The Peak Of Ottoman Power, 1481–1566

Domination of southeastern Europe and the

Middle East
During the century that followed the reign of Mehmed II, the
Ottoman Empire achieved the peak of its power and wealth. New
conquests extended its domain well into central Europe and
throughout the Arab portion of the old Islamic caliphate, and a new
amalgam of political, religious, social, and economic organizations
and traditions was institutionalized and developed into a living,
working whole.

Bayezid II
The reign of Mehmed II’s immediate successor, Bayezid II (1481–
1512), was largely a period of rest. The previous conquests were
consolidated, and many of the political, economic, and social
problems caused by Mehmed’s internal policies were resolved,
leaving a firm foundation for the conquests of the 16th-century
sultans. The economic stringencies imposed to finance Mehmed II’s
campaigns had led during the final year of his reign to a virtual civil
war between the major factions in Istanbul, the devşirme party and
the Turkish aristocracy. Bayezid was installed on the throne by
the Janissaries because of their military domination of the capital,
while his more militant brother Cem fled to Anatolia, where he led a
revolt initially supported by the Turkish notables. Bayezid managed
to conciliate the latter, however, by exposing to them his essentially
pacific plans, which downgraded the devşirme, leaving Cem without
major support. Cem then fled into exile in Mamlūk Syria in the
summer of 1481. He returned the following year with the help of the
Mamlūks and the last Turkmen ruler of Karaman, but his effort to
secure the support of the Turkmen nomads failed because of their
attraction to Bayezid’s heterodox religious policies. Cem remained
in exile, first at the court of the Crusading Knights of Rhodes and
then with the pope in Rome, until his death in 1495. European
efforts to use him as the spearhead of a new Crusade to regain
Istanbul were unsuccessful.
In the meantime, however, the threat that Cem might lead a foreign
attack compelled Bayezid to concentrate on internal consolidation.
Most of the property confiscated by his father for military
campaigns was restored to its original owners. Equal taxes were
established around the empire so that all subjects could fulfill their
obligations to the government without the kind of disruption and
dissatisfaction that had characterized the previous regime.
Particularly important was the establishment of the avâriz-ı
divaniye (“war chest”) tax, which provided for the extraordinary
expenditures of war without special confiscations or heavy levies.
The value of the coinage was restored, and Mehmed II’s plans for
economic expansion were at last brought to fruition. To that end,
thousands of Jews expelled from Spain by the Inquisition during the
summer of 1492 were encouraged to immigrate to the Ottoman
Empire. They settled particularly in Istanbul, Salonika (present-
day Thessaloníki, Greece), and Edirne, where they joined their
coreligionists in a golden age of Ottoman Jewry that lasted well into
the 17th century, when Ottoman decline and the rising power of
European diplomats and merchants enabled them to promote the
interests of the sultan’s Christian subjects at the expense of Muslims
and Jews alike. Bayezid II completed the effort begun by Mehmed II
to replace the vassals with direct Ottoman administration
throughout the empire. For the first time the central government
regularly operated under a balanced budget. Culturally, Bayezid
stimulated a strong reaction against the Christianizing trends of the
previous half century. The Turkish language and Muslim traditions
were emphasized. Since Bayezid himself was a mystic, he brought
mystic rituals and teachings into the institutions and practices of
orthodox Islam in order to counteract the increasing menace of
heterodox Shīʿism among the tribes of eastern Anatolia.
Though Bayezid preferred to maintain peace—in order to have the
time and resources to concentrate on internal development—he was
forced into a number of campaigns by the exigencies of the period
and the demands of his more militant devşirme followers. In Europe
he rounded off the empire south of the Danube and Sava rivers by
taking Herzegovina (1483), leaving only Belgrade outside Ottoman
control. The Hungarian king Matthias Corvinus (ruled 1458–90)
was interested mainly in establishing his rule over Bohemia and
agreed to peace with the Ottomans (1484), and, after his death,
struggles for succession left that front relatively quiet for the
remainder of Bayezid’s reign. To the northeast the sultan pushed
Ottoman territory north of the Danube, along the shores of the Black
Sea, capturing in 1484 the ports of Kilia (present-day Kiliya) and
