Melchor vs. Saez G.R. No.
88672 & 88916  Likewise, Foreign Service Act deals with the "Career
October 3, 1990
Facts:
 Alejandro Melchor, Jr. was also appointed by President
Aquino as Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary assigned in Moscow. A complaint was
filed to the Philippine Embassy in Moscow against
petitioner alleging his acts inimical to the Foreign
Service, in violation of the Foreign Service Code, blatant
disregard of COA rules and regulations and the Civil
Service Code.
 Upon Board of Foreign Service Administration BFSA
reexamination of the evidence against Melchor it came to
the conclusion that all charges against him should be
dropped as there was "no basis".
 However, Secretary of Foreign Affairs submitted a
Memorandum to the President recommending the
termination of the services of Melchor — described as "a
political (non-career) Ambassador — as Chief of Mission
and as Ambassador" to the U.S.S.R. This was
"APPROVED by authority of the President" by Executive
Secretary Macaraig.
 Hence, Melchor filed a petition that the termination of his
services by Foreign Affairs Secretary Manglapus after he
had been absolved of the charges against him, was
unwarranted and illegal, and that the authority to
terminate his services was "vested exclusively on the
President herself likewise he seek invalidation of the re-
assignment or transfer of Ambassador Juan V. Saez
from Amman Jordan to his post in Philippine Embassy at
Moscow.
 He assert that his appointment as chief of mission had
undoubtedly given him security of tenure.
Issue: W/N petitioner is cloth of security of tenure as a public
officer.
Ruling: NO. The petitioner does not have security of tenure
upon his employment being a public officer.
 Pursuant to Section 5 of said PD No. 807
onecharacteristic of "career service" positions is
characterized is security of tenure.
Service Corps, composed of Foreign Service Officers
appointed by the President upon the recommendation of
the Secretary," and declares that "(n)o person shall be
eligible for appointment (in such corps) unless he has
passed such competitive examinations as the Board of
Foreign Service examination may prescribe to determine
his fitness and aptitude for the work of the service and
has demonstrated his loyalty to the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and his attachment to the
principles of the Constitution." Those who qualify are
"certified by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs as eligible
for appointment as Foreign Service Officer(s)," and it is
exclusively from these officers so certified that the
President "shall appoint Foreign Service Officers.
 There are those, like petitioner, who are appointed to the
Foreign Service, without having qualified in the manner
just indicated and consequently without having been
certified by the Foreign Affairs Secretary as eligible for
appointment as Foreign Service Officers, they certainly
do not and cannot be deemed embraced in the Career
Service Corps and they can only be regarded then as
"non-career officers" or "political appointees" who, as
already pointed out, have a "tenure coterminous with that
of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasures.
 Therefore, Melchor, being an political ambassador is
classified as non career officer, consequently, his
termination was not dependent on proof of some legally
recognized cause therefor, after due notice and hearing
— as in the case of career officers and employees — but
lay entirely within the will of the President, in the exercise
of her discretion, and her determination of the wisdom,
necessity or convenience of such a step in the national
interest, actually a political decision.
Palmera v. CSC
Facts:
 Petitioner was appointed Assistant Regional Director of
the National Capital Region which later charged with
grave misconduct and dishonesty in two administrative
cases.Thereafter, he was placed under 90-day
preventive suspension but was eventually lifted.
 Here comes another complaint was filed and all
allegations pertains to anomalies anomalies in the flood
control and related projects in Metro Manila
subsequently charged petitioner of malversation, estafa,
falsification and violations of R. A. No. 3019, and P. D.
1
 1759. The second preventive suspension was lifted but
he was no longer ordered reinstated.
 Palmera was repeatedly assured he would be appointed
to another position but no such appointment was ever
extended him but instead, the DPWH Assistant Secretary
for Legal Services recommended that Palmera be hired
on a contractual basis for the period from January 1 to
December 31, 1987, to provide a legal basis for the
payment of his salaries. After December 31, 1987,
management would decide whether or not to renew the
contract. The petitioner signed the contract but it was
never renewed.
 This transpired Palmera a letter-appealto to Civil Service
Commission for his reinstatement with full back wages
and without loss of seniority rights. He also prayed for
the nullification of the appointment of Mendoza as
Assistant Regional Director.
Issue: W/N there is impairment to Palmera’s constitutional
right to security of tenure.
Ruling: Yes. The constitutional right to security of tenure of
Palmera was impaired. Pursuant to P.D. 807 specifically
includes the position of Assistant Regional Director in the
Career Executive Service, of which one that characterized a
career service position is by tenure of service.
 Security of tenure means that no officer or employee in
the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except
for cause as provided by law and after due process.
Together with the merit and fitness rule, it is a basic
feature of the civil service system.
 So his ouster violated his security of tenure. He was then
compelled to accept contractual appointment which
transformed his former appointment thus breaking his
security of tenure.
 Although the petitioner took nine years before filing suit
for his reinstatement, all because of repeated
assurances of his reappointment, which never
materialized, he cannot be deprived of redress due to
laches. To constitute laches the following requisites mus
be evident (1) the complainant must have knowledge of
the conduct of the defendant or of one under whom he
claims, and (2) he must have been afforded an
opportunity to institute suit. The first requirement is
lacking in this case. There was no formal communication
to the petitioner that he had already been dismissed from
the service. The contract cannot be considered a notice
of dismissal because it was null and void and therefore
produced no legal effect.
