Bengzon Jr vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee GR No 89914 20
November 1991
POSTED BY RACHEL CHAN IN CASE DIGESTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
Facts: A petition for prohibition was filed to enjoin Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and
produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of
Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez to the Lopa Group in several
corporations. Earlier, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile had delivered a
speech asking the Senate to look into possible violation of the Anti
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because of the said purchase.
Issue: Whether or not Senate has authority to conduct inquiry?
Decision: Petition granted. The 1987 Constitution expressly
recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, the investigation must be “in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure.”
BENGZON VS SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE EN BANC
Posted by kaye lee on 5:46 PM
G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991 [Section 21, Article 6: Aids in
Legislation: On Legislative Investigation]
FACTS:
PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin Romualdez, et
al for engaging in devices, schemes and stratagems to unjustly
enrich themselves at the expense of plaintiff and the Filipino
people.
The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a speech before
the Senate on the alleged take-over personal privilege before the
Senate on the alleged "takeover of SOLOIL Inc," the FlagShip of the
First Manila Management of Companies or FMMC by Ricardo Lopa
and called upon the Senate to look into the possible violation of the
law in the case with regard to RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act).
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers [SBRC]) started its investigation on the matter.
Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the SBRC to
appear before it and testify on what they know regarding the sale of
36 corporations belonging to Benjamin Romualdez. Lopa and
Bengzon refused to testify, invoking their rights to due process,
and that their testimony may unduly prejudice the defendants and
petitioners in case before the Sandiganbayan.
SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying
and the SBRC continued its investigation of the matter.
The petitioners filed for prohibition with a prayer for TRO and/or
injunctive relief, claiming that the SBRC in requiring their
attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and
legislative purpose.
The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for reconsideration
filed by one of the defendants of the civil case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether or not the SBRC's inquiry has valid legislative purpose.
3. whether or not the civil case of Sandiganbayan is beyond the
power of the SBRC to inquire into.
4. Whether or not the inquiry violates the petitioners' right to due
process.
RULING:
1. Yes. In Angara vs Electoral Commission, the Constitution
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. The Court has provided that the allocation of
constitutional boundaries is a task which the judiciary must
perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent
case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an
obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to
this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987
Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with
the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."
The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over
the present controversy for the purpose of determining the scope
and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to
conduct inquiries into private affairs in purported aid of legislation.
2. No.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is
specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer
to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in
connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of
future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters
vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.
It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent
Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" because it is not
related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the
aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of
the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No.
3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that
appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the
legislature.
3. No. It cannot be said that the contemplated inquiry on the
subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the
alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin
"Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant
to Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not
indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the
herein petitioners are connected with the government but are
private citizens.
4. Yes. The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not
call for the banning or prohibition of investigations where a
violation of a basis rights is claimed. It only requires that in the
course of the proceedings, the right of persons should be
respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against
a witness testifying at all, simply because he is already facing
charges before the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Constitution
allows him to interpose objections whenever an incriminating
question is posed or when he is compelled to reveal his court
defenses, but not to refuse to take the witness stand completely.
CASE DIGEST: AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., et al. v. SENATE
COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
FACTS: On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S.
Resolution 706, which directed the Senate Ethics Committee to
investigate the alleged double insertion of P200 million by Senator
Manny Villar into the C5 Extension Project. After the election of
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as Senate President, the Ethics Committee
was reorganized, but the Minority failed to name its representatives
to the Committee, prompting a delay in the investigation.
Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee.
In another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated he will answer the
accusations before the Senate, and not with the Ethics Committee.
Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the Ethics Committee, then
moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be
transferred to the Senate as a Committee of the Whole, which was
approved by the majority. In the hearings of such Committee,
petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics
Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. They also
questioned the quorum, and proposed amendments to the Rules.
Senator Pimentel raised the issue on the need to publish the rules
of the Senate Committee of the Whole.
ISSUES:
[1] Is Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator
Villar, an indispensable party in this petition?
[2] Is the petition premature for failure to observe the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction or prior resort?
[3] Is the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the
Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole violative of
Senator Villar's right to equal protection?
[4] Is the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of
the Senate Committee of the Whole violative of Senator Villar's right
to due process and of the majority quorum requirement under Art.
VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution?
[5] Is publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole
required for their effectivity?
HELD:
[1] An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the
controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be
made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. In
this case, Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the
petition before the Court. While it may be true that she has an
interest in the outcome of this case as the author of P.S. Resolution
706, the issues in this case are matters of jurisdiction and
procedure on the part of the Senate Committee of the Whole which
can be resolved without affecting Senator Madrigal's interest.
[2] The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case.
The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized
skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the
contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within
the competence and jurisdiction of the Court.
[3] While ordinarily an investigation about one of its members
alleged irregular or unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction of
the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from
pursuing the investigation when they refused to nominate their
members to the Ethics Committee. The referral of the investigation
to the Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy
undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved by a majority of
the members of the Senate, and not violative of the right to equal
protection.
