AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE OF AND REMEDIES FOR

CORRUPTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:

FOCUSING ON ZIMBABWE

by

Musafare Takaendesa Mupanduki

APPROVED BY SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE:

_________________________________________
_ Lloyd J. Dumas, Chair

_________________________________________
_ Donald Arbuckle

_________________________________________
_ Richard K. Scotch

_________________________________________
_
Habte Woldu
 Copyright 2012

Musafare Takaendesa Mupanduki

All Rights Reserved

This work is dedicated to my late sister, Chisinamuridzi and my late brother, Tanyanyiwa.

Without your toiling under very difficult conditions I would never have seen the door of a

classroom. It is true that you are both gone; but you will always be close to me.
Tanyanyiwa, I know that until your death you had faith in me; and that it had always been your

wish to see me climbing higher heights in education, and all other fields of endeavor. You

inspired me to work hard no matter the circumstances. This is the result of your inspiration! You

are no longer here to share the joy with us but as you rest, I want you to know your faith in me

has brought me this far!

I also dedicate the output of my toil to my wife, Shilah for her unconditional love, patience and

support in days and sleepless nights, sadness and happiness, summer and winter. She was indeed

a reader and an editor. I cannot imagine what I could do without her on my side.

Today, I dedicate the product of hope, perseverance, and faith to the less fortunate in Zimbabwe

and around the world that need someone to urge them to carry on and follow their dreams no

matter the obstacles.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE OF AND REMEDIES FOR

CORRUPTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:

FOCUSING ON ZIMBABWE

by

MUSAFARE TAKAENDESA MUPANDUKI

DISSERTATION

Presented to the Faculty of

The University of Texas at

Dallas in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements

for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS

August 2012

UMI Number: 3523597

All rights reserved

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It has, indeed, been a very long journey! My sincere gratitude goes to all who made it possible

for me to complete this journey. All your sacrifices, efforts, dedication have made this possible.
There is not enough space to list all who in diverse ways have made this journey a success.

However, there are certain people this work will not be complete without mentioning their

names.

I am grateful to Dr. Lloyd J. Dumas, the chair of my dissertation committee, who guided and

mentored me throughout the research and writing process of the dissertation. His advice,

understanding, and support made the work easier. I am also grateful to Drs. Richard Scotch,

Habte Woldu and Donald Arbuckle, for their valuable suggestions throughout the research and

writing process. Of course, I appreciate the advice and support I received from so many people,

who I cannot name individually. To my colleagues and friends Dr. Joseph Darmoe and Dr.

Hillary Ebvayiro, thank you for reviewing and critiquing my work..

Last but by no means least, I would also like to extend my everlasting debt of gratitude to all

those who participated in the interviews in Zimbabwe, and the U.S.A.

I would also like to express my everlasting debt of gratitude to John and Rejoice Moyanah.

Without Rejoice’s assistance in the transcription of my research interviews, this project would

not have reached the completion stage. In addition, on the several occasions that I was in Dallas

for this project, their house was always open to me including the provision of transport to go

round my business.

v
Many thanks go to members of my family both in the U.S.A. and in Zimbabwe, particularly to

Veronica and Killian Mutiro who provided me with accommodation and means of transport to

do my field work in Zimbabwe, and many thanks to Dr. Itai Takaendesa Mupanduki for the

contribution and encouragement and his approach to this study with great enthusiasm. My

gratitude is also extended to my cousin, Trevor Misery who contributed in no small measure

during my field work in Zimbabwe. I would also like to thank my sister- in-law Bertha Kura,

who worked tirelessly to shape the format of my dissertation.

Many thanks go to Mrs. Sarah Chaska for helping me with final copies of transcriptions of my

interviews. She was very professional in this field.

Last but by no means least, I would also like to extend my everlasting debt of gratitude to all

those who participated in the interviews in Zimbabwe, and the U.S.A.

March 2012

AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE OF AND REMEDIES FOR

vi
 CORRUPTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:

FOCUSING ON ZIMBABWE

Publication No. ___________________

Musafare Takaendesa Mupanduki, Ph.D.

The University of Texas at Dallas, 2012

ABSTRACT

Supervising Professor: Dr. Lloyd J. Dumas

This study examines the nature of and remedies for corruption in Zimbabwe by linking the

origins and spread of corruption to the unique colonization of Zimbabwe, the lasting legacy of

that colonization, and the actions and practices of international actors. In the same way, the

Zimbabwean leaders, politicians, business people and civil servants should share the blame for

that corruption. I argue that corruption cannot be blamed on one party but two parties who enter

into an unholy alliance. The review of literature consists of an analysis of the main causes of and

remedies for corruption. I found that the specific case of Zimbabwe, although with its unique

type of colonization, fits perfectly into all the causes and suggested remedies for corruption that

are mentioned in the literature review. In an attempt to find the nature of and remedies for

corruption, a collection of interviews, archival and documentary analyses were performed.

Through a combination of interviews, document analysis, and the real life-experience of living

in Zimbabwe, I found that much of the corruption in Zimbabwe was due to structures inherited

from the past. In addition, I also established that it will be very difficult to eradicate corruption

within the economic and political system that is currently in place in Zimbabwe.

vii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements........................................................................................................................v

Abstract........................................................................................................................................vii

List of Tables...............................................................................................................................xiii

List of Figures.............................................................................................................................xiv

List of Acronyms..........................................................................................................................xv

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION………………….………………………..…………......

…..1

1.1 Structure of the Study……....……………….………………………….….

……….....2

1.2 The Research Challenges…..…………………….…………………………….……..3

1.3 The Research Purpose……..…………………………….….……………….………..4

1.4 Justification……………………………………………….………………..…….……
4

1.5 Statement of Limitations.………………………………………...………………..

…..5

1.6 Statement of Ethics……..…………………………...…………………………...

…....5

CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW….……………………………………..……....……

7

2.1 Theoretical Framework……………………………………………………..…………

7

2.2 Conceptual Framework………………..……………….……………….…..…..……

12

CHAPTER THREE ZIMBABWE—BACKGROUND………………………...

……………….16
viii
 3.1 Country Profile……….......……………………………………………………….
….16

3.2 Introduction……………………………………………………………………….
….17

3.3 African Culture and Value Systems…………………...………………………...

…...18

3.4 The Establishment of Settler Colonialism in Zimbabwe..…………..

……………….22

3.5 Conclusion…….…………………………………………………………………..…
79

CHAPTER FOUR INSTITUTIONS AND STRUCTURES OF GOVERNANCE…...

………...83

4.1 Introduction………………………………………………………….
…………….....83

4.2 Executive………………….………………………………………….………..
……..88

4.3 Legislature.…………………………………………………………………..……....94

4.4 The Judiciary…………………………….…………..…………………………..

…...98

4.5 The Public Service.….

……………………………………………………………...103

4.6 The Police…………………………………………………………………….

…….109

4.7 Ombudsperson……………...……………………..………………………….
…….111

4.8 Anti-Corruption Commission………………………………………………….

…...115

4.9 Civil Society……………………………………...………………………………...119

ix
 4.10 The Media………………………..……………………………………..…………
125

4.11 Private Sector………….…………………………………………………….….…

129

4.12 International Institutions…………………………………...………………..

…….132

CHAPTER FIVE METHODOLOGY…………………….………………..

…………..............140

5.1 Research Questions…………………………………………………………………

140

5.2 Research Design……………….………………………………………….……...…

141

5.3 Strategies of Inquiry………..……………………………………..……….…..……

142

5.4 The Researcher’s Role…………………………………..………………..……...…

142

5.5 Data Collection Strategies…………………………….……….………………...

….143

5.6 Interviews………………………………………………………………………..
….143

x
 5.7 Archives/Documentary…………………………………………………..…………145

5.8 Observations…………………………..…………………………………………....146

5.9 Data Recording Procedures……………………………….………………..………146

5.10 Data Analysis……………………...……………...……………………………….147

5.11 Reliability and Validity……………………………………………………………147

5.12 Reporting Findings………………………………………...…………………...…148

5.13 Research Participants…………………………………………….……….……….149

5.14 The Interview Guide……………………………………..…………...….…….….153

CHAPTER SIX THE RESEARCH ANALYSIS……..………………………..……..…..……158

6.1 Colonial Zimbabwe……………………..………………….…………….……..….160

6.2 Post-Colonial Zimbabwe……………...………………….……………………..….163

6.3 Public Sector Corruption…………………………………………………....…..….167

6.4 Administrative Corruption……………………………………….……………....…170

6.5 Political/Grand Corruption………………………………………….……………...175

6.6 The Private Sector…………………………………………………………………..178

6.7 Civic Society…………………………………….………………….……………....181

6.8 Media…………………………………………………………………...…………..184

6.9 International Institutions……………………………………………….……...…....185

CHAPTER SEVEN MAJOR FINDINGS………..…………………………………………….191

7.1 Major Findings……………………………………………………………………...191

7.2 Policy Implications…………………………………………….………………..….199

 xi

7.3 Conclusion…………………………………..………………………….……..……212

7.4 Suggestions for Future Research on Corruption...……………………….........……216

APPENDIX A STAKEHOLDERS’ OUTLAY……...……………………...…....……...….….217

APPENDIX B INTERVIEW GUIDE………..…………………………………..…………….219

APPENDIX C LETTER OF INTRODUCTION………...…………………………….….……220

APPENDIX D INFORMED CONSENT LETTER……...…………………………….…….…

221 APPENDIX E THE NATIONAL FLAG OF ZIMBABWE...…………………………..…..

….223

REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………………..……..224

VITA
 xii

LIST OF TABLES

3.1 The Land Apportionment Act in Southern Rhodesia in 1930……….…………….………...47

3.2 Rhodesian Population Growth, 1901-1970………………………….………...……….…….50

5.1 Zimbabwe Stakeholders’ Respondents Outlay…….…………….……………...……...…..150

6.1 Corruption Perception Index for Zimbabwe, 1998-2008……….………………...…….…..165

7.1 Zimbabwe’s Yearly Inflation Rate from 1998-2008…….…………………………………193

xiii

LIST OF FIGURES
3.1 Map of Zimbabwe………….….…………………………………………………….….……16

3.2 Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 1965……………………..………….65

3.3 African Leaders at the Lancaster House Conference in London……...….……….…………74

xiv

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADB……………………………………………………….......………African Development Bank

ACC…………………………………………………......…….…….Anti-Corruption Commission

AU……………………………………………………...............................................African
Union
BSAC………………………………………………………………British South Africa Company

EPA…………………………………………………………….........…….Emergency Powers Act

CAF…………………………………………………………..………...Central African Federation

CAG…………………………………………………………….Comptroller and Auditor-General

CAT………………………………………………………...……...….Capacity Assessment Team

DFID……………………………………………..........Department for International Development

FLS……………………………………………………………….........................Front Line States

GNU………………………………………………………………..Government of National Unity

ICA…………………………………………………………………..Industrial Reconciliation Act

ICCPR…………………………………….International Convention on Civil and Political Rights

ILO………………………………………………………………International Labor Organization

IMF…………………………………………………………………..International Monetary Fund

JSC…………………………………………………………...……...Judicial Service Commission

LAA……………………………………………………………………...Land Apportionment Act

LOMA…………………………………………………………...Law and Order Maintenance Act

LTA…………………………………………………………..........……………..Land Tenure Act

xv

MP…………………………………………………………………..............Member of
Parliament

MSA…………………………………………………………...........………….Master Servant Act

NAAA…………………………………………………………….Native Affairs Amendment Act

NAD……………………………………………………………….…...Native Affairs Department

NC…………………………………………………………………………...Native Commissioner

NHLA……………………………………………………….....……..Native Land Husbandry Act

NRA…………………………………………………………………Native Regulation Ordinance

NUAA…………………………………………………………………….Native Urban Areas Act

OAU…………………………………………………………...…...Organization of African Unity

OPC…………………………………………………………...Office of the President and Cabinet

PAAA………………………………………………………....Public Accounts and Auditors Act

PAC……………………………………………………...…………...Public Accounts Committee

PIPPA……………………………………..Privileges, Immunities, and Powers of Parliament Act

PDA……………………………………………………………..……….Prevention Detention Act

POA……………………………………………………………………….……...Public Order Act

PSA……………………………………………………………………………..Public Service Act

PSC…………………………………………………………………....Public Service Commission

PSR……………………………………………………………………...Public Service Regulation

RF…………………………………………………………………………………..Rhodesia Front

SAA……………………………………………………………………..Subversive Activities Act

SAP……………………………………………………...……….Structural Adjustment Programs

SAPES…………………………………...……..Southern African Political Economy Series Trust

xvi

TI-Z……………………………………....…….………...Transparency International—Zimbabwe

TNC…………………………………………………………………..Trans National Corporations

UANC………………………………………………………….United African National Congress

UDI……………………………………………………….Unilateral Declaration of Independence

UNDP……………………………………………………...United Nations Development Program

UNHCR………………………………………..United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF……………………………………………...United Nations International Children Fund

UZ…………………………………………………………….......………University of Zimbabwe
ZANU…………………………………………………...…….Zimbabwe African National Union

ZAPU………………………………………………………….Zimbabwe African Peoples’ Union

ZANLA…………………………………....……….Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army

ZMC………………………………………..…..………………….Zimbabwe Media Commission

ZIPRA…………………………………………………..Zimbabwe Peoples’ Revolutionary Army

xvii

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Corruption is understood as everything from the paying of bribes to civil servants in

return for some favor and the theft of public purses, to a wide range of dubious economic and

political practices in which politicians and bureaucrats enrich themselves and any abuse of public

power to a personal end.

A few years after the European invasion, Zimbabwe evolved into a society in which a

“pre-colonial society which was people-centered with consensual and power-sharing leadership
dimensions was interrupted and destroyed by colonialism” (Herbst, 2000). By so doing,

colonialism replaced the political culture of leadership for the people based on accountability,

power-sharing and consensus with a culture of oppression and autocracy which has persisted

since independence and has led to a country ruled by corruption above anything else. According

to Transparency International (TI-Z) “corruption in Zimbabwe as in other sub-Saharan African

states is on the increase. It has reached epidemic proportions to the extent that there is a general

consensus that the scourge threatens to tear apart the very fabric of society.”(TI-Z, 2006/7:325)

The World Bank has lately named corruption as the “new” archenemy of development, and

numerous researchers such as Mauro,1998 and Ali Isse, 2003 have confirmed that corruption

indeed has deterrent effects on development.

1
 2

Although Zimbabwe is rich in resources, the income from these resources is deviated from the

majority of the population which still lives in abject poverty. In the face of these facts the

primary issues in this study focuses on the nature of and remedies for this corruption.

My research begins with the review of literature which explores the theoretical and

conceptual frameworks for the study of corruption. The process of the literature review was

complimented by interviews that I performed with high ranking officials from the public sector,

the media, civil society organizations, business community, representatives of international

organizations and archival/document analysis in Zimbabwe. During the interview process I

focused my attention on institutions and structures of governance and possible solutions for the

elimination or reduction of corruption. Simultaneously, I also engaged in the analysis of the

current anti-corruption measures by the government to understand its strategies.

With the combination of the research process, document analysis, interviews and my

personal experience in Zimbabwe I came to the conclusion that corruption is a multifaceted,

complex problem, and that any effort to combat it should recognize the need for a

comprehensive approach that cuts across disciplines.

1.1 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

The study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter One sets the introduction which

includes the purpose of the study, the research problem, justification for the research, and a

statement of limitation and ethical issues. Chapter Two is the review of previous literature,

which includes discussion of theoretical and conceptual frameworks. The detailed analysis of the

Zimbabwe background- including African value systems and the establishment of colonialism is

discussed in Chapter Three. Chapter Four examines institutions and structures of governance in

Zimbabwe. The presentation of methods is subject of Chapter Five.. The research analysis is
 3

dealt with in Chapter Six. Chapter Seven describes the major findings, policy implications,

conclusion and challenges for future research on corruption in Africa.

1.2 THE RESEARCH CHALLENGES

There are challenges that confront corruption studies in Zimbabwe. One of these

challenges is: how does one measure the incidence and seriousness of corruption where the giver

and recipient are both accomplices? Owing to the fact that corruption, particularly bribery,

involves mutually satisfying relations between parties involved, it is often difficult to accurately

capture its incidence or seriousness as cases of corruption are often not reported. Another crucial

challenge is how to define corruption in Zimbabwe where legality and morality seem to diverge.

In societies such as Zimbabwe, where the collectivist culture require public servants to bestow

favors on kinship/community networks, as a moral obligation, officials are often faced with the

dilemma of either succumbing to the requirements of their collectivist culture or submitting to

the law. This creates a conflict between private and public requirement of morality. The

challenges raise the difficulty of creating an appropriate research design to accurately capture

such a complex topic without compromising the ethicality of the research. (Alolo, 2006:4)

One of the major difficulties in corruption research has also been the lack of empirical

basis for the research. Most of the time we are dealing with complex transactions taking place in

large hierarchies to which independent researchers normally have no access, nor the appropriate

social networks for picking up and checking rumors. The information is indirect and until

recently unsystematic.

1.3 THE RESEARCH PURPOSE

The overall objective of the research is to conduct a baseline study as an initial step to

enhance an evidence-based understanding of corruption issues as they relate to sub-Saharan

 4

Africa but focusing on Zimbabwe, by collecting data on existing knowledge and activities,

drawing on national and international best practices, to identify knowledge and analytical gaps

and outlining suggestions for further analysis. Thus, the expected outcome of the research is to

strengthen awareness among advocacy components, the academic field and other stakeholders of

understanding corruption and its impediment to socio-economic development. It is intended to

serve as a reference for future action, the basis for further empirical research and a benchmark

for future performance in the fight against corruption in sub-Saharan Africa in general and

Zimbabwe in particular.

1.4 JUSTIFICATION

The study attempts to analyze the process and increase of corruption taking an approach that

traces the phenomenon to the history of Zimbabwe. It is true that corruption is one of the most

written about topics. Several documents have been written about the scourge of corruption

outlining some of the aspects of this pandemic, including its extent, causes and consequences.

However, most previous efforts to diagnose the factors accounting for corruption in Zimbabwe

and to prescribe solutions to it, seem to have failed to present an approach that integrates its

historical and international dimensions and also fail to focus on the totality of participants, that

is, the givers and the receivers. Moreover, the studies that link corruption directly to colonialism

make no attempt to explain corruption in Zimbabwe in terms of the country’s unique nature and

pattern of colonialism; a neo-European colony modeled along the lines of Australia, Canada,

New Zealand, South Africa and the United States. Thus, the ninety years of British settler

colonialism and exploitation provide the historical context for evaluating and understanding of

corruption in Zimbabwe today.

 5

The final issue examined by the study is the implications that the approach has for the

alleviation of the scourge of corruption. If the efforts geared toward combating corruption are to

work, there must be a departure from the previous emphasis on national causes of the problem to

focus on the internal and external drivers of the evil. This is particularly so given the growing

urgency to stamp out corruption in Zimbabwe.

1.5 STATEMENT OF LIMITATIONS

Before designing the research, there is a need to clearly specify the study population.

Findings cannot be generalized beyond the group. In this study, I would have preferred to

examine attitudes for both private and public officials across a number of private and public

institutions in all Commonwealth sub-Saharan Africa in order to generalize my findings to the

entire sector. However, the limitation of time, and above all, resources, rendered such a major

project infeasible. While I believe that the results of my study could be generalized to the entire

private and public sectors in the sub-Saharan African region, for diverse reasons, I can only

positively generalize findings to the several institutions subject to my study in Zimbabwe.

1.6 STATEMENT OF ETHICS

My preliminary study whose main purpose was to ensure the feasibility of this research

revealed four important issues, two of which were related to standard interview preliminaries

and the other two to interview techniques I was to adopt during the course of this research;

• First I obtained permission from the Research Council of Zimbabwe, the National Archives

of Zimbabwe, the media and from the Public Service Commission which is responsible for

all government institutions including the parastatals (government-owned public enterprises),

to make appointments and conduct interviews, analyze documents and make observations. I

also obtained permission from selected stakeholders in the private sector such as Central

Africa Pharmaceutical Society, Hunyani and a few others.

 6

• Second, preliminary study participants had to be clearly informed of the benefit of the study

not only to individuals but also their organizations and the nation as a whole. In that case, I

explained that the research was not about investigating who or which institution was corrupt

but was mainly intended to assess the nature of corruption in Zimbabwe and to find possible

remedies to the problem.

• Third, Participants needed full information about the purpose of the research in order to

respond to as many questions as possible.

• Finally, a sensitive research subject, such as corruption, where the mention of the word

sends cold shivers down public officials’ spines, does not only have to guarantee a high

degree of anonymity requires that some language must be rephrased, to get better response.

(Alolo 2006:5) Even in the preliminary exercise for this study, where officials knew their

response was only a pretest for the main study, they still expressed glaring signs of

discomfort upon hearing the word corruption. I, therefore, in certain circumstances, had to

change the introduction of the research topic from an analysis of the nature of corruption to

“public and private attitudes towards ethical dilemmas”. This would not deceive the

participants as corruption generally falls under the rubric of public sector ethics.
 CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Although there is a widespread agreement among academics, policymakers and the informed

public that corruption essentially involves the use of public office for private gain, there is no

consensus on the causes of corruption. An array of explanations includes “centralization of

power, lack of ethical leadership, morality, accountability, and transparency; greed; excessive

and over-centralized economic and political power and inefficiency”. (Riley, 1998:67)

Modernization

One of the explanatory theories of corruption is the Modernization thesis which offers the

earliest and most popular explanation for corruption in Africa. The theory argues that corruption

may be more prevalent during the most intense phases of modernization. (Abdullahi, 2004) To

buttress their position, these theorists, (Huntington, 1968; Mcmullan, 1970; Ekeh, 1975; Riggs,

1962:29-30) argue that “modernization involves a change in basic values”. The basic assumption

of this theory, of course, is that modern bureaucracy has been prematurely introduced into

Africa.” Its values and institutions are, at present, inappropriate to African”. (Okoli, 1980).
 8

Capitalist Orientation

Capitalist orientation of African states theory is used by left wing scholars to explain corruption

in Africa. They argue that “African states are the product of imperial adventure. In fact, the

present African territories were more or less incorporated as commercial interests of private

monopolies in Europe. The foundation of class domination by a handful of persons was laid

during the colonial period, and the relationship between the dominated and the rulers has

changed little since independence” (Olowu, 1988:221)

Centralization of Power

The first generation of African leaders took actions that tried to create a unitary and

strong central government; containing tribalism, mainly created by the colonial divide and rule

political systems. According to Mbaku, centralizing power and creating one party state,

therefore, became the norm”. (Mbaku, 1992:29) The effect was to create personal rule, and other

effects such as suffocation of civil society, external debt, economic decay and dependency,

hijacking most formal bureaucratic organizations, such as the civil service, the legislature and the

judiciary. (Hope, 1997) According to Fanon, “at independence both the retreating colonial

powers and the African nationalist elites wanted the state to be the engine of all social

processes.” (Fanon, 1961:148) Thus, later, Mbaku argues “ political competition failed to have a

significant impact on corruption since there were no institutional reforms that adequately

checked the exercise of a government agency to minimize corruption”. (Mbaku 1992:35)

The above theories are supported by recent empirical studies linking Africa’s current

corruption and underdevelopment to colonial rule. (Nunn 2005:157-175) The studies show that a

country’s colonial heritage, Price, 2003) and the identity of the Bertocchi and Canova 2002) “are
 9

important determinants of subsequent economic growth”. Lange (2004) finds that among former

British colonies, those that were governed by indirect rule are now less political stable and have

the worse corruption and rule of law. Englebert finds that “the inadequacies of arbitrarily

imposed post-colonial institutions explain a significant proportion of the rampant corruption of

the countries of sub-Saharan Africa” (Englebert, 2000a:179) Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) shows

that in former colonies where the colonizer’s focus was on extraction, weak institutions of

private property were established and these poor institutions persist today.

Participatory Democracy

Closely linked to the above is lack of participatory democracy in sub-Saharan African

states. The concentration of power has failed to nurture the birth of a popular participatory

democracy and to empower the press and civil society. (Johnston, 1998) Osoba (1996) has

argued that participatory democracy is a necessary requirement in combating corruption.

However, democracy does not guarantee clean governance. Many new democratic states in

Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America are characterized by high levels of corruption.

Relatively weak democratic structures in these countries have proven ineffective in curbing

corruption. (Harris-White and White, 1996)

Public Choice Perspective

In the public choice theory, corruption is seen as a post-constitutional opportunism aimed

at producing benefits for an individual or group at the expense of society; once the constitution is

adapted there is an incentive by individuals and groups to capture the state’s redistributive or

transfer power.
 10

Principal-Client-Agent

The Patron-Client-Agent theory such as that by Rose-Ackerman (1978) and Klitgaard

(1998) regard corruption as an information problem on behalf of the ‘principal’ who fails to

control the “agent” properly. In this context, the citizens who elect a politician are considered as

the principals and the politician as the agent—or the top level primarily rely on information

problems in explaining the incidence of corruption.

According to Gurger and Shah, “these theories heavily emphasize the importance of

monitoring the power of institutions and horizontal competition within the government as an

antidote to corruption.” (Gurgur and Shah, 2005:6-8) This classic principal-agent framework has

been extended to include chains of principal-agent relationships exploring various aspects of

private organizations with possible collusion among members. (Tirole and Laffont, 1996) Note

should be taken that there is little difference between the crime-and-punishment model and the

principal-agent model in explaining corruption. In both theories corruption is regarded as a

function of two major sets of variables: opportunities for corruption and controlling power of

institutions. The first set covers a wide range of variables from the size of government to state

intervention to the economy. The second captures various institutions such as internal control

mechanisms, judiciary, political institutions, and civil society.

Cultural

One more important theory needs to be mentioned. Some scholars and academics argue

that the practice of corruption has cultural characteristics. Detailed analysis of this thesis can be

found in (Mbaku 1998:65-66). However corruption should not be seen as culturally determined.

As shown by Hilton Root’s study of Hong Kong and Singapore (Root 1996), the quality of

political and legal institutions is not culturally determined. This is illustrated by the fact that

those societies have experienced remarkable economic growth, and Root shows convincingly
 11

that the prerequisite for that growth was the successful fight against corruption beginning in the

1970s. In a comparative perspective, those countries are distinguished by a relatively low extent

of corruption.

Political Will

This study argues that bringing colonialism into the analysis of corruption enables us to

inject a historical dimension in the explanation of its prevalence. The emphasis placed on the role

of the historical event of colonialism in the birth and entrenchment of corruption in sub-Saharan

Africa should, however, should not be construed as attributing corruption entirely to colonialism.

Indeed, if self-determination or (protracted war of liberation in the case of Zimbabwe) gave

African leaders the opportunity to choose what was good for their people, then one would be

justified in arguing that opportunity has existed for them to choose non-corrupt practices. That

they did not opt for that path is a clear indication of the total lack of commitment and political

will by the country’s political and bureaucratic elites to depart from corruption. (Mulinge and

Lesetedi, 1998:25)

International Actors

A comprehensive analysis of corruption must be explained in its international dimension.

According to Hirst and Thompson, “globalization has been accompanied by the emergence of

uncontrollable market forces and truly transnational corporations (TNCs) that dominate the basic

dynamics of the world global economy, and by a worldwide spread of manufacturing and sales.”

(Hirst and Thompson, 1996:38)

Johnston (1998) further argues that “increasing interdependence of economies and

markets makes it possible for corrupt agents to extend their dealings across borders. For instance,

it allows for the shifting of illicit profits out of poor countries into numbered bank accounts

elsewhere”.(Johnston, 1998:79) Thus, corruption in sub-Saharan Africa is not a problem that is

caused and sustained by internal factors alone. Rather, it is also a consequence of external factors
 12
manifested through the activities of foreign governments, aid organizations and private

companies seeking to further their own (economic) interests through actions and practices that

condone corrupt practices or that are corrupt themselves. (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 1999) Most

cases of grand corruption also have international dimensions: as pointed out by Gulfing “the

bribe giver might be a TNC; a corrupt politician might seek refugee from prosecution abroad;

and, most common of all, the proceeds of corruption can be secreted to numbered accounts in

foreign destinations”( Gulfing, 1988:118).

This analysis also focuses on the provision of “conditional loans and grants in aid, the

desires to protect economic and strategic interests, and the acquisition of contracts and business

licenses through kickbacks as practices that promote corruption.” (Mulinge and Lesitedi, 1999).

It also examines the role of IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs (Di Tella,

1997), including the imposition of economic embargos and sanctions as in the case of Zimbabwe

from 1965-1980 and from 2001 to Britain and its Western allies including the United States of

America.

2.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

It is essential to note from the outset that there is no single, comprehensive and

universally accepted definition of corruption. Senior, (2004:24) attributes the problems of

coming up with a convincing definition to the shades of corruption found in Heidenheimer

(1989). Heidenheimer attributes the definitional problems to the many shades that corruption

takes and the complex processes of decision making. He is cited by Kalcheim, (2004) as having

classified corruption into three categories, namely, black corruption—indicating that a particular

action is one that a majority consensus grounds of principle; grey corruption—indicating that

some elements, usually elites, may want to see action punished, others not, and the majority may

well be ambiguous; white corruption signifying that the majority of both elite and mass opinion
 13

would not vigorously support an attempt to punish a form of corruption that they regard

tolerable. (Senior, 2006:24)

Though there are technical hitches in agreeing on a common universal definition, it is

extremely important to define corruption so that the actions of individuals and institutions can be

judged as corrupt or not corrupt. To this end, this study explores the definitions given by

different authors and draft a working definition used in the study.

Defining corruption has become a matter of classifying behavior rather than whole

societies, a process based ultimately on the idea of “the abuse of public roles invested with power

that is impersonal, limited, and held in trust”. (Moodie, 1980:29) These definitions have taken a

number of forms, but as Williams points out, “even those who wish to refrain from giving

preference to “western” or legalistic conceptions of office still define corruption with reference

to some underlying conception of office”. (Williams, 1999:43)

While most behavior-classifying definitions fall into Heidenheimer’s enduring categories

of “public-office-centered”, “market-centered”, and “public-interest-centered” (Heidelheimer,

(1989 ed.: 8-11) and Williams, (1999) correctly points out that all three approaches ultimately

rest upon a conception of public office. Nye provides the best-known example of public-office

definition:

“[corruption is] behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of

private-regarding (close family, personal, private clique) pecuniary or private-regarding

influence”. (Nye, 1967: 417)

Heidenheimer offers Van Klaveren’s as an example of the market –centered approach:

“A corrupt civil servant regards his public office as a business, the income of which he will…

seek to maximize. The office then becomes a “maximizing unit.” The size of his income
 14
depends…upon the market situation and his talents for finding the point of maximal gain on the

public’s demand curve”(Heidenheimer, 1989b:9)

The Zimbabwe Prevention of Corruption Act (1985:10) defines corruption as:

“If any agent solicits, accepts, obtains, agrees or attempt to obtain from any person a gift or

consideration for himself or any other persons as endowment or reward for doing, or for having

done or not done any act, in relation to his principals’ affairs or business.”

A study on corruption conducted in February 2003, by the Zimbabwe Mass Media Public

Opinion Institute came out with these definitions: ‘the use of one’s position of power, be it in the

public sector or private sector, to enrich him/herself at the expense of the public.’ The other

common definition from this study was ‘the abuse of public office to obtain personal profits

through bribery, nepotism, fraud and embezzlement.’

Having argued and suggested thus, the working definition of this study has two major

elements. First, the study conceptualizes corruption not as an attribute of a particular action or

individual, but rather as a systematic problem having to do with the sources, uses, limits, and

accountability of wealth and power. Second, in the light of the foregoing, the study treats

corruption as the abuse of public roles or resources for private benefit—emphasizing that terms

such as abuse, public, private, and even benefit are matters of considerable ambiguity or dispute

in many societies. Indeed, the terms of this definition are nothing new but the purposes are

different. In effect, this study seeks to keep some of the old answers regarding definitions of

corruption but to change the question that is asked.

 CHAPTER THREE

ZIMBABWE–BACKGROUND

3. 1 COUNTRY PROFILE

Figure3.1. Map of Zimbabwe

Area: 390,757 sq. km (150,872 sq. mi)

Population: 13.5 million (UN 2008). Note: more than 3 million Zimbabweans are now

estimated to live outside the country

Capital City: Harare (population of Greater Harare: 1.1 million)

People: Shona, Ndebele, Others (10%)

Languages: English (official language), Shona and Ndebele

Religion(s): Christian (various); indigenous; small Hindu, Muslim, Jewish communities

Currency: Multi-currency, predominantly the US dollar and South African rand (the most
 16

16

widely used currencies) but also the Botswana pula, British pound and the euro. The Zimbabwe

dollar was suspended indefinitely by the Zimbabwe government in April 2009 following a period

of hyper-inflation.

Head of State: President Robert Mugabe, ZANU(PF) (since 1987)

Prime Minister: Morgan Tsvangirai, MDC-T (since February 2009)

Foreign Minister: Simbarashe Mumbengegwi, ZANU(PF) (since April 2005)

Membership of international groupings/organisations: United Nations (UN), International

Monetary Fund (IMF) ; World Bank, African Union (AU), Southern African Development

Community (SADC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and Non

Aligned Movement (NAM). Zimbabwe withdrew from the Commonwealth on 7 December 2003

following its suspension from the Councils of the Commonwealth.

Source: National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ)

3.2 INTRODUCTION

In order to have an insight into the link between Zimbabwe’s colonization and corruption

this analysis will take the term corruption as defined by Osoba, refers to:

“a form of anti-social behavior by an individual or social group which confers unjust or

fraudulent benefits on its perpetrators, is inconsistent with the established legal norms and

prevailing moral ethos of the land and is likely to subvert or diminish the capacity of the

legitimate authorities to provide fully for the material and spiritual well-being of all members of

society in a just and equitable manner.”(Osoba, 1996:372)

While much research publication on colonialism has focused on the economic and

political issues, less attention has been paid to the effects of colonialism on African relationships

and perceptions of the past, particularly the manner in which African peoples have been alienated

from their heritage. It has of course been frequently noted that African cultural values and
 17
systems suffered and continue to suffer as the colonizing powers forced Africans to abandon their

religious beliefs, government systems, and a host of other traditional ways of doing things. In

much of Southern Africa, for example, “the introduction of Christianity led to the creation of new

values which, in the long term, led Africans to neglect and despise their past cultural

values.”(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008:40) Before Zimbabwe was colonized, the country was

characterized by a large degree of pluralism and flexibility. The country consisted of the Ndebele

and Shona ethnic groups with unique unchanging cultures, and more fluid units that would

readily incorporate outsiders (including whites) into the community as long as they accepted its

customs, and where the sense of obligation and solidarity went beyond nuclear family.

3.3 AFRICAN CULTURE AND VALUE SYSTEMS

Family and Political Organization

Pre-colonial Zimbabwean society was of a varied nature. Both the Ndebele kingdom and

the Shona chiefdoms were founded on the principles of communalism in that they were

selfgoverning, autonomous entities, and that all members took part, directly or indirectly, in the

daily running of the ethnic group. The chiefs ran the daily affairs of the nation together with one

or more councils. These councils simultaneously informed the chief, checked his powers and

made policy by reaching unanimous decisions. If unanimity was not reached, a village assembly

would be called to debate the issue and majority ruling would now apply. The chief would

silently listen to all queries during such debates and every male adult was free to criticize him.

The role of the chief during such debates was to sum up what had been said and attempt to form

some consensus among the diverse opinions. Hence the chief did not rule or dictate but ruled by

consensus.

Basic control over social and political groupings seems to have been exercised through a

belief in various levels of spirit cults, ranging from the system of individual guardian spirits

controlled by village elders at the level of the extended family and descent group, through a
 18

progressive hierarchy of ritually senior, loosely territorial land spirits holding sway over the

progressively larger realms of neighborhood leaders, petty chieftains, chiefs, and paramount

chiefs. Leaders at each level controlled a following of spirits and living people who were

interconnected, and the fluctuating network of alliances between leaders as symbolized and held

together by an intermittent traffic in tribute, diplomatic missions, and religious congregations

coming to the shrines at the various headquarters (mazimbabwe) of the confederacy. When the

confederacy was large and not rent by civil war and secession, the system culminated in a

unifying central cult devoted to a supreme spirit, such as the Mwari Nyadenga, supporting the

Mambo, whom the Portuguese called king or emperor. The society could easily depose a chief

who was thought to have abused his power. Accountability and transparency were, therefore, an

obligation on the part of the African political value systems.

Economic Survival

The external trade of the Zimbabwe culture, whose main occupation at Great Zimbabwe

dates from the 12th to the 15th centuries, was linked to world demand, especially from India Its

primary exports were gold, ivory, and copper; its major imports were cloth and beads, followed

by ceramics. (Garlake, 1973:131-135) The gold trade was politically important because of its

diplomatic prestige value; on the other hand, both gold mining and gold washing were nearly

always seasonal and secondary occupations carried on during the slack dry period in the annual

Shona cycle of subsistence cultivation. “Patron-client relations between Shona groups were

often expressed through limited symbolic tribute in agricultural labor, food, military service,

slaves, gold, ivory, cattle, wives, and other locally produced prestige items which the leaders

could then use in external trade.” (Theal, 1979:398-9)

In pre-colonial Zimbabwe agricultural and pastoral farming were also basic features of

economic activities. Land was held commonly and could not be bought or sold, although other
 19
things, such as cattle, were owned individually. Africans did not practice subsistence agriculture

alone, rather, they were involved in a complex agricultural economy that produced both food and

cash crops. The Shona also practiced animal husbandry and attached great value to their cattle.

Beach has provided a contextualized argument that “cattle had both economic and social value

within Shona society.” (Beach 1976:46) Cattle could be killed for meat and hides, milked, sold

in order to acquire other material resources, used for the payment of lobola, the bride price, and

relied upon during years of crop failure, and thus, cattle were the people’s insurance.

“Peasantization was well underway before the advent of colonialism”. (Arrighi, 1970:17)

African Land Tenure System

European invaders in Southern Rhodesia denigrated African land tenure systems as

‘communal’ since they believed that “individual freehold title was the highest form of evolution

in land tenure.” (Palmer 1977:18) The African land tenure systems tend to be misunderstood. For

example, “Europeans thought of land grants made to them by Africans as grants of ownership

more or less temporary, of occupational use.” (Palmer 1977:16) It is worth quoting Palmer at

length when discussing the differences in attitude regarding land:

“…in Rhodesia a European cannot sell “his” to an African; while in Shona society no one can

dispose of rights to land to a third party, except to the next of kin in the case of senility or death.

In terms of obligations there are various similarities between black and European rural

communities in the sense that there is very strong social pressure to be a good neighbor and offer

help and hospitality to those in need. Such obligations were rather strong in Shona society and

extended to acknowledging the authority of the land-giver, the ward headman, which did not

apply to Europeans. Shona chiefdoms in fact covered virtually the whole of Rhodesia, and there

were very few parts of the country where there was not one clear individual, a ward headman,

who was able to give permission to settle. The chiefdoms themselves, often as a result of wars

and conflicts overland were almost always contiguous and defined by ‘rivers, minor streams,
 20

ridges or imaginary lines between hills and trees.’ As Beach points out: “A chiefdom might not

occupy all its land, but it would know its frontiers and it would be most sensitive to any invasion

by strangers.” (Beach, 1980:37) The Europeans chose to disregard such factors, and they were

also guilty of seriously underestimating the security inherent in Shona land tenure, whereby

“because the land and its resources belong to the community, every full member of this

community has an inalienable right to a reasonable share according to his requirement.” (Palmer,

1977:17)

Although the tenure system was egalitarian, these traditional societies were not classless.

A rich upper class could afford the luxuries of elaborate stonewalls around well-built huts, ample

livestock, and various delicacies. As Beach argues, “this upper class existed alongside an

underclass that owned a few or no cattle, and less elaborate huts. Most of this information was

derived from archeological evidence gathered at the site of the ancient Shona state at Zimbabwe

that rose between the 13th century, and reached its peak in the late 14th century, and collapsed by

16th century”. (Beach, 1980:36-51)

3.4 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SETTLER COLONIALISM IN ZIMBABWE

The term colonialism is used here to refer to “an international system of economic

exploitation in which more powerful nations dominate weaker ones”. (Johnson, 1995:11) A

distinction is made between two phases of colonialism: that is, active and passive colonialism.

(Mulinge & Lesetedi 1998:15-28) The former refers to the conquest of a people followed by the

direct control of the same by the conquerors using a combination of measures such as military

coercion and dominance of major internal institutions such as the polity. The latter, on the other

hand, represents what is commonly referred to as neo-colonialism or the extension of especially

economic domination of a people beyond the attainment of self rule. The second phase of

colonialism, relevant to this analysis, is associated with practices, policies and structures
 21
inherited from the first phase. These constitute a colonial legacy that, in my view, impact on the

extent of corruption in independent Zimbabwe and while the former is here associated with

origins/birth of corrupt practices, the latter is considered to be partially responsible for the

entrenchment of it.

Spreading “Civilization, Christianity and Commerce” was the rationale offered for

colonizing Africa. To this day debate continues on how Africa has benefited from its colonial

experience. “But the drama of colonization was not just a European affair.” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni,

2008:39) It was an encounter between human beings, both European (white) and African (black).

The pre-occupation of each was to make sense, and take advantage of the other. In Diana Jeater’s

words;

“There was a mutual lack of recognition and understanding, expressed through both goodwill

and hostility. The “other” was potentially a fellow but potentially an enemy or savage. There was

room for uncertainty. Interactions succeeded or failed; people learned from their interactions”

(Jeater, 2007:2)

Therefore, apologists for colonialism would argue that colonialism benefited its subjects and may

even have imposed a burden on the colonizers. (Smith 1997) Africa may have benefited from the

infrastructure, western education, commerce, and medical expertise brought by Europeans. A

closer analysis of colonialism, however, will show that the benefits tended to be self-serving and

often were outweighed by the final legacy of dysfunction and ruthless dictatorship that ensued.

One of the several places where this argument is amply illustrated is in Southern

Rhodesia, “where the Europeans gradually and systematically displaced and pauperized the

native Africans by a combination of means: treaties/covenants, military and other forms of force,

a series of self-serving laws, discriminatory policies, and ideological intrigues” Keppel-Jones

1983:69). Thus, ‘Zimbabwe’s foundation was based on a triple heritage, namely; a heritage of

force and violence, through colonial occupation, dispossession, and dehumanization by white
 22

prospectors from South Africa looking for gold and then stumbled onto elephant tusks and then

forcibly seized African cattle and land when gold did not come handy.” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni,

2009:39-74) The colonialists replaced the African governance and land tenure systems and

created the myth of the lazy, primitive, and savage natives who needed a heavy hand to guide

them toward civilization and productivity. This myth was used to rationalize the displacement

and underdevelopment of Africans in colonial Southern Rhodesia.

Rather than using the traditional definition of “development,” i.e. the higher the per capita

income, the higher the level of development, as some scholars would do (Yudelman, 1964:44), I

will employ Amartya Sen’s theory that the essence of “development” is not just poverty

alleviation, but also the means to allow people to live meaningful lives with greater substantive

freedoms. These freedoms include: “democracy, an extension of economic opportunities,

characterized by unrestricted participation on the markets and in the labor force, access to such

basic necessities as educational institutions and healthcare facilities; the provision of safety nets

to protect people from harsh economic conditions and poverty; and the people’s right to critical

information.” (Sen, 1999:34) For Amartya Sen, therefore, development and freedom are

interconnected, and they reinforce each other.

The colonization of Zimbabwe was a complex affair that ignored indigenous people’s

development and involved the capitalist interests of the Cape, Natal, the Rand (South Africa) and

London, the British Foreign office, the Colonial Office, the Governors and High Commissioners

of the Cape, as well as the missionary interests and those of the Afrikaans and the Portuguese.

(Keppel-Jones, 1983) Finally the British emerged as the colonizers in 1890. Nevertheless,

Britain’s unwillingness to become directly entangled in colonial acquisitions and colonial

administration did not become a barrier to her capitalist expansions. She resorted to the practice

of using chartered companies, on her behalf, which had already been well-tried in India and
 23
Canada in the seventeenth century. Ndhlovu-Gatsheni argues that “the occupation of Zimbabwe

must therefore be seen in the light of British economic considerations, and the feeling that she

had to colonize the area north of the Limpopo River, so that she could control the balance of

power and ultimately stabilize the region for her own exploitation.” Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008) The

discovery of large quantities of gold deposits in the Transvaal, of course, gave rise to high

expectations and hope that the ‘golden belt’ stretched further north to the Limpopo River. It

followed that there was to be enormous competition from other European countries and the

Afrikaans in South Africa—all searching minerals and concessions. The British government

forestalled these advances by fraudulently laying paper claims to the area that was to become

Southern Rhodesia.1

The Rudd Concession (1888)—Deception, Fraud and Faith

The earliest representatives of the imperial world were the Christian missionaries who

eventually played a major role in the subjugation of the Africans in the late 1890s. (Ndlovu

Gatsheni, 2008) The white missionaries who accompanied the settler pioneer column deceived

the Matebele King Lobengula to sign away Zimbabwe. Thus, what had started as a cultural

encounter, characterized by mutual trading and attempts to convert Africans to Christianity, was

taking on a violent colonial dimension. Missionaries were not just the bearers of a hegemonic

Christian ideology but were also human vehicles of a Western world view. Gann argued that

“their mission was to engage African communities in a web of symbolic and material

transactions that was to bind them ever more securely to the colonizing culture.” (Gann,

1964:124-176). However, missionary activities did not directly challenge the autonomy of the

African polities. But Christianity by its very nature was “dangerous as it entailed the colonization

of the Africans’ consciousness with the axioms and aesthetics of ‘corrupt’ western culture.”
1 The best study of the opening of Rhodesia from the perspective of British imperial policies is
Ronald
Robinson and John Gallagher with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians (London, Macmillan,
1963).
 24

(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007:173-191) Christian teachings emphasized individual accountability to

God alone, thus undermining African ideologies of divine leadership that combined political,

judicial and religious powers and therefore accountable to the people. In fact, the creation of the

British South Africa Company (BSAC), together with the missionary factor and the raising of an

armed invasion force, was indicative of how Western powers were prepared to destroy African

social, spiritual, economic and political formations. The missionaries dismissed the African ways

of worshipping God as nothing but paganism while at the same time belittling their ancestral

spirits as demons and evil spirits (The London Missionary Record, 1864: xxvii).

In early 1888, John Moffat, a London Missionary Society official persuaded Lobengula

the Ndebele King to sign a treaty to protect the riches in Matebeleland and Mashonaland. It is

alleged that he signed the treaty claiming to be not only the King of the Ndebele, but also of the

Shona people, thus putting all these territories under the British sphere. Lobengula could not sign

another treaty with any other European treaty-seeker, and in return, Lobengula hoped to gain

British protection from the Transvaal Boers. According to Beach:

“The reason why Lobengula agreed to the treaties and concessions that he did, in spite of the fact

that most of those he tried to deal with were cheating him, was in order to keep foreign capitalist

influence in and around his state to a minimum. He tried nearly every possible means to avoid

outright war with the whites, because he did not think he could win” (Beach, 1884:1667)

On October 13, 1888, Lobengula, under the influence of a London Missionary Society’s official

C.D. Helm, and his most senior indunas,7 Lotshe and Sikombo, signed the Rudd Concession.

Charles Rudd, Rochfort Maguire, and Francis Thomson represented John Cecil Rhodes at the

meeting with Lobengula. The terms of the Rudd Concession were:

• Lobengula’s heir’s and successors would be paid one hundred thousand pounds sterling

every month;
 25
• One hundred Martin-Henry breech rifles and one thousand rounds of suitable ball

cartridges would be delivered to Lobengula;

• Either an armored steamboat to be kept on the Zambezi River would be delivered to

Lobengula, or else he would be paid five hundred thousand pounds sterling. (Ndlovu-

Gatsheni, 2009:44)

As observed by Phimster, on his part, Lobengula granted Cecil Rhodes and his men;

“the complete and exclusive charge over all metals and minerals situated and contained in my

kingdom, principalities and dominion together with full power to do all things that they may

deem necessary to win and procure (find) the same and whereas I have been much molested of

late by divers (sic) persons seeking and desiring to obtain grants and concessions of land and

mineral rights in my territories, I do hereby authorize the said grantees, to take all necessary and

lawful steps to exclude my kingdom all persons seeking land or mining rights from and after this

date without their consent.” (Phimster 1974:6)

Academics question the validity and authenticity of both the Moffat Treaty and the Rudd

Concession on the grounds that Lobengula was not “King” of both Mashonaland and

Matebeleland, and yet his “X” signature opened the doors to both provinces. Palmer has

expressed the opinion that:

“Lobengula, of course, had no right in customary law to make such a grant as far as the Ndebele

homeland was concerned, for land was not a marketable commodity; still yet did he have the

right to sign away land over the whole country. But the legal fiction that Lobengula controlled

the whole of Rhodesia at least saved the company the bother of tracking down the Shona Chiefs

and ‘persuading’ them to sign farcical treaties like those obtained by Thompson and Sharpe in

North-Eastern Rhodesia” (Palmer, 1976:27-36).

Blake(1977) disagrees with the interpretation that the Rudd Concession made positive grant of

land to settlers; and Bowman has asserted the concession was “secured by fraud, threat and
 26

negotiation concessions on mineral rights from Lobengula…” (Bowman, 1973:5) It was therefore

not surprising that when colonization began, Lobengula claimed that he had been deceived.

Hoping to exploit to his own advantage the enmity between Cecil Rhodes and one

Edouard Lippert, Lobengula signed another treaty on April 22, 1891 with Lippert’s associate

Renny-Tailyour. The Lippert Concession was according to Palmer a land concession that

granted: “The sole and exclusive right, power, and privilege for the full term of 100 years to lay

out, grant, or lease…farms, townships, building plots and grazing areas; to impose and levy rents,

licenses and taxes thereon, and to get in, collect and receive the same for his own benefit; to give

and grant certificate…for the occupation of any farms, townships, building plots and grazing

areas” (Palmer, 1977:27-28).

Cecil Rhodes bought the Lippert Concession and was able to consolidate his control over

Mashonaland and Matebeleland. (Bowman , 1973:6) This transaction “legally” transferred

thousands of hectares of African land to Cecil Rhodes and marked the beginning of the

commoditization of land in Zimbabwe. Thus, this “legality” culminated in the first phase of the

dispossession process. The Africans remained on the land, but no longer had any legal rights of

possession. Customary law was replaced with a “legal” fact or fiction: a fact for the Europeans, a

fiction at this time for the Africans. In 1894 Lobengula unsuccessfully tried to have the treaties

revoked by sending a delegation to England seeking Queen Victoria’s intervention.

Thus, unlike other British territories which were, in turn, occupied, annexed and

governed by Britain, Zimbabwe never experienced a British military or administrative presence

(Windrich, 1975:vi). The country became a colony not through conquest necessarily, but through

among other things, fraud, deception, and faith on the part of Lobengula. Indeed, “ the Rudd

Concession gave Rhodes mineral rights to an area which was ultimately interpreted to embrace

all of the present boundaries of Zambia and Zimbabwe.” (Bowman 1973:7)

 27
With this concession in hand, and despite Lobengula’s protests, Rhodes was able to

obtain a royal charter from the British on October 29, 1889, to create the British South Africa

Company (Bowman, 1973:8) Modeled on the British and Dutch East India companies, the

British South Africa Company (BSAC) was a commercial political entity with a mandate to

focus on the exploitation and expropriation of Zimbabwe’s economic resources such as gold and

diamonds as well as on political powers to clear the way for British finance capital. “The BSAC

had the power to raise its own police force, fly its own flag, build roads, railways, telegraphs and

harbors, establish banks, conduct mining operations and settle territories that it acquired.”

(Blake, 1977:54)

African Dispossession and Proletarianization

The problem of Zimbabwe has been unique in the tortuous history of decolonization.

The country was named Rhodesia derived from Rhodes the leader of the BSAC. According to

Blake, “it was in May 1898 that the BSAC officially adopted the name Rhodesia, but was not

recognized by the British government until the Southern Rhodesia Order-in Council of 1898.”

(Blake, 1977:115) The Order-in-Council became the governing instrument of Rhodesia until the

time of responsible government in 1923. It was a compromise between imperial and BSAC

interests. (Palley, 1966:10-16) What was being constructed was a settler colony whose major

characteristics, as in Australia and Canada, were land seizures, the arrival of a settler population,

segregated internal colonial governance, and political and economic privileges for the white

community. Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen correctly noted that:

“settler colonialism was marked by ongoing negotiation and struggle among four key groups—

an imperial metropolis where sovereignty formally resided, a ‘local administration charged with

maintaining order and authority, an indigenous population significant enough in size and tenacity

to make its presence felt and an often demanding and well-connected settler community’—that
 28

were expecting to reap dividends from their domination of the African population.” (Elkins and

Pedersen, 2005:4)

Thus, as pointed out by Bowman, “from the first days of white occupation, the Europeans

implemented laws and ordinances regulating the African population to serve white settler

needs.” (Bowman,1973:9). Quite unlike other British colonies whose system of African control

was through indirect rule, in Zimbabwe, the settlers went for what Mahmood Mamdani termed

the bifurcation of the colonial state. In this scheme of things, “direct rule took the form of urban

civil power that excluded Africans from civil liberties and freedoms.” (Mamdani, 1996:18) While

Mmadani provides a picture of a neatly dichotomized bifurcation of the colonial state into

‘citizens’ and ‘subjects’, the evidence from the Africans’ interaction with the early settlers

indicates a contested boundary that was porous and exploitable by whites. The early colonial

state introduced many measures in its endeavor to build a racially bifurcated colony, dotted with

white cities. Thus, under the 1898 regulations a policy of direct rule was implemented throughout

African areas. The policy was administered by the Native Affairs Department (NAD), which had

the authority to appoint all chiefs and headmen and to amalgamate and subdivide tribes. “In

theory the chain of command ran from the British government through the local European

administration to the chiefs, headmen, kraal heads, and on to the African people, but in practice

Native Commissioners (NCs) had vast discretionary authority.” (Bowman, 1973:11) A

combination of administrative, judicial, and legislative functions lay in the hands of the NCs and

no aspect of African life failed to come under their purview. 2 NCs were in charge of fraudulent

land allocation, tax collection and pass administration. Consistent with (Osoba, 1996:371-386),

this practice is viewed here as a by-product of traits of fraudulent behavior derived from British,

French, German, Portuguese and other colonial rulers. In fact, the Native Affairs Act (NAA) of

2 Report on Administrative and Judicial Functions of Native Affairs,

(1961:53-110).
 29
1927 consolidated all previous rules and regulations and gave the native commissioner new

jurisdiction in African civil cases and in criminal cases where the accused was an African. The

NAA gave NCs exclusive criminal jurisdiction over NAA-stipulated offenses. Thus, the native

commissioner became prosecutor, plaintiff, witness, and judge, (all in one) over these broadly

defined offenses.

Pass laws controlled Africans’ entry into, and movement within urban areas. They were

administered by the Native Affairs Department (NAD) through a 1902 act which required every

adult male to register with his native commissioner upon reaching his 14 th birthday. Other laws

such as Native Registration Act (NRA) of 1936 and the Native Urban Areas Act (NUA) of 1946,

consolidated previous regulations and augmented the methods of urban control. It is therefore not

surprising that “early urban settlements had characteristics of expanding ‘settler laagers’

permeated by surveillance as well as the colonial politics of control, segregations and

exploitation.” (Yoshikuni, 2007:3)

The use of African labor in the farms and in the mines was enforced by the levying of

taxes which could only be met from wages earned in the European economy. The hut tax of

1895, promulgated by the BSAC, quickly came to be enforced as an annual fee assigned to each

adult male African in the country, both indigenous and foreign. According to Mulinge and

Lesetedi, “the introduction of a monetary tax-namely, the hut and later poll tax was a very

significant way by which the British settler colonial government fostered the growth of

corruption. It was not the introduction of taxation per se, but the manner in which the tax itself

was collected that encouraged corrupt behavior,” (Mulinge & Lesetedi 2002:54). The labor

demanded of the head of the family was to enable him to pay the head tax in return for the

individual’s freedom and that of the family. Failure to pay tax made him a real prisoner or

permanent fugitive in hiding from the agents of the state. Taxes, therefore, would be considered a

punishment rather than a duty conferring on the tax payer entitlement to social benefits, human
 30

and political rights in a free society. In this way, payment of tax did not give the payer the right

to question the reason and manner in which taxes would be dispensed reinforcing even further

the non-accountability of the colonial state to the individual African.

What became known as isibalo (Ndebele) or chibaro (Shona) referred to a system of forced

recruitment of African people, who were required to sign long contracts that obliged them to

remain under the compound conditions at their places of work. Thus forced labor was the

beginning of the process of dispossession and forcible proletarianization of the Africans in

Zimbabwe. In Chibaro: African Mine Labor in Southern Rhodesia, Charles van Onselen

analyzed how the Africans were forced to provide labor to the mining sector:

“Such means included the restriction of Africans’ access to land in order to undercut peasant

agricultural production and increasing taxation as a way to force Africans to sell their labor

cheaply to mine owners.” (Charles van Onselen, 1976:91)

The tax was increased from ten shillings to one pound in 1904 (Bowman, 1973:15).

Forced labor was undoubtedly practiced in many areas, and L.H. Gann has computed that “with

the possible exception of the Transvaal, the Rhodesian African tax was the highest anywhere in

Southern Africa” (Gann, 1965:124-175). In addition, there were two fundamental aims of the

mining sector during early colonial period: output maximization and cost minimization. The

latter had to be achieved by ensuring that African workers received starvation wages. Van

Onselen, further commented that:

Van Onslen contends that “through changes in the structure of the political economy, between

1903 and 1912, Ndebele and Shona tribesman were becoming increasingly proletarianized. The

structural determinants of the process of proletarianization, such as access to land, taxation and

the inroads made by an increasingly competitive white commercial agricultural industry, were
 31
supplemented by the techniques used by mine managers to produce these features.” (van Onselen

1976:100)

In fact, forced labor was built into the exploitative Master and Servant Act (MSA) of 1891 under

which labor contracts were defined. Bowman argues that “ under the MSA African workers were

subject to numerous regulations that channeled them into certain jobs and delimited their rights

and opportunities”. (Bowman, 1973:17) MSA became the basic legislation controlling Africans

in domestic service and on European farms—two job categories which together comprised 50

percent of the total African workforce. Under the MSA, it was an offense not to obey the ‘lawful’

order of an employer, and an employee could be charged for “insulting his master, neglecting his

master’s property and deserting from his master’s service” (Sanderson, 1961:259-259)

A combined deployment of such legislation as the MSA, the Pass Laws and the Native

Regulations Ordinance (NRA) provided mine owners with semi-feudal powers over the lives of

the African laborers that were close to those of the slave owners of the 19th century (Clark,

1974:17-38). The development of both white agricultural and mining sectors in Southern

Rhodesia took the form of undermining the Africans’ means of livelihood. Only when Africans

had been dispossessed of their land and cattle would they depend on selling their labor cheaply to

the mines and farms. As noted by Phimister (1974:73), “the wanton undercutting of African

peasant production was sowing the seeds of underdevelopment in reserves of Southern Rhodesia”

(Phimister, 1974:73). Land expropriation was part of a broader strategy of creating property less

natives dependent on selling their labor. The unsteady development of white commercial

agriculture was a tale of the monetization of the economy, a tale of dispossession and

proletarianization and this has had a profound effect on the African population in postcolonial

Zimbabwe.

Structures of Settler Colonial Control and Ideology

 32

Recent research has revealed that modern African ethnicity is a social construction of the

colonial period through the reactions of pre-colonial societies to the social, economic, cultural

and political forces of colonialism. Berman contends that “the strategic logic of political control

in the settler colonial state in Southern Rhodesia, rested on a particular application of divide and

rule, namely a practice of fragmenting and isolating African political activity within the confines

of local administrative sub-divisions and thereby inhibiting the spread of opposition and

resistance to a colony-wide basis where it might threaten to overwhelm the limited coercive

resources at hand.” (Berman, 1989:162) Each administrative unity ideally contained a single

culturally and linguistically homogenous ‘tribe; in which people continued to live within the

indigenous institutions and were subject to ‘tribal discipline’ through local structures of

authority. The imperative of control thus also constrained the transformation of African societies

and, indeed, made what the white colonial state understood to be the local institutions of tribe and

kinship into the grassroots foundations of settler colonial domination, as well as a means by

which it could derive a degree of legitimacy from association with ‘traditional’ social forces.

( Ekeh, 1993:683-5)

Furthermore, all colonial powers in Africa, as Mamdani has recently argued, practiced a

form of indirect rule, ‘decentralized despotism,’ through local chiefs and village headmen,

regardless of whether they characterized their systems as ‘indirect rule’ or ‘administration

directe.’ (Mamdani, 1996:2-3). The most important political relationship in the settler colonial

state in Southern Rhodesia as indicated earlier was the alliance between Native Commissioners

(NCs) and the chiefs of administrative sub-divisions and village headmen beneath them. The

extensive autonomy and discretion that NCs exercised in practice was applied primarily to

working out an effective relationship with their local African collaborators, who supplied the
 33
actual day-to-day presence muscle of colonial domination. Chiefs and headmen were the

essential linkage between the settler colonial state and African societies (Berman, 1989:160-3).

This relationship typically took on a patron/client form, and had several important and

contradictory consequences.

First, NCs sought to provide chiefs and headmen with sources of income and patronage to

supplement their generally meager official salaries and to reward them, along with influential

elders of powerful local families and growing numbers of other African officials, teachers,

wealthy farmers and businessmen with some of the profits of commodity production and trade.

The distribution of such resources materially demonstrated the benefits of colonialism and

secured the loyalty of those who shared them. This both reinforced the role of the state as the

principal source of the benefits of modernity and development, and gave a partisan cast to its

involvement in the contradiction between accumulation and control. It also, and most crucially,

made patron/client relations not only the fundamental mode of access to the state and its

resources, but also, as in pre-colonial society, the fundamental relationship between ordinary

people and those with wealth and power. Moreover, while colonial states recoiled, on the one

hand, from the disruptive consequences of full scale capitalist transformation of African society;

local administrators, on the other, often promised such development as a way of rewarding their

allies and securing the support of a class of ‘progressive’ Africans’.

Second, through the reliance of chiefs and headmen the settler colonial state in Southern

Rhodesia was linked to the exchange networks of rural society and implicated in the factional

conflicts of lineage and clan through the chief’s increasing control of peasant labor, peasant

access to land, and the distribution of state patronage and resources ( Mamdani, 1996:ch.5). The

ability of the settler colonial state to act as a benevolent paternal protector of its African subjects

and as a disinterested arbiter of conflicting interests was thus compromised by the involvement of

its agents in grassroots society and politics.

 34

Third, the chiefs and headmen, through their active pursuit of wealth, distribution of

patronage to families and supporters, and frequent abuse of their power to punish their enemies

and extort extra-legal payments from the populace under their control, were not only active

agents in the process of social differentiation and class formation, but also principal subjects of

both local challenges to the colonial state and the active internal politics and class conflicts of

ethnic construction. Paradoxically, the colonial state’s agents of local rule were also a critical

source of social disruption and a threat to the maintenance of control.

Equally important, the conservative neo-traditionalism of NCs generated a crucial

ambivalence about African cultures and societies. “ On one level African societies were

denigrated as savage and primitive, classified, in the evolutionary model of social development

of turn of the century anthropology that seemed to have supplied the assumptions of the folk of

anthropology of the proconsuls, as ossified, stagnant survivals of earlier stages of social

evolution” (Bruce, 1998:305-341) At the same time, for neo-traditionalists NCs, African

societies represented precisely the sort of small-scale, integrated ‘organic community’ of order,

stability and harmony that they idealized and feared would be destroyed by the development of

capitalism. ( Eliot, 1954:18-19) Tribal societies thus represented some form of social order and

culture which NCs also valued and regarded as ‘natural’ for Africans. For NCs, ‘every African

belonged to a tribe just as every European belonged to a nation’ and they believed they

confronted “an Africa comprised of neatly bounded, homogenous tribes”. (Berman, 1989:106-8)

“The tribal pattern is so ingrained in the African that it will take a superficial façade of Western

Democracy to eradicate his deep respect for and allegiance to the tribesmen living in the Tribal

Trust Lands, but also to the majority of Africans living in the urban areas.” ( Eliot, 1954:18-19).

Therefore, ideology reinforced political expediency, to generate an understanding of African

 35
tribes as ancient communities and identities in which behavior was governed by uniform and

binding custom.

Divide and Rule Tactics

As the above analysis has shown, continuing developments in the state of control, in

consequence, had been the building up of the positions of the chiefs especially after the

Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November 1965. Cousins point out that, “ their

wages were raised to 420 pounds sterling per year in 1965, considerably more than the earnings

of ordinary Africans. They were given seats in the senate in the 1969 Constitution and had

representatives in the House of Assembly.” (Cousins, 1991:35-64) It was of course in the chiefs’

interests to support this government emphasis on their age, experience, and traditional position,

as the young educated nationalists and urbanized elites were just as much a threat to their

position as to that of the white settlers.

The claim that the chief speaks for his people had been strongly pressed in the early days

of the Rhodesian Front (RF) government, when arrangements had been made for a group of

chiefs to visit Britain. They told the British government:

“We, as chiefs and leaders of the people, have one desire, and that is to live in peace and

harmony without this chaos and murder that seems to be the order of the day. As far as the

granting of independence to Southern Rhodesia is concerned, we abhor one man, one vote, and

absolutely recoil at the thought of this because of the chaos and murder that is bound to result.”

((D. Lardner-Burke, 1966:13-15).

At about this time and in subsequent years, ideas about the nature of tribal structures were

elaborated in a number of documents, one of the best examples being the report of the

Domboshawa Indaba.3 This meeting of chiefs had been called in 1964, to demonstrate to the

British government that the majority of the population supported Smith’s request for

3 Indaba is a Ndebele word for a

meeting.
 36

independence. “The testing of African opinion has for some years been a major issue in world

politics. It is bedeviled and clouded by violent fictions,” stated the government report on the

Indaba.4 It went on to give details of how all these chiefs present fully supported the

government in its request to the British for immediate independence. Annexure A to the report

consists of a memorandum prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs explaining tribal

psychology and tribal structure, and suggesting that the interpretation of African society was

supported by anthropologists and other experts. “It is most unrealistic,” it states in paragraph 5,

“for the government to approach the communal African in the same manner as it does the

individualistic European.” It goes on, after building up a case amazing in its self-confidence

assertions, to say; “the obsession with the purely mechanical device of the vote—as distinct from

the essential ideals and principles of democracy. . .means that it is taken for granted that a vote is

the only answer to the problem of ascertaining the majority view.”5 Such a belief, it argues, was

completely misguided and disregarded the realities of African societies, where democratic vote

would be inappropriate. The definitive conclusion of the memorandum, therefore, was that

Africans could only be fairly represented by their chiefs thereby seriously dividing the African

society.

Of particular significance was also the practice of favoring one ethnic group over others

with the dual objective of securing the loyalty of a particular group to the settler administration

and encouraging rivalry between different ethnic groups as a strategy for preventing the

development of unity among the groups. Thus, colonial authorities adopted a policy of ‘divide

and rule’ allied to territorial separation. One community was separated from one another as

indigene had earlier separated from immigrant. Allied to this, colonial administration compiled

reports and notably censuses in a classificatory manner. The simple Christian-Heathen of

4 Rhodesian Government, The Domboshawa “Indaba” (Salisbury, 1964)

5 Rhodesia Government, Domboshawa, Annexure A. para.31.
 37
English-foreigner dichotomy was replaced by even more elaborate classifications as government

divided and re-divided populations into discrete groups, on the basis of linguistics, religion,

ethnicity and skin color. (Christopher, 1988:233-240) “These, (because they appeared in the

official census reports), assumed a degree of permanence as officials operated on the assumption

that the groups so distinguished were distinct entities to be treated differently. Segregation was

essentially enforced and policed by the colonial power to protect British settlers, officials and

others, together with such indigenous and immigrant communities as collaborated with the

colonial power” (Crush, 1980:71-86). In this manner, social distance was converted into physical

distance.

In the urban areas, different indigenous and settler communities were organized

separately and attempts were made to segregate them spatially. Separate townships and locations

for indigenous migrants to the towns were established, with clearly defined areas and buffer

strips to physically separate the different communities. (Christopher, 1987) Social integration

was prevented as the cities expanded through planning laws and legal practices. The results were

the forerunners of such measures as the Land Tenure Act (1967) in Zimbabwe. Where a degree

of residential integration did take place, official remedial efforts were directed toward the

removal of mixed areas by town planning action, through urban renewal schemes, causing the

residents to be re-housed in separate areas.6 Thus, colonial cities were designed and maintained

as segregated entities.

Problematic as urban segregation may have been, it was in the rural areas that colonial

officials often showed their greatest propensity to draw ethnic boundary lines upon the ground.

The division of land resources between immigrant and indigene was one of the basic functions of

settler colonial administration. The extent to which immigrant communities acquired land

dependent on their numerical and political strength. In Zimbabwe, as indicated below,

6 Transvaal (1903) Reports of the Johannesburg Insanitary Area Improvement Scheme
Commission (Transvaal Leader, Johannesburg)
 38

substantial blocks remained as ‘native reserves’ within which settlers could not purchase or

acquire land. Settler colonial policies once introduced often made the reform and modernization

of ‘traditional’ land economics remarkably difficult, as indigenous legal processes became

formalized and indeed fossilized and resistant to change. (Palmer, 1977) Such policy culminated

in the division of the country into ethnical regions and sub-regions such as Mashonaland and

Matebeleland, with paramount (super-ordinate) and subordinate groups, the former enjoying

considerable privileges by the colonial rulers. In Southern Rhodesia, it was the Shona to whom

were extended these favors over the Ndebele. In Nigeria, it was Eastern Nigeria over all other

vast regions of that country.

To understand the association between corruption and the practice of divide and rule one

must reflect on the methods used to sustain it. As pointed out by Kalinga, “ the groups enjoying a

privileged status in the colonial administration were rewarded with easy access to Western

(Missionary) education,” (Kalinga 1985:95) and government sponsored economic opportunities.

This created immense regional disparities in the extent of educational attainment and economic

opportunities. As will be shown later in this analysis, such divisive practices sowed the seeds for

future practices of the sociology of patronage and the economics of affection. The system was

also intensified during the country’s bitter struggle for independence. To weaken the freedom

fighters’ movements, such as the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and

the Zimbabwe Peoples’ Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), that swept across Zimbabwe. In the

1970s, the settler government of Ian Douglas Smith groomed collaborators, mainly chiefs, who

were used to divide the ranks of these movements and betray them to the settler colonial

authority in exchange for monetary rewards or other favors.

Colonial Land Expropriation

 39
The system of rewards was extended to land which was used, first, as a palliative for the

shareholders of the financial strained BSAC who had become restless because they had not

received dividends. (Bowman, 1973) The Stakeholders were told that their investments were well

secured by millions of acres of un-alienated or unsold land in Southern Rhodesia. Although the

land policy of the BSAC was limited by Southern Rhodesia Order- in- Council of 1898, which

required the Company “to provide sufficient land for the natives’ occupation and suitable for

their agricultural and pastoral requirements (Palmer, 1977:36), the Company ignored the interests

of the indigenous people. The BSAC embarked on an entirely new policy of selling the best

available land to settlers and providing such incentives as financial and technical assistance. Land

was rapidly alienated to European farmers and mining syndicates as an encouragement for them

to invest in Southern Rhodesia.

By March 1899, 15.8 million acres had been acquired by Europeans, 9.3 million of which

were owned by Companies that held the land for speculative purposes (Palmer, 1977:36).

Millions of hectares were also held by individual families. Missionaries, in particular Catholics,

acquired almost a third of a million acres by 1901. For example, Knight-Bruce, the Anglican

Bishop of Mashonaland, acquired more than 40 farms, all of which were over 3,000 acres in size.

Furthermore, individual settlers were given equally large farms for services rendered to the

Company. According to Yudelman:

“Eighty-two companies held 824, 000 acres given in exchange for certain rights and interests

acquired by the British South Africa Company; 162 farms totaling 5.07 million acres were given

or to be given to companies and syndicates who introduced capital for the general development

of the territory. For services rendered to the Company, 1,124 farms were given to individuals

(pioneers, police, and others), and 38 farms had been given to clubs, societies, municipalities and

so forth—a total of 28,390 acres alienated without cash sales. Sixty farms of 316, 304 acres had

been sold for 18,838 pounds and 163 farms of 86,525 acres had been alienated on permits of
 40

occupation for 41,679 pounds. Unoccupied land was to be offered to companies and syndicates

to encourage these groups to invest in agricultural development.”. ( Yudelman 1964:76) These

farms tended to be situated in the most fertile lands with heavy clay soils. Most people were not

immediately evicted from the land that now belonged to the Europeans; rather they were required

to pay rents to their landlords in order to remain on the land.

The policy of promoting white settlement on land, more than any other legacy of colonial

rule, determined the pattern of the future land tenure and rural development policies in Southern

Rhodesia. This complex feature of Zimbabwean life permeates all questions of economic, social,

and political life and no aspect of Zimbabwean corrupt practices can be understood without some

knowledge of the colonial land policy.

The early white settlers made clear drives for the accumulation of wealth ahead of the

indigenous black people. Besides looting cattle in a primitive accumulation style and levying

taxes on Africans, the BSAC government, as well as the 1923 successor Responsible

Government, made moves to parcel out land to white settlers. Although small reserves were

established for Africans in remote parts of colonial Zimbabwe, in reality little attention was paid

to African land use. Both the settlers and the British government thought it proper for white

settlers to allocate the land, and any thought that Africans had a right to more than a fraction of it

was dismissed as an absurdity. ( Quinton Report, 1914:17-18) By 1905 the BSAC had arbitrarily

created about 60 African reserves that occupied only 22 percent of the new colony: the settler

community misappropriated the bulk of the land for themselves.” Yudelman). By 1922, a year

before Responsible Government, 64 percent of all Africans were required to live in reserves.

(Phimister, 1974:68)

Furthermore, various taxes were introduced between 1894 and 1923: the hut tax, poll tax,

dog tax, dipping fees, grazing fees, among others. These taxes were paid in the form of livestock,
 41
crops and money and were often seized at gunpoint by the Native Commissioner and armed

policemen.7 Taxation was an effective method by which Africans were removed from their

traditional agricultural practices and placed in the position of forced wage labor. Palmer noted

that:

[…conditions of work were generally appalling. Not only was there frequent recourse to sjambok

or chikoti, the hide whip, both by employers and the young inexperienced Native

Commissioners…but there were also numerous fatalities in the small primitive mines, and many

employers were not above picking quarrels with their workers toward the end of the month with

the predictable, and intended, result that workers fled their employment unpaid.” (Palmer,

1977:43)

The upsurge in economic activities coupled with immigration of new settlers,

strengthened the political position of settlers in the colony. “They formed themselves into a

powerful white settler bourgeoisie that sought to safeguard their acquisitions against the

indigenous population, because as a class, they were thinking seriously about their long term role

and prospects in Southern Rhodesia.” (Mlambo, 2009:77) Therefore, settler domination in

Southern Rhodesia flourished due to the absence of hostile class antagonisms between the white

rural bourgeoisie and the settler urban wage workers because they had a common interest in land.

Land became the common denominator to the settler society because even the civil servant,

business and professional man, miner or railway employee looked to retiring to a plot of land— a

feature that formed the basis of corruption with regard to land redistribution in post-colonial

Zimbabwe.
Furthermore, settlers were agreed on forcibly and fraudulently depriving indigenous

people of as much of their land as was possible and subsequently cut the Africans’ ties to the land

which was their sole source for food supplies. Moreover, settler- farmers wanted the agricultural

7 Headmen were required to give up gangs of men on a quota system, and were whipped for
failing to produce the required numbers. Villagers fled their homes at the sight of an
approaching policemen who force-marched them to work sites.
 42

productivity of the indigenous population curtailed to the barest minimum in order to stop any

competition from that sector. Urban settlers supported land deprivation because it was the best

and safest mechanism for creating an abundant supply of cheap labor. Restrictive laws to deprive

blacks of their land and to curb their agricultural productivity continued to be enacted and

implemented throughout the colonial era, with the sole aim of forcing the Africans into a

situation where they would not cause labor shortages. To Brett:

“For as long as the peasant had his land, the capitalist could not expect to find ‘labor power in the

market as a commodity’, since the African would still be ‘in the position to sell commodities in

which his labor (was) incorporated’, and would not therefore be obliged to sell his labor power

itself.” (Brett, 1966:50)

This structure was expected to lead to the growth of the internal market and the

expansion of the demand for the produce of settler farmers, because all those indigenous

populations who would have been forced into wage employment would want to buy food

because they will not be producing it themselves. Also, it was expected that those who were

earning wages would develop tastes for the ‘white man’s goods’, and that if such tastes were

nurtured, they could result in a considerable rise in the demand for finished products.

Unfortunately this projection ignored that black workers were being paid a pittance wage and

also that the settler regime was levying several taxes on the African workers. Meanwhile, at the

same time that settler farming became the central sector of the colony’s economy, members of

the rural bourgeoisie occupied strategic positions in government and parliament. Thus, by 1930,

thirteen of the thirty members of the legislative assembly had been farmers, while all Rhodesian

Prime Ministers, with the exception of the first, Coghlan (1923-7), and the majority of cabinet

ministers had been farmers.

The Land Apportionment Act (LAA)--1930

The apportionment of land stood thus:

 43
Table 3.1. The Land Apportionment in Southern Rhodesia in 1930 (Figures are given in
thousands of acres)
CATEGORY ACRES % OF COUNTRY

European Areas 49,149,174

51
Native Reserves 21,127, 040

22
Unassigned Areas 17,793,300

18.5
Native Purchase Area 7,464,566

7.8
Forest Area 590,500

0.6
Undetermined Area 88,540

0.1
Total 96,213,120

100
Source: First Report of the Select Committee on Resettlement of Natives (Salisbury, Government
Printing Office. 1960) and the Land Tenure Act.
The year 1930 witnessed the formalization of Southern Rhodesian land division by an

act that remained the cornerstone of Southern Rhodesian segregation until the passage of a

similar Act—the Land Tenure in 1969. The Land Apportionment Act (LAA) became the basis of

a complex structure of all forms of political, economic and social controls to condition Africans

to the dictates of settlers. (Bowman, 1973:14) Also, the Industrial Reconciliation Act (ICA) of

1934 stands with the LAA as major cornerstone of Rhodesia’s white supremacist society. The

ICA was passed at the behest of white workers whose overriding purposes were to protect the

white wage structure and to control access to employment opportunities. Thus, settlers used the

racially segregated laws and their entrenched dominance over land and the country’s economic
 44

apparatus to subdue Africans. The settler government rarely felt the need to justify its African

policies. Bowman has rightly argued that, “the difference in capabilities and achievement

between the ‘primitive African population’ and the technological advanced Europeans were so

pronounced in white eyes that they conceived their domination as beneficial, mandatory, and

timeless.” (Bowman, 1973:15) Little thought was given to the effect these rules and regulations

had upon African lives or upon the character of European society.

Under the LAA, land was divided into European areas, “Native Reserves, Native

Purchase Areas and Forest Areas; there were also about seven million hectares of ‘unassigned

land’ and Native Reserves were increased to 98 and this was considered to be adequate for the

needs of a fast growing African population. (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009:66) African reserves were

assigned in the most remote and least fertile areas of Zimbabwe. (Moyana, 2002:43) The African

population grew rapidly, and as early as the 1930s agricultural experts agreed that the reserve

land was fully populated and could not support a larger African population. (Bowman, 1973:16)

Land deterioration became a permanent feature of reserve life, leading to urban migration and an

extensive African squatting on white land. Until well into the 1950s little was done to change this

basic picture. Europeans steadily consolidated their hold on the best land, even though much of it

remained unused.

Africans were left with the choice of remaining on deteriorating land or working on

European land in exchange for a place to live in their own country. (Palmer, 1977:213) Either

choice brought the Africans under further administrative domination by the settlers. As Table 2

shows, the African population also grew rapidly, and as early as the 1930s agricultural experts

agreed that the reserve land was fully populated and could not support a larger African

population.
 45

Table 3.2. Rhodesian Population Growth, 1901-1970

Year Africans Europeans Total
 46

901 500,000 11,000 510,000

1907 670,000 14,000 690,000

1911 740,000 23,600 770,000

1921 860,000 33,000 900,000

1926 930,000 39,200 970,000

1931 1,080,000 49,9000 1,130,000

1936 1,260,000 55,400 1,320,000

1941 1,400,000 69,000 1,480,000

1946 1,770,000 82,000 1,860,000

1951 2,170,000 135,600 2,320,000

1956 2,990,000 177,100 3,180,000

1961 3,550,000 221,500 3,790,000

1965 4,070,000 224,000 4,320,000

1970 5,130,000 249,000 5,405,000

Source: 1961 Census of the European, and Colored Population (Salisbury, Central Statistical
Office, 1965) and Economic Survey for Rhodesia for 1970 ( Government Printing Office, 1971).

Africans could not hold land in European areas unless they were tenants, and similarly,

Europeans could not occupy land in African areas unless they were educators, missionaries, or

traders. The LAA went further than any other previous law in facilitating active dispossession,

and coming in the light of the Great Depression it exacerbated poverty and suffering among the

Africans. Moyana argues that “ the LAA did more to galvanize mass African Nationalism, which

hitherto had been elitist, than any other law in Southern Rhodesia.” (Moyana, 2002:106-7).

Segregation was introduced not only in agriculture, but also in all aspects of Rhodesian

life, including education, medical, and social facilities. In 1931 and 1934 the Maize Control Acts
 47
(MCA) and the Cattle Levy Acts (CLA) were passed. These acts subsidized European farmers

through a 10% levy imposed on African produce, and instituted a two-price system. “These

formal checks on African competition in the produce market simply supplemented what was still

the main discriminatory device: the distance of African lands from the consumption centers and

lines of communication.” (Arrighi, 1970:220)

The Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) of 1951 proved to be a controversial piece of

legislation. Through the Act, the state asserted legal control over peasant production. Destocking

was also ruthlessly enforced. The livestock carrying capacity of the reserves was assessed and a

five destocking program was in operation by 1945. The Act has been considered a revolutionary

manifesto for African rights by some scholars such as Yudelman who called it “one of the most

far-reaching land reform measures in Africa [. . . ] revolutionary [. . .] it represents a change of

vast proportion in the lives of those living in African areas” (Yudelmen 1964:226)

Palmer’s view is to some extent consistent with Yudelman’s since he argues that “the NLHA

was designed to create a loyal urban and rural middle class, while simultaneously satisfying the

needs of the country’s rapidly expanding secondary industry by denying urban workers access to

farmland.” (Palmer 1976:28)

The settler colonial government introduced other laws that effectively paralyzed

Africans. The subversive Activities Act (SAA) of 1950 was passed as a result of the 1948 strike.
This Act authorized the government to ban meetings and literature considered to undermine

constitutional government. The Public Order Act (POA) of 1955 authorized the government to

detain and restrict any African without charge or trial. The government enacted the Unlawful

Organization Act (UOA), The Native Affairs Amendment Act ( NAAA), the Prevention

Detention Act (PDA), the Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA), and the Emergency Powers

Act ( EPA), “whose provisions were so sweeping that, if fully enforced would have obliterated

any notion of liberty and individual rights.” (Meridith, 1979:28) For Africans, these laws enabled
 48

the government to curb freedom of speech, movement, privacy, assembly and association, to

arrest and detain without trial, to control businesses and employees and prevent interference with

all services deemed essential, and to suppress African political parties.

In 1965, the Tribal Trust Land Act (TTLA) was passed. It changed the name of Native

Reserves to Tribal Trust Lands and created European Trustees for the land. Legally this meant

“that Africans lost any semblance of ownership and could not make decisions concerning the

land on which they were settled. Britain, which had the veto power and was the legal guardian of

African interests made no attempts to intervene.” (Meridith, 1979:29)

The Land Tenure Act (LTA) of 1969, replaced the LAA of 1930. It imposed new

restrictions on Africans and divided land on permanent basis. The Act made any African living

in a European area “a sojourner whose right to domicile and ownership were at the discretion of

the Europeans.”(Meridith, 1979:63) It also regulated the employment of Africans in urban areas

and the use of schools, hospitals, hotels, and provided for the eradication of “black spots” in

European areas. Complimenting the Act was the 1969 constitution, which did away with the

possibility of future African rule. Ian Smith (then Rhodesian Prime Minister) went further than

any previous government in buttressing European supremacy in Rhodesia, while at the same

time, Africans continued to be evicted from the land.8

Thus, the 1920s and the 1930s witnessed the settler colonial state becoming increasingly

interventionist on behalf of white settlers against the interest of Africans. As noted by Phimister,

“the wanton undercutting of African peasant production was sowing the seeds of

underdevelopment in the reserves of Rhodesia.” (Phimister, 1974:217-228) In essence, the role

of the settler colonial state was destructive since Africans were no longer mobilized for their own

production but for the needs of the settler colonial power. (Ake, 1981:290) Further, the

concentration of economic development in European areas made it unrealistic in the extreme to

 49
think that any important opportunities for employment existed where Africans would not have to

“merely assist, and not to compete with, the white man.” (Bowman, 1973:17)The point was

driven home by the Public Services Act (PSA) of 1931 which shut off government administrative

jobs –even those in the African reserves—to nonwhites. The whole system worked smoothly to

protect whites from competition and restricted Africans to menial roles. These features of the

settler colonial state gave rise to the following phenomena in Southern Rhodesia:

• State and society were set apart as were their interests

• The state did not exist in the context of the morality of the African society as it was

therefore not responsible for it.

8 A case in point was the heated and internally known Tangent Saga, in which Chief Rekey Tangent and
his people resisted forceful and arbitrary eviction from their ancestral lands over several years. Realizing
the government’s unrelenting persistence, Chief Tangent , now an old man, joined the armed struggle in
1969. Nonetheless he and his people were removed from the land. The Tangent people are quite unique in
Rhodesian/Zimbabwean history because they never gave up their rights to their land, and after
independence in 1980, they got it back.
• The settler colonial state was essentially in a permanent situation of war with society,

which in turn, was in a situation of permanent resistance.

• Being amoral, the settlers would only be dealt with amorally by the African society.

Individual and collective behavior internalized these features between the settler state and

African society, and they were to have dire consequences on economic and political

developments in post-colonial Zimbabwe. The LAA exercise was done so intensely that

by the late 1930s, the expropriation of the best Highveld land was at its peak. By then the

government occasionally articulated the theory that Africans could rise to any heights

within their own areas. This was called the two-pyramid or parallel development policy.

Settler Prime Minister Huggins explained:

“the European in this country can be likened to an island of white In a black sea…” Huggins saw

blacks as objects for perpetual oppression, who were not to be allowed to advance economically,
 50

otherwise they would erode the ‘shores of the white man’s island’ and to “permit this (economic

advancement of the blacks) would mean that the leaven of civilization would be removed from

the country and the black man would inevitably revert to a barbarism worse than

before.”(Quoted in Bowman, 1973: 46)

Huggins did not elaborate why blacks would become more barbaric than they were

before their country was colonized. It is obvious that what he meant was simply that indigenous

people would start demanding their land. The Huggins policy was the foundation for the

formation of the Central African Federation (CAF).

Drive to Federation

Southern Rhodesia enjoyed an economic boom stimulated by the World War 11, and the

European population more than doubled with the influx of immigrants. White immigration to the

colony was at an all-time high, increasing the white population by 13 percent in 1945-46 alone . 8

However, this post-war immigration did not focus on settling people on the land; the impetus was

to attract people who could bring skills needed in the burgeoning secondary industry sector. The

manufacturing, construction, and service industries grew very quickly, and the gaps in the labor

force were soon apparent. Yet mass white immigration was neither practical nor desirable. Why

import a white working class when one already had African workers who worked at a fraction of

the cost of white workers?

As a result, the new wave of white immigration worked mostly in the service and skilled

manufacturing industries, and they were people who had already acquired a modicum of skills

before migrating. (Shutt & King, 2005:357-379) Thus, Southern Rhodesia’s settler population

8 National Archives of Zimbabwe, Harare (hereafter NAZ) S842/132/4/49, Immigration. J.R.H.

Saul to Huggins, 17 April 1946
 51
became essentially suburban and middle class in lifestyle, with a few of its members doing

unskilled or manual work, even if back home they had not enjoyed middle class status (Shutt &

King, 2005:360) Some of the white settler elite also viewed the block on mass white

immigration somewhat altruistically: Robert Tredgegold wrote that white immigration could and

should “avoid hindrance to the natural and rightful advancement of the African” (Tredgegold

1968:166) Within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, district commissioners’ reports on African

discontent were “frowned upon.” ( O’Meara, 1975:135) and a hitherto highly commended DC,

A. Wright “had to retire from the service through ill health” as a result of his writing a series of

articles in the Rhodesia Herald discussing Africans’ dissatisfaction with their position in

Rhodesian society, in which he drew special attention to economic disparities between Europeans

and Africans, lack of European courtesy, and government policies of attracting unskilled white

immigrants and alienating land in order to settle the newcomers. (Weinrich, 1976:211-12) Yet to

the very large majority of the settlers, Tredgold was missing the point as argued by Kay:

“Rhodesia was conceived and developed as a “White Man’s Country, a colony rather than a

protectorate, in which commercial economic activity was to be fostered primarily by white

settlers and locally based companies which would provide the requisite capital, technology,

management and skills for rapid progress. The colonial territory provided the resource base

and a supply of raw, unskilled labor.” (Kay, 1980:95-114)

The emerging manufacturing sector also demanded an increasingly larger pool of African

workers that could be built up only through a combination of policies. According to Mlambo

“those intended to push Africans off the land into the cities, and those—such as the provision of

better family accommodation for workers in the urban areas—aimed at stabilizing labor.

(Mlambo, 2009:75-114) Indeed, the question of urban housing became more important and

contentious, with larger numbers of Africans migrating to the towns and cities as rural
 52

livelihoods were eroded by overcrowding, environmental degradation and hostile colonial land

policies.

The gradual inflow of indigenous African workers into the urban centers resulted in

changing the ethnic and cultural face of Southern Rhodesian towns and cities. As Tsuneo

Yoshikuni has documented, “Salisbury (the colonial capital) was dominated by ‘foreign’ or

migrant workers from neighboring countries such as Malawi, Zambia, and Mozambique.”

(Yoshikuni, 2007:57) Indeed, as late as the 1950s, ‘alien’ Africans still comprised a sizeable

proportion of the country’s urban population.9 However, the local African population gradually

dominated the country’s urban centers.

Also significant for corruption legacy, was the rise of an African middle class of educated

professionals—teachers, nurses, lawyers and entrepreneurs—“whose concerns and aspirations

did not, at first, always coincided with those of the ordinary people and who sought to distance

themselves from the masses.” (West, :2002:45) The tensions emerging from the interaction of

these groups and trade union activists and the nationalists were to help shape the trajectory of the

development of African political growth and development in the subsequent years .Thus, while

toward the end of the period an African political consensus eventually emerged, initially the

anti-colonial struggle took different and sometimes conflicting forms, as each social grouping—

alien and indigenous urban workers, the rural population, the emerging middle class—sought to

advance its own interests. Moreover, Africans tended toward resigned acceptance of white rule.

Thus, the response by Africans, which also suited the colonial order, was the withdrawal even

more deeply into kinship systems in which the individual was protected and fulfilled, and to

which the person gave full allegiance. At the same time, being so weakened, these systems could

not individually and separately pose any threat to the colonial order.

9 Between 40 and 60 per cent of the urban African population at the time were designated ‘alien
natives,’ See Phi mister and Raftopoulos, “Kana Sora Rasta Ngaritsve. 2000:295.
 53
Early organizations such as the Rhodesian Bantu Voters Association and the African

National Congress, formed in 1920 and 1930’s were, as argued by Ranger “tiny elite

organizations formed by a few educated Africans.” (Ranger, 1968:223) Their petitioning and

lobbying efforts focused on improving conditions for themselves; because they were so far

removed from the masses. For the most part, however, the mass of the population in Southern

Rhodesia were politically inert, passive and virtually powerless. Bowman observed thus, “the

rule of the white man was apparently accepted almost as inevitable; open resentment was rarely

manifested; European privileges and prestige seemed inviolable; white supremacy appeared to be

permanently established. It was now an opportune time for the settlers to negotiate for the

amalgamation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland under settler

domination.” ( Bowman, 1973:16)

The federal White Paper, resulting from five conferences held between 1951 and 1953

(Plewman Report, 1958:22), was a formal constitutional document, but in reality it represented a

British-Rhodesian bargain in that the agreement enshrined settler aims. For a little more than

agreeing to disavow amalgamation, a federation was proposed with a strong central government
10
having considerable autonomy. Federation complicated Rhodesian political life. A new

government and civil service was established, but the territorial government and civil service

remained. The federal government generally assumed functions that pertained to the entire area

(defense, external affairs, economic growth and development, commerce, and nearly all revenue

responsibilities); the territorial government was left with more limited, but ultimately crucial,

responsibility for handling African Affairs.

White interests were carried forward on two levels. The federal government (wholly dominated

by white Rhodesians) pressed unceasingly federation-wide independence, skewing economic

10 The Central African Federation (CAF) comprised Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) Northern
Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi). See Theodore Bull, Two Views of the Central
African Federation 11. The Situation in Southern Rhodesia: The World Today. Vol. 19, No. 7
(Jul. 1963):311-316.
 54

development and other financial matters to Southern Rhodesia’s advantage. At the same time, the

country retained its internal self-government constitution for white interests if federation failed.

More important, however, is the fact that from 1953 (the formation of the CAF) to 1963 (when it

ended), white Rhodesians had two entrenched governments actively promoting and defending

their narrow racial interests. Although there was considerable white political competition,

particularly in the territorial sphere, it all occurred within the general framework of united

resistance to African nationalism and centered on the selection of political strategies that would

best sustain white rule. A prime concern was how to entice new constitutional concessions from

Britain. The federal leadership and those who governed Rhodesia through 1962 believed that the

small concessions encased in the liberal-sounding rhetoric was the best ploy for handling Britain;

the Rhodesian Front (RF) which came to power in 1962, “was less willing to make the verbal

gesture.” (Bowman, 1973:22) Before the Rhodesian Front came to power, however, Britain

consented to the 1961 Constitution that granted new autonomy to Rhodesia without jeopardizing

white rule. This constitution again reflected Britain’s limited ability and interest in effecting

political change in Rhodesia. Godfrey Huggins and Roy Welensky completely dominated federal

political life.11 Their leadership was never challenged within the political system. Federal Party

domination led to complete political rigidity. The men who conceived federation saw it through,

and there was never any circulation of new leadership, new ideas, or new policies. Nothing about

the federation is more remarkable than its unchanging vision during ten years of dramatic

political development elsewhere in Africa.

Despite Southern Rhodesia African National Congress’s public opposition and more

outspoken denunciations—such as that by Robert Mugabe (current President of Zimbabwe) who

accused the proposed CAF of being little more than ‘an instrument that will be wielded to

11 Huggins was prime minister until 1956; Welensiky served as prime minister until the
federation dissolved at the end of 1963.
 55
12
suppress our self-determination and progress’ —Southern Rhodesia African opposition to

federation increasingly became ambivalent, as some leaders went on to participate in federal

government structures through their membership of the white-led United Federal Party (UFP).

Explaining why Southern Rhodesian African elites such as Joshua Nkomo, Jasper Savanhu and

Mike Hove accepted Federation, Nathan Shamuyarira wrote that the establishment of the

Federation was:

“regarded by Southern Rhodesian Africans as full of promise: the new policy of partnership, 13

which was to be inscribed in the federal constitution, would bring to a speed end the segregation

humiliation and indignation which we had suffered for 40 years…the northern territories would

help to break down the racial barriers and the Southern Rhodesian whites would even of their

own accord, inspired by partnership, pass laws which would let us share political power and

economic privileges and enjoy social justice.” ( Shamuyarira 1965:15-16)

The optimism was, of course, misplaced. As at another time Huggins commented that

14
“all the Federal Party wanted to integrate was the territories of British Central Africa,

Welensky was no less blunt: “We believe that the African should be given more say in the

running of the country, as and when he shows his ability to contribute more to the general good,

but we must make it clear even when that day comes , in a hundred or two hundred years time,

he can never hope to dominate the partnership. He can achieve equal standing but not go beyond
15
it.” Federal politicians cannot be criticized for failing to implement partnership. Their

irrevocable commitment to white domination was never a secret; they always viewed partnership

12 Bantu Mirror, 27 June,

1953
13 Federal resistance to change was noticeable whenever political advancement for Africans
was broached. Huggins and Welensky’s statements against equality, integration, and partnership
are legion. A remark commonly attributed to Huggins was that “partnership between black and
white is the partnership between the horse and its rider.”
14 Rhodesian Herald, October 21, 1953, (Source Zimbabwe Newspapers Archives)
15 Federal government press release of March 2, 1956. Italics
added.
 56

as a meaningless slogan to assuage British opinion. 16 Would Britain indefinitely accept the slogan

without any substance? British-federal relations turned on to the answer to this question.

Thus, little improved in the lot of the Africans under colonial rule occurred because, as Eshmael

Mlambo argued:

‘Federation notwithstanding, in all three territories a form of petty apartheid prevailed in which

‘Africans continued to be denied the right to use hotels, restaurants, public lavatories and public

facilities on the railways. Up to 1957, they were not allowed that dangerous liquid, European

beer. Discriminatory practices continued, and by the end of 1950s even the so-called African

“moderates” were expressing their misgivings about the Federation.’ (Mlambo, 1972:144)

British support for the Federation dissipated after 1957, and by 1960 it was evident that

the chance for a white independent federation had evaporated. The fundamental change occurred
18
because trends elsewhere in Africa finally began to have an impact in Central Africa.

Moreover, the pressure that originally led Britain to support federation no longer seemed so

important. Britain was now much more comfortable in dealing with black Africans ( Bowman,

1973:37). Finally, Britain had dealt with the Afrikaners in Pretoria for more than a decade and

rather than being a threat to British interests, South Africa had become a bigger and more

important commercial partner than ever. Thus, in so far as the British were concerned, economic

interest prevailed over Africans’ welfare in Rhodesia.

The Monckton Commission report in October 1960 delivered the coup de grace. The

Commission concluded that racial hostility was so great that federation could not be maintained

except by force or by introducing massive changes such as rapidly dismantling of the

16 Ian Douglas Smith, who was Federal Party member of parliament from 1954 to 1961, told the
1960 Monckton Commission that “the people of Southern Rhodesia had understood that the idea
of federation was to spread the Southern Rhodesian way of life throughout the three territories.”
United Kingdom, Moncton Commission Evidence, Cmd. 1151, vol. 4 (London, HMSO,
1960):116.
 57
discriminatory apparatus in Rhodesia, broadening the franchise, establishing racial parity in the

federal house, granting self-government to Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, and barring
19
constitutional advance without local acceptance. No one—not Britain, not the federal

government, not any of the territorial governments—really considered maintaining federation

headed by different races. Such was the achievement of partnership. Federation might have been

saved by an African government in Southern Rhodesia, but here the whites remained determined

to resist and Britain possessed far much less local power with which to induce change.

18Ghana achieved independence in 1957, and other British colonies were following Ghana’s lead. In
East Africa the Mau Mau emergency pointed up the high cost of supporting small white minorities.
19
The key document was United Kingdom, Report of the Advisory Commission on the Review of the
Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Cmd. 1148 (London, HMSO. 1960). It was supplemented by:
Survey of Development since 1953. Cmd. 1149; Possible Constitutional Changes, Cmd. 1150. And
Moncton Commission Evidence, Cmd. 1151, 5 vols. (London, HMSO. 1960). The best review of the
Monckton Commission is R.. Cranford Pratt, “Partnership and Consent: The Monckton Report
Examined,” International Journal 16 (Winter 1960-1961):37-49.
Nevertheless, during the short-lived Federation (1953-1963) an upsurge of African

nationalist activity, stimulated by the relative superior status of Africans in the other two

constituent territories, began to gain strength. According to Mlambo, “the Africans denied

Todd’s partnership approach, and it became quite clear that the African people’s future could no

longer be entrusted to the whims of benevolent white liberals and that Africans had to take

control of their own destiny.” (Mlambo, 2009:107). Garfield Todd, who had become the Prime

Minister of Southern Rhodesia in 1953, conscious of the need to take some measures to placate

the African nationalists, introduced a number of moderate reforms, including the extension of the

franchise of the African voters by means of a special roll. But even these modest measures

aroused the indignation of the settlers, and Todd was replaced by Edgar Whitehead who

remained in power until the Rhodesian Front (RF) defeated the United Federal Party (UFP) in

1962. (Bowman, 1973:30) Interpreting Todd most favorably, we could say that he tried to take
 58

some rough edges off the Rhodesian system. But it is crucial to note that the attacks against him

by his dissident ministers seldom touched on racial questions. “He was removed because he

offended amour propre of some federal politicians, not because he in any way was prepared to

challenge the operation or correctness of the system itself.” (Bowman, 1973:32) Then followed a

quick reversal of Todd’s efforts; several African political parties were banned and hundreds of

active African workers imprisoned without trial. ( Dayal, 1980:466-486)

To consolidate the support of his European constituents, Whitehead began exerting

pressure on Britain to eliminate its nominal control over the colony. As a result of a conference

convened in 1960-1 and attended by four African nationalist leaders, a new constitution was

adopted which provided for a legislature of sixty-five seats with the Africans controlling some

fifteen on the basis of a separate roll with lower qualifications. (Dayal,1980:468) The

constitution was rigged with loopholes that negated any possibility that it would curb the

authoritarian propensities of the white government. The 1961 constitution also implied the

eventual coming into force of majority rule. Britain’s reserve powers to advise the Sovereign to

withhold assent to bills or to annul bills, and exercise control over matters relating to the Native

Department were relinquished in return for the entrenchment of provisions relating to a

Declaration of Rights, a Constitutional Council, the Judiciary and the amendment procedures for

the constitution. The declaration of rights was a travesty. As rightly pointed out by Bowman,

“Each ‘right’ was subject to many exceptions. The “right to personal liberty” for instance, had

five major and thirteen minor clauses spelling out limitations. Moreover, the declaration did not

pertain to extant legislation. Since the bulk of Rhodesia’s restrictive and discriminatory

legislation was already on the books, the declaration was assured of having no meaningful effect.

The constitutional council was equally ineffectual. It could review legislation but it had no

enforcement power and could be overruled immediately by a two thirds majority parliament or
 59
by a simple majority after six months. Its purview did not apply to money bills, and it had no

authority to initiate action against existing legislation. Further, if the prime minister asked for a

certificate of urgency for any bill, the council was by passed entirely.” (Bowman 1973:40)

In the 1962 elections, Whitehead was ousted by the newly-formed Rhodesian Front (RF),

led by Winston Field who was also ousted by the redoubtable Ian Smith in the 1965 elections.

Should the nationalists have participated in the 1962 elections under the terms of the 1961

elections? “The expectation that if the nationalists have been in political office the white

government would have been reluctant to suppress African members of parliament” ( Bowman,

1973:56), is entirely conjectural, but in view of government actions before and after 1961, it is

hard to take this view seriously. Nevertheless, all subsequent British and white Rhodesian action

bears out this analysis. Thus, although their alternatives of boycotting the elections were

unsatisfactory, the nationalists stood outside the political process and hoped to build new

pressure for substantial political change. In all this nationalist strategy, British double standards

were very noticeable. As rightly argued by Bowman:

“Britain assumed that the four nationalist leaders at the 1961 constitutional conference could

make any decisions without interaction with their constituency. But what if the Europeans had

rejected the constitution? Would Britain then have sulked? Would no new conference have been

called? The decision to implement the constitution arose out of British eagerness to disengage

from Rhodesia, to accept the reality of local white power, and not from any effort to do equal

justice to white and black” ( Bowman 1973:57)

 60

Figure 3.2. Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 1965. Prime Minister Ian
Douglas Smith signs the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 11/11/1965 (Source: National
Archives of Zimbabwe)
As pointed out early in this analysis, Rhodesia always differed from other British

colonies. It was never governed directly from Britain. From the outset it was largely self-

governing, with Britain retaining certain reserve powers, mainly over constitutional affairs. Like

Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa Rhodesia was to be dealt with as a Dominion.

( Brides, 1980:177-184) Southern Rhodesia’s exceptional status was further marked by the fact

that the prime minister of Southern Rhodesia attended all the meetings of Dominion prime

ministers—that is to say, he sat in with the leaders of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South

Africa—on a personal and as it were, honorary footing until after World War 11. “Moreover,

Southern Rhodesia—like the Dominions, but unlike any other British dependent territory—

raised, paid and controlled her own armed forces, and there were never any British forces as such

on Rhodesian soil”. (Brides, 1980:177) Hence it was against a background of protracted earlier

quasi-independence that in 1963 the Rhodesian white colonial government began negotiations

with Britain for full independence, based on the 1961 constitution which provided for gradual

African political advance but meanwhile ensured the continuance of white minority rule. This

constitution provided the skeleton for Rhodesia’s future development; but the flesh and the very
 61
life blood of the body politic depended upon the parties which would work within the

constitution, and especially the RF which eventually won control of the government. (Barber,

1966:457-469) It is true that the 1961 Rhodesian Constitution was a compromise that represented

the maximum that the Rhodesian whites would concede and the minimum that, at any rate at that

point, the Africans would accept. Acceptance was soon withdrawn by the African leaders. The

compromise could not last because it was an attempt to reconcile two apparently irreconcilable

principles. Knowing that their greatest strength lay in numbers, Africans insisted that the correct

principle was the counting of heads. Without either substantial wealth or education, and with

little prospect in the given dispensation of acquiring either, they demanded “one man, one vote;”

White settlers, in view of their small numbers, feared being swamped by the Black masses. 17

They wanted their wealth and skills thrown into the scales to redress the weight of African

numbers. Both the British and Rhodesian governments were using the 1961 constitution as a

basis for their discussion in the negotiations for independence. Yet it was fortuitous and

misleading that the two governments, who had contradictory aims, had been able to start from the

same document. For the R.F., the constitution was too liberal, but they thought it worth accepting

if it could be used as a lever to obtain independence while preserving white rule. It was in R.F.

eyes the very furthest they could go in compromising their principles. Any suggestions for

constitutional reform which R.F. leaders had proposed had been backwards, away from

increasing African participation. In sharp contrast, successive British Governments had regarded

the 1961 constitution as one of a series of steps toward increased African participation, toward

majority rule, and therefore the constitutional amendments they had initiated had been directed

toward giving Africans an increased role.

Waving the banner of the preservation of western standards and defense of the values of

Christian civilization against the alien doctrines of Communism, the leader of the R.F., also

17 For a detailed discussion on the 1961 Constitution, see Edward Feit, Rhodesia: Background,
Crisis, and Future, The Massachusetts Review, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring, 1966:336-357).
 62

prime of Rhodesia, Ian Douglas Smith, launched his crusade. “While the leading European

industrialists and intellectuals may have regarded Smith as a swash-bucking cowboy, a throw-

back to the nineteenth century brand of adventurers, the grass-roots level of settler white

community placed unquestioning faith in his leadership.” ( Dayal, 1980:468)

Assured of his unchallenged supremacy at home, Smith declared the UDI in 1965. He had

calculated that after the initial shock of surprise, South Africa would recognize the new regime,

followed by Portugal, and other western countries. 18 Indeed, Smith’s defiance of Britain sent a

shock-wave throughout the world. From being a problem largely between a metropolitan power

and a troublesome colony, it now became a matter of world concern. “It was debated at the

United Nations (UN), and featured prominently on the agenda of the Commonwealth Summit

Conferences, at meetings of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and sessions of the

Nonaligned States.” .(Dayal, 1980:468) Britain’s reaction was prompt. Recognition was

withdrawn from the Rhodesian Government whose leaders were now technically rebels, and

dealing with them was treasonable. Sanctions were imposed, followed by an oil embargo and

naval blockade. The UN soon joined in calling for further economic and diplomatic sanctions.

Over the years, sanctions produced an effect, though it was slow and debilitating, rather

than a quick one. Sanctions-busting was a complicated and expensive business which laid a firm

foundation for corrupt practices in the private business sector. International companies operating

in Rhodesia played a major role in sanctions busting. Rhodesia in 1965 had been poised for

speedy growth, particularly in mining. This prospect did not materialize. In time the cumulative

impact of restrictions on travel to, and communications with, places other than South Africa

became steadily harder to bear and had to be conducted in non-transparent ways. However,

besides the shortages and inconveniences, for the first five or six years of illegal independence

18 South Africa was also whiter settler- dominated with Portugal controlling Angola and
Mozambique
 63
white morale remained high—high enough, in any event, for Ian Smith to feel that he could

afford to turn down the mainly favorable terms which the British Government offered him for a

settlement in two meetings with Harold Wilson the British Prime Minister in 1966 and 1968.”

(Brides, 1980:180)

The Wilson terms were mainly favorable to the White minority—first, because if put into

effect they would have resulted in Rhodesia becoming independent before the implementation of

majority rule; secondly, because they would have given the representatives of the white minority

in the Rhodesian Parliament, acting on their own, the power permanently to block constitutional

change; and thirdly, because the white minority regime would have controlled the rate of African

political advance by determining the pace of educational development, and thus—since a given

level of education was to be a condition of exercising the franchise—the number of Africans who

would vote. Three years later, in November 1971, similar proposals were agreed upon in

Salisbury 19 by Ian Smith and Sir Alec Douglas- Home, the Foreign and Commonwealth

Secretary; but in a test of acceptability held in January/March 1972, it was determined that while

the great majority of Europeans supported them, they were rejected by the majority of Africans,

and were therefore unacceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole (Dayal, 1980:470).

Whatever hope Britain had for success was based on three erroneous assumptions: that

sanctions would be effective, that there was the possibility of getting Smith to split with the RF in

order to reach an amiable accord with Britain and that the internal opposition to UDI would

materialize. Sanctions were not going to work, and UDI was not going to crumble. Sanctions

could only be effective immediately if they were given the wholehearted cooperation of states

which were, on the face of it, unlikely to cooperate. Realistically, considered, force, as demanded

by the African states, was the only way that White Rhodesian independence could be ended if

Rhodesians, White and Black, did nothing themselves to end it (Feit, 1966:336-357). The British
19 Salisbury was the capital of Southern Rhodesia to be replaced by Harare after
independence in April 1980
 64

government would not use force against kith and kin to end the rebellion. A blunt step which

openly revealed the meager nature of British authority within Rhodesia, UDI was a plain

unadorned assertion by white Rhodesia that it was fully competent to handle its own affairs

(Bowman, 1973:117). It did not want British supervision, however infrequently that supervision

was attempted or accepted. It was also a blatant challenge to Britain to assert its proclaimed

authority. In not being able to regain any semblance of control within Rhodesia, Britain had been

forced to admit its inability to do anything about the Rhodesian rebellion, at least within the

limits of action it considered acceptable.

White efforts to end UDI were unlikely. Not only had Ian Smith, whether one supported or

opposed his stand, played his cards well but he managed to avoid many of the pitfalls which the

British government believed would lead to his early overthrow.

Contrary to sanguine expectations, Africans in Rhodesia had not risen against the Smith

government. “As far as it could be ascertained –and with Rhodesian censorship—after some

attempts at a strike which collapsed quite quickly, most Africans had accepted the situation as it

was, not because they were certain that it would be to their advantage, but because it seemed as

likely to aid their cause as anything else on the horizon.” (Bowman, 1973:150) R.B Sutcliffe has

rightly argued:

“If UDI had not occurred it is very hard to see that the political position of Africans would be

better now than in fact it is. If the British government has had insufficient power to end a

rebellion, it seems very doubtful that it would have had sufficient power to produce an

improvement in the political status of Africans without the provocation of that rebellion…”

(Sutcliffe 1987:113)

The fact remained, as Africans then realized, that only through their own efforts was political

change likely to come to Rhodesia. Such change was what guerrilla strategy was designed to
 65
induce—the use of force to unseat the settler regime that had been consistently maintained by

brutal coercion.

The Liberation Struggles

With the collapse of the fascist regime in Portugal, Mozambique became independent in

1975 and Angola in 1976. In November 1975, the Zimbabwe African National liberation Army

(ZANLA) was set up in Mozambique. Its freedom fighters cadres were chiefly members of

ZANU under Robert Mugabe. ZAPU under Joshua Nkomo set up the Zimbabwe African

Peoples’ Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) operating from Zambia. In October 1976, the formation

of a joint “Patriotic Front” consisting of these two organizations was announced by Nkomo and

Mugabe, who during the next three years worked closely together, and in particular attended

successive discussions about the future of Rhodesia as a joint delegation under joint leadership

( Brides, 1980:181). Also after 1976 the government of Angola and Mozambique joined with

those of Zambia, Tanzania, and Botswana to form the “Front Line States (FLS),” a grouping

which consistently supported the Patriotic Front, and played a careful concerted and major part in

all negotiations about Zimbabwe.

For seven years ZANLA and ZIPRA liberation army waged a steadily intensifying war against

the settler regime in Rhodesia from Mozambique and Zambia bases. Against these the

Rhodesian forces launched a number of pre-emptive cross-border attacks, some of which killed

thousands of innocent men and women refugees. The fighting is thought to have cost the lives of

some fifty thousand Zimbabweans, the overwhelming majority of them black. Thus, it then

became evident that the white minority’s bid to extend indefinitely its monopoly of political

power in Rhodesia suffered a fatal setback when Portugal’s African colonies were given their

independence in 1975 and 1976. Mozambique changed from being an area of supply and support

for the Smith regime, into a launching ground for liberation army attacks. South Africa’s own

policy changed too. As pointed out by Brides, “in the early years of UDI it had been one strong,
 66

though unpublicized, moral and practical support for the Rhodesian white minority government

in military and sanctions-busting activities. Indeed, the white minority own confidence in Ian

Smith, and their will to assist in preventing the advent of black majority rule, became steadily

eroded as the years passed and the casualties mounted.” ( Brides, 1980:182).

So in March 1978,the Smith regime yielded to majority rule, and using the policy of

divide and rule, found within Rhodesia black leaders, notably Bishop Abel Muzorewa, leader of

the United African National Congress (UANC), with whom to make an internal settlement. That

goal came to fruition when Bishop Muzorewa was sworn as Prime Minister of

ZimbabweRhodesia on May 29, 1979. The new Rhodesian constitution, which came into effect

on June 1, the same year, provided that the white minority would be able to block, in Parliament,

any unwelcome constitutional changes, but incorporated the principle of majority rule. It had

previously been submitted in a referendum to the whites, who approved it; but the blacks were

not asked whether they approved it or not. It was condemned by both the Organization of

African Unity ( OAU) and the UN.

The British Conservative Government which took office on May 3, 1979 agreed with other

Commonwealth Governments at Lusaka on an outline plan for action, of which essential features

“were the grant of independence to Zimbabwe on the basis of genuine black majority rule, but

with appropriate safeguards for minorities; the holding of free and fair elections; the cessation of

hostilities and the ending of sanctions; and as a means of setting all this on foot, the calling by

Britain of a constitutional conference, to which all the parties, including the Patriotic Front,

would be invited.” ( Dayal,1980:472)

The Lancaster House Conference

The marathon Conference opened at Lancaster House on 10 September, 1979 in an

atmosphere of acrimony. But Lord Carrington’s intriguing chairmanship and skilled diplomacy
 67
20
rose to the occasion. The first major crisis of the conference occurred over the independence

constitution—a British draft preceding the attainment of self-rule. After much bickering, both

African delegations had moved toward the British draft constitution in its essentials. “The

Constitution relied very heavily on the 1979 Rhodesian Constitution; among the features retained

being the Commissions which controlled the security services, bureaucracy and judiciary.”

(Dayal, 1980:475). The number of reserved seats for Europeans, entrenched for seven years was

reduced to twenty. The PF surprised many by accepting reserved white seats in the proposed

parliament and conceding the British position on the powers of the President of the republic of

Zimbabwe; despite favoring an executive president, the PF accepted Britain’s constitutional head

of state. It also agreed that citizenship of the new Zimbabwe would be automatically conferred

upon post-UDI immigrants.

Figure 3.3. African Leaders at Lancaster House Conference in London. Robert Mugabe (2R),
Joshua Nkomo (R), S. Mundawarara (2L) and Bishop Abel Muzorewa (L) at Lancaster House
Conference in 1979, negotiating the transition to independence of Zimbabwe. (Source: National
Archives of Zimbabwe)

Reluctant PF acceptance of the draft constitution was prevented by the provision for land

tenure in the proposed Bill of Rights. While the PF argued for a radical restructuring of

agriculture on a communal basis, the British constitutional provisions for land, tacitly supported

20 Lord Carrington was the British Government Secretary for Commonwealth and Foreign
Affairs.
 68

by a Muzorewa delegation which did not produce its own position on the issue, envisaged a

modified form of the existing system of white-dominated land ownership. Thus, “there was

much dispute over land redistribution and compensation which was only resolved by an offer of

massive aid backed by the U.S. A.” (Dayal, 1980:475)

The first crisis of the conference thus highlighted once again Britain’s limited power to

exert effective influence without international assistance, and also demonstrated the wide range

of international interest at stake in the Rhodesian issue. Among other features were the

citizenship provisions, a Declaration of Rights, and pension guarantees.

The next item concerned pre-election arrangements. The British Government would

appoint a Governor with supreme legislative powers as well as a full control over the PF forces.

The period of illegal ‘independence’ would be thus ended and the colony returned to legality.

The British Government pledged itself to transfer power to a government chosen by the free will

of the people. All contending parties likewise undertook to abide by the result of the election.

The British Government would hold free and fair elections under its authority and supervision; a

Commonwealth team would monitor the conduct of the campaign and polling. With the election

completed, Zimbabwe would have taken the decisive step toward sovereign independent status

under the Lancaster House, and not a Zimbabwean, Constitution. Robert Mugabe’s

overwhelming victory left no room for choice as to Prime Minister-ship. His advent was hailed

with joy by the vast majority, but it disappointed many and alarmed some. Mugabe dismissed the

fears and the disappointments thus: “If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today you have

become a friend and ally with same national interest, loyalty, rights and duties”.

The willing-buyer-willing seller principle enshrined in the constitution was the main

obstacle to successful land reform; “it protected the interest of white, large-scale commercial

farmers and prevented the government from buying enough land to meet the increasing needs of

a growing population.” (Tshuma, 1997:165)) Thus, the agreement on land reached at Lancaster
 69
House had itself been a compromise, and one in which the Zimbabwean negotiators had little

choice but to accept. In return for Britain to underwrite half the cost of a resettlement program,

they undertook to guarantee existing property rights. Thus, while the government could acquire

any land on a ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ basis, only under-utilized land, which was required

for resettlement or other public purposes, could be acquired compulsorily,21 and in such cases

compensation had to be adequate (i.e. based on the full market value of the land), it was paid

promptly and it was remittable abroad.22 This agreement lasted for ten years and placed severe

constraints on the government’s land policy. Conscious of the racial protection guaranteed by the

constitution, white farmers were reluctant to relinquish their colonially inherited privilege. In this

respect, the 1979 constitution “pervaded the process and structures through which the new state

sought both to consolidate national independence and provide a basis for genuine economic and

social development.” ( Mandaza, 2004::2) It is therefore not surprising that apart from

safeguarding the economic interests of minority whites by ensuring that ‘Zimbabwe inherited the

key elements of the white settler colonial apparatus,’ the constitution hampered the progress

toward justice and political reconciliation by entrenching a special parliamentary position for

whites ( Mandaza, 2004:42). Until the removal of the twenty reserved seats in 1987, politically

active whites continued to see themselves as existing outside the new nation state and

overwhelmingly supported the Rhodesian Front. (Sylvester, 1986:252)

It should be noted, however, that like the Rudd Concession discussed earlier in this

analysis, the Lancaster House Constitution was coercive, deceitful and fraudulent. Davidow was

quick to call the1979 Lancaster House Conference a success. Yet the price of this success was

not adequately explored. As Davidow himself notes, “ the British exerted a great deal of

pressure on the Patriotic Front to accept the terms offered by a Conservative British government

and agreed to by the Muzorewa-Smith regime.” (Davidow 1984:1430) This agreement has

21 Land Acquisition Act 1985 s. 3(1) (a) (iii)

22 Constitution of Zimbabwe 1980 s. 16 (1) ©, (5) (a)
 70

already led to problems within Zimbabwe. As pointed out above, the government must purchase

white land at the current market rate when the whites decide to sell or when the land they

forcibly stole from Africans is fallow. The process of stolen land acquisition is cumbersome and

expensive, an undertaking which has intensified the problem of land hunger and led to a resultant

increase in squatters. In addition, US and British aid for resettlement purposes, promised at

Lancaster House Conference, has not been forthcoming. Also the impartiality of the judiciary

had already become questionable by the new black government. Finally, as already noted, whites

were guaranteed representation in the Parliament far beyond their proportion of the population.

Indeed, these and other factors limited the new government’s room for maneuver, and

have hindered the country’s development efforts. Thus in 1980 a new black government took

power in Zimbabwe, confronting the widest gap in the world between the very poor and the very

rich. Some 6000 white farmers owned farms with an average size of 6000 acres, comprising the

best half of the arable land in the country. 800,000 African farmers scratched a living out of the

sand and rocks that constituted the other half. Seventy-five percent of the children of wage

workers on the white farms suffered from malnutrition: their parents had a minimum monthly

wage of R$20. Eighty-five percent of those children had never received a medical examination or

visited a clinic.23 The dismal figures roll on and on. “In effect, it ‘gave settler capital a

decadelong period of consolidation, during which issues around the radical restructuring of the

legacy of economic inequality were effectively put on hold.” (Raftopoulos, 2004:2)

Revolutionary parties seize power in order to gain control of the state machinery. Robert

Mugabe’s party proclaimed that it had fought a long war in order to use that machinery to

transform Zimbabwe’s society into one more favorable to the black, poor and disinherited mass.

23 See Robert B. Seidman, How a Bill Became Law in Zimbabwe: On the problem of
transforming a Colonial State, Africa Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 52, No.
3, Past and Present in Zimbabwe 1982:56-76.
 71
The state operated to change society primarily through the legal order. Despite its protestations,

however, Zimbabwe’s revolutionary government made hasty slowly. A year and half after

independence it had not introduced a land reform bill. It had not changed the Industrial

Reconciliation Act, repealed the old regime’s oppressive LOMA, changed the regressive tax

laws, enacted an Equal Employment Opportunity Act ( employers still legally could and did

discriminate against blacks in employment), nor brought before the Parliament an Equal Rights

in Housing Act.

Before Third World revolutions theorists concerned with the problems of state power

sought to explain how democratic polity could nonetheless maintain an inegalitarian legal order,

Max Weber spoke of legitimacy, the Marxists of hegemony. ( Seidman, 1982:56) Both tried to

answer generally de Tocquevilles’s question about the United States: How could the mass have
24
the power but not the wealth? The success of the Third World revolutions changed the

perceived problem. Having seized the levers of political power, the new rulers needed to know

which ones to pull in order to change the inherited political and economic institutions. How to

identify in detail the procedures and laws that defined and bolstered the institutions that

engendered the mass’s miseries? That became part of the subject-matter of law and development:

how to develop, draft, enact and implement law that would bring about changed behavior by a

variety of actors in order to transform the political economy in favor of the mass. 25 In the process

corruption ensued.

24 nd
In general see W.J. Chambliss and R.B. Seidman, Law, Order and Power (2 edition) Reading,
Mass: Addison, Wesley, Forthcoming)
25 See generally, R.B. Seidman , The State, Law and Development (London: Croom, Helm,
1978); Chapter 11.
 72

3.5 CONCLUSION

This study starts with any analysis of the pre-colonial culture and value systems of the

African people in Zimbabwe. Both the Ndebele kingdom and the Shona chiefdoms were founded

on principles of communalism in which all members took part in the daily running of the ethnic

group. Politically, the chief ruled with councils which informed him, checked his powers and

made policy by reaching unanimous decisions. For survival, these people had mixed economies

in which agriculture, pastoralism/cattle rearing, hunting and gathering, trade, and mining were

major activities.

The systematic dispossession realized largely through violence, war and legislative

enactments by successive colonial Governments led to the racially skewed land distribution and

ownership pattern that until recently, was characteristic of Southern Rhodesia. The Rudd

Concession of 1888, fraudulently obtained from King Lobengula, became the vehicle through

which colonialists obtained mineral rights in Mashonaland. The Concession provided Rhodes

with the impetus to obtain a Royal Charter in 1889, which granted the BSAC authority to

administer and govern the region that encompasses present day Zimbabwe. The Rudd

Concession was countered by the Lippert Concession which was also deceitfully obtained from

Lobengula. With the connivance of the British Government and without Lobengula’s knowledge,

the Lippert Concession was soon purchased by the BASC.

Disillusioned at the non-existence of the “Second Rand” in Mashonaland and the

assumption that there existed more gold reserves in Matebeleland, the BSAC on a flimsy pretext

invaded Matebeleland in 1893, destroyed Lobengula’s Kingdom, primitively seized and

plundered cattle and other livestock and property and subdued the Ndebele and Shona people.

European invaders were promised huge tracts of land and gold mines as payment for services

rendered to the British Queen.. Initially, Europeans depended on the African sector for food and
 73
seed, and their farms faced stiff competition. This was soon to change with the introduction of

various pieces of legislation that removed Africans from the land and forced them to work on

European farms and mines. The hostility that was generated as a result of this systematic

displacement and subjugation, culminated in the first Chimurenga (African resistance wars) of

1896-7. After the uprisings were suppressed European settlers expropriated more land from the

Africans by right of conquest. Henceforth, the Africans were forced into the newly established

reserves. Others became rent-paying tenants on the land that they had occupied for generations

and was rightful theirs. Rent was payable in either cash or labor, both of which had the effect of

securing labor for the newly established settler farms.

In 1923 Southern Rhodesia became a self-governing colony. Britain gave the settlers the

right to legislate, except in instances where the legislation distinguished between the races. Such

legislation required British approval, and Britain had a veto. Nevertheless, Britain was

completely marginalized in the colony’s activities and the settlers were able to establish a society

that was legally segregated. The Land apportionment Act of 1930, the Land Husbandry Act of

1951, the Land Tenure Act of 1969, among others, strengthened European agricultural interests.

Britain did not intervene and the Africans who were politically disenfranchised were helpless.

Thus, a dual economy with thriving white agricultural, and impoverished landless African sectors

emerged both in practice and in law.

When the Central African Federation (CAF) was established in 1953, Great Britain was in

a state of political and economic decline. The CAF was intended to boost economic growth and

to be a counterweight to Afrikaner hegemony in Southern Africa. Southern Rhodesia dominated

and benefited the most from the CAF. The Cold War was raging and the “wind of change” was

blowing across the continent by 1957 when Ghana gained independence. Also, the Civil Rights

Movement in the US gained momentum, the Suez Canal unfolded, and Mau Mau uprising in

Kenya was won at a heavy cost. By 1960 it was clear that the British Empire was falling apart.
 74

Britain could not maintain the CAF, and in 1964 Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were granted

independence as Malawi and Zambia, respectively. Although Southern Rhodesia enjoyed

materially from the dissolution of the CAF, Its unfulfilled demands for independence led to the

Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965.

Due to its political and economic problems, Britain was not able to end Rhodesia’s

rebellion. In the beginning Britain handled the dispute with Rhodesia on bi-lateral terms, and

adopted sanctions in response to UDI. When the bi-lateral approach failed to work, repeated

attempts to solve the dispute involved third parties: the regional countries, and eventually the US.

The exaggerated repression of the white minority regime, which was propped by South Africa,

caused the nationalist movement to gather momentum. The nationalists used the land issue to

mobilize the African majority.. Those forces culminated in the Lancaster House Conference of

1979.

The Lancaster House Conference established democracy and Rhodesia became

independent. The land policy that emerged reflected British bias towards the settler minority.

Anxious to appease the black electorate at home and counter the Communist threat, Jimmy

Carter jointly agreed to fund the land distribution in order to move the negotiations for a

settlement further. The African nationalists were the only ones with land on their agenda. They

had not won the war decisively and their economically weak supporters—the Frontline States—

were anxious to for a settlement. This put the nationalists in a weak position. Lastly, the settlers

were fighting a losing war, the economic sanctions were taking their toll, and the ties with South

Africa had weakened. Under the new constitution, property rights were protected and land could

not be expropriated except in a few specific instances, with the “prompt” payment of full

compensation. The willing-buyer-willing seller doctrine was established and would remain for

ten years. With this agreement, Britain re-asserted its authority and prevailed the heavy cost of
 75
international isolation as a result of the Rhodesian crisis. The nationalists gained political power,

legitimacy, and land agreement, which, however unfeasible enabled them to keep their

commitment to the peasants they represented. The white settlers got a land policy that would

slow down land acquisition. At Lancaster, the only people who did not get anything tangible

were peasants and the rank and file of freedom fighters. Given Britain’s economic ideology and

commitments, as well as its interests in Southern Africa, an amicable future resolution of the land

question was unlikely.

Rational men, population planners, and social engineers therefore might well be asked

what the ideal socio-economic structure for an emerging nation such as Zimbabwe? What range

of differentials within the total rewards system will prove beneficial, promote enterprise and

reward endeavor without creating unacceptable ‘inequality’ or ‘deprivation’? Above all, what

type of institutions and structures are likely to foster rapid development without threatening

peace and unity?

 CHAPTER FOUR

INSTITUTIONS AND STRUCTURES OF GOVERNANCE

4.1 INTRODUCTION

History matters in the study of change. The path taken in the past can eliminate options, because

of inherited structures, institutions, ideologies, attitudes, and values (including apartheid,

colonialism, and nationalism).26

The relatively peaceful decolonization of British and French Africa in the 1950s and

1960s led, for the most part, to the capturing of state power by a new political elite rather than a

thorough-going transformation of the state structures inherited at independence. Instead of

refashioning institutions in ways that might increase political participation and social justice,

existing state capacities tended to be marshaled for exclusionary and, in many cases,

authoritarian purposes.27

Zimbabwe, however, did not follow this model of ‘consensual decolonization.’ As

analyzed above, there, entrenched settler regime had no intention of voluntarily liquidating its

control, and was prepared to resist indefinitely the move toward decolonization. Settler

26 See, for example, R. Mathews, ‘The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of
Growth’, in
Economic Journal (London) 96, 1968:903-18; Douglas North, Institutions, Institutional Change
and Economic Performance (Cambridge, 1991); and John Harris, Janet Hunter, and Colin Lewis.
The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development (London 1965).
27 On variations within this overall pattern, see B.O. Nwabueze, Presidentialism in
Commonwealth Africa (London: 1974); Ruth Collier, ‘Parties, Coups, and Authoritarian
Rule’, in Comparative Political Studies (Beverly Hills), 11, April, 1978:62-93.
 77

83

intransigence forced African opposition underground and set in motion what was to become

protracted liberation struggles. Unprecedented political changes forged in the heat of armed

struggle, it is claimed, irreversibly’ determined the character of the coming state.’ (Chabal,

1983:95) The imperatives of mobilizing against a recalcitrant colonialism,’ for John Saul,

‘inevitably involved a basic reordering of social relationships’. ( Saul, 1979:71-80) According to

Basil Davidson, “popular organization and the creation of an alternative politics meant that the

new rulers would have ‘no need to take over any of the structures and institutions of colonial

rule.” (Davidson1976:75) And for Patrick Cabal, “successful people’s wars usher in the

establishment of states the legitimacy and structure of which owe little, if anything to their

colonial predecessors.” (Chabal, 1983:218))

According to the mobilization thesis, “the character of the post-colonial state in these

societies would have an ‘inevitable’ and positive connection to the insurgent ‘state’ that was built

up in liberated zones during the struggle for independence.” ( Weitzer, 1984:529-557) Since the

years of liberation struggle produced a political culture and practice in opposition to the colonial

system, a revolutionary, seemingly irrevocable break had been accomplished.

Thirty one years after independence, Zimbabwe does not seem to fit this scenario. The

Zimbabwe revolution was lost at Lancaster House in December 1979. The Lancaster House

document was essentially based on West-minister-style constitution of a non-executive president

with a prime minister as head of government; a bicameral legislature; an independent judiciary

and an entrenched and justiciable Declaration of Rights. As pointed out by Hatchard, “it also

contained special protections for white minority including the provision of 20 seats reserved for

voters on the white roll. The Declaration of Rights and white roll were specially entrenched in

the Constitution for ten years and seven years respectively from the date of independence.”
 78
(Hatchard, 1991;79-101) This meant that any amendment or repeal of those provisions required

the affirmative vote of all members of Parliament. Thereafter, any amendment or repeal required

the affirmative votes of not less than two thirds of the total parliamentary membership. These

restrictions emphasized the interim nature of the constitutional settlement and ensured that

draftsmen, lawyers and academics would be busy dealing with constitutional changes for years to

come. Thus the constitution could be changed to meet the interests of the ruling elites in future

However, the especially entrenched provisions precluded any immediate fundamental

constitutional change. Thus, the first amendments to the Constitution between 1980 and 1987 did

little to alter the basic structures. Perhaps the two most significant changes were the introduction

of provincial governors28 and the re-organization of the Judicial Service Commission. 29 Thus,

first, the Lancaster House Constitution neither reflected the basic principles of the liberation

movements nor any of their manifestos. Second, the Constitution was not a reflection of the

majority African culture and value systems that the settler colonial system had brutally destroyed.

However, we must never forget that the settler colonial state in Zimbabwe was an

authoritarian bureaucratic apparatus of control and not intended to be a school of democracy. Its

European officials believed themselves to be agents of a superior civilization with a right to rule

over people of inferior culture and paternally guide them to a higher level of social development.

However haphazard and ramshackle the reality of state power, the settler colonialists struggled to

maintain the façade of omnipotence and omniscience. Their sense of being a legitimate and

uniquely capable ruling class was passed on through the elite secondary schools and, eventually,

universities that trained cadres of potential African successors to run not only the former

28 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 5) Act

29 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (N. 4) Act 1984. Other amendments including the
abolition of dual citizenship (1983); reduction in the minimum age for membership of statutory
commissions and the Senate (1981) and the replacement of the old court system of the General
Division and Appellate Division of the High Court with a new court structure consisting of the
Supreme Court and the High Court (1981).
 79

capitalist enterprises, but also the apparatus of the bureaucratic state. (Berman, 1998:239) It is

therefore not surprising that, since independence, the new government’s institutions and

structures display a striking degree of continuity with its colonial predecessor.

During the 1959—60 period, The Rhodesian Government introduced a battery of enactments

designed to counter African political activity, and to fortify state power. Over the next two

decades this coercive armory was augmented and streamlined. Powers not provided under the

various draconian statutes were available to the state in the form of emergency decrees and the

carte blanche offered by martial law. ( Weitzer, 1984:531) These measures were the objects of

repeated condemnation from nationalist and liberation armies, who promised to withdraw them

once the settler state have been overthrown. It is true, at independence, the political system ‘was

opened’ in the sense of popular enfranchisement. The white minority was finally deprived of its

political authority. Martial law and the special courts were abolished. And a justiciable

Declaration of Rights was written in the new constitution.

Yet the vast majority of Rhodesia’s repressive powers have not been abandoned by the new

government. The virtues of the current Declaration of Rights are largely cancelled as long as the

state of emergency under whatever form or name continues. Emergency rule permits the

promulgation of executive decrees of great magnitude, with only nominal legislative control.

Section 3 (6) of the Emergency Powers Act (EPA) of 1960 provides that a regulation must be

laid before the Assembly ‘as soon as may be after it is made,’ and that it can be annulled within

28 days. The Zimbabwean executive has not followed this procedure 30 The Government has used

the Act for reasons of expedience and to bypass the ordinary legislative process. The net effect of

the heavy reliance on emergency rulings has been the elevation of the executive at the expense of

parliamentary authority and judicial control. Moreover, since by the time a regulation is

30 ‘Emergency Powers: mechanism for instant legislation’ in Moto (Gweru),

July 1983.
 80
publicized it is already a fait accompli, the Government does not have to contend with public

debate and opposition.

Not foreseeing in 1960 that the Emergency Powers Act would become the permanent

weapon that it had been, the Rhodesian Government introduced another all-encompassing

measure, the Law and Order (Maintainance) Act (LOMA) and this remains, under different

names, the pinnacle of repressive legislation today. In addition to provisions intended to counter

intimidation, sabotage, violence, incitement, the carrying of weapons, and acts of terrorism, the

Act gives the police and the Minister of Home Affairs arbitrary powers to control suspected or

potential foes and to criminalize ordinary political activity. Wietzer points out that, “it provides

for the prohibition of public meetings, processions, publications, the wearing of certain uniforms,

boycotting, passive resistance to the law, the making of ‘subversive statements’ broadly defined,

and other forms of political protest and opposition” (Weitzer, 1984:533)

Despite appearances there has never been a genuine Westminister heritage in the country.

Rhodesia’s political system was overtly racialistic and hence counter to Westminister tradition.

Only 5 percent of the nation’s population was politically enfranchised. Secondly, there was little

circulation of parties in and out of office. The RF held power, and completely dominated

Parliament, for 16 years before independence. ZANU-PF has been in power for 31 years. “If in

Britain the legislature and the judiciary are relatively weak, in Rhodesia they were in some sense,

the loci of power; ‘parliamentary supremacy’ was an even greater fiction than in Britain,”

(Loweinstein, 1982:120), while the judiciary played little role in protecting rights and liberties.

The executive as a whole, and the ‘commanding heights’ of the security sector in particular,

progressively gained more autonomy from state and societal accountability. The traditions that

have impeded radical abuses of state power in Britain never took root in Rhodesia. This is

Zimbabwe’s political legacy. Institutions and Structures of governance took the pattern of the

settler colonial regime, with executive, legislature, and judiciary as the main pillars of
 81

government, supplemented by an elaborate civil service/public sector and other government and

semi-government agencies.

4.2 EXECUTIVE

Under the Lancaster House Constitution the President could act alone in only a limited

number of circumstances, the most important being the appointment and removal of the Prime

Minister. In practice, the commanding parliamentary majority of ZANU-PF made such powers

superfluous. This left the President as something of a figurehead. “In other African countries, the

constitutional structures inherited at independence tended to enhance corruption through the

centralization of power, and impairment of participatory democracy.” Mulinge & Lesetedi,

2002:51-74) In Zimbabwe this figurehead position was not necessarily unacceptable as it enabled

him to perform a useful advisory role. Indeed he played a crucial part as a unifying force at a

time of considerable tension between the two political parties (ZANU and ZAPU) and his

continued efforts to reconcile the protagonists is now acknowledged as being instrumental in

bringing about the December 22, 1987 unity Agreement.

In other former British colonies, the new constitutions vested enormous powers in the

hands of a single office, institution or individual, usually the presidency. Thus, the ‘outgoing

strongmen’ oversaw the emergence of laws that facilitated a continuation of the repressive

practices they had subjected the colonized to, only this time using mwana wevhu (son of the soil)

as their proxy. Indeed, the establishment of the executive presidency as practiced in other

African states was always the goal of ZANU-PF and this was accomplished in December 1987.

This trend elsewhere in Africa had given birth to autocratic presidents and bureaucracies that are

above the law; devoid of accountability, transparency, rule of law, and administrative

predictability; and irresponsible.31

31 This issue is dealt with in the literature review. See Hope

(1999).
 82
The qualifications for presidential candidature are now citizenship of Zimbabwe by birth

or descent; aged 40 years and above; and ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe. The inclusion of

citizenship by descent is important because it ensures that persons born outside the country

(particularly during the war of liberation) are not excluded from holding office. The President is

directly elected in a multi-candidate election. 32 The six-year term has been retained because it

ensured a reasonable long period in office and avoided presidential and parliamentary elections
33
invariably coinciding. A major change is that the provisions of the Lancaster House

Constitution restricting the President to a maximum of two six- year terms of office, was

removed.

The President appoints all Cabinet members from the legislature and enjoys absolute

discretion in doing so. Cabinet members all serve at the pleasure of the President and can be

dismissed at anytime and without giving reasons. Parliament plays no role in the appointment

and removal of Cabinet members. The President is directly elected for six years and may be

reelected indefinitely with no term limits-a fatal weakness of the present constitution, but not

surprising.. Secondly, there was little circulation of parties in and out of office. The RF held

power, and completely dominated Parliament, for 16 years before independence. The incumbent

president has been in power for 31 years. He has been the only executive president since 1987.

The 7th Amendment bestowed the executive President overwhelming powers vis-à-vis

Parliament, with only notional checks (Mhlaba, 1991:42), thus reducing parliament to little more

than a forum for publicity rather than power.

Moreover, whilst in office, the President is not personally liable to any civil or criminal

proceedings in any court (section 30). This useful provision is new to Zimbabwe although there

32 For the purposes of the first election of the first executive president, members of the
legislature met as an electoral college and on December 30, 1987, unanimously elected Robert
Mugabe.
33 Minister of Justice and Parliamentray Debates October
27, 1987
 83

are precedents in other African states. The intention is to bring dignity to the office of the

president and to prevent presidential attention being diverted from matters of state. However, the

provision does not imply complete immunity. Thus civil and/or criminal proceedings may be

instituted against the President after he/she has left office in respect of actions taken prior to

assuming office and things done or omitted to be done in his/her personal capacity during the

holding of office. Time does not run against a litigant in these circumstances. Even so, as there is

no restriction on the number of terms in office, a litigant may have to wait a considerable time

before being able to pursue a claim.

The Executive towers over both Parliament and the Judiciary, and is reinforced by the

Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act of 1986 that empowers the President to make

emergency decrees. The weakness is that determining the emergency is also at his discretion.

Thus, the President may at any time, by proclamation, declare in relation to the whole of

Zimbabwe or any part that a state of emergency exists. The first problem concerns the retention

of a state of emergency itself. In the case of Zimbabwe, the state of emergency, which was

introduced in 1965, was retained after independence and, with parliamentary approval, was

renewed after every six months until July 1990 when it was finally lifted. Over the years, a

variety of reasons were propounded for its continued existence. “These included the dissident

problem in Matebeleland; increased crime, destabilization by South Africa; attacks inside

Zimbabwe carried out by Renamo guerrillas operating from Mozambique; re-structuring of the

economy; economic problems and industrial unrest.” (Hatchard, 1991:89) Based on Article 4 of

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (which was relied upon by the

government as the basis for of the state of emergency in Zimbabwe) 34, these reasons did not

justify the retention of the state of emergency for such a long period, if at all.

34 See, for example, the speech of the Minister of Home Affairs, Parliamentary Debates , July
13, 1982.
 84
The two posts of Vice-President are entirely new. The incumbents are the principal

assistants to the President in the discharge of his executive functions and also perform such other

functions as the President may assign to them (section 31C). Appointments are made solely at the

behest of the President. Whenever the post of the President is vacant or the incumbent is out of

the country or otherwise unable to perform his/her functions, the vice-President designated for

such eventuality assumes office (section 31 (1) ). The desire to retain a link between the

executive and the legislature is reflected in the fact that Vice-Presidents must be members of

Parliament. This does not necessarily restrict presidential choice for any appointee has up to three

months to find a parliamentary seat (section 31 (2) ).

Ministers exercise general direction and control over their ministries and there is no law

that binds ministers to give reasons for their decisions. If intra-legislative checks on the power of

the ruling party are cosmetic at best, both the Rhodesian and Zimbabwean Parliaments have gone

a step further in accommodating executive power by delegating to Cabinet Ministers a host of

exceptional powers. Ministers enjoy immense discretion to detain without trial, criminalize

organizations, indemnify state agents, ban processions and meetings, restrict freedom of speech,

and virtually anything else. Weitzer, 1984:535) However, government ministers enjoy

circumscribed discretion with regard to staffing matters in their ministries. They neither can

directly hire, fire nor discipline their ministerial staff; such powers are vested in the Public

Service Commission (PSC) , an inherited constitutional body in charge of the whole Zimbabwe

public service (TI-Z, 2007:333). Whereas ministers are political heads of their ministries, the

administrative heads dating back from Rhodesia, are referred to as ‘Permanent Secretaries’ and

their appointment is done by the president, just as the other senior administrators, in direct

consultation with the PSC. It appears the President consults the PSC as a matter of constitutional

courtesy.
 85

The granting of licenses is normally the responsibility of regulatory agencies instead of

ministers.. Most legislation governing these regulatory agencies has provisions for appealing to

the responsible Minister. An aggrieved person may also appeal to the Administrative Court (AC)

which may confirm, vary or set aside the decision or action appealed against.

The President has in the past eight years been on an anti-corruption crusade warning

about corruption threatening society’s moral fabric. (TI-Z, 2007:334) The Government has

instituted several initiatives that, at least at the symbolic level, indicate a high level of concern

and determination to deal with the problem. The President created a Ministry of Anti-Corruption

and located it in the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC) presumably to give it teeth to

bite. He has also established an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) that became operational in

October 2010. However, by February 2011, the time I was in Zimbabwe for this research, the

ACC was not yet fully functional and was yet to produce tangible results. Thus, the challenge

arises at the level of implementation Zimbabwe has a bloated Executive; presently with the

formation of the Inclusive government—referred to as Government of National Unity (GNU) in

2009, there are Forty- three core -ministries that make up the Executive and whose employs

constitute the Zimbabwe Public Service.

With regard to financial matters, the Ministry of Finance is the central agency that,

through treasury Instructions, oversees all ministries, Treasury instructions must be followed by

all ministries. (TI-Z, 2007:334) Equally important is the office of the Comptroller and

AuditorGeneral, (CAG), responsible for auditing all governments and public sector departments.

A major weakness of the AGC is its location, in the Ministry of Finance, seriously compromising

its autonomy in that it cannot confidently investigate its own principal.

Within the executive branch, the Office of the President and Cabinet ( OPC) also

provides oversight of the various ministries. The Chief Secretary in the OPC has oversight

responsibility for the way all ministries operate. Also within the OPC is the Monitoring and
 86
Evaluation Unit which monitors ministries and reports on its findings. Outside the executive but

playing a potentially critical role is the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) which is a

parliamentary watchdog committee. The Committee’s main purpose is to establish accounting

propriety, probity and legality of government expenditures but its effectiveness has been visibly

weak. Its chef weakness is that it acts after the event and like CAG the Committee lacks any

enforcement powers.

The Public Service has a Code of Conduct in the form of Statutory Instrument 1 of 2000

(Public Service Regulations).It covers a wide variety of topics, which include appointments,

resignation, grading, salaries, allowances, leave issues, discipline, and grievance procedures

among other issues relevant to the welfare and conduct of public officials. However, the political

executive does not have such binding codes except taking an oath pledging to conduct

government business ‘for the good management of the public affairs of Zimbabwe.’35 There are

rules on gifts and hospitality governing administrators but none for the political executive.

However, the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) has aspects regulating gifts and hospitality

but this act is applicable to every citizen.

In law, there is nothing compelling the Executive to disclose their assets nor is there

anything requiring lifestyle monitoring. This is a major weakness in that virtually all ministers

and senior government officials are known to live well beyond their means.

4.3 LEGISLATURE

The new model also gives the Parliament safeguarding power. Under the independence

constitution, if the House of Assembly passed a vote of no confidence in the government, the

Prime Minister was required to resign from office within three days or be removed by the

President. The only alternative was the dissolution of Parliament itself. Since 1987 the President

now has three options: to dissolve Parliament; to resign from office; (iii) to remove the
35 [ Schedule (1) of the
Constitution].
 87

VicePresidents and all ministers and deputy ministers from office, unless they have already

resigned (section 31 F). The third option is unusual in the African context as it permits the

President to remain in office whilst replacing his entire ministry. As the supreme executive

authority vests in the President and Cabinet, it is, on the face of it, somewhat surprising that this

choice is available. Parliament also retains the power to remove the President from office.

Until 2000, the ruling party—ZANU-PF benefitted from an overwhelming imbalance of

power in the legislature similar to the Rhodesian pattern. Parliament is reduced to little more than

a forum for publicity rather than power. Neither of the two chambers has functioned as an arena

of struggle over the creation and implementation of legislation. The Senate Legal Committee—

charged with evaluating Bills and Statutory Instruments in light of the Declaration of Rights—

has thus far not placed significant constraints on the Assembly or the Government. Procedural

changes made in previous decades continue to impose narrow limitations on debates and

questions concerning security and public sector abuse of office. As in the past, and until 2008,

the Government benefitted from frequent favorable rulings by the Speaker of the Assembly and

till today by the President of the Senate. Until 2008, time and again, Ministers maintained an

unresponsive stance toward Opposition queries; blanket notions of ‘national interest’ and ‘state

security’ are invoked so frequently that even the publicity function of Parliament is eroded. The

renewal of the state of emergency for instance, used to be treated as so transparently necessary

that it transcended debate and justification, as the Minister of Home Affairs once proclaimed:

“Clearly, we are not going to defend the state of emergency. It is the state of emergency which is

going to defend us. Unless we want to start changing the meaning of words, a state of emergency

is something that has in itself the reason for its existence. An emergency does not ask for

discussion but for action.”(Parliamentary Debates 1982:683)

 88
A defect of this branch of government is that there is no statutory framework that governs

oversight of the legislative branch. In law, Parliament is not accountable to anyone outside the

electoral process. Even then, there is no recall procedure. “Additionally, the Zimbabwe

Parliament is a comparatively opaque institution, a legacy of the past. For instance the Capacity

Assessment Team (CAT) noted that the Privileges, Immunities and Powers of Parliament Act of

1971 has not been amended in line with ongoing parliamentary reforms so as to enhance the

transparency of the committees.” ( TI-Z 2007:335)

Another weakness is that legislators are not required to disclose contacts with lobbyists.

This is probably because Zimbabwe does not have a strong tradition of interest groups lobbying

of parliamentarians, mainly because parliament is perceived by the potential lobbyists as not

central to the policy-making processes. Even if interest groups lobby parliamentarians, and

persuade them of their point of view, there is little likelihood of the parliamentarians being able

to substantively influence the content and direction of policy. There are already indications that

civic associations that have been contributing to public hearings with a view of influencing

policy are getting disenchanted because their input is routinely ignored.

There is presently no code of conduct for parliamentarians. However, in theory,

Parliament of Zimbabwe (POZ) has rules governing conflict of interest regarding financial

matters. Standing Order No. 19 compels members to register their financial interest in a book

maintained under the direction of the Speaker and to do so in a manner specified in the Code of

Conduct and ethics which code, however, is not yet available. Standing Order 101 (1) also makes

it an offence of contempt of the House if a member takes part in a parliamentary or committee

discussion of any matter which s/he has a direct pecuniary interest. An MP also ceases to hold

his/her position if the member accepts any other public office in national or local government or

if a public agency fails to terminate his/her appointment to such positions.36

36 Section 41, 1 (f & k) of the

constitution
 89

A serious missing link is that there are no asset disclosures records for legislators and no

lifestyle monitoring. This is an area that urgently needs attention in line with best practices

elsewhere. The Parliament of Zimbabwe also does not have any provisions for whistle blowing

directed at MPs and this has not been seriously discussed within its ranks.

The legislative branch of government enjoys formal powers of sanction against its

members. The Speaker/President can invoke provisions of the Privileges, Immunities and Powers

of Parliament Act (PIPPA) in the case of a parliamentarian abusing privileges. These powers of

sanction have been invoked on several occasions since independence, the most recent one being

that of an opposition MP who was tried and convicted by a Parliamentary ad hoc committee and

sentenced to fifteen months in prison for assault of a fellow parliamentarian. Recently, a senior

minister who allegedly lied under oath to a parliamentary portfolio committee was also

investigated.37

Zimbabwe legislators enjoy limited immunity from prosecution. According to the

Privileges, Immunities and Powers of Parliament Act PIPPA, MPS enjoy immunity from

prosecution for things done within the ‘precincts of Parliament’ or during the conduct of their

official duties. To date, parliamentary immunity has not interfered with the law enforcement

processes involving corruption by MPs. A number of them have been prosecuted on various

corruption charges.

4.4 THE JUDICIARY

The Lancaster House constitution made no express vesting of judicial power in the courts

and it thus remained possible to argue that such power did not exist separately but was embraced

within the power of the legislature to make laws. In 1990 this omission was rectified so that now

the Constitution specifically provides that the judicial authority of Zimbabwe vests in the

37 For full discussion of this, see Transparency International Zimbabwe (TIZ), National
Integrity Systems in 5 Southern African countries: 2006/7:321-379.
 90
Supreme Court, which is the final court of appeal, the High Court and other subordinate courts.38

The subordinate courts are constitutionally recognized for the first time as is the requirement that

customary law be administered by all the courts and not just the community courts. Thus,

Judges of the Supreme Court and High Court hold office until the age of 65 years;39 the office

of a judge of either court cannot be abolished during the tenure of office without his consent; and

(iii) the remuneration of judges is paid out of the Consolidated Revenue fund and cannot be

reduced while a judge remains in office.40. With regards to appointments, the Chief Justice and

other judges of the Supreme Court and High Court are appointed by the President after

consultation with the Judicial Service Commission. Judges of the Supreme Court and High Court

are only removable for inability to discharge the functions of their office, whether arising from

infirmity of body or mind or any other cause, or for misbehavior. In the case of the Chief Justice,

if the President considers that the question of his removal should be investigated, he must

appoint a tribunal of inquiry made up of three experienced lawyers. If the tribunal so

recommends, the President must refer the matter to the Judicial Service Commission which then

makes a binding recommendation on the matter (section 87). Under the Lancaster House

Constitution the President, acting on the advice of the Chief Justice, was entitled to set up a

similar investigation into the possible removal of a judge of the Supreme Court or High Court. In

1984, a constitutional amendment provided that either the Prime Minister or the Chief Justice

could advise the President. This followed considerable concern over the decision of the then

Chief Justice to take no action when a recently appointed Supreme Court Judge resigned to take

up a similar post in a the South African Bantustan. The Amendment was never used and with the

38 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (No.11) Act 11).

39 Although a judge may elect to remain until 70 years of age (section
86 (1) )
40 Section 86 & 88 of the Constitution of
Zimbabwe
 91

establishment of the Executive President, the Constitution has rightly reverted back to the

pre1984 position.

The Constitution guaranties the independence of the judiciary; “in the exercise of his

judiciary authority, a member of the judiciary shall not be subject to the direction or control of

any person or authority.”41 This judiciary independence as discussed above, is further buttressed

by constitutionally guaranteed procedures for the tenure, conditions of service and removal of

Judges of the Supreme and High Courts. Presently, these guarantees do not extend to judicial

officers of subordinate courts.

However, during the two decades before independence, the jurisdiction discretion of the

judiciary was diluted, and its capacity to contain executive power was progressively eroded by

legislation and emergency regulations. The Zimbabwe Government has used this inheritance to

its advantage. Since the restructuring of the bench in 2001, there have been concerns that the

judiciary is now compromised, especially in dealing with governance issues. This restructuring

followed the unprecedented resignations and retirement of some judges which saw the expansion

of the bench and the appointment of new judges based on “party loyalty rather than judiciary

qualification.” (Mari & Sit hole, 2002)

The President appoint judges of the Supreme and High Courts after consultation with the

Judicial Service Commission (JSC).The Zimbabwe judiciary is seriously under-resourced and

has persistently complained of being poorly resourced but little has been done to remedy the

situation. If the Judiciary loses both its independence and ability to prosecute and give sentences

to those involved in corrupt practices then it becomes a politically dependent judiciary which can

also facilitate high-level corruption. Thus when the judiciary is part of the corrupt system, the

wealthy and the corrupt operate with impunity, confident that a well-placed payoff will deal with

any legal problems. Thus the judiciary will lack the capacity for the objective general application
41 Zimbabwe Constitution section 798
 92
of rule of law in all cases brought before the courts. In a majority of cases it has to await consent

from the Attorney General’s office to prosecute cases of corruption and this is where most of the

cover up takes place. Indeed in many countries the Attorney General has the powers to terminate

cases without having to give an explanation. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for those under

prosecution or convicted of corrupt practices to be accorded presidential pardons.42 In law,

the judiciary, as an institution, is not required to report to any other body or person in conformity

with section 79B of the Constitution whereby members of the judiciary

“shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority.” Section 18 (s. s. 10)

of the Constitution states that court hearings and proceedings, including the announcements of

the decision of the court, “shall be held in public” with the exception whereby a special case has

been advanced by parties to the litigation for proceedings to be held in camera. Other exceptions

are situations where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice, or in the interest of public

morality, defense, public safety, public, order or the economic interests of the state.43 As is

the case with other public sector institutions, there are no specific rules governing conflict of

interest for the judiciary. Section 14 (1) of the recently enacted but not yet implemented Judicial

Service Bill prohibits a member of the Judicial Service from engaging in any activities outside

the Judicial Service that “conflict with the member’s functions within the Judicial Service; or

bring into question the member’s ability to act impartially as a member.” Subsection 2 stipulates

that a member shall not engage in financial and business dealings “that may reasonably be

perceived to exploit a member’s position within the Judicial Service.” There are also presently

no explicit rules regulating gifts and hospitality except those encapsulated in the Prevention of

Corruption Act and the newly enacted Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act both of

which proscribe obtaining, soliciting or agreeing to accept “any gift or consideration as an

42 For a general discussion on the judiciary and corruption see Makumbe, 1994 and Rose-
Ackerman: 1999.
43 Section 18 (11) (1) and
(2).
 93

inducement or reward for doing or committing to do something.” Section 18 (d) of the Judicial

Service Bill will address this longstanding lacuna by providing for a code of ethics covering “the

prohibition or limitation of gifts to judicial officers or to members of their families residing with

them that may influence or reasonably be construed to influence the execution of the duties of

judicial officers.”

Presently, the law does not have explicit rules on disclosure of assets by judges and other

senior judiciary officials. However, the Judicial Service Bill, Section 17 will provide for codes

of conduct providing for a range of areas that could conceivably include asset disclosure. Section

18 of the Act also provides for codes of ethics. It is not clear from the proposed law who will

monitor these codes to ensure compliance. A positive feature and one that and one that advances

transparency is the accessibility of court records. Unless there is a ministerial certificate to the

effect that it would not be in the public interest for a matter to be publicly disclosed, court

records are readily accessible to the public. However, the judiciary does not have any whistle

blowing provisions. To my knowledge, there are also no oversight mechanisms, except those

relating to procedures in Section 87of the Constitution for removing judges from office.

It must be noted that of the three arms of government, the judiciary is perceived the

cleanest, though in the two years (2004 and 2005) for which data is available; the public image

of the judiciary with regard to corruption is on the decline. Thus while in May 2004 19% of

sampled respondents felt that “most” or “all” of the judges and magistrates were corrupt, this

figure had risen to 24% by October 2005.44 Presently, there is no blanket program to protect

witnesses in corruption cases with the key legal instrument (the PCA) being silent on this.

However according to the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Section 267(2)], any

44 [Afrobarometer Surveys (2004 and 2005) carried out by Mass Public Opinion Institute
(MPOI)
 94
accomplice who gives satisfactory evidence for the state is not liable to prosecution for it; the

person shall be “discharged from all liability to prosecution for the offense concerned.”

4.5 PUBLIC SERVICE

Real choices and decisions about public policy are made within a structural framework of

constrains that are not but vary according to historical circumstances. Limitation on choice

derive in the first instance from organizational context and, secondly, from the broader

socioeconomic context in which organizations themselves are imbedded (Bratton, 1980:441-

464). Only through historical investigation of the emergence of the state and its interaction with

the material environment can a full understanding be gained of the determinants of public choice.

Zimbabwe’s transition to political independence therefore did not wipe the slate clean in terms of

the organization, orientation, and style of public sector activities. Instead, Zimbabwe inherited a

strong state whose identity, unlike the institutions transferred in an earlier era of de-colonization,

bore the stamp of the settler colonial experience. Inherited intact, the nature of the new state—

and in particular, the public service—imposed severe prohibitions on the ability of political

leadership to select and implement a new development strategy.

Mainstream development theory now accept that institutional capacity is a crucial

element in development. The experience of two development decades in Africa has demonstrated

that the organization of people and the construction of institutions to allocate capital effectively

are every bit as important as the availability of capital itself. (Bratton, 1980:441) For this reason,

the public service had the potential to become a primary instrument of development in

Zimbabwe. At the time of independence it was already a pivotal institution in the management,

servicing, and regulation of a sophisticated political economy. The capacity of the Rhodesian

public service was such that, virtually throughout the colonial period, it executed the public

policies of settler governments effectively and efficiently. Whether existing institutional capacity
 95

could be harnessed, reformed, and re-directed to new public-policy goals was one of the critical

development issues facing the country.

To argue that public institutions are the product of historical conjunction of political

interests and economic structures is not, however, to imply determinism in public-policy choice.

Recent shifts in the primacy of group interests as a result of political conflict have led to

institutional fluidity. Rhodesia was governed under three different constitutional orders in 1979

alone and a fourth—the constitutional proposals of Lancaster House—came into effect with the

independence of Zimbabwe in April 1980. The potential for the continuity of the public service

in the face of regime change was well illustrated by the reliance of the transitional British

governor on the settler administrative machinery between December 1979 and the time of

independence in April 1980.

Independence brought with it the opportunity for quick advancement and enrichment,

especially in the state sector, encouraging the adoption of sometimes corrupt practices,

capitalisttype production, and colonial life-styles for a few, contrary to socialist rhetoric.

The fortunes of African elites increased markedly after independence, but public-sector

salaries, although high, were insufficient to enable top civil servants to keep up with the

conspicuous consumption of their professional African neighbors. The result was an early rush of

cases of fraud and corruption, which resurfaced in the mid-1980s.45 By 1993 fraud in the

parastatals and corruption in the public service had reached seemingly epidemic proportions.

Leaders appeared to be unrestrained by any principles in their conduct; political office was

45 Since 1986, almost every quarterly report on Zimbabwe by The Economist Intelligence Unit
(EIU), London, contained one or more new fraud or bribery cases, and one recorded the
uncovering of 114 cases in three months. This figure might have been exaggerated , but most
Ministries were implicated; most parastatals are involved and the police services are riddled
with misconduct. When the best known (Willowvale) case—of Ministers acquiring cars with
scarce foreign exchange at controlled prices, and reselling them for up to five times the amount
paid—was made public, only a very few Ministers were exempted from accusation. EIU, 1989
(1).
 96
extensively used for private benefit, and public administration became a system of patronage.

Frequently resources intended for the poor were appropriated for personal gain: for example,

Ministers, MPs and top civil servants such as permanent secretaries, ambassadors, members of

the judiciary etc., were granted leases to state farms, some of which had been intended for

resettlement.46 Successive reports of the Comptroller and Audit-General form the mid-1980s

offered evidence of unauthorized expenditures and other irregularities under a variety of

departmental heads. Apart from the fact that short-term costs to the economy are raised when

dishonesty becomes endemic, it is extremely difficult to reverse corruption once it takes hold,

even when/if there is a change in leadership. ( CAG Report, 2009)

Government resolve to deal with corruption and with other serious offences by politicians

has faltered. The government has usually allowed the due process of law, but has frequently

granted an official pardon to those convicted. In 1984 a Leadership Code was promulgated by

the Government, which was intended to restrain corrupt practices by placing limits on the

acquisition of wealth by political leaders. “Ministers and members of the Central Committee as

well as provincial, district, and branch leaders were prohibited from receiving more than one

salary or income from rented property, from owning farms in excess of 50 acres, and from

establishing businesses.” (Maxima, 1984:99) However, the Code was easily circumvented by

transferring to relatives the formal title to farms, business, and luxurious homes.47 And yet the

inherited public sector system has elaborate Public Service regulations deeply entrenched in the

Constitution of Zimbabwe.

The Constitution of Zimbabwe created the Public Service Commission (PSC). Section 73

provides for the creation of the Public Service for the administration of the country. The PSC is

created in terms of Section 74 and the functions of the PSC are stipulated in section 75.

46 It was estimated in 1993 that civil servants, Cabinet Ministers, MPs, and ZANU-PF
party officials owned some 8% of commercial farmland. Weiss, 2002:187
47 Some politicians were reported as having said openly that they would leave politics if the
Leadership Code was enforced. EIU, 1989 (1)
 97

Accordingly, the Public Service Act (Chapter 16:04) provides for the general administration of

the Public Service of Zimbabwe.48 Thus, the PSC is responsible for the human resources issues

of civil servants. The civil servants include members of the uniformed forces which are governed

by the Police Service Commission, the Defense Forces Commission and the Prison Service

Commission. All Commissioners who sit in these Commissions are direct Presidential

nominations. The Chairman of the PSC reports to the Minister of Public Service, Labor and

Social Welfare and the President. All public servants are required as stipulated in the Public

Service Regulations(PSR) to be politically neutral. The idea is based on the British traditions that

governments come and go but continuity is provided by the civil servants.

Part 1V of the Statutory Instrument [(s.1) of 2000 (Public Service Regulations (PSR) of

2000)] deals with misconduct of public servants. It deals with career mobility and disciplinary

procedures of civil servants. It is very clear that corruption or dishonesty, which includes bribery,

which contravenes the PCA is considered as acts of misconduct. As will be shown later in this

analysis, the problem of bribery has, however, been occasionally reported involving especially

civil servants who provide essential services, whose demand make it very difficult for easy

access by the public. Practicing nepotism or any other form of favoritism in making or

recommending an appointment or promotion to any post or office is deemed an offense by PSR.

The civil service has clearly laid down procedures for recruitment, selection, and

appointment. These are elaborated in the PSR of 2000. Currently there are Forty- three core

ministries that make up the Public Service of Zimbabwe. There are, however, some Ministries

that may be regarded as “key” institutions in the public service because of the important role they

play in the administration of the country. These are the Ministry of Finance which is responsible

for the allocation of funds to all the sectors of the country through annual budgets and other

mechanisms; the Ministry of Justice which give legal advice on all government undertakings; the

48 CAFRAD-Questionnaire on National Public Administration in Africa: Zimbabwe

 98
Ministry of Education which is also central because a healthy nation also produces more wealth.

“The Ministry of Agriculture is particularly central because Zimbabwe is an agro-based

economy, while Defense and Home Affairs are regarded as very important for sovereignty and

national security reasons.” (TI-Z, 2007:537)

The budgetary process in the Public Service involves submissions of proposals or bids by

the ministries to the Treasury. Civil servants do not generally have access to off-the book funds.

All their funds are spent as provided for by the Finance Act. These funds are accessed through

the Consolidated Revenue Fund which is managed by Treasury but audited by the CAG.

Civil service supervision comes generally in the form of Acts of Parliament, for example

the Public Service Act and Statutes like the Statutory Instrument 1 of 2000 ( Public Service

General Regulations ) and the Public Service (Disciplinary) Amendment Regulations, S. 1 49 OF

1995. These general regulations are elaborated on and clarified by circulars and general letters.

Generally these rules are effective because there is close monitoring, for example, by the

Performance Audit and Inspectorate Agency which is responsible for checking and ensuring that

all civil servants adhere to the rules and regulations that govern civil servants. Many cases have

however been brought before disciplinary hearings which is an indication of flouting of civil

servants regulations. For auditing purposes, the Audit and Exchequer Act ((Chapter 23.03) is the

chief piece of legislation in the Zimbabwe Public sector. Section 7 of the Audit and Exchequer

Act provides for the examination and audits of all of all public accounts. Section 14 states the

requirement that the ACG submit an annual report to the Ministry of Finance. Another piece of

legislation that rules over public funds is the Public Accountants and Auditors Act (PAAA),

(Chapter 27:12) which provides for the existence of accountants and auditors responsible for

public funds. Sometimes there are delays in auditing which means that by the time the audit is

done it would have been overtaken by events.

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However, transparency can become difficult in the civil service when the supervising

Ministers become implicated in corrupt deals. Also, because they are a public office, the public

sector is supposed to consult the public in all its operations, even though it is not explicitly stated

anywhere. Consultation is not an enforceable requirement but is necessary and has been

instituted to a limited extent in the public sector. Public consultation is therefore not guaranteed

in the public sector since it is not statutorily regulated or enforced by practice and custom.

On conflict management, the PSC provides an opportunity for conflict resolution in terms

of Section 15 of the Second Schedule of Statutory Instrument 1 of 2000 that considers the failure

to disclose to a superior any case of conflict of interest as an act of misconduct. On the

acceptance of gifts and hospitality, the public service is governed by General Letter number 39

of 1992. The making, offering, or receiving of bribe, gift or any other favor in connection with

the discharge of duty is defined as an act of misconduct. “However, in some cases, an individual

is allowed to retain a gift that has been given as a personal item and is obviously meant for the

recipient’s personal and domestic use, depending on the character and value of the gift.” (TI-Z,

2007:357). Disclosure of assets by civil servants is not a requirement. There are no legal

requirements to publish procedures and criteria for administrative decisions such as granting

permits, licenses, bank loans and tax assessments. Some public sector agencies have, however, at

times published such decisions in the press, for example, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe always

publishes registered asset managers in the press.

The Civil Service does not have specific provisions on whistle blowing. It has a division

called Performance Audit and Inspectorate Agency, which welcomes all information concerning

misconduct in the civil service. There used to be a ministry of Anti-Corruption and

AntiMonopolies and there is the Anti-Corruption Commission, which welcome information from

whistle blowers. Public sector agencies such as the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA),

have the whistle-blowing funds where they offer 10% of the amount recovered. This and the
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RBZ reward system on whistle blowing has been effective as members of the public are

motivated by the reward.

4. 6 THE POLICE

Section 19 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe states that the Police, who are headed by the

Police Commission, are charged with the general duty of maintaining law, order and peace

within the national borders of Zimbabwe. There are other specific duties designed to them. In the

exercise of their duties the police are required to bring offenders to book and ensure successful

prosecution. To ensure that their duties are fairly performed, police are enforced to be firm and

fair. Occasionally, and only when absolutely necessary and as the last resort, the police may be

expected to use moderate force. The force to be applied under this scenario should only allow the

police to achieve their objectives. Once an objective has been attained, the police must then

withdraw their force. In the search for dangerous weapons, the police should obtain authority of

the magistrate or officer of the rank of superintendent or anyone occupying a higher position

than the latter. However, the police can also carry out a search without warrant.

Even though the duties of the police are clearly spelt out in the constitution, they

sometimes divert from the norm, thereby raising eyebrows from the general public. As a result,

the police end up falling short of the expected integrity, transparency and accountability. Cases

of bribery, fraud, extortion and other nefarious activities in the police force are now so rampant

that the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) has ceased to make attempts at integrity and

transparency; it has lost the face that once displayed a remarkable proficiency. The police traffic

section is particularly so notorious for taking bribes from offending motorists that there is

reportedly a scramble to serve in this unit and that those within it happily forego their leave days.

Sometimes the police use their powers beyond their brief but they will have to justify this

before a magistrate or other senior judicial officer. Concern has long been raised that the police

are not independent since politicians give them unlawful orders.. For instance, police find their
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hands tied when it comes to investigating corruption cases involving politicians. Sometimes the

police may call upon the army when situations of violence get out hand. Prosecutors on the other

hand work very closely with the police to ensure successful prosecution of offenders. Some of

the police officers actually train as prosecutors. The independence of the police is usually

nominally; in practice the police is not independent as its powers can be seriously abridged.

However, the police has a whistle blowing fund, acting as a motivating factor to report on

corruption cases. There is a department of internal investigation, which investigates the police

officers alleged to be involved in corrupt practices, but its effectiveness is either not yet proven

or publicized, thus rendering it not effective as it should.

4.7 OMBUDSPERSON

Over the last 30 years, the office of the Ombudsman has achieved worldwide importance

as an independent institution which safeguards individuals against arbitrary government action.

In view of the weakening of other constitutional safeguards, the office of the Ombudsman in

Zimbabwe is potentially of considerable significance. The Lancaster House Constitution

provided for the establishment of the office and on January1, 1983, the first Ombudsman took up

his appointment.

The function of the Ombudsman is to investigate action taken by certain specific

government bodies where it is alleged that a person has suffered injustice in consequence of that

action and it does not appear that there is any other remedy reasonably available by way of

proceedings in a court or appeal from a court (section 108 (1) ). “This pursuit of administrative

justice is undertaken in a manner which is confidential, informal and flexible.” ( Hatchard,

1991:99). Thus any person who claims to have suffered injustice at the hands of a government

official may complain to the Ombudsman and if the case is accepted, an investigation is

undertaken in private and free of charge. If a complaint is sustained the Ombudsman reports the

fact to the offending body and makes such recommendations as s/he thinks fit. If a body fails to
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remedy the injustice, the Ombudsman may report the matter to the President or Parliament. In

theory, the office is potentially a most effective investigatory body operating within—although

not being a part of—government. This is because wide-ranging investigative powers give an

Ombudsman unique access to government documents and officials and allows for the

development of personal contacts with high-ranking government officials which can often

swiftly resolve a complaint.49

In practice, it is difficult to assess the impact of the office in Zimbabwe. Certainly

increasing number of individuals have turned to the Ombudsman for assistance and the very

presence of the office may have had some effect in encouraging government officials to perform

their tasks more diligently. Even so, several factors have combined to reduce the effectiveness of

the office. Firstly, the independence of the institution is questionable because the Ombudsman

and deputy Ombudsman are both appointed by the President50 and because the office has no

independent budget but is positioned under the Ministry of Justice. Thus its entire funding comes

through a Ministry which is frequently the subject of investigation by the Ombudsman. Thus,

this source of funding for the Ombudsman triggers conflict in the sense that the Ombudsman has

to handle cases against the civil servants of this ministry. It is questionable whether the

Ombudsman will be as impartial as he/she can in executing her duties against a Ministry

responsible for her funding. Legally there are no rules on gifts and hospitality and

postemployment restrictions as with regards to the Ombudsman. Secondly, constant under-

funding by the government has led to a serious shortage of staff and other resources which has

both adversely affected the running of the office and made it impossible to expand its operations,

especially into the rural areas.51

49 For an account of the Ombudsman, see J Hatchard, “The Institution of the Ombudsman in
Africa with special reference to Zimbabwe, 1986:35 ICLQ 255.
50 After consultation with the Judicial Service
Commission
51 See the heart-felt plea for more resources by the Ombudsman in the sixth Annual
Report of the Ombudsman (1988), where a full survey of the operational difficulties are
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Thirdly, there are strict limitations on jurisdiction. At present, the Ombudsman may

investigate action taken by most ministries or Departments together with local authorities,

hospitals, schools and statutory bodies. It can also investigate any force or service maintained

and controlled by the state other than the defense forces, the police and prison services.52 The

exclusion of the security services from investigation is critical because, in practice these bodies

are the subject of many complaints, all of which the Ombudsman is unable to deal with. This

restriction was defended by the Minister of Justice on the grounds that any investigation “might

have the result of inhibiting the activities of [the security forces] much to the detriment of the

State.53 It was further argued that there would be too many complaints for the Ombudsman to

deal with as any prisoner or person arrested would be inclined to “rush to the Ombudsman and

complain.”54 Why an investigation into the activities of the security forces should “inhibit” their

operations is only explicable on the basis that such activity is potential unlawful and government

is anxious to conceal such conduct. One might also ponder why government was afraid that an

expanded jurisdiction would produce a rush of complains. Another area of investigation

currently beyond the reach of the Ombudsman is the activities of political parties. An increasing

number of complaints are being received by the office against members of both ZANU-PF and

MDC-T parties for example, relating to alleged abuses of power by party officials. For practical

and /or legal reasons it is sometimes difficult for an aggrieved person to pursue an action against

the party. One other gap in the present jurisdiction concerns the right to initiate investigations.

set out.
52 S. 108(2) Constitution of Zimbabwe and ss.8 & 10 and sch. 1 Ombudsman Act 1982. Also
specifically excluded are the President and his staff; the Cabinet Office and the Judicial officers;
the Attorney General and his law officers in relation to legal advice given to the state or legal
proceedings, including prosecutions conducted on behalf of the State S.9 and sch. 2 Ombudsman
Act 1 1982.
53 Parliamentary Debates June 18, 1982
54 Minister of Justice Parliamentary Debates June 18, 1982. The question of security
problems and “deluge of frivolous cases” are already provided for in the Ombudsman Act
(see s. 8(3) © and (d).
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The majority in most African countries, still suffers from ignorance of their constitutional rights

and remain extremely susceptible to governmental abuses of power.55 This means that the

Ombudsman must be in a position to take immediate action where necessary in order to protect

the rights of citizens. Such a jurisdiction is especially important where urgent action to protect

constitutional rights is required for it is clearly unacceptable to predicate action sorely upon the

receiving of a complaint. It is difficult to understand why the Zimbabwe Ombudsman does not

have this jurisdiction and indeed in the first Annual Report in 1983, the Public Service

Commission also supported this view. Such a power is clearly necessary if the aim of creating a

“people oriented” institution is to be fulfilled.56 Surprisingly, the recommendation of the PSC

was not accepted by government on the grounds that “the office is fully committed to dealing

with its present work load.”57 Of course this merely begs the question as to why virtually no

resources have been given to the Ombudsman since 1983, despite a much increased workload.

However, there are rules of conflict of interest in the Ombudsman’s Office. Legally, the

Minister of Justice may prevent an investigation by certifying in writing to the Ombudsman that

it would not be in the interest of public security or foreign relations of Zimbabwe to investigate a

matter.58 On transparency, the Ombudsman compiles and tables before Parliament Annual

Reports that can be accessed even by the public. However the annual reports themselves are

always published several years late partly due to limited resources. There is legal provision for

public whistle blowing on the misconduct of the government ministries. Section 15 of the

Ombudsman Act permits the Ombudsman to consult the public wherever possible. People are

55 Minister of State for the Public Service discussing the recommendations made for such an
expansion in the Report of the Public Service Review Commission 1989; see Parliamentary
Debates November1, 1989.
56 First Annual Report of the Zimbabwe Ombudsman, Harare, 1983, at 6.
57 Minister of State for the Public Service discussing the recommendations for such an
expansion in the report of the Public Service Review Commission 1989; see Parliamentary
Debates, November 1, 1989.
58 Ombudsman Act (section 9 (3)
(a) (1)
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entitled to register complaints about maladministration, unfair official decisions, favoritism and

other such matters in the state service. The President and Members of his staff, the Cabinet

Office, the Attorney General and judicial officers are, however, specifically excluded from

being subject of investigation. There is a provision that the aggrieved can complain

anonymously. In some instances, the complainant may be aggrieved by actions from the

authorities in a ministry she/he will be working for. To avoid unnecessary tensions and further

victimization, anonymous complaints may be lodged.

It is a Constitutional provision that the Ombudsman can be removed only with relevant

justification. The Ombudsman has successfully targeted corruption, only that the issue is

cancerous, hence difficult to curb. The Ombudsman toils to “bridge the gap between the

governors and the governed and also on how the abuse of power can be reduced or eliminated

completely.”59

4.8 ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION

The establishment of the Ministry of State for State Enterprises, Ant-Monopolies and

Anti-Corruption was the first indicator of state political will in the drive to fight corruption in

Zimbabwe. Following the establishment of the Ministry, the Anti-Corruption Commission

(ACC) came into being on 8 September 2005 when the first Commissioners were sworn in and

became operational in October 2005. The Commission was established in terms of the

Constitution of Zimbabwe and reports to Parliament through a Minister of State in the President's

Office. As such, the Commission is well placed to discharge its mandate as provided for in the

Anti-Corruption Commission Act Chapter 9:22 Young as it is, the ACC is a signatory to the

Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Protocol as well as the African Union (AU)

and United Nations Convention on Anti-Corruption.

59 Seventh Annual Report of the Ombudsperson, January 1, 1989—December 31, 1989.

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The Commission consists of nine Commissioners who are employed full time and have

executive powers. A Chairperson who is assisted by a Deputy Chairperson heads the

Commission. Below the Commissioners is the Secretariat, which consists of three operating arms

namely Corruption Prevention and Corporate Governance; Investigation and Prosecution; and

lastly Publicity and Education. The functions of the commission are tabled in section 108A (3) as

briefly to combat corruption, theft, misappropriation, abuse of power and other improprieties in

the public and private sectors; to make recommendations to the government and the private

sector to increase accountability and integrity and to prevent improprieties and to exercise any

other functions imposed by an Act of Parliament.60 Having these broad functions increases the

likelihood of the commission being successful as it will not be restricted to certain aspects of

corruption.

The issue of independence is important. Since the commission is under a ministry there is

the danger of political interference and issues of political accountability and allocation of

resources for the commission are raised to establish such independence. If politics is the aspect,

the commission will not be successful. For this commission to succeed it must be adequately

financed by the responsible government of Zimbabwe. This enables the commission to tackle

corruption at the highest level because there are high-tech methods of misappropriation

particularly in the private sector and hence the commission and all those working under it must

be abreast with these methods. There is, therefore, the need for the commission to have its own

budget allocation to ensure that it maintains its independence.

Section 108 (4) states that Parliament can order powers of investigation on the

commission. It is, therefore, important for the commission to have powers to investigate

corruption. As indicated before, the law enforcement agency is inadequate to deal with

sophisticated methods of corruption such as those they have to deal with at present.

60 TI-Z Position Paper on the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission, (July

2, 2002).
 107

The level of accountability of the Commission is also below the expected standards. As

an integral pillar of anti-corruption, in the society, the Commissioners, in law are expected to be

accountable in all respects. By all means necessary, Commissioners are expected to curb

corruption and avoid unscrupulous dealings. “The Commissioners, like all other persons, are not

above the law and are, therefore, also prone to face the consequences/judgments associated with

corrupt acts. Offenses under the ACC Act involve the Prevention of Corruption Act”. ( TI-Z

2007:370)

While the law is silent on public consultation, the Commission works closely with the

police, whose investigations involve public consultations. For unpolluted investigation, ideally,

the ACC Commissioners are supposed to consult among other people; the public. Such exercises

should be conducted without any interference for neutrality. While independence of operations

forms an indisputable expectation on the ACC, the Zimbabwe case is unique in that the

Commissioners are endorsed by the Ministry to embark on investigations. Without authorization

from the Ministry, the Commissioner cannot independently proceed in conducting investigations.

Such a scenario, poses questions such as: Will the Ministry not influence prosecutions and also

the extent to which investigations should proceed? In this regard, one cannot rule out the chances

of manipulation of the ACC work. Ideally, the Ministry should play an oversight role to the ACC

and not run the day-to-day operations of the Commission.

On gifts and hospitality, it is mandatory for the Commissioners to disclose in writing, to

the President, the full extent of every occupation, service or employment in which the member or

his/her spouse engages for remuneration and all assets held by the member or his/her spouse in

excess of such value as the President may specify, before assuming office. In the event that the

Commissioner acquires assets in excess of value as specified by the President, s/he will have to

disclose the content of the assets in writing to the President.

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On transparency, and as a legal requirement, the ACC is expected to prepare periodic

reports on results of its investigations, additionally to the annually reports. It is important to note

that the law left it to the discretion of the Commissioner, on the beneficiaries of the reports and

the dissemination process. However, despite the need to produce reports as stipulated by law,

the Commission’s weakness also lies in its failure to generate the required reports ( TI-Z,

2007:372). Throughout the history of corruption cases in Zimbabwe, it has been proven that

reports on corruption are rarely released when it involves high-ranking government officials,

contrary to the Minister, the RBZ Governor and the President’s anti-corruption campaign that no

stone will be left unturned in investigating graft cases. The government scrambled to bury the

report on the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO) scandal compiled by the National

Economic Conduct Inspectorate (NECI), while Ministers have been trying to obfuscate the issue

(TI-Z, 2007:373. The report revealed a number of government officials who plundered the

Parastatal of billions of dollars. The Parastatal finances were looted through questionable

contracts and payments involving huge sums of money to contractors who never provided the

services as per contractual agreements. It is important to note that any anti-corruption strategy to

stop the vice can only be effective if corruption cases are dealt with indiscriminately. “ZISCO

collapsed and was recently sold out to ESAR, an Indian Multinational for US$750 million

constituting 80% shares with the government remaining with 20%.” (TI-Z, 2007:372) The ACC

has failed to show its teeth and analysts in the have rightly noted that absolutely nothing tangible

has come out of the commission in the six years of its existence.

4.9 CIVIL SOCIETY

Lloyd Sachikonye defines civil society as:

“an aggregate of institutions whose members are engaged primarily in a complex of non-state

activities—economic and cultural production, voluntary associations, and household life—and

 109

who in this way preserve and transform their identity by exercising all sorts of pressures or

controls.” (Sachikonye, 1995:15

“For most Africa, in terms of this working definition, civil society would include trade

unions; professional associations; church and para-church organizations; student, business and

other special interest associations; the media; and various types of non-governmental

organizations.” (Makumbe, 1998:305-317). The concept of civil society originated with the

writings of Hegel, Gamsci and necessary to Marx. (Geremek, 1992:3-12) I will not delve into the

merits and / or demerits of this concept; however, it is underline the fact that while the political

developments of the late 1980s and early 1990s in most of sub-Saharan Africa have tended to

give the impression that civil society in Africa is synonymous with anti-statism, the truth is that

the African experience of civil society is largely focused on the people’s struggle against

despotic rulers, repressive regimes and governments that violated both their individual and their

collective rights (Geremek, 1992:3-12) Larry Diamond outlines some of the functions of civil

society in democratizing Africa as follows:

“civil society performs many…crucial functions of democratic development and consolidation:

limiting the power of the state more generally, and challenging its abuses of authority;

monitoring human rights and strengthening the rule of law; monitoring elections and enhancing

the overall quality of and credibility of the democratic process; educating citizens about their

rights and responsibilities, and building a culture of tolerance and civic engagement;

incorporating marginal groups into the political process and enhancing the latter’s

responsiveness to social interests and needs; providing alternative meaning, outside the state, for

communities to raise their level of material development; opening and pluralizing the flows of

information; and building a constituency for economic as well as political development.”

(Diamond, 1997:24)
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During the colonial settler regime in Zimbabwe, the government discouraged the

formation of civic groups to take part in active politics, except those whose membership

consisted of the settlers and the colonists themselves (Makumbe, 1998:306) These included

farmers’ unions, women’s clubs, sports and recreation associations from which Africans were

excluded. White farmers’ unions were instrumental on applying pressure on the government to

create the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and the Dairy Marketing Board (DMB). Africans

responded to this restriction by creating seemingly apolitical people’s organizations such as

burial societies and various kinds of community-based organizations. Over time, these

organizations became crucial for the expression of the political demands of the oppressed

colonized people. So successful was this approach in fulfilling the civil needs of the colonized

Africans that in Zimbabwe the black majority government continued to seek control of these

groups through the colonial legislation, registration and various other measures which would

enable the government to know what was going on in these organizations.

The Private Voluntary Organization (PVO) Act of 1995 that superseded the 1967 Welfare

Organizations Act provides the legal framework within which Non-Governmental Organizations

(NGOs operate. There are numerous NGOs in Zimbabwe with diverse interests and modus

operandi. By and large the actions of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are a function of a

number of factors that tend to vary from one institution to the next. On the basis of excluding

political parties, civil society in Zimbabwe encompasses residents associations, student bodies,

voluntary organizations, community –based organizations, trade unions, church groups,

cooperatives, philanthropic organization and a range of other NGOs. Non-Governmental

organizations often play a critical role in the formulation of human rights standards and in their

implementation. Further, they can contribute to the supervision of the observation of individual

freedoms “by calling attention to violation, by gathering information and by helping victims of

such violations.” ( Hatchard, 1993:155) Of the civil anti-corruption organizations, a number

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conduct public education campaigns against corruption, as well as raise public awareness.

However, the education system—a colonial legacy—does not have curricula to address integrity,

transparency and accountability issues as the antithesis to corruption. Civil society as an

independent actor representing the interest of the general public is uniquely positioned to

investigate and mobilize the public against corruption and build support for virtues of integrity,

accountability and transparency. This is true at the country level, as well as internationally.

Some CSOs are spreading the fight against corruption. Transparency International is the most

prominent example of what an international civil society organization can achieve in awareness

raising, pressuring governments for change and working with various sectors to implement

innovative anti-corruption reforms.

Making these points would seem to argue that civil society in Zimbabwe does not suffer

from any serious problems. Commenting on civil society in Africa, Larry Diamond argued:

“the problem is that civil society does not only consist of…democracy building groups and

functions. It is also an arena of conflict (and often very intense conflict) between organized

interests of various kinds—economic, social, and ethnic. And civil society organizations in

Africa too often are crippled by the same problems of poverty, corruption, nepotism,

parochialism, opportunism , ethnicism, and willingness to be co-opted that plague the society in

general.” (Diamond, 1997: 24-25)

Thus, is civil society in Zimbabwe part of problem or solution? As already mentioned in this

analysis, CSOs by their nature play a critical role in influencing policy generation, public

accountability, sustainable development and civic awareness. However, in spite of the

mushrooming of literally thousands- (precisely over 2,500) –of civic groups throughout the

country, the public is wondering whether there has been a corresponding impact resulting in

increased democratization and social transformation.61 The Zimbabwe civil society seem to have

61 http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/8763-is-civil-society-part-of-problem-or-solu... 6.24/2011
 112
distinguished itself as masters of reaction and issue inertia as it seems to be in the same place it

was ten years ago.62 If the civic groups in Zimbabwe are to be viable and effective champions of

the cause of their membership, they need to be autonomous and well endowed with the right kind

of resources. The civic groups in Zimbabwe, as noted above, are not capable of sustaining

themselves without the support of either the state or foreign international donors. Thus, “many of

the civil groups have become appendages of political parties. Instead of agenda setting, they

have agendas set by political parties and international donors and other supporting partners. In

this way their autonomy is seriously compromised from the start. Those civic groups that that

depend on the goodness of the state for space and resources.” ( Diamond, 1997:25), quickly find

out that they have to toe certain lines that are determined by the state—which, obviously,

restricts them only to those areas of operation that the state may feel comfortable in delegating to

such groups. Civic groups that depend on resources provided by international donor agencies

equally find themselves constrained to be mere implementers of the donor agencies’ agenda. In

Zimbabwe, for the last ten years, their agenda has been “regime change.” Their own political,

social, and economic programs will have to be consistent with those of their benefactors if they

wish to receive these resources. Indeed, most of the time of civic groups is spent on resource

mobilization and not program implementation and a large percentage of the funds are corruptly

used to enrich the leadership of CSOs. The mushrooming of the CSOs has become a problem

itself. It must be understood that most of the vibrant civic societies in Zimbabwe cannot sustain

themselves for more than a few months from the annual subscriptions paid by their registered

members. This weakness is evident in the majority of these civic groups including labor unions.

Another major weakness of civil society in Zimbabwe is that some of the civic groups are

themselves sadly undemocratic in both their organizational structures and their operations. Drool

calls some of these civic groups an ‘under-developed civil society.’ ( Darnel, 1997:20-21) Such

62 Financial gazette,
6/24/2011
 113

groups are characterized by undemocratic behavior on the part of their leadership, lack of

discussion of issues of concern and matters of operation, hierarchical organization structures,

and lack of democratic systems for the transfer of power, authority and responsibility from

incumbent leaders to new ones.

Moreover, civic organizations which are guilty of these undemocratic practices cannot

effectively challenge state authorities to be democratic. They therefore run the risk of being mere

legitimizing agents of the state. If civil society in Zimbabwe is to be able effectively to safeguard

the people’s rights and interests against the government, it needs to acquire knowledge or at least

awareness of the working of government and state apparatus and reading international politics so

that their approach is not business as usual without due regard to possibilities of shifts in foreign

policy. Most civic groups do not take the trouble to acquire the requisite understanding of how

government departments work, how policies are made, and what the implications of these

policies could be for the people as a whole, or for their own membership. The problem is

exacerbated by the fact that there is a serious dearth of information about national developments

and situations in Zimbabwe itself. Some of the times the government jealously guard this vital

resource—information—for the obvious reason that their monopoly of it enables them

effectively to control the people’s behavior.

4.10 THE MEDIA

A strong media with the requisite investigative skills is necessary if corruption issues are

to be clearly expounded. The journalist has a social responsibility of providing information to the

public, and as such information will only be invaluable if it is based on sound and analytical

investigative research. Thus the role of the media is multifold—informing, educating and

entertaining. Encapsulated in these core functions of the media is a plethora of expectations that
 114
any society run along democratic lines place on its media. These include, and are not limited to

the following:

• The surveillance of the political landscape and the reporting of any changes or

developments of public interest,.

• The identification of the key issues and national goals and aspirations,

• The promotion of social dialogue, and

• The provision of a social window through which public and private officials could be

held accountable for their actions, and thus making accountability part of a national

psyche.63

How a journalist engaged in investigative reporting achieves his/her objectives depends on a

number of factors, particularly the legal environment. Laws in Zimbabwe now regulate the

operations of the media. There is an array of laws, both statutory and common law regulating the

conduct of media practitioners and institutions.

The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) requires that

journalists or media houses wishing to practice the profession should first register and be

accredited with the Media and Information Commission (MIC). 64But as far as getting

government officials to reveal information, the law stipulates that the journalist or media house

should apply to the relevant authority and a reply can be available in not more than 30 days.

Newspapers and other media players have deadlines to meet so the law has not proved helpful to

the profession, as it does not guarantee that a positive response will come after thirty days. To a

large extent, these laws are used favorably by the government to control the media and restrict

journalist freedom.

63 A Journal of Investigative Journalism Focusing on Corruption in Zimbabwe: TI-Z; The

coalition against corruption; 2010:8
64 A Journal of Investigative Journalism Focusing on Corruption: TI-Z , the coalition against
Corruption. 2010:
 115

In theory, the media in Zimbabwe is independent but in practice the Minister of

Information appoints, dismisses and remunerates oversight bodies that control the private media

as well. Closely related to this weakness is the colonial legacy in Zimbabwe of acquiring and

controlling such media outlets as the national radio and television networks, the national daily

and weekly newspapers, and even popular monthly magazines, all of which were required to

protect and promote the interests of the state and the ruling elite. The Zimbabwean government

maintained the notorious colonial Ministry of Information to watch over and control these media

outlets. Darnley aptly observes:

“If the government has the right to appoint state commissioners in state agencies and/or

corporations, it can, furthermore, apply editorial pressure in this way as well. informal pressure

from the ministries can also occur, although such behavior is difficult to demonstrate.” (Darnley

1997:55)

Thus, media censorship is common in both the public and private owned media as both

are afraid to upset their principals. The government-controlled press writes glowingly about the

President, his ministers and the ruling party as well as government companies so that they do not

raise the ire of their principals. In the private media, the advertiser is the king because without

adverts the privately-owned media is financially doomed. For example, the Zimbabwe

government is notorious for ‘punishing’ privately-owned newspapers by denying them official

advertisement and thereby seriously threatening their economic viability.65

Investigations by journalists are hampered by the lack of access to information that

results from public information being categorized as classified information. This is further

compounded by the lack of comprehensive training of local journalists, especially in the area of

investigative journalism, coupled with limited or lack of resources among media houses to
65 A good example of this was the Sunday Gazette, which collapsed after barely twelve
months of operation because of non-viability. The newspaper was considered by most
government and ruling party officials to be particularly frank and fearless, and therefore,
necessarily anti-statist.
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sustain a vibrant investigating desk. Limited or lack of resources has also led the private media to

be appendages of international donor agencies’ agendas. As a result, this has hindered any

exposition of corruption and the perpetrators as private media attention is now directed towards

the needs of political parties and international donors and governments for the regime change

political agenda. It is, however, also true that in Zimbabwe there is too much risk involving

investigative journalism and fear of reprisal, especially if cases embroil ruling political heavy

weights. The high cost of litigation and AIPPA militates against the tradition of investigative

journalism in the media. Potential key informants are reluctant to divulge information due to

unavailability of protection of whistle blowers.

In Zambia and Zimbabwe in 1996 and 1997, for example several journalists working for

private sector newspapers were detained and tried for stories which were deemed to be hostile to

elements within the national political leadership.66 The media in Zimbabwe, then, hardly

constitute an asset which can positively contribute to the strengthening of civil society. The

country’s media organizations or associations such as the Zimbabwe Union of Journalists (ZUJ)

and the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) are working with Transparency

International-Zimbabwe (TI-Z) to promote the culture of investigative journalism, exposing the

impact of corruption on social justice and economic development in society by drawing attention

to the corruption perpetrated at the cost of public funds. There is a Forum for Investigative

Journalism whose sole purpose is to expose corruption or lack of transparency in the society.

Thus, recently, however, there have been several new and exciting developments with the

emergence of privately owned media enterprises, which are slowly revolutionizing the

information sector in Zimbabwe. Nevertheless,” there is still a lot of self-censorship on the part

of these private owned media outlets, as they face the wrath of the state should they be perceived
66 In Zambia, Fred Membe of the Post was arrested for alleging that President Chiluba was
born of nonZambian parents. In Zimbabwe, Rusike and Ncube of the Financial Gazette were
detained ad tried for a story alleging that President Mugabe had married his former secretary
long before the official wedding took place. In both cases, other than hostility to the
government were alleged as a cover up.
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unduly anti-statist in their coverage of national events and in their comments”. (Makumbe,

1998:313)

In Zimbabwe, the Media sector makes up to three percent of GDP. (TI-Z, 2007:375) The

key media oversight bodies are the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ) and the Media

and Information Commission. ZUJ is a union body and therefore looks to the welfare and labor

issues of journalists, while MISA , the Media Monitoring Project in Zimbabwe (MMPZ) are civil

society bodies that aim to raise the role of the media by advocating for its unreserved freedom, as

well as focus on the content of print and electronic media and its impact on social change. “The

electronic media is accountable to BAZ whilst the print media is monitored by the MIC. The two

bodies concentrate on performing an oversight role in the private media and lending a blind eye

to the public media where, it is alleged, rules and ethics are broken with impunity.” ( TI-Z,

2007:376) At the moment there is no code of conduct for journalists but ZUJ and MISA have

crafted their position on media code of conduct. This has been sent to the government for perusal

and, hopefully, endorsement. The draft touches on the conflict of interest for journalists.

Although the draft is silent on gifts, respective media houses encourage journalists to declare

gifts far above their salaries. By law, journalists are able to withhold disclosure of sources, but

when the government feels national security is at stake, that law is revoked, and the media

houses are not expected to disclose any donations of whatever form either. To date there has not

been any cases of government prosecuting media for withholding sources67 and this is

problematic. The lack of adequate resources will, however, continue to further inhibit the

dissemination of information to the majority of the people, particularly those in rural areas—on

average, 70 percent of the Zimbabwean population.

67 See TI-Z Integrity Systems,

2006/7: 355
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4.11 PRIVATE SECTOR

Business in Zimbabwe like in many other sub-Saharan African countries is either

indigenous or foreign-owned and controlled. The sector largely comprises of companies

registered under the Companies Act (chapter 24:03). The other minor plays are partnerships and

cooperatives. Generally, the business sector can be categorized by industry type and further

subdivided by type of organization. For companies to legally conduct business in a given

industry they have to go through a registration process with a government board overseeing the

operations of that particular industry.

The business sector is regulated by a number of laws and statutory instruments. These

include laws governing working relationships, contracts, formation of boards , management

systems set up, discrimination and corruption. As mentioned above, Zimbabwe has an Anti-

Corruption Act, which broadly covers the business sector and public organizations. This act

defines corruption and provides a framework for establishing the existence of corruption and any

remedial actions if proved to be in existence for any case. The act has a zero-tolerance and it is

characterized by heavy jail sentences. “There has been instances where even senior government

officials have been charged by the act. For example, Professor C. Herrera was sentenced to

twoyear jail time for corruption charges at the Zimbabwe United Passenger Company

(ZUPCO).” (TI-Z, 2007:380) Other laws such as the Banking Act, Insurance Act, Financial Law

Act, etc, were created to monitor the operations of respective players in the industry.

The effectiveness of laws governing the business sector is probably more delicate than

their existence. Judging from past corporate failures, rampant corruption and a culture of bribes,

the effectiveness of these laws is questionable. For instance the closure of financial institutions

such as Trust Bank Limited, Royal Bank Private Limited, Time Bank Private Limited, ENG

Asset Management etc between 2003-2004, demonstrates how corruption, money laundering and

facilitation payments can be deemed to be deeply-rooted in Zimbabwe.

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It is important to understand that in most African countries, indigenous business enterprises are

small and weak in resource terms compared with the government as aptly argued by Makumbe:

“Indeed, most of them can only operate profitably by working in close cooperation with the

state. It is the state which has the responsibility of creating an environment conducive to the

operation of business enterprises. It is also the state which is the major consumer of some of

these privateowned indigenous business enterprises. The winning of government tenders for the

supply of goods and services to state institutions is dependent on the preservation of a good

relationship with key state officials.” (Makumbe, 1998:313)

In Zimbabwe, the relationship between government and the business sector cannot be

viewed as very cordial. Generally, government has tended to treat the business sector with

suspicion as far as the business sector’s economic participation and influence is concerned.

“Response from government has been the introduction of ‘draconian’ laws and the enforcement

of controls in areas where market forces are supposed to reign.” ( TI-Z, 2007:381) This has

contributed to the business sector downsizing operations and strategizing, albeit unethically, in

order to survive. In addition, before 2009, there had been shortages of basic commodities,

emergence of ‘black market’ and the establishment of ‘middle-men.’ In response, government

enforced stricter compliance and bureaucratic processes increased. Getting basic services, such

as withdrawing cash from a bank, obtaining a trading license, purchase of the staple food

maizemeal and purchase of fuel became a service (unofficial) for which the cost of service

fluctuated according to demand and supply pressures.

In summary, the business sector appears to be frustrated by excessive government

interference. However, the business sector has shown signs of greed and indiscipline in their

operations, which may have been the basis of government interference. For example, from time

to time, the government introduces price controls on goods and services in a move meant to

reduce corrupt practices. In addition, the business sector is a convolution of the informal and
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formal sectors, where, before the introduction of multi-currencies, prices had tended to be

pegged on the n black market foreign exchange rates, regardless of whether it was justifiable or

not. The business sector formal economy also comprises the capital markets—the stock and bond

market. The stock market is governed by the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Act, while the

Zimbabwe Stock Exchange operates according the Zimbabwe Exchange Act (Chapter 198). This

act ensures that accountability and transparency of publicly listed companies is adhered to all

times. In addition, the listing requirements are arguably stringent to ensure sound corporate

governance.

4.12 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Zimbabwe is a member of many international institutions, many of which have offices in

the country. These include the United Nations (UN) and its agencies such as the United Nations

Development Program (UNDP) , United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations

High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), and many of its other agencies, the International

Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, International Labor Organization (ILO), World Trade

Organization (WTO), to mention but just a few. Others include the African Union (AU), the

African Development Bank (ADB), Southern Africa Development and many others. There are

also international institutions that provide technical assistance and development cooperation.

They include Africa Capacity Building Foundation, Plan International, World Vision, Care

International, European Union, British Department for International Development (DFID) to

mention but just a few.

Zimbabwe has no provision for whistleblowers on misconduct by international

institutions. There has also never been any investigation or prosecution of any international

institutions for corruption-related crimes ( TI-Z, 2007:387). However, a comprehensive analysis

of the nature of and remedies for corruption in Zimbabwe must bring in its international

dimension. The salience of this dimension has been elevated to new heights by the process of
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globalization. To analyze corruption in any one country, one has to understand the world system

in which it functions. Globalization has been accompanied by the emergence of uncontrollable

market forces and truly transnational corporations (TNCs) that dominate the basic dynamics of

the world global economy, and by a worldwide spread of manufacturing and sales (Hirst &

Thompson, 1998). Increasing interdependence of economies and markets makes it possible for

corrupt agents to extend their dealings across borders ((Johnston, 1998). For instance it allows

for the shifting of illicit profits out of poor countries into numbered accounts elsewhere. Thus,

corruption in Zimbabwe as in other African countries is not a problem whose centrality is

internal alone. Rather, its nature is also manifested through the activities of foreign governments,

aid organizations, and private companies seeking to further their own economic interests through

actions and practices that condone corrupt practices or that are corrupt themselves. Most cases of

grand corruption in Zimbabwe also have an international dimension: a corrupt politician or

business person might seek refugee from prosecution abroad. For example, the Zimbabwe

Guardian of August 7/2011, reported:

“A fugitive Zimbabwean banker has been detained in Taiwan on an Interpol arrest warrant.

Nicholas Mugwagwa Vingirai, 58,was detained on Wednesday after flying in from Singapore,

authorities said. The former Inter-market Holding Limited boss was fingered as one of the

bankers who triggered the Zimbabwean banking crisis between 2003 and 2004. He was specified

under the country’s anti-corruption laws…along with a dozen other business executives and

bankers…Despite the de-specification in 2009, Vingirai’s arrest warrant for money laundering

was not cancelled. Taiwan’s Criminal Investigation Bureau (CIB) says it picked Vingirai from a

hotel in Taipei after learning in advance that he was flying from Singapore. He arrived on

August 9, 2011…CIB has informed Interpol about Vingirai’s arrest and has confirmed his

identity. Vingirai has an arrest warrant in Zimbabwe for alleged money laundering, fraud, and

embezzlement of funds from Inter-market Bank. Vingirai is suspected of stealing an estimated

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Z$5.21 billion (US$ 14.4) of company funds, which he converted into South African rand and

US dollars in overseas accounts.”

International governments, organizations and agencies further the entrenchment of high

level (major) as well as lower level (minor) corruption in Zimbabwe ( TI-Z, 2007:389).

Therefore, any discussion about the nature f corruption in Zimbabwe must feature international

communities as accomplices in corrupt practices, either because their actions and policies fail to

counter (or appear to encourage) the same or they serve as givers in corrupt exchanges. For

instance, huge sums of money are being directed by some international governments through

international donor agencies to certain political parties and civic societies facilitate a regime

change agenda. While international governments, and aid organizations may enhance corruption

through their policies and responses that appear to condone and urge on the takers in corrupt

exchanges as givers. The analysis presented in this section focuses on the provision of

conditional loans and grants in aid, the desire to protect economic and strategic interests, and the

acquisition of contracts and business licenses through kickbacks as practices that promote

corruption. It also examines the role of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs).