Achacoso vs. Macaraig
Facts:
Petitioner, Tomas Achacoso, was appointed Administrator of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. In
compliance with a request addressed by the President of the
Philippines, he filed a courtesy resignation, and this was
accepted by the President “with deep regrets”. The Secretary
of Labor requested him to turn over his office to the Deputy
Administrator as officer-in-charge. He protested his
replacement and declared he was not surrendering his office
because his resignation was not voluntary but filed only in
obedience to the President's directive. Nonetheless,
respondent Jose Sarmiento was appointed administrator of
the POEA. Thus, Achacoso filed a motion for reconsideration
but this was denied hence, this petition for prohibition and
mandamus.
Arguments:
Achacoso contends that he is a member of the Career Service
of the Civil Service and so enjoys security of tenure, which is
one of the characteristics of the Career
Service as distinguished from the Non-Career Service. His
argument is that in view of the security of tenure enjoyed by
the officials (provided in the Civil Service Decree), it was
“beyond the prerogatives of the President” to require them to
submit courtesy resignations. Such courtesy resignations,
even if files, should be disregarded for having been submitted
“under duress,” as otherwise the President would have the
power to remove career officials at pleasure, even for a
capricious reasons.
On the other hand, respondents assert that the petitioner is
not entitled to the guaranty because he is not a career official.
They contend that as the petitioner was not a career executive
service eligible at the time of his appointment, he came under
the exception to the rule and so was subject to the provision
that he “shall subsequently take the required Career Executive
Service examination and that he shall not be promoted to a
higher rank until he qualifies in such examination.” Not having
taken that examination, he could not claim that his
appointment was permanent and guaranteed him security of
tenure in his position.
Issue:
2
WON petitioner is entitled to security of tenure, as provided in
the Civil Service Decree?
Held & Rationale
No. The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career
Service does not automatically confer security of tenure to its
occupant even if he does not possess the required
qualifications. A person who does not have the requisite
qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the
first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be
appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of
appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him
cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so
designated. The person named in an acting capacity accepts
the position under the condition that he shall surrender the
office once he is called upon to do so by the appointing
authority. There is also a long line of cases affirming the rule
that “One who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed
tenure of office; his employment can be terminated at the
pleasure of the appointing power, there being no need to
show that the termination is for cause.”
Medardo AG. Cadiente vs. Luis T. Santos, et al.
1. Sept. 13, 1971 – Cadiente was appointed by the then
Mayor Lopez as City Legal Officer of Davao City ---
appointment was duly attested & approved as “permanent” by
the CSC under RA 2260
2. Jan. 6, 1972 – new incumbent Mayor Santos
(respondent) sent Cadiente a letter advising him that his
services as the Legal Officer of Davao City are dispensed with
effective the receipt of the letter on the ground that his position
is primarily confidential in nature
3. Mayor Santos then appointed Atty. Clapano as the new
City Legal Officer of Davao City
4. CSC – decided in favor of Cadiente stating that the
position of Cadiente is not among those positions enumerated
in RA 2260 as belonging to the non-competitive service
5. City Council of Davao – passed Res. # 210 ---
considering and recognizing Cadiente as the rightful City
Legal Officer --- however respondents still decline & refuse to
recognize Cadiente
6. Feb. 8, 1972 --- CSC returned appointment of Clapano
stating that they had overlooked the fact that Cadiente is
already 57 y/o & therefore, authority of his appointment be first
secured from the Office of the President (Sec. 6, RA 728)
7. Cadiente filed w/ CFI of Davao City a petition for
mandamus, quo warranto w/ PI against respondents ---
dismissed on the ground:
a. Mun. Atty., Prov. Atty, & City Legal Officer are by their
nature, primarily confidential & therefore, belong to the non-
competitive service because the function attached to the office
requires trust & confidence of the appointing authority
Issue:
W/N the position of City Legal Officer is one primarily
confidential in nature w/c will render the termination of
Cadiente valid?
Held: YES!
1. Primarily Confidential – denotes not only confidence in
the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but
primarily close intimacy w/c insures freedom of intercourse,
w/o embarrassment on freedom from misgivings of betrayals
of personal trust on confidential matters of the state.
2. Tenure of officials holding this position ends upon loss of
confidence, because theor term of office lasts only as long as
confidence endures & thus their cessation does not involve
removal but an expiration of term.
3. When Mayor Santos terminated the service of Cadiente,
he was not removed nor dismissed but his term merely
expires --- there being no removal or dismissal, there was no
violation of the constitutional provision that “no officer or
employee in the civil service shall be suspended or dismissed
except as cause provided by law”
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. SALAS – REYES
TOPIC: APPOINTMENT TO CIVIL SERVICE
DOCTRINE: The nature of the position, as may be
ascertained by the court in case of conflict, which finally
determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-
determining or highly technical.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Salas was appointed by PAGCOR
Chairman as Internal Security Staff [ISS] member
and assigned to the casino at Manila Pavilion Hotel.
2. His employment was terminated for loss of
confidence after a covert investigation of the
Intelligence division of PAGCOR.
a. From affidavits of 2 customers of PAGCOR
who were used as gunners by the
respondent, the latter was allegedly
engaged in proxy betting.
b. 2 polygraph tests show corroborative and
unfavorable results.
3. Salas submitted a letter of appeal to the Chairman
and the Board of Directors of PAGCOR requesting
for reinvestigation since he was not given an
opportunity to be heard. It was DENIED.
4. The appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board
was denied on the ground that as a confidential
employee, respondent was not dismissed from
service but his term of office expired. CSC affirmed
the decision of MSPB.
