CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

Case Digest Compilation (Batch 1 & 2)

Preamble, Articles I, II, & III
ARTICLE I - NATIONAL TERRITORY

1. Magalona vs. Ermita(GR 187167, 16 August 2011)

ISSUES:
1) Does RA 9522 “dismember a large portion of national territory” because it discards the
pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related
treaties?
2) Does RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islands framework to draw the
baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the Kalayaan Island
Group (KIG), weaken our territorial claim over the area?
3) Did RA 9522 fail to textualize the Philippines’ claim over Sabah in North Borneo?
4) Did RA 9522 unconstitutionally convert Philippine internal waters into archipelagic
waters?

Ruling:
1) No, it does not. On the contrary, it increased the Philippines’ total maritime space
(internal waters, territorial sea, and EEZ) by 145, 216 square nautical miles, way beyond the
demarcation set out by the Treaty of Paris, while also obeying the stipulations of UNCLOS III.
2) No. Sec. 2 of RA 9522 expresses a committed continuation of the Philippines claim of
sovereignty and jurisdiction over the “regime of islands” KIG and Scarborough Shoal.
3) It did fail to textualize the claim; however, this argument against RA 9522 is
untenable. The said Act did not repeal Sec. 2 of RA 5446, which expresses the Philippine claim
over Sabah. As such, the claim stands despite it not being textualized in the new law.
4) No. It is understood in Art. 1of the Constitution and Art. 49 of UNCLOS III that the
Philippines, as an archipelagic country, exercises sovereignty “over the body water lying
landward of the baselines….” As such, whether they are called “internal” or “archipelagic,” these
waters are one and same and are under Philippine sovereignty.

ARTICLE II – DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

2. Imbong vs Ochoa, GR 204819, 8 April 2014

ISSUE: Does the RH Law violate the separation of church and state?

RULING: The separation of church and state is qualified by the Non-Establishment and Free
Exercise clauses.

Because of the Non-Establishment Clause, which restricts what government can do with
religion and also limits what religious sects cannot do with government, the State is allowed
to enhance its population control program through the RH Law via contraceptives despite
religious objections. If the State accedes to the demands of religious sects, then it would be
favouring a religion, contrary to the Establishment Clause.

The RH Law, however, undermines the Free Exercise Clause through Sections 7, 23 and 24
thereof which commonly mandate a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a
person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare
provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.In cases of
conflict between the State and the Free Exercise clause, the Court adheres to the doctrine of
benevolent neutrality (otherwise called neutral accommodation) which doesnot seek a
declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, butan exemption (i.e.
conscientious objection) from its application or its 'burdensome effect,'whether by the
legislature or the courts." When the free exercise of religion is burdened, the State must show
a more compelling state interestin the accomplishment of an important secular objective. The
OSG failed to show this compelling state interest.
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
Case Digest Compilation (Batch 1 & 2)
Preamble, Articles I, II, & III

3. International School Manila vs ISEA, GR 167286, 5 Feb 2014

ISSUE: Shall separation pay be allowed as a measure of social to all employees who have
dismissed? 

RULING: No. Separation pay shall only be allowed as a measure of social justice only in
those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious
misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid
dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like
theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give
the dismissed employee separationpay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is
called, on the ground of social justice. In the instant case, the Court found equitable and
proper the award of separation pay in favor of Santos in view of the length of her service with
the school. 

4. Garcia vs Drilon, GR 179267, 25 June 2013

ISSUE: Does RA 9262 violate the fundamental equality between men and women?

RULING: No. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-
repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union is
instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of
the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be
affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. 

5. Imbong vs Ochoa, GR 204819, 8 April 2014

ISSUE: Does the RH Law violate the rights to health and protection against hazardous
products?

RULING: No. No contraceptive was yet submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law;
thus, time will tell which drugs and contraceptives the FDA will approve for public
consumption. Moreover, the contraceptives that would be provided under the RH Law are
subject to the regulations under R.A. 4729 (An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation,
and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices), which provides adequate
safeguards by ensuring that: 1) only licensed drug stores or pharmaceutical companies will
sell the contraceptives; and 2) that they shall not be dispensed without the prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner.

6. General Santos City vs COA, GR 199439, 22 April 2014

ISSUE: Does the constitutional mandate for local autonomy grant local governments the
power to streamline and reorganize as well as the authority to create a separate or
supplementary retirement benefit plan?1

1
Former Mayor Acharon of General Santos City issued Executive Order No. 40, series of 2008, creating management teams
pursuant to its organization development program. In addition to, Executive Order No. 13, series of 2009 was also adopted
embodying the organization development masterplan. This was followed by Resolution No. 004, series of 2009, requesting for
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
Case Digest Compilation (Batch 1 & 2)
Preamble, Articles I, II, & III
RULING: Local autonomy also grants local governments the power to streamline and
reorganize. This power is inferred from Section 76 of the Local Government Code on
organizational structure and staffing pattern, and Section 16 otherwise known as the general
welfare clause. In this case, the constitutional mandate for local autonomy supports petitioner
city’s issuance of Executive Order No. 40, series of 2008, creating change management teams
as an initial step for its organization development masterplan.