[4] The adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules
of the Ethics Committee does not violate Senator Villar's right to
due process. The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate
its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by
this Court in Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution,
which states: "Each House shall determine the rules of its
proceedings."
[5] The Constitution does not require publication of the internal
rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or the Senate
that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate,
such rules need not be published,unless such rules expressly
provide for their publication before the rules can take effect. Hence,
in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published before the
Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required
under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly
mandate their publication. PARTIALLY GRANTED.
June 24, 2009
Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the
President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring
Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to
the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public
Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray
for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines,
through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or
investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department,
bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government
Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials
of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource
speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and
issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire why it must be respected.
tapping, and the role of military in the so-called “Gloriagate
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive
Scandal”.
branch to evade congressional requests for information without
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said
the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of legislation is frustrated.
Congress.
NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE
ISSUE:
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials,
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON
enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS,
prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and
SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE
constitutional?
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY
RULING:
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and
covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive
Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment
matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public
and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in
interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the
the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion
obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the
Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of
necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public
China.
interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the
the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that
executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the
executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it
several high executive officials and power brokers were using their HELD:
influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
The communications are covered by executive privilege
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and
Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was
employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws
interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos
and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v.
of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his
Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of
approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed
legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed
privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
him not to accept the bribe.
underpinnings.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where
NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive
the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the
privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the
repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve. powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a
letter to the senate averring that the communications between GMA Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential
and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in communications privilege:
Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential
respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention
and non-delegable presidential power.”
until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received”
ISSUE:
by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity”
covered by executive privilege? with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere
privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, by an appropriate investigating authority.
such that the information sought “likely contains important
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of
evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
petitioner’s claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional
an appropriate investigating authority.
provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if
executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made
by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where
correspondence between the President and public officials” he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he
necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process” expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions
and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic claim of executive privilege.
of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential communications
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to
privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy
limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
or foreign relations.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents,
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
the presidential communications privilege. First, the
well as to government research data used as basis for policy
communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
limitations as may be provided by law.
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to
enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the AKBAYAN vs. Aquino G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
Petitioner: AKBAYAN Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), Pambansang
jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a
Katipunan ng mga Samahan sa Kanayunan (PKSK), Alliance of
close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity”
Progressive Labor (APL), Vicente A. Fabe, Angelito R. Mendoza,
test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member
Manuel P. Quiambao, Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles, Cong. Lorenzo R.
of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate
Tanada III, Cong. Mario Joyo Aguja, Cong. Loreta Ann P. Rosales,
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of
Cong. Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel, Cong. Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva.
Respondents: Thomas G. Aquino, in his capacity as Undersecretary
of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), et. al.
Facts:
Petitioners, non-government organizations,
Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers requested, via the petition
for mandamus and prohibition, to obtain from respondents the full
text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement
(JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted
during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and
annexes thereto. The Congress, through the House Committee
called for an inquiry into the JPEPA, but at the same time, the
Executive refused to give them the said copies until the negotiation
was completed.
JPEPA was the bilateral free trade agreement entered between the
Philippine government with Japan, concerned with trade in goods,
rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in
services, investment, intellectual property rights, government
procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation,
competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and
settlement, improvement of the business environment, and general
and final provisions.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to request for the
full text of JPEPA.
Whether or not the President can validly exclude Congress,
exercising its power of inquiry and power to concur in treaties,
from the negotiation process.
Discussion:
Standing
In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern, which is a public right by its very
nature, petitioners need not show that they have any legal or
special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that they
are citizens and, therefore, part of the general public which
possesses the right. As the present petition is anchored on the
right to information and petitioners are all suing in their capacity as
citizens and groups of citizens including petitioners-members of
the House of Representatives who additionally are suing in their
capacity as such, the standing of petitioners to file the present suit
is grounded in jurisprudence.
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it
is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during
the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public
concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that
diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive
privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information
and the policy of full public disclosure.
“Showing of Need” Test
In executive privilege controversies, the requirement that parties
present a “sufficient showing of need” only means, in substance,
that they should show a public interest in favor of disclosure
sufficient in degree to overcome the claim of privilege. Verily, the
Court in such cases engages in a balancing of interests. Such a
balancing of interests is certainly not new in constitutional
adjudication involving fundamental rights.
However, when the Executive has – as in this case – invoked the
privilege, and it has been established that the subject information
is indeed covered by the privilege being claimed, can a party
overcome the same by merely asserting that the information being
demanded is a matter of public concern, without any further
showing required? Certainly not, for that would render the doctrine
of executive privilege of no force and effect whatsoever as a
limitation on the right to information, because then the sole test in
such controversies would be whether an information is a matter of
public concern.
Treaty-making power of the President
Petitioners argue that the President cannot exclude Congress from
the JPEPA negotiations since whatever power and authority the
President has to negotiate international trade agreements is derived
only by delegation of Congress, pursuant to Article VI, Section 28(2)
of the Constitution and Sections 401 and 402 of Presidential Decree
No. 1464.
