Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:1475–1487
DOI 10.3758/s13414-012-0330-z
An examination of the processing capacity of features
in the Thatcher illusion
Nick Donnelly & Katherine Cornes & Tamaryn Menneer
Published online: 16 June 2012
# Psychonomic Society, Inc. 2012
Abstract Detection of the Thatcher illusion (Thompson,
Perception, 9:483–484, 1980) is widely upheld as being
dependent on configural processing (e.g., Bartlett & Searcy,
Cognitive Psychology, 25:281–316, 1993; Boutsen,
Humphreys, Praamstra, & Warbrick, NeuroImage, 32:352–
367, 2006; Donnelly & Hadwin, Visual Cognition, 10:1001–
1017, 2003; Leder & Bruce, Quarterly Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 53A:513–536, 2000; Lewis, Perception, 30:769–
774, 2001; Maurer, Grand, & Mondloch, Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 6:255–260, 2002; Stürzel & Spillmann, Perception,
29:937–942, 2000). Given that supercapacity processing
accompanies configural processing (see Wenger &
Townsend, 2001), supercapacity processing should occur
in the processing of Thatcherised upright faces. The
purpose of this study was to test for evidence that the
grotesqueness of upright Thatcherised faces results from
supercapacity processing. Two tasks were employed:
categorisation of a single face as odd or normal, and a
same/different task for sequentially presented faces. The
stimuli were typical faces, partially Thatcherised faces
(either eyes or mouth inverted) and fully Thatcherised
faces. All of the faces were presented upright. The data from
both experiments were analysed using mean response times
and a number of capacity measures (capacity coefficient, the
Miller and Grice inequalities, and the proportional-hazards
ratio). The results of both experiments demonstrated some
evidence of a redundancy gain for the redundant-target
condition over the single-target condition, especially in
the response times in Experiment 1. However, there was
very limited evidence, in either experiment, that the
N. Donnelly (*) : K. Cornes : T. Menneer
School of Psychology, University of Southampton,
Southampton SO17 1BJ, UK
e-mail: N.Donnelly@soton.ac.uk
redundancy gains resulted from supercapacity processing.
We concluded that the oddity signalled by inversion of eyes
and mouths does not arise from positive interdependencies
between these features.
Keywords Face perception . Response time models
In the Thatcher illusion, faces appear grotesque as a
consequence of inverting the eyes and mouth in an
otherwise upright face (Bartlett & Searcy, 1993; Cornes,
Donnelly, Godwin, & Wenger, 2011; Thompson, 1980).
However, the grotesque appearance disappears when
Thatcherised faces are inverted. Given that the Thatcher
illusion is affected by inversion, the Thatcherisation of
features is thought to affect relational (or configural)
information within the faces (e.g., Boutsen, Humphreys,
Praamstra, & Warbrick, 2006; Donnelly & Hadwin,
2003; Leder & Bruce, 2000; Lewis, 2001; Maurer,
Grand, & Mondloch, 2002; Stürzel & Spillmann, 2000).
Typically, the explanation of the Thatcher illusion is
couched in terms of the dual-mode hypothesis (Bartlett &
Searcy, 1993), which states that faces are processed in terms
of features and of the relationships between features
(configurations), but with the processing of configurations
restricted to upright faces.
The aim of the present research was to test whether the
grotesqueness of Thatcherised faces is subject to a form of
configural or face superiority effect (Homa, Haver, &
Schwartz, 1976; Pomerantz, Sager, & Stoever, 1977). In
relation to the Thatcher illusion, the issue of configural
superiority can be explored by measuring the processing
capacity for detecting the oddity signalled by the inversion
of eyes and mouths. Processing capacity reflects the resources
available to complete a task at a given time. It is calculated
1476
from the relationship between the amounts of work that can be
achieved in the presence of different amounts of information
(e.g., both eyes and mouth inverted vs. either eyes or mouth
inverted). Importantly, measures of processing capacity
provide an assessment of performance (work achieved)
that goes beyond that which can be inferred from simple
differences in average response time (RT) data across
conditions. Most importantly, processing capacity can be
determined at all time points, rather than being based on
a comparison of measures of central tendency.
Three levels of processing capacity relate to the effect on
performance when variations in the amount of information
(i.e., workload) occur (see Townsend & Nozawa, 1995).
Limited capacity is signified by a decrement in performance
as workload increases. Unlimited capacity occurs when
there is no change in performance as workload increases.
Finally, in supercapacity processing, positive interactions
between the channels cause performance to improve under
increased workload (Wenger & Townsend, 2001).
Given that supercapacity is required for configural
processing (see Blaha, 2004, and Blaha & Townsend,
2006, for changes in capacity with configural learning;
see Wenger & Townsend, 2001, for the relationship
between capacity and configural, or Gestalt, processing),
we hypothesised that supercapacity processing should be
observed in detecting oddity in Thatcherised faces. With
respect to this hypothesis, it is important to be clear
how configural processing is causal in the experiencing
of the Thatcher illusion. There are two ways in which
the grotesqueness in the Thatcher illusion may be related to
configurality. First, inversion of the eyes and mouth might
create highly atypical configurations, and such atypicality
causes the experience of grotesqueness. Second, the feature
inversion of eyes and mouths may impede the ability to
encode the eyes and mouths within facial configurations that
are otherwise fluently processed. In this second hypothesis,
Thatcherisation is associated with local difficulties in configural
processing. Nevertheless, and according to either version, the
configurations computed for upright faces act as carriers for
signals of oddity (grotesqueness). Evidence of superca-
pacity in oddity detection would reveal a form of con-
figural superiority for the detection of oddity from
emergent features in Thatcher faces.
Here we manipulated the number of target (inverted)
features, to create partial Thatcher faces, in which either
eyes or mouths were inverted, as well as full-Thatcher faces,
in which both eyes and mouths were inverted. Changes in
the number of inverted features are known to correspond
to perceived grotesqueness, with grotesqueness ratings
increasing as the number of inverted features increases
from one to two (Cornes et al., 2011). By manipulating
the number of features inverted, we used the redundant-
targets paradigm (e.g., Miller, 1982; Townsend &
Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:1475–1487
Wenger, 2004) to determine the processing capacity for
Thatcherised faces.
To the extent that the Thatcher illusion is processed
configurally, then interaction or dependencies between the
eyes and the mouth should allow more work to be achieved
in the full than in the partial Thatcher conditions. We therefore
hypothesised that we would find supercapacity processing for
detecting oddity when both eyes and mouths are inverted
relative to when only eyes or only mouths are inverted. Failure
to find supercapacity would bring into question the presence
of configural processing in generating the illusion. Moreover,
given the status of the Thatcher illusion as the prime exemplar
