Structural Survey

The role of human error in construction defects

Andrew R. Atkinson
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Andrew R. Atkinson, (1999),"The role of human error in construction defects", Structural Survey, Vol. 17 Iss 4 pp. 231 - 236
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ANDREW R. ATKINSON, (2002),"The pathology of building defects; a human error approach", Engineering, Construction
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The role of human error
in construction defects
Andrew R. Atkinson
Downloaded by CHALMERS UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY At 23:14 30 January 2016 (PT)
The author
Andrew R. Atkinson is Senior Lecturer at South Bank
University, London, UK.
Keywords
Defects, Human error, Project management, Systems
Abstract
This paper reports research on the human error causes of
defects, which has important implications for design
professions involved in supervising new and refurbished
building work. Modern thinking on human factors related
to failures is beginning to stress managerial forces influ-
encing the event rather than concentrating on the individ-
ual actions of a single error perpetrator. The current work
develops this thinking and applies it to the problem of
avoiding defects in construction. Field research involving a
survey of construction industry practitioners, a statistical
study of 23 house-building sites and a further series of
unstructured interviews reveals that: managerial influ-
ences underlie many errors leading to defects; the “pathol-
ogy” of error occurrence exhibits systemic characteristics,
with errors high in the managerial chain having a notice-
able influence on errors committed by operatives; and the
emphasis placed by publications on correct technical
solutions is misplaced and factors related to managers
(such as better management training and education)
should be given greater emphasis.
Structural Survey
Volume 17 · Number 2 · 1999 · pp. 231–236
© MCB University Press · ISSN 0263-080X
231
Introduction
Reducing defects in building work has been
given considerable attention in recent years
(HAPM, 1991; BRE, 1991; Department of
the Environment, 1989), but the construction
industry has been slow to recognise the possi-
bility that it is errors of application that lie
behind poor performance; that the “defects
problem” is not so much a matter of not
knowing what to do, but of “not doing what
we know we should not do” (Bea, 1994).
The Building Research Establishment has
made limited attempts at examining the
causes of defects since the early 1980s. For
example, Bentley (1981) observed 27 build-
ing projects and divided the cause of “quality
related events” into 13 categories including
“lack of skill”, “lack of care” and “lack of
knowledge” of the site operative and “difficult
to build”, “low quality design” and
“unclear/missing project information” as
“aspects of design/project information”. This
categorisation is a curious mix of technical
inadequacies related to the design and a much
more pejorative condemnation of the site
worker. Why, for instance, is lack of skill, care
or knowledge not indicted for “designs that
will not work”? Bentley notes, however, that
the most frequently cited cause of quality
related event is “unclear/missing project
information” – a cause related to managerial
inadequacies rather than operative failings.
Beyond the construction literature it is
common ground that human error, not tech-
nology, predominates in failures of all types
(ACSNI, 1993; Kletz, 1985; Lourens, 1990;
Eldukair and Ayyub, 1991; Ellingwood, 1987;
Rollings and Rollings, 1991; Stewart, 1995).
Further, managerial causes are behind many,
if not most, failures. Indeed, a psychological
perspective (Rasmussen, 1983; Reason,
1990) reveals that errors at the work-face are
inevitable, often beneficial and consequently
need to be managed. Several authors (Reason,
1990; Blockley, 1992; Petroski, 1985) divide
errors into two types, “active” and “latent”.
Latent errors are managerial failures, which
predispose a system to failure and active
errors are precipitating events, such as a
simple lapse by an individual operative, which
directly causes the failure. Modern thinking
also now recognises that the causes of failure
are more complex than simple attributions to
either workers or managers. Causes interact
with errors at one level in an organisation,
 The role of human error in construction defects
Andrew R. Atkinson
affecting the probability of other errors else-
where. This “socio-technical” view is accom-
panied by the development of models which
illustrate the varying managerial levels at
which errors influence failure (Embrey, 1992;
Harrison, 1992; Eldukair and Ayyub, 1991;
Whittington et al., 1992; Fortune, 1984).
Current research
Current work seeks to apply the socio-
technical view of errors outlined above to
construction projects generally and to the
occurrence of defects within those projects in
particular. A systematic review of literature
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from technological, social science and
management perspectives has led to the con-
struction of a three-level model of the error
process in construction projects. The compo-
nents of the model are listed in Table I. Subse-
quent field research was directed towards
empirically testing this model.
Tests of the model
Four empirical studies were carried out, a
general survey and three studies of speculative
house-building involving statistical, interview
and observational components. The studies
relied on an overall triangulation methodolo-
gy for verification of findings. This paper
concentrates on the statistical study, but with
some reference to the interview study.
General survey
The general survey was reported in detail in
Atkinson (1998). A total of 107 UK-based
Table I Model of errors in construction projects
Level of the model Factor
Primary Knowledge (education/training)
Selection of knowledgeable personnel
Self-inspection of tasks
Managerial Checking work
Dividing responsibilities
Controlling change
Controlling concurrent working
Communications
Global Organisational culture
Economic pressure
Time pressure
Political pressure
Societal pressure
232
Structural Survey
Volume 17 · Number 4 · 1999 · 231–236
construction industry practitioners (including
building surveyors, architects, structural
engineers, quantity surveyors, contractors
and sub-contractors) were asked to rate the
factors in the model in a detailed question-
naire. Communications was the highest rated
factor, followed by time pressures, avoiding
