Stolnitz's Attitude: Taste and Perception

Author(s): George Dickie

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism , Winter, 1984, Vol. 43, No. 2
(Winter, 1984), pp. 195-203
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/429993

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 GEORGE DICKIE

Stolnitz's Attitude: Taste and

Perception

JEROME STOLNITZ has objected in this theory: the eighteenth century theories of
Journal1 to my criticism2 of his interpreta-taste which lack the notion of disin-
tion of certain eighteenth century philoso- terested perception and the later aesthet-
phers as aesthetic-attitude theorists. Stolnitz ic-attitude theories which make disin-
had originally claimed to find descriptions terested perception central. I was orig-
of aesthetic or disinterested perception in inally led to distinguish between these two
the writings of these eighteenth century Brit- kinds of theory by comparing the theory
ish philosophers.3 In my criticism, I had of the eighteenth century philosopher
claimed that the notion of aesthetic per- Francis Hutcheson with present-day aes-
ception had first appeared in the writings thetic-attitude theorists such as Stolnitz.
of the nineteenth century philosopher Hutcheson's theory involves a four-part
Schopenhauer. Unfortunately, my earlier structure:
remarks about Schopenhauer, as Stolnitz
points out, are mistaken in an important 1. External senses (vision, hearing, and the like);
way. Fortunately, this mistake does not 2. An internal sense of beauty (a faculty which
invalidate my main conclusion that Stol- reacts to certain objects of the external senses);
3. Uniformity in variety (the specific characteris-
nitz's attributing of aesthetic perception
tic of objects of the external senses which causes
to the eighteenth century British phi- the internal sense to react);
losophers is wrong. Stolnitz is right that 4. Pleasure (the product of the reaction of the in-
the notion of disinterestedness is pres- ternal sense).

ent in the theorizing of these British phi-

losophers and thus that the association Stolnitz's theory is summed up in his
of disinterestedness with theories con- definition of "the aesthetic attitude"
cerned with beauty and the like beginswhich
in is, he says, "disinterested and sym-
the eighteenth century, but he is wrong in attention to and contemplation of
pathic
thinking that these British thinkers predi-
any object of awareness whatever, for its
cated disinterestedness of perception as own sake alone."4 Stolnitz's theory, ig-
do present-day aesthetic-attitude theorists noring the notion of "sympathic," in-
such as himself. Stolnitz's mistake is the volves a two-part structure:
result of the fact that he does not fully un-
derstand the nature of the aesthetic-atti- 1. Disinterested attention (a prior condition for the
tude theory that he himself holds. occurrence of the action which is the second part of
In criticizing Stolnitz's original claim, I the structure;
argued that there are two distinct kinds of 2. Contemplation of any object for its own sake
alone.

GEORGE DICKIE is professor of philosophy at the Stolnitz sometimes seems to write as if

University of Illinois at Chicago. disinterested attention and contemplation
? 1984 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