As for the supplementary retirement benefit plan, however, it is proscribed by Section 28,
paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, otherwise known as the Government Service
Insurance Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 4968. This provision bans all supplementary
retirement or pension plans for government employees in order to prevent the undue and
inequitous proliferation of such plans.

7. Belgica vs Ochoa, GR 208566 etc., 19 Nov. 2013

ISSUE: Does the Pork Barrel System enable politicians who are members of political
dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power?

RULING: The argument is largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated
how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.

More importantly, Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is considered not self-executing
due to the qualifying phrase “as may be provided by law.” Said provision does not, by and of
itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies guideline for
legislative or executive action. Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which
crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from
ruling on this issue.

8. Belgica vs Ochoa, GR 208566 etc., 19 Nov. 2013

ISSUE: Are petitioners entitled to the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed
of their PDAF, and the use of the Malampaya funds, etc?

RULING: No. The right to information does not include the right to compel the preparation
of “lists, abstracts, summaries and the like.” The proper remedy to invoke the right of
information is to file a petition for mandamus and for mandamus to issue, the applicant must
have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the
imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required.

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and are entitled to “access to
official records,” the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of
official records to prepare lists abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire
information on matters of public concern.

the mayor’s support for GenSan SERVES, an early retirement program to be proposed to the Sangguniang Panlungsod.

Consequently, Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was passed together with its implementing rules and regulations. The said
ordinance “provides for separation benefits for sickly employees who have not yet reached retirement age.”

Respondent Commission on Audit (COA) argued that Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, partakes of the nature of a
supplementary retirement benefit plan proscribed by Section 28, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186 as amended. COA
also observed that GenSan SERVES was not based on a law passed by Congress but on ordinances and resolutions passed and
approved by the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Executive Orders by the city mayor. Moreover, nowhere in Section 76 of the
Local Government Code, does it provide a specific power for local government units to establish an early retirement program.
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
Case Digest Compilation (Batch 1 & 2)
Preamble, Articles I, II, & III
(Note: Petitioners failed to establish a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to be
furnished by the Executive Sec. and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List
and the Presidential Pork Use Report. They did not assert any law to form the bases of the
respondents’ duty to furnish the documents requested.)

ARTICLE III
Right to Life and Property

9. Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, GR 203335, 18 Feb. 2014

ISSUE: Is Sec. 13 of the Cybercrime Law a deprivation of the right to property? 2

RULING:No, it is not. Firstly, it is uncertain whether service providers have the obligation
to indefinitely keep a copy of its users’ data in its own servers. In fact, if they so wished, the
users themselves should have retained copies of their own data in their computers upon
generation or receipt. What the law provides is to require service providers to keep such
copies for at least 6 months from date of transmission or 6 months from date of order as an
aid during court proceedings. Neither the users nor the service providers are denied access to
the data sought to be preserved. Further, the process of preserving data does not unduly
hamper its normal transmission or use. Hence, no deprivation of property exists.

10. Imbong vs. Ochoa, GR 204819, 8 April 2014

ISSUE: Does the RH Law violate the constitutional right to life of the unborn?

RULING: No. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and must
therefore be protected. The ponentetakes the position that life begins upon fertilization, which
is the same as conception. Thus, it rejects the view that life begins upon implantation of a
fertilized egg on the uterus. Therefore, the RH Law is constitutional because only makes
available those contraceptives which prevent fertilization (non-abortificient contraceptives)
while illegalizing those that destroy an already fertilized egg (abortifacient contraceptives).
Police Power
11. Fernando vs St. Scholastica College, GR 1611107, 12 March 2013

ISSUE: Is Marikina Ordinance No. 192, imposing a five-meter setback, a valid exercise of
police power?3

RULING: No. “Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes
and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people.” Two tests have been used by the Court – the rational
relationship test and the strict scrutiny test:

2
Petitioners claim that Section 13 amounts to the undue deprivation of the right to property because it is similar to the
garnishment of personal property in civil forfeiture proceedings. The Government’s order prevents internet users from accessing
and disposing of traffic data that basically belongs to them.

3
Respondent SSC’s property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence. Marikina City enacted an ordinance which provides
that walls and fences shall not be built within a five-meter allowance between the front monument line and the building line of an
establishment.
The City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to demolish, replace, and move back
the fence. As a response, the respondents filed a petition for prohibition with an application for a writ of preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Marikina. The RTC granted the petition and the CA affirmed.
Hence, this certiorari.
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
Case Digest Compilation (Batch 1 & 2)
Preamble, Articles I, II, & III
Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the following requisites:
(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require its exercise; and
(2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

The real intent of the setback requirement was to make the parking space free for use by
the public and not for the exclusive use of respondents. This would be tantamount to a taking
of private property for public use without just compensation. Anent the objectives of
prevention of concealment of unlawful acts and “un-neighborliness” due to the walls and
fences, the parking area is not reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of these goals.
The Court, thus, finds Section 5 of the Ordinance to be unreasonable and oppressive. Hence,
the exercise of police power is not valid.

