PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
DISTINCTION BETWEEN IGNORANCE OF
FACT AND IGNORANCE OF LAW
RODOLFO CARANTO, PETITIONER, v. ANITA
AGRA CARANTO, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 202889, March 2, 2020
Digest by: Jay J.L. Astillo
FACTS:
Respondent Anita Agra Caranto (Anita) is the registered owner of a
347-square-meter parcel of land situated in Mandaluyong City (TCT
7884). Rodolfo filed a complaint for reconveyance and cancellation
of TCT alleging that he is the brother of Juan, the husband of Anita.
In 1972, Juan executed an SPA in favor of Rizalina (sister)
authorizing her to execute Deed of Extra judicial settlement whereby,
a property is adjudicated to Juan (TCT 277297). Juan died intestate
in 1983. In 1993, Anita executed an Affidavit of self-adjudication
adjudicating said property to herself as sole heir of Juan. As a result,
TCT 7884 was issued.
Upon learning, Rodolfo filed Notice of Adverse Claim and a criminal
complaint for Falsification of Public Documents. Rodolfo argued that
Anita is not the sole heir because there are other collateral relatives,
himself and Rizalina. Since Rizalina executed Deed of waiver,
Rodolfo claimed he has ½ share of the said property.
Anita denied the allegations stating that Rodolfo’s claim is barred by
prescription, that the property is exclusive property having bought it
using her own money and that Rodolfo is not a legitimate brother of
Juan.
RTC denied the complaint because Rodolfo failed to produce Birth
Certificate which would disprove testimonies of witness against his
claim. The CA also agreed with RTC that Rodolfo failed to prove that
he is the brother of Juan
ISSUE: Whether or not Rodolfo was able to prove his filiation with
Juan to warrant an action for reconveyance. [NO]
RULING:
The allegations of Rodolfo are a mere rehash of his arguments
before the CA and essentially raise questions of fact as to be beyond
the ambit of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court lays down the rule that only questions
of law should be raised in petitions filed under the said rule since
factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by
certiorari. The Court will thus not entertain questions of fact as the
factual findings of the appellate court are considered final, binding,
or conclusive on the parties and upon this Court especially when
supported by substantial evidence.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on
a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the
doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a
question to be one of law, the question must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely
on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it
is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the
question posed is one of fact.
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Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the
appellation given to such question by the party raising the same;
rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue
raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it
is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.
Rodolfo's arguments are essentially questions of fact. Rodolfo argues
that he is the brother of Juan although his birth certificate stated that
his mother was Guillerma Lopez-Caranto while the marriage contract
between Juan and Anita indicated that Juan's mother was Dolores
Lopez, and both documents stated that Juan Caranto, Sr. was their
father. Rodolfo stresses that, assuming that he and Juan have
different mothers, he is therefore entitled to the ownership of the
entire property being the legitimate heir of Guillerma Lopez-
Caranto and because of Rizalina's relinquishment of her rights over
the same in his favor.
It is thus clear that if the Court has to entertain the above-mentioned
contentions assailing the findings of the appellate court, it has to
review the probative value and evaluate once again the evidence
presented by the contending parties. This is evidently beyond the
purview of a petition for review under Rule 45.
EXCEPTION TO PROSPECTIVE
APPLICATION
ESTHER ABALOS Y PUROC, PETITIONER, v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 221836, August 14, 2019
Digest by: Kathia Kierstin S. Chanyee
PRINCIPLE:
In the case of Hisoler v. People, the Court has ruled that since the penalty
under the RPC is more beneficial to the accused, thus, it is the proper
penalty to be imposed.
It is clear, therefore, that if R.A. No. 10951 would be given retroactive
effect, the same will prejudice petitioner. The penalty under the RPC,
insofar as it benefits the petitioner must prevail.
FACTS:
Petitioner Esther P. Abalos (petitioner) was convicted of of Estafa
rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in its Decision dated May
20, 2015,2 in CA-G.R. CR No. 35633, which affirmed the
indeterminate penalty of four years and two months of prision
correccional as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum imposed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
During the pendency of the case, RA 10951 was enacted which
provides a graver penalty (higher minimum period) for the crime of
Estafa.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 10951 should be given retroactive
effect [NO]
RULING:
As to the penalty imposed, we take into consideration the amendment
embodied in R.A. No. 1095140 which modifies the penalty in
swindling and estafa cases. Section 100 of the said law, however,
provides that it shall have retroactive effect only insofar as it is
favorable to the accused. This necessitates a comparison of the
corresponding penalties imposable under the RPC and R.A. No.
10951.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
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From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
The penalty imposed by the RPC in estafa committed under Section
315, paragraph 2(d) are as follows:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud
another by any of the means mentioned herein below shall be
punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over
12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount
exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall
be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and
for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
Considering that the actual amount involved in this case is P232,
500.00, the proper imposable penalty is prision mayor in its medium
period. Since the penalty prescribed by law is a penalty composed
of only one period, Article 65 of the RPC requires the division of the
time included in the penalty into three portions, thus:
Maximum: 9 years, 4 months and 1 day to 10 years
Medium: 8 years, 8 months and 1 day to 9 years and 4 months
Minimum: 8 years and 1 day to 8 years and 8 months44
Under Article 64 of the RPC, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed
in its medium period when there are neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances. Considering the absence of any modifying
circumstance in this case, the maximum penalty should be anywhere
within the medium period of eight years, eight months and one day
to nine years and four months.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), the minimum term,
which is left to the sound discretion of the court, should be within the
range of the penalty next lower than the aforementioned penalty,
which is left to the sound discretion of the court.
Thus, the minimum penalty should be one degree lower from the
prescribed penalty of prision mayor in its medium period, or prision
mayor in its minimum period.46 The minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from six years and one
day to 10 years.
Under R.A. No. 10951, therefore, the petitioner is liable to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and
one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eight years, eight months
and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.
It appears, however, that the imposable penalty under the RPC,
which is six months and one day to 20 years, presents a lower
minimum period, but a higher maximum period of imprisonment
compared to that imposable under R.A. No. 10951, which is six
years and one day to eight years, eight months and one day. In the
case of Hisoler v. People, the Court has ruled that since the penalty
under the RPC is more beneficial to the accused, thus, it is the proper
penalty to be imposed. It ratiocinated as follows:
At any rate, even if the maximum period imposable upon the
petitioner under the RPC in this case is higher than that under R.A.
No. 10951, the Court finds that the benefits that would accrue to
the petitioner with the imposition of a lower minimum sentence
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outweighs the longer prison sentence and is more in keeping with
the spirit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
In fixing the indeterminate penalty imposable upon the accused, the
Court should be mindful that the basic purpose of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is to "uplift and redeem valuable human material, and
prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty
and economic usefulness."
Simply, an indeterminate sentence is imposed to give the accused the
opportunity to shorten the term of imprisonment depending upon his
or her demeanor, and physical, mental, and moral record as a
prisoner. The goal of the law is to encourage reformation and good
behavior, and reduce the incidence of recidivism. While the grant of
parole after service of the minimum sentence is still conditional, the
flexibility granted upon the petitioner to immediately avail of the
benefits of parole considering the much shorter minimum sentence
under the RPC should inspire the petitioner into achieving the
underlying purpose behind the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
It is clear, therefore, that if R.A. No. 10951 would be given
retroactive effect, the same will prejudice petitioner. The penalty
under the RPC, insofar as it benefits the petitioner must prevail.
Hence, the penalty imposed by the RTC and the CA, which is four
years and two months of prision correccional as minimum to 20 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum, is correct as it is within the proper
penalty imposed by law.
ARTICLE 15
ORION SAVINGS BANK v. SUZUKI
740 SCRA 345, G.R. No. 205487 November 12, 2014
Digest by: Eliza Den A. Devilleres
PRINCIPLE:
Property relations between spouses are governed principally by the
national law of the spouses. However, the party invoking the application
of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign
law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the
judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to
know only domestic or the law of the forum.
FACTS:
In the first week of August 2003, respondent Shigekane Suzuki
(Suzuki), a Japanese national, met with Ms. Helen Soneja (Soneja) to
inquire about a condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland
Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang
(Kang), a Korean national and a Special Resident Retiree's Visa
(SRRV) holder. On January 27, 2004, Suzuki filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages against Kang and Orion. At the
pre-trial, the parties made the following admissions and stipulations:
 That as of August 26, 2003, Kang was the registered
owner of Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42;
 That the mortgage in favor of Orion supposedly
executed by Kang, with Entry No. 66432/C-10186
dated February 2, 1999, was subsequently cancelled by
Entry No. 73232/T No. 10186 dated June 16, 2000;
 That the alleged Dacion en Pago was never annotated in
CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118;
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
 That Orion only paid the appropriate capital gains tax
and the documentary stamp tax for the alleged Dacion
en Pago on October 15, 2003;
 That Parking Slot No. 42, covered by CCT No. 9118, was
never mortgaged to Orion; and
 That when Suzuki bought the properties, he went to Orion
to obtain possession of the titles.
Orion's on the other hand contended that the Deed of Sale executed
by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and void. Under Korean law, any
conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with the consent
of both spouses;
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of Kang in favor of Suzuki is valid.
[YES]
RULING:
It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is
exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state where it is
located.21 The reason is found in the very nature of immovable
property — its immobility. Immovables are part of the country and
so closely connected to it that all rights over them have their natural
center of gravity there.
Thus, all matters concerning the title and disposition of real property
are determined by what is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can
alone prescribe the mode by which a title can pass from one person
to another, or by which an interest therein can be gained or lost. This
general principle includes all rules governing the descent, alienation
and transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and
construction of wills and other conveyances.
This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed
relating to immovable property, no matter what its nature may be.
Thus, an instrument will be ineffective to transfer title to land if the
person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci rei sitae, even though
under the law of his domicile and by the law of the place where the
instrument is actually made, his capacity is undoubted.
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are
governed principally by the national law of the spouses.
However, the party invoking the application of a foreign law has
the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a
question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge
cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to
know only domestic or the law of the forum.
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy
thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or
by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country inwhich the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis
supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation ofcopy must state. — Whenever a copy of
a document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if
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there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the
seal of such court.
Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real
property shall be governed by Philippine law while issues pertaining
to the conjugal nature of the property shall be governed by South
Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South
Korean law on the conjugal ownership of property. It merely
attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea"
to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not
qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for
there is no showing that it was properly authenticated by the seal of
his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132.
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity
approachor processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a
foreign law is not pleaded or, evenif pleaded, is not proven, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun
Sook Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other
words, the import from the certificates of title is that Kang is the
owner of the properties as they are registered in his name alone,
and that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung.
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held that
registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does not
negate the possibility of it being conjugal or community property. In
those cases, however, there was proof that the properties, though
registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed either
conjugal or community properties. Accordingly, we see no reason to
declare as invalid Kang’s conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the
supposed lack of spousal consent.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
CATERPILLAR, INC VS. SAMSON
G.R. No. 164352, Novemer 9, 2016, Bersamin
Digest by: Francis Roel Dulay
PRINCIPLE:
A common element of all such cases for unfair competition - civil and
criminal - was fraud. Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, a civil action
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought
by the injured party in cases of fraud, and such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution. As such, it will not operate
as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal
cases at bar.
FACTS:
Caterpillar is a foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture and
distribution of footwear, clothing and related items. Caterpillar was
issued search warrants for unfair competition to search the
establishments owned, controlled and operated by Samson which led
to the seizure of various products bearing Caterpillar's Core Marks
(CATERPILLAR, CAT, CATERPILLAR & DESIGN, etc.).
On July 31, 2000, Caterpillar commenced a civil action against
Samson and his business entities, with the IPO as a nominal party -
for Unfair Competition, Damages and Cancellation of Trademark
with Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
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From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
On January 31, 2001, Caterpillar filed 26 criminal complaints for
unfair competition.
Samson filed a Motion to Suspend Arraignment in Criminal Cases
claiming that there exist prejudicial questions pending litigation in the
civil case filed against him for unfair competition.
ISSUE: WON there exists a prejudicial question in this case. NO
RULING:
The civil case filed by Caterpillar in the RTC in Quezon City, was for
unfair competition, damages and cancellation of trademark, while
the criminal cases were the criminal prosecution of Samson for unfair
competition. A common element of all such cases for unfair
competition - civil and criminal - was fraud. Under Article 33 of the
Civil Code, a civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action may be brought by the injured party in cases of fraud,
and such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that
will justify the suspension of the criminal cases at bar.
The elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7 of
Rule 111, Rules of Court, to wit: (a) a previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar to or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
An action for the cancellation of trademark is a remedy available to
a person who believes that he is or will be damaged by the
registration of a mark. On the other hand, the criminal actions for
unfair competition involved the determination of whether or not
Samson had given his goods the general appearance of the goods
of Caterpillar, with the intent to deceive the public or defraud
Caterpillar as his competitor.
In the suit for the cancellation of trademark, the issue of lawful
registration should necessarily be determined, but registration was
not a consideration necessary in unfair competition. Indeed, unfair
competition is committed if the effect of the act is "to pass off to the
public the goods of one man as the goods of another;" it is
independent of registration. As fittingly put in R.F. & Alexander &
Co. v. Ang, "one may be declared unfair competitor even if his
competing trade-mark is registered."
Art 26(2)
DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, A.K.A. "DOREEN GRACE
MEDINA KOIKE," Petitioner, v. MICHIYUKI KOIKE, THE LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondent.
GR No. 215723 July 27, 2016
Digested by: Jennifer Lim
Principle:
In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, the Court had the occasion to rule that:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is
the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a
rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country."
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This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the
alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment
on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an
action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of
his claim or defense.
Facts:
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and
respondent Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were
married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines.
On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of
Japan, filed for divorce before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi
Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even date as appearing
in the Divorce Certificate and the same was duly recorded in the
Official Family Register of Michiyuki Koike.
Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition10 for judicial recognition
of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant
to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code11 before
the RTC.
At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition. On the other
hand, Doreen presented several foreign documents, namely,
"Certificate of Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance of Divorce" and
"Family Register of Michiyuki Koike" both issued by the Mayor of
Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic
of the Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a certified
machine copy of a document entitled "Divorce Certificate" issued by
the Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila that was
authenticated by the Department of the Foreign Affairs, as well as a
Certification issued by the City Civil Registry Office in Manila that
the original of said divorce certificate was filed and recorded in the
said Office. In addition, photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and
their corresponding English translation, as well as two (2) books
entitled "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of
Japan 2009" were likewise submitted as proof of the existence of
Japan's law on divorce.
RTC denied Doreen's petition, ruling that in an action for recognition
of foreign divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code,
the foreign divorce decree and" the national law of the alien
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven
in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence. The RTC ruled that while the divorce documents
presented by Doreen were successfully proven to be public or official
records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving the national
law of her husband, particularly the existence of the law on divorce.
The RTC observed that the "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The
Civil Code of Japan 2009," presented were not duly authenticated
by the Philippine Consul in Japan as required by Sections 24 and 25
of the said Rules, adding too that the testimony of Doreen relative to
the applicable provisions found therein and its effect on the
matrimonial relations was insufficient since she was not presented as
a qualified expert witness nor was shown to have, at the very least,
a working knowledge of the laws of Japan, particularly those on
family relations and divorce.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in denying the petition for recognition
of the divorce decree obtained abroad? NO.
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Ruling:
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our
courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which
addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino
and a foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
Under the above-highlighted paragraph, the law confers jurisdiction
on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree
to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity
of the dissolution of the marriage.
Thus, in Garcia v. Recio, it was pointed out that in order for a divorce
obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in our
jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. Both the divorce
decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven. Since our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence
requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the
alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.
ARTICLE 26(2)
REPUBLIC VS. MANILYN TANEDO MANALO
G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
Digest by: Majeerah Sinarimbo
PRINCIPLE:
There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a
divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes
of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who
have the same rights and obligations in an alien land. The circumstances
surrounding them are alike. Hence, to make a distinction between them
based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the
divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives
undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
FACTS:
Respondent Manalo, a Filipina, is previously married in the
Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO as
shown by their Marriage Contract. Recently, a case for divorce was
filed by Manalo in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce
decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese
Court
Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for
cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan,
Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a
Japanese court.
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The RTC ruled that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should
not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the
New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right
to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad,
if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated
their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless
Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine
laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights
and duties, together with the determination of their condition and
legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, including
marriages."
However, the CA held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who
filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree
they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former,
capacitating him to remarry.
ISSUE: Whether, under Article 26(2) of the FC, a Filipino citizen has
the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a
divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment
against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry – YES
RULING:
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based
on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that
there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law
does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who
initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted.
It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner
or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.
Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding
or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same
result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or
wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the
same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien-initiated proceeding.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such
principle, found under Article 15 of the Civil Code, is not an absolute
and unbending rule. In fact, the mere existence of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception
thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must
be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression
to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected
by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as
written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
ARTICLE 6 (2)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETI TIONER, v.
FLORIE GRACE M. COTE, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 212860, March 14, 2018
Digest by: Jay J.L. Astillo
FACTS:
On July 31, 1995, Rhomel Gagarin Cote (Rhomel) and respondent
Florie Grace Manongdo-Cote (Florie) were married in Quezon City.
At the time of their marriage, the spouses were both Filipinos.
On August 23, 2002, Rhomel filed a Petition for Divorce before the
Family Court of the First Circuit of Hawaii on the ground that their
marriage was irretrievably broken. This was granted on August 23,
2002 by the issuance of a decree that states among others:
A decree of absolute divorce is hereby granted to [Rhomel], the
bonds of matrimony between [Rhomel] and [Florie] are hereby
dissolved and the parties hereto are restored to the status of single
persons, and either party is permitted to marry from and after the
effective date of this decree.
Seven years later, Florie commenced a petition for recognition of
foreign judgment granting the divorce before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). On April 7, 2011, the RTC granted the petition and
declared Florie to be capacitated to remarry after the RTC's decision
attained finality and a decree of absolute nullity has been issued.
The RTC ruled, inter alia, that Rhomel was already an American
citizen when he obtained the divorce decree.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on May 17, 2011. However, the
RTC, believing that the petition was covered by A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, applied Section 20 of said
Rule and denied the appeal because the notice was not preceded
by a motion for reconsideration. The Petitioner Republic appealed
to the CA but the latter denied the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies in cases of
recognition of foreign decree of divorce. [NO]
RULING:
The confusion arose when the RTC denied petitioner's appeal on the
ground that no prior motion for reconsideration was filed as required
under Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Petitioner posits that
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC do not cover cases involving recognition of
foreign divorce because the wording of Section 1 thereof clearly
states that it shall only apply to petitions for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages, viz.:
Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court applies; Motion for Reconsideration
not a condition precedent to the filing of an appeal
The CA is correct when it ruled that the trial court misapplied Section
20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
A decree of absolute divorce procured abroad is different from
annulment as defined by our family laws. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
only covers void19and voidable20marriages that are specifically
cited and enumerated in the Family Code of the Philippines.
ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO
6
Void and voidable mmTiages contemplate a situation wherein the
basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of
the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. It treats
the marriage as if it never existed. Divorce, on the other hand, ends
a legally valid marriage and is usually due to circumstances arising
after the marriage.
It was error for the RTC to use as basis for denial of petitioner's
appeal Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Since Florie followed
the procedure for cancellation of entry in the civil registry, a special
proceeding governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, an appeal
from the RTC decision should be governed by Section 321 of Rule
41 of the Rules of Court and not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.he penalty
imposed, we take into consideration the amendment
Art 26(2)
LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ MORISONO, Petitioner,
v. RYOJI* MORISONO AND LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, Respondents
G.R. No. 226013, July 02, 2018
Digest by: Kathia Kierstin S. Chanyee
PRINCIPLE:
Thus, pursuant to Manalo, foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify
marriages between a Filipino and an alien citizen may already be
recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who between the spouses
initiated the divorce; provided, of course, that the party petitioning for
the recognition of such foreign divorce decree – presumably the Filipino
citizen – must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
FACTS:
Luzviminda was married to private respondent Ryoji Morisono (Ryoji)
in Quezon City on December 8, 2009.3 Thereafter, they lived
together in Japan for one (1) year and three (3) months but were not
blessed with a child. During their married life, they would constantly
quarrel mainly due to Ryoji's philandering ways, in addition to the
fact that he was much older than Luzviminda.
As such, she and Ryoji submitted a "Divorce by Agreement" before
the City Hall of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, Japan, which was
eventually approved on January 17, 2012 and duly recorded with
the Head of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, Japan on July 1, 2012.5 In
view of the foregoing, she filed a petition for recognition of the
foreign divorce decree obtained by her and Ryoji before the RTC so
that she could cancel the surname of her former husband in her
passport and for her to be able to marry again.
In a Decision dated July 18, 2016, the RTC denied Luzviminda's
petition. It held that while a divorce obtained abroad by an alien
spouse may be recognized in the Philippines – provided that such
decree is valid according to the national law of the alien – the same
does not find application when it was the Filipino spouse, i.e.,
petitioner, who procured the same. Invoking the nationality principle
provided under Article 15 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 26
(2) of the Family Code, the RTC opined that since petitioner is a
Filipino citizen whose national laws do not allow divorce, the foreign
divorce decree she herself obtained in Japan is not binding in the
Philippines;
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
ISSUE: Whether or not Art 26(2) applies despite the fact that it was
the Filipino(a) spouse that obtained the divorce decree [YES]
RULING:
The rules on divorce prevailing in this jurisdiction can be summed up
as follows: first, Philippine laws do not provide for absolute divorce,
and hence, the courts cannot grant the same; second, consistent with
Articles 1511 and 1712 of the Civil Code, the marital bond between
two (2) Filipino citizens cannot be dissolved even by an absolute
divorce obtained abroad; third, an absolute divorce obtained
abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national
laws; and fourth, in mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage
in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The fourth rule, which has been invoked by Luzviminda in this case, is
encapsulated in Article 26 (2) of the Family Code which reads:
Article 26. x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise. have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
This provision confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage. It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign
divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce.
Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is
tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the principles of comity,
our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of
foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody,
care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses,
must still be determined by our courts.
The rationale for this rule is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino
as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is
no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a
divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national law.14 In
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, the Court held:
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse." The legislative intent is for the benefit
of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling
the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating
him or her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose
or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize
divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;
Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign
country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the
Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as
ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO
7
basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the
Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign
divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the
alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage.
No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration
for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by
his national law. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
According to Republic v. Orbecido III, the following elements must
concur in order for Article 26 (2) to apply, namely: (a) that there is
a valid marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and (b) that a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
In the same case, the Court also initially clarified that Article 26 (2)
applies not only to cases where a foreigner was the one who
procured a divorce of his/her marriage to a Filipino spouse, but also
to instances where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired
foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding,
and obtained a favorable decree.
However, in the recent case of Republic v. Manalo (Manalo),20 the
Court En Banc extended the application of Article 26 (2) of the
Family Code to further cover mixed marriages where it was the
Filipino citizen who divorced his/her foreign spouse. Pertinent
portions of the ruling read:
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same
provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under
Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and
obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who
is capacitated to remarry. x x x.
We rule in the affirmative.
xxxx
When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal
effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should
not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and
necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry.
Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and
observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to
exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses
change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
xxxx
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter
of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one
who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was
granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the
petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The
Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words
in the mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know
the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have
expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a
statute there should be no departure."
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should
be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually
initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter
of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes
should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends
and purposes. x x x.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in
the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly
where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.
Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding
or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same
result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or
wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the
same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.
Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both
instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect
of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their
alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter's national law.
xxxx
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated
with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real,
material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should
not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities
imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic, cultural, and
religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and
procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married
to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a
divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another
Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien
against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance
with the national law of the foreigner.
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between
a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino
who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are
considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in
an alien land.
The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner
spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a
distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference
of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly
unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly
discriminate against the other.
xxxx
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be
harmonized with other constitutional provisions. Aside from
strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally
mandated to actively promote its total development.
ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO
8
It is also obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.
To our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligations if
We limit the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those
foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. x x x.
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm
than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and
obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing
"mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship
that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as
illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law.
Worse, any child born out of such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer
the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just
but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but
also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the
subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of
marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to
be tilted in favor of marriage and. against unions not formalized by
marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to
live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous
customs.
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present
time. With the advancement of communication and information
technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system
that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed
marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized
that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans
more often than not create imperfect unions.
Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the
attainment of the individual's full human potential and self-fulfillment
is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus, it is
hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at
the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are of rotten
quality.
Going back, We hold that marriage, being mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of
any good to the society where one is considered released from the
marital bond while the other remains bound to it. x x x.21 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
Thus, pursuant to Manalo, foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify
marriages between a Filipino and an alien citizen may already be
recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who between the spouses
initiated the divorce; provided, of course, that the party petitioning
for the recognition of such foreign divorce decree – presumably the
Filipino citizen – must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate
its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.22
In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial
of Luzviminda's petition to have her foreign divorce decree
recognized in this jurisdiction was anchored on the sole ground that
she admittedly initiated the divorce proceedings which she, as a
Filipino citizen, was not allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid
down in Manalo, such ground relied upon by the RTC had been
rendered nugatory.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
However, the Court cannot just order the grant of Luzviminda's
petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree, as Luzviminda
has yet to prove the fact of her. "Divorce by Agreement" obtained,
in Nagoya City, Japan and its conformity with prevailing Japanese
laws on divorce. Notably, the RTC did not rule on such issues. Since
these are questions which require an examination of various factual
matters, a remand to the court a quo is warranted.
ARTICLE 26 (2)
JUEGO-SAKAI v. REPUBLIC
873 SCRA 83, G.R. No. 224015 July 23, 2018
Digest by: Eliza Den A. Devilleres
PRINCIPLE:
The fact that it was the Filipino spouse who initiated the proceeding
wherein the divorce decree was granted should not affect the
application nor remove him from the coverage of paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code which states that “where a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
FACTS:
Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married
on August 11, 2000 in Japan pursuant to the wedding rites therein.
After two (2) years, the parties, by agreement, obtained a divorce
decree in said country dissolving their marriage. Thereafter, on April
5, 2013, petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40,
Camarines Norte. In its Decision dated October 9, 2014, the RTC
granted the petition and recognized the divorce between the parties
as valid and effective under Philippine Laws. On November 25,
2015, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. In an Amended
Decision dated March 3, 2016, however, the CA revisited its findings
and recalled and set aside its previous decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely erred when it held that the
second requisite for the application of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code is not present because the petitioner
gave consent to the divorce obtained by her Japanese husband.
[YES]
RULING:
Despite the fact that petitioner participated in the divorce
proceedings in Japan, and even if it is assumed that she initiated the
same, she must still be allowed to benefit from the exception