The subject of Article VI Section 28(2) of the Constitution is not the
power to negotiate treaties and international agreements, but the
power to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, and other taxes.
As to the power to negotiate treaties, the constitutional basis
thereof is Section 21 of Article VII – the article on the Executive
Department.
While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly
belongs to Congress, and is exercised by the President only be
delegation of that body, it has long been recognized that the power
to enter into treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the
President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of
all the Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this
light, the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements
with foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464 may be interpreted
as an acknowledgment of a power already inherent in its office. It
may not be used as basis to hold the President or its
representatives accountable to Congress for the conduct of treaty
negotiations.
This is not to say, of course, that the President’s power to enter
into treaties is unlimited but for the requirement of Senate
concurrence, since the President must still enure that all treaties
will substantively conform to all the relevant provisions of the
Constitution.
It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while
possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere in the field of
treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate
concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under
consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its
conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a while that has
been given the authority to concur as a means of checking the since it cannot be interpreted as a waiver of the privilege on the
treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate. part of the Executive branch.

Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as private For reasons already explained, this Decision shall not be
citizens, petitioners-members of the House of Representatives fail interpreted as departing from the ruling in Senate v. Ermita that
to present a “sufficient showing of need” that the information executive privilege should be invoked by the President or through
sought is critical to the performance of the functions of Congress, the Executive Secretary by order of the President.
functions that do not include treaty-negotiation.
Pork barrel system is unconstitutional - SC
Held:
Unconstitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. -
The petition was dismissed.
G.R. No. 208566/G.R. No. 208493/G.R. No. 209251. November 11,
Petitioner’s demand to be furnished with a copy of the full text of 2013
the JPEPA has become moot and academic, it having been made
Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, et al. Vs. Hon. Executive Secretary
accessible to the public since September 11, 2006. As for their
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr, et al./Social Justice Society (SJS) President
demand for copies of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted
Samson S. Alcantara Vs. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, etc., et al./Pedrito
during the JPEPA negotiations, the same must be denied,
M. Nepomuceno, etc. Vs. President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et
respondents claim of executive privilege being valid.
al.
Diplomatic negotiations have, since the Court promulgated its
Concurring Opinion - C.J. Sereno, J. Carpio, J. Leonen.
Resolution in PMPF v. Manglapus on September 13, 1988, been
recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction and the reasons Concurring and Dissenting Opinion - J. Brion.
proffered by petitioners against the application of the ruling therein
"x x x.
to the present case have not persuaded the Court. Moreover,
petitioners both private citizens and members of the House of The Issues Before the Court -
Representatives have failed to present a sufficient showing of need
Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments,
to overcome the claim of privilege in this case.
the
That the privilege was asserted for the first time in respondents
following are the main issues for the Court‘s resolution:
Comment to the present petition, and not during the hearings of
the House Special Committee on Globalization, is of no moment, I. Procedural Issues.
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions
involve an actual and justiciable controversy; (b) the issues raised in
the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to
judicial review; (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue; and (d)
the Court‘s Decision dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105,
113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled ―Philippine Constitution
Association v. Enriquez‖114 (Philconsa) and Decision dated April
24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled ―Lawyers Against Monopoly
and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management‖115 (LAMP)
bar the relitigation of the issue of constitutionality of the ―Pork
Barrel System‖ under the principles of res judicata and stare
decisis.
II. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel.”
1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional
insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have
been
stated. In addition, the Court shall also tackle certain ancillary
issues as
prompted by the present cases.
x x x.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the
constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the Court
hereby

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering
(a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article;
that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a)
separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c)
checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and
(b) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork
(f) local autonomy.
Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the
III. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel.” various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators –
whether individually or collectively organized into committees – to
Whether or not the phrases (a) ―and for such other purposes as
intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-
may be hereafter directed by the President‖ under Section 8 of PD
enactment stages of the budget execution, such as but not limited
910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) ―to finance the
to the areas of project identification, modification and revision of
priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the
project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment,
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as
unrelated to the power of congressional oversight;
may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of
the Philippines‖ under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD
(c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork
Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the
various Congressional Insertions, which conferred personal, lump-
sum allocations to legislators from which they are able to fund
specific projects which they themselves determine;
(d) all informal practices of similar import and effect, which the
Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(e) the phrases (1) ―and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President‖ under Section 8 of Presidential
Decree No. 910 and (2) ―to finance the priority infrastructure
development projects under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No.
1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing
the sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power.
Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10,
2013 is hereby declared to be PERMANENT. Thus, the
disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for
the year 2013, as well as for all previous years, and the funds
sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase ―and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President‖
pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the
Presidential Social Fund under the phrase ―to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects‖ pursuant to Section 12 of
Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1993, which are, at the time this Decision is promulgated, not
covered by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special
Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or not, are
hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by this
permanent injunction shall not be disbursed/released but instead
reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund, while
the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social
Fund shall remain therein to be utilized for their respective special
purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper
substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES petitioners‘ prayer seeking
that
the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and
Management be ordered to provide the public and the Commission
on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the
availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases.