12. SJS vs. Lim, GR 187836, etc., 23 November 2014

ISSUE: Is amendatory Manila Ordinance No. 8187, allowing the continued stay of oil depots
in Pandacan, valid and constitutional?4

RULING: The same best interest of the public elaborated in G.R. No. 1560521 guided the
Court in resolving this issue. The Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target even if the
contents have been lessened. In the absence of any convincing reason to persuade this Court
that the life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the
presence of the oil depots, we hold that Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan
Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional.

13. Hermano Oil vs TRB, GR 167290, 26 Nov. 2014

ISSUE: Was the putting up of a fence on petitioner’s property at the Sta. Rita Exit of NLEX a
compensable taking or a valid exercise of police power?

RULING: It was a valid exercise of police power. The limited access imposed on the
petitioner’s property did not partake of a compensable taking due to the exercise of the power
of eminent domain. There is no question that the property was not taken and devoted for
public use. Instead, the property was subjected to a certain restraint, i.e. the access fence, in
order to secure the general safety and welfare of the motorists using the NLEX. Therefore,
the access fence was a reasonable restriction on the petitioner’s property given the location
thereof at the right side of Sta. Rita Exit of the NLEX. There being a clear and valid exercise
of police power, the petitioner was certainly not entitled to any just compensation.

Substantive Due Process

4
On 20 November 2001, during the incumbency of former Mayor Atienza, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No.
8027 reclassifying the use of the land in Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and its adjoining areas from Industrial II to Commercial I. The
owners and operators of the businesses thus affected by the reclassification were given six months from the date of effectivity of
the Ordinance within which to stop the operation of their businesses. Writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary
mandatory injunction were issued in favor of the oil depot operators.

On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of Mayor Lim, who succeeded Mayor Atienza, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted
Ordinance No. 8187. The new Ordinance repealed, amended, rescinded or otherwise modified Ordinance No. 8027, Section 23 of
Ordinance No. 8119, and all other Ordinances or provisions inconsistent therewith thereby allowing, once again, the operation oil
depots. Hence, this instant petition.
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
Case Digest Compilation (Batch 1 & 2)
Preamble, Articles I, II, & III

14. Disini vs Secretary of Justice, GR 203335, 18 Feb. 2014

ISSUE: Is Sec. 17 of the Cybercrime Law, allowing for the destruction of previously
preserved or examined computer data, a deprivation of property without due process?

RULING:No, it is not. Petitioners failed to show that users have a demandable right to
require service providers to retain copies of their [users] data indefinitely in their [service
providers] servers. The users should have personally preserved copies of the data they wanted
in their own computers when they generated the data or received it. In addition, users also
have the option to request a copy from the service provider prior to its scheduled deletion.
Hence, there is no deprivation of property without due process.

15. Deoferio vs Intel, GR 202996, 18 June 2014

ISSUE: Was Deoferio denied subatantive due process/ procedural due process/ or both? 5

RULING: In Labor cases, substantive due process means that the termination must be based
on just and/or authorized causes of dismissal. On the other hand, procedural due process
requires the employer to effect the dismissal in a manner specified in the Labor Code and its
IRR.

In the case at bar, Intel had an authorized cause (disease not curable in six months) to dismiss
Deoferio, thus substantive due process is complied with. However, Intel failed to follow the
two written notices requirement, namely: (1) the notice to apprise the employee of the ground
for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the notice informing employee of his dismissal,
after employee has been given reasonable opportunity to answer and to be heard on his
defense. Thus Deoferio was denied procedural due process.

Procedural Due Process

16. Jardeleza vs CJ Sereno, GR 213181, 18 Aug. 2014

ISSUE: Is the constitutional right to due process available in JBC proceedings? 6

RULING: The right to due process is available and thereby demandable as a matter of right.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. The Court,
however, could not accept, lock, stock and barrel, the argument that an applicant’s access to
the rights afforded under the due process clause is discretionary on the part of the JBC. While
the facets of criminal and administrative due process are not strictly applicable to JBC
proceedings, their peculiarity is insufficient to justify the conclusion that due process is not
demandable. Notwithstanding being "a class of its own," the right to be heard and to explain
one’s self is availing.
5
Deoferio, an employee of Intel, was apparently suffering from a disease. Upon several consultations and examinations, a Dr. Lee
concluded that Deoferio is suffering from schizophrenia and certified that it is not curable in six months and will negatively affect
his work and social relations with co-workers. Pursuant to these findings, Intel terminated Deoferio. Deoferio argues that his right
to procedural due process was violated when Intel summarily issued a notice of termination.

6
Jardeleza was included in the names of candidates for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. Respondent accompanied
with others manifested that she would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009against him, according to them petitioner’s
integrity is dubious. Petitioner was asked by respondent on whether he wanted to defend himself against the integrity issues
raised against him. He answered that he would defend himself provided that due process would be observed and that Sereno and
Carpio should execute a sworn statement specifying their objections and that he be afforded the right to cross-examine them in a
public hearing. On the other note, representative Niel G. Tupas Jr. also manifested that he wanted to hear for himself Jardeleza’s
explanation on the matter. However, Jardaleza refused as he would not be lulled into waiving his rights. However, the JBC
continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for the nominees to be included in the shortlist in which petitioner was not
included.
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
Case Digest Compilation (Batch 1 & 2)
Preamble, Articles I, II, & III

17. Estrada vs Ombudsman, GR 212140-41, 21 Jan. 2015

ISSUES:
1) Did the Ombudsman violate the Due Process clause when it denied Sen. Estrada’s request
for copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents?