provided under Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently, since her
marriage to Toshiharu Sakai had already been dissolved by virtue
of the divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby capacitating
Toshiharu to remarry, petitioner shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
Nevertheless, as similarly held in Manalo, We cannot yet grant
petitioner's Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment for
she has yet to comply with certain guidelines before our courts may
recognize the subject divorce decree and the effects thereof.
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9
Time and again, the Court has held that the starting point in any
recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment
that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and
laws.
This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the
alien himself or herself.14 Since both the foreign divorce decree and
the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain
a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section
2415 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court applies.
Thus, what is required is proof, either by (1) official publications or
(2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the
Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine Foreign
Service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
In the instant case, the Office of the Solicitor General does not
dispute the existence of the divorce decree, rendering the same
admissible. What remains to be proven, therefore, is the pertinent
Japanese Law on divorce considering that Japanese laws on persons
and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges
are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
ART. 26(2) DIVORCED VALIDLY OBTAINED
ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE
RACHO VS.TANAKA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 199515, June 25, 2018, Leonen
Digest by: Francis Roel Dulay
PRINCIPLE:
According to the national law of Japan, a divorce by agreement
"becomes effective by notification." A Certificate of Acceptance of the
Report of Divorce which was duly authenticated, can prove that the
divorce was validly obtained according to Japanese law. (Paraphrased)
Article 26 should be interpreted to mean that it is irrelevant for courts
to determine if it is the foreign spouse that procures the divorce abroad.
Once a divorce decree is issued, the divorce becomes "validly obtained"
and capacitates the foreign spouse to marry. The same status should be
given to the Filipino spouse.
FACTS:
Rhodora Racho and Seiichi Tanaka were married on April 20, 2001
in Las Piñas City, Metro Manila. On December 16, 2009, Tanaka
filed for divorce and the divorce was granted. She secured a Divorce
Certificate issued by Consul Takayama of the Japanese Consulate in
the Philippines and had it authenticated by an authentication officer
of the Department of Foreign Affairs.
She tried to have the Divorce Certificate registered with the Civil
Registry of Manila but was refused by the City Registrar since there
was no court order recognizing it. When she went to the Department
of Foreign Affairs to renew her passport, she was likewise told that
she needed the proper court order. She was also informed by the
National Statistics Office that her divorce could only be annotated
in the Certificate of Marriage if there was a court order capacitating
her to remarry.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
On May 19, 2010, she filed a Petition for Judicial Determination and
Declaration of Capacity to Marry with the Regional Trial Court, Las
Piñas City. RTC denied the petition stating that while she was able to
prove Tanaka's national law, the Divorce Certificate was not
competent evidence since it was not the divorce decree itself.
Upon petition for review on certiorari to the SC, she attached a duly
authenticated Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce
that she obtained in Japan.
ISSUE1: WON Divorce Certificate and Certificate of Acceptance of
the Report of Divorce, without the divorce decree itself, sufficient
evidence to prove that Filipino spouse have capacity to remarry
under Article 26(2) of the Family Code. YES
RULING:
Petitions for Review on Certiorari are limited to questions of law and
additional evidence is not accepted because it now becomes a
question of fact. The court records, however, are already sufficient
to fully resolve the factual issues. Additionally, the Office of the
Solicitor General neither posed any objection to the admission of the
Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce nor argued that
the Petition presented questions of fact. In the interest of judicial
economy and efficiency, this Court shall resolve this case on its merits.
Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, the admissibility of
official records that are kept in a foreign country requires that it must
be accompanied by a certificate from a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, consular agent or any
officer of the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in that
foreign country.
The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was
accompanied by an Authentication issued by Consul Bryan Dexter B.
Lao of the Embassy of the Philippines in Tokyo, Japan, certifying that
Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular Service Division, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Japan was an official in and for Japan. The Authentication
further certified that he was authorized to sign the Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce and that his signature in it was
genuine. Applying Rule 132, Section 24, the Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is admissible as evidence of the
fact of divorce between petitioner and respondent.
The Regional Trial Court established that according to the national
law of Japan, a divorce by agreement "becomes effective by
notification." Considering that the Certificate of Acceptance of the
Report of Divorce was duly authenticated, the divorce between
petitioner and respondent was validly obtained according to
respondent's national law.
ISSUE2: Does it matter if it is the alien spouse or the Filipino spouse
initiated the divorce proceedings? NO
RULING:
In this particular instance (Article 26[2], FC), it is the Filipina spouse
who bears the burden of this narrow interpretation, which may be
unconstitutional. Article II, Section 14 of our Constitution provides:
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in
nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men.
In 1980, our country became a signatory to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
Under Articles 2(f) and 5(a) of the treaty, the Philippines as a state
party, is required:
ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO
10
Article 2 (f) to take all appropriate measures, including
legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations,
customs and practices which constitute discrimination
against women;
Article 5 (a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of
conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the
elimination of prejudices and customary and all other
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority
or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped
roles for men and women[.]
By enacting the Constitution and signing on the CEDAW, the State
has committed to ensure and to promote gender equality.
In 2009, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna
Carta for Women, which provides that the State "shall take all
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in
all matters relating to marriage and family relations." This
necessarily includes the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code. Thus, Article 26 should be interpreted to mean that it is
irrelevant for courts to determine if it is the foreign spouse that
procures the divorce abroad. Once a divorce decree is issued, the
divorce becomes "validly obtained" and capacitates the foreign
spouse to marry. The same status should be given to the Filipino
spouse.
The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino spouse from
initiating or participating in the divorce proceedings. It would be
inherently unjust for a Filipino woman to be prohibited by her own
national laws from something that a foreign law may allow.
Parenthetically, the prohibition on Filipinos from participating in
divorce proceedings will not be protecting our own nationals.
ART. 26(2) DIVORCED VALIDLY OBTAINED
ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE
IN RE: PETITION FOR JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF DIVORCE
BETWEEN MINURO* TAKAHASHI AND JULIET RENDORA
MORAÑA, JULIET RENDORA MORAÑA, PETITIONER, v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
GR No. 227605 December 5, 2019
Digested by: Jennifer Lim
Principle:
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present
time. x x x it is recognized that not all marriages are made in
heaven and that imperfect humans more often than not create
imperfect unions. x x x it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity
of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth
that some of them are of rotten quality.
Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two
parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society
where one is considered released from the marital bond while the
other remains bound to it. x x x
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact
and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene
the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary
the letter of the law. A statute may, therefore, be extended to
cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent.
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From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
Racho v. Tanaka further enunciated that the prohibition on Filipinos
from participating in divorce proceedings will not be protecting our
own nationals. Verily, therefore, even though it was petitioner herself
or jointly with her husband who applied for and obtained the divorce
decree in this case, the same may be recognized in our jurisdiction.
So must it be.
Facts:
On June 24, 2002, petitioner and Minoru Takahashi got married in
San Juan, Metro Manila.
Ten (10) years later, the couple got estranged. Consequently, they
jointly applied for divorce before the Office of the Mayor of
Fukuyama City, Japan.
On May 22, 2012, the Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City
granted their application for divorce and issued the corresponding
Divorce Report. On October 2, 2012, petitioner filed with the
Regional Trial Court-Manila an action for recognition of the Divorce
Report.
The trial court dismissed the petition for failure to present in evidence
the Divorce Decree itself. The trial court held that the Divorce Report
and Certificate of All Matters cannot take the place of the Divorce
Decree itself which is the best evidence here. Besides, the
authenticated Divorce Certificate issued by the Japanese
government was not even included in petitioner's formal offer of
evidence aside from the fact that it was a mere photocopy and was
not properly identified nay authenticated in open court. Too, on cross,
it appeared that petitioner herself was the one who secured the
Divorce Decree which fact is not allowed under Philippine laws.
She asserts it was not she who voluntarily secured the divorce decree.
It was her husband who encouraged her to apply for a divorce
decree so that the Japanese government would support and send
their children to school. When she testified that she secured the
divorce papers, she actually meant it was she who requested copies
of the Divorce Report and Certificate of All Matters. She and her
husband jointly applied for divorce. She could not have applied for
divorce on her own since she is not well versed in the Japanese
language and characters.
She further avers that only the Divorce Report and Certificate of All
Matters were issued to her by the Japanese government. These
documents are equivalent to the Divorce Decree itself. In any case,
there is no difference between a "Divorce Decree" and the "Divorce
Report" she presented in court. The Divorce Report itself bears the
fact that she and her husband obtained a divorce in Japan. More,
although the Divorce Report and Certificate of All Matters are mere
photocopies, the same were duly authenticated by the Japanese
Embassy.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for the recognition of the foreign
divorce decree should be denied? No.
Ruling:
A foreign decree of divorce may be recognized in the Philippines
although it was the Filipino spouse who obtained the same
Republic v. Manalo emphasized that even if it was the Filipino spouse
who initiated and obtained the divorce decree, the same may be
recognized in the Philippines, viz.:
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Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based
on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that
there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law
does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who
initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted.
It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner
or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. x x x
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should
be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually
initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter
of the statute when to do so would d1epart from the true intent of
the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent
with the general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve,
and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry
out such ends and purposes.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to
the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. x x x Whether the Filipino spouse
initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien
spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse
will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in
like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an
alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should
not make a distinction. x x x
x x x Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must
be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and
oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are
equally protected by law. x x x
x x x In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates
one of the essential requisites of the equal protection clause.
Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign
divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it
is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
x x x there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino
who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who
obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are
considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in
(an) alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were
it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their
foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to
make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial
difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not
is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and
unjustly discriminate against the other.
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more
harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and
obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing
"mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship
that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as
illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of
such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded
as illegitimate.
Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only
to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive
interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle
of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the
Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against
unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State
protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families
formed according to indigenous customs.
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Divorce Decree
Petitioner identified, presented; and formally offered in evidence
the Divorce Report issued by the Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama
City. The Court is not persuaded. Records show that the Divorce
Report is what the Government of Japan issued to petitioner and her
husband when they applied for divorce. There was no "divorce
judgment" to speak of because the divorce proceeding was not
coursed through Japanese courts but through the Office of the Mayor
of Fukuyama City in Hiroshima Prefecture, Japan.
In any event, since the Divorce Report was issued by the Office of
the Mayor of Fukuyama City, the same is deemed an act of an official
body in Japan. By whatever name it is called, the Divorce Report is
clearly the equivalent of the "Divorce Decree" in Japan, hence, the
best evidence of the fact of divorce obtained by petitioner and her
former husband.
The Divorce Report, Certificate of All Matters, and Divorce
Certificate were all authenticated by the Japanese Embassy. These
are proofs of official records which are admissible in evidence under
Sections 19 and 24, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence, to wit:
Section 19. Classes of Documents. - For the purpose of their
presentation (in) evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of
the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country;
xxx xxx xxx
Section 24. Proof of official record. - The record of public documents
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by
a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody.
If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer
in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of
his office.
Finally, the Court has, time and again, held that the court's primary
duty is to dispense justice; and procedural rules are designed to
secure and not to override substantial justice. On several occasions,
the Court relaxed procedural rules to advance substantial
justice. More so here because what is involved is a matter affecting
the lives of petitioner and her children; the case is meritorious; the
belated issuance of the Divorce Certificate was not due to petitioner's
fault; and the relaxation of the rules here will not prejudice the State.
Here, what petitioner offered in evidence were mere printouts of
pertinent portions of the Japanese law on divorce and its English
translation. There was no proof at all that these printouts reflected
the existing law on divorce in Japan and its correct English
translation. Indeed, our rules require more than a printout from a
website to prove a foreign law.
In Racho, the Japanese law on divorce was duly proved through a
copy of the English Version of the Civil Code of Japan translated
under the authorization of the Ministry of Justice and the Code of
Translation Committee. At any rate, considering that the fact of
divorce was duly proved in this case, the higher interest of substantial
justice compels that petitioner be afforded the chance to properly
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prove the Japanese law on divorce, with the end view that petitioner
may be eventually freed from a marriage in which she is the only
remaining party. In Manalo, the Court, too, did not dismiss the case,
but simply remanded it to the trial court for reception of evidence
pertaining to the existence of the Japanese law on divorce.
The case was REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for
presentation in evidence of the pertinent Japanese law on divorce
following the procedure in Racho v. Tanaka.
ART. 26(2) DIVORCED VALIDLY OBTAINED
ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE
CYNTHIA GALAPON VS. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 243722, January 22, 2020
Digest by: Majeerah Sinarimbo
PRINCIPLE:
Article 26 (2) applies to mixed marriages where the divorce decree is:
(i) obtained by the foreign spouse; (ii) obtained jointly by the Filipino
and foreign spouse; and (iii) obtained solely by the Filipino spouse.
FACTS:
Cynthia, a Filipina, and Park, a South Korean national, got married
and ended with a divorce by mutual agreement in South Korea. After
the divorce was confirmed by the Cheongju Local Court, Cynthia filed
before the RTC a Petition for the Judicial Recognition of a Foreign
Divorce [(Recognition Petition)].
The RTC, finding the Recognition Petition sufficient in form and
substance, issued an Order setting the case for hearing.
During the presentation of evidence, Abigail Galapon, Cynthia's
sister and attorney-in-fact, testified in court. Abigail averred that
Cynthia could not personally testify because the latter's Korean visa
expired upon her divorce with Park. Nevertheless, Abigail alleged
that she has personal knowledge of the facts alleged in the
Recognition Petition and claimed, among other things, that Park
intended to marry his former girlfriend and that Cynthia was forced
to agree to the divorce because Park made a threat to her life.
The RTC found that the requisites for the application of Article 26,
paragraph 2 of the Family Code [Article 26 (2)] concur.
First, there was a valid marriage celebrated between
Cynthia and Park, as shown by the Certificate of Marriage
issued by the National Statistics Office.
Second, a valid divorce was obtained abroad by Park
capacitating him to remarry, as shown by the
Certification issued by the Cheongju Local Court. While the
RTC recognized that the divorce decree in question was
obtained by mutual agreement, it ruled that such fact does
not preclude its recognition in this jurisdiction since the
testimony of Abigail Galapon (Abigail) confirms that Park
merely coerced Cynthia to agree to the divorce.
The CA held that the divorce decree in question cannot be recognized
in this jurisdiction insofar as Cynthia is concerned since it was
obtained by mutual agreement.
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Clearly, since the divorce under consideration was jointly applied for
and obtained by a Filipino and a foreigner spouse, it was incorrect
for the RTC to apply the provision of the second (2nd) paragraph,
Article 26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in denying the recognition of the
divorce decree obtained by Cynthia and her foreign spouse, Park –
YES
RULING:
The controversy is centered on the interpretation of Article 26 (2) as
applied to divorce decrees obtained jointly by the foreign spouse
and Filipino citizen.
According to the CA, the fact that the divorce decree had been
obtained by mutual agreement of Cynthia and Park precludes the
application of Article 26 (2), since the language of the provision
requires that the divorce decree be obtained solely by the foreign
spouse.
The CA is mistaken. In the recent case of Manalo, the Court en
banc extended the scope of Article 26 (2) to even cover instances
where the divorce decree is obtained solely by the Filipino spouse.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should
be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually
initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter
of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act.
Pursuant to the majority ruling in Manalo, Article 26 (2) applies to
mixed marriages where the divorce decree is: (i) obtained by the
foreign spouse; (ii) obtained jointly by the Filipino and foreign
spouse; and (iii) obtained solely by the Filipino spouse.
Based on the records, Cynthia and Park obtained a divorce decree
by mutual agreement under the laws of South Korea. The sufficiency
of the evidence presented by Cynthia to prove the issuance of said
divorce decree and the governing national law of her husband Park
was not put in issue. In fact, the CA considered said evidence
sufficient to establish the authenticity and validity of the divorce in
question. Thus, as confirmed by Manalo, the divorce decree obtained
by Park, with or without Cynthia's conformity, falls within the scope
of Article 26 (2) and merits recognition in this jurisdiction.
PYSCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
CHI MING TSOI, PETITIONER v. COURT OF
APPEAS AND GINA LAO-TSOI, RESPONDENTS
G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997
Digest by: Jay J.L. Astillo
FACTS:
Both plaintiff and defendant were married in 1988 at the Manila
Cathedral.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that
as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having
sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed,
slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep .
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There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night.
The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they
can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife, they
went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an
uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the
defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4)
days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse
between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long
walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located
at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the
same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this
period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them.
[S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts
nor did he see hers.
The RTC declared their marriage VOID which was later affirmed by
the CA on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage must be declared VOID due to
psychological incapacity. [YES]
RULING:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless
and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse
with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged
to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68,
Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298).
Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an
island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not
have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled
self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is
sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual
intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is
a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the
parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
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Psychological Incapacity
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner, v. MARIE
IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent
[G.R. NO. 155800: March 10, 2006]
Digest by: Kathia Kierstin S. Chanyee
PRINCIPLE:
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the
interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception.
It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert
medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have
had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time
this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago.
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was
26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year
after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the
Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church
wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro
Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born
on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993, Petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to
respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for
nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent's incapacity
existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists
up to the present.
As manifestations of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity,
petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the
people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment
and other events or things, to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an
illegitimate son, and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the
adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the
boy's parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources
after their marriage.
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David,
attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident
occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician,
Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she
graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated
with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single
member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities
with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show
was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even
presented an invitation to that effect but petitioner discovered per
certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such
occasion had taken place.
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and
under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be
from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in
the commercial industry worth P2 million. Petitioner later found out
that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters
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to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.17 He
likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only
figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known
in or connected with Blackgold.
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she
altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher
income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told
petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer.19 She
spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money
from other people on false pretexts.
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of
calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could
no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August
1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did
not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera
Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the
tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal,
introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other
hand, they observed that respondent's persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic
relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.
They further asserted that respondent's extreme jealousy was also
pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no
actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair
with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her
essential marital obligations.
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her
marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She
asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated
stories, told lies and invented personalities.
She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because
she was afraid of losing her husband.
(2) She told petitioner about David's attempt to rape and kill her
because she surmised such intent from David's act of touching her
back and ogling her from head to foot.
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had
been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2)
years.
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive
producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with
McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson &
Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank.
She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she
was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the
Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show
was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8
December 1979.
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by
her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of
the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while
Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband
but averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter
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if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to
monitor her husband's whereabouts.
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported
almost ten people from her monthly budget of P7, 000.00.
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a
child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by
petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was
that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a
finding of psychological incapacity on her part.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage must be nullified based on Art
36[YES]
RULING:
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines
in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the
psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony,
he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife's
behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the
Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent's claims
pertinent to her alleged singing career.
He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of
psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent
was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts
below considered petitioner's evidence as credible enough. Even the
appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally
honest with petitioner.
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of
nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action
with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot
be considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but
is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires
the participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney,
fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the
psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence,
any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily negate
such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity has
been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial
court's decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent,
from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of
peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing
personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using
fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income,
educational attainment, and family background, among others.
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further
linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field
of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in
particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the
department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals, testified
as follows:
WITNESS: Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit
provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of things that [are]
terribly wrong with the standards.
There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over
and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent,
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constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think,
based on assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is
abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q - Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations
of the respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic
obligations of her marriage?
A - Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards
another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the person,
and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see,
relationship is based on communication between individuals and what
we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then
when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to
tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think
is going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore,
it undermines that basic relationship that should be based on love,
trust and respect.
Q - Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the
respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then
incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q - Mr. Witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who
is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has
been calling up the petitioner's officemates and ask him (sic) on the
activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the
petitioner.
And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of
stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness?
A - If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid,
which means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her
husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the
extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal.
We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and
then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or
pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband
is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently
believes that the husband is having an affair with different women,
then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q - Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be
considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic
obligations of the marriage?
A - Yes, Ma'am.
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the
psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological
capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a]
pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to
fabricate about herself."
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological
incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of
respondent's testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of
petitioner.
While these witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the
Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos that personal
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
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From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the
spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.
We deem the methodology utilized by petitioner's witnesses as
sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede
and Lopez's common conclusion of respondent's psychological
incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioner's
version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself
accepted the veracity of petitioner's factual premises, there is no
cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn
therefrom by petitioner's expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial
court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its decision
in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her
actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about
almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing
abilities, her income, etc.
She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe
making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and
significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and
constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets
of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and
respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner,
such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to
psychological incapacity.
Third. Respondent's psychological incapacity was established to
have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration
of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from
fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she
kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child's real parentage
as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after
their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity is
sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared
only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated
petitioner left his wife.
Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of
petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent's
psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in
extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not
adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into
marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of
respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the
truth. Petitioner's witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on
respondent's inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic
nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of
respondent's inability to understand and perform the essential
obligations of marriage.
Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality
would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the
marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding
obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable
to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any
legal or emotional commitments.
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The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent
allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply
exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not
convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her
willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates
her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
Respondent's ability to even comprehend what the essential marital
obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence
convincingly disputes respondent's ability to adhere to the truth, her
avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded
much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code
which states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either
party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the
circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies
that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health,
rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give
grounds for action for the annulment of marriage."
It would be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations
made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45
(3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the
spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the
lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point
to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred
to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential
marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an
inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic
tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and
respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled
by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this
detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it
anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner's efforts to bring
the matter to its attention.
Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held
that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in a
Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due
discretion" on the part of respondent.90 Such decree of nullity was
affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, and
the Roman Rota of the Vatican. In fact, respondent's psychological
incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was
appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from
contracting another marriage without the Tribunal's consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent
is considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially
ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and
employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor
markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal
Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the
integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.
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From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required
by law that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and
premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s],
the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of adverse
personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the
substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and
that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent
in terms of its deliberative component.
In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its
practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse
action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from
eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent.
There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well
the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the
Petitioner.94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at
not only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must
clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage
in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar
recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioner's
allegations.
Had the trial court instead appreciated respondent's version as
correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings
of the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished
persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial
trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded
significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina
that such psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court
of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate
court noting that it did not appear certain that respondent's condition
was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially
separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work.
However, respondent's aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as
she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive
jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent's
condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that
respondent's condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that
respondent's psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a
remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had
petitioner's expert witnesses characterized respondent's condition as
incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological
incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts'
taciturnity on this point.
The petitioner's expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the
trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events
transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made
explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other
provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January
1995, began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the
Family Code committee, then the opinion of canonical scholars,