Petitioners‘ access to official documents already available and of
public record which are related to these funds must, however, not
be prohibited but merely subjected to the custodian‘s reasonable
regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the same. This
denial is without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they
or the Commission on Audit may choose to pursue through a
separate petition.
The Court also DENIES petitioners' prayer to order the inclusion of
the funds subject of these cases in the budgetary deliberations of
Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the
political branches of government. following manner:

Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down
to – P40 million for “hard projects” (infrastructure projects like
government to, within the bounds of reasonable dispatch,
roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “ soft projects”
investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials
(scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT
and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses related to
development, etc.);
the irregular, improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of
all funds under the Pork Barrel System. b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million
for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100
SO ORDERED.
million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
Belgica et. Al., vs Ochoa et. Al., GR 208566 November 19, 2013
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of
710 SCRA 1 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Local Government funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for the
– Invalid Delegation realignment of funds into their department provided that the
request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator
Legislative Department – Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power
concerned.
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No.
Presidential Pork Barrel
209251.
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the
in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two
Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as
sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project
the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the
– this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social
Congress. It underwent several legal designations from
Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been
“Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development
around since about 1983.
Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is
integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act(GAA). Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations
of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur
Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork
barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles
had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds
into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government organizations)
which would make it appear that government funds are being used
in legit existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects.
An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the
results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed
various petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is
constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is
unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the
release of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other
hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the
PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but
under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after
the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves
dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to
– a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of
the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case
of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called
as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional
insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel
funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the
executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator
concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress
alone. (The Constitution does grant the people legislative power but
only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are
concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by
Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to
it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this
shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or
other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject
to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator
to identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a
violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The
power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two
houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual
members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the
Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of
Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of
the president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be
inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because
of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now
identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under
such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by
the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the
GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which
effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President
useless.”
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their
local affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the
LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their
localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the
members of the house of representatives, what’s happening is that
a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC
and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the
national government (note, a congressman is a national officer)
meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is
contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local
autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork
barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal
fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork
barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1),
Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the
earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any
appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created
the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993),
which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation,
to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others,
collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a
special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further
finance energy resource development and for other purposes which
the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of
PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the
Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government
infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29,
Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated
therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a
general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
Belgica vs. Executive Secretary Ochoa (digest)
BELGICA, ET AL. VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL. (G.R. NO.
208566; SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, ET
AL. (G.R. NO. 208493); NEPOMUCENO VS. PRES. AQUINO (G.R. NO.
209251) NOVEMBER 19, 2013
FACTS
HISTORY of CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
• The term “pork barrel”, a political parlance of American-
English origin, refers to an appropriation of government
spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or
primarily to bring money to a representative’s district.
• The earliest form of the pork barrel system is found in
Section 3 of Act 3044, otherwise known as the Public Works
Act of 1922. Under this provision, release of funds and
realignment of unexpended portions of an item or
appropriation were subject to the approval of a joint
committee elected by the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
• In 1950, members of Congress, by virtue of being
representatives of the people, also became involved in
project identification.
• The pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued when
martial law was declared.
• It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General
Appropriations Act (“GAA”) called “Support for Local
Development Projects” (“SLDP”). SLDP started the giving of
lump-sum allocations to individual legislators. The SLDP
also began to cover not only public works project or “hard
projects” but also covered “soft projects” such as those
which would fall under education, health and livelihood.
• After the EDSA People Power Revolution and the restoration
of democracy, the pork barrel was revived through the
“Mindanao Development Fund” and the “Visayas
Development Fund”.
• In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed “Countrywide
Development Fund” (“CDF”). The CDF was meant to cover
small local infrastructure and other priority community
projects.
• CDF Funds were, with the approval of the President,
released directly to implementing agencies subject to the
submission of the required list of projects and activities.
 Senators and congressmen could identify any kind of project
from “hard projects” such as roads, buildings and bridges to
“soft projects” such as textbooks, medicines, and
scholarships.
• In 1993, the CDF was further modified such that the release
of funds was to be made upon the submission of the list of
projects and activities identified by individual
legislators. This was also the first time when the Vice-
President was given an allocation.
• The CDF contained the same provisions from 1994-1996
except that the Department of Budget and Management was
required to submit reports to the Senate Committee on
Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations
regarding the releases made from the funds.
• Congressional insertions (“CIs”) were another form of
congressional pork barrel aside from the CDF. Examples of
the CIs include the DepEd School Building Fund, the
Congressional Initiative Allocations, and the Public Works
Fund, among others.
• The allocations for the School Building Fund were made
upon prior consultation with the representative of the
legislative district concerned and the legislators had the
power to direct how, where and when these appropriations
were to be spent.
• In 1999, the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced
by three separate forms of CIs: (i) Food Security Program
Fund, (ii) Lingap Para sa Mahihirap Fund, and (iii)
Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund. All
three contained a provision requiring prior consultation with
members of Congress for the release of funds.