2) Is he entitled to the essential and fundamental requirements of due process in

administrative proceedings as laid down in the AngTibay case?

RULING:

1) The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process. There is no
law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the
counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the
complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the
counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. Clearly, what Section 4(b), Rule II of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman refers to are affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously, the
counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of the
complainant.

2) The AngTibay guidelines for administrative cases do not apply to preliminary

investigations in criminal cases. An application of the AngTibay guidelines to
preliminary investigations will have absurd and disastrous consequences. The purpose of
the Office of the Ombudsman in conducting a preliminary investigation, after conducting
its own fact-finding investigation, is to determine probable cause for filing an
information, and not to make a final adjudication of the rights and obligations of the
parties under the law, which is the purpose of the guidelines in AngTibay. To now rule
that AngTibay, should apply to preliminary investigations will mean that all past and
present preliminary investigations are in gross violation of constitutional due process.
Moreover, a person under preliminary investigation, as Sen. Estrada is in the present case
when he filed his Request, is not yet an accused person, and hence cannot demand the full
exercise of the rights of an accused person.

18. Remman Enterprises vs. PRC, Decision 3, GR 197676, 4 Feb. 2014

ISSUE: Does Sec. 28 (a) of RA 9646 violate the Equal Protection clause since there is no
substantial distinction between real estate developers and the mentioned exempted group
because both are property owner dealing with their own property? 7

RULING: No. Unlike individuals or entities having isolated transactions over their own
property, real estate developers sell lots, houses and condominium units in the ordinary
course of business, a business which is highly regulated by the State to ensure the health and
safety of home and lot buyers. This shows that substantial distinctions do exist between
7
RA 9646, otherwise known as the "Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines" was signed into law. It aims to professionalize the
real estate service sector under a regulatory scheme of licensing, registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners
the country. Petitioners sought to declare as void and unconstitutional the Sec. 28(a) of RA 9646:

SEC. 28. Exemptions from the Acts Constituting the Practice of Real Estate Service. – The provisions of this Act and its rules
and regulations shall not apply to the following:

(a) Any person, natural or juridical, who shall directly perform by himself/herself the acts mentioned in Section 3 hereof with
reference to his/her or its own property, except real estate developers;

According to petitioners, Sec. 28(a) of RA 9646 violates the equal protection clause as no substantial distinctions exist between
real estate developers and the exempted group mentioned since both are property owners dealing with their own property
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Case Digest Compilation (Batch 1 & 2)
Preamble, Articles I, II, & III
ordinary property owners exempted under Section 28(a) and real estate developers like
petitioners, and the classification enshrined in RA 9646 is reasonable and relevant to its
legitimate purpose. Thus RA 9646 is valid and constitutional.

Equal Protection

19. Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, 18 Feb. 2014

ISSUE: Does Sec. 4 (a) 6 of the Cybercrime Law violate Equal Protection for causing those
who use their real names to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases? 8

RULING:No, it does not. There is no substantial difference between one who uses his real
name as a domain name and one using an alias for the same purpose. The distinction is
irrelevant because what the law condemns is the malicious registration of domain names. The
law only penalizes those who acquire a domain name in bad faith with the intention to profit,
mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who have the lawful right to register such
domain name.

20. Imbong vs Ochoa, GR 204819, 8 April 2014

ISSUE: Does the RH Law violate Equal Protection by primarily targeting the poor for the
government program on contraceptives?

RULING: Equal Protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to their rights and obligations. It does not require universal application
without distinction/classification as long as the following requisites are observed:
i. the classification rests on substantial distinctions
ii. it is germane to the purposes of law
iii. it is not limited by existing conditions only
iv. it applies equally to all members of the same class.
To provide priority to the poor in health programs does not violate Equal Protection, because
there is no showing that the classification is invalid. The prioritization is precisely pursuant to
Art. XIII, Sec. 11 of the Constitution which says: “There shall be priority to the
underprivileged…” in terms of health development and services.

21. 1-UTAK vs Comelec, GR 206020, 14 April 2015

ISSUE: Are Sections 7 (g) 5 and 6, in relation to Section 7 (f) of Comelec Resolution No.
9615 (which prohibits the posting of any election campaign or propaganda material inter alia
in PUVs and public transport terminals) in violation of Equal Protection?

RULING: Yes. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615in prohibiting owners
of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election campaign materials violates the equal
protection clause. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in
other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others. In order that there can be valid classification so that a

8
Petitioners claimed that Sec. 4 (a) 6 of the Cybercrime Law violates the Equal Protection because it penalizes both the person
using his real name as his domain name and the person using an alias as his domain name. Petitioners wish the law to recognize
the difference the two.
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Case Digest Compilation (Batch 1 & 2)
Preamble, Articles I, II, & III
discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is
necessary that the four requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) it must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the class.