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 196
are the same thing. Sometimes, however,
he treats the two as separate: for exam-
ple, he writes, "the aesthetic attitude 'iso-
lates' the object and focuses upon it[s ob-
ject]-the 'look' of the rock, the sound of
the ocean, the colors in the painting."5
Here he must be talking about an act or
an occurrence of disinterested attending
which isolates its object perceptually from
the things to which it stands in relation.
Once this initiating act of disinterested
attending occurs, the perceptually rela-
tionless object can be focussed on and
contemplated.
Stolnitz mentions several things which
are supposed to be destructive to disin-
terested attention. Criticism is one. Of
aesthetic appreciation and criticism, he
writes, . . /'they are psychologically op-
posed to each other. The aesthetic and
critical attitudes are such radically differ-
ent ways of approaching an object that
when one is uppermost in the mind, it
drives the other out."6 The reason, on
Stolnitz' s theory, for the incompatibility
of the aesthetic and critical attitudes is
that the disinterested attention component
of the aesthetic attitude perceptually de-
taches its object from its relations to other
things whereas criticism involves relating
the object to something else. If the critical
attitude gains the upper hand it relates the
object to something and destroys disin-
terested attention, and, hence, the aes-
thetic attitude. Stolnitz has similar things
to say about the moral content of works
of art. If we respond to the moral content
of a work of art, "this disrupts the aes-
thetic attitude."7 The reason that the
aesthetic attitude is disrupted in such
cases is that the work of art has been re-
lated to something else, and this prevents
the occurrence of disinterested attention.
Hutcheson's theory of taste differs sub-
stantially from Stolnitz's aesthetic-attitude
theory. In Hutcheson's theory, there is no
such thing as disinterested attention; there
is just the effect of a specific kind of fea-
ture on the sense of beauty. On Hutche-
son's theory, the specific feature of a per-
ceived object at work is uniformity in
variety, but on Stolnitz's theory, anything
may be contemplated. For Stolnitz, any-
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DICKIE
thing may be contemplated because any-
thing can be isolated by disinterested at-
tention. For Hutcheson, only uniformity
in variety can be the object of beauty be-
cause it is the only kind of object to
which the internal sense of beauty can re-
spond. For Hutcheson, anything to which
uniformity in variety stands in relation is
just irrelevant to the sense of beauty be-
cause the sense of beauty is unable to re-
spond to it.
Of course, for Hutcheson, a person is a
complex being with many aspects and
interests in addition to the sense of
beauty. Consequently, for Hutcheson, the
effect of uniformity in variety on a person
may have to compete with other interests
of that person. For example, he writes,
"Who was ever please'd . . . with un-
equal legs or arms, eyes or cheeks in a
mistress? It must however be acknowl-
edg'd, that interest may often counter-
balance our sense of beauty in this affair
as well as in others, and superior good
qualities may make us overlook such
imperfections."'8 The counterbalancing
by interests Hutcheson has in mind here
is not one in which the awareness of
beauty is prevented or even interfered
with, it is a counterbalancing in which the
awareness of a relative lack of beauty
of a person is weighed against the per-
son's other qualities. There is nothing in
Hutcheson's theory which necessarily
makes interests incompatible with the
appreciation of beauty, as there is in aes-
thetic-attitude theory. Burke makes the
point of the compatibility of interest and
the appreciation of beauty within the con-
text of the theory of taste nicely in a pas-
sage in which he distinguishes between
the love caused by beauty and the desire
caused by sexual attraction. Burke writes,
i'.. . the passion caused by beauty,
which I call love, is different from desire
[sexual attraction], though desire may
sometimes operate along with it. . ..9
There just is not anything in Burke's or
Hutcheson's theories which makes inter-
est and the appreciation of beauty neces-
sarily incompatible. Of course, Burke and
Hutcheson and everyone else would agree
that there are "desperate cases" in which
Taste und Perception 197

