a ccty cain ss mes Service de sect Our file: 117-2010-177 a 4 December) +2010 Mr, Jim Bronskill ‘The Canadian Press 800-165 Sparks Street Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5B9 Dear Mr. Bronskill: This refers to your Access to Information Act request of November 4, 2010, for CSIS Director Richard Fadden's recent report to the Public Safety minister on foreign interference in the Canadian Political / public service milieu, received on November 16,2010. A receipt for your $5.00 will have been included in the response for your request 117-2010-176, processed separately. Enclosed please find a copy of the releasable material pertaining to the subject of your request. Portions of the material have been exempted from disclosure by virtue of one or more of sections 15(1) (as it relates to the efforts of Canada towards detecting, preventing or suppressiig subversive or hostile activities), 19(1), 21(1)(a), and 21(1)(b) of the Act. Some of the information has also been excluded under paragraph 69(1)(g) re:(c) of the Act. Should you wish to obtain clarification conceming your request, please use the information at the bottom of this letter to either call or write us. Please provide the file number at the to9 of this, letter for reference purposes. Please be advised that you are entitled to complain to the Information Commissioner concerning the processing of your request within sixty days of the receipt of this notice. In the event you decide to avail yourself of this right, your notice of complaint should be addressed to: Information Commissioner of Canada, Tower "B", Place de Ville, 112 Kent Street, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 1H3. ‘Yours truly, AN db Nicole falbert Coordinator Access to Information and Privacy Attachments Canad# P.O, Box 9732, Sation “T", Otava, Onurio KIGAGH_ C.. 9732, Succusale T°, Ottawa (Ontario) KIG AGH ‘Tele (613) 281-0107 1-877-995-9903 Fax: (613)882-1271Canadian Security Service canadien du Intelligence Service renseignement de sécurité Director - Directeur CCM # 6951 TOP SECRET. For Decision JUL 28 2010 MEMORANDUM TO THE MINISTER FOREIGN INFLUENCED ACTIVITIES this briefing note provides an overview of foreign influenced activities (also commonly known as foreign interference) in Canada, the two cases of suspected foreign interference involving members of two provincial ministries to which I made reference in my June 22, 2010, interview with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) “Foreign interference” represents covert activities undertaken by foreign governments and other foreign entities (e.g. listed terrorist organizations) in order to influence the political process and public policy of another state and/or to control and monitor diaspora communities abroad - with the objective of furthering the interests of the interfering parties. Canada is a target for foreign interference due to our natural resources, scientific and technological sectors, our role and influence in the international community, and our close relations with powerful allies. Defined as a threat to national security in section 2(b) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Act, the Service is mandated to investigate the activities of various foreign govemments and foreign entities suspected of engaging in direct and indirect covert interference in Canadian politics, government and society. The targets of foreign interference vary depending on the objectives and interests of the states and entities involved, but can include elected representatives, candidates for public office and public servants at the municipal, provincial and federal levels of government, as well as diaspora or ethnic communities. Interference within ethnic communities is conducted for the purposes of monitoring the activities of community members, collecting information on dissidents, and/or soliciting community PO, Box 9732, Station “T, Otawa, Ontario KIG 4G4 CP. 9732, Succrsile “T", Ottawa (Ontario) KIG 4G-2- TOP SECRET. support for or against Canadian policy in favour of the interests of the interfering party. This community support can also be leveraged to promote targeted elected representatives or electoral candidates, and is often developed once influence is established Some members of the diaspora community targeted by an interfering state or entity are subject to exploitation and coercion Politicians are targeted to solicit support for policies and positions that favour the interests of the foreign state or entity. This influence is sought through the offering of electoral support, as mentioned above, Publicservants are also targeted in order to influence policy decisions Interference and influence involving politicians and public servants are, in some cases, conducted subtly and involve a long period of cultivation during which the targeted individual may not be aware of the intent of the interfering party. it is a slow and methodical development of relationships that aim to affect the perspective and decision-making of those being influenced. Foreign interference may also aid foreign espionage activities, both within ethnic communities - or within Canadian ‘government or commercial circles, where individuals under the influence of foreign stetes or entities may assist in the theft of technology or classified or sensitive information. Some parties engage in all of the above acti while others. restrict their interference operations to monitoring and attempting to influence the diaspora community. DISCUSSION: The investigation of foreign interference presents several challenges to the Service. One is distinguishing between foreign interference and legitimate lobbying. is entitled to and does build relationships and formally express its support for or opposition to specific Canadian government policies. That said, clandestinely influence Canadian policy and individuals at the federal, provincial and municipal levels.3+ TOP SECRET. This targeted demographic also includes public servants also targets other Canadians it believes are either sympathetic to its interests or vulnerable to cultivation, the target may be, as mentioned above, subject to threats, coercion or potential blackmail. it should be emphasized that the source of the foreign interference threat is the foreign state or entity involved - not Canadians or Canadian politicians or public officials who may be targeted - and it is the activities of these foreign parties that are generally the focus of our investigations. That said, if the activities of Canadians interacting with foreign officials themselves constitute a threat to national security, the Service is mandated to initiate an investigation and report to the government as appropriate. It is informative to note reflect the ongoing and persistent foreign interference and further illustrate the problem of foreign interference as I have described in this note. such activities are being conducted not only in Canada but in many other countries.-4- TOP SECRET and the Service continues to investigate foreign influenced activities as mandated under the CSIS Act. While active, open and transparent lobbying is a norma! aspect of the Canadian political process, the manipulation of Canada’s government and ethno-cultural ‘communities through foreign interference poses an ongoing threat to our sovereignty and national security. These clandestine efforts by foreign governments to influence our officials, policies and communities have the potential to undermine our ability to make independent decisions in Canada’s national interests. Foreign interference is a long-standing security threat; it is challenge that pre-dates the Service, and one that we assess will continue in the years to come. As such, the Service will continue to investigate and provide timely advice to government on this ‘ongoing threat to Canada’s security.-5- TOP SECRET. I would appreciate an opportunity to discuss the above with you. Richard B. Fadden OD Tagree O Idisagree The Hon. Vie Toews, P.C., Q.C., M.! cc: Deputy Minister of Public Safety Attachments. Tits DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A RECORD WHICH MAY BE SUIJECT 10 MANDATORY EXEMPTION UNDER THE ACCESS TO INFORMATION [ACT OR FHE PRIVACY ACT. THE INFORMATION OR INTELLIGENCE MAY ALSO BE PROTECTED BY THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 3) $11) OF THE CANADA EVIDENCE ACT. THE INFORMATION OR INTELLIGENCE MUST NOT BE DISCLOSED OR USED AS EVIDENCE WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THE CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE