G.R. No.

175888               February 11, 2009

SUZETTE NICOLAS y SOMBILON, Petitioner,

vs.
ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs; RAUL GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice;
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Interior and
Local Government; SERGIO APOSTOL, in his capacity as Presidential Legal Counsel; and L/CPL. DANIEL SMITH,
Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 176051               February 11, 2009

JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, JOSE DE LA RAMA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., FLORIN
HILBAY, and BENJAMIN POZON, Petitioners,
vs.
DANIEL SMITH, SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL SERGIO APOSTOL, SECRETARY
RONALDO PUNO, SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, The Special 16th Division of the COURT OF APPEALS, and all persons
acting in their capacity, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 176222               February 11, 2009

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), represented by Dr. Carol Araullo; GABRIELA, represented by Emerenciana de
Jesus; BAYAN MUNA, represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo; GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, represented by Rep. Liza Maza;
KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU), represented by Elmer Labog; KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), represented by
Willy Marbella; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), represented by Vencer Crisostomo; and THE PUBLIC INTEREST LAW
CENTER, represented by Atty. Rachel Pastores, Petitioners,
vs.
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as concurrent Defense Secretary, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, AND
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, Respondents.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

These are petitions for certiorari, etc. as special civil actions and/or for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in Lance Corporal
Daniel J. Smith v. Hon. Benjamin T. Pozon, et al., in CA-G.R. SP No. 97212, dated January 2, 2007.

The facts are not disputed.

Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the United States Armed Forces. He was charged with the crime of
rape committed against a Filipina, petitioner herein, sometime on November 1, 2005, as follows:

The undersigned accused LCpl. Daniel Smith, Ssgt. Chad Brian Carpentier, Dominic Duplantis, Keith Silkwood and Timoteo L. Soriano,
Jr. of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 8353, upon a complaint under
oath filed by Suzette S. Nicolas, which is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as Annex "A," committed as follows:

"That on or about the First (1st) day of November 2005, inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Olongapo City and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused’s (sic), being then members of the United States Marine Corps, except Timoteo L.
Soriano, Jr., conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with lewd design and by means of force, threat and
intimidation, with abuse of superior strength and taking advantage of the intoxication of the victim, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sexually abuse and have sexual intercourse with or carnal knowledge of one Suzette S. Nicolas, a 22-year old
unmarried woman inside a Starex Van with Plate No. WKF-162, owned by Starways Travel and Tours, with Office address at 8900 P.
Victor St., Guadalupe, Makati City, and driven by accused Timoteo L. Soriano, Jr., against the will and consent of the said Suzette S.
Nicolas, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW."1

Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, entered into on
February 10, 1998, the United States, at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith pending the proceedings.

During the trial, which was transferred from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zambales to the RTC of Makati for security reasons, the
United States Government faithfully complied with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith to the trial court every time his presence
was required.

On December 4, 2006, the RTC of Makati, following the end of the trial, rendered its Decision, finding defendant Smith guilty, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution to adduce sufficient evidence against accused S/SGT. CHAD BRIAN
CARPENTER, L/CPL. KEITH SILKWOOD AND L/CPL. DOMINIC DUPLANTIS, all of the US Marine Corps assigned at the USS Essex,
are hereby ACQUITTED to the crime charged.

The prosecution having presented sufficient evidence against accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH, also of the US Marine Corps at the
USS Essex, this Court hereby finds him GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of RAPE defined under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, and, in accordance with Article 266-B, first paragraph thereof,
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with the accessory penalties provided for under Article 41 of
the same Code.

Pursuant to Article V, paragraph No. 10, of the Visiting Forces Agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States,
accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH shall serve his sentence in the facilities that shall, thereafter, be agreed upon by appropriate
Philippine and United States authorities. Pending agreement on such facilities, accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH is hereby temporarily
committed to the Makati City Jail.

Accused L/CPL. DANIEL J. SMITH is further sentenced to indemnify complainant SUZETTE S. NICOLAS in the amount of ₱50,000.00
as compensatory damages plus ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.2

As a result, the Makati court ordered Smith detained at the Makati jail until further orders.