a person's interests are so powerful (life-
threatening cases, for example) that the
appreciation of beauty becomes impossi-
ble. For the theory of taste, such power-
ful interests simply crowd out the appre-
ciation of beauty. (Throughout his article
Stolnitz misinterprets my view that in
theories of taste a specific kind of object
triggers the faculty of taste to mean that
nothing can intefere with the triggering.
Of course, the triggering can be interfered
with or even prevented in given cases.)
The aesthetic-attitude view, however, is
very different on the score of interest and
contemplation, because it holds that there
is an inherent incompatibility between
interest and contemplation. This in-
compatibility derives from the aesthetic-
attitude theorist's view that contemplationFor Stolnitz, a person has cognitive
requires the antecedent occurence of dis-
abilities such as vision and hearing; de-
interested attention which must first per-
sires such as hunger, desire for property,
ceptually isolate its object from its re-
lations. Stolnitz says in a discussion of
Hutcheson that Hutcheson ". . . details
the conditions which prevent aesthetic
experience."10 Stolnitz is misreading
Hutcheson because he takes him to be
talking about aesthetic perception. Stol-
nitz should have written, "Hutcheson de-
tails the conditions which may interfere
with and may even in extreme cases pre-
vent aesthetic experience." (By the way,
it is a mistake to import the expression
"aesthetic experience" into a discussion
of these eighteenth century theories.)
Another way in which Stolnitz's and
Hutchson's theories differ is that while
pleasure is mentioned from time to time
by Stolnitz, it does not seem to play the
central role in his theory that it does in
Hutcheson's and other theories of taste.
This point is not, however, one of great
significance.
I will sum up the previous discussion
by giving a (partial) description of an ex-
perience of beauty as envisaged by Hut-
cheson and a (partial) description of an
experience of an aesthetic object as en-
visaged by Stolnitz.
For Hutcheson, a person has external
senses such as hearing and vision; internal
senses such as the sense of beauty and
the moral sense; desires such as hunger,
desire for property, and sexual desire; and
contents of consciousness such as visual
and auditory objects as well as pleasures,
pains, and various other feelings. Vision
can inform the person, for example, that
there is a red, round object in front of
him, and vision plus memory and other
cognitive faculties can inform him that
there is an apple in front of him which re-
lates to his hunger. Through vision, the
apple's complex property of uniformity in
variety can affect the person, and when
that happens the sense of beauty can re-
act to produce pleasure. For the Hutche-
sonian person, there is no necessary con-
flict between the perception of the two
apple properties-its uniformity in variety
and its edibility.
and sexual desire; and contents of con-
sciousness such as visual and auditory ob-
jects as well as pleasures, pains, and
various other feelings. A Stolnitzean per-
son has an additional mental ability-he
can attend either interestedly or disinter-
estedly. When, for example, he sees an
apple while attending interestedly, he will
see it as something to eat, i.e., as relating
to his hunger. When he sees an apple
while attending disinterestedly, he will see
it as an aesthetic object, i.e., as unrelated
to any interest. For a Stolnitzean person,
there is a necessary conflict between the
perception of the two apple properties
(aesthetic-objectness and edibility) be-
cause, as Stolnitz says, whichever of
disinterested attention or interested atten-
tion is dominants "it drives the other
out.""l
My conclusion concering Stolnitz's the-
ory is that Stolnitz claims that there is a
kind of perception which he calls "aes-
thetic perception" which is made up of
two parts: 1) disinterested attention and 2)
contemplation of an object. So long as
disinterested attention is maintained, it is
guaranteed that its object is perceptually
relationless and, consequently, the con-
templation of its object must be disin-
terested. The contemplation is disin-
terested because its object does not stand

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 198
in relation to anything else perceptually.
The reason, according to the aesthetic-at-
titude view, that the contemplated object
is perceptually relationless is that it is first
the object of disinterested perception.
My conclusion about Hutcheson is that
there is no trace of aesthetic perception in
his theory, because there is no trace of
disinterested attention. On Hutcheson's
theory of beauty there can be disinterested
contemplation, which turns out to be the
contemplation of an object which possesses
uniformity in variety. In such contempla-
tion, the object's uniformity in variety is,
from the point of view of the sense of
beauty, relationless because uniformity in
variety is the only thing to which the sense ofhauer's view is not, strictly speaking, an
beauty can respond. The object itself, how-
ever, is not perceived as relationless. The
question, for Hutcheson, of whether the
interest of a person may crowd such con-
templation out of the domain of the external
senses is purely contingent. Disinterested
contemplation is a part of both Hutcheson's
and Stolnitz's theories, but it is achieved in
different ways.
In my 1974 discussion, I was interested
primarily in two questions: 1) what in the
history of philosophy is responsible for
the disappearence of theories of taste
such as Hutcheson's and the rise of aes-
thetic-attitude theories such as Stolnitz's,
and 2) who is the first aesthetic-attitude
theorist. I pinpointed certain aspects of
Kant's philosophy as initiating the chain
of events which ultimately produced aes-
thetic-attitude theory, and I pointed to
Schopenhauer as the first aesthetic-atti-
tude theorist. I was, I believe, right in fo-
cusing on Kant and Schopenhauer, but I
focused on the wrong aspects of Kant's
philosophy, and, consequently, I misinter-
preted Schopenhauer's theory.
I focused on Kant's view that the mind
imposes on its objects various proper-
ties-spatial, temporal, causal, and so on.
Since up to a point, Schopenhauer follows
Kant in this regard, I interpreted Scho-
penhauer as holding that aesthetic con-
sciousness imposes an aesthetic character
on its object. I read Schopenhauer as
what I called a "strong aesthetic-attitude
theorist" and characterized another kind
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DICKIE
of attitude theory as "weak," i.e., as
holding that aesthetic consciousness does
not impose an aesthetic character but is
rather simply a necessary condition for
the apprehension and appreciation of an
aesthetic character which is independent
of the mode of perception. The aspect of
Kant's philosophy I focused on was a
false lead and mislead me in my interpre-
tation of Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer's
view is not a "strong" version of the aes-
thetic-attitude theory, and neither is
anyone else's. What, then, is Schopen-
hauer's view?
If Stolnitz's view is taken as a model of
aesthetic-attitude theory, then Schopen-
aesthetic-attitude theory. Schopenhauer
maintains that aesthetic consciousness
must have as its object some Platonic
Idea, not any object whatsoever, as the
paradigm view holds. So Schopenhauer
has in common with Hutcheson the view
that a specific kind of object is required.
His view differs from Hutcheson's, how-
ever, in affirming disinterested attention.
Strictly speaking, Schopenhauer's view is
neither fish nor fowl, but is a transition
between the theory of taste and aesthetic-
attitude theory. (One might read Schopen-
hauer's theory as an aesthetic-attitude
view of a certain restricted kind, namely,
as the view that aesthetic consciousness
can take as its object any Platonic Idea
whatsoever. (Aesthetic consciousness can-
not take any object whatsoever, but it can
take any object whatsoever from a restricted
domain, namely, Platonic Ideas.)
Whatever the correct understanding of
the historical Schopenhauer is, there is
embedded in the vast, eclectic structure
which is his philosophy a conception
which comes very close to being an aes-
thetic-attitude theory. It was this concep-
tion which was subsequently so influ-
ential. Few, if any, were influenced by
what Schopenhauer said about the place
of Platonic Ideas in aesthetic experience,
but many were influenced by his account
of aesthetic consciousness. Stolnitz's the-
ory, for example, is essentially Schopen-
hauer's theory of aesthetic consciousness
with "any object whatsoever" replacing
Taste and Perception 199

"any Platonic Idea" as the description of quired for the purely objective appre-
the object of aesthetic consciousness. hension of the true nature of things . . .
Stolnitz writes of Schopenhauer, "One of [Platonic Ideas]"'18 Finally, the aesthetic
the best brief descriptions of the aesthetic .. state is conditioned from the out-
attitude to be found anywhere is in the side by our remaining wholly foreign to,
writings of the nineteenth century German and detached from, the scene to be con-
philosopher Schopenhauer."'12 Stolnitz is templated, and not being at all actively in-
quite right that a description of the aes- volved in it."9
thetic attitude is to be found ". . . in the First, Schopenhauer's account of aes-
writings of . . . Schopenhauer," even if, thetic consicousness does not involve any
it may be added, Schopenhauer himself is sort of noncognitive faculty of taste as
not quite an aesthetic-attitude theorist. does Hutcheson's theory of taste; the
What, then, is the nature of aesthetic whole account is in terms of intellect and
consciousness, according to Schopen- its objects. Second, aesthetic conscious-
hauer? It does not involve, I now admit, ness depends on or is conditioned by the
imposing an aesthetic character on some- intellect's ability to act in such a way as
thing. The picture he gives of ordinary to detach the object of its perception from
consciousness is of intellect (the cognitive its relations and make it perceptually rela-
faculties) totally in the service of the will. tionless. Stolnitz's notion of disinterested
Consequently, in ordinary consciousness attention is the lineal descendant of Scho-
the objects of perception are simply the penhauer's notion of the intellect's ability
intersections of sets of temporal, spatial, to disengage its object from its relations.
and causal relations because it is through Third, for Schopenhauer, once the de-
knowledge of these relations that the will taching and isolating act occurs, disin-
is served. Aesthetic consciousness is very terested contemplation of an object of
different and rare. The infrequent transi-perception becomes possible. Fourth, if
tion to aesthetic consciousness '. . . any trace of the will manages to breach
can happen only by a change in the sub- the isolating action of the intellect, aes-
ject."13 This change in the subject oc- thetic consciousness is destroyed; there is
curs when a person is ". . . raised up by an absolute antagonism between aesthetic
the power of the mind. . . [tol . . . relin- consciousness and interest.
quish the ordinary ways of considering Schopenhauer did not, however, make
things...."14 The change ". . . takes the transition to this new way of con-
place suddenly, . . . [when] . . . knowl- ceiving of the experience of beauty all by
edge tears itself free from the service of himself. Kant's account of the way in
the will. . . . "15 When aesthetic con- which beauty is experienced, although
sciousness is achieved, what previously formulated in the old terminology of the
was perceived as the intersection of rela- theory of taste, differs in an important
tions is then perceived as a perceptually way from the accounts of the British
relationless Platonic Idea. The Platonic theorists. The difference that Kant intro-
Idea then becomes the object of aesthetic duces closely resembles Schopenhauer' s
contemplation. Aesthetic consciousness is notion of aesthetic consciousness.
not only infrequent, it is precarious. Scho- The relevant aspects of Kant's theory
penhauer writes, "What makes this state are developed in the first and third mo-
difficult and therefore rare is that in it the ments of his "Analytic of the Beautiful."
. . . intellect . . . subdues and eliminates Kant writes,
the . . . will, although only for a short
time."'6 Furthermore, the aesthetic state The delight which we connect with the represen-
can be maintained " . . . only when we tation of the real existence of an object is called
ourselves have no interest in . . . [the ob- interest. Such a delight, therefore, always in-
volves a reference to the faculty of desire. . ..
jects of perception, i.e.,] . . . they stand
Now where the question is whether something is
in no relation to our will."17 "[T]he ab- beautiful, we do not want to know, whether we,
solute silence of the will . . . [is] . . . re- or anyone else, are, or even could be, concerned