Foreign aid is supposed to encourage low-income states to develop; yet critics across the

ideological spectrum accuses it of doing the opposite. The policy, in most cases defeats one of its

main purposes by perpetuating the poverty it seeks to eliminate. It is true that “international

governments, development organizations, and aid agencies often attach certain conditions to

loans and grants availed to developing countries like Zimbabwe. Some of these conditions

approximate corrupt practices.” (Mulinge & Lesetedi, 1998:15-28). For instance, there are

several cases in which an organization or agency requires from the recipient of loans or a grant in

aid to draw from the donor country’s technical capacity to implement the project for which

funding is being sought without taking into consideration the availability of such technical

capacity in the recipient nation. This constitutes a fraudulent act that negatively affect a country
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like Zimbabwe which has a very high degree of qualified people in various educational fields.

This deprives the country of a major benefit of investing in development projects—the creation

of employment. Also, more often than not, these aid organizations and donor agencies provide

over-priced but unqualified, incompetent and inexperienced technical personnel as part of aid

packages to the country. While the demand to rely on technical personnel from a donor agency or

government may not itself constitute corruption, it would be naïve to term the granting of

incompetent technical personnel as anything else. The practice is irresponsible for substandard

development projects such as poor engineered roads. It furthers economic retardation and the

general improvement of the people in Zimbabwe and elsewhere.

A second way through which the nature of corruption can be understood within an

international context is the need for international governments to extend and protect their

economic their economic and/or strategic interests in former colonies at any cost. As Mulinge

and Lesetedi point out, this has created an environment that is conducive to the emergence of

policies and actions that appear to aid the entrenchment of corruption.” ( Mulinge & Lesetedi,

1999:63) Several illustrations testify to the fact .First, in Zimbabwe, for last eleven or 12 years,

there has been the tendency by international governments and donor organizations to disburse

aid to opposition political parties and civil societies and certain public service and government

officials even where it is very clear that a considerable fraction of that money is diverted to

private use. This practice which is tantamount to subsidizing corruption, has encouraged most

leaders of these organizations in Zimbabwe to view aid as a reward for their cooperation in the

fulfillment of the economic and political interests of the international governments. The Western

governments, for instance, are supporting and subsidizing, using tax payer’s money, opposition

political parties and civil societies for over 12 years because these countries profess their

opposition to the country’s land reform policies.

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Economic and other interests have also aided the entrenchment of corruption in

Zimbabwe and other African countries through adoption of half-hearted, and other unclear and

inconsistent stances toward corruption itself and corrupt regimes. The linking of aid to the

control of corruption and good governance is a case in point. The enforcement of this policy has,

to say the least, been inconsistent and lacking in the commitment that would be central to its

success .This appears to have mixed signals to corrupt to corrupt bureaucracies that have given

them the courage to engage international governments and organizations to what amounts to hide

and seek games. As an illustration, the Kenya government engaged the World Bank. “The IMF,

and the United States and other governments in a protracted wild goose chase by promising to

deliver on economic and political reforms as a condition for aid disbursement until around 1997

when these finally suspended aid to the country.” ( Mulinge & Lesetedi, 2002:64)

Business Companies

Multinational firms are central actors in many large scale corrupt deals in Zimbabwe.

According to Rose-Ackerman:

“these companies face a dilemma when dealing with corrupt regimes that lead them to believe

that they need to pay bribes. They feel obliged to pay kickbacks—something amounting to 10

percent or otherwise of the total value of the contract—in exchange contracts. By indulging or

acquiescing in practices such as these, the organizations play the role of givers in corrupt

exchanges and thus fuel corruption in developing countries. In many countries, bribes paid to

obtain foreign business are tax deductible” (Rose-Ackerman, 1999:234)

The act of obtaining tenders through corrupt means also often breeds more corruption because

tenders won this way are likely to lead to poor quality projects that are an economic drain on the

country affected. (Mulinge & Lesetedi, 199:64) Some contractor who acquire projects through

corrupt deals may lack the technical capacity necessary for the satisfactory completion of the job
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and hence produce substandard projects. Zimbabwe, after independence, is crowded with roads

that were constructed under the guidance of engineers who knew nothing about engineering.

Structural Adjustment Programs

An understanding of the declining or devalued wages in Zimbabwe, however, must bring

in IMF and World Bank fronted Economic Structural Adjustment Programs (ESAPs).The gains

made in the provision of social services in the country were steadily eroded by the economic

decline of the 1990s. However, a series of droughts led to a decline in agricultural productivity

and a drastic fall in exports, and the implementation of the IMF/World Bank ESAP in 1991 saw

average economic growth decline from 4 per cent to 0.9 per cent, recovering to only 2.9 per cent

in 1998/99. Large numbers of workers were retrenched as industries closed down, and as public

spending was cut in line with structural adjustment policies. “By 1994, government statistics

revealed that 20,710 workers had lost their jobs since the beginning of the economic

liberalization program; the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions estimated the figure to be over

30,000. Unemployment rose from 32,22 per cent in 1900 to 44 per cent in 1993.” ( Mlambo,

1997:88) At the same time, the deregulation of prices and the removal of subsidies on basic

consumer goods under ESAP resulted in severe hardships for the workers, the unemployed, and

the poor, all of whom battled to get basic goods as prices skyrocketed and workers’ real wages

declined. Under structural adjustment, women’s and children’s suffering intensified as poor

households relied increasingly on these groups’ reproductive labor to sustain themselves.

Government cutbacks in health and education subsidies made these services inaccessible to the

majority of the poor and unemployed, and the introduction of user fees under ESAP further

reduced school enrolments. The quality of health services also deteriorated. According to a 1993

UNICEF study, health services had fallen by 30 per cent, twice as many women were dying in

childbirth as had before 1900, and fewer people were visiting clinics and hospitals because they

could not afford it.

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68
The plight of the rural population also worsened during this period. There was a

deindustrialization of the Agri-industrial sector, and rural poverty intensified because of ESAP’s

adverse effects on the agricultural output of the poor. It also exacerbated national and rural

income inequalities. The combined result of the reduction in government extension and

agricultural input services, the introduction of tight and more expensive credit, and the

deterioration in rural roads was a severe decline in both peasant agricultural productivity and

peasant earnings. Further, structural adjustment increased pressure on rural land and natural

resources as retrenched urban workers either sent their families to their rural homes or went with

them (. Moyo, 2008:59-90). The increased pressure on land and natural resources led to a flareup

of social tensions that had not been resolved in the first decade of independence, such as those

concerning racial inequalities and land ownership. Thus, as it became increasingly impossible for

agricultural workers to meet their monthly budgets, acts such as the taking of bribes or

embezzling funds from accounts they were responsible for acquired justification in their minds

and were incorporated as part of the formal budget.

68 Studies showed that by 1995, at least a quarter of Zimbabwe’s rural population was earning
less that the poverty datum figure of Z$4,000 per annum ; nor were they growing sufficient
crops or keeping enough livestock to feed their families. See Central Statistics Office (CSO)
Demographic and Health Survey 1995.
 CHAPTER FIVE

METHODOLOGY

5.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Good qualitative studies answer clearly stated, important research questions, in order to focus

and direct the goals of the study.(Frankel & Devers (2000; Tellis 1997) Thus, researchers pose

research questions and try to answer them to provide a better understanding of the issue

(Cresswell 2009). I developed research questions at the outset of this study from the extensive

theoretical and conceptual frameworks covered in the literature review. Therefore, the research

questions that asked for an exploration of the central phenomenon or concept in this analysis are:

• What is the nature of corruption in Zimbabwe?

• To what extent is corruption is a legacy of colonialism?

• How can corruption be minimized?

However, the research will also cover two significant components that will raise sub-questions:

First, examining the national and international institutions set up to identify loopholes for corrupt

practices; and how these institutions put in place checks and balances to prevent the loopholes

from being used; Second, seeking to secure expert opinion from professional bodies,

public/business officials and civil society on the nature of the corruption and on possible

remedies. Thus, the sub-questions that arise out of these issues cover the following:  What role

does the Executive, Legislature and the Judiciary play in combating corruption?
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140

• How significant are international organizations as factors in driving corruption in

Zimbabwe?

• How significant are the demand and supply issues that affect the level of finding

remedies for corruption?

5.2 RESEARCH DESIGN

The research used qualitative methods to answer the above and subsequent questions. It is

true that a study of this nature requires a methodology that will afford the researcher to do an

indepth assessment of the phenomenon being studied. Because the study cannot cover all the

subSaharan countries, mainly due to time constraints, and very limited financial resources, the

study used qualitative method as the primary research strategy. This is important especially

considering that qualitative methods make it possible to investigate the why, and how of decision

making and not just the what, where and when. Thus, qualitative analysis of data involved the

non-numerical organization of data in order to discover patterns, themes, forms and qualities

found in field notes, interviews, transcripts, open-ended questions, diaries, etc. According to

Creswell “Qualitative inquiry employs different philosophical assumptions; strategies of inquiry;

and methods of data collection, analysis, and interpretation.” (Creswell, 2007:73) Qualitative

research, therefore, made it possible to gain insight into what the challenges were in analyzing

the nature and pattern of corruption in Zimbabwe, and enabled the study to find remedies for

the pandemic. Within the scope of qualitative research, there is also the need to use a method

that will create favorable conditions for the study to effectively answer the research questions.

It is for this reason that that study focused on Zimbabwe (case study) as the area of research.
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5.3 STRATEGIES OF INQUIRY

Beyond the above-mentioned general characteristics were more specific strategies of

inquiry. Focusing on Zimbabwe is a qualitative strategy that enabled me to explore in- depth the

institutional frameworks, the general public, the environment in which the various stakeholders

operate and the legal terrain framework for the fight against corruption in Zimbabwe. Because

this study also involves variables of interest, there was a need to use a method that would enable

the use of multiple sources of evidence as well as making it easier to study different variables in

a setting that is not controlled.

5.4 THE RESEARCHER’S ROLE

I worked in the Zimbabwe public service, holding very senior positions, for five years.

During the course of that time, I was typically involved in sustained and intensive experience

with most of the current senior stakeholders in government, private sector and non-governmental

organizations. This introduces a range of strategic, ethical and personal issues into the qualitative

research process. (Locke et al. 2007) With these concerns in mind, I explicitly identified my

biases, values, and personal cultural background and socioeconomic status , that might shape

my interpretations formed during the course of this analysis.( Creswell 2009)

It should be noted that I undertook some preliminary research study during

OctoberNovember 2009. During this stage, I observed that the President of Zimbabwe had in the

past four years been on an anti-corruption crusade warning about corruption “threatening

society’s moral fabric”, condemning the corruption “scourge”, and labeling it the country’s

“number one enemy”. I also noted that government instituted several initiatives that, at least at

the symbolic level , indicated a high level of concern and determination to deal with the problem.

(Transparency International Zimbabwe, 2007:33) However, the study was set to find out the

extent to which some of the anti-corruption initiatives were being implemented, given that the
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economic down-turn the country had seen over the past ten years had certainly heightened both

public and private sector corruption.

5.5 DATA COLLECTION STRATEGIES

The above comments about my role lead me to set the stage for discussing issues

involved in the collection of data. I have taken into consideration the fact that this type of study

is bound by time and activity. I therefore, collected detailed data by interviewing a broad range

of targeted stakeholders, observations, documents and audio-taped material from January

20,March 25, 2011. Thus, data collection steps for this study included setting the boundaries for

the study, collecting information through unstructured or semi-structured interviews, documents

and observations, as well as establishing the protocol for recording information.

As argued by Berg, “unstructured interviews have no set order, no set wording to any

questions, level of language may be adjusted, interviewer may answer questions and make

clarifications and interviewer may add or delete questions between interviews” (Berg, 2006:939

5.6 INTERVIEWS

In this section l selected participants from the public as well as the private sectors, and

also from the media, civil society and international stakeholders. This issue is echoed by

Creswell (2009) who argues that the idea behind qualitative research is to purposefully select

participants or sites (or documents or visual material) that will best help the researcher

understand the problem and the research question. Miles and Huberman (1994), identify four

aspects of participants and sites: the setting (where the research will take place), the actors (who

will be observed or interviewed), the events (what the actors will be observed or interviewed

doing) and the process (the evolving nature of events undertaken by the actors within the

setting). However, “in addition to identifying the data, references to the participants were, how

they had been identified (selected), what they were told about their participation, and what steps

had been taken to protect them from harm, were included”. (Berg, 2007:352) Ancillary concerns
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connected to discussions about the participants, involved how many are included, what

determined their numbers, and how many refused to take part in the research and why (if the

reasons are known).

In the case of this study, data collection was divided into three phases: pre-field work,

preliminary and design phases, in which the above concerns have been covered. The pre-field

phase characterized the initial stages where related studies were reviewed to identify gaps in

literature, clarify/define concepts and parameters of the study and identify/consult key

stakeholders.

The preliminary phase, on the other hand, consisted of stages in the field where the

feasibility and previous assumptions of the research enterprise were examined to clarify

ambiguities and checked the appropriateness and feasibility of undertaking such a sensitive study

in Zimbabwe without bringing harm to the participants. It was also a stage in which I had to

confront initial assumptions made about the institutions selected for the study. For instance, prior

to the preliminary phase, the plan was to collect data from the Comptroller and AuditorGeneral’s

Department which oversees accountability issues with respect to government departments in

Zimbabwe. Primarily, government departments are generally perceived to have high and petty

levels of corruption within the public service. However, once in the field from October-

November 2009 and again from January- February 2010, I realized that there was need to access

quite a considerable number of both private and public institutions. This realization called for the

selection of a carefully selected number of other institutions to augment the Comptroller and

Auditor- General’s Department’s data. I used a list taken from the conclusions of a 2007 survey

carried out by Transparency International--Zimbabwe included the public sector comprising of

the executive , the legislature, the judiciary and the civil service. It also included and media, civil

society, business sector and the international organizations.

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5.7 ARCHIVES/DOCUMENTARY

Traditionally, the term archive brings to mind some form of a library. Libraries are indeed

archives. Archives provide large quantities of inexpensive data. I found the Zimbabwe National

Archival data attractive because this particular public archive uses more or less standard formats

and filing systems, which made locating pieces of data on corruption and creating research filing

systems for analysis easier. During the process of research, I also collected qualitative

documents. These were public documents such as newspapers, minutes of meetings on

corruption, official reports ( such as the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General), official

court transcripts, police reports, crime statistics, political speeches transcripts and internally

generated government agency reports. I also continued to gather a large volume of Zimbabwe

newspapers’ articles on corruption.

However, documents were considered to be relevant if they described any of the

following aspects of the research program: (a) African culture and value systems, (2)

establishment of colonial institutions, (3) institutions and structure of governance and (4) the role

of international actors. Two categories of documents emerged. The first category dealt with

descriptive issues about historical aspects, grand, petty and survival types of corruption and

remedies for the phenomenon. Forty five such documents were reviewed, including press

statements by the government; ministerial reports to parliament; project documents of

international donor agencies; and newspaper reports. The second category was of documents that

assessed the progress of anti-corruption measures pursued by the government and international

organizations, country profiles by donor agencies, and reports of independent researchers based

at the institutions of higher learning.

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5.8 OBSERVATIONS

Observations are those in which I took field notes on the behavior and activities of

participants at the research site. (Creswell, 2009:181) In these field notes I recorded, in an

unstructured or semi-structured way activities at the research site. However, participant

observation has its problems of bias. To enable me to eliminate the problem associated with

participant observation, I used multiple methods of data collection. The use of different data

collection methods reduced and solved the risk of bias, and other related problems associated

with participant observation. Another way to obviate biases of the participant observer is to

ensure the participant observer does not report his own interpretation but the actual account of

what takes place by providing valuable insights into the daily functions and operations of the

organization.

5.9 DATA RECORDING PROCEDURES

Interview Protocol

This protocol included the following components: A heading (date, place, interviewer,

interviewee), statement or a question such as, “Who should I visit with to learn more about my

questions?”, space between the questions to recording responses, a final thank you statement to

acknowledge the time the interviewee spent during the interview (see Creswell, 2007), recording

information from interviews mostly by audio-taping and also by hand-written notes, and,

typically, my notes reflected information about the documents or other material as well as key

ideas in the documents.

5.10 DATA ANALYSIS

Merriam et al, (1988) contend that data collection and data analysis must be a

simultaneous process in qualitative research. Schitzman and Strauss (1973) claim that

qualitative data analysis primarily entails classifying things, persons, and events and the

properties which characterize them. Typically, throughout the data analysis process
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ethnographers index or code their data using as many categories as possible. (Jacob, 1987) They

seek to identify and describe patterns and themes from the perspective of the participant(s), then

attempt to understand and explain these patterns and themes. (Agar, 1980) During data analysis

the data was organized categorically and chronologically, reviewed repeatedly, and continually

coded. A list of major ideas that surfaced were chronicled ( as suggested by Merriam, 1988).

Taped interviews were transcribed verbatim. Field notes and diary entries were regularly re

viewed.

5.11 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

To ensure internal validity, I employed the following strategies:

1. Triangulation of data—Data was collected through multiple sources to include interviews,

observations and document analysis.

2. Member checking—The participants served as a check throughout the analysis process. An

ongoing dialogue regarding my interpretations of the participants’ reality and meaning

ensured the truth value of the data.

3. Peer examination—Two doctoral students with whom I had shared ideas in the Public

Affairs Program served as peer examiners.

4. Clarification of researcher bias—At the outset of this study my bias was articulated in this

study under the heading, “Researcher’s Role

The primary strategy utilized in this project to ensure external validity was the provision

of rich, thick, detailed descriptions that anyone interested in transferability had a solid

framework for comparison. ( Merriam, 1988) Three techniques to ensure reliability were

employed in this study. First, I provided a detailed account of the focus of the study, my role,

the participants’ position and basis for selection and the context from which data will be gathered

(Le Compte & Goetz, 1984). Second, triangulation or multiple methods of data collection and

analysis were used, which strengthened reliability as well as internal validity (Merriam, 1988).
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Finally, data collection and analysis was reported in detail in order to provide an accurate picture

of the methods used in the study.

5.12 REPORTING THE FINDINGS

Miles and Huberman (1984) address the importance of creating a data display and

suggest that narrative text has been the most frequent form of display for qualitative data. This is

a naturalistic study. Therefore, the results are presented in descriptive, narrative form rather than

as a scientific report.

5.13 RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS

My research agenda was to collect data on issues of corruption and its nature and how

best it could possibly be eradicated or minimized. The case study of doing the research in

Zimbabwe, enabled me to get different and comprehensive narratives about the subject than I

would have if I had not conducted the research nationally. Data collection procedures in case

studies are frequently not routinized, unlike structured survey where consistency in the delivery

of the questioner is crucial. Case studies often require the interviewing of ‘key informants’ such

as professionals, government officials, journalists and head of the media commissions, national

and international non-governmental organizations. These were experts on governance issues in

Zimbabwe. Interviews lasted between 30-45 minutes with some going less than that time.

I selected my research participants purposefully to represent diversity of the institutions

and structures of governance in Zimbabwe. In all, I interviewed thirty two people. Seven top

civil servants, two university professors, one academic and author, five private sector

executives, one high ranking law enforcement officer, two members from the judiciary, four

from the media fraternity, three from the international donor agencies, three ordinary citizens,

one member of parliament, one economist consultant and three executives from the

nongovernmental organizations (see table 3 below).

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The political situation in the country helped me to determine the selection of cases or

participants and the conditions of studying them. For instance the Zimbabwe Government of

National Unity (GNU) comprising three political parties all of which do not subscribe to the

same ideological platform. These parameters were also generated from the literature and from

the objective and significance of the project. Burgess (1984); Hitchcock and Hughes (1989)

emphasize the need to seek out people whom the researcher feels are integral to the scenes and

situations being investigated. This demands that the researcher has knowledge of the situation

that is to be studied in order to evaluate the individual’s position in a particular setting and their

knowledge of that setting. I used this knowledge to draw up my preliminary guide who,

matched each respondent and the organization against the area that I wanted to investigate.

Table 5.1. Zimbabwe Stakeholders’ Respondents Outlay

-RESPONDENT-
Respondent Stakeholder Position in Stakeholder Category(where
applicable )
Category

Number 1 Civil servant Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs

Number 2 Lecturer Department of political and Administrative

Studies, University of Zimbabwe.

Number 3 Civil Servant Assistant Secretary in the Ministry of Finance

Number 4 Civil servant Principal Director in the President’s office

Number 5 Dr. Ibo Mendoza Academic, Author and Publisher; Currently

Convener of the Policy Dialogue Forum at

SAPES Trust.
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Number 6 Civil Servant Assistant Director, National Archives of

Zimbabwe

Number 7 Civil servant Undersecretary, Ministry of Public Services

Number 8 Office executive Assistant Director, Anti-Corruption

Commission.

Number 9 Civil Society Director Acting Director , Transnational

InternationalZimbabwe.

Number 10 Judicial officer Prosecutor , Harare magistrate court

Number 11 Judicial officer Judge of the High court of Zimbabwe

Number 12 Law enforcement Senior Police Spokesman: Deputy Assistant

Commissioner of Police.

Number 13 Citizen N/A

Number 14 Civil servant Administrative Project officer in the Ministry

of Health

Number 15 Private sector Senior Deputy Manager. National Blanket

executive
Manufacturing Company

Number 16 Donor Agency worker Program Officer, Conrad Adenauer

Foundation

Number 17 Parent N/A

Number 18 Parliamentarian Member of Parliament in the Parliament of

Zimbabwe

Number 19 Civil servant Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Number 20 Economist Private Business Consultant

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Number 21 Private sector Chief Executive Officer of Delta Corporation

executive Production of Opaque beer and beverages.

Number 22 Private sector Director, Zimbabwe Associated Banking

Executive Group

Number 23 Private sector Deputy Director of Hunyani Paper and Pulp

executive
Products

Number 24 Media executive Editor of a daily newspaper

Number 25 Civil society executive Director of a Non Governmental Organization

Number 26 Civil Servant Director of the Anti-Corruption Commission

in the President’s office

Number 27 Chief Executive Zimbabwe Mass Media Commission.

Officer

Number 28 Media executive Editor of The Sunday Mail weekly paper.

Number 29 Dr. J. Makumbe Associate Professor, Department of Political

and Administrative Studies University of

Zimbabwe. Faculty of Social Studies

Number 30 Private sector . Chief Executive Officer of Coca-Cola

Company for the manufacture of beverages.

Executive

Number 31 Donor agency worker Swedish International Development Agency

Number 32 Donor Agency worker Democracy and Governance Advisor; USAID

From this stakeholder’s outlay, I compiled an interview guide for my personal use during

interview sessions as illustrated below.

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5.14 THE INTERVIEW GUIDE

QUESTIONS

• What are the different types of corruption?

• What is the nature of public/private sector corruption?

• How is the state linked with society around and beyond it (international actors)?

• How far does the state’s power and authority extend?

• What are the specific features of corruption in your ministry, organization,

company, or donor agency?

• What measures, if any, is the state taking in eliminating corruption in the country?

• Is civil society part of the problem or solution to corruption?

• What is the role of the Media in the fight against corruption?
This shortened the time spent in the field by eliminating the hit-and –miss element

associated with random selection from a pool that may or may not be familiar with the issue

under investigation. During the research process a lot of listening rather than the talking needs to

be done and with the government set up in Zimbabwe it was imperative to be completely neutral

in order to discern the contemporary mood, which sets the research in motion. Respondents were

interviewed to assess the perception on corruption trends, key institutions involved in corrupt

activities, the role the executive, the judiciary and legislatures were playing in combating

corruption. Since few or no researchers have specifically focused on linking the legacy of

colonialism to corruption trends in Zimbabwe, the collection of data was deliberately exploratory

and aimed to establish emerging conceptualizations of the nature of corruption against the

government’s single and monolithic definition of corruption in the country. The study, thus used

multi-disciplinary approaches to collect mainly qualitative data using various methods including;

open-ended interviewing, participant observation, and secondary data sources. Mechanisms to

reduce corruption were reviewed and interviews held with various government officials and

private stakeholders and agencies involved in the fight against corruption in Zimbabwe. Informal
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talks were done during my attendance of Transparent International-Zimbabwe outreach

programs in some few provinces and other informal gatherings. Through notes-taking some

information on the nature of corruption were gathered during these informal interactions.

Existing and archival media reports and sources provided further insight into the nature of

corruption in Zimbabwe.

Equipped with my Zimbabwean background, biases and subjectivities toward the

Zimbabwean context and its people, I was in a better position than an outsider in terms of

gathering information because I had the social and linguistic advantage. Although I conducted

my interview in English, the fact that I speak and understand local languages made me

understand people’s informal conversations and could discern the contemporary mood as a result

of my experiences of the Zimbabwean culture.

Thus, data for this study was collected through in-depth individual interview, participant

observations, and secondary data sources. I did an extensive content analysis of the literature on

the detailed background information about Zimbabwe and of government documentary sources,

different media houses libraries, and the National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ). The analysis of

documentary sources was done on a continuous basis. This research strategy gave a holistic and

multi-dimensional account of the politics of the nature of corruption in Zimbabwe. I took

extensive time carrying out interviews. The interview stage of the project was the time that I was

most visible to the participants as it was a face-to-face interaction. Interviewing is a research

strategy that aims to move away from fixed answer questions, which one finds in questionnaires

and surveys. Interviews provide answers to the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions rather than just the

‘how many’ or the ‘how often’ of the questionnaire approach. Most of the questions I asked

during the interview process were open-ended, which allowed for dialogue between the

interviewer and the interviewee. “Open-ended questions are questions that demand long
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responses. Rather than allowing the participant to respond with a “yes” or “no”, they require the

interviewee to respond to the questions more extensively.” (Creswell 2007)

To devise a schedule, I listed all the issues I was interested in and then tried to talking

them through with my cousin, who is also a researcher, to see whether in what ways it was

possible to introduce them into a ‘normal conversation. My cousin, Trevor Misery, from

Zimbabwe, is a Senior Researcher with the African Reform Institute and a Program Director of

Africa Leadership & Management Academy. I kept a log of these conversations and used them

as a basis for preparing a list of themes that I took into each interview, in case a free flowing

conversation fails. I had done the practice during my preliminary research in Zimbabwe and my

prior- research interviews with Zimbabweans in Washington D.C. With so much pressure in an

interview, it is almost impossible for the interviewer to record the content of the interview

directly into paper. Most of the interviews were tape-recorded which facilitated less interruption

in the interview for extensive notes-taking. As well as convenient and labor saving, Pile

suggests that a verbatim transcript is the only way to achieve a full qualitative analysis:

“Any analysis of language can only be carried out with confidence if there is an entire record of

a conversation. Hastily scribed notes…are not accurate enough to be used in this way.

Taperecorded sessions provide the only viable data for this kind of analysis.” (Pile, 1990:217)

Interviews were conducted with key informants during the day and at night I met with my

cousin and listened to the interviews and arranged for follow up interviews. At times I would

call back interviewees the following day and make follow-up telephone interviews on critical

and gray issues that I felt needed more clarification. The responses from earlier interviews helped

me to narrow my focus and formulate interview questions for subsequent interviews with

different informants. According to Burton “good researchers use a strategy of feeding

information from earlier interviews into questions for subjects who are subsequently

interviewed.” (Burton, 2000:223) I realized that whilst most respondents talked about corruption
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in Zimbabwe, they also made reference to how government was protecting some corrupt

officials. I quickly realized that most of the respondents were talking about the politics of

polarization that is prevailing in the country in terms of which official and from which political

party will be prosecuted for corruption offenses. It helped me have a focus, and I was excited

about that and having a strong background in Zimbabwe political dynamics made the detour and

interdisciplinary nature of the project an exciting undertaking.

However, the greatest difficulty is that data on corruption in Zimbabwe is scattered, not

well documented and inconsistent. Whereas the government of Zimbabwe has declared

corruption” number one enemy.(TI-Z, 2007:333) of the state, there is limited support for more

detailed scrutiny of the nature of corruption as a big problem of socio-economic and political

dimensions in the country.

Some respondents were not ready and willing to divulge information that they thought

was political and dangerous because of the political tension existing in the country after 2000

and since the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in February 2009. The

existence of laws which makes it a crime to criticize the president also made it difficult for some

of the respondents to be open in responding to my questions. But there was a considerable

number that were open. However, other respondents during informal interviews went to the

extent of asking me how my research was going to end the problem of corruption in a country in

which everyone, from top to bottom has accepted corruption as a culture. My response was that

my research was advocating for punishing both the giver and the receiver.

Government bureaucracy was also problematic. Besides having a letter from the Director,

Doctoral Program in Public Affairs, Dr. Richard K. Scotch, that I was carrying, some

organizations insisted that I write another letter seeking permission, despite the fact that I had

already been granted permission during my preliminary research. Some officials would need an

appointment, two weeks in advance. I ended up not selecting Ministers when there were other
 143
top government officials, such as permanent , deputy, under, and assistant secretaries, who could

give me, maybe, better information in a relaxed atmosphere.. The next chapters discuss the

entire analysis and the major findings from the field including policy indicators.
 CHAPTER SIX

THE RESEARCH ANALYSIS

The analysis and coding of collected data resulted in categories, themes and concepts

emerging which are related. These include historical and international contexts of the nature of

corruption, the involvement of the leaders, politicians, business people, the media, citizens and

civil society in the process of corruption.. The different accounts that I gathered during my field

trip are written in italics and are more or less as the interviewees narrated them to me. Some of

the accounts are my own experiences and, as I have already mentioned above, are difficult.

Based on a review of the literature some main forms or manifestations of corruption can

be characterized according to a number of basic questions: To what extent is corruption a legacy

of colonialism? What are the different types of corruption? What is the nature of public sector

corruption? How is the state linked with society around and beyond it (international actors)?

How far does the state’s power and authority extend?

There are two types of corruption in Zimbabwe. The first one is grand corruption –

corruption which is done on a grand scale where people in positions of power defraud either the

state or companies of large thousands if not millions of dollars. The second type, is

administrative/petty corruption; where for example, the judiciary system, law enforcement

agents, education, health, and transport sectors demand bribes for discharging services to the
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community That is administrative corruption. Though when you look at it there is nothing

exactly petty about petty corruption because a lot of these are systemic manifested in very small

158

amounts. So it’s actually widespread systemic corruption that is inaccurately called petty

corruption. Most of these are, however, linked to the legacy of colonialism.

On the legacy issue, corruption is linked to the destruction of the cultural and value

systems by colonization and the establishment of colonial political, economic and social

structures in Zimbabwe, as reflected in the pre-colonial and colonial periods .On post-colonial

era, corruption is linked to the failure by the new leaders to effect some non-corrupt

administrative measures for the emerging state. Instead of combating corruption, they intensified

it.

On the national arena, corruption takes place at the meeting point between the state and

the various non-state actors (Johnston 2004). On the one side is the corrupt state official; on the

other side is the corrupter, the supplier of bribes. The official can be anyone from the president

and top political leadership (political corruption) down through the hierarchy (bureaucratic

corruption) to the most remote local government public servant. The many possible non-state

counterparts include the general public, any non-governmental and non-public individual,

corporate and organizational. “Many theories and conceptualizations of corruption will call

attention to the corrupters, those who offer the bribes in the first place, and the advantages they

gain. Other theories will emphasize the corrupted and their advantages.” (Advil et al. 2000:13)

The international arena includes the globalization of markets, finances, and numerous

other transactions, including between the various non-state players and the “host” government

and its representatives. Multinational companies are for instance buying concessions, preferences

and monopolies; kickbacks are offered on tenders, loans and contracts; and development projects

are sometimes eased through by including travels, computers and other fringe benefits for local
 146

officials. “Corrupt host countries are sometimes particularly attractive for certain businesses

abroad”. (Bayard et al. 1999:175) However, international actors, ( in business, politics and

development co-operation) can be both possible corrupters and reform supporters. (Rose

Ackerman 1999); Moody-Stuart 1997) Nevertheless, foreign-sponsored bribery tends to be held

by many observers in Zimbabwe as the most significant contributing factor to corruption.

6.1 COLONIAL ZIMBABWE

My study attempts to assess the relevance of colonialism to the nature of corruption in

Zimbabwe. It lends support to the evidence from previous literature that corruption can be traced

from the nature and pattern of colonialism in the country. If you go to the root causes, it is a

governance crisis; it is a leadership crisis predicated on severe governance deficit manifesting

itself in the scourge of corruption. This leadership crisis manifested itself in the manner in which

Lobengula was deceived and fraudulently made to sign the Rudd Concession in 1887. Thus, the

European invaders corrupted the African government of the time—the Lobengula regime to an

extraordinary extent. Indeed Lobengula could not resist an offer of an attractive bribe of the

instruments of death, namely guns and ammunition imported from Europe into Zimbabwe, which

also became the most powerful means of ‘buying’ the King who signed the Rudd Concession

which allotted the whole of Zimbabwe to the Queen Mother, to the British South Africa

Company and to each Missionary Society. That day the Zimbabwean sovereignty was literally

bought through bribery and corruption. One respondent lays out this analysis in context:

Then we look at issues now like previously inherited issues. So I want to look at
corruption in the country in relation to the character of an executive leader at that time
and the preceding infrastructure and systems that are set prior to that executive because
you cannot just look at corruption as if it is coming in isolation. It has to be birthed
somewhere because there is a relationship between the seed and the harvest. So I am
saying in Zimbabwe, it is important to identify the seed of corruption and track the
process of the development of that seed to harvest because trying to understand the
harvest without understanding the seed becomes an illusion. (Transcript of an interview
with the Principal Director in the Prime Minister’s office, January 24, 2011)
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Thus, if we do a historiography analysis of the nature of corruption in Zimbabwe and fraud as a

component of that corruption, we find that it dates back to 1890 or the pre-1890 period when

Zimbabwe was colonized. Even the foundation of colonialism was fraudulent; it was naked

corruption. Lobengula had to sign all those concessions because he was deceived by outright lies

and promises that were never fulfilled:

All the concessions that were signed from 1887, 88, 89 and 1890 when the BSAC
invaded Zimbabwe were corrupt. The leaders of that time knew that they had colonized
Zimbabwe but the foundation and the stratagem to colonize Zimbabwe was founded on a
fraudulent basis or fraudulent foundation. From there all the negotiations, all the
struggles- the first and second Chimurenga, were trying to address not only the
colonization but the fraudulent and corrupt chain of activity that was associated with
colonization. If we do a root cause bottom line analysis we find that there was a trust and
sincerity deficit. So if there is a trust and sincerity deficit that provides a conducive
environment for corruption to thrive. So that is exactly what transpired in 1890.If we look
at our history, the Land Apportionment Act of 1932, going even to November 1965, the
Unilateral Declaration of Independence period, those were all activities of corruption.
(Transcript of an interview with a Professor in the Department of Political and
Administrative Studies at the University of Zimbabwe on January 24, 2011)

Corruption in Zimbabwe did not start in 1980. It dates back to the colonial era. So it’s

that history of corruption, but the red thread that runs from 1890 or pre-1890 is that everything

rises and falls on leadership. It was not an ordinary person who was promised to have a gunboat

placed in the Zambezi River; it was the leader of the people who was promised that. It was

government of the time that did not consult with the people so there was no citizenship

participation; there was no transparency; there were no structures or mechanisms of

accountability. So it was that top-down structure; there was no bottom-up structure; that system

of patronage; Lobengula and the few people that were around him were the ones who were

making all these decisions; fundamental decisions on behalf of so many thousands of people. It

has taken Zimbabweans more than a century trying to undo that state of affairs. Reacting to this

state of affairs, one respondent had this to say:

So Zimbabwe was colonized because there was a governance deficit within the then
governing systems. So if you take that template and come to or fast forward to present
day Zimbabwe, there are so many government contracts that are being signed, for
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example, the platinum, the gold mines,--that is all mortgaging our future. So when we
turn forty or fifty and our children turn twenty five thirty, we will be told that all the
platinum in Ceuta and Ngami belongs to the Chinese because the Chinese would have
signed a fifty year mining contract with the government of the day. (Transcript of an
interview with the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 27, 2011)

Although there was corruption during the colonial period, it was not highlighted because

basically it was government-directed to bust the United Nations sanctions against the regime of

Ian Smith immediately after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 9UDI) in 1965. Apart

from that, there were no institutions like Transparency International, civil society and so on, and

no mechanism to deal with the corruption problem. The grand corruption we are talking about

requires a lot of communication which is not paper based. As stated by one respondent:

You want to investigate it; you need cell phones, computers, blue tooth and satellite.
That’s the only way to investigate it and pin it down. If you think you are going to get it
in documents of what so and so did, forget it! That’s the difference between the
corruption of 1923 to 1965 and the corruption now. With the corruption now, the guy
doesn’t even see the money because it’s an electronic transfer into an offshore account.
He doesn’t even go to sign for it. He can transfer it into three other banks and do money
laundering in such a way when it eventually comes to Zimbabwe (if it comes to
Zimbabwe at all), it will be squeaky clean money. In other words there is a huge
difference between the corruption pre-1965 and post-1965. In fact in the post
independence/ post 1980 corruption, we have big cars or big people who are actually
changing cars every year. I am not talking about Japanese cars. I am talking about
German cars and French cars – big things, expensive. He uses it for one year or less and
he changes to another brand new one. That’s why Zimbabwe has the highest per capita
number of Mercedes Benzes in the world. (Transcript of interview with Dr. Makumbe of
the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Zimbabwe,
January 24, 2011)
Thus, unlike its predecessor, the post-colonial state presents the face of modern state

power, bureaucratic omnipotence and technical expertise—the avatar of modernity and

corruption.

6.2 POST-COLONIAL ZIMBABWE

It should be noted that generally, the colonial system in Zimbabwe was different from

other colonial states in the sub-Saharan region save in South Africa and Namibia. The situation

in Zimbabwe was exacerbated by the wealth of the country. If you wanted to be corrupt in
 149
Malawi and get rich as a result of corruption, you would struggle because there is nothing to be

corrupt on. In Zimbabwe there was a lot to be corrupt on and the wealth was such that you could

be corrupt and get rich and get away with it. In Zimbabwe there were systems of combating

corruption, such as the Official Secrets Act, and the Anti-corruption Act at independence and

already had a tender board which is now called the Public Procurement Board. Thus, the country

already had all those things in place but they never succeeded in uprooting corruption. At

independence in 1980 there was a shifting of the whites out of the public service even out of the

business. There were people who had spent perhaps fifteen to twenty years in the bush – very

poor with nothing. They are suddenly in the corridors of power. They want to be distinct from

the posh or the vananji(masses). So there was the difference of a political party which engaged in

the liberation struggle and came into power. The party was really taking people who had

hitherto not owned any property into the corridors of power and asking them to put on a tie and

suit and sit at the back of a Mercedes Benz and be driven to work. So they found ways of

walking the talk – looking rich and being rich and the only way out was corruption. As one

respondent puts it:

In Zimbabwe, the nature of corruption that is pertinent to the country is the economics of
affection and the sociology of patronage. What I mean by the economics of affection is a
situation where the state has manifested itself through individuals, that is, the hijacking of
national institutions by individuals. Corrupt acts are practiced within the administrative domain.
These include such behavior as nepotism and cronyism based on a spoils system, resulting from
a pervasive politicization of the bureaucracy; ghost workers on public payroll; purchase of public
offices; collection of unauthorized fees; falsification of or the destruction of records; arbitrary
administrative action and bending or circumventing established regulations. Thus, rather than
bureaucracy serving the public interest, the bureaucracy itself becomes an instrument for
propagating the political interest of the leadership, its own self interests, or personal interests of
those within it—all inherited from the structure of colonial institutions. (Transcript of an
interview with the Principal Director in the Prime Minister’s Office, January 26, 2011)

Thus, independence brought with it the opportunity for quick advancement and enrichment,

especially in the state sector, encouraging the adoption of sometimes corrupt practices,

capitalisttype production, and colonial lifestyles for a few, contrary to socialist rhetoric.
 150

However, the emphasis placed on the historical event of British settler colonialism in the

birth and entrenchment of corruption in Zimbabwe should, however, not be construed as

attributing corruption entirely to colonialism. Indeed, if the bitter war of liberation and self

determination gave Zimbabwean leaders the opportunity to choose what was good for the people,

then one would be justified in arguing that the opportunity has existed for them to systematically

abandon predatory methods of governance in favor of more equitable ones. The most valuable

prize is the state, because state power can be used to create opportunities for private gain. Where

private sector opportunities are limited, the occupation of public office remains the most reliable

means of accumulating wealth. One respondent puts it in context:

The quest for power and wealth expressed itself sometimes in open corruption and
nepotism. The long years of colonial domination and deprivation, not to mention
imprisonment and the hard days of the struggle, became almost the license-albeit for only
a few among the many who might claim such a license to accumulate wealth quickly; and
the state appeared the most viable agency of accumulation. (Transcript of an interview
with the Deputy Director of the National Archives of Zimbabwe on February 26, 2011).
That corruption has become one of the most notoriously persistent and progressively social

problems afflicting Zimbabwe today is indisputable. The practice has permeated virtually all

institutions, public and private, governmental and non-governmental. Having reached endemic

proportions, corruption has become not only a way of life but also the principal method for the

accumulation of private property in present day Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe is ranked the 14th most corrupt nation out of a total of 180 countries surveyed

by Transparency International. The 2008 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) scores 180 countries

on a scale from 10 (highly clean) to zero(highly corrupt). Zimbabwe, which is ranked 166th had a

score of 1.8 on CPI scale indicating the country has been slowly moving toward the highly

corrupt level. From Table 4 with the CPI Indices it is clear that as the economic situation

escalates, so has the corruption.