On December 29, 2006, however, defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law enforcement
agents, purportedly acting under orders of the Department of the Interior and Local Government, and brought to a facility for detention
under the control of the United States government, provided for under new agreements between the Philippines and the United States,
referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 19, 2006 which states:

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America agree that, in accordance with
the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between our two nations, Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine Corps, be
returned to U.S. military custody at the U.S. Embassy in Manila.

(Sgd.) Kristie A. Kenney (Sgd.) Alberto G. Romulo

Representative of the United States Representative of the Republic
of America of the Philippines

DATE: 12-19-06 DATE: December 19, 2006

and the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 22, 2006 which states:

The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines and the Embassy of the United States of America agree that, in
accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between the two nations, upon transfer of Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith,
United States Marine Corps, from the Makati City Jail, he will be detained at the first floor, Rowe (JUSMAG) Building, U.S. Embassy
Compound in a room of approximately 10 x 12 square feet. He will be guarded round the clock by U.S. military personnel. The
Philippine police and jail authorities, under the direct supervision of the Philippine Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
will have access to the place of detention to ensure the United States is in compliance with the terms of the VFA.

The matter was brought before the Court of Appeals which decided on January 2, 2007, as follows:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, we resolved to DISMISS the petition for having become moot.3

Hence, the present actions.

The petitions were heard on oral arguments on September 19, 2008, after which the parties submitted their memoranda.

Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of defendant L/CPL Smith because, first of all, the VFA is void and
unconstitutional.

This issue had been raised before, and this Court resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the VFA. This was in Bayan v. Zamora, 4
brought by Bayan, one of petitioners in the present cases.

Against the barriers of res judicata vis-à-vis Bayan, and stare decisis vis-à-vis all the parties, the reversal of the previous ruling is
sought on the ground that the issue is of primordial importance, involving the sovereignty of the Republic, as well as a specific mandate
of the Constitution.

The provision of the Constitution is Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 which states:

Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military
Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that
purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

The reason for this provision lies in history and the Philippine experience in regard to the United States military bases in the country.

It will be recalled that under the Philippine Bill of 1902, which laid the basis for the Philippine Commonwealth and, eventually, for the
recognition of independence, the United States agreed to cede to the Philippines all the territory it acquired from Spain under the Treaty
of Paris, plus a few islands later added to its realm, except certain naval ports and/or military bases and facilities, which the United
States retained for itself.

This is noteworthy, because what this means is that Clark and Subic and the other places in the Philippines covered by the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement of 1947 were not Philippine territory, as they were excluded from the cession and retained by the US.
Accordingly, the Philippines had no jurisdiction over these bases except to the extent allowed by the United States. Furthermore, the
RP-US Military Bases Agreement was never advised for ratification by the United States Senate, a disparity in treatment, because the
Philippines regarded it as a treaty and had it concurred in by our Senate.

Subsequently, the United States agreed to turn over these bases to the Philippines; and with the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement in 1991, the territory covered by these bases were finally ceded to the Philippines.

To prevent a recurrence of this experience, the provision in question was adopted in the 1987 Constitution.

The provision is thus designed to ensure that any agreement allowing the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in
Philippine territory shall be equally binding on the Philippines and the foreign sovereign State involved. The idea is to prevent a
recurrence of the situation in which the terms and conditions governing the presence of foreign armed forces in our territory were
binding upon us but not upon the foreign State.

Applying the provision to the situation involved in these cases, the question is whether or not the presence of US Armed Forces in
Philippine territory pursuant to the VFA is allowed "under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate xxx and recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting State."

This Court finds that it is, for two reasons.

First, as held in Bayan v. Zamora,5 the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the
United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States government.

The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate does not detract from its status as a
binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal United States law. Notice can be
taken of the internationally known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements that are
policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry out or further implement these policymaking agreements are merely submitted to
Congress, under the provisions of the so-called Case–Zablocki Act, within sixty days from ratification.6

The second reason has to do with the relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951. This earlier
agreement was signed and duly ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the United States Senate.

The RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty states:7

MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Signed
at Washington, August 30, 1951.