of the effect of configurality on face processing, any evidence
that it does not result from configural processing would
require us to ask fundamental questions about configural
face processing in general.
In the redundant-targets paradigm, performance is
compared in three conditions: A (here defined as inverted
eyes), B (here defined as inverted mouths), and A plus B (here
defined as inverted eyes and mouths). First, RTs are compared
in order to determine whether there is a gain for the redundant-
target condition as compared with the single-target conditions.
If such a redundancy gain is found, the critical issue is whether
this gain arises from supercapacity processing. Supercapacity
arises when the work done in the A-plus-B condition is greater
than the sum of the work done in the A and B conditions. The
work done is calculated from the RT distributions, as
explained later. In examining this issue, we used a number
of measures: the proportional-hazards model (Allison, 2010;
Cox, 1972), the capacity coefficient (Townsend & Nozawa,
1995), the Miller inequality (Miller, 1982), and the Grice
inequality (Grice, Canham, & Boroughs, 1984; see Townsend
& Wenger, 2004, for a discussion of the relations among these
measures). All four measures were used to provide converging
evidence for or against the hypothesis that supercapacity
processing of full Thatcherisation (eyes and mouth inverted)
will occur relative to partial Thatcherisation (either the eyes or
the mouth inverted). Average RTs alone cannot be used to
calculate capacity, and therefore cannot address the question
of configurality in the detection of Thatcherisation.
Processing efficiency across time: methods of analysis
The formulae for calculating the capacity coefficient, the
Miller inequality, and the Grice inequality are presented
in the following sections, together with discussion of
possible outcomes.
Hazard ratios
The hazard function provides a measure of the probability of
making a response at the next time point, given that the task
Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:1475–1487
is not yet completed (Wenger & Townsend, 2000). Formally,
it is the probability that a response is made at a given time
point (probability density function of task completion over
time) divided by the probability that a response has not yet
been made up to and including a given time point (the survivor
function1). The hazard function can be used as a measure of
the amount of work that can be achieved in a given unit of
time, and as such lends itself to measuring the processing
capacity of a system—that is, the relationship between
amounts of work achieved under different conditions
(Townsend & Ashby, 1978; Wenger & Gibson, 2004).
The proportional-hazards model (see Allison, 2010; Cox,
1972; Wenger & Gibson, 2004) can be used to determine the
ordering of hazard functions, and as such allows a test of
whether work is achieved earlier in the full-Thatcher condition
than in the partial-Thatcher conditions by calculating the ratio
of the hazard function for the full-Thatcher condition to that
for the partial-Thatcher conditions. Because this measure
relies on the relative ordering of the hazard functions, rather
than on precise values, it is more robust than alternative
methods when there are relatively few data points (Allison,
2010; Wenger & Gibson, 2004).
An alternative method for measuring capacity using the
hazard function is the capacity coefficient (Townsend &
Nozawa, 1995). This measure is calculated using Eq. 1,
where t is a given time point, HF(t) is the integrated hazard
function for the full-Thatcher condition, HP1(t) is the
integrated hazard function for one partial-Thatcher condition,
and HP2(t) is the integrated hazard function for the other
partial-Thatcher condition.
HF ðtÞ
CðtÞ ¼ ð1Þ
HP1 ðtÞ þ HP2 ðtÞ
Given that the hazard function provides a measure of the
amount of work done in a given unit of time, its integral
provides a cumulative measure of work done (Townsend &
Ashby, 1978; see also Wenger & Townsend, 2000). This
cumulative hazard function is calculated as the negative log
of the survivor function. When the work done at a given
time point is less for the full-Thatcher [HF(t)] than for the
sum of both partial-Thatcher [HP1(t) + HP2(t)] conditions,
capacity is limited, in that only a certain amount of
information can be processed, and any extra information
does not cause more work to be achieved. Limited
capacity therefore occurs when HF(t) < HP1(t) + HP2(t), such
that C(t) < 1. Unlimited capacity is defined as when
HF(t) 0 HP1(t) + HP2(t), such that C(t) 0 1. Super-
capacity is characterised by HF(t) > HP1(t) + HP2(t), such that
1
Survivor function 0 1 – cumulative distribution function, which
provides the probability of no response having occurred as a function
of time.
1477
C(t) > 1, demonstrating that the work achieved in the full-
Thatcher condition is greater than the sum of the work
achieved with the partial-Thatcher changes.
The Miller inequality (Ingvalson & Wenger, 2005; Miller,
1982; Townsend & Nozawa, 1995)
SF ðtÞ  SP1 ðtÞ  SP2 ðtÞ þ 1  0 ð2Þ
The Miller inequality is given in Eq. 2, where t is a given
time point, SF(t) is the survivor function for the full-
Thatcher condition, SP1(t) is the survivor function for the
first partial-Thatcher condition, and SP2(t) is the survivor
function for the second partial-Thatcher condition.
A violation of the Miller (1982) inequality implies super-
capacity. If SF(t) 0 SP1(t) + SP2(t), it can be clearly seen that
the Miller inequality will not be violated (the left-hand side
[LHS] will be 1). Similarly, the inequality will not be
violated when SF(t) > SP1(t) + SP2(t) (LHS will be
greater than 1). A violation of the Miller inequality will
occur when SF(t) + 1 < SP1(t) + SP2(t). That is, at time
t, the probability that a response has not occurred for the full-
Thatcher condition is lower than the summed probabilities for
the partial-Thatcher conditions, and this difference at least 1.2
In other words, responses occur faster for the full-Thatcher
condition than they do for either of the partial-Thatcher
conditions. Given that the Miller inequality is a more
conservative test of supercapacity than the capacity coefficient,
a violation is evidence for extreme supercapacity (see Ingvalson
& Wenger, 2005, p. 19; Townsend & Wenger, 2004).
The Grice inequality (Grice et al., 1984; Ingvalson
& Wenger, 2005; Townsend & Nozawa, 1995)
The Grice inequality (Eq. 3) is computed by subtracting the
survivor function for the full-Thatcher condition from the
survivor function of either the eye condition or the mouth
condition, depending on which of these values is smaller:
min½SP1 ðtÞ; SP2 ðtÞ  SF ðtÞ  0: ð3Þ
As well as measuring processing capacity, the Grice
inequality can also be used to determine a redundancy gain
in a finer-grained way than can be achieved with mean RTs.
A violation of the Grice inequality implies limited capacity.
If SF(t) > SP1(t) or SF(t) > SP2(t), then the Grice inequality is
violated (LHS < 0). In other words, a violation occurs at time t
if the probability of not having responded is lower in one of
the partial-Thatcher conditions than in the full-Thatcher
2
Given that the maximum for any probability is 1, the requirement that
SF(t) is at least 1 less than SP1(t) + SP2(t) makes the Miller (1982)
inequality a conservative test of supercapacity.
1478
condition. Put simply, a violation occurs when responses are
faster in at least one of partial-Thatcher conditions than in the
full-Thatcher condition. A violation therefore provides