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 200
in the real existence of the thing,
estimate we form of it on mere contemplation an aspect of its object, namely, whether
20
An object's real existence involves it in
relations to other objects, and it is
through these relations that desire can get
a foothold. Thus, when Kant claims that
the beautiful object has no involvement
with real existence, he is saying that the
object's being beautiful does not involve
having relations to anything else. The
beautiful object can, therefore, involve no
reference to desire. This is the Kantian
account of the disinterested nature of the
contemplation of the beautiful.
Kant tries to ensure universal validity
of judgments of taste by having the facul-
ty of taste consist of the cognitive facul-
ties of imagination and understanding
functioning in a secondary way. Since
everyone has these cognitive faculties,
universality is assured. For Kant, when
one has an experience of the beautiful,
the object of the experience is contem-
plated as unrelated to anything else (not
experienced as an object having real exis-
tence). Underlying the experience of the
beautiful is the imagination and the under-
standing functioning in the secondary way
that Kant calls "free play." Free play is
to be contrasted with the primary func-
tioning of the imagination and the under-
standing in which objective knowledge is
produced and in which real existence is at
issue. The harmonious, free play of the
cognitive faculties produces pleasure, and
this pleasure is disinterested because it is
cut off from the real existence of objects,
and, hence, from interest.
The Kantian notion of the harmonious,
free play of the cognitive faculties which
effectively cuts off its object from its rela-
tions to other things strikes me as being
very similar to the Schopenhauerian no-
tion of intellect acting to sever its object's
relations to other objects.
Kant's theory differs from Hutcheson's
in that the Kantian faculty of taste is the
cognitive faculties functioning in a secon-
dary way whereas The Hutchesonian fac-
ulty of taste is a noncognitive, reflex fac-
ulty. For Kant, the way in which the
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DICKIE
cognitive
butfaculties
rather function
what determines
or not the percipient is aware of the ob-
ject's relations. For Hutcheson, the facul-
ty of taste is involved with a specific kind
of object-form of purpose. Whether, on
Kant's view, the form of purpose triggers
the faculty of taste is not clear, but I shall
make no attempt to clarify this point.
Kant's theory is similar to Schopenhau-
er's in that both theories focus only on
cognitive faculties and on those faculties'
struggle with desire (will). Kant's theory
differs from Schopenhauer's in that Kant
retains virtually all of the terminology of
the earlier theories of taste. Kant's and
Schopenhauer's theories can both be seen
to have a close and important relation of
the later aesthetic-attitude theories.
My earlier account contained a discus-
sion of Schiller's aesthetic theory. It did
so because I was trying to find a philos-
opher whose theory provides a transition
from Kant's theory of taste to Schopen-
hauer's aesthetic-attitude theory. Since I
now think that Kant's and Schopenhau-
er's theories are more similar than I
thought earlier, I have no need to find a
transition theory. I am relieved of the ne-
cessity of discussing Schiller's exceed-
ingly obscure views.
I turn now to Stolnitz's claim that he
finds the notion of aesthetic perception in
the theories of the eighteenth century
British philosophers of taste. I shall con-
sider the theorists he discusses in chrono-
logical order, beginning with Shaftesbury.
In my earlier account, I devoted only a
few lines to Shaftesbury, although I ac-
knowledged his influence on the theorists
of taste. Stolnitz takes exception to my
remark about ' 'Shaftesbury's concern
with the Platonic Form of Beauty ..."
as the object of contemplation,21 and he
goes on to claim that aesthetic perception
is central to Shaftesbury's view.22
It is not central to my concern to deter-
mine whether Shaftesbury was writing
about the Platonic Form of Beauty or not.
I was led to believe that he was by the re-
mark he makes just before the passage on
disinterestedness which is so frequently
quoted. He writes there, ". . . whatever
Taste and Perception
in nature is beautiful or charming is only
the faint shadow of that first beauty." He
then goes on to speak of the contempla-
tion of beauty '. . . in itself or as it ap-
pears imperfectly in objects which strike
the sense. .. .23 I took "the first beauty"
to be a reference to the Platonic Form of
Beauty. If it is a reference to something
else, that is fine with me.
I am not, however, indifferent to Stol-
nitz's claim to discover that Shaftesbury
writes about aesthetic perception. Stolnitz
quotes several passages which are sup-
posed to be about aesthetic perception.
He quotes from a passage in which
Shaftesbury speaks of the pleasure one
might take in contemplating a mathemat-
ical proof. Stolnitz, embedding part of
Shaftsbury's sentence in his own, writes
'"The joy that accompanies the perceptionof the eating of the fruit of the trees.
'turns wholly upon what is exterior and
foreign to ourselves'. "24 First, Stolnitz
speaks of perception, but the word "per-
ception" does not appear in Shaftesbury's
passage. Second, in this passage, Shaftes-
bury is simply distinguishing between dif-
ferent kinds of joy: the joy of contemplat-
ing a mathematical proof and the joy of
anticipated benefit. He makes this distinc-
tion to counter the view that there is only
one joy involved in cases such as this,
namely, the joy of anticipated benefit.
There is nothing in this passage which in-
dicates that Shaftesbury has in mind cog-
nitive faculties which perceptually sever
their object from its relations in order that
it can be contemplated.
Stolnitz mentions only the last of the
four examples from the famous passage in
which Shaftesbury is frequently said to
have introduced the notion of disinterest-
edness in the discussion of the experience
of beauty, but I shall discuss them all
briefly. In the first case, Shaftesbury con-
trasts the enjoyment of contemplating the
beauty of the ocean with the enjoyment of
owning the ocean. Shaftesbury's remarks
that the enjoyment of ownership is ". . .
very different from that which should nat-
urally follow from contemplation of the
ocean's beauty."25 He is here making the
same point that he makes in the passage
about the mathematical proof, namely,
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201
that two different enjoyments are involved
in this kind of case. In the second case,
Shaftesbury asks a question about the
contemplation of a tract of land and the
ownership of the land. He asks if one
"... should, for the enjoyment of the pros-
pect, require the property or possession
of the land."26 The answer is, "No," be-
cause one can look at and contemplate
the tract without owning it. The third and
fourth cases also involve distinguishing
the enjoyment of the contemplation of
beauty from the enjoyment of anticipated
benefit, but in these two last cases there
is also a suggestion of conflict between
the two enjoyments. The third case in-
volves distinguishing between the enjoy-
ment of the contemplation of the beauty
of a grove of trees and the enjoyment
Shaftesbury suggests that the enjoyment
of the fruit may divert one from the beau-
ty of the grove. And so it may. The fourth
case involves distinguishing between the
enjoyment of contemplating human beau-
ty and the desire for sexual possession.
Shaftesbury suggests that the ". . . eager
desires, wishes, and hopes . . ." for sex-
ual possession are ". . . no way suitable
... to [the] rational and refined contem-
plation of beauty."27 He is saying that the
desire for sexual possession may interfere
with the contemplation of human beauty.
And so it may, but Shaftesbury nowhere
even suggests that there is a mental ca-
pacity which can function to perceptually
isolate the beautiful object and thereby
preserve the contemplation of it from the
interference of competing interests of the
perceiver. Shaftesbury is free to agree
with Burke that ". . . desire may some-
times operate along with . . ." the appre-
ciation of human beauty, although he gives
the impression of being less optimistic
than Burke is, that this will happen with
great frequency.
Stolnitz, citing the affinities between
Addison's theory of taste and Shaftes-
bury's view, claims to discover the notion
of aesthetic perception in Addison's writ-
ing. But, as the notion of aesthetic per-
ception is not to be found in Shaftes-
bury's work, the citing of affinities be-
 202 DICKIE