The Parties of this Treaty

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all
peoples and all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area.

Recalling with mutual pride the historic relationship which brought their two peoples together in a common bond of sympathy and
mutual ideals to fight side-by-side against imperialist aggression during the last war.

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination to defend themselves against external
armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area.

Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the
development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific area.

Agreeing that nothing in this present instrument shall be considered or interpreted as in any way or sense altering or diminishing any
existing agreements or understandings between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America.

Have agreed as follows:

Article I. The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may
be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in
their international relation from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article II. In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid
will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article III. The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will consult together from time to time regarding the
implementation of this Treaty and whenever in the opinion of either of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of
either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific.

Article IV. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace
and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United
Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain
international peace and security.
Article V. For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the
metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean, its armed forces,
public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

Article VI. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under
the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article VII. This Treaty shall be ratified by the Republic of the Philippines and the United Nations of America in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at
Manila.

Article VIII. This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other
party.

In withness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done in duplicate at Washington this thirtieth day of August, 1951.

For the Republic of the Philippines:

(Sgd.) Carlos P. Romulo

(Sgd.) Joaquin M. Elizalde

(Sgd.) Vicente J. Francisco

(Sgd.) Diosdado Macapagal

For the United States of America:

(Sgd.) Dean Acheson

(Sgd.) John Foster Dulles

(Sgd.) Tom Connally

(Sgd.) Alexander Wiley8

Clearly, therefore, joint RP-US military exercises for the purpose of developing the capability to resist an armed attack fall squarely
under the provisions of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon to provide for the joint RP-US
military exercises, is simply an implementing agreement to the main RP-US Military Defense Treaty. The Preamble of the VFA states:

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to strengthen international
and regional security in the Pacific area;

Reaffirming their obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951;

Noting that from time to time elements of the United States armed forces may visit the Republic of the Philippines;

Considering that cooperation between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines promotes their common security interests;

Recognizing the desirability of defining the treatment of United States personnel visiting the Republic of the Philippines;

Have agreed as follows:9

Accordingly, as an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, it was not necessary to submit the VFA to the US
Senate for advice and consent, but merely to the US Congress under the Case–Zablocki Act within 60 days of its ratification. It is for
this reason that the US has certified that it recognizes the VFA as a binding international agreement, i.e., a treaty, and this substantially
complies with the requirements of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of our Constitution.10

The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is complied with by virtue of the fact that the presence of the US Armed Forces
through the VFA is a presence "allowed under" the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty itself has
been ratified and concurred in by both the Philippine Senate and the US Senate, there is no violation of the Constitutional provision
resulting from such presence.

The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and
provisions.

The VFA provides that in cases of offenses committed by the members of the US Armed Forces in the Philippines, the following rules
apply:
 Article V

Criminal Jurisdiction

xxx

6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall immediately reside with United
States military authorities, if they so request, from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings. United
States military authorities shall, upon formal notification by the Philippine authorities and without delay, make such personnel available
to those authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the offense with which the person has been charged.
In extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government shall present its position to the United States Government regarding custody, which
the United States Government shall take into full account. In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one
year, the United States shall be relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one year period will not include the time
necessary to appeal. Also, the one year period will not include any time during which scheduled trial procedures are delayed because
United States authorities, after timely notification by Philippine authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.

Petitioners contend that these undertakings violate another provision of the Constitution, namely, that providing for the exclusive power
of this Court to adopt rules of procedure for all courts in the Philippines (Art. VIII, Sec. 5[5]). They argue that to allow the transfer of
custody of an accused to a foreign power is to provide for a different rule of procedure for that accused, which also violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution (Art. III, Sec. 1.).

Again, this Court finds no violation of the Constitution.

The equal protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign
military armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all other accused.11

The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces allowed to enter one’s territory is immune from local jurisdiction, except to the
extent agreed upon. The Status of Forces Agreements involving foreign military units around the world vary in terms and conditions,
according to the situation of the parties involved, and reflect their bargaining power. But the principle remains, i.e., the receiving State
can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties.12

As a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure is curtailed or violated, but
rather one in which, as is normally encountered around the world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of one State do not extend or
apply – except to the extent agreed upon – to subjects of another State due to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity given to such
bodies as visiting foreign armed forces.