Akkerman (Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyy)—both in what is now Ukraine—
which controlled the mouths of the Danube and Dniester. The
Ottomans thus controlled the major entrepôts of northern European
trade with the Black Sea and Mediterranean. Because those
advances conflicted with the ambitions of Poland, in 1483–84 war
ensued, until the diversion of Poland by the threat
of Muscovy under Ivan III the Great left that front quiet also after
1484.
Bayezid then turned to the east, where previous conquests as far as
the Euphrates River had brought the Ottomans up to the Mamlūk
empire. Conflict over control of the small Turkmen principality
of Dulkadir (Dhū al-Qadr), which controlled much of Cilicia in
southern Anatolia and the mountains south of Lake Van, and an
Ottoman desire to share in control of the Muslim holy cities
of Mecca and Medina led to an intermittent war (1485–91). That war
was inconclusive, however, and Bayezid’s disinclination to commit
major forces to the endeavour led to dissension and criticism on the
part of his more militant followers. To counter that, Bayezid tried to
use Hungarian internal dissension to take Belgrade, without
success, and raiding forces sent into Transylvania, Croatia, and
Carinthia (present-day Kärnten state, Austria) were turned back. In
1495 Cem died and a new peace with Hungary left Bayezid’s
objectives unfulfilled, so he turned toward Venice, his other major
European enemy. Venice had been encouraging revolts against the
sultan in the Morea (Peloponnese) and in Dalmatia and Albania,
which it had ceded to the Ottomans in 1479. It also gained control
of Cyprus (1489) and built there a major naval base, which it refused
to allow Bayezid to use against the Mamlūks. Instead, the Venetians
used Cyprus as a base for pirate raids against Ottoman shipping and
shores, thus pointing up the island’s strategic importance to the
sultan. Bayezid also hoped to conquer the last Venetian ports in the
Morea to establish bases for complete Ottoman naval control of the
eastern Mediterranean. All those objectives, except control of
Cyprus, were achieved in the war with Venice that followed in 1499–
1503. The Ottoman fleet emerged for the first time as a major
Mediterranean naval power, and the Ottomans became
an integral part of European diplomatic relations.
Bayezid never was able to use that situation to make new conquests
in Europe, because the rise of revolts in eastern Anatolia occupied
much of his attention during the last years of his reign. There the old
conflict resumed between the autonomous, uncivilized nomads and
the stable, settled Middle Eastern civilization of the Ottomans. The
Turkmen nomads resisted the efforts of the Ottomans to expand
their administrative control to all parts of the empire. In reaction to
the orthodox Muslim establishment, the nomads developed a
fanatical attachment to the leaders of the Sufi and Shīʿite mystic
orders. The most successful of those were the Ṣafavids of Ardabīl, a
Turkish mystic order that had immigrated there from eastern
Anatolia along with seven Turkmen tribes
(called Kizilbash [“Redheads”] because of their use of red headgear
to symbolize their allegiance); the Ṣafavids used a combined
religious and military appeal to conquer most of Iran. Under the
shah Ismāʿīl I (ruled 1501–24), the Ṣafavids sent missionaries
throughout Anatolia, spreading a message of religious heresy and
political revolt not only among the tribal peoples but also to
cultivators and some urban elements, who began to see in that
movement the answers to their own problems.
A series of revolts resulted, which Bayezid was unable or unwilling
to suppress, because of his involvements in Europe and because his
mystic preferences inclined him to sympathize with the religious
message of the rebels. Finally, at the start of the 16th century, a
general Anatolian uprising forced Bayezid into a major expedition
(1502–03) that pushed the Ṣafavids and many of their Turkmen
followers into Iran. There the Ṣafavids turned from orthodox Sufism
to heterodox Shīʿism as a means of gaining the loyalty of the
Persians to a Turkish dynasty. Ismāʿīl continued, however, to spread
his message as Sufi leader in Anatolia, leading to a second major
revolt of his followers against the Ottomans (1511). All the
grievances of the time coalesced into what was essentially a religious
uprising against the central government, and only a major
expedition led by the grand vizier Ali Paşa could suppress it. But the
conditions that had caused the uprising remained a major problem
for Bayezid’s successor. In the end Bayezid’s increasingly mystic and
pacific nature led the Janissaries to dethrone him in favour of his
militant and active son Selim.