concurrency, controlling changes and educa-
tion and training. The lowest rated factors
were economic, societal and political pres-
sures. Respondents were invited to supply
further factors that they considered impor-
tant, and in response there was some indica-
tion that factors related to the individual
qualities of the manager (such as leadership
and motivation) and to “systems” were
important. Regarding the three-level form of
the model, factor analysis was used to investi-
gate whether responses loaded on the levels of
the model. Factor analysis showed a fairly
clear split between global factors “outside”
the control of the project participants and
factors “within” their control, but not
between managerial and primary factors.
Statistical study
The statistical study investigated whether
there was any statistically significant relation-
ship between factors in the model and the
performance of 23 new housing projects. The
study compared a dependent variable of the
level of errors leading to defects with indepen-
dent variables constructed from the factors in
the model. “Primary” factors were represent-
ed by a rating for the skill level of the trade
operative for each site. In addition the influ-
ence of primary factors related to the site
manager on performance was rated using
three variables representing the experience
level, background (trade or management) and
qualifications of the manager.
“Managerial” factors were represented by
five variables. Communications was divided
into two categories, informal and formal
communications. For informal communica-
tions, the number of contacts between site
managers and non-line staff per month was
assessed and sites were divided into two cate-
gories, those with a high as opposed to those
with a low level of communications. For
formal communications, the site manager
rated the quality of project documents (draw-
ings and specification) and sites were divided
into those with high as opposed to those with
low quality documents. Organisational
 The role of human error in construction defects
Andrew R. Atkinson
culture was treated as a managerial factor in
the analysis and, following literature equating
organisational culture with the extent of
managerial participation (ACSNI, 1993;
Turner, 1978), the number of contacts
between site managers and line staff per
month was assessed and sites were divided
into those with a high level as opposed to a
low level of participation. Divisions of respon-
sibilities, control of concurrency and control
of changes were combined into one overall
planning factor for the purpose of statistical
analysis on the basis (Morris, 1994; Hinze
and Raboud, 1988) that control of these
factors is represented by good planning. Sites
Downloaded by CHALMERS UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY At 23:14 30 January 2016 (PT)
were divided into two categories, those with a
high level of planning as opposed to those
with a low level of planning. Additionally, the
overall influence of the project management
of sites was assessed by taking the product of
scores for planning, informal and formal
communications. Sites were subsequently
divided into intensively as opposed to less
intensively project managed.
“Global” factors were represented by two
variables. For economic/cost pressures, the
site manager was asked whether the site was
pressurised in terms of cost and sites were
divided into two cost categories, tight/not
tight. For time pressures, the site manager was
similarly asked whether the site was pres-
surised in terms of time and sites were divided
into two time categories, tight/not tight. Two
factors, checking and societal pressure, could
not be included in the statistical analysis
because data were not suitable for construct-
ing variables.
Analysis
Independent variables were compared with
dependent variables for strength of associa-
tion and tested using chi-square computed
with SPSS for Windows. The null hypotheses
were that there would be no significant associ-
ation between independent and dependent
variables. Results are as shown in Table II.
From Table II it can be seen that the null
hypothesis of no association between depen-
dent and independent variable can be rejected
for the following associations:
(1) At p < 0.05:
The background of the site manager and
the reported level of defects (a managerial
background is associated with a lower
level of defects)(p = 0.019).
233
Structural Survey
Volume 17 · Number 4 · 1999 · 231–236
The qualifications of the site manager and
the reported level of defects (qualified
managers are associated with a lower level
of defects)(p = 0.033).
The level of planning and programming
and the reported level of defects (more
detailed planning is associated with a
lower level of defects)(p = 0.049)
The intensity of project management and
the reported level of defects (more intense
management is associated with a lower
level of defects)(p = 0.007).
(2) At p < 0.10:
The quality of formal communications
and the reported level of defects (better
quality formal communications are asso-
ciated with a lower level of defects)
(p = 0.057).
The experience of the site manager and
the reported level of defects (inexperi-
enced managers are associated with a
lower level of defects) (p = 0.059).
Discussion
The findings support two indications from the
general survey. In that survey, communica-
tions was rated as the most important factor
in avoiding errors and the significant associa-
tion between formal communications and
performance in relation to defects supports
that finding. The general survey also indicated
that primary factors, but at a managerial level
were important and significant associations
between the qualifications, background and
experience of the site manager supports this.
An interesting finding is that inexperienced
managers are associated with better perfor-
mance. A further test between the two inde-
pendent variables, experience and qualifica-
tions of the site manager also shows a signifi-
cant association indicating that inexperienced
managers are also better qualified (p = 0.016).
This suggests that qualifications more than
make up for lack of experience in avoiding
errors.
Follow-up interview study
Interviews with 40 managers in the house-
building industry revealed that the most
common cause of defects (out of 220 causes
relayed by the managers) was poor formal
communications (61/220), followed by errors
related to the site worker (47/220), pressure of
time (19/220) and checking problems
 The role of human error in construction defects Structural Survey
Andrew R. Atkinson Volume 17 · Number 4 · 1999 · 231–236