Although, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not limited to existing
conditions and applies equally to the members of the purported class. However, the
classification remains constitutionally impermissible since it is not based on substantial
distinction between owners of PUV s and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles
and other properties Ownership of PUVs and transport terminals, though made available for
use by the public, remains private. The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made
available for use by the public is likewise not substantial justification to set them apart from
private vehicles and other properties. Furthermore, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of
Resolution No. 9615 is not germane to the purpose of the law.

Void-for-Vagueness and Over-breadth

22. Imbong vs Ochoa, GR 204819, 8 April 2014

ISSUE: Is the RH Law void for vagueness for imposing the penalty of imprisonment for any
violation and for not defining the type of conduct to be treated as a violation thereof?

RULING: No. The assailed provision was Sec. 23 (a) (1) which punishes any health care
service provider, whether public or private, who knowingly withhold information, restrict
dissemination thereof, and/or intentionally provide incorrect information regarding programs
and services on reproductive health. Petitioners argued that the words “knowingly” and
“incorrect” were vague. The provision, according to the plain meaning rule, makes out
“knowingly” to mean as “with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional.” Meanwhile,
“incorrect” just means failure to coincide with the truth.

Section 2

23. Hing vs Choachy, GR 179736, 26 June 2013

ISSUES: 1) Is the right to privacy confined only to one’s house or residence?

2) What is the “reasonable expectation of privacy test?

RULING: 1) Under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, an individual’s right to privacy should
not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to
exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s
residence,” therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual
considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may
not infringe on his right to privacy.
2) “Reasonable expectation of privacy” test is a tool used by the Court in ascertaining
whether there is a violation of the right to privacy. This test determines whether a person has
a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated. And in
Ople v. Torres, the Court enunciated that “the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of
privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited
an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as
reasonable.”

24. Worldwide Web Corp. vs PLDT, GR 161106 & 161266, 14 January 2014
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Case Digest Compilation (Batch 1 & 2)
Preamble, Articles I, II, & III

ISSUE: Did the search warrants lack “particularity of description” and partake of the nature
of general search warrants?

RULING:As a general rule, the things to be seized must be described with particularity,
however technical precision of description is not required. It is only necessary that there be
reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and
seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. Indeed, the law does not
require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave
no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. In the case at hand, PLDT was able
to establish the connection between the items to be searched as identified in the warrants and
the crime of theft of its telephone services and business, thus the warrant met the requisite of
particularity.

25. Disini vs Sec. of Justice, GR 203335, 18 Feb. 2014

ISSUE: Does Sec. 19 of the Cybercrime Law, empowering the DOJ to restrict or block
access to computer data, violate the right against unreasonable searches and seizures?

RULING:Yes, it does. Computer data, which are produced or created by its own authors and
coders, are the personal property of such authors and coders. Being personal property, it is
protected by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution on one’s right to be secure in his papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose. The only way search and seizure is deemed reasonable is in pursuance of a search
warrant duly issued by a judge who personally determined that probable cause exists.

The power of the DOJ to restrict or block access to computer data amounts to the
Government seizing and placing computer data under its control and disposition without a
warrant. The DOJ order does not substitute a judicially-issued warrant which the Constitution
specifically requires. Hence, the subject DOJ power is violative of the citizens’ right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

26. De la Cruz vs People, GR 200748, 23 July 2014

ISSUE: Was the urine drug testing of the petitioner arrested for extortion an unreasonable
search?

RULING: Yes. Petitioner was compelled to submit his urine for drug testing even if he
refused to do so and even asked for a lawyer before the extraction of his urine. His efforts in
exercising his rights were futile. Article III Sections 2 and 17 are clear: Unreasonable search,
seizures, and testimonial compulsion are proscribed. Drug testing of all arrested persons
regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is made is not condoned. Law
enforcement agencies must be mindful of the reasonable limits of their authority so as not to
transgress the protected rights of the citizens.

27. Pestilos vs Generoso and People, GR 182601, 10 Nov. 2014

ISSUES:

1) In order to effect a warrantless arrest, must the arresting officer be actually present at the
scene while a crime was being committed to be considered having personal knowledge of a
crime?
2) Can one who is “invited” to come to the police precinct be arrested?
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RULING:

1) No, provided that, from his personal evaluation of the facts or circumstances at the scene of
the crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be
arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and
gathering of facts should be immediately after the commission of the crime. In determining
the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests, it is incumbent for the courts to consider: 1) if
the officers have complied with the requirement of immediacy (Section 5, Rule 113, Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure); 2) the officer's personal knowledge of facts or circumstances;
and lastly, 3) the propriety of the determination of probable cause that the person sought to be
arrested committed the crime.

2) Yes. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. Arrest is effected either by actual restraint of the
person sought to be arrested or his voluntary submission to the arresting officer. Manual force
or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there was an intention by the
arresting party to arrest and the intention of the other to submit to the arrest.

SECTION 3

28. Disini vs Sec. of Justice, GR 203335, 18 Feb. 2014

ISSUE: Does Sec. 4 (b) 3 of the Cybercrime Law violate the right to privacy and
correspondence?

RULING:No, it does not. Petitioners failed to show how the government’s efforts to
minimize computer-related theft violated their rights to privacy and correspondence.