Nothing in the Constitution prohibits such agreements recognizing immunity from jurisdiction or some aspects of jurisdiction (such as
custody), in relation to long-recognized subjects of such immunity like Heads of State, diplomats and members of the armed forces
contingents of a foreign State allowed to enter another State’s territory. On the contrary, the Constitution states that the Philippines
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. (Art. II, Sec. 2).

Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a different treatment when it comes to detention as against
custody. The moment the accused has to be detained, e.g., after conviction, the rule that governs is the following provision of the VFA:

Article V

Criminal Jurisdiction

xxx

Sec. 10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by
appropriate Philippines and United States authorities. United States personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the right
to visits and material assistance.

It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference between custody during the trial and detention after conviction, because
they provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention. And this specific arrangement clearly states not only that the detention
shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also that the detention shall be "by Philippine authorities."
Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of the accused in
the United States Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not "by Philippine authorities."

Respondents should therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate with representatives of the United States towards an agreement on
detention facilities under Philippine authorities as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA.

Next, the Court addresses the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Medellin v. Texas ( 552 US ___ No. 06-984,
March 25, 2008), which held that treaties entered into by the United States are not automatically part of their domestic law unless these
treaties are self-executing or there is an implementing legislation to make them enforceable.1avvphi1

On February 3, 2009, the Court issued a Resolution, thus:

"G.R. No. 175888 (Suzette Nicolas y Sombilon v. Alberto Romulo, et al.); G.R. No. 176051 (Jovito R. Salonga, et al. v. Daniel Smith, et
al.); and G.R. No. 176222 (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan [BAYAN], et al. v. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.).

The parties, including the Solicitor General, are required to submit within three (3) days a Comment/Manifestation on the following
points:
 1. What is the implication on the RP-US Visiting Forces Agreement of the recent US Supreme Court decision in Jose
Ernesto Medellin v. Texas, dated March 25, 2008, to the effect that treaty stipulations that are not self-executory can
only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect; and that, while treaties may comprise international
commitments, they are not domestic law unless Congress has enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself
conveys an intention that it be "self-executory" and is ratified on these terms?

2. Whether the VFA is enforceable in the US as domestic law, either because it is self-executory or because there
exists legislation to implement it.

3. Whether the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951 was concurred in by the US Senate and, if so, is
there proof of the US Senate advice and consent resolution? Peralta, J., no part."

After deliberation, the Court holds, on these points, as follows:

First, the VFA is a self-executing Agreement, as that term is defined in Medellin itself, because the parties intend its provisions to be
enforceable, precisely because the Agreement is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to produce
L/CPL Smith before the court during the trial.

Secondly, the VFA is covered by implementing legislation, namely, the Case-Zablocki Act, USC Sec. 112(b), inasmuch as it is the very
purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be
immediately implemented. The parties to these present cases do not question the fact that the VFA has been registered under the
Case-Zablocki Act.1avvphi1

In sum, therefore, the VFA differs from the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the Avena decision of the International Court
of Justice (ICJ), subject matter of the Medellin decision. The Convention and the ICJ decision are not self-executing and are not
registrable under the Case-Zablocki Act, and thus lack legislative implementing authority.

Finally, the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty was advised and consented to by the US Senate on March 20, 1952, as reflected in the US
Congressional Record, 82nd Congress, Second Session, Vol. 98 – Part 2, pp. 2594-2595.

The framers of the Constitution were aware that the application of international law in domestic courts varies from country to country.

As Ward N. Ferdinandusse states in his Treatise, DIRECT APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN NATIONAL
COURTS, some countries require legislation whereas others do not.

It was not the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting Article XVIII, Sec. 25, to require the other contracting State
to convert their system to achieve alignment and parity with ours. It was simply required that the treaty be recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting State. With that, it becomes for both parties a binding international obligation and the enforcement of that obligation is
left to the normal recourse and processes under international law.

Furthermore, as held by the US Supreme Court in Weinberger v. Rossi,13 an executive agreement is a "treaty" within the meaning of
that word in international law and constitutes enforceable domestic law vis-à-vis the United States. Thus, the US Supreme Court in
Weinberger enforced the provisions of the executive agreement granting preferential employment to Filipinos in the US Bases here.

Accordingly, there are three types of treaties in the American system:

1. Art. II, Sec. 2 treaties – These are advised and consented to by the US Senate in accordance with Art. II, Sec. 2 of
the US Constitution.

2. Executive–Congressional Agreements: These are joint agreements of the President and Congress and need not
be submitted to the Senate.

3. Sole Executive Agreements. – These are agreements entered into by the President. They are to be submitted to
Congress within sixty (60) days of ratification under the provisions of the Case-Zablocki Act, after which they are
recognized by the Congress and may be implemented.

As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given under it and this can
only be done through implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another form of implementation of its provisions.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED, and the Court of Appeals’ Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97212 dated January 2,
2007 is MODIFIED. The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, entered into
on February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006 are
DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA, and respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs is hereby ordered to forthwith negotiate with
the United States representatives for the appropriate agreement on detention facilities under Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V,
Sec. 10 of the VFA, pending which the status quo shall be maintained until further orders by this Court.

The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve without delay the related matters pending therein, namely, the petition for contempt
and the appeal of L/CPL Daniel Smith from the judgment of conviction.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
G.R No. 187167               August 16, 2011

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE,
JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA BARBARA ACAS,
VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA,
JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI CAÑETE,
VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III,
GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY
KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO,
JAKLYN HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK
TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO,
MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA,
and MARCELINO VELOSO III, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY,
and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522 1 (RA
9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.

The Antecedents

In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) 2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
archipelagic State.3 This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in
1958 (UNCLOS I),4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their "territorial sea," the breadth of
which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in
1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for
legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of
baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was
prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III),5 which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984. 6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land
ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines 7 and sets the deadline for the filing of
application for the extended continental shelf.8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline,
optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely,
the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own
applicable maritime zones.

Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or x x x
legislators,"9 as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522
reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of
Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris 11 and ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522
opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining
Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine
resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions. 13

In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in the loss of a
large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. 14 To buttress their argument of territorial
diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included – its failure to reference either the Treaty
of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III’s framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG
and the Scarborough Shoal.

Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petition’s compliance with the
case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners’ alleged lack of locus standi and (2) the
propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents
defended RA 9522 as the country’s compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG
or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the country’s security, environment and
economic interests or relinquish the Philippines’ claim over Sabah.
Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners’ assertion that what Spain ceded to
the United States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of the
rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.

We left unacted petitioners’ prayer for an injunctive writ.

The Issues

The petition raises the following issues:

1. Preliminarily –

1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and

2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of
RA 9522.

2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

The Ruling of the Court

On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of
certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to
declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.

On the Threshold Issues

Petitioners Possess Locus
Standi as Citizens

Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition alleges
neither infringement of legislative prerogative15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by the passage and
implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners’ locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient
interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating
urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants
possessing "a more direct and specific interest" to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting
citizenship standing.17

The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition

Are Proper Remedies to Test
the Constitutionality of Statutes

In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of
the writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in
the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part
of petitioners.18

Respondents’ submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional power of
judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to
test the constitutionality of statutes,19 and indeed, of acts of other branches of government. 20 Issues of constitutional
import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners,
carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the
case and pass upon the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute
sought to be reviewed here is one such law.

RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional

RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool
to Demarcate the Country’s
Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
Delineate Philippine Territory

Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the national territory" 21 because it discards the pre-
UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the
definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional
definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the
territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners
argue that from the Treaty of Paris’ technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds
of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris. 22

Petitioners’ theory fails to persuade us.