• In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (“PDAF”)
appeared in the GAA. PDAF required prior consultation with
the representative of the district before the release of
funds. PDAF also allowed realignment of funds to any
expense category except personal services and other
personnel benefits.
• In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu concept
which is essentially a list of general programs and
implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project
may be subsequently chosen by the identifying
authority. This was retained in the GAAs from 2006-2010.
• It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal
participation of non-governmental organizations in the
implementation of PDAF projects was introduced.
• The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with respect
to specific amounts for individual legislators.
• In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express
statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual
legislators and the Vice-President. It also contained a
provision on realignment of funds but with the qualification
that it may be allowed only once.
• The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as
implementing agencies. Legislators were also allowed
identify programs/projects outside of his legislative
district. Realignment of funds and release of funds were
required to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee
on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as
the case may be.
MALAMPAYA FUNDS AND PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND
• The use of the term pork barrel was expanded to include
certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Fund
and the Presidential Social Fund (“PSF”).
• The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under
Section 8 of Presidential Decree (“PD”) No. 910 issued by
President Ferdinand Marcos on March 22, 1976.
ISSUE/S
• The PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV of PD No.
1869, or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (“PAGCOR”), as amended by PD No.
1993. The PSF is managed and administered by the
Presidential Management Staff and is sourced from the
share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of
PAGCOR.
PORK BARREL MISUSE
• In 1996, Marikina City Representative Romeo Candozo
revealed that huge sums of money regularly went into the
pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks.
• In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification
of the PDAF but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition
for lack of evidentiary basis regarding illegal misuse of PDAF
in the form of kickbacks.
• In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation probed the
allegation that a syndicate defrauded the government of P10
billion using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and
various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.
• In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released the
results of a three-year audit investigation detailing the
irregularities in the release of the PDAF from 2007 to 2009.
• Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million from
the Malampaya Funds had gone into a dummy NGO.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
• Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated
petitions involve an actual and justiciable
controversy, (b) the issues raised are matters of policy not
subject to judicial review, (c) petitioners have legal standing
to sue, (d) previous decisions of the Court bar the re-
litigation of the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel system.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
• Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other
Congressional Pork Barrel laws are unconstitutional for
violating the constitutional provisions on (a)separation of
 powers, (b) non-delegability of legislative power, (c) checks
and balances, (d) accountability, (e) political
dynasties, (f) local autonomy.
RULING
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
(a) There is an actual and justiciable controversy
• There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in the
cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is
satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties
regarding the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
• The case is ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds
and the laws allowing for their utilization are currently
existing and operational and thereby posing an immediate
or threatened injury to petitioners.
• The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the PDAF
and the abolition thereof does not actually terminate the
controversy on the matter. The President does not have
constitutional authority to nullify or annul the legal
existence of the PDAF.
• The “moot and academic principle” cannot stop the Court
from deciding the case considering that: (a) petitioners
allege grave violation of the constitution, (b) the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system presents a
situation of exceptional character and is a matter of
paramount public interest, (c) there is a practical need for a
definitive ruling on the system’s constitutionality to guide
the bench, the bar and the public, and (d) the preparation
and passage of the national budget is an annual occurrence.
(b) Political Question Doctrine is Inapplicable
• The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is
not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political
branches of the government but rather a legal one which the
Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon.
• The 1987 Constitution expanded the concept of judicial
power such that the Supreme Court has the power to
determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality on the part of the
government.
(c) Petitioners have legal standing to Sue
• Petitioners have legal standing by virtue of being taxpayers
and citizens of the Philippines.
• As taxpayers, they are bound to suffer from the
unconstitutional usage of public funds.
• As citizens, the issues they have raised are matters of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest.
(d) The Petition is not barred by previous cases
• The present case is not barred by the ruling in Philconsa vs.
Enriquez [1] because the Philconsa case was a limited
response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on
the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification
authority to Members of Congress.
• On the contrary, the present cases involve a more holistic
examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and
the PDAF Articles with each other, and (b) the inter-relation
of post-enactment measures contained within a particular
CDF or PDAF article, including not only those related to the
area of project identification but also to the areas of fund
release and realignment.
• Moreover, the Philconsa case was riddled with inherent
constitutional inconsistencies considering that the authority
to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the
power of appropriation is a form of legislative power
thereby lodged in Congress. This power cannot be exercised
by individual members of Congress and the authority to
appropriate cannot be exercised after the GAA has already
been passed.
• The case of Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty vs.
Secretary of Budget and Management[2] does not also bar
judgment on the present case because it was dismissed on a
procedural technicality and hence no controlling doctrine
was rendered.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
(a) The separation of powers between the Executive
and the Legislative Departments has been violated.
• The post-enactment measures including project
identification, fund release, and fund realignment are not
related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence,
allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that
properly belong to the sphere of budget execution, which
belongs to the executive department.
• Legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to
participate in the various operational aspects of budgeting,
including ―the evaluation of work and financial plans for
individual activities and the ― regulation and release of
funds in violation of the separation of powers principle.
• Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation
of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
• That the said authority to identify projects is treated as
merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its
unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role
in the implementation or enforcement of the law.
• Respondents also failed to prove that the role of the
legislators is only recommendatory in nature. They even
admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes
a mandatory requirement before the PDAF can be tapped as
a funding source.
 (b)The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers
has been violated
• The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the
principle of non-delegability since said legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in
Congress.
• That the power to appropriate must be exercised only
through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution which states that: ― No money shall
be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
• The legislators are individually exercising the power of
appropriation because each of them determines (a) how
much of their PDAF fund would go to and (b) a specific
project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine.
accountability as Congress is incapable of checking itself or
(c) Checks and balances
its
• Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion
only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said
amount would be further divided among individual
legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum
allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively
appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion.
• This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative
identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a
―budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed
procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the
President‘s power of item veto.
• It forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the
entire PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects
of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with
his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the
detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.
• In fact, even without its post-enactment legislative
identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain
constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a
prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation. This is because
the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and
purposes of the appropriation for further determination
and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item
which may be subject to the President‘s power of item veto.
(d) The Congressional Pork Barrel partially prevents
members.
• The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment
roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult
for them to become disinterested observers when
scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation
of the appropriation law.
• The conduct of oversight would be tainted as said
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority,
 would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they
themselves participate.
• The concept of post-enactment authorization violates
Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
prohibits members of Congress to intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government, because it renders
them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own
office.
• The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same
post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislator‘s
control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate
himself in office.
• The use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter
which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a
case-to-case basis.
(e) The constitutional provision regarding political dynasties
is not self-executing.
• Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that the state shall prohibit political dynasties as
may be defined by law, is not a self-executing provision.
• Since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes
the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court
must defer from ruling on this issue.
(f) The Congressional Pork Barrel violates constitutional
principles on local autonomy
• The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the
constitutional principles on local autonomy since it allows
district representatives, who are national officers, to
substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local
development.
• The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based
solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the
specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents.
• The allocation/division limits are clearly not based on
genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or
geographic indicators have been taken into consideration.
• This concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and
PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local
Development Councils (“LDCs”) which are already legally
mandated to―assist the corresponding sanggunian in
setting the direction of economic and social development,
and coordinating development efforts within its territorial
jurisdiction.
• Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions
are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their
programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden
nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national
officers that have no law-making authority except only
when acting as a body.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL
 (a) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869
are valid appropriation laws.
• For an appropriation law to be valid under Section 29 (1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “No
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law”, it is enough that (a) the
provision of law sets apart a determinate or determinable
amount of money and(b) allocates the same for a particular
public purpose.
• Section 8 of PD 910 is a valid appropriation law because it
set apart a determinable amount: a Special Fund comprised
of ― all fees, revenues, and receipts of the [Energy
Development] Board from any and all sources.
• It also specified a public purpose: energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President.
• Section 12 of PD No. 1869 is also a valid appropriation law
because it set apart a determinable amount: [a]fter
deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%)
percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross
earnings of [PAGCOR], or 60%[,] if the aggregate gross
earnings be less thanP150,000,000.00.
• It also specified a public purpose: priority infrastructure
development projects and x x x the restoration of damaged
or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines.
(b) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869
constitutes undue delegation of legislation powers.
• The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD
910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority
with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds
may be used.
• This phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and,
in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law.
• This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest
of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the
Malampaya Funds ―to finance energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government, remains legally effective and subsisting.
• Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative powers because it lies independently
unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law.
• The law does not supply a definition of “priority
infrastructure development projects” and hence, leaves the
President without any guideline to construe the same.
 • The delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is too
broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to
any kind of facility.
G.R. No. 127545 April 23, 2008
ANDRES SANCHEZ, LEONARDO D. REGALA, RAFAEL D. BARATA,
NORMA AGBAYANI, and CESAR N. SARINO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
Facts:
The 1987 Constitution has made the Commission on Audit (COA)
the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all
accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and
the uses of public funds and property, including the exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish
the techniques and methods for such review, and promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations.1 Its exercise of its
general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that
give life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of
government.2
The exercise of this power by the Department Auditor of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) is the
subject of the instant Petition for Review 3 dated 10 February 1997.
Prior to the disbursement acceleration program (DAP) cases, the
essence, breadth and scope of “savings” and “augmentation” as
referred to in the 1987 Philippine Constitution have already been
discussed by the Supreme Court (en banc) in the 2008 case of
“Sanchez, et. al. vs. Commission on Audit (COA).” The Highest
Court, through Justice Tinga, explains, to wit-
“Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, in turn, provides:
Sec. 25(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; However, the President, the President of the Senate,
The Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions
may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission are instructive
as regards the extent of the President’s power to augment:
MR. SARMENTO: I have one last question. Section 25, paragraph
(5) authorizes the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, the President, the President of the
Senate to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law. Do
we have a limit in terms of percentage as to how much they should
augment any item in the General Appropriations Law?
MR. AZCUNA: The limit is not in percentage but “from savings.” So
it is only to the extent of their savings.