evidence for limited capacity, in which there is no capacity
for processing the extra information in the full-Thatcher
condition, and responses are actually slower than the faster of
the two partial-Thatcher conditions. The requirement for
slower responses in the full-Thatcher condition causes
a violation of this inequality to be evidence for extreme
limited capacity (see also note 8 of Ingvalson & Wenger,
2005; Townsend & Wenger, 2004): A full-Thatcher condition
is actually less helpful than at least one of the partial-Thatcher
conditions.
Unlike the capacity coefficient and the Miller inequality,
the Grice inequality is not reliant on a comparison between
the full-Thatcher and both partial-Thatcher conditions.
Rather, it compares the full-Thatcher condition with the
faster of the partial-Thatcher conditions, regardless of
whether one partial-Thatcher condition was relatively fast
and the other relatively slow.
Experiment 1
The aim of Experiment 1 was to test whether inverted
mouths and eyes, presented in an upright face context,
produce supercapacity processing, or whether responses to
full-Thatcher faces are equivalent to the combination of
responses to inverted eyes and inverted mouths in partial-
Thatcher faces. Inverted faces were not tested, as we did not
hypothesise supercapacity processing for inverted faces.
Method
Participants A group of 12 undergraduate students partici-
pated in Experiment 1 for course credit. The participants had
a mean age of 20.5 years (SD 0 3.6). Two of the participants
were male, ten were right-handed, and all had self-reported
normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Apparatus The experiment was conducted using custom E-
Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Sharpsburg,
PA), with stimuli displayed on a 15-in. monitor set to a refresh
rate of 60 Hz and a resolution of 1,280 × 1,024. Responses
were made using the left and right mouse buttons, with the
buttons counterbalanced across participants. The participants
were seated approximately 57 cm from the screen.
Stimuli Sixteen greyscale female faces were obtained from
the Stirling Picture Database. These 16 faces were used to
create four sets of stimuli: no stimulus manipulation (typical
faces), only the eyes or only the mouths inverted (partial-
Thatcher faces), and both the eyes and mouths inverted
Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:1475–1487
(full-Thatcher faces) (see Fig. 1).3 In total, there were 64
face stimuli. The faces were manipulated in Adobe Photoshop
with the blur tool used to remove high-contrast edges caused
by manipulating the images. Whole images were blurred
using Gaussian blur with a radius of one pixel. The stimuli
subtended 6.7° × 8.3° of visual angle, with the face occupying
4.1° × 6.3° within the image, and, perhaps most critically for
the task, the distance between the top of the eyebrows and the
bottom of the mouth was 2.9° (see Fig. 1).
In order to address the hypothesis that detection of the
Thatcherised features in upright faces would be marked by
supercapacity processing, only upright faces were presented.
Procedure Participants were presented with a single, typical
partial- or full-Thatcher face. The participants were asked to
decide whether the face was “odd” or “normal” as quickly and
accurately as possible. The stimulus was displayed until re-
sponse. Given the nature of the response (“odd” or “normal”),
the task was to detect oddity, or grotesqueness, within the
stimulus.
The experiment comprised 768 trials, divided into four
blocks. Each Thatcherised face was presented twice in each
block, to give 32 eye, 32 mouth, and 32 eye-and-mouth
trials. Each unchanged face was presented six times in each
block to give 96 typical trials. In total, each participant
viewed 128 eye, 128 mouth, and 128 eye-and-mouth
Thatcher trials, and 384 typical trials. The participants had
a short, self-paced break between blocks. Face identity and
type of manipulation were randomised within all blocks.
The primary aim in deciding the frequency of each trial
type was to equate the number of “odd” and “normal”
responses, such that the probability of finding an inversion
in any given face was .5. However, the trial proportions
chosen may increase the chance of finding a redundancy
gain by artificially inhibiting responses to one of the partial-
Thatcher faces. Such inhibition can occur for two reasons.
Firstly, given no inversion for one feature (e.g., the eyes),
the probability of an inversion for the other feature is .25
(e.g., 32 mouth-inversion trials vs. 96 typical trials). This
probability is lower than the overall probability of an inversion
(.5), and will therefore inhibit responses to single-inversion
trials (e.g., responses to mouth-inversion trials will be slower
than those to full-Thatcher trials) (Mordkoff & Egeth, 1993;
3
A control experiment was run with the eyes and mouths outside of
their facial contexts. Using a same/different paradigm, participants
were presented with pairs of identical eyes and mouths of similar
orientations (either both upright or both inverted) or different orienta-
tions (one upright and one inverted). There was no difference between
responses to the eyes and mouths in terms of RT or accuracy, suggest-
ing that the eyes and mouths were matched for overall pair-wise
difficulty of discrimination. Equal discriminability reduces the poten-
tial for bias towards one feature over the other, and is therefore less
likely to encourage possible frequency effects such as the ones de-
scribed in the Procedure.
Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:1475–1487
Fig. 1 Example stimuli from Experiments 1 and 2, with a typical face
(top left), eye partial-Thatcher (top right), mouth partial-Thatcher (bot-
tom left) and full-Thatcher (bottom right). Note the example of the face
image is not one of the stimuli used in the experiment, but an illustra-
tive example of the Thatcher illusion as instantiated in this study
Mordkoff & Yantis, 1991). It is worth noting that the same
contingencies are not implied by the presence of an inversion:
Inversion of one feature (e.g., the eyes) is not predictive of the
inversion of the other feature (e.g., the mouth), because given
an eye inversion, the proportion of trials with a mouth
inversion is .5. Secondly, the RTs for the single-inversion trials
can be artificially slowed if the participant preferentially
attends to one location or another (Mullin, Egeth, &
Mordkoff, 1988). For example, if the participant attends to
the eye location, an eye inversion would result in faster
responses than would a mouth inversion. This difference
would not affect the responses to full-Thatcher trials but
would slow the mouth-inversion trials relative to the other
trial types, causing an overall slowing for single-inversion
trials. The participants were not informed about these
probabilities of co-occurrence.
Results
Before assessing processing efficiency, analyses were
conducted on the performance data (RT and accuracy) in order
to establish whether a redundancy gain occurred for detecting
grotesqueness in the full-Thatcher condition as compared with
the partial-Thatcher conditions. These analyses were
1479
conducted both for individual participants and over all
participants. Secondly, given a redundancy gain, the
measures of processing efficiency were calculated in
order to establish the capacity levels underlying the
redundancy gain. All of the analyses were conducted
only on Thatcher trials, in which a feature inversion had
occurred, in order to compare between the partial- and full-
Thatcher conditions. All post-hoc t tests were Bonferroni
corrected by adjusting the p value.
Redundancy gain: analyses of group mean and individual
RTs To test for an overall redundancy gain, the effect of the
number of feature changes (partial vs. full Thatcher) on RTs
and error rates was first examined at the group level. In
order to minimise positive skew in the RT data, and hence to
eliminate the need for outlier trimming, reciprocal RTs were
analysed (Ratcliff, 1993) using the mean reciprocal RT over
correct trials. Nontransformed mean RTs were also analysed
(see note 5 for the results). The error data were transformed
pffiffiffi
using the arcsine transformation, arcsin ð xÞ, where x is the
percentage error. This transformation was required to
normalise the binomial distribution of the accuracy data.
One-way repeated measures ANOVAs revealed a significant
effect of feature change for RTs and error rates, Fs(2, 22) 0
22.03 and 35.97, both ps < .01, partial eta-squareds (ηp2s) 0 .67
and .77, respectively (see Fig. 2). Follow-up t tests revealed a
redundancy gain, with faster responses and higher accuracy in
the full-Thatcher condition than in both partial-Thatcher
conditions [all ts(11) > 6.36, p < .01]. There was no significant
difference between the eye and mouth conditions for RTs or
errors [ts(11) 0 2.26 and 2.68, ps 0 .14 and .07, respectively].4
As the capacity measures will be examined at the level of
the individual, each participant’s RT data were also analysed
separately to test for a redundancy gain for each individual.
For each participant, a separate one-way independent-
samples ANOVA5 was conducted for the Feature Change
factor, with three levels (eye and mouth vs. eye vs. mouth)
and with up to 128 trials in each condition. The effect of
feature change was significant for ten of the 12 participants
[F(2, 325) to F(2, 371) > 3.5, ps < .04, ηp2s 0 .02 to .2],
approached significance for one participant [F(2, 322) 0
2.60, p 0 .08, ηp2 0 .02], and was not significant for the last
participant [F(2, 302) 0 1.32, p 0 .27, ηp2 0 .01]. Follow-up t
tests were conducted on the ten participants showing a signif-
icant effect of feature change. For five of the participants, RTs
4
Nontransformed RTs were also analysed, at both the individual and
group levels. The results revealed a pattern similar to that observed
with reciprocal RTs, except that one fewer participant exhibited a
redundancy gain at the level of the individual.
5
RTs across the three conditions are from the same participant, but a
within-participants ANOVA could not be employed here, because it
was not possible to pair the RTs from each condition with those from
the other conditions.
1480
Fig. 2 Mean response times (RTs, in milliseconds) and error rates
(percentages) from Experiment 1 (black) and Experiment 2 (grey).
Error bars represent one standard error
were faster in the full-Thatcher condition than in one of the
partial-Thatcher conditions (all ps < .05). For the remain-
ing five participants, RTs were faster in the full-Thatcher
condition than in both of the partial-Thatcher conditions (all
ps < .05), demonstrating a redundancy gain.
Processing efficiency across time The RT analyses revealed
a significant redundancy gain at the level of the group, and
at the level of the individual for five participants. We wished
to determine whether or not this redundancy gain arose due
to supercapacity processing. Mean-RT analyses alone cannot
be used to answer questions regarding processing capacity,
particularly when capacity changes over time, and there-
fore the measures of processing capacity defined earlier
were employed.
The three panels in Fig. 3 show the mean values for the
capacity coefficients, Miller inequalities, and Grice inequalities
calculated across groups (those exhibiting a redundancy gain
vs. those not), and Fig. 4 presents these measures for all 12
participants individually. Given that the three methods are
nonparametric, no transformation of RTs was required before
analysis. RTs for incorrect trials were removed before analysis,
and for each incorrect-trial RT, the most similar correct-trial RT
was also removed from the same condition. This removal of
twin RTs is standard practice and is necessary because there
were two possible responses (odd and normal), so for every
incorrect trial that could be considered a guess, there was also a
correct trial that could be considered a guess (Eriksen, 1988).
The survivor functions were calculated using the SAS
Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:1475–1487
LIFETEST procedure, with the life-table method and a width
(bin size) of 25 ms (see Allison, 2010).6
For the group of participants exhibiting a redundancy
gain (n 0 5/12), overall capacity measures at the level of
the group (Fig. 3) showed supercapacity at early time points
(capacity coefficient > 1, violation of the Miller inequality),
as well as a little evidence for extreme limited capacity at
late time points (violation of the Grice inequality). For the
group of participants not exhibiting a redundancy gain
(n 0 7/12), there was no evidence of supercapacity (capacity
coefficient < 1, one very minor violation of the Miller
inequality) or of extreme limited capacity (violations of the
Grice inequality). In sum, there was only modest evi-
dence for supercapacity processing in five out of 12
participants, and for most of these the evidence was
limited to very early time points.
For completeness, at the level of individuals, there was
very little evidence of extreme supercapacity from the Miller
inequality (few violations, all values close to or above zero),
with the few violations that did occur occurring at early time
points ( < 800 ms). Those participants demonstrating the
strongest violations were those that exhibited a redundancy
gain (black lines, Fig. 4). There was some evidence of
extreme limited capacity from the Grice inequality for some
participants, with violations at some time points (values
below zero). The participants demonstrating violations were
ones who did not exhibit a redundancy gain (grey lines,
Fig. 4). From the capacity coefficients, there was some
evidence of supercapacity, with values exceeding 1 for the
majority of time points for one participant, and at some early
time points ( < 750 ms) for five participants. All but one of
these participants exhibited a redundancy gain (black lines,
Fig. 4). For mid-to-late time points, the capacity coefficients
were between 0 and 1, indicating limited to unlimited
capacity, but no evidence of supercapacity processing.
Discussion
The analysis revealed a redundancy gain at the level of the
mean, as well as redundancy gains at the level of the individual
for five of the 12 participants. For most participants, the capacity
data are inconsistent with interdependencies between features
6
Note that calculation of the capacity coefficient and of the Miller
inequality only makes sense when all three conditions (full Thatcher,
eye inversion, and mouth inversion) have a survivor function value,
and the capacity coefficient cannot be calculated when the hazard
function is zero for both of the partial-Thatcher conditions. On the
other hand, the Grice inequality requires that the full-Thatcher condi-
tion and only one of the single-inversion conditions have survivor
function values. Given that the number of time points that have
survivor function values will vary across condition, the number of time
points that can be calculated across capacity and the Miller and Grice
inequalities will also differ.
Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:1475–1487 1481