G.R. No. 206510               September 16, 2014

MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa D.D.; MOST REV. DEOGRACIAS S. INIGUEZ, JR., Bishop-Emeritus of
Caloocan, FRANCES Q. QUIMPO, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., Kalikasan-PNE, MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, RENATO M. REYES, JR.,
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, HON. NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, Bayan Muna Partylist, ROLAND G. SIMBULAN, PH.D., Junk VF A
Movement, TERESITA R. PEREZ, PH.D., HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, Kabataan Party-list, PETER SJ. GONZALES, Pamalakaya, GIOVANNI
A. TAPANG, PH. D., Agham, ELMER C. LABOG, Kilusang Mayo Uno, JOAN MAY E. SALVADOR, Gabriela, JOSE ENRIQUE A. AFRICA,
THERESA A. CONCEPCION, MARY JOAN A. GUAN, NESTOR T. BAGUINON, PH.D., A. EDSEL F. TUPAZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as Commander of the US. 7th Fleet, MARK A. RICE in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS
Guardian, PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, HON. ALBERT
F. DEL ROSARIO, Secretary, pepartment of Foreign Affair.s, HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Executiv~.:Secretary, Office of the President, . HON.
VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN, Secretary, Department of National Defense, HON. RAMON JESUS P. P AJE, Secretary, Department of Environment and
Natural Resoz!rces, VICE ADMIRAL JOSE LUIS M. ALANO, Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines,
ADMIRAL RODOLFO D. ISO RENA, Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard, COMMODORE ENRICO EFREN EVANGELISTA, Philippine Coast
Guard Palawan, MAJOR GEN. VIRGILIO 0. DOMINGO, Commandant of Armed Forces of the Philippines Command and LT. GEN. TERRY G.
ROBLING, US Marine Corps Forces. Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercise Co-Director, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR, J.:

Before us is a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under
Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules), involving violations of environmental laws
and regulations in relation to the grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs.

Factual Background

The name "Tubbataha" came from the Samal (seafaring people of southern Philippines) language which means "long reef exposed at low tide."
Tubbataha is composed of two huge coral atolls - the north atoll and the south atoll - and the Jessie Beazley Reef, a smaller coral structure about 20
kilometers north of the atolls. The reefs of Tubbataha and Jessie Beazley are considered part of Cagayancillo, a remote island municipality of Palawan. 1

In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on August 11, 1988.
Located in the middle of Central Sulu Sea, 150 kilometers southeast of Puerto Princesa City, Tubbataha lies at the heart of the Coral Triangle, the global
center of marine biodiversity.

In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. It was
recognized as one of the Philippines' oldest ecosystems, containing excellent examples of pristine reefs and a high diversity of marine life. The 97,030-
hectare protected marine park is also an important habitat for internationally threatened and endangered marine species. UNESCO cited Tubbataha's
outstanding universal value as an important and significant natural habitat for in situ conservation of biological diversity; an example representing
significant on-going ecological and biological processes; and an area of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance. 2

On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067, 3 otherwise known as the "Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to
ensure the protection and conservation of the globally significant economic, biological, sociocultural, educational and scientific values of the Tubbataha
Reefs into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and future generations." Under the "no-take" policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is strictly regulated
and many human activities are prohibited and penalized or fined, including fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the resources within the TRNP.
The law likewise created the Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board (TPAMB) which shall be the sole policy-making and permit-granting body of
the TRNP.

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested
diplomatic clearance for the said vessel "to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of
routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty." 4 On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13,
2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.1âwphi1

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while
transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan.
No cine was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift, expressed regret for the incident in a press statement. 5 Likewise, US
Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a meeting at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on February 4, "reiterated his regrets over
the grounding incident and assured Foreign Affairs Secretazy Albert F. del Rosario that the United States will provide appropriate compensation for
damage to the reef caused by the ship." 6 By March 30, 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship
from the coral reef.

On April 1 7, 2013, the above-named petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their respective sector/organization and others, including minors
or generations yet unborn, filed the present petition agairtst Scott H. Swift in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th Fleet, Mark A. Rice in his
capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian and Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling, US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercises
Co-Director ("US respondents"); President Benigno S. Aquino III in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
DF A Secretary Albert F. Del Rosario, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr., Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin (Department of National Defense),
Secretary Jesus P. Paje (Department of Environment and Natural Resources), Vice-Admiral Jose Luis M. Alano (Philippine Navy Flag Officer in
Command, AFP), Admiral Rodolfo D. Isorena (Philippine Coast Guard Commandant), Commodore Enrico Efren Evangelista (Philippine Coast Guard-
Palawan), and Major General Virgilio 0. Domingo (AFP Commandant), collectively the "Philippine respondents."