5. CA- Salas is not a confidential employee, hence he
may not be dismissed on the ground of loss of
confidence.
a. CA applied “proximity rule”
b. Sec. 16 of PD 1869 has been superseded
and repealed by Section 2(1), Article IX-B of
3
 the Constitution.
ISSUE/S: WON respondent Salas is a confidential employee.
NO.
RATIO:
1. The power to declare a position as policy-
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical
as defined therein has subsequently been codified
and incorporated in Section 12(9), Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code
of 1987.
a. Serves to bolster the validity of the
categorization made under Section 16 of
Presidential Decree No. 1869. Such
classification is not absolute and all
encompassing.
2. Two recognized instances when a position may be
considered primarily confidential:
a. When the President, upon recommendation
of the CSC, has declared the position to be
primarily confidential;
b. In the absence of such declaration, when by
the nature of the functions of the office there
exists “close intimacy between the
appointee and the appointing power which
insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom of misgivings of
betrayals of personal trust or confidential
matters of state.
3. It would seem that the case falls under the first
category by virtue of Sec. 16 of PD 1869, but the
second category shows otherwise.
4. Since the enactment of Civil Service Act of 1959, it is
the nature of the position which finally determines
whether a position is primarily confidential, policy
determining, or highly technical. Executive
pronouncements [like PD 1869] are merely initial
determinations that are not conclusive in case of
conflict.
5. Piñero doctrine -- notwithstanding any statutory
classification to the contrary, it is still the nature of the
position, as may be ascertained by the court in case
of conflict, which finally determines whether a
position is primarily confidential, policy-determining or
highly technical -- is still controlling with the advent of
the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code of
1987, Book V of which deals specifically with the Civil
Service Commission, considering that from these
later enactments, in defining positions which are
policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly
technical, the phrase "in nature" was deleted
a. Submission that PAGCOR employees have
been declared confidential appointee by
operation of law must be rejected.
6. The primary purpose of the framers of the
Constitution in providing for declaration of a position
as policy determining, highly confidential, or highly
technical is to exempt these categories from
competitive examination as a means for determining
merit and fitness.
a. These positions are covered by security of
tenure although they are considered non-
competitive only in the sense that
appointees do not have to undergo
examinations to determine merit and fitness.
7. CA Correctly applied “proximity rule. Where the
position occupied is remote from that of the
appointing authority, the element of trust between
them is no longer predominant.
a. Position of the private respondent does not
involve “such close intimacy” between him
and the appointing authority. FACTORS:
i. Routine duties of Salas [check full
text]
ii. ISS members do not directly report
to the office of the chairman in the
performance of their official duties.
Subject to the control and
supervision of an Area Supervisor.
iii. Position of ISS belongs to the
bottom level salary scale of the
corporation, being in pay class 2
level only [pay class 12 being the
highest]
DISPOSITIVE: CA order affirmed. Salas not a confidential
employee.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT VS. NITA P. BUENAOBRA
[G. R. No. 170021, September 08, 2006]
FACTS: Ombudsman's SP Officer filed an information against
respondent Buenaobra, Chairman of the Komisyon sa Wikang
Pilipino, with the SB for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
Ombudsman approved the recommendation for the reversal of
the probable cause finding and the withdrawal of the
information filed against respondent.
PAGC conducted a parallel administrative investigation and
charged the respondent with causing undue injury to the
government and giving unwarranted benefits to Merylvin
Publishing House. Thereby, recommending her dismissal from
the service, forfeiture of financial benefits, and disqualification
from joining the government.
4
Petitioner adopted PAGC's recommendation and dismissed
respondent from office. However, CA granted respondent's
petition holding that the proceedings before the PAGC were
procedurally and substantially flawed because the PAGC did
not give respondent the opportunity to present evidence.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner argues that respondent was a presidential
appointee and a holder of a non-career service position,
hence, she could be removed from the service at the pleasure
of the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not, Respondent was a presidential
appointee and a holder of a non-career service position.
HELD: Yes. The petition lacks merit.
RA 7104 creating the Commission on the Filipino Language
provides for 11 commissioners to be headed by a chairman
and all appointed by the President. The chairman and two
commissioners shall serve full-time for a term of seven years.
Under Section 4, Article IV, of PD 807, or the Civil Service
Decree, positions in the civil service are classified into career
service and non-career service. Section 6 of same article
describes a non-career service employee or officer as follows:
Sec. 6. The Non-Career Service shall be characterized by (1)
…xxx… (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by
law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing
authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the
duration of a particular project for which purpose employment
was made.
The Non-Career Service shall include:
xxxx
3. Chairman and members of commissions and boards with
fixed terms of office and their personal or confidential staff.
Based on the foregoing, respondent who is the Chairman of
the KWP is a non-career service personnel whose tenure is
limited to seven years as provided under R.A. No. 7104.
Since her tenure is fixed by law, her removal from office is not
at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
We have consistently ruled that non-career service personnel
enjoy security of tenure. They may not be removed without
just cause and non-observance of due process.
An employee who belongs to the non-career service is
protected from removal or suspension without just cause and
non-observance of due process.
Buenaobra did not give any unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference to the publisher nor had she acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
Such being the case, it necessarily follows that the
charge/complaint against petitioner must be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
TOPIC: TERM OF OFFICE v. TENURE OF OFFICE
Doctrine: The distinction between term and tenure is
important, for, pursuant to the Constitution, ‘no officer or
employee in the civil service may be removed or suspended
except for cause as provided by law’ and this fundamental
principle would be defeated if Congress could legally make
the tenure of some officials dependent on the pleasure of the
President, by clothing the latter with blanket authority to
replace a public officer before the expiration of his term.
