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Scand. J of Economics 101(4), 617-630, 1999
Andrea Fosfuri
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, ES-28903 Madrid, Spain
Massimo Motta
European University Institute, I-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy and Universitat Pompeu
Fabra, ES-08005 Barcelona, Spain
Abstract
We question the widespread argument that firms embarking on foreign direct investments must
possess some specific advantages to offset the penalties of operating across national and
cultural boundaries. A simple model shows that firms might invest abroad to capture local
advantages through geographical proximity of plant location, rather than to exploit existing
ones. Because of spatially bounded spillovers, laggard firms might use foreign investments to
acquire location-specific knowledge, whereas leading firms might prefer costly exports to
avoid the dissipation of their advantages.
I. Introduction
*This paper was prepared for the Conference on Competition and Industrial Policies in Open
Economies, held in Bergen, May 1998. It is a thoroughly revised version of a paper with the
same title, presented at the Workshop on Multinationals, Trade and Economic Geography, IUI,
Stockholm, May 1996. We would like to thank A. Ciccone, G. Schejelderup, G. Siotis and three
anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
? The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics 1999. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road,
Oxford OX4 lIN, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
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618 A. Fosfuri and M. Motta
'Location of production abroad is not the only channel through which a firm can benef
localized spillovers. For instance, a firm can establish R&D facilities abroad with the
of acquiring new technologies; see Fors (1996) and Cantwell and Hobson (1991).
2Elsewhere, we study in more detail the mechanism through which knowledge m
involuntarily move from a multinational subsidiary to other firms located in the same
see Fosfuri et al. (1999). We argue that spillovers occur because workers, after rec
appropriate training at the multinational site, might later be hired by local firms and brin
them (part of) the knowledge they have previously acquired. Some empirical refe
concerning this type of spillovers can be found in Blomstr6m and Kokko (1998).
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Multinationals without advantages 619
3In a previous version of this paper, where we solved the model assuming price competition
and product differentiation, the results were qualitatively unchanged.
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620 A. Fosfuri and M. Motta
assume that when both firms locate in the same country, the follower will
obtain the leader's technology with probability Ai E [0, 1], with Ai being
country-specific. Ai is therefore a measure of the extent of technological
spillovers in country i.
We are now able to analyze the proposed game. Table 1 shows the normal
form of the first stage of the game, where f stands for direct investment, e
for exports and 4/ for not serving the foreign market. In the profit expres-
sions, the subindex identifies the firm, (1 or 2), while the superindex
indicates the strategy chosen by the firm. All profit expressions are condi-
tional on what the other firm is doing. For instance, Hel/ are the profits of
firm i = 1, 2 when it exports while firm j 34 i does not invest abroad.
In the second stage of the game the firms compete in the product market
by simultaneously choosing quantities, conditional on the supply configura-
tion which arises from the first stage. As usual, we solve backwards to find
the equilibria of the game. There exist nine possible configurations for which
we have to compute the Cournot equilibria.
When both firms undertake a foreign direct investment in the other
country, total profits of firm i are given by:
He - (I 9
i(- 2ci +cj
9
t)+ (- 2ci -2t +cj2 (2)
When firm
Table 1. Pay
firm l/firm 2 e f
4Note that this expression, as well as all other payoff expressions where at least one firm
exports, make sense only if transport costs are not too high. Otherwise, the condition for
positive output (1 - 2ci - 2t + cj > 0) would be violated.
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Multinationals without advantages 621
[9 9]
+ S)i -
When neither
WIf gt
1
(I -~Ai) ~9
s (1 - 2ci
9
+c)+ Aii (1Ic (6)
li = -(14ci)
~~9
+ (1-2ci-2t +c1). (8)
+~i ] = (1 C( - cm)2 + ? (1
+ Aj S4i (I1-Cmin)2 +
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622 A. Fosfuri and M. Motta
In this sub-section we restrict our attention to a simpler game than the one
just described, to introduce the reader to the main effects of spillovers on the
internationalization decisions of the firms. In particular, we want to illustrate
that a technological follower might invest abroad without possessing techno-
logical advantages, precisely because it wants to acquire the technology of
the leader; and that a technological leader might have an incentive not to
invest abroad to avoid dissipation of its advantages. To this purpose, we
consider the case in which firm 2 neither invests nor exports. (The whole
game will be studied in the next sub-section.) Firm 1 will therefore choose to
undertake a foreign direct investment if flf q5 0 max(Hl I k, fH' qO}, that,
after substitution of the corresponding profit expressions, can be rewritten as:
"spillover" component
9 g(F2) (10)
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Multinationals without advantages 623
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624 A. Fosfuri and M. Motta
Finally, note that the presence of spillovers might alter the relationship
between the technology gap, [cl - C21, and the propensity to invest abroad
Without spillovers (A2 0 0), a larger technology gap narrows the parameter
space under which foreign direct investment is chosen by the technological
follower. Instead, the direction of change might be reversed when there are
sufficiently large spillovers in the market. Note that if the firm is the
technological follower (cl > C2) then a larger gap makes the "traditiona
component smaller, but the "spillover" component larger. Indeed, one can
show that for a sufficiently large spillover, )2, an increase in the technology
gap between the firms enlarges the parameter space under which foreign
direct investment is chosen by the technological follower.7
We now widen the strategy set of the players and analyze a game where, in
the first stage, the two firms simultaneously decide about their mode of
internationalization. We assume that firm 1 is the technological leader and
we set cl = 0 and c2 = c > 0, with c capturing the technology gap between
firms. From now on we denote s, = s~u and S2 s(1 - Ai), where s is the
aggregate market size of the two economies and ft is the share of the
aggregate population which is resident in country 1.