The Petition

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage
of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte,
Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from this
Court for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection with
the grounding incident.

Specifically, petitioners cite the following violations committed by US respondents under R.A. No. 10067: unauthorized entry (Section 19); non-payment
of conservation fees (Section 21 ); obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section 30); damages to the reef (Section 20); and destroying and disturbing
resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore, petitioners assail certain provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court to nullify
for being unconstitutional.
The numerous reliefs sought in this case are set forth in the final prayer of the petition, to wit: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Petitioners
respectfully pray that the Honorable Court: 1. Immediately issue upon the filing of this petition a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)
and/or a Writ of Kalikasan, which shall, in particular,

a. Order Respondents and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist all operations over the Guardian grounding incident;

b. Initially demarcating the metes and bounds of the damaged area as well as an additional buffer zone;

c. Order Respondents to stop all port calls and war games under 'Balikatan' because of the absence of clear guidelines, duties, and liability
schemes for breaches of those duties, and require Respondents to assume responsibility for prior and future environmental damage in
general, and environmental damage under the Visiting Forces Agreement in particular.

d. Temporarily define and describe allowable activities of ecotourism, diving, recreation, and limited commercial activities by fisherfolk and
indigenous communities near or around the TRNP but away from the damaged site and an additional buffer zone;

2. After summary hearing, issue a Resolution extending the TEPO until further orders of the Court;

3. After due proceedings, render a Decision which shall include, without limitation:

a. Order Respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, following the dispositive portion of Nicolas v. Romulo, "to forthwith negotiate with the
United States representatives for the appropriate agreement on [environmental guidelines and environmental accountability] under Philippine
authorities as provided in Art. V[] of the VFA ... "

b. Direct Respondents and appropriate agencies to commence administrative, civil, and criminal proceedings against erring officers and
individuals to the full extent of the law, and to make such proceedings public;

c. Declare that Philippine authorities may exercise primary and exclusive criminal jurisdiction over erring U.S. personnel under the
circumstances of this case;

d. Require Respondents to pay just and reasonable compensation in the settlement of all meritorious claims for damages caused to the
Tubbataha Reef on terms and conditions no less severe than those applicable to other States, and damages for personal injury or death, if
such had been the case;

e. Direct Respondents to cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses and in the collection and production of evidence, including
seizure and delivery of objects connected with the offenses related to the grounding of the Guardian;

f. Require the authorities of the Philippines and the United States to notify each other of the disposition of all cases, wherever heard, related to
the grounding of the Guardian;

g. Restrain Respondents from proceeding with any purported restoration, repair, salvage or post salvage plan or plans, including cleanup
plans covering the damaged area of the Tubbataha Reef absent a just settlement approved by the Honorable Court;

h. Require Respondents to engage in stakeholder and LOU consultations in accordance with the Local Government Code and R.A. 10067;

i. Require Respondent US officials and their representatives to place a deposit to the TRNP Trust Fund defined under Section 17 of RA 10067
as a bona .fide gesture towards full reparations;

j. Direct Respondents to undertake measures to rehabilitate the areas affected by the grounding of the Guardian in light of Respondents'
experience in the Port Royale grounding in 2009, among other similar grounding incidents;

k. Require Respondents to regularly publish on a quarterly basis and in the name of transparency and accountability such environmental
damage assessment, valuation, and valuation methods, in all stages of negotiation;

l. Convene a multisectoral technical working group to provide scientific and technical support to the TPAMB;

m. Order the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of National Defense, and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to
review the Visiting Forces Agreement and the Mutual Defense Treaty to consider whether their provisions allow for the exercise of erga omnes
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and for damages which follow from any violation of those rights;

n. Narrowly tailor the provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement for purposes of protecting the damaged areas of TRNP;

o. Declare the grant of immunity found in Article V ("Criminal Jurisdiction") and Article VI of the Visiting Forces Agreement unconstitutional for
violating equal protection and/or for violating the preemptory norm of nondiscrimination incorporated as part of the law of the land under
Section 2, Article II, of the Philippine Constitution;

p. Allow for continuing discovery measures;

q. Supervise marine wildlife rehabilitation in the Tubbataha Reefs in all other respects; and

4. Provide just and equitable environmental rehabilitation measures and such other reliefs as are just and equitable under the premises. 7
(Underscoring supplied.)