The challenged provision is about Computer-related Identity Theft that punishes those who
acquire or use another’s identifying information without right, with the intention to cause
damage. A person’s identifying information includes his name, citizenship, residence address,
contact number, place and date of birth, the name of spouse if any, occupation, etc.

29. Disini vs Sec. of Justice, GR 203335, 18 Feb. 2014

ISSUE: Does Sec. 12 of the Cybercrime Law, on the collection of real-time internet traffic
data, violate the right to privacy and correspondence? 9

RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that when seemingly random bits of traffic data are gathered
in bulk, pooled together, and analyzed, they reveal patterns of activities which can then be
used to create profiles of the persons under surveillance. With enough traffic data, analysts
may be able to determine a person’s close associations, religious views, political affiliations,
and even sexual preferences. Such information is likely beyond what the public may expect to
be disclosed, and clearly falls within matters protected by the right to privacy.

Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated with specified
communications." But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the
law enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications. The power is
virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in "fishing expedition,"
choosing whatever specified communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of
individuals to privacy.

9
Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or record traffic data in real time as tending to
curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for official abuse. They claim that data showing where digital messages come
from, what kind they are, and where they are destined need not be incriminating to their senders or recipients before they are to
be protected.
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(ADDITIONAL INFO/MAY BE OMITTED): The authority that Section 12 gives law
enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint. While it says that traffic data
collection should not disclose identities or content data, such restraint is but an illusion.
Admittedly, nothing can prevent law enforcement agencies holding these data in their hands
from looking into the identity of their sender or receiver and what the data contains. This will
unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked information or, worse, to extortion from certain
bad elements in these agencies.

30. Vivares vs St. Theresa’s College, GR 202666, 29 Sept. 2014

ISSUE: Was there an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty,
or security of the minors that will entitle them to the writ of habeas data? Up to what extent is
the right protected in Facebook and other social networking sites? Did STC violate the right
to privacy of the minors?10

RULING: No. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.

Using Facebook’s privacy tools, users can choose as to when and to what extent to disclose
facts about themselves – and to put others in the position of receiving such confidences. The
utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s invocation
of his or her right to informational privacy.

In the case at bar, the petitioners’ children’s Facebook accounts, allegedly, were under “Only
Friends.” However, the Court said that setting the privacy to “Friends” is no assurance since a
user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend
thereto, resulting to a greater number of users who can view the content. In addition,
respondent STC got the information from persons who had legitimate access to the said posts.
Clearly, STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy. Hence, the petition for
habeas data is denied.

Section 4

31. Disini vs Sec. of Justice, GR 203335, 18 Feb. 2014

ISSUE # 2: Does Sec. 4 (b) 3 of the Cybercrime Law violate freedom of the press by
hindering journalists from accessing the unrestricted use account of a person in the news to
secure information about him that can be published?

RULING: No. Clearly, what this section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, use,
misuse or deletion of personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to
acquire another’s personal data. This does not, in any way, violate the freedom of the press
since the “accessing of the unrestricted user account of a person in the news to secure
information about him that could be published” is not the type of identity theft that the law
seeks to prohibit and punish. Evidently, the theft of identity information must be intended for
an illegitimate purpose. Moreover, acquiring and disseminating information made public by
10
Daluz, Suzara, among others, who were graduating high school students of St. Theresa’s College, took digital pictures of
themselves being covered only in their undergarments, drinking hard liquor, and smoking cigarettes. The photos were shown to
Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s HS department. She reported the matter and the identified students were then barred from
joining their commencement exercises.
Petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data. The RTC dismissed the petition for habeas
data. Hence, this certiorari.
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the user himself cannot be regarded as a form of theft. As such, the press, whether in quest of
news reporting or social investigation, has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is
present to negate intent to gain which is required by this Section.

(ADDITIONAL INFO/MAY BE OMITTED): Petitioners simply fail to show how

government effort to curb computer related identity theft violates the right to privacy and
correspondence as well as the right to due process of law. Also, the charge of invalidity of
this section based on the overbreadth doctrine will not hold water since the specific conducts
proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms like speech. Furthermore, the Court has
defined intent to gain as an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the
offender, and it may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to
another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. In
the absence of such special circumstance, no crime is said to have been committed.

32. Disini vs Sec. of Justice, GR 203335, 18 Feb. 2014

ISSUE: Does Sec. 4 (c) 1 of the Cybercrime Law violate freedom of expression by
criminalizing private communications of a sexual character between husband and wife or
consenting adults?11

RULING: No. Deliberations on the matter show a lack of intent to penalize a "private
showing between and among two private persons although that may be a form of obscenity to
some." The understanding of those who drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of
"engaging in a business" is necessary to constitute the illegal cybersex. The Act actually
seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor and
consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and pornography, i.e., by webcam.

The case of Nogales v. People shows the extent to which the State can regulate materials that
serve no other purpose than satisfy the market for violence, lust, or pornography. In any
event, consenting adults are protected by the wealth of jurisprudence delineating the bounds
of obscenity. The Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands a
construction that makes it apply only to persons engaged in the business of maintaining,
controlling, or operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or
sexual activity with the aid of a computer system as Congress has intended.