When EO 163 was issued, the purpose was to comply with
the constitutional provision that “the term of office and other
qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the
Commission (on Human Rights) shall be provided by law”
(Sec. 17(2), Art. Xlll, Const.). As the term of office of the
Chairman and the members of the CHR is 7 years, without
reappointment, as provided by EO 163, and to give the CHR
the needed independence, the tenure in office of said
Chairman and members cannot be made dependent on the
pleasure of the President. Hence, EO 163-A providing that the
tenure of said Chairman and the members of the CHR shall
be at the pleasure of the President is unconstitutional
The Administrative Code also vests in the President the power
to appoint the Chairman and members of the Commission on
Human Rights, which is likewise not subject to confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments. (Administrative Code, Book
V, Chapter 13, Title II, Subtitle A, Section 4) (Bautista vs.
Salonga, 172 SCRA 164).
BAUTISTA V. SALONGA
Petitioner: Mary Concepcion Bautista
Respondents: Sen. Jovito Salonga, Commission On
Appointments Committee on Judicial and Bar Council and
Human Rights, Hesiquioa Malilin
5
Facts: In August 1987, President Cory Aquino designated
petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as "Acting
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights”. In
December 1987, she extended to Bautista a permanent
appointment as Chairman of the Commission. Bautista
took her oath of office and immediately discharged her
functions and duties.
In January 1989, President Aquino extended an "ad
interim appointment" to Bautista.
Controversy arose when in February 1989, the
Commission on Appointments, requested Bautista's
presence along with documents as required by its rules
in connection with the confirmation of her appointment.
Bautista refused to be placed under CA's review.
She then filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the
immediate issuance of a TRO before the SC, to declare
"as unlawful and unconstitutional and without any legal
force and effect” any action of the CA on her lawfully
extended appointment on the ground that they have no
lawful and constitutional authority to confirm and to
review her appointment.
Meanwhile, the CA wrote a letter to Executive Secretary
Macaraig informing him that the CA disapproved
Bautista's "ad interim appointment" as Chairperson of the
CHR.
Pending the resolution of Bautista's case, President
Aquino designated respondent Hesiquio Mallillin as
"Acting Chairman of the CHR".
Bautista filed a supplemental urgent ex-parte motion
seeking to restrain respondent Mallillin from continuing to
exercise the functions of chairman. The SC issued a
TRO.
CA contends that, granting that Bautista's appointment
as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is one
that, under Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution , as
interpreted in the Mison case, is solely for the President
to make, yet, it is within the president's prerogative to
voluntarily submit such appointment to the CA for
confirmation.
Malilin invoked EO 163-A which provides that the tenure
of the Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR
shall be at the pleasure of the President.
Issue: Whether the appointment of Bautista as the CHR
Chairman requires the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments?
Ruling: No. The position of Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights is not among the positions mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution , it
follows that the appointment by the President of the Chairman
of the (CHR), is to be made without the review or participation
of the Commission on Appointments.
The appointment of the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights is not specifically provided for
in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of
the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections
and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments are
expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Possible follow-up questions:
After Bautista took an oath and discharged the functions of the
office, could the President extend an "ad interim appointment"
or any other kind of appointment that called for confirmation
by the CA?. Neither the Executive nor the Legislative
(Commission on Appointments) can create power where the
Constitution confers none. The evident constitutional intent is
to strike a careful and delicate balance, in the matter of
appointments to public office, between the President and
Congress (the latter acting through the Commission on
Appointments). To tilt one side or the other of the scale is to
disrupt or alter such balance of power. In other words, to the
extent that the Constitution has blocked off certain
appointments for the President to make with the participation
of the Commission on Appointments, so also has the
Constitution mandated that the President can confer no power
of participation in the Commission on Appointments over other
appointments exclusively reserved for her by the Constitution.
The exercise of political options that finds no support in the
Constitution cannot be sustained.
Was the appointment or re-appointment of Bautista on
January 14, 1989 an ad interim appointment? Does an ad
interim appointments apply to appointments solely for the
President to make, i.e., without the participation of the CA?
No. Under the Constitution, ad interim appointments do not
apply to appointments solely for the President to make, i.e.,
without the participation of the Commission on Appointments.
Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987
Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of
6
the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad
interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproved by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the
President solely to make, that is, without the participation of
the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad interim
appointments.
Can the tenure in office of said Chairman (and Members) be
made dependent on the pleasure of the President? No.
Previous to Executive Order No. 163-A, or on 5 May 1987,
Executive Order No. 163 was issued by the President, Sec.
2(c) of which provides:
Sec. 2(c). The Chairman and the Members of the Commission
on Human Rights shall be appointed by the President for a
term of seven years without reappointment. Appointments to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor.
It is to be noted that, while the earlier executive order (No.
163) speaks of a term of office of the Chairman and Members
of the Commission on Human Rights — which is seven (7)
years without reappointment — the later executive order (163-
A) speaks of the tenure in office of the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights, which is "at
the pleasure of the President."
Tenure in office should not be confused with term of office. As
Justice Concepcion in his concurring opinion in Alba vs.
Evangelista, stated:
The distinction between "term" and "tenure" is important, for,
pursuant to the Constitution, "no officer or employee in the
Civil Service may be removed or suspended except for cause,
as provided by law" (Art. XII, section 4), and this fundamental
principle would be defeated if Congress could legally make
the tenure of some officials dependent upon the pleasure of
the President, by clothing the latter with blanket authority to
replace a public officer before the expiration of his term.
