G.R. No.

170923               January 20, 2009

SULO SA NAYON, INC. and/or PHILIPPINE VILLAGE HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL E.
PANLILIO vs. NAYONG PILIPINO FOUNDATION
PUNO, C.J.:

FACTS:

Respondent leased a portion of the Nayong Pilipino Complex to petitioner Sulo sa Nayon, Inc.
for the construction and operation of a hotel building, to be known as the Philippine Village
Hotel.
Beginning January 2001, petitioners defaulted in the payment of their monthly rental.
Respondent repeatedly demanded petitioners to pay the arrears and vacate the premises. The
last demand letter was sent on March 26, 2001.
Respondent appealed to the CA which held that the RTC erroneously applied the rules on
accession, as found in Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code when it held that petitioners were
builders in good faith and, thus, have the right to indemnity. Petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the rules on accession, as found in Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, apply
to the instant case.

RULING:

No. This article [Article 448] is manifestly intended to apply only to a case where one builds,
plants, or sows on land in which he believes himself to have a claim of title, and not to lands
where the only interest of the builder, planter or sower is that of a holder, such as a tenant.
In the case at bar, petitioners have no adverse claim or title to the land. In fact, as lessees, they
recognize that the respondent is the owner of the land. What petitioners insist is that because of
the improvements, which are of substantial value, that they have introduced on the leased
premises with the permission of respondent, they should be considered builders in good faith
who have the right to retain possession of the property until reimbursement by respondent.
We affirm the ruling of the CA that introduction of valuable improvements on the leased
premises does not give the petitioners the right of retention and reimbursement which rightfully
belongs to a builder in good faith. Otherwise, such a situation would allow the lessee to easily
"improve" the lessor out of its property. We reiterate the doctrine that a lessee is neither a
builder in good faith nor in bad faith that would call for the application of Articles 448 and 546 of
the Civil Code. 
G.R. No. 180587               March 20, 2009
SIMEON CABANG, VIRGINIA CABANG and VENANCIO CABANG ALIAS “DONDON" vs.
MR. & MRS. GUILLERMO BASAY
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:

Plaintiff Cabang bought Lot No. 7777 from the heirs of Felix Odong and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-22,048 was issued in their name. They did not occupy the said property.

Spouses Basay had been in continuous, open, peaceful and adverse possession of the same
parcel of land since 1956 up to the present on the belief that the area they were actually
occupying was Lot No. 7778. It was then discovered that Spouses Basay were actually
occupying Lot No. 7777.

RTC ruled in favor of Cabang. CA ruled in favor of Basay. Basay offered to pay 21,000 as
payment for the improvements which the respondent rejected arguing that the said lot cannot be
be subject of Motion for Execution as it is a family home. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not a duly constituted family home cannot be subject to execution.

RULING:

It bears stressing that the purpose for which the records of the case were remanded to the court
of origin was for the enforcement of the appellate court’s final and executory judgment in CA-
G.R. CV No. 55207 which, among others, declared herein respondents entitled to the
possession of Lot No. 7777 of the Molave Townsite subject to the provisions of Articles
448, 546, 547 an 548 of the Civil Code. Indeed, the decision explicitly decreed that the remand
of the records of the case was for the court of origin "[t]o determine the rights of the defendants-
appellees under the aforesaid article[s] of the New Civil Code, and to render judgment thereon
in accordance with the evidence and this decision."

There can be no question that a family home is generally exempt from execution, provided it
was duly constituted as such. It is likewise a given that the family home must be constituted on
property owned by the persons constituting it.

Therein lies the fatal flaw in the postulate of petitioners. For all their arguments to the contrary,
the stark and immutable fact is that the property on which their alleged family home stands is
owned by respondents and the question of ownership had been long laid to rest with the finality
of the appellate court’s judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 55207. Thus, petitioners’ continued stay on
the subject land is only by mere tolerance of respondents.
All told, it is too late in the day for petitioners to raise this issue. Without doubt, the instant case
where the family home issue has been vigorously pursued by petitioners is but a clear-cut ploy
meant to forestall the enforcement of an otherwise final and executory decision. The execution
of a final judgment is a matter of right on the part of the prevailing party whose implementation
is mandatory and ministerial on the court or tribunal issuing the judgment.

G.R. No. 165907               July 27, 2009

SPS. DOMINADOR R. NARVAEZ and LILIA W. NARVAEZ vs. SPS. ROSE OGAS ALCISO
and ANTONIO ALCISO
CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

Alciso entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale to Celso S. Bate (Bate). The TCT  was issued in the
name of Bate. Bate entered into a Deed of Sale of Realty, selling the property to the spouses
Spouses Narvaez and the TCT was issued in the name of the Spouses Narvaez who built a
commercial building on the property.

Alciso alleged that she informed the Spouses Narvaez that she wanted to repurchase the
property but they failed to reach an agreement on the repurchase price. RTC rules in favor of
Alciso.

The Court of Appeals held that Bate and the Spouses Narvaez entered into a sale with right of
repurchase and that, applying Article 448 of the Civil Code, Alciso could either appropriate the
commercial building after payment of the indemnity or oblige the Spouses Narvaez to pay the
price of the land, unless the price was considerably more than that of the building. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 448 applies in cases involving contracts of sale with right of repurchase.

RULING:

No. Article 448 is inapplicable in cases involving contracts of sale with right of repurchase — it is
inapplicable when the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter.

Article 448 is inapplicable in the present case because the Spouses Narvaez built the
commercial building on the land that they own. Besides, to compel them to buy the land, which
they own, would be absurd.

In a sale with right of repurchase, the applicable provisions are Articles 1606 and 1616 of the
Civil Code, not Article 448.