before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of
psychological incapacity.
ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO
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Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa's opinion expressed during the
deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable," and the
view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity
must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on
psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference
to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the
trial court came out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether
respondent's psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly,
Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the
psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration
of nullity.
At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of
this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial court's decision
that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose
only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate
review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an
argument that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively with
the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the
courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute
in enacted. Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical
considerations.
The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily
cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there
was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that
respondent's psychological incapacity was curable or incurable
simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a
declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly
propounded to him.
If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue
prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially
those presently on appellate review, where presumably the
respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen
the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those
cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is
actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court
level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the
interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case
perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case
an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the
parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to
that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten
(10) years ago.
From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that
the incurability of respondent's psychological incapacity has been
established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further
dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which
indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of
psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent
was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that
annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of
action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing
the trial court.
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From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it
does the marital bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It
is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains
in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the
petition for nullity.
In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondent's
avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides
these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage,
in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire
of people in love to live together.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
NGO TE vs. YU-TE
579 SCRA 193, G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
Digest by: Eliza Den A. Devilleres
PRINCIPLE:
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a
rigid set of rules, as the one in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,
268 SCRA 198 (1997), in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity; The unintended consequences of Molina has taken its toll on
people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and
sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by
little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions—
far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-
jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it.
FACTS:
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena
Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-
Chinese association in their college. Around 3 months after their first
meeting, Edward and Rowena eloped. When they went back to
Manila, both of them stayed at the place of Rowena's uncle.
Rowena's uncle brought her and Edward to court so that they should
get married. The two then continued to stay at her uncle’s place
where Edward was treated like a prisoner—he was not allowed to
go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and
warned the latter not to leave Rowena.
At one point, Edward was able to call home and talk to his brother
who suggested that they should stay at their parents’ home and live
with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested
that he should get his inheritance so that they could live on their own.
Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad,
told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward
must go home. After a month, Edward escaped from the house of
Rowena’s uncle, and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him
from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for
him. Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence
that they should live with his parents, she said that it was better for
them to live separate lives. They then parted ways.
ISSUE: Whether or not based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the
marriage between the parties is null and void. [YES]
ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO
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RULING:
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose
a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then
alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital
bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG’s exaggeration of Article 36 as
the “most liberal divorce procedure in the world.” The unintended
consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who
have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic
personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the
very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions.
Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a
strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly
or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has
allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs,
narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the
sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled
marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said
individuals.
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy
provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this
contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through
the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties
and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed
by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse,
domestic violence and incestuous rape. In dissolving marital bonds on
account of either party’s psychological incapacity, the Court is not
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting
the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person
afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or
assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that
sacred bond.
It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional
indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and
psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic
personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no
marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the
very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity
under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn
marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of
Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice
Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, 484 SCRA 353 (2006), there is
need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern
the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle
that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months.
They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital
vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who
provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically
incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the
classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondent’s,
that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. By the very
nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
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From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 76 (1999) emphasizes
the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the
precise cause of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that
it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos,
343 SCRA 755 (2000) asserts, there is no requirement that the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between
the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself. This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for
emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a
thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist
or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and
incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the
inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, an option for the
trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed
psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and evaluation
of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the courts,
who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an
intelligent and judicious determination of the case. The rule, however,
does not dispense with the parties’ prerogative to present their own
expert witnesses.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
AZCUETA VS. REPUBLIC AND CA
G.R. No. 180668, May 26, 2009, Leonardo-De Castro
Digest by: Francis Roel Dulay
PRINCIPLE:
[A person], who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot
assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing
love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is
unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows
others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live),
tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has
difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with
fears of being abandoned.
Of course, this is not to say that anyone diagnosed with dependent
personality disorder is automatically deemed psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage. It is the duty
of the court in its evaluation of the facts, as guided by expert opinion,
to carefully scrutinize the type of disorder and the gravity of the same
before declaring the nullity of a marriage under Article 36.
FACTS:
Marietta C. Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met in 1993. Less than two
months after their first meeting, they got married. Marietta was then
23 while Rodolfo 28. They separated after four years of marriage
and with no children.
On March 2, 2002, Marietta filed with the RTC a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
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Marietta complained that Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job
and instead always asked his mother for financial assistance. When
they were married it was Rodolfo’s mother who found them a room
near the Azcueta home and it was also his mother who paid the
monthly rental. Upon urging him to look for a job, he reasoned out
that he does not have shoes and clothes. Sometime later, Rodolfo
claimed to have found a job but it turns out that he didn’t actually
get a job and the money he gave her (which was supposedly his
salary) came from his mother. When she confronted him about the
matter, Rodolfo allegedly cried like a child and told her that he
pretended to have a job so that petitioner would stop nagging him
about applying for a job.
Marietta also complained that every time Rodolfo would get drunk
he became physically violent towards her. Their sexual relationship
was also unsatisfactory. They only had sex once a month and
petitioner never enjoyed it. When they discussed this problem,
Rodolfo would always say that sex was sacred and it should not
be enjoyed nor abused. He did not even want to have a child yet
because he claimed he was not ready. Additionally, when petitioner
requested that they move to another place and rent a small room
rather than live near his parents, Rodolfo did not agree. Because of
this, she was forced to leave their residence and see if he will follow
her. But he did not.
Marietta presented a psychiatrist as a witness who concluded (based
on Marietta’s description of Rodolfo) that he was suffering from
Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe inadequacy
related to masculine strivings. She added that the root cause of this
psychological problem was a cross-identification with the mother who
was the dominant figure in the family considering that respondent’s
father was a seaman and always out of the house. Also, she testified
that this kind of problem was also severe because he will not be able
to make and to carry on the responsibilities expected of a married
person. It was incurable because it started in early development and
therefore deeply ingrained into his personality.
ISSUE: WON Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated thus rendering
the marriage void. YES
RULING:
The Molina guidelines are as follows:
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity.
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the marriage.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children.
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From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that there
was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant the annulment of
the parties’ marriage under Article 36.
First, petitioner successfully discharged her burden to prove the
psychological incapacity of her husband.
In Marcos v. Marcos, it was held that there is no requirement that
the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined
by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
What matters is whether the totality of evidence presented is
adequate to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Marietta’s
evidence were her own testimony, corroborated by the testimony of
Rodolfo’s close relative, and the Psychiatrist’s findings corroborated
by her own testimony in open court to explain fully the contents of
her findings.
Second, the root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity has
been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the petition,
sufficiently proven by expert testimony, and clearly explained in the
trial court’s decision.
The root cause of the above clinical condition is due to a strong and
prolonged dependence with a parent of the opposite sex, to a
period when it becomes no longer appropriate. This situation
crippled his psychological functioning related to sex, self-confidence,
independence, responsibility and maturity. It existed prior to
marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration due to
marital stresses and demands. It is considered as permanent and
incurable in nature, because it started early in his life and therefore
became so deeply ingrained into his personality structure. It is severe
or grave in degree, because it hampered and interfered with his
normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustment.
Third, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was established to have
clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of
marriage. Witnesses were united in testifying that from inception of
the marriage, Rodolfo’s irresponsibility, overdependence on his
mother and abnormal sexual reticence were already evident. To be
sure, these manifestations of Rodolfo’s dependent personality
disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage being rooted
in his early development and a by-product of his upbringing and
family life.
Fourth, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity has been shown to be
sufficiently grave, so as to render him unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Rodolfo, who is afflicted with dependent
personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations
of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering
help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions
without advice from others, allows others to make most of his
important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with
people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing
things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order
to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless
when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital
obligations embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. As a
result of Rodolfo’s dependent personality disorder, he cannot make
his own decisions and cannot fulfill his responsibilities as a husband.
Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital obligations to live
together, observe mutual love, respect, and support under Article 68.
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Indeed, one who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one
who cannot independently make decisions regarding even the most
basic and ordinary matters that spouses face everyday; one who
cannot contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being
of his spouse is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
marital obligations within the meaning of Article 36.
Sixth, the incurability of Rodolfo’s condition which has been deeply
ingrained in his system since his early years was supported by
evidence and duly explained by the expert witness.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner, vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 16635 January 14, 2015
Digested by: Jennifer Lim
Principle:
"Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.
Facts:
In this case, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent)
suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies
of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses
were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which
had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied
on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions,
visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and
neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s
alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of
quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and
wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually
engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is
no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically
incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the
opposite conclusion.
A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not
totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her
marital and parental duties. Not once did the children state that they
were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that
she took care of them, was around when they were sick, and cooked
the food they like. It appears that respondent made real efforts
tosee and take care of her children despite her estrangement from
their father.
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There was no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and
neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two
sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite
having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic short comings to
Malyn’s actions.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage should be declared void pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code? YES.
Ruling:
The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that
Fernandez was indeed psychologically incapacitated as they
relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with regard to this case.
Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were just
given much respect in this case.
Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE
The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA
have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every
instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity
to the fate of certain rejection.
But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too
literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters
to adopt its enacted version of “less specificity” obviously to enable
“some resiliency in its application.” Instead, every court should
approach the issue of nullity “not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts” in
recognition of the verity that no case would be on “all fours” with the
next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the
nullity of marriage; hence, every “trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much
as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity
as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are
concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must
of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves
on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and
judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being
grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by
experts.
Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence
must be considered
We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate
for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution
only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to
a marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a marriage
has no legal existence.
There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically
incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because
what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately
establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.”
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Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the
like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain
condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed
in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be
weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence
on the causation.
Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be
considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative
value only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation.
The expert’s findings under such circumstances would not constitute
hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence.
Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to
psychological and emotional temperaments
The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved
credence because it was in the better position to view and examine
the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying.
The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the
evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be
downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect.
The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to such
expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment,
least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the
declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said
experts sufficiently and competently described the psychological
incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the
Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert
witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records
and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC
itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual premises.
The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to expert
testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in
cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very
nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, “despite having
the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but,
instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”
Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of
parental duties
The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have
delimited our determination of the presence or absence of
psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her
obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of
parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully
appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have known
that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong
sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices
that would erode their moral fiber. Nonetheless, the long-term effects
of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on
her family life, particularly on her very young children.
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her
mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties,
but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of
gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of
gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very
grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to
the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires.
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The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s
moral and mental development. This disregard violated her duty as
a parent to safeguard and protect her children.
ARTICLE 36
MIRASOL CASTILLO VS. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 214064, February 6, 2017
Digest by: Majeerah Sinarimbo
PRINCIPLE:
The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere
statement of her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she
can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for
her criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is
founded.
FACTS:
Mirasol and Felipe got married in Bani, Pangasinan on April 22,
1984 and were blessed with two (2) children.
In 2011, Mirasol filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
Mirasol alleged that at the beginning, their union was harmonious
prompting her to believe that the same was made in heaven.
However, after thirteen (13) years of marriage, Felipe resumed
philandering. Their relatives and friends saw him with different
women.
In support of her case, Mirasol presented clinical psychologist Sheila
Marie Montefalcon (Montefalcon) who, in her Psychological
Evaluation Report, concluded that Felipe is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
On the other hand, the OSG argues that Mirasol failed to establish
from the totality of evidence the gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability of Felipe's alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder. At
most, the psychologist merely proved his refusal to perform his
marital obligations. Moreover, she has no personal knowledge of
the facts from which she based her findings and was working on pure
assumptions and secondhand information related to her by one side.
ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of evidence presented warrants
the declaration of nullity of the marriage of Mirasol and Felipe on
the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code – NO
RULING:
The presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence
to show the psychological incapacity, however, did not mean that the
same would have automatically ensured the granting of the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity
of marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a
thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe
and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. The probative
force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement
of her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can
render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for
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her criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her
conclusion is founded.
It was, however, admitted that Montefalcon evaluated respondent's
psychological condition indirectly from the information gathered
from Mirasol and her witness. Felipe's dysfunctional family portrait
which brought about his personality disorder as painted in the
evaluation was based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of
petitioner. There was no independent witness knowledgeable of
respondent's upbringing interviewed by the psychologist or
presented before the trial court. Angelica Mabayad, the couple's
common friend, agreed with petitioner's claims in the interview with
the psychologist, confirmed the information given by petitioner, and
alleged that she knew Felipe as "chick boy" or "playboy." She did not
testify before the court a quo.
As such, there are no other convincing evidence asserted to establish
Felipe's psychological condition and its associations in his early life.
Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as
the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity,
the respondent's unfaithfulness must be established as a
manifestation of a disordered personality, completely preventing
the respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the
marital state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor that effectively incapacitated him from complying
with the obligation to be faithful to his spouse. It is indispensable that
the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO, PETITIONER v. JOSE O.
DEL ROSARIO AND COURT APPEALS,
RESPONDENTS
G.R. No. 222541, February 15, 2017
Digest by: Jay J.L. Astillo
FACTS:
Sometime in 1988, Rachel went to Hongkong to work as a domestic
helper. During this period, Rachel allegedly provided for Jose's
tuition fees for his college education. Rachel and Jose eventually
decided to get married on December 28, 1989 in a civil rites
ceremony held in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija. On February 19, 1995,
they renewed their vows in a church ceremony held in the Philippine
Independent Church, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.
In 1998, Rachel went back to Hongkong to work as domestic
helper/caregiver and has been working there ever since, only
returning to the Philippines every year for a vacation.
In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition11 for declaration of
nullity of marriage before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 11-
891, alleging that Jose was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
his essential marital obligations. In support of her petition, Rachel
claimed that: during their marriage, Jose conspicuously tried to avoid
discharging his duties as husband and father.
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According to Rachel, Jose was hot tempered and violent; he punched
her in the shoulder a few days before their church wedding, causing
it to swell, when she refused to pay for the transportation expenses
of his parents;
he hit his own father with a pipe, causing the latter to fall unconscious,
which forced them to leave Jose's parents' house where they were
then staying; and he even locked her out of their house in the middle
of the night sometime in December 2007 when she fetched her
relatives from the bus terminal, which he refused to perform. Rachel
added that Jose would represent himself as single, would flirt openly,
and had an extra-marital affair which she discovered when Jose
mistakenly sent a text message to her sister, Beverly A. Juan
(Beverly), stating: "love, kung ayaw mo na akong magpunta diyan,
pumunta ka na lang dito."
Another text message read: "Dumating lang ang asawa mo, ayaw
mo na akong magtext at tumawag sa 'yo." On one occasion, she,
together with Wesley and Beverly, caught Jose and the other woman
with their child inside their conjugal dwelling. Finally, she claimed that
Jose would refuse any chance of sexual intimacy between them as
they slowly drifted apart.
The RTC declared their marriage VOID because of psychological
incapacity. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in
reversing the RTC decision declaring the marriage VOID due to
psychological incapacity. [YES]
RULING:
The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family
as the basic social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the
family.34 Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage as
legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. In this regard, psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify
the marriage under Article 3635 of the Family Code, as amended,
should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage.
It should refer to no less than a mental - not merely physical -
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage, which, as provided under
Article 6837 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and
render help and support. In other words, it must be a malady that is
so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.
The Court maintains a similar view in this case and, thus, denies the
petition. Based on the totality of the evidence presented, there exists
insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Jose's immaturity,
irresponsibility, or infidelity amount to psychological incapacity.
Particularly, the Court notes that Rachel's evidence merely showed
that Jose: (1) would often indulge in drinking sprees; (2) tends to
become violent when he gets drunk; (2) avoids discharging his duties
as a father to Wesley and as a husband to Rachel, which includes
sexual intimacy; (3) flirts openly and represented himself as single;
and (4) engaged in an extra-marital affair with a bar girl who he
brought to the conjugal dwelling on several occasions.
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Significantly, Rachel admitted that their married life ran smoothly in
its early years. Dr. Tayag's findings, on the other hand, simply
summarized Rachel and Wesley's narrations as she diagnosed Jose
with APD and proceeded to conclude that Jose's "personality flaw is
deemed to be severe, grave, and have become deeply embedded
within his adaptive systems since early childhood years, thereby
rendering such to be a permanent component of his life [and]
[t]herefore x x x incurable and beyond repair despite any form of
intervention."
Psychological Incapacity
MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE,
Petitioner, v. RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR.,
Respondent
G.R. No. 188400, March 08, 2017
Digest by: Kathia Kierstin S. Chanyee
PRINCIPLE:
Psychological incapacity is a mental illness that leads to an inability to
comply with or comprehend essential marital obligations.
Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support." In this case, petitioner and respondent may have
lived together, but the facts narrated by petitioner show that respondent
failed to, or could not, comply with the obligations expected of him as
a husband. He was even apathetic that petitioner filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of their marriage.
This Court also noticed respondent's repeated acts of harassment
towards petitioner, which show his need to intimidate and dominate her,
a classic case of coercive control. At first, respondent only inflicted non-
physical forms of mistreatment on petitioner by alienating her from her
family and friends due to his jealousy, and stalking her due to his
paranoia. However, his jealousy soon escalated into physical violence
when, on separate instances, he poked a gun at his teenage cousin, and
at petitioner.
Coercive control is a form of psychological abuse, which refers to a
pattern of behavior meant to dominate a partner through different
tactics such as physical and sexual violence, threats, emotional insults,
and economic deprivation.
Although not specifically named, coercive control as a form of
psychological abuse or harm has been recognized in Republic Act No.
9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004.
FACTS:
Petitioner Maria Teresa and respondent Rodolfo De La Fuente, Jr.
(Rodolfo) first met when they were students at the University of Sto.
Tomas. Soon thereafter, they became sweethearts.
After graduating from college, Maria Teresa found work at the
University of Sto. Tomas Treasurer's Office.6 Meanwhile, Rodolfo,
who was unable to finish his college degree, found continued
employment at his family's printing press business.
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While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that
Rodolfo was an introvert and was prone to jealousy. She also
observed that Rodolfo appeared to have no ambition in life and felt
insecure of his siblings, who excelled in their studies and careers. On
June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa and Rodolfo got married in
Mandaluyong City. They had two children: Maria Katharyn, who was
born on May 23, 1985, and Maria Kimberly, who was born on April
6, 1986.10
Rodolfo's attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life.
He was jealous of everyone who talked to Maria Teresa, and would
even skip work at his family's printing press to stalk her.11 Rodolfo's
jealousy was so severe that he once poked a gun at his own 15-year
old cousin who was staying at their house because he suspected his
cousin of being Maria Teresa's lover. In addition, Rodolfo treated
Maria Teresa like a sex slave. They would have sex four (4) or five
(5) times a day.13 At times, Rodolfo would fetch Maria Teresa from
her office during her lunch break, just so they could have sex.
During sexual intercourse, Rodolfo would either tie her to the bed or
poke her with things.15 Rodolfo also suggested that they invite a
third person with them while having sex, or for Maria Teresa to have
sex with another man in Rodolfo's presence.16 Rodolfo's suggestions
made Maria Teresa feel molested and maltreated.17 Whenever
Maria Teresa refused Rodolfo's advances or suggestions, he would
get angry and they would quarrel.
Maria Teresa sought the advice of a doctor, a lawyer, and a priest,
as well as any person she thought could help her and Rodolfo.19
Maria Teresa also suggested that she and Rodolfo undergo
marriage counselling, but Rodolfo refused and deemed it as mere
"kalokohan".
Sometime in 1986, the couple quarrelled because Rodolfo suspected
that Maria Teresa was having an affair.21 In the heat of their
quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa's head. Maria Teresa,
with their two (2) daughters in tow, left Rodolfo and their conjugal
home after the gun-poking incident. Maria Teresa never saw Rodolfo
again after that, and she supported their children by herself.
On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage23 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. The case was initially archived because Rodolfo failed to file a
responsive pleading.24 Maria Teresa moved for the revival of the
Petition.25 The trial court granted the motion and referred the case
to the Office of the City Prosecutor for collusion investigation.26
Assistant City Prosecutor Jocelyn S. Reyes found no collusion and
recommended the trial of the case on the merits.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage must be nullified based on Art
36 [YES]
RULING:
The 1995 case of Santos v. Court of Appeals77 was the first case
that attempted to lay down the standards for determining
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Santos
declared that "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."78
Furthermore, the incapacity "should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage[.]"79
Two (2) years later, Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,
provided the guidelines to be followed when interpreting and
applying Article 36 of the Family Code:
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(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing
it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations
he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
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(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear
that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee
from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became
effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes
of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it
stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally
- subject to our law on evidence - what is decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose
of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and
the Church - while remaining independent, separate and apart from
each other - shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as
the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.81 (Emphasis in the
original)
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that there
was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant the nullity of
petitioner's marriage with respondent. Petitioner was able to
discharge the burden of proof that respondent suffered from
psychological incapacity.
The Court of Appeals chided the lower court for giving undue weight
to the testimony of Dr. Lopez since he had no chance to personally
conduct a thorough study and analysis of respondent's mental and
psychological condition. The Court of Appeals cited Republic v.
Dagdag,82 where this Court held that "the root cause of
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified
and sufficiently proven by experts."
The Court of Appeals then ruled that "[o]obviously, this requirement
is not deemed complied with where no psychiatrist or medical doctor
testifies on the alleged psychological incapacity ofone party."84
The Court of Appeals is mistaken.
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes states that the non-examination of one of
the parties will not automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the
findings of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist, since
"marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two
persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the
cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed
mainly by the other."
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Marcos v. Marcos emphasizes that Molina does not require a
physician to examine a person and declare him/her to be
psychologically incapacitated. What matters is that the totality of
evidence presented establishes the party's psychological condition.
Dr. Lopez's testimony, as corroborated by petitioner, sufficiently
proved that respondent suffered from psychological incapacity.
Respondent's paranoid personality disorder made him distrustful and
prone to extreme jealousy and acts of depravity, incapacitating him
to fully comprehend and assume the essential obligations of
marriage. As the trial court found:
Dr. Lopez testified that he arrived at his conclusion of respondent'[s]
personality by taking into consideration the psychological impression
and conclusion he gathered from the analysis of the different
behaviors he manifested during the time that he and petitioner were
living together. According to him, under the Diagnostic Statistical
Manual, he found the respondent to be suffering from a paranoid
personality disorder manifested by the respondent's damaging
behavior like reckless driving and extreme jealousy; his being
distrustful and suspicious; his severe doubts and distrust of friends
and relatives of the petitioner; his being irresponsible and lack of
remorse; his resistance to treatment; and his emotional coldness and
severe immaturity. He also testified that this kind of disorder is
actually one of the severe forms of personality disorder even more
severe than the other personality disorders like the borderline and
narcissistic personality disorders.
As to the root cause, [h]e explained that this must have been caused
by a pathogenic parental model. As he investigated the family
background of the respondent, Dr. Lopez discovered that his father
was a psychiatric patient such that the respondent developed a
similar symptom or psychic contamination which is called double
insanity. This, according to Dr. Lopez is usually developed among
close family members, bestfriends (sic), sweethearts and even couples
who are close to one another; that people close to one another get
psychically contaminated; that surprisingly, the symptom that the
father manifested is the same as those of the respondent. The said
disorder started during respondent's late childhood years and
developed in his early adolescent years.
He further testified that this disorder is very severe, serious and
incurable because of the severe paranoia of the patient; that
patients with this kind of personality disorder could never accept that
there is something wrong with them and if ever forced to seek
treatment, they would rather engage in an intellectual battle with the
therapist rather than cooperate with them.
Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's personality
disorder, he is incapacitated to perform his marital obligations of
giving love, respect, and support to the petitioner. He recommends
that the marriage be annulled.89 (Emphasis supplied)
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the ultimate
task of decision-making, must give due regard to expert opinion on
the psychological and mental disposition of the parties.
The root cause of respondent's paranoid personality disorder was
hereditary in nature as his own father suffered from a similar
disorder. Dr. Lopez stated that respondent's own psychological
disorder probably started during his late childhood years and
developed in his early adolescent years. Dr. Lopez explained that
respondent's psychological incapacity to perform his marital
obligations was likely caused by growing up with a pathogenic
parental model.
The juridical antecedence of respondent's psychological incapacity
was also sufficiently proven during trial. Petitioner attested that she
noticed respondent's jealousy even before their marriage, and that
he would often follow her to make sure that she did not talk to
anyone or cheat on him. She believed that he would change after
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they got married; however, this did not happen. Respondent's
jealousy and paranoia were so extreme and severe that these
caused him to poke a gun at petitioner's head.
The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological
incapacity were likewise discussed by Dr. Lopez. He vouched that a
person with paranoid personality disorder would refuse to admit that
there was something wrong and that there was a need for treatment.
This was corroborated by petitioner when she stated that respondent
repeatedly refused treatment. Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a
priest, and a doctor, and suggested couples counselling to
respondent; however, respondent refused all of her attempts at
seeking professional help. Respondent also refused to be examined
by Dr. Lopez.
Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support." In this case, petitioner and respondent may
have lived together, but the facts narrated by petitioner show that
respondent failed to, or could not, comply with the obligations
expected of him as a husband. He was even apathetic that petitioner
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
This Court also noticed respondent's repeated acts of harassment
towards petitioner, which show his need to intimidate and dominate
her, a classic case of coercive control. At first, respondent only
inflicted non-physical forms of mistreatment on petitioner by
alienating her from her family and friends due to his jealousy, and
stalking her due to his paranoia. However, his jealousy soon
escalated into physical violence when, on separate instances, he
poked a gun at his teenage cousin, and at petitioner.
Coercive control is a form of psychological abuse, which refers to a
pattern of behavior meant to dominate a partner through different
tactics such as physical and sexual violence, threats, emotional insults,
and economic deprivation.94 Although not specifically named,
coercive control as a form of psychological abuse or harm has been
recognized in Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Children Act of 2004:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or
a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his
wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common
child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment
or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to,
the following acts:
....
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely
to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not
limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property,
public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental
infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the
physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family
to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or
to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted
deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common
children.
Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by
intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife from her family and
friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof
of his depravity, and utter lack of comprehension of what marriage
ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO
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and partnership entail. It would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to
decree that petitioner should remain married to respondent.
After she had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family,
respondent simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong
in their marriage. This shows that respondent truly could not
comprehend and perform his marital obligations. This fact is
persuasive enough for this Court to believe that respondent's mental
illness is incurable.
In granting the petition and declaring void the marriage of Maria
Teresa and Rodolfo, this Court reiterates the pronouncement we
made in an opinion in Mallilin v. Jamesolamin:
Our choices of intimate partners define us - inherent ironically in our
individuality. Consequently, when the law speaks of the nature,
consequences, and incidents of marriage governed by law, this refers
to responsibility to children, property relations, disqualifications,
privileges, and other matters limited to ensuring the stability of
society. The state's interest should not amount to unwarranted
intrusions into individual liberties.
Since the State's interest must be toward the stability of society, the
notion of psychological incapacity should not only be based on a
medical or psychological disorder, but should consist of the inability
to comply with essential marital obligations such that public interest
is imperiled.
Lastly, this Court takes note of Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu Te's
observation that a straitjacket application of the Molina guidelines
"has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior,
moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like
termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families,
our basic social institutions."
Ironically, the ultimate effect of such stringent application of the
Molina guidelines is the perversion of the family unit, the very
institution that our laws are meant to protect.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
BAKUNAWA III v. BAKUNAWA
837 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 217993 August 9, 2017
Digest by: Eliza Den A. Devilleres
PRINCIPLE:
In Republic of the Philippines v. Galang, 650 SCRA 524 (2011), the
Supreme Court (SC) held that “[i]f the incapacity can be proven by
independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof
cannot be admitted to support a conclusion of psychological incapacity,
independently of a psychologist’s examination and report.
FACTS:
Nora and Manuel met each other when they were still students at the
University of the Philippines. When Nora became pregnant, she and
Manuel got married. After they got married, they lived with Manuel's
parents. On June 19, 2008, Manuel filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City on the ground that he and Nora are psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Manuel presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas (Dr. Villegas),
who testified that Manuel has Intermittent Explosive Disorder,
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From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
characterized by irritability and aggressive behavior that is not
proportionate to the cause. Dr. Villegas diagnosed Nora with Passive
Aggressive Personality Disorder, marked by a display of negative
attitude and passive resistance in her relationship with Manuel. Her
findings were based on her interview with Manuel and the parties'
eldest son, Moncho, because Nora did not participate in the
psychological assessment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the psychological evaluation report is
sufficient to prove that Manuel and Nora are psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage
[NO]
RULING:
The CA did not err in not according probative value to her
psychological evaluation report and testimony.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Galang, 650 SCRA 524 (2011), the
Court held that “[i]f the incapacity can be proven by independent
means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted
to support a conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently of a
psychologist’s examination and report.” In Toring v. Toring, et al., 626
SCRA 389 (2010), the Court stated that:
Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons
intimately related to them, such as relatives, close friends or even
family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the allegedly
incapacitated spouses’ condition at or about the time of marriage, or
to subsequent occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity
already present at the time of marriage.
In this case, the only person interviewed by Dr. Villegas aside from
Manuel for the spouses’ psychological evaluation was Moncho, who
could not be considered as a reliable witness to establish the
psychological incapacity of his parents in relation to Article 36 of the
Family Code, since he could not have been there at the time his
parents were married.
With regard to the Confirmatory Decree of the National Tribunal of
Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal of
First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila in favor of nullity of the
Catholic marriage of Manuel and Nora, the Court accords the same
with great respect but does not consider the same as controlling and
decisive, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
SINGSON VS. SINGSON
G.R. No. 210766, January 6, 2018, Del Castillo
Digest by: Francis Roel Dulay
PRINCIPLE:
It is settled that "[p]sychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance
of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the
difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations
or ill will." "[I]t is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he or she
must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some
psychological, not physical, illness."
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[T]he parties' child is not a very reliable witness in an Article 36 case
as "he could not have been there when the spouses were married and
could not have been expected to know what was happening between
his parents until long after his birth."
FACTS:
Maria Concepcion Singson and Benjamin Singson were married on
July 6, 1974. When they started living together, Maria (petitioner)
noticed that Benjamin (respondent) was "dishonest, unreasonably
extravagant at the expense of the family's welfare, extremely vain
physically and spiritually," and a compulsive gambler; that
respondent was immature, and was not ab1e to perform his paternal
duties; that respondent was also irresponsible, an easy-going man,
and guilty of infidelity; that respondent's abnormal behavior made
him completely unable to render any help, support, or assistance to
her; and that because she could expect no help or assistance at all
from respondent she was compelled to work doubly hard to support
her family as the sole breadwinner.
On February 27, 2007 petitioner filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She
averred in the said petition that currently, Benjamin is confined in a
rehabilitation institution for being diagnosed of suffering from
Pathological Gambling.
ISSUE: WON suffering from Pathological Gambling equates to
being psychologically incapacitated thus rendering the marriage
void. NO
RULING:
In Santos v. CA (Santos), the Court first declared that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be
grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical
antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved). The Court laid down more definitive
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code in Republic of the Phils. v. CA, [also known as the Molina
guidelines].
We agree with the CA that the evidence on record does not
establish that respondent's psychological incapacity was grave
and serious as defined by jurisprudential parameters since
"[respondent] had a job; provided money for the family from the
sale of his property; provided the land where the family home was
built on; and lived in the family home with petitioner-appellee and
their children." In fact, Benjamin received an inheritance money of
P2.9M which covered items for their family budget, such as their
children's education, the payments for association dues, and for
electric bills came from this money. And no less significant is
petitioner's admission that respondent provided the land upon which
the family home was built
What's more, petitioner and respondent likewise lived together as
husband and wife since their marriage on July 6, 1974 (and in the
company of their four children, too). In fact, shunting aside the time
that respondent was under treatment at the Metro Psych Facility,
petitioner did not allege any instance when respondent failed to live
with them.
To the foregoing, we ought to add the fact that petitioner herself
admitted, that respondent likewise brought her to the hospital during
all four instances that she gave birth to their children.
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Neither does petitioner’s bare claim that respondent is a
pathological gambler, is irresponsible, and is unable to keep a job,
necessarily translate into unassailable proof that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations. It is settled that "[p]sychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to
take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is
not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of
marital obligations or ill will." "[I]t is not enough to prove that a
spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable
of doing so because of some psychological, not physical, illness."
Further, the medical basis or evidence adverted to by the RTC did
not specifically identify the root cause of respondent's alleged
psychological incapacity. In fact, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not point to
a definite or a definitive cause, viz. "with his history of typhoid fever
when he was younger, it is difficult to attribute the behavioral
changes that he manifested in 2003 and 2006."
Besides, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio admitted that it was not she herself, but
another psychologist who conducted the tests. And this psychologist
was not presented by petitioner. More than that, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's
testimony regarding respondent's alleged admission that he was
allegedly betting on jai alai when he was still in high school is
essentially hearsay as no witness having personal knowledge of that
fact was called to the witness stand.
And, although Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio claimed to have interviewed
respondent's sister in connection therewith, the latter did testify in
court. And we are taught that "[t]he stringency by which the Court
assesses the sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports is
necessitated by the pronouncement in our Constitution that marriage
is an inviolable institution protected by the State."
Equally bereft of merit is petitioner's claim that respondent's alleged
psychological incapacity could be attributed to the latter's family or
childhood, which are circumstances prior to the parties' marriage; no
evidence has been adduced to substantiate this fact. Nor is there
basis for upholding petitioner's contention that respondent's family
was "distraught" and that respondent's conduct was "dysfunctional";
again, there is no evidence to attest to this.
Needless to say, petitioner cannot lean upon her son Jose's testimony
that his father's psychological incapacity existed before or at the
time of marriage. It has been held that the parties' child is not a
very reliable witness in an Article 36 case as "he could not have
been there when the spouses were married and could not have
been expected to know what was happening between his parents
until long after his birth."
To support her Article 36 petition, petitioner ought to have adduced
convincing, competent and trustworthy evidence to establish the
cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity and that the
same antedated their marriage. If anything, petitioner failed to
successfully dispute the CA's finding that she was not aware of any
gambling by respondent before they got married and that
respondent was a kind and caring person when he was courting her.
Against this backdrop, we must uphold the CA's declaration that
petitioner failed to prove that respondents alleged psychological
incapacity is serious or grave and that it is incurable or permanent.
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PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs. KATRINA S.
TOBORA-TIONGLICO, Respondent
G.R. No. 218630 January 11, 2018
Digested by: Jennifer Lim
Principle:
The psychological illness that must afflict a party at the inception of
the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive the party of his or her awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was then about to
assume
Facts:
Katrina and Lawrence met sometime in 1997 through a group of
mutual friends. After a brief courtship, they entered into a
relationship. When she got pregnant, the two panicked as both their
parents were very strict and conservative. Lawrence did not receive
the news well as he was worried how it would affect his image and
how his parents would take the situation. Nevertheless, they got
married on July 22, 2000.
They moved into the home of Lawrence's parents until the birth of
their child, Lanz Rafael Tabora Tionglico (Lanz), on December 30,
2000. Lawrence was distant and did not help in rearing their child,
saying he knew nothing about children and how to run a
family. Lawrence spent almost every night out for late dinners,
parties and drinking sprees. Katrina noticed that Lawrence was
alarmingly dependent on his mother and suffered from a very high
degree of immaturity. Lawrence would repeatedly taunt Katrina to
fight with him and they lost all intimacy between them as he insisted
to have a maid sleep in their bedroom every night to see to the needs
of Lanz.
Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Juan Arellano (Dr. Arellano),
who confirmed her beliefs on Lawrence's psychological incapacity.
Dr. Arellano, based on the narrations of Katrina, diagnosed
Lawrence with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, that is characterized
by a heightened sense of self-importance and grandiose feelings
that he is unique in some way.
Dr. Arellano determined that this personality disorder is permanent,
incurable, and deeply integrated within his psyche; and that it was
present but repressed at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and the onset was in early adulthood. His maladaptive and
irresponsible behaviors interfered in his capacity to provide mutual
love, fidelity, respect, mutual help, and support to his wife.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage should be declared void pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code? No.
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From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
Ruling:
Time and again, it has been held that "psychological incapacity" has
been intended by law to be confined to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it
must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable
of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b)
juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.
The case of Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals has set out
the guidelines that has been the core of discussion of practically all
declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis of psychological
incapacity cases that the court has decided:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. xxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. xxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. xxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. xxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. xxx
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. xxx
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. xxx21
Using these standards, SC ruled that Katrina failed to sufficiently
prove that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to discharge
the duties expected of a husband.
Where the various tests conducted by Dr. Arellano can most certainly
be conclusive of the psychological disposition of Katrina, but cannot
be said to be indicative of the psychological condition of Lawrence.
There was simply no other basis for Dr. Arellano to conclude that
Lawrence was psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential
marital obligations apart from Katrina's self-serving statements.
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To make conclusions and generalizations on a spouse's psychological
condition based on the information fed by only one side, as in the
case at bar, is, to the Court's mind, not different from admitting
hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
evidence.
The testimony of Katrina with regard to the behavior of Lawrence
hardly depicts the picture of a psychologically incapacitated
husband. Their frequent fights, his insensitivity, immaturity and
frequent night-outs can hardly be said to be a psychological illness.
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the "psychological
incapacity" that the law requires, and should be distinguished from
the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations that characterize some
marriages.
It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility
and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown
to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. The
psychological illness that must afflict a party at the inception of the
marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive
the party of his or her awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.
No other evidence or witnesses were presented by Katrina to prove
Lawrence's alleged psychological incapacity. Her testimony,
therefore, is considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary
value.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
ABIGAEL AN ESPINA-DAN VS. MARCO DAN
G.R. No. 209031, April 16, 2018
Digest by: Majeerah Sinarimbo
PRINCIPLE:
To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's
psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side
to a clinical psychologist is, to our mind, no different from admitting
hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
evidence.
FACTS:
Petitioner Abigael An Espina-Dan is a Filipina and respondent
Marco Dan is an Italian national. They got married in January 2006.
Soon after the wedding, respondent returned to Italy. Petitioner
followed thereafter. The couple lived together in Italy. On April 18,
2007, petitioner left respondent and flew back into the country.
Petitioner filed a Petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage
citing psychological incapacity.
Petitioner presented a clinical psychologist, who testified that
petitioner was subjected to a series of psychological tests, written
and oral form. She likewise subjected the mother of the petitioner to
clarificatory analysis. In her evaluation, she found no sign or symptom
of major psychological incapacity of the petitioner, while respondent
is suffering from a Dependent Personality Disorder with Underlying
Anti-Social Trait, by his parasitic attitude.
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From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
She was able to arrive at these findings on respondent although he
did not submit himself for the same psychological tests, through the
clinical assessments and information supplied by the petitioner, and
the description of the petitioner's mother regarding how she
perceived the respondent.
Both the trial and appellate courts dismissed the petition on the
ground that petitioner's evidence failed to sufficiently prove that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to enter marriage at
the time. They held that while petitioner alleged such condition, she
was unable to establish its existence, gravity, juridical antecedence,
and incurability based solely on her testimony, which is insufficient,
self-serving, unreliable, and uncorroborated, as she did not know
respondent very well enough — having been with him only for a
short period of time; Dr. Tayag's psychological report — which is
practically one-sided for the latter's failure to include respondent in
the study; and the account of petitioner's mother, which is deemed
biased and thus of doubtful credibility.
ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONER'S EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT AND SATISFIED
THE STANDARDS OF REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND
MOLINA AND OTHER PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE IN POINT –
NO
RULING:
Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of her judicial affidavit and
testimony; the judicial affidavits and testimonies of her mother and
Dr. Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's psychological evaluation report on the
psychological condition of both petitioner and respondent. The
determination of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity was
based solely on petitioner's account and that of her mother, since
respondent was presumably in Italy and did not participate in the
proceedings.
This is insufficient.
With the declared insufficiency of the testimonies of petitioner and
her witness, the weight of proving psychological incapacity shifts to
Dr. Tayag's expert findings. However, her determinations were not
based on actual tests or interviews conducted on respondent himself
— but on personal accounts of petitioner alone. This will not do as
well.
Rumbaua vs. Rumbaua provides some guidelines on how the courts
should evaluate the testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in
petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, viz.:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the
respondent's psychological incapacity were based on the information
fed to her by only one side — the petitioner — whose bias in favor
of her cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does
not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report,
testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid
and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above.
For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the
prism of a third-party account; she did not actually hear, see and
evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and
responded to the doctor's probes.
Dr. Tayag’s observations and conclusions are insufficiently in-depth
and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological
incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying
with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the
root cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to
prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
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Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged
disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of
fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not
physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's
conclusion in her Report — i.e., that the respondent suffered
"Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality
Disorder declared to be grave and incurable' — is an unfounded
statement, not a necessary inference from her previous
characterization and portrayal of the respondent.
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES , PETITIONER, v.
MARTIN NIKOLAI Z. JAVIER AND MICHELLE K.
MERCADO-JAVIER, RESPONDENTS
G.R. No. 210518, APRIL 18, 2018
Digest by: Jay J.L. Astillo
FACTS:
On November 20, 2008, Martin filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage and Joint Custody of Common Minor Child under
Article 36 of the Family Code.5 Martin alleged that both he and
Michelle were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.6 He thus prayed for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage, and for the joint custody of
their minor child, Amanda M. Javier.
In order to support the allegations in his petition, Martin testified on
his own behalf, and presented the psychological findings of Dr. Elias
D. Adamos (Dr. Adamos) (i.e., Psychological Evaluation Report on
Martin and Psychological Impression Report on Michelle).
In the Psychological Impression Report on Michelle, Dr. Adamos
diagnosed her with Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Likewise, Dr.
Adamos concluded in the Psychological Evaluation Report that Martin
suffered from the same disorder. Their disorder was considered
grave and incurable, and rendered Martin and Michelle
incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Dr.
Adamos further testified before the RTC to provide his expert
opinion, and stated that with respect to the Psychological Impression
Report on Michelle, the informants were Martin and the respondents'
common friend, Jose Vicente Luis Serra (Jose Vicente ). He was
unable to evaluate Michelle because she did not respond to Dr.
Adamos' earlier request to come in for psychological evaluation.
The RTC dismissed the petition of insufficiency of evidence. The CA
reversed the decision of the RTC stating that there was sufficiency of
evidence.
The Republic is now before this Court, arguing that there was no basis
for the CA's ruling granting the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. It argues that the testimony of Martin was self-serving,
especially in relation to Dr. Adamos' diagnosis that Michelle was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations under the Family Code. According to the Republic, there
were no other witnesses that were presented in court, who could have
testified on Michelle's behavior.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void due to psychological
incapacity. [YES]
RULING:
The Court finds the present petition partially unmeritorious. The
totality of evidence supports the finding that Martin is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of
marriage.
The psychological incapacity of a spouse must be characterized by
(a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability, which the
Court discussed in Santos v. CA, et al. 30 as follows:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.
The Court later clarified in Marcos v. Marcos that for purposes of
establishing the psychological incapacity of a spouse, it is not
required that a physician conduct an actual medical examination of
the person concerned. It is enough that the totality of evidence is
strong enough to sustain the finding of psychological incapacity. In
such case, however, the petitioner bears a greater burden in proving
the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of the other
spouse's psychological incapacity.
While the Court has consistently followed the parameters in Republic
v. Molina, these guidelines are not meant to straightjacket all
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The merits of each
case are determined on a case-to-case basis, as no case is on all
fours with another.
Martin, as the petitioner in this case, submitted several pieces of
evidence to support his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
He testified as to his own psychological incapacity and that of his
spouse, Michelle.
In particular, he stated that Michelle was confrontational even before
their marriage. He alleged that Michelle always challenged his
opinions on what he thinks is proper, which he insisted on because he
witnessed the abuse that his mother went through with his biological
father. He also thought that Michelle was highly impressionable and
easily influenced by friends, as a result of which, Martin alleged that
Michelle acted recklessly and without consideration of his feelings.
The psychological findings of Dr. Adamos were also presented in the
trial court to corroborate his claim. According to Dr. Adamos, Michelle
suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder as a result of
childhood trauma and defective child-rearing practices. This disorder
was supposedly aggravated by her marriage with Martin, who she
constantly lied to. It was also alleged in the Psychological Impression
Report that Michelle openly had extra-marital affairs.
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PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.
LIBERATO P. MOLA CRUZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 188400, March 08, 2017
Digest by: Kathia Kierstin S. Chanyee
PRINCIPLE:
The Court has to affirm the declaration of respondent's marriage as
void ab initio, even as it is clear from the records how much petitioner
must love his wife to endure the pain and humiliation she callously
caused him in the hope that their relationship could still work out.
Clearly, Liezl does not recognize the marital responsibilities that came
when she married petitioner. The severance of their marital vinculum will
better protect the state's interest to preserve the sanctity of marriage
and family, the importance of which seems utterly lost on respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent and Liezl were married on August 30, 2002 in Bacolod
City. Their dating relationship began when Liezl's sister gave Liezl's
mobile phone number to respondent so they could become textmates.
In the course of their relationship, Liezl left for Japan to work as an
entertainer for six (6) months. The couple got married after Liezl
returned home. They lived for some time in Manila where respondent
worked, but later moved to Japan where Liezl again secured a
contract as an entertainer and respondent found work as a
construction worker.
It was while living in Japan when respondent noticed changes in Liezl.
She began going out of the house without respondent's permission
and started giving respondent the cold treatment. Liezl also started
getting angry at respondent for no reason. The couple later returned
to the Philippines after Liezl was released from detention due to
overstaying in Japan. It was then that Liezl confessed to respondent
her romantic affair with a Japanese man. Despite the confession,
Liezl did not end the illicit relationship, which caused respondent such
stress that he was hospitalized.
Respondent expressed her willingness to forgive Liezl but she chose
to walk away from their marriage. The couple reconciled after
respondent made efforts to woo Liezl back. One day, however,
respondent found Liezl's Japanese lover in their house. To
respondent's surprise, Liezl introduced him to her lover as her elder
brother. Respondent went along with the charade, and allowed Liezl
to share her bed with her lover as she threatened to leave their home.
Liezl went on with her partying ways, and continued working in a
Manila nightclub despite respondent's offer for her to start a
business.
Despite the concessions given her, Liezl left respondent a second time.
Respondent tried to move on and left for Singapore to work in 2008.
Though abroad, he continued to woo his wife back, but found out that
Liezl already cohabited with her lover.
Respondent decided to file a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage must be nullified based on Art
36 [NO]
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
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From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
RULING:
The CA decision itself recognized and Our own review of Dr. Tudla's
psychological report confirms, contrary to petitioner's allegation, that
Dr. Tudla personally interviewed both spouses regarding their
personal and familial circumstances before and after the celebration
of their marriage. Information gathered from the spouses was then
verified by Dr. Tudla with Ma. Luisa Conag, Liez's youngest sister, a
close relation privy to Liezl's personal history before and after she
got married. Dr. Tudla then based her psychological evaluation and
conclusions on all the information she gathered.
Her findings were, thus, properly anchored on a holistic psychological
evaluation of the parties as individuals and as a married couple
under a factual milieu verified with an independent informant. The
courts a quo properly accorded credence to the report and utilized
it as an aid in determining whether Liezl is indeed psychologically
incapacitated to meet essential marital functions. Clearly, petitioner
has no basis to assail Dr. Tudla's psychological findings as wanting
evidentiary support.
Even the failure of an expert to conduct personal examination of the
couple will not perforce result to the expert's opinion becoming
unreliable, as petitioner advances. In Kalaw, a case also involving a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage wherein the expert
witnesses declared the respondent spouse therein as suffering from
narcissistic personality disorder without personally examining the
latter albeit with the support of the medical findings of the
respondent spouse's own clinical psychologist.
In said case, the Court had the occasion to re-emphasize that such
lack of personal examination does not per se invalidate the experts'
findings of psychological incapacity. Citing Marcos v. Marcos,21 the
Court emphasized the importance of the presence of evidence that
adequately establishes the party's psychological incapacity and the
inessentiality of a physician's personal examination to have a party
declared psychologically incapacitated. Kalaw expounded on the
point, as follows:
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the
like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain
condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed
in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be
weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence
on the causation.
Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be
considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative
value only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation.
The expert's findings under such circumstances would not constitute
hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence. This is so,
considering that any ruling that brands the scientific and technical
procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be
eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric evaluation had been
based on the parties' upbringing and psychodynamics.
Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential premise, the Court holds that
both the CA and the RTC did not err in finding that the totality of
evidence presented by respondent in support of his petition,
sufficiently established the link between Liezl's actions showing her
psychological incapacity to understand and perform her marital
obligations and her histrionic personality disorder.
The Court respects the RTC's appreciation of respondent's testimony
during trial on what transpired before and during the marriage,
considering that "[t]he totality of the behavior of one spouse during
the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed
mainly by the other."
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In addition, Dr. Tudla was able to collect and verify largely the same
facts in the course of her psychological evaluation of both spouses
and her interview of Liezl's sister. Dr. Tudla's report gave a
description of histrionic personality disorder, and correlated the
characteristics of this disorder with Liezl's behavior from her
formative years through he course of her marriage to petitioner.
Indubitably, Dr. Tudla's report and testimony enjoy such probative
force emanating from the assistance her opinion gave to the courts
to show the facts upon which her psychological conclusion was
based.24
The fact that Liezl's disorder manifested itself through actions that
occurred after the marriage was celebrated does not mean, as
,petitioner argues, that there is no psychological incapacity to speak
of. As held in Republic v. Pangasinan, psychological incapacity may
manifest itself after the celebration of the marriage even if it
already exists at the time of the marriage. More importantly, Art. 36
of the Family Code is explicit - a marriage contracted by a
psychologically incapacitated party is also treated as void even if
the incapacity becomes manifest only after the marriage was
celebrated.
Also, contrary to petitioner's allegation, the CA did expound on the
reasons why it found Liezl's disorder grave, deeply rooted in her
childhood and incurable.
To entitle a petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or
her marriage, the totality of the evidence must sufficiently prove that
the respondent spouse's psychological incapacity was grave,
incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage.2
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage;
it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. "
There must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person - an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to the marriage
which must be linked with the manifestations of the psychological
incapacity." The CA explained that Liezl's histrionic personality
disorder was the cause of her inability to discharge her marital
obligations to love, respect and give concern, support and fidelity to
her husband. The CA also narrated how the disorder was evidenced
by Liezl's actions after the marriage was celebrated, starting from
when she and petitioner lived together in Japan.
The gravity of her disorder is shown by appreciating the totality of
her actions after she got married. Liezl was unable to accommodate
the fact that she was already married into the way she wanted to
live her life, and essentially treated petitioner as a manipulable
inconvenience that she could ignore or threaten to accede to her
desires. It is clear that Liezl is truly incognitive of her marital
responsibilities.
The disorder was found by the CA to have begun when Liezl was an
adolescent and continued well into adulthood. It fully appreciated
Liezl's psychological evaluation that revealed her unconsciousness of
her disorder. Together with its rootedness in Liezl's personality since
her teens, the CA came to agree with the expert findings that any
medical or behavioral treatment of her disorder would prove
ineffective.
Petitioner also relies on the premise that Liezl's sexual infidelity and
abandonment are only grounds for legal separation and cannot be
used as basis to hold a marriage void ab initio.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
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From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
According to petitioner, Liezl cheated on and abandoned her
husband because of her illicit affair and not because she is
psychologically incapacitated.
It is true that sexual infidelity and abandonment are grounds for
legal separation. It may be noted, however, that the courts a quo
duly connected such aberrant acts of Liezl as actual manifestations
of her histrionic personality disorder. A person with such a disorder
was characterized as selfish and egotistical, and demands immediate
gratification.
These traits were especially reflected in Liezl's highly unusual acts of
allowing her Japanese boyfriend to stay in the marital abode,
sharing the marital bed with his Japanese boyfriend and introducing
her husband as her elder brother, all done under the threat of
desertion. Such blatant insensitivity and lack of regard for the
sanctity of the marital bond and home cannot be expected from a
married person who reasonably understand the principle and
responsibilities of marriage.
The Court has to affirm the declaration of respondent's marriage as
void ab initio, even as it is clear from the records how much petitioner
must love his wife to endure the pain and humiliation she callously
caused him in the hope that their relationship could still work out.
Clearly, Liezl does not recognize the marital responsibilities that
came when she married petitioner. The severance of their marital
vinculum will better protect the state's interest to preserve the sanctity
of marriage and family, the importance of which seems utterly lost
on respondent.
ARTICLE 40
CASTILLO v. DE LEON-CASTILLO
789 SCRA 503, G.R. No. 189607 April 18, 2016
Digest by: Eliza Den A. Devilleres
PRINCIPLE:
A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly
required where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage. However, as this Court
clarified in Apiag v. Cantero and Ty v. Court of Appeals, the
requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not apply to marriages
that were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code,
particularly if the children of the parties were born while the Civil Code
was in force.
FACTS:
Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to
her subsisting marriage to Benjamin Bautista and her psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Lea opposed the
Petition, and contended among others that her marriage to Bautista
was null and void as they had not secured any license therefor, and
neither of them was a member of the denomination to which the
solemnizing officer belonged. On 3 January 2002, Lea filed an
action to declare her first marriage to Baustista void. On 22 January
2003, the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City rendered its
Decision declaring that Lea's first marriage to Bautista was indeed
null and void ab initio.
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Thereafter, the same court issued a Certificate of Finality saying that
the Decision dated 22 January 2003 had become final and
executory. On 12 August 2004, Lea filed a Demurrer to Evidence
claiming that the proof adduced by Renato was insufficient to
warrant a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground that
it was bigamous. In his Opposition, Renato countered that whether or
not the first marriage of Lea was valid, and regardless of the fact
that she had belatedly managed to obtain a judicial declaration of
nullity, she still could not deny that at the time she entered into
marriage with him, her previous marriage was valid and subsisting.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a need for a declaration of nullity
of a previous void marriage contracted before the effectivity of
the Family Code. [NO]
RULING:
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code
rendered the rulings in Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977),
People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954), and People v. Aragon, 100
Phil. 1033 (1957), inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3
August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
is now expressly required where the nullity of a previous marriage
is invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. A second
marriage contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity
is thus considered bigamous and void.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572 (1993), we
explained the policy behind the institution of this requirement:
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an
“inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family”; as such,
it “shall be protected by the State.” In more explicit terms, the Family
Code characterizes it as “a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law
for the establishment of conjugal and family life.” So crucial are
marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that
their “nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation.”
As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for
the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished
merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that
their union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites
of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with
no legal effect — and nothing more.
Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to
a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And
the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-
ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a
socially significant institution, an official state pronouncement
through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting
norms of society. Not only would such an open and public
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the
contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable
through records accessible to everyone.
However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero and Ty v. Court
of Appeals, the requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not
apply to marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of the
Family Code, particularly if the children of the parties were born while
the Civil Code was in force.
In the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was
entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule
was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of
private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there
was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could
contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that
private respondent's second marriage to petitioner is valid.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would
prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held
in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect
unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that
impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent x
x x. (Citations omitted)
As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon is
applicable to this case. The Court thus concludes that the subsequent
marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her
first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage
license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first
marriage was void ab initio before the second marriage was
contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the
Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC of
Parañaque City declaring the nullity of Lea’s first marriage only
serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to
Renato is valid.
ART. 41 REMARRIAGE, FIRST SPOUSE
BEING ABSENT
REPUBLIC VS. SEREÑOGON, JR.
G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016, Del Castillo
Digest by: Francis Roel Dulay
PRINCIPLE:
[M]ere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the
law), or lack of news that such absentee is still alive, failure to
communicate [by the absentee spouse or invocation of the] general
presumption on absence under the Civil Code [would] not suffice. This
conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family
Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the
additional and more stringent requirement of "well-founded belief"
which can only be discharged upon a due showing of proper and
honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the
absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent
spouse is [either] still alive or is already dead.
To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable
efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these
efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the
absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not
a mere passive one).
FACTS:
Jose and Netchie got married on August 10, 1996. They lived
together as husband and wife for only a month because he left to
work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic
helper. For three months, he did not receive any communication from
Netchie. He likewise had no idea about her whereabouts. While still
abroad, he tried to contact Netchie’s parents, but failed, as the latter
had allegedly left Clarin, Misamis Occidental. He returned home
after his contract expired. He then inquired from Netchie’s relatives
and friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not know where
she was. On November 4, 2008, Jose filed a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife Netchie.
ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO
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ISSUE: WON Jose’s efforts to locate Netchie sufficient to support a
well-founded belief that she is probably dead. NO
RULING:
Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four essential
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the
Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that
the absentee is dead; and,
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
With respect to the third element (which seems to be the element that
in this case invites extended discussion), the holding is that the mere
absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), or
lack of news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate
[by the absentee spouse or invocation of the] general presumption
on absence under the Civil Code [would] not suffice. This conclusion
proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places
upon the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and
more stringent requirement of "well-founded belief" which can only
be discharged upon a due showing of proper and honest-to-
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent
spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse
is [either] still alive or is already dead.
To be able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable
efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion
of active effort (not a mere passive one).
In the case at bar, the RTC ruled that Jose has "well-founded belief"
that Netchie was already dead upon the following grounds:
(1) Jose allegedly tried to contact Netchie’s parents while he was still
out of the country, but did not reach them as they had allegedly left
Clarin, Misamis Occidental;
(2) Jose believed/presumed that Netchie was already dead
because when he returned home, he was not able to obtain any
information that Netchie was still alive from Netchie’s relatives and
friends;
(3) Jose’s testimony to the effect that Netchie is no longer alive, hence
must be presumed dead, was corroborated by Jose’s older brother,
and by Netchie’s aunt, both of whom testified that he (Jose) and
Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for one month and
that after this, there had been no information as to Netchie’s
whereabouts.
Given the Court’s imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code, it must follow that there was no basis at all for the RTC’s finding
that Jose’s Petition complied with the requisites of Article 41 of the
Family Code, in reference to the "well-founded belief" standard. If
anything, Jose’s pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing
Netchie are notches below the required degree of stringent diligence
prescribed by jurisprudence.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
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From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
For, aside from his bare claims that he had inquired from alleged
friends and relatives as to Netchie’s whereabouts, Jose did not call
to the witness stand specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly
saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the allegedly
missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the assistance
of the pertinent government agencies as well as the media. Nor did
he show that he undertook a thorough, determined and unflagging
search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those years
were), and naming the particular places, provinces, cities, barangays
or municipalities that he visited, or went to, and identifying the
specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the course of his
search.
ART. 41 REMARRIAGE, FIRST SPOUSE
BEING ABSENT
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. NILDA B.
TAMPUS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016
Digested by: Jennifer Lim
Principle:
The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present
spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and
reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates
exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere absence
of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any
news that such absentee spouse is still alive, failure to communicate,
or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not
suffice.
Facts:
Respondent Nilda B. Tampus (Nilda) was married to Dante L. Del
Mundo (Dante) on November 29, 1975 in Cordova, Cebu. The
marriage ceremony was solemnized by Municipal Judge Julian B.
Pogoy of Cordova, Cebu. Three days thereafter, or on December 2,
1975, Dante, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
left respondent, and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned.
The couple had no children. Since then, Nilda heard no news from
Dante. She tried everything to locate him, but her efforts proved
futile. Thus, on April 14, 2009, she filed before the RTC a petition to
declare Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose of
remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of thirty-three (33) years
without any kind of communication from him, she firmly believes that
he is already dead.
The RTC granted Nilda's petition and declared Dante as
presumptively dead for all legal purposes, without prejudice to the
effect of his reappearance.
CA denied the OSG's petition and affirmed the RTC Decision
declaring Dante as presumptively dead. The CA gave credence to
the RTC's findings that Nilda had exerted efforts to find her husband
by inquiring from his parents, relatives, and neighbors, who likewise
had no knowledge of his whereabouts. Further, the lapse of thirty-
ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO
35
three (33) years, coupled with the fact that Dante had been sent on
a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu, gave rise to Nilda's well-founded
belief that her husband is already dead.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC Decision declaring
Dante as presumptively dead? YES.
Ruling:
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained,
it must be shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded
belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of
the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code), there are four (4)
essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death: (1) that
the absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years, or
two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there
is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391
of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry; (3)
that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee
is dead; and (4) that the present spouse files a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the
foregoing requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code exist. Since
it is the present spouse who, for purposes of declaration of
presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue,
it stands to reason that the burden of proof lies with him/her. He who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is
not evidence.
In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she
tried to locate him by making inquiries with his parents, relatives, and
neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not
know where to find him. Other than making said inquiries, however,
Nilda made no further efforts to find her husband. She could have
called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request information
about her husband, but failed to do so. She did not even seek the
help of the authorities or the AFP itself in finding him. Considering her
own pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP on a combat
mission to Jolo, Sulu at the time of his disappearance, she could have
inquired from the AFP on the status of the said mission, or from the
members of the AFP who were assigned thereto.
Furthermore, Nilda did not present Dante's family, relatives, or
neighbors as witnesses who could have corroborated her
asseverations that she earnestly looked for Dante. These resource
persons were not even named. In Republic v. Nolasco, it was held that
the present spouse's bare assertion that he inquired from his friends
about his absent spouse's whereabouts was found insufficient as the
names of said friends were not identified in the testimony nor
presented as witnesses.
Finally, other than Nilda's bare testimony, no other corroborative
evidence had been offered to support her allegation that she
exerted efforts to find him but was unsuccessful. What appears from
the facts as established in this case was that Nilda simply allowed
the passage of time without actively and diligently searching for her
husband, which the Court cannot accept as constituting a "well-
founded belief that her husband is dead.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
ARTICLE 41
REPUBLIC VS. LUDYSON CATUBAG
G.R. No. 210580, April 18, 2018
Digest by: Majeerah Sinarimbo
PRINCIPLE:
Spouses may easily circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage by
simply agreeing that one of them leave the conjugal abode and never
return again. Thus, there is a need for courts to exercise prudence in
evaluating petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse. A lenient approach in applying the standards of diligence
required in establishing a "well-founded belief" would defeat the State's
policy in protecting and strengthening the institution of marriage.
FACTS:
While the husband Ludyson was working abroad, he was informed
by his relatives that Shanaviv left their house and never returned. In
the meantime, private respondent's relatives took care of the
children.
Worried about his wife's sudden disappearance and the welfare of
his children, private respondent took an emergency vacation and
flew back home. Private respondent looked for his wife in Enrile
Cagayan, but to no avail. He then proceeded to inquire about
Shanaviv's whereabouts from their close friends and relatives, but
they too could offer no help. Private respondent travelled as far as
Bicol, where Shanaviv was born and raised, but he still could not
locate her.
Private respondent subsequently sought the help of Bombo Radyo
Philippines, one of the more well-known radio networks in the
Philippines, to broadcast the fact of his wife's disappearance.
Moreover, private respondent searched various hospitals and
funeral parlors in Tuguegarao and in Bicol, with no avail.
After almost seven (7) years of waiting, private respondent filed with
the RTC a petition to have his wife declared presumptively dead.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT COMPLIED
WITH THE ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF A PETITION FOR
DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF
THE Family Code – NO
RULING:
Prevailing jurisprudence has time and again pointed out four (4)
requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code that must be complied
with for the declaration of presumptive death to prosper:
 the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive
years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance
occurred where there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code.
 the present spouse wishes to remarry.
 the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead.
 the present spouse files for a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
In seeking a declaration of presumptive death, it is the present spouse
who has the burden of proving that all the requisites under Article 41
of the Family Code are present.
ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO
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Notably, the records reveal that private respondent has complied
with the first, second, and fourth requisites. Thus, what remains to be
resolved is whether or not private respondent successfully
discharged the burden of establishing a well-founded belief that
his wife, Shanaviv, is dead.
The Court in Cantor, pointed out that the term, "well-founded belief"
depends on the circumstances of each particular case. In Republic vs.
Orcelino-Villanueva, the Court provided that such belief must result
from diligent efforts to locate the absent spouse. Such diligence
entails an active effort on the part of the present spouse to locate
the missing one. The mere absence of a spouse, devoid of any
attempt by the present spouse to locate the former, will not suffice.
In the case at bar, the Court finds that private respondent's efforts
falls short of the degree of diligence required by jurisprudence for
the following reasons:
First, private respondent claims to have inquired about his missing
wife's whereabouts from both friends and relatives. Further, he claims
to have carried out such inquiries in the place where they lived and
in the place where his wife was born and raised. However, private
respondent failed to present any of these alleged friends or relatives
to corroborate these "inquiries." Moreover, no explanation for such
omission was given. As held in the previous cases, failure to present
any of the persons from whom inquiries were allegedly made tends
to belie a claim of a diligent search.
Second, private respondent did not seek the help of other concerned
government agencies, namely, the local police authorities and the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). In Cantor, the Court reasoned
that while a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of
the situation, it would still be prudent for the present spouse to seek
the aid of the authorities in searching for the missing spouse. Absent
such efforts to employ the help of local authorities, the present spouse
cannot be said to have actively and diligently searched for the
absentee spouse.
Finally, aside from the certification of Bombo Radyo's manager,
private respondent bases his "well-founded belief" on bare
assertions that he exercised earnest efforts in looking for his wife.
Again, the present spouse's bare assertions, uncorroborated by any
kind of evidence, falls short of the diligence required to engender a
well-founded belief that the absentee spouse is dead.
Taken together, the Court is of the view that private respondent's
efforts in searching for his missing wife, Shanaviv, are merely passive.
Private respondent could have easily convinced the Court otherwise
by providing evidence which corroborated his "earnest-efforts." Yet,
no explanation or justification was given for these glaring omissions.
Again, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it by some
other means than mere allegations.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
ARTICLE 41
ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS, PETITIONER v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHLIIPPIENS, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018
Digest by: Jay J.L. Astillo
FACTS:
On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadco-Matias filed before
the Regional Trail Court (RTC) of Tarlac City a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of her husband, Wifredo N. Matias
(Wilfredo). The allegations of the petition read:
1. [Petitioner] is of legal age, married to [Wilfredo], Filipino and
curr[e]ntly a residnet of 106 Molave street, Zone B. San Miguel
Tarlac City;
2. [Wifredo] is of legal age, a member of the Philippine
Constabulary and was assigned in Araya, Pampanga since August
24, 1967[;]
3. The[p]etitioner and [Wilfredo] entered into a lawful marriage on
January 7, 1968 in Imbo, Anda, Pangasinan x x x;
4. After the solemnization of their marriage vows, the couple put up
their conjugal home at 106 Molave street, Zone B. San Miguel, Tarlac
City;
5. [Wilfredo] continued to serve the Philippines and on September
15, 1979, he set out from their conjugal home to again serve as a
member of the Philippine Constabulary;
6. [Wilfredo] never came back from his tour of duty in Arayat,
Pampanga since 1979 and he never made contact or communicated
with the [p]etitioner nor to his relatives;
7. That according to the service record of [Wilfredo] issued by the
National Police Commission, [Wilfredo] was already declared
missing since 1979 x x x;
8. Petitioner constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for
any news regarding [her] beloved husband [Wilfredo], but the
Philippine Constabulary had no answer to his whereabouts, [neither]
did they have any news of him going AWOL, all they know was he
was assigned to a place frequented by the New People's Army;
9. [W]eeks became years and years became decades, but the
[p]etitioner never gave up hope, and after more than three (3)
decades of awaiting, the [p]etitioner is still hopeful, but the times had
been tough on her, especially with a meager source of income
coupled with her age, it is now necessary for her to request for the
benefits that rightfully belong to her in order to survive;
10. [T]hat one of the requirements to attain the claim of benefits is
for a proof of death or at least declaration of presumptive death by
the Honorable Court;
11. That this petition is being filed not for any other purpose but
solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as amended.
The RTC declared WILFREDO N. MATIAS absent or presumptively
dead under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines for
purpose of claiming financial benefits due to him as former military
officer.
The Republic questioned the decision of the CA which the later
granted the petition by reversing the decision of the RTC:
ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO
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Be that it may, the petition to declare Wilfredo presumptively
dead should have been dismissed by the RTC. The RTC is without
authority to take cognizance of a petition whose sole purpose is
to have a person declared presumptively dead under either
Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code. As been held by
jurisprudence, Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely
express rules of evidence that allow a court or a tribunal to
presume that a person is dead-which presumption may be
invoked in any action or proceeding, but itself cannot be the
subject of an independent action or proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in denying the petition
for the declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo. [YES]
RULING:
It can be recalled that the RTC, in fallo of its January 15, 2012
Decision, granted the petitioner's petition by declaring Wilfredo
presumptively dead "under Article 41 of the FC." By doing so, RTC
gave the impression that the petition for the declaration of
presumptive death filed by petitioner was likewise filed pursuant to
Article 41 of the FC.9 This is wrong.
The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed by
petitioner is not an action that would have warranted the application
of Article 41 of the FC shows that the presumption of death
established therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting
a valid subsequent marriage under the said law. Thus:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of
a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect
of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the
declaration of the presumptive death Wilfredo as a prerequisite for
remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of presumptive death,
petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed "not for any
other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638
a amended.
Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was
not filed for the purpose of remarriage, petitioner was clearly
relying on the presumption of death under either Article 390 or
Article 391 of the Civil Code11 as the basis of her petition. Articles
390 and 391 of the Civil Code express the general rule regarding
presumption s of death for any civil purpose, to wit:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether
or not the absence still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all
purposes except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening
his succession till after an absence of five years shall be sufficient in
order that his succession may be opened.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an
aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four
years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and
has been missing for four years;
(3) a person who has been in danger of death under other
circumstances and his existence has not been known for four
years.
Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring
the presumptive death of Wilfredo was misleading and grossly
improper. The petition for the declaration of presumptive death filed
by the petitioner was based on the Civil Code, and not on Article 41
of the FC.
Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration
of presumptive death of Wilfredo under the Civil Code, the RTC
should have dismissed such petition outright. This is because, in our
jurisdiction, a petition whose sole objective is to have a person
declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code is not regarded
as a valid suit and no court has any authority to take cognizance of
the same.
The above norm had its conceptual roots in the 1948 case of In re:
Petition for the Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw.12 In the
said case, we held that a rule creating a presumption of death13 is
merely one of the evidence that-while may be invoked in any action
or proceeding-cannot be the lone subject of an independent action
or proceeding. Szatraw explained:
The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of the evidence which
permits the court to presume that a person had been unheard
from in seven years had been established. This presumption may
arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or
in a special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and
submitted for decision to, a competent court. Independently of
such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death
cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action
or special proceeding.
In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy
prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband.
Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his right
or status or for the ascertainment of particular fact, for the
petition does not pray for the declaration that the petitioner 's
husband us dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be
presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven
years. If there is any pretense at securing a declaration that the
petitioner's husband os dead, such a pretension cannot be
granted because it is unauthorized.
The petition is for a declaration, even if judicially made, would
not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption
is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that
effect, even if final and executory, would be a prima facie
presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it
cannot be the subject of judicial pronouncement or declaration,
if it is that only question or matter involved in a case, or upon
which a competent court has to pass.
ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO
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The latter must decide finally the controversy between the
parties, or determine finally the right or status of a party or
establish finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and
obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy is
decided by a final decree, then the judgement on the subject of
the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a party
or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata,
subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances
especially provided by law. It is, therefore, clear that judicial
declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had
been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris
tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of
finality or become final.
ARTICLE 41
Republic v. Quiñonez,
G.R. No. 237412, [January 6, 2020])
Digest by: Kathia Kierstin S. Chanyee
Principle
Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision
of the Civil Code which it superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It
requires a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already dead
before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
We have had occasion to make the same observation in Republic v.
Nolasco, where we noted the crucial differences between Article 41 of
the Family Code and Article 83 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has
been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to
remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard
than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either
that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is
generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse
present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well
founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the
law), lack of any news that such absentee is still alive, failure to
communicate or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code
would not suffice.
This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family
Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the
additional and more stringent requirement of "well-founded belief"
which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse's
whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent spouse is still alive
or is already dead.
Facts:
[Petitioner Remar A. Quiñonez (Remar)] and his wife Lovelyn met in
[Gamaon], 6 Mangagoy, Bislig City when Remar was in college [and]
staying at his aunt's house. After eight months [of being] in a
relationship, they got married on August 16, 1997 at the Saint
Vincent de Paul Parish in Mangagoy, Bislig City[. The wedding was]
officiated by Rev. Fr. Ivan E. Novo, as shown in their Marriage
Certificate.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
After their wedding, the couple stayed at the house of Lovelyn's
parents and they begot two (2) children [namely], Emar A. Quiñonez
born on January 20, 1998 and Diana Love Quiñonez born on
December 15, 1999.
To support his family, Remar started working as a security guard at
the National Food Authority Warehouse in October 1997, although
later on, he transferred to Cebu City for an opportunity to earn a
bigger salary.
Sometime in 2001, when Lovelyn's father received his retirement
pay, Lovelyn asked her husband's permission to go on a three-month
vacation in Manila to visit some relatives. Despite Remar's reluctance,
he agreed to his wife's request.
During the first three months[,] Lovelyn constantly communicated with
Remar through cellphone. It was also at this time that Remar resigned
from his work in Cebu City and transferred to Surigao City, where
he worked as a security guard at the Surigao City Hall of Justice.
Remar informed Lovelyn that as soon as she arrive[d] from Manila,
they would x x x be living together in Surigao City [with] their two
children. Thereafter, the calls and text messages tapered off until the
communication between the spouses ceased altogether.
At first, Remar thought that his wife just lost her cellphone, so he
inquired about her from their relatives in Bislig City. Someone
informed him that his wife was then already cohabiting with another
man and would no longer be coming back out of shame.
On November 2003, Remar's uncle informed him that Lovelyn was in
Bislig City to visit their children. Remar filed for an emergency leave
of absence from his work and left for Bislig City only to be told that
his wife had already left for Lingig, Surigao del Sur. He went after
her in Lingig, yet upon arrival, he was told that Lovelyn stayed only
for a day and returned to Bislig. He was then constrained to go back
to Surigao City, without seeing his wife.
In the summer of 2004, Remar filed for a leave from work to look
for his wife in Manila. [Remar also] went to Batangas along with his
aunt, Evelyn Pachico[,] as well as to Cavite with Lovelyn's aunt,
Leonora Aguilar, yet they were not able to find her.
On February 27, 2013, after almost ten (10) years of trying to know
about the whereabouts of his wife from their relatives proved futile,
x x x [Remar filed a] Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death
before the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the standard of “well-founded belief” was met in
order to declare the absent spouse presumptively dead [NO]
Ruling:
Article 41 of the Family Code provides the requirements for a
declaration of presumptive death, thus:
ART. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence
of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect
of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis supplied)
ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO
39
Culled from this provision, the essential requisites for a declaration
of presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage are:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years,
or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there
is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391,
Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. 32 (Emphasis in
the original)
The Petition is anchored on Remar's alleged failure to prove
compliance with the third requisite. Thus, a closer examination of this
requirement is necessary.
In Cantor, the Court en banc clarified the meaning of well-founded
belief by comparing the language of Article 41 to its Civil Code
counterpart. The Court held:
Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old
provision of the Civil Code which it superseded, imposes a stricter
standard. It requires a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is
already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive
death can be granted. We have had occasion to make the same
observation in Republic v. Nolasco, where we noted the crucial
differences between Article 41 of the Family Code and Article 83 of
the Civil Code, to wit:
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has
been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to
remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter
standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely
requires either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive;
or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to
be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390
and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand,
prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already
dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be
granted.
Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by
the law), lack of any news that such absentee is still alive, failure to
communicate or general presumption of absence under the Civil
Code would not suffice.
This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the
Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving
the additional and more stringent requirement of "well-founded
belief" which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and
honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the
absent spouse's whereabouts but, more importantly, that the absent
spouse is still alive or is already dead.
The Requirement of Well-Founded Belief
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It
depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Its
determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be
able to comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove
that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts
and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these
efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances,
the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active
effort (not a mere passive one). 33 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied; emphasis and italics in the original omitted)
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
Based on these parameters, the Court held that the efforts exerted
by respondent therein fell short of the degree of diligence required
by law and jurisprudence:
In the case at bar, the respondent's "well-founded belief" was
anchored on her alleged "earnest efforts" to locate [her husband,]
Jerry, which consisted of the following:
(1) She made inquiries about Jerry's whereabouts from her in-laws,
neighbors and friends; and
(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked
through the patients' directory, hoping to find Jerry.
These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and
degree of diligence required by jurisprudence for the following
reasons:
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. It
can be inferred from the records that her hospital visits and her
consequent checking of the patients' directory therein were
unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for
her husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily
directed to look for him. This Court thus considers these attempts
insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerry's absence to the police nor did she
seek the aid of the authorities to look for him. While a finding of
well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation in which
the present spouse is placed, under present conditions, we find it
proper and prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been
missing, to seek the aid of the authorities or, at the very least, report
his/her absence to the police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry's relatives or their
neighbors and friends, who can corroborate her efforts to locate
Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly made
inquiries, were not even named. As held in Nolasco, the present
spouse's bare assertion that he inquired from his friends about his
absent spouse's whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the friends
from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the testimony nor
presented as witnesses.
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the
respondent's claim that she conducted a diligent search. Neither was
there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-founded
belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends
and in-laws about her husband's whereabouts.
In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged
in a "passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries
from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She failed to conduct a
diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a
well-founded belief that her husband was already dead.
As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),
"[w]hether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief
of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be
drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after
the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent
of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse." (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; emphasis in the original omitted)
Citing Cantor, the Republic asserts that the standard of "well-
founded belief" is exacting; it presupposes that the present spouse
had exerted diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent
spouse. 35 According to the Republic, Remar's efforts fall short of this
requirement.
The Court agrees.
To recall, Remar's efforts to locate Lovelyn are marked by the
following acts:
ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO
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1. Remar travelled to several places where his wife had been
reportedly seen particularly, Bislig City and the Municipality of
Lingig in the province of Surigao del Sur, Metro Manila, Batangas
and Cavite; and
2. Remar constantly communicated with Lovelyn's relatives for a
period of ten (10) years in order to ascertain Lovelyn's whereabouts.
Unfortunately, Remar failed to allege, much less prove, the extent of
the search he had conducted in the places where he claims to have
gone. This leaves the Court with no way to ascertain the extent of
Remar's search.
Remar also failed to identify which of Lovelyn's relatives he had
communicated with, and disclose what he learned from these
communications. Again, this leaves the Court with no basis to
determine whether the information Remar learned is sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that Lovelyn is dead.
Moreover, much like the respondent in Cantor, Remar never sought
the help of the authorities to locate Lovelyn in the course of her ten
(10)-year disappearance. Remar was given ample opportunity to
explain his failure to report Lovelyn's disappearance, considering
that the Republic first noted such failure when it filed its Petition for
Certiorari with the CA. Curiously, however, Remar chose not to
address the matter.
Finally, the allegations in Remar's Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death suggest that he is aware of the true cause of
Lovelyn's disappearance, thus:
In the first three (3) months that his wife was in Manila[,] [there] was
x x x constant communication through cellphone calls and [texts].
[Remar] relayed to [Lovelyn] that he is x x x working in Surigao City
as a security guard in the Hall of Justice. x x x
Then the calls and [texts] got fewer and fewer until [they] stopped.
He thought that the cellphone of his wife was just lost so he started
inquiries from his and her relatives in [Bislig] City. One confess[ed]
that his wife is now [cohabiting] with another man and will not be
going home because of shame. He could not believe and refuse[d]
to believe the devastating news. 38
The Court commiserates with Remar's plight. Nevertheless, the Court
cannot uphold the issuance of a declaration of presumptive death for
the purpose of remarriage where there appears to be no well-
founded belief of the absentee spouse's death, but only the
likelihood that the absentee spouse does not want to be found.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
KO vs. ARAMBURO
836 SCRA 70, G.R. No. 190995 August 9, 2017
Digest by: Eliza Den A. Devilleres
PRINCIPLE:
Article 160 of the Old Civil Code, which is the applicable provision
since the property was acquired prior to the enactment of the Family
Code as stated above, provides that “all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
The Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who
gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of real property. It
simply provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a
court order allowing the sale, the same would be void.
FACTS:
This case pertains to the alleged conjugal property of Simeon and
Virginia which was sold by Simeon to Corazon without his wife's
conformity to such sale. Corazon on the other hand alleged that
Simeon sold and conveyed his entire one-half share in the co-owned
properties in her favor. Hence, Corazon became the sole owner
thereof and consequently, was able to transfer the titles of the same
to her name. Corazon argued that the subject properties belong to
Simeon's exclusive property, hence, Virginia's conformity to such sale
was not necessary.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the sale of the conjugal property in the
instant case is void. [NO, only voidable as the sale
happened during the effectivity of the Old Civil Code]
2.) Whether or not the action has already prescribed. [YES]
RULING:
At the outset, let it be stated that the law which governs the instant
case is the Old Civil Code, not the Family Code, as the circumstances
of this case all occurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988.
Article 160 of the Old Civil Code, which is the applicable provision
since the property was acquired prior to the enactment of the Family
Code as stated above, provides that “all property of the marriage
is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” This
presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with a
strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of
exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof
rests upon the party asserting it.
At any rate, the question of whether petitioners were able to adduce
proof to overthrow the presumption of conjugality is a factual issue
best addressed by the trial court. It cannot be over-emphasized that
factual determinations of the trial courts, especially when confirmed
by the appellate court, are accorded great weight by the Court and,
as a rule, will not be disturbed on appeal, except for the most
compelling reasons, which We do not find in the case at bar.
As for the share pertaining to Simeon and Virginia, We must
emphasize that the governing law in this case is the Old Civil Code.
Under the said law, while the husband is prohibited from selling the
commonly-owned real property without his wife's consent, still, such
sale is not void but merely voidable.[39] Article 173 thereof gave
Virginia the right to have the sale annulled during the marriage
within ten years from the date of the sale. Failing in that, she or her
heirs may demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the value
of the property that Simeon erroneously sold. Thus:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from
the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends
to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs,
after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of
property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO
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The Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife
who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of real property.
It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a
court order allowing the sale, the same would be void. Thus, the
provisions of the NCC governing contracts are applied as regards
the issue on prescription. Under the NCC, a void or inexistent contract
has no force and effect from the very beginning, and this rule applies
to contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law as in
the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouse’s
written consent. Under Article 1410 of the NCC, the action or defense
for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe.
As this case, as far as Virginia is concerned, falls under the provisions
of the Old Civil Code, the CA erred in ruling that the subject Deed
of Absolute Sale is void for the lack of the wife’s conformity thereto
and thus, applying Article 1410 of the NCC stating that the action to
question a void contract is imprescriptible. Again, Simeon’s sale of
their conjugal property without his wife’s conformity under the Old
Civil Code is merely voidable not void. The imprescriptibility of an
action assailing a void contract under Article 1410 of the NCC, thus,
does not apply in such case. The 10-year prescriptive period under
Article 173 of the Old Civil Code, therefore, should be applied in
this case.
Simeon's sale of their conjugal property without his wife's conformity
under the Old Civil Code is merely voidable not void. The
imprescriptibility of an action assailing a void contract under Article
1410 of the NCC, thus, does not apply in such case. The 10-year
prescriptive period under Article 173 of the Old Civil Code,
therefore, should be applied in this case.
Here, the invalid sale was executed on December 14, 1974 while
the action questioning the same was filed in 1993, which is clearly
way beyond the 10-year period prescribed under Article 173 of
the Old Civil Code. Virginia's recourse is, therefore, to demand only
the value of the property, i.e., the one-third portion of the subject
properties invalidly sold by Simeon without Virginia's conformity
pursuant to the same provision.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
TAN, JR. VS. HOSANA
G.R. No. 190846, February 3, 2016, Brion
Digest by: Francis Roel Dulay
PRINCIPLE:
[T]he deed of sale was declared null and void by positive provision of
the law prohibiting the sale of conjugal property without the spouse’s
consent. It does not, however, preclude the possibility that Tomas paid
the consideration stated therein. The admission of the deed of sale as
evidence is consistent with the liberal policy of the court to admit the
evidence which appears to be relevant in resolving an issue before the
courts.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020] 42
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas

FACTS: The principle of unjust enrichment requires Jose to return what he or

Milagros received under the void contract which presumably
Jose and Milagros Hosana married on January 14, 1979. On benefitted their conjugal partnership.
January 13, 1998, Milagros sold to the petitioner Tomas P. Tan, Jr.
(Tomas) the subject property, as evidenced by a deed of sale
executed by Milagros herself and as attorney-in-fact of Jose, by
virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Jose in her
favor. The Deed of Sale stated that the purchase price for the lot
was P200, 000.00. Tan claimed that the actual consideration paid CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
was P700, 000.00 and it was Milagros who caused the Deed of Sale
to state a consideration of only P200, 000.00.
DOLORES ALEJO, Petitioner vs. SPOUSES ERNESTO CORTEZ and
PRISCILLA SAN PEDRO, SPOUSES JORGE LEONARDO and
On October 19, 2001, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of
JACINTA LEONARDO and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
Sale/Cancellation of Title/Reconveyance and Damages. Tomas BULACAN, Respondents
maintained that he was a buyer in good faith and for value.

ISSUE: What was the status of the sale? VOID G.R. No. 206114 June 19, 2017

RULING:
A void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very
beginning. This rule applies to contracts that are declared void by
positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal property
without the other spouse’s written consent. A void contract is
equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects.
It cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription. When,
however, any of the terms of a void contract have been performed,
an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of
what has been given under it.
While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be enforced
since it is deemed inexistent, it does not preclude the admissibility of
the contract as evidence to prove matters that occurred in the course
of executing the contract, i.e., what each party has given in the
execution of the contract.
Digested by: Jennifer Lim
Principle:
The law is unequivocal when it states that the disposition of conjugal
property of one spouse sans the written consent of the other is void.
Facts:
At the heart of the instant controversy is a parcel of land measuring
255 square meters located .at Cut-cot, Pulilan, Bulacan and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-118170. The property
belonged to the conjugal property/absolute community of
property7 of the respondent Spouses Jorge and Jacinta Leonardo
(Spouses Leonardo) and upon which their residential house was built.

The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be used as a means
to ascertain the truthfulness of the consideration stated and its actual
payment. The purpose of introducing the deed of sale as evidence is
not to enforce the terms written in the contract, which is an obligatory
force and effect of a valid contract. The deed of sale, rather, is used
as a means to determine matters that occurred in the execution of
such contract, i.e., the determination of what each party has given
under the void contract to allow restitution and prevent unjust
enrichment.
It appears that sometime in March 1996, Jorge's father, Ricardo,
approached his sister, herein petitioner Dolores Alejo (Dolores), to
negotiate the sale of the subject property. Accordingly, on March 29,
1996, Jacinta executed a Kasunduan with Dolores for the sale of the
property. for a purchase price of PhP500,000. Under
the Kasunduan, Dolores was to pay PhP70,000 as down payment,,
while PhP230,000 is to be paid on April 30, 1996 and the remaining
balance of PhP200,000 was to be paid before the end of the year
1996.9 The Kasunduan was signed by Jacinta and Ricardo as witness.
Jorge, however, did not sign the agreement.

In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null and void by
positive provision of the law prohibiting the sale of conjugal property
without the spouse’s consent. It does not, however, preclude the
possibility that Tomas paid the consideration stated therein. The
admission of the deed of sale as evidence is consistent with the liberal
policy of the court to admit the evidence which appears to be
relevant in resolving an issue before the courts.
Tomas failed to substantiate his claim that he paid to Milagros the
amount of P700, 000.00, instead of the amount of P200, 000.00
stated in the deed of sale. No documentary or testimonial evidence
to prove payment of the higher amount was presented, apart from
Tomas’ sole testimony. Tomas’ sole testimony of payment is self-
serving and insufficient to unequivocally prove that Milagros
received P700, 000.00 for the subject property.
However, on July 3, 1996, Jorge wrote a letter to Dolores denying
knowledge and consent to the Kasunduan. Jorge further informed
Dolores that Jacinta was retracting her consent to the Kasunduan due
to Dolores' failure to comply with her obligations. This was followed
by another letter dated September 29, 1996 from Jorge to Dolores
demanding that the latter pay the balance of PhP200,000 on or
before October 5, 1996, otherwise the purchase price shall be
increased to PhP700,000.
Issue:
Whether or not the Kasunduan was void absent Jorge's consent and
acceptance? Yes.

Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit at

the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of
another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and
good conscience." The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized
public policy of the State and is based on Article 22 of the Civil
Code.