Capacity Coefficient

Capacity Coefficient
1.5
5
4
1.0
3
2
0.5 1
0
0 1000 2000 3000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000
Time from earliest response (ms) RT bins

1.0 1.0

Miller Inequality
Miller Inequality

0.5
0.5
0.0

0.0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000

RT bins
0 1000 2000 3000
RT bins
1.0
Grice Inequality
0.2
Grice Inequality

0.1
0.0
0 1000 2000 3000 4000
RT bins
Fig. 3 Processing efficiency data from Experiment 1, presented at the
level of the group. Black lines represent the mean values for the group
of participants exhibiting a redundancy gain, and grey lines represent
the mean values for the group who did not. The capacity coefficient
means were calculated by lining up the earliest response of each
participant before averaging across relative time bins
that serve to boost performance. Therefore, the results demon-
strate that supercapacity is not necessary, nor automatic, for
detection of the Thatcher illusion, and some participants were
able to complete the task with limited capacity. However, there
were some participants, particularly those demonstrating a re-
dundancy gain, for whom there was some evidence of process-
ing reaching supercapacity, with nonadditive processing of eyes
and mouths.
The results suggest that the discrimination between
Thatcher and typical faces does not rely on supercapacity
processing and can occur using a limited to an unlimited
capacity system. There is little evidence that the redundancy
0.5
0.0
0 1000 2000 3000 4000
RT bins
Fig. 4 Processing efficiency data from Experiment 1. Each line rep-
resents the efficiency measure for one participant over time. Black lines
represent values from those participants who exhibited a redundancy
gain, and grey lines represent values from those who did not
gain arises from supercapacity, and no evidence that
supercapacity is necessary for a redundancy gain, especially
at mid-to-late time points. No extra work is necessarily
achieved in the full-Thatcher condition, as compared with
the total work across both partial-Thatcher conditions. In
addition, there is little evidence that the redundancy gain,
when present, emerges because of positive interactions
between features. These results could be explained by a race to
completion of two independently processed features.
In these tasks, our reasoning was that participants sought
evidence of inversion (and, hence, oddity). The presence of
one inverted feature would require an “odd” response, while
the presence of a typical feature would not necessarily
indicate a “normal” response. The gain in RTs for the
redundant inverted feature (full over partial Thatcher) does
indeed suggest that participants were using the inverted
1482
feature(s) to conduct the task. However, we should note that
there is nothing to prevent participants from assigning the
same task relevance to upright as to inverted features. In this
case, the presence of both types of information in the partial-
Thatcher condition would engage additional resources for
processing relative to the full-Thatcher condition. The effect
of this would be to suppress the measure of processing
capacity. Although this is possible, the account is highly
unlikely to hold, as it would require participants to engage
in the simultaneous detection of two types of targets. In
other types of visual-processing tasks, it is known that
performance is compromised when participants are
required to, for example, search for and detect two different
targets simultaneously (Menneer, Barrett, Phillips, Donnelly,
& Cave, 2007).
It might be possible that participants could detect a feature
inversion but not experience grotesqueness. If so, the results
would not require reference to grotesqueness at all. This is,
however, highly unlikely to be the case. Firstly, the
phenomenon of grotesqueness in the illusion is experienced
automatically (e.g., Bartlett & Searcy, 1993), with a
correlation between the timings of activation of the
fusiform face area and the amygdala when viewing
Thatcherised faces (Donnelly et al., 2011; Rotshtein,
Malach, Hadar, Graif, & Hendler, 2001), and secondly,
the magnitude of perceived grotesqueness is higher for full-
than for partial-Thatcherised faces (Cornes et al., 2011).
Therefore, it is highly unlikely that any strategy for perceiving
inversion without the experience of grotesqueness could
succeed. In addition, our analyses concerned comparisons
across full-Thatcher and partial-Thatcher conditions.
The presentation of features remains constant across
these conditions, and therefore any particular instance
of a feature in which grotesqueness was not apparent
would be the same across both partial- and full-Thatcher
faces.
Experiment 2
There are at least three possible reasons why a redundancy
gain could be found in Experiment 1 without strong
evidence for supercapacity. The first is that the task of
categorising faces as “odd” or “normal” could have
encouraged participants to focus on the indicative features
(eyes or mouth) to make the categorisation. Secondly, the
2.9° distance between eyebrows and mouth may have
encouraged eye movements, which in turn are likely to
encourage the selective processing of individual features more
than when eye movements are prohibited, particularly because
eye movements are frequently made to eyes and mouths in the
processing of faces (Smith, Gosselin, & Schyns, 2004; Spezio,
Adolphs, Hurley, & Piven, 2007). Such serial processing
Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:1475–1487
would allow for self-termination after examination of a single
feature, rather than exhaustive processing of both features.
Such a change would suggest that configural processing was
no longer taking place (Wenger & Townsend, 2001) and
would therefore affect the inferences regarding capacity made
in Experiment 1. Thirdly, Experiment 1 might not have
provided strong evidence for supercapacity if participants
used typicality as well as oddity to conduct the task, as we
discussed earlier.
In Experiment 2, we explored whether the failure to
observe supercapacity in Experiment 1 might have resulted
from the reasons described above (categorisation task
demands, eye movements, and two sources of information
in the partial-Thatcher condition). Using the same stimulus
set, we adopted the procedure employed by Ingvalson and
Wenger (2005), in which same/different judgements were to
be made to successively presented face pairs. The design
allowed for “same” and “different” responses to be orthogonal
to the presentation of typical and Thatcherised faces. In doing
so, Experiment 2 would prevent the use of a single absolute
value (odd/normal) to complete the task. While this task could
still be terminated on the first feature of the second face,
because only one difference was required in order to
provide a “different” response, the probe face was pre-
sented sufficiently briefly that eye movements could not
be made in response to these faces. Nevertheless, eye
movements were measured, and data were excluded
from trials on which eye movements were made.
Method
Participants A group of 15 student volunteers were recruited
as participants. Three of the participants were excluded, as their
average error rates across conditions exceeded 25 %.7 The
mean age of the remaining participants was 25.8 years (SD 0
6.6). Three of the participants were male, 11 were right-handed,
and all had self-reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Apparatus The stimuli were presented on a 21-in. monitor
with a refresh rate of 60 Hz and a resolution of 1,280 × 1,024.
Responses were made via a two-button response box, with the
buttons counterbalanced across participants. Eye movements
were recorded using an SR Research EyeLink 1000 eyetracker
and the associated software. Although stimulus viewing was
binocular, recordings of eye movements were made from the
right eye only. A chin rest and a forehead rest were used, with
the participants seated 57 cm from the monitor.
7
An error rate exceeding 25 % may seem high, but the faces were
small (1º between eyes and mouth; see the Stimuli section), the
changes were minimal (see Fig. 1), and the presentations were brief
(150 ms for second face, as described in the Procedure section).
Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:1475–1487 1483