Selim I
Whereas Bayezid had been put on the throne by the Janissaries
despite his pacific nature and carried out military activities with
reluctance, Selim I (ruled 1512–20) shared their desire to return
to Mehmed II’s aggressive policy of conquest. But Selim did not
wish to be dependent on or controlled by those who had brought
him to power, so he killed not only all of his brothers but also all
seven of their sons and four of his own five sons, leaving only the
ablest, Süleyman, as the sole heir to the throne. That action deprived
potential opponents of alternative leaders around whom they could
coalesce. Selim was thus able to leave the devşirme in control of the
government, but it was he who dominated. Selim’s
ambitions encompassed Europe as well as Asia. Bayezid had left the
European fronts relatively quiet, however, so the new sultan turned
first to the east and chose the Ṣafavids of Iran as his initial victims.

Selim I, detail of a miniature, 16th century; in the Topkapı Palace

Museum, IstanbulSonia Halliday
Selim first launched a vigorous campaign against the Ṣafavid
supporters in eastern Anatolia, massacring thousands of tribesmen
and missionaries and espousing a strict defense of Islamic
orthodoxy as a means of regaining political control. In the summer
of 1514 he undertook a major expedition against the Ṣafavids,
hoping to add Iran to his empire and finally eliminate the threat of
heterodoxy. Ismaīʿīl employed a scorched-earth policy, retiring into
central Iran and hoping that winter would force the Ottomans to
retire without a battle. But the militant Kizilbash followers of the
Ṣafavids forced the shah to accept battle by intercepting the
Ottomans before they entered Azerbaijan. The Ottomans, with
superior weapons and tactics, routed the Ṣafavid army
at Chāldirān (August 23, 1514), northeast of Lake Van in Iran;
Selim’s cannons and gunpowder overpowered the spears and arrows
of the Ṣafavids.
Although Azerbaijan’s capital, Tabrīz, was occupied, the Ottoman
victory did not lead to the conquest of Iran or the collapse of the
Ṣafavid empire. The Ottoman army became increasingly
discontented under the impact of Ṣafavid propaganda among the
already heterodox Janissaries. A relative lack of booty and supplies
compared with campaigns in Europe also weakened morale. Selim
was compelled to retire, and the Ṣafavids regained their lost
province without resistance. The major result of the Chāldirān battle
was to convince Ismāʿīl and his successors to avoid open conflict
with the Ottomans at all costs, a policy that continued for a century.
The Ṣafavid army was thus preserved, but the battle enabled Selim
to overcome the last independent Turkmen dynasties in eastern
Anatolia (1515–17) and to establish a strong strategic position
relative to the Mamlūk empire, which was falling into internal decay
and was ripe for conquest. While Ismāʿīl was occupied with the
restoration of his army, Selim I was able to overwhelm
the Mamlūks in a single, yearlong campaign (1516–17). The Mamlūk
army fell easily to the well-organized and disciplined Ottoman
infantry and cavalry supported by artillery. The conquest was aided
by the support of many Mamlūk officials, who betrayed their
masters in return for important positions and revenues promised by
the conquerors. In addition, most of the major populated centres
of Syria and Egypt turned out their Mamlūk garrisons, preferring
the security and order offered by the Ottomans to the anarchy and
terror of the final century of Mamlūk dominion. Thus, in a single
sweep, Selim doubled the size of his empire, adding to it all the
lands of the old Islamic caliphate with the exception of Iran, which
remained under the Ṣafavids, and Mesopotamia, which was taken by
his successor.