Using the equilibrium solutions of the quantity game computed before, we
can derive the equilibrium of the supply mode sub-game. Obviously, the
equilibrium configurations will be different according to the different values
taken by the parameters. To simplify the presentation, we fix the values of all
but two parameters and analyze the solutions in the plan.
Figure 1 indicates the equilibria of the game in a plan where the relative
size of country 1 (lu) is on the x axis, and the technology gap between the
firms (c) is on the y axis. In this figure, we have fixed Al = ?2 = 0, which
means that there are no spillovers.8 Notice that, given the value chosen for
transportation costs (t = 0.2), exports always give positive profits to firm 1.
6The technology gap increases because either cl increases or c2 decreases or both. Some
simple algebra shows that the derivative of the LHS of (10) with respect to ci is positive if
A2 > 2t/[(9s1/8S2)(l - Cl) + (1 - 2cI + c2)] whereas the derivative with respect to c2 is
negative if )2 > t/[(9s1/8s2)(1 - c2) + (1 - cI)]
7Implicitly, we are assuming that the follower is always able to enjoy the spillovers. Our mod
does not take into account that the magnitude of the spillovers might actually depend on th
size of the technology gap. If a firm lags too much behind, it might be unable to capture any
the benefits from proximity of plant location. Our assumption that the costs of the two firm
are not 'too different' might be seen as corresponding to the case where the laggard
advanced enough to absorb the technology of the leader. We thank an anonymous referee fo
bringing this point to our attention.
8Other parameter values are fixed as follows: s = 30, F1 = F2 = 1, t = 0.2 .
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Multinationals without advantages 625
0.3 |2 2 -
0.2
0.1
_ eA E[2 I 2
0
Fig. 1. The benchmark case: s=30, F =F2 =1, t 0.2, Al=A2 =O0
Hence, firm 1 has only one indifference curve between exports and foreign
direct investment (Hl -- Hf), whereas firm 2 has three indifference curves,
respectively between exports and foreign direct investment (H71 = Hjf),
foreign direct investment and not investing (H~f - H0), and exports and not
investing (H-se - fll))
In this specific example, only the 'traditional' component influences the
entry mode decision of the firms. For any given level of transportation and
set-up costs, a larger technology gap (c larger) reduces the parameter space
under which foreign direct investment is chosen by the technological
follower at equilibrium. Similarly, a larger country 1's market size relative to
country 2's reduces the parameter space under which foreign direct invest-
ment by firm 1 takes place at equilibrium.
We can now analyze how the presence of localized spillovers, affects the
equilibrium configurations of the game. Figure 2 describes the equilibrium
solutions for Ali = A2= 0.2. Note in particular that the presence of spillovers,
introduces a link between the two markets which was previously absent (with
zero spillovers and constant marginal costs, the foreign mode strategy chosen
by each firm was independent of the strategy adopted by the other firm). For
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626 A. Fosfuri and M. Motta
0.4 (f, e)
0.3
0.2
0.1
0~f,
9Notice that there are areas in the plan where there are no equilibria in pure strategies.
Equilibria in mixed strategies (which we do not analyze, for brevity) arise in those areas.
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Multinationals without advantages 627
'0While we focus merely on the benefits of foreign direct investment due to technological
spillovers, there are many other channels through which multinational activity might favor the
host country's growth; see Blomstrom and Kokko (1998).
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628 A. Fosfuri and M. Motta
to operate across national and cultural boundaries or to raise the size of the
spillover effect. However, a couple of objections might be addressed to these
(less common) policies. The first is that a government might end up by
giving subsidies to (domestic) firms which would invest abroad anyhow. The
second is that it is unclear why a subsidy is needed at all, since a firm has a
private incentive to invest abroad if this allows it to attain a superior
technology. Therefore, such policies might be justified only if there existed
externalities that a firm would not take into account. A possible first
externality is that consumers might also benefit from more advanced
technologies. A second externality might be that in a richer model than the
one we have proposed here, other domestic firms (operating in the same
sector, or in other vertically related sectors) might benefit from spillovers
received by the investing firm. Of course, the issue is complicated by the fact
that there might also exist negative externalities. This might happen if
resources devoted to encouraging foreign investments are subtracted from
other domestic sectors.
Finally, as far as the leader country's government is concerned, the
question that arises is whether policies aimed at reducing technological
spillovers to avoid dissipation of technological advantages are appropriate or
not. Policies of this type have been invoked in the United States, for instance,
where massive investment by foreign firms (particularly Japanese) in some
high-tech industries have generated a feeling among many that the govern-
ment should intervene, otherwise US technological leadership would be
rapidly eroded.' 1
In the context of our model, policies which discourage foreign firms from
investing close to domestic technological leaders might be appealing, since
they preserve the technological advantage of local firms. However, we
should point out that in many circumstances spillovers work as a two-way
flow of knowledge. When this is the case, firms would benefit from each
other instead of only having the laggard learn from the leader (as we
modeled in a rather crude way). Also, it is clear that investment by a foreign
firm might have all sorts of positive effects on the home economy (increas
competition, giving a wider choice of products to consumers, reduced
unemployment) which might outweigh the effect of avoiding dissipation of
knowledge. On top of that, some of the surplus earned by the foreign firms
might accrue to domestic agents.
"That the US Government is sensitive to such issues can also be seen by its use of the Exxon
Florio amendment to veto acquisitions of US companies by foreign firms for motives of
"national security".
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Multinationals without advantages 629
IV. Conclusions
References
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630 A. Fosfuri and M. Motta
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