Stimuli The stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1, the practice trials were not recorded. Participants were asked
except for the following. Only ten of the 16 faces were used, to keep their eyes still when viewing the stimulus. If more
in order to reduce the number of trials and to prevent the than one fixation was made on the second face, the trial and
participants from becoming uncomfortable during the data were discarded, which resulted in two trials being
eyetracking process. The ten faces used were randomly discarded from the analysis across all participants.
selected from the 16. Secondly, the faces were presented
with a smaller visual angle of 2.1° × 2.6°, giving a Results
maximum of 1.0° vertical distance from the top of the
eyebrows to the bottom of the mouth. A smaller stimulus was The data were analysed as in Experiment 1 unless otherwise
used in order to allow processing of the face within a single stated. All analyses were conducted only on “different”
fixation, and thus to minimise serial or piecemeal processing trials that contained a typical face, such that a double feature
of the eyes and mouth. change (typical paired with full Thatcher) exhibited a
smaller change in grotesqueness than did a single feature
Procedure There were four variants of each face: one typical, change (typical paired with partial Thatcher). A double
two partial-Thatcher faces, and one full Thatcher. Each variant feature change also occurred between a Thatcherised eye
of a face was paired with the three other variants of the same face and a Thatcherised mouth face, but the difference
face, giving six pairs. Two randomly selected faces were would not represent a change in the total amount of
reserved in order to provide 16 practice trials. For the eight grotesqueness. For completeness, the data for all types
faces used in the experimental trials, this process created 48 of trial are presented in Fig. 5.
pairs of faces matched for identity but varying in structure. Trials containing a typical face (i.e., those analysed)
The order of presentation of the two faces in each pair was could be presented with the typical face appearing first or
counterbalanced, providing 96 “different” trials, of which 32 second. Bonferroni-corrected t tests on reciprocal RTs and
were eye change only, 32 were mouth change only (either arcsine error rates revealed shorter RTs for both single-
typical to partial Thatcher or partial Thatcher to full Thatcher), change conditions, as well as lower error rates for the mouth
and 32 were double change (typical to full-Thatcher faces or change condition when the typical face was presented first
partial-Thatcher eye change to partial-Thatcher mouth than when it was presented second (all ts > 2.97, ps < .05).
change). Each variant was also matched with itself to create There was no effect of face order for the double-change
32 “same” pairs, which were each presented three times condition or for the eye change condition on error rates
throughout the experiment, to provide 96 “same” trials. There
were a total of 192 experimental trials. The trial frequencies
were the same as had been presented in Experiment 1, in that
the numbers of “same” and “different” responses were
equated, at the expense of artificially increasing the chance of
finding a redundancy gain (see the Exp. 1 Procedure).
The eyetracker was calibrated within 0.3° accuracy for
each participant using a nine-point calibration display. Each
trial began with a drift correction dot, which was displayed
until the participant fixated it within 0.5°. Calibration was
repeated if this level of accuracy was not achieved. After the
drift correction, the first face was displayed for 500 ms,
followed by a blank screen for 500 ms, then the second face
for 150 ms. This timing was chosen in response to piloting,
with the aim of avoiding multiple fixations on the second
face. During practice trials, the second face was presented for
250 ms to allow the participants to familiarise themselves with
the task. In all trials, a response screen of four centrally located
question marks was shown until response.
The participants were instructed to decide whether pairs
of sequentially presented faces were the same or different.
This task therefore differed from that in Experiment 1, in
that responses could not depend on the mere detection of Fig. 5 Mean response times (RTs, in millseconds) and error rates
grotesqueness. The participants were told to respond as (percentages) from Experiment 2 for each type of trial. Error bars
quickly as possible while minimising errors. The data from represent one standard error
1484 Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:1475–1487

3.0

Proportional hazards ratio

(all ts < 1.88, ps > .26). This analysis shows that there are
some differences in the levels of difficulty within each type 2.5
of single-change trial. However, such differences were to be
expected, and given that both orders were used for each pair 2.0
of faces, any effects of order would cancel out throughout 1.5
the experiment.
1.0
Redundancy gain: analyses of group mean and individual 0.5
RTs One-way ANOVAs across all participants revealed a
0.0
significant main effect of feature change for errors, F(2, 22)

Overall
Individual participants
0 13.24, p < .01, ηp2 0 .55, but no effect for RTs, F < 1, ηp2 0
.05 (see Fig. 5). Error rates were lower in the double-change
condition than in both single-change conditions (both ts >
4.28, ps < .01), and there was no difference between the 1.0

Miller Inequality
single-change conditions (t < 1).
One-way ANOVAs for individual participants were used to
0.5
analyse the reciprocal RTs, with up to 16 trials in each
condition. One of the 12 individual-participant ANOVAs
0.0
gave a significant effect of feature change, F(2, 47) 0
5.75, p < .01, ηp2 0 .20, and one showed a trend
towards a significant effect, F(2, 43) 0 3.07, p 0 .06, -0.5
ηp2 0 .13. All other ANOVAs showed no significant 0 1000 2000
effect (all Fs < 1.79, ps > .18, ηp2s 0 .02 to .08). For RT bins
the participant exhibiting an effect of feature change,
RTs were faster in the double-change (full-Thatcher) 1.0
Grice Inequality

condition than in the eye change (partial-Thatcher) con-

dition, t(30) 0 3.94, p < .01, but not than in the mouth
change (partial-Thatcher) condition, t < 1. These results
do not exhibit a redundancy gain at the level of the
individual.
There was no evidence for a redundancy gain in the RT
data at the level of the mean, as well as at the level of
individuals.8 However, the error data did suggest a redundancy
gain, implying a speed–accuracy trade-off in which RTs were
speeded in the single-change conditions at the expense of
accuracy. If accuracy levels were equal across the single-
change and double-change conditions, a redundancy gain in
RTs may have been found, because single-change RTs may
have needed to be longer to achieve the levels of accuracy
exhibited in the double-change condition. Therefore, the
processing capacity measures will be calculated. Given that
the capacity measures were calculated after incorrect and
twinned correct RTs were removed, the RTs analysed
represent correct nonguessed responses, and therefore
compensate for a speed–accuracy trade-off.
Processing efficiency across time The data were analysed as
for Experiment 1, except that the Cox proportional-hazards
ratio was calculated instead of the capacity coefficient
because of the reduced number of trials, using the
8
As in Experiment 1, nontransformed RTs were also analysed, revealing
the same pattern of results observed for reciprocal RTs.
0.5
0.0
-0.5
0 1000 2000 3000
RT bins
Fig. 6 Processing efficiency data from Experiment 2. For the hazards
ratios, the first 12 bars represent the individual participants, and the
13th bar represents the ratio calculated over all participants. For the
Miller and Grice measures, the black lines represent the mean values
over all participants, and each grey line represents the efficiency
measure for one participant over time
PHREG procedure in SAS. Figure 6 shows the Cox
proportional-hazards ratios, Miller inequalities, and Grice
inequalities at the levels of the group and the individual.
Schoenfeld residuals were calculated for the RTs over all
participants and change conditions (eye, mouth, or both),
using the RESSCH procedure in SAS. There was no signifi-
cant correlation between RTs and the Schoenfeld residuals,
confirming that the assumption of constant proportionality
was met, and therefore the RTs did not require trimming
before analysis.
At the level of the group, the proportional-hazards ratio
was calculated over all participants, with stratification by
Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:1475–1487
participants to control for heterogeneity between the partici-
pants. The ratio was not significantly different from 1 (p 0
.125), indicating that the number of changes had no effect on
processing capacity. To examine changes in capacity over time,
the Miller and Grice inequalities were calculated and showed
no evidence of supercapacity at any time point (no violations of
the Miller inequality), and some evidence for limited capacity
(violations of the Grice inequality).
At the level of individuals, three participants had hazards
ratios that were significantly greater than 1 (all ps ≤ .05),
indicating an increase in processing capacity between one
and two changes (eyes or mouth vs. eyes and mouth). For
the remaining nine participants, and over all participants
together, the hazards ratios were not significantly different
from 1 (all ps > .2). For the changes in capacity over time
(Miller and Grice inequalities), one participant, who also
had a hazards ratio greater than 1, exhibited a large violation
of the Miller inequality, demonstrating supercapacity at the
early time points ( < 625 ms). The same participant showed
no violations of the Grice inequality, indicating that capacity
was not limited. Two other participants had a few minor
violations of the Grice inequality at early time points.
However, the remaining participants had larger violations of
the Grice inequality, implying limited capacity, particularly at
early time points ( < 850 ms).
Discussion
The lack of evidence for supercapacity in Experiment 1
might have been due to the task characteristics allowing
piecemeal sampling of the facial features. In Experiment 2,
such sampling was prevented by restricting eye movements.
However, there was no redundancy gain in RTs for any
individual or at the level of the mean. The lack of a
redundancy gain suggests that there was no benefit of
two changes (typical as compared with full Thatcher)
over the single-change conditions (typical as compared
with partial Thatchers). In addition, the capacity analyses
provided very little evidence for the supercapacity processing
of feature inversion in upright faces. The results are consistent
with inverted eyes and mouths being processed independently
in upright faces, or as having interdependences that are not
excitatory, thus failing to produce supercapacity.
Despite the difference in the tasks, and the measures
taken to encourage configural processing, these results agree
with those from Experiment 1 by demonstrating that
processing of grotesqueness in the Thatcher illusion is
not at supercapacity when participants can terminate on
the first feature completed. There is, however, evidence
that such experimental designs sometimes encourage
analytic, nonconfigural perception of features in faces (Wenger
& Townsend, 2001), while exhaustive processing promotes
findings of supercapacity (Wenger & Townsend, 2006).
1485
The lack of a redundancy gain for grotesqueness
detection here is in contrast with those of Bradshaw
and Wallace (1971; also replicated by Perry, 2008, and
Perry, Blaha, & Townsend, 2008), who found that the
speed of same/different face judgements increased with the
number of differences between the faces. The difference
between the results could be explained by the presentation
of the stimuli, which were presented simultaneously by
Bradshaw and Wallace, but successively here. The simultaneous
presentation used in previous research may have encouraged
piecemeal comparison between the faces, and thereby increased
the probability of attending to a changed feature early in the trial
when there were two changes as compared with when there was
only one. In addition, despite being face-like, the faces used by
Bradshaw and Wallace were sketch-like Identi-Kit faces, which
may have discouraged configural processing (Leder, 1996).
General discussion
Across successive same/different and categorisation tasks,
whether or not eye movements were allowed, similar results
held: The distinguishing of Thatcherised faces from typical
faces generally occurred with capacity processing that was
sub-supercapacity (i.e., was limited to unlimited), such that
the grotesqueness signals in full-Thatcher faces rarely go
beyond the sum of grotesqueness signalled by partial-
Thatcher faces. This finding is contrary to what was
expected. Furthermore, although a simple redundancy gain
was reliably found in Experiment 1, where a categorisation
response was required, it was not found in Experiment 2,
where a same/different response was required. This result
was obtained despite the fact that the experiments were
conducted with trial frequencies that should have biased
towards finding a redundancy gain. We therefore conclude
that the signalling of grotesqueness in Thatcher faces can be
aided when signalled by two features as compared with one,
but this facilitation only occurs when categorisation
responses to single faces are required. Even then, the
processing capacity data are consistent with simple,
parallel horse-race processing, and possibly with serial
processing on occasion (when extreme limited capacity
is found). These data are consistent with two accounts.
First, no interactions formed across inverted eyes and
mouths serve to speed the detection of grotesqueness.
Second, inhibitory interactions exist between feature-
processing channels. In the absence of other data,
Occam’s razor suggests that we should go with the most
parsimonious account and thus conclude that there is
little evidence of interactions across eyes and mouths
in the Thatcher illusion.
While the stimuli and tasks were not equated across
Experiments 1 and 2, a comparison across the two does
1486
reveal something of interest: While responses were faster to
eyes than to mouths in Experiment 1, there was a trend in
the opposite direction in Experiment 2. The shifting trend is
also reflected in the accuracy data, with a significant
interaction across experiments for accuracy [F(2, 44) 0
3.19, p 0 .05], although it misses significance for RTs
[F(2, 44) 0 2.36, p 0 .11]. The two tasks were different,
and therefore there was no a priori expectation that RTs in the
full-Thatcher condition would be matched across experi-
ments. Nevertheless, the fact that they were matched
makes it appropriate to comment on the differential
trends across eyes and mouths. We suggest that the catego-
risation task used in Experiment 1 was approached much as a
recognition task, in which attention tends to be allocated to
eyes (Riby, Riby, & Reay, 2009; Smith et al., 2004). The
same/different task used in Experiment 2 may have been
approached more as a pattern-matching exercise, such that
the preference to attend to the eyes was removed.
The present finding goes beyond the fact that the orientation
of whole faces is critical to enabling the perception of
grotesqueness in the Thatcher illusion. The present
experiments addressed whether there is a positive interaction
between Thatcherised features, as measured by processing
capacity, and showed that no more work is necessarily
achieved in response to full-Thatcher faces than the sum of
the work achieved in response to individual features.
These data are inconsistent with upright faces leading
to a configural superiority effect for the detection of
grotesqueness in the Thatcher illusion, but they are
consistent with research demonstrating that effects that
appear configural in nature can be accounted for by nonconfi-
gural models (Fifić & Townsend, 2010).
The lack of supercapacity in processing Thatcherised
faces is apparently in contrast to the findings of Ingvalson
and Wenger (2005), who found supercapacity processing in
their test of the dual-mode hypothesis. However, there was
an important difference between their work and the present
experiments. Here, we measured capacity for two configural
changes that led to grotesqueness; hence, both changes were
of the same type, and combining the two changes would not
affect the type of information available. Ingvalson and
Wenger, in contrast, were measuring capacity for different
types of changes (featural and configural), to test whether
the two channels of information interact. The difference
between a single change (featural or configural) and both
types of changes is not only in the amount of information,
but in the types of information available. This change in
information type did not take place for the stimuli used here.
The results of the present study should be considered
alongside those of Cornes et al. (2011). Cornes et al.
explored the Thatcher illusion within the terms of general
recognition theory (GRT), using response frequencies rather
than latencies. They demonstrated that the effect of inversion
Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:1475–1487
on the Thatcher illusion could be accounted for by shifts in
perceptual sensitivity and decision criteria (in terms of GRT, a
violation of perceptual and decisional separability) across
orientations. Their data suggested that within-stimulus
interactions between internal and external features in
Thatcher faces were limited. We added to those data here by
reporting very limited evidence of oddity detection occurring
with supercapacity.
The present findings provide some initial evidence about
the relationship between configural processing, processing
capacity, and the Thatcher illusion. Given the surprising lack
of evidence for configural processing in the Thatcher illusion,
it may be that other reported configural face effects should be
similarly explored.
The present experiments were designed to address the issue
of configurality in terms of supercapacity processing, and they
cannot directly speak to questions of processing architecture
(serial vs. parallel vs. coactive) or the stopping rule (self-
terminating vs. exhaustive) (see Wenger & Townsend,
2001). However, the lack of evidence for supercapacity in
the present data suggests that a coactive architecture with
positive dependencies between feature channels (eyes and
mouth) can be ruled out as a possible architecture for the
processing of the Thatcher illusion. For instance, a positively
dependent coactive architecture would give rise to capacity
coefficient values of up to 5 (see Townsend & Wenger, 2004).
Future research should extend these findings such that the
results can speak directly to the processing architecture and
stopping rule, as well as to processing capacity. Such research
should also evaluate performance in tasks that require exhaus-
tive processing (e.g., Wenger & Townsend, 2006). We also
suggest that other tasks used as markers of configurality
should be explored in terms of processing capacity.
Author note A subset of the data presented here were also reported
in Katherine Cornes’s PhD Thesis (2008, University of Southampton),
titled Spatial and Temporal Factors in the Development of Second
Order Relational Processing. Cornes’s PhD was funded by the
Economic and Social Research Council. Thank you to Helen J.
Richards for her advice on the survivor function analyses, and to
Michael J. Wenger, James T. Townsend, Mario Fifić, Joshua
Solomon, and Stefan Schweinberger for their comments on earlier
drafts of the manuscript.
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