When Executive Order No. 163 was issued, the evident
purpose was to comply with the constitutional provision that
"the term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of
the Members of the Commission (on Human Rights) shall be
provided by law" (Sec. 17(2), Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).
As the term of office of the Chairman (and Members) of the
Commission on Human Rights, is seven (7) years, without
reappointment, as provided by Executive Order No. 163, and
consistent with the constitutional design to give the
Commission the needed independence to perform and
accomplish its functions and duties, the tenure in office of said
Chairman (and Members) cannot be later made dependent on
the pleasure of the President.
Executive Order No. 163 was declared unconstitutional.
Can Bautista be removed from office? Bautista is the lawful
incumbent of the office of Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights by virtue of her appointment, as such, by the
President on 17 December 1988, and her acceptance thereof,
is not to say that she cannot be removed from office before
the expiration of her seven (7) year term. She certainly can be
removed but her removal must be for cause and with her right
to due process properly safeguarded.
BONDOC v. PINEDA
Doctrine: The members of the house of representative
electoral tribunal are entitled to security of tenure just like
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). So the
membership in itself shall not be terminated except for just
cause and the disloyalty to the party is not a just cause.
Disloyalty to party is not a valid ground for the expulsion of a
member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
Its members must discharge their functions with impartiality
and independence from the political party to which they
belong.
Petitioner: Dr. Emigdio Bondoc
Respondents: Rep. Marciano Pineda, Rep. Madaleno Palacol,
Col. Juanito Camasura, and the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
Facts: Respondent Rep. Pineda, member of Laban nd
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and petitioner Bondoc, member
of Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for
Representative for 4TH district of Pampanga.
Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest at the
House of Rep Electoral Tribunal (HRET) where after review,
HRET decided that petitioner Bondoc won by 107 votes.
Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court
Justices to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
Moved by candor and honesty, Cong. Camasura revealed to
his “Chief” Cong. Jose Cojuangco (LDP Sec. Gen) that he
voted for Bondoc because he was ‘consistent with truth,
justice and self-respect’ and that they would abide by the
results of the recounted votes where Bondoc was leading.
Cong. Jose Cojuangco then informed Camasura that the LDP
Davao del Sur Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur, had already
7
expelled him and Congressman Benjamin Bautista from the
LDP for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido
Pilipino of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly
having invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said
political party; and that as those acts are "not only inimical
uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but also a complete
betrayal to the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP,Cong.
So, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V.
Mitra about the ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP,
and asked the House of Representatives, to take note of it
'especially in matters where party membership is a
prerequisite. HRET then ordered Camasura to withdraw and
rescind his nomination from the tribunal.
Issue: Whether the expulsion of Camasura valid (under the
topic on security of tenure)
Ruling: No.
The SC ruled that the expulsion resolution of the House of
Representatives violated Congressman Camasura's right to
security of tenure.
Members of the HRET as "sole judges" of congressional
election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as
members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our
Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Possible follow-up questions/discussion:
HRET is a non-political body
The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution
underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral
Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The
tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court
although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-
political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had
earlier said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to
the electoral tribunals of the Senate and House of
Representatives:
Electoral tribunals are independent and impartial
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the
Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and
impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to
legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to
transfer to that tribunal all the powers previously exercised by
the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of
its members.
The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge
contests relating to the election and qualification of members
of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature.
Electoral tribunals as sole judge of all contests relating to
election returns and qualifications of members of the
legislative houses
The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were
created by the Constitution as special tribunals to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to election returns and
qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and, as
such, are independent bodies which must be permitted to
select their own employees, and to supervise and control
them, without any legislative interference. (Suanes vs. Chief
Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House
Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear
and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared
by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.
The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and
independent of the legislature and though not a power in the
tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and
purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an
independent organ; while composed of a majority of members
of the legislature it is a body separate from and independent
of the legislature.
xxx xxx xxx
The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for
the specific purpose of determining contests relating to
election returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when
and while acting within the limits of its authority, but the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission
for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent
of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of
all contests relating to the election and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)
Can the House of Representatives compel the HRET not to
promulgate its decision?
The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so
zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would,
however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House
of Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle
and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial)
component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of
the party in power.
Removal of HRET member for disloyalty to a party impairs
HRET constitutional prerogative
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing
Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal
for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of
the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear
8
impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House
Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest
between Pineda and Bondoc.
To sanction such interference by the House of
Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal
would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the
aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three
justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would
be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well
abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.
Is disloyalty to a party a valid cause for termination of
membership in the HRET?
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan.
They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality, and independence even
independence from the political party to which they belong.
Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline,"
are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the
tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET
for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based
strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the
ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House
of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an
injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of
expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null
and void.
HRET members enjoy security of tenure
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the
House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman
Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET
as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled
to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy
security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII,
1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House
Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just
cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional
term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from
the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal
affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid
cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of
Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has
formally affiliated with another political group. As the records
of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has
become a registered member of another political party, his
expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid
cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.
Republic v. Imperial
Doctrine: that the operation of the rotational plan requires two
conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) that the
terms of the first three (3) Commissioners should start on a
common date, and, (2) that any vacancy due to death,
resignation or disability before the expiration of the term
should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the
term.
For the effective operation of the rotational scheme of the
Constitutional Commissions, the first Commissioner should
start on a common date and any vacancy before the
expiration of the term should be filled only for the unexpired
balance of the term.
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondents: Hon. Domingo Imperial and Hon. Rodrigo
Perez
Topic: Staggering of terms
Facts: This case involves a quo warranto proceeding instituted
by the SolGen against respondents to test the legality of their
continuance in office as Chairman and Member, respectively,
of the Commission on Elections.
According to the Solicitor General, the first commissioners of
Elections were duly appointed and qualified on July 12, 1945,
with the following terms of office:
Hon. Jose Lopez Vito, Chairman, for 9 years, expiring on
July 12, 1954.
Hon. Francisco Enage, Member, for 6 years, expiring on
July 12, 1951.
Hon. Vicente Vera, Member, for 3 years, expiring on July
12, 1948;
Chairman Vito died in May 1947 and Member Vicente de Vera
was promoted Chairman to serve until July 12, 1954, when
the original term of Vito will expire (this is in accordance with
the ruling of the Court in Nacionalista Party vs. Vera and
Nacionalista Party vs. Felix Angelo Bautista that successors
should only serve for the remaining unexpired term of his
predecessor).
Chairman Vera then died in August, 1951, before the
expiration of the maximum term of nine years (on July 12,
1954) of Vito. Respondent Imperial was appointed Chairman
to succeed Vera "for a term expiring July 12, 1960". The
Solicitor General argues that the term for which Imperial could
legally serve as Chairman legally expired on July 12, 1954,
that is, the expiration of the nine-year term for which the first
Chairman, Honorable Jose Lopez Vito, was appointed.
The respondent Perez on the other hand was appointed
9
Member of the Commission on December 8, 1949, for "a term
of nine years expiring on November 24, 1958", when Enage
retired on November, 1949. The Solicitor General also argues
that the term of office of respondent Perez legally expired on
July 12, 1951, the expiration of the term of six years of
Commissioner Enage.
The Solicitor General concludes that the respondents
Commissioners Imperial and Perez have ceased to have any
legal or valid title to the positions of Chairman and Member,
respectively, of the Commission on Elections, and that
therefore, their positions should be declared vacant.
Issue: Whether or not the terms of respondents Imperial and
Perez have expired.
Ruling: No. The legal terms of office of the respondents Perez
and Imperial have not as yet expired.
Section 1, paragraph 1, of Article X of the Constitution reads
as follows:
SEC. 1. There shall be an independent Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and two other Members to
be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, who shall hold office for a term
of nine years and may not be reappointed. Of the Members of
the Commission first appointed, one shall hold office for nine
years, another for six years, and the third for three years. The
Chairman and the other Members of the Commission on
Elections may be removed from office only by impeachment in
the manner provided in this Constitution.
The provision that of the first three commissioners appointed,
"one shall hold office for 9 years, another for 6 years, and the
third for 3 years," when taken together with the prescribed
term of office for 9 years, without reappointment, evidences a
deliberate plan to have a regular rotation or cycle in the
membership of the commission, by having subsequent
members appointable only once every three years.
The operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions:
(1) that the terms of the first three commissioners should start
on a common date; and (2) that any vacancy due to death,
resignation or disability before the expiration of the term
should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the
term.
The fact that such appointments would make the appointees
serve for less than 9 years in case of death or resignation
does not mean that the nine-year term can be lifted out of
context and independently of the provision limiting the terms
of the terms of the first commissioners to nine, six and three
years. In filling the vacancy, only the tenure of the successor
is shortened, but not the term of office.
The court then ruled that the terms of the commissioners
should begin on the organization of the Commission on
Elections under Commonwealth Act 657, on June 21, 1941,
since said act implemented and completed the organization of
the Commission that under the Constitution "shall be"
established.
Therefore:
Hon. Jose Lopez Vito, Chairman, nine-year term, from June
21, 1941 to June 20, 1950.
Hon. Francisco Enage, Member, six year term, from June
21, 1941 to June 20, 1947.
The first 3 year term, from June 21, 1941 to June 20, 1944,
was not filled.
Thereafter, since the first three-year term had already expired,
the appointment (made on July 12, 1945) of the Honorable
Vicente de Vera must be deemed for the full term of nine
years, from June 21, 1944, to June 20, 1953.
The first vacancy occurred by expiration of the initial 6-year
term of Commissioner Enage on June 21, 1947 (although he
served as de facto Commissioner until 1949). His successor,
respondent Rodrigo Perez, was named for a full nine-year
term. However, on the principles heretofore laid, the nine-year
term of Commissioner Perez should be held to have started in
June 21, 1947, to expire on June 20, 1956.
The second vacancy happened upon the death of Chairman
Vito on May 1947. Commissioner Vicente de Vera was
appointed to succeed Vito. Such appointment could legally be
only for the unexpired period of the Lopez Vito's term, up to
June 20, 1950.
10
To fill the vacancy created by Vera's assumption of the
Chairmanship, Commissioner Leopoldo Rovira was appointed
on May 1947. Pursuant to the principles laid down, Rovira
could only fill out the balance of Vera's term, until June 20,
1953.
Commissioner Vera's tenure as Chairman expired, as we
have stated, on June 20, 1950, the end of Lopez Vito's original
term. A vacancy, therefore, occurred on that date that Vera
could no longer fill, since his reappointment was expressly
prohibited by the Constitution. The next Chairman was
respondent Commissioner Domingo Imperial, whose term of
nine years must be deemed to have begun on June 21, 1950,
to expire on June 20, 1959.
The vacancy created by the legal expiration of Rovira's term
on June 20, 1953 is unfilled up to the promulgation of the
decision of the case (1955). The time elapsed is counted
against his successor, whose legal term is for nine years, from
June 21, 1953 to June 20, 1962.