Table 6.1. Corruption Perception Index for Zimbabwe; 1998-2008 (Source: Transparency
International)
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Year Rank CPI Score Std Dev Surveys Used Confidence
Interval
1998 43 4,2 2,2 6 -

1999 4S 4,1 1,4 9 -

2000 65 3 1,5 7 0.6-4.9

2001 65 2,9 2,9 6 1.6-4.7

2002 71 2,7 0,5 6 2.0-3.3

2003 106 2,3 0,3 7 2.0-2.7

2004 114 2,3 - 7 1.9-2.7

2005 107 2.6 - 7 2.1-3.0

2006 130 2,4 - 7 2.0-2.8

2007 150 2,1 - 8 1.9-2.3

2008 166 1,8 - 7 1.5-2.1

Source: Global Corruption Report Index: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2004.enhtm#cpi2004

Explanatory notes:

CPI Score – measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption in a given country and is a

composite index, drawing on different expert and business surveys from business people,

academics and risk analysts. It ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).

Confidence range – provides a range of possible values of the CPI score. This reflects how a

country’s score may vary depending on measurement and precision. Normally with a 5 percent

probability the score is above this range and with another 5 percent it is below. However

particularly when only a few sources are available, an unbiased estimate of the mean coverage

probability is lower than the nominal value of 90%.

Surveys used – refers to the number of surveys that assessed a country’s performance. At least 3

surveys are required for a country to be included in the CPI.

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Standard deviation – indicates the differences in the values of the sources; the greater the

standard deviation the greater the differences of perceptions of a country among the sources.

Although these global indicators represent a definite advance in the measurement and

knowledge of the running of the institutions (including from the point of view of corruption) and

governance at international level, they nonetheless have a certain number of shortcomings worth

mentioning (Roubaix, 2006:1). Three types of weaknesses can be defined with regard to these

global indicators:

• The indicators are tarnished by relatively large margins of error, which make the

intercountry and time-based rankings highly inaccurate. The indicators provide no way of

assessing governance trends at worldwide level, only allowing for relative positions.

They provide no indication of the policies that might reduce corruption;

• The aggregation procedure and the choice of the different primary sources used to put

together the indicators are questionable;

• The global indicators’ estimators and their accuracy only concern the perception of

corruption (generally by experts) and not corruption itself.

Nevertheless, the Sunday Mail, in a heading captioned “Corruption and white collar crime

have reached catastrophic proportions” had this to say about the level of corruption in

Zimbabwe:

If you doubt this, flip through any newspaper and there is a high probability that you will
find a corruption-related item on virtually every page. Alarmingly, society has reached
such a stage where corruption has become a way of life. As this social malady gains
momentum, more and more people are beginning to accept it as inevitable. People get
momentarily disgusted upon hearing of a case of corruption but the shock soon wears off
when a bigger scandal erupts. In other words, corruption is no longer shocking. What is
shocking is people’s willingness to accept it as normal life. (Sunday Mail, September 26,
2010)
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Indeed corruption is almost an accepted way of doing business, but this is not, by any

means, to say that there are no more honest people in the country and that all government and

business officials have to be bribed to render and to be rendered services.

6.3 PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION

In contemporary discussions of public sector corruption, a distinction is often drawn

between political or grand corruption, on the one hand, and petty or bureaucratic corruption, on

the other. The dichotomy appears to be premised on the divide between politics and

administration. Thus, political or grand corruption takes place at the highest levels of political

authority. It is when the politicians and political decision-makers (heads of state, ministers and

top officials), who are entitled to formulate, establish and implement the laws in the name of the

people, are themselves corrupt. With grand corruption, we are dealing with highly placed

individuals who exploit their positions to extract large bribes from national and transnational

corporations, who appropriate significant pay-offs from contract scams, or embezzle large sums

of money from the public treasury into private (often overseas) bank accounts. Political

corruption is furthermore when policy formation and legislation are tailored to benefit politicians

and legislators (Moody—Stuart 1997; Doing and Theo bald, 2000:3). Usually, this takes place

when there is no strict internal monitoring system within an organization (public or private) for

overseeing cash. The perpetrators identify a loop hole within regulations and then they take

advantage of that; for example, when there is no strict internal monitoring system within a

company for overseeing cash.

Both forms of corruption tend to go hand in hand and are mutually reinforcing: political

corruption is supported by administrative corruption and the latter is frequently caused and

encouraged by the former. The symbolic relationship is often manifested and reinforced by a

phenomenon that is itself a form of corruption, namely, favoritism. Defined as the inclination to
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accord preferential treatment to friends, family and acquaintances, favoritism is a mechanism for

the biased distribution of resources. As one informant puts it:

Zimbabwe is afflicted by both bureaucratic and political corruption. In fact the legislative
frameworks within which the procurement of goods and services occurs in the public
sector bristle with opportunities for the extension of favoritism on political grounds, or
simply as nepotism. (Transcription interview with the Permanent Secretary in the
ministry of public services, February 4, 2011)

In other words, corruption is a particular (and, one could say, perverted) state society relation.

On the one side is the state that is the civil servants, functionaries, bureaucrats and politicians,

anyone who holds a position of authority to allocate rights over (scarce) public resources in the

name of the state or the government. Corruption is when these individuals are misusing the

public power they are bestowed with for private benefit. The corrupt act is when this responsible

person accepts money or some other form of reward, and then proceeds to misuse his official

powers by returning undue favors. For instance, it is an act of corruption when a state official

takes a bribe to render some public service that is supposed to be free of charge or demands more

than the official cost of it. The involvement of state officials in corruption is also emphasized in

an alternative definition, where corruption is seen as:

a form of secret social exchange through which those in power (political or

administrative) take personal advantage, of one type or another, of the influence they
exercise in virtue of their mandate or their function. (Merry cited in de Saran 1999:49)

In sum, almost every definition (or rather conceptualization) of corruption has a principal focus

on the state and politics (“the corrupted”), and a “demand-oriented” perspective.

On the other side of a corrupt act is nevertheless the “supply side”, and some theories and

conceptualizations exist that emphasize the “corrupters”, those who offer the bribes, and the

advantages they gain. These suppliers are the general public, or – in other words – the non-state

society. The counterparts to the corrupt officials are any non-governmental and non-public

individual, corporate and organizational, domestic and external (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).

Although the presence and nature of corruption varies significantly from sector to sector it is
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common that government officials are charging extra for services, seeking small favors, or using

public facilities and materials for their own direct or indirect marginal gain.

6.4 ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION

The Justice System

Where judicial corruption occurs, the damage can be pervasive and extremely difficult to

reverse. Judicial corruption undermines citizens’ morale, violates their human rights, harms their

job prospects and national development and depletes the quality of governance. A government

that functions on behalf of all its citizens requires not only the rule of law, but an independent

and effective judiciary to enforce it to the satisfaction of all parties.

The professionals that make up the judicial system can use their skills, knowledge and

influence to privilege truth and benefit the general public, and the vast majority do. But they can

also abuse these qualities, using them to enrich themselves or to improve their careers and

influence. For whatever reason and whether petty or gross, corruption in the judiciary insures

that corruption remains beyond the law in every other field of government and economic

activity in which it may have taken root. Indeed, without an independent judiciary, graft

effectively becomes the new ‘rule of law’.

When the judicial system of a country like Zimbabwe is compromised by corruption and

incompetence then the consequences are very serious for all levels and sectors of the society.

When judges and magistrates are appointed as part of the political patronage system, then their

subsequent judgments in political or any other cases will be subject to severe conflict of interest.

In an interview with Deputy Director of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), it was

established that high court judges, magistrates, prosecutors, lawyers, clerks of court, officers of

the Labor Court and traditional chiefs are all among those receiving bribes and compromising the

country’s justice system:

Of all cases reported to us, the highest number involved bribery and corruption against
magistrates, prosecutors and clerks of court. Judges represent the lowest number of
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corruption cases being handled by our organization. Some lawyers are fraudulently
selling properties, conniving with prosecutors to solicit money to obtain judgments and
with clerks of court to remove documents from records. Interference in the independence
of the judiciary is the biggest area of corruption. Poor remuneration, lack of the
monitoring mechanisms, inadequate work facilities, greed, lack of integrity and
unprofessionalism also contribute to this scourge. (Transcription interview with an ACC
Deputy Director, January 29, 2011)

It is unfortunate that the judges and their subordinates, who are the ultimate decision makers

and the highest government officials in the justice system and who should be the focal point for

reducing corruption and promoting the rule of law engage in unlawful acts . Commenting on

public concerns about bribery within the judiciary as the major complaint, an official from

Transparency International-Zimbabwe had this to say:

The public allege that the parties against whom unfavorable court judgments are passed
bribe judicial officials to ensure favorable verdicts and to avoid convictions altogether.
The public have indicated that because of this, they have lost confidence in the justice
delivery system since it is not based on practice of the law but on corrupt tendencies,
since just delayed is justice denied. ( Transcript of interview with the Coordinator of
ALAC of Transparency International- Zimbabwe on January 29, 2011)

A prosecutor at the Harare Magistrate Court in also showed her indignation of the justice

system in Zimbabwe thus:

At our Harare Magistrate Court there is a pending case of a foreign currency dealer who
allegedly stole US$ 100 000 from his associate . He was arrested and taken to the police
station. I am sure the policemen that caught him would have accepted a bribe from him
had he not been on the wanted list for other pending fraud cases. In prison he managed to
bribe the prison guard with US$ 5 000 to ask the magistrate to grant him bail. In court the
magistrate granted him bail upon receiving a US$15 000 bribe. Out on bail he went to
the court clerks who are in charge of the criminal files and bribed them with US$750 so
that they steal his file for him. With no case file and out on bail he is continuously on
further remand. (Transcription interview with a prosecutor at the Harare Magistrate Court
on January 30, 2011)

Zimbabwe has had its fair share of the corrupt judicial system to the extent that in some cases

officials from the judiciary have been prosecuted, while others have been convicted. A Judge

of the High Court commended the ACC for coming out speaking strongly against corruption in

the judiciary as shown by what he said in an interview with me:

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It is important for urgent action to be taken against judicial officers because
anticorruption work to some extent depends on them. Corrupt judiciaries fracture and
divide communities by keeping alive the sense of injury created by unjust treatment and
mediation. Judicial systems debased by bribery undermine confidence in governance by
facilitating corruption across all sectors of government, starting at the helm of power. In
so doing, they send a blunt message to the people in this country, corruption is tolerated.
(Transcription interview with a high court judge on January 31, 2011)

The Police

In an interview, a national police spokesman admitted corruption was endemic within the

ranks of the police force, adding while public complaints against the police continue to be

significantly higher than other categories under review, the people should bear in mind the

Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) recruited from nowhere else but Zimbabwe. Therefore, he

said, the behavior of the people recruited into the force represented the nature of the

Zimbabwean society.

When considering this issue, we should also look at society at large. We recruit our
officers from society, and if the police officers are corrupt, it is a reflection of Zimbabwe
because we recruit from in Zimbabwe in Zimbabwe alone. We are not saying we don’t
have problems, because we have some corrupt officers in the organization and we are on
record acknowledging this problem. But that does not make us a very corrupt
organization because we still value our service character, that’s why we don’t protect
undisciplined or corrupt officers. You will find that there is corruption everywhere, even
among media reporters, there are corrupt elements. In simple professions like teaching
there is corruption. You will also find corruption in the judiciary and the transport sector,
whether it’s licensing or not. (Transcript of an interview with the Deputy Commissioner
of Police on February 2, 2011)

Transport Sector

It is now almost impossible to pass a driving test in Zimbabwe without paying a bribe.

Vehicle Inspection Department (VID) depots have of late been described as flea markets rather

than licensing depots as most people turn to buying the licenses. So well-oiled is the system that

would be drivers have to pay the instructors at their driving school who in turn pass the bribes to

syndicates at VID. One victim of the VID scam explained to me:

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Getting the learners is the easy part though. A learner’s license costs US$20 to obtain and
consists of 25 questions. This sounds simple enough, but the catch is that the tests are not
the standard tests that were written in the past. The tests do not test knowledge of the
rules of the road and how competent would be drivers are, but are more of money making
scheme. The more times you fail the more money is received by the department. The tests
are changed every time the learners master the tests so that more people fail the test as
opposed to passing. One would think the motive of the tests is to get competent drivers
on the road. I looked at some of the questions being asked and simply wondered what
their relevance are. Some questions are so badly written that they do not make sense.
Some questions have no correct answers while others have more than one answer.
(Interview with a VID victim scam on February 9, 2011)

Health Sector

Corruption makes health initiatives, health policy and international aid less effective in

achieving their goals, undermining international efforts to combat deadly diseases and to

increase coverage and quality in the health systems. Combating corruption in health systems is

an essential development goal, due the capability to increase efficiency and maximize the

outcomes of the health resources spent by the countries.

Corruption in the health services industry comes with a high price tag, representing

worldwide billions of dollars lost to theft, bribery and extortion. Unethical and fraudulent

behavior in the health sector compromises fundamental human rights and create barriers to the

achievement of essential medical care. Corruption affects all health systems. Whether in the

industrialized or developing world, whether via embezzlement from health budgets or bribes

extorted at the point of health service delivery, the effect is enormous and the burden falls

disproportionately on the poor. A project officer who was a member of the research team that

looked into corruption in the sector had this to say:

The medical staff had been supplying backyard pharmacies as well as black-market
dealers with stolen drugs, which were often sold at higher prices. Health workers, are,
claiming that low salaries had driven them into corrupt activities as coping strategies. The
health workers are creating false shortages in order to force patients to go and buy, in
most cases, at their pharmacies. Drug stock outs have also become common place
because drugs are diverted to the black market through covert fraud and dispensing to
ghost patients. Nurses and other health workers in the public sector have often
complained about the poor salaries, as they earn between US$150 to US$250 per month.
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(Transcript of an interview with an administrative project officer in the Ministry of
Health on February 18, 2011)

A director of marketing of one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the country spoke of

the involvement of the company, under European management, in large scale corruption

particularly in the ordering of laboratory supplies. He said:

It was management’s practice that the South African suppliers will be required to
overprice all of the products the company was ordering by at least 30%. Two invoices
will be issued, and the one with the correct price will be used for customs and company
records. 30% percent will be deposited into the personal foreign account of the manger
concerned. This included large purchases for aids testing equipment to hospitals and paid
holidays at tourist resort centers or special gifts of their choice at the end of every
transaction. Government could be charged 200-300% mark up and Private hospitals
could pay as little as 10% mark up, and in essence the government money was being used
to finance private hospitals where management had an interest. Major equipments that
were being imported from the foreign market, for an example, Aids equipment. Only
private hospitals’ employees were getting first preference, so that government hospitals
could be forced to send their patients to private hospitals. When the machine is about to
go obsolete, training will then be given to government employees at negotiated rates.
(Transcript of an interview with the Marketing Director of the Central African
Pharmaceutical Society (CAPS), on February 19, 2011)

Education Sector

Like in all other countries of the world, education is largely the responsibility of

governments. Unfortunately, due to the financial difficulties of the past eleven years, the

government is now turning to already poverty-stricken parents to bear the burden of the cost of

education and literally take care of the teachers in the public schools.

For teachers to come to school and teach our children we have to bring them groceries at
the beginning of the term. Each child has to go with salt, sugar, cooking oil and soap on
the first day of school if they want to be allowed to sit in class. Us parents are already
struggling to access these basic commodities for our families without having to worry
about the teachers’ groceries too. ( Transcript of an Interview with parent of a pupil at
Mabuchi Primary School, Harare)
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6.5 POLITICAL/GRAND CORRUPTION

The two processes of political corruption—extraction for private benefit and enrichment,

and the use of corrupt means for power preservation—are important analytical categories,

especially when it comes to formulating counter-measures. Importantly, the two processes are

often connected. Many of the grand nature of corruption scandals include both aspects, large

scale bribery schemes are concluded when the extracted money is used to buy political support,

and the full circle is made when the purpose of power is wealth and the purpose of wealth is

power.

One of the manifestations of political corruption in Zimbabwe is when politicians bribe

voters directly. The practice is fuelled by money that is not properly accounted for at best, from

criminal sources at worst.

It is difficult to assess how widespread the practice of voting buying is in this country.
The term encompasses many kinds of inducements, such as the distribution of food,
clothing or public services, in addition to direct monetary exchanges. (Transcript of an
interview with an opposition Member of Parliament on February 18, 2011)
Below is also a brief presentation of a few grand corruption acts I gathered from the media

archives in Zimbabwe the Institute for War & Peace Reporting, (IWPR) ZIM Issue 91; April

2008:223:

(1) The most celebrated example of grand corruption in post-independence Zimbabwe was
the Willow gate Scandal69 of 1989, in which government ministers were accused of
buying vehicles cheap and reselling them at a substantial mark up. When the media broke
the story the President quickly set up a commission of inquiry, but he went on to grant
pardons to those who were implicated. At that point, people began doubting whether the
justice system was up to the job of dealing with corruption.
(2) Things got worse in the nineties, with the “VIP Housing Scandal” of 1995 in which
government officials and politicians allegedly looted funds contributed by civil servants
to build or buy homes. Most of the civil servants who contributed money on the premise
that the government would build houses for them remain homeless to this day. None of
those involved in the scandal was prosecuted or punished.
(3) This scandal was followed soon afterwards by the plunder of the War Victims’
compensation Fund set up to help those who had participated in Zimbabwe’s liberation
struggles of the 1970s. Once again there were no arrests or prosecutions because those

69 Willowvale is a car assembly company jointly owned by the government and

private sector.
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involved were high level politicians. But this case did provoke 50,000 rank-and-file war
veterans to start demanding monthly benefits from the government. They were aggrieved
that some of their leaders had abandoned them and were living an ostentatious lifestyle
far in excess of their salaries. After the veterans staged street protests and threatened to
march on the President’s official residence, he was forced to order payments of Z$
50,000 per person October 1997.
Because the allocation had not been set aside in Zimbabwe’s annual budget, it led to the
collapse of the currency a month later on November 14, in what some analysts agree that
this marked the beginning of Zimbabwe’s current economic troubles.
(4) The land reform program instituted from 2000- ostensibly in the interest of fair
distribution to landless Zimbabweans70—soon became fertile ground for
misappropriation. Government ministers, officials and top military and police officers
ignored the land reform policy of “one man one farm” with some acquiring several
properties and passing them on to relatives. It is interesting to note that the President has
so far instituted seven land audits which have confirmed the obvious—that most of his
ministers, senior police, intelligent and military officials possessed more than one farm.
In August 2003, he declared that he would deal with those who had seized more than one
property, but the threat was greeted with stony silence. To date, no looted farms have
been returned, and no action has been taken against the culprits.
(5) Finally there are the allegations that emerged in 2007 concerning misappropriation of
funds at the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO)71 , the country’s sole steel
producer. Following an official inquiry, parliament conducted hearings in which
allegations were made against a number of senior politicians said to have benefited from
payments made by the company. (IWPR, Issue 91, 2008:23)

Commenting on corruption as a result of fuel shortages at the state run oil procurement

company, the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM) in 1999, one Ministry of Energy

official said:

Several high ranking executives had been affected at that time. At the height of the crisis,
when supplies nearly dried up, there were indications that some oil products were being
sold on the black market. In addition to this, some attendants at petrol service stations
took bribes from motorists in exchange for preferential treatment. A situation of shortage
therefore encouraged a new form of corruption that was unknown before the crisis. The
corruption at NOCZIM was a clear example of primary corruption in which the “Big
Fish” received no punishment at all. (Transcript interview with the Deputy Secretary in
the Ministry of Energy, on February 7, 2011)

It is true that the most unanimous opinion condensed from audit reports, donor reports,

household surveys, business environment and enterprise surveys, legislative reports and

diagnostic studies available between 1980—1987 was that the incidences of corruption though

70 These were white commercial farms taken over by the government

71 ZISCO is a parastatal involved in iron smelting and producer of steel in the Midlands
Province of Zimbabwe..
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present were minimal no matter how defined.( Shana, 2006:5) During this period the state

enjoyed a relatively high level of integrity. The down spiral began in 1987 and then chronicled

the progressive disintegration of national moral economic fiber as illustrated by the following list

of grand corruption scandals besides the above-mentioned list:

1. 1987—Air Zimbabwe Fokker Plane Scandal—involving $100million; This involved

the purchase of planes which were outdated and no longer being manufactured

2. 1989—ZRP Santana Scandal; Police vehicles were bought which were unsuitable for

the Zimbabwean environment and whose spare parts were no longer available.

3. 1995—Grain Marketing Board (GMB) Grain Scandal: Top officials at the GMB were

buying grain from the farmers at a lower price and sold the grain at very higher price

in order to share the huge profits.

4. 1998—Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) YTL Sultan Scandal: ZESA

officials concluded deals (with the connivance of big politicians), with YTL Sultan

Electricity Supply Company of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in which they

put an extra cost price which they then shared among themselves.

5. 2001 Harare Airport Scandal: The President’s nephew was granted a tender to build a

modern extension of the national airport when he did not have funds and ended up

making huge profits using government funds for sourcing out the building and other

materials needed for the project.

The vast majority of the cases mentioned above, if not all, involved high ranking politicians

some of whom are still active in politics and or government having been recycled back into

positions of authority even when they had been convicted and sentenced. Involvement in

corruption appears to have enhanced their political careers not damaged them ( Shana, 2006:7).
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6.6 THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Corruption, like any exchange, requires two actors – a buyer and a seller. The buyer in

the private sector pays a bribe to the seller in the public sector to obtain something valuable.

Bribes can be used to allocate perfectly legal, but scarce, benefits such as foreign exchange,

import licenses, credit or public contracts, or they may provide something the buyer does not

deserve such as exemption from a valid regulation, an illicit tax break or permission to carry on

an illegal business. Bribes can even be used to induce public authorities to harass and investigate

one’s competitors. Bribery does not always involve public officials – private purchasing agents

have been implicated in corruption scandals, as have loan officers in private banks. The common

feature is a person with authority to distribute each scarce benefit who fails to use a method to

select beneficiaries other than the willingness to bribe.

Corrupt buyers and sellers frequently develop systems that are mutually reinforcing and

persist over time. Such systems are not just effective ways of hiding payoffs and managing the

disposal of illicit funds. They may also be organized to affect the very types of services and

contracts the government provides. Government decisions about what kinds of public works

projects to support and what types of concessions and privatizations to sponsor may be

intimately linked to the corrupt system. Since certain kinds of corruption benefits the participants

on both sides, neither group has an incentive to end the relationship unilaterally. There is no way

to disentangle the network to affix blame on just one of the participants. All bear responsibility.

As pointed out by one informant:

Like economics there is a supply- side and demand-side for corruption. The supply-side
or the giver resides in business. Business pay the bribes. The demand side is where the
receiver or taker is predominantly government officials. Government officials demand
bribes. In most discussions corruption is often blamed on government officials and
seldom on the private sector. This is not to say that the private sector is the sole suppliers.
If you look around, you will see that non-governmental organizations and international
actors are steady suppliers of corruption in developing countries. The center piece of
supply and demand for corruption in Africa and many advancing nations has been the
many market oriented reform, such as privatization, Public Sector Procurement for a
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long time now has attracted corrupt activities. (Transcript interview with an economist/
private consultant in Harare on February 15, 2011)

Government Tender and Public Procurement

As public sector operating budgets in transition and developing country economies continue to

grow tighter, national and local government entities are increasingly looking to the private sector

to provide goods and services to their constituents. Such goods and services are often acquired

through a public procurement process whereby the government entity contracts with a private

sector enterprise to furnish a particular good or to provide a particular service for a fee subject to

legal terms and conditions contained in a contract. As one respondent said:

You find leaders in the private sectors that just wake up with 5000 hectares of land
because they are related to the Minister responsible for the land redistribution. 0 I think
there is also a positive co-relation between your closeness to power and your ability to
acquire companies and loans within the private sector. You look at the tender system for
example. It takes two to tango. If the government is corrupt, usually it’s because there is a
corruptor, who is usually the private sector. So what you really find with a lot of these
chief executives is this - if you do a analysis of how do people get these tenders, look at
Air Zimbabwe and the airport scandal, you look at a whole lot of other scandals, for
instance the diamond thing. These are private sector companies. How did they get those
tenders? Usually private companies have greased an official or MPs who are sitting on
the procurement committee or the state procurement board. So it’s rife among the private
sector. Without that, it’s difficult sometimes to be competitive for a lot of those guys. It’s
not merit, it’s really a system of patronage based on who you know and who you are
close to. (Transcript of an interview with the Acting Director of Transparency
International-Zimbabwe on February 5, 2011)

Because public procurement is one of the key areas where the public sector and the private sector

interact financially, it is a prime candidate for corrupt activity, cronyism, and favoritism as well

as outright bribery. Commenting on his experiences and in collaboration with the above

respondent, one Chief Executive Officer (CEO) said:

When I am applying for a tender I always make sure that I send my tender when my
‘associates’ on the board have gone through all the other tenders and they tell me the
figures that will make me win the tender. It would be suspicious if my company
always won the tender, so I change the name all the time and create fictitious
companies. I usually give my ‘associates’ a reasonable percentage of what I make. If I
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don’t do this, I will not get the tenders. (Transcript of an interview with a Chief
Executive Officer of Delta Corporation, February 7, 2011)

In the early period of Zimbabwe’s independence there was also sabotage corruption,

(which continues even up to the present), whereby those in the corporate business are determined

to economically undermine the new government. As stated in an interview with Dr. I. Mendoza:

There is a lot of bribing in the private sector to do with mineral exportation – the
exportation of minerals in their raw form. There is a lot of double invoicing. The minerals
mined here are taken out of the country through double invoicing and only part of the
money comes into the country. The rest of the money is send into offshore accounts or
into the subsidiaries of multi-national companies that are operating in the country. The
Zimbabwe government has no capacity to monitor that and to arrest the situation. It
doesn’t. Technically and in terms of human resources and in terms of regional
cooperation, they don’t have the capacity to stop it. They simply don’t. So if you can’t
stop it, you participate also in it. They are actually among the worst perpetrators of the
corruption. The guys in government through fronts, through private companies which
they hire to do the dirty work for them and they receive the money. So that’s the nature of
the corruption in the private sector. (Transcript of an interview with Dr. I. Mendoza,
Chairman of the Southern African Political Economy Trust (SAPES) on February 20,
2011)

Almost everyone who is in the productive sector of the private business would most likely be

involved in this type of corruption. The productive sector would be in farming, mining,

manufacturing and the service delivering sectors of the Zimbabwean economy.

6.7 CIVIL SOCIETY

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are the product of an era that is rapidly passing.

Yet the common goals they strive toward remain and are far from being realized. Poverty,

inequality, insecurity and injustice were stubborn features of the old world order and are abiding

features of the new ( Flower, 2000:637-654). A brief history of NGOs and of the radical shifts in

the context where international development takes place shows that the goals NGOs typically

aspire to cannot be reached by simply relying on the framework employed by the official aid

system. In either type of transformation, NGOs will necessarily relinquish their prevalent role as

subsidy-providing intermediaries in a declining aid system molded around internationalized

patriarchy: a system that has fostered and abetted multiple levels of patronage, dependency,
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pathological institutional behavior and financial malpractice (Evade, 1997; Gould &

AmadoReyes, 1983; Moody—Stuart, 1994; SIDA996).

In Zimbabwe, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are often populated by registered

charities, development non-governmental organizations, community groups, women’s

organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help

groups, social movements, business associations, coalition and advocacy groups, (Chimhosva,

2010). The strategic objectives of civil society and NGOs in an effort to transmit value to the

down-trodden population of Zimbabwe should embrace advocacy for constitutional reform and

organizing peaceful resistance to repression and other forms of restriction of individual and

societal liberties. The quest for a new people driven constitution in Zimbabwe is central to this

objective. The freedom to choose a leadership that is responsive to the people’s needs should be

a fundamental objective of civil society and NGO backed revolutionary crusade.

In the light of the above discussion an attempt will now be made to highlight some of the

failures of civil society and NGOs and why they should now be discouraged to further

undermine the struggle of the Zimbabwean people. Commenting on corruption on the part of the

leadership of the CSOs AND NGOs (more than 2500) currently operating in Zimbabwe, an

editor of a weekly newspaper said in an interview:

The donor community has accepted the classic definitions of civil society and NGOs and
applied it to Zimbabwe as if Zimbabwe was a normal society. The concept of voluntarism
does not exist in the context of the chaotic Zimbabwean socio-economic environment.
Most entrepreneurial and sharp academic brains in Zimbabwe could not find employment
in the public sector or the non-existent private sector. The only available foreign currency
based entrepreneurial activity was the NGO and Civil Society sector. Instead of being a
voluntary service oriented non-profit sector this sector graduated into a huge profit based
industry whose source of competitive advantage was the speed at which the organizations
could woo the unsuspecting western donors into parting with their taxpayers’ funds. The
end result has been the betrayal of the reason why civil society and NGOs exist, which is
to garner socio-politico-economic value on behalf of an oppressed people. (Transcript of
interview with the editor of a daily newspaper on February 24, 2011)
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The west has donated a vast amount of money for various projects right from promotion of good

governance to “regime change” to the constitution making process where the leaders of that

process are pocketing copious amounts of money. The Zimbabwean crisis has long lost its value

as the epitome of the struggle for freedom of the oppressed masses of Zimbabwe but a very

vibrant self-enrichment program for donor sharks based in Zimbabwe, UK, US, South Africa,

Botswana, Canada, New Zealand and other countries:

When we look at foreign aid and corruption in Zimbabwe, I think it’s an underdeveloped
branch of inquiry mostly because people view foreign aid in a positive light. These
people come with emergency food relief or with hospital money but there is a lot of
corruption. Being in civil society myself, I see how rife it is. First of all in just
representing interests that are not legitimate. It’s very easy to be called by a donor who
tells you that if you run with a certain cause, you’ll get money. That is corruption and this
is happening on a large scale. Just look at many NGOs. Look at their strategic plans (if
they have any). There is no adherence to strategic plans. What you follow is where donor
funds are going. That’s where you find the influence and corruption of donor money in
this country. Not just that. A lot of the money is just free funds with no monitoring
whatsoever. You are given $100000 sometimes in cash and the donor will say don’t site
our name. Don’t even mention that we are the ones who gave you. Don’t even account
for it to us. This is the 21st century and you are given $100000 of tax payer’s money and
there is no accounting for it? They know what’s going on and the question is why would
you give someone so much money without accounting? It’s because you are trying to
push them to move a certain goal that’s not legitimate. This is rife in this country. We
also look at the abuse of the NGO per diem system- unbelievable! You find conferences
and workshops being held in places they shouldn’t be held. They are held because of high
per diems. If you just do the Math, Nyanga has more per diem than Mutare. So I sit down
as a program Officer and there is a workshop, I’ll take it to Nyanga. No one asks me why
I am taking a workshop to Nyanga and sometimes it’s a difference of US$3500 a day.
That’s how people are making money. (Transcript of an interview with the Acting
Director of Transparency International—Zimbabwe, on February 21, 2011)
It is really, the commercialization of development work in Zimbabwe. The kind of expensive

houses and cars that NGO senior executives live in and are driving clearly indicates that civil

society is no longer about identifying with the poor that they purport to do.

6.8 MEDIA

The normative framework employed in this study, discussed in chapter four, highlights

the ideal roles of the news media as watchdogs, agenda‐setters and gatekeepers. If we accept that

these roles strengthen the quality of democratic governance, the question is: under what
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conditions do the media perform these roles most effectively? And under what conditions does it

fail? In this analysis, I pull together the strands of the argument and summarize the evidence. I

highlight the way that a series of barriers – including restrictions on press freedom by the state,

market failures, lack of professional journalistic standards, the weakness of civil society

organizations, and limited public access and media literacy – mean that the news media often

fails to live up to these ideals. As pointed out by a government official:

Of late we have some spirited articles demonizing a number of personalities in our

community using recycled information of a dubious nature. One begins to wonder
whether the era of sponsored write-ups or the so-called ‘check-book journalism’ has not
now visited us. We hope a survey will also be done to see to what extent other corrupt
practices in journalism are prevailing in Zimbabwe like elsewhere in the region.
(Transcript of an interview with the Director of the ACC in the President’s Office
responsible for Anti-corruption and anti-monopolies, on February 22, 2011)

Although there are few recorded cases of corruption in Zimbabwe journalism, there is certainly

corruption in sports journalism and in sports itself. There are two cases I can remember reading

about in the newspapers some time ago involving a freelance journalist and a scribe for one of

the weekly newspaper who were reportedly caught in a sting operation, accepting a $10 000

bribe they had solicited from the owner of a restaurant in Harare. The pair appeared in court but

the charges were withdrawn.72

According to the media commission, the public understanding is that:

Journalism is not a highly rewarding job in Zimbabwe as compared to other countries in

the world, although from the look of things, local journalists still earn enough to live
reasonably well. The journalist, while doing their work, are exposed to rich personalities
who are willing to part with some of their money in return for publicity. Others are not so
rich but when faced with damaging articles, they are prepared to part with their money
for damage limitation. This also applies to businessmen, but mostly of the small scale
type. (Transcript of an interview with the Chief Executive Officer of Zimbabwe Media
Commission on February 23, 2011)

It might seem paradoxical to condemn journalists for corrupt practices when it is

journalists themselves who occasionally expose corruption. After all who else would? In my

72 A Journal of Investigative Journalism: Focusing on Corruption in Zimbabwe: 2010:41

 169
view the trouble is they don’t do it enough, and none else ever does it. Corruption comes in all

shapes and sizes. It takes two to create corruption so it is not only the businesspeople, politicians

and bureaucrats but also, by their acquaintances, some of the journalists as well.

It is a brutal truth that the media in this country is populated with young, inexperienced,
poorly-paid, poorly-trained journalists whose lifestyles have been transformed overnight
as a result of corrupt practices. Nevertheless, whatever corrupt practices journalists
engage in—grand or petty—must be condemned in the strongest terms as they invariably
destroy the moral fabric of our society. (Transcript of interview with an editor of a
weekly newspaper on February 26, 2011)

6.9 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

International governments, organizations and donor agencies further the entrenchment of

high level (major) as well as low level (minor) corruption in various ways. Any analysis of the

nature of and remedies for corruption in Zimbabwe or any other country in sub-Saharan Africa

must feature international communities as accomplices in corrupt practices, either because their

actions and policies fail to counter or appear to encourage the same because they serve as givers

in corrupt exchanges. According to Mulinge and Lesetedi, corruption is a consequence of

external factors manifested through the activities of foreign governments, aid organizations, and

private companies seeking to further their own (economic) interests through actions and

practices that condone corrupt practices or that are corrupt in themselves.” ( Mulinge &Lesetedi,

1999).

Multinational Firms

While international governments and donor agencies may enhance corruption through

their policies and responses that appear to condone and urge on the takers in corrupt exchanges,

international corporations and other private businesses may participate directly in corrupt

exchanges as givers. At present corruption in international business is quite prevalent in

Zimbabwe like in many other advancing countries. The laws of Zimbabwe are not

comprehensive and in some cases they are non-existent to deal with the problem. The
 170

government of Zimbabwe has no mechanisms to control it; the regional governments lacks laws

to effectively deal with that problem. As described by a senior manager of Hunyani

Corporation:

At Hunyani, tobacco products will be undervalued and supplied to a foreign market. This
will enable the company to declare less income from foreign market, and the reserve
bank had no way of identifying this misrepresentation. On the other hand, the receiving
customer on the foreign market will pay less duty in his country, but sell the products at a
price which will enable him/her to bank at least 35% of his revenue to an assigned
foreign account. Certain products were also sold as rejects. This meant that the price
could be anything below 50% and customs officials did not have the knowledge and
capabilities of differentiating rejects and non-rejects products. Generous discounts which
were over and above standard were given, and the extra margin will be divided between
the purchaser and management. Managers were entitled to buy groceries at selected
outlets and the charges were accounted for as staff canteen expenses. Managers were also
entitled to clothing allowance, and all clothing including their family clothes were
purchased at selected outlets and charged to the company as staff uniforms. A manager
within the organization had the preference of buying the vehicle which he/she is using
after every two years when a new replacement is due. The vehicle could be sold at a
fraction of the cost, not more than 5% of the original value. (A transcript of an interview
with a senior manager of Hunyani Company on February 25, 2011)

A company executive at National Blankets had this to say concerning corruption in the

company:

Bales of blankets could be produced as samples, and supplied to departmental stores of

people with influence at zero costs. The marketing and general manager would then be
paid 50% of the sales of all blankets given as samples.
Donated second hand clothing materials were being used as raw materials for blanket
production, but selling price was always factored with the cost of raw materials. A local
agency was appointed in consultation with management to invoice the donated raw
materials in foreign currency, and they would share the spoils.
Family and friends weddings and other functions had their expenses charged to the
company as business entertainment expenses.
Foreign companies were also in habit of using third party negotiators in order to build
their income reserves in foreign countries. An example is DRC, soon after Kabila went
into power. Buyers would request us to negotiate with a third part even though it was cost
effective to deal direct with them. We would invoice the third part, who will in turn
invoice the end customers at 100-250% mark up. This process will help them to share the
proceeds and bank them in Belgium or France. (Transcript of an interview with a
company executive on February 26, 2011)

Donor Agencies
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The analysis presented in this section focuses on the provision of conditional loans and

grants in aid, the desire to protect economic and strategic interests, and the acquisition of

contracts. It will also examine the role of Structural Adjustment Policies.

An understanding of the declining wages in Zimbabwe must bring in IMF and World

Bank fronted Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the 1990s. SAPs constitute another

dimension in the international contextualization of corruption in Zimbabwe and other

subSaharan African countries where operational policies have been associated with declining

social services for the majority of the African population and the stagnation of wages

(Thompson,

1992). Thus, the IMF, the World Bank and International governments that support and push for

the implementation of the kind of austerity measures that SAPs prescribe are, to some extent,

directly responsible for the entrenchment of lower level corruption in Zimbabwe. As one

respondent puts it:

In Zimbabwe where SAPs were implemented, there were massive lay outs and
retrenchment in the civil service, in this case, many people lost their source of livelihood,
hence increased levels of poverty and struggles for scarce state resources, which
subsequently led to internal conflicts as the appropriation of state resources took an
ethnic or nepotism dimension. Privatization of public enterprises and downsizing of the
civil services engendered the spread of corruption as multinationals supported by
Western governments and their agencies continued to engage in corruption on a vast
scale in the country. These conditions therefore reinforced the systematization of
corruption and graft that is common in Zimbabwe, as ruling politicians use such
opportunities of incumbency to loot the public domain. (Transcript of an interview with
an official from the UNDP on February 17, 2011)

International governments, development organizations and donor agencies often attach

certain conditions to loans and grants availed to Zimbabwe. For instance organizations or

agencies have required Zimbabwe to draw from the donor country’s technical capacity to

implement the project for which funding is being sought without taking into consideration the

availability of such technical capacity in the country. A respondent lays it in context:

This practice is fraudulent and it has negatively affected our country in two ways. First,
our country has been rated the highest educated in Africa and therefore has the technical
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capacity being provided as part of a loan or grant in aid, this has deprived us of a major
benefit of investing in development projects—the creation of employment. Second, more
often than not, aid organizations and donor agencies have provides overpriced but
unqualified, incompetent and inexperienced technical personnel as part of an aid package
to Zimbabwe. (Transcript of an interview with a Democracy & Governance Advisor, at
USAID on February 26, 2011).

The World Bank has nailed its flag to the global anti-corruption mast by adopting a

‘zero tolerance’ strategy towards corruption among borrowing governments. By

now, the logical outcome of zero tolerance should have been a dramatic reduction

in lending to countries suffering from `endemic' or `systemic' corruption, including

most of sub-Saharan Africa. But apart from one or two countries in Africa, it

appears to be more or less ‘business as usual' for the Bank and the rest of the aid

industry in Africa. Donors, it seems, are not about to undermine their disbursement

imperatives because of their

(very real) concerns with corruption.