33. Disini vs Sec. of Justice, GR 203335, 18 Feb. 2014

ISSUE: Does Sec. 4 (c) 3 of the Cybercrime Law which penalizes spam and unsolicited
advertisements violate freedom of expression? 12

RULING: Yes. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right
to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is
a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given
to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression, but is nonetheless entitled to
protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression.

11
Petitioners claim that Sec. 4 (c) 1 violates the freedom of expression clause of the Constitution. They express fear that private
communications of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded as crimes under the
penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when done "for favor" in cyberspace.
12
Sec. 4 (c) 3 penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known as "spam." The OSG points out
that unsolicited commercial communications or “spams” are a nuisance that wastes the storage and network capacities of
internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes with the owner’s peaceful
enjoyment of his property.
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34. Disini vs Sec. of Justice, GR 203335, 18 Feb. 2014

ISSUE: Does Sec. 4 (a) 3 and Sec. 5 of the Cybercrime Law suffer from overbreadth for
creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression? 13

RULING: No. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose,

constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily
sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms. Section 4(a)(3)
does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of
vandalism, the act of willfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this
case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no
connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer
systems and private documents. Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the
heavy burden of proving that under no set of circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be valid.
Petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.

(ADDITIONAL INFO/MAY BE OMITTED): All penal laws, like the cybercrime law,
have of course an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem effect or the fear of possible
prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the boundaries
of what is proper. Here, the chilling effect that results in paralysis is an illusion since Section
4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil that it seeks to punish and creates no tendency to intimidate
the free exercise of one’s constitutional rights.

35. Imbong vs Ochoa, GR 204819, 8 April 2014

ISSUES: 1) Does the RH Law violate the right to free speech for compelling a person to
explain a full range of family planning methods? 2)If it is not a speech-regulating statute, can
the RH law be “facially challenged?”

RULING: 1) Yes. This is related to the issue of religious freedom, “it being an
externalization of one’s thought and conscience.” The right to speak includes the right to be
silent. Religious freedom comes with the protection for simply being silent on matter that one
does not believe in. 2) Yes. Following the application of doctrines in the U.S., the Philippine
Supreme Court can entertain facial challenges to statutes affecting “First Amendment
Rights,” e.g. free speech, religious freedom, peaceful assembly, and redress for grievances.
But because of the expanded power of judicial review which the U.S. Supreme Court does
not have, our Court can also entertain facial challenges involving penal statutes and all other
fundamental rightsto determine whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

36. GMA Network vs Comelec, GR 205357, 2 Sept. 2014

ISSUE: Does Sec. 9 (a) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits violate the
freedoms of expression, speech, and the press? 14

13
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to discourage data interference, it intrudes
into the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms
14
The five petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No.
9615 (Resolution) limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for 2013 national election
positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They
contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to
suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forthcoming
elections.

The heart of the controversy revolves upon the proper interpretation of the limitation on the number of minutes that candidates
may use for television and radio advertisements, as provided in Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9006 (R.A. No. 9006), otherwise
known as the Fair Election Act
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RULING: Yes. Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the
“aggregate-based” airtime limits unreasonably restricts the guaranteed freedom of speech and
of the press.

The assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it

unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and
communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based”
airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state interest
which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political
parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government.
And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a
prohibitive measure. 

Political speech is one of the most important expressions protected by the Fundamental Law.
“[F]reedom of speech, of expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and
have to be protected at all costs for the sake of democracy.” 51 Accordingly, the same must
remain unfettered unless otherwise justified by a compelling state interest

37. Diocese of Bacolod vs Comelec, GR 205728, 21 Jan. 2015

ISSUE: Does the Comelec order for the removal of the Team Buhay/Team Patay tarpaulin
violate freedom of speech and expression?15

RULING: Yes. While it is true that the present petition assails not a law but an opinion by
the COMELEC Law Department, this court has applied Article III, Section 4 of the
Constitution even to governmental acts.

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a
preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and
political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions. This primordial right calls for utmost respect, more so when
what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the
equally vital right of suffrage.
The action of the COMELEC in this case is a strong deterrent to further speech by the
electorate. Given the stature of petitioners and their message, there are indicators that this will
cause a "chilling effect" on robust discussion during elections. Embedded in the tarpaulin are
opinions expressed by petitioners which is a specie of expression protected by our
fundamental law.

What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech forms: expression by the electorate
that tends to rouse the public to debate contemporary issues. This is not speech by candidates
or political parties to entice votes. It is a portion of the electorate telling candidates the
conditions for their election. It is the substantive content of the right to suffrage.

38. 1-UTAK vs Comelec, GR 206020, 14 April 2015

15
Petitioners posted two tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin
was 6'x10' in size. The second tarpaulin, which is the subject of the present case, contains "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates
as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark. The electoral candidates
were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, or the RH Law.

Respondent Bacolod City Election Officer issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials for being oversized. Petitioners
replied requesting, among others, that petitioner Bishop be given a definite ruling by COMELEC Law Department regarding the
tarpaulin. The latter then ordered the immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election
offense against petitioners.

Petitioners then filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
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ISSUE: What is the “captive-audience doctrine?” Can the doctrine justify Section 7 (g)
items 5 & 6 of Comelec Resolution 9615?