Since only the Philippine respondents filed their comment 8 to the petition, petitioners also filed a motion for early resolution and motion to proceed ex
parte against the US respondents. 9

Respondents' Consolidated Comment

In their consolidated comment with opposition to the application for a TEPO and ocular inspection and production orders, respondents assert that: ( 1)
the grounds relied upon for the issuance of a TEPO or writ of Kalikasan have become fait accompli as the salvage operations on the USS Guardian
were already completed; (2) the petition is defective in form and substance; (3) the petition improperly raises issues involving the VFA between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America; and ( 4) the determination of the extent of responsibility of the US Government as regards
the damage to the Tubbataha Reefs rests exdusively with the executive branch.

The Court's Ruling

As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute on the legal standing of petitioners to file the present petition.

Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." 10 Specifically, it is "a party's personal and substantial interest in a case
where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the act being challenged, and "calls for more than just a generalized grievance." 11
However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.12

In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 13 we recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time
in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law." We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be
written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it
is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.1âwphi1 Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment.14

On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to
sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations. Thus:

Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral,
land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present a:: well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full 1:njoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. 15 (Emphasis
supplied.)

The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which
allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct
interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature." 16

Having settled the issue of locus standi, we shall address the more fundamental question of whether this Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents
who did not submit any pleading or manifestation in this case.

The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the State, 17 is expressly provided in Article XVI
of the 1987 Constitution which states:

Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.

In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,18 we discussed the principle of state immunity from suit, as follows:

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now · expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally
accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. x x x.

Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation.
Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and
consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these
principles in its relations with other states.

As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that ''there can be no legal right against
the authority which makes the law on which the right depends." [Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349] There are other practical reasons for the
enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the
maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would,
in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." [De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171]

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state
for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,. such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must
be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. [Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120] In such a situation, the state
may move to dismiss the comp.taint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent. 19 (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the American Constitution, the doctrine is expressed in the Eleventh Amendment which reads:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals,20 we further expounded on the immunity of foreign states from the jurisdiction of local courts, as follows:

The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely identified with
the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of
state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit arc those of a foreign government
done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the
immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The
proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim -par in parem, non habet imperium
-that all states are soverr~ign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an
official would rec 1uire the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded. 21 (Emphasis
supplied.)

In the same case we also mentioned that in the case of diplomatic immunity, the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of the
territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction. 22

In United States of America v. Judge Guinto, 23 one of the consolidated cases therein involved a Filipino employed at Clark Air Base who was arrested
following a buy-bust operation conducted by two officers of the US Air Force, and was eventually dismissed from his employment when he was charged
in court for violation of R.A. No. 6425. In a complaint for damages filed by the said employee against the military officers, the latter moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that the suit was against the US Government which had not given its consent. The RTC denied the motion but on a petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed before this Court, we reversed the RTC and dismissed the complaint. We held that petitioners US military officers were
acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant and thereafter testified against him
at his trial. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their
principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.

This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without the former's consent or waiver has
evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (Jure imperil") from private, commercial and proprietary acts
(Jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity extends only to acts Jure imperii. The restrictive application of State
immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs.24

In Shauf v. Court of Appeals,25 we discussed the limitations of the State immunity principle, thus:

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As
was clearly set forth by JustiGe Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. : "Inasmuch as the State
authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials
or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of
immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State
department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an
unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the
State may not be sued without its consent." The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice.

xxxx

The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the
public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the
government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority
or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. 26 (Emphasis
supplied.) In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision
over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was
committed while they we:re performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial
actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore
bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.