tween the views of the two men supplies show that all the phenomena are reducible to the
no ground for interpreting various re- same general principle and that the qualities of
matter are not beautiful or sublime in them-
marks by Addison as being about aesthet- selves, but as they are, by various means, the
ic perception. signs or expressions of qualities capable of pro-
Stolnitz objects to my classification of ducing emotion.3'
Burke as a taste theorist. I had asserted
that for Burke the faculty of taste isI sim-
am aware that on Alison's view a qual-
ply the disposition to respond with disin- ity of matter may become an expression
terested pleasure to the perception of of mind or a sign of a quality of mind
certain qualities. Stolnitz rejects my clas- merely by association. How a quality of
sification and writes, "Burke vigorously matter comes to be an expression or a
repudiates any reactive faculty of taste, sign for someone is irrelevant. The point
such as an inner sense. . .28 It is true is that once it is taken as an expression or
that Burke explicitly denies that the facul- sign it can trigger the faculty of taste. I
ty of taste is a special internal sense as am also aware that through association
Hutcheson had maintained, but he cer- any quality of matter may become a sign
tainly conceives of it as reactive. Burke but it is not the quality of matter simpli-
writes, "Beauty . . . is no creature of our citer which triggers the faculty of taste, it
reason, since it strikes us without any ref- is the quality of matter seen as an expres-
erence to use, . . . we must conclude that sion or sign. The specification of signs of
beauty is, for the greater part, some qual- qualities of mind or expressions of mind is
ity in bodies, acting mechanically upon a complex although still specific kind of
the human mind by the intervention of the object. Alison himself regards such a
senses."29 It seems perfectly reasonable specification as a reduction "to the same
to me to say that Burke is here referring general principle." Alison's view is that
to the same general sort of mental func- the specific kind of object which triggers
tion that Hutcheson and others referred to the faculty of taste is more complex
as a faculty of taste. Burke claims that a (much more complex) than Hutcheson or
complex of aspects of mind reacts to Burke imagine.
certain specific properties of perceptual Stolnitz insists that he finds the notion
objects, and Hutcheson claims that a sin- of aesthetic perception in Alison's theory.
gle aspect of mind reacts to a certain spe- He claims to find passages in which Ali-
cific property of perceptual objects. son distinguishes ". . . the mode of atten-
Concerning Alison, I had maintained 1) tion requisite to such feelings [feeling in-
that he was a taste theorist in part be- volved in the experience of beauty] from
cause he claims that a specific kind of other modes of attention or, specifically
complex object, namely, an expression of disinterested from interested attention
mind or a sign of a quality of mind, trig- ...."32 But there are no such passages, and
gers the faculty of taste and 2) that his Stolnitz thinks that he finds them only be-
theory does not involve aesthetic per- cause he does not understand what disin-
ception. Stolnitz writes concerning the no- terested attention is supposed to be. What
tion of a specific kind of object, "In Hut- Alison does say, in the passages Stolnitz
cheson, it is uniformity in variety; in cites, is that the functioning of the
Burke, smallness or delicacy or . . ., and imagination is required for the experience
so on. The inference cannot be drawn in of beauty and that insofar as anything in-
Alison. There is no limit in principle to terferes with the functioning of the
the properties possessed by beautiful imagination, the experience of beauty is
things or to such things."30 reduced. If one attends solely to some-
Concerning the first point, I simply thing other than the beautiful object, then
quote Alison. He writes concerning the there is no experience of beauty at all;
one is totally distracted. If one attends to
. . . origin of the beauty and sublimity of the both the beautiful object and to some
qualities of matter .... I shall endeavor to other thing, the functioning of the