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 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
Ruling:
Any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during
the effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article 124 thereof
which provides:
Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court
or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on
the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn
by either or both offerors.
Here, it is an established fact that the Kasunduan was entered into
solely by Jacinta and signed by her alone. By plain terms of the law
therefore, the Kasunduan is void.
The Kasunduan constitutes a continuing offer from Jacinta and Dolores
and that Jorge had the option of either accepting or rejecting the
offer before it was withdrawn by either, or both, Jacinta and
Dolores.
The point of contention is whether Jorge accepted such continuing
offer. If so, then the Kasunduan is perfected as a binding contract;
otherwise, the Kasunduan remains void .
It is undisputed that after the execution of the Kasunduan, Jorge sent
two letters to Dolores: one, in forming her that he did not consent to
the sale; and the other, demanding that' Dolores pay the balance of
the purchase price on or before October 5, 1996 and failing which,
the purchase price shall be increased to PhP700,000.
Clearly, Jorge's first letter was an outright and express repudiation
of the Kasunduan. The second letter, while ostensibly a demand for
compliance with Dolores' obligation under the Kasunduan, varied its
terms on material points, i.e., the date of payment of the balance
and the purchase price. Consequently, such counter-offer cannot be
construed as evidencing Jorge's consent to or acceptance of
the Kasunduan for it is settled that where the other spouse's putative
consent to the sale of the conjugal property appears in a separate
document which does not contain the same terms and conditions as in
the first document signed by the other spouse, a valid transaction
could not have arisen.
Neither can Jorge's subsequent letters to Dolores be treated as a
ratification of the Kasunduan for the basic reason that a void contract
is not susceptible to ratification. Nor can Jorge's alleged
participation in the negotiation for the sale of the property or his
acquiescence to Dolores' transfer to and possession of the subject
property be treated as converting· such continuing offer into a
binding contract as the law distinctly requires nothing less than a
written consent to the sale for its validity. Suffice to say that
participation in or awareness of the negotiations is not consent.
ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO
43
ARTICLE 130
SPOUSES JULIETA B. CARLOS and FERNANDO
P. CARLOS VS. JUAN CRUZ TOLENTINO
G.R. No. 234533, June 27, 2018
Digest by: Majeerah Sinarimbo
PRINCIPLE:
As in any other property relations between husband and wife, the
conjugal partnership is terminated upon the death of either of the
spouses.
FACTS:
The subject matter of the action is a parcel of land with an area of
1,000 square meters and all the improvements thereon located in
Novaliches, Quezon City. Without Juan's knowledge and consent,
Mercedes (wife) and Kristoff (grandson), who were then residing in
the subject property, allegedly forged a Deed of Donation, thereby
making it appear that Juan and Mercedes donated the subject
property to Kristoff.
In April 2011, Kristoff offered the sale of the subject property to
Julieta's brother, Felix Bacal (Felix), who is also the administrator of
the lot owned by Julieta which is adjacent to the subject property.
When Felix informed Julieta of the availability of the subject
property, Spouses Carlos then asked him to negotiate for its purchase
with Kristoff. After a series of negotiations, Kristoff and Julieta
executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) stating that Kristoff
is selling the subject property to Julieta. On the same day, a Deed
of Absolute Sale was executed between Kristoff and Julieta.
Upon learning of the foregoing events, Juan executed an Affidavit
of Adverse Claim which was annotated on the TCT.
Meanwhile, Kristoff and Julieta executed another Deed of Absolute
Sale dated September 12, 2011 over the subject property and, by
virtue thereof, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued a new
TCT in favor of Spouses Carlos. The affidavit of adverse claim
executed by Juan was duly carried over to the title of
Spouses Carlos.
ISSUE: Who, between Juan and Spouses Carlos, has the better to
right to claim ownership over the subject property – PARTLY JUAN,
PARTLY SPS. CARLOS
RULING:
Juan and Mercedes appear to have been married before the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. There being no
indication that they have adopted a different property regime, the
presumption is that their property relations is governed by the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
Since the subject property was acquired on March 17, 1967 during
the marriage of Juan and Mercedes, it formed part of their conjugal
partnership. It follows then that Juan and Mercedes are the absolute
owners of their undivided one-half interest, respectively, over the
subject property.
Meanwhile, as in any other property relations between husband and
wife, the conjugal partnership is terminated upon the death of either
of the spouses. In respondent Juan's Comment filed before the Court,
the Verification which he executed states that he is already a
widower. Hence, the Court takes due notice of the fact of Mercedes'
death which inevitably results in the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
In retrospect, as absolute owners of the subject property, Juan and
Mercedes may validly exercise rights of ownership by executing
deeds which transfer title thereto such as, in this case, the Deed of
Donation in favor of their grandson, Kristoff.
With regard to Juan's consent to the afore-stated donation, the RTC,
however, found that such was lacking since his signature therein was
forged. Notably, the CA did not overturn such finding, and in fact,
no longer touched upon the issue of forgery. On the other hand, it
must be pointed out that the signature of Mercedes in the Deed of
Donation was never contested and is, therefore, deemed admitted.
In the present case, it cannot be ignored that Mercedes' consent to
the disposition of her one-half interest in the subject property
remained undisputed. It is apparent that Mercedes, during her
lifetime, relinquished all her rights thereon in favor of her grandson,
Kristoff.
Furthermore, Mercedes' knowledge of and acquiescence to the
subsequent sale of the subject property to Spouses Carlos is
evidenced by her signature appearing in the MOA and the Deed of
Absolute Sale.
Given the foregoing, the Court is disinclined to rule that the Deed of
Donation is wholly void ab initio. We deem it proper to uphold the
validity of the Deed of Donation but only to the extent of Mercedes'
one-half share in the subject property.
Accordingly, the right of Kristoff, as donee, is limited only to the one-
half undivided portion that Mercedes owned. The Deed of Donation
insofar as it covered the remaining one-half undivided portion of the
subject property is null and void, Juan not having consented to the
donation of his undivided half.
ARTICLE 147
SIMEON R. PATERNO, PETITIONER v. DINA MARIE
LOMONGO PATERNO, RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 213687, January 8, 2020
Digest by: Jay J.L. Astillo
FACTS:
The petitioner and the respondent were married on December 27,
1987. After living together for about a decade, the petitioner left in
June 1998. On June 9, 2000, petitioner filed a petition before the
RTC seeking the declaration of nullity of his to the respondent on the
ground of the latter's psychological incapacity. This was granted by
Branch 144 of RTC Makati (Branch 144) in a Decision dated March
11, 2005, where both parties were adjudged to be psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill their marital obligations to each other. The
March 11, 2005 attained finality. However, the proceedings for the
liquidation, partition, distribution of the common properties and the
delivery of their children's presumptive legitimes remain pending
before Branch 144.
The Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 12447, affirmed the
Orders dated November 29, 2011 and February 27, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 136, Makati City (Branch 136)
which ordered the partial delivery of respondent Dina Marie
Lomongo Patemo's share in the conjugal partnership and directed
petitioner Simon R. Paterno to increase the monthly support to P250,
000.00.
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The following are the properties which the respondent alleged were
admitted by both parties to be co-owned by them:
( 1) House and lot in Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City;
(2) Condominium unit in Rockwell, Makati City;
Petitioner vehemently objected to the characterization of the above-
listed properties as being admittedly co-owned properties.
Petitioner contended that while the Ayala Alabang and Rockwell
properties were purchased during the parties' union, the mortgage
payments for these properties have been made after they
separated in fact solely from his exclusive funds. As such, the trial
court cannot as yet make a true and accurate appraisal of the said
properties without ruling on the status of the payments made by the
petitioner in servicing the loans taken for the said properties.
ISSUE: How should the properties in Ayala Alabang and the
Rockwell Condominium be partitioned?
RULING:
There is no quarrel that the marriage of the petitioner and the
respondent had long been declared an absolute nullity by reason of
their psychological incapacity to perform their marital obligations to
each other. The property relations of parties to a void marriage is
governed either by Article 147 or 148 of the Family Code. Since the
petitioner and the respondent suffer no legal impediment and
exclusively lived with each other under a void marriage, their
property relation is one of co-ownership under Article 147 of the
Family Code.
The said provision finds application in this case even if the parties
were married before the Family Code took effect by express
provision of the Family Code on its retroactive effect for as long as
it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Here, no vested rights
will be impaired in the application of the said provision given that
Article 147 of the Family Code is actually just a remake of Article
144 of the 1950 Civil Code.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a
party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the farmer's efforts consisted
in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivas of his or
her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned
in common, without the consent of the other, until after the tennination
of their cohabitation.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited
in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the
absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
the cohabitation.
The co-ownership envisioned under this article was explained by this
Court in Barrido v. Nonato, viz:
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a
woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other,
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void
marriage or without the benefit of marriage. It is clear,
therefore, that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the
woman:
(1) must be capacitated to marry each other;
(2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
(3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their
marriage is void.
This Court's earlier pronouncement in G.R. No. 180226 that Article
147 of the Family Code applies only to properties acquired by the
parties during the period of their cohabitation is thus binding in this
case. The question now that comes to the fore is the proper
application of the said ruling with respect to the Ayala Alabang and
Rockwell properties.
It is not disputed that the Ayala Alabang and Rockwell properties
that were acquired during the period of the parties' cohabitation had
not yet been fully paid at the time they separated.
From the arguments advanced by the petitioner, it can be inferred
that he made much of the term "acquired" in that he distinguished
portions of the disputed property to that which had been paid for
during the period of cohabitation, and to the portion which was yet
unpaid when the parties separated. For him, only the paid portion
should be encompassed in the term "acquired" and thus, be presumed
to belong to the parties in equal shares.
The Court does not agree. In the construction of the term "acquired,"
this Court must be guided by the basic rule in statutory construction
that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the court. A
reading of Article 147 of the Family Code would show that the
provision did not make any distinction or make any qualification in
terms of the manner the property must be acquired before the
presumption of co-ownership shall apply.
As such, the term "acquired" must be taken in its ordinary acceptation.
For as long as the property had been purchased, whether on
installment, financing or other mode of payment, during the period
of cohabitation, the disputable presumption that they have been
obtained by the parties' joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares, shall arise. Applied in this case, since
the Ayala Alabang and Rockwell properties were purchased while
the petitioner and the respondent were living together, it is presumed
that both parties contributed in their acquisition through their joint
efforts (which includes one’s efforts in the care and maintenance of
the family and of the household), work and industry. Thus, the
properties must be divided between them equally.
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ARTICLE 148
JOSE Z. MORENO, Petitioner, vs. RENE M.
KAHN
G.R. No. 217744, [July 30, 2018]
Digest by: Kathia Kierstin S. Chanyee
Principle:
Thus was it made clear that a failure to allege earnest but failed efforts
at a compromise in a complaint among members of the same family, is
not a jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a
cause of action. Versoza was cited in a later case as an instance
analogous to one were the conciliation process at the barangay level
was not priorly resorted to. Both were described as a "condition
precedent for the filing of a complaint in Court." In such instances, the
consequence is precisely what is stated in the present Rule. Thus:
The defect may however be waived by failing to make seasonable
objection, in a motion to dismiss or answer, the defect being a mere
procedural imperfection which does not affect the jurisdiction of the
court.
Facts:
Jose was filed a complaint for specific performance and cancellation
of titles with damages and application for temporary restraining
order and writ of preliminary injunction, against members of his
family.
RTC motu proprio ordered the dismissal of Jose's complaint for
failure to allege compliance with the provision of Article 151 of the
Family Code which requires earnest efforts to be made first before
suits may be filed between family members.
Issue: Whether or not failure to allege the facts under Art 151 is a
jurisdictional defect that warrants the dismissal of the complaint
[NO]
Ruling:
The appellate court committed egregious error in dismissing the
complaint. The appellate courts' decision hinged on Article 151 of
the Family Code x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
The appellate court correlated this provision with Section 1, par. (j),
Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
Section 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the
answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to
dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been
complied with.
The appellate court's reliance on this provision is misplaced. Rule 16
treats of the grounds for a motion to dismiss the complaint. It must be
distinguished from the grounds provided under Section 1, Rule 9
which specifically deals with dismissal of the claim by the court motu
proprio. Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure
provides:
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. — Defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings
or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, that there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a
prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the
claim.
Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may
motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d)
prescription of action. x x x. cSEDTC
xxx xxx xxx
Why the objection of failure to allege a failed attempt at a
compromise in a suit among members of the same family is waivable
was earlier explained in the case of Versoza v. Versoza ([Versoza]
135 Phil. 84, 94 [1986]), a case for future support which was
dismissed by the trial court upon the ground that there was no such
allegation of infringement of Article 222 of the Civil Code, the origin
of Article 151 of the Family Code. While the Court ruled that a
complaint for future support cannot be the subject of a compromise
and as such the absence of the required allegation in the complaint
cannot be a ground for objection against the suit, the decision went
on to state thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Thus was it made clear that a failure to allege earnest but failed
efforts at a compromise in a complaint among members of the same
family, is not a jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the
statement of a cause of action. Versoza was cited in a later case as
an instance analogous to one were the conciliation process at the
barangay level was not priorly resorted to. Both were described as
a "condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in Court." In such
instances, the consequence is precisely what is stated in the present
Rule. Thus:
The defect may however be waived by failing to make seasonable
objection, in a motion to dismiss or answer, the defect being a mere
procedural imperfection which does not affect the jurisdiction of the
court.
In the case at hand, the proceedings before the trial court ran the full
course. The complaint of petitioners was answered by respondents
without a prior motion to dismiss having been filed. The decision in
favor of the petitioners was appealed by respondents on the basis
of the alleged error in the ruling on the merits, no mention having
been made about any defect in the statement of a cause of action.
In other words, no motion to dismiss the complaint based on the failure
to comply with a condition precedent was filed in the trial court;
neither was such failure assigned as error in the appeal that
respondent brought before the Court of Appeals.
Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional
defense or objection is wholly applicable to respondent. If the
respondents as parties-defendants could not, and did not, after filing
their answer to petitioner's complaint, invoke the objection of absence
of the required allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise, the
appellate court unquestionably did not have any authority or basis
to motu proprio order the dismissal of petitioner's complaint. 33
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In this case, a plain reading of the records shows that the RTC
ordered the dismissal of Jose's complaint against respondents for his
alleged failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code —
even before respondents have filed a motion or a responsive
pleading invoking such non-compliance. As such ground is not a
jurisdictional defect but is a mere condition precedent, the courts a
ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO
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quo clearly erred in finding that a motu proprio dismissal was
warranted under the given circumstances.
Even assuming arguendo that respondents invoked the foregoing
ground at the earliest opportunity, the Court nevertheless finds Article
151 of the Family Code inapplicable to this case. For Article 151 of
the Family Code to apply, the suit must be exclusively between or
among "members of the same family." Once a stranger becomes a
party to such suit, the earnest effort requirement is no longer a
condition precedent before the action can prosper. 34 In Hiyas
Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. v. Acuña, 35 the Court explained the
rationale behind this rule, to wit:
[T]hese considerations do not, however, weigh enough to make it
imperative that such efforts to compromise should be a jurisdictional
pre-requisite for the maintenance of an action whenever a stranger
to the family is a partly thereto, whether as a necessary or
indispensable one. It is not always that one who is alien to the family
would be willing to suffer the inconvenience of, much less relish, the
delay and the complications that wranglings between or among
relatives more often than not entail.
Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that the determination of the
rights of a stranger to the family who just happened to have
innocently acquired some kind of interest in any right or property
disputed among its members should be made to depend on the way
the latter would settle their differences among themselves. 36
In this relation, Article 150 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.
In this light, case law states that Article 151 of the Family Code must
be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule. Hence,
any person having a collateral familial relation with the plaintiff
other than what is enumerated in Article 150 of the Family Code is
considered a stranger who, if included in a suit between and among
family members, would render unnecessary the earnest efforts
requirement under Article 151. 37 Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. The express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others. 38
In this instance, it is undisputed that: (a) Jose and Consuelo are full-
blooded siblings; and (b) Consuelo is the mother of Rene, Luis,
Philippe, and Claudine, which make them nephews and niece of their
uncle, Jose. It then follows that Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine are
considered "strangers" to Jose insofar as Article 151 of the Family
Code is concerned.
In this relation, it is apt to clarify that while it was the disagreement
between Jose and Consuelo that directly resulted in the filing of the
suit, the fact remains that Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine were
rightfully impleaded as co-defendants in Jose's complaint as they are
co-owners of the subject lands in dispute. In view of the inclusion of
"strangers" to the suit between Jose and Consuelo who are full-
blooded siblings, the Court concludes that the suit is beyond the ambit
of Article 151 of the Family Code. Perforce, the courts a quo gravely
erred in dismissing Jose's complaint due to non-compliance with the
earnest effort requirement therein.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
FAMILY HOME
FELICITAS L. SALAZAR, PETITIONER, v. REMEDIOS FELIAS, ON
HER OWN BEHALF AND REPRESENTATION OF THE OTHER HEIRS
OF CATALINO NIVERA, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 213972, February 05, 2018
Digest by: Eliza Den A. Devilleres
PRINCIPLE:
The movant's claim that his/her property is exempt from execution for
being the family home is not a magic wand that will freeze the court's
hand and forestall the execution of a final and executory ruling. It is
imperative that the claim for exemption must be set up and proven.
FACTS:
In this case, Felicitas assails the Writ of Execution and Demolition of
RTC Branch 55, contending that the Writ of Execution is being
enforced against property that is exempt from execution, as what is
sought to be demolished is her family home. In this regard, Article
155 of the Family Code ordains that the family home shall be exempt
from execution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property is indeed a family
home which is exempt from execution. [NO]
RULING:
Indeed, the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable
and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and
the land on which it is situated. It confers upon a particular family the
right to enjoy such properties. It cannot be seized by creditors except
in certain special cases.
However, the claim that the property is exempt from execution for
being the movant's family home is not a magic wand that will freeze
the court's hand and forestall the execution of a final and executory
ruling. It must be noted that it is not sufficient for the claimant to merely
allege that such property is a family home. Whether the claim is
premised under the Old Civil Code or the Family Code, the claim for
exemption must be set up and proved.
In fact, in Ramos, et al. v. Pangilinan, et al., the Court, citing Spouses
Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc., et al., laid down the rules relative
to the levy on execution of the family home, viz.:
No doubt, a family home is generally exempt from execution
provided it was duly constituted as such. There must be proof that
the alleged family home was constituted jointly by the husband
and wife or by an unmarried head of a family. It must be the
house where they and their family actually reside and the lot on
which it is situated. The family home must be part of the
properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership,
or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's
consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the family.
The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time
of its constitution, the amount of P300,000 in urban areas and
P200,000 in rural areas.
In addition, residence in the family home must be actual. The law
explicitly mandates that the occupancy of the family home, either by
the owner thereof, or by any of its beneficiaries must be actual. This
occupancy must be real, or actually existing, as opposed to
something merely possible, or that which is merely presumptive or
constructive.
ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO
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Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential tenets, it becomes all too
apparent that Felicitas cannot conveniently claim that the subject
property is her family home, sans sufficient evidence proving her
allegation. It bears emphasis that it is imperative that her claim must
be backed with evidence showing that the home was indeed (i) duly
constituted as a family home, (ii) constituted jointly by the husband and
wife or by an unmarried head of a family, (iii) resided in by the family
(or any of the family home's beneficiaries), (iv) forms part of the
properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of
the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent, or
property of the unmarried head of the family, and (v) has an actual
value of Php 300,000.00 in urban areas, and Php 200,000.00 in rural
areas.
A perusal of the petition, however, shows that aside from her bare
allegation, Felicitas adduced no proof to substantiate her claim that
the property sought to be executed is indeed her family home.
Interestingly, Felicitas admitted in her Motion for Reconsideration
dated December 23, 2013, and her Petition for Annulment of
Judgment dated June 22, 2006, that she is, and has always been a
resident of Muñoz, Nueva Ecija. Similarly, the address indicated in
Felicitas' petition for review on certiorari is Muñoz, Nueva Ecija.
Equally important, the Court takes judicial notice of the final ruling of
the RTC Branch 55 in the case for recovery of ownership, that the
subject property has belonged to the Heirs of Nivera since the
1950s. This automatically negates Felicitas' claim that the property
is her family home.
Undoubtedly, Felicitas' argument that the property subject of the writ
of execution is a family home, is an unsubstantiated allegation that
cannot defeat the binding nature of a final and executory judgment.
Thus, the Writ of Execution and Demolition issued by the RTC Branch
55 must perforce be given effect.
PROOF OF FILIATION
CALIMAG VS. HEIRS OF MACAPAZ
G.R. No. 191936, June 1, 2016, Reyes
Digest by: Francis Roel Dulay
PRINCIPLE:
[I]t is well settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the fact
of a solemnized marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage
certificate. Hence, even a person's birth certificate may be recognized
as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.
[P]ersons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in
the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and
of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is
'that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
FACTS:
Calimag and Silvestra Macapaz were co-owners of a parcel of land.
Silvestra died without issue leaving his brother as sole heir. Her
brother and his wife subsequently died leaving their children
Anastacio, Jr. and Alicia (Heirs of Macapaz) as heirs. Heirs of
Macapaz now claims a share of the land showing their parents’
marriage contract, Certificate of Canonical Marriage and their
certificates of live birth as evidence. Calimag opposed saying that
the marriage contract presented by the respondents is not admissible
under the Best Evidence Rule for being a mere fax copy or
photocopy of an alleged marriage contract, and which is not even
authenticated by the concerned Local Civil Registrar.
In addition, there is no mark or stamp showing that said document
was ever received by said office. Further, while the respondents also
presented a Certificate of (Canonical) Marriage, the petitioner
asserts that the same is not the marriage license required under
Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code; that said Certificate of
(Canonical) Marriage only proves that a marriage ceremony actually
transpired between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela. Moreover, Calimag
contends that the certificates of live birth of the respondents do not
conclusively prove that they are legitimate children of Anastacio, Sr.
ISSUE: WON the Heirs of Macapasz was able to prove their
legitimate filiation. YES
RULING:
The fax or photocopy of the marriage contract was inadmissible as
evidence there being no proof that the original was not available.
Also, a canonical certificate of marriage is not a public document.
They are private writings and their authenticity must therefore be
proved as are all other private writings in accordance with the rules
of evidence. Accordingly, since there is no showing that the
authenticity and due execution of the canonical certificate of
marriage of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was duly proven, it cannot be
admitted in evidence.
Notwithstanding, it is well settled that other proofs can be offered to
establish the fact of a solemnized marriage. Jurisprudence teaches
that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other
than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth certificate
may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between
his parents.
The petitioner's assertion that the birth certificate must be signed by
the father in order to be a competent evidence of legitimate filiation
does not find support in law and jurisprudence.
Verily, under Section 5 of Act No. 3753, the declaration of either
parent of the new-born legitimate child shall be sufficient for the
registration of his birth in the civil register, and only in the registration
of birth of an illegitimate child does the law require that the birth
certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant,
or only by the mother if the father refuses to acknowledge the child.
Sec. 5. Registration and Certification of Birth. - The declaration
of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in
default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn
child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the
civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the
documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil
registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the
physician, or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either
parent of the newly born child.
xxxx
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In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be
signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or
only the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall
not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name
of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give
therein any information by which such father could be identified,
xxx
Forsooth, the Court finds that the respondents' certificates of live birth
were duly executed consistent with the provision of the law
respecting the registration of birth of legitimate children. The fact
that only the signatures of Fidela appear on said documents is of no
moment because Fidela only signed as the declarant or informant of
the respondents' fact of birth as legitimate children.
Nonetheless, the respondents' certificates of live birth also intimate
that Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela had openly cohabited as husband and
wife for a number of years, as a result of which they had two children
— the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than three years
after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible proof to
establish the validity of marriage.
In Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court ruled that as proof
of marriage may be presented: a) testimony of a witness to the
matrimony; b) the couple's public and open cohabitation as
husband and wife after the alleged wedlock; c) the birth and
baptismal certificate of children born during such union; and d) the
mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.
Moreover, in a catena of cases, it has been held that, "[p]ersons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common
order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation
of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of
Civil Procedure is 'that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.'
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage."
Furthermore, as the established period of cohabitation of Anastacio,
Sr. and Fidela transpired way before the effectivity of the Family
Code, the strong presumption accorded by then Article 220 of the
Civil Code in favor of the validity of marriage cannot be
disregarded. Thus:
Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity
of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans
toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of
property during marriage, the authority of parents over their
children, and the validity of defense for any member of the
family in case of unlawful aggression.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
ADOPTION
In re: Petition for adoption of Jan Aurel Maghanoy Bulayo with
application for change of name of adoptee from “Jan Aurel
Maghanoy Bulayo” to “Jan Aurel Bulayo Kimura”
G.R. No. 205752. October 1, 2019
Digested by: Jennifer Lim
Principle: An illegitimate child is a relative within the first civil degree
of consanguinity of his biological mother. Unlike a nephew and niece,
an illegitimate child belongs to the direct maternal lineage, which is
never uncertain. The world “child” referred to in Article 966 of the
Civil Code is used in a general term and is without qualification. This
is so because the provision contemplated blood relation, not status.
When the provision does not distinguish legitimate and illegitimate
relatives, we, too, must not. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera
debemus (where the law does not distinguish, nore the interpreter
must distinguish).
Facts:
Spouses Mary Jane Kimura, a Filipino National, and Yuichiro Kimura,
a Japanese national got married on June 2004.
Prior thereto, Mary Jane gave birth to her son Jan Aurel on
November 1997. However, she was not married to her son’s
biological father, thus making Jan Aurel her illegitimate son.
On March 2009, petitioners filed a joint petition for adoption of Jan
Aurel seeking to have him declared as his legitimate son, enjoying
the rights and observing the duties of an adopted child as provided
by law.
RTC denied the petition for adoption because Yuichiro, being a
Japanese citizen, did not comply with the requirements laid down
under Section 7 of RA 8552 and Section 7 of Administrative Matter
No. 02-06-02-SC.
Issue:
Whether or not the illegitimate child of the spouse of an adopting
alien falls within the ambit of the clause “relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree as
contained in Republic Act No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of
1998)? Yes.
Ruling:
Section 7(b)(i) and (iii) of RA 8552 should extend and apply even to
illegitimate children.
Although Senate Bill No. 1523 originally indicated that the exception
should only cover relatives by consanguinity, the lawmakers were in
agreement during the period of individual amendments to include the
phrase “ or affinity within the fourth civil degree” in order to expand
the coverage to more children or relatives under the preferential
exception embodied in Section 7.
RA 8552 undoubtedly intended to include Jan Aurel, the biological
child of Mary Jane, in the term “relatives” under Section 7 (b)(iii)
because he was her relative within the first civil degree. Finding
otherwise would engender a situation where the alien adopter would
ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO
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be able to undergo a speedy and less expensive adoption process
by being able to adopt.
At any rate, had the legislators intended that only the legitimate
children were contemplated by Section 7(b)(i) and (iii), then Congress
should have written the law explicitly. Indeed, Congress did so in
Section 7(b)(ii) by including the term “legitimate” to describe the
children contemplated by that clause. Section 7(b)(i) and (iii)clearly
covered both legitimate and illegitimate relatives as long as they
were within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS INTERNATIONAL,
INC. VS. ERMILINDA R. ABEJAR
G.R. No. 170631, February 10, 2016
Digest by: Majeerah Sinarimbo
PRINCIPLE:
Article 1902 (now Article 2176) does not limit or specify the active
subjects, much less the relation that must exist between the victim of the
culpa aquiliana and the person who may recover damages, thus
warranting the inference that, in principle, anybody who suffers any
damage from culpa aquiliana, whether a relative or not of the
victim, may recover damages from the person responsible therefor.
FACTS:
Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was walking along the west-bound lane
of Sampaguita Street. A Mitsubishi L-300 van with plate number PKM
195 was travelling along the east-bound lane, opposite Reyes. To
avoid an incoming vehicle, the van swerved to its left and hit Reyes.
Alex Espinosa (Espinosa), a witness to the accident, went to her aid
and loaded her in the back of the van. Espinosa told the driver of
the van, Jimmy Bautista (Bautista), to bring Reyes to the hospital.
Instead of doing so, Bautista appeared to have left the van parked
inside a nearby subdivision with Reyes still in the van. Fortunately for
Reyes, an unidentified civilian came to help and drove Reyes to the
hospital.
Upon investigation, it was found that the registered owner of the van
was Caravan. Caravan is a corporation engaged in the business of
organizing travels and tours. Bautista was Caravan's employee
assigned to drive the van as its service driver.
Caravan shouldered the hospitalization expenses of Reyes. Despite
medical attendance, Reyes died two (2) days after the accident.
Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes' paternal aunt and
the person who raised her since she was nine (9) years old, filed
before the RTC a Complaint for damages against Bautista
and Caravan alleging that Bautista was an employee
of Caravan and that Caravan is the registered owner of the van that
hit Reyes.
Caravan argues that Abejar has no personality to bring this suit
because she is not a real party in interest. According to Caravan,
Abejar does not exercise legal or substitute parental authority. She
is also not the judicially appointed guardian or the only living relative
of the deceased. She is also not "the executor or administrator of the
estate of the deceased."
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
According to Caravan, only the victim herself or her heirs can enforce
an action based on culpa aquiliana such as Abejar's action for
damages.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar is a real party in
interest who may bring an action for damages against
petitioner Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. on account
of Jesmariane R. Reyes' death – YES
RULING:
Both of Reyes' parents are already deceased. Reyes' paternal
grandparents are also both deceased. The whereabouts of Reyes'
maternal grandparents are unknown. There is also no record that
Reyes has brothers or sisters. It was under these circumstances that
respondent took custody of Reyes when she was a child, assumed the
role of Reyes' parents, and thus, exercised substitute parental
authority over her. As Reyes' custodian, respondent exercised the full
extent of the statutorily recognized rights and duties of a parent.
Consistent with Article 220 of the Family Code, respondent
supported Reyes' education and provided for her personal needs. To
echo respondent's words in her Complaint, she treated Reyes as if
she were her own daughter.
In several cases, the court allowed natural parents of victims to
recover damages for the death of their children. Inasmuch as persons
exercising substitute parental authority have the full range of
competencies of a child's actual parents, nothing prevents persons
exercising substitute parental authority from similarly possessing the
right to be indemnified for their ward's death.
In this case, Reyes was already 18 years old when she died. Having
reached the age of majority, she was already emancipated upon
her death. While parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation, respondent continued to support and care for Reyes
even after she turned 18. Except for the legal technicality of Reyes'
emancipation, her relationship with respondent remained the same.
The anguish and damage caused to respondent by Reyes' death was
no different because of Reyes' emancipation.
In any case, the termination of respondent's parental authority is not
an insurmountable legal bar that precludes the filing of her
Complaint.
In interpreting Article 1902 of the old Civil Code, which is
substantially similar to the first sentence of Article 2176 of the Civil
Code This court declared that Article 1902 of the old Civil Code (now
Article 2176) is broad enough to accommodate even plaintiffs who
are not relatives of the deceased.
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PARENTAL AUTHORITY
RENALYN A. MASBATE AND SPOUSES RENATO
MASBATE AND MARLYN MASBATE, PETITIONERS,
VS. RICKY JAMES RELUCIO, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 235498, July 30, 2018
Digest by: Jay J.L. Astillo
FACTS:
Queenie was born on May 3, 2012 to Renalyn and Ricky James, who
had been living together with Renalyn's parents without the benefit
of marriage. Three (3) years later, or in April 2015, the relationship
ended. Renalyn went to Manila, supposedly leaving Queenie behind
in the care and custody of her father, Ricky James.
Ricky James alleged that on November 7, 2015, Spouses Renata
and Marlyn Masbate (Renalyn's parents) took Queenie from the
school where he had enrolled her. When asked to give Queenie
back, Renalyn's parents refused and instead showed a copy of a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Renalyn granting full
parental rights, authority, and custody over Queenie to them.
Consequently, Ricky James filed a petition for habeas corpus and
child custody docketed as SP No. FC-15-239 before the RTC
(petition a quo).
A hearing was conducted on December 3, 2015, where Renalyn
brought Queenie and expressed the desire for her daughter to
remain in her custody.
The RTC ruled that the custody of three (3)-year-old Queenie
rightfully belongs to Renalyn, citing the second paragraph of Article
213 of the Family Code, which states that "[n]o child under seven [(7)]
years of age shall be separated from the mother x x x." The RTC
likewise found that, while Renalyn went to Manila to study dentistry
and left Queenie in the custody of her parents, her intention was to
bring Queenie to Manila at a later time.
CA affirmed the RTC Orders granting custody to Renalyn "pending
the outcome of the case," stating that only Queenie's mother, Renalyn,
has parental authority over her as she is an illegitimate child. Further,
the CA declared that the RTC must thresh out Renalyn's capacity to
raise her daughter, which shall, in tum, determine whether or not the
tender-age presumption must be upheld, or whether Queenie's well-
being is better served with her remaining in the custody of her
maternal grandparents in the exercise of their substitute parental
authority or with Ricky James, who was Queenie's actual custodian
before the controversy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly remanded the case a quo for
determination of who should exercise custody over Queenie.
[YES]
RULING:
As a general rule, the father and the mother shall jointly exercise
parental authority over the persons of their common children.
However, insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176
of the Family Code states that illegitimate children shall be under the
parental authority of their mother. Accordingly, mothers (such as
Renalyn) are entitled to the sole parental authority of their
illegitimate children (such as Queenie), notwithstanding the father's
recognition of the child. In the exercise of that authority, mothers are
consequently entitled to keep their illegitimate children in their
company, and the Court will not deprive them of custody, absent any
imperative cause showing the mother's unfitness to exercise such
authority and care.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
In addition, Article 213 of the same Code provides for the so-called
tender-age presumption, stating that "[n]o child under seven [(7)]
years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." The rationale behind
the rule was explained by the Code Commission in this wise:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a
tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her.
No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived
of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule
has to be for "compelling reasons" for the good of the child;
those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother's heart is not to
be unduly hurt.
According to jurisprudence, the following instances may constitute
"compelling reasons" to wrest away custody from a mother over her
child although under seven (7) years of age: neglect, abandonment,
unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable
disease.
As the records show, the CA resolved to remand the case to the RTC,
ratiocinating that there is a need to establish whether or not Renalyn
has been neglecting Queenie, for which reason, a trial is
indispensable for reception of evidence relative to the preservation
or overturning of the tender-age presumption under Article 213 of
the Family Code. In opposition, petitioners contend that the second
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code would not even apply
in this case (so as to determine Renalyn's unfitness as a mother)
because the said provision only applies to a situation where the
parents are married to each other.
In like manner, the word "shall" in Article 213 of the Family Code
and Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court has been held to
connote a mandatory character. Article 213 and Rule 99 similarly
contemplate a situation in which the parents of the minor are married
to each other, but are separated by virtue of either a decree of
legal separation or a de facto separation.
For easy reference, Article 213 of the Family Code and Section 6,
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, which were cited in Pablo-Gualberto,
are quoted hereunder in full:
Article 213 of the Family Code:
Article 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental
authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven
years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.
The Court cannot also subscribe to petitioners' contention that even if
there are compelling reasons to separate Queenie from her mother,
Renalyn, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 213 of the
Family Code, Ricky James would still not acquire custody over their
daughter because there is no provision of law granting custody rights
to an illegitimate father.
In the event that Renalyn is found unfit or unsuitable to care for her
daughter, Article 214 of the Family Code mandates that substitute
parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
However, the same Code further provides in Article 216 that "[i]n
default of parents or judicially appointed guardian, the following
persons shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in
the order indicated:"
ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO
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Article 216. x x x
(1) The surviving grandparent as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless
unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless
unfit or disqualified.
Indeed, it may be argued that Article 176 of the Family Code has
effectively disqualified the father of an illegitimate child from
exercising substitute parental authority under Article 216 even if he
were the actual custodian of the child under the premise that no one
is allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly.
However, the Court cannot adopt a rigid view, without running afoul
to the overarching consideration in custody cases, which is the best
interest of the minor. Even way back, Article 363 of the Civil Code
provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody, education
and property of the children, the latter's welfare is paramount. Under
present rules, A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC explicitly states that "[i]n
awarding custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the
minor and shall give paramount consideration to [her] material and
moral welfare.
The best interests of the minor refer to the totality of the circumstances
and conditions as are most congenial to the survival, protection, and
feelings of security of the minor encouraging to [her] physical,
psychological and emotional development. It also means the least
detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the growth and
development of the minor."
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Queenie's best interest
demands that a proper trial be conducted to determine if she had,
indeed, been neglected and abandoned by her mother, rendering
the latter unfit to exercise parental authority over her, and in the
event that Renalyn is found unsuitable, whether it is in Queenie's best
interest that she be in the custody of her father rather than her
grandparents upon whom the law accords a far superior right to
exercise substitute parental authority.
In the case of Bagtas v. Santos, which was a tug-of-war between the
maternal grandparents of the illegitimate minor child and the actual
custodians of the latter, the Court faulted the trial court for hastily
dismissing the petition for habeas corpus and awarding the custody
of the minor to the grandparents without conducting any trial. The
import of such decision is that the preference accorded by Article
216 of the Family Code does not automatically attach to the
grandparents, and is conditioned upon the determination of their
fitness to take care of their grandchild. In ruling as it did, the Court
ratiocinated that the child's welfare being the most important
consideration, it is not bound by any legal right of a person over the
child.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
SURNAMES
EMELITA BASILIO GAN, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
[September 14, 2016]
Digest by: Kathia Kierstin S. Chanyee
Principle:
A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right; a proper
and reasonable cause must exist before a person may be authorized to
change his name. 21 "In granting or denying petitions for change of
name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound
discretion of the court.
What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of
the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety
of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the
consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative
for making such determination being lodged in the courts.
Facts:
Emelita Basilio Gan (petitioner) was born on December 21, 1956 out
of wedlock to Pia Gan, her father who is a Chinese national, and
Consolacion Basilio, her mother who is a Filipino citizen. 3 The
petitioner's birth certificate, 4 which was registered in the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, indicates
that her full name is Emelita Basilio.
On June 29, 2010, the petitioner filed a Petition 5 for correction of
name with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Libmanan, Camarines
Sur. The petitioner sought to change the full name indicated in her
birth certificate from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio Gan." She
claimed that she had been using the name "Emelita Basilio Gan" in
her school records from elementary until college, employment
records, marriage contract, and other government records.
Issue: Whether or not the Petition for the Change of Name must
be granted [NO]
Ruling:
A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right; a proper
and reasonable cause must exist before a person may be authorized
to change his name. 21 "In granting or denying petitions for change
of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the
sound discretion of the court.
What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance
of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and
propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful
of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole
prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the
courts."
After a judicious review of the records of this case, the Court agrees
with the CA that the reason cited by the petitioner in support of her
petition for change of name, i.e., that she has been using the name
"Emelita Basilio Gan" in all of her records, is not a sufficient or proper
justification to allow her petition. When the petitioner was born in
1956, prior to the enactment and effectivity of the Family Code, the
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code then regarding the petitioner's
use of surname provide:
Article 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall
principally use the surname of the father. If recognized by only one
of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of the
recognizing parent.
ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO
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Article 368. Illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 shall bear
the surname of the mother.
In her amended petition for change of name, the petitioner merely
stated that she was born out of wedlock; she did not state whether
her parents, at the time of her birth, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other, which would make her a natural
child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code.If, at the time of the
petitioner's birth, either of her parents had an impediment to marry
the other, she may only bear the surname of her mother pursuant to
Article 368 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, she may use the surname
of her father provided that she was acknowledged by her father.
However, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence that would
show that she indeed was duly acknowledged by his father. The
petitioner's evidence consisted only of her birth certificate signed by
her mother, school records, employment records, marriage contract,
certificate of baptism, and other government records. Thus, assuming
that she is a natural child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code,
she could still not insist on using her father's surname. It was, thus, a
blatant error on the part of the RTC to have allowed the petitioner
to change her name from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio Gan."
The petitioner's reliance on the cases of Alfon v. Republic of the
Philippines, Republic of the Philippines v. Coseteng-Magpayo, and
Republic of the Philippines v. Lim to support her position is misplaced.
In Alfon, the name of the petitioner therein which appeared in her
birth certificate was Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte; she
was a legitimate child of her father and mother. She filed a petition
for change of name, seeking that she be allowed to use the surname
"Alfon," her mother's surname, instead of "Duterte." The trial court
denied the petition, ratiocinating that under Article 364 of the Civil
Code, legitimate children shall principally use the surname of the
father. The Court allowed the petitioner therein to use the surname
of her mother since Article 364 of the Civil Code used the word
"principally" and not "exclusively" and, hence, there is no legal
obstacle if a legitimate child should choose to use the mother's
surname to which he or she is legally entitled. 27
In contrast, Articles 366 and 368 of the Civil Code do not give to an
illegitimate child or a natural child not acknowledged by the father
the option to use the surname of the father. Thus, the petitioner cannot
insist that she is allowed to use the surname of her father.
In Coseteng-Magpayo, the issue was the proper procedure to be
followed when the change sought to be effected in the birth
certificate affects the civil status of the respondent therein from
legitimate to illegitimate. The respondent therein claimed that his
parents were never legally married; he filed a petition to change his
name from "Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo," the name
appearing in his birth certificate, to "Julian Edward Emerson
Marquez-Lim Coseteng."
The notice setting the petition for hearing was published and, since
there was no opposition thereto, the trial court issued an order of
general default and eventually granted the petition of the
respondent therein by, inter alia, deleting the entry on the date and
place of marriage of his parents and correcting his surname from
"Magpayo" to Coseteng."
The Court reversed the trial court's decision since the proper remedy
would have been to file a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. The Court ruled that the change sought by the respondent
therein involves his civil status as a legitimate child; it may only be
given due course through an adversarial proceedings under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court. The Court's pronouncement in Coseteng-
Magpayo finds no application in this case.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
Finally, Lim likewise finds no application in this case. In Lim, the
petition that was filed was for correction of entries under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court; the petition sought, among others, is the
correction of the surname of the respondent therein from "Yo" to "Yu."
Further, the respondent therein, although an illegitimate child, had
long been using the surname of her father. It bears stressing that the
birth certificate of the respondent therein indicated that her surname
was the same as her father albeit misspelled. Thus, a correction of
entry in her birth certificate is appropriate.
Here, the petitioner filed a petition for change of name under Rule
103 and not a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108.
Unlike in Lim, herein petitioner's birth certificate indicated that she
bears the surname of her mother and not of her father.
SURNAMES
REPUBLIC v. SALI
822 SCRA 239, G.R. No. 206023 April 3, 2017
Digest by: Eliza Den A. Devilleres
PRINCIPLE:
The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other
grounds, if the new first name has been habitually and continuously used
by the petitioner and he or she has been publicly known by that first
name in the community. The local city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general has the primary jurisdiction to entertain the petition. It is
only when such petition is denied that a petitioner may either appeal to
the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the
proper court.
FACTS:
This case involves the error in recording the facts of Sali's birth. The
personnel of the Local Civil Registrar of Baybay, Leyte[,] thru
inadvertence and mistake[,] erroneously entered in the records the
following: Firstly, the first name of the petitioner as "DOROTHY"
instead of "LORENA" and Secondly, the date of birth of the petitioner
as "June 24, 1968" instead of "April 24, 1968." A copy of the
Certificate of Live Birth of Dorothy A. Omapas issued by the National
Statistics Office (NSO) and Certification from the Local Civil Registrar
of Baybay, Leyte are hereunto attached as Annex "B" and Annex
"C" respectively.
Sali has been using the name "Lorena A. Omapas["] and her date of
birth as "April 24, 1968" for as long as she (sic) since she could
remember and is known to the community in general as such. To
sustain her claim that the entries in her Certificate of Live Birth
pertaining to her first name and date of birth should be corrected so
that it will now read as "LORENA A. OMAPAS" and "April 24, 1968"
respectively, attached hereto are: the Certificate of Marriage of
Morsalyn [D.] Sali and Lorena A. Omapas, and a photocopy of the
Postal Identity Card of the petitioner as Annex "D" and Annex "E"
respectively. The RTC granted her petition. The Republic opposed. It
argues that although Sali's petition is entitled: "IN THE MATTER OF
THE PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY IN THE CERTIFICATE OF
LIVE BIRTH OF DOROTHY A. OMAPAS," it is actually a petition for a
change of name.
ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO
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The first name being sought to be changed does not involve the
correction of a simple clerical, typographical or innocuous error such
as a patently misspelled name, but a substantial change in Sali's first
name. This considering, the applicable rule is Rule 103, which
requires that the applicant's names and aliases must be stated in the
title of the petition and the order setting it for hearing, and that the
petition can be granted only on specific grounds provided by law.
Further, assuming that a petition for correction of entries under Rule
108 is the appropriate remedy, the petition should not have been
granted for failure to exhaust administrative remedies provided for
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sali’s petition must be granted. [PARTIALLY
GRANTED].
RULING:
The petition for change of first name may be allowed, among other
grounds, if the new first name has been habitually and continuously
used by the petitioner and he or she has been publicly known by that
first name in the community. The local city or municipal civil registrar
or consul general has the primary jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
It is only when such petition is denied that a petitioner may either
appeal to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition
with the proper court. We stressed in Silverio v. Republic of the
Philippines, 537 SCRA 373 (2007): RA 9048 now governs the
change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general concerned.
Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of
first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned
administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude
the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of
Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It
likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In
sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first
name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
In this case, the petition, insofar as it prayed for the change of Sali’s
first name, was not within the RTC’s primary jurisdiction. It was
improper because the remedy should have been administrative, i.e.,
filing of the petition with the local civil registrar concerned. For failure
to exhaust administrative remedies, the RTC should have dismissed
the petition to correct Sali’s first name.
Anent Sali’s petition to correct her birth date from “June 24, 1968”
to “April 24, 1968,” R.A. No. 9048 is inapplicable. It was only on
August 15, 2012 that R.A. No. 10172 was signed into law amending
R.A. No. 9048. As modified, Section 1 now includes the day and
month in the date of birth and sex of a person, thus: Section 1.
Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of
First Name or Nickname.—No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname, the day
and month in the date of birth or sex of a person where it is patently
clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake in
the entry, which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city
or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
SURNAMES
IN RE YUHARES JAN BARCELOTE TINITIGAN ET
AL. VS. REPUBLIC, ET AL.
G.R. No. 222095, August 7, 2017, Carpio
Digest by: Francis Roel Dulay
PRINCIPLE:
The mother must sign and agree to the information entered in the birth
certificate because she has the parental authority and custody of the
illegitimate child. In Briones v. Miguel, we held that an illegitimate child
is under the sole parental authority of the mother, and the mother is
entitled to have custody of the child. The right of custody springs from
the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority is a mass of rights
and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the
children's physical preservation and development, as well as the
cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses.
FACTS:
On June 24, 2008 Jonna Barcalote bore a child (Yohan Grace
Barcelote) out of wedlock with a married man, Ricky Tinitigan. On 24
August 2011, she bore another child with Tinitigan, (Joshua Miguel
Barcelote). Both births were not registered to avoid humiliation,
ridicule, and possible criminal charges. Upon need of birth certificate
for school admission she submitted copies of the late registration of
the births to the NSO. Barcelote was informed that there were two
certificates of live birth (subject birth certificates) with the same name
of the mother and the years of birth of the children in their office. In
both certificates, the surname of the children were Tinitigan and the
informant for both was Ricky. Thus, Barcelote filed a petition with the
RTC for the cancellation of the subject birth certificates registered by
Tinitigan without her knowledge and participation, and for containing
erroneous entries.
ISSUE: WON the certificates of live birth should be cancelled. YES
RULING:
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, provides:
“Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support
in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use
the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly
recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in
the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or
private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the
father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to
prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a
legitimate child.”
In Grande v. Antonio, we held that "the use of the word 'may' in
[Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255] readily
shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion
to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word 'may' is
permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate
children."
The law is clear that illegitimate children shall use the surname and
shall be under the parental authority of their mother. The use of the
word "shall" underscores its mandatory character. The discretion on
the part of the illegitimate child to use the surname of the father is
conditional upon proof of compliance with RA 9255 and its IRR.
ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO
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Since the undisputed facts show that the children were born outside
a valid marriage after 3 August 1988, specifically in June 2008 and
August 2011, respectively, then they are the illegitimate children of
Tinitigan and Barcelote. The children shall use the surname of their
mother, Barcelote. The entry in the subject birth certificates as to the
surname of the children is therefore incorrect; their surname should
have been "Barcelote" and not "Tinitigan."
The mother must sign and agree to the information entered in the
birth certificate because she has the parental authority and custody
of the illegitimate child. In Briones v. Miguel, we held that an
illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother,
and the mother is entitled to have custody of the child. The right of
custody springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental
authority is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to
parents for the purpose of the children's physical preservation and
development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the
education of their heart and senses.
Since it appears on the face of the subject birth certificates that the
mother did not sign the documents, the local civil registrar had no
authority to register the subject birth certificates. Under the IRR of
Act No. 3753, the civil registrar shall see to it that the Certificate of
Live Birth presented for registration is properly and completely filled
up, and the entries are correct. In case the entries are found
incomplete or incorrect, the civil registrar shall require the person
concerned to fill up the document completely or to correct the entries,
as the case may be.
Clearly, the subject birth certificates were not executed consistent
with the provisions of the law respecting the registration of birth of
illegitimate children. Aside from the fact that the entry in the subject
birth certificates as to the surname of the children is incorrect since it
should have been that of the mother, the subject birth certificates are
also incomplete as they lacked the signature of the mother.
Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory
laws shall be void. In Babiera v. Catotal, we declared as void and
cancelled a birth certificate, which showed that the mother was
already 54 years old at the time of the child's birth and which was
not signed either by the civil registrar or by the supposed mother.
Accordingly, we declare the subject birth certificates void and order
their cancellation for being registered against the mandatory
provisions of the Family Code requiring the use of the mother's
surname for her illegitimate children and Act No. 3753 requiring the
signature of the mother in her children's birth certificates.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020] 55
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas

SURNAMES In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, the Court enumerated several

recognized grounds that can be invoked by a person desirous of
changing his name, viz:

ERIC SIBAYAN CHUA, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to
PHILIPPINES, Respondent. write or pronounce;

(b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as

G.R. No. 231998, November 20, 2017 legitimation;

Digested by: Jennifer Lim (c) when the change will avoid confusion;

(d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood
Principle: by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage;

In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, the Court enumerated several (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and
recognized grounds that can be invoked by a person desirous of
changing his name, viz:
XX (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing
that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or
(c) when the change will avoid confusion;
XX that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
Avoidance of confusion was invoked in Alfon v. Republic, wherein the
Court granted the petition for change of name of Maria Estrella
Facts: Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon.

On January 7, 2013, Eric filed a petition for change of surname from
"Kiat" to "Chua." In his petition, Eric alleged that he was born on
November 8, 1973 to a Chinese father named "Cheong Kiat"
(Cheong) and a Filipino mother named "Melania Sibayan" (Melania).
However, after his birth, his father Cheong allegedly secured a
favorable judgment allowing him (Cheong) to change his surname
from "Kiat" to "Chua." Thus, Eric adopted the new surname of his
father, "Chua," and had been using the name "Eric Sibayan Chua" in
all of his credentials. Eric likewise averred in his petition that he is
known in their community as "Eric Chua" instead of "Eric Kiat." The
petition was docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 907 before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 34, in Balaoan, La Union.
Finding the change of name as nothing more than a straightening of
the records, the RTC rendered its January 22, 2014 Decision granting
the petition.
CA reversed the RTC ruling. According to the CA, Eric failed to
establish a compelling ground for changing his name. The CA
deemed that there was no proof offered tending to establish that
Eric's father, Cheong, was able to secure a court judgment allowing
him to officially change his surname from "Kiat" to "Chua." Eric and
Melania's testimonies were seen as mere allegations that do not
satisfy the requisite quantum of evidence to establish such fact. The
appellate court likewise held that no proof was offered to show that
Eric will be prejudiced by his use of his registered name.
The same circumstances are attendant in the case at bar. As Eric has
established, he is known in his community as "Eric Chua," rather than
"Eric Kiat." Moreover, all of his credentials exhibited before the
Court, other than his Certificate of Live Birth, bear the name "Eric
Chua." Guilty of reiteration, Eric's Certificate of Baptism, Voter
Certification, Police Clearance, National Bureau of Investigation
Clearance, Passport, and High School Diploma all reflect his surname
to be "Chua."
Thus, to compel him to use the name "Eric Kiat" at this point would
inevitably lead to confusion. It would result in an alteration of all of
his official documents, save for his Certificate of Live Birth. His
children, too, will correspondingly be compelled to have their records
changed. For even their own Certificates of Live Birth state that their
father's surname is "Chua."
To deny this petition would then have ramifications not only to Eric's
identity in his community, but also to that of his children.
The imperatives of avoiding confusion dictate that the instant petition
be granted.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellate court erred in disallowing petitioner

from officially changing his name. YES.

Ruling:

Contrary to the ruling of the CA, there is legal and factual basis for
granting Eric's petition for change of name. To recall, his petition is
not only anchored on his father's alleged change of surname from
"Kiat" to "Chua," but also on the fact that he (Eric) had been using
the surname "Chua" in all of his credentials. Thus, it may be that Eric
and Melania's testimonies are not preponderant proof of Cheong's
change of surname, but this should not foreclose the possibility of
granting the petition on a different ground.

ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO

 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
SURNAMES
REPUBLIC VS. MICHELLE SORIANO GALLO
G.R. No. 207074, January 17, 2018
Digest by: Majeerah Sinarimbo
PRINCIPLE:
Changes to one's name, therefore, can be the result of either one of
two (2) motives. The first, as an exercise of one's autonomy, is to
change the appellation that one was given for various reasons. The
other is not an exercise to change the label that was given to a person;
it is simply to correct the data as it was recorded in the Civil Registry.
FACTS:
Gallo has never been known as "Michael Soriano Gallo." She has
always been female. For her, in her petition before the RTC, her
Certificate of Live Birth contained errors, which should be corrected.
For her, she was not changing the name that was given to her; she
was merely correcting its entry.
To accurately reflect these facts in her documents, Gallo prayed
before the RTC in a special proc. for the correction of her name from
"Michael" to "Michelle" and of her biological sex from "Male" to
"Female" under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
In addition, Gallo asked for the inclusion of her middle name,
"Soriano"; her mother's middle name, "Angangan"; her father's
middle name, "Balingao"; and her parent's marriage date, May 23,
1981, in her Certificate of Live Birth, as these were not recorded.
As proof, she attached to her petition copies of her diploma, voter's
certification, official transcript of records, medical certificate,
mother's birth certificate, and parents' marriage certificate. The
doctor who examined her also certified that she was female. On
cross-examination, Gallo explained that she never undertook any
gender-reassignment surgery and that she filed the petition not to
evade any civil or criminal liability, but to obtain a passport.
The OSG appealed, alleging that the applicable rule should be Rule
103 of the Rules of Court for Petitions for Change of Name. It argued
that Gallo did not comply with the jurisdictional requirements under
Rule 103 because the title of her Petition and the published Order
did not state her official name, "Michael Gallo." Furthermore, the
published Order was also defective for not stating the cause of the
change of name.
Citing Republic v. Mercadera, petitioner Republic argues that "only
clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil
registry may be raised" in petitions for correction under Rule 108.
Thus, the correction must only be for a patently misspelled name. As
"Michael" could not have been the result of misspelling "Michelle,"
petitioner contends that the case should fall under Rule 103 for it
contemplates a substantial change.
ISSUE: Whether or not Michelle Soriano Gallo's petition involves a
substantive change under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court instead of
mere correction of clerical errors –
RULING:
As to the issue of which between Rules 103 and 108 applies, it is
necessary to determine the nature of the correction sought by Gallo.
Upon scrutiny of the records in this case, this Court rules that Gallo's
Petition involves a mere correction of clerical errors.
ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO
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Considering that Gallo had shown that the reason for her petition
was not to change the name by which she is commonly known, this
Court rules that her petition is not covered by Rule 103. Gallo is not
filing the petition to change her current appellation. She is merely
correcting the misspelling of her name.
Correcting and changing have been differentiated, thus:
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the
faults or error from." To change means "to replace something
with something else of the same kind or with something that
serves as a substitute.
Gallo is not attempting to replace her current appellation. The lower
courts have determined that she has been known as "Michelle" all
throughout her life. She is merely seeking to correct her records to
conform to her true given name.
However, Rule 108 does not apply in this case either.
As stated, Gallo filed her Petition for Correction of Entry on May 13,
2010. The current law, Republic Act No. 10172, does not apply
because it was enacted only on August 19, 2012.
The applicable law then for the correction of Gallo's name
is Republic Act No. 9048.
To reiterate, Republic Act No. 9048 was enacted on March 22, 2001
and removed the correction of clerical or typographical errors from
the scope of Rule 108. It also dispensed with the need for judicial
proceedings in case of any clerical or typographical mistakes in the
civil register, or changes of first name or nickname. Therefore, it is
the civil registrar who has primary jurisdiction over Gallo's
petition, not the Regional Trial Court. Only if her petition was
denied by the local city or municipal civil registrar can the Regional
Trial Court take cognizance of her case.
As to Gallo’s middle name as well as the middle names of her parents
Likewise, the prayers to enter Gallo's middle name as Soriano, the
middle names of her parents as Angangan for her mother and
Balingao for her father, and the date of her parents' marriage as
May 23, 1981 fall under clerical or typographical errors as
mentioned in Republic Act No. 9048.
These corrections may be done by referring to existing records in
the civil register. None of it involves any change in Gallo's
nationality, age, status, or sex.
Moreover, errors "visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding" fall within the coverage of clerical mistakes not
deemed substantial. If it is "obvious to the understanding," even if
there is no proof that the name or circumstance in the birth certificate
was ever used, the correction may be made.
Thus, as to these corrections, Gallo should have sought to correct them
administratively before filing a petition under Rule 108.
As to Gallo’s biological sex
However, the petition to correct Gallo's biological sex was rightfully
filed under Rule 108 as this was a substantial change excluded in the
definition of clerical or typographical errors in Republic Act No.
9048.
This was affirmed in Republic v. Cagandahan:
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry
involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020]
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas
It was only when Republic Act No. 10172 was enacted on August 15,
2012 that errors in entries as to biological sex may be
administratively corrected, provided that they involve a
typographical or clerical error.
However, this is not true for all cases as corrections in entries of
biological sex may still be considered a substantive matter.
In Cagandahan, this Court ruled that a party who seeks a change of
name and biological sex in his or her Certificate of Live Birth after a
gender reassignment surgery has to file a petition under Rule 108.
SURNAMES
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,
V. VIRGIE (VIRGEL) L. TIPAY, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 209527, February 14, 2018
Digest by: Jay J.L. Astillo
FACTS:
Virgel sought the correction of several entries in his birth certificate.
Attached to the petition are two (2) copies of his birth certificate,
respectively issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Governor
Generoso, Davao Oriental and the National Statistics Office[5]
(NSO). Both copies reflect his gender as "FEMALE" and his first name
as "Virgie." It further appears that the month and day of birth in the
local civil registrar's copy was blank, while the NSO-issued birth
certificate indicates that he was born on May 12, 1976.[6] Virgel
alleged that these entries are erroneous, and sought the correction
of his birth certificate as follows: (a) his gender, from "FEMALE" to
"MALE;" (b) his first name, from "VIRGIE" to "VIRGEL;" and (c) his
month and date of birth to "FEBRUARY 25, 1976."
The petition was found sufficient in form and substance, and the case
proceeded to trial. Aside from his own personal testimony, Virgel's
mother, Susan L. Tipay, testified that she gave birth to a son on
February 25, 1976, who was baptized as "Virgel." The Certificate
of Baptism, including other documentary evidence such as a medical
certificate stating that Virgel is phenotypically male, were also
presented to the trial court.
There was no opposition to the petition. Soon after, the RTC rendered
its Decision dated July 27, 2010 granting Virgel's petition
The CA ruled in favor of Virgel, stating that while the correction of
the entry on his gender is considered a substantial change, it is
nonetheless within the jurisdiction of the trial court under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition must be granted. [NO]
RULING:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court governs the procedure for the
correction of substantial changes in the civil registry.
It is true that initially, the changes that may be corrected under the
summary procedure of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are clerical or
harmless errors. Errors that affect the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a person, are considered substantial errors that were
beyond the purview of the rule.
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Jurisprudence on this matter later developed, giving room for the
correction of substantial errors. The Court ultimately recognized that
substantial or controversial alterations in the civil registry are
allowable in an action filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as
long as the issues are properly threshed out in appropriate
adversarial proceedings— effectively limiting the application of the
summary procedure to the correction of clerical or innocuous errors.
The Court's ruling in Republic v. Valencia, explained the adversarial
procedure to be followed in correcting substantial errors in this wise:
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is
not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and
innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship,
which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted,
affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary
in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be
enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the
appropriate remedy is used.
This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors
in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. As a
matter of fact, the opposition of the Solicitor General dated
February 20, 1970 while questioning the use of Article 412 of
the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court admits that "the entries sought to be corrected should be
threshed out in an appropriate proceeding."
Evidently, the Republic incorrectly argued that the petition for
correction under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is limited to changes
in entries containing harmless and innocuous errors. The cited cases in
the petition were already superseded by much later jurisprudence.
Most importantly, with the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048
in 2001, the local civil registrars, or the Consul General as the case
may be, are now authorized to correct clerical or typographical
errors in the civil registry, or make changes in the first name or
nickname, without need of a judicial order. This law provided an
administrative recourse for the correction of clerical or typographical
errors, essentially leaving the substantial corrections in the civil
registry to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
R.A. No. 9048 defined a clerical or typographical error as a mistake
committed in. the performance of clerical work, which is harmless and
immediately obvious to the understanding. It was further amended in
2011, when R.A. No. 10172 was passed to expand the authority of
local civil registrars and the Consul General to make changes in the
day and month in the date of birth, as well as in the recorded sex of
a person when it is patently clear that there was a typographical
error or mistake in the entry.
Unfortunately, however, when Virgel filed the petition for correction
with the RTC in 2009, R.A. No. 10172 was not yet in effect. As such,
to correct the erroneous gender and date of birth in Virgel's birth
certificate, the proper remedy was to commence the appropriate
adversarial proceedings with the RTC, pursuant to Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. The changes in the entries pertaining to the gender
and date of birth are indisputably substantial corrections, outside the
contemplation of a clerical or typographical error that may be
corrected administratively.
Notably, the Republic does not assail whether the proceedings
before the trial court were adversarial, but merely insists on the
erroneous premise that a Rule 108 proceeding is limited to the
correction of harmless, clerical or typographical errors in the civil
registry. Having established that the proper recourse for the
correction of substantial changes in the civil registry is Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court, the Court cannot sustain the Republic's assertion
on this matter.
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LATEST CASES [2016-
2020] 58
From the Lectures of Atty. Lydia Galas

The Court has long settled in Republic v. Olaybar that as long as the
procedural requirements in Rule 108 were observed, substantial
corrections and changes in the civil registry, such as those involving
the entries on sex and date of birth, may already be effected, viz.:

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for

cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The
proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction
is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a
party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is
adversary.

Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia in 1986, the Court

has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry
may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the
true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error
availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." An
appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court
has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully
and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.

ASTILLO I CHANYEE I DEVILLERES I DULAY I LIM I SINARIMBO