Inserted notes from Atty. Elman, just in case Atty. Tupas will
ask to distinguish this case from the Thelma Gamina case:
That‘s why the case of Thelma Gaminde whose term of office
has expired on Feb 2 1999 yet he continued to perform a duty
of being commissioner beyond that term. This means that the
interval between the start of the term of office and the date of
qualification of the official should be counted against her. For
example, as applied, the commissioner. Her predecessor‘s
term of office expired on Feb 2, 1992 but Gaminde applied for
the office of commissioner of the civil service commission only
in June of 1993 that is more than a year after the
commencement of term of office of the successor. So, this
fact(?) to be counted against the appointee of Gaminde. She
can serve for a period of 7 years be counted from time of her
qualification than the _________ June 1993, rather the start of
her term of being Feb 2 1992 but she is qualified only a year
after the fact should be counted against her. In other words,
she should serve only the unexpired time of term of office.
PRIMARY CONFIDENTIAL POSITIONS
GRINO V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Doctrine: The applied positions of legal attorney in this case,
the supreme court declares that the positions of his provincial
attorney is primarily confidential.
Petitioners: Hon. Simpicio Grino, Sixto Demaisip, Santos
Aguadera, Manuel Travina and Manuel Casumpang
Respondents: Civil Service Commission, Teotimo Arandela,
Cirilo Gelvezon, Teodulfo Dato-on, Nelson Geduspan
Facts: Sixto Demaisip was the provincial attorney of Iloilo. He
resigned and recommended Arandela as his replacement.
This was approved by the governor.
Grino was elected as the new governor. When he took over,
he terminated Arandela, and re-appointed Demaisip as
provincial attorney. Apparently, there was loss of trust and
confidence. Also terminated were other subordinates of the
provincial attorney.
Arandela appealed the action taken by Governor Grino to the
Merit Systems Protection Board of the CSC.
The MSPB declared the termination illegal, and ordered they
Arandela be immediately restored to their positions, with
backwages. This was affirmed by the CSC.
Gov. Grino now filed a petition for review assailing the
decision of the MSPB and CSC. He relied on the case of
Cadiente, which ruled that a city legal officer was a primarily
confidential position. He argued that since a provincial atty
and a city legal officer has similar functions, then a provincial
atty is also a primarily confidential position, one requiring
utmost confidence on the part of the mayor to be extended to
said officer.
Arandela on the other hand contends that the CSC has
already classified the position of Provincial Attorney as a
career position, and that the same is permanent, and can be
removed only for a cause.
ISSUE: Whether the position of a Provincial Attorney and
Legal Officer were confidential in character and thus can be
terminated upon loss of trust
SC: PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL.
In Cadiente vs. Santos, the court ruled that the position of a
city legal officer is undeniably one which is primarily
confidential in this manner:
“The position of a City Legal Officer is one requiring that
utmost confidence on the part of the mayor be extended to
said officer. The relationship existing between a lawyer and
his client, whether a private individual or a public officer, is
one that depends on the highest degree of trust that the latter
entertains for the counsel selected. The phrase "primarily
confidential" "denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of
11
the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close
intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse, without
embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of
personal trust on confidential matters of state”
The positions of city legal officer and provincial attorney were
created under RA5185, which categorized them together as
positions of trust. Both the provincial attorney and the city
legal officer serve as a legal adviser and legal officer for the
civil cases of the province and the city that they work for. Their
services are precisely categorized by law to be “ trusted
services.”
A comparison of these 2 positions under the LGC would
reveal the close similarity of the 2 positions. Said functions
clearly reflect the highly confidential nature of the 2 offices and
the need for a relationship based on trust between the officer
and the head of the LGU he serves.
The fact that the position of Arandela as provincial attorney
has already been classified as under career service, and
certified as permanent by the CSC cannot conceal or alter its
highly confidential nature. Since in the Cadiente case the city
legal officer was declared by this Court to be primarily
confidential, the Court must also hold that the position of
provincial attorney is also primarily confidential. To rule
otherwise would be tantamount to classifying 2 positions with
the same nature and functions in to incompatible categories.
Arandela’s termination valid. The tenure of an official holding a
primarily confidential position ends upon loss of confidence.
He was not dismissed or removed from office, his term merely
expired.
Note also that the atty-client relationship is strictly personal
because it involves mutual trust and confidence. As such, the
personal character of the relationship prohibits delegation in
favor of another attorney without the client’s consent.
However, the legal work involved, as distinguished from the
relationship, can be delegated. The practice of delegating
work of counsel to his subordinates is apparent since the
Provincial Attorney is granted power to exercise administrative
supervision and control over acts and decisions of his
subordinates.
It is therefore possible to distinguish the positions in the civil
service were lawyers act as counsel in confidential / and non-
confidential positions simply by looking at the proximity of the
position in relation to that of the appointing authority.
With respect to the legal assistants and subordinates of the
provincial attorney (who were also terminated along with
Arandela), they have been employed due to their technical
qualifications. Their positions are highly technical in character
and not confidential. Thus they are PERMANENT
EMPLOYEES and they belong to the category of
CLASSIFIED employees under the CSL. Thus, the positions
are permanent and they enjoy security of tenure.
There is no need to extend the professional relationship to the
legal staff and subordinates which assist the confidential
employer. Since the positions occupied by these subordinates
are REMOTE from that of the appointing authority, the
element of trust between them is no longer predominant. The
importance of these subordinates now lies in the contribution
of their legal skills to facilitate the work of the confidential
employee.