Construing this provision, the Court ruled in the pre-eminent case
of Demetria v. Alba:
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to
another was explicit and categorical under the 1973 Constitution.
However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the
government and those of the constitutional commissions
considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the
constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer
of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in
another item in the appropriation concerned. The leeway granted
was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for which funds may
be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the
purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made
only if there are savings from another item in the appropriation of
the government branch or constitutional body. [Emphasis supplied]
Issue; Whether or not par. 1, Sec. 44 of Presidential Decree No.
1177 is unconstitutional?
Thus, we declared unconstitutional par. 1, Sec. 44 of Presidential
Decree No. 1177 which authorized the President “to transfer any
fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices
and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in
the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity
of any department, bureau or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment” because it
unduly overextends the privilege granted under Sec. 16(5) of the
1973 Constitution.
We ruled that the President cannot indiscriminately transfer funds
from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project or activity of any department,
bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment, without regard to whether the funds
to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the
same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the
purpose of augmenting the item to which the transfer is to be
made.
R.A. 7180 contains a similar provision on the President’s power to
augment and provides the meaning of “savings” and
“augmentation,” thus:
Sec. 17. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads
of Constitutional Commissions under Article IX of the Constitution,
the Ombudsman and the Commission on Human Rights are hereby
authorized to augment any item in this Act for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
xxx
Sec. 19. Meaning of Savings and Augmentation. Savings refer to
portions or balances of any programmed appropriation free of any
obligation or encumbrance still available after the satisfactory
completion or unavoidable discontinuance or abandonment of the
work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized,
or arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining
to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay.
Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of an item, project,
activity or purpose with an appropriation which upon
implementation or subsequent evaluation of needed resources is
determined to be deficient. In no case, therefore, shall a non-
existent item, project, activity, purpose or object of expenditure be
funded by augmentation from savings or by the use of
appropriations authorized otherwise in this act.
Clearly, there are two essential requisites in order that a transfer
of appropriation with the corresponding funds may legally be
effected. First, there must be savings in the programmed
appropriation of the transferring agency. Second, there must be an
existing item, project or activity with an appropriation in the
receiving agency to which the savings will be transferred.
Actual savings is a sine qua non to a valid transfer of funds from
one government agency to another. The word “actual” denotes that
something is real or substantial, or exists presently in fact as
opposed to something which is merely theoretical, possible,
potential or hypothetical.
As a case in point, the Chief Justice himself transfers funds only
when there are actual savings, e.g., from unfilled positions in the
Judiciary.
The thesis that savings may and should be presumed from the
mere transfer of funds is plainly anathema to the doctrine laid
down in Demetria v. Alba as it makes the prohibition against
transfer of appropriations the general rule rather than the stringent
exception the constitutional framers clearly intended it to be. It
makes a mockery of Demetria v. Alba as it would have the Court
allow the mere expectancy of savings to be transferred.
Contrary to another submission in this case, the President, Chief
Justice, Senate President, and the heads of constitutional
commissions need not first prove and declare the existence of
savings before transferring funds, the Court in Philconsa v.
Enriquez, supra, categorically declared that the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, shall approve the realignment (of savings). However, “[B]efore
giving their stamp of approval, these two officials will have to see
to it that: (1)The funds to be realigned or transferred are actually
savings in the items of expenditures from which the same are to be
taken; and (2) The transfer or realignment is for the purpose of
augmenting the items of expenditure to which said transfer or
realignment is to be made.”
As it is, the fact that the permissible transfers contemplated by
Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution would occur
entirely within the framework of the executive, legislative, judiciary,
or the constitutional commissions, already makes wanton and
unmitigated malversation of public funds all too easy, without the
Court abetting it by ruling that transfer of funds ipso facto denotes
the existence of savings.
Precisely, the restriction on the transfer of funds, and similar
constitutional limitations such as the specification of purpose for
special appropriations bill, the restriction on disbursement of
discretionary funds, the conditions on the release of money from
the Treasury, among others, “were all safeguards designed to
forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds.” (emphases by
the Court; G.R. No. 127545)
As such settled jurisprudence, would the impending redefinition by
Congress of "savings" and "augmentation" be vulnerable to judicial
review due to apparent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and thus, be declared as invalid and
unlawful by the Supreme Court? Grave abuse of discretion is
defined as "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility."
(Ganaden, et. al. vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R.
Nos. 170500 & 170510-11 [2011]). Or, on the other hand, would
the Supreme Court apply the political question doctrine and/or
succumb to the adage, "vox populi, vox Dei?"
Araullo vs Aquino GR 209287 July 1, 2014
Political Law – Constitutional Law – Separation of Powers – Fund
Realignment – Constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration
Program
Power of the Purse – Executive Impoundment
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration
noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank
advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary
Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of
government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds
from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for
next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that
if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a
certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be
withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are
declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be
reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work
to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported
and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by
the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from
the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are
standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an
exposé claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from
the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment
of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that
the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the
request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP
does not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that
some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few:
Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B
for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the
Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for
Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file
various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of
the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule
which provides that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law .”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws
particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof),
Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to
augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the
President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings,
respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as
impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are
constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP
is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is not
a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing
government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional
provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP
no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise,
an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds,
which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being
realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP.
Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to refuse to
spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for
whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA
unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget
deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no
impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP
was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional.
It is true that the President (and even the heads of the other
branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to
make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment
should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no
cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under
the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA
for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other
non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured
realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the before unprogrammed funds were used.
DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal
projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because
effects of an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by
no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of
the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely
these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under
helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If
the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such,
the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then
transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal
it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer
basis.
be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return
On the issue of what are “savings” what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of
the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being
applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the
declared by the Executive. Under the definition of “savings” in the
DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or
GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an
administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed,
finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer Bengzon vs Drilon (G.R. No. 103524)
to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus,
Posted: July 25, 2011 in Case Digests
since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with
under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, Veto Power of the President
savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But
FACTS: On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision
under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain
for the Supreme Court and the Lower Court’s General
projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as
Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution
“savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
by the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the
money source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the
only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer Court of Appeals as well as members of the Constitutional
to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of
the General Appropriations bill is constitutional.
HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued
pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797.
The president has no power to set aside and override the decision
of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to
enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much
less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is unconstitutional
since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in
the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of
an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item.
NOTES: Pocket Veto Not Allowed
Under the Constitution, the President does not have the so-called
pocket-veto power, i.e., disapproval of a bill by inaction on his part.
The failure of the President to communicate his veto of any bill
represented to him within 30 days after the receipt thereof
automatically causes the bill to become a law.
This rule corrects the Presidential practice under the 1935
Constitution of releasing veto messages long after he should have
acted on the bill. It also avoids uncertainty as to what new laws are
in force.
When is it allowed?
The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of Art 6 of the
Constitution which grants the President power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill.
The veto in such case shall not affect the item or items to which he
does not object.
3 ways how a bill becomes a law.
1. When the President signs it
2. When the President vetoes it but the veto is overridden by 2/3
vote of all the members of each House; and
3. When the president does not act upon the measure within 30
days after it shall have been presented to him.
Philippine Constitution Association vs Salvador Enriquez
November 13, 2011
235 SCRA 506 – Political Law – Veto Power – Part of the Legislative
Process
Constitutionality of the Pork Barrel “Countrywide Development
Fund”
This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto
authority of the president involving the General Appropriations Bill
of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel. The
Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the
countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can
only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which
those funds would be applied for since that is already the function
of the executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some
provisions of the GAB of 1994, neither house of congress took
steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Wigberto Tañada and Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
Alberto Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and
The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s), the
mandamus against Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona et al.
President vetoed special provisions which authorize the use of
Tañada et al contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four
income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving
special provisions added to items in the GAB of 1994 for the Armed
funds was likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works
were already funds allotted for the same in the National
and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the
expenditure Program. Tañada et al claimed this as unconstitutional.
President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the
The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to the “One
CAFGU’s, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).
Fund Policy” – it avoided double funding and redundancy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President’s veto is valid.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for
HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted road maintenance
within its power and that the CDF is constitutional. In the Tañada
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result
petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the
to a breach of contractual obligations. The funds if allotted may
others.
result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled
Veto on special provisions that this Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate
provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the
The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to
appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it
the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The president particularly
specifies how the said item shall be expended – 70% by
vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting
administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows
that the scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation and
the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items
may be more properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He,
in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the
however did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation
items to which they relate so long as they are “appropriate” in the
therefor. Tañada et al averred that the president cannot validly veto
budgetary sense. The veto herein is then not valid.
that provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of
the president herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of
considered “inappropriate”; in fact the Sc found that such provision military equipment
if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act
making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation.
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc
and prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of non-
In his veto message: “The said condition is consistent with the
impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, “shall
Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of
effectively alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to
the Constitutional which states that ‘no elective or appointive public
cover all military equipment deemed necessary to modernize the
officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
AFP”. The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision blocking an
compensation unless specifically authorized by law.’ I am,
administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative
therefore, confident that the heads of the said offices shall maintain
approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and
fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established
substantive bill. Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions.
principle on compensation standardization. Tañada et al claim that
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds the conditions imposed by the President violated the independence
and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation
COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the
benefits should be covered by direct appropriations specifically
conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by
approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of
Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message merely
the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use
highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect
savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of
compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the second
Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the veto per reasons
place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements
provided by the president.
of appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU’s statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.

Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU’s including the Pork Barrel Constitutional
payment of separation benefits. The President declared in his Veto
The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being
Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the
representatives of their local districts know more about the
item on the CAFGU’s shall be subject to prior Presidential approval
problems in their constituents areas than the national government
pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to
or the president for that matter. Hence, with that knowledge, the
retain the veto per reasons provided by the president. Further, if
Congressmen are in a better position to recommend as to where
this provision is allowed the it would only lead to the repeal of said
funds should be allocated.
existing laws.