Several studies have also examined how aid flows affect the level of corruption in partner

countries. (Singer, 1991:31-34) A basic theoretical rationale for these types of studies is that aid

is a type of windfall, which may cause groups and individuals to vie for a portion, resulting in

increased rent-seeking activities and corruption. So far, there is no consistent evidence from

cross-country econometric studies that aid causes corruption. Knack (2001) finds that aid is

positively related to corruption. In the view of a respondent commenting on aid to Zimbabwe and

other African countries:

First, there is the tendency by international governments and donor organizations to

disburse aid to developing countries even where it is very clear that a considerable
fraction of that money is wasted on bribes and kickbacks or diverted to private use. This
practice, which is tantamount to subsidizing corruption, has encouraged most African
political leaders to view aid as a reward for their cooperation in the fulfillment of the
economic interests of their former masters. Second, the policy of linking aid to the
control of corruption and good governance has been inconsistent and lacking in the
commitment that would be central to its success/ (Transcript of an interview with a
program officer at the Conrad Adenauer Foundation on February 25, 2011)
 173

Indeed, corruption in international business concerns the making of unlawful payments to the

politicians, government officials and, sometimes to mafia of a host country. There is often

suspicion between representative of donor countries and recipient officials that often leads to

conflict of interest. It is true that more than fifty years of development assistance have seen Third

World leaders stashing away development funds in Swish bank accounts, building houses on the

French Riviera, and using their own private jets to fly there.
According to Dumas et al.,

… there are the problems that often accompany shared, or split, responsibility. When
both donor and recipient are ostensibly responsible, in fact neither party may take
responsibility. Donors may feel less reason to take responsibility because the recipient is
technically officially in charge of the project. Recipients may feel less responsibility
because they are under pressure from donors to implement donor-driven projects in
which they feel they have little or no real “ownership.” There is certainly nothing wrong
with operating as true collaborators under a system of well-defined joint responsibility,
but operating under a system of poorly defined shared responsibility can create room for
shirking responsibility, even blaming each other for problems. This does little to prevent,
and is actually more likely to encourage, accountability failures. (Dumas et al., 2010:23)

Thus at present, corruption in international business is quite prevalent. The laws of many

countries against corruption in international business and donor agencies are not comprehensive

and in some cases are non-existent. The purpose of the next chapter is to discus among other

things, what I consider the implications of and solutions to the issues raised in the research

analysis.
 CHAPTER SEVEN

MAJOR FINDINGS

7.1 MAJOR FINDINGS

In Zimbabwe, incidences of corruption dates back to the colonial period through 1980

when the country attained independence from Britain. Thus corruption in the early 80s was rife

in the public sector; however the vice has grown and expanded to the private sector and civil

society as well. During my research from October 25-November 29, 2010 and again from

January 23-February 27, 2011, I found from a survey carried out by TI-Z, that three quarters of

the respondents singled out the public sector as undisputed the most corrupt sector in the country.

Police officers were ranked as the most corrupt with a mainstream 55% ranking them highly on

the corruption chart. Business people had the second rating. Ranked third are the immigration

and customs officials with 15% rating (TI-Z, 2006-7:342). The least corrupt professionals are the

teachers; principals and education officers and the judicial officers (TI-Z, 2006-7:342).

All these rise and fall squarely on the leadership of the country. There is a powerful

Executive that is not accountable. There are no systems of checks and balances. Zimbabwe

inherited a system in which the state was not meant to be accountable to the majority of the

people – a system that more or less is still maintained by the current government. In other

words the people are not allowed to participate in the political and economic business of their
 175

country. That was the essence of colonialism. Even in post independence Zimbabwe, there is still

a situation where the people are invisible, nameless and formless.

191

The problem has been compounded by the economic downturn that the country has seen

over the last ten years. This has certainly heightened corrupt practices. Over the period,

20002009, the Zimbabwe economy experienced a significant downturn characterized by

hyperinflation, multiple exchange rates, persistent fiscal deficit, low foreign exchange reserves,

falling international terms of trade, negative interest rates and a build-up in external debt arrears

(TI-Z 2006-07:330). “Social indicator also deteriorated as poverty and income inequality

continued to rise exacerbated by massive underemployment, decline in the social welfare system,

food insecurity and the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic”. (TI-Z, 2007:330-331) The

purchasing power of the average Zimbabwean was reported to have fallen to levels seen in the

1950s and the formal sector of the economy had significantly shrunk because of high

inflationary rates as illustrated below.

On the political front, the review period (from 1999-2009) had been characterized by a

series of political and economic events that contributed to heightened political tensions in the

country. At the centre of the political instability were the land reform program and election

disputes. On the rule of law, although there has been an overall downward trend in violence

associated with farm invasions and political disputes in the recent past compared to the situation

in 2000-2003, there are still allegations of non-protection of civil liberties and human rights

violations, especially with recent reports of isolated cases of political violence. On corporate

governance, some progress has been made in reforming the operations of the financial

institutions, but more efforts are needed to restructure and privatize public enterprise.
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Table 7.1. Zimbabwe’s Yearly Inflation Rate from 1998—2008

Year Inflation%

1998 48

1999 56,9

2000 55,2

2001 112,1

2002 198,9

2003 598,7

2004 1336,6*

2005 585,8

2006 1281,1

2007 66212,3

2008 231million*

Source: Central Statics Office of Zimbabwe

1336,6* = Inflation rate for January 2005
231 million*= Inflation rate for June 2008
NB: All other inflation rates are for December of each year.

However, the study finds that the upward spiral of corruption took a dramatic turn

following the elections of 2001/2002. From 1980-1987, the nature of corruption was largely

opportunistic or greed corruption; from 1987-2001 Zimbabwe witnessed the emergence of

political elite corruption or network corruption. This was fast followed by patronage corruption

as the networks needed protection and ensured political loyalty and leverage from the patrons.
 177

From 2002 the country entered political corruption-- chaotic corruption and now it is in the belly

of a new phenomenon of corruption—systemic or managed corruption that has engulfed the

private sector in a great manner than before.

The study finds that National Integrity Systems like the parliament, judiciary, law

enforcement watchdog institutions and civil servants lost their autonomy, professionalism and

accountability to the nation for service delivery. With accountability and professionalism now

subordinated to party politics, it was inevitable that immoral, criminal and corrupt activities that

serve political advantage would now be justified as political strategy and patronage for political

protection from the various camps that were emerging. The total impact is that the rule of law or

rules and laws in general become academic markers that can easily be circumvented with the

right connection. Indeed, the enactment of legislation that seriously restricted or criminalized

democratic and constitutional rights of speech and association added to the further

disempowerment of national conscience and voices that could be raised against an increasingly

stifling stranglehold by the corrupt political patronage elites.

To some extent, politicization of the nation (including the Western economic sanctions),

has had catastrophic impact on the country’s economy as well as the levels of transparency,

integrity and accountability. Secondly, as the economy took a tumble the political elites became

increasingly powerful as to who received what of the shrinking national resources. Scarcity of

resources and unlimited political power are the classic recipe for corruption, especially in Africa

where political power and patronage are a means to gain and keep economic enrichment. Thus

the culture of impunity towards corruption by the Zimbabwean government and Zimbabweans in

general, is in part enhanced by the prevailing politics of despair and politics of tired nationalism

in which people are trapped in, thereby creating apathy, and by so doing legitimizing corruption.

Hence, in my opinion, a behavioral approach based on the prevailing political culture can be of

significant contribution in the fight against corruption in Zimbabwe.

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Apart from corruption in the public sector, the study also finds that transparency and

honesty have become pressing issues in the civil society business in recent years. “Only a few

NGOs seem to be transparent in their activities,” The Nepal News (2001) has observed. Mike

Moor (2001), Director General of the World Trade Organization, has called for a code of

conduct that would require transparency from NGOs. Such demands simply ask NGOs to deliver

what they demand of others: transparency, honesty, and accountability. After all, he who seeks

equity, it is said in law, must come with equity.

In this study, I found that socio-political developments have exerted enormous impact.

NGOs in Zimbabwe have gone through series of challenges with regard to their legal framework,

their formation and legitimization, their priorities and methods, and their strategies and the way

those strategies are implemented, coupled with the demand to show increased transparency and

demonstrate honesty. In fact, all aspects of NGOs work have been influenced by the

sociopolitical arena.

I found that many NGOs in the country do not publicly disclose necessary information

within the country. The stakeholders and the general public are entitled to information about the

management of development funds. A majority of them display increased transparency of this

sort to their foreign donors, but not to other stakeholders. This may be because of the hidden

agendas of the foreign donors in relation to “regime change.” Nevertheless, in respect to finances

and remunerations, many Zimbabwean NGOs are not transparent toward communities that

benefit from their interventions. I also found that weaknesses include inadequate management

skills (because of the brain drain); poor planning in relation to identifying issues systematically

and strategizing goals; the inability to clearly identify the beneficiaries of a given project and

they have not been able to adopt a common national code of ethics.

This study also examined the expanded role of the state in the economy. I find that the

Lancaster House Constitution which ushered Zimbabwe to independence enhanced corrupt

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practices by not curtailing the role of the state in economic activities. This was particularly so

during the colonial period and after independence up to the early 1990s when most countries

embraced the privatization agenda, even though half heartedly. This involves both state

participation in economic decision making and the proliferation of public enterprises often

referred to as ‘parastatals.’ The dual role of the state sets the stage for bureaucratic corruption to

thrive.. “The centralization of economic decision-making has culminated in an expanded

bureaucracy vested with discretionary powers. This has resulted in the creation of influence

peddlers (bureaucrats and politicians) who yearn for a share of and demand kickbacks from any

government contract.” (Makumbe, 1994:47) These have chronicled the progressive

disintegration of national moral and economic fiber as illustrated in the section dealing with

analysis of this study.

On the business sector, I found that the private sector is more cash liquid than the public

sector, more performance driven, profit motivated and always short of time. No cost no gain is

an established rule of the profit game. Risk undertaking gives the game adrenalin. Entrepreneurs

outperform one another in pursuit of profits. This desperation, risk inclination and willingness to

pay whatever it takes render the business sector gullible to demands of bribes. In an interview

conducted by Takawira with citizens, “ 86% of the respondents saw corruption as a major

problem in the public sector, whereas 60%s saw corruption as a major problem in the in the

private sector.” (Takawira 12 February 2011)

I also found that many firms in Zimbabwe made unofficial payments to public officials

with many of them frequently or always making such payments. In my interview with

representatives of the business sector, they confirmed that unofficial payments constituted a

regular feature of transactions between business firms and public service agencies. They also

stated that service was frequently delivered once they made an unofficial payment. Thus,
 180

although there is not much statics on the level of private sector involvement in corruption in

Zimbabwe, it is common knowledge that there is an increase in the supply of bribes in the

country. Why then do corporations with good corporate governance systems pay bribes? I found

out, first, that there has to be a conducive atmosphere for the supply and demand of bribery.

This can take place in a broad range of business activities over which some government officials

hold discretionary powers. Common among these; where firms bribe public officials to avoid or

reduce tax, to secure public procurement contracts, to bypass laws and regulations, or to block

the entry of potential competitor.

On the surface bribery seems to be cost-effective for business because bribe payment is

often a fraction of the monetary value of the services rendered by the corrupt officials. Moreover,

the reason to bribe becomes even more compelling when public officials hold the power to

punish the firms for not paying the bribe, such as revoking business licenses.

I also interviewed representatives of foreign aid agencies and donors in Zimbabwe.

Emerging evidence of widespread corruption in several countries receiving substantial

international aid has raised questions related to a number of issues. For example, I wanted to

know; do corrupt governments tend to receive government-to-government assistance? What is

the relationship between such assistance and corruption? Does financial assistance reduce such

corruption? Or, could government assistance actually foster corruption? Analysts have also

questioned how borrowed monies are monitored or tracked to ensure they are used for the

purpose intended by the donors. ( Caxton, 1999) On the whole this study finds that while the

objectives of foreign economic assistance are commendable, foreign aid and lending do have

important (sometimes unintended) corruption—promoting effects on recipients’ economies for a

number of reasons. Aid is dispersed not only on the basis of strategic and geo-political

considerations , but can also perpetuate or strengthen existing corruption.

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My interviews with representatives of donor agencies, shows that such aid is not on the

basis of need, but on the basis of strategic and geopolitical considerations. For instance

Zimbabwe used to receive quite substantial aid assistance from the Western countries. But after

the Land Reform exercise in 1999/2000, in which the country sought to redistribute land to the

disadvantaged African population, these countries immediately stopped direct aid to the

government. Thus recipients of aid monies have economic incentives that may differ or conflict

with the intentions of donors. They have incentives, for example, to reward their friends,

supporters, and special interest constituents. In this case Zimbabwe’s actions conflicted with the

Western donor countries’ interests.

Foreign aid, then, has not worked to promote reform in Zimbabwe, even before the

implementation of the land reform program and the imposition of sanctions. Consequently, aid,

like the IMF/World Bank SAP, of the 1990Ss, tended to subsidize and thereby strengthen

existing government connections and structures since the country also distributed its aid so as to

preserve its political positions. In short, political elites benefited from aid. In practice, foreign aid

seldom includes meaningful incentives to alter governmental behavior with regard to corruption.

It would, therefore, mean that when existing regimes are corrupt, the result is that these corrupt

political regimes can benefit from foreign aid and become more firmly entrenched.73

7.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Corruption in any country of the world is inversely related to the levels of the following

factors and attendance to these can help us determine future anti-corruption policies that

governments in Zimbabwe as well as in the sub-Saharan region can take:

1. Democratic governance practiced in the nation including respect for human rights and the

media.

73 The World Bank survey finds that governments in power for a long time are less likely to
implement reforms. World Bank, Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t and Why?
World Bank and Oxford University Press, 1998:64-66
 182

2. Economic empowerment of citizens and their access to economic resources.

3. The quality of delivery services of both public and private sector.

4. The moral values of national society

What is the way forward?

The four factors that determine the levels of corruption in a nation that are outlined above

provide a good starting point. Although corruption can never be entirely eliminated, the practice

needs to be “reduced to levels that are both tolerable” (Galtung, 1998:106). In Zimbabwe and in

the other sub-Saharan African countries, the problem is a particular concern because of its

adverse effects. Corruption creates innumerable forms of injustice which affect every aspect of

daily life for ordinary citizens and no sector of the population is immune from it (Alatas, 1990;

Riley, 1998). There is mounting evidence that in sub-Saharan Africa, corruption impairs

political, economic, and social development. (Hope,1997) The practice is not a victimless crime.

Rather, it is a transaction which carries substantial social, political and economic costs.

Corruption hinders administrative development and performance by generating overall

inefficiency in the bureaucracy (Alatas, 1990). It undermines political institutions by weakening

the legitimacy of accountability of governments (Johnston, 1998).

However, it is irrelevant to center debate on the issue of whether corruption is inherently

good or bad. It is more useful to determine which types of corruption have the most corrosive

effects on social and economic stability. For example, where imbalances in power occur between

state and society, “corruption is more likely to flourish. Michael Johnston argues that specific

kinds of imbalances produce distinct kinds of problems, each of which poses its own reform

challenge. (Johnston.” 1997b:28) At a minimum, a vibrant and sustainable democracy requires a

balance between state and society and between political and economic power. In the relationship

of the former, officials are strong enough to act authoritatively, yet subject to all the rigors of

accountability; in the latter, neither officials nor economic interests are so weak as to be
 183

exploited by the other. These linkages are helpful to understand various corruption scenarios and

to formulate timely reform strategies. In addition, they provide insight into the impact of these

scenarios on political will. “The scale of the stakes involved (small, such as ordinary consumer

goods, versus extraordinary, major manipulation of imports or hard currencies) and the number

of suppliers (few or relatively many) are extremely significant to the relationship between state

and society.” (Johnston, 1993:195) They are also significant to generate political will. Actors'

responses to anti-corruption measures in both the public and private sector are usually in direct

correlation to the scale of the political and economic stakes that are involved. Newly

democratizing polities may find that widening access to influence and public goods encourages

corruption but, at the same time, shifts the mix of corrupt activities toward less disruptive types

(Kpundeh, 1991:95). It is even possible that some of the less disintegrative forms offer shortterm

advantages. Illicit markets may satisfy some material needs and illegal activities may promote

more efficient economic activity. Extended patronage organizations or machine-like parties can

strengthen the links between political leadership and society. More people have a stake in

participating in the political process and with increased participation, political will increases.

Politicians who want to retain power propose and enforce reform measures. For example, in

Zimbabwe, a competing opposition attempts to garner support by showing it is more willing to

attack the difficult issues in curbing malfeasance, and a stronger civil society may seek to

increase its influence by promoting increased accountability and transparency in government.

“A balance between political and economic opportunities fosters vitality, openness and strength

in both politics and the economy. It also implies that powerful people and groups may be less

able to exploit their counterparts in other arenas.” (Kpundeh, 1991: 97).

However, from the national context we can explore the following as national strategies:

institutional reforms; independent press; Awareness campaigns; formation of independent

anticorruption authorities; citizen empowerment; the establishment of codes of ethics for public
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servants; private sector and international actors’ roles; and the establishment of E-Government.

Most of these are not new, but I argue that they need strengthening in order to achieve the

desired effects.

Anti-corruption Agencies

Conventionally, corruption has been fought through the use of penal statutes. However,

the law alone has not proved to be an effective solution. For instance, the law can only apply

after the fact and only where a corrupt practice has been unearthed (Muganda, 1999). Where an

act has occurred but has not been exposed , the law remains impotent. The same may also apply

when neither the giver nor the receiver is aggrieved. The creation of effective independent

corruption fighting agencies operating under a strong statute is thus a necessary step in the war

against corruption, (Muganda, 1999; Rose-Ackerman, 1999).

Zimbabwe has embraced such agencies with varying degrees of success or setbacks. For

instance, the new look Anti-Corruption Commission marks a year in office with very little to

show for it. The nine-member commission carries with it the nation’s hopes in so far as

eradicating corruption is concerned, but the biggest question to ask is: Will it be allowed to

function in the true sense of the word? Previous commissions, despite having the right skills at

all levels, did very little to justify their existence. This applies to all the commissions that have

been in place since September 2005 when the first commissioners were appointed and sworn in

by the President. The previous one, chaired by respected former commissioner of taxes and

Zimbabwe’s black Comptroller and Auditor-General, was no exception. In fact, that commission

exited while battling an image crisis after some of its officers were fingered for corruption,

raising the critical question: Who shall watch over the work of the commission? All the previous

commissions have been criticized for targeting the small fish in society leaving the big ones—

whose impact on the corruption is the most significant.

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Two major lessons can be drawn from the experience of Zimbabwe. First, that for

anticorruption commissions to be effective, they must be independent of the executive and

imbued with all the necessary investigative powers. They must also have effective preventive

and education programs in support of the deterrent. Second, and most importantly, that the

passing of ant-corruption laws and the constitution of anti-corruption agencies, while a necessary

condition, may not be sufficient for the reduction of the vice. Political good will on the part of

the state and the overall political leadership is critical to fight the problem for such laws and

agencies to have an impact and play a meaningful role. In order to succeed in minimizing

corruption in the African countries, one must start by examining the nature of institutional

arrangements in each country with a view to modifying them. This calls for the reconstruction

and reconstitution of the post-colonial state through democratic constitution making to provide a

new set of laws and institutions that reflects the values of each country’s relevant stakeholders.

Thus, to cleanup corruption from the African economies, improve both productive and

efficiency, and generally enhance development, national leaders must engage their people in

democratic institutional reforms to provide society with transparent, accountable, and

participatory governance structures.

Independent Press

The media is the watchdog of society and as such, it plays a critical role, informing,

entertaining, and raising awareness among its many roles. The media not only raises awareness

about corruption, its causes, consequences and possible remedies but also investigates and

reports incidences of corruption. The media is an integral element in the fight against corruption

in its various manifestations and it provides leads to possible cases of corruption and publicizes

cases that come before the courts. Thus, the emergence of an independent and vocal press has

highlighted the role the media can play in exposing corruption and mobilizing public opinion.

The direct result can be institutionalized political will, particularly if the media operate
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independently of government control and are guided by competent journalists. While opposition

groups and integrity movements provide avenues to expose wrong-doing in government and its

ruling party, the media can uncover patronage and profiteering in all sectors of society.

Institutional Reforms

Corruption flourishes where national institutions and guarantees of basic economic rights

are weak. (Knack and Keefer, 1995) Institutional reforms are thus indispensable ingredients of

any sustainable anti-corruption strategy. (Johnston, 1998) The reforms should be designed to

enhance accountability and transparency in the operation of the state and major economic

institutions.

The principle of transparency demands that public sector institutions perform openly. It

also includes publicly recording its decisions and comportment. If public officials' performances

are not scrutinized, they are more likely to act (a) in their own interests and (b) in the interests of

small numbers of privileged elites, thereby abusing the public trust and contravening the rule of

law. Their failure to observe openness presents opportunities for the dishonest to mystify their

activities under a cloak of secrecy, while actually, involving themselves in extortion and

favoritism. Published government budgets, accounting and auditing procedures, revenue

collection, statutes and rules, and proceedings of legislative bodies help to increase transparency

in government operations. This applies equally at the local and national levels.

When a few senior officials have access to unaudited funds, the risks and perception of

corruption may be magnified, even if the funds are used for legitimate purposes.

In Zimbabwe, the salience assumed by the problem of corruption in recent years has

occurred hand in hand with the increasing push for democratization and economic liberalization.

These processes entail the reform of major institutions of the society that have a bearing on

corruption. Primary emphasis should be placed on the total separation of powers of the three

arms of government. This can only occur through the total emancipation of the civil service,
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legislature and judiciary from the stifling grip of the executive, that is, through the creation of

totally independent civil services, parliaments, and judiciaries which are above the manipulation

and domination of the Executive. With respect to the civil service, appointments to senior

positions should be vetted by parliament. This will increase the likelihood of merit appointments

and curtail corrupt practices during the term of such appointments. It will also put to an end to

the patronage that has shielded corrupt officials from prosecution. Empowering parliament, on

the other hand, will make it possible for it to deal with those named in corruption reports by

watchdog agencies.

Serious judicial reforms are imperative in Zimbabwe for the effective combating of

corruption. Reforms should nevertheless go beyond the creation of independent judiciaries to

incorporate the appointment of judicial officers after vetting by parliamentary committees.

Vetting the candidates is likely to restore confidence among the public. Vetting would go a long

way toward ensuring that the process of appointing judicial personnel is itself free of corruption.

Awareness Campaigns

Corruption is a sensitive subject and by its nature hard to observe. It is inherently a secret

activity. The guilty rarely admit wrong doing and at the same time flaunt their material gains.

Public awareness helps remove the taboo and veil of secrecy that engulfs corrupt activities.

Debates on malfeasance and its remedies that are broadcast via radio and television, conducted in

classrooms and during community activities, as well as in formal workshops, strengthen political

will. But more important, these campaigns begin to personalize corruption--explaining clearly

and explicitly how individuals are affected. Agents of the state easily express public ire.

However, that ire is easily piqued when the public is informed about abuses at a higher level, e.g.

the diversion of public funds or flagrant disregard for the law. The citizenry is empowered if it
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understands its own stake in the abuse of public funds. The public quickly comes to realize that

fewer schools, higher taxes and school fees, lower salaries, fewer jobs, etc. all result from

bribery and malfeasance. Once people feel they personally have a stake in the elimination or

control of corruption and they have the power to do something about it, they can demand action

from the leadership. Their support then becomes crucial in galvanizing political will and

constituencies for reform.

The Private Sector Role

The private sector can be an important check on the government's arbitrary exercise of

power. But its effectiveness is contingent upon the government's willingness to reveal

information about its actions and people's willingness to organize (Rose-Ackerman, 1997).

Private industry, much like civil society, can strengthen political will when it acts independently

representing its special interests, sometimes in opposition to the ruling party and politicians. But

it depends heavily on private sector actors' commitment to ethics and a corruption-free business

environment. Professional organizations can include a mandatory anti-corruption clause in their

membership and ethics codes, with expulsion as the sanction for non- observance, (Langseth, et

al, 1997) “The idea of ‘Islands of Integrity’ proposed by TI might be a useful monopoly-

breaking approach. For example, bidders on government projects and procurement contracts can

band together to decide no company will pay bribes – commitments backed by sizable bonds

subject to forfeiture in the event of non-compliance.”. (Kpundeh, 1991:104) This approach is to

be tried in selected countries, and it can send a definitive message that private industry is

committed to fair play and is no longer willing to contribute to efforts to defraud the government

and the public by abusing procurement practices.

Empowerment of Civil Society

Corruption has been thriving in many countries because many people are unaware of

their rights. As such, any long term anti-corruption strategy should incorporate citizen
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empowerment. It is the only way through which we can create citizens and organizations of civil

society that are willing to confront the practice head on and take on the institutions that sustain it.

Citizen empowerment should entail the strengthening of civil society by widening and protecting

its political and economic resources "in order to enhance its political and economic vitality."

(Johnston, 1998: 85) Empowerment should also provide the citizenry increased access to the

state and lay down rules of interaction .between the state and society According to Johnston

(1998), by reducing the economic and political vulnerability of grassroots communities and

peoples we bequeath them more effective means of recourse. Empowerment reduces their

vulnerability to exploitation and enhances their ability to participate effectively in politics and to

check the self interested behavior of official decision makers and each other (Johnston, 1998)

Most importantly, it makes them effective watchdogs over corrupt public officials and also

reduces their vulnerability to being corrupted or participating in corrupt deals. As Cooter

indicates, “where social empowerment is effective, social groups and private interests can

become not the instigators or targets of corruption, but 'law merchants”. (Cooter, 1997:191)

Citizen empowerment will bolster institutional reforms by enabling the citizenry to act as the

watchdog over institutional practices.

An autonomous civic constituency that recognizes the value of reform and dedicates itself

to monitoring and defending the reform strategy, including its leaders, builds political will. If

such a constituency maintains its willpower, despite changes in leadership, it will be an effective

part of the reform paradigm. Its interests, not always aligned with the political leadership, if

established independently, can be an important tool for curbing corruption.

Codes of Ethics for Public Servants

The lack of a code of ethics to guide public servants and the holders of other positions of

responsibility in society is one of the major factors responsible for corrupt practices in Africa

today. Logically, therefore, governments need to develop and, most importantly, enforce codes
 190

of conduct to govern the behavior of their employees. Of significance are the conflicts of interest

that most African bureaucrats seem not to pay attention to. This in itself creates conditions for

the peddling of corrupt practices such as a cabinet minister, a permanent secretary or any other

senior bureaucrat awarding his or her company the tender for a government project. The rule of

the thumb should be that no civil servants engage in private business while holding office.

To promote ethics in the civil service, clear rules governing conflicts of interest, expected

behavior, and obligatory disclosure of assets should be enacted and enforced (Shihata, 1999). All

public servants, including the President, the two Vice Presidents, ministers, ordinary members

of parliament and other high ranking civil servants should be made to publicly declare their

wealth every year. This should also apply to their spouses and any dependent children to

circumvent attempts to hide stolen assets by registering them under a spouse or a child's name.

At the beginning of every year, such officials should declare financial statements; income; assets,

including land, buildings, vehicles, investments and any financial obligations owed to the person

making the declaration; and any liabilities. But as pointed out by Dumas:

“It must be emphasized that no code, no matter how well constructed, can be expected to

eliminate unethical behavior. No general set of principles, laws, or rules yet devised, from the

Ten Commandments to the UN Charter—and no body of national law or custom—has ever

succeeded in completely preventing violations by bad actors. But a sufficiently clear and specific

code of ethical behavior can help clarify the distinction between those who behave well and

those who behave badly, and make it easier to reward the former and sanction the latter. It can

also make it far more difficult for bad actors to credibly claim that they did not understand that

the behavior in which they engaged was proscribed.” (Dumas et al.2010:51)

E-Government

Zimbabwe has been suggesting e-government model of government for close to two years

now. This is because e-government has been identified as one of the most efficient vehicles for
 191

appropriate, transparent and inclusive / participatory decision making. Zimbabwe has shown a

higher propensity to indigenous knowledge systems which are full of inefficiencies, a lot of red

tape in public service delivery, and prone to corrupt and inefficient practices. The adoption of

eGovernance promises a sharp paradigm shift where public institutions will be more responsive

and transparent, promote efficient Public Private Partnerships (PPP), and empower citizens by

making knowledge and other resources more directly accessible. This paper assessed the

challenges, opportunities, and issues together with e-government adoption criteria regarding

successful encapsulation of e-government into the Zimbabwean contextually environment. It has

been found that lack of adequate ICT infrastructure and political will, provision of content in

English other than local languages, lack of proper change management procedures,

noncontextualization of e-government practices, etc., contribute much to the delay in appropriate

egovernment adoption in Zimbabwe. Out of this challenge identified, the study proposes a model

which offers balanced e-government adoption criteria involving a combination of electronic and

participatory services. The proposed model is a starting-point for a model which can later be

replicated to include the whole lot of Southern African Development Community (SADC)

countries given the similarity in the contextual environment.

The African continent as a whole cannot be excluded from this paradigm shift of

egovernment. This can be substantiated by the communiqué which was released by the 4th

African Development Forum (ADF IV, 2004) and reads in part:

“E-Governance … is an important innovation for enhancing good governance and strengthening

the democratic process and can also facilitate access to information, freedom of expression,

greater equity, efficiency, productivity, growth and social inclusion. Successful e-government

initiatives can have demonstrable and tangible impact on improving citizen participation and

quality of life as a result of effective multi-stakeholder partnerships. African governments need

 192

to develop policy frameworks, supported by legislation for e-Governance, that are linked to

strategic development objectives.”

International institutions

Western and European benefactors no longer feel the need to support corrupt regimes.

Susan Rose-Ackerman’s chapter suggests four broad arenas for international involvement:

“controlling corruption in project loans and grants, supporting reform program, limiting

corruption in international business and controlling money laundering”. (Rose-Ackerman,

1999:95)

While the core of much of Rose-Ackerman's counsel is joint efforts, one can also advocate that

the international aid and business communities develop structures that work independently of

their governments or recipient governments to inject accountability and transparency into

international business and aid projects. This institutionalizes political will on an international

level.

Thus, the international community must move beyond rhetoric to suggest new concrete

programs and develop better strategies to enforce all its programs for the reduction of corruption.

As Rose-Ackerman (1999) indicates, individual firms must consider their obligations as

international actors in the war against corruption. Companies operating in corrupt environments

must take a stand against corruption and report it to local authorities and to the outside world.

“Keeping quiet is probably the worst option”(Rose-Ackerman, 1999:188). Similarly, for

Zimbabwe to extricate herself from corrupt clutches of foreign companies, the country must

identify and blacklist these, and relevant information should be relayed to all governments (

Muganda, 1999) as a way of also punishing the corruptor. Most countries should not only ratify

treaties such as those passed by the OECD Council outlawing bribery of foreign officials and

criminalizing the tax deductibility of bribes, they should also pass conforming legislation. These
 193

treaties should guarantee freezing of accounts created through corrupt practices and the

repatriation of the proceeds of corruption.

7.3 CONCLUSION

This study presents a holistic analysis of the nature of and remedies for corruption in

Zimbabwe by integrating the historical and international contexts of the problem. I link the

origins and spread of the problem to the colonization of Zimbabwe, the lasting legacy of that

colonization and the actions and practices of international actors. It examines the African culture

and value systems which were completely destroyed by colonialism. The adoption of a holistic

approach to corruption is pegged on three factors. That is, it enables us to understand the vice in

its historical totality; affords a more encompassing explanation of the vice by integrating both its

internal and external dimensions; and allows for the development of well-rounded strategies for

the alleviation of the problem. Consistent with the last factor, my discussion culminates with the

examination of broad based national and international strategies that can be utilized to address

the problem of corruption in Zimbabwe and sub-Saharan Africa today. Certain basic conclusions

derive from the discussion in the study.

The fight against corruption cannot be a “one man show” or relegated uniquely to the

political leadership. Anti-corruption strategies are most effective if they are inclusive, systematic

and structured, integrating all institutions and policies--investigation, prosecution, research and

prevention. Take for example the recently formed Anti-Corruption Commission in Zimbabwe;

the issue of independence is important since if the commission is under a ministry there is the

danger of political interference and issues of accountability and allocation of resources for the

commission are raised to establish such independence. If politics is the key aspect, the

commission will not be successful. In most existing anti-corruption commissions in sub-Saharan

Africa, the officials are appointed by the Head of State and report either directly to him or

through a ministry. This is giving too much power to the Head of State and this may be
 194

detrimental to the anti-corruption cause. Section 108 A (1) states that that this will be the case in

Zimbabwe.

The profession of an equitable administrator “includes not only those values which are

considered an essential part of an objective accountability, (such as public affairs), but also those

ideals (such as the spirit of self-sacrifice for public duty, serving the public and community as a

higher ideal, maintaining the highest standards of personal honesty and integrity, and protecting

the common good) that are an integral part of moral accountability.” ( Caiden & Dwivedi,

2001:252)

Politicians must have the will-power to pass legislation to put structures in place and arm

administrators with the capacity to effectively accomplish their goals. But they require the

support of a vocal constituency. Political institutions must be endowed with adequate autonomy,

authority, financing and qualified personnel. They must operate in a system that has checks and

balances to ensure no single institution, politician, businessmen or individual can thwart an

investigation into wrongdoing and punishment for violating laws that are administered fairly.

However, no amount of laws, codes of conduct, and threats of punishment can force public

officials to behave ethically, and to promote just government. “Unless they are guided by a sense

of vocation, serving others, and accountability, it is impossible to expect a moral government.

Behavior emanating from ideals associated with service as the highest calling includes

possessing and exhibiting such virtues as honesty, impartiality, sincerity, and justice. Further, it

is equally desirable that the conduct of public administrators should be beyond reproach; and that

they should perform their duties loyally, efficiently, and economically.” (Dwivedi, 1995:297)

Institutionalized political will is most effective when it is inclusive-incorporating the

interests of a wide range of constituencies. It is, in the end, more powerful than the interests of

any individual. The power of institutions and official government positions are not dependent

upon personality and the good nature and intentions of a particular person. Society works to curb
 195

corruption when it supports a reform paradigm that removes control from individuals and

popularizes the mandate for accountability with effective citizen involvement. But more

important, broadening political participation enhances the array of tools and strategies that can be

utilized to deal with a wider range of needs, priorities and objectives in civil society and political

systems. Finally, the relationship of political will in the aggregate – civil society, media, the

populace, etc. – to the actions of individual political leaders is an essential component in a Re-

organization program. Are there mechanisms in place to ensure that government is accountable

to the public? Do political leaders generate support across the institutional divide?

Several points come to mind to ensure some level of checks and balances in the system.

First, establishing structures that create independent sources of power and information

outside the executive branches of government can check corruption. These structures can include

the media, the legislature, transparent and fair procurement rules, etc. Second, the private sector

can be an important check on the arbitrary abuse of government muscle. However, their

effectiveness is dependent upon government's transparency-information about its actions, and

actors must be available to people who can organize into associations and nonprofit opposition

groups. “In countries with democratic electoral systems, citizens can vote against government

officials believed to be corrupt, thus providing politicians with a powerful incentive to match

their public pronouncements with concrete demonstrations of personal and political integrity”.

(Rose-Ackerman, 1997:85) Elections are not the only method that citizens can utilize to express

displeasure with dishonest officials and ineffective policies. While some may be able to keep

their wrongdoing secret, they are usually unable to hide decisions made in response to those

activities. Citizens who learn about expensive projects with few public benefits or wasteful

government program can organize and act to eliminate such projects.

A third aspect of checks and balances is the method government structures use to protect

individuals from state abuses. Administrative law can provide some protection to individuals.
 196

The ombudsman represents one method to route and organize citizen complaints. Many

governments have established ombudsmen in response to citizen complaints, even beyond those

related to malfeasance. While these offices can help increase government agencies'

accountability, they are seldom avenues for uncovering large-scale systemic corruption and

rarely are endowed with the authority to initiate lawsuits. (Pope, 1996) A system of checks and

balances limits the power of any one political group or individual to make policy without

consulting or obtaining the support of others. It also implies that once a law or regulation is

enacted, individuals and groups both inside and outside government have the ability to monitor

and alter its administration and set into motion legal or political enforcement process.

Consequently, reorganization measures are more likely to succeed, bolstered by a participative

process that goes beyond the interests of any single actor. However, there are also situations

where zealous crusaders work toward a cause driven more by political motives than by the goal

of decreasing the incidences of corruption.

Nevertheless, an effort to combat corruption must recognize, from the onset, its complexity

and the impossibility of eliminating it altogether. (Shihata, 1999) It should also recognize the

need for a comprehensive approach that the economic, social, legal, administrative and moral

aspects of the problem can be targeted; the close linkages among these aspects recognized; and

the international dimension of the nature of the problem drawn in.

7.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ON CORRUPTION

One important research topic concerns the roles played by international organizations and

multinational companies in fostering as well as combating corruption. This approach could

examine both the opportunities and constrains of multilateral agreements and donor initiatives in

reducing corruption, and may also offer some guidelines on the potential of external

interventions. Such knowledge is of particular relevance to governments and aid agencies when

developing strategies for institutional development and administrative reforms.

 APPENDIX A

STAKEHOLDERS’ OUTLAY

Interview with the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Interview with a Professor, Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of

Zimbabwe

Interview with the Undersecretary, Ministry of Finance

Interview with Mr. Valentine Sinemani, Principal Director in the Prime Minister’s Office.

Interview with Dr.Ibbo Mendoza, Academic, Author and Publisher; Convener of the Policy

Dialogue Forum at SAPES Trust.

Interview with the Director of the National Archives of Zimbabwe

Interview with the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Public Services

Interview with the Deputy Director, Anti-Corruption Commission; Zimbabwe

Interview with the Acting Director, Transnational International—Zimbabwe

Interview with the Prosecutor, Harare Magistrate Courts

Interview with a Judge of the High Court of Zimbabwe

Interview the Deputy Commissioner of Police; Senior Police Spokesperson.

Interview with the Administrative Project Manager, Ministry of Health

Interview with the Senior Deputy Manager, National Blankets Manufacturing Company.

197
 198

Interview with the parent of a pupil at a primary school in Harare.

Interview with a Member of Parliament of Zimbabwe

Interview with the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Labor and Social Services

Interview with an economist, Private Business Consultant

Interview with the Chief Executive Officer of Delta Corporation

Interview with the Director of Zimbabwe Associated Banking Group

Interview with the Deputy Director of Hunyani Tobacco Products

Interview with the Editor of the Herald daily newspaper

Interview with the Director of Anti-Corruption Commission in the President’s Office.

Interview with a the Director of a nongovernmental organization

Interview with Dr.Tafataona Mahoso, Chief Executive Officer of the Zimbabwe Mass

Media Commission

Interview with the News Editor of the Financial Gazette weekly newspaper

Interview with Professor J. Makumbe, Associate Professor, Department of Political and

Administrative Studies, University of Zimbabwe, Faculty of Social Studies.

Interview with the Executive Director of Coca-Cola Company.

Interview with the Program Director, Swedish International Development Agency

Interview with the Democracy and Governance Advisor, United States Agency for International

Development

Interview with the Program Officer, Conrad Adenaeur Foundation.

 APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW GUIDE

QUESTIONS

• What are the different types of corruption?

• What is the nature of public/private sector corruption?

• How is the state linked with society around and beyond it (international actors)?

• How far does the state’s power and authority extend?

• What are the specific features of corruption in your ministry, organization,

company, or donor agency?

• Is Civil Society part of the problem or solution to corruption?

199
200
 APPENDIX C

LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

The University of Texas at Dallas

School of Economic, Political & Policy Sciences
800 W. Campbell Road, Richardson, TX 75080-3021
(972) 883-2922 FAX (972) 883-6297

January 20, 2011

To Whom It May Concern:

Mr. Musafare Mupanduki is a doctoral candidate in good standing in the Ph.D. Program in

Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Dallas. Mr. Mupanduki’s doctoral dissertation

concerns corruption in sub-Saharan Africa, focusing on Zimbabwe, and he will be conducting

research on this topic in the coming months.

Mr. Mupanduki will be traveling to Zimbabwe from January 25, 2011 through February 25,

2011 to collect archival and interview data from key informants about this issue. Any assistance

you can provide to Mr. Mupanduki would be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Richard K. Scotch, Ph.D.

Professor of Sociology and Public Policy
Director, Doctoral Program in Public Affairs

APPENDIX D

201
 INFORMED CONSENT LETTER

Dear Prospective Participant,

The purpose of this letter is to collect data for the research on the nature of and remedies
for corruption in Zimbabwe.
This study is carried out as a dissertation fulfillment for my doctoral program, but the results
might help in eradicating or minimizing corruption in Zimbabwe.
Thus, your participation in this study will be acknowledged and appreciated. A
considerable amount of anonymity and confidentiality will be taken into account to protect your
privacy and any harm that might be caused as a result of your participation in this research. I
will not force you to participate in the study as it is your inalienable right not to participate.
Thank you in advance for your co- operation.
Sincerely,
Musafare Mupanduki
Doctoral Student
University of Texas at Dallas
USA

APPENDIX E

THE NATIONAL FLAG OF ZIMBABWE

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203
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 VITA

Musafare Takaendesa Mupanduki was born in Marondera, Mashonaland East Province of

Zimbabwe. He did his primary education at Mabvuku Primary School and later moved to

Goromonzi High School, Zimbabwe, (on Rhodes and Beit Scholarship) for his secondary

education. He obtained a certificate in library studies at the British Council Center in Malawi.

From Malawi he was admitted to Achimota College in Ghana where he obtained his General

Certificate of Education, Advanced Level (GCE A’ Level). He proceeded to the University of

Cape Coast, Ghana, and got a Bachelor of Education degree. From there he was admitted to the

University of Ghana and obtained a Master of Arts degree in African Studies, specializing in

Government and Politics in Africa.

He was appointed Secretary-General (CEO) of the All Africa Students Union (ASU) . In 1980,

he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an Under-secretary. He was later seconded to the

Zimbabwe Red Cross Society as the organization’s Secretary-General (CEO) in 1981. From

1990-1999 he was the Executive Director of MUSADO Company. His Civic responsibilities in

Zimbabwe included:

• Provincial Chairman and member of the Executive Council of the Zimbabwe Human

Rights Association (ZimRights)

• Provincial Chairman and Board Member of the National Civic Education

• Provincial Chairman and Board Member of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA)
He joined University Texas at Dallas in 2005, and obtained a Master of Public Affairs degree.

He is currently a Goodwill Ambassador for Cullinan Foundation, an organization based in the

Philippines.