Table II Chi-square association – reported defects

p < 0.1 shown in italics

p = 0.510 Skill level of trades-people
High Low Total
Level of Low 6 6 12
reported High 7 4 11
defects Total 13 10 23
p = 0.059 Experience of manager
Experienced Inexperienced Total
Level of Low 4 8 12
reported High 8 3 11
defects Total 11 11 23
p = 0.019 Background of manager
Managerial Trades Total
Level of Low 8 4 12
Downloaded by CHALMERS UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY At 23:14 30 January 2016 (PT)

reported High 2 9 11
defects Total 10 13 23
p = 0.033 Qualifications of manager
Qualified Unqualified Total
Level of Low 6 6 12
reported High 1 10 11
defects Total 7 16 23
p = 0.855 Level of informal communications
High Low Total
Level of Low 5 7 12
reported High 5 6 11
defects Total 10 13 23
p = 0.057 Quality of formal communications
High Low Total
Level of Low 10 2 12
reported High 5 6 11
defects Total 15 8 23
p = 0.827 Organisational culture (level of participation)
High Low Total
Level of Low 6 6 12
reported High 6 5 11
defects Total 12 11 23
p = 0.049 Planning/programming
Local and central Central Total
Level of Low 7 5 12
reported High 2 9 11
defects Total 9 14 23
p = 0.007 Intensity of project management
High Low Total
Level of Low 10 2 12
reported High 3 8 11
defects Total 13 10 23
p = 0.304 Cost pressure
High Low Total
Level of Low 9 3 12
reported High 6 5 11
defects Total 15 8 23
p = 0.552 Time pressure
High Low Total
Level of Low 4 8 12
reported High 5 6 11
defects Total 9 14 23