DE PERIO SANTOS V. MACARAIG
Doctrine: the position of Permanent Representative to the
United Nations in Geneva was considered a primarily
confidential position.
Petitioner: Rosalinda De Perio Santos
Respondents: Executive Sec. Catalino Macaraig and Sec.
Raul Manglapus
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari* seeking to set aside
Administrative Order No. 122 of the Office of the President,
finding the petitioner guilty of dishonesty and meting upon her,
after appreciating certain mitigating circumstances in her
favor, the penalty of reprimand with a warning that a repetition
of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
The President affirmed Assignment Order No. 58/88 dated
April 27, 1988 of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs recalling the
petitioner to the home office from her post as permanent
representative to the Philippine Mission to the United Nations
and other International Organizations (MISUNPHIL, for short)
in Geneva, Switzerland.
Petitioner Rosalinda de Perio-Santos, a career service officer
with the rank of Chief of Mission II and Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, was appointed on July 24,
1986, by her Excellency, President Corazon C. Aguino, to the
position of Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the
Philippine Mission to the United Nations and other
International Organizations with station in Geneva,
Switzerland.
On April 6, 1987, petitioner sought a leave of absence from
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to spend the Easter
Holidays in New York, U.S.A. Before they could leave
Geneva, petitioner received instructions from the home office
directing her to proceed to Havana as a member of the
Philippine delegation to the UNCTAD G-77 Preparatory
12
Conference from April 20-26, 1987. Instead of buying an
economy roundtrip ticket, she used for the Geneva-New York-
Geneva portion of her trip the two (2) discounted tickets
costing only SFr. 1,597 for herself and her daughter Pia. They
left Geneva for New York en route to Havana on April 15,
1987.
On the same day, the DFA approved her application for a
leave of absence with pay from April 27 to May 1, 1987.
Instead of claiming reimbursement for SFr. 2,996, she
requested, and received, reimbursement of only SFr. 1,597
which she spent for the Geneva to New York, and New York
to Geneva portion of her trip, thereby effecting savings of
SFr.1,399 for the Government. On September 21, 1987, the
DFA required her to refund the amount representing her
daughter's round-trip ticket since DFA received a copy of the
"facture" from the travel agency showing that the amount of
SFr.1,597 was in payment of (a) 1 billet adulte-Geneva/New
York/Geneva SFr. 950, and (b) 1 billet enfant-Geneva/New
York/Geneva SFr. 673; and that the sum of SFr. 673
represented the cost of her daughter's portion of the ticket.
ISSUE: WON petitioner’s designation was one based on
special trust and confidence which the appointing power, the
President, may revoke at the loss of such.
HELD: YES. The petitioner's designation as the permanent
representative of the Philippine Government to the United
Nations and other International Organizations in Geneva was
one based on the special trust and confidence which the
appointing power, the President, had in the appointee. Once
that trust and confidence ceased to exist, the incumbent's
continuance in the position became untenable.
The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions
ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office
lasts only as long as confidence in them endures (Corpus vs.
Cuaderno, 13 SCRA 591). When that confidence is lost and
the officer holding the position is separated from the service,
such cessation is not removal from office but merely an
expiration of his/her term (Cadiente vs. Santos, 142 SCRA
280).
An incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at
the pleasure of the appointing power. When the pleasure turns
into displeasure, the incumbent is not removed or dismissed
from office — his term merely expires (Ingles vs. Mutuc, 26
SCRA 171).
"Primarily confidential" denotes "not only confidence in the
aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but
primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse
without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of
betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state"
(Pinero vs. Hechanova, 18 SCRA 417; citing De los Santos
vs. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289).
It is the fact of loss of confidence, not the reason for it, that is
important and controlling. As holder of a primarily confidential
position, petitioner's foreign assignment was at the pleasure of
the President. The recall order terminating her tour of duty in
Geneva and returning her to the home office was merely a
change of post or transfer of location of work.
Petitioner may not justifiably assail the appointment of Narcisa
Escaler as her replacement in Geneva because the power to
appoint is essentially discretionary. The appointing power, the
President, has the right of choice which she may exercise
freely, according to her best lights (Pamantasan ng Lungsod
ng Maynila vs. Court of Appeals, 140 SCRA 22). This Court
may not order the reinstatement of the petitioner to her former
position in Geneva for that would be tantamount to a
usurpation by this Court of the power of appointment, which is
the exclusive prerogative of the Chief Executive (Article VII,
Section 16, 1987 Constitution). It would violate the system of
separation of powers which inheres in our democratic
republican form of government.
Was the recall order valid? The recall order issued by the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs (Assignment Order No. 58/88)
was a valid exercise of his authority as an alter ego of the
President. His acts, "performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of
the latter. His order recalling the petitioner to the home office,
having been affirmed by the President, any doubts as to its
validity and propriety have thereby been laid to rest.
Atty. Elman Notes, in case nay follow-up question si Atty.
Tupas: Take note, it was mentioned earlier, it is not be labeled
permanent in nature beyond no positon but rather the nature
of mission of position that make it primarily confidential, policy
determining. She then, in this occasion, well, the position was
classified as permanent representing to the UN. Nonetheless,
it‘s not be labeled rather the need of the function being
performed by the committee that would make it competitive or
non-competitive or that will make it primarily confidential
position. So, in the case of primarily confidential position, the
tenure of officer in such position or upon lost of confidence
because this is the term of office not only, so long as
confidence in the appointee is present or endures.
13