RULING: The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a practical
matter, escape from intrusive speech, the speech can be restricted. The “captive-audience”
doctrine recognizes that a listener has a right not to be exposed to an unwanted message in
circumstances in which the communication cannot be avoided. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6)
ofResolution No. 9615 are notjustified under the captive-audiencedoctrine because the
commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials posted on
PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to receive the messages
contained in the posted election campaign materials since they may simply avert their eyes if
they find the same unbearably intrusive.

Section 5
39. Imbong vs Ochoa, GR 204819, 8 April 2014

ISSUE: Does the RH Law violate freedom of religion?

RULING: Yes. The RH Law, however, undermines the Free Exercise Clause through
Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof which commonly mandate a hospital or a medical practitioner
to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another
accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or
ethical beliefs. In cases of conflict between the State and the Free Exercise clause, the Court
adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality (otherwise called neutral accommodation)
which does not seek a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, butan
exemption (i.e. conscientious objection) from its application or its 'burdensome
effect,'whether by the legislature or the courts." When the free exercise of religion is
burdened, the State must show a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an
important secular objective. The OSG failed to show this compelling state interest.

40. Ronulo vs People, GR 182438, 2 July 2014

ISSUE: Does the separation of church and state principle preclude the State from qualifying
the church “blessing” into a marriage ceremony? 16

RULING: No. The principle of separation of church and state has been duly preserved by
Article 6 of the Family Code when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the
freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement
that the core requirements of law be observed.

Article 15 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and that
our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State has paramount interest in the
enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To
this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and
mockery of marriage.

16
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that
they don’t have marriage license. The entourage then, as a recourse, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians
(Aglipayan Church) and requested the petitioner to perform a ceremony without a marriage certificate.

An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code was then filed against the petitioner before the MTC for
allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony. The MTC found the petitioner guilty. The RTC affirmed the findings of the
MTC. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. This petition for review on certiorari was then filed.
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From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage
ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner
may view this merely as a “blessing,” the presence of the requirements of the law constitutive
of a marriage ceremony qualified this “blessing” into a “marriage ceremony” as contemplated
by Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.

Section 9

41. Republic vs Heirs of Borbon, GR 165352, 12 Jan. 2015

ISSUE: Is the expropriator, who has taken possession of the property subject of
expropriation, obliged to pay reasonable compensation to the landowner if the proceedings
had been discontinued on the ground that the public purpose for the expropriation had
meanwhile ceased?17
RULING: In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the
property to the respondents, there is no need to pay “just compensation” to them because their
property would not be taken by NAPOCOR. Instead of full market value of the property,
therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their
property rights from the time of entry in March 1993 until the time of restoration of the
possession by paying to them actual or other compensatory damages. The compensation must
be based on what they actually lost as a result and by reason of their dispossession of the
property and of its use, including the value of the fruit trees, plants and crops destroyed by
NAPOCOR’s construction of the transmission lines. Considering that the dismissal of the
expropriation proceedings is a development occurring during the appeal, the Court now treats
the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings as producing the effect of converting the case
into an action for damages.

42. Republic vs Soriano, GR 211666, 25 Feb 2015

ISSUE: Is the landowner entitled to consequential damages if the entire area of the subject
property is being expropriated and not merely a proportion thereof?

RULING: No. Consequential damages are awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the
remaining property of the owner suffers from impairment or decrease in value. Considering
that the subject property is being expropriated in its entirety, there is no remaining portion
which may suffer impairment or decrease in value as a result of the expropriation. Hence, the
award of consequential damages is improper.

Section 10

43. Goldenway vs Equitable PCI Bank, GR 195540, 13 March 2013

ISSUE: Does Section 47 of RA 8791 violate the Non-impairment of Contracts clause? 18

17
In February 1993, NAPOCOR entered a property located in Barangay San Isidro, Batangas City in order to construct and
maintain transmission lines for the 230 KV Mahabang Parang-Pinamucan Power Transmission Project. Respondents heirs of
Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the property. On May 26, 1995, NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation in the RTC, seeking
the acquisition of an easement of right of way over a portion of the property, alleging that it had negotiated with the respondents
but failed to reach any agreement; and that, nonetheless, it was willing to deposit an amount representing the assessed value.
Respondents argued that there was no negotiation and the entry was done without their consent.

18
On 1985, Goldenway Merchandising Corporation (petitioner) executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Equitable PCI Bank
(respondent) over its real properties. As petitioner failed to settle its loan obligation, respondent extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgage on 2000. Petitioner offered to redeem the foreclosed properties but was told that it is not possible since his right has
already expired relying on R.A. 8791 that took effect also in 2000. Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages against the respondent, asserting that it is the one-year period of redemption under Act No. 3135 which should apply
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RULING: Ruling: No. Section 47 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their
foreclosed properties but only modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the
one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135. The new redemption period commences
from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or
three months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise no retroactive
application of the new redemption period because Section 47 exempts from its operation
those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall retain their
redemption rights under Act No. 3135.

and not the shorter redemption period provided in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8791 since applying the said law would result in the
impairment of obligation of contracts and violation of the equal protection clause under the Constitution.