthat
the distinction between magic and religion,
whetherphrasedas dichotomyor polarity,is
unwarranted.Magic is not an entity distinct
from religion but a form of ritual behavior
and thus an element of religion. That the
distinction has led only to confusion sup-
ports the judgment that the abstraction is
based on misinterpretation.It has not only
falsified the relation between religion and
magic, and led to obscurantismconcerning
magic, but it has also given rise to a trun-
cated concept of religion as a whole. The
cosmological concepts inherent in religions
are more complex than belief in spiritualbe-
ings only. Because the index of "beliefin su-
perhuman beings" recognizes only one as-
pect of religion, it seems preferableto sub-
stitute the definitionthat religion entails be-
lief in superordinateagencies.
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