234
 The role of human error in construction defects Structural Survey
Andrew R. Atkinson Volume 17 · Number 4 · 1999 · 231–236

(17/220). More importantly, the interviews Conclusions

revealed interactions between errors leading
Building surveyors, architects and structural
to defects. Interactions were of three broad
engineers spend a great deal of time and effort
types, simple self-contained errors, two-way
in detecting and correcting defects. As many
interactions and complex interactions.
are also involved in commissioning new or
Simple self-contained errors, when related
refurbishment work, minimising the inci-
to the operative, would directly result in a
dence of future defects or failures must also
defect or failure. In contrast, simple errors
be a prime concern. This research shows that
at a managerial level were often corrected by
the causes of defects are not so obvious as
operatives and did not cause problems. In
they might seem. Selecting the correct tech-
two-way interactions, interviewees acknowl-
nology is not the problem. The problem
edged that two errors (such as bad work and
relates to the people who carry out construc-
poor supervision) led to a defect. Complex
tion in the widest sense – from designer to
interactions of two types were illustrated in
operative and from senior manager to junior
the interviews. Firstly, some incidents
trainee.
Downloaded by CHALMERS UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY At 23:14 30 January 2016 (PT)

involved complex multiple errors leading to

By taking a socio-technical view of error
defects, which spread beyond the site
causation in complex systems, and proposing
initially involved.
a model of errors in construction projects, it is
An example was an incident where a
possible to investigate the underlying causes
bricklayer built fixings for first floor timbers
of defects. This research has shown that these
at too high a level because clear
are strongly biased towards managerial. Fur-
drawings/instructions were not provided.
ther, unstructured interviews with construc-
The carpenter “following on” subsequently
tion industry practitioners have illustrated the
over-notched the timbers to correct the
complexity of causation leading to defects.
levels. Electricians in an independent inci-
Defects appearing in finished work might be
dent also over-notched the timbers for
caused by pressures far removed from the
cabling and this resulted in the floor being of
work-face and the operative. The implication
inadequate strength. The series of defects
of this is that error occurrence cannot be
was repeated throughout the site as a result
treated in isolation and that analysis of cause
of the site managers failing to give clear
must treat the whole project as a system.
instructions to the carpenters and electri-
Emphasising the influence of managers is
cians not to cut into timbers in future. Thus,
rather a broad criticism, however, and the
in one incident, multiple errors related to
studies reported here give some indication of
communications, checking and operative
where attention should be concentrated in
primary errors were involved.
future research. Two areas stand out. Firstly,
The second type of complex interaction
the strong indictment of communications in
recorded was systemic multiple errors driven
all areas of research suggests that a compre-
from the top. An incident of this type involved
hensive examination of communications in
a series of “show houses” on one site contain-
the construction industry is overdue. Second-
ing several defects. The defects were effective-
ly, the emphasis on the qualities of the manag-
ly planned by senior managers who admitted
er revealed in the statistical study by signifi-
that the houses were built too quickly in order
cant associations between performance and
to meet sales targets. This was needed to
individual managerial qualities suggests that
improve year-end accounts and reduce the
further detailed work on what makes a good
threat of take over of the company on the
manager, whether education, training, age or
Stock Exchange!
other, would pay dividends.
The “pathology” of errors appears as
operative primary errors forced by concur-
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