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Taste and Perception 203

imagination is enfeebled and the experi- stroyed, thereby preventing the conjunc-
ence of beauty is reduced. Alison writes tion Alison allows.
of a person in pain or grieving ". . .
whose mind, by these means, is attentive 1 Jerome Stolnitz, "'The Aesthetic Attitude' in the
Rise of Modern Aesthetics," The Journal of Aesthet-
only to one object or consideration, the
ics and Art Criticism, XXXVI no. 4, (1978), p. 409-
[beautiful] scene, or the [beautiful] form, 23.
will produce no feeling of admiration, 2 George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic (Cornell
which, at other times, when his imagina- University Press, 1974), pp. 53-77.
tion was at liberty, would have produced 3 Jerome Stolnitz, "On the Origins of 'Aesthetic
Disinterestedness'," The Journal of Aesthetics and
it in its fullest perfection."33 Alison is Art Criticism, XX, no. 2 (1961), p. 131-43.
here writing of total distraction, and he 4 Jerome Stolnitz, Aesthetics and Philosophy of
does not speak of different kinds of atten- Art Criticism (New York, 1960), pp. 34-35.
tion, only of attention to different kinds of 5 Ibid., p. 35.
6 Ibid., p. 377.
objects.
7 Ibid., p. 36.
Consider now this famous passage from 8 Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original
Alison. of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (London, 1726),
Second Edition, p. 77.
9 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the
Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful
It is upon the vacant and the unemployed [mind] (London, 1759), Second Edition, p. 163.
. . . that the objects of taste make the strongest 10 Stolnitz, 'The Aesthetic Attitude," p. 416.
impression. ... The seasons of care, of grief, or " Stolnitz, Aesthetics, p. 377.
of business, have other occupations, and de- 12 Ibid., p. 43.
stroy, for the time at least, our sensibility to the 13 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and
beautiful or the sublime, in the same proportion Representation, E. F. J. Payne, trans. (New York,
that they produce a state of mind unfavorable to 1969), vol. 1, p. 176.
the indulgence of imagination.34 (Italics mine) 14 Ibid., p. 178
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 369.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., p. 370.
Notice that the objects of taste are said 19 Ibid., p. 373.
by Alison to make the strongest impres- 20 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgment, J.
sion on a mind unemployed in anything C. Meredity, trans., (Oxford, 1928), p. 42.
else. This statement clearly implies that 21 Dickie, p. 59; Stolnitz, 'The Aesthetic Atti-
tude," p. 415.
an object of taste can make a less strong
22 Stolnitz, 'The Aesthetic Attitude," p. 414.
impression on a mind which is not wholly 23 Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics
vacant and unemployed. Notice also that of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (New York,
later in the passage Alison says that care, 1964), vol. 2, p. 126.
24 Stolnitz, "The Aesthetic Attitude," p. 414.
grief, and the like interfere with the expe-
25 Shaftesbury, 127.
rience of beauty "in the same proportion" 26 Ibid.
that they interfere with the function of the 27 Ibid., pp. 126-27.
imagination. 28 Stolnitz, "The Aesthetic Attitude," p. 416.
Alison does not mention different kinds 29 Burke, pp. 209-210.

of attention. Furthermore, he allows for 30 Stolnitz, "The Aesthetic Attitude," p. 418.

the appreciation of beauty at the same
time that a person is attentive to other
things, and this conjunction is supposedly
ruled out by disinterested attention. Sup-
posedly, disinterested attention percep-
tually disconnects its object from its rela-
tions to other things, thereby preventing
the conjunction Alison allows. Also, if
interest in something related to the object
of disinterested attention arises, disin-
terested attention is supposed to be de-
31 Archibald Alison, "Essays on the Nature anc
Principles of Taste" in What is Art? Alexander Se-
sonske, ed. (New York, 1965), p. 184.
32 Stolnitz, "The Aesthetic Attitude," p. 418.
33 Alison, p. 185.
34 Ibid.
I wish to thank Peter Kivy and Suzanne Cun-
ningham for their very helpful comments on an ear-
lier version of this paper. I also wish to thank
Byung-nam Oh for our conversations on